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**COMPLEMENTARITY AND COST REDUCTION:
EVIDENCE FROM THE AUTO SUPPLY INDUSTRY**

Susan Helper

Complementarity and Cost Reduction: Evidence from the Auto Supply Industry

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Susan Helper
Department of Economics
Case Western Reserve University
Cleveland, Ohio, 44106
E-mail: sxh23@po.cwru
Phone: (216) 368-5541

Abstract: Over the last 20 years, the success of Japanese manufacturing firms has brought renewed attention to the importance of cost reduction on existing products as a source of productivity growth. This paper uses survey data and field interviews from the auto supply industry to explore the determinants of average-cost reduction for a sample of 171 plants in the United States and Canada between 1988 and 1992. The main result is that the determinants of cost reduction differ markedly between firms which had employee involvement programs in 1988 and firms that did not. The two groups of firms achieved equal amounts of cost reduction, but did so in very different ways. Firms with employee involvement saw their costs fall more if they also had "voice" relationships with customers and workers. Firms without such involvement gained no cost-reduction benefit from these programs; instead, their cost reduction success was largely a function of increases in volume. These results provide support for Milgrom and Roberts's concept that certain production practices exhibit complementarity.

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I. Introduction

In the 1960s, Samuel Hollander found that DuPont's incremental improvements to its production process for rayon had led to consistent decreases in standard costs of almost four percent per year for two decades. This "minor technical change" accounted for more than 70% of all cost reduction achieved by DuPont's operations during that time (Hollander, 1965, pp. 192-6). Despite the magnitude of this result, economists in recent years have neglected the study of the determinants of incremental improvements.¹

In manufacturing, by contrast, incremental improvement has been seen as a key source of competitive advantage for firms. Japanese automakers for decades have required their suppliers to reduce their costs annually by several percent--in nominal terms (Okano, 1994). Recently US automakers have adopted the idea that the prices of the components they buy from suppliers should go down every year (not up), and they have adopted a Japanese word (*kaizen* or "continuous improvement") to describe how suppliers should achieve this goal. (Ford for example announced in 1996 that suppliers should reduce costs by 5% per year through the year 2000. (Konet, 1996))

This paper uses data from the automotive supply industry to examine the sources and determinants of cost reduction. Of course cost reduction is not the only way to maximize profits. Also, cost reduction is not always due to productivity improvement, because cost reduction can be achieved by obtaining lower factor prices. However, cost reduction on an existing product has been a principal focus of many firms in the auto industry. Because the auto industry has in the US

¹Most of the large literature on the learning curve is an attempt to measure its effects rather than determine its causes. For a survey, see Dutton, Thomas, and Butler (1984). For an exception, see Adler and Clark (1991).

been at the forefront of attempts to adopt Japanese practices such as kaizen, an understanding of this industry may well provide broader lessons. In addition, US suppliers are participants (willing or not) in a natural experiment, as General Motors aggressively seeks cost reduction by setting up a global competitive market, while Ford and Chrysler are trying to attain the same goal by making long-term commitments to a few firms (Helper, 1994; Dyer, 1996).

The next section of the paper uses field research to describe two approaches to cost reduction. Section 3 describes the survey data used to test the determinants of cost reduction. Section 4 presents hypotheses, and section 5 presents results from estimating this model for the period 1988 - 1992. Section 6 provides discussion, and section 7 concludes.

The focus of this paper is on the how the nature of incentives affects agents' willingness to participate in cost reduction activities. In contrast, a series of excellent case studies on the mechanisms by which cost reduction and process improvement can be achieved has been produced by Marcie Tyre² and by John Paul MacDuffie (forthcoming). These papers focus on issues of implementation, such as achieving the right balance between isolating improvement activities from day-to-day production pressures and removing a sense of urgency.

Data for this paper come from two sources. The first is interviews with a variety of participants in the automobile industry over the past 12 years; these interviews were conducted as part of ongoing research on how supplier/customer relations affect performance in the US auto industry. The second source is two surveys I conducted of managers at auto supply firms in 1993.

II. Types of Approaches to Cost Reduction

A. The traditional approach

²See for example Tyre, 1991; von Hippel and Tyre; Tyre and Orlikowski.

The traditional recipe for reducing costs in American business has been based on 1) emphasis on adopting high-fixed cost production processes which can be profitable only if capacity utilization is kept high, and 2) using arms'-length markets for inputs. For much of this century, this strategy proved extremely successful in both reducing costs and maintaining high profits.³

This strategy is quite common among US auto suppliers. Below are two examples from my field research.⁴ The first is a firm located in Wellington, Ohio. A large part of this firm's operation involves putting anti-corrosion and other types of coatings onto fasteners used in automotive engines. Many of the parts require that a thin strip of coating be placed in a precise location. The firm's competitive advantage is that it has figured out how to use tumblers (big bowls of parts which are jiggled by an electric motor underneath) to orient the small parts so that the coating can be applied by machine rather than by hand. The operators' job is to watch the parts coming out of the machine, to remove any that are defective, and to call a skilled maintenance worker if the machine stops running. In practice, the operator can't check every part, because the parts come off of the machine very quickly (and also the work quickly induces boredom, as could readily be observed on the operators' faces). If quality is very important (as in

³On the achievement of economies of scale and of throughput, see Chandler (1977). On use of arms'-length input markets for labor, see Lazonick (1989); for parts supply, see Helper (1991). For a critique of these practices, see Piore and Sabel (1984).

⁴ This paper discusses production by automotive parts suppliers, not automotive assemblers. Parts suppliers typically make a large variety of parts. Thus, they have been slow to adopt a key tenet of 'Fordist' practice, which is to create an assembly line where the product flows from one station to another one unit at a time, rather than grouping machines by function and having them produce in batches. Thus while both assemblers and parts makers seek economies of scale, parts makers have traditionally produced in large batches, carrying a lot of work-in-process inventory and having long throughput times.

an airbag part, for example), extra inspectors are added (which of course adds to the cost).

The operators are paid \$8 per hour, about the average for the area; they receive no training (other than watching someone else do the job for a brief time). They are not expected to contribute suggestions for improvement, and typically do not stay more than a year or two.⁵

The main source of reduced costs was the result of engineers figuring out how to automate the coating of ever trickier parts. In one case we observed, engineers were trying to figure out how to automate the coating of a part which was almost, but not quite, symmetric. They were working on special feeder trays, and talking about machine vision systems, but had not asked the customer if it would be possible to change the design of the part to make it easier to orient. When asked why they hadn't discussed the matter with the customer, they said they didn't think the customer would be interested, because other coaters wouldn't have the same process. (In most cases, the coating firm doesn't receive any contracts for its work; when it receives a batch of parts from a customer, there is no guarantee that the customer will send another one.) Purchasing a machine vision system would have been a substantial addition to the firm's fixed costs, so it would increase the firm's breakeven point and the extent to which its cost function is characterized by economies of scale. In contrast, a firm having the 'voice' relationship with its customer discussed below might have been able to solve the problem more cheaply, by discussing whether the part could be redesigned to fit with the existing process.

A second example is a firm which made printed circuit boards for the auto industry. This firm brought in a consulting firm to facilitate a comprehensive review of their manufacturing

⁵At the time of my visit in July 1996, some of these features were in the process of being changed. For example, management was introducing a system of individual evaluation of workers, in which points were given for number of jobs learned and suggestions made.

operations. Following an established, proprietary methodology developed about ten years ago, the consulting firm established a goal of reducing “compressible” costs (those the plant had some control over) by 40%. (The 40% goal is a standard one for this process; in this case it worked out to be a reduction of about 15% of average total cost over an 18-month period (six months for planning a list of improvements and 1 year for implementation)).

The consultants worked with a team of engineers and supervisors from the plant to rethink the entire process. To overcome any resistance to change, the consultants also set up a committee of higher-level managers within the company to challenge those who said it couldn't be done. “A key part of the process is fear”, said one of the consultants involved in the process. “Everybody will know which guy didn't get his 40%. Who do you think will get promoted, and who will get laid off? That fear is key to getting people to stop protecting each other.” The firm's customers were not involved in this cost reduction effort.

The project is well on its way to achieving its goal. The key was a change in the way the boards were assembled. In the original process, a short screw was inserted into the board, the board was then turned over, and another short screw was inserted. This process had a cycle time of 24 seconds. The team came up with a new method, in which a single long screw was inserted, eliminating the need for flipping the board over. The cycle time was reduced to 18 seconds; since this was the bottleneck, the output per hour of the entire process also increased by one-third. This meant that machines and workers in other stages of the process could be utilized at a higher capacity, and so eliminated the need for an entire third shift, saving millions of dollars per year. This idea came from a shift supervisor in conjunction with some engineers.

These firms illustrate the key features of what I've called the “traditional” production

system. Both firms aimed to a large extent to keep their machines running at all times, to spread their fixed costs over many units.⁶ Because of fear of dependence, relationships with both workers and customers were arm's length; little commitment was received from customers, and little was offered to workers. In fact, as the consultant's quote indicates, commitments to workers were seen as inimical to cost reduction, since they would make it difficult to lay off workers freed up by the improvement process. (As a consequence, participation of workers in generating ideas for such improvements was minimal.) The firms received little commitment from their customers, who worried that making a commitment to an input provider left them vulnerable to a costly 'hold-up', due to their high fixed costs (Helper and Levine, 1992).

This traditional practice has come under heavy criticism in the last 15 years⁷. These critics argued that because the automated equipment is only profitable if its large fixed costs can be spread over many identical units, companies were led to ignore customer preferences for variety and quality in their quest to "get the metal out the door". Further, in their desire to avoid

⁶Such is the power of this logic that the rule is observed even at plants like the fastener operation described above, where equipment costs are less than 10% of total costs. According to management, workers at this plant could stop the line, but rarely did. What we observed in the plant was that when worker found defects, they threw them away, and made no attempt to determine the cause of the problem. In contrast, in the voice system, a worker would stop production until the cause of the problem had been determined and corrected.

An extreme (though not uncommon at the time) observance of the rule that the line should not be stopped was experienced by Michael Smitka, now an economist at Washington and Lee University, who was a summer employee in a Chrysler parts plant in the 1970s. Early one day one of the machines went out of alignment, and started punching holes in the wrong place. It happened that the plant manager and his assistant were out of the plant that day. Since they were the only two people with the authority to stop the line, everyone (several hundred employees) had to continue working even though they knew everything they produced for the next eight hours would have to be scrapped.

⁷Two books that were particularly influential in the automotive industry were Schonberger (1984) and Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990).

dependence, firms cut themselves off from valuable sources of new ideas from customers, suppliers, and workers.⁸

B. The Voice Approach

Instead of following the traditional approach, these critics suggest, firms should adopt what following Hirschman (1970) could be called a "voice" approach. That is, when a problem such as high cost or low quality arises, firms try to resolve the problem by communicating with suppliers and workers, rather than exiting from them. These relationships have been shown to lead to significant performance improvements in areas such as product development productivity and lead time (Clark, 1989; Dyer, forthcoming), product quality (Dyer, forthcoming), and inventory levels (Lieberman, Helper, and Demeester, 1995).

However, these suggestions may be based on proprietary information, and achieving the high levels of information flow characteristic of these participative arrangements requires high levels of relationship-specific investment by both sides.⁹ A supplier will not make such

⁸Despite these criticisms, many automotive suppliers, including General Motors' parts-making divisions, continue to emphasize volume increases as the main source of cost reduction. "The only way to really get your costs in line is to take advantage of global volume opportunities," said GM Chairman Jack Smith. In a 2 1/2 tabloid-page article in *Automotive News* about GM's plans to cut costs, the only other initiative mentioned was a reduction in product variety, which again reduces average cost by spreading (given) fixed costs over more units. GM's plan did not include establishing closer relations between its parts plants and its assembly plants to generate cost-saving ideas, or similar discussions with workers. GM lost \$1.2 billion last year due to strikes by its workers, mostly at parts plants where GM wanted to reduce costs by outsourcing work to lower-wage firms (Child, 1997, p.25; Taylor, 1997, p.96).

⁹Even if the skills are generally applicable ex ante, they may still be what Williamson calls "dedicated assets", which are "discrete additions to generalized capacity which would not be put in place but for the prospect of selling a large amount of product to a particular customer. Premature termination of the contract by the buyer would leave the supplier with a large overhang of capacity that could be disposed of only at distress prices." (1985, p.194)

investments without some assurance that it will continue to have the business long enough to earn a reasonable return. In addition, intensive communication over the course of a long-term relationship means that the parties come to understand each other's products and processes very well, leading to a high cost of switching business partners. Thus, a voice relationship with suppliers reduces the customer's bargaining power (Helper and Levine, 1992).

The suppliers have been reluctant to offer commitments to their work forces for the same reasons that their customers (the Big Three automakers) have wanted to maintain flexibility. Yet without such guarantees, workers may be unwilling to actively participate in making suggestions, particularly when it may make the suggestor's continued services unnecessary (Parkin, 1996, Parkin and Helper, 1995).

An example of a firm which is struggling to adopt a voice approach to production is the Industrial Strainer Corporation, an 80-employee firm located in Plymouth, Michigan. The firm designs, produces and assembles stamped parts for the automotive industry. The firm was founded in 1959, when survival in the auto industry was based on ability to be the low bidder in stamping simple parts to the automakers' blueprints. Because of the ever-present threat of loss of business, it was important to keep overhead (such as engineers) low. When the automakers' strategies changed in the 1980s, the firm managed to survive by investing in more design capability, including a 3-D CAD (Computer-Aided Design) system in 1990. (The firm's owners were willing to devote a substantial proportion of retained earnings to the project due to contracts from Ford which lasted the life of the car model.) Eighty percent of the firm's business was with

Ford in 1996, and half of that was on just one product, an oil separator for the Escort¹⁰.

In 1994, Ford made a big push to teach its suppliers, including Industrial Strainer, *kaizen* techniques. The process involved analyzing the workload of each operator, and brainstorming ways to eliminate waste (such as time spent walking between machines), and better balance the workload (so one operator was not idle while others worked). An example of a successful *kaizen* was on the finishing process of the previous generation of Escort oil separators (the 22080 part). Nine employees from different areas of the company (including the chief steward of the UAW local, and the quality engineer) worked for four days on the cross functional *kaizen* team. On the first two days, two Ford engineers taught a continuous improvement class in Industrial Strainer's conference room. The team spent the next two days improving their processes under the guidance of the Ford engineers. The operators made important contributions to the process. For example, one idea for moving the machines closer together was to turn the line 90°; However, the forklift driver on the team pointed out that this would partially block an aisle and create problems for forklift traffic. Another operator suggested that one of the workers on the oil separator line had enough time to do a job (placing a cap on a grommet) which had been done as a separate process; her suggestion thus both increased productivity and reduced inventory, since the subassemblies were not created until they were needed.

By the end of the week, the number of employees required to do the process had been reduced from four to three. The main sources of improvement were 1) moving machines into a U-shape so that an employee could work on a second machine while waiting for the first to

¹⁰Oil separators decrease the amount of oil that an engine burns by separating it from other gasses emitted by the engine and recirculating the oil back into the engine.

complete its task, and 2) equalizing the time required to do each job (better line balance).

A need identified during the kaizen process and addressed a few weeks later was for ergonomic improvements. (An expert in this area from the UAW national office provided specialized expertise often unavailable to a small firm; "she was wonderful--we never could have done this without her," said the manufacturing vice president.) The shop had always used large, cardboard packing crates that were heavy and difficult to move. Storage design meant employees had to reach over their heads to load parts into the crates. The crates weren't meeting customer needs either because they were troublesome to empty and created a large amount of cardboard waste. After a kaizen activity, Industrial Strainer switched to returnable crates made from corrugated plastic that are smaller, lighter, and easier to handle. Now, there are also new tables that raise, lower, and rotate to prevent employees from bending and stretching when handling parts. The benefits of the investment are increased productivity, reduced injuries (which saves money), and reduced packaging costs for both Industrial Strainer and Ford. Quality also improved, because of reduced damage to parts while they were sitting in inventory.

The kaizen process cost 36 person-days of effort and 2 lift tables (costing at most \$8000), and yielded savings of one employee for one year (when the part was redesigned)--about \$30,000. Despite the clear payoff to the group improvement efforts, it was hard for management to find the time to spare engineers from routine production pressures.¹¹ For example, at the time of my first visit to the firm in May 1996, they were changing over to make a slightly redesigned oil separator

¹¹As the shop steward put it, "I wish continuous improvement around here were really continuous. Instead, it just seems to fizzle."

for the 1997 model Escort¹². They were using 10 people to do the assembly, rather than the four that had been assumed when they quoted their price to Ford. (From watching the process it seemed that two of the extra people were not really necessary even for the current layout of the process. Instead, their presence was probably due to management's desire not to lay anyone off, even though the firm had just lost a large order for Ford's F-150 truck (the part had been designed out of the new model).) I was told that they had named a team to work on the new oil separator, but the team had still not met four months later.

In contrast to the workers at the coating plant described above, Industrial Strainer employees felt that the company had made a commitment to them. The average operator at Industrial Strainer had 19.5 years of seniority, and was paid about \$12 per hour, slightly above the prevailing wage for the area. Because of their long tenure, and extensive job rotation, the workers were familiar with their jobs, and understood how the processes fit together.¹³ In addition to the group improvement processes, of which there have been 3 since 1994, any employee can make suggestions by filling out a form which is posted on a wall in the plant. Last year there were

¹²The fact that the kaizen team's application of the kaizen principles depends crucially on the detailed design of the product (even a slight change in product specifications such as the one described above led to big changes in the assembly process) and on the machinery which the firm already has in place suggests that this type of technical change is not non-rival in any meaningful sense. Even if the "recipe for mixing inputs together" (Romer, 1990) could be easily shared (making the kaizen results non-excludable as well), who would be interested? Even a rival making the same product would be using different equipment or have a different configuration of factory floor space available. It seems to me that the market failure involved in this sort of technical change does not have to do with the nature of the output ("the recipe") but rather the relationship-specific investments necessary to generate the recipe. (On the concept of relationship-specific investments and skills, see Asanuma (1989).)

¹³Getting would-be improvers (whether they are operators or engineers) to understand in detail how each job fits with the others in a line is key to a successful process (MacDuffie, forthcoming; von Hippel and Tyre; Aoki, 1990, p.11).

about 170 cost-saving suggestions submitted by employees, even though there were no special rewards for employees who did so.

Key to the workers' active participation in the activities described above was management's commitment that no one would be laid off as a result of productivity improvement. Even though layoffs had been quite rare in the past, the union shop steward reported that there had been "a lot of fear" in the plant when the idea of continuous improvement was first presented; she had spent a great deal of time obtaining assurances from management and communicating them to her members. Thus, Ford's intervention helped Industrial Strainer's human resource policies become complementary: the suggestion program and the labor-management committee were more effective in eliciting workers' ideas because they were accompanied by safeguards of a no-layoff for productivity pledge and an efficiency wage.¹⁴

Industrial Strainer had long had paternalistic wage and layoff policies. However, employees weren't used to having much of a say in production decisions, so the workers' experience and good will went largely untapped. Ford's involvement with Industrial Strainer was key to changing this, because the automaker's training program both showed the company how to organize employee involvement and forced the company to concentrate on improvement activities which otherwise always seemed to get pushed aside by pressures for immediate production.¹⁵ On the other hand, Ford's training program would not have been so successful had workers not had the skill or inclination to participate. Thus, we see evidence of complementarity (Milgrom and

¹⁴See Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (forthcoming) for a discussion of complementarity in human resource practices.

¹⁵On the importance of some degree of insulation from production pressures of people doing incremental improvements, see Tyre (1991).

Roberts (1992)): worker voice and supplier voice are more effective when used together.¹⁶

These improvement processes also had the impact of making the firm's breakeven point lower than that of a firm making similar products using a traditional production process. U-shaped lines and cross-trained workers meant the firm could vary labor input for a particular product according to demand. (For example, if demand for the oil separator were to fall, one person could assemble the whole part herself.)

In addition, the firm gained access to expertise without having to make a lumpy investment in specialists. That is, the cost reduction process at Industrial Strainer depended heavily on voice relations with its workers and its principal customer. These relationships gave parties with many different types of experience with the product the incentive and the capability to make suggestions for improvement, rather than turning the problem over to specialists (Aoki, 1990). Because these programs improve quality by improving the process (rather than by adding inspectors) there is not necessarily a cost-quality tradeoff.

C. Discussion

From the above discussion, it appears that firms in the US auto parts sector have used two different models of cost reduction in the last decade: the traditional approach and the voice approach. These models highlight different factors as important for good performance. To clarify this, it is perhaps useful to put these approaches in the context of cost functions. The traditional approach implies:

$$1) AC = AC(Q, W, D, T),$$

¹⁶See Helper and Levine (1992) for other examples of complementarity between supplier and worker participation: benefits of a long chain of communication, more effective just-in-time production, and economies of joint implementation of the two sets of policies.

where AC is average cost per non-defective part, Q is quantity of output, W is a vector of factor costs, D is the defect rate, and T controls for the technology used to make the product. Totally differentiating, we find the change in average cost with respect to time, t:

$$2) \frac{dAC}{dt} = AC'(Q) * \frac{dQ}{dt} - AC'(W) * \frac{dW}{dt} - AC'(D) * \frac{dD}{dt} - AC'(T) * \frac{dT}{dt}$$

I hypothesize that in the traditional model $AC'(Q) < 0$ for some part of its range, $AC'(W) > 0$, and $AC'(D) > 0$ (there is a quality-cost tradeoff). I interpret the last term of (2) as the degree of technological opportunity for cost reduction afforded by the product. If the technology is very mature, then it will be more difficult to think of cost-reducing modifications to the production process that haven't already been tried.

In contrast, the voice model can be written as follows:

$$3) AC = AC(W, \int V(\int W, \int I^I), T),$$

where $\int V$ indicates the cumulative amount of voice which has been used with factor I, which is a function of I's cumulative wage, and of the amount of information which has been exchanged by the parties.¹⁷ Totally differentiating gives:

$$4) \frac{dAC}{dt} = AC'(W) * \frac{dW}{dt} - AC'(\int V) * \int V'(\int W) W - AC'(\int V) * \int V'(\int T) I - AC'(T) * \frac{dT}{dt}$$

As in the traditional model technological opportunity for cost reduction should continue to affect opportunities for cost reduction, and the direct effect of an increase in factor prices should still be to increase costs. However, as discussed above, the average cost of producing a product is not

¹⁷By $\int V$, I mean the integral from t= 1 to the current period; $\int W$ has a similar interpretation. The rationale for this formulation that average cost is a function of cumulative voice is that parties learn from each other over time, and gain trust in each other. Therefore, even a constant level of communication per year between the parties will produce a change in costs over time.

particularly dependent the quantity produced of that product¹⁸. Also, moderate increase in the factor price might *reduce* costs by improving the use of voice in the relationship. (This could be done either by increasing the current price, or the total expected revenue stream by increasing commitment to suppliers or workers.) As shown in the Industrial Strainer case, the rationale would be both that the increased expected payment leads to both more investment (as in the CAD purchase made possible by the long-term contract with Ford), and more loyalty (as in a gift exchange (Akerlof, 1982)). As discussed above, in the voice model there is no longer a systematic relationship between quality and cost.

III. Data

The data come from two surveys of automotive suppliers I conducted in spring and summer 1993.¹⁹ The first survey was sent to the divisional director of sales and marketing at automotive suppliers in the United States and Canada.²⁰ The focus of this survey was information about relationships with customers, and product characteristics. The second survey was sent to plant managers, and asked about operations policies and relationships with workers. Because many companies supply their customers with several different types of products, and their relationships with their customers differ by product, respondents were asked to answer the

¹⁸ In many cases, economies of scale will continue to be present in some form even in voice-oriented firms. (Commitments to suppliers and workers may increase a firm's fixed costs, although these commitments also increase the firm's flexibility in allocating these inputs to different products.) However, to sharpen the difference between the two models of cost reduction, I will leave quantity out of the voice model.

¹⁹ Similar surveys were carried out in Europe by Mari Sako of the London School of Economics; she also carried out the sales manager survey in Japan.

²⁰ The survey was sent to the divisional business manager or director of strategic planning in the case of components divisions of vehicle manufacturers.

questionnaire for their most important customer regarding one product which was typical of their company's output and with which they were familiar.

Many of the questions were taken from an earlier survey undertaken by Helper in the United States in 1989 and a short questionnaire on trust and opportunism administered by Sako in the electronics industry in Japan and Britain in 1988-9. In addition, questionnaires were piloted at a handful of supplier companies in the USA and Japan during 1992. As a result, improvements were made to the clarity of questions and the ease of answering them. Much attention was paid to the phrasing of questions in a vocabulary familiar to managers, and to the consistency of meaning in the English and Japanese languages. For instance we asked several people to translate some questions from English to Japanese and others to translate them back from Japanese into English. The process of piloting and revision took around nine months.²¹

The sample chosen for the North American questionnaire was every automotive supplier and automaker component division named in the *Elm Guide to Automotive Sourcing* (available from Elm, Inc. in East Lansing, Michigan). This guide lists the major first-tier suppliers (both domestic and foreign-owned) to manufacturers of cars and light trucks in the United States and Canada. Each respondent who hadn't yet responded to the survey received three mailings over the course of 2 1/2 months.

The responses were far above the norm for business surveys. The response rate was 55% for the sales manager survey, and 30% for the plant manager survey.

²¹Although English-language surveys were sent to Japanese-owned suppliers in the United States, we believe that this process helped us to use language that was understood consistently by both US and Japanese managers. (About 1/3 of the surveys from these Japanese "transplants" were filled out by people with Japanese names.)

The respondents to each survey are quite representative of the population in terms of size of firm and location, as compared with data from the Elm Guide and from County Business Patterns for SICs 3714 (automotive parts) and 3496 (automotive stampings). However, vertically integrated business units of the automakers were under-represented. (The results reported below do not change if the sample is restricted to financially-independent firms.)

The analysis in this paper required data from firms which answered both the plant manager and the marketing director survey; 171 business units provided this complete data. This subsample does not differ from the full samples on the variables used in the analysis.

The respondents had a wealth of experience; they averaged more than 18 years in the automobile industry and more than 11 years with their company. One advantage of the combined sample is that it reduces common measure bias; most important, the characteristics of worker relationships and customer relationships are measured independently of each other. (The customer relationship variables are also found in the plant manager survey; these yield similar results for cost reduction as the ones in the marketing director survey.)

A second advantage of the survey is that it asks questions not only about the current year (1992) but also about four years previously. Therefore, the dataset has a semi-longitudinal character. By analyzing determinants of cost reduction between 1988 and 1992 using data which comes from 1988 or which measures the change from 1988-92, we can alleviate the problem of reverse causality.

The dependent variable is the average annual percent change in cost between 1988 and 1992 to make the product for which they answered the survey. The respondents were asked not to adjust the data for inflation. To preserve confidentiality, respondents were asked to answer the

question within ranges (e.g., did costs fall more than 10%, between 3.1 and 10%, plus or minus 3%, increase 3.1% to 9%, or increase more than 9.1% ?). Data from respondents checking the box marked 'don't know' was omitted, as were missing values.

Using cost reduction as a performance measure perhaps requires some discussion. First, it may be that firms with high cost reduction are the laggards--those who hadn't gotten around to reducing their costs before 1988. In this case, high cost reduction would be a sign of poor (not superior) performance. Looking at non-cost performance measures, there is little support for this view: The 21 % of the sample which reduced their costs more than 3% per year²² had significantly more new products, and were more likely to produce "just-in-time" (i.e., they produced in smaller batch sizes, an important ingredient in reducing lead time). There was no significant difference in number of customer awards received, or in R&D spending as a percent of sales. In addition, firms which reduced their costs more than 3% per year over the 1988-92 period were more likely to have reduced their costs by that much between 1991 and 1992. This figure provides evidence that the top cost reducers were engaged in sustained cost reduction; they hadn't done all their trimming in one big lump. On the other hand, firms which had engaged in a systematic improvement process in 1988 or before had significantly less cost reduction between 1988 and 1992. As discussed below, the explanation for this result could be either that early improvement efforts focussed on objectives other than cost reduction (such as increasing safety or reducing lead time), or that to some extent there is only one lump of cost reduction, so if it was taken out in 1988 there was less room for improvement in 1992.

²²Given inflation of about 3% per year during this period, this translates into a 6% real decrease in costs annually.

IV. Methods

Combining the insights from the case studies with the data available from the survey generates the following hypotheses about the determinants of cost reduction:

0. The determinants of cost reduction should be different for firms using the traditional model compared to firms using the voice model of production. To test this hypothesis, I split the sample according to whether or not firms had data available on suggestions received from workers in 1988.²³ (See chart 1 for variable definitions, and chart 2 for summary statistics.) The rationale for this was that if the plant manager didn't have an idea of how many suggestions had been received, then worker voice could not have been a particularly important part of the firm's operations strategy.²⁴

The hypotheses investigate the effect of five determinants of the change in average cost between 1988 and 1992: 1) changes in economies of scale between 1988 and 1992, 2) factor prices in 1988, 3) voice in 1988, 4) the relationship between cost and quality in 1992, and 5) technological opportunity for cost reduction over the period 1988-1992.

1. Changes in quantity produced. In the traditional model, an increase in quantity produced will lead to a decrease in average cost. Only about 12 million cars and light trucks were produced in North America in 1992, in comparison with 14 million in 1988 (Automotive News, 1995 p.9).

²³See section 6 for the results of using other measures of worker voice to separate the sample.

²⁴Thus, many of the firms in the suggestion group had a fairly minimal program. For firms that had any suggestions, the mean number of suggestions per worker in 1988 was 1.2 ; the maximum was 11.7. In contrast, auto assembly workers in Japan make an average of 23 suggestions per year. (Pil and MacDuffie, 1995))

Therefore, most firms were producing at well below their peak capacity, making it likely that they were in the declining portion of their average-cost curves. The measure of quantity is:

CHSALES, the percentage change in the business unit's sales to the most important automotive customer between 1988 and 1992.

2. Factor costs

2a. In the traditional approach, firms with increasing factor costs will have a greater increase in average total costs than will firms which do not experience such increases. Our measure of this variable is

CUTWAGE, the importance in the firm's manufacturing strategy in 1988 of efforts to reduce growth of wages and benefits.

2b. In the voice approach, firms which pay high relative wages will have lower costs, for efficiency wage and gift-exchange reasons. This variable is measured using

RELCOMP, the percentage by which total compensation for the firm's unskilled and semi-skilled production workers exceeds the average for equivalent workers in all industries in the plant's region.²⁵

Note that the measure of current factor costs differs between the two approaches. The rationale is that in the voice approach, wages are an important determinant of costly-to-observe effort, like suggestions. (If a worker doesn't make a suggestion, it is hard for management to know if that is because there simply was no way to improve the process, or because the worker decided not to work that hard.) Receiving higher pay relative to other workers in the area is a

²⁵This variable was available only for 1992. However, according to Groshen (1991a and b), employer wage strategies are quite stable over time.

powerful incentive to participate, due both to a greater cost of job loss if one is caught shirking, and to loyalty to the firm. In contrast, the traditional production process is designed not to require such hard-to-observe effort by workers, so the direct effect of compensation on costs outweighs the indirect effect of higher relative compensation on worker motivation to reduce costs.

2c. Measures which commit management to paying workers into the future will increase average costs in the traditional model, and reduce them in the voice model. Our measures of commitment to workers are:

NOLAYOFF, a dummy variable measuring whether or not a plant had "made a commitment to our regular work force that no layoffs will result from productivity increases" in 1988.

3. Voice with customers and workers. In the voice approach, the use of voice will lead to a greater reduction in average cost. In the traditional approach, voice will have no impact.

CUSTVOICE is one if the supplier had in 1988 a relationship with its most important automotive customer which was characterized by a) a contract at least two years, b) the supplier provides detailed information to the customer on its process steps, and c) the customer would help the supplier match a rival's price for a product of equal quality. If any one of these three conditions is not met, then **CUSTVOICE** is equal to zero.

SUGGEST, the number of suggestions per worker received in 1988.

4. Cost-quality tradeoff. Because of the need to hire technicians to analyze the sources of defects in the traditional approach, the more the firm increases its quality, the more it will see its costs increase as well. There is no such tradeoff in the voice approach, because line workers do this work in the course of their regular duties. Our measure is:

USEDATA, which is greater if the firm is more likely to use data regarding sources of defects in past production to modify its processes.

5. Technological opportunity. *Factors which affect the technical constraints underlying the production process also affect the success of cost reduction efforts.* Our measures of technological opportunity are:

IMPROVE, a dummy variable capturing whether or not the plant had gone through a systematic improvement process (such as the Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle) before 1988. If there is an easily capturable lump of cost reduction that is available to the plant only once, then capturing it early makes it unavailable later, so the effect of this variable on the change in average costs between 1988 and 1992 would be positive.

PPRICE, the price of the plant's typical product (the one for which they answered the survey). This variable is highly correlated with complexity; both indicate the scope of things which could be changed to reduce costs, so they should have a negative effect on the change in average cost.

ALUM, a dummy indicating if the product is made of aluminum or not. This variable captures the impact on cost reduction of using a material which is much less well understood than steel, the traditional material. It also reflects the impact of a change in the price of raw aluminum.²⁶

FORGE, a dummy indicating if the product was forged or not. During this period, a

²⁶Producer price indexes for aluminum fell an average of 9.6% annually between June 1988 and June 1992; in contrast, they fell only .4% for steel (which is the material used in 52% of the products made by firms in the sample.) Thanks to Barbara Good of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland for providing the price information.

technique known as near-net shape forging was diffusing throughout the industry; it significantly reduced costs by allowing the product to be forged in a shape close to its final shape, rather than the traditional technique of forging a part which is much larger than its final shape, and then machining it down (Forging Industry Association, 1992).

JAPAN, a dummy indicating if the plant is Japanese-owned or not. This variable captures two (contradictory) factors. One is that Japanese firms had more experience with the voice approach, so they should be able to apply it better, leading to more cost reduction.²⁷ On the other hand, Japanese management wanted to make sure that the product produced in its US plants was exactly the same as that produced in Japanese plants, to reduce complexity and to assure customers of continuing high quality. Unfortunately, freezing the design meant that the scope for continuous improvement was much reduced.²⁸

V. Results

The model described above was estimated using the "Grouped Data" procedure in LIMDEP. As table 3 shows, most of the hypotheses are supported. Most important, there is strong support for the hypothesis that the determinants of cost reduction are different for the voice and traditional approaches to production.

To show the difference in determinants of change in costs, we can use a form of the likelihood ratio test (described in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985, pp.171-2)) for testing non-nested

²⁷Data from the Japanese survey indicates that Japanese suppliers in Japan reduced their costs between 1988 and 1992 significantly more than did firms located in the United States. See Helper and Sako (1995).

²⁸A leading Japanese-owned firm that I visited in 1989 had so constrained itself that all that its quality circles could work on was improved packaging. For similar examples, see also Cusumano and Takeishi (1991).

hypotheses of discrete choice models.²⁹ The result of this test is that we can reject at the .01 level the hypothesis that the traditional model explains cost reduction better for the voice approach than does the voice model. We can also reject at the .01 level the hypothesis that the voice model explains cost reduction better for the traditional approach.³⁰

Looking at column one of table 3, we see that the voice hypothesis is supported for the plants with suggestions: close relations with customers leads to a significantly greater reduction in average costs. Perhaps most surprising to the traditional school is that firms which pay *higher* wages relative to their competitors have *more* cost reduction.³¹ Firms with products which are expensive or made out of aluminum also had more cost reduction. On the other hand, the hypothesis about long-term commitment to workers was not supported; firms having no-layoff policies did not have significantly different changes in costs. Also, given that a firm had a suggestion program in place, having more suggestions did not lead to more cost reduction.

Turning to the no-suggestion group (column 2), both the economies of scale and the quality/cost tradeoff hypothesis are supported. Neither of the factor cost hypotheses are supported; even in the traditional model, a willingness to lay off employees and cut wages do not produce greater cost reduction.

²⁹The test was carried out by re-estimating the equations using multinomial logit.

³⁰An alternative approach to testing for differences in models would have been to include interaction terms for those variables which are hypothesized to enter differently into the voice and traditional models. These interaction terms were not significant.

³¹Substituting RELCOMP for CUTWAGE in the traditional model did not produce significance; neither did putting in CUTWAGE instead of RELCOMP in the voice model. (Thus it is not the case that high-wage firms cut costs by cutting wages; in fact there is no correlation ($p=.9$) between RELCOMP and CUTWAGE.) Labor costs are not a big part of costs for these firms; for both groups the median is 11%.

The traditional model fares much worse for the plants with suggestions; the only significant variables are a subset of the technological opportunity variables (column 3). The sign on USEDATA becomes negative (though not significant), indicating that these plants do not face a quality-cost tradeoff. In column 4, we see that *none* of the variables in the voice model are significant in explaining change in costs for the no-suggestion group.

For both the suggestion and the non-suggestion groups, having had a formal improvement process in 1988 or before reduces the amount of cost change, suggesting either that there is a part of cost reduction that is characterized by a one-time payoff, or that early improvement processes were not focussed on reducing costs. The Japanese variable is always insignificant.

VI. Discussion

To summarize, the suggestion group achieves cost reduction primarily through information-rich relationships with customers and workers. In contrast, the no-suggestion group achieves cost reduction through volume increases, and minimizing attention to quality. That is, firms which had voice relationships with workers benefited also from voice relationships with customers. Firms that did not have voice relations with workers achieved no significant cost reduction due to voice with their customers. Conversely, firms which did not involve their workers suffered cost increases when they tried to prevent defects from occurring, presumably because they had to hire additional staff to undertake this task. In contrast, the suggestion group was able to tap into the ideas of workers and customers.

The mean average annual change in costs for both the suggestion and the non-suggestion group was the same--about .5% in nominal terms. At least for the period 1988 and 1992, firms which had a suggestion program as their only type of voice had no more cost reduction than did

firms without any voice mechanisms at all. However, firms which had both a suggestion system and voice with their customers did significantly better than firms without these mechanisms. These results are consistent with Milgrom and Roberts's (1992) argument that certain production practices are complementary with each other.³²

Given these results, one wonders why not all firms with customer voice and expensive products did not adopt a suggestion program. Similarly, one would think that customers would want to adopt voice relationships with all of their suppliers who had suggestion systems in place.³³

Alternative interpretations. An alternative interpretation is that the practices chosen by a firm's management are dictated by technology, in which case switching to another cost-reduction regime would not improve that firm's performance. However, this interpretation is not supported by the results of several sensitivity tests. First, there was little evidence that the nature of a firm's product or process technology affected its observed degree of participation with workers. Firms with suggestion systems did not differ from those without such systems by their capital-labor ratio, the nature of the material they used (plastic, rubber, ceramic, aluminum, or steel), or the

³²However, efforts to find further complementarity within the suggestion group were unsuccessful. For example, an interaction term for customer voice and suggestions was not significant.

³³Since the dependent variable is not observed, marginal effects cannot be estimated for the grouped data model (Greene, 1994, p.665). However, for this dataset, the grouped-data estimates are similar to those obtained via ordinary least squares. Using the OLS results as a guide, a firm with the average attributes of the no-suggestion group and a voice relationship with its customer would have an average increase in cost of 0.3% per year. If this firm were to adopt a suggestion system, its predicted annual change in cost would fall by 4.8 percentage points, to -4.5%--a substantial decrease.

nature of their production process (did it involve forging, casting, extrusion, assembly, etc³⁴). In cases where two firms listed the same product, they usually had a variety of practices. For example, of the two firms making fasteners, one had a suggestion system while the other did not.

Technology did affect a firm's level of cost reduction in the cases of aluminum and forged products discussed above, but the inclusion or exclusion of these variables did not affect the core results. Other aspects of the institutional environment appeared to have little effect on the level of cost reduction. Union was never significant; I tried it in regressions without other labor relations variables, and I tried controlling for the particular union involved (Canadian Auto Workers, United Rubber Workers, company union, etc.).

The suggestion and non-suggestion groups do vary on a number of important variables, most of which have to do with mutual dependence between the firm and its workers³⁵: Firms with suggestion programs are significantly more likely to be Japanese-owned (17% vs. 8%); have lower turnover (4.7% vs. 8% per year); and to "strongly agree" that "Each year we expect our shop workers to make substantial improvements in their own method of operations". They invest one-third more in formal training of experienced workers (a median of 16 hours per year vs. 12). Even though the plants are larger (a median 218 employees vs. 150), the ratio of workers to supervisors is far higher (21 vs. 16). Surprisingly, the suggestion plants are somewhat *less* likely to have voice relations with customers (6.9% vs. 10%).

³⁴The only exceptions are that stamping firms were more likely to have suggestion systems than the sample as a whole, and firms whose product was made out of aluminum were less likely to have labor-management committees.

³⁵Using a Kruskal-Wallis test, these differences are significant at the 5% level or better, except for the difference in customer voice.

However, the two groups are similar in terms of nature of production process, price of product, size of firm (as opposed to size of plant), wage levels, and willingness to make a no-layoff pledge. As noted above, the two groups are also similar in the average annual change in costs they report: an increase of 0.5% per year.

The importance of suggestion systems. A second issue is whether a suggestion program is the only employee-involvement practice which separates the firms using the two models. Alternatively, a suggestion system may be highly co-linear with other variables. MacDuffie (1995) and Ichniowski, Shaw, and Pennushi (forthcoming; hereafter ISP) found that participative human resource practices a) tended to be adopted in clusters and b) to have a greater impact on productivity and quality when they are adopted in clusters. (MacDuffie's findings were based on a study of automotive assemblers, while ISP's came from steel finishing lines.) To examine these issues, I constructed measures of each of the seven sets of participatory human resource practices used in ISP's study of complementarity and used each of them separately to split the sample.

Two measures of labor-management communication besides suggestion programs were found to be significant determinants of whether a 'voice' or a 'traditional' model better explained a plant's degree of cost reduction. These were a) management 'strongly agreed' that 'Each year we expect our shop workers to make substantial improvements in their own method of operations' , and b) the existence of a labor-management committee which had power over at least one of the following policies in the plant: work methods and task assignments; changes in product design; purchasing new tools; safety and health policies; subcontracting work to suppliers; and selecting supervisors or team leaders.

In each case, the basic results were the same as when the sample was split on the basis of

the existence of a suggestion system: the voice model fit the high-participation group better than did the traditional model; customer voice was a significant determinant of cost reduction only for those firms with participative human resource policies, and that high relative compensation enhanced participative firms' cost reduction efforts. (See tables 4 and 5).

These 'worker voice' practices are often adopted together. (See table 6 for correlations.) However, they are different in their emphasis. A suggestion program emphasizes individual effort, which may or may not be the result of a sustained study. A labor-management committee, such as the one at Industrial Strainer, engages in sustained study of a topic, and attempts to brainstorm based on members' diverse knowledge bases. The expectation that a worker will improve her own practices does not require the worker to write anything up or speak in public (significant advantages to people who may not have done either of these things since leaving school), and leaves the new technique under the worker's control; the disadvantage from management's point of view is that the knowledge remains uncodified, and that output from different workers may vary slightly.

Other participative practices studied by ISP were incentive pay; rigorous selection criteria; employment security; job flexibility; training, and low-conflict labor relations. None of these factors proved to be significant determinants of which model of cost reduction best applied to a plant.

I also investigated if adopting additional policies increased cost reduction for a high-participation group, by entering them as independent variables into the voice model. As discussed above, firms with suggestion programs, worker-generated improvements, and labor-management committees all had more cost reduction if their relative compensation was higher. In contrast to

ISP's findings, however, neither incentive pay nor job security policies had a significant impact. Having more than one worker voice mechanism also did not improve performance.

There was significant complementarity among the three components of customer voice: splitting them up changed the results. Having a long-term contract by itself (without the information provision or customer prodding to remain price competitive) led to a significant *increase* in cost in some specifications, whereas providing information by itself was not significant. These results are consistent with Hirschman's (1970) view that while some loyalty is helpful for resolving problems, blind loyalty produces little incentive for action.

Can the models be combined? As discussed above, there is no difference in the average cost reduction for firms in each of the six worker-voice categories (with and without suggestions, with and without labor-management committees, with and without worker-generated improvements). What is to stop a firm from trying to combine the best of both worlds?

Combining the models' labor relations policies as hypothesized would be difficult, since the voice model of cost reduction works best with a no-layoff pledge and high relative compensation while the traditional model works best with layoffs and with declining wages. However, the hypothesis about layoffs was not supported.

Seeking economies of scale would not seem to be harmful to a firm with a voice model. The breakeven point for a product should be lower for a firm with voice than for a firm without voice, because of the reduced need to hire specialists who cannot be transferred to other work; this factor should reduce, though not necessarily eliminate, the impact of an increase in a product's

sales on average cost.³⁶ The results of adding CHSALES to the voice model provides some support for this idea; while the coefficient was negative, it was not significant.

VII. Conclusion

This paper has found a number of instances in which policies appear complementary in *performance*. Plants which have both worker and customer voice have greater success at cost reduction than do firms with neither or only one of these practices. Similarly, plants with both worker voice and high wages reduced costs more than firms with neither or only one of these practices. Firms with all three elements of customer voice performed better than firms with only one or two, if they also had an employee involvement program.

However, plants do not show much complementarity in their *adoption* of these practices. Although there is some correlation among adoption of the three measures of worker voice, there is no correlation between adoption of worker voice and adoption of a high wage policy, or between adoption of worker voice and customer voice. There are several possible reasons for this: firms don't know about these results, their strategy is effective in improving performance on measures besides cost, they are prevented by past decisions or other factors from moving to a new strategy, or they are worried that changing to a new strategy would reduce their ability to appropriate rents.³⁷

³⁶At the level of a *plant or a firm*, however, fixed costs might rise with a voice approach, due to the need to make commitments to input suppliers (and due to the ability to make long-term investments if commitments are received from customers, as in the case of Industrial Strainer's CAD purchase.) However, these resources are flexible across products, so the breakeven for any one product should not rise with a voice approach.

³⁷The result that firms with worker participation are no more likely to have customer participation is consistent with that found by Helper and Levine (1994), using somewhat different measures on 1993 data from the plant manager survey.

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TABLE 1. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS***Dependent Variable*****CHCOST**

Change in average cost 1988-92 for the "typical" product for which the respondent chose to answer the survey.

1= costs fell more than 10%, 2= fell between 3.1 and 10%, 3= plus or minus 3%, 4=increase 3.1% to 9%, 5= increase more than 9.1%

Independent Variables**CHSALES**

Change in sales to most important customer, 1988-92.

1 = decrease more than 30%, 2 = decrease 15-30%, 3 = decrease 6-14%, 4=+/-5%,
5= increase 6-15%, 6= increase 15-30%, and 7=increase more than 30%.

CUTWAGE

Importance to the business unit's manufacturing strategy of reducing growth of wages and benefits, 1988

1 to 5 scale, where 1= Less important, 5=Extremely important

RELCOMP

Percentage by which pay of unskilled and semiskilled production workers exceeds that for equivalent workers in all industries in the plant's geographic area, 1992

NOLAY

= 1 if management has made a commitment to the regular work force that no layoffs will result from productivity increases, 1988

=0 otherwise

SUGGEST

number of suggestions per production worker, 1988

CUSTVOICE

= 1 if all of the following are true:

a) a contract with most important automotive customer of at least two years, b) the supplier provides detailed information to the customer on its process steps, and c) the customer would help the supplier match a rival's price for a product of equal quality

=0 otherwise

USEDATA

1 to 5 scale. 1= Strongly agree, 5=Strongly disagree "We rarely use data regarding sources of defects in past production to modify past processes.

IMPROVE

=1 if plant had completed formal improvement process by 1988,
=0 otherwise.

PPRICE

Price of the product, 1992

ALUM

= 1 if product is made of aluminum;
=0 otherwise

FORGE

=1 if product is forged;
=0 otherwise

JAPAN

=1 if firm is Japanese owned;
= 0 otherwise

LM POWER

0 to 6 scale, where one point is awarded for each of the following policies in the plant over which the labor-management committee has influence: work methods and task assignments; changes in product design; purchasing new tools; safety and health policies; subcontracting work to suppliers; and selecting supervisors or team leaders
= 0 if there is no labor-management committee

Sample Separation Variables

SUGGESTION PROGRAM = 1 if the plant had a suggestion program in place in 1988;
= 0 otherwise.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE= 1 if the firm had a labor management committee which influenced at least one of the policies in LM POWER;
=0 otherwise.

WORKER-GENERATED IMPROVEMENT= 1 if management 'strongly agrees' that 'Each year we expect our shop workers to make substantial improvements in their own method of operation;
= 0 otherwise.

Table 2. Summary Statistics

A. Plants without suggestions

Variable	Label	N	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum
CHCOST	Change in average cost, 88-92	89	0.0030899	0.0533402	-0.1500000	0.1400000
CUSVOICE	Voice relations w/customer,88	89	0.1011236	0.3032005	0	1.0000000
SUGGEST	Suggestions per worker, 1988	89	0	0	0	0
CHSALES	%change sales to customer,88-92	89	15.6460674	17.1330360	-35.0000000	35.0000000
USEDATA	Rarely use defect data,92	89	4.2696629	1.0418956	1.0000000	5.0000000
NOLAY	No layoffs due to productivity,92	89	0.2359551	0.4269999	0	1.0000000
RELCOMP	Pay relative to workers in area,92	89	0.0435393	0.1162120	-0.3000000	0.3000000
CUTWAGE	Importance of slowing wage growth,88	89	2.9775281	0.9290456	1.0000000	5.0000000
IMPROVE	Engaged in improvement process, 88	89	0.3146067	0.4669900	0	1.0000000
PRICE	Product price, 1992	89	18.5730337	30.3914378	0.5000000	150.0000000
ALUM	Product made of aluminum	89	0.0224719	0.1490522	0	1.0000000
FORGE	Product is forged	89	0.0337079	0.1814987	0	1.0000000
JAPAN	Owned by Japanese firm	89	0.0898876	0.2876412	0	1.0000000

B. Plants with suggestions

Variable	Label	N	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum
CHCOST	Change in average cost,88-92	86	0.0075000	0.0572700	-0.1500000	0.1400000
CUSVOICE	Voice relations w/customer,88	86	0.0697674	0.2562489	0	1.0000000
SUGGEST	Suggestions per worker,88	86	1.2453057	1.8173402	0.0176533	11.6772152
CHSALES	%change sales to customer	86	14.1860465	17.7707702	-35.0000000	35.0000000
USEDATA	Rarely use defect data,92	86	4.3720930	0.9080880	2.0000000	5.0000000
NOLAY	No layoffs due to productivity,92	86	0.2093023	0.4091966	0	1.0000000
RELCOMP	Pay relative to workers in area,92	86	0.0576163	0.1048212	-0.1500000	0.3000000
CUTWAGE	Importance of slowing wage growth,88	86	3.2093023	0.9470236	1.0000000	5.0000000
IMPROVE	Engaged in improvement process,92	86	0.4418605	0.4995210	0	1.0000000
PRICE	Product price	86	26.1686047	36.8842076	0.5000000	150.0000000
ALUM	Product made of aluminum	86	0.0232558	0.1515989	0	1.0000000
FORGE	Product is forged	86	0.0116279	0.1078328	0	1.0000000
JAPAN	Owned by Japanese firm	86	0.1744186	0.3816947	0	1.0000000

TABLE 3. TWO MODELS OF COST REDUCTION.
SEPARATION VARIABLE: EXISTENCE OF SUGGESTION PROGRAM

VARIABLE	<u>VOICE MODEL</u> <u>PLANTS WITH</u> <u>SUGGESTION</u> <u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL MODEL</u> <u>PLANTS WITHOUT</u> <u>SUGGESTION</u> <u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL MODEL</u> <u>PLANTS WITH</u> <u>SUGGESTION</u> <u>PROGRAM</u>	<u>VOICE MODEL</u> <u>PLANTS WITHOUT</u> <u>SUGGESTION</u> <u>PROGRAM</u>
	COEFFICIENT	COEFFICIENT	COEFFICIENT	COEFFICIENT
CONSTANT	1.4587* (0.85283)	-2.1324 (2.5817)	0.48851 (3.5926)	-0.46862 (0.78717)
CHSALES		0.06857** (0.3040)	-0.02737 (0.03123)	
CUSTVOICE	-4.6173** (2.0714)			-0.74491 (1.8390)
SUGGEST	-0.27298 (-0.30171)			
CUTWAGE		-0.47281 (0.54427)	0.57808 (0.60503)	
RELCOMP	-11.170** (5.0650)			-0.77774 (4.7220)
NOLAYOFF	1.2089 (1.3937)	1.0052 (1.4422)	0.89877 (1.5034)	1.0244 (1.5280)
USEDATA		0.95764** (.49036)	-0.26840 (0.63859)	
IMPROVE	2.7570*** (1.0646)	1.3351 (1.2150)	1.8643* (1.1051)	1.3583 (1.2996)
PPRICE	-0.0261* (.0144)	-0.0276 (0.0189)	-0.0351** (-0.0155)	0.0300 (0.0199)
ALUM	-7.8280** (3.6794)	-4.8018 (3.5407)	-8.1735** (3.8963)	-5.0640 (3.6464)
FORGE	1.1885 (5.0473)	-5.5441** (2.9188)	3.3911 (5.3394)	-4.7527 (3.0513)
JAPAN	0.0716 (1.4956)	1.5558 (-2.0529)	0.16636 (1.5647)	1.1511 (2.1462)
LOG L	-95.7	-94.9	-100.2	-98.5
N	85	86	85	86

NOTES TO TABLE 3:

1. STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES.
2. *.05>P>.10
3. **.05>P>.01
4. ***.01>P

**TABLE 4. TWO MODELS OF COST REDUCTION
SEPARATED BY EXISTENCE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE**

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>VOICE MODEL</u> <u>PLANTS WITH</u> <u>LABOR-MGMT</u> <u>COMMITTEE</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL MODEL</u> <u>PLANTS WITHOUT</u> <u>LABOR-MGMT</u> <u>COMMITTEE</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL MODEL</u> <u>PLANTS WITH</u> <u>LABOR-MGMT</u> <u>COMMITTEE</u>	<u>VOICE MODEL</u> <u>PLANTS WITHOUT</u> <u>LABOR-MGMT</u> <u>COMMITTEE</u>
	<u>COEFFICIENT</u>	<u>COEFFICIENT</u>	<u>COEFFICIENT</u>	<u>COEFFICIENT</u>
CONSTANT	-0.10191 (1.2528)	-4.5140 (2.8623)	-1.1880 (3.0479)	-0.21455 (0.79954)
CHSALES		-0.040306 (0.030859)	-0.029501 (0.34643)	
CUSTVOICE	-3.5583** (1.8406)			-0.75478 (2.1491)
LMPWR	0.62330 (0.41820)			
CUTWAGE		0.52588 (0.52619)	0.14737 (0.65318)	
RELCOMP	-10.130** (4.7319)			-4.0702 (5.0156)
NOLAYOFF	0.012128 (1.3140)	-0.44135 (0.77842)	0.83161 (1.3849)	-0.58315 (1.6148)
USEDATA		0.70368 (0.54328)	0.47749 (0.55295)	
IMPROVE	2.9585*** (1.0313)	1.5845 (1.2535)	2.0683** (1.0305)	1.7449 (1.2844)
PPRICE	-0.045368*** (0.017461)	0.030429* (0.016114)	-0.052870*** (0.017367)	0.027198* (0.016531)
ALUM	-8.9706** (3.8247)	-3.2826 (3.5092)	-10.198*** (3.9458)	-3.5080 (3.5753)
FORGE	-5.5246 (3.7076)	3.0009 (3.4546)	-4.7847 (3.8065)	-2.5436 (3.6189)
JAPAN	3.5509** -1.7464	-0.93658 (1.6075)	3.5483* (1.9177)	-0.79821 (1.6400)
LOG L	-104.5	-86.2	-107.9	-87.9
N	94	77	94	77

NOTES TO TABLE 4

1. STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES.

2. *-05>P>.10

3. **-.05>P>.01

4. ***-.01>P

TABLE 5. TWO MODELS OF COST REDUCTION
SEPARATION VARIABLE: EXPECTATION OF HIGH WORKER IMPROVEMENTS

<u>VARIABLE</u>	<u>VOICE MODEL</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL MODEL</u>	<u>TRADITIONAL MODEL</u>	<u>VOICE MODEL</u>
	<u>PLANTS WITH HI WORKER IMPROVEMENTS</u>	<u>PLANTS WITHOUT HI WORKER IMPROVEMENTS</u>	<u>PLANTS WITH HI WORKER IMPROVEMENTS</u>	<u>PLANTS WITHOUT HI WORKER IMPROVEMENTS</u>
	<u>COEFFICIENT</u>	<u>COEFFICIENT</u>	<u>COEFFICIENT</u>	<u>COEFFICIENT</u>
CONSTANT	2.730 (.80315)***	-2.7994 (2.5794)	4.4777 (3.9881)	-0.19480 (0.69081)
CHSALES		-0.050501* (0.026685)	0.0349 (0.0395)	
CUSTVOICE	-6.3006*** (1.8693)			-0.40578 (1.7015)
CUTWAGE		0.14701 (0.48542)	-1.2214 (.78101)	
RELCOMP	-15.095*** (4.4584)			-5.6802 (4.2580)
NOLAYOFF	0.89955 (1.2258)	0.81418 (1.3032)	0.53128 (1.5659)	0.10600 (1.3210)
USEDATA		0.62663 (0.50935)	-0.5290 (0.58484)	
IMPROVE	-1.2209 (1.1328)	2.9956*** (0.99174)	-3.4472*** (1.3927)	3.8155*** (1.0008)
PPRICE	0.0040 (.01159)	-0.022811 (0.018369)	-0.00859 (0.01400)	-0.027062 (0.018569)
ALUM#		-6.3505** (2.7789)		-5.6995** (2.7860)
FORGE	3.9481 (3.7420)	-4.7183 (3.0952)	6.7260 (4.4497)	-3.9671 (3.1385)
JAPAN	-0.38927 (1.7213)	1.9027 (1.5529)	-0.37775 (-0.193)	2.0239 (1.5664)
LOG L	-33.5	-150.6	-41.7	-152.3
N	43	128	43	128

NOTES TO TABLE 5

1. STANDARD ERRORS ARE IN PARENTHESES.

2. *-.05>P>.10

3. **-.05>P>.01

4. ***-.01>P

#5. NO FIRMS MAKING ALUMINUM PRODUCTS HAD HIGH EXPECTATIONS OF WORKER IMPROVEMENTS

Table 6. Correlation Analysis

Variable	N	Mean	Std Dev	Simple Statistics			
				Sum	Minimum	Maximum	Label
POSSUG existence of suggestion program, 1988	171	0.49708	0.50146	85.00000	0	1.00000	
HILM existence of labor-management committee	171	0.54971	0.49898	94.00000	0	1.00000	
HIXPC worker-generated improvements	171	0.25146	0.43513	43.00000	0	1.00000	

Pearson Correlation Coefficients / Prob > |R| under Ho: Rho=0 / N = 171

	POSSUG	HILM	HIXPC
POSSUG existence of suggestion program, 1988	1.00000 0.0	0.19453 0.0108	0.20558 0.0070
HILM existence of labor-management committee	0.19453 0.0108	1.00000 0.0	0.03692 0.6317
HIXPC worker-generated improvements	0.20558 0.0070	0.03692 0.6317	1.00000 0.0