THE 1984 RIOTS:

LAWRENCE, MASSACHUSETTS

by

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ⓒ   Joseph D. Duran

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ABSTRACT

A series of interviews were conducted with key informants
at governmental and community levels regarding the civil
disturbances which broke out in the city of Lawrence, Mas-
sachusetts on August 8, 1984. The interviews sought to collect
informants' impressions regarding the causes of these disturbances.
Based on these impressions, an assessment was made regarding
the intergovernmental and community-level action-responses to
the riots.

The 1984 riots in Lawrence, Massachusetts, are seen here as
political expressions on the part of the Lawrence Hispanic
community. The riots are regarded as an important dimension
of the Hispanic community's struggle for political equality
based on claims for social and economic equality and demands
for increased access to, and responsiveness from, the Lawrence
city government.

Four critical factors of political mobilization are examined
with regard to the Lawrence Hispanic community. First, the
group size of the Lawrence Hispanic community is identified
as a critical resource for political incorporation into city
government. Second, the limited political experience of Lawrence
Hispanics in city affairs is seen as a pivotal basis for continued
activism. Third, the nascent organizational development of col-
lective efforts to address Hispanic issues is seen as an emerging
critical resource for political mobilization. Fourth, the need
for the development of broad-based electoral coalitions is identi-
fied as the most critical resource area in need of further develop-
ment.

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CHAPTER ONE

"PROTEST, POLITICS AND PLURALISM"

1.0   Introduction to chapter:

In this chapter I will introduce some of the key themes to be
used in later chapters as the bases for examining the stories collected
for this report. The stories were collected to indicate a range of
select critical perceptions regarding the riots of last summer in
Lawrence, Massachusetts.

First among the themes, is the view that the riots are
legitimately seen as political expressions; as part of the slow social
process moving toward the incorporation of Lawrence Hispanics into the
political arena. The riots are seen here as an important dimension of
Hispanics' struggle for political equality in Lawrence.

A second theme refers to the conventional wisdom which claims
that relative social inequality, between people of color and the white
population, represents a significant precipitant to social protest
movements; inequality is regarded a causal factor in explaining riots.
On this point most observers agree.

Third, the brief review of the riot and social protest
literature gleans several important issues: the dynamic interaction
between governors and governed; how this interaction is seen as a
bargaining process where resources are required to bargain; a process
within which policies and practices evolve as social learning takes
place; and how this learning may facilitate or inhibit the moblization
of challenging parties and coalitions.

Also in this chapter, we will examine how this interactive

relationship has been characterized by reciprocal conflict in other locales. In the Browning, Marshall, and Tabb study (1), the "Theory of Political Incorporation" is developed; a theory which identifies the necessary resources for successful minority mobilization which in turn leads to political incorporation into city government.

The mobilization of challenging parties, where protest activity --including riots -- is seen as part of that challenge, will be examined as it relates to the traditional view of pluralist democracy.

1.1 Struggles for Political Equality:

"The gradual development of the equality of conditions is therefore a providential fact," claims de Tocqueville (2) in his view of the "irresistible revolution," which he asserts as having advanced for centuries in spite of "such amazing obstacles." He describes progress toward equality as "universal... ...durable..it constantly eludes all human interference, and all events as well as all men contribute to its progress..."

There are several key propositions in de Tocqueville's view that are pertinent to the discussion at hand: that social movements toward equality ("revolution"), seen in their historical and "providential" dimension, exert a seemingly natural force, unmitigated by "human interference." Moreover, these social movements are aided in their progress by "all events" and "all men."

These propositions serve as good starting questions to begin an examination of the set of events leading to, and following, the riots which surfaced August 8th and 9th, 1984, in Lawrence, Massachusetts. These riots are seen here as political expressions by

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the Hispanic community in Lawrence which shares much in common with the history of such struggles which have sought to expand claims for political equality to more broadly encompass demands for social and economic equality as well.

It is certainly well beyond the scope of this "short thesis" to recount the history of the struggles to remove the ascriptive barriers to political participation, such as birth, wealth, race, religion, and more recently, gender. These barriers have been removed in the face of defeats, setbacks, social control and repression; and other such "amazing obstacles" and "human interference;" they have shared the themes of access to governmental decision-making and responsiveness in governmental policies and practices.

The discussion in this report will center on the interaction between the Lawrence Hispanics, seen as individuals, families, and small groups --within the 'community' context,-- vis a vis official actors, seen here as institutional representatives, social planners and other actors -- within the 'intergovernmental' context. Both contexts are understood to function within a broader political economy; and as part of the larger social context, or body politic. The interaction between the intergovernmental actors and those representing the community level are influenced by this political economy as they also depend on the ultimate acceptance of the body politic. Thus, while this report will focus on the dynamic nature of this interacti:-- between governors and governed, it will acknowledge the influence o÷ politically-based economic forces and in particular, of white response, as these relate to the conditions bearing on the political existence of Hispanics in the city of Lawrence, Massachusetts.

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1.2   Political Incorporation of Minorities and Pluralist

Democracy.

1.2.0 Preface to discussion.

The Browning, Marshall, and Tabb study, discussed

below, was chosen as a framework for discussion of the Lawrence riots

because it is one of very few studies that specifically examines the

role of Hispanic communities in social protest. Also, the among the

cities examined were four which share much in common with Lawrence with

regard to size of the city and the relative percentage of Hispanic

residents. Further, the scope of the study, examining minority group

mobilization over a twenty year period is seen as helpful in

appreciating the gradual process of community development.

1.2.1 The Theory of Poltical Incorporation.

The Theory of Political Incorporation was developed

by Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, and

presented in their recent publication, <u>Protest Is Not Enough</u> , (1984).

Looking at ten northern California cities over a twenty-year

period, the authors examined the impact of the national civil rights

movement and federal social programs on local minority (Blacks and

Hispanics) mobilization, the political incorporation of these

minorities into city government, and the policy responsiveness to

minorities on the part of city governments.

Based on this analysis they formulated a theory of "minority

mobilization and white response in which electoral mobilization is a

key to political incorporation, and incorporation in liberal dominant

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coalitions is central to policy responsiveness. The stronger forms of incorporation -- including the replacement of conservative coalitions on city councils and minority participation in new, more liberal coalitions -- are necessary and sufficient for sustained policy responsiveness to the interests of minority groups" (p.240).

The theory asserts that "incorporation" depends on the determined and sustained mobilization of minority resources in the electoral arena. These resources are identified as (1) group size; (2) the amount of support for minority interests among the rest of the electorate; (3) organizational development; and (4) political experience.

They found that although "demand-protest" often contributes to electoral mobilization, demand-protest alone is not enough to produce strong incorporation of minority interests in city government. "And although demand-protest yields some measurable gain in responsiveness from city governments, the incorporation of the group yields more" (p.240).

The basic resources of group size and support, facilitated by organizational development and political experience, create strong incentives where they are present and strong constraints where they are not.

As also found by Clark and Ferguson (3), the evolution of group mobilization and the response of dominant coalitions is contingent on the traditional local ways of dealing with demands on city government. Conservative coalitions tend to resist minority mobilization demands and to oppose their efforts to gain access to city government; liberal coalitions tend to co-opt.

The theory gives special prominence to electoral effort and

the role of coalitions in electoral mobilization and in governmental
decision making. In particular, it stresses the need to appreciate
coaltion-formation and development over time. Also key to the theory
is the relevance of ideology. Browning et al found that "conservative
and liberal coalitions (dominant in city government) responded very
differently to minority mobilization and demands" (p.241).

1.2.2   The Pluralist View of Democracy.

The Browning et al study focused on two central
questions: (1) how open were city government systems? and (2) how
responsive were city government actions and policies to minority
interests. These questions bear directly on two features of the
pluralist view of democracy: the condition of open access to the
political arena, and, the condition of balance of power (particularly
as it refers to responsiveness of policy and practice).

Robert Dahl (4) suggests that the "fundamental axiom in the
theory and practice of American pluralism is: Instead of a single
center of sovereign power there must be multiple centers of power, none
of which can be wholly sovereign." This is important because the
"existence of multiple centers of power...will help tame power, to
secure the consent of all, and to settle conflicts peacefully."

Pluralism is seen from inside the political arena. This arena
is seen more or less as an orderly contest, "carried out by the classic
pluralist rules of bargaining, lobbying, logrolling, coalition
formation, negotiation, and compromise."

1.2.2.0 Poltical access.

Entry into the political arena is seen by

the pluralist view as an open access situation with "no barriers to a
group getting a hearing" (p.24). As Dahl argues: "Because even
minorities are provided with opportunities to veto solutions they
strongly object to, the consent of all will be won in the long run."
According to this pluralist view: "the institutions ....offer
organized minorities innumerable sites in which to fight, perhaps to
defeat, at any rate to damage an opposing coalition" (p.329).

1.2.2.1 Balance of Power.

"Because one center of power is set against
another," Dahl continues (p.24), "power itself will be tamed,
civilized, controlled, and limited to decent human purposes, while
coercion, the most evil form of power, will be reduced to a minimum."

When a political system meets these conditions, Dahl argues,
neither rigidity nor tyranny will result. No one group will become
dominant for several reasons: 1. self restraint -- the institutions
will "generate politicians who learn how to deal gently with opponents,
who struggle endlessly in building and holding coalitions together, who
doubt the possibilities of great change, who seek compromises" (Dahl,
p.329);
2. Long-run self interests encourage self restraint -- in a world of
ever changing coalitions the "wise government" does not antagonize
groups which may be tomorrow's allies on a set of other issues; 3.
Short-run self interests --
around concern for internal stability discourage the abuse of power
because factionalism can occur within the ranks or could be stimulated
by such abuse; and, 4. power -- which threatens to become abusive
stimulates countervailing power coalitions.

According to pluralist thought, the existence of these conditions help to produce responsiveness. As William Gamson (5) observes: "The critical element in this argument is that in the normal operation of the political system, dissatisfied groups are encouraged to organize and translate their dissatisfaction into concrete political demands. Several elements in the political system lead to such encouragement" (p.8). These elements include: 1. competitive elections; 2. organization into alliances; 3. multiple points of access to political system; and 4. a normative commitment of competing parties to open access.

Gamson continues his observations on pluralist thought: "Thus, no group will long remain unrepresented, and it will find its entry into the political arena smoothed and facilitated by powerful allies who find it useful to do so for their own purposes. There will be no need for such groups to violate the existing rules of democractic politics to bring about the remedy of legitimate grievances."

The result is an image of the U.S. political system as a game involving bargaining and trading, where any number can play, with the rule of entry being that one agrees to behave oneself. As Gamson observes: "The rules prohibit the use of violence or any efforts aimed at permanently removing other contestents from the game. The essence of the competition is bargaining for relative advantage, with the attendant tactics of influence trading, coaltion formation, logrolling and the like" (p.9).

1.3   The "Flaw in the Pluralist Heavens."
What Gamson observes, and Browning et al also found, is that

the pluralist explanation of democratic ideals-in-action, being an

inside view, does not centrally address how challenging groups first

get in from 'outside;'

particularly when such groups are relatively less powerful and when

they encounter barriers to political entry unaccounted for in the

pluralist explanation. As Schattschneider (6) writes: "The flaw in

the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong

upper-class accent. Probably 90 percent of the people cannot get into

the pressure system."

The "heavenly chorus" seems a well established group. As Lowi

(7) writes: "Groups provide a great deal of social efficiency...They

are effective means of articulating and representing interests and

providing low-level social controls that reduce the need for

governmental coercion. But the very success of established groups is a

mortgage against a future of new needs that are not yet organized or

are not readily accomodated by established groups."

How then do challenging members become part of the

establishment?

How do they secure the opportunity to join in the 'chorus,' and perhaps

sing a different song? How do they take out a 'mortgage,' one perhaps

that can accomodate the future of "new needs?"

For many challenging groups, the point(s) of entry have

necessarily been approached through mobilizing resources, and directing

the force of these resources at specific targets. By appealling to the

targets' "reference publics," per Lipsky (8), challenging groups

attempt to secure a favorable response from these reference publics who

may ultimately help support entry into the political system. It is

often a 'fight' for entry; not always the pleasant joining together for

the 'bargaining game.'

The magnititude of this fight "in the short run," according to Charles Tilly (9), "depends on an interaction of the tactics of contenders and the coercive practices of government." In the longer run "the magnitude of the conflict depends on the established means by which contenders can enter and leave the polity, and the frequency with which entries and exits actually occur" (p.4).

The pluralist image, therefore, seems only half-true. The appropriate image for challenging groups seeking entry into the political system is more like a fight with no holds barred, than it appears to be a well-behaved contest under well-defined rules. Lowi says it well again: "The history of the United States is not merely one of mutual accomodation among competing groups under the broad umbrella of consensus. The proper image of our society has never been a melting pot. In bad time, it is a boiling pot; in good times, it is a tossed salad. For those who are 'in,' this is all very well. But the price has always been paid by those who are 'out,' and when they do get in they do not always get in through a process of mutual accomodation under the broad umbrella of consensus" (p.53).

Do some challenging groups eventually get in the political arena? Browning et al found that some did. In their findings they concur with Gamson's assessment: "Some of these unruly and scrappy challengers do eventually become members. One might be tempted to conclude from this that the flaw in the pluralist heaven is, after all, rather exaggerated. Entry is not prohibited for those with the gumption, the persistence, and the skill to pursue it long enough. But this is, at best, cold comfort. Beyond the unsuccessful challengers....there may lie others unable to generate enough effort to

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mount even a visible protes. If it costs so much to succeed, how can

we be confident that there are not countless would-be challengers who

are deterred by the mere prospect?" (p.143).

What Browning, Marshall, and Tabb found among their

'successful' and 'unsuccessful' challengers was that it takes more than

"gumption, persistance, and skill." Their findings -- about the

resources necessary for a successful challenge -- respond to the

"problem of the powerless" as first articulated by one observer of

black protest, James Q. Wilson (10). Wilson was among the first to

suggest that protest activity be conceived as a problem of bargaining

in which the basic problem is that (black) groups lack political

resources to exchange.

1.4 The Problem of Resources.

What Browning et al found was that challenging groups, in

their case -- groups of color -- have been successful to the extent

they have been able to moblize the resources of group size and white

support, which depended on coalition formation, organizational

development, and political experience. Their standard for measuring

success "is movement in the direction of increasing city government

responsivenss to the interest of minority groups"

(p.210). They concur with Lipsky's findings about protest being "one

of the few ways in which relatively powerless groups can create

bargaining resources." And they share with Lipsky's concern that the

outcome of successful challenges -- responsiveness -- goes beyond

"symbolic assurances." The Theory of Political Incorporation addresses

the receipt and gain of more tangible rewards: political participation

and power.

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1.5 Implications for Lawrence.

The riots which broke out in the Lower Tower Hill neighborhood
of Lawrence, Massachusetts, on August 8th, 1984, and continued
intermittently for two days brought an extraordinary amount of
attention on the problems of this city of approximately 65,000
residents, twenty-eight miles north of Boston.

The 'primary voice' of the riots was immediately identified by
most observers -- the media, government officials, community residents,
and members of the general public-at-large -- as that of the generally
low-income Hispanic residents of Lawrence. Despite the fac   tne
riots began as a fight between a Hispanic and a white person, and
escalated to an altercation between a group of Hispanic versus a group
of white persons, the public awareness of the long standing social
problems of the predominately Hispanic Lower Tower Hill neighborhood
has led most observers to regard the riots as most directly related to
the civic status of Lawrence Hispanics in general.

In this sense, therefore, I will view the riots as "articulate
protests against genuine grievances" in keeping with Fogelson's
standards for an interpretation of protest activity (11). They are
protests because they became an attempt, once escalated beyond the
initial fight scenario, to call attention of larger society to the
dissatisfactions of many low income Lawrence residents. The riots are
articulate because they were restrained, selective, and directed at the
immediate sources of social discontent -- first, taking the form of
cross-racial tension, and then directed at legal authority, and
ultimately, local government. Moreover, they are genuine because, by
the standards of democratic equality, the conditions of Hispanics in

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Lawrence, who are disproportionately represented among the poor, are deplorable.

As will be indicated by the stories which follow, the various responses to these riots take various forms. The legislative and executive responses are allocative in nature, with financial, material, and human resource allocations aimed 'at' primary measures of social control and adjustment, and secondary measures fostering socio-political development. The institutional responses, initiated by these legislative and executive actions, have been prescriptive in nature, with planning efforts targeted 'for' recipient populations in the form of 'treatment' programs and services.

The response of primary interest here is that emergent, 'derivative,' community-level response; the community folks 'with' whom community developers, social planners, and official governmental actors would be well-advised to negotiate a new social contract. A social contract based on the fundamental objectives of governmental access and responsiveness, initiated by dialogue; and acknowledging the interpendent relationships which exist between the city and its white and brown populations.

This social contract, of an irrepressible political nature, is a fundamental and necessary platform upon which any community development plans -- social, economic, physical -- must be established. Indeed, I firmly believe, if the plans generated by last summer's riots fail to earn the 'unofficial licensure' of the total community -- particularly, the Hispanic community -- the future of the City of Lawrence will continue to be characterized by the tenuous social conditions of mutual fear, distrust, and instability. These are the conditions, I believe, that attend any plans which do not sufficiently

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account for the significant political participation of all citizens to whom such plans refer. It is only with such political power that the 'symbolic assurances' of a concerned goverment make any 'real sense.' It is only with the 'tangible rewards' of political incorporation that such extreme and disruptive events as riots become politically unnecessary.

CHAPTER TWO

"THE STORIES BEHIND THE NUMBERS"

2.0   Introduction to chapter:

In this chapter, the discussion begins with the relevance of acknowledging the presence and relative inequality of the Hispanic population from national, regional, and local perspectives. The data which follow are presented as indicators of this inequality. The stories which accompany the data introduce into the discussion some of the multiple dimensions within which this information can be related to issues bearing directly on the political, social, and economic conditions faced by Lawrence and its Hispanic community.

Except as otherwise noted, comments included here are taken from personal interviews with the author; which were conducted with assurances of anonymity. In some cases, names of speakers appear when permission was granted by the speaker or when comments were spoken in a public forum.

2.1   Toward a visible community.

Interestingly, many commentators from de Tocqueville to Myrdal have seen inequality, as a precipitant to social protest, in literally "black and white" terms; as indicated by de Tocqueville's words: "If there ever are great revolutions there, they will be caused by the presence of blacks upon American soil. That is to say, it will not be the equality of social conditions but rather their inequality which may give rise thereto" (1).

Theorists and other experts involved in the report of the U.S.

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (2) pointed to the danger of a divided society in 1968, saying: "our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white -- separate and unequal."

Within twenty years after the Second World War, the civil rights movement was seen by Myrdal in terms of the "American dilemma" of "an ever-raging conflict" between egalitarian beliefs and the unequal treatment and position of blacks.

The United States is not simply a two-color nation, black and white. The U.S. Hispanic population, according to the 1980 U.S. Census (3), represented 6.4% of the total U.S. population of 226 million, or 14.6 million in absolute terms. The black population was enumerated at 25.5 million in the 1980 Census, or approximately 11.3% of the total population.

Although the enumeration of Hispanics was substantially improved in the 1980 Census as compared to the 1970 Census (see footnote), many experts agree that the 1980 Census continued to undercount Hispanics and other minorities. Estimates have placed the population size in 1980 to be closer to 20 million Hispanics, or 8.9% of total population, accounting for estimates of the number of undocumented residents as well as Census undercount of U.S. Hispanic citizens. Both figures exclude the 3.1 million Puerto Ricans living in the Puerto Rico.

Some have suggested that due to the undercount, coupled with high fertility and immigration rates, the nation's Hispanic population may surpass blacks, or at least equal their size, in the coming decade.

The relevance of acknowledging the presence and size of the population, with particular regard to potential social protest, is underscored by the relative inequality Hispanics experience compared to

the white majority.

2.2 Hispanics and inequality: the national perspective.

Given that inequality between blacks and whites dominates the literature related to social protest movements, particularly as these movements include riots, it is important to stress that Hispanics also form a seriously disadvantaged population on a national scale. A few examples are indicative: In 1981 median family income for Hispanics was $16,401, lower than the $23,517 of white families but higher than black family income of $13,266. In 1982, nearly 30 percent of Hispanic families lived in poverty. two-and-a-half times the rate for whites. The average unemployment rate for Hispanics in 1983 was 13.8 percent, compared to 8.4 percent for whites and 19.5 percent for blacks. (For census purposes, "persons of Spanish origin," as a multiracial population, are also included in the black and white population groups). Low educational attainment figures are also a cause for concern. Though Hispanics' educational attainment has generally increased over the past decade, dropout rates remain high. One recent census estimate put the percentage of Hispanics eighteen and nineteen years old who were neither high school enrollees nor graduates at 37 percent, compared to 16 percent for white and 19 percent for blacks (4).

If experts are correct in their assumption that inequality is a significant precipitant to social unrest, and that it can be seen as a causal factor in explaining riots, the 'American dilemma' must therefore be seen with a specific view to the Hispanic presence in the United States.

Certainly, the case of the Lawrence riots shares a history of

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social unrest among Hispanic communities in this country. Hispanics

participated in the civil rights movements, albeit to a lesser degree

than blacks, in most cities, as documented in the Browning, Marshall,

and Tabb study. Thus, we are well-advised to take a closer look at

historical trends of inequality vis a vis Hispanics, as well as

population growth trends.

By appreciating Hispanics as a visible community we can begin

to understand their claims for access to, and responsiveness from

government. We can further appreciate the common ground Hispanics

share with other racial, ethnic, and linquistic minorities, who

likewise face the problems of inequality. Moreover, we can appreciate

the potential power of these groups joining together in a 'rainbow

coalition' demanding political, social and economic equality.

2.3   Lawrence Hispanics and inequality.

2.3.0 The State of the City.

The Kerner 1967-1968 National Advisory Commission's

widely accepted basic finding that one major cause of the ghetto

disorders of the 1960's was the shameful conditions of life in the

cities," was reiterated by the Commission on the Cities in the 1970's,

in their report -- The State of the Cities (5). This commission

found that "since 1968 most of the changes in those conditions have

been for the worse. Housing is still the national scandal it was then.

Schools are more tedious and turbulent. The rates of crime and

unemployment and disease and heroin addiction are higher. Welfare rolls

are larger. And, with few exceptions, the relations between minority

communities and the police are just as hostile."

In the following sections, we will examine just a few of the

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significant indicators of social inequality, as well as some interview
stories which relate these data to general issues facing Lawrence.
These stories acknowledge some of the conditions under which Lawrence
Hispanics live. The stories of some informants are seen as part of the
gradual rise of the informants' political consciousness and as
indicators of their capacity for action.

2.3.1   Education.

The Hispanic population is Lawrence is poorly
educated as indicated by the census data. In the adult population (25
years or older), the median level of education is 8.9 years, or just
beyond junior high school. Just over a quarter of this group (26%) has
a high school diploma. In the total Lawrence population median years
of schooling for adults is 12.1, and nearly half (48.2%) have high
school diplomas; equivalent for men and women. Hispanic adults are
consequently at a clear disadvantage competing for all but unskilled
jobs.

26.6% of the young adult population (18-24) have less than 8
years of schooling, and 38.3% have high school diplomas. Relatively,
the young adult population indicates an improvement in school
attainment as compared the adult population; still the number who have
left school without diplomas is alarming.

In one interview, I was informed that at Lawrence High School
alone, with a total student body population of 1600 students, the
dropout rate of Hispanics from year to year is "at least 50%." This is
a remarkable attrition rate considering that Hispanics represent 40% of
the total student body. The national dropout rate for Hispanic
children is 36% and in Boston estimates are as high as 69%.

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One school administrator claimed that Hispanics in Lawrence schools "on the average face almost insurmountable odds against their success. The schools are not equipped to deal with problems of a culturally mixed population. The language difficulties, cultural insensitivity on the part of staff, racism among the children and staff, and negative teacher attitudes toward Hispanics are among some of our greatest challenges. Lawrence is not a good place if you are a Hispanic youth in school here. As a matter of fact, Lawrence schools are not a good place for any kid...the school system here is in shambles....if the schools are bad for kids in general you know they are worse for minorities."

"The situation of Hispanics in Lawrence schools must be seen in the context of the city budget." states a school administrator. "For the last five months the school budget has been the subject of some of the most acrimonius debate I have ever heard between a school department and a city government. It has particular implications for Hispanics. Consider the Mayor's comments at a city council meeting that bilingual programs should not be funded since "minorities can't even speak their own language."

The Lawrence City Council recently approved a 19.2 million dollar budget for fiscal year 1985-86; an increase of one million over the previous year but less than the 24 million dollar requested by the School Superintendent, Eugene Thayer. Noteworthy is the fact that before the passage of Proposition 2 1\2 the school budget was $18 million for 7,800 students. This year the enrollment is up to 8,700, half of whom are Hispanic students;representing a 55 percent increase in Hisapanic students since 1980.

Despite Thayer's numerous attempts to appeal to the city

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council and the mayor (who is the chairperson of the School Committee as well), he recently announced a layoff of thirty-five teachers positions. According to Thayer: "I think we've reached the point of devastation in this school system. It's absolutely disgusting."

According to the Teacher's Union President: "Once again the teachers are taking it on the chin. I think this is bad for the kids. We already have classes with 35 kids or more." The crowded size of classrooms became the focus of a school committee demonstration outside of city hall. One of the demonstrators informed me: "This demonstration does not even begin to address the special problems faced by Hispanic kids in our school system. The entire school system is in a state of : :is so you've got to figure this makes it worse for Hispanics. With the over-crowding in classrooms I have talked to many teachers who claim they are no longer concerned about the high drop out rates, truancies, and high absenteeism among Hispanic kids.....they almost seem to welcome it."

For 1983-84 Lawrence had a per pupil cost of $1,915 for about 8,800 pupils. The state average is $2,866. About 96 percent of the cities and towns in Massachusetts spend more per pupil than Lawrence (6). According to the school superintendent, because of this low per-pupil expenditure, "Lawrence schools do not provide a guidance program with psychological and sociological counseling. The schools ought to have 12 to 14 counselors and more school adjustment counselors. There is no drop-in center to handle youngsters with drug, alcohol, suicide and pregnancy problems. There is no foreign language instruction in elementary and junior high schools. There is no summer or evening programs which means if a kid flunks a course there is no way to make it up. There are no enrichment programs in writing,

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science or math."

According to a group of Hispanic parents with whom I met, the "typical response we have received when we have voiced our concerns to the school principals and teachers is that we need to understand the schools are bad for every one and we should not be so upset because they are not discriminating. They seem to think just because we are Hispanics that the only concern we have is discrimination. They do not take into account that we are no different than other parents when it comes to a quality education for our kids. Without the special programs, for slow learners and bright kids, none of our kids have a prayer of a chance to survive or excel. For the slow learners it means they will probably drop out. For the bright kids it means they will not be able to compete for the better colleges."

In 1984-85 fiscal year, the school system received an emergency $1.2 million allotment from the governor based on a $4 per pupil to be spent for school supplies and field trips. The schools will receive over $40,000 for the year because of the percentage of immigrant children, an allotment from the federal Emergency Immigrant Education Assistance Program. According to one school principal, "these allotments are urgently needed but they also help the mayor avoid centrally addressing the school budget as a priority in the city budget. Without some of the special money for bilingual programs and immigrant children, I am convinced this mayor and this city council would not support any special assistance to racial or linguistic minorities....the city schools are dependent on state and federal aid.."

The total city budget for the upcoming year is $67 million. According to the mayor "there is no room in the city budget for an

increase beyond the 19.2 million for the school system." He claims the rest must come from the state and he expects the educational reform bill "now working its way through the state legislature will provide the additional two million dollars Thayer claims he needs to keep the school system at current staffing."

According to the Lawrence Mayor: "Massachusetts has one of the worst records in the nation in financing education and they should should pay more than it does...."

According to state estimates (7), Lawrence received $31.4 million in aid from the state for the 1984-85 fiscal year, an increase of over $7 million from the year before. Projected state aid for the 1986 fiscal year is $34.9 million. The state is also giving Lawrence an additional $4 million in aid for construction of two new schools. When asked about the seeming discrepancy between the mayor's comments about state educational aid to Lawrence, one city councillor claimed: "He's (the mayor) is playing political games with the school children of this city..." referrring to the Mayor's recent announcement to run for a 12th term based on a $700,000 surplus in the city budget. "The Mayor has no commitment to quality education, I think because of the large percentage of Hispanic student population. He treats the schools like he does the housing projects....he does not want to make either too attractive to increased inflow of Hispanics..."

One Hispanic parent summed it up in this way: "When you look at the mess the school is in... just as a starting point... you begin to see why there were riots in Lawrence. From the school situation, you see teenage dropouts and unemployment. If the city does not provide good schools you certainly don't think they provide jobs or recreation for kids, do you? And then you take a look at the housing

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situation, then unemployment for adults, and then city services, the entire city is in bad shape. I don't condone violence, but I think those who rioted did the city a civic service....by bringing attention to the many problems for which the city is to blame....if there are riots in the future, I wouldn't be surprised if parents, teachers, and students participated in them...that's just how mad some people are.....things have gotten worse since the riots not better."

2.3.2 Housing.

Hispanics are concentrated in four Lawrence neighborhoods: Arlington, Arlington Extension, Lower Tower Hill (the site of the riots), and Newbury Street. Each of these neighborhoods is at least one-third Hispanic.

In accordance with public testimony obtained at the public hearings conducted by the Massachusetts Commission on Hispanic Affairs, in September of 1984, housing is seen by the community as a critical area of need. During the past ten years the city has lost over 1,000 housing units. In 1980 Hispanics paid the same rent as whites despite the fact that they live in more crowded housing(50-100% greater household density than whites), of poorer quality as evidenced by housing valued at half that of whites' housing. The problems of housing must be further understood in the context of a 96% renter population among Hispanics.

1,070 families live in the city's four housing projects. Of these, 90% are Hispanic in the Merrimck Courts; 83% are Hispanic in the Beacon Courts; 87% of the Hancock Courts are Hispanic; and in the Stadium Courts 27% are Hispanic.

According to Millie Bass, who lives in the Beacon Court

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housing project: "The Lawrence Housing Authority is becoming a city within a city. Between rubbish removal, providing our own security, our own social services, we are being cut off from the city." Residents with whom I spoke complained that the lack of security and poor response from calls to police are responsible for the recent rash of "gangs terrorizing project residents." "Since last month (April, 1985) we have had a taxi driver murdered, a construction worker was stoned and a resident stabbed," reports one project resident. Another housing development resident states: "The city blames the projects for the riots....even though they have promised to improve the projects since the riots...there is still an attitude at city hall that if they had their way they would kick all of us out of the city...I know I complained to city hall because of the cockroaches, bad plumbing, and the fact that the police did not answer my calls when I being harassed by the gang of kids that run wild here...and the dope dealing...all I got.. was ignored."

According to Roland Hatch, the city's Housing Director, there have been over 13 burglaries in the last month alone, which prompts him to want to use a $220,000 state grant prompted by last summer's riots to study the "possibility of setting up a separate bilingual police unit specifically trained to work in housing projects." Over 18 million dollars has been allocated this year (one million of which was part of the "riot aid legislation" approved in September, 1984) for improvements to the housing developments. While Hatch sees this inflow of funds as necessary, many long term city programs and services require assurance of longer term funding; "assurances this city council seems to me unwilling to make."

"Unfortunately, the introduction many Hispanics get to

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Lawrence is through the housing projects," laments one informant. "The projects are well known centers of drug traffic, the burglaries and terrorizing are frequent ocurrences, police are afraid to go near them much less walk inside, and the litter and filth is disgusting. When I hear the mayor complain that twenty-five years ago there were flower boxes in the project windows and the projects were something to be proud of, I wonder if he realizes that he has been the one person most responsible for the decline in the quality of the projects. It is no wonder people who live there are unmotivated and feel hopeless. The city has done nothing to respect them or to provide the necessary improvements....at least not until the riots hit."

"Why should we plant flowers when cockroaches crawl through our food, when the plumbing does not work, and heating does not work?" adds another informant. "That's why you saw the signs during the riots (the curfew that prohibited people from leaving the projects)....the signs said: "Don't lock us in our cages - We are not animals"....but if you lived here you would see that they are cages.....and the riots rattled the cages....and you know what happens then.....people react as if they were being treated like animals.... elieve the city would be spending a dime to fix them up?"

To date there is no housing court in the Lawrence area. In January, 1985, a coalition of groups organized to pressure the state to pass legislation for a housing court; legislation which was introduced in last year's session but failed to pass because of a logjam of bills during the final weeks of the session. This year, Sen. Patricia McGovern of Lawrence is the sponsor of one of three bills calling for the creation of a housing court. According to one Hispanic resident: "This is a great idea but unless they provide for bilingual services,

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unlike the other courts, many of us will not be able to bring our
grievances against the slumlords into court....and when I talk about
the slumlords I mean the Housing Authority too..." (Translated from
Spanish). According the bill's sponsors there is no current specific
provision for bilingual services.

2.3.3 Unemployment and Labor Force Participation.
Unemployment statistics, reflecting the percentage of
those _in_ _the_ _labor_ _force_ who are not working, tell us only
about all people 16 and over who are not disabled and who have worked
and\or looked for work in the past month. Nearly 60% of the Hispanic
and white population is participating in the labor force; the remaining
40% has not looked for work recently for reasons unknown here. The
rate of unemployment for Hispanics is 11.5% as compared to the white
population rate of 6.3% Unemployment in the Lawrence-Haverhill SMSA is
the fourth highest rate in the state.

When one looks at the 16-19 age group the differences are even
more striking with 35% of the Hispanics youth unemployed as compared to
11.4% white unemployed within this age cohort. The implications are
many when one considers this data in combination with educational
attainment data --- an alarming percentage of the Hispanic young are
neither at work or at school.

"The riots were about jobs...pure and simple." claims one
Lawrence resident. "Without decent employment the residents of this
city have no investment here....why not riot?"

"You try to find a job in this city and what happens?" asks a
Hispanic male who claims to have applied for over thirty positions this
year alone. "I am told to get job training. I apply to job training

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and they tell me I have to go to school and learn English. I apply for an English program and they tell me I have to wait for six months for an opening. I wait six months and they tell me I have to wait until they can find a bilingual teacher. I do not speak or understand English too well so none of this makes sense to me.....the program that is supposed to teach me English does not have anyone there who speaks Spanish?.... In Puerto Rico I was trained as a machinist and a supervisor. Here all I am offered is custodial work which pays me less than I get on welfare (He is the sole parent of two young children)....I hate being on welfare but what can I do?" (translated from Spanish).

At a group meeting of 13 unemployed Hispanics, hosted by a resident of the Merrimack housing project, I had an opportunity to discuss with them their thoughts and feelings regarding their unemployed status. One participant captured the group's sentiments: "The beginning of this year, I lost my job at the shoe factory. Since then I have tried to find a job but since I do not speak English well, I am told so many things I do not understand that I am left to believe that they just don't want to hire me because I'm Latino...I do not like to think it is discrimination but since the riots people seem afraid to hire us....or they tell us to go and see about this new training program starting up. I want a job..the training programs do not pay...they do not ensure a job...and they teach you English that helps you order food in a restaurant but not what you need to know to speak up on the job... Others (employers) have told me plain to my face that I should go back where I came from. I need a job but I need my dignity too. Now I hear there are more jobs coming into the area. Suddenly, my friends who are also unemployed become very secretive.

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They do not want me to find out about the jobs...and I do not tell them

what I have heard either...it is the competition....first I get a job

and then I will tell you about the opportunity....this goes against my

concern for my people...but in America we must all compete.."
(translated from Spanish).

2.3.4 Type and Location of Employment.

76% of employed Hispanic population work in the

manufacturing industry as compared to 46.5% of whites who work in

manufacturing firms. 10% of Hispanics and 22% of whites work in the

service sentor. 70% of those Hispanics in the manufacturing sector

list the nature of their employment as "machine operator." This

information, combined with income data, suggest that most Hispanics are

heavily concentrated in low-wage assembly line manufacturing, probably

non-union, with little advancement potential, poor job security

vulnerable to economic downturns.

Recent estimates claim that as many as 1,000 new jobs will be

created in the Lawrence area in the next two years, with the extension

of the 'high tech corridor' moving up from Boston through the Merrimack

Valley. It is thought by some labor organizers that without adequate

provision of job readiness programs, particularly English-as-Second

Language, or agreements to provide Spanish-speaking unit supervisors

for job positions not specifically requiring English (as a transitional

on-the-job language training process), many Lawrence Hispanics may be

unable to take advantage of the anticipated boom. Local labor

organizers have shifted to a community-organizing focus, with

particular concerns for targetting the Hispanic community, in an effort

to use the city-state-federally financed Industrial Revenue Bonds as an

organizing platform to secure employer commitments in four basic areas:

1. prevailing wages; 2. jobs for community residents first; 3. health
and welfare provisions; and 4. job security.   According to Rand
Wilson, of the Communicatons Workers of American, and Enid Eckstein, of
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union, the organization of the
Hispanic community around worker issues could represent a significant
rallying point of a broader community coalition. "We are trying very
hard to raise the level of consciousness among the Hispanic community
around their potential power as an organized community bloc around
worker's rights." A written communique of their local effort -- the
Lawrence Area Strategy for Employment Rights (LASER) -- specifically
addresses the issues of the "history of run away industry" and
"industrial desertion" which have seriously affected the Lawrence
Hispanic community in recent years, namely with the closing of a
textile plant and three shoe factories at the beginning of this year;
employers of an estimated 600 Hispanic work force.

        To date, many Hispanics I spoke to remain unaware, and some
distrustful, of the community-level workers' rights organizing efforts.
As one informant told me after an open community meeting sponsored by
LASER: "It is hard enough for a Hispanic to find a job here....if
employers find out you are part of a union effort before you even
apply...forget it...the only way it will work here is if the majority
of us gets together...those employed and those unemployed ...and demand
these things.....I think Hispanics here are a long way away from that
kind of 'movida' (movement) even though it could be very helpful...part
of the problem I see is that there are no Latino organizers whom we
could trust are telling us the truth...in terms we can understand....I
don't understand all this stuff about the (Industrial Revenue)

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bonds..."

2.3.5 Income and Poverty Rates.

The median Hispanic income of $8614 is less than half
of the median white income of $17,047. Female-headed households among
Hispanics (38% of all families) have a median income of $4,326.. 45.1%
of Hispanic families are below the federal poverty level. 17% of all
Lawrence families, and 11.4 percent of all white families are below the
poverty level. One-third of Hispanic families receive public
assistance; twice the rate of total Lawrence families.

Since these figures are from the 1980 census, we can assume
that cuts in federal spending on domestic programs have forced more
people below the poverty level. Nationally, there were 600,000 more
Hispanic children living in poverty in 1983 than there had been in
1980, bringing the percentage of Hispanic children living in poverty up
to 41.8% (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1984). Overall, 22%
more Hispanics lived in poverty in 1983 than in 1980, so that one out
of every four Hispanics were at or below poverty level.

At a group meeting of newly arrived Hispanics (recently
settled within the last two years), I had the opportunity to hear their
expressions of discontent and disappointed expectations about life in
the United States. A telling comment follows: "Although conditions in
Lawrence provide many favorable things...a small town life similar to
our native towns...a Spanish-Speaking community ....churches, sports
leagues, clubs, restaurants, and meeting centers...we are disappointed
that the opportunities that brought us here are affected by the
attitudes of the townspeople....many of whom have told us to go back
where we came from...just like what they yelled during the

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riots...actually, that's what I think started the riots...they assume we are all illegal aliens...many of us are citizens...as Puerto Ricans we have no choice about U.S. citizenship...but it seems the Americans have a choice about whether they will recognize us as citizens...We want to be part of the total community...to contribute our culture....to raise our families....but none of this is possible if we are kept in a position of earning such low wages...if we are kept at the bottom of the pile....if we are kept poor....People tell us that to make it in America we have to work and study hard...we would love to have a full chance to do those things.....a good and decent job and opportunities for a good education..but I do not see those opportunities here for everybody......What it make come to is that we will have to fight for these things....and believe me, if it comes to that, we will fight...." (translated from Spanish).

2.4   Group Size: Lawrence Hispanic Population Trends.

2.4.0   Relevance to Browning, Marshall, Tabb Study.

In the Browning et al study, the group size of a challenging population is seen as a critical resource in political mobilization. In the following section, I will briefly profile some of the dimensions related to group size.

In following chapters the relevance of these data to electoral mobilization will be discussed further.

2.4.1   Population Growth: The National Perspective.

The rapid growth of the Hispanic population in Lawrence reflects a national trend. Nationally, Hispanics became the fastest growing minority group in the U.S. during the 1970's;

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attributable to high birth rates and immigration. In 1970, there were just over nine million Hispanics living in this country. By 1980, there were 60% more, approximately 14.6 million. The Hispanic population grew annually at the rate of 6.1% as compared to the 1.1% per year for the whole population, in contrast to the 1.8% increase of the Black population. With the illegal status of many Hispanics living in this country, it is quite likely that the Hispanic population is even larger than the above numbers suggest.

U.S. fertility rates have been falling from the "baby boom" of 3.8 children per woman in the 1950's to 1.8 children per woman in 1976. Hispanic birth rates, by contrast, show a very different trend. With an average of 3.5 children per woman, the Hispanic population appears to be entering its own "baby boom." According to national statistics for 1980, 62.4 babies were born for every 1,000 white women aged 15-44, as compared to 95.4 babies born for every 1,000 Hispanic women in that age group. On average, the Hispanic population is far younger, the largest cohorts being those 15-24, who are just entering peak child-bearing years. The median age for white women is 31 years; for Hispanic women it is 22 years.

The numerous factors related to immigration -- jobs during economic expansion; dependent economies of Latin American countries; employers' willingness to hire at substandard pay; political upheavels in Latin countries; and family unification immigration policies -- suggest that the current immigration flows to the U.S. from Latin American countries will continue.

According to a Ford Foundation report: "There is little doubt that the Hispanic population will continue to grow rapidly as a result of high fertility and high rates of immigration and slowly approach the

black population in size in the next fifteen years" (8).

2.4.2 Population Growth: The Regional Perspective.

Massachusetts has the 12th largest Hispanic population (141,043) with the eighth highest growth rate. At over 11% per year, the Massachusetts' growth rate is nearly twice the national rate for Hispanics. This is in part due to the fact that the state has become an increasingly significant destination point of migration; with individual adults coming first and family migration following.

Within the state, Boston contains the largest Hispanic community, followed by Springfield, Lawrence and Worcester. But the highest concentration is found in Lawrence, where Hispanics represent at least 16.1% of the population. Estimates for the Lawrence Hispanic population for the year 1990 range from 34.3% to 52% of the total Lawrence population. These estimates assume the 1970-80 trends for all races for the former percentage estimate, and a constant white population with a 50% 1970-80 growth rate for Hispanics in the latter estimate.

It is interesting to note that cities in Massachusetts with rapidly growing Hispanic populations are those experiencing slight declines in total population, notably whites. Without the Hispanic growth, for example, cities such as Lawrence and Lowell would be experiencing dramatic population losses; of disastrous implications to local economies. In Lawrence it is estimated that Hispanics comprise 20% of the Lawrence consumer market, representing in 1980 an expenditure of $29.3 million spent in the city mainly on white-owned businesses. Following population trends estimates, this figure of Hispanic consumer participation is projected between $41-60 million in

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1985, and $60 to 100 million in 1990.

2.4.3 Age and Sex.

The Lawrence Hispanic population is notable for its youth. The median age for Hispanics (20.1 years) is much younger than that of the total population (29.7 years). There are virtually no Hispanic senior citizens in Lawrence and very few between the ages of 50 and 65. The number of women between 20 and 35, peak child bearing years, is striking and suggests a high birth rate in the coming years. The ratio of women to men in the Hispanic and total population is roughly 50-50.

The relative youthfulness of the Lawrence Hispanic community is further documented in the following statistics. 80% of all Hispanic families (as compared with 50% of all Lawrence families) include children under 18. Perhaps more important, 53% of Hispanic families (compared to 25% of all families) include children under 6.

Hispanic families with children under 18 and children under 6 are roughly similar in composition, almost evenly divided between two-parent and female-headed households. In Lawrence as a whole, there are far more two-parent households, and only 31% of families with children under 18 are headed by single women. Among Hispanics, 51.7% of all children under 18 live with one parent, and 43.6% live with two parents.

2.5 An Immigrant City.

2.5.0 The question of ethnic succession.

Lawrence has a long history of immigrant populations, dating to the early years of this century when European

immigrants were attracted to jobs available in a growing industrial economy. While it is well beyond the scope of this report to examine the conditions common and dissimilar to earlier immigrant populations and those under which Hispanics live today; suffice it to say that the question of "ethnic succession" remains an open one. By ethnic succesion I mean that Hispanics today are becoming the successors to the earlier claimants for political position and governmental benefits. Indeed, earlier European populations used local governments to gain a political foothold and access to government jobs and services. While the term of ethnic succession implies an historically-based inevitability, it seems more realistic to regard the matter as more of a social and political choice than a destined historical process.

Two of my Lawrence informants have observed this process for years in their work as social service providers to, and community organizers of, immigrant populations in Lawrence. One states: "Those in power in Lawrence today have a short historical memory. Their basic assertion, in oppostion to Hispanics here, is that they made it in this society without welfare, bilingual education, job programs, and the range of governmental benefits that we seek for immigrants today. They forget that it was the absence of many of those very programs that prevented many of their own from making it....and it was only through their incorporation into the political system that certain opportunities were opened up for them."

Her colleague interjects: "Maybe it is precisely because they remember this fact that prompts them to want to deny the help to Hispanics....to prevent them from making it.."

"Good point," continues the former informant, "But, they forget, too, the riots, protest, strikes, demonstrations, that make up

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a part of their history....their history is one of a struggle for food,
housing, education, jobs, decent treatment.....the very things they
actively seek to deny Hispanics today.....it is a classic situation of
the formerly oppressed becoming the oppressor.....I am not sure what
you mean by ethnic succession...but I can tell you from my community
organizing days in New York that any group who forgets how they
struggled cannot rest comfortably while others struggle in their
midst.....the politics of immigration are clear...if you help, because
you once needed help, you will survive...if you deny the help to others
you once needed, your political days are numbered...you will be
replaced by those who protest against you.... or your own constituency
will replace you because you have not been able to contain the
protests.....if that is what you mean by ethnic succession....then,
yes, the Irish and Italians who have risen to power in Lawrence are at
a crossroads whether they realize it or not....those who will survive
politically will understand how similar is their history to the current
conditions at hand for Hispanics today...it is both a matter of racism
and political ignorance....no government can progess smoothly with
either ...whether they are incorporated in your personal attitudes or
in your institutionalized way of doing things....."

2.5.1 Country of Origin.

Lawrence Hispanics come from a number of different
countries in Central and South America and the Caribbean. Since the
U.S. Census enumerates only Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Mexicans
separately; all other Hispanics fall into the "other category." Beyond
the census limitations, observers in Lawrence believe the majority of
these listed as "other" come from the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,

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and Guatemala.

Puerto Ricans, who began migrating to the Lawrence area in the 1950's, represent the oldest and largest segment of the Hispanic population. While many of them were originally recruited to work as seasonal farm workers, the availability of work in the manufacturing sector led to a permanent settlement in Lawrence, as in other urban centers. As of 1980, Puerto Ricans accounted for 59% of this population.

There are no reliable statistics that account for the Dominican migration which began in the mid-1960's when political unrest in the Dominican Republic and an expanding U.S.job market in the secondary job sector of unskilled, low-wage work sought immigrant labor.

2.5.2 Language Barriers and Citizenship.

3.2% of Hispanics in Lawrence speak <u>only</u> English. This points to the fact that Lawrence Hispanics are primarily first and second generation immigrants. 64% are bilingual, 33% speak English poorly or not at all. Clearly, the language barriers inhibit communications among the general community and stand in the way of competition in the job market and the political arena. Among young people of 14 to 24 years, a slightly lower (22.9%) percentage speak little or no English. This suggests both older and younger populations are handicapped by language barriers. The implications of this language barrier extend to the education of children; assuming that many school-aged children come from households where English is not spoken and may therefore require special educational assistance in the public schools.

That a full 75% of Lawrence Hispanics are U.S. citizens points to the high percentage of Puerto Ricans in the population. Assuming the 6,065 Puerto Ricans in the Census are citizens, this leaves 1,681, or 40% of the non-Puerto Ricans who are U.S. citizens. Given the likelihood of a census undercount of Hispanics residing in Lawrence, it is again quite likely that the number of Hispanic citizens and non-citizens residing in Lawrence may be much higher than is known.

3.5.3 Residential stability.

Despite the recent wave of immigration, the Lawrence Hispanic community is remarkably stable with regard to place of residence. 31% of Hispanics had not moved between 1975 and 1980, lower than the 57% of the general population who had the same address over those five years. However, an additional 35% of Hispanics had been residing in the same county; this means that 66% of Hispanics had been living in the Lawrence area in 1975. That more than half of them had moved within the area at some point is probably attributable to the high percentage (96%) of renters, whom we can assume move frequently to improve their living situation; their low incomes probably forcing them to accept substandard and thus unstable housing.

Few Hispanics (5%) had moved to Lawrence from elsewhere in Massachusetts; over twice that number (11.5%) had relocated from another state, primarily in the Northeast. Many of the Hispanics I interviewed reported that quite a few of Lawrence Hispanics had come from New York, a common point of entry for immigrants into this country. The largest group of in-movers (17.3%) came from outside the continental U.S. (including Puerto Rico) so it does seem that Lawrence is also a first stop for some immigrants. It is hard to generalize

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about the Lawrence Hispanics based on this evidence except to say that although a majority of them have lived in Lawrence for at least five years, there is still a sizeable group of newcomers who are settling into Lawrence for whom resettlement can be an anxiety-ridden experience.

These statistics, seen from the perspective of stability or instability, have important implications for mobilization of Lawrence Hispanics. From the perspective of residential stability, many Lawrence Hispanics have developed the neighborhood networks of communication, resource exchange, and support that facilitate civic involvement. For example, two crime watch groups have been started in predominately Hispanic neighborhoods and one in the Merrimack Courts which are within blocks of the riot scene.

From the perspective of instability, many Lawrence Hispanics will continue to encounter difficulties in finding decent and affordable housing as well as facing the racism, xenophobia, and fear that has characterized white response to immigrant populations in Lawrence, as across the country.

3.6 Chapter Summary.

In this chapter, I have attempted to present a demographic profile of the Hispanic community within the context of relative inequality. The implications of this data and information for understanding the riots of 1984, and as issues for political moblization, will be discussed in the following three chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

"THE LAWRENCE RIOTS: MEANING AND ACTION."

3.0   Introduction to the chapter.

This chapter will focus on some of the intergovernmental action -responses to the riots. It will also highlight some of the perceived contradictions of these action-responses from the community-level perspective.

In the following chapter, I will offer my 'impressionistic' analysis of this complex set of intergovernmental processes. Additionally, I will advocate a distinct planning relationship which may respond to the perceived contradictions of these intergovernmental processes and the action-responses which emerge from them.

In Chapter Five, I will draw our attention to the complexities and perceived contradictions within the community context; particularly among the Hispanic community's action-responses to the riots. The discussion will culminate with an attempt to identify the elements which may facilitate or inhibit the dynamic interaction between the intergovernmental and community contexts.

3.1   What's in a word: Riot.

3.3.0   How stories will be discussed.

In the 54 interviews I conducted for this thesis, involving close to 175 people, no one word seemed to elicit greater variations among informant responses than the word: "riot." The following stories will be examined first as the riots are interpreted from the intergovernmental and community level. Second, the stories

will be used to describe two key intergovernmental action-responses to the riots: legislation and executive action. Third, the stories selected here will offer some community-level perceptions of the intergovernmental action-responses.

The discrepancies perceived between meaning (official and community interpretations) and action (intergovernmental responses) will provide the basis for assessing the potential form and content of Hispanic mobilization; the subject of the final chapter.

3.3.1 Official (intergovernmental) interpretations.

The Mayor of the City of Lawrence, John Buckley, states that the riots "were just an isolated incident...over nothing important...it was a hot night and tempers were high....things just got away from themselves." (Boston Globe, August 10, 1985).

A city alderman dismissed the riots as "just an opportunity for those hot-blooded Latins to blow off some steam....once they get it out of their system they cool off."

Kevin Blanchette, House Representative from Lawrence, stated to me: "I think the factors that lead to the riots had to do with a sense of frustration toward the system.....poverty, poor housing conditions, unemployment, drugs, and criminality. The riots came out of a sense of alienation. For years the City of Lawrence has been a closed shop...people are fed up with the lack of access to decision-making in city government and policy-setting...the riots broke out because they didn't know what else to do."

He continues: "I hold the City of Lawrence civilly responsible and negligent for the escalation of the riots....this is the city government that has been deaf to the cries of its citizens

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(referring specifically to Hispanics) to whom they ought to be more responsive...During the riots, I and Jim Shannon charged into the city council and demanded they do something because the crowd was clearly out of control....people milling around...over three hundred of them...things had gotten crazy with the crowds...without intervention who knows how much they would have swelled. We witnessed an incredible meeting of the city fathers (city council) that lasted only seven minutes....we demanded they do something...call a state of emergency so the state police could be called in...several of the city alderman yelled back: "it's the state's damn fault for dumping all these minorities into Lawrence..."..."it's your fault we have all this scum in the housing projects"..."why don't you pass legislation to keep all these 'spics' from moving here?"...yes, said publically....from the same city council who, to this day, claims there were no racial overtones to the riots..."

Yohel Camayd-Freixas, MIT Professor of Urban Studies, and consultant coordinating the "Hispanics in Lawrence Symposium" series sponsored by the Department of Social Services states: "Riots among Hispanics are highly unusual...That's why Dukakis saw them as a major problem. Things have got to be extremely serious when rioting breaks out among Hispanics. I see the major problems leading to the riots as related to social disorientation...and dissolution of the Hispanic families who migrated to Lawrence as a function of the economic dependency of their native countries on the United States. They were attracted to the magnet labor economy of the northeast...and they arrived here to find themselves involved in a pattern of social alienation and a truncated economy which inhibits their social mobility. When the awareness of their social situation coincides with

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unrest in the community they are prompted to riot."

"The riots?" asks an informant rhetorically. "What else could they mean? This city has denied the Hispanic community has even existed ...not to mention the fact that they (Hispanics) are here with some very serious problems...the riots were a statement...and that statement was a loud cry for help...they (riots) mean the community is hurting....and angry as hell!"

One administrator of a Lawrence-based state agency observes: "...I can only guessthat the Hispanic community does not feel all their needs are being met and so I suppose that's what the riots meant.....they have so many needs in all areas of life.....individual and family stress...economic stress....suffering the stress of just being Hispanic in a city that is still clearly a provincial...and racist city....Maybe the riots were a cry for help....help for all the stress they (Hispanics) experience every day."

Another informant, an administrator of a state human service bureaucracy, states: "The riots could only mean one thing....we are not doing our job. We are a human service agency. They are humans. The two of us are not connected to one another. With all our resources from the state...with all our human services knowledge...with all our good intentions....the riots were a cry from a desperate community."

One government source disagreed when I mentioned some of the responses I had heard so far: "I'll tell you what they (riots) mean. They mean the system is sick....the system that is set up to help people has gotten so busy feeding itself ....that we forgot there were hungry people out there..."

Another government employee, an area director for a state bureaucracy, saw it this way: "I'm not sure what the people involved

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in the riots were attempting to do. I think they themselves were
unsure and just got caught up in the emotional pitch of the situation.
But I do know that the riots brought to everyone's attention how poorly
run this city is...and how the economic situation of Hispanics is so
bad that it can be considered a real civic crisis."

In other interviews with government sources, the comments
included: "The problem causing the riots is jobs;" "It was a race
riot pure and simple." "The rioters acted out of hysteria." "The
riots had no meaning. People just got crazy." "The riots meant that
people cannot be expected to act sanely in a crazy social environment."

One government source summed up many of the themes in this
way: "Riots are by their very nature irrational. Rational citizens
voice their concerns through governmental channels. But government
channels are also irrational. The system is as sick as the people who
resort to violence and disorderly conduct. When you ask what the riots
mean to me, I can only say that they mean the government and its
citizens need a lot of help to cure their respective ills."

3.3.2   Community-level interpretations.

"First of all, I don't believe these were really
riots at all." claims one unemployed Hispanic resident. "...it was
just a neighborhood fight that got out of control...when it got out of
control other people wanted to turn it into a demonstration...."

"Drugs is what the riots were really all about," another
unemployed Hispanic resident told me. "Anytime you have an area that's
a drug scene...it's always a tense situation..something like this
breaks out and people rush to the scene.....news spreads like wild fire
here...it's a chance to get in and bust some heads for some folks....or

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just shout out some of their anger....or a chance to join up...a friend

of mine who doesn't live in Tower Hill actually tried to get in past

the curfew blockades to try and see how he could get involved in

keeping things stirred up...."now's our chance" he told me....

"our chance to band together and make people give us some

attention".....sure I joined in....what the hell....I had a few things

to get off my chest about the racist (leaders) who run this city...."

An 'identified' leader of the Hispanic community had this to

say: "Sure there was a big commotion....but I wouldn't call them

riots...they started out as a fight and turned into a demonstration...

many of the people who got involved wanted to turn the riots into a

demonstration of how these city fathers ...of Lawrence...had better

take better care of their children...we pay more respect to our pets

than they do to our people...if they don't take better care of their

'children' then some of the children are going to have to take over as

city fathers.....that's whats wrong with this city...they call

themselves the city fathers and they abuse and neglect their

children...."

Another community person, who admits to participating in the

riots, observes: "They started out as a fight between two races of

people...and then as they started to get bigger...it became a fight

between countries... ...Canada...Puerto Rico..and the United

States...The Americans were telling the Puerto Ricans to go home where

they came from....the Puerto Ricans were yelling at the French

Canadians to go home where they came from...and the Americans were

yelling "We were here first"....it was crazy....but you could see how

ready people were to join in and get things off their chest....things

they had thought about for a long time but never let out....that's why

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I joined in.....I didn't want to hurt nobody....I wanted to protect

people from getting hurt by the cops....or from the other folks....but

I couldn't resist getting involved and shout out some of my anger...it

felt good...until I got arrested....the way the cops treated the

Hispanics in jail was shameful...the whites who were arrested were

treated much better...but that's what the riots were all about to begin

with..."

Several other community folks I interviewed had these things

to say:

- "The riots were just a neighborhood brawl until the police

got involved and then they became an official riot;"

- "If you treat people like animals they start acting like

animals. The riots are the fault of the city which treats Hispanics

like animals;"

-"The riots were part protest, part hysteria, and part street

fight...it meant something different to everyone involved.....

...everybody joined in for some of the same reasons... coming to your

people's defense..... but for your own private reasons too....like

anger at the system...hatred for people who are different....some just

for the hell of it."

One young Hispanic women summed it up this way: "The riots

have no meaning...what has meaning is what people are going to do about

them."

3.4 Action talks.

3.4.0 Preface to action-responses.

In this section we will examine the action-responses

that evolved from the above interpretations. We will begin to

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appreciate how the meanings attributed to the riots, as indicated by the descriptions of the social problem situation, helped give shape to the corresponding action-responses.

3.4.1 Official (intergovernmental) responses.

3.4.1.0 The planning climate.

One state official described the response to the riots in this manner: "The riots hit in Lawrence and the shit hit the fan in Boston!"

Another state official states: "There is no question in my mind that when the riots broke out in Lawrence, Governor Dukakis saw flashes of the national Hispanic vote going down the drain in his presidential or vice presidential bid.....That shouldn't be any surprise if you've been following his career....Dukakis has his eyes on the White House and the last thing he needs is a record of Hispanic rioting in his own state...He's aware of the national population trends...Within a few years...certainly by the time he'd make a presidential bid...the size of the Hispanic voting bloc...particularly if it is joined by the black vote...the rainbow vote...could make or break any candidate....So, although I think he is a committed and concerned chief executive of the Commonwealth...one cannot separate out the political implications of the Lawrence riots on his career....The Governor was in Springfield when the riots broke out.....Before he got back to Boston, the message ran like wildfire through the state bureaucracy....What is your office doing for Hispanics?"

Another state official put it this way: "I can remember that week like it was yesterday......during a three day period, services to Hispanics became the order of the day..."

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One state official put it this way: "On August 8, 1984, the riots in Lower Tower Hill broke out and by August 9th, Hispanics were a top state priority. Suddenly, everywhere a flurry of memos back and forth from one bureau to the next...."What are we doing for Hispanics?"....the Governor wants to know ....and soon!"

Another informant, an employee of a state executive human service agency, states: "You can call them the Lawrence Initiative...but I call them the Lawrence Panic Reaction....we heard the word: riot...and suddenly it came down to what programs and services do Hispanics need....Overnight, millions of dollars and scores of government employees had something to say about what Lawrence needed...."

3.4.1.1 The Legislative Response.

State House Representative Kevin Blanchette explains the legislative bill he introduced within one month of the Lawrence riots: "I sponsored a 5.5 million dollar riot aid legislative bill in the state legislature to help Lawrence by allocating $3.5 million for social, educational, police, housing, social services, and recreational programs, and an additional $2 million in bonds to offset public safety costs and damage to public property during the riot."

He referred to his bill as a "hardware and a software approach.... .....the hardware approach deals with making sure the city of Lawrence...particularly the police and fire departments are equipped to handle these emergencies...the software approach deals with getting someone to start talking to people in the neighborhoods and find out about their anxiety and problems, especially the kids...To this day I

hold the City of Lawrence responsible for the escalation of the riots

while they occurred and ignoring them and the Hispanic community since

they ocurred...To this day the city has held no public inquest to

examine the meaning of the riots and why they ocurred..they have

adopted an ostrich mentality...."

Regarding the legislative debate over riot funds, he

continues: "We had quite an acrimonious debate on the legislative floor

which meant that I had to pull a lot of procedural maneuvers to get

them to take up the bill which was being blocked by one legislator for

poltical concerns.....having to do more with infighting for control of

the House...and House committee appointments than they did with the

real emergency...there were economic concerns, too, relating to his

district..... but he also held up the bill because of his unfavorable

view toward minorities......"

Curious about these comments I reviewed some of the newspaper

articles covering this debate. The legislator cited above, as blocking

consideration of the bill, is quoted in a 12 12 84 Boston Globe article

as objecting to the measure because: "my community would have to give

up (local aid) money." In the same article, it is said that he argued

that the Lawrence legislation "goes beyond the (civil) disturbances

there." The article claims that he said that he did not think

Lawrence's social problems were more severe than other communities.

"There's a lot of cities that have a lot of Hispanics, a lot of

problems," he is quoted as saying.

Blanchette continues: "What we also asked for was money

slated for textbooks, teacher training on cultural senstivity and

awareness, youth and mental health programs, and police and fire

equipment and training. These were cut from the original bill."

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According to a 2 _14_ 85 article in the Lawrence Eagle-Tribune, "some of the $2.9 million that was cut from the original riot aid bill will be added to the state budget as separate programs....direct appropriations ...(which) will be acted on in June (1985)."

"We finally got a $2.6 million dollar riot aid package approved in December of 1984," our fellow traveller continues, "..it provides for $1 million for disaster relief, repairs to streets and city property...and measures to avoid further trouble.....these include money for police to purchase riot gear and get riot training...the additional amount will go toward improving some of the housing developments, some recreation for the kids, and some money to help the city in its outreach to the community..."

On the issue of riot gear, according to the Lawrence Eagle-Tribune on 12 _4_ 84: "Police Capt. Thomas Nastasia has given Johnson (City Alderman in charge of Public Safety) a three-page list of of equipment the department could use. It includes everything from grenades to dog muzzles, at an estimated cost of $287,927. And that comes to less than half of what Johnson may receive for the Police Department."

The article continues: "Police have said that the equipment used during the August riots was outdated. There were no riot helmets, flak jackets or combat uniforms. Tear gas cannisters expired in 1957 amd most of the gas masks were made in 1941." Among other items requested, according to this article, were: "walkie talkies, riot batons, twelve shotguns, ten grenade launchers and more than 200 grenades." And, "other communication equipment, ammunition and riot gear."

When I asked Blanchette about these requests, he confirmed

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that the police department had received the equipment and added: "I understand half of the riot batons have already been stolen by the police themselves....they also have a calendar in their bathroom, I understand, and a pool of money predicting the date of the next riots in Lawrence." The latter claim was confirmed to me by one of the Lawrence police officers with whom I spoke who said: "In my opinion, many of the guys on the force can't wait for an opportunity to use the new equipment....at least we're prepared."

Blanchette continues: "(the appropriation) also includes recreation....such as two water spray structures to cool kids off during the hot summer months...ease tensions.....and some handball courts, a basketball court, and improvements to city parks.....it also includes another $1 million to improve and modernize the Lawrence Housing projects.."

On the matter of housing project improvements, the Mayor of Lawrence, John Buckley, "said rehabilitating public housing should be a top priority, since the stalled improvements to the Merrimack Courts could lead to more frustration" according to a 3\14\85 Lawrence Eagle-Tribune article which goes on to quote the mayor as saying: "That's one of the weak links we have. Public housing has to do something and do it this year."

The article continues: "It's too bad he didn't have that attitude twenty years ago, " responded Lawrence Housing Authority Executive Director Roland D. Hatch. "He presided over the demise of public housing. All we get is finger pointing, but what have they (the City Council) done?"

I mentioned to Blanchette that I had spoken to the Director of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, Alex Rodriguez,

who expressed concern about the City of Lawrence's position of civil rights and had threatened to block any state or federal funds to the city.

The legislator agreed that Lawrence was in "a poor position" with regard to compliance with civil rights legislation. "Part of the money, $200,000 worth, will be spent for improving the city's planning and community outreach....specifically, improving the city's governmental mechanisms including the recently formed Human Relations Commission...improving it by making it more reflective of the racial makeup of the city and by implementing the Citizen Advisory Board which was mandated by the new city charter voted to take effect in the 1985 city elections....I will insist that the riot aid money be contingent on the city moving forward on these programmatic improvements....I will insist, for example, that the city fire the Affirmative Action Officer who is not doing his job....I have also been in contact with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination......I will insist that Lawrence make progress toward updating their Affirmative Action Plan and finally get around to developing a Fair Housing Plan.....but in the long run, the money is only as good as it will be spent.....and I am not optimistic because it is going to the city and they have made no attempt to meet with Hispanic citizens to learn why the riots occurred."

3.4.1.2 The Institutional Response.

In addition to the state legislative action, the Executive Offices of Communities and Development, and, Human Services, through a measure referred to as the Lawrence Initiative introduced a package of health and human services at a cost

of over $1.4 million dollars. These programs and services included

allocations to the exisiting human service delivery system in Lawrence

as well as the existing housing and community development programs.

Also included in this Initiative was an allocation of $33,000. for the

development of an "organizational strategy to yield a multi-service

center at the service of Lawrence Hispanics." This center,

incorporated in February, 1985, as Centro Panamericano will be featured

in the final chapter as it relates to the potential for mobilization of

the Hispanic community.

3.4.2 Community-level feedback.

Following are some of the stories I collected from

community residents in response to my question: "What are your

thoughts and feelings about how the state and city have responded to

the riots?"

One informant describes the response this way: "To tell you

the truth I am afraid the riot hysteria has affected the legislator's

judgment...I worked with him on the 'yellow hat brigade'.....the group

who tried to do some crowd control during the riot....but seeing what

he has done with this riot aid bill.... I think he really got

panicked.....he was so interested in the group of us who got together

with the Alliance for Peace...he was very helpful....and he turns

around and arms the police.....now there's talk he wants to run for

mayor....we might as well stick with Buckley...at least he doesn't

pretend to like Hispanics......at least it didn't matter to him the

police had outdated equipment to handle riots...."

Another informant responds: "Hardware which includes grenades

and shotguns...and software that includes talking to people about their

problems just doesn't make sense when you put them together....it is a sign of a government afraid of its own people, on one hand, and trying to care for them on the other.."

One recent immigrant sees it this way: "I came to the United States to escape this kind of police state.....in our country the minute you see the police prepare for battle.....you know soon there will be more war...there are many of us here trying to escape this ..."

Another Lawrence Hispanic states: "In Boston they tell us they will help the Hispanics in Lawrence. And so, they give police riot gear...since last summer they've swooped in on us....from drug enforcement undercovermen, social workers, the state office of this and the state office of that....I just want to have some dignity, alright? And a job....I haven't heard about either from any of you....it's like somebody let the floodgate down in Boston and here come all you folks with your notebooks and shit...so now that you know about my anxiety and problems...now what are you going to do?....Got a job for me, brother?"

"I think it is insulting that so much argument has gone on about what to do with the riot aid money....the so-called Human Relations Commission is the group deciding on community priorities....have you seen who is on that? Not our leaders! No wonder the police are getting guns and the fire department a new fire truck....there's your hardware.....they are using the word riot to get what the city wants not what the people need...." is how another resident expressed her feelings to me.

Another resident put it this way: "We are talking about helping Hispanics here and the state is giving the police riot gear....is that a double message or what?"

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One resident observer laments: "They want to shower down our kids this summer with water to cool them off ....and shoot their parents with shotguns to shut them up if they try to protest again.....Are supposed to feel like the city and the state cares for us just because we going to get a few basketball courts?......While the police prepare for another riot?...and the fire department can use their new truck to put it out.....it is disgraceful that so much attention is placed on the fear that Hispanics will riot again.....instead they should help us prepare for jobs....help improve our schools....the state should force the city to pay attention to us...or else there will be more riots and this time people could get killed..."

The Reverend Danny'Neill tells me: "the word riot has become the magic word....everybody's using it to get the money...But very few of them have had the decency ...and the wisdom...to ask the Hispanic community what should be done here....they talk about helping us help ourselves...but they want to tell us how all along the way...many of us have tried for years...and we have learned a lot along the way ....one major lesson we have learned is that the community must get itself together, seek its own agenda, with the help of those who support us, and not depend on the city..."

3.5 Chapter summary.

In this chapter we have examined the meanings attributed to the riots, and their corresponding action-responses. In the following chapter we will examine to what extent Lawrence is similar to other social protests in other cities, and what are some possible interpretations of the riots in Lawrence.

CHAPTER FOUR

"INTERPRETATIONS AND RESPONSES"

4.0   Introduction to the chapter:

In this chapter I will begin the discussion by briefly

acknowledging the spirit with which I have collected and used stories

in this report. Then, I assess the interpretations of the riots and

the action-responses that emerged from these 'Rashoman-like'

interpretations. My assessments attempt to respond to a set of key

questions; key themes which run through the literature on social

protest movements. These themes bear directly on the implications of

political expressions of social discontent with conditions of

inequality; the basis upon which challenges for entry into the

political arena have been launched. Also in this chapter, I will

relate these themes to two theoretical interpretations of social

protest which dominate historical accounts.

4.1   Reflections on a theme.

In the attempt to reflect on the themes of the stories

collected here, I am reminded of an article written by Richard Bolan

(1) where he reports: "A recent seminar at Boston College brought

together a number of protaganists involved in an issue which generated

one of the major riots in the ghetto of an eastern city (Newark, New

Jersey) in the summer of 1967. Observing these actors was like

observing those in the movie: Rashoman. Each perceived and intrepreted

the same set of facts and circumstances in an entirely different way."

While I make no attempt to resolve this "communication

significant differences _and_ commonalities among the stories I collected. In this regard, I believe the 'communication problem' related to Lawrence might well be addressed by sifting through different interpretations, paying close attention to the social problem descriptions, and identifying themes of commonality. This task requires good, active listening skills and senstive interpersonal abilities; above all, it takes the willingness to address the communication problem directly by talking to the Rashoman cast of characters at a face-to-face level. Moreover, I believe the locus of the communication problem in Lawrence is not with the fact of various interpretations, as much as it is located in the limited opportunities to participate in the discussion. Because the interpretation of the Lawrence riots "depends on who you talk to," as many informants responded, it is even more critical in planning action-responses that those with whom one talks are those to whom plans refer.

The excerpts I chose from these stories are not offered as 'typical' nor 'methodologically' representative, since these are 'key informants,' and not respondents to a more scientifically-designed research design. Rather, the excerpts I have chosen from the stories I collected, and the interpretations I make of them, are intended to suggest a range of themes which are pertinent to the consideration of the social problem situation in Lawrence. They may be of some potential use to those who would plan with the social problems of Lawrence in mind. Since many of my informants remarked that no one else had asked their impressions, I am less concerned that their stories be variously interpreted, than I am concerned that they may not have been heard at all.

To the extent that planners can depend on these stories, as

contrasted to other sources of information, is a matter beyond the

scope and intent of this report, and subject to the questions planners

frame for themselves. This attempt has been to offer a 'Rashoman' of

interpretations, trusting that a cooperative tendency will emerge among

the different versions, suggesting areas of common agreement upon which

action-responses can be based.

4.2 The use of qualitative research in realistic planning.

The interview method I employed in gathering these stories has

two inspirational sources. One is an article by Lisa Peattie (2)

entitled: "Realistic Planning and Qualitative Research" in which she

writes: "Planners often fail to recognise that at the bottom they

depend on stories of how the World works. They need not notice their

dependence on stories of how the World works because they take them for

granted -- until for some reason events prove them wrong...." The

stories collected here are a conscious attempt on my part to depend on

them for a view of how Lawrence works, or doesn't, as a basis also of

providing a 'street level' or 'front line' perspective that could be of

some use to those who would plan in Lawrence.

Stories collected at a face-to-face, interactive level, as

here, can serve a purpose beyond the needs of planners, although one

consistent with planners' needs. They serve the basic purpose of

helping those to whom plans refer. The very process of collecting these

stories serves a valuable and critical educational\political function.

The stories help the informants to "name their world;" and by naming it

begin to develop an understanding of how to move to transform the world

where it does not work, and how to preserve the ways in which the world

does work. This educational process, a fundamental political act, is

inspired by the work of Paulo Freire whose writing in the <u>Pedagogy of</u>

<u>the Oppressed</u> helped to shape my thoughts on the "planning with" mode

of planning which I will advocate in the following chapter.

4.3 Theoretical basis for examining stories.

4.3.0 Two views of protest.

Two distinct theoretical explanations emerge from

the historical and contemporary accounts of social protest. One

explanation reflects the traditional view of social protest from a

<u>collective behavioral approach</u> ; emphasizing social protest as the

irrational behavior of the 'victims' of social pathology. Their cries

and shouts of protest are seen as emotional expressions and are viewed

as signals of social strain and of the stresses of societal conditions.

Predictably, governmental responses to protest seen from this

perspective adopt a 'treatment' posture; actions seem intent on

treating the emotional symptoms rather than addressing their systemic

bases.

The alternative view sets forth a <u>resource management</u>

<u>approach</u> . While not discounting the social pathological

interpretation, this approach sees social protest as a dimension of

historical processes of poltical participation; more goal-conscious in

its orientation, involving consideration and allocation of individual

resources to a collective effort. Governmental responses to protest

seen in this way address conditions and resources that can facilitate

the evolvement of protest into more peaceful means of political action.

The interplay of these two distinct views in attempting to

explain social protest behavior generates important challenges to the

pluralist tradition of explaining democratic ideals as practiced in the

United States. The collective behavior paradigm sees the participants

of social protest as human products of social disorganization; acting

in a disoriented fashion somehat 'outside' the political arena;

irrational in that 'available' means of political recourse are not

considered or utilized.

The resource management perspective views participants as

involved in a conscious pattern of "forming and dissolving, moblizing

and demobilizing, formulating and making claims, acting collectively

and ceasing to act, gaining and losing power" (3); no more nor less

rational than other political actors. This perspective regards the

protest activity as a means of attempting to gain entry into the arena

and once in, seeking to make the political system responsive to the

protestors' claims. The resource management perspective acknowledges

the emotional pitch of protest activity, and it contagion effect, but

attributes meaning beyond the seemingly witless release of tension

regarded in the main by the collective behaviorialist theorists.

The implications of these views to the action-responses which

emerge from them, particularly on the part of intergovernmental actors

and agencies, is relevant to the discussion of the Lawrence riots.

Both views are seen as operative; with the collective behaviorial view

dominating and the resource perspective assuming a secondary emphasis.

In particular, the primary emphasis on programs and services, and on

social control measures, will be highlighted as it contrasts to the

secondary emphasis of resource allocation for political development;

namely, resources for organizational development.

The action-responses of primary emphasis are seen here as

predictable intergovernmental responses, particularly in view of how

their spokespersons describe social problem situations. The latter

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secondary emphasis on political development are seen as the more critical resources necessary for sustained governmental access and responsiveness relative to Lawrence Hispanics; with political development (including the mobilization of group size; white support; political experience and organizational development) seen as the critical channel for the expression of social discontent into concerted social action.

4.3.1 The Collective Behavior View of Social Protest.

A critic of this view, Ronald Aminzade (4), summarizes it for the purposes of contrast with an alternative: "The disrupting effects of large-scale social change, such as migration and urban population growth, involve a breaking apart of social bonds due to the uprooting of persons from traditional communities, which disorients individuals and leads them into disorderly, and sometimes violent, political action. The focus is upon the social disorganization and disintegration produced by the rapid pace of structural change, which leads to deviant behavior....Implied in the model is the mass society notion that the most alienated and disoriented individuals are most likely to join the ranks of the revolution and that collective political violence is essentially an anomic phenomenon" (p.4).

Eric Hoffer (5), one of the earlier prophets of the collective behavior tradition, characterizes the central theme: that participation in collective action of a protest nature is fundamentally irrational. According to Gamson (6). "Hoffer is an extreme representative of the collective behavior tradition; he virtually

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ignores the social conditions that produce the behavior he describes.
But other more sophisticated proponents still rely on such
psychological states as loss of identity and alienation as the
intervening mechanisms in their explanations. Even in the more complex
versions, people are unaware of what it is that energizes them to act,
and their actions are not directed at the underlying conditions that
produce the alienation or anxiety."

4.3.2 The Resource Management Perspective.

Ronald Aminzade explains the alternative view as
follows: "The resource management model views (social protest) as an
extension or continuation, in a particular form, of everyday,
nonviolent political activity. An event of collective violence is
conceptualized, not as a sudden and unpredictable outburst or eruption
of heretofore latent tensions or frustrations which take their manifest
form in an organizational vacuum, but rather as the outcome of a
continuous process of organizational activity" (p.5).

Anthony Oberschall (7), a proponent of the resource view,
states: "In ordinary everyday activity, at work, in family life, and
in politics, people manage their resources in complex
ways.....resources are constantly being created, consumed, transferred,
assembled and reallocated, exchanged or even lost. At any given time,
some resources are earmarked for group ends and group use, not just
individual use. All these processes can be referred to as "resource
management" (p.28).

He continues: "Group conflict in its dynamic aspects can be
conceptualized from the point of view of resource management.
Mobilization refers to the processes by which a discontented group

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assembles and invests resources for the pursuit of group goals. Social control refers to the same processes, but from the point of view of the incumbents or the group that is being challenged. Groups locked into conflictg are in competition fro some of the same resources as each seeks to squeeze more resources from initially uncommitted third parties" (p.28).

Charles Tilly asks the following, in contrast to the collective behavior paradigm, "Why begin an inquiry into collective violence with the presumption that violent politics appear only as a disruption, a deviation, or a last resort? Rather than treating collective violence as an unwholesome deviation from normality, we might do better to ask under what conditions violence disappears from ordinary political life" (p.27).

4.4 The question of meaning.

Many of the interpretations, most notably those of official governmental representatives, primarily adopt the perspective of the collective behavior paradigm. The riots are seen as the acts of "alienated," "disoriented," "crazy," citizens acting out their "hysteria" because "they didn't know what else to do" -- dramatic interpretations of socio- psychological pathology.

However, a secondary emphasis on the 'rational' character of the riotous behavior is also evident. Observers also acknowledge that riot particpants acted with a 'political' consciousness and earmarked some of their resources for group ends, that is, they joined in to deliver some group messages: "fed up with lack of access," "cry for help," "needs not being met," and, "anger at the system," to name but a few.

Apart from these interpretations are also those observers who do not attribute any meaning to the riots beyond their being a reaction to the hot weather or of a "hot-blooded" population; interpretations which can be seen as serving a denial and avoidance function of no inconsequential political strategy.

4.4.1 Political expressions?

The mayor of the City of Lawrence, several of the city alderman, and other official observers who insist that the riots were meaningless outbursts share a history with the observers of other riots in other cities. The mayors of New York, Los Angeles, and many other cities which experienced riots in the 1960's also insisted that the riots in their cities were spontaneous events signifying little, except for their common theory about the effects of hot weather. As Fogelson observes: "They have, in effect, denied that the disorders were political expressions, no matter how broadly defined. For these government officials this interpretation is most reassuring; it precludes attempts to blame them for the rioting and also relieves pressures to alleviate long-standing problems in the ...ghettos."

It would appear that the reluctance of the Lawrence 'city fathers' to attribute much political significance to the riots could be an attempt to both avoid responsibility and the complex task of alleviating the plethora of social problems which others clearly see as directly related to the riots. It is this avoidance of the political dimensions of the riots that has brought charges of "an ostrich mentality" by the state legislator, Kevin Blanchette, who "holds the city civilly responsible for the riots" and soundly criticizes

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the city for not having held a public inquest into the riots. Others I
interviewed hold the city's "denial of the political message of the
riots" as untenable; a frequent criticism echoing Blanchette's: that
no public inquiry or "dialogue with the citizens" has ensued in the
riots' aftermath.

Remarkably, service bureaucrats at the state level, community
residents, and local service providers perceived the social and
economic conditions of racism; poverty; lack of equal opportunity in
employment, education, and housing; discrimination in jobs and
services; as the grievances which constituted the 'meaning' of the
riots. In particular, relative inequality within these areas was
frequently cited as a causal factor. While many observers thought the
initial fight which set off the riots was not a "conscious political
act" on the part of those initially embattled, there was the
observation that as the riots escalated "they took on a political
dimension...both in what the rioters were saying to one another...the
racial slurs...but also in how the riots were handled, and ignored, by
the government officials.." as summed up by one informant.

4.4.2 Lawlessness and disorder?

Several informants, and numerous media accounts of
statements made by Lawrence city officials and city residents,
perceived the riots as incidents of "lawlessness and disorder." Many
comments here reflect the "riff-raff" accounts of riots in other
cities, where the riot participants are characterized as the
unemployed, ill-educated, and criminal element whose basic disrespect
for the law accounts for the disorder. The image here is one of chaos,
where the confusion of the riotous events is complete and overwhelming,

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leading many to conclude the participants were the "irrational" victims of the "stresses and strains of society," so disoriented as to disregard law and order; as accounted for in the 'collective behavioral' theory of social protest.

But a closer view of the events, as provided by some of my informants, indicate a rationality, with features of restraint and selectivity, that suggest the riots may have a different meaning. The accounts of some participants, who saw the riots as "a chance to band together and make them (city) give us some attention;" and "I sure had a few things to get off my chest about the racist (leaders) who run this city;" or "to protect people from getting hurt," suggest visible individuals and discernible patterns that helped shape the turn of events and their apparent 'meaning.' Indeed, the "yellow hat brigade" of community residents which sought to exercise crowd control evolved with another purpose which was "also to try and channel some of the frustration into other forms of protest where people would not get hurt...that's how the Alliance for Peace emerged from the ranks of some of us who participated in the riot activity..." as one informant describes his participation.

There were also discernible patterns of restraint and selectivity. Accounts from other informants who observed and\or participated in the riots identified a 'selective' response to the police interventions; where state police were not subjected to the hostility expressed against the city police. Although an estimated fifteen homes were the targets of firebombing, and two commercial sites were burned, there is some indication of 'restraint' in that this type of attack against property did not escalate indiscriminately. In fact, numerous informants claim that the owner of one commercial

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establishment actually "paid some people to burn his place down for the insurance.." as one participant reported. Other observers claim that when the tavern was looted many of the original fighting factions "actually got together and had a few beers." Some attribute the looting of the tavern as the purposeful and opportunistic act of "drug addicts who saw this as a chance to openly steal to help support their habit." Others saw the burning as an attempt to "burn out the drug dealing," indicating a specific instance of a larger apparent collective thought: that the riots would somehow improve an already deplorable situation.

4.4.3 Racial overtones?

Perhaps the most distinct difference between 'official' and other informants' interpretation of the riots has been around the question of whether the riots can be intrepreted as "racially motivated." Again, the dismissal of this highly charged issue on the part of the governing officials may be seen as an attempt to avoid blame or responsibility for the systemic bases of institutionalized racism in city government practices. One news reporter with whom I spoke said this: "I was amazed to hear the racist barrage of comments among the rioters and the total dismissal of racial overtones by city officials....to the trained or untrained eye, the riots clearly expressed racial tensions and a cross-fire of racist hatred."

The informant who claimed the "meaning" of the riots is found in "what people are going to do about it" went on to say: "If the riots were not racially motivated or racist in nature, then you only need to look at what the city and state have done to see racism in

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action....since the riots, the public comments of the city council and mayor smack of racism...meanwhile the state has helped equip the city with riot gear to shoot down any further opposition....if the riots had been a protest against the city from the white population, I am sure the response from government would have been substantially different....the racial overtones are on both sides of the riots..."

4.4.4 Hispanic riot?

It is remarkable, too, that the riots were seen primarily as a statement of concern for the social conditions of Hispanics. A few observers have interpreted the riots in terms of class issues, but the prevailing thought seems to regard the problem as a cultural issue between white and Hispanics; hence the several allocations for cross-cultural training of teachers, police, and government employees. Noteworthy has been the lack of attention to the general problems of the poor and immigrant populations, those who are not Hispanic but share many of the same grievances; experiencing the same deplorable conditions as those of the Hispanic poor in Lawrence.

This cultural view seemed to influence the foci of programs and services which were 'targeted' at the Hispanic population, mostly by the state. In turn, the governmental service bureaucracy followed suit by planning for Hispanics as the primary servie recipient population. These measures seem to adopt a view of Hispanics as a marginal population. The task then is to "mainstream" them into the general current of life in Lawrence; this has been a dominant metaphor in the planning language relative to the Hispanics' civic status in Lawrence.

Remarkably, the view has been extended to a 'cross-cultural'

perspective predominately in the service delivery sector. Here the state has channelled resources "to train service providers on cross-cultural issues." One example has been the symposia series on "Hispanics in Lawrence" sponsored by the Department of Social Services; which received mixed reviews from informants. One major criticism of the symposia, designed to address cross-cultural issues, was its emphasis on the socio-psycho-pathological characteristics of the Hispanic populations at the apparent disregard of the systemic bases for cross-cultural dilemmas in communication and interaction. As one informant, who attended the four sessions of this series, states: "The meetings were problem-oriented which is good except that the multi-problems they emphasized were those of the Hispanics...they ignored the multi-problems of the state, city, and local services, many of whom are out of touch or resistant to serving the needs of Hispanics....The riots were as problem-oriented an experience as we needed....the need which remains is what the total community is going to do about the problems which are well known?...The symposium missed the mark in the same way the state and city have...by focusing on the problems of Hispanics they have avoided dealing with how the white community have contributed to the problem..and how they must also become part of the solution as much as the Hispanics must solve their own problems..."

One noteworthy effort to address systemic issues has taken the form of a regulatory control measure. The actions taken by the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, Alex Rodriguez, to freeze certain federal and state funds into Lawrence until the City of Lawrence makes "substantive progress in the implementation of an Affirmative Action Plan and in the development of

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a Fair Housing Plan" represent a specific strategy directed at the systemic source of problems faced by Lawrence Hispanics.

This move has been steadfastly resisted by the city council, and the mayor who recently complained that the Commissioner Rodriguez "is interfering with city business and has no right to tell the city what to do."

One informant comments on this move by Rodriguez: "Finally we have someone who sees the riots not as a Hispanic problem but as an official problem...the Hispanics called attention to 'the' problem..which is a racist and unresponsive city government....instead many people have seen the Hispanics as 'the' problem..."

4.5   The question of purpose.

4.5.0   Riots as purposeful protest.

A common theme among some stories is that the riots had a purpose to them with identifiable audiences and objectives. These themes underscore the resource management perspective and are helpful in appreciating the political dimension of the riots, as well as the consideration of "under what conditions violence disappears from political life," per Tilly.

4.5.1   Audience?

In Lipsky's terms it would appear that the "reference publics" to which the rioters and subsequent intergovernmental and community-level responses have appealed, include the city and state governments, the general public, and the white and Hispanic Lawrence populations.

Examining the riotous behaviors, two identifiable audiences were the racially defined groups which represented the initial locus of

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conflict. As our stories indicate, the riots then took on a larger

audience as participants became aware of media coverage and of each

other's protest agenda. The emergence, for example, of the Alliance

for Peace, a grassroots citizen organization which emerged from among

the riots' participants and later, their supporters, demonstrates an

intent to channel the riot 'message' to a governmental and community

audience. Certainly, as time goes on, the awareness of a wider

audience of interest may influence the interpretations of the riots'

purpose(s). What does seem clear at this point is that the riots are

being viewed as a dramatic demonstration of the poor relationship which

has existed between the Hispanic population and the local city

government in Lawrence.

Examining the various action-responses, it is clear that many

programs and services were intended to respond to perceived and

expressed needs of the Hispanic community. Others were intended to

respond to the identified needs of the governmental agencies, most

notably the police department. The legislator's expressed concern

about the lack of a dialogue between the city and its residents found

its way into support for funding to "improve the community outreach by

the city," part of his "software approach." It would appear that the

emphasis on the implementation of the city's Human Relations Commission

is an appeal to the body politic of Lawrence and the question of

pluralist democracy in Lawrence; a measure which indirectly addresses

the issue of white response among the city residents and their elected

and appointed leaders.

4.5.2 Target?

Again, the initial targets of the riotous activity

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were perceived as those most immediately within range: the residents

of different racial and cultural identity. As the rioting escalated,

the immediate targets became the state and local police; attacks

against them led to over 150 arrests of both white and Hispanic

residents. The targets of private property were perceived as both an

expression of hostility about poor housing, a number of "slumlord-owned

housing units" were firebombed; and an expression of opposition to the

known "drug-dealing centers of activity" perceived by some riot

participants as having been located in the two commerical sites which

were burned.

4.5.3 Practices or Principles?

Although many informants denounced the rioters as

"lawless" and "interested only in burning and tearing down the system,"

it would appear that such images do not fit the rioting activity or

events which have proceeded from them. First, none of the attacks

against property were directed against municipal buildings as might be

thought symbolic of attacks against 'the system.' Although many

informants claim the number of citizen-owned handguns is quite high,

there was no sniper shooting against the police as characteristic of

riots in other cities whose pronounced intention was to "Burn, Baby,

Burn." If the allegations about the prevalence of citizen owned

handguns is true, that no shots were fired on either side indicates a

measure of restraint.

Second, as indicated by the emergence of a grassroots citizen

organization, the Alliance for Peace, which was itself an outgrowth of

the 'yellow hat brigade' which emerged to control the crowds, there is

some evidence to suggest that the riots were channelled into an attempt

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to deliver a political message. That message carried claims for
equality, and for attention by the system to alleviate the social
problems that attend the inequality within which Hispanics and other
poor people live in Lawrence. These messages were clearly articulated
in the prayer vigil conducted by sympathetic, and community-supported,
clergy on the evenings of the two nights of rioting. One would imagine
that, had the prevailing ideology been to destroy the system, a
prayer-oriented peace vigil would have been likewise opposed.

As seems the case with Lawrence, and as has been interpreted
of the civil protests of the 1960's, the dominant mood of the riots was
not to overturn the system so much as join it as equal partners. As
Fogelson concludes about the civil rights protests of an earlier era:
"...far from rejecting the prevailing ideology, the rioters demanded
that all citizens honor it; they insisted on changes in practices, not
principles."

As one informant indicates: "We (Hispanics) are not opposed
to America...we are here because we too believe in the freedom and the
opportunity that is supposed to be what American democracy is all
about...Rather than ask whether Hispanics wanted to tear down the
system, you should ask whether the system is keeping its part of the
bargain...whether they are practicing democracy or just talking it...."

4.6 The question of intergovernmental processes.

4.6.0 Intergovernmental response.

The resource management perspective is most helpful
in appreciating the complexities of the intergovernmental context. In
this case, the limited financial resources to support responsive
programs and services are seen as a critical resource problem for the

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intergovernmental actors, which in turn makes for resource problems at the community level.

In an article by David Walker on "Intergovernmental Response to Urban Riots" (8) he discusses the multi-faceted, multi-level action program which addresses the central problem of intergovernmental issues "which at first glance appear to be far removed from the pathology of a riot." Walker's report on the work of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (1968) supports the view by Browning et al that the apparent reason for much of the dissatisfaction of minority groups in cities was (and is still, I believe) rooted in local government structure and fiscal arrangements.

As many of stories in Chapter Two indicate, particularly those of the school system and the housing authority, the conditions in Lawrence, which can be considered as contributory to the potential for social protest, are appreciably understood as an intergovernmental problem.

4.6.1 The city.

As our stories have indicated, many of the City of Lawrence's social problems -- in the areas of education, housing, jobs, and city services, to name a few major ones -- are rooted in a fiscal dependence on the state and federal government. Coupled with an apparent lack of responsiveness to the Lawrence Hispanic community, the Lawrence City Council is faced with social problems not totally accomodated by their local economy.

For example, when the Lawrence Superintendent of Schools laid off teachers and points to a future budgetary needs occasioned by the construction of two new schools, the city council regards the problem

as a primarily a state responsibility. By the same token, the Director of the Housing Authority is concerned whether the riot-initiated funding to improve the housing developments will result in the longer term funding for ongoing programs seen as necessary to sustain satisfactory conditions in the projects -- public safety and security, health, education, and employment programs and services, to name a few.

Within the local service delivery system, the influx of riot-initiated funding has caused considerable concern among many service providers. The competition for funds, the lack of a comprehensive and integrated service delivery area-wide plan, and the low level of intra-agency cooperation and communication, are examples of the concerns expressed by service providers with whom I spoke. One informant summed it up this way: "Well, the shit hit the fan here too. Only it was in the form of money. We too became aware that Hispanics were a service priority and it immediately shifted our attention to specific programming for Hispanics. The rumors of who might compete and what they were planning have been rampant. New organizations are being started by the state to deal specifically with Hispanics was the first word we got...But then we were also encouraged to target more of our services to Hispanics...The whole thing has been very confusing.. ...Where are we going to find bilingual and bicultural staff? And board members? How do we know that next year these funds won't be cut? What about those of us who already provide services to Hispanics...will our service population be undercut by the new multi-service center the state is setting up? What about duplication of services? We are a service network, alright, but you wouldn't believe it lately....you could say our lines of communications are all jammed up....business has

not been the same since the riots...."

4.6.2 The state.

When the state legislator proposed the "riot aid package" he included numerous provisions to improve city programs and services. He and others acknowledge that, without state support and sanction, the City of Lawrence would not move forward in kind. At the state level, however, many of the requests for Lawrence -- primarily for school supplies and teacher training -- were met with opposition by competing claims for these same needs in other cities and towns throughout the Commonwealth.

Noteworthy is the state's support of the office of the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination which has recently "frozen certain state and federal aid for the lack of compliance on the part of the City of Lawrence in two major areas: no progress in Affirmative Action and the absence of a Fair Housing Plan" according to its Commissioner, Alex Rodriguez.

In a similar posture, the state legislative delegation from Lawrence has insisted that the City of Lawrence comply with provisions of a city charter amendment which goes into effect this year, particularly as these provisions have called for the creation of a Human Relations Commission. The Human Relations Commission's recent decision to "eliminate itself and form a leaner and more powerful body to fight discrimination in the city" represents a move of the part of certain Lawrence citizen members on the commission "to establish a systematic mechanism for eliminating unlawful discrimination." At the time of this report, the city council has not taken action on the Commission recommendation; some Hispanic leaders with whom I spoke

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indicated the recommendation to establish a "Human Rights Commission"
with subpoena power and authorization to formally investigate charges
of discrimination "could represent the first substantial step toward
Hispanic involvement in city government."

4.6.3 The federal government.

In recent testimony before a federal congressional
hearing, Massachusett's Secretary of Communities and Development, Amy
Anthony "pleaded ..with the congressman to fund (Urban Development
Action Grant Program - UDAG) at 1985 levels" because "the future of
Lawrence is tied to federal funding." Anthony pointed to the $6.1
million dollar federal grant issued to GCA Corporation in Lawrence
which will generate 1,000 jobs. According to Anthony: "Getting that
plant into Lawrence has meant that...over half of the some 1,000 jobs
created by this decision are going to the Hispanic population in
Lawrence, with special skill training programs being established for
these residents by GCA.." This kind of economic development "is not
going to happen without a public role that's clear," claims Anthony,
who sees the federal government as instrumental in that role. Several
state officials I interviewed claimed that Reagan's recent call for the
elimination of the UDAG program would have serious negative effects on
the ability of the City of Lawrence to provide for the economic
development of the Hispanic community.

That Secretary Anthony and other state officials have based
arguments on the needs of Hispanic citizens in Lawrence, and related
these needs as causal factors of the riots, indicates a resource view
of the riots. Arguments for continued federal assistance have been
couched in terms of "resources for the Hispanic community which can

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create the conditions seen as necessary if future riots are to be averted."

4.7 The question of response.

4.7.0 The Collective Behavior View and the Resource View.

Blanchette's description of a "hardware and software approach" typifies the two views of social protest which are reflected in both the legislative response to the riots and the executive-level response. On one hand, the hardware approach is an allocation of resources aimed at social control through riot equipment and training. This exemplifies the 'resource management view' from the perspective of the challenged party.

By contrast, the software approach includes an array of programs and services of a distinct 'treatment' nature, in keeping with the 'collective behaviorial view.' These services adopt the view that the Hispanic community are victims of "alienation" and their behavior in the riots was prompted by a "sense of frustration." Thus, programs are aimed to help relieve the frustration and reduce the stresses and strains of social conditions; as expressed by the "cries of a desperate community."

4.7.1 Social control.

In a review of "Establishment Response" in the aftermath of riots in the United States, Joe Feagin and Harlan Hahn, (9), conclude: "In general, one cannot fail to be impressed more by the scope and intensity of the law enforcement or control response than by the relatively limited character of the social and economic reforms

which came in the aftermath of the rioting." They go on to take issue
with Skolnick's (10) assumption that "reform measures have about the
same prospect of gaining executive and legislative support as control
and firepower measures." Feagin and Hahn conclude: "When faced with
crises, urban governments have usually had limited financial (and
other) resources at their disposal. The resources that are available
will tend to flow into the areas where there is the least resistance --
and strengthening law enforcement capabilities appears to be the most
welcome response of governnments to crises from the perspective of
white powerholding groups."

The allocation of resources for social control, namely the
riot gear and training of the local police, was perceived by most
community-level observers as the most contentious issue among the
intergovernmental responses. Especially in the absence of a concerted
effort on the part of city government and local state government to
establish a direct dialogue with the Hispanic community, this issue has
raised the level of apprehension on the part of many community-level
citizens. Additionally, a recent report by the state Criminal Justice
Training Council, commissioned in response to the riots, has pointed
out "glaring problems" in the police operations which some residents
feel will result in "an over-reaction on the part of Lawrence police to
flex their muscle and demonstrate their effectiveness through excessive
use of force, intervention, and harassment in the Hispanic
neighborhoods," as stated by one concerned Hispanic leader who summed
up a meeting of concerned Hispanic residents who met to discuss police
and community relations.

4.7.2 Treatment.

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While it is beyond the scope of this report to detail the specifics of the institutional response by the state and local service bureaucracies, suffice it to say that the nearly two million dollar "Lawrence Initiative" was comprised mostly of program and services of a 'treatment' nature. A smaller percentage, less than 4%, was allocated for organizational development. The bulk of the financial, human, and material resources were allocated to increase the service capacity of the state, city, and privately-run service delivery system, with a particular view toward increased delivery of services to Hispanics.

Many observers agreed with the need for such services but expressed concern that the targetting of these programs and services to the Hispanic population tacitly presumes that the social problems in Lawrence are being sufficiently 'treated.' As one informant claims: "The emphasis on programs and services to treat the sick people, as well as the presentation of facts regarding the relative higher stress which Hispanics experience that has been the central subject addressed at the symposium (the Department of Social Services Symposia series on Hispanics in Lawrence), does nothing more than attempt to take off the rough edges of the social problems. We are not blaming the victim so much as treating him. What remains to be done is rehabilitating the system which perpetuates the social inequality...this is not something the state or city can do...this work must be done by the community...at the ballot-box, and in the meeting rooms, and living rooms where organizations and leaders are developed...."

4.7.3 Resources.

The emphasis up to this point has been on the

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allocation and implementation of resources which emanated from within the intergovernmental context. We see how these resources have corresponded to the collective behavioral view of social protest as well as the resource management perspective.

4.8 Chapter summary.

In this chapter I have attempted to demonstrate how I have depended on the stories I collected to give meaning to the riots and various action-responses. The discussion attempted to respond to several key questions regarding the riots as a means of painting the backdrop against which planning efforts supporting the mobilization of Lawrence Hispanics will be set.

In the following final chapter, I will generalize the intergovernmental modes of planning -- planning 'at' and planning 'for' -- toward the purpose of advocating a 'planning with' mode within the community context. This mode adopts the resource management perspective of the Hispanic community; particularly with regard to existing and required resources which may indicate the mobilization potential of the community, should it become their collective political will to move toward political incorporation.

CHAPTER FIVE

"PLANNING WITH THE HISPANIC COMMUNITY OF LAWRENCE"

5.0   Introduction to chapter.

In this final chapter, the discussion begins with an assessment of the planning modes which have characterized the intergovernmental action-responses to the riots: planning 'at' and planning 'for.' I will then advocate an alternative mode: planning 'with.' I will present examples of this planning mode based on my experience in collecting stories for this report. Following a discussion of the role of language and dialogue in planning and political participation, we will turn our attention to the final point of this report: a resource view of the potential for mobilization of Lawrence Hispanics.

We will examine the resources which the Hispanic community in Lawrence can bring to their mobilization effort. These resources will be assessed in view of the dynamic interaction between the Hispanic community and the city government; particularly, in terms of entry into the political arena. The resources for mobilization identified by the Browning, Marshall, and Tabb study will provide the framework for examining the Hispanic community at a closer level.

The chapter will conclude this report with two open questions: the political will to move toward political incorporation of Hispanics into city government in Lawrence; and the political necessity for so doing.

5.1   Planning modes.

   5.1.0 Overview.

      Throughout this report I have included excerpts of
stories about the various interpretations of the riots and action
responses to them. In the course of reflecting on these stories,
participating in some of the social planning efforts on the part of one
institutional action-response, and, observing at close range other
action-responses, I have developed a conceptual framework for
discussing the distinct orientations of different planning responses.
I will briefly describe these planning modes with an emphasis on the
role of language and communication in these planning relationships. I
advocate one such planning relationship because I believe it responds
to a conscipicuously absent relationship between those who plan and
those to whom plans refer.

   5.1.1   Planning 'at' mode .

      At the executive and legislative echelon of the
intergovernmental context public officials have described the social
problem situation of Lawrence in global terms which reflect both the
collective behavior perspective -- "a sense of alienation" -- and the
resource management view -- "fed up with the lack of access to
decision-making." The action-response has generally been to allocate
financial and human resources, in the main, to address the problems.
I refer to this perspective in terms of planning 'at' a problem, as
characterized by a common criticism of "throwing money at a problem."
This mode is typified by a relationship to the constituency which is

channeled through various levels of goverment, most directly relating to those to whom plans refer by way of a service delivery system or bureaucracy which is charged with the task of implementation. In most cases, this is the environment influenced by concerns for, and f︰ the larger political economy, where policies are usually decorated with global abstractions, such as those 'paper promises' of "cultural senstivity" which have emanated from the executive offices and those of "increased governmental access" which have come forth from state legislators in the aftermath of the Lawrence riots. Implementation here is a matter of control, over resources, with such control authorized by elective or appointed office. Channels of implementation are vertically determined with the locus of action at governmental providers 'closer' to the people, admitting to a socio-political distance between governors and governed.

The key actors in this 'allocative' planning response have been the governor and the state congressional delegation from Lawrence; remarkably absent have been the Lawrence city officials whose public proclamations range from denial of the problem to verbose and empty proclamations such as those which claim "we have to get at the bottom of the problems of minorities in this city." With regard to the Governor's actions, many informants remarked that the message of the chief executive to the service bureaucracy was clear: get services to Hispanics. They claimed the sense of priority was extraordinary, urgent, and crisis-like. One informant's comments are telling: "The executive order was clear....get at the problem. It didn't matter how, just get at it...and soon."

A dominant metaphor in this planning response was that of 'mainstreaming.' The problem was described as one of Hispanics being

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outside the main current of society and the solution was to bring them into the flow of things, to extend the metaphor for purposes of description but still in keeping with the nature of the response. Because Hispanics were seen at a relative societal disadvantage, the planning response was to throw resources 'at' them, with the tacit assumption that such resources would enable them to dive in the mainstream of civic life.

Another common set of metaphors are those 'gun' metaphors -- target, setting sights, aiming -- which suggest planning from a distance, aiming 'at' social problems; the tacit assumption being that problems can be 'shot down.'

Much of the language, mixed metaphors and all, within which plans were couched ranged from the ideological abstractions of legislators on the House floor -- "We are talking about equal opportunity here. They need help to pull themselves up by the bootstraps and come into the mainstream of civic participation as free and equal citizens" -- to the wording of technocratic plans -- "The Lawrence Initiative is a comprehensive agenda of economic and community development, the goals of which are capacity-building, institutional support, and leadership development, for the purpose of closing the gap between Hispanics and mainstream Lawrence."

5.1.2 Planning for mode .

Within the service bureaucratic levels of the intergovernmental context, the planning mode seems more 'prescriptive' in focus with the medical metaphor much in use, in keeping with the collective behavioral view of social protest. The key actors here are

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social planners who seem to identify themselves as planning on the behalf of 'service recipients' for whom they prescribe specific 'treatment interventions.'

The problem here is one of a population 'in need' for whom the logical action-response is a program of services formulated to respond to their needs, and help to alleviate their problems. Again, the view is one of a marginal population who needs external assistance proferred as a means of human resource development. Implementation here is through a service provider-recipient relationship in a relationship formally designated and authorized by the governmental source of funds.

The extant language in this mode is a form of bureaucratic jargon, not unlike the technocratic orientation of the planning at mode. Here plans talk of "needs assessments" and "social indicator indicies" which are basic planning building blocks for programs and services "aimed at the alleviation of the social psychological stress exacerbated by such social ills as poverty and racism, compounded by chronic unemployment and disturbing social conditions of poor and crowded housing." (Proposal submitted to Department of Public Welfare from Lawrence-based state agency).

5.1.3   Planning with mode .

The planning 'with' mode is based in an interactive, side by side, relationship between the planner and those with whom plans are mutually determined. This mode does not necessarily conflict with the two former modes, except that plans are derived from among those to whom such plans refer, as is the legitimate authority to conduct and implement said plans. This mode, therefore, is

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'derivative' in nature.

Of critical importance here is the notion that any program which seeks to be of service to a particular community is 'unofficially licensed' by that community. Licensure is determined by a gradual development of the trust and confidence that is ensured by specific demonstrations of the connection between planning intent and achievment. Word-of-mouth endorsements, referrals, and personalized support by 'informal authority figures ' are important aspects of this critical licensure. In particular, cultural customs and traditions, some of which are highly ritualistic, play an important part in the welcoming and 'adoption' of community-based programs. In Lawrence, the approval of an Isabel Melendez or a Carlos Ruiz is a signal of approval to which a larger Hispanic audience responds. In my travels through Lawrence, that I had been a guest in the home of specific persons provided me with access and legitimacy that no amount of 'paper promises' or actual resources could garner. "I heard you attended Mass at our church," "I understand you played at one of our softball games," "The Torres family were so happy you joined them for dinner," went beyond expressions of social amenities; these comments represented an 'informal,' albeit critical, permission to enter the Hispanic community, and part of the welcoming process to it, without which one's actions lack legitimacy.

While locally-derived resources are insufficient to enact plans, implementation proceeds only insofar as control and designation functions (by those who provide necessary resources) do not conflict with locally-derived intentions. This mode has been characterized by such mixed metaphors as "grass-roots," "lifting oneself up by one's bootstraps," "streetcorner" and "street-level" programs. The language

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is colloquial in nature and suggests a more familiar and personalized view of planning.

A common reference to this type of planning mode has been to refer to programs with this objective as "community-based" or more specifically, "neighborhood-based." The notion is one of decentralized authority, typically referred to as "community control," which vests the meaning of policies at their point of action. Consequently, many policies for which no channels of realistic implementation exist are dismissed or disregarded as impractical or irrelevent. The criticism here is that the policies and policy-makers are "out of touch" with the constituencies for whom plans are intended; a common complaint is levied against the loftiness of espoused ideals, the technical complexity of proposed practices, and the discrepancy between both and the realities of the practice context. These criticisms, as common as they are, suggest that the implementation of a planning 'with' strategy is indeed a difficult one, particularly as those with whom planners attempt to engage in a planning relationship lack the necessary resources, the skills to utilize them, and the experience to confidently proceed.

As difficult as such a planning with relationship may be to establish, utilize, or even articulate, it is seen here as the one necessary and missing link to the Hispanic community in Lawrence; conspicuously absent in the main of action-responses to the riots, with the potential exception of Centro Panamericano and the Hispanic Political Action Committee which will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

As the following example of this mode of planning attempts to suggest, the close social distance, trust, and confidence which marks

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this planning relationship ought not be regarded simply as a matter of personalistic style. 'Planning with' is as much a 'social technology' as the modes of planning often characterized as more 'sophisticated' in their approach. That it is more difficult to articulate and does not lend itself as easily to 'replication,' ought not detract from its power. Indeed, relative to those regarded as the 'disaffected,' its virtual necessity ought not be discounted by anyone seriously intent on genuinely communicating with a community at the 'folk level.'

5.1.4 Examples of 'planning with' dialogue .

Following are two excerpts from 'political' accounts expressed at two sessions of dialogue I participated in, as a means of collecting stories for this report.

" We have talked much this evening about what it means for us to live under these conditions in Lawrence....You understand how important 'confianza' (interpersonal confidence and trust) is in 'la politica'....when people speak to us in terms we do not understand it becomes easy for us to believe that they do not respect us a people with a different view and different language and customs....We sense that the politicians mean only to intimidate us or dominate us. When they pay most attention to us is when they mean to impress us into voting for them....But we clearly understand their intention even if we do not always understand their words....They do mean for us to join them in city hall, they only want us to put them there...When we ask them questions as we have done in the past (with the Latin Alliance for Political Action and Progress) they ignore us or try to set us up one against the other.....We asked them why they have ignored us and we are told to sit down, shutup, or get out.....Always we are told to

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wait...and we are made to feel that we have no place in city hall...To
me this is more an act of war than the riots could ever be....this is
the first time I say those words...but in my heart I have believed them
for a long time...the riots proved them to be true....we did not escape
war when we came to the United States....we are at battle in a free
land...but we fight each other needlessly and foolishly...the real
enemy is our ignorance of one another...a world which has neighbor
competing against neighbor and does allow or reward the time it takes
to learn your neighbor's name..the enemy is an impersonal world....a
world without personalismo...a neighborly love...I am a realistic
women, though, and I realize that even love must be fought
for...sometimes I had to fight for and with my family because I loved
them and because I could see no other way....anger blinds us...as does
love....I am not an educated women but I have learned that this country
itself was built by those willing to fight for their freedom...as old
as I am I will fight in whatever way is necessary to make sure my
children and their children can have their rightful share of dignity
and hope in Lawrence...if it takes riots then let it take riots....we
can no longer be ignored....we are at battle in a free land....and we
will win...with the help of God..." (translated from Spanish).

At another evening dialogue session, another informant
expressed his view in this way: "I do not understand the political
system here...partly because I do not speak English and partly because
when things are explained to me.... about what the leaders say they are
going to do...I look around and I see nothing.....politicians here are
masters of the words....and we are slaves to their inaction"
(translated from Spanish).

5.1.5   The politics of planning with .

The 'planning with' mode I advocate here is inspired by the writings of Paulo Freire (1) who refers to such a side-by-side relationship as one of co-intentional education, the praxis of cultural synthesis which is based on a coming together of opposing factions against the structures of oppression. He writes: "Any situation in which some men prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence. The means are not important; to alienate men from their own decision-making is to change them into objects" (p.73). He continues: ""Trust is contingent on the evidence which one party provides the others of his true, concrete intentions; it cannot exist if that party's words do not coincide with his actions. To say one thing and do another -- to take one's own word lightly --cannot inspire trust. To glorify democracy and to silence the people is a farce; to discourse on humanism and to negate man is a lie. Nor yet can dialogue exist without hope. Hope is rooted in men's incompletion, from which they move out in constant search -- a search which can be carried out only in communion with other men. Hopelessness is a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it. The dehumanization resulting from an unjust order is not a cause for despair but for hope, leading to an incessant pursuit of the humanity denied by injustice"(p.80).

This "naming of the world," seen in Paulo Freire's terms, is a 'political' act. When Lawrence observers 'name' the riots and 'name' the attendant implications, they are engaged in "the awakening of critical consciousness." Which, per Freire, "leads the way to the expression of social discontents precisely because these discontents are real components of an oppressive situation."

For many observers, this naming of the world -- recognizing

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the social discontents observable in the riots -- represents the

beginning of an important political emergence from the "culture of

silence;" that immoblized state of internalized oppression, seen here

as a form of political 'unconsciousness.' They 'feel' the oppression

in the concrete circumstances of their everyday life even if they have

been hopelessly silent in the experience, as their feelings are

articulated they are empowered to act. This empowerment is the

objective of the 'planning with' mode.

For other observers, the naming of the world surrounding the

riot continues in their familiar pattern of closing themselves off into

"circles of certainty" within which they make their own truths. These

truths   partial. They deny the oppression, deny 'feeling' it, deny

responsibility to and for it, and still claim a certain hopefulness

that somehow everything will work itself out, or a resignation that

things proceed as they should even if the process is unjust.

The critical point here is not that the riots of last summer

ought to be seen as the standoff between those formerly 'silent' and

those who continue to feel so 'certain.' To be sure, this standoff is

evident in Lawrence today. What this discussion hopes to contribute is

how the whole of the Lawrence community can learn from the riots and

how they can teach each other their meanings; not in spite of the riots

but rather because of them.

The stories collected here indicate the potential for an

actual 'social dialogue' which can only be created by the bringing

together of the city's observers, in various constellations, with their

various names, in a side-by-side learning relationship. This could

represent the foundation from which a new social contract for Lawrence

could emerge, based on dialogue and "co-intentional education" -- a

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cultural synthesis of citizens so in conflict with one another they are
unable to surmount the antagonistic contradictions of the social
structure within which they all reside. For all the citizens of
Lawrence, a social dialogue of co-intentional education could provide
the requisite societal learning to move this city beyond its current
state of conflict.

5.2 Premises for community mobilization.

5.2.0 Overview.

In this section, we will briefly overview the
political environment in Lawrence, as indicated by the stories
collected for this report, and as related to the findings of the
Browining et al study.

5.2.1 Assessment of political environment.

Following is a brief list of premises upon which the
mobilization of the Hispanic community may be based. There are offered
here as conclusions, based on my own interpretations derived from the
stories I collected, and from my own direct observations:

- The dominant coalition occupying the Lawrence
city government is resistant to the political incorporation of Hispanic
citizens.

- Thus, the city government in Lawrence is a
relatively closed, inaccessible, and unresponsive in both policy and
practice.

- Members of the state legislature are sympathetic
to the need for political access and responsiveness with regard to
Lawrence Hispanics.

- The human service delivery network, including the state service bureaucracy and local private institutions, are likewise sympathetic to Hispanic concerns and interests; with institutional competition representing an inhibitory factor.

5.2.2 Trends in Browning study.

"Factors Perceived as Most Responsible for Minority Oriented Programs of City Governments, 1980."

The findings of major interest here are those concluded from a survey conducted by the above researchers regarding the perceptions of importance of city officials and outside pressure in bringing about "minority-oriented programs." They found: "When the dominant coalition was opposed or less comitted to minority interests, respondents perceived (outside) pressure as more important than city hall in bringing about minority programs. It is interesting to note that minority mobilization is typically viewed as more important than either city hall or (outside) pressure in both kinds of cities -- those with liberal and those with more resistant dominant coalitions." (In this study, the authors reviewed the impact of federal programs. In this thesis, I am assuming that the role of the state is analogous to federal pressure given it has similar regulatory and monitoring functions and power in relationship to the channelling of outside funds into the city).

5.2.3 "Four main patterns of mobilization.

According to Browning, Marshall, and Tabb: "We identify four main patterns of mobilization and incorporation that resulted from the interaction between minority mobilization and white response. Levels of incorporation achieved depended not only on the resources of or political pressures exerted by (minorities), but also on the context in which they mobilized, on the response of the dominant coalition, and the amount of support for challenges to resistant coalitions. The four main patterns of incorporation and mobilization are:"

"1. Biracial electoral alliance. Strong incorporation was achieved early as a result of leadership by blacks and whites in forming liberal electoral alliances..."

"2. Co-optation. Partial incorporation was achieved where minorities had less control over issues and candidates in liberal electoral coalitions ...these coalitions used co-optation strategies to respond to minority demands, which limited the levels of incorporation achieved...."

"3. Protest and exclusion. The levels of incorporation in these cities varied. All the cities experienced intense demand-protest and tenacious resistance by conservative dominant coalitions over a long period of time....(one city won a challenge to the dominant coalition by a coalition led by a minority candidate)..in other cities no such breakthroughs occurred, and incorporation was either transitory or very weak."

"4. Weak minority mobilization. No incorporation was achieved in cities where little or no demand-protest or electoral effort occurred and where the dominant coalition was extremely resistant."

5.3 Resource view on group size.

As indicated by the relative and absolute group size, and growth and migration characteristics, the Hispanic community in Lawrence could represent a significant electoral bloc to the extent it is moblized to register and vote. Such mobilization will depend on the success of community organizers to educate the Hispanic community and the extent to which Hispanic interests are represented in electoral campaigns by virtue of Hispanic candidates and\or supportive non-Hispanic candidates. The announced campaign of Modesto Maldonado for city council and the anticipated announcement by Rev. Danny O'Neill (known as 'the man with the Irish name and the Spanish American soul') are expected to generate considerable motivation to register and vote.

One additional feature of the Hispanic group size is the active existence of several social, cultural, political, and athletic clubs and organizations of various Latin national origins which range in membership from fifty to three hundred members. These clubs are long standing communications networks and community support systems which have been estimated as "being able to deliver as many as one hundred people within one hour's notice to any location in Lawrence if the issue warrants" by one community informant. To the extent this assertion is true, mobilization efforts which might include demonstrations or demand-protest activities could be significantly facilitated.

One potential inhibitory factor is the history of intra-community tensions related to national politics and personal socio-political disagreements. One informant claims that the factionalized character of the various Hispanic groups represents one of the major obstacles to political action. More will be discussed in

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this regard in the following section on organizational development.

5.4 Resource view on political experience.

The Lawrence Hispanic community has a history of political

activism that dates back at least ten years. The Alliance of Latins

for Political Action and Progress (ALPA) was organized eight years ago

with a charter group of thirty-three members, twenty-four of whom are

still active in community affairs. The original agenda around which

ALPA was organized was to apply pressure on the city council eight

years ago to formulate and implement an Affirmative Action Plan which

would bring Hispanics into the city's employ.

The failure of the city council to have an adequate plan was the basis

upon which the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development

froze nearly four million dollars of funds from being channelled into

Lawrence.

The protest activity launched by ALPA, the opposition

demonstrated by the city council, and the disorganization within the

larger Hispanic community, resulted in what one informant claims "a

tear in the social fabric that has not yet been repaired. The Hispanic

community was pitted against itself, one faction against another, by a

very divisive city council....we tore ourselves to shreds and the city

council looked on with glee. For many of us the protest against the

city was met with such antagonism and racism on the part of the city

council that many of our own members were so disgusted they gave up

very early in the fight. Despite our attempts to engage in a peaceful

dialogue with the city, we were given the runaround so many times that

it took us a while to realize that cooperating with a city council we

could not trust was a politically naive and totally unsuccessful

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strategy.....Unfortunately, the experience exhausted our limited resources and although we had plenty of energy many of our members decided instead to direct their energies in their own self-interest by working at their jobs and getting more security for their families...."

Many of the original group regard this activism directed at city hall as a distinct failure in that the city council was able to "coopt one of our own people into a puppet by naming him the Affirmative Action Officer and granting him no power....not to mention the fact that his commitment to fight for our civil rights has been very weak..." Informants point to the fact that in the last eight years no additional Hispanics were hired into positions of authority or influence within the city government as a failure on the part of the Affirmative Action Officer to implement equal opportunity measures and the concomitant success of the city council to block any such effort.

Despite the self-identified lack of success of ALPA, it should be noted that one of its ideas was implemented and has survived for the last seven years. The annual Hispanic Festival is a product of ALPA's Cultural and Recreation Committee and has represented the singularly most well-attended and significantly participatory event for the entire Hispanic community since its inception. According to Reverend O'Neill, an ALPA founder and one of its most active participants: "The mother (meaning ALPA as an organization) died in childbirth...we gave birth to the Hispanic Festival and everything else died...maybe it is a testimony to the fact that the Festival was a pleasurable activity while the political struggles were ugly and brutal.."

Informants who describe the current rise in political consciousness and commitment to action claim that "the short two year history of ALPA serves as a great lesson from our own history....we see

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now where we went wrong and also where we went right....Danny O'Neill's

plan for community education...based on a rotating Ezekiall's Wheel

with six committees rotating through six zones in the city and

revolving around a central coordinating committee was what produced the

Festival....the Festival became a reality because it was the one idea

that was met with support on a community-wide basis....it was the one

idea that we could get excited about because it looked possible and it

looked like something we could create, own, and not lose....it would

always remain ours....also it was the one idea we could implement

without outside help....the one idea based on our cultural pride and

strength and our sense of identity..."

Another informant continues: "Although the Festival is not a

political activity per se...it shows us what we can do as a

community....it is a real achievment we can point to with pride....what

we need to do now is transfer this knowledge into the political

forum....with our own candidates this year and our two new

organizations we have the opportunity to put our hindsight into

practice...."

5.5 Reource view on organizational development.

What Browning et al found to be significant among the Hispanic

demand protest of the ten cities they studied was that the emergence of

organizations through which political campaigns could be channelled

represented, along with coalition membership, the key to the successful

political incorporation into city government. Such is the hope and

potential for the Lawrence Hispanic community in the development of two

organizations which emerged as action-responses to the riots. One is

the Hispanic Political Action Committee and the other is Centro

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5.5.1 Hispanic Political Action Committee (HIPAC).

According to the recently elected president of the newly formed HIPAC, Carlos Ruiz, "the purpose of this organization is to educate the Hispanic community and bring them to the awareness of what the political process is in this country and how important it is for them to participate."

Based on an NAACP model described at a recent convention in Boston, the Lawrence HIPAC will serve as a "non-partisan body for the primary purpose of voter education, registration, and voter turnout."

In consideration of this ambitious task, Ruiz comments on the potential inhibitory factor: "...we have to keep in mind that we can have 10,000 Hispanics registered to vote, but if only 300 turn out on election day, then we haven't accomplished anything."

While we do not have statistics about the previous level of political participation among Hispanics in Lawrence, certain assumptions can be drawn from national figures. Nationally, we find that the percentage of eligible voters who register and vote is not all that different for Hispanic, black, and white populations (2). In 1982, 68% of all eligible white voters registered, and 76% of those registered voted; for Blacks the figures were 61% registered and 73% of those voted. While only 52% of eligible Hispanics were registered in 1982, 72% of them voted. Since younger (18-21) people are less likely to register than their elders, and a very high proportion of the Hispanic population in Lawrence is in this age cohort, it is possible that registration rates for Hispanics and other groups would look similar once one controls for age.

If Lawrence Hispanics register and vote at the same rate as U.S. Hispanics, then we could assume that 52% of eligible voters (approximately 4080 representing citizens over 18 years of age), or 2122 people would be registered. Of those 2122, anywhere from 1528 to 1740 would vote, also depending on whether it is a presidential election year.

Given the average grand total of citizens voting in Lawrence elections over the past twelve years is 9,500, a Hispanic bloc of votes could represent a significant factor although it is unlikely that any Hispanic-supported candidate could win solely on this electoral support. It appears, therefore, that the Browning et al finding regarding the necessity of participation in biracial electoral alliances for successful electoral mobilization would hold in Lawrence as well.

5.5.2 Centro Panamericano, Inc.

The following collection of stories is offered here to indicate the planning challenge which this newly formed organization faces in its attempt to provide an organizational channel for concerted social action on the part of the Lawrence Hispanic community; a formidable planning challenge indeed.

The planning impetus for Centro Panamericano was part of the executive level Lawrence Initiative which included a planning and implementation contract awarded to Inquilinos Boricuas en Accion (IBA), a Boston-based Community Development Corportation. IBA was contracted with the state "to design and implement an organizational strategy to improve the social and economic well-being of the Hispanic community in Lawrence." IBA's specific planning task has been recorded as having

been "to develop and implement a plan that would yield an independent, ongoing multi-service center at the service of the Hispanic community."

"First," begins one key informant, "it sounds like too ambitious an organization if it is really expected to improve the social and economic well-being of Hispanics in Lawrence. No one agency can do that alone. Second, the social and economic problems which Hispanics face have a political basis in the hostile way the city fathers view Hispanics. Will Centro Panamericano adopt a political agenda? How are you going to fund a poltical program?"

"Don't expect too much support from the existing human services network," advises another informant. "It's not that we don't support the need for services to Hispanics, it's just that we are already into heavy competition with existing service providers for limited human services funding. And many of us have been attempting to increase our service delivery to Hispanics...many of us serve substantial numbers of Hispanics....for yet another agency to come in and compete for these funds...and even to compete for the clients..sounds like we are all going to fight for a share of the pie.."

Another informant admits: "I am totally frustrated and confused....most of my clientele is Hispanic....does that mean my agency has to stop serving Hispanics simply because we are a primarily non-Hispanic staff and we are seen as a white agency?...and where does Centro Panamericano expect to find qualified Hispanic professional staff?...we try and can't afford to pay them...or they don't want to work in Lawrence...so what does that mean? ...once Centro Panamericano opens up we have to refer our Hispanic clients to them?.....I heard they will help to evaluate our services...what criteria will they use? How do I know they won't bad mouth us just so they can cut into our

funding sources?"

"If Centro Panamericano starts out saying it is going to provide services to needy Hispanics in Lawrence," predicts one Hispanic community leader, "they will close down in less than six months......there are too many needs here...once Hispanics throughout the whole community find out there is one special agency only for Hispanics they will swarm in on Centro Panamericano....when Centro Panamericano finds it cannot meet everyone's needs...the community at large will get angry...stop using the services...and withdraw its support."

On the matter of community support, one informant states: "The last thing we need in Lawrence is another letterhead agency with a nice-sounding name and a list of the Hispanics who have tried and failed to get organizations going in the past....just how are they going to help?...what are they going to do?....just exactly how are they going to come here and tell me what I need to do to help myself? What do they mean by self-help? What kinds of services are those? If they come here to provide better jobs, better housing, and better schools, then I will support them all the way....but if they are going to come here promising those things....then they won't get my vote."

Another informant put it this way: "Centro Panamericano is our chance to get the services we need here. You go to the state offices and they are rude to you ...they make you feel like you are stupid because it's so hard to understand their procedures...or other programs you have to wait for two months to get someone who can speak Spanish. With an agency of our own hopefully we can get services we can understand....with simpler procedures...less wait...and in Spanish...by Hispanics....I hope they open soon....I know many people who need help

now and don't want to go to the state offices or the other centers here."

Ana Perez, Interim Director of Centro Panamericano, describes the concept behind the center "is to provide an organization that allows for local community self-help initiatives and to provide more control over community development resources in the hands of the Hispanic Community....it can be a storehouse of information for the evaluation of existing services and the planning of new ones... Ultimately, it aims at enabling Lawrence Hispanics to increase their capacity to address their social and economic problems."

A state legislator, expresses his expectations this way: "We are expecting Centro Panamericano to provide a local voice for Hispanics in Lawrence....a voice that can speak to the city and state on behalf of the Hispanic community...a community voice is our vision....in order to do this legitimately Centro Panamericano will need to be well connected with the local folks at the community level...in order to speak on their behalf successfully Centro Panamericano will need to become well connected throughout all levels of government and in the non-Hispanic community as well because that's where much of the power and resources exist."

"Centro Panamericano needs to stay out of the business of human services and get into the business of political development." adds another informant. "By political development I mean they should educate the Hispanics in Lawrence to become the political force their percentage of the population suggests is possible......political equality should be their goal....and that means political clout all the way to the state house....they must have some clout already to have brought all the politicos and state bosses here for the MIT

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symposium....that's the first time I've ever heard the mayor of Lawrence welcome any Hispanic...much less a group ...to Lawrence!"

An informant with one of the executive state offices states: "What we are looking for with Centro Panamericano is an agency that can do the bidding for the Lawrence Hispanics. An agency that can participate on equal footing in the human services delivery system and community economic development network as a Hispanic provider."

"How do you get something like that funded?" asks a Centro Panamericano planner in reference to goals of a political nature. "I know organizing the community is necessary but there are no funds to do that sort of thing."

"For the Hispanic community, Centro Panamericano can be our symbol of pride and opportunity....a place for our vision to become a reality," says one informant, adding: "We need our own agency that speaks for us.... and knows us.....and represents our interests in Boston and in local affairs....it will be like our own little city hall....like they tried in Boston.... where we can take our community problems and have Centro Panamericano put them into the right words to argue before the city council or at the State House."

Again, Ana Perez expresses here vision for Centro Panamericano in these words: "Centro Panamericano seeks to identify, develop, and support Hispanic leaders who can speak for Hispanics interests in a variety of areas. In addition to being a training ground for Hispanic leadership....Centro Panamericano can lessen community tensions.........it can provide the infrastructure on which to conduct community-based economic development. Lastly, Centro Panamericano can help to lessen the strain between Hispanics and other groups by establishing positive working relationships with organizations that

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represent these other groups both in areas of potential conflict and mutual concern."

To the extent that Centro Panamericano is able to respond to these planning challenges and scale its programs and services accordingly, will determine whether it can provide the organizational development resource seen as a critical resource in the Browning study.

5.6 Resource view on coalition building,

What Browning et al found to be the major critical key to successful mobilization of minority communities represents the most significant area of lack with regard to the Lawrence Hispanic community. As the stories above indicate, the competition for funds and the relatively disorganized nature of the human service network are serious inhibitory factors among the most significant potential source of support that could be summoned by Lawrence Hispanics. The human service network is perhaps the most sympathetic, if not yet coalesced, sector to the interests of Lawrence Hispanics. Their participation in numerous meetings with regard to the social problem situation within which Lawrence Hispanics exist has educated them beyond any previous level of awareness. Additionally, their increased attention to Hispanic issues, motivated by the riots themselves and the various action-responses, indicates a predisposition to a potential alliance. Although their service orientation may predispose them in this manner, their public funding base may inhibit a full expression of their political interests and action.

One significant boost to the political involvement of the human service network came recently in the form of a strong message

issued by the coordinator of the Lawrence Initiative, Jorge Santiago, a

spokesperson and employee of the Executive Office of Human Services:

"Human service managers can no longer operate in a vacuum. They must

be politically active. Human service agencies should take part in city

politics and show they are part of the city's future. Human service

workers must reach out to the community, attend public meetings, and be

articulate representatives of their services within a political

agenda."

The extent to which human service staff respond to this

encouragement and the extent to which the Lawrence Hispanic community

elicits their sympathetic predisposition of support, may determine the

extent to which a broad-based coaltion could be formed from among this

sector.

5.7 CONCLUSION:

In the final analysis what remains for each sector which plays

an important role in Lawrence city politics to answer are two open

questions: Does the political will -- to work together to politically

incorporate the interests and members of the Hispanic community --

exist within each governmental sector; within each community service

sector; and among the various population groups which comprise the body

politic? To what extent does a critial consciousness exist regarding

the social necessity of exercising this political will?

I regard this social necessity as the higher ground of

political expedience upon which the future welfare of the whole of

Lawrence is staked. To get there, in Saul Alinsky's words, we must

take: "the low road to morality..... There is no other. A major

revolution to be won in the immediate future is the dissipation of

man's illusion that his own welfare can be separate from that of all others....The fact that it is not man's "better nature" but his self-interest that demands that he be his brother's keeper....the most practical life is the moral life and ....the moral life is the only road to survival."

I believe this is the kind of argument that the actual experience of Lawrence citizens' equips them to understand...an argument they have no alternative to accept if they wish to keep the riots as events of the past. The riots are part of that political pragmatic lesson which informs us that civilized society functions best when its citizens learn to live with other political ideologies....not on an elevated plane of altruism and self-sacrifice but on the higher ground of Everyman's daily desires and self-interests.

To not see the riots as the political expressions of a community seeking entry into the political arena is to miss their essential truth: of the interdependence of all citizens.....socially, economically, and thus politically. A truth upon which the ideal of pluralist democracy is based; an espoused ideal which democracy-in-action often denies, avoids, or otherwise falls short......... at great social cost.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER TWO:

Special Note: The census data cited in this chapter are from both the
1970 census and the 1980 census. Special note should be made regarding
the count of "persons of Spanish origin or descent." The Hispanic
population data for 1970 and 1980 were obtained with the same question,
in which people identified themselves as of Spanish origin, but the
1970 data are estimates based on a relatively small sample (5
percent); also, the Census Bureau acknowledges an undercount of
Hispanics in 1970. Spanish surname was the only census criterion for
"Hispanic" in 1960 and was one of the criteria, along with Spanish
language, for most of the data on "Hispanics" reported in the 1970
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<u>Opportunities</u> . (New York: Ford Foundation Office of Reports, 1984).
pp.15.

CHAPTER THREE:

The quotations cited in this chapter were obtained in personal
interviews with the author. In some interviews, anonymity was assured.
In others, as noted by name of speaker in this report, anonymity was
not an assurance of the interview; in most cases, these interviews were
with public officials whose statements were collected 'on the record.'

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pp. 6-7.
4. Ronald Aminzade, <u>Revolution and Collective Political Violence:</u>
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5. Eric Hoffer, <u>The True Believer</u> . (New York: Harper & Row, 1951).
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CHAPTER FIVE:

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