Crossed Swords:
Divided Militaries and Politics in East Asia

by

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
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation proposes that militaries in developing states are usually deeply divided internally on domestic social, economic, and political issues. Contrary to the way the military is often portrayed, there is no single "military mind." Neither, however, are internal military divisions primarily idiosyncratic. Differences in composition and sociology endow different military services and branches with distinct domestic preferences. High-tech military organizations are more likely to support liberal socio-economic positions, while troop-oriented ones often embrace integral nationalism – a statist vision of development aimed at unifying the state by reducing economic and social differences.

These propositions are tested against the history of armies and navies in Thailand, China, and Indonesia since 1945, as well as additional evidence from Latin American, European, and other Asian states. The case studies examine coups, counter-coups, military-sponsored "mass" movements, and legislative battles involving uniformed officers. The historical evidence confirms the theory. Military services often take opposite sides in domestic disputes, with naval officers consistently backing more liberal socio-economic positions than their army colleagues, especially those from the infantry branch. The balance of power between contending military actors frequently determines national political trajectories for decades at a stretch.

These patterns of divided military involvement in politics carry critical implications for international security. The political leaders who emerge victorious from domestic battles often secure their military flank by giving substantial control over strategy and force planning to uniformed allies. Domestic politics, then, frequently have a decisive impact on strategic planning and produces policies that the consideration of external threats alone would not suggest.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Do military officers in developing states tend to have homogenous and unified political views that set them apart from those of civilians? Or are militaries more frequently internally divided on domestic issues? Is there, in other words, a single and distinctive military mind with regard to domestic policy? If the answer to this last question is "no," is it possible to find patterns? Do certain types of officers favor particular types of domestic ideologies or policies? Or are the differences between officers idiosyncratic? Finally, what effect do divided militaries and their involvement in politics have on political outcomes and military policy?

The answers to these questions bear on a number of larger policy-related and theoretical issues. They impinge, for example, on whether or how the United States can, in its "war on terror," engage with military officials in developing states without undermining liberal political, economic, and social values. For liberal reformers in the developing world, the answers to these questions are critical for evaluating the advisability of various types of strategies for controlling the military. Is it generally possible, for example, to find allies within the military to balance hostile elements, or will the military be largely united in its opposition? If liberal leaders do seek to build pro-reform coalitions within the military, where should they look for allies? In the longer term, is it possible to shift the political values of the military as a whole? For strategic analysts, meanwhile, questions about the relative unity of the military bear on the interpretation of military strategy and force structure. Do shifts in

military strategy necessary imply a changed perception of the external threat, or should domestic political events receive equal attention as possible causal explanations?

This thesis does not definitively answer all of these questions. But it does answer a critical subset of them, and in so doing, sheds additional light on the remainder. The thesis focuses most explicitly on four questions: (1) Do officers from different military services and branches have different domestic (economic, social, and political) preferences? (2) If they do, what are those preferences and how can they be explained? (3) What effects do these intra-military differences have on politics and political outcomes? And (4) what impact does the military's divided involvement in politics have on the types of military force structures and strategies chosen by political winners?

To assess these questions, this thesis examines the record of armies and navies in the politics of Thailand, China, and Indonesia. Contrary to the way the military officer corps is frequently treated, I find that officers do not tend to be unified in their domestic political thinking. They are, rather, frequently deeply divided. Most major political struggles in these states have not pitted "the military" against "the civilians," but rather contending civil-military coalitions against one another. And the political leaders that emerge victorious in these contests frequently reward their military partners by giving them first priority in military resource allocation and pride of place in establishing military strategy and doctrine.

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The findings suggest that the United States can engage more with militaries in the developing world without undermining liberal values, but only if it tailors its engagement appropriately. Liberal leaders in the developing world, for their part, can generally find military allies to balance hostile ones. And sudden shifts in military strategy – even including those accompanied by sudden buildups of military equipment of one type or another – do not necessarily imply changed perceptions of the external threat (much less actual changes). Before proceeding to summarize the dissertation's findings and implications in greater detail, I will first stipulate the specific propositions tested and methods used to guide the investigation.

Theory and Methods

THESIS: CIVIL-MILITARY COALITIONS AND STRATEGY

This dissertation tests the following thesis: Differences in composition and organization give different military services, branches, and functional groups distinct domestic preferences. In general, the more "technical" the organization, the more liberal its socio-economic preferences; the more "troop-oriented" the organization, the more prone toward integral nationalism – a vision of the common good based on equitable income distribution and state-led economic growth.[1] Crises that threaten the economic or political survival of major groups

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[1] Conceptually speaking, I would define "technical" organizations as those in which officers spend relatively more of their time addressing mechanical or analytical problems and relatively less time managing people. "Troop-oriented units organizations would be the reverse. I operationalize this based on the relative per capita capitalization of the organization. The more technical the organization, the higher its per capita capitalization will be. Although general staffs and some other "technical" organizations do not work primarily with machines (like air forces might be said to do), the technical nature of the analytical problems with which they deal will be reflected in high personnel costs (per capita), as well as relatively high spending on the telecommunications infrastructure that supports them.

in society and draw into the question the legitimacy of the state's political structures will lead

military organizations to form or be drawn into coalitions with like-minded civilian groups.

After the resolution of those crises, the military partners of the winning coalition will be given

broad authority over the definition of national military policy. The logic of the thesis is

presented in an arrow diagram in figure 1.1.

SCOPE AND BOUNDARIES OF INVESTIGATION

In order to assess the thesis systematically and make clear predictions, the thesis' scope is

limited in three ways.

- First, as suggested above, I restrict the scope of this thesis to events in the developing world. Although intra-military differences may also be evident in developed states, they are likely to be less pronounced than in developing ones.[2] Moreover, political circumstances in developing states will make the political views of military officers more important.[3]

- Second, in order to facilitate clear theory testing, predictions about the domestic preferences of military organizations are limited to those concerning two services, armies and navies. Some assessment is also made of groups within each of those services. The causal explanations offered to justify the thesis' predictions should nevertheless apply to those parts of the military not explicitly treated.[4]

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[2] Reflecting the situations in developing and developed militaries, the difference between the per capita capitalization of the services is generally considerably smaller – though still noticeable – in the militaries of latter than it is in the former.

[3] The military is more likely to be drawn into politics when there is general disagreement within the state over the fundamental legitimacy of political structures and practices. Developing states are significantly more prone to such disagreement than developed ones. There is a high correlation between national wealth and democratic governance, as there is between wealth and the propensity of militaries to intervene in politics. There are, of course, exceptions. Elements of the French army, for example, attempted a coup d'etat in 1961. It is worth noting that in that instance, intra-military differences had a critical impact on the course of the revolt. Air and naval elements, both of which opposed the coup, blocked the passage of rebellious troops from Algeria, the center of army dissent, to the French mainland.

[4] In general, I would expect air force officers to view domestic issues much as naval officers do. Navies were selected over air forces as the focus of comparison for two reasons. First, the air force's military capabilities are more specialized and less well rounded – at least for domestic missions – than are the navy's. Navies, even in

- Third, the discussion of domestic preferences is largely restricted to two competing socio-economic ideologies: integral nationalism and liberal nationalism. These are ideal types and do not represent all of the possible combinations or permutations of political, economic, and social belief-systems that might be encountered. Nevertheless, they capture the essential choices that confront leaders in most developing states: To what extent should the state attempt to guide the economy and regulate social activity, and to what extent should it depend on markets and free society?

Note that although these ideologies may be related to the question of elections and electoral democracy, they do not correspond neatly with them. The possibility that one service supports electoral democracy is considered but rejected in Chapter 2 as overly simplistic at best and wrong at worst. For the sake of full disclosure, I do believe that values liberal economic and social orders are more consistent with electoral democracy than are those associated with integral nationalism. Full participation in today's globalized economy demands transparency and accountability and therefore tends to support democratic governance. But the association between liberal economics and democratic governance is not absolute, and each case must be evaluated on its merits.

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developing states, generally include ground, air, and sea components. Air forces, on the other hand, usually have minimal if any ground and sea components. Hence, even if their preferences differed, the tactical situation may not often allow air force officers to act on their preferences. Second, aircraft are of modern origin and, even in the militaries of the great powers, air forces were confined within army air corps until long after that. Air forces are, in other words, of much more recent origin than navies. Until recently, the senior officer corps of many air forces had been educated in army academies and should therefore be expected to hold world views less divergent from their army classmates. We should, however, expect to find the political values of air force officers converge with those of the navy within two or three decades of their institutional independence from the army.

Figure 1.1: Arrow Diagram of the Civil-Military Coalition Theory

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┌──────────────┐
│ Organizational│
│ Structure of the│
│ Service       │
└──────────────┘
   │      ╲
   │       ╲  Service
   ▼        ╲ Ideology
┌──────────────┐
│ Political     │
│ Preferences of the│
│ Services      │
└──────────────┘
   │
   ▼                    Civilian Groups
┌──────────────┐          ↙
│ Civil-Military│  ←── Domestic Crises
│ Coalitions    │
└──────────────┘
   │      │
   │      ▼
   │   ┌──────────────┐     Int'l Environment
   │   │ Outcome of political│  ←──
   │   │ battles between │
   │   │ civil-mil coalitions│  Tactics of Both
   │   └──────────────┘     ↙  Sides
   │      │
   ▼      ▼
┌──────────────┐
│ Military Strategy│
│ Chosen by     │
│ National Leaders│
└──────────────┘
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
PREDICTIONS
Four specific predictions are tested:

(1) Navies will support liberal nationalist positions, whereas armies will frequently support integral nationalist ones.

Integral nationalism posits that sustainable economic, social, and political development depends on national unity and that national unity, in turn, requires development be balanced across regions and that incomes be relatively evenly distributed – conditions requiring a high level of state intervention in the economy and society. Liberal nationalism, in contrast, believes that market forces with minimal government intervention best deliver sustainable development.

Note that the labels used here (integral and integral nationalist) represent worldviews, rather than self-conscious ideologies. In other words, individual officers do not identify themselves as "integral nationalist" or "liberal nationalist." But their actions and rhetoric (both written and spoken) will reflect the domestic priorities and values outlined above.

The domestic preferences of officers from both services are driven primarily, if largely indirectly, by the types of capital used by each. Naval officers, even in developing states, work with high-tech equipment and relatively skilled enlisted personnel. Their service thrives when the coastal, urban economy does well. Naval officers therefore favor the relatively open economic policies that tend to favor those parts of the economy.

For armies in the developing world, soldiers are the organizations' primary capital, and soldiers in these states are generally conscripted from their nations' rural (and therefore interior) social base. Anything that causes serious dislocation or hardship in the rural economy is likely to affect morale and cohesion at the unit level. Army officers will, therefore, favor state-led developmental strategies that offer to protect disadvantaged (especially rural) parts of the population and economy while growing the economy.

Differences in the social and educational background of the officers themselves, as well as in how they are socialized early in their careers will, for a variety of reasons, reinforce the preferences discussed above.

(2) Because navies are more homogenous than armies (for example, in terms of the educational and experiential background of their officers), navies will tend to be more internally unified in their domestic preferences than armies. But although armies are frequently divided in terms of their domestic preferences,

they will almost invariably contain elements sympathetic to integral nationalist positions.

(3) When politics becomes highly polarized, armies and navies will form or be drawn into coalitions with like-minded civilian groups – armies with civilian integral nationalists and navies with other liberal elements (most notably, with members of the upper-middle class). Relatively strong naval forces will, all things being equal, make liberal victories in domestic political battles more likely.

(4) The leaders of winning coalitions will, in order to protect their position against counterattack, promote their military partners to top military posts. That, in turn, will enable the winning coalition's military partners to advance their own organizational interests. Hence, victories by liberals are likely to see the rise of naval forces and strategies, while victories by integral nationalist coalitions will result in the strengthening of continental forces.

CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY

The above predictions are derived in part from the empirical evidence in Latin America as well as from principles associated with organization theory and other work on the domestic sources of grand strategy. Given their empirical bases in Latin American cases, testing should ideally be – and is – conducted on a different set of cases.[5] This thesis tests the above predictions against the post-World War II record of three East Asian states: Thailand, China, and Indonesia. The three Asian cases selected provide substantial variation in several aspects: the specific nature of their regime type, the historical origins of their military institutions, and

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[5] There is disagreement on the necessity of using different data sets to generate and test theories. King, Keohane, and Verba argue for its necessity. Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994). Van Evera argues since the researcher will almost always start with some knowledge of his cases, having one or two data sets is largely irrelevant. Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 45. My position here is simply that demonstrating the utility of the theory in two regions (even if only briefly in the case of Latin America) provides additional support for the theory.

their strategic situations. These variations allow the theory to be tested under a variety of domestic and international circumstances.

I examine several political crises in each state, all pitting integral and liberal nationalists against one another in struggles for control of the state. A total of eight cases are examined. For each, I code the domestic choices available to the military actors as either liberal or integral nationalist; determine which of these options was chosen by each of the services; and examine why and how military strategies and force structures changed (if they did) after the resolution of the crisis. Wherever possible, the services' logic behind their political-economic choices is examined and analyzed.[6] Where direct evidence of motivation is missing, the choices themselves are assessed as either consistent with liberal nationalism or integral nationalism, and whatever circumstantial evidence might suggest values or motivations is summarized.[7] For each case, I consider two alternative theories. First, a theory based on the services' material or parochial interests – in contrast to the more highly articulated logic suggested by my own theory – is evaluated as a competing explanation for the services' domestic preferences. And second, a threat based theory for strategic change is considered as an alternative explanation for strategic change. Ultimately, I find that although

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[6] For the most part, this is more possible in the more recent cases than in the earlier cases, where English language source material is sparse. The early Chinese case is an exception, since I was able to use Chinese language materials.

[7] Process tracing is employed in these cases and in several cases yields critical clues. On process tracing, see Alexander L. George and Timothy J. Mckeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making," *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations* 2 (1985). King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, 226-28. Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 64-67.

some aspects of the cases are consistent with the competitor theories, the evidence provides

substantially stronger support for the civil-military coalition theory.

Empirical Findings

Post-World War II East Asian domestic politics has been characterized by three "waves": a

brief period of experimentation with liberal politics during the late 1940s and early 1950s; a

shift to state-led integral nationalist government during the late 1950s and 1960s; and a liberal

revival beginning in the 1980s.[8] Although this characterization fits the region's non-

communist states – including, among others, Thailand and Indonesia – more obviously than

its communist ones, even China experienced analogous relative shifts in its ruling ideology.

Political and economic moderates (closer to the liberal end of the political-economic spectrum

than their rivals) held sway during the 1950s and again after 1978; Mao Zedong and the Gang

of Four (all of whom were closer to the integral nationalist ideal) dominated during the

interim.

The evidence from these cases provides strong support for the predictions associated

with my thesis. Naval officers supported liberal economic, social, and domestic systems, both

in the immediate postwar period and again during the 1980s and 1990s, and they resisted the

transition to integral nationalist rule during the intervening period. Although armies were

frequently divided, their officers provided the most important backing for integral nationalist

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[8] On the general subject of historical political waves, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, Okl.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). On waves in East Asia over the postwar period, see Mingxin Pei, "The Fall and Rise of Democracy in East Asia," in *Democracy in East Asia*, ed. Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

rulers during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and many of their officers subsequently resisted liberal economic and political reform. In each case, new civilian elites promoted their own supporters within the military, resulting in the rise of naval leaders, forces, and doctrines during the postwar period, the demise of those forces and doctrines during the 1960s and 1970s, and the reemergence of naval strength since the 1980s.

THAILAND

Since 1932, the Thai navy has been closely associated with the nation's liberal leadership – sometimes at great material cost to its own short-term interests. The army has been divided: line officers, who dominated the army from 1947 to 1980, backed integral nationalist programs, while general staff and technical officers opposing them. Naval fortunes have risen and fallen with the tides of liberalism.

OVERTHROWING NATIONAL SOCIALISM, 1938-47. In 1938, the army's General Phibun Songgram established a national socialist state (consistent with integral nationalism) in Thailand and aligned the state with Imperial Japan. Immediately following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, prominent prewar liberal parliamentary leaders organized a resistance movement against Phibun's regime. The navy's high command formed a core element of that opposition. General Phibun was overthrown in 1944, and the nation's new liberal leaders were quick to reward the navy. Between 1944 and 1946, naval budgets increased by 50 percent, while the army's was reduced by 40 percent.

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RESISTANCE TO MILITARY RULE, 1947-73. In 1947 mid-level army officers overthrew the freely elected government. The navy then launched three countercoup attempts, all of which failed. After the failure of the third in 1951, army leaders "restructured" the navy, stripping it of combat aircraft, armor, police functions, and most of its marine corps. Suspicious of both "big" capitalists and parliamentary democracy (the two of which they believed were linked), army officers established an integral nationalist state. In place of liberal freedoms, they promoted the idea of "balanced" development – i.e., development under which the gap between regions, ethnic groups, and social classes would narrow rather than widen. The navy, however, continued to cooperate with liberals in parliament until its abolition in 1958.

LIBERALISM'S FALSE START, 1973-80. In October 1973, student protesters demanded that the military government step down. Some army elements attempted suppression, while the navy, air force, and other army elements backed the students. With the threat of civil war, the king intervened to oust the nation's army rulers. The new prime minister appointed the navy's commander as supreme commander and, later, minister of defense. Between 1973 and 1976, well-organized student groups became more radical and threatened both the nation's capitalist economic system, as well as the new civilian leaders' ability to govern effectively. Naval leaders, with the strong support of Thailand's middle class, led a joint-service group of senior officers in overthrowing civilian rule. Unlike past coup leaders, however, this group quickly promulgated a new constitution and Thailand then made a slow but steady transition to democracy.

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This case supports the proposition that when a system of electoral democracy appears inconsistent with the preservation of liberal economic values, the navy will frequently choose free markets over political democracy. It also supports the proposition that the navy will almost invariably be aligned with the middle class, especially the upper middle class, whether or not the latter supports democracy at any particular point in time. As the events below illustrates, the navy, as well as the middle class, swung once again to liberal politics after the imminent threat to liberal economic values has passed.

LIBERAL TRANSITION AND CONSOLIDATION, 1980-2002. The navy worked with pro-business Democrat Party and army general staff officers to defend the new transitional regime against threats by hardline army line officers. Naval officers were promoted to top positions in the military hierarchy (including supreme commander), and the government approved contracts for a major expansion of the navy's fleet. In 1991 army officers succeeded in overthrowing civilian government. The following year, however, protesters again demanded an end to military rule. When army units fired on protesters in May 1992, the navy shielded protesters from attack by the army and paramilitaries. After the restoration of democratic rule, parliament approved new contracts for naval hardware, as well as new military doctrines emphasizing the importance of sea power.

CHINA

In China the struggle between Communist Party moderates, who would allow room for individual economic and social difference, and hard-line leftists, who would eliminate such differences, mirrored the conflict between liberals and integral nationalists (respectively) in

other East Asian states. The navy was closely associated with political moderates during the 1950s and early 1960s and was purged by leftists within the Party during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). After the Cultural Revolution, the navy, in contrast to much of the army, provided strong and unified political support to Deng Xiaoping and his effort to implement policies of reform and opening.

FROM LIBERATION TO THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (1953-1976). For much of the first part of this period, Party moderates, who were relatively liberal in the Chinese context, were largely in control of domestic policy. Military policy was in the hands of technocrats, strongly backed by the civilian moderates. The navy prospered, establishing its first destroyer squadron in 1954 and launching its first domestically produced destroyer in 1956. And the navy's leadership, unlike many army commanders, enthusiastically embraced the call for reconciliation with intellectuals (i.e., college educated individuals) and even former members of the Nationalist government.

In 1966 Mao and leftist hardliners launched the Cultural Revolution and purged Party moderates. The radicals who ascended to power intensely distrusted the navy for both its lack of political correctness and its close ties with political moderates. The radicals limited the navy's access to resources, closed most of its schools, encouraged the lower ranks to report on their superiors, and reassigned officers from the army to establish a shadow command within the navy. But the navy's professional leadership remained hostile to the leftists' program. And its senior officers took a prominent role in the showdown with, and arrest of, the Gang of Four in 1976.

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THE NAVY BACKS REFORM AND OPENING, 1978-92. The army was thoroughly

divided after the end of the Cultural Revolution, and many of its officers fiercely opposed the

program of liberal economic and social reform undertaken by Deng Xiaoping. The navy, on

the other hand, was united in support of it. In the mid-1980s, for example, naval officers were

prominent in the defense of opening China's coastal cities to foreigners and foreign

investment, while many in the army were sharply critical of the social consequences of that

opening. Naval officers were promoted to top positions in the military and even Communist

Party hierarchy, and they used those positions to defend Deng and his program from political

attack. Throughout the 1980s and most of the 1990s military resource allocation saw a

relative shift away from the army and towards the navy.

INDONESIA

The Indonesian navy enjoyed privileged access to resources during the Sukarno period,

experienced a troubled relationship with Suharto between 1967 and 1998, and firmly backed

students and the middle class in their calls for liberal reform in 1998 and 1999. The effects of

domestic politics on military strategy have created what, from a realist perspective, appears to

be a strategic riddle. The army maintained unquestioned first priority throughout the 1980s

and most of the 1990s, even after the defeat of most separatist movements and the rise of

other regional navies. After 1998, the navy became dominant, despite the reemergence of

separatism and the improvement of Indonesia's relationship with China and other regional

states.

THE NAVY FROM INDEPENDENCE TO SUHARTO, 1949-1978. Indonesia's army and navy shared common military and domestic views in the immediate post-independence period. They began to diverge, however, during the late 1950s. Technically oriented Dutch-trained officers remained in control of the navy. In the army, however, Japanese-trained officers, who came from less-prosperous families, gained the upper hand. Many of these officers believed that developmental work should be the military's top priority.

The army, against strong protest from the navy, removed Sukarno from power in 1967, and the new president, General Suharto, adopted explicitly integral nationalist policies. Military strategy was adjusted to emphasize economic and social development. The new doctrine of "total people's defense" called, among other things, for one sergeant and one assistant to be stationed in every one of Indonesia's villages and for an expansion of the army's civil action program. The navy resisted participation in Suharto's integral nationalist programs. It soon found itself with reduced access to funds, and by 1984 its fleet had been reduced to less than one third of its 1966 size.

THE NAVY AND THE MIDDLE CLASS, 1978-2002. In response to economic problems (specifically declining state revenues from oil exports) Suharto lifted some restrictions on the economy and society during the mid- and late 1980s. Much to the chagrin of Indonesia's small but growing middle class, however, he clamped down again during the early 1990s. In May 1998, student protests and a hostile populace convinced Suharto to resign in favor of Vice President B.J. Habibie. The Democratic Party, a liberal and largely middle class party, demanded that new parliamentary elections be held before the selection of a new president,

and protests continued. Army commanders threatened protesters with a Tiananmen-like crackdown. The navy's representatives in parliament, on the other hand, defected en masse from the ruling party (Golkar) to the Democrats. In November 1998, paramilitary units backed by the army, fired on students. The navy then deployed marines to march with and protect the party's supporters. Habibie stepped down shortly thereafter, and the new president chose a naval officer as commander of the military, the first non-army officer ever appointed to the post.

SUMMARY

In each of the above cases, naval officers proved significantly more supportive of liberal policies, especially economic ones, than most of their army counterparts. Although armies were, unlike navies, generally divided on domestic issues, officers who favored integral nationalist policies have dominated army hierarchies for much of the period since World War II. In many instances, naval and army units mobilized to confront one another over domestic issues, and in several cases, confrontations resulted in skirmishes or even more significant fighting. Apart from the provision of blunt force, military allies in domestic coalitions performed a variety of other services. They provided intelligence on rivals, served as patriotic banners to prove the nationalism of their political allies, and offered direct political support in their capacity as parliamentary or party members. Shifts in doctrine have followed close on the heels of major political crises. Integral nationalist victories have presaged the primacy of armies and continental strategies (even in archipelagic states), while liberal victories have brought maritime strategies (even in continental states).

Theoretical and Policy Implications

This thesis has both broad and specific implications for the collective understanding of

organization theory, civil-military relations, and grand strategy.

There is no single, uniform "military mind." But neither are differences in the

political values of military officers idiosyncratically determined. The lack of uniformity –

and the existence of officers sympathetic to liberal policy – suggests that liberal reformers in

developing states should generally be able to find allies within the military. The search for

military allies will of course compete with other demands for the attention of leaders already

busy trying to consolidate their hold and overhaul the domestic system. But the existence of

patterns implies that, with an understanding of what those patterns are, finding military allies

will be easier than might otherwise be imagined. Liberal leaders are likely to find supporters

within the military's high-tech services and branches, and those supporters, in turn, will

frequently mobilize their organizations in defense of liberal change or consolidation.

This thesis suggests that the structure, composition, and mission of organizations have

a major impact on their culture and values. This finding does not necessarily imply that it is

impossible to influence the political values of military organizations by direct methods, such

as adjustments to their academic curriculum. But it does suggest that it should also be

possible to influence the political values of military organizations by manipulating their

structure and composition. And under many circumstances, this approach may be politically

or practically more expedient than the more direct approach. Modernizing the army,

streamlining it, replacing conscription with volunteer soldiers, and eliminating territorial-oriented defense structures will tend to diminish patrimonial, integral nationalist sentiment. And many of these changes will be welcomed by much, if not all, of the army's senior leadership. A direct attempt to influence the officers' formal political doctrines, on the other hand, may be regarded as a direct challenge to the military's institutional autonomy.

These findings suggest, by extension, that United States can engage with the militaries of developing states without undermining liberal values, but only if it does so judiciously and with an understanding of how military structure and organization affects values. The United States should consider targeting its engagement with those elements most likely to be sympathetic to liberal causes. And it should use its military aid budgets to encourage the kinds of structural changes mentioned above: the reduction of conscription, upgrading equipment, and phasing out territorial organization.

Finally the thesis suggests that analysts seeking to understand shifts military strategies in developing states should examine domestic political circumstances as well as external events or ambitions as potential explanations.[9] In the context of developing states in Asia, the thesis supports a central conclusion drawn by Jack Snyder from his study of historical

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[9] Currently, there is little literature on the specific relationship between politics and grand strategy in these states. This deficiency in the literature is particularly curious, given both the understanding that domestic politics should play a major role in determining the grand strategies of these states and the nature of the direct and indirect threats to American security interests today (i.e., largely emanating from developing states). There are exceptions. On Asia see, for example, Muthiah Alagappa, *The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand* (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House Publishing, 1987). See also the works in the Alagappa's edited volume: Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998). For a treatment of Middle Eastern cases, see James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequence in the Middle East," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999).

European cases: State leaders in rapidly evolving states frequently bend all aspects of national policy to balance against pressing threats to their regime – whether those threats are domestic or internal. The thesis shows that efforts to balance against military elements that threaten the regime often have a decisive impact on force structures and military strategy. What has been explained as a competitively motivated naval arms buildup in East Asia over the last fifteen years, for example, should more accurately be described as the military by-product of political liberalization across the region and its associated military politics.[10]

Chapter Outline

This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 2 (Literature Review) first summarizes existing statements on differences in the army and navy's domestic preferences and behavior, finds that existing works are not supported by events in Latin America (where the secondary source literature is particularly rich), and proposes an alternative argument. It then reviews the more general literature on civil-military relations, organization theory, and domestic sources of grand strategy and comments on where this thesis' approach borrows from existing work or differs from it. Chapter 3 (Theory) establishes the thesis' predictions and methodology in more detail. Chapters 4-6 each examine the historical record of a single state. Each of these chapters is divided into a discussion of two or more cases. Chapter 7

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[10] For works that treat the naval buildup as largely driven by threat and insecurity see Paul Mann, "Arms Races Likely When Asia Recovers," *Aviation Week and Space Technology* 156, no. 9 (2002). Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (1993/94); Paul Dibb, "Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads," *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 1 (2001); Michael T. Klare, "The Next Great Arms Race," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993).

(Conclusions) summarizes the results of the eight cases, discusses the theoretical and policy implications of this work, and highlights areas for future research.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Conceptually, this thesis has two components: one that examines the domestic preferences of military services, and one that looks at the effects of those preferences on coalitional conflict, domestic outcomes, and national military and strategic policy. (See figure 2.1.) This discussion of the existing literature is therefore divided into a review of work most relevant to each of these components. In the first instance, I address the literature on civil-military relations; in the second, I treat works on domestic sources of grand strategy. In each case, I highlight the areas from which I have borrowed, as well as those areas where I diverge from existing approaches.

The specific lens used in this thesis to examine more general questions about service preferences and coalitional politics – and the specific propositions tested in the case studies – focuses on army-navy differences and the involvement of both in politics. Before moving on to the general literature review outlined above, therefore, I offer an assessment of the existing literature on the role of navies in politics. I address two specific questions. First, is the navy more pro-democratic than the army? Second, can the navy be a competitive 'player' in domestic political or military struggles? These questions merit separate and extended discussion for two reasons. First, as I explain below, the currently accepted answers to these questions, which suggest that no generalizations can be made, partly explain the larger lack of recent efforts to generalize about the political predilections of all types of military

organizations. A second and related reason is that, as a near ideal type technical service,

patterns that prove true for the navy should apply, to one degree or another, to other technical

military services and branches.

Figure 2.1: Component Parts of the Theory

	Independent Variable	Intermediate Variable	Dependent Variable
Component 1	Organizational Structure of the Services	Interests, Socialized Biases, and Ideology	Domestic Political Preferences of the Services
Component 2	Domestic Preferences of the Services	Contending Civil-Military Coalitions	Outcome of Challenges to the Domestic Order	Mil Strategy Chosen by New Leaders

Navies in Politics

Although many authors have touched on the political role of navies in case studies of individual countries, there has been little if any attempt in the recent past to treat the subject systematically in a comparative fashion.[11] This omission neglects an area that should provide good leverage on a number of larger questions in the field of civil-military relations. For example, the lack of systematic comparison forgoes opportunities to study the effects of organizational variables on the military's domestic values while holding national political and cultural variables constant.

This window on civil-military relations has not been left closed without reason. Two analytical judgments explain this gap in the literature. The first is that early conceptions of the navy as pro-democratic proved unsustainable during the mid-20th century. Navies took inconsistent positions on democratic rule. Consequently, the motivation to study navies in politics lagged. In the second instance, many analysts have ruled that navies do not have the military capacity to be significant domestic political actors. Hence, regardless of their domestic preferences, navies would not prove worthy of study. But as I show below, plausible generalizations about the domestic preferences of navies can be made, and the navy can be – and frequently is – a powerful force in domestic political disputes.

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[11] Individual works that devote substantial space to comparing armies and navies in individual cases include: Kyoshi Ikeda, *Kaigun to Nihon* (Tokyo: Chukoshinsho, 1981). Jonathan Steinberg, *Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet* (London: MacDonald and Co., 1968). William W. Cormack, *Revolution and Political Conflict in the French Navy, 1789-1794* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Other sources that discuss differences more briefly are cited throughout this chapter.

THE NAVY AND DEMOCRACY

Probably the longest-standing hypothesis about the services in politics is that naval forces

favor the development of constitutional, democratic rule, while armies have inherently

antidemocratic tendencies. This idea, in its simplest form, is found in the 4th century work of

Aristotle:

> "Where the territory is suitable for the use of cavalry, there is favorable
> ground for the construction of a strong form of oligarchy.... [I]t is only men of
> large means who can afford to breed and keep horses.... Light armed troops
> and the navy are wholly on the side of democracy."[12]

In 1906, during a period when military technology and organization were more comparable to

our contemporary era, Otto Hintze advanced a similar argument:

> "Land forces are a kind of organization that permeates the whole body of the
> state and gives it a military cast.... Sea power lacks all feudal vestiges. To an
> eminent degree it serves the interests of trade and industry. Its place is with
> the modern forces in life, simply by virtue of the vital importance that
> technology and capital have in its development. Sea power is allied with
> progressive forces, whereas land forces are tied to conservative tendencies."[13]

Echoing Hintze's commentary, students of British history have also highlighted the role that

military format – especially the reliance on a large navy and a small professional army – has

played in preserving English liberties. Even through the 19th century, many in the English

parliament distrusted their own army, preferring to fund a "safer" naval establishment.[14]

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[12] As quoted in Samuel E. Finer, "State and Nation-Building in Europe: The Role of the Military," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), 84.

[13] Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 214.

[14] Hew Strachan, *The politics of the British Army* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997).

The apparent credibility of the idea that navies tend to serve as a bulwark for democracy, however, was destroyed by a series of naval-led coups d'etat in the Southern Cone of Latin America from the 1950s to the 1970s. Naval officers either executed or played leading roles in antidemocratic coups d'etat in Brazil in 1954, 1955, 1961, and 1964; in Argentina in 1962 (twice), 1963, and 1976; and in Chile in 1973. Although the navy had support from army elements in many of these cases, it was, according to the secondary source literature, the most committed element in all of these instances. Moreover, in a majority of these cases, part or all of the army remained loyal to the government. Given this history, Latin American navies gained a reputation as being, in direct contradiction of Hintze's earlier argument, "less progressive" than armies.[15] But Latin American navies have also, on many other occasions, either defended democracy against military threats or championed the restoration of electoral democracy where it had been suspended.[16] Given the apparent inconsistency in naval positions, it is perhaps not surprising that several scholars of civil-military relations have treated navies as just another military faction pursuing its own interests without regard to ideology or domestic program.[17]

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[15] John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1964), 237. Bruce W. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), 63.

[16] The Argentine navy led or participated prominently in countercoups (against military rulers) in 1944, 1945, and 1955. And in Brazil, the navy stood (unsuccessfully) against an army coup in 1937 and participated (successfully) in an effort to oust two military-led governments, once in 1945 and once during the 1970s. And during the 1980s, the Brazilian navy was more active in supporting a return to the barracks than was the army.

[17] Despite some discussion of service and branch differences, both Finer and Farcau conclude that neither armies nor navies have consistent ideologies. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military*, 53-86. Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962), 290.

But a reexamination of the secondary literature on civil-military relations in Latin America and elsewhere points in another direction: Navies appear to have taken a consistent stand on questions relating to the economic and social organization of the state – even if they have not taken a consistent position on the issue of electoral democracy. Specifically, they have backed leaders with liberal economic and social agendas (i.e., those who support market economics, free trade, private property, and private freedoms), and they have opposed integral nationalists. Armies tend to be deeply divided, but almost inevitably, some elements (and sometimes most) of that service will favor integral nationalist leaders and positions. These patterns of service preferences apply whether the government is democratically elected or holding power by authoritarian means.

Here, I illustrate that observation with brief summaries of the navy's post-World War II political involvement in several Latin American states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela) and several other cases (Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Imperial Japan). While not systematic or detailed enough to represent a test of the above propositions in their own right these summaries provide sufficient bases for formulating predictions that can be tested against more a more detailed treatment of other cases.

In Argentina during the 1940s and early 1950s, the navy opposed Juan Peron and other populist army officers who seized power in a 1943 coup d'etat. Peron's government instituted state-led import substitution industrialization programs, nationalized much of Argentina's private industry, and organized social groups in hierarchical corporatist organizations. Peron himself was fond of saying that "Mussolini was the greatest man of our times, but he made

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some disastrous mistakes," and Peron's "Decalogue of Workers' Rights" mimicked the

Fascist Carta del Lavoro.[18] The navy took a prominent role in abortive countercoups designed

to remove Peron in February 1944, October 1945, and June 1955. A final effort in September

1955 succeeded. Having ostensibly defended electoral democracy against Juan Peron, the

navy then proceeded for the next two decades to intervene against "Peronistas" – who were,

in these cases, democratically elected proponents of policies originally instituted by Peron.

Both before and after Peron's fall, the army was divided, with many officers sympathetic to

his pro-labor position and state-led development programs.[19]

In Brazil too the navy opposed a populist army leader (Getulio Vargas), who captured

power in a coup d'etat and established a neo-fascist corporatist order (the *Estado Novo* or

New State) in 1937. Having been unseated by a conservative coalition in 1945, Vargas was

elected to the presidency five years later. But the Brazilian navy contested his return,

regardless of its constitutional basis. And after the navy's meddling pushed Vargas to suicide

in 1950, the navy continued to intervene against the elected heirs to Vargas' ideas. In 1964

Joao Goulart, a Social Democrat and Vargas' former minister of labor, won the presidency in

a landslide. The navy revolted and, together with two of the army's field armies, defeated two

other field armies that had remained loyal to the president. Goulart was ousted and the

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[18] David Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History and Its Impact* (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California, 1993), 145.

[19] On Argentina, see Marvin Goldwert, *Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966* (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1972). Edwin Lieuwen, *Generals versus Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964). Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History and Its Impact*. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Permanent Crisis and the Failure to Create a Democratic Regime: Argentina, 1955-66," in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America*, ed. Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).

military assumed direct control of the state. By the mid-1970s, however, after the Social

Democrats had been thoroughly suppressed (and after the army's dominant *duro* faction had

demonstrated its economic nationalist tendencies), the navy threw its support behind the more

liberal *Sorbonne* army faction and its calls for a withdrawal to the barracks.[20]

In Chile the navy, having been courted by civilian business groups, spearheaded the

successful effort to oust the socialist president, Salvador Allende in 1973. Army units

ultimately participated in the coup, and the army's General Augusto Pinochet led the junta

afterwards. But the navy conducted the coup's early planning and was far more united and

aggressive in its opposition to Allende.[21]

Events in Venezuela in April 2002 displayed a similar pattern. In November 2001,

senior naval officers began conspiring with prominent business groups and some dissident

army elements to overthrow of President Hugo Chavez, an outspoken populist and former

colonel in the paratroop corps. After his election in 1998, Chavez, attacking the existing

constitution as "oligarchic," had pushed through a referendum establishing a new one.

Among other provisions, Chavez' new constitution tightened the national grip on industry and

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[20] On the Brazilian case, see Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America.* Lieuwen, *Generals versus Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America.* Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military.* Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988). Robert Hayes, *The Armed Nation: The Brazilian Corporatist Mystique* (Tampe, Arizona: Arizona State University Press, 1989).

[21] On Pinochet's role, see Pinochet initially hung back and refused to take the lead. Mary Helen Spooner, *Soldiers in a Narrow Land: The Pinochet Regime in Chile* (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1994). Nathaniel Davis, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co., 1985). Pamela Constable and Arturo Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991). On the role of business and the middle class, see also Jon Lee Anderson, "The Dictator," *The New Yorker*, October 19 1998.

guaranteeing state pensions for all. The navy-backed anti-Chavez coup, launched on April 11, 2002, was ultimately unsuccessful, but the rebels did succeed in temporarily installing the president of the chamber of commerce, Pedro Carmona, as the president of the nation. Carmona promptly selected senior naval officers to fill two key cabinet posts.[22]

Non-Latin American historical cases also demonstrate that navies defend liberal economic and social policies against more nationalist policies in those areas – even if they do not necessarily defend democracy. In the oldest case considered here, many French naval officers welcomed the early liberal phase of the French Revolution of 1789. But even the purged rump of its officer corps opposed the radical Jacobin turn in 1792, and in 1793 a third of the French fleet defected to England at Toulon.[23] The army, in contrast, proved loyal to the Jacobins after a less thorough purge of its officers, and it crushed revolts both near Toulon and in the Vendee. In Germany between 1870 and 1918, senior naval officers refused to even discuss a pro-Imperial putsch and overthrowing parliament – a scenario widely and frequently discussed by army officers. In late 1918, however, with pro-socialist sentiment running high throughout the country, Admiral Alfred Tirpitz threw in the navy's lot with Eric Ludendorff

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[22] On the coup in Venezuela, see Scott Wilson, "Clash of Visions Pushed Venezuela Toward Coup: Admiral and President Were Old Rivals", *Washington Post*, April 21 2002. Juan Forero, "In Venezuela, Chavez Starts Shuffling Disloyal Officers", *New York Times*, April 19 2002; "Venezuela: President Carmona Appoints New Cabinet", *Globovision Television*, April 12 2002, in FBIS-LAP-2002-0413. "Deposed Venezuelan President Moved to Naval Base", *RNE Radio*, April 13 2002, in FBIS-EUP-2002-0413. Juan Forero, "Venezuela's President vs. Military: Is Breach Widening?" *New York Times*, March 19 2002.

[23] Cormack, *Revolution and Political Conflict in the French Navy, 1789-1794*. T. C. W. Blanning, *The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802, Modern wars* (London: Arnold, 1996); Ernest Harold Jenkins, *A history of the French navy, from its beginnings to the present day* ([London]: Macdonald & Jane's, 1973), 196-200.

to impose direct military rule.[24] And in Japan the naval ministry resisted the army's more

radical proposals to nationalize the economy and took significantly firmer measures against

military terror – including the February 1936 coup attempt. Senior naval officers enjoyed a

rapport with liberal parliamentary parties not shared with their army counterparts.[25]

A review of qualitative descriptions of navies in politics (as opposed to the event-

driven investigation above) reveals two things. First, words such as "democratic,"

"conservative," and "progressive" are – not surprisingly – used inconsistently in the literature,

adding to the sense many have that it is impossible to generalize about service preferences.

But second, if one looks more closely at the descriptions of naval preferences in individual

cases, their context, and their economic as opposed to political content, clear patterns emerge.

Navies defend market economics, private property, and individual rights, while armies push

more actively for social equity and state leadership over the economy and society.

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[24] On German naval liberalism during the 19th century, see Eckart Kehr, *Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy* (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1997); Steinberg, *Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet*. On the German army, see Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (London: Oxford University Press, 1955). On the 1918 coup, see Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

[25] There are no adequate English-language works on the politics of the pre-war Japanese navy. For the best Japanese treatment – and one of the best treatments on naval politics in any country, see Ikeda, *Kaigun to Nihon*. For a popular translated treatment of some of these themes, see Agawa Hiryuki, *The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1979). See also Oide Hisashi, *Yonai Mitsumasa: Showa Saiko no Kaigun Taisho* (Tokyo: Tokuma Bunsho, 1993). Inoue Shigeyoshi Denki Kankokai, *Inoue Shigeyoshi* (Tokyo: Inoue Shigeyoshi Denki Kankokai, 1982). Oide Hisashi, *Yonai Mitsumasa: Showa Saiko no Kaigun Taisho*.

Examples of such qualitative descriptions reveal both truths:

- Edwin Lieuwen writes of the Argentine military "The Navy's democratic traditions, albeit of the classical Greek, privileged-class type, conflicted with Peron's [and the army's] proletarian oriented authoritarianism."[26]

- Ikeda Kyoshi reports on the prewar Japanese case that, "In contrast to the army, which was made up largely of farmers and had a 'democratic' if militant character, stood naval 'liberalism.'" The navy's ideology was, he argues "cosmopolitan, without roots in the realities of Japanese politics."[27]

- John Johnson remarks that "Brazilians are sure, and with some reason, that the navy is the most aristocratic of the three services and that the army 'represents the country better and is more progressive-minded.'"[28]

- Scott Wilson says the Venezuelan navy today is "urban" and "conservative," while the army is "rural" and "socialist." In an interview, Venezuelan naval admiral and former national security advisor, Carlos Molina, says simply: "I am the middle class."[29]

- Writing about Germany during the late 19th century, Jonathan Steinberg states: "That the German Navy was a child of German liberalism and the Revolution of 1848 is simply a fact." He calls it "the most thoroughly bourgeois, liberal institution in the country."[30]

Whether or not the navy is described as "aristocratic" (in Argentina or Brazil) or "bourgeois" (in Germany or Venezuela), or whether it is described as "liberal" (in Germany or Japan) or "conservative" (in Venezuela), these navies are all connected -- in attitude, politics, and, frequently, family origin – to those elements that dominate the internationally competitive segments of the economy. Whether or not navies are said to be "democratic" or

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[26] Lieuwen, *Generals versus Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America*, 15.

[27] Ikeda, *Kaigun to Nihon*, 28.

[28] Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America*, 237.

[29] Wilson, "Clash of Visions Pushed Venezuela Toward Coup: Admiral and President Were Old Rivals".

[30] Steinberg, *Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet*, 36, 46.

"progressive" depends on the author's perspective (and the circumstances of the individual

case). For those who define "democracy" as support for relatively equal political access by

workers and peasants, and "progress" as economic, social, or political gains by those groups,

the navy is frequently neither democratic nor progressive. However, for those who define

"democratic" as supportive of systems that protect individual liberties (including the right to

utilize private wealth in the electoral system to pursue political goals), and "progressive" as

supportive of science, industry, and trade, the navy is both democratic and progressive. This

thesis avoids most of these semantic difficulties by defining the specific policy content of

adjectives or descriptors associated with ideology and outlook – definitions that are presented

in Chapter 3 (Theory).

THE NAVY'S DOMESTIC POWER

A second preliminary question about navies and politics is whether the navy has sufficient

power to play a major political role. Some analysts answer this question in the negative.

Bruce Farcau, for example, writes that "The navy and the air force generally have very little

of the applicable fighting force, usually determined in terms of the number of trained

infantrymen on hand, which would relate to a coup d'etat...."[31] Morris Janowitz similarly

writes that infantry battalions "can be deployed in uban centers or in rural areas" and are "in

essence a form of super-police.... Naval units, by contrast, are much less effective for

domestic political objectives."[32] If the contention that navies are non-players in domestic

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[31] Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military*, 64.

[32] Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 33.

politics were true, the political preferences of navies would be of little consequence. They could not act on their preferences, and they would hardly make attractive allies for civilian groups seeking military partners in domestic political struggles.

But the evidence suggests that the navy is a potent domestic force. Although individual circumstances vary, navies tend to possess three primary organizational strengths and one weakness in domestic political struggles. The navy's strengths include the quality and variety of military assets it can employ, the relative unity and coherence of its officer corps (especially in comparison with the army), and its status as a relatively autonomous organization that is, nevertheless, part of the military establishment. Its weakness lies, as Farcau suggests, in the small size of its infantry forces.

These strengths and weaknesses interact in different ways to shape the navy's relative power in four different types of political-military scenarios. These contingencies include coups d'etat (and the defense against coups); civil wars (and coups that turn into civil wars); support for efforts by national political leaders (whether civilian or military) to control the leadership and direction of the military as a whole; and policing activities, especially large-scale efforts required by authoritarian political rule. The navy's strengths make it a significant player — frequently the equal of the army and sometimes stronger — in the first three situations. In the fourth, the navy's weakness in personnel strength limits its effectiveness.

COUPS D'ETAT. The lack of large infantry forces is not a major obstacle to either the

navy's ability to launch coups or, especially, deter others from doing the same. Because of

the need for secrecy, most military coups are carried out by relatively small units (frequently

comprised of one or two battalions), though leaders frequently consult with a wider circle of

officers before taking action.[33] During this initial military phase of a coup, the organizational

quality of the force (particularly its ability to arrive on time at the right location) matters more

than the size of the unit. The navy's elite infantry (i.e., its marines) and its ability to muster

combat aircraft or naval gunfire support for that infantry – witnessed in the Argentine navy's

surprise infantry-air assault on Peron in June 1955 – give it potent capabilities in this form of

domestic warfare.[34]

The navy is perhaps even more capable of deterring or defending against coups d'etat.

Having raised the flag of revolt, most coups depend on statements of support from other key

garrisons, especially those near the capital, to succeed. Early negative reactions and the threat

of civil war they engender will frequently deter other military elements from joining the

rebellion. Here, the navy's artillery helps it establish the proper tone of gravity in its

signaling, and the mobility of its marine units allows it to position units quickly in key

blocking positions. On February 26, 1936 a handful of army officers and a battalion of

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[33] Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 225. For more on coups as military operations, see Edward Luttwak, *Coup d'état; a practical handbook* (New York,: Knopf, 1969). Gregor Ferguson, *Coup d'etat : a practical manual* (Poole, Dorset: Arms and Armour, 1987); Alexander M. Grace, *The coup : tactics in the seizure of power* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994).

[34] This particular assault failed due to poor weather and the inability to land reinforcements as planned, but other naval coups have succeeded as planned – as, for example, the Argentine navy's March 1962 action (supported by the army's cavalry corps) against Frondizi.

infantry seized the center of Tokyo and called for a general army uprising (and a new imperial restoration). The navy, however, quickly moved battleships and marines into Tokyo Bay, helping to convince the army's high command, which had been equivocating, to also come out against the revolt.[35]

CIVIL WARS. The navy's ability to deter coups d'etat depends in part on its prospects should a coup actually degenerate into combat – bringing about a short but intense civil war. If such combat were to pit the full combat forces of the army against those of the navy, the navy would almost certainly be unable to defend its bases. But here, the navy's cohesion – and more importantly the army's frequent lack of it – provides the former with the opportunity to bring its considerable support assets to bear and tip the balance in favor of one side or the other. In 1964 the Brazilian navy was aligned with the 2nd and 4th armies in the rebellion against President Goulart, who was supported by the 3rd Army and parts of the 1st Army. The 1st Army in Rio de Janeiro collapsed when faced with converging attacks by army elements on the landward side and naval marine units landing along the coast, and the 3rd Army abandoned the fight when naval warships steamed into Porto Alegre, the 3rd Army's headquarters.[36]

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[35] One indication that the army was not planning on moving against the rebels prior to the fleets arrival was that in its communiqués, it continued to refer to the group as a "gigun" (righteous army), a term associated with samurai acting rebelliously out of loyalty to a higher principle. Oide Hisashi, *Yonai Mitsumasa: Showa Saiko no Kaigun Taisho*, 45-86; Yoshida Toshio, *Gonin no Kaigun Daijin* (Tokyo: Bunsho Bunko, 1986), 60-62.

[36] Lieuwen, *Generals versus Presidents: Neomilitarism in Latin America*, 69-85.

BUREAUCRATIC/INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT. The navy can also play a critical role in supporting the work of political authorities (whether elected or not) within the military establishment. As uniformed members of the military, senior naval officers can be tapped for to fill senior military posts (e.g., supreme commander or chairman of the joint staff). Once in these positions, naval officers can monitor the behavior of all the services, push through reform measures designed to restructure the military, or revise its operating procedures and rules in ways that advantage incumbent political leaders. Although it is generally possible to find individual army officers (or pockets of them) who will support liberal economic policies, those officers may come under intense pressure from brother officers with different views. As a separate and highly cohesive service, naval officers bring the support their organization and institutions with them, giving them value beyond the numbers actually appointed to senior posts. Even pro-reform army officers serving in senior political or military positions frequently select naval officers for critical subordinate positions previously dominated by the army. Admiral Jose Oliveira, for example, was brought in by leaders of the Brazilian army's liberal Sarbonne faction to head the Escola Superior de Guerra – where he rewrote the military's political doctrine, emphasizing the norms of civilian control and nonintervention.[37]

POLICING FUNCTIONS. The navy's primary weakness in domestic politics is that it generally maintains only small ground forces, a weakness that limits its domestic policing capabilities.[38] When the military attempts to rule the country directly for extended periods of time, policing tends to become a critical military function, and the navy's utility in any

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[37] On changes at the school during Oliveira's tenure, see Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, 45-54.

[38] Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 225.

military government (even one that it supports in ideological or policy terms) may decline. At the same time, more emphasis on police functions – whether or not extra funds for this purpose go to the navy – tend to distract the navy from its external defense missions more than the army. Given the post-coup policing problem, the navy's weakness in that area makes its sponsorship of coups somewhat self-destructive. More accurately, however, such instances suggest that the navy sees integral nationalism – against which naval coups are almost invariably directed – as a greater threat to its interests than that posed by some period of direct military rule.

SUMMARY. The navy's domestically relevant military power is less than that of "the army," but divisions within the army are frequently deep, and the relative cohesion of most navies tend to make such comparisons misleading. Naval officers can lead coups d'etat, and their units can act as the spearhead for such operations, though to succeed, they generally need the support of some army elements. Their defensive role can be even greater, since quick action by even small units can easily frustrate the ambitions of military coup plotters. And if internecine warfare does occur, naval guns, amphibious operations, and interdiction may become decisive factors, tipping the balance in favor of the navy and its allies. While less dramatic, the navy's role in backing political authorities within the military establishment – providing intelligence and sponsoring military structural adjustments – can frequently be even more important.

Two Bodies of Literature

The above observations about several well-documented cases of navies in politics justify much of the approach used in this thesis, as well as many of the specific propositions tested. I will now turn to a discussion of the broader literature on civil-military relations and the literature on the domestic sources of grand strategy, highlighting where my approach borrows or diverges from one or more parts of the existing literature.

Broadly speaking, the civil-military relations literature relates to the first component of the thesis, that having to do with service preferences, while the literature on the domestic sources of grand strategy relates to the second component, the impact of service preferences on coalitional politics, political outcomes, and military strategy. That said, there is overlap in the substantive content of these two fields: Some civil-military relations theorists treat the effects of military politics on strategy, and some analysts of domestic politics and grand strategy treat the military in considerable detail. There is also overlap in theoretical approach: Both fields, for example, include works that use sociological, organization theory, and ideational approaches. But to the extent that one can separate these fields according to the primary dependent variables – the main outcomes that each is trying to explain – the individual discussions serve as a good way to introduce and frame key theoretical questions.

CIV-MIL RELATIONS: BRINGING ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY BACK IN

The literature on civil-military relations, as most define it, looks at questions related to civilian control of the military or, conversely, military intervention in politics. Although this

literature has addressed both the civilian and military sides of the equation in relatively equal measure, I deal here with how the military – and specifically its motivations for intervention in politics – has been treated. In this literature, the military's domestic policy preferences (here, the dependent variable) have been defined in three ways: (1) in strictly political terms – specifically, in terms of support for or opposition to democracy; (2) in economic and social terms; and (3) in terms of the search for factional advantage. The relevant explanatory (i.e., independent) variables have also been defined in three ways: (1) sociological determinants; (2) organizational interests; and (3) ideational factors.

Unlike much recent scholarship on this subject, I treat domestic preferences largely in economic and social terms, rather than as support for or opposition to democratic rule. This thesis proposes that support for or opposition to democratic rule is largely derivative of the services' views of the proper economic and social organization of the state. In explaining the services' domestic preferences, I propose an inclusive organization theory, one that considers functional organizational interests and early socialization as well as the material interests of the services. This inclusive approach, I believe, provides significantly better explanatory and predictive power than one that focuses more narrowly on the material interests of the services. The inclusion of functional interests in the more inclusive approach followed by this thesis does not imply full organizational rationality: Early professional socialization is generally related to the functions performed by junior officers, but it can have dysfunctional effects as officers rise through the ranks.

FROM DEVELOPMENTALISM AND SOCIOLOGY TO THE EXPLICITLY POLITICAL.

The literature on civil-military relations has generally evolved in step with mainstream views

on comparative politics and, specifically, political development. From the 1950s through the

early 1970s, most analysts treated "development" as a relatively unitary phenomenon

involving economic, social, and political processes – all working inextricably and in concert

to produce change and, ultimately, democracy.[39] Those studying civil-military relations

sought to identify the military's role in those processes. Many found that armies – most did

not treat navies or air forces in detail – frequently defined their most important tasks in terms

of economic and social development. In order to explain this observation, theorists looked

primarily to the sociology of military institutions, including the social class of military

officers and the degree and nature of the professional characteristics of the military's

corporate body. Some technical training, exposure to more advanced states, relatively modest

middle class origins, and a national rather than sectional purview gave military officers a

sense of mission to effect the economic and social transformation of their states.[40] The

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[39] In the 1950s democratization was believed to follow almost automatically from economic development. After the more optimistic prophecies proved unrealistic, most observers began to examine the social bases for democratization. Gabriel A. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civil Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958); Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 53 (1959).

[40] See, for example Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America;* Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries,* ed. John J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). Claude E. Welch, "The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention," in *Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change,* ed. Claude E. Welch (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970). Daniel Lerner and R.R. Richardson, "Swords and Ploughshares: The Turkish Army as a Modernizing Force," *World Politics* 13, no. 1. Work by Morris Janowitz, while less sanguine in its conclusions about the ultimate impact of military intervention in politics, also emphasizes the sociological causes of and economic and social motivation of the military's political activity. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1960); Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations.*

implication was that military officers in developing states might be a force for economic

progress and ultimately, since economic development and democracy were assumed to be

closely linked, democracy.

This approach was criticized on several grounds. First, the explanations failed to

adequately explain differences in the behavior of the militaries in different countries. While

some militaries exhibited adherence to socially progressive developmentalist ideologies,

others intervened in ways that were described as conservative – specifically, to defend what

were variously described (depending on the perspective of the observer) as either liberal

economic orders or oligarchic systems.[41] In another line of attack, several critics observed

that there was no correlation in the developing world between military rule and economic

growth.[42] Meanwhile, students of comparative politics began to question whether economic

development, even if it could be accelerated, would necessarily bring democracy in its

wake.[43] Indeed, claims to developmental priorities could be used disingenuously to put off

democratic reform indefinitely.

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[41] Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Second ed. (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1981), 288-97.

[42] Robert W. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Governments and Social Change in the Third World," *American Political Science Review* 70, no. 4 (1976); Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," *The American Political Science Review* 64, no. 4 (1970).

[43] Dietrich Rueschemeyer, E.H. Stephens, and J.D. Stephens, *Capitalist Development and Democracy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); Alfred Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin America," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Theda Skocpol (Cambridge, Ma.: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

Civil-military relations theorists began to focus more narrowly on the question of

when and how militaries intervened against democratic rule.[44] And their explanations focused

on other (i.e., non-sociological) factors, such as the organizational interests of the military,

struggles for power and resources between informal factional groups in the military, and

institutional arrangements subordinating (or not subordinating) the military to civilian

authorities.[45] More recently, some have again sought answers in the culture of the military

organizations. But rather than looking at the sociological or interest structure of the military

to explain that culture, they have instead treated culture as a largely free-standing (i.e.,

independent) variable that can differ profoundly from one military to the next depending on

the specific belief-systems of the military's senior officers or the education purveyed by its

educational institutions.[46] And the cultural content they treat is defined by military attitudes

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[44] Note the difference between titles of two books published in 1964 (Johnson's *The Military and Society in Latin America* or Janowitz' *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*) and two works published in 1977-78 (Linz and Stepan's *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* and *Nordlinger's Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government*). All of the works cited subsequently in this paragraph focus on the effects of various factors (generally military-related) on democracy – not on economic or social development.

[45] Those who emphasize the organizational interests of the military include Eric Nordlinger and Alfred Stepan. (Samuel Finer, it should be observed, preceded both of these individuals in exploring organizational motivations.) Bruce Farcau also stresses the importance of interests, but believes that it is the competition between factions that drives many of the coups in Latin America. Wendy Hunter argues that civilian commitment – and particularly its aggressiveness in confronting military prerogative – can be decisive in subordinating the military to civilian rule. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military;* Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics;* Wendy Hunter, *Eroding military influence in Brazil: politicians against soldiers* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.* Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977).

[46] Cultural theorists do not deny that structures matter (or vis-à-vis). The question is one of emphasis: To what degree do structures shape culture, or to what degree can culture be considered a truly independent variable. With this caveat in mind, those works that emphasize culture as a relatively independent (instead of intermediate) variable include: Alagappa, ed., *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences;* Brian Dean Taylor, "The Russian Military in Politics: Civilian Supremacy in Comparative and Historical Perspective" (Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998). There are many works that are less explicit about theory and method, but nevertheless emphasize the distinctive culture of individual militaries. See, for example, Hayes, *The Armed Nation: The Brazilian Corporatist Mystique.* Alain Rouquie, *The Military and the State in Latin America* (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1987).

towards civilian authority, electoral politics, and the military's proper role vis-à-vis political

authorities.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: BACK TO A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC APPROACH. This

first component of this thesis examines the economic and social preferences of military

organizations. (See figure 2.1.) Hence, its dependent variable is similar to that examined in

the civil-military relations literature of the 1960s and early 1970s. While acknowledging the

validity of some of the points raised by subsequent critics of that literature (and making some

adjustments in response), I would offer several arguments for revisiting the question of

military attitudes towards economic and social issues.

First, critics of early theories on the military's economic and social role were more

trenchant in their attack on the efficacy of military programs than on the ascribed motivations

for many of the military's interventions in politics. The most widely cited critiques, by Eric

Nordlinger and Robert Jackman, correlate military rule and measures of economic growth (or

indicators of social change that generally correlate with economic growth).[47] Having found

little or no correlation, they conclude that military rulers (and hence the military) are no more

oriented towards development than civilians. But to conclude from the fact that, for example,

Juan Peron's economic policies were a disaster -- which they were when viewed from the

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[47] Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States." Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Governments and Social Change in the Third World.". Both utilize the same data set. Of seven dependent variables considered, six are measures of GNP growth or related indicators (such as "improvement in agricultural productivity"). Only one ("leadership commitment to economic development, 1957-1962") has more to do with economic strategy than outcome – and that measure covers only six years of data.

perspective of most measures of economic growth – that he had no distinctive economic or social ideology (or that his ideology was not shaped by his military background) would run counter to almost any historian's account of the man or his rule.

The policies of Brazil's Getulio Vargas, South Korea's Park ChungHee, Thailand's Sarit, Egypt's Gamal Nasser, and Turkey's Mustafa Kemal also met with uneven success. Some did better than others. But early work on the military origins of their social and economic perspectives did identify common motivations and worldviews of these officers. They all pursued state-led development that would guarantee a relatively equitable distribution of wealth. This thesis takes greater interest in the motives for military positions vis-à-vis political authorities and in the political and military effects of military leaders' economic and social preferences than it does in the success their economic programs, though in drawing policy implications it does assumes that in today's world, transparent, liberal economic orders will, under most circumstances, both outperform state-led economies and be more compatible with democratic political rule.

A second argument for revisiting this literature is that in doing so I address (and hope to help resolve) a question that undermined the apparent validity and utility of earlier work on this subject: Why have militaries in developing states intervened in politics for very different reasons? A number of scholars have observed that, while there may be a surprising number of socially "progressive" military governments (e.g., those like Peron, Vargas, or Park), there have also been "conservative" coups. Indeed, one possible explanation for why Nordlinger and Jackman find no correlation between military rule and key indicators of social change (as

described above) is that a relatively even distribution of "progressive" and "conservative" coups might cause the social effects of each to cancel each other out in the aggregate.[48]

The failure to deal adequately with variance in the motivation of military officers has provided the most powerful ammunition to those who have argued that military officers have no consistent ideologies about which scholars or policy-makers might generalize. This thesis seeks to explain variations by treating the military as less than a unitary, single organization, but more than a collection of individuals or factions. Specifically, it looks at the interests and outlooks of different components – services, branches, and functional groups – of the larger whole.

Third, although this thesis takes a non-deterministic stand on the connection between economic strategies and democracy, it nevertheless has direct relevance to the question of protecting electoral democracy. If the thesis' propositions are true, even a rudimentary knowledge of political conditions – i.e., a rough outline of the political-economic issues dividing the nation, which side controls the government, and whether or not they were elected to office – should be sufficient to determine how the military will be divided and which elements will be relatively more supportive or more opposed to electoral democracy. (For

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[48] Jackman does make one attempt to test Samuel Huntington's explanation for the variance in coup motives. Huntington proposed that during the beginning of the modernization process, militaries (generally led by middle class officers) tend to conduct progressive "breakthrough" coups, designed to free the economy, society, and politics from traditional, premodern elites. But when labor begins to make increasing demands on government as more of the society is politicized, the military becomes relatively more conservative. Jackman looks to test this by looking at the effects of coups in low-income countries and higher-income developing states. Finding little difference, he concludes that Huntington's hypothesis is incorrect. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Governments and Social Change in the Third World." Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 221.

example, when elected populists dominate the government, the navy is unlikely to support the

electoral system that brought them there, while portions of the army will be supportive.)

In a more general sense, this analysis suggests that the problem currently thought of as

the "military coup d'etat" might be more productively addressed as the "civilian-military coup

d'etat."[49] When society is deeply divided and politics gridlocked, all sides will generally be

able to find sympathetic actors within the military. And even if those actors have no intention

to preempt, they may seek out military allies in an effort to protect themselves against

offensive action by their competitors. In other words, domestic security dilemmas are likely

to be acute, and the civilians may well share responsibility for the military's increasing

participation in politics. A survey of Latin American coups (including, for example, the

infamous 1973 coup in Chile that overthrew Allende) indicates that in many if not most, coup

leaders were lobbied by civilians, and both military and civilian actors appeared to believe

that if they did not act, their ideological opponents would.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 1: AN INCLUSIVE ORGANIZATION THEORY. My

proposed explanation for the services' economic and social preferences draws primarily from

organization theory. It is, however, broadly inclusive. It incorporates ideas consistent with a

sociological approach to organizations. And it also considers ideology, though it proposes

that ideology is heavily influenced by the material conditions under which organizational

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[49] This language is increasingly accepted as a descriptor of many coups. Argentina's civilian defense minister, Horacio Jaunarena, recently stated that "the vast majority of coups d'etat in Argentina were civilian-military coups." "Argentine Defense Minister Underscores Military's Respect for Democratic Rule; Denies Malaise in Armed Forces", *La Nacion*, March 13 2001, in FBIS-LAP-2001-0313.

leaders operate. (In other words, it suggests that officers who lead primarily conscripted

soldiers will, for example, tend to have a different outlook on many issues than those who

work primarily with highly trained volunteers – or directly with high-tech equipment.)

Hence, my treatment treats ideology primarily as an intervening variable, though it does not

reject outright the idea that it is also an independent variable. (See figure 2.1.)

Civil-relations theorists have keyed on three different types of logic to explain the

behavior of military organizations: functionally based, material interest based, and those

based on socialized biases. Military historians tend to emphasize function, political scientists

tend to emphasize the quest for material gains, and sociologists stress perceptual biases

derived from early education. While some have built theories or arguments based strictly on

one of these motivations, most scholars combined specific elements of two or more of these

motivations to explain specific phenomena. For example, some political scientists, in

explaining why military officers appear to almost invariably prefer offensive to defensive

doctrines, see a combination of functional motivations (e.g., to reduce uncertainty in military

planning) with material budgetary motives (e.g., to justify higher budgets and more

resources).[50] Sociologists have observed that officers' early socialization revolves around the

need to fulfill specific missions (i.e., functions), but that once socialized, the officers' belief-

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[50] The reduction of uncertainty requires standard operating procedures, which themselves have unintended consequences. Nevertheless, military organizations cannot operate without these SOPs. Yet offensive doctrines also serve as a strong basis for high budgetary demands on the state. Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive Between the World Wars," *International Security* 9, no. 1 (1984).

systems or ideologies may become at least partly dysfunctional in other settings.[51] Both of

these groups observe the unintended and frequently unfortunate effects of large organizational

structures on the performance of tasks.

This civil-military coalition theory is eclectic, in the sense that it includes several

explanatory variables. At the same time, however, it establishes specific relationships

between variables, as well as the relative importance of each. As I argue in Chapter 3,

function, material interests, and socialized biases all work together to overdetermine the

predicted outcomes. Over time, domestic preferences that may originally be driven by a

combination of functional motivations and socialized biases are likely to crystallize into

organizational culture – a force that will then exert some independent influence over

preferences. But this thesis treats organizational culture primarily as an intermediate variable

and suggests that it will be shaped, in probabilistic ways, by the structure of the

organization.[52]

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF STRATEGY

The second aspect of this thesis looks at the effects of military preferences on domestic

political conflicts and the selection of national military strategies. In doing so, it builds on a

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[51] See, for example, Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, 1972). Many political scientists have borrowed from this logic. See, for example, Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America*. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*.

[52] Of course, officers may seek to structure their organization in ways that conform with and support their culture. But military structures are more amenable to adjustments by political actors and will also be influenced by technical factors. At the end of the day, air force pilots must fly aircraft (and soon perhaps drones) to remain air force pilots, and the aircraft, as well as the demands of flying, will always be central to the air force's culture.

growing body of work on the domestic sources of grand strategy. Specifically, it combines a

consideration of politics and class conflict, issues highlighted by the work of Jack Snyder,

with a more fine-grained understanding of how the military defines its own interests in those

conflicts.

REALISM AND THE DOMESTIC SOURCES OF STRATEGY. Work on the domestic

sources of grand strategy represents a reaction against, or at least an amendment to, strict

adherence to structural realism. Structural realists propose that states behave in a certain way

or are punished by the international system. In other words, although all states may not

behave in absolutely uniform ways, the international system conditions a certain type of

behavior. Specifically, structural realists suggest that it is safe to assume that most state react

relatively smoothly and rationally to threats in their environment, and protecting the state

against these dangers will generally take precedent over other values the state might pursue

(e.g., maximizing the benefits of absolutely free trade).[53] In challenging those assumptions,

research on the domestic sources of grand strategy recalls classical realism, which embraced

the idea that domestic factors were likely to make some states more aggressive than others or

that states might otherwise perceive their interests in very different ways.[54]

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[53] Examples of structural realist work includes Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Relations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc, 1979). Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

[54] Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1960). Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1964).

Recent scholarship on the domestic sources of grand strategy has sought to make explicit generalizations about how and under what circumstances specific domestic variables affect the foreign and defense policies of nations. This work falls broadly into three categories.

The first of these draws on organization theory to show that the interests of sub-national, bureaucratic units can affect the rationality of responses to the external environment.[55] Analysts of military bureaucracies, for example, have concluded that those organizations' interests in both size and the reduction of operational uncertainty gives them a strong predilection for offensive war-fighting doctrines – regardless of whether technology or political circumstances favor such operations.[56] Hence, political intervention is frequently necessary to achieve the integration of foreign policy tools into a coherent and mutually supporting whole. Others have argued that national strategic orientation – including the very definition of what constitutes a critical threat – can be heavily influenced by the relative power of bureaucracies (including the military or subordinate components of it) within the government.[57]

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[55] Allison, *Essence of Decision.*

[56] Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive Between the World Wars." Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars.*

[57] Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); Chalmers Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, ed. Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

A second approach to studying the domestic sources of grand strategy looks at the foreign policy effects of more explicitly political aspects of the state – including conflicts between the economic groups (e.g., industries), social classes, and ethnic groups, as well as the political structures available to moderate those conflicts.[58] Michael Doyle revives the discussion of democracy and its effects on war-proneness.[59] David D'Lugo and Ronald Rogowski assess the effects of constitutional fitness on the relative ability of Britain and Germany to sustain the pre-World War I naval arms race.[60] Jane Kellet Cramer has demonstrated that security "panics" can and have on a number of historical occasions been created and/or manipulated to further specific political agendas – an observation that, without denying the real challenges faced by the U.S. since 9.11, may say much about the specific content of recent American rhetoric and strategies for fighting the "war on terror."[61]

Of most relevance to states in the developing world (and hence, to the present thesis), Jack Snyder argues that domestic pathologies, frequently resulting from major social change brought in the wake of rapid economic development, can lead states to adopt irrational or self-destructive grand strategies. When major social groups see their political power threatened in

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[58] Andrew Moravcsik has made a noble effort to incorporate political actors and political structures into a single coherent theoretical framework. Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Relations," *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997).

[59] Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986). Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace, An International Security Reader* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996).

[60] David D'Lugo and Ronald Rogowski, "The Anglo-German Naval Race and Comparative Constitutional 'Fitness'," in *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, ed. Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).

[61] Jane Kellett Cramer, "National Security Panics: Overestimating Threats to National Security" (PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002).

ways that will prevent its future recovery, they may make every effort to obstruct the political

processes that may lead to such an outcome. The gridlock that results can be most

conveniently be broken by coalitional log-rolling, but because domestic issues are non-

negotiable, logrolling tends to be outwardly oriented, producing imperial projects that benefit

coalitional members but jeopardize the state.[62]

A third approach has concentrated on the influence of ideational and cultural factors

on foreign policy. John Mueller, for example, makes a strong case that attitudinal changes

towards war have made Europe inherently more stable than it has ever been historically.[63]

Literature on strategic culture is weakest when it explains differences in foreign policy

preferences in terms of enduring and unchanging national characteristics.[64] These accounts

are difficult to reconcile with cases in which major events have punctuated the equilibrium of

foreign policy and produced dramatically new approaches – for example, Japan, where some

strategic ideas and assumptions changed dramatically after World War II even as others

remained relatively stable. The strategic culture literature is strongest, when it is explicit

about the relationship between ideas and the structures that maintain them over time.[65]

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[62] Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).

[63] John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1988). This explanation is, unfortunately, difficult to test against others.

[64] Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary* 64, no. 1 (1977). Colin Gray, *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986). Alastair Johnston offers perhaps the most careful test of strategic conceptions as long-enduring features of individual states' histories. Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[65] Peter Katzenstein and Noburo Okawara's work on Japan provides a relatively good example. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a*

DEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: STRATEGY IN DEVELOPING STATES. The second component of this thesis looks at the effects of the military services' domestic preferences (the independent variable) and the involvement of civilian-military coalitions in politics (the intermediate variable) on the military strategies of developing states (the dependent variable). (See figure 2.1.)

There are two reasons for pursuing this research on the sources of strategy in the developing world. First, understanding strategy in these states is important – and becoming more important. Military strategies and force structures can be more or less threatening to neighbors and produce lesser or greater security dilemmas. And without the bipolar Cold War framework to dampen and restrict intra-regional conflict between developing states, the danger of war between them has become more real – as has the danger that the U.S. might be drawn into them. The ongoing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dramatically raises America's stakes in the strategies chosen by developing states and the conflict that may result. At the same time, different military strategies may also be more or less compatible with effective governance and democratic rule, an issue that is of increased salience to America's own security in a highly integrated and interdependent world.

Second, apart from historical studies from Europe during the age of industrialization, there have been few attempts to generalize about the effects of politics on grand strategy in

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Changing World (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1993). Neither Katzenstein and Okawara nor others have, however, dealt adequately with what effects changes in the structure of the Japanese state has or will have on Japanese strategic culture.

developing states. Perhaps the longest standing generalization about these states and their military policies holds that high levels of domestic threat frequently produce inwardly focused counterinsurgency strategies. The corollary of this has been that conventional strategies, where they appear, signal an absence or at least diminution of domestic threat.[66] Most analysts tend to explain conventional military phenomenon, such as the naval arms buildup in Latin America during the 1970s, by looking for the international threats or conflicts that may have sparked them.[67] But this simple dichotomy between internally focused counterinsurgency and externally oriented conventional strategies fails to consider the effects of politics on strategy – effects that were evident even in Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

One work that does systematically address domestic sources of grand strategy in developing states takes as its focus European states during the age of imperialism. In *Myths of Empire* Jack Snyder argues that whether or not national leaders care more about foreign or domestic threats cannot be decided a priori; they will react to whichever threat is greater.[68] And threats will not always be defined relative to the state; they may often be viewed from the perspective of regimes and the social groups that supported them. An expanding middle or working class seeking constitutional change may be viewed as a critical threat to state leaders.

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[66] This pattern is, for example, taken as a matter of course in Muthiah Alagappa's edited volume. Alagappa, *The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand.*

[67] Wayne A. Selcher, "Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: From Rivalry to Friendly Cooperation," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 27, no. 2 (1985). James L. Garrett, "The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 27, no. 3 (1985).

[68] Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition.*

Those leaders may, in response, craft military force structures or strategies in ways that

sandbag their own political position. If domestic politics affected the foreign and military

policies of these major powers in the heart of Europe – a contention Snyder's research

generally supports – the effect should be even larger on the small- and medium-sized states in

the developing world today.[69] The external threat faced by most of these states is relatively

minor, whereas domestic conflicts tend to loom larger.[70]

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 2: REVISITING MILITARY BUREAUCRACIES. In a

broad sense, this thesis seeks to build on Snyder's work, though the application of his ideas to

developing states today demands some adjustment. Specifically, it requires a more detailed

and nuanced treatment of military organizations. In most of Snyder's cases, top civilian and

military elites were relatively unified in class and social outlook (though perhaps less so than

his treatment suggests).[71] In Britain throughout most of the 19th century, for example,

commissions into the Army's officer corps were purchased, effectively limiting membership

to sons of the aristocracy. Once in the service, technical military training and indoctrination

for many of these officers was minimal. Today, examinations for admission to military

academies in developing states may result in certain social classes being disproportionately

represented. But the more important effect of selection based on merit – especially given the

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[69] Snyder does apply many of these ideas to a variety of contemporary developing states, including China, in his subsequent book. Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

[70] On the external threat level of developing states and the involvement of militaries in those cases see Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 76, 206-07.

[71] Even as late as the mid-20th century, European militaries (and those of many other states) tended to be dominated by aristocratic elites. See George A. Kourvetaris and Betty A. Dobratz, *Social Origins and Political Orientations of Officer Corps in a World Perspective* (Denver: University of Denver, 1973).

relatively modest training needed to pass most entrance exams – has been to widen, rather than narrow, the social origins of most officer corps.

If it proves true that state leaders manipulate strategies and force structures for political ends, that conclusion will challenge established ideas on the relationship between military and political change. In the mid-1970s, Charles Tilly persuasively argued that the development of nation states as we know them today was a natural and almost inevitable response to the financial and social demands of interstate wars in the heart of Europe.[72] That view, embraced by many students of political development, sees the functional military demands of the state as a primary driver of everything from financial to education to welfare policy. But if political actors desire a given political organization for the state, and if there is no truly pressing external threat that requires them to select a particular military format, then it stands to reason that those political actors will select the military strategy and force structure that best supports their political designs.

As many scholars of international security dilemmas have observed, military forces are largely fungible, meaning that offensive and defensive forces are difficult to distinguish but also implying that many military threats can be addressed by a variety of means. A wing of ground attack aircraft may, under many circumstances, replace an infantry division or vis-à-vis, and threat analysis can frequently be manipulated to accentuate the need for politically attractive doctrinal adjustments. There may be some loss of efficiency in military spending.

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[72] Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State Making," in *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, ed. Charles Tilly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975). Michael Howard, *War in European History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1976).

But often either the external threat environment or the dynamics of modern war will be ambiguous enough for the trade-offs to be unclear. And even where they are clear, inefficient approaches to security may be worth the political gains for those faced with prickly domestic political dilemmas.

The point is not that Tilly was wrong. Indeed, these observations are the corollary of Tilly's own conclusions. Rather, the point is that the causal direction established by Tilly – with military demands driving social needs and political formats – may not hold in many states during much of their history. This thesis seeks, in part, to determine how often domestic politics drives military strategy, as opposed to the reverse.

CHAPTER 3: THEORY

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section, I outline the logic of my proposed theory of domestic politics, military services, and grand strategy in developing states. In the second section, I briefly summarize the logic of two competing theories and list the major and minor predictions generated by both my own theory and the two competing alternatives. And in the third section, I discuss case selection and methodology.

Civil-Military Coalition Theory

The theory proposed here suggests that domestic politics frequently have a decisive effect on grand strategy in the developing world. The theory includes four major predictions about the domestic preferences of the military services, the formation of contending civil-military coalitions, and the impact of coalitional competition and its outcomes on subsequent continuity or change in grand strategy. The four primary predictions are:

- The composition and organization of military organizations will have a major impact on their political preferences. Officers from technology-oriented military organizations (e.g., the navy and air force) will generally support liberal nationalist domestic positions; officers from troop-oriented organizations (including many army elements) will support integral nationalist ones. Values will be reflected both in the services' activities and the rhetoric of their officers.

- The degree of internal unity and cohesion of each service's officer corps, in terms of political outlook, will depend on the degree of homogeneity in the composition and organization of subordinate units and officers – again, in terms of the degree of relative technological content. The navy's officer corps, being more homogenous in this dimension, will tend to be more united than that of the army.

- When politics are gridlocked over issues that threaten the future power or existence of major social or political groups, military organizations are likely to be drawn into – or seek to create – domestic political coalitions with like-minded civilian actors; often, two contending civil-military coalitions will emerge. All things being equal, relatively strong technical services and branches – e.g., navy, air force, and army general staff – will advantage liberal coalitions, while the weakness of these arms will advantage their integral nationalist competitors.

- Domestic victors will solidify their position against a comeback by their rivals by adjusting force structures and military strategies to reward their military allies. Victories for liberal nationalists will, therefore, likely signal shifts toward maritime strategies, while victories for integral nationalist positions will herald the rise of continental strategies.

IDEAL TYPES AND THE IMPERFECT WORLD

Before elaborating on each of these predictions, it is necessary to have a working definition of integral nationalism and liberal nationalism. Presented here as ideal types, these represent the fundamental choices from which the leaders of most developing states have selected during the sixty years since World War Two. Needless to say, many if not most political actors in the real world embrace mixed positions, but these ideal types allow us to place actors on a continuum.

The integral nationalism adhered to by many army leaders posits that economic development and increasing national power can be achieved only by consolidating and unifying the nation. Many developing states have been threatened by a lack of cohesion. Integral nationalists believe that strengthening unity and cohesion requires reducing differences and increasing coordination between all elements of society. Integral nationalists seek development that is balanced across regions and in which income and other resources are

relatively evenly distributed.[73] "Balanced" (i.e., even) development requires strong central

leadership of the economy and society and tight restrictions on foreign involvement in the

domestic economy.[74] Unregulated trade and social contact with foreign cultures will tend to

further favor those regions of the state that are most advanced (generally coastal areas), hence

exacerbating the divide between the nation's large hinterland and its few wealthy trading

centers.[75] Politically, integral nationalists are likely to oppose political systems in which the

electoral process is the only point of contact between social groups and the government, and

they oppose those in which private money plays a major role. They generally prefer systems

where electoral politics is supplemented by government-mediated corporatist systems of

direct social representation.[76]

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[73] On the military, and especially the army, penchant for income equality and for justice more broadly construed, see Harold Lasswell, "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus the Civilian State," in Jay Stanley, ed., *Essays on the Garrison State* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997), p. 53.

[74] Integral nationalists believe in concentrating the state's limited financial assets (especially foreign currency) and managerial talent to achieve maximum results. This requires government intervention and supervision. See Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962).

[75] This philosophy is broadly consistent with the "*Dependendista*" ("Dependency") school of political economists. See Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); and Peter B. Evans *Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multinational State and Local Capital in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).

[76] On corporatist systems, see Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "Ism"* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1971).

Figure 3.1: Elements of Integral Nationalist and Liberal Nationalist Ideologies

	Integral Nationalist	Liberal Nationalist
Economic	State guided	Free market
Social Values	Equity	Liberty, efficiency
Social Organzation	Corporatist	Free association
Foreign Contact	Regulated, discouraged	Unregulated, encouraged
Regional Focus	Interior	Coastal areas
Center-Periphery	Centralized	Decentralized
Political System	Electoral system supplemented with functional representation	Electoral representation only
Pejorative moniker (or deviant variant)	Fascism National Socialism	Plutocracy Oligarchy
Examples	Peron's Argentina Park's Korea Mussolini's Italy	Columbia (today) USA (today and arguably even more so in the early 20th century)

The liberal nationalism adhered to by naval leaders, on the other hand, emphasizes national progress through integration with global markets and the free flow of people and ideas across borders. It accepts – indeed honors -- differences at home between individuals, regions, and social groups, and it tends to favor reliance on markets, classical economic rationality, and economic pluralism. Liberal nationalism tends to stress aggregate economic growth more than integral nationalism and worries less about equitable distribution. Although it may take time, wealth will ultimately diffuse to all areas of the state. Politically, liberal nationalists support electoral systems that respect individual difference, personal freedoms,

and the free market.[77] They may oppose democratic electoral systems where checks and

balances on government power do not protect those values.[78] Conflict between integral and

liberal nationalist visions of the public good describes much of the political struggle that has

taken place in the developing world since World War II, and disputes over "democracy"

frequently mask contests over the economic and social organization of the state.

Integral nationalists and liberal nationalists both commonly accuse the other of

favoring systems inherently prone to corruption. In contemporary America, the failures of

integral nationalism – collusion, opacity, and crony capitalism – are accepted wisdom. And it

may be true, as I assume in drawing implications from this thesis, that in order to have very

low levels of corruption, a relatively liberal system is necessary. But in the developing world,

very high levels of corruption have also plagued many regimes established along liberal, free

market lines. If liberal economic positions are defined as being relatively free of corruption

by definition or if corrupt market economies are defined as being imperfectly liberal, then the

logic connecting markets and reduced corruption becomes circular. In a number of countries

since the end of World War Two, integral nationalist regimes that succeeded liberal ones

reduced corruption by increasing commitment to the task, reducing the number of individuals

with access to power that can be put to ill use, or both. The point here is not that these two

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[77] Liberal nationalists believe that free markets are necessary to the maintenance of true and meaningful democracy and the defense against authoritarianism. See Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

[78] Liberalism is often equated with electoral democracy. In fact, liberalism respects individual rights and difference, whereas democracy subjects the minority to the will of the majority. On this tension, see David Braybrooke, "Can Democracy Be Combined with Federalism or with Liberalism?" in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., *Liberal Democracy* (New York: New York University Press, 1983).

ideologies are equally valid, but that in an imperfect world, there is enough truth in the logic

of both to accept that either can motivate political actors. Which view an individual embraces

will of course depend in part on highly particularistic factors but will also be influenced in

probabilistic ways by organizations, groups, or societies to which that individual belongs.

HYPOTHESIS 1

"Naval officers will generally support liberal nationalist domestic positions. Army officers,

on the other hand, will frequently support integral nationalist ones."

Students of government (and other) organizations have long observed that differences

in composition and mission frequently lead these organizations to work toward different

objectives – sometimes in opposition to one another or even in opposition to executive

political authorities. Analysts of military organizations have concluded, for example, that

military organizations tend to have relatively fixed doctrinal preferences, regardless of the

strategic merits of that doctrine in individual cases. European armies preferred offensive

action during the late 19th century and early 20th century, despite the demonstrated fact that

barbed wire and machine guns appear to have given the edge to the defender. Many of the

same theoretical precepts suggest that military organizations may have relatively constant

domestic political or economic preferences, in addition to military ones. But given that

different types of military organizations within the same state will vary in their material and

human composition, mission, and structure (e.g., command and control relationships), it is

reasonable to suppose that different types of military organizations may differ in terms of their specific domestic preferences.

An inclusive organization theory (and the one adopted here) suggests that an organization's function, material interests, and the socialized biases of its members all affect motivation and behavior. Functional motivations are those endowed by the organization's need to perform stipulated tasks. In the case of the army and navy these are: to win wars on land and sea, respectively.[79] Material interests are those that are driven by a desire to benefit the welfare or power of the institution and its professional members – for example, by increasing the manpower or budget of the organization.[80] Finally, socialized biases are based on early personal or professional experience (dependent, for example, on social class or professional schooling) and will incline officers to embrace or reject certain types of economic or social policies, regardless of subsequent exposure to information or data that

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[79] There are at least two types of literature that take a largely functionalist approach to the treatment of military organizations and political-social issues. First, a variety of historians have observed that intensive warfare in Europe resulted in the victories by those military thinkers (such as Carl von Clausewitz) who advocated social policies with functional benefits for the military's ability to win wars. Howard, *War in European History*. These individuals viewed many military professionals as being relatively more functionally oriented than the traditional members of the political class, who sought to utilize military hierarchy to reinforce the interests of themselves and their preferred social systems. See Hew Strachan, *European armies and the conduct of war* (London ; Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1983). Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975). A second body of literature that begins from functionalist premises is on military sociology and politics. (While much of this literature begins from functional premises, it does not end there. See footnote below discussing perceptual biases.) Representative works on this include Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations," (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[80] On organization theory in general, see James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy : What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It* (New York: Basic Books, 1989). James March and Herbert Simon, *Organizations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967). On the application of these ideas to military organizations, see Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*. Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive Between the World Wars." Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive*. Allison, *Essence of Decision*.

undermines the apparent validity or rationality of those inclinations.[81] Many scholars have

observed that socialized bias can critically affect the organization's preferences or behavior.

Functional imperatives faced at the unit level during their first years of service will continue

to influence the officers' worldview later in their careers – sometimes becoming increasingly

dysfunction as the officers become farther removed from unit level leadership.[82]

Below, I summarize key structural differences between the army and the navy and

then discuss how those structural differences shape the interests (both functional and material)

and biases of the services.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ARMIES AND NAVIES. While individual differences in

outlook will always exist between even individuals with similar backgrounds, the functional

and structural characteristics of organizations will influence the perspectives of their members

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[81] As noted above (in the footnote on functional explanations), many sociological approaches to the study of military organizations begin with functional premises. (For example, infantry officers must lead troops, and therefore junior officer education teaches the importance of developing a heroic persona. See Morris Janowitz.) But this literature acknowledges that (1) there might be other (especially class or organizational) motivations for socialization; and (2) that early, functionally-motivated sociology might either prove dysfunctional later in the later careers of many officers or that it might have unintended consequences in, for example, shaping the political views of those individuals. On socialization and political attitudes, see Huntington, "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations." Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations.* Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power.* Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America.*

[82] This can be demonstrated, once again, with an analogy to the military's behavior in combat. Most military leaders during the U.S. Civil War, especially during its early stages, got their first combat experience during the Mexican American War, when the smooth-bore musket was still the main infantry arm and bayonet attacks therefore still had a good chance of succeeding with relatively modest casualties. By the start of the Civil War, rifles, deadly at much longer rangers, had replaced muskets, but for several years, commanders continued to show a preference for the infantry charge – despite the high losses incurred by those using such tactics.

and produce distinctive distributions of true believers in various types of ideologies within different types of organizations.

The army and the navy differ in at least five important dimensions: (1) the relative importance of capital and technology; (2) the background, education, and experience of their officers; (3) the quantity and quality of the enlisted personnel required by each; (4) the location of their bases; and (5) the degree and type of contact that the officers enjoy with their foreign counterparts. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list, but rather one that captures the most salient structural factors highlighted by the political scientists, historians, and military analysts who have sought to explain the domestic behavior of military organizations.[83]

Technology. If there is a "keystone" difference between armies and navies it lies in the level and type of capital and technological content incorporated into the weapons systems of the two.[84] Navies, even in developing states, are organized around high-technology

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[83] For perhaps the most comprehensive treatment of service characteristics in a single states, see Ikeda, *Kaigun to Nihon.* On Germany, see Steinberg, *Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet.* For a more general treatment of the relationship between technological requirements and military culture in general (i.e., not army/navy specific), see Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.* And for an application of Janowitz' ideas to the Korean army and navy, see John P. Lovell, Mun Hui Sok, and Young Ho Lee, "Professional Orienation and Policy Perspectives of Military Professionals in the Republic of Korea," *Midwest Journal of Political Science* 13, no. 3 (1969).

[84] For example, in the developing states of East Asia, the per capita capitalization of the navy (with marines included) is between 50 percent (in Taiwan) and 287 percent (South Korea) higher than that of the army. Taiwan's budget shares can be derived from "Characteristics of Taiwan's 1997 Defense Budget", *Kuang-Chiao Ching,* May 16 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-0516. South Korean service budget shares are from "Ministry to Reorganize Basic Defense Structures", *Yonhap,* September 25 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-0926. Military manpower figures are from IISS, *Military Balance.*

weapons systems (many of which must be imported). Most army units rely to a much lesser extent on technology. These differences between the services in the technological content of weapons and other equipment largely, though not entirely, drive the differences in the other four areas.

Officers. The services draw from different segments of the population to fill their officer corps. Because of the high technical requirements of operating naval weapons, naval academies tend to place more of a premium on recruiting cadets with strong academic backgrounds than do army academies.[85] But perhaps more important than the respective recruiting base for the two academies lies in the percentage of total officers in each service who are academy trained. Whereas navies in developing states tend to draw the bulk of their officers from their academies, only 15-25 percent of army officers are academy-trained.[86] And whereas the navy generally draws the remainder of its officers from Reserve Officer Training Courses or direct commissioning programs (all of which are based on college campuses), the army fills out much of its officer corps with Officer Candidate School graduates drawn from its enlisted ranks. These recruiting patterns generally mean that naval

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[85] This is true even in the U.S. military. According to *U.S. News*, 91% of Naval Academy successful applicants submit SAT scores, whereas only 65% of successful applicants Army Academy do. And among those who do submit scores, averages for the army range between 1160 and 1350 (25-75 percentile), while those for the navy range between 1210 and 1380. www.usnews.com (viewed on August 18, 2002).

[86] This is a rough estimate based on data from several states. In the Indonesian army, for example, around 20 percent of officers are academy-trained, another 20% are ROTC-trained, and the remaining 60% are former enlisted personnel trained in OCS programs. A "majority" are said to come from the academy. Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (St. Leonards, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1996), 118. Another way of looking at this problem is that the navy graduates 60% as many academy-trained officers as the army, but only has 14% as many officers in its force – making the ratio some four times as high.

officers tend to come from relatively higher-income families and that more come from urban areas than is the case in the army.

Post-recruiting differences in military education and experience are at least as significant as those in recruiting. Virtually all naval officers have some engineering training, and most are assigned to oversee mechanical sections during their early onboard assignments. Although some academy-trained army officers have some engineering training, few are expected to use many of those technical skills in their early assignments – if ever. Rather, most academy-trained officers, and virtually all OCS-trained officers spend most of their careers leading troops or managing relatively low-tech, manpower-intensive operations, such as basic logistical support units (e.g., moving food and fuel).

Enlisted personnel. Most armies in the developing world continue to draw a large majority of their soldiers from conscription. Navies, again because of their higher technological requirements and lower quantitative requirements, use a higher percentage of long-service volunteers.[87] While army recruits come from the nation's social base, frequently peasant families, the navy draws much of its force from urban areas. Given the absence of long-serving volunteers in the army, these organizations tend to lack an effective, functioning

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[87] According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the proportion of the armies' manpower acquired through conscription in the states of South America for which data is available (Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Peru, and Venezuela) is over twice as high as that of navies'. IISS, *The Military Balance, 2000-2001* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000). Because the IISS figures provide figures for conscripts as a percentage of the total force (including officers), it is difficult to estimate how much of the enlisted force they represent. In the case of China, interviews with Chinese army and naval officers, as well as a survey of relevant *Jiefangjun Bao* (Liberation army daily) articles, suggests that between 3 and 8 percent of army enlisted are long-term volunteers, while the number in the navy is between 25 and 35 percent.

non-commissioned officer corps. In the navy, senior enlisted personnel frequently serve as front-line supervisors and provide an effective layer of middle management between the officers and junior enlisted personnel.

Basing. The need for harbor and repair facilities ensures that most naval units and bases are located in or near coastal cities. Army units, especially operational units, tend to be located in the countryside, where they can train unobstructed by the civilian population, where they are closer to their conscription base, and where they frequently have been deployed historically for the purposes of preserving order or suppressing rebellion.

Foreign contact. Because of the navy's need to acquire technical knowledge, the location of its bases in coastal cities, and the simple fact that its ships visit foreign countries, the naval officers of most developing states are likely to have more contact with foreign military officers (and even civilians) than those of the army. Moreover, the foreign contact that naval officers have is more likely to be with individuals from liberal maritime states, given the advanced naval capabilities enjoyed by those states and their value as organizational models and sources of technical information.[88] Relatively more of the army's limited foreign contact will be with individuals from continental states. Finally, even in the exceptional cases where the navy's foreign contact is not primarily with liberal maritime states, the officers with

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[88] Between 1870 and 1941, the Japanese army took Germany as its model, dispatching a large plurality of its exchange students to that nation, while the navy took Great Britain as its model. Ikeda, *Kaigun to Nihon*. The same was true of both Chile and Argentina and a host of other nations. Today, although the United States serves a model for both the armies and navies of many states, armies in the developing world get relatively more of their assistance from elsewhere.

whom the navy has contact will, as naval officers, tend to be more outwardly oriented and

cosmopolitan than the army officers of the same state.[89]

SERVICE POSITIONS. The specific characteristics of the services in these five

dimensions endow the officers of each service with different functional and material interests

and perceptual biases, inclining the two in largely opposite directions on economic and social

issues.

The army. Interests and socialized biases incline army officers toward integral

nationalism – encouraging it to emphasize social welfare and equity issues, as well as state-

led approaches to economic development.

The most compelling functional consideration pushing the armies of most developing

states toward integral nationalism derives from their enlisted manning patterns. With higher

disciplinary demands than technical ones, most of the army's manpower is drawn from the

countryside and, to a lesser extent, the urban poor (though generally not from the very poorest

urban elements). Most armies in the developing world rely on conscription. Depending on

the terms of service, between 40 percent and 60 percent of the enlisted force is replaced

annually in conscript armies, bringing a constant flow of young men straight from farms and

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[89] Both the Thai army and navy received much of their technical assistance and military equipment from Japan before World War II. Japanese naval officers were, however, considerably more cosmopolitan and liberal than their army counterparts, who generally shared strong preferences for national socialist doctrines.

villages through army line units. In some developing states, these soldiers are only barely removed from the farm – during harvest season many are given passes to return to assist their parents.

Given these manning patterns, anything that causes major hardship in the countryside will also have a detrimental effect on unit-level morale and effectiveness. Army officers will favor nationally sponsored development projects designed to preserve the viability of rural life.[90] They will, on the other hand, tend to be suspicious of purely market-based solutions that may risk causing rural dislocation or opening farmers to usury.[91] Foreign trade and investment may raise aggregate national wealth, but it is also likely to increase the gap between urban and rural areas, as well as between coastal and rural ones. If agriculture is included in the free trade regime, as urban and coastal elites are likely to advocate, the army's rural base may be eviscerated both physically and spiritually. In Japan during the 1930s, thousands if not tens of thousands of farm families were forced by destitution to sell their daughters into urban prostitution, a fact that damaged morale among the army's enlisted force and was blamed by angry junior army officers on free trade and the liberal, mostly urban, politicians who backed it.

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[90] On the logic of army support for income equality and for 'justice' more broadly construed, see Harold Lasswell, "Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State versus the Civilian State," in *Essays on the Garrison State*, ed. Jay Stanley (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1997), 53.

[91] Army officers expressing socialist, national socialist, or anti-capitalist doctrines have not been rare, and all have cited the negative effects of capitalism on the countryside as a primary motive for their economic and social doctrines. These include Argentina's Juan Peron, Brazil's Getulio Vargas, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Imperial Japan's Ugaki Kazushige and Tanaka Giichi, Thailand's Sarit, and Korea's Park ChungHee. Interestingly, the officers of aristocratically-dominated armies – including those in Victorian Britain, late 19th century Germany, and pre-1917 Russia, have also bemoaned the ill effects of capitalism on the countryside and the effects of urbanization on the health and discipline of soldiers.

Organizational and personal interests tend to reinforce these preferences. The army's large presence in the countryside enables it to play a significant role in social development projects, and these projects in turn, generally provide a rationale for further increases in the army's size. Growth in personnel strength (and consequently in officer billets) – and increased prestige and authority at home – may compensate the army in part or in full for whatever degradation it may suffer in conventional capabilities as a result of its developmental involvement.[92] At the same time, the humble social origins of many army officers may give them a personal stake (through their families or localities) in the development of poorer areas. And developmental work may give officers potential second legal or less than legal sources of income.

Perceptual biases reinforcing tendencies towards integral nationalism derive from the early professional experience of army officers. For valid functional reasons, young army officers are encouraged to demonstrate a sense of welfare (and often an exaggerated sense of welfare) for the men under their command. Even today, many ground commanders around the world would agree with Napoleon's statement that the "moral is to the material as three is to one" – a ratio that naval or air commanders would likely believe is reversed in their own areas of endeavor. Without understating the importance of technology and skill in land

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[92] Under Peron, for example, weapons imports were cut back sharply, but the size of the army increased from 30,000 in 1943 to 100,000 by the end of 1945. The size of the enlisted force was subsequently reduced, but the number of officers continued to climb. These inducements, justified by the army's involvement in social problems, successfully bought the loyalty of most of the Argentine army. David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1987* (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1985), 251, 81-82.

warfare, for young army officers at the small unit level, morale is one variable of great military consequence over which they have great control.

The difference between the services in terms of emphasis placed on the moral factor in war is reflected in the etiquette and habits of U.S. military officers. Army officers eat in the "mess" with their men, generally waiting until all their troops have been served before taking the last portion of the same food. Naval officers, from the most junior to the most senior, eat in the "wardroom" away from their enlisted troops who eat in the "mess deck." Places in the wardroom are frequently set with linen and china and crystal, and until recently, ships officers were served by Pilipino mess boys. (Enlisted sailors have since taken the mess boys' place as servers.) Army officers see their roles as something akin to that of football coaches, responsible for imparting the basic skills necessary to win but equally important for motivating their charges, while naval officers on board ship may view their own collective role as closer to that of a brain trust in a Fortune 500 company.

Early socialization, functional at the junior officer ranks, shapes the lenses through which army officers see larger economic and social issues as they advance in rank – and may, at higher levels, become dysfunctional for the organization and its mission.[93] Some army officers in developing states may even begin to reverse the original functional logic, seeing

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[93] For an application of this general principle to the air force, see Arnold Kanter, "The Career Patterns of Air Force Generals," *American Journal of Political Science* 21, no. 2 (1977).

their paternalistic care for their soldiers and the classes from which they come as their primary

purpose, rather than as a boon to the potential combat effectiveness of their force.

The navy. Interests and biases incline most naval officers to favor liberal nationalism

– including market-based approaches to the domestic economy, free trade and exchange with

foreign states, and social freedoms.

The navy's functional interest in liberal nationalism derives primarily – if largely

indirectly – from its high technology content. Whereas infantry battalions form the backbone

of most armies in developing states, warships and aircraft provide the bulk of combat power

in the navies of virtually all states, developing or otherwise. In developing states, critical

systems (if not whole platforms) must be imported. This is true even of relatively wealthy

developing states, i.e., those on the cusp of becoming advanced industrial states. New OECD

member South Korea – which has a massive shipbuilding industry and an equally large

electronics industry – purchases foreign surface-to-surface missiles (Harpoon and Exocet),

surface-to-air missiles (Sea Sparrow), shipboard helicopters (Super Lynx and Alouette III),

torpedoes (Mk 46), and communications and radar gear for its domestically built naval hulls.

The Korean army, on the other hand, has been building its own tanks and artillery – including

most of their on-board electronic equipment – for at least the last fifteen years. On the eve of

the Pacific War, the Imperial Japanese Navy, which had been building its own warships for

decades, continued to import not only massive amounts of steel and oil, but also critical

machine tools and other production equipment from the United States for the manufacture of

guns, propellers, and other high-end, precision items.[94]

In theory, and sometimes in practice, state-led economic strategies (especially export

led strategies) succeed in raising the industrial and technical capacity of the state. But they

may require decades to produce domestic industrial capabilities relevant to the navy and in the

meantime almost invariably call for tight controls on the use of foreign exchange and a virtual

ban on the import of major capital items other than the machine tools necessary for export

industries. In some cases, such as Peron's Argentina or Goulart's Brazil, trade balances and

foreign reserves may remain in a constant state of near crises, effectively precluding the

import of arms for the military. In the Argentine and Brazilian cases, this affected both the

army and the navy but had a much bigger effect on the latter than the former.[95]

Even where smarter strategies are pursued and massive foreign reserves built up, as in

Korea under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, integral nationalist leaders tend to set

foreign reserves aside for industrial purposes. In the Korean case, emphasis on domestic

military production raised questions about the reliability of artillery ammunition (all of which

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[94] Michael A. Barnhart, *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 185-86.

[95] In Argentina, foreign reserves were depleted by two-thirds (including the entire dollar fund) in the two years between 1946 and 1948, putting the nation on the verge of default and making the purchase of foreign military equipment impossible. Similarly, in Brazil in 1963 (less than a year before the officers of the Navy Club submitted an ultimatum to the President to resign), the government announced that interest payments on the debt already scheduled for 1963-1965 equaled 43 percent of expected export revenues. Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1987*, 293. Alfred Stepan, "Political Leadership and Regime Breakdown: Brazil," in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America*, ed. Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 114-15.

was domestically produced) and other ground forces equipment, but it had a more significant impact on the navy, which remained small and relatively primitive until the 1990s.[96] (The navy began to grow during the mid-1990s when the consensus behind strict controls on the use of foreign currency began to erode.)

It is arguably true that both integral nationalists and liberal nationalists can tell a plausible story about how naval capabilities might be strengthened in the long term. Integral nationalism, however, asks naval leaders to defer the import of critical systems and technologies, an idea they are unlikely to embrace. Moreover, the social and socialized biases of naval officers will further incline them towards liberal nationalist ideas and away from integral nationalist ones. The navy's technical needs generally lead it to seek better-educated officer candidates than those of the army. The navy's officer corps may be predominantly aristocratic, where the aristocracy is relatively better educated than other social classes (e.g., Imperial Japan or early 19th century Latin America); or it may be primarily bourgeois, where that class achieves higher education attainment (e.g., 19th century Germany). Either way, naval officers will be raised in a social milieu that is more cosmopolitan and outward looking than that of army officers. Naval officers' professional residency in coastal ports, assignments that require their collaboration with industry, and their frequent contact with

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[96] On the South Korean preference for indigenous production, see Choi Jong Chul, "South Korea," in *Arms Procurement Decision Making: Volume 1: China, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand*, ed. Ravinder Pal Singh (Solna, Sweden: Oxford University Press, 1998).

foreign officers, often from leading liberal maritime trading states, all reinforce this

perceptual bias in favor of liberal economic policy.[97]

Moreover, free trade and market-based domestic economic policies carry fewer

negative ramifications – and more positive ones – for the navy's enlisted base than for the

army's. In the navies of even many developing states, long-service volunteers make up much

of the enlisted force, reducing the flow of volunteers through the force. With a more

permanent, professional force, then, social dislocation wrought by rapid growth and structural

economic change has less of an impact on the navy than the army. Because volunteers

generally serve as an NCO class, naval officers are further insulated from direct supervision

of – and contact with – the conscripts that do serve in the force. Moreover, the base from

which the navy tends to draw its enlisted sailors – whether short term conscripts or longer

term professionals – tends to be positively rather than negatively affected by free trade.

Navies tend to recruit from more coastal and urban areas than the do armies, and free trade

regimes generally lift the economies of these areas first, producing a better-educated group of

potential recruits.

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[97] All of these points are illustrated in the pre-war Japanese case. The navy's senior officer corps prior to the war was almost entirely descended from samurai families, which had been transformed into an educated bureaucratic class before the Meiji restoration of 1868 and took a leading role in scientific, industrial, and educational endeavors of the new state after that time. Yamamoto Isoroku, as famous for his knowledge of America and opposition to the war with it as he was for his role in the Pearl Harbor attack, was not alone in his foreign exposure. Promising officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy were posted to either the United States or Great Britain at some point in their careers, and most senior officers on the eve of war had served several years in such posts. They were also posted at mid-career to assignments "overseeing" the construction of one or more ships. While these assignments probably involved little actual technical oversight, they did bring naval officers into the industrial world of shipbuilding and precision equipment. Some, like Yamamoto, also developed ties to the aviation world and the zaibatsu most deeply involved in it. Ikeda, *Kaigun to Nihon*. Inoue Shigeyoshi Denki Kankokai, *Inoue Shigeyoshi*. Agawa Hiryuki, *The Reluctant Admiral: Yamamoto and the Imperial Navy*. Oide Hisashi, *Yonai Mitsumasa: Showa Saiko no Kaigun Taisho*.

Finally, naval officers will tend to have material interests, both organizational and personal, in liberal economic and social policies. Free trade may give the navy more important missions – the protection of shipping, screening of coastal areas, etc. – and greater budgetary potential. And the largely upper middle class origin of most naval officers may also give those individuals some direct interest (through family or associational groups) in market-based economic approaches.

The navy's domestic position towards the liberal end of the liberal-integral spectrum is over determined. Although several factors may conspire to produce a contrary outcome, change in any one dimension is seldom enough to change the navy's domestic preferences. Material interests, for example, are unlikely to single handedly trump all other concerns. The Chinese navy's leadership remained opposed to the radical politics of the Cultural Revolution, despite the significant expansion of its size and manpower under the doctrine of "people's war at sea." The same can be said of interests based on social class. Indeed, organizational culture may often be taken as a reflection of class difference, even where little if any difference in fact exists. During the recent coup in Venezuela, the contrasting behavior of naval and army officers was ascribed to the navy's relatively higher social class composition. Yet although there may be some truth to this idea, it is interesting to note that Rear Admiral Carlos Molina, the leader of the attempted coup d'etat who is described by at least one source

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as the very symbol of aristocratic thinking in the navy, was actually the son of an army

officer.[98]

The navy, liberal nationalism, and democracy. This thesis does not suggest that

navies will inevitably support democratic rule. Indeed, it argues that in general, the military

services define their domestic preferences in economic and social terms (with the navy more

focused on the former and the army more concerned with the latter), rather than in strictly

political terms. Where economic liberalism collides with political liberalism, the navy is

likely to give greater weight to economic liberalism, as navies in the Southern Cone of Latin

America did during the 1960s and 1970s (or as the Venezuelan navy did in 2002).

HYPOTHESIS 2

"Navies will tend to be more united in their political and economic preferences than armies,

which are frequently deeply divided."

The logic of this prediction is similar to that underpinning prediction 1, but in this case

is applied to the component organizations that comprise the services themselves and the men

(and sometimes women) who staff them. This prediction holds that the degree of unity or

disunity within each service will depend largely on the degree of homogeneity in its

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[98] Wilson, "Clash of Visions Pushed Venezuela Toward Coup: Admiral and President Were Old Rivals".

subordinate organizations, and that the views of individuals staffing subordinate units will,

again, largely depend on the functional and organizational characteristics of those units.[99]

Almost all naval units either operate technically sophisticated systems, including both

combat systems such as warships and support systems such as weather centers or shore-based

radar and communications systems, or they perform technical functions, such as command

and control or logistics. Consequently, virtually all senior naval officers have substantial

technical education and experience, and many of the navy's enlisted personnel (in virtually all

units) will be long-service volunteers. Army organizations, on the other hand, may perform

highly technical functions (e.g., communications or general staff units) or almost entirely non-

technical ones (e.g., infantry units).[100] Even among the combat arms there are significant

differences: leading armored units is significantly more technically demanding leading non-

mechanized infantry units. Mid-level and high-ranking army officers may have almost

entirely technically, or almost entirely non-technical backgrounds, depending on their branch

and choice of career paths.

Within the army, infantry officers are most likely to hold the integral nationalist views

described earlier. We would expect the domestic political preferences of officers with

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[99] Just as we expect the domestic preferences of armies and navies to differ substantially because of the dramatic differences (in technological and human requirements, etc.) in their compositions, we would also expect officers from the component elements (e.g., unit types) of services to differ if those elements differ substantially from one another along similar axes. We expect less difference where they are more similar to one another.

[100] For two works that treat the effects of technology on the attitudes of both army combat arms officers and technical officers, see Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations;* Lovell, Sok, and Lee, "Professional Orienation and Policy Perspectives of Military Professionals in the Republic of Korea."

primarily technical career paths – e.g., the communications branch, those with long experience in the general staff, and, to a lesser extent, armored officers – to be relatively more like those of naval officers. Even the technical requirements of many relatively high-technology army units, however, are generally closer to low-end naval units (such as torpedo boats) than they are to the navy's primary units (which are, in most developing navies, corvettes, frigates, and destroyers).

The specific structure of the army or the arrangement of its parts can alter the balance of power between those who would favor integral nationalism and those who might be relatively more sympathetic to liberal nationalism. Either might enjoy a commanding position within the organization. To the extent that general staff officers have an advantage in promotions, for example, the army's top command will be more inclined to accept liberal economic and social positions than it would otherwise. Conversely when line officers dominate the highest posts, the army will tend to be more inclined towards integral nationalist, anti-liberal domestic positions. Doctrine and force structure are likely to affect these outcomes. Conventional military doctrines with centralized command structures are more likely to ensure the dominance of technical officers, while guerrilla doctrines and territorially-organized forces are more likely to promote flat hierarchies and the dominance of line officers.

But despite the possibility of manipulating army ideology by tweaking structure, two differences between it and the navy are likely to remain. First, even the army's relatively liberal officers will generally be less liberal in economic and social outlook than will most of

the navy's officer corps. Relatively liberal army officers may make alliances with the navy and liberal civilians, and they may even, depending on the balance of domestic power and other variables, take the lead role in military or political action against common enemies. But even many of these "liberal" army officers may prefer a greater degree of state leadership in the economy or society than their coalitional partners. The Brazilian army split in 1964 over whether or not to depose the elected president Joao Goulart, a socialist and Vargas protégé. But after his overthrow, those liberal nationalist army officers who allied with the navy to depose him introduced substantial state control over the economy, much to the chagrin of naval officers who were among the first to then support a return to democratic (but not socialist) rule.

A second difference with the navy is that whether the army is dominated by relatively technically-minded (and liberal) officers or radical military socialists, the raw materials for the latter are almost always present in the armies of developing states. When the nation's social base is enduring economic hardships, some portion of the army's junior and mid-level line officers are likely to embrace integral nationalism with great fervor. The army is the service of the "Young Turk," intent first on purifying his own institution and then the state. And because these military socialists are generally troop commanders from line units, they will almost always represent a potentially important political force. Much of Argentina's army hierarchy was still aristocratic and pro-status quo when Juan Peron and the colonels of the *Grupo Obra de Unificacion* (GOU, or Task of Unification Group), under the banner of "political sovereignty, economic independence, and social justice," overthrew the oligarch Ramon Castillo in June 1943. Having seized power, Peron not only established an integral

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nationalist state, he also secured the dominance of like-minded officers within the army. The same story can be told of Getulio Vargas and the *tenentes* (lieutenants) group in Brazil, or Park Chung Hee and his fellow conspirators in Korea. (Park's preference for state activism won him a death sentence as a communist before being pardoned during the Korean War.)

Historically, there have been exceptions to the above generalizations. Indeed, in the case of armies, the description above has only been valid since the adoption of some minimal merit-based standards for entry. In armies where officer commissions were restricted entirely to a narrow and cohesive ruling class, especially a landed one (as was the case, for example, in Wilhelmine German army), those organizations often functioned as powerful reactionary forces. Nevertheless, although this thesis does not examine differences in service preferences in 19th or early 20th, it is interesting to note that army preferences were close to the integral nationalist ones in at least one dimension – they tended to be anti-capitalist (though they were anything but progressive).

It is significant that, as the cases of the Argentinean *Grupo Obra de Unificacion* or the Brazilian *tenentes* (among others) suggest, army officer corps do not have to be thoroughly inclusive or representative in order for integral nationalist ideologies to take hold among significant groups of officers. It is sufficient, rather, that they be partly open or that the "ruling classes" themselves lack cohesion or formal definition. Today, virtually all armies, even in the developing world, depend largely on merit-based exams for recruiting officers.

HYPOTHESIS 3

"When politics are gridlocked and economic strategies failing, military organizations are likely to be drawn into – or seek to create – domestic political coalitions with like-minded civilian actors; often, two contending civil-military coalitions will emerge."

Rapid economic growth (as well as economic downturns along that path) frequently leads to political gridlock and acute crises surrounding the legitimacy of governing institutions.[101] Economic change produces powerful new economic groups capable of challenging political structures that may privilege older elites. But both historical observation and experimental sociology suggest that individuals and groups are more inclined to expend energy defending existing interests than acquiring new ones. Hence, old elites will fight fierce rearguard actions. Poorer groups – displaced peasants or new classes of urban workers – may also become mobilized by hardship or uncertainty, throwing yet one more element into the mix.[102] In this highly competitive and uncertain environment, some groups may have little faith that new legal or institutional arrangements can represent their interests and may challenge the legitimacy of governing institutions. While there is no inevitability about armed clashes or civil war at any particular step during the process, the threat of violence certainly looms large during many key transition points.

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[101] See, for example, Barrington Moore Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon, 1966). Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

[102] Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon, 1944). Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

This thesis suggests that civil-military coalitions are frequently found on both sides of domestic disputes. This observation is consistent with a growing number of scholars and officials in both Latin America and Asia who argue that many events heretofore labeled "military interventions" in government should more rightly be called "civil-military interventions."[103] When the legitimacy of political institutions is challenged, social groups (the challengers or status quo groups) will often arm themselves to take direct action against their political adversaries. Even more likely, groups will arm defensively, seeking to protect themselves against the threat (imagined or real) that political adversaries will attack them. As domestic security dilemmas worsen, it is likely that both sides will look to sympathetic actors within the military to provide weapons and/or personnel.[104] Given the importance and urgency of military support, civilians will look to officers whose loyalties are most likely to correspond to their own, naval officials and staff officers in the case of liberals and army line officers in the case of integral nationalists. Alternatively, military organizations themselves may also take the initiative in creating domestically oriented political coalitions.

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[103] For example, Argentina's civilian defense minister, Horacio Jaunarena, recently stated that "the vast majority of coups d'etat in Argentina were civilian-military coups." "Argentine Defense Minister Underscores Military's Respect for Democratic Rule; Denies Malaise in Armed Forces". Indonesia's defense minister has made a similar argument. These arguments are not entirely new. In 1968 Samuel Huntington argued, "Military explanations do not explain military intervention. The reason for this is simply that military interventions are only one specific manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies: the general politicization of social forces and institutions." Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 194.

[104] This type of spiral logic explains why it is frequently difficult – even in hindsight – for analysts to determine whether specific coups were offensive or defensive, preemptive strikes. This was true in the Indonesian case in 1965, in the Argentinian case in 1955, and to some degree in the Chilean case in 1973 in Chile. Both sides are arming today in Venezuela, and if violence should break out, it will undoubtedly be difficult to determine which side was on the offensive and which on the defensive.

Specifying the services' coalition partners. Which specific social groups each military

faction will align with depends on a constellation of factors, the most important of which will

be the competitiveness of individual sectors and social groups in free market domestic and

international competition. If there is an iron-fast rule, it is that navies in the developing world

are almost invariably aligned in their liberal preferences with the middle class, especially the

upper middle class and those parts of the middle class engaged employed in the private

sector.[105] The navy will also tend to be aligned with industry, especially in industrializing

states (as opposed to states where industry is a declining force), and may be aligned with

aristocrats and other large-scale landholders, especially where commercial agriculture is

internationally competitive.

Integral nationalists in the army may ally with white-collar workers in government and

or managers in state-supported firms – both groups that stand to be substantially enlarged and

enriched under integral nationalist economic structures. Where the lower middle class sees

itself structurally trapped in its inferior status by established social or economic actors, it may

also align itself with army integral nationalists. Integral nationalist military officers will also

champion society's more vulnerable groups, including farmers and, often, urban workers.

(Appearing before a workers' rally, Peron announced, "I am a soldier in the most powerful

unionized association of all: the military."[106]) But while these integral nationalist officers

may ally with existing farmers groups and/or labor unions, their suspicion of groups outside

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[105] This is likely to be true those occasions when the economic and political interests of the middle class collide with one another and the middle class backs non-democratic political solutions.

[106] Rock, *Authoritarian Argentina: The Nationalist Movement, Its History and Its Impact*, 142.

of state supervision may lead to friction with those groups. Integral nationalist officers will

partner with civilian groups, but the nature of their relationship with those is less than fully

equal.

Picking winners. Which coalition will win? A variety of factors are likely to

influence political-military outcomes, and this thesis is circumspect about making predictions

in this area. I will, however, venture a few comments about several key variables.

Several of these variables are non-military. The economic performance of the

incumbent government will help determine how large and committed faction members on

both sides may be. During 2003, the Chavez government's economic difficulties

progressively alienated even the parts of the government's labor base, but Chavez' slide in

popularity was reversed after the surge in world oil prices permitted him to initiate major new

social programs in 2004. The long-term political and economic interests of contending social

groups, however, may lead them to emphasize the relative distribution of domestic wealth and

power over absolute welfare, diminishing to some extent the expected impact of any objective

assessment of governmental performance. The structure of the economy and cohesion and

organizational capabilities of the contending coalitions' civilian elements will also influence

outcomes. The dominant position of the extractive industries in Chile, for example, gave the

upper middle class significant leverage in its showdown with Allende's socialist government

in 1973.

Several military variables will also affect political outcomes. The logic of this thesis suggests that a large, powerful navy will increase the probability of liberal victory. After an era of integral nationalist dominance in Argentina and Brazil during the 1930s and 1940s, strong naval traditions (and relatively powerful navies) helped largely upper class, liberal actors claw their way back into power in Argentina and Brazil during the 1950s and 1960s. In Asia, the army's dominance in South Korea probably helped Park Chung Hee consolidate his integral nationalist regime quickly after his coup d'etat in 1961, whereas a powerful navy in Thailand resulted in a much longer transition after an army coup in 1947 – and one in which the outcome was not decided until the failure of two naval-led counter coup attempts in 1949 and 1951. A second variable, the army's doctrine and force structure, will affect the distribution of integral nationalist and liberal actors within that service. (See prediction 2 above.)

Powerful military enemies can complicate the task of consolidating power, even without threatening coups d'etat. They may, for example, allow insurgencies to fester (or even aid and abet them), refuse to release resources for economic projects, or publicly question civil authorities' competence on military issues (thus damaging their perceived legitimacy). Military allies can, in contrast, assist in consolidation work. Ultimately, however, a powerful military coalition can only buy time for new or existing regimes. If the regime fails to perform, civilians will ultimately come challenge its legitimacy. No matter how much military restructuring the regime has done, it will almost always harbor significant elements inclined to support the opposition, and when major portions of civil society turn

against the government, the size and energy of military opposition too will grow. Purely military variables are important in determining the outcome of developmental crises, but they alone do not determine outcomes.

HYPOTHESIS 4

"Victories for liberal nationalists in domestic political contests will likely signal shifts toward maritime strategies, while victories for integral nationalist positions will signal shifts toward continental strategies."

Two-level games theorists modify traditional realist precepts by arguing that national leaders give precedence to whichever threats to the regime are greatest – whether foreign or domestic.[107] Based on this logic, the effects of domestic politics on military policy should be particularly large in new regimes (i.e., new constitutional or institutional domestic orders). The consolidation of new democratic regimes frequently takes ten years or more, even when no decisive reversal overturns incremental gains.[108] To a lesser extent, we also expect this logic to apply to most non-democratic regimes, regardless of age, since those governments tend to be plagued by low levels of legitimacy and the lack of peaceful means of

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[107] Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460; Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

[108] Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).

succession.[109] Both new democratic regimes and all non-democratic ones are frequently

vulnerable to either armed domestic threats or, depending on the circumstances, "people

power" (i.e., non-violent mass action aimed at crippling the government and forcing it from

power).

Securing military allies is often critical for regime survival in these situations.

Ultimately, political leaders will seek to establish firm control over all facets of the military

and military policy. But military organizations tend to be largely self-governed and difficult

to penetrate.[110] Civilian leaders may be able to replace top military leaders, for example, but

military organizations often have control (either by law or by custom) over which individuals

stand as candidates for those top positions. More important, the self-contained nature of

military society creates organizational cultures that may be difficult to influence in the short

term using the tools available to civilian leaders. Faced with these dilemmas, civilian leaders

frequently rely heavily on those parts of the military that are known to be sympathetic to their

domestic agenda, at least until widely recognized legal prerogatives can be established giving

leaders more articulated control of the military establishment. Integral nationalists are thus

likely to promote army line officers (and the army in general, once those individuals are fully

in command of the hierarchy), while liberal nationalists are more likely to promote naval

officers and technical officers from within the army.

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[109] On this point, see Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequence in the Middle East."

[110] On the self-governing nature of military organizations, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); and Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Free Press, 1960). Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.*

Allies within the military serve several specific domestic functions. First, they deter coups d'etat by threatening to defend the government by force of arms. Second, they gather intelligence on activities by military (and sometimes civilian) opponents of the government who might be determined to undermine or overturn the regime – allowing the government to take preventive action. Third, they sponsor structural military changes designed to advantage military groups that are sympathetic to the government. Finally, if they gain effective control over the key administrative positions and have already carried out structural reforms to ensure the authority of those positions, they can begin to take more direct measures to shift the organizational subculture of those groups that remain hostile to the government. They may, for example, change doctrine as it taught in military academies or command schools. This effort, which will take many years, may diminish the domestic differences between military organizations, though it is unlikely to eliminate them entirely.

In return for this support, civilian leaders offer two incentives to military allies: increased resource allocation relative to those of other military organizations and considerable leeway in promoting preferred military doctrines. Increasing relative resource allocation to military allies not only secures the loyalty of those allies, it also strengthens their capability to support the government, especially in deterring coups and gathering intelligence (i.e., functions that require budgets and manpower). Granting military allies significant control over military doctrine may serve similar purposes, further cementing loyalty and justifying military structural reforms strengthening their own position within the military hierarchy.

Perhaps more importantly, however, political leaders in these cases frequently have little choice. They are likely to be engaged in other desperate political fights simultaneously, and they will also be undertaking difficult and delicate efforts to restructure the national economy without causing massive dislocations. Hence, given these constraints on time and political resources, civilians may have little choice but to cede considerable control of strategy to their military allies.

In the case of liberal transitions, these resource constraints may limit the degree to which the navy's warship strength can be increased. Some budget share can be taken from the army, a tactic that may weaken that organization (or key parts of it) at the expense of potentially increasing its hostility to the new government. In addition, doctrinal shifts towards maritime strategies will, in addition to the functions discussed above, serve as a promissory note to the navy, implying that when resources do become available, the navy will receive priority. In the short term, the marine corps may be strengthened, since this can be done relatively cheaply and will, dollar-for-dollar, provide the most domestic military muscle.

Competing Explanations

Tests pitting proposed theories against relevant alternative explanations tend to be more robust than those that simply address the null hypothesis (i.e., the hypothesis that the theory is not true and has no utility).[111] Two competing explanations, one for each of the above two

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[111] Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 38-39.

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elements, are considered. A material interests-based theory is considered as an alternative to

the more highly articulated theory I have proposed to explain the services' domestic leanings.

And an explanation based on armed threats to the state (the "strategic military environment")

is proposed as an alternative explanation for national military strategies and force structures.

MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED THEORY

If two theories, one simple and one complex, explain the same number of outcomes, we

should favor the former over the latter as more parsimonious and powerful.[112] Some

organization theorists explicitly recognize a mix of task-related functional, interests-based,

and socialization effects on preferences and behavior.[113] Others recognize some combined

subset of specific motivations that fall within two or more of these categories.[114] Perhaps the

most parsimonious approach to organizations has been taken by those who suggest that the

organization's pursuit of its material interests – specifically manpower and budgets – provides

the most compelling explanation for much if not most organizational behavior.[115] If material

interests can explain the domestic preferences of the military services without reference to

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[112] The requirement for equal explanatory power imposes a difficult condition, and there is some debate on the merits of simplicity. Nevertheless, all things being equal, simplicity is generally best. King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, 20.

[113] See, for example, Wilson, *Bureaucracy : What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It.*

[114] These authors are the most numerous. Sociologists, not surprisingly, tend to emphasize a combination of functional and socialization effects. See, for example, Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait.* Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations.* Political scientists – again not surprisingly – tend to emphasize a combination of functional and material motivations. Barry Posen and Stephen Van Evera, for example, stress the functionally-related desire to reduce uncertainty in military planning, as well as motivations related to budgets and manpower, in explaining the preference of military organizations for military doctrines. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars;* Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive Between the World Wars."

[115] For an explanation of military strategy prior to World War I that rests almost entirely on the material interests of organizations, see Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive.*

function or, especially, without considering the effects of socialization we should prefer this explanation.

A simple organization theory that sought to explain army and naval preferences would treat those two organizations as interest-driven factions without stable ideology.[116] This theory would predict that the services would make cost-benefit calculations about support for political actors on a case-by-case basis. Given the propensity to defend existing assets more fiercely than they would pursue new gains, we would expect the services to behave relatively conservatively and not turn against those who had favored them with budgetary or manpower increases, except in cases where there were credible promises from rivals to provide large rewards quickly. Also, the services should show relatively little interest in economic and social issues per se, except insofar as they directly affect political outcomes.

Perhaps the most challenging variant of this theory might suggest that both services will, for reasons related to predispositions about national strategy, expect liberals to favor the navy and integral nationalists to favor the army. Service preferences might frequently look similar to those predicted by the civil-military coalition theory predicts, but predictions would nevertheless diverge in some cases. The preferences of the army's subordinate elements would not, for example, diverge based on the degree of capital or technology used. And we would still expect the services to evaluate costs and benefits on a case-by-case basis. Army officers will not, for example, continue to support integral nationalist leaders who cut the

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[116] Though focused on army factions, Bruce Farcau has offered just such an assessment, arguing that Latin American military behavior can be satisfactorily explained by the struggle for factional advantage. Farcau, *The Transition to Democracy in Latin America: The Role of the Military.*

army's budget and show little indication of increasing it again soon. The navy, similarly, might back integral nationalists who have demonstrated a willingness to increase naval budgets.

STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

Explanations based on the strategic military environment predict that national strategy and force structure will adjust to match the most pressing military threats facing the nation. Broadly speaking, these explanations are consistent with realist theories of international relations. Realists assume that state leaders tend to be highly sensitive to external threats and will work to insure that strategy and forces are reasonably well tailored to meet those threats.[117] Many realists, however, attach a number of qualifications to their threat-based predictions, including two that are particularly germane to this thesis. First, modern realists have suggested that the great powers are most likely to make a serious effort to match doctrines and forces to external threats; weaker states may view the task of unilateral defense as difficult if not hopeless. Second, some realists do not deny that bureaucratic or other politic affect strategy and force planning when threat levels are low, but they nevertheless demonstrate that when threat levels are high, military planning tends to become more rational.[118]

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[117] The clearest summary statements of structural realism are Waltz, *Theory of International Relations*. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.

[118] See, for example, Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*.

Despite the qualifications that realist theorists place on their predictions, the popular literature on military strategy and force planning – even on those of small states and even in relatively low threat environments – is generally dominated by military threat-based explanations. Civilian state leaders and military commanders almost invariably explain their choices about strategy and force structure as the best response to the state's external threat environment. Reporters, often unschooled in military analysis and looking for explanations that are easily comprehensible to general (and sometimes distant) readers, tend to report these official explanations uncritically as reflecting the actual calculations behind military planning. These explanations then find their way into longer analyses of strategic and military affairs.

The privileged place accorded the strategic military environment and rational defense planning in the press, popular international relations literature, and even in some academic writing makes testing strategic explanations important. Given the caveats attached to realist theory, these do not necessarily represent tests of realist theory more broadly. Nevertheless, realist caveats, especially about the applicability of the approach to relatively weak states, tend to be under-specified. (Do the predictions not apply to these states or merely apply with less force or in modified form – e.g., with greater emphasis on allies and alliances – to these cases?) And those caveats have sometimes been broadly ignored even by those who acknowledge them in principle. Hence, this thesis' side-by-side examination of politically based and military threat-based explanations should provide additional perspective on the applicability of realist theory in a variety of settings and threat environments.

Explanations based on the strategic military environment (which I also refer as

"threat-based theories") include a variety of specific propositions. Relatively greater overall

threat levels should result in increased military spending and invigorated efforts to find allies,

while a decline in the threat should, to a lesser extent, result in less emphasis in these areas.

In general, new or stronger continental threats should lead the state to redouble efforts to

strengthen their ground forces. Where the threat of conquest is high and the state cannot

plausibly generate the resources to defeat it in conventional combat, the state may rely more

on *guerrilla-type* forces. Where the ground threat is to peripheral, largely uninhabited areas

and where the state can plausibly generate forces capable of defeating more substantial

invasion threats outright, we expect the state to pursue *conventional* ground forces and

doctrines. An increase in the maritime threat should generally lead the state to build stronger

naval forces. This generalization may not hold, however, when the state cannot plausibly

generate the resources to defeat the threat with their own maritime power. In these cases, we

would expect states to build forces appropriate for a sea-denial strategy in offshore areas.

Such forces may, for example, include submarines or ground-based air capabilities.

Alternatively (or in addition), these states may devote most of their military resources to

building strong ground or air capabilities, so that potential invaders can defeat the enemy once

he comes. But to the extent that external threats are naval and maritime defenses plausible,

we should certainly expect to find emphasis on naval forces and strategy.

The balance between domestic and foreign military threats to state sovereignty may be

particularly relevant to East Asian states during the post-World War II period. When major

insurgencies are in progress, we expect that military doctrine will be modified accordingly. A

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relative shift from naval to ground capabilities will be observed. In the context of this thesis and its subject matter, I examine an alternative explanation for strategic change based on the rise and fall of communist insurgencies in the region. Specifically, I examine the possibility that the decline of naval forces throughout the region after an initial postwar maritime buildup corresponded with the rise of communist insurgencies. Viewed from an aggregate regional perspective, the explanation is plausible and worthy of investigation.

Case Selection and Methodology

I test the above hypotheses in structured, focused comparative case studies of three countries (Thailand, China, and Indonesia), dividing each examination into between two and four cases, each of which revolves around the services' reactions to changes in the dominant organizing ideology of the state and changes in grand strategy.

CASE SELECTION

Having formulated the theory largely on the basis of empirical observations of the record of Latin American navies and armies, I test its hypotheses against historical events in East Asia. This eliminates the problem of using the same data to generate and test the theory, and, perhaps more importantly, offers the chance to demonstrate the utility of the theory in two separate regions.[119] Case studies on Thailand, China, and Indonesia offer considerable

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[119] There is disagreement on the necessity of using different data sets to generate and test theories. King, Keohane, and Verba argue using different data sets helps reduce the possibility of eliminating known theory-infirming cases. King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.* Van Evera argues that the measure is largely ineffective, since the researcher will almost always start with some knowledge of all his cases. Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 45.

variation in terms of domestic structure, military institutions, and strategic variables. They are also all important for U.S. policy in Asia.

These states have varied considerably in their domestic political and economic structures over the post-World War II period. For example, Thailand was ruled by a succession of uniformed officers for much of the period; China has been ruled by its Communist Party since 1949; and Indonesia was ruled by a civilian (if former military) strong-man between 1967 and 1998. Variations in the economic and social organization of these states have been equally dramatic. If the domestic preferences of armies and navies when confronted by a choice between figures representing *relatively* liberal nationalist and *relatively* integral nationalist positions – despite significant differences in the actual structure of government or economy – then the theory's results can be said to be relatively robust in this dimension.

A second dimension in which these cases vary lies in the institutional origins of their military establishments. The Thai army and navy are bureaucracies that have enjoyed great institutional continuity from the 19th century. The Indonesian army and navy were born during the war of independence against the Dutch (1945-1949), though most of the high ranking officers who built the force were graduates of either the pre-World War II Dutch-trained military structure or the Japanese-trained wartime training system. The Chinese army was the child of a lengthy revolution – though some key military officers did have prior military experience. The Chinese navy (or "People's Liberation Army Navy") was and is officially a branch of the army, though it has become a full service in all but name. The

variation and evolution of the organizations involved provides additional longitudinal variation in organizational characteristics in addition to those based on snapshots of different organizations at a given point in time. (We will, for example, expect service differences to become sharper as they become more institutionalized and as they establish independent recruiting and training systems.)

The third dimension in which these cases vary is in terms of geography and power. Indonesia is an archipelago with important resources separated from its population and political center of gravity by relatively large stretches of ocean, making it more vulnerable (in purely geographical terms) to sea-borne invasion. China is a large continental state that has historically focused on landward threats. And Thailand is a peninsular state, potentially vulnerable to either sea- or ground-based attack. These states also vary in size, with China qualifying as a medium power aspiring to be a major power and the other two being aspiring medium powers. These strategic differences help produce divergent predictions for the civil-military coalition theory (which suggests external events will fail to explain outcomes) and structural realism (which suggests that they will).

Finally, these states are important cases because the domestic politics and military policies of all (especially China and Indonesia) significantly affect U.S. security. This is most obviously true of China, which many in the United States have regarded as a potential threat to regional peace and stability since after the end of the Cold War. The dissertation will, I hope, speak directly to important causes of grand strategy in China. The examination of politics and grand strategy in Indonesia and Thailand should also place events in China in a

comparative context of other developing states in East Asia. This set of cases allows us to ask whether China's strategic behavior is exceptional. The strategic futures of Indonesia and Thailand are also important in their own right. Although significantly less powerful than China, both are strong enough in a Southeast Asian context that their military postures can provide a powerful influence – positive or negative – on sub regional stability.

In addition to the importance of their military postures, the domestic futures of all three states are also critical to American interests. The consolidation and gradual expansion of liberal economic and political reforms – or the failure and collapse of those reforms – will help determine whether the democratic third wave in Asia gathers further momentum or whether instead a backlash develops. A related concern is that, at least in the case of China or Indonesia, political gridlock surrounding these issues could conceivably result in the partial collapse of the state, resulting in massive refugee flows, lawlessness, and even the possibility that terrorist groups could find important new sanctuaries in remote areas. Understanding of the dynamics of civil-military relations in these states is critical for predicting and influencing (to the extent possible) the domestic futures of these states.

CASE DEFINITION AND OUTLINE

With some variation, the post-World War II histories of Thailand, China, and Indonesia have seen three decisive shifts in the dominant political-economic organizing principles that governed national policy. Each saw (1) a postwar interlude of liberal politics; (2) a longer period of state-led integral nationalist government; and (3) a revival of liberalism. In each

case, a domestic crisis pitting advocates of one ideology against the other preceded the shift in

ideology and leadership. Each case covers one state during one major domestic crisis.

Each case is divided into seven parts: (1) a brief summary of the key events covered

by the case; (2) an assessment of the domestic political order and any challengers and a

coding of each as integral nationalist or liberal nationalist; (3) a summary of the military

services' positions taken towards the ruling regime and its competitors, as well as an

assessment of each service's unanimity on these issues; (4) an assessments of what factors

appeared to drive service preferences; (5) an assessment of the changes in force structure and

doctrine, especially changes in the relative balance between maritime and continental forces,

which took place after the resolution of key political contests; (6) a summary evaluation of

how the predictions generated by the civil-military coalition theory perform; and (7) an

evaluation of the two competing theories discussed above, one based on the strategic military

environment and another based on the material interests of the services (specifically, in

manpower and budgets).

THEORY TESTING AND PROCESS TRACING

The predictions generated by the three theories addressed by this thesis (and especially the

civil-military coalition theory's predictions) are tested in two ways. The first involves the

coding of independent and dependent variables and the comparison of those values to

predicted results. This is, in principle, a straightforward exercise, even if coding is sometimes

difficult or yields ambiguous results. The second method, used wherever the data permit, is

process tracing.[120] Process tracing involves not just coding variables, but also examining the steps (or process) by which the independent variable caused (or did not cause) the dependent variable. This can, with sufficient data, confirm not just the expected correlation predicted by a theory, but create a rich tapestry that can confirm suspected causal logic – or suggest modifications to it. In this thesis, predictions about service positions and strategic effects are coded and tested, while causal logic, including the effects of various organizational characteristics, are tested through process tracing. Process tracing is conducted more in the case of recent cases, where the data are richer, than for earlier ones, for which the data are sparser.

Summary of Predictions

Civil-military Coalition Theory (1)

1.1.0   Navies will generally support liberal nationalist domestic positions. Armies will frequently support integral nationalist ones.

    1.1.1   The services' domestic preferences will remain relatively stable, changing slowly if at all even when they stand to lose materially in the short term from adherence to those preferences.

    1.1.2   The services will show direct interest in economic and social issues beyond their support for political leaders engaged representing those interests in domestic struggles.

    1.1.3   Where military services have long and relatively uninterrupted institutional histories, the degree to which they will ascribe to this general prediction – even when it runs counter to the services' material interests – will be strengthened.

1.2.0   Navies will tend to be more united in their domestic preferences than armies.

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[120] On process tracing, see George and Mckeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision Making." King, Keohane, and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*, 226-28. Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 64-67.

1.2.1 Divisions within the army will see line officers (especially from the infantry branch) more inclined toward integral nationalism than officers from more technical branches or units (such as general staff units or communications).

1.2.2 Manipulating the leadership or structure of the army can produce changes in its official doctrine, but strong integral nationalist sentiments will almost always remain among the officers of many line units.

1.2.3 Naval resistance to non-liberal national arrangements will run deep, and replacing top naval leaders will have relatively little effect in changing the organization's ideology and behavior.

1.3.0 When politics are gridlocked and economic strategies failing, military organizations are likely to be drawn into – or seek to create – domestic political coalitions with like-minded civilian actors; often, two contending civil-military coalitions will emerge.

1.3.1 Civilians will be aware of the services' distinctive domestic preferences, and communication between like-minded civilian and military groups will occur.

1.3.2 Navies will generally find themselves aligned with those groups involved in the most internationally competitive sectors of society, which will frequently include the middle class (especially the upper middle class), industry, and, sometimes, large scale, commercial agriculture.

1.3.3 Integral nationalists in the army will frequently ally with state workers (including workers in state-owned enterprises) and disadvantaged social elements (including peasants, blue collar labor, and sometimes the lower middle class).

1.3.4 Military variables affecting the outcome of contests between integral and liberal coalitions include the relative size and strength of the army and navy and the degree to which the army's doctrine and force structures are oriented towards conventional as opposed to guerrilla (or territorial) warfare.

1.4.0 Victories by liberal nationalists in domestic political contests will signal shifts toward maritime strategies, while victories by integral nationalists will bring shifts towards continental strategies.

1.4.1 The timing of major doctrinal and force structure shifts will follow closely on the heels of domestic political crises that result in the incumbent's ouster.

1.4.2 Military doctrines and the specific force structure decisions will tend to be poorly integrated with diplomatic or economic policies when new domestic groups are consolidating power.

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1.4.3   During transitions to liberal regimes, the costs of adding major new warships and the other demands on the resources of new regimes will generally mean that doctrinal change and the promotion of naval leaders will frequently be more significant than actual changes in the navy's warship inventory.

1.4.4   To the extent that naval personnel or budgets expand, new resources will frequently be devoted first and foremost to the strengthening of marine ground strength.

1.4.5   Integral nationalist leaders will frequently restructure the army to systematically advantage line officers (by, for example, decentralizing command, thereby minimizing the importance of the general staff and other technical positions.) Liberal leaders tend to restructure the army to advantage technical officers.

Material Interests-based Theory (2)

2.1.0   Services will make cost-benefit calculations about support for political actors on a case-by-case basis and will weigh the potential material rewards (in terms of manpower and budgets) above all other considerations.

2.1.1   Services will be generally risk-averse and will not cease to support those who have favored them with budgetary and manpower increases, especially without the credible promise of large short-term rewards by opponents.

2.1.2   Services will not oppose incumbent political authorities when there is little prospect for their successful removal, but will abandon loyalty to old political elites soon after their removal or defeat. They will be prone to bandwagon.

2.2.0   Neither service will show interest in economic and social issues per se, except insofar as that involvement directly affects political outcomes.

Strategic Military Environment (3)

3.1.0   Doctrinal change will track closely in time to changes in the nature of threats to state sovereignty and survival.

3.1.1   Heightened external continental (ground force) threats will lead to increased resource allocation to ground forces – conventional ground forces if the state can plausibly generate sufficient resources to successfully mount such a defense and guerrilla-type forces when it cannot.

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3.1.2   Increased external maritime threats will lead to relatively greater emphasis on naval capabilities.

3.1.2   Increased threats from armed domestic insurgent groups will lead to shifts towards greater resource allocation towards the army and the adoption of counterinsurgency strategies.

3.2.0   State leaders will show an interest the content of military strategy – especially in those aspects designed to meet pressing threats – and military policy will be well integrated with diplomatic and other aspects of the state's foreign and security policy.

CHAPTER 4: THAILAND

Introduction

Both Thai inter-service politics and strategic outcomes support the civil-military coalition theory. By the mid-19th century, the army and navy had emerged as independent bureaucracies, and by the outbreak of World War II, the two services already had very different ideas of how the state, economy, and society should be organized. That divergence only widened during and after the war, placing the two squarely in opposing domestic camps by the end of the war. The army was divided, but many in it supported the creation of a national socialist (and integral nationalist) state prior and during World War II. Naval officers, unhappy about the direction of national policy, served as the military core of the opposition Free Thai movement during the war years. Over the following decades, the navy maintained its commitment to liberal values, while the army's position became further solidified behind an increasingly well-defined program of state-led development. Nor was support for these positions passive: On several occasions the army and the navy engaged in armed conflicts against one another, and in many other instances, they proffered other forms of key organizational or political support to like-minded civilian actors.

With the different political-economic preferences of both services on record since at least 1942, political leaders have subsequently manipulated grand strategy to strengthen the hand of sympathetic military actors. Liberal leaders have held sway three times since 1942:

immediately before and after the end of World War II (especially between 1944 and 1947);

between 1973 and 1976; and between 1980 and the present (especially between 1986 and the

present). In all three cases, liberal leaders promoted naval leaders, strategies, and force

structures. In the intervening years available resources were devoted instead to army

expansion, with naval budgets and capabilities declining in relative – and sometimes even

absolute – terms.

The degree to which naval fortunes have been tied with those of liberalism in Thailand

is illustrated by the correlation between naval officers serving as either supreme commander

or defense minister and periods of liberal parliamentary rule. Between 1932 and 1997, there

were only two brief periods (1946-47 and 1975-76) when the Thai constitution provided for

an elected senate with no administratively appointed military representatives. During both of

those parliamentary interludes, and at no other times, were naval officers appointed ministers

of defense. Naval officers also served as supreme commander during the second of these

periods. (The position, having been abolished in 1944, did not exist during the first.) Naval

officers also occupied the position between 1986 and 1987 and between 2001 and 2002 – i.e.,

during years of liberal reform. At no other point since World War II have naval officers

served in that position.

Each examines civil-military politics and strategic outcomes during an important

political-economic transformation or attempted transformation. The periods covered by each

are:

- *Case 1 (1938-1947): The Free Thai revolt against national socialism.* The navy backs the Free Thai movement against General Phibun's regime.

- *Case 2 (1947-1973): The rise of Sarit and the developmental state.* General Sarit creates an integral nationalist regime that serves as a model for his army successors; the navy remains in opposition.

- *Case 3 (1973-1980): Student revolution and the struggle between liberals and radicals.* The navy sides with students, reap some rewards, but turns against the students as their economic demands become more radical.

- *Case 4 (1980-2002): Consolidating liberal rule.* The navy, together with army general staff officers, help engineer a return to democratic rule.

With some variation depending on the specific demands of the historical period in question, each case is divided into five subsections: (1) an assessment of the political-economic choices available to the services; (2) an evaluation of the positions taken by each service, as well as the extent of internal unanimity; (3) a discussion of the political resolution in each case and changes in military strategies and force structures under the new political authorities; (4) a summary evaluation of the civil-military coalition theory; and (5) an assessment of the relative merits of two alternative theories – one based on the strategic military environment and a second based primarily on the material interests of the services.

Institutional Background of the Military

The modern Thai army and navy were established under King Mongkut in the mid-19th century and have enjoyed a high degree of continuity in their institutional history, especially in comparison with the military organizations of other East Asian states.[121] The difference

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[121] The naval academy was established on its current site in 1900. From undated pamphlet by the Royal Thai Navy, *The Royal Thai Navy Brief History*.

between Thailand and other regional states was particularly pronounced in the case of the navy, which was modern, if small, by the time of the 1932 revolution against royal absolutism. The 1932 revolution – really a bloodless coup d'etat – was executed by civilians and military officers who had coalesced as a political group during their overseas training in France and other European states. The number of naval participants in the coup was only slightly fewer than the number of army participants despite the much smaller size of the former, and the number of naval parliamentary representatives between 1932 and 1951 was always close to the number of army representatives. [122] In short, the navy was a formidable institutional and political force during the earliest period examined by this thesis.

This section briefly reviews those characteristics of the services that might be expected to influence their views on domestic (i.e., political, economic, and social) issues. These service characteristics did not remain entirely constant across time, but changes tended to be by degrees, and including a discussion under each case would, in many respects, prove redundant. The discussion is divided into similarities and differences in five areas: (1) the degree of non-human capital used by each; (2) the background and training of officers; (3) the recruitment and composition of the enlisted ranks; (4) basing patterns and locations; and (5) the degree of foreign contact enjoyed by each.

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[122] For example, there were sixteen naval and eighteen army officers in the 1932 and 1933 parliaments. Kato Kazuhide, *Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru Minshushugi* (Tokyo: Kobundo, 1995), 102.

CAPITAL CONTENT. The navy's non-human capital content is significantly higher than that of the army, and much of its capital is imported. This is evident from recent data: the navy's personnel level is 38 percent of the army's; its budget is 43 percent of the army's; and although its imports vary significantly from year to year, they have, in recent years, ranged between 50 and 100 percent of the army's.[123] The navy's higher per capita spending holds despite the army's extremely top-heavy rank structure. As of 1998, the army was 128 percent over strength in terms of general officers (with 1060 on the payroll to fill 462 positions), while the navy was only 28 percent over strength (with 270 to fill 211 positions).[124] The Thai army, with one general officer for every 130 men, has more generals – by absolute count – than the notoriously top-heavy Russian army.

Although figures on manpower, budget, and foreign purchasing are sketchier for earlier periods, the discrepancies between per capita army and navy spending (both domestic and foreign) seem to have been even higher during the 1930s and early 1940s than they are today. On the eve of Thailand's Indochina War against France (1940-41), the navy's manpower was 28 percent that of the army (10,000 vs. 35,000), while its budget was 62

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[123] Personnel figures are from IISS, *Military Balance, 1998-99* (London: IISS, 1998). The breakdown for the 1998 military budget is found in "Battle to Beat Military Cuts", *Bangkok Post*, April 27 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-0428. Budgets for foreign purchases are found in various places. Most only track budget requests, not approved purchases. The budget request for 1997 included naval purchases worth 62 percent those of the army. See "Chawalit and Military Spending", *The Nation*, December 20 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-1220.

[124] Most navies have heavier rank structures than the army. In terms of official billets, Thailand is no exception. The Thai navy, with 38 percent as many personnel, has 45 percent as many slots for general rank officers. "Too Many Generals in Thai Armed Forces", *The Nation*, September 7 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0906. "Thai Defense Council Agrees to Streamline Armed Forces", *The Nation*, May 28 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-0528.

percent as large – making its per capita spending over twice that of the army.[125] The navy's

vessels were all imported. Thailand purchased nine ships from Italy and fifteen, including

two light cruisers and four submarines, from Japan between 1936 and 1938.[126] The army's

divisions were overwhelmingly infantry formations, with a total of two armored battalions

and nine artillery battalions. Although armor and artillery were imported, this could have

only amounted to a small fraction of the navy's overseas spending.

OFFICER SELECTION AND TRAINING. The navy's officer corps has generally been

drawn from a higher social class than the army's. Prior to the 1932 revolution, the navy had

traditionally been commanded by royal princes, several of who were generally serving with

the fleet at any one time. During the two decades after 1932, the navy's top officers were

almost invariably the scions of aristocratic families. [127] The army's top commanders prior to

1932 were aristocrats, with an occasional prince thrown into the mix. But even by the late

19th century, joining the army was seen as an avenue of social advancement. And after 1932,

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[125] Budget figures for the services are from Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, *The Free Thai Movement and Thailand's Internal Political Conflicts (1938-1949)* (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Institute of Asian Studies, 1991), 15. Army manpower figures are from Royal Thai Army Operations Division, *The Unit Organization During the Indo-China Conflict and The Great East Asian War* (No city given: Royal Thai Army Operations Division, 1946), 92.

[126] Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1995), Chapter 1, footnote 34. The navy's older vessels were also all imported, with most having been purchased from Britain.

[127] Thak Chaloemitarana writes that after the revolution of 1932, "the social prestige and the highly technical nature of the navy's armaments attracted the sons of the aristocracy." Naval officers with aristocratic lineage included, among others, admirals Thamrong and Sangad, both of whom play prominent roles in the case studies discussed below. Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism* (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand, 1979), 72 (in Japanese version).

most of its most prominent generals and commanders – including at least three prime

ministers – were of common birth.[128]

While the social difference between the two services was more significant in the 1940s

and 1950s than it has been recently, the cultural sense of difference has persisted. This is

reflected, among other places, in the difference at which the glass ceiling for OCS graduates is

set. In the army OCS graduates fill out a substantial portion of the officer corps. And

although none has risen to command army regions, many in that service have become

colonels and some have become at least brigadier generals – all reifying the notion that the

army is relatively "democratic" and remains an avenue for social advancement. OSC officers

are present in the navy, but these individuals serve only as section chiefs and none has ever

commanded even an offshore patrol craft.[129] Reinforcing differences in social class, the two

services also differ on the basis of education capabilities and expectations. A 1967 survey of

cadets, for example, found that 47 percent of naval cadets and only 1 percent of army cadets

saw the military as a means to further their education.[130]

ENLISTED PERSONNEL. Enlisted recruiting in Thailand has been conducted locally

since at least the late 19th century. And since that time, much of the army has been deployed

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[128] Murashima Eiji, *Pibun: Dokuritsu Tai Okoku no Rikken Kakumei* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996). Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957*, 12. Generals Phibun, Sarit, and Thanom, all prime ministers, were of common birth.

[129] Information on OCS and non-academy officers is from interviews with Thai army and navy officers conducted in Beijing, September 12, 2000. Individuals left unidentified at subjects' request.

[130] Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 50.

in border areas, especially in the northeast, to assert royal control over territories that had not yet been fully settled or integrated.[131] Although the army's mission has evolved, its basing patterns have changed relatively little. Hence, the army's personnel have been and still are drawn relatively evenly from Thailand's thirty provinces, though with higher than average proportions drawn from the impoverished north and northeast and south. The navy's bases, and consequently, its recruiting, is conducted almost entirely in the six coastal provinces along the northern portion of the Gulf of Thailand, where the population is more heavily urban and generally better off than those in the interior.

While both the army and the navy fill a majority of their enlisted manpower needs with conscripts, the navy supplements more heavily with volunteers.[132] There are currently two types of volunteer programs. One is a recent program that takes volunteers on conscript terms (i.e., with the same pay and benefits), generally finding willing individuals only in Thailand's poorer provinces. The second, targeting individuals capable of performing important technical tasks, has been in existence longer. It is used primarily by the navy and air force to fill positions requiring extensive training and not suitable for short-service conscripts.[133]

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[131] Murashima Eiji, *Pibun: Dokuritsu Tai Okoku no Rikken Kakumei*, 8-10.

[132] Although it is difficult to get precise figures on the percentage of the enlisted force conscripted, the International Institute of Strategic Studies provides an estimate of the percent of total personnel (including officers in the denominator) conscripted. According to those figures, 53 percent of army personnel and 34 percent of naval personnel are conscripted, with the remainder recruited on a volunteer basis.

[133] Information on volunteer systems is from interviews with Thai army and navy officers, Beijing, September 12, 2000.

BASING LOCATIONS. In addition to the effects of basing locations on recruiting

patterns and the composition of the enlisted force, basing locations also have direct effects on

the economic interests of the services. The army, deployed largely to interior and relatively

backward provinces, can be involved in and benefit from the development of those areas, but

the market is less likely to bring such development in the short term than are state-led efforts.

(Markets will tend to take investment capital to coastal areas, where the infrastructure is better

and the workforce better educated.) Under the integral nationalist regimes that ruled from the

late 1950s to the mid-1970s, developmental tasks in those areas received top priority. The

navy has had an interest in the development of the seaboard – expectations that have been

better met by liberal leaders of the 1940s and from 1987 to the present.[134]

FOREIGN CONTACT. Prior to 1951, naval officers were significantly over represented

among those officers sent overseas for training. (Despite the army's officer corps being

several times that of the navy, both services sent an approximately equal number of officers

overseas.) And, prior to 1945, the location and type of that contact differed substantially.

Although the navy bought much of its equipment from Japan immediately prior to the war

(when General Phibun served as defense minister and later prime minister), it looked

primarily to England and even more to Denmark (which the Thai navy saw as a good model,

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[134] Two recent cooperative ventures between the navy and liberal political parties are the Southern Seaboard Development Project and the proposed Kra Canal across southern Thailand, which will, if completed, link the Gulf of Thailand with the Andaman Sea. Piyanart Srivalo, "PM Gives Three Seaboard Developments Green Light", *The Nation*, February 14 1997; "Regional Perspective: Opposing Sides Dig in for Battle Over Kra Canal", *The Nation*, August 30 1999.

being a small neutral state) for its training and organizational models. The army, on the other

hand, was more fully enamored with Germany and Japan.[135]

Although the army has received the bulk of the overseas training billets since 1951

(when the navy and army clashed and the navy lost), other forms of foreign contact appear to

favor the navy on a per capita basis. The services, for example, maintain an approximately

equal number of officers in foreign embassies – one attaché per service per embassy in most

mid-sized states. Fleet visits and joint exercises also bring naval officers into more regular

contact with foreign officers than that experienced by army officers, who, apart from the staff

and senior command, tend to be in more isolated areas.

EXPECTED IMPACT. I expect each of the differences summarized above to have

some impact on the services' domestic preferences. On balance, the characteristics of the

services in all five areas should push the navy towards liberal nationalist positions and the

army more towards integral nationalism. The higher capital content of the navy and its

dependence on imported capital should give it a greater interest in economic policies that do

not tightly restrict the use of foreign currency reserves. Differences in the educational and

family background of army and navy officers are likely to endow the officers of the two

services with different biases in looking at economic and social problems. (On balance, upper

middle class officers should be more prone to share the views of civilian upper middle class

groups on economic problems than officers with lower middle class backgrounds.) The

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[135] Moreover, while both services had extensive contact with Japan, the Japanese naval officer corps was heavily influenced by British and American models, while the Japanese army was much closer to Germany and Italy.

biases that officers bring with them to their military service will be further reinforced by early

professional socialization.

Of particular note, the experience of army officers leading conscripted troops is likely

to given them an interest in issues that affect the nation's social base. There is some evidence

that this was true, even before 1932, when the army's highest posts were still dominated by

the aristocracy. In a warning to cadets in 1913, the commandant of the army academy said:

> "Most of our people are farmers, and our government exists to for their welfare
> and benefit. Officials of the government have a duty to work for the welfare of
> the people... and there is nothing that makes me angrier than officers abusing
> their troops. The costs of the government's work are borne less by the King
> who leads than by the people and their taxes."[136]

Finally, coastal urban basing and contact with foreign officers and civilians should endow

naval officers with more cosmopolitan views than their more physically and socially isolated

peers in the army.

Case 1: Overthrowing National Socialism (1941-1947)

This case looks at the choices that were made by the army and navy between late 1941 and

August 1944, together with the circumstances and outcome of those decisions. Between 1938

and 1944 General Phibun Songgram created and directed a national socialist regime (coded

integral nationalist) and threw Thailand's lot in with the Imperial Japanese Empire. From

December 1941, however, a Free Thai movement, led by prominent pre-1938 political

figures, emerged to challenge Phibun. The movement included a mix of liberals and

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[136] Murashima Eiji, *Pibun: Dokuritsu Tai Okoku no Rikken Kakumei*, 15.

moderate socialists. The navy served as the military core of this opposition movement, while the army remained generally united behind Phibun.

In 1944, with the war going against Japan and a growing opposition at home, parliament (which Phibun had packed with ostensible supporters) overthrew him and called on the leaders of the Free Thai movement to form a new government. In 1946 parliament passed a new, liberal constitution that established a bicameral legislature and eliminate appointed members of parliament. Naval forces and leaders provided military protection for Thai political leaders against a feared army resurgence. The navy's chief, Admiral Thamrong Nawasawat, headed a thoroughly liberal, middle class backed political party in parliament.

THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CHOICES

According to the definition established in Chapter 3, the incumbent regime, led by General Phibun Songgram, was integral nationalist. The challenger, represented by the Free Thai movement was, on balance, more liberal.

General Phibun, who led the incumbent regime in 1942, was elected prime minister in 1938 and quickly set about to establish a national socialist state. Phibun's closest advisor, Wichitwathakan (dubbed 'a pocket Dr. Goebbels' by one British diplomat), stated shortly before Phibun's accession that "The constitutional government is a revolutionary government. Its revolutionary task is to build a new nation."[137] The government's economic policies were

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[137] Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957*, 104.

nationalist – defined largely in opposition to Western interests, the domestic upper class, and

Thailand's Chinese businessmen.[138] Producers were strongly encouraged to join agricultural

cooperatives or trade associations, organizations over which the government exercised close

oversight. These organizations were expected to break the hold of business over life in the

countryside. Hefty taxes were also imposed on independent commercial organizations

(mostly foreign multinationals and Chinese-owned businesses). After Thailand's declaration

of war on the allied powers (in January 1942) remaining Western industries were

nationalized.[139]

Phibun's government was equally integral nationalist in its cultural policy. A Ministry

of Culture was established, and twelve Cultural Mandates were passed. The first of these

changed the name of the country from Siam to Thailand, a move intended to emphasize

nationality (comprised of all Thai-speaking people) over the physical boundaries of the state.

Other mandates prescribed uniform dress, behavior, and speech. Some provisions (such as

those mandating the wearing of pants and shirts) were designed in part to make Thailand more

Western in appearance. But all – especially the linguistic provisions prohibiting the use of

honorifics and other words with class connotations – were intended to reduce social

distinctions.[140]

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[138] Much of this activity was advanced under the slogan "Thailand for the Thai." Wichitwathakan's special antipathy to the Chinese was on display in several speeches in which he called them the "Jews of Siam." David K. Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 254.

[139] On Phibun's economic policies see Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957*, 144-51.

[140] Ibid., 110-29.

Phibun's means to achieving his integralist objectives were largely authoritarian. Parliament was not dissolved, but its membership was purged and, to an even greater extent, cowed. Police powers were expanded and used liberally by Phibun to arrest prominent political opponents. Within one month of taking office, he ordered the arrest of forty such opponents, including members of the royal family and the old bureaucratic aristocracy, parliament officials, and army rivals. Eighteen were executed.[141] Phibun relied for his authority largely on his leadership of the military, and fifteen of Phibun's twenty-five ministers were military officers.

The Free Thai movement offered an alternative center of allegiance, one with the declared aim of establishing a liberal parliamentary regime and ending Thailand's active cooperation with Japan. The movement was formed several days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 with British and, especially, American support. Its two top leaders were Seni Pramoj and Pridi Phanomyong, both lawyers and both with aristocratic lineages. Seni Pramoj was Thailand's leading lawyer and was thoroughly liberal, in economic, as well as social and political terms.[142] As ambassador to the United States at the time of Pearl Harbor, Seni refused to deliver Thailand's declaration of war and led the overseas Free Thai movement. Pridi, who remained in Thailand throughout the war, was a prominent

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[141] Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, 253.

[142] On Seni's economic, social, and political views, see David Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1996).

member of parliament prior to 1938 and was a political liberal, even if his economic

inclinations sometimes led him to advocate vaguely socialist solutions.

Pridi's socialist economic ideals notwithstanding, the Free Thai movement was more

liberal than its alternative. Its leaders, largely drawn from the ranks of the old elites and the

upper middle class, were firmly committed to restoring effective parliamentary rule.

Parliamentary rule prior to 1938 had produced moderate, liberal economic and social

policy.[143] After Phibun's fall a pluralist parliamentary order was, in fact, reestablished, with

business interests heavily represented. And Pridi, who remained the single most powerful

figure in parliament, but was unable to establish policy without securing a parliamentary

coalition beyond his own party, was either disinclined or unable to push a socialist economic

agenda. A September 1948 memo from the U.S. Embassy in Thailand called the Seri-Free

Thai group "the best democratic, liberal talent in the country."[144]

ARMY AND NAVY POSITIONS

Pridi's association with naval officers extended back before 1938, and many of these officers

opposed Phibun's government even before the outbreak of war. When the war began and the

Free Thai was established, the navy was immediately active in it and, throughout the war,

provided the core of the Free Thai's regular military forces.

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[143] Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, 250.

[144] This endorsement, unfortunately, came after the group's overthrow, but nevertheless while they stood some chance of restoration. Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957*, Note 87, page 228.

On December 11, 1941, four days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Pridi

convened the movement's first meeting. The organizational group, designated as the "X.O.

Group," was comprised of "leading civilian members of the government and influential elders

from the Thai aristocracy."[145] Overseas, in the United States and Britain, the movement was

comprised primarily of liberal students, and its membership both inside and outside of

Thailand remained primarily among the educated elite throughout the war.[146] During the war,

especially its early stages (1941-1943), General Phibun's was able to strengthen his base of

support among the urban lower and lower middle class.[147]

At the movement's founding in December 1941, the only members of the military

present were naval officers.[148] The most senior of whom was Rear Admiral Songwon

Yuthakit, the Deputy Commander of the Royal Navy. The navy provided the Free Thai with

intelligence on General Phibun's plans and on those of the Japanese. The navy also provided

ground forces in key locations: In addition to serving as Deputy Commander of the Navy,

Admiral Songwon Yuthakit also commanded all of the military police in Bangkok.[149]

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[145] John B. Haseman, *The Thai Resistance Movement During the Second World War* (Illinois: Northern Illinois Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1978), 23.

[146] On this point, see Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, *The Free Thai Movement and Thailand's Internal Political Conflicts (1938-1949)*.

[147] Ibid.

[148] Haseman, *The Thai Resistance Movement During the Second World War*, 28.

[149] Ibid., 24.

During its first year in operation, the Free Thai expanded its membership within the navy, but had not yet gained a following within the army or police. This, according to one source, was a result of Pridi's reluctance to approach "leaders whose political reliability and friendship was questionable" or those who were not longtime personal acquaintances.[150] By summer 1944, the movement included some army and regular police units, but the navy maintained a dominant military position.[151]

The navy's dominance is reflected in strength figures and leadership composition. Among the 50,000 armed followers Pridi believed he could count on for the planned uprising against the Japanese late in the war, he counted several thousand naval and marine soldiers and their officers.[152] Most of the remainder was comprised of armed civilian guerillas in the country's northeast, together with and a handful of army units and a somewhat larger group of regular police. (Others have estimated the total number of armed Free Thai effectives at closer to 10,000, suggesting a much higher proportion of naval members.[153]) At the end of the war, civilians occupied the Free Thai's number one and two positions, naval officers occupied the number three and four positions, an army general held the number five position,

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[150] Ibid., 47.

[151] Kato Kazuhide lists the primary members of the Free Thai as "Northeastern members of parliament, the navy, a portion of the army, and the police." Kato Kazuhide, *Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru Minshushugi*, 116. Thak Chaloemtiarana lists the main supporters as "senior officers in the navy, Isan [Northeastern Thailand] MP's, students studying in England and the United States, and others who were closely associated with Pridi." Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 3.

[152] For an outline of the plan, which included a joint U.S.-Thai marine drive on Bangkok from Satthahip naval base, see Bruce E. Reynolds, *Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 208-09.

[153] Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, *The Free Thai Movement and Thailand's Internal Political Conflicts (1938-1949)*, 3-4.

and a police general held the number six post. Until August 1944, when General Phibun's government fell, the bulk of the army remained loyal to Phibun's government.[154]

In August 1944, with the war turning against Japan, the rump National Assembly (including many members appointed by Phibun) ousted Phibun and established a provisional government dominated by members of the Free Thai. During the liberal interlude between 1944 and 1947, Pridi served as prime minister for only five months, but all five of the other individuals who served in the same post during this period were close associates of his and cooperated closely with him on political issues. The government adopted a new constitution in 1946, one that limited the role of active duty military officers in government as well as that of the King and was arguably the most democratic constitution that Thailand had had until the 1997 constitution was promulgated.

The navy's senior officer corps remained firmly allied with Pridi on political issues throughout this period and was firmly committed to liberal, parliamentary rule. On economic policy, however, they were *more* committed to liberal, market principles than Pridi. Most naval members of parliament did not join Pridi's Cooperation Party, which they regarded as socialist leaning. Admiral Thamrong Nawasawat, the navy's former commander and prime minister from August 1946 to November 1947, formed the Constitution Front party, which operated in coalition with Pridi but advanced a more market oriented economic position.[155] A

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[154] The commander of the First Division, strategically located near Bangkok, was probably the most important army supporter of the Free Thai.

[155] David A. Wilson, *Politics in Thailand* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 236.

smaller number of naval officers joined Khuang Aphaiwong's Democrat Party, the more

aristocratic, right wing of Pridi's parliamentary coalition.[156]

Thai political historian Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid summarizes the three wings of

Pridi's coalition in the following terms. Pridi's Cooperation Party, which the navy did not

join, "was characteristic of democratic socialism" and "represented the needs of the lower

classes in society." (Its composition was not lower class, but rather largely intellectual and

regional, with a northeastern membership.) Admiral Thamrong's Cooperation Party, which

had the most naval support, "espoused the concept of democratic liberalism" and "represented

the needs and aspirations of the middle class." And Khuang's Democrat Party, with some

naval support, "espoused the ideals of conservatism and monarchism," "represented the

interests of the upper class" (including the aristocracy and the royalty), and "had ties with

capitalists, big business, and real estate."[157] (After 1947, the Cooperation Party disappeared,

the Democrat Party gradually became less monarchist and more middle class, and the navy's

support shifted towards the Democrat Party – developments discussed below as part of cases

2 and 3.)

After 1944 the army was highly unpopular and generally distrusted – especially by

those groups with most influence and access in parliament. The handful of army officers who

had joined the Free Thai movement, mostly junior officers, generally joined Pridi's own left-

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[156] Sorasak Ngamcachonkulkid, *The Free Thai Movement and Thailand's Internal Political Conflicts (1938-1949)*, 30.

[157] Ibid., 28-30.

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leaning Cooperation Party. Some aristocratic members, who also represented a small portion

of that service's total officer corps, joined the Khuang's Democrat Party. The majority of

army officers, however, remained hostile to Pridi and the parliamentary system. Ultimately,

the army's hostility manifested itself in the coup d'etat of 1947, discussed in Case 2 (below).

Of the five service characteristics outlined earlier, the social origins of the officers

appeared to be particularly important. Admiral Thamrong's family, like those of most other

senior naval officers who participated in the 1932 revolution, was from the pre-1932 lower

aristocracy. In this, they came from the same social mix that produced Free Thai leaders Pridi

and Seni, who were lawyers by profession and members of the pre-1932 lower aristocracy.

Most other civilian members of parliament also shared this upper class background. General

Phibun, in contrast, was from a distinctly lower middle class background, as were many of the

senior army officers who supported him.[158] While it is difficult to prove a link to class

background, Phibun's army-backed regime consciously appealed to members of the lower

middle class and created social and economic organizations to give the members of that class

greater political and social voice.[159] Thak Chaloemitarana, who has written one of the most

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[158] Murashima Eiji, *Pibun: Dokuritsu Tai Okoku no Rikken Kakumei*. Although there were army officers from the lower aristocracy who participated in the 1932 revolution and later gained senior positions, these individuals were fewer in number than their aristocratic counterparts in the navy, and they were purged or neutralized by Phibun after he gained power in 1938.

[159] Phibun's advisor, Wichitwathakan, was also of the same class. Kobkua writes that "The People's Party under Phibun's leadership decided to identify as their power base the petty bourgeois class from within and outside the bureaucratic system. The economic policy thus introduced aimed to weaken the socio-economic power and prestige of the old regime, while promoting the economic prosperity of the country based on the active participation of the petty bourgeoisie." Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957*, 145.

careful accounts of military politics during this period, attributes much of the services' differences to the social rivalry and the mutual prejudices of their members.[160]

Although many senior officers in both services had foreign experience, the location and type of that contact probably also had played a role in defining different identities. In going to war with the English, the navy was moving against the state that had provided its organizational model for many years prior to 1938. The army, on the other hand, was cementing an alliance with a partner it viewed as not only a military model, but a political and social one as well.[161]

POLITICAL OUTCOME AND MILITARY POLICY

The navy thrived under Thailand's post-1944 liberal leaders, while the army was treated with suspicion. Fearing a comeback by Phibun and the army, the new government relied largely on the navy for protection. Naval leaders were put in positions from which they could control or, at a minimum, observe the movements of the army, and naval strength was reinforced so that it could counter such an armed threat should it materialize. Under the first post-1944 cabinet (headed by Khuang Aphaiwong) no army officers were represented; naval officers served as Defense Minister, Minister of Interior, Minister of Agriculture, and Minister of Industry.[162] The importance of the Defense Minister was, moreover, enhanced by the

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[160] Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 50.

[161] Moreover, while both services had extensive contact with Japan, the Japanese naval officer corps was heavily influenced by British and American models, while the Japanese army was much closer to Germany and Italy.

[162] Kato Kazuhide, *Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru Minshushugi*, 177. Direk Jayanama, *Siam and World War II* (Bangkok: Social Science Association of Thailand Press, 1978), 98.

elimination of the post of supreme commander, which technically had operational control over the services and was occupied by Phibun even after he stepped down as prime minister. (The government felt it safer to eliminate the position than try to replace Phibun as its occupant.) Naval officers subsequently filled other key security posts. In 1945, Vice-Admiral Sangworn Suwannachip, one of Pridi's key allies in the navy and former Free Thai officer, was appointed to serve simultaneously as adjutant general of the armed forces and chief of police.[163]

The navy was also strengthened materially, both in absolute terms and relative to the army. Between 1944 and 1946, parliament increased naval budgets by 50 percent, while reducing the army's budget by 40 percent.[164] Pridi funneled many of the best weapons given to the Free Thai movement during World War II by the U.S. Office of Strategic Services to the navy. By 1947, naval marine infantry units were, unlike the army, equipped with tanks and were generally equipped with more and better support weapons than most army elements.[165] But while Pridi and other civilian Free Thai leaders used the navy as a first line of defense, they were aware that the marines, as well equipped as they were, would not prevail if the army were united in opposition. By 1947 Pridi began emphasizing the sacrifices of "all sincere Siamese patriots" [including army units that had remained loyal to Phibun],

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[163] Thak Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 28.

[164] Daniel Fineman, *A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947-1958* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 27.

[165] Thak Chaloemtiarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 49.

rather than only those who had participated in the wartime underground. And, in 1947, just months before he was overthrown by a coup d'etat, he asked the United States to establish an army training mission in Thailand.

SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY

The historical data during this period generally support the civil-military coalition theory. During the war years, an army officer created and led the integral nationalist regime, a regime backed strongly by most of the army, even when the war turned against Thailand. Naval officers opposed General Phibun's integral nationalist government, served as core members of the Free Thai movement during the war, and occupied prominently in key positions (both elected and appointed) under the liberal parliamentary order after the war.

These patterns are consistent with predictions on the political-economic positions of armies and navies. The evidence assembled here also generally supports – though more weakly – predictions on the internal unanimity of the services. It is true that the army was more deeply divided in its preferences than the navy, supporting the thesis' second major prediction, but the navy also suffered from some divisions. (The navy's commander, for example, was a latecomer to the Free Thai camp.) And the data are insufficient to draw conclusions about the background of officers who dissented from the majority integral nationalist position, making it impossible to draw conclusions about the more detailed predictions.

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The historical data provide strong support for predictions about coalitional patterns and their impact on force structure. Both the army and the navy cooperated with sympathetic civilian groups – the army's Phibun actively courting the lower bourgeoisie, while the navy was more closely aligned with aristocratic and upper middle class groups. Probably the only surprise in this regard is that many government workers, whom we might expect to side with Phibun's integral nationalist government, instead backed Pridi's Free Thai. But the exception in this case proves the rule, since the bureaucracy and old aristocracy were unified. (Membership in officialdom conferred aristocratic status and opened access to land and other benefits.) Changes in military resource allocation and force structure tracked closely with domestic events. Regime change – occurring in the midst of a war – brought a quick and large shift in resource allocation between the services. The marines received early and disproportionate attention after 1944, further suggesting domestic motives.

EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES

The civil-military coalition theory performs relatively better than the other two theories considered by this thesis, though both help explain parts of the case.

STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. Explanations based on the strategic military environment expect that military policy should track reasonably closely in time with changes in the external security environment. Prior to August 1944, this was arguably the case, but shifts in the distribution of military resources during the three years after that time are more difficult to square with Thailand's external threat environment.

Between 1934 and 1944 (when General Phibun served first as Defense Minister and later as Prime Minister), Thailand's military resource distribution provided a relatively good match for Thailand's strategic position – at least as they were defined by Phibun. Phibun harbored irredentist claims against both the French in Indochina and the British in Burma and the Malaysian states and was unafraid to take risks in "re-acquiring" these territories. [166] By capitalizing on opportunities presented by Japanese gains, Thai forces might plausibly seize territory in both areas, but those operations might nevertheless bring Thailand into conflict with some combination of French or English land, sea, and air forces. Under these circumstances, increasing defense budgets was in order, and Phibun did just that – expanding the defense budget from 22 percent of the national budget to 38 percent. [167] The navy's share of the total declined marginally, from 64 percent of the total in 1934 to 62 percent by 1938. But the navy's budget nevertheless increased substantially in absolute terms (by 21 percent between 1934 and 1938), and naval tonnage more than doubled while the average age of ships in the fleet declined substantially. [168]

The actual outcome of Phibun's wars did bring temporary gains for Thailand, though these were reversed at the end of the war. After losing a naval engagement to France in January 1941, a combination of Thai ground and air attacks and Japanese political pressure

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[166] Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, 256-57. For a more detailed explanation of outstanding grievances against France, see Royal Thai Army Operations Division, *The Unit Organization During the Indo-China Conflict and The Great East Asian War* (No city given: Royal Thai Army Operations Division, 1946).

[167] Constance M. Wilson, *Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics* (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1983).

[168] Calculated from *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1939-1940*.

forced Vichy French concessions in Indochina later in the year.[169] The Thai army and air force scored wins against British-backed forces in Burma in 1942, and Phibun gained Japanese agreement for Thailand to administer one additional province in Burma and the four in Malaysia.

Changes in the distribution of Thai military spending after August 1944, when Pridi and the Free Thai took control of the state, appear less well connected to military threats facing the state. Immediately after August 1944, Thai troops remained in defensive positions in Burma, and Thailand was still, formally at least, a Japanese ally. In reality, Thailand was, however, leaning towards the Allies. Both Thai and Japanese leaders were contemplating preemptive action against the other. And each realized the other was considering hostile action.[170] Although there was some coastal component to these plans, both Thai and Japanese contingency planning called for the main action to take place on land, inside Thailand's borders.[171]

Given Thailand's position inside Burma and Laos and the threat posed by possible Japanese action inside Thailand, we would expect that Thai leaders would, at a minimum, not reduce the proportion of military resources devoted to the army. The quick shift in budgetary

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[169] During the engagement, "a motley collection of warships, led by an aging cruiser," ambushed the Thai fleet just offshore and sank one of two of Thailand's new Japanese-built cruisers, as well as two Thai torpedo boats. Reynolds, *Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945*, 43.

[170] Ibid.

[171] At that time, Japanese forces inside Thailand numbered about 170,000. Ibid. The Thai army, including forces deployed in Malaysia, Burma, and Laos, numbered 120,000. Royal Thai Army Operations Division, *The Unit Organization During the Indo-China Conflict and The Great East Asian War*, 325.

and equipment priorities towards the navy, then, appears better understood as an effort by

Pridi to strengthen those military elements most inclined to respond to his orders and as an

effort to weaken the army, significant elements of which still harbored strong sympathy for

General Phibun. This assessment is strengthened by the observations of a Thai prince, who,

visiting Pridi's residence, found it guarded by naval sailors, rather than the army.[172]

Nor does the shift in resource allocation, which continued before and after the end of

Allied hostilities with Japan in August 1945, seem particularly well suited to the threat

environment Thailand faced in the post-war period. At the end of the war, the European

powers fought their way back into Asia – the Dutch in Indonesia, the British in India, Burma,

and Malaysia, and the French in Indochina. Both Britain and France pressed for concessions

from Thailand to which it leaders were loath to agree. Britain's demands would have given it

substantial control over the Thai economy making it, in the words of Seni Pramoj "a slave

state for years to come."[173] French demands were limited primarily to the return of territory

in Laos ceded by the Vichy government in 1941, but Thai elite sentiment ran strongly against

concessions to France on what they regarded was territory stolen in the late 19th century by

Paris.[174]

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[172] Reynolds, *Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945*, 147.

[173] Britain's twenty one postwar demands included, among other things, monopoly rights over exports in Thai oil, timber, rice, rubber, and tin; control of Thai shipping; bases, including the power to station troops at strategic points indefinitely; and a monopoly of commercial airlines through Bangkok. Pp. 26-28.

[174] Royal Thai Army Operations Division, *The Unit Organization During the Indo-China Conflict and The Great East Asian War*.

These issues could have led to substantial military clashes with Britain, France, or both.[175] Ultimately, the United States brought considerable pressure to bear on London to soften its demands, but the Anglo-Thai peace treaty signed in January 1946, while not as tough as earlier demanded, nevertheless imposed harsh reparations demands on the latter.[176] British action to collect reparations or enforce other terms of the agreement was not unthinkable. The situation with France proved even more difficult to resolve, and by April 1946 Thai and French forces along the Thai-Indochina border were conducting company- and battalion sized raids across their respective lines of control.[177] In November 1946, Thailand agreed to return the French territories it had regained during the war. Pridi provided some aid to insurgents fighting the French in Vietnam and the British in Malaysia before and after the settlement of these issues.

The nature of the military threat posed by Britain and France was multidimensional. But the disputed provinces were contiguous with Thailand proper; the action (to the extent there was any) was on the ground; and without a Japanese naval shield, any naval maritime efforts against Britain or France were likely to be futile. The end of large-scale active hostilities in East Asia at the end of World War II probably did call for a reduction of army budgets and some recalibration of relative priorities, but it is harder to explain the large

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[175] Both the U.S. and Thai governments were worried about the prospects for violence. Although Thailand's difficulties with France proved more difficult to resolve and ultimately resulted in border skirmishes, the U.S. was, in August 1945, more concerned about problems between Britain and Thailand. See Adulyasak Soonthornrojana, "The Rise United States-Thai Relations, 1945-1975" (Ph.D., University of Akron, 1986).

[176] According to the treaty, Thailand was to provide reparations for British wartime losses, plus provide 1,500,000 tons of rice free to Britain – an especially exacting demand, given the economic hardships suffered throughout Thailand after the war. Ibid. 32.

[177] Ibid. 37-38.

absolute increase in spending on the navy, especially given that budget deficits caused high

inflation throughout 1944-1947, threatening the state's economic base and threatening

domestic stability.

Probably the best case that could be made for the impact of the strategic military

environment on force structure change between 1944 and 1947 is that because the threat was

indeterminate (especially after August 1945) and its level low (especially after August 1945),

the theory's predictions in this case might be indeterminate. State leaders were therefore

relatively free to establish military policies that would defend the state against a plausible

range of threats while focusing their attention on other considerations, including cost and

domestic political considerations. In other words, this case might be a relatively easy one for

the civil-military coalition theory – one that it does in fact comfortably pass. Thai leaders

reacted primarily to the threat that ultimately brought their demise (and the death of some) – a

threat from recalcitrant army officers, not external foes.

MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. In looking at why and

how the services chose their political-economic positions and partners, did the search for

budgetary or other resources provide a compelling explanation? A logical place to start such

an investigation is to ask: did the navy support the Free Thai because of their loss of relative

budget share during the war years?[178]

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[178] This is one of the explanations cited by Kato. Kato Kazuhide, *Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru Minshushugi*, 116.

While this might have been one contributing factor, it alone is insufficient to explain

the navy's actions. A narrowly material interests-based explanation would suggest risk-

averse behavior from organizations, if not from individuals. Parties will not abandon alliance

with political authorities unless there is a high probability of better rewards under a different

partnership. Yet it was a gamble, personally and for the institution, for naval officers to join

the Free Thai in 1942 – and certainly in late 1941 when the movement was founded. The

movement was dependent on Allied victory for success. Yet even after the Battle of Midway,

Japan's reputation was riding so high in Bangkok in the autumn of 1942 that a British

observer there heard that the Thai were betting 10-1 to 20-1 odds on an Axis victory.[179] And

even assuming an ultimate allied victory, naval participants were also gambling that the

movement would not be discovered and wiped out, together with the navy's top officers,

before the end of the war.[180]

Another problem with this proposed material interests-based explanation involves

Phibun's record on the navy. Phibun, who served as defense minister from 1934 to 1938,

spearheaded a successful drive to increase aggregate defense spending and did more than

anyone since King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) to build up the navy prior to 1942. Even a

moderately conservative organization would stick with Phibun – at least as long as the war

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[179] Reynolds, *Thailand and Japan's Southern Advance, 1940-1945*, 37. Japanese power was widely respected even by anti-militarists before the war. Japanese trade as a percentage of total trade increased in virtually all Asian states during the decade before WWII. Japan occupied northern Vietnam in September 1942, an event that might have weighed heavily in the Thai calculation reported by this particular observer. The Japanese disaster at Midway was, for its part, kept as a tightly guarded secret in Japan, and may not have been widely known in Thailand.

[180] The Japanese were well aware of the movement and considered moving preemptively against it. But instead gave priority to maintaining the appearance of pacific alliance relations with Thailand. Ibid., 218-19.

was going even moderately well – if material interests were the overriding concern. Finally, some senior army and naval officers – most prominently Phibun and Thamrong – demonstrated direct interests in economic affairs that appear difficult to explain in terms of the services' direct material interests.

Case 2: The Rise of State-led Development (1947-1969)

Military politics from 1947 to 1969 was very much a continuation of the struggle between Phibun and his army successors on the one hand and civilian parliamentary leaders and the navy on the other. In November 1947 a group of mostly mid-level army officers overthrew Thailand's liberal parliamentary regime and reestablished a new integral nationalist one in its place. But the army was not entirely unified in its preferences, and, while most line officers were compliant if not supportive, officers from the general staff launched an unsuccessful countercoup in 1948. The navy was both united and strenuous in its opposition to the 1947 "Coup Group" (as the coup participants called themselves). Naval officers participated in the army general staff's uprising and launched two of its own. After the second of these, the navy's strength was drastically reduced, but it continued a close association with liberal politicians through the end of the period.

THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC ORDER IN EARLY 1947

The existing political order between August 1944 and November 1947 was significantly more liberal than its predecessor or successor governments. The constitution, developed by a parliamentary committee and promulgated in May 1946, introduced a bicameral legislature

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with a fully elected House of Representatives and a Senate elected by the lower house.[181] The

number of military representatives of the upper house dropped from 61 percent to 34 percent

(a percentage that was less than half any post-1947 government until the temporary

restoration of democratic rule in 1973).[182] Phibun's Ministry of Culture was abolished, as

were his cultural edicts, and freedom of speech and the press were restored.[183] Restrictions

were eased on Chinese entrepreneurs, and industrial planning was abandoned. Foreign

investment was actively sought, especially to develop Thailand's mineral resources, and by

the end of 1946, the United States had concluded an agreement with Thailand, Australia, and

the United Kingdom for the procurement of Thai tin.[184] Conservative royalist and democratic

socialist party competed in parliament with liberal parties, but the latter, together with their

business and commercial allies, tended to dominate.[185]

That the government was largely organized along liberal lines does not imply that it

was without problems or entirely free or corruption. Faced with severe economic challenges,

it made critical errors that allowed corrupt politicians and businessmen to profit. The

government inherited a massive government deficit and runaway inflation from Phibun's

regime, problems that were compounded by reparations agreements with Britain restricting

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[181] Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, 263.

[182] Ketut Gunawan, "Thai and South Korean Military Withdrawal and Democratization," (Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2000).

[183] H.M. Spitzer, "Siam's Political Problems," *Far Eastern Survey* 15, no. 7 (1946): 108.

[184] Adulyasak Soonthornrojana, "The Rise United States-Thai Relations, 1945-1975" 40.

[185] Pridi's Cooperation Party, the partial exception in terms of composition and policy, held power for only five of twenty-five months.

the sale of Thailand's primary exports (rice, teak, tin, and rubber). In an effort to both raise

government revenues and reduce urban inflation, Prime Minister Thamrong passed legislation

in 1946 requiring farmers to sell rice cheaply to the government. Although the intent was to

resell the rice in urban areas for a marginal markup, some officials sent rice instead to

Malaysia, where it commanded even higher prices, and pocketed the difference.[186]

Despite mistakes and corruption, however, the governments associated with Pridi and

Thamrong between 1944 and 1947 were relatively more liberal in both political and economic

terms than either Phibun's earlier regime or the army-backed governments after 1947. And

the army's drug-running and business activity during the latter period demonstrated that,

despite the relatively egalitarian developmentalism embraced by many Thai army officers, the

army's integral nationalism was no less corrupt than the parliamentary governments of 1944-

47. Rather, its corruption was of another variety.

THE SERVICES' POLITICAL-ECONOMIC POSITIONS

ARMY PREFERENCES. In 1947 the army proved relatively – though not entirely –

united in opposition to the existing liberal order. An army coup overthrew the sitting prime

minister in November 1947. In April of the following year the same Coup Group restored

Phibun, Thailand's wartime leader. Phibun resurrected a modified version of his previous

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[186] Virginia Thompson, "Government Instability in Siam," *Far Eastern Survey* 17, no. 16 (1948): 186. In another example, the government sold wartime stockpiles of consumer goods to parliamentary leaders, who then used their commercial connections to make handsome profits from the transactions. Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 19.

national socialist regime (described in case 1). In 1957 another coup brought General Sarit

Thanarat to power. Sarit, borrowing some ideas from Phibun but also adding much that was

new, unified the army behind a distinctive developmental – integral nationalist – ideology.

Sarit's approach was more pragmatic in foreign economic relations than Phibun's (i.e.,

somewhat more open) and more focused on basic rural infrastructure and small industry. But,

like Phibun's administration, Sarit's government remained committed to state-leadership of

the economy and suspicious of both private capital and parliament.

The 1947 Coup Group took advantage of a constellation of factors that made liberal

parliamentary government vulnerable. In particular, its members capitalized on the

widespread hardship that Admiral Thamrong's rice policy was causing in the countryside.

They blamed the collusion of politicians, big business, and urban elites more generally for the

hardship in the countryside. The Coup Group's first proclamation, issued one day after the

event, stated, "At a time when people are starving, the government and other opportunitists

live in wealth and extravagance and ignore the cries of the people."[187] The mysterious death

of the king, which the government deemed a suicide but which royalist opponents suggested

was possibly a government-sponsored assassination, added to the government's

vulnerability.[188]

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[187] Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 35.

[188] One survey of attitudes in a single rural village highlights the role of the king's death and the effectiveness of opposition publicity campaigns in weakening the image of the ruling parties. Lauriston Sharp, "Peasants and Politics in Thailand," *Far Eastern Survey* 19, no. 15 (1950). The "assassination" scenario held that the plot was hatched and executed by a naval officer, Wacharachai Chayasithiwet. Although tried and executed under the Coup Group, the purported witness on whose testimony the trial turned recanted his testimony many years later.

The Coup Group was not content simply to remove Pridi and his supporters, but rather moved as quickly as politically feasible to create an integral nationalist order. Constrained in the immediate aftermath of the coup by a lack of high profile members, the group recruited a known and respected moderate politician, Khuang Aphaiwong, as prime minister.[189] Within six months, however, they reneged on their promise not to interfere in his administration, forcing Khuang from office and replacing him with Phibun. Phibun's policies over the next nine years were largely a continuation of those of 1938-1944. If anything, his integralist ambitions and programs were on a grander scale, despite the need to balance the demands of the Coup Group on the one hand and a weakened but still potentially troublesome parliament on the other.

The regime's integral nationalist traits are visible in both economic and cultural policy. Economically, he appealed to his base of supporters in the lower middle class by passing the Low-cost Housing Act in 1948, and attempting to redistribute land from landlords to peasants through the Land Titles Act in 1953 and the Land Codification Act in 1954. Phibun imposed severe restrictions on the use of foreign currency in order to reserve those assets to supply capital equipment for government-sponsored industrial promotion projects. He established a National Economic Promotion Corporation that purchased foreign industries operating in Thailand, installing Thai leadership in an effort (largely unsuccessful) to promote domestic management capabilities.[190] In the cultural realm, he codified his earlier efforts to

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[189] The group's most senior member was Phin Chunhawan, a lieutenant general, and most of the other thirty-two members were majors or colonels.

[190] On these policies, see Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957*, 150-51.

homogenize Thai culture by, among other things, establishing a Ministry of Culture in 1952.[191]

Support for the 1947 coup within the army was not unanimous, especially after the Coup Group brought in Phibun to replace Khuang's caretaker government. Members of the general staff planned a coup for October 1, 1948 – seeking to take advantage of a wedding party for Sarit Thanarat, a key member of the Coup Group, to capture its leadership in one swoop. The plot was uncovered and the plotters arrested. During their trial, the staff officers suggested they were motivated by the conviction that further involvement in politics would divide the military and hinder professional development. Prosecutors demonstrated that the plotters had been soliciting opinions about the best path to develop and modernize the army from other officers – possibly in an attempt to sound-out other officers about possible support for action.[192] Although a weak effort, the 1948 countercoup attempt represented the efforts of technical officers to revive constitutional, if not fully democratic, government.

Sarit Thanarat, a member of the 1947 Coup Group and commander of the 1st Infantry Division (stationed near Bangkok), took personal control of the government in two coups, one that removed Phibun in 1957 and the other that dissolved parliament in 1958. Sarit's politics, described by one historian as "despotic paternalism," appear to represent the mainstream

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[191] Ibid., 138.

[192] Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 41-44.

preferences of the army, or at least line officers.[193] At a minimum, they reflected a powerful

current within the army, one that Sarit was to make the mainstream.

Sarit's policies were, like those of Phibun, integral nationalist – though in some

specifics, they differed from Phibun's. Sarit placed particularly heavy emphasis on education.

Between 1956 and 1959, the education budget climbed from 7 percent of the national budget

to 19 percent – or from 35 percent of the defense budget to 90 percent.[194] (Under the Pridi-

Thamrong governments, spending on education had declined from 11 percent in 1943 to 7

percent by 1947.) Perhaps even more indicative of Sarit's integral nationalist philosophy,

however, was the shift in emphasis within the education budget. Whereas the Pridi-Thamrong

governments placed considerable emphasis on secondary and tertiary education, the Sarit's

priority was increasing mandatory education from four years to seven.[195]

At the same time, the government increased its attention to the development of

physical infrastructure in the nation's interior, a fact also reflected in the expansion of

development budgets from 10 percent of the government's budget in 1957 to 16.3 percent in

1959.[196] Sarit established regional development committees for less developed areas. He

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[193] Ibid.

[194] Wilson, *Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics*, 276.

[195] Suehiro Akira, *Tai Kaihatsu to Minshushugi* (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993), 43. Sarit's government did establish two new universities, but they were not established in Bangkok. Both were opened in the impoverished northeast.

[196] Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 343.

began with a Northeast Development Committee, a body he personally chaired. In 1963 he

created a National Development Ministry to unify these efforts.[197]

Sarit's industrial policies, laid out in a decree on "encouraging productive activity" in

November 1958, were designed to promote import substitution. He permitted more foreign

investment in the economy than Phibun and de-emphasized public ownership, but he raised

tariffs substantially in an effort to protect infant industries. In 1959, he established a National

Economic Development Board to strengthen planning capabilities and, in an effort to

coordinate domestic and international investment and ensure that it was "properly" targeted, a

Board on Investment was created.[198]

NAVAL PREFERENCES. The navy remained firmly opposed to the Coup Group after

1947, allying itself first with Pridi until 1951 and later with Seni Pramoj's pro-business

Democrat Party – an affiliation that remained current at least until the 1990s.

The navy was a central actor in two countercoup attempts after 1947, one in 1949 and

one in 1951.[199] During the first, in February 1949, Naval ships smuggled Pridi Banomyong

(the former leader of the Free Thai movement), disguised in the dress white uniform of a

naval officer, into Bangkok. Naval units took over the national Thai radio station and

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[197] Suehiro Akira, *Tai Kaihatsu to Minshushugi*, 39.

[198] Both the Board on Investments and a National Economic Development Board were established in 1959. Ibid.

[199] In addition to these, prosecutors under the 1947 Coup Group accused several naval officers of participating in the October 1948 attempt organized by the general staff. The evidence on that involvement is, however, ambiguous. See Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 43-44.

announced a new government, under which the commander of the navy, Admiral Sinthu

Songkhramchai, was to be Supreme Military Commander, and the marine commander, Rear

Admiral Thahan, was to serve as defense minister.[200] As this announcement was being made,

marine units under Pridi's military aide, Naval Lieutenant Wacharachai Chayasithiwet, were

taking over the palace.

Despite solid planning on the part of Pridi and his naval supporters, a combination of

bad luck on the one hand and good intelligence and quick reactions on the part of army

officials on the other led to the failure of the 1949 countercoup attempt. Sarit, then

commander of the army's 1st Infantry Division, with at least partial knowledge of the plan

prior to the event, had stationed tanks in the capital. On the day of the coup, these were

quickly used to recapture the palace. Adverse tides prevented scheduled marine

reinforcements from landing, and many of the Free Thai leaders who were to lead armed

groups from the countryside had been arrested shortly prior to the event and were unable to

participate. Although bitter fighting continued at scattered points around the capital, many

senior naval officers, seeing that things were going the wrong way, decided against

committing their forces.

In June 1951, junior naval officers launched an equally dramatic, if less well planned,

countercoup against the 1947 group. Naval Lieutenant Commander Manat Charupha led a

force of officers and sailors that kidnapped Prime Minister Phibun in full view of foreign

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[200] Ibid., 48.

civilians and naval delegations during a naval christening ceremony. The prime minister was transferred to the navy's flagship, the Si Ayudhaya, and the plotters called on the navy to converge on Bangkok.

Seeing an opportunity to finally defeat its naval nemesis in battle, General Sarit and other army officers launched an all-out attack on naval installations – without, apparently, regard for whether the commanders of individual garrisons were involved in the uprising or not. Army howitzers shelled naval ground installations and recaptured strategic land targets. The air force, independent only since 1941 and staffed largely by former army officers, bombed naval air bases. Announcing that Prime Minister Phibun was willing to sacrifice himself for his country (an announcement that apparently came as a rude shock to him), air force planes also bombed and sank the Si Ayudhaya. Phibun was able to swim to shore. The rebellion was crushed before the naval high command, led by Admiral Sinthu, could decide whether or not to back its junior officers. Total casualties numbered around 600.

After the failure of the 1951 coup attempt, Pridi was effectively a dead letter in political terms, and the navy was drastically weakened (see below). But the navy did not cease to play a political role. Rather, it joined forces with the Democrat Party, then led by Seni Pramoj, a prominent lawyer and leader of overseas Free Thai elements during World War II. (The party had begun as a royalist party in the mid-1940s but had, after Seni assumed its leadership, become increasingly identified as a pro-business, middle class party.[201])

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[201] After the demise of Admiral Thamrong's Constitution Front Party in 1947 led business and middle class actors shifted their allegiance to the Democrat Party. The party was led by Seni Pramoj, a lawyer who, together

During the mid-1950s, both the Democrat Party and the navy made a tactical alliance with

Phibun in order to protect parliament's continued function against the 1947 Coup Group's

threats of closure.

Despite Phibun's ideological proclivities and the history of antagonism between

himself and Seni, he understood that, without the control of the army, his only effective

power-base was in parliament, and his only viable military protection was offered by the

navy.[202] Phibun's rhetoric became more democratic and liberal. The Democrat Party and the

navy, for their parts, saw alliance with Phibun as the best hope of defending themselves

against even more radical active duty army officers.[203]

But while the navy's alliance with Phibun was tactical and relatively short-lived, its

cooperation with the Democrat Party was more enduring. This was evident in the 1969

parliamentary elections. Having suspended parliament entirely after 1958, popular pressure

forced the army leadership to promulgate a new constitution in 1968 and schedule elections

for February 1969. The navy was solidly in its camp. According to one source, the army

generals, understanding the navy's loyalties, ordered the fleet to sea during the elections to

prevent its personnel from voting.[204] Whether apocryphal or true, the story indicates that the

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with Pridi, was one of the two most important leaders of the wartime Free Thai movement. Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj*, 112, 30.

[202] Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957*, 202-03.

[203] Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj*.

[204] Ibid., 130.

army and navy were still widely understood to maintain divergent political-economic

preferences in the late 1960s.

EXPLAINING SERVICE DIFFERENCES. As in case 1, differences in the social origins

of the officer corps appear to have been one of the most important factors in deciding the

above outcomes. Phibun was, as noted earlier, from a lower middle class background.

General Sarit shared similar origins. In this case, the regional backgrounds of key individuals

– especially Sarit – also appear to have been important. Sarit's family was from the northeast,

and he explained his own emphasis on developing that area largely on the basis of his own

early exposure to that underdeveloped region. The degree of foreign contact may also have

been a factor. Unlike the navy's senior officers who had experience overseas, Sarit and many

of his associates were entirely domestically educated.

EFFECTS ON FORCE STRUCTURE AND GRAND STRATEGY

Immediately after the 1951 naval revolt, the army formed a committee for the "restructuring"

of its rival. The navy's responsibility for public security, which it had exercised in six of the

nation's seventy-one provinces (mostly in coastal states), was stripped, together with a large

portion of its police force. Its state and provincial organizations – including both regular

reserves and coastal patrol elements – were split between the army and the police. Fleet

headquarters was moved from its location on the Phraya River, close to the capital of

Bangkok, to the Sattahip naval base (half way between Bangkok and the Cambodian border).

A pre-cadet school was established, in which the future cadets of all services would spend

several years together, a move that was almost certainly intended to retard the perpetuation of

a separate navy (and air force) culture. A personnel limit was established, and individuals in

excess of that limit were transferred to other services. The navy's air service was disbanded

and all combat aircraft were transferred to the air force. The navy's musical band was given

to the army, presumably as a trophy to signify the navy's subjugation. Most importantly – at

least from the army's perspective – the navy's marine corps was reduced from four battalions

to one.[205]

SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY

The facts of this case conform very closely to the predictions of the civil-military coalition

theory. First, the two services supported very different types of domestic orders: The navy

backed liberal institutions and actors, and the army favored integral nationalist ones. Both

took risks in their support of these positions, and both maintained their preferences for long

periods of time. The the October 1948 counter-coup attempt by army general staff officers

supports the prediction that armies are often internally divided, with the more technologically-

intensive and less troop-oriented branches adhering to relatively more liberal positions than

line officers.

The services engaged in coalition building with civilian groups, and political outcomes

correlated closely in time and kind with subsequent changes in strategic direction. The navy's

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[205] Kobkua Suwannathat-Pian, *Thailand's Durable Premier: Phibun Through Three Decades, 1932-1957*, 198-99.

"downsizing" occurred immediately after the failure of its second countercoup attempt in

1951. Its budgets – and marine corps – recovered somewhat after the navy found common

cause with Phibun in the mid-1950s. But that recovery proved temporary. The navy was

relegated to a secondary, supporting role throughout the period of army-led integral

nationalist rule. Despite the purchase of three small frigates in late 1969, its fleet tonnage

ended the period smaller than at its beginning.

EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES

STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. I suggested in Chapter 3 that one plausible

explanation for the general regional shift toward continental strategies might be the rise of

local insurgencies that required the redeployment of scarce resources. A history of

insurgency in Thailand prior to 1932 had done little to inhibit naval building. Despite serious

periodic warfare in the northeast, the Thai navy vied with the army during the 19th century as

an almost equal service in terms of both budgets and status. Nor does the threat of insurgency

seem to adequately explain the timing or degree of Thailand's strategic shift during this

period – and specifically, its dramatic naval deconstruction in 1951.

Thai intellectuals and bureaucrats (including members of the military) had debated the

relative merits and demerits of communism at least since the Russian Revolution in 1917, and

many, though certainly not all, within elite ranks were clearly fearful of it.[206] But Thailand

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[206] The civilian-military group that overthrew absolute monarchy in 1932 had virtually all been exchange
students in Europe – primarily France. There, they debated all the latest political theory, and some became

did not face an insurgency on its own soil until 1965.[207] The French fought an active and

armed communist movement in Indochina from 1946, but because it was a nationalist

movement – and one fighting Thailand's longtime enemy – Pridi supported the communist

movement there. Two events in 1953 raised the stakes for Thailand. First, China established

a Thai Nationality Autonomous Area in its southern province of Yunnan, an area with Thai-

speaking minorities and one that could be used as a base from which to destabilize Thailand.

Second, Vietminh forces moved into Laos and Cambodia for the first time. In 1954, Thailand

and the United States began discussing the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty

Organization (SEATO), which came into being in 1955 and helped usher in an era of

expanded U.S. economic and military assistance to Bangkok.[208]

Thailand's external environment, however, does not appear to have been the decisive

factor in the demise of its navy. First and most obviously, the navy's major reduction

occurred in 1951 – immediately after its coup attempt and two years before communist

insurgents landed on Thailand's doorstep. Phibun then sought to rebuild naval strength in the

mid-1950s, only to be stopped by another army coup in 1957. Second, while Phibun and the

army welcomed U.S. military assistance, there are questions about how imminent they viewed

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enamored of socialism. Two communist parties were formed in Thailand, one in 1929 and one in 1935. But
these appealed to a narrow range of dissidents. And to the extent that they had gained adherents under the
relatively tolerant politics of the Pridi-Thamrong period (1942-47), those gains were easily wiped out by quick
police sweeps after the 1947 coup. Sean R. Randolph and Scott W. Thompson, "Thai Insurgency:
Contemporary Developments," (Beverly Hills: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown
University, 1981).

[207] Thailand's own Internal Affairs Ministry agrees with this assessment. Suehiro Akira, *Tai Kaihatsu to
Minshushugi*, 72. See also Randolph and Thompson, "Thai Insurgency: Contemporary Developments."

[208] Adulyasak Soonthornrojana, "The Rise United States-Thai Relations, 1945-1975" 87-101.

the insurgent threat. Military spending fell dramatically after 1947, from an average of 26 percent of the national budget in 1944-1947 to an average of 12 percent between 1948 and 1958.[209] And when SEATO was formed in 1955, Phibun sought to use it to gain heavy weapons systems, arguing that an army of 50,000 Free Thai forces was gathering inside China for an invasion of Thailand.[210] At the same time, however, he argued for improving relations with communist China, including the establishment of trade ties.

Neither Thailand's continental shift nor its integral nationalist domestic policy was unconnected to the concept of national strength embraced by Thai army leaders (and those of many other developing states). At the heart of this concept was a perceived need to use state power to consolidate an immature nation state by narrowing differences within the state. While nearby insurgencies may have heightened the perceived need to put their plans into action, these disturbances did not create their conceptions of national security, which were formed well prior to the insurrection.

The development of an integral nationalist state was not the only possible response to insurrection. Different actors can have different conceptions about how best to attack any given national weakness. In Latin America, naval officers, working in conjunction with the besieged middle class, established authoritarian police states designed to protect neo-classical economic orders. In Thailand, the rise of the state-led developmental model (in this case

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[209] Wilson, *Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics*, 276.

[210] Pridi escaped to Beijing after the failure of the 1949 countercoup attempt, but there is no evidence that he or any other Free Thai ever plotted an invasion. Adulyasak Soonthornrojana, "The Rise United States-Thai Relations, 1945-1975".

import substitution) was a product of victory by relatively young army integral nationalists. And although the distribution of military resources was partly consistent with the needs of fighting an insurgency, it was even more a function of political outcomes. In Latin America, fighting insurgency meant rising defense budgets, larger navies, and the emergence of immensely powerful military intelligence organizations; in Thailand, local insurgencies brought smaller defense budgets, redeployment of military assets to infrastructure and other nation building tasks, and a much smaller navy.

MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. In this case, it is possible to make a moderately strong case for a purely interests-based organization theory model, but material interests alone failure to account for many of the more important aspects of the case. Material interests offer a plausible explanation for the army's 1947 overthrow of Pridi – who had cut the army's budget, reduced its status, and questioned its loyalty. From the standpoint of organizational interest, it is somewhat harder to explain why the army needed or wanted to install its own regime after Pridi's ouster. The Khuang government increased the army's budget and proffered respect for the institution and its autonomy. Indeed, general staff dissent against the Coup Group's actions demonstrated that even some who could support the overthrow of Pridi could not countenance more active involvement in administering the state.

Army leaders also demonstrated direct interest in economic and social affairs that went beyond what organization theory might expect. While the army's increased involvement in infrastructure projects might possibly justify higher budgets, it is remarkable that military

budgets did not, in fact rise (at least as a percentage of GNP). Hence, whatever money the army was putting into civil engineering projects came out of other parts of the force structure. And the jump in educational spending under Sarit was of such magnitude that it impinged on any possibility of increasing military budgets, if not on maintaining them at current levels. Clearly, although material interests help us understand some of the army's motivations, the actions of senior army leaders reflect much more than simple rent seeking.

Similar conclusions can be reached with regard to the navy. The 1949 countercoup attempt might be comprehensible as a risky, but nevertheless promising, attempt to restore a pro-navy government. But with Phibun in charge of the government, aggregate defense budgets on the rise, and its marine corps and combat air power intact, other approaches (such as seeking beneficial accommodation) might also have been a realistic interest-based strategy. Indeed, the navy failed to reach a satisfactory accommodation with the military government even after the quick return of liberal rule became extremely unlikely during the 1960s.

Case 3: Liberals vs. Leftists (1969-1980)

This case looks at the military services' behavior during two key crises: a civilian uprising against military rule in 1973, and a period of political gridlock and economic collapse culminating in a second political crisis in 1976. In the first instance, the army was divided, with some elements backing tough action against the students and some not; the navy took a clear stand against suppression and helped usher in an era of parliamentary rule. In the latter instance, naval leaders and army staff officers launched a coup d'etat and established a

constitution under which parliament was reestablished, but with a proportion of its

membership – set to decline over several years according to a fixed timetable – appointed by

the military. While the navy's actions in this case were not always pro-democratic, the navy

was – without exception – in line with business and middle class positions. And when

democracy did not appear to jeopardize liberal economic values, the navy did support

democratic positions. Military outcomes were also consistent with the theory: the navy saw

its officers promoted to top military positions, both under civilian rule from 1973 to 1976 and

after the establishment of a pro-reform military-led government in 1979.

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CHOICES IN 1973

The most salient choices available to military leaders (and others) when student protests

began in 1973 were, on the one hand, support for General Thanom Kittikachorn's integral

nationalist regime, and, on the other, what appeared at the time to be a liberal alternative

backed by the students themselves.

After the death of General Sarit in 1963, General Thanom Kittikachorn stepped into

his place as premier, keeping and in some cases strengthening Sarit's developmental (and

integral nationalist) policies. Economic planning agencies were strengthened, and the

government's economic bureaucracy grew in size and reach, as did national or quasi-national

firms.[211] Foreign investment and ownership was allowed, but was restricted to those areas

that could provide maximum opportunities for Thai companies to learn and develop. The

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[211] Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand: Liberalization Without Democracy," in *Driven By Growth: Political Change in the Asia-Pacific Region*, ed. James Moreley (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 134-36.

budget for development projects in the countryside increased significantly faster than that of the military.[212] But the picture was not all positive: corruption also become a much bigger political issue under Thanom than it was under Sarit, whether because the problem itself grew larger or because of greater public scrutiny of the problem (or, most likely, some combination of the two).[213]

In 1968, after ten years without a permanent constitution or parliamentary elections, General Thanom, under pressure from the middle class and the United States, promulgated a new constitution and agreed to hold elections in February 1969. The army's own party, with help from election rules that worked to their benefit, was able to gain a majority. But opposition parties in parliament – and some in Thanom's own party – proved unruly, and Thanom suspended parliament once again in 1971. A combination of evident corruption and police brutality, however, galvanized professors and, later, students to action in 1972-1973. By October 1973, student protests demanding General Thanom's resignation had swelled to two hundred thousand, and the government faced a major crisis.

On the eve of Thanom's fall, his ouster appeared to offer a liberal alternative to the military's integral nationalism. In October 1973, there was little indication that under a post-Thanom regime, business would lose out to student radicals. Student leaders in charge of the

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[212] Laurence D. Stifel, "Technocrats and Modernization in Thailand," *Asian Survey* 16, no. 12 (1976): 1194.

[213]Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, *Corruption and Democracy in Thailand* (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1994), 42-43.

demonstrations quoted St. Augustine, Rousseau, and Abraham Lincoln in their speeches.[214]

Parliament would be reestablished, and in the 1969 elections, 46 percent of those elected had

been businessmen and another 16 percent were lawyers.[215] The business-friendly Democrat

Party had garnered more seats than any party except the military's own party, and in a fair

election, most expected it to emerge as the dominant party.[216] Despite the ties of many in the

middle class to government, that group was solidly behind the students. These middle class

actors believed they could do better with less government regulation and bureaucracy, and

most desired the personal liberties associated with democracy.[217]

THE SERVICES' POLITICAL ECONOMIC POSITION

NAVAL PREFERENCES. Between 1969 and 1980, the navy generally took liberal

political positions, and it was always in line with the majority of the middle class in backing

positions consistent with the maintenance of free market economic regimes. Naval officers

had maintained strong ties with Seni Pramoj's Democrat Party, and many voted for the party

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[214] Robert F. Zimmerman, "Student 'Revolution' in Thailand: The End of the Bureaucratic Polity?," *Asian Survey* 14, no. 6 (1974): 511.

[215] Anek Laothamatas, "Business and Politics in Thailand: New Patterns of Influence," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 4 (1988): 454.

[216] Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj.*

[217] On middle class support for the movement, see Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History.* See also James M. Markham, "A Year After Uprising, Uneasy Thais Take First Steps Toward Democracy", *New York Times*, October 13 1974. Between 1960 and 1970, Bangkok's middle class grew by 60 percent, from 170,000 to 284,000 (or 7 percent of the city's population), and industry had grown from 18 percent to 24 percent of GDP. Average incomes in Bangkok's commercial industries were some ten times higher than farm wages. Figures are from Thailand's National Economic and Social Development Board and cited in Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand: Liberalization Without Democracy," 122-23.

in the 1969 elections.[218] The navy did not support the attempted suppression of the student

revolt in 1973. It did sponsor a coup in 1976 to end the political polarization that was

paralyzing the country at that time, and launched another coup the following year to remove

an ultraconservative prime minister appointed by the king and install a junta of moderate

military figures committed to restoring parliamentary democracy.

In October 1973 the navy sided with the middle class in opposing an armed

crackdown on the student movement, helping pave the way for their victory in that struggle.

By October 14 crowds of students demanding an end to military rule had grown to 200,000

people. The army, on orders from General Thanom (serving as both prime minister and

supreme commander), began a military attack on the demonstrators, firing into the crowds

with tanks and from helicopters (see army section below).[219] Navy boats, in contrast,

evacuated wounded students from Thammasat University (on the Chao Phya River).[220] On

October 15, King Bhumiphol summoned the service chiefs to his palace to ascertain their

views. The air force chief and the navy's commander, Sangad Chaloryu, were strenuously

opposed to employing force. The army's commander, Kris Sivara, took a more tentative

position. With fighting continuing in Bangkok and a deeply divided military threatening to

plunge the nation into civil war, the king directed the service chiefs to exile Thanom. The

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[218] Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj*, 130.

[219] Some "units" of the student group, especially from among the vocational schools, was armed and violent. Most were unarmed. The army was indiscriminate in using force against both. Ruth-Inge Heinze, "Ten Days in October -- Students vs. the Military: An Account of the Student Uprising in Thailand," *Asian Survey* 14, no. 6 (1974): 500-02.

[220] Ibid.: 501.

president of Thammasat University and committed liberal, Sanya Thammasakdi, was

immediately sworn in as interim president. The new government promptly promoted the

navy's commander, Admiral Sangad, as the new supreme commander.[221]

In 1976 the navy once again sided with the middle class, but this time cooperation

took the form of a coup d'etat against parliamentary government. Between October 1973 and

October 1976 students, feeling their role in the overthrow of Thanom's military regime

entitled them to a standing voice in government, pushed an increasingly radical agenda. The

Democrat Party ruled parliament, and businessmen were heavily represented in parliament.

But socialist-leaning student groups made direct demands on elected officials, backed by the

threat – often exercised – of taking direct action in the streets should their demands not be

met. They sought and won the nationalization of key segments of the economy, and they

worked to organize labor in the private sector. The number of strikes rose from 34 in 1972 to

an average of 360 a year over the next three years, and both the number of workers involved

and the duration of those strikes (in work days lost) rose even more dramatically.[222] The

number of communist insurgents in the countryside also increased – as did the number of

peasant and urban anti-communist groups. Assassinations and other forms of intimidation on

both sides became more common, and many moderates were caught in the middle.[223]

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[221] On these events see Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj*, 153. For two somewhat different account (that nevertheless agree on the navy's refusal to participate in the crackdown), see Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), 17. Jeffrey Race, "Thailand 1973: 'We Certainly have been Ravaged by Something...'" *Asian Survey* 14, no. 2 (1974): 200.

[222] Suehiro Akira, *Tai Kaihatsu to Minshushugi*, 72.

[223] Ibid., 72, 76-80.

In October 1976 Admiral Sangad, who was then serving as defense minister for the

Democrat Party's Prime Minister Seni Pramoj, led the military high command in a coup

d'etat. Key participants, calling themselves the Administrative Reform Council, consisted in

almost equal measure of naval officers, air force officers, and army general staff officers.[224]

Their action had the full support of Thailand's business and commercial class, who had

backed the restoration of parliament three years earlier.[225] Even Prime Minister Seni, who

was overthrown by the coup, admitted later "to tell you the truth, I felt quite relieved then. I

knew we couldn't handle the situation."[226] On taking power, Sangad assured the public that

the real goal of the action was to stabilize the social and economic situation and restore

democracy as quickly as possible, but on firmer ground.

Although his promises were not widely believed at the time they were made, Admiral

Sangad honored his commitments to restore parliamentary rule and begin the process of

economic and social liberalization. The first months, however, were not auspicious. Two

days after the coup, the king appointed an uncompromising anticommunist judge, Thanin, as

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[224] In addition to Sangad, who served as the chairman of the group, the most powerful members included Deputy Supreme Commander General Kriangsak Chamanand (discussed further below), Air Chief Marashal Kamol Dechatungka, who was placed in charge of overall national security, and Admiral Amorn Sirikaya, the new navy commander, who was put in charge of internal affairs. David A. Andelman, "New Thai Junta Solidifies Rule; Curfew Lifted", *New York Times*, October 8 1976.

[225] William Bradley et al., *Thailand, Domino by Default? The 1976 Coup and Implications for U.S. Policy* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, Southeast Asia Program, 1978), 17.

[226] In a more general vain, he said, "Democracy did not work at that time. Democracy does not work in a situation of anarchy. Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj*, 184.

prime minister. Relying heavily on the army (and increasing its budget), Thanin began a

harsh and largely indiscriminate crackdown on leftists, swelling the ranks of guerilla bands in

the countryside with new recruits and pushing foreign investment below even its modest pre-

1976 levels.[227] In October 1977 Admiral Sangad, still serving as defense minister, led the

high command in a second coup, this time to replace Thanin.

In announcing the coup group's reasons, Sangad highlighted the Thanin government's

harshly repressive tactics, its failure to improve the investment climate, and its lack of

willingness to deal with the new government of Vietnam.[228] Sangad also argued that Thanin's

twelve-year timetable for the reintroduction of democracy was "unnecessarily slow and

against the wishes of the people."[229] The high command promulgated a new constitution in

1978, setting parliamentary elections for the following year (1979) and establishing a four-

year schedule for reestablishing effective parliamentary rule. As one historian observed, "For

the first time, the military moved to get rid of a civilian government not because it was too

liberal for their tastes but too conservative."[230]

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[227] Many of these were moderates – including the Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, the former governor of the Bank of Thailand and rector of Thammasat University – who almost certainly would not have joined the guerrillas without the harsh crackdown. Wyatt, *Thailand: A Short History*, 303.

[228] Spokesmen for the coup leaders emphasized the economic importance of improving Thailand's image in the West, especially the United States. Bradley et al., *Thailand, Domino by Default? The 1976 Coup and Implications for U.S. Policy*, 57.

[229] Murashima Eiji, Nakharin Mektrairat, and Chalermkiet Phiu-nual, *Political Thoughts of the Thai Military in Historical Perspective* (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyujo, 1986), 150.

[230] Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj*, 196. For a similar contemporary assessment, see Henry Kamm, "Thai Junta Ousts Civilian Regime, Charging It Delayed Vote Too Long", *New York Times*, October 21 1977.

THE ARMY'S PREFERENCES. One reason that the navy has been able able to reassert itself in politics since the mid-1970s is that it has been allied with an increasingly powerful middle class. The other, more immediate, reason is that the army has been profoundly divided. Although there were many army faction during this period – too many to discuss in a brief summary of events – it is possible to divide its politically-minded officers into three groups: (1) status quo groups organized around senior army line officers (especially in the First Army command area); (2) young officers bent on purifying the Thai military of corruption so that it might better achieve the its social and security tasks; and (3) general staff and other senior technical officers seeking a more professional force and a gradual end to the military's domination of politics. Here, I discuss the policy choices and beliefs of each, followed by a short discussion of the often-understated commonalities.

The first group was comprised of factions of line officers organized around different senior commanders, according to army, academy graduating class, or blood relations. Each was vying to make its leader the next Sarit or Thanom – both of whom had emerged from command positions. None sought fundamental change in the role of the military or the domestic direction of the state, but cooperation among them, even for the defense of the status quo, was problematic. Hence, despite these factions' common dislike of both the commercial class and middle class students, only a handful of officers defended Thanom's regime in 1973. It is perhaps a statement on the state of factional politics in the army that two of the

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most important officers who did follow his orders were his son and son's father-in-law.[231] An attempted coup d'etat in March 1977 was also orchestrated by a father-son combination.[232] Army line officers in the Sarit-Thanom mould remained a potentially dominant force within the military during this period, but none emerged to realize that potential.

A second group was the so-called Young Turks faction (formally known as the Young Military Officers' Group) of junior officers.[233] The Young Turks, organized in 1973, was a secret group committed to purifying the military of corruption – especially, by eliminating its involvement in business management. But they did not call for an end to government or military involvement in projects designed to promote social welfare. On the contrary, they believed in committing the army more fully to developing the countryside, thereby reducing the chances for communist recruitment in those areas. The group, though anti-communist, was almost equally vehement in its distrust and criticism of businessmen. Formed first by five individuals who had served in Vietnam or against the Thai communist guerrillas in their own country's northeast, it included eighteen battalion commanders by 1977.

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[231] Thanom's son, Narong Kittikachorn, a colonel who was serving as assistant to the National Executive Council's director of national security, and most importantly, had ties to most of the battalion commanders in the First Division (located near Bangkok). Narong's father-in-law was Police Director General Prapass Charusathiara. David Morrell, "Thailand," *Asian Survey* 13, no. 2 (1973): 165-66. Heinze, "Ten Days in October -- Students vs. the Military: An Account of the Student Uprising in Thailand," 500.

[232] David A. Andelman, "Thai Coup Attempt, Mostly Just a War of Words, Is Foiled", *New York Times*, March 27 1977.

[233] Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982). See also Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86*, 12-14.

A third group was comprised of staff and technical officers who became a politically significant force after 1973, marking the first time since the General Staff's attempted coup against Sarit and his "Coup Group" in 1948 that army staff offices had played an important role in military politics.[234] Staff officers organized the Democratic Soldiers faction shortly after the student revolution of 1973. Few had ever commanded troops, but they had all served in planning positions in Thailand's own counterinsurgency war. They believed that "democratization" – a term they never defined carefully during the 1970s – was the only solution to its problems. The democratic soldiers supported Admiral Sangad after October 1976, and proved instrumental in supporting General Prem Tinsulanonda – the non-First Army general that set Thailand firmly on a path to parliamentary rule – during the 1980s. Although few expected staff officers to remain influential for long following 1976, they remained a major force in Thai military politics through at least the mid-1990s (see case 4).[235]

There were important differences between these groups. The second (Young Turks) group was against participation by military officers in business management. The third group (Democratic Soldiers) foreswore military coups d'etat as instruments of influence. The first group (senior line officers) was significantly more distrustful of politicians than the third (Democratic Soldiers). The Democratic Soldiers favored contact with independent business,

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[234] On the Democratic Soldiers see Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86*, especially pages 14-15 and 21-22.

[235] Speaking of the October 1977 coup group (led by Admiral Sangad), one group of American observers wrote in 1978 "The coup group was composed of little-known officers from staff rather than command positions. The continuing support of senior military officers, which is essential, remains questionable." Bradley et al., *Thailand, Domino by Default? The 1976 Coup and Implications for U.S. Policy*, 25. In fact, however, the group remained cohesive and proved able to balance its own enemies against one another.

labor, and student groups in addition to outreach through state-sponsored organizations; the other two groups preferred to rely solely on the latter and discourage the former.

But these groups also shared several common fundamental beliefs about the correct socio-economic organization of the state. They all believed that business tends to be corrupt and, without close monitoring by the state, has a tendency to exploit the urban poor and, even more so, rural farmers. In a 1981 public statement, the Young Turks said "Traders and capitalists have taken advantage of the farmers and other laboring people who are regarded as the backbone of the country and who have earned their living in a persistent, industrious manner amidst hardships. These poor farmers and laboring people have been mercilessly intimidated by some bold-faced traders who lack virtues."[236] A strategic document written by members of the Democratic Soldiers similarly states that "Because Thailand has a liberal economic system but its state mechanisms for mobilizing resources and distributing benefits are still weak, some economic groups have been able to take advantage to build up monopolistic power which inflicts social injustice and material hardship on the people, creating conditions for war."[237] Another document refers to corrupt businessmen as "dark influences."[238] All of these groups also saw the gap between the rich and the poor – and urban areas and the countryside – as primary threats to national stability and security. They all believed that the military had a critical role to play in organizing and implementing developmental projects at the local level. And they all believed that the military should have

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[236] Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks*, 89.

[237] Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86*, 96-97.

[238] Ibid., 101.

a constitutionally sanctioned place in national politics – ensuring both that business interests

would not dominate the agenda and that the interests of the peasants would be heard. As the

Democratic Soldiers warned, "Monopolist groups [i.e., pernicious businesses] have been able

to develop great political bargaining power which is an obstacle to the development of

democracy."[239]

The staff officers that made up the Democratic Soldiers group was, on a relative scale,

the most liberal army group in terms of their economic, social, and political values during this

period. They worked for reform in cooperation with the navy and politicians from several

liberal political parties. But even the Democratic Soldiers pursued an ideology that was

relatively more integral nationalist than those of its civilian and naval allies.

While army officers clearly had mixed motives during this period, their troop-leading

experience and their heavy exposure to the poor north and northeast regions of the country

(where incomes were one quarter to one third of the national average) almost certainly

influenced their thinking on economic and social issues. While many sought power, none

sought it in conjunction with business or middle class groups, and all – whether or not they

foreswore the military coup d'etat as a valid means to their ends – emphasized the dangers

inherent in an urban-rural divide. As a member of the Young Turks put the issue, "We went

to fight in Laos and [later] in the jungle with the [Thai] communist terrorists. Our feeling

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[239] Ibid., 97.

while fighting in the jungle was that the country was decaying and degenerating because the mechanisms in the city were bad."[240]

IMPACT ON MILITARY POLICY, 1969-1980

The navy gained new prominence and resources following General Thanom's ouster. After some discussion about doing away with the position of supreme commander, the post was retained, with Admiral Sangad as its occupant. Despite a drop in defense spending from 18.2 percent of the budget in 1972 to 16.4 percent in 1975, the navy added six new large offshore patrol craft to the inventory.[241] Between 1973 and 1976, the navy's manpower grew, from 20,000 to 27,000 (or from 16 percent of the army's to 19 percent). The marine component of that expanded from 6,500 to 9,000.[242] The Ministry of Defense portfolio was given to a non-army officer, Air Chief Marshal Dawee Chulladrabya, and the first deputy minister of defense was a naval officer. Dawee, who had tried to acquire frigates for the navy as deputy minister of defense in 1968, worked closely with the navy.[243]

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[240] Ibid., 44.

[241] The Thai government did not break down military budgets by service during this period, but according to most analysts, the navy's proportion "increased" during this period. See, for example, Ibid., 17. Aggregate Budget data is found in Alagappa, *The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand*, 120. Thak Chaloemitarana, *Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism*, 343.

[242] Wilson, *Thailand: A Handbook of Historical Statistics*, 275.

[243] The attempted frigate purchase was opposed by the U.S. government, which wanted Thailand to strengthen its ground forces. The U.S. ambassador suspected the request may have made for political reasons and reported that the request "may be one of the first fruits of a constitutional Thailand." Cable to Secretary of State Dean Rusk on Congressional reluctance to approve a military sale to Thailand's Navy. Ambassador Unger describes his meeting with Dawee. Cable. Department of State. Secret. Issue Date: June 29, 1968. Date Declassified: November 20, 1995.

Despite a decline in available resources, the army, coping with a worsening insurgency, expanded its manpower. It also revised its doctrine, formalizing a Total People's Defense strategy aimed at maximizing its social and political in the countryside at the grass roots level. It rapidly built up local militia-type forces in the villages and urban areas. (Lower middle class vocational students, who had worked with other students for Thanom's resignation in 1973, were heavily recruited by the army and proved among the most violent during subsequent military actions.)

SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY

The evidence strongly supports three out of four predictions associated with the civil-military coalition theory and offers more limited support for the fourth. The navy supported liberal positions, while the army was divided. Although the navy backed a coup against an elected government, the action was (like several navy-led coups in Latin America) taken with the support of the middle class and for the purpose of ensuring a liberal economic order.

The evidence generally supports, if somewhat more weakly, a connection between domestic politics and grand strategy. On the one hand, the navy made relative gains immediately after it helped install civilian government (gains it maintained after overthrowing that government and establishing a pro-reform military government in its place). As the theory predicts, marine combat forces were the most heavily effected by change. On the other hand, the magnitude of the shift appears to have been relatively small. While the theory as a whole holds up well in this case, the data offers only partial support for its predictions on force structure and doctrine.

EVALUATION OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

Material interests and, especially, the strategic military environment explain some aspects of

this case. In this case, the best explanation for changes in force structure and doctrine is

probably explained by a combination of the strategic military environment and civil-military

coalition theory.

STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. Between 1972 and 1975, the estimated

number of communist guerrillas increased from fewer than 6,000 to 8,000.[244] Cambodia and

Laos were facing increasingly severe insurgencies. Thailand was under significantly greater

military pressure than it had been since World War II. The pressure along Thailand's

northeastern borders makes the increase in the navy's relative share of resources difficult to

explain in purely strategic terms. On the other hand, within the army, the shift to a Total

People's Defense doctrine and the expansion of paramilitary forces was consistent with the

mounting insurgent threat.

After 1975, shifts in the threat picture are more ambiguous. Thailand did face an

influx of boat people crossing the Gulf of Thailand after that time, and additional naval craft

would be useful in policing Thai waters. But only a small portion of new Indochinese

refugees came by boat. Many more came by land – with Lao representing the largest number

and even many Vietnamese coming by land through Cambodia – and the management of

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[244] Suehiro Akira, *Tai Kaihatsu to Minshushugi*, 72.

refugees was primarily a new challenge to the army.[245] At the same time, the fall of the Lao and Cambodian governments to communist forces brought communist forces to Thailand's doorstep, and the domestic insurgency continued to grow, reaching a peak of 11,000 by 1979. These military pressures may help explain why the Thai navy did not appear to gain relative to the army between 1976 and 1980.[246]

Ultimately, it is difficult to understand Thai defense policy between 1969 and 1980 without considering both the military and political threats faced by Thai leaders.

MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. An explanation based purely on the services' material interests would suggest that the navy sided with civilian protesters in 1973 on the expectation of gaining a greater share of the military budget under parliamentary rule. This is possible, but not likely. The government of General Thanom, which was overthrown by the 1973 movement, had used some of a growing military budget to purchase warship in 1969 and again in early 1973. Backing the student rebellion was, in any case, a high-risk strategy. At worst, the movement would fail, and the navy would once again find itself, politically and materially speaking, out in the cold. Moreover, even if the student movement succeeded, there was no guarantee that the new civilian authorities would

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[245] Library of Congress Federal Research Division, "Thailand: The Indochinese Refugee Question," in *http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+th0075)*. As of 1979, the Thai army was caring for 149,000 Cambodians.

[246] The ratio of manpower between the services remained about the same, and Thailand did not add significant naval vessels to its inventory.

appreciably increase spending on naval equipment. In the actual event, the navy received relatively more of a declining defense budget and its net gains were modest.

Some army factions were clearly angling for factional advantage and parochial gains. But while there were some army officers who were more self-motivated than others, the degree of similarity in the political-economic views of these officers is perhaps more remarkable. The most prominent difference between the factions in this regard was over whether or not coups d'etat were regarded as legitimate means to their desired ends, but even those who foreswore coups (of which there was only one group) distrusted businessmen and believed in the guiding hand of the state.

Case 4: Consolidating Liberal Rule (1980-2002)

The period from 1980 to the present represents a coherent single case because – with the exception of the interlude between February 1991 and May 1992 – liberal reformers were in power but struggling against entrenched opposition to overhaul state institutions. But while it is reasonable to discuss these two decades as a single case, liberal consolidation was achieved through a series of important but incremental moves. Hence, this treatment is divided into three parts, each focused on a different problem or group of problems:

- The political and military structural reforms carried out by Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanoda between 1980 and 1988.

- The coup d'etat by General Suchinda Kraprayoon in February 1991 and the middle class civilian movement to end military rule in May of 1992.

- The economic, political, and, military structural reforms carried out under civilian prime ministers after May 1992.

During much of this period, reformist army officers took leading roles in affecting liberal change. But, although holding top positions, these reformers were opposed or threatened by factions representing large portions of the army's officer corps – if not an outright majority of its members. The case provides an opportunity to examine in greater detail the differences within the army. At the same time, the navy, significantly more united than the army, played an important role in the pro-reform coalition. It provided forces that helped suppress coups d'etat in 1981 and 1985. A year after General Suchinda's February 1991 seizure of power, the navy weighed in on the side of middle class protesters and helped push the general from power. Although the navy received most acclaim (and the largest rewards) for its role in ousting Suchinda, perhaps its most important role was its quiet but clear support for institutional military reforms from the beginning to the end of this period.

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC BASELINE: LIBERAL TRANSITION

The entire period from 1980 to 2002 – with one short setback from 1991 to 1992 – can be regarded as a long period of transition to a more liberal economic, social, and political order. The transition occurred in two phases: the first led by army General Prem Tinsulanoda from 1980 to 1988 and the second, after 1988, under parliamentary rule.

Under Prem, change was more gradual, but also more steady than under later civilian governments. The most significant change during this early phase was recorded in politics,

rather than in the economic or social spheres, but political change under Prem clearly (and predictably) set the stage for later economic reform. Politically, the biggest change was simply that elections were permitted and respected and that the constitution, established in 1978, was upheld. Prem ruled through a parliamentary coalition of liberal parties. In 1983, he led a successful parliamentary effort to defeat a drive by conservative civilian and military officials to extend the interim provisions of the 1978 constitution, which granted a variety of political prerogatives to the military.[247] Whereas previous military prime ministers had launched coups d'etat against their own governments when faced with recalcitrant parliamentary opposition, Prem called new elections (in keeping with the constitution). Elections were held three times, in April 1983, July 1986, and April 1988, and when he could not establish a coalition after the April 1988 elections, he resigned and allowed the leader of the largest party to form a new government.

Economic change under Prem was less dramatic. Prem and his technocratic economic advisors continued to strengthen state planning organizations by, for example, raising the profile of the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), responsible for drawing up the nation's five year plans. On the other hand, Prem's government sought to build a cooperative relationship between business and the planning agencies, rather than one in which the government simply ruled by fiat. A Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC) was formed, with the representation of both government agencies and

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[247] The interim clauses, which were due to end in 1983, allowed active duty military officers and other active civil servants to serve in cabinet, and they gave the senate (which was chosen largely from the military ranks by appointment) nearly equal power to the elected house. Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86,* 41.

three members each from Thailand's three largest industrial associations. The government

also allowed new provincial chambers of commerce to be establishing, with the number rising

from 3 in 1979 to 34 in 1984 to 68 in 1987.[248] Although economic change was incremental,

and was not all in one direction, the economy saw net liberalization.

Economic change under civilian rule was less evolutionary, and large sectors of the

economy were rapidly deregulated. Under Chatichai Choonhavan (1988-1991), of the

provincial business party Chart Thai (Thai Nation), the NESDB was downgraded, and the

Bank of Thailand (an institution with a generally more liberal economic outlook) became the

most important organization in setting macroeconomic and fiscal policy.[249] Both the

governments of Chatichai and Chuan Leekpai (Democrat Party, 1992-1995) increased the

flow of investment funds to domestic provincial businesses, which had previously been

largely starved of access.[250] Perhaps most significant of all, civilian government opened the

spigots on foreign direct investment (FDI), giving private firms an alternative source of loan

money and dramatically reducing the government's leverage over industry. Annual FDI

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[248] But while businessmen were pleased to have some progress, most felt that both the JPPCC and the chambers of commerce tended to be dominated by the bureaucrat's agenda, rather than their own. On the economy under Prem, see Chai-Anan Samudavanija and Sukhumbhand Paribatra, "Thailand: Liberalization Without Democracy," 134-39. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, "Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s," in *Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation*, ed. Kevin Hewson (New York: Routledge, 1997), 26-27.

[249] Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, "Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s," 27.

[250] Parichart Chotiya, "The Changing Role of Provincial Business in the Thai Political Economy," in *Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation*, ed. Kevin Hewison (London: Routledge, 1997), 254-55.

inflows increased from around 0.6 percent of total GDP in the early 1980s to 2.5 percent of GDP during the early 1990s and 6.5 percent of GDP in 1998.[251]

SERVICE POSITIONS UNDER PREM, 1980-88

The army was divided on Prem's reform agenda, with most line officers deeply suspicious and staff officers largely supporting it. The navy was part of the pro-reform coalition. It participated in suppressing coup attempts and backed reform measures intended to extend greater civilian control over the military.

THE ARMY'S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC POSITION, 1980-88. The forces working against Prem came from both civilian and military circles, but given both the willingness of integral conservative (i.e., integral nationalist) army officers to cross newly established legal lines and the entrenched position of the army throughout Thai society, his most dangerous opposition came from within that organization. Ultimately, Prem and his military allies were able to balance the army's line factions against one another while undertaking structural reforms of the military that gradually weakened both the motives for opposition and power of those groups. This section first reviews the problem of army factions, their sources of power, and the threat they presented to Prem's regime. It then assesses the nature of Prem's army supporters and the tactics they used to maintain and strengthen his hold on the military.

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[251] Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, *Thailand's Boom and Bust* (Bangkok: Silkworm Books, 1998).

Line officer factions and army opposition to Prem. Army factionalism presented Prem

with a double-edged sword. On the one hand, he need to and could court some of them to

balance against the others. On the other hand, having promoted any single group, that

faction's power would grow, making it a potential threat to his authority. Prem's relationship

with General Arthit Kamlangek's faction illustrates the dilemma. General Arthit and his

group supported Prem during the early 1980s. As commander of the Second Army Region,

Arthit helped the prime minister suppress a 1981 rebellion by the Young Turks, who were,

among other things, seeking to purify the army of vested business interests (of which Arthit

had many). Arthit also used his influence in parliament to block moves by the opposition

Chart Thai party to bring down Prem's government.[252] In recognition of Arthit's services and

the ongoing coup threat from other factions, Prem promoted him first to army chief (1982-

1986) then supreme commander (1983-1986). Having reached the top of the military

hierarchy, however, Arthit increasingly challenged Prem's positions and authority, becoming

his greatest nemesis after 1983.

At the start of the 1980s, army leaders had a number of powerful political assets at

their disposal: parliamentary representation, access to the media, the control of mass

organizations, and, in the last resort, soldiers. The first of these, representation in parliament,

was an asset that a senior commander with good connections might mobilize to take direct

(and constitutional) legislative action. According to the December 1978 constitution,

members of the upper house, with the power to effectively veto legislation, were appointed by

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[252] Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86*, 40-41.

the king – an interim provision set to expire in 1983. In April 1979 over 80 percent of its

members were active military officers. Nominations were forwarded by the supreme

commander, who assigned quotas to the services. In 1979 the quotas gave 60 percent to the

army, 20 percent to the navy, and 20 percent to the air force.[253] Soldiers turned politician also

headed several major political parties in the lower house.[254] Many of the military officers in

both houses retained strong ties to serving military officers and factions.

Many of General Arthit's anti-Prem efforts were centered in parliament and utilized

his factional ties and alliances. In 1983, for example, he Arthit worked with a variety of right-

wing (royalist and army-connected) parties in an attempt to extend the interim clauses of the

1978 constitution. In early 1986 he took measures to mold those same parliamentary allies

into a single organization, the United Democratic Party (UDP). From at least 1985, when he

backed Major General Chamlong Srimuang (a former Young Turk officer) against a

Democrat Party candidate for mayor of Bangkok, he was involved in efforts to defeat political

candidates associated with Prem.[255]

A second source of potential power for senior army officers was the army's control

over media outlets. Although an independent print media existed prior to 1980, the army and

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[253] Kato Kazuhide, *Tai Gendai Seijishi: Kokuo wo Genshu to Suru Minshushugi.* Between 1932 and 1957, the number of army and navy representatives in parliament were approximately equal.

[254] Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj*, 198.

[255] Barbara Crossette, "Bangkok Elects Ascetic Ex-General as Mayor", *New York Times*, November 29 1985. It is not clear whether Chamlong sought help from Arthit. By 1985, he had become more associated with a new reformist Buddhist organization than he was with the military, and he had publicly criticized Arthit in 1983. On Chamlong, see Duncan McCargo, *Chamlong Srimuang and the New Thai Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

other government agencies maintained its own sizable print media. More significantly, all of

the nation's radio and television channels were government owned and operated. The army

managed a disproportionate number of these. With 128 of a total of 523 radio stations, it had

more than any other single organization except the Public Relations Department (with 145).

The army operated eight times the number of stations controlled by parliament (16), and it

controlled more than all other military organizations combined. The navy controlled twenty-

one stations.[256]

General Arthit made extensive use of both supreme headquarters and army media to

support his efforts in parliament, influence administrative policy issues, and weaken the

public's support for Prem. He personally appeared on army television in November 1984 to

attack Prem's decision to devalue the baht (November 1984) and call for both a repeal of the

decision and the removal of responsible cabinet ministers.[257] Arguments for extending the

interim provision of the constitution and against Democratic Party candidates in the Bangkok

bi-elections in 1985 were delivered on the army's national weekly radio program, *The Army*

Meets the People. The Democratic Party, was (with some irony) accused of being under the

control of bankers *and* communists. During General Chamlong's mayoral race against a

wealthy businessman and member of the Democratic Party, Arthit was quoted on army radio

[256] Apart from the army and navy's, other military stations included those held by the police (44), air force (36), supreme headquarters (16), and office of the secretary of defense (3). Civilian stations included those held by the University Bureau (12), Post and Telegraph Department (12), Task Force (11), and Meteorological Department (6). Six other agencies held four or fewer. These numbers are for 1998, but they were probably similar for the mid-1980s. "Army Bids to Hold 124 Radio Lines", *Nation*, May 6 1998.

[257] Nick B. Williams, "In Thailand, Military Still Has the Final Word", *Los Angeles Times*, October 31 1985.

as saying "Only the army has never abandoned the people and its sincerity towards the people."[258]

A third source of power for senior army officers was control over mass organizations. The army had been heavily involved in rural development since the late 1950s, and it built on that base to establish mass organizations in the countryside in the early-1970s to counter the Communist Party of Thailand's expansion there.[259] The Village Scouts and the National Defense Volunteers provided an auxiliary combat and intelligence gathering force for the army. The Volunteer Development for Self-Defense Villages worked primarily to mobilize resources for developmental projects at the village level. Regardless of their origins, however, these organizations could and occasionally were diverted to achieve other ends.[260]

In his position as army commander and chief of the Internal Security Operations Command (always held concurrently by the army commander), General Arthit strengthened and made extensive use mass organizations. For example, he created the Military Reservists for National Security. The organizations stated goal was to encourage participation in the democratic political process, but it was used to turn out the vote for political parties affiliated with General Arthit. Under the Reservists organization, "democratic pavilions" were established to "educate" rural voters at the sub-district level. In May 1986, shortly before he

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[258] Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86*, 44.

[259] On these organizations, see Ibid., 49-68.

[260] The Village Scouts, for example, were brought to Bangkok in early 1976 and used to provide fights with radical university students, creating the appearance of chaos and the need for the military to step in and restore order.

was finally removed from active service by Prem, Arthit established "election centers" in each

of the four army regions in an apparent attempt to support his new United Democratic Party.

A fourth and final politically useful asset available to army commanders was access to

soldiers and units deployable in coups d'etat. During Prem's tenure as prime minister, there

were two attempted coup attempts against his government, one in April 1981 and the other in

September 1985. In the latter case, a force of 500 soldiers and two-dozen tanks took over the

Internal Security Operations Command headquarters and radio Thailand. Although officers

of the Young Turks faction led tactical units during this assault (as they had in 1981), there

was strong suspicion that they had the backing of senior army leaders, perhaps even Arthit

himself.[261]

Support from staff and technical officers. A handful of senior staff and technical army

officers organized Prem's defense against the threat from line officer factions described

above. These individuals, many of whom were former members of the Democratic Soldiers

group during the late 1970s, were relatively more liberal in their economic and political

outlook than the line officers and sought to create a more professional military.

Kriangsak Chomanand, Admiral Sangad's closest collaborator during the October

1977 coup against the hard-line Thanin government and supreme commander from 1976 to

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[261] Ted Chan, "Letter Links Thai Military Leaders to Coup Attempt", *United Press International*, January 17 1986.

1977, was the first long-time staff officer to command the military since at least the 1940s.[262]

(Again with Sangad's backing, he served from prime minister from 1977 to 1980.) During his

tenure as supreme commander, he was reportedly "not considered an army man."[263] But he

did clear the way for other staff officers to reach top army positions. General Saiyud Kerdpol

and Chavalit Yoongchai, also long-time staff officers, followed Kriangsak to the supreme

commander's post in 1981 and 1987 respectively. Chavalit, a communications officer and

founding member of the Democratic Soldiers, played a central role in designing Prem's

domestic military strategy and has arguably been the most important military reformer in

Thailand during the liberalization process of the 1980s and 1990s – pursuing a consistent

agenda first as an advisor to Prem from 1979 to 1986, supreme commander from 1987 to

1990, defense minister from 1995 to 1997, prime minister from 1996 to 1997, and once again

defense minister after 2001. Both generals Saiyud and Chavalit brought with them a broad

network of general staff colleagues.

Under Prem's administration, senior staff officers served three functions. First, unlike

every faction with which Prem made tactical alliances between 1980 and 1988, the staff

officers never attacked his policies and served as a reliable base around which to organize

more instrumental coalitions. Second, they drafted a new strategy for the war against

Thailand's communist insurgency, embodied in the 1980 Prime Ministerial Order No.

66/2523. That order called for a more political approach to the guerrillas (as opposed to a

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[262] Kriangsak's biography on the official government site on Thai prime ministers does not mention service as commander of the army and suggests that instead he had been promoted from army chief of staff to supreme commander in 1976, while Sangad was serving as minister of defense.

[263] Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86.*

strictly military one) and more democratic engagement with the general civilian population of Thailand's remote areas – tactics that would better serve Prem's domestic agenda than the status quo treatment of large areas of the northeast as a general war zone. The third function these individuals performed was to begin military structural reforms that would, in the long run, diminish the threat posed by the army's line factions.

Structural military reforms, which began tentatively during the 1980s and accelerated in the mid-1990s, revolved primarily around efforts to centralize decision-making on key military issues (such as military appointments and budgets). In 1981 Supreme Commander Saiyud appointed the three service commanders as deputy supreme commanders. Although largely symbolic, the move was intended to restore the equality of the services in fact as well as principle – as well as to subordinate all three to a higher authority. In 1987 Supreme Commander Chavalit ushered the Military Service Regulations Act through parliament, establishing a Defense Council to decide on budgets and promotions. The Defense Council was chaired by the defense minister and includes the supreme commander, members of the supreme commander's staff, the service commanders, and four other officers from each of the services.

THE NAVY'S POLITICAL POSITION, 1980-88. The navy, together with the air force, served as a loyal coalition partner for Prem and his general staff supporters, especially Saiyud and Chaovalit. The technical services gave the pro-reform group critical military capabilities, as well as the numbers they needed in administrative and parliamentary settings to achieve their ends.

This military support was particularly important in facing down a March 31, 1981 coup attempt.[264] The revolt was led by members of the Young Turks, a faction that had been formed in the early 1970s by junior officers seeking to cleanse the military of corrupt influences and return it to an idealized, integral nationalist past. The Young Turks, now lieutenant colonels and colonels, brought all or parts of 18 battalions, totaling 8,000 men, into the streets of Bangkok, seizing key sites and announcing the formation of a new government. Some members of the high command were captured and put on television reading vague statements neither explicitly condemning nor disavowing the coup. Others, including the army's deputy commander and, most ominously, the commander of the First Army Region, appeared to be more active in their cooperation.

With a large hostile force in the capital, General Prem faced the threat that the wholesale defection of the First Army might effectively seal the government's fate. He gambled on quick action by small forces. The commanders of the navy and the air force declared quickly for Prem and remained committed to the government's defense, as did Arthit, the commander of the Second Army Region covering southern Thailand. Prem moved his headquarters – together with the royal family – to the Second Army Headquarters of Korat. The navy's commander, Admiral Samut Sahanavin, moved to the Sattahip naval base southeast of Bangkok and remained in close touch with Prem. The air force commander remained at the Don Muang airbase outside of Bangkok and sent F-5 fighter-bombers over

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[264] This account is taken primarily from John McBeth, "The Coupmakers' Order of Battle," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 10-16 1981. Paisal Sricharatchanya, "A War of Words But Not of Bullets," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 10-16 1981.

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rebel positions in Bangkok in a show of force. On April 3, Prem ordered Bangkok cleared and moved elements of six loyal battalions into the capital – four battalions from the Second Army airlifted by C-130s into Don Muang air force base, together with a reinforced marine battalion moving into the city from Sattahip. Together, they had perhaps half the manpower of the coup leaders.

Despite the prospects for a major confrontation, the incident ended with only minor bloodshed. Two Young Turk regimental commanders (including its most aggressive commander) and the First Army Region's deputy commander were captured when their jeep ran into one of the government's advancing columns. The rebels appeared confused by the rapid thrust, and aside from scattered skirmishing, most of the rebel forces surrendered peacefully. Most of the Young Turk officers were then cashiered from the army. Prem's victory, viewed from the perspective of the first day's action, was unlikely. It hinged on three factors: (1) quick declarations of loyalty from enough operational commanders (including the commanders of the navy, the air force, and the Second Army Region commander) to give key senior officers pause before declaring fully for the rebels; (2) the operational mobility provided by the navy and, especially, the air force;[265] (3) and quick, decisive, smart action by Prem, including his quick action to move the royal family.

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[265] In addition to being able to move troops, command of the air allowed the personal mobility of key leaders – and lack of it hampered their mobility. Prem's first attempt to escape Bangkok was foiled by army helicopter gunships, but later, within one day of the coup' launch, the air force was active and it was the coup leaders who could not travel by air.

Following the coup attempt, General Saiyud (a professional staff officer and former

member of the Democratic Soldiers faction) became supreme commander, and the navy (and

air force) worked closely with him. In late 1981 the navy backed General Saiyud's plan to

make the service commanders into deputy supreme commanders – a move opposed by Arthit,

who had been promoted to army commander after the March 31 coup attempt.[266] In 1983, the

navy backed Prem and once again opposed Arthit on the issue of extending the interim

provisions of the 1978 constitution.[267] The amendment would have allowed the army to

maintain its appointed positions in the parliament's upper House (and effective veto power

over legislation) for four years and perhaps longer. The amendment failed by a razor thin

margin, and without the support of the pro-reform military bloc in parliament, consisting of

the navy, the air force, and several members of the Democratic Soldiers faction, it would have

passed.[268]

In September 1985, the navy again assisted in the suppression of an army coup. The

coup was launched by several cashiered Young Turks and their former soldiers, this time

numbering only 500 men and a handful of tanks. The navy's commander again declared early

for the government, and a marine task force was among the first several battalion-sized units

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[266] Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86*, 24.

[267] Niel Kelly, "Thailand Overrules Miiltary to Move Closer to Democracy", *Christian Science Monitor*, March 17 1983.

[268] John McBeth, "Politicians Win in Parliament, But the Military Strikes Back: The Sweet and the Sour," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 31 1983. Even with Saiyud's pro-reform coalition voting against the measure, the vote was constitutionally ambiguous. A number of parliamentary positions were empty due either to death or retirement, and the constitution did not specify whether amendments needed over half of the authorized number of members or more than half of the sitting members of parliament. The difference was decisive, and much debate followed.

mobilized for action. (The marine force was tasked with recapturing one of the three radio stations held by coup forces.[269]) Members of Class 7, a rival faction to the Young Turks, held key commands in the Bangkok garrison and the coup was easily defeated. But a number of serving and former generals, including Arthit, were investigated after the coup, and there is strong circumstantial evidence that Arthit was involved.

The services' relationships with civilians remained a study in contrasts throughout this period. Army generals cultivated alliances with demagogic urban politicians like Samak Sundaravej, whose base of support was among Bangkok's lower classes.[270] Union leaders in Bangkok were among the only prominent civilians to publicly welcome the brief three-day reign of the Young Turks during their March 31, 1981 coup effort.[271] And two labor leaders attempted to rally public support for one-day Young Turk coup in September 1985.[272] Naval officers, on the other hand, remained closely affiliated with the pro-business Democrat Party, as they had been since 1951. In a closely watched by-election in May 1985, Democrat Party candidate Admiral Somboon Chuapibun resoundingly defeated an army general, running as part of Samak's populist Prachakorn Thai Party, for one of Bangkok's seats in parliament. Admiral Somboon's popularity was due in no small part to his outspoken defense of

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[269] Royal Thai Army, *White Book on the Chronology of the Coup Developments on 9th September 1985* (Nexis, October 5, 1985 [cited September 1 2003]).

[270] Pasuk Phongpaichit and Baker, "Power in Transition: Thailand in the 1990s," 24.

[271] Paisal Sricharatchanya, "A War of Words But Not of Bullets."

[272] John McBeth and Paisal Sricharatchanya, "A Barrage of Cannon Fire Bloodies a Failed Coup," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 19 1985.

democratic principles during the 1983 debate over the extension of the constitution's interim provisions.[273]

In May 1986 Prem removed General Arthit from his post as supreme commander, the first time an individual had ever been removed from the post before his term had expired. (The prime minister prepared for the move by engineering the appointment of rivals to key commands around Bangkok and, immediately prior to announcement, moving under escort to the Second Army Region headquarters.[274]) Arthit was replaced by the navy's commander, Admiral Sup Kotchesenee. Alone among military organizations, the navy had both provided consistent support to Prem and his reform agenda and had significant operational ground forces.[275] In 1986, the size of the marine corps was increased by 50 percent, from 13,000 to 20,000. And in 1987, Chavalit began negotiations with China for the purchase of naval frigates, the first step towards the substantial expansion of Thailand oceangoing fleet.[276]

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[273] John McBeth, "Setback for Samak: The Democrats Regain a Seat in a Bangkok By-Election and Claim This is the Beginning of Their Resurgence in the Capital," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 23 1985.

[274] John McBeth, "Pre-emptive Strike: Prem Fires Arthit to Stop Army Meddling in Election," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 1986.

[275] In this latter aspect, the navy differed from the Democratic Soldiers faction, which was comprised primarily of staff officers. The air force had only a limited air marine. Moreover, the air force's loyalty to liberal reformers after 1980, while generally reliable, was less ironclad than that of the navy. Part of its air marine was involved in the 1985 coup, and its commander threw his weight fully behind General Suchinda's coup in 1992 (described below). On all other major issues observed during this period, however, the air force acted as a core member of the reform group.

[276] When Chavalit, who was serving as Prem's military advisor in 1986, became defense minister in 2001, he engineered the appointment of another naval officer to the post of supreme commander.

THE SERVICES UNDER MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1991-1992

Chatichai Choonhavan's government (1988-1991) proved less adept at managing military factions and coalitions than had Prem's. Chatichai allowed Class 5 officers (from the Military Academy Class of 1958) to dominate key operational commands, without balancing that faction with those of competing groups or maintaining a core pro-reform faction composed of officers from the technical services and branches.[277] In February 1991 Class 5 officers executed a coup and established a military-dominated government. Although the government lasted less than a year and a half, it was able to reverse (if only temporarily) many of the liberal economic and administrative reforms that had been undertaken by Prem and Chatichai Choonhavan (Chart Thai party, 1988-91). The navy remained largely aloof from the military government and protected protesters from army attack during the anti-government demonstrations of May 1992 that ultimately restored parliamentary rule.

The 1991 coup was planned and executed by the Class 5 faction under its class president, army commander General Suchinda Kraprayoon. A National Peacekeeping Council (NPKC) was created to control political events behind the façade of an appointed civilian prime minister. Officially, it included Supreme Commander Sunthorn Kongsompong and the commanders of the army, navy, air force, and police. In fact, almost all key decisions were made by three senior army and one air force officer – specifically, generals Suchinda, Sunthorn, Issapong Noonpackdee (Suchinda's brother-in-law and Interior Minister under the

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[277] The rise of the Class 5 group admittedly dated to Prem's regime, but judging by Prem's past behavior, had he remained in power as prime minister, he would have taken measures to hedge against that faction's defection. Chavalit, appointed supreme commander in 1987, remained in that post until 1990, but the pro-reform military coalition was in disarray by early 1991.

NPKC), and Air Marshal Kaset Rojananil.[278] While the naval commander was present on the

NPKC, he remained a passive member, a fact appreciated by political leaders after the

restoration of parliament: No naval officers were arrested or reassigned.[279]

In May 1992, when massive crowds of largely middle class protesters sought an end to

military rule, the navy's position became more visibly differentiated from that of the army.

Protests began after General Suchinda announced in April 1992 that he would personally

assume the post of prime minister despite earlier assurances that he would not. Informal

surveys by reporters on the scene indicated that a large percentage of the protesters, who

numbered over 200,000 by May 17, were well-to-do white collar workers.[280] On May 18

Suchinda ordered the suppression of the democracy movement, and police and army units

began using deadly force against the crowds. According to government figures released later,

40 civilians were killed and 600 were wounded. Reports of the missing ranged from 70 to

1,200.

At the critical moment, the marine corps staked a clear position against the use of

deadly force. The first public revelation of the marine position came on the evening of May

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[278] Air Marshal Kaset was a member of contemporary of Suchinda's, and attended the pre-cadet school with the officers of the army's Class 5. After becoming commander of the air force, he purged its top ranks of rivals. Nevertheless, it does not appear that his following within the air force was deep, and after the restoration of civilian rule in 1992 (and the removal of Kaset) the air force was far more supportive of liberal reform than was the army.

[279] Three senior army generals and an air force officer were arrested, while several other members of the army were reassigned.

[280] David Murray, *Angels and Devils: Thai Politics from February 1991 to September 1992* (Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996), 140-42.

18. Marine forces guarding the western entrance to the city center at the Pinklao Bridge allowed fleeing protesters to pass through their ranks and escape pursuing soldiers. The following day, newspapers reported that one marine officer at the scene said "we will not use force against the people."[281] Although it does not explicitly refer to a split in the military's ranks, an official army report on the May 1992 violence refers to even greater confusion at the same bridge as army infantry units attempted to pass over it into the city, causing a confrontation between the units that the army report officially ascribed to poor coordination.[282]

Historian David Van Praagh, in his assessment of the May 1992 events, suggests that the threat of an intra-military civil war led Suchinda and his colleagues to relinquish power on May 24th. He argues that army units opposed to the government's actions had been mobilized by retired supreme commander Prem (then serving as advisor to King Bhumiphol) and were moving on Bangkok.[283] While that may (or may not) have been the case, the marines, already in Bangkok, were almost certainly the first unit to openly flout the orders of the high command, and their actions likely had a major impact on the thinking of Suchinda and his companions.

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[281] Ibid., 168.

[282] "Phichit Panel Throws Light on Black May", *The Nation*, June 29 1999.

[283] Van Praagh cites reports by reliable diplomatic and military sources. Van Praagh, *Thailand's Struggle for Democracy: The Life and Times of M.R. Seni Pramoj*, 261-65.

Following the May 1992 violence and the restoration of democratic rule, the navy received a double bounce. It benefited both from its lack of involvement in the events of May 1992 themselves *and*, as a consequence of its distance from those events, from its ability to maintain its organizational autonomy in the post-May 1992 environment. The navy came away from those events as an organization that was publicly recognized as a disciplined, professional force that could provide a model for, and perhaps even assist in, the restructuring of a military that would not intervene in politics. As one observer remarked "The only arm of the military to emerge from the tragedy with some of its honor intact was the navy."[284] The navy itself only vaguely veils its satisfaction with the public acclaim it has won since the 1970s and, especially, during the events of 1992. Its official Website reports that,

> "By the 1970s, Thais began calling for more democracy. In the resulting upheaval, the Navy unwittingly found itself in a conciliatory position.... [In 1992], the gates of Navy headquarters were thrown open to people fleeing the violence. Ironically, simply by doing its job, the RTN scored a major media and public relations coup, inspiring loyalty and respect for the military from the very people who were protesting!"[285]

In return for its support for democracy in 1992, the navy was rewarded with approval on a variety of new procurement contracts (discussed further below in section on force structure). The *Far Eastern Economic Review* reported "The navy's non-involvement [in the May 1992 massacre] did not go unnoticed, either by the public or the elected civilian government which came into power in September 1992." Given the "favorable political

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[284] Murray, *Angels and Devils: Thai Politics from February 1991 to September 1992*, 168.

[285] Royal Thai Navy, *Inside the Royal Thai Naval Academy* ([cited September 1 2003]); available from http://www.navy.mi.th/newwww/eindex.php.

mood towards it," the article quoted one Western diplomat as saying, "the Thai navy is in a rush to buy now."[286]

The army emerged from May 1992 battling to preserve its autonomy, especially over personnel management issues. When Prime Minister Leekpai attempted to introduce legislation that would penalize the leaders of abortive coups in early 1993, army commander General Wimon Wongwanit replied that coups were caused by bad government, not military irresponsibility. He argued that "when something's wrong and the politicians won't do anything to correct it, it will be up to the people whether a coup takes place or not."[287] Two years later, when Defense Minister Chavalit sought to block the appointment to army commander of General Phaibun Emphan, a military classmate of General Suchinda and participant in the May 1992 suppression activities, Wimon again warned, "If they [members of parliament] want to make changes [to the military's personnel reshuffle list], let them. I wouldn't mind. But I think they understand what they have to do if they do not want the military to become involved in politics."[288]

By 1993, it was clear that the new civilian government was using both naval and air force leaders as point men in an effort to separate the military from politics. In October 1993, Prime Minister Chuan invited the commanders of both those services to separate meetings

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[286] Rodney Tasker, "Silent Service: Navy Reaps Rewards of Steering Clear of Politics," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 21 1993.

[287] "Army Chief Does not Rule Out Coup Possibility", *The Nation*, January 25 1993, in FBIS-BK-1993-0125.

[288] "All Set for the Changing of the Guard", *The Nation*, July 23 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-0723.

where, according to one source, "he urged them to help protect the country's democratic system." Prime Minister Chuan had, the same source said, "a lot of faith and confidence in the two commanders as he considered them tough professional soldiers who would not stray from the democratic system."[289] Following their October 1993 meetings with the Prime Minister, both naval and air force leaders reaffirmed their commitment to democracy and the civilian government. The naval commander "pledged to distance himself from politics," while the air force commander offered a similar statement, saying "one of our main policies in the air force is non-interference in politics."[290]

SERVICES POSITIONS DURING LIBERAL CONSOLIDATION, 1995-2002

From 1995 to the present the civilian authorities in Thailand have introduced a number of structural reform initiatives. Many of these measures have been shepherded past the military by the same pro-reform military coalition – including army staff officers, the navy, and the air force – that supported Prem's reforms during the 1980s. General Chavalit (who was an original member of this pro-reform coalition) played a central role once again as defense minister (1995-1997), prime minister (1996-1997), and again as defense minister (2001-present). But he could have not have succeeded without a solid coalition, and the navy was his most steadfast partner. While the degree of opposition by senior army line officers and

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[289] "New Commanders Reaffirm Apolitical Status", *Bangkok Post*, October 2 1993, in FBIS-EAS-1993-1002.

[290] Ibid. By all appearances, the commanders of the two services coordinated both their military and political positions after 1992 more closely than they had historically. During a ceremony at the Sattahip naval base, airforce commander Kan Phimanthip was made an honorary admiral. He used that occasion to deliver a message that seemed to reflect the position of both the navy and airforce: "The military's worst fault in the past was its interference in politics, which led to various troubles. But now that we have proven our grounds of noninterference, we will in time regain the support and confidence of the people." "Air Force Chief Warns Military to Avoid Politics", *The Nation*, September 30 1993, in FBIS-BK-1993-0930.

their factions may have declined somewhat during this period, the change was incremental, and many army leaders bitterly opposed political and economic liberalization and military reform.

POLITICAL REFORM. Shortly after taking office in July 1995, Prime Minister Banharn Sinlapa-acha established the Political Reform Committee, charged with preparing the ground for further democratizing the constitution. Defense Minister Chavalit invited the services to meet with key members of that organization to receive briefings on the committee's thinking. But even before the army could meet with members of the committee, official army media organizations attacked the committee. In an August 1995 article in the *Army Times*, published by the Royal Thai Army's Information Center, an officer from the Army Secretariat Office published a satirical piece openly mocking the committee and its agenda. The officer wrote that the Political Reform Committee's plan was a matter of "taking away power from the powerful by the unpowerful," and stated that Mr. Chumphon (the committee's chairman) had been made a "clown" for chairing the committee.[291]

Later in the same month, the Army's *Sayamanusati* radio program launched a broader attack on the Prime Minister himself. The program blasted the government for failing to solve the problem of soaring prices for essential goods and called for a courageous "social manager" or "administrator of society" to take change and solve these problems. Democratic activists from the Campaign for Popular Democracy saw the program's "social manager" as

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[291] "Army Paper 'Ridiculed' Political Reform Panel", *Bangkok Post*, August 16 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-0816.

being a transparent surrogate term for "army rule," and the program's overall message as an invitation to *coup d'etat*. Although the army commander, General Wimon Wongwanit denied direct involvement, he did defend the program, saying that "The editorial may have been too harsh, but we only try to present the truth."[292]

The navy proved more receptive to constitutional change. Concerning army radio criticisms of the Banharn government, the navy's commander, Admiral Prachet Siri Siridet, would say only that the navy "has nothing to do with it."[293] In August 1997, after the details of the proposed constitutional revisions had been decided, the navy's new commander Admiral Vijitr, the navy's commander said that he had examined the draft charter and would "almost certainly vote for it," while the army's commander, General Chettha Thanajaro, was noncommittal.[294]

MILITARY REFORM. The navy was also more receptive than the army on issues of military reform. Although military reforms proposed by Chavalit were multi-faceted, the most important involved strengthening the hand of the Defense Minister vis-à-vis the supreme commander. Under one such measure, many general staff functions, including coordination, planning, and research, would also be transferred from the supreme commander's office to that of the permanent secretary of defense. Whereas the supreme commander was, by custom,

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[292] Information from this paragraph is from "Army Comments Trigger Extensive Reaction, CPD Criticizes Program", *The Sunday Post*, August 27 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-0827.

[293] Ibid.

[294] "Army Chief Remains Non-Committal on Draft Charter", *Bangkok Post*, August 21 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-0821.

chosen by his predecessor and therefore less subject to political control, the permanent

secretary of defense (who was not actually permanent) was a direct selectee and subordinate

of the defense minister.[295]

Another of Chavalit's measures was designed to bring the Defense Council,

responsible for reviewing and forwarding the services budget and personnel proposals, under

the control of the defense minister and strengthen its functions. In effect, control of the

Defense Council was determined by how seats on the body were apportioned. Under the

existing structure, officers from the army commander's chain of command and officers

appointed by the supreme commander had a controlling majority. Under the proposed

structure, a clear majority would either be appointed by the defense minister, or be reserved

from individuals from organizations directly controlled by him.[296]

The navy proved more receptive to the reform of these military institutions than the

army. According to an August 1995 article from *The Nation*, the navy's commander

"guardedly supported" Chavalit's plan for centralizing budgets under a revised Defense

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[295] Many of Chavalit's "structural" reforms, were actually structural fixes for problems that were more customary in nature than structural. The power of appointment within the military was one of the most troublesome and ambiguous issues left over from decades of military rule. Although the Defense Minister might "legally" be entitled to "intervene" in the selection of a Supreme Commander, custom, as emphasized by senior army officers, dictated otherwise. The power of custom is witnessed by the fact that during a 1995 personnel reshuffle Chavalit found it necessary to say "I believe that there will not be any more *interference* [in military selections]." (Emphasis added.) "Defense Minister Discusses Military Plans", *Naeo Na*, October 16 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-1016. "Think Tank for Thai Military Proposed", *Bangkok Post*, October 5 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0805.

[296] These would include seven retired officers appointed directly by the minister of defense, five officers serving in specific positions within the defense ministry staff, and two members of the Royal Aide de'Camp's Department. For more details and numbers on the old and new strutures, see "Concerns Expressed Over Proposed Change to Defense Council", *The Nation*, July 28 1988, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0728. "Think Tank for Thai Military Proposed".

Council, while the army remained "firmly against the plan." A high-ranking army officer

explained, "Each of the armed forces has always tried to get as much money as possible." He

asked, "Who would back off?"[297] The answer is, of course, that under the proposed structure,

the army might occasionally be forced to back down. Senior army officers also objected to

giving the Defense Council greater authority over military transfers. Army General Phaibun,

for example, argued "there would not be any problem with military reshuffles if everything is

based on a decision made by the commander of the three armed forces with the approval of

the Supreme Commander."[298]

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ALLIANCES. The army and the navy have taken a direct

interest in different economic and social causes and formed partnerships with different types

of social groups.

Army officers demonstrated a continuing interest in the welfare of rural peasants – and

have continued to do so some two decades after the end of the communist insurgency. As one

observer has remarked, "Every chief of the army since 1990 has emphasized this

[developmental] role and declared that soldiers have a duty to improve the living conditions

of the people."[299] While most of this development attention was and is targeted in rural areas,

during the 1980s and 1990s the army also began showing increasing concern for the urban

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[297] "Navy Chief on Centralized Armed Forces Budget", *The Nation*, August 22 1995, in Navy Chief on Centralized Armed Forces Budget.

[298] "Military Rejects Proposal on Force Reshuffle", *Bangkok Post*, December 15 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-1215.

[299] Suchit Bunbongkarn, "Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads," in *Military Professionalism in Asia*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Honolulu: East-West Center, 2001), 82.

poor. General Arthit used his position as chief of the Capital Security Command (CSC) to peacefully resolve several pending labor problems and improve the quality of life in some squatter areas dramatically. In the words of one observer, Arthit "has demonstrated to the poor and the deprived that he has power, authority, influence and most of all, a willingness to help."[300] Nor was the interest of army officers in these subjects purely official or tactical in nature. The Young Turk officer, Chamlong Srimuang, wrote his Master's degree thesis at the US Naval Postgraduate School on labor unrest in Thailand. After retiring from the army he went on to become mayor of Bangkok, largely on the strength of his appeal to the urban working class, but both his early interest in the subject and his ascetic lifestyle after becoming mayor both suggest more genuine commitment to the issues than tactical calculation.[301]

As in past decades, the civilian organizations and groups with which the navy was closely associated in the 1990s were the leading forces for liberal political, economic, and social change. The Democratic Party, which represented a broader range of liberal interests including moderate economic and political decentralization, continued to enjoy strong ties with the navy.[302] Both the liberal press and liberal academic institutions also continued to have a generally favorable view of the navy and its causes, especially after 1992. Prominent

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[300] Suchit Bunbongkarn, *The Military in Thai Politics, 1981-86*, 59-60.

[301] For a sympathetic treatment, see Chai-Anan Samudavanija, *The Thai Young Turks*, 28-29. For a less sympathetic one, see McCargo, *Chamlong Srimuang and the New Thai Politics*.

[302] Admiral (and Senator) Surawut Maharom, for example, was known to have strong ties to the party and, had the Democrat Party regained power in 1996, was a candidate for the post of Permanent Secretary of Defense. "Military Reshuffle '95 Analysis: Big Chiu Controls 30 Percent", *Athit*, October 6-12 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-1006. The party sympathies of naval officers during the 1990s were almost certainly more disparate than they were in past decades. But this trend may be seen as a function of the movement of the political center itself towards moderate liberal positions, relative to the days when dominant army officers ensured that the center remained conservative and state centered.

liberal papers, such as *The Nation* and the *Bangkok Post*, strongly supported naval expansion during the mid-1990s and, for the most part, have continued to provide sympathetic coverage to the present. A 1994 article in The Nation predicted that the navy would become "the most influential policy decision-maker in 2010."[303]

All of these elements were brought together in a series of 1999 discussions galvanized by liberal nationalists in Chuan's Democratic administration on Thailand's future. *The Nation* reported, "Interestingly, the Royal Thai Navy has [been] featured in all of these debates."[304] The army did not participate in any. Among these discussions was a seminar co-organized by the nation's top two elite liberal universities (Thammasat and Mahidol) and the navy on "Thailand's National Power in the 21st Century."[305] During the conference, the predominant messages echoed by variety of "academics and social critics" were that Thailand could not isolate itself against the trend towards globalization and that it needed stronger systems of deliberative democracy, a knowledge-based economy, and thoroughgoing economic reform to cope with such a transition.[306] Other discussions have included debates on building a canal across southern Thailand linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans, a move supported by the navy

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[303] The article is quoted in J.N. Mak and B.A. Hamzah, "Navy Blues," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 17 1994.

[304] "Regional Perspective: Opposing Sides Dig in for Battle Over Kra Canal".

[305] The navy began its co-sponsorship of the annual seminar in 1998, indicating an interesting institutional relationship between these organizations. *The Nation* touched on the 1999 conference in a series of reports. The reports included: Ibid. "Knowledge Crucial to Nation", *The Nation*, August 28 1999. "Thais Told to Aid China on Global Stage", *The Nation*, August 27 1999.

[306] "Knowledge Crucial to Nation".

but opposed for years by the army leaders who have been concerned about the implications

for the government's relationship with the Malay minority population in the south.[307]

EXPLAINING ARMY/NAVY DIFFERENCES

By 1980 each of the services – and especially the army – had well developed political-economic

ideologies. Conscription and involvement in the hinterland gave the army a sense of itself as the

representative and protector of the nation's base. In his (unsuccessful) argument for extending the

interim provisions of the 1978 constitution – especially those clauses preserving appointed positions in

the upper house – one major general suggested that without appointment "We shall not have

representatives of the poor people, farmers, and workers in parliament." He estimated that an elected

parliament would produce 20 percent old politicians, while 80 percent would be "influential persons

and the rich."[308] Although clearly self-serving, these beliefs reflected the army's sense of itself as a

democratic reflection of Thai society. As one long-time observer of Thai military politics remarked,

"The army is a huge organization, with traditions deeply rooted in socity, with its own culture and

ethics." Change, he suggested, would take time.[309] The navy's political economic views similarly

reflected its own composition and strengths, but rather than reflecting Thai society at large, it views

itself as representing the most productive vanguard of that society.

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[307] "Regional Perspective: Opposing Sides Dig in for Battle Over Kra Canal".

[308] "Army Leader Questioned on Threat to 'Stage Exercises'", *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, January 18 1983. These same views found their way into Arthit's official army report on the subject.

[309] The comment, by Suchit Boonbongkarn, is cited in Ron Corben, "Development-Thailand: Army Chief Leads Troops on Reform Mission", *Inter Press Service*, March 4 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS. Despite the difficulties and time required, Suchit sees reform as inevitable.

MILITARY FORCE STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY, 1980-2002

During this period – especially between 1987 and 1996 – Thailand saw a major shift in the balance between the continental and maritime aspects of its strategy. Maritime forces expanded, and naval doctrine became more ambitious. Some change was also seen in the army's force structure, though of a more limited nature.

NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE. Between 1980 and 1986, the biggest change in naval strength was in the marine corps, which grew from 14,000 to 20,000 in 1986. The government signed contracts for two corvettes in 1983 (commissioned into the force in 1986 and 1987), but those ships only maintained the size of the fleet. Between 1987 and 1990, however, a rapid expansion of the fleet began. During that period, contracts were signed for three additional corvettes from Italy (September 1987), six frigates from China (four in July 1988 and two in September 1989), and an amphibious assault ship capable of supporting Sea Harrier aircraft (1990). These ships were all delivered between 1991 and 1997. In addition, contracts were signed in 1994 for the lease of two Knox class frigates, and the navy took delivery of those ships in 1995 and 1996. Between 1991 and 1997, the number of major surface ships in the inventory increased from eight to twenty, and the total tonnage of those ships more than tripled, from 13,000 tons to 47,000 tons. Between 1986 and 1996, the average age of warships in the fleet decreased from 28 years to 19 years. The amphibious assault ship added a capability not enjoyed by any other country in East Asia, and four of the new frigates were larger and more capable than anything in the Thai inventory during the 1980s.

In addition to major surface ships, the navy added or strengthened a number of other capabilities in the 1990s. Between 1993 and 1995, the Thai navy negotiated for and purchased ten AV-8 Sea Harrier vertical lift fighters and six S-70 Seahawk heavy lift helicopters for the Chakri Naruebet and eighteen A-7 attack aircraft for use from ground-based sites. For a force that had not possessed any ground or carrier based fixed wing fighters since 1951, the AV-8s and A-7s represented a significant new capability. Minesweeping vessels, logistical ships, and new patrol craft rounded out the fleet, and new sealift assets were purchased for the marine corps.[310] Commensurate with the addition of tonnage and other capabilities, the navy's manpower also increased, both in absolute terms, and relative to that of the army. Between 1988 and 1998 the navy's manpower increased by 140%, from 22,000 to 53,000 (not including marine personnel). While naval manpower represented only 8.6% of total military manpower in 1988, the figure climbed to 17.3% by 1998.

In 1993, one year after the navy was hailed for its role in bringing General Suchinda's military regime down, the government adopted three new defense-planning documents, all of which emphasized the importance of naval power.[311] The Thai navy also strengthened its intellectual infrastructure during the 1990s and improved its capacity to promote maritime thinking and planning. The navy introduced five-year plans in 1993 (the first of which run from 1993 to 1998 and the second of which covers 1999-2004), strengthening its ability to perform three tasks: design its desired force structure in more detail than was previously

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[310] The supreme commander, an army general, vetoed a proposed tank purchase for the marines.

[311] Panitan Wattanayagorn, "Thailand: The Elite's Shifting Conception of Security," in *Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 438-39.

possible; press its claims for domestic resource allocation based on an official planning document; and justify the importance of the navy as an institution in the court of public opinion.[312] In 1994, the navy formed a think tank modeled consciously on the US Center for Naval Analysis within the Advanced Naval Studies Institute to coordinate the navy's message.[313] The Naval Institute and its leadership pushed for the formation of a Maritime Affairs Research and Development Institute of Thailand, which would carry out additional research on maritime matters in coordination with other government agencies and the private sector.[314] Together with the Naval Operations Department, a stint commanding the Advanced Naval Studies Institute is becoming one stop on the way towards becoming commander of the navy, ensuring that the maritime ideas and policies generated at the navy's new think tank are absorbed by the navy's top leadership.

In 1993 the commander of the navy said the force was moving from a "brown water to a blue water" role.[315] Clearly, the navy's first five-year plan (1993-1998) reflected a shift in that direction. According to that document, the navy sought not only additional frigates, it also wanted to purchase at least two submarines. The submarines would be of little use for operations within Thailand's 200 mile EEZs, which are confined and shallow, but they would be of potentially greater use in the South China Sea or Indian Ocean. With the preponderance

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[312] "Hopes Pinned on Maritime Security Policy", *The Nation*, July 26 1999. One of the prime purposes of the second five-year plan was "to educate the public about the importance of maritime defense."

[313] Sermsuk Kasitipradit, "Disputes Over Spratlys Worry Navy's Top Brass", *Bangkok Post*, June 30 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-0630.

[314] Ibid.

[315] Tasker, "Silent Service: Navy Reaps Rewards of Steering Clear of Politics."

of naval assets then based on the Gulf of Thailand coast, a new naval base was also to be set up on the Andaman Sea coast to cover contingencies to the west of Thailand. There was also talk in 1993 of acquiring a second aircraft carrier, although that item was not included in the first five-year plan.[316]

ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE AND DOCTRINE. The army saw considerably less change than the navy in its force structure and doctrine during this period, though by the late 1990s, some attitude changes toward the purpose and direction of the force were beginning to occur. As early as the late 1970s, Chavalit and other general staff officers advocated downsizing the army and making it a volunteer force. But while staff officers had increased influence at the highest military levels, they did not yet have effective control of the army hierarchy. Far from becoming smaller and more compact, the army grew steadily from 141,000 in 1978 to 190,000 in 1991. And in 1993, the army's commander, General Wimol Wongwanich declared that the experimental introduction of volunteers had "met with little success."[317]

In a 1995 interview Chavalit, returning to the military policy world as defense minister, restated his goal: "I want a small-sized armed forces. They must be well-versed in national defense and particularly modernized in terms of equipment and operations."[318] He also revived the goal of increasing volunteer numbers. In 1996 Supreme Commander

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[316] The two carriers were to give the Thai navy a carrier presence on both coasts. Ibid.

[317] "End to Draft Poses Acid Test for PM", *Bangkok Post*, February 24 1997.

[318] "Defense Minister Discusses Military Plans".

Mongkhon Amphonphisit, an army officer close to Chavalit (and chosen by him for the position), announced a goal of reducing army strength by 25 percent by sometime between 1999 and 2001.[319] These measures proved difficult to implement. As of 2001 (the latest year for which data is available), the force size remains unchanged at 190,000. The introduction of a volunteer system has made more significant gains. In 2001, 24,000 individuals volunteered though, because some areas may have then been oversubscribed, it is unclear how many of these could actually be inducted. (The national total annual intake of enlisted soldiers was 87,000.)

Doctrinal change was also mixed. On the one hand, defense budget increases and the stabilization of the force size allowed greater mechanization of the force during the mid- to late 1990s. The number of armored and mechanized divisions increased from four in 1993 to seven by 2000. On the other hand, there was no change in the official doctrine of total people's defense or the emphasis on economic development. The Defense Ministry's 1996 white paper devotes more space to "national development and civic action" than to "defense against external threats." The former includes subsections on "creating national unity from regional and local diversity," "basic infrastructure projects," and "promotion of agricultural cooperatives."[320] Throughout the 1990s, the army continued to maintain four "development divisions," with manpower equivalent to those of infantry or armored divisions. Indeed, even many of those calling for a more "professional" force issued simultaneous – and from all

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[319] "Supreme Commander: Military Can Hold Off Arms Purchases", *Thailand Times*, December 3 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-1203. "Military Chief of Staff on Modernization", *Siam Rat*, June 27 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-0627.

[320] Ministry of Defense, "The Defense of Thailand, 1996," (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, Thailand, 1996).

appearances heartfelt – statements of support for the army's developmental work. As late as

May 2002, the army's commander suggested the army would, at the behest of General Prem

Tinsulanonda (serving as Privy Council), open 50 new "development camps" in border

provinces.[321]

SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY

The civil-military coalition theory explains much about the speed, timing, and nature of

strategic change in Thailand over the last two decades. There were clear differences in the

political-economic preferences of the army and the navy – as well as relatively more

unanimity among naval officers – throughout this period. Army officers, and specifically

senior army line officers, proved to be dogged opponents of liberal domestic reform. Army

staff officers, on the other hand, not only backed reform, they took leading positions in the

reform coalition during the 1980s and continued to support it thereafter. The navy has

likewise been a strong supporter of political, economic, and military reform from the 1980s

through the present, serving as a committed member of Prem and Chavalit's reform coalition.

The Chatichai government (1988-1991) mismanaged its handling of the military – albeit not

an easy task – and was overthrown by General Suchinda and his Class 5 faction in 1991. The

navy remained aloof from the military government, and, during the anti-government protests

in May 1992, its refusal to participate in suppression efforts helped bring about the collapse of

Suchinda's regime.

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[321] "King Tells Army to Keep in 'Regular' Touch with Border Villagers", *Bangkok Post*, May 3, 2002 2002, in FBIS-SEP-2002-0503.

Finally, the specific timing of force structure and strategy decisions tracks closely with major domestic events. First, the navy's marine corps was strengthened and an admiral chosen as supreme commander one year after the navy provided support in suppressing a coup attempt by the Young Turks in 1985. Second, the largest and most dramatic set of ship purchases took place from 1987 to 1990, the same years that Chavalit served as supreme commander – a position that made him the key military player in procurement decisions. Chavalit's support for the navy's procurement agenda cemented his pro-reform coalition and enhanced its power. Third, more purchases were made and a new emphasis placed on maritime strategy shortly after the collapse of Suchinda's military regime (which the navy did not support) in 1992.

EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES

STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. Changes in Thailand's strategic military environment may help explain changes in Thai force structure and doctrine during the 1980s and 1990s, but it fails to explain many aspects of the case.

An explanation for Thailand's strategic change based on the strategic military environment might suggest that the end of the effective communist insurgency in 1982 (when mass surrenders emptied the ranks of rebels) and/or Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia diminished the land-threat facing Thailand and enabled it to reorient its resources towards naval-building. It might also posit that the end of the Cold War, uncertainties attending continued U.S. naval presence in the region, and regional naval rivalries might also have

provided motives. But during the 1980s, changes in Thailand's strategic environment were more ambiguous than this account suggests. And during the 1990s, the scale of Thailand's naval buildup – and the way in which it was executed and financed – is difficult to reconcile with a balanced assessment of the military threats and economic capabilities.

The end of the insurgency and the Vietnamese threat, 1979-1989. The insurgency threat did decline dramatically after 1979, and the insurgency was effectively over by the end of 1982. But the insurgency threat declined *because* the threat posed by Vietnam increased. That is, China cut off its aid to Thai insurgents in response to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, an event that threatened Thai and Chinese interests.

Despite the easing of the insurgency, the primary military threat after 1979 remained continental. In 1979, the Vietnamese army numbered 1,000,000 men, more than six times the size of the 155,000-strong Thai army. At peak strength, Vietnam maintained around 180,000 troops in Cambodia alone.[322] Moreover, Vietnamese forces were equipped and trained better for conventional warfare than their Thai counterparts. When the Vietnamese army launched its Cambodian venture, it operated close to ten times as many medium and light tanks as the Thai military (2,500 to 278). Yet between 1979 and 1986, when it became clear that Vietnam was *beginning* to withdrawal troops, the percentage of total military manpower held by the Thai navy climbed from 12.9 percent to 16.4 percent. And Thailand began exploring the

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[322] Although Vietnam began withdrawing these troops in the mid-1980s, until the late 1980s, the withdrawals were small. Up to 70,000 Vietnamese troops – together with a Soviet-equipped Cambodian regular force of 40,000-50,000 – were still present in country as of early 1989. The last Vietnamese forces withdrew in September 1989. Murray Hiebert, "Phnom Penh Prepares for Vietnamese Withdrawal: Standing Alone," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 29 1989.

purchase of major new warships in 1986, well before it became clear when (or even if)

Vietnam would withdraw its full complement of troops. Contracts signed between 1987 and

1989 increased Thailand's combat fleet tonnage by 40 percent, and if a 2 percent annual

discount rate is used to determine "combat value" of the fleet based on the average age of the

fleet, its "effective" tonnage increased by 85 percent. This increase was from a very low base,

and there could be some use for naval forces even in a war with Vietnam. But similar military

arguments could also be made for naval forces between 1951 and 1979 (or certainly parts of

this period), a period when the Thai navy was in secular decline.

An era of reduced continental threat, 1989-2003. After 1989, the strategic military

environment seems more consistent with national strategic outputs, though this is more true

because the overall threat level declined, creating a relatively forgiving strategic environment,

than because naval threats or opportunities became overriding or urgent.

The continental threat clearly diminished with the final withdrawal of Vietnamese

forces from Cambodia in 1989. These forces could, of course, have returned to the Thai

border by re-invading Cambodia, and Vietnam probably remains Thailand's greatest potential

ground threat, when rated purely on capabilities. But Vietnam lost its primary military aid

donor with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1989, it has established firm diplomatic and

economic ties with most states in Southeast Asia (including Thailand). Few have rated a

Vietnamese repeat performance in Cambodia likely since its withdrawal from that country.

At the end of the 1980s, Thailand had – and to some extent still has – land border disputes with most of its neighbors. In 1988 Thailand fought (and lost) a border skirmish with Laos, an event still remembered and celebrated in the latter. Thailand's boundaries with Malaysia are not yet fully settled, and Bangkok protested moves by Kuala Lumpur to build a wall in disputed territory in 1997.[323] Parts of Thailand's border with Cambodia are disputed, and Phnom Penh has occasionally protested what it claims are incursions by Thai army units. And past or present involvement of Thailand in ethnic separatist movements, the drug business, and illegal logging in northeastern Burma have resulted in numerous skirmishes – and several Thai villages burned – since 1988. Nevertheless, Thailand and its neighbors, especially Malaysia, Cambodia, and Laos, have made progress in resolving border and other disputes.

Given both political and military considerations, Burma is probably Thailand's most significant ground threat. Burma's army doubled in size (to 325,000 men) between 1988 and 2002. And poor terrain along much of the Thai-Burmese border would neutralize, to some degree, Thailand's superior firepower. Moreover, China maintains a strategic partnership with Burma and provides arms and expertise to the regime. Nevertheless, Burma's military logistics are poor, a problem that prevented it from destroying ethnic rebellions for decades. Deep Thai military relations with China (discussed further below) make Chinese support for any Burmese military effort against Thailand unlikely. And the remoteness of the Thai-Burma border region would make sustaining any significant combat there extremely difficult.

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[323] "The Troubled Waters of Thai-Malaysian Ties", *Nation*, February 26 1997, in NEXIS-LEXIS.

Burmese forces do not present nearly as challenging a potential military threat as Vietnam's

did while they occupied Cambodia. Malaysia, which has enjoyed relatively good relations

with Thailand over the last fifteen years, is the only other force that might be considered a

continental competitor. But Malaysia's ground forces (105,000 in 1980 and 80,000 today) are

substantially smaller than Thailand's, and no better armed.

The maritime dimension: disputes and resolutions. If Thailand's continental threat

picture has improved since 1989, what of the maritime situation? Regional maritime disputes

received high-profile attention in the U.S. media and elsewhere during the 1990s. Rising

regional energy demand, the creation of large but overlapping exclusive economic zones

under the UN Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 (which took effect in 1994), and the

presence of oil and gas in disputed regional waters were all said to contribute to regional

rivalries and naval arms buildups.[324] The Spratly Islands are claimed, in part or in whole, by

five states (if Taiwan is counted as a state). Some of these fortified their positions there

during the 1970s and 1980s, and China evicted Vietnamese forces from several of islands in

1988. China subsequently built structures on several other disputed reefs and islets.

Some of these emerging problems, however, did not affect Thailand directly. Other

problems proved to be overstated (or selectively reported), and some had largely the opposite

effect of that hypothesized by some American analysts in the early 1990s.

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[324] For a treatment that blends all of these elements, see Kent Calder, *Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific* (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1997). For a critique of this logic, written three years later, see Robert A. Manning, *The Asian Energy Factor (Revisited): Myths and Dilemmas of Energy, Security and the Pacific Future* (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

While American Asian observers tend to view military developments in the region –
including those in Thailand – in the context of China's rising power, there is little evidence
that the naval buildup was undertaken in response to stimulus from that quarter. Thailand is
not a participant in the Spratly Island dispute. Few Thai commentators highlighted China as a
potential military competitor, though some do point to an uncertain future. Indeed, Thailand
has maintained a close military and strategic relationship with China since at least 1982 and
was the first Asian nation to sign a "strategic partnership agreement" with it. In addition to
purchasing a large number of tanks and artillery systems from the PLA, Thailand has also
bought six out of the nine warships it has purchased since 1986 from that source. The two
countries continue to exchange military delegations, and Thailand continues to explore
additional arms purchases from China.

China aside, energy issues and maritime boundary disputes might – on the surface –
nevertheless provide a plausible explanation for Thai naval growth. In November 1993 the
navy's commander reported that the only strategic problem the navy was facing was the
conflict over the demarcation of sea boundaries between Thailand and its neighbors.[325]
Thailand's energy situation is one of the most severe in Asia. During the 1970s, Thailand
experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization. Oil consumption increased 500 percent
by volume between 1975 and 2000, while the nation's economy grew only half that

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[325] "Admiral Calls for Adjustment of Combat Forces", *Bangkok Army Television*, November 2 1993, in FBIS-EAS-1993-1102.

amount.[326] By the early 1980s, Thailand's oil imports by value represented over 40 percent of

Thailand's total imports, accounting for much of Thailand's growing deficit.[327] At the same

time, the Gulf of Thailand has been known since at least the 1960s to contain large untapped

reserves of oil and gas. And the Gulf of Thailand's maritime boundaries are as messy as

anywhere on the globe, with overlapping claims between Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, and

Cambodia. Several of these states had recently been in actual or virtual states of war with one

another, and outside major powers have backed varying subsets of these states. If any energy-

related situation should have produced conflict in Asia, the Gulf of Thailand should have been

a likely candidate.

These disputes were, however, relatively smoothly resolved. During the early 1970s,

all of the Gulf of Thailand states established claims to 200 nautical mile EEZs, and

overlapping claims and misunderstandings did lead to tensions over the next several years.

But the need to resolve energy supply problems was pressing, both for the health of national

economies and for the survival of individual political actors. The government of Prime

Minister Kriangsak (1977-1980) fell as a direct result of its 1979 decision to raise oil prices

by fifty percent, a decision taken to ensure adequate access to oil supplies.[328] And

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[326] In 2000, the price of oil was only twice that of 1975, while the consumer price index was 320 percent of what it had been in 1975. Adding price into the equation, the value of Thailand's imported oil in 2000 was less relative to its total economy than it had been in 1975. But price volatility has produced dramatic shifts in this picture over time. In 1983, for example, the price of oil stood at $38 per barrel, far higher than either its cost in 1975 ($12) or its cost in 2000 ($24) – and the repercussions for Thailand's economy were severe. Thailand has struggled to maintain access to oil, a consideration reflected in the three-day 18 percent drop in Thailand's stock market following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

[327] Stewart Dalby, "Thailand Reconsiders Energy Programme", *Financial Times (London)*, March 1 1983.

[328] Richard Nations, "Prem Balances His Cabinet: Deep-Seated Problems Over Energy and Economic Policy Remain Despite the New Sense of Confidence in Bangkok," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 28 1980.

international oil companies – whose involvement is necessary for the success of oil operations – would not do substantial work in contested areas.[329] Thai leaders, like those of its neighbors, had major incentives to reach agreements with their neighbors, and they have generally acted accordingly.

Tensions over oil and sovereignty did not disappear after the 1970s, but Thailand was already embarked on the diplomatic resolution of these issues by the start of the 1980s. In 1979, Thailand signed separate MOUs with Vietnam and Malaysia to establish joint development areas with those states. (In the case of Vietnam, the agreement came after its invasion of Cambodia.) In 1985, Thailand and Malaysia began negotiating revenue sharing arrangements for any work done in jointly claimed areas. In 1990, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur established a joint authority organization to oversee work in their disputed areas, and in 1992, Thailand and Vietnam did the same. In 1995, Thailand began negotiations with Cambodia over maritime boundaries and the joint exploitation of resources in areas claimed by both.

Since the 1950s, the government has strictly controlled the retail price of oil. The government has provided subsidies, but also pressured foreign-invested refineries to keep prices down. This pressure on domestic middlemen has resulted on occasion in insufficient supply, and Kriangsak's move to increase the price of oil was an effort to ease capacity and supply problems.

[329] Thailand itself had experience with this truth. In 1973, it awarded exploration rights to a block claimed by both Thailand and Cambodia to Amoco, Unocal, and Sun Oil. These companies began exploration, but quickly pulled out in the face of Cambodian protests. Harish Mehta, "Tensions Run High Over Disputed Oilfields", *Business Times (Singapore)*, October 7 1992. Of particular note here is that Cambodia had, for all intents and purposes, no navy, and yet it was able to deny Thailand the ability to exploit jointly claimed resources.

On balance, energy needs and the ambiguity of maritime boundaries have produced more cooperation than conflict around the Gulf of Thailand.[330] By 1996, the national oil companies of Thailand and Malaysia – with collaborative achievements behind them and knowledge of their complementary technical and business strengths –had established committees to look into joint projects *outside* of the Gulf of Thailand.[331] The Royal Thai Navy did refer to the need to resolve boundary disputes on satisfactory terms as one rationale for fleet growth. But given the interests of Thailand's civilian leadership in cooperation and their largely successful efforts at resolution, it is not surprising that the navy's arguments were advanced only in vague terms, without reference to any substantial conflict generated by unsettled borders, much less a discussion of specific disputes.

Admiral Prachet Siridet, the navy's commander, suggested a second possible rationale for naval building in a December of 1993 interview. "Our mission," he said, "is to maintain a power balance vis-à-vis our neighbors."[332] But in 1993, as the navy was preparing to embark on a new round of purchases, Thailand's naval balance of power vis-à-vis its immediate neighbors was more than adequate. Thailand's defense budget was more than 33 percent larger than that of Malaysia, which had the largest defense budget of any state sharing a maritime boundary with Thailand. It had more than twice as many surface warships as

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[330] Robert Manning makes a similar argument. See Manning, *The Asian Energy Factor (Revisited): Myths and Dilemmas of Energy, Security and the Pacific Future.* Also, although the timing of events in the South China Sea lagged significantly, a variation on this pattern can be seen: political authorities in China allowed the navy to engage in adventurous and self-serving behavior for a decade, but around the time China's actual (instead of projected) energy needs began to exceed its production, civilian leaders became serious about reigning in the navy and preventing its actions for alienating important regional partners.

[331] Peter Janssen, "Oil Soothes The Way to Resolving Conflict," *Asian Business*, August 1996.

[332] "Navy Chief on Modernization, PRC Technology", *The Nation*, December 26 1993, in FBIS-BK-1993-1226.

Vietnam, the leading neighbor in that category, and more than three times as many as

Malaysia. Thailand's best anti-ship missiles had a range twice that of any neighbor. There is

little question that Thailand's navy was already superior to those of its neighbors in 1993.[333]

A third strategic argument put forward by the navy was the protection of the sea lines

of Thailand's communication (SLOCs). In 1996, the military's official white paper discussed

sea-lane defense as one of the navy's primary missions.[334] In June 1997, the commander of

the Advanced Naval Studies Institute observed that the vast majority of the country's imports

and exports are via the sea, and any conflict over territorial rights in the South China Sea

could threaten Thailand's survival. Two months later, Admiral Vijitr Chamnankarn, the

navy's commander in chief (and the former commander of the Advanced Naval Studies

Institute) offered a similar assessment. He observed that 95 percent of Thailand's imports and

exports go through the Straits of Malacca and into the Gulf and said, "The main responsibility

of the Naruebet is the protection of the international sea lanes of communication."[335]

But while Thailand could conceivably face a problem defending its SLOCs, it does not

seem that concern over the SLOCs drove Thailand's naval buildup. The rationale was not

offered until a full decade after Thailand had embarked on a major expansion of its naval

forces. When the contract for the aircraft carrier, the Chakri Naruebet, was signed in 1990,

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[333] If anything, the balance of conventional land forces required more attention. Because Thailand devoted substantial army resources to developing effective counterinsurgency capabilities and local development projects, it was outnumbered in medium tanks by more than six-to-one by Vietnam.

[334] Ministry of Defense, "The Defense of Thailand, 1996," (Bangkok: Ministry of Defense, Thailand, 1996).

[335] Kavi Chongkittavorn, "The Changing of Our Naval Defense Strategy", The Nation, August 14 1997.

the vessel was publicly justified as a ship that would be useful in the event of hurricanes or other natural disasters. And the fleet even today is simply too small to effectively escort Thailand's maritime traffic in the event of hostilities – much less sweep the South China Sea of potential competitors.

All things being equal, more military power (of all forms) is better than less, and the easing of the continental threat with the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in 1989 allowed Thailand to consider other types of forces. But there was no pressing naval threat that required an expansion of maritime forces on the scale that Thailand undertook. China has arguably emerged as a latent threat to Thailand's SLOCs, but it is less of a threat than Soviet naval forces represented before 1989, and the fact that Thailand purchased the bulk of its new ships from China is not consistent with an effort to balance against that threat. By all appearances, the Thai navy was a force in search of a mission. In 1993, the navy's commander said that to design the best strategy, "we must first figure out what kinds of threats we might face" and "which countries should be listed as possible enemies."[336] Six years later, the navy's chief said that "there is no threat of a major war in the next 10 years.... We will monitor weapon buildup by every country and try to achieve a balance with it."[337]

But certain features of Thailand's naval buildup – namely its speed, scope, and financing – suggested that something other than reallocating loose resources was at work. For a state with a total defense budget of between two and four billion dollars (depending on the

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[336] "Admiral Calls for Adjustment of Combat Forces".

[337] "Navy Chief on Budget Cut, Foreign Threat," *Bangkok Post*, January 2, 1999.

exchange rate) and an army that continued to demand the bulk of military resources, naval

growth between 1986 and 1996 was extraordinary. In order to pay for this extraordinary

buildup, Thailand's parliament allowed the navy to use unorthodox – and risky – means. The

navy borrowed heavily against future budgets, in U.S. dollars, with the partnership of foreign

commercial banks. And while the navy did not cause Thailand's 1997 financial crisis, it did

contribute to it. The aircraft carrier alone added $500 million to an annual current account

deficit of around $7 billion.

The Thai navy was already dangerously overextended financially before the baht's

value plummeted in 1997. With the baht's collapse, the navy's dollar-denominated debts

suddenly doubled in value. At the same time, the navy's budget, under IMF scrutiny, was cut

by a third. The navy's aircraft carrier and most other capital ships ceased even limited

training operations, and the navy requested funds for small patrol craft to conduct its basic

coastal functions on a lower budget. Some pundits suggested the navy should sell its carrier

to cover any new purchases.

Although the navy may have benefited from a decline in land-based threats at the end

of the 1980s, the more permissive external environment does not appear to tell the whole

story. National political authorities examined army budgets critically after 1980, and

especially 1992. They did not do the same with naval requests. Without the navy's defense

of liberal, constitutional rule during the 1980s and 1999s and its close ties to the Democratic

Party, the rapid expansion of the fleet seen over the last two decades seems unlikely. A 1994

article in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* observed that Thailand's military modernization

"seems to have taken a heavily maritime bias." But, the article continued, "Such a shift is not immediately explicable, given that Thailand has no real external threats to its maritime security."[338] Indeed, the navy appears to have benefited as much from its domestic political position as it did from any shift in its strategic environment.

MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. Material interests also explain only some aspects of this case, especially in the case of the army. After 1986 the navy received significant material rewards for its support to those undertaking Thailand's liberal transformation. Those benefits could arguably have been anticipated in the earlier 1980s, given that the military reform efforts of Prem and Chavalit promised to strengthen the navy's relative institutional position. Nevertheless, the navy's extended support for domestic reform early in the 1980s is remarkable.

Even more remarkable – and more clearly at odds with an explanation based narrowly on material interests – has been the army's refusal to embrace liberalism, or military doctrines suggested by liberals, over the last fifteen years, and especially since the collapse of Suchinda's government in 1992. A material interests-based theory predicts bandwagonning with domestic political winners, especially in the absence of viable alternatives. By 1990 most political analysts believed that while military officers still might attempt to execute coups d'etat, they could no longer rule the state – a belief confirmed by the experience of 1991-92. While the long-term future is difficult to predict, a return to integral nationalist rule in the short term is at least as unlikely today as a quick return to liberal rule was in the early

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[338] Mak and Hamzah, "Navy Blues."

1960s. Yet, like the navy during the earlier period, the army has adjusted its domestic position only slowly and incompletely.

Summary and Conclusions

The civil-military coalition theory frequently does a better job than the strategic military environment at explaining changes in military force structure and doctrine, and, on balance, it does a better than material interests-based theories in explaining the domestic preferences of the services.

The strategic military environment is more consistent with strategy and strategic change during some periods than others. It appears to have trouble explaining particular events during four periods. First, it does a relatively poor job of explaining the absolute growth in naval budgets between 1944 and 1947, at a time when Thailand had few potential enemies and even fewer against which its navy might stand a chance of defeating. Second, it cannot explain the speed or magnitude of the decline in naval force structure in 1951. Until at least 1954, Thai leaders were at least as concerned about the return of the European powers (and especially the French) to East Asia as they were about the rise of communism, and concerns about a possible communist insurgent threat only gradually emerged during the following decade. Third, the increase in relative spending on the navy between 1973 and 1976 – exactly the period when the armed communist insurgent movement was reaching peak strength – seems anomalous. In this case, the strategic shift was less dramatic, and the disconnect between threat and response therefore less pronounced, but the facts nevertheless

present the theory with an apparent puzzle. Fourth, the extent of the naval buildup after 1986 is also difficult to explain. While some relative shift in priorities might be expected, there was no new naval threat that would easily explain an absolute increase in naval spending.

At other times, strategy and strategic change have appeared more consistent with the strategic military environment. The army experimented with a variety of strategies for addressing the communist insurgency after its outbreak in 1965, and despite the addition of some additional resources to maritime forces during the period from 1973 to 1976, the military was clearly and largely successfully focused on attacking that problem. Strategy today is arguably being brought into line better with Thailand's potential military threat. Since 1999 the army has slowly begun moving towards a smaller, more professional conventional defense posture (though there are also mixed signals), and since 1997 naval purchases have received greater scrutiny on strategic grounds. The legitimacy of domestic institutions has been largely settled (at least for the foreseeable future) even as state budgets have tightened, reducing the impact of politics on strategy and force structure.

Although the material interests of the services may partly explain some aspects of the cases, they too do a relatively poor job compared to a theory that also considers functional interests and, especially, the effects of socialization around those interests. Supporting a material interests-based explanation, there are instances in which the services overthrew government that had cut their budgets. The army's opposition to the Pridi-Thamrong government (1944-1946) is one example. In other cases, one service or the other supported

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opposition groups or positions that promised greater rewards, as in the case, for example, the navy's support for liberal reform during the 1980s.

But a theory based purely on the services' pursuit of material interests would surmise a wide variety of domestic alliance patterns. While navies might back outward looking liberal regimes more than half the time, we would also expect many exceptions. Not all integral nationalist leaders will necessarily stint the navy (or liberal leaders the army). Phibun, for example, supported naval growth between 1936 and 1938, and Thanom approved more modest, but nevertheless significant purchases in 1969 and early 1973. Yet at critical moments, the navy joined in opposition to these leaders. Perhaps more importantly, the act of forming tactical alliances itself could have significantly changed instrumental calculations based on regime type. For example, the navy could have joined in Suchinda's military crackdown in May 1992 with the expectation of being rewarded afterward. And given little prospect of changing the government during the 1960s, we might have expected the navy to throw its weight behind Thanom with similar expectations. Yet throughout the postwar period, the navy supported liberal groups and policies, while most army officers backed integral nationalist ones.

The civil-military coalition theory performs well as an explanation for both service preferences and strategic change in Thailand during the postwar period. The theory does a better job than a more narrowly material interests-based theory in explaining the strong continuity of the services' domestic preferences, and the direct interests that the services

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showed in economic and social policy. The army took an early role in rural development – at the cost of its conventional force structure. More recently, it has also demonstrated an interest in urban poverty alleviation. The navy, for its part, has been associated with pro-business political parties, the liberal media, and academia. And while the civil-military coalition theory illuminates broad patterns of service preferences, it also helps explain the variations found in their strength. For example, the theory helps explain why the army's general staff officers were relatively more liberal than army line officers.

The civil-military coalition theory also largely explains Thailand's military and strategic policy during the postwar period. On balance, the theory accurately predicts more instances of strategic change or continuity than does the strategic military environment. In some instances the effects of domestic politics – and specifically conflicts between civil-military coalitions – are quick and unmistakable. After the collapse of Phibun's government in 1944, the navy received an immediate lift from its support of the Free Thai movement leading up to that event. In 1951 the army "reorganized" the navy, cutting its strength dramatically and stripping it of many assets, after an army coup ousted Pridi and two naval countercoups, launched in cooperation with Free Thai civilian groups, failed. Between 1986 and 1990, the navy benefited from its support of Prem's reform government against a coup attempt in 1985, and after 1992, it received a further boost after refusing to support Suchinda's military government against civilian protesters. Only during the 1970s do explanations based on the strategic military environment fit comfortably with doctrinal and force structure outputs. But those outputs were, it should be added, also consistent with the civil-military coalition theory.

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CHAPTER 5: CHINA

Introduction

In China the struggle between Communist Party moderates, who would allow room for individual economic and social difference, and radical leftists, who would eliminate such differences, mirrored the conflict between liberals and integral nationalists in other East Asian states. The Chinese navy aligned itself closely with Party moderates, and naval fortunes rose and fell with those of moderate political leaders. The army was divided, with some senior officers favoring moderate politics and others giving support to radical leftist leaders. Throughout the postwar period, political leaders have been highly sensitive to the social, economic, and political implications of different military force structures, while military leaders have been equally attuned to the implications of domestic political and economic policy on their desired force structures and strategies.

This examination of the Chinese military politics and grand strategy is divided into two parts:

- *Case 1 (1949-1976)*. This case examines the services' involvement in politics and the impact of that involvement on military strategy during the transition from an early period of moderate (if contested) leadership to the radical leftist (and integral nationalist) leadership of the Cultural Revolution.

- *Case 2 (1976-2002)*. This case treats military politics and strategic outcomes during the period of "reform and opening," under which Deng Xiaoping and his successors introduced reforms designed to liberalize economic, social, and, to a lesser extent, political policies.

In the first case (1953-1976), political moderates held the upper hand and were largely in control of the day-to-day administration of the country until 1966, when the radical leftists launched the Cultural Revolution. The first case, then, involved the transition from relatively more liberal to integral nationalist governance. The navy's manning, training, and equipment preferences placed it squarely in the moderate camp. The army was deeply divided, with technical officers supporting moderate political positions and many others sympathetic to leftist politics. Civilian and military leftists viewed the navy's leadership, as well as that of other technical military branches, as a threat to their preferred social and economic policies. As the leftists, with Mao Zedong's backing, gained power, they sought to remove or constrain the navy's senior leadership. Opposition to leftist politics in the navy ran deep, however, and the organization remained a thorn in the side of the leftist faction throughout even the Cultural Revolution. During the latter part of the Cultural Revolution, naval leaders worked to bring down the radical leftist leadership known as the Gang of Four, and Xiao Jinguan, the navy's commander, actively plotted the arrest of those individuals in September and October 1976.

During the second period (covering the years since 1976), moderate civilian leaders, led by Deng Xiaoping, returned to power. Deng brought the navy into his political coalition to balance against opposition from conservative (i.e., leftist and integral nationalist) army officers, especially regional military commanders and those associated with the military's political department. In return for its stalwart political support, Deng gave the navy considerable autonomy, an expanded share of military resources, and free license to

propagandize the cause of maritime industry and maritime defense. But it is important to note that the navy backed the moderates' return before these rewards were promised, and its preference for liberalization went beyond backing for any single political program or individual. Many naval officers appear to have sympathized with demonstrators during the democracy movement that culminated with the Tiananmen massacre of June 1989.

These cases support the civil-military coalition theory. The services maintained consistent political preferences, with the army being deeply divided but at a minimum harboring a considerable core of officers sympathetic to the leftists' extreme integral nationalist agenda and the navy consistently backing liberal positions. Although these preference appear to have sprung originally from a relatively narrow range of military considerations, both military and political authorities quickly became aware of the inter-connections between military policies and the domestic social, economic, and political milieu in which they exist (e.g., the influence of military policy on domestic social policy and the impact of domestic social policy on military possibilities). In forming their domestic preferences, most military leaders appear to have given substantially greater weight to the potential impact of domestic issues on the form and doctrines of military forces than on the size or budgets that would accrue from domestic outcomes. Evaluating the relative effects of domestic political considerations and strategic calculus in military politics is complicated by the existence of competing theories about the relationship between different forms of domestic national strength and national security. But the timing of major strategic shifts generally correlated more closely with domestic political crises than they did with external

events, and the leaders involved clearly understood and gave great weight to the domestic

implications of the military choices with which they were confronted.

Case 1: From Liu Shaoqi to the Arrest of the Gang of Four

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF EVENTS

This case examines the services' involvement in politics during the transition from moderate

leadership (i.e., one that was relatively liberal on the Chinese continuum) towards a political

system dominated by radical leftists (a group that was closer to the integral nationalist ideal),

as well as the effects on force structure and doctrine of that involvement.

The immediate aftermath of the Korean War saw top civilian and military leaders

working in relative harmony. Moderates controlled the day-to-day administration of the

country and Peng Dehuai, an advocate of strengthening China's conventional forces, served

as Defense Minister. But while Peng worked closely and comfortably with Liu Shaoqi and

other civilian moderates, the army was deeply divided. Leftists within the army feared that

liberal politics and a technically-oriented military would undermine revolutionary social

values, while officers from the technical branches supported the civilians' moderate social and

economic policies. The navy gave strong support to civilian moderates and Peng's military

leadership, despite budget cuts that impinged on the navy's desire to develop a major surface

fleet quickly.

With Mao Zedong's backing, leftists made inroads against the moderates after 1956 and ultimately gained the decisive upper hand during the first phases of the Cultural Revolution. By then, after more than a dozen years of sparring, it was clear to both the moderate and leftist camps that the gulf between them was substantial. Before and during the Cultural Revolution, civilian and military leftists distrusted officers from the technical services, especially the navy. By reorienting military doctrine to reemphasize "people's war," the leftists empowered and expanded their support base while weakening their military opponents. The leftists' concerns about the liberal political proclivities of the navy were not entirely unjustified, though they were in part self-fulfilling. By treating the navy as an enemy, the enmity between it and the leftists was certainly exacerbated. Shortly after Mao's death in 1976, senior naval officers enthusiastically joined with a group of army officers, mostly from other technical branches, to arrest the Gang of Four, put an end to the Cultural Revolution, and restore moderate civilian leaders to power.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Since 1949 Chinese politics has been defined by struggles between pragmatic moderates, concerned largely with economic results rather than social and political purity, and more ideologically oriented leftists, who remained relatively true to the Communist Party's original social ideal of absolute egalitarianism.

During the first decades after 1949, a core of moderate Party leaders thought it would

be necessary to work with social groups that socialist purists found anathema, including

capitalists, intellectuals, and even former Guomindang (Nationalist Party) administrators.[339]

They saw some trade with foreign states and the importation of technology and capital as

necessary to developing the economy. While they favored state ownership over most

economic assets in principle, they believed that it might be necessary to permit private

production and ownership for an extended period of time during the transition. In the political

realm, they believed that the Party elite should decide policy, but that the Party's decisions

should be reached through intra-party democracy – i.e., according to established procedures

and rules, rather than by fiat or under pressure from mass activism. Similarly, a technically

proficient elite would carefully oversee economic management. All of this suggested that it

would be necessary to tolerate economic and, to some extent, ideological differences in

society.

Mao Zedong and his leftist supporters believed that the tolerance of social and

economic difference, as well as the active recruitment of members of a de facto bourgeoisie

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[339] The moderate group described here included Chen Yun, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai. The two coalesced and became more distinct after the Great Leap Forward (1957-59) than they had been before that time. Some individuals included in this group (e.g., Deng Xiaoping) supported the moderate economic position described here during the early and mid-1950s, but went along with Mao Zedong in supporting the Great Leap Forward – only to regret that decision as the scope of the ensuing disaster became evident. Others, including most prominently Chen Yun, opposed the Great Leap before it was launched. By 1960, however, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai were working together with Chen Yun to undo the damage and restore more balanced economic and social policies. For the evolution of this group and the political-economic debates during these years, see Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965," in *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For a shorter treatment in a broader context, see Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990), 541-602.

into government and economic planning, would, in practice, lead to the consolidation and exacerbation of social differences.[340] They believed that the revolution itself had decapitated the old regime, but had not fundamentally changed Chinese society or social relationships. The bourgeoisie could, in their view, easily return to dominate politics. They therefore believed in excluding former capitalists and intellectuals from any influential posts in government, the economy, or society.

The leftists favored continuing the revolution. They pushed for rapid and complete collectivization and, during the Cultural Revolution, conducted "struggle sessions" against former members of the capitalist classes to ensure their integration into a new classless society. In politics, they believed in refreshing the Party's own ideological purity by mobilizing the masses to oversee and critique the Party itself (an unruly process that was, in their minds, necessary despite its dangers). And, with 70 percent of the Party recruited from the countryside (in contrast to the Soviet Communist Party base that was 70 percent urban), policy emphasized the welfare and empowerment of peasants, though ultimately it was the peasants who suffered most from their miscalculations. The leftists distrusted urban elites – whether former capitalist or aspiring socialists.

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[340] Whereas the moderates were very much a group of equals, the leftists were able to compete during the early part of this period only through Mao's patronage and support. For the Great Leap, Mao was able to convince many moderates to join his camp, but afterwards, his remaining supporters were either military figures or low level Party functionaries. The remainder of this chapter describes how Mao and Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, made common cause with the army figure Lin Biao to promote other leftists to positions of power and, ultimately, launch the Cultural Revolution. For a more detailed account of politics on the civilian side, see Harry Harding, "The Chinese State in Crisis, 1966-1969," in *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 148-247. Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965." Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 514-617.

In contemporary Chinese politics, there were no individuals who would have been defined as true liberals, but in relative terms, China's moderates were closer to the ideal type than were its leftists. They were relatively more inclined towards trade, the toleration of former capitalists, a more relaxed view of private property and markets (however limited), and the acceptance of social differences. They were hardly enlightened liberal philosophers, but they were pragmatic enough to recognize the need for relatively more liberal economic and social policy. Most if not all of the moderates had significant foreign education, many in Western Europe, and they were significantly more cosmopolitan in upbringing and outlook than the radical leftists. Looking ahead to the 1980s, it was the surviving moderate pragmatists who began the wholesale transformation of the Chinese economy along free market principles and freed Chinese society from collective controls – without, of course, making it an electoral democracy.

Domestic politics during the period covered by this case saw first an era of shared power, with first one group and then the other holding the initiative between 1949 and 1965, followed by a period of leftist domination during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Advantage in the civilian and military worlds did not move in lock-step. On the civilian side, advantage can be assessed as follows:

- The first five-year plan (1953-1957). During the PRC's first five-year plan, moderates dominated the day-to-day administration of the Party, state apparatus, and economy. Careful economic management and the use of Soviet models and advisors led to dramatic increases in output.

- Great Leap Forward (1958-1959). Mao Zedong and other leftists, fearing that the moderates' economic policies threatened the social values of the revolution, launched the Great Leap Forward, under which massive communes were established and private agricultural production eliminated completely.

- Retrenchment and recovery (1960-1965). Initiative returned to the moderates, who reduced the scale of collectivization, restored private plots, and reconciled (to a degree) with urban intellectuals. Mao, discredited, abandoned any attempt to oversee the day-to-day management of the economy.

- Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Mao and his leftist followers in the Party and the army regained dominance in 1966 by launching a frontal attack on the political purity of Liu Shaoqi and his fellow moderates. They sealed China off from most foreign trade and contact and once again abolished private property completely.

Advantage in the military realm – though heavily influenced by outside actors – was frequently out of step with that found in the civilian political world. Competition between "expert" and "red" (i.e., professional and political) factions mirrored that between moderates and leftists on the civilian side. In the military case, the "expert" faction was dominant immediately after the Korean War but came under increasing fire from leftists inside and outside of the military after 1956. After the failure of the Great Leap Forward in 1959 and Mao's withdrawal from everyday economic administration, Mao focused his attention on securing his base of power within the military. Hence, as moderates reasserted control in civilian policy, they lost influence in the military. Later, during the first stages of the Cultural Revolution, the military's institutional structure insulated parts of it from the worst leftist excesses – though the "expert" faction's position did erode over time. In general, then, shifts in advantage within the military occurred in a more incremental fashion than it did in the civilian world, with the "expert" faction strongest during the early and mid-1950s and slowly but steadily losing out to leftists thereafter.

SERVICE POSITIONS

During the 1950s, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai enjoyed a strong relationship with civilian moderates under Liu Shaoqi, and he established military modernization and regularization as the most important tasks for the PLA. The army, however, was deeply divided, with many in favor of more revolutionary social and economic policies and opposed to what they regarded as Peng's attempt to turn the military into a conventional fighting force. The navy, however, was unified in its support of both Peng Dehuai and Liu's civilian leadership.

After 1956, Mao, fearing that Peng's efforts to modernize and regularize the military reinforced the position of Liu and his allies and threatened his preferred domestic (mostly social) priorities, sought and found support from Peng's opponents within the army. When Peng took the lead in directly challenging Mao over the failure of the Great Leap in 1959, Mao succeeded in purging him and installing Lin Biao, who had been vocal in promoting leftist political thought and a return to more revolutionary military doctrines. In 1966, Lin Biao helped Mao and Jiang Qing (Mao's wife and radical leftists) launch the Cultural Revolution and sweep moderate civilians from the government. From its inception, the navy's preferred policies placed it squarely in the moderate camp, and despite repeated leftist efforts to transform the organization after Peng Dehuai's fall, the organization remained largely hostile to the leftist program. Although frequently under attack after 1956 and largely isolated after 1966, senior naval officers maintained their commitment to moderate politics and, in 1976, played key roles in the eventual overthrow and arrest of the Gang of Four.

THE ARMY'S POLITICAL POSITION. Although the Chinese Communist Revolution

(1927-1949) was fought largely by guerrilla forces using guerrilla tactics, the balance between

conventional guerrilla operations varied from area to area, as well as across time. The PLA

partly reorganized itself to fight large-scale conventional battles for the final conquest of first

the north (1946-1948) and then the south (1949) of China. It is therefore not particularly

surprising to find that different officers took different lessons from this history, as well as

from their own varied experiences during the Revolution.

The experience of the Korean War, however, tipped the scales towards a heavy

emphasis on conventional organization and tactics. The Chinese had suffered grievously from

their lack of an adequate logistical system and a shortage of artillery, armor, and, at least at

the beginning of the war, aircraft. Peng Dehuai, who was more inclined towards conventional

force structures and doctrines than most PLA generals even before the Korean War,

commanded Chinese forces in Korea throughout the conflict and then returned home at its end

to become Minister of Defense.[341] Peng proceeded to push a bold program to strengthen the

PLA's conventional military capabilities, but he faced resistance. This resistence was based

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[341] Peng, for example, took a prominent role in the only major CCP conventional assault on Japanese forces during the Second World War. Involving some 400,000 men and lasting almost four months (from August to December 1940) the so-called Hundred Regiments Campaign inflicted significant losses on the Japanese, but the CCP also sustained heavy casualties, leading Mao to prohibit such costly tactics in all future operations. From 1947 to 1949 Peng fought any number of conventional engagements and, though frequently failing at a tactical level, managed to attrit Nationalist forces and gradually push them out of his area of operations in Shanxi and Yenan. Jurgen Domes, *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image* (Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press, 1985), 25-50. William W. Whitson, *The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927-1971* (London: Macmillan Press, 1973), 111-14.

largely on social and political concerns, as well as military ones, and was fed by civilian

leftists, as well as military ones.

In 1953, Peng began to prepare the ground among members of the Central Military

Commission (CMC), unit commanders, and Party and state officials for military

modernization and "regularization" (or standardization, which he saw as a necessary step

towards modernization). He explained the need for such reforms in the following terms:

> We need a regularized military system.... A regularized [or professionalized]
> military system is an important condition for a modern army. In particular,
> because in the past our army was spread over many different areas, the military
> system of all the different units was not unified. For this reason, in the course
> of modernization, it is of extreme importance that we stress regularization!"[342]

Regularization would, of necessity, take the PLA far from its guerrilla origins and the military

model developed by Mao Zedong. Mao's model included the integration of military forces

with local administration, the fostering close relations with local populations, and tailoring

military structures to capitalize on local resources and strengths.

Peng advanced a number of regularizing reforms. A system of ranks was introduced,

together with a pay scale graded by rank and experience. Academic standards for entry to

military schools and promotions were introduced. A bifurcated personnel system was

established, under which academic and other requirements were standardized for officers,

while conscription was instituted to fill the enlisted ranks. A regular, military-run reserve was

established, while the bulk of China's vast and disparate militia organizations were either

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[342] Domes, *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image*, 68. The comments were made in September 1968.

disbanded or removed from direct military management. Peng reduced the size of the regular

force from 4.8 million to 3.5 million, and he worked to strengthen the relative authority of

central organizations, such as the general staff and the departments, vis-à-vis the military

regions. Most of these reforms were approved at a marathon 51-day "all military meeting"

from December 1953 to January 1954. The meeting was stacked with branch, service, and

military school commanders – i.e., officers from the central military establishment, rather than

the military regions.[343]

Peng worked closely with Liu Shaoqi and the other civilian moderates who then

dominated the Standing Committee of the CCP Central Committee. He shared their interest

in stable and relatively close relations with the Soviet Union, which was providing substantial

technical assistance in both the economic and military spheres (but which was viewed with

great suspicion by Mao).[344] He favored the continued employment of "intellectuals" and even

former members of the Nationalist military, just as they favored the employment of civilian

technicians who had formerly served the Nationalists civilian government.[345] Peng

understood that economic growth would require freeing resources for civilian investment and

consequently reduced the military budget from over 30 percent of the budget in 1953 to

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[343] He Ding Wang Yan, Jiang Baihua, *Peng Dehuai Zhuan* (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1995), 511.

[344] In February 1958, long after Mao had made his aversion to "over reliance" on Soviet models and assistance, Peng delivered a speech commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Soviet Red Army suggested closer military cooperation between China and the Soviet Union. Domes, *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image*, 81.

[345] On the military side, these individuals were largely employed in the air force and, as I will discuss further, in the navy.

around 10 percent in 1959.[346] And he worked with the civilian leadership to ensure that the specifics of military industrial planning were in sync with overall economic planning.[347]

But Mao, together with leftists in the army, grew increasingly concerned about the political, social, and economic effects of Peng's military reforms during the mid-1950s. Some proposed reforms had direct bearing on the Party's control of the military – especially Peng's politically naïve attempt in 1953 to establish a single commander system (yizhangzhi), which would have clearly subordinated political commissars to military commanders in PLA line units.[348] Mao's opposition to other aspects of Peng's military program are best understood in the context of his larger concerns about the direction of social and economic policy.

Specifically, Mao felt that former capitalist classes were regrouping, that national policy was once again favoring urban elites and interests over rural ones, and that government and even the Party was becoming bureaucratized and incapable and unwilling to affect social revolution.[349] In Mao's view, introducing a system of ranks into the military, an organization

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[346] David Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (London: University of California Press, 2002), 188-89. The figures vary depending on source, but all agree on the direction of movement and degree of change. See also Wang Yan, *Peng Dehuai Zhuan*, 503.

[347] In an effort to coordinate mid-term military planning with planning for the second five-year plan (1958-1962), Peng invited the finance minister, state planning minister, railroad chief, transportation minister, heads of the machinery and heavy industrial departments, and other key economic planners to take part in the expanded session of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in March 1956. Wang Yan, *Peng Dehuai Zhuan*, 536.

[348] Ibid., 513.

[349] On the concerns that led to Mao's intervention, see Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 561. Harlan W. Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 52.

that had long led the Party's efforts to educate and set an example for the masses, widened the

problem of class.[350] The introduction of academic standards for officer schools favored urban

candidates, who benefited from betters schools than their urban competitors. And Peng's

emphasis on conventional military training (which was to be given three times as much study

as politics), his advocacy of studying the Soviet model, and his efforts to divorce the militia

from the PLA all threatened to remove the military entirely from its social role.

Mao's socio-political criticisms resonated with many senior army officers. In 1956,

just one year after most of Peng's professional innovations were put into place, some officers

began to complain about military reform's unintended consequences. In September of that

year, Deputy Minister of Defense Tan Zheng delivered a speech to the Eighth Party Congress

in which he discussed five newly emerging phenomenon in the force: (1) ignoring the unity of

commanders and men and the tradition of unity between those above and below; (2)

overlooking the function of democracy (i.e., an atmosphere within which inferiors could

freely suggest ideas or even criticize those above them); (3) emphasizing administrative work

and ignoring thought (i.e., leftist political) work; (4) departing from applied knowledge in

classroom work and pursuing dogmatism and formalism; and (5) a sense of distance in the

relationship between military units and the people, local Party organizations, and local

government.[351]

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[350] Under the pay scale established by Peng, platoon leaders earned five to six times the average urban wage (which itself was several times the average rural wage), and the wages received by top military commanders were some 40 times the urban wage. Wang Yan, *Peng Dehuai Zhuan*, 518.

[351] "Jianjun Xinjieduanzhong Zhengzhi Gongzuo de Ruogan Wenti", *Jiefangjunbao*, September 24 1956.

It is difficult to assess with any precision how much of the army supported Peng's

military reform program relative to those who sympathized with Mao's efforts to keep the

military a bastion of leftist strength. Mao was almost certainly right that military reform, left

unchallenged, would ultimately create strong technocratic sympathies within the military and

undermine its commitment to core revolutionary values. But most officers in the mid-1950s

had joined the force when it was still organized largely along revolutionary lines. At the most

senior level, China's ten marshals (so designated because of their sterling service during the

Civil War) appeared split, with some, like Nie Rongzhen (who led China's military

technology efforts), providing reliable support for professionalization, and others, including

Zhu De and He Long, voicing concerns suggesting that although weapons are important,

human qualities had historically provided the PLA with its primary advantage in its military

struggles.[352] Those human qualities, Zhu De emphasizes, included the democratic unity

between commanders and their men and the unity of the army with the people.[353] At a

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[352] The available evidence strongly suggests that certain aspects of Peng Dehuai's program came under serious and sustained criticism from influential individuals inside and perhaps outside of the military. Comments and reporting by a wide variety of individuals make this clear. But a caveat is in order. With one or two exceptions, it is far more difficult to determine from the reporting whether the individuals making such statements were themselves critics or were, rather, acknowledging some faults raised by others in order to defend broader programs with which they were in general agreement. Peng Dehuai himself said, "Because of insufficient experience and investigation, a number of serious problems have arisen.... For example, in the process of making a conventional force some things occurred that affected the unity of officers and men.... In order to complete our task of building a modernized army, we must be firm in maintaining the following systems in accordance with our experience and the actual situation in the units: (1) maintain the military's leadership system [under which a division of responsibilities exists in the joint leadership of commanders and political officers]; ...(2) the military's political system; ...and (3) the military's democratic system." "Zai Dang de Dibaci Quanguo Daibiao Dahuishang: Peng Dehuai Tongzhi de Fayan", *Jiefangjunbao*, September 20 1956.

[353] Zhu De, "Renmin Jundui, Renmin Zhanzheng", *Jiefangjunbao*, August 1 1958. As early as 1956, the political department had been using the example of Mao Zedong and, especially, Zhu De (as commander of the Chinese 4th Worker and Farmer's Army) at Jinggangshan in 1928 as a model of people's war and its power. During Zhu De's campaigns there, the example set by the commander and his men, according to these articles, turned

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minimum, the army included many left-leaning officers that could, if mobilized, constitute a

major challenge to technically-oriented reforms inside the military and liberal tendencies in

national politics.

The most tenacious military critic of Peng Dehuai's reforms – and later the toughest

military critic of Liu Shaoqi's civilian leadership – was Lin Biao. During the Civil War, Lin

had helped develop the CCP strategy of using the countryside to surround the cities, a key

guerrilla tactic that ultimately enabled Lin to wrest Manchuria from the Nationalists during

the Civil War.[354] At a meeting of the Central Military Commission in October 1957 Lin

argued that Peng's military policies would not enable the PLA to emerge victorious in a major

military confrontation.[355] He was one of the most consistent critics of cooperation with the

Soviet Union and welcomed Mao's 1958 attack on "dogmatism" – the uncritical study and

adoption of Soviet technology and methods. And in contrast to Peng, Lin approved

wholeheartedly of the new militia units activated by Mao in 1958, and he was a strong

supporter of the Great Leap Forward for which they had been mobilized.[356]

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skeptical, war weary peasants into strong supporters and was instrumental in turning the tide against local
Nationalist forces. See, for example, "Hongjun Zai Jinggangshanshang", *Jiefangjunbao*, April 12 1954.

[354] Lin Biao also participated in a number of conventional operations against the Nationalists, Japanese
(including the Hundred Regiments Campaign), and Americans (in Korea), but more than some early top PLA
leaders he embraced and helped developed the guerrilla strategies that were instrumental in allowing the
Communists to prevail over the Nationalists during the Civil War.

[355] Domes, *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image*, 68. By at least one account Mao was already grooming Lin
Biao for military leadership by late 1957.

[356] Lin's support was couched in larger social and political terms: "The Chinese People's Liberation Army...
has always regarded the revolutionary mass movement as its own affair. When the masses rise up and wage
hard, bitter struggles against the old system and for the transformation of society and of nature, the People's
Liberation Army always stands as one with the people.... And whenever hostile forces attempt to obstruct and
undermine the mass revolutionary movements, the People's Liberation Army always stands behind the masses."

Until 1958, political-military issues revolved largely around the structure and

operation of the military, rather than the military's involvement in purely political or

economic policy areas. There were exceptions: in 1956, for example, Peng, joined by Liu

Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, had blocked efforts to have references to "Mao Zedong Thought"

included in a new constitution.[357] And certainly military questions were debated with clear

and explicit recognition of their political implications. But direct military involvement in the

Party's political direction was relatively unusual prior to the Great Leap Forward. After that

time, however, as politics became more contentious and the stakes for those involved became

higher, military leaders were increasingly drawn into – or interposed themselves in – political,

economic, or social issues of less immediate military relevance.

After sparring with Mao since 1953 (and arguably before that time), Peng Dehuai

openly broke with the CCP patriarch over the question of whether China should continue or

abandon the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960).[358] By the end of 1958, Peng was convinced

that communization of agriculture and the establishment of backyard steel furnaces were

having disastrous consequences for production. He presented his findings during the Lushan

Conference of Party officials in July 1959, and he suggested in the process that Mao was less

John K. Fairbank Robert R. Bowie, ed., *Communist China, 1955-1959: Policy Documents with Analysis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962) 46.

[357] Domes, *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image*, 72. An earlier example included a murky affair reportedly involving the efforts of two military political commissars to push Zhou Enlai and Liu Shaoqi from office and take their places. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 542-43.

[358] This paragraph is based on Domes, *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image*, 70-102. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 581-82. Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966*, vol. 3, *The Origins of the Cultural Revolution* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 104-13.

than truthful in professing ignorance of his policies' negative impact. In addition to making

his own critique, he appeared to urge others to be more bold and direct in their criticism.

Mao, with his Party leadership challenged as never before, charged Peng with having formed

a "right opportunist clique" and having undertaking "unprincipled factional activity." Mao

forced those present to take sides and was ultimately able to purge Peng from his military and

Party posts, as well as secure a commitment to launch the second phase of the Great Leap

Forward during 1959-1960.

Having removed Peng at Lushan, Mao replaced him with Lin Biao. Lin moved first to

buttress the leftist position within the military. In a CMC meeting beginning in September

1960, Lin affirmed the central role of Mao Zedong Thought in military affairs, compiling a

list of Mao's sayings that ultimately became the "little red book" used inside and outside the

military.[359] Lin rolled back many of Peng's military reforms, increasing the percentage of

training time devoted to political instruction, expanding the militia, and, ultimately, abolishing

all ranks. There was some resistance to these moves within the army. Although most

opposition came from the technical branches, one of Lin's toughest critics was, ironically, a

political officer, Luo Ruiqing, who had been selected by Lin to serve as chief of staff. (Luo's

association with the navy provided a key pretext for Lin's attacks on the naval leadership in

1966.) But although there were some holdouts, Lin was able to find enough like-minded

senior officers in the army to ensure broad compliance.

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[359] The book, *Quotations from Chairman Mao*, was formally published and distributed within the military in 1963 and distributed outside the military starting in 1964. It became the ubiquitous symbol of Red Guard radicalism during the Cultural Revolution.

Lin used his base in the military to exert political influence outside of it. During the

Party's central work conference in 1962, when the Great Leap Forward was again being

reevaluated, Lin offered an unabashed defense. He argued that the gains outweighed the

losses, though the former might not yet be fully visible. Ultimately, his defense of Mao's

policies failed, agriculture was gradually de-communized, and Mao was forced to conduct a

self-criticism.[360] But in the ensuing years, Lin helped Mao regain his authority at the grass

roots level and, in 1966, triumph over his critics. In 1963, Mao issued a call for the country to

"learn from the PLA." Lin made clear that the ideal soldier was more politically pure than he

was technically proficient.[361] Lin integrated the military with local political structures by

introducing civilian Party members into the military's chain of command as political

commissars and making the commanders of the military districts into secretaries in regional

Party bureaus.[362]

Until the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, moderates remained in almost all

key central civilian positions despite suffering losses at lower levels, and they were even able

to provide a modicum of protection to the professionally oriented officers in the military who

supported them. The rough balance of power was, however, shattered in 1966 when Lin Biao,

Mao Zedong, and a circle of radical leftists from the cultural field formed a loose coalition to

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[360] On Lin Biao's speech, see MacFarquhar, *The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966,* 166-68.

[361] Around the same time that Mao launched his campaign to learn from the military, the PLA "discovered" (i.e., wrote) and published the *Diary of Lei Feng,* a soldier who, like Hollywood's Forrest Gump, lived by his values rather than his skills (but who was considerably less lucky than Forrest and was said to have been run over by a truck while sleeping after tireless efforts to help the masses).

[362] Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965," 127-28.

launch the Cultural Revolution. The idea came primarily from Jiang Qing – Mao's third wife, an embittered failed actress, and a hard line leftist. But Lin Biao played a critical supporting role, providing Jiang with an institutional base by making her the official cultural advisor to the military and allowing her to use the military's cultural and political organs. This leftist alliance, by attacking moderates in relatively low-ranking positions and gradually pursuing those above by guilt through association, allowed Mao Zedong to sweep moderates (including Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and Chen Yun) out of the Party and enabled Lin Biao to remove military rivals (for example Luo Ruiqing, Peng Zhen and a number of technical officers, including the heads of the navy, air force, and armored corps) from their posts.

The start of the Cultural Revolution and the consolidation of Lin Biao's position within the military moved that organization, on balance, towards the left politically and towards guerrilla war doctrinally. But although Lin was certainly more leftist and more of an advocate of guerrilla war doctrine than Peng Dehuai, he was less committed to those causes than was the Gang of Four.[363] Lin's death and the dominance of the Gang of Four after 1971 brought further leftist pressure on professionally oriented officers within the military. The Gang sought to virtually eliminate the distinction between the military and civilian realms, using the military primarily as an agent of social change and opposing the purchase or manufacture of almost all major conventional military systems. Their impact in some technical areas – including the navy – was mitigated to some extent by the depth of suspicion

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[363] Having removed his politically moderate rivals, Lin Biao sought to secure the loyalty of remaining commanders by securing new resources for virtually all areas of the organization. Although there was a relative shift towards guerrilla doctrines and strategies, conventional capabilities were not ignored. And politically, Lin used the military to maintain order, curbing the worst excesses of the Red Guard groups comprised of radical leftist students and workers.

felt towards them by the officer corps. But they had allies within the army, especially the military regions. And by leaving many central military and technical positions (including the chief of armored forces and the commander of the air force) unfilled for years on end, they were able to outflank opponents who might otherwise have wielded the power conferred by these positions.

THE NAVY'S POLITICAL POSITION. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), despite having been born from the PLA and led by former army officers from its founding in 1949, was largely free from the types of divisions that plagued the army. It was thoroughly technical in outlook, and its perceived economic, social, and political interests meshed well with those of civilian moderates, as well as with technically oriented army officers (e.g., Peng Dehuai and Ye Jianying).

Xiao Jinguang, the navy's first commander, and other officers brought in to staff the navy were acutely aware of the services' technical demands. "From its inception," an official navy history reports, the people's navy emphasized education and technical foundations in selecting its personnel."[364] While it officially maintained that its spirit would remain consistent with that of the Communist "farmer's army" (nongjun), its first request for personnel – transmitted through the CMC – asked that the "each field army survey its forces and find those individuals who had served in the [Nationalist] navy, worked on merchant ships, or studied in maritime schools, as well as those who understood something about

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[364] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi* (Beijing: Zhongguo Jiefangjun Chubanshe, 1989), 21.

machinery (including those who had operated or maintained tanks or cars)."[365] When

conscription was instituted in 1955, naval sailors were expected to spend a full five years in

the service, in contrast to the three served by army conscripts.[366]

Although the bulk of the navy's personnel did come from the army, its most important

core – from a technical standpoint – came from the old Nationalist navy. Some 4,000

individuals from the old navy joined the new, comprising some two-thirds of the new navy's

first frigate detachment (formed in November 1949) and serving as trainers for the rest of the

force on shore.[367] Another important source of personnel for the navy were "intellectuals" –

defined in objective terms in the Chinese lexicon as those with at least some college education

– and 30,000 such individuals were in the force by 1955.[368] The employment of these

individuals was consistent with Liu Shaoqi's advocacy of cooperation with and employment

of skilled members of the former "capitalist classes."[369] But the practice diverged

considerably from recruiting patterns in the army, where even Peng's reforms designed to

introduce academic standards for admittance to the officer corps was proving controversial.

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[365] Ibid.

[366] Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 50.

[367] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi*, 24 and 45.

[368] Ibid., 21 and 24. Of 180,000 sailors in the navy in 1955, 110,000 (or 60 percent) were from the army, 6,000 (or 3 percent) from the air force, 30,000 (or 16 percent) were intellectuals, and 4,000 (2 percent) former sailors from the Nationalist navy.

[369] At the time, some former Nationalists were returning from overseas and many more who had never left were contributing to the revival of China's economy.

The technical orientation of the navy pervaded even its political department. In August 1951, the navy's deputy commissar emphasized that "Political officers must study technology.... Discussing the navy's politics without understanding technology will produce only vacuous dialogue."[370] Political officers with poor technical knowledge were reported ridiculed by the new sailors as "ballast," and special classes for political officers were quickly established.[371] Some political officers, having achieved technical proficiency, went on to assume operational posts, including ship command.[372] In October 1958 Su Zhenhua, the navy's deputy political commissar between 1954 and 1957 and political commissar between 1957 and 1967, led a group of Chinese specialists to the Soviet Union, where the team acquired licenses for China to build warships and missiles. On his return, he took an active role in organizing the relevant research and design departments to maximize the value to indigenous design capabilities of the licenses acquired.[373] This voyage by Su Zhenhua (who was subsequently tasked with clearing radical leftists out of their strongholds in Shanghai after the end of the Cultural Revolution) is remarkable for two reasons. First, it was a purely technical task executed by an ostensibly political officer. And secondly, it took place after leftists in the CMC had begun their attack on "dogmatism" – an "excessive" reliance on studying Soviet technical and technical models.

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[370] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi*, 35.

[371] Ibid.

[372] Ibid., 61.

[373] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu* (Beijing: Haichao Chubanshe, 1999), 1645.

The navy enjoyed a strong relationship and relatively high status – if not budget windfalls – under Liu Shaoqi. The PLAN's official 1989 *Naval History* records that the period between the Korean War and the Cultural Revolution was, with the exception of those periods when the navy was under attack from leftists, one of rapid progress.[374] Navy commander Xiao Jinguang was appointed deputy minister of defense when the defense ministry was created in 1954. Peng Dehuai took an active interest in naval affairs. Budget constraints forced Peng to make trade-offs, and he chose to place strengthening armored and air force strengths ahead of naval construction. But he nevertheless approved the establishment of a marine corps (1953), the first PLAN destroyer detachment (1954), and research on a variety of new capital ships, as well as the establishment of a substantial naval educational and maintenance infrastructure.

Although there is little if any evidence to suggest that Liu Shaoqi took a personal interest in the aggressive pursuit of naval building, he was adopted by the navy in later years as something of an unofficial patron saint. After Liu Shaoqi's political rehabilitation in 1980 (eleven years after his death in prison), the navy supplied four frigates to escort his ashes for reburial at sea, firing off a twenty-one-gun salute for his overdue state funeral.[375] His inscription, "Build a powerful navy, develop our ocean industries," was featured prominently in naval propaganda – more so than ostensibly similarly pro-navy statements by Mao

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[374] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi*, 49. See also Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu*, 1948.

[375] Guo Jinyan, "Liu Shaoqi Zhuxi yu Shuibing: Yigu Guojia Zhuxi Liu Shaoqi Shengqian Guanxin Haijun Jianshe Jishi", *Jiefangjunbao*, November 23 1998.

Zedong.[376] The inscription served as the title of naval commander Liu Huaqing's first public

article on naval priorities in 1984.[377] And on the anniversary of Liu Shaoqi's hundredth

birthday in November 1998, the only article commemorating the event in the pages of the

PLA's *Jiefangjunbao* was an article by a naval propagandist entitled "Chairman Liu Shaoqi

and the Sailors," a collection of stories by retired naval officers and enlisted about their

interactions with Liu during his various interactions with the navy.[378] Although the evidence

is more suggestive than definitive, the navy appears to have adopted Liu Shaoqi as its patron

more because of the political-economic policy atmosphere he established than because of any

specific contribution to naval construction.

Any concerns leftists had about the direction of military policy prior to 1966 were

especially deep in regards to the navy, and leftists marked the navy for special criticism and

attack. During the "anti-dogmatism campaign" mentioned above (begun in May 1958), the

navy had already been singled out for its poor politics in an expanded session of the CMC.[379]

In early 1962, Lin Biao took over the daily work of the CMC and lost no time in launching

more serious attacks on the navy's direction. In a February 1962 all military work

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[376] Although Mao's relationship with the navy appears to have been profoundly ambivalent, there are certainly quotations that could have been used had the navy sought to highlight its relationship with the founding father of the CCP. In 1953, for example, Mao wrote "In order to prevent imperialist invasion, we absolutely must build a powerful navy." There is at least one *non-PLAN* book that does make the most of the relationship between Mao and the navy: Yang Zhaolin, *Jianli Qiangda de Haijun, Zhongguo Chule ge Mao Zedong [China Produced a Mao Zedong]* (Jiangsu: Jiangsu Wenyi Chubanshe, 1993), 160. The book is part of a series on Mao Zedong (not the navy) and carries a prologue by an army general, Yang Shangkun rather than a naval officer.

[377] Liu Huaqing, "Jianshe Yizhi Qiangda de Haijun, Fazhan Woguo de Haiyang Shiye: Haijun Siling", *Renminribao*, November 24 1984.

[378] Guo Jinyan, "Liu Shaoqi Zhuxi yu Shuibing: Yigu Guojia Zhuxi Liu Shaoqi Shengqian Guanxin Haijun Jianshe Jishi".

[379] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi*, 63-64, 75.

conference, he compared the navy to a "sick patient, who is already in possession of good

medicine [i.e., socialist political and military thought] but refuses to take it, running around

instead looking for other medicine [i.e., foreign military ideas]."[380] In April 1962 Lin

dispatched a CMC inspection team led by Li Zuopeng, an army political officer and

committed leftist, to survey the navy's political situation. The team concluded that the navy's

"problems are deep, its political foundation is weak, relations [among its personnel] are

strained, and its general work style is poor."[381] Using the report as a pretext, Lin Biao then

installed Li Zuopeng to be the navy's deputy commander (with specially designated

responsibilities in its political committee) and another of Lin's followers, Zhang Xiuchuan, to

be its deputy political commissar. These individuals acted as a shadow command and

continued to apply pressure for conformity with Lin's leftist military and political line.

The navy, however, continued to enjoy the protection of Liu Shaoqi and other

moderate political and military figures. In May 1966, with radical leftists gaining the upper

hand in the political struggle unfolding across China, Li Zuopeng convened a meeting of the

navy's political committee and suggested that navy commander Xiao Jinguang and political

commissar Su Zhenhua were "capitalist representatives" and "followers of Luo Ruiqing" (the

recently ousted proponent of modernization and professionalization). Although Lin Biao and

Li Zuopeng launched their attack when Liu Shaoqi (still the president and the number two

man in the CCP) was under siege within the Party, Liu was not yet out of the game

completely. Both he and the moderate CMC vice chairman Ye Jianying came forward to

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[380] Ibid., 76.

[381] Ibid.

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defend the navy's professional leadership, and they were able to turn the navy's political

meeting into a counterattack against Li Zuopeng and Zhang Xiuchuan. In all likelihood, Liu's

calculation at this most dangerous time in his political career was that he could not afford to

lose one of his last remaining anchors in the military and that, with the support of a generally

friendly political committee in the navy, this was one fight he could win. Lin Biao,

outmaneuvered and in danger of losing the men he had planted in the navy's command

structure, retreated, instructing both sides in the dispute to cease their attacks and undertake

"mutual criticism and mutual assistance."[382] Two months later, Liu Shaoqi and Ye Jianying

again personally intervened to save Xiao Jinguang and Su Zhenhua from yet another attempt

to affect a *coup* within the navy.[383]

By the end of 1966, however, Mao's radical student Red Guards had turned their

attacks directly on Liu Shaoqi, making physical safety his primary concern and leaving Xiao

Jinguang and Su Zhenhua without political protection. Xiao and Su were relieved of their

positions in January 1967. As the navy's official history records, "during the ten chaotic

years of confused and complex struggle [during the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976], the

navy was one of the organizations that suffered the most damage."[384] Nine of fourteen naval

schools were shut down, and four out of the remaining five were forced to move because of

conflicts (unspecified in naval histories) with local authorities. Academic selection standards

for officer programs and other training schools were reduced as political qualifications were

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[382] Ibid., 77-78.

[383] Liu Tienhe, *Xiao Jinguang* (Beijing: Zuojia Chubanshe, 1997).

[384] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi*, 74.

placed above technical ones. Most new students had only elementary or some middle school-level education. Training time at the unit level was limited to one hour per day, as political education was given priority. And central maintenance and repair facilities were closed, with units instructed to do their own repair work.

Lin Biao died in 1971 while fleeing the country after an abortive apparent *coup d'etat* attempt. Li Zuopeng was stripped of his party and military positions two years later. But although Xiao Jinguang and Su Zhenhua were quickly brought back in to assume their old positions, the Gang of Four proved no less persistent in their attacks on the navy than had Lin Biao.[385] In 1972 Zhang Chunqiao – a member of Standing Committee of the Politburo and one of the Gang of Four – staked out a military rationale against purchasing new ships for the navy: "We are continentalists. With advanced missiles installed on shore and capable of hitting targets at any location, there is no need for building a big navy."[386] Yet despite this strategic justification, other incidents betrayed a political motive for the Gang of Four's campaign against strengthening the navy. In a June 1974 fleet visit, Jiang Qing, Mao's wife and another Gang of Four member, pointed to an officer in front of the assembled crew and said: "I do not trust your type, and that is to say I do not trust you." Pointing to an enlisted party member, she then declared, "I do trust you and your type." Unlike the army, the navy

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[385] How Xiao and Su regained their positions is one of the many mysteries of the Cultural Revolution. Some moderates, especially those who were not prone to challenge the leftist political drift in broad terms but rather defend specific programs or policies important to the moderates' cause, remained in important posts through the Cultural Revolution. These included Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying. It is possible that these individuals had some role in this decision. Both had protected professional military institutions against physical attack by Red Guards during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution.

[386] Quoted in "'Sirenbang' Shi Yihuo Shizu de Touxiangpai, Maiguopai", *Jiefangjunbao*, March 15 1977. See also John Wilson Lewis and Litai Xue, *China's Strategic Seapower: The Politics of Force Modernization in the Nuclear Age* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 223.

had retained the Soviet-style uniforms first adopted in 1955, and Jiang next turned her

attention to that question. She derided enlisted naval headgear as "imperialist" in fashion,

calling on enlisted sailors to cut the "tails" off their caps. Finally, she accused navy

commander Xiao Jinguang – who was not present – of having failed to distribute reading

materials on the correct "military line."[387]

Although the navy's leaders were too weak to reverse the leftist onslaught during the

1960s and early 1970s, they did resist its full conquest, and, when opportunities presented

themselves, they did counterpunch. Xiao Jinguang was a leader, not just in the navy's

defense, but also among the broader community of moderate survivors seeking to reverse the

radical leftist tide. He maintained his Party posts even after having been driven from the

navy, and according to later reports in the *Jiefangjunbao*, he voted against Lin Biao and all

four members of the Gang of Four during the 1969 Party Congress, a bold move by any

standard at a time when Lin Biao was being written into the constitution as Mao's

successor.[388] During the mid-1980s, Xiao wrote the obituaries for two other prominent

military moderates – a task he more than likely drew because of his own credibility in

reporting their opposition.[389] Although the Chinese Communist Party has remained

ambivalent about reporting military intrigues – even those related to combating the Cultural

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[387] "Baigujing Jiang Qing Chundao Haijun Jianting de Yici Chou'e Biaoyan", *Jiefangjunbao*, March 13 1977. Harlan Jencks writes that "The navy has clung to the highest degree of rank-consciousness in the PLA. Even during the Lin Piao years, cadres and sailors wore different styles of shirts under their blue Chung-shan jackets." Jencks, *From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981*, 162.

[388] "Xiao Jinguang Tongzhi Shengping", *Jiefangjunbao*, April 9 1989.

[389] Xiao Jinguang, "Daonian Su Yu Tongzhi", *Jiefangjunbao*, February 13 1984. Xiao Jinguang, "Chentong Daonian Xiao Hua Tongzhi", *Jiefangjunbao*, August 27 1985.

Revolution – these obituaries recount angry and excited conversations behind closed doors

between military opponents of the gang of four.

A variety of Chinese sources indicate that, following the death of Mao in September

1976, naval commander Xiao Jinguang and naval political commissar Su Zhenhua played

important supporting roles in the arrest of the Gang of Four.[390] Immediately after Mao's

death, the Gang activated Shanghai's 100,000-strong militia and prepared for a showdown

with their many enemies. They made the critical error, however, of personally remaining in

Beijing instead of retreating to Shanghai, where they had substantially more support.

Historians agree that General Ye Jianying, an army officer with long involvement in technical

research and development projects who was then serving as Vice Chairman of the CMC, was

the central figure in the plot to arrest of Jiang Qing and her followers. An account of Ye

Jianying's actions in the months before and after the October arrests, however, suggests that

the navy's Xiao Jinguang was involved in a parallel effort to gather support for decisive

action against the Gang and that he and his coconspirators coordinated with Ye and urged him

to take quick and decisive action.[391] Two official obituaries for Xiao Jinguang after his death

in 1989, one by General Yang Shangkun and another by the navy, support this contention. In

similar language, both state that in September and October 1976, Xiao twice approached

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[390] See, for example, Yang Shangkun, "Dao Xiao Jinguang Tongzhi", *Jiefangjunbao*, April 10 1989. Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Haijun (the PLAN), "Daonian Women de Silingyuan -- Xiao Jinguang Dajiang", *Jiefangjunbao*, May 11 1989. Fan Shuo, *Ye Jianying Zai 1976* (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe, 1995), 361-62.

[391] Fan Shuo, *Ye Jianying Zai 1976*, 361-62.

Marshall Ye Jianying with "an important suggestion" related to "smashing the Gang of Four."[392]

The navy's political commissar, Su Zhenhua, is also credited with playing a significant role in the arrest of the Gang. According to one account, Su personally arrested the Gang's leader, Jiang Qing, at her residence in Zhongnanhai and, in the process, pulled off her wig to complete her humiliation.[393] While the above story may be apocryphal, Ye Jianying's biographer writes that Ye consulted Su on tactics prior to the arrest.[394] And, without delving into specifics, Deng Xiaoping himself credited Su with having made a "major contribution" to smashing the Gang of Four in a speech delivered at Su's funeral in February 1979.[395]

The 1987 *Haijunshi* (History of the navy) suggests that opposition to leftist thought was broad based within the navy's officer corps. The history says that naval officers had a difficult time "understanding and accepting" Mao's exaggeration of continuing class conflict and his consequent efforts to make politics and class struggle the focus of military activity.[396] Naval officers, it says, complained openly that "over the last few years, our naval work has

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[392] Yang Shangkun, "Dao Xiao Jinguang Tongzhi". Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Haijun (the PLAN), "Daonian Women de Silingyuan -- Xiao Jinguang Dajiang".

[393] Cited in Richard Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 404n50.

[394] Fan Shuo, *Ye Jianying Zai 1976*, 360.

[395] "Zai Su Zhenhua Tongzhi Zhuidao Dahuishang Deng Xiaoping Tongzhi Zhi Daoci", *Jiefangjunbao*, February 16 1979.

[396] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi*, 75.

been one step forward, two steps back, with standards in each year falling short of the previous year. Presently, we have fast attack craft that are no longer fast and submarines that cannot submerge. Soon, we will have aircraft that cannot go airborne."[397] And the history claims in several places that naval officers resisted (dizhi) the implementation of leftist programs.[398] The navy may have been only vaguely sensitive to civilian political issues (including social and economic thought) prior to the 1960s, but there is no question that it became increasingly sensitive to the importance of politics during the course of the 1960s and 1970s.

STRATEGIC CHANGE

Throughout the period from the end of the Korean War to the end of the Cultural Revolution, the navy grew, but its development was qualitatively different before the Cultural Revolution and during it.

THE FORCE STRUCTURE UNDER THE MODERATES (1953-1966). Under Peng Dehuai (1953-1959), two trends were evident. First, defense budgets shrank, especially relative to the national budget. Second, emphasis was placed on modernization and the establishment of stronger conventional (as opposed to guerrilla) capabilities. After Peng's replacement by Lin Biao in 1959, some of the former's priorities were reversed. Militia and other force structures appropriate for guerrilla war received renewed emphasis. The trend

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[397] Ibid., 77.

[398] Ibid.

towards guerrilla doctrines and force structures became even more pronounced after Lin Biao died in 1971 and the Gang of Four established its supremacy on military matters.

Under Peng Dehuai, the central military budget was cut from some 34 percent of the national budget in 1953, at the end of the Korean War, to around 9 percent by 1959.[399] Peng cut the size of the force from 4.8 million in 1953 to around 2.5 million by 1957. He established a regular reserve force apart from the militia and diminished the role and importance of the latter. Peng also established a new military doctrine, under which the enemy would be ensnared on Chinese soil by popular resistance but would also be hit with counterattacks by mechanized units. Special emphasis was, therefore, placed on the development of armored capabilities. Air forces, which could support China's conventional ground forces, also received emphasis. The entire force was also made more professional, with ranks, pay scales, insignia, and recruiting standards introduced in 1955.

The navy did not receive top priority under Peng's plan, but its conventional capabilities were nevertheless strengthened. A marine corps was established in 1953. China's first destroyer detachment was established in 1954.[400] The first Chinese-made frigate (the Chengdu-class, assembled from Soviet parts) was launched in 1956.[401] Research on a new Chinese-designed guided missile destroyer, which, after substantial delays, became the

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[399] Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, 188-89. The figures vary depending on source, but all agree on the direction of movement and degree of change.

[400] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu*, 1946.

[401] John Moore, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1979-1980* (London: Jane's Yearbooks, 1979).

Luda-class, was begun in 1960.[402] Naval educational structures were established, and an on-shore support base established.

But although civilian moderates remained in power until 1966, leftists began making inroads in the military significantly earlier, and the modernization and regularization of the force faced political obstacles from the start. Ranks, insignia, and pay systems, put in place in 1955, were abolished in 1957. The marine corps was disbanded the same year. Funds for continuing research on destroyers was cut shortly after being allocated. Nevertheless, despite major obstacles, the navy's 1999 encyclopedia calls the period between 1956 and 1966 "a period of progress on all fronts."[403]

THE FORCE STRUCTURE DURING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. The Cultural Revolution enabled Lin Biao to consolidate his position within the military. As noted earlier, this shifted military politics leftward and, on balance, pushed the force structure towards a guerrilla organization, though not as far as it was to move between 1971 and 1975 – i.e., the period between Lin's death and the appointment of a successor (Ye Jianying), during which time the Gang of Four were able to dominate military policy.

The military grew substantially during the Cultural Revolution. The budget expanded from around 18 percent of the national budget in 1966 to around 26 percent two years later.[404]

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[402] Hiramatsu Shigeo, *Yomigaeru Chugoku Kaigun* (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 1991), 70.

[403] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu*, 1948.

[404] Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, 188-89.

After Lin Biao's death, the official national military budget stabilized (and went down as a percentage of total national spending). But the military's increased role in local politics and the economy expanded dramatically, and it is reasonable to assume that its access to extra-budgetary resources also grew appreciably. Total PLA manpower grew 76 percent over the course of the Cultural Revolution, from 2.5 million at the beginning to 4.4 million at its close.

The navy also grew – by some measures faster than the army. But it grew in ways that hardly pleased its professional leadership – as opposed to those leftist army officers who were transferred into the navy to dilute its political "rightism." The number of naval personnel jumped 160 percent between 1966 and 1976, from 136,000 to 360,000.[405] (The army grew 60 percent.) The navy's leadership was, however, forced to accept a doctrine of guerrilla strategy at sea – and a force structure to match. Under Lin Biao, the defense industry accelerated warship production. The rate of production dropped precipitously under the Gang of Four. But even under Lin, the relative balance of production was already shifting towards forces more appropriate for guerrilla war.

The shift in strategic and force structure emphasis during the Cultural Revolution is evident from unit and personnel figures. Swarms of patrol craft and a substantial fleet of submarines were built and dispersed along the coastline. The number of light coastal craft

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[405] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance, 1966-1967* (London: IISS, 1966). International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance, 1976-1977* (London: IISS, 1976).

(between 50 and 400 tons) doubled or tripled between 1966 and 1976.[406] The number of destroyers and frigates grew more modestly, expanding by about 50 percent (from 22 to 34 ships). Assessed by total tonnage, the combined weight of coastal craft increased from 48 percent of that of major surface ships in 1966 to some 158 percent in 1976. The submarine fleet also grew rapidly, from 29 units in 1966 to 89 by 1976. Naval forces and facilities were dispersed and hidden along China's coastline, with new pens constructed for small strike forces. The biggest naval growth area was, therefore, its construction corps, which expanded by over 800 percent, from 9,000 at the beginning of the period to 76,000 by its end.[407]

As noted previously, however, the educational, maintenance, and command structure of the navy decayed during this period, and no amount of growth in the navy's water-borne guerrilla command could convince its commanders that either the new doctrine or its accompanying leftist politics were good for the navy.

SUMMARY OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY

The civil-military coalition theory explains much about the services' political positions and strategic change in China between 1953 and 1976. The army was divided on major political issues, with those supporting moderate (i.e., relatively liberal) political positions holding an advantage during the mid-1950s and their leftist (i.e., integral nationalist) opponents gradually

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[406] *Jane's Fighting Ships*, various years. According to the figures provided by Jane's, the number grew from between 200 and 300 in 1966 to between 700 and 800 by 1976. These are generally lower than figures provided by other sources for the PLAN around this time, but the point here is that numbers in this category were growing rapidly, rather than the absolute count.

[407] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi*, 86.

gaining influence after that time. The navy cooperated closely with moderate civilian leaders during the first part of the period and remained deeply suspicious of radical leftist politics during the latter part. It remained relatively united in its political outlook, despite concerted attempts by leftist civilian and military leaders to undermine the position of senior naval leaders and encourage the growth of leftist political sentiment within its ranks.

Military doctrine and force structure decisions tracked closely with domestic events and, especially as politics turned towards the left, appeared to be driven largely by political motives. Civilian moderates supported Peng Dehuai's efforts to turn a force largely organized for guerrilla warfare into a slimmer, better armed force more prepared for conventional battles. Civilian moderates and military modernizers shared a variety of common interests: strong relations with the more technically advanced Soviet Union; social and political policies that would not completely alienate former capitalist or intellectual classes; and prudent economic planning (a dual track that would support key state industries, while preserving room for some private production). After Peng's removal in 1959, civilian moderates gradually became aware of the threat presented to their own position of the growth of leftist influence in the armed forces and sought – with some success until mid-1966 – to protect the navy and other technical services that were most sympathetic to their position.[408]

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[408] Kenneth Lieberthal argues that it took some time for the moderates, who continued to occupy most key civilian posts, to realize the dangers of resurgent leftism, in the military and elsewhere. Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965," 91. But over the course of the 1960s, they did become increasingly aware of the threat.

As Mao and his leftist civilian and military allies gained authority, they shifted away from conventional military doctrines and attacked the supporters of such doctrines within the military. Civilian and military leftists alike openly admitted social and political motives in these moves, as well as military ones. They also openly acknowledged the opposition their programs faced from technical officers inside the military establishment, including, perhaps most prominently of all, the navy. The Gang of Four opposed the expansion of an ocean-going surface fleet and publicly questioned the political reliability of the navy's senior leadership. They did, however, back the expansion of other naval elements more appropriate for a guerrilla war at sea, but they did so with the understanding that those elements would undermine the authority of the navy's senior leaders. The construction corps, with its responsibilities for local infrastructure, was recognized by all to be a particular bastion of leftist thought within the military, and this was precisely the naval element increased the fastest. The shift from larger ships to smaller craft reduced, to an extent, the need to recruit "intellectuals" into the force. And the diminution of central organizations within the navy, increasing decentralization, reduced the authority of the navy's senior-most leaders.

EVALUATION OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. The changes that took place in China's strategic thinking between 1953 and 1976 were not unrelated to a strategic debate, but the strategic debate appeared appears to have been frequently motivated more by domestic political considerations than by external events. True, specific personal military experiences

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during the Chinese Revolution, the war against Japan, and the Korean War had a profound impact on some participants in these debates. But virtually all of these individuals understood the domestic political implications of different military doctrines, and many appeared to be at least as concerned about these implications as they were about military efficacy. Indeed, some of China's external threats were self-made under circumstances that raise strong suspicions about possible domestic political motivations. On balance, although strategic considerations were not irrelevant in determining China's military doctrine and force posture, they should not be regarded as the primary drivers of military policy.

The doctrinal debate throughout this period revolved around the proper balance of guerrilla, conventional, and nuclear forces. Some sought a mixed doctrine with significant conventional forces, while others were content to rely exclusively (or almost exclusively) on a guerrilla forces and a pure strategy of "people's war." The strategic rationale used to argue these positions focused on differing assessments of several factors: the likelihood of a full-scale invasion of China; the likelihood of more limited wars around China's borders; the likelihood of nuclear attack; and the technical capacity of the Chinese state to produce specific systems (such as tanks or nuclear weapons). In general, advocates of "people's war" held that the likelihood of global war, hostile nuclear use, and invasion was high; the likelihood or peripheral wars low or their importance negligible; and the capacity of China to produce advanced conventional weaponry limited. Advocates of a more mixed strategy, with a significant conventional component, made the opposite arguments.

From the Korean War to the Cultural Revolution (1953-1966). In general, external

events more plausibly correlated with expected doctrinal changes between 1953 and 1966

than they did between 1966 and 1976. The experiences of the Korean War – during which the

lack of air, armor, and artillery cost the PLA dearly – could explain a shift towards more

conventional doctrines. Such a shift was in fact justified by Peng Dehuai on precisely those

grounds. Later, the 1957 deployment in Taiwan of U.S. Matador missiles, capable of hitting

targets hundreds of miles inside China, could help explain a shift the other direction – i.e.,

back towards "people's war." Sino-American relations were further damaged the following

year after the second crisis over Quemoy and Matsu. China's worsening relations with the

Soviet Union, increasingly serious in 1959, led to the withdrawal of Soviet advisors the

following year and presumably raised Chinese nuclear insecurities, providing further

incentive to fight a dispersed guerrilla war, rather than one in which China's military assets

would be massed (and therefore vulnerable) in conventional formations.

Even during this early period, however, strategic imperatives were more mixed than

the selective account above would suggest. The record of the Korean War did not imply that

there was no chance of China's being invaded; indeed General Douglas MacArthur had

advocated both the use of nuclear weapons and widening the conventional war to China

during that struggle. The 1954 and 1958 skirmishes over Quemoy and Matsu worsened

relations with the United States, heightening the probability of large-scale conflict and

providing a plausible explanation for China's quick return to more traditional "people's war"

doctrines. But the fighting over Quemoy and Matsu was peripheral, limited, and capital

intensive – the same characteristics that were said to have made the Korean War a catalyst for

strengthening conventional doctrines and capabilities. And if it raised tensions with the

United States, it especially highlighted the continuing conflict over the status of Taiwan and

its offshore islands – strategic problems that should have underscored the need for stronger air

and naval forces. The 1962 war against India, though primarily a ground war, was also

conventional and peripheral.

One particularly knotty problem during this period is the strategic "chicken and egg"

question: Might the external threats to which China was ostensibly reacting have been

produced by its own actions and, if so, were domestic political interests driving events.[409] Of

the plausible external explanations for the gradual return towards guerrilla doctrines

beginning in the mid- and late-1950s, nuclear insecurity is perhaps the strongest. Yet in

considering China's position vis-à-vis both the United States and, especially, Russia during

this period, it is clear that its insecurity was largely self-made and at least partly motivated by

domestic political considerations. While Taiwan shares some of the blame for the fighting

over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954, the Chinese opened fire first in 1958. In launching the

attack in 1958, Mao appears to have been asserting Chinese independence from the Soviet

line and the idea of Peaceful Coexistence, rather than pursuing a more coherent strategy

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[409] A number of analysts have highlighted the role of domestic political motives in Chinese foreign policy during this period. Thomas Robinson, for example, writes that "domestic politics ... reigned supreme over international politics during Mao's time." Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Foreign Policy From the 1940s to the 1990s," in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). For a treatment that sees a greater mix of motives during this period, but nevertheless highlights the importance of domestic political objectives, see Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

toward either Taiwan or the United States.[410] He also believed that tensions with Taiwan

would give him the support needed to overcome opposition to his plans for the Great Leap

Forward. Shortly after the attacks began, Mao reported to the State Council that:

> "Besides its disadvantageous side, a tense [international] situation can mobilize
> the population, can particularly mobilize the backward people, can mobilize
> the people in the middle, and can therefore promote the Great Leap Forward in
> economic construction.... Lenin said that a war could motivate people's
> spiritual condition, making it tense. Although there is no war right now, a
> tense situation caused by the current military confrontation can also bring
> about every positive factor."[411]

Events over the following two years further demonstrated Mao's opposition to Premier

Nikita Khrushchev's condemnations of Stalin's tough line against the west and Mao's

determination to ensure that China did not follow the same line domestically or

internationally. Chinese moderates had gained politically from shifts in the international

environment brought about by Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist

states, as well as from adherence the Soviet economic models at home. As Kenneth

Lieberthal observes, "Mao's own position in the system would be affected by the type of

economic development strategy pursued."[412] Mao's core areas of competency were foreign

policy, rural economics, and the pace of revolutionary social change, while finance and urban

economic issues – both emphasized under Soviet-style planning – represented areas about

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[410] On the 1958 crisis, see Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict.* Lorenz Luthi, "Ideology, Strategy, and Misperception: The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis and American-Sino-Soviet Relations in the 1950s."

[411] Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 175.

[412] Lieberthal, "The Great Leap Forward and the Split in the Yan'an Leadership, 1958-1965," 96.

which he knew very little.[413] Mao could and did use his control over foreign policy to undo

China's adherence to both a Soviet-made foreign policy and the Soviet economic model.[414] In

the process, he made China less secure but strengthened his own argument for both guerrilla-

based strategy and leftist economic and social policy. It is significant to note that Peng

Dehuai, who favored continued strong relations with the Soviet Union as well as a more

conventional strategy, opposed the 1958 attacks on Taiwanese-held islands.[415]

On balance, political events track more closely, both logically and temporally, with

doctrinal and force structure change than do external events. Mao was concerned about the

direction of social, economic, and political policy by 1956, and those concerns provided the

motivation for him to begin reversing the trend towards professionalization within the PLA.

Mao's desire to mobilize support for the Great Leap Forward led him to launch a second

round of attacks against Quemoy and Matsu islands in 1958 – without reversing, either before

or after this event, his preference for guerilla strategies and forces. After the failure of the

Great Leap in 1960, mounting political pressure for Mao's effective retirement from politics

provided further incentive for him to solidify his base of political support within the military

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[413] Ibid.

[414] A related domestic argument is offered by Steven Goldstein: "The Chinese leader was seeking to attenuate co-operation with the Soviet Union not primarily because of global developments, but because he was coming to believe that such attenuation was essential to his unfolding plans for China's domestic transformation." Steven M. Goldstein, "Sino-Soviet Relations," in *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 240.

[415] Domes, *Peng Te-huai: The Man and the Image.*

and take steps to weaken his opponents.[416] The navy, favoring relatively moderate economic and political policies and distrusted by Mao and his leftist associates, was particularly vulnerable.

Cultural Revolution period (1966-1976). During the Cultural Revolution, and especially after 1969, the connection between external threats and doctrinal change became particularly tenuous. At the start of the Cultural Revolution it is true that the Vietnam War was intensifying, and that event certainly raised concerns in Beijing about U.S. intentions in Asia. On the other hand, China's nuclear position was eased somewhat by its successful test of a nuclear weapon in 1964 – the product of a sustained nuclear effort supported by moderates and the left alike. And the Vietnam War itself was, from a Chinese perspective, a limited battle outside of its own borders involving Chinese forces that were from relatively technology intensive fields, such as air defense and communications.

By mid-1969, the threat of invasion was, from an objective standpoint, more remote than it had been at any time since 1953, even allowing for a degree of uncertainty. In June 1969, U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered the first troop withdrawals in what was to become the Vietnamization of the Indochina conflict and a protracted drawdown of U.S. military forces in the region. In July Kissinger went to Beijing, leading to Sino-American

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[416] Despite efforts by Mao and Lin Biao to shift doctrine, however, the strategic debate continued. Doctrine shifted less with each external event, but rather with the arrest of each key advocate of conventional war fighting doctrines, including Peng Dehuai in 1959, Luo Ruiqing in 1964, and a host of other civilian and military figures in 1966 and 1967.

rapprochement and a visit by Nixon to Beijing the following year. Relations with the Soviet Union continued to worsen throughout this period, but until the late 1970s, the only real perceived military threat from that quarter was along the border. The clash along the Ussuri River in 1969 was a conventional engagement along China's periphery and should, if anything, have justified the strengthening of conventional capabilities.

Yet despite a lack of realistic invasion threats, especially after the draw down of U.S. forces from the region after 1969, Chinese military doctrine continued to move towards "people's war." Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated and made Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission in 1975, and he did try to stay if not reverse this trend. But he was purged once again in April 1976. For the next year, the Gang of Four again dominated politics and the military and reaffirmed a guerrilla doctrine. Deng returned once again to his post as CMC Vice Chairman in July 1977. But he was not able to overcome military, especially army, opposition to conventional war fighting doctrines (or liberal economic reform) until the early or mid-1980s. Debates about China's strategic environment took place during this period, but many if not most of the arguments were disingenuous. The personal stakes in political outcomes were high given the fierce and daily political violence endemic during this period. And by the start of the Cultural Revolution, all major political players understood that greater emphasis on guerrilla war fighting doctrines would strengthen the position of the political left and that emphasis on conventional capabilities would tend to have the opposite effect.

MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. A theory that

would predict organizational behavior based on the potential rewards of different choices in

terms of organizational size or budgets would also not be sustained by this case. The navy, as

well as technical officers in the army, supported Peng Dehuai's policies to professionalize the

military, despite the necessary cuts to force size this would entail and despite his commitment

to work with moderate civilian leaders in reducing military budgets. Similarly, these officers

opposed radical leftism inside and outside of the military during the Cultural Revolution,

despite a major increase in the size and authority of both the army and the navy.

A somewhat more sophisticated organization theory that considers, for example,

interests in missions, equipment, and force structures for more abstract reasons related to

prestige and perceived importance might arguably explain more about the services'

preferences. Naval proclivities for large surface combat craft have been observed in other

cases.[417] And the Chinese navy's political position during the Cultural Revolution would be

largely consistent with this pattern. According to this explanation, the PLAN might have

objected to Cultural Revolution politics because they knew it held out prospects for growth

only in small and not particularly glamorous craft. But even the more sophisticated

explanation fails to explain the navy's support for Peng Dehuai, despite his reluctance to

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[417] The Japanese, British, and American navies were all reluctant to begin or emphasize convoy operations during World War II – despite the lessons of World War I. At the beginning of the war, all three faced a shortage of destroyers appropriate for escort. In the Japanese case, where there was weak if any civilian control, the Imperial Japanese Navy failed to implement a convoy system until the last year of the war. (The Japanese navy also failed to use submarines for commerce raiding, hoarding them instead for use as pickets in fleet actions.)

spend substantial amounts on the navy. And it does not explain the broad resistance within the navy to even the symbols of leftism, including egalitarian dress, or the organization's failure to bandwagon or reach an accommodation with Cultural Revolution authorities in, for example, 1971, when the radical left was unlikely to disappear from the political scene anytime soon.

To explain the navy's preferences, one would have to add still more elements to equation – including the organization's interest in certain types of personnel and training policies (and the politics most likely to provide them). But adding these other elements begin to move the simple, interests-based organizational explanation closer to the more inclusive theory proposed by my own thesis. The navy cares not only about how much equipment or how many personnel it is assigned, but also what kinds. The navy's access to certain kinds of equipment and certain types of people, and their ability to secure those resources depends not just on how much budget it is allocated, but rather a broader range of "domestic" policies related to the development of certain types of domestic capabilities or the ability to import them from abroad.

SUMMARY OF COMPETITOR THEORIES. The civil-military coalition theory does a significantly better job of explaining army navy differences and strategic outcomes than either competitor theory examined. Threat-based explanations fail to provide a persuasive explanation for much of China's military policy during this period, especially after the mid-1950s. The domestic political implications of military policy were well known by all

the actors by then, and strategic policy was frequently transparently manipulated to serve

political ends. At the same time, a material interests-based explanation only partly explains

the services' political positions during this period. This is especially true of the navy, which

opposed leftist politics, despite the greater manpower and budgets that guerrilla war – even

applied in the naval realm – offered.

Case 2: Deng Xiaoping and 'Reform and Opening'

From 1978 to the present, the Chinese political-economic system has undergone a slow but

steady transition from something approaching the integral nationalist ideal towards a more

liberal system.[418] The process has been gradual. To borrow Deng Xiaoping's words, it has

been characterized by "two steps forward, one step backward." The process has also moved

much farther in the economic and social fields than in the area of high politics. But the

process has been sustained and steady, and even political practice – if not most structures –

has changed substantially.

Throughout most of this period, especially from the end of the Cultural Revolution

through the early 1990s, conservative (i.e., leftist) army officers represented the biggest threat

to reform. The Chinese navy, on the other hand, was an early ally of Deng and his program.

Its support was clear even before it began to receive substantial new resources. But by the

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[418] With 40 percent of the economy still accounted for by state owned firms and a government that in which authority is increasingly diffused and institutionalized but in which even intra-Party democracy is lacking, this is clearly a relative shift towards a more liberal system, not a completed (or even nearly completed) transformation.

mid-1980s, Deng recognized the domestic political value of a strong navy. He appointed

naval officers to senior military and political positions, and he freed new resources for the

navy, even as he cut military spending overall and dropped "military strengthening" to fourth

– and last – in China's list of national priorities.[419]

DOMESTIC BACKGROUND

The period from 1976 to the present is frequently called the era of "reform and opening."[420]

A series of liberalizing reforms have privatized much of the economy. In the process, society,

which used to be strictly monitored and controlled through an interrelated set of state-run

work units, housing projects, and neighborhood committees, has become far more

independent.[421] While political liberalization has lagged behind economic reform and social

change, significant change has nevertheless occurred. Political power has become more

diffused and institutionalized, and, in a sign that the Party understands it must speak to new

and different constituencies, businessmen have been admitted into its ranks. While the

political and economic debate in the 1950s and 1960s was between relatively more and less

radical socialists, the post-1976 debate has ranged far more widely. The result has been the

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[419] The four modernizations were first proposed by Zhou Enlai in January 1975. They included "all-around modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology by the end of the century." They were adopted as official national priorities in 1978. In 1980, Deng reversed the sequence of the last two modernizations, putting science and technology in third place and national defense in fourth, and last, position. Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 52, 88.

[420] For more on this period, see Ibid. Susan L. Shirk, *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Merle Goldman, *Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).

[421] Bruce J. Dickson, *Red Capitalists in China: The Party, Private Entrepreneurs, and Prospects for Political Change* (New York: Columbia, 2003). Michael Dutton, *Streetlife China* (New York: Cambridge, 1998).

creation of a largely capitalist economic structure, a vibrant society in the throws of dramatic

change, and an evolving political system. Although the reformers ultimately succeeded, they

were faced with determined opposition at every step of process. They were not only checked

but also forced back on several occasions, and it was at no point until at least the mid-1990s

obvious to supporters or opponents that the reform movement would ultimately triumph.[422]

The Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress, held in December 1978 set the tone

for the reform movement, advocating some liberalization in general terms and establishing

China's immediate objective as the "four modernizations" – a commitment to modernize

agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology by the end of the century.

In 1978 and 1979, an experiment was established in Sichuan and Anhui provinces effectively

decollectivized land and transferred land use rights instead to individual families – an

experiment that proved successful and was gradually implemented in other provinces. In July

1979 four "special economic zones" (SEZs) were established, enabling foreign companies to

establish manufacturing bases in China. Their location, in southern China, was meant to

insulate Beijing and other northern and central cities from any potential ill effects of contact

with westerners. In 1984, however, SEZs were established in fourteen additional coastal

cities in both the north and the south. All of these SEZs brought not only companies, but also

facilitated, directly or indirectly, an expanding stream of foreign workers, dependents,

students, and tourists. Rules on the conduct of private enterprise were relaxed, and private

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[422] Chinese history has not, of course, ended. The inevitable future debate over democracy may prove more tumultuous than the events of recent years (and could easily lead to large-scale violence). But while any variety of outcomes is conceivable, there is no route back to the old system. It is in this sense that I say that reformers triumphed.

industries began to expand while supports for state industries were gradually reduced (though

they are substantial even today).

When reform began, senior Party members fell broadly into three groups: (1) those

who opposed change and sought to maintain the status quo; (2) those who favored reform, but

only insofar as it would return China to the pre-1958 status quo (i.e., to a predominantly

planned economy, but with some incentive-based systems and markets in place); and (3) those

who wanted to take China in a new direction by marketizing much or most of the economy.

While the initial reform coalition therefore included the second (limited reform) and third

(strong reform) groups, the farther reform proceeded, the more members of the second

(limited reform) group moved into the opposition camp originally centered on the first group

(those against reform). Hence, although the ranks of the third (strong reformer) group may

have grown with economic success and the entrance of younger actors and although the ranks

of the first (anti-reform) group may have suffered attrition, primarily through age and death,

the migration of many members of the original middle group into the opposition camp

resulted in a rough balance between 1978 and 1993. More than anything else, Deng

Xiaoping's force of will and political savvy kept the reform process alive. Nevertheless,

momentum changed hands on a semiannual basis (with smaller shifts occurring almost every

year), depending primarily on the state of the economy but also occasionally on independent

political or social events and phenomena.[423] And, given the often razor thin margin between

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[423] For a commentary on the political cycle "letting go" (fang) and "tightening up" (shou) during the process of reform, see Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 5-9.

the two camps, every personal and institutional ally in Deng's camp – including the navy –
was important.

Political skirmishing over the question of reform was continuous from 1978 to the
mid-1990s. Opponents of reform seized opportunities to launch major attacks in 1979, 1981,
1983, 1986-1987 and, to one degree or another, shift the momentum of the debate. These
periods of conservative momentum corresponded with periods when the economy overheated
and inflation surged or when social groups used new freedoms to attack the Party's
leadership. The latter sometimes followed closely on the heals of the former.

A note on the importance of moral debates in real political struggles is necessary to
understand why and, more importantly, how support from one or more element of the military
could be politically critical. Political conflict during much of this period frequently played
itself out in struggles for the moral high ground. Both before and after the Culture
Revolution, Chinese politics operated on a collective basis. Statements of general principle
were typically used not just to signal direction but also leveraged to attack and eliminate
dissenters – generally first at the lower levels and then, with success, moving up the chain.
Senior opponents could be eliminated when shown complicit in the moral offenses of their
subordinates (leading, among other things, to careful calculations about whether to support or
jettison protégés who might find themselves under fire). In this moral combat, conservative
opponents of reform achieved various types and degrees of success. They threatened to stall
change during the early 1980s, eliminated Deng's chosen successors (and thereby threatening
the viability of reform after his passing) during 1986-1987, and came close to seizing control

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of the entire Party and government apparatus in the two years following the Tiananmen

massacre in June 1989. In Each case, however, Deng and his pro-reform allies defeated the

challenge.

SERVICE PREFERENCES

Since 1978 the navy has been unified in its support for reform, while the army has been

divided, with conservative officers from that service representing perhaps the greatest single

threat to reformers and their agenda. This section is subdivided into three periods. During

each, the balance of domestic power and the opportunities presented to each faction were

different. Hence, the tactics employed by the contending civil-military coalitions were

distinct. The relative position of the services, however, remained relatively constant. The

period has been has been subdivided as follows:

- *Deng consolidates power, 1978-1984.* During this period, Deng's challenge was to achieve basic working control over political, economic, and military policy. The army, as in later periods, was divided, but during these years conservative opponents were deeply entrenched within the military regions and used their bases there to fight a stubborn rearguard action against economic and political reform, as well as changes to military doctrine. The navy quickly purged leftists from its ranks and rallied behind reform, with some of its senior officers serving in key military and civilian positions.

- *Search for a Successor, 1985-1988.* During this period, Deng Xiaoping had achieved authority – precarious at times – within Party and government but had not secured a successor to ensure the completion of his agenda. Conservative army officers used their dominant position on the CMC to successively obstruct and undermine two of Deng's designated successors, both liberals. The navy again remained a stalwart pillar of support for Deng's program and helped prevent conservative momentum from becoming overwhelming.

- *Tiananmen and its Aftermath, 1989-1992.* The third subsection deals with the services during the democracy movement of 1989, the reversal of reform momentum after the Tiananmen massacre, and Deng's efforts to restart reform in 1992. During this period,

conservative army officers and civilian conservatives backed strong measures against student demonstrators. After the crackdown, they exploited the political situation to consolidate their own position, launch a purge against prominent liberal figures, and roll back economic, social, and political reform. Within the navy there was considerably more reluctance to use force against the students, and the organization continued to support reform and opening even during the nadir of liberal influence from late 1989 to early 1992. Its leadership supported Deng's reemergence in 1992 to restart stalled reform.

Although the PLAN was not a decisive political force at the beginning of this period, it became a more significant factor over time as the navy's power grew and its leaders gained key positions. Both Deng and his liberally inclined lieutenants supported the growth of naval power during the 1980s. Naval leaders received key promotions at critical moments during Deng's struggles with conservative army leaders. In 1992, when Deng came out of retirement to restart the stalled reform process, he promoted a record number of naval officers to the central committee. The navy never single-handedly "defeated" the army in these political-military battles. But together with civilian reformers and a handful of army supporters, mostly affiliated with its technical branches, the navy did play a critical role in tipping the balance over the long term in Deng's favor.

THE SERVICES AND LIBERAL REFORM, 1978-1985. The army was divided after Deng's restoration. Conservative army officers, largely though not exclusively officers from the regions or with traditional infantry backgrounds, represented perhaps the biggest single threat to Deng's liberal agenda. Officers from the general staff, technology intensive units (e.g., armor), and those with long records overseeing research and development projects were more supportive. Naval leaders were much more committed to reform, and their statements

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and policies suggested that they saw the success of reform and opening – in comprehensive

economic and political terms – as a precondition to achieving their military objectives.

Perhaps more than in other cases, the boundaries of opposition and support for liberal

reform shifted in this case over time, with a wide range of views about how much change

might be appropriate even among those who viewed some adjustment as necessary. Many,

especially in the army, welcomed the demise of the Gang of Four and Deng Xiaoping's

political rehabilitation, but quickly moved into the opposition camp as it became clear Deng

would pursue a continuing program of reform and opening. Naval leaders proved less

diffident.

The army's position (1978-1985). The opportunity for the first army counterattack

against reform was presented by the Democracy Wall movement of late 1978 and early 1979,

during which dissidents wrote manifestos critical of the Party and calling for the "fifth

modernization" – democracy. Deng's most forceful proponent of reform, Hu Yaobang, took a

generally tolerant stand towards these activities, but many in the Party saw them as

threatening the stability and national unity.

Several days after the Fourth Plenum of the Eleventh National Congress, held in mid-

September 1979, reconfirmed the reformist direction, Marshal Ye Jianying made a speech

introducing a somber note of caution into the discussion of national direction.[424] Ye had

orchestrated the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976 and represented the group of army officers

who favored elite-led socialism with some limited role for the market but not wholesale

liberalization. While he affirmed his commitment to economic modernization, he suggested it

must be achieved without sacrificing discipline. In his speech he appealed to the "four

cardinal principles," mandating unwavering allegiance to (1) socialism; (2) the people's

democratic dictatorship; (3) Communist Party leadership; and (4) Marxism-Leninism-Mao

Zedong Thought.[425]

Ye emphasized that the Party was a collective leadership and that no one individual

should have absolute power over the Party. Under the Party, "all people are equal...and it is

absolutely impermissible that any Party member would not be subject to the Party's discipline

or that there could be any special persons outside the Party who would not be subject to

national law."[426] This last point was almost certainly aimed at Hu Yaobang and his protection

of democracy activists (whom Ye regarded as lawbreakers). Ye's critique of one-man rule

may easily be taken as an indirect critique of Deng's growing power. Finally, he suggested

[424] Ye Jianying, "Zai Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli Sanshi Zhounian Dahuishang de Jianghua", *Jiefangjunbao*, September 9 1979.

[425] Deng Xiaoping himself agreed to a crackdown on the Democracy Wall activists, and in mid-March 1979 he agreed with the Party consensus that the Four Cardinal Principles should be adopted as a necessary balance to the four modernizations. Roderick MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-1982," in *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 324. As with most phrases and concepts in Chinese politics, this one could and was used by different people in very different ways. And the point of raising Ye Jianying's use here is not that he or other military officials were the only ones using the term, but that they were pointedly using it to attack Deng's most liberal allies – and perhaps Deng himself.

[426] Ye Jianying, "Zai Qingzhu Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Chengli Sanshi Zhounian Dahuishang de Jianghua".

that while improving the material condition of the Chinese people was important, improving

their moral and spiritual condition – in his words, building a "socialist spiritual civilization" –

was equally if not more important.

Wei Guoqing, the head of the PLA's political department, picked up on many of these

themes over the next several months, turning them into a more explicit attack on liberal

bourgeois values.[427] In doing so, he acted in concert with Hua Guofeng, who remained the

Party chairman even as the more liberally inclined Deng gained increasing control over the

Party's actual direction. In April 1980, Hua Guofeng addressed an all-army political work

conference sponsored by Wei. During his address he borrowed Wei's admonition to "foster

proletarian ideology, eliminate bourgeois ideology" and criticized "one-sided emphasis on

economic means."[428] These admonitions represented barely disguised attacks on Deng

Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang, who had staked very public positions in favor of giving economic

growth pride of place among China's national priorities. General Wei also worked with Hu

Qiaomu, a Party propaganda official who had considerable influence over the main

government newspaper, *Renminribao*. Hu Qiaomu questioned the growing strength of

bourgeois liberalism, manifest, among other places, in the growth of translated Western

novels and the importation of Hong Kong cultural icons. He used his influence to publish

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[427] "Shuli Chonggao de Geming Daode Fengshang", *Jiefangjunbao*, November 22 1979. "Wei Guoqing Tongzhi Zai Quanjun Zhengzhi Huiyishang Tichu, Zhuahao Dang de Jianshe Jiaqiang Zhengzhi Gongzuo", *Renminribao*, May 9 1980. The first of these articles was not written by Wei and does not cite him, but it was written by individuals under his command.

[428] Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 92-93.

articles by Wei, while blocking those by liberal supporters of Hu Yaobang – against whom

most of the conservative attack focused.[429]

Although Deng was able to shut down General Wei's persistent criticisms in the

civilian Party press in May 1980 by personally ordering the *Renminribao* and the

Gangminribao to cease publishing antibourgeois slogans, Deng's battle with Wei was not

over.[430] In August 1982 PLAN[431] propagandist Zhao Yiya published an article in

Jiefangjunbao (the GPD's newspaper, controlled by Wei) attacking the neglect of socialist

values in the ongoing process of reform even more directly:

> "What our party is advocating is socialist spiritual civilization.... When this
> problem was first raised, it was in order to foster the revolutionary spirit and
> maintain the socialist road. But some comrades, in interpreting and
> propagating the slogan, one-sidedly emphasize 'culture,' but ignore 'spirit,' or
> even worse, 'socialism'....[432]

With Hu Yaobang emphasizing learning and culture in his own vision of socialist spiritual

civilization, Hu was clearly the primary target of this new leftist assault. Over the next

month, other articles followed, adopting the same explicitly anti-bourgeois rhetoric. Faced

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[429] Ruan Ming, *Deng Xiaoping: Chronicle of an Empire*, trans. Peter Rand Nancy Liu, and Lawrence R. Sullivan (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992), 77.

[430] Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 93.

[431] The naval leadership's involvement in this affair is assessed further in the next section.

[432] Zhao Yiya, "Gongchanzhuyi Sixiang Shi Shehuizhuyi Jingshen Wenming de Hexin", *Jiefangjunbao*, August 28 1982. The same article was also published on the same day in the Shanghai newspaper, *Jiefangribao* (Liberation daily).

with an increasingly serious threat, Deng Xiaoping, then serving as CMC chairman, managed to force the resignation of Wei Guoqing in September 1982.[433]

Although Deng was able to neutralize this GPD political offensive by fiat, widespread army resistance on military issues during the same period proved more difficult to counter. During Deng's brief 1975 accession to the CMC (lasting less than a year), he had bluntly told a gathering of military leaders that the military's deficiencies could be summarized by five words: "fat, factionalism, pride, luxury, and laziness."[434] His priorities included: (1) a housecleaning of the military regions and the transfer of senior personnel in each; (2) the reduction of the army's size; (3) a shift to more conventional doctrine; and (4) the imposition of professional standards for hiring and promotions. These measures would, if successful, reduce military inefficiency, free resources for rebuilding the national economy, and make the army more amenable to economic and political reform.

When he returned to the CMC in 1977 as vice chairman, Deng's priorities remained similar. The military had, in the meantime, grown even larger and less disciplined. Deng faced obstacles at every turn. Officers in the military regions, who had grown accustomed to autonomy during the ten years of the Cultural Revolution, refused transfer orders. Deng's frustration with these regional commanders was evident in his 1977 comment:

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[433] Precluding any ambiguity about the cause of Wei's resignation, the *Jiefangjunbao* published a retraction of Zhao Ziyang's essay on the same day Wei's resignation was announced. "Yipian You Yanzhong Cuowu de Wenzhang", *Jiefangjunbao*, September 27 1982. (Deng had been promoted to CMC chairman in June 1981.)

[434] Deng Xiaoping, *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), 15.

"Presently, there are a few officers who do not execute the instructions and orders of their superiors. This is not disciplined action.... They [the commanders] think that with the power behind them, no one will touch them – they think no one will dare rub the tiger's ass!"[435]

As late as 1980, four of eight division commanders slated for transfer from the Nanjing military region disputed their orders. It was not until 1985 that Deng was able to transfer the last holdouts among the Cultural Revolution era Military Region commanders. The most prominent of these was Li Desheng, the commander of the Shenyang Military Region who, it was feared, might use his military forces if threatened.[436]

Not only did this inability to control the regions hamper Deng's ability to reduce the size of the force and accomplish other military tasks, it also damaged his ability to implement social, economic, and political policy at and below the provincial level. In a 1981 discussion with military officers, Deng complained of continuing leftist tendencies within the military and the need to continue efforts to identify and root out those responsible for leftist excesses – themes that were echoed three years later in a series of articles in the *Renminribao* and *Jiefangjunbao*.[437] Some senior regional leaders (including Li Desheng) had been closely

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[435] Ibid., 82.

[436] On Li Desheng's removal, see Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 122 and 84. Ellis Joffe, *The Chinese Army After Mao* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 139. For a summary of a June 1985 interview with Hu Yaobang concerning whether or not Li could be removed and whether or not he might use force in his own defense, see MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-1982," 378-79.

[437] For Deng's March 27, 1981 speech, see Deng Xiaoping, *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan*, 379-82. For 1984 *Renminribao* articles see April 30 and May 20. For a summary that includes these observations, see, Richard Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s," in *The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 376-79.

affiliated with leftist radicals during the Cultural Revolution, most were strongly opposed to

liberal reform, and all had built up a broad and powerful set of connections with regional

officials.[438]

It was even more difficult for Deng to shift doctrine and strategy away from a purely

guerrilla format towards one that emphasized conventional warfighting. Most commanders

adopted Deng's doctrinal buzzwords (e.g., "people's war under modern conditions" and

"active defense"), but many continued to interpret those in ways that were more consistent

with guerrilla warfare rather than conventional doctrines. Even Yang Dezhi, the chief of the

general staff, for example, argued in 1983 that Mao's conception of people's war had strategic

merit, even under modern conditions:

> "In modern war, the enemy will use concentrated masses of high tech
> weapons. He will rely heavily on his rear area.... This will make conditions
> for the opening of our 'people's war' extremely favorable.... Considering the
> justness and greatness of the socialist system, we should be able to bring the
> advantages of just war to bear.... We should be able to gradually shift the
> balance of power and ultimately emerge victorious."[439]

The continued advocacy of traditional people's war provided, among other things, a rationale

for continued high troop levels. Despite Deng's repeated calls to trim the force and split the

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[438] Li Desheng had cooperated with the radicals during the first stages of the Cultural Revolution and owed much of his rise to that event. In 1970, he served on the new Central Organization and Propaganda Group with several of the most senior Cultural Revolution leaders, including Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Ji Dengkui. MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-1982," 267 and 84. Other prominent military leftists included Xu Shiyou, Chen Xilian, and Wang Dongxing.

[439] Hiramatsu Shigeo, Chugoku Jinmin Kaihogun (Tokyo: Isanami Shinsho, 1987), 97-98. Yang Dezhi was certainly not an unqualified opponent of military reform. He frequently spoke in favor of "modernization." Nevertheless, there is evidence he opposed cuts in the force structure, and the quotation cited here might have been, in part, an argument for maintaining personnel levels.

associated savings between strengthening the civilian economy and modernizing military equipment, the number of soldiers in the force continued to climb until 1981.[440]

The navy's position (1978-1985). In contrast to the army's resistance to both domestic and military reform, the navy welcomed both. After the arrest of the Gang of Four, it acted quickly to affirm its loyalty to the new leadership and purge its own ranks of leftists. It served as a reserve of politically loyal officers to the center. Its public pronouncements – offered in civilian newspapers and magazines, rather than the *Jiefangjunbao* (the military's newspaper, controlled by the GPD), offered a clear military rationale for the domestic economic and social policies associated with reform and opening. And it openly acknowledged the need for both limited military spending and military support for infrastructure work during the first decades of economic reconstruction.

Deng and his supporters enlisted naval leaders in their efforts shortly after their return to power. In January 1975, when Deng Xiaoping was restored to key military positions, the navy's political commissar, Su Zhenhua, was promoted to the Central Military Commission. And in 1976, after Su's participation in the plot to arrest the Gang of Four, he was assigned as the first secretary of Shanghai with the mission of eliminating Gang of Four supporters who had made their stronghold in that city.[441] He died in 1979, having achieved, by all accounts, a

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[440] Yitzhak Shichor, "Demobilization: The Dialectics of PLA Troop Reduction," *China Quarterly* 146 (1996): 340.

[441] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu*, 1645. MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-1982," 311.

high degree of success in identifying and removing those who had worked with the Gang of Four. A second officer with long experience in the navy, Liu Huaqing, was brought in to serve as Deng Xiaoping's personal military advisor within the CMC in 1979. Liu, despite already being 63 years old in 1979, remained a key member of Deng's military team until 1997, when he stepped down from his last military position as vice chairman of the CMC.[442]

Within the PLAN, professional naval officers began rooting out leftists almost as soon as the Gang of Four fell, though the official navy history states that this work was complicated – at least until the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in December 1978 – by the accession of Hua Guofeng, who took an ambivalent line on the left-right divide.[443] Much of the task fell to the navy's deputy commander, Liu Daosheng, who, with Xiao Jinguang sick, served as the navy's acting commander between 1978 and 1980.[444] Liu Daosheng was a career naval officer, who had served as the navy's first political commissar in 1950, attended Voroshilov naval academy in the Soviet Union from 1953 to 1957, and remained a strong advocate of naval building until he was purged during the Cultural Revolution, reportedly for his outspoken naval advocacy.[445] In April 1978, under the banner of "investigation,

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[442] Liu served as Deng's military advisor within the CMC from 1979 to 1982. He was commander of the PLAN from 1982 until 1987. He was made a CMC member in 1987, and he became a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and 1st vice chairman of the CMC in 1992. He retired in 1997.

[443] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi*, 89-91.

[444] During and for several years after the Cultural Revolution, official postings within the military were frequently out of line with actual responsibilities. Liu Daosheng held the post of 1st deputy commander of the navy between 1977 and 1982.

[445] For career details, see Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu*, 1272-73. This source does not record his being purged during the Cultural Revolution. For that, see David Jr. Muller, *China as a Maritime Power* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 204-06. [PAGE 205] Liu Daosheng's obituary reports rather cryptically that, "During the ten years of turmoil [i.e., the Cultural Revolution], he fought a

consolidation, and transformation," 6,000 political officers in 700 teams visited virtually all naval units.[446] The officers visited those identified as radicals or malcontents and removed those who were unwilling to change their colors. By 1979, the program was largely complete and the navy began to focus most of its energies on operational training, but occasional campaigns to "eliminate leftist ideological influence" and correct the "ossification of thinking" continued periodically even after that time.

The PLAN moved just as quickly to restore the names of those naval officers who had been purged by the left during the Cultural Revolution. As the Third Plenum ended, the navy's Party committee held its own meeting. Its two resolutions were: (1) "to clarify truth in the navy's history and make that history right which had been turned on its head"; and (2) to restore those leaders who had been wrongfully criticized or purged since 1966. Under the first provision, all resolutions forced upon the navy by Lin Biao, Li Zuopeng, and the Gang of Four were briefly but clearly repudiated. Under the second, the names of 2,230 officers who had been accused of "rightists" or "inclined right" were cleared, and 500 individuals from the former KMT military but who had participated in uprisings or otherwise joined the PLAN were declared loyal.[447] The navy's school system was also quickly reestablished along pre-Cultural Revolution lines.[448]

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resolute battle against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four. He resolutely and thoroughly implemented the policy direction set forth by the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress [in 1978], and maintained unity with the Party's politics and thought." "Liu Daosheng Tongzhi Shishi", *Jiefangjunbao*, June 8 1995.

[446] This and the information from the subsequent two sentences are from Muller, *China as a Maritime Power*, 205.

[447] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Haijunshi*, 89-91.

[448] Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu*, 1950.

Between January 1980 and September 1982 the PLAN was commanded, for the only

time in its history, by a political conservative, Ye Fei. But this peculiar interlude in Chinese

naval history was the exception that proved the rule. Ye Fei was a transplanted army officer.

His first experience in the navy came in 1979, at the age of 65, when he was appointed as the

PLAN's political commissar.[449] Although there is no Chinese commentary on how this came

to pass, it was probably pushed by Wei Guoqing, the PLA political commissar, and Hua

Guofeng, still serving nominally the chairman of the CMC. (See section above on army

politics.) Ye Fei and Wei Guoqing had served together as commander and political

commissar of the 10th Army during the Civil War (a relatively small command, about the

same size as a U.S. army division). Wei Guoqing and Hua Guofeng were already cooperating

in an effort to block Deng Xiaoping's reforms.[450] These individuals, acting together, would

have had considerable authority over appointments, especially of political officers. Whatever

propelled his accession as PLAN commander, Ye proved a tough critic of Deng Xiaoping's

reform program, allowing, among other things, Zhao Yiya to publish his devastating attack on

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[449] On Ye Fei's career, see Ibid., 1818-19. From 1953 Ye was the commander of the Nanjing Military Region. Between 1975 and 1979, he had served as the Minister of Transportation.

[450] For an order of battle showing these individuals at the top of the 10th Army together, see "ChinaDefense.com: The Third Army Order of Battle, February-June 1949," http://www.china-defense.com/orbat/pla_orbat_1949/pla_orbat_1949-3.html (viewed August 5, 2003). According to Baum, by early 1979 the PLA old guard was already angry about the Democracy Wall movement. Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s," 324. PLA conservatives might have seen the navy, which was in the midst of purging its conservative members, as something of a renegade organization and sought to place one of their own there. Ye Fei's appointment first as political commissar would have been relatively easily influenced by the GPD, then headed by Wei Guoqing. It is possible that Deng Xiaoping might not have anticipated that Ye Fei would be critical of reform (especially since he had come under attack during the Cultural Revolution) and therefore did not oppose the move. But bringing an army officer to any important naval post, not to mention overall command, was out of character with Deng's military style, so it was almost certainly not his doing.

Hu Yaobang and Hu's purported lack of communist ideals in September 1982.[451] But there is

no evidence that Ye Fei's views reflected those of the professional navy, and in fact he and

Liu Daosheng, who remained the deputy commander of the navy, appeared to work at cross-

purposes. And in September 1982, Deng Xiaoping personally intervened to end this interlude

by removing Ye Fei – together with the GPD chief Wei Guoqing – in response to the

publication of Zhao Yiya's article.[452]

To replace Ye Fei as PLAN commander, Deng brought in Liu Huaqing, a graduate of

the Voroshilov Naval Academy who was then serving as Deng's military advisor.[453] Liu

Huaqing immediately set about restoring the navy's educational institutions and engaging in a

reexamination of the navy's organization and structure. In 1984 Liu Huaqing published two

articles, putting the navy publicly on record as fully supporting not just Deng's military

direction but also his economic and political policies as well.[454] These statements contrasted

markedly with the hostile tone of Yu Qiuli, Wei Guoqing's replacement in the General

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[451] Zhao Yiya, "Gongchanzhuyi Sixiang Shi Shehuizhuyi Jingshen Wenming de Hexin". (On the significance of this essay, see comments on it earlier in this chapter.) Ye Fei himself also chimed in on many of the same issues in his own essay on socialist spiritual civilization, including appearing on the front page of *Jiefangjunbao* on August 16, 1982 – just twelve days before Zhao's article appeared. Like Zhao, he suggested in this article that some in the Party [i.e., Hu Yaobang] had forgotten that communist ideals must be the core of socialist spiritual civilization. See "Jianshe Jingshen Wenming de Hexin Shi You Gongchanzhuyi Sixiang: Ye Fei Zai Haijun 'Shuangxian' Huishang Zuo Baogao, Haozhao Wei Shixian Dang de Mubiao Fendou Daodi", *Jiefangjunbao*, August 16 1982.

[452] MacFarquhar, "The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-1982," 333.

[453] Liu Huaqing began his career in the army. He joined the navy in 1952, two years after its founding, and attended Voroshilov from 1954, one year after Liu Daosheng. From 1960 to 1970 he served primarily in PLA science and technology positions, but returned to the navy in 1970 as deputy chief of staff. Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu*, 1274-75.

[454] Du Zhongwei *et al.*, "Haiyang, Haijun, Xinjishu Geming -- Fang Haijun Silingyuan Liu Huaqing", *Liaowang*, August 13 1984. Liu Huaqing, "Jianshe Yizhi Qiangda de Haijun, Fazhan Woguo de Haiyang Shiye: Haijun Siling".

Political Department, and the more ambivalent but nevertheless critical tone of other senior

PLA commanders. Significantly, Liu Huaqing's statements were carried not by the military's

Jiefangjunbao – which was under the control of the GPD – but by two civilian outlets, the

main government newspaper, *Renminribao*, and the weekly, *Liaowang*.

In the *Liaowang* article, Commander Liu listed the navy's priorities: "First, we must

eliminate the lingering pernicious effects of 'leftism' – a task that history has clearly

bestowed on the people's navy.... Second, we must positively participate in national

economic strengthening and in the development of the ocean.... And third, we must

strengthen training and the development of personnel."[455] Throughout both statements (one

of which was an extended interview, the other of which was an article by the commander),

Liu emphasized the importance of establishing the proper political and economic

preconditions for naval strengthening. Both statements reviewed the historical record as seen

by the PLAN – specifically, the positive effects of Liu Shaoqi's moderate economic and

political policies and the disastrous impact of the Cultural Revolution. In a likely reference to

the Great Leap Forward, when the navy increased its tonnage but quality declined, Liu

observed that "The navy not only requires a certain amount of quantity, to an even greater

extent it also requires quality. It requires the use of up-to-date science and technology."

On domestic economic policy, the navy, in contrast to the army, placed itself fully and

squarely on the side of reformers – backing an urban, technologically oriented vision of

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[455] Du Zhongwei *et al.*, "Haiyang, Haijun, Xinjishu Geming -- Fang Haijun Silingyuan Liu Huaqing".

growth. Whereas senior army leaders cautioned about unrestrained reform producing

"spiritual pollution" in coastal cities, Liu Huaqing suggested, "The Party center has decided

that with regard to reform of economic organs, making the cities the focus of the entire

economic system is important. This is a great and profound change that could well produce a

major positive effect on naval building." With regard to the opening of new SEZs in 1984,

Liu argued,

> "The policy ... to open up fourteen coastal port cities is an important policy in
> speeding economic construction. When the economies of the coastal port
> cities have developed, when the economic power and science and
> technological level of the entire nation has risen, when shipbuilding
> electronics, metallergy, machine industries, and chemical engineering
> industries have been strengthened, these will all provide a strong foundation
> for naval building."

And Liu suggested that not only would growth in coastal cities benefit the navy, but the navy

could "and must support the economic strengthening of these coastal port cities with all its

power." "Executing these tasks," he continued, "will be beneficial to our state, our military,

and our people."

In contrast to the army, within which a brisk discussion of the difficulties of leading

urban troops flourished throughout the 1980s, Liu made no mention of this problem. Nor did

he mention the fostering of the proper socialist spirit or the demands of political education.

Rather, Liu's comments on education were purely technical. The ceaseless integration of new

types of technology in naval systems would continue, "demanding that we place greater

emphasis on intellectual development and the renewal of knowledge.... Therefore, we

absolutely give education and training a position of strategic importance." We must, he

continued, "thoroughly implement CMC Chairman Deng Xiaoping's command that

"education should face modernization, face the world, and face the future."

One month before Liu Huaqing's keystone statements, two senior army figures,

generals Yang Shangkun (then CMC vice chairman) and Yu Qiuli (the GPD chief) addressed

a gathering of naval officers, and the difference in tone between their address and Liu

Huaqing's statements is instructive.[456] While praising the navy's progress in strengthening its

capabilities and also its work in eliminating "leftism" from its ranks, the generals' remarks

focused on how to adapt to the opening of coastal cities without corrupting the soldiers. "We

must," they suggested, "strengthen political work and administrative management, adhere to

education in the four basic principles [absolute supremacy of socialism and the Party] and

nationalism, ensure that all officers and soldiers are self disciplined in respecting the laws and

regulations of the SEZs, and uphold the solemn dignity of the nation and the glory of our

units." While readily acknowledging the technical demands and skills of the navy, they

cautioned its leaders: "The more modernized the unit, the technical the unit type or branch,

the more it needs strict discipline." Although these comments were not inconsistent with

Deng Xiaoping's position, generals Yang and Yu certainly highlighted different implications

of reform and opening than those chosen by Liu Huaqing.

Deng Xiaoping developed close ties with the navy during this period and appears to

have made some additional resources available to it for special projects, despite an overall

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[456] "Yang Shangkun Yu Quili Huijian Haijun Shi Yishang Ganbu Shi Qiangdiao Shiying Kaifang he Gaige Xin Xingshi Gaohao Budui Jianshe", *Jiefangjunbao*, July 1 1984.

reduction of defense budgets. He personally inspected naval units in 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1984. None of these visits was made public until 1984 when a photo of Deng Xiaoping surrounded by sailors on the deck of a warship appeared on the front page of the *Renminribao* (People's Daily), together with a lengthy article featuring details of his various naval visits.[457] By that time, Deng had both gained substantial control of the national media, including the *Renminribao*, and was leaning towards a reevaluation of China's strategic situation that would highlight the need for a powerful navy. The marine corps, first formed in 1953 but disbanded in 1957, was reestablished at the end of 1979. Series production was ramped up on new frigates and destroyers. And funds were made available for the establishment of new research organizations, including some tasked primarily with producing historical or broad strategic studies – i.e., naval propaganda.

THE SERVICES AND POLITICAL SUCCESSION, 1985-1989. Between 1985 and 1989 Deng Xiaoping fought to secure the acceptance of a liberal successor to his own position as Party general secretary. His first appointed successor was Hu Yaobang and, with Hu's political demise, his second was Zhao Ziyang.

The succession struggle for both was fought against the backdrop of a deepening economic and social transformation. The fourteen new SEZs established in 1984 (bringing the total up to sixteen) and spurred inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and, since most of

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[457] Gu Yuezhong, Liu Nanchang, "Jinge Tiema – Deng Xiaoping Junwei Lingdao Tongzhi Guanxin Jundui Xiandaihua Jishi," (Glittering speers and steel warhorses – Military Commission leader Deng Xiaoping shows care for military modernization efforts), *Renminribao*, August 11, 1984.

this was in the export sector, the rapid growth of industrial exports. They also carried

attendant unsettling social effects. In 1985 the economy began to overheat and inflation rose

to serious levels. At prominent universities, students began to protest against Japanese

investment, interracial dating (involving African students), and military presence on

campuses, and labor began to organize itself.[458]

Conservatives attacked the ill social effects of reform and, by so doing, sought to

obstruct and undermine the candidacy of Deng's appointed liberal successors. Senior army

commanders were among the most prominent critics. They successfully blocked first Hu

Yaobang and subsequently Zhao Ziyang from becoming CMC chairman, severely damaging

the prospects that either of these individuals (both of whom were liberal in the contemporary

Chinese context) would succeed Deng as Party leader in according with Deng's intentions.

The navy continued to support both reform and opening and Deng's chosen successors,

helping Zhao to remain a viable contender until 1989 and, more generally, helping prevent

political defeats from turning into a rout.

The army's position (1985-1989). Whereas the army had been divided on early

reform efforts and included many supporters as well as opponents, it was, by 1985, largely

unified in its opposition to many continuing reform efforts. That opposition was manifest in

its efforts to torpedo the succession of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang to the Party's top

political position. Yu Qiuli, as head of the PLA's GPD (and Wei Guoqing's successor),

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[458] Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping,* 190-93. The protest against military activities on campus took place at Beijing Agricultural University.

established the intellectual basis upon which the army's attack on Hu Yaobang and Zhao

Ziyang was built. Between 1985 and 1987 he launched three propaganda campaigns, each

questioning the effects of economic and social change on the military. With broad support

among senior army officers, these political campaigns drew blood and, ultimately, helped

bring down the candidacies of both Hu and Zhao.

Yu Qiuli launched the "Mao'erdong campaign" in 1985, publicizing the hardships

faced by China's young soldiers deployed opposite Vietnam (near Mao'erdong) and

highlighted the efforts of those soldiers to assist the local minority population in harvesting

and basic education.[459] A musical troupe, organized from frontline soldiers and playing

instruments made from spent artillery casings and other military paraphernalia, traveled to

three elite Beijing universities.[460] These universities were, at that time, the focus of liberal

social agitation. The army arranged for extensive media coverage of the tour, allowing the

press and public ample opportunity to contrast the students' life of ease with the soldiers'

lives of hardship and danger. The larger message was that while reforms were unsettled

society and while students were protesting against the government, soldiers from China's

heartland were upholding the country's finest socialist traditions.

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[459] This campaign bagan in the *Jiefangjunbao*. Although an ongoing story, the tempo changed in July 1985. In the eighteen months prior to that time there had been only two articles in the *Jiefangjunbao* touching on Mao'erdong. In the eighteen months after that time, there were seventy-two. With the encouragement of senior army officers the campaign was, by early 1986, picked up by the *Renminribao*.

[460] "Mao'erdong Zhi Sheng Yuetuan Lai Jing Yanchu", *Renminribao*, December 19 1986. Other articles on "The Sounds of Mao'erdong" appeared on December 22, 24, 26, 28, and 29. For an example of purported exchange between students and soldiers, see Liu Yuqie, "Fumei Liuxuesheng Liu Yuqie Zhishu Qianxian Jiangshi, Biaoshi Zhenxi Shijian Keku Xuexi Wei Guo Zhengguang", *Jiefangjunbao*, December 31 1986.

A second campaign had a similar message but was more explicitly critical of the

impact of social change on the military. In July 1986, Yu Qiuli began to encourage all

elements of the military to discuss and debate "the theory of soldiers' gains and losses."

Officers and soldiers were told to examine the idea, said to be "widespread" among military

officers, that during the reform era, "to become a soldier was to take losses."[461] Ostensibly,

the official "answer" was that soldiering was still a worthy and rewarding profession. But by

posing the question and offering extensive evidence of the hardships that liberal reform

imposed on soldiers, the campaign represented another critique of reform and opening. And

although Yu Qiuli described the campaign as an internal military discussion, it was widely

publicized in the civilian as well as the military press.[462] In August 1986, Yu Qiuli launched a

third political campaign, a renewal of Wei Guoqing's call for a "socialist spiritual

civilization."

These campaigns built on one another and were used by conservatives with great

effect against Deng's liberal protégés during 1985 and 1986. In preparation to install Hu

Yaobang in key Party positions, Deng Xiaping sought to have him confirmed as the chairman

of the CMC during the 1985 Beidaihe meetings. (Leadership meetings are held annually at

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[461] Chen Shenggeng, "Yu Qiuli Zai Zhu Jing Budui Geda Danwei Zhengzhibu Zhuren he Zhongzheng Jiguanchu Yishang Ganbu Hui Tichu: Zai Quanjun Kaizhan Zhengque Kandai Junren 'De yu Shi' Da Taolun", *Jiefangjunbao*, July 24 1986.

[462] This "internal" military debate was announced in the *Renminribao* three days after its appearance in the military daily. "Yu Qiuli Zai Jundui Zhu Jing Danwei Ganbuhuishang Tichu: Quan Jun Kaizhan Guanyu Junren 'De yu Shi' Da Taolun", *Renminribao*, July 27 1986.

Beidaihe, a resort on the Yellow Sea.) Hu's confirmation was, however, blocked by

conservative army officers, especially General Xu Shiyou, who blamed him for the rise of

"bourgeois liberalism."[463] Conservative critics, not least in the military, continued to attack

Hu Yaobang's record, and he was forced to resign his Party posts in January 1987.[464]

Conservative army officers then quickly turned their political attacks on Zhao Ziyang,

who was, after Hu Yaobang's ouster, Deng's next pick as successor. Zhao favored deepening

economic liberalization, but he advocated a somewhat slower pace than Hu and left himself

less vulnerable to charges of encouraging dissent and disorder – at least until the start of the

Tiananmen democracy movement. Deng appeared more conscious of the need to build

military support for Zhao as chairman of the CMC and courted sympathetic military elements,

including the navy. Ultimately, Zhao was allowed to become vice chairman of the CMC

(behind Deng), but conservative army officers extracted a promise from Deng that Zhao

would report to General Yang Shangkun, who effectively controlled the CMC's agenda.[465]

The navy's position (1985-1989). The navy saw its interests as aligned closely with

those of first Hu Yaobang and later Zhao Ziyang during this period. In the case of Hu

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[463] Jane Teufel Dreyer, "Deng Xiaoping: The Soldier," *The China Quarterly* 135 (1993). Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 187.

[464] For more on army criticism of Hu Yaobang, see Hiramatsu Shigeo, *Chugoku Jinmin Kaihogun*, 193-94. For the composition of the conservative movement and its arguments, see Lawrence R. Sullivan, "Assault on Reforms: Conservative Criticism of Political and Economic Liberalization in China, 1985-1986," *China Quarterly* (1988).

[465] Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 217.

Yaobang, personal ties to the navy commander Liu Huaqing helped cement a relationship

based on common interest. Hu and Liu jointly led the Chinese Academy of Sciences

immediately after the Cultural Revolution, and both advanced similar, liberal positions with

regard to the development of national technology and exchange with the outside world.[466] Hu

was a strong backer of a smaller, more professional, more modern military – all positions the

navy appreciated as in its interests.[467] Hence, the navy was willing to publicly support Hu's

pronouncements on economic and political opening, and even those related to the need for

further military budget cuts.

In the midst of Yu Qiuli's conservative campaigns and much army grumbling about

resource cuts, the navy's high command went on record in support of military frugality. The

navy's commander, Liu Huaqing, said, "We must begin all planning and activities with a

consideration of the nation's economic strength…. Given that the nation is not rich, we

cannot get too carried away in emphasizing the needs of national defense or put additional

pressure on the nation." The navy's political commissar, Li Yaowen, said, "Only with a

relatively strong economy can we achieve Deng's call for regularization of our military

equipment. Focusing first on economic building is the key to a establishing a rich country

and, therefore, also a good policy for establishing a strong military." Other officers called for

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[466] Mitsubishi Sogo Kenkyujo Hen, *Chugoku Saiko Shidosha, 1996 Nenban* (Tokyo: Sososha, 1996), 269. Other personal connections included common experience in the Fourth Field Army during the Revolution and the fact that Liu's former secretary, Liu Shaojiang, married Hu Yaobang's daughter. Liu Shaojiang later became a senior officer in the GPD after Liu Huaqing became vice chairman of the CMC.

[467] See, for example, Hu's comments recorded in Liu Huinian, "You Wenhua de Xin Yidai Junren Chengwei Jiefangjun Zhuti; Hu Yaobang Gaodu Zanyang Xin de Lishi Tiaojianxia de Renmin Jiefangjun de Geming Juewu, Junzheng Jilu he Jundui Suzhi You Hen Da Tigao", *Renminribao*, October 1 1984.

maintaining a positive mental attitude; taking advantage of the navy's position in coastal cities to assist in economic tasks; and making personal adjustments to maximize flexibility.[468]

During the 1987 Party Congress Plenum, Deng appointed Liu Huaqing as a full member of the CMC. At the same Plenum – when Zhao Ziyang came under pressure from conservatives inside and outside of the military – Liu was the most prominent military officer to deliver a speech supporting Zhao Ziyang's call for deepening reform. In it, he said, "Socialist society should pursue unrelenting reform and cannot be static.... As the policy of reform and opening faces its most serious test, the navy stands in the forefront of its defense. The navy, with high technical, knowledge, and personnel skill requirements, is fully qualified and capable of supporting reform."[469] The Tiananmen demonstrations ultimately made Zhao Ziyang's position untenable and ushered in a period of conservative leftist reaction. But the navy helped him to survive politically until then, and, more importantly, it was instrumental in restarting the reform period three years after the Tiananmen massacre.

THE SERVICES, TIANANMEN, AND AFTER, 1989-1992. In the eyes of many conservative Party leaders, the democracy movement validated the leftist position on key domestic issues. Conservatives held that marketizing large sectors of the economy and putting economic reform ahead of socialist values had and would continue to lead to the

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[468] "Fucong Daju, Yousuo Zuowei", *Jiefangjunbao*, March 21 1986. Contributors included the navy commander, Liu Huaqing; navy political commissar, Li Yaowen; naval chief of staff, An Liqun; equipment chief, Zheng Minghe; logistics chief, Li Chunming; and the head of the navy's political department (a different position than the commissar post), Zhong Guorong.

[469] Li Xuanhua *et al.*, "Gaige Shi Jianshe You Zhongguo Tese de Shehuizhuyi de Biyou Zhi Lu", *Jiefangjunbao*, October 31 1987.

resurgence of "bourgeois liberalism." And with the Party apparently threatened, Deng himself agreed that a crackdown was necessary and that some temporary retrenchment on reform would be necessary. After June 4 1989, conservatives were assisted materially by the purge of those liberals seen as responsible for the demonstrations or opposed to their suppression – including most prominently Zhao Ziyang but also his protégés and supporters. By pressing their gains, the conservatives were, by the end of 1991, threatening to permanently freeze or undo economic reform. Surviving pro-reform leaders ultimately fought off this challenge to emerge victorious and restart reform. But they did so only after Deng Xiaoping's reemergence from retirement to jumpstart the process, and even with the elderly Deng's assistance, the outcome was far from preordained.

The services reacted differently to the democracy movement of 1989 and to the choices presented after its suppression. The army was divided, especially on the armed suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations. But despite these divisions, senior army officers, especially revolution-era commanders, represented the most forceful advocates of the move. After June 4 (as the Chinese refer to the armed suppression on that date), these commanders purged the army of dissenters and allied with other conservative Party leaders to eliminate liberals from senior positions in the Party. The navy, in this case, was also deeply divided. But there appears to have been a higher proportion of dissenters in the navy's officer corps. And even those who did back the use of force in June 1989 (including Liu Huaqing) did not join the conservative reaction after the event, but rather continued to sing the praises of reform and opening, if more cautiously than before the event.

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The army (1989-1992). In the days leading up to the June 4th clearance, the army was

divided. It is difficult to make neat or precise generalizations about those who supported or

opposed the action. Some rough patterns do, however, appear to emerge from the sketchy

facts available. Younger officers, officers from the general staff, and technical branch

commanders tended to take a more moderate line than did many of the older officers

(especially from infantry backgrounds) and officers from the GPD.[470] By late May 1989,

conservatives had gained the upper hand, and they gradually consolidated their position,

purged opponents within the army, and made the army a core member of the conservative

coalition during the Maoist revival of 1989-1992.

Revolution era officers – including Yang Shangkun, Wang Zhen, Peng Zhen, and Li

Xiannian – were among the most outspoken advocates of a forceful response to the

Democracy Movement. Yang Shangkun, the 1st chairman of the CMC, championed the

suppression and was the architect of the military plan.[471] But comments by Li Xiannian,

made at a council of elder statesmen shortly before the decision to clear Tiananmen Square

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[470] On these differences see Willy Wo-Lap Lam, *China After Deng Xiaoping* (Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, 1995), 225-27. Paul H.B. Godwin, "Party-Military Relations," in *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Michael Swain, *The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, and Beliefs* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992).

[471] See, for example, the long sections devoted to his arguments in Zhang Liang, *The Tiananmen Papers*, trans. Andrew J. Nathan and Perry Link (New York: Public Affairs, 2001). Zhang Liang is the pseudonym of the author and an individual who is said by Nathan and Link to be a former Chinese official. The book was compiled from notes of key meetings, which were said by the author to have been smuggled out of China. The veracity of much of its contents cannot be confirmed. But the editors, both experienced China specialists, judge it to be real. If it turns out not to have been compiled from notes taken by observers, its significance will be less. Nevertheless, even in that case, it represents an assessment of responsibility by a well-informed insider and critic of the events covered.

was made, were typical of the views of all: "Our People's Revolution was built with the blood of more than twenty million revolutionary martyrs.... We can't allow turmoil to destroy all this overnight.... China will lose all hope if we let turmoil have its way or open the door to capitalism."[472] Wang Zhen said, "When we were their [the students'] age we lived in a forest of rifles and a rain of bullets; we didn't know what a peaceful day was. Give them peace and they don't want it...."[473] These were men who, right or wrong, had brought epochal change to China, and they were not going to let the revolution they had led be hijacked or overturned by college students.

There were, however, dissenters even among the ranks of the old guard. The group did include several officers with traditional infantry-oriented military backgrounds, but technical officers were, even among this group of revolutionary-era officers, over represented. Two of the most prominent were Zhang Aiping and Nie Rongzhen, longtime leaders of China's military science and technology community. The group also included Yang Dezhi and Xu Xiangqian, prominent proponents of military modernization and regularization, and Ye Fei, a former commander of the navy (who, as pointed out earlier, had little naval background and a past record of conservative action).[474]

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[472] Ibid., 257-58.

[473] Ibid., 208. Wang Zhen had long felt antagonized by dissatisfied students. In a confrontation with students of the Central Party School in 1986 (when smaller student demonstrations were taking place), Wang said "You have three million college students. But I have three million soldiers, and I will cut your freakin' heads off!" Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 204.

[474] Seven retired senior officers reportedly wrote a letter critical of the declaration of martial law. According to Godwin, these included former defense minister Zhang Aiping; former vice minister of defense Xiao Ke; former chief of staff Yang Dezhi; former commander of the navy, Ye Fei; and the former president of the PLA

Similar patterns can be observed among younger, serving officers, though this group

was regarded by its elders as being, in general, more ambivalent and less politically reliable

than members of their own generation.[475] Officers affiliated with better-trained and more

technology-intensive units appear to have been less responsive to the Party's commands. The

most obvious and widely discussed illustration is the record of the first two army groups to

reach Beijing. The 38th Army Group's base was closest to Beijing, recruited heavily from in

and around the city, and was known to benefit from the highest standards and best equipped

of any of China's army groups. Given orders to advance into the city, it balked. Many of its

officers apparently refused to obey orders. The 38th Army Group's commander, Xu Qinxian,

avoided the dilemma by checking himself into a hospital. And many of the 38th Army

Group's subordinate units either abandoned or torched their own equipment.[476] The soldiers

of the 27th Army Group, mostly drawn from rural areas around its base in Shijiazhuang (Hebei

province), were told and apparently believed that the disturbances were being caused by

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Academy of Military Science Song Shilun. Godwin, "Party-Military Relations," 83. Baum provides a different list of elderly military leaders who were not happy with the declaration: Zhang Aiping, Yang Dezhi, Chen Zaidao, Li Desheng, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian. Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 305.

[475] Some 1,500 officers were reported punished for failings during the clearing operation. According to Far Eastern Economic Review (and cited by Paul Godwin), 3,500 officers were investigated, including some twenty officers at the regimental and battalion level and thirty-six at the regimental and battalion level. Godwin, "Party-Military Relations," 85. For additional sources on the military operation and the problems in the 38th Army Group, see Yabuki Susumu, *Chugoku Jinmin Kaihogun* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1996), 94-167. Swain, *The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, and Beliefs*, 160-68.

[476] According to a classified document leaked to reporters in Hong Kong, the unit's commander, 110 other officers, and 1,400 soldiers from the army group left their posts or refused to take orders. Lam, *China After Deng Xiaoping*, 205.

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drifters and misfits (*liumang*). The units of the 27th Army Group followed orders and were responsible for much of the killing during the suppression effort.[477]

In the case of these two army groups, specific regional composition and personal affiliations played a significant role in determining their behavior. Senior officers in the 27th Army Group had ties to Yang Shangkun. But after the military suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations, conservative military officers cited emphasis on technical education as a cause of military disobedience, confirming that Chinese military officials perceived a link between modern and professional military forces and those unwilling to intervene in politics – or at least those unwilling to intervene in the service of leftist politics.

After the crackdown, Yang Shangkun and his brother, Yang Baibing, the head of the GPD and also a member of the CMC, mobilized an extensive network of military allies to "rectify" the military. In order to insulate itself further from bourgeois liberalism, the army placed renewed emphasis on recruiting in rural areas, less tainted by spiritual pollution. The army's rectification effort was more successful than that of many civilian organizations (including Party organizations), and military sections were assigned to radio and television stations, as well as Party and government departments, to monitor political work.[478] The

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[477] There were units from every military region present – presumably to create a collective guilt that would preclude those in the regional chain of command from later distancing themselves from the event and casting blame on others. It is difficult to apportion blame for the various shooting incidents that occurred, especially on the approaches to the city where most of the killing took place. But the 27th Army Group was clearly among the most active in the operation.

[478] Lam, *China After Deng Xiaoping*, 196.

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Yang brothers increased the proportion of unit time spent on political indoctrination – which in some units reached 50 percent of all training time.

Nationally, conservatives gained momentum after the purge of the Party's liberal wing (including Zhao Ziyang and his supporters), and much of their success is attributable to the support of army leaders. By 1992, conservatives were praising the excellence of "Mao Zedong Thought," drafting policy documents calling for new restrictions on the SEZs, and rhetorically associating reform and opening with bourgeois liberalism.[479] The army was one of the most consistent critics of liberalization during this period and contributed to the revival of "Mao Zedong Thought" by promoting the study of his military theory and practice.[480] In November 1991, when Deng suggested renewing reform and seeking reconciliation with the United States, Wang Zhen challenged Deng's commitment to Marxism and accused him of fostering peaceful evolution in China.[481] Yang Shangkun ultimately proved more loyal to Deng personally, but he too balanced his praise for Deng with an equal (and sometimes stronger) advocacy of Maoist doctrine. By 1992, Deng was concerned that, even if the Yang

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[479] Even Jiang Zemin began to emphasize Mao Zedong thought in his public speeches. See, for example, Jiang Zemin, "Zai Qingzhu Zhongguo Gongchandang Chengli Qishi Zhounian Dahui de Jianghua", *Jiefangjunbao*, July 2 1991.

[480] With the move to the left, the number of mentions of "Mao Zedong thought" in Jiefangjunbao (Liberation Army Daily) increased from 31 in 1988 to 239 in 1990. For examples, see "Yang Shangkun Zhuxi Zai Shanghai Shicha Budui Shihou Qiangdiao Jiaqiang Zhengzhi Jianshe, Nuli Tigao Zhandou Li", *Jiefangjunbao*, February 2 1990. "Mao Zedong Junshi Sixiang Yiran Shi Wojun Jianshe de Zhidao Sixiang", *Jiefangjunbao*, December 26 1990.

[481] Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 336.

brothers remained loyal to him personally – a fact of which he could not be guaranteed – they might undo his legacy after his passing.[482]

The navy (1989-1992). The student demonstrations of 1989 showed how delicate this alliance between the navy and a Party intent on economic and social reform but unwilling to do so at the expense of its own authority could be. Dissent over the suppression of the student movement appears to have been particularly high in the navy in 1989. After the suppression, the navy continued to advocate reform, though more quietly than before, and in 1992-1993, it played an instrumental role in helping to regain stalled momentum for military and economic reform.

Liu Huaqing, recently promoted from navy commander to vice chairman of the CMC, did agree to the use of force. But there is little evidence of his having taken a prominent role in the decisions that led to the massacre.[483] Moreover, there were signs of dissent even at the highest levels in the navy. Li Yaowen, the navy's political commissar, was among those

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[482] Rumors had long circulated that Deng was worried about the possibility of an effective coup by the Yang brothers by 1992. Secret files of the CCP recently smuggled out of China appear to confirm that this was indeed the case. Although their authenticity cannot be guaranteed, the circumstances of their appearance and the channels through which they suggest that they are real. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, eds., *China's New Rulers: The Secret Files* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2002) 150-54.

[483] I found no discussion of the role played by the navy's commander, Zhang Lianzhong, during Tiananmen (or the position he might have taken) in any Chinese, Taiwanese, Hong Kong, or U.S. sources. Presumably, since he was not removed after the event, he signed on for the event, but he certainly did not play a major role. As CMC vice chairman, Liu Huaqing's official backing for the suppression is better documented, he does not figure prominently in any accounts. He is mentioned in ten places in the Tiananmen Papers, but nine of those are simply to record his presence at various meetings. The other vice chairman of the CMC, Yang Shangkun, appears on 134 pages of the book. One source that departs from other accounts in casting Liu Huaqing as a major actor in the event – something it explains by his close personal connection to Deng Xiaoping – is Paul Beaver and Bridget Harney, "Role of the Military in Tiananmen Square," in *China in Crisis: The Role of the Military*, ed. Jane's Informaiton Group (Coulsdon, UK: Jane's Information Group).

purged after the event for actions taken – or more likely not taken – during the troop

mobilization.[484] Taiwanese military analyst Zheng Yi claims that when Li Peng ordered the

movement of marine troops for suppression activities, Li Yaowen refused. Li, according to

this source, responded in a memo that "the marine brigades are not adequately trained, and it

would be difficult for them to cooperate with other forces involved. I am afraid that they (the

marines) would impair the operation."[485]

According to Zheng Yi, "The entire naval high command supported the student

movement. Mid-ranking and lower ranking naval officers participated in demonstrations."[486]

This last contention is supported by other analysts. Michael Swain, who conducted interviews

shortly after the Tiananmen massacre, concludes that members of the navy and air force were

particularly unhappy with the conservative government empowered by the purge.[487]

The navy's reluctance to go along with the suppression may have been partly a

product of a desire, especially strong among its junior officer corps, to see greater separation

between the military and the Party. Since the 1980s, some PLA officers had been

participating in military "solons" (unofficial – and unauthorized – discussion groups), within

which one of the major topics was the idea of turning the military into a "national army"

(*guojia jundui*), in contrast to a "Party army." The idea was, in theory, consistent with the

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[484] Zhang Liang, *The Tiananmen Papers*, 456.

[485] Zheng Yi, *Zhongguo Juntou Dianjiang Lu* (Taibei: Kaijin Wenhua Shiye Youxian Gongsi, 1995), 235.

[486] Ibid.

[487] Swain, *The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, and Beliefs*.

efforts of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, and other party liberals, all of whom

had advocated greater separation between the Party and government administrative

organizations.[488] Naval officers, air force officers, and army officers from the general staff

were, according to Hong Kong sources, particularly active in these salons.[489] The "salons"

and the discussion of a "national army" were later identified by military officials as

contributing to dissent and disobedience within the military before and during the

crackdown.[490]

After the June 4 suppression, surviving naval leaders admitted a need for more

political work and restrained their pro-reform rhetoric, but, unlike many army officers, they

did not criticize reform and opening or call for a return to Maoist values. There is no public

record of either CMC vice chairman Admiral Liu Huaqing or the navy's commander, Zhang

Lianzhong, having called for combating "bourgeois liberalization" or of their having voiced

even veiled criticism of ousted liberals from the Party's inner circle.[491] Indeed, even during

the liberal nadir in 1990-1991, Liu Huaqing continued to publicly assert that China "would

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[488] Deng Xiaoping had attempted to move the CMC, then as now a Party organ, to state control. He was blocked by conservative army officers, though they apparently allowed him to set up a second CMC with identical membership.

[489] Swain, *The Military and Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, and Beliefs*, 166.

[490] See, for example, Zheng Nianqun, "Ping 'Jundui Feizhengzhihua' de Miulun", *Jiefangjunbao*, August 14 1990.

[491] This conclusion is based on a full-text survey of Renminribao, Jiefangjunbao, on-line sources using Chinese and American search engines, and a review of major statements in naval magazines and other journals. It is, of course, impossible to know whether a wider survey would have yielded any statements critical of bourgeois liberalism.

never abandon reform and opening."[492] The same generally held throughout the navy's ranks.

During the National People's Congress meeting in March 1990, almost half of the army's

delegates attacked "bourgeois liberalization" and others criticized problems in the recent past

with the corruption of senior Party officials (i.e., Zhao Ziyang). None of the naval delegates

did likewise.[493]

When Deng Xiaoping, concerned about his legacy, emerged from retirement in 1992

for a *nanxun* (Southern tour) designed to halt the conservative tide and restart the reform

process, Liu Huaqing and the navy provided immediate and unequivocal support. Deng

sought to use the dynamic southern coastal cities as a backdrop for a series of pro-reform

addresses. But although Deng began his tour on January 15, conservatives blocked any

explicit mention of his trip in the media until mid-February. Navy propagandist Huang

Caihong, however, published an article on January 19 in *Renminribao* (People's Daily)

highlighting the navy's role in developing the coastal cities and mirroring Deng's rhetoric

about the positive connection between "reform and opening in the coastal cities" and "social

stability and development."[494]

On January 26, Liu Huaqing delivered a speech in the southernmost Military Region,

Guangzhou, saying that if China wanted to emerge strong and powerful, "then in must put

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[492] "Mengjialaguo Haijun Sanmouzhang Fanghua Liu Huaqing, Qin Jiwei, Chi Haotian Fenbie Huijian", *Renminribao*, October 6 1991.

[493] Wang Jianguo, "Jiaqiang Sixiang Jiaoyu, Weihu Wending Daju", *Jiefangjunbao*, March 24 1990.

[494] Huang Caihong, "Haijun Zhiyuan Yanhai Jingji Jianshe 10 Nian Toulao 1,500 Duowange, Chudong Jianting, Feiji Wanyu Jiaci", *Renminribao*, January 19 1992.

great energy into developing its economy; lift the nation's comprehensive national strength;

guarantee, as a critical and glorious responsibility, the orderly progress of reform and

opening; and support reform and opening by, among other things, taking real and proactive

measures to support local economies."[495] Over the next year, the public relations battle over

reform continued, and Liu Huaqing continued to provide outspoken support for reform and

opening.[496]

In late 1992, Deng brought naval officers into a series of key positions in what China

analyst Willy Wo-Lap Lam described as a strategy "to bring in the navy as a counterweight to

the army."[497] During the preceding year, one of Deng's greatest concerns was the role that

the military might play after his death in blocking reforms or threatening the position of his

designated successor, Jiang Zemin. He was particularly worried about the power base that

generals Yang Shangkun (the first vice chairman of the CMC) and Yang Baibing (the head of

the GPD) had developed within the military. During the November 1992 Party Congress,

Deng removed both from the CMC. In a move that most China-watchers agreed was an effort

to shelter Jiang from military attack, Deng appointed the navy's Liu Huaqing as the CMC's

new first vice chairman and made him a member of the Politburo Standing Committee.[498]

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[495] Zheng Guolian, "Liu Huaqing Zai Guangzhou Junqu Yige Huiyishang Qiangdiao Zou Jingbing Zhi Lu Yao Zhuzhong Zhiliang Jianshe", *Renminribao*, January 27 1992.

[496] See, for example, "Jundui Renda Daibiao Liu Huaqing Zai Fenzu Huishang Fayan Zhichu: Zhichi Baowei Gaige Kaifang Jiasu Wojun Zhiliang Jianshe", *Renminribao*, March 26 1992. Wang Yuwen, "Liu Huaqing Sanjia Jiefangjun Daibiaotuan Taolun Shi Qiangdiao: Anjiao Deng Xiaoping Xinshiqi Jundui Jianshe de Sixiang, Jianshe Qiangda de Xiandaihua Zhengguihua Geming Jundui", *Renminribao*, October 16 1992.

[497] Lam, *China After Deng Xiaoping*, 221.

[498] Mitsubishi Sogo Kenkyujo Hen, *Chugoku Saiko Shidosha, 1996 Nenban*, 269-71. Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 367.

Significantly, the appointment of the seventy-six year old Liu ran counter to Deng's policy of selecting younger individuals for key posts – a policy he had emphasized in countless public speeches. He also secured the appointment of six naval officers as full or alternate members of the party's Central Committee – more than from any other military service.[499]

EXPLAINING ARMY-NAVY DIFFERENCES

What explains the consistent difference in outlook between the two services? In chapter 3, I suggested that several interrelated characteristics related to functional and material interests, as well as derivative socialized biases, drive differences in the services' domestic outlooks. Those characteristics include: the technological and industrial, as opposed to human, capital inputs required by each; consequent differences in officer and enlisted recruiting, as well as the relationship between officers and men; the location and type of basing; and the degree and nature of foreign contact.

There is evidence in the Chinese case that differences in each of these areas existed and that they had a critical role in determining the positions taken by each service. Some of these – including the connection between capital content and basing location on the one hand the services positions on the other – have already been treated in the preceding narrative at some length, and are treated only briefly here. Others, especially manpower and social issues, are dealt with in more detail.

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[499] Lam, *China After Deng Xiaoping*, 221.

CAPITAL CONTENT AND BASING LOCATION. Since the establishment of the PLAN in 1950, its leadership has stressed the navy's status within the military as a high-tech organization. Naval commander Shi Yunsheng's 1997 observation was typical: "A modern warship is a floating science city or a miniature replica of a modern industrial and technological strength of the nation."[500] The Chinese navy openly acknowledges that reform and opening, and the ability to purchase foreign hardware and technology, have been instrumental in enabling them to strengthen their capabilities. An article on the development of frigates, for example, states that little progress was made on rectifying serious deficiencies in air defense capabilities from the mid-1960s to the late 1970s. But "since China implemented its opening policies during the 1980s," the article continues, "the shipbuilding industry has been able to import foreign naval weapons and electronic systems," as well as "raise its own scientific and technological standards."[501] In 1984 Liu Huaqing argued that reform and opening would "strengthen the scientific and technological level of the nation," and establish "a strong foundation for naval building," – an argument that has since been echoed by all subsequent PLAN commanders.[502]

RECRUITMENT AND SOCIAL ISSUES. Different recruiting patterns have been driven by the technological requirements of each service (as well as geographic considerations), but the implications of this derivative issue are large enough to warrant separate consideration.

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[500] Huang Caihong, "Jianfu qi Kuashiji Hancheng de Zhongren", *Jianchuan Zhishi*, March 6 1997.

[501] "Zhongguo Huweijian Guanjian Jishu Yanjiu," *Jianchuan Zhishi*, December 6 1997.

[502] Du Zhongwei *et al.*, "Haiyang, Haijun, Xinjishu Geming -- Fang Haijun Silingyuan Liu Huaqing". Huang Caihong, "Jianfu qi Kuashiji Hancheng de Zhongren".

Reform and opening has had a massive impact on Chinese society, but its effects have been

uneven across geographical, occupational, and, increasingly, class lines. Given that the

services recruit from different segments of the population, then, it is understandable that each

has been effected by – and sees – social change differently.

With the exception of targeted recruiting for technical positions, recruiting (i.e.,

conscription) is done locally in China. Army personnel have been overwhelmingly drawn

from the rural population. The navy tends to recruit from wealthier, urbanized coastal areas.

Reform and opening has brought more investment and faster growth to the coastal areas than

it has to interior regions.[503] The GDP per capita of the inland provinces, 56% that of the

coastal provinces in 1983, fell to 40% by 1999.[504] Education and other social services, which

had previously been provided largely by now ailing state owned firms and agricultural

communes, have deteriorated in many interior provinces. Along the coast, the provinces'

rising revenues have bettered positioned them to pick up the slack or improve services.

Given the discrepancies in the bases from which they draw, it is not surprising that the

two services frequently described two different realities in their recruiting. During the 1980s,

army officers in many units complained of rising illiteracy, while naval officers heralded an

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[503] The coastal city of Shanghai (population 16 million), for example, attracted 110 times as much foreign investment as the inland province of Guizhou (population 36 million) between 1978 and 1999. For the investment figure, see Dexter Roberts, "China's Wealth Gap," *Business Week*, May 8 2000. On differential growth rates, see Economist Intelligence Unit, "Country Profile: China 2003," (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003). Chuan Hwee and John G. Bauer, *The Income Distribution of China: Regional Disparities* [http://www.ntu.edu.sg/nbs/publications/regional_issues_in_economics/08-chy96.pdf] ([cited August 2 2003]).

[504] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 4, 2000.

increase in educational levels and standards of recruits.[505] Army leaders have also

complained more of the difficulty of leading their new "city soldiers" than have naval

officers, perhaps because more of these officers hail from coastal cities and perhaps because

the navy's sailors have always been drawn largely from urban areas.[506]

A second major difference in manning is that naval enlistments are also longer than

those of the army, and the navy can recruit selectively for many positions. Up until 1999,

naval (and air force) conscription had been for four years, while that of the army was three.

After 1999, standard two-year terms were established, but the navy continued to enlist sailors

for three or four years if the individual was assigned a position that required technical training

courses at the start of the enlistment period.[507] The navy also uses relatively more long-

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[505] A thorough survey by two army officers from the Jinan military region between 1986 and 1988 reported educational standards declined in their region. At the time of the survey, some 15 percent of all soldiers were functionally illiterate and could not write a letter home. Su Zhenshui Tang Mingcheng, "Zhanshi Wenhua Shuiping Bugao", *Jiefangjunbao*, December 24 1988. Officers from the Nanjing region also reported similar findings, observing that over the last few years the problem of illiteracy had "reemerged" in their ranks. In one tank unit, which should have been better off then infantry units, 4 percent were said to be illiterate. Yang Xu Li Changsen, "Mou Tanke Shi de Diaocha Biaoming Bingyuan Wenhua Suzhi Xiajiang Yingxiang Jiaoyu Shunlian", *Jiefangjunbao*, August 24 1988.

[506] Both services saw an increase in the number of urban soldiers conscripted into the force. In the army, a vigorous discussion of the supposed disciplinary problems caused by the induction of city soldiers followed, and by all accounts, the increase in city soldiers appears to have increased tensions within units. See, for example, "Yifen Changle Fandiao de Diaocha", *Jiefangjunbao*, July 8 1986. But several articles by political officers, appearing in the military's *Jiefangjunbao*, observed that much of the problem may have lay in the unwillingness or inability of some officers, many of whom themselves had only rudimentary education and were accustomed to absolute control over their villager soldiers, to adjust their treatment of their new urban charges. Yang Yuzhen, "'Bing Nandai' de Shi yu Fei", *Jiefangjunbao*, December 18 1988. Zhang Zuowu Xiong Xuehui, "Qing Paoqi Dui Chengshi Bing de Pianjian", *Jiefangjunbao*, January 9 1987. With a more urbanized officer corps and more professionals in the enlisted ranks (see text below), these problems had less impact on the navy. The one exception was during the period immediately after the Tiananmen square massacre, when the navy faced significant disciplinary problems.

[507] Bernard D. Cole, *The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century* (Anapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 116.

service "volunteers" than the army. Volunteers, selected from among conscripted applicants,

serve long terms (up to twenty years) at significantly higher rates of pay than basic

conscripts.[508] While only between five and ten percent of army personnel at the division level

are volunteers, some thirty percent of naval enlisted come from the same source, with a higher

percentage onboard submarines and advanced destroyers.[509]

The services' attempts to integrate long-service volunteers into their ranks offer

insights into the interests and values of each. Integration in the army was anything but

smooth, especially during the late 1980s but also more recently. Long-service soldiers were

not spread throughout the force, and there appears to have been little attempt to turn them into

a de facto NCO corps. Rather, they were grouped in support units, such as transportation

battalions (serving in those cases in maintenance and driving capacities). Their officers

commonly complained of their having an "iron rice bowl" mentality, with little motivation to

work hard. One division took the radical step of mass punishment: canceling the volunteer

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[508] During the late 1980s, volunteer pay was about fifteen times higher than that of conscript pay and several times higher than average rural wages, making this a lucrative career choice for many.

[509] These numbers are estimates. A junior army officer suggested the number of volunteers in the ground force at about 4-5 percent of the total. (Interview, 5.28.98) The high end of this estimate was derived from "a certain division near Beijing," which was said to have slightly over 1000 volunteers, or about 9 percent of its total strength. Wang Wuzhang Li Futian, "Mou Shi Qianyu Zhiyuanbing Zhengque Duidai Ping Junxian", *Jiefangjunbao*, September 9 1988. The Beijing division (probably part of the elite 38th Army) may well have had access to a higher number of volunteers than average divisions. The range cited above is also consistent with anecdotal evidence from several other Jiefangjunbao articles. (See July 27 1990, August 5 1994, November 11 1993, and November 21 1993.) Figures on volunteers in the navy are from discussions with current and retired naval officers. On the submarine force, one detachment granted long-service volunteer contracts to 84 individuals in the course of three years – a rate that would yield significantly more volunteers than the estimated 30 percent above. Yang Weicheng, "Buzhuli, Buxunsi, Buteshu: Haijun Mou Bu Dangwei Lianjie Qinzheng Ju Juxin", *Jiefangjunbao*, November 11 1993. The International Institute for Strategic Studies reported in 2001 that in the Chinese army, 800,000 of 1,700,000 personnel (or 47%) were conscripted; in the navy, the figure given was 40,000 of 220,000 (or 18%). While it is not clear how IISS calculated its figures, and the percentages are different than my own estimates, the difference between the services is similar to my own calculations – especially if one were to take officers out of the equation.

status of thirty-two volunteers in a single subordinate unit and returning them to the

conscripted ranks for punishment.[510] The army now appears to have come to understand, in

theory, the need for a professional NCO corps, but it is less clear if it can and will take those

steps necessary to put one in place.[511]

The navy welcomed long-service volunteers from the start. Volunteers are spread

throughout the organization and tend to assume leadership and training roles similar to those

performed by NCO's in Western militaries.[512] Naval officers appear to have been more

secure in their authority than their army colleagues. At the same time, by providing an

additional layer of supervision between conscripted sailors and officers, the NCO corps

further insulates naval officers from direct exposure to whatever negative social effects might

have resulted from economic reform. The relative ease of moving into the long-service ranks

also gives conscripted sailors a greater sense of investment in their training. According to one

account, "entering the Party, going to schools, being decorated, and making the transition to

long-service volunteer are regarded as natural and expected events."[513] In contrast, the more

limited expansion of volunteer service in the army caused a significant increase in unit-level

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[510] Cao Chengfa, "Mou Shi 32 Ming Zhiyuanbing Bei Tingxin Dang Zhanshi", *Jiefangjunbao*, May 10 1988. As in the case of dealing with urban soldiers, however, political commissars suggested that faults in volunteer performance frequently lay more with the inability of officers to deal well with the added pressure of handling professional soldiers on a more equal status as themselves. See, for example, Yi Ruiin, "Zhongshi Jiejue Zhiyuanbing Guanlishang de Xin Wenti", *Jiefangjunbao*, September 6 1984.

[511] See David M. Finkelstein, *Looking for the People in the People's Liberation Army: Who is G.I. Zhou* (2000 [cited August 4 2003]); available from http://www.ndu.edu/inss/China_Center/CMA_Conf_Oct00/paper2.htm.

[512] See, for example, Chen Shungen, "Er Wu San Qianting Junshizhang Quanbu You Zhiyuanbing Danren", *Jiefangjunbao*, January 24 1983.

[513] Yang Yaoxin, "Xhuixia Jianbing", *Renminribao*, May 15 1993.

graft. Peasant conscripts routinely brought money – sometimes a year's worth of income or

more from their families – to bribe junior officers charged with recommending candidates.[514]

For the navy, military reforms that went hand-in-hand with the general monetization

of the economy offered new avenues for obtaining a skilled, professional manpower base, and

the improvement in educational standards in coastal areas enabled them to draw from a better

pool of talent. The army, on the other hand, saw mixed effects on the technical qualities of its

recruiting base and was concerned with the negative effects of free market economics on

discipline within its ranks. Both of the services appealed to these very different realities in

their political statements and positions.

FOREIGN CONTACT. Chinese naval officers and enlisted personnel had and continue to

have more contact with the outside world than do army officers. The contrast is especially true at the

more junior levels. According to a 1991 Chinese report, a single naval base (the Wusong base

in Shanghai) had received 20,000 foreign military visitors from 70 different countries over the

course of thirty years.[515] In contrast, most Chinese army bases have little or no contact with

foreigners. In addition to receiving incoming port calls, PLAN ships now routinely make port

calls around East Asia and occasionally beyond (e.g., along the east coast of Africa and west

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[514] Gao Lihai, "Qing Zhanshi Jiazhang Buyao Gei Ganbu Ji Qian Ji Wu", *Jiefangjunbao*, April 16 1992. Li Jiangmao, "Jie Zhuan Zhiyuanbing Zhi Ji Shoushou Huilu, Yingzhang Yang Gongyou Bei Panxing", *Jiefangjunbao*, February 11 1991.

[515] Guo Yijiang, "Wusong Jungang: Haijun de Chuankou Youyi de Menhu", *Jiefangjunbao*, April 8 1991.

coast of North and South America), giving officers and sailors alike to mix with their

counterparts in a variety of settings.[516]

This contact has given the navy and its officers and men a better appreciation of

China's relative backwardness and the necessity of importing foreign equipment and ideas, as

well as a more general appreciation of foreign perceptions and cultures. Even the navy's

official propaganda often portrays the United States more as a big brother or model from

which to learn than as an immediate rival.[517] (The period immediately following the bombing

of China's Belgrade embassy was an exception to this general rule.) An article about life in a

destroyer detachment describes an "English language corner," established by the chief of an

electrical section on board one of the ships.[518] And the navy does publicize its overseas

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[516] According to China's 1998 Defense *White Paper*, the PLAN had made port calls in twenty countries over the last nineteen years. Two fleet visit between March and May 1997 brought Chinese naval ships to the United States, Mexico, Chile, Peru, Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia.

[517] A reflection of this attitude can be found in Hai Zhi Hun (the spirit of the sea), a 1997 novel that was made into a feature length film and television series in 1998. Within the story, the prize possession of the hero, a naval ship captain working to master the computer skills necessary for success in the modern navy, is a cigarette lighter given to him by a U.S. naval officer during a fleet visit. Scenes portraying the visit itself leave no doubt about the American navy's superiority in size and quality but was, in no way, portrayed as menacing or ugly. Similarly, an unbridled admiration for U.S. technology is also on display in most issues of Jianchuan Zhishi (Naval and merchant ships), the most official public naval magazine in China. A distinctive change in attitude is visible after the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, but even now, the prevailing attitude appears to be that much remains to be learned, and the United States navy is the best model to study. Some analysts have put a more competitive spin on these facts, suggesting that the PLAN's study of the U.S. navy is typical of any navy studying its primary threat, but the preponderance of articles on U.S. subjects do not approach their subject in that spirit – or even provide details on vulnerabilities that one might expect to find if that were the purpose.

[518] Chen Wanjun and Zhang Zhao, "Weile Sandai Lingdaoren de Zhutuo: Mou Haijun Quzhujian Zhidui Xiandaihua Jianshe Jishu", *Renminribao*, April 20 1997.

"diplomacy" – port calls, etc. – in ways that project both a positive image of engagement and opening and the navy's role in that process.[519]

STRATEGIC CHANGE

The navy did better than any other service or branch during the 1980s, the first decade of reform and opening. During the 1990s, the navy continued to thrive, though given the expansion of the defense budget in general during that period, it is more difficult to gauge the expansion of naval resources relative to those of other military organizations. By the late 1990s, the rising prominence of the mainland-Taiwan dispute – a phenomenon that was itself largely caused by conservative senior army officers – justified the need for a more balanced force structure compared to one designed for more distant South China Sea contingencies.

NAVALIST PRIORITIES, 1980-1989. Early efforts to modernize and open China's economy required funds – to, for example, import new steel technology – and the state was quickly running substantial budget deficits. In part to free funds for other purposes and in part over frustrations with the political direction of the army, Deng dropped military modernization from third place to fourth place in the list of the "four modernizations" in 1980.[520] He suggested that any significant expansion of funds for that purpose might have to

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[519] See, for example, "Shouci Hengdu Taipingyang Di Meiguo Bentu Shengdiege Fangwen: Wo Haijun Jianting Biandui Shoudao Rilie Huanying", *Jiefangjunbao*, March 23 1997.

[520] Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping*, 88. The four modernizations included the modernization of (1) agriculture, (2) industry, (3) national defense, and (4) science and technology. The term was first used by Zhou Enlai in 1964 but was quickly dropped at that time. Zhou used it again in 1975, and it was adopted as a guiding objective by the third plenum of the eleventh Party Congress in 1978. In 1980, Deng reversed the order of the third and fourth modernization.

wait until the turn of the century. Deng then cut the budget by 13 percent in 1980. Although

Deng's initial reduction in military spending might be attributable to an adjustment after the

1979 Sino-Vietnamese war, reductions continued throughout the 1980s, ultimately bringing

spending down 21 percent during the decade. While Deng encouraged the military to engage

in business to make up for shortfalls, it is doubtful that these ventures ever contributed much

if anything to procurement or operations budgets, but rather served primarily to provide

sustenance and employment to soldiers who were effectively removed from real military

service.[521]

While Chinese sources do not break down the military budget by service, most

indicators suggests that the navy fared far better than the army during this period of military

austerity. Indeed, while overall military budgets fell, the aggregate tonnage of major surface

warships increased by 86 percent during the decade. Foreign currency was made available for

new imported weapons systems. French Crotale SAM systems and their associated radar

systems (Castor—IIJ fire control systems) were, for example, retrofitted on existing ships and

ship frames. Imported and license-produced French Dauphin helicopters were added to the

onboard inventory, significantly increasing at-sea aerial capabilities. An entirely new class of

destroyer, the Luhu, designed and built around imported General Electric engines, provided a

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[521] According to the General Logistics Department, profits from PLA enterprises during the mid-1990s were $600-700 million. Foreign estimates put the number several times that high. David Shambaugh, who offers perhaps the most detailed assessment of the question, concludes that the "vast majority" of that money remained with the enterprises, rather than going to the operation and maintenance of operational units. The primary function was to offset the hardships to personnel caused by shrinking military budgets and the monetization of the economy. Shambaugh, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*, 200-01.

significantly larger and faster platform than anything previously fielded.[522] The Luhu also included, for the first time, an integrated tactical command center imported from France.

Organizational changes in the navy's structure accompanied the material development of the force and the new willingness to import technology. Shortly after assuming command of the force in 1982, Liu Huaqing set about recentralizing and revitalizing the force.[523] In 1983 he created the Navy Equipment Assessment Research Center (Haijun Zhuangbei Lunzheng Yanjiu Zhongxin), bringing together eighteen different research organizations from various components of the navy and substantially strengthening overall design and development capabilities.[524] Nor was the new organization simply a consolidation of existing units; the center hired new talent (including a variety of individuals with Ph.D.s from top universities) and became a premier modern research and development center. A history of the organization by one of its members suggests that the navy's development was resented by other elements of the military:

> "At the time this [the Center's creation] took place, the whole military was undergoing reduction and revitalization. Some asked 'why should they be being upgraded, while everyone else is being downgraded or eliminated. But this development was in fact totally in keeping with the scientific trend in army building."[525]

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[522] Although not commissioned until the early 1990s, the Luhu class was designed during the early 1980s and the first two units ordered in 1985. After 1989 and the US embargo on military-use or dual-use equipment, no subsequent units were ordered.

[523] Like other Chinese military organizations, the navy had been decentralized during the Cultural Revolution, and the naval headquarters had lost much of its ability to integrate disparate functions of the force.

[524] The official Chinese naval encyclopedia translates the center as simply the "Naval Research Center." Zhongguo Jiefangjun Haijun (PLAN), *Zhongguo Haijun Baike Quanshu*, 682.

[525] Cai Xiaohong, "You Zheyang Yige 'Sixiangku'", *Jiefangjunbao*, July 8 1985.

Although the army and air force also managed to import equipment and design new systems during the 1980s, neither gained nearly as much as the navy in terms of budgets for these systems or derivative capabilities. In the case of the air force, the much higher requirement for subsystem integration and integrated design prevented it from capitalizing on access to foreign technology.[526] In the case of the army, only limited funds were made available for increased production to equip the newly designated rapid reaction forces.

NAVAL EXPANSION, 1990-2003. In some ways, the navy reached peak influence during the 1990s. Liu Huaqing acceded to 1st vice chairman of the CMC in 1992. In the same year, a record number of naval officers were appointed to the Central Committee. Design work began in the mid-1990s on the Luhai, a 6,600-ton destroyer that was one third larger than anything then in the inventory, and in 1996 the navy signed a contract to purchase two 8,500-ton Sovremenny-class destroyers from Russia. Both the first Luhai and the first Sovremenny were commissioned into the operational forces in 2000.[527]

But while the navy continued to expand throughout the 1990s, this expansion took place against the backdrop of a major expansion of the overall defense budget, and navy's relative position may in fact have slipped during the decade. Between 1980 and 1990, Chinese defense budgets declined by 21 percent, but naval tonnage increased by 86 percent (or 55,600 tons); between 1990 and 2000, defense budgets grew by 91 percent, while naval

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[526] On the difficulties faced by the PLAAF in integrating technologies acquired from foreign sources, see Kenneth W. Allen, Glenn Krumel, and Jonathan D. Pollack, *China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1995).

[527] China ordered two more Sovremenny-class destroyers in January 2002.

tonnage increased by only 33 percent (or 39,800 tons). Quality of design and equipment improved, but new domestically produced destroyers have been built only in very small numbers, in part because of the diversion of resources to import warships from Russia.

Another change during the mid-1990s, obscured to some extent by an expanding fleet but nevertheless both significant and clear on close examination, was the relative shift in emphasis away from the sea control forces favored by most naval officers to sea denial forces. The shift was manifested most clearly in the quashing of naval hopes for the early acquisition of an aircraft carrier and the purchase instead of a small fleet of Russian Kilo submarines. In 1985 Liu Huaqing ordered the establishment of a warship captain's course for pilots, and the academy's president spoke about both the likelihood of building carriers and the need to prepare ship captains ahead of time.[528] By the early and mid-1990s, Chinese naval magazines and newspapers, especially naval ones, were filled with stories about China's need for aircraft carriers and optimism about the prospects.[529]

In the late 1990s, however, the Central Military Commission apparently ruled against the acquisition of an aircraft carrier, at least in the short term, and urged the navy to pursue submarines instead, producing a relative shift in thinking from power projection to a doctrine

[528] You Ji, *The Armed Forces of China* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), 195.

[529] The pages of *Jianchuan Zhishi* (Naval and Merchant Ships, the navy's most official outlet for ideas) were filled with full color spreads of aircraft carriers, as well as articles assessing the relative merits of different types of designs. According to one analyst, there were more than 55 articles in that magazine devoted to aircraft carriers. Huang Caihong, *Hangkong Mujian [Aircraft carriers]* 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-0630.

of denial.[530] An increasing number of military commentaries began to highlight the need for weapons systems appropriate to China's developmental level, some making the observation that lifecycle maintenance costs on most naval systems are many times the already considerable purchase or production price.[531] After starting to modernize its submarine force in 1994, with the purchase of its first two kilo submarines (delivered in 1995), the PLAN set about negotiating for a larger force later in the decade. After several years of negotiations, it ordered eight additional kilos in 2002, bringing its total orders to a dozen.

The navy may not be happy with this shift in emphasis. *Jianchuan Zhishi* (*Naval and Merchant Ships*), the closest thing to an official PLAN magazine, has published the results of several on-line debates about the wisdom of a submarine-based denial strategy and the relative merits of submarines and aircraft carriers.[532] Many of the contributors, published openly as reader commentary, have been highly critical of the shift in emphasis. There is little doubt that the navy's budget is still increasing. Nevertheless, the navy appears to have lost a clear edge in setting doctrine and defining its own force structure, and it is not clear whether its access to resources is growing faster than that of the other services.

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[530] This was more likely a series of debates and decisions about individual choices that coalesced into a more general set of opinions about priorities. The tenor of the debate began to shift some time in 1997.

[531] Gao Chunxiang, "Establish a Scientific View on the Strengths and Weaknesses of Weapons", *Jiefangjunbao*, December 5 2000, in FBIS-CPP-2000-1205.

[532] See, for example, "Wangluo Kuaidi: Tan Hangmu, Lun Guoqing" [Internet dispatches: discussion of aircraft carriers, the national economic situation], *Jianchuan Zhishi*, September 2000, pp. 11-12.

SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY

The civil-military coalition theory explains much, though not everything, about the positions of the services since the end of the Cultural Revolution, as well as about changes in force structure.

Inter-service differences and intra-service differences (especially within the army) were particularly pronounced during the first decade and a half of this period (roughly 1976 to 1992). The army was deeply divided. Although individual positions depended on a variety of factors, infantry officers in the military regions and the General Political Department tended to be more conservative (i.e., integral nationalist) than technical officers from, for example, the armored branch or the General Staff Department. Despite divisions, however, the army was, on balance, significantly more conservative than the navy.[533] Army officers, working with like-minded civilians, represented a significant and multifaceted threat to Deng's reform agenda. The navy proved far more loyal to Deng and his program, and Deng ultimately secured the promotion of its leaders to key military and political positions. The domestic threat perception of the central leadership became more complicated after the rise of the democracy movement in 1989, and both the technical characteristics of and political positions of the services narrowed throughout the 1990s. But differences persist and could once again become critically important to the fate of the nation should political circumstances once again change.

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[533] I would emphasize once again that these labels are used in relative terms. Many army officers at least passively supported the arrest of the Gang of Four and the end of chaos that the first stages of reform and opening brought, but later opposed any significant deepening of reform or any fundamental change in the organization of society or production.

Personnel, doctrine, and force structure decisions during this period appear to have been heavily influenced by political events and the role of the services in those events. During the 1980s, with Deng pushing reform, the navy in support, and the army pushing back, the navy's fleet and even its headquarters infrastructure grew rapidly, despite a reduction in overall military budgets. Promotion of personnel served as an important intervening mechanism. As a committed and capable backer of both Deng and his reform program, Liu Huaqing was promoted, despite his advanced age, through the senior military ranks between 1978 and 1992. And Liu, in turn, used his position to promote a navalist ideology, as well as the growth of the organization itself.

EVALUATION OF COMPETING EXPLANATIONS

STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. A variety of threat-based (or opportunity-based) arguments can and have been advanced to explain the shift in Chinese service priorities and force structure since 1976. One is that the threat of invasion and military dismemberment diminished and the threat of conflict around the periphery rose. If the strategic shift began in the late 1980s, this would be an eminently plausible explanation. But China's strategic change began during the 1970s and continued as Soviet bellicosity and military power reached new heights. A second and more persuasive strategic explanation has less to do with changes in China's threat profile and more to do with the strategic acuity of individual leaders: China's strategic dilemmas remained largely unchanged, but Deng had a

better answer about how to deal with it. But while this may help us understand some aspect

of China's evolving military strategy, it provides only a tenuous explanation for the dramatic

expansion of the PLAN, and its apparent freedom in propagating new strategic doctrine. A

third argument has less to do with threats than opportunities: China's strategic reorientation

came in response to new opportunities in the South China Sea and an increasingly severe

energy situation. This explanation accords with much of the Chinese navy's own propaganda,

but a closer look at both the timing and content of this argument demonstrate that this

explanation is highly suspect.

Invasion and subjugation or peripheral war? Shifts in China's position vis-à-vis the

superpowers provide a better explanation for strategic change after the late 1980s than they do

before that time. In June 1985 Deng announced to an expanded session of the CMC that it

was no longer necessary for China to prepare for immanent all-out nuclear war with the

Soviet Union but that the possibility of limited, local war around China's periphery could not

be ruled out.[534] By all accounts, this assessment accelerated a trend already underway in

redistributing budget share from the army to the navy.

China's 1985 reevaluation of its external environment was only the culmination of a

consistent and continuous effort begun ten years earlier. As early as 1975, he began pushing

for a reevaluation of China's external threats. In 1977 he asserted, "The international system

is positive. We can obtain some more time without war…. The Soviets have not yet made

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[534] Deng Xiaoping, *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan*, 126-29.

dispositions to execute their global strategy."[535] In 1981, he suggested that China would

enjoy a window of peace lasting "between five and ten years."[536]

This effort was as much domestically motivated as it was an objective description of

changes in China's strategic environment. Indeed, Deng maintained great continuity in his

strategic evaluations throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, even as a number of

intervening events appeared to increase the peril faced by the Chinese state: the fall of South

Vietnam to Soviet-backed North Vietnamese forces (April 1975), the expansion of the Soviet

presence in the new Vietnam (ongoing throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s), the

Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (December 1978), and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan

(December 1979).

Beijing found these developments worrisome enough to solidify its ties with the

United States, but not of sufficient concern to increase its own evaluation of the threat. In

keeping with Deng's consistent admonitions, the public discussion continued to move away

from describing the Soviet Union as an imminent or hegemonic threat. A full-text search of

the Renminribao (People's daily) shows that the number of articles discussing Soviet Union

that also included the word "hegemony" or "hegemonism" (baquan or baquanzhuyi) declined

from 48 percent in 1976 to 10 percent in 1983, and 4 percent in 1985. Declines were even

registered in 1978, 1979, and 1980 – the years before, during, and after China's war with the

Soviet-backed Vietnamese military.

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[535] Ibid., 77.

[536] *Deng Xiaoping Guanyu Xinshiqi Jundui Jianshe*, (Beijing: Zhongyang Junwei Bangongting, 1993).

By the mid-1980s there was greater objective cause for optimism in Beijing about the

strategic environment. China's strategic partnership with the United States had become

significantly closer.[537] And in March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, talking about a major

reevaluation of domestic and foreign priorities, became General Secretary of the Soviet

Communist Party.

But a review of the specialized Chinese journal literature on international relations

literature and the Soviet Union reveals that even Gorbachev's statements on domestic reform

were not taken seriously among specialists until mid-1986 and changes in Soviet international

behavior were not seen as significant until mid-1988.[538] The Soviet Union still deployed

around 50% more of its ground forces in the Far East than it did in Europe, and there were

few tangible signs of diminution in numbers or any relaxation of their posture. China clearly

appreciated U.S. technical assistance and intelligence, but it is unlikely that its leaders could

have expected the U.S. to enter a war in defense of the Chinese homeland. And most

contemporary U.S. analysts gave China little hope of resisting a determined Soviet invasion –

at least not by a conventional military defense.

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[537] James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Random House, 1988), 53-95. This interpretation would be consistent with some of Deng's statements in the 1985 meeting: "In the past, we drew a strategic line against the Soviet threat of hegemony.... But presently we are simply raising high the banner of opposing hegemony. Whoever tries to gain hegemony – that is who we will oppose." Deng Xiaoping, *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan*, 128.

[538] This assessment is shared by Stephen Goldstein. Goldstein, "Sino-Soviet Relations," 253.

The specific wording of Deng's 1985 statement on shifting strategy is revealing. Deng stated, "after the 'gang of four' was crushed, particularly after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh (CCP) Central Committee, our estimate of the international situation changed."[539] Far from referring to a specific recent change in the international environment, Deng referred to a major political event, the 1978 Plenum that solidified broad support for his reform program. The strategic reevaluation was consistent with the domestic economic and political needs of reformers, who sought to free funds for the import of new capital equipment and to confront domestic conservatives within the military. And it explains the steep drop in public discussion of Soviet hegemonism noted above, despite continuing border skirmishes with Vietnam, a Soviet client state.

Strategic (or military) acuity. A variant of the above threat-based theory sees the longstanding expressed differences between Mao and Deng on issues of threat more as a reflection of their differing views of military efficacy or, alternatively, differing views of similar international circumstances (instead of substantial change in the actual environment).

This view accords considerable importance to leadership, and it has considerable merit as an explanation for some aspects of this particular case. Certainly, Deng's consistent efforts to shift broad strategic planning assumptions are consistent with this interpretation. Deng had been – despite his status as a political officer during the Civil War – consistently more willing than Mao to back conventional force modernization as far back as the 1950s. The dismal

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[539] Deng Xiaoping, *Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan*, 126-29.

performance of Chinese forces during the 1979 war with Vietnam, to which Deng

subsequently referred in discussions of military restructuring, merely affirmed this preference.

Given that Mao's international and military assessments were transparently politically

motivated (as I have argued above and a majority of the China watching community holds),

one might argue that Deng's military reassessment, whether dated to 1975 or 1985,

represented the rationalization of Chinese strategy. Deng could easily believe that reducing

the military's size could be consistent with both improved military efficiency and the fiscal

demands of economic reform. For example, reductions would, in theory, allow him to

remove aging officers who might be less technically competent than many junior officers.[540]

Some of Deng's other policy initiatives, such as the decision to encourage military units to go

into business, are less consistent with this military logic, but might nevertheless be explained

as necessary or desirable from the broader perspective of national interest or long-term

national security.

Some aspects of Deng's military reorientation, however, are difficult to explain

without reference to domestic politics. The relative shift in resource allocation towards the

navy is perhaps the most prominent example. At a time when China was increasing security

cooperation with the United States to counter a lingering and significant Soviet threat and at a

time when China's own defense budgets were shrinking, Deng effectively took yet more

money from the ground forces to support the navy. Modernization for top priority army units

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[540] In fact, Deng was forced to rely on relatively trusted comrades from the Civil War to fill the top ranks of the military hierarchy, resulting in a continuation of the aging trend in at least the most senior ranks. It was not until the 1990s that the average age of senior officers began to drop.

lagged. And even air force spending took second place to naval modernization. China did fight a naval engagement with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands in 1974, but its naval performance in that engagement was significantly better than its ground or air performance against the same foe in 1979.

There was clearly a need to modernize the navy after the Cultural Revolution, but it is difficult to argue that that need was any greater than the need to modernize ground or air capabilities. Indeed, the logic of China's international position had not much from the 1950s, when Peng Dehuai backed a moderate expansion of the navy but reserved first priority for air, armor, and artillery assets. Then, as in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Chinese capabilities in all areas were badly outclassed. Redressing continental capability was arguably more important for guarding the nation's fundamental sovereignty. And in both eras, the continental strategy could more viably produce a war-winning capability against major attack by combining improved conventional elements with guerrilla war.

The Soviet Union could threaten Chinese sovereignty without recourse to naval war, and if it did choose to use its navy, the PLAN could not possibly build enough ships to resist: Soviet naval tonnage in the Far East alone was some around 350 percent that of Chinese tonnage during the mid-1980s, and its technology was at least two generations more advanced. It was, after all, the purchase of a handful of Soviet warships some twenty years later that was said to have given China a quantum jump in its naval capabilities.

The magnitude of military resource reallocation to the navy during the 1980s only made sense from a threat perspective if contingencies against the weaker powers of Southeast Asia were regarded as both important and likely relative to other possible military contingencies. Both the Chinese navy and outside analysts seeking to explain the PLAN's prominence after 1978 have, in fact, emphasized the new incentives that ostensibly increased the probability and importance of conflict in Southeast Asia. These rationales are examined below and found unpersuasive. The fact that these arguments could be developed and go unchallenged for many years (at least within the Chinese system) was as much a function of the navy's privileged political position during the 1980s as they are a function of any objective reality.

Energy and the South China Sea. Arguments about the rising probability of limited war in the South China Sea focus on a complex of resource needs (especially energy), new strategic opportunities in the South China Sea, and competition with relatively weaker Southeast Asian states.[541] Reform and opening and the rapid expansion of Chinese industry drove energy needs that were forecast to outstrip domestic production. (China became a net oil importer in 1993.) The South China Sea contained a potentially rich bed of these resources, and the new Law of the Sea (signed in 1982 and modified in 1994) gave island owners the right to minerals located nearby.

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[541] See, for example, Calder, *Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific.* Ji, *The Armed Forces of China,* 162.

As an explanation for China's naval-oriented strategic shift, however, this explanation

is suspect on several grounds. First, the Chinese navy only began to make the argument well

after the shift in military resource allocation had begun. Although there was some mention of

resources prior to 1986, energy did not become a major theme in the PLAN's own rhetoric

until after that date. Second, there is evidence that high estimates on energy reserves in the

area were conjured by the navy to justify its own importance and may not have been widely

believed even by Chinese energy experts.

The navy began receiving relatively more resources during the early 1980s, whereas

the discussion of resources in the South China Sea only began in earnest in November 1986.

The discussion began with a symposium on "The Development of Naval Strategy," a

conference proposed by Guo Zhenkai of the Naval Equipment Research Center and presided

over by Liu Huaqing.[542] Shortly thereafter, naval writers began to discuss the concept of

China's oceans as an extension of its "living space" (shengcun kongjian).[543] The discussion

of possible oil under the South China Sea intensified after 1988, when the PLAN held a

meeting to discuss strategic interests there. In 1989, preliminary geological surveys were

conducted by the navy-affiliated Oceanographic Bureau, and the results, it was announced,

indicated that there might be as much as 196 billion barrels of oil.[544] Yet the 1989 survey was

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[542] Cao Jinping, "Yongbao 'Haiyang Guotu' Diyi Ren", *Xiandai Jianchuan*, June 1998.

[543] Prior to 1987, the only use of this term had been in the context of Hitler's lebensraum – and not in laudatory terms. The first use of the term by naval writers was in April 1987. Xu Guangyu, "Zhiqiu Heli Sanwei Zhanlue Bianjiang", *Jiefangjunbao*, April 3 1987. Thereafter, the use of the term in its original World War II context disappeared from military sources.

[544] On this estimate, announced December 24, 1989, see John W. Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests," *The China Quarterly* 132 (1992): 1015.

cursory at best, and its estimate, seventeen times as much as the only previous survey estimate

(made by the Soviet Union), was suspiciously high. Indeed, in 1984 PLAN commander Liu

Huaqing had cited an estimate of 8 billion barrels.[545]

The later, higher estimates are doubted by energy experts, and they must be seen in the

context of the navy's larger public relations effort. Liu Huaqing has been described as a

Chinese Mahan.[546] His role was, however, closer to that of the Soviet Union's Sergei

Gorshkov – i.e., the organizer and promoter of the fleet, rather than as an operations or even

strategic theoretician. As such, he sponsored the creation of new research centers that

functioned as public relations and propaganda arms. These included the Science and

Technology Information Center (Keji Qingbao Shi) established in the Naval Equipment

Assessment Research Center in 1983, and the Naval Military Science Institute (Haijun Junshi

Xueshu Yanjiusuo), created in 1985 and attached to the navy commander's office.[547]

Officially, the former dealt primarily with translating foreign articles and documents on naval

affairs, while the latter focused on assessing naval doctrine. In fact, much of the work done

by both involved selling the importance of the navy to a broader Chinese audience.

The early literature on the oceans – especially the South China Sea – as China's new

lebensraum was written by researchers at these naval think-tanks, and although Western

analysts have chosen to focus primarily on the issue of energy, the literature on this subject

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[545] Du Zhongwei et al., "Haiyang, Haijun, Xinjishu Geming -- Fang Haijun Silingyuan Liu Huaqing", 8.

[546] See, for example, Jeffrey B. Goldman, "China's Mahan," *Naval Institute Proceedings* 122 (1996).

[547] The navy's encyclopedia translates the latter as the Naval Research Institute

was broader and more imaginative in its reach. Food was a primary theme. According to one frequently repeated formula, the oceans could supply one thousand times as much food as all of the world's dry land agriculture combined. Algae grown and harvested in the near oceans alone would represent a food stock twenty times as plentiful as all the wheat grown and harvested today.[548] Naval writers describe harvesting the oceans wealth in three dimensions. And while none went so far as to describe bubble cities below the oceans, there were hints in that direction: "tunnels under the ocean floor, man-made islands, ocean bridges, and ocean-top airports and cities will all become hot topics in the next century."[549]

The point of rehearsing the Chinese navy's version of *Waterworld* meets *Soilent Green* is that there no reason to believe that China's energy planners took the navy's energy arguments any more seriously than its agricultural planners took its plans for introducing algae into Chinese cuisine. Western military and strategic analysts have focused overwhelmingly on the PLAN's arguments about oil because that was the credible element to those individuals – though not to most Western oil analysts. The navy gained enough influence within the government during the late 1980s and early 1990s to make the emphasis on China's rights in the South China Sea a diplomatic priority. But as China's energy demands actually began to outstrip its own production, reaching accommodation with the Southeast Asian states began to take precedence over asserting maritime territorial claims.

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[548] Zhang Zhaozhong and Hu Jie, "Renlei Shengcun de Di'er Kongjian: Haiyang", *Jiefangjunbao*, September 15 1990.

[549] Wu Chungguang, *Taipingyangshang de Jiaoliang: Dangdai Zhongguo de Haiyang Zhanlue Wenti* (Beijing: 1998), 3.

In other words, at the exact moment that analysts who explained China's naval growth as a function of resource scarcity might have predicted maximum conflict, the navy's rhetoric was instead reined in and international cooperation increased. Although China's energy officials, like those of many other countries, hedge against uncertainty by exploring exclusive contracts with willing partners, they have tended to emphasize purchase over ownership since the beginning of reform and opening.

MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. The material interests of the services explain some parts of this case, but also present riddles about several aspects of the services' behavior.

Organizational interests do help explain the army's position during the early 1980s and the relative silence of the navy immediately after the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989. The army's opposition to Deng and his domestic programs was probably heightened by a realization, obvious to most after 1975, that Deng was intent on reducing the army's size and prerogative and by the impression that his political position was vulnerable. The muted nature of naval support for liberal reform between 1989 and 1992 may also be partly explained by the navy's consideration of its organizational interests. When Deng Xiaoping joined military and civilian conservatives in a pact to crush the democracy movement, the movement's prospects for success edged from slim to almost none, and any open naval defense of it would have simply damaged the navy's interests.

But simple calculations of material interest fail to explain much about the services'

positions since the end of the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, even the navy's position between

1989 and 1992 cannot be adequately explained without recourse to discussion of a more

deeply rooted set of preferences. With little short-term prospects for the democracy

movement's success even during its best days – or any evidence that the navy would benefit

in any tangible sense from the movement even if it did succeed – individual naval officers

nevertheless participated in the movement. And even the navy's senior leadership proved

reticent in criticizing either the students or prominent liberal political figures like Zhao

Ziyang.

The navy's early support for Deng and his program are also difficult to explain in

terms of material organizational interests. Indeed, the navy's 1984 statement of support for

reform and opening included recognition and affirmation of the need for the navy itself to

undertake belt tightening measures. Expansion of the fleet was relatively slow during the first

several years of reform, and the expansion that did occur took place as other elements of the

organization, especially shore installations and construction units, were reduced dramatically.

Historically based fears of persecution at the hands of leftist radicals almost certainly

encouraged the navy to support liberal reform. But the navy was not substantially rewarded

for its loyalty to liberalism until after its political proclivities became clear.

The army seemed similarly more dogged in opposition to reform than calculations of

its material interests might suggest. Early opposition might have been explained as a response

to force reduction plans ordered by Deng. If so, those calculations backfired when Deng

continued to win domestic battles and, exasperated by military intransigence, dropped the priority on strengthening the military from third to fourth in the list of national tasks. While this can be chalked up to miscalculation by the leaders involved, the army's continued opposition to reform after the mid-1980s raises more significant questions about why the senior leadership did not make tactical compromises with Deng in exchange for greater access to resources. Ultimately, army leaders proved far more committed to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist social, economic, and political values than did Deng, and they were not averse to taking political risks to defend their preferences.

SUMMARY. Some parts of these competing explanations can be dismissed with relative ease, while others do contribute to the fullest understanding of Chinese strategic change after 1976. Material interests explain some tactical aspects of the services' behavior, but they do not explain the services consistent political preferences during the two decades following the Cultural Revolution. And strategic change cannot be adequately understood without considering the political activities of the military services. Change did not come, or at least did not begin, in response to a fundamental change in China's strategic position. China's new leadership after the Cultural Revolution did have a very different view of military efficacy than their immediate predecessors. But even their military theories cannot fully explain the degree of emphasis placed on the navy after 1978. Rather, the navy received special treatment because, unlike the army, it fully embraced reform.[550]

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[550] This thesis uses differences between armies and navies as a lens into the larger issue of differing perspectives of all kinds of different military organizations. Although the thesis generally avoids discussion of air force involvement in politics, it is worth speculating in this case on why the navy received priority over the air force. The answer probably lies in the relatively greater cohesion of the navy after the Cultural Revolution. The air force had experienced even more contentious politics during the Cultural Revolution than had the navy, and its

Chapter Summary and Conclusions

Both Chinese cases support the theory. After the Korean War, the navy found common cause

with the relatively moderate technocrats then dominant in the Communist Party hierarchy.

The two groups shared interests in strong relations with the Soviet Union, the rehabilitation of

former Nationalists, and the stable development of industry and agriculture under a planning

system that nevertheless left some room for private production. Leftists in the Communist

Party and the PLA, who were relatively closer to the integral nationalism outlined in the

theory chapter, opposed both the technocratic management of the economy and the military

and sought both to continue the social revolution and to integrate military policy with

domestic social and economic policy. They were deeply suspicious of technocrats in the

military and considered the navy a particularly recalcitrant bastion of opposition to their

ideology.

During the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, Mao Zedong's military lieutenant, led a

sustained leftist attack on the navy's leadership, practices, and values. During 1966, the first

year of the Cultural Revolution, civilian moderates successfully defended the navy. But after

those civilians themselves came under increasingly severe attack, Lin succeeded in

establishing a shadow command within the navy comprised of leftist officers transferred

directly from the army. Senior naval officers, however, remained bitterly opposed to the

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leadership was decimated, confused, and disoriented after the experience. In the decade after 1976 it was a
significantly less useful partner to Deng than the navy, though it has since received greater attention from
political authorities. On the air force during and after the Cultural Revolution, see Allen, Krumel, and Pollack,
China's Air Force Enters the 21st Century.

leftists' agenda, and several of them played prominent roles in the arrest of the Gang of Four and the subsequent purges of the Gang's stronghold in the city of Shanghai.

Under Deng Xiaoping, the navy proved far more supportive of reform and opening than most of the army. Army leaders were highly critical of economic reforms that they argued strengthened bourgeois thinking, especially in China's rapidly developing urban areas, and damaged the position of peasants in the countryside. Even many of army's leaders who had opposed the Cultural Revolution – most of whom held technical portfolios – sought a return to the pre-1966 status quo rather than the dramatic reforms envisioned by Deng. Moral arguments, critical in Chinese power struggles, were mobilized by conservative army officers to effectively block confirmation of two of Deng's proposed successors during the 1980s.

The navy supported virtually all aspects of reform and opening. It quickly purged its ranks of leftist holdouts. Naval commanders published articles praising liberal reforms and the need for rebuilding the economy before spending additional money on the military. Deng rewarded the navy by promoting its leaders into key military and Party posts, as well as by giving the navy priority in resource allocation. The navy was torn by the 1989 democracy movement between loyalty to Deng and commitment to continued liberal reform. Naval officers were overrepresented in the military ranks of those who apparently sympathized with the movement, and the navy's political commissar refused to mobilize units for suppression duties.

CHAPTER 6: INDONESIA

Introduction

The domestic preferences of the services in Indonesia have been consistent with the predictions of the civil-military coalition theory over most of the postwar period. The navy backed liberal positions whenever there were viable liberal contenders for power, while the army supported integral nationalist positions, especially those that protected the interests and stability of the countryside. Regime change (defined by changes in domestic ideology and structure) brought decisive changes in national military strategy and force structure – changes that cannot be adequately explained by shifts in the nature or degree of threats facing the state.

This examination of military politics and grand strategy is divided into two cases:

- *Case 1 (1949-1978)*: This case examines the services' preferences during the political turmoil of the early independence period and the impact of these preferences on politics and strategy.

- *Case 2 (1978-2001)*: This case examines service positions under Suharto's integral nationalist regime and the transition to a relatively liberal political order. It focuses largely on events surrounding Suharto's overthrow and the ousting of Suharto's Golkar successor, Habibie, as well as events under President Wahid.

The civil-military coalition theory explains much of what happened during both of these periods (in terms of civil-military relations and strategic outcomes). On balance, however, it explains more in the second case than the first. During much of the earlier period, liberalism was an extremely weak force, complicating the task of observation and coding.

Nevertheless, as the theory predicts, when there were viable liberal leaders contending for power, naval leaders supported them. The army began the period divided on domestic as well as military issues but ultimately coalesced around an integral nationalist doctrine that stressed state-guided economic development and the integration of military and developmental activities. The second case, which saw resurgent liberal forces contending for power against an established integral nationalist order, provides a clearer test for the theory. As the theory predicts, the bulk of the army backed the latter (integral nationalism), while the navy supported the former (liberalism).

The two competitor theories, especially the services' material interests, help explain parts of both Indonesian cases. It is, for example, impossible to understand the navy's close relationship with Sukarno without considering its material interests. And the army's resistance to liberal reform during the late 1990s was certainly consistent with a defense of its privileges. On balance, material interests probably explain more aspects of the Indonesian military's behavior than in the other cases examined in this thesis. But even here, there are an equal number of instances in which the services acted with little apparent regard for their budgets or manpower. And there is evidence that many, if not all, officers embraced and acted according to larger principles, whether or not consistent with their services' material interests.

Case 1: From Sukarno to Suharto, 1949-1978

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF EVENTS

This case looks at civil-military politics and strategic outcomes under parliamentary rule

(1949-1957), during the rise and fall of Sukarno's 'Guided Democracy' (1959-1967), and

through Suharto's first two terms as president (1968-1978).

Under parliamentary government, the navy's Dutch-trained officer corps, together

with the handful of Dutch trained army officers, serving mostly in the army's general staff,

supported several liberal prime ministers, while other army officers, including many trained

by the Japanese during World War II, stood with socialists in opposition. As socialists came

to dominate the increasingly fractious parliament after 1953, the navy and Dutch-trained army

officers found themselves with little influence within the military hierarchy.

In 1957 Sukarno, who had been serving as a largely ceremonial president, declared

martial law and established a strong presidential system, justifying his actions primarily on

the ineffectiveness of parliament. Most officers from both the army and navy concurred. But

after Sukarno began pursuing confrontational foreign policies, many in the army began to see

his policies as a threat to the viability and success of their new civic action and development

programs. Although naval officers remained generally loyal to Sukarno, senior officers from

both the army and the navy opposed Sukarno's tilt towards communism in 1964, and after a

small group of communists civilians and military officers (from all three services) launched

an abortive revolt in 1965, the military began a pogrom that killed between 250,000 and

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1,000,000 suspected leftists. (Many Chinese and Islamists were also swept up in the purge.) After destroying Indonesian communism, the navy favored leaving Sukarno in power with restricted authority. The army, which had developed a coherent socio-economic ideology, wanted to remove Sukarno and pursue its own integral nationalist program.

Ultimately, hardline anti-Sukarno army officers led by Suharto won the day and ousted the President. Suharto became the head of state and established a developmental state that, while admitting significant room for private enterprise, nevertheless stressed equity and social stability, especially in the countryside. Notably, the end of Sukarno's confrontational policies with the Dutch and British, as well as the new focus on development, brought smaller army and naval budgets and a contraction of manpower and force structure for both. The army ultimately traded the conventional ambitions of its Dutch-trained officers for the economic and social roles preferred by its Japanese-trained officers and former militia. The navy never embraced Suharto's developmental objectives, and Suharto's never trusted the navy. He limited its strength throughout his thirty-year tenure and maintained force levels below what even his own 'total people's defense' strategy appeared to require.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Between 1949 and 1957 Indonesian politics operated under a parliamentary system within which liberal leaders vied with socialist leaders (who shared many beliefs in common with integral nationalism, as defined in chapter 3) for the direction of the state. Parliamentary liberals relatively were strong between 1949 and 1953, while the socialists dominated from 1953 to 1957. "Liberal" and "socialist" were, in the contemporary Indonesian context,

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defined in relative terms: One economic historian observed that "Espousal of socialism as the preferred pattern of economic organization had been an almost universal element in Indonesian political ideology since independence."[551]

Nevertheless, politicians associated with the moderate Islamic party, Masjumi, and the Socialist Party (or PSI) proved relatively commercially minded, and they had the opportunity to put their ideas into practice between 1949 and 1953.[552] With the backing of the Masjumi and the PSI, prime ministers Hatta (1948-1950), Natsir (1950-51), and Wilopo (1952-1953) sought to impose fiscal discipline on the government, promote incoming foreign investment, and, in the case of Natsir and Wilopo, expand the list of items that could be freely imported.[553] Despite the success of these relatively liberal leaders in the economic realm, however, socialists and populists had won the political battle by late 1953, convincing most voters that foreigners and Indonesia's own largely ethnic Chinese commercial class was responsible for the nation's continuing poverty. Parliament was dominated by a shifting landscape of socialist factions between 1953 and 1957 – none of which was able to solve or even mitigate Indonesia's continuing economic problems.

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[551] Lance Castles, "The Fate of the Private Entrepreneur," in *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia*, ed. T.K. Tan (Melbourne, Australia: The Jacaranda Press, 1967).

[552] This paragraph is based on Bruce Glassburner, "Economic Policy-Making in Indonesia, 1950-1957," in *The Economy of Indonesia: Selected Readings*, ed. Bruce Glassburner (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971). Hal Hill, *Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Indonesia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987). Bruce Grant, *Indonesia* (Carlton South, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1964).

[553] During this period relatively liberal cabinets alternated with socialist ones, with socialist prime ministers following both Hatta and Natsir. Hence, Natsir and Wilopo spent much of their time undoing policies that had been put in place by their predecessors.

In 1957 Sukarno, the former leader of the Indonesian independence movement and president from 1945 to 1967, declared martial law, and two years later he established a strong presidential system under which he took effective power. Politics under Sukarno was more stable but less democratic than it had been under his immediate parliamentary predecessors. Defining Sukarno as more or less socialist than those individuals is difficult; he was certainly more of a socialist than Hatta, Natsir, and Wilopo, but probably no more so than their successors.[554] On the one hand, he nationalized Dutch enterprises when he took Indonesia to war against Holland over the control of Irian Jaya in 1957 and did the same to British and many American businesses during his war against the creation of an independent Malaysia from 1963 to 1965. On the other hand, he introduced a series of liberalizing reform measures in 1963, establishing a consultative body of national businessmen, selling some small government enterprises to private entrepreneurs, and granting a variety of tax holidays and other tax reductions for business.

Suharto's governing ideology was integral nationalist. Setting himself apart from the Indonesian liberals, parliamentary socialists, and Sukarno, he made the consolidation of "national resilience" (i.e., cohesion and unity) his first priority. He believed in strong state leadership of the economy, but not complete state ownership. Like integral nationalists in Thailand, Suharto's believed that the government had responsibility for developing the human and material infrastructure of the countryside and that this should be a, if not the,

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[554] On Sukarno's economic policies, see T.K. Tan, ed., *Sukarno's Guided Indonesia* (Brisbane, Australia: The Jacaranda Press, 1967) especially chapters by Peter Hastings, T.K. Tan, and Lance Castles. Bruce Glassburner, ed., *The Economy of Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1971) especially chapters by J.A.C. Mackie and Ingrid Palmer and Lance Castles.

government's major priority. Although the percentage of the economy owned by the state

increased under his rule, he was less enamored of large state owned industries (other than oil)

than was Sukarno and more committed to the growth of small industries. Finally, he sought

to reorganize society and government around explicitly corporatist lines, under which

functional groups representing different economic, professional, and religious groups would

received a fixed share of seats within parliament alongside representatives elected at large.

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE SERVICES

When Indonesia achieved independence in 1949, its military officers were drawn from three

different sources: the pre-World War II Dutch-trained forces, wartime Japanese-trained units,

and laskar (militia) elements raised during World War II and the war for independence.[555]

The services drew in very different proportions from each of these groups. And each group,

whether because of differences in the social class, the type and length of their military

training, or the circumstances in which they fought, approached domestic political issues from

a different vantage.

Most of the army's highest-ranking officers from 1945 to 1953 and from 1957 to 1965

were former officers with the Dutch-trained Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL). Most of

these individuals were the sons of Indonesia's prewar aristocracy and, as such, had received

their pre-academy education through the Dutch-organized educational system. They all spoke

Dutch fluently, frequently using it among themselves, and were familiar with Western

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[555] Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press, 1982). David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984).

political, economic, and social thought. But the KNIL ground force was small (30,000), and only a small minority of its officers were Indonesian nationals.[556] Hence its officer corps could supply only a small fraction of the leaders needed to man the much larger post-independence army, which numbered some 350,000 regulars and 470,000 irregular laskar troops by 1949.

A second group of officers, and one that supplied most mid-level officers in the post-1949 army, was trained by the Japanese during World War II to lead its indigenous Defenders of the Fatherland (PETA, or Pembela Tanah Air) units. The Japanese had consciously chosen its PETA officer candidates from families that were not part of the aristocracy or pre-war Dutch establishment and were thus expected to be more loyal to their Japanese promoters. (Some, like Suharto, had been KNIL NCOs and received further training and their commissions from the Japanese; others were new recruits.) These individuals were largely drawn from small towns and villages and were generally the sons of petty administrators, clerics, or independent farmers.[557] Given the background of these officers, it is not surprising that they would later embrace the idea of remaking Indonesian society and breaking the hold of its traditional elites.

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[556] On the Dutch defense strategy and force structure for Indonesia prior to the Japanese invasion in 1941, see Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*.

[557] In addition to the works by Sundhaussen and Jenkins, see Kurasawa Aiko, *Nihon no Senryo-shita no Jawa Noson no Yenyou* (Tokyo: Soshisha, 1992). Shiraishi Takashi, *Sukaruno to Suharuto* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1997).

Finally, the leaders of militia groups, or laskar units, represented the third source of officers. These individuals tended to be bold young men of no particular social station from Indonesia's 65,000 villages, and most had only the rudimentary education. Although of low technical capabilities, this group remained a political force for a decade after the revolution. But for the most part, this group's activism was limited to a collective effort to prevent manpower cuts that would take their jobs before those of the other two groups.

What survived of the laskar in the longer term were its revolutionary traditions and legends. The revolution was, for the most part, a guerrilla war, and the army performed better than the revolution's civilian leadership, much of whom surrendered to the Dutch without a fight. Apart from its dogged resistance, the army's leaders also highlighted its close cooperation with "the people," by which they generally meant villagers who provided cover and sustenance to guerrilla bands operating in the countryside. Although the army's KNIL leadership provided much of the organizational and technical horsepower to see the revolution through to its successful conclusion, the laskar legend lived and prospered. Ultimately, that legend was inherited by, and rebounded to the benefit of, Japanese trained PETA officers, many of whom had both wartime guerrilla credentials and the skills to survive in a smaller and relatively more professional army.

The officer corps of the post-independence navy was more homogenous. The Dutch had relied primarily on naval and air power for its pre-war defense, and its Indonesian military establishment included a navy of three light cruisers, six torpedo boats, eleven

submarines, as well a variety of locally manufactured craft.[558] Neither the Japanese-trained

PETA nor the laskar forces included naval elements. Hence, from the time the time the

Republic of Indonesia's navy was mustered in August 1945, it was organized along Dutch

lines.[559] And given the large size of the pre-war Dutch colonial naval structure and the very

small size of the postwar Indonesian navy – a few small captured Japanese coastal craft in

1945 with a destroyer and four corvettes added by 1951 – graduates from the Dutch Naval

Academy and Sekolah Pelayaran Tinggi (Maritime College) could fill all important positions.

There was rivalry between the graduates of the two institutions, and officers belonging to the

former group tended to be better-trained and more professional in orientation than the latter.

But unlike the difference between the army's KNIL, PETA, and laskar officers, the

differences within the navy's officer corps, which was all KNIL, were of degrees, rather than

fundamental worldview.

SERVICE POSITIONS FROM SUKARNO TO SUHARTO, 1949-1978

The army was deeply divided throughout this period (especially before 1967). Relatively

liberal Dutch-trained army officers, led by Nasution (army chief, 1945-1953 and 1955-1962;

minister of defense, 1962-1965), were pitted against Japanese-trained PETA officers, who

leaned towards integral nationalist ideologies, for control of the organization's political and

military position. The navy was more unified and solidly liberal. The navy's leadership was

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[558] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*.

[559] Global Security.Org, *ALRI -- Navy of the Republic of Indonesia*
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/alri.htm, [cited October 3 2002]).

allied closely with Nasution and the army's Dutch-trained elite until the latter were purged

from the army in 1967.

PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS, 1949-1957. Prior to 1957, the army's KNIL leaders and

the navy were closely allied with relatively liberal parties (the Masjumi and PSI). Prime

ministers from or backed by these parties – including Hatta (1948-1950), Natsir (1950-1951),

and Wilopo (1952-1953) – kept the KNIL officer Nasution as the army chief of staff (a

position he had held since 1945) and lent their backing to his efforts to reduce the army's size,

give the military a more conventional orientation, and strengthen professional standards.

Hatta and Wilopo provided the modest resources necessary to gradually expand the navy,

which was led by the former KNIL naval officer and close associate of Nasution, Admiral

Subiyakto (1945-1959).

Former KNIL army and naval officers reciprocated by providing moral support for

these "liberal" leaders in parliament. This allegiance was not simply a quid pro quo

arrangement for material benefits. All of Indonesia's early liberal leaders maintained tighter

budgets, including military budgets, than did their socialist counterparts. And KNIL army

and naval officers backed Wilopo as solidly as they did Hatta and Natsir, despite the fact that

Wilopo cut the defense budget severely, from 2.6 billion rupiahs to 1.9 billion.[560]

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[560] Nasution's biographer documents that this former KNIL general's political position derived largely from his concerns about economic management. C.L.M. Penders and Ulf Sundhaussen, *Abdul Haris Nasution: A Political Biography* (St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1985). There is, unfortunately, no available record of Admiral Subiyakto's motivations.

In contrast to the military's KNIL officers, former PETA and laskar army officers joined traditional Muslim parties and the PKI in attacking the early liberals, especially Natsir and Wilopo, as being too "pro-Western." Their most senior representatives also publicly criticized Nasution for abandoning the military's revolutionary guerrilla tradition in his zeal to create a professional conventional force.[561] With Nasution having reduced the army's size from 350,000 in 1949 to 200,000 in 1953, and given his efforts in 1953 to reduce its size further to 120,000, job security for many in this group was also clearly a consideration.

Nevertheless, criticism was heard from even relatively technically qualified PETA officers, many of whom had made efforts to continue their military education and whose positions were not under threat. These PETA officers continued to advocate people's war -- and military civic action programs – long after the KNIL officers were purged from the force, the size of the force stabilized, and their own positions secured. In other words, they appeared to be sincerely attached to an unconventional military doctrine based on the unity of the military and the people, especially the nation's peasant base. Whatever their motivation – and they were probably mixed – military and civilian leftist criticism forced Wilopo from office and ushered in a new era of socialist politics.

The army's KNIL officers and the navy opposed the agenda established by Indonesia's the new brand of politicians between 1953 and 1957, but they had few resources with which to work. PETA officers were appointed to senior army positions – though

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[561] Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics. 1945-1967*.

Nasution, after having been retired in 1953, returned as the army's chief of staff in 1955. And the navy remained, despite some modest expansion immediately after independence, weak in both manpower and capabilities. It was primarily the internal divisions among parliamentary socialists, as well as their inability to manage the economy, that made them vulnerable to Sukarno's bid for less restricted presidential power.

THE SERVICES AND SUKARNO, 1957-1967. The fact that Sukarno, his immediate predecessors, and his successor (Suharto) were all more integral nationalist than liberal complicates the task of coding services preferences during this period. Nevertheless, Sukarno differed from his predecessors and his successor in several important dimensions. The services' responses to specific aspects of Sukarno's rule do provide some insight into the validity of key elements of the civil-military coalition theory. Army officers coalesced during this period around an ideology that placed the welfare and stability of the countryside above all else, while the navy demonstrated more concern in this case with parochial interests and, after 1965, with a defense of civilian political rule against an alternative model of military-led economic and social development advanced by Suharto and other army officers.

In 1957 General Nasution and Admiral Subiyatko backed President Sukarno's declaration of martial law – a move which gave Sukarno a decisive advantage in political disputes with parliament and allowed him to restore a presidential system in 1959.[562] Although Nasution had consistently warned against military dictatorship and the rise of Latin

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[562] The revolutionary government of the Republic of Indonesia had operated under a presidential constitution between 1945 and 1949, when a new parliamentary constitution was adopted. In 1959 Sukarno restored the original 1945 constitution.

American-style strongmen, both Nasution and Subiyatko placed the needs political and

economic stability above a defense of the 1949 constitution.[563]

But despite the temporary interservice unity among the most senior officers, a new

ideology was emerging among mid-level army officers in 1958 – one that would eventually

result in an open rupture between the army and navy in 1965. Revolts in western Java,

Sulawesi, and Sumatra from 1957 and 1958 strengthened the position of those army officers

who believed that the development of the countryside, especially on the outer (i.e., non-

Javanese) islands, was critical for maintaining Indonesia's cohesion.[564] Nasution and his

KNIL subordinates shared the concerns of their PETA colleagues about resource allocation,

development, and stability in the outer islands. But while the former clung to the idea of

simultaneously developing conventional and guerrilla force structures and doctrines, a group

of rising stars among the army's PETA officers turned their full attention to formulating

unconventional doctrines that would integrate developmental and defense objectives. The

intellectual leader of this group was Suwarto, an officer who had experience fighting Muslim

rebels in Western Java and whose ideas heavily influenced the thinking of other senior PETA

officers, including Yani (army chief of staff, 1962-1965) and Suharto (a lieutenant general

and commander of the strategic reserve, 1962-1965). Suwarto, serving as deputy commander

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[563] Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. There were seventeen cabinets, one every ten months, between 1948 and 1958. And there were, at one point, forty-three political parties simultaneously in existence. Grant, *Indonesia*, 39.

[564] There were two major insurgencies. One was the Darul Islam revolt, aimed at establishing an Islamic state and centered in West Java, Aceh (in northern Sumatra), and South Sulawesi. The second was the Permesta rebellion (sometimes called the PRRI rebellion), which sought to maintain a federated system against Sukarno's efforts at centralization and was centered primarily on Sulawesi and Sumatra. The Darul Islam revolt proved the more difficult to suppress.

of SESKOAD, the Army Staff and Command School, designed the army's civic action program in 1961, and his belief in integrating the army and society down to the village level later served as the basis for the army's doctrine of "total people's defense."

The emergence of this integral nationalist ideology led the army, especially Suwarto and the adherents to his ideas, into increasingly bitter conflict with Sukarno. After Indonesia gained its independence, the Dutch had held on to control of mineral-rich Irian Jaya, and in 1960, the president launched a war to recover that territory. After the successful conclusion of that conflict in 1962, an emboldened Sukarno went to war in 1963 with Britain, Australia, and Malaysia to incorporate Malaysia, which had just gained its independence from Britain, into the Republic of Indonesia. Despite the fact that war swelled military budgets and the size and influence of the army, Suwarto and a majority of army officers strongly opposed these conflicts since they diverted national resources away from domestic tasks and army resources away from civic action. During the Malaysian war, the army's leadership obstructed an aggressive prosecution of the war.[565] Most army officers also saw Sukarno's increasingly close relationship with the PKI after 1964, a move that was largely motivated by the need to balance army opposition, as a threat to stability in the provinces. Nasution (then defense minister) was viewed as too pro-Sukarno by most PETA officers despite the fact that his efforts to represent the army's position led Sukarno to view him as disloyal and potentially

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[565] For the most part, the army simply refused to fight. The senior command also opened a secret liaison with their Malaysian counterparts to ensure that few operations resulted in actual combat. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*, 173. Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978), 69-75.

dangerous. Caught in the middle, he and his fellow KNIL officers were increasingly marginalized.

The navy, on balance, moved in the opposite direction – towards stronger support for Sukarno – between 1957 and 1964. The president's confrontational foreign policies and his largesse towards the military benefited the navy significantly. In 1959 a group of relatively young former Dutch marine officers (i.e., graduates of the Dutch Maritime College, as opposed to Dutch Naval Academy), led by Rear Admiral Martadinata, maneuvered the cautious Admiral Subiyakto (a Dutch Naval Academy graduate) out of his position as naval chief of staff.[566] The navy's new leadership worked closely with Nasution on questions of force structure and planning, but unlike the army's leaders, they vigorously pursued military operations against Dutch Irian Jaya and Malaysia. By 1964, some junior naval officers were demanding openly that the navy distance itself from Nasution, whom they regarded as an anti-Sukarno figure.[567]

But while the navy supported Sukarno, its leadership nevertheless agreed with that of the army in its anti-communism, and as Sukarno turned towards the PKI in 1964, naval officers became more ambivalent about their support for the president. The PKI, for its part, actively recruited within the military, finding some adherents, mostly though not exclusively among the enlisted and junior officers in the air force, some army divisions, and the marine corps. On September 30, 1965, a group of communist civilians and military officers, led air

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[566] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 97.

[567] Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*, 190.

force elements and several battalions of army infantry in an attempt to sweep the military of anti-communists. The group claimed it acted on rumors that a group of anti-communist army officers were preparing its own coup d'etat against Sukarno. The September 30 group captured, tortured, and killed six senior army generals and called on other units to join the revolt. Ultimately, the rebellion failed. Surviving army leaders, together with the navy's commander, Martadinata, agreed on the need to rid Indonesia of its communist organizations. Between 250,000 and 1,000,000 suspected leftists were killed in the savage crackdown that followed.

Having crushed the immediate threat from the left, however, the services differed on what to do next. The navy favored leaving Sukarno in power with restricted authority. Some in the army, especially its KNIL officers, agreed. But the army's PETA officers, especially those associated with Suwarto and Suharto pressed for his replacement.[568] For one year, the MPR (the congressional body which had replaced parliament in 1959) held effective power while Sukarno remained as a figurehead president and the army lurked in the background. In March 1967 when Suharto threatened to upset this new equilibrium by formally deposing the president, the navy mobilized forces in eastern Java and Jakarta, threatening military action should Suharto act. Suharto was able to mobilize superior forces, however, and the navy relented.[569]

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[568] Ibid., 227-28.

[569] Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 217.

THE SERVICE AND SUHARTO, 1967-1978. Under Suharto's New Order, the army

turned Suwarto's integral nationalist ideology into doctrine and adjusted its command

structure and force deployment patterns accordingly. Suharto also adopted the ideology as a

national doctrine for the economic and social development of the state. The navy did not

embrace the nation's new developmental priorities and found itself starved of funds.

Suharto's regime was clearly integral nationalist. His domestic, military, and foreign

policies were all designed to build what he called 'national resilience' and to minimize the

'primordial loyalties' that he and other army leaders believed threatened to pull the country

apart.[570] The biggest difference between the Suharto and Sukarno governments lay in the

relative balance between industry and agriculture. Sukarno, with Soviet backing, focused on

building heavy industry and largely ignored agriculture. Suharto promoted government-run

development projects designed to improve rural infrastructure. And his industrial policies,

embodied in his first five-year economic plan (1969-1974), emphasized smaller scale projects

and the growth of those industries with forward and backward linkages to agriculture.[571] In

some senses, Suharto pursued more orthodox economic policies than Sukarno. A new foreign

investment law in 1967 loosened restrictions on FDI. But the state sector of the economy

grew under Suharto from 13 percent in 1968 to 41 percent in 1983.[572] And after 1974, FDI

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[570] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia.*

[571] Hill, *Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Indonesia*, 11.

[572] Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order* (London: Routledge, 1998), 56. While some of this growth was due to the growth in the oil sector and the rise in oil prices during the 1970s, oil alone does not explain all of the increase.

was once again tightly restricted – a policy change undertaken largely in response to pressure from integral nationalist army officers.[573]

The army fared much better than the navy under the New Order. The navy and air force were starved of funds, and their officer corps were disproportionately affected by the purge that Suharto claimed was designed to eliminate leftists from the force but that was more obviously meant to eliminate opponents. In 1969 Suharto subordinated all of the services to a central military command structure dominated by army officers. Service commanders (renamed "service chiefs of staff") lost their command authority, which was reassigned to the armed forces general staff and territorial commanders, as well as their ministerial status.

The army's remaining Dutch-trained officers resigned or were pushed from the service shortly after Suharto's accession. PETA officers, who dominated the military until the 1970s and 1980s when most retired, were the primary beneficiaries. Under PETA leadership, the army effectively abandoned the idea, long-cherished by its former KNIL officers, of building a conventional military. Suwarto's integrated social, political, and military ideology was elevated to official doctrine, not just for the army, but also for the entire military establishment. Part of the new doctrine was *dwifungsi* (dual function), under which the military would perform social and political functions in addition to its military ones.[574] *Dwifungsi* underpinned the army's expectation that it would have direct representation in the

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[573] Hill, *Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Indonesia.* On the army's role, see Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983.*

[574] This was an idea that had gained currency among army leaders after 1958 but did not become espoused as official doctrine after 1966.

MPR (congress), but it also gave the army a responsibility to integrate its military doctrine closely with the government's social and economic policies and undertake extensive civic action programs.

The military rationale for *dwifungsi* lay in the concept of the "total people's defense" doctrine, a guerrilla defense strategy that also became official doctrine in 1966.[575] Under total people's defense, the territorial forces were to be closely integrated with local populations, upon which they would depend for sustenance during any extended guerrilla campaign against invaders. The importance of the territorial force was highlighted by promotion patterns that favored officers with service in the territorial force.[576] A social and political staff, functioning alongside and at an equal level with the general staff and commanded by an officer of equal rank, was included at each level of the hierarchy down to the Kodim (or sub-sub-region, of which there were 271 in the archipelago).[577] The civic action program was expanded to include village-level activities by virtually all army units. Military doctrine dictated that one sergeant and one assistant be posted in every one of Indonesia's 65,000 villages, an ideal that was never fully achieved in practice because of manpower limitations, but which nevertheless indicated an extraordinary commitment to local presence.[578] In an effort to promote national unity, the army's also emphasized balanced ethnic representation

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[575] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 3.

[576] The elevation of the territorial forces within the military hierarchy is one of the clearest ways in which pre- and post-1966 doctrine diverged. Nasution was instrumental in creating the territorial defense structure, but under his conception, these would be largely irregular forces, while the army's elite would be centered on the central reserve. Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*, 39.

[577] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 184-86.

[578] Ibid., 167. Throughout most of the New Order period, the army was held to about 180,000 men.

within its own ranks – even at the expense of maximizing the corps' technical qualifications.

During the Suharto years, Javanese officers never comprised more than 45 to 50 percent of

the senior officer corps, approximately replicating the Javanese share of the general

population.[579]

The army embraced integral nationalist doctrines and, broadly speaking, supported

Suharto – despite the fact that Suharto slashed military budgets and the army's force structure

immediately after taking office. Given Suharto's origins in the army and the fact that his own

political thinking was derivative of the army's larger ideology, the general accord between

Suharto and the army is not terribly surprising. Suharto, however, was more a consumer of

the army's new ideology than the intellectual force behind its creation. Many in the army

remained more true to Suwarto's original formulation of integral nationalist doctrine than did

Suharto. In 1974, for example, the army's leaders mobilized Jakarta's poor in a series of anti-

Japanese riots that forced Suharto to back away from the liberalization of foreign direct

investment inflows. The army remained suspicious of foreign direct investment and domestic

market structures, constraining Suharto's room to maneuver throughout his presidency.

The navy never embraced Suwarto's integral nationalist ideology, and its relations

with the regime were strained. It is true that Admiral Sudomo, one of Suharto's close

personal associates since the two served together in 1961, did serve Suharto loyally in the

important post of commander of Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and

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[579] Approximately 55 percent of the general population is Javanese. Figures are based on semi-annual compilations of biographical data on Indonesian military elites conducted by the editors of *Indonesia* (a semi-annual journal covering Indonesian history and politics published by Cornell University).

Order (or KOPKAMTIB), one of the highest intelligence organizations in the state.[580] But

throughout the New Order period, the navy as an institution continued to appeal for more

conventional military doctrines, failed to embrace civic action, and continued to stress

technical qualifications over balanced ethnic representation in its officer recruitment. The

navy's focus on technical qualifications ensured that the overwhelming majority of senior

naval officers (between 85 and 90 percent) were, in sharp contrast to those of the army, drawn

from Java.[581] And in the late 1970s, naval and marine officers were over represented among

the retired military general officers participating in the dissident Foundation for the Institute

of Constitutional Awareness, a group that called for less military involvement in politics and

other restrictions on the military's dual function.[582]

STRATEGIC CHANGE

In 1949, at the end of Indonesia's war for independence, the military consisted of 350,000

regulars and 470,000 laskars (militia), with firearms for only a fraction of the force. Under,

early, relatively liberal prime ministers, the army's force size was cut substantially, while a

navy and an air force were assembled. By the end of 1953 the army's size had been cut to a

total of 200,000 and the foundations laid for transition to more conventional doctrines. The

navy acquired one British destroyer, four Australian corvettes, and a force of forty smaller

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[580] Sudomo was the commander of naval forces in Suharto's Mandala Command for the liberation of West Irian in 1961 and the two developed a rapport. Sudomo then road Suharto's coat tails to important posts thereafter and spearheaded Suharto's purge of the navy after 1967. See Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983*, especially pages 23-27, 147.

[581] Editors of *Indonesia*, various years.

[582] The institute included four naval and marine officers, representing 33 percent of the total group of twelve military figures. At that time, naval officers comprised about 8 percent of the military's officer corps. Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983*, 102-12, 237.

patrol craft. Under Wilopo (1952-1953), plans were formulated for further reductions in the army's size and its continued transformation into a more professional and conventional force. But military cuts left little money for new equipment. Under the socialists who followed Wilopo, defense budgets were increased, but little went to the navy or the other high-tech arms. Hence, neither under Wilopo (whom the navy supported) nor under his successors (whom it did not) did the naval force structure expand.

During Sukarno's wars with Holland over Irian Jaya and with Britain over Malaysia, defense budgets – and the manpower and equipment inventories of all the services – increased dramatically. The size of the army ballooned from 200,000 to 290,000, and the navy's manpower from 10,000 to 40,000. In addition to new fighters and bombers for the air force, Indonesia purchased a host of warships from Italy and the Soviet Union (mostly the latter). By 1966, the fleet included one cruiser, eight destroyers, ten frigates, twelve submarines, as well as numerous smaller craft. Indonesia had deployed anti-ship missiles at sea and was establishing facilities for the production of anti-aircraft missiles in Eastern Java. The navy's commander, Admiral Martadinata, apparently expected continued growth and development, stating in an interview that naval strength was only 40 percent of "that needed for the security of Indonesian waters."[583] But already, in the words of one analyst, "Indonesia was qualified, at least on paper, as a second-class military power."[584] In the regional context, this was certainly true. Indonesia's surface fleet was larger, newer, and more coherent than was China's.

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[583] "Indonesia's Armoury," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, November 1 1962.

[584] Grant, *Indonesia*, 99.

Under Suharto's New Order, military budgets were cut sharply. Army manpower was cut from 290,000 in 1966 to 200,000 in 1974 to 180,000 in 1979. Force planning was adjusted away from a doctrine that combined conventional and guerriila defense – but sought to gradually strengthen conventional forces relative to guerrilla ones – toward a strategy that gave pride of place to guerrilla forces. The force structure provided an alternative means of defense to the more conventional force pursued by Sukarno while simultaneously serving the needs of policing the state and developing the social and material infrastructure in the countryside. The army's civic action programs were greatly expanded, taking more military budget away from strictly defense functions but giving it a framework within which it could participate in building a stronger social and material infrastructure in the countryside.

But while the army was willing and able to refashion itself to serve new political priorities, the navy was not, and it suffered more severely as a result. The navy's effective combat strength was more heavily affected than that of the army. Within five years of Suharto's accession, the cruiser, destroyers, and many of the submarines were paid off, as were many smaller craft. As one Australian observer remarked, "The fall of [Sukarno's] instant navy was almost as abrupt as had been its inception."[585] By 1979 naval tonnage had dropped to less than a third of what it had been in 1965. More important from the political vantage, the marine corps, which had stood at 14,000 in 1965, was reduced to 5,000 by the mid-1970s – a drop that was proportionately much sharper than that suffered by the army.

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[585] John Moore, "Indonesia's Navy", *Defense and Foreign Affairs*, February 1989, in LEXIS-NEXIS.

SUMMARY OF CVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY

This case provides modest support for the civil-military coalition theory. The ambiguity of the case is found primarily in the navy's support for Sukarno, a socialist (and therefore closer to the ideal type integral nationalist than liberal nationalist). But by the time of Sukarno's rise there were no liberal choices. The navy did support the liberal option from 1949 to the mid-1950s, when such an option was available. Later, given a field dominated by integral nationalists of various stripes, the navy appears to have made the choice for Sukarno based largely on its material interests. But while the navy backed Sukarno, there is no evidence to suggest that the navy shared Sukarno's affinity for the PKI – or the PKI's preference for radical economic and social policies. Overall, the evidence on the navy side is mixed.

The army's political economic preferences between 1949 and 1978, as well as the internal differences within the army, accord relatively well with the civil-military coalition theory. The army showed early concern for the unity – or "resilience" – of the state. Its leaders developed a well-articulated integral nationalist ideology that emphasized the balanced development of the state. It also acted on this ideology, even though that meant forgoing the budget increases of the Sukarno years and later swallowing leaner budgets under Suharto. And although there were no discernable differences between line and staff or technical officers per se, there were differences between former KNIL officers, who had a relatively high degree of technical training and who tended to do more technical work (including staff work), and former PETA officers, with less technical training and tasking.

Coalitional politics, in which the services were sometimes central actors on opposite sides, help explain strategic change at critical junctures. Sukarno, in a bid to balance what he understood was growing opposition to him within the army, threw additional resources at the navy and air force. And the dramatic and disproportionate downsizing of the air force and the navy under Suharto, as well as the elimination of former KNIL army officers, were conducted with an eye towards the effective elimination of threats from within the military, a point on which contemporary observers and historians agree.[586]

EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES

STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. It would be difficult to argue that military policy reflected the objective level and type of military threat facing the state throughout this period. Domestic separatist movements remained strong until at least 1961 – several years after Sukarno's conventional (and outwardly oriented) military buildup began. Although rebellions subsequently occurred in individual regions from time to time (especially during the mid-1970s), the immediate domestic threat was significantly lower during Suharto's New Order than it had been during the early years of Sukarno's Guided Democracy – yet doctrine and force structure became less conventional and more centered on guerrilla defense. Hence, if the strategic military environment is to explain the timing and direction of strategic change, it must rely more on major differences in the analytical frameworks used by national leaders

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[586] See, for example, Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. Moore, "Indonesia's Navy".

to assess threats than on objective conditions. Suharto saw the state as more fragile than did Sukarno and thus favored more domestically oriented military strategies.[587]

But different analytical frameworks and threat perceptions cannot explain all of the strategic change that took place during this period. The speed with which Suharto moved to build down the strength of the navy and air force, for example, indicates a likely desire to limit the domestic military capability of those services. The navy could have been of use against domestic rebellions; it had been instrumental against domestic revolts during the late 1950s and early 1960s. And even if we assume that Suharto preferred a ground based strategy because ground forces could be used more readily for civic action, this preference would still not explain why the marine ground forces were cut substantially more than even the army's strategic reserve elements.

MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. Parts of this case offer evidence that material interests influenced the behavior of the services, but material interest cannot explain important aspects of the services' behavior. Sukarno's largesse towards the navy almost certainly helped seal the navy's support for him and its subsequent opposition to his complete removal from office. The material incentives were large, especially relative to the navy's contemporary size and scale. The navy was given carte blanche to import major new systems from the Soviet Union. And at the time, there was no serious ideological alternative. Hence, although the navy ultimately proved itself an enemy of

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[587] This preference, however, itself provides a measure of support for the civil-military coalition theory, since both his preferences and his ability to become president derived from his experience in the army.

the Indonesian Communist Party, it was willing to support Sukarno, despite his ties to the party. Material interests do a relatively poorer job of explaining the navy's support for early, liberal governments (which cut aggregate military budgets and afforded only gradual expansion of the fleet), as well as its refusal to fall in line behind Suharto and his strategic approach after his consolidation of power (especially given the limited prospects for his removal).

A simple material interests-based theory explains relatively less of the army's behavior during this period. The army turned against Sukarno early in his tenure, despite an expanding army budget and force structure. It was the army's refusal to take Sukarno's material bait that led Sukarno to offer those same incentives – money, equipment, and power – to the navy. The army could have gained even more than it already had from the war with Malaysia. It is difficult to understand the army's position without recourse to its evolving integral nationalist ideology. In part, that ideology was born of the social origins of the PETA officers and their experience in revolutionary warfare, but it was reinforced and refined by the conditions of service in Indonesian army and the types of social issues affecting the army's soldiers and those in their areas of operation.

Ulf Sundhaussen, one of the most careful historians of the Indonesian military during the 1950s and 1960s, argues that the army's corporate interests "do not seem to have played a significant role in the army's gradual widening of its non-military roles.... The overthrow of

Sukarno led, for the first few years, to savage cuts in the military budget."[588] Those cuts

were, he adds, predictable. The army did gain some stability in its political status and position

under Suharto. But interestingly, there was more dissent within the officer corps about having

a formal political role under Suharto's New Order than there was about the army's role in

civic action programs – a considerably less lucrative activity. Parliamentary seats proved

appealing and lucrative to some and were regarded as divisive by others, but the army's social

role was embraced by virtually the entire army's officer corps.[589]

Case 2: From Suharto to Wahid, 1978-2001

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Although there were few direct challenges to Suharto's rule between 1978 and 1997,

economic and social actors seeking liberal reform grew in size and potential political power

throughout the period. Shortly after the Asian financial crisis struck Indonesia in late 1997,

protesters began demanding political and economic change, setting up a showdown between

liberal interests and entrenched integral nationalist ones.

The army was divided in 1997 and 1998, with some officers providing a stubborn

defense of his regime and others pleased to see him stumble. After Suharto's resignation in

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[588] Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*, 262.

[589] Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983*. Much of this debate played out at SESKOAD, where the army's integral nationalist ideology had originated. Ostensibly, the military's political role derived from its role within society. As an important social actor, it should also have political voice. The dissenters within SESKOAD, however, believed that seats in parliament would make the military a partisan institution. Better, they believed, for it to maintain a latent political force that would only enter politics to adjudicate disputes that could not be otherwise resolved and then once again withdraw into reserve. None of the officers in this debate, however, believed the army should end or reduce its social role, however.

May 1998, some in the army supported changes in the military's *dwifungsi* (dual function) doctrine. But the army's senior leaders and most of the officer corps sought to preserve the central elements of the state structure, as well as the military's role within it. In other words, even most of those in the army who did not want Suharto, nevertheless wanted Suharto's system with a different man at the top. After Suharto's resignation, the army backed his vice president and chosen successor, B.J. Habibie. And after Habibie was forced from office by parliamentary and societal opposition in October 1999, senior army leaders pursued a variety of strategies to obstruct the passage and implementation of liberal economic and political reforms under the country's new civilian leadership. Liberal leaders have accused dissatisfied army officers with throwing in their lot with hardline Islamists in an effort to undermine the stability of the new regime, and there is at least some evidence that this has in fact taken place.

The navy, on the other hand, embraced changes in domestic political and economic structures, as well as military reform. While the army was torn during the anti-Suharto protests in May 1998, the navy was united – and its marines were sent to march with and protect student protesters. And unlike most dissidents within the army (of whom there were, in any case, fewer), the navy did not simply wish to replace the man at the top while leaving the system in place. In November 1998, when parliamentary opposition to Habibie gained momentum, naval marines again protected students – this time against a more determined army assault. Naval officers in parliament defected from the government party to Megawati Sukarnoputri's liberal Democratic Party of Indonesia (PDI). These actions did not go unrewarded. After Habibie's fall, Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia's first democratically

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elected president in half a century, selected the navy's chief of staff, Widodo Adisutjipto, to

serve as the nation's first ever non-army commander of the military. The navy's strength,

especially that of the marine corps, was rapidly built-up and used to protect the new civilian

regime, while Widodo and other navy officers spearheaded military reform and lent their

moral support for civilian political and economic reform.

THE DOMESTIC CHOICES

A brief period of liberal reform, between 1983 and 1993, punctuated Suharto's reign. Before

and after this period – and for the most part during it – the government and economy were

organized largely integral nationalist lines. The political structure was explicitly corporatist,

with both social and economic entities grouped into peak organizations and incorporated

systematically into political structures. The concentration of domestic industry in large

conglomerates tied to the government allowed economic bureaucrats to focus available

resources on the development of indigenous technological capabilities. Enormous resources

were devoted to the development of an Indonesian automobile, an Indonesian shipbuilding

industry, and an Indonesian aircraft. The fact that most of these technology projects turned

out to be a colossal waste of public funds does not change the ambition behind them. The

government undertook concerted and only somewhat more successful efforts to break down

the "primordial loyalties" of ethnic groups and foster "national resilience." The army's civic

action programs were part of this effort, as was the promotion of internal migration and the

brutal repression of opposition movements.

The Suharto regime was, of course, corrupt and self-serving, but it was also, by many measures, reasonably successful in increasing the welfare of the people. Suharto and his relatives managed to siphon off billions of dollars, largely through their involvement in state controlled monopolies. Salaries for government officials, including military officers from all of the services, were left at almost subsistence levels, with the built-in expectation that these individuals would have additional sources of income. Corruption was endemic to the system. Yet at the same time, the regime did produce solid economic growth, in marked contrast to those of Suharto's predecessors (and to a lesser extent his successors). And it contained, partly though not entirely through force of arms, the fractious impulses of Indonesia's outer islands. Many, both at the center of the system and even some outside of it, believed that the system's integral nationalist principles were correct and functional, even if the application of those policies was far from perfect.

It was not, however, universally admired, even within Indonesia. During the 1980s and early 1990s, Suharto was forced to make a number of economic concessions to private industry and some political concessions to the growing middle class. But economic reforms were only partial and incomplete, and both political and economic liberalization was largely reversed by the mid-1990s. Having tasted political influence and its derivative economic gains the middle class was restive and moved into active opposition in late 1997 when the East Asian financial crisis exposed Suharto's vulnerability.

Until the 1980s, oil revenues were used to keep Indonesia's domestic conglomerates solvent. During the 1980s, however, oil prices collapsed and with them, the government's

ability to subsidize major heretofore state-backed firms. In the face of rising costs, the

consumers of intermediate goods produced by these conglomerates, mostly smaller private

firms, demanded easier access to foreign parts and materials. Suharto needed the foreign

exchange generated by these downstream producers, and in 1983, he began a series of liberal

economic reforms, relaxing some restrictions on foreign imports of raw materials and capital

goods and, to a lesser extent, foreign investment.[590] During the late 1980s and early 1990s,

liberal economic reforms continued. Some political and social opening also occurred. Under

this "tropical glasnost," press restrictions were partially lifted, new parties were permitted,

and government interference in the affairs of existing parties was lessened.[591]

Reform, however, remained tenuous, and it was ultimately reversed almost

completely. In 1994, with investigative journalists increasingly digging into official

corruption and mismanagement, the most outspoken newspapers and magazines were shut

down, while the remainder faced new restrictions. And since the conglomerates run by or

connected to the state were critical to Suharto's political survival, reforms favoring private

enterprise could not be pushed to the point of jeopardizing the their survival. By the early

1990s some new economic policies were more anti-liberal than not, making the net direction

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[590] On the logic and course of economic liberalization between 1983 and 1993, see Richard Robinson, "Authoritarian States, Capital-Owning Classes, and the Politics of Newly Industrializing Countries: The Case of Indonesia," *World Politics* 41, no. 1 (1988). Rizal Mallarangeng and R. William Liddle, "Indonesia in 1995: The Struggle for Power and Policy," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 2 (1995).

[591] See Jacques Bertrand, "False Starts, Succession Crises, and Regime Transition: Flirting with Openness in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 69, no. 3 (1996). Bertrand dates political reform from 1989 to 1994. The phrase "tropical glasnost" comes from Donald K. Emmerson, "Indonesia in 1990: A Foreshadow Play," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 2 (1991): 179.

of change difficult to ascertain.[592] The 1997 financial crises forced Suharto to make tough

choices. Although he did, out of necessity, make some concessions to the IMF, his main

impulse was to re-embrace economic nationalism.

Having grown in size and power for several decades and having benefited from liberal

reforms during the 1980s and early 1990s, the middle class was loath to retreat. Even after

rapid expansion, Indonesia's middle class was relatively small, representing only four percent

of the population by the early 1990s.[593] But the middle class was concentrated in Jakarta and

Surabaya and made up a sizable percentage of the population of those cities. The Democratic

Party of Indonesia (PDI) represented middle class interests, and the PDI and its leader,

Megawati Sukarnoputri, were becoming more determined in resisting state intervention in its

party affairs.[594] The Nahdlathul Ulama (NU), once a traditional Islamic party, was also

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[592] Habibie was appointed Minister of Technology in 1990, and as his power grew in subsequent years, he sponsored technology-development projects that cost billions, drained funds away from private enterprise, and required closing new areas of the economy to protect newly targeted high-tech industries. Mallarangeng and Liddle suggest that the momentum shifted in 1993. Mallarangeng and Liddle, "Indonesia in 1995: The Struggle for Power and Policy," 111.

[593] Leo Suryadinata, "Democratization and Political Succession in Suharto's Indonesia," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 3 (1997): 270. The four percent figure cited here includes only "professional and technical" workers and "managers and administrators." Other, more inclusive, estimates put the figure as high as seven percent. Whichever is closer, the relatively small size of the middle class is partly a function of Indonesia's poverty. Indonesian GDP per capita in 1996 was $1,420 (in 1999 dollars), about that of Thailand in 1980. Historically, the composition of the middle class has compounded the problem of its small size. The commercial class has traditionally been dominated by ethnic Chinese, who depend on the state for their physical protection. However, state policy since at least 1974 has favored the development of indigenous capitalists and technicians – even as it has included an important place for the Chinese – and the ethnic Malay middle class has grown steadily.

[594] Although Megawati began her political career echoing her father's concern for the Indonesian downtrodden, her party became the rallying point for the middle class during the 1990s. When the PDI published its "Framework for Indonesian Economic Recovery" in 1999, its focus was overwhelmingly liberal: the sale of state assets, improving transparency and openness, macroeconomic stabilization, anti-inflationary measures, and the strengthening of independent judicial institutions. "Megawati's Master Plan for Indonesia", *United Press International*, July 29 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS. On the PDI's support base, see also "Time for Golkar to be in Opposition", *The Jakarta Post*, June 25 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS.

transformed by the late 1980s into largely urban and commercial party (along the lines of the old Masyumi party).[595] These two parties, which represented coherent and relatively liberal alternatives to the governing Golkar party, were well positioned to take advantage of the national mood of dissatisfaction in late 1997.

INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF THE MILITARY

The rise of a viable opposition and the increased fluidity of politics after late 1997 confronted Indonesian army and navy leaders with a number of critical domestic choices. Both services had evolved considerably since they had last been confronted with equally momentous decisions during the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, most of that evolution had institutionalized characteristics that already differentiated the two services. Here, I touch briefly on the characteristics of military organizations that I suggested in Chapter 3 tend to differ between services and shape contrasting domestic priorities and preferences.

Capital requirements. Ground forces have more choice than navies in how they calibrate the balance between material and human capital in their force mix (given the same expectation of effectiveness relative to likely competitors). Suharto's economic strategy, which required that the lion's share of foreign exchange be devoted to technology and capital

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[595] Prior to Suharto's overhaul of the political system in 1971, parties representing liberal (abangan) and strict (santri) Muslim vied with Christian and non-religious parties in parliament. After 1971 these were consolidated in the United Development Party (PPP), a party that Suharto controlled through largesse and cooptation. In 1984 Wahid became chairman of the Nahdlathul Ulama (NU), a largely rural, traditional (santri) organization, and led it out of the PPP. Wahid expanded the urban base of the party, which then became known as the only independent Muslim organization with significant political strength and began to attract a broader range of Muslim supporters. On these events, see Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order.* Grant, *Indonesia.* On the number of NGOs, see Suryadinata, "Democratization and Political Succession in Suharto's Indonesia," 271.

acquisitions for quasi state-run civilian firms, left very little for weapons acquisition and affected naval capabilities more than army ones.

Under Suharto, the army made a virtue of necessity by strenuously emphasizing the importance of human capital in its military doctrine and de-emphasizing the role of weapons and weapons systems. The extent to which its "human preference" has been incorporated into a coherent ideology is illustrated by the fact that it has, on occasion, rejected equipment acquisitions even when it was capable of financing them. For example, helicopter assault forces, which might be considered extremely desirable for an archipelagic nation facing insurgent movements, were resisted on ideological grounds. Helicopter forces "symbolized to some an excessive reliance on technology to overcome what were perceived to be societal and political problems."[596]

Capital limitations – especially limitations on foreign currency spending – have been far more problematic for the navy. Even when the country was flush with foreign reserves, Suharto's economic policies made very little available to the military, and the navy had been forced to coordinate even its limited weapons purchases with the regime's broader program for national development. For example, the navy was forced to buy used East German corvettes during the 1990s, instead of purchasing new frigates or destroyers. The navy was to be allotted $1.1 billion by B.J. Habibie, then ministry for science and technology, for refurbishing the ships in Indonesia. The government's rationale was that this would allow

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[596] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 90.

Indonesia to simultaneously boost both its industrial and naval capabilities. Ultimately, Habibie diverted much of that money for the development of Indonesia's shipbuilding infrastructure, and little was spent on upgrading the ships themselves. The corvettes, then, added little if anything to Indonesia's naval capabilities.[597]

Officer origins. The two services continue to draw their officers from very different sources. The majority of officers in the navy are graduates of Indonesia's four-year military academy. Only around one fifth of the army's officers are academy graduates, with another fifth joining through an ROTC-type program and around three fifths promoted from the ranks.[598] This very large group of army officers promoted through the ranks (via an Officer Candidate School system) represents a broader cross-section of society than any other elite component of the state. And even the army's academy cadets are drawn from across the archipelago, effectively requiring affirmative action given the poor educational infrastructure on many outer islands. This relatively democratic (but only partly meritocratic) approach to officer selection contributes to the army's sense that it is a "people's army." The navy makes no such pretensions. Vice Admiral Rudolf Kasenda, who served as the navy's chief from 1986 to 1989 and was fluent in Dutch, English, Russian and had training in several countries, including the United States, may have been unusual for the breadth of his knowledge and

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[597] Ibid., 25.

[598] Ibid., 118. In 1998, the academy graduated 333 army officers and 200 naval officers. With only 14% as many personnel as the army and 60% as many academy graduates, the navy has four times as many academy graduates *per capita* as the army. For 1998 academy graduate numbers, see "President Habibie: Clear Thinking to Dampen Social Turmoil", *Kompas Online*, December 18 1998.

cosmopolitan background even among his naval colleagues.[599] But he was less unusual in the navy than he would have been in the army. The navy continued to select its officer candidates based on math and other aptitude scores, producing an officer corps drawn overwhelmingly from Java.

Enlisted recruiting and enlisted-officer relations. NCOs and their enlisted subordinates in the Indonesian military – both army and navy – are professional in the sense that they all serve long-term, generally on 20-year contracts. Nevertheless, there are significant differences in the recruitment of those individuals, and those differences have an effect on how the officers of each service see economic and social problems. The army recruits its territorial forces locally, ensuring that its enlisted ranks, like its officers, are drawn from a broader cross-section of Indonesian society than the navy, which worries more about the technical capability of its enlisted personnel and offers special terms to technically qualified individuals.[600]

Contact with foreign officers. As in the case of many other states, the navy in Indonesia, despite having only 10 percent of total military manpower (excluding the marines) has more contact with foreign militaries and military officers than any other service. Its exercises with both Singapore and Malaysia are primarily naval. Until 1993, only the navy

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[599] "Leadership Profiles: Vice Admiral Rudolf Kasenda, Navy Chief of Staff, Indonesia," *Defense and Foreign Affairs* (1989).

[600] "Special terms" include, most prominently, shorter seven-year contracts. Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 119.

participated in joint exercises with Australia.[601] After signing of the Mutual Security

Agreement with Australia in 1995, the scope of joint exercises expanded to include all

service, but naval cooperation continued to provide the central element. Although tensions

over East Timor caused military-to-military ties to be suspended in late 1999, Indonesian

naval exchange students remained in place there.[602] Ties with the United States were also

affected by events in Timor, but before the suspension of official contacts, up to fifteen U.S.

warships a year visited Indonesian ports, providing opportunities for Indonesian and

American naval officers to meet and mix.

SERVICE POSITIONS

The institutional characteristics discussed above helped shape very different domestic

preferences following the series of domestic crises that have unfolded since the Asian

financial crisis of 1997. The current discussion of the service's preferences and behavior is

broken into three sections: a brief review of the services' political positions prior to late 1997;

the period from November 1997 to Indonesia's first free elections in October 1999; and the

period from October 1999 to the present. Together, these cover Indonesia's transition to a

more liberal political and economic system, as well as the years before and immediately after

that shift. During the years covered by this case, especially after 1997, service positions were

clear: the army was resistant to liberal reform, while the navy was far more receptive to it.

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[601] Ibid., 42.

[602] On the navy's call, see "Indonesian Navy Sends Positive Signal to Australia", *Mandiri*, February 25 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0225. In addition, the navy's chief of staff, unlike his army counterpart, called the rapid resumption of ties.

SERVICE POSITIONS FROM 1978 TO 1997. There was some evidence of naval

dissatisfaction prior to 1997, though there was little to suggest the major gap between the

services' domestic preferences that became apparent after that time. In light of events during

and after 1997, the most important lesson from the immediate preceding period may be that,

in the absence of acute political crises, intra-military differences are frequently difficult to

discern – even when later events prove them substantial.

Well before 1997 the army was divided between those satisfied with the status quo

and those who wanted to distance the military as an institution from Suharto's regime. Much

of the debate within the army revolved around how to define *dwifungsi* – the military's

doctrine of "dual function." Under *dwifungsi*, the military had both a military and social

function. The army was, according to the doctrine, a legitimate social actor. It had a right

and responsibility to participate in development projects, especially in the countryside, and

few in the military questioned its involvement in local administration.

The debate within the army centered on what the implications of *dwifungsi* were for

the military's national political role. Between 1978 and 1983 reformist officers in the Army

Staff and Command School (SESKOAD) argued that the army should not be involved in day-

to-day political issues. And specifically, it should not be tied to Golkar, the ruling party

controlled by Suharto.[603] Involvement in Gokar, dissident officers argued, made the military

a partisan force. The army should, rather, sit above the partisan fray and only assert a

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[603] The most detailed source on this dissident movement is Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983*.

political role as the arbiter of last resort. But while this pro-reform group within SESKOAD opposed the idea that dwifungsi should involve them directly and continuously in national politics – and especially tie the military as an institution to Suharto – they did not question the idea that the military had a social or even political role.

By 1983 Suharto was able to contain the reformists' momentum within the army by removing dissident officers from important posts, especially within SESKOAD, but he was unable to root out all individuals with sympathies towards the group's general agenda. During the 1990s, Suharto found a new group of supporters within the military by promoting santri (or strict) Muslim officers, who had hitherto been marginalized within the military hierarchy and subsequently depended on him for patronage. By the time of Suharto's political demise in 1997, there were three factions within the army: a "red and white faction" (taking its name from the colors of the Indonesian flag) of pro-reform nationalist officers; a "green faction" comprised of santri Muslim officers; and a group of old school Suharto supporters who had more personal ties to the president.

All of these groups held values that were, to one degree or another, consistent with integral nationalism. Those officers with the ideology closest to the ideal type position were members of the "red and white" faction. These officers believed that the state had an important role in national development and that the army had an important role within the state and its developmental program. Their complaint with the existing system lay in the army's active support for the ruling party at the national level. The "green" (Islamist) faction represents a bastardized form of integral nationalism in which a clerical order would embody

a national egalitarian order. Its failure to accommodate Indonesia's religious minorities in the faction's plans was (and remains) potentially divisive rather than unifying and did not, therefore, fit entirely within the integral nationalist rubric. But their goal was to redefine Indonesia as a spiritually homogenous society with Islam as a core aspect of the nation. The faction's thinking may therefore be seen in a larger sense as a corrupted variant of the integral nationalist ideology.[604] Probably the most distant from the integral nationalist ideal type were the old school Suharto supporters, who appeared to be motivated at least in part by reasons of personal profit but who nevertheless could and did rationalize their support for him on ostensibly integral nationalist grounds.

There were several signs of naval dissatisfaction with Suharto prior to 1997. Retired naval and marine officers were prominent among the reform-minded officers' groups between 1978 and 1983 and were over-represented in the dissident Foundation for the Institute of Constitutional Awareness, which grew out of the army's SESKOAD-based reform movement.[605] And the navy also continued to push for doctrinal change, suggesting in 1993

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[604] This kind of sectarian partisanship is not uncommon among those who might otherwise be described as integral nationalists. The definition of core national values is likely to result in the exclusion of some groups who might find it more difficult than others to be define their beliefs in ways consistent with those values. Peron's efforts to include Christianity in core state values resulted in the exclusion or alienation of Jews and other non-Christians. And Phibun's efforts to emphasize Thai language and values resulted in the marginalization of Thailand's sizable Chinese minority. In some cases, the exclusion of certain groups may be the inadvertent but inevitable result of an effort to define core national values, while in other cases, there may be a conscious decision to define national values in opposition to some group against which many in the state will rally. Those efforts may be particularly successful when the excluded group or its religion or ideology can be portrayed as a foreign implant. In the Indonesian case, Christianity can be attributed to European colonization – conveniently ignoring the fact that all but animist religions were, at one time or another, brought to Indonesia by conquering empires.

[605] Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983*, 102-12, 236-37.

that an archipelagic defense strategy should be adopted as Indonesia's official doctrine.[606]

There was also some evidence that the navy and liberal groups found common cause during the mid-1990s. It was the 1994 campaign by *Tempo*, Jakarta's most outspoken liberal weekly magazine, to expose corruption by associates of B.J. Habibie in the purchase of the East German navy's fleet that led Suharto to end his experiment with free press. The navy had been opposed to the purchase, and the article reflected the navy's dissatisfaction. In 1996, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, then a prominent member of the Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) and later a liberal member of parliament, publicly criticized Suharto's grand strategy, suggesting that more emphasis should be placed on maritime defense.[607] Given Dewi's outspoken calls on other occasions for an end to military involvement in politics, her advocacy of naval strategy may have been as much motivated by politics as by strategic logic.[608] But whatever differences the navy had with Suharto's system – and these differences were quickly revealed as substantial after 1997 – they were relatively well hidden before the financial crisis of that year exposed the president's vulnerability.

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[606] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 30.

[607] In a widely publicized seminar on military strategy, she delivered an address in which she quoted a retired rear admiral whom she suggested might not have felt free to speak out publicly, saying, "Indonesia is a maritime continent with extensive waters," but "we are virtually naked there." "Threat Seen to Future Access to Markets and Resources", *Antara*, November 8 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-1108. Although LIPI was nominally under the control of Habibie, it had a reputation for independent thought. In February 1998, 19 researchers from LIPI issued a "statement of concern" over the country's political and economic situation. Habibie condemned their actions as political and warned them to maintain their "professionalism." "Habibie Warns Researchers Over Statement", *Kompas (Internet)*, February 11 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0211.

[608] During a conference on democratization hosted by LIPI in August 1998 Dewi called on Indonesians to seize the moment and reduce the military's involvement in politics. "Expert: Indonesia Has Weak President, Troubled Economy", *The Jakarta Post*, August 13 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0813.

THE SERVICES FROM 1997 TO 1999. Differences in the domestic preferences of

the army and the navy became more apparent after August 1997, when the East Asian

financial crisis brought new hardships and anti-government rallies to Indonesia. The navy

welcomed the challenge to the existing order, putting marines on the streets to protect student

protesters before and after Suharto's fall and later joining Megawati's PDI in its effort to oust

Habibie. The army proved divided but generally resisted change, and it attempted to suppress

student demonstrations both before and, especially, after Suharto's resignation, inflicting

significant casualties on several occasions.

In August 1997 the Indonesian Rupiah began to slip against the dollar, causing rapid

inflation, and in February 1998, students held their first protests in the capital. In March,

retired marine Lieutenant General Ali Sadikin, the chairman of the reformist "Petition 50"

group, became the most established figure to call for Suharto's resignation.[609] On May 12

four student protesters from Jakarta's Trisakti University were shot and killed, sparking riots

that lasted several days. The army appeared undecided about how to respond. Its

commander, General Wiranto, first threatened students with tough action but later sounded

more accommodating. Other army generals continued to threaten students with a "second

Tienanmen."[610] Naval and marine officers, on the other hand, took a significantly more

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[609] The "Petition 50" group was founded in 1980 by fifty retired senior military and civilian officials. See Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983*, 162. On the activities of Ali Sadikin and the group in 1998, see "Megawati, Other Political Activists Meet", *Kompas (Internet)*, January 16 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0115. "Petisi 50 Criticizes Suharto's Speech", *Jakarta Post*, March 7 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0309. "Indonesian Dissidents Support Protests", *Kompas (Internet)*, May 13 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0512.

[610] "'Tienanmen Threat' Halts Rally", *The Nation*, May 21 1998.

accommodating line, and marine soldiers escorted student marchers after May 12.[611] On May 18, 1998, with student protests growing across the country, a group of sixteen retired military leaders presented a letter demanding Suharto step down. Of the four general rank officers who signed the petition in Surabaya, two were naval officers.[612] Three days later, with his government in disarray, Suharto announced his resignation.

In the uncertain weeks and months following Suharto's fall, the navy's support for reform became stronger, more visible, and increasingly distinct from the army's position. Vice President Habibie was sworn in to serve out the four years and ten months remaining of Suharto's five-year term. Student groups continued to protest, now supporting Megawati's call for Habibie to declare himself a caretaker and call new MPR elections under competitive rules. Retired marine Lt General Ali Sadikin once again remained active in the democratic movement, speaking to student groups and lending an aura of respectability and authority to the student cause.[613] (He was arrested for sedition in December of 1998.[614]) In early October 1998, naval and marine officers in parliament defected en masse from the ruling Golkar party and joined Megawati's DPI, while the majority of the army's delegates remained with Golkar.[615]

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[611] "Riots Follow Peaceful Jakarta Protest", *Washington Post*, November 15 1998.

[612] "Anti-, Pro-Suharto Protests Reported", *Suara Pembaruan*, May 19 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0519.

[613] "Students Stage 'Largest' Demonstration in Jakarta", *Media Indonesia (Internet)*, September 24 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0923.

[614] "Two Indonesian Dissidents to Face 'Conspiracy' Charges", *Medan Waspada (Internet)*, December 11 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1211.

[615] "164 ABRI Retirees Join Pro-Megawati PDI Camp", *Media Indonesia (Internet)*, October 4 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1004.

In October the standoff between increasingly hardline army elements and recalcitrant student groups was building to a climax. At the end of September, Habibie rejected Megawati's demand for early elections and instead called for all military personnel to take "firm action" against "rioters and looters." While the army, air force, and police chiefs of staff were all present to hear Habibie's call, as were the commanders of all the major territorial commands, Naval Chief of Staff Widodo was conspicuously missing, as he was said to be "preparing for celebrations to mark maritime day."[616] The army began moving paramilitary units into Jakarta. Student protesters turned out by the thousands when a special session of the old, unreconstructed MPR (parliament) was held November 10-13 to determine the timing and procedures for subsequent elections. Early on the morning of November 13, after two days of clashes between military units and students, Minister of Defense and Security, General Wiranto, warned: "Soldiers assisted by civilians will face and take stern action against anyone or any group which blatantly violates laws or the constitution."[617] Hours later, army and police units began firing on the crowds, said to number some 50,000.[618] At least a dozen students were killed and hundreds injured on November 13 alone.[619]

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[616] "Habibie Orders ABRI to Take Firm Action Against Rioters", *Radio Republik*, September 24 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0924.

[617] "Megawati's Sister Rejects MPR Session", *Rajawali Televisi Indonesia*, November 13 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1112.

[618] Ron Moreau and Dorinda Elliott, "They are Cruel, Cruel," *Newsweek*, November 23 1998.

[619] Over the two days (November 12-13), fourteen people were killed and 448 injured. Almost 200 were still hospitalized on November 17. "Death Toll From Jakarta Unrest Put at 14", *Radio Republik Indonesia*, November 17 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1117. One of the killed may have been a soldier killed on November 12, while the remainder were probably all students killed the following day.

With the democracy movement facing suppression, marine forces once again intervened to protect prostesting students. The navy had already prepared for this contingency. In mid-October, it had reinforced its own presence in the capital with ten additional marine companies (for a total of 41 companies).[620] On November 14, the day after army and paramilitary troops fired on the protesters, more than one thousand students, accompanied by a company of marines, marched on the parliament building. Clearly indicating prior coordination, the marines marched behind the six student leaders but ahead of the main student body. On reaching the parliament building, the marines deployed themselves in a protective shield between the students and other security elements present on the scene.[621] The navy also deployed additional aircraft in the capital and warships in the Jakarta harbor.

On November 18, 1998 Habibie agreed to hold new elections no later than June of the following year, but the government continued to spar with parliamentary opponents and their student backers over the terms of the elections, the role of the military, and the structure of the state. The army remained deeply divided but generally opposed to any compromise on fundamental issues with the opposition, while the navy and marines appeared to welcome

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[620] "Marines Chief Denies Issuance of New Operational Order", *Televisi Pendidikan*, November 15 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1115.

[621] "Students with 60 Marines Allowed to Reach Parliament", *Hong Kong AFP*, November 14 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1114. One marine was shot in the leg by police mobile brigade soldiers, after which the police mobile brigade (perhaps alarmed at the possible consequences of their own actions) quickly retreated, ceding the field to the students and their marine escorts. "Marine Shot in Firing, Students Return to Jakarta Streets", *Hong Kong AFP*, November 14 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1113. "Wiranto: 'No Order' To Shoot Protesters; Probe Ordered", *Radio Republik Indonesia*, November 14 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1114.

change. The army's commander, General Wiranto, denied that he had issued orders to use live ammunition on November 13, 1998 and initiated an investigation into the events of that day. But even if he had not issued the orders (a major unknown), Wiranto's own pronouncements and actions frequently reflected a deeply ambivalent, and sometimes an outright hardline, position vis-à-vis the protests. In December 1998 he announced the creation of a controversial civilian militia – a body likely to be less disciplined even than the army in the use of force – to help maintain order.[622] On February 6, 1999, he held a press conference to clarify the results of an ABRI (Indonesian military) leadership meeting held two days earlier. He announced, "The ABRI declares war against all forms of riots." Thenceforth, he stated, orders to shoot rioters on the spot would be implemented throughout the Republic of Indonesia.[623] The vacillation in Wiranto's position between 1997 and 1999 almost certainly reflected deep divisions within the army itself, as well as some degree of personal ambivalence.

The navy and marines, meanwhile, demonstrated no such ambivalence, reveling instead in their popularity among students, liberal legislators, and the population at large. The navy looked for ways to accommodate political pressures for change *and* maintain order social simultaneously. According to news reports, easily identifiable marine corps NCOs and officers, wearing distinctive red berets, crouched over maps with student leaders plotting

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[622] "Jakarta to Start Recruiting Civilian Militia in January 1999", *Media Indonesia (Internet)*, December 13 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-1213.

[623] It is probably true that Wiranto was more ambivalent than reactionary. He was probably pulled towards a reactionary response by the need to maintain the unity of the armed forces, particularly the army. The press conference discussed here is reported in "The Armed Forces Declare War", *Kompas (Internet)*, February 7 1999.

routes of march.[624] In contrast to army officers who faced a hostile press corps and seemed

dazed by the dilemmas in which they found themselves, senior naval and marine commanders

basked in questions about their successful crowd control tactics. In a November 1998 press

conference, Rear Admiral Suyadi thanked the public for its display of goodwill towards the

navy and marines.[625] Ten months later, a full year after their initial reinforced deployment,

marines on the streets of Jakarta still maintained an easy and cordial relationship with the

students – even as those same students occasionally clashed violently with other elements of

the security forces.[626]

New elections for the MPR were held in June 1999. The governing Golkar was

defeated, and the dominant opposition parties prepared to select a new president on October

22. Even before Abdurrahman Wahid was elected president, however, the navy had become

the unofficial guardians of Indonesia's new democracy. On September 1, the marine corps

announced that it had been tasked by parliamentary leaders with securing the upcoming MPR

general session.[627] After Wahid's election, the navy became a major element in the

President's coalition, protecting him from threats emanating from reactionary elements in the

military and providing internal military leverage on constitutional and legal problems related

to the military.

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[624] Moreau and Elliott, "They are Cruel, Cruel."

[625] "Marine Shot in Firing, Students Return to Jakarta Streets". For reporting a similarly upbeat press briefing by the marine commander, see "Marines Chief Denies Issuance of New Operational Order".

[626] "Security Forces Teargas Students in Jakarta", *Detik*, October 14 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1014.

[627] "Marines Being Prepared to Secure MPR General Session", *Antara News Agency*, September 2 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-0901.

THE SERVICES UNDER WAHID, OCTOBER 1999 TO JUNE 2001. On October 22, 1999 Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of the moderate Islamic party, Nahdlathul Ulama (NU), was sworn in as president. Several days later he announced his cabinet, which included Indonesia's first civilian defense minister, Dr. Juwono Sudarsono, a former University of Indonesia professor of political science. Given the events that led up to the June 1999 elections and Wahid's accession, the new president and his defense minister probably would have relied disproportionately on the navy for domestic military support and protection even without further evidence of an army-navy divide on domestic preferences. But Wahid came to office with an ambitious liberal reform agenda. The army's opposition to these measures and the navy's support – especially on Wahid's desire to create a federal system from a unitary one and privatize government businesses – worked to confirm the navy's position as a potentially valuable ally in reform.

President Wahid promoted naval officers to the top of the military hierarchy. The short list for the TNI's new commander included two individuals, both naval officers: Admiral Widodo Adisutjipto (then the military's deputy commander) and Admiral Akhmad Sucipto (then the navy's commander).[628] Widodo was chosen. Widodo and Defense Minister Sudarsono then engineered the appointment of naval officers and (in lesser numbers) air force officers to key positions that had been held by army officers throughout Suharto's reign.[629] Wahid also chose several naval officers as personal aides. Naval officers worked to neutralize

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[628] "Wahid Likely to Sideline Army", *The Australian*, October 26 1999, in Lexis-Nexis.

[629] Editors, "Changes in Civil-Military Relations Since the Fall of Suharto," *Indonesia*, no. 10 (2000): 126.

military opposition on domestic political and economic issues; defend the president against

coups d'etat; maintain order in areas where the army or army elements might allow domestic

disturbances to fester; and lead military reform efforts designed to give the president clearer

legal authority over that institution.

Positions on political and economic reform. After Wahid's accession, the army found

itself at loggerheads with the president on a broad range of issues. Two that were more

domestic than strictly military included the debates over federalism vs. the unitary state and

privatization of the economy. On both issues, the navy was significantly more supportive of

the president's position.

Wahid's preferred plan for resolving the problem of separatism in the outer islands

was to transform the unitary republic into a federal one – though he was cautious about his

use of language in broaching the idea. In a December 1999 interview he stated, "The idea of

giving the people full autonomy, which is not very different from the federal system, can be

accepted…. We need a kind of federal state – in nature, but not in word."[630] Most army

officers were fiercely opposed. General Wiranto (then Coordinating Minister for Politics and

Security) said, "The form of the unitary Republic of Indonesia is final." He suggested that the

Wahid's comments on federalism – and specifically Wahid's plan to hold a referendum in

Aceh on the question of making it a federal state – were the president's personal opinion and

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[630] "Wahid Gives Insight Into Political Strategy", *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 22 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS.

did not represent state policy.[631] The army's spokesman, Major General Sudrajat, also voiced opposition, "(We) should not keep mentioning the idea of federalism, because we have experimented with the idea in the 1950s and it's not in line with our values." He added that the president's statements in support of federalism were personal and had not been made "as president."[632] (Wahid himself had made no such distinction.) Lieutenant General Agus Widjojo, TNI's territorial chief, argued that "a change in the state's system and structure will only enlarge the problem."[633]

Although naval leaders did not publicly support federalism per se, they did consistently back the president's softer line on regional issues, including greater autonomy for areas with long running separatist movements. In November 1999 Admiral Widodo argued, "The problems of Aceh are interconnected and cannot be solved from the security angle.... The proper way would be through communication to create a more conducive and positive atmosphere, which will hopefully allow for a dialogue."[634] In May 2001, he explained that military measures in Aceh could only be one part of the government's approach, which also must include "early enactment of the law on special autonomy for Aceh, the supremacy of the law, [and] the rehabilitation of conflict-affected Aceh."[635] Rear Admiral Freddy Numbery,

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[631] "Aceh: Jakarta's Big Headache," *Asiaweek*, November 26 1999.

[632] "Indonesia Armed Forces Warn Against Federalism", *AFX*, November 17 1999.

[633] "Indonesian Military Accepts Federalism", *The Straits Times (Singapore)*, December 7 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS.

[634] "Indonesia's Widodo Says to Soften Aceh Security Policy, Suggests Dialogue", *AFX*, November 4 1999, in LEXIS-NEXIS.

[635] "Military Chief Calls for Proportional Measures to Deal with Separatist Movement in Aceh", *Antara*, May 3 2001, in Lexis-Nexis.

serving as Wahid's State Minister for State Apparatus Reform, lent support to the president's

conciliatory policies by admitting that the military had been involved in human rights abuses

in Irian Jaya (an unusual admission among military officers) and urging a less heavily military

approach in the future.

The navy was also more inclined to support liberal economic reforms and corporate

privatization than the army, despite the fact that the navy, like the army, was involved in

quasi-state enterprises. After coming to office, Wahid's Finance and Economics Coordinating

Minister, Kwik Kian Gie, strongly supported cooperation with the IMF, and he used the 1998

agreement with that organization as a template for economic reforms designed to steadily

privatize state companies and encourage the return of foreign capital.[636] The army was among

those groups most strongly opposed to privatization, and army officers were used to walk in

and intimidate managers at the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA).[637] The

army's self-image provided some rationalization for army opposition, enabling the individuals

involved to believe that more than self-interest was at stake. Army officers justified their

involvement in business as necessary to "indigenize" the economy – i.e., use joint ventures

with ethnic Chinese businessmen to promote the development of indigenous Indonesian

management.[638] Widodo and the navy, on the other hand, explicitly called for an end to the

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[636] "Politics Gets in the Way of Indonesian Economy", *Straits Times*, April 3 2000. Wahid also appointed an Investment and Privatization Minister.

[637] "Indonesia's Hasty Survival Strategy," *Business Week*, October 16 2000.

[638] On this point, see the assessment of the army's self-rationalization for business involvement in "Gus Dur Struggles to Control TNI", *The Jakarta Post*, September 28 2000, in LEXIS-NEXIS.

military's dual function and said that the military should focus exclusively on defense against foreign threats and phase out internal security duties.[639]

The navy's role in regime protection, domestic stability, and military reform. Both Wahid and his defense minister, Juwono, were well aware of service differences on domestic preferences. They set about to use the navy and naval officers to protect the new regime from the possibility of an army coup d'etat and what they (probably rightly) regarded as the larger threat of army-engineered instability and a creeping coup d'etat – i.e., the threat that the army would foster or permit instability in the expectation that civilians would then once again desire or invite the military to play a larger political role. Juwono also turned to the navy to promote and implement reforms within the military that they hoped would ultimately modify the domestic capabilities and preferences of the army.

(1) Deterring a direct seizure of power by the army. Modern Indonesian history records few military attempts to seize power outright through coups d'etat.[640] And if army officers did plot coups against Wahid during his reign, none moved to action. But, faced with a military establishment that was used to sharing power, precedent alone offered little comfort

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[639] "Widodo Wants TNI to Shed Political Role", *The Hindu*, April 21 2000, in LEXIS-NEXIS.

[640] The two cases that might plausibly be defined as attempted or real coups d'etat (as traditionally defined) are the communist-connected revolt on September 30 1965 and Suharto's seizure of power two years later. In the former case, however, it was unclear that the rebels intended to assume power themselves or merely eliminate military opponents they thought might launch a pogrom against Indonesia's communist organizations. And in the latter case, it was unclear if the troops which frightened an already spooked Sukarno into ceding his power were deployed as part of conscious plan by Suharto, or whether he simply took advantage of the president's predicament. (The troops involved wore no insignia and were never identified.) But despite the paucity of coups d'etat as strictly defined, there have been several groups of officers who have demanded concessions on specific issues.

to Indonesia's first democratically elected leader in over forty years. Rumors of military

plotting and coups d'etat spread through Jakarta several times during Wahid's presidency, at

one time becoming serious enough that U.S. and Australian officials publicly warned

potential participants against such a move.[641] The army's attitude, reflected in its public

pronouncements, was not particularly reassuring. When Wahid attempted to remove a pro-

status quo army general, Sudradjat, as TNI spokesman in late December 1999, he refused to

stand down, and army officers explained his refusal on the grounds that it was "not certain yet

whether the President was in the right state of mind" when he made the order.[642]

Certainly, Wahid and his advisors took the possibility of coups d'etat seriously from

the first days of his presidency, and the navy was an important part of their plans for deterring

a coup. Less than a month after taking office, Defense Minister Juwono appealed to the

political parties to develop mechanisms for civil control of the military and warned of a

Pakistan-style military takeover should they fail.[643] Two weeks later, he announced that the

marine corps would be expanded from two brigades to three (six battalions to nine). Marine

manpower would be increased 77%, from 13,000 to 23,000, suggesting that it's support

elements, including both mobility and firepower, would be enhanced far beyond the number

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[641] "U.S. Warns Indonesian Forces Against Coup", *Australian Business Intelligence (ABIX)*, January 17 2000, in LEXIS-NEXIS. On rumors of coups, see also "TNI: A Loose Cannon", *The Jakarta Post*, January 3 2000. Seth Mydans, "Indonesia Army Chief Says He Opposes a Coup", *New York Times*, February 5 2000. "Reforming the Military", *The Jakarta Post*, October 13 2000. Coup rumors circulated in, at least, January and February 2000, when Wahid was considering removing Wiranto as Coordinating Minister for Security, and in October 2000, when he was considering making additional personnel changes.

[642] "Can the Soldiers Still Call the Shots?" *The Straits Times*, January 2 2000.

[643] "Sudarsono Warns Politicians of Pakistan-Style Takeover", *Antara News Agency*, November 22 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1122.

of maneuver elements. In keeping with its expanded organization, the marine corps

commander was promoted from two-star rank to three-star rank, putting him on par with the

commander of Kostrad (Central Reserve) and above the two-star commanders of Kopassus

(Special Forces) and the Java Kodam commander.[644] And, highlighting the fact that marine

corps growth was not simply part of a larger expansion of centrally available reserve forces, it

was announced that Kopassus would be cut from their current level of 6,000 troops to just

over 5,000.[645]

The marine corps, especially in its expanded form, was a powerful deterrent against a

coup by any military force except perhaps by several major commands acting together. Apart

from the navy's marine corps itself, the three commands with easy access to Jakarta include:

Kopassus (the Special Forces), Kostrad (Central Reserve troops), and the Java Kodam

(Military Area Command).[646] Counting only maneuver elements (infantry and armor), special

forces command totaled four battalions, central reserve had twenty-three battalions, and the

Java military area command had five. While the central reserve maintains more battalions

than the marines, its personnel strength, 27,000, is not much greater than that of the expanded

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[644] "TNI AL Marine Corps to be Strengthened by 10,000 Pers", *Republika (Internet)*, December 9 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1208. A more recent report suggests that the marine corps may actually triple in size over the next five years. "Indonesian Military Plans to Add Personnel/Arsenal", *The Jakarta Post*, February 11 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0211.

[645] One report suggests that Kopassus might be reduced to 1,000 men. While not very credible, even the fact that such rumors may be making the rounds suggests a major reversal of fortune for the Special Forces command. "Wahid Moves to Seal Power", *The Australian Financial Review (Internet)*, February 29 2000, in FBIS-AFP-2000-0228. The 5,000-man figure was reported on CNN international, March 9, 2000.

[646] Kusnanto Anggoro, of Jakarta's Center for Strategic and International Studies, has also made this point. "Gus Dur's Statement Does Not Rattle TNI", *Kompas (internet)*, February 9 2000.

marine corps will be.[647] Moreover, much of the central reserve force is on rotation to the

outer islands at any given time. Although the same may be true of the marine corps, the

navy's control of the sea would give the marines an advantage in a fight for Jakarta. And of

course, naval warships and aircraft might provide additional direct support during operations,

especially along the coastal areas of Java.

In addition to expanding the marine corps, Wahid also used navy and air force officers

on his personal staff to provide him with intelligence on domestic military threats. This was

apparent during his final confrontation with Wiranto. Wahid announced Wiranto's removal in

February 2000 while the president was on a 17-day tour of Asian and European capitals.

With coup rumors rife, Wahid made it clear that he was tracking Wiranto's movements and

activities in minute detail.[648] This information almost certainly came to him via two trusted

officers – one navy and one air force – who accompanied him on his trip.[649] During Wahid's

stop in Seoul, a Korean daily wrote that "Wahid's place in politics seems firm as his nation's

air force and navy is standing by him, weakening the defiant Indonesian army's power."[650]

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[647] On force strengths and deployments, see Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 85-101.

[648] The president, for example, announced the specific house address where Wiranto had met informally with military supporters and suggested that such meetings were inappropriate. "Indonesia: Wiranto Suspension Poses Questions", *Jawa Pos*, February 16 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0216. "Indonesia: Those Behind Wahid", *The Jakarta Post*, February 29 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0229.

[649] The first of these individuals was a naval intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel Juanda, with whom the president had enjoyed a close relationship for many years. The second was Air Rear Marshal Budy Santoso, Wahid's military secretary. "Gus Dur Dismisses Reports of Daughters' Influence", *The Jakarta Post*, February 19 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0219. Santoso's role has been criticized by Islamic politicians and journalists. "Mounting Criticism of President's Advisers", *Republika*, February 10 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0210.

[650] "Economic Issues Dominate ROK, Indonesian Presidents Summit", *Yonhap*, February 10 2000, in FBIS-KPP-2000-0210.

(2) <u>Defense against a creeping coup d'etat.</u> The navy was also used to help prevent a slow motion (or creeping) coup d'etat – i.e., to minimize the probability that the army might be able to selectively exacerbate the security situation in such a way as to create the conditions for its own return.

Most Indonesian analysts have regarded the danger of a creeping coup as being greater than a simple seizure of power. While the army had been largely discredited among significant segments of the population, the commitment by the Indonesian people to civilian rule may not be as deeply rooted or immutable as it is in many other countries. According to a 1997 survey of Jakarta's middle class, 81% of respondents opposed the military's dual function. But fully 57% believed that "in emergency situations such as civil war and separatist rebellion," the president should be an active military figure.[651] In an interview in Jakarta at the end of December 1999, former Army Chief of Staff Rudini said that if the situation in the country becomes chaotic, "the TNI [military] will take over security responsibility." A reporter's follow-up question – unanswered by the officer – asked, "What will happen if the TNI itself creates a chaotic situation?"[652]

There is a long history of manipulated crises in Indonesian civil-military relations, including several documented and several other suspected examples. Suharto almost certainly manipulated and supported a broad network of well-organized groups in March 1966

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[651] "Kompas Opinion Poll on Armed Forces Image", *Kompas Online*, October 4 1998. The wording of the actual survey questions was not reproduced in the article itself, so there is some uncertainty about specifics.

[652] "Former Indonesian Army Chief Rules Out Military Coup", *Detik (Internet)*, December 31 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1230.

pressuring President Sukarno to cede additional powers to the military in the hopes of securing, among other things, his own personal safety.[653] In 1974 General Sumitro engineered riots by Jakarta's poor against Japanese investment in part to undermine Suharto on economic issues around which the army and civilian integral nationalists agreed.[654] Although the facts of more recent cases remain murky, the anti-Chinese riots across Indonesia in May 1998 appear to have been orchestrated by army elements, perhaps to discredit liberal student protests occurring simultaneously. And the material support provided by the Indonesian special forces for the East Timor militias' depredations in 1999 was probably calculated as much to send a message to Habibie about making decisions (in this case on autonomy) without consulting the army as it was to intimidate separatists.

Since early 2000 a new combination of forces has emerged with considerable potential to affect a creeping coup d'etat. The threat derives from a loose alliance between hardline Islamic political leaders and dissatisfied army elements. The civilian half of this coalition coalesced in early January 2000, when the four non-NU Islamic parties (i.e., those not affiliated with Wahid) announced that they would merge into a single party, the Indonesian Council of Ulemas (MUI), for the next election. With conflicts pitting Christians against Muslims in Maluku, Timor, and Lombok, the MUI immediately set about to position the party as the defender of Muslims throughout the archipelago.[655] It supported a call by the Laskar

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[653] Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, 179-96.

[654] Ibid., 312-17.

[655] "Four Indonesian Islamic Parties Plan to Merge", *Antara News Agency*, January 7 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0107. After the resolution of the East Timor situation, the biggest Christian-Muslim conflict was in the Malukus, where Christians were fighting the settlement of non-natives onto the island. In mid-January 2000, the

Jihad, a radical Muslim group, to go to the Maluku Islands and fight Christians – a crusade

that Wahid said represented a threat to the survival of the state and existing social order.[656] In

a bid to win the support of dissatisfied army elements, it also called on the military to take a

more aggressive stance toward threats to national unity and advocated disbanding the

National Commission on Human Rights.[657] Even as the MUI sowed the seeds of instability in

the Malukus, however, Amien Rais, one of the party's leaders and chairman of the MPR,

issued an ultimatum to Wahid giving him two weeks to settle the situation there.[658]

In January 2000 President Wahid accused renegade military officers of cooperating

with radical Muslims in the province in order to perpetuate their authority within the state:

"Those Muslim militants [and] those generals who are not satisfied would like to rule

forever."[659] Suharto had promoted a "green" (i.e., Islamic) faction within the army during the

1990s. The group included Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, the commander of the

strategic reserve in May 1998 and the man widely suspected of having orchestrated the anti-

Chinese riots that swept Indonesia later that month.[660]

AFP estimated that 1,700 people had been killed and 2,300 injured since clashes began in the Malukus. "800 Said Missing as Spice Island Clashes Continue", *AFP*, January 12 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0112.

[656] "Ulemas Council Backs Muslim Youth Call for Maluku Jihad", *Antara*, January 15 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0115. "Wahid Says Jihad Group Should Be Kept Out of Maluku", *Antara*, January 11 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0111.

[657] "Ulemas Council Backs Muslim Youth Call for Maluku Jihad".

[658] "Amien Claims Wahid to Solve Ambon Issue in '1-2 Weeks'", *Detik (Internet)*, January 7 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0106.

[659] "Wahid Threatened by New Alliance", *Business Times*, January 27 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0127.

[660] An official government investigation of the rioting, conducted under Habibie's tenure as president, found that Prabowo "might have been involved in the riots." "Government Promulgates Latest Facts on Rape During

After Wahid's succession military elements, especially from the army, continued to take sides in local conflicts.[661] The leader of the Laskar Jihad stated in May 2000 that the chief of the Diponegoro regional military command (responsible for eastern Java), Bibit Waluyo, had given the organization a green light to send its fighters to Maluku – an accusation the general denied but for which there was circumstantial evidence.[662] Whether or not the army expressly backed the Jihad group's actions, some of its senior officers have clearly been less than fully proactive in addressing disturbances. Brigadier General Max Tamaela, the military area commander responsible for Maluku, for example, said in April 2000 that the "planned visit to Maluku by the Jihad group was a positive thing, provided that the group's intentions were good."[663] (At the time, the Jihad was openly running paramilitary training camps for recruits headed to Maluku.) When sectarian warfare broke out in June, Tamaela offered excuses for his own soldier's passive stance, twisting the work of Indonesia's human rights commission in arguing that "soldiers were hesitating in taking firm action as they fear legal charges may be brought against them in the future if they open fire on mobs."[664]

Rioting", *The Jakarta Post*, December 22 1998, in Lexis-Nexis. Public opinion and the press see a more certain connection.

[661] "Soldiers Involved in Massacre: General", *The Australian*, February 1 2000, in Lexis-nexis. "Shooting Incident in Ambon Involving Security Forces Personnel", *Tempo*, December 28 2001, in FBIS-SEP-2001-1228.

[662] "General Denies Approving Jihad Mission to Ambon", *Antara*, May 11 2000, in Lexis-Nexis. The two did meet each other around the time that the Jihad leader said, but the general denied giving permission. According to Bibit, he suggested the organization provide moral and material contributions.

[663] "Officials View Maluku Unrest, Threat of Holy War", *Suara Merdeka*, April 13 2000, in Lexis-Nexis.

[664] "Ambon Now Resembles Battlefield", *The Jakarta Post*, June 26 2000. In Irian Jaya, attacks on foreigners have been perpetrated with M-16s, weapons that the rebels there do not have in any numbers, and the recent

Wahid and his Defense Minister, Juwono, used the navy and marine corps to minimize

the prospects for military mischief and a creeping coup d'etat. The navy, on its own accord,

worked toward this end during the leadership transition itself. According to one account in

the liberal media, the navy's chief of staff in May 1998, Admiral Arief Kushariadi, bypassed

Central Reserve Commander Lieutenant General Prabowo (the army officer who ostensibly

had operational control over marine units in Jakarta) and personally directed marine units that

suppressed the anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta.[665] Some speculated that Prabowo had sponsored

the riots to discredit liberal student protesters.

The subsequent expansion of the navy and promotion of its officers to senior TNI

positions allowed the navy to take on more tasks. In line with the more moderate position of

their commanders, marine units appear to have maintained relatively good relations with local

populations in Maluku, Aceh, and elsewhere.[666] In an interview in August 2000 U.S.

Ambassador to Indonesia Robert Gelbard drew a sharp contrast between the behavior of the

army on the one hand and the navy and air force on the other, and he urged the U.S.

government to rethink its blanket prohibition on military-to-military contacts. He said the

army had had a "clear breakdown in the chain of command" from Aceh in the west to Maluku

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bombing in Bali was carried out using C-4 explosives, in both cases raising questions about the origins of the offending weapons and the motives for the attacks.

[665] *Is This the Real Story Behind the May 98 Riot?* (http://www.indonesiamedia.com/rubrik/english/english00october-riotstory.htm, 2000 [cited September 18 2002]).

[666] In Maluku, Laskar Jihad has accused the marines of taking sides with the Christians – a good indication of their sensitivity toward the indigenous population. On Aceh, see "Ex Marine Chief Suspects External Forces in Aceh Killings", *Berita Buana (Internet)*, January 28 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0128.

in the east. But, he argued, "I think it is useful and important for us to consider relationships with certain parts of the military under certain circumstances, particularly starting with the navy, marines and air force."[667] As of this writing, the United States has generally followed Gelbard's prescription, restarting its military-to-military contact first with naval and air exercises while taking a more cautious approach towards engaging the Indonesian army.

While the navy cannot be all places at all times and hence has limits in the degree to which it could impede a creeping coup d'etat, its utility can nevertheless be seen in the conflict in the Malukus. Immediately after Laskar Jihad declared war on the Christians on the island, the navy imposed a blockade on the island, using both warships and Nomad surveillance aircraft, confiscating weapons from jihad participants, as well as from professional gunrunners delivering weapons to Christians.[668] Shortly thereafter, TNI Commander Admiral Widodo visited the island to stiffen resolve, stating that military units there must remain "professional, neutral, firm, and impartial."[669] At the end of February, Admiral Widodo helped facilitate the replacement of Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Suaidy Marasabessy, a "green" officer favored by the MUI and Laskar Jihad.[670] His replacement, Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago, took a more proactive line in confronting

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[667] Richard S. Ehrlich, "Indonesia's Security Efforts Off Target U.S. Envoy", *The Washington Times*, August 29 2000.

[668] "Indonesian Navy Blockades Ambon Port", *Associated Press (AFX)*, January 7 2000`, in Lexis-Nexis. "Navy Sent in to Halt Maluku Gun Runners", *AFP*, July 17 2000, in Lexis-Nexis.

[669] "TNI Chief Orders Troops in Ambon to be Neutral", *Bali Post*, January 10 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0110.

[670] "Subaidy's Dismissal Gets Strong Reaction in Ambon", *Antara*, February 28 2000, in Lexis-Nexis. After his removal, the general attended an Islamic congress that was held – with the predictable result of provoking intense Christian anger – in Maluku in June 2001. "Islamic Congress to Open on Tuesday", *The Jakarta Post*, June 19 2001, in Lexis-Nexis.

the Jihad. Chaniago established a special "mixed battalion" – comprised of troops from the

navy's marine corps, the air force's special troops corps, and the army's special forces for use

in the Malukus. Once there, the battalion conducted aggressive sweeps for weapons among

Laskar Jihad elements that had established themselves on the island and occasionally

engaging in firefights with Jihad members.[671] The composition of the force, in a theater

where 90 percent of the forces were army, is notable – it was mixed, presumably to avoid

accusations by the MUI against any particular service, but largely non-army. The navy's

perceived reliability in the Malukus was also demonstrated by the fact that the marines

provided security for both TNI Commander Admiral Widodo and Vice President Megawati

during separate visits to the island.[672]

(3) Deflecting army opposition to military reform. The third area of naval support to

Wahid and his reform agenda was in bypassing or defeating army opposition to military

reform. While the 1945 Constitution is vague on the military's legal authority, some military

officers have publicly advanced interpretations of that document that give their institution

powerful legal prerogatives under the rubric of *dwifungsi*, or the military's "duel function."

The army's defense of prerogative was particular intense in the area of personnel

appointments. In late February 2000, when President Wahid was making military personnel

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[671] "Elite Indonesian Troops Head to Malukus", *Japan Economic Newswire*, August 8 2000, in Lexis-Nexis. "Jihad Legion Urges Government to Withdraw Joint Battalion From Ambon", *Antara*, January 30 2001, in Lexis-Nexis.

[672] "Two Warships to Secure Megawati's Visit to N. Maluku", *Antara*, December 21 2000, in Lexis-Nexis. "TNI Chief Orders Troops in Ambon to be Neutral".

changes designed to undermine General Wiranto's base of power within the military and

install people loyal to the government, Wiranto and his allies appealed to the sanctity of the

Wanjakti. The Wanjakti, or military's Board of Highest Function, is a collegial body with

responsibility for all senior military personnel appointments. The president could not, they

argued, make personnel changes without the Wanjakti's approval.[673] Given both legal

ambiguity and, more importantly, the military's broad insistence over its prerogatives,

President Wahid did not publicly challenge the military directly over their right to manage its

own personnel issues. Rather, he said, "I [have] never *interfered* with the military transfers

whether they were in the Indonesian Army, Airforce, or Navy." [674]

The broader argument advanced by these army officers to justify their position on

personnel issues was that the president did not, under the constitution, have day-to-day

authority over military management in any area. Even prior to Suharto's fall, the military had

developed a doctrine that emphasized loyalty to the constitution, rather than to the person who

occupied the Presidency.[675] And shortly after Wahid took office, TNI spokesman Major

General Sudrajat stated that the president was not, under the Constitution, the supreme

commander.[676] Article 10, which specifies the authority of the President, states that "the

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[673] "Wiranto at Commission I of Parliament: 'No Self-Defense Effort", *Kompas Online*, March 2 2000.
Although Wahid announced the removal of General Wiranto (as coordinating minister for security) in early
February 2000, the president, under pressure from Wiranto's allies in the army, allowed the general to remain in
office until the commission on human rights completed its investigation of army actions in Timor in 1999.

[674] "Wahid Admits 'Interference' in Military Transfers", *Detik*, March 1 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0301.

[675] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 64.

[676] "Labor Leader: Hint of Military Coup in Spokesman's Remark", *Detik (Internet)*, December 30 1999, in
FBIS-FTS-1999-1229.

President shall hold supreme authority over the Army, Navy and the Air Force." But this was interpreted by Sudrajat and other status quo army officers as granting the president emergency authority only, rather than actual authority over the day-to-day management of TNI internal affairs. Although Sudrajat's statement aroused a great deal of controversy among civilians and ultimately resulted in his removal, his ideas were widespread throughout the service. Beyond their questioning of the president's authority over military management, pro-status quo army officers also fought to maintain their allotted seats in parliament and to defend the army's territorial system, which gives the army social and political influence at the lowest societal levels.

As TNI commander, Admiral Widodo helped President Wahid to mitigate some of the constitutional and legal challenges posed by conservative army officers. On article 10 of the constitution, dealing with whether or not the president is the commander in chief, he suggested that if the constitution were ambiguous, an amendment should be passed clarifying the president's effective control over the military.[677] He threw the moral weight of his office behind a successful effort by liberal parliamentarians to phase out the military's involvement in parliament, with seats in the lower house eliminated in 2004 and those in the upper house to be phased out by 2009.[678] And Widodo backed less productive efforts to end the territorial system and the larger system of *dwifungsi*.[679]

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[677] "TNI to Leave Parliament in 2004", *Kompas (Internet)*, February 26 2000.

[678] "Indonesian Military Ready to Withdraw from Parliament by 2004", *Agence France Presse*, February 25 2000, in Lexis-Nexis. "TNI to Leave Parliament in 2004". While this solution was less proactive in quickly eliminated the military from politics than some civilian proposals, which called for the military to be completely phased out in 2004, it was nevertheless more forthcoming than the position maintained by most army officers –

Of most practical value in the short term, Admiral Widodo, as the chairman of the

Wanjakti (a position always held by the TNI commander), was instrumental in replacing

officers of questionable loyalty to the civilian regime with supporters. Many of the new

appointments went to navy and air force officers, virtually all of whom proved to be firm

supporters of the reform agenda. Two weeks after the comments by TNI spokesman Major

General Sudrajat challenging the president's authority under article 10 of the constitution,

Admiral Widodo replaced Sudrajat with the air force's Air Rear Marshal Graito Husodo.[680]

He also appointed Vice Air Marshal Ian Santoso Perdanakusumah as the first non-Army

officer to occupy the politically critical post of Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS) chief.[681]

In addition to placing naval and air force officers, Widodo also reached into the army

officer ranks to promote liberal officers ahead of their peers. For example, he selected Major

General Agus Wirahadikusumah, who had written a book in October 1999 advocating an end

to the territorial system, as the new Kostrad (strategic reserve) chief in January 2000.[682] And

one month later he replaced the "green" (Islamic) Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant

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that being that the military should remain engaged in both houses of parliament with some reduction in the number of seats.

[679] For a summary of where the territorial system stands now and the lack of progress in its abolition over the last four years, see John McBeth, "Indonesia: The Military Fans Out," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (2002).

[680] "Labor Leader: Hint of Military Coup in Spokesman's Remark". "Indonesian President Replaces Senior TNI Spokesman", *The Jakarta Post*, January 14 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0113. "Indonesia's Wahid Sidelines Generals", *NRC Handelsblad*, January 15 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0117.

[681] "New Indonesian Intelligence Chief Installed", *Detik (Internet)*, January 21 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0121.

[682] "New Kostrad Commander's Biography Profiled", *Suara Pembaruan*, February 29 2000; "Wahid Moves to Seal Power". Major General Agus published a book calling for the end of the military dual function in October 1999.

General Suaidy Marasabessy, who appeared to be stirring up trouble in Maluku, with the more neutral Lieutenant General Djamari Chaniago. These transfers brought criticisms from army quarters of foul play, specifically of President Wahid's "interference" in army management. But the fact that the transfers were executed by TNI chief Admiral Widodo and defended as such by the TNI's new spokesman Air Rear Marshal Graito Usodo dampened the impact of these accusations.[683]

Army divisions and alternatives to the navy? As some of Widodo's army appointments suggest, there were some liberal army officers in the force. Could President Wahid have used individuals from the army to lead the reform effort, rather than using the navy and, to a lesser extent, the air force to spearhead reform? The answer is that it would have been difficult at best. Appointing Admiral Widodo, who was already the deputy commander of TNI, was significantly less controversial than reaching beyond the army's chief of staff deep into the army's hierarchy to select a new TNI commander.[684] There were few if any good candidates among army three and four star officers. The army's commander at the time was an unreformed officer from the Suharto era and was on record as being against most of the military and political reforms sought by Wahid and his civilian defense minister Juwono.[685]

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[683] "Strategic TNI Functions Communicated by the TNI Commander to the President", *Kompas (Internet)*, February 29 2000.

[684] When Wahid was contemplating the replacement Widodo with Agus when the former was nearing retirement, conservative army officers argued that the new replacement would have to be a serving or former service commander.

[685] The army's commander, Subagyo Hadisiwoyo, was pointedly against significant changes to dwifungsi and the territorial system. He was, he said, against "hasty, aimless, indiscriminate, unconstitutional, radical, or revolutionary reforms." In the political lexicon of the day (June 1998), the statement clearly placed him among

Ultimately, with Admiral Widodo in place as the TNI commander, the government

promoted Tyasno Sudarto, the former head of military intelligence and an individual known

to be more sympathetic to reform than his predecessor. But even Tyasno, like most in the

army's "reform faction" prior to 1999, was bent on cleaning the system rather than

transforming it. He offered to make some changes to the territorial system and the

understanding of dwifungsi. But his proposed adjustments were relatively minor, and his

rationale suggested little desire to go much further than he actually did: "We are returning to

our original mission of winning the people's hearts."[686]

The career of General Wiranto is also instructive. General Wiranto became known as

a staunch military conservative and threat to liberal government by the time he was removed

as coordinating minister for security in February 2000. But when he became TNI commander

in February 1998, he was known as a progressive, pro-reform officer associated with the "red

and white" faction. Intense pressure from status quo officers combined with little desire to

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those seeking to defend the existing order against liberal challenges. "Indonesian General: Army Against 'Radical' Reform", *Media Indonesia*, June 22 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0622. He had also sponsored the creation of a 40,000 strong civilian militia force during Habibie's tenure. "Indonesia to Start Training 40,000-strong Militia Next Month", *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, January 6 1999, in Lexis-Nexis.

[686] "TNI to Study Territorial Function", *The Jakarta Post*, March 3 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0302. Sudarto's proposed changes included eliminating territorial commands on Java, while maintaining those on the outer islands. He also proposed focusing more on social issues than expressly political ones. But he offered little guidance about how the military would maintain strict separation of social and political policy at the local level. Also, despite later offers to eliminate the territorial commands on Java, he stepped down from his post in August 2000 having actually created more commands than he eliminated. (He took an instrumental role in expanding the number from ten to seventeen in December 1999.) "Indonesian Military Chief Responds to Officer's Criticism", *Kompas (Internet)*, December 16 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1216.

fundamentally change the ruling system (as opposed to attacking corruption within it) ultimately made him a major obstacle to Wahid's reform program.[687]

There were committed liberal officers in the army, but in 1999 they were far enough down in the hierarchy that they could not rise without outside assistance. The highest-ranking officer in this category was a major general, Agus Wirahadikusumah, a Harvard educated officer of thoroughly Western outlook.[688] Even with backing from Wahid, Juwono, and Widodo, however, Agus was twice removed from key assignments and dispatched to less meaningful posts – once from the army's planning section to the command of the Sulawesi military region (far from Jakarta) and once from the command of Kostrad (the strategic reserve) to an over-strength position without title.[689] He died under mysterious circumstances in August 2001.[690] The existence of liberal officers like Agus indicates that once reform was firmly on track, it might have been possible for army officers to take the lead in continuing reform or consolidating gains, but for the first phase, the use of the navy provided critical leverage for jumpstarting the process.

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[687] Wiranto's erratic behavior, vacillating between hard and soft positions, during the events from May 1998 to October 1999, are discussed earlier in this chapter, as is the perceived threat that Wiranto represented to Wahid during early 2000. For the pre-1998 view of Wiranto as a reformer, see Sander Thoenes, "Voice of Moderation Who is 'Ready for a Dialogue': Unlike His Predecessor, Wiranto Might Not Threaten to Shoot Demonstrators", *Financial Times*, March 14 1998.

[688] On Agus' call for reform, see "TNI Officers Call for End to Military's Dual Function", *Jakarta Post*, October 29 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1029. Note that this Agus is not the same man as Agus Widjojo, a conservative army officer and one of the former's nemeses.

[689] "Indonesian Army Chief Subagyo Defends TNI Reshuffle", *The Jakarta Post*, November 10 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1109. Wahid, who clearly favored Agus, probably concurred in these assignments in exchange for concessions from status quo officers on other assignments.

[690] Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, 296.

With or without the navy leading reform, the navy would have been a critical part of

the reform coalition. It offered not only willing reformers of three and four star rank but also

a complete menu of supporting organizations: combat arms, intelligence, and logistics. And

unlike the army, even its mid-ranking and junior officers supported the liberal reform agenda.

Middle Class (and Protestant) Navalism vs. Islamic Militancy. After 1997, and

especially after Wahid's accession in 1999, as differences in the political-economic outlook of

the two services became more apparent, contending social groups became increasingly aware

of those differences and the implications of those differences for their own political and

economic interests.

Newspapers aimed largely at urban middle-class readerships were more active in

reporting on naval developments than were either regional or Islamic newspapers. The

editorial slant of the Protestant newspaper, *Suara Pembaruan*, was consistently among the

most supportive of maritime strategy. A December 1999 article, for example, argued the need

for naval expansion:

> "Everyone knows that as the largest archipelagic nation in the world with
> about 17,000 islands and two-thirds of its territory consisting of waters,
> Indonesia must in theory have a strong navy. However, the facts show that the
> expansion of the ABRI [Indonesia's armed forces] since the establishment of
> the republic has focused more on the army only."[691]

Middle class media outlets have been quick to highlight the navy's liberal leanings. *Media*

Indonesia, for example, a website aimed at middle class Javanese, posted a story about

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[691] "Daily Comments on Lack of Operational Navy Warships", *Suara Pembaruan (Internet)*, December 9 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1210. Another example of the newspapers editorial leaning is "Indonesian Navy to Restructure Primary Naval Bases", *Suara Pembaruan*, February 9 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0210.

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Admiral Arief Kushariadi stepping in to stop anti-Chinese riots in May 1998 – with the disclaimer that the article was based on "unconfirmed but reliable sources." In September 2000 Jakarta's English language paper, *The Jakarta Post*, published an editorial under the title "Send in the Marines," suggesting that the marines lacked the army's ideological baggage and should be used to disarm the militia elements who had fled from East Timor to West Timor.[692]

The interests of media outlets targeting santri (strict) Muslim audiences highlighted entirely different aspects of military affairs. The newspaper *Republika*, affiliated with the Indonesian Muslim intellectuals Association (ICMI), all but ignored naval issues. On the other hand, it bemoaned conspiracies to divide the military and to discredit such army organizations as *Kopassus* (Special Forces) and *Kostrad* (Strategic Reserve). The *Republika* reported on the general "increasing resentment" within the ranks of the military about the President's "interference" in military affairs, and decried Wahid's practice of using informal military advisors to circumvent established channels.[693] In February 2000, it quoted Lieutenant General Arie J. Kumaat, the head of the Indonesian Intelligence Coordination Agency (Bakin) as saying that he did not know where the President got his information: "The President can get information from anywhere. Anyone can talk to the President now." The same article warned that given the confused state of the President's information, the "TNI would eventually become indifferent to the various security and defense issues facing the nation now and in the future."[694]

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[692] "Send in the Marines", *Jakarta Post*, September 13 2000, in LEXIS-NEXIS.

[693] "Indonesian Dailies on Military/Civilian Relations", *Republika*, January 25 2000, in FBIS-FTS-2000-0125.

[694] "Mounting Criticism of President's Advisers".

STRATEGIC CHANGE

Under Suharto the dominance of the Indonesian army and its continental strategy was never in doubt. The navy did stabilize its fleet size and add some new capabilities during the 1980s, after a precipitous decline in fleet size and power after Sukarno's fall in 1967. But the army's dominance was reconfirmed during the 1990s, when the army's size was expanded but almost nothing done to strengthen the fleet. Only after Wahid's accession to president in October 1999, was this situation reversed. Under Wahid, doctrine and basing plans changed to reflect greater weight on maritime defense; a relative shift occurred away from continental and toward maritime forces; and the navy was able to strengthen its intellectual and public relations infrastructure by building naval-related think tanks.

THE SERVICES AND TOTAL PEOPLE'S DEFENSE (1978-1998). Between 1978 and 1998 "total people's defense" (*sishankamrata*), a strategy that relied primarily on guerilla resistance against all but minor incursions, continued to serve as the basis for Indonesian defense planning.[695] The navy and air force were, under this strategic conception, relegated to supporting roles and organized primarily to operate within the archipelago, rather than to fight at or beyond its maritime frontiers. Nevertheless, there were differences in strategic emphasis at different times within this period. The navy and air force fared relatively better during the first decade of this period than they did during the second – despite a better aggregate military budget picture during the 1990s and the growth of maritime frictions with China.

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[695] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, xxi.

Between 1978 and 1988, defense budgets fell from $4.4 billion to around $1.9 billion

in 1999 inflation adjusted dollars (or from about 3.1 percent of GDP to 1.6 percent).

Although much of this reduction can be attributed to the fall in oil prices and consequent loss

to the central budget, it also reflected Suharto's efforts during this period to reach out to other

groups in society and build alternative bases of support – of which economic reform and the

lifting of press restrictions were key components. Army end strength remained unchanged at

around 211,000, falling as a percentage of the population from 0.18 percent to around 0.13

percent. The navy, however, despite tight overall budgets, increased its manpower

marginally, from 39,000 to 43,000, and added seven frigates, bringing the total number of

operational frigates in the force from ten to seventeen. The "new" frigates were, in fact, old.

Six of them were Dutch Van Speijk-class warships built in the late 1960s. They did, however,

add significantly to Indonesia's naval capabilities. The Van Speijk class, at 2,800 tons, was

30 percent larger than the largest ships in the inventory during the 1970s. And their onboard

systems had been updated over the years and included anti-ship missiles, as well as capable

anti-aircraft weapons.

During the 1990s, the army once again took absolute priority, and the relative position

of the navy deteriorated. The twenty-five year plan promulgated in 1993 (covering 1994-

2019) called for a staggering 56 percent increase in army manpower. Ostensibly, the plan was

largely designed to narrow the gap between the doctrine – calling for a sergeant and enlisted

man in every one of Indonesia's villages – and reality. During the first five years of this plan,

the number of army personnel was to increase 15 percent, from 211,000 to 243,000. The

continuing importance of the "total people's defense" doctrine was highlighted by the fact that

the number of territorial battalions were to increase 11 percent by 1999, from 74 to 82, while

the number of central forces battalions was only raised 4 percent, from 23 to 24.[696] The

remainder of the personnel increase was to fill out under strength units, mostly in the

territorial forces. Between 1994 and early 1999, the twenty-five year plan and its heavy

emphasis on army strength was regularly reaffirmed.[697]

The army had long been unable to meet doctrinal demands for personnel in the

villages. There is, therefore, some question as to why Suharto decided to expand its strength

so dramatically in 1993. It is true that the ratio of manpower to population had fallen over

time. But the timing also coincided exactly with Suharto's retrenchments on economic and

social reforms – all of which angered the emerging middle class and weakened Suharto's

political position, especially in urban areas. Suharto reversed his previous efforts to reduce

his reliance on the military for support and fell back once again on that institution for support,

despite his sometimes uncomfortable relationship with it. Hence, although the military's

1993 plan and its implementation were consistent with a guerrilla defense strategy – as well as

with an integral nationalist conception of security – it was also almost certainly formulated

with an eye on regime security. And while other explanations (e.g., declining army

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[696] Ibid., 86.

[697] After the twenty-five year plan was put in place in 1993, statements affirming that expanding the number of territorial units and fleshing out their manpower was first priority in military budgets were released in November 1995, July 1997, and in January 1999. Leonard C. Sebastian, "Article analyzes Military White Paper", *Business Times*, November 25-26 1995, in FBIS-FTS-1995-1125. "Officer Discloses Planned Enlargement of Armed Forces", *Radio Republik Indonesia Network*, July 22 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-0722. "Indonesia to Strengthen ABRI's 'Territorial Presence'", *Media Indonesia*, January 6 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-0106.

manpower to population ratios) might be found for parts of the 1993 plan, concerns about regime security is the only plausible explanation for General Wiranto's announcement in December 1998 that a new 40,000 member civilian militia, *"equipped with cudgels and handcuffs"* would be established.[698]

Despite substantial new funds for the military during the 1990s, the navy did not fare well. Between 1988 and 1997, the defense budget increased from $1.9 billion to $4.9 billion in inflation-adjusted 1999 dollars (or from 1.6 percent of GDP to 2.2 percent). Yet the navy suffered numerous disappointments during the decade, and arguably ended period weaker in absolute terms than it was at the beginning of it. The only ships that Indonesia added to its inventory during the decade were 39 ships and patrol craft of the former East German navy. As a dramatic wholesale purchase of much of another state's naval force, that deal was taken by some East Asia observers as support for the idea that an arms race was underway in Asia.[699] But that purchase – a brainchild of the then Minister of Research and Technology B.J. Habibie – was hardly welcomed by the navy's leadership, which had originally proposed the purchase of 23 new frigates.[700]

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[698] "Jakarta to Start Recruiting Civilian Militia in January 1999".

[699] For example, Kent Calder notes argues under a section entitled "The Drift Towards 'Arms Race Asia'" that Indonesia is expanding rapidly in terms of defense spending over the 1990-96 period as it began deploying the entire East German navy. Calder, *Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific*, 140.

[700] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 98-99. Although the navy's chief of staff, Admiral Muhammad Arifin originally supported the East German purchase, he apparently changed his mind before the deal was finalized. John McBeth, "Techno-Battles: Habibie's Sway Over Weapons Purchases Irks Military," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, April 7 1994, 26. Much of the navy's unhappiness with the purchase stems from the fact that expected funds for refurbishment were slashed by around a third by the Finance Ministry. On taking delivery of the last two ships, Vice Admiral Arif Kushariadi's comments did not betray unbridled pleasure: he said that the ships would replace older types in the Indonesian navy and "therefore, our naval strength actually remains the

The largest and most important of the East German ships, 16 Parchim class corvettes, had been built between 1981 and 1985. They were similar in design to the Soviet Grisha class built in 1969 and 1970 and were criticized as being "clearance sale items" incorporating "worn out 1970s technology."[701] Unlike frigates acquired by the Indonesian navy during the 1980s, the Parachim lacked anti-ship missiles. There were even questions about whether they were seaworthy: An article appearing in the German press in 1999 reported, "Some of these completely outdated ships have already sunk."[702] The East German ships might have been suitable for patrolling the archipelago and were arguably consistent with the strategy of "total people's defense" (although the high cost of maintaining old ships draw even this assertion into question). But they hardly fulfilled the hopes of naval officers who had visions of rebuilding a blue water navy and whose minimum expectations included maintaining a navy built around frigates.

The 1994-2019 twenty-five-year plan did specify that Indonesia's submarine forces should be strengthened. But even in this area, the navy was sorely disappointed. In 1990 the Indonesian submarine force was comprised of two German type-209 submarines purchased in 1977. In 1992, Indonesia began negotiations with Germany to purchase two additional new

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same." "Navy Chief Commissions Ships Purchased From Germany", *Republika*, July 15 1996, in FBIS-FTS-1996-0715.

[701] See Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 19. McBeth, "Techno-Battles: Habibie's Sway Over Weapons Purchases Irks Military," 26-27.

[702] "Report Details FRG Armament Deal, Trade with Indonesia", *Die Woche*, September 17 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-0917. September 17, 1999, *Hamburg Die Woche*, FBIS-FTS 19990917000708.

type 209's – to be built at a German shipyard in Kiel.[703] Despite periodic statements of intent,

including an announcement by the naval chief of staff, Vice Admiral Arief Kushariadi that

Indonesia "had bought a new [type 209] submarine from Germany" and "hoped the new

submarine will arrive next year," negotiations were in fact inconclusive. In April 1997, the

decision on the type 209's was reversed entirely – almost certainly by B.J. Habibie – and the

navy announced that Indonesia would instead acquire five used German type 206's.[704] The

type 206 is one-third the size of the type 209 (450 tons against 1,390 tons); its range is only

slightly over half (4,500 against 8,200 NM); it has a shallower diving capability (159 against

240 meters); and the *newest* of the type 206 boats in question had been launched in 1973 and

was already twenty-four years old as the negotiations began. Even this purchase was,

however, cancelled in early 1998.[705]

Total naval tonnage (including corvettes over 500 tons) increased between 1990 and

1997. But the age of the fleet also increased and the average size of major surface combatants

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[703] "Germany to Build Submarines for RI [Republic of Indonesia]," *Indonesian Observer*, February 5, 1993, 1, cited in Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (1993/94). Richard Sharpe, *Jane's Fighting Ships* (Alexandria, Va.: Jane's Information Group, 1994), 296.

[704] The type 206 negotiation was first revealed in April 1997 by the Navy Information Service Head, Col Mualimin Santoso, who was responding to questions from reporters about negotiations about submarines with Germany. "Navy to Purchase Additional Submarines From Germany", *Kompas (Internet)*, April 19 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-0419. BJ Habibie, however, made the official announcement, immediately after the signing of the MoU with Germany in September 1997. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology, was acting at that time as the Chairman of the Procurement Team for Naval Ships. "Navy Decides to Buy Submarines From Germany", *Kompas (Internet)*, September 9 1997, in FBIS-FTS-1997-0909.

[705] In January 1998, Commander Armed Forces, Feisal Tanjung, announced that the submarine deal would be postponed. "Jakarta Delays Purchase of Russian Planes, German Subs", *Media Indonesia*, January 10 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0111.

decreased. The military's emphasis on the army was reflected in the navy's declining share of total military manpower, which fell from 15.2 percent to 14.4 percent.

NASCENT NAVALISM UNDER WAHID. Military priorities changed dramatically after Suharto's fall, especially after Wahid's accession to the presidency. The navy was the primary beneficiary. In addition to the promotion of naval officers to senior military posts, a subject discussed earlier in this chapter, naval progress under Wahid was manifested in three areas: (1) naval advocacy by political leaders and the ability to establish naval and maritime "information" centers, (2) a new, outward looking naval doctrine and basing scheme, and (3) plans for significant increases to naval (especially marine) manpower and additional funds for operational readiness.

The navy made some gains immediately after Suharto's fall – a full year before Wahid took office. During the first month of Habibie's presidency, the navy established a Foundation for Maritime Services, an organization that has since worked to publicize maritime strategy and the importance of the navy.[706] Admiral Widodo, then the navy's commander, wasted little time in propagandizing his service's cause: "Maritime natural resources," he said, "have potential to become the foundation of future national development if handled well." But, he warned, foreign poachers had stolen many of those resources, and greater efforts to defend Indonesia's maritime frontier were necessary.[707]

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[706] "Naval Officer: 6,000 Foreign Ships Catch Fish Illegally", *Antara News Agency*, November 2 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1102.

[707] "Habibie Opens New Economic Zones", *Suara Pembaruan*, September 27 1998, in FBIS-FTS-1998-0930.

President Wahid's accession provided further opportunities for the navy. The president's first major policy address after taking office in October 1999 emphasized the need to strengthen Indonesia's maritime defenses and protect its ocean resources.[708] In November 1999, the navy's Foundation of Maritime Service announced that "thousands" of foreign fishing ships had been seized for illegally fishing in Indonesian waters over the preceding two years.[709] Later in the same month, the navy seized 56 Thai fishing boats and arrested 1,200 crewmembers in one spectacular take.[710] Not mentioned in the navy's version of events was the fact that foreign boat owners had, for many years, illegally purchased fishing licenses from the Indonesian navy. Given greater latitude in its public statements and a freer and generally sympathetic press, the navy began to complain of its history of second-class status and low budgets and to agitate for higher funding. In March 2000, Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Akhmad Sucipto announced that the navy had only 114 warships but needed 136 to patrol the archipelago adequately.[711]

The navy also undertook a significant change in its fleet organizing and basing deployments. On February 9, 2000, Admiral Sutjipto stated that the Navy's Primary Naval Bases were to be abolished, and Maritime Area Commands would be established in their place. The old bases had been had been organized under the Eastern Fleet and Western Fleet,

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[708] "Indonesia: Naval Spending Set to Increase", *Radio Australia*, October 25 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1025.

[709] "Naval Officer: 6,000 Foreign Ships Catch Fish Illegally".

[710] "Indonesian Navy Arrests 1,200 Thai Fishermen, Seize Boats", *The Nation*, November 27 1999.

[711] "Navy Chief Urges People to Prevent Unrest", *Antara*, February 25 2000, in FBIS-SEP-2000-0225.

with headquarters in Surabaya and Bandung (both on Java), and the preponderance of units were located on the Java Sea, between Borneo, Java, and Sulawesi – the geographic heart of the archipelago. Under the new arrangement, bases would be located in three "strategic regions along the Indonesian border."[712] The navy concluded that a large part of its new mission is to face the outside world along Indonesia's maritime boundaries, rather than to patrol the interior of the archipelago. Although this change took place when the navy was being used more, not less, in domestic missions (especially off the coast of Maluku and Aceh), the new doctrine positions the navy to purchase larger ships for an ocean-going navy in the future.

Because the navy must import its major warships and most of their onboard systems, it was hit particularly hard by the massive slide in the rupiah's value during 1997 and 1998. But the first military budget proposal developed under President Wahid's administration did finance a major expansion of the navy's manpower. On February 10, 2000, TNI chief Admiral Widodo presented the military's budget request, calling for a ten percent rise overall in the level of spending. According to *The Jakarta Post's* reporting on that event, "the Navy has also disclosed a long-term plan to build its troops to 70,000 within five years."[713] The plan represented an increase of 49 percent in naval manpower. The same report did not discuss changes in total manning for the army, but the target number of army recruits for the coming year (11,500) is exactly expected replacement level for the force and suggests no

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[712] "Indonesian Navy to Restructure Primary Naval Bases".

[713] "TNI Plans to Add Personnel, Weapons", *Jakarta Post*, February 11 2000, in LEXIS-NEXIS.

expansion.[714] Hence, it appears that total naval manpower (including the marine corps) was set to rise from around 15 percent of the military's total to around 22 percent.

SUMMARY EVALUATION OF CIVIL-MILITARY COALITION THEORY

The data from this case fit predictions consistent with the civil-military coalition theory. When given a choice between defending the integral nationalist domestic status quo and supporting liberal reformers, the army chose support for the status quo. Although the army's defense of Suharto was half-hearted, its determined defense of Habibie and its efforts to limit reform under Wahid support the conclusion that most army officers wanted the governing system to remain largely intact. In contrast, the navy quickly threw it support behind liberal opponents of Suharto when he began to look vulnerable in May 1998. Its cooperation with liberal opponents of the status quo became even clearer and more open as Habibie's opponents maneuvered to oust him between May and December 1998. After President Wahid was inaugurated, the navy offered moral support for the new president's domestic agenda, provided material support for his defense against coups d'etat, and spearheaded efforts to reform the military.

Strategic change during this period correlated closely with domestic events, with the transition from integral nationalist ideology bringing a shift from an overwhelmingly continental, especially guerrilla, defense to much greater emphasis on maritime strategy.

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[714] Robert Lowry observes that most soldiers are volunteers and serve sign up for 20-year terms. He writes, "Only about 5 percent of the force needs to be replaced every year." In 1999, the army had a strength of 230,000. The 11,500 new recruits work out to exactly 5% of the total force. On recruiting, see Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 117-19.

Although the aftereffects of the 1997 Asian financial crisis limited the amount that could be spent on new equipment, admirals were promoted to top military positions, the naval force structure (especially the marine corps) was expanded, the navy was given greater latitude in doctrinal planning and basing structures, and new maritime think tanks and agencies were established.

EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES

STRATEGIC MILITARY ENVIRONMENT. Indonesia's doctrine and force structure, especially during the 1990s, present an enigma to anyone trying to correlate military policy with the external strategic environment. During the early and mid-1990s, when we might have expected relatively greater emphasis than previously on maritime defense, Indonesia instead embarked on a buildup of its ground forces. And during the late 1990s, when some of the maritime threats were mitigated and domestic separatist groups were gaining momentum, the state began to place greater emphasis on naval strengthening and downsized some of the army's most elite fighting units.

By 1993 there was more than enough cause for Indonesia to reconsider its continental-based defense strategy – or at a minimum to give relatively greater weight to a naval component in that strategy. Several other regional states began expanding their naval force structures during the 1980s. Naval growth in China, which suffered poor relations from Indonesia throughout Suharto's reign, was particularly notable. Between 1979 and 1993 China's naval tonnage doubled, growing from 57,000 tons to 128,000. In 1988 China

occupied several islands in the Spratly Islands, more than half way from China to Indonesia, and began to increase its garrisons and patrolling activities around the islands.[715] The question of Chinese intent began to impinge more directly on Indonesia's security outlook in 1993, when China produced a map of its territorial claims that encompassed the Natuna Islands, an important source of Indonesia's natural gas production at the northern end of the archipelago.[716] The following year, China passed a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law, hardening its position on sovereignty issues over the entire South China Sea area. By December 1995 Suharto was concerned enough about the foreign threat to abandon his disinclination to sign bilateral alliances and conclude a mutual security agreement with Australia.

But despite what would appear to be heightened awareness of a foreign, maritime based threat, Indonesian military planning in 1993 adopted a plan that called for a major increase in army manpower, with virtually no increase in naval or air capabilities. Nor can the apparent anomaly in Indonesian strategic direction during the 1990s be explained by an increase in domestic unrest or a growth in separatist strength. As in past decades, separatist movements continued in several provinces, but the scale and frequency of armed revolts in those areas declined during the late 1980s and early and mid-1990s.[717]

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[715] On the expansion of Chinese naval presence in the South China Sea between 1974 and 1992 see, Garver, "China's Push Through the South China Sea: The Interaction of Bureaucratic and National Interests."

[716] "Is the South China Sea Really China's?" *Global News Wire*, April 26 2001, in Lexis-Nexis.

[717] Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia*, 164-76. In his 1996 book, Lowry summarized the situation in the three provinces that have historically proved most troublesome to the central government by saying that resentment continues to smolder because the causes of conflict remained unresolved, but at the same time, "in all three cases, government forces have defeated or severely subdued the armed resistance." P. 176

Consistent with their integral nationalist philosophy, Suharto and the generals may have been trying to assure the long-term stability of the countryside by deepening the army's roots in the outer islands.[718] But the army had long been clamoring for more force structure, so this explanation does not explain why the army's desires were suddenly met in 1993. The significant gains made by opposition parties during the 1992 elections and the president's need to secure his position both among the generals and in the countryside, better explains Indonesian military policy under Suharto during the early and mid-1990s than does the degree of external or domestic military threat posed to the state.[719]

After the fall of the New Order, the navy rose in prominence, even as the domestic military situation deteriorated (stretching infantry forces thin) and relations with China improved (easing the imminence of naval threat). Even before Wahid took office, the confluence of four factors led to a worsening domestic security situation: (1) the 1997-1998 financial crisis, which created rampant inflation and exacerbated unemployment across the archipelago; (2) generally heightened regional expectations under more democratic politics; (3) specific promises made by Habibie to leaders in East Timor, which further raised regional expectations; and (4) willful acts by some military officers to undermine order. Rebel ranks in East Timor, Aceh, and Irian Jaya grew during 1998 and 1999, and rival ethnic groups in

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[718] This was the explanation provided by the Indonesian military's official white paper.

[719] On the results of the 1992 elections, which saw gains for both the official Muslim party and Megawati's Democratic Party of Indonesia, see "Partial Triumph for Ruling Party in Elections", *Agence France Presse*, June 11 1992, in Lexis-Nexis.

other locations, including Maluku and Lombok, began to battle each other, using homemade

weapons at first but subsequently acquiring standard military small arms.

Meanwhile, Indonesia's relations with China improved. Although China did not

formally renounce its claims to the Natuna area, it did so in de facto terms in December 1997,

when it began negotiating with Indonesia to purchase natural gas from the field.[720] The

creation of the ASEAN+3 (an organization including the ASEAN states plus South Korea,

Japan, and China) in 1997 facilitated cooperation between China and the Southeast Asian

states, including Indonesia. China extended aid to Indonesia during the latter's currency crisis

in 1998. In July of 1999, Beijing, breaking with past precedent, hinted at a willingness to

engage in multilateral negotiations on "guidelines" for behavior in the South China Sea.[721]

President Wahid's inaugural address in October – the same one that called for stronger naval

capabilities – also argued for building a strong relationship with China and pledged that his

first visit as president would be to Beijing.[722] The following month, Wahid floated the idea of

creating an informal alliance of Asian middle powers, including India, China, and Indonesia,

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[720] "Jakarta in Talks with China Over Sale of Gas From Natuna", *Agence France Presse*, December 29 1997, in Lexis-Nexis. "Indonesia Talking to China about Possible Sale of Gas From Natuna Field", *Chemical Business Newsbase*, February 13 1998, in Lexis-Nexis.

[721] "China Willing to Subscribe to 'Guidelines' on Spratly Claims", *Agence France Presse*, July 27 1999, in Lexis-Nexis. In July 2000 with discussions under way on an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, China went one step further indicating a desire to enter into a formal code of conduct for the area – a long-held aspiration of the ASEAN states "China Ready to Agree 'Code of Conduct' for South China Sea", *Agence France Presse*, July 13 2000, in Lexis-Nexis.

[722] "Canberra Cautious on Wahid", *Sydney Morning Herald*, October 26 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1025. "Indonesia: Naval Spending Set to Increase".

with technical and financial backing from Japan.[723] In a more realistic initiative Indonesia

and China, with private investors from South Korea and elsewhere, began negotiating to build

a pipeline between the Natuna natural gas field and Shanghai.[724]

An analysis of foreign and domestic military threat profiles alone would not have led

one to predict that Indonesia would increase its reliance on ground forces during the early and

mid-1990s and then shift direction in 1999. It is true that military forces are, up to a point,

frequently fungible. Prior to 1999 Indonesia's theory of victory against sea-based threats lay

in guerrilla warfare, and after 1999 national leaders sought to use naval blockade to reduce the

need for ground formations. But both strategies, especially when taken to extremes, danced

around critical problems. As an archipelago, ground-based guerrilla tactics without the

mobility provided by survivable naval units and air cover would be untenable in holding on to

far flung islands against an enemy that might hive off one part of Indonesia's territory and

apply overwhelming force to pacify it. Similarly, naval blockades can never catch all of the

weapons bound for a given destination, and they cannot prevent locals from manufacturing

primitive homemade weapons. Marines, of course, are ground forces, and it is no accident

that this component, both politically reliable and of most immediate relevance to Indonesia's

new strategic problems, grew faster than any other immediately after Habibie's fall.

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[723] "Gus Dur Seeks Japan Support for 'Informal Alliance'", *Media Indonesia*, November 9 1999, in FBIS-FTS-1999-1108.

[724] Negotiations began in late 1999. "Asian Gas Grid Will Not Threaten Supply to Southast Asia", *Business Times (Malaysia)*, October 21 2002, in Lexis-Nexis.

Indonesian regimes before and after 1999 chose to address military challenges to the state with those strategies and force structures that best suited their domestic political needs. Army leaders shared Suharto's integral nationalist philosophy and provided general support for his New Order. When Suharto's regime was most clearly threatened, he fell back on the army as one of his core bases of support. Army officers, however, represented an imminent threat to liberals, who saw the navy as a more reliable partner in their efforts to overhaul the economic and political structure of the state.

MATERIAL INTERESTS-BASED ORGANIZATION THEORY. Material interests help explain the services domestic preferences in these cases, but they are less compelling than a richer variant of organization theory that also takes into account functional considerations and socialized biases.

Some types of interest-based explanations are more persuasive than others. One explanation that raises as many questions as it answers is based on personal profit. Since the early post-independence period, the central government has provided only some 30 percent of the military's budget, with shortfalls made good by the military's involvement in business. Extra-budgetary funds have been particularly important in making up shortfalls in personnel expenses, and access to business income can be highly lucrative for high-ranking commanders. It is also a well-developed, highly refined system, where one's access to additional income is closely calibrated to reflect the rank of the individual – regardless of service. While the protection of perks may be a very plausible explanation for the army's

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general opposition to fundamental reform, it raises the question of why the navy's top officers were more willing to surrender their privileges than the army's leadership.

Here, self-image and perceptions of functional interest appear important. Army officers were better able justify their involvement in business as both profitable in a personal sense and functional in a larger political-military sense. As the Jakarta Post observed: "Many in the military [here meaning the army] are still living in the romantic revolutionary past, when troops faced the enemy alongside civilians. This culture and self-image appears to be a self-imposed restriction for reform."[725] In theory, the military's involvement in the economy was necessary not just to raise funds for the military but also to police the activities of outsiders (i.e., the Chinese) in the economy and to "indigenize" the economy. This function, however, fit more comfortably with the army's self-image as a revolutionary force than it did with the navy's self-image as a technical and professional force.

Interest in official military budgets and budget share provides a better material interest-based explanation for service difference, but even this does not appear sufficient to explain the breadth or degree of difference in the services' positions. Under the old order, the army clearly fared better in terms of budget share than the navy relative to what might be expected of a military belonging to an archipelagic nation. But while the army's budget share had been high relative to the other services, the overall military budget had been kept

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[725] "Gus Dur Struggles to Control TNI".

relatively low throughout Suharto's reign. It was just over two percent of GDP when he resigned from office.

Clearly, regime change would confront the army with major new uncertainties, and it is not surprising that many top leaders would approach change warily. Yet the breadth and depth of opposition is somewhat harder to understand without recourse to a consideration of the army's self-image. There was little reason to believe that military budgets, or even the army's budget, would decline under parliamentary rule. In fact, Wahid's defense minister, Juwono, asked for a 60 percent budget increase in his November 1999 budget request and secured an actual 32 percent increase. [726] While the navy and air force received an expanded share of the total, the marginal increase was more than sufficient to ensure that the army would receive substantial new funds.

Budgetary considerations do help explain the navy's position towards political change, especially during the transitions from Suharto to Habibie, to Wahid. Given that the army held the lion's share of the military budget, even a small reduction in the army's share could produce a much larger percentage change in the navy's budget. And both Suharto in late 1997 and Habibie one year later looked eminently vulnerable. On the other hand, the navy's principled, liberal positions after the inauguration of democratic rule are less easy to explain in terms of the prospects for immediate gain. The navy supported constitutional reform (and the elimination of military seats in parliament) and the separation of the military from

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[726] Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia*, 2nd ed. (Victoria, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2002), 280.

business. And in May 2001, when Wahid faced parliamentary censure and the imminent threat of impeachment, the navy refused to sanction the president's threat to impose martial law, despite his strong support for the navy throughout his tenure.

All of the navy's positions may have been partly motivated by a desire to ensure that its interests would not be damaged by a return to either Sukarno-style or Suharto-style authoritarian (and integral nationalist) rule, but they involved considerable sacrifice in terms of short-term interests. The navy demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice its own seats in parliament, money from its business ventures, and, most significantly, a privileged political position as the protector of Wahid's regime.

Summary and Conclusions

The civil-military coalition theory does a better job of explaining the services' domestic preferences since 1949 than do material interests, and it explains key aspects of Indonesia's strategy and force planning that explanations based on objective changes in the strategic military environment cannot.

The navy made common cause with Dutch-trained, technocratic army officers during the 1950s in supporting relatively liberal parliamentarians against socialist (integral nationalist) political contenders and their Japanese-trained army allies. In 1998 and 1999 the navy provided steadfast support to liberal members of the MPR who were then vying to overthrow the integral nationalist status quo order of Suharto and his once vice president,

Habibie. During the early 1950s, the army was divided in its loyalties but largely opposed to the country's liberal prime ministers. During the 1990s, the army was again divided but largely hostile to liberal social groups and politicians.

The politics surrounding the rise and fall of Sukarno's Guided Democracy (1957-1965) did not pit integral nationalism against liberalism directly since liberal politicians had vanished from the scene. But the period nevertheless provides some insight into the services' domestic preferences. Army officers, especially wartime guerrilla leaders, opposed Sukarno's policies of confrontation with the West and his courting of communist actors, since all of those policies impeded opportunities for social action and other grass roots activities designed to build national unity and resilience. Significantly, the army's resistance to Sukarno came despite major budget increases and an expansion of the force structure. The navy, with less interest in social and rural development issues and no real liberal alternatives, was swayed by the promise of higher budgets and a larger force structure.

The domestic position taken by the services has had a significant impact on strategy and force planning since at least the early 1960s. In neither 1967 nor 1999 was there any fundamental shift in external or even military threats faced by the state, yet both of these dates mark stark changes in Indonesia's strategic posture. To some extent, strategic shifts derived from the different philosophies, theories, and priorities of national leaders. But even the different strategic lenses of ruling elites cannot explain either the degree of change or some of its specific content. Facing stiff army opposition to both his foreign and domestic program, Sukarno relied heavily on the navy and marine corps to accomplish his foreign objectives.

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Suharto, on the other hand, distrusted the navy and hobbled its power even beyond what his own focus on domestic missions and tasks would have suggested. During the late 1990s, the new generation of liberal leaders understood that much of the army would oppose their policies. Consequently, they used the navy in a variety of domestic capacities and strengthened it in order to ensure its capacity to ensure it could carry out those tasks.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This chapter reviews the results of the cases considered in this dissertation, assesses the implications of those findings in greater detail, and addresses the continuing relevance of these findings in light of shifting domestic political-economic landscapes and the war on terror.

Summary of Findings

The cases examined in this thesis strongly support the contention that in developing states, different types of military organizations often have different domestic preferences and frequently take opposite sides in political conflicts. Armies tend to be more internally divided on domestic issues than navies, but often support integral nationalist positions. Navies have backed liberal actors and positions. The liberal way forward is eased when these intra-military differences are understood by liberal political leaders and when that information is used to court allies within the military. It is also eased when naval forces are relatively strong. The thesis demonstrates that the domestic preferences of the services are, in fact, often understood by political leaders on both sides and that those leaders frequently designed military policy to advantage their own supporters within the military establishment. The results of the eight case studies are displayed in chart 7.1.

Table 7.1: SUMMARY EVALUATION OF COMPETING THEORIES FOR EIGHT CASES

Country		Thailand				China		Indonesia	
Dates		1938-1946	1947-1972	1973-1979	1980-2002	1949-1976	1977-2002	1949-1978	1979-2002
Civil-military coalition theory									
	Army position	++	++	++	++	++	++	++	++
	Navy position	++	++	++	++	+	++	+	++
	Strategic change	++	++	+	++	++	++	++	+
Simple organization theory									
	Army position	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	+
	Navy position	-	+/- *	+	+	-	+	++	+
Strategic military environment		-	+	+	+(-?) **	-	+	+	-

Key: "-" indicates that the theory or explanation is not substantiated by the case. "+" indicates that the case provides some support for the theory but that some aspects are inconsistent with it or only weakly affirmed. "++" indicates that the case provides strong support for the theory. The top three rows summarize the performance of different parts of the civil-military coalition theory. Is the army divided, and do significant portions act to support integral nationalist actors or positions? Does the navy back liberal positions? Do political leaders give additional resources to those military groups that supported them in the political crises that either brought them to power or allowed them to remain there? The rows below summarize the performance of competing theories. Do service behaviors appear to be driven largely and directly by calculations about potential gains and losses in manpower and budget? Do events in the strategic military environment correlate in expected ways with changes in doctrine or force structure?

Notes:
* Navy's position arguably matched associated predictions through 1951, but not after that time.
** Case is indeterminate.

In at least seven of the eight cases examined, navies proved significantly more sympathetic to liberal political-economic positions than did armies. The possible exception is Indonesia during the mid-1960s, when the navy backed President Sukarno. But even in this case, other details, including the navy's support for liberal actors during the 1950s, appear to support the theory. Apart from the early Indonesian case, there was one other episode in which the navy explicitly rejected electoral democracy: the Thai navy's support for the overthrow of democracy in 1976. But in that case, the navy's actions were taken in support of liberal social and economic values and under the credible threat of economic collapse. Moreover, in that case naval leaders did promise – and deliver – a quick return to democratic political rule. And in that case, as in all the other cases (with the possible exception, again, of the early Indonesian case), naval actors found themselves in league with the preponderance of the middle class, especially the upper middle class.

In all cases, new political elites brought to power by changes in regime type (from liberal to integral nationalist or vis-à-vis) affected strategic and military force structure changes that favored their domestic military supporters. In several cases, these shifts were dramatic. In all three countries, shifts towards integral nationalist regimes and the political struggles surrounding them resulted in the gutting of naval and marine corps strength. Liberal regimes brought greater emphasis on the navy and maritime strategy. Budgetary constraints sometimes limited the scope of warship construction or purchase. But even in those cases, doctrines were adjusted, justifying future growth; naval leaders were promoted to top political positions; and the navy's marine ground forces were rapidly expanded.

A couple of patterns emerge from longitudinal comparisons across cases that are not immediately evident from a summary of any single case. First, as a general rule, the theory explains more about the later cases than the earliest cases. In all three countries, intra-military differences were evident from the earliest periods examined. But military institutions were newer, officers manning the force had been trained under different systems, and the domestic attitudes of the services were relatively underdeveloped. In general, the services also came to evaluate their interests from longer-term perspectives as their ideologies – and the differences between army and navy ideologies – sharpened. Hence, the Chinese navy, which supported moderate (i.e., relatively liberal) political positions both before and after the Cultural Revolution became relatively more outspoken – and more willing to accept short-term sacrifices – in its defense of those values.

The Thai military is the exception that proved the rule. Unlike military institutions in the other two states examined here, the Thai army and navy dated to long before the first case examined here. And it is the one of the three countries where service preferences were as distinct, and intra-military battles fought as fiercely, in the first case as they were in later cases.[727] In both of the other countries, the services had distinct preferences from the early post-independent period, but those preferences were less distinctly defined, sometimes overridden by short-term material interests, and not, for the most part, defended as vigorously as in later cases.

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[727] An interesting contrast here is the Thai air force, which was detached from the army and established as an independent service shortly before World War II. A newer service, its political identity was, until at least the 1970s, substantially less distinct from the army than was that of the navy. (Indeed, it provided much of the firepower the army needed to defeat the navy in 1951.)

A second pattern, one that has been of shorter duration and is therefore not visible from the summary table of case coding, is that as armies have downsized and become more mechanized (especially over the last ten years) the domestic preferences of the services appear to have experienced some convergence around relatively more liberal positions. Senior Thai army officers are, for example, considerably more restrained in their anti-democratic and anti-capitalist rhetoric than they used to be, and many now swear unqualified allegiance to civilian authorities.

The moderation of integral nationalist sentiment within regional armies (and indeed, among armies in the developing world more broadly) should ease the task of democratic consolidation. In part, these attitudinal shifts were consciously designed by the regimes' new liberal leaders. In other words, liberal leaders adjusted force structures in ways they expected would shift military values and culture. In part, however, they have also been a byproduct of the demonstrated effectiveness of high-tech warfare. Repeated defeats of mass armies, especially at the hands of U.S. forces, has given reformers ample ammunition to use against those officers who would insist that they can create a force maximized for assisting with grass roots developmental projects and simultaneously for defense against invaders.

Circumspection in this tentative observation about the moderation of army views is order. Historically, the services' differences in all three of these countries have remained well hidden until acute political crises provide the opportunity and incentive for the services to reveal their domestic positions. Indonesia and, especially, China are likely to endure political

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crises in the years ahead that will severely test civil-military relations. Army leaders in

Indonesia believe that a coup or other forms of military intervention in politics today would

have little support, but some also believe that civilian attitudes will change as the country's

problems worsen. In other words, the actions and public statements of army officers may

reflect their views of what the political market will bear at the present time, rather than a

fundamental shift in their own thinking. Even if attitudes are moderating to some degree,

differences between the various services and branches persist. As the political center

continues to shift in each of these states, relative differences in officers' political views will

remain relevant. Most importantly, as these and other cases demonstrate, even relatively

small factions of junior officers with a clear ideology and purpose – no matter how misguided

– can emerge to dominate the military if the right circumstances present themselves.

Theoretical and Policy Implications

The patterns of intra-military difference and strategic impact summarized here carry four

major implications. First, they affirm that in developing states, military policy is often

influenced decisively by domestic political considerations; any realist theory that seeks to

explain the military behavior of these states must adopt a broad definition of threats to include

domestic threats to regime security alongside threats to state sovereignty as key motivators.

Second, even regional international military trends may be the product of domestic politics;

political change frequently occurs in waves and this may produce similar types of strategic

change in multiple states. Third, a conceptual understanding of intra-military differences and

their causes should allow liberal reformers in developing states to develop a playbook for

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dealing with the military, even without a detailed knowledge of the specific views of hundreds of individual officers. And fourth, the findings suggest that the United States can, in its war on terror, engage the militaries of important developing states more closely without undermining liberal reform (where it is ongoing), but only if it tailors that engagement appropriately.

REALIST THEORY AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Realism provides a powerful framework for understanding the security policies of even small developing states, but only if it is construed to include the consideration of domestic, as well as international threats and only if threats are considered in relation to regime security, as well as state security.

The cases examined here tend to confirm Jack Snyder's proposition that national leaders react to external or domestic threats, depending on which are more pressing, and they will design both domestic and international policy accordingly.[728] In other words, states are likely to formulate policy (including foreign and military policy) to counter domestic threats to regime security when those are more immediate than foreign ones, just as they will tend to formulate domestic policy to better enable them to counter foreign threats when those are more pressing. Domestic threats are particularly likely to drive national policy in developing states. The balance of power between social groups (and between social groups and the state) is likely to shift relatively quickly in these states, and even if there are democratic

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[728] Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition.*

mechanisms for making politics a transparent and iterated game, those mechanisms are likely to be relatively weak.

Because China is a mid-sized power, it is easy to forget that it is also a relatively poor developing state. (A large population may give it substantial aggregate resources, but does little to free it from most of the political, economic, and social dilemmas commonly faced by developing states.) The Chinese cases examined in this thesis suggest that when domestic political structures are hotly contested, military forces and strategies are frequently manipulated to influence outcomes at home. As of this writing, the central leadership is relatively unified and its various social contradictions are reasonably well in hand. Its military and strategic planning are, accordingly, less affected by domestic considerations than at some points in its past. But this could easily change, even in the near future, and in the longer term, it is safe to say that its political system will almost certainly face severe and acute tests that will make political considerations critical in force planning and strategy. With China looming large in U.S. defense planning, it is important to appreciate the domestic drivers of its military behavior, as well as the international ones.

ILLUSORY 'ARMS RACES' IN EAST ASIA AND LATIN AMERICA

As the comments above suggest, military trends in East Asia and other developing regions – often taken to reflect the level or nature of conflict between states – may instead be driven more by domestic events. This, together with the fact that political change in the developed world tends to occur in waves, can create region-wide shifts in military strategy and weapons acquisition patterns. If shifts from integral nationalism to liberalism in any given state are

likely to bring in tow greater emphasis on national maritime forces and doctrines, then a

liberal wave affecting a set of five, ten, or a dozen neighboring states is likely to lead to a

region-wide naval arms buildup. These dynamics may produce the illusion of arms racing

even where little or no strategic interaction is actually occurring. Strategic shifts can,

nevertheless, heighten mutual insecurity about the intentions of potential adversaries and

require careful management regardless of their causes.

In East Asia, the size of naval inventories has increased rapidly over the last two

decades, a phenomenon that some have described as a naval arms race.[729] Between 1980 and

2001, the number of major surface warships in East Asian inventories increased from 198 to

300, or 52 percent.[730] This naval growth is particularly prominent when considered in light of

changes in tank and combat aircraft holdings, which grew 11 percent and -28 percent

respectively. Naval growth was also reflected in manpower figures. Between 1980 and 1997,

East Asian navies' share of total military manpower climbed 25 percent (from 11.4 percent to

14.3 percent), while the armies' dropped by 5 percent (from 75.2 percent to 71.8 percent) and

the air forces' rose by 8 percent (from 12.7 percent to 13.7 percent).

These developments cannot be explained simply in terms of economic growth and the

replacement of manpower with capital. Regional naval forces atrophied during the 1960s and

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[729] See, for example, Mann, "Arms Races Likely When Asia Recovers." Paul J. Bracken, *Fire in the East : the rise of Asian military power and the second nuclear age*, 1st ed. (New York: HarperCollins, 1999). Calder, *Asia's Deadly Triangle: How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia-Pacific.*

[730] Richard Sharpe, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 2001-2002* (Alexandria, Va: Jane's Information Group, 2001). Moore, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1979-1980.* In this section, ship numbers and aggregate tonnage include ships over 500 tons. Because the average size of those warships also increased, aggregate tonnage grew even faster, some 69 percent.

1970s despite high levels of economic growth. Nor, as the cases examined in this thesis show, does the decline or rise of naval forces correspond in any simple way with the start or finish of local insurgencies.

Rather, these cases suggest that the East Asian naval arms buildup was more a byproduct of the "third wave" of democratic reform than it is a naval arms race. The three states examined represent three out of four cases that have seen the fastest naval growth, and in each, shifts in resource allocation were more closely associated with domestic political change than with shifts in the international environment or any imminent sense of maritime threat. Naval growth in the fourth of these states, South Korea, also followed closely in the wake of liberal political reform. An examination of aggregate military data for developing and developed states tends to support this thesis. The only two regional states that began the 1980s as advanced industrial democracies, Australia and Japan, did not undertake similar resource reallocation. The combined warship, tank and combat aircraft inventories of these two states grew by 12 percent, 23 percent, and –7 percent between 1980 and 2001. For the ten developing states of the region, the figures were 68 percent, 10 percent, and –30 percent.

Variations of this theme can be seen in other places during different historical eras. In Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, liberal economic policy was, in the 1960s and 1970s, associated with illiberal government. Faced with a choice, naval officers in all these states chose traditional liberal economic and social orders over democratic political structures, and in all, naval officers played leading roles in authoritarian government. The result, in military force structure terms, was increased spending on naval forces and what some analysts

described as a naval arms race in Latin America. Territorial disputes along the Antarctic rim were, in the case of Argentina and Chile, said to provide motivation. But these disputes emerged as salient issues only after the navy's involvement in politics, and they were addressed and resolved through quiet diplomacy shortly after the restoration of democracy.

To conclude that domestic drivers may decisively influence external security policies does not preclude the possibility of dynamic interaction – real arms races – developing between states. The rapid expansion of the Wilhelmine German navy was largely domestically driven but nevertheless triggered an intensive battleship building contest with Britain, one that hastened Germany's self-encirclement and, ultimately, contributed to World War I. In contemporary Asia, rapid naval growth in individual states could, and in some cases has, increased the sense of insecurity in other states. The free hand that liberal leaders have given national navies in propagandizing their various causes may exacerbate the problem. To date, however, specific problems that have emerged to threaten working relationships between regional states have been contained or resolved before they have fatally damaged those relations.

Some U.S. assessments of the East Asian security environment overstate the levels of mutual suspicion and insecurity in the region (especially those involving China). Nevertheless, liberalization does carry some new dangers even as it mitigates others. Ultimately, consolidating liberal gains will provide the best long-term solution to these problems, but until this is achieved, new dangers will demand thoughtful management by the United States and its partners.

Barring the emergence of a self-sustaining arms race, which at this point does not appear imminent, naval growth should slow eventually as new liberal regimes are consolidated – much as naval growth slowed in South America after the domestic circumstances there changed. In Thailand and China, there are already signs that political changes have already eroded the privileged political position of their respective navies.[731] But sub regional and individual national patterns are likely to vary considerably. In those states where democratic rule and free markets have been largely consolidated (e.g., Thailand), the speed of military resource reallocation should slow significantly. In those states where liberal reformers have taken power but are still in the process of consolidating recent gains (e.g., Taiwan) liberal political leaders may continue to rebalance service priorities in favor of the navy. Finally, in those states where leaders are ambivalent about change or facing particularly complex challenges (e.g., China and Indonesia) both domestic priorities and strategic direction are likely change repeatedly in step with one another.

A PLAYBOOK FOR LIBERAL POLITICAL LEADERS

For political leaders attempting to begin or consolidate liberal transitions in developing states, the theory and cases presented above provide a number of broad lessons.

First, Reformers should generally be able to find support within the military if they look in the right places. Specifically, natural allies are likely to exist in organizations where

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[731] In the former case, civilians have consolidated their authority and no longer need the navy as much as they did previously; in the latter, political authorities now see the primary threat to their position as those who want to push liberal reform faster, rather than those who would seek to derail it.

officers possess a high degree of technical education and perform technical tasks – including

the navy, the air force, and some portions of the army (e.g., among those army officers

branched in communications or with careers built primarily in staff positions). A rudimentary

knowledge of the relationship between structure and culture will, to a significant extent,

negate the need for a detailed familiarity with the political preferences of specific uniformed

officers. And because institutional military allies can sponsor military reforms that may

minimize the potential for integral nationalist military challenges in the longer-term, this

institutional knowledge underpins a comprehensive, integrated strategy for dealing with

domestic military threats.

Second, even if a core of reform-minded army officers can be found, naval and air

force officers will generally constitute a critical part of any potential pro-reform coalition

during political transitions. Liberal army officers are likely to be subject to intense pressure

from other members of their own service, many of who will almost certainly have strong anti-

liberal biases. Apart from personal pressures that may be brought to bear against pro-

reformer army officers by academy classmates or other acquaintances, opponents will almost

always be heavily represented on the boards and committees that control key policy areas

and/or promotion lists. Naval and air force leaders, on the other hand, will enjoy the broad

support of their own organization, which can provide a layer of insulation against pressure or

intimidation.

Third, the promotion of relatively liberal military officers to top positions tends to

provide only temporary protection to liberal leaders unless those officers are mobilized to

promote structural military reforms giving civilian authorities legally sanctioned and/or broadly recognized authority over the details of defense budgeting and senior personnel appointments. Early in the reform process, conservative integral nationalists officers may be on the defensive. But as in Thailand, where high-profile veterans of the 1992 coup d'etat have recently been promoted to senior posts in the army, the system of service committees that frequently prepare promotion lists or determine other key policy areas may provide opportunities for the conservative opponents to stage comebacks if clear oversight authority is not secured by political authorities. If opportunities for structural and legal reform are not seized, liberal regimes may be challenged by reactionary officers when the former are least prepared to defend themselves. And although navy and air force leaders are useful allies and can help sponsor whatever military reform might be undertaken, they may have difficulty rescuing regimes that fail to prevent military conservatives within the army from regaining the initiative.

Fourth, in the long-term, the army can and should be restructured in ways that make it more sympathetic to liberal values. All things being equal, those armies with large high-technology components, officers with advanced schooling and technical education, long-service volunteer enlisted soldiers, strong general staffs, and conventional military doctrines are more likely to support liberal political and economic programs than are armies without such characteristics. All things are not, of course, always even. The Junker monopoly on commissions within the army of Wilhelmine Germany made that army a politically reaction force, despite its being the most technologically advanced in Europe. But in general, making

armies more closely resemble navies in key organizational features should make their politics more similar to those of navies.

U.S. EFFORTS TO SUPPORT LIBERAL RULE

How can the United States assist liberal leaders in developing states consolidate recent gains? Although the U.S. capacity for influencing the domestic behavior of military forces in foreign states is limited, some measures deserve consideration.

First, the U.S. government, foundations, universities, and think tanks can and should promote comparative studies of civil-military relations, especially those with an eye towards distilling practical lessons for liberal leaders in developing states. The case studies presented in this thesis show remarkable similarities in the tactics employed by those who have been most successful in dealing with domestic military challenges. Other recent comparative work has also yielded other clear lessons about tactics that work and those that do not.[732] Yet lessons from this academic work seldom if ever find their way into the popular media where it might be more accessible. The results of existing case studies should be made as accessible as possible, and the lessons that derive from them should be distilled for those who need that information quickly. Testing competing theories also remains critical.

Second, decisions about whether or not the United States should engage in military-to-military ties with developing states in which "the military" represents a potential threat to elected leaders should not be considered all-or-nothing choices. In states where military

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[732] One standout example is Hunter, *Eroding military influence in Brazil: politicians against soldiers.*

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elements represent a latent threat to liberal leadership, the United States may be able to achieve multiple aims simultaneously by focusing its military aid on strengthening naval and air forces. Based on his empirical observations of the Indonesian military, Robert Gelbard, U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, suggested exactly this approach in August 2000.[733] In that case, his advice has been largely followed. As suggested throughout this thesis, officers from the navy and other relatively technical military organizations can provide physical protection for liberal leaders, as well as sponsorship for the institutional reform of the military as a whole. And because military forces of different kinds are largely fungible, these efforts can significantly strengthen defensive capabilities against even continental-based external military threats.

Third, in U.S. dealings with foreign armies, focusing on work with technical officers and branches would, in the long term, change the dynamics of these organizations. Military reformers in Thailand emerged from the general staff and the communications branch; in the Chinese case, they came from the general staff and the military's science and technology community. In both case, line officers had long dominated the military establishment. In neither would even most observers have predicted before the fact that technical officers would emerge to assert strong political and military leadership. Yet those officers proved critical. Capable individuals from the army's communications, logistics, and general staff should be encouraged to apply for advanced training in the United States (e.g., for advanced technical courses), while funding for basic officer courses in the combat arms branches (especially the

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[733] Ehrlich, "Indonesia's Security Efforts Off Target U.S. Envoy".

infantry) should be scrutinized more closely. Training young infantry officers may create more professional officers, but it is also more likely to provide career advantages for officers who already hold deeply ingrained integral nationalist views.

Intra-Military Differences and the War on Terror

The ideas developed and tested in this thesis were formulated prior to the attacks of 9.11 and the subsequent "war on terror." The cases themselves do not, for the most, deal explicitly with the relationship between military organizations and religion or religious fundamentalism. To a significant extent, of course, the behavior of individual officers will depend on the religious beliefs and upbringing of the individual. Nevertheless, the thesis' findings do permit some informed speculation on how the military services, in general terms, might differ in the face of a terrorist or insurgent threat from religious fundamentalists. And although political Islam in Asia has generally been significantly more moderate than that practiced in the Middle East, the recent violence perpetrated by the militant wing of Jamaah Islamiah, as well as social inequality in Indonesia, Malaysia, and other critical countries, increases the salience of this question.

In states with Islamic minorities (e.g., Thailand, China, and the Philippines) all military services are likely to be staunchly opposed to Islamic fundamentalism, but they may nevertheless differ in their specific responses. Integral nationalist officers in the army are likely to take an extremely hard line against fundamentalism, will be quick to see any religious political organization as a threat to the state's integrity, and may use the war on

terror to push an illiberal re-centralization of state power. Naval and air force officers are likely to be more inclined to support liberal policies, such as federalism and greater integration with world markets, in an effort to generate economic growth and, hopefully, ameliorate the conditions that may promote fundamentalism. Unless fundamentalism threatens the viability of the state in an immediate sense, these officers are unlikely to seek authoritarian solutions. To operationalize the prediction, navies in these countries will support authoritarian tactics only when the majority of the middle class backs that approach, while the army will support such tactics significantly earlier.

In states with preponderantly Muslim populations (e.g., Indonesia), the behavior of the services, especially the army, may be somewhat different. The navy will still be inclined to defend liberal economic and social values, but the probability of its coming to view authoritarian political necessary methods as necessary for the defense of those values will be higher than in states where Muslim's represent only a fraction of the population. In Indonesia, the navy remains relatively more committed to political liberalism than other military organizations, but if the Islamic threat rises, the navy could swing sharply the other direction. The operative assumption here, however, is not that naval actors will act on different principles than they will in other cases, but that it will be easier for naval officers (like much of the middle class) to imagine political Islam as an imminent threat.

Armies in states with Muslim majorities are likely to be beset by particularly sharp divisions, with multiple factions vying for the ideological high ground. There will be some officers, primarily from the technical branches, who will continue to embrace liberal

nationalist ideas similar to those of most naval and air force officers. Other officers will, as before, continue to adhere largely to some form of integral nationalism. In this case, however, "integral nationalists" will themselves likely be divided into two camps. On the one hand, some will embrace a relatively pure form of the doctrine (as it has been described in this thesis). These officers will reject any idea – including radical Islamic doctrines – that cannot be embraced by the entire population. This group may hold illiberal, but nevertheless secular, preferences about the organization of economic, social, and political activity.

Others, who adhere to a bastardized form of the ideology, may see a clerical order as the embodiment of a national egalitarian order. And they will not be concerned even if Christian, Hindu, animist or other minorities of the state can never be comfortably included in that order. These individuals will hold that Islam is a core aspect of the nation. This split personality between different types of integral nationalism is already visible in the Indonesian army, where committed secular officers coexist alongside a activist Islamic ones, and some renegade members of the latter have almost certainly provided weapons and training to, for example, jihad fighters headed to Malacca. Those officers have received cover from some key leaders in Islamic political parties, and the factionalization of the army has made it difficult to police their activities through internal means.

It is of course possible to imagine any military officer, depending on his personal background or early upbringing, sympathizing with domestic radicals. But long service in poor regions and extended involvement with local administration – and interaction with clerics fulfilling minor bureaucratic functions – may reinforce these tendencies. In contrast, a

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life devoted to technical education and the management of complex tasks – including

extended work with other similarly trained individuals – is likely to diminish such tendencies.

Hence, the services are as likely to differ almost as significantly in relation to questions of

state and religion as they are to differ on secular issues of political economy.

These patterns carry several implications for U.S. policy. First, economic and social

variables will probably be more important than military ones in determining political

outcomes. In the face of violent terrorist attacks, few if any military groups will support

liberal political rule if such government appears to exacerbate rather than ameliorate the social

conditions that sustain terrorism. While the United States will have limited leverage over

national economic policies in these states (much less over political variables), it should

nevertheless do what it can to buttress the new liberal regimes of Asia by helping them to

provide the social and economic goods to their populations. It might, for example, support

legal education and exchange programs, keep the doors open to cheap imports from these

states, increase aid projects targeted at particularly poor regions, and support micro-lending

and other innovative approaches to poverty alleviation.

As far as military-to-military engagement is concerned, the United States should resist

the temptation to target assistance exclusively or even primarily to special forces, which may

be most directly engaged in the fight with guerrillas but also often continue to represent the

greatest military threat to liberal government. It should, rather, balance assistance for those

elements (if, indeed, it engages them at all) with a broader effort to improve the

professionalism and efficiency of the entire military organization. This will further the

objective of winning the military fight against terrorist organizations, while minimizing the

chances of creating the conditions that will lead to the regeneration of radical ranks. Liberal

orders may have many weaknesses, but reactionary government is almost certain to fail to

provide the answers needed to confront today's challenges. Yet without broader military

reform, assistance programs aimed at the most problematic parts of the military structure may

increase the chances that reactionary governments will assume power and may, therefore,

prove counterproductive in the long run.

APPENDIX 1: DATA ON THAI CASE

APPENDIX 1.1: PEOPLE DISCUSSED IN THE TEXT (THAILAND)

Arthit Kamlangek

Helped suppress 1981 coup, then turned against PM Prem.

2nd Army Region Cdr		-	1982
Army Commander	1982	-	1986
Supreme Cdr	1983	-	1986

Chamlong Srimuang (gen.)

Young Turk member and proponent for Thai poor.

Chatichai Choonhavan

PM from provincial pro-business party, Chart Thai.

Prime Minister	08.88	-	02.91

Chavalit Yoongchai (gen.)

Communications officer and member Democratic Soldiers.

Advisor to Prem	1979	-	1986
Supreme Cdr.	1987	-	1990
Defense Minister	1995	-	1997
Prime Minister	11.96	-	11.97
Defense Minister	2001	-	

Khuang Aphaiwong

Moderate royalist able to work with most Thai pol groups.

Prime Minister	08.44	-	08.45
Prime Minister	01.46	-	03.46

Kriangsak Chomanand (gen.)

Gen. Staff Officer. Became PM with Adm. Sangad's assistance.

Supreme Cdr.	1976	-	1977
Prime Minister	11.77	-	02.80

Phibun Songgram (general)

National socialist leader of Thailand during WWII.

Prime Minister	12.38	-	07.44
Prime Minister	04.48	-	09.57

Prem Tinsulanonda (general)

Led Thai transition to democracy during 1980s.

2nd Army Commander	10.74	-	09.77
Dpty Army Chf of Staff	10.77	-	09.78
Minister of Defense	05.79	-	03.80
Army Commander	10.78	-	09.81
Prime Minister	03.80	-	07.88
Privy Councilor	1988	-	

Pridi Phanomyong

Liberal politician; "father of Thai democracy"

Free Thai leader	1942	-	1944
Dominates parliamnt	1944	-	1947

	Prime Minister	03.46	-	08.46
Saiyud Kerdpol (general)	Staff officer who worked closely with navy.			
	Supreme Cdr.		-	1983
Samak Sundaravej	Bangkok demagogic populist allied with Gen. Arthit.			
Sangad Chaloryu (admiral)	Supreme Cdr.	1973	-	
	Cdr. of the Navy	1973	-	1976
Sarit Thanarat (general)	Prime Minister	09.57	-	09.57
	Prime Minister	10.58	-	12.63
Seni Pramoj	Free Thai leader	1942	-	1944
	Prime Minister	09.45	-	01.46
	Prime Minister	02.75	-	03.75
	Prime Minister	04.76	-	10.77
Suchindra Kaprayoon (gen.)	Led coup against democratic government in Feb. 1991			
	Army Commander		-	1992
	Prime Minister	04.92	-	05.92
Sunthorn Kongsompong	Supreme Cdr. during and immediately after the Feb '91 coup			
	Supreme Commander		-	05.92
Thamrong Nawasawal (adm.)	Prime Minister	08.46	-	09.47
Thanin Kraivichian	Hard line PM appointed by King, overthrown by Adm. Sangad.			
	Prime Minister	10.76	-	10.77
Thanom Kittikachorn (gen.)	PM who followed Sarit (and Sarit's policies).			
	Prime Minister	12.57	-	10.58
	Prime Minister	12.63	-	10.73
Wichitwathakan	National socialist advisor to Phibun during war years.			
	Advisor to Phibun	1938	-	1944

APPENDIX 1.2: LEADERSHIP POSTS (THAILAND)

Prime Ministers, 1932-Present

Manopahorn	1932	-	11.38
Phraya **Bahol**	11.34	-	12.38
Phibun Songgram	12.38	-	07.44
Khuang Aphaiwong	08.44	-	08.45
Thawi Bunjaket (?)	08.45	-	09.45
Seni Pramoj	09.45	-	01.46
Khuang Aphaiwong (2)	01.46	-	03.46
Pridi Phanomyong	03.46	-	08.46
Thamrong Nawasawal	08.46	-	09.47
Khuang Aphaiwong (3)	09.47	-	04.48
Phibun Songgram (2)	04.48	-	09.57
Sarit Thanarat	09.57	-	09.57
Pote Sarasin	09.57	-	12.57
Thanom Kittikachorn	12.57	-	10.58
Sarit Thanarat(2)	10.58	-	12.63
Thanom Kitttikachorn (2)	12.63	-	10.73
Sanya Thammasak	10.73	-	02.75
Seni Pramoj (2)	02.75	-	03.75
Kukrit Pramoj	03.75	-	04.76
Seni Pramoj (3)	04.76	-	10.76
Thanin Kraivichian	10.76	-	10.77
Kriangsak Chomanand	11.77	-	02.80
Prem Tinsulanonda	03.80	-	07.88
Chatichai Choonhavan	08.88	-	02.91
Anand Panyarachun	03.91	-	04.92
Suchindra Kaprayoon	04.92	-	05.92
Anand Panyarachun	06.92	-	07.95
Banhara Silpa-areka	07.95	-	09.96
Chavalit Yoongchai Yudh	11.96	-	11.97
Chuan Leekpai	11.97	-	

Commanders of the Royal Thai Navy

Phraya **Preechacholayudha**	07.32	-	08.33
Phraya **Wichcitcholathai**	08.33	-	12.33
Sin Kamonnawin	01.34	-	05.34
Phraya **Wichanworajak**	05.34	-	10.38

Sin Kamonnawin (2)	10.38	-	07.51
Luang **Pholasinthanawat**	07.51	-	12.51
Luang **Yuthasatkoson**	12.51	-	09.57
Luang **Chamnanarthayutha**	09.57	-	09.62
Sawat Phutianands	10.62	-	09.64
MC **Kanchitpon** Apakorn	10.64	-	02.66
Charoon Charlermtiarana	04.66	-	09.71
Thawin Rayananonda	10.71	-	09.72
Komon Sitakalin	10.72	-	09.73
Cherdchai Thomya	10.73	-	11.73
Sangad Charloru	11.73	-	09.76
Amon Sirigaya	10.76	-	09.78
Kawee Singha	10.78	-	09.81
Somboon Chuaphiboon	10.81	-	09.83
Prapat Chantawirat	10.83	-	09.84
Niphon Sirithorn	10.84	-	09.86
Thada Ditthabanchong	09.86	-	09.87
Prapat Krishnachan	10.87	-	09.91
Vichet Karunyavanij	10.91	-	09.93
Prachet Siridej	10.93	-	09.96
Wichit Chamnankarn	10.96	-	09.97
Suvatchai Kasemsook	10.97	-	09.98
Thira Hao-Charoen	10.98	-	09.00
Prasert Boonsong	10.00	-	

Partial List of Supreme Commanders

Sangad Chaloryu (navy)	1973	-	
Kriangsak Chomanand	1976	-	1977
Saiyud Kerdpol		-	1982
Arthit Kamlangek	1982	-	1986
Sup Kotchesenee (navy)	1986	-	1987
Chavalit Yoongchai	1987	-	04.90
Sunthorn Kongsompong	04.90	-	05.92
Mongkhon Amphonphisit	11.95	-	2000
Sampao Chusri	2000	-	12.01
Narong Yuthawong (navy)	12.01	-	09.02
Surayud Chulanont	10.02		

APPENDIX 1.3. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (THAI)

Year	National Political or Economic Event	Strategic Military Event (External or Insurgent)	Domestic Political-Military Event (including coup)	Military Strategy and Force Structure Development
1932	Liberal revolution ends absolute monarchy, establishes constitutional monarchy. Constitutional monarchy established. Half of assembly appointed by King and PM.		Navy significantly overrepresented in the liberal revolution.	
1938	General Phibun elected PM. Begins establishing national socialist state; courts lower and lower middle class.			
1938-1944	State reorganized along National Socialist lines. Authoritarian politics. Corporatist social structures.			Budgets for all three services increase rapidly. Naval budget increases 21 percent, but slips from 64 % of the army's budget to 62.
1941 (Dec.)		Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. (Dec. 7)	Free Thai movement formed to subvert Phibun and Japanese alliance. Led by Pridi and Seni. Heavy naval participation.	
1941-1942		War with France to reclaim provinces in Laos. Vichy French government agrees to return four provinces.		

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1942		Thailand declares war on the allied powers. (January)		
1944	National Assembly ousts Phibun (August) and establishes a provisional government.			
1944-1947	Government dominated by liberals associated with Pridi and his Free Thai allies. Liberal order established.	Peace negotiations with Britain begin Aug 1945, signed Jan 1946. Reparations require rice and mineral to England.	Naval officers remain close to Pridi, heavily represented in liberal and cabinets parties. Army hostile to parliamentary govt.	Naval budgets increase by 50%; army budgets decline by 40% between '44 and '46. Marines given best ground forces equipment (eg, tanks).
		Peace negotiations with France. Skirmishes on Laos border from mid-'46. Agreement signed Jan. 1947. Thailand returns four provinces.		
1946	Liberal constitution adopted. Lower House entirely elected. Upper House elected indirectly by Lower House. (May)			
1946-1947	Admiral Thamrong, head of the Constitution Front party, serves as PM. Aug '46 - Nov '47.			
	Foreign investment allowed in mining sector. Tax rates reduced. Rice shortage caused by reparations to Britain and bad policy.			

1947 (Nov.)	Coup d'etat. Provisional constitution adopted. Upper House transformed into nominated body.		Successful coup d'etat by mid-level army officers. (November)	
1948	Phibun brought in as figurehead PM by 1947 coup leaders. Phibun subsequently tries to establish his independence. (April) Phibun adopts economic policies to help the poor and promote national industries. Policies consistent with integral nationalism.		First counter-coup attempt against 1947 coup group (Oct '48). Launched by army's general staff. Naval officers also suspected.	
1949 (Feb.)			Second counter-coup attempt against 1947 coup group. Navy, Pridi, and other Free Thai seize downtown Bangkok. Defeated.	
1950		Korean War begins. Thailand provides one inf. bn., naval corvettes, and transport assets. Major U.S. assistance to Thailand begins.		
1951			Third counter-coup attempt against 1947 coup group. Junior naval officers seize Phibun, call for uprising. Effort violently suppressed with heavy losses. (June)	After counter-coup failure, navy "restructured." Stripped of police and combat air. Personnel reduced. Marines cut from 4 battalions to 1. Fleet tonnage declines.

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			Bloodless "Radio Coup" by members of the 1947 coup group against their own government. Parliament suspended. (November)	
1952	New constitution. Modeled on 1932 constitution. Elected and nominated MPs, with the latter selected by the govt and military.			
1953		Vietminh forces establish first presence in Cambodia and Laos.		
1954		French forces defeated at Dien Bien Phu. (May)		
1955		SEATO formed.		
1957	Gen. Sarit establishes developmental state. Integral nationalist economic policies (high tariffs, planning, etc). Emphasis on basic education and rural infrastructure.		Coup d'etat elevates army General Sarit Thanarat to power over his peers from the 1947 coup group.	Sarit reduces defense spending.
1958	PM Sarit dissolves parliament. Not reestablished until 1969.			
1963-1973	Death of Sarit (1963). Gen. Thanom takes charge. Economic and social policy largely unchanged.			

1965		Armed Thai communist insurgency, with PRC backing, begins. Focused in Northeast. Vietnam War intensifies. U.S. increases troop levels.		
1967		Sea-Bed Committee begins work on what becomes the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention. (Takes force in 1994.)		
1968	Under pressure from middle class and the United States, new constitution put into effect.			
1969	First parliamentary elections (Feb.) since '58. Mil. party gains most seats, but pro-business Democrat Party is second. Business heavily represented.	Nixon orders first withdrawals from Vietnam. "Vietnamization" begins. (June)	Naval officers believed to vote preponderantly Democrat Party in parliamentary elections. Army officers stick with military party.	
1971		Vietnam claims 200 nm EEZ off its coast.	PM Gen. Thanom suspends '68 constitution, dissolves parliament.	
1973	200,000 student protesters demand Gen. Thanom's resignation after arrest of students distributing political leaflets. (October)	Thailand claims 200 nm EEZ. Awards oil exploration contracts to US firms, which quickly abandon work after protests by Cambodia, which also claims area.	Thanom orders military to disperse students. (See "politics" column.) Some elements respond, some do not. Navy commander Sangad opposes suppression.	

	With threat of civil war looming, King orders Gen. Thanom to go into exile. Liberal university head, Sanya, selected as interim PM.		Under the new PM, Sanya, Admiral Sangad appointed Supreme Commander. Air force officer is made defense minister. Young Turks faction formed. Members are mid-ranking army officers. Seek to rid military of corruption, but share integral nationalist values. Dem. Soldiers group formed by army staff officers. Foreswear coups d'etat. More liberal than other army groups, but share some elements of integral nationalist ideology.	
1973-1976	Liberal parties hold power in parliament, but radical leftist students and labor leaders hold and use leverage on economic and social issues. General decline in economic situation. Inflation increasing. Labor unrest and strike activity increases.	Number of communist insurgents in the countryside grows from approximately 6,000 to 8,000 as economic situation worsens.		Decline in defense budget as percent of state budget. Navy grows. Adds offshore patrol craft. Marine corps grows from 4,000 to 10,000. Army adopts Total People's Defense strategy. Expands paramilitary and grass-roots orgs in countryside.
1975		Fall of South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to communist forces.		

		Refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos flood Thailand. Most come by land but some also by boat.		
1976 (Oct.)	Following Sangad's coup (see "military politics" column), King (without Sangad's consultation) appoints hard line judge, Thanin, as new PM.		Admiral Sangad (the defense minister) leads high command in preemptive coup. Promises quick return of democratic rule.	
1977 (Oct.)			Admiral Sangad, still defense minister, leads a coup against PM Thanin. Criticizes Thanin's harsh tactics and long time-horizon for reestablishing democracy.	
1978	New constitution established. Parliament will have elected and appointed members, but timetable established for phasing out appointed membership. Elections scheduled for 1979.	Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, invades Cambodia. (December)		
		With tensions between China and Vietnam rising, China cuts off funding to Thai rebels.		
1979		Chinese invasion of Vietnam. (February)		

		Thailand signs separate MOUs with both Malaysia and Vietnam to establish joint authority for development of disputed sea areas.		
		Communist guerrilla strength, growing throughout the 1970s, reaches peak of 11,000.		
1980-1988	PM Gen. Prem rules through liberal coalition in parliament. Observes constitution and overseas transition to democratic rule.			Naval manpower increases from 32,000 to 42,000 (from 7.8% of military manpower to 8.6%). Fleet tonnage grows from 11,000 tons to 13,000 tons.
				PM Order No. 66/2523 shifts anti-guerrilla strategy away from military-based approach to more political one (e.g., one with amnesty provisions).
1981			Coup attempt by members of the Young Turks. Defeated with assistance of marine corps.	
1982		Mass surrenders of communist fighters -- the effective end of the insurgency.		
		Law of the Sea Convention, establishing 200 nm EEZs, open for signing. (December) Enters into force in November 1994.		

1983			Army officers attempt to delay phase out of military seats in parliament. Opposed by most civilian MPs, Democratic Soldiers, the navy, and the air force.	
1985 (Sept)			Coup d'etat attempt. Possible backing from Gen. Arthit. Marine corps assists in suppression.	
1986			Gen. Arthit tries to unify anti-liberal elements into single party. Is removed from post of supreme commander. Replaced by navy cdr, Adm. Sup.	Force structure announcement: size of marine corps to be increased from 13,000 to 20,000.
1988	Parliamentary elections. Prem fails to form coalition. Hands power to Chatichai, leader of the largest party.	Chinese seize several of the Spratley Islands in the center of the South China Sea.		Contract signed for four frigates to be purchased from China. (July)
1988-2001	Democratic era (with the exception of February 1991 - May 1992 military government)			Naval manpower increased from 42,000 to 68,000 (from 16% of mil total to 22%). Naval tonnage grows from 13,000 tons to 42,000.
1988-1991	PM Chatichai, of provincial business party, weakens state planning and allows incoming FDI to expand dramatically.			

1989		Vietnam pulls the last of its troops out of Cambodia (Sept). (Withdrawals had been ongoing since 1982.)		Contract signed for two frigates from China, bringing total of Chinese frigates in inventory to six. (Sept.)
1990		Thailand and Malaysia establish joint authority for exploration of oil and natural gas in shared area of Gulf of Thailand.		Contracts signed for small aircraft carrier from Spain and Sea Harriers to accompany.
1991 (Feb.)	Following military coup, some recentralization and reimposition of central planning.		Coup d'etat by Academy Class of 1958. Led by Gen. Suchinda of First Army Group. (Feb)	
1992 (April)	General Suchinda announces that he himself will serve as PM.			
1992 (May)	200,000 civilian protests, largely middle class, call for Gen. Suchinda's resignation.		Gen. Suchinda orders suppression of protesters. Army units open fire, kill 40, wound 600. (May 18) Marines in Bangkok shelter fleeing protesters. Some army elements outside Bangkok also rumored to mobilize in opposition to Suchinda.	
	Gen. Suchinda goes into exile. Democratic rule restored.			
1992-1995	Democratic Party PM Chuan Leekpai reduces state regulation of economy, further loosens restrictions on FDI.			

1993-1995				Navy contracts to buy 10 AV-8 Sea Harriers, 18 A-7s, and 6 S-70 Seahawk helicopters.
1993				Three defense policy planning documents released, all emphasize naval power.
				Navy introduces its first five-year planning document.
1994		UN Law of the Sea Convention takes effect. (November)		Navy contracts for two Knox-class frigates.
				Navy substantially upgrade Advanced Naval Studies Institute.
1995-1997	PM Banharn establishes Political Reform Committee, charged with making further democratic reforms to constitution.		Prominent active army officers oppose democratic constitutional revision. Navy provides public, if tentative, support.	
			Effort to transfer authority over Defense Council (responsible for budgets and appointments) from Supreme Commander to Def Min's office. Army opposes; navy supports.	
1996				Military white paper suggests that the navy's missions include SLOC defense.

1997	Thailand adopts new 1997 constitution. Regarded as most democratic constitution in Thailand's history.	East Asian financial crisis begins with the devaluation of the Baht. Baht loses more than 50 percent of its value. Thailand and Vietnam settle maritime boundary disputes. (Signed MOU in '72, began more serious discussions in '92.)		Navy squeezed by financial crisis, which raises value of its debt and results in smaller budgets.
1999			Discussions sponsored by Democrat Party, two liberal universities, and the navy on Thailand's future. Advocate embracing globalization and knowledge based economy. Army does not participate.	

APPENDIX 2: DATA ON CHINESE CASE

APPENDIX 2.1: PEOPLE DISCUSSED IN THE TEXT (CHINA)

Deng Xiaoping	CCP, General Secretary	1954	-	1966
	CMC Vice Chairman	01/75	-	04/76
	PLA Chief of Staff	01/75	-	04/76
	CCP Cent. Com. Vice Chair	07/77	-	09/82
	Vice Premier	07/77	-	03/80
	CMC Vice Chairman	07/77	-	06/81
	CCP Politburo Chairman	09/82	-	11/89
	CMC Chairman	06/81	-	11/89
Geng Biao	Minister of Defense	03/81	-	11/82
Hu Jintao	CMC Vice Chairman	10/99	-	present
	CCP General Secretary	11/02	-	present
Hu Yaobang	CCP Chairman	1981	-	1982 (Post eliminated)
	CCP General Secretary	1980	-	01/87
Hua Guofeng	CCP Chairman	1976	-	1981
	CMC Chairman	10/76	-	06/81
	Prime Minister	02/76	-	09/80
Jiang Qing	Mao's wife and member of the gang of four			
Jiang Zemin	CCP General Secretary	06/89	-	11/02
	CMC Chairman	11/89	-	Present
	President	03/93	-	
Li Desheng	Cdr. Shenyang Mil. Region		-	1985
Li Zuopeng	Deputy Navy Commander	1962	-	1973
Lin Biao	CMC Vice Chairman	09/59	-	09/71
	Minister of Defense	09/59	-	09/71
Liu Huaqing	CMC, Advisor to Deng	1979	-	1987
	CMC, full member	1987	-	1989
	PLAN Commander	08/82	-	01/88
	CMC Vice Chairman (2nd)	11/89	-	10/92
	CMC Vice Chairman (1st)	10/92	-	09/97
Liu Shaoqi	CCP, Vice Chairman	1949	-	1966

	President	1959	-	1966
Luo Ruiqing	PLA Chief of Staff	09/59	-	03/66
Mao Zedong	CCP, Chairman	06/45	-	1976
	President	10/49	-	04/59
	CMC Chairman	09/54	-	09/76
	Died	09/76		
Nie Rongzhen	CMC Vice Chairman	01/66	-	1985
Peng Dehuai	Minister of Defense	09/54	-	09/59
	CMC vice Chairman	09/54	-	09/59
Xiao Jinguang	PLAN Commander	01/50	-	01/80
	Deputy Minister of Defense	1954	-	
	PLAN Commander	1967	-	
Yang Dezhi	PLA Chief of Staff	03/80	-	11/87
Yang Shangkun	CMC Vice Chairman	09/82	-	1992
	President	04/88	-	03/93
Ye Fei	PLAN Commander	01/80	-	08/82
Ye Jianying	CMC Vice Chairman	01/66	-	10/85
	Minister of Defense	01/75	-	03/78
	President	03/78	-	06/83
Zhang Aiping	Minister of Defense	11/82	-	04/88
Zhang Chunqiao	Politburo, standing committee. Member, Gang of Four.			
Zhang Lianzhong	PLAN Commander	01/88	-	
Zhang Wannian	PLA Chief of Staff	11/92	-	09/95
	CMC Vice Chairman (3rd)	09/95	-	09/97
	CMC Vice Chairman (1st)	09/97	-	
Zhang Zhen	CMC Vice Chairman (2nd)	10/92	-	09/97
Zhou Enlai	Prime Minister	1949	-	1976
	Foreign Minister			
Zhao Ziyang	Prime Minister	09/80	-	11/87
	CCP General Secretary	01/87	-	06/89
	CMC Vice Chairman	11/87	-	06/89
Zhu De	President	01/75	-	07/76

APPENDIX 2.2. LEADERSHIP POSTS (CHINA)

PARTY POSITIONS

Generations of Chinese Communist Party Leadership*

1st	Mao Zedong
2nd	Deng Xiaoping
3rd	Jiang Zemin
4th	Hu Jintao

* The lexicon of "generations" became common after the mid-1990s, and was applied post hoc to Mao and Deng. The terms are useful in that they suggest the locus of real power, instead of identifying the formal occupant of a particular position. For many years during his reign, Deng's only formal position was president of a bridge club. The primary drawbacks are that they are overly simplistic, and ignore facts embarrassing to the party – such as the role played by Hua Guofeng after Mao's death.

While Mao and Deng are referred to simply as the first and second generation leaders, identification of the third and fourth is as follows: "the third generation of leaders, with Jiang Zemin as its core"; "the fourth generation of leaders, with Hu Jintao as its core." The significance of the latter phrasing is that it implies greater institutionalization and diffusion of power – though I would note that Mao and Deng faced many competitors and challengers.

CCP Chairmen   (Post abolished in 1982)

Mao Zedong	06/45	-	1976
Hua Guofeng	1976	-	1981
Hu Yaobang	1981	-	1982

CCP General Secretary   (Top Party post after 1982)

Deng Xiaoping	09/56	-	1957
Hu Yaobang	02/80	-	01/87
Zhao Ziyang	01/87	-	06/89
Jiang Zemin	06/89	-	11/02
Hu Jintao	11/02	-	present

STATE POSITIONS

Prime Minister

Zhoe Enlai	10/49	-	01/76
Hua Guofeng	02/76	-	09/80
Zhao Ziyang	09/80	-	11/87
Li Peng	11/87	-	03/98
Zhu Rongji	03/98	-	

The prime minister heads the state council, a cabinet ostensibly chosen by the NPC and oversees the work of state commissions and ministries.

State President**

Mao Zedong	10/49	-	04/59
Liu Shaoqi	04/59	-	10/68
Dong Biwu (acting)	10/68	-	01/75
Zhu De	01/75	-	07/76
Ye Jianying	03/78	-	06/83
Li Xiannian	06/83	-	04/88
Yang Shangkun	04/88	-	03/93
Jiang Zemin	03/93	-	2003

This post carries less authority than that of prime minister (which controls the bureaucracy), but can and has been used by as an additional post with great status – including some foreign relations responsibilities. (Some individuals have also been appointed to the post to bestow high nominal status, while removing them from more posts with more real power.) The name has varied over time, including (from most recent to most distant) president of the republic, chairman of the standing committee of the National People's Conference, and chairman of the central people's government.

MILITARY POSITIONS

CMC Chairman

Mao Zedong	09/54	-	09/76
Hua Guofeng	10/76	-	06/81
Deng Xiaoping	06/81	-	11/89
Jiang Zemin	11/89	-	present

CMC Vice Chairman

Zhu De	09/54	-	09/59
Peng Dehuai	09/54	-	09/59
Lin Biao	09/59	-	09/71
He Long	09/59	-	01/67
Nie Rongzhen	09/59	-	1985 (d. 1992)
Ye Jianying	01/66	-	10/85 (d. 1986)
Xu Xiangqian	01/66	-	1985 (d. 1990)
Chen Yi	01/66	-	01/72
Liu Bocheng	01/66	-	09/82
Yang Chengwu	02/67	-	03/68
Deng Xiaoping	01/75	-	04/76
Wang Hongwen	07/75	-	10/76
Deng Xiaoping	07/77	-	06/81
Yang Shangkun	09/82	-	10/92
Zhao Ziyang	11/87	-	06/89
Liu Huaqing	11/89	-	09/97 (2nd vice chairman, then 1st after 1992)
Zhang Zhen	10/92	-	09/97 (2nd)
Zhang Wannian	09/95	-	(3rd, then 1st after 09/97)
Chi Haotian	09/95	-	(4th, then 2nd after 09/97)
Hu Jintao	10/99	-	

Cao Gangchuan and Guo Boxiong are set to take over from Zhang Wannian and Chi Haotian in late 2002 or 2003.

Minister of Defense

Peng Dehuai	09/54	-	09/59
Lin Biao	09/59	-	09/71
Ye Jianying	01/75	-	03/78
Xu Xiangqian	03/78	-	03/81
Geng Biao	03/81	-	11/82
Zhang Aiping	11/82	-	04/88
Qin Jiwei	04/88	-	03/93
Chi Haotian	03/93	-	

Chief of Staff

Xu Xiangqian	10/49	-	11/54
Song Yu	11/54	-	10/58
Huang Kecheng	10/58	-	09/59
Luo Ruiqing	09/59	-	03/66
Yang Chengwu	08/66	-	03/68
Huang Yongsheng	06/68	-	09/71

Deng Xiaoping   01/75 - 04/76
Yang Chengwu   07/77 - 03/80
Yang Dezhi   03/80 - 11/87
Chi Haotian   11/87 - 11/92
Zhang Wannian   11/92 - 09/95
Bo Quanyou   09/95 -

PLAN Commanders

Xiao Jinguan   01/50 - 01/80
Ye Fei   01/80 - 08/82
Liu Huaqing   08/82 - 01/88
Zhang Lianzhong   01/88 -

APPENDIX 2.3. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (CHINA)

Year	National Political and Economic Events	Strategic Military (external or insurgent)	Domestic Pol-Mil (including coups)	Military Strategy and Force Structure
1949	KMT swept from mainland; PRC established.			
1953-1957	First Five Year Plan: technocratic and moderate (by later standards), with some room for private production.			
1953		Stalin dies in March. Sino-Soviet relations improve significantly. Korean War ends. (July)		PLAN marine corps established. Disbanded, '57. Reestablished, '80.
1954-1959			Peng Dehuai, former commander of Chinese forces in Korea, serves China's first Minister of Defense and also as vice chairman of CMC. PLAN cdr Xiao Jinguang serves as Dpt Min of Def. Provides strong support for Peng Dehuai, as well as for civilian moderates.	Mil budgets cut: 34% of national budget to 9%. Manpower cut from 4.8 million to 2.5 mil. Conventional capabilities improved. Navy strengthened, but first priority to air and armor.

1954		First Straits Crisis begins (Aug). China bombards Quemoy and Matzu. Taiwan attacks coastal targets, incl. Shanghai civilian and military facilities.		China's first destroyer detachment established.
1955		Zhou Enlai says at Bandung Conference: war between great powers not inevitable.		Ranks, insignia, and recruiting regulations and standards introduced.
1956	Mao begins expressing increasing concerns about deterioration of egalitarianism in Chinese society.	Mao's relationship w/ USSR deteriorates after Khruschev denounces Stalin and opens Sov system more to intellectuals.	Mao worries that PLA's technical orientation undermining social egalitarianism more generally.	China's first domestically produced destroyer, Chengdu-class, launched.
1957	Hundred Flowers campaign gives more room to intellectuals. Sponsored by Mao, who then leads reaction against it.	US deploys Matador missiles into Taiwan. Can target hundreds of miles into China with nukes.	PLA changes (see right-hand column) explicitly taken to strengthen it ideologically -- i.e. reinforce the left.	Reversals for policies established by Peng Dehuai: PLA regular reserve merged with militia again; marine corps disbanded.
	Anti-rightist campaign. 300,000 intellectuals branded liberals. Technocrats purged from govt, universities, and econ posts. (July)			
1957-1961	Great Leap Forward. Massive communes created. Private plots eliminated. Approx. 20 million starve.			
1957	Anti-dogmatism campaign targets those "slavishly" following Soviet model -- generally political moderates			

1958	Mao begins using radical language of "continuing revolution" to attack social problems. After criticism from many CCP officials, Mao stops sitting on Politburo meetings. Still dominates CMC.	Second Straits Crisis provoked by Mao. China shells islands, but ops more limited than during first crisis.	Expanded CMC session: "Struggle between two military lines" (revolutionary and Soviet). Navy singled out for criticism.	Militia size expanded significantly. Expanded further after 1962.
1959	Mao steps down as pres. Liu Shaoqi consolidates authority on civilian matters. Mao remains CMC chair. (April)	Khrushchev goes to the US for talks at Camp David. Sino-Soviet relations continue to deteriorate.	Lushan Conference: Peng Dehuai challenges Mao on Great Leap. Peng replaced by Lin Biao as MoD and CMC vice chair. (July)	
1959-1971				Lin Biao accelerates shift towards guerrilla doctrines, but keeps more conventional capabilities than the "gang of four" did later (1973-1976).
1960	Civilian moderates begin to ease measures taken during the Great Leap.	USSR withdrawals all 1,300 experts from China. 343 major contracts and 257 technical projects canceled. (September)	Expanded cession of CMC: Lin stresses Mao Zedong thought in new approach to military problems.	
1961-1965	Moderates control economic policy. Some private plots restored. Communes scaled back. Former capitalists and intellectuals employed.			

1962		PLA performs well under tough circumstances in border war against India. (fall)		Mao orders the creation of an enormous civilian militia under military control.
1963-1965			PLA expands role in CCP affairs. Heads of mil districts become secretaries in regional party bureaus. First secretaries of provinces become political commissars in military.	
1963			Mao declares: "Learn from the PLA," holds PLA as model revolutionary org. "Discovery" of Lei Feng diary. Model soldier. Used to attack poor values displayed by intellectuals and writers.	
1964		China successfully tests a nuclear bomb.		(See "threat" column)
1965		Foreign policy defeats. US increasing involvement in Vietnam; Pakistan defeated in war with India; Chinese-backed PKI smashed in Indonesia.		Lin abolishes ranks and insignia within the military. (May)
1966-1976	Cultural Revolution. China lurches left.			PLA manpower increased: 2.5 mil to 4.4 mil. Guerrilla doctrine. PLAN: "People's war at sea"; small craft and submarines; manpower increased; construction corps grows 700%. Standards drop.

1966	Cultural Revolution (CR) begins. Civilian moderates (Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Zhou Enlai) purged.		Lin Biao helps enable CR by giving Jiang Qing (Mao's wife) official military post. (February)	
	Work on "third line" begins; industry moved to inaccessible interior areas			
	Red guards attack intellectuals, party organs.			
1967	Mao intervenes to moderate radicalism. Revolutionary committees established with three-way representation: the masses, the PLA, and party cadre.		(See "politics" section.)	
1969		PLA fights Soviet troops on the Ussuri river. 100 Soviets and around 800 Chinese killed. (March)		
		Nixon orders withdrawals from Vietnam. "Vietnamization" begins. (June)		
1971	Zhou Enlai expands private plots. Brief period of more moderate econ and pol policy in midst of CR.	Kissinger goes to Beijing. (July)	Lin Biao dies, allegedly during flight to Soviet Union after coup plot discovered. (Sept)	
		PRC gains UN seat; Taiwan forced to withdrawal.		

1972		Nixon goes to China. Shanghai communique signed.		
1973-1976	"Gang of Four" all occupying key political posts; all in Politburo in 1973. Politics moves to extreme left again.			Central mil organs gutted by gang of four. Guerrilla doctrines supreme. Militia, railway corps strengthened. Little work on capital ships.
1974		PLAN units evict Vietnamese from the Paracel Islands, occupy islands.		
1975	Deng Xiaoping made vice chairman of the Party.	Saigon falls to Sov-backed NVA. (Apr) Sov presence in Vietnam expands thereafter.	Deng Xiaoping becomes CMC vice chairman and PLA chief of staff. (January '75) Deng characterizes military deficiencies in five characters: fat, faction-ridden, proud, luxury-prone, and lazy. Pushes for downsizing.	
1976 (Jan-April)	Tiananmen protests (Mar-Apr) follow death of Zhou Enlai (Jan). Deng purged of all posts; criticized for Tiananmen protests. (Apr)			
1976 (Sept-Oct)	Death of Mao. Hua Guofeng becomes CCP chairman; though weak, remains in that post until 1981.		Gang of Four prepares Shanghai militia and other mil supporters for showdown after Mao's death. Ye Jianying and Xiao Jinguang plot arrest of the Gang. Gang of Four arrested. (October)	

			Navy Pol Commissar, Su Zhenhua, assigned to purge Gang of Four supporters from Shanghai stronghold.	
1976-2003	Period of "Reform and Opening." Liberal economic reform and the re-institutionalization of politics.			
1977	Deng Xiaoping rehabilitated; reappointed to former posts. (Jul)		Deng restored as vice chairman of CMC.	
1978				Deng orders reduced troop strength, but manpower continues to climb until '81. Does not reach 1978 level again until 1986.
(April)			Acting navy cdr Liu Daosheng launches effort involving 6,000 political officers in 700 teams to investigate and remove leftists from navy.	
(Dec)	Third Plenum of Eleventh Party Congress. Reform and opening affirmed as policy. Deng Xiaoping emerges as leading political figure. (Dec) Experiments in two southern provinces with private agricultural plots and the "family responsibility system."	Soviet client state Vietnam invades Cambodia. (Dec)		

1979 (Jan-Feb)		China invades Vietnam. (Feb) Lose 40,000 men in four months of combat.	Liu Huaqing becomes Deng's personal advisor within CMC.	
(Jul-Sep)	Four "special economic zones" (SEZs) established, foreign firms establish operations. (Jul)		Army Marshal Ye Jianying introduces "four cardinal principles," arguing absolute authority of Party. Criticizes liberals for departing from Party consensus. (Sep)	
(Dec)		Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (Dec) China encircled by Soviet power.		
1980	Hu Yaobang, Deng's liberal protoge, becomes Party General Secretary.		PLA GPD chief Wei Guoqing cooperates with Party Chairman Hua Guofeng to "eliminate bourgeois ideology," undermine Deng's position.	Deng Xiaoping drops "military modernization" from third to fourth (and last) place among the four national priorities.
			Wei Guoqing and Hua Guofeng bring conservative army general, Ye Fei, in to command the navy.	Defense budget for 1981 cut by 13 percent.
			Deng faces continuing problems in the military. Four of eight division commanders slated for transfers from Nanjing MR refuse orders.	

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1980-1990				Military reductions; emphasis on navy. Def budget shrink 21%. Naval tonnage grows 86%. New warships; naval systems imported. Army modernization slow: army unwilling to downsize and lacks funds.
1981	Hu Yaobang replaces Hua Guofeng as Party Chairman. Hu expected to replace Deng as paramount leader after the latter's retirement in 1987.			
1981-1982	High inflation puts Deng and liberals on the defensive. Some retrenchment.			
1982		UN Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 ready for signing. Takes effect in 1994.	Zhang Aiping, a member of the military's science and technology community, appointed Min. of Defense. PLA GPD chief Wei Guoqing fired (September) after PLA article attacking liberalization and Hu Yaobang. Replaced by Yu Qiuli, who proved an equally tough critic. Navy admiral Liu Huaqing becomes navy cdr, replaces Ye Fei. (Sept)	

				Navy cdr Liu Huaqing establishes Navy Equipment Assessment Research Center, improving design capabilities, think-tank / naval propaganda capability.
1984	Major new economic liberalization initiative. Special economic zones established in fourteen additional cities (brining total to 16).		Navy cdr Liu Huaqing publishes article: navy's first priority "combating leftism," places econ rebuilding ahead of mil spending.	
1985-1986			PLA's GPD launches anti-liberal campaigns, including "theory of soldiers' gains and losses." Uses these to attack Deng's liberal allies, especially Hu Yaobang.	
1985			Army officers attack liberal Deng protoge Hu Yaobang, prevent him from becoming CMC chairman -- critically damaging his candidacy to succeed Deng. (July-Aug)	At CMC meeting, Deng announces no longer necessary to prepare for imminent world war. Limited, local war around Chinese periphery cannot be ruled out. (Jun)
				Adm Liu Huaqing establishes warship captain's course for pilots. Early acquisition of an AC carrier widely discussed.
			Li Desheng, leftist military holdout, finally removed from his post as cdr of Shenyang military region.	

1986		Navy's discussion of resources under the SC Sea begins w/ symposium sponsored by Naval Equipment Research Center. (Nov)		
1987	Hu Yaobang, weakened by conservative attacks, forced to resign all posts. (January)	PLAN analysis: First use of term lebensraum ("living space" or "shengcun kongjian") in reference to ocean and ocean resources. (April)	Mil allows Deng protoge Zhao Ziyang to become CMC vice chair, but only on condition he reports to General Yang Shangkun, CMC First Vice Chair. (November)	
	Zhao Ziyang becomes CCP General Secretary. (January)	China begins to establish permanent structures and permanent presence on Spratley Islands.	Liu Huaqing made full member of CMC; delivers outspoken speech for reform and opening during Party plenum. (Nov)	
1988		Chinese analysts begin to see changes in Soviet behavior as significant.

Chinese naval and maritime forces seize several of the Spratley Islands in the center of the South China Sea. | | Ranks and insignia restored to the PLA (established in 1955; abolished in 1965). |
| 1989 | Tiananmen Square massacre. (June 4) | U.S. and other states embargo weapons-related sales to China. Disrupts ongoing R&D, supply of spare parts. | | |
| | Zhao Ziyang purged. Jiang Zemin, relatively obscure mayor of Shanghai, becomes new Party general secretary. | PLAN-affiliated Oceanographic Bureau surveys SC Sea; "finds" 196 billion barrels of oil -- 2400% of Liu Huaqing's '84 estimate. | | |

1989-1992	Army conservatives lead reaction, threaten to derail reform permanently. Retrenchment in all areas: econ, social, and political.			
1990-2000				Defense budgets grow rapidly -- 91 percent over ten years. Navy continues growing, but at slower rate.
1992	Deng Xiaoping undertakes his "nanxun" (southern tour) designed to halt the conservative tide and restart the reform process. Begins January 15.		Navy's Huang Caihong publishes article echoing all main themes from Deng's nanxun. (Jan 19) On Jan 26, Admiral Liu Huaqing delivers speech doing the same.	
	National media does not report on Deng's southern trip until mid-February.		Deng removes army generals (and brothers) Yang Shangkun and Yang Baibing from key military posts. Admiral Liu Huaqing becomes first vice chairman of the CMC. Record number of naval officers in politburo.	
1993		China becomes a net oil importer. China publishes map; appears to claim gas-rich Natuna Islands, long claimed (and occupied) by Indonesia.		

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1994		China passes Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone Law.		
1995		China begins building structures on Mischief Reef, close to major islands of the Philippines.		
1997		China begins negotiating purchase of gas from Natuna Island fields, tacitly recognizing Indonesian sovereignty. ASEAN+3 formed: ASEAN states plus China, Japan, and ROK.	Admiral Liu Huaqing (age 81) retires.	PLAN shifts emphasis to sea denial systems like submarines. Indefinitely delays acquisition of AC carrier.
1998		Obstacles to China's joining WTO begin to fall. Serious negotiations with major parties.		
1999			Hu Jintao becomes CMC vice chairman in preparation for political transition in 2002-2003.	
2001		China agrees to multilateral negotiations over SC Sea code of conduct. (Nov) Zhu Rongji proposes ASEAN-China free trade agreement.		
2002	Hu replaces Jiang as Party Gen Secretary. Jiang remains CMC chairman.	Nonbinding code of conduct signed on behavior in the SC Sea.		PLAN signs contract for eight Kilo-class submarines from Russia.

APPENDIX 3: DATA ON INDONESIAN CASE

APPENDIX 3.1: INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT (INDONESIA)

Agus Wirahadikusumah	Ast. For TNI planning	01/99 -	11/99
	Wirabuana Military Cmd.	11/99 -	02/00
	Kostrad commander	02/00 -	07/00
	Overstrength officer	07/00 -	08/01
	Died	08/01 (age 49)	
Agus Widjojo	TNI Territorial Chief	1999	
Habibie	Science and Tech Minister	1990 -	
	Vice President	-	05/98
	President	05/98 -	10/99
Hatta	Vice President	1945 -	
	Prime Minister	1948 -	1950
Martadinata	Navy Chief of Staff	1959 -	
Nasution, Abdul Haris	Army Chief	1945 -	1953
	Army Chief	1955 -	1962
	TNI Commander	1962 -	1965
Natsir	Prime Minister	1950 -	1951
Prabowo Subianto	Special Forces Commander		
	Cdr of Central Reserve		
Subagyo Hadisiswoyo	Army Commander	02/98 -	11/99
	Head of BAIS (Mil. Intel.)	-	02/98
Subiyakto	Commander of the navy	1945 -	1959
Sucipto, Akhmad	TNI academy commander	-	09/98
(or Sutjipto)	Dept. Navy commander 9/98	-	07/99
	Navy commander	07/99 -	10/00
Tyasno Sudarto	Army Commander	11/99 -	08/00
Suharto	Cdr Strategic Reserve	1962 -	1965
	President	1968 -	05/98
Sukarno	President	1945 -	1967

Suwarto	Dpty Cdr of SESKOAD	1961		
Wahid	President	10/99	-	06/01
Widodo	Navy commander		-	07/99
	Dept TNI commander	07/99	-	10/99
	TNI commander	10/99	-	06/02
Wilopo	Prime Minister	1952	-	1953
Wiranto	Army commander			02/98
	TNI commander	02/98	-	10/99
	Coordinating Min.	10/99	-	02/00

APPENDIX 3.2: ABBREVIATIONS AND FOREIGN TERMS (INDONESIA)

ABRI   Indonesian military (as it was known 1968-1999)
                           Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia

Dwifungsi   Dual function – the military's dual military and socio-economic function

Guided Democracy   Name of state system established by Sukarno, 1959-1966

KNIL   Royal Netherlands Indies Army (indigenous forces)

Komkamtib   Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (an intel.
organization)

Kopassus   Special Forces Command
                           Komando Pasukan Khusus

Kostrad   Army Strategic Command (or Indonesia's strategic reserve)
                           Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat

Laskar   Militia forces (used during WWII and revolutionary)

Laskar Jihad   Islamic organization formed in 1999 to fight against Christians in Maluku

MPR   People's Consultative Assembly (after 1959)

MUI   Indonesian Council of Ulemas, party formed in 2000 from non-NU Islamic parties

New Order   Name of the state system led by Suharto after 1968

NU   Wahid's Islamic Party
                           Nahdlathul Ulama

PETA   Defenders of the Fatherland, WWII Japanese-trained forces
                           Pembela Tanah Air

PKI   Communist Party of Indonesia

PSI   Socialist Party of Indonesia

SESKOAD   Army Staff and Command School

TNI   Indonesian military (as it was known 1945-1968, 1999-present)

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APPENDIX 3.3. CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS (INDONESIA)

Year	Political or Economic Event	Strategic Military (external or insurgent)	Domestic Political-Military (incl. coups)	Military Strategy and Force Structure
1941	Japanese military government begins.	Occupation of Dutch East Indies by Japanese military.		
1945	Republic of Indonesia declares independence. (August 17) Constitution adopted, establishing a presidential political system. (August 29)			
1945-1949		Indonesian Revolution.		
1949	New constitution (with parliamentary system) adopted.	Dutch concede Indonesian independence. Do not cede Irian Jaya. (December 27)		
1949-1953	Liberal politicians hold sway in parliament.		Former KNIL army officers and the navy support parliamentary liberals. Former Peta army officers opposed.	Army reduced from 350,000 to 200,000, conventional capabilities strengthened. Navy grows from 0 to 4,200 tons.
1949-1962		Darul Islam revolt aimed at creating Islamic state. (Peak intensity: '57 to '61)		

1953-1957	Socialist politicians hold sway in parliament, but politics highly unstable; economic turmoil.			
1957-1963	President Sukarno declares martial law (March 14). Era of "guided democracy" follows.		Navy supports Sukarno; army begins period in support, but opposition steadily grows.	Navy grows from 4,200 to 56,000 tons. Army's size expands from 200,000 to 290,000.
1957-1963		Successful war with Holland over control of Irian Jaya.		
1958				Army advances the idea of dwifungsi: military to serve "dual (military and social) function."
1958-1961		PRRI/Permesta revolt to preserve federal system against Sukarno's efforts to centralize.		
1959	Sukarno restores the 1945 (presidential) constitution, consolidates control.			
1961				Army begins civic action program in countryside.
1963-1966		War with Malaysia, United Kingdom, and Australia over Malaysia.	Navy participates in Malaysia war willingly; army opposed to war.	War brings large budgets, force structures for all services.
1965			Failed communist uprising backed by mil elements, especially in the air force. (September 30)	

1965-1966	Army, especially General Suharto, gradually limit President Sukarno's effective political power.		Military purge of communist political and social organizations. Between 250,000 and 1,000,000 killed.	
1967			Army's General Suharto, after facing down protests by navy, removes Sukarno from power. (March)	Army moves to a doctrine of "Total People's Defense," later expanded to become doctrine for entire military. Civic-action programs expanded.
1968	Suharto elected President by the MPR (congress). Suharto's "New Order" lasts until 1998.			
1968-1978				Naval tonnage declines from 56,000 to 15,000 tons. Marine Corps reduced from 14,000 to 5,000. Army reduced from 290,000 to 180,000.
1974			Anti-Japanese riots, orchestrated by dissident army officers, results in stricter laws on FDI.	
1975		Indonesia invades and occupies East Timor. Insurgency follows.		
1978-1983			Officers at SESKOAD seek to reduce corruption in the army and qualify dwifungsi (the "dual function" doctrine).	

			Foundation for the Institute of Constitutional Awareness (YLKB) active.	
1983-1994	Some liberalizing economic reforms undertaken, continue until the early 1990s, when most are reversed.			
1988		Chinese naval and marine forces seize several of the Spratley Islands in the center of the South China Sea.		
1993		China appears to claim the gas-rich Natuna Islands, long claimed by Indonesia.		New 25-year (1994-2019) force structure plan: Army to grow by 54 percent; little naval growth planned.
1994	*Tempo* (weekly magazine) runs story criticizing VP Habibie's role in the purchase of East German naval corvettes.			
1995		Treaty of Mutual Security signed with Australia		
1997	East Asian Financial Crisis hits Indonesia, rapid inflation follows. (Aug)	Ties with China improve. Negotiations to sell LNG from Natuna Islands to China. (Dec)		
1998 (Feb-Mar)	Students hold first, tentative protest rallies against Suharto's continuing rule. (February)		Ali Sadikin, former marine cdr, sponsors petition demanding Suharto's resignation. (Mar)	

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1998 (May)	Four protesting students shot and killed. Protests grow larger. (May) President Suharto resigns. VP Habibie sworn in as new President. (May 21)		After protesters killed, marine units escort student demonstrators.	
1998 (Oct)			Naval and marine officers quit ruling Golkar party, join Megawati's liberal DPI party. (October 3)	
1998 (Nov)	Student protests grow after Habibie rejects demands for new elections under freer rules. Pres Habibie agrees to hold elections no later than June '99. (Nov 18)		Gen. Wiranto warns students. Army fires on students, kills a dozen, wounds hundreds. (Nov 13) Marines resume escort of student protesters. (November 14)	
1999-2000		Sectarian violence erupts in Malacca in January 1999. 2,500 killed by June 2000.		
1999-2002		Revolt in Aceh. 100 killed between May and June 1999.		
1999 (Jun)	Elections for MPR held. Process for selecting new president begins.		Marines in charge of protecting MPR. Naval warships on alert.	
1999 (Aug)		Elections held in East Timor. Army-backed militia attack pro-independence groups.		

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1999 (Oct)	Wahid selected and sworn in as new Pres, Megawati as VP. (Oct 22)		First civilian (Juwono) as Def Min. First naval officer (Adm Widodo) as mil cdr. (October 25)	
1999 (Nov)		5,000 pro-independence natives gather in Irian Jaya, begin to agitate for independence.		
1999 (Dec)				Force structure announcement: Marine strength to rise from 13,000 to 23,000.
2000 (Jan)			Wahid replaces TNI spokesman Army Maj. Gen. Sudrajat with AF officer, after Sudrajat challenges President's authority as CinC; AF officer also appointed as first non-army head of Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS).	
2000 (Feb)			Wahid fires Coordinating Minister for Security army Gen Wiranto. Coup rumors sweep Jakarta.	
2000 (Feb)				Force structure announcements: Army SOF to be cut from 6,000 to 5,000, possibly further. Navy announces new, outwardly oriented basing structure, plans for expansion.

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2000 (June)		People's Congress in Irian Jaya approves resolution for independence. Rejected by national government.		
2000 (Sept)		UN begins operations in E. Timor in preparation for independence.		
2001 (Jun)	Megawati inaugurated as President.			

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