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Nationalism in the Post Cold-War World

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NATIONALISM IN THE POST COLD-WAR WORLD

A Thesis for the University Honors Program

Krista Knaul
Fall 1996

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Abstract

Nationalism--one of the most salient forces working within the contemporary system of states--is on the rise, and no state is immune. Contemporary nationalism is fundamentally different from that which first appeared on the political scene more than two centuries ago. In the international system, state sovereignty is recognized over the right of self-determination of nations. Since the right of self-determination is incompatible with sovereignty, changes must be made. Some nations work toward receiving a voice or gaining greater autonomy; others clamor for secession. It is the latter which poses the greatest threat to peace and international stability. There are various ways to resolve nationalistic conflict; the key lies in finding solutions for nationalism before it occurs. States should form governments which are inclusive, yet preserve cultural autonomy; nations must feel they have a voice in the political system. Multinational organizations and institutions should also be embraced by the world community. Ultimately, one must realize that each state, though possessing similarities, is also unique. Solutions must therefore be sought which are appropriate for each state.

Acknowledgments

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Introduction and Definitions

Nationalism--one of the most salient forces working within the contemporary system of states--is on the rise, and no state is immune. For many states, nationalism poses *the* most serious threat to their political development today (Connor, 1994). Indeed, studying nationalism--its components and its impact--should help one better perceive such world crises.

Before proceeding, however, the student of political theory should clarify the words *nation*, *state*, *nation-state*, and *nationalism*, with the following definitions being used for the present study. A nation is a group of people who perceive themselves as sharing a common identity. It could be of a religious, ethnic, linguistic, geographical, historical, or cultural nature. The key to defining a nation is in the group's perception of itself. Walker Connor explains the definition in another way: it is "the largest human grouping characterized by a myth of common ancestry. The historical accuracy of the myth is irrelevant" (1994, 80). Identifying the exact number of nations or ethnic groups throughout the world is extremely difficult--for a variety of reasons. International organizations do not have statistics on all ethnic groups because they are difficult to define and observe, and their existence is often denied, or at least minimized, by their state's government (Gurr 1993). Geographer Bernard Nietschmann (Gurr 1993) estimates there

are between 3000 and 5000 nations in the world. Alternatively, political scientists Gunnar Nielson and Ralph Jones (Gurr 1993) identify 575 ethnic groups as "actual or potential nation-states." The disparate views between these studies help to provide an example of the difficulty in defining just how many nations actually exist. This is especially true when even the concept of a nation is greatly disputed.

As defined by international law, the state is the sovereign, legitimate government of the peoples of a territory. The state includes the government and all groups within its boundaries; it is the country. For example, the United Nations has 185 member states. This membership list is not comprehensive, though, as Switzerland and Taiwan are both states that are not part of the UN.

The misuse of the words *nation* and *state* can be seen in many common words. One need only look toward such examples as the Inter*national* Court of Justice, the Inter*national* Monetary Fund, and Inter*national* relations to see why so many people confuse the two terms (Connor 1994). Each of these examples would be more accurate if the word *state* replaced *nation*. Although these terms are easily confused, it is the state that is the repository of international rights and power.

A nation-state is a state with a single, homogenous nation within its boundaries. Thus, if all states were nation-states, there would not be as much need for a distinction between the two terms *nation* and *state*. Conceptually, however, the *people* would still be linked by their identity (psychological), the *citizens* linked by their government (legal).

Finally, nationalism is the belief that nations should govern themselves--that they have the right of self-determination. It involves ultimate loyalty toward the nation and is the means by which a group achieves cohesiveness and unity. Nationalism can be either a

positive or negative force in the international sphere. If a nation has autonomy or a voice in government, nationalism acts as a unifying force--much the same as patriotism is viewed. However, when a nation is suppressed within a state, nationalism is viewed as a destructive force; it serves to unite the nation against the country, that is, against the majority group(s) and present government. To further understand what actually causes nationalistic tension, one may examine some of the controversies surrounding nations and states. Then when the causes are established, she may probe for solutions.

A Brief History of Nationalism

The nationalism that has emerged today, characterized mostly by ethnic conflict of minority groups in third-world countries, is vastly different from nationalism when it first emerged on the political scene. Understanding the history of nationalism is imperative not only to comprehending modern-day nationalistic conflicts, but also to recognizing solutions to the uprisings it causes. In 1861 John Stuart Mill first posed the issue of nationality in his Considerations on Representative Government (Connor 1994). Mill stated that the authority of government should coincide with the boundaries of a nation. Contrary to Mill, in 1862 Lord Acton asserted that having several nations within a state is the only way to prevent an absolutist ruler and secure the freedoms of the people (Connor 1994). Lord Acton believed multiple nations within a state were the only way for a civilization to progress. He did not want assimilation, however, but complete autonomy of cultures. In such early written debates on nationalism, scholars set out to determine whether a state could progress better if it were a cohesive nation-state or a state having many nations within. Nationalism today is greatly different from that of Mill and Lord Acton. Most states do not coincide with only one homogenous nation within its boundaries. Furthermore, in the contemporary state system, having multiple nations in a single state seems to lead to increased ethnic conflict--not increased freedoms for the

nations.

For the most part, before the Age of Enlightenment and French Revolution, cultures that were assimilated were not cognizant of belonging to different groups (Connor 1994). Today people have a much greater awareness of their membership. Although group identity sometimes existed for the state, before the 1800s groups were not clamoring for nationalistic reasons. With the French Revolution, the masses became more conscious of their identity. With this identity, nationalism became a driving force of political and cultural integration for the peoples of the state (Kohn 1945). Nationalism can especially be seen with the French Revolution, in which the masses mobilized in order to have direct rule over themselves. This is precisely what Walker Connor (1994) avers when noting that nationalism is a mass, not an elite phenomenon. Nationalism did not come into being until the masses in society became cognizant of their group affiliation and mobilized as a nation. In other words, nations can exist without nationalism.

After World War I, the doctrine of self-determination--as envisioned by the victors--rose to the pinnacle of the international scene. The victors wanted to divide nations into sovereign states (Kedourie 1993). Furthermore, the allies believed that nations which governed themselves were likely to establish civil and religious freedoms within their states (Kedourie 1993). But the international law doctrine of "self-determination of nations" was not meant to encompass the world, only to give sovereignty to those nations under the rule of defeated powers (Connor 1994). The League of Nations was to prohibit annexations and promote the self-determination of nations. The proliferation of new nation-states did not lead to increased peace or stability. Instead, it led to new conflicts, including World War II. The disasters of defining

boundaries along nationalistic lines can be seen in Europe's history after 1919, for the new boundaries did not increase political freedom, prosperity, or peace (Kedourie 1993).

Before World War II, states viewed nationalism as a people's desire to be free (Barkin and Cronin 1994). After the War, however, a new variant of nationalism emerged. This "ultra-nationalism," characterized by expansionism and xenophobia, rose in prominence and was viewed as a threat to international peace. Nationalism was perceived differently in the first, second, and third worlds (Connor 1994). The first-world states regarded themselves as cohesive nation-states where nationalism was too old and outdated to be an issue. The second world believed that because all peoples would be educated in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, nationalism "was either superfluous or anachronistic" (Connor 1994, 68). The third world, where the majority of ethnic conflicts exist today, consisted of multinational states that tended to be ignored by the first and second worlds. The lid would have to cover the simmering pot of nationalism in the third world throughout the period of empires and bipolarity. The end of the Cold War served as the catalyst that activated the fertile ground of nationalistic conflict. The American civil rights movement in the 1960s did help to motivate minorities elsewhere who were threatened by modernization or historical grievances, but from the time of the second World War through 1989, nationalism was not a serious problem to the international community. Many nations were still searching for their self-identification during this time. Since the unification of Germany in 1989, and especially since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, ethnic conflict has exploded into the spotlight. Stated differently, before the French Revolution wars were fought with princes or absolute monarchs; after the French Revolution, conflict arose between states. By the end of World War I,

nationalism--and conflicts with nations--had risen to the forefront of international politics. During the Cold War, tensions arose mainly between communism and democracy. Each of these past conflicts--with emperors, nations, and ideologies--was a conflict within western civilization. With the end of the Cold War, non-western civilizations moved into the center of the action (Huntington 1993). Today's nationalistic crises are fundamentally different from those of the past, so different, in fact, that one must re-examine what the ingredients of a nation actually are.

Primordialism v. Instrumentalism

There is much debate among scholars about the origin of nations. The primordialist viewpoint asserts that nations are discovered, not created, and that nations are an obvious division of the world's population. Primordialism assumes nations are a natural phenomenon--a "given" in life. According to Elie Kedourie (1993), nationalist doctrine maintains that nations are primordial. Primordialism emphasizes a group's defense of its ethnic identity (Gurr and Harff 1994). Conversely, instrumentalism states that nations are created. Usually developed by the elites, nation formation is important for advancing the elites' aspirations. Instrumentalist theory asserts that since a group's main goals are for material and/or political gains, ethnic identity is created to further these ambitions (Gurr and Harff 1994).

These two theories seem contradictory, but Gurr and Harff (1994) believe they are not as fundamentally opposing as some scholars may believe. Groups are most likely to mobilize if there is a strong sense of group identity, and perceived disadvantages or discrimination. When different ethnic groups compete for the same resources, their identities become more important to them. Thus, when one group is more successful, inequalities increase, and may lead to an instrumental approach by elites for mobilizing ethnic groups in conflict. In other words, as differences among groups become apparent, leaders can manipulate disparities and use them to unite one group against another.

What Constitutes a Nation?

As noted in the beginning, there are many different interpretations of what constitutes a nation. According to Walker Connor (1994), a people's self-identification with their past, present, and future destiny are the most important ingredients. But there is a common belief that people who live on a single land mass and share common interests and traits automatically constitute a nation (Connor 1994). Kedourie asserts that "people who speak an original language are nations, and nations must speak an original language" (1993, 61). Disagreeing with Kedourie, Connor observes that there is "a vivid sense of sameness or oneness of kind, which, from the perspective of the group, sets it off from all other groups in a most vital way" (Connor 1994, 145).

Just because a group perceives itself as a nation does not necessarily make it politically cohesive or united. This "emotional force and cohesion" of ethnic groups is derived from their common values and experiences (Gurr 1993, 4). Cohesiveness and an appeal to a group's "collective identity" are important in helping to create a politically active ethnic group. This is especially true when one considers that a sense of kinship usually does not exist past the nation (Connor 1994).

There are some instances in which indigenous peoples are considered nations as well. According to the definition set out by the Working Group on Indigenous

Populations (created by the United Nations in 1983), almost every nation could also be considered an indigenous people. The majority of scholars agree that the most essential criteria for an indigenous group is "that the group be antecedent to all other subsequent arrivals" (Corntassel and Primeau 1995, 345). However, even this distinction has been blurred by the fact that many times there are no historical records for a group. More importantly, many groups believe in their common ancestry--even though it may be a myth. Corntassel and Primeau (1995) set out three categories for aboriginal populations: first, those colonized by a Western imperial power, second, nations bereft of coinciding state boundaries (by the Working Group's definition, these peoples are indigenous), and, finally, indigenous populations composed of aborigines, Indians, natives, minorities, first people, and/or those in the "fourth world." As the previous definitions show, some nations in the modern world could also be labeled indigenous.

The debate over what constitutes a nation is important in order to determine whether a conflict is based on nationalism, and if so, what caused the nationalistic tensions to occur. Identifying a nationalistic conflict is easier to do when based on an understanding of the situation. All of this leads to the most important question of all: how to deal with nationalism in the post Cold-War era.

Nationalism

Since the end of the Cold War, one of the most important issues relating to international peace and stability is nationalism and "the failure of the state to capture the loyalties of its citizens" (Barnett, 1995). In the most explicit sense of the term, nationalism asserts that humanity is divided into nations and that the only legitimate governments are nations which rule themselves (Kedourie 1993). Those who view nationalism from a primordialist perspective view ethnic nationalism as the impact of cultural tradition based on a primordial sense of ethnic identity (Gurr 1993). On the other hand, instrumentalists view ethnic nationalism as a response to discrimination (Gurr 1993).

As with defining what constitutes a nation, nationalism must be studied from a psychological perspective to understand its potency (Connor 1994). Nationalism should be differentiated from patriotism, though. Whereas nationalism involves ultimate loyalty to the nation, patriotism is defined as loyalty to one's state and institutions. Usually, these two loyalties do not coincide, and they compete for the individual's allegiance (Connor 1994). Nationalism is almost always a far more powerful force in the international community. One reason could be that the sense of kinship usually does not extend past the nation. Also, although belief in a common ancestry is usually just a myth, if this is one of the perceptions uniting the group, it is nonetheless extremely important.

For a nation with a state, nationalism serves as a conservative, cohesive, and unifying factor. For a nation without a state, nationalism can be divisive, disruptive, and involve changing the status quo. Geoffrey Howe asserts that nationalism can easily become "competitive" and "exclusive"(1995, 136). But there are varying degrees of nationalism. Xenophobia, or "a fear of cultural dilution" (Gurr and Harff 1994, 157), is most commonly found in ethnic conflicts where it serves as a destructive force. Civic nationalism, paradoxically, is more patriotic, salubrious, and reinforcing. It is usually found in nation-states. There is also a doctrine of expansionist nationalism which asserts that the nation-state should expand outside its boundaries in order to encompass the entire nation (Barkin and Cronin, 1994). The ethnic group may want recidivism of its boundaries, or simply the establishment of new boundaries in the international system. Whatever the case, expansionists not only want a sovereign nation-state; they want their entire nation to be under one rule.

Nationalistic tendencies are on the rise, and ethnopolitical conflicts are global in scope (Gurr 1993). The fundamental source of these nationalistic tensions is cultural. Compromise is harder when cultural/ethnic differences are involved rather than simply political or economic ones (Huntington, 1993). Another interesting factor is that nationalism is neither a right-wing nor left-wing movement (Gurr 1993). This is easily understood when one realizes that nationalistic conflict comes about when any nation invokes its perceived right to self-determination. Nationalistic tensions can currently be viewed in such places as Rwanda, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, Chechnya, Turkey, Iraq, Northern Ireland, Spain, Taiwan, and Mexico. Interestingly, ethnic groups' identities and historical grievances can be revived and persist for generations after they seem to have disappeared (Gurr 1993).

A

Case

Study

In

Nationalism

The History of Nationalistic Problems in Rwanda

Throughout the world, the roots of ethnic fighting can be traced back to nationalism within the state.   Ninety-nine and a half percent of the people living in the world today live in multiethnic states (Visiting lecturer 1995). Thus, the political environment is one in which a sovereign state can, and many times does, suppress nations within its boundaries. Rwanda is the epitome of this conflict, and of many of the controversial topics related to nationalism. This case study shows how the roots of nationalism can be planted, and provides an example of a country in which the international community utterly failed to prevent the worst case of genocide since World War II. Rwanda also furnishes a concrete illustration of how little the international community understands nationalistic crises.

Rwanda is a landlocked country in central Africa, between Tanzania and Zaire. It is in this region that the Hutu and Tutsis nations have lived among one another since the fourteenth century. In 1894, the Berlin Congress carved out the continent of Africa, giving Rwanda to German East Africa; after World War I, the Belgians inherited this territory under a League of Nations mandate. Since the 1500s, the Tutsi elite ran Rwanda with a system of government that included a monarch and a feudal caste system (Sparrow 1994). The Belgians, though, greatly magnified Tutsis influence over the Hutu majority.

The Hutu and Tutsis have lived together for more than 600 years. Before that time, these two groups were two distinct nations, but after so many centuries of peaceful co-existence, assimilation has occurred. Both Hutus and Tutsis speak the same language, have the same culture, worship the same god(s), maintain the same physical characteristics, and have gone through generations of inter-marriage (Mollan 1994). Before Rwanda was ruled as a protectorate by Belgium, these two nations were able to co-exist peacefully and develop within a single land mass. When the Belgians came to power, though, they decided to institutionalize the ethnic stereotypes in Rwanda (Mollan 1994). It is easier for a leader to have control if the people are opposing each other instead of uniting against an oppressor. Thus, the Belgians deliberately divided the Hutu and Tutsis nations in order to remain in power in Rwanda. This was done by requiring every person to carry an identity card showing to which ethnic group he/she belonged, by giving privileges to the Tutsi, and by banning Hutus from holding positions of authority. Even the Catholic missionaries endorsed the idea of Tutsis superiority in Rwanda (Sparrow 1994). The Hutu nation makes up approximately 85% of Rwanda, while the Tutsi make up less than 15%. Although these ethnic divisions were artificially implemented, they are extremely relevant in the lives of the Hutu and Tutsis.

During the 1950s, the church abandoned the idea of Tutsi superiority and sought reforms in support of the Hutu (Sparrow 1994). At the same time, the Tutsi elite were increasing their power and beginning to clamor for independence. The Belgians, too, turned their support toward the Hutu. Hutus demanded widespread reforms, especially an end to the caste system (Sparrow 1994). When the Tutsi resisted, the Hutu (supported by Belgium) were able to violently overthrow the Tutsi in 1959. Up to 100,000 Tutsis were

massacred, and at least another 100,000 became refugees in neighboring states (Mollan 1994). These refugees were not able to come back to Rwanda, and as a result a whole generation of Tutsis were born and raised in foreign countries. On July 1, 1962, Belgium granted Rwandan independence. In 1962, the United Nations recognized the partition into two states of Rwanda and Burundi; this was not done on nationalistic lines (Howe, 1995).

During the 1960s, ethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsis continued to increase as the Hutu government stimulated anti-Tutsis sentiment throughout Rwanda (Mollan 1994). No Tutsis could join the army, children were indoctrinated at school to believe the Tutsi were the enemy, the Tutsi were discriminated against in applying for jobs, and land was allocated in favor of the Hutu (Mollan 1994). In July 1973, Juvenal Habyarimana (a Hutu) came to power through a coup d'etat. President Habyarimana ruled as a dictator, although he implemented many reforms throughout Rwanda in the 1970s and 1980s. But Rwanda faced a severe problem of overpopulation as it was/is the most densely populated country in Africa (Sparrow 1994). Food production slowed as quickly as the population increased (Sparrow 1994). By 1990, President Habyarimana faced an overwhelming political and economic crisis in Rwanda.

Because of all the internal pressures President Habyarimana confronted, in 1990 he loosened his grip and allowed the establishment of multiple political parties in Rwanda. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a group which consisted mostly of second-generation Tutsi refugees living in Uganda (although it also contained Hutus who were opposed to Habyarimana's regime), interpreted this move as a diversionary tactic to continue to disallow refugees from returning to Rwanda (Sparrow 1994). On October 1, 1990, the RPF's military forces invaded Rwanda with the goals of allowing the refugees (some of

whom had been in exile since 1959) to return home, and establishing a democratic government in Rwanda (Mollan 1994). The civil war began as a war for political power in Rwanda, not as an ethnic war between Hutus and Tutsis.

President Habyarimana was determined to remain in power, so he started making plans for the extermination of the Tutsi population in Rwanda. While the government army resisted the force of 7,000 RPF rebels, they also began distributing firearms to Hutu citizen militias, or Interhamwae (Sparrow 1994). Hutu mobilizers became ethnic manipulators. The government also began a massive propaganda campaign on the radio, which broadcast such messages as "The Tutsi deserve to die, they must be killed!" and "Go out and kill Tutsi, before they kill you" (Mollan 1994). In July 1992, a cease-fire emerged from the Arusha Accords, which contained provisions to implement a broad-based transitional government that included both Hutus and Tutsis (Sparrow 1994). In the meantime, the government continued planning the cultural genocide of the Tutsi.

As T. S. Eliot (1934) wrote, "April is the cruellest month. . . " By April 1994, the United Nations had sent in troops to monitor the ongoing peace process in Rwanda. These troops witnessed the preparation of mass genocide, but the UN Security Council failed to respond. Instead, it pulled out the remaining peacekeepers. Then on April 6, 1994, the plane carrying President Habyarimana and President Cyprien Ntaryamina of Burundi was shot down. Although the cause is not clear, speculators say that Hutu extremists targeted Habyarimana (Gourevitch 1995). Within a few hours the government army and Interhamwae began murdering Tutsis throughout Rwanda, and moderate Hutus within the government. Over a period of 100 days, approximately 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were slaughtered, one million Tutsis were displaced from their homes,

and another two million Hutus and Tutsis fled Rwanda as refugees to neighboring countries. With a population of approximately eight million, almost half of the state was either dead or displaced within three months time.

The RPF was victorious over the Hutu government, and a coalition government containing both Hutus and Tutsis was established. Today, this coalition government does not have firm control over the country. More importantly, the ex-Rwandan government and military are in Zaire busily re-arming and plotting to take over the coalition government (Skoler 1995). When the RPF took power in July of 1994, they disbanded the Hutu-controlled army and instituted their rebel army as the new national army. Human rights monitors in Rwanda report that the clandestine cross-border insurgencies are increasing, while the government's arrest rates have dramatically risen as well (Hackel 1995). There are also rumors that the new government's aim is Tutsi power (The Economist 1996, 23 March). At a camp in Kibeho, there have been instances of the new Rwandan government massacring refugees (The Economist 1996, 17 February), while former prime minister, Faustin Twagiramungu, asserts that the government has killed 300,000 Hutus (The Economist 1996, 23 March). One of the results of the increased fighting is a further delay in the efforts to convince the two million refugees to return home. Immediately after the genocide ended, and until recently, refugees did not return home for fear of Hutu militiamen in the refugee camps (The Economist 1996, 17 February). Now, however, many refugees will not return to Rwanda for fear of arrest and imprisonment as suspects in the 1994 genocide. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is attempting to bring the refugees home by making life in the refugee camps less tolerable--all but the essentials for living are restricted (The Economist 1996, 17

February).

After the hundred days of genocide, the UN sent peacekeepers back into Rwanda. Spending $1.9 billion on a relief effort (Maclean's 1996), the UN utterly failed in its efforts to help the people of Rwanda. Rwandans resent the fact the UN turned the other way during the genocide, and came back only after so many people were slaughtered (The Economist 1996, 23 March). The peacekeepers left Rwanda on March 8, 1996.

Experts say the only way to bring peace to the war-torn country of Rwanda is by prosecuting those involved in the genocide. This is an extremely slow process, since over eighty percent of the judges and magistrates either fled to neighboring countries or were murdered (The Economist 1996, 23 March). On June 6, 1996, Ambassador Theogene Rudasingwa testified in a United States House of Representatives hearing on the International Tribunal. Created by U.N. Security Council Resolution 955, the International Tribunal is to prosecute the leaders involved in the killings. It has jurisdiction over serious violations of international law, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Eleven people have been indicted, including Jean-Paul Akayesu, a former mayor accused of taking part in the massacre of 2,000 people, and Georges Anderson Rutaganda, the former vice president of the Interhamwae and part owner of the "Libre des Mille Collines" which helped fuel the genocide. Scheduled to begin in September 1996, these trials have been delayed until atleast January 1997. In order to aid the International tribunal and the Rwandan justice system, foreign support must be given. With these problems, Rwanda continues to be plagued with ethnic conflict.

Seeing the ethnic nationalism that has occurred in Rwanda, one is not surprised

that Africa south of the Sahara has the greatest concentration of ethnic groups at risk for conflict--more than forty-two percent of the regional population (Gurr 1993). After World War II, self-determination in Africa was understood as synonymous with decolonization of Europe. Actually, the nations were demanding political independence of the state rather than national self-determination (Connor 1994). More than two dozen indigenous peoples south of the Sahara have been challenged because of the political and economic advantages they gained during the days of colonial rule (Gurr 1993). The Tutsi are one example of this. They benefited from positive differentials before 1971. The risk--that of retaliation or revenge--came when they lost power (Gurr 1993). The Hutu intelligentsia were not only able to unite the Hutu against the Tutsi, but they suppressed Tutsis' voices in government through state sovereignty. With Hutu in power, they were able to deny the Tutsi their basic human rights, which the UN and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as UNICEF, OXFAM, and Earth Action were unable to prevent. The UN supported the right of Rwandan sovereignty by evacuating the 2,700 troops (which had been brought in to monitor the peace process under the Arusha Accords) once the genocidal civil war began in April 1994. A report from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation shows that the UN peacekeepers were well aware of the planning of the mass genocide by Hutus, but did nothing to stop it (Begleiter 1994).

Since 1959, when Hutus first came to power in Rwanda, ethnic nationalism has continuously increased. Characterized by a destructive xenophobia which sought to suppress the Tutsi at all costs, the Hutu intelligentsia were able to transform a civil war initially begun over the fight for political power into a nationalistic war in which the Hutu nation slaughtered the Tutsi. In fact, the Hutu elite were so effective in uniting the Hutu

peoples that women and children participated in the genocide (African Rights 1995).

Priests and other religious figures cooperated in the bloodshed as well (Hammer 1995).

Thus, elites were able to select aspects of the Hutu culture, attach to them new values and

meaning (i.e., "if you don't kill Tutsis, then the Tutsi will kill you"), and use them as ethnic

appeals to mobilize the Hutu nation (Brass 1979). These Hutu extremists in the

government sought to divide and rule, exploiting ethnic tensions to further their cause

(Clancy 1995). Xenophobic feelings continue today, as many nationalistic Hutu refugees

have formed guerrilla bands that cross into Rwanda at night to ambush soldiers, lay land

mines, and sabotage the infrastructure--ultimately hoping to bring an end to the current

Tutsi-controlled government (Hackel 1995). As the civil war began and the Hutu

intelligentsia tried to ethnically unite their nation against the Tutsi, many Hutus did not

follow, however. In fact, countless Hutus hid and saved Tutsis; many lost their lives

(Griener 1994).

While the Hutu took advantage of their power in control of the sovereign state, the

Tutsi never invoked their right of self-determination. As a minority group of oppressed

peoples, the Tutsi did not want to secede from Rwanda. The majority of Hutus also did

not want the mass genocides to take place or for the Tutsi to secede. On the basis of

cultural, physical, and religious characteristics these peoples formed one nation within one

state. As Faustin Twagiramungu, the former prime minister of Rwanda, asserts, "We are

the same people--speak the same language. We also have intermarriage and we don't

know why we should keep on fighting each other. . . . the objective is to have a common

nation" (Begleiter 1994).

During the 100 days of civil conflict, Rwanda experienced the worst case of

genocide since World War II. The international community looked with horror at the fighting going on between the Hutu and the Tutsi, yet was (and still is) reluctant to become involved in what appears to be just a civil conflict within a sovereign state. The present state of affairs in Rwanda is like a time bomb that could erupt at any minute. If left uncontrolled, this situation could erupt into war on a very large scale (Carter 1995).

As the Rwandan disaster shows, the international community must work toward solving crises at an early stage; governments cannot wait for mass genocides to begin before taking action. Ted Robert Gurr (1993) has outlined some solutions to specifically deal with conflict in Africa. Political parties, especially the ones in power, need to allow for greater input from multiethnic masses. There must be supraethnic party identities and political interaction allowing different ethnic groups to identify with the same political party. There must be fair competition between the parties. There should also be a greater reliance on regional solutions and a decreased reliance on foreign intervention to contain ethnopolitical conflict. In the case of Rwanda, however, some observers conclude that a few thousand more UN peacekeepers could have averted the genocide (Forbes 1996).

For Rwanda specifically, Ambassador Theogene Rudasingwa has outlined his visions for Rwanda's future. There must be a break in the divisions of the ethnic groups. They have been created and can be removed gradually if the government dedicates itself to this goal. The identity "Banyarwanda" could be the national identity. All ethnic groups should participate in the government, and all should benefit from progress. Economic opportunity must be created so as to have "self-sustaining growth and development." Finally, Rwanda would be more secure if there was increased cooperation and integration of Africa.

The

Legal

Perspectives

of

Nationalism

States, Nation-States, Sovereignty, and Self-determination

Since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, states have been the main actors in international affairs. States, in contrast to nations, are essential for a civilized society (Howe, 1995). With stable institutions, states can better ensure compliance of laws. Moreover, they already have an established government with political institutions. According to Barkin and Cronin (1994), this should lead to a more stable international system.

Multinational states are the most common in the world, homogenous nation-states the least (Connor 1994). The boundaries for nations and states rarely coincide. Yet, a nation-state is legitimized by the fact that it represents the political ideology of a single nation (Barkin and Cronin 1994). A true nation-state must be entirely homogenous.

There are examples of minority nations within states that coexist amicably--the Swedish minority in Finland, the immigrants in the Netherlands, and the Irish Americans in the United States (Gurr and Harff 1994). In each of these states, the minority group was not forced to give up its cultural identity. A person should not be forced to choose between the nation and the state; one should be allowed to identify with both (Howe 1995). If this were always the case, nationalistic conflicts would not be as numerous as they are.

The doctrine of self-determination for a nation is contrary to that of sovereignty for the state. It is not possible to satisfy both statist and nationalist principles at the same time (Barkin 1995). State sovereignty is equivalent to power over a territory. National sovereignty is equivalent to power over the people. At times when international norms legitimize states' rights over nations, the international community tends to support states in cases of conflict by ethnic groups (Barkin and Cronin 1994). Paradoxically, when international norms are more sympathetic toward national sovereignty, the world community tends to be more supportive of nations' rights to self-determination. This support may even come at the expense of the state. The legitimacy of state sovereignty varies throughout history; these changing understandings of sovereignty affect the study of international relations (Barkin and Cronin 1994).

In today's international system, the sovereignty of states is recognized over the right of self-determination of nations--it is the defining feature of the international system. Sovereignty creates an anarchic world where states have supreme authority within their governing spheres. National sovereignty, on the other hand, allows sovereign authority over a defined population (Barkin and Cronin 1994).

States were not originally empowered with absolute rights to sovereignty (Barkin and Cronin 1994). The notion that states had exclusive authority over their institutions and borders quickly developed, however. The Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the American intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 are both examples of states violating this exclusive sovereignty in another state's territory (Goldman 1994). Under the Helsinki Accords (1975), the Soviet Union agreed to uphold human rights and allow periodic reviews to make sure human rights were not being

violated. This is significant because, from this time on, the Soviet Union could no longer "assert that other countries' concerns for human rights were an intolerable intrusion into its sovereignty" (Howe 1995). With the Helsinki Accords, the role of sovereignty, at least with respect to issues involving human rights, was diminished.

According to Steven E. Goldman (1994), all states are not equal and, therefore, should not have equal sovereignty. Legitimate states--those which are democratic--have full sovereignty and a legitimate right to intervene in non-legitimate states--those which do not possess equal sovereignty. Kevin Ryan (Goldman 1994, 127) avers,

> Any government that, in principle, prevents the exercise
> of people's right to internal self-determination is illegitimate,
> and efforts by outside forces to give a voice to the people
> are justifiable in principle.

Thus, dictatorships which deny the right of self-determination within a state do not have the right to absolute sovereignty. Goldman (1994) asserts that legitimate states are democratic; undemocratic states are not legitimate and are not sovereign.

The idea of sovereign states is becoming intermingled with the global economy. The marketplaces have bypassed national and state boundaries (Howe 1995). Sovereignty is decreasing. Gidon Gottlieb (1993, 18-19) gives examples of this as the U.S. and European States exercise jurisdiction beyond state boundaries: governing seabed activities; enforcing Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, drug policies, environmental laws, and non-proliferation treaty obligations; and thwarting terrorism. Yet the doctrine of state sovereignty continues to have popular appeal in the post Cold-War world (Gottlieb 1993) and probably will not be significantly decreased any time in the near future.

When national self-determination is invoked, it leads to disorder in the

international system. According to Kalevi Holsti (Barkin and Cronin 1994, 129), if the right of self-determination were given to every nation, there would be a proliferation of completely ineffective states. Walker Connor (1994, 19) offers multiple scenarios in which this could happen. A nation may not be prepared to rule itself, it may have too few people, its territory may be too limited, or its economy may not be viable. Each of these problems could lead to ineffective nation-states in the international system.

The United Nations charter, which states the right of "self-determination of peoples," implies that every individual has a right to participate in his/her government (Barkin and Cronin 1994). By definition, then, as long as everyone in a state has equal access to government, and the government does not control peoples outside the state, self-determination has been fulfilled (Barkin and Cronin, Winter 1994). James Mayall (1994) notes that the international community has reached a consensus that no secessionist right to self-determination should be recognized. Most groups, however, do not want secession but greater autonomy in governing themselves (Corntassel and Primeau 1995). For those groups which do want outright self-determination, sovereignty will only exacerbate problems between the ethnic group and the state (Corntassel and Primeau 1995). The proliferation of states has led to increased problems for controlling weapons and managing global issues such as AIDS, terrorism, environmental degradation, and overpopulation (Gottlieb 1993). Understanding these issues is imperative to recognizing the causes of nationalistic tensions.

Conflict Between Nations and States

Modernization theory asserts that with greater economic and political interaction between ethnic groups, ethnic identities will decrease and loyalty to the larger community will increase (Gurr and Harff 1994). Hence, cultural assimilation will occur. In actuality, although modernization has affected ethnic conflict, it has not been in the way modernization theorists hypothesized. Increased contact between ethnic groups has led to increased national consciousness, tension, and xenophobia (Connor 1994). Gurr and Harff (1994) assert this is because ethnic identities have a deep historical, social, and genetic foundation. Modernization is a threat to an ethnic group's culture and lifestyle. Moreover, increased social interaction can lead to discrimination against the minority groups by advantaged groups (Gurr 1993). In return, the disadvantaged groups react with increased ethnic identity. Modernization pressures provide the fuel for political mobilization by ethnic groups (Gurr 1993). Connor (1994) states that since the end of the Cold War, there is a much greater "frequency" and "scope" of contact between ethnic groups.

Yet in some instances, assimilation has occurred with success. The U.S. "melting pot" in the nineteenth century helped America to become a diverse cultural nation based on the belief of democracy and the American dream. Where assimilation has not worked

in the U.S., for example, with African-Americans during this same time period, it has been because the dominant group did not want assimilation--not the other way around (Connor 1994). Another instance of assimilation is with the Scottish and Welsh in Great Britain. Some groups lose their identities over time because of assimilation or marginalization by other groups (Gurr 1993). Nonetheless, assimilation is more of a threat to self-determination than is a multinational state (Connor 1994).

Conflict between nations and states has increased dramatically as the number of each has grown (Howe 1995). Discrimination and increased ethnic group identification contribute to ethnic mobilization (Gurr and Harff 1994). Gurr (1993) observes that when the dominant group works to assimilate and unite the state, the minorities feel threatened. This intrusiveness leads to an ethnic group's mobilization in support of leaders who advocate increased power in the political realm or secession. Interestingly, there are cases of tension and conflict arising even when the groups possess the same language, race, and/or religion (Connor 1994).

Not only do internal factors such as modernization and discrimination lead to increased ethnic conflict, but there are external factors as well. The economic status of the state and external support for the state contribute to the amount of ethnic conflict within a state (Gurr and Harff 1994). The more external support there is for the state, the greater the chances are that ethnic groups will use violence to challenge authorities. States with abundant resources usually have the good fortune of having greater support from the international community. However, states esteemed with greater international status are less likely to have challengers supported externally (Gurr and Harff 1994).

Within a state, the less democratic the government is, the greater the chance

violence will be used in ethnic conflict (Gurr and Harff 1994). The more violence used by political authorities, the more violence used by ethnic groups. But, if governments use extreme force, such as genocide, torture, massacres, etc., there is a decreased chance the challengers will use violence (Gurr and Harff 1994).

International law is silent on whether or not ethnic groups are allowed to use force in self-defense (Goldman 1994). Even with the United Nations Charter, which grants the right of "peoples" to self-determination, and the Universal Declaration to Human Rights, there are no universal rights that any individual or group can claim in each situation. First, there are no enforcement mechanisms for states which violate international laws. This leads to a situation in which the United Nations may act to protect the disadvantaged group(s) or maybe not. The epitome of the UN not acting to help an abused ethnic group is with the Tutsis in Rwanda. The UN peacekeepers in Rwanda were well aware of the Hutu's genocide plan. They even reported it to the UN Security Council. The Council chose to look the other way, however, and instead of acting to protect the Tutsis, the UN completely withdrew when the mass exterminations began.

Ethnic groups which have gone through the self-identification process may want to protect and assert their identity (Gurr 1993). Most indigenous peoples and ethnonationalists aim at secession or greater autonomy from the state (Gurr 1993). If the latter cannot be achieved, groups look toward the idea of secession. These demands for secession are the most threatening because they can lead to the breakup of the state. In order to achieve secession, nationalistic wars are usually fought to the end (Gurr 1993). For secession to be successful, domestic as well as international support is critical. Thus, some states may calculate the costs of a nationalistic war and then negotiate with the

ethnic group for greater autonomy rather than secession (Gurr 1993). There are many reasons for this, with cost-benefit analysis being of critical concern. But, if a state is otherwise homogenous, allowing secession for a rebellious nation may make the state more governable (Gurr 1993).

Democratic states have usually been successful in accommodating ethnonationalists before there is a serious rebellion (Gurr 1993). But, because of the rise of nationalism, multinational states have tended to become less democratic (Connor 1994). In general, democratic governments do not participate in human rights violations or the "systematic denial of self-determination" (Goldman 1994, 127). Not surprisingly, most of the African and Asian states that are involved in ethnic conflict are not democratic (Connor 1994). Rwanda is a good example.

Ways Ethnic Groups Assert Nationalism

There are different types of ethnic groupings, each with its own unique ways of dealing with other nations and the state. Indigenous peoples are usually greatly disadvantaged and suffer discrimination, but their demands and actions are seldom a threat to international security (Gurr and Harff 1994). Communal contenders seek a greater share of power within the state system; this is usually sought by conventional methods (Gurr and Harff 1994). Ethnonationalists pose the greatest threat to states in the international system because they want greater autonomy and/or independence (Gurr and Harff 1994). Separatists, too, are nations which want political autonomy or independence (Gurr and Harff 1994). Pluralists, however, are ethnic groups which seek equal treatment within the state; this includes some victims of genocide as well as others who are discriminated against but do not seek independence (Gurr and Harff). National peoples are regionally concentrated and have lost autonomy to the state. They preserve part of their cultural distinctions and want political separation. Minority peoples, on the other hand, have a defined political and socioeconomic status in society and are, therefore, concerned with protecting that status. Minority peoples simply want greater access and control in government (Gurr 1993).

Political mobilization of ethnic groups is caused by discrimination, competition for

access to power, the spread of ethnopolitical movements in other places, and state activities (Gurr 1993). Political action can take three main forms: nonviolent protest, violent protest including terrorism, and rebellion (Gurr 1993). Protest aims at changing policies toward a group through mobilization and showing support for reforms. Nonviolent protest has by far been the most used form of political action by ethnic groups since World War II, violent protest the least (Gurr 1993). Rebellion aims at fundamental changes in the government. The strategy is to mobilize coercive power so that the government is forced to change. This violence is planned, and can range from terrorism to all-out war (Gurr 1993). In Ted Robert Gurr's study (1993), he found that since the 1950s, all forms of ethnic conflict have dramatically increased. Nonviolent protest has more than doubled, violent protest has increased fourfold, and rebellion has increased almost fourfold as well.

For each type of ethnic group, traits help to shape their grievances and potential for acting on these concerns (Gurr 1993). The extent of the collective disadvantage (how many in the group are affected) is important, as is the salience of the group's identity. The extent of group cohesion (mobilization) and the degree of repressive control by dominant groups are also factors. Discrimination is the most important factor in maintaining inequalities between groups (Gurr 1993). The general dimensions of grievances include political autonomy, political rights (other than autonomy), economic rights, and social/cultural rights (Gurr 1993). According to Gurr (1993), large changes in the global system since 1945, including growth of the state and global economy, have led to intensified grievances of ethnic groups. Usually political and economic grievances lead to a demand for increased access to the political system as well as increased economic

opportunity (Gurr 1993). Moreover, the more distinct an ethnic group is from the dominant group, the more they tend to suffer politically and economically. Most suppressed ethnic groups live in poverty and do not have the economic opportunities as others. Cultural differentials, such as ethnicity, language, origin, customs, etc., reinforce political and economic disadvantages. Paradoxically, if the group has a history of political autonomy, this usually leads to the desire for secession. Ultimately, an ethnic group has three basic options: to work through the governmental laws and institutions of the state, to work outside the state (leave), or remain loyal to the state and not voice its concerns.

The political context of an ethnic group's action is set by the state's institutions and laws. If the ethnic group cannot voice its grievances within the established government, it may turn to more radical measures. Thus, how a state responds to grievances by minority groups is absolutely crucial in shaping the conflict's outcome (Gurr 1993). Strong states have the ability to suppress or make concessions to rebelling ethnic groups; weak states have the capability to do neither. But no state is likely to address grievances of minorities until the leaders representing the group have coherently expressed them (Gurr 1993). This is particularly evident in Rwanda. The state did not allow Tutsis a voice, and the government was weak. The radical measures that erupted were worse than anyone's worst nightmare.

Solutions

To

Nationalistic

Conflict

Answering the Controversial Questions About Nationalism

With each of the controversial issues raised about nationalism, ultimately one must decide which arguments are more sound. The primordialist versus instrumentalist debate is one example. Ted Robert Gurr (1993) notes the two viewpoints are not necessarily the polar opposites some scholars portray. Both are important for mobilization. When group identity and grievances about disadvantages are weak, there is little chance for mobilization. Yet a combination of the two "provides highly combustible material for fuel" in mobilization and political action (Gurr 1993, 124). He goes on to aver that a group's identity can be changed or maintained according to changes in a group's goals. If political, class, or economic interests shift within a group, unification may be weakened. However, the flexibility of identities to change is limited to a finite number of persistent identities (Gurr 1993). In other words, a nation could be primordial, even though the instrumental cohesiveness is stronger while the primordial component is weaker.

Some nations may be primordial, but biological, cultural, linguistic, or religious givens are not always enough to predict the future development of nations. Paul R. Brass (1979) helps to define this debate by listing criteria which must be met in order for nations to be primordial. Brass notes that unless *descent* translates as *shared cultural features*, one cannot define the term broadly enough to include everyone. But cultural *features* are

not necessarily a primordial phenomenon, although some primordialists believe that looking at a distinct group is sufficient to predict future developments of nations. No one, however, could have looked at the English, Irish, Italian, German, or other ethnicities in Europe in the sixteenth century and predicted they would form a cohesive American nation just a few centuries later.

The situation in Rwanda provides another example in the debate. When the Tutsi arrived in present-day Rwanda in the fourteenth century, the Hutu were already there. It was the Tutsi who instituted the feudal caste system. However, assimilation between the groups did occur. It was under the Belgian rule that the differences between the two nations were exploited. Rwanda exemplifies that, whereas nations may be primordial, mobilization of a nation is instrumental.

The discussion on primordialism versus instrumentalism helps explain why groups mobilize, which is the immediate precursor of political action, but it does not show what the ingredients of a nation are. The Rwandan case study also provides an example of what constitutes a nation. For Rwanda, the Hutu and Tutsis were of the same language, culture, religion, etc., but they still perceived themselves as different nations. Kedourie (1993) maintains that if a group speaks an original language they constitute a nation. With Rwanda, this statement is clearly false. Perception is the key to a nation. If a nation *perceives* itself as a separate group, this is the important ingredient for nation formation. Nonetheless, the majority of nations are primordial. It is nationalism--or group identity and mobilization--which is instrumental.

If perception is the key determinate in the formation of a nation, then there cannot be any definitive criteria which can be applied to all nations. Any gauge used to determine

what a nation is can only be ambiguous and changing at best (Gottlieb 1993). Each

group's perception of itself could be different in comparison with that of other groups. A

group's perception of itself could even be subject to vicissitudes.

Resolving Nationalistic Conflict

Throughout the world, there are more than two hundred ethnic and religious groups which are contesting their positions (Gurr 1993). For these groups and others, there are many different types of governmental policies to deal with conflict. Aside from granting the ethnic groups autonomy--which is a struggle to secure and is not necessarily permanent once secured--public policy makers can take up policies of containment, assimilation, pluralism, and power-sharing. Gurr (1993) defines the main characteristics of these four public policies as follows: containment involves keeping minorities separate and unequal, assimilation requires absorbing minorities into society, pluralism necessitates maintaining equal rights for the group with separate status for the individual components, and power-sharing involves organizing society on communal lines. Today, there are not many advocates of containment policies directed toward nations. Assimilation policies usually do not threaten the dominant groups; however, some minorities, as well as majorities, do not want to be assimilated. Pluralist policies have major economic and political implications. Because pluralism requires equality among ethnic groups, many times economic wealth and political power must be redistributed. Finally, power-sharing, or consociationalism, allows each ethnic group to have proportional representation in government and for each group to have a veto right (Gurr 1993). But proportional

government still allows the dominant group to abuse its larger share of the power. Different policies obviously work better under variable circumstances.

Another solution to nationalistic tension is allowing the nation regional autonomy. For the present government, regional autonomy is cheaper and less threatening than civil war and secession (Gurr 1993). It is also more beneficial than secession to the ethnic groups because cultural autonomy, control over mineral resources, government subsidies, and participation in state decisions affecting them can be negotiated (Gurr 1993).

Allowing each nation statehood is a radical proposal that would create an abundance of new problems. There would be so many sovereign nation-states that the international system would be chaotic. Moreover, there are no rigid guidelines to establish which groups constitute a nation. It would not be plausible to grant every nation independence simply on the grounds of its "perception" of itself as a nation. Geoffrey Howe (1995) states that the right to a nation's preservation of culture, language, etc., does not lead to the right of secession for nations. Moreover, the difficult normative question of *should* this group constitute a nation, as well as the empirical question of *does* this group constitute a nation, would have to be answered. Minorities would faction off from the new nation and want to invoke their right of self-determination as well. New conflicts within ethnic groups would be created. Gurr (1993) concludes that reconstructing boundaries would cause more problems than it resolves. He asserts that there are simply some ethnic aspirations that cannot be satisfied. In the end, the means of achieving cohesive nation-states would probably be war. Current norms in international law are not equipped to deal with today's nationalistic conflicts (Gottlieb 1993). The nationalistic belief that all nations should have statehood can only be solved by eradicating the idea.

The true test for the future of international relations is not just in identifying nationalistic conflict, however, but solving it. The world is currently ruled by the "largely ineffective international supervision" of the G-7 (Gottlieb 1993, 7). The international system must come to better understand the ethnic conflicts arising today in order to achieve international peace and stability. A solution for one nationalistic crisis may simply create more problems for another. Although there are similarities between nationalistic tensions in different states, world leaders must recognize the differences in order to better resolve tensions and uprisings. One thing is certain: present systems of government will not work. State sovereignty must be weakened--especially in countries where nationalistic conflict occurs. If the international system can achieve weakened sovereignty, more power can be given to nations, and, then, maybe nations would not find it necessary to invoke their right to self-determination. Cultural autonomy must be preserved; nations should not feel threatened by modernization or assimilation. Similarly, nations which gain power should not impose their cultural beliefs or standards upon other peoples. Ethnic groups should be given legal recognition. This would lead to disputes being settled in a more humane and orderly way (Gurr and Harff 1994). Nations should also not receive the right to absolute sovereignty. Instead, states should establish pluralist or power-sharing systems. The rights of minorities to participate in government must be upheld. For nationalistic tensions to be curbed, nations must feel they have a voice in the political system. In states where one nation is largely dominant, pluralist systems would seem to work better, although the majority would resent equal rights with the minority. But for a pluralist state system to work, the international community of states must be willing to protect the collective rights of groups within a state (Gurr 1993). In states where the

percentages of ethnic groups have less disparity, power-sharing systems of government should be advocated. Another solution would be a government with a bicameral legislature. One house would have proportional representation, the other equal representation--thus providing a compromise between pluralistic and power-sharing governments. The key is that all ethnic groups have a voice, and that their voice not be trampled on by the advantaged group.

Multinational organizations and institutions should be embraced in order to help relations between nations and states. There must be international organizations to monitor states' treatment of nations. The United Nations is an obvious institution to look toward. In order for the UN to be successful, though, states must once again wholeheartedly embrace the institution. There are regional organizations such as the Council of Europe, NATO, and OSCE that could also effectively deal with nations and states. Each of these organizations must be given increased power and legitimacy in dealing with states' violations of minorities' rights. Inalienable rights, given to all humans, must be defined within the parameters of international law and enforced by every state. The UN should amend article 2.7 in the Charter to further restrict state sovereignty--it cannot be absolute. One must remember that each conflict, although having similarities, is also unique. As Gurr (1993) maintains, politically and socially creative policies must be found in order to unite minority and state interests. Most importantly, these creative policies must be implemented during the earliest stages of conflict. If these policies are implemented, the chances for containing and preventing ethnic conflict in the post Cold-War world will be increased.

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