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The self in prejudice

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The self as a psychological construct, and the self in relation to the other has been discussed in psychological and sociological literature for decades, but not much attention has been given to the psychological development of the self in relation to the social construction of prejudice. The primary aim of this article is to explore the self in prejudice and thus the psychological processes involved in the development of self within the social context. Consequently, the aim is to explore the self in the construction and expression of prejudice from both a social and psychological approach, and to explain selfhood influences at the individual, group and community levels. I use the conceptual framework of Kohut's self psychology as a lens to present the development of the self and thus the idea of the development of the self in relation to the other. In such exploration of self in prejudice, I present some of my ideas which include prejudice as an outcome of self-definition in the context of the other, as well as linking self in prejudice and group dynamics to attachment theory and the notion of "selfgroup' in terms of overidentification with the in-group. While the social and the psychological in terms of the development of the self cannot be separated, I have therefore attempted to merge at some point the two bodies of thought in relation to the self in prejudice.

Keywords: prejudice, self, identity, self psychology, social identity theory, attachment theory

Introduction

Within classical psychoanalysis or the drive-orientated theory as first proposed by Freud and later early object relations theorists such as Klein and Fairbairn, the notion of projection was used to explain prejudice. Projection was first put forward by Klein (1935) and Fairbairn (1943, 1952) and later developed by Bion (1967) to be the externalisation of the unwanted within, or the repressed bad object, onto the external other. Projection was seen as the psychological act of the self in getting rid of that which is psychologically intolerable and thus unacceptable within. It was viewed as a method of psychically managing the unwanted aspects of the self by expulsion onto another. Projection as a concept used to explore prejudice is, in some areas, currently still used in psychoanalytic literature (Akhtar, 2001; Friedman, 2007; Hollander, 2009, 2010). For example, Friedman, (2007, p. 32) highlights this link between projection and prejudice when he commented that "all malignant prejudice is due to toxic introjects projected onto scapegoats, who are then feared or hated, or both. The repressed bad object in the person who becomes a bigot 'returns' and is projected onto the external screen of those who have been dehumanized by negative myths".

I view the use of projection to understand prejudice to be limited. To this end, there have been profound paradigmatic shifts in psychoanalysis which demand a fuller understanding of prejudice. One such major shift is the move from a purely intrapsychic approach to a relational approach in the development of self, and thus to a self that is formed in and through the real and imagined interactions of others. In this context, the intrapsychic act of projection becomes conceptually less a focus while the self-other matrix in relation to the development of the self takes central stage in the unfolding understanding of prejudice. Within this major paradigmatic shift from the classical psychoanalytic intrapsychic development of the self to the relational tilt in psychoanalysis (Aron,

1996; Mitchell, 1988) with its emphasis on the relational development of the self, I suggest that prejudice emerges from the development of the self-in-relation to the other. I therefore fundamentally move away from the classical object relations theories of Klein and Fairbairn and their work on projection to the ideas of eminent psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut's (1966, 1971, 1977, 1984; Kohut & Wolf, 1978) and his followers. From within his views of the development of self in relation to the other, as espoused by his well-known theory of the self or what is now termed *self psychology*, I suggest that prejudice is an outcome of self-development and the need to differentiate and separate from and thus prejudice becomes an act of self-definition.

Conversely, the current social-cultural understanding of prejudice as opposed to the psychoanalytic approach is that prejudice develops through social interaction with others, and thus it is an interpersonal, interactional social event where an out-group and an in-group are identified, and where the out-group is evaluated negatively (Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005; Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2003; Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Hodson, Dovidio, Gaertner, 2002; Saucier, Miller & Doucet, 2005; Tajfel, 1969, 1970, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). It is suggested that the social world and, by implication, the world of the other plays a major role in identity and thus, as indicated above, self-definition in terms of the development of an "us and them" and thus the development of prejudice. If prejudice is an act of self-definition, the implication is that the psychological and the social understanding of prejudice cannot be easily separated from each other because the self (as a psychological unit) cannot be easily separated from the social. This idea of the role of the self and self-definition within the psycho-social world in terms of the construction of prejudice needs to be further investigated.

The aim of this article

The self as a psychological construct, and the self in relation to the other has been discussed in psychological and sociological literature for decades, but not much attention has been given to the psychological development of the self in relation to the social construction of prejudice. The primary aim of this article is to explore the self in prejudice and thus the psychological processes involved in the development of self within the social context. I use the conceptual framework of Kohut's Self psychology as a lens to present the development of the self and thus the idea of self in relation to the other. In such an exploration of self in prejudice, I present some of my ideas, which include prejudice as an outcome of self-definition in the context of the other, as well as linking self in prejudice and group dynamics to attachment theory and the notion of "selfgroup" in terms of over-identification with the in-group.

Social theories of prejudice

The scientific study of prejudice has been a subject matter within social psychology and thus pursued uninterruptedly since the introduction of the first investigations into what we now understand as intergroup behaviour and attitudes. The work of early writers such as Bogardus (1925), Thurstone (1928), Adorno, et al., (1950), Allport (1954, 1962) and Bird (1957) began the first concentrated social-cultural studies into prejudice. Today, arguably, it is theorist and social scientist, Thomas F. Pettigrew who has become distinctly synonymous with the on-going scientific study of prejudice. His (selected) work (1975, 1979, 1991, 1998, 2011), together with colleagues, (1995, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011) on prejudice, discrimination, intergroup dynamics and racism has spanned several decades. Pettigrew has indicated that this (now) massive body of scientific work on prejudice is so extensive and comprehensive that it is now "unlikely to encounter completely new ideas" (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014, p. 670). During these past decades, several theories have emerged that attempt to make sense of the intricacies and complexities of prejudice. From within the social psychology perspective, there are as many theories as there are definitions of prejudice. Pettigrew himself (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014) refers to The *Oxford English Dictionary* for a concise definition of prejudice, which he obviously supports. This definition is: prejudice can be understood as "dislike, hostility, or unjust behaviour deriving from preconceived and unfounded opinions." This definition, which Pettigrew highlights, also appropriately links prejudice to both hostile intergroup attitude and discriminatory behaviour. However, Pettigrew and others before him have made the distinction between discrimination and prejudice and show that the link between prejudicial attitude and discrimination is not always obligatory and to be assumed but it needs to be scientifically demonstrated (Allport, 1954, 1962; Brewer, 1999; Gaertner et al., 1997; Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014). In addition, it is also understood that hostility is not *always* linked to discrimination (Nier & Gaertner, 2012a, 2012b): "we hold that discrimination does not require hostility" (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014, p. 670). To this end, it was concluded that the many forms of discrimination that may

develop, develop "not because outgroups are hated, but because positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and trust are reserved for the ingroup and withheld from outgroups" (Brewer, 1999, 438). The implication for this in-group favouritism is, according to Pettigrew and colleague, "the *prime* mechanism of discrimination" and they have gone a long way to demonstrate this phenomenon in their most recent work (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014, p. 760). When hostility or hostile prejudice is often linked to discrimination, however, it may do so without regard for in-group favourability (Wagner, Christ, & Pettigrew, 2008).

In the earlier years, socialisation theories developed in terms of prejudice, such as social identity theory, which can be defined as a person's sense of who they are based on their membership to the group (Tajfel, 1969, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In terms of social identity theory, identity is thus understood to be formed in and defined by the other, and thus identity-formation is always in the social context of the other. Identity or the "I-ness" of an individual is thus an out-growth of the interplay between the individual within in-group and thus by implication, the members of the out-group. The inference is that prejudice is about the negative relationship between the in-group and the out-group. This is also important in terms of the psychology of identity and the sense of self within the group. As this article is about self in prejudice, identity becomes linked to self and self becomes a source of personhood in terms of group dynamics.

Other more recent sociological studies on the nature of prejudice have been offered, such as the emphasis on the negative evaluation toward a particular out-group (Butz1 & Plant, 2009; Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005; Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2003; Hodson, Dovidio, Gaertner, 2002; Saucier, Miller, Doucet, 2005). The implication is that the in-group is comprised of sameness and the out-group, of difference. It seems that people develop a sense of belonging in the in-group and identify with this group (Dovidio, et al., 2005; Heilman, & Haynes, 2008; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Outsiders are experienced as not the "same as" (different) and this perhaps explains Allport's (1962) earlier observation of the preference for one's own social group. From within the perspective of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) the self-concept is therefore established from membership to the relevant social in-group. In this regard, social identity theory attempts to predict intergroup preferences and behaviours on the basis of perceived group status differences.

Self-categorisation theory (Reynolds et al., 2001), developed from the observations and core tenets of social identity theory, offers a comprehensive account of self in relation to the group and group processes. As this article focuses on the self in prejudice, how one defines oneself in relation to what is the same (in-group) and not the same (out-group) becomes important. Further socially-based distinctions of prejudice have been made; the so-called "old-fashioned" form characterised by obvious resentment and denunciation towards other groups and individuals, and the so-called "modern" form which is more subtle, indirect and clandestine (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Brown, 1995; Duckitt, 1994; Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov,

& Duarte, 2003; Fiske, 2000; Saucier, Miller, Doucet, 2005). More recently, the notion of prejudice has also been refined as either "malignant" or "benign" (Friedman, 2007; Parens, 2007a, 2007b, 2012). From within this newer perspective, prejudice is studied as a dimension of cognitive behaviour that is fundamentally a judgment formed without evidence for such a judgement (Greenwald & Pettigrew, 2014; Hodson, Dovidio, Gaertner, 2002; Saucier, Miller, Doucet, 2005; Parens, 2007a, 2007b, 2012; Parens, et al., 2007). Prejudice is therefore concluded to be a premature conclusion without adequate knowledge and thus is most likely to be an inaccurate assumption of the other or out-group. From this perspective, the social process of prejudice against the out-group may be understood as a defensive mechanism against the loss of group identity. Hatred preserves both the in-group and out-group boundaries. Stephan and Stephan (1985) have shown that the role of threat in intergroup contact and the corresponding arousal of anxiety is important in understanding prejudice and fear of the other. It has been noted that a flurry of research was inspired by their analysis and that the idea of repeated intergroup contact could reduce intergroup threat and anxiety (Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, Lickel, & Kowai-Bell, 2001; Paolini et al., 2004; Pettigrew, 1998; Stephan, Stephan, & Gudykunst, 1999; Stephan et al., 2002; Voci & Hewstone, 2003). However, this implies that prejudice could be reduced by information about the other and thus it was thought that contact with the other (out-group) could (simply) show how similar the other really is, and thus create a "what is there to be afraid of? – they are like us, you know" attitude. However, differences in the out-group were also diminished as a result of this approach (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008).

Self psychology and the development of the self: Self-definition as an act of prejudice

Self psychology, as developed originally by Kohut (1959, 1966, 1971, 1977, 1984; Kohut & Wolf, 1978) and his followers, offers an integrated view of normal development as well as the roots of psychopathology and the treatment or analytic process to assist in overcoming difficulties in living. His work on the self is both refreshing and innovative and falls within what is known as the relational tilt within psychoanalysis, the outflow of the emergence of paradigm shifts within psychoanalysis, as indicated earlier. One such paradigm shift (around about the 1950s) was essentially the discarding of the traditional view that there can be an objective reality and the observer can observe without being influenced by or influencing what is observed. In response to this paradigm shift, Kohut, first in 1959, updated psychoanalytic epistemology by focusing on its "method of observation" (Fosshage, 2009). Kohut (1984) recognised "the relativity of our perceptions of reality," and "the framework of ordering concepts that shape our observations and explanations" (p. 400) and that "the field that is observed, of necessity, includes the observer" (Kohut, 1984, p. 41). This view had profound implications for the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. The primary implication for analysis was that the therapeutic encounter between the two participants fundamentally becomes an encounter in which

an intersubjective or relational field is created and that involves "the intersection of two subjectivities" (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984) and the "meeting of minds" (Aron, 1996). In this context, subjectivity and the notion of other and the impact of other on experience itself and ultimately the sense of self became important and eventually objectivity became less trusted and valued.

As a result of this first paradigm shift a second paradigm shift emerged – this was a transformation in epistemology from intrapsychic theory to relational field theory or *intersubjective* or, now, *systems* theory (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984; Fosshage, 2003, 2009; Mitchell, 1988). The implication was that the analyst could and does impact on the analysand and vice versa, meaning that in the development of the analytic material, what was discussed or made a part of the analysis was always a co-construction (intersubjectivity) of both the analyst and analysand (Aron, 1996). The subsequent ongoing shifts and transition in paradigms, from an essentially positivistic to a relativistic science or from objectivism to constructivism, upset and unashamedly dethroned the analyst from a protected and privileged or elevated position of objectivity and unceremoniously confronted the analyst with an increasing recognition not only of the influence of their own subjectivity in constructing interpretations but also of their participation in co-creating while the patient's subjectivity remained the principal core focus of the analytic process (Fosshage, 2009).

From within this new approach in psychoanalysis, it can be seen that the analytic encounter of the two persons (as opposed to the one-person psychology of classical psychoanalysis) and what developed between them could not be separated out. The implication was that the development and experience of the self (both inside and outside of therapy) was always in relation to the other.

This second paradigm shift in psychoanalysis produced thinkers and writers that acknowledged this relational tilt in psychoanalysis. This idea of relational as central to the development of self as well as the co-construction of the analytic material was crystallised with the pioneering thinking of several prominent psychoanalysts at that time, such as Sullivan (1953, 1954), who advocated the interactional and interpersonal nature of development and psychopathology, as well as the ground-breaking work of Mitchell (1988, 1993, 1997) on defining and highlighting relational concepts in psychoanalysis, psychoanalyst Bowlby (1973, 1980, 1982, 1988) on attachment theory with its focus on the emotional and psychological attachment patterns individuals create in order to have meaningful connections with others, and thus on attachment patterns that may become unhealthy or maladaptive and that give rise to pathology, and finally, the emphasis by psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott on the social context of the developing infant and that there is no such thing as a baby except in relation to the mother (Winnicott, 1975a, 1975b). Self psychology, with its emphasis on the *self–selfobject matrix*, has been viewed as structurally a relational theory that was one of the main contributors to this paradigm change (Fosshage, 2003, 2009). Common to these theorists' ideas was the adoption of the relational approach, which essentially shifted away from the original

notion of drives to view motivation as the intrinsic and prewired need to connect with others, and thus the development of self was viewed as from within a social and thus relational or intersubjective milieu (Atwood & Stolorow, 1984; Mitchell, 1988).

The relational perspective, in summary, ushered in an increasingly stronger focus within psychoanalysis on the development of self in relation to other.

To this end, as a result of this second paradigm shift, many subsequent psychoanalytic theorists have increasingly emphasised that the development of the infantile self is within a social relational context – that of the mother-infant dyad and later self-other matrix (Bion, 1967; Kohut, 1984; Winnicott, 1975a, 1975b). These theorists describe a process of early infantile development of the self that includes the active involvement of the other in such a way that the other acts like a holding function in which the infantile self can emerge. They describe how the infantile self is deeply connected to and reliant upon the mother for all psychological and physical needs, thus contributing to the relational tilt in psychoanalysis. During this delicate and early development time, there is a necessary psychological merger with the mother. Out of this merger with the mother, the infant does not have a sense of a separate self. In a way, the self of the mother is the self of the infant. The (mother) or other in this merger is experienced as the same. The infantile psychological process of self-development is one of moving from a primitive psychological *state of undifferentiation* ("my mother and I are the same and therefore *there is no difference*" or "you are an extension of me") towards a psychological *state of differentiation* or psychic separateness from the mother, and thus the recognition of difference ("my mother and I are not the same and therefore *there is difference*" or "me versus not me").

This shift from sameness and melting merging to recognition of difference and the subsequent formation of boundaries between "me versus not me" ushers in the infantile sense of self-other (Bion, 1967; Mahler, Pine & Bergman, 1975; Winnicott, 1975a, 1975b). In this context, sameness and difference is established and the notion of other and thus difference becomes of utmost importance to this process of self-definition which, in its simplest meaning, is the separation from what was thought to be the same as (undifferentiation) to what is now perceived to be different from (differentiation), which forms the basis of prejudice. In other words, the infantile self develops from an experience of sameness to an experience of difference and therefore the recognition of a "me versus not me" experience. This idea can be expressed in the following way – "My sense of self develops from the recognition that I am not the same as my mother".

Thus I suggest that the recognition of difference is an act of self-definition, and this links to my idea that self-definition is an act of prejudice.

As indicated, Kohut's (1977, 1984) self psychology, with its emphasis on the *self–selfobject matrix* was principally a relational theory of self (Fosshage, 2009). Kohut defined the core of development as the maturation of a "cohesive nuclear self", imbued with basic strivings for recognition, affirmation, empowerment and achievement of success, as well as the development of idealised goals and ambitions, and the development of talents and skills (Kohut & Wolf, 1978). Later Kohut (1984) postulated a fundamental motivation underlying all personality development as a striving to develop, to grow, to strive "to realize its [the self's] nuclear program in the course of its life span" (p. 42). This self was viewed as sustained by the "empathic response of others" who could meet the lifelong needs for affirmation, validation, and a sense of belonging, hence emphasising its relational core.

To expand on the above basic strivings of the self, Kohut (1971, 1977, 1984) conceptualised that the developing child had a psychological need for primarily two sets of experiences in relation to others or caretakers and thus within the framework of *self–selfobject matrix*. The first set of experiences was for the child to experience admiring and confirming responses from parents and others to his or her innate sense of grandiosity, specialness and greatness, perhaps illustrated like this – "I am special". With appropriate responsiveness and validation or "mirroring', Kohut emphasised that this early experience of feeling special and admired by others matures into self-esteem, assertiveness, ambition, a healthy enjoyment of successes and the pursuit of interests and activities. A child thus needs to be acknowledged and affirmed (*mirroring selfobject* needs) by a parent or parental surrogates to feel worthwhile, loved and capable. A sense of capability and self-worth, in turn, promotes a drive to succeed and be ambitious (Fosshage, 2009). The developing child also has a need for closeness and support from an omnipotent source of strength or from a parental figure that is admired, looked up to, followed and copied, perhaps illustrated as – "you are special". This is the second set of experiences a child needs. When the developing child finds and merges with this great or idealised figure these needs are transformed into ideals, ambitions, goals, values, and a healthy sense of respect and admiration for others. Transformation of early idealising needs also leads to the capacity for self-soothing and self-comfort, which is important in the context of learning to independently manage adverse or negative experiences and distress. A child thus also needs from a parent a sense of protection, security and safety, and parents or parental surrogates who are people that have qualities a child admires, which are termed by Kohut *idealising selfobject* needs (Fosshage, 2009).

Kohut (1984) later refined and defined a further basic psychological need for "*twinship"* as the experience of alikeness, belonging, and kinship with others, whether it is as part of a family, community, or a nation – it gives rise to a sense of self in relation to the other. In this experience of alikeness or sameness, and thus to an extent, group connectedness and belonging, Kohut understood and viewed appropriate human intimacy and trust or closeness resulting in a psychological ability to translate a positive experience of twinship into developing one's skills and abilities.

Kohut (1977) emphasised that the emergence of the self *is relational* in tone and dependent on the presence of others not only in childhood but throughout life and who provide experiences that give rise to and maintain a cohesive sense of self. These self-other experiences

that promote psychological growth in and through the other (object) and the development of a cohesive sense of self are called *selfobject* experiences, emphasising the interdependence between self and object. Selfobject refers to the internal, subjective experience of functions provided by others who are experienced as a needed part of the self and they therefore, in positive relations, provide experiences which produce the healthy development of a sense of self. These mirroring, idealising and twinship functions which facilitate the development of healthy narcissism underlie the development of a healthy sense of self-worth. In this process, selfobject functions initially provided by others are internalised to become self functions, a process Kohut (1984) termed *transmuting internalisation*.

Later Lichtenberg (1991) emphasised that the term selfobject refers less to a function than to "a vitalising affective experience", crucial for maintaining a cohesive and vital sense of self. The term *selfobject* was thus subsequently redefined as a (self) vitalising experience that permitted individuals to experience a greater range or scope of experience, including solitary as well as relational experience (Fosshage, 2009; Lichtenberg, 1991; Lichtenberg, Lachmann, & Fosshage, 1992). Fosshage (2009, p. 5) later clarified this point to remark that "essentially we are referring to *vitalizing and devitalizing* experiences, a dimension of experience that is crucially important for the development and maintenance of a positive thriving sense of self".

Fosshage (2009) asserts that despite his emergence from initially a classical analytic background, as shown in his earlier 1971 work, Kohut became increasingly drawn to and persuaded of the value of the development of the self as well as the development of object relations and postulated a narcissistic line of development separate and distinct from an object relational line of development. Fosshage also pointed out that in his book, *The Restoration of the Self* (1977), Kohut, while discarding drive and energy theory, rejected his notion of two separate lines of development and posited instead a supraordinate theory of the self. Kohut therefore came to believe that the development and maintenance of the self is the central developmental task for all of us, and that it is a life-long project.

The genesis of psychopathology within the relational approach of self psychology, important in terms of understanding prejudice, is no longer something based on an intrapsychic mechanism (and thus projection) but is, following the second paradigm shift, rooted in an interpersonal and relational milieu. In other words, "the origin of psychopathology lies in disturbances in the self-selfobject relations of childhood. When the child's need for empathic responsiveness is not adequately met by caregivers, development becomes derailed, leading to structural deficits and pathological defenses. The latter are erected to safeguard or restore the fragile self and to prevent further fragmentation or traumatization" (Gardener, 1999, p. 46).

A relational perspective refreshingly prevents placing the blame for problems in living on the individual patient (Fosshage, 2009) but it supports a patient empathically to understand how these problems emerged not out of an individual-in-isolation but out of their past relational experience with others. This links to attachment theory and the ways in which attachment patterns become maladaptive and cyclical in nature (Levenson, 2010) and give rise to problems in relating with others.

To an extent, psychopathology within self psychology is an interpersonal event, and emerges from between (intersubjective) and within the social matrix and therefore has a relational genesis to problems in living rather than purely an intrapsychic one. From within this relational and self psychology approach, prejudice may be seen not as something emerging from an individual existing outside of a social context and thus isolated and alone, but as from the group dynamics in which the individual functions and lives.

Thus prejudice is a relational phenomenon grounded in the sense of self that develops in relation to the (adequate responsiveness) of the other. "The self-psychology model makes clear that we are interdependent with one another throughout our lives" (Fosshage, 2009, p. 5). Prejudice is thus the development of a social and relational dynamic and is a social concern rooted in a psychological self that has not had "good enough" mirroring or idealising selfobject experiences. The sense of self is deficient as a result of a lack of responsive and empathetic experience of selfobjects. Prejudice is therefore linked to selfobjects that give rise to a sense of self that is inadequate, unworthy and thus lacks self-esteem, the malignant or unhealthy development of narcissism. "Pathogenesis is understood as involving problematic parental responses that thwart selfobject needs and the development of a positive sense of self, creating, in turn, negative self-feelings and images" (Fosshage, 2009, p. 5).

It has been noted by Fosshage (2009) that in psychoanalytic theory the analyst, as the other, is a participant in the therapeutic process and thus contributes to what may emerge. As a result of this participation, the therapeutic relationship can be viewed of as a social one in which both participants are contributing and thus the analytical material is a co-construction. In the same way, prejudice, in the context of the social, is a co-construction; it requires the participation of the other and thus emerges in the context of the other.

From within the self psychology approach to the development of self, to be prejudicial or to have prejudices is a way to make the other or out-group members feel inadequate. The self in prejudice is weakened by years of inadequate and lack of empathetic responses from caretakers, and thus prejudice is not an unconscious act as in the case of projection but a conscious and intentional act of a weakened sense of self seeking to find what is lacking within through the denigration of the other.

Social processes involved in prejudice, identity development and the sense of self

As indicated, the perspective of social identity theory, first developed by Tajfel (1969, 1978), describes the idea that groups (e.g. race, family, gender, religion) which people belong to provide a sense of self and self-esteem. These social groups thus give an individual a sense of social identity which then results in a sense of

belonging to the social world. Groups are structured according to in-groups and out-groups and thus there is immediately a sense of some individuals that don't belong to the group while others do (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005; Tajfel, 1969). If this notion is developed further, the sense of identity is maintained by both the psychology of the in-group and the out-group because both highlight that which is "the same" and "not the same" thus emphasising the compartmentalisation of prejudice into an "us" and "them" The development of the prejudice in relation to the development of the self and the so-called twinship process described earlier implies that the psychology of identifications with the in-group often falls along a continuum from minimal identification to overidentification (Aviram, 2007; Ekehammar, Akrami, & Araya, 2003). When there is overidentification with the chosen in-group, there is a necessary heightened psychological awareness of the characteristics of the in-group and a sharp sensitivity towards being a member because the sense of self is locked into being a part of the in-group. This overidentification can result in a paranoid fear of rejection because such loss of membership may mean loss of self (Aviram, 2007). The implication is that social identification can range from, on the one hand, mild to moderate levels of identification with the broader group, while on the other hand, to the extreme, that being overidentification with the group. Thus is can be said that one can move from identification to overidentification within the social group (Aviram, 2007).

From a developmental psychology perspective, I suggest that attachment theory (Bowlby, 1973, 1980, 1982, 1988) may be linked to the idea described above of social identification with the group. Attachment theory describes a continuum of dependency patterns from extreme dependency to overdependence. Taking attachment theory and linking this to social identification patterns, the links between the two can be described of as along a continuum from dependency/identification to over-dependency/overidentification with the group.

If this idea of attachment to essentially the in-group and thus sameness is extended, it appears that there is some evidence that prejudice may be a consequence of a preference to be with the same and thus to belong to the in-group while evaluating the out-group in a negative manner (Aviram, 2007; Hollander, 2009, 2010; Hodson, Dovidio, & Gaertner, 2002; Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The implication is that prejudice can be viewed along a continuum from benign to malignant, and that it can become malignant when the self, as a defence mechanism, overidentifies with the in-group because it perceives a threat of loss of self by the out-group. This attachment and preference for sameness is a negative judgement towards difference: if prejudice is a consequence of a preference to be with the same, by implication, it is difference that defines sameness.

In this regard, identity can be established by and through the group and thus identity can be a collective identity (Erikson, 1959; Guimond, et al., 2003; Tajfel, 1969, 1978). The inference for the development of prejudice is that people categorise themselves into groups

of sameness versus difference in order to develop a sense of self and figure out their place in that world of sameness and difference (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel, 1969). This links to the self psychology notion of the development of the self as needing experiences of alikeness, sameness and belonging, whether to a family or the wider group of the community and nation. The experiences of mirroring and idealising from within the group itself cements the sense of self-worth and the development of skills and talents, and in this way, these selfobject experiences inside the in-group allow for the manufacture of a sense of loyalty, allegiance and belonging to the greater whole.

If self-categorisation theory suggests that people categorise themselves into groups (Reynolds et al., 2001), it means that these group identifications are context-driven so that when collective identity is important to the individual, self-definition is dependent upon being a group member, and distinctions or categories are made along social lines such as race, gender, or religion (Aviram, 2007). When this happens, depersonalisation occurs, as collective identity is accentuated, which reduces differences between in-group members and stresses differences with out-group members (Aviram, 2007; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 1998). In this light, an individual whose collective identity is prioritised gives rise to the idea of the uniqueness of the individual as effectively diminished in service of the collective. In this case, the group is overidentified with and replaces individual identity in favour of a collective identity. In this context, the self obtains a sense of meaning from being in the group, and thus the psychology of the group means that self-is-the-group. Without the group there is no identity, and thus no sense of having a place in the world.

Furthermore, with regards to the self within the group, psychoanalyst Fairbairn (1935) suggested that there was a close link between the self/individual and the social world and proposed that the first social group into which we are born is the family. He asserted that we obtain our identity from the psychodynamics of the family constellation, and this normally involves the development of emotional ties which later become templates for emotional attachment to others in adulthood. He further suggested that the community and the in-group become substitutes for the original family group, and early attachment patterns are also later repeated in subsequent social identifications with social groups. The suggestion underlying this observation is that this social and psychological repetition of patterns is essentially the transference of the social and socialised ways of being and relating onto adult relationships. This links back to attachment theory mentioned earlier, which emphasises early attachment patterns specifically to sameness and members of the in-group. Consequently, social bonding is central to the sense of self (Aviram, 2002; Erikson, 1968; Tajfel, 1969).

Aviram (2007, p. 6) upholds the idea that primary identification with the group may be a defence mechanism "to compensate for the experienced inadequacy of the infantile character". The consequence of this results in an overidentification with the group because the group "provides an emotional experience of self" (p. 6). In this experience of overidentification with the group, the self is essentially lost. In this context, I use the term *selfgroup* (in

a similar way that Kohut (1977) used the term selfobject) to explain the psychological union or merger of the self with the group, in which the group not only provides an experience of the self but functions as the self. In this regard, there is a psychological state of union and this can be stated in the following way: "the group is me". This notion links to the idea that the group is important not only because it "provides an emotional experience of self" but also because it provides a sense of identity (Erikson, 1968).

Erikson (1959, p. 97) understood the phenomenon of overidentification with an in-group in adolescence and indicated that it was "to the point of apparent complete loss of identity … they become remarkably clannish, intolerant, and cruel in their exclusion of others who are 'different' in skin color or cultural background". The consequence of this clannish mentality is that the out-group is not only side-lined but hated. This overidentification with the in-group, however, is not limited to adolescence (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1963; Erikson, 1959). Bettelheim and Janowitz, (1963) emphasised that this overidentification is a kind of reparation for an insubstantial sense of self. If the in-group can be hated, then the in-group can be loved because it preserves a sense of self, at least to some extent. Erikson (1959) pointed out that such glorification of the in-group is a defensive act against a sense of identity confusion. Thus prejudice against the out-group can be understood as a way of preserving the in-group identity, and in this way, hate enforces boundaries between out-group and in-group membership and hate protects against loss of self. The psychological strategies of idealisation and devaluation parallel perceptions of in-groups and out-groups, and any threat of annihilation of self that is experienced within the group is protected through various defensive mechanisms, of which prejudice is one strategy (Aviram, 2007).

Erikson (1968) developed a theory of human development that was divided into stages linked to age and each stage had various psychological tasks to be achieved. He was acutely aware of the interconnection between the social world and the psychology of the individual. With reference to the stage of adolescence, he identified that this was a time of "identity formation versus role confusion", and emphasised the need of the adolescent to separate from the family of origin in favour of a new group made up of peer members. This new peer group enhanced and facilitated the further formation of identity. Here the adolescent not only thrusts away from but also vigorously mutinies or rebels against the family group and their values and attitudes. The adolescent begins to experiment with life offerings and may create a new value system contrasting the family's values and belief. It is a time of further maturing and the enmeshment into the lives of peers allows for the internalisation of the new values of the new group (Erikson, 1959, 1968). This idea of moving away from family to peer groups links to the work of Aviram (2002, 2005, 2007), who proposes that in some cases when identity formation is the primary developmental task, as in the case of Erikson's adolescent stage of identity formation, group affiliations are overidentification.

In my view, this shift away from the family to the new group is a furthering of the developmental process of separation-individuation in that the young person undergoes a furthering of the differentiation process not between self and mother, but between self and family. Because the focus is on moving away from family to peers and discovering a new sense of self within the new group, and identifying with this new group, it could be suggested that the adolescent individuation process is a process of prejudice in the sense of evaluating what is now the new in-group and thus disparaging the old (family) out-group. The movement the one group (family) to the other new group (adolescent group) is a necessary psychological shift in that it heightens the importance of the social nature of the new group in terms of the role it provides for a sense of identity.

Conclusion
In this article, prejudice has been defined as the negative evaluation of others, which is based on an erroneous assumption of the other because the data available regarding the other is largely ignored. This article has used the psychoanalytic and social processes to understand the processes involved in prejudice. Within the psychoanalytic approach, the use of Kohut's self psychology was adopted as a lens through which to understand the development of self and thus the self in prejudice. Using both approaches, some new thoughts on the development of prejudice have been presented. These thoughts are that the use of attachment theory and thus patterns of attachment from dependency to over-dependency can be linked to levels of intensity of prejudice which fall along a continuum from the identification to over-identification. Moreover, self-definition is a process of categorising what is the same and what is not the same – thus in terms of the definition of prejudice, it is suggested that self-definition is in itself an act of prejudice. Making use of the psychoanalytic term selfobjects, derived from self psychology, it is also suggested that when the individual intensely merges with the group (overidentification) to the extent that the self is lost within the group, a state of *selfgroup* develops. This means that the boundaries between self and the group are blurred. In this context, the group becomes vital to the sense of self, and so prejudice is high or intense towards the out-group which is viewed as a threat to the sense of self. Linked to this view is that the hostility for the out-group can be understood as a defence against loss of self. Thus hostility masks the fear of the threat of self disintegration posed by the out-group. The fragile sense of self, like a borderline character, needs to merge with the group in order to have a sense of self. Without the group, there is no self. If the in-group is potentially threatened with disintegration, it translates into a threat of self destruction and thus loss of self.

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