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# Experimental Markets for Product Concepts

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## Abstract

Market prices are well known to efficiently collect and aggregate diverse information regarding the value of commodities and assets. The role of markets has been particularly suitable to pricing financial securities. This article provides an alternative application of the pricing mechanism to marketing research - using pseudo-securities markets to measure preferences over new product concepts. Surveys, focus groups, concept tests and conjoint studies are methods traditionally used to measure individual and aggregate preferences. Unfortunately, these methods can be biased, costly and time-consuming to conduct. The present research is motivated by the desire to efficiently measure preferences and more accurately predict new product success, based on the efficiency and incentive-compatibility of security trading markets. The article describes a novel market research method, provides insight into why the method should work, and compares the results of several trading experiments against other methodologies such as concept testing and conjoint analysis.

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# 1 Introduction

Markets are well-known as an efficient tool to collect and aggregate diverse information regarding the value of commodities and assets. They have been particularly successful in the domain of financial assets. This paper presents a study of markets through both simulations with artificial agents and experiments with human subjects. Specifically, we explore an alternative application of the market mechanism to marketing research—using markets to collect consumer preferences on virtual product concepts. This application of markets is motivated by the desire to seek alternative reliable and accurate means to collect consumer preferences, and the belief that markets are efficient in aggregating information.

This paper presents the results of three market experiments in which participants express their preferences on some new product concepts by trading virtual securities. The preferences collected are compared and studied together with results derived from a separate study of the same problem using a survey method. We find that results across different market experiments are consistent with each other, and in addition, highly correlated with those from the independent survey method. To gain a better understanding how markets work in this particular application, we relate our market experiments with some classic examples from the experimental economics literature. Lastly we propose some conjectures on issues including how equilibrium prices are related to individual participants' preferences, how participants gather and process information, and what possible trading strategies are.

The essence of the markets for product concepts centers around the establishment of virtual stock markets that trade virtual securities, each associated with an underlying product or service. These products or services could be a concept or prototype under evaluation or an existing product that anchors the market to the real world. Upon entering a concept market, each participant receives an initial portfolio of cash (virtual or real) and virtual stocks. Participants are also provided with detailed information on the products (stocks) that includes specifications, images, and multimedia illustrations. The objective of the market game is to maximize the value of the portfolio, evaluated at the market closing price. If participants play with real money, they will have the opportunity to profit from trading and bear the risk of losing money. The financial stakes in the game provide incentives to reveal true preferences,

process information and conduct research. If fictitious money is used, prizes can be awarded according to individuals' performance. One can also reward all participants just for their service.

As in financial markets, the prices of the stocks are determined by the demand and supply in the market, which depend on the participants' evaluation of their own *and* others' preferences of the underlying products. Thus at the market equilibrium, prices should reflect all participants' aggregate preference of the products. Traders make trading decisions just as they would in a financial stock market: they assess the values of the stocks, sell the overvalued and buy the undervalued. Traders buy and sell virtual stocks, essentially voting on the worth of the products. In this way, a stock's price becomes a convenient index of a product's consumer value.

Surveys, polls, and focus groups are the traditional methods to collect such information. Concept markets can serve as an alternative means to the same tasks or as a compliment to other methods. There are multiple reasons why the market mechanism can add value to the collection of diverse consumer preferences:

- *Accuracy*: Market participants have more incentives to trade according to the best of their knowledge because of their financial stakes in the market. The market can also capture, continuously, the ever changing "consumer impulse" for all participants who can express their opinions multiple times during the course of the market. Furthermore markets allow for dynamic movement of a virtual product's worth or price along a slide scale, rather than attempting to collect yes/no survey answers when consumer's real sentiment lies somewhere in between.
- *Learning and Interaction*: A concept market participant is not only evaluating on behalf of himself or herself, but also considering the opinion of the public at large. Furthermore, participants can observe others' valuations of the virtual products and adjust their own dynamically in the market environment. Learning is an important element in these markets.
- *Scalability*: Unlike surveys, markets are intrinsically highly scalable. In fact, the efficiency of the market, and therefore the quality of data collected, improves with the number of participants.
- *Ambiguous and Intangible Attributes*: The market method is particularly useful over survey meth-

ods when a product cannot be naturally described or represented by a set of attributes (for example, a movie script). Market participants would evaluate the concepts directly and market prices would effectively reflect the overall viability of the concepts.

However, we also recognize limitations of the market method. Unlike typical marketing research techniques, in which information is collected from individuals and aggregated in subsequent analysis, the market method focuses on aggregate beliefs and preferences and neglects those of individuals'. Virtual concepts markets are vulnerable to price manipulations and speculative bubbles because the values of virtual securities hinge on the aggregate beliefs, which are endogenously determined within the same market. Traders may form false beliefs that could cause prices to deviate from their fundamentals. For these reasons, the market method must be applied with cautions and consistency of the results must be checked.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the background for survey markets, which includes an overview of similar opinion-collecting markets on the web, a description of a concept testing project that this study is based on, and relevant research in experimental economics. Section 3 presents the designs of the securities and markets. Section 4 provides conjectures on how the survey markets work by considering an equilibrium model and simulations with artificial agents. Lastly, section 5 presents results from three market experiments.

## **2 Background**

### **2.1 Opinion-collecting Electronic Markets**

The application of the market mechanism is not restricted to the pricing of assets in financial markets. Different non-financial markets have been established for opinion polling, forecasts and predictions. The Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM)<sup>1</sup> from the University of Iowa is one of the pioneers of non-financial markets in the polling of opinions (Forsythe, Nelson, Neumann & Wright (1993)). The IEM was founded for research and educational purposes. Trading profits from the market provide incentives

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<sup>1</sup>The Iowa Electronic Markets <http://www.biz.uiowa.edu/iem/>

for traders to collect and process information of relevant future events. The IEM features real-money futures markets in which contract payoffs depend on the outcome of future political and economic events. Examples of these markets are the U.S. Presidential Election Market and the Computer Industry Returns Markets. In the U.S. Presidential Election Vote Share Market, for example, the contract *RepVS* would pay \$1.00 times the vote share (percentage of popular vote) received by the Republican Party nominee, George W. Bush, in the November 2000 election. Traders at IEM invest their own funds, buy and sell listed contracts according to their own judgment of the likelihood of the underlying events, which is equivalent to the values of the corresponding contracts. On the election day, the contract *RepVS* (Bush) was liquidated at \$0.497 while the contract *DemVS* (the Democratic Party nominee, Al Gore) was liquidated at \$0.499, indicating that the overall market "thought" that Bush and Gore would receive 49.7% and 49.9% of the popular votes respectively.<sup>2</sup> IEM predicted the voting results, in terms of popular votes, of the past two Presidential elections within two-tenths of a percentage point, outperforming most national polls.<sup>3</sup> The Gallup Poll's predictions, for example, deviated from election results by 1.9% and 5.7% for the Democratic candidates in years 1992 and 1996 respectively.<sup>4</sup>

With a similar idea, the Hollywood Stock Exchange or HSX<sup>5</sup> establishes virtual markets trading movie stocks and star bonds. Each share of a movie stock pays a percentage of a particular movie's U.S. box office total; a star bond is priced based on a movie star's performance at the box office of his or her recently released movies. Prices of these stocks and bonds are determined by the demand and supply in the market, which in turn depend on players' consensus. Players trade with fictitious money called "Hollywood dollar." Market prices serve as predictions on earnings of movies and consensus of movie stars' popularity. Box office forecast is an invaluable service to film makers and Hollywood marketers. But traditional marketing research techniques have been found notoriously inaccurate and unreliable.<sup>6</sup> HSX markets provide an alternative means of obtaining such forecasts in an arbitrarily large scale inexpensively.

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<sup>2</sup>Bush and Gore received 47.87% and 48.38% of the popular vote respectively.

<sup>3</sup>*Business Week*, 11/11/96.

<sup>4</sup><http://www.gallup.com/Election2000/historicalsummary.htm>

<sup>5</sup>The Hollywood Stock Exchange <http://www.hsx.com>

<sup>6</sup>*Wall Street Journal* July 21, 2000. Box Office Muddle: How Will Films Fare From Week to Week.

## **2.2 Virtual Concept Testing**

Our virtual markets are set up to collect consumer preferences to facilitate product concept testing, a critical step in new product development. Concept testing is a procedure to narrow down multiple design concepts to the "optimal" design according to the responses collected from potential users of the product or service being studied. Dahan & Srinivansan (2000) presents a methodology that conducts product concept testing over the Internet using virtual prototypes in place of real, physical ones. The authors consider the World Wide Web as an attractive environment for conducting marketing research because of its interactive nature, instantaneous access to respondents, and availability of new technologies to deliver rich multimedia contents. The authors claim that the use of virtual product reduces costs in new product development so that a larger number of concepts can be explored. In their Internet-based approach, virtual prototypes are presented in the form of visual static illustrations and animations, plus a virtual shopping experience. Through an interactive Web page, respondents are able to rank different products by specifying the prices they are willing pay for individual products. After data are collected from respondents, conjoint analysis is conducted to obtain market share predictions of the concept products. Conjoint analysis is a technique used to decompose respondents' preference on individual attributes of a product based on their overall preferences. Green & Wind (1981) provides a tutorial of the technique. The goal of the study is to choose the best design of a bicycle bump among nine concept products and two commercially available products. The authors find that the virtual prototype tests produce market share predictions that closely resemble to those given by tests in which real physical prototypes are used.

Following this successful use of virtual prototypes, we adopt the virtual illustrations and animations from Dahan & Srinivansan (2000) to study the same problem. But instead of conducting surveys, virtual markets are set up.

## **2.3 Rational Expectation Models and Experimental Markets**

Our trading experiments are closely related to the literatures in rational expectations model and experimental markets. A typical rational expectations (RE) model (Grossman & Stiglitz (1980)) studies

a market of agents with diverse information. Under certain conditions, the competitive equilibrium prices will reveal all relevant information. The most important criterion for convergence is that agents condition their beliefs on market information. In particular, agents make inferences from market information about other agents' private information. The RE model has received considerable attention in the study of experimental markets. Studies of the informational efficiency of a market relative to the RE benchmark fall into two categories: *information dissemination* between fully informed agents ("insiders") and uninformed agents, and *information aggregation* among many partially informed agents. Plott & Sunder (1982), Plott & Sunder (1988), Forsythe, Palfrey & Plot (1982) and O'Brien & Srivastava (1991) show that both information aggregation and dissemination occur successfully—markets attain the rational expectations equilibrium—in various experimental markets with human subjects.

Our trading experiments share some common characteristics with experimental markets. Both information aggregation and dissemination can offer explanations on the underlying activities in our virtual markets. One possible scenario is that there may be traders who possess superior information about the products or have high confidence on their beliefs. These can be considered as "insiders." On the other hand, traders who have little knowledge or opinion of the products can be regarded as the "uninformed." The interaction between the insider and uninformed constitutes a scenario of information dissemination. What is intriguing about this scenario is that even with the presence of traders, who may ignore the underlying product information and only focus on market information, the market could still converge to efficient prices that reflect all the relevant information or beliefs. Another possibility is that individual traders form their own beliefs about the products, and realize that market prices would depend on the aggregate beliefs. This is similar to the information aggregation scenario where traders are partially informed.

However, there are also significant differences between our product concept markets and those in the experimental markets literature. In a typical experimental market, subjects' preferences and their information set are fixed and assigned by the researchers. Therefore, even before trading begins, theoretical equilibrium prices can be calculated. In contrast, in concept market experiments, neither subjects' preferences nor their information sets are known. In fact, these are what experiments aim to



discover.

### 3 Design of Markets and Securities

The market method is applied to the same product concept testing problem presented in Dahan & Srinivansan (2000). Three trading experiments were conducted to predict the market share of nine concept bike pumps. A market is set up with eleven securities—nine concept products and two commercially available products—corresponding to the eleven bike pumps in Dahan & Srinivansan (2000). Each of the securities is the stock of the virtual company that manufactures and sells a particular pump as its only product. These pump-manufacturing companies will go public, and their initial public offering (IPO) prices are to be determined in our virtual market. All companies will offer the same number of shares of common stock to the public. The objective of the game is to maximize the value of one's portfolio at market close. The value of a portfolio is calculated as the sum of the cash and total worth of the stocks, which are valued at the market *closing prices*. Participants should strive to maximize their profits by trading the stocks using their personal valuation of the companies, as well as any information they can observe from the trading dynamics. Fictitious money was used in the markets, but we rewarded top players with prizes. This provides the participants an incentive to perform in the experiments. It is assumed that all the eleven companies have identical production cost structures, manufacturing capacity, distribution channels, financial structures, management expertise and all other factors that may affect their profitability. In other words, all factors other than the quality and desirability of the pumps can be ignored in valuing the stocks.

The eleven bike pump companies are Cyclone, AirStik, Soliboc, Gearhead, Silver Bullet, TRS, Gecko, Epic, Skitzo, RimGripper and 2wister. To anchor the value of the fictitious currency, one of the eleven securities—Cyclone—has its price fixed at \$10 and is not traded. Cyclone is served as a reference price or numeraire security. For example, if a trader thinks that the company TRS is worth twice as much as Cyclone, he or she would pay up to \$20 for one share of TRS. The stocks of the ten freely traded companies may be priced at any level, depending on the demand and supply in the market.

A typical trading experiment is conducted in the following way. Detailed product information for the bike pumps are given in the form of static illustrations and animations (see Figure 1), as in Dahan & Srinivasan (2000). These visual depictions show participants the appearance of the pumps as well as how they work. In addition, each bike pump is rated in terms of four attributes: the speed with which a pump inflates a tire, compactness, the ease of operation and durability. The participants are presented with a single Web page with the visual depictions and profiles of the bike pumps, trading instructions, and the objective of the trading game. They have ten minutes to study the material before trading begins.


All participants are provided with an identical portfolio that consists of \$10,000 of cash and 100 shares for each of the securities. No borrowing or short-selling is allowed in the market. At the end of the experiments, we reward the top three players with highest portfolio values with Amazon.com gift certificates of \$50, \$30 and \$20 respectively. Participants first log in with self-chosen user-names and passwords (see Figure 2a), then trade the securities through a graphical user interface (see Figure 2b). Market information available to the traders includes the last transaction price and size, current bid/ask prices and sizes, and a historical price and volume chart for each security. A trader can submit either a limit or market order to trade, or cancel an outstanding order that has not been executed. The markets are typical double auction markets with no market-makers. A transaction occurs when a market or limit order matches with a limit order on the opposite side of the market. All prices are specified in one-sixteenth of a dollar.

## **4 Possible Trading Strategies**

Our market experiments serve to aggregate diverse preferences or beliefs from all participants. One's belief may consist of three independent elements:

- Product information — This is what a participant knows about the underlying products. All participants are provided with the same facts and specifications of the products, but they may have obtained extra product information from their personal experience outside the experiments.

(a)



(b)




Figure 1: The profiles of the eleven bike pumps.

(a)

**User login**

User ID: MbMTrader      password: \*

Login

**New user? Please register here**

User ID: MbMTrader      password: \*      password again: \*

Register

(b)




Figure 2: Login and trading interface.

- A participant's personal preference — This is what surveys and polls try to collect. Although the aggregate preferences of the whole market is the object of interest, one's personal view should contribute to his or her trading decisions.
- A participant's assessment of others' preferences — A participant would form an assessment of what others think so as to make profitable trading decisions.

How are beliefs or preferences aggregated in these markets with virtual securities? Not only should the traders form their own assessment of the stocks, but they should also infer the stocks' potential market value from the market. In a typical market in experimental economics, both the preferences of the traders and the state of nature (for example, probability distribution of a security payoff) are known to the researchers (Plott & Sunder (1982); Plott & Sunder (1988); Forsythe & Lundholm (1990); O'Brien & Srivastava (1991)). Traders are assigned with preferences that specify securities payoffs in various possible states. The theoretical equilibrium (rational expectations equilibrium) prices can be derived given full information of the markets. The main focus of these experiments is whether and under what conditions rational expectations equilibria can be attained in double auction markets. Some attempts have been made to understand the convergence of prices and how learning occurs in the market as a whole. But it is unclear how individual human traders learn and react to the market. Attempts to model the trading strategies of individual traders from the market data may be overly ambitious. Here we try to shed some light on some possible strategies.

The objective of the trading game is to predict the final prices of the securities. A trader may form an assessment of the fair values of the securities before trading starts. This opinion may take into account her own preference on the underlying products, and perhaps more importantly what she perceives as the preferences of the whole group. The trader may then make trading decisions based on her belief: she buys undervalued stocks and sells over-valued ones. During the course of the market, the trader may either maintain her valuations or update her beliefs in real time conditioning on her observation of the market dynamics. Learning is taking place if the latter approach is taken. But learning is a rather complex process because one's expectations of prices affect prices, prices are used to infer others' assessments, and the inference of others' assessments in turn affects both prices and expectations of

prices.

Some traders may take a dramatically different approach by largely ignoring all fundamental information about the underlying products but focusing on market information only. These traders play the roles of speculators or market-makers who try to gain from the market by taking advantage of price volatility, providing liquidity or looking for arbitrage opportunities. Their presence may introduce mixed effects to the market. While they could enhance liquidity on one hand, they may also introduce speculative bubbles and excess volatility into the market.

Appendix A provides an example of how such a market works with a theoretical equilibrium model in which agents aggregate diverse beliefs within a group. The illustration is continued in Appendix B with simulations of artificial agents.

## 5 Experimental Results and Comparison with Survey Study

Three trading experiments were conducted from September 1999 to April 2000. Subjects in the trading experiments are MBA students from MIT Sloan School of Management.<sup>7</sup> Experiments 1 and 2 were conducted at a centralized location, the Sloan school trading laboratory. These two experiments were not timed—we closed the market when trading activities died down. They lasted 10 and 18 minutes. Experiment 3, on the other hand, was conducted over the Internet—participants joined the market remotely from arbitrary locations. The market was open for trading for one hour, during which participants might enter or leave the market as they wished. The longer trading time was aimed to offer more flexibility to the participants and investigate whether time constraints affect the trading activities of a market. There are 18 to 27 participants in each of the experiments. Table 1 describes the details of the experiments. Experiment 3 has the highest volume (in share and trade) despite a small number of participants. This seems to suggest that a longer duration does generate more trading interest. Figure 3 presents the sample price and volume history of a virtual stock—AirStik—in Experiments 1 to 3. The prices close around \$25 in the three experiments.

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<sup>7</sup>Three groups of students were recruited from Prof. Ely Dahan's class 15.828 *New Product Development* in fall 1999 and Prof. Andrew W. Lo's class 15.433 *Investment* in Spring 2000.




Figure 3: Price and volume history for AirStik in Experiments 1 to 3.

Experiment Number	Number of Participants	Duration (Minutes)	Volume (Shares)	Volume (Trades)	Venue
1	27	18	10,013	167	Trading Lab
2	26	10	6,150	79	Trading Lab
3	18	60	13,128	233	Internet

Table 1: Details of the three trading experiments.

For each of the market experiments, trade and quote data is collected. For our analysis, we focus on the trade data, which consists of time series of transaction prices and quantities:

$$(p_{1,i}, q_{1,i}), (p_{2,i}, q_{2,i}), \dots, (p_{T_i,i}, q_{T_i,i}),$$

where  $i$  is the index for the  $i$ -th product and  $T_i$  is the number of trades for the  $i$ -th product. Our hypothesis is that prices reveal market consensus of the profitability of the bike pumps. To provide an analogous study to that by Dahan & Srinivansan (2000), we focused on the potential market share of the products. In particular, we propose that a product's market share can be predicted by its relative market capitalization. The market capitalization of a company, or the total value of its stocks, equals to the product of market price and the number of outstanding shares. The relative market capitalization is defined as the ratio of a company's market capitalization to the capitalization of the entire market (all the companies). Since all the companies have the same number of outstanding shares, market capitalization is proportional to the market prices. The market closing price is a natural candidate for the valuation of the companies. However, it is observed that the closing price is not a particular robust measure for stock valuation. Because the traders' portfolios are valued at the closing prices, prices tend to become more volatile towards market close. This is especially true for the low-volume stocks. Hence, in addition to the closing price, we consider other price statistics that take into account *all* transactions during the session: the mean, median and volume weighted average price. The mean and median prices are calculated from the time series of trade prices  $(p_{1,i}, p_{2,i}, \dots, p_{T_i,i})$ ; the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) is computed as follows:



$$VWAP_i = \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T_i} p_{t,i} q_{t,i}}{\sum_{t=1}^{T_i} q_{t,i}}.$$

The mean price is sensitive to outliers—a small number of transactions that occur at extreme prices. Both mean and median prices ignore the volume in a transaction and treat all transactions equally. Volume can be regarded as a measure of the amount of information in a transaction. A trade with higher volume is generally more informative than one with lower volume. In our concept markets, volume is also related to how confident the traders are at the corresponding transaction price. VWAP effectively summarizes the prices by considering the amount of information and confidence behind the trades. In practice, VWAP has been a widely accepted benchmark price in financial markets. It is a commonly used metric for the evaluation of trade executions.

Now given a price statistic  $s_i^p$ , which can be the closing, mean, median or volume weighted average prices, we can compute predicted market share as the relative market capitalization.

$$MS_i = \frac{s_i^p n}{\sum_{j=1}^N s_j^p n} = \frac{s_i^p}{\sum_{j=1}^N s_j^p},$$

where  $N$  is the number of securities in the market and  $n$  is the total number of shares for a security. Among the four price statistics, we expect the median price and VWAP to be particularly robust against potential price volatility. To relate these metrics to those in the computer simulations, it is important to point out that the mean price in Appendix B is equivalent to the VWAP because all transactions are restricted one share.

To verify the validity of the market method, we ask two questions: (1) whether the results from the market method are consistent across different experiments, and (2) how close the results from the markets are to those from the independent survey study. We focus on the market share predictions derived from the four types of price statistics and those from the survey. Table 2 presents the predicted market share based on VWAP for the three experiments. We find that the top three products (Skitzo, Silver Bullet and Epic), in terms of predicted market share, are the same in the three experiments, as well as from the survey study. Furthermore, the rankings among the three are exactly the same across

	Skitzo	Silver Bullet	Epic	Gecko	Cyclone	Rim Gripper	Gear- head	TRS	2wister
Survey	32.1%	25.6%	10.3%	6.4%	3.8%	3.8%	2.6%	2.6%	1.3%
Exp 1	10.4%	13.3%	10.1%	7.5%	6.7%	5.3%	10.0%	7.0%	4.8%
Exp 2	12.2%	14.6%	10.5%	10.2%	5.7%	4.8%	6.4%	6.2%	5.5%
Exp 3	11.0%	11.5%	10.1%	7.5%	6.8%	7.6%	8.2%	7.5%	7.9%

Table 2: Market share predictions for nine products concepts by the survey method and Experiments 1 to 3. Market share predictions from experiments are calculated based on VWAP.

different experiments. In a typical concept testing process, it is more important to be able to identify the best designs because they are more likely to be materialized. Figure 4 presents the predicted market share based on all four price statistics for the three experiments. The mean price, median price and VWAP measures are reasonably close, while the closing price measure could be substantially different from the rest in certain stocks (Epic in Experiment 1, Gecko in Experiment 2 and Rim Gripper in Experiment 3).

For consistency across experiments, we calculate the pair-wise sample correlation between market share predictions based on each price statistic from individual experiments. For example, the association between experiments  $a$  and  $b$  is quantified by the sample correlation between  $(MS_1^a, MS_2^a, \dots, MS_N^a)$  and  $(MS_1^b, MS_2^b, \dots, MS_N^b)$ . For comparison with the survey method, we calculate the sample correlation between the market share predicted by the survey study and those derived from individual experiments. These correlation coefficients are presented in Table 3. The results from the three experiments show significant correlation. All correlation coefficients are above 80% for the mean price, median price and VWAP. The results from these three experiments are also highly correlated with the survey data: the correlation coefficients for median price and VWAP measures range from 74% to 89%. As we expected, the closing price is too noisy to give any conclusive results.

To ensure robustness of the results, we present another measure of association between different market share prediction results: Spearman’s rank correlation. We transform all the market share data into ranks,  $R_i = \text{rank}(MS_i)$ , and calculate the sample correlation (see Table 4). A similar conclusion is reached: the results from all the three experiments are significantly correlated among themselves and




Figure 4: Predicted market share based on the closing price, mean price, median price and VWAP for Experiments 1 to 3.

<b>Closing Price</b>				
	Survey	Exp 1	Exp 2	Exp 3
Survey	1.00	0.22	0.34	0.72
Exp 3		1.00	-0.02	0.11
Exp 4			1.00	0.05
Exp 5				1.00

<b>Mean Price</b>				
	Survey	Exp 1	Exp 2	Exp 3
Survey	1.00	0.68	0.87	0.89
Exp 1		1.00	0.83	0.82
Exp 2			1.00	0.84
Exp 3				1.00

<b>Median Price</b>				
	Survey	Exp 1	Exp 2	Exp 3
Survey	1.00	0.87	0.83	0.88
Exp 1		1.00	0.89	0.92
Exp 2			1.00	0.89
Exp 3				1.00

<b>Volume Weighted Average Price</b>				
	Survey	Exp 1	Exp 2	Exp 3
Survey	1.00	0.74	0.86	0.89
Exp 1		1.00	0.85	0.82
Exp 2			1.00	0.86
Exp 3				1.00

Table 3: Price correlation coefficients between outcomes from the survey study, and Experiments 1, 2 and 3.

<b>Closing Price</b>				
	Survey	Exp 1	Exp 2	Exp 3
Survey	1.00	0.66	0.63	0.58
Exp 1		1.00	0.42	0.68
Exp 2			1.00	0.34
Exp 3				1.00

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<b>Mean Price</b>				
	Survey	Exp 1	Exp 2	Exp 3
Survey	1.00	0.73	0.82	0.60
Exp 1		1.00	0.90	0.62
Exp 2			1.00	0.55
Exp 3				1.00

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<b>Median Price</b>				
	Survey	Exp 1	Exp 2	Exp 3
Survey	1.00	0.75	0.71	0.55
Exp 1		1.00	0.78	0.78
Exp 2			1.00	0.73
Exp 3				1.00

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<b>Volume Weighted Average Price</b>				
	Survey	Exp 1	Exp 2	Exp 3
Survey	1.00	0.78	0.78	0.58
Exp 1		1.00	0.97	0.72
Exp 2			1.00	0.68
Exp 3				1.00

Table 4: Rank correlation coefficients between outcomes from the survey study and Experiments 1, 2 and 3.

with the survey data. Numerically, rank correlation coefficients are lower than the price correlation coefficients.

It is also interesting to quantify the association between experiments and the survey by noting their average absolute difference in the predicted market share. The difference between experiments  $a$  and  $b$  is computed as follows:

$$\Delta MS = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N |MS_i^a - MS_i^b|$$

The average absolute differences of predicted market share based on VWAP are presented in Table 5. The differences between individual experiments are smaller than those between an experiment and the

	Exp 1	Exp 2	Exp 3
Survey	6.1%	5.5%	6.8%
Exp 2		1.3%	1.4%
Exp 3			1.8%

Table 5: Average absolute difference in predicted market share between an experiment and the survey, and between two experiments.

survey study.

The results from our experiments show a remarkable agreement with those from the survey study despite many fundamental differences between the two methods. These differences include the differences in the data collection mechanism (a virtual security market versus a virtual shopping experience), the modeling of the predicted market share (the use of relative market capitalization of the virtual securities versus conjoint analysis), the questions asked (what you prefer versus what the group prefers), and lastly the subject population (MIT students versus Stanford students).

## 6 Conclusions

In this paper we study a novel application of the market mechanism: the use of market to aggregate diverse consumer preferences. The idea is tested on a product concept testing study that aims to predict potential market share for some product prototypes. The results from three market experiments show high consistency among themselves and significant correlation with an independent survey study. Furthermore, an equilibrium model and two computer simulations are presented to provide some insights into how such a virtual market may successfully aggregate the desired information.

Keynes (1958) wrote about the similarities between stock selection and a beauty contest:

*“... professional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitor as a whole ...”*

The analogy is perhaps more accurate for describing what happens in the stock market in the short run. After all, stock prices depend not only on investors' subjective beliefs or expectations, but also on other objective information such as companies earning potential and valuations of assets. On the other hand, the trading experiments presented in this paper are precisely "beauty contests," since values of the virtual securities are derived endogenously from the expectations of the market participants, which are largely subjective. To improve the reliability of these virtual markets, one may need to anchor the values of the securities to some objective fundamental variables of the corresponding products. To predict future market shares, for example, one could link security values with the realized market shares of the corresponding products.

## A A Theoretical Market Equilibrium

In this section, we attempt to provide an example of an equilibrium for a market that aggregates diverse beliefs of a group of agents. Consider a portfolio selection problem faced by an agent in a two-period economy with one risk-free and one risky security. The risk-free security yields no return. It serves as a numeraire security with price equal to 1. The payoff of the risky security depends on the state of the economy in period two. Let us consider the risk-free security as cash and the risky security as a stock. There are two possible states of the economy, a bad state and a good state. The stock pays 1 and 0 in the good state and bad state respectively. The futures contracts traded in the Iowa Electronic Market are examples of such a security.<sup>8</sup> All agents in the economy have identical preferences and are provided with identical initial endowment. This is a typical portfolio selection problem in which agents choose the optimal allocation of cash and stock in period one in order to maximize their expected utility in period two. The essence of the problem is that they may have different beliefs about what will happen in period two.

Specifically, there are  $N$  agents in the economy, all possess an initial endowment of  $w$  unit of cash in period 1. Agent  $i$  believes that the probability of the good state is  $\theta_i$  and that of the bad state is  $1 - \theta_i$ .

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<sup>8</sup>For example, the Republican President contract will pay \$1 if the Republican nominee is elected president.

It must choose  $x_i$ , the number of shares of the risky asset to own. The stock is traded in the market with a price  $p$ . The agent's budget constraint implies that it holds  $(w - px_i)$  unit of cash. Consequently its period-two wealth is  $\tilde{w}_i = (w - px_i) + \tilde{p}x_i$ , where  $\tilde{p}$  is the period-two price for the risky security, which equals to 1 in the good state and 0 in the bad state. The agent maximizes its expected period-two utility subject to  $x_i$ , according to their beliefs:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{x_i} \quad & E[U(\tilde{w})] \Rightarrow \\ \max_{x_i} \quad & \theta_i U((w - px_i) + x_i) + (1 - \theta_i) U(w - px_i) . \end{aligned}$$

Now assume that all agents have a log utility function:  $U(w) = \log(w)$ . The demand of agent  $i$  can be derived from the first order condition of its optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \theta_i \frac{1-p}{w + x_i(1-p)} + (1-\theta_i) \frac{-p}{w - x_i p} &= 0, \\ x_i &= \frac{w(\theta_i - p)}{p(1-p)} . \end{aligned}$$

Agents may hold a long or short position in the risky security, i.e.  $x_i$  may be positive or negative. At equilibrium, the total demand in the market must be equal to zero. The market price in period one is derived by imposing this market clearing condition:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^N x_i &= 0 \Leftrightarrow \\ p^* &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \theta_i . \end{aligned}$$

With this particular set-up of the problem, the market price is the average of individuals' beliefs. Note that other equilibria may result under different assumptions. Pennock & Wellman (1997) studies a similar problem with agents that have a negative exponential utility function,  $U(w) = -e^{-cw}$ , where  $c$



is the risk aversion coefficient. In its one-security case, the equilibrium price is found to be

$$p = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^N \theta_i^{c'_i}}{\prod_{i=1}^N \theta_i^{c'_i} + \prod_{i=1}^N (1 - \theta_i)^{c'_i}} ,$$

where  $c'_i$  is a function of an agent's risk aversion coefficient.

## B Simulations with Artificial Agents

The equilibrium model presented in Appendix A exemplifies how a market equilibrium can be derived from individual beliefs. However, questions about how such equilibria are attained remain unanswered. Characterizations of the learning dynamics in an experimental market are typically very challenging. To gain some insights on the price dynamics and agent trading strategies, we turn to computer simulations. Similar to the presentation of the equilibrium model in Appendix A, we aim to demonstrate one possibility of how a market can successfully aggregate diverse beliefs, but not to offer an explanation for the observations from our market experiments.

One way to specify an agent's behavior is to directly model its demand given the market price. Suppose the belief of agent  $i$  can be characterized by a “fair” price,  $r_i$ . For example, in the two-security economy in Appendix A, for a risk-neutral agent<sup>9</sup>, the expected price given its belief can be considered as a fair price to the agent:

$$r_i = E[\tilde{p}|\theta_i] = \theta_i(1) + (1 - \theta_i)(0) = \theta_i .$$

Given the fair price and market price,  $p$ , one can construct a linear demand function,

$$x_i(p) = \beta_i(r_i - p),$$

where  $\beta_i$  is the price elasticity controlling the sensitivity of demand to price deviation from the fair

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<sup>9</sup>A risk-neutral agent has a utility function  $U(w) = w$ .

value. With this linear demand function, an agent would buy or sell  $\beta_i$  shares of the security for each unit of the price difference,  $(r_i - p)$ . Assuming all agents follow this linear demand function, imposing the market clearing condition, the equilibrium price is the average of all fair prices:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^N x_i &= 0 \Rightarrow \\ p^* &= \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N r_i . \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

Depending on the form of the demand function, some other equilibria may exist. Figure 5a shows an example of a piece-wise linear demand function that describes the short term demand of a agent. The upward-sloping portions of the curve seem to defy the law of demand. The rationale behind such a demand function is that when the market price is within a certain range from the agent's fair price ( $r - 1 \leq p \leq r + 1$ ), it buys if the market price is lower than its fair price and sells otherwise; when the market price deviates too much from its fair price, the agent may lose faith in its belief and begin to close its position: selling on decreasing price ( $r - 2 \leq p \leq r - 1$ ) and buying on increasing price ( $r + 1 \leq p \leq r + 2$ ). Given such a piece-wise demand function, *multiple* equilibrium prices may result. Consider the total demand from two agents with fair prices  $r_1$  and  $r_2$ . As shown in Figure 5b, the market clears in multiple price ranges:  $p \leq r_1 - 2$ ,  $p = r_1$ ,  $r_1 + 2 \leq p \leq r_2 - 2$ ,  $p = r_2$ , and  $p \geq r_2 + 2$ .

Consider a simulated market in which there is one single security in the market. Each artificial agent forms a belief about the fair price ( $r_i$ ) of the security at the beginning of a market, then follows a linear demand  $x_i(p) = \beta_i(r_i - p)$ . Following from Equation 1, we consider the equilibrium price  $p^* = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N r_i$  as the benchmark price for a market with  $N$  artificial agents with fair prices  $r_i$ 's.

We further impose that an agent trades only one share in one transaction. From its demand function, one can derive that the agent would buy one share when  $p \leq r_i - 1/\beta_i$  and sell one share when  $p \geq r_i + 1/\beta_i$ . Equivalently, one can consider the prices  $b_i = r_i - 1/\beta_i$  and  $a_i = r_i + 1/\beta_i$  as the agent's bid and ask prices respectively. All agents submit orders according to the procedure described in Table 6, given their bid and ask prices. All agents are provided with an equal amount of cash. No borrowing is permitted so the total demand for the stock is bounded. The trading mechanism is a simplified double-




Figure 5a: An example of a non-linear demand function.




Figure 5b: The total demand in the market with two agents with fair prices  $r_1$  and  $r_2$ . the market clears in multiple price ranges:  $p \leq r_1 - 2$ ,  $p = r_1$ ,  $r_1 + 2 \leq p \leq r_2 - 2$ ,  $p = r_2$ , and  $p \geq r_2 + 2$ .

Scenario	Action
<i>existing bid, existing ask</i>	
$b_i \geq a$	buy at market
$a_i \leq b$	sell at market
$b_i > b$	post a bid $b_i$
$a_i < a$	post an ask $a_i$
<i>no bid, existing ask</i>	
$b_i \geq a$	buy at market
$a_i > a$	post a bid $b_i$
otherwise	post a bid $b_i$ and an ask $a_i$
<i>existing bid, no ask</i>	
$a_i \leq b$	sell at market
$b_i < b$	post an ask $a_i$
otherwise	post a bid $b_i$ and an ask $b_i$
<i>no bid, no ask</i>	
all cases	post a bid $b_i$ and an ask $a_i$

Table 6: The order submission algorithm of the trading agents, where  $a_i = r_i + 1/\beta_i$  denotes the ask price by agent  $i$ ,  $b_i = r_i - 1/\beta_i$  the bid price by agent  $i$ ,  $a$  the best ask price and  $b$  the best bid price in the market.

auction market. Agents can submit a bid and/or an ask, or accept a posted bid or ask. If there is an existing bid for the stock, any subsequent bid must be higher than the current bid. Similarly, on the sell side, a subsequent ask must be lower than the current ask. A transaction occurs when an existing bid or ask is accepted (a market order matches with a limit order).

The computer simulations feature two types of agents. One firmly believes in their beliefs and maintains them throughout the course of the market. Let us call these static agents. The other (adaptive agents) attempts to update their beliefs by making observations of the market. We consider a simple heuristic with which the adaptive agents “learn” from the consensus of the population. In particular, it updates its fair price using the observed market price  $p$ :

$$r_i \leftarrow r_i + \alpha_i(p - r_i) ,$$

where  $\alpha_i$  is the learning rate of the agent, dictating how rapidly belief updates take place. The rationale behind this updating rule is that if a large number of transactions occur at price  $p$ ,  $r_i$  will converge to

the market price  $p$ . If  $p$  is the population average price, this update rule will eventually make all fair prices converge to the population mean.

Do prices fully reflect all available information—individuals’ diverse beliefs on the values of the securities? In all simulations, we focus on the efficiency of the market in terms of whether or how close the price converges to the benchmark equilibrium as described in Equation 1. The role and impact of learning are the other issues that we are interested in.

To quantify the performance of the markets, we focus on three statistics of the price: the mean price, median price and closing price. Given a price statistic  $s_t^p$  for trial  $t$ , we compute its average price deviation from the benchmark equilibrium price in  $T$  trials of a market:

$$\Delta_{s^p} = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T |s_t^p - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N r_i| .$$

In addition, we study the standard deviation of agents’ beliefs or fair prices at the end of the market session. This variable measures how much disagreement exists among all agents.

We conduct two computer simulations, each consisting of a series of markets. Each market is characterized by parameters such as the composition of the agents (static versus adaptive) and the learning rate of the agent population. We run each market 1000 times or epochs to get average measures of the market performance. A typical epoch of a simulated market consists of 2000 trading intervals. At each trading interval, an agent is chosen randomly from the population to submit an order. Before the beginning of a market, all agents are provided with 5 units of cash and 10 shares of stock. Agents’ beliefs are assigned in the form of a fair price  $r_i$ . The fair prices  $r_i$ ’s are drawn randomly from a uniform  $[0, 1]$  distribution. The following describes the details of the simulations.

- **Simulation 1:** In this simulation, we study the effect of the learning rate on the performance of a market. There are 20 adaptive learning agents, each with an identical learning rate, in all markets. Each market differs by the learning rate of the agent population.
- **Simulation 2:** Markets in this simulation are characterized by the composition of the agent population. There are 20 static agents and 0 adaptive agent in market 1, 19 static agents and 1

adaptive agent in market 2 and so on. Eventually in market 21, there are 0 static agent and 20 adaptive agents. All adaptive agents have a learning rate of 0.01. By varying the composition of agents, we investigate the performance of the market with populations that have heterogeneous learning capabilities.

Figure 6a shows typical realizations of four markets in Simulation 1, with the learning rate  $\alpha$  equal to 0.00, 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. One can observe that market price converges to the neighborhood of the equilibrium price for small learning rates. If the agents learn too fast, the market may converge to an arbitrary price, as in the case when  $\alpha = 0.1$ . As expected, the speed of convergence is proportional to the learning rate. Figure 6b shows the price deviations from the equilibrium price for the mean, median and closing price in markets with different  $\alpha$ 's. Measured by the mean price, markets with low  $\alpha$  values ( $[0.005, 0.015]$ ) converge close to the equilibrium price. At higher learning rates, the median and close prices give relatively smaller price deviations. When there is no learning or when learning is slow, the mean price is a more robust measure for the consensus of the market. As  $\alpha$  keeps increasing, convergence in the markets deteriorates on all three measures, implying that if the agents adapt to market consensus too rapidly, the overall market would diverge from the equilibrium. Another evidence of learning in the markets is shown in Figure 6c. The standard deviation of the agents' beliefs decreases with the learning rate, indicating that the difference in agents' beliefs diminishes as they approach a market consensus.

Results from Simulation 2 show that the market efficiency improves with an increasing number of adaptive agents, given an appropriate learning rate ( $\alpha = 0.01$  in this case). Furthermore, the mean price is much more robust in measuring market consensus than the median and closing prices for markets with a heterogeneous agent population (see Figures 7a and 7b).

The study of agent simulations provides some insights into how a market aggregates diverse beliefs. The implications of these simulations are as follows: (1) learning in a market facilitates its convergence to the market consensus; (2) when learning occurs too rapidly, market price may diverge from the market consensus; (3) mean price is a more robust measure of the market consensus and the closing price does not always converge to an equilibrium price. However, one has to be cautious about the




Figure 6a: Typical realizations of markets in Simulation 1 with the learning rate  $\alpha = 0.00, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1$ .




Figure 6b: Deviations of mean, median and closing prices from the equilibrium price for markets with agents with different learning rates in Simulation 1.




Figure 6c: Standard deviation of agents' beliefs at the end of the markets in Simulation 1.






Figure 7a: Deviations of mean, median and close prices from the equilibrium price for markets with different numbers of adaptive learning agents in Simulation 2.




Figure 7b: Standard deviation of agents' beliefs at the end of the markets with different numbers of adaptive learning agents in Simulation 2.

limitation of such studies. Significant assumptions have to be made about the form of beliefs, the functional form of demand functions, the trading strategies, and the updating of beliefs. For example, a demand function may not necessarily be in a simple linear form, and there may exist multiple equilibria in a single market; or agents may not always update their beliefs using a constant learning rate.

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