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MAT

**A BLACK WORK-GROUP'S PERCEPTION OF
THE RESOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL GROUP CONFLICT**

BY

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THESIS

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ABSTRACT

A BLACK WORK-GROUP'S PERCEPTION OF THE RESOLUTION OF INDUSTRIAL GROUP CONFLICT

The primary purpose of this study was to determine various perceptions of a group of Black industrial workers regarding group conflict which arises between management and the workers. A second objective was to establish whether any differences exist between the perceptions of this group and those of a similar White group.

"Conflict" as a phenomenon was introduced and 'collective bargaining' as a means of resolving labour-management conflict was reviewed. This required examining the history of negotiation and its development from biblical times, the Black man's traditional method of negotiation, and the Black workers' involvement in the trade union movement in South Africa to-day.

A study of the relevant literature revealed various approaches to industrial relations, and frames of reference, and it became clear that a person's approach would largely be determined by the frame of reference adopted.

The most popular frame of reference in Western industrialized countries appears to be the pluralist perspective which views conflict as a natural outcome of human interaction. As such it is found in all labour-management interaction, and has been institutionalized through the process of collective bargaining.

The sample used in the study consisted of 424 Black and 201 White industrial workers employed in East London. The instrument used was a questionnaire designed to measure the attitudes of the two groups on various aspects of collective bargaining.

The findings of the study revealed significant differences between the attitudes of the two groups on every aspect of collective bargaining studied. This does not mean that opposite views were necessarily expressed. In some cases there was agreement, but the differences appeared in the strength of the attitudes manifested.

The main conclusion drawn was that, while the Black worker strongly believed in collective bargaining as a means of resolving problems, the current negotiation procedures, because of Black worker attitudes, were not as effective as they could be. In this respect the main recommendation submitted is that the Labour Relations Act (Act No 28 of 1956) be amended to provide for:

- i) a greater degree of in-plant bargaining, and
- ii) disclosure of relevant information by managements to enable the workers to negotiate more effectively.



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SAMEVATTING

DIE BESKOUING VAN 'N SWART WERKGROEP TER OPLOSSING VAN NYWERHEIDS- GROEPKONFLIK

Die hoofdoelwit van hierdie studie was om 'n bepaling te maak van die beskouings van 'n groep Swart nywerheidswerknemers rakende groepkonflik wat ontstaan tussen bestuur en werknemers. Tweedens is gepoog om vas te stel of daar enige verskille bestaan tussen die beskouings van bogenoemde groep en 'n soortgelyke groep Wit nywerheidswerknemers.

Die konsep ,konflik' is omskryf en kollektiewe bedinging as 'n metode om groepkonflik te skik, is ondersoek. Met die oog hierop was dit nodig om die geskiedkundige ontwikkeling van onderhandeling sedert Bybelse tye te ondersoek, asook die metodes wat die Swartman volg tydens onderhandeling; en verder Swart deelname in die ontwikkeling van vakunies in Suid-Afrika.

'n Studie van relevante literatuurbronne het verskeie benaderings ten opsigte van nywerheidsbetrekkinge asook verskillende moontlike vertrekpunte aangedui. Hieruit was dit duidelik dat 'n spesifieke vertrekpunt 'n mens se benadering sal bepaal.

Die gewildste vertrekpunt in Westerse nywerheidslande blyk te wees die pluralistiese benadering wat konflik as 'n natuurlike uitvloeisel van menslike verhoudings beskou. As sodanig word dit in alle werknemer-bestuur interaksie gevind en het dit beslag gekry deur die proses van kollektiewe bedinging.

Die monster wat tydens hierdie studie gebruik is, het bestaan uit 424 Swart en 201 Wit nywerheidswerknemers wat in Oos-Londen werksaam was. 'n Vraelys is gebruik om die standpunte van die twee groepe ten opsigte van verskeie aspekte van kollektiewe bedinging te bepaal.

Die bevindinge van die studie toon dat daar wesenlike verskille bestaan tussen die standpunte van die onderskeie groepe ten opsigte van elke aspek

van kollektiewe bedinging wat ondersoek is. Dit beteken egter nie noodwendig dat botsende standpunte uitgespreek is nie. In sekere gevalle het menings ooreengestem, maar die verskille het tot uiting gekom in die graad van erns waarmee standpunte gehuldig is.

Die vernaamste gevolgtrekking waartoe gekom is, is:

Alhoewel die Swart werknemer sterk vertrou het in kollektiewe bedinging as 'n metode van probleemoplossing, is die huidige onderhandelingsprosedures, vanweë Swart werknemers se standpunte, nie so doeltreffend as wat dit kan wees nie. Die belangrikste aanbeveling wat in hierdie verband gedoen word is dat die Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge (Wet Nr 28 van 1956) gewysig word om voorsiening te maak vir die volgende:

- i) 'n groter mate van binne-aanleg bedinging, en
- ii) openbaarmaking van relevante inligting deur bestuur om werknemers in staat te stel om meer effektief te onderhandel.



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PREFACE

Very important changes in the political, social, technological and industrial relations spheres are taking place in South Africa at present, and all South Africans, private organisations, and the government will have to make concerted efforts to adapt to meet these changing conditions if the desired economic growth rate and the concomitant political and industrial peace are to be achieved and maintained.

Black workers, who presently constitute approximately 70% of the Republic's economically active population, will increasingly be called upon to fill more highly skilled jobs if serious future labour shortages are to be avoided. This in itself will cause numerous problems, mainly because the Blacks are to a large extent unskilled and unaccustomed to an industrial environment.

The position is aggravated by the currently high inflation and unemployment rates, while at the same time the Blacks are demanding equal political rights and a greater share in the determination of conditions of employment.

The Riekert (1978) and Wiehahn (1979) Commissions of Inquiry submitted proposals aimed at achieving an acceptable and more democratic system for all workers in the Republic, and the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission in particular emphasised the need for consultation and negotiation between employers and employees. Subsequent legislation in the form of the Labour Relations Act is evidence of the government's concern.

A tragic situation in South Africa is that, while there is a shortage of labour in many of the skilled occupations, there is serious unemployment in the unskilled categories. Taken together with the unpre-

cedented high inflation rate this situation gives cause for grave concern.

It is into this situation that the Black worker is being introduced to participate in negotiation and exercise his skills in conflict resolution. His perception of and approach to negotiation and conflict resolution will unquestionably affect the degree of both political and industrial peace in the Republic in the years to come.



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CHAPTER 1

1. GENERAL AIM OF STUDY

Conflict is a phenomenon commonly found everywhere throughout the world. In fact, it may be accepted that wherever there is human interaction a degree of conflict will be found. This is basically the result of differences in human perceptions and preferences, their expectations and their interests. The form conflict takes differs from situation to situation and could be between two individuals, an individual and a group, or between two or more groups of individuals.

This is a study of industrial group conflict and involves all aspects of conflict arising between management on the one hand, and the labour force, or workers, on the other. The main purpose of the study is to obtain a better understanding of conflict, and of the various methods used in its control.

Most 'Western' countries use what is known as 'Collective Bargaining' as an approach to the resolution of industrial group conflict, with varying degrees of success. This involves bargaining between owners and managers on the one hand and working people and their organisations on the other.

An investigation into 'collective bargaining' as an approach to the resolution of industrial conflict reveals that, even in the industrialised 'western' countries, not all participants believe it to be the ideal approach. Some employers still believe that they alone should decide on the conditions of employment offered to their employees, while some trade unions, particularly those with stronger 'marxist' views, participate in the system only to get as much for the workers they represent as possible while they proceed with their ultimate aim, which is the overthrow of the present system.

If collective bargaining is such a controversial matter, even in the developed countries, how much more could one expect it to be so in developing 'third world' countries, including South Africa.

Industrial peace is primarily dependent upon the interaction between management and the workforce with the government playing a facilitative role. If this is the case, then Black workers, who comprise approximately 70% of the economically active population in South Africa, should have a substantial say in the endeavours to achieve industrial peace.

Unfortunately, from 1924 when the first Industrial Conciliation Act (Act No 11) was passed, Blacks have been precluded from participating in the negotiation of industrial agreements. It is only since the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (Act no 94 of 1979) was passed that Black workers were afforded this privilege.

As a result of this long exclusion of the Blacks from the official negotiation table, little is known of their perception of negotiation and the settlement of industrial disputes. While the adoption by the government of most of the proposals of the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation in 1979 has opened the way for the participation of all race groups in the industrial relations system, some Black unions still refuse to participate.

⊗ This study seeks to determine the Black workers' perception of the resolution of industrial group conflict, and in so doing to contribute to a better understanding of the Black worker, and to a greater degree of industrial peace.

CHAPTER 2

2. CONFLICT

A close look at the meaning of the term 'conflict' is necessary before 'Collective Bargaining' as a means of resolving labour-management conflict can be considered.

The Oxford dictionary defines conflict (noun) as a 'Trial of strength between opposed parties or principles', and as a verb intransitive as 'to be at odds, or inconsistent or in conflict with'. The Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary defines it as (noun) 'a violent collision; a struggle or contest; a battle; a mental struggle'; and as a verb intransitive as 'to fight, contend, to be in opposition; to clash'.

Interest in the phenomenon 'conflict' in this thesis will revolve around human relations and in this respect attention will be given to the inter-personal and inter-group aspects of conflict between workers and management rather than those relating to intra-individual conflict. While acknowledging that intra-individual conflict could, in certain circumstances, affect the degree of inter-personal and inter-group conflict, the discussion here will concern inter-group conflict whatever the cause.

The following forms of conflict are found. Firstly, intra-personal (intra-individual) conflict refers to a state of conflict found within an individual when he has two or more goals or interests which cannot be satisfied simultaneously. He must decide which one to forfeit, and when the goals are equally attractive this could give rise to a state of conflict within the individual.

Secondly, inter-personal conflict arises when the goals of two associated people cannot be satisfied simultaneously and one of these has to be forfeited. A simple example of this type of conflict is found in

marriage. Often conflict arises because the goals of the parties are divergent and in order to continue the association some of the goals may have to be forfeited.

Thirdly, intra-group conflict refers to that conflict found within a group. An example of this type of conflict is that found within a trade union when agreement cannot be reached among the members on certain matters.

Fourthly, inter-group conflict is that conflict which arises between groups of people when the goals of the groups cannot be achieved simultaneously and one or both groups have to compromise or forfeit their goals.

Du Brin (1981 p95) maintains that the term conflict has developed several popular meanings. Among them are controversy, strife, battle, quarrel and incompatibility. He is of the opinion that in human relations, incompatibility seems to point to the true meaning, and therefore offers the following definition:

"A conflict occurs when two goals are incompatible or mutually exclusive".

In this respect Severy, Brigham and Schlenker (1976 p4) are of the opinion that conflict is a situation in which the goals of two or more parties are incompatible to some degree, and that not all parties can achieve their desired goals at one time. They (p5) maintain that:

"No two people or groups ever agree totally on everything and where differences exist, so do the seeds of conflict. In fact, it can be argued that conflict is present, at least to some degree, in all human relationships".

This view is shared by Lyman and Scott (1979 p36) who say:

"If life consists of encounters, episodes and engagements among persons pursuing goals of which they are consciously aware, or about which they can be made aware, then it appears that the fundamental structure of human action is conflict. This is true even when individuals are pursuing the same ends, since each is out to maximise his own interest".

A further view of human conflict to be cited is that of Brown (1979 p378) who says:

"Conflict is a form of interaction among parties that differ in interests, perceptions and preferences".

Finally, reference will now be made to a more specific type of conflict, namely, 'Labour-management' or 'Industrial' conflict. This refers to that conflict arising between the labour force and its management, and could be between one employer and one trade union (group of workers), or between one employer and a number of trade unions. Similarly it could be between a number of employers and one trade union or a number of employers and a number of trade unions. It should be seen as a particular type of inter-group conflict involving, on the one hand, the employers of labour and on the other their employees. As it is this type of conflict that will be the subject of investigation in this thesis, a closer examination becomes necessary.

2.1 INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT

A number of people perceive industrial conflict simply as referring to labour strikes. This is a misconception, because strikes, while being possibly the most serious and spectacular aspect of conflict, should be

seen as being a manifestation, and therefore only a part, of the phenomenon. Kornhauser (1954 p13) maintains that any consideration of industrial conflict should examine:

"..... the total range of behaviour and attitudes that express opposition and divergent orientations between individual owners and managers on the one hand and working people and their organisations on the other".

He lists a number of manifestations of industrial conflict which he divides into two main sections; firstly, organised conflict, examples of which are strikes and lock-outs, and secondly unorganised and individual conflict, which includes such matters as labour turnover and absenteeism.

Fox (1971) presents a four-category classification of conflict. Firstly, conflict between individuals, an example being conflict between individuals within the management or union organisations. Secondly, conflict involving an individual who is not a member of a trade union, and management. Thirdly, conflict between a collectivity (trade union) and management, and lastly conflict between collectivities, an example of which could be inter-union conflict.

All these views seem to indicate that wherever there is human interaction a degree of conflict will be found. This is basically the result of differences in human perceptions and preferences, their expectations and their interests. And as the human interaction between labour and management is not unique, it may be concluded that this interaction and relationship will be characterised by a degree of conflict.

2.2. MANIFESTATIONS AND MEASUREMENT OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT

It has already been suggested that 'strikes' are perhaps the most sensational and serious manifestations of industrial conflict, but

there are many more. For example labour turnover, absenteeism, accidents and low productivity could all be indications of discontent within organisations. That is why it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accurately measure the extent of conflict in an establishment.

The number of strikes occurring is perhaps the most popular rough measure of industrial conflict but this by itself could be very misleading. For example, a larger number of strikes involving a few workers could be less serious than fewer strikes involving many workers. The length or duration of the strike must also be taken into account. It could therefore be that as far as strikes are concerned, the best measure is 'man-days lost' because of strikes. This exercise, however, would only attempt to measure one manifestation of conflict and all the others, namely labour turnover, absenteeism, accidents, low morale, low productivity would have to be considered if a more accurate evaluation of the situation is to be obtained.


Even after all these criteria have been used one could only claim to have a rough indication of the level of conflict in the organisation. This is because the level of conflict has to be relatively high before most workers will take drastic action such as striking or leaving their places of work. Also, during times of high unemployment, workers are less likely to leave their jobs than when work is plentiful. It could therefore be unwise to argue that because of the apparent absence of one or more of these criteria that there is no conflict between the management and its workers.

2.3. CHANGING VIEW OF CONFLICT

The traditional view assumed that all conflict was bad for organisations. The aim of those holding this view is to eliminate conflict and by so doing to improve performance. The current view, however, is that conflict will occur and is inevitable. The aim of those holding this view is to manage or control it. Gray and Stark (1984 pp481-482) use the following illustration to explain these two views of conflict.

FIGURE 1

Traditional and current views of conflict



From this illustration it will be seen that the traditional view assumes that when the level of conflict is low, organisational performance will be high, and vice versa. The current view however, assumes that organisational performance will be low when conflict is both low and high. It seems to indicate that a certain degree of conflict is necessary for top level performance. Brown (1979 p378) supports the current view by maintaining that:

"Too much conflict produces strong negative feelings, blindness to interdependencies, and uncontrolled escalation of aggressive action and counteraction".

On the other hand he argues that too little conflict could result in unsatisfactory decisions and costly results, and in this respect he refers to the Bay of Pigs disaster during the Kennedy administration in the United States of America. (Discussed in greater detail by Severy, Brigham and Schlenker 1976 pp340-350).

In Kochan's (1980 p19) view there is an inherent conflict of interest between employers and employees. While the employees seek job secu-

rity, income improvements, job satisfaction and better working conditions, the employers seek to promote efficiency and organisational effectiveness in order to satisfy the shareholders. This conflict is, however, limited because:

- (1) Employers and employees are interdependent (i.e. neither can survive without the other) and
- (2) Employers and employees may share common goals on a range of issues of mutual interest.

Kochan therefore appears to support the current view by arguing that while conflict of interests is inherent in the labour-management relationship, it is kept within bounds because the parties are interdependent.

It should therefore be accepted that a degree of conflict will be found in all labour-management interaction and that this situation is acceptable provided it is kept within reasonable limits. The manner in which these limits affect the negotiation process between labour and management will be referred to later in this thesis.

Now if conflict is inherent in labour-management relations, one is led to ask how it is resolved and/or controlled. The most common approach, in Western-type industrialized communities in any event, is through collective bargaining, a process which will be discussed in greater detail later in this thesis.

CHAPTER 3

3. HISTORY OF NEGOTIATION

Negotiation is not a new concept, and has taken place from the very beginning of civilisation. One of the earliest cases of negotiation is recorded in the first book of the Bible (Genesis ch 24) with the story of the old Jewish patriarch Abraham who negotiated for a bride for his son Isaac. It was the custom in those times for a father to choose a wife for his son, and in this case Abraham was not happy to choose a bride from the daughters of the Canaanites amongst whom he dwelt, so he called the eldest servant of his house, the one who ruled over all he had, and sent him to Mesopotamia to get a wife there for his son Isaac. The negotiation that took place may briefly be recorded as follows:

- * The servant agreed by oath to go as Abraham's representative to Mesopotamia to negotiate for a bride for Isaac.
- * It was agreed that if the woman selected was not prepared to leave her country to become Isaac's wife, the servant would be freed from his oath.
- * On meeting Rebekah the servant gave her a present of two golden bracelets and a gold earring.
- * The negotiation began when the servant met Rebekah's parents and brother Laban. The servant stated Abraham's case and asked for an answer to his proposals.
- * When Rebekah and her parents agreed that she would go to become Isaac's wife, the servant gave both Rebekah and her parents many valuable presents of silver, gold and clothing.
- * Rebekah accompanied Abraham's servant to become Isaac's wife.

In this simple story we have the ingredients of a near-perfect negotiating situation, namely:

- (a) Two negotiating parties (Abraham's family and Rebekah's family)
- (b) Representatives of the two negotiating parties (Abraham's servant and Laban - Rebekah's brother)
- (c) Negotiating parties of equal strength - Abraham could not force Rebekah's family to accept his proposal - they had perfect liberty to refuse.
- (d) Abraham's proposal, and gifts, were accepted by Rebekah's family who in turn gave Rebekah to Abraham to become Isaac's wife.
- (e) Had the mission failed, no blame would have attached to Abraham's servant - he would have been freed from his oath. Abraham no doubt had full confidence in his representative - he being the servant who ruled over all Abraham had.

Reference will now be made to a second example of negotiation taken from the scripture. While the first example cited was one of successful negotiation, the second one will be of unsuccessful negotiation. It is recorded in the Second Book of Chronicles, chapter 10. The negotiation that took place may briefly be described as follows:

- * After the death of King Solomon, Rehoboam, his son, reigned in his place.
- * Ten of the twelve tribes of Israel chose Jeroboam and sent him to negotiate with King Rehoboam.

- * The proposal brought by Jeroboam was:

"Your father made our yoke heavy. Now therefore lighten the hard service of your father and his heavy yoke upon us, and we will serve you".

- * The King asked for three days to consider the proposal, during which time he asked advice from certain of his men. Older men advised him to speak kindly to the ten tribes, while younger men advised that he should speak harshly to them. The King chose the latter advice.

- * When Jeroboam returned after three days the King said to him:

"...And now, whereas my father laid upon you a heavy yoke, I will add to your yoke. My father chastised you with whips, but I will chastise you with scorpions"

(Revised standard translation).

- * When Jeroboam and the people who were with him heard this, they answered the King:

"What portion have we in David? We have no inheritance in the son of Jesse. Each of you to your tents, O Israel!"

In so doing they rebelled, and caused a rift in Israel that continued for hundreds of years.

It is suggested that the reason for failure in this case was the fact that King Rehoboam misinterpreted the situation. He saw himself as being more powerful than the other party, and he therefore believed he could impose his conditions upon them irrespective of whether or not they agreed. It is thus seen that good intentions on the part of one

of the negotiating bodies ended in disaster for the other party because of an arrogant attitude and misinterpretation of the true situation. King Rehoboam did not realise that there cannot be true agreement in negotiation if terms are dictated by one party and forced upon the other.

Present-day negotiation and collective bargaining between employers and employees is the result of a long and painful evolutionary process. For thousands of years labouring men have suffered slavery, serfdom, low wages and poor working conditions, and it is only in the last few hundred years that they have succeeded in forming workers' organisations to combat exploitation. During this time employers resisted all attempts by the workers to form associations to take collective action, while they themselves were guilty of doing the same thing.

Very early cases of collective action are recorded in the Bible. In 1490 BC Hebrew brickmakers in Egypt revolted against being required to make bricks without straw. (Exodus ch 5 vs 6-19). The Webbs (1898 p2) referring to this revolt, say it was a curious precedent for the strike of the Stalybridge cotton-spinners, AD 1892, against the supply of bad material for their work.

An example of early collective action by employer master craftsmen is recorded in The Acts of The Apostles, (ch 19 vs 23-41). St Paul had been preaching in Ephesus where the word of God grew mightily and prevailed. A silversmith named Demetrius, fearing that they would lose the wealth they received by making silver shrines for Diana, the goddess of the Ephesians, called together the silversmiths who together stirred up the feelings of the people against St Paul. The object of their action was to protect their craft and businesses which they felt were threatened.

During the middle ages craftsmen formed types of masters' guilds, while associations of wage earners made an appearance. The objective in both cases was greater power through collective action. During this time

the craftsmen generally operated their own small businesses, and in this respect could be considered as employers, having 'apprentices' and labourers assisting them. It is therefore questionable whether the present trade union evolved from the craftsmen's master guilds, or from the associations of wage earners. In tracing the history of trade unions, the Webbs (1898 p12) suggest that the trade union had, in some undefined way, really originated from the craft guilds.

Hutt, (1975 p19) however, maintains that:

"...it is a question of some importance whether masters' combinations led to the formation of unions or whether it worked the other way".

He states further (p20) that:

"Evidence before the Trade Union Commission of 1867 suggested that the motive of employers' associations - reluctantly entered into - was self-defence".

One thing is certain, however. The formation of workers' bodies to protect their interests has, until recently, been strongly resisted by both employers and governments. In England, for example, employers would appeal to parliament each time a group of workers attempted to form an association. Parliament would then pass legislation prohibiting the workers from proceeding with their plans. As early as 1387, according to the Webbs (1898 p 2), the serving-men of the London cord-wainers, in rebellion against the 'overseers of the trade' were reported to be aiming at making a permanent fraternity. In 1417 the tailors' 'serving men and journeymen' in London had to be forbidden to dwell apart from their masters as they held assemblies and had formed a kind of association (Webbs 1898 p3).

Despite this opposition, men's clubs were often established under the cloak of friendly societies. These clubs were initially confined to single towns, but were later extended to include other towns and areas. The advent of the Industrial Revolution and the introduction of the factory system resulted in the divorce of the worker from ownership of the means of production. This gave impetus to the formation of trade combinations which were resisted by the English parliament. The Webbs (1898 p64) maintain that :

"Under the shadow of the French Revolution, the English governing class regarded all associations of the common people with the utmost alarm".

Associations of workers, however, continued to grow despite the attempts of the government to prevent them. The Webbs (1898 p61) say:

"Indeed, prior to the general Acts of 1799 and 1800 against all combinations of journeymen, Parliament was, from the beginning of the eighteenth century, perpetually enacting statutes forbidding combinations in particular trades".

This legislation, however, failed to contain the workers' surge to emancipation, and in 1825 a Bill to repeal all the Combination Laws and to legalise trade societies was passed. Referring to the Act of 1825, the Webbs (1898 p 97) say:

"The right of collective bargaining, involving the power to withhold labour from the market by concerted action, was for the first time expressly established".

It is therefore seen that formal employer-employee negotiation through collective bargaining has been in operation in England for the past one hundred and fifty years.

Trade Unions made an appearance in the United States of America during the closing years of the eighteenth century. (Sloane & Witney 1977 p57). As markets expanded and industrialisation took place, craftsmen could no longer count on advancing into the class of masters themselves - the scope of manufacturing was necessarily greater, and to enter the employer ranks now took capital on a scale not ordinarily available to most wage earners. Referring to this period, Sloane & Witney, (1977 p59) say:

"Basically the skilled workers' alternatives were to passively accept wage cuts, the competition of non-apprenticed labor, and the harsh working conditions, or to join in collective action against such employers innovations. Increasingly, by the end of the eighteenth century, they chose the latter course of action".

The concept of Trade Unionism and collective bargaining was carried from Europe to other parts of the world by settlers who went to colonise distant lands. As industries were established and grew in these colonies trade unionism made an appearance, being largely influenced by Europeans who had had experience in this field. In South Africa, for example, early trade unionism was strongly influenced by immigrants. (Grey Coetzee 1976 p 2; du Toit 1976 p10).

The march towards industrial democracy continues, and negotiating procedures between employers and workers are continually being refined to meet present day needs. It becomes more difficult to bargain when more than one employer and more than one trade union are involved, and reaching agreement under these circumstances is often an involved and drawn-out process, calling on the negotiating skills and expertise of the parties involved.

Negotiation in South Africa is presently in a state of metamorphosis. Recent legislation (Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (No 94 of 1979)) has opened the door to Black workers to participate, along with the other three work groups, in the negotiation process. The degree to which this group is successful in coping with the situation will go a long way towards determining the degree of industrial peace in South Africa during the next five to ten years. It is possible that the Black workers' perception of negotiation differs from that of the other groups. Whether or not this is the case, there is little doubt that Black workers will, in the foreseeable future, be playing a major role in negotiating conditions of employment with management.



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CHAPTER 4

4. THE BLACK MAN'S TRADITIONAL METHOD OF NEGOTIATION

Perhaps the best documented cases of negotiation among the Black people are those involving the custom of 'Lobola' - the process of acquiring a bride. Reference will be made to the procedures followed in this form of negotiation for various reasons. Firstly, the custom of Lobola is common throughout the Black tribes of Southern Africa (Ciskei Commission 1980 pp 211-212), Koyana (1980 p5), one of the relatively few Black writers who have dealt with the subject, says:

"The Lobola* custom goes like a thread through all the Black nations of Southern Africa..."

Secondly, it contains the ingredients of a near-perfect negotiation situation, and thirdly, all the Blacks involved in this study would either have been involved in the lobola negotiation or would at least be well aware of what takes place. It is hoped that this will result in a better understanding of the Black man's traditional method of negotiation, and may make a contribution towards understanding some of the findings which could arise out of this study.

Koyana (1980 p3) defines Lobola as follows:

"Ukulobola* is the custom whereby a young man pays cattle or their monetary value to his wife's father or guardian on the occasion of his marriage".

The cattle paid, known as "ikazi" normally vary between six and ten. He says further that it is aptly defined by the Government Commission on Native Laws and Customs of 1883 as:

* NOTE: The terms 'Lobola' and 'Ukulobola' used in this thesis are synonymous.

"..... a contract between the father and the intending husband of his daughter, by which the father promises his consent to the marriage of his daughter, and to protect her in case of necessity, either during or after such marriage, and by which in return he obtains from the husband valuable consideration, partly for such consent and partly as a guarantee by the husband of his good conduct towards his daughter as wife".

'Ukulobola' should therefore be seen as the negotiation of a contract which is binding upon the two parties involved.

4.1. MARRIAGE NEGOTIATION

The lobola process of negotiation for a bride, though seemingly common among Black people throughout Africa, differs in procedure from tribe to tribe. While differing in detail from area to area even within a single tribe, the basic negotiation which takes place appears to be the same. An account will be given of a 'typical' Black marriage with emphasis being placed on the Xhosa, the people involved in the present study. The Lobola process may briefly be described as follows:

- * A young man wishing to marry informs his father, indicating the girl he would like as his wife.
- * The father appoints representatives who go to the girl's father to start the negotiation.
- * The father of the 'bride to be' in turn appoints members of his family as representatives, to negotiate with the representatives of the young man's family.
- * The negotiation generally centres around the 'ikhazi', or number of cattle to be paid.

- * Once the ikhazi has been agreed upon, the cattle pass from the father of the bridegroom to the father of the bride and the marriage takes place.

This very simple description of the lobola process contains all the ingredients of a typical Black man's negotiation procedure. It contains the two negotiating parties; the representatives of these parties; a giving and receiving by the parties (compromising), and the formalities required to carry the negotiation to a successful conclusion.

Various aspects of the Black man's approach to negotiation will now be considered by referring to different cases of lobola. These will include the following:

- (a) The Black man's attitude to negotiation;
- (b) The effect on negotiation of formalities, customs and beliefs; and
- (c) The Black man's understanding of compromise.

4.2 THE BLACK MAN'S ATTITUDE TO NEGOTIATION

The concept of negotiation is not new to the Blacks as is evidenced by the great amount of literature found dealing with this subject. (Holleman 1952 pp148-201; Reader 1966 pp 179-184; Hunter 1936 pp 180-226; Middleton 1965 pp 54-60).

The degree to which formalities, customs and beliefs play a role in the negotiation procedure is surely an indication that the Black man's attitude to negotiation as a means of entering into a contract is positive.

Because of the absence of written contracts in earlier times, a scheme had to be devised which would ensure, firstly, complete understanding between the contracting parties, and secondly, a system of witnessing

of the contract. Hence the very long and complicated procedures found in the marriage negotiation process. (Marwick 1940 pp 101-157; Holleman 1952 pp 148-201). After completing the negotiating procedures there is little chance of either party claiming misunderstanding, and there are sufficient witnesses to prove that agreement had been reached. Indeed, the very fact that the parties completed the negotiation formalities is an indication that they understood the conditions of the agreement.

43. THE EFFECT ON NEGOTIATION OF FORMALITIES, CUSTOMS AND BELIEFS

Formalities, customs and beliefs have played an important role in the Black man's approach to negotiation throughout the ages. Reference will be made to some of the formalities, customs and beliefs involved in the Lobola process. This will give a better insight into some factors affecting the Black when he is involved in negotiation.

The particular circumstances and beliefs of the individual tribes may affect the formalities which are considered necessary for the success of the negotiation, but the broad approach to the negotiation process appears to be the same.

The formalities involved in the marriage negotiation signifies the Black man's concern for mutual agreement, which he sees as vital to the success of the contract.

Hunter, (1936 p 190) maintains that there can be little dispute after Black negotiation has been completed. The boundaries of the agreement have been clearly stated and understood by both parties and witnessed.

It is their concern for understanding and success that has traditionally made the Black assign the duty of negotiation to older men of good reputation, who were honest, eloquent, trustworthy and experienced in life. The Blacks argued that younger men could not successfully negotiate because of a lack of general knowledge and experience. This

argument appears reasonable, particularly in earlier years when there was little or no formal education and experience was the only teacher.

Black marriages are usually very complicated affairs, and numerous formalities are followed. Perhaps the most important of these is the use of a negotiator to negotiate the marriage agreement between the two families involved. According to Reader (1966 pp 179-184) the Zulu negotiator (umkhongi) is empowered to negotiate on behalf of the bridegroom's father. He is held in high esteem by both families and receives rewards from both for successfully concluding the marriage agreement. During the negotiation procedures he is subjected to abuse by the bride's family, which is intended to belittle the bridegroom's family. This formality of pretending that they are not in favour of the marriage is intended to indicate their love for their daughter, and that they consider her worthy of the Lobola price demanded.

Brown, (1926 p59) writing about the Bechuana marriage, states that the parties to be married are not involved in the marriage arrangements at all - this is taken care of by the elders of both families.

With regard to the bargaining that takes place, Hunter (1936 p191) maintains that haggling over the bride price was perfectly in order, provided that the groom and his father-in-law did not, in person, take part in the negotiations. This had to be done through their representatives.

Middleton, (1965 p55) writing on the Lugbara tribe in Uganda, describes the very lengthy and complicated marriage negotiation process that takes place. Here again, the terms of the marriage are negotiated by elders of both families. The formalities required by this tribe differ slightly from those of other tribes, but the negotiation process remains basically the same. For example, a 'Bull of Seduction' must first of all be offered by the parents of the bridegroom. This has to be followed some time later by the bride price of approximately seven cattle. The conditions of the marriage are discussed in great detail

and even include provisions for divorce. If a couple are divorced the parents of the bride have to return the cattle paid for her, less one for each child born after the marriage - the children remaining with the husband.

4.4. THE BRIDE PRICE (IKHAZI)

It has been tradition for the bride price to be paid in cattle. This has been so for various reasons. Throughout the years cattle have been the symbol of wealth to the Black. His general status in the community was judged by the number of cattle he possessed. Furthermore cattle were normally available and were therefore an acceptable method of payment. It would appear that when cattle are not available, alternative means of payment are agreed upon. In more recent years, and particularly among urban Blacks who have no cattle, money is substituted for cattle.

4.5. BELIEF IN ANCESTRAL SPIRITS

Another reason for the use of cattle as the bride price is the Black man's belief in ancestral spirits. Hunter, (1936 p 192) states that the passage of cattle puts the girl received in exchange for the cattle in close relationship with the ancestral spirits of the family from which the cattle came.

In this respect Ngubane, (1977 p 72) states that the Black man believes that ancestral wrath may be incurred over the marriage if certain formalities have not been complied with. Sacrificial animals have to be provided to join the ancestors of the two descent groups. For example, the girl's father has to provide a sacrifice to promote her reproductivity. If the beast is not provided, the bride will eventually fail or miscarry in childbirth. According to Ngubane, the Zulu tribe believes that ancestral wrath over marriage obligations can be reduced to the following four variables:

- (1) The woman's ancestors being annoyed by their own descendants.
- (2) The woman's ancestors being annoyed by her husband's people.
- (3) The husband's ancestors being annoyed by their own descendants.
- (4) The husband's ancestors being annoyed by his wife's people.

With all this perceived ancestral anger threatening, it is not surprising that the Black man is generally very careful about providing the sacrificial animals prescribed.

The belief in the influence of the spiritual world is not confined to the 'heathen' Black only. Pauw, (1975 pp 232-233) cites a study undertaken among rural church-going Blacks. Out of a sample of seventy four, thirty four subjects attributed the causes of misfortune to witchcraft, sorcery or familiars. The remaining forty attributed it to non-mystical causes.

The belief in spirits is not confined to the uneducated either. Success in recent negotiations conducted between the Chief Minister of the Ciskei and the Minister of Co-operation and Development of the Republic of South Africa, was attributed by the Chief Minister to the miraculous ways of the spirits of the great warrior chiefs of the Ciskei. He was quoted, (Daily Despatch 11-6-1979) as saying:

"The spirits of our great warrior chiefs of old have begun to work in their miraculous way and the result of our recent negotiations have shaken the very pillars of the mighty South African parliament".

Another press report is of interest here. In a recent case in the Republic of the Transkei, Paramount Chief Sabata Dalindyebo, appearing on charges under the Public Security and Constitution Acts, maintained

that ancestral spirits had appeared to him and instructed him what to do. (Daily Dispatch 19-3-1980).

Berglund, (1976 pp 78-245) maintains in his study of Zulu thought-patterns and symbolism that the Zulu belief in divinities, shades (spirits) medicines and diviners, although so different from that of the Whites, is fact, and that it does affect his behaviour. With regard to shades (ancestral cult) he says:

"The importance of the shades in Zulu life and thinking cannot be over-estimated " (p 78).

The belief in the influence of the spiritual world could have a marked effect on the motivation of Blacks at work. According to Mitchell (1965 p 196) the control of work is largely in the hands of Whites who appear to behave capriciously and unpredictably. He says:

"Whether a workman is engaged or discharged it seems, and indeed often is, so much a matter of luck that becoming and remaining a wage earner is fraught with as much uncertainty as hunting dangerous animals, embarking on a long journey, or similar activities in which magic and ritual figure prominently".

4.1. OTHER IMPLICATIONS OF LOBOLA

The payment of the Bride-price in the Lobola negotiation process, while perhaps most important, is not the only aspect necessary for the successful completion of the agreement. While there has to be a giving end and a receiving end - the family of the bridegroom giving the cattle; the family of the bride giving the bride - these reciprocal actions only constitute the preliminary balance between the parties. Other matters have to be agreed upon. For example, Holleman (1952 pp 148-201) discussed the position in the Shona tribe should a woman not

be able to bear children, or should she die before bearing a child; and to whom the children belong before the full price has been paid; that is, in those cases when the full price has not been paid.

Another implication of Lobola is that marriage is often not considered legal until Lobola has been paid. According to Marwick (1940 p 125) the function of the Swazi Lobola procedure is to legalise the children of the marriage.

Colson and Gluckman (1961 pp 127-128) maintain that in a well fixed marriage where the Lobola has been paid, the two families are linked - otherwise only the parties are linked. They also say that a further function of the formal Lobola process is that it gives the families involved the opportunity to get to know each other.

With regard to the formalities involved in the Lobola process, a young Black female lecturer at the University of Fort Hare told the writer that she would never marry unless the Lobola procedure was followed. If she was forced to be married under Western custom, she would always somehow feel un-married. To her, marriage was real only after the whole Lobola procedure had taken place.

This viewpoint is better understood if the views of de Jager (1971 pp 169-170) are considered. He says the payment of Lobola has many complicated and interrelated functions, the most universal of these being;

- "(a) It signifies the legal rights to which a husband is entitled in marriage.
- (b) It establishes the legal position of the children born from the union of the man and woman.
- (c) It establishes the legal position of the wife in the marriage.

- (d) It establishes a manner of control over the well being and interest of the woman and her children by her own family.
- (e) It is a means of attaching children to particular lineages, in Africa in general to that of the man.
- (f) It is a mechanism providing for the possible dissolution of the marriage."

It is therefore evident that the Black man's customs, beliefs and formalities still play an important role in his behaviour and could very well affect his perception of negotiation.

4.7. THE BLACK MAN'S UNDERSTANDING OF COMPROMISE

During the student boycott at the University of Fort Hare in 1979, the writer discussed the question of 'compromise' with a group of Black lecturers at the university. It was pointed out to him by these lecturers that the Black man does not understand the meaning of compromise, and if he does, his understanding differs from that of the White man. When this view was challenged by the writer who pointed out that, in Black marriage negotiation, the father of the bride often compromised by agreeing to accept a lesser number of cattle than that originally demanded, he was informed that this was not compromise as such, but rather a form of hire purchase. The fact that the girl's father agreed to accept a lesser number of cattle did not release the bridegroom's family from its indebtedness for the balance of the bride-price.

A review of relevant literature appears to support this view. Hunter (1936 p191) maintains that the bride's family may go on asking for the balance of the bride price until her death, and even after. A case is cited of a Black girl who, after the death of her mother, was beaten by

her father for refusing to work in his lands. The girl ran away to her mother's family. When her father arrived to take her home, he was told that, as he had not completely paid for her mother, he had no jurisdiction over her offspring. He could only take his daughter if he completed the payment for her mother.

de Jager (1971 p 172) refers to the fact that the whole 'lobola' price is never paid over at once. He says:

"The Xhosa even have a standard expression 'ikhazi aligqitywa', that is, 'bride price is never finished'".

While some of the older informants claimed that in the olden days the full amount had to be paid, other referred to the custom known as 'uteleko', that is, 'to withhold'. The primary function of this custom seems to be the control of the husband and to protect the wife from ill treatment. Traditionally it meant that if a woman was ill treated, she could return to her parents who could withhold her from her husband until he paid one head of cattle as penalty for his misconduct.

According to Koyana (1980 pp 11-12) 'uteleko' is also used as a remedy for default in payment. If it has been agreed that a certain number of cattle should be paid over by a particular date, and the bridegroom's family fail to do this, the bride may visit her family and fail to return to her husband. A beast will then have to be paid to secure her return.

The Xhosa expression that the 'bride price is never finished', and the custom of 'uteleko' (to withhold) certainly gives the negotiating parties space in which to manoeuvre. Under these circumstances the bridegroom's representative could negotiate a price higher than that which they intended paying, on the understanding that the 'uteleko' might never be paid. On the other hand, the bride's representative could agree on a amount less than that originally demanded on the

understanding that the 'uteleko', or part thereof, could under certain circumstances, be recovered at some time in the future.

If this 'withholding' of part of the lobola features prominently in arriving at a compromise with regard to the actual 'cash' amount to be paid, this would support the view that the Blacks' understanding of compromise could be different from that of the Whites.

The Black lecturers referred to (p27) saw compromise between Whites as having a degree of finality - there being no strings attached, no future obligations. In the case of the Blacks they saw compromise as lacking that degree of finality - strings were attached and there were future obligations.

Soga (1931 p266) agrees with this view by saying:

"It should be remembered that the essential feature of lobola among the Xhosa is that there is no finality to it."

Cattle may pass from the husband to the wife's parents throughout the husband's life time and even beyond it - to the second and even the third generation. (see Soga's chapter on lobola pp 263-285).

Schapera (1937 p 114) agrees with this view saying that there is no finality in the marriage agreement.

After the student boycott at the University of Fort Hare in 1979, the writer asked some of the final year students how they felt about the outcome of their action. In all cases the answer was given in two words - 'we lost'. It would appear that the students could only view the outcome of the boycott in the 'win-lose' manner. No account seemed to have been taken of the fact that the university administration had indeed made certain concessions. A compromised settlement did not seem to be considered.

If the contention that Blacks do not understand the meaning of compromise is true, or if their perception of it differs from that of the Whites, it is suggested that a completely new dimension would be added to the Black-White negotiation process.



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CHAPTER 5

5. BLACK WORKER INVOLVEMENT IN NEGOTIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the previous chapter attention was given to the Black man's traditional method of negotiation, and it was seen that 'negotiation' as such was not foreign to him. In this chapter attention will be given to the Black man's involvement in the negotiation of conditions of service in South Africa, and events during the past century or so will be reviewed. It is not the intention to give a detailed account of the involvement of Blacks in the trade union movement in South Africa. This would be a mammoth task and for the purpose of this study would not be necessary. Rather, reference will be made to some of the salient events depicting the development of trade unionism in South Africa and the involvement of Black workers. Then, after having considered the Blacks' traditional method of negotiation, and their development in trade unionism, it is hoped that a more accurate perspective of the Blacks' approach to collective bargaining and the resolution of industrial conflict will be obtained.

5.1. BLACK-WHITE NEGOTIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

EARLY NEGOTIATION

Negotiation between the Blacks and Whites in South Africa began when these two groups met in the Eastern Cape two to three hundred years ago. The early negotiations between these two groups were approached with a degree of suspicion and distrust. Negotiation parties were often accompanied by armed guards and, unfortunately, aspects of these negotiations appear to have had lasting negative effects on attitudes to inter-group negotiation. Two examples will be quoted in this regard.

Moodie (The Record p 73) records that White Settlers bartered four bunches of beads and two copper plates for each head of cattle, and one

string of beads for each calf, in business transactions with Blacks in the Eastern Cape. Some Blacks still view this early negotiation with a measure of chagrin. In a discussion after a recent Industrial Relations Seminar at the University of Fort Hare, reference was made by a student to the early White settlers who 'cheated our forefathers - giving beads for cattle'. A number of students immediately joined in the condemnation of this 'cheating' behaviour. It is suggested that Blacks holding this view would approach present-day negotiation with Whites with a degree of suspicion and fear.

On the other hand, some Whites still refer to the negotiation between Piet Retief, a Boer leader, and Dingaan, the Zulu Chief. Dingaan's treachery, which resulted in the deaths of Retief and those in his party, has caused many Whites to feel that Blacks cannot be trusted. Whites having this attitude would probably approach negotiation with Blacks with a degree of suspicion.

5.2. BLACK WORKER INVOLVEMENT IN THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA


Trade unionism was introduced to South Africa by immigrants, mainly from Britain. The earliest of these unions were craft unions and the main purpose was to protect the craftsmen from competition from unqualified workmen. The illiterate Black worker did not constitute a danger in this respect and therefore did not initially become involved in unionism.

The position changed, however, after the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley in 1870, followed by gold on the Rand in 1886. The mines attracted many workers, both white and non-white, and operator-type jobs became available. Industries sprang up around the mines, and still more operator-type jobs became available. As these jobs generally called for workmen other than qualified craftsmen, competition was fierce. White workers began to fear the competition which came from the non-whites who were accustomed, and willing, to work for lower wages. They therefore organised themselves into unions and vigorously

attempted to safeguard their position. Numerous strikes occurred at the beginning of the century and labour relations gave rise to problems which led up to the '1922 Witwatersrand General Strike'. (du Toit, 1976 pp 11-12; Grey Coetzee 1976 pp 4-11).

Whereas previously the Blacks* were not particularly interested in trade unionism because of not being directly involved, they now began to question and show interest because of becoming more directly involved. They could see that their welfare was now directly being affected and the need for some kind of protection became apparent.

In 1919 Clements Kadalie founded the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (I C U) (Horrell 1969 p2). This union was started in Cape Town as an organisation of dock-workers (du Toit 1976 p 34).# The dock-workers' strike of 1919, which was supported by some railway and other workers, gave great impetus to the I C U. 8000 non-white workers were involved in a successful strike for an increase in pay (du Toit 1976 p 35).



In the meanwhile a strike in Port Elizabeth resulted in the deaths of 23 Black workers. This only resulted in motivating the I C U to greater efforts. On the 20 July 1920 the first convention of Black workers took place in Bloemfontein under the patronage of the I C U.

* In this section the terms 'Black' 'African' and 'Native' will be used. They are in fact synonymous, and refer to the Black man as opposed to the term 'non-white' which includes the Blacks as well as Coloureds and Asiatics.

Much of the information which follows is based on the findings of Horrell and du Toit. Only salient points will be referred to.

The result of the conference was a claim for increases in dock-workers' pay. After consultation between the government and the I C U the claims were met and possible strikes averted.

By 1925 the I C U claimed a membership of 50 000 Black members. It was at about this time that the I C U moved its head office to Johannesburg, and the publication of their monthly 'Workers' Herald' began (du Toit 1979 p 35).

Kadalia's I C U, which was originally an association of dock-workers, changed and soon catered for heterogeneous interests which later included members who were not employed in an industry and became more of a political organisation than union (du Toit 1976 p 35).

While Johannesburg was the main centre of industrial activity in the country, the I C U's move to the Rand lost it a number of influential coloured members at the Cape. It nevertheless grew in strength and possibly reached its peak in 1927 when it claimed a membership of 100 000. At this time it unsuccessfully applied for affiliation to the South African Trade Union Congress. The application was turned down on the grounds that too much effort would be required to persuade White workers to agree to the affiliation (du Toit 1976 p35).

Kadalia's I C U had taken approximately 10 years to reach its peak. Its disintegration however, was rapid. Horrell (1969 p7) suggests two main reasons for this. Firstly it did not confine its membership to those in industrial or commercial employment, and secondly it came under left-wing influence to lose its industrial character and become a political party of national emancipation. The rapid disintegration is perhaps more easily understood if one considers what the union had become. From an association of dock-workers it was now a power-hungry organisation. The following extract is quoted from the I C U journal 'Workers' Herald' (du Toit 1976 p36).

"The union movement must have a definite objective and the membership must take an active and intelligent interest in striving to achieve that object, the complete control of industry to those who work industries and the land to those who work the land. Fellow workers, come into the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, and make an effective workers' union and let its fame be broadcast and let it embrace all workers of Africa in their millions.

Friends, pull down the barriers that bar our way to freedom. The organisation of the Blacks, especially in the I C U is a menace to the Whites, but the weight of our might will absorb their fewness. Many of the leaders of the Black people think that the liberation of the race from foreign domination means the economic and political freedom of the entire community. No, it is not so. There will be no peace until the Black man triumphs over the White man".

This extract clearly indicates the extent to which the objectives of the ICU had changed, and this is considered one of the reasons for its disintegration.

5.3. ESTABLISHMENT OF CENTRAL TRADE UNION BODY

In the meanwhile the Minister of Labour had, in 1924, summoned a conference of trade unionists. As a result the South African Association of Employees' Organization was established in 1925 (Horrell 1969 p5). At its first annual conference it changed its name to the South African Trade Union Congress (TUC).

The Cape Federation of Labour Unions did not join this new body for various reasons, one of which appears to have been the racial issue and

another a clash of personalities. Also, not all unions outside the Cape Federation joined the TUC, apparently because it was felt that the congress was dominated by the left wing of the movement.

At this time, a South African Trade Union Co-ordinating Committee, under the chairmanship of a Department of Labour official, was established and operated for a while to try to bring the two bodies together.

In 1926 a purge took place in the I C U and communist leaders were expelled. Some of these leaders had been organising unions in the laundry, baking, clothing, mattress and furniture industries on the Rand. They formed a Non-European Trade Union Federation which claimed a membership of 10 000 in 1928 (Horrell 1969 p8). This federation disintegrated during the depression of 1930-1933. The Laundry Workers' Union, however, survived. It broke away from the communists and was re-organised by the Trotskyist Max Gordon, who formed about 20 African unions and established a Joint Committee of African trade Unions which claimed a membership of 23 000 - 26 000 in 1940. He was however interned during the war and the association disintegrated (Horrell 1969 p8)..

Another union which broke away from the communists and survived was the Native Clothing Workers' Union, which was led by Gana Makabeni. A group of unions rallied around him and formed a co-ordinating Committee with a membership of 2 672 in 1940 (Horrell 1969 p 8).

During the depression years trade unionists realised that greater cohesion was desirable. The South African Trade Union Co-ordinating Committee was replaced in 1930 by the South African Trades and Labour Council which represented the Trade Union Congress, the Cape Federation and non affiliated unions. It was not long however before there was dissension between the unions, and the Cape Federation broke away.

At this time left wing organisers began forming Coloured and African workers' unions in the Western Cape. This was apparently resented by the older unions and some of them broke away from the Cape Federation and formed the Western Province Federation of Labour Unions in 1941. In 1945 the Cape Federation reconstituted itself a local committee of the Trades and Labour Council (Horrell 1969 p10).

The Trades and Labour Council invited all unions, registered or not, to affiliate. In 1945 seven African unions had affiliated, and by 1947 a total of 111 Black, White and mixed unions had affiliated.

5.4. POLITICAL INTERVENTION IN TRADE UNIONS

It is necessary at this point to make reference to the effect that politics had on trade unionism during the 1930's. The Labour Party which had come to power in the early twenties, had lost much of its support. The Nationalist and South African Parties had joined to form the United Party and won the election held in 1933. At this time Dr D F Malan established the Purified National Party which aimed at promoting the Afrikaner in all spheres of public life. The "Blankewerkers-beskermingsbond" (White workers' Protection Union) was established, and had as its aims:

- (1) Combating the activities in the trade unions of "Jews, Communists and Kafferboeties"
- (2) preventing mixed membership of trade unions, and
- (3) the clear demarcation of work between White and nonwhite workers (Horrell 1969 p10).

From 1936 a "Reform League" under Dr Albert Hertzog began persuading Afrikaner workers to leave mixed and liberal unions and to oppose non-white industrial advancement. The Reformers later gained control of the executive committee of the important Mine Workers Union, and

succeeded in inducing many Nationalist trade unionists to begin thinking about the establishment of right wing unions (Horrell 1969 p11).

5.5. FORMATION OF RIGHT WING CO-ORDINATING BODY

In 1945 the Trades and Labour Council's executive committee adopted a resolution that organised African trade unions which had a non-party-political basis should be registered, and that African workers should have the right to send their own representatives to Industrial Council meetings when matters affecting their interests were discussed. This policy was opposed by the leaders of the mining, iron and steel and some other unions.

In 1947 five unions, under the leadership of L J van den Berg of the SA Iron and Steel Trades Association, broke away and founded the Co-ordinating Council of South African Trade Unions (ko-ordinerende Raad van Suid-Afrikaanse vakverenigings). This break greatly affected the membership of the Trades and Labour Council as the following figures show. In 1947, before the break, 111 trade unions with a total membership of 184 041, were affiliated to the Trades and Labour Council. In 1950 affiliated unions totalled 80 and their membership 126 018. By 1950 the Co-ordinating Council had 13 affiliated trade unions with a total membership of 30 000 (Horrell 1969 p11).

5.6. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONFEDERATION OF LABOUR

The S A Confederation of Labour was registered in 1958 and was originally composed of the following three federal bodies:

- (1) The Co-ordinating Council of S A Trade Unions
- (2) The S A Federation of Trade Unions, and
- (3) The Federal Consultative Council of the S A Railways and Harbours Staff Association (du Toit 1976 p 63).

In 1968 the confederation altered its constitution to allow individual unions to affiliate. The position in 1969 was that 27 unions with a total membership of 183 781 were affiliated.

5.7. THE COUNCIL OF NON-EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONS

In 1941 the African Mineworkers Union was established under the leadership of John B Marks. Then in 1944 this union, together with, Makabeni's Native Clothing Workers' Union and some other unions on the Rand and in Pretoria formed the Council of Non-European Trade Unions. The main aim was to secure full recognition of African unions. The Council extended its interest outside the Transvaal and in 1945 claimed 119 affiliated unions with a membership of 158 000 in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Bloemfontein, Kimberley, Port Elizabeth, East London and Cape Town. From 1946 this Association, like those previously mentioned began to decline. By 1950 Black trade unions could be categorised as follows:

- (1) Unions completely independent of unions of other racial groups - 32 - membership 11 725.
- (2) Unions established under supervision of registered unions - 3 - membership 1 770.
- (3) Unions recognised by and under supervision of Railways and Harbours Administration - 8 - membership 17 255.
- (4) Unions which had withdrawn from registered unions but still had some contact - 9 - membership 3 400.
- (5) 3 700 Black workers were members of mixed unions.

It would therefore appear that the position with regard to Black Trade Unions in 1950 was that there were 52 unions with a total membership of 34 551. If the 3 700 mixed union members are added, the position would

be that there were 38 251 paid-up Black union members at the beginning of 1950 (du Toit 1976 pp 38-39).

5.8. THE TRADE UNION COUNCIL OF SOUTH AFRICA

In 1954 sixty one unions established a central co-ordinating body known as the South African Trade Union Council (SATUC). This name was changed to the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) in 1962 (Imrie 1979 pp 5-6).

Fourteen of the founder members of the Trades and Labour Council did not agree with the exclusion of the Black Unions from TUCSA and decided to co-operate with the Council of Non-European Trade Unions to form the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) which granted equal recognition to Black and registered unions (du Toit 1976 p 41).

Once again there was discord amongst the Black unions and eight of them, plus four Coloured unions, joined the Congress. They were later joined by a further 17 Black and five Coloured unions. By 1961 the Congress claimed an affiliated membership of 46 unions with 53 323 members. (du Toit 1976 p 41). Horrell (1969 p 26) divides this membership into 498 Whites, 12 384 Coloureds, 1 650 Indians and 38 791 Africans.

SACTU however, soon strayed from trade union affairs to become interested in politics. The following statement of policy is quoted by du Toit (1976 p41):

"The South African Congress of Trade Unions is conscious of the fact that the organizing of the mass of the workers for higher wages, better conditions of life and labour, and the successful struggle for them, is inextricably bound up with a determined struggle for political rights and for liberation from all oppressive laws and practices.

It follows that a mere struggle for the economic rights of the workers without participation in the general struggle for political emancipation would condemn the trade union movement to uselessness and to a betrayal of the interest of the workers".

Horrell (1969 p 26) maintains that they decided to work with the African National Congress and other members of the Congress group, in organising 'stay-at-home' demonstrations and strikes.

The government could not tolerate this situation; acted in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act and by 1965 no fewer than 60 officials of the Congress had to abandon their posts (du Toit p42).

Added to this problem was the fact that many employers were not too sympathetic towards Black unions and the Congress. These circumstances led to a decline in the Congress and by 1967 it virtually existed in name only.

In the meanwhile the unions, which did not join the Congress, had remained in contact with TUCSA. In 1959 they formed a new co-ordinating body named the Federation of Free African Trade Unions (FOFATUSA). Among their aims were:

- (1) to build up bargaining power, and
- (2) to negotiate from strength to strength to achieve a non-racial state (Horrell 1969 p28).

By 1962 FOFATUSA claimed having 20 affiliated unions with a total membership of 36 000. Unfortunately for the Federation, it was at this time that TUCSA decided to accept the affiliation of unregistered unions. This decision affected the position of FOFATUSA as some unions left to join TUCSA. By 1965 the Federation only had 12 unions with a membership of 13 000. It decided to disband and encouraged the remain-

ing unions to join TUCSA (du Toit 1976 pp 42-43). By 1967 TUCSA had 13 affiliated African Unions with a total membership of 5 000 (Horrell 1969 p 31).

TUCSA's approach to the organisation of African unions was at the time attacked by the Minister of Labour. As a result it called a special conference in December 1967 to discuss the matter. It soon became apparent that TUCSA faced serious problems, and some African unions resigned to save the Council from breaking up.

At it's annual congress in April 1968 TUCSA voted in favour of allowing continued affiliation of African Unions. Certain registered unions which did not agree with this decision withdrew from TUCSA. Realising the problems being caused by this decision, TUCSA once again, at their 1969 conference, decided to rescind the previous decision, and to exclude all unions which were not registered.

du Toit (1976 pp 162-164) summarises the position with regard to non-white trade unions in the 1960's as follows:

1. Federation of Free African Trade Unions of SA

16 Unions plus

African Leather and Allied Trades Welfare organisation

Total membership 18 385

2. South African Congress of Trade Unions

36 Black unions White union

9 Coloured unions

The Black membership was 38 791 of the total of 53 323.

3. Unaffiliated

8 Unions plus two welfare organisations

Total membership 2 776

After 1965 these two federations disintegrated and disappeared. At this time (1966) 15 Black unions were affiliated to TUCSA but by the end of 1968 the number was three. By the middle of 1969 thirteen Black unions with a total membership of 16 040 existed (du Toit 1976 p 165). However, by 1970 only two unions viz the National Union of Clothing Workers (14 000 members) and The African Leather Workers Union (2 000 members) remained.

According to Horrell (1969 p 45) the numerical strength of the two co-ordinating bodies, as well as the unaffiliated unions, was as follows in 1969:

TABLE 1

Membership of co-ordinating bodies

	<u>Affiliated to</u>		<u>Unaffiliated</u>
	<u>Confederation</u>	<u>TUCSA</u>	
White Unions	27	13	58
Racially Mixed	-	25	10
Coloured/Asian	-	23	16
African	-	-	14
	<u>27</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>98</u>

Their membership was as indicated in Table 2.

TABLE 2**Trade unions' membership**

	<u>Affiliated to</u>		<u>Unaffiliated</u>
	<u>Confederation</u>	<u>TUSCA</u>	
White Unions	183 781	33 088	148 985
Racially Mixed	-	129 830	20 093
Coloured/Asian	-	23 560	27 550
African	-	-	16 040
	<u>183 781</u>	<u>186 478</u>	<u>212 668</u>

Lewsen (1976 p 73) in a more recent study, summarised the overall position of white, coloured and mixed unions as follows:

TABLE 3 Overall position of White, Coloured and Mixed unions

	Whites only	%	Coloured only	%	Mixed	%	TOTAL
Number of Trade Unions	85	48,9	49	27,6	41	23,6	174
Membership	382 525	58,5	91 995	14,1	179 174	27,4	653 694
Average membership	4 500		191		4 370		3 756

In the same study the membership of the main co-ordinating bodies was given as follows:

1) TUSCA

64 affiliated registered unions having a total membership of 63 000 Whites and 150 000 Coloured/Asians. A further four unregistered unions had a membership of 25 000.

2) S A Confederation of Labour (SACL)

25 affiliated unions with a total of 193 000 White members.

3) S A Central Labour Organisation (SACLO)

Formed May 1976. Membership unknown.

4) Unaffiliated Unions

Before SACLO was formed, unaffiliated unions had 154 000 white and 39 000 coloured and Asian members. At the time there were 80 unregistered unions (Lewsen 1976 pp 73-74).

According to the Europe Year Book (1976 p 1453) the trade union position in South Africa in August 1974 was that there were 169 registered unions - 83 all-white, 46 all coloured and 41 mixed membership. The total membership of these unions at the end of 1973 was 618 690.

The Natal strikes of 1973 seems to have given impetus to the formation of Black trade unions and by July 1974 there were 20 of these with a total membership of 40 000 (du Toit 1976 p 165).

5.9. STRATEGIES OF FOUR MAIN GROUPS OF BLACK TRADE UNIONS IN THE MIDDLE 70's

Lewsen (1976 pp 59-60) in his study refers to the following four approaches to Black Trade unions:

1) Parallel unions

Here the Black unregistered unions run in parallel to and under the tutelage of registered unions. The idea is that if the Industrial Conciliation Act was changed to include the Blacks these could be assimilated into the registered unions without much trouble.

2) The Urban Training Project

The prime focus here is on developing the skills of Black trade union leaders and of proving union acceptability to management.

3) TIACC

This was a co-ordinating body for five Black trade unions in Durban. It believed that managements would not recognise Black unions until they (the unions) were strong and could earn recognition. This is a power strategy which aimed at building up a large membership.

4) The Black Allied Workers Union

Their strategy may be identified with Black consciousness (but is also directed at Coloureds and Asians). They see trade union recognition being achieved through the realisation of fundamental changes in the structure of society rather than by White hand-outs.

5.10. CURRENT POSITION OF BLACK TRADE UNIONS

The position of Black trade unionism in South Africa has radically changed during the past decades. Some of the more recent events which led to this change will now be reviewed.

The South African Government had not, until recently, been in favour of the participation of Black trade unions in the Industrial Council system of negotiation. In 1953 the Bantu Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act (No 48 of 1953) was passed. The act provided for, among other things, the establishment of Works Committees which afforded Black workers the opportunity to negotiate with management. However, the Works Committee system as provided for in this act, was not a success and in 1972, nineteen years after the act was introduced, there were less than thirty registered works committees. (Kraft 1973 p13).

The 1973 Black labour unrest in Durban was attributed mainly to a lack of communication between the workers and their employers. It

was felt that there was a need for improving the system of consultation between employer and employee, and with this in view the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act (Act No 70) was introduced in 1973. The act made provision for, among other things, the establishment of a Central Labour Board and the following labour committees:

- 1) Liaison committees,
- 2) Works committees,
- 3) Co-ordinating works committees, and
- 4) Regional Bantu Labour committees.

This Act proved more successful than the original act. In September 1974, fifteen months after Act 70 was introduced, there were 200 Works Committees in existence. (Verster 1974 p 93). The number of Liaison Committees grew from 120 in July 1973 to 1 211 in August 1974 (Verster 1974 p 9). By 1979 the number of Works and Liaison committees had increased to 311 and 2 681 respectively. These works committees represented 75 689 workers - the Liaison committees 700 265 workers (Benso 1979 p 17).

Grey Coetzee (1976 p 16) maintains that:

"...it is difficult not to conclude that if 1922 was the decisive year in the conflict between White mineworkers and the mining companies, it also decisively marked the parting of the ways of the Black and White industrial workers".

If this is the case, then surely the Natal strikes and labour unrest marked the beginning of the convergence of these ways.

The number of Works and Liaison committees established in 1973 and 1974 points to Act 70 being a step in the right direction, and

seemingly obtained the approval of the employers of Black labour. Verster (1974 p 20) found that 91% of all Liaison committees were established as a result of management's initiative. In the same investigation he found, on calling for suggested alterations to make the system of Works and Liaison committees more effective, that there was a measure of consensus in only two areas. The first was that Black employees should receive more training and guidance in negotiation and the basics of the committee system. The second was that Blacks should receive voting powers at industrial council meetings (Verster 1974 pp 69-71).

The Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act was amended in 1977. (Act No 84 of 1977). The most important provision of this amendment was that Blacks, through the various committees, could negotiate legally binding agreements with their employers under certain circumstances. This was an important amendment making the Act potentially effective in areas where there were no industrial council agreements in force, and where Wage Determinations had been in force for more than twelve months.

Despite the progress made by these two Acts (Act No 70 of 1973 and Act No 84 of 1977) the situation remained unsatisfactory. The provisions for Black worker communication and negotiation with management remained untidy. Black workers were still denied full freedom of association, and the whole labour system remained dualistic in nature - some provisions applying only to Whites, Coloured and Asiatics, while others applying only to Blacks.

It was under these circumstances that the government appointed a commission of inquiry into labour legislation on 21.6.1977.

The terms of reference of the commission which became known as the "Wiehahn Commission", were to inquire into, report upon and make recommendations in connection with existing legislation with

specific reference to modernising the existing system for the regulation of labour relations and the prevention and settlement of disputes. (White paper on part I of report).

Part I of the report was submitted to the Government on 19 February 1979 and was somewhat in the nature of an all-encompassing interim report stating broad principles and highlighting for early attention those questions which were of the greatest importance and urgency.

In accepting all the recommendations of the report in principle, the government saw its approach as being essentially evolutionary. It envisaged the various recommendations being implemented in either the short term, the medium term or the long term. (White Paper on Part 1 of the Report).

The strategy of allowing certain changes to 'evolve' is not without merit. Verster (1974 p 77) found that one of the main advantages of the liaison committee system was that it made evolutionary training of the Blacks in negotiation possible. While the Whites have had some 100 years of experience in negotiating with management, the Blacks will virtually be 'thrown in at the deep end' during the 1980's. Their liaison committee experience will therefore be invaluable to them in coping with the situation.

One of the most important recommendation was on the principle of "freedom of association" and the membership of trade unions. The principle of "freedom of association" was accepted by the Government with certain reservations. The Government's decision was that all persons, irrespective of race, colour or sex, who enjoy permanent residence in South Africa and who were in fixed employment, would automatically be eligible for trade union membership. (White Paper p 11).

This was a radical change in the Government's approach to Black trade unions. Black workers who had been precluded from participating in the country's labour negotiating machinery by the Industrial Conciliation Act (Act No 11 of 1924) could now, after more than fifty years, participate in the determination of conditions of employment which concerned them.

Van der Watt (1980 p 74) aptly summarised the South African labour situation at this time by saying that to a large extent the dialogue between unions and government no longer covered what should be done, but 'how, when and what' could be done to speed up the process.

"The object is to remove racial discrimination from the job situation. This sounds nice and simple. But we are fully aware that it is bound to have immense social and political effects."

This gave impetus to the interest in and growth of Black trade unionism in South Africa and by the middle of 1982 there were 87 000 Blacks who were members of registered trade unions and 210 000 who were members of unregistered unions (Jones 1984 p 49).

The position of trade unionism in South Africa appears to be unsettled at present with changes taking place ever so often. At the end of 1983 there were four major federations of trade unions. These were:

- (i) Trade Union Council of S A (TUCSA)
- (ii) SA Confederation of Labour (SACOL)
- (iii) Federation of SA Trade Unions (FOSATU)
- (iv) Council of Unions of SA (CUSA) (Jones 1984 p 52).

The membership of these four major federations was as follows (December 1983).

TUCSA : 453 906
 SACOL : 129 223
 FOSATU: 106 000
 CUSA: 100 000

(Survey of Race Relations in SA 1983 pp 178-181)

While TUCSA and FOSATU were open to workers of all races, CUSA was open to Blacks only, and SACOL aimed primarily at maintaining the position of the Whites.

While the number of registered trade unions in South Africa fell during the period 1982 to 1984, the membership of these unions rose. Table 4 gives a synoptic picture of the number of registered trade unions and their membership numbers from 1982 to 1984.

TABLE 4 Registered trade unions and their membership numbers, RSA, 1982, 1983 and 1984

Scope of membership	Number of trade unions			Number of members		
	1982	1983	1984	1982	1983	1984
Whites	57	56	46	355 579	348 768	275 572
Coloureds and Asians	43	35	25	83 01	63 591	46 562
Blacks	21	23	25	210 538	289 578	383 018
Multi-racial	78	80	97	577 318	586 811	701 150
TOTAL	199	194	193	1226 454	1288 748	1406 302

(National Manpower Commission Report 1985 p 33).

The above figures, however, do not give a true picture of the total situation because unregistered unions are omitted. It is

estimated that there are 58 of these unions having a total paid-up membership of 230 000 (Ibid p 106). If these figures are added to those of the registered unions given in Table 4, the estimated total numbers of unions in South Africa in 1984 was 251 and the total membership 1 636 302.

On the 1.12.1985 a new 'so-called' super federation was brought into being in Durban. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) claimed a membership of \pm 500 000 (Daily Dispatch 2.12.85). While the membership of this federation was primarily non-white, an interesting observation is that CUSA, the exclusively Black federation, opted out of COSATU. According to CUSA's Natal co-ordinator Norman Middleton, only Black leaders could effectively serve the majority Black workers' interests, and as COSATU was initiated by Whites this need could not be fulfilled.

Mangum (1978 p 7) commenting on the then labour situation in South Africa, said:

"To an outsider who has observed manpower and industrial relations systems in Western and Eastern Europe, the Middle and Far East and North America, South Africa's system must be classified as the most complex".

He gave the racial composition of the population as the main reason for this situation, maintaining that:

"Here there are two white 'tribes' (plus many white nationalities), eight indigenous black tribes, plus others from surrounding nations and most of them traditional enemies, plus the coloureds and East Indians. Each has its own language".

Matters are further complicated by the present political situation in the country where one finds political unrest, acts of terrorism and the Black community demanding greater political participation and power.

It is within this very complex and dynamic labour situation that the government, employers and employees are presently striving to bring about changes necessary for ensuring industrial peace.

5.ii. DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE CONFRONTED BLACK UNIONS

In order to view the Black trade unionist and worker in truer perspective, one must consider the particular difficulties and circumstances under which they have had to work during the last 50 years.

Whilst it must be acknowledged that Black trade unions had made little progress during this period, the reasons for this state of affairs are manifold, and include the following:

- (1) It had been the Government's policy not to recognise Black unions in White areas. They were expected to operate in their own homelands. Unfortunately, up to the present time almost all industry is situated in White areas. The need, if any, for Black trade unionism has been in the White areas.
- (2) Because of (1) above, Black unions have lacked official recognition and the accompanying status. Employers have often not been sympathetic and have looked upon the active trade unionist as 'agitators'.
- (3) From the start of the trade union movement in South Africa attempts at bringing about a united association of workers have failed repeatedly because of differing

views amongst Whites on the question of Non-white membership and industrial advancement. This is possibly the main difficulty faced by the Black unions.

- (4) The migratory labour system has added to the difficulties faced. Under normal circumstances trade union stop-orders on employers facilitate the collection of union fees. Not having these facilities and, in addition, not having a permanent labour force, have made the administration of the Black unions most difficult.
- (5) Black organisers have often been ill-educated and have lacked the necessary book-keeping knowledge to administer the union properly.
- (6) The Suppression of Communism Act had also affected the formation and growth of Black unions. Some of the Whites who earlier helped the Blacks with the formation of unions were communists. When these were banned much needed assistance and advice was lost.
- (7) Indiscretion on the part of some Black unionists has also contributed towards creating antagonism against their unions. To make a statement as quoted previously (p35) that 'There will be no peace until the Black man triumphs over the White man' would certainly not attract much sympathy from the Whites.

5.12. FUTURE BLACK-WHITE NEGOTIATION

CULTURAL AND LANGUAGE PROBLEMS

Problems which will have to be faced are those associated with Black- White communication in the negotiation process. In his investigation of communication with Black workers, Verster (1976

p 57) refers to the effect of culture on the communication process. He maintains that when both sender and receiver are from the same culture, and attach more or less the same standard interpretation to reality, it facilitates and improves communication considerably. It follows that when people are from different cultural groups, as is the case with Blacks and Whites in South Africa, communication and understanding between them is more difficult. Another important effect of culture is the language dimension, for without a common language, communication is extremely difficult. Not only is there a language difference between Whites and Blacks in South Africa but the problem is compounded by the fact that the Whites have two official languages, while the Blacks speak eight main languages (Verster 1976 p 21). Apart from this, a number of dialects are spoken, while migrant labour bring their own vernacular with them.

The absence of a common language gives rise to many communication problems between the different race and ethnic groups in industry. Verster (1976 pp 23-24) discusses various approaches to solving the language problem, but there appears to be no solution to this problem in the short term, and even if a magic wand could be waved to ensure a common language, misunderstanding would still occur because of different interpretations of reality by the various ethnic and cultural groups.

Compounding the problem is the fact that the Urban Black in South Africa, in addition to having different languages and cultural backgrounds, stands astride three cultures, namely, his own static tribal culture, the dynamic Western culture of the Whites, and the new developing Black urban culture. (Silberbauer 1968 p 53). This urban group constitutes \pm 32% of the total Black population (Tiley 1974 p 9), which makes it an important reference group in industry.

It is therefore suggested that it would be unreasonable at the present time, for the White in industry to expect the Black to view and interpret reality in the same manner as he does. Concepts such as discipline, regular attendance at work, increasing productivity and punctuality could be foreign to many Black workers. They do, to a greater or lesser degree, make adjustments to their outlook as they continue in an industrial environments. However, there are so many new entrants from rural areas that this problem will continue in the foreseeable future.



CHAPTER 6

6. CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR SITUATION

The National Manpower Commission's report for the period 1 January 1984 to 31 December 1984 reveals that the Republic of South Africa had, in 1980, a total population of 29 499 000 (p258) of whom 9 338 000 were economically active (p 261). It was estimated that these were divided into the various race groups as follows:

TABLE 5 Economically Active Population (1980)

Race group	Number	%
Whites	1 906 000	20,4
Coloureds	952 000	10,2
Asians	261 000	2,8
Blacks	6 219 000	66,6
TOTAL	9 338 000	100,0

Relative figures for 1960 and 1970 were as follows:

TABLE 6 Economically Active Population (1960)

Race group	Number	%
Whites	1 151 000	20,1
Coloureds	553 000	9,7
Asians	126 000	2,2
Blacks	3 891 000	68,0
TOTAL	5 721 000	100,0

TABLE 7 Economically Active Population (1970)

Race group	Number	%
Whites	1 509 000	18,6
Coloureds	716 000	8,8
Asians	182 000	2,2
Blacks	5 707 000	70,4
TOTAL	8 114 000	100,0

An examination of the above figures reveals that there has been little, if any change in the racial compositions of the economically active population in South Africa over the last two decades. Approximately seven out of every ten of the country's economically active population are Black and there are no reasons to suggest that this proportion of Blacks will be reduced significantly during the next few years. Urbanisation and the recent relaxation in the influx control measures should rather contribute to the increase in this proportion of Black workers.

The above information relates to the total South African situation. As this study is concerned with conflict resolution and collective bargaining, it is necessary to consider the economically active population who are included in the scope of the Labour Relations Act, 1956. Tables 8 and 9 give the figures by race group for the years 1970 and 1984 respectively. (National Manpower Commission Report 1985 p 269).

TABLE 8 Economically Active Population included in the scope of the Labour Relations Act 1956 (1970)

Race group	Number	%
Whites	1 004 000	27,5
Coloureds	381 000	10,4
Asians	132 000	3,6
Blacks	2 139 000	58,5
TOTAL	3 656 000	100,0

TABLE 9**Economically Active Population included in the scope of the Labour Relations Act 1956 (1984)**

Race group	Number	%
Whites	1 435 000	25,6
Coloureds	593 000	10,6
Asians	229 000	4,1
Blacks	3 345 000	59,7
TOTAL	5 602 000	100,0

The above figures indicate that of the total number of workers in South Africa who can negotiate conditions of service in terms of the Labour Relations Act, approximately 60% are Black. Although this figure is less than the overall figure, it still constitutes a very significant proportion of the workers, being more than twice that of any of the other race groups.

The Black, even though he has numerically contributed 70% (overall) of the country's labour force, has been restricted in the degree to which he could participate in negotiations between workers and management. These restrictions have been relaxed by the passing of the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act (No 94 of 1979) which permits him to organise himself into trade unions and to register in terms of this Act. It can therefore be expected that this large segment of the work force will move towards negotiating with management on the same basis as the other race groups.

The Government, through its attitude to the proposals submitted by the Wiehahn Commission, has accepted the fact that there is a need for change, and has given the go-ahead. It is now the responsibility of management and the total work force to bring about the changes in the most productive and peaceful manner possible. It is therefore submitted that an urgency is attached to the improvement of negotiating procedures between management and the work force.

6.1 NEED FOR BETTER UTILISATION OF BLACK LABOUR

There presently appears to be a serious shortage of skilled employees in many sectors of the South African economy, while at the same time there is an over-supply of unskilled labour. This is an undesirable situation because it results in, among other things, inferior workmanship at inflated rates of pay, while at the same time contributing to the forces slowing down the growth rate in the economy.

The White group, and to a lesser degree the Coloured and Asian groups, has provided the required labour in the skilled category, but it appears that they are no longer capable of doing so.

Benso, in discussing the demand for and supply of labour, makes the following statement:

"The need for training Blacks is therefore actually greater and the large-scale training of skilled labour must be undertaken as an urgent matter".

(Benso Jan 1979 p 139).

In considering these circumstances it becomes abundantly clear that the Black group will have to be called upon to fill this need. To do this successfully will involve, not only a better utilisation of this work group by giving it work of a more advanced nature, but also by seeking to obtain its co-operation in any plans aimed at achieving improved industrial relations' systems and industrial peace.

It is submitted that commitment to any plans for continuing industrial peace can only be expected of the work force if it has, as a whole, participated in formulating those plans. It is for this reason that an improved system of negotiation between employers and employees in South Africa appears to be a matter of extreme urgency.

62. THE PROBLEMS OF UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION

The Economic Development Programme for the Republic of South Africa (1978-1987) contained reference to the 'Unemployment' and 'Inflation' problems then facing the country. With regard to the unemployment problem it is stated (p34):

"The conclusion that can be drawn after evaluating the results of the simulations given above is that, even under very favourable conditions, it will not be easy to reduce the unemployment rate, not to mention the absolute level of unemployment".

One of the approaches to the reduction in the unemployment rate relates to the stimulation of labour intensive rather than capital intensive production methods where practicable (p 35).

With reference to the inflation problem a proposed approach to reduce the inflation rate was (p 37):

"... to push up the productivity of the country's limited production factors as high as possible".

Management's failure to conduct meaningful negotiation with its labour force in the past has contributed to the magnitude of these two problems being faced by the country today.

After the 1973 Durban strikes by Black employees, Black wages increased dramatically. The following figures, taken from a Wage Determination, an Industrial Council Agreement, and a Salary survey reflect the position.

Wage Determination No 356 for the Commercial Distributive Trade (1977 p 12) provided for a minimum increase of 57% in the Labourer's rate of pay during the period November 1973 and April 1977.

The Industrial Council Agreement for the Iron, Steel, Engineering and Metallurgical Industry (1977 p 138) stipulated an increase of 76% in the minimum rate of pay for the lowest category of employee between March 1974 and August 1977.

Urwick International's Wage Surveys (1974-1977) reveal an average increase of 53% in Black wages during the period June 1974 to June 1977.

A question which may now be posed is:

"Why did employers grant these large wage increases when previously they had been withheld?"

The main reason for the Durban labour strikes was generally given as a lack of communication between management and the workers. (see 'Strikes - the lessons for Natal' pp 37, 39, 47). This was tantamount to an admission that employers were not aware of the fact that their workers needed a reasonable pay packet in order to maintain an acceptable standard of living. While it is difficult to believe that this could have been the true situation, it was nevertheless believed by many to be the case. The Bantu Labour Relations Regulations Amendment Act (No 70 of 1973) was subsequently passed to provide for, amongst other things, the establishment of Liaison Committees to improve communication between Black workers and employers. Relative industrial peace followed and this was attributed largely to improved communication resulting from the liaison committee system.

While it is accepted that the Liaison Committee system did improve communication between the Black work force and management, it is submitted that it was not the lack of communication that caused the labour unrest in the first place, but rather a lack of meaningful negotiation over conditions of employment between workers and employers. No legal machinery provided for organised collective bargaining

between Black workers and employers, with the result that the Black had, to a large degree, to be satisfied with paternalistic pay-increase hand-outs. When these were seen to be withheld, or too small, the workers felt they had no option but to go on strike, despite the fact that this action, under the circumstances, was prohibited by law.

In an effort to understand the events leading to the labour unrest in Natal and other parts of the country during 1973/74, the South African Institute of Race Relations held a workshop on 'Labour Organisation and the African' in March 1974 at the University of Natal. At this workshop Professor Schlemmer (1975 p 5) reported on a study conducted in 1971/72 in which it was found that 71% of Blacks in general mentioned inadequate pay as a major problem.

Mare (1975 p 21) found that 98% of the workers had struck for higher wages. In reply to the question:

"Did the workers talk to the employers before the strikes?",

80% replied that they had. Despite this claim, many employers stated that they had no advance warnings of the strikes. Commenting on this situation Mare (1975 p 21) stated:

"We felt that these contradictory claims were most probably due not simply to a complete lack of communication but to a situation where employers, because of the power they hold, have been in a position to ignore the rumble of discontent".

This statement supports the submission made in the previous paragraph.

The labour unrest at this time was extensively covered by the media, and much was written about conditions of service, poverty datum lines

and subsistence levels of pay. Political pressure was brought to bear, particularly on overseas controlled companies, to increase Black wages.

Referring to this time (1973), when the lowest wages paid to workers in South Africa were widely criticised and protested, Batson (1974 p 83) says that a wage of approximately R1 000 per annum, understood to be vouched for by experts, was seen as a demarcation line recognised by consensus as the absolute minimum for subsistence in South Africa.

"In fact, there was no such consensus, and for that matter, no such line. But the belief that they existed was real in its effects. These included official cognisance by the governments of the United States and United Kingdom and pressure of various kinds upon firms operating in South Africa".

As a result of this pressure, large wage increases were granted to Black workers throughout the country, as already shown (pp 61-62).

It may be questioned however, whether reference to increased productivity was made in granting these increases. One rather gains the impression that, because the increases were so large, and so hurriedly granted, that they were more the result of panic than sound managerial judgement.

Matthews (1975 p 91) who at the time conducted a study on the effects of large across the board wage increases granted to Black workers, found that these increases had not significantly affected the productivity of the workers concerned. He also compared the increased labour cost with the increases in consumer prices, and came to the conclusion that wage increases granted in this manner contributed to the increase in the inflation rate (Matthews 1975 p 124).

With reference to the unemployment problem it is argued that employers, faced with the very substantial increase in their Black wage bills - in some cases these had more than double between 1972 and 1974 (Matthews 1975 p 69) - would start looking at the replacement of labour with machines.

It is also submitted that the Government's Decentralisation plan, which would have provided job opportunities for Blacks in the border areas if successful, was in some cases rendered unsuccessful by the sharp increase in Black wages. As an example, reference will be made to the situation in the East London area. In accordance with the Government's decentralisation plan and the development of border industries, Berlin, a small village situated between East London and King Williams Town, and virtually adjacent to Mdantsane, the second largest Black township in South Africa, was proclaimed an industrial area. One of the benefits offered to prospective entrepreneurs was low Black wages. Unfortunately, while the project was being promoted, Black wages in East London increased to such an extent that low labour costs could no longer be used to lure entrepreneurs to the area. The Berlin project, which held so much promise for the area, turned out to be a dismal failure.

While the Economic Development Programme suggested the stimulation of labour intensive rather than capital intensive production methods where practicable as a means of combating the unemployment problem, it should be remembered that this is only feasible if the cost of labour intensive production is competitive with capital intensive production. It must be accepted that most organisations are established to make a profit not to act as welfare organisations.

It is therefore argued that the present inflation and unemployment problems have, to a marked degree, been the result of the spiralling of Black wages during the mid seventies, and this in turn was largely as a result of management's failure to conduct meaningful negotiation with the Black labour force. Had this taken place during the late 1960's

and early 1970's, wages would have increased gradually, and employers would have been in a better position to relate the increases granted to possible increases in productivity. They would have been in a better position to plan for future increases and not have these forced upon them.

It is very difficult seeing entrepreneurs being prepared to establish labour intensive industries when large wage demands could, within a short while, make them uncompetitive and possibly put them out of business. In these circumstances they perceive machine production as being more predictable than human production.

It is going to be difficult overcoming the problems of inflation and unemployment. It is suggested that, without meaningful negotiation, not only will these problems remain unsolved, but they will rather increase in magnitude.

Reference to these two national problems supports the submission that an urgency is attached to the improvement of negotiating procedures between managements and the work force.

6.3. THE INFLUENCE OF BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS

Black consciousness as a socio-political phenomenon began to manifest itself strongly in South Africa at the end of the 1960's and early 1970's, following its manifestation in the United States of America five to ten years earlier. As it is impossible to exclude its effect on Black worker attitudes in their work situation, some attention will be given to this phenomenon. Before reviewing the situation in South Africa, consideration will be given to the American 'Black consciousness' experience, as this will give a broader base from which to review the situation in South Africa.

BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The Civil Rights movement, which came to the fore during the 1960's in America, highlighted the 'Race' problem being experienced there with all its social, political, economic and industrial implications. In countries having a multi-racial labour force it is difficult isolating any problem which does not affect, or is not affected by, other problems arising out of the 'Race' issue. The Black in the industrial world cannot be isolated from the broader aspirations of the Black people outside his work place.

In 1967 the Industrial Relations Research Association of America devoted its annual spring meeting to discussion on the parallels between the 'Industrial' conflict of the 1930's and the 'Race' conflict of the 1960's. Chamberlain (1967 p 3) of Yale University, in his opening address, justified the consideration of race relations in an approach to the study of industrial relations by saying:

"There were two reasons why an association of experts in industrial relations should have concerned themselves with race relations; first, to see what light knowledge in their own special field might throw on the most important issue of the day; second, because industrial relations has itself always had race relations as a component problem".

He further maintained that:

"In the Thirties workers were demanding 'recognition'. In the Sixties Negroes were doing likewise".

In this respect he said that when workers sought 'recognition' they meant:

"....recognition of a union as their representative to negotiate with an identifiable management for terms explicit enough to be reduced to writing and enforced if need be through arbitration".

In referring to the industrial union movement, Tyler (1967 p 37) of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union said:

"The big revolution is, the union recognises, the fact that you have a voice. That is your right. After that come the real gains you can define and you can measure. They are tangible".

Mazey (1967 p 15) of the Auto Workers Union supported this view by saying:

"....the things we were seeking were a better way of life, and all its broad aspects, we were seeking industrial democracy, a voice in the conditions of employment, a voice in the say, we were trying to end the industrial dictatorship of employees".

On the question of having a voice, Bernstein (1967 p 17) of the University of California said the Negro:

"....wants to be heard by the White community to enjoy, in the contemporary cliché, 'Black Power'".

Green (1967 p 25) of Michigan State University, encouraged Negro professionals and so called middle class Negroes to assist civil rights leaders in structuring power blocks. He said:

"Without power we will not make any progress".

Tyler (1967 p 37) took this question of power a little further by saying:

"....because you can get measurable and tangible gains at a given hour, written down on a piece of paper, you can regularise the process of war and peace. You can say, when the contract ends, we have war, but when we sign the contract, we have peace."

Thus we see the pattern unfolding. Initially there is the need for recognition, a basic need of man. This is achieved by having a voice which gives the worker power to negotiate tangible gains for himself - a power likened to that of making war and peace.

Some veiled warnings were however issued to the Civil Rights movement, the unions, and those in positions of power in the following statements:

(1) Tyler (1967 p 37) maintained that:

"New movements invariably produce leaders who are pure-and- simply hooligans. Emotions are high, violence is common, and men appear on the scene who are fundamentally warriors".

(2) Of the unions, Mazey (1967 p 13) said:

".....where unions were more securely entrenched, as in construction and railroading, White advantage was generally served by disadvantaging Negroes with systematic exclusion of the latter from better jobs and union membership".

- (3) In conflicts for change, it often happens that the issue becomes a little clouded and new objectives are substituted for, or become more important than the old. McKersie (1967 p 62) of the University of Chicago, refers to this by saying:

"For example, desegregating public accommodation is not a high priority item in the surveys that have been done amongst Negroes, or is housing for that matter. Jobs come at the top of this list, but yet the movement has not always focussed on this objective".

- (4) Coleman (1967 p 85) of the Ford Foundation submitted that:

"There are parallels anywhere and everywhere to illustrate the inability of most people who are in power to hear new messages coming up from below.they remain unhearing and immovable until the force reaching them from below is so powerful that there has to be a reaction. That point then comes so late as to make it inevitable that the response be poorly thought out in its details."

Reference to the proceedings of this meeting of the Industrial Research Association has been made because it was considered relevant and very important for the purpose of this study, and also because an attempt will be made to draw a parallel in South Africa in an endeavour to obtain a better understanding of the inter-racial - industrial relations problems being faced in this country.

6.3.2. BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Black consciousness, in its purest form, is a cultural concept. It seeks to make the Black people conscious of their worth as Black people

- to make the Black see himself as a being, entire in himself and equal to men of other race groups. It aims at replacing generations of sub-servience and feelings of inferiority with feelings of confidence and pride.

It has, however, not remained cultural, but has been changed to become more of a political concept. 'Black consciousness' has become 'Black Power', and the clenched fist salute signifies more than a cultural awakening or development. It is the overflow of this movement into the industrial sphere, through changes in the Black workers' attitudes to their jobs and their employers, that is of interest in the study of industrial relations.

Black consciousness has its roots in the past. One could possibly refer to the second and third decades of this century when a Black, Clements Kadalie, organised the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, as a manifestation of Black consciousness. Initially this was a trade union, but it moved away into the sphere of politics and finally disintegrated around 1930.

Other non-union movements have made an appearance on the South African scene. In the 1940's the Non-European Unity movement and the African National Congress became active. In the 1960's the Pan Africanist Congress was formed. The change from the 'Black consciousness' to the 'Black power' concept is a more recent phenomenon which seems to have popular support among Blacks in South Africa and other Black states. This Black power ideal appears to incorporate all aspects in the political, social and economic spheres.

In America, where the Blacks are a minority group, the Civil rights-Black consciousness - Black power movement had a marked effect on industrial relations. In South Africa, where the Blacks are the majority group, a similar movement could be as effective, and its influence felt in the work place.

It is therefore submitted that Black consciousness, as a socio-politico phenomenon, cannot be excluded from deliberations seeking a solution to the resolution of industrial conflict in South Africa.



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CHAPTER 7

7. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF THE STUDY

7.1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS THEORY

7.1.1. INTRODUCTION

Industrial Relations, as a field of study, encompasses all aspects of people at work. As such it would be seen as an interdisciplinary field which includes the study of the behaviour of individual and groups of workers, individual and groups of employers; trade unions and/or workers' associations and employer associations, and the legal framework within which these exist and interact. Of necessity therefore, students of industrial relations must draw from such disciplines as the behavioural sciences, economics, history and law if a satisfactory understanding of this whole area of worker-management interaction is to be obtained.

While the industrial relations system exists and operates within, and is strongly influenced by a particular environment, which includes society as a whole, it should basically be seen as the interaction between three parties, namely, the employers, employees and the government. While the employers and employees negotiate and agree upon conditions of employment, the government provides the legal framework within which the negotiation and agreement takes place; the manner in which the agreements are to be administered and the procedure for the settlement of disputes between the parties should these occur.

The study of people at work and the interaction that takes place between management and the workforce becomes very complex when consideration is given to the following points. Firstly, this interaction takes place within a complicated legal framework.

Secondly, the approach of the parties is often influenced by economic and political events beyond their control, and finally, the parties involved are made up of individuals and groups having different interest, needs, attitudes, expectations and aspirations.

Industrial relations is presently a very topical subject in South Africa. Despite the complexity of the subject and the fact that students are forced to transcend the boundaries of one discipline to investigate and take cognisance of phenomena in another in order to get an adequate insight into the matter, there appears to be no shortage of advice and opinion on what should be done to improve the relationship arising from the interaction between employers, employees and the government. In an endeavour to obtain a more balanced perspective, consideration will now be given to the historical development of industrial relations.

7.1.2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Attitudes toward the role of work and the relationship between employer and employee have undergone drastic changes over the centuries. The early Greeks, for example, viewed work as a form of drudgery to be reserved for the lower classes and avoided by the aristocratic or leisure classes. (Fox 1971 pp 3-7). This view changed somewhat with the spread of Christianity and what later became known as the Protestant Ethic (see Weber 1930). Religious leaders, among whom were Luther and Calvin, saw work as a virtue in itself and a means of living a full and complete life and a way of serving God.

7.1.3. THE CLASSICAL ECONOMISTS AND LABOUR AS AN ECONOMIC COMMODITY

The advent of the Industrial Revolution which brought forth the factory system of work and gave rise to mass urban society, changed the views of work. Technological change and increased mechanization resulted in mass production with many new skilled and unskilled occupations. The moralistic views of work as projected by the protestant ethic gave way

to a more rational approach to labour in the industrial society. According to Kochan (1980 p 3) the economic frameworks of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill and Alfred Marshall became prominent in conceptualizing labour during the 1800's. These classical economists shared the view that labour could be conceptualised and treated the same as other factors of production. They saw labour, like other commodities, as being subject to the laws of supply and demand, and there was therefore no need for developing a special approach to the study of people at work.

7.1.4. MARX AND THE WEBBS

Karl Marx was one of the most vocal and influential critics of the application of the classical theory of labour. (Kochan 1980 p3). He attacked the views that labour was a commodity, and argued that the capitalistic system inflicted injustices of poverty, exploitation and alienation on the workers. He suggested that the ultimate solution to the workers problems was the introduction of a marxian economic and social system.

The Webbs in their two works (1898, 1902) advocated evolutionary strategies for improving the miserable lot of the working class. They saw trade unions as a means of improving the material positions of the workers in the capitalist system.

7.1.5. INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

Commons (1934 p 162) identified the essence of an alternative framework as:

"....a shift from commodities, individuals and exchanges to transactions and working rules of collective action".

Institutional economists appear to have taken a middle path between the classical economists and the Marxist/socialists. Work was viewed as affecting the welfare of the workers, their families and communities, and as such was too important to simply be treated as another factor of production.

7.1.6. INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGISTS

At the beginning of this century industrial psychologists began to exert a profound effect upon management thought and practice throughout the world, and perhaps Frederick Taylor's scientific management movement contributed mostly to this. (see Taylor 1919). By creating a number of very important shop management techniques such as time study, methods study, cost control systems and piece-rate bonus schemes, he altered both management and the workers' perceptions of work and consequently the working relationship which existed between them.

Scientific management was an attempt to blend economic incentives and industrial engineering techniques in such a manner that a 'best' way for organising work was arrived at. While focussing on the individual worker, scientific management held that if there was proper organisation of production, proper supervision and financial incentives, this would lead to high performance which would in turn result in satisfied workers. While there is little doubt that the scientific management approach resulted in benefits for both management and the workers, the techniques used, such as work and time study and incentive schemes, gave rise to sources of conflict which continue to the present time.

7.1.7. INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGISTS

While the industrial psychologists stressed the effect of economic incentives and the physical environment on individuals, a new movement which stressed the effect of the work group and group dynamics on work performance made an appearance in the 1930's, but particularly after the second world war. This movement, which became known as the 'human

relations movement' had its theoretical and intellectual foundations' roots in the experiments of Elton Mayo and his Harvard University colleagues at the Hawthorne Works of the Western Electric Company in Chicago from 1927 to 1932. (Beach 1980 p 21). The human relations movement, while focussing on the work group and group dynamics, shared with scientific management the belief in the commonality of goals between employers and employees. Their perceptions of the situation differed, however, in the sense that scientific management saw high performance, which was achieved through proper organisation, supervision and incentives, resulting in satisfied workers; whereas the human relations movement saw satisfied workers resulting in high performance.

The term 'human relations' remained in vogue for approximately three decades and was then replaced by the more modern term 'behavioural science'. This is basically a scientific study of human behaviour, and according to Beach (1980 p 21) is a branch of the social sciences which includes cultural anthropology, psychology and sociology. Among the most significant contributors to this movement have been Maslow (1954), McGregor (1960), Argyris (1964), Blake and Mouton (1964), Herzberg (1966) and Likert (1967).

7.1.8. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

As unions grew to become a threat to management and a potent force capable of inflicting costs on society, the need was perceived to end the separate studies of the problems of management on the one hand and the problems of the work force on the other. The need for management - union co-operation in attempts to maximise organisational effectiveness became apparent, and as a result more attention has been given in recent times to the treatment of workers as 'people' with rights as groups and individuals.

Workers are no more prepared to accept arbitrary treatment by management, and are more and more demanding a say in the making of decisions about matters which concern them. They demand the right to express

their views and to negotiate conditions of service with management. This has led to a field of study which has become known as Industrial Relations. While it is difficult to define this term precisely, it is generally accepted that it refers to those relationships between employers and employees which come about as a result of the process of collective bargaining between the employer and employee representatives, and result in conditions of service which are binding on both parties. Most students therefore see industrial relations in terms of 'institutions of job regulation'. Hyman (1975 p 31) however, is slightly more specific by maintaining that it should be seen in terms of the 'processes of control over work relations'. It is through these 'institutions of job regulation' and the 'processes of control over work relations' that attempts are made to control the conflict which arises as a result of the interaction between employers and employees.

The problem of maintaining industrial conflict within acceptable limits is complicated by the fact that individuals and groups of individuals have different perspectives of industrial relations. For the remaining part of this chapter attention will be given to three current approaches to industrial relations theory and three frames of reference or ideologies which determine how a person perceives and interprets industrial relations. This will hopefully give a deeper understanding of the field of study and a better appreciation of the complexity of industrial relations.

7.2 . CURRENT APPROACHES TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS THEORY

The three approaches which will be examined in this section are:

- 1) The systems approach.
- 2) The industrial government (Oxford) approach, and
- 3) The radical approach.

Reference will be made to the work of one recognized expert in each of the three approaches.

7.2.1. THE SYSTEMS APPROACH


While most of his predecessors saw Industrial Relations as part of an existing discipline, Dunlop (1958) viewed it as a separate one. He saw the system being made up of various actors operating within certain environmental contexts. The whole system was held together by an ideology, and a web of rules controlled or directed the actors in their work behaviour. He classified the actors into three main groups, namely, the employers, the employees, and the government agencies, or state. These three groups of actors inter-related within environments having various characteristics, three of which were identified. First, the technological development and characteristics of the workplace influenced the behaviour of the actors. Second, the market, or budgetary constraints and economic factors which affected decisions like wage rates, and third, the distribution of power in the wider society. For example, if power was centralised, the state would play a greater role in influencing work behaviour. Conversely, the greater the degree of democracy, the less the state would try to interfere.

With regard to the set of rules within which the actors operated, Dunlop identified two main types. First, substantive rules which specify actual conditions of employment e.g. wage rates and working hours, and second, procedural rules which regulate the manner in which the actors operate, e.g. when and how negotiations will take place.

In Figure 2 Allen and Keaveny (1983 p 20) give a simplified view of Dunlop's systems approach to Labour Relations.

FIGURE 2

Dunlop's systems approach to Labour Relations



It will be clearly seen from figure 2 that certain environmental forces affect the three actors - the unions, management and the government in their process of spinning the web of workplace rules, which in turn have a feedback affect on the environmental forces. Kelly and Nicholson (1980 p 860) agree with this perspective of industrial relations as a subsystem of society. They see the actors generating rules to regulate employment relationships which are bound together by an ideology.

7.2.1.1. APPRAISAL OF SYSTEMS APPROACH

Bluen (1983 pp 428-430) reviews the various critiques of Dunlop's model. Those who acclaim the work maintain that it provides a framework within which facts can be organised, while others say the approach has in itself no predictive value, and should therefore be used only as a heuristic device for structuring data.

With regard to the 'set of rules' some agree that this should occupy a central position in Industrial Relations while others maintain that

Dunlop's approach deals with the resolution of conflict in the system while failing to consider the causes of the conflict. He has therefore only considered half the problem.

A further criticism is aimed at Dunlop's view that the Industrial Relations system is held together by a common ideology to which the three parties ascribe, a fact which is questioned.

The systems approach emphasizes the institution of Industrial Relations at the expense of the people. It is maintained that the treatment of the behavioural variables is inadequate.

A final criticism is that Dunlop uses key concepts such as systems, rules and ideology in an ambiguous fashion.

Some writers have suggested that the systems approach be modified to cater for some of the criticism levelled at it. Katz and Kahn (1966) discuss what has been termed an 'open systems' approach in which consideration is given to input, throughput and output. The environment provides the input, for example, the attitude of the actors and technology; this is processed by the system (throughput) and then fed back to the environment (output). However it is suggested that if the modifications proposed were adopted it could be argued that the basic concept of systems theory had been so radically altered that it was unrecognisable. (Jackson 1977 pp 22-23).

Despite the criticisms, none of the writers appear to reject the notion of systems analysis, but suggest that with modification it can be useful.

7.2.2 . THE INDUSTRIAL GOVERNMENT ("OXFORD") APPROACH

Bluen (1983 pp 430-436) discusses the "Oxford Approach" which refers to the work of Bain, Clegg, Flanders, Fox, Hughs, McCarthy and Marsh, all of whom worked for some time at Oxford University. It is synonymous

with the Industrial Government approach which assumes that the various conflicting interest groups of an industrial society are able to reach agreement through the process of collective bargaining.

The Oxford approach, best represented by the writings and work of Flanders (1970) who in the opinion of Poole (1981 p 48) '.... was unquestionably the principle theoretical architect of the "Oxford school"....' also expresses the view that a system of industrial relations is a system of rules. (Flanders 1970 p 86). However, while the systems approach considers the sociological, economic and ideological influences on rule determination, the Oxford approach looks at collective bargaining as the institution responsible for the process of rule making and therefore focusses on political variables.

According to Kochan (1980 p 27) the term "collective bargaining" was first introduced in the works of Sidney and Beatrice Webb shortly before the turn of the century. (see S and B Webb 1902). They saw it mainly as an economic transaction to which the employees turned in order to enhance their bargaining power when negotiating with management on wages and other conditions of service. Flanders (1970 pp 213-240) however, points out that the scope for collective bargaining is not limited only to the market issues described by the Webbs. In their consideration very little attention was given to the employers' interest in collective bargaining and therefore only a part of the phenomenon was investigated. Flanders' views appear to be more in line with those of Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965 pp 136-137) who discussed three approaches to collective bargaining. The first was the marketing concept which they considered as an exchange relationship. The second was the governmental concept seen as a political relationship and the third concept that of industrial governance which they saw as a functional relationship.

While the systems approach therefore examines the sociological, economic and ideological aspects of rule determination, the Oxford approach views collective bargaining as the institution responsible for

the process of rule making and therefore focusses on political variables (Bluen 1983 p 431).

7.2.2.1. APPRAISAL OF THE 'OXFORD' APPROACH

In evaluating the 'Oxford approach' and the views of Flanders, Bluen (1983 pp 434-435) refers to writers who consider this approach as having had a major impact on Industrial Relations thinking, particularly in England, and who predict that Industrial Relations theory is likely to develop in accordance with Flanders' suggestions. At the same time, however, a number of writers have criticised Flanders for his concentration on the institutionalization of job regulation. By focusing on the process of conflict resolution through job regulation, he implies that Industrial Relations deals only with maintaining stability in industry. Personal relationship as a cause of conflict has been neglected. Like Dunlop he has concentrated on 'rules' and has given too little attention to the behavioural variables and the generation of conflict. It is argued that the Oxford approach is too narrow to offer a comprehensive framework for the study of Industrial Relations because it concentrates on the political aspect of Industrial Relations at the expense of the other relevant variables.

A final criticism is that Flanders ascribes to trade unions the limited role of checking management prerogative, and being involved in workplace matters only, while it is felt by some that the aims of trade unions should include a challenge to the basic assumption of a class society. Which brings us to the third approach to be discussed - the radical approach.

7.2.3. THE RADICAL APPROACH

Two classes of people are found within a capitalist society - the capitalists who owns the means of production, and the workers who own the ability to work. Industrial relations concerns itself with all aspects of the dynamic relationship between these two groups. Histori-

cally these classes have been involved in a power struggle in an attempt to strengthen their relative positions with regard to influencing the labour position in industry. This struggle for power and influence continues to be the central theme in industrial relations, and gives rise to the inherent conflict found in this relationship.

Hyman (1975 p 19) in discussing this conflict suggests that it occurs because of the fact that labour is treated as a commodity. Two sources of conflict are 'labour transactions' and 'control of workers'.

7.2.3.1. LABOUR TRANSACTION AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT

In the capitalist society the workers enter into a labour transaction with the capitalists to sell their labour for cash in the form of salaries or wages. In this respect labour is considered as a marketable commodity subject to the forces of supply and demand.

One of the goals of the capitalist is to maximize profits, and this can be achieved by either reducing production costs, or increasing the selling price of his products. Because of the competition from other producers it is often not possible to increase the selling price, which leaves him the alternative of reducing production costs. Labour, as a factor of production, contributes substantially to the total production cost, and the endeavour by the capitalist to keep this cost as low as possible conflicts with the aims of the workers to get as much for their labour as they possibly can. This labour transaction represents the basic conflict of interest between the capital and labour classes.

7.2.3.2. CONTROL OF WORKERS AS A SOURCE OF CONFLICT

Human labour, unlike other commodities, cannot be separated from the person selling it. Therefore, when a worker sells his labour to an employer, he subjects himself to the control of that employer for the duration of his employment. He must obey every order and instruction given and must work to maximise the employer's profits or his services

could be terminated. As the supply of labour usually exceeds the demand, the employer's position is strengthened and he is able to keep wages relatively low. This tremendous struggle between the employer, who seeks to reduce labour costs, and the employee who fights for an increase in wages, is ever present in the capitalist system.

The Radical approach to Industrial Relations is rooted in general marxist theory. It sees industrial relations as being an aspect of the totality of social relations and therefore the constant power struggle between capital and labour can only be settled if and when the social order is changed from capitalism into socialism. This can only be achieved by the workers combining to take control and determining the economic policy of the society. It is argued that once the workers have control private profit would be abolished and thus economic inequality eliminated.

7.2.3.3. TRADE UNIONS IN THE RADICAL APPROACH

The position of trade unions in the radical approach to industrial relations is interesting. Hyman (1975 p97) sees trade unions as checking managements' prerogative but by participating in the collective bargaining institution they cannot change managements' fundamental right to exercise control. By participating in the system they are helping to maintain the status quo. The role of trade unions should be to get as much short-term benefit for the workers as is possible out of the capitalist system while working toward the overthrow of the capitalist social order.

7.2.3.4. APPRAISAL OF THE RADICAL APPROACH

Bluen (1983 pp 439-440) refers to certain critiques of the Marxist - radical approach. The first question handled is whether or not it is possible to have a marxist approach to Industrial relations when the Marxist analysis examines society as a whole and seeks its change.

Scheinstock (1981) criticizes Hyman's exposition of the marxist approach by observing that the protective function of trade unions is overestimated and their presence does not eliminate the capitalists' power base. Also because they have been incorporated into the system they have forgone their revolutionary role. Furthermore, Marx's prediction that the capitalist system would destroy itself has not eventuated because the state has intervened to maintain the status quo.

Hyman's treatment of labour as a 'commodity' is also questioned when consideration is given to the humanization of work that has taken place, particularly during this century. Hyman, like Dunlop and Flanders, has not given sufficient attention to the psychological factors, and what managements have done to satisfy the needs of the workers, in his consideration of labour as a commodity used primarily to maximize profits.

Finally, Hyman's view that conflict of interest between capital and labour predominate industrial relations and the only solution is for the whole society to be revolutionized can be questioned. His assumptions are based on a radical ideology, whereas if another ideology was used a different picture would emerge.

7.2.3.5 SUMMARY

Three separate approaches to industrial relations have been considered in this section. In Dunlop's systems approach the structural components were the important phenomena discussed, whereas in Flanders' 'Oxford' approach the main accent fell on the institution of job regulation. Hyman's radical approach gave attention to the wider societal influences.


According to Bluen (1983 pp 440-441) two observations may be made from the work of these three theorists. Firstly, all three seem to have neglected the behavioural variables in their models, and secondly all three approaches reflect the importance of considering conflict and

harmony in industrial relations. Dunlop, while not directly referring to conflict, does stress harmony by proposing that a common ideology is needed if the system is to work successfully. The dynamics of harmony and conflict are clearly stressed by both Flanders and Hyman. In the case of Flanders he sees conflict as being inherent in the capital - labour relationship, but sees the parties striving for harmony through the process of collective bargaining because they realise that they are dependent upon each other. Hyman sees conflict predominating the management - work relationship because of the structure of the capitalist society. Conflict in the work situation will only be removed when and after the present 'class' society is changed to a classless one.

Bluen (1983 p441) uses a conflict-harmony continuum to indicate the position of the approaches of the three theorists in their consideration of harmony and conflict.

FIGURE 3

Position of three IR approaches on the Harmony-Conflict continuum



7.3. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IDEOLOGIES - (Frames of reference)

In order to gain a better understanding of the three theories of industrial relations discussed, it is useful to consider the various ideologies, or frames of reference, which determine how theorists perceive and interpret industrial relations. It should be remembered that associated with each ideological perspective is a specific set of attitudes and practices. Therefore if ones ideology to industrial relations is one of harmony and peace, ones attitude and action will be aimed in that direction, whereas if it is one of conflict ones attitudes and actions would probably be in the opposite direction. For example, in Dunlop's Systems Approach while the most important aspect is the web of rules which governs the relationship between the actors, the system as such is held together by a common ideology ascribed to by the actors. While each group of actors may have their own separate ideologies, there must be a large area of common ground if a stable, harmonious industrial relations system is to be maintained. Society prescribes, in a way, the main body of ideology of the three groups of actors.

On the other hand the radical approach takes a different view of a 'common' ideology. Here it is claimed that society's influence on the actors' ideologies tends towards maintaining the status quo of inequality between the classes, something that is unacceptable. An examination of the ideologies of the protagonists of the three main approaches to industrial relations will therefore assist in understanding the various theories discussed above.

7.3.1. IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Fox (1966, 1971, 1973, 1974, 1975) is possibly the theorist who has addressed the question of collective bargaining and industrial relations more than anyone else. He discusses three frames of reference - unitarism, pluralism and radicalism - in some depth in his work which appeared in 1974 (Fox 1974 pp 248-296). It is argued that the manner

in which we perceive and approach industrial relations would be influenced by the particular frame of reference we adopt.

Kelly and Nicholson (1980 p 872) in their review of the theoretical approaches to the causation of strikes seem to agree with Fox when they say:

"Frames of reference are seen as the basic value orientations which predispose people to view the world in certain ways, such as perceptions of interest conflicts, and the unitarism/pluralism/radicalism trichotomy provides one mode of organising these categories".

Bluen (1983 p 442) maintains that this classification is inaccurate because the radical approach is not a frame of reference as such, but rather a critique of the pluralist approach. Whether or not this is the case will not be debated here. Attention will however be given to these three frames of reference.

7.3.1.1.

THE UNITARY FRAME OF REFERENCE

As the term suggest this ideology refers to a 'unit' or 'oneness', and is analogous to a family unit. There is one source of authority which is accepted by the workers because they perceive management as being best qualified to run the organisation effectively. They perceive management and workers being loyal to each other and striving to achieve common goals. In this unified structure of authority, leadership and loyalty management's prerogative is legitimized by the employees who believe it acts in the best interest of all members of the organisation.

The emphasis of the unitary ideology is placed on harmony, and conflict between management and the workers is viewed as undesirable. When it does arise it is seen as being of a minor nature which should not be

pursued. As in a family unit, differences in opinion should be subjugated to the interest of the group. Each member should therefore strive for harmony and work for the interests of the organisation as a whole, believing that the goals of management are harmonious with the personal goals of the workers.

There is little room in this approach for collective bargaining because conflict of interests is not viewed as being sufficiently serious to warrant special attention, and also because, by suggesting there are conflicts of interest between management and the workers, it disturbs the harmony in the organisation.

It is suggested that managements subscribe more readily to the unitary approach than do the workers, and the principle of trade unionism and collective bargaining, while being given lip service, is generally not kindly received. Many reasons for this attitude could be advanced. Firstly, no one in authority likes his authority to be questioned and when a trade union, representing the workers, challenges management's right to unilaterally decide on conditions of service, this is perceived by management as interference in its managerial functions and an effort to restrict its power to decide what is best for all in the organisation. Secondly, while it may be true that during earlier times the traditional manager was guilty of failing to recognize the necessity of adopting a more humane approach to the management of his workers, and trade unions were established to get a better deal for them, this no longer was the case. Because of the present day enlightened management, the need for trade unions no longer exists. Thirdly, because of their ignorance, or disregard, of simple economics, their often outrageous demands are not in the organisation or national interests. Finally trade unions are viewed with suspicion as seeking to undermine the existing social order and change the status quo in management-worker relations.

While the unitary frame of reference may be attractive to management (Jackson 1977 p29) it is argued that the realities of the situation

seem to indicate that this approach is fast becoming obsolete because it is not being subscribed to by the majority of workers. It may be found suffering a lingering death in long-established family concerns having in the employ long-service older workmen, but as these waste away and are replaced by the younger generation so the ideology will finally be laid to rest.

7.3.1.2. THE PLURALIST FRAME OF REFERENCE

While the unitary ideology paints a beautiful picture of an organisation operating in harmony and peace - one large family with common objectives and interests - the pluralist ideology accepts that an enterprise is made up of people with differing aims and aspirations. Whereas in the unitary approach conflict of interest is viewed as being pathological and therefore to be avoided, the pluralists accept that conflict is a natural outcome of human interaction and is therefore inevitable. It will therefore be found in all labour-management interaction and is acceptable provided it is kept within reasonable limits.

While there are various versions of pluralism found in, for example, the different political and economic systems, which could have existed for centuries, in the industrial relations field it probably had its origin in the industrial revolution and the advent of trade unionism. Not that collective action by the working class was absent previous to this time. For example, very early cases of collective action are recorded in the Bible (see pl3). What is being argued is that while collective action by workers has taken place during the centuries, the rights of the workers to organise and participate in bargaining with management is a relatively new post industrial revolution phenomenon which was given prominence by the Webbs at the turn of this century.

The position then was that many employers, while recognising employee rights, strove to protect their managerial prerogatives. This led to increased conflict and government departments became increasingly

involved in an interventionalist role. The search for an acceptable approach to industrial relations led to the pluralist perspective which legitimized intergroup conflict in industry which was institutionalized through collective bargaining.

The pluralist therefore urges a coalition structure where bargaining is based on frank recognition of divergent group interest. The parties, while pursuing their own interests, recognize that each is dependent upon the other and so agree to respect the survival of the other. Through joint consultation and participation negotiated agreements are reached, and because both management and the workers have participated in the bargaining process, both feel morally bound to observe the terms of the agreement reached.

The pluralist therefore feels that while conflicts arise over terms of co-operation, the values and norms of both sides are not so divergent that workable compromises cannot be achieved. While managements holding the unitary view argue that trade union action is originated and sustained by people who persuade others to adopt a conflict stance towards management, those holding the pluralistic perspective accept the view that a certain amount of conflict is structured into the situation by virtue of the coalition nature of the organisation. They recognise that while there are diverging interests between management and the workers, the paramount need is to co-operate to keep industry prosperous in order that both sides derive maximum benefit from their association.

In order to operate within the pluralist framework each side must recognise the legitimacy of the other. Management must recognise that the union has the legitimate function of representing the workers, while the workers have to recognise managements legitimate right to performing the management function. Management, in performing its function must behave within a set of constraints which include satisfying the shareholders, the employees, the customers, the general public and the state. Within these constraints management endeavours

to balance the differing interests, acknowledging that all parties stand to benefit from a prosperous organisation.

The pluralist therefore sees the trade union, as representing the workers, bargaining with management to get a fair deal for its group. While this bargaining is done in an orderly fashion no major problems should arise. However, a central assumption of pluralism is that there is, or should be, a rough balance of power between the different interest groups. This is because bargaining can only really take place if the parties involved are of near equal strength, otherwise the weaker party must bargain under duress. It is the rejection of this assumption that forms the basis of the radical challenge.

7.3.1.3. THE RADICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

There would be very strong arguments to support the pluralist approach to industrial relations if it were possible to view a work organisation as a voluntary coming together of independent and autonomous participants having equal power and common objectives. Unfortunately people do not generally come together freely and spontaneously to set up work organisations. Most of them do so because they are forced to by their need to earn a livelihood. This forms the central theme of the radical critique of the pluralist ideology.

The radical perception of industrial society is one of class division and the exploitation of one group by another - the exploitation of the working class by the capitalist class; the powerless by the powerful; the proletariat by the bourgeois. Any suggestion of equality is rejected. Within the capitalist structure of industry workers are treated more as factors of production than as human beings with distinctive needs and aspirations. The whole approach to education and training is aimed at making the worker more useful to the employer.

This in turn contributes to maintaining the status quo of inequality, there being a vast disparity of power between, on the one hand, the

owners of economic resources and, on the other, those dependent upon them for access to those resources as a means of livelihood.

While the pluralists see management and labour, through collective bargaining, negotiating work agreements on roughly equal terms, the radicals see "free and equal joint regulation" as no more than "bargaining under duress".

The radicals also differ with the pluralists with regard to the moral obligation of the participants in collective agreements to observe the conditions of the agreements. The pluralist argue strongly that the participants, because of the fact that they have negotiated, and have agreed to be bound by, the conditions of the agreement, are 'morally bound' to abide by these conditions. On the other hand the radicals argue that, because the workers have been coerced to agree to certain conditions, they are not 'morally bound' to observe the agreement.

The pluralists see trade unions as being partners in a coalition structure and operating within their assumptions and philosophy. This partnership survives because there is recognition by each participant of the others' rights and interests. Although pursuing each his own interest they recognise their mutual dependence upon each other, and adjust their differences by methods which improve rather than destroy the lot of the other. On the other hand the radicals see trade unions as participating in the pluralist approach only because it is expedient for them to do so in the short term. They feel they have a better chance of the workers' needs being met by doing so, but their objective in the longer term is the annihilation of the social order which forces the working class to sell itself to the capitalist class.

The pluralist argument that there is a rough power parity between the bargaining units is rejected by the radicals. Fox (1974 p 276) maintains that what many see as labour having equal power (in some cases even an advantage over the employers) only arises from issues which labour choose to contest, and these never touch the real roots

of ownership, inequality, hierarchy and privilege. Only if labour were to challenge an essential pillar of the capitalist structure would the owners of capital need to bring into play anything approaching their full power.

Fox (1974 p 284) takes the radical argument a little further when he says that the unions, as the workers' representatives, take their seats with management at the negotiating table, not as free and equal citizens, but rather as men who have already been

"socialized, indoctrinated, and trained by a multiplicity of influences to accept and legitimize most aspects of their work situation; a situation designed in the light of the values and purposes of the major powerholders".

They avoid psychological discomfort by shrinking from challenging inequalities imposed on them by the more powerful employers, and by so doing the unsatisfactory status quo is maintained.

The radical perspective therefore challenges the moral validity of negotiation and collective bargaining in the capitalist society on the basis of disparity between the contracting parties. At the same time some of the reasons why the status quo is maintained are given.

7.3.1.4. SUMMARY

In the first part of this chapter three theoretical approaches to the study of industrial relations, and the work of one recognised expert in each approach, was examined. In the latter part three frames of reference were discussed. It now becomes clear that a person's approach to industrial relations will largely be determined by the frame of reference adopted.

None of the three theoretical approaches to industrial relations is derived from, or is closely related to, the unitary frame of reference. While this perspective may be popular among employers, who nostalgically long for days long past when their prerogative was less strongly challenged, in reality it can be discarded as a serious approach to current industrial relations. The advent of trade unionism and collective bargaining has been responsible for this state of affairs.

The most popular frame of reference, in western industrial countries at least, appears to be the pluralist perspective. Both Dunlop's systems approach (albeit to a lesser extent) and Flanders' 'Oxford' approach are derived from this frame of reference. The radicals, on the other hand, are very critical of the pluralist ideology. They nevertheless participate in the collective bargaining process because they believe that by doing so they can best serve the needs of the workers in the short term.

Attention in this thesis will therefore be directed towards the pluralist perspective of industrial relations which views conflict as a natural outcome of human interaction. As such it will therefore be found in all labour-management interaction, each side recognising the legitimate rights of the other. This intergroup conflict in industry has been institutionalized through the process of collective bargaining. The following chapter will be devoted to this process.

CHAPTER 8

8. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the Pluralist frame of reference regarding industrial relations appears to be the most common approach used, in 'western' countries at least, in the establishment of conditions of employment and the resolution of industrial conflict. This approach involves what is now commonly referred to as collective bargaining, a phenomenon which has become more and more accepted, particularly since the second world war. Taylor (1948 p 1) aptly summarises the position in the late 1940's by maintaining that:

"A rare unanimity of opinion exists about the soundness of collective bargaining as the most appropriate means of establishing the conditions of employment".

Stewart Pogony
In an endeavour to obtain a better understanding of the meaning of collective bargaining, a more detailed examination of this phenomenon will now be made. In doing so the following aspects will be considered:

- (a) Definition
- (b) Objectives
- (c) Characteristics
- (d) Compromise
- (e) Bargaining power
- (f) Strategy and tactics
- (g) Difficulties associated with collective bargaining
- (h) Legal requirements.

8.1. (a) Definition of collective bargaining

The term 'Collective Bargaining' was first used by Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1902) at about the turn of the century. They saw collective

bargaining as fundamentally an economic transaction, one used by employees to increase their bargaining power vis a vis their employer. It was used to refer to negotiations concerning pay and conditions of employment between trade unions on the one hand and employers on the other. Many later writers have expressed views on the meaning of the term, but have been unsuccessful in arriving at a precise definition.

Flanders (1969 pp 11-41) expands on the Webbs' perception by arguing that collective bargaining goes beyond the negotiation of economic terms to include the definition of the rights of and relationship among individuals, employees, union officials and employers.

In another place he says that collective bargaining is:

'.....a method of settling the terms and conditions of employment of employees..'

and he suggests that it is useful to view collective bargaining from three different angles. Firstly, it normally starts with a dispute, otherwise there would be no need for bargaining. Secondly, it ends in an agreement or the bargaining has broken down. Lastly, to arrive at an agreement some procedure has to be followed by the parties. (Flanders 1956 pp 252-253).

Collective bargaining is, according to Allen and Keaveny, (1983 p 234):

"....the process through which labour and management negotiators resolve their disagreements over wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment".

Beach (1980 p 96) maintains that:

"Collective bargaining is concerned with the relations between unions representing employees,

and employers (or management representatives). It involves the process of union organisation of employees; negotiation, administration and interpretation of collective agreements covering wages, hours of work and other conditions of employment; engaging in concerted economic action, and dispute settlement procedures".

Schuster (1980 p 264) says:

"Collective bargaining involves the joint determination by employees (or rather their elected representatives) and management of such issues as compensation, retirement benefits, other fringe benefits, procedures for discipline, layoff, promotion and work scheduling".

Alfred (1984 p 11) maintains that:

"It is a formalised ritual which serves to control and institutionalise conflict".

In the opinion of Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965 p 113) collective bargaining may be viewed as:

"....the process which determines on what terms labor will continue to be supplied to a company by its present employees or will be supplied in the future by newly hired workers".

They also say (p 130) that:

"...it is a method of conducting industrial relations, a procedure for jointly making decisions on matters affecting labour".

Another view expressed is the following:

"Collective bargaining involves the formation of the terms and methods of a mutual contract, agreement or understanding between two or more persons, pertaining to something that is to be done, such as the performance at work". (Sikula 1976 p 385).

From the definitions cited so far, it is clear that for any form of collective bargaining or negotiation to take place, there must be at least two parties involved; that the parties should have conflicting interests, but even though the interest conflict, they are dependent upon each other for the benefit of all parties. In this respect Walton and McKersie (1965 p 3) express the view that labour negotiations are:

"...the deliberate interaction of two or more complex social units which are attempting to define or re-define the terms of their interdependence".

It then becomes apparent that while the parties have conflicting interests, they can only achieve these by working together for the common good. Cascio and Awad (1981 p 509) stress this point in their definition of negotiation and collective bargaining by saying that:

"Negotiation is a process involving two parties with common and conflicting interest, who agree to put forth and 'bargain' on explicit proposals concerning specific terms of a fair and just agreement."

They proceed to say that the core of the definition lies in the interrelationship between "common interest" and "conflicting inte-

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rests". Unless both interests are present in one form or another, negotiation makes no sense.

Another view of collective bargaining is that of Davey (1972 p 2) who maintains that it may be defined as:

"...a continuing institutional relationship..."

between management and employees. The participants in collective bargaining do not act for themselves - they represent groups of people. It follows then that collective bargaining typically involves organised group relationships.

A final view to be cited is that of Dessler (1978 p 457) who draws on the "National Labour Relations Act" (in America) for the following definition:

"For the purpose of (section 8 of this Act) to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment,...."

Dessler (1978 p 458) maintains further that 'Bargaining in good faith' is the cornerstone of effective labour-management relations.

It is now possible, after considering the various definitions, to formulate one's own definition. For the purpose of this thesis collective bargaining will be defined as:

"A continuing institutional relationship between employers and employees in which they, having common and conflicting interest, are obliged to

bargain in good faith from time to time with the view to resolving their differences by jointly determining the content of operating agreements which cover the conditions of employment and are aimed at achieving the objectives of the negotiating parties."

8.2. (b) Objectives of Collective Bargaining

Before considering the specific objectives of the parties in the bargaining process it is necessary to analyse what actually constitutes labour negotiation, and in this respect reference will be made to a framework proposed by Walton and McKersie (1965 pp 4-5). They maintain that:

"Labour negotiations, as an instance of social negotiations, is comprised of four systems of activity, each with its own function for the interacting parties, its own internal logics, and its own identifiable set of instrumental acts or tactics".

The four systems are:

- 1) Distributive bargaining
- 2) Integrative bargaining
- 3) Attitudinal structuring, and
- 4) Intra-organisational bargaining.

A closer look at the meaning of each of these terms is necessary.

8.2.1) Distributive bargaining

This term refers to the activity of dividing or distributing limited resources, and as such may be seen as the dominant activity in the union-management relationship. The unions, representing the workers,

bargain with management in the determination of wages, hours of work and other working conditions, and as this involves the distribution of limited resources, there is assumed to be some conflict of interests between management and the workers. Distributive bargaining is therefore the joint decision process for resolving conflicts of interest, and since the resources are limited, it usually follows that what one party wins the other loses. It is:

"... bargaining in the strictest sense of the word"
(Walton and McKersie 1965 p 4).

8.2. 2) Integrative bargaining

This type of bargaining occurs in situations where the attainment of the objectives of one party are not in conflict with those of the other party. It refers to joint problem-solving resulting in benefits to both parties. Mutual problem areas are identified, such as alcoholism and absenteeism, safety and accidents, job security and pension funds, and in this case the parties openly express their views and preferences in efforts to solve 'our problem'. While the outcome of this type of bargaining is advantageous to both parties, it should not be assumed that it is equally beneficial to both parties. Both agree because there is something to gain without the possibility of loss.

8.2. 3) Attitudinal structuring

The bargaining process provides the parties with the opportunity to restructure their attitudes toward each other. It is aimed at influencing the relationship between the parties and involves such matters as friendliness-hostility, trust-mistrust, and respect-disrespect. The desired relationship could be affected by contextual factors such as the state of the economy, technology and whether the relationship is new or of long standing. Each party could aim at changing its own, or opponent's attitude, or both.

8.2.4) Intra-organisational bargaining

In order to reach agreement by resolving conflict, both parties must compromise. In order to do this, the negotiators must get the agreement of their constituents, and this is often very difficult to do.

This usually involves, not only caucusing from time to time, but reporting back to members to get new authority and directives. When a number of employers and unions are involved in the bargaining process, this can be a very difficult thing to accomplish.

Having considered the elements which constitute labour negotiation, it is now possible to examine the various objectives or goals of collective bargaining.

In considering the definition of collective bargaining already given (pp101-102) it would appear that the overall objective of the parties involved is to attempt to resolve their differences by agreeing on conditions of employment which will in a measure achieve the objectives of the negotiating parties. It should be remembered that while the negotiating parties have conflicting interest, neither party can achieve its objectives without the participation of the other. In this respect Allen and Keaveny (1983 p 233) maintain that:

"While the relationship between labour and management is characterized by conflict, this conflict usually takes place within bounds as both groups have a vested interest in developing a prosperous organisation".

They proceed to identify the following three broad categories on which parties seek agreement through collective bargaining:

- 1) It is seen as a system for determining workers' compensation, including both wages and fringe benefits;

- 2) It is a procedure for establishing, revising and administering the rules of the work place, and
- 3) It is used as a method for resolving disputes arising during the life of the labour agreement (p 234).

Cascia and Awad (1981 pp 510-511) differentiate between the goals of management and those of the unions representing the workers. They maintain that:

"For the purpose of contract negotiations, management has three major goals: stability in its employee relations, continued viability in the competitive market, and prerogative in decision making".

With regard to the unions' goals they say:

"Labour organisations typically focus on two major goals: increased membership and higher wages."

While many writers see collective bargaining in terms of tangible benefits accruing to the parties, Davey (1972 p 390) sees it in a much broader sense. He maintains that:

"Collective bargaining remains the most valid institutional approach for strengthening the essential components of our private enterprise system while at the same time enhancing the dignity and freedom of the individual worker in our society".

Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965 p 3) express a very much narrower view by saying that collective bargaining:

".....concerns the agreement by employers and union on the general terms under which employees will consent to work."

The goals of trade unions in collective bargaining have been the subject of debate in the past, and differing views have been expressed. The Webbs (1898 p 1) describe a trade union as:

"....a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment."

Victor Feather (1963 p35) appears to support this view by asserting that:

"The main job of a trade union is to maintain and improve the living standards of its members. That, in a nutshell, is the only fixed principle of trade unions, wherever they may be. How they set about that work, however, cannot be fixed."

In discussing the goals of American trade unions, Kochan (1980 p 163) mentions three separate critiques of the bargaining goals of unions which have been offered by various groups.

Firstly, there are those who would like to see the unions broaden their goals to meet, not only their members' shortrun economic interests, but also the interest of the outside community. They would like to see unions joining in the fight against poverty, pollution, discrimination and other social evils, rather than concentrating on the narrow goals of improving the wages and conditions of employment for the select group of workers they represent. These critics would like to see unions becoming a basically conservative force in society exhibiting

more social idealism and one that resembles a social movement rather than a labour institution.

A second set of critics would like to see the union pursuing goals which reflect the public interest rather than the narrow interests of its members. This group would like to see the union more actively seeking to minimize strikes and disruptions to society and to limit the extent of their wage demands to conform to national economic policies. They argue that unions should be more concerned with the broader social and economic objectives of public policy.


More recently a third set of critics has joined the debate by arguing that unions' goals are no longer responsive to the needs of the work force. They would like to see the unions placing more emphasis on the psychological needs of the workers such as meaningful work, personal growth and self esteem.

Bendix (1978 p 25) in discussing trade union objectives uses the following figure to differentiate between what he considers to be the four main groups of trade union goals, with examples given. (Figure 4).

This schematic representation of trade union goals seems to include the whole universe of possible union goals. The extent to which a union favours one set of goals above another could lay itself open to possible criticism, as indicated by Kochan.

It would therefore appear that while management and the workers have conflicting interests and goals, the main objective of their participation in collective bargaining is to build a prosperous organisation, without which neither of their interests and goals could, to any degree, be achieved.

FIGURE 4



8.3. (c) Characteristics of collective bargaining.

It has been argued that collective bargaining should not be regarded as analogous to the negotiation of a contract between two individuals. While the most important characteristic of a normal contract is possibly its voluntary nature, Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965 p 425) argue that collective bargaining in most instances to-day requires that some form of agreement is reached between the parties. They introduce the concept of 'Conjunctive Bargaining' which they say arises from the absolute requirement that some agreement - any agreement - be reached so that the operations on which both are dependant may continue. Neither party can secure its objectives without a joint working relationship.

Herman and Kuhn (1981 p 320) express the situation by saying that a

unique feature or characteristic of the union - management contract is that:

"... the parties must agree, even if they don't agree".

Beach (1980 p 97) agrees with this argument by maintaining that bargaining a labour agreement differs from negotiating a commercial contract, for example buying or selling a commodity, in two respects. Firstly, in the labour agreement the parties must learn to live with each other whether they like it or not. They cannot discontinue the relationship as in a commercial contract. Secondly, it differs because of the human relations and political aspects of the labour - management relationship. For example, a union, representing workers, is a political - economic organisation and the leaders have to deal with dissident groups within their ranks. The social aspects of collective bargaining therefore set it apart from the negotiation of an ordinary business contract.

In this respect Walton and McKersie (1965 p 380) maintain that:

"There are at least two characteristics essential to bargaining situations:

- (1) a conflict of interest of the parties cannot be satisfied completely and simultaneously;
- (2) a possibility of mutual gain through co-operation - gain meaning more than each party could achieve by going it alone."

In a general statement on the relationship between management and the workers Allen and Keaveny (1983 p 233) say:

"Their relationship is characterised by conflict. However, this conflict usually takes place within bounds".

The same authors proceed (pp 235-239) to identify five main characteristics of collective bargaining, these being:

(1) Collective bargaining involves group relationship

Groups and sub-groups of workers negotiate with groups and sub-groups of management and a relationship develops between these.

(2) Collective bargaining involves a continuous relationship

Unlike the general commercial contract, the parties involved in industrial collective bargaining have to live with each other, being dependant on the other to achieve their own objectives.

(3) Collective bargaining is a diversified relationship

The nature of the collective bargaining relationship is a function of a number of different variables, for example, the technology employed by the firm, the product manufactured, and the labour market, to mention a few.

(4) Collective bargaining is a dynamic relationship.

The relationship between the participating parties is alive - it grows, changing form from time to time. It could be that a cordial relationship one year could change into a rather strained one the next.

(5) Collective bargaining is essentially a private relationship.

While the bargaining takes place between groups of workers and groups of managers in an individual enterprise, a particular region or even on a national basis, the relationship is essentially a private one, concerning only those managements and workers in the particular industry. The government's involvement is generally merely to provide the legal framework within which the relationship is conducted.

Another characteristic of Collective Bargaining is expressed by Mabry (1965 p 480) who maintains that:

"Since gains to labor rarely accrue without some accompanying monetary or psychological loss to management, and vice versa, the collective bargaining relationship can be characterised as a situation in which the interests of the parties are opposed".

Beach (1980 p 96) refers to collective bargaining as being:

"....characterised as a form of industrial democracy and industrial government".

He refers to the following phases of government:

- Legislative phase, during which the representatives of the parties draw up a legally binding agreement,
- Executive function, where management take on the authority and responsibility to operate the agreement, and
- Judicial function, with the Industrial Council normally having the responsibility to see that the conditions of the agreement are being adhered to and to sort out problems which may arise.

Allen and Keaveny (1983 p 234) agree with this analogy by saying that:

- "Collective bargaining is a system for determining workers' compensation including both wages and fringe benefits,
- Collective bargaining is a procedure for establishing, revising, and administering the rules of the workplace, and
- Collective bargaining is a method for resolving disputes arising during the life of the labour agreement".

It should be remembered that industrial agreements only prescribe general minimum conditions of service. They cannot possibly cater for every situation in every participating enterprise. Provision is therefore normally made for a system of exemption from aspects of the agreement to enable individual firms to function more satisfactorily. For example, the agreement may prescribe that a minimum period of one hour be allowed for lunch breaks. This is the general rule but it could suit, for various reasons, both the workers and the management of an individual company to make the duration of the lunchbreak half an hour. In this case the company would make application to the industrial council for an exemption from that particular provision of the agreement permitting the company to observe a half hour lunch break.

Collective bargaining therefore not only aims at arriving at agreement, but also at ensuring that the agreement, once decided upon, operates smoothly and well.

Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965 pp 136-137) throw further light on the characteristics of the relationship between management and the workers by discussing three approaches to collective bargaining. The first is the marketing concept which they say looks upon collective bargaining as a means of contracting for the sale of labour. It is therefore an exchange relationship. The second is the governmental concept which

views collective bargaining as a constitutional system in industry. It is a political relationship. The third is the industrial relations concept which views collective bargaining as a system of industrial governance. It is a functional relationship.

Finally, further attention will be given to the dynamic nature of collective bargaining. It should be remembered that collective bargaining has always been analysed from an 'open systems' approach. This means that analysts and practitioners accept that collective bargaining relationships must adapt to changing external conditions. These conditions have been conceptualised in many ways. Kerr (1955 pp 10-22) discussed a number of economic, social, political and community characteristics as far back as 1955. Dunlop (1958) at about the same time classified the industrial relations environment into three dimensions, namely:

- (i) economic
- (ii) technological and
- (iii) societal.

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Kochan (1980 pp 36-83) discusses the effect of various contexts of the environment of collective bargaining in some depth, clearly indicating its dynamic nature.

Allen (1971 p 39) maintains that industrial relations occur:

"...within a dynamic conflict situation which is permanent and unalterable so long as the structure of society remains unaltered".

In considering the various definitions of collective bargaining, one characteristic was the parties 'attempting to define or re-define the terms of their interdependence' (see p100). Because of the continuing nature of the relationship it is subject to pressure from the environments and the parties are thus obliged to revise the perceptions of

their respective roles from time to time. Some of the more important factors exerting pressure on collective bargaining are:

(i) New technologies for performing work is perhaps one of the most important factors. Improved computers and production machinery often make present skills obsolete and labour redundant. Workers are continually being called upon to adapt to new production methods and this often results in dissatisfaction and problems, particularly when older employers are involved.

(ii) Changes in the attitudes and expectations of the workers affect the situation. Younger workers, for example, are generally more educated, more interested in participating in the decision-making process at work, and more concerned about the quality of their jobs than older workers.

(iii) Managements are continually expected to improve profits. To do this they have to improve productivity, an exercise which is often perceived by the workers as an attempt to squeeze 'blood out of a stone'.

(iv) Unions on their part are expected to do a better job than previously, and are judged by the benefits they can get out of management for the workers.

(v) The larger society also has an interest in industrial relations because ultimately it must bear the social, economic and political costs of strikes and other forms of labour unrest. Public calls for changes in the management-labour relationship are often heard, particularly during and after periods of 'labour unrest'. Examples of this in South Africa are the passing of the Bantu Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act in 1973 after the 'Natal strikes', and the appointment of the 'Wiehahn Commission' of enquiry into labour matters in 1977. Both these major events in South Africa's management-labour history were aimed at changing both the management and workers' attitudes toward

collective bargaining, particularly in respect of co-operation and problem solving. Changing attitudes at work, however, is not easily achieved especially when these are influenced by strong environmental forces outside the immediate management - worker relationship.

Management and the labour force, being subject to these pressures from all sides, must adapt to survive. What was acceptable in the past is not necessarily acceptable to-day. The dynamic nature of this relationship demands that both management, and the labour force, change their attitudes and the perceptions of their respective roles from time to time. This will mean compromising, but this is what collective bargaining is all about.

8.4. (d) Compromise

Reference has been made (see p101) to 'bargaining in good faith'. Dessler (1978 p 458) maintains that one of the characteristics of 'good faith' bargaining is concession. He says that the interpretation of the National Labour Relations Board and the courts is that:

"....although you are not required to make a concession, the courts and board definitions of good faith suggest that a willingness to compromise is an essential ingredient in good faith bargaining."

Allen and Keaveny (1983 p 260) in discussing 'good faith bargaining' refer to a United States Court of Appeal interpretation that in order for the parties to bargain in good faith, they must:

"- Enter negotiations with an open mind, that is, without a predetermined disposition not to bargain.

- Make a sincere effort to reach an agreement on mutually acceptable terms."

This interpretation of good faith bargaining in the United States is no doubt applicable everywhere. It may be accepted then, that an essential element of successful collective bargaining is 'compromise', or in other words 'agreement attained by mutual concession'. Without this bargaining cannot take place.

Occasions may arise when concession is not necessary, for example, when the employer is prepared to offer more than the employees demand. This in practice seldom occurs, and in such cases the deliberations cannot be referred to as a bargaining session. For the purpose of this thesis, therefore, any agreement arrived at through collective bargaining will be considered as "an agreement attained by mutual concession or compromise."

The degree to which the parties concede is determined to a large extent by their perception of their, and the other party's power positions. To obtain a clearer understanding of collective bargaining, a closer and more careful investigation of this aspect of bargaining is essential.

8.5. (e) Bargaining power

One of the variables in the collective bargaining situation about which there is general agreement is the influence the relative power positions of the participating parties have on the outcome of negotiations. Because of its vital importance, miscellaneous perceptions of bargaining power will be given as well as a method for determining the extent of this power.

In commenting on the relationship between power and conflict resolution Fox and Flanders (1969 p 159) are of the opinion that:

"... power is the crucial variable determining the outcome".

Kochan (1980 p 21) agrees with this view by maintaining that:

"If unions are partly chosen by employees to increase their bargaining power, then it follows that the outcomes of employer and union interactions are a function of the relative power of the parties".

Wright Mills (1948 p 233) argues that because labour unions arose as a counterforce to the corporate forms of business enterprise, they were:

"...economic attempts to equalise the bargaining power of the workers and the corporations".

Herman and Kuhn (1981 p 295) say that 'power' is the main thing unions and collective bargaining are all about, and they go on to define it as follows: (p 296)

"Power is the ability to get wanted goods from another party, and bargaining power is the ability to get them on good terms - that is, by giving relatively little in return".

Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965 p 170) submit the following definition:

"Bargaining power can be defined as the ability to secure another's agreement on one's own terms".

They argue further that, to a substantial degree, the form of the final agreement reflects the relative bargaining power of the parties. They maintain that: (p 170)

"The view has been expressed that bargaining power is the effective force behind the whole collective bargaining relationship and the process of inter-group agreement".

Allen and Keaveny (1983 p 241) explain bargaining power in the following manner:

"...the union's bargaining power is management's willingness to accept the union's demands. Similarly, management's bargaining power can be viewed in terms of the union's willingness to accept management's demands".

Mabry (1965 p 481) in discussing the power positions of the parties involved in bargaining, comments as follows:

"In sum, then, the ability of a party to win a concession from another is influenced by the party's ability to reward or punish an opponent and also by the opponent's estimate of this ability".

From the above definitions and views it would appear that a party's bargaining power is its ability to force its conditions on the other party. This would appear to be a simple strait forward process, but it is an over-simplification of the situation. Cascio and Awad (1981 p 521) maintain that:

"...traditionally negotiation is viewed as a rational process in which each party seeks to secure its own interests".

This has, they maintain, been described by economists as an economically rational process. They however maintain that attempts have been made more recently to integrate 'economics' and 'rational behaviour'

with other relevant factors, and this has resulted in various behavioural models of collective bargaining, the best known being that developed by Walton and McKersie (see p102).

Bargaining is further complicated by the fact that, while demands for wage increases are normally the main issue bargained, there are normally a number of matters making up the total package demanded by the unions. Management's main objective is for the total package agreed upon to cost as little as possible while giving maximum satisfaction to the workers. In this respect its bargaining team makes use, formally or informally, of the Catastrophe Theory discussed by de Villiers (1985 pp 16-25). Using this approach, management endeavours to determine the area in which the smallest concession will give the greatest satisfaction for each item bargained. And this need not necessarily be determined in direct costs alone. For example, management could agree to a demand costing R20 000 per month rather than to one costing R15 000 per month, if it considers the satisfaction arising from it to be proportionately more than that arising from the cheaper demand. The total cost of managements concessions is therefore not only determined in real terms but consideration is given to the concept of 'value for money'.

The determination of bargaining power

Perhaps the most important cause of deadlock in labour negotiations is the parties' inability to accurately determine their bargaining power, as well as that of their opponent. There is no precise measure to do this, and judgement must of necessity be subjective in nature. Atkinson (1980 p 8-24) however uses a method which, while giving approximate values only, is more objective than a purely subjective 'guess-work' approach. The model determines the bargaining power of the negotiating parties as follows:

The disadvantages your opponent would suffer if he were to disagree with your proposal.

Your bargaining power= _____

The disadvantages your opponent would suffer if he were to agree with your proposal.

and conversely

The disadvantages you will suffer if you disagree with his proposal.

His bargaining power= _____

The disadvantages you will suffer if you agree with his proposal.

(The symbol= is best described 'is indicated by'; the line can be taken to mean 'relative to'.)

Elements representing disadvantages arising out of disagreement are listed above the line, and those representing disadvantages arising out of agreement are listed below the line. Each element is then rated twice, firstly in terms of the degree (cost) of the disadvantage to the party, and secondly in terms of the likelihood of it actually occurring. The product of the values attributed to the cost and the likelihood of the cost occurring gives the total cost. The sum of the values given to all the elements then gives the total cost. The negotiating parties can then compare the cost of disagreeing with a proposal made by the other party with the cost of agreeing with that proposal.

8.6. (f) Strategy and tactics of negotiating parties.

Parties coming together to bargain have differing demands and expectations, and perceptions of what they consider to be a 'fair deal'. These perceptions, and consequent initial demands, appear further apart than what they in reality are. The result is that when negotiation commences the demands of the parties appear irreconcilable.

In this connection Sloane and Whitney (1977 p 188) have the following to say:

"In most instances, unions presenting their original proposals will demand more than they actually intend to get, and companies' first counter proposals are usually much lower than the managements are actually prepared to offer".

Allen and Keaveny (1983 p 250) also refer to this strategy by saying:

"At the outset of negotiations, the positions of the parties are usually far apart. Through the collective bargaining process the parties change positions and come closer to each other".

It would appear that this strategy in bargaining is used to give the impression that the party is magnanimous in its bargaining in good faith. In other words, it wishes to give the opposing party the impression that it is prepared to make large concessions, when in actual fact it may not be making a concession at all. As an example of this, take the case of negotiation that takes place over wages. Let us assume that a trade union demands eleven rand per week increase for a particular category of workers, but in actual fact would be extremely happy to receive an eight rand increase. Let us also assume that management is prepared to grant an increase of up to ten rand, but initially counter-proposes five rand. In a great show of 'good faith' bargaining the management makes a significant concession by agreeing to grant a nine rand increase. This is more than the union expected and it perceives management as having made a tremendous concession, when in fact it is less than the figure management believed it would have to make.

Stevens (1963 p 33) maintains that certain advantages arise from this strategy of the unions inflating their initial demands and the employers deflating their initial offers. Firstly, he maintains that it allows room for bargaining. Secondly, it is a form of insurance against events which may occur during negotiation.

As this strategy or tactic is considered one of the most important in collective bargaining, a more detailed examination of how it operates, together with its association with the 'power' positions of the negotiating parties, appears necessary.

At the start of negotiations both parties decide upon two figures- a minimum and maximum, only one of which is revealed to the other party. For example, in the case of the trade union, it decides on a minimum figure it is prepared to accept, but keeps this figure secret. The figure it reveals to management is the inflated figure demanded. Similarly, in the case of management, it keeps secret the maximum figure to which it is prepared to concede, while offering a greatly reduced figure to the union. It is within this range and between these extremities that successful bargaining has to take place.

Walton and McKersie (1965 p 14) use the following figure to explain the range within which negotiation takes place.

FIGURE 5

Range of negotiation





Figure 5 depicts the units of value accruing to both parties participating in the bargaining process. The settlement point will be somewhere in the range C to I depicted by the strait line CI. At point C the units of value for one party - say the employer - is 6 while those of the opponent - the workers - is 0. At point E the units of value for the employer would be 4 while those for the workers 2. Similarly at point I the units of value for the employer would be 0, while those of the workers 6. Now at a point B, to the left of C, the units of value to the employer would be 7 while those to the workers -1. In the same way, at a point J, to the right of I, the units of value to the employer would be -1 while those to the workers 7. Neither side would accept a situation where they receive a negative quantity of value. At point B and J therefore, deadlock in the bargaining would occur with possible strike action following. The settlement range is therefore from C to I. The exact position would depend, to a large degree, on the 'power positions' of the parties negotiating. In the above example, if the employer's position is more powerful than the workers'

FIGURE 7

Negative settlement range




In this situation where management's resistance point (MRP) is lower than the union's resistance point (URP), agreement is hardly likely and there is a strong possibility of a strike.

To explain these positive and negative settlement ranges, two bargaining situations will be discussed. For the purpose of the explanation it will be presumed that an increase in wages is the only issue being negotiated. Let it further be presumed that the rate of pay for a particular work group is 86 cents per hour and that the union is demanding 106 cents per hour, while the lowest figure it will accept is 90 cents per hour. Management would probably want the increase to be as small as possible, but presume it decides than under no circumstances would it agree to pay more than 100 cents per hour. This situation 'A', could then be depicted as in figure 8.

FIGURE 8

Situation A - positive settlement range




Within a positive settlement range, therefore, any contract value is more acceptable to both parties than a strike, and agreement is possible. As Management's resistance point of 100 cents per hour is greater than the Union's resistance point of 90 cents per hour, agreement is reached.

Now refer to figure 9 and presume the situation is reversed, that is, that management's resistance point is 90 cents per hour - management is not prepared to exceed this figure - while the union's resistance point is 100 cents per hour - the union is not prepared to accept any figure lower than this - and a negative settlement range results.

FIGURE 9

Situation B - negative settlement range



Now considering situation A depicted in figure 8, accepting any figure below the 106 cents originally demanded, provided it is more than 90 cents, would be considered less costly to the union than to call their members out on strike. Similarly, accepting any figure below 100 cents would be considered less costly to management than having the workers go on strike, so a compromise is reached somewhere between 90 and 100 cents per hour.


Now consider situation B depicted in figure 9. To accept any figure less than 100 cents per hour would be considered by the union to be more costly than calling the workers out on strike, and a strike would probably occur. On the other hand, accepting any figure above 90 cents per hour would be considered by management to be more costly than a strike, the result being that the possibility of a strike would continue until either or both parties change their resistance points until that of the union became at least equal to or less than that of management.

Now turning again to situation A (figure 8), if the employer was in a more powerful bargaining position than the union, the negotiated rate would probably be nearer 90 cents per hour than 100 cents per hour. Similarly, if the union was in the stronger bargaining position, the negotiated rate would probably be nearer 100 cents than 90 cents per hour.

Atkinson (1980) makes use of the terms Ideal Settlement, Realistic Settlement and Fall Back Position to describe the parameters of bargaining. He (p 43) uses the following figure to indicate the area of settlement which may be expected in a bargaining situation where settlement is at all possible.

FIGURE 10


Parameters of bargaining (settlement situation)



If both parties are inflexible and stick rigidly to their original ideas, the settlement area will be between the two fall back positions as indicated. This is only possible if the fall back position of the employer exceeds that of the union. In cases where the employer's fall back position is less than that of the union a confrontation situation arises. This situation is depicted in figure 11 (Atkinson 1980 p 52).

FIGURE 11

Parameters of bargaining (confrontation situation)



Here management is not prepared to offer more than 15% increase while the union is not prepared to accept less than 25%.

This method of explaining the situation is basically the same as that of Allen and Keaveny, already discussed, but uses different terminology.

Two points become abundantly clear from what has been discussed. Firstly, compromise or concession is required from both parties if successful negotiation is to take place. Secondly, it appears evident that any negotiated agreement will tend to favour the party possessing the greater degree of power, and vice versa.

8.7. (g) Problems associated with collective bargaining.

Reference has been made to 'power' and the strategies used in collective bargaining. Some of the problems which arise herefrom will now be discussed with special reference being made to the situation in South Africa.

Levitan Mangum and Marshall (1981 pp 439-440) suggest the following as being problem areas or weaknesses within the bargaining process:

- (1) Strikes - the most potent instrument used by labour to demonstrate their power- can inflict considerable inconvenience, if not damage, on the public. The question is how to maintain collective bargaining while eliminating the possibility of strikes. It is felt that should the Government place an overall ban on strikes, this would introduce a third power into the bargaining relationship and possibly nullify some of the benefits of participatory democracy.
- (2) Because it is based on power and conflict, it does most for those who need it least.
- (3) An entrenched labour organisation may exclude outsiders for reasons like race, sex and nationality.

Davey (1972 pp 8-9) maintains that three major problem areas may be defined in terms of the objectives of collective bargaining. Firstly, there is the question of how to achieve full employment without inflation while maintaining 'free' collective bargaining (that is, without direct control over wages and prices). Secondly, how to achieve democratization of industrial relations, while being faced with an increased amount of centralization in bargaining structure and in decision-making in both union and management organisations. Finally, how to achieve a stable, equitable condition of industrial peace while avoiding undue governmental control.

In South Africa the racial composition and structure of the work force adds a dimension to the problems associated with employer - employee negotiation not encountered to the same extent in other industrialised countries. The four main racial groups - Whites, Blacks, Coloureds and Asiatics - show divergence in cultural backgrounds, languages, standards of education and levels of industrial sophistication. Often all four groups are employed in a single establishment, and in these cases successful negotiation means satisfying all four groups as well as the employer.

As has already been indicated (see p57) the Blacks constitute approximately 70% of the economically active population in the Republic. A large percentage of these is drawn from the rural areas, they are illiterate, untrained, are from different cultural backgrounds, and are drawn into a situation which is, to a large extent, foreign to them. Traditionally they have done the more menial types of work and as a result have, as a group, not received the more skilled types of training. With regard to negotiating skills, training has been virtually non-existent, the main reason, perhaps, being that they were precluded from participating in the negotiation process between registered employers' and employees' organisations by the Industrial Conciliation Act (Act no 11 of 1924).

This situation has resulted in there being both a shortage and surplus of labour in South Africa - a shortage of more highly skilled workers and a surplus of untrained work-seekers. The fact that the Blacks fall mainly into this latter category gives rise to serious problems.

Levitan Mangum and Marshall (1981) discuss this situation, and with regard to collective bargaining suggest that labour movements in developing countries face unique pressures. They maintain (p 434) that these workers have greater difficulty establishing collective bargaining relations with employers, because in these circumstances:

"Collective bargaining also is impeded by the workers' weak bargaining power, caused by surpluses and limited skills".

A further point which should be made is when power differences are introduced into intergroup relations it has the effect of suppressing communication among the groups and this could give rise to serious problems. Brown (1979 p 381) argues that the low-power group is vulnerable, and so must censor communication - such as dissatisfaction - that might elicit retaliation from the higher-power group. In consequence the higher-power group remains ignorant of information considered sensitive by the low-power group. The long-term consequences of this mutually reinforcing fear and ignorance can be either escalating oppression - a particularly destructive form of too little conflict, or sporadic eruptions of intense and unexpected fighting, which is also an undesirable situation.

This reinforces the argument that the most satisfactory situation would be one in which the negotiating parties are of near equal strength; where no party has the power to intimidate the other. This situation would result in better communication and lead to a better overall negotiating climate.

8.8. (h) Legal requirements of collective bargaining.

The approach of the South African Government to Industrial Relations appears clear from the White Paper (1979) on Part 1 of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Labour Legislation, which has become known as the Wiehahn Commission. In considering the government's reactions to this report the following points will be made:

- The Government sees its approach as being essentially evolutionary. It envisages the various recommendations being implemented either in the short term, the medium term, or the long term.

- In keeping with free enterprise principles, and the endeavour to involve all population groups, maximal self-governance by employer and employee parties, maximal decentralisation of negotiation and decision-making, and minimal state intervention in the essentially private relationship between the two parties is advocated.
- The proven system of consultation, negotiation and consensus is viewed as the proper way to bring about changes.
- A sustained flow of advice to the Minister of labour policy and practices is necessary. This involves that acknowledged model of tripartism i.e. the state, employer parties and employee parties working together.

Most governments in the western world appear to adopt this approach which is aimed at giving the employers and employees maximum democratic rights to determine the conditions of employment which concern both the workers and employers. However the government cannot remain uninvolved and must be drawn into the association to a lesser or greater degree.

There is an immense variation in collective bargaining machinery from one country to another, and indeed different forms are often found in a single country. An examination of variations in bargaining machinery inevitably leads one to question why such variations exist and why particular industries, firms or countries have adopted one form of bargaining machinery rather than another. Jackson (1977) who reviews the work of such writers as Blanpain, Deal and Wichersham, Ross and Hartman, and Kuhn, stresses the importance of viewing collective bargaining machinery as part of a wider system. He argues that:

".....collective bargaining machinery can best be viewed in a historical perspective as the outcome of the interaction of social and economic condi-

tions and the motives and perceptions of individuals". (p 134).

It is therefore not surprising to find that the extent to which the law is involved differs from country to country. For example, of the situation in the United States of America, Beach (1980 p 97) has the following to say:

"Labour-management relationships are heavily regulated by both Federal and State labour laws at the present time".

The laws referred to are mainly The Wagner Act 1935 which gave employees the right to self organisation and to bargain collectively; the amended Taft-Hartley Act 1947 which regulated and restricted the activities of unions and was aimed at protecting individual employees and employers against the power of the unions; and the Landrum-Griffin Act 1959 which was introduced to regulate the affairs of unions and the conduct of their officers.

The British model of collective bargaining can be contrasted with the United States' model. In this respect Jackson (1977 p 126) has the following comment to make:

"Traditionally the hallmark of British collective bargaining has been its 'voluntary nature', although it has been encouraged by the State, especially during wartime. In the United States of America, however, the bulk of collective bargaining has a legislative base".

The legal involvement in collective bargaining found in the other western industrialised nations appears to be somewhere along the continuum between these extremes. While most of the European bargaining is on an industrial basis as opposed to the American plant bargain-

ing system, their legal framework resembles that of United States rather than of the British. However the degree to which the 'Law' is involved in collective bargaining is not important for the purpose of this discussion - the point being argued is that the law cannot be left out. The fact is that while the relationship between employers and employees is essentially a private one, this is strictly not the case as the relationship affects the whole of the community. In this respect Chamberlain and Kuhn (1965 p 265) say:

"The legal concern was not simply for the rights of individual workers, but also for the community's welfare since this too may be subject to abuse by private power."

Now while the main function of the law in collective bargaining is to provide a framework within which the bargaining takes place, this is not its only function. The law must also make provision for the resolution of 'Deadlock' should this occur in the bargaining process. In discussing this function Chamberlain and Kuhn (ibid) maintain that despite the most earnest efforts to reach agreement, there may come a time in any bargaining situation when each party feels that it has compromised as much as is feasible, and deadlock may ensue. It is in these circumstances that the law must prescribe what action should be taken to resolve the deadlock. The manner in which this is done in the various countries is not important for the purpose of this discussion, hence reference will only be made to the South African situation.

The Labour Relations Act (Act No 28 of 1956 as amended) which provides the legal framework within which collective bargaining takes place in South Africa, prescribe that in the event of 'deadlock' in the negotiation process, the situation should be remedied by one of the following courses of action:

- The establishment of a Conciliation Board (Section 35-42),
- Mediation (Section 44),
- Voluntary arbitration (Section 45),
- Compulsory arbitration (Section 46), and
- The prohibition of strikes or lockouts in certain circumstances. (Section 65).

Ample provision therefore appears to be made within the legal framework for the resolution of deadlock.

The State's involvement, through the law, in collective bargaining between employers and employees therefore appears to be for two main purposes. Firstly it provides the legal framework within which bargaining can take place, and secondly, it provides legal remedy should unsolved disagreement occur within the bargaining process.

4.1. SUMMARY

Various conclusions may be drawn from what has been discussed in this chapter. Those which are considered important for the purpose of this thesis are the following:

- Wherever there is human interaction a degree of conflict will be found. As the human interaction between management and workers is not unique, it may be concluded that this interaction and relationship will be characterised by a degree of conflict.
- Not all conflict is undesirable and in the management-worker situation it is acceptable provided it is kept within reasonable limits.

- In most Western industrialised countries the method used to keep this conflict within bounds appears to be through the 'collective bargaining' process.
- The most successful bargaining occurs when the parties bargain 'in good faith'. This requires the making of concessions - in other words, the parties' 'willingness to compromise'.
- The degree to which a party is required to concede depends on its perception of its own power position, as well as that of its opponent.
- The State's involvement in collective bargaining is through providing the legal framework within which the bargaining may take place. There therefore appears to be no legitimate reason (in western industrialised countries) why collective bargaining should not be used as a means to resolve management-worker conflict.
- The chances of successful 'good-faith' bargaining are enhanced in cases where the negotiating parties are of near equal strength. Disparity in power is conducive to poor communication which in turn leads to unsuccessful bargaining.
- Finally, in reviewing what has been written about the strengths and weaknesses, the successes and failures of the collective bargaining process, it is perhaps apt to conclude with a quotation from Davey (1972 p 381) who maintains that:

"Collective bargaining is not championed as an ideal system by anyone close to the scene. At best it is an imperfect institutional process that works reasonably well in an imperfect society. It is the best we have. No one up to now has come forth with any alternative procedure that will work any better".

CHAPTER 9

9. HYPOTHESES

At this juncture, having considered various aspects of collective bargaining as a means of resolving and controlling industrial group conflict; and having paid special attention to the Black man's approach to negotiation in the past, it is now possible to submit hypotheses on the Black workers' perceptions of the resolution of industrial group conflict. Brief reasons for each of the hypotheses will be given.

9.1 HYPOTHESIS I

From the literature reviewed it is apparent that 'negotiation' as such is a phenomenon not foreign to the Black people, and has taken place throughout the ages. An examination of an instance of their traditional approach to negotiation reveals a sophistication which would indicate a very positive approach to this form of conflict resolution.

In South Africa their endeavour to participate in trade unionism as a means of bargaining conditions of employment is almost as old as that of the other race groups, and it was seen that they have been involved in trade unionism to a lesser or greater degree since about the turn of the century.

It is therefore possible to hypothesize that:

"The Black worker favours negotiation as a means of resolving industrial group conflict."

9.2 HYPOTHESIS II

While the Black worker has shown an interest in trade unionism and group action in bargaining, he has, since 1924, been excluded from the official negotiating procedure introduced by the Industrial Conciliat-

ion Act. It was not until 1979 that he was afforded the opportunity of participating. This long exclusion denied him the opportunity of gaining experience, together with the other race groups, in the skills required to negotiate conditions of service in industry.

He has also, during this period, to a large degree been denied certain human and political rights. The question which arises is whether the protracted struggle for these rights has resulted in illfeeling and mistrust to such a degree that it would have an influence on his behaviour in other fields of activity.

The whole universe of trade union objectives has been referred to earlier in this thesis. These range from a narrow concern for ones private welfare to those concerned with the welfare of the whole community. It is argued that the granting of parity to Black trade unions to negotiate on an equal basis with other unions will be used by the Black worker to strive for objectives related to the welfare of the whole community to a greater degree than other unions. It is therefore hypothesized that:

"The Black trade union's goals will be more society orientated than those of the White trade union."

9.3. HYPOTHESIS III

It has been shown that 'bargaining in good faith' is an absolute prerequisite for successful conflict resolution, and, in order to accomplish this, 'compromise' on the part of the negotiating parties is essential. The emphasis is placed on 'successful' bargaining, and in this respect does not refer to situations where one of the negotiating parties is in a position to force its will on the other. This results in an 'uneasy truce' and cannot be regarded as successful negotiation.

A further factor to be considered is the negotiators' perception and understanding of 'compromise'. If, for example, a negotiator sees

'compromise' as 'failure', then it could be questioned whether he would come to the negotiation table 'in good faith'. Or if a negotiator ascribes a different meaning to 'compromise' than that of his 'opponent', the degree of success in the bargaining could be affected.

It was pointed out that communication between the many cultural groups was difficult, not only because of the many languages, but also because of the differing perceptions of various phenomena by the cultural groups.

The literature study therefore leads one to the third hypothesis which is:

"The Black worker's perception of 'compromise' differs from that of the White worker."



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CHAPTER 10

10. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The primary objective of the empirical study reported here was to determine the perceptions of a group of Black workers of conflict resolution in industry. A secondary, yet very important objective, was to determine whether or not these perceptions differed from those of a group of White workers. Where differences are found these should be exposed, and attention given to them in an endeavour to understand and manage industrial conflict in South Africa.

10.1 THE QUESTIONNAIRE

10-1.1. THE PROBLEM OF DECIDING ON AN INSTRUMENT TO MEASURE ATTITUDES

The problem of deciding on the most useful instrument to measure attitudes was carefully studied. The instrument chosen had not only to measure the attitudes of Black workers vis-a-vis White workers, but had to cater for differences in the degree of literacy and numeracy, and the degree of industrial sophistication of the respondents.

10-1.2. RATING SCALES

Rating scale techniques are commonly used to quantify attitudes. However, in a review of previous research Morris and van der Reis (1980) found that many problems were associated with eliciting value judgements. These problems may be due to the topic of the study, the respondents, the interviewers or the techniques of questioning employed. They (op cit pp 3-5) outline the nature of some of these problems as follows:

1. Respondents may have little or no knowledge or experience of the topic under discussion.

If respondents are ignorant of the topic, they are not able to make valid and reliable judgements about it. If 'forced' to do so, their judgements are likely to be little more than guesses.

2. Respondents may have some knowledge of the topic but have no established attitudes towards it.

In these cases, if respondents are 'forced' to express feelings, artificially created attitudes will result.

3. Respondents may try to give the socially approved answer.

Even if respondents have knowledge and definite feelings about a topic, they may give an answer which they believe is correct and will please the interviewer.

4. Interviewers may bias the responses.

Interviewers may unwittingly influence the respondents by:

- a) not adhering strictly to the wording of the questionnaire,
- b) making comments which may influence the responses,
- c) reacting to the respondents' answers with expressions of surprise or pleasure, and
- d) failing to establish rapport with the respondents.

5. Respondents may misunderstand or misinterpret the question asked or instructions given.

Ambiguous and unfamiliar language, not used in everyday speech, could lead to misunderstanding and therefore should be avoided.

6. Respondents may not have an adequate frame of reference against which to make judgement.

The respondents need 'rules' in order to make judgements which can subsequently be compared. The origin and unit need to be specified. If this is not done, the respondents' frame of reference will differ from each other and may also vary with time.

10.1.3. IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF RATING SCALES TO OBTAIN ATTITUDINAL DATA FROM SURVEY RESPONDENTS

While rating scales give respondents the necessary frame of reference against which to make their judgement, Morris and van der Reis (1980 p 6) maintain that they are subject to the following specific problems of their own:

- a) Respondents may not make their judgements within the framework implied by the concept of equal-appearing intervals, and
- b) Rating scales may be too coarsely or too finely divided to reflect the respondents true judgements.

In deciding the number of categories to be used in rating scales, care would therefore have to be taken to ensure that the scales are neither too coarsely nor too finely divided.

THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSFERABILITY OF RATING SCALE TECHNIQUES TO A DEVELOPING COUNTRY'S POPULATION

In considering the difficulties in transferring Western-type rating scales to non-Western peoples for the purpose of determining attitudes, Morris and van der Reis (1980) investigated the following four types of scales, namely:

- i) verbal
- ii) numerical
- iii) visual, and
- iv) graphic

They concluded that the verbal rating scales were superior to the non-verbal rating scales in measuring levels of satisfaction (op cit p 110). The fact that the less educated respondents were able to use the verbal scales almost as successfully as did the more educated respondents is a strong argument in favour of the use of verbal rating scales to assess the attitudes of African respondents.

Another finding of interest to the present study was that the less educated respondents had difficulty remembering more than five alternative answers (op cit p 113). This indicates that when surveys included illiterates, five categories may be the maximum number that these respondents may be expected to remember.

In view of these findings it was decided that the instrument which should prove most successful in measuring attitudes for the purpose of the present study should be:

- a) a verbal rating scale, and
- b) a rating scale of not more than five categories.

D.1.5. THE PROBLEM OF DECIDING ON THE CONTENT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Having decided on the instrument to be used in the study, the next problem to be tackled was the content of the questionnaire. Certain questions appeared obvious, but it was felt that the opinions of employers of Black labour could be helpful. With this in view a questionnaire was sent to various employers in the area involved in the study.

Employer sample.

It was decided to utilize a sample of employers of Black labour from the Port Elizabeth, Uitenhage, East London and King Williams Town areas. To obtain as random a sample as possible, one employer from each letter of the alphabet was taken from each of the centres mentioned. The telephone directories were used for this purpose. For example, in Port Elizabeth Acro Engineers Ltd, Bagshaw Footwear (Pty) Ltd and Corobrick were taken from the companies with names beginning with the first three letters of the alphabet. In East London the first four companies used were Afrox Ltd, Berkshire International (SA) Ltd, Car Distributors Assembly (Pty) Ltd and Deepfreezing and Preserving (Pty) Ltd. Organisations were similarly obtained from Uitenhage and King Williams Town. It was unfortunately not possible to obtain organisations with names starting with every letter of the alphabet. For example, the X, Y and Z's were sometimes missing. However, this was not considered too important as the object of the questionnaire was only to obtain guidance to areas where the employers felt there was a difference between negotiating with Black and White workers. Altogether eighty organisations were used for this purpose (Appendix 6).

It was also decided to solicit the opinions of the eleven Industrial Councils in the Port Elizabeth-East London areas, as well as the four main federations of trade unions (Appendix 7). Finally a questionnaire was sent to the South African Transport Services.

Of the ninety six organisations canvassed, thirty six responded (38%). Of these fourteen indicated that they had experienced differences in negotiating with their Black and White workers. The remaining twenty two said they had experienced no differences.

Differences experienced

The differences expressed from the East London area are summarised as follows:

1. White workers have a better understanding of business principles and how the free enterprise system functions.
2. Our experience arising from negotiations with our Black employees indicates a lack of skill in submitting their requirements and an obvious inability to relate their demands to the economics of the day.
3. White workers are more direct in their approach and attitude. Black workers are less direct and more emotional.
4. Initial small demands tend to overflow into a heavy reaction against the White group and demands become unrealistic eg. release Mandela, and other demands, which are beyond the control of management.
5. Group co-hesiveness much stronger with Blacks.
6. Black unions rarely negotiate, they demand and are not prepared to discuss issues in detail. White unions tend more to negotiate and take cognisance of influencing factors.
7. The Black workers tend to confine their negotiation to the wage paid.

The following main features of differences were received from organisations in Port Elizabeth:

1. A basic lack of knowledge of the functioning of a business in a free enterprise system. Difficulty in reconciling the disciplines of the workplace, i.e. time related schedules, quality levels, consistency of work input.
2. We find Black workers tend to be uneconomical e.g. when economic conditions are unfavourable they will still demand the same increase and not be prepared to settle for less.
3. They are far more emotional in their negotiations and make more use of dramatics.

The differences mentioned by organisations in Uitenhage were:

1. Black workers expect management to have all the answers and offer few solutions from their side.
2. Proper training and years of experience.
3. Black workers are very easily misled by their leaders as the workers are not inclined to think for themselves. When questioned individually about any decision they may have taken they cannot give any positive reasons for the decision.
4. Black workers, once they made up their minds, be it right or wrong, they are not prepared to accept any other viewpoint or deviate from the chosen direction.

The single response received from King Williams Town was that the difference was one of communication (language).

Differences expressed by the South African Transport Services were:

1. The Black worker's insight in the functions and intricacies of an abstract corporate entity is often less than that of his White counterpart. Due to this fact, Black workers' perception of such negotiation is much more naive, whereas White workers might be more realistic in this regard.
2. The naivety of Black workers is frequently seen in either the meek and mild manner in which they approach management or in unrealistic and extreme demands that they put before management.

Finally the only response received from a trade union federation indicated that there was a difference, and expressed it as follows:

"White managers don't understand the needs, aspirations and the need for 'retributive' bargaining which is cardinal to the situation".

Responses summarised

An attempt was made to group these responses into different categories, but it was found that this was difficult because of the fact that certain of the responses could reasonably well fall into more than one category. For example, the fact that the Black worker made an unrealistic demand could also be interpreted as the worker lacking understanding of how a business operates. The responses were nevertheless divided into five broad categories, and expressed as a percentage of those received, were as follows:

- | | |
|---|-----|
| 1. Lack of understanding of how a business operates | 28% |
| 2. Unrealistic demands | 22% |
| 3. Not prepared to compromise | 17% |
| 4. Lack of training in negotiation | 17% |

- | | |
|---------------------------|-----|
| 5. Emotional factors | 11% |
| 6. Retributive bargaining | 5% |

The single response in category 6 concerning retributive bargaining is singled out as being important for several reasons. Firstly, it is the only response received from a federation of trade unions. Secondly, it is a response from a federation with exclusively Black worker membership and therefore presumably guides their approach to negotiating with management. Finally it is stated that it is cardinal to the situation. The fact that 'White managers don't understand the needs, aspirations and the need for 'retributive' bargaining which is cardinal to the situation' could, if true, explain why some of the demands made by Blacks are considered to be unrealistic by management while being seen as 'cardinal' by the workers.

Cognisance was taken of this information in the design and content of the questionnaire used in this study. For example, 'the lack of understanding of how a business operates' and 'the making of unrealistic demands' constitute 50% of the perceived differences in negotiating with the two groups. If one adds to this 'the unwillingness to compromise' (this could be related to the two factors mentioned) then one is led to believe that two thirds of the differences perceived arise out of the lack of understanding of how a business operates. This in turn results in unrealistic demands being made with little or no room to compromise.

The questionnaire (Appendix 1) was therefore designed not only to fulfil the requirements of a sound attitude - determining instrument, but also to cater for perceived differences experienced by the employers of Black labour.

10.2. COMPOSITION OF THE INTERVIEWING TEAM

In order to overcome some of the problems related to obtaining attitudes from Black subjects, and the fact that the interviewers could bias the responses (see p 142), very careful attention was given to the composition of the interviewing team, which finally consisted of the following:

- ONE Black male lecturer in Industrial Psychology.
- ONE Black male Masters' student in Industrial Psychology
- TWO Black male Honours' students in Industrial Psychology, and
- ONE Black female Honours' student in Industrial Psychology.

Every one of the five-member interviewing team was Xhosa speaking.

10.3. PILOT STUDY

The questionnaire was discussed in detail with the interviewing team to ensure a clear understanding of all the questions. After it had been established that no uncertainty existed, the team was sent out to undertake a pilot study of fifty interviews, that is, ten interviews each. The purpose of this exercise was to determine whether there were any particular difficulties associated with the completion of the questionnaire.

At a report-back meeting the team indicated that no difficulties had been encountered and that the interviewees appeared to have understood all the questions. It was then decided to proceed with the main group of interviews.

10.4. LOCATION OF STUDY

A research study of this nature would be most meaningful if a truly representative sample of every Black industrial worker in South Africa

could be obtained. The practicality of this is, however, an almost impossible task because of the many variables involved. For example, the workers are located as far apart as the Western Cape, Natal and the Transvaal. They are from different cultural groups, speak different languages and have different degrees of industrialisation and urbanization. To eliminate some of these variables it was decided to limit the study to a particular locality where the culture, language and domicile of the workers were to a large degree similar. The locality decided upon was East London, where the workers are all from the Xhosa cultural group; all speak Xhosa; all reside in the Mdantsane township, and all worked in East London. The results of the study would then indicate the perceptions of this particular groups of workers only, and while they could possibly reflect the views of other Black groups throughout the country, no claim to this effect would be made. Similar research would have to be undertaken among other Black groups of workers before wider conclusions could be made.

10-5


SUBJECTS (Black sample)

Having decided on the location of the study the next questions to be answered were how the subjects were to be selected, and how many subjects to use. Attention to these two questions was given in the following manner:

- 1) Mdantsane, the location of the study, is a Black township with an estimated population of 250 000 (Development Bank of Southern Africa 1985 p 4). It is situated on the outskirts of East London and is the main source of Black labour in the city. The township is geographically divided into sixteen zones. In order to draw as random a sample as possible it was decided to use a number of subjects from each of the zones by taking not more than one subject per street.
- 2) The size of the sample is always an important consideration in research. In multisubject studies the number can theoret-

ically vary from two to infinity. Because two is usually too small a number, and it is impractical and unnecessary to use too large a number, the question of deciding on an adequate, or most suitable number, is an important issue. In this respect Christensen (1985 pp 279-281) in discussing the problem of determining the size of the sample, refers to the method used by Krejcie and Morgan for computing the sample size required for populations of up to 1,000,000 when the 0,05 confidence level is desired. This method is based on a formula developed by the National Education Association Research Division (small sample techniques 1960) that allows one to determine the sample size needed for it to be representative of a given population. The curve used for this purpose is reproduced as figure 12.

FIGURE 12 Computation of sample size



Relationship between sample size and total population.
 (From Krejcie, R. V., and Morgan, D. W. Determining sample size for research activities. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 1970, 30, p. 609.
 Copyright 1970 by Frederick Kuder. Reprinted by permission.)

For the purpose of this study it was decided to use this method of computing the sample size. A sample of approximately 380 workers was therefore aimed at. Even though this required 380 respondents it was possible to obtain 424.

10.6. SUBJECTS (White sample)

As already mentioned (p 141), a secondary objective of the study was to determine whether or not the perceptions of the group of Black workers differed from those of a White group with regard to conflict resolution. In this respect it was decided to use a sample of White workers drawn from East London. These workers, to a large degree, worked in the same factories as the workers used in the Black sample, and would therefore be subject to the same or similar organisational climates.

A team of helpers handed out the questionnaires to randomly selected homes in all the suburbs of the town. The general purpose of the research was explained to the helpers who in turn conveyed it to those who were asked to complete the questionnaire. The team collected the completed questionnaires after a few days. A sample of approximately 200 was aimed at and 201 finally obtained.

The overall purpose of this approach to the study was:

- 1) To get a representative sample of approximately 400 Black workers;
- 2) To get a random sample of approximately 200 White workers;
- 3) By combining the two samples to have a sample of approximately 600 Black and White workers from which combined views could be obtained, and
- 4) Within the total sample possible differences between Black and White workers' perceptions could be identified.

CHAPTER 11

II. FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The following will be the modus operandi in recording the findings of the study:

- a)
 - i) The responses of both groups to the structured questions i.e. questions 8 to 34, will be given, both in numbers and percentages. These responses will indicate the groups' attitudes to the subject questioned.
 - ii) The chi-square test for the significance of a difference will be applied to determine whether or not the differences in the responses of the two groups were as a result of chance alone.
- b)
 - i) The responses of both groups to the semi-structured open-ended questions i.e. questions 35 to 44 will then be given. These responses will indicate the groups' attitudes to the subject questioned.
 - ii) The chi-square test for the significance of a difference will be applied to determine whether or not the differences in the responses of the two groups were as a result of chance alone.
 - iii) The reasons for the responses to these ten questions will then be given. It is hoped that consideration of the reasons given will assist in understanding any differences in attitudes expressed.

In all cases the question will be stated first and then the responses given.

*Note: Values of chi-square significant at 0,05 and 0,01 levels

Degrees of freedom	0,05	0,01
1	3,841	6,635
2	5,991	9,210
3	7,815	11,341
4	9,488	13,277
5	11,070	15,086

* (Lathrop 1969 p288).

QUESTION 8

Conflict between management and the workers is usually resolved through the process of collective bargaining. This involves representatives of the workers negotiating with representatives of the management. How strongly do you believe in this form of negotiation?

The responses to this question are given in Table 10.

TABLE 10 Responses to question 8

	I very strongly do not believe in collective bargaining	I do not believe in collective bargaining	Neutral feeling	I believe in collective bargaining	I very strongly believe in collective bargaining	Totals
Blacks	8	10	29	172	204	423
Whites	18	13	44	85	39	199

Chi square = 78,71

df=4

P < 0,01

The first observation which may be made from these responses is that both the Black and White groups of workers are largely in favour of collective bargaining as a means of negotiating with management. In the case of the Black group 172 (40,7%) believe in collective bargaining while 204 (48,2%) strongly believe in it. A total therefore of 376 (88,9%) believe in this approach. On the other hand 10 (2,4%) do not believe in this approach while 8 (1,9%) strongly do not believe in it. A total therefore of 18 (4,3%) do not believe in it. Those who indicated that they had neutral feelings amounted to 29 (6,9%).

In the case of the White group the corresponding figures were:

Believe in collective bargaining	85 (42,7%)
Strongly believe in collective bargaining	39 (19,6%)
A total therefore of	124 (62,3%) believe in collective bargaining.

Do not believe in collective bargaining	13(6,5)
Strongly do not believe in collective bargaining	18 (9,0%)
A total therefore of	31 (15,6%) do not believe in collective bargaining.

44 (22,1%) expressed neutral feelings.

While both groups largely indicated a belief in collective bargaining, when the two distributions of attitudes are compared a significant difference is found. The value of chi-square 78,71 indicates a significant difference at the 0,01 level.

This finding reveals that, not only does the Black group believe in collective bargaining, but that this belief appears to be stronger than that of the White group.

Note: In commenting on the information given in Table 10 the details of each cell were given. This was done for question 8, but is considered to be, to a large extent, a repetition of the information already given. For the remaining questions all the responses will be given in the respective tables, but in commenting on the responses reference

will only be made to the two main groups, namely, those who believe and those who do not believe, or those who agree and those who disagree, as the case may be. This will reduce repetition and simplify the comments without withholding any information.

QUESTION 9

How strong is your trust in your management to treat workers fairly?

The responses to this question are given in Table 11.

TABLE 11 **Responses to Question 9**

	I strongly distrust management	I distrust management	Neutral feeling	I trust management	I strongly trust management	Totals
Blacks	183	190	14	25	12	424
Whites	1	13	38	108	39	199

Chi square = 379,8

df=4

P < 0,01

Table 11 reveals that 373 (88,0%) of the Black group distrusted management while 37 (8,7%) expressed trust in management to treat the workers fairly. Of the White groups 14 (7,0%) expressed distrust and 147 (73,9%) indicated trust. This highly significant difference in the views of the two groups is shown by the high value of chi-square as indicated.

QUESTION 10

How strongly do you feel that South African workers are not receiving a fair share of the profits of organisations?

The responses to this question are given in Table 12.

TABLE 12 Responses to question 10

	I strongly feel that workers are not receiving a fair share of the profits	I feel that workers are not receiving a fair share of the profits	Neutral feeling	I feel that workers are receiving a fair share of the profits	I strongly feel that workers are receiving a fair share of the profits	Totals
Blacks	148	228	11	23	13	423
Whites	14	55	54	65	11	199

Chi square = 212,1 df=4 P < 0,01

It will be observed from Table 12 that 376 (88,9%) of the Black group felt that the South African workers were not receiving a fair share of the profits of organisations, while 36 (8,5%) felt that they were.

With regard to the White group 69 (34,7%) felt that the workers were not receiving a fair share of the profits while 76 (38,2%) felt that they were.

While the White group is divided approximately in equal numbers with regard to their views on this matter, the Black group feel strongly that the workers are not receiving a fair share of the profits.

When the distribution of views of the two groups is compared, a high value of chi-square is found indicating a highly significant difference in the views of the two groups.

QUESTION 11

To what extent should political views influence attitudes during negotiations with management?

The responses to this question appear in Table 13.

TABLE 13 Responses to question 11

	Political views should certainly not influence attitude	Political views should not influence attitude	Neutral feeling	Political views should influence attitudes	Political views should certainly influence attitudes	Total
Blacks	51	61	29	217	64	422
Whites	106	67	24	2	0	199

Chi square = 246,9

df=4

P < 0,01

Of the Black group 112 (26,5%) felt that political views should not influence attitudes during negotiations, while 281 (66,6%) felt that political views should influence attitudes. With regard to the White group 173 (86,9%) felt that political views should not influence attitudes while 2 (1,0%) felt that they should.

There is a highly significant difference between the attitudes of the two groups in regard to this matter as evidenced by the very high value of chi-square.

QUESTION 12

Who do you feel should represent the workers in negotiation with management?
The responses to this question appear in Table 14.

TABLE 14Responses to question 12

	Only trade union officials from outside the organisation	Trade Union officials and others outside the organisation e.g. labour lawyers	Non-trade union employers inside the organisation	Trade union officials from outside the organisation and shop stewards inside	Only shop stewards inside the organisation	Totals
Blacks	46	146	33	154	41	420
Whites	5	12	67	33	81	199

Chi square = 195,0

df=4

P < 0,01

The responses given in Table 14 speak for themselves. However the following observations will be made:

- i) 192 (45,7%) of the Black group (46+146) preferred representatives who were from outside the organisation, while 17 (8,6%) of the White group expressed this preference.
- ii) A further 154 (36,7%) of the Black group and 33 (16,7%) of the White group chose a combination of trade union officials from outside and shop stewards inside the organisation.
- iii) 74 (17,6%) of the Black group (33+41) and 148 (74,7%) (67+81) of the White group favoured representatives who came only from inside the organisation, whether or not they were trade union members.

When the two distributions of views were compared a significant difference was indicated.

QUESTION 13

Do you feel that worker representatives should be required to report back to the workers before making final decisions when negotiating with management?

The responses to this question appear in Table 15.

TABLE 15 Responses to question 13

	Representatives never need to report back i.e. they should have full authority to make final decisions	Representatives need not report back	Neutral feeling	Representatives should report back	Representatives should always report back i.e. they should have no authority to make final decisions	Totals
Blacks	10	7	9	188	175	389
Whites	3	14	9	104	71	201

Chi-square = 16,0

df=4

P < 0,01

Of the Black group 363 (93,3%) felt that worker representatives should report back to the workers before making final decisions, while the figure was 175 (87,1%) for the White group. The numbers who felt that the representatives did not need to report back were 17 (4,4%) for the Blacks and 17 (8,5%) for the Whites.

Both the groups therefore strongly favoured the representatives being required to report back to the workers before making final decisions. Nevertheless when the two distributions of views were compared a significant difference appeared.

QUESTION 14

In your opinion, is conflict between management and the workers necessary to improve the working conditions of the workers?

The responses to this question appear in Table 16.

TABLE 16 Responses to question 14

	Conflict is certainly not necessary to improve the working conditions of employees	Conflict is not necessary to improve the working conditions of employees	Neutral feeling	Conflict is sometimes necessary to improve working conditions of employees	Conflict is always necessary to improve working conditions of employees	Total
Blacks	32	59	7	279	42	419
Whites	45	53	19	75	9	201

Chi-square = 80,2

df=4

P < 0,01

The value of chi-square indicates a significant difference in the responses of the two groups to this question. Of the Black group 321 (76,6%) felt that conflict was necessary to improve working conditions. The corresponding figure for the White group was 84 (41,8%). The figures for those who did not feel that conflict was necessary were: Blacks 91 (21,7%) and Whites 98 (48,8%).

When the two distributions of responses were compared a significant difference appeared.

QUESTION 15

In reaching group decisions do you insist on unanimity (total agreement) between the members of the group?

The responses to this question appear in Table 17.

TABLE 17**Responses to question 15**

	I never insist on unanimity	I do not insist on unanimity	Neutral feeling	I insist on unanimity	I always insist on unanimity	Total
Blacks	10	24	12	166	209	421
Whites	11	61	39	68	21	200

Chi-square = 167,8

df=4

P < 0,01

375 (89,1%) of the Black group insist on unanimity in reaching group decisions while 89 (44,5%) of the White group do so. Of the Black group 34 (8,1%) do not insist on unanimity while the figures for the White group are 72 (36,0%). A significant difference in the views of the two groups is apparent.

QUESTION 16

In a bargaining situation each side must concede (give in) to reach agreement. This is called "compromise". Do you believe in compromise as a means of reaching agreement with management when negotiating conditions of service?

The responses to this question appear in Table 18.

TABLE 18 Responses to question 16

	Compromise is never a requirement for reaching agreement	Compromise is usually not a requirement for reaching agreement	Neutral feeling	Compromise is a requirement for reaching agreement	Compromise is always a requirement for reaching agreement	Total
Blacks	13	82	9	248	70	422
Whites	3	17	13	127	40	200

Chi-square = 20,2

df=4

P < 0,01

318 (75,4%) of the Black group believe that compromise is necessary for reaching agreement. The figures for the White group are 167 (83,5%). The numbers for those who do not believe that compromise is necessary are: Blacks 95 (22,5%) and Whites 20 (10,0%). A significant difference in the distribution of the responses of the two groups appears.

QUESTION 17

"Workers are sometimes unrealistic (unreasonable) in their demands from management". Do you agree with this statement?

The responses to this question appear in Table 19.

TABLE 19 Responses to question 17

	I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree	Total
Blacks	53	63	30	244	34	424
Whites	3	6	23	116	51	199

Chi-square = 69,4

df=4

P < 0,01

Of the Black group 278 (65,6%) agree that workers are sometimes unreasonable in their demands from management, while the corresponding figure for the White group is 167 (83,9%). The figures for those in the two groups who disagree with the statement are Blacks 116 (27,4%) and Whites 9 (4,5%). The chi-square test indicates a significant difference between the two groups of attitudes.

QUESTION 18

When agreement is difficult to reach during negotiations, what approach do you, as a worker, recommend?

Responses to this question appear in Table 20.

TABLE 20 Responses to question 11

	Continuation of friendly dialogue (talk) with no thought of a strike	Less friendly dialogue	Neutral feeling	Aggressive dialogue	Aggressive dialogue and threats of a strike	Total
Blacks	126	177	15	61	45	424
Whites	135	32	21	7	2	197

Chi-square = 116,8 df=4 P < 0,01

Of the Black group 303 (71,5%) believed that friendly dialogue should continue even when it was difficult to reach agreement, while 167 (84,8%) of the White group did so. 106 (25,0%) of the Black group felt that a more aggressive approach was necessary in these circumstances while 9 (4,6%) of the White group felt so.

A significant difference in the responses of the two groups is indicated by the chi-square value.

QUESTION 19

How good is your understanding of how a business operates?

The responses to this question appear in Table 21.

TABLE 21 **Responses to question 19**

	Very bad	Bad	Average	Good	Very good	Total
Blacks	21	25	110	218	48	422
Whites	2	8	87	73	31	201

Chi-square = 28,2

df=4

P < 0,01

266 (63,0%) of the Black group felt that their knowledge of how a business operates was good. The figure for the White group was 104 (51,7%). Those who felt that their understanding was bad were: Blacks 46 (10,9%) and Whites 10 (5,0%).

The chi-square value indicates a significant difference in the views of the two groups in respect of this question.

QUESTION 20

Should management keep the workers informed with regard to the financial state of the organisation?

The responses to this question appear in Table 22.

TABLE 22 Responses to question 20

	Workers should never be informed	Workers should not be informed	Neutral feeling	Workers should be informed	Workers should always be informed	Total
Blacks	9	15	7	229	164	424
Whites	13	33	32	93	30	201

Chi-square = 107,6 df=4 P < 0,01

393 (92,7%) of the Black group felt that management should keep the workers informed with regard to the financial state of the organisation. The corresponding figures for the White group were 123 (61,2%). The figures for those who felt that the workers should not be informed were: Blacks 24 (5,7%) and Whites 46 (22,9%). A significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question is indicated.

QUESTION 21

If in a negotiating situation with management the workers are obliged to accept a compromise, would you feel that management is indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demand?

The responses to this question appear in Table 23.

TABLE 23**Responses to question 21**

	Management would never be indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demands	Management would not be indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demands	Neutral feeling	Management would be indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demands	Management would always be indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demands	Total
Blacks	12	64	21	245	81	423
Whites	45	92	37	23	2	199

Chi-square = 237,8

df=4

P < 0,01

Of the Black group 326 (77,1%) felt that management was indebted to them for the balance of their original demand even though they had compromised. The comparative figure for the White group was 25 (12,6%). The Black group who felt that management was not indebted to them amounted to 76 (18,0%). The figure for the White group was 137 (68,8%).

The chi-square value of 237,8 indicates a highly significant difference between the attitudes of the two groups with regard to this question.

QUESTION 22

"General economic conditions in the country should influence workers with regard to the size of the demands they submit to management". Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

Responses to this question appear in Table 24.

TABLE 24 Responses to question 22

	I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree	Total
Blacks	14	32	22	288	67	423
Whites	7	21	21	109	41	199

Chi-square = 12,6 df=4 P > 0,01

355 (83,9%) of the Black group felt that the economic conditions in the country should influence the size of the demands submitted to management. The corresponding figures for the White group were 150 (75,4%). 46 (10,9%) of the Black group disagreed while 28 (14,1%) of the White group disagreed.

In this case the difference in the responses of the two groups was not significant at the 0,01 level in terms of the chi-square test. It was however significant at the 0,05 level.

QUESTION 23



"A better understanding of how your organisation operates would help you in negotiating conditions of employment". Do you agree or disagree with this statement.

The responses to this question appear in Table 25.

TABLE 25 Responses to question 23

	I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree	Total
Blacks	5	13	11	287	106	422
Whites	4	3	20	119	54	200

Chi-square = 18,5 df=4 P < 0,01

The number of the Black group who agreed that a better understanding of how the organisation operated would help in negotiating was 393 (93,1%). The figures for the White group were 173 (86,5%). The numbers of those who disagreed with the statement were: Black 18 (4,3%) and White 7 (3,5%).

The value of chi-square indicates a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 24

"Workers have a right to negotiate conditions of employment with their management". Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

The responses to this question appear in Table 26.

TABLE 26 Responses to question 24

	I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree	Total
Blacks	4	10	5	221	183	423
Whites	3	21	22	108	44	198

Chi-square = 65,8 df=4 P < 0,01

404 (95,5%) of the Black group felt that the workers had a right to negotiate conditions of employment with their management. The corresponding figures for the White group were 152 (76,8%). The number of the Black group who did not think that the workers had a right to negotiate was 14 (3,3%). The corresponding figures for the White group were 24 (12,1%).

The chi-square test indicates a significant difference between the views of the two groups with regard to this question.

QUESTION 25

"Strong trade unions get more concessions from management than weak trade unions do". Do you agree or disagree?

The responses to this question appear in Table 27.

TABLE 27 Responses to question 25

	I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree	Total
Blacks	17	29	33	222	120	421
Whites	7	37	58	67	29	198

Chi-square = 80,9

df=4

P < 0,01

The number of the Black group who agreed with this statement was 342 (81,2%). The figures for the White group were 96 (48,5%). The numbers who disagreed with the statement were: Blacks 46 (10,9%) and Whites 44 (22,2%).

There is a significant difference in the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 26

Do you believe that you have been underpaid in the past?

The responses to this question appear in Table 28.

TABLE 28 Responses to question 26

	I strongly believe that I have not been underpaid	I believe that I have not been underpaid	Neutral feeling	I believe that I have been underpaid	I strongly believe that I have been underpaid	Total
Blacks	7	19	15	217	164	422
Whites	11	18	44	92	28	193

Chi-square = 89,16

df=4

P < 0,01

Of the Black group 381 (90,3%) believe that they have been underpaid in the past. The corresponding figures for the Whites were 120 (62,2%). The numbers who believed that they had not been underpaid were: Blacks 26 (6,2%) and Whites 29 (15,0%).

There is a significant difference in the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 27

If you believe that you have been underpaid in the past, should present demands to management take this fact into account?

The responses to this question appear in Table 29.

TABLE 29 Responses to question 27

	Present de- mands should certainly not take in- to account underpayment in the past	Present de- mands should not take in- to account underpayment in the past	Neutral feeling	Present de- mands should take into account un- derpayment in the past	Present de- mands should certainly take into account un- der payment in the past	Total
Blacks	28	35	24	236	96	419
Whites	19	60	47	56	13	195

Chi-square = 124,8

df=4

P < 0,01

The number of Black workers who felt that present demands should take underpayment in the past into account was 332 (79,2%) while the number for the White group was 69 (35,4%). The numbers who felt that underpayment in the past should not be considered in present demands were: Blacks 63 (15,0%) and Whites 79 (40,5%).

There is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 28

"Workers get concessions from management more easily during periods of labour unrest, that is, during periods of strikes or threats of strikes".
Do you agree?

The responses to this question appear in Table 30.

TABLE 30 Responses to question 28

	I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree	Total
Blacks	22	51	24	264	57	418
Whites	12	66	49	55	17	199

Chi-square = 107,8 df=4 P < 0,01

The number of the Black group who agreed with the statement was 321 (76,8%) while that of the White group was 72 (36,2%). The numbers who disagreed were: Blacks 73 (17,5%) and Whites 78 (39,2%).

The chi-square test indicated a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 29

In bargaining with management a trade union's main concern should be for the welfare of its members only. Do you agree?

The responses to this question appear in Table 31.

TABLE 31 Responses to question 29

	I very strongly agree	I agree	Neutral feeling	I disagree	I very strongly disagree	Total
Blacks	28	52	11	177	118	386
Whites	30	73	22	55	19	199

Chi-square = 92,7 df=4 P < 0,01

The numbers of the two groups who felt that a trade union's main concern should be for its members only were: Blacks 80 (20,7%) and Whites 103

(51,8%). The numbers who disagreed with the statement were Blacks 295 (76,4%) and Whites 74 (37,2%).

There is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 30

Do you believe that your management is in a position to grant all demands made by the workers?

The responses to this question appear in Table 32.

TABLE 32 Responses to question 30

	Management certainly could not grant all demands made by the wor- kers	Management could not grant all demands made by the wor- kers	Neutral feeling	Management could grant all demands made by the workers	Management certainly could grant all the de- mands made by the wor- kers	Total
Blacks	29	127	16	199	52	423
Whites	76	92	22	8	1	199

Chi-square = 197,9

df=4

P < 0,01

The number of the Black workers who believed that management was in a position to grant all their demands was 251 (59,3%), while the number of Whites was 9 (4,5%). The numbers who felt that management could not grant all the demands made were Blacks 156 (36,9%) and Whites 168 (84,4%).

The responses of the two groups to this question differ significantly.

QUESTION 31

If the employment situation in the country was generally bad (that is, a large number of workers did not have jobs) would you, who have a job, continue to make demands to better your own working conditions?

The responses to this question appear in Table 33.

TABLE 33 Responses to question 31

	I certainly would not make demands to improve my own position	I would not make demand to improve my position	Neutral feeling	I would make demands to improve my position	I would certainly make demands to improve my position	Total
Blacks	29	71	40	200	82	422
Whites	31	68	40	50	10	199

Chi-square = 76,2 df=4 P < 0,01

282 (66,8%) of the Black group felt that they would continue to make demands irrespective of the employment situation in the country, while the figures for the White group were 60 (30,2%). Those who would not make demands are: Blacks 100 (23,7%) and Whites 99 (49,7%).

There is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 32

In bargaining with management a trade union's main concern should be for the welfare of society as a whole. Do you agree?

The responses to this question appear in Table 34.

TABLE 34 Responses to question 32

	I very strongly agree	I agree	Neutral feeling	I disagree	I very strongly disagree	Total
Blacks	138	191	7	38	15	389
Whites	21	83	40	41	13	198

Chi-square = 100,6

df=4

P < 0,01

329 (84,6%) of the Black group felt that the trade union's main concern in bargaining should be for the welfare of the society as a whole. The corresponding figures for the White group were 104 (52,3%). Those who disagreed with the statement were: Blacks 53 (13,6%) and Whites 54 (27,3%).

There is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 33

Should the disciplinary code of your organisation be negotiable; in other words, should the workers and management negotiate what disciplinary action should be taken on specific offenses rather than management deciding on its own?

The responses to this question appear in Table 35.

TABLE 35 Responses to question 33

	The discipli- nary code should most certainly be negotiated	The discipli- nary code should be negotiated	Neutral feeling	The discipli- nary code should not be negotia- ted	The disci- plinary code should most cer- tainly not be negotia- ted	Total
Blacks	117	280	5	12	9	423
Whites	19	79	24	54	23	199

Chi-square = 169,8

df=4

P < 0,01

397 (93,9%) of the Black group felt that the disciplinary code of the organisation should be negotiated with the workers, while the corresponding figures for the White group were 98 (49,2%). Those who felt that the code should not be negotiated were: Blacks 21 (5,0%) and Whites 77 (38,7%).

There is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 34

Should the grievance procedure of your organisation be negotiable; in other words, should the workers have a say in determining what the procedure should be?

The responses to this question appear in Table 36.

TABLE 36 Responses to question 34

	The workers should certainly have a say in determining what the procedure should be	The workers should have a say in determining what the procedure should be	Neutral feeling	The workers should not have a say in determining what the procedure should be	The workers should most certainly not have a say in determining what procedure should be	Total
Blacks	101	291	9	19	3	423
Whites	21	77	38	50	12	198

Chi-square = 152,6

df=4

P < 0,01

392 (92,7%) of the Black group felt that the workers should have a say in determining what the grievance procedure should be, while 98 (49,5%) of the White group felt this way. 22 (5,2%) of the Black group felt that the workers need not have a say in determining the procedure while these figures were 62 (31,3%) for the Whites.

There is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

SEMI-STRUCTURED QUESTIONS

The responses to these questions are recorded and analysed in the following manner:

i) Questions 35-38

These four questions called for a single reason or statement. The first 100 questionnaires were taken and for each of these questions the reason or statement given, as the case may be, was recorded. These responses were then examined and it was found possible to cluster them together into major groups or clusters. The responses in the subsequent questionnaires were fitted into these major categories.

ii) Questions 39-44

These six questions not only called for a response, but also for the reason for the response. These responses were treated in the following manner:

- a) The responses of the two groups to the questions were recorded, and the chi-square test used to determine whether or not a significant difference in the responses of the two groups existed.
- b) The reasons given for these responses were treated in the same way as those for questions 35-38, that is, they were grouped into clusters, and the number in each cluster given.

The responses were as follows:

QUESTION 35

If you are a member of a trade union what is the main reason why you joined the union?

The responses to this question are given in Table 37.

TABLE 37 Responses to Question 35

Main reasons for joining trade union	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Protection of rights	4	18,2	90	55,2
Negotiation with management	5	22,7	31	19,0
Job security	0	0,0	17	10,4
Compulsion	6	27,3	3	1,9
Other	7	31,8	22	13,5
Totals	22	100,0	163	100,0

QUESTION 36

If you are a member of a trade union what is the main thing you expect your union to do for you?

The responses to this question are given in Table 38.

TABLE 38 Responses to Question 36

Main things expected of union	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
To fight for improved wages	5	22,7	96	58,9
To fight for my rights	3	13,6	27	16,6
To negotiate on my behalf	6	27,3	31	19,0
Other	8	36,4	9	5,5
Totals	22	100,0	163	100,0

QUESTION 37

If you are a member of a trade union what is the main thing you consider the union is not doing for you?

The responses to this question are given in Table 39.

TABLE 39 Responses to Question 37.

Main things union is not doing for members	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Does not fight for employee rights	1	12,5	1	2,6
Does not fight for increased pay	0	0,0	3	7,9
Weak on negotiation/communication	2	25,0	6	15,8
Does not fight for improved working conditions	3	37,5	4	10,5
Other	2	25,0	24	63,2
Totals	8	100,0	38	100,0

QUESTION 38

If you are not a member of a trade union what is the main reason why you have not joined a union?

The responses to this question are given in Table 40.

TABLE 40 Responses to Question 38

Main reasons for not joining trade union	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
No union where I work	22	21,6	56	32,4
Dislike of union	7	6,9	6	3,5
Malfunctioning of union	4	3,9	6	3,5
Fear	1	1,0	4	2,3
Other	68	66,6	101	58,3
Totals	102	100,0	173	100,0

QUESTION 39

Should all the members of a team of worker representatives have a say during negotiations or should the talking be left to a single chief spokesman? Give main reason for your opinion.

The responses to this question are given in Tables 41 and 42.

TABLE 41 Responses to Question 39

Responses	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
All representatives should speak	41	30,6	283	72,8
Only chief spokesman should speak	93	69,4	106	27,2
Totals	134	100,0	389	100,0

Chi-square = 75,1 df=1 P < 0,01

There is a highly significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

TABLE 42 Main reasons for responses to Question 39

Main reasons why all should speak	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Team has mandate -not single person	0	0,0	32	14,7
Strength: many speakers can convince management	0	0,0	42	19,3
All views should be expressed	26	83,9	81	37,2
One speaker could never withstand management pressure	0	0,0	8	3,6
Other	5	16,1	55	25,2
Totals	31	100,0	218	100,0

TABLE 42 (cont.)

Main reasons for chief spokesman only to speak	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
To avoid chaos	42	56,0	26	33,8
All members have same objective	12	16,0	3	3,9
Other	21	28,0	48	62,3
Totals	75	100,0	77	100,0

QUESTION 40

Within the Xhosa culture, as part of the 'Ukulobola' custom in marriage, the bride price, 'Ikhazi', is negotiated. Worker representatives also negotiate their conditions of employment and pay with management. Are there any differences between these two types of negotiation? Explain.

The responses to this question appear in Tables 43 and 44.

TABLE 43 Responses to Question 40

Responses	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
There is no difference	34	45,3	165	53,7
There is a difference	41	54,7	142	46,3
Totals	75	100,0	307	100,0

Chi-square = 1,71 .df= 1 P > 0,01

The difference between the responses of the two groups to this question is not significant in terms of the chi-square test.

TABLE 44 Main reasons for responses to Question 40

Main reasons given for there being no difference	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Compromise needed in both cases	3	17,6	60	46,2
Both involve negotiation involving money	6	35,3	27	20,8
Conclusion must be reached in both cases	8	47,1	8	6,1
Other	0	0,0	35	26,9
Totals	17	100,0	130	100,0
Main reasons given for there being a difference	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Reasons involving technicalities	28	80,0	87	67,4
Reasons involving relationships	1	2,9	7	5,4
Reasons involving culture	5	14,2	16	12,4
Other	1	2,9	19	14,8
Totals	35	100,0	129	100,0

QUESTION 41

If worker representatives in a wage negotiation demand 50% increase, but could get management only to agree to a 30% increase - on which they settled. What do the rules of compromise say? Is the matter finalised or have workers the right to claim any of the difference between 30% and 50% in future? Explain.

The responses to this question appear in Tables 45 and 46.

TABLE 45 Responses to Question 41

Responses	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Matter is finalised	106	94,6	121	34,7
Matter not finalised - workers have right to claim difference	6	5,4	228	65,3
Totals	112	100,0	349	100,0

Chi-square = 122,0 df=1 P < 0,01

A highly significant difference in the responses of the two groups to this question is indicated.

TABLE 46 Main reasons for responses to Question 41

Main reasons given why a compromised settlement should be considered final	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
The matter has been finalised	79	78,2	16	14,4
You have come to an agreement	14	13,9	64	57,7
Other	8	7,9	31	27,9
Totals	101	100,0	111	100,0

Main reasons given why a compromised settlement should not be considered final	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Money is still owing to workers	1	16,7	65	30,2
Employer must pay amount demanded	0	0,0	29	13,5
Problem is not solved	0	0,0	23	10,7
Other	5	83,3	98	45,6
Totals	6	100,0	215	100,0

QUESTION 42

In wage negotiations should worker representatives initially ask for substantially more money than what they actually are prepared to accept as a satisfactory settlement? If so, how much more? 50%, 25%, 10%? Why? The responses to this question appear in Tables 47, 48, 49 and 50.

TABLE 47 **Responses to Question 42**

Responses	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Should ask substantially more	82	64,1	318	91,4
Should not ask substantially more	46	35,9	30	8,6
Totals	128	100,0	348	100,0

Chi-square = 52,05 df=1 P < 0,01

There is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

The amounts which should be demanded in addition to what the workers are prepared to receive are indicated in Table 48.

TABLE 48 **Amounts by which the demand should exceed the acceptable amount**

Responses	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
10%	21	32,8	82	32,9
25%	25	39,1	66	26,5
50%	18	28,1	101	40,6
Totals	64	100,0	249	100,0

The reasons given by those who felt that substantially more should be demanded than the acceptable amount appear in Table 49.

TABLE 49

Reasons given by those who felt that more than acceptable amount should be demanded

Main reasons given	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Bargaining strategy	56	96,6	226	83,4
Workers not paid well	0	0,0	4	1,5
Other	2	3,4	41	15,1
Totals	58	100,0	271	100,0

The reasons given by those who felt that the amount demanded should not substantially exceed the amount expected appear in Table 50.

TABLE 50

Reasons given by those who felt that amount demanded should not substantially exceed amount expected

Main reasons given	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Should ask what they need	15	45,5	16	69,6
Demands should be realistic	14	42,4	1	4,3
Other	4	12,1	6	26,1
Totals	33	100,0	23	100,0

QUESTION 43

Management's negotiation team in most instances consists of 3-5 people. What are your views regarding the number of people who should constitute the employee team? Why?

The responses to this question appear in Table 51.

TABLE 51**Responses to Question 43**

Responses	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
The employee's team should be:				
Same as management's team	81	73,0	241	68,9
More than management's team	1	0,9	35	10,0
Less than management's team	6	5,4	3	0,9
More than five	2	1,8	40	11,4
Less than five	4	3,6	12	3,4
Does not matter	17	15,3	19	5,4
Totals	111	100,0	350	100,0

Chi-square = 37,2 df=5 P < 0,01

This is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

The main reasons for the responses appearing in Table 42 were given as follows:

- i) Same as management's team in order that both sides should balance.
- ii) More than management's team so that the workers can overpower them.
- iii) Less than the management's team because management owns the business.
- iv) More than five because there are many departments and views to be expressed.
- v) Less than five to avoid too much dialogue.
- vi) Does not matter - it depends on the size of the business.

QUESTION 44

Who should talk first during negotiation. The employer or employee representatives? Why?

The responses to this question appear in Tables 52 and 53.

TABLE 52 Responses to Question 44

Responses	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Worker representatives should talk first	80	55,2	264	71,5
Management representative should talk first	39	26,9	96	18,7
It does not matter	26	17,9	36	9,8
Totals	145	100,0	369	100,0

Chi-square = 13,3 df= 2 P < 0,01

There is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

The reasons given for the responses appearing in Table 52 appear in Table 53.

TABLE 53

Reasons for responses to Question 44

Reasons why worker representatives should talk first	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Because they are submitting the demands	46	71,9	116	47,3
Because they have the problems/grievances	17	26,6	111	45,3
Other	1	1,5	18	7,4
Totals	64	100,0	245	100,0
Reasons why management representatives should talk first	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Because management has the final say	4	16,7	37	67,3
Management must answer the demands	4	16,7	11	20,0
Out of respect	4	16,6	7	12,7
Other	12	50,0	0	0,0
Totals	24	100,0	55	100,0
Reasons why it does not matter who talks first	White group		Black group	
	No	%	No	%
Depends on who called the meeting	21	91,3	11	42,3
Could be on rotational basis	0	0,0	8	30,8
Other	2	8,7	7	26,9
Totals	23	100,0	26	100,0

CHAPTER 12

12. REVIEW OF FINDINGS

QUESTION 8 Collective bargaining

The responses to this question, given in Table 10 (p 155), indicate that a large proportion of the Black group (88,9%) believed in collective bargaining as an approach to negotiating with management. The White group also favoured collective bargaining - the percentage who were in favour being 62,3 percent. 4,3 percent of the Black group and 15,6 percent of the White group indicated that they did not believe in collective bargaining. The percentages of those who expressed neutral feelings were 6,8 and 22,1 percent for the Black and White groups respectively. Both groups of workers, therefore, appear to strongly favour collective bargaining as a form of negotiating with management. While both groups favoured collective bargaining, it was shown (p 156) that a significant difference between the two distributions of attitudes existed, which indicates that the Black group's belief in collective bargaining is stronger than that of the White group.

In the literature study reference was made to 'Ukulobola', the Black man's traditional method of negotiation which takes place between two families when a marriage is arranged. It was shown that this custom is common in many parts of Africa, and as every married Black appears to have been involved in this custom, all would be familiar with the process of negotiation. It is therefore not surprising that so strong a view in favour of collective bargaining was expressed.

This finding that a very large proportion of the Black worker group believed in collective bargaining as a means of negotiating with management is substantiated by recent statistics. During the first four years after Black trade unions were permitted to register in terms of the Labour Relations Act, the number of Black workers who were members of registered trade unions increased from 56 737 in 1980 to

469 260 in 1983, (National Manpower Commission annual report for 1983 p 369). Unfortunately these figures only apply to membership of registered unions, and it is known that a number of Black trade unions refuse to register in terms of the Act. The figures nevertheless show a marked increase in trade union activity in recent years.

Finnemore & van der Merwe (1986 p 42) maintain that in 1984 there were 251 unions operating in South Africa with a membership of approximately 1 500 000.

According to the NMC Annual reports for 1983 (p 368) and 1986 (p C8) the number of registered Black unions and their membership for the years 1981-1986 were as indicated in Table 54.

TABLE 54 Number of registered Black trade unions with their membership

Year	Number of registered unions	Membership
1981	23	259 582
1982	26	-
1983	19	289 578
1984	25	383 018
1985	26	290 401
1986	23	490 926

While the membership of these unions has almost doubled during this period, the number of registered unions remained relatively static. In a recent discussion with an Honours class of Black Industrial Relations students, the reason given for this state of affairs was that some Black unions did not register because by doing so they would be participating in the 'system' which had discriminated against them since 1924. This view is supported by Ncube (1985 p 141) who maintains that the emergent unions were not in favour of industrial councils because they believe that councils had for many years perpetuated job reservation, the industrial colour bar and high wages for the racist

minority unions. The fact that the 'system' was made equitable in 1979 has not as yet changed the perceptions of it.

A further reason given by Ncube (1985 p 159) why many unions are not in favour of the Industrial Council system is the fact that the system is perceived as being remote from direct and immediate worker participation at shop floor level, and as such is an undemocratic and bureaucratic process.

It would therefore appear that it is not collective bargaining as such which is questioned by some unions, but rather the legal framework within which it is supposed to take place.

The above statistics, which show a rapid growth in trade union membership since 1979/80, together with the responses to question 8, which revealed that a large proportion of the Black group (88,9%) believed in collective bargaining, very strongly support Hypothesis 1 which states that:

"The Black worker favours negotiation as a means of resolving industrial group conflict".

QUESTION 9

Trust in management

The responses to this question, given in Table 11 (p 157), reveal that 88,0 percent of the Black sample distrust management, while only 8,7 percent trusted management to treat the workers fairly. The respective figures for the White sample were 7,0 and 73,9 percent. This is a most interesting and important finding which could have important implications for industrial relations, and collective bargaining in particular, in South Africa. It was shown (p 101) that in order for negotiation to be successful both parties had to bargain in good faith. If one of the bargaining parties so strongly distrusted the other, it is questioned whether it is at all possible to bargain in good faith. The White group expressed an almost opposite attitude, 73,9 percent of the

group expressing trust that management would treat the workers fairly. On the basis of this variable alone one could postulate that negotiating with a Black trade union would be far more difficult than negotiating with a White union. One could search for the reasons for the disparity between the two work groups with regard to their trust in their management to treat them fairly, and no doubt one would find many. It is however, suggested that one of the main reasons for this distrust is possibly the long exclusion of the Black worker from the negotiation table. True, it was the government that introduced the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924, when Black workers were first legally precluded from participation in the negotiating machinery established by the act, and not the employers. The fact remains, however, that during the period 1924-1979 the Black workers saw their management negotiating with workers of other race groups, while they themselves were precluded. The White management participated in the 'system', and as such were seen to be part of the forces which discriminated against them.

It is therefore submitted that one of the variables which contributes towards making negotiating between Black trade unions and Employer organisations difficult is the lack of trust that the Black worker has in his management. It is suggested that employers will somehow have to work to improve this aspect of their relationship with the workers if the negotiation process is to be facilitated.

QUESTION 10

Fair share of profits

This question is related to question 9, but deals specifically with the profits of organisations and the perception of the workers' share of these. It was seen (p 158) that 88,9 percent of the Black group felt that the workers were not receiving a fair share of the profits, while the corresponding figure for the White group was 34,7 percent. It can be argued that many workers throughout the world feel that they are under-compensated. The fact, therefore, that a large proportion of the Black group felt that workers were not receiving a fair share of the

profits of organisation is therefore not as important as the fact that the percentage of those who have this sentiment is more than double that of the White group. The perception that the workers are not receiving a fair share of the profits of organisations is therefore much stronger among the Black worker than his White counterpart.

Changing the workers' perceptions of the profits of organisations will be a difficult task, and will never be completely successful until consensus is reached about what constitutes a 'fair share' of the profits. However, the fact that there is a significant difference between the attitudes of the Black and White groups on this matter does give management a starting point - that of changing the Black workers' attitudes in this respect. If this conviction could be reduced to the strength of the White group, a great deal would have been accomplished.

QUESTION 11

Political views and negotiation

Here again, a significant difference in the sentiments of the two groups became evident. It was seen (p 159) that 66,6 percent of the Black group felt that political views should influence attitudes during negotiations, while only 1,0 percent of the White group felt so.

The degree to which politics is involved in labour matters differs from country to country. For example, it is not as involved in the United States of America as it is in Europe or Australia. Nevertheless, the fact that there is such a marked difference between the views of the two groups could have serious implications for negotiating in South Africa.

Colonel F H P Creswell founded the Labour Party in 1910 to act as a political front for the trade unions (Grey Coetzee 1976 p 4). When the Labour Party and Nationalists formed a pact after the miners' strike of 1922, and won the election in 1924, Creswell became the first Minister of Labour. The emphasis in labour matters appears to have changed at this time to become one of colour, with the Black workers being

precluded from participation in the negotiation procedures established by the Industrial Conciliation Act (Act No 11 of 1924). The influence of the Labour Party as a political front for unions seems to have waned from this time, although the Communist party continued until it was banned by the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950.

The current Labour Relations Act (Act No 28 of 1956) expressly forbids trade unions and employers' organisations from affiliating with or granting financial or other assistance to any political party (Section 8 (6) (c) (d)). Nevertheless, in analysing the causes of strikes between April and June 1986, Coetzee (1986 p 15) found that the two main issues causing industrial unrest were:

- i) Wages and/or working conditions -32 percent, and
- ii) detentions - 31 percent.

This finding of Coetzee that 'detentions' were one of the most important causes of industrial unrest appears to support the feeling expressed by the Black group that political views should influence attitudes in negotiating with management.

In this respect it is important to take note of the views expressed by Ncube (1985 p 149) who maintains that a common objective of all emergent unions was complete freedom from political and economic strangulation. This, he maintains, signifies a commitment to the abolition of apartheid and simultaneously capitalism because in the eyes of the Black worker the two are seen as one and the same phenomenon.

It is therefore questionable whether the provisions of the Labour Relations Act regarding the affiliation of unions and political parties will be successful.

QUESTION 12

Workers' representatives

The responses to this question, given in Table 14 (p 160) indicate the spread of attitudes relating to this matter. It is suggested that the most important piece of information which comes to light is the fact that 45,7 percent of the Black group felt that their representatives should be completely from outside the organisation, while the corresponding figure for the White group was only 8,6 percent.

It is argued that this attitude is related to the one on trust already discussed (p 157). Matthews, (1981 p 89) in his study of negotiation with management, asked the question: "What is the greatest weakness in Liaison committee representation"?

The main reason by far (48,1% of responses) was given as: "Representatives fear victimisation". The fear of expressing ones views in managements' presence, particularly when those views differ from those of management, is very real among the Black worker.

However, it would appear that greater use of legal advisors is being made by both employer and worker organisations, and there is little that either side can do if an 'opponent' chooses to do so.

QUESTION 13

Representatives reporting back to workers

The responses to this question, given in Table 15 (p 161), reveal that both groups feel very strongly that representatives should report back to the workers before making final decisions. Both groups are reluctant to give their representatives 'carte blanche'. Nevertheless there is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups, which possibly suggests that the Black trade union representatives would be expected to report back to the workers to a greater degree than the representatives of the White workers.

Ncube (1985 p 159) draws attention to a problem in this respect. He maintains that the management practice of denying union officials and shop stewards the opportunity to seek mandate ratification from union members on the employer's wage proposals during negotiations, is seen as a violation of the basic tenets of worker participation in the collective bargaining process. He states further that this is perceived to be an unfair labour practice which should be condemned because of failure to bargain in good faith.

The above allegation, portrayed by Ncube as a general management practice, is however questioned, as it is difficult to believe that any management team would do this. Nevertheless, it does highlight the fact that the Black worker feels very strongly in this respect, and possibly suggest that management should exercise a greater degree of patience in permitting the worker representatives the opportunity to report back frequently, if necessary.

Perhaps reference should briefly be made to the difference between 'Representative democracy' and 'Participative democracy'. In the past people have been happy to have representatives who would negotiate and make decisions on their behalf. It was felt that these representatives would always be fighting for those they represent.

More recently however, it would appear that people are demanding greater participation in the negotiation process, which means that the discretionary powers of the representatives are being reduced. This in turn means that the representatives are expected to report back more often to seek new mandates.

It therefore appears that the employers will have to accept this fact, and possibly prepare themselves for lengthy negotiations, as this is not necessarily the decision of the representatives, but rather that of the workers they represent.

QUESTION 14

The necessity of conflict to improve working conditions

The responses to this question (Table 16 p 162) here again reveal that there is a significant difference between the views of the two groups concerning this question. 76,6 percent of the Black group felt that conflict was necessary to improve working conditions while the figure for the White group was 41,8 percent.

This finding is supported by the statistics given in the National Manpower Commission's annual report for 1986 (p C9). These statistics show that during 1980 there were 207 strikes which involved 56 286 Black workers, but not a single White worker. During the year 1986 the number of strikes had increased to 793 with the numbers of workers involved being: Blacks- 408 775 and Whites - 255.

While the views of the White group show a fair percentage who agree with the Black workers about the necessity for a state of conflict to achieve additional benefits for the workers, the degree to which they resort to strike action is negligible when compared with the Black workers.

It would appear from this finding that employers will have to accept the fact that Black trade unions use strike action, as a strategy in negotiating, to a far greater degree than the White unions do. Recent major strike action in the South African Transport services, the Mining Industry, and the Postal Services seems to support this finding.

QUESTION 15

Unanimity between members of group

This matter of unanimity between members of a group in decision-making appears to be very strong among the Black workers, the figures in Table 17 (p 163) showing that 89,1 percent of the Black group insisted on unanimity, while 44,5 percent of the White group do so.

One of the implications of this finding is that negotiations could be 'drawn out' while the Black representatives caucus often to reach agreement. This could also contribute to the attitude that representatives are expected to report back to the workers before coming to any agreement (see p 161). Time does not appear to be an important aspect in negotiations as shown by Matthews (1981 pp 36-37) in his review of the Black man's traditional approach to negotiation.

QUESTION 16

Compromise

The perception measured here was whether or not the group believed that compromise was a requirement for reaching agreement. Table 18 (p 164) gives the responses to this question. It is seen that 75,4 percent of the Black group believes that compromise is necessary for agreement, while the corresponding figures for the White group is 83,5 percent. Both groups therefore very strongly believe that compromise is necessary. It is interesting to note that 22,5 percent of the Black group and 10,0 percent of the White group did not believe that it was necessary. While both groups strongly believe in compromise, a significant difference between the responses of the groups appears to show that the White workers' belief in compromise is stronger than that of their Black counterparts.

Further reference to this matter of compromise will be made later in the study when the responses to question 21 are reviewed.

QUESTION 17

Unrealistic demands

It is seen from the responses to this question, given in Table 19 (p 164), that 65,6 percent of the Black group felt that demands put to the employers were sometimes unreasonable, while the corresponding figure for the White group was 83,9 percent. Also, the figures for those who did not feel that demands were sometimes unreasonable were Blacks 27,4 percent and Whites 4,5 percent. The significant difference between the responses of the two groups in regard to this question is of interest,

particularly when they are compared with those of question 42 to be discussed later. It would appear that the Black workers view unreasonable demands more in the light of 'bargaining strategy', than in the sense of them being 'unreasonable' (refer to responses to question 42).

QUESTION 18

Approach when agreement is difficult to reach

Responses to this question (Table 20 p 165) indicate that a large proportion of the Black group (71,5%) felt that friendly dialogue should continue even in cases where agreement was difficult to reach. The percentage who felt that in these cases a more aggressive approach was called for was 25,0 percent. The corresponding figures for the White group were 84,8 percent and 4,6 percent respectively, which seems to indicate that the 'tolerance' level of the White workers was higher than that of his Black counterpart. Nevertheless both groups of workers strongly believe that friendly dialogue should continue even when agreement appears difficult to achieve.

This finding seems to indicate that the employer representatives should exercise a tremendous amount of patience when negotiating with both Black and White groups of worker representatives. It is suggested that a lack of patience on the part of the employers during negotiation sessions could be a source of the negotiating problems.

QUESTION 19

Understanding of how a business operates

Table 21 (p 166) reveals that 63,0 percent of the Black group felt that their understanding of how an organisation operates was good/very good, while 10,9 percent felt that their knowledge was bad/very bad. The corresponding figures for the White group were 51,7 and 5,0 percent respectively.

It is suggested that this finding will surprise most people, who may feel that it is impossible that such a large proportion of Black

workers could believe that their understanding of how a business operates was either good or very good. For example, when these responses were mentioned to a group of Black Honours students in Industrial Relations at the University of Fort Hare during a study session, their immediate reaction was that the responses should be omitted from the study because they were 'nonsense'. It was pointed out to them that whether or not one agreed that the responses were 'nonsense', the fact remained that a large proportion of the Blacks believed that their knowledge was good or very good, or at least indicated it to be so.

It is however suggested that the responses of the Black group to this question should be considered in conjunction with their responses to question 23, where a substantial proportion (93,1%) of the group felt that negotiation would be facilitated if they had a better understanding of how their organisation operated. (Refer to the responses to question 23).

QUESTION 20

Information re financial state of organisation

The responses to this question, given in Table 22 (p 167), show that 92,7 percent of the Black group felt that management should keep the workers informed with regard to the financial state of the organisation. The corresponding figure for the White group was 61,2 percent. The significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question suggests that the Blacks feel very much more strongly about this matter than does his White counterpart.

In a discussion on this subject Pennington (1987 p 26) argues for information disclosure. He refers to sources of power available to the parties in a collective bargaining situation, these being information, neutral and threat-based sources, and maintains that if the information based source of power is missing, threat based power is resorted to.

It is difficult to visualise 'bargaining in good faith' in situations where relevant information is withheld from one of the parties. The question debated is how much information should an employer be required to impart to the unions. Pennington (ibid) maintains that there is considerable resistance in South Africa at present to the sharing of information, many employers believing that 'The less the union knows the weaker they will be' in the bargaining arena. This approach could be shortsighted, and could backfire. Matthews (1975 pp 69-72) records a negotiation situation in which he was involved. The union had demanded a 15,4 percent increase for the labourer category of employee, but the employer had claimed that the financial state of the company did not permit this, and that it faced bankruptcy if this demand was granted. The union, in good faith, accepted the situation and settled for a 9,9 percent increase. At this time the Durban (1972) strikes occurred and tremendous political pressure was brought to bear on the company to increase wages. Within a period of +2 months the company increased the wages of the labourer group by 42,9 percent. In comparing the valence of politics versus the valence of additional effort, Matthews (1975 pp 121-122) suggested that the workers could have perceived political involvement as being more effective than normal collective bargaining. It is suggested that in this instance the company did not bargain in good faith by withholding information from the workers, and in fact misrepresenting the financial state of the organisation. This approach to bargaining appears to have backfired in this instance - the company subsequently becoming involved in strike action and a consumer boycott of its products, which possibly were the first in its history.

It is not being argued that all information concerning the enterprise should be made known to the workers. Rather, that the situation be as in the United States of America and the United Kingdom where information which is relevant to negotiation is prescribed, and has to be given to the negotiating parties to enable all to negotiate from a knowledge base and therefore bargain intelligently (Pennington 1987 p 27).

Workers therefore expect to be given information regarding the financial state of the organisation. If it is given it could result in more intelligent negotiation - if not it could contribute towards mistrust in management which already appears to be at a seriously high level (Refer to responses to question 9).

QUESTION 21

Indebtedness of management

The responses to this question, given in Table 23 (p 168), bring to light a most interesting difference between the perceptions of the two groups with regard to the meaning of compromise. Of the Black group 77,1 percent felt that management was indebted to them for the balance of their original demand even though they had compromised and accepted a lower offer. The corresponding figure for the White group was 12,6 percent. These almost diametrically opposite views or understanding of compromise gives rise for concern. This finding is supported by research done by Matthews (1981 p 95) when 58,4 percent of the Black sample were of the opinion that if Black workers accepted a compromise they would believe that management was indebted to them for the balance of their original demand. (For a report on this aspect of the study see Matthews 1986 pp 14-18).

The responses to question 16 (p 164) reveal that 75,4 percent of the Black group and 83,5 percent of the White group believed that compromise was necessary to reach agreement. Therefore, it may with confidence be alleged that a large majority of both groups of workers believe that compromise is essential for agreement. However, when the question on the meaning of compromise was posed, almost opposite views were expressed by the two groups. This indicates that they have different perceptions of what compromise means.

QUESTION 22

General economic conditions

The responses to this question (Table 24 p 169) reveal that 83,9 percent of the Black group and 75,4 percent of the White group believed that the economic conditions in the country should influence workers with regard to the size of the demands they submit to management. The difference between the responses of the two groups to this question is not significant at the 0,01 level. It is however significant at the 0,05 level.

These responses show a degree of responsibility on behalf of both White, as well as Black workers. It would seem that, during times of economic sluggishness and depression, the employers should have an easier task persuading the workers to accept a reasonable offer than during times of great economic activity.

Perhaps a surprising observation here is that this attitude is stronger among the Black workers than it is among the Whites.

QUESTION 23

Additional information on business organisations

The responses to this question (Table 25 p 169) reveal that 93,1 percent of the Black group and 86,5 percent of the White group believed that a better understanding of how an organisation operates would help in negotiating conditions of employment. While the responses of the two groups differ significantly, in both cases a large proportion believe that additional information would assist. This finding supports the arguments submitted for additional information being given to the workers when the responses to question 20 were discussed. Being honest with the workers by giving them additional information about the organisation does seem to be an approach to bargaining worth trying.

Reference must be made to the finding on question 19 (p 166) where 63,0 percent of the Black workers indicated that their understanding of how an organisation operated was either good or very good, while here 93,1

percent indicated that a better understanding would help in negotiating with management.

This seems to indicate that the responses to question 19 were in relative terms. The very strong belief that additional information was necessary if negotiation was to be improved, or more intelligently undertaken, appears to indicate that the workers' real feelings are that they don't know enough about the operation of organisations.

QUESTION 24

Workers' right to negotiate

The responses to this question (Table 26 p 170) show that 95,5 percent of the Black group and 76,8 percent of the White group believe that the workers had the right to negotiate conditions of employment with their management. The significant difference between the responses of the two groups indicates that the Black workers believe more strongly in this right than the White workers do.

Because the Black worker had been precluded from negotiation with management, in terms of the Industrial Conciliation Act, from 1924 to 1979, employers could have, and this possibly unconsciously, accepted that this basic right did not apply to the Black. After all, this view was endorsed by the government, and it was therefore easier for employers who perhaps questioned this belief to still their consciences.

Although this right was granted to the Black worker in 1979, it could still have been assumed that he, because of this long isolation, would not have strong feelings in regard to this right. The responses above show how wrong this assumption would be.

Whether or not employers recognise that workers have the right, through their representatives, to negotiate conditions of employment, it is suggested that they take cognisance of this fact.

QUESTION 25

Strong and weak trade unions

The responses to this question, recorded in Table 27 (p 171), show that 81,2 percent of the Black group agreed with the statement that strong trade unions got more concessions from management than weak trade unions did. The proportion of the White group who agreed was 48,5 percent. It has already been shown (Table 10 p 155) that a large proportion of the Black group believed in collective bargaining. The responses to this question now show that the Black worker not only believes in collective bargaining, but also believes that this is more successful when done from a position of strength.

The power positions of the negotiating parties were discussed in some detail earlier (pp 116-120) and it was shown that the stronger party usually got the better of the deal. It appears that the Black workers are more aware of this phenomenon than his White counterpart.

QUESTION 26

Underpayment in the past

The responses to this question, recorded in Table 28 (p 172), reveal that 90,3 percent of the Black group felt that they had been underpaid in the past, while the figure for the White group was 62,2 percent. While a large proportion of both groups felt that they had been underpaid, a significant difference between the responses of the groups was evident, which indicates that this belief among the Black group was stronger than it was among the White workers.

It is suggested that these responses should be linked to those given to question 9 - those which related to trust in management. It would not be surprising that when such a large percentage of workers felt that they had been underpaid in the past, a similar percentage should show distrust in management. It will be seen that when these responses are compared, the situation in the Black group is as would be expected- 88,0 percent expressed distrust in management, while 90,3 percent felt that they had been 'underpaid'. This was, however, not the case when

the responses of the White group were compared. Here, only 7,0 percent expressed distrust in management while 62,2 percent believed that they had been underpaid. This finding appears to be an anomaly, and it is not the intention to offer an explanation, other than to suggest that it could be a sign of the mentality of the White worker in South Africa, that he would remain trusting his management while believing that he has been underpaid. It would seem that the White worker accepts a perceived injustice more easily than the Black, at least to the extent that he is not prepared to express his feelings about it. An analogy in the political field is the man who continues to show trust in his party leadership despite the fact that he feels they are not performing well.

QUESTION 27

Retributive bargaining

The responses to this question, which appear in Table 29 (p 173), show that 79,2 percent of the Black group felt that present demands should take into account underpayment in the past, while the corresponding figure for the White group was 35,4 percent. The attitudes of the two groups to this question differed significantly.

This finding supports the view of the secretary of the 'Blacks only' trade union federation CUSA who stated (see p 148) that the Whites did not understand that there was a need for retributive bargaining.

This finding would lead one to believe that the Black worker would demand more than he feels is a realistic figure in order to make up for underpayment in the past.

A point which should not be overlooked is the fact that a fair proportion of Whites (35,4%) also felt this way.

It would appear that the perceived injustices of the past are not easily forgotten.

QUESTION 28

Concessions during periods of unrest

The responses to this question (Table 30 p 174) show that 76,8 percent of the Black group agreed that concessions were more easily obtained from management during periods of labour unrest i.e. during periods of strikes or threats of strikes. The corresponding figure for the White group was 36,2 percent. A significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question is evident.

This finding is substantiated by the National Manpower Commission's annual report for 1986. Statistics given in this report (p C9) appear in Table 55.

TABLE 55 Number of strikes and employees involved

Year	Strikes	Employees involved	
		White	Black
1980	207	0	56 286
1986	793	255	408 775

These statistics show that during 1980, the first year that Black trade unions were permitted to register in terms of the Labour Relations Act, there were 207 strikes, involving 56 286 Black workers but not a single White worker. Six years later, the figures for 1986 showed that there were 793 strikes involving 408 775 Black workers and only 255 White workers.

These statistics seem to confirm the views of those of the Black group that concessions are obtained more easily during periods of strikes, and it is suggested that this is a bargaining strategy used to a greater degree by the Blacks than the Whites.

This finding has serious implications for employers. In many instances they may concede to the workers' demands, not because they believe they

are reasonable, but to avoid, or end strikes, and then comfort themselves with the thought that they have averted more serious labour unrest. What they would be doing in these circumstances was re-inforcing the workers' views that to strike was the quickest way of getting the employers to concede.

A further point which should be born in mind is that an organisation seldom operates in isolation. A recent strike in a major chain of food stores resulted in the management making major concessions. Shortly thereafter a second food chain was involved in a similar strike. It seemed as if the union was playing one employer up against the other.

It is not being suggested that employers should not make concessions. To make concessions is necessary in all bargaining situations. What is being suggested is that, if strikes, or the threat of strikes, is indeed a unions bargaining strategy, the employer should be aware of this, and consider the consequences of making concessions if these are simply to avoid threatened strikes.

QUESTION 29

Main concern of unions

The responses to this question, recorded in Table 31 (p 174), show that 20,7 percent of the Black group and 51,8 of the White group agreed with the statement that a trade unions main concern should be for the welfare of its members only. This finding will be reviewed together with the findings of question 32. It should be noted, however, that there is a significant difference between the responses of the two groups to this question.

QUESTION 30

Belief that management is in position to grant all demands

The responses to this question, recorded in Table 32 (p 175), show that the proportion of Black workers who believed that management was in a

position to grant all their demands was 59,3 percent, while the corresponding figure for the White sample was 4,5 percent.

This significant difference between the responses of the two groups could have serious implications for collective bargaining. It suggests that bargaining with a Black group would be more difficult than with a White group because the reasons given by the employer for not conceding to a demand could be seen as an excuse rather than a reason. For example, if a large proportion of a group honestly believed that management was in a position to grant a wage increase, then all arguments submitted by the employer connected with the financial feasibility of the demand would likely fall on deaf ears.

A most interesting situation arises when these responses are compared with the responses to question 42, which show that 91,4 percent of the Black group felt that they should demand substantially more than they expect to receive, mainly because this was bargaining strategy. Further comment on these seemingly contradictory views will be made when the responses to question 42 are considered.

QUESTION 31

Making demands during periods of large scale unemployment

The responses to this question, which appear in Table 33 (p 176), show that 66,8 percent of the Black group and 30,2 percent of the White group felt that they would continue to make demands to improve their own working conditions even in circumstances of large scale unemployment.

These responses are interesting, particularly when considered together with the responses to question 22 already considered. Large proportions of both groups indicated that general economic conditions would influence them with regard to the size of the demands they would make, while the responses to this question show that they would continue to make demands if they were one of the fortunate who has a job.

One of the implications of these findings is that employers will continue to receive demands from the work force, even during periods when the economic situation in the country was bad. However, there seems to be some comfort in the fact that the demands submitted will probably not be as large as they are during 'good times'. Or if the demands are as large, the workers will probably be prepared to accept a lesser offer than they would during normal times.

QUESTION 32

Union's concern for the whole of society

The responses to this question, which appear in Table 34 (p 177), show that 84,6 percent of the Black group felt that the trade union's main concern in bargaining with management should be for the welfare of society as a whole. The corresponding figure for the White group was 52,3 percent.

This finding very strongly supports the responses given to question 29 (p 174). The significant differences in the responses of the two groups to these questions indicate that the Black workers are more concerned about the welfare of others in their society than the Whites are. This feeling is so strong that 84,6 percent of those questioned felt that it should be the trade unions' main concern when bargaining with management.

This view appears to be supported by Ncube (1985 p 133) who refers to the fact that at their national conference held in 1982 the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) passed a resolution encouraging affiliates to play an active role in community matters such as the demolition of squatter camps, detention without trial, the housing shortage and the soaring rate of unemployment.

On the other hand the White worker appears to be a more selfish creature. 51,8 percent of the group (see p 175) agreed that a trade union's main concern should be for its members only, while the corre-

sponding figure for the Black group was only 20,7 percent. This assumption, however, need not necessarily be correct.

In discussing the functions of trade unions, Salamon (1987 pp 72-73) maintains that emphasis will depend on the particular union's approach. For example, the radical union, which concerns itself with developing a socialist society, will place emphasis on an "expression of class consciousness". A second group, who are concerned with the effect of the union on the existing economic, social and political system, believe that their main function should be to act in a "socially responsible manner". A third group places emphasis on their "job regulation and rule making" role. These approaches differ from country to country. British unions are known for their "welfare orientation", the American unions have a "business orientation", while the European union has a more "political orientation".

The responses to this question, together with those to question 31, suggest that the Black South African union has a similar orientation to that of the British union.

These findings suggest that arguments in favour of the community would be more acceptable to Black trade unions during negotiations with management than they would be to White unions who, to a greater degree, appear to be concerned about their members only.

These findings support hypothesis 2 which states:

"The Black trade union's goals will be more society orientated than those of the White trade union".

QUESTION 33

Should the disciplinary code be negotiated

The responses to this question, which appear in Table 35 (p 178), show that 93,9 percent of the Black group felt that the disciplinary code of the organisation should be negotiated with the workers, while the

corresponding figure for the White group was 49,2 percent. This significant difference in attitudes of the two groups to this question leads one to examine possible reasons for this situation. It is not the intention to do so here, as this is a study on its own outside the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless one possible reason will be touched upon.

The Black South African, like all the other races in South Africa, has, through the years, had to subject himself to the laws and disciplinary procedures of the land. This has possibly been more difficult for him to do than for the other race groups because of a number of factors, only a few of which will be mentioned. Firstly, the Blacks are, in Western terms, less educated than the other race groups. Secondly, they have had little participation in the formulation of the laws and disciplinary procedures of the land. Thirdly, the cultural differences between the Black and other groups are so large that they have led to problems. For example if acceptable norms within his 'culture' become punishable outside this 'culture', one could expect confusion and misunderstanding.

It could therefore be argued that the Black, consciously or unconsciously, has resisted disciplinary procedures which he hardly understands and which are in certain respects against certain acceptable forms of behaviour in his own culture. Also, he has had little or no participation in the formulation of these procedures.

This problem becomes accentuated when it comes to life in industry where some specific types of behaviour are punishable, when it would seem to be normal and acceptable under other circumstances.

In search for an explanation, the writer, who grew up among Blacks in a now independent state, and who has over twenty years personnel management experience in industry, offers the following thoughts for consideration by referring to two examples drawn from his experience.

'Punctuality' does not seem to be a behaviour considered very important among Black people, and late-coming is not particularly frowned upon, especially if there appears to be a reason for it. For example, a group of rural Blacks, who agree to work together on a particular project, could conceivably arrive 'at work' at any time, say between 07h00 and 08h00. Those who arrived at 07h00 would not be emotionally upset with those who arrived at 08h00, if the reason for their late coming was that they had to walk a longer distance than those who arrived at 07h00. The industrial Black now finds himself in a situation where he is remunerated by the hour, calculated to the nearest quarter hour. This means that if he is 7 minutes late he receives full pay, but if he is 8 minutes late a quarter of an hour's pay is deducted. This he becomes accustomed to and accepts to a degree. What he finds difficult to accept is the employer drawing up a disciplinary code which includes reprimands and/or dismissal for continual late coming, when, while he has possibly accepted short payment, he does not perceive this aspect of his behaviour as deserving such harsh disciplinary action.

A second example is the following: Organisation 'A' had a policy towards employees 'fighting on the job'. The ruling was that both employees, if they participated, were discharged. The reason for this decision was that it often was difficult to establish who started the fight. Therefore if an employee struck another, the man who was struck was supposed to report the matter to management who discharged the employee doing the striking. However, if an employee retaliated, both were discharged. This disciplinary procedure was seen to be harsh because it was felt that a man has the right to defend himself.

It is therefore suggested that if the Black worker participated in the drawing up of the disciplinary code of an organisation, the approach to various offenses could be different from those decided unilaterally by management.

Because the Black workers feel so strongly about this matter it is suggested that organisations give serious attention to consulting them whenever disciplinary matters involving workers are considered.

QUESTION 34

Should the grievance procedures be negotiated

The responses to this question, which appear in Table 36 (p 179), show that 92,7 percent of the Black group felt that the workers should have a say in determining what the grievance procedure should be, while the corresponding figure for the White group was 49,5 percent. Here again, the significant difference between the responses of the two groups seems to indicate that the White worker's feelings about this matter are not as strong as those of his Black counterpart, and that he would therefore more readily accept a grievance procedure imposed upon him by his management than would be the case of the Black.

This finding shows how strongly the Black group feels about this matter, and it is therefore suggested that the management of organisations will have to take cognisance of these feelings, and consult with the Black workers, if they wish their grievance procedure to be acceptable to this section of the work force.

QUESTION 35

Reasons for joining a trade union

It will be seen, by referring to Appendix 2, that 40,8 percent of the Black group were members of a trade union while the corresponding figure for the Whites was 11,9 percent. The main reasons given for joining a trade union, together with the number of responses and percentage giving the reason, are recorded in Table 37 (p 181).

It will be seen that a large proportion, 55,2 percent of the Black group gave their main reason for joining a trade union as being the protection of their rights. The workers perceive that they have certain rights, and believe that the union is one way of protecting these rights. The other main reasons, given in descending order of

importance, were 'Negotiation with management', 'Job security', 'Compulsion' and 'Other' reasons.

Examples of the responses which were categorised as 'Other' were:

- i) To uplift the standard of living of Black workers,
- ii) Fear of sanctions from other workers,
- iii) Source of information, and
- iv) Unity.

Because the number of White workers who responded was so small, no meaningful observation could be made, other than to notice that the main reason given for joining a union was compulsion (27,3%).

Appendix 2 reveals that only a small proportion (11,9%) of the White group are members of a union, and when one considers that 27,3 percent of these only joined because they were obliged to do so under the 'closed shop' clause, one comes to the conclusion that White workers show little interest in trade unions. On the other hand the involvement of Black workers is almost equal to that in Great Britain, where the trade union density was 45 percent in 1984 (Salamon 1987 p 560).

QUESTION 36

Main thing expected from trade union

The responses to this question, which are given in Table 38 (p 181), show that the main thing expected from the trade union by the Black worker was for it to fight for improved wages (58,9%). A further 16,6 percent indicated that the unions main objective was to fight for the workers' rights. An interesting observation is that while 55,2 percent of the members gave their reasons for joining a union as 'to fight for their rights', only 16,6 percent mention this specifically when asked what the main thing they expected from the union was.

It is suggested that improved wages is perceived as a right. Indeed, the second most frequent response given was 'to negotiate on my part',

and if this was understood to mean negotiation for what the workers' rights were, then a total of 94,5 percent of the sample felt that the unions main concern should be for the workers rights.

Among the responses classified as 'Other' were:

- i) To better employee/employer relationships, and
- ii) to supply information.

Again no comment will be made on the White responses other than to say that the main thing expected from a union was to fight for improved wages, as was the case with the Blacks. Both groups therefore see improved wages as the main issue.

This finding appears to be supported by Levy (1987 p 4) who maintains that pressure will continue to be placed, first and foremost, on wages as a priority item in collective bargaining in South Africa.

QUESTION 37

Main thing trade union is not doing

The responses to this question appear in Table 39 (p 182). It will be observed that relatively few (38) responded to this question, so meaningful conclusions are difficult to reach. Furthermore, it was difficult categorising the reasons given. For example, the views that the union did not fight for employees' rights, or for increased pay, or improved working conditions, could all be related to the one given as 'Weak on negotiation/communication', or perhaps plainly expressed as inefficiency on the part of the union.

Included in the 'other' category were:

- i) Does not educate the workers,
- ii) Does not create more jobs, and
- iii) Does practically nothing.

QUESTION 38

Main reasons for not joining a union

The main reasons given for not joining a trade union are recorded in Table 40 (p 182). It will be noticed that the main reason given by both Black as well as White workers was "no union where I work". This seems to indicate that if a union was present and active, a fair proportion of workers would join. This is an interesting finding, particularly with reference to the Black workers. It was seen (p 217) that 40,8 percent of the Black sample were members of trade unions. This proportion is high, even in terms of European or American trade union density figures.

Now if it is assumed that a further 56 would possibly join if a union was present in the organisation, the trade union density for the Blacks in the sample could be as high as 54 percent. This would make the density higher than in most European countries, and in the United States of America.

Here again it was difficult categorising the reasons given. Those in the 'Other' category included the following:

- i) Never had reason to join a union,
- ii) lack of interest,
- iii) the union does nothing for society,
- iv) I believe in negotiating with management myself,
- v) I do not need a trade union,
- vi) I don't have enough information about a trade union,
- vii) the trade union has no money, and
- viii) I am on salaried staff.

QUESTION 39

Single spokesman versus all representatives speaking during negotiation sessions

The responses to this question are given in Tables 41 and 42 (pp 183-184). It will be seen from Table 41 that 72,8 percent of the Black

sample felt that all the representatives should have a say during negotiations. The corresponding figure for the White group is 30,6 percent. There is a significant difference in the responses of the two groups to this question, which indicates that the feelings of the Black in this respect is very much stronger than that of his White counterpart.

By referring to Table 42 it will be seen that the main reason given by both groups for this attitude was: "All views should be expressed." It is seemingly feared that one speaker could forget one of more of the salient arguments.

In the case of the Black group this reason was followed by:

"Strength: many speakers can convince management" (19,3%).

"Team has mandate- not a single person" (14,7%).

and "One speaker could never withstand management pressure" (3,6%).

Grouped in the 'Other' category were the following which are given as examples:

- i) One speaker could be bribed by management,
- ii) one speaker could result in one side's advantage,
- iii) one man can easily be changed,
- iv) to give each other support,
- v) more brains are better than one, and
- vi) management cannot single one out.

The main reason given for there being one speaker only was:

"To avoid chaos" (33,8%).

The only other reasons which could meaningfully be grouped were:

"All members have the same objective" (3,9%).

Some of the remaining reasons which were included in the 'Other' category were:

- i) The employer will not tolerate many people,
- ii) to avoid the possibility of speakers contradicting each other,
- iii) saves time, and
- iv) confrontation if all bring the disputes.

This strong tendency for both groups, but especially the Black group, to favour all representatives having a say, seems to indicate an inclination towards participative democracy rather than representative democracy (see p 199). This has traditionally been the Black man's approach to collective bargaining and perhaps it would facilitate employer-employee negotiation if this fact could be acknowledged and provision made for each of the Black representatives to have a say.

This would no doubt be a time consuming exercise, calling for tolerance and patience. But how can one evaluate the cost of an additional hour, day or week of 'time' lost against the possible benefit of a year's industrial peace?

It is therefore recommended that serious attention be given by the employers to this question. The accepted 'western' approach of having a chief spokesman could possibly be replaced by one in which, in an orderly manner, each representative in turn be given the floor to express his views. Psychologically this would be self satisfying, would act as a release valve to reduce pent up emotions, as well as satisfying the desire of the representatives to have their say.

QUESTION 40 : Difference between negotiation involving "Ukulobola" and negotiating conditions of employment

The responses to this question are given in Table 43 (p 184). It is interesting to note that this is the only question which did not result in a difference in the responses of the two groups at either the 0,01 or 0,05 levels of significance. Actually the Whites were not expected to answer this question because of it being based on the Black culture. The responses are nevertheless given.

It will be seen that 53,7 percent of the Black group indicated that there was no difference between the two types of negotiation, while 46,3 percent felt that there was. However, when the reasons for these views are considered, the total picture changes. Clarity on this point will emerge as the reasons for the responses are examined.

By referring to Table 44 (p 185) it will be seen that the main two reasons submitted for there being no difference were:

- i) Compromise needed in both cases - 46,2 percent, and
- ii) both involve negotiation involving money - 20,8 percent

Examples of the responses which were included in the 'Other' category were:

- i) Both are indebted to pay the difference,
- ii) in both cases a conclusion must be reached, and
- iii) in both cases one party is trying to reduce what he has to pay.

It is interesting to note that most of the reasons given for there being a difference between the two types of negotiation were of a technical nature (67,4%). Examples grouped in this category are:

- i) Ukulobola is negotiated before marriage - working conditions are negotiated after joining the organisation,
- ii) Ukulobola is a once-off deal - negotiating with management is ongoing,
- iii) negotiation at work is affected by whether the workers work hard or not,
- iv) the parties in Ukulobola need not agree - workers and management must agree, and
- v) Ukulobola negotiations can go on for months.

The second largest group of reasons given involved culture. Examples are:

- i) Ukulobola is culture- the other not, and
- ii) Ukulobola is our tradition.

An example of the responses grouped as 'Other' is: "The thing negotiated is different".

It will be observed from the reasons given for there being a difference between the two types of negotiation, not one referred to a difference in the negotiation 'procedure' as such, but rather to the nature of the negotiation. It was difficult categorizing the reasons, and those involving relationships and culture could equally well have been grouped with those indicating differences involving technicalities.

A conclusion which may therefore be drawn from these findings is that a larger majority of Black workers than that shown in Table 43 feel that there is no difference between the two type of negotiation, because those who indicated a difference gave reasons relating to specific aspects of the negotiation rather than the process itself.

QUESTION 41

The finality of a compromised settlement

The responses to this question appear in Tables 45 and 46 (p 186).

From Table 45 it will be seen that 34,7 percent of the Black group were of the opinion that in the case of a compromise the matter was finalised, while the figure for the White group was 94,6 percent. On the other hand 65,3 percent of the Black group felt that the matter was not final and that the workers had a right to claim the difference between the figure demanded and the one on which they settled. A highly significant difference between the perceptions of the two groups is found when the responses are compared. It is interesting to consider the reasons given for the differing views.

In Table 46 it will be seen that the main reasons why a compromised settlement should be considered final are given as follows:

- i) The matter has been finalised, and
- ii) you have come to an agreement.

It could be argued that these two reasons are very similar. This may be so, but it is nevertheless interesting to note that of the responses of the Black group 57,7 percent used the word 'agreement' while only 14,4 percent used the word 'finalised.' On the other hand 13,9 percent of the White group's responses referred to 'agreement' while 78,2 percent used the term 'finalised'.

Examples of the reasons included in the 'Other' category are:

- i) Both sides have made a sacrifice, and
- ii) better to get 30 percent than nothing.

The main reasons given by the Black group why a compromised settlement should not be considered final are:

- i) Money is still owing to workers,
- ii) employer must pay amount demanded, and
- iii) problem is not solved.

Examples of the reasons included in the 'Other' category are:

- i) Management cannot tell the workers what they need,
- ii) workers are the ones who do the work,
- iii) management improves production,
- iv) they (the workers) did not get what they need, and
- v) you have to live with it -i.e. the compromised agreement.

It is clearly seen that while both the White and Black groups strongly believed in 'compromise' as a means of achieving agreement in negotiations between employers and employees (Table 18 p 164), there is a marked difference between the perceptions of the two groups as to the meaning of the term.

In considering the responses to question 21 (p 168) it was seen that 77,1 percent of the Black group felt that management was indebted to them for the balance of their original demand even though they had compromised.

The responses to this question indicate that 65,3 percent of the Black group believe that, even after having compromised, the matter is not finalised, and the workers have the right to claim the difference between the original demand and the figure on which they settled. The corresponding figure for the White group was 5,4 percent.

Matthews (1981 p 95) in a previous study found that 58,4 percent of the Black sample were of the opinion that if Black workers accepted a compromise they would believe that management was indebted to them for the balance of their original demand.

The Chambers Etymological English Dictionary (1967 p 121) gives the meaning of 'compromise' as:

".... a settlement of differences by mutual concession".

The essence of the meaning appears to be settlement by 'mutual concession'. This the Black worker does not appear to understand.

It would appear that the suggestion made by the Black lecturers of the University of Fort Hare (see p 27) that the Black man's understanding of 'compromise' differs from that of the White man, has substance. The degree of finality attached to the meaning of the word seems to be the source of the different perceptions. Whereas the White, to a large extent, perceives a degree of finality in a compromised settlement, the Black perceives it as a temporary arrangement only, lacking the same degree of finality.

The responses to the three separate questions, referred to above, which dealt with the perception of compromise, indicated that 77,1 percent, 65,3 percent and 58,4 percent of the Black groups tested indicated that the balance of their original demand was still owing to them even after they had settled for a lessor amount. The responses of the White group to the two questions dealing with compromise in this study show that 12,6 percent and 5,4 percent respectively believe that the employer owed them the difference between their original demand and the compromised figure on which they had settled.

It is suggested that the Black man's traditional method of negotiation and compromise could still have an influence on his perception of compromise when negotiating in industry.

This finding confirms that a major difference exists between the perceptions of the Black and White groups of workers with regard to compromise, and it supports Hypothesis III which states:

"The Black worker's perception of 'compromise' differs from that of the White worker".

QUESTION 42

Size of the workers initial demand

The responses to this question, which appear in Table 47 (p 187), show that of the Black group 91,4 percent were of the opinion that the initial demand should be substantially more than they were prepared to accept as a satisfactory settlement. The corresponding figure for the White group was 64,1 percent. While both groups felt that substantially more should be asked, there was a significant difference in the responses, which indicates that this feeling among the Black workers was stronger than among their White counterparts.

The amounts by which the initial demand should exceed a satisfactory amount, together with the percentage of each group who selected the amounts, are given in Table 48 (p 187). There does not appear to be an obvious difference between the feelings of the two groups other than to note that the largest percentage of the Black workers (40,6%) felt that the initial demand should exceed the acceptable amount by 50 percent, while the largest percentage of the White workers (39,1%) felt that the figure should be 25 percent. This finding seems to suggest that Black workers will inflate their initial demands to a greater degree than the White worker will do.

The reasons given by those who felt that more than the acceptable amount should be demanded are given in Table 49 (p 188). Here it will be seen that "bargaining strategy" is given as the reason by 83,4 percent of the Black group and 96,6 percent of the White group. A further small percentage (1,5%) gave 'workers not paid well' as a reason. Among the reasons classified as 'Other' were the following:

- i) To close the wage gap, and
- ii) because it is hard to work.

The reasons given by those who felt that the amount demanded should not substantially exceed the amount expected appear in Table 50 (p 188).

The main reason given by both the Black (69,6%) and White (45,5%) groups was simply that the workers 'should ask what they need'. The second most important reason given was that the 'Demands should be realistic'. Among the reasons classified as 'Other' was the following:

- 1) Workers should not beat about the bush.

These findings clearly indicate that both groups will demand substantially more than the amount they consider to be a satisfactory settlement, because they consider this to be a good bargaining strategy. It confirms that both groups bargain within the theoretical framework discussed previously (see pp 120-129). However, a problem does arise when the views of the Black group are considered.

While 91,4 percent of the group indicated that they should ask substantially more than they expected, and gave the main reason for this as 'bargaining strategy', it must be remembered that, in response to another question, 59,3 percent of the group indicated that they believed management was in a position to grant all their demands (see p 175). The problem arises when an attempt is made to reconcile these apparently differing views.

It is possible that the Black worker may decide on certain demands which he considers to be fair, and which he believes could be granted by the management. To be granted these demands he must, as a bargaining strategy, asked for substantially more than expected, to the extent that he may acknowledge that the demands are unreasonable (see p 165). Yet he indicates that he believes that management is in a position to grant all his demands. It could be that he, when responding to question 30, had in mind the initial demands which he had decided upon as being fair, and not the inflated demands which he had submitted as a bargaining strategy. If this is the case it would explain the apparent contradiction conveyed by his responses to these questions.

QUESTION 43

Size of negotiating teams

The responses to this question are given in Table 51 (p 189). The views expressed necessitated the responses being divided into six main groupings. This was done because a statement was made in the question that the management team usually consisted of 3-5 people, and the question called for the size of the employees' team. Difficulty arose when the response, for example, was 'more than five'. Did the respondent mean that the team should be more than the management team, or did he mean that negotiation required more than five representatives, and that the management team could be more than five as well? It was therefore decided to include the 'more than five' and 'less than five' groups.

It is interesting to note that a large proportion of both groups (Whites 73,0% and Blacks 68,9%) felt that the two teams should be the same, in order that both sides should balance. It seems that most workers believe that the fairest deal will be negotiated if the teams are equal. This is true, provided cognisance is taken of the many other factors which influence the outcome of negotiations irrespective of the size of the negotiating teams e.g. economic and political factors.

This leads to the next group of responses which was "more than management's team". Here 10,0 percent of the Black respondents felt that the workers team should be more than the management team, while 0,9 percent of the White respondents did so. Some of the reasons given for this response were:

- i) So that they can overpower management,
- ii) workers are in majority,
- iii) the team represents hundreds of workers,
- iv) workers are deprived of their rights,
- v) management is clever and the workers' representatives should be more to convince them,

- vi) so that the workers' views will be in majority,
- vii) representation should be in proportion to the members, and
- viii) to be double that of the management team.

Further comment will be made on these reasons when the 'more than five' group are discussed.

In the next group 5,4 percent of the White and 0,9 percent of the Black respondents felt that the worker team should be less than the management team. The main reasons given for this view were:

- i) Because management owns the business, and
- ii) less chance of conflict.

The second largest proportion of the Black respondents (11,4%) indicated that the workers' team should be more than five, while only 1,8 percent of the White group felt so. The reasons given for this view are similar to those given that the team should be more than the management team, and included the following:

- i) Because all do not have the same views,
- ii) because workers are more,
- iii) because we differ in ideologies,
- iv) every department should be represented,
- v) we should overrule their decisions, and
- vi) to represent everybody.

If these reasons are considered together with those of the 'more than management' group, it would appear that a fair proportion of Black workers (21,4%) believe in 'noise and numbers' to get a better deal.

A few respondents in both groups indicated that the teams should be less than five. The main reasons given for this view were:

- i) To avoid too much dialogue,

- ii) one- provided he is the right man, and
- iii) the fewer the better - too many cooks spoil the gravy.

QUESTION 44

Who should talk first during negotiation

It will be seen from Table 52 (p 190) that 71,5 percent of the Black group and 55,2 percent of the White group felt that the workers' representatives should be given the opportunity to talk first. A larger percentage of the Whites (26,9%) than the Blacks (18,7%) felt that management should talk first, while 17,9 percent of the Whites and 9,8 percent of the Blacks felt that it did not matter. While the majority in both groups were in favour of the workers' representatives talking first, the significant difference between the responses of the two groups indicates that this feeling is stronger among the Blacks.

The reasons given for the responses to this question appear in Table 53 (p 191). The main reasons why worker representatives should talk first were given as:

- i) Because they are submitting the demands,
- ii) because they have the problems/grievances, and
- iii) other.

Included in the 'Other' category were:

- i) So that their opinion cannot be thwarted before they can lay their cards on the table,
- ii) only the workers know what they want,
- iii) because workers are the backbone of industry,
- iv) because he works,
- v) because they are the backbone of society, and
- vi) we are the ones who are suffering.

The reasons submitted for the view that the management representatives should talk first were:

- i) Because management has the final say,
- ii) management must answer the demands,
- iii) out of respect, and
- iv) other

Included in the 'Other' category were:

- i) Management owns the factory
- ii) the employer is leading both teams,
- iii) management must welcome the employees,
- iv) the employer knows more, and
- v) to ask what is demanded.

The reasons given why it did not matter who talks first were:

- i) Depends on who called the meeting,
- ii) could be on a rotational basis, and
- iii) other.

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Included in the 'Other' category were:

- i) negotiation is round table,
- ii) if demands have been submitted the employer talks first. If the demands have not been submitted the employees talk first.

NEGOTIATION SCENARIO

It is possible to conclude, having reviewed the findings of the study, by sketching a negotiation scenario which is likely to occur when management meets its Black workers.

- 1) Because the Black worker so strongly favours collective bargaining as a means of negotiating with management, it will

not be difficult getting him to the negotiation table. Indeed, he very strongly believes that he has a right to negotiate.

- 2) At the negotiating table he will expect to be given the opportunity to talk first in order to present his demands, and to elaborate on the reasons supporting the demands.
- 3) The demands submitted will be unrealistically high, for various reasons. Firstly, he believes, like all other trade unionists, that this tactic should be used as part of his bargaining strategy. Secondly, he strongly believes in 'retributive bargaining'. Because he feels that he has been underpaid in the past, he believes that present negotiation should take this into account, with the result that the demands become even more unreasonable. Finally, because he believes that management is in a position to grant all demands, these will tend to be more unreasonable.
- 4) Because the Black worker:
 - i) Traditionally insists on complete understanding by all involved in the negotiations, even if this necessitates the negotiation continuing over a lengthy period;
 - ii) believes in unanimity among the group members;
 - iii) believes that friendly dialogue should continue even when settlement proves difficult; and
 - iv) strongly believes that representatives should report back to the worker before finally agreeing on any issue;

the employer should prepare himself for protracted negotiation sessions if he hopes to conclude these successfully.

Failure to do so, and insistence that negotiations be concluded within a particular period, will lead to failure. The employer must accept that 'Time', in the bargaining context, is not as important to the Black as complete clarity, understanding and acceptance of the proposals by all members concerned.

5) Because the Black worker:

- i) believes that he has been underpaid in the past; and
- ii) very strongly distrusts management to treat the workers fairly;

the employer should prepare himself for serious, thorough sessions, even when he is prepared to make generous concessions, because the Black will be searching for possible 'catches' in the offer.

6) Because the Black worker:

- i) believes that he gets more concessions during periods of labour unrest, that is, during periods of strikes, or threats of strikes;
- ii) believes that strong unions get more concessions from management than weak unions do; and
- iii) believes that conflict is necessary to improve working conditions;

the employer should prepare himself for negotiating sessions during which there will be a show of strength, with threats of strikes. The Black worker is also more prepared to strike than the White. It therefore follows that the extent to

which an employer uses 'brinkmanship' as a daring strategy in negotiating with Black workers should be less than when negotiating with Whites.

7) Because the Black worker:

- i) believes that the trade union's main concern should be for the welfare of society as a whole;
- ii) believes that general economic conditions existing at the time should influence the workers with regard to the size of the demands submitted to management; and
- iii) believes that political views should influence attitudes during negotiations;

the employer should be prepared to receive some demands which are motivated by circumstances outside the immediate work environment.

8) Because the Black worker believes that 'compromise' is necessary for reaching agreement, it should not, in most instances, be too difficult getting him to do so. However, subsequent difficulties may arise because of his perception of the meaning of compromise, which is different from that of the White worker.

9) Because the Black worker believes that additional information on the operation of organisations would assist him in negotiating conditions of employment, employers should seriously consider giving him sufficient relevant information to permit him to negotiate in good faith, and intelligently. Otherwise many of the arguments submitted would appear illogical to management.

10) Two integral aspects affecting industrial relations are:

- i) The grievance procedure of the organisation, and
- ii) the disciplinary code.

Because the Black worker has very strong feelings about these, it is strongly recommended that management consult him with regard to the form these should take.

- 11) Because the Black worker fears victimization by management, it is unlikely that he will express himself freely in his management's presence. Therefore, allowing a neutral person to assist during the negotiations could be an exercise worth trying, even when matters of a domestic nature are discussed.

(Reference is being made here to the situation where negotiation takes place within a single organisation where the employees are known to the management. This situation is unlikely to occur when outsiders, whoever they may be, represents the workers).

This scenario strongly suggests that employers should bear these perceptions of the Black worker group in mind if success in the resolution of industrial conflict is to be achieved.

CHAPTER 13

GENERAL SUMMARY

CHAPTER 1

General aim of study

The concept 'conflict' was introduced and it was shown that wherever there is human interaction conflict will be found.

Industrial group conflict, which involves managements on the one hand, and the labour force on the other, is a special type of conflict and the study was aimed at obtaining a better understanding of this conflict and the various methods used in its control.

It was shown that in most "Western" countries, the negotiation known as 'collective bargaining' was used as an approach to the resolution of industrial group conflict, with varying degrees of success. However, not all believed in this approach. At the one end of a continuum of ideas was the employer who felt that he alone had the right to decide on conditions of employment, while at the other end was the radical trade union which only participated in the bargaining while it proceeded with its ultimate aim of overthrowing the capitalist system.

It was suggested that, because the Black worker constitutes approximately 70 percent of the economically active population in South Africa, he should participate in the endeavours to achieve industrial peace. However, because of a long exclusion of the Black worker from the official negotiation table (1924-1979) little is known of his perception of negotiation and the settlement of industrial labour disputes.

The study set out to determine the Black workers' perceptions of the resolution of industrial group conflict, and in so doing to contribute to a better understanding of the Black worker, and to a greater degree of industrial peace.

CHAPTER 2

Conflict

An in-dept look at the meaning of the term 'conflict' was taken, as this was considered necessary before 'collective bargaining' as a means of resolving labour-management conflict could be considered. In this respect the views of various authorities were given.

The manifestations and measurement of industrial conflict was then considered, and it was shown that it is extremely difficult, it not impossible, to accurately measure the extent of conflict in an organisation.

The traditional view of conflict was that it was bad for an establishment. However, the modern view was that conflict was inevitable and that it was not necessarily bad if managed properly. Too much, as well as too little conflict appeared equally bad for an organisation.

CHAPTER 3

History of negotiation

In this chapter the history of negotiation was considered, starting with examples taken from the Bible and proceeding through the middle ages to the time of the Industrial revolution.

Reference was made to the start of the trade union movement in England as early as the fifteenth century, and then, later in America during the closing years of the eighteenth century.

It was then shown how the concept of Trade Unionism and collective bargaining was carried from Europe to other parts of the world by settlers who went to colonise distant lands.

The march towards industrial democracy continues, and it was shown that in South Africa negotiation was presently in a state of metamorphosis, recent legislation having opened the door to Black workers to participate. As these workers were in the majority, it was suggested that they would be playing a major role in negotiating conditions of

employment with management in future.

CHAPTER 4

The Black man's traditional method of negotiation

In this chapter the Black man's traditional method of negotiation was considered, and the marriage negotiation taken as an example. It was shown that this contains the ingredients of a near-perfect negotiation situation.

Various aspects of the Black man's approach to negotiation were then considered. These included:

- i) his attitude to negotiation,
- ii) the affect on negotiation of formalities, customs and beliefs, and
- iii) his understanding of compromise.

It was felt that a better understanding of the Black man's traditional method of negotiation could make a contribution towards a better understanding of some of the findings which could arise out of the study.

CHAPTER 5

Black worker involvement in the trade union movement in South Africa

This chapter reviewed Black worker involvement in the trade union movement in South Africa. Reference was first made to the early Black-White negotiation which took place between the Settlers and the Xhosas in the Eastern Cape some two to three hundred years ago, and the possible effects this negotiation could have on attitudes today.

Black worker involvement in the trade union movement in South Africa from the turn of the century was then considered. It was shown that

CHAPTER 7

Theoretical foundation of the study

The theoretical foundation of the study was handled in this chapter. The first section dealt with a historical perspective of industrial relations theory. Reference was made to the classical economists, Marx and the Webbs, institutional economics, industrial psychologists, and industrial sociologists which lead to the modern perspective of industrial relations.

Three current approaches to industrial relations theory were examined, these being:

- i) The Unitary frame of reference,
- ii) the Pluralist frame of reference, and
- iii) the Radical frame of reference.

It became clear that a person's approach to industrial relations will largely be determined by the frame of reference adopted.

As none of the three theoretical approaches to industrial relations is derived from, or closely related to, the unitary frame of reference, it could in reality be discarded as a serious approach to current industrial relations.

It was questioned whether or not it was possible to have a radical (marxist) approach to industrial relations when the Marxist analysis examined society as a whole and saw the solution as being the overthrow of the present system and society being revolutionized. For this reason and for the purpose of this thesis, it will be discarded as an approach to industrial relations.

The most popular frame of reference, in western industrial countries at least, appears to be the pluralist perspective, which views conflict as a natural outcome of human interaction. As such it is found in all

labour-management interaction, and has been institutionalized through the process of collective bargaining. It is this process of collective bargaining that will be discussed in the remaining part of this thesis.

CHAPTER 8

Collective bargaining

An in-dept examination of collective bargaining was made in this chapter. To obtain a better understanding of its meaning the following aspects were considered:

- a) Definition
- b) Objectives
- c) Characteristics
- d) Compromise
- e) Bargaining power
- f) Strategy and tactics
- g) Difficulties associated with collective bargaining
- h) Legal requirements.

In reviewing what was written about the strengths and weaknesses, and the successes and failures of the collective bargaining process, the chapter was concluded with the following quotation from Davey (1972 p381):

"Collective bargaining is not championed as an ideal system by anyone close to the scene. At best it is an imperfect institutional process that works reasonably well in an imperfect society. It is the best we have. No one up to now has come forth with any alternative procedure that will work any better."

CHAPTER 9

Hypotheses

Having considered various aspects of collective bargaining as a means of resolving and controlling industrial group conflict, and having paid special attention to the Black man's approach to negotiation in the past, it was possible to submit the following hypotheses on the Black workers' perceptions of the resolution of industrial group conflict. Brief reasons for each of the hypotheses were given.

Hypothesis I

"The Black worker favours negotiation as a means of resolving industrial group conflict".

Hypothesis II

"The Black trade union's goals will be more society orientated than those of the White trade union".

Hypothesis III

"The Black worker's perception of 'compromise' differs from that of the White worker".

CHAPTER 10

The questionnaire

The problems of deciding on an instrument to measure attitudes was discussed in this chapter. Important considerations in the use of rating scales to obtain attitudinal data from survey respondents were examined with special attention being given to the problem of the transferability of rating scale techniques to a developing country's population.

The content of the questionnaire was then considered. In this respect

it was decided to solicit the views of a sample of employers of Black labour in this area to determine whether they had experienced any differences in negotiating with their Black workers as compared with their White workers. Ninety four organisations were canvassed of which thirty six responded. The responses were summarized and questions relating to the main categories were included in the questionnaire. The remaining questions were formulated from aspects of negotiation described in the theoretical study as well as from practical experience of negotiation. The questionnaire finally consisted of forty four questions, seven of which called for biographical information, twenty seven were structured, six were semi-structured and the remaining four open-ended.

Aspects of the study which were then described were the composition of the interviewing team, the pilot study, the location of the study and the subjects involved.

CHAPTER 11

Findings of the study

The findings of the study were given in this chapter. The responses of both the Black and White groups to each question were given together with a Chi square value indicating whether or not a significant difference between the responses of the two groups existed.

CHAPTER 12

Review of findings

The findings of the study were reviewed and commented upon in this chapter, and possible explanations for differences in the perceptions of the two groups sought. It was seen that there was a significant difference at the 0,01 level in the responses of all but two of the thirty three structured and semi-structured questions. Of these questions, one indicated a difference at 0,05 level. There was therefore only one question to which the responses of the two groups did not differ significantly, and it is interesting to note that this question did not relate to industrial negotiation as such but rather

sought to determine the Black group's view as to whether or not differences existed between their traditional form of negotiation, 'ukulobola' and negotiating with management. Actually, this is the only question which the White group, because of a lack of knowledge, were not expected to answer. However, a number of Whites in this area are aware of 'Ukulobola', and some in the sample expressed their views. If the responses by the White group to this question are discarded, it will be seen that the differences in the responses of the two groups to all the structured and semi-structured questions were significant.



CHAPTER 14

14. MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It is now possible, having examined the responses to the questionnaire, to draw certain major conclusions, and from these to submit certain recommendations. It is not the intention to draw divers conclusions relating to every aspect of the Black workers' perception of conflict resolution. Rather, an attempt will be made to limit the comments to matters related to the three hypotheses submitted, as well as to a group of attitudes which could have important practical implications for collective bargaining in South Africa.

However, to see the situation in its proper perspective, the following broad observation should be borne in mind. There appears to be a significant difference between the perceptions of the Black and White worker groups to every aspect of industrial group conflict resolution investigated. Negotiators from both the management as well as the worker sides should be aware of this if negotiation is to be facilitated.

It is not being submitted that the two worker groups have opposite views to the various aspects of negotiation, nor that the perceptions of one groups is superior or more correct than those of the other, or even those of management. In fact, in most of the issues there was agreement; the difference occurring in the degree or strength of the view expressed. Bearing this situation in mind will assist in placing the following comments and recommendations in their proper perspective.

14.1 HYPOTHESIS 1

"The Black worker favours negotiation as a means of resolving industrial group conflict".

Perhaps the major finding of the study was to see the degree to which

the Black workers favoured collective bargaining as an approach to the resolution of industrial group conflict. They were not only in favour of it, but expressed the view, very strongly, that they had the right to negotiate with management. This belief is evidenced by the degree to which they are becoming unionised, as well as their belief that strong trade unions got more concessions from management than weaker ones did.

They strongly believe in reaching unanimous decisions and will continue talking until this objective is reached. In this respect they not only believe that all representatives should speak, but also that the representatives should report back to members to allow them to express their views and ratify the representatives' mandates while the negotiations are in progress. They feel that there is no difference between this form of negotiation and that of their own traditional form, and the only differences that may exist are related to the circumstances surrounding the negotiation.

These observations would lead one to believe that South Africa's negotiation structure, as provided for by the Labour Relations Act, would be acceptable to them, and that it would lead to a reduction in industrial group conflict and a greater degree of labour peace. This, however, does not appear to be the case. It would seem that the present system of industrial democracy, which provides for negotiation through industrial councils, is to a degree rejected by the Black workers for various reasons. Firstly, they see it as being part of the system which, for so many years has discriminated against them. The fact that the discriminatory characteristic has more recently been eliminated does not seem to have changed their perceptions of it. Secondly, the system is perceived as being remote from direct and immediate worker participation at shop floor level, and as such is seen to be an undemocratic and bureaucratic process.

This view is not different from that of workers in other parts of the world. The International Research Group (Industrial Democracy in

Europe 1981 p326) found that workers at the bottom of the organisational pyramid are at a disadvantage as far as individual decision-making is concerned. They, however, had strong feelings favouring participation and had high aspirations to change the system to give them greater participation. While this research referred to the situation in twelve countries in Europe, the finding surely appears to apply to the Black workers in South Africa.

The position is perhaps best summarised by Clegg (1977 pp97-98) who said:

"So long as adequate arrangements are made for collective bargaining within the plant, collective bargaining may be regarded as a satisfactory form of industrial democracy. But where regional or industrial agreements fail to provide for plant bargaining, there are demands for alternative arrangements to allow workers to exercise some influence over those matters which concern them, and which cannot be adequately regulated in regional or industrial agreements".

The argument that workers are moving from "representative democracy" to "participative democracy" certainly seems to apply to the Black workers in South Africa and provision will have to be made to satisfy this need. This, however, will not be a simple undertaking. In its investigation of the level of participation in Europe, the International Research Group (European Industrial Relations 1981 pp1-9) found that in the twelve countries involved, there was neither a common industrial relations system nor an identical industrial democracy arrangement, and that the degree of participation was probably dependant upon the country-contextual variables which included political, economic, social and labour organisation matters. Therefore, a system tailored to meet the South African situation is necessary.

The Labour Relations Act, which theoretically may appear sound, does not in its present form seem to be the most successful instrument providing for the negotiation of conditions of employment in South Africa, and changes will have to be made if the "system" is to become more acceptable to a greater proportion of the work force, particularly the Black segment.

14-1.1. RECOMMENDATIONS

The main recommendation submitted is that the current Labour Relations Act be amended to provide for "in-plant" bargaining. If this is not possible, the Act should be scrapped and replaced by one which does provide for this type of negotiation.

Whichever method is used, the new system should be negotiated with the labour force, particularly the Black workers who constitute the majority segment of workers. If a new system is imposed upon the workforce, its chances of success will be diminished.

To promote negotiating "in good faith", and to enable the workers to negotiate more intelligently, a legal provision should be included in the new Act providing for the disclosure by management of information which is vital to the negotiations. The withholding of relevant information only leads to suspicion and mistrust.

14-2. HYPOTHESIS II

"The Black trade union's goals will be more society orientated than those of the White trade unions".

The Black work group indicated that, in bargaining with management, a trade union's main concern should be for the welfare of society as a whole and not only for its members. They also indicated that the general economic conditions in the country should influence the size of the demands submitted to management. With regard to politics they felt

that political views should influence attitudes during negotiations. These findings add a dimension to negotiation in South Africa which may not be found, to the same extent, in other countries.

4.2.1. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Managements should take cognisance of these findings, which should help in understanding certain arguments submitted during negotiations. This would decrease the extent to which proposals submitted would be summarily rejected as being unreasonable. The proposals may still be rejected but only after sympathetic consideration and acknowledgement of their importance to the workers.
2. The Government, as well as the management of organisations, simply have to accept that politics cannot be excluded from the work situation. The current Labour Relations Act expressly forbids trade unions and employers' organisations from affiliating with or granting financial or other assistance to any political party. The objective of this provision is a little obscure. Is it to discourage Trade Unions from interfering in politics, or political parties from influencing labour matters? Be it as it may, the Act seems to have had only limited success in this respect. In a recent discussion with Black post-graduate students, the reason given for Black workers' bringing politics into labour negotiations was because they did not have a political forum to express their views. If this is indeed the case, then one could expect political involvement in industrial negotiation to diminish as Blacks are given greater representation in political matters. Negotiating parties, together with the Government, should keep these findings in mind.

4.3. HYPOTHESIS III

"The Black worker's perception of "compromise" differs from that of the

White worker".

A large proportion of Black workers indicated that they believed that compromise was necessary to reach agreement when negotiating conditions of service. However, when perceptions of compromise were tested they were largely of the opinion that even when they compromised, management was indebted to them for the balance of their original demands, and they indicated that workers had the right to claim the difference between the compromised settlement and their original demand. This finding could have serious implications for management.

4-3-1. RECOMMENDATIONS

Managements should keep the Black workers' perception of compromise in mind during negotiations. It cannot be assumed that the granting of concessions will lead to a satisfied work force. In fact, it could be that the concessions, even if they are above average, could lead to a disgruntled staff if these are not what the workers demanded. It will probably take a long time for Black workers to change their perception of 'compromise' to become the same as that of the White workers. Therefore it is recommended that, after concessions have been made by both parties, and agreement reached, management should recognise the original demands submitted by undertaking to consider the balance of the demands at a later date, something they would in any event do. This approach would make it more akin to the traditional form of 'Ukulobola' negotiation.

14.4. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT

Certain findings of the study reveal miscellaneous attitudes which have important implications for management. These will be briefly commented on:

1. Mistrust

It will probably come as a great surprise to management to be

informed that, of their Black workers, 88,0 percent indicated that they distrust their management; 88,9 percent felt that the workers were not receiving a fair share of the profits, 90,3 percent believed that they had been underpaid in the past, and 79,2 percent believed in retributive bargaining, that is that present demands should take underpayment in the past into account. This is a terrible situation, and it is surprising that organisations can operate successfully with a staff having these views. It is therefore not surprising that so large a proportion would rather choose representatives from outside the organisation because of fear of victimisation. It is also a possible explanation for low productivity. Managements will have to very carefully consider ways of improving their image if human relationships are to be improved in organisations.

2. Information

The recommendation that it become a legal requirement for the disclosure of information for negotiation purposes has already been made. However, there are many other areas where additional information will assist in improving management/worker relationships. For example, 93,1 percent of the workers believed that a better understanding of how the organisation operated would help them in negotiating conditions of employment. It is therefore recommended that managements embark on education programs designed to give all workers a better understanding of all aspects of the organisation's operations. This will have the added psychological advantage of making the workers feel they are part of the organisation.

3. Participation

Strong views that the workers should participate in the formulation of disciplinary codes and grievance procedures support the submission that workers demand greater participation in deciding on issues which affect them.

4. Negotiation sessions

The following recommendations regarding the operation of negotiation sessions are submitted:

- a) Because a large proportion of the workers feel that their representatives should talk first, it is recommended that they, at the beginning of the negotiations, be given the floor to submit their demands verbally.
- b) Because they believe that all the representatives should talk, rather than to leave it to a single chief spokesman, a procedure should be devised affording every representative the opportunity to speak. The Chairman of the meeting could call upon each representative by name to deliver his views. It could happen that a representative would decline the invitation, but this would be his prerogative. This procedure would probably extend the negotiation sessions, but it should be remembered that a clear understanding of the outcome of the negotiation appears more important to the Black than the time taken to reach this understanding.

c) Conflict

Because so large a proportion of the workers believed that concessions from management came more easily during periods of labour unrest, and indeed felt that conflict was necessary

to improve working conditions, managements should prepare themselves for an increasingly aggressive approach to bargaining by the workers.

Finally, consideration of the various aspects and approaches to collective bargaining as a means of settling industrial group conflict has shown how difficult and complex the process is. The inability on the part of negotiating parties to reach agreement has often resulted in deadlock and subsequent costly strikes. The structure for collective bargaining in South Africa is similar to those found in Europe and America so the problems to be overcome will also, to a large extent, be similar. However, the composition of the labour force in South Africa is such that the problems are compounded. It would seem then, that the settlement of industrial group conflict in South Africa could be a far more difficult task than what it is in other western countries.

It is hoped that the findings of this study will contribute towards a better understanding of the Black workers' perception of negotiation and conflict resolution.

RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The findings of this study refer to the perceptions of a particular group of Black workers. While these perceptions of conflict resolution could be representative of those of other Black groups, no claim to this effect is made. Confirmation that these are indeed the perceptions of all Black workers in South Africa could only be made by similar research among other Black groups. Because this aspect of industrial relations in South Africa is of cardinal importance further research is recommended.

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Questionnaire on: "A Black workgroup's perception of the resolution of industrial group conflict."

EXPLANATORY NOTE:

Whenever the views of management and the workers differ with regard to conditions of service, these two groups may be said to be in a state of conflict.

The differences may be very slight, in which case they are easily resolved. However, they could be perceived as being serious, in which case it may be difficult to resolve them.

This questionnaire deals with conflict in all its forms, from the very small differences which can be settled in a matter of minutes, to the large differences which could lead to serious measures being taken to solve the problem, for example strikes and lock-outs.

Please bear these thoughts in mind when completing this questionnaire.

Please place a ✓ in the appropriate square.

1. Race

Black	
White	

2. Home language

Xhosa	
English	
Afrikaans	
Other: State	

3. Age

Up to 20 years	
21 to 30 years	
31 to 40 years	
41 to 50 years	
51 to 60 years	
61 years and over	

4. Education

Nil to Sub B	
Std 1 to Std 5	
Std 6 to Std 8	
Std 9 to Std 10	
Std 10 plus	

5. Domicile:

Total length of time
lived in an urban (town)
area

0 - 5 years	
6 - 10 years	
11 - 15 years	
16 - 20 years	
21 years and over	

6. What is the position
you hold in your organisation?

worker	
supervisor of workers	

7. Are you a member of a Trade Union?

Yes	
No	
If answer is YES, which Union?	

8. Conflict between management and the workers is usually resolved through the process of collective bargaining. This involves representatives of the workers negotiating with representatives of the management. How strongly do you believe in this form of negotiation?

a	b	c	d	e
I very strongly do not believe in collective bargaining	I do not believe in collective bargaining	Neutral feeling	I believe in collective bargaining	I very strongly believe in collective bargaining

9. How strong is your trust in your management to treat the workers fairly?

a	b	c	d	e
I strongly distrust management	I distrust management	Neutral feeling	I trust management	I strongly trust management

10. How strongly do you feel that South African workers are not receiving a fair share of the profits of organisations?

a	b	c	d	e
I strongly feel that workers are not receiving a fair share of the profits	I feel that workers are not receiving a fair share of the profits	Neutral feeling	I feel that workers are receiving a fair share of the profits	I strongly feel that workers are receiving a fair share of the profits

11. To what extent should political views influence attitudes during negotiations with management?

a	b	c	d	e
Political views should certainly not influence attitudes	Political views should not influence attitudes	Neutral feeling	Political views should influence attitudes	Political views should certainly influence attitudes

12. Who do you feel should represent the workers in negotiating with management?

a	b	c	d	e
Only trade union officials from outside the organisation	Trade union officials and others outside the organisation e.g. labour lawyers	Non trade union employees inside the organisation	Trade union officials from outside the organisation and shop stewards inside	Only shop stewards inside the organisation

13. Do you feel that worker representatives should be required to report back to the workers before making final decisions when negotiating with management?

a	b	c	d	e
Representatives never need to report back i.e. they should have full authority to make final decisions	Representatives need not report back	Neutral feeling	Representatives should report back	Representatives should always report back i.e. they should have no authority to make final decisions

14. In your opinion, is conflict between management and the workers necessary to improve the working conditions of the workers?

a	b	c	d	e
Conflict is certainly not necessary to improve the working conditions of employees	Conflict is not necessary to improve the working conditions of employees	Neutral feeling	Conflict is sometimes necessary to improve working conditions of employees	Conflict is always necessary to improve the working conditions of employees

15. In reaching group decisions do you insist on unanimity (total agreement) between the members of the group?

a	b	c	d	e
I never insist on unanimity	I do not insist on unanimity	Neutral feeling	I insist on unanimity	I always insist on unanimity

16. In a bargaining situation each side must concede (give in) to reach agreement. This is called 'compromise'. Do you believe in compromise as a means of reaching agreement with management when negotiating conditions of service?

a	b	c	d	e
Compromise is never a requirement for reaching agreement	Compromise is usually not a requirement for reaching agreement	Neutral feeling	Compromise is a requirement for reaching agreement	Compromise is always a requirement for reaching agreement

17. "Workers are sometimes unrealistic (unreasonable) in their demands from management". Do you agree with this statement?

a	b	c	d	e
I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree

18. When agreement is difficult to reach during negotiations, what approach do you, as a worker, recommend?

a	b	c	d	e
Continuation of friendly dialogue (talk) with no thought of a strike	Less friendly dialogue	Neutral feeling	Aggressive dialogue	Aggressive dialogue and threats of a strike

19. How good is your understanding of how a business operates?

a	b	c	d	e
Very bad	Bad	Average	Good	Very good

20. Should management keep the workers informed with regard to the financial state of the organisation?

a	b	c	d	e
Workers should never be informed	Workers should not be informed	Neutral feeling	Workers should be informed	Workers should always be informed

21. If in a negotiating situation with management the workers are obliged to accept a compromise, would you feel that management is indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demand?

a	b	c	d	e
Management would never be indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demands	Management would not be indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demands	Neutral feeling	Management would be indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demands	Management would always be indebted to the workers for the balance of their original demands

22. "General economic conditions in the country should influence workers with regard to the size of the demands they submit to management". Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

a	b	c	d	e
I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree

23. "A better understanding of how your organisation operates would help you in negotiating conditions of employment". Do you agree or disagree with this statement.

a	b	c	d	e
I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree

24. "Workers have a right to negotiate conditions of employment with their management". Do you agree or disagree with this statement?

a	b	c	d	e
I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree

25. "Strong trade unions get more concessions from management than weak trade unions do". Do you agree or disagree?

a	b	c	d	e
I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree

26. Do you believe that you have been underpaid in the past?

a	b	c	d	e
I strongly believe that I have not been underpaid	I believe that I have not been underpaid	Neutral feeling	I believe that I have been underpaid	I strongly believe that I have been underpaid

27. If you believe that you have been underpaid in the past, should present demands to management take this fact into account?

a	b	c	d	e
Present demands should certainly not take into account underpayment in the past	Present demands should not take into account underpayment in the past	Neutral feeling	Present demands should take into account underpayment in the past	Present demands should certainly take into account underpayment in the past

28. "Workers get concessions from management more easily during periods of labour unrest, that is, during periods of strikes or threats of strikes". Do you agree?

a	b	c	d	e
I strongly disagree	I disagree	Neutral feeling	I agree	I strongly agree

29. In bargaining with management a trade union's main concern should be for the welfare of its members only. Do you agree?

a	b	c	d	e
I very strongly agree	I agree	Neutral feeling	I disagree	I very strongly disagree

30. Do you believe that your management is in a position to grant all demands made by the workers?

a	b	c	d	e
Management certainly could not grant all demands made by the workers	Management could not grant all the demands made by the workers	Neutral feeling	Management could grant all demands made by the workers	Management certainly could grant all the demands made by the workers

31. If the employment situation in the country was generally bad (that is, a large number of workers did not have jobs) would you, who have a job, continue to make demands to better your own working conditions?

a	b	c	d	e
I certainly would not make demands to improve my own position	I would not make demands to improve my position	Neutral feeling	I would make demands to improve my position	I would certainly make demands to improve my position

32. In bargaining with management a trade union's main concern should be for the welfare of society as a whole. Do you agree?

a	b	c	d	e
I very strongly agree	I agree	Neutral feeling	I disagree	I very strongly disagree

33. Should the disciplinary code of your organisation be negotiable; in other words, should the workers and management negotiate what disciplinary action should be taken on specific offences rather than management deciding on its own?

a	b	c	d	e
The disciplinary code should most certainly be negotiated	The disciplinary code should be negotiated	Neutral feeling	The disciplinary code should not be negotiated	The disciplinary code should most certainly not be negotiated

34. Should the grievance procedure of your organisation be negotiable; in other words, should the workers have a say in determining what the procedure should be?

a	b	c	d	e
The workers should certainly have a say in determining what the procedure should be	The workers should have a say in determining what the procedure should be	Neutral feeling	The workers should not have a say in determining what the procedure should be	The workers should most certainly not have a say in determining what the procedure should be

35. If you are a member of a trade union what is the main reason why you joined the union?

36. If you are a member of a trade union what is the main thing you expect your union to do for you?

37. If you are a member of a trade union what is the main thing you consider the union is not doing for you?

38. If you are not a member of a trade union what is the main reason why you have not joined a union?



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39. Should all the members of a team of worker representatives have a say during negotiations or should the talking be left to a single chief spokesman? Give main reason for your opinion.

40. Within the Xhosa culture, as part of the 'Ukulobola' custom in marriage, the bride price, 'Ikhazi', is negotiated. Worker representatives also negotiate their conditions of employment and pay with management. Are there any differences between these two types of negotiation? Explain.

41. If worker representatives in a wage negotiation demanded 50% increase, but could get management only to agree to a 30% increase - on which they settled. What do the rules of compromise say? Is the matter finalised or have workers the right to claim any of the difference between 30% and 50% in future? Explain.

42. In wage negotiations should worker representatives initially ask for substantially more money than what they actually are prepared to accept as a satisfactory settlement? If so, how much more? 50%, 25%, 10%? Why?

43. Management's negotiation team in most instances consists of 3-5 people. What are your views regarding the number of people who should constitute the employee team? Why?

44. Who should talk first during negotiation. The employer or employee representatives? Why?



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Analysis of sample

	Blacks		Whites	
	n	%	n	%
<u>Home language</u>				
Xhosa	423	100,0	0	0,0
English	0	0,0	157	78,1
Afrikaans	0	0,0	44	21,9
Totals	423	100,0	201	100,0
<u>Age</u>				
Up to 20 years	17	4,0	9	4,5
21 to 30 years	129	30,5	39	19,4
31 to 40 years	116	27,4	59	29,4
41 to 50 years	98	23,2	47	23,4
51 to 60 years	52	12,3	32	15,9
61 years and over	11	2,6	15	7,4
Totals	423	100,0	201	100,0
<u>Education</u>				
Nil to Sub B	4	0,9	0	0,0
Std 1 to Std 5	83	19,6	1	0,5
Std 6 to Std 8	166	39,2	47	23,4
Std 9 to Std 10	129	30,5	70	34,8
Std 10 plus	41	9,7	83	41,3
Totals	423	100,0	201	100,0
<u>Domicile</u>				
Total length of time lived in urban (town) area				
0 - 5 years	22	5,2	8	4,0
6 - 10 years	64	15,2	6	3,0
11 - 15 years	78	18,5	15	7,5
16 - 20 years	108	25,6	25	12,4
21 years and over	150	35,5	147	73,1
Totals	422	100,0	201	100,0
<u>Position held at work</u>				
Worker	365	86,1	102	50,7
Supervisor of workers	59	13,9	99	49,3
Totals	424	100,0	201	100,0
<u>Membership of trade union</u>				
Member of trade union	173	40,8	24	11,9
Not member of trade union	251	59,2	177	88,1
Totals	424	100,0	201	100,0

BLACKS

APPENDIX 3

Responses of the Black group to the structured questions 8-34

Question	Number of responses					Total
	A	B	C	D	E	
8	8	10	29	172	205	423
9	183	190	14	25	12	424
10	148	228	11	23	13	423
11	51	61	29	217	64	422
12	46	146	33	154	41	420
13	10	7	9	188	175	389
14	32	59	7	279	42	419
15	10	24	12	166	209	421
16	13	82	9	248	70	422
17	53	63	30	244	34	424
18	126	177	15	61	45	424
19	21	25	110	218	48	422
20	9	15	7	229	164	424
21	12	64	21	245	81	423
22	14	32	22	288	67	423
23	5	13	11	287	106	422
24	4	10	5	221	183	423
25	17	29	33	222	120	421
26	7	19	15	217	164	422
27	28	35	24	236	96	419
28	22	51	24	264	57	418
29	28	52	11	177	118	386
30	29	127	16	199	52	423
31	29	71	40	200	82	422
32	138	191	7	38	15	389
33	117	280	5	12	9	423
34	101	291	9	19	3	423

Responses of the White group to the structured questions 8-34

Question	Number of responses					Total
	A	B	C	D	E	
8	18	13	44	85	39	199
9	1	13	38	108	39	199
10	14	55	54	65	11	199
11	106	67	24	2	0	199
12	5	12	67	33	81	198
13	3	14	9	104	71	201
14	45	53	19	75	9	201
15	11	61	39	68	21	200
16	3	17	13	127	40	200
17	3	6	23	116	51	199
18	135	32	21	7	2	197
19	2	8	87	73	31	201
20	13	33	32	93	30	201
21	45	92	37	23	2	199
22	7	21	21	109	41	199
23	4	3	20	119	54	200
24	3	21	22	108	44	198
25	7	37	58	67	29	198
26	11	18	44	92	28	193
27	19	60	47	56	13	195
28	12	66	49	55	17	199
29	30	73	22	55	19	199
30	76	92	22	8	1	199
31	31	68	40	50	10	199
32	21	83	40	41	13	198
33	19	79	24	54	23	199
34	21	77	38	50	12	198

Analysis of Trade Union Membership

Name of Union	No of Members	%
<u>Black workers</u>		
South African Allied Workers' Union	86	57,0
Food and Canning Workers' Union	17	11,3
Textile Workers' Industrial Union	16	10,6
Motor Industry Combined Workers' Union	1	0,7
National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union	7	4,6
Chemical Workers' Industrial Union	3	1,9
Metal and Allied Workers' Union	12	7,9
Media Workers' Association of South Africa	2	1,3
Sweet Workers' Union	1	0,7
National Union of Mineworkers	1	0,7
National Union of Leather Workers	1	0,7
South African Transport and Allied Workers' Union	4	2,6
TOTALS	<u>151</u>	<u>100,0</u>
<u>White workers</u>		
Spoorbond	3	14,3
Amalgamated Engineering Union	2	9,5
South African Association of Municipal Employees	1	4,8
Motor Industry Employees' Union of South Africa	1	4,7
Motor and Allied Workers' Union	1	4,8
Artisan Staff Association	1	4,7
Salaried Staff Association	1	4,8
South African Society of Bank Officials	1	4,7
S A Hairdressers Employees' Industrial Union	1	4,8
Motor Industry Staff Association	1	4,7
S.A.T.A. } * <u>Note:</u>	1	4,8
S.A.T.C. } The Department of Manpower	1	4,7
S.A.P.A. } in East London could not tell	1	4,8
M.I.F. } * what these letters stand for,	1	4,8
B.S.O.A. } and were unaware of these unions.	3	14,3
SELSTAFF }	1	4,8
TOTALS	<u>21</u>	<u>100,0</u>

APPENDIX 6

The Managing Director
Acrow Engineers Ltd
P O Box 14147
SIDWELL
6061

The Managing Director
Bagshaw Footwear (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 3019
NORTH END
6056

The Managing Director
Corobrick
P O Box 20
SWARTKOPS
6210

The Managing Director
Daykor Flooring (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 3571
NORTH END
6065

The Managing Director
Everite Ltd
P O Box 9007
ESTADEAL
6012

The Managing Director
Ford Motor Co of SA (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 788
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

The Managing Director
General Motors SA (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 1137
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

The Managing Director
Haggie Rand Ltd
P O Box 4022
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

The Managing Director
Igersoll-Rand Co (SA) (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 1028
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

The Managing Director
Jack and Jill Footwear (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 4052
KORSTEN
6014

The Managing Director
Kalley Flooring Co (PE)(Pty) Ltd
P O Box 2330
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

The Managing Director
Lipton (SA) (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 4042
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

The Managing Director
MAN Trucks and Buses
P O Box 96
SWARTKOPS
6210

The Managing Director
Norton Abrasives (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 2018
NORTH END
6056

The Managing Director
Oddy's Bodies
P O Box 677
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

The Managing Director
Papla Industries (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 2167
NORTH END
6056

The Managing Director
QHS Electrical Division
P O Box 2293
NORTH END
6056

The Managing Director
Savage & Longmore (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 7172
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

The Managing Director
Unico Manufacturing Co (PE) (Pty)Ltd
P O Box 3173
NORTH END
6056

The Managing Director
Wilrose Timber (Cape) (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 12118
CENTRAHIL
6006

The Managing Director
Afcan Mufflers Uitenhage
P O Box 670
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Dorbyl Automotive Products
P O Box 457
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Electricity Supply Commission
P O Box 212
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co (SA)(Pty) Ltd
P O Box 126
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Reinforcing Ability Co (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 2014
NORTH END
6056

The Managing Director
Timber Engineering
P O Box 2205
NORTH END
6056

The Managing Director
Van Leer SA (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 728
PORT ELIZABETH
6000

The Managing Director
Xemco (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 4016
KORSTEN
6014

The Managing Director
Bosal Africa (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 52
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Cape of Good Hope Wool Combers (Pty)
P O Box 85
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Fiume Engineering (Pty) LTD
P O Box 209
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
H & B Toolmaking & Engineering
P O Box 21
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Joycor Enterprises (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 5
UITENHAGE
6230

The Town Clerk
Municipality
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
SA Bata Tannery Ltd
P O Box 128
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
United Dairies Co-op Ltd
265 Caledon Street
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Window Press (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 2902
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Border Footwear (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 188
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
De Lange's Transport
P O Box 265
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Farrer's Auctions (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 168
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Kiriba Batteries (Pty) Ltd
4 New Street
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
P E Tramways Ltd
Mitchell Street
UITENHAGE 6230

The Managing Director
Thermotron
P O Box 615
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Volkswagen of SA (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 80
UITENHAGE
6230

The Managing Director
Amatola Bandag Tyre
P O Box 46
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Ciskei Milling Co (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 497
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Erasmus Bottling Co (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 137
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Gordon Phillips (Earthworks)(Pty)Ltd
P O Box 215
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Heaton Construction (Pty) Ltd
45 Buffalo Road
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
King Tanning Co (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 517
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Town Clerk
Municipality
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Paddy's Engineering
P O Box 179
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery
P O Box 258
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Afrox Ltd
P O Box 701
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Car Distributors Assembly (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 671
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
East London Model Dairy Co-op Co Ltd
P O box 115
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Irman's Carpet & Upholstery Cleaning
P O Box 1170
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
L E Construction (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 1059
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
National Motor Spares Scarpyard
114 Buffalo Road
KING WILLIAMS TOWN 5600

The Managing Director
Radue Weir Holdings Ltd
P O Box 512
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Triplejay Equipment (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 8
KING WILLIAMS TOWN
5600

The Managing Director
Berkshire International (SA) Ltd
P O Box 788
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Deepfreezing & Preserving (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 607
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Federated Timbers
P O Box 260
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Grinaker Construction (Cape)(Pty)Ltd
P O Box 1701
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Irvin & Johnson Ltd
P O Box 50
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Langeberg Co-op Ltd
P O Box 507
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Nampak Corrugated Containers (Border)
P O Box 487
EAST LONDON 5200

The Managing Director
OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd
P O Box 713
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Quarryman (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 3077
CAMBRIDGE
5206

The Managing Director
Shell SA. (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 694
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Union Liquid Air Co (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 681
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Hogetts Timbers (EL)(Pty)Ltd
P O Box 392
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Kohler Corrugated
P O Box 355
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Liquidair
P O Box 681
EAST LONDON
5200

The Town Clerk
Municipality
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Pharmador (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 422
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Raylite Batteries
Settlersway
EAST LONDON
5201

The Managing Director
Tek Industrials (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 7094
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Vleissentraal (Co-op) Ltd
P O Box 176
EAST LONDON
5200

The Managing Director
Wilson Rowntree (Pty) Ltd
P O Box 140
EAST LONDON
5200



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APPENDIX 7

The General Secretary
Trade Union Council of SA
90 Anderson St
JOHANNESBURG
2000

The General Secretary
S A Confederation of Labour
430 Church Street West
PRETORIA
0002

The General Secretary
Federation of SA Trade Unions
125 Gale Street
DURBAN
4001

The General Secretary
Council of Unions of SA
P O Box 10928
JOHANNESBURG
2000

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Baking & Confectionery Industry
SA Wool Combing Building
PORT ELIZABETH
6001

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Building Industry
169 Haupt St
SIDWELL
6001

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Clothing Industry
SA Wool Combing Building
PORT ELIZABETH
6001

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Furniture Manufacturing Industry
SA Wool Combing Building
PORT ELIZABETH
6001

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Hairdressing Trade
SA Wool Combing Building
PORT ELIZABETH
6001

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Road Passenger Transport
SA Wool Combing Building
PORT ELIZABETH
6001

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Building Industry
EL Mutual Building
Terminus Street
EAST LONDON 5201

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Electrical Industry
P O Box 7379
EAST LONDON
5200

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Meat Trade
P O BOX 610
EAST LONDON
5200

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Motor Industry
EL Mutual Building
Terminus Street
EAST LONDON 5201

The Secretary
Industrial Council
Sweet Manufacturing Industry
7 Gladstone Street
EAST LONDON
5201



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