

On the security of 2-key triple DES

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Abstract

This paper reconsiders the security offered by 2-key triple DES, an encryption technique that remains widely used despite recently being de-standardised by NIST. A generalisation of the 1990 van Oorschot-Wiener attack is described, constituting the first advance in cryptanalysis of 2-key triple DES since 1990. We give further attack enhancements that together imply that the widely used estimate that 2-key triple DES provides 80 bits of security can no longer be regarded as conservative; the widely stated assertion that the scheme is secure as long as the key is changed regularly is also challenged. The main conclusion is that, whilst not completely broken, the margin of safety for 2-key triple DES is slim, and efforts to replace it, at least with its 3-key variant, and preferably with a more modern cipher such as AES, should be pursued with some urgency.

1 Introduction

Despite the fact that it has long since been regarded as purely of historical interest by many cryptographers, triple DES remains of considerable practical importance, particularly in the payments industry. This is true of both its widely discussed variants, i.e. 2-key and 3-key triple DES.

In late 2015, NIST finally withdrew support for 2-key triple DES, something that had long been trailed and that does not appear to have occurred because of any new insights into the security of the scheme. However, this withdrawal of support does not mean that the world has stopped using this variant, and it also remains an ISO/IEC standard (albeit with ISO/IEC having published warnings regarding the limited level of security that it provides).

As discussed below, 2-key triple DES has always been regarded as only

giving a small margin of safety. In this paper we show that this margin is even less than was previously thought. We do this in three main ways:

- we show how the well-known van Oorschot-Wiener attack can be generalised to allow its effectiveness to be considerably improved by exploiting ciphertext generated using multiple keys;
- we show how the DES complementation property can be used to gain a factor of two efficiency improvement;
- we demonstrate how partially known plaintext/ciphertext pairs can be used in the attack as well as fully known pairs, without significantly damaging the attack's computational or storage complexity.

We also briefly discuss possible practical approaches to the implementation of attacks against 2-key triple DES, as well as considering the impact of the generalised attack on the security of the ANSI retail MAC. We conclude that the widely held assessment that 2-key triple DES only offers 80 bits of security is by no means an overly conservative assumption. It also follows that some of the most significant advice given to users of 2-key triple DES in order to help avoid cryptanalytic attacks is of limited validity.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the history of triple DES. This is followed in Section 3 by a discussion of a generalisation of the van Oorschot-Wiener attack, which for the last 25 years has been the most effective known attack against 2-key triple DES. In Section 4 we briefly discuss how the DES complementation property can be used to double the attack speed. We turn in Section 5 to considering how partially known plaintext/ciphertext pairs can be used in the attack. We briefly review possible practical attack implementation strategies in Section 6, before discussing the use of the attack method against the ANSI retail MAC in Section 7. The paper concludes in Section 8.

2 Triple DES — a brief history

The DES block cipher was originally published as a US Federal Standard (NBS FIPS PUB 46 [26]) as long ago as 1977 — for further details of its origins see, for example, chapter 7 of Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone [18]. DES, also known as the *Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA)*, is a 64-bit block cipher, i.e. it transforms a 64-bit plaintext block into a 64-bit ciphertext block, employing a 56-bit key.

From day one it was criticised for the short length of its key. Even 40 years ago, performing 2^{56} encryptions, as needed for a brute force search for a key using a single known plaintext/ciphertext pair, was just about within the

bounds of possibility using special-purpose hardware. Indeed, the design for a special purpose brute-force device capable of finding a DES key within a day was sketched by Diffie and Hellman, [5], and was estimated by them to cost 10 million US dollars.

These concerns did not stop the very widespread adoption of DES, not only within the US (where it became an ANSI standard, X3.92 [2]), but worldwide, particularly within the financial sector. This was probably because of the lack of any widely known public competitor schemes. Despite the short key length, the use of DES was arguably a huge success and there are no public domain examples, of which the author is aware, of significant compromises because of the limited key length.

However, it became clear within a few years of its publication that a more secure version of DES was required, allowing a longer key length. This need gave rise to the two well-known versions of triple DES, one of which forms the main focus of this paper. With the rise of triple DES, use of just one iteration of DES, as originally standardised, became known as single DES.

The gradual switch to triple DES was supported by its standardisation by NIST [21, 23], ANSI [3], and ISO/IEC [10, 11]. This switch was very timely, as by the second half of the 1990s single DES has been broken in various ways (all using brute force attacks). Of particular interest was the fact that in 1998 a special-purpose DES breaking machine, Deep Crack, was designed and built for a few hundreds of thousands of US dollars [6], vindicating the 1977 predictions by Diffie and Hellman. In fact, a large distributed software-only attack (coordinated through the *DESCHALL project*) had shortly before succeeded in breaking a ‘DES challenge’ [4]. This served notice to the world at large that single DES was no longer secure.

Since double DES (i.e. two iterations of DES encryption using independent keys) has long been ruled out as offering very limited additional security by comparison with single DES (see Diffie and Hellman, [5]), then the obvious next alternative is to perform triple DES, i.e. three iterations of the DES algorithm. The general idea of using three iterations of DES was mentioned in 1977 by Diffie and Hellman, [5], as a way of dramatically improving the security of DES. In practice, rather than performing three consecutive encryptions, it has become the norm to first perform an encryption (using key K_1), then perform a decryption (using key K_2), and finally perform another encryption (using key K_3). The encrypt-decrypt-encrypt approach has the advantage of being backwards-compatible with single DES if $K_1 = K_2 = K_3$. This potentially makes migration from single to triple DES much simpler. If K_1 , K_2 and K_3 are all chosen independently, encrypt-decrypt-encrypt is known as 3-key triple DES.

As reported by Merkle and Hellman, [19], in 1978 Tuchman proposed a 2-key variant of triple DES. This involves choosing $K_1 = K_3$, i.e. first encrypting

with K_1 , then decrypting with K_2 , and finally re-encrypting with K_1 . This approach has the advantage of only involving two DES keys, reducing the key storage and transmission requirements to the same as for double DES, but giving significantly greater security than provided by double DES. However, it is clear that 2-key triple DES is itself significantly less secure than 3-key triple DES, and Merkle and Hellman [19] described an attack against 2-key triple DES which is significantly more effective than the best known attack against the 3-key version. They suggested that this means that the 3-key variant should always be used. Since Merkle and Hellman's attack was published in 1981, one other attack against 2-key triple DES has been devised, namely that due to van Oorschot and Wiener, [28]; this latter attack is discussed in Section 3 below.

The NIST standard for the DES algorithm, FIPS PUB 46-3 [21], was withdrawn back in 1999. This signalled the end of standard-status for single DES. The situation for 2-key and 3-key triple DES standardisation is much less clear cut. Triple DES has been standardised by a variety of bodies including NIST in SP 800-67, [23], and by ISO/IEC in the first and second editions of ISO/IEC 18033-3, [10, 11]. All these standards specify both 2-key and 3-key triple DES.

Despite the fact that 2-key triple DES is clearly less secure than the 3-key version, it has been very widely used, particularly by the electronic payments industry, where it remains in active use. For example, the current version of the EMV standard, [7], used as the basis for security for credit and debit cards worldwide, specifies that 'The double-length key triple DES encipherment algorithm (see ISO/IEC 18033-3) is the approved cryptographic algorithm to be used in the encipherment and MAC mechanisms' [here double length is a reference to the 2-key variant of triple DES].

As a result, there is considerable industry pressure to retain both variants as standards. At the same time, there has been considerable pressure both from academia and from bodies such as NIST to phase out all use of DES (and in particular 2-key triple DES) in favour of more modern, more secure, and more efficient algorithms, such as AES, [22].

In this latter connection, for some years NIST has been particularly keen to phase out triple DES, particularly the 2-key variant. Indeed, in the latest revision of NIST SP 800-131A, [24], published in late 2015, it was announced that support for 2-key triple DES had been withdrawn. A similar statement can be found in the latest (January 2016) version of NIST SP 800-57 Part 1, [25]. This withdrawal of support is in line with previous announcements on the subject. However, ISO/IEC has not followed the same path, and both 2-key and 3-key triple DES variants remain as standard algorithms in the most recent (2010) version of ISO/IEC 18033-3 [11], although use of the 3-key variant is recommended. ISO/IEC SC 27 (the committee responsible

for drawing up ISO/IEC 18033-3) has published guidance on the use of triple DES in two standing documents, [12, 13]. Key statements from one of these standing documents, [12], expressing sentiments that have been widely reproduced elsewhere, are:

- ‘depending on the required security level, the maximum number of plaintexts encrypted under a single key should be limited’; and
- ‘the effective key-length of two-key Triple-DES in specific applications can only be regarded as 80 bits (instead of 112 bits)’.

The statement regarding 80-bit security has also been given in various documents produced by NIST (see, for example, Section 5.6.1 of NIST 800-57 Part 1, [25]). We reconsider both these claims at the end of this paper.

3 Generalising the van Oorschot-Wiener attack

3.1 The original attack

In 1990, almost a decade after the Merkle-Hellman attack was published, a somewhat more practical attack against 2-key triple DES was described by van Oorschot and Wiener [28]. This attack is more practical in that it only requires known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, rather than chosen plaintext/ciphertext pairs. We next provide a brief description of this attack.

The attack requires that the attacker has access to n plaintext/ciphertext pairs (P, C) , all created using the same 2-key triple DES key (i.e. the same pair of DES keys (K_1, K_2) — we use this notation throughout). The main idea is to fix a 64-bit value A , and to hope that $e_{K_1}(P) = A$ for one of the pairs (P, C) . If this is true, then finding K_2 only requires a single DES key search, i.e. performing 2^{56} DES operations. Of course, unless n is very large, the guess is unlikely to be true, so the attack has to be performed for many values of A . The larger the value of n , the larger the probability of a successful attack using a value A , and hence the more efficient the attack.

The attack proceeds as follows, where $e_K(P)$ and $d_K(C)$ represent the DES-encryption of P , and DES-decryption of C , respectively, using the key K .

1. Tabulate the (P, C) pairs, sorted or hashed on the plaintext values P , to create Table 1, which requires $O(n)$ words of storage.
2. Now randomly select and fix (for steps 2–4) a value A . [This stage of the attack will succeed if and only if $A = e_{K_1}(P)$ for one of the known plaintexts P . If steps 2–4 succeed with this value of A we can find the target triple DES key; if not, we simply repeat with a different value of A — see step 5.]

3. Create a second table (Table 2) as follows. For each of the 2^{56} possible DES keys i , calculate $P_i = d_i(A)$. Next look up P_i in Table 1. If P_i is found in the first column of Table 1, take the corresponding ciphertext value C and compute $B = d_i(C)$. Now store B together with i in Table 2, which is sorted (or hashed) on the B values. Note that the same B value may occur more than once.
4. Each entry in Table 2 consists of a value of B and the corresponding key i , where i is a candidate for K_1 ; as described above, each (B, i) pair is associated with a (P, C) pair from Table 1 where $e_i(P) = A$. The remaining task is to search for possible values of K_2 .
 For each of the 2^{56} candidates, j , for K_2 , calculate what the value B would be if j had been used for K_2 , i.e. $B_j = d_j(A)$. Now look up B_j in Table 2. For each appearance of B_j (if any) the corresponding key i from Table 2, along with key j , is a candidate for the desired pair of keys (K_1, K_2) . Each such candidate key pair is then tested on at most two other plaintext/ciphertext pairs. If this key pair gives the correct results then the target triple DES key (K_1, K_2) has been found and the task is complete.
5. If step 4 fails, then the process in steps 2–4 is repeated for a new random value of A . [Note that, to avoid the (small) risk of repeating values of A , the values could be worked through in some order].

We can summarise the complexity of this attack as follows.

- The time required to create and sort/hash Table 1 is negligible compared to other computations given $n \ll 2^{56}$. As already mentioned the space required is $O(n)$.
- For each trial value A , Table 2 costs a little more than 2^{56} DES computations to create (assuming Table 1 is hashed on the plaintext values so that look-ups take a constant time). Because only 2^{56} out of 2^{64} possible 64-bit blocks are searched for in Table 1, the expected number of entries in Table 2 is $n/2^8$, i.e. the storage required for Table 2 is small by comparison with Table 1.
- Working with Table 2 to find candidate pairs of keys costs a further 2^{56} DES computations. That is, testing a single value of A costs a total of around 2^{57} DES computations.
- The probability that one iteration of steps 2–4 will succeed, i.e. yield the correct key pair, is approximately $n/2^{64}$, so the total attack cost is approximately $2^{121}/n$ DES computations (assuming the cost of the various look-ups and tests is dwarfed by the DES calculations).

In summary, if we have 2^t known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, i.e. $n = 2^t$, then 2-key triple DES can be broken using 2^{121-t} DES computations and $O(2^t)$ storage. For example, if $n = 2^{32}$, i.e. if we have as many as 4 billion known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, then the key can be discovered in 2^{89} DES computations. In conclusion, launching an attack only becomes practical if very large volumes of matching plaintext and ciphertext, all generated using a single triple DES key, are available. This has led to the following two widely drawn conclusions regarding the security of 2-key triple DES, referred to at the end of Section 2.

- As a safe estimate, 2-key triple DES offers at least 80 bits of security.
- If the key is changed reasonably frequently (limiting n in the above attack), practical attacks against 2-key triple DES are infeasible.

In the remainder of this paper we challenge the second conclusion, and also provide evidence that the lower bound estimate of 80 bits of security is not as conservative as it might seem.

3.2 Dualising the attack

The above attack can readily be dualised. That is, instead of choosing and fixing a candidate for $A = e_{K_1}(P)$, one could choose a candidate for $B = d_{K_1}(C)$. All possible encryptions of B can then be compared with values of C in Table 1. This observation underlies the application of the van Oorschot-Wiener attack to the ANSI retail MAC, as described in Section 7.

3.3 The generalisation

We start by making an apparently simple observation on the van Oorschot-Wiener attack. That is, the attack will work *just as well* if the n plaintext/ciphertext pairs are generated using a range of different triple DES keys. Of course, when performing the tests in step 5, it is necessary to use additional plaintext/ciphertext pairs that have been generated using the appropriate triple DES key. Also, when the attack is successful, only one of the keys will be found, and can only be used to decrypt other material encrypted using that key. Nevertheless, depending on the application, this could still have devastating consequences for security.

We can modify the algorithm described above to take account of this observation by changing steps 1, 3 and 4, as follows.

- 1' Assemble the pairs (P, C) into subsets¹, where all the pairs in each

¹We require that each subset contains at least two, and preferably three, pairs, so that candidates for (K_1, K_2) can be checked.

subset have been created using the same key, and assign each subset a unique label s (we also use s as the label for the triple DES key used to create the subset). Tabulate all the (P, C, s) triples (where s is the key label), sorted or hashed on the plaintext values, to create Table 1, which requires $O(n)$ words of storage. Note that there may be repeated P values, but this should not create a major difficulty.

- 3' Create a second table (Table 2) as follows. For each of the 2^{56} DES keys i , calculate $P_i = d_i(A)$. Next look up P_i in Table 1. If P_i is found in the first column of Table 1, take the corresponding ciphertext value (or values) C (and the label(s) s) and for each compute $B = d_i(C)$. Now store B together with i and s in Table 2, sorted (or hashed) on the B values. Note that the same B value may occur more than once.
- 4' Each entry in Table 2 consists of a value of B and the corresponding key i and label s , where i is a candidate for K_1 for label s ; as described above, each (B, i, s) triple is associated with a (P, C, s) triple from Table 1 where $e_i(P) = A$. The remaining task is to search for possible values for K_2 .

For each of the 2^{56} candidates, j , for K_2 , calculate what the value B would be if j had been used for K_2 , i.e. $B_j = d_j(A)$. Now look up B_j in Table 2. For each appearance of B_j (if any) the corresponding key i from Table 2, along with key j , is a candidate for the desired pair of keys (K_1, K_2) with label s . Each such candidate key pair is then tested on at most two other plaintext/ciphertext pairs from the label s subset. If this key pair gives the correct results then the triple DES key (K_1, K_2) with label s has been found and the task is complete.

Apart from the fact that the tables have an extra value in each entry (the key label, typically at most four bytes long), none of the attack complexities have changed. I.e., if we have 2^t known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, i.e. $n = 2^t$, then 2-key triple DES can be broken using 2^{121-t} DES computations and $O(2^t)$ storage. Here the meaning of ‘broken’ is slightly different, in that it now means that one of the triple DES keys has been discovered, rather than the single key used to encrypt all the n known pairs.

It is important to see that this means that changing the triple DES key from time to time has no impact on the attack effectiveness. Of course, regular key changes remain a good idea since, even if the attack is successful, only the plaintext encrypted using the broken key can be recovered. Knudsen and Robshaw, [16], observed that ‘It is interesting to note that changing encryption keys does not necessarily provide much additional protection against exhaustive search’ — prescient remarks!

An interceptor may not always know when keys have changed, so labeling plaintext/ciphertext pairs may not be simple. In such a case, the known

plaintext/ciphertext pairs could be arranged in order of transmission, in the hope that the pairs generated using a single DES key pair will be consecutive in the list. When checking a candidate key pair, the two adjacent pairs in this temporal ordering could be used to check whether the candidate is valid.

Finally, we observe that there is nothing specific to DES about the above generalisation, or the original van Oorschot-Wiener attack for that matter. The attack would work equally well against any triple-iterated block cipher with the same key structure; however, we restrict our attention to DES here since it is the only block cipher for which triple encryption is widely used (at least as far as is known to the author). Also, the enhancement described in the next section *is* specific to DES.

4 Exploiting the DES complementation property

The effectiveness of the generalised van Oorschot-Wiener attack can be improved using the well-known DES complementation property (see, for example, [18]). This property says that, for any 64-bit block P and any DES key K (where \bar{X} denotes the bit-wise complement of bit string X):

$$\overline{e_K(P)} = e_{\bar{K}}(\bar{P}).$$

I.e., if P and K are complemented, then the output ciphertext is also complemented. It is interesting to observe that Lucks [17] considered how to use this property to improve the efficiency of his attacks on 3-key triple DES.

This property can be used to effectively double the number of plaintext/ciphertext pairs, since every plaintext/ciphertext pair for the key K will give us another pair for the key \bar{K} . Another way of looking at this is that we can perform the attack steps for A and \bar{A} simultaneously, reducing the required number of DES computations by half. Hence, if $n = 2^t$, then 2-key triple DES can be broken using 2^{120-t} DES computations and $O(2^t)$ storage. E.g., if $n = 2^{32}$, i.e. if we have as many as 4 billion known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, then the key can be discovered in 2^{88} DES computations.

5 Using partially known plaintext

We next describe an attack enhancement designed to cope with the situation where we have ciphertext blocks for which we do not know the precise plaintext value. For example, we may have a ciphertext block C for which we know 56 of the 64 plaintext bits, but not the other eight, i.e. there is a set of 2^8 possible values for P for a given ciphertext block C . The van Oorschot-Wiener attack (and the variants we have so far described) cannot use such information, rather restricting the attack scenarios.

Such a situation could easily arise in practice. To take a simple example from the payments industry (where 2-key triple DES is in use), the ISO 9564-1 [9] Format 0 PIN block involves creating a 64-bit plaintext block by combining an account number with a 4-digit PIN [9]. If a triple-DES-enciphered Format 0 PIN block is obtained for which the account number is known, then the only unknown information in the plaintext is the value of the PIN, for which there are only $10^4 \approx 2^{13}$ possible values.

Such partial plaintext information can be used in a further modification to the van Oorschot-Wiener attack. This modification arises from the observation that the attack will still work even if some of the plaintext/ciphertext pairs are actually false. If a false pair generates a candidate key, then this key will be rejected when it is checked against ‘correct’ pairs. Of course, there is the danger that the check at the end of step 4 might be done using a false pair, and hence a valid candidate would be rejected, but we can avoid this if we assume checking is always done using valid data.

This observation can be used to make use of partial knowledge of a plaintext block (for a known ciphertext block) by generating a set of plaintext/ciphertext pairs all having the same ciphertext element. That is, we generate all the plaintext blocks P which satisfy the known information, and for each such ‘possible’ plaintext block we create a pair containing it and the known ciphertext block. We then add them all to the set of known plaintext/ciphertext pairs used in the attack. For example, if we have a ciphertext block C for which we know all but w bits of the plaintext block, we then generate 2^w plaintext/ciphertext pairs with plaintext blocks covering all possibilities for the ‘missing’ w bits, all with the same value of C . Of course, all but one of these pairs will be false, but this does not matter.

To see how this affects the attack, we give below a modified version of the generalised attack technique given in Section 3.3 — only steps 1 and 4 are changed, and hence we only show these steps. Whilst we could readily combine this modification with the attack exploiting the complementation property, in order to simplify the presentation we avoid doing this here.

We suppose that we have n ciphertext values, for some of which we have only partial plainrext. We assume that in every case there are at most 2^w candidates for the plaintext block, i.e. the set of mostly false pairs for a single ciphertext block contains at most 2^w pairs.

- 1'' Assemble the pairs (P, C) into subsets including the sets of mostly false pairs (as above), where all the pairs in each subset have been created using the same key, and assign each subset a label s . Note that there will be at most $2^w n$ pairs. Tabulate all the (P, C, s) triples, sorted or hashed on the plaintext values, to create Table 1, which requires $2^w O(n)$ words of storage. Note that there may be repeated P values,

but this should not create a major implementation difficulty.

4'' Each entry in Table 2 contain a B value and the corresponding key i and label s , where i is a candidate for K_1 for label s ; as described above, each (B, i, s) triple is associated with a (P, C, s) triple in Table 1 where $e_i(P) = A$. It remains to search for values for K_2 .

For each of the 2^{56} candidates, j , for K_2 , calculate what the value B would be if j had been used for K_2 , i.e. $B_j = d_j(A)$. Now look up B_j in Table 2. For each appearance of B_j (if any) the corresponding key i from Table 2, along with key j , is a candidate for the desired pair of keys (K_1, K_2) with label s . Each such candidate key pair is then tested on at most two other plaintext/ciphertext pairs from the label s subset (where either the mostly false pairs are avoided, or where only the partial information about the plaintext is used in the checking). If this key pair gives the correct results then the triple DES key (K_1, K_2) with label s has been found and the task is complete.

It remains for us to consider the complexity of this modified attack.

- Table 1 will contain at most $2^w n$ entries. The time required to create and sort/hash Table 1 remains negligible compared to other computations as long as $n \ll 2^{56-w}$. The space required is $2^w O(n)$.
- For each trial value A , Table 2 costs a little more than 2^{56} DES computations to create (assuming Table 1 is hashed on the plaintext values so that look-ups take a constant time). Because only 2^{56} out of 2^{64} possible 64-bit blocks are searched for in Table 1, the expected number of entries in Table 1 is $2^{w-8} n$, i.e. the storage required for Table 2 is negligible by comparison with Table 1.
- Working with Table 2 to find candidate pairs of keys costs a further 2^{56} DES computations. That is, testing a single value of A costs a total of around 2^{57} DES computations.
- The probability of a single iteration of steps 2–4 succeeding, i.e. giving the correct key pair, is around $n/2^{64}$, and so the total attack cost is approximately $2^{121}/n$ DES computations (assuming the cost of the various look-ups and tests is dwarfed by the DES calculations).

In summary, if we have 2^t partially known plaintext/ciphertext pairs, i.e. $n = 2^t$, and we assume $n \ll 2^{56-w}$, then 2-key triple DES can be broken using 2^{121-t} DES computations and $O(2^{t+w})$ storage. For example, if $n = 2^{32}$, i.e. if we have as many as 4 billion known (or partially known) plaintext/ciphertext pairs, then the key can be discovered in 2^{89} DES computations. That is, the extra work introduced through the use of ‘false’

pairs is minimal as long as $n \ll 2^{56-w}$, i.e. $t + w \ll 56$. Of course, the cost of storage has increased to $O(2^{t+w})$, but this is still relatively modest if $t + w \ll 56$. Note that we can reduce the total number of DES computations to 2^{120-t} by combining the above modification with that given in Section 4. Returning to the PIN block example above (for which $w \approx 13$), if $n = 2^{32}$ then the attack complexity would not be significantly different to the case where 2^{32} fully known plaintext blocks are available.

In summary we have generalised the attack to the case where only partial known plaintext is available, without significantly increasing the computational complexity of the attack; there is an increase in the memory complexity, but the attack is still feasible. This, while not simplifying the attack, means it will potentially apply in many more practical scenarios.

6 Implementation strategies

Whilst performing an attack on 2-key triple DES will clearly be a non-trivial computation, it is perhaps worth considering how it might actually be done in practice. Note that while we refer to steps 1–5 from the unmodified van Oorschot attack, the remarks below also apply to all the modified versions described above.

First note that step 1 is a one-off computation working with the known plaintext-ciphertext material to create Table 1. This step should be performed carefully to optimise the cost of the look-ups performed using Table 1 in subsequent parts of the attack. Next observe that there are obvious ways in which the remainder of the attack can be parallelised.

- Performing steps 2–4 for a particular value of A is completely independent of performing them again for a different value of A . All that is required is access to a copy of Table 1, generated by step 1. That is, software could be created which generated random values of A and performed steps 2–4, and this software could be run without reference to other running copies of the software — the only requirement is an effective random number generator so that different instances of the software generate different values of A (with high probability).
- Creating Table 2 in step 3 could be parallelised by partitioning the set of possible keys i , so that multiple machines can create Table 2.
- Similarly, the use of Table 2 in step 4 could be partitioned by partitioning the set of possible keys j . Note that each device performing this part of the attack will require a copy of Table 2. Note also that, as they are found, ‘candidate’ keys could be sent to a different device for testing using entries from Table 1.

7 Attacking the ANSI Retail MAC

7.1 Background

We next consider the impact of the van Oorschot-Wiener attack on the ANSI Retail Message Authentication Code (MAC) [1]. This MAC algorithm appears to be used in the payments industry, since it is standardised in A1.2.1 of the current version of EMV Book 2 [7]. The scheme, otherwise known as CBC-MAC-Y or ISO/IEC 9797-1 algorithm 3 [8], operates as follows. For the purposes of this paper we describe it in the context of use with DES, although the remarks apply more generally. We also use the same notation as employed previously.

A message D to be MAC-protected is first padded and split into a sequence of q n -bit blocks: D_1, D_2, \dots, D_q . The MAC scheme uses a pair of keys K_1, K_2 . The MAC computation is as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} H_1 &= e_{K_1}(D_1), \\ H_\ell &= e_{K_1}(D_\ell \oplus H_{\ell-1}), \quad (2 \leq \ell \leq q), \text{ and} \\ M &= e_{K_1}(d_{K_2}(H_q)), \end{aligned}$$

where \oplus represents bit-wise exclusive or, and M is the MAC. Note that, for simplicity, we assume that the MAC is not truncated.

It is not hard to see that this amounts to encrypting the message using single DES in CBC mode, but using 2-key triple DES on the final block; the MAC M is then simply the encryption of the final block. This suggests that the van Oorschot-Wiener attack may be relevant (and it is!).

The most effective general-purpose key recovery attack on the ANSI retail MAC algorithm requires 2^{57} DES operations and 2^{32} known message/MAC pairs, as described by Preneel and van Oorschot [27]. An alternative key recovery attack, requiring only one known MAC/message pair but a larger number of verifications, is due to Knudsen and Preneel, [15]; this attack requires 2^{56} DES operations, one known message/MAC pair, and 2^{56} online MAC verifications. Further key recovery attacks based on MAC verifications have been devised, [14, 20], although they are more relevant in the case where the MAC is truncated and so we do not describe them further here.

7.2 Applying the van Oorschot-Wiener attack

First observe that the applicability of the van Oorschot-Wiener attack to the ANSI retail MAC does not appear to have previously been considered, very probably because the ‘standard’ Preneel-van Oorschot attack is typically more effective. As discussed in Section 3, the van Oorschot-Wiener attack

requires large volumes of matching plaintext and ciphertext generated using a single key in order to be effective. Also, as discussed immediately above, the Preneel-van Oorschot attack, [27], requires 2^{32} known message/MAC pairs, and if such material is available it is then significantly more efficient than the van Oorschot-Wiener attack. That is, the van Oorschot-Wiener attack does not appear to offer any advantage over the established Preneel-van Oorschot attack.

However, the fact that van Oorschot-Wiener can be made to work where the known ciphertext has been generated using multiple keys, suggests that it may have significance to this MAC scheme. We next sketch how the attack can be applied in this case. For simplicity we look at the application of the ‘standard’ version of the attack (as described in Section 3), although the generalised versions of sections 3.3 and 4 also apply.

We suppose the attacker has access to n message/MAC pairs $((D_1, D_2, \dots, D_q), M)$, all created using the same pair of DES keys (K_1, K_2) . Note that, for simplicity, we consider the padded and split version of a message. As before, we fix a 64-bit value A , and in this case hope that $d_{K_1}(M) = A$ for one of the known pairs $((D_1, D_2, \dots, D_q), M)$. If this is true, then finding K_2 only requires a single DES key search, i.e. performing 2^{56} DES operations. Of course, unless n is very large, the guess is unlikely to be true, so the attack has to be performed for many values of A . The larger the value of n , then the larger the probability of a successful guess of a value A , and hence the more efficient the attack. The attack proceeds as follows.

1. Tabulate the $((D_1, D_2, \dots, D_q), M)$ pairs, sorted or hashed on the values of M , to create Table 1, which requires $O(2^r n)$ words of storage if we make the simplifying assumption that q is bounded above by 2^r .
2. Now randomly select and fix (for steps 2–4) a value A . [This stage of the attack will succeed if and only if $A = d_{K_1}(M)$ for one of the known values of M . If steps 2–4 succeed with this value of A we can find the target key pair (K_1, K_2) ; if not, we simply repeat with a different value of A — see step 5.]
3. Create a second table (Table 2) as follows. For each of the 2^{56} possible DES keys i , calculate $M_i = e_i(A)$. Next look up M_i in Table 1. If M_i is equal to one of the value of M in Table 1, take the corresponding ciphertext message D_1, D_2, \dots, D_q and compute

$$\begin{aligned} H_1 &= e_{K_1}(D_1), \\ H_\ell &= e_{K_1}(D_\ell \oplus H_{\ell-1}), \quad (2 \leq \ell \leq q), \text{ and} \\ B &= H_q. \end{aligned}$$

Now store B together with i in Table 2, sorted (or hashed) on the B values. Note that the same B value may occur more than once.

4. Each entry in Table 2 consists of a B value and the corresponding key i , where i is a candidate for K_1 ; as above, each (B, i) pair is associated with a $((D_1, D_2, \dots, D_q), M)$ pair from Table 1 where $d_i(M) = A$. The remaining task is to search for possible values of K_2 .

For each of the 2^{56} candidates, j , for K_2 , calculate what B would be if j had been used for K_2 , i.e. $B_j = e_j(A)$. Now look up B_j in Table 2. For each appearance of B_j (if any) the corresponding key i from Table 2, along with key j , is a candidate for the pair of keys (K_1, K_2) . Each such candidate key pair is then tested on at most two other message/MAC pairs. If this key pair gives the correct results then the target DES key pair (K_1, K_2) has been found.

5. If step 4 fails, then steps 2–4 are repeated for a new value of A .

7.3 Impact on security

The algorithm is very similar to that given in Section 3. As a result, the complexity considerations are very similar too, with the following exceptions.

- Table 1 is now larger, containing a q -block message and a 64-bit MAC. If, as above, we assume $q \leq 2^r$ for some r , then Table 1 will contain at most $2^{r+3}n$ bytes.
- Computing an entry in Table 2 will take up to $r+1$ DES computations instead of a single DES computation.
- Checking a candidate key pair will take up to $r+2$ DES computations.

However, as long as r is not too large, say $r \leq 2^{10}$ then even if n is as large as 2^{40} , Table 1 will contain at most 2^{53} bytes. Since the number of entries in Table 2 is much less than in Table 1, and similarly the number of candidate key pairs is much less than 2^{56} , the other two differences do not affect the overall attack complexity.

Given the generalisations to the van Oorschot-Wiener attack described above, if we have 2^t known message/MAC pairs, i.e. $n = 2^t$, and the message length is bounded above by 2^r , then the ANSI retail MAC can be broken using 2^{120-t} DES computations and $O(2^{t+r})$ storage. For example, if $n = 2^{32}$, i.e. if we have as many as 4 billion known message/MAC pairs, then one of the DES key pairs used can be discovered in 2^{88} DES computations. The main novel observation here is that the known message/MAC pairs do not need to all have been generated using the same pair of keys.

Hence if, for example, no more than 2^{30} message/MAC pairs are available generated using a single key, the Preneel-van Oorschot attack will simply not apply, whereas the attack described above will. That is, limiting the

number of MACs generated using a single pair of DES keys, whilst effective in mitigating the Preneel-van Oorschot attack, does not protect against the generalised van Oorschot-Wiener attack.

These observations suggest that in practice this MAC scheme has become dangerously weak. Unlike the encryption case, where known plaintext may be difficult to obtain, known message/MAC pairs are likely to be readily available whenever protected data is intercepted. Moreover, the attack outlined above will still work (with increased storage complexity) even if the MAC is truncated, e.g. from 64 to 48 bits. Precisely the arguments given in Section 5 apply, since a message/truncated MAC pair can be used to generate 2^t message/untruncated MAC pairs (only one of which is valid) assuming the known MAC is truncated by deleting t bits.

8 Conclusions — the future of 2-key triple DES

The fact that the van Oorschot-Wiener attack works with both plaintext/ciphertext pairs generated using a multiplicity of keys and with partially known plaintext significantly enlarges the set of scenarios in which the security of 2-key triple DES is at risk. Whilst obtaining 2^{32} known plaintext-ciphertext pairs all generated using a single key sounds difficult for an attacker, obtaining the same number of only partially known plaintext/ciphertext pairs possibly generated using a multiplicity of keys seems greatly more plausible. This is why we suggest that the estimate of 80-bit security seems a very realistic estimate, and does not leave much margin of safety. In particular, advice to change keys regularly does not give the protection expected. Of course, performing regular key changes is good advice, but does not reduce the attack's success probability; it only limits the impact of a successful attack.

80 bits of security does not seem very much today, given that 56 bits of security, as provided by single DES, was deemed very risky 30 or more years ago. It would therefore seem prudent to replace 2-key triple DES as soon as possible, either with the 3-key variant or, preferably, with a more modern and more efficient algorithm like AES. Use of AES also allows the introduction of 256-bit keys, giving protection against possible attacks based on quantum computing.

Finally we also observe that the observations in Section 7 cast very serious doubt on the future viability of the ANSI retail MAC when used with DES.

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