

PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University Nijmegen

The following full text is a publisher's version.

For additional information about this publication click this link.

<http://hdl.handle.net/2066/148495>

Please be advised that this information was generated on 2018-07-07 and may be subject to change.

20020

GOD'S CREATED SPEECH

*A Study in the Speculative Theology of the
Mu'tazilî Qâdî l-Qudât Abû l-Hasan 'Abd al-Jabbâr
bn Ahmad al-Hamadânî*

PROEFSCHRIFT

TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE GRAAD VAN DOCTOR IN DE LETTEREN
AAN DE KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT TE NIJMEGEN,
OP GEZAG VAN DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS PROF. DR. A.J.H. VENDRIK,
VOLGENS BESLUIT VAN HET COLLEGE VAN DEKANEN
IN HET OPENBAAR TE VERDEDIGEN OP 23 SEPTEMBER 1976
DES NAMIDDAGS TE 4.00 UUR

DOOR

JOHANNES REINIER THEODORUS MARIA PETERS

geboren te Nijmegen



LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1976

GOD'S CREATED SPEECH

GOD'S CREATED SPEECH

*A Study in the Speculative Theology of the
Mu'tazilî Qâḍî l-Quḍât Abû l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbâr
bn Aḥmad al-Hamaḍânî*

PROEFSCHRIFT

TER VERKRIJGING VAN DE GRAAD VAN DOCTOR IN DE LETTEREN
AAN DE KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT TE NIJMEGEN,
OP GEZAG VAN DE RECTOR MAGNIFICUS PROF DR A J H VENDRIK,
VOLGENS BESLUIT VAN HET COLLEGE VAN DEKANEN
IN HET OPENBAAR TE VERDEDIGEN OP 23 SEPTEMBER 1976
DES NAMIDDAGS TE 4 00 UUR

DOOR

JOHANNES REINIER THEODORUS MARIA PETERS

geboren te Nijmegen



LEIDEN
E. J. BRILL
1976

Published with financial support from the Netherlands Organization
for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.)

Promotor :

Prof. Dr. J. VAN ESS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	IX
Abbreviations	XII
I. INTRODUCTION	1
1. Eternity or createdness of the Qur'ân	1
2. The Mu'tazila	3
3. 'Abd al-Jabbâr	6
His life	8
His works	10
His doctrine	14
4. The "theological environment" of 'Abd al-Jabbâr	16
His teachers	16
His opponents	19
His disciples	23
5. Al-Muġnî	25
The manuscripts and the edition	25
Its outline and contents	27
6. <u>K</u> alq al-Qur'ân, the seventh part of the Muġnî	35
II. SOME REMARKS ON 'ABD AL-JABBÂR'S "PHILOSOPHY"	39
A. Logic	39
1. Knowledge	40
2. The way to acquire knowledge	57
3. The manner in which knowledge is expressed	76
4. Sources of human knowledge	91
B. Cosmology	105
1. Existence	106
2. Substances	119
3. Accidents	123
4. Qualities	144
C. Anthropology	159
1. The essence of man	160
2. Man is living	168
3. Man is perceiving	175
4. Man is able	194
5. Man is knowing	211
6. Man is willing	211

D. Theodicy	224
1. Our knowledge of the other world	225
2. God	231
3. God's permanent states	235
4. God's qualities	248
5. What has to be denied about God	255
6. God's acts	266
7. The use of "revealed" arguments in Theodicy	276
III. THE QUR'ÂN AND GOD'S OTHER SPEECH	278
A. The texts	279
B. Speech in this world	293
1. The definition of speech	293
2. Further description of speech	300
3. Refutation of opponents	305
Other definitions	305
Other opinions	307
C. The quality speaking in this world	313
1. Speech may inhere in any substrate	314
Speech inheres in a substrate	314
Speech cannot exist without inhering in a substrate	315
Speech can inhere in any substrate	317
Speech does not need movement	317
Speech does not need a special structure	320
Speech (and sound) does not need hardness	323
The substrate of speech is not qualified as speaking	323
2. Speech does not necessitate a living being to be in a state	324
The quality speaking does not indicate the subject to be in a state	327
3. Speaking means making speech	327
D. God is speaking by temporal speech	330
1. Various opinions about God's speech	331
2. God is speaking since He made speech	336
God is able to produce speech	337
God made speech and by it became speaking	338
3. God can only be speaking by temporal speech	340
God cannot be speaking per se	341
God cannot be speaking "neither per se nor by a cause"	348
God cannot be speaking by eternal speech	349

God cannot be eternally speaking by speech different from human speech	353
One cannot say : God's speech cannot be qualified .	361
One cannot say : God's speech is not something other than God	361
4. Arguments of the opponents	363
E. God's speech is good	385
1. God's speech is communicative	385
2. The reproduction of God's speech	388
3. God's speech is called "created"	397
4. Conclusion	402
IV. SOME MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF 'ABD AL-JABBÂR'S THEOLOGY	403
1. Characteristics of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's method	403
2. Unity of all existent things	407
3. Determinism	412
4. God's speech and His revelation	417
5. Conclusions	420
Bibliography	422
Index	430

PREFACE

My interest in 'Abd al-Jabbâr and his theology was aroused first by the late Professor Houben, who was himself steadily working on the manuscripts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's *Muhit*. His enthusiasm for this great Mu'tazilî theologian was so contagious that I began to study his works myself, and in the course of this study my interest kept growing so that, finally, I decided to devote my dissertation to an explanation of his theology.

As a central topic for the present study I chose 'Abd al-Jabbâr's treatise on God's speech and the Qur'ân, which is found in the seventh part of his *Mugnî*, I did so, not only because this subject was a much disputed topic in the history of Islamic theology, but also because it covers many aspects of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology and furnishes a fine example of his style of arguing.

I discovered that for a correct understanding of the contents and the argumentation of this part of the *Mugnî*—as in fact for the totality of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works—it was absolutely necessary to analyse profoundly the terms he uses and the concepts that lie behind this technical vocabulary. Therefore, I devoted, after a general introduction, my second chapter to an analysis of the technical philosophical and theological terms used before discussing in the third chapter his argumentations concerning God's speech and the Qur'ân.

I hesitated a long time how to divide the matter to be dealt with in the second chapter, since it was my intention to treat the underlying philosophical and theological substrata, I could not simply follow 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own division. Finally, I chose a classical division, used in the European Aristotelian tradition, consisting in logic, cosmology, anthropology, and theodicy. I believe that this division will be useful in the discussion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine.

My principal aim in this study was to get a survey of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's basic system and an insight into the way he argues, not to compare it with the theological or philosophical systems of other Muslim or non-Muslim scholars, this can be done later on. In studying 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, I started from the technical vocabulary he uses and analysed this vocabulary throughout his theological works. I hope this method too will prove to be useful in the present work.

Having read the entire book, one might come to the conclusion that its title, "God's Created Speech", is not quite correct. I would agree, but, nevertheless, I gave it this title since it draws the attention to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's place in the evolution of Islamic theology.

I realize that I have been able to write the present book thanks to the work of many scholars, particularly those who prepared the edition of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works and in this way made them accessible. I know from my own experience how difficult and hard this work can be, and I witnessed it during my frequent contacts with the late Prof. Houben, who was preparing the edition of the entire *Muḥiṭ*, but whom a sudden death prevented to complete the task. The reason why I shall refer in this study to his edition of the *Muḥiṭ* is, consequently, a personal and non-scientific one, and it does by no means imply that it is better than the edition prepared by 'Umar as-Sayyid 'Azmi.

In the course of this book I suggest a number of corrections to be made in the texts edited. In the case of the seventh part of the *Muḥiṭ* I always consulted a microfilm of the original manuscript; I shall add a remark indicating whether my suggestion is or is not in accordance with the text of the manuscript; when no such remark is made, both readings are possible in the manuscript. The corrections proposed for the other works are always made without consulting the manuscripts, on the sole basis of the context. Suggestions for the correction of the punctuation of the text are made only if this is absolutely necessary for a correct understanding of the text. When translating passages literally, I put them between inverted commas, eventually adding in brackets some explanatory words which are not found in the Arabic text. To keep the difficult text as clear as possible and not to overburden it, I omit all eulogies after the name of God, His prophet, or other people. I want to emphasize, however, that this is not due to a lack of respect, but only to my wish to make the text as accessible as possible. In my translation of verses from the Qur'ân I have tried to render their meaning as 'Abd al-Jabbâr understood them, meanwhile following the Arabic text as closely as possible; therefore, I have not used one of the accepted English translations.

For the transcription of Arabic words I make use of the transliteration used in Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic*; this transliteration is rather simple and offers the advantage of noting one single Latin character for any single Arabic character. Arabic proper names and technical terms are, besides some exceptions (I write "Islamic" instead of *Islâmi* and "Muslims" instead of *Muslimûn*), also

transliterated in the above mentioned way. In quotations from the works of European scholars I usually (unless noted) kept the transcription they used themselves; when referring, however, to Arabic books that also bear their title in Latin transcription I nevertheless use my own transliteration of the Arabic title.

I wish to thank all persons and all organizations that made the publication of this study possible: the late Prof. Dr. J. Houben (Nijmegen), who suggested to me the subject of the present study and directed it as long as his health allowed him to do so; Prof. Dr. J. van Ess (Tübingen), who after Dr. Houben's death spontaneously accepted to supervise this study, and who made many valuable remarks and suggestions; the Catholic University of Nijmegen, which granted me a sabbatical year in order to complete my thesis, as also my colleagues, who were so kind as to take over during that year my tasks in the faculty; Prof. Dr. D. S. Attema (Amsterdam), who gave me his advice and read part of the manuscript; Dr. W. Peters, who revised my English text and also made some suggestions to make the text more understandable for the interested reader who is versed neither in the Arabic language nor in the study of Islâm; Drs. W. Stoetzer (Kairo), who procured for me a microfilm of the seventh part of the *Muġni; Dâr al-Kutub* in Kairo, which made it possible to consult the text of the manuscript; the librarians of the universities of Nijmegen, Leiden, and Beirut (Université St. Joseph), who gave me all assistance needed; Prof. Dr. M. Allard, Prof. Dr. P. Nwyia, and other colleagues in the Université St. Joseph in Beirut, who stimulated me to continue my studies in this field, and with whom I have cooperated in a very friendly atmosphere; L. Pouzet and R. Lavenant (Beirut), who first aroused my interest in the Arabic language and culture. Finally, I wish to thank the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.), which by its subvention made the actual publication of this study in this form possible.

It is my sincere hope that this work may help both Muslims and orientalists to get a deeper insight into the theology of 'Abd al-Jabbâr and through it also into the theology of the Mu'tazila, which may be—God willing—of some help in the great task of creating a modern Islamic thinking.

Nijmegen, July 15, 1975

JAN PETERS

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>BSOAS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies</i>
<i>EI</i> ¹	<i>The Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , first edition
<i>EI</i> ²	<i>The Encyclopaedia of Islam</i> , second edition
<i>IC</i>	<i>Islamic Culture</i>
<i>IS</i>	<i>Islamic Studies</i>
<i>Isl</i>	<i>Der Islam</i>
<i>IQ</i>	<i>Islamic Quarterly</i>
<i>JA</i>	<i>Journal Asiatique</i>
<i>JAOS</i>	<i>Journal of the American Oriental Society</i>
<i>JRAS</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society</i>
<i>JTS</i>	<i>Journal of Theological Studies</i>
<i>Lane</i>	E W Lane, <i>An Arabic-English Lexicon</i>
<i>MIDEO</i>	<i>Melanges de l'Institut dominicain d'etudes orientales du Caire</i>
<i>Mugni</i>	'Abd al-Jabbâr, <i>Al-Mugni fî abwâb at-tawhid wa-l-'adl</i>
<i>Muhit</i>	'Abd al-Jabbâr, <i>Kitâb al-majmû' fî l-muhit bi-t-taklîf</i>
<i>MW</i>	<i>Muslim World</i>
<i>OLZ</i>	<i>Orientalistische Literaturzeitung</i>
<i>REI</i>	<i>Revue des etudes islamiques</i>
<i>REJ</i>	<i>Revue des etudes juives</i>
<i>Sarh</i>	'Abd al-Jabbâr, <i>Šarh al-usûl al-ḳamsa</i>
<i>Sh EI</i>	<i>Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam</i>
<i>SI</i>	<i>Studia Islamica</i>
<i>ZA</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Assyriologie</i>
<i>ZDMG</i>	<i>Zeitschrift der Deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft</i>

Other abbreviated titles can be found easily in our bibliography

INTRODUCTION

I. ETERNITY OR CREATEDNESS OF THE QUR'ÂN,
A CENTRAL TOPIC IN EARLY ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS THINKING

The Qur'ân is God's speech. About this point of view there is no disagreement among Muslims throughout the centuries. The discussions, however, centered upon the question whether the Qur'ân is eternal or temporal and created, have led to fierce disputes and even to the persecution of the adherents of one or the other of the two positions. The question at stake was: did the Qur'ân coexist with God, uncreated, in all eternity, so that God could send it down to His prophet and reveal it to mankind, or did God create it in time and did it have a beginning, "it was not, afterwards it was", (*"lam yakun, tumm kân"*) as the traditional formula says.¹

After the time of the great persecution (the so-called "*Mihna*", which lasted from 218 AH/ 833 AD till 234 AH/ 848 AD), in which this topic played a central part as it was used as a criterion to distinguish between orthodoxy and heterodoxy,² it remained a very important question in Islamic theological discussions. Some 150 years later, one out of the twenty parts of the *Muğnî* (the "*Summa Theologica*") of the Mu'tazilî theologian 'Abd al-Jabbâr seems to be devoted to this subject; anyhow, the discussions around the eternity of the Qur'ân or its createdness fill many of that part's pages.

The very origins of the discussion remain wrapped in darkness, nor can we know for certain why exactly this question became so central a topic in later disputes.³ But at the beginning of the third century AH

¹ Cf., for instance, *Muğnî* VII, 3

² Al-Ma'mûn, who was a calif in Bagdâd from 198 AH/ 813 AD till his death in 218 AH/ 833 AD, wrote in 218 AH a letter to Ishâq bn Ibrâhîm, ordering him to test all judges and transmitters of traditions (*muhaddithûn*) as to their belief in the nature of the Qur'ân. The text of this letter has been transmitted by Ṭabarî (*Annales* III, 1112-1116) and translated by W M Patton (*Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and the Mihna*, 57-61). This letter is considered to be the start of the *Mihna*.

³ The question of the origins of this discussion is dealt with in most manuals of Islamic theology and in some monographs that in some way or other deal with the subject. Cf. for instance, J Bouman, *Le conflit*, 1-6, Watt, *Formative Period*, 143-145

we see the two contradictory doctrines firmly established. It may suffice for the moment, just to give an example, to quote two texts dating from the beginning of the third century and representative of the two currents. In an old creed, the *Wasiyat Abi Hanifa*, composed about 210 AH/ 825 AD,⁴ we read (article 9) "We confess that the Qur'ân is the speech of God, uncreated, His inspiration and revelation, not He, yet not other than He, but His real quality, written in the copies, recited by the tongues, preserved in the breasts, yet not residing there. The ink, the paper, the writing are created, for they are the work of men. The speech of God on the other hand is uncreated, for the writing and the letters and the words and the verses are manifestations of the Qur'ân for the sake of human needs. The speech of God on the other hand is existing in Him, and its meaning is understood by means of these things. Whoso sayeth that the speech of God is created, he is an infidel regarding God, the Exalted, whom men serve, who is eternally the same, His speech being recited or written and retained in the heart, yet never dissociated from Him."⁵ On the other hand we have a letter written by the Calif al-Ma'mûn in 218 AH/ 833 AD,⁶ this letter figures as the beginning of the *Mihna*, the inquisition, in which the belief in the createdness of the Qur'ân had to be used as the criterion of orthodoxy. The calif is very fierce in his condemnation of who believes in the eternity of the Qur'ân. "The masses and the great multitude of the mean people and the lowest classes do not think, do not reflect, and do not use the arguments and the guidance God has provided, they are not enlightened by the light and the argumentations of real knowledge, this is the situation in all regions and all territories. They do not know God, they are blind for Him, and they err away from the essence of His religion, the acknowledgement of His unity, and the belief in Him, they turn away from His clear signs and from His path, which they have to follow, they are

and 242-245, Paret *Der Standpunkt al-Bâqillânî s.*, 294-296. Becker, *Islamstudien* I, 441-443. Badawi, *Histoire*, 45-47.

⁴ For a history of the Islamic creeds. A. J. Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, and W. M. Watt, art. 'Akida in *IEP*.

The date mentioned in our text is given by Watt ('*Akida*, 335), Wensinck's conclusion about the time of its composition. "So the *Wasiya* seems to have originated in a period between Abû Hanîfa and Ahmad ibn Hanbal and probably belongs to the latter part of that period" (*The Muslim Creed*, 187). This roughly corresponds with the period mentioned by Watt.

⁵ Wensinck translates in his book the most important Islamic creeds, for the text quoted *The Muslim Creed*, 127. I used his translation with only slight modifications.

⁶ Cf. note 2.

unable to understand the real greatness of God, to know Him as He really is, and to see the difference between Him and His creation; so weak is their insight, so defective their intellect, and so great their distaste for reflection and recollection. They show this most clearly by putting God—the Blessed and Exalted—on the same level with the Qur’ân, which He has sent down; they are all agreed, unanimously and unequivocally, that the Qur’ân is eternal, exists from the first beginning, and is not created nor produced nor originated by God.”⁷

When reading these two short quotations—many others might be added—one understands that the disputes and persecutions turned fierce and bitter, but the question remains how this problem became of so great an importance. But whatever may have been the causes, it is evident that the choice in favour of one of the two answers, eternity or createdness of the Qur’ân, had great implications for the believing thinking about God and world.

The belief that the Qur’ân is eternal implies, for instance, that God preordained any event described in it and leads to a belief in God’s absolute predestination; who wants to deny this predestination must believe the Qur’ân to be created. And, to mention yet another example, he who advocates the doctrine of God’s absolute unity and unicity (a central Islamic belief) and wishes to take this in the strictest sense, denies the existence of an uncreated Qur’ân together with God in all eternity.

In the course of time, however, the question loses some of its importance and we shall see that, for ‘Abd al-Jabbâr, it is no longer the central topic of his discussion of the Qur’ân; for him this problem appears to be basically of historical interest.

2. THE MUTAZILA

‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s treatise on God’s speech and the Qur’ân, the work we take as our starting-point in this book, is a theological study; it belongs to the category of the so-called “*kalâm*”-works.

The *kalâm* often did not have a very good reputation both among Muslims and among orientalists; most authors hesitate to describe the *kalâm* as “theology”. Some of them consider it to be a form of rationalistic thinking,⁸ others see in it a pure apology, which comes

⁷ Tabarî, *Annales* III, 1112-1113.

⁸ So, for instance, Wensinck: “The *mutakallimûn* (the writers of *kalâm*-treatises) were thus characterized, not as theologians, but as rationalists and philosophers,

to be no more than a form of contradiction-making,⁹ nevertheless in our days we see a growing insight into the background of real concern for the (theological) truth concealed behind the sometimes very elaborate and far-fetched argumentations, which make these works often seem entirely uninspired.¹⁰ But when studying these *kalâm*-treatises, one will discover that the *kalâm* really is a form of theological thinking, an attempt to arrive at a synthetic view of God and the cosmos; this view is based on a double foundation: human intellect and divine revelation. Though the importance attached to these two "sources" vary among the writers of *kalâm*-works, they all elaborate the data of revelation and human intellect by means of speculative reflection. Therefore, I call this kind of theological thinking in the subtitle of the present work "speculative theology".

Among the early "*mutakallimûn*" (the scholars in the field of *kalâm*) we meet with an apparently coherent group of theologians, who, though they themselves preferred the name "*ahl al-'adl (wa-t-tawhîd)*"¹¹ are usually known by the name "Mu'tazila". About the origin of this name¹² and about the history and doctrine of this intellectual movement much has been written in the far and recent past;¹³ hence,

and the fact that the *kalâm* in the course of time received the meaning of dogmatic theology is an indication of the rationalistic direction which Muslim theology has gradually taken" (*The Muslim Creed*, 79)

⁹ "If the *Kalâm* is essentially no more than an elaborated polemic of apology without true and primary concern for the rational (i.e. dialectical and analytic) understanding of the totality of being that is subject of theology, then it is a kind of sophistry — an art of making contradictions" (Frank, *Kalâm*, 295) Frank observes that even Allard in his book *Le problème des attributs divins* did not consider the *kalâm* to be a really theological discipline. The here quoted phrase has been taken from his critical remarks on Allard's work

¹⁰ One of the great defenders of the *kalâm* and of its rightful place among the other Islamic religious disciplines as a form of really theological thinking is Richard Frank. See, for instance, his *Remarks on the Early Development of the Kalâm*, his *The Kalâm, an art of contradiction-making or theological science?*, and his introduction to *The Metaphysics of Created Being*

¹¹ By this name (the people of (God's) justice, or, in the longer form, the people of (God's) justice and the profession of (God's) unity), they refer to the central topics of their own theological system: God's absolute unity and His absolute justice

¹² The classical explanation of the name "Mu'tazila" is found, for instance, in aš-Šahrastâni, *al-Milal wa-n-nihal*, 60-61. 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives a slightly different version in *Šarh* 137-138. For a discussion of the data of the various sources: Watt, *Formative Period*, 209-210 and 215-217

¹³ Cf. the bibliography in this book for the more important works. For contemporary or nearly contemporary information we are depending on the few works of Mu'tazilî authors that have been preserved, especially the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and on the works of the great heresiographers. For the history of the Mu'tazila, as seen by the Mu'tazila themselves, the *Fadl al-Œizâl* by 'Abd al-Jabbâr is a rich

I will by way of introduction restrict myself here to some general remarks.

The Mu'tazila, which as an intellectual and theological movement was born in al-Baṣra in the beginning of the second century AH and a century later even for some time was the official theological doctrine of the califate in Baġdād, in which time it instituted the *Mihna* or inquisition, is traditionally said to be based on five principles; these principles are: 1) God's unity (*at-tawḥīd*); 2) God's justice (*al-'adl*); 3) God's promise and threat (*al-wa'd wa-l-wa'id*); 4) the intermediate position of the Mu'tazila (*al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn*); 5) the command to do what is approved and the prohibition to do what is reprehensible (*al-amr bi-l-ma'rūf wa-n-nahy 'an al-munkar*).¹⁴ This schematization, however, is not based on any intrinsic logic of the Mu'tazilī system, but it is called forth by apologetic motives.¹⁵ Intrinsically, the whole system is summarized under two heads: the belief in God's absolute unity and the belief in His absolute justice.

But probably more than in these principles, the difference between the Mu'tazila and their opponents is to be found in their theological methods; for the Mu'tazila, theologians who had come to know the Greek philosophical tradition, the human intellect itself was a source of real knowledge. They brought the appreciation for the independently thinking and arguing human intellect into the religious sciences; in their thinking about God and cosmos¹⁶ they fought for the right to

source of knowledge, data on the later Mu'tazila are added by al-Hākīm Abū Sa'd al-Muhsin al-Juṣamī al-Bayhaqī, who died in 494 AH (cf Johann Fück in *OLZ* 59 (1964), 371-374 and 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṣmān, *Qāḍī l-Qudāt*, 63). These texts are used by Ibn al-Murtadā, *Tabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*.

Among the books and articles written in our own century, I wish to point first to two classical studies: the studies of the famous Egyptian scholar Ahmad Amin, especially in the third tome of his work *Ḍuhā l-Islām*, and the article of Nyberg in the first edition of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*. In recent times we have the works of van Ess and Madelung about the history and "Ideengeschichte" of the Mu'tazila and the works of Frank, which are mostly concerned with the analysis of the philosophical and theological vocabulary.

For a general introduction, see, for instance, Badawi, *Histoire*, 18-261, Watt, *Formative Period*, 209-250; Nader, *Le système philosophique*.

¹⁴ Cf., for instance, al-Ḳayyāt, *Kitāb al-intisār*, 93 (Arabic text) and *Ṣarḥ* 123.

¹⁵ Cf. *Ṣarḥ* 122-125, where 'Abd al-Jabbār admits that the list of five principles is rather arbitrarily chosen, he himself sometimes mentions only two or four principles. The choice of the principles is mainly made for apologetic reasons.

¹⁶ Therefore, some authors see in modern developments in the field of Islamic thought, where we meet a growing appreciation of the human intellect, a kind of neo-Mu'tazilī current. As regards the situation in Egypt see Caspar, *Un aspect de la pensée musulmane moderne le renouveau du Mo'tazilisme*, *MIDEO* 4 (1957), 141-201.

use the intellect as an independent source and not only as an instrument to study the revealed sources. This fight was, however, not a goal in itself; their first aim remained to describe their believing synthetic view of God and cosmos, a view which is in accordance both with revelation and with the data of the human intellect.

3. 'ABD AL-JABBAR

The fourth century AH—corresponding roughly to the tenth century AD—witnessed a process of rapid disintegration of the vast Islamic empire and the rise of various independent or semi-independent states on the frontiers of the Islamic world; in the track of the decentralization of the political influence and the building of new capitals followed the rise of new cultural and intellectual centres. The famous Mesopotamian cities, Baġdād and al-Baṣra, remained centres of cultural life, but they had to share their leading position with cities as al-Qāhira (Kairo), Ḥalab, Rayy, and the great cultural centres in Islamic Spain.¹⁷

As to the Mu'tazila, they had been given a hard time after the period of their great political influence at the court in Baġdād had come to an end and the tables had been turned by the succession to the califate of the calif al-Mutawakkil in 232 AH. The so-called *Sunni*¹⁸ reaction, which was both political and doctrinal, followed the period of the *Mihna* and was supported by a developing *Sunni* theology, which was to fight the Mu'tazila with their own weapons: reflection and intellectual argumentation. Their leading scholar was al-Aṣ'arī (260-324 AH/873 (874)-935 (936) AD), whose theology was going to make a redoubtable attack on Mu'tazilī supremacy in matters of speculative theology.

But in the fourth century the school flourished again, and this time especially in the eastern provinces of the Islamic world, the Persian districts. Especially the Mu'tazilī school of al-Basra, to which 'Abd

Khālid, *Some aspects of Neo-mu'tazilism*, IS 8 (1969), 319-347 described the situation in modern Pakistan and India, and also dealt with the Egyptian scholar Ahmad Amin, in this way his article forms a supplement to Caspar's

¹⁷ For the position of Baġdād during this century see, e.g., M. Canard, *Baġdād au IV^e siècle de l'hégire (X^e siècle de l'ère chrétienne)*, *Arabica* 9 (1962), 267-287

¹⁸ *Sunni* is an adjective related to the word *Ahl as-Sunna*, this is a name given to the so-called "orthodox" Muslims, who keep to the *Sunna*, the custom of the Prophet. It is mostly used for the great body of Muslim believers, as opposed to the *Ši'a*, it is also used as it is here for the traditionalists (the *muhaddithūn*), the scholars in the science of the Islamic traditions about the Prophet, and their followers as opposed to the Mu'tazila and the Mu'tazilī theology

al-Jabbâr must be counted, greatly contributed to this resurgence, which was greatly favoured by the reigning princes of the Bûyid dynasty belonging to the Šî'a.¹⁹ This century has known some great Mu'tazilî thinkers, who were, however, not very favourably looked upon by the great masses of Muslims and by their traditional leaders.²⁰ This is one of the reasons why their books disappeared and would have been lost forever, had not the Mu'tazilî school of Baġdâd gradually been identified with the Zaydiyya—a branch of the Šî'a which survived in al-Yaman (Yemen)—: a most happy coincidence since we are now so fortunate as to reap the harvest, saved from ruin, of the Mu'tazilî manuscripts of al-Yaman, where the influence of the Mu'tazila remained while it disappeared from the Persian scene in consequence too of the invasions of the Mongols.

The greatest Mu'tazilî scholar in the second half of this century was without any doubt 'Abd al-Jabbâr. In the older European handbooks of Islamic theology his ideas are scarcely mentioned at all, but since the rediscovery and publication of his works appreciation for him and for the later Mu'tazila has steadily been growing so that he is now numbered among the greatest Muslim theologians.²¹

Ibn al-Murtaḍâ mentions him as the leading scholar of the eleventh generation of the Mu'tazila and records the saying of al-Ḥâkim :

"I do not know any expression which might do justice to the place he ('Abd al-Jabbâr) occupied in matters of science and culture, for it is he who laid open the speculative theology and spread its coolness and wrote about it splendid books, which reached the Orient and the Occident. He includes therein a so accurate and splendid theological thought as no one ever reached. His whole long life he devoted to teaching and dictating (of his works) so that he covered the world with his books and his disciples; his fame reached far, and great was

¹⁹ For a general survey of the history of this dynasty : Cl Cahen, *Buwayhids or Bûyids*, *EP*², I, 1350-1357 with an enlightening sketch of the different rulers out of this dynasty on p 1351

For a thorough and more elaborate investigation of their history and position Heribert Busse, *Chalif und Grosskönig, Die Buviden im Irak 945-1055*, Wiesbaden 1969

²⁰ The traditional leaders of the Islamic community accused the Mu'tazila of using rational argumentation in a field where no argumentation but only belief is required, the field of divine revelation. Moreover, the scientific method and the basic presuppositions of the Mu'tazila were considered to be non-Islamic, as derived from the Greek philosophy. Cf. L Gardet, *Raison et foi en Islam*, 450 and R. Arnaldez, *Grammaire et théologie chez Ibn Ḥazm de Cordoue*, 260.

²¹ R. Caspar, *Le renouveau du Mu'tazilisme*, 151-152 and R. M. Frank, *BIOR* 29, 354.

his importance. He got a leading position among the Mu'tazila so that he became their unmatched teacher and scholar, everybody based himself on his books and his 'questiones' so that his works replaced the books of the (Mu'tazilî) teachers of former generations"²²

His life

To gather trustworthy information about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's biographical data is a difficult task²³. The first difficulty already presents itself as soon as we try to reconstruct his full name. Taking into account the items to which an amount of certainty can be attributed, we reconstruct it as Abû l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbâr bn Ahmad al-Hamađâni, frequently preceded by the honorific title Qâdî l-Qudât.²⁴

²² Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 112, cf. al-Hâkim, *Šarh al-'uyûn*, 365

²³ The most important available sources for the life of 'Abd al-Jabbâr are al-Hâkim, *Šarh al-'uyûn*, 365-371, Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 112-113, Ibn al-A'îr, *al-Kâmil fi l-târîḫ*, VIII, 694, IX, 111 and 334, as-Subkî, *Tabaqât as-Šâfi'iya*, III, 114 and 219-220, al-Ḳatib al-Bagdâdî, *Târîḫ Bagdâd*, XI, 113-115, Yâqût, *Irsâd*, I, 70-71, II, 312-314 and 335

In recent years three monographs have been written about 'Abd al-Jabbâr and his theology: 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât 'Abd al-Jabbâr bn Ahmad al-Hamađâni*, Bayrût 1386 AH/ 1967 AD, 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf, Arâ' al-Qâdî 'Abd al-Jabbâr al-Kalâmiya*, Bayrût 1391 AH/ 1971 AD, George F. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism, the ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbâr*, Oxford 1971

The first book, which is based upon an extensive research of many manuscripts and printed sources, describes the life and works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr and gives a general, but rather superficial, survey of his theology. In his second work 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân explicitly and in detail treats 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, this study is structured around the concept of the *taklîf*, gives much attention to the text of the *Muhit*, and often literally keeps to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's words. Hourani deals with 'Abd al-Jabbâr's ethics and compares them with modern ethical systems, in my opinion the ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbâr should first be studied in the context of the whole of his theology.

²⁴ The core of the problem rests in the Arabic custom of inserting the ancestors' names, thus one finds for instance bn Ahmad bn 'Abd al-Jabbâr (Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 112), as-Subkî continues this series of ancestors bn Ahmad bn 'Abd al-Jabbâr bn Ahmad bn al-Ḳalîl bn 'Abdallâh (III, 219-220), without stating which source he used, 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân shortens this series bn Ahmad bn Ḳalîl bn 'Abdallâh (*Qâdî l-Qudât*, 11), Brockelmann's choice for bn Muhammad bn 'Abd al-Jabbâr (*GAL*, S I, 343) must be a mistake. Most authors restrict themselves to bn Ahmad (Ibn al-A'îr, Yâqût) or to bn Ahmad bn 'Abd al-Jabbâr.

As regards the detail "al-Hamađâni", it is noteworthy that by most writers this is indeed read as "al-Hamađâni" (descendent from Hamađân, a region where probably also the birth-place of 'Abd al-Jabbâr is to be found, cf. 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 13), but by Prof. Mustafâ as-Saqqâ in the introduction to part XIV of *al-Muḡni*, on the first page, as "al-Hamdâni". He traces this name back to Hamdân, an old Yemenitic tribe. Badawî (*Histoire*, 199) follows this vocalization. In the edition of Ibn al-Murtađâ (112) we find (not vocalized) al-Hmdâni. On account of the similarity between the consonants *ḡ* and *d* in Arabic writing it remains difficult to decide which

The most characteristic part of his name, and that by which he is usually named, is 'Abd al-Jabbâr, but among Mu'tazila he is often called Qâdî l-Qudât or al-Qâdî.²⁵

All historical data with regard to his birth are absent. But since the year of his death is given as 414, 415, or 416 AH,²⁶ alongside with the fact that he lived to attain a high age surpassing even ninety years,²⁷ we can safely conclude that his birth goes back to around 320 AH/932 AD, probably at Asad Âbâd in the region of Hamađân.²⁸

Having first applied himself to studies in his place of birth, he continued these in Hamađân and Isfahân, where he became a follower of the theological school of al-Aš'arî.

Afterwards he went to al-Basra, where he became impressed by the teaching of the Mu'tazila and decided to become a Mu'tazilî himself.²⁹ His teacher there was Abû Ishâq. After a while he went to Bagdâd, where he became a disciple of Abû 'Abdallâh al-Basrî.³⁰

After the year 360 the wazîr aš-Šâhib bn 'Abbâd invited him to come to Rayy and appointed him to the important function of chief-judge in Rayy,³¹ within the direct vicinity of modern Teheran. He held this

one has been the original name, but since it is practically certain that 'Abd al-Jabbâr was born in Hamađân (not the city but the region), the solution as therefrom derived appears the most acceptable Cf al-Hâkîm, *Šarh al-'uyûn*, 366

To the aforesaid name is sometimes added "al-Asad Âbâdî" to specify his place of birth, but where in regard to this denomination also a number of variations are brought up, it is advisable to see 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 26-27

Hourani (*Islamic Rationalism*, 5) mentions yet another honorific title that was sometimes used for 'Abd al-Jabbâr 'Imâd ad-Dîn (Pillar of the Religion), cf al-Hâkîm, *Šarh al-'uyûn*, 365

²⁵ Cf as-Subkî, *Ṭabaqât aš-Šâfi'iya*, III, 219-220 For an example see Ibn al-Murtadâ, *passim*

²⁶ Most sources offer 415 as the year of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's death, and this date is normally adhered to, for a discussion of the various possibilities 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 26-27

²⁷ Ibn al-Aṭîr, IX, 334

²⁸ Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 11 Asad Âbâd is a Persian city one day's journey from the city of Hamađân

²⁹ Cf Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 112; al-Hâkîm, *Šarh al-'uyûn*, 366

³⁰ Cf Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 112 and 105-107, al-Hâkîm, *Šarh al-'uyûn*, 366

³¹ Abû l-Qâsim Ismâ'il bn 'Abbâd at-Ṭalaqânî, known as Ibn 'Abbâd or by his honorific title as-Šâhib, was born in 326 AH/938 AD. He occupied a position as wazîr to the Bûyid prince Mu'ayyid ad-Dawla (366-373) and later to Faḡr ad-Dawla. His activity as wazîr was interwoven with the struggle for power between the different Bûyid princes. He is known both as an eminent wazîr and as a scholar and man of letters who wrote himself many works on various subjects, and managed to gather in the city of Rayy a circle of scholars and poets under his patronage. Following Mu'tazilî tendencies of thought, he invited 'Abd al-Jabbâr to Rayy there to take up the function

office till his promotor's death in 385; this office assured him his title of "Qâdî l-Qudât". Since that time, no longer being able to continue his dedication to public duties, he henceforth probably consecrated his life to his studies and teaching until his death at Rayy in 414, 415, or 416 AH (1023-1025 AD).

His works

During his long life 'Abd al-Jabbâr composed numerous writings, many of them in dictating form, about the most diverse subjects of Islamic sciences.

Ibn al-Murtadâ records al-Hâkim's saying that he has heard that the works composed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr came to a total of 400.000 sheets of paper. He apologizes that it is not possible to mention them all, and that he has to restrict himself to some examples; but even then he mentions 27 titles.³²

'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân has searched 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works and many other sources and manuscripts for titles of other books from his hand, mentioned in these texts, trying to make a list as complete as possible of all his writings. In doing so he arrives at a total of 69 titles.³³

Out of the twenty-seven works mentioned by al-Hâkim according to him twelve are concerned with subjects of speculative theology (*kalâm*), among them the famous works *al-Muğnî*, *al-Muḥiṭ*, and *Šarḥ al-usûl al-kamsa*; four are commentaries, two deal with principles of legislation (*uṣûl al-fiqh*), two books contain refutations of works written by his opponents, five give answers to questions posed to him, one is about points of disagreement (*kilâf*), and one contains religious exhortations (*mawâ'iz*).³⁴

Among the sixty-nine titles listed by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, forty-

of chief judge This function probably included the right to nominate the judges in the district and to this functionary one turned if one wanted to appeal to a higher court, which shows that this function was of great importance Ibn 'Abbâd died in 380 AH/990 AD

Cf Cl Cahen and Ch Pellat, art *Ibn 'Abbâd*, *EP*, III, 671-673

³² Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 113 Badawî (*Histoire*, 201-202) comes to a total of 29 titles His number 29 is based on a misinterpretation of Ibn al-Murtadâ's text, further, he divides "*An-Nihâya wa-l-'amâ*" into two titles Cf, however, 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 61-62 Cf also al-Hâkim, *Šarḥ al-'uṣûn*, 367-369

³³ Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 55-72 He also mentions "*Ar-Risâla fî 'ilm al-kimîya*" (Cf Brockelman, *GAL* S I, 343), but comes to the conclusion that this "letter" is not composed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr (*Qâdî l-Qudât*, 72)

³⁴ Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 113

five refer to speculative theology and the principles of religion (*'ilm al-kalâm wa-usûl ad-dîn*), the others are concerned with Qur'ân-sciences (five), traditions or *hadîth* (two), religious exhortations (two), legislation or *fiqh* (seven), points of disagreement (two), biography (one), others (five)³⁵

It is evident that his interest in theology has widened very considerably, though he was famous too as a scholar in the field of Islamic legislation, but, according to his own saying, "there are many people who devote themselves to the study of Islamic legislation for worldly reasons, but speculative theology finds its one and only goal in God Himself"³⁶

Most of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works are lost forever or are, undiscovered yet, hidden in some library. At the moment thirteen of his works are known to exist in manuscript, completely or partly, seven of them have been published already.³⁷ These seven books are

1 *Mutašâbih al-Qur'ân* (or *Bayân al-mutašâbih fî l-Qur'ân*, as 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself calls this work), this book has been edited by Dr 'Adrân Muhammad Zarzûr and was published in al-Qâhira in 1969.³⁸ The title of this book, which may be translated as "the non-clearly-intelligible passages from the Qur'ân", refers to a Mu'tazilî genre of Qur'ân-interpretation in which the authors react against the literal interpretation of every expression in the Qur'ân, and try to discover the true sense of these expressions, making use of linguistic arguments and placing these non-clearly-intelligible passages against the background of the totality of the Islamic revelation. As a conclusion of this work, 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that he has proved that his opponents (al-Mujabbira, the adherents of Ibn Ḥanbal, and all those who deny that human beings perform their own acts) do not have any argument in the text of the Qur'ân on which they can base themselves.³⁹ This book has been dictated during the time 'Abd al-Jabbâr also dictated the *Mugnî* (360-380 AH),⁴⁰ and before he wrote his *Tanzîh al-Qur'ân*

³⁵ 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân *Qâdî l-Qudât* 55-72

³⁶ Quoted by al-Hâkim, *Šarh al-'uyûn*, 367

³⁷ A list of manuscripts is found in Sezgin, *GAS* I 625-626. Fourteen manuscripts are mentioned there, including, however, *Ar-Risâla fî l-kimya*, the authenticity of which is very doubtful. Cf. note 33.

³⁸ This work has been published by Dâr at-turâṭ in two volumes, it numbers 808 pages. 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions this work in *Mugnî* XX/2,258, and gives it the title *Bayân al-mutašâbih fî l-Qur'ân*.

³⁹ *Mutašâbih al-Qur'ân*, 711

⁴⁰ In *Mugnî* XX/2,258 this book is said to have been dictated during the time the

'*an al-maṭā'in*. In his introduction to this last book he briefly explains why he wrote the other one: "Many people err because they base themselves on (a literal interpretation of) the non-clearly-intelligible passages from the Qur'ān; ... therefore we have dictated a book that distinguishes between the clearly and the non-clearly-intelligible passages. We treated in that (book) all the *suwar* (chapters) of the Qur'ān in succession, we explained the meaning of the non-clearly-intelligible verses, and we also explained how some people misinterpreted them, all this in the hope that more profit is gained from the reading of the Qur'ān."⁴¹

2. *Tanzih al-Qur'ān 'an al-maṭā'in*, printed in al-Qāhira (1329 AH) and reprinted in Bayrūt (n.d.).⁴² The title of this work can be translated as "demonstration that the Qur'ān is above all abusive attacks", but the word "*tanzih*" is also a theological terminus technicus meaning "de-anthropomorphism". The book belongs to the literary genre of the "*tafsir*", the commentary on the Qur'ān. But though 'Abd al-Jabbār in this work covers all the *suwar* (chapters) of the Qur'ān, he only deals with a restricted number of verses. Mostly he answers questions and reacts to opponents who make objections against the text of the Qur'ān or against his theology on the basis of a text from the Qur'ān; sometimes 'Abd al-Jabbār only explains a verse or shows that it constitutes an argument for his own theology. In his introduction he states that his main goal is to clarify the "meanings" (*ma'ānī*) of the Qur'ān.⁴³ As we saw above, this work has been written after "*Mutaṣābih al-Qur'ān*", and, since the *Muḡnī* does not mention it among the works 'Abd al-Jabbār wrote during the time he dictated the *Muḡnī*, he probably composed it after the year 380 AH.

3. *Taḥbīt dalā'il an-nubūwa*, edited by Dr. 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṭmān and printed in Bayrūt (1966 or later).⁴⁴ In this book, "Establishment

Muḡnī was composed, it is also mentioned in *Muḡnī* XVII,94 Cf also 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṭmān, *Qādī l-Qudāt*, 58

⁴¹ *Tanzih al-Qur'ān 'an al-maṭā'in*, 3-4 (Egyptian edition)

⁴² The Egyptian edition was, without the mention of an editor, printed by Al-Matba'a al-Jamāliya and numbers 392 pages, it was published together with the introduction to the *tafsir* by Abū l-Qāsim ar-Ragīb al-Isfahānī. The Lebanese edition is a reprint of the original Egyptian edition, it even reprints its introduction, it numbers 496 pages. I quote the Egyptian edition

⁴³ *Tanzih al-Qur'ān 'an al-maṭā'in*, 3

⁴⁴ This work has been published by Dār al-'Arabiya in two volumes (718 pages). The introduction to this edition has been dated 1386 AH/ 1966 AD, Badawi (*Histoire*, 202) gives 1968 as the year of publishing

of the indications of (Muḥammad's) prophethip", written in the year 385 AH,⁴⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr, basing himself on the text of the Qur'ân and the traditions about Muḥammad, argues from miracles and Muḥammad's knowledge of hidden things that he was truly a prophet. This work is ranged by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân among the works about traditions (*ḥadîṭ*).

4. *Faḍl al-Fīzâl*, edited by Fu'âd Sayyid and printed in Tûnis in 1974. This book, which includes a general introduction to the doctrine of the Mu'tazila and 'Abd al-Jabbâr's "*Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*", belongs to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's latest works and must have been composed between 388 and 407 AH.⁴⁶

5. *Šarḥ al-uṣûl al-ḳamsa*, edited by Dr. 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân and printed in al-Qâhira in 1384 AH/ 1965 AD.⁴⁷ This work, which was dictated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr during the time he also dictated the *Muḡni*, has been preserved in two different versions made by two of his disciples; the editor used the version of Qawâm ad-Dîn Mânkdîm Ahmad bn al-Ḥusayn bn Abî Hâšim al-Ḥusaynî Šašdiw.⁴⁸ One might suppose that this work is a commentary ("*šarḥ*") on an older book, called "*Al-Uṣûl al-ḳamsa*", written by one of the older Mu'tazila; it is, however, very significant that al-Ḥâkim in his enumeration of some of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works—although he has a special category of commentaries and although he mentions the title of this work as "*Šarḥ al-uṣûl al-ḳamsa*"—does not mention this book in his "*šarḥ*"-category.⁴⁹ In this book 'Abd al-Jabbâr does what the title promises: he gives a commentary on the five principles of Mu'tazilî theology. Like the next two books to be mentioned, this work too is a hand-book of speculative theology (*kalâm*).

⁴⁵ This date is given in *Taḥbîṭ dalâ'il an-nubûwa*, 168 Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Qadî l-Qudât*, 60

⁴⁶ Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Qadî l-Qudât*, 63-64 This work is the one he mentions in the category "biography" It has been published—together with passages from Abû l-Qâsim al-Balkî's *Maqâlât al-Islâmiyyin* and from al-Ḥâkim's *Šarḥ al-'uyûn*—under the title "*Faḍl al-Fīzâl wa-Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*" 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text is found on pp 135-350 The work was published by ad-Dâr at-Tûnisiya li-n-našr and numbers 451 pp

⁴⁷ It has been published by Maktabat Wahba and numbers 830 pages

⁴⁸ Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân in his introduction to the *Šarḥ* (*Šarḥ* 28-29) The other disciple who wrote a version of the *Šarḥ* was called Abû Muhammad bn Ismâ'il 'Alî al-Farzâdî Cf also *Muḡni* XX 2, 258

⁴⁹ *Šarḥ al-'uyûn*, 368, cf Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 113 For a discussion of this question cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân in his introduction to the *Šarḥ* (*Šarḥ* 26-28)

6. *Al-Muḥiṭ bi-t-taklīf*; this work, which probably was written after 380, the year in which 'Abd al-Jabbār completed his *Muḡnī*, exists in the version of 'Abd al-Jabbār's disciple Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan bn Aḥmad bn Mattawayh. This version, which bears the title "*Al-Majmū' fī l-muḥiṭ bi-t-taklīf*", has been edited under this title by Dr. J. J. Houben in Bayrūt and by 'Umar as-Sayyid 'Azmi under the title "*Al-Muḥiṭ bi-t-taklīf*" in al-Qāhira; both editions were published in the same year 1965. So far of both editions only the first of the four volumes has appeared; this volume contains the treatise on the *tawḥīd* and part of the treatise on the *'adl*.

Of the original work of 'Abd al-Jabbār some fragments seem to have been preserved in Hebrew transliteration.⁵⁰

7. *Al-Muḡnī fī abwāb at-tawḥīd wa-l-'adl*; 'Abd al-Jabbār's elaborate *summa theologica*, dictated between 360 and 380 AH, originally consisted of twenty parts, fourteen of which have been discovered, and edited by various scholars; they have been published in Egypt from 1960 onwards. About this important work I speak in detail later on.

His doctrine

From texts of the last three works mentioned, 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine in matters of theology can be read and reconstructed. By doing so we come to the conclusion that he was not an outspoken original thinker. He was a true and good Mu'tazilī: he knew the history of his school and its ideas and became the great "compiler" of the Mu'tazilī ideas as developed in former centuries by his great predecessors. But he did more than that: he built a comprehensive, coherent, and closed system of theological thinking on the foundations laid for him by the older generations of Mu'tazila. He himself considers his greatest merit to be the making of a systematic approach to theological questions and the elaboration of the principles of argumen-

⁵⁰ The Lebanese edition, published by al-Matba'a al-Kāṭūlikiya, numbers 449 pages; the Egyptian edition, published by ad-Dār al-Misriya li-t-ta'liḥ wa-t-tarjama, gives the original text in 422 pages. My references will be to the Lebanese edition.

Recently Ben-Shammai in his article *A Note on some Karate Copies of Mu'tazilite Writings* pointed to some fragments in the libraries of London and Leningrad and proved them to be transcriptions in Hebrew characters of parts of the *Muḥiṭ* in a version different from that made by Ibn Mattawayh. According to Ben-Shammai, it may very well be the transliteration of a copy of the original work of 'Abd al-Jabbār. A thorough study of the fragments--if possible also those in the library in Leningrad could be of much help both for the understanding of the *Muḥiṭ* as we have it in the version of Ibn Mattawayh, and for the study of 'Abd al-Jabbār's theology.

tation in general,—the lack of these was, according to him, the cause of many errors—,⁵¹ and he was the more apt to do this since he had to respond to the attacks launched by the great opponent of the Mu'tazilî theology, al-Aš'arî, and his school. He is forced to sharpen his argumentations and his terminology and to make his system as coherent and as defensible as he could.

Although in the course of the present study we shall discover and elaborate the contents of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system, it may be useful to sketch here very briefly some of its major features. They are chosen somewhat at random and are primarily introduced here to give an impression of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's place in the history of the philosophical and theological traditions of his time. I restrict myself to that part of his theology which forms the object of this study, and leave aside other subject-matters, such as the contents of the revealed theology, exegesis, legislation, and the organization of the Islamic society.

'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology is a permanent attempt to make a synthesis between the data of the human intellect and those of the Islamic revelation : he really wants to build an "Islamic theology".

This becomes clear where he considers human intuition—and here also perception finds its place—to be a source of true and reliable knowledge, which in fact is guaranteed by God Himself. In this way this kind of knowledge is as "divine" and as "theological" as the knowledge which is revealed by God to His prophets and transmitted by them. Consequently, both kinds of knowledge cannot really be contradictory; in the case of an apparent contradiction, the data of the revelation have to be interpreted according to the conclusions of human reflection on this intuition.

For 'Abd al-Jabbâr the only way to arrive at real knowledge of God is to start from human intuition and to reflect upon this intuition; this reflection, consequently, is the first duty of every human being. Thus, man can know God without any assistance of revelation; a "natural religion" is very well possible. Reflecting in this way, man even must come to the conclusion that God is absolutely one and

⁵¹ He says so at the end of the dictation of his *Mugni Mugni* XX/2, 255-257. One small fragment "Maybe someone will say what this book contains is only a compilation of what was (already) known from the (other) books (Answer) The question is not as he assumes, if you study it, there is no doubt that in every chapter of it nothing is left out—a wide-spread collection and a miscellaneous compilation, the explanation of the correct issue, and the warning for sophisms (the arguments of the opponents), the study of the conditions of the indication (the basis of every argumentation), and the definition of those things upon which (in *Mugni* XX 2, 255, line 19 read 'alayh instead of 'illatuh) the point and the correct issue are built"

indivisible and absolutely just; both principles of Mu'tazilī theology can be deduced by human reflection. But this God never becomes a purely "philosophical" god: He remains the personal God of the Islamic revelation, who sent His message to Muḥammad and revealed the Qur'ān.

Man is for 'Abd al-Jabbār, in contradiction to the Aristotelian tradition, an absolute unity; any distinction between a spirit and a body is rejected as is the case with the assumption that there are separate faculties, such as intellect and will. The human being is a material unity, which as a whole acts, thinks, or wills. But man is also thought of and described as the person who has to fulfil the duties imposed by God, and who is responsible towards God for all his acts.

The world is built from substances and accidents as in the Aristotelian philosophy; substances are composed of atoms, their smallest possible parts. Though 'Abd al-Jabbār also seems to know a similar division of time into time-atoms, this does not lead to an absolute atomism in which at every moment of time all things have to be created anew. Things can remain, and in this way the principle of causality in this world is safeguarded so that the human being can be truly responsible for his own acts.

Throughout 'Abd al-Jabbār's theology we see, besides the attempt to realize a synthesis between the faith of Islām and the conclusions of an independently operating intellect, a permanent emphasis on the relation between God and man, an emphasis which certainly has to be reckoned among the main characteristics of 'Abd al-Jabbār's theological doctrine.

At the end of our study we add a final chapter describing some more characteristics of 'Abd al-Jabbār's theology, its method and its contents. We suggest that one first reads those "conclusions" before studying our second and third chapters. Hopefully, this "summary" shows the great outlines of his theology and thus helps understand the other chapters.

4. THE "THEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT" OF 'ABD AL-JABBĀR

His teachers

In the course of his theological works 'Abd al-Jabbār often refers to "our teachers";⁵² from the passages in which he is a little more

⁵² I am referring here to the Arabic word *ṣaykūnā* and its derivatives. The word *ṣaykū* is a more general title of honour, which is used also as an epithet for an eminent teacher

specific and gives some names of the scholars referred to, it becomes clear that he is using this word not only when referring to his own immediate teachers, but also to indicate the totality of the former Mu'tazila or one or the other of their great scholars of the past.⁵³

As to his teachers in the strict sense of the word, the scholars with whom he studied in his youth: after his conversion to the Mu'tazilî way of theological thinking, he studied first with Abû Ishâq in al-Baṣra and afterwards with Abû 'Abdallâh in Bagdâd.⁵⁴ In the *Fadl al-ʿIṭzâl* 'Abd al-Jabbâr declares to have studied with Abû Ishâq,⁵⁵ concerning Abû 'Abdallâh, we read in the *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila* that his books were in the possession of 'Abd al-Jabbâr when the latter went to Rayy after his appointment as chief-judge by Ibn 'Abbâd.⁵⁶

As far as we know, these two scholars were the direct teachers of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. Although Abû 'Abdallâh lived and worked in Bagdâd, he did not belong to the Bagdâdî school of the Mu'tazila, but, just as Abû Ishâq, he must be reckoned to be a member of the Baṣrî school, both of them being disciples of Abû Hâšim, in his life-time the head of the Baṣrî school.⁵⁷

About Abû Ishâq Ibrâhîm bn 'Ayyâš al-Baṣrî we know scarcely more than his name;⁵⁸ Abû 'Abdallâh al-Ḥusayn bn 'Alî al-Baṣrî was a theologian and a jurist who spent the whole of his life in Bagdâd. Ibn al-Murtaḍâ has handed down to us some anecdotal stories about his assiduity in working, his long dictations and short lessons (a habit contrary to that of his colleagues), his purity, and his piety.⁵⁹

and scholar Although it does not totally correspond with the English word "teacher", the addition of the possessive pronoun "our" (in English, *-nâ* in Arabic) stresses the relation to the author

In the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr we find the singular *šaykunâ* (cf., e.g., *Muḡnî* VII, 27) applied to individual scholars, and the plural forms *šuyûkunâ* (*Muḡnî* VII, 3) and *mašâyikunâ* (*Šarh* 307) mostly used for the whole of the Mu'tazila

⁵³ For instance, Abû Hâšim (d 321 AH) in *Muḡnî* VII, 27 and elsewhere very often, Abû 'Alî (d 303 AH) in *Muḡnî* VII, 31 and elsewhere very often, but it is also used for others, such as Abû l-Huḍayl al-'Allâf (d ±230 AH) in *Šarh* 307, and for Abû l-Qâsim al-Balkî al-Ka'bi (d 319 AH) in *Šarh* 434

⁵⁴ Cf. al-Hâkîm, *Šarh al-'uyûn*, 366 and Ibn al-Murtaḍâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 112

⁵⁵ *Fadl al-ʿIṭzâl*, 328

⁵⁶ Ibn al-Murtaḍâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 107

⁵⁷ Ibn al-Murtaḍâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 94 and 105-107

⁵⁸ Even about this name there is some disagreement Fu'âd Sayyid (*Fadl al-ʿIṭzâl*, 328) reads 'Abbâs instead of 'Ayyâš Abû Ishâq worked in various places, he was very pious, ascetic, and learned He wrote some good books, among which one about the *Imâma* of al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn and their superiority Cf. *Fadl al-ʿIṭzâl*, 328-329 and Ibn al-Murtaḍâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 107

⁵⁹ Ibn al-Murtaḍâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 105-107 He followed Abû 'Alî bn Ḳallâd,

With regard to 'Abd al-Jabbâr and his theology, the main task of these two teachers, apparently not very important and anyhow not great or original thinkers, has been that they constituted the living link between 'Abd al-Jabbâr and the two great Mu'tazilî theologians who really were his "two teachers": Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâšim.

Abû 'Alî Muḥammad bn 'Abd al-Wahhâb al-Jubbâ'î⁶⁰ is generally known by his surname al-Jubbâ'î (the man from Jubbâ); 'Abd al-Jabbâr, however, always calls him by his kunya Abû 'Alî, a custom we will follow in this book.

Abû 'Alî was born in 235 AH/ 849 AD in Jubbâ, a town and region in Kuzistân east of al-Bašra;⁶¹ he studied and worked mainly in al-Bašra; he died in 303 AH/ 915 AD and was buried in Jubbâ.⁶² Until his death he was the head of the Basrî school of the Mu'tazila; in this position he was the successor of Abû Ya'qûb Yûsuf aš-Šaḥḥâm, who also was his main teacher.⁶³

Abû 'Alî was himself the teacher of Abû l-Ḥasan al-Aš'arî, who was to become later one of the principal opponents of the Mu'tazilî theology and took great pains to refute in his works the theses of his former teacher. Many of al-Aš'arî's works have survived until now and have already been published, whereas no original work of Abû 'Alî, out of the numerous pages he has written,⁶⁴ has been handed down to us in its totality. So he suffers from the disadvantage that modern scholars had access to his theology only and mainly by reading a refutation of it.

The publication of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works has recently changed this situation: his books contain much explicit information on the theology of his teacher, and we can be sure that many of the arguments and opinions recorded by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as being his own are in fact borrowed from the works of Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâšim. These two possible approaches to Abû 'Alî's theology may be the reason of the great divergencies in appreciation one finds among modern scholars

later Abû Hâšim, and was the most serious and assiduous among Abû Hâšim's disciples. He studied for quite a long time Islamic jurisprudence (*fiqh*) with Abû l-Ḥasan al-Karḳî. He showed definitely Šî'î tendencies and wrote a very good book about this subject. Cf. *Fadl al-Γ'uzâl*, 325-328.

⁶⁰ Cf. *Fadl al-Γ'uzâl*, 287.

⁶¹ *Ibn Khallikan's Bibliographical Dictionary* II, 671.

⁶² Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 85.

⁶³ Cf., for instance, Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 71 and 80, *Ibn Khallikan's Bibliographical Dictionary* II, 669.

⁶⁴ Ibn al-Murtadâ recorded the saying of Abû l-Ḥusayn that the dictations alone of Abû 'Alî filled 150 000 sheets of paper (*Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 82).

concerning his theological work and his position in the history of the Mu'tazila and the history of Islamic theology in general. Some authors see in him the beginning of a theological decadence, they strongly emphasize what they call his rationalistic tendencies and his verbal subtlety,⁶⁵ others consider him an original thinker, one of the greatest Muslim theologians, who greatly influenced later generations.⁶⁶

Personally, I think it worth while trying to reconstruct Abû 'Alî's theology, making use of the now published works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr

Abû Hâšim 'Abd as-Salâm bn Muhammad bn 'Abd al-Wahhâb al-Jubbâ'î⁶⁷ was born the son of Abû 'Alî in al-Basra in the year 277 AH/ 890 AD. He studied theology with his father in al-Basra, and, as so many Mu'tazila, he applied himself also to the study of Arabic grammar, here his teacher was the famous Mu'tazilî grammarian al-Mubarrad. After the death of his father in 303 AH/ 915 AD he became the leading theologian of the Basrî school. Afterwards, he moved to Bagdâd, where he died in 321 AH/ 933 AD.⁶⁸

Much of what has been said about his father applies to him: no works have survived as far as we know, we have to deduce his ideas from quotations by other authors and from refutations by his opponents whose books met a better fate than Abû Hâšim's. His ideas, still more than those of Abû 'Alî, are explicitly or implicitly preserved for us in the writings of 'Abd al-Jabbâr.

There was a disagreement between him and his father about various theological topics, and Abû Hâšim has been attacked because of this, 'Abd al-Jabbâr, however, takes his defence declaring that a disciple must have the right to disagree with his teacher and that, moreover, the topics about which he disagreed were not essential but only of minor importance.⁶⁹

His opponents

'Abd al-Jabbâr is very often arguing in his works against one or more opponents, sometimes he calls them by name, but it is remarkable

⁶⁵ So, for instance, Laoust, *Les schismes dans l'Islam*, 128. Allard, who made a study of the theology of al-Aš'arî, runs the risk of seeing Abû 'Alî entirely through the eyes of his former disciple, cf. *Le problème*, 132-133.

⁶⁶ Gardet, art. *Al-Djubbâ'î*, *EP*², II, 569 and Frank, *Kalâm*, 299.

⁶⁷ Cf. Ibn al-Murtaḍâ, *Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 94.

⁶⁸ According to Ibn al-Murtaḍâ (*Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 96), he moved to Bagdâd in 317 AH for financial reasons, according to Ibn an-Nadim (*Fihrist*, 174) this happened in 314 AH. For some anecdotes on Abû Hâšim *Fadl al-Fīzâl*, 304-308.

⁶⁹ Recorded by Ibn al-Murtaḍâ, *Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 95.

how many times he speaks about them in very general and often impersonal terms. The reason may be that in some cases these opponents and the described oppositions are imaginary ones; in other cases, however, we are able to discover the scholars referred to.

His main opponent appears to be **Abû l-Ḥasan al-Aš'arî**. Al-Aš'arî had followed the same road as 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the evolution of his theological thinking, but he did it the other way round. Whereas 'Abd al-Jabbâr began as a follower of the Aš'arî theology and was converted to the Mu'tazila, al-Aš'arî had been a Mu'tazilî until he decided to leave this school and turned to the doctrine of Ibn Ḥanbal, keeping, nevertheless, to the rational methods of the Mu'tazila, and thus inaugurating a relatively new form of Islamic theology,⁷⁰ which has been called "Sunnite theology".

Maybe because of this similarity in the life-history of both men, 'Abd al-Jabbâr appears to have conceived an outspoken and almost personal aversion to al-Aš'arî although the latter died about the time 'Abd al-Jabbâr was born. Often he argues against al-Aš'arî's ideas and he refutes his arguments, but he scarcely ever mentions his name; and when he does so, he evidently cannot help joining to it a qualification expression his disdain.⁷¹

Abû l-Ḥasan 'Alî bn Ismâ'îl al-Aš'arî⁷² was born in al-Baṣra probably in the year 260 AH/ 873-874 AD. Here he studied Mu'tazilî theology with Abû 'Alî, but around the year 300 AH/ 913 AD⁷³ he was converted to the ideas of Ibn Ḥanbal, which he tried to formulate and to defend by means of the rational method of argumentation he had learned to use during his studies in Mu'tazilî theology. Later he moved to Baġdâd where he died probably in 324 AH/ 935-936 AD.⁷⁴ He wrote many books; a good number of them were refutations of the

⁷⁰ The originality and newness of al-Aš'arî's theology is often overemphasized, there already existed a tradition of *Sunnî* theology in the days of al-Aš'arî, the so-called Kullâbiya

⁷¹ *Šarh* 183, 235, and 477 In the first chapter of the seventh part of the *Mugni* 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "Al-Aš'arî committed the outrage to say " (*Mugni* VII, 4), and in the rest of this part his name will not be mentioned again

⁷² For all data about his life and his works and for a critical examination of information handed down to us by Islamic tradition, see the excellent study of Michel Allard *Le problème des attributs divins dans la doctrine d'Al-Aš'arî et de ses premiers grands disciples*, especially 25-72

⁷³ The year 300 AH, traditionally given, may be symbolical For the various versions of the story of al-Aš'arî's conversion, see Watt, *Formative Period*, 304-306 and Allard, *Le problème*, 37-39

⁷⁴ Cf Allard, *Le problème*, 49

Mu'tazili theology.⁷⁵ Very generally speaking, we can say that he defends the literal interpretation of all Qur'ân-expressions; thus he affirms the reality of all God's qualities, of all eschatological images, even of the fact that God then will be seen by human eyes.

Among al-Aš'arî's fore-runners and 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents is a most remarkable scholar, called **Ibn Kullâb**. His name is often found—just as the name of his "school", the "Kullâbiya"—when 'Abd al-Jabbâr is recording the views of his opponents.⁷⁶

Ibn Kullâb, the same as al-Aš'arî, tried to fight the Mu'tazila of his time with their own intellectual weapons, the methods of rational thinking, meanwhile holding on to the pure doctrine of the traditionalists. In doing so, he created what might be called a third way of expressing the belief of Islâm rather than a new school; probably, al-Aš'arî's so-called "conversion" was in fact his feeling attracted to this already existing third way and his transition to it. Anyhow, this was how 'Abd al-Jabbâr saw it. In listing the opinions of his opponents about various subjects, he mentions al-Aš'arî's name—if it is mentioned at all—just after Ibn Kullâb's without much difference in the opinions recorded; and, evidently, al-Aš'arî and his followers usually are reckoned among the Kullâbiya.⁷⁷

Recently Josef van Ess published a very thorough study on this scholar and his doctrine, a study which saved him from oblivion and presented a remarkable synthesis of our information about this early Muslim theologian.⁷⁸ So we cannot do better than make use of this work and summarize here some of its conclusions.

His name is reconstructed with some probability—as: Abû Muḥammad 'Abdallâh bn Sa'id bn Muḥammad bn Kullâb al-Qaṭṭân al-Bašrî.⁷⁹ About the course of his life and his activities—other than his theological doctrine—next to nothing is known⁸⁰ but we assume that he died in 241 AH/ 855 AD.⁸¹ This implies that he lived and

⁷⁵ For a critical survey of the authenticity and the contents of these books see Allard, *Le problème*, 48-74, Watt, *Formative Period*, 306-307, summarizes Allard's main conclusions

⁷⁶ The bulk of the discussions about the nature of the Qur'ân seems to be with the Kullâbiya, cf *Muḡni* VII, 95-179

⁷⁷ Cf van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 136.

⁷⁸ Josef van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb und die Mihna. Oriens* 18-19 (1967), 92-142

⁷⁹ Cf van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 98-99 He also treats the questions of the vocalization of his name (Ibn Kullâb or Ibn Kilâb) and its meaning (a patronymic or an agnomen, deciding for the first solution)

⁸⁰ Cf Allard, *Le problème*, 146, van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, passim

⁸¹ Cf van Fss, *Ibn Kullâb*, 99

worked during the time of the *Mihna*, the Mu'tazilī "inquisition", which brought the questions concerning the createdness or eternity of the Qur'ân to the forefront. Therefore, it is not surprising that the information we have about his theology is mostly concerned with the nature of the Qur'ân and God's speech and with the more general but related question of God's qualities.

Although he was almost forgotten in later centuries and al-Aš'arī's star seems to have eclipsed Ibn Kullâb's, he was an outstanding scholar among whose disciples are counted some great names of his time.⁸²

In his doctrine concerning the nature of God's qualities and the question of the Qur'ân Ibn Kullâb has been influenced by the Šī'î theologian Hišâm bn al-Ḥakam,⁸³ whose name we find among the opponents listed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.⁸⁴

Abû Muḥammad Hišâm bn al-Ḥakam⁸⁵ lived during the second century AH, half a century before Ibn Kullâb and more than two centuries before 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself. He was born in Wâsiṭ, south-east of Baġdâd, but mainly lived and worked in al-Kûfa and later on in Baġdâd. The date of his death is differently given and varies between 179 and 199 AH (795 and 815 AD).⁸⁶

Twenty seven titles of his works are enumerated in the *Kitâb al-fihrist* of Ibn an-Nadîm, but, unfortunately, all are lost; so, for a reconstruction of his theological system we have to fall back upon the writings of later theologians and heresiographers.⁸⁷

Finally, we must mention two groups of opponents given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the introductory chapter of the seventh part of the *Muġnî*, the part about the Qur'ân: the Ḥašwiya and the Ašḥâb aṭ-Ṭabâ'î.⁸⁸

Ḥašwiya⁸⁹ is a nickname used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr and other Mu'tazila to indicate the absolute traditionalists, who keep to the literal interpretation of every *ḥadiṭ* even if it is evidently anthropomorphic. The use of this term is very clear in the passage from the *Šarḥ al-uṣûl*

⁸² So, for instance, Hâriṭ al-Muhâsibî and Abû l-'Abbâs al-Qalânisî Cf van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 99-100 and 135 On his "school" see van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 97

⁸³ Cf. van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 112, see also Ibn an-Nadîm, *Fihrist*, 175 and Watt, *The Râfidites*. See also the register in Watt's *Formative Period* under *Râfidite*.

⁸⁴ Cf *Muġnî* VII, 3

⁸⁵ Thus in Ibn an-Nadîm, *Fihrist*, 175

⁸⁶ Cf the discussions in Watt, *The Râfidites*, 114, van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 115; Madelung, art *Hišâm b. al-Ḥakam*, *IE*², III, 496-497, Watt, *Formative Period*, 187

⁸⁷ Cf Ibn an-Nadîm, *Fihrist*, 175-176 and al-Ḳayyât, *Kitâb al-intisâr*, in the latter work see the indices under *Hišâm bn al-Ḥakam* and *ar-Râfida*.

⁸⁸ Cf *Muġnî* VII, 4

⁸⁹ Also vocalized as Ḥašawiya or Ḥušwiya, cf *IE*², III, 269

al-kamsa where he mentions “al-Ḥašwīya an-Nawâbit (another nickname⁹⁰) from the followers of Ibn Ḥanbal”.⁹¹

To some of the Ḥašwīya ‘Abd al-Jabbâr ascribes the view that the Qur’ân is the Creator Himself, to others that it is a part of Him.⁹² They even assert that the Qur’ân in recited or written form is uncreated, unproduced, and even co-eternal with God.⁹³

The Aşḥâb aṭ-Ṭabâ’i’ or Naturalists believe in the causality of “natures” and deny the possibility of God’s acting in this world.⁹⁴ There is a relationship between them, the so-called Dahriya or Materialists, and the philosophers,⁹⁵ but these terms are not totally identical.⁹⁶

According to ‘Abd al-Jabbâr, some of them hold the view that the Qur’ân cannot be really God’s act.⁹⁷

So, in these last two groups of opponents we discover the two extreme positions in the discussions about the nature of the Qur’ân. And with them the scala of opinions ‘Abd al-Jabbâr had to cope with varies from an identification of God and the Qur’ân (Ḥašwīya) on the one hand to the denial of the divine character of the Qur’ân (Aşḥâb aṭ-Ṭabâ’i’) on the other.

His disciples

In his “*Ṭabaqât al-Mu’tazila*” Ibn al-Murtaḍâ has handed down to us the names and some biographical details of thirty-four of ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s disciples, who form together the twelfth and last generation of the Mu’tazila as far as they are described in this book.⁹⁸ I mention here two of these disciples, not because they have been the most important in their own generation, but because their theological writings have reached us and may help us understand the theological system of their learned teacher.

The first is Abû Rašîd Sa’îd bn Muḥammad⁹⁹ an-Nisâbûrî. He was a member of the Baġdâdî school of the Mu’tazila, but afterwards he

⁹⁰ Cf Watt, *Formative Period*, 270 and literature mentioned in the notes

⁹¹ *Šarh* 527 “al-Ḥašwīya an-Nawâbit min al-Ḥanâbila”

⁹² *Mugni* VII, 4

⁹³ *Šarh* 527

⁹⁴ Cf *Šarh* 389

⁹⁵ See *Šarh* 124. Cf also Pretzl, *Die fruhislamsche Attributenlehre*, 49

⁹⁶ Cf Goldziher-Goichon, art *Dahriya*, *EP*², II, 95-97

⁹⁷ *Mugni* VII, 4

⁹⁸ Ibn al-Murtaḍâ, *Ṭabaqât al-Mu’tazila*, 116-119; cf al-Ḥâkım, *Šarh al-’uṣūn*, 382-391

⁹⁹ Cf Sezgin, *GAS* I, 626, who adds bn Sa’îd

became a follower of 'Abd al-Jabbâr; he had a theological circle in Nisâbûr and after the death of his teacher directed his school in Rayy. He died in the first half of the fifth century AH.¹⁰⁰

The *Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila* gives us the name of only one work of his hand, called "*Dîwân al-uşûl*".¹⁰¹ But the title of the work which has been preserved in manuscript runs: "*Al-Masâ'il fî l-kulâf bayn al-Basriyîn wa-l-Bağdâdiyîn*" From this manuscript some chapters and passages have been published and translated by A. Biram and M. Horten. This work has not yet been published in its totality, nor has it been the object of a thorough study.¹⁰²

The other disciple is called Abû Muhammad al-Ḥasan bn Aḥmad bn Mattawayh¹⁰³ and died in 469 AH/ 1076 AD.¹⁰⁴ He wrote a book "*Al-Majmû' fî l-muḥîṭ bi-t-taklîf*" in which he made a version of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's dictations about the *taklîf*;¹⁰⁵ possibly this is the same work as the one mentioned by Ibn al-Murtadâ as "*Al-Muḥîṭ fî usûl ad-dîn*". Ibn al-Murtadâ also mentions a second book "*At-Taḍkîra fî laṭîf al-kalâm*".¹⁰⁶

Finally, I cannot but mention the name of a theologian who certainly was not a disciple of 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the strict sense of the word, but who was very close to him in his theological thinking, and who was probably strongly influenced by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's writings. I mean

¹⁰⁰ Cf Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 116 Badawi, *Histoire*, 205, gives as the date of his death 1068 AD without mentioning his sources

¹⁰¹ Cf *Fadl al-Fîzâl*, 382-383 Abû Rašîd is said to have composed two versions of this work Abû Rîda thinks it possible that this is the work found in San'â, and edited by him under the title *Fî t-tawhîd* According to Richard Martin in his dissertation at New York University (not yet published), the work edited by Abû Rîda would be the *Ziyâdât šarḥ al-uşûl* by the same author, in his dissertation Martin edited another manuscript of the same text (communication by Prof J van Ess, 14-8-1975)

¹⁰² Arthur Biram, *Die atomistische Substanzenlehre aus dem Buch der Streitfragen zwischen Basrensern und Bağdadensern*, Berlin 1902, this book gives the Arabic text and a German translation of the chapter on atoms Max Horten, *Die Philosophie des Abû Raschid*, Bonn 1910, this work contains a German translation of selected passages with explications without the Arabic text Apart from this book Horten wrote a short article *Die Erkenntnistheorie des abû Raschid (um 1068)*, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 24 (1911), 433-448

¹⁰³ Badawi, *Histoire*, 206, vocalizes "ibn Mattûyah (ou Mattawayh)".

¹⁰⁴ This year is mentioned by Badawi, *Histoire*, 206, 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṣmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 51, proposes 468 AH No sources are given

¹⁰⁵ Cf Houben, *Muḥîṭ* I, 8, where he gives the incorrect vocalization Ibn Mutawayh Maybe *al-majmû'* is an indication of the redactional work of Ibn Mattawayh

¹⁰⁶ *Ṭabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 119 In San'â a work of him is found with the title *At-Taḍkîra fî ahkâm al-jawâhir wa-l-a'râd* (cf Sezgin, *GAS* I, 627)

Yûsuf al-Baṣîr, a Jewish (Karaites¹⁰⁷) theologian who wrote in Arabic and was a younger contemporary of 'Abd al-Jabbâr.¹⁰⁸ In our days his book "*Kitâb al-muḥtawî*" has been the subject of several studies especially by Georges Vajda,¹⁰⁹ who frequently called the attention to the influence of 'Abd al-Jabbâr on Yûsuf al-Baṣîr and to the relationship between the two theological systems. Thus the study of the *Kitâb al-muḥtawî* can make an important contribution towards the understanding of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works, just as Vajda has already demonstrated in the opposite case.¹¹⁰

5. AL-MUGNÎ

The manuscripts and the edition

Until a couple of years ago the "*summa*" of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, his *Muġnî*, was known only by name, a destiny which had befallen many of the Mu'tazilî writings apart from the *Muġnî*, for ultimately this school had to capitulate in front of Aṣ'arî teaching; this tendency indeed has caused the gradual disappearance of nearly all Mu'tazilî works.

In 1950 the famous Egyptian writer and scholar, the late Ṭâhâ Husayn, was called to the office of Minister of Education in the royal Egyptian government. Among the many plans he inaugurated during the two years he held this high office (January 1950 till January 1952) was the decision to send a scientific expedition to al-Yaman (Yemen), in the hope that this expedition would be able to procure photographs of old manuscripts which now might come to the light after having been hidden for many centuries in the libraries of that country.

He knew that there were many manuscripts, since long forgotten, which could be of the utmost importance for the history and for the renewal of Islamic thinking. The purchases of old manuscripts in al-Yaman by the German Ed. Glaser during his stays in 1882-1884 and 1885-1886 and those by the Italian G. Caprotti in 1903-1906

¹⁰⁷ Karaism is a Jewish school of theological and scientific thinking, roughly contemporary with the Islamic Mu'tazila and comparable with it in its goals and methods. Consequently, it often has been called the Jewish Mu'tazila.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Vajda, *La démonstration*, 285 (also note 3).

¹⁰⁹ See our bibliography under Vajda and also under Sirat.

¹¹⁰ In his various articles Vajda always refers to the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and the study of his articles shows that these references aid very much in understanding the work of Yûsuf al-Baṣîr.

had proven the immense wealth of the Yamani libraries¹¹¹ especially as regards Mu'tazilī manuscripts. This restriction is not unexpected since the Zaydiyya in al-Yaman had always maintained a strong relationship with the Mu'tazilī school of thinking.

In 1951 the expedition left for al-Yaman. This expedition of which Fu'ād Sayyid, conservator of the Arabic manuscripts in *Dār al-Kutub* (the national library) in al-Qāhira, was a member, was headed by Ḳalīl Yahyā Nāmī, professor at the university of al-Qāhira. They stayed in al-Yaman for three months and, in spite of many difficulties, succeeded in their task of drawing up a first simple inventory of some libraries and copying some important manuscripts.¹¹²

Among the very rich harvest of this expedition was a manuscript of 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Mugnī*, comprising the parts IV to IX (partially), XI to XIV, XVI and XX out of the twenty parts which constituted the totality of this work. This manuscript is generally referred to as the manuscript *s* and was, according to the closing paragraph of the twentieth and last part of the work, completed on Friday, the first of *Rajab* 606 AH (1210 AD).¹¹³ Consequently, we have a span of more than two hundred years between the composition of the *Mugnī* by 'Abd al-Jabbār and its present copy, whereas nothing is known about its multiplication during the interim.

Other manuscripts¹¹⁴ of the *Mugnī* have been discovered after-

¹¹¹ For these earlier finds and the history and descriptions of the thus purchased manuscripts R. Caspar, *Le renouveau du Mo'tazilisme* MIDEO 4 (1957), 198.

¹¹² Cf. the official report of this mission written by the director, Ḳalīl Yahyā Nāmī, *Al-Ba'ī'a al-misrīya li-taswīr al-maḳtū'āt al-'Arabīya fi bilād al-Yaman*, al-Qāhira 1952. For a description of the photographed manuscripts Fu'ād Sayyid *Maḳtū'āt al-Yaman*, in *Majallat ma had al-maḳtū'āt al-'Arabīya*, 1 (1955), 194-215.

¹¹³ About this first manuscript see Anawati, G., *Une œuvre mu'tazilite inédite le Mugnī du Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār*, in *Akten des vierundzwanzigsten Internationalen Orientalisten-Kongresses*, Wiesbaden 1959, 288-292. G. C. Anawati, R. Caspar, Mahmūd el-Khoderī, *Une somme inédite de théologie mo'tazilite Le Moghni du Qadi 'Abd al-Jabbār*, MIDEO 4 (1957), 281-316. The article gives the headings of all chapters found in this manuscript.

The colophon here referred to is found in *Mugnī* XX 2, 262. The article of Anawati, Caspar, and el-Khoderī mentioned above gives the following supplementary information about the manuscript: "Seule la section seizième a été copiée par Ja'far b. Ahmad al-Ḥāmī. Les onze autres sections sont de la main du copiste Mohammad b. Ahmad b. 'Alī b. al-Walīd, mohyī l-dīn wa-zayn al-mowahhidīn. L'ensemble du livre a été copié pour la Bibliothèque de 'Abdallāh b. Hamza b. Solaymān b. Rasūl, al-Mansūr billāh, imām solaymanite ahlī, mort en 612 de l'H." (p. 284). Cf. also *Mugnī* VI 1, p. 1.

¹¹⁴ According to el-Khoderī (see next note) there are at least three different manuscripts, one containing parts XV and XVI, the second part XV, the third the fragment from part XVII. El-Khoderī's informations were, unfortunately, not complete.

wards, they comprise parts V, VI, XV, XVI (partially even in two versions) and XVII (partially) This text (which is not dated but roughly from the same time as the manuscript *s*) is mostly referred to as *t*

So, till now the parts I-III, IX (partially), X, XVII (partially), XVIII and XIX are still missing ¹¹⁵

Tâhâ Ḥusayn, who realized the importance of this work, took care of the means necessary for the publication of this big work and gathered a group of Egyptian scholars who were willing to take the responsibility for its restitution in print, and who distributed among themselves the various parts of the work In 1957 the work of publication could take a beginning, and in 1960 the first volume, containing part sixteen, was printed and published by the Egyptian ministry for culture and national guidance The volumes followed each other until 1969 when the sixteenth and last volume was completed ¹¹⁶

The work of publication was very difficult 'Abd al-Jabbâr's personal style is not easy and is complicated by the fact that this work was not written personally but dictated, the manuscript, which is written in old naskî script, is not always clear, has few diacritical points, nearly no punctuation and no division of the text other than the division into chapters, the subject of the book is specialised too, and one has to be versed in Mu'tazilî theology to understand all the author's arguments

Thus, it is understandable but regrettable that the published texts are not without mistakes and misinterpretations, while the lack of registers is a serious handicap for every scholar who wishes to study this important work

Its outline and contents

"*Mughnî*"—the root of the word means that it procures all that is necessary and makes other things superfluous—, might be rendered by the Latin word "*summa*" the work gives all the information about

¹¹⁵ Cf Mahmoud El-Khodeiri, *Deux nouvelles sections du Moghni du Qâdi 'Abd al-Jabbâr*, MIDEO 5 (1958), 417-424 But cf also *Mughnî* VI/1, p *s* and p *t* and *Mughnî* V, 8 about some parts of this manuscript not mentioned in El-Khodeiri's article In *Mughnî* V the manuscripts *s* and *t* are marked by the editor respectively *m* and *k* (*Mughnî* V, 8)

* According to a note of Ben-Shammai (*A Note*, 302-303) some passages from *Mughnî* IX and X (and from parts which are already known) are found in Leningrad

¹¹⁶ Part VI and XX both have been published in two volumes We quote them as respectively VI/1, VI/2, XX/1, and XX/2

the subject concerned. The contents of this subject are made explicit in the title given to the Egyptian edition of the work: "*Al-Muġnī fī abwāb at-tawhīd wa-l-'adl*" or "*al-Moġhni in Monotheism and Equity*"¹¹⁷ as it is rendered in English on the reverse side of the printed books. This is the title which we find upon both the larger (s) and the smaller (t) manuscript.¹¹⁸ Apart from this name, the work of 'Abd al-Jabbār is known also by another name: "*Al-Muġnī fī uṣūl ad-dīn*", "*the summa in the principles of religion*".¹¹⁹ The most commonly used title for this book, mentioned in the *Muġnī* itself,¹²⁰ in other writings by 'Abd al-Jabbār,¹²¹ and in old written sources,¹²² is the simple "*Al-Muġnī*".

The *Muġnī* has not been written down by 'Abd al-Jabbār personally; he dictated and the text was taken down by a secretary or a disciple. This fact is mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbār himself at the end of the *Muġnī* when he speaks about the twenty years he has worked on this book and the many other works he dictated in the meantime;¹²³ it is confirmed by the headings on the manuscript¹²⁴ and by a statement of Ibn al-Murtadā.¹²⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbār began the dictation of this work in the year 360 AH (970-971 AD) in the mosque in Rāmhurmuz, where he was teaching, and finished it twenty years later in 380 AH (990-991 AD) in Rayy, in the presence of aṣ-Ṣāhib Ibn 'Abbād, who had invited him to Rayy and appointed him *qāḍī l-quḍāt*.¹²⁶

The *Muġnī* consists of twenty parts (*juz'*; plural: *ajzā'*),¹²⁷ and the manuscript s was composed of sixteen volumes (*mujallad*; plural: *mujalladāt*).¹²⁸ Some parts consist of two or more "sections", which

¹¹⁷ Meaning for a Mu'tazilī the whole of his theology.

¹¹⁸ For the manuscript s see the photographcopy of the manuscript on page t of *Muġnī* VII. For the manuscript t see Mahmoud El-Khodeiri, *Deux nouvelles sections*, 417.

¹¹⁹ This is the name used by 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṣmān, cf. *Qāḍī l-quḍāt*, 70; introduction to 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Ṣarh*, 23.

¹²⁰ Cf. *Muġnī*, VII, page z and *Muġnī* XX/2, 262.

¹²¹ *Ṣarh* 122-123.

¹²² Ibn al-Murtadā, *Tabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*, 113.

¹²³ *Muġnī* XX/2, 258.

¹²⁴ See the photographcopy of the manuscript reproduced on page t of *Muġnī* VII: after the title of the book is marked *Imlā' al-qāḍī Abī l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār bn Ahmad*, dictation by the qāḍī Abū l-Ḥasan 'Abd al-Jabbār bn Ahmad.

¹²⁵ *Tabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*, 113, the *Muġnī* is mentioned among the works dictated by 'Abd al-Jabbār.

¹²⁶ Cf. *Muġnī* XX/2, 257 ff. Cf. also 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṣmān, *Qāḍī l-Quḍāt*, 70 and 245-247.

¹²⁷ The end of the twentieth part, which bears the heading "*the twentieth part of the Muġnī*", runs "*tamm al-kitāb al-Muġnī*", "*the Muġnī is finished*" (*Muġnī* XX/2, 262).

¹²⁸ Cf. Anawati, Caspar, El-Khodeiri, *Une somme inédite*, 283, where the authors

generally are headed by “*al-kalâm fî ...*”; the parts and sections are again subdivided into chapters (*faṣl*; plural: *fuṣūl*).

The composition of the *Muḡnî* is—at first sight—unclear, the more so because six of its parts (among which the first three) are missing, and two other parts (nine and seventeen) are not complete.

Fortunately, we are informed by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr in his *Šarḥ* that—contrary to the five principles (*al-uṣūl al-kamsa*) of the *Šarḥ*—the *Muḡnî* only knows two basic principles which every adult believer has to know: *tawḥîd* (God’s unity) and ‘*adl*’ (God’s justice).¹²⁹ In the *Muḡnî*, he continues, prophecy and legislation are mentioned under the ‘*adl*’ (justice), and the same holds true for “the promise and the threat”, “the intermediate position”, and “the command to do what is approved and the prohibition to do what is reprehensible”. Therefore the *Muḡnî* justly restricts itself to two principles.¹³⁰ So we might presume that the *Muḡnî* is composed around these two principles, just as the *Šarḥ* is around its five, and that we have to look for the matter usually found under the three other principles under the heading of the ‘*adl*’.

This conclusion is reinforced by a remark at the end of the fifth part of the *Muḡnî* where we read: “*tamm al-kalâm fî t-tawḥîd wa-yatlûh al-kalâm fî l-‘adl’*”, “the treatise on the *tawḥîd* is finished, follows the treatise on the ‘*adl*’”.¹³¹

Let us concentrate first on the five parts apparently dealing with the *tawḥîd*. As we have said already, parts I to III are missing; part IV deals in its three sections with three propositions about God that have to be denied, and arrives at the conclusion that God cannot need something, that He cannot be seen or perceived, and that there can be no second one like Him (He is unique). Part V refutes the doctrines of the opponents who do not accept the unity and unicity of God,¹³² and it ends with some chapters discussing the names that are given to God on the basis of His qualities which have been discussed before.¹³³

refer to the text written on the last volume of the manuscript saying that it is the sixteenth and last volume (*mujallud*) of the *Muḡnî*

¹²⁹ *Šarḥ* 122.

¹³⁰ *Šarḥ* 123 The last three principles form together with the *tawḥîd* and ‘*adl*’ the five traditional principles of the *Mu‘tazila*

¹³¹ *Muḡnî* V, 259

¹³² Cf. *Muḡnî* IV, 349-351, *Muḡnî* V, 261-263

¹³³ In these chapters, devoted to the names of God (*Muḡnî* V, 204-258), the references to matters already proved are very frequent, thus it becomes evident that the qualities themselves have already been dealt with in a much more elaborate way.

This chapter on God's names proves, together with frequent references to the "*bâb aṣ-ṣifât*" which are found in the later parts of the *Muğni*, that God's qualities have been discussed in the first three parts of the *Muğni*. If we compare the structure of the treatise on the *tawhîd* in the *Muḥîṭ* and the *Šarḥ*, we discover a great resemblance, and we suppose that the *Muğni* knew the same structure. After a general introduction, both works show that this world with all its bodies is temporal, that it needs someone who produced it, and that this someone must be eternal. In this way 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues that a god must exist. Next he deals in both works with God's qualities, His being able, knowing, living, hearing, seeing, perceiving, existent, and eternal, and with the way in which God is entitled to these qualities.¹³⁴ Afterwards he discusses what has to be denied about God (here he concludes with the three propositions discussed in the *Muğni*), and he ends with a refutation of those who do not accept the absolute unicity of God.

When we try to reconstruct the composition of these first five parts of the *Muğni*, we assume that part I after a general introduction proved the existence of an eternal able producer of the bodies and accidents in this world; part II may have been the chapter on God's qualities (*bâb aṣ-ṣifât*), while part III may have dealt with the way in which He is entitled to them, and how we can know them; in this part also qualities that have to be denied about Him will have been discussed; part IV continues the discussions of qualities that have to be denied about God; part V contains, besides the refutation of non-monotheist opponents, a discussion about the names we give to God because of all that has been discussed before.

Parts I-V dealing with the *tawhîd*, the remaining fifteen parts (VI-XX) must be consecrated to the '*adl*'. This is confirmed by a statement at the end of part V, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr announces that He will speak about God's names which are related to His acts at the end of his

This is confirmed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's statement in *Muğni* V, 258 that it is only possible to speak about names after treating the reality behind these names, one has to deal with the *mâ'âni* before dealing with the *asmâ'*. Moreover, part XX of the *Muğni* ends in a similar way with the discussion of some names that can be applied to God, this time on the basis of all that 'Abd al-Jabbâr has said before in his treatise on God's Justice (Cf *Muğni* XX'2, 186-237; this was already announced in *Muğni* V, 258). So we can safely assume that the first three parts contained an elaborate discussion of God's (essential) qualities

¹³⁴ The verb "to be entitled to" is used as a translation of the difficult concept of *istahaqq* (to merit). It indicates the reason why a subject can and must be given a certain descriptive qualification. I treat this matter in detail when discussing the qualities in the course of my second chapter.

treatise on God's 'adl; in fact he deals with those names at the end of part XX.¹³⁵

The general goal of these parts of the *Muḡni* is to show that God only does what is good, that without any doubt He does what is obligatory, and that He only invites to serve Him in a way which is good.¹³⁶ First, 'Abd al-Jabbâr has to define the technical meaning of the terms he uses and to prove his basic principles; he defines the "act" (*fī'l*) and the qualifications which are given to acts, as, for instance, "good", "evil", "permitted", "supererogatory", and "obligatory".¹³⁷ He also proves that God really is able to do what would be evil if He were to do it; finally, he must prove his basic principle that God actually will not do something evil.¹³⁸ To all these subjects *Muḡni* VI/1 is devoted.

Another problem arises: some of God's acts are not recognized as such by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents; consequently, before being able to draw his conclusions from the fact that they cannot be evil, he must prove that they really are God's acts. In this way he proves that God's will is His act, and he draws his conclusions from the principle that as God's act it cannot be evil (*Muḡni* VI/2);¹³⁹ in a similar way 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that God's speech is His act, and he draws his conclusions from the principle that also this act cannot be evil (*Muḡni* VII). Other acts are considered by his opponents to be God's acts, whereas in fact they are human: the direct and indirect human acts (*Muḡni* VIII-IX); since these acts are not God's acts, they can be evil and their evilness cannot be attributed to God.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ Cf, respectively, *Muḡni* V, 258 and *Muḡni* XX/2, 186-237

¹³⁶ In his introduction to the sixth part of the *Muḡni* 'Abd al-Jabbâr summarizes what he is going to say in his treatise on God's Justice. He does not give many details but mentions only some subjects he will have to discuss. Cf *Muḡni* VI/1, 3 " *lâ yaf'al illâ l-hasan, wa-lâ budd min an yaf'al al-wâjib, wa-lâ yata'abbad bi-mâ yata'abbad bih illâ 'alâ wajh yahsin*"

¹³⁷ The Arabic terms used here are *hasan* (good), *qabih* (evil), *mubâh* (permitted) *nadh* (supererogatory), *wâjib mudayyaq* (obligatory, not freely chosen), *wâjib mukayyar* (obligatory, freely chosen). These judgements about acts are discussed in our next chapter

¹³⁸ God's being able (*qâdir*) will be dealt with in our chapter on God's essential qualities, the second section of *Muḡni* VI/1 is devoted to the thesis that God is also able to do acts that would be evil if He were to do them (*Muḡni* VI/1, 135-176), in the third section (*Muḡni* VI/1, 177-231) 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that God actually will not do something evil

¹³⁹ The question at stake is: is God's being willing an essential quality (*sifat aḡ-dât*) or a factual quality (*sifat al-fī'l*), does it indicate an aspect of God's essence or only that He did something? Cf *Muḡni* VI/2, 3-7

¹⁴⁰ In these parts are also treated the famous questions about the *kasb* and the

The tenth part of the *Muğni* is still missing, but from the fact that 'Abd al-Jabbâr announces, both in the sixth and in the eighth parts of his *Muğni*, a chapter on the "power" or "ability" (*bâb al-istitâ'a*)¹⁴¹ and the fact that a similar chapter can be found in the *Muhit* at exactly the same place, we conclude that the missing tenth part of the *Muğni* is in fact the chapter on the (human) ability, in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows that man can choose freely his own acts, that they are not necessitated, and that consequently, he is responsible for his acts. That these really are the contents of this part might be confirmed by a fragment of the *Muğni* found in the library of Leningrad.¹⁴²

In *Muğni* XI 'Abd al-Jabbâr first discusses in three short sections three other kinds of acts in order to decide whether they are God's acts and what are the consequences. These acts are death and similar things (*al-âjâl*), sustenance and means of life (*ar-rizq*), and prices (*al-as'âr*).

Having proved that God can do no evil, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to a second principle saying that all God's acts necessarily must be good; the question to be answered now becomes in which way they are good. After having discussed creation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to a very important topic: God's *taklif*, His imposing duties on mankind. This *taklif* is good since it implies a reward.

To be good, however, the *taklif* presupposes the fulfilling of a number of conditions; some of them concern the person who is obliged by this *taklif*, some concern the imposed duty, and others concern God who imposes it.¹⁴³ All this is dealt with in *Muğni* XI.

tawlid, questions related to the topic of the causality of human acts and man's responsibility for these acts. For the contents of these parts VIII and IX, cf also *Muğni* VIII, 335

¹⁴¹ Cf *Muğni* VI/2, 351 and *Muğni* VIII, 59. *Muğni* X is still missing and so is the end of *Muğni* IX (the last nine chapters, see *Muğni* IX, 8-9 where a complete list of the chapters of the original text is given, these missing chapters appear to be found in a manuscript in the library of Leningrad, cf Ben-Shammai, *A Note*, 303). At the moment we do not know a possible indication at the end of *Muğni* IX, the beginning of *Muğni* XI does not mention what was discussed before.

¹⁴² Cf Ben-Shammai, *A Note*, 303, concerning fragment no. 13. As for his fragment no. 9, I do not think that this found its place in this part ten, as for Ben-Shammai's only argument being that it terminates with the phrase "*tamm al-juz' al-'âsir*", I want to remark that the subject of this fragment ("the criteria for assessment of belief and unbelief, obedience and disobedience, reward and punishment") does not belong in a *bâb al-istitâ'a* but in a discussion on the promise and the threat or eventually a discussion on the intermediate position, as one will easily see when comparing the structure of the *Šarh*. Both the promise and the threat and the intermediate position have been dealt with in the also missing parts XVIII-XIX of the *Muğni*, as we will see below.

¹⁴³ Cf. *Muğni* XI, 426-432.

A most important duty imposed by God is the use of the human intellect: the duty to reflect in order to acquire in that way true knowledge about God. This duty also constitutes the basis for the knowledge of the other duties.¹⁴⁴ In *Muğni* XIII 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the divine assistance (*al-luṭf*) which makes the performance of the imposed duties possible,¹⁴⁵ and in a second section the pains (*al-âlâm*) and the way in which they can be good, namely by a compensation (*al-'iwaḍ*). Thus the three ways in which God's acts can be good (as favour, reward, and compensation¹⁴⁶) have been discussed. After having proved that God does no evil and that all His acts are good, the last aspect of His justice is that He necessarily does what is obligatory. Therefore *Muğni* XIV is consecrated to the "wâjib", the obligatory; here 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses what is obligatory for God. Finally, this part also deals with the "taklif 'aqlî" (the duties God imposes upon us in so far as we can know them independently of the data of divine revelation) and its consequences.¹⁴⁷

Having dictated the text of *Muğni* XIV, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes the following remark "We now begin with the section on prophecies because we have mentioned all about the *taklif 'aqlî*; what we did not mention about it belongs to the chapter of the (promise and) the threat and to other chapters. We postponed these subjects in order to mention them in the appropriate place in this book. Follows—God willing—the section on prophecies."¹⁴⁸ After having discussed a number of subjects which the human intellect can know without the assistance of divine revelation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to speak about the "*taklif sam'î*"¹⁴⁹ and other subjects that suppose a divine revelation in order that man can know and understand them.

In parts XV and XVI, which clearly belong together,¹⁵⁰ prophecy is

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *Muğni* XII, 3 and *Muğni* XIV, 149

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *Muğni* XIII, 3, for the meaning of the term *luṭf* see *Muğni* XIII, 11.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. *Muğni* XI, 134 for the three aspects of goodness to be found in God's acts: favour (*tafaddul*), reward (*ṭawâb*), and compensation ('*iwaḍ*)

¹⁴⁷ Especially the consequences of neglecting what is obligatory are discussed: blame and repentance. For the distinction between the various consequences of God's justice, cf. *Muğni* VI/1, 3.

¹⁴⁸ *Muğni* XIV, 461

¹⁴⁹ This term is mentioned, for instance, in *Muğni* XIV, 150.

¹⁵⁰ Part XV is announced at the end of part XIV (p. 461) as the section on prophecies. Part XVI at its turn ends with the following statement: "The end of the book on prophecies, follows—God willing—the section in which we explain the aspects of the knowledge of the meaning of God's and his prophet's words" (*Muğni* XVI, 433)

discussed, followed in part XVII by a treatise on the sources of revealed knowledge.¹⁵¹

In parts XVIII and XIX, which are missing, 'Abd al-Jabbâr must have treated the promise and the threat, the intermediate position, and the command to do what is approved and the prohibition to do what is reprehensible; in any case he intended to do so.¹⁵²

Finally *Muğni* XX deals with the *imâma* (the leadership of the Islamic community),¹⁵³ and it ends with a summary about the names one may apply to God because of the acts He did, a section on the prayer of supplication, and a nine page long concluding paragraph.¹⁵⁴

If we try to reconstruct schematically the composition of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's *Muğni*, we come to the following outline :

TAWHÎD

introduction	part I
establishing God as the eternal producer of this world	part I
God's qualities	part II
how God is entitled to His qualities	part III
what has to be denied about God	parts III-IV
refutation of the non-monotheist opponents	part V
conclusion : the names of God related to His essence	part V

Moreover, the section about the "*ḵabar*" is divided, the first half is found at the end of part XV, the second half at the beginning of part XVI, part XVI, therefore, does not have the usual heading "*al-ḵalâm fî* "

¹⁵¹ The only manuscript of this part is not complete beginning and end are missing, about the probable length and the contents of the missing chapters of this part, cf Amin al-Ḳûlî in his introduction to the edition of this part (*Muğni* XVII, 3-4) The manuscript is marked "*Aṣ-Ṣar'iyât min al-Muğni*" (cf *Muğni* XVII, 4), but 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself says at the end of the *Muğni* that he did not treat the *ṣar'iyât* in this book since it would have made it too long According to him, this was the only subject from the many related to God's 'adl that he did not deal with in the *Muğni* (cf *Muğni* XX/2, 259) We already mentioned the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr introduced this part at the end of part XVI (see note 150) In *Muğni* XVII, 92 he says that he deals here with the "indications in matters of divine legislation" (*al-adilla aṣ-ṣar'īya*) because he needs these in his chapters on the principles of divine legislation (*uṣûl aṣ-ṣarâ'i'*; the subject of this part), the promise and the threat, names and judgments (another name for the principle of the intermediate position), the command to do what is approved and the prohibition to do what is reprehensible, and the *imâma* Cf also *Muğni* XV, 8

¹⁵² Cf *Muğni* XIV, 461, *Muğni* XV, 8, *Muğni* XVII, 92

¹⁵³ *Muğni* XX/1, 11-15

¹⁵⁴ The concluding paragraph (*Muğni* XX/2, 254-262) gives some details about the actual composition of the *Muğni* and a summary of the general contents of the *taklif*

*ADL

introduction : terminology	part VI/1
God does no evil act	part VI/1
God's will is His act and cannot be evil	part VI/2
God's speech is His act and cannot be evil	part VII
direct human acts are human and can be evil	part VIII
indirect human acts are human and can be evil	part IX
man's power over and responsibility for his acts	part X
death, sustenance, and prices	part XI
God's acts must be good	part XI
God's creation must be good	part XI
God's <i>taklif</i> must be good	part XI
reflection and knowledge (as a duty and a source)	part XII
God's assistance to fulfil duties	part XIII
sufferings and God's compensation to make them good	part XIII
God does what is obligatory	part XIV
contents and consequences of the <i>taklif 'aqli</i>	part XIV

REVELATION

sources of revealed knowledge	
prophecy	parts XV-XVI
others sources and principles	part XVII
the promise and the threat	parts XVIII-XIX
the intermediate position	parts XVIII-XIX
the command and the prohibition	part XIX
the <i>imâma</i>	part XX
conclusion : the names of God related to His acts	part XX
<i>Appendices</i> : prayer of supplication	part XX
conclusions and remarks about the <i>Muğni</i>	part XX

6. KALQ AL-QUR'AN, THE SEVENTH PART OF THE MUĞNÎ

The seventh part of the *Muğni*,¹⁵⁵ with its manuscript of 127 double pages one of its smaller parts, will have our special attention, and our final chapter will be given mainly to a study of this part of the *Muğni*.

¹⁵⁵ About this part of the *Muğni* a study has been published, not long after its

The manuscript of this part was entrusted by Dr. Ṭāhâ Ḥusayn, who had the supervision of the enormous task which was indeed the re-edition of the entire *Muğnî*, to Dr. Ibrâhîm al-Abyârî¹⁵⁶ in al-Qâhira; who actually prepared its edition. In doing so he met with all the difficulties we described above when speaking about the edition of the whole *Muğnî*: the lack of indications for the beginning and the end of sentences and paragraphs, the obscure and complicated style in which the work has been composed, the rather difficult manner of argumentation used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and, possibly in the first place, the absence of diacritical points. As a consequence of this lack of diacritical points, the interpretation of the text is left to a great extent to the reader of the manuscript and in the present case to its editor, who has to make a choice since he is forced to fit the text with diacritical points, without which the signs for several letters coincide. Dr. al-Abyârî himself mentions the problems he met with during the preparation of this publication in the introduction to this part of the *Muğnî*;¹⁵⁷ he mentions problems related to the obscurity of the manuscript—the fact that the work had to be done on the basis of one sole extant manuscript made the work even more difficult—and problems related to the subject-matter of this work. All this accounts for the fact that some misinterpretations have crept into the text of this edition, mainly as regards its division into sentences and paragraphs.¹⁵⁸

The text, which had been prepared on the basis of the sole manuscript (to be found in the larger manuscript of the *Muğnî*, the one marked *ṣ*) by Dr. Ibrâhîm al-Abyârî, was published by the General Culture

publication by J. Bouman, it is entitled *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr on the Qur'ân as the Created Word of Allâh* and was published in *Verbum*, essays on some aspects of the religious function of words, dedicated to Dr. H.W. Obbink, Utrecht 1964, 67-87.

¹⁵⁶ The title-page of the edition (both the Arabic and the English one) gives the name of the editor incorrectly as al-Ibyârî, the correct vocalization al-Abyârî is found at the end of the introduction. (Oral communication during the month of October 1970; during this meeting Dr. al-Abyârî laid very much emphasis upon the difficulties he had met with while preparing the edition of this part of the *Muğnî*)

¹⁵⁷ Cf. *Muğnî* VII, the pages marked *j* and *d*

¹⁵⁸ With all respect for the difficult task Dr. al-Abyârî has undertaken and for the way in which he prepared the edition of this complicated manuscript, I propose in this book some corrections to be made in the text. I do not intend to give an exhaustive list, but I shall point only to corrections which are in my opinion necessary for a correct understanding of the texts to which I give my attention. This especially holds true of the division of the text into sentences and paragraphs. I shall only suggest some correction to be made when the interpunction in the printed text suggests an incorrect interpretation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's work

Administration of the Ministry of Culture and National Guidance of the (then called) United Arab Republic.¹⁵⁹ It appeared in 1380 AH/1961 AD in al-Qâhira under the title “*Ḳalq al-Qur’ân*” (the createdness of the Qur’ân).¹⁶⁰

The original name of this part of the *Muğni* was not “*Ḳalq al-Qur’ân*”; in its manuscript, both in the text and in the table of contents,¹⁶¹ one finds the title “*Al-Kalâm fî l-Qur’ân wa-sâ’ir kalâm Allâh ta’âlâ*” (treatise on the Qur’ân and God’s other speech). In practically the same way this part was announced at the end of part VI of the *Muğni* according to the text of the manuscript marked *ı*.¹⁶² So, we safely assume that we have found here the original title of this part of the *Muğni*. This could imply that the createdness of the Qur’ân was not such a central topic in this work as the title of the edition actually suggests.

If we consider the place of this seventh part in the composition of the entire *Muğni*, we come to a similar conclusion. This subject (the Qur’ân and God’s other speech) is not treated in one of the first five parts, which deal with God’s *tawhîd*, where we would expect to find it if its real subject were the question whether the Qur’ân is created or not, since ‘Abd al-Jabbâr would argue that an eternal Qur’ân would be a threat to the absolute unity and uniqueness of God. In fact it is treated in the parts devoted to God’s justice (*al-’adl*), amidst the other acts God has performed or still performs for the benefit of mankind. We already saw that this part in the composition of the *Muğni* aims to show that God’s speech really is His act, and to draw the conclusions from the general principle that His acts cannot be evil. Therefore the title “*Ḳalq al-Qur’ân*” over-emphasizes one aspect of the discussion.

This is confirmed by the contents of the concluding chapter of this part of the *Muğni*; this very short (only ten lines in manuscript) chapter

¹⁵⁹ Now the Arab Republic of Egypt. The English translation of the data mentioned in the text is taken from the English title page on the reverse side of the book.

¹⁶⁰ The book contains an introduction by Dr. al-Abyârî, dealing mainly with the problems he met in preparing its edition and with the question whether the manuscript was complete or not. Further, it contains photocopies of six pages of the manuscript, the text itself covers 224 pages and is divided into 23 chapters, just as the editions of the other parts of the *Muğni*, it has a table of contents but no registers.

¹⁶¹ Cf. *Muğni* VII, 3 and the page marked *ı*.

¹⁶² Part VI of the *Muğni* has been preserved in two manuscripts, in the manuscript referred to as *ı* the seventh part is announced as “*al-kalâm fî l-Qur’ân wa-fî sâ’ir kalâm Allâh subhânâh*” whereas in the text of the manuscript *ı* it is announced as “*al-kalâm fî l-Qur’ân*”. Cf. *Muğni* VI 2, 351.

mentions as a conclusion—after a chapter on the createdness of the Qur’ân—that God created it for the benefit of His servants, and after creating at least one of them; this is a condition that had to be fulfilled to make His speech really His good act.

For someone who reads this part of the *Muğnî*, but without the context of the whole work,¹⁶³ the most remarkable feature will be the emphasis laid upon the discussions about the being eternal or being created of the Qur’ân and of God’s speech in general; for such a reader the final chapter of this part must come as a surprise. But also through further inquiries into the composition of this part—even without paying attention to the composition of the entire *Muğnî*—one must come to the conclusion that, in spite of all emphasis placed on the question of the being eternal or being temporal and created of the Qur’ân, the fact that it is God’s act, which cannot be evil and therefore is characterized by some judgements about it, virtually is the central theme of this book.

On the basis of this seventh part of the *Muğnî*, chosen for the broad range of philosophical and theological topics it covers and for its being representative for ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s style of thinking and arguing, an effort to elucidate the dark corners of his philosophical and theological building will not be out of place.

¹⁶³ So did Bouman, when he wrote his article, the publication of the *Muğnî* just began, the seventh part being among the first ones to be printed. The same holds true of Dr. al-Abyârî, this may have been the reason why he considered this work to be a study on the createdness of the Qur’ân. Also, when speaking about the probability that the manuscript of this part is not complete, he may have been influenced by this view on the subject matter of this book. Actually, I do not think his arguments to be decisive. The fact that we have the end of the manuscript (the last page is not entirely filled), that ‘Abd al-Jabbâr has dealt with all the subjects mentioned in the introduction, and that more parts of the *Muğnî* end without a formal conclusion are arguments against al-Abyârî’s point of view. Moreover, the beginning of the last chapter does not suppose that a lengthy chapter is following.

SOME REMARKS ON 'ABD AL-JABBÂR'S "PHILOSOPHY"

In this chapter I present a bird's-eye view of what, with much hesitation and between inverted commas, I have called 'Abd al-Jabbâr's "philosophy", the basic outlines of his system in as far as it is independent of knowledge gained by divine revelation. To make a clear distinction between the "philosophical" and "theological" aspects of a *kalâm*-system is not always possible, but, fortunately, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes this distinction himself in dividing knowledge based on human intuition (*'aql*) alone from knowledge based on revelation, and in dividing the *taklîf* known by intuition from the *taklîf* known by revelation;* so I feel entitled to follow in his footsteps.

It will be a bird's-eye view, not a systematic and exhaustive analysis but rather an attempt to lay bare some of the basic structures.

A. LOGIC

The first subject to be treated here is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's logic, the logic forming the cornerstone of the building erected by architects of a system of human thinking. As most *kalâm*-writers, 'Abd al-Jabbâr did not compose a special treatise on logic and the structures of argumentation, but in the course of his works much emphasis is placed on the discussion of the sources of knowledge, especially those of revealed knowledge,¹ and although he does not deal with the structures of logical argumentation as such, 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses at length the essence of human² knowledge and reflection. He does so

* The "intuitive" knowledge is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* XII, whereas he deals with the sources of revealed knowledge especially in part XVII (and also in parts XV and XVI)

For the distinction between *taklîf 'aqlî* and *taklîf sam'î*, see p 33

¹ In the *Mugni* especially in part XVII, a special genre of theological works is devoted to these sources the *Usûl al-fiqh*, 'Abd al-Jabbâr wrote some monographs about them Cf 'Abd al-Karim 'Uṭmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 61-62

² 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine about God as knowing is rather simple, God is

in two different contexts: when he deals with God's qualities and speaks about God as knowing,³ and when he speaks about the duties God imposed upon mankind (*taklif*) and discusses human reflection and knowledge as the principal duties, which also constitute the basis for the knowledge of the other duties⁴

With these data furnished by 'Abd al-Jabbâr I shall try to sketch the structures of knowledge, a serious handicap is found in the fact that the "*bâb as-sifât*" (the chapter on God's qualities) of the *Mugni*, in which he discussed some of these basic structures, had its place in the first three, still missing, parts of the *Mugni*⁵

Successively I describe in this paragraph 'Abd al-Jabbâr's views on knowledge and its implications, the way to reach it, the manner in which it is expressed, and, finally, its sources

I apologize for using in this paragraph a number of technical terms which in their full technical meaning will be explained only in later paragraphs

1 KNOWLEDGE⁶

In dealing with knowledge, 'Abd al-Jabbâr starts from the direct human experience, as he often tries to do, and he compares two of these experiences

It is beyond all doubt, he says, that we sometimes notice that we are "*mu'taqid*" and sometimes that we are "*nâzir*",⁷ these are direct

essentially knowing and therefore He has no 'knowledge', moreover, the way human beings sometimes have to go to arrive at this knowledge (by way of reflection and argumentation) does not apply to God. So all that is said about knowledge is said about human knowledge. About God we can only say that He is knowing. Cf. pp. 241-243

³ *Sarh* 156-160 and 182-213, *Muhit*, I 113-120 and 170-197, the corresponding part of the *Mugni* is missing

⁴ *Mugni* XII, *Sarh* 39-75, *Muhit* I, 1-25, 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses this subject more in detail in the not yet published parts of the *Muhit*, see his remark in *Muhit* I, 17

⁵ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 5 and XII, 23

⁶ Many books and articles have been written about the definition and function of knowledge in the kalâm, most of them, certainly the more recent ones, deal with 'Abd al-Jabbâr's views too. I want to mention here one book and two articles which have very much contributed in recent times to a better knowledge of this subject. These are Josef van Ess, *Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Adudaddîn al-Îrî*, Wiesbaden 1966 (with excellent indices), Georges Vajda, *Autour de la connaissance chez Saadia*, *REJ* 126 (1967), 135-189 and 375-397, Marie Bernard, *La Notion de 'Ilm chez les premiers Mu'tazilites*, *SI* 36 (1972), 23-45 and *SI* 37 (1973), 27-56

⁷ *Mugni* XII, 5 "Know that the reflecting (subject) finds himself reflecting because he intuitively realizes the difference between his being reflecting and between the other

experiences, which do not need any form of proof or argumentation⁸ Their evidence is as strong as the evidence of a perceived object⁹ For these direct experiences 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the term "wajad nafsah", to find oneself It is a kind of necessary knowledge¹⁰

If we analyse these "experiences", we find in both cases (in being *mu'taqid* and in being *nâzir*) a connection between the subject¹¹ and a thing (*šay'*) in its qualities If the subject has this connection with one quality of that thing in a stable way, he is "*mu'taqid*", if he is asking whether there is a quality, and if so which one, he is "*nâzir*"¹² This description is rather obscure; but the experiences described are being convinced (*mu'taqid*) and reflecting (*nâzir*), we are convinced that something has a certain quality or we are reflecting about the qualities a thing may have The first forms the basis of human knowing, the second is a way to human knowing

When analysing the experience of "being convinced", we discover that we are not always and not necessarily convinced, therefore we are not essentially convinced being convinced is not an integrating part of our human essence¹³ Consequently, there must be a "cause" (*'illa*) which causes us to be convinced when we are so This cause, which causes us to be "*mu'taqid*" (convinced), we call "*i'tiqâd*" (convic-

states (*ahwâl*) by which he is characterized Likewise, he intuitively realizes (*šaqiq*) the difference between his being reflecting and (his being) willing (*murid*)" Cf *Mugni* XII, 23 and XII, 29

⁸ *Mugni* XII, 29 "Man finds himself reflecting and does not need an indication (*dalil*) to arrive at the knowledge of this

⁹ See *Mugni* XII, 5 "There is nothing more evident (*zâhir*) than the (perception of the state) in which one of us finds oneself, its knowledge is as strong as the knowledge of a perceived object"

¹⁰ For the different kinds of necessary knowledge p 54

¹¹ The term "connection" is a translation of the Arabic word *ta'alluq*, which also has the concrete meaning of 'linkage' 'Abd al-Jabbâr sees this "connection" as a linking up of the subject and the connected object The same holds true of the term *i'tiqâd* from the root 'qd, meaning "to tie" So *Šarh* 190 "The word *i'tiqâd* is metaphorically used and resembles the tying of a cord" And *Mugni* XII, 28, recording the opinion of the two teachers "The subject convinced is qualified thus because he is tied with his heart (*qalb*, the substrate of the intellectual acts) to the object of his conviction"

¹² *Mugni* XII, 9 "Know that the reflection resembles the conviction as far as they both must be connected with something else and that they are both connected with things in all their aspects, but the reflection differs from the conviction as far as this one is connected with the thing having a (certain) quality, whereas the reflection is not connected with only one quality, but is connected with (the question) whether it has a quality or the opposite quality or does not have the quality"

¹³ Cf *Mugni* XII, 5

tion)¹⁴ So the definition of "*i'tiqād*" (conviction) is "what causes the subject to be *mu'taqid* (convinced)" We call this *i'tiqād* a *ma'nā*¹⁵

What is the relation between this conviction, the subject, and his being convinced? It is not because he made the conviction that the subject is called convinced, for in that case one would know the act first and then conclude to a certain qualification of the acting subject (so for instance, one first perceives a movement and then concludes that a subject is moving it)¹⁶ Therefore, this *i'tiqād* must be something existing in the subject which by its very existence in him makes him to be in a state (*hāl*)¹⁷ of being "*mu'taqid*", convinced (So one finds oneself "living" and concludes to the existence of something called "life")

Summarizing the human subject perceives sometimes that he is convinced, the cause of this state is a "conviction" which exists in him

It is clear that the translation of *i'tiqād* as "belief" and *mu'taqid* as "believing"¹⁸ is evidently wrong and the result of a misunderstanding of 'Abd al-Jabbār's texts and those of other *mutakallimūn* The *i'tiqād* being a firm and stable connection between the subject and the object in one of its qualities (the doubt, "*šakk*", is expressly excluded by 'Abd al-Jabbār from the genus *i'tiqād*,¹⁹) we have to choose the English term "conviction" or one of its equivalents²⁰

¹⁴ *I'tiqād* is the infinitive of the verb of which *mu'taqid* is the active participle We have here a pure formal explanation of the "state" So e.g., when something is red, there must exist in it a "redness" that causes it to be red We can deduce the existence of this "redness", but it remains indescribable The same holds true of this *i'tiqād*

¹⁵ We deal with this *ma'nā*—and also with the '*illa*—in our paragraph on 'Abd al-Jabbār's cosmology For the moment suffice it to say that it is something which causes an object to have a certain qualification

¹⁶ The primary perception here consists in the human subject "finding himself convinced" Qualifications are given because of an act done, in this case the first known is the act Or the qualification is the first known, and from the qualification one concludes to the presence of the cause of this qualification

¹⁷ About this "state" (*hāl*), see our paragraph on 'Abd al-Jabbār's cosmology pp 145-148

¹⁸ So recently by Hourani (*Islamic Rationalism*, 17) and by Rosenthal (*Knowledge Triumphant*, 63) Both give neither argumentation nor other details about the meaning of this term

¹⁹ Cf *Mugni* XII, 116, *Šarh* 49

²⁰ So e.g. Vajda, *La connaissance chez Saadia*, 138 "conviction" (en français), so also Bernard, *La notion de 'Ilm*, *SI* 36, 24 Frank, *Kalām*, 355 gives in English "conviction" Van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 71 chooses 'Überzeugung" and describes it as "jedes Urteil ohne Rücksicht, ob wahr oder falsch, welches durch das Wahrheitskriterium zum Wissen werden kann" We shall see that for 'Abd al-Jabbār—contrary to the view of some other *Mu'tazila* (cf *Mugni* XII, 13-14 about the position of Abū 'Alī and Abū Hāšim)—this criterion is not sufficient to make a conviction into a knowledge

According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the genus *i'tiqâd* can be subdivided into various species. Thereby he distinguishes between two differentiae specificae.

First he mentions an objective criterion, the criterion of truth: is the subject connected with the object as it really is (according to the reality) or not?²¹ The second criterion seems to be rather subjective and much more difficult to verify; 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it the "tranquillity of the soul", "*sukûn an-nafs*".²²

So, in consequence of the presence or absence of one or both of these differentiae specificae, he distinguishes among the following species:

Jahl: the truth is absent, the "*sukûn an-nafs*" too. This word, *jahl*, is generally translated as "ignorance". Ignorance, however, implies a lack of knowledge, a "blank" in the mind, whereas the *jahl* as it is used here indicates a conviction that does not correspond with reality, a "mis-conviction".²³ The Arabic word *jahl* has the two meanings; to make a distinction between them in English, I propose the translation "positive ignorance" for the *jahl* described here by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and the translation "negative ignorance" for the "blanks" in the human mind.²⁴

Taqlid and Tabkîr: the criterion of truth is present, the tranquillity of the soul (*sukûn an-nafs*) is not.²⁵ This means that the contents of the

Van Ess also deals with the relation between the Greek "*doxa*" and the Arabic *i'tiqâd* (71-72), see also Pollak, *Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles*, 47

²¹ *Mugni* XII, 25 "Our teachers say that knowledge belongs to the genus conviction, when it (conviction) is connected with something according to how it is (*'alâ mâ huw bih*) and so happens that it supposes the tranquillity of the soul, it is knowledge. When it (conviction) is connected with something not according to how it is (*'alâ mâ lays bih*), it is positive ignorance. When it is connected with something according to how it is (*'alâ mâ huw bih*, the edition reads—evidently wrong!—*'alâ mâ yaqwih*, which brings Hourani to his translation "in a way that confirms it", evident nonsense, see his p. 17) but does not suppose the tranquillity of the soul, it is neither knowledge nor positive ignorance"

Vajda translates (*La connaissance chez Saadia*, 143) "lorsqu'elle s'attache à la chose telle que celle-ci la fortifie" and he remarks in a note that he did not find a plausible correction, although the meaning of this sentence is not clear

²² About the meaning of this tranquillity we come to speak later pp. 48-49

²³ Translated, as "ignorance" e.g., by Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 17 Cf. note 21

²⁴ For the different meanings of this word, cf. Lane II, 477. Van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 273 makes the same distinction and suggests the German words "komplexe Unwissenheit" for our "positive ignorance" and "einfache Ignoranz" for our "negative ignorance"

²⁵ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 25, translated in note 21

conviction correspond with reality, but that the soul did not wholly come to rest.

The *taqlid* is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as "the acceptance of the words of someone else without demanding from him a proof or an evidence".²⁶ The word is used as a technical term for the uncritical adherence to the doctrine of a school and all its traditions; in this sense we translate it as "traditionalism".

The word *tabkîit*, which is less used, has a cognate meaning; among theologians it is used to indicate a belief at first view without further consideration;²⁷ we translate it as "uncritical belief". About every time 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses this word *tabkîit*, he does so in combination with the word *taqlid*.

Taqlid is for him the central term here; it is against the implications of this idea that he fights and that he puts into the field his second criterion for real knowledge, the tranquillity of the soul. According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr traditionalism (*taqlid*) is not a religious duty, as his opponents say; it even is a failing in the fulfilling of these duties: God Himself has imposed as a duty on mankind to acquire real knowledge,²⁸ and real knowledge cannot be reached by uncritical adherence to traditions.

As a matter of fact, traditionalism includes the possibility of errors; 'Abd al-Jabbâr explains this by saying that in the field of traditionalism there are only two possibilities: either one follows all traditions existing, how contradictory they are (and, evidently, this is not possible), or one makes a choice and accepts some traditions while rejecting others. But, if one makes a choice, one can never be sure to have made the good one because no criterion is possible; neither the authority of the majority, nor the authority of ascetics, nor the authority of another traditionalism can guarantee the correctness of the choice.²⁹ Another argument against traditionalism is found in the

²⁶ Cf *Šarh* 61. He adds "so that he uses it like a necklace (*qilâda*) around his neck", playing with the etymology of the word *taqlid*.

²⁷ Cf *Lane*, 158.

²⁸ To this subject is devoted the third and last section of the twelfth part of the *Mugni Mugni* XII, 347-533.

²⁹ Cf *Mugni* XII, 123-126. The opinion of the majority, is not evidently true, arguments are given on pp 123-124, arguments from the Qur'ân and the argument that Muhammad's followers were in the beginning a small minority as also the Muslims in Christian countries, nevertheless their conviction is true. For the ascetics see *Šarh*, 61. Possibly this is also the meaning of *Mugni* XII, 123, line 7. Claiming the authority of traditionalism to justify traditionalism leads to an endless series (*Mugni* XII, 124).

fact that even God Himself does not demand blind adherence to His message, but proves it by arguments and by miracles.³⁰

To show systematically the difference between traditionalism (*taqlid*) and real knowledge (*'ilm*), and to show that traditionalism is not knowledge, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes the tranquillity of the soul (*sukûn an-nafs*) a second differentia specifica delimiting the species knowledge inside the genus conviction. In doing so, he brings the two—traditionalism and uncritical belief—together and combines them with assumption (*ẓann*) against knowledge (*'ilm*).³¹

Ẓann: assumption. Assumption is defined by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the same formal way as he defined the conviction: assumption is what necessitates that the subject in which it exists is assuming. This state of being assuming is something a subject who is compos mentis "finds himself" (*wajad nafsaḥ*) in. The subject "finds himself" assuming and concludes to the presence of a *ma'nâ* "assumption".³²

It is not knowledge because—contrary to knowledge—it may be not-corresponding with the reality as the examples given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his *Muġnî* clearly indicate.³³ But in some cases one has to be satisfied with an assumption because it is impossible to arrive at real knowledge, for instance in questions concerning the future;³⁴ but

³⁰ Cf. *Muġnî* XII, 124-125; *Šarḥ* 63. See also van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 45-46.

³¹ Vajda (*La connaissance chez Saadia*, 140-141) tries to draw up a hierarchical order of the degrees of knowledge or certitude in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system ("un ordre hiérarchique des degrés du savoir ou plutôt de la certitude"). His draft comprises the following five terms in their hierarchical order: *'ilm*, *ẓann*, *tabkîṭ*, *šakk*, *taqlid*.

Some remarks have to be made here. First: according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr no degrees of knowledge exist, there is no more or less; if the tranquillity of the soul is present, knowledge is; if this tranquillity is not present, knowledge also is not. If with "certitude" the subjective certitude is meant, it corresponds with the tranquillity of the soul, which admits no degrees; if objective certitude is meant (degrees of chance that the contents of the conviction are corresponding to reality) I must object that the division into different forms of conviction made by 'Abd al-Jabbâr is a qualitative, not a quantitative one.

Second: *Tabkîṭ* and *taqlid* constitute a species in the genus conviction; this species is characterized by the absence of the tranquillity of the soul.

Third: the *šakk* (doubt) does not belong in this list. It is not a *ma'nâ* as the others, but an act of the subject who is wavering between two or more possibilities. See note 43.

³² Cf. *Šarḥ* 395: "Assumption (*ẓann*) is the *ma'nâ* which, when it exists in one of us, necessitates that he is assuming".

³³ So the two examples in *Muġnî* XII, 43: the assumption a sleeping person has about what he witnesses and sees in his dreams, and the assumption of somebody who sees a *fata morgana* and assumes that it is water.

³⁴ Here especially matters of religious legislation are concerned; see e.g. *Muḥit* I, 12 and *Muġnî* XVII, 359-360. This is only justified when the acquiring of real knowledge is not possible.

always there must be a sign (*amâra*) that leads to this special assumption.³⁵ As kinds of assumption are mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, for instance, "suspicion" (*tawahhum*) and "melancholic assumption" (*zann sawdâwî*); the latter forms the basis of fear (*ḵawf*).³⁶

Among Mu'tazila there was a disagreement concerning this "assumption" being a kind of "conviction" (*i'tiqâd*) and belonging to the genus conviction, or constituting a genus of its own on the same line as the conviction.³⁷ 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself hesitates between the two possibilities. Sometimes he states that assumption is a kind of conviction and shows some likeness with traditionalism and uncritical belief: here also the tranquillity of the soul is not present, while the criterion of truth may be present and may be not. Sometimes one even gets the impression that traditionalism and uncritical belief are both sub-species falling under the species "assumption", which again falls under the genus "conviction".³⁸ But in other places 'Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly states—on the basis of a not very convincing argument³⁹—that assumption is a genus of its own, although it is necessarily linked with a special kind of conviction which he calls "*tajwîz*": "admitting that it may be otherwise".⁴⁰

'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions about traditionalism (*taqlîd*), uncritical belief (*tabkîit*), and assumption (*zann*)—if this last is considered to be a kind of conviction—point to the clear possibility of their not-being corresponding with reality. He also said that he calls every conviction not corresponding with reality "positive ignorance" (*jahl*);⁴¹ conse-

³⁵ Cf *Mugni* XII, 43 and XVII, 357, *Muhit* I, 12. The word used here *amâra* is less used than the word *dalil*, indication, *dalil* is used when man comes to knowledge via reflection upon an indication. So, the sign (*amâra*) has not the cogent force of proof which has the indication (*dalil*).

³⁶ For suspicion *Ṣarh* 395, for melancholic assumption *Ṣarh* 73.

³⁷ Cf *Ṣarh* 73 and 395. Abû Hâšim seems to have been the only important propagator of the thesis that assumption is a special kind of conviction, *i'tiqâd maḵsûs*.

³⁸ In *Mugni* XII, 43 he explicitly states " (that kind of) conviction that is assumption, traditionalism, and uncritical belief" (*al-i'tiqâd alladî huw zann wa-taqlîd wa-tabkîit*). On the same page he mentions twice *az-zânn al-mubaḵḵit*, the second participle apparently constituting a specification of the first "who assumes on the basis of uncritical belief". This could indicate that uncritical belief (and traditionalism) are subspecies of "assumption".

³⁹ *Ṣarh* 395. God imposes sometimes "assumption" as a duty, a conviction can be not-corresponding with reality. Therefore, God cannot impose it. In other places, 'Abd al-Jabbâr admits himself that also assumption can be not-corresponding with reality. So it does not make any difference.

⁴⁰ *Ṣarh* 73.

⁴¹ Cf *Mugni* XII, 25.

quently, we observe in this case an overlapping of both terms. There are forms of traditionalism and uncritical belief (and assumption) that are also positive ignorance, and others that really are the *tertium* mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, neither knowledge nor positive ignorance; they are corresponding with reality.

Together with the assumption, also the "doubt" (*šakk*) is mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.⁴² The doubt, however, is not a *ma'nâ* causing the subject to be in a certain state (*hâl*), and, therefore, does not fall under the conviction or its likes.⁴³

'*Ilm* (knowledge)⁴⁴ also belongs to the genus conviction, and inside that genus it is characterized by the criterion of truth and by the tranquillity of the soul.⁴⁵

This description of what knowledge is has been used with some variations by many Mu'tazila, among them Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâšim, as a definition of knowledge. 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself admits to have used it, saying that knowledge is "the conviction by which the soul is tranquil (and certain) that the reality is corresponding with the contents of its conviction."⁴⁶ But later, in the *Mugnî* and the *Šarh*, he gives a definition of his own.⁴⁷ "knowledge is the *ma'nâ* that supposes

⁴² See e.g. *Mugnî* XII, 12 and XII, 69

⁴³ 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not follow the majority of scholars who assert that it is a *ma'nâ* *Šarh* 49, *Mugnî* XII, 116, *Muhîr* I, 20

⁴⁴ For a summary of what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says about knowledge, especially about its existence and definition, see 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, *Nazariyat at-taklîf*, 45-58. See also Hourani's chapter about knowledge, especially about its place in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's ethical system, in *Islamic Rationalism*, 17-37. Both texts are descriptive rather than analytical.

⁴⁵ Cf. *Mugnî* XII, 25. "Our teachers say (and 'Abd al-Jabbâr quotes them with approval) that knowledge belongs to the genus conviction, when it (conviction) is connected with something according to how it is and so happens that it supposes tranquillity of the soul, it is knowledge."

"Thus knowledge has both objective and subjective specific differences: (a) an intellectual content corresponding to reality in the manner of truth, and (b) an emotional state of satisfaction and tranquillity. Both characteristics are necessary to constitute knowledge" (Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 17). See also Frank, *Fundamental Assumptions*, 6.

⁴⁶ So he did in his book called "*Al-'Umad*" Cf. *Šarh* 46. It is somewhat surprising that Rosenthal chooses exactly this definition to explain 'Abd al-Jabbâr's point of view, a definition rejected by him later on. Cf. next note.

⁴⁷ The reason is that 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not mention in his definitions genus (or species) and *differentia specifica*, but tries to restrict himself to a pure *differentia specifica*. "The goal of defining is to include the object which must be defined and to separate it from everything else, in a way that nothing else can be mixed up with it and nothing belonging to it can remain outside, therefore, it is man's duty in

the tranquillity of the knowing subject's soul at what he has obtained"⁴⁸ or, shorter yet, "knowledge is what supposes the tranquillity of the soul" which may be amplified as follows: "and the quiet of the breast and the calmness of the heart".⁴⁹

Hereby we have to bear in mind that knowledge is not directly known and defined from experience; as in the case of every conviction, the subject finds himself "knowing" and, in the case of human subjects, one has to deduce that he is knowing because of a *'illa* or *ma'nâ*, and this we call "knowledge".⁵⁰

This concept of the tranquillity of the soul (*sukûn an-nafs*) plays an important rôle in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's views on knowledge and in the distinction he makes between real knowledge and the conviction based upon uncritical belief or traditionalism. The concept of the soul being tranquil may at first sight be somewhat strange and its significance not very obvious. On the contrary, 'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks, it is self-evident and every subject reflecting on himself necessarily discovers this state.⁵¹

"The distinction one of us finds in himself, when watching himself, between his being convinced that Zayd is in the house because he sees him, and his being convinced that he is there because an unknown somebody informed him; he finds in one of the two situations a more and a state he does not find in the other situation; it is this more we point to by saying 'tranquillity of the soul'".⁵²

"One of us finds himself convinced about something, his soul being tranquil at what he is convinced about—as for instance the perceived objects—, and he distinguishes between his being in that state and

defining to give the most specific expressions" (*Mugni* XII, 15-16) Consequently, one must not mention the expressions which the defined object has in common with others (as here being a conviction), this only can be done as a prologue (*Mugni* XII, 14 *muqaddimât*) to the real definition or as a description 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions a number of definitions of knowledge which he rejects and refutes in *Mugni* XII, 17-22 More definitions, gathered from the Islamic theological, philosophical, and scientific tradition, are found in Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant*, 52-69, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's views and his place in the tradition is discussed on pp 211-212

⁴⁸ *Mugni* XII, 13 "*al-ma'nâ alladî yaqtadî sukûn nafs al-'âlim ilâ mâ tanâwalah*".

⁴⁹ *Šarh* 46 "*ʿalj as-sadr wa tuma'ninat al-qalb*"

⁵⁰ Cf p 41 God is always knowing and therefore essentially knowing So He has no "knowledge" He is *'âlim li-dâtih, lâ bi-'ilm* Cf *Šarh* 201-213

⁵¹ For a discussion of this tranquillity of the soul, see also van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 75-77

⁵² *Šarh* 46-47

his being (in the state of) uncritical belief, assumption, or traditionalism.”⁵³

‘Abd al-Jabbâr refers here to what for him is a clear experience, an experience of certitude. The term he uses, however, is very vague and ambiguous; the word *sukûn* means “immobility”, “rest”, especially after a movement.⁵⁴ One might be led by this terminology to assume that the process of acquiring knowledge is a kind of movement in the human soul, which comes to an end by reaching the final stage of this process.

This, however, is not the case. The process of acquiring knowledge is not a movement,⁵⁵ and the word *sukûn* is used metaphorically. It is not usual to use metaphors in definitions, but the word *sukûn* in connection with the word *nafs* is called a terminus technicus; its contents being clear, it is permitted to use it in a definition.⁵⁶

‘Abd al-Jabbâr chooses a vague term and uses it metaphorically. In my translation, tranquillity of the soul, I made an attempt to render the “technical” meaning of this expression.⁵⁷

What ‘Abd al-Jabbâr has in mind here is not a purely intellectual tranquillity or certitude. He deliberately uses the term *nafs* (soul) and not *qalb* (heart), *nafs* indicating the whole subject, while *qalb* is the substrate of a number of “interior” acts.⁵⁸

After all these explanations the question has to be put, a question

⁵³ *Mugni* XII, 23 See also *Mugni* XII, 20 “when man does not find unrest and confusion of his soul concerning the object he is convinced about, as he finds in the case of assumption and conviction (we call it tranquillity of the soul)”

⁵⁴ Cf *Mugni* XII, 22 in a discussion about a definition of knowledge by “movement”

⁵⁵ Cf *Mugni* XII, 22, where ‘Abd al-Jabbâr makes a distinction between the use of “immobility” and of “movement” in this matter, with the term immobility metaphorically used one points to something that is known before and deduced from a perceived state of the human subject That is not the case with “movement”

⁵⁶ Cf *Mugni* XII, 20-21, *Šarh* 47

⁵⁷ Vajda (*La connaissance chez Saadia*, 139) and Bernand (*Le ‘ilm chez les premiers Mu‘tazilites*, SI 36, 24) translate “tranquillité de l’âme” Van Ess (*Erkenntnislehre*, 75) gives “Seelenruhe” and for the longer formula (*sukûn an-nafs ilâ l-ma‘lûm*) “ruhiger Hingabe der Seele an das Wissensobjekt” Frank (*Fundamental Assumptions*, 6) explains it by translating “a secure sense of certainty”, so does Rosenthal, less correctly, “satisfies” (*Knowledge Triumphant*, 211) and “one’s own satisfaction” (*Knowledge Triumphant*, 49), Hourani (*Islamic Rationalism*, 18) chooses “repose of the soul”

⁵⁸ *Mugni* XII, 22 “When the tranquillity of the soul is connected with the soul, the totality is meant (*al-jumla*) because we call that the soul Don’t you see that one says my soul is tranquil at what I said, and my soul is desiring this matter or abandoning” Note. these paraphrases are generally translated in English by “I (myself)” So, one might translate “tranquillity of the subject”

frequently put already by his opponents, whether this criterion is not too subjective to base upon it the distinction between what is real knowledge and what is not. 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers in the negative and says it is a really truthful human self-experience; this experience is disputed, however, by his opponents, and therefore it is not easily used as evidence *prima facie* as 'Abd al-Jabbâr tries to do.⁵⁹

A second question which might be asked is about the relationship between knowledge and tranquillity of the soul; are they identical, does one cause the other or suppose the existence of the other? 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is that there does not exist a direct relationship between the two of them; the tranquillity of the soul is not related to the knowledge but to the knower, the knowing subject (*al-âlim*).⁶⁰

Man knows from his own inner experience that, when he knows, he necessarily is tranquil in his soul (*sâkin an-nafs*); from his being knowing with the real possibility that he sometimes is not he deduces that he has a state (*hâl*) "knowing", which is caused by the *ma'nâ* "knowledge", and that this knowledge makes it necessary (*yûjib*) that he is tranquil in his soul too. In the same way he concludes from his being tranquil in the soul to the presence of a *ma'nâ* "tranquillity of the soul". Consequently, there is no direct relationship between the two "*ma'ânî*" (plural of *ma'nâ*), but they characterize the same subject; so 'Abd al-Jabbâr says all he can in defining knowledge as: the *ma'nâ* that supposes (*yaqtadî*) that the knowing subject is characterized by tranquillity of the soul.⁶¹

Having dealt with the definition of knowledge, we now come to the matter of how to establish its existence in a subject and how it originates.

Concerning the first of these two questions, we remark that knowl-

⁵⁹ See e.g. *Muğni* XII, 36-37.

⁶⁰ *Muğni* XII, 20. "Therefore, we said in the definition of knowledge: it is what supposes (*yaqtadî*) tranquillity of the soul. Thus we made the tranquillity of the soul attributable (*râjî'*) to the knowing subject and not to the knowledge, to show in this way that knowledge is characterized by the fact that it makes necessary (*yûjib*) this judgement (*hukm*) on the knowing subject".

⁶¹ Cf. *Muğni* XII, 13. Hourani apparently does not understand the function of these *ma'ânî*, where he says: "In the present case we are not enlightened as to what this ground (*ma'nâ*) is which is present in the knower and gives him repose of mind". But there is no more to say about this *ma'nâ*, apart from the fact that it causes the subject to be knowing. Hourani's supposition "perhaps it is the deliberate and rational process which his mind goes through", is diametrically opposed to the essence of a *ma'nâ*. Cf. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 18. About *ma'nâ*, see our chapter on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's cosmology, pp. 156-158.

edge is not directly perceptible by the senses,⁶² one has to deduce its presence from the data furnished by perception

How is this to be done? 'Abd al-Jabbâr notices in the twelfth part of his *Mugni* that he has dealt with this question in his "chapter about the qualities" (*bâb as-sifât*), which had its place in the first three, missing, parts of the *Mugni*⁶³ Fortunately, the chapters about the qualities have been preserved both in the *Muhit* and in the *Šarh*⁶⁴ There are mentioned two ways to establish the existence of knowledge and its presence in a subject, one based on introspection, the other on external perception

The first argumentation starts from the fact that man finds himself knowing and can deduce – as we already explained above—the presence of a *ma'nâ* "knowledge" in himself⁶⁵

The second is based on outer perception, and only in this way can we conclude to the presence of knowledge in someone else "The precise act is an indication that the subject for whom it is possible differs from the subject for whom it is not possible, and the (first) subject is characterized by it in a way which supposes that this quality is due to him by a cause ('illa)", as 'Abd al-Jabbâr summarizes it himself⁶⁶ So the possibility of the "precise act" (*fi'l muhkam*) shows that the acting subject is knowing, and human beings are thus by a *ma'nâ*, "knowledge"

A "precise act" (*fi'l muhkam*) is "every act which proceeds from an acting subject in a way in which it does not proceed from other subjects"⁶⁷ or "what does not proceed from every acting subject in that methodical order"⁶⁸ It is an act that requires more than the pure ability to act, it requires knowledge in order to produce mostly a certain composition or order in this act, which is characteristic of it and which is the reason that not every able subject can perform this act

⁶² Abû 'Alî held that it is perceptible, and he is refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* XII, 23

⁶³ Cf *Mugni* XII, 5 and 23

⁶⁴ Cf *Muhit* I, 97-226 and *Šarh* 151-298

⁶⁵ This argument is summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* XII, 23 "One of us finds himself convinced about something, tranquil in his soul at what he is convinced about—e.g. perceived objects—and he distinguishes between his being in that state and his being (in the state of) uncritical belief, assumption, or traditionalism. If that is so and we know that he is only characterized by it because of a *ma'nâ*, this *ma'nâ* must be what our terms knowledge ('ilm) and cognition (*ma'rifa*) mean"

⁶⁶ *Mugni* XII, 23

⁶⁷ *Šarh* 156

⁶⁸ *Muhit* I, 113

As examples 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives speaking and writing.⁶⁹ A subject who can do these acts in a way which is really precise must be characterized by the corresponding knowledge. Evidently, the concrète application of this general rule will meet with many difficulties. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's main goal, however, is to demonstrate that God is knowing, and therefore this argumentation fulfils the conditions.

Concerning the second question—how knowledge originates in a subject—much has been said again by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his chapter on the qualities in the missing parts of the *Muġnî*.⁷⁰ But his conclusions are summarized in the twelfth part: knowledge belongs to the genus "conviction" and is characterized by its involving the tranquillity of the soul; the reason why it is characterized by it and, consequently, the reason why it is a separate species cannot be found in something attributable to the genus,⁷¹ nor can it be a quality of it,⁷² nor the intention of an acting subject.⁷³ When 'Abd al-Jabbâr thus has excluded all other possibilities, he arrives at the conclusion—by way of exclusion—that conviction becomes knowledge because of the way in which it happens; it is knowledge when it happens in a way which supposes tranquillity of the soul.⁷⁴

'Abd al-Jabbâr gives five of these "ways" (*wujûh*) in which conviction becomes knowledge :⁷⁵

the conviction occurs to someone who reflects (*nâzîr*) upon an indication (*dalîl*) in a way which corresponds with this indication (and really uses it as an indication);⁷⁶

⁶⁹ *Šarh* 157, *Muġnî* I, 113

⁷⁰ Cf *Muġnî* XII, 34

⁷¹ If it was something attributable to the genus, whatever belongs to that genus must be characterized by it, also uncritical belief, traditionalism, and even positive ignorance would be knowledge. Therefore, knowledge cannot be knowledge because of its genus, its existence, or its coming into existence (*Muġnî* XII, 34), *Šarh* 190-191 adds "a quality of its genus" and "its non-existence"

⁷² In the text of the *Šarh* he also excludes the possibility of the non-existence of a quality being the reason of the origination of knowledge, and he argues on the basis of inner perception. (*Muġnî* XII, 34, *Šarh* 190-191)

⁷³ Man, in fact, is not able to decide a conviction he reaches to be uncritical belief or knowledge *Šarh* 191

⁷⁴ Cf also *Muġnî* XII, 13 where 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions this already in his first description of knowledge

⁷⁵ In *Muġnî* XII, 34-35 he mentions six ways and all of them with approval. In *Šarh* 191-192 he first mentions three ways about which his "two teachers" are agreed; the fourth and fifth are from Abû 'Abdallâh, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's immediate teacher. We give them in this order. Finally, he mentions a sixth one, from Abû Hâšim, —concerning the transformation of a conviction which first was not knowledge, into knowledge —which is accepted in the *Muġnî* but rejected in the *Šarh*

⁷⁶ Thus in *Šarh* 191. The *Muġnî* summarizes "if it proceeds from reflection" (XII, 34)

the conviction occurs to someone who remembers a (former) reflection and argumentation;⁷⁷

the conviction results from an act of Him who knows the object of the conviction Himself (especially said about knowledge God directly gives to man);⁷⁸

the conviction occurs to someone who deduces concrete judgements from general rules;

the conviction occurs to someone who remembers a former knowledge. These are the only five ways in which knowledge originates in a subject.

If we look into the characteristics of these "five ways", and especially into the question who in fact is the producer of the knowledge, we restrict this distinction to two basic ways: one resulting from the activity of the subject who by it becomes knowing, the other coming from someone else, in fact from God. It is the difference between "given" and "worked" knowledge; the difference between knowledge as a gift and knowledge as the fruit of an effort.⁷⁹ The first of these two ways corresponds with the third way given above (the conviction results from an act of Him who knows the object of the conviction himself), the other four are put together in this second way. This distinction between two kinds of knowledge according to the way it is produced, corresponds with the classical distinction⁸⁰ between "necessary" (*ḍarūrī*) and "acquired" (*muktasab*) knowledge, which has been used and elaborated by 'Abd al-Jabbār too⁸¹

'*Ilm ḍarūrī* (or: '*ilm al-iḍṭirār*): necessary knowledge. One has sometimes translated this term by the English "immediate knowledge";⁸² this, however, is not quite correct. As we will see presently, 'Abd al-Jabbār distinguishes inside the category of necessary knowledge between

⁷⁷ In *Šarh* 191 he adds "for instance, the conviction which proceeds from someone who wakes up from his sleep".

⁷⁸ *Šarh* 191 lacks the word "act" (*fi'l*) (this word is found in *Muḡni* XII, 34), but adds "for instance, the convictions which occur in us from God's side", because these come from Him who really knows all objects; therefore it is knowledge.

⁷⁹ Cf van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 114 "ob Geschenk oder Frucht der Mühe".

⁸⁰ Cf Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 20, van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 114.

⁸¹ For a discussion of these two categories of knowledge in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbār *Muḡni* XII, 41-68 and *passim*, *Šarḥ* 48-51; 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṣmān, *Nazarīyat at-taklīf*, 59-64, Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 20-26; van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, *passim* (see index), especially 114-121.

⁸² So e.g. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 20, approved by Frank in his review article in *BIOR* 29, 355

direct or immediate and indirect knowledge, so it is preferable to use here the word "necessary" knowledge.

As its definition 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives "the knowledge which occurs in us, not from ourselves" or "the knowledge we cannot in any way banish from our soul" ⁸³

There are two kinds of necessary knowledge ⁸⁴ direct and indirect knowledge,⁸⁵ the indirect one supposing something else before God can give this knowledge. This indirect knowledge again has two sub-categories: first, what occurs "by way of something" and second, what occurs in a manner that is analogous to such a "way". As for this first sub-category, the "way" to go mentioned here is sensory perception (*idrâk*), this perception is not in itself knowledge, nor does it generate (*wallad*) knowledge, but it is a way to it ⁸⁶ If the perceiving subject is "compos mentis" (*âqil*) and there is no ambiguity in the perceived object, God creates knowledge in the perceiving subject ⁸⁷ Thus perception here is human, knowledge an act of God. As for the second sub-category, this refers to two "knowledges", one forming the basis (*asl*) of the other (*far'*), so one must know, for instance, the essence of something to be able to know its state (*hâl*),⁸⁸ and God must give the *asl* before He can give the *far'*.

The direct knowledge comprises first of all what we call the direct inner experience, the knowledge of the state (*hâl*) one is in, this 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls "to find oneself" (*wajad nafsah*), for instance to find

⁸³ For these definitions see *Šarh* 48-49. 'Abd al-Jabbâr first combined the two definitions given here into one: "the knowledge which occurs in us, not from ourselves, and which we cannot in any way banish from our soul". Then he adds that half of it is superfluous because the two halves of this definition are coextensive. So, for a correct definition one has to restrict oneself to one of the two. He also gives some variants with only slight modifications.

⁸⁴ Hourani (*Islamic Rationalism*, 20-21) gives another subdivision into two sub-categories: perception and rational intuition. This subdivision however does not correspond with 'Abd al-Jabbâr's: it makes Hourani e.g. take together the inner perception and the sensory perception, which in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's division do not belong together.

⁸⁵ Direct knowledge: what occurs "beginning" (*muḥtadī'*), without conditions which have to be fulfilled. *Šarh* 50. Indirect knowledge: what occurs "generated" (*mutawallid*), *Muḥnī* XII 57), or what occurs in us "by way of something" (*an tariq*) or analogously (*mā wajr majrâ t-tariq*"), *Šarh* 50.

⁸⁶ Not a necessary way. God is able to create knowledge of perceptible objects in a human subject without the perception (*idrâk*) taking place, this is not the case in the second sub-category. God cannot create knowledge of a state of something without creating knowledge of its essence (*Šarh* 50).

⁸⁷ Cf. *Muḥnī* XII 59.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Šarh* 50. See also note 86.

oneself convinced, knowing, willing, desiring, etc.⁸⁹ Further, he distinguishes in the direct knowledge—and in the indirect knowledge—between two sub-categories: first, what is considered (to belong) to the completeness of the intuition and second, what is not considered to belong to its completeness. This latter sub-category is a kind of knowledge some persons have and others have not without this having any influence on the completeness of their intuition and their being “*compos mentis*” (*‘âqil*). By way of example he mentions recognizing somebody.⁹⁰ The other sub-category again comprises two kinds of knowledge:⁹¹ what is based upon experience⁹² and what is not. The latter concerns the knowledge of general rules of argumentation and its basic axiomata, the other comprises general rules concerning acts and also the basic ethical rules.⁹³ From what has been said above, it is clear that these are axiomata every person who is *compos mentis* necessarily knows because God Himself has given them.

‘Ilm muktasab (*‘ilm iktisâbî*): acquired knowledge. Contrary to necessary knowledge, which in its different aspects is a pure gift from God, man has to work to acquire this second kind of knowledge, and he does so by means of reflection (*naẓar*) and only by means of reflection. “There is nothing in the acquired knowledge the basis of which is not attributable to reflection”.⁹⁴ About reflection and related concepts we speak in our next paragraph, which deals especially with this way to acquire knowledge.

⁸⁹ See pp 40-41 and notes 7-9 Cf *Šarh* 50

⁹⁰ *Šarh* 51

⁹¹ ‘Abd al-Karim ‘Uṭmân, who does not make the distinction between what is considered to belong to the completeness of the intuition and what does not a subdivision of the direct knowledge (as ‘Abd al-Jabbâr does in his *Šarh* 50-51), but of knowledge in general (*Nazariyyat at-taklîf*, 61, where he identifies what is considered to belong to the completeness of the intuition with the direct knowledge), gives also another subdivision of this sub-category According to a still unpublished part of the *Muhîr* (II, 258 A, see also *Šarh* 50, note 3) this sub-category comprises the knowledge of the principles of argumentation (*usûl al-adilla*), the knowledge of the rules of argumentation, and what is supposed by these two kinds of knowledge, as, e.g., experience, usage, memory, general principles

⁹² The text of *Šarh* 51 reads *k̄br*, in a note also the possibility of *k̄bra* is mentioned The meaning of the word must be here, as is clear from the context, “experience” and not “information” (*k̄bar*) So, we prefer the reading *k̄ibra*, if one reads *k̄br*, this has to be vocalized *k̄ubr*

⁹³ Hence Hourani (p 22) is right when he says that knowledge of general ethical rules is not “innate”, prior to experience, but he goes too far when he says (p 21) that all knowledge of general truth is preceded by perception Cf *Šarh* 50-51

⁹⁴ Cf *Muḡni* XII, 67-68

Ma'rifa: cognition⁹⁵ is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a synonym for knowledge (*'ilm*); by other authors this term is sometimes used to indicate an intuitive form of knowledge, especially concerning hidden and divine things, even God Himself.⁹⁶ For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, who holds as a principle that we can only speak about the other world (*al-ğayb*) on indications furnished by the evident reality of this world (*aş-sâhid*), and according to whom God can only be known by reflection and acquired knowledge and not by direct and necessary knowledge,⁹⁷ this form of human knowledge, which may be expressed by the term "cognition" (*ma'rifa*), has to be emphatically rejected. He does so repeatedly, and apparently with much emphasis he affirms that *'ilm* and *ma'rifa*, knowledge and cognition, are synonyms.⁹⁸

We have dealt with a conviction which has neither the criterion of truth nor the tranquillity of the soul (*jahl*, positive ignorance), with a conviction which has both (*'ilm*, knowledge), and with a conviction which has the criterion of truth but not the tranquillity of the soul (*taqlid*, *tabkîl*,—and maybe *zann*—when they are in harmony with the reality: traditionalism, uncritical belief and assumption).

Theoretically, there remains a fourth kind of conviction, which has the tranquillity of the soul but not the criterion of truth. This possibility, however, is only theoretical because the tranquillity of the soul is sufficient to delimit the knowledge as we have seen. Consequently, "what Abû 'Utmân asserts—that the soul of a subject in ignorance is tranquil—is only a supposition of the subject himself; in reality he is not tranquil in his soul."⁹⁹

⁹⁵ For various suggestions for a correct translation of the two terms *'ilm* and *ma'rifa*, see Rosenthal, *Knowledge Triumphant*, 4

⁹⁶ Cf. Peters, *Aristotle and the Arabs*, 151: "But there is another type of intuitive knowledge which knows the intelligibilia that are separated from matter. This type of intuition, generally known as *ma'rifah* (*gnosis*), opens into the problem of prophecy and sufism".

⁹⁷ See *Šarḥ* 52-60.

⁹⁸ See *Muğni* XII, 16: "This *ma'nâ* which supposes the tranquillity of the soul is called cognition as it is called knowledge; there is no difference between the meaning (*jâ'ida*) of these two (words): therefore, every knowing subject is called having cognition (*'ârif*)" See also *Šarḥ* 46 and *Muğni* XII, 16, where also other terms for knowledge are dealt with and considered synonyms of *'ilm*.

⁹⁹ Cf. *Muğni* XII, 37. The Abû 'Utmân mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr must be al-Jâhîz. Among the Mu'tazila bearing this name he is the one whose ideas of knowledge correspond with the objection formulated here. See also van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 77.

2 THE WAY TO ACQUIRE KNOWLEDGE

The way to acquire knowledge—other than necessary knowledge¹⁰⁰—goes via the *nazar* and only via the *nazar*, there is no acquired knowledge which is not ultimately based upon *nazar*¹⁰¹

Nazar: reflection It is neither perceptible by the senses¹⁰² nor directly known by necessary knowledge, what we know by direct necessary knowledge is that we are “*nâzîr*” when we are thus, we perceive this by way of direct self-experience “Being *nâzîr*” belongs with “being convinced” to the states the subject “finds himself” (*wajad nafsah*) in, the similarity between the two states being that in both cases the subject has a connection with a thing with regard to its qualities, a difference is found in the fact that he, being convinced, has this connection with regard to one quality in a stable way (he is convinced that the thing has this quality), whereas, being *nâzîr*, he is looking whether this quality is present or not or maybe its opposite¹⁰³ So we necessarily know that we are *nâzîr*, when we are thus, and we know also that we are not always and not essentially *nâzîr*, consequently, we must be so because of a cause, a *ma'nâ*, and this *ma'nâ* we call “*nazar*”.¹⁰⁴ What is described here by 'Abd al-Jabbâr is rational, discursive thinking in its most general form, I have chosen the English word “reflection” as an appropriate equivalent¹⁰⁵

'Abd al-Jabbâr himself had the choice out of many equivalents and synonyms of the word *nazar*,¹⁰⁶ and his preference for this word, one

¹⁰⁰ Necessary knowledge also knows its “ways”, especially sensory perception, see p 54 Knowledge based upon perception, however, is not “acquired” knowledge generated by this perception, but a gift from God

¹⁰¹ Cf *Mugni* XII, 67-68 “As for acquired knowledge we have demonstrated that one of us (a human being) can only make it, for instance, as a result of (*'an*) *nazar* or memory of *nazar*, or when he knew (before) the object of his conviction, or because he knows that what is characterized by a certain quality must have another one too There is nothing in acquired knowledge the basis of which is not attributable to *nazar*”

¹⁰² So said Abû 'Alî, this is denied by 'Abd al-Jabbâr *Mugni* XII, 5

¹⁰³ See pp 40-41 and *Mugni* XII, 9

¹⁰⁴ *Mugni* XII, 5

¹⁰⁵ The French equivalent of this word is given by Vajda (*La connaissance chez Saâda*, 145) “reflection discursive”, Bernand (*Le 'ilm chez les premiers Mu'tazilites*, *SI* 36, 24) renders *examen rationnel*”, Hourani (*Islamic Rationalism*, 14) gives “inquiry”, and Frank (*Fundamental Assumptions*, 8) gives it as “enquire”, Peters renders “speculation” (*Aristotle and the Arabs*, 151), and is supported by van Ess (*Erkenntnislehre*, 238) “Spekulation und Diskursives Denken”

¹⁰⁶ Cf *Šarh* 45 “Reflection (*an-nazar bi-l-qalb*) has (many) names, among them thought (*tafkîr*) investigation (*baht*), contemplation (*ta'ammul*), consideration (*tadabbur*), inspection (*ru'ya*)”

of the most ambiguous he could choose—the word originally means “to look”¹⁰⁷—is apparently based upon the tradition of his school and ultimately on the vocabulary of the Qur’ân.¹⁰⁸

When he has to give a definition of reflection, he renders it by “thought” (*fikr*) because both these terms are coextensive: nobody is reflecting but he is also thinking, and nobody is thinking but he is reflecting too.¹⁰⁹ Now he has to explain the term “thought”, which he describes as follows:¹¹⁰ “contemplation (*ta’ammul*) of the state (*hâl*) of a thing and comparison between it (the thing in question) and other (things) or comparison (between its state and) other (states) which come into existence.”¹¹¹

From this definition, it becomes already clear that ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s reflection will be built upon a two-terms-argumentation rather than on the three-terms-argumentation which we know as the syllogism.

According to the objects of the reflection ‘Abd al-Jabbâr makes a distinction between a reflection about the things of this world (*umûr ad-dunyâ*) and one about the things of “religion” (*umûr ad-dîn*). This distinction does not coincide with our western distinction between philosophy and theology: for ‘Abd al-Jabbâr the first form of reflection is concerned mainly with the matters of daily life, it is a rather practical reflection; the second form is the one he himself practises in his works,

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *Šarh* 44-45 and *Mugni* XII, 4 ‘Abd al-Jabbâr mentions five meanings of the word *nazar* the original meaning, “to look”, further, “to await”, “to be kind and merciful”, “to be face to face”, “to reflect” (*nazar bi-l-qalb*, literally: to look by means of the heart).

¹⁰⁸ Cf. van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 238-239 “Die Tradition der Mu’tazila hat in diesem Bereich starker als sonstwo weitergelebt. *Nazar* ist ihr ein Lieblingswort gewesen Ihre Anhänger nannten sich stolz *ahl an-nazar*. Der Begriff *nazar* stammt aus dem Koran Verse, in denen *nazara* als das Schauen auf die Wunder der Schöpfung verstanden ist, sind Legion aus der Ordnung des Kosmos erschaut man Grosse und Almacht Gottes, in weiter ausgreifender Dialektik auch seine Einzigkeit”

¹⁰⁹ ‘Abd al-Jabbâr adds “and in this way realities (*haqâ’iq*) are known” (*Mugni* XII, 4) He does not use here the word “definition” (*hadd*) but the word “reality” (*haqiqa*) As far as I have been able to ascertain, I did not find a direct definition of *nazar*

¹¹⁰ In his *Šarh* (p. 45) he defines “thought” just as he defines other *ma’âni* it is the *ma’nâ* which makes it necessary (*yûjib*) that man is thinking

¹¹¹ The Arabic text is not very clear, it reads “*ta’ammul hâl aš-šay’ wa-t-tamtiil baynah wa bayn gayrih aw tamtiil hâliha min gayrihâ*” Vajda (*La connaissance chez Saadia*, 146) proposes the following translation “considérer l’état d’une chose, la comparer à une autre, ou (examiner) un phénomène en prenant pour terme de comparaison un autre phénomène” The last four words of ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s description are the reason of all difficulties Here only one term of the comparison is given, without the preposition “between” (*bayn*), and the suffix used here is in the feminine and not in the masculine form In my translation this suffix corresponds with the word *hâl* already used, which may be feminine and masculine.

and it is centred upon the essential questions of human life, which are essentially related to God, and as such belong to the "matters of religion".¹¹²

He then makes a subdivision inside this latter form of reflection; one may reflect to refute the theses and arguments of the opponents, —and this only is the task of some scholars who fulfil this task in the name of the whole Islamic community— or one may reflect to acquire knowledge about God (and also about the other matters of religion), and this is the task of every adult Muslim.¹¹³

According to the definition 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives of "thought" (*fikr*), his argumentation is a two-term-argumentation. He confirms this point of view when explaining the way a reflecting subject has to follow to arrive at real knowledge; the reflection goes from the indication to the thing indicated by it, from the "*dalîl*" to the "*madlûl*".¹¹⁴ This implies that there are in our world "indications" intentionally¹¹⁵ placed there (mainly by God Himself) to indicate something else, the thing indicated (*madlûl*); if the reflecting subject follows these indications in the way meant by the one who placed them, he will arrive at the knowledge of the thing indicated (*madlûl*).

Not every reflection (*nazar*), however, will lead to real knowledge. In order that the reflecting subject arrives in fact at the knowledge of the *madlûl*, the reflection has to be "correct" (*saḥîḥ*). The criterion for its correctness is found in its leading to tranquillity of the soul, the criterion of real knowledge.¹¹⁶ This criterion is rather subjective

¹¹² See *Šarh* 45 "It (the reflection, *nazar*) is divided into two kinds: first, reflection about matters of this world (*umûr ad-dunyâ*), such as reflection about forms of medical treatment and forms of commerce, second, reflection about matters of religion (*umûr ad-dîn*)" Cf. also *Mugnî* XII, 4

¹¹³ See *Šarh* 45 "first, the reflection about sophisms (*šubah*, the false arguments of the opponents) in order to refute them, second, the reflection about indications (*adilla*) in order to arrive by them at knowledge"

¹¹⁴ See *Šarh* 87 "The principle is that the way (*tariq*) to knowledge of something else when this is not necessarily known, is only the "indication" (*dalâla*),— which is identical with "indication" (*dalîl*)—; the meaning of both is: what, if the reflecting subject reflects upon it, makes him arrive at the knowledge of something else, if he who has placed this (indication) has placed it in this way"

Cf. also *Mugnî* XII, 10

¹¹⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr firmly stresses the necessity of this intentionality, see e.g. *Šarh* 88

¹¹⁶ Cf. *Mugnî* XII, 11; XII, 69-70 "Know that our teacher Abû Hâšim makes it a sign (*'alâma*) for the correctness (*siḥha*) of the reflection, that it generates knowledge. He says: the tranquillity of the reflecting subject's soul at the correctness of what he is convinced about, and the difference between him and the subject who is in positive ignorance, in doubt, or assuming, supposes the correctness of his reflection" *Mugnî* XII, 69

although 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not admit this. He mentions, however, also some objective conditions which certainly have to be fulfilled if the reflection be correct.

First, the reflecting subject must be *compos mentis* ('*âqil*);¹¹⁷

second, there must be a connection with an indication (*dalil*);¹¹⁸

third, the reflecting subject must know this indication ('*âlum bih*),¹¹⁹

fourth, the reflecting subject does not know the "thing indicated" (*madlûl*) before, nor must he be in positive ignorance (*jahl*) based on sophisms about it, but there must be some form of uncertainty;¹²⁰

fifth, the reflecting subject has to follow the way indicated by the indication, just as it has been meant by the one who placed it as an indication.¹²¹

If all conditions are fulfilled, if the reflection really is correct (*saḥiḥ*), and there is no hindrance (*man*), reflection necessarily generates (*yuwallid*) knowledge. Thus the relation between reflection and knowledge is expressed by the term "generating" (*tawlid*), it is the relation between a cause and its effect, when the cause directly falls under the

"We ('Abd al-Jabbâr) have shown already that the tranquility of the soul supposes that conviction is knowledge, and that, consequently, there can be no doubt or wavering, and that his state differs from the state of the subject who is assuming or doubting. If this quality is really present (*saḥh*) in the conviction which comes into existence at (as a consequence of) the reflection upon the indication, it (the reflection) must be correct" *Mugni* XII, 69-70. The interpunction of the printed text is misleading here.

Vajda (*La connaissance chez Saadia*, 145-154) deals in detail with the problems arising from the criterion of correctness of the reflection which 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses in this text. Vajda's translation of the first text quoted above—"La tranquillite d'âme de celui qui soumet au contrôle de l'examen rationnel l'authenticite de ce qu'il admet en sa creance" (p. 147)—is, however, not correct.

¹¹⁷ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 11, *Šarḥ* 87-88.

¹¹⁸ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 100 "*muta'alliq bi-dalil*".

¹¹⁹ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 101. For the pure possibility of the reflection, it suffices that the subject is convinced about the indication (*dalil*), but if the reflection must generate knowledge and thus be correct, the subject must know the indication.

¹²⁰ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 102. If one knows the "thing indicated" (*madlûl*), one can reflect upon an indication, in order to know whether it is an indication or not, but a reflection in order to acquire knowledge is in this way not possible.

See *Mugni* XII, 11-12. "Reflection is only possible if the subject admits that the indicated object may have a (certain) quality or may not, this admission must be joined with it. This may occur with doubt, this may occur with assumption, this may occur with conviction as uncritical belief. But it (reflection) is not possible with knowledge, not with positive ignorance which happens as a result of sophisms, for the knowing subject has in common with the subject in positive ignorance—by this knowledge and this positive ignorance—that they both do not admit something other than what they are convinced about" (*Mugni* XII, 12).

¹²¹ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 11.

ability (*qudra*) or power of an acting subject, and the effect necessarily follows without intervention of that subject or anybody or anything else, on condition that there is nothing that hinders the occurring of the effect.¹²²

“An indication for this is that at the reflection upon an indication the conviction about the indicated object results always in the same way (*‘alā ʿarīqa wāhida*), if there is no hindrance (*manʿ*); this conviction results at (simultaneous with) it (the reflection), in accordance with it (the reflection); no other conviction will result than that about the indicated object... (at a reflection upon the coming into existence of the bodies no conviction about the prophetship of Muḥammad can result)... If it (the conviction) necessarily exists at (simultaneous with) it (the reflection), always in the same way, and¹²³ in accordance (*bi-ḥasabih*) with it, in the way we explained, its¹²⁴ state as generated from it (*mutawallid ʿanh*) is like that of other generated (objects).”¹²⁵

If not all the above mentioned conditions are fulfilled, the reflection does not generate something else; it does not generate anything at all.¹²⁶

The reflection upon matters of religion, consisting not in the reflection upon the sophisms of the opponents to refute them but upon the indications God Himself has placed in creation, in order to acquire in this way knowledge about God (and other matters of religion) is the first duty of every adult Muslim.¹²⁷ “If somebody asks: ‘What is the first duty God imposed upon you?’, you have to answer: ‘The reflection leading to the knowledge of God’, for God cannot be known by necessary knowledge, nor by sight; consequently, He must be known by thought and reflection.” So ‘Abd al-Jabbār began his *Explanation of the Five Principles* (*Šarḥ al-uṣūl al-ḳamsa*), stressing the importance of this duty, reflection.¹²⁸

¹²² About the *tawlid* or generating in general. see the “*bāh at-tawlid*” *Mugni* part IX (and also part VIII, *passim*) About the *tawlid* in the relation between reflection and knowledge *Mugni* IX, 161-163

¹²³ Read *wa-bi-ḥasabih* where the edition gives *fa-bi-ḥasabih*

¹²⁴ Read *fa-vaḳib* instead of *wa-vaḳib*

¹²⁵ *Mugni* XII, 77 See also *Mugni* IX, 161

¹²⁶ ‘Abd al-Jabbār discusses this problem of reflection generating, e.g., assumption, doubt, positive ignorance, when not all the conditions to make it correct (*ṣahih*) are fulfilled, in detail in *Mugni* XII, 104-118

¹²⁷ See *Šarḥ* 45 Cf *Muhit* I, 17 The third and last section of part XII of the *Mugni* (p. 347-533) is devoted to this subject

¹²⁸ *Šarḥ* 39

Fikr (*tafkīr*, *tafakkur*¹²⁹) can be translated as "thought" and is, as we have seen, according to 'Abd al-Jabbār a synonym of the word *nazar* (reflection).¹³⁰

Tadakkur¹³¹ or remembrance may play its part in the process of acquiring knowledge¹³² and might also be confused with reflection; the difference between reflection and remembrance, however, is that by reflection one seeks knowledge about an object having a certain quality or not or its opposite, and that by remembrance one seeks the knowledge of something one once knew.¹³³

Ḥadīṭ an-nafs: talk of the soul.¹³⁴ Another human act which might be confused with reflection and thought¹³⁵ is the "talk of the soul" (*ḥadīṭ an-nafs*). 'Abd al-Jabbār nowhere explains the rather obscure meaning of this term, probably because he never directly uses it in his own argumentation; the term plays its part in the refutation of his opponents' views.

It is "hidden speech" (*kalām kaḥfī*),¹³⁶ which might be heard by angels and demons;¹³⁷ it really is speech, not thinking about speech,

¹²⁹ The three words (*fikr*, *tafkīr*, and *tafakkur*), respectively the infinitives of the first, second, and fifth form of the verb, are used by 'Abd al-Jabbār without distinction in their meaning. Thus he uses also the participles of the second and fifth forms *mutafakkir* and *mutafakkir*. See *Muḡnī* XII, 4 and *Šarḥ* 45.

¹³⁰ See p. 58

¹³¹ Also the word *ḍikr* occurs and the participle of the first form *dākīr*, although this form of the verb also has the meaning "to mention". See *Muḡnī* XII, 7

¹³² Cf. *Muḡnī* XII, 34-35; *Šarḥ* 191-192

¹³³ *Muḡnī* XII, 7

¹³⁴ Among modern authors, van Ess most clearly described what we know about this rather obscure concept. *Erkenntnislehre*, 240-241.

¹³⁵ *Muḡnī* VII, 16, XII, 7.

¹³⁶ *Muḡnī* VII, 16. In this context we have to mention a rather obscure remark in *Muḡnī* VII, 16, where 'Abd al-Jabbār says: "All this remains the speech we know (consequently not a different kind of speech, a *ma'nā* in the soul), although it is hidden by the thought about it (*bi-t-tafkīr fih*)" If we study the manuscript, we come to the conclusion that we have to read *wa-t-tafakkur* (eventually *tafkīr*) *fih*. This sentence, in consequence, has to be translated as follows: "Maybe the thought about the letters of speech is confused with the talk of the soul by the subject, but all this (thought about the letters of speech, talk of the soul, and maybe also the *ḳāṭir* mentioned earlier) remains the speech we know, although it is hidden, and the thought about it" Consequently, also in this sentence the basic distinction between thought and talk of the soul remains intact. This explanation is confirmed by *Muḡnī* VII, 19, where it is stated that all such things are either speech or thought

¹³⁷ *Muḡnī* VII, 16: "In our opinion it is not impossible, it (the talk of the soul) being as it is, that demons and angels hear it as they hear each other's speech, although we (read *nasma'h* and not *tasma'h*) do not hear it because of its being hidden" He also

and therefore it is no longer possible for a human subject when his breath is taken away;¹³⁸ it occurs in two ways: either it (this term) points to¹³⁹ the arrangement of letters man forms in his soul—so that he is qualified by it—or he makes in the breath,¹⁴⁰ which penetrates in the direction of his breast, what is analogous to the articulation of the letters (speaking while inhaling?¹⁴¹)—so that he is qualified by it.¹⁴² Anyhow, one cannot say that being reflecting is attributable to this “talk of the soul”.¹⁴³

Concluding, we say that this “talk of the soul” must be an act which has the form of the spoken letters and speech, and is similar to speech to such a degree that it even needs the breath, but which is not audible to human ears.

KĀṬĪR (plural: *kawāṭīr*): warning. A third and last phenomenon that might be confused with reflection is the so-called *kāṭīr*.¹⁴⁴ The definition of its exact meaning is as difficult to give as that of the talk of the soul. But contrary to ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s almost complete silence about this talk of the soul, he discusses at length the implications of the *kāṭīr*.¹⁴⁵

states that, if one would try to show it (*izhārah*), it becomes normal audible speech (*Muḡnī* VII, 16)

¹³⁸ *Muḡnī* VII, 16, especially by this remark the talk of the soul is placed on the side of speech and its similarity to speech stressed. Thus it is no longer possible to see it as an inner act which prepares the uttering of the letters.

¹³⁹ The text (*Muḡnī* XII, 7) reads *yusārīk*, no logical meaning being possible for this word in this context. I propose to read *yusār*.

¹⁴⁰ The word used here has the same form as the word for “soul” *nafs*. Although *nafs* (soul) is frequently used in this context, I think we have to vocalize in this case *naḡas* (breath), a word used also in *Muḡnī* VII, 16 in a similar context. A vocalization as *nafs* does not give any sense.

¹⁴¹ This appears the only acceptable explanation of the expression ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses here: *an-naḡas allaḡī yanfuḡ fī nāḡiyat as-sadr*.

¹⁴² Cf. *Muḡnī* XII, 7-8.

¹⁴³ Cf. *Muḡnī* XII, 8: we know this “talk of the soul” not in the way we know a *mā’na*, but in the way we know acts. ‘Abd al-Jabbār continues: “There is no difference between somebody who says ‘his being reflecting is attributable to talk of the soul’ and somebody who says his being willing is attributable to motives (*dawā’i*) and free choice of the act.” This manner of argumentation is very frequent in the *Muḡnī* and can be rendered as “the first sentence is as stupid as the second.” It goes too far to look for an analogy between the two sentences (so van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 240), one cannot deduce from it that for ‘Abd al-Jabbār this talk of the soul is related to the subject’s being reflecting, just as the motives and the free choice of the act are related to the subject’s being willing.

¹⁴⁴ *Muḡnī* VII, 16, XII, 142.

¹⁴⁵ *Muḡnī* XII, 386-443.

It is mostly mentioned together with the "*dâ'ir*", the motive or summoning.¹⁴⁶ It is hidden speech just as the talk of the soul,¹⁴⁷ but this speech is not the act of the human subject in whose soul it exists but the act of God Himself;¹⁴⁸ it is hidden speech that God produces in the soul of man. There are three kinds of hidden speech in his soul: the talk of the soul (made by himself), the *kâṭir* (made by God), and the "whispering" (*waswâs*, the temptation made by the demon).¹⁴⁹

In a non-technical meaning, *kâṭir* is everything that occurs or arises in the soul,¹⁵⁰ but here it is used in a technical sense which is restricted to the field of religion.¹⁵¹ Its function, as described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and the fact that a man in whose soul God produced this *kâṭir* is called "*muḳṭar*", which word might be translated as "warned",¹⁵² justify a rendering of this term by "warning", the warning God produces in the human soul. This warning warns the human subject against blame and punishment (coming from God) which await him if he does what is evil and fails to do what is his duty.¹⁵³ In this way, the warning secures man's knowledge that reflection is his duty. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, having described reflection as man's first duty, has to show how man can know this duty. This happens by way of the warning; in this way God reveals the obligation (*wujûb*) of reflection since failing to do it might cause blame and punishment. So man becomes afraid and begins to reflect.¹⁵⁴ I believe

¹⁴⁶ See, e.g., *Mugni* XII, 386, where this combination occurs in the title of the chapter "Reflection is only obligatory and the subject who is compos mentis only knows that it is obligatory if there is a warning and a summoning or something analogous"

¹⁴⁷ Cf. *Mugni* VII, 16, XII, 401-413

¹⁴⁸ *Mugni* XII, 406

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 412

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 410. First, in its most general meaning, the root *kṭr* in its first form indicates anything which arises in the human mind, any thought, any conviction, etc., more specifically, it is used for "what a man is convinced about at a certain "sign" (*amâra*) so that he becomes afraid in matters of this world"; but this is not yet the most specific meaning in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses it as a terminus technicus

¹⁵¹ Cf. *Mugni* XII, 410, although it may be used metaphorically even in this field ('*alâ jihat al-majāz*)

¹⁵² It is the passive participle of the fourth form of the verb Cf. *Mugni* XII, 403

¹⁵³ *Mugni* XII, 387

¹⁵⁴ *Mugni* XII, 386-387. "If this is correct and the obligation of the reflection upon the knowledge of God follows upon the fear to fail to do this, and this fear is, without any doubt, a fear of harm which is related to religion, as e.g. punishment, blame, and similar things—and in the intuition of the subject who is compos mentis this is not the result of a habit so that the subject has it by his background and experience and practice, just as he (read *yumâris*) practices handcraft and human behaviour, in this

that we justly compare this *kâṭir* with what we know as God's voice in our heart, our conscience.

Methods of reflection

Just as there is no acquired knowledge which has not in some way been generated by reflection (*naẓar*),¹⁵⁵ there is no reflection which can generate this knowledge without being connected with an "indication" or "*dalīl*".¹⁵⁶

Dalīl and dalāla—both words are often used as synonyms by 'Abd al-Jabbār and are expressly declared to be synonyms¹⁵⁷—mean "indication". In their non-technical meaning these words are used for somebody or something guiding into the right direction; for concrete persons ("guides") and concrete things (e.g. road-signs) the word *dalīl* is preferred; the other word, *dalāla*, is mainly used for less concrete indications and for the act of indicating, and also for the quality "to be indicating" which is found in the indication.¹⁵⁸

As a technical term, it is used for an indication intentionally placed in this world, which has a connection with something else it indicates; so the indication in itself, without intervention of any reflecting subject indicates (*dall*) something, which "something"—be it a body, an accident, or a conclusion—is then called *madlūl*, "indicated". So, to be a *dalīl* in this technical meaning of the word, the indication must fulfil two conditions; first, it must be placed intentionally; otherwise it may guide into the right direction, but it is not called *dalīl*.¹⁵⁹

way he knows the intentions, and knowledge about handicraft results hereby in his soul —without any doubt a sign (pointing) to it must come in order that he is afraid at it (the sign) so that the reflection becomes his duty This sign is the admonition by the summoning and the warning"

¹⁵⁵ Cf *Mugnī* XII, 67-68

¹⁵⁶ Cf *Mugnī* XII, 10, XII, 100; *Šarh* 87

¹⁵⁷ In *Šarh* 87 'Abd al-Jabbār makes the two words synonyms Van Ess (*Erkenntnislehre*, 358) makes a distinction between *dalīl* "Zeichen" and *dalāla* "demonstrative Kraft", cf. also his *Logical Structure*, 26. A similar distinction is found, e.g., in *Muhīt* I, 49 There he uses the combination *dalālat al-adilla*, which might be rendered as "the being indicating of the indications" in accordance with van Ess's suggestion, but three lines later he uses the combination *dalālat ad-dalāla* in the same way. So we conclude that for 'Abd al-Jabbār there exists no clear distinction between the two terms, although for the "demonstrative Kraft", the "being indicating", he only uses the word *dalāla*.

¹⁵⁸ Cf Lane, 900-901

¹⁵⁹ Cf *Šarh* 87-88 "Therefore, one does not say about the trace a robber left behind that it is an indication (*dalāla*) (pointing) to him, although it is possible to infer (*istadall*) from it the place where he stays"

Second, there must be a connection between the indication and the thing indicated;¹⁶⁰ without such a connection there would be no reason why an indication indicates the thing indicated and not something else. This connection is, in fact, the cause of its "being indicating".¹⁶¹ According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr,¹⁶² there are four kinds of connection between indications and things indicated; one occurs in matters of divine revelation, the other three in matters of human intuition.¹⁶³

In matters of human intuition 'Abd al-Jabbâr distinguishes three kinds of relationship between the indication (*dalîl*) and the thing indicated (*madlûl*); in these relations the "initiative" lies with the thing indicated: the thing indicated is said to be, in one way or the other the cause of the indication. So, man with his human intellect can follow this way back and go from the "result" to the "cause". Consequently, in this relation the cause is the thing indicated and the effect is the indication.¹⁶⁴ The first kind of relationship is called "*alâ wajh al-wujûb*", "in the way of necessity": the thing indicated necessitates the indication by its very presence; the 'illa (cause) by its very presence necessitates a certain qualification or state (*hâl*), the presence of "knowledge" in a subject necessitates him to be knowing.¹⁶⁵

The second kind of relationship is described as "*alâ wajh aṣ-ṣihḥa*", "in the way of possibility": the thing indicated brings about that the

¹⁶⁰ In *Ṣarh* 87 'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks that there are two conditions mentioned in his definition of *dalîl* or *dalâla*. This definition runs as follows "what, if the reflecting subject reflects about it, makes him arrive at the knowledge of something else, when he who has placed this (indication) has placed it in this way" There appears to be only one condition, but according to the example given in the text the second condition must be "the possibility to arrive by it at the thing indicated (*madlûl*)" the falling of snow in its time is not an indication of the prophethood of Muhammad because it is not possible to arrive through it at the prophethood of Muhammad. I think that the cause of this possibility is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Muhit* I, 49 where he mentions as a condition that there must be a "connection" (*ta'alluq*) between the indication and the thing indicated. Only if this connection is present, the "arriving" (*tawassul*) at the thing indicated (*madlûl*) is possible. So we assume that the conditions mentioned respectively in the *Ṣarh* and the *Muhit* are in fact one and the same thing.

¹⁶¹ Cf. *Muhit* I, 49.

¹⁶² *Muhit*, I, 49. This text has also been discussed by van Ess (*Erkenntnislehre*, 359).

¹⁶³ Respectively in the *ṣar'iyât* (literally matters of divine legislation, in opposition to *'aqliyât* it is used for matters which we only know because they have been revealed by God) and the *'aqliyât* (what the human subject can know without intervention of divine revelation).

¹⁶⁴ The words "cause" and "effect" are used here in their non-technical meaning.

¹⁶⁵ *Muhit* I, 49.

indication is possible; man's being "able" (*qâdir*) makes it possible that he acts.¹⁶⁶

The third kind of relationship is "*alâ tariqat ad-dawâ'i wa-l-iḫtiyâr*", "in the way of motives and free choice": because a subject is in a certain state (e.g., knowing, ignorant, needing, etc.), he makes a certain choice; the motives and the state of the choosing subject bring about that he performs an act which may be used as an indication.¹⁶⁷

In these three forms of relationship we can by means of our human intellect follow the way back: from the state (*ḥâl*) or qualification (*wasf*) we deduce the cause (*'illa*) of that state; from the real possibility of an act we deduce that a condition is fulfilled; from certain acts we deduce the motives the acting subject had, or the state he was in.

In the case of matters of divine revelation, and especially of divine legislation, the relationship is somewhat different because here enters the argument on the basis of someone's authority. Because God is wise, He can only command, prohibit, impose in the Qur'ân, by the *Sunna* or the *Ijmâ'* (the general consensus of the believers)¹⁶⁸—this is the *dalil*—what in fact is, respectively, good, bad, and obligatory—this is the *madlûl*—. So, when we know that God revealed something, we know the reality behind this because we know that He is wise.¹⁶⁹

So every indication, to be an indication, must have one of these four relationships with something indicated.

There are four kinds of indications; one is concerned with *'aqliyât*: the authority of the human intuition (*ḥujjat al-'aql*); the other three are concerned with matters of divine revelation: the Qur'ân, the *Sunna*

¹⁶⁶ *Muhit* I, 49-50. "without his being able, the act would not be possible (*sahh*)" Van Ess (*Erkenntnislehre*, 359) does not hit the exact meaning of this "*sihha*" and the verb "*sahh*", he renders "besässe man nicht Handlungsfreiheit (*qudra*), wurde das Tun (*f'i'l*) nicht in rechter Weise zustandekommen" I discuss the meaning of these words later on in my paragraph about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology. For the moment it suffices to quote the translation of the term *sihha* given by Frank "objective possibility" (*Ma'nâ*, 252) or "the original ontological possibility" (*Some Fundamental Assumptions*, 10)

¹⁶⁷ *Muhit* I, 50 "without the subject who performs an evil act being ignorant or needing, he would not choose it" Cf pp 269-270

¹⁶⁸ Qur'ân, *Sunna* (the "way" of Muhammad), and *Ijmâ'* are for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the three indications in the field of revealed knowledge, according to *Ṣarḥ* 88

¹⁶⁹ *Muhit* I, 49. "He (God) who made them (the indications in the field of divine legislation and revelation in general both the word *ṣar'i* and the word *sam'i* are used in this paragraph) is wise (*hakim*), consequently, He only imposes what is obligatory, He only commands what is good, He only prohibits what is bad" *Muhit* I, 50 "without the prayer being obligatory, God's imposing of it would not be good". Therefore he calls this also the "way of the good", *tariqat al-hasan*

(the "way" of the prophet Muḥammad), and the *Ijmâ'* (the general consensus of Muslims).¹⁷⁰

If a human subject follows one of these indications in the way it has to be followed, he arrives at the "thing indicated" (*madlûl*) on the condition that the indication is really known. This activity of the human intellect is called "reflection" (*naẓar*); also the verb "*istadall*", tenth form of the root to which also belong the words "*dalîl*" and "*dalâla*", is used for this act, meaning: to establish an indication and acquire in this way knowledge, or to infer.¹⁷¹

For these structures found in our world where one "thing"—whatever it may be—indicates something else, and for the process of following these indications in the right direction, the direction into which they point, 'Abd al-Jabbâr has a number of technical terms which may indicate a difference in the relationship between indication and thing indicated (*dalîl* and *madlûl*)—we have already seen that 'Abd al-Jabbâr distinguishes four basic forms of relationship¹⁷²—or emphasize a certain aspect in the human reflection (*naẓar*) which generates the knowledge of the thing indicated. I mention here briefly the most important among these terms.

I'tall: to mention as the cause.¹⁷³ This word is from the same root as the two words *'illa* (cause) and *ma'lûl* (effect). In fact, in this case the relationship between the two "things" concerned is the relationship between the *'illa* and its *ma'lûl*; although we translate these Arabic words by "cause and effect", not every cause and every effect are called by this name. It is a special causal relationship which we will treat in our paragraph on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's cosmology; for the moment, it may suffice to quote Frank:¹⁷⁴ "the *'illa* is most often an intrinsic cause; it is interior to the thing and automatically produces its effect." It is the relationship we have already met in the conviction which causes a subject to be convinced, in the knowledge which causes the subject to be knowing, and in the reflection which causes the subject to be reflecting. When 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses this term *i'tall*,

¹⁷⁰ See for this division: *Šarḥ* 88.

¹⁷¹ For "*istadall*" see, e.g., *Muğni* VII, 15; cf. Lane, 901.

¹⁷² The four kinds of "connection" (*ta'alluq*) mentioned on pp. 66-67.

¹⁷³ This verb is constructed as follows: "*i'tall fî ... bî*" or "*i'tall fî ... min ḥayṣ*"; to mention as the cause of something (or: that...). In the English translation one has to say "the cause" and not "a cause", because the relationship concerned is always the immediate one-cause one-effect relationship.

¹⁷⁴ Frank, *Ma'nâ*, 251.

he means: to deduce from the effect (*ma'lûl*) which is known, the existence of the cause (*'illa*), and to use in this way the effect (*ma'lûl*) as an indication (*dalîl*) to the cause (*'illa*). So, for instance, from the (perceptible) way in which speech occurs in our world one concludes that the cause of this way of occurring (and not occurring) is that speech "needs" (*muhtâj*) something, such as movement or a special structure;¹⁷⁵ from the concrete, perceptible reality one deduces the existence of non-directly-knowable "things" which constitute the cause of the reality's being so.

Aṭbat: to establish. This term points, not to a certain relationship between the two "things" concerned, but to the result of the reflection upon the indication. When this reflection results in the knowledge of the existence of something, 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it "*aṭbat*", to prove the existence of something, to establish.¹⁷⁶ What is "established" is the existence of the accidents (*a'râd*), modes of being (*akwân*), or acts (*a'âf*).¹⁷⁷ He establishes these in general in order to prove the existence of God as the One who produces some of them. In this case the absolute form *aṭbat* is used.¹⁷⁸ Or he establishes an accident or substance as having a relation to a certain subject so that this subject is qualified (*mawṣûf*) by it. To indicate this he uses several formulae: "*aṭbatah mawṣûf*" (he established him being so and so) or "*aṭbat lah ṣifa*" (he established for him a quality; he established that he had a quality).¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁵ See, e.g., *Muḡnî* VII, 31, 32, 33, 41. The relationship is very clear in *Muḡnî* VII, 32: "He (Abû 'Alî) mentioned as the reason (*kân i'tall*) of the need of speech for (a special) structure that it exists in the same way in what is characterized by structure and cannot exist in what has no structure, although the ability for it exists in both substrates, consequently, this indicates (*iadull*) its need for it (the need of speech for structure)" In this sentence the relationship between the terms *dall* and *i'tall* is very obvious.

¹⁷⁶ Rosenthal (*Knowledge Triumphant*, 223) renders this word as "asseveration", van Ess is more specific when he renders "die Existenz bestätigen" (*Ibn Kullâb und die Mihna*, 111). The term is related to the term "nafy" (to deny the existence of something), which is used as its opposite, cf. *Ṣarh* 153. *Muḡnî* VII, 14: "When it is certain that there is no way to establish it, by no kind of knowledge, it is necessary to deny it" See also *Muḡnî* VII, 62.

¹⁷⁷ See *Ṣarh* 92-93 and 96, *Muḡnî* VII, 82.

¹⁷⁸ See *Ṣarh* 92-94. *Ṣarh* 92: "If you want to infer (*iastadill*) from the accidents (*a'râd*) (the existence of) God, you first have to establish (*tuḡbit*) them, then to know their coming into existence (*hudûṭ*), then to know that they need a producer (*muhdûṭ*) and maker (*tâ'il*) different from us (human beings) and that is God".

¹⁷⁹ About the general principles of this *iḡbât* (establishing), especially the fact that it needs the knowledge of the object the existence of which one tries to establish, 'Abd al-Jabbâr wrote in *Muḡnî* VII, 14. For the establishing that a subject has a quality, see, for instance, *Muḡnî* VII, 58, 62, 82.

Bayyan: to explain. The use of this word, which is very frequent in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, is still determined by the basic meaning of the root "byn", to which it belongs as the second form of the verb. This basic meaning can be described as: to be separated from other things and to become in this way clearly visible.¹⁸⁰ More obviously than in the second form this basic meaning appears in the fourth form of the verb, "abân", which is used together with the preposition "min" (from) in the sense of "to set apart from, to distinguish from".¹⁸¹

This meaning is also apparent in the use of the verbal noun "bayân", which can be rendered by "explanation", but has, when used in combination with the preposition "min" (from), a sense comparable with that of "abân"; therefore, it is used in combination with the words "hadd" (definition) and "haqîqa" (reality), which indicate the distinction between the thing defined and everything else.¹⁸²

Also the second form, *bayyan*, has this connotation: to explain something by distinguishing it from other things. It is used both for the relationship between the indication and the thing indicated (the indication "explains" the thing indicated) and for the act of the human subject who follows the indication and, in doing so, "explains" the thing indicated. So it appears to be often used as a synonym for "to indicate" (*dall*);¹⁸³ a difference may be found in the fact that, when more arguments for something are given, 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses "to indicate" (*dall*) for the first argument and "to explain" or other verbs for the following arguments.¹⁸⁴ This difference can be caused by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's belief that for a correct reflection, which generates knowledge, the thing indicated (*madlûl*) cannot be known before. So, possibly the fact that the thing indicated (*madlûl*) is already known through the first argumentation prevents 'Abd al-Jabbâr from using the words

¹⁸⁰ See Lane, 285-286

¹⁸¹ Cf *Mugni* VII, 7 "to distinguish it (*li-nubînah*) from other genera and from its own genus when it happens in another way, as we distinguished (*abannâ*) knowledge by the fact that it (read *mâ* where the text has *mimmâ*) is what supposes the tranquillity of the soul at its known (object) from other different and corresponding accidents" It is the definition which explains the contents of a concept and distinguishes its contents from anything else

¹⁸² Cf *Mugni* VII, 6 and 8 ("*bayân haqîqat al-kalâm min gayrih*" the explanation of the reality of speech (which distinguishes it) from anything else)

¹⁸³ Cf *Mugni* VII, 26, where the verbs *dall* and *bayyan* are used in the same sentence and in apparently the same meaning

¹⁸⁴ See, for instance, the succession of the different verbs (*dall*, *bayyan*, *awdah*) in *Mugni* VII, 26 and 27

“indication, to indicate, indicated” for the second time, in a second argumentation.

Awḍāḥ: to elucidate. This word appears to be used by ‘Abd al-Jabbār, not so much as a terminus technicus, but more as an alternative for *dall* and *bayyan*, but it is less frequently used.¹⁸⁵ For its specific meaning we have to look into the basic meaning of the root “*wḍḥ*”, to which it belongs (as the fourth form of the verb), and which can be described as: being clear, lucid. Therefore, I propose as a rendering of the fourth form: to make clearly visible or to elucidate.

Some forms of reflection (*nazar*) and argumentation are more complicated than the direct indication-indicated relationship we treated above. We now want to speak about the deduction by analogy (*qiyās*), about the deduction by “division” (*taqṣīm*), and about the argumentation ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses when attacking his opponents (*ilzām*).

Qiyās: analogy or deduction by analogy.¹⁸⁶ The strict form of this kind of deduction is described by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in the seventeenth part of his *Muḡnī*, when he deals with the sources of our revealed knowledge and the forms of argumentation used there.¹⁸⁷ Consequently, his attention is directed mainly to analogy in matters of (divine) legislation (*ṣar’iyyât*), but he often refers to the use of this form of argumentation in matters of human intuition (*‘aqliyyât*).¹⁸⁸

We describe this deduction by analogy (*qiyās*) as follows: if the object about which one seeks knowledge (*far’*) resembles the object about which one has knowledge (*aṣl*) in what necessitates a certain judgement (*ḥukm*) on the *aṣl*, the *far’* is entitled to the same judgement (*ḥukm*).¹⁸⁹ “What necessitates a certain judgement” is the cause, the *‘illa* of this *ḥukm*. Consequently, if we know that a certain cause

¹⁸⁵ See, for instance, *Muḡnī* VII, 26.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. the pages devoted to the *qiyās* by van Ess in his *Erkenntnislehre*, 381-394

¹⁸⁷ Cf. *Muḡnī* XVII, 276-335

¹⁸⁸ Cf., for instance, *Muḡnī* XVII, 280: “The form of the method of deduction by analogy in matters of divine legislation (*al-qiyās aṣ-ṣar’î*) is the same as the form of the deduction by analogy in matters which are known on the basis of intuition (*al-qiyās al-‘aqlî*). . .”

¹⁸⁹ Cf. *Muḡnī* XVII, 280 and 320-321. The terminology used here, *aṣl* and *far’*, the principle and the branch of the knowledge, is also used for the general principle (*aṣl*) and the concrete derivatives (*far’*, plural *furū’*). the deduction by analogy is, however, not restricted to this form of it. The *ḥukm* or judgement is a qualification necessitated by the cause (*‘illa*). This relation cause-judgement can be used in this form of argumentation because the *‘illa* always produces its effect automatically and immediately

necessitates a certain judgement, we know that in other cases too this cause will necessitate this judgement, if in person A the presence of knowledge necessitates the judgement "knowing" and we know that in person B there is knowledge, person B is also entitled to the judgement "knowing" ¹⁹⁰ 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not use this strict form of deduction by analogy very frequently in his discussions about *'aqlivât*. The most important rôle it plays in these discussions we find in the analogy between this world and the world of God (*aš-šâhid wa-l-gayb*). For instance, a man's being speaking (the cause, *'illa*) necessitates that he is "making speech" (the judgement, *hukm*), consequently we know that God, when He "is speaking", is also "making speech" ¹⁹¹

But far more than this strict form of *qiyâs*, 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses in his books a form of *qiyâs* which does not follow the rules of this deduction as given above. In that case it is a three-term-argumentation, which resembles our syllogism from a general truth and a concrete datum he draws the conclusion. He uses various words to indicate this scheme, one of the most frequently used being "*idâ sahh wa-tabat fa-yajib*", "if it is correct that (a general truth) and it is a sure fact that (a concrete datum), it must be (the conclusion)" ¹⁹² For instance, if it is correct that the giving of a definition of something is a derivative from the knowledge of that thing, and it is an established fact that the knowledge of speech is necessary knowledge and comes via the sensory perception, it must be possible to define it in this way ¹⁹³

Taqsim or **qisma**: division ¹⁹⁴ This method of argumentation tries to solve a problem and to find the right answer by enumerating all possible answers, which are then subsequently dealt with, and, consequently, it consists in the division of the problem concerned into various sub-problems. Frequently such a division is introduced by the words "*lâ yaqlû min*", "it is not without", followed by the various

¹⁹⁰ Brunschvig (*Rationalité* 216) describes the "indication" in this form of argumentation as follows: "Tout *qiyâs* correct doit ce caractère scientifique 'à l'indice probant (*dahil*) qui désigne le moyen terme et incite à l'analogie. There are some conditions: the cause has to be known both in the *asl* and in the *far'*, the judgement (*hukm*) of the *asl* must be known: there must be no hindrances (*ma'ânî*). All these and other data about this *illa* are found in *Mughni* XVII, 276-335.

¹⁹¹ Cf. *Mughni* VII, 53.

¹⁹² Cf. for instance *Mughni* VII, 6, 9, 24.

¹⁹³ Cf. *Mughni* VII, 6.

¹⁹⁴ For the history of this terminology and the use of this method of argumentation in philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence, see van Ess, *Erkenntnislehre*, 394-396.

possibilities : A or B or C... When one has made this division, there are three different ways to continue this argumentation according to the goal one wants to reach. One may try to show that all possibilities enumerated are correct; this method is used when one wants to show the different ways in which a certain thing can happen, or to prove that, for instance, all conditions are fulfilled.¹⁹⁵

One may try to show that all possibilities are false and that, consequently, the presupposition must be false. To give an example: the opponents say that everybody knows that there exists speech in his heart; 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that this knowledge must be either necessary or acquired knowledge; then he shows that one cannot know this through necessary knowledge nor through acquired knowledge. Consequently, the supposition of his opponents must be incorrect.¹⁹⁶

One may try to show that one solution is the correct one by proving all others to be false; this method of argumentation supposes, as a matter of course, that the starting-point is correct, and that all possible solutions are enumerated.

We distinguish two forms of this last method, the first being the more sure, the second being an easy target for the attacks of the opponents. The first form is comparable with the method used in our days in computational logic: every question is divided into sub-questions, until every sub-question only has two alternatives: yes or no; 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls them "*iqbât wa nafy*", establishing and denying.¹⁹⁷ By following always the yes-line of the alternatives, one ultimately arrives at the correct answer. In fact, 'Abd al-Jabbâr in every alternative shows that one of the two possibilities is false, and that consequently the other must be the correct one.¹⁹⁸

To give an example of this form in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own words: "If somebody says: 'Why did you say that this ("combination") matter only is the presence of a *ma'nâ*?', we say: it cannot be without (one of the following possibilities); it is attributable either to itself or to its

¹⁹⁵ As an example 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives the enumeration of the various things which hinder (*mawâni*) the seeing. Cf. *Šarḥ* 99.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. *Muğni* VII, 17.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. *Šarḥ* 98.

¹⁹⁸ This form van Ess has in mind when he writes: "Kalâm, craving for certitude, favored the first variant, truth derived from the mutual exclusion of two contradictory statements: the world is either eternal or created; if it is then not eternal (which has, of course, to be proven), it must be created. One sometimes called this "*dalâla bil-muqâdda*", argumentation by establishing a contrast, but mostly *qisma* or *taqsim*". (*Logical Structure*, 40).

qualities, or to something else. It cannot be attributable to itself nor to its qualities. If it is attributable to something else, it cannot be without (one of the following possibilities), either its influence is in the manner of making possible—like the influence of the maker on what he makes—or its influence is in the manner of necessitating. Its influence cannot be in the manner of making possible. If its influence is in the manner of necessitating, it cannot be without (one of the following possibilities), it is non-existing or existing. It cannot be non-existing. The only possibility that remains is that it is existing, as we say¹⁹⁹

The second form tries to enumerate all different possibilities, and in this lies its weak spot: how to prove that this enumeration is complete?

As an example of this form I quote 'Abd al-Jabbâr, in his argumentation about "knowledge": "(Conviction becomes knowledge) either because of its genus and essence, or because of a quality of its genus, or because of its existing, or because of its non-existing, or because of the existence of a *ma'nâ*, or because of its coming into existence, or by an acting subject, or because it happens in a certain way"²⁰⁰ When he has proved all possibilities except the last one to be false, he concludes this one to be the correct one. It is easy to see that the opponents will try to show that this division is not complete, that there are other possibilities, and that, consequently, the argumentation is not valid.²⁰¹

Ilzâm: argumentum ad hominem. In the strict sense of the word, this method of argumentation is only used in the dispute with the opponent, it consists in taking the thesis of the opponent for granted, and in drawing from it conclusions which the opponent cannot by any

¹⁹⁹ *Šarh* 98

²⁰⁰ *Šarh* 190

²⁰¹ To summarize all this in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own words: "This division (the one translated in our text concerning combination *ijtimâ'*) is hesitating (*mutaraddida*) between denying and establishing—in the same way the Qâdî l Qudât gave it in the *Muhit*—, it is better than the other divisions which the teachers gave in their books because, if a division does not hesitate between denying and establishing, it implies that additions might be possible, and the opponents can make some trouble about it. Know that one may use a division, aiming to show that some (possibilities) are false and others correct—as we mentioned here—, one may use it aiming to show that all (possibilities) are false—as what we say about the indication that God cannot be knowing because of a knowledge—, and one may use it aiming to show that all (possibilities) are correct—as what we say about the things about which we know by means of our intellect that they hinder the seeing: they are six" (*Šarh* 98-99)

means accept, either because he must admit that they are absurd, or because they are obviously in contradiction with his own doctrinal position and his own theses 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses this method very frequently in his disputes although he seldom uses the verb *al-zam* or the noun *il-zâm* ²⁰² He also uses a similar method of argumentation when no discussion with his opponents is given, he uses it, for instance, to show that a certain possibility in a division (*taqsim*) has to be excluded because it is not correct. He may do so by showing that the acceptation (*tajwîz*) of this possibility leads to the necessity of accepting also other things or theses which evidently are absurd, in other cases, the accepted thesis itself would "necessitate" (*awjab*) something else that is, in fact, absurd ²⁰³ In this form of argumentation the verb *awjab* (or the first form *wajab*) is very frequently used, therefore, one could call this form "*ijâb*" or "*reductio ad absurdum*" (reduction to something absurd)

In this context we like to mention the term "*šubha*" sophism. It is the word 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses to indicate the arguments of his opponents ²⁰⁴ It is, in a way, the contrary of the "indication" (*dalil*). When somebody supposes something to be a *dalil* and follows it, while in fact it is not a *dalil*, it becomes a *šubha*, just as the argumentation based upon it. Who is in "positive ignorance" (*jâhil*) thinks that he has an indication, but in fact he has a sophism. It is the task of the Muslim theologians to refute these sophisms in the name of the Islamic community ²⁰⁵

By way of conclusion we summarize: acquired knowledge is always generated by reflection (*nazar*) upon an indication (*dalil*). For 'Abd al-Jabbâr the term *dalil* still has its original meaning: something indicating something else. Nevertheless he also uses it for more complex forms of argumentation, where the meaning of this word shows a tendency to melt with more general terms such as proof or demonstration. But he always remains far from the strict forms and rules

²⁰² For a series of these "argumenta ad hominem" (*il-zâmât*), where 'Abd al-Jabbâr also uses this term in indicating them, see *Mugni* VII, 148-150.

²⁰³ See, for instance, *Mugni* VII, 21, where in the context of a division (*taqsim*) different terms are used in an argumentation based on this *yab*. But instances of the *il-zâm* and the *ijâb* are found in almost every chapter of the *Mugni*.

²⁰⁴ Cf. for instance, *Mugni* VII, 133-179, where the *subah* of the opponents' their arguments for their thesis that God is speaking by eternal speech which exists in Him are refuted.

²⁰⁵ See *Šarh* 45 and *Mugni* VII, 14.

of demonstration as built up by the philosophers of the Aristotelian tradition.

3. THE MANNER IN WHICH KNOWLEDGE IS EXPRESSED

Under this vague and somewhat ambiguous heading we intend to deal with three different manners in which we express what we know (in the vocabulary of 'Abd al-Jabbâr we cannot say that we express our knowledge, *'ilm*, this knowledge being only the *ma'nâ* which causes us to be knowing, but we have to say that we express what we know, *al-ma'lûm*): first, the definition, in which one tries to circumscribe the object of one's knowledge; second, some qualifications we give to propositions when we use these in the course of our argumentation, such as "correct", "evident" propositions; third, other qualifications by means of which we express what we know about an object, such as "good" and "evil".

As a matter of fact, especially the terms treated in the third category may give the impression to have been rather arbitrarily chosen (the terms in the second category may suffer from the same defect, but in a lesser degree). Many words, also words of some importance in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, will not be discussed. My choice was determined by the texts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr about God's speech. All words that play an important part in his argumentation on this subject are treated presently.

Definition

Hadd: definition. To give a definition or to define (*tahdîd*) something is a derivative (*far'*, branch) from the knowledge one has about that thing;²⁰⁶ one has to know the thing concerned before being able to define it, for "to define" can be rendered by "to circumscribe", and in order to circumscribe something exactly, one has to know what belongs to it and what does not. "By defining something one aims at circumscribing it in a way that does not enter into it what does not belong to it, and that does not remain outside it what does belong to it",²⁰⁷ or, to put it in a more poetical style, a definition is "*jâmi' mâni'*", "gathering and hindering".²⁰⁸ These are instances of the first

²⁰⁶ Cf *Mughni* VII, 6

²⁰⁷ *Mughni* VII, 6

²⁰⁸ *Sharh* 494

and most generally used description of the definition as found in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr.²⁰⁹

We also find other descriptions, which are less formal in describing definitions as being purely circumscriptions, but which furnish some more material aspects: the definition is "more clear (than the pure name of the thing to be defined), it reveals its meaning, and circumscribes its sense; and this is the goal of defining."²¹⁰

So, two conditions have to be fulfilled to constitute a good definition: it must be more revealing about the meaning (than the pure name) and it must give an exact circumscription.

For the external form in which the definition is presented 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives some strict rules.

First, it is not allowed to insert in the text of the definition anything that the object to be defined has in common with other things. The definition has to be restricted to the specific peculiarities of the object to be defined.²¹¹ Consequently, a definition constituted by the mention of the genus proximum and the differentia specifica—as, for instance, "man is a reasonable animal" (*animal rationale*) or "knowledge is conviction which involves tranquillity of the soul"—is rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr since "being an animal" does not circumscribe man, and "being conviction" does not circumscribe knowledge.²¹² 'Abd al-Jabbâr looks for a pure differentia specifica, which has to function against the background of pure existence or even the background of existence and non-existence.

Second, it is not permitted to choose for the definition any expression one likes; one has to use the most characteristic qualifications (*aḳaṣṣ al-awṣâf*) or the most characteristic expressions (*aḳaṣṣ al-'ibârât*), which are at the same time the most apt to gather all that belongs to the object to be defined and to distinguish it from other things.²¹³

²⁰⁹ This form of description, which aims at a pure coextension, is described in *Mugni* XII, 4 (though here the word *ḥaqīqa* is used), here "reflection" is rendered (defined?) by "thought" because both are coextensive, and "in this way *ḥaqā'iq* are known" See also *Šarḥ* 40 This formal concept of a definition (the word *ḥadd* is used in a non-technical vocabulary for a border) is not a peculiarity of 'Abd al-Jabbâr; see, for instance, al-Bāqillānī. *Tamhīd*, 6.

²¹⁰ *Šarḥ* 40-41. One may ask whether the definition given in note 209 (reflection is thought) comes up to these requirements

²¹¹ Cf *Mugni* VII, 8 and *Mugni* XII, 13 Therefore, many of his definitions begin with *mā* (what), *man* (who), or *allāḍi* (which)

²¹² See *Šarḥ* 46

²¹³ Cf *Mugni* XII, 15-16

Third, it is not allowed to mention in the definition more than is strictly necessary. In a certain case, it may be allowed to mention two things which are really coextensive for reasons of "disclosure" (*kašf*); thus we find: living is he for whom it is not impossible (*lâ yata'addar*) to be knowing and able";²¹⁴ both qualities (being knowing and being able) are only possible because the subject is living; therefore, to make the definition more "disclosing" (*akšaf*), it is permitted to mention both. If the two are not coextensive (e.g. speech is articulated sounds and arranged letters; but not every articulated sound is arranged letters),²¹⁵ it is not permitted to mention in the definition the expression which is too extensive. One might add it afterwards as an explanation (*tafsîr*) of the definition.²¹⁶

Fourth, it is not allowed to mention in a definition something that the object to be defined needs, nor the cause (*sabab*) of the object, nor the instrument (*âla*) by which it is produced.²¹⁷ The same holds true of other circumstantial data.

Summarizing, we say that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a definition is evidently not a description; but more than at a disclosure of the essence of the object to be defined, it aims at a circumscription of this object. One has to admit, however, that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's attempts to restrict his definitions to the pure mention of the differentiae specificae, often run the risk to obscure rather than disclose the meaning of the things concerned.²¹⁸

Ḥaqīqa: reality. This word is not a synonym of the word *ḥadd*, definition, although one may get this impression when reading 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works. Sometimes the two words are used together²¹⁹ and sometimes the word reality (*ḥaqīqa*) is used when one expects the word definition (*ḥadd*).²²⁰ In a passage where the

²¹⁴ *Mugni* VII, 8 and *Mugni* XII, 14 "if one would restrict oneself to one of these two (knowing and able), it would be correct" In *Mugni* XII he is more positive than in *Mugni* VII, in *Mugni* XII he prefers (it is *awlâ*) the mention of both qualities because this is more disclosing (*akšaf*)

²¹⁵ Cf *Mugni* VII, 7 and 8

²¹⁶ Cf *Mugni* XII, 14-16, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the definitions of knowledge given by his teachers. What they meant (*maqṣaduhum*) was correct, but what they did was in fact to give an explanation of this definition

²¹⁷ See *Mugni* VII, 12

²¹⁸ Cf van Ess, *Logical Structure*, 37

²¹⁹ *Mugni* VII, 7 "the distinction of its (speech's) definition and reality" (*bayân ḥaddih wa-ḥaqīqatih*), see also *Šarḥ* 39

²²⁰ So, e.g., in the title of the chapter in *Mugni* VII, 7 "The mention of the reality of

term *ḥaqīqa* is used several times, the original meaning of this term appears to be the real meaning of a word, in opposition to the wider sense (*'alâ jihat al-ḥaqīqa aw at-tawassu'*).²²¹ For 'Abd al-Jabbâr there is an obvious relationship between words and the realities behind the words; so this word *ḥaqīqa* comes to stand for both: the real meaning of the word and the "reality" of the thing concerned.

Consequently, the "reality" is something in the thing and in its name, the *ḥadd* is one of the ways in which we express this "reality";²²² hence 'Abd al-Jabbâr can call a definition "the mention of the reality of something" or, still more frequently, "the distinction of the reality of something from other things."²²³

So, this "reality" is not the essence of the thing nor an accident, but it is "what a thing really is"; as vague as that.

Qualifications given to propositions

The first distinction to be made when we consider the qualifications of propositions that 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses in his argumentations, is the distinction between "correct" and "incorrect" propositions, between propositions the contents of which correspond with "reality", and propositions the contents of which do not correspond with it: between "*ṣaḥīḥ*" and "*bâṭil*". This is a complete "division" (*taqsīm*); there exists no third possibility because it is a "yes-no-division".²²⁴

Bâṭil: incorrect. This qualification is given to every proposition the contents of which do not correspond with reality (*al-ḥaqq*): it is used to indicate a logical untruth. It is also used, in the form of a substantive "*al-bâṭil*", "the incorrect", as the opposite of "*al-ḥaqq*" (the ontolo-

speech", *Mugnî* XII, 4 "the reality of that (the reflection) is thought", see also *Šarḥ* 43 "the reality of the reflection" (*ḥaqīqat an-nazar*) and p 45 "the reality of knowledge" (*ḥaqīqat al-ma'rifa*)

²²¹ *Mugnî* XII, 4

²²² It is only one of the ways, the way which uses the most characteristic expressions and which meets all the requirements of the real definition But in *Mugnî* VII, 8 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that his teacher Abû Hâšim mentioned the reality of speech by way of disclosure and elucidation (*'alâ tariqat al-kašf wa-l-idâh*), and therefore he mentioned more details than is allowed in a definition Possibly, this is the reason why in *Mugnî* XII, 4 and *Šarḥ* 43 he calls his rendering of "reflection" by "thought" not definition but *ḥaqīqa* See the whole context in *Mugnî* XII, 4

²²³ For the combination with the word "mention" (*dīkr*) see *Mugnî* VII, 7 (the title of the chapter) and *Šarḥ* 39 The word *bayân* (explanation, distinction, see p 70) is used in *Mugnî* VII, 7 and 8, *Mugnî* XII, 3 and 4, the verb *bayyan* (to explain, to distinguish, see p 70) is used in *Šarḥ* 43 and 45

²²⁴ Cf *Šarḥ* 98-99

gical reality, the ontological truth), and in that context it is used to indicate the ontological untruth.²²⁵

The quality of being incorrect is called "*butlân*" (incorrectness), the demonstration that a proposition is incorrect is called "*ibtâl*".²²⁶ Instead of the above mentioned forms of the root "*btl*", 'Abd al-Jabbâr sometimes uses terms derived from the root "*fsd*"; so we find "*fâsid*" (wrong) instead of "*bâtîl*" (incorrect), and "*fasâd*" (wrongness) in the place of "*butlân*" (incorrectness),²²⁷ without difference of meaning, without difference in the context or in the emotional function of the words.

Ṣaḥīḥ : correct. This is the most general term to qualify a proposition which is true, the contents of which correspond with reality. The noun "being correct" is rendered by "*siḥḥa*" (correctness), and the act of demonstrating that a proposition is correct by the verbal noun "*tashīḥ*";²²⁸ to be correct is rendered by the verb "*ṣaḥḥ*". One has, however, to be very attentive when meeting one of these words in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works, because he uses them in two different ways and with two different meanings; at first sight, they are not always easy to distinguish. Besides being used in a logical context— as is done in the cases we presently discuss—as a qualification given to a proposition (but not only to propositions; it is also applied to other things in order to indicate that they are "correct"²²⁹) they are also used in an ontological context, and in that case they indicate the ontological possibility of the thing concerned.²³⁰

²²⁵ See *Mugnî* XII, 55

²²⁶ The term *butlân* is used to indicate that concrete propositions, statements, and definitions are incorrect (cf. e.g. *Mugnî* VII, 59), but also in a more general way to indicate that a doctrine (*madḥab*) or demonstration (*dalâla*) is incorrect (See *Mugnî* VII, 197 and 100) The same holds good of the verbal noun *ibtâl* and the corresponding verb *abtâl* (*Mugnî* VII, 14)

²²⁷ Cf., e.g., *Mugnî* VII, 14, 24, 99, 185, 197 There appears to be no reason why 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not use the words from the root *btl* in these (and other) cases In *Mugnî* VII, 49 he uses the two roots in the same context "What we have said before shows the incorrectness (*yubtlu*) of these words Explains the wrongness (*fasâd*) of what they said "

²²⁸ For the use of this verbal noun (the corresponding verb is *sahḥaḥ*) see, e.g., *Ṣarḥ* 99 The words *sahḥ*, *sahīḥ*, and *siḥḥa* are used with great frequency

²²⁹ So, e.g., for knowledge "Know that the meaning of our proposition 'knowledge is correct' is that the soul of the knowing subject is tranquil at what he knows ." (*Mugnî* XII, 36), and for speech (*kalâm*) *Mugnî*, VII, 10

²³⁰ About this meaning of the words *siḥḥa* and *sahīḥ* we speak later in more detail In the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr the logical and the ontological meaning of this word even occur in one and the same sentence "It is not correct (*lâ yasiḥḥ*) to define

Propositions which are qualified by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as being "correct" (*ṣahîh*) have other qualifications too, according to the kind of knowledge by which the contents of this proposition are known (for instance: *ma'lûm*, *ma'lûm bi-l-iḍṭirâr*, *ma'lûm bi-l-iktisâb*, *ma'rûf*, *ma'qûl*), or according to their function in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentation and to their evidence (*tâbit*, *ẓâhir*).

Ma'lûm: known.²³¹ The proposition is correct because it is based on knowledge, either on necessary or on acquired knowledge. When it is based on necessary knowledge, it concerns a truth which is necessarily known by every person who is "compos mentis" (*'âqil*), and which "occurs in us, not from ourselves, and which we cannot in any way banish from our soul."²³² Such a proposition is qualified as "*ma'lûm bi-l-iḍṭirâr*" (necessarily known) in order to specify the kind of knowledge concerned.²³³ In this case, the evidence of the proposition is founded on the fact that nobody can honestly deny it because it concerns a knowledge common to all sane persons.²³⁴ When the proposition is qualified as "correct" because the truth expressed by it is known through acquired knowledge, 'Abd al-Jabbâr usually first mentions the indication (*dalîl*) and describes the way by which he inferred (*istadall*) the thing indicated (*madlûl*); then he concludes that the proposition expressing this *madlûl* is *ma'lûm*²³⁵ or, still more specifically, "*ma'lûm bi-l-iktisâb*" (known by acquiring, known by acquired knowledge). The evidence of this kind of proposition is founded upon the argumentation given. Since 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not admit any difference between the meanings of the two nouns for

speech as what comes into being from a knocking in special exits because of what we have explained about the possibility (*sihha*) of the existence of speech coming from God in another way" (*Muḡni* VII, 12)

²³¹ Also other expressions are used to indicate that a certain proposition is known; for instance, *wa-qad 'alimnâ* (see *Muḡni* VII, 33, 50, 180) and *qad 'ulum* (see *Muḡni* VII, 180)

²³² Cf *Šarh* 48-49

²³³ Cf *Muḡni* VII, 13.

²³⁴ The problems arise when an opponent nevertheless denies, and keeps on denying, that he has this knowledge. For this problem 'Abd al-Jabbâr has no appropriate answer. See, e.g., *Muḡni* XII, 37 (where his opponent denies a knowledge 'Abd al-Jabbâr deems necessary) and *Muḡni* VII, 17 (where 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies a knowledge his opponents consider to be necessary).

²³⁵ He also uses this term *ma'lûm* by way of introduction to his argumentation (this is known because), in this case he also uses the imperative form *i'lam* (know that). This expression is often used at the beginning of a new chapter, see, e.g., *Muḡni* VII, 14, 26

knowledge *'ilm* and *ma'rifa*, nor between the meanings of the two verbs indicating "to know" *'alim* and *'araf*,²³⁶ he can call a proposition *ma'rûf* instead of *ma'lum*.

Ma'qûl: intuited, known by intuition. The word *ma'qûl* is clearly related to the noun *'aql*, intuition,²³⁷ which belongs to the same root (*'ql*). Provisoryly, one could render the term *ma'qûl* as "what falls under the *'aql*". The use of this term *'aql* may easily lead to a misunderstanding of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's intentions. The reason is that for him—contrary to the use of this word by philosophers and thinkers in the Aristotelian tradition—the *'aql* is not a human faculty, nor a substance, nor a sense, nor an instrument,²³⁸ but "a special aggregate of 'things known' (*'ulûm*; literally: knowledges);²³⁹ when they occur in a 'responsible subject' (*mukallaf*; a subject upon whom God imposes His duties), reflection, inference, and execution of the imposed duty become possible for him."²⁴⁰

This "intuition" belongs to the genus conviction (*i'tiqâd*); it is a form of conviction over which man has no power; it occurs in him independently whether he wishes this to happen or not; it falls under the power of God alone.²⁴¹ It belongs—inside the genus conviction—to the species "knowledge" (*'ilm*), as 'Abd al-Jabbâr indicates making "intuition" (*'aql*) and "things known of the intuition" (*'ulûm al-'aql*) synonyms.²⁴² Consequently, we have to look for this intuition in the category of knowledge that we called necessary knowledge.

Not all knowledge is called intuition (*'aql*) since the Arabic word

²³⁶ See *Mugnî* XII, 16 and our page 56, where we rendered *ma'rifa* by cognition

²³⁷ I have hesitated for quite some time between two possible renderings of the word "*'aql*" either "intuition" or "intelligence" When considering the meaning of this word in the philosophical discussions in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's days (see also *Mugnî* XI, 375-379 for 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own position in this discussion) and its meaning in the Aristotelian tradition, one easily prefers the translation "intelligence" So does, for instance, Frank in *Fundamental Assumptions*, 6 But considering the meaning 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself gives to this word, I came to prefer -notwithstanding the above given arguments—the rendering "intuition"

²³⁸ Cf *Mugnî* XI, 375 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the following Arabic words *jawhar* (substance), *âla* (instrument), *hâssa* (sense), and *qûwa* (faculty) All these alternatives are rejected in *Mugnî* XI, 375-379

²³⁹ *Mugnî* XI, 375 reads "*jumla min al-'ulûm maḳsûsa*", *Mugnî* XI, 379 reads. "*al-'ulûm al-maḳsûsa*" In the rendering of *jumla* by "aggregate" I follow Frank (*Fundamental Assumptions*, 6-7)

²⁴⁰ Quoted from *Mugnî* XI, 375 "*Jumla min al-'ulûm maḳsûsa, matâ hasalat fi l-mukallaf, sahh minh an-nazar wa-l-istidlâl wa-l-qiyâm bi-adâ' ma kullif*"

²⁴¹ Cf *Šarh* 90

²⁴² See *Muhit* I, 28 and *Šarh* 90

'*aql* is metaphorically used here; its original meaning is: the hobbling of the feet of a she-camel to hinder its moving; consequently, its use in a philosophical context needs a special connection or indication.²⁴³ There are only two kinds of "things known" (*'ulûm*) which can be called thus; first, the intuition that some concrete things are evil, a knowledge which hinders the human soul to move in the direction of these things when it desires them, as the hobbling of the feet of the camel hinders it from going where it likes; second, some basic principles, basic "things known", which bring about that the knowledge of other things is firm and immovable (*tâbit*), as the hobbling of the camel's feet makes it stand firm and immovable.²⁴⁴ We conclude that intuition (*'aql*) consists in an aggregate of things intuitively known, directly given by God, forming the basic principles (*usûl*) which make possible reflection and inference and also the execution of the duties God imposes upon mankind. Consequently, they form a condition for God's imposing duties to be "good" (*ḥasan*) and therefore also of its being possible.²⁴⁵

Every human being, who has this intuition, who knows these basic principles, and who, consequently, is bound (*mukallaf*) to fulfil the

²⁴³ See *Muḡni* XII, 16-17 Cf Lane, 2113 "he bound the camel's fore shank to his arm" or "he folded together the camel's fore shank and his arm and bound them both in the middle of the arm with the rope called '*iqâl*'"

²⁴⁴ *Muḡni* XI, 386 "As for the '*aql*, it is qualified thus for two reasons, first, because it hinders to move in the direction of the desired things to which the soul aspires, and which are deemed evil in his (the person's) intuition (*'aql*), thus a comparison is made between this knowledge and the '*aql* of a she-camel, which hinders it to move as it desires. Second, because with it stand firm all things known (*'ulûm*) which have a connection with understanding (*fahm*) and inference (*istidlâl*). Because it supposes the standing firm of all things known which have a connection with understanding and inference, a comparison is made between it and the '*iqâl* of the she-camel (see previous note) which supposes its standing firm"

²⁴⁵ For the last remark in the text *Muḡni* XI, 379 and 386 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives some examples of '*ulûm* which belong to the intuition: the knowledge of what we perceive and the knowledge that others must know it also in the same circumstances (*Muḡni* XI, 380), the knowledge of some basic principles concerning the perceived substances: that they are combined or divided (*muḡtami'a aw muḡtariqa*), that they cannot be in two places, that they cannot be eternal and produced at the same time, nor existent and non-existent at the same time (*Muḡni* XI, 383), some basic principles about living beings, some principles in matters of ethics (*Muḡni* XI, 384-385)

Frank, *Fundamental Assumptions*, 6-7 holds the opinion that '*aql* "is directed essentially and primarily towards action, specifically towards those actions which are morally good and best in terms of achieving benefit and well-being and avoiding harm". In my opinion, the most important character of the '*aql* is that it furnishes all basic principles man needs for his further reflection, thus it forms the basis for all human knowledge, the acquired knowledge included

duties God imposed, is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr *'âqil* (compos mentis).²⁴⁶

Tâbit²⁴⁷: certain. In the preceding paragraph we saw how 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a comparison between a she-camel "standing firm and immobile" (*tâbita*) and a certain kind of knowledge.²⁴⁸ In both cases the same verb "*tâbat*" is used, a verb we met in the fourth form (*atbat*, infinitive: *itbât*)²⁴⁹ with the meaning of to establish the existence of something. This qualification, given to a proposition, indicates that the proposition concerned "stands firm and immobile", expresses an established fact, and, consequently, is certain.

'Abd al-Jabbâr happens to use this term sometimes by way of conclusion, to indicate that a proposition because of the argumentation given has become to express an established fact.²⁵⁰ Generally, however, he uses it in the premises of his argumentation; in a two-term-argumentation he can qualify the first term, the indication (*dalîl*), as certain so that the conclusion (*madlûl*) necessarily follows.²⁵¹ In a three-term-argumentation it is very frequently used to qualify the second term; against the background of this second term, established and certain (often a general truth), the first term becomes an indication (*dalîl*) which leads to the conclusion (*madlûl*, indicated).²⁵²

Zâhir: self-evident. This word, which does not belong to the most frequent terms in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's vocabulary, indicates a proposition which "is apparent"²⁵³ and therefore needs no further proof. A description of this kind of evidence is found in the *Muhîf*, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that "we are not able to make a sophism against it".²⁵⁴ It is so self-evident that it is quite impossible to fabricate any argumentation that could attack this self-evidence.²⁵⁵

²⁴⁶ *Mugnî* XI, 386 For a survey of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion about the *'âqil*, see also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 74-77

²⁴⁷ More yet than the form given in the text (*tâbit*, the active participle) the past tense of this verb (*tâbat*) is used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr

²⁴⁸ Cf *Mugnî* XI, 386

²⁴⁹ Cf p 69

²⁵⁰ *Mugnî* VII, 59

²⁵¹ *Mugnî* VII, 9, 28, 99

²⁵² *Mugnî* VII, 6, 24, 208 Especially the combination "*ida sahh ..* (proposition A) *wa-tâbat* (proposition B), *fa-wajib* (the conclusion)" is very frequent as form of the three-term-argumentation

²⁵³ Cf Lane, 1926-1927

²⁵⁴ *Muhîf*, I, 38 "*wa-lâ subha fî qudratnâ 'alayhâ*".

²⁵⁵ Some instances of the use of this word are found in *Mugnî* VII, 12-13

Other qualifications

A very general kind of qualification, applicable to nearly everything, is expressed by the words "good" and "evil", in Arabic "*ḥasan*" and "*qabih*".²⁵⁶ The English words, however, do not exactly correspond with the Arabic words as they are used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, but for lack of better ones I use these two terms, which, moreover, are current in English translations of Arabic texts.

When one of these two words is applied to a substance, it generally indicates an opinion of the subject about its outer form: the subject desires to look at that form or he tries to avoid seeing it;²⁵⁷ in this case we translate these words as, respectively, "beautiful" and "ugly". But we restrict ourselves here, as does 'Abd al-Jabbâr, to the more philosophical use of these qualifications. Used in this way, they may give the impression of being purely ethical qualifications, having no relation with the subject of the present study. But because 'Abd al-Jabbâr's ethics tend to be objective,²⁵⁸ and since for him there is no clear distinction between the activity and its result, he uses these qualifications (good and evil) also in an ontological sense. For this reason, and because these words have in his works a meaning slightly different from the way we usually understand them, we must give our attention to these qualifications.

The distinctions, made in the present context by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and the definitions given are based upon the subject's deserving either blame (*ḍamm*) or praise (*madḥ*), either when doing or when omitting the act which is to be qualified.²⁵⁹ The meaning of the words "blame" and "praise" and the essence of their relationship with the act's being good or evil—a relationship expressed by the verb "deserve"

²⁵⁶ To this matter—the meaning of "good" and "evil" and related problems—the first volume of the sixth part of the *Muḡni* is devoted *Muḡni VI I*. See also *Muḥit I*, 230-242 and *Šarḥ* 39-42 and 301-313. Hourani has written a monograph on this subject, especially on its ethical aspects, called *Islamic Rationalism*, and bearing the subtitle *The Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbâr*. See also 'Abd al-Karim 'Uṣmân, *Nazarīyat at-taklīf*, 440-449.

²⁵⁷ According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr these qualifications (the "aesthetic" ones) are based on subjective criteria, while the ethical qualifications are based on objective ones. See *Muḡni VI I*, 25 and 'Abd al-Karim 'Uṣmân, *Nazarīyat at-taklīf*, 447-448.

²⁵⁸ Acts are qualified as good and evil in themselves, these are objective realities which man can come to know. This is one of the conclusions reached by Hourani in his *Islamic Rationalism*.

²⁵⁹ Cf., for instance, *Muḡni VI I*, 7-8.

(*istahaqq*)—are not further explained by 'Abd al-Jabbâr but supposed to be self-evident. According to him, these belong to human intuition ('*aqf*), consequently, every person who is *compos mentis* must know them.²⁶⁰

With the two criteria given above, 'Abd al-Jabbâr defines four categories of acts

Mubâh: permissible²⁶¹ The doer of this act does not deserve praise nor blame, nor does the ommitter. We, in our own vocabulary, which is different from 'Abd al-Jabbâr's, could call this act "neutral". As instances of this kind of act 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions 'to breathe or to eat (when there are no special circumstances)²⁶²

Nadb: recommended²⁶³ The doer of this act deserves praise, the ommitter does not deserve blame. If such an act is directed towards another person who profits by it, it is called favour (*tafaddul*), doing good (*ihsân*), benefaction (*in'âm*), or voluntary good deed (*tatawwu'*),²⁶⁴ if it is not directed to somebody else, but the acting person himself

²⁶⁰ Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 44-47 questions the meaning of these words, especially the relation expressed by the term "deserve". Therefore he analyses one of the very few passages in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks about the meaning of this word, *Mugnî* XIII 344-347, where he is attacked for his use of the verb "deserve" (*istahaqq*) in a definition of ethical terms. Hourani's conclusion runs: "Whether these terms (e.g. 'corresponding' and 'requit') can adequately express the meaning of "desert" without any expression or implication of fittingness (a value concept) in the relation, may be questioned, but we can credit him at least with being aware of the problem and struggling to solve it".

In *Mugnî* XI, 384 the question is mentioned in the context of a discussion on human intuition ('*aqf*) among the "things known" ('*ulûm*) forming together the intuition are mentioned: "the goodness of the blame for the evil when there are no hindrances, and the goodness of the blame for the omitting of the obligatory when the hindrances are taken away" (*husn ad-damm 'alâ l-qabîh idâ lam yakun hunâk man' wa-husn ad-damm 'alâ l-iklâl bi-l-wâjib ma irtifâ' al-mawâni*). Here he evidently uses the goodness of 'for' instead of "deserve".

²⁶¹ A synonym of this word *mubâh* is *halâl* cfr. *Mugnî* VI 1, 32

²⁶² See *Mugnî* VI 1 31-32. There he states that we only use the term *mubâh* (notwithstanding the contents it expresses) to indicate the act of somebody who has been informed or knows by way of an indication, that the act has this qualification. Therefore, we do not use this term when we speak about God's acts or the acts of animals but only when we speak about the acts of a person who is *compos mentis* ('*âqil*).

²⁶³ The meaning of this word *nadb* recommended is "that a recommending person recommends it and incites to do it" (*Mugnî* VI 1 38) it is evident that one has to read there *wa-haqq 'alayh* instead of the non-sense *wajab 'alayh*.

²⁶⁴ See *Mugnî* VI 1 37-42. Other suggestions for names to give to this kind of act are also discussed there.

profits in some way by it, it is called “*nadb*”, as, for instance, works of supererogation (*nafl*).²⁶⁵

Wājib: obligatory. The doer of this act deserves praise, the ommitter of it deserves blame. This kind of act occurs in three forms: *wājib muḍayyaq*: the concrete act concerned has to be performed; *wājib muḳayyar fih*: the subject can make a choice between several acts, and perform another act instead of the act concerned; *furūd al-kifāyât*: another person can perform the act in the place of the subject concerned.²⁶⁶

Qabiḥ: evil. The doer of this act deserves blame. “Evil” is defined by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr more exactly than in the summing up given above as “(an act) by which an able subject when he does it, in some respects deserves blame”.²⁶⁷ The restriction “in some respects” is made by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr, as he explains immediately after having given the definition, because there are two exceptions to the rule, two cases where the doer of an evil act does not deserve blame: first, when he does not know and cannot know that the act is evil (young children, animals, lunatics), and second, when besides a smaller evil a larger good is

²⁶⁵ This second category “is characterized by some ‘advantage’ (*salâh*) and the facilitating of religious duties, by doing them one deserves praise, and thus they are analogous to the doing good (*ihsân*) and the favour (*tafaddul*)” This second category - the strict “*nadb*”—is only known to be so by divine revelation. Cf. *Mugni* VI/1, 37

²⁶⁶ The *Muḥit* (I, 231) gives three forms of *wājib*, *Mugni* VI.1, 3 only gives the first two forms. Instances of the first form are to give back a deposit and the reflection generating knowledge about God (*Muḥit* I, 231), for the second form if one has to pay back a debt, one can choose oneself the pieces of money with which one pays it back (*Ṣarḥ* 42, *Mugni* VI 1, 43 uses the same example, but the text is distorted possibly one has to read *mâ* instead of *matâ*); the third form consists in the duties of the Islamic community (the raising of an army, defending the frontiers, governing), all these duties can be delegated

²⁶⁷ “*Mâ, idâ fa’alah al-qâdir ‘alayh istahaqq ad-damm ‘alâ ha’d al-wujûh*”, this is the definition given in *Ṣarḥ* 41 Hourani uses in his book the definition given by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* VI/1, 26, which says the same but in a very difficult way Hourani’s translation of this definition runs as follows “That (act) for which, if it occurs in any way in the part of one who knows it will occur from him in that way, and who lets it happen, he deserves blame, unless there is a restricting reason” (*Islamic Rationalism*, 50). I think that it is better not to translate in this definition “in any way” (Arabic *‘alâ wajh*), but “in a certain way”; ‘Abd al-Jabbâr indicates here the various ways in which an act may be evil, for instance, by occurring in the way it is wrongdoing or positive ignorance Cf. *Mugni* VI/1, 61, where the different *wujûh* of being evil are mentioned

For a simpler form of the definition of evil, but evidently not as complete as the texts given above, see, e.g., *Mugni* XII, 14 and 34 (on page 14 read *taharruz* instead of *tahrir*)

performed, and consequently the praise dominates the blame ²⁶⁸ But in both cases, 'Abd al-Jabbâr emphasizes, the act remains evil although its doer does not deserve blame So there is an objective being-good and being-evil in acts, independent of the concrete desert of blame or praise ²⁶⁹

Ḥasan : good The concept of "being good" does not belong as such to the enumeration given above This term comprises the first three categories (permissible, recommended, obligatory), and is the opposite of the last one (evil) It is even defined as the opposite of evil "what happens in a certain way so that its doer, by doing it, if he knows it, does not deserve blame for it in certain respects" It is evident that this definition has been formulated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as the exact counterpart of his definition of evil (*qabîh*) ²⁷⁰ As is the case with the definition of evil, the definition of "good" (*hasan*) describes the being good of an act independently of the knowledge of its doer, and makes it an objective qualification

The defining of "good" as the exact counterpart of "evil" seems to express a complete yes-no division (*taqsim*) of all acts some acts are such that their doer deserves blame (if some conditions are fulfilled), and the other acts are such that their doer does not. There can be no "neutral" acts since the acts we could qualify in this way by the fact that their doer deserves neither praise nor blame, are called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr "permissible" (*mubâh*) and consequently "good" (*hasan*)

Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Jabbâr knows some neutral acts The division (*taqsim*) given above is not a division of all acts which exist, but only of the acts which above their existence have another quality which makes them form a special category, these we call "value acts", acts on which the qualification of "deserving" is applicable

Some acts are always value acts because they cause benefit (*naḥ*)

²⁶⁸ See *Šarh* 41 and *Mugni* VI 1, 26

²⁶⁹ For the various ways in which an act may be evil, cf *Mugni* VI,1, 61-69 and Hourani *Islamic Rationalism*, 69-70 As instances are mentioned there wrongdoing (*zulm*) uselessness (*'abaṭ*), lying (*kaḏib*), ingratitude for a favour (*kufr an-ni'ma*), positive ignorance (*jahl*), willing evil (*irâdat al-qabîh*), commanding evil (*amr bi-l-qabîh*), and imposing unattainable duties (*taklif mâ lâ yutâq*)

²⁷⁰ *Mugni* VI/1 31 "mâ yaqa' 'alâ wajh lâ yastahiqq fâ'iluh bi-fî'lih idâ 'alimah 'alayh aq-damm 'alâ wajh" Cf the definitions of "evil" given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr and mentioned in note 267 For more details about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's ideas about "good", see *Mugni* VI/1, 31-51 and the descriptions of his position by Hourani and 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṣmân (see note 256)

or harm (*darr*); these acts are always, independently of the doer, and of his being under constraint,²⁷¹ good or evil. Other acts, however, become good or evil—and consequently value acts—only through the knowledge, conviction, and intention of the doer. If these acts proceed from someone who does not know and has no conviction (a sleeping or unconscious person; a little child; an animal), they are neither good nor evil, they are not value acts, but neutral acts.²⁷²

Finally, we discuss three terms which, in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine, are ways (*wujûh*) in which an act is good or evil, and which also play an important role in his argumentation about the problem of God's being speaking and the essence of His speech. These terms are: '*abaṭ*, '*salâh* and '*naf*'.

'**Abat**: uselessness. 'Abd al-Jabbâr considers '*abaṭ* to be one of the ways in which an act may occur, and which causes it to be evil.²⁷³ The best definition for '*abaṭ* I have been able to find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works is from his *Šarḥ*: "Know, that useless ('*abaṭ*) is every act which

²⁷¹ About the constraint (*iljâ*) Gimaret, *La notion d'"impulsion irrésistible" (iljâ) dans l'éthique mu'tazilite*. JA 259 (1971), 25-62, and Schwarz, *Some Notes on the Notion of Iljâ (constraint) in Mu'tazilite Kalâm*. IOR II (1972), 413-427 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses here the combination "*iljâ wa-ikrâh*", constraint and compulsion

²⁷² In the words of 'Abd al-Jabbâr: "It (an act) may come into existence and have no quality above its pure coming into existence (*Mugnî* VI 1, 9 uses the word "existence", *wujûd*, instead of *hudûṭ*) or have a quality above its pure coming into existence. The first is the simple (*yasîr*) movement (read with the Egyptian edition, p. 232 *min* and not '*alâ*) and simple speech proceeding from an unconscious and sleeping (person), when there occurs in it no benefit (*naf*); absent in the Lebanese edition) and no harm (*darr*), for, if one of these two is there, one can call it evil and good according to our choice, although there is no question of blame and praise. It is known that from an unconscious and sleeping (person) things may proceed by which he benefits, as the removal of fleas, the breaking of something (*kasr ṣay*', maybe better. *kasr sayy*', the breaking of something bad), or the scratching of an itch and similar things; all this does not fall under the meaning of our words 'have no quality above its pure coming into existence'.

If it has a quality above its pure coming into existence, it may proceed from someone who knows it or it may proceed from someone who does not know it. If it proceeds from someone who does not know it and cannot(know)it, it has no judgement (*hukm*), this is not what we mean in our problem, for this is analogous with what proceeds from a sleeping or unconscious (person), and we have excluded that already from this totality.

When it proceeds from someone who knows it, it may occur without constraint (*iljâ*) and compulsion (*ikrâh*), or it may happen when there is constraint and compulsion; this second (category) also belongs to what has no judgement (*hukm*)" *Muḥit* I, 230-231. See also *Mugnî* VI/1, 9-17.

²⁷³ "Uselessness is evil just as wrongdoing is evil": *Mugnî* XI, 64. See also *Mugnî* VI/1, 61

the acting subject does without a proportional recompense”²⁷⁴ It is an act characterized by a clear disproportion between the act and the result reached by it, either because the result is too small in proportion to what is invested in the act,²⁷⁵ or because the same result could be reached with less investments,²⁷⁶ or because no result is reached at all,²⁷⁷ or because the act even has no reasonable goal²⁷⁸ In all these cases the act is useless and consequently evil

Ṣalāh : advantage²⁷⁹ In the Islamic discussions about God's acts, this word has played an important role and it was generally used in a very broad and intensive meaning : all that is really good, appropriate. 'Abd al-Jabbār, however, makes it a synonym of “benefit” (*naf'*) : “*Salāh* is the benefit (*naf'*) . these are two expressions for the same meaning”,²⁸⁰ and he adds that both are coextensive and are used in exactly the same way.

²⁷⁴ “*ʿIlam ann al-'abaṭ kull fi'l yaf'aluh al-fā'il min dūn 'iwad muḥliḥ*” *Ṣarḥ* 514 Hourani has discussed this concept in his *Islamic Rationalism* on p 75-76, and he based himself in those paragraphs especially on the thirteenth part of the *Mugni*, where 'Abd al-Jabbār gives some examples without giving a real definition The result is that it remains rather obscure Frank, in his review of this book in *BJOR* 29 (1972), gives some additional material from the eleventh part of the *Mugni*, among which two definitions

The first definition he quotes is not very clear “any act in which the agent intends no rational aspect” (the translation is Frank's) “*kull fi'l lam waḡṣud biḥ fā'iluh waḡḥan ma'qūlan*” (*Mugni* XI, 191), I translate against the background of the definition given in the *Ṣarḥ* “any act in which the agent (its doer) does not intend a reasonable aspect (goal)”, the reasonable (*ma'qūl*) goal being in this case an effect which is in proportion with the act The other definition quoted by Frank and found in *Mugni* XI, 64 runs “if an agent who knows what he is doing does not perform his act for some purpose that entails its being good, it must be useless” Here the “reasonable aspect” is explained as “a purpose (*garad*) that entails its being good”, which corresponds with my opinion about the first definition

²⁷⁵ Cf the example in *Ṣarḥ* 514 somebody engages himself in difficult and dangerous affairs to gain only one dirham, this is useless

²⁷⁶ Cf the previous note, the dirham could be gained in a much easier way See also *Mugni* XII, 312 to rescue a drowning person by pulling him out with a broken hand, although one could do the same with the other hand

²⁷⁷ Cf *Mugni* XIII, 312 at good pay bring water from one part of the sea to another, or from one river to another, without any purpose (*Ṣarḥ* 514)

²⁷⁸ Cf the examples in note 277 and *Mugni* VII, 224 if God would speak before the creation of other beings, His speech could have no goal at all and would be useless Cf note 274

²⁷⁹ Cf Brunschvig, *Mu'tazilisme et Optimum (al-aslah)*, *SI* 39 (1974) 5-23, the author discusses in this article the use of the term *aslah* and other forms of the same root and the disputes about God's acts being the best (*aslah*) possible

²⁸⁰ *Mugni* XIV, 35 See also Brunschvig, *Mu'tazilisme et Optimum*, 15

Naf' : benefit. Besides *naf'* also *manfa'a* is used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, in the same context and with the same meaning, as becomes clear from the definitions he gives of both terms.²⁸¹ And, as we have seen above, the word *salâh* (advantage) is also used as a synonym. They are defined by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as: "pleasure, happiness, or what leads to both or to one of them".²⁸² Pleasure (*ladḍa*) is based on perception; it is a sensual feeling of well-being, whereas happiness (*surûr*) is mental and based upon an imagination of these pleasant things.²⁸³ Also the repulsion of harm (*daf' aḍ-ḍarr*) is called a benefit because it leads to happiness.²⁸⁴

4. SOURCES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

The knowledge a man has has come to him in various ways. Some knowledge has been given to him, other knowledge has been acquired by way of reflection upon things one already knew; this latter kind of knowledge may be based directly upon other acquired knowledge but ultimately upon some form of given knowledge. If we accept this distinction between necessary (*darûrî*) and acquired (*iktisâbî*) knowledge, we can call the necessary knowledge and the way it is given a source of human knowledge.²⁸⁵

According to another criterion, all knowledge can be divided into '*aqliyât* and *sam'iyât*, the knowledge of the '*aqliyât* being based ultimately on the '*aql* (intuition), and the knowledge of the *sam'iyât* being based ultimately on the *sam'* (revelation; literally: hearing).²⁸⁶ Thus

²⁸¹ See the definition of *naf'* in *Mugni* XIV, 34 and the definition of *manfa'a* in *Šarh* 80

²⁸² See *Šarh* 80 He gives some examples: it is pleasure (*ladḍa*) when one scratches an itch of someone else, gives him some good food in his mouth, or clothes him with a very expensive garment. It leads to both of them when one gives money to someone else to buy whatever he wants. It leads to happiness when one guides someone else to a treasure. All these examples are concerned with benefit.

In *Mugni* IV, 14 a restriction is made after the definition given above: "if it does not lead to harm which outweighs it"

²⁸³ Cf. *Mugni* XIV, 33-34. See also *Mugni* IV, 15: "a happy (*masrûr*) subject is only happy because he knows, or assumes, or is convinced that a benefit will reach him"

²⁸⁴ See *Šarh* 80 and *Mugni* XIV, 34. Harm (*ḍarr*) is defined by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as the opposite of benefit (*naf'*): every pain (sensual), sorrow (mental), or what leads to both of them, provided they are not the cause of a benefit which outweighs them. Cf. *Mugni* XIV, 41.

²⁸⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks about them as the kinds of "indication" (*dalâla*). See e.g. *Šarh* 88, where he says that there are four kinds: "*fa-lam ann ad-dalâla arba'a ḥujjat al-'aql wa-l-Kitâb wa-s-Sunna wa-l-Ijmâ'*". On the same page he calls them *dalil* too.

²⁸⁶ Cf., for instance, *Muḥit* I, 14: "The purpose (*ḡarad*) of '*aqli* is the way to the

there are two basic sources of human knowledge: *'aql* (intuition) and *sam'* (revelation).

As we mentioned before,²⁸⁷ intuition is an aggregate of necessary and, consequently, "given" knowledge, given directly by God.²⁸⁸ This leads to the conclusion that not only revelation (*sam'*) but also intuition (*'aql*) directly comes from God. Hence, in the eyes of 'Abd al-Jabbâr there is no purely human knowledge; the only thing man can do and even has to do (because it belongs to the duties God imposed upon him) is to reflect (*nazar*) upon the knowledge God gave to him, and to acquire in this way further knowledge, which is as certain as the knowledge God gave to him; this reflection is always based upon an "indication" (*dalil*) which God has placed for mankind.

By way of conclusion we say that God gives knowledge to mankind in two ways: either directly in the heart of every single individual—and this we call intuition or *'aql*—or through His prophets and the community of believers—and this we call revelation or *sam'*—, but ultimately all human knowledge is divine.

'Aql: intuition. Intuition is an aggregate of things known, given by God; it forms the basis of our further knowledge because it makes possible reflection (*nazar*), inference (*istidlâl*), and also the execution of the duties God imposed upon mankind.²⁸⁹ In the broadest sense of the word, it comprises the whole of necessary (*darûrî*) knowledge, but not every detail of this necessary knowledge is really indispensable, especially where the knowledge of concrete things (individualia) is concerned. To indicate what really is indispensable 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the term "completeness of the intuition" (*kamâl al-'aql*).²⁹⁰ Without the knowledge of a certain amount of individualia, and without the knowledge of the ethical qualifications of a certain amount of indivi-

knowledge of which is the *'aql* (intuition), though there can be a difference because one sometimes reaches it necessarily and sometimes by acquiring. The meaning of *sam'i* is the way to the knowledge of which is the *sam'* (revelation); here always inference (*istidlâl*) is absolutely necessary"

²⁸⁷ See pp 54 and 82-83.

²⁸⁸ *Muhîr* I, 28 and *Šarh* 90

²⁸⁹ Cf pp 55 and 82-83.

²⁹⁰ Cf *Šarh* 51 and *Muğni* XI, 379-387. I chose the translation "completeness" because the term "*kamâl*" is used here to indicate that the intuition concerned encompasses every concrete knowledge that is needed to make it complete (it has everything that is really necessary); this does not imply a kind of "perfection", but rather indicates the indispensable minimum

dualia,²⁹¹ one cannot be really "compos mentis" (*'âqil*), and the intuition (*'aql*) cannot be complete, but it is not necessary to know all these individualia and their ethical qualifications. We can be compos mentis and our intuition can be "complete" without our knowing everything that can be known by intuition. To the "completeness of the intuition" belongs, besides the knowledge of the principles of indication,²⁹² general ethical axiomata,²⁹³ and other things,²⁹⁴ also the knowledge of a number of perceptible²⁹⁵ objects (*mudrakât*). This last form of knowledge forms part of the intuition and is given by God, just as is the case with the knowledge of the axiomata. Perception (*idrâk*) does not generate (*wallad*) this knowledge; it is not the cause of this knowledge, but it is nevertheless, as 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it, "a way" to knowledge, a "*ṭariq*".²⁹⁶ Therefore we reckon it, if we use the term "source" in a broader sense of the word, among the sources of human knowledge.

Idrâk : perception.²⁹⁷ 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not define perception (*idrâk*), but he appeals to general human experience, and states that everybody knows what it is and also the difference between perception and knowledge and between the different kinds of perception.²⁹⁸ He has full confidence in the reliability of perception, and it is because of this absolute confidence that he can say that perception is a way to knowledge. Against this kind of knowledge no sophism, no argument, no doubt is possible; it is necessary knowledge we cannot by any means banish from our soul.²⁹⁹

²⁹¹ Cf *Mugnî* XI, 380 "Therefore, we did not deem it necessary that in the subject who is compos mentis (*'âqil*) comes the knowledge of many of the perceptible objects (*mudrakât*) because they have no connection with (are not indispensable for) the completeness of the intuition" "therefore, he (the subject who is compos mentis) surely must know what he perceives" *Mugnî* XI, 384 "it belongs to the completeness of the intuition that one knows some things deemed evil, some things deemed good, and some obligatory things"

²⁹² Cf *Muhit* I, 6-7, not all principles belong to the *'aql*, some belong to the *sam'*

²⁹³ Cf *Mugnî* XI, 384 for a list of these general principles

²⁹⁴ Cf 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklif*, 61

²⁹⁵ Cf *Mugnî* XI, 380

²⁹⁶ Cf e.g. *Mugnî* XI, 381 and XII, 59

²⁹⁷ For the discussion of knowledge based on sensory perception, see Bernard, *Le savor entre la volonté et la spontanéité selon an-Nazzâm et al-Gâhiz*, *SI* 39 (1974), 25-57

²⁹⁸ Cf *Mugnî* IV, 81

²⁹⁹ Cf *Mugnî* IV, 70 "Know that perception is only connected with an object as it is, and therefore it becomes a way (*ṭariq*) to knowledge, otherwise, if it was not such, it could not be a way to it" and "What proves (*yubayyin*) that it is a way to

In the fourth part of the *Muğni* 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals in detail with perception and especially with seeing,³⁰⁰ and he summarizes many of his conclusions in the twelfth part of his *Muğni* as follows: "We have already explained that perception is a way to knowledge (*ṭarîq li-l-'ilm*) if the perceiving subject is *compos mentis* (*'âqil*), and the perceived object no longer has any vagueness.³⁰¹ We explained that perception is not a *ma'nâ*,³⁰² in which case one could say that it generates knowledge; and (we explained also) that it cannot be generated by the soundness (*sihha*) of the eye, or the movement (*talqîb*) of the eyelid, or something else. And (we explained) that the knowledge which occurs about the perceived object must be God's act, on His initiative (*ibtidâ'*), although He always makes it when the perceiving subject comes to be perceiving."³⁰³

From this description of the perception as a way to knowledge it becomes manifest why 'Abd al-Jabbâr so frequently, and so easily, appeals to the data of sensory perception as a source of knowledge and as one of the main pillars of his theological edifice; for, perception leads to a certain and necessary knowledge, which is guaranteed by God Himself. If one really is perceiving (this supposes for a subject who perceives by way of his senses that his sensory instruments are intact and there is nothing that hinders the perception)³⁰⁴ the object

knowledge is that one, when perceiving something, is convinced that it is as one perceives it to be, one's soul becomes tranquil at it, and one becomes in one way in what one is convinced about (one has a firm, unchangeable conviction about it), and to examine something one takes refuge to its perception by the senses, and one cannot banish this conviction from one's soul by sophisms or doubts (*bi-ṣ-ṣubah wa-lâ bi-ṣ-ṣukûk*), so it is certain that it is a way to knowledge"

³⁰⁰ The second section of the fourth part is given to the argumentation that God cannot be seen (*nafy ar-ru'ya*), in that context much is said about perception in general. The section is found in *Muğni* IV, 33-240

³⁰¹ See also *Muğni* IV, 70-79. For the word "vagueness" in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text *lâbs* is used and also *iltihâs*, which might be translated as "ambiguity". The object must be clearly perceptible. The perceiver must be "compos mentis", animals, little children, and lunatics may perceive without getting any knowledge. This is one of the reasons why 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies that perception generates knowledge.

³⁰² The text runs "*al-idrâk lays yamtani' fa-yuqâl innah yuwallid al-'ilm*" this results in a contradiction according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr perception does not generate knowledge. Basing myself especially on the text of *Muğni* IV (c.g. p. 50-58), I suggest to read here instead of *yamtani'* *bi-ma'nâ*

³⁰³ *Muğni* XII, 59

³⁰⁴ God does not perceive by way of senses, consequently, He has no instruments which can be afflicted, the hindrances of perception (darkness, a veil, distance, etc.) are related also to the instruments. Therefore, God perceives all perceptible things when they exist. Man can only perceive by way of his five senses. Cf. *Muğni* IV, 36-38

is clearly perceived, and one is also *compos mentis* ('*aql*) so that one can have knowledge, God must produce this knowledge.

Sam' : revelation. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, knowledge based upon the data of divine revelation is not direct knowledge and is not self-evident since it must always be based on reflection and inference : at least, one has to show that its sources are trustworthy, and in many cases one needs an argumentation to deduce the real meaning of the data of divine revelation.

Revealed knowledge, by its very essence, is never necessary knowledge; it is always acquired.³⁰⁵ One must prove its sources to be true, and this can only be done by way of a rational argumentation which is ultimately based on the human intuition ('*aql*). Only then these sources can function as real sources.

Revealed knowledge is based on prophecy and on the information transmitted³⁰⁶ by a prophet (*rasûl* or *nabî*³⁰⁷), and every discussion of the sources of revealed knowledge must start with a discussion of prophecy. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion in points of revelation, and his thesis that these have to be proved by argumentation become manifest in the way in which he arranges his chapters on revelation and prophecy in the *Muġnî*.³⁰⁸ First, he shows that prophecy can be good (*ḥasan*) and consequently is possible; then he shows that prophecy is necessary and obligatory (*wâjib*) for God. After this introduction, which is entirely based on data furnished by human intuition and reflection upon these data, he comes to the question of how we can

³⁰⁵ See, e.g., *Muġnî* I, 14

³⁰⁶ Hourani (*Islamic Rationalism*, 26) uses this aspect of revelation, its being transmitted by a prophet, to translate *sam'i*, he uses the word "transmitted" 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own terminology expresses the way in which it is mostly received (by hearing)

³⁰⁷ 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to the conclusion that these two words are coextensive, though in both cases a different aspect of the function of the prophet is emphasized, cf. *Šarḥ* 567 and *Muġnî* XV, 9-19 The *rasûl* is the man God has sent to mankind, the word *nabî* is differently explained according to its etymology if it goes back to the root *nh'* (to inform), he is the man who brings God's information to mankind, but if it is brought back to the root *nhu*, it indicates "high rank" and "greatness" Cf. *Muġnî* XV, 16-19

³⁰⁸ In his introduction to the fifteenth part of the *Muġnî*, he gives a short description of the order in which he arranged his materials (*Muġnî* XV, 7-8), he distinguishes among three sections (*ajnâs*, literally "kinds") The first is about the possibility of prophetic missions and the obligation (*wujûb*) of this mission, the second about the occurring of such a mission and the way one recognizes it (miracles), and the third about Muhammad's being a prophet and the details of the Islamic revelation

recognize true prophets, and how we can know that Muḥammad is a true prophet, and that the "information" transmitted by him forms a source of knowledge. The criterion he gives here, the showing of a miracle, is a rational criterion. The whole arrangement of this argumentation, from possibility and necessity to the reality, shows his efforts to base revelation and revealed knowledge on the necessary knowledge of the intuition, and so to make it as cogent and inevitable for all human beings, also for his unbelieving opponents, as the direct data of the intuition.

Revelation is good (*ḥasan*) because³⁰⁹ there are things we cannot in any way know without this supplementary information given by God and transmitted by prophets. These things we cannot know, neither by necessary knowledge nor by acquired knowledge based on intuition; nevertheless, it may be for our benefit to know them. 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with this question when speaking about the *taklif*, the duties God imposes, and his attention is directed mainly to the "*šarī'a*", the divine legislation. It contains rules for human behaviour, which are for the benefit of mankind, but which we cannot know by reflection upon the data of intuition.

"It is stipulated in the intuition of every subject who is compos mentis that it is obligatory to repulse harm from the soul; it also is certain that what urges to (do) the obligatory and averts from (doing) what is evil is by all means obligatory, and that what averts from (doing) the obligatory and urges to (do) the evil is by all means evil. If that is correct, and we admit that there are acts by doing which we come closer to the execution of the obligatory things and the avoidance of things deemed evil, and acts by doing which we are in the opposite situation, and if it does not fall under the power of the intuition to know that and to know the difference between what is benefit and favour (*mašlahā wa-luṭf*) and what is not so, God makes

³⁰⁹ 'Abd al-Jabbâr records in *Muḡnī* XV, 19-21 a discussion between Abû 'Alī and Abû Hâšim about the way in which God's revelation must occur to be good. The principle remains and is accepted by both participants that there must be no evil in it and, to make it really good, there must be some "purpose" (*ḡaraḍ*) in this revelation. (This argumentation was originally directed against the Brahmans, who stated that there was always an aspect of evil in every form of revelation). The question disputed by the Mu'tazilī theologians was whether God reveals things which are already known through human intuition, or has His revelation a strictly separate field of its own? When God reveals things which are already known by intuition, with the purpose, for instance, to affirm these things or to stimulate man to do acts he already knew to be obligatory by means of his intuition, would not such a revelation be superfluous (*'abāṭ*) and therefore evil (*qabīḥ*)?

us know without any doubt the state (*ḥāl*) of these acts..."³¹⁰ Such things as have been mentioned in this text from 'Abd al-Jabbār's *Šarḥ*, where he has in mind, for instance, the ceremonies of the *ḥajj* (the pilgrimage) and the prayer³¹¹ and, in general, things which are for the benefit of man because they help him fulfil his duties and so acquire reward from God,³¹² form the contents of divine revelation. If this is the case, it would be evil when God did not let us know these things because according to 'Abd al-Jabbār God's *taklīf*, His imposing duties, makes it obligatory for Him to give man all he needs to fulfil these duties.³¹³ And because it is impossible to know these things by necessary knowledge and by acquired knowledge based on the intuition, God has to send a prophet to us and prove that that man is a prophet by a "sign" (*alam*), a miracle, which is an indication of his trustworthiness.³¹⁴ This prophet can give us the information we need, and his information functions as a source of knowledge.

For 'Abd al-Jabbār the message of Muḥammad, which has been confirmed and authorized by God Himself by way of miracles, becomes, in consequence of these miracles, a source of knowledge. But here again, and now for the last time, the assistance of human argumentation based on intuition has to be invoked to distinguish real miracles, and to furnish the criteria to do so.

Etymologically spoken (*fī l-luġa*) a *mu'jiz* (the Arabic word used here, and rendered by us as "miracle") is he who makes someone else

³¹⁰ *Šarḥ* 564 Here 'Abd al-Jabbār immediately concludes to God being obliged to send prophets. In the *Muġnī* he deals with all these questions separately, these things (described in *Muġnī* XV, 19-23) cannot be known by necessary knowledge (p. 23-26) or by inference based on intuition (*istidlāl 'aqlī*, p. 26-29)

³¹¹ Cf. *Šarḥ* 563 See also *Muġnī* XV, 30-50

³¹² According to the text of the *Muġnī* (XV, 30) especially acts which lead to other acts, he uses here the verb *da'ā*, to invite, and he continues that an act can only invite to perform another act on the condition that the relation between the two acts is known. And therefore we need divine revelation.

³¹³ Cf. *Muġnī* XI, 426-432, especially p. 431

³¹⁴ Cf., e.g., *Muġnī* XV, 17-18, where the various signs and indications which point to someone being a prophet are given. "Know that there must be a message he bears, authorized by God, he must accept that and make up his mind to carry it out in as far as he has to do it, he must endure everything that forms an obstacle of it. When he bears that (message) and does what we mentioned, he must proclaim the message as such and invite the (people) to whom he was sent to accept it from him. In that case God will show for him what forms an indication for his state (of being a prophet) in order that it becomes a duty for the others to accept (it) from him, by showing a miracle which indicates that they are the people to which he is sent (literally for a matter which goes back to the one to whom is sent) and not only that he is a prophet" (*Muġnī* XV, 17)

unable (*man yu'jiz al-ḡayr*); used as a terminus technicus (*fī l-muṣṭalah 'alayh*), however, it is used for the act which indicates the truthfulness of him who claims to be a prophet. It resembles the etymological meaning since human beings are unable to produce what happens in this way, and so it is as if it makes them unable.³¹⁵

'Abd al-Jabbār mentions five criteria, five conditions which have to be fulfilled to make an act a miracle.³¹⁶ It must come from God or has such a quality that it presents itself as if it comes from God,³¹⁷ it must occur following the claim of him who claims to be a prophet,³¹⁸ it must correspond to that claim, it must break the "usage" (*al-'āda*),³¹⁹ the normal course of events in this world,³²⁰ and it must come from someone who performs it and is just and wise (*fā'il 'adl ḥakīm*) because only in that case the authorization proves the truth of the message.³²¹

One can distinguish between two kinds of miracles, two ways in which God can indicate that a prophet is to be trusted, and that a message really is His message.³²² He may do it through the message

³¹⁵ Cf. *Šarh* 568. The etymological meaning of a word is always very important for 'Abd al-Jabbār, when dealing with the miraculous character of the Qur'ān (in Arabic *i'jāz*, literally "to make unable"), he strongly emphasizes this meaning.

³¹⁶ In this summing up I follow the text of the *Šarh*, which mentions these five criteria. In the *Muḡnī* 'Abd al-Jabbār deals with the characteristics of the miracles in XV, 168-181, he expressly mentions two criteria (*Muḡnī* XV, 171), which are the first and fourth among the criteria mentioned in the *Šarh*, but the other three are also mentioned in the *Muḡnī*. Cf. *Šarh* 569-572.

³¹⁷ *Šarh* 569. The addition "or has such a quality that it presents itself as if it comes from God" is made by 'Abd al-Jabbār because some miracles consist in the fact that a man who has power over the genus of an act but not over a special manner in which it occurs nevertheless performs it by a special assistance from God.

³¹⁸ *Šarh* 569. A sign which preceded the claim cannot be an indication for the claim.

³¹⁹ About the meaning of this *'āda* or "usage", see especially *Muḡnī* XV, 182-196. This "usage" is concerned not with the acts of human beings, but with God's acts, it is the normal course of events in this world, which is changed by God alone. It corresponds, qua contents, with what we call the laws of nature. As an example of such a usage 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions that the sun rises in the east and sets in the west. God alone can change this usage, and that is a miracle. See *Šarh* 570.

³²⁰ *Šarh* 570. The edition reads "that it is breaking the usage of him in whose midst (it is)" (*li-'ādat man bayn zahrānayh*). In a note as a variant is given *li-l-'āda*, in that case we render "that it is breaking the usage in the midst of it (the world as it goes)".

³²¹ *Šarh* 571. This condition is not given by 'Abd al-Jabbār in the same series with the other four. This fifth condition constitutes, as it were, the basis of the other four. Only when we know that the one who works the miracle is reliable and wise, can we know that it is a miracle in the sense 'Abd al-Jabbār has given to this word an indication to the truthfulness of the prophet.

³²² Cf. *Muḡnī* XV, 164. 'Abd al-Jabbār first proves here by way of a *taqṣim* (division)

(*kitâb*) itself, by creating it so that it is a miracle (*mu'jiz*) and fulfils the five conditions mentioned above, or He may confirm the claim of the prophet by other miracles, which we could call "circumstantial"

Muhammad's claim that he is God's prophet and the bearer of a message coming from God is confirmed by miracles of both kinds. The message itself, the Qur'ân, is a miracle, it even is the greatest and most important miracle indicating Muhammad's truthfulness because it surpasses the human possibilities in its eloquence (*fasâha*). It is *mu'jiz* it "makes unable", other beings are unable to come forward with something similar to it, which they really made themselves and not by way of imitation or reproduction of the Qur'ân.³²³ This brings us to the much discussed problem of the "*i'jâz al-Qur'ân*", the inimitability of the Qur'ân. 'Abd al-Jabbâr consecrates many pages to this subject, showing in which way the Qur'ân is inimitable, the way in which one can prove that it is so, and how it is an indication (*dalil*) to the truthfulness of Muhammad and of his claim that he is God's prophet.³²⁴ But this question falls outside the scope of our present study. For our purpose it suffices to say that the Qur'ân is a miracle, and in this way an indication (*dalil*) to Muhammad's truthfulness.

Besides the inimitability of the message itself, God has also shown other miracles, circumstantial miracles, to confirm Muhammad's claim that he really is God's prophet. These miracles too, and the way in which they constitute an indication, are dealt with in detail by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.³²⁵

Because of all these miracles, we know that the message of Muhammad and other things he said are sources of knowledge, and constitute what 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls "*sam*", revelation.

The principle of indication (*asl ad-dalâla*) in matters of revelation and revealed knowledge is, as we have seen, that we know who is the one who gives us this information—that it is God Himself, who is wise

that God can only indicate someone to be His prophet by way of a miracle. This miracle is either in the message itself or connected with it.

³²³ See *Mugni* VII, 187-208, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr treats the *hikâya*, the reproduction of the speech of someone else, and argues that the inimitability of the Qur'ân is not concerned with such a reproduction, but only with the real making, the "invention" (*iktirâ'*) of it.

³²⁴ When 'Abd al-Jabbâr in part sixteen of the *Mugni* gives his proofs for the prophethood of Muhammad, he devotes nearly all the pages he composes on this subject to the inimitability of the Qur'ân, so the edited text of this part bears, wrongly but understandably, the title "*i'jâz al-Qur'ân*". See *Mugni* XVI, 143-406.

³²⁵ Cf. *Mugni* XVI, 407-423 and *Šarh* 595-597.

—and consequently knows the truth—, and just—and consequently cannot deceive—. The fact that it is God who gives us the information concerned, is the guarantee that it is true. 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls this principle: "the knowledge of who informs by the information" (*al-'ilm bi-muḳbir al-iḳbâr* or *al-aḳbâr*).³²⁶

In the field of *'aqlîyât*, knowledge based ultimately on human intuition, there is only one "indication" (*dalîl*), the human intuition itself;³²⁷ in the field of *sam'îyât*, revealed knowledge, however, three different "indications" or sources are distinguished by 'Abd al-Jabbâr: the Qur'ân, the "Sunna" or "way" of the prophet, and the "Ijmâ'", the general consensus of the Islamic community.³²⁸ On these three sources the totality of our revealed knowledge is based.³²⁹

Qur'ân: This is the message (*kitâb*)³³⁰ the prophet Muḥammad transmitted from God to the people to whom he was sent. It is the speech (*kalâm*) of God Himself. When we know that it is God's speech and that God is just and wise, we know His speech to be a source of knowledge; then the Qur'ân can function as an indication (*dalîl*) on which man should reflect to acquire further knowledge.³³¹

The truthfulness of the text of the Qur'ân has been proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by means of a rational argumentation based on the data of the human intuition (*'aql*): from his insight into the structures and laws of our world, he concluded that there must be a God, and, always by means of rational argumentation, he deduced the qualities of this God and the necessity of His revelation. Finally, he recognized this revelation in the mission of Muhammad and in the Qur'ân he transmitted.

Consequently, it is not possible to use the Qur'ân as an indication

³²⁶ Cf *Muḥit* I, 7

³²⁷ Cf *Šarḥ* 88 See our pages 91 and 92

³²⁸ Cf *Šarḥ* 88

³²⁹ Other sources as "*qiyâs*", "analogy", generally mentioned in this series are according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr not separate sources, but fall under the three sources mentioned by him and recorded in our text.

* Cf *Šarḥ* 88 In *Muḥit* XVII, 275, however, *qiyâs* is called an "indication" (*dalîl*) in the *Šar'îyât*

³³⁰ The term used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in this context, "*kitâb*", which is translated as "message", is more general than the term "Qur'ân" It is used for the message of every prophet But because the Qur'ân fulfils and even can abrogate what is said in the former prophecies (cf XVI, 49-142, where an entire section of that part of the *Muḥit* is devoted to this subject), in fact for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the message meant here is the Qur'ân

³³¹ Cf e.g. *Muḥit* XVII, 93 ff and *Šarḥ* 88

to God's existence and to His qualities or to the basic structures of our world and the qualities of substances. All this has been used to prove the truthfulness of the Qur'ân, and to use the Qur'ân as an indication to it would be going the other way round, from the derived to the basic knowledge, from the *far'* to the *asl*.³³² In this way it would constitute a circular reasoning.

Nevertheless, the Qur'ân speaks about these things, but, 'Abd al-Jabbâr says, when it does so, this does not constitute a real indication; it only gives a confirmation (*ta'kid*) of what was already known by intuition.³³³ It is the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr arranges his argumentations when not *sam'iyât* but *'aqliyât* are concerned: he proves the truth of his own theses by way of rational argumentation based on intuition only, and at the end he quotes texts from the Qur'ân to confirm his statements.

But, besides this "confirming" function of the Qur'ân, it really indicates other things; it constitutes an indication (*dalil*) to things which are not yet known by intuition and reflection upon this intuition. These things are summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as follows:

"From all this follows that the message only indicates by way of free choice.³³⁴ If it indicates by way of information, it indicates what was and what will be and is as it were absent (*al-ġayb*: the world of God, which is not here and hidden for mankind); it indicates the qualities of acts so that one knows by it that they are obligatory or evil etc.; it indicates what is connected with these qualities such as the cause (*sabah*), intrinsic cause (*'illa*), condition (*šarṭ*), time (*waqt*) etc., as we will explain. What is not information, but resembles a command or prohibition (*amr* or *nahy*), only indicates the qualities of the acts; the promise and the threat (*al-wa'd wa-l-wa'id*) also come under this head because they both indicate His choice to do what is deserved by the person under His obligation. We have, indeed, explained that the doing of reward is known by intuition, but the doing of the punishment of him who deserves it is known only by revelation, because

³³² Cf. *Muġnî* XVII, 93 and *Šarh* 88

³³³ Cf. *Muġnî* XVII, 94; 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers here to the introduction of his book *Mutašâbih al-Qur'ân*, cf. its edition pp. 1-5

³³⁴ The indication "by way of free choice" is one of the three ways in which something can be an indication which indicates something else. See p. 67: because we know that God is just and wise, we know that what he chooses in His free choice must be good and must be true. In fact, what is meant here is the fourth way of "indication" given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, which resembles the third one, but is only applicable to revealed knowledge

it would be possible—considered from the point of view of the intuition—to drop and to forgive it.”³³⁵

In this way the Qur'ân forms an indication (*dalil*), especially in moral questions. But not every verse (*âya*, sign) of the Qur'ân forms an indication in itself; some verses need something else which has to be linked with it (a “*qarîna*”) to constitute together the indication. A verse which is clear, which constitutes an indication by itself, and by its form or external sense alone reveals its meaning is called “*muhkam*”, “precise”.³³⁶ A verse which needs a “*qarîna*” to constitute an indication, and which does not reveal its real meaning by its external sense alone is called “*mutašâbih*”, “obscure”.³³⁷ The *qarîna* which is needed to reveal its real meaning may itself be revealed—a part of the Qur'ân, a datum from the *Sunna* or the *Ijmâ'*—or it may be something based upon human intuition, something ‘*aqlî*’.³³⁸ This leads to the necessity of interpreting the Qur'ân, which has become in Islâm a science of its own; 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself wrote books in this field of science, some of which have survived until our days.³³⁹

Sunna: the “way” of the prophet.³⁴⁰ This term comprises everything Muḥammad has said besides his transmitting the Qur'ân, or has been silent about, everything he has done or omitted, everything he has approved or rejected. The *Sunna* is the second of the three revealed indications, the three sources of revealed knowledge.³⁴¹ Its truthfulness is based upon the knowledge that the *Sunna* is the way of the prophet and that the prophet is just and wise and, consequently, has to be trusted. That the prophet is just and wise forms the subject of disputes among Muslim theologians on the “qualities of the prophet” (*ṣifât ar-rasûl*). The point of view which we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works

³³⁵ *Mugni* XVII, 94

³³⁶ In *Šarh* 600 he gives the following definition of *muhkam* “*ma ahkam al-murâd bi-zâhirih*”, “what precisely gives the meaning by its external sense” See also *Mugni* XVII, 81, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to what he said in *Mugni* XVI

³³⁷ Cf *Šarh* 600, where he gives the following definition of *mutašâbih* “*mâ lam yuhkam al murâd bi-zâhirih, bal yahtâj fi dâlik ilâ qarîna*” “what does not precisely give the meaning by its external sense, but needs therefore something to be connected with it”

³³⁸ Cf *Mugni* XVII, 81-86 and *Šarh* 600

³³⁹ These books are *Tanzîh al-Qur'ân 'an al-matâ'in*, *Mutašâbih al-Qur'ân*, and in a less strict sense also *Taḥbîr dalâ'il an-nubûwa* Cf the short description of these books on pp 11-13

³⁴⁰ Instead of the word *as-Sunna*, also the combinations *Sunnat an-nabî*, *Sunnat ar-rasûl*, or similar expressions are used

³⁴¹ See, e.g., *Šarh* 88 and 600 and our page 91

is that it is God's purpose that the mission of the prophet is accepted by mankind; therefore He must avoid all that may harm this acceptance, and make His prophet an ideal of human goodness so that he is just and wise and trustworthy. This argumentation forms the basis of the *Sunna*. 'Abd al-Jabbâr puts it as follows: "The prophet must be absolutely free from everything which is repelling (*al-munaffirât*), be it great or small; for the purpose of his mission is only favour and benefits for mankind, and what is (conceived) thus must be made by its instigator (*mukallif*; God, who imposes it) in the most effective way. Therefore God must absolutely, as we have said, avert from His prophet what repels (his hearers) from accepting out of his hands (the message), for, if He would not avert from him what is thus (repelling), the acceptance out of his hands would not occur. And because man to whom it is directed (*al-mukallaf*) only comes closer to it in the way we mentioned, God must avert for them (the prophets) all other things which play a part in the (process of) repelling."³⁴² "The entire Islamic community is agreed that who is sent is surely better (*afḍal*) than who is not sent."³⁴³

Ijmâ': Consensus.³⁴⁴ This term is generally used to indicate that the agreement of the entire Muslim community in a certain age constitutes an indication, a source of knowledge, when it concerns religious matters; such a "*Ijmâ'*" has to be accepted by all Muslims, also those of later ages.³⁴⁵

'Abd al-Jabbâr states that this term is used for every agreement between people about a certain thing which is to be the object of their consensus, on the condition that it is expressly and intentionally made in this way.³⁴⁶ There are two kinds of Consensus: Consensus of the whole community (the common people and the erudite) when it concerns matters which everybody can think about, or Consensus

³⁴² *Šurh* 573.

³⁴³ *Šurh* 576. Cf. *Muḡni* XV, 279-316, especially p 278-279 for a list of some of these qualities which characterize a prophet.

³⁴⁴ See especially the two articles M Bernand wrote about the *Ijmâ'* in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr: *L'ig̃mâ' chez 'Abd al-Ġabbâr et l'objection d'an-Nazzâm*, *SI* 30 (1969), 27-38; *Nouvelles remarques sur l'ig̃mâ' chez le qâdi 'Abd al-Ġabbâr*, *Arabica* 19 (1972), 78-85. See also *Muḡni* XVII, 153-245.

³⁴⁵ Cf. Hourani, *The Basis of Authority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam*, *SI* 21 (1964) 13-60.

³⁴⁶ Cf. *Muḡni* XVII, 153: "the occurring of an agreement (*mušâraka*) with each other in what is described as their consensus, what is so is qualified as consensus when it comes from them on purpose and intentionally"

of only the erudite (*'ulamâ'*) when technical points or decisions are at stake.³⁴⁷

It is not possible to base the value of the Consensus on a rational argumentation, nor is it confirmed by God through special miracles; the only basis it has is the Qur'ân and the *Sunna*: these two sources of revealed knowledge indicate that also the Consensus (*Ijmâ'*) is a source and indication of revealed knowledge.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁷ Cf. *Mugnî* XVII, 243

³⁴⁸ This question is examined, with all its consequences, by Madame Bernard. Cf. the two articles mentioned in note 344. See also *Šarḥ* 89, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that the truthfulness of the Consensus can only be based upon the Qur'ân and the *Sunna*.

B. COSMOLOGY

Like other Mu'tazila, 'Abd al-Jabbâr at bottom is a theologian; the studies he made, the books he wrote are really theological works. He is not a philosopher, nor primarily interested in metaphysics; his books must not and cannot be read as a description of the cosmos, the world in which we live. His main attention is directed towards God and towards His relationship with man and the answer man gives to God. The world is the place of God's absence (He is in "al-ğayb", the other world), but which at the same time is the field where we gather the indications (*dalâ'il*) which lead us, if we reflect upon them, to knowledge about God; the world also is the place where we believe in God, and where we serve Him.

But, notwithstanding all this, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology is based upon a firm foundation of insight into the structures of our world. It even is exactly because the cosmos furnishes the indications we need for our reflection, and which point to God, and because—according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr—man needs the use of his intellectual faculties to arrive even at the smallest amount of knowledge about God, that an insight into the structures of the cosmos is absolutely necessary.

In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works, an underlying metaphysical doctrine is discernible, which sometimes comes to the surface and is expressly dealt with. This is the case when he discusses the way in which a reflecting human subject, starting from these structures, finally arrives at the knowledge of God;¹ it also appears when he deals with the way in which we express our knowledge about God in terms we use for the description of our world too.² Now the importance of these underlying metaphysics for the structures and the expression of his theological doctrine becomes immediately manifest.

These metaphysics are not of his own making; he has his place

¹ How we can—and must—acquire knowledge about God is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Muħit* I, 28-93 and in *Šarħ* 89-122. The corresponding part of the *Muğni* (it is highly probable that this subject was treated in one of the first parts of the *Muğni* as it is found in the beginning of the *Muħit* and the *Šarħ*) is missing.

² When 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with God's qualities, his argumentation is based upon the meaning and the function of these qualities in the cosmos (*Muħit* I, 97-226 and *Šarħ* 151-298; the latter part of these discussions is preserved in *Muğni* IV and V).

in the tradition of the Mu'tazila, and his metaphysics are a continuation and adaptation of the line of this tradition of religious and metaphysical thinking. We must credit him with the fact that he consistently and systematically used these basic metaphysical data, every time 'Abd al-Jabbâr appeals to the structures of the cosmos in his theological argumentation, it becomes clear that there is a metaphysical substrate, the result of a real reflection upon the world.

Because, according to the metaphysics of our cosmos as seen by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the world is existent and can be divided into substances and accidents, I shall deal successively with existence, with substances, with accidents, and with the relation between substances and accidents.

1. EXISTENCE

When first we direct our attention to the most fundamental structures of the world, to the most basic qualification we can give to the cosmos, we call the cosmos "*mawjûd muhdağ*" or, more basically yet, "*mawjûd hâdiğ*", the second terms (*muhdağ* and *hâdiğ*) being a stricter determination of the contents of the first one (*mawjûd*). The cosmos is existent (*mawjûd*) but not from all eternity, it once began to exist (*hâdiğ*).

Existence being the most fundamental quality of all existent things, the primary distinction 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes is that between what is existent and what is non-existent, between *al-mawjûd* and *al-ma'dûm*.

Mawjûd: existent. The meaning of this word is self-evident, says 'Abd al-Jabbâr, it belongs to the human intuition (it is *ma'qûl*). Therefore it is not necessary to explain or to define it, it suffices to point to the experience every human being has, and that experience is the knowledge that what we perceive is existent. This knowledge is necessary. Not all existent things are, however, perceptible, besides the perceived or perceptible things (*al-mudrakât*), there are other existent things (*mawjûdât*) the existence of which we can only know by acquired knowledge and, consequently, by argumentation and inference.³

³ Cf. *Muhit* I, 133 and *Šarh* 176. The most general term, comprising both the existent and the non-existent, is "thing" (*šay'*, plural *ašyâ'*), this term is applied to everything that can be known and about which information can be given (*Šarh* 221), but some discussion arose as to its use to indicate God. God is existent, but we cannot know Him by necessary knowledge, we can only know Him and His existence through argumentation and inference (*istidlâl*).

Because the term "*mawjûd*" itself is evident, it is even not possible to define it because a definition must, by its very essence, be clearer and more revealing than the term to be defined;⁴ it is, however, not possible to find a term or a description which in fact is more revealing than the simple word *mawjûd*.⁵ Nevertheless, in the *Šarḥ* 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives a definition of *mawjûd*, a definition rejected by his disciple Mânkdîm, who wrote the published version of this work on the dictation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. The definition mentioned runs: "what is characterized by a quality at which appear the qualities and judgments (*tazhar 'indahâ ṣ-ṣifât wa-l-aḥkâm*)".⁶ When something is existent, the quality of its essence ("what it is") appears, and by it also other qualities by which the thing concerned is characterized; one can say that this is made possible by its being existent.⁷ The crux of this definition or description lies in the meaning of the term "*ẓahar*", to appear. 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses a non-technical term, probably on purpose, to leave the manner in which these qualities "appear" as vague as possible. What 'Abd al-Jabbâr exactly has in mind when using this term *mawjûd*, will become manifest when we look into the meaning of its opposite "*ma'dûm*", non-existent, and the way he describes it.

Ma'dûm: non-existent.⁸ This concept is not meant by 'Abd al-Jabbâr to be the absolute contrary of *mawjûd*: not everything, possible or not,

⁴ See pp 76-78, where we have given the conditions which have to be fulfilled to make a definition correct Cf also *Muhîṭ* I, 133, where it is stated that the definition must be "more lucid" (*awdah*) than the term to be defined, and *Šarḥ* 176, where it is said to be "more manifest" (*azhar*), "more disclosing" (*akṣaf*), and "more lucid" (*awdah*)

⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects the definition given by his teacher Abû 'Abdallâh al-Basrî and by "our teachers from Bagdâd" This definition has that *mawjûd* is "what is and stands firm" (*al-kâ'in at-tâbit*) According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, this definition is less clear than the term to be defined, the terms *kâ'in* and *tâbit* are coextensive so that one is superfluous, and not every existent thing is also *kâ'in* See *Šarḥ* 175-176

⁶ See *Šarḥ* 176 About the composition of the *Šarḥ* see p 13 Mânkdîm adds "Although this is true, it is not correct to give this as a definition because it is more complicated (*aṣkal*) than our term *mawjûd*, and it belongs to the essence of a definition that it is more manifest than it (the term to be defined). Therefore, it is better not to define *al-mawjûd* by way of a definition because our term *mawjûd* is more disclosing and more lucid than everything he mentions in its definition"

⁷ See *Muhîṭ* I, 135-136. Something existent cannot be existent by an accident "existence" (*wujûd*), it is existent because someone made it: it is existent "because of an acting subject" (*bi-fā'il*)

⁸ See especially *Muhîṭ* I, 133-138 and *Šarḥ* 175-181.

conceivable or not, that is not existent is *ma'dûm* non-existent.⁹ So our English translation (like also the Arabic word) may be confusing.¹⁰

Ma'dûm is not the purely possible, not everything one might imagine or conceive, but it is the really possible, the metaphysically possible. Its existence cannot be in all circumstances incompatible with the conclusions of the human intellect. *Al-ma'dûm* is what can exist under certain circumstances, but in fact now does not exist. Therefore, a second god besides God is not non-existent because we know that there can be only one God; so also annihilation (*fanâ*) is not non-existent, although it is not existent, because this is a purely negative concept which under no circumstances can exist.¹¹ And, since in this world only substances and accidents exist, only substances and accidents can be non-existent.

'Abd al-Jabbâr in his definition emphasizes another aspect of this non-existence by saying that *al-ma'dûm* is "*al-ma'lûm alladî lays bi-mawjûd*": what is known, or knowable, and is not existent.¹² This implies that God knows all *ma'dûmât*, all non-existent things, for He knows everything that can be known because He is essentially knowing and not knowing by knowledge as human beings are.¹³ So, what 'Abd al-Jabbâr places special emphasis upon is that all non-existent things are already known, even when they do not exist. This implies that they already have a kind of "essence": they can be described and they can be used in an argumentation as 'Abd al-Jabbâr often does. They are "known" (*ma'lûm*) in the strict sense which this word has for 'Abd al-Jabbâr: they are known with certainty. They are known by human beings, either because they once existed,¹⁴ or because they are known

⁹ Cf. *Šarh* 176-177

¹⁰ One might be tempted to translate the word *ma'dûm* as "absent" and *mawjûd* as "present". This translation corresponds with a normal use of these words and seems to be confirmed by the combination *ma'dûm 'an* (see *Šarh* 102). On studying the text of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, one becomes convinced that these words are used indeed in a metaphysical and not in a physical context so that the correct translation must be in terms of existence and not in terms of presence.

¹¹ *Šarh* 177

¹² The text of this definition is found in *Šarh* 176. The participle (*ma'lûm*) can have both meanings: what in fact is known and what can be known.

¹³ We discuss this question in more detail when we deal with God's qualities in our paragraph on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theodicy. Cf. pp. 241-243.

¹⁴ The definition given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's teacher Abû 'Abdallâh al-Basrî is rejected by his disciple because in his opinion this definition comprises only the *ma'dûmât* which once did exist, it reads: "the non-existent is 'the lacking (*al-muntafi*) which is not being nor standing firm". For 'Abd al-Jabbâr the use of the word *muntafi* implies that the thing in question did exist before. Cf. *Šarh* 176.

by argumentation as metaphysically possible things. They are metaphysically possible and only need the producing act of an able subject to come into existence and to be in fact what they are.

Kâ'in: being (in space). The meaning of this word, the participle of the verb "*kân*", to be, in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr is fully determined by the importance of etymology and other linguistic arguments throughout his rational argumentations. He is convinced that the structures of language and the structures of reality run parallel with each other. Consequently, just as a human being is '*âlim* (knowing) by '*ilm* (knowledge), just as he is '*murîd* (willing) by '*irâda* (will), just as he is '*nâzir* (reflecting) by '*nâzar* (reflection)—and many other instances may be mentioned where 'Abd al-Jabbâr combines in this way the active participle and the infinitive of a verb to describe structures in this world—the same human being (and other beings too) is *kâ'in* by *kawn*. The meaning of this term "*kawn*", handed down to him by the Mu'tazilî tradition,¹⁵ makes him define *kâ'in* (being) as "being in a given place", "occupying a given amount and form of imaginary space". "*Kâ'in*, he says, is only used for a substance which originates in a (occupying a given amount of) place."¹⁶

So, it becomes evident that this word *kâ'in*, which can be translated very literally as "*ens*", does not correspond with the meaning of "*ens*" in our European Scholastic tradition, nor with the meaning of our term "a being". Besides the fact that *kâ'in* can be used only for a being which occupies a place, there is yet another difference between the two terms. The word being or "*ens*" is too static to use it as a translation for *kâ'in*; the Arabic verb *kân* expresses both the beginning and the continuation of what we call "to be": it expresses both "becoming" and "being". According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, this word when used without further determination means "beginning"; used in combination with one of the four "*akwân*" (modes of being),¹⁷ it can become a more static term.¹⁸ The inchoative character of this term

¹⁵ For a discussion of the term *kawn*, see later in this paragraph, where we speak about the accidents, the *akwân* are for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the accidents which determine the situation of a substance in space

¹⁶ See *Šarh* 176 "*al-kâ'in innamâ yusta'mal fî l-jawhar alladî hasal fî hayvîz*" See also *Muhîr* I, 33

¹⁷ Cf note 15 The four "modes" of being in space are movement, immobility, combination, and separation See *Muhîr* I, 33

¹⁸ See *Muhîr* I, 33 "Sometimes we call it *kawn* without addition because it exists as beginning (*ibtidâ*), not after something else, this is only the case in the existent thing at the moment of the coming into existence of the substance (*hâl hudû' al-jawhar*)"

is also found in the use of the verb "originate" in the quotation given above; 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses there the verb "*ḥasal*".

Concluding: *kâ'in* is used only for substances which occupy place (not for accidents, not for things that do not occupy place) and expresses especially their becoming in that place. "A body is surely 'spatial' (*mutaḥayyiz*) at its existence; it can only be spatial if it is 'being' (*kâ'm*), and it is only 'being' (*kâ'm*) by a 'mode of being' (*kawn*)".¹⁹

Inside the category of existent things (*al-mawjûdât*) one should make a further distinction between things the existence of which had a beginning and things the existence of which did not have a beginning. It is the doctrine of 'Abd al-Jabbâr that the whole of our cosmos did not exist from all eternity and is not eternal (*qadîm*); it once came into existence: it is "*ḥâdîṭ*". This coming into existence, moreover, had a cause, someone who produced and made; our cosmos is *muhḍat* and *maf'ûl*. And if it is God who made something by His decision (*taqdîr*), it is also *maklûq*, created.

Hâdîṭ: coming into existence, temporal.²⁰ For 'Abd al-Jabbâr this term *ḥâdîṭ* is the absolute contracy of the term *qadîm* (eternal); together these two terms cover all existent things; every existent thing is either eternal or temporal, there is no third possibility, and nothing can have both qualifications. The reason is that this division is a yes-no division, which necessarily is complete, and where no third possibility can be imagined.²¹

The difference between what is eternal (*qadîm*) and what is temporal (*ḥâdîṭ*) is expressed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in different ways: whereas eternal (*qadîm*) is something existent "the existence of which has no

¹⁹ *Ṣarh* 112

²⁰ 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not make a clear distinction between the terms *ḥâdîṭ* (the active participle of the first form of the verb *hadat*) and *muhḍat* (the passive participle of the fourth form) This may be influenced by the fact that both terms are co-extensive Cf *Ṣarh* 114 "*al-ḥâdîṭ wa-l-muhḍat sîwâ*" Tritton, *The Speech of God*, SI 36 (1972), 8 makes a distinction between *ḥâdîṭ* and *mahḍat* (this is the passive participle of the first form, the first form being intransitive, we probably have to read here *muhḍat*), and renders these two terms respectively as "coming into being" and "brought into being"

²¹ *Muhit* I, 138 "The intuitively known division supposes in the existent thing that its existence is either from a first or not from a first, that is a hesitation (*taraddud*) between denying and establishing (no or yes) In what is thus no medium (between these two) is conceivable" See also our pp 72-74

first”²², “the existence of which is not from a first”²³ or “for which non-existence is not admissible (possible)”²⁴ “temporal” (*ḥâdiṭ*) is described as its contrary and said to be something existent “the existence of which has a first”, “the existence of which is from a first”, or “for which non-existence is admissible”.

The term *ḥâdiṭ* has for ‘Abd al-Jabbâr a double meaning; originally the verb “*ḥadaṭ*” indicates: to occur or to happen.²⁵ As a technical term it is used—and especially the verbal noun “*ḥudûṭ*” and the active participle “*ḥâdiṭ*” have this technical meaning—for the “coming into existence” of something, “the momentary state of coming into existence”.²⁶ In a more remote sense, it is used also—and this is very frequently done—for the result of this coming into existence: the temporal being; in this case “*ḥudûṭ*” means “the existence of something after it was not”,²⁷ and “*ḥâdiṭ*” something that exists now, but once did not exist. This twofold meaning of the term, as used by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr, may lead, depending on the context, to a translation as “coming into existence” or as “temporal”.

The whole of our world, which is built up from substances which carry accidents,²⁸ is temporal (*ḥâdiṭ*). This point, which evidently is of the greatest importance for theology, is proved by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr both in his *Šarḥ* and in his *Muḥit*,²⁹ while the corresponding part of the *Muḡni* is missing.

That the accidents (*a'râd*) are temporal is, according to ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s ideas as they are expressed in the *Šarḥ*, very simple to prove: accidents can be non-existent (*ma'dûm*); in fact they disappear and fall into non-existence whenever their opposite (*ḍidd*) comes into existence, and we, human beings, can even in some cases be the cause of this, for instance in the case of movement and immobility. Because non-existence is not possible for what is eternal, the accidents must be

²² *Šarḥ* 181: “*mâ lâ awwal li-wujûdh*”

²³ *Muḥit* I, 138: “*an yakûn wujûduh 'an awwal aw lâ 'an awwal*”.

²⁴ *Šarḥ* 93: “*qad ṭabat annah yajûz 'alayh al-'adam wa-l-butlân, wa-l-qadîm lâ yajûz 'alayh al-'adam wa-l-butlân*”.

²⁵ See, e.g., Frank, *Metaphysics*, 13.

²⁶ *Šarḥ* 100: “*ḥâlat al-ḥudûṭ*”

²⁷ *Šarḥ* 100: “*.. wujûdah ba'd an lam yakun*”.

²⁸ For a discussion of “substances” (*jawhar*; pl. *jawâhir*) and “accidents” (*'arad*, pl. *a'râd*) see the corresponding sections of this paragraph.

²⁹ Cf. *Šarḥ* 89-122 and *Muḥit* I, 28-67. Because a necessary knowledge of God is not possible, this remains for ‘Abd al-Jabbâr the only way to come to an acquired knowledge of God.

temporal.³⁰ In his *Muḥit* 'Abd al-Jabbâr realizes, however, that this argumentation is not as simple as it appears to be; many arguments against it are brought into the field by his opponents, and because they are based on entirely different views upon the essence of the accidents, they are not easy to refute.³¹ This is one of the reasons why he starts there with an argumentation to prove that bodies (*aḥsâm*) and not accidents are temporal.³²

In his argumentation, which indeed is very detailed, aimed at demonstrating that bodies are temporal,³³ 'Abd al-Jabbâr starts from the body's being in space. That a body is in space, occupies an amount of (imaginary) space, is evident by force of its essence; a body is defined as "what is characterized by length, breadth and depth",³⁴ and this implies that it occupies space. This has as consequence that it is moving or immobile, combined or separated, for these qualifications are given to existent things in their being in space. The body is thus (moving or immobile, combined or separated) because of *ma'ânî* which are called—in this case—*akwân*, "modes of being (in space)"; there are four *akwân*: movement, immobility, combination, and separation.³⁵ These modes of being (*akwân*) are not eternal but temporal because it is possible for them to be non-existent, whereas this is not possible for what is eternal.³⁶ And because a body cannot exist without these

³⁰ See *Šarh* 93-94.

³¹ See *Muḥit* I, 29 some consider the accidents to be an expression (*i'tibâr*) about the bodies, others say that they happen from the nature of the substrate in which they exist, and others again that they do not come into existence and fall into non-existence, but that they are hidden or appear (the doctrine about the "*kumûn*" and "*zuhûr*" and the "interpenetration" of bodies, the so-called "*mudâkâla*", of which especially an-Nazzâm was a propagator, can be seen as an alternative for the doctrine of substances and accidents)

³² Other reasons given in *Muḥit* I, 29 are: the argumentation to prove that the bodies are temporal comprises also the knowledge that the accidents are temporal, the temporality of the bodies has to be known to prove God's unicity and uniqueness (*tawḥîd*)

³³ This argumentation is found in *Šarh* 95-118 and in *Muḥit* I, 32-67 Both works give argumentations which run in their general outlines parallel with one another

³⁴ See, e.g., *Mugni* VII, 6

³⁵ Cf *Muḥit* I, 32-46 See also *Šarh* 112 and the translation on our p 110 In both the *Šarh* and the *Muḥit* 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues by way of a division (*taqṣîm*) that the body only can be moving etc because of a *ma'nâ* which here is a *kawn* He proves that there is no other reason why a body can be moving etc This *taqṣîm* is translated on our pages 73 and 74, the example used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in that argumentation is the "combination", one of the four *akwân*

³⁶ Cf *Muḥit* I, 49-55 What is eternal is eternal because of its essence (*li-dâth* or *li-nafsih*), and therefore it cannot be non-existent (see, e.g., *Šarh* 107) That the *akwân*

temporal modes of being (*akwân*), it must be itself temporal too.³⁷ This argument, which was current among Mu'tazilî scholars, was—according to the indications given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr—first used by Abû l-Huḍayl.³⁸

When 'Abd al-Jabbâr in this way has proved that the bodies are temporal, he continues his argumentation showing that they must have been produced and made; because human beings do not have the power to produce bodies, they must have been made by someone else, by God. When he has proved further God's uniqueness, always by way of arguments based on human intuition, he can conclude that besides God nothing can be eternal so that everything in our world must be temporal.

Muḥḍat: produced, brought into existence³⁹ Our dealing with the terms *ḥâdîṭ* and *muḥḍat* under two different headings may suggest a clear distinction between the two terms, which in fact is not present in

can be non-existent is evident because it is known by experience. We see that something, if it becomes immobile, is no longer moving. The *kawn* "movement" cannot remain in its place, it cannot disappear by transition to another place, and, consequently, it must disappear by falling into non-existence. It is the only remaining possibility. See, e.g., *Šarh* 104-106.

³⁷ See *Muḥîṭ* I, 55-56. That a body cannot be without these modes of being (*akwân*) becomes apparent from its impossibility at this moment. We know that now bodies cannot exist without *akwân*, consequently, they can never exist without them. For the conclusion, see *Muḥîṭ* I, 57-67.

³⁸ See *Šarh* 95. The argument is summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as follows: "The bodies were never without the temporal things (*al-hawâdîṭ*) and did not precede them, and what was not free from a produced thing (*muḥḍat*) which it preceded, must be produced (*muḥḍat*) just as that (thing)." In the text of the *Šarh* 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two more arguments to prove that the bodies are temporal, both arguments being based upon the being temporal of the accidents, in these cases the arguments for the temporality of the accidents precede. In both cases he argues from this datum that God must exist, be unique, and be just. Then the two arguments separate, the first continues that this proves that the revelation is trustworthy, also when it says that the bodies are temporal, the second deduces that there can be no second eternal thing besides God, for that thing would be like God and that is impossible, consequently, the bodies cannot be eternal and must be temporal. The argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr prefers is the argument given in our text. Cf. *Šarh* 94-95.

³⁹ Various English words are used to translate the term *muḥḍat* and the words related to it, such as the verb *aḥḍat*, the verbal noun *ihḍât*, and the active participle *muḥḍîṭ*. Hourani (*Ethics*, 37) translates "generated" (a word I use to render the Arabic verb *wallad*) and explains it as "an event coming into existence after non-existence". Tritton, *Speech of God*, 5, renders it as "originated", and so does Watt (*Formative Period*, 282) "originated in time, that is, *kâna ba'd an lam yakun*, it existed after it did not exist", and because 'Abd al-Jabbâr also uses it as an equivalent of "*ḥâdîṭ*", he also translates it as "temporal" (*Formative Period*, 245). Rosenthal (*Knowledge Triumphant*, 128) does not reach the right solution when he makes it an equivalent of *maḳlûq* and translates it as "created".

'Abd al-Jabbâr's works. The term *muhdaṭ* is generally used as an equivalent to *hâdiṭ* and as the contrary of *qadîm*, "eternal"⁴⁰ Although the grammatical form of the word is a passive participle, and although one might 'Abd al-Jabbâr expect to say that something being produced already implies that there is a producer, he states that "one may know that something produced is produced (temporal) without knowing that it has a producer".⁴¹ Nevertheless, it is his conviction that all that is produced (*muhdaṭ*) or temporal (*hâdiṭ*) has a producer (*muhdiṭ*).

In his argumentation that every temporal thing in fact is brought into existence and is produced (*muhdaṭ*),⁴² and therefore needs a subject who has once brought it into existence and produced it (a "*muhdiṭ*" or "producer"), 'Abd al-Jabbâr again finds his starting-point in the evidences of human experience.⁴³ He appeals to our experience that whatever comes into existence from our side, from our free choice (*taṣarrufâtunâ*), and especially the four "modes of being" (*akwân*), needs us in order to come into existence. It is known by necessary knowledge that an act (*fī'l*) needs an acting subject (*fâ'il*).⁴⁴ What comes into existence from our side needs us because our state (*hâlunâ*), the state in which we are, has influence (*ta'îr*) upon that thing. We discover this because it happens according to our motives (*dawâ'i*)⁴⁵ and intentions (*qusûd*); but also in other cases we can conclude that such a thing happens according to our state.⁴⁶ This influence we have upon the thing coming into existence shows that it needs us.

But for what does it need us? 'Abd al-Jabbâr says: it needs us to

⁴⁰ See note 20 and the text from *Šarh* 114 we quoted there "*al-hâdiṭ wa-l-muhdaṭ siwâ*", "temporal and produced are the same"

⁴¹ See *Šarh* 324-325 "*ann al-muhdaṭ yu'lam muhdaṭan wa-in lam yu'lam ann lah muhdiṭan*"

⁴² I use here the word *muhdaṭ* not in the general sense of "temporal", but as the passive participle of the verb *ahdaṭ*, to bring into existence. Every time I make a distinction between *hâdiṭ* and *muhdaṭ*, it will be the distinction between "temporal" and "brought into existence", independently of the less strict use of both terms in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr

⁴³ See *Muhit* I, 68-93 and *Šarh* 118-119

⁴⁴ "The knowledge of the connection between the act and its actor (*fâ'ilih*), this is the knowledge, in general (*'alâ tariq al-jumla*), of the coming into existence from the side of the actor and (the knowledge) of its (viz the act's) need for him (viz the actor)" *Muhit* I, 69 "The knowledge that this act is characterized by it in a way in which it is not characterized by something else, is necessary (knowledge)" *Muhit* I, 70

⁴⁵ These motives are described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Muhit* I, 70

⁴⁶ See *Muhit* I, 71-72, where he deals with the acts of the unconscious person, who can nevertheless act and bring into existence

come into existence (*fī l-ḥudūt*). He gives two arguments; first, we know that it needs us because it happens according to our intention; at the same time we know that what happens according to our intention is its coming into existence (*ḥudūt*).⁴⁷ Another argument is given as follows: we know—by necessary knowledge—that every act needs an acting subject; that must be because of something all acts have in common and that can only be their coming into existence (*ḥudūt*).⁴⁸

Thus we know that everything that comes into existence from our side needs us in order to come into existence, needs us as “*muḥdī*”, the subject who brings it into existence. By way of analogy (*qiyās*), we can deduce that everything that comes into existence needs a *muḥdī*. In this analogy the ‘*illa* (the intrinsic cause of the judgement or quality) is the *ḥudūt*, the judgement or quality caused by it is that it needs a *muḥdī*. Everything that has the same ‘*illa* must have the same *ḥukm*, what has the same intrinsic cause is entitled to the same judgement. Consequently, everything that has the ‘*illa* “*ḥudūt*” and comes into existence must necessarily need a *muḥdī*, a subject who brings it into existence and produces it.

Maf’ûl: done, made.⁴⁹ ‘Abd al-Jabbâr does not make a distinction between the act (*al-fîl*) and what is done (*al-maf’ûl*); what the subject really “does” is not more than to bring into existence a substance or accident that was non-existent. This substance or accident is now called an act or made (*fîl* or *maf’ûl*). Thus ‘Abd al-Jabbâr calls the bodies (*ajsâm*) God’s acts (*af’âl Allâh*). Mostly he uses the term *fîl*, in some cases also the term *maf’ûl* (done, made). Thus he calls the Qur’ân both “God’s act” and “done by Him”.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ “The indication that it needs us in the coming into existence (*fī l-ḥudūt*) is that by the (same) thing by which we know the need (for us), it is certain that the aspect of the need is the coming into existence. Don’t you see that what originates (*yatajaddad* instead of *yatahaddad*) at our intention and motives is the “coming into existence” (*ḥudūt*)?” *Muhit* I, 73 Cf. *Šarh* 118-119

⁴⁸ Cf. *Muhit* I, 73 and *Šarh* 119. What all things can have in common and is consequently not attributable to the genera or the qualities of the genera, is “existence”, “non-existence”, and “coming into existence”. For the first two the things do not need us, therefore, it must be the third.

⁴⁹ ‘Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the essence of “acts” at the beginning of *Mugni* VI/1, further especially in *Muhit* I, 229-230 and *Šarh* 324-325.

⁵⁰ For an enumeration of all kinds of acts which do fall under our ability (*qudra*) or do not and therefore must be God’s acts, see e.g. the discussions on page 90 of the *Šarh*. The Qur’ân is called *maf’ûl*, in *Mugni* VII, 3, and it is called one of God’s acts (*af’âl*) in *Mugni* VII, 208.

An act is "a temporal thing originating from an able subject",⁵¹ but to include also acts which come into being or remain after the death of the doer (*fâ'il*) or after he became no longer able to do it by some other reason, a better way to put it, is "what comes into existence, and something else was able to (do) it",⁵² or what "exists from the side of one who was able to (do) it".⁵³ So there cannot be any doubt: every act is temporal *ḥādīṭ*. 'Abd al-Jabbâr not only defines "acts" by way of "temporal things", but in his discussions of the subject he expressly excludes what is "non-existent" (*ma'dûm*) and "eternal" (*qadīm*), so that only the temporal (*ḥādīṭ*) remains.⁵⁴

But the question remains, whether there is a difference between the two qualifications *muhdaṭ* and *maf'ûl*, and if so, what difference.⁵⁵ Is there a difference in the meaning of both terms, or is there a difference in their extension?

In his *Šarḥ* 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions a difference qua meaning: "There is a difference between *muhdaṭ* (produced) and *fî'l* (act): one may know that something produced is produced without knowing that it has a producer (*muhdiṭ*). This is not the case with the act; if one knows it to be an act, one knows that it has a doer (*fâ'il*), although one

⁵¹ "*Mâ yahsul min qâdir min al-hawâdīṭ*", *Šarḥ* 324

⁵² "*Mâ hadaṭ wa-kân al-gayr qâdiran 'alayh*", *Muhit* I, 229 There are three ways in which an act can be done: by direct immediate production (*ikṭirâ*, possible only for God), directly (*mubâšaratan*), or by way of generating (*tawliḍ*), in this last case the result may appear after a lapse of time. See, for instance, the example of the shooting of an arrow which after some moments hits the target. Cf. *Šarḥ* 223. To include the case that the shooting subject becomes unable or dies between his shooting and the arrow hitting the target, the addition in the definition is made. But more than here, it is the case in acts which remain, e.g., the writing of someone, which remains after the death of the person who wrote.

⁵³ "*wujūd min jihat man kân qâdiran 'alayh*", *Mugnî* VI 1, 5. The use of the verb *wujūd* (to exist) emphasizes that acts can remain and that the act is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr that which is done. In the other definitions the verbs *hadaṭ* and *hasal* are used, which indicate the moment of coming into existence rather than its consequence, the temporal existence.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Mugnî* VI 1, 5.

⁵⁵ Hourani, *Ethics*, 37 thinks that there is a difference between *muhdaṭ* and *fî'l*, also qua extension: "It is not enough to define it (an act) as something generated (*muhdaṭ*), an event coming into existence after non-existence. This is a necessary condition of its being an act, but to differentiate an act from other generated things, we must mention its specific relation to another being that it arises from a purposive being with ability to do or not to do it, in modern terminology a free agent." This is not 'Abd al-Jabbâr's point of view. Cf. e.g., *Muhit* I, 76, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that the intention (and purpose) is not necessary, but that our act is everything which occurs according to our states (*ahwâlmâ*), also without motives. See also what we said on pp. 88-89 about neutral acts.

may not know him individually."⁵⁶ So, qua meaning, the difference between the two terms is a difference between the knowledge expressed by them: if we know the temporal thing to have a relation with an able subject who "did" it, a "doer", we call it an act; so long as we do not know that, or deny that, we can call it *muḥḍaṭ* (produced) but not *fi'l* (act) or *maḥḥūl* (done).

For some of 'Abd al-Jabbār's opponents there is also a difference qua extension between the terms *muḥḍaṭ* and *fi'l*; they are the people who state that a "nature" can produce something, or a "necessitating power";⁵⁷ for them there are temporal things which do not come from an able subject. 'Abd al-Jabbār denies this. Nothing can produce without having been able; an act may occur without a strict intention, without knowledge, but it has to correspond with the "state" (*ḥāl*) of a producing subject. Therefore, "one must say that a produced thing (*muḥḍaṭ*) indicates the producer, the doer",⁵⁸ and "when we find a produced thing which (to make) is not possible for able subjects in this world, it must certainly have a connection with an able subject who is different from us (and 'Abd al-Jabbār will prove that this subject must be God)."⁵⁹ In consequence, we conclude that for 'Abd al-Jabbār the qualifications *muḥḍaṭ* and *maḥḥūl* are coextensive and, therefore, that the whole of our world, besides being existent (*mawjūd*), temporal (*ḥādīṭ*), and produced (*muḥḍaṭ*), is also made or done (*maḥḥūl*).

Maklūq: created.⁶⁰ The entire discussion around the terms *kalq* and *maklūq* is for 'Abd al-Jabbār a matter of the past. He remarks that it is a dispute about terminology, not about concepts and their contents.⁶¹ Qua meaning, these words do not express anything new or anything special. The only reason why 'Abd al-Jabbār gives it some (not very much) attention is because of the central place these terms were given in the fierce disputes about the nature of the Qur'ān, held in former

⁵⁶ See *Šarḥ* 324-325

⁵⁷ Cf. *Muḥit* I, 229. these people are, respectively, the *ashāb al-tabā'i'* or naturalists and the Mujbira or Jabriya

⁵⁸ "*fa-yaqib an yuqāl inn al-muḥḍaṭ yadull 'alā l-muḥḍiṭ al-fā'il*", *Muḥit* I, 229.

⁵⁹ *Muḥit* I, 230

⁶⁰ See in particular the discussions of God's speech and the Qur'ān, especially in *Mugnī* VII, 208-223, *Muḥit* I, 345-346, and *Šarḥ* 548-549.

⁶¹ *Muḥit* I, 345: "*ḥādā l-fasl kalām fī l-'ibāra wa mā vata'allaq bi-l-ma'nā*" (this chapter concerns terminology and has no connection with "meaning"). But "because people were so crazy about discussions of creation and created, our teachers spoke about it too" (*Šarḥ* 548)

ages. It is significant that he deals with the terms *kalq* and *maklûq* in his chapter on God's speech and the Qur'ân, but only in the form of some casual remarks.⁶² It is mainly because of the historical importance of these qualifications that he deals with them at all; the concept in itself does not have a place of its own in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological system.

The definitions he gives seem to be, at first sight, rather obscure. Thus he states that creation (*kalq*) is determination (*taqdîr*); and "created" (*maklûq*) is, according to the definition he gives, "the act which is determined (*muqaddar*) by the purpose and the motive which correspond with it, in a way that nothing is added to it and nothing is lacking from it."⁶³ How does he arrive at these—to say the least—not very clear definitions? In accordance with his starting-point, every term which is metaphorically used must in some case be used literally, in its real meaning (*bi-l-haqîqa*); moreover, if it is a term which is used both for the other world and for our world, the real meaning, the original meaning, has to be looked for in our world.⁶⁴ The original meaning of the term *kalq* is found by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the technical vocabulary of the manufacture of leather: the word is used there for the measuring of leather before it is cut; instead of the term *kalq* also the verb *qaddar* and the verbal noun *taqdîr* are used. In this way 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to his definition which makes *kalq* an equivalent of *taqdîr*.⁶⁵

⁶² The object of the chapters in question is to show that God's speech is His act and that it is not eternal. The casuality of the remarks about its being created appears most manifestly in the text of the *Šarh* pp. 548-549.

⁶³ This definition is given in *Šarh* 548. The *Mugnî* (VII, 208) says that *maklûq* is "what happens in the way of determination" (*kawnuhâ* (sc. *al-af'âl*) *wâq'atan 'alâ sabîl al-taqdîr*"), and the *Muhîr* describes it as "the act which occurs in a kind of determination, corresponding to the need". The central term in all 'Abd al-Jabbâr's definitions evidently is the *taqdîr*—determination or measuring.

⁶⁴ This question is elaborated in *Mugnî* VII, 209-210: "When it is certain that it (this term) is communicative, it must without any doubt in some case be real because a term cannot be (always) metaphoric without reality, the fact that it is permitted to use a term metaphorically supposes that it has a reality and is used outside its own context to communicate something else than for what it was made" (*Mugnî* VII, 208). "A name exists first on the basis of (*min*) this world, either in what we know or in what we are convinced about, afterwards it is applied to the other world" (*Mugnî* VII, 210).

⁶⁵ Cf. *Mugnî* VII, 208-223 *passim*. In this chapter 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the different explanations which had been given to this term *kalq*. These are: to produce immediately (*iktirâ'*, the meaning given by the Mujbira), to produce immediately with a certain quality (*iktirâ' 'alâ sifa*, the doctrine of Abû 'Alî, the *sifa* concerned being its being *muqaddar*, determined) an act from God (some Mu'tazila from the school of Bagdâd), untruth and lie, manufactured (*ma'mûl*), or the measuring of leather alone

Hence we can call every act which is done “*muqaddar*” (“determined” or “measured”) *maḳlûq*, and every subject who does such an act can be called *ḳâliq*. This implies that we call all God’s acts created; He does all his acts “measured” and “determined”. As for human beings, they too can do “determined” acts and create (just as they can “create” leather), but according to religious usage based on revelation we do not use the word *ḳâliq* without any addition for a human being, nor the word *maḳlûq* without any addition for human acts. That does not mean, however, that human beings do not create things.⁶⁶

By way of conclusion: all temporal things which are made by God—and according to ‘Abd al-Jabbâr these are all bodies and many of the accidents—are *mawjûd*, *ḥâdiṯ*, *muhḍaṯ*, *maf’ûl*, and *maḳlûq* (existent, temporal, produced, made, created), whereas the qualification “created” is normally not given to our human acts.

2. SUBSTANCES

Jawhar: substance.⁶⁷ Our world, which is a composite aggregate of individual material things, in which change is possible while the things in question keep their own individuality, shows an element of permanence as well as an element of change. This view of the world is expressed metaphysically in the thesis that the world is composed of a material substrate, which is so undetermined that it can be transformed even in a so radical way as happens in the burning of wood where the wood changes into fire, and second, of accidents, which form the changing element, and which give the things their outer, changing, appearance.⁶⁸ But because ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s philosophy is never purely metaphysical, but tends always to be the expression of a physical reality, this division coincides in his doctrine with a physical world

All these alternative solutions are successively discussed and rejected. The enumeration is given in *Muḡnî* VII, 209. The alternatives are discussed in *Muḡnî* VII, 210-215.

⁶⁶ Cf. *Muḡnî* VII, 212.

⁶⁷ The part of the *Muḡnî* where one could expect more ample discussion about this object (most probably part III) is missing. Discussions are found in the chapters where ‘Abd al-Jabbâr refutes the thesis that God is a body. *Šarḥ* 217-230 and *Muḥit* I, 197-201. See also ‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uṯmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 117-128.

For further literature, see especially A. Biram, *Die atomistische Substanzenlehre aus dem Buch der Streitfragen zwischen Basrensern und Bagdadensern*, Berlin 1902; Pines, *Beiträge zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, Berlin 1936; O. Pretzl, *Die frühislamische Atomenlehre*, *Der Islam* 19 (1931), 117-130; Frank, *Metaphysics*, 13-16.

⁶⁸ See, e.g., *Šarḥ* 230-231.

view which sees the world as composed of separate atoms which are brought together in composites to constitute material bodies

A substance, by its being pure materiality, from itself has only a small number of qualities,⁶⁹ all related to the concept of "materiality" Besides its being a substance, it can be existent (*maḥjūd*). When it exists, it is spatial (*mutahayyız*) This is the most characteristic quality of a substance because this is the meaning of materiality being in space When a substance is spatial, it is "being" (*kâ'm*)—a word 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses, as we have seen, for the being in space alone—and it can only be "being" (*kâ'm*) by a "mode of being" (*kawn*) Therefore, the essential quality of a substance, its being in space (*tahayyız*), necessitates that it always is either moving or immobile, either combined or separated, and consequently has the corresponding *akwân*⁷⁰

Substances, constituting the element of permanence in our world, remain Once they are brought into existence, they are permanent and remain themselves⁷¹

Our experience shows that human beings, and other material beings, are not able to produce substances We can only change them—and that is a question of accidents, which constitute the element of change – but we cannot bring them into existence Because they are produced and brought into existence, together with our inability to do that, it must be done by someone else, who can only be God.⁷²

All substances are similar (*mutamâṭila*) because they have the same essential quality, their being spatial (*tahayyız*) This has as a consequence that what is necessary for a given substance in every situation must be necessary for every substance in every situation; what is

⁶⁹ 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṣmân (*Nazarīyat at-taklīf*, 119) mentions four qualities (*ṣifāt*) 'al-jawharīya wa-t-tahayyız wa-l-wujūd wa-l-kaynūna fī jihat mā' its "being a substance", its "being spatial", its "existence", and its "being in a direction" Evidently, it has these qualities only when it exists because, according to *Sarh* 219, a substance can also be non-existent, and in that case it is not spatial (Read on page 219 of the *Sarh*, line 16 *mutahayyız* instead of *mutamayyız*) When a substance is non-existent, it only has the quality *jawharīya* (being a substance)

⁷⁰ *Šarh* 96-118

⁷¹ *Šarh* 230-231, where substances are called *bâqīya ṭâbita*, "remaining and standing firm" See also *Muḡnī* VII, 24

⁷² Substances cannot produce themselves, for in that case they would be able when they are still non-existent, and that is not possible Consequently, they are produced by someone else This cannot be a human being, someone who is "able by an ability" (*qâdir bi-qudra*), for that would imply "that one of us could create the possessions and sons he wants, and we know that that is not the case" Therefore, God produced them See *Šarh* 119

necessary for a given substance under certain conditions, what is possible or impossible for it, must be necessary under those conditions, be possible or impossible for all other substances too ⁷³

Substances are "bearers" or "substrates" of accidents, some accidents can exist in every substance, others need a certain composite whole of substances, a body, to exist in it, so, for instance, the accident "life" not every substance on its own can bear the accident "life", but only a certain compositum ⁷⁴

The term "substance" being a metaphysical terminus technicus, indicating the element of permanence and the element that can bear accidents, its relation to the physical term *juz'* (atom) is not explicitly defined. Hence, a substance may be one or more atoms. Although the term *jawhar* occurs in Islamic and Mu'tazilî theology to indicate the *jawhar fard* or atom, I myself did not find instances in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr where he uses the word *jawhar* in this way

Juz' (plural *ajzâ'*). atom ⁷⁵ We have spoken until this moment on a metaphysical level, we now come to the physical level, the structure of the concrete material world. Here 'Abd al-Jabbâr agrees with most Mu'tazilî thinkers that the world is ultimately built from "atoms" (*ajzâ'*), the smallest possible parts which cannot be divided again

⁷³ Cf. *Šarh* 219 when a substance is a substance in every state (*hâl*) all substances must be thus when it is "spatial" (cf. note 69) on the condition of its existence, all substances must be thus, when it is possible that it is (*ka'in*) in another condition than it is now it is possible for all substances, and when it is not possible for a substance to be at the same time in the direction in which it is and in another direction, this must be impossible for all other substances too

⁷⁴ About the substance as a bearer of accidents, see, e.g. *Mugnî* VII, 25. About the actual possibility to bear certain accidents as, e.g., life or knowledge, see *Šarh* 220, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks about "bodies" (*aqsâm*), but the same holds true of substances. "A body bears what it bears because of its being spatial, and "being spatial" (*tahayyuz*) is surely present (*tâbit*) in all bodies. Consequently, every body can surely bear something similar to what another bears, it can even (bear) the same individual (accident) as the other as we shall say about "composition" (*ta'lif*). As for what you (the opponent) mentioned about inorganic bodies and living beings (*al-jamâd wa-l-hayy*) (viz. that inorganic bodies cannot bear the accident 'life'), that is because life needs a special structure to exist, built from flesh and blood, and inorganic bodies are not thus, it is not because the substrate could not bear it (life)." The last word (*yahitmiluhumâ*) is better read as *yahitmiluhâ*

⁷⁵ Among Muslim thinkers fierce discussions have taken place around the various forms of "atomism" and their implications. I leave these discussions outside my present study because the entire question of the existence and essence of atoms does not seem to be of great importance to the forming of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological worldview. Suffice for the moment to refer to the lines 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân has given to the subject *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 120-122.

Human beings are not able to divide a material being into its atoms, but God can do so by taking away all combinations between the atoms and so separating them. But He too cannot divide them again, therefore they are called "*al-juz' allaqi lâ yatajazza*", the indivisible component. But it remains a substance (*jawhar*), which is spatial (*mutahayyiz*), is characterized by the "modes of being" (*akwân*), and can bear some accidents. So the atom is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr not a logical necessity, but an actual possibility.

Jism: body. The word "body" (*jism*) is, like the word "atom" (*juz'*), originally a term which indicates a physical reality. It indicates the concrete material beings we meet in this world, the beings which are ultimately divisible into their atoms. Therefore, because it indicates a physical reality, 'Abd al-Jabbâr defines it by a definition, not derived from a philosophical vocabulary, but from the vocabulary of general everyday speech (*fî l-luga*): a body is "what is characterized by length, breadth, and depth"⁷⁶ or "what is long, broad, and deep"⁷⁷.

A body (*jism*), to be long, broad, and deep, must be composed of at least eight atoms, two constituting its length, two more to constitute its breadth, and again four more to constitute its depth, thus they form what we would call a cube.⁷⁸

The, originally physical, concept of "body" melts, however, with the metaphysical concept of "substance" (*jawhar*). And so 'Abd al-Jabbâr says about bodies the same things he says about substances. He mentions both these concepts together and even moves in the course of his argumentation from the one word to the other.⁷⁹ And, consequently, he concludes that bodies are bearers of accidents and constitute substrates in which accidents can exist,⁸⁰ bodies are spatial (*mutahayyiz*) and must have "modes of being" (*akwân*),⁸¹ bodies are all similar to each other;⁸² bodies are created by God and are

⁷⁶ *Mugnî* VII, 6

⁷⁷ *Šarh* 217 "*mâ yakûn tavîlan 'aridan 'amiqan*"

⁷⁸ See *Šarh* 217 "two points originate opposite the looking subject and this is called length or a line—and two other points originate on the right and the left on the side of the first two—so breadth results and it is called a surface or a plane, then above them four atoms, similar to them, originate—and depth results and the eight atoms thus arranged are called a body."

⁷⁹ *Šarh* 217-220

⁸⁰ *Mugnî* VII, 25

⁸¹ *Muhit* I, 197 and *Šarh* 220

⁸² In *Muhit* I, 198 two arguments for their being similar (*tamâful*) are given, first,

permanent (*bâqî*),⁸³ for 'Abd al-Jabbâr they constitute the principal indication of the existence of God, their producer, maker, and creator

Mahall: substrate *Mahall* is another name for a substance or a body. This term indicates the substance or body in as far as it is the place in which a certain accident inheres. The substance is called in that case "the substrate of this concrete accident" (*mahall al-'arad*). Consequently, the term substrate always indicates a relationship.

This substrate can be a single atom (we have seen that some accidents can exist in a single atom), a composite of some atoms, or even an organic body, in that case it is called a "*jumla*", an aggregate of various substances. All depends on what the accident concerned needs in its substrate to exist and to inhere (*hall*) in it. Movement, for instance, only needs a single atom as a substrate, composition needs more atoms, one may discuss what sound and speech need in their substrate.⁸⁴ Finally, it is evident that the accidents of a living being require an accurately composed body, although one may ask in certain cases what especially is their substrate, so, e.g., knowledge does not inhere in the hand, its substrate is only the human heart.⁸⁵

3 ACCIDENTS

'Arad: accident. After mentioning the physical analysis of the world and its division into bodies which are composed of and divisible into their smallest elements, the atoms (*ajzâ'*), we now return to the metaphysical level.

Everything that comes into being in our world—and that, consequently, is produced and made, and in this way called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr "acts" or *af'âl*—shows an element of permanence and an element of change. The first we called "substance" (*jawhar*), the second we call "accident" (*'arad*), or, because even this element of change needs a plurality, "the accidents" (*al-a'râd*).⁸⁶

they are all spatial (*mutahayyiz*) and this belongs to their most specific qualities, when two things have a so characteristic quality in common they are similar.

Second two different substances may be mixed up when one perceives them (note read *iltibâs* instead of *al-qiyâs* in line 10), this can only be caused by their similarity.

⁸³ See e.g., *Mugnî* VII, 24

⁸⁴ See *Mugnî* VII 31-42

⁸⁵ See, e.g., *Šarh* 220

⁸⁶ See, e.g., *Muhî* I, 28 "wa kull al-hawâdit lâ taḥruj an an takûn jawâhir an a'râdan"

Because they are the element of change in a world which fundamentally remains the same, they must always be connected with a substance which constitutes the element of permanence. This is expressed by the thesis that an accident normally inheres in (*hâll*) a substance and does not exist without a substance.⁸⁷ Consequently, an accident cannot inhere in another accident because every change in our world happens on the basis of a permanent substrate. The accident, being the element of change in the world, is defined by 'Abd al-Jabbâr accordingly as "what happens (*ya'rid*) in the existence and does not have to remain in the manner substances and bodies remain";⁸⁸ this means that it only lasts for some time and can fall back or be brought back into non-existence, in the case of substances, however, this is not possible.

'Abd al-Jabbâr distinguishes between several genera (*ajnâs*) of accidents, which he brings together in some broader categories. I mention here some of these divisions into categories of genera, since I hope that these divisions may elucidate 'Abd al-Jabbâr's metaphysical intentions whenever he uses the word "accidents".

The first distinction 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes is between accidents which are perceptible, and consequently known by necessary knowledge,⁸⁹ and accidents which are imperceptible and can only be known by way of reflection and inference.⁹⁰ According to the text of the *Šarh*, in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr is far more concrete in his description

⁸⁷ For the discussions, –centred especially upon the essence of the divine will—whether an accident can exist without a substrate on the condition that it necessitates a "state" (*hâll*) for a living being see for instance, *Muğni* VII, 26-30.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Šarh* 230. This definition (*mâ ya'rid fî l-wujûd wa-lâ yajib lahûh ka-labî al-jawâhir wa-l-ajsâm*) is based upon the meaning of the verb '*arad*' and its derivatives in the vocabulary of non-technical Arabic. "Know that accident ('*arad*) originally means in the (common) language what happens (*ya'rid*) in the existence and does not remain for a long time independently of its being a body or an accident. Therefore one says about a cloud that it is '*arid*' (according to Lane, 2011 various descriptions of this term are given all tending in the same direction, for instance a collection of clouds appearing or presenting itself, or extending sideways in the horizon) and also is said the world is a present and frail good ('*arud hâdir*), the righteous and the unrighteous eat thereof (cf. also Lane 2008 who gives the translation quoted above and observes that it is a tradition indicating that the goods of this world have no permanence)."

To the text of the definition is added "in the manner substances and bodies remain" because accidents may remain for some time, but never in the same manner as substances do. When a substance is brought into existence, it remains and stays firm (*tabîl*) whereas accidents which remain can nevertheless be annihilated and fall back into non-existence by the production of their opposites.

⁸⁹ For the relation between perception and the necessary knowledge, created in that case by God, see pp. 93-95.

⁹⁰ See *Šarh* 92-93.

and enumeration of the accidents than in the text of the *Muḥit*, one can distinguish seven genera or seven kinds of perceptible accidents; these are: colours, tastes, odours, warmth, coldness, pains, and sounds.⁹¹ These are genera (*ajnās*) of accidents, which implies that they can be subdivided. Thus under the heading of "colours" the various varieties of colours are mentioned, and—according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr—under the heading of "sounds" also the category of speech.

Other accidents are imperceptible, but their presence can be deduced from the possibility of change in our world; we know that a given substance or body is in a certain "state" (*ḥâl*) at this moment, while we know that this state is related to the changing element in the world and not to the element of permanence, because of our knowledge that the substance or body concerned could also be not in that state. Because this is related to the element of change, which 'Abd al-Jabbâr called "*a'râq*" (accidents), he deduces the presence of an accident in the substance concerned which is the cause of the possibility of change. Consequently, this accident must not be seen as a physical but as a metaphysical entity.⁹² Some of these imperceptible accidents can inhere in any substance and give it a certain state, as for instance the accident "movement", which causes the substance to be "moving",⁹³ others can only inhere in a composite substance which has a special structure, as for instance the accident "life", which causes the composite substance to be "living".

A second distinction is made between accidents which are remaining (*bâqiyā*) and accidents which are not remaining.⁹⁴ None of the accidents, however, is "permanent" in the strict sense of the word; none necessarily remains in existence once it has been brought into existence, such as the substances in this world. But some of these accidents, nevertheless, remain until they are annihilated, and this happens by the production of its opposite. This is the case, for instance, when a substance cannot exist without either a given accident or its opposite, as we have seen when discussing the "modes of being" (*akwân*).⁹⁵ A sub-

⁹¹ These accidents are called in Arabic *alwân, ḡū'um, rawā'ih, harâra, hurûda, âlâm, aswât* (*Šarḥ* 92)

⁹² Cf. *Šarḥ* 93. Some authors who discuss this theory tend to see it too physically. Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, passim, appears to do so, but also 'Abd al-Karim 'Uṣmân, *Naẓariyat at-taklîf*, 128-129, does not realize the full metaphysical implications.

⁹³ In this case the metaphysical character of this accident must be manifest. Physically, the accident is not the cause of the substance's being moving, that cause is the "mover".

⁹⁴ See *Šarḥ* 231

⁹⁵ See pp. 112-113

stance remains "immobile" by "immobility" until its opposite "movement" is produced in it and makes it to be "moving"; but, because the substance must be either moving or immobile, the accident which is present must remain until its opposite is produced. Other accidents which do not have an opposite and without which a substance actually can exist do not remain at all, but disappear after some time without any intervention from outside. This we see, for instance, in the case of sounds and speech.⁹⁶

A third distinction: some accidents only need a substrate (*maḥall*) to exist, as, for instance, colours, odours, or tastes. They do not need a special structure, but can exist "everywhere". Other accidents, however, need a specially structured and composed substance to exist. They need a living being. To this category belong, for instance, ability (*qudra*), life, and knowledge.⁹⁷ The first category only needs a substrate, and, in consequence of that, characterizes that substrate only. When a colour inheres in our hand, our hand, and our hand alone, is characterized by it: our hand is coloured, not the whole subject of which the hand forms an element. The second category, which needs a living being, also characterizes the whole living being; when there exists knowledge in our heart, we say that "we" are knowing, not the heart.

Fourth: some accidents are a "'illa", others are not. The accidents which are a 'illa characterize a thing and make it to have a quality, whereas the other accidents do not.⁹⁸ We have, already seen that all imperceptible accidents we know necessarily must be 'ilal (plural of 'illa), for only in this way we came to know their presence: we know them as the 'illa of the state we know the substance to be in.

The fifth and last distinction 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes among accidents is based on the distinction between the subjects who made them and have power over them.

There are eleven kinds (genera: *ajnâs*) of accidents which do not come under our human ability, over which we have no power at all.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ See *Muḡni* VII. 5

⁹⁷ *Muḥit* I, 28.

⁹⁸ See *Šarh* 231

⁹⁹ *Šarh* 90. The enumeration of the various accidents we give here in our text, is taken from a discussion of the *a'âl* (acts) which fall or do not fall under the power of someone who is not essentially able (so is God alone) but able by an ability (*qâdir bi-qudra*) But because everything that is temporal according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr is also made (*ma'ûl*) and consequently an act (*'i'l*), all accidents must be mentioned in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's list of the acts, there are no accidents which are not acts. In consequence, when we omit from this list the substances (which evidently are not accidents) and the

These eleven genera are : colours, tastes, odours, warmth, coldness, wetness, dryness, life, ability, desire, aversion.¹⁰⁰ Because these accidents, which are, as all existent things, brought into existence and made, cannot be made by human beings, and cannot be our acts (*af'âl*), they must be God's acts.

To the second category belong ten genera of accidents; all these genera come under our ability. This category is subdivided by 'Abd al-Jabbâr into two sub-categories, which he calls "the acts of the limbs" (*af'âl al-jawâriḥ*) and "the acts of the hearts" (*af'âl al-qulûb*).

The five acts of the limbs are : modes of being (*akwân*), pressures (*i'timâdât*), compositions (*ta'lifât*), sounds, and pains. The five acts of the hearts are : conviction, will, non-will,¹⁰¹ assumption, and reflection.¹⁰²

This list, which 'Abd al-Jabbâr has given in his *Šarḥ*, pretends to be an exhaustive list of all genera of accidents. Consequently, in his opinion, there exist twenty-one genera of accidents, ten of which fall under our human power.

Within the category of genera that fall under our power, one does find some instances which, however, do not fall under it, and which, consequently, are created by God. We have seen that we are able to produce (acquired) knowledge by means of reflection; we also saw that knowledge belongs to the genus conviction, which comes under our ability. But besides the acquired knowledge there is necessary knowledge, there is intuition (*'aql*), over which we have no power at all, but which is given to us by God, who creates it.¹⁰³

'Abd al-Jabbâr gives some other instances too : we have no power

annihilation (*janâ'*, which is not really something, and which can only be known by revelation), we keep the accidents —The formulation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr runs "*mâ lâ yadkûl jinsuh taht maqdârnâ*"

¹⁰⁰ The Arabic terms used are *alwân*, *tu'ûm*, *rawâ'ih*, *harâra*, *hu'ûda*, *ru'ûba*, *yubûsa*, *hayât*, *qudra*, *šahwa*, *nafra*. It is noteworthy that in this series the four "elements" of the old Greek philosophy are mentioned — warmth, coldness, wetness, dryness

¹⁰¹ Since desire (*šahwa*) and its opposite (*nafra*) belong to the category of accidents which are created by God, we cannot translate the term *karâha* by "aversion", "distaste", or something similar. It must be the opposite of *irâda* just as *nafra* is the opposite of *šahwa*. To make the distinction between the two pairs of accidents as clear as possible, I render *karâha* as "non-will". The implications of this distinction between desire and will, a distinction in which the desire is created by God and the will an act of man, is dealt with in our discussion of the place of the will in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology

¹⁰² See *Šarḥ* 90, the Arabic terms are *i'tiqâdât*, *irâdât*, *karâhât*, *zunn*, and *anzâr*. In this list the assumption (*zann*) is not reckoned to fall under the genus "conviction" (*i'tiqâd*). See our discussion of this subject on page 46

¹⁰³ See pp 92-93, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions this example in *Šarḥ* 90-91

over a tremor and the movement of the arteries; they must be created by God. The pain caused by the sting of a hornet or a scorpion stands in no relation to its cause and therefore must be caused by God,¹⁰⁴ although the genus "pain" comes under the ability of able subjects (animals too) in this world.

Of the twenty-one genera of accidents mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the text of the *Šarh*, nine need a living being in order to exist, twelve need only a substrate. Of the nine genera which need and characterize a living being, three have already been discussed; these are conviction (*i'tiqâd* in its various forms: knowledge, positive ignorance, traditionalism, uncritical belief), assumption (*ẓann*), and reflection (*naẓar*); the other six (life, ability, desire, aversion, will, non-will) are dealt with in the paragraph about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology. Of the twelve genera which only need and characterize a substrate (*maḥall*), we leave aside the seven genera which are created by God and belong to the given situation of this world (colour, taste, odour, warmth, coldness, dryness, and wetness), and restrict ourselves to some remarks about the five remaining genera: the accidents which only need a substrate, and can be produced and made by man. These five genera are: being in space (*kawn*), pressure (*i'timâd*), composition (*ta'lif*), pain (*alam*), and sound (*ṣawt*).

Kawn: being.¹⁰⁵ This genus of accidents, which in any form must

¹⁰⁴ These instances are given in *Šarh* 91

¹⁰⁵ See in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr especially *Šarh* 96-104 and *Muhit* I, 32-46. Max Horten wrote an article devoted to this concept: *Was bedeutet al-kaum als philosophischer Terminus?*, *ZDMG* 65 (1911), 539-549. As for the translation of this term *kawn* by "being" or, for the sake of clarity, by "being (in space)", this translation corresponds with the term used in Arabic, *kawn* being the verbal noun of the verb *kân*, "to be"

Similar translations are given also by Horten, *Was bedeutet al-kaum?*, 539: Seinsformen oder Seinsweisen, Pretzl, *Attributenlehre*, 47: Seinsweisen des Dinges im Raum; Horowitz, *Über den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie*, 72: Seinsformen; Frank, *Ma'nâ*, 249: modes of being in space.

That among Mu'tazila it originally had the sense of becoming, is argued by Frank in his *Metaphysics*; so, e.g., p. 17. "Abû l-Hudhayl does speak of an 'accident' of 'becoming' (*kawn*, pl., *akwân*), where he does recognise a kind of continuous process, viz., a defined process of becoming in time and place from 'this' to 'that.'" When we know, as we will prove in our text, that the meaning of "becoming" is still emphasized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the translation Nader gives in his *Système philosophique*, 170-171, "génération", is not far from the truth, although he could not know all implications of this concept. In as far as it concerns 'Abd al-Jabbâr's vocabulary, the reproach made by M. Bernand (*La notion de 'ilm*, 39) that this translation is "un regrettable contresens", does not seem justified. She herself translates *akwân* as "accidents propres", which is a rather formal way of translating

always inhere in the substances which exist in our world, and which is deduced from the fact that these substances exist in space, occupy a certain amount of space, and have a "volume", gives the substance in which it inheres two characteristics—first, its concrete structure in space, and second, its becoming and changing in space. This accident expresses a being in space and time and a certain dynamism in them.

Both these aspects are expressed in the definition of the "being" we find in the *Muhîl* "*mâ bih yasû al-jawhar fî jha dîn jha*", "by what a substance becomes in a concrete individual place"¹⁰⁶ Here the accident "being" explicitly is defined by means of the verb "to become" (*šar*); this makes clear that this element is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr still of importance¹⁰⁷

When the term "being" (*kawn*) is used absolutely, without any addition, it indicates an accident which only inheres in a substance at the moment of its coming into existence. It is the absolute "becoming". When the substance remains after its coming into existence, it bears the accident "immobility" (*sukûn*)¹⁰⁸ Apart from this "being" in its absolute sense, 'Abd al-Jabbâr distinguishes among four other kinds of "being", the four "modes of being" (*akwân*)

From the text of the *Muhîl* it becomes apparent that in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions of the *akwân* two different views are discernible, the first view is rather physical, whereas the second is surely metaphysical and corresponds to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's normal way of dealing with accidents.

The first view implies that the *kawn* of a substance is its relation to the concrete place it occupies at a certain moment of time, it is its being in that concrete place at that concrete moment. This has as a consequence that there is no real difference between this *kawn* no matter whether the substance is moving or immobile, combined or separated. It is only "called"¹⁰⁹ thus (immobility, movement, combi-

¹⁰⁶ The definition given in the text is found in *Muhîl* I, 33. The word *jha* used in the definition indicates the direction into which the substance extends itself, and consequently also the concrete place it occupies. See for the meaning of this word, e.g., Gôchon, *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sinâ*, 423-425.

¹⁰⁷ It is especially in the *Muhîl* that this meaning of the term is emphasized. The text of the *Šarh* is less explicit.

¹⁰⁸ *Muhîl* I, 33. "Sometimes we call it being (*kawn*) without any addition when it exists as beginning, not after something else (after some other accident on the same substance), this is only in the existent thing in the state of the coming into existence of the substance (it only inheres in a substance at the moment of the substance's coming into existence). Thereafter, we may call it "immobility" when it remains"

¹⁰⁹ See *Muhîl* I, 33, 'Abd al-Jabbâr repeats several times that we "call" (*nusammî*) the *kawn* immobility or movement and so on.

nation, separation); these are "names" which give information about the relation of the substance concerned to other *akwân*, be it of the substance concerned itself or of other substances. But, though the names may differ, the reality remains the same: the being at a concrete place. This view supposes a certain atomism in time: time is divided into "moments" (*waqt*; plural: *awqât*), "time-atoms", and every moment the accidents are created again.¹¹⁰

The second view is the metaphysical one. It holds: being moving is something else than being immobile; this difference in the states in which the substance is needs a *ma'nâ*, an accident which is the cause of the state concerned. This is the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr showed the existence of knowledge, reflection, and other accidents.¹¹¹

We elaborate both these views below.

Sukûn: immobility. In the first view mentioned above, the physical view, we call a *kawn* "immobility" when it comes into existence on a substance immediately after another *kawn* which was similar to it. When in the second "moment" the substance occupies the same place as in the first "moment", we call its *kawn* in the second moment "immobility". Consequently, the *kawn* receives its name from its relation to the immediately preceding *kawn*.¹¹²

In the second and metaphysical view, "immobility" is said to be the *ma'nâ* which necessitates the substance to be in one and the same place for two or more moments.¹¹³

Ḥaraka: movement. This accident is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in a way which is strictly analogous to the way in which he described immobility. Thus, movement is defined as the "being" (*kawn*) which comes into existence immediately after its opposite; this means that the substance's being in a certain place follows its being in another place in the immediately preceding moment. The two "beings" are different; in that case the second one in time is called "movement".

¹¹⁰ See especially *Muhit* I, 33 This view is mentioned in the *Muhit* more explicitly than in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's other works

¹¹¹ About the *ma'nâ* we speak when we deal with the relationship between substance and accidents and the different names derived from this relationship

¹¹² See *Muhit* I, 33 "Sometimes we call the being (*kawn*) immobility (*sukûn*, not as the Egyptian edition p 41 reads *takawwun*), this means that it (this *kawn*) comes into existence immediately after (another *kawn*) similar to it"

¹¹³ *Muhit* I, 33 immobility is "by what the substance remains in one and the same place for two moments or more"

Consequently, the name we give to a "being" (*kawn*) expresses its relationship with the immediately preceding "being": when they are similar, it is called immobility; when they are different, it is called movement.

Movement is also defined in the way the *ma'ânî* generally are defined; it is what necessitates its substance to be moving, to be in a place after it was in another place, without interruption.¹¹⁴

Ijtimâ': combination. The word "ijtimâ'" is the normal terminus technicus for this "being". That 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses three other words in its place, when he describes the various "modes of being" in his *Muhîṭ*, must therefore have a reason.¹¹⁵ He mentions in that context: *mujâwara* (vicinity), *muqâraba* (proximity),¹¹⁶ and *qurb* (nearness). Whereas *ijtimâ'* could imply a certain composition, an influence of one substance on another, this is explicitly excluded by the terms here mentioned on the authority of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. That he uses twice a third form of the verb (*fâ'al*, with the verbal noun: *mufâ'ala*), indicates that there is a relation to something else; it is not a combination inside the substance concerned, but a touching of another substance. This accident indicates that the substance concerned is so near to another substance that there remains no distance between the two of them.¹¹⁷

One may justly ask why this rather external relationship supposes an accident in the substances concerned. The reason is probably that 'Abd al-Jabbâr took these four "modes of being" from the tradition of his school, in which they certainly had functioned in some way or other.¹¹⁸ But the last two (combination and separation) could scarcely find an appropriate place in his system.

¹¹⁴ See *Muhîṭ* I, 33: "Sometimes we call it (the being or *kawn*) movement when it comes into existence immediately after its opposite, or necessitates that the body is in a place after it was in another one without interruption (*bi-lâ fasil*)"

¹¹⁵ See *Muhîṭ* I, 33. In the *Šarh* the whole argumentation to prove the existence of the modes of being and their being produced is centred upon the term *ijtimâ'*.

¹¹⁶ Read here *muqâraba* (with the Egyptian edition, p 41) and not *muqârana*. In the same line the Lebanese edition has another error, where it reads *muhâwara* instead of *mujâwara*.

¹¹⁷ *Muhîṭ* I, 33: "Sometimes we call an occurrence of it (*ba'dah*; sc. of the being) vicinity, proximity, and nearness when this substance is near another substance in a way there is no distance between the two of them" An alternative reading, mentioned by Houben in the Lebanese edition, runs "in a way they touch each other" (*al-mumâssa* instead of *lâ masâfa*).

¹¹⁸ It seems to have had its function in the system of absolute atomism. In that system it might indicate the way the atoms were related to each other, both in time

Iftirâq: separation. This word is the contrary of the preceding one. The alternative names which 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions in the *Muhit* are "mufâ'ala-forms" of the verb, just as was the case in the preceding paragraph; he mentions *mufâraqa* (separation from) and *mubâ'ada* (being distant from). The meaning of this term is said to be that there is a distance between the substance concerned and another substance.¹¹⁹

Ta'lif: composition.¹²⁰ Composition belongs, as the "modes of being", to the acts of the limbs, and just as was the case in the preceding paragraph, we have to deal here with a view on the structures of the world which has both physical and metaphysical elements. We always have to be aware of the influence the physical views have on the metaphysical doctrine.

Composition is, in fact, the touching of two substances, a "mumâssa" as 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it.¹²¹ This description already implies that to constitute a composition at least two substances are needed. Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that composition only needs a substrate in which it can inhere. This substrate is, however, in origin two substrates, two substances which together form something like one substrate.¹²² Hence he can make the remark that accidents which do not need a living being to exist only need a substance, except the composition, which needs two substances which are going to form together

and in space, and in which they built together the bodies and made them change See, e.g., Pines, *Atomentehre*, 6

Horowitz, *Einfluss*, 74, discovered a relation between these modes of being and the five categories of Plato "Die fünf Accidenzen sind nichts anderes, als die von uns bereits mehrfach erwähnten fünf Kategorien Platos, nur dass an Stelle von Identität und Verschiedenheit durch ein sprachliches Missverständnis Verbindung und Trennung getreten sind Uebereinstimmung und Verschiedenheit wurden missverständlich für räumliche Verbindung und Trennung genommen"

¹¹⁹ *Muhit* I, 33 "Sometimes we call an occurrence of it (*hâ'dah*, sc. of the being) separation from, being distant from, and separation when there exists on a distance from it another substance"

¹²⁰ Composition is just as the other "acts of the limbs" (*af'âl al-jawârih*) discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his chapter about human acts and the way in which man can do these acts *Mugni* IX, passim

¹²¹ See *Muhit* I, 366 Among the five acts of the limbs (*af'âl al-jawârih*) is mentioned "al-mumâssa allatî yurja' bihâ ilâ t-ta'lif", the touching which is based upon the composition In other enumerations composition itself is mentioned among the five acts of the limbs

¹²² See, e.g., *Mugni* VII, 36 "In our opinion it (composition) only needs a substrate, but the two substrates form for other things—as it were one substrate because it (composition) only inheres in them both"

something that behaves as one substrate. In another place he even says that this accident can exist "between" the two substances.¹²³ Because the composition is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the pure touching of the two substances, there is only one kind of composition; no subdivision is possible.¹²⁴

The question now poses itself what the difference may be between this composition (*ta'lif*) and the combination (*ijtimâ'*) we discussed before. Both are characterized by the fact that two substances touch each other. Is it the only difference that the *ta'lif* inheres in both substances together, and the *ijtimâ'* in both substances separately?

When we make a composition, we must do this by means of a cause (*sabab*), by means of generation (*tawlid*), because we cannot make it directly (*mubâšaratan*).¹²⁵ The cause we use is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr *mujâwara*, which word is employed by him, as we have seen¹²⁶ and as becomes manifest in the texts concerned, to indicate the "mode of being" (*kawn*) which is also called *ijtimâ'*. When we make a "vicinity" or "combination", the result constitutes immediately a cause, "*sabab*" which necessitates a composition (*ta'lif*);¹²⁷ it even causes this composition without any delay.¹²⁸ Vicinity causes or generates (*wallad*) this composition only at the moment it itself comes into existence,¹²⁹ and when the vicinity disappears, the composition may remain.¹³⁰

The solution of this rather enigmatic relationship between vicinity and composition is found in the vicinity being one of the "modes of being", one of the *akwân*. It is exactly because it is a mode of being that it expresses the presence of the substance in a concrete, individual

¹²³ *Muhit* I, 367 "The composition which can exist between two substrates" (*bayn mahallayn*) This does not mean that the accident composition exists without a substance, but, because the two substrates touch each other, the accident can be said to be exactly on that point of touching. This evidently is a very physical view.

¹²⁴ *Muhit* I, 366, explicitly is mentioned in the list of acts which occur in various forms that composition is *nan' wâhid*, one kind only.

¹²⁵ About the various manners in which we act, directly or by using a "cause" (*sabab*) which generates the effect, we give some more details in our paragraph on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology.

See also *Mugni* IX, 124-132.

¹²⁶ See page 131.

¹²⁷ See *Muhit* I, 411 and *Mugni* IX, 44.

¹²⁸ See *Mugni* IX, 155.

¹²⁹ See *Mugni* IX, 160, *Muhit* I, 414.

¹³⁰ Cf. *Mugni* IX, 44 'Abd al-Jabbâr can therefore say in *Mugni* VII, 36 "Composition in reality does not need the vicinity, it only cannot exist when the two substrates are at a distance from each other (*ma' tabâ'ud*) because the two of them behave by the vicinity as one substrate."

place in space. This being determined by a concrete place is not one of the characteristics of the accident "composition". It is pure touching. So, when both substances move together to another place, the "composition" remains, but the "vicinities" of both substances disappear and are replaced by other "vicinities".¹³¹ In consequence, we say that composition does not need in its substrate a "vicinity" (because it may be replaced by its opposite, another vicinity) but that composition is impossible when there is a distance between the two substances.¹³²

We conclude that composition (*ta'lif*) is an accident, inhering in two touching substrates together; unlike the "combination" (*ijtimâ*), it does not restrict the substrates to a certain place.

Alam : pain.¹³³ For 'Abd al-Jabbâr the accident "pain" is comparable to the accident "composition" (*ta'lif*), and both are dealt with in his works in an analogous way.

Pain is a form of separation which occurs in a composite substance.¹³⁴ Just as composition, it only needs a substrate in which it inheres to exist.¹³⁵ Consequently, it can exist also in substances which are not living, although—says 'Abd al-Jabbâr—in that case it is not called "pain". There is only one kind of pain because it is pure separation, as composition is pure touching.¹³⁶

We cannot make "pain" directly; we must do it by means of a "cause" (*sabab*) which generates (*wallad*) the pain. This cause we have to use is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr "*wahâ*", cleavage.¹³⁷ The difference between this cleavage, which is a kind of separation (*iftirâq*), and the pain is that by pain the substrate is not restricted to a concrete individual place; the separation or cleavage, which is a mode of being, determines the place the substance occupies in space. The cleavage

¹³¹ See *Mugni* IX, 44, where it is stated that the various "vicinities" are each other's "opposite" (*didd*) because they exclude each other in the same substrate

¹³² So, e.g. in *Mugni* VII, 36 and *Muhit* I, 414

¹³³ For a discussion of the essence of pain, see especially the chapters 'Abd al-Jabbâr devotes to human acts in part IX of the *Mugni*

¹³⁴ See *Mugni* IX, 52 ff

¹³⁵ See *Mugni* VII, 36, *Muhit* I, 414

¹³⁶ See *Muhit* I, 366, here 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions, apart from pain, also delight (*ladâ*), which comes under the same genus, is the same genus, and only differs from pain by the name which is given to it, a name based upon things which are connected with it "Pains and delights, they constitute one genus, the name given to them differs by the connection of special *ma'âni* to it" In fact, these are the aversion or the desire of the subject concerned

¹³⁷ See *Mugni* IX, 52

(*wahâ*) causes or generates the pain without any delay.¹³⁸ When the cleavage disappears, the pain can remain because the cleavage is replaced by another cleavage.

Pain is, however, not always called pain. To be called thus it must be perceived by a perceiving subject who, moreover, has a sensation of aversion. A subject is said to have pain when he perceives the pain "with an aversion of his nature".¹³⁹ Hence, in fact it is used for the body of a living being. Against this background 'Abd al-Jabbâr defines the cleavage (*wahâ*) which generates pain as: the separation (*iftirâq*) at which the soundness which is needed by life disappears. Other forms of separation are not called by this name.¹⁴⁰ Hence, it is understandable that Abû 'Alî holds the view that pain needs a living being to exist; in fact, it does not need a living being to exist, but only to be called pain.¹⁴¹

I'timâd: pressure.¹⁴² From 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions of this term and its functioning in the description of human acts, it becomes clear that the accident "pressure" is the translation into metaphysical language of what we know in this world as the normal physical pressure or pushing. The example which is given to elucidate the meaning of this pressure—the pushing of the human hand against an object, which pushing generates the movement of that object¹⁴³—clearly points to the physical background of the concept.

¹³⁸ *Muhit* I, 408 ff., *Mugnî* IX, 27

¹³⁹ See, e.g., *Mugnî* IV, 15 "One only becomes 'having pain' (read *âlim* instead of *alam*) when one perceives something from which one's nature has an aversion, then one is qualified as having pain" *Mugnî* VII, 37 it must be "perceived with an aversion of the nature", "*mudrak mâ' nufûr at-tab'*"

¹⁴⁰ "*iftirâq alladî tantafî 'indah as-sihha allatî tahtâj ilayhâ l-havât, dûm al-iftirâq alladî lâ yu'atîr hâdâ t-ta'tîr'*" *Mugnî* IX, 52

¹⁴¹ The opinion of Abû 'Alî is mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugnî* VII, 36-37 and *Muhit* I, 414

¹⁴² The discussions about the pressure (*i'timâd*) have found their place, as have the discussions about the other acts of the limbs, in the chapters 'Abd al-Jabbâr devoted to human acts *Mugnî* IX, passim, *Muhit* I, 356-421 and passim See also Bernard, *La notion de 'ilm*, especially pp 39-40

¹⁴³ See, e.g., *Mugnî* IX, 60 "When one of us touches something with his hand or touches what touches it (viz., the "something" mentioned, read here *mâ mâsvah* instead of *mâ mâ massah*, what is meant is the direct or the indirect touching) and presses (*i'tamad*) upon it, movement must be generated in it"

What Horowitz, *Der Einfluss*, 18, says about the meaning of the word *i'timâd* in the theology of an-Nazzâm is, in any case, not applicable to its function in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr "'I'timâd ist nichts anderes als das stoische tonos, die Spannung des Körpers, die Stromung des Pneumas, welche vom Zentrum des Körpers nach der Peripherie hin sich erstreckend und von dort wieder zurückkehrend die Teile einerseits zusammen und anderseits in gewissen Abständen auseinanderhalt"

Consequently, *i'timâd* is not pure "strength" or power, but it is actualized and directed strength inhering in a substance. It is the actual pushing in a given direction; it is the "strength" in the hand which actually pushes something forward; it is the "strength" of a slope which makes things on it go downhill; it is the "strength" in an arrow flying through the air, which makes it to be in the next place in the given direction the next moment. To emphasize that this strength is an actualized and directed strength, we call it pressure.

From the examples given it will be clear that by this *i'timâd* the substance has a "direction", is tending towards a given direction; hence it is this *i'timâd* that can cause changement of place. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr pressure is "what is characterized by direction".¹⁴⁴ At first sight one may get the impression that pressure by this definition is said to be similar to movement. This, however, is not the case, for in the opinion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr movement is not characterized by "direction" (*jîha*). To explain this he states that by direction is meant "that by which the pushing (*al-mudâfa'a*) distinguishes itself". Direction is the quality by which pushing (and pressure) is distinguished from everything else.¹⁴⁵ Movement, which is one of the modes of being, is only the presence of a substance in a given place after it was in another place; fundamentally, it is a "*kawn*", the being of a substance at a given moment of time at a given place of space. Hence, it does not have the characteristic "direction".¹⁴⁶

To exist, pressure only needs a substrate; it can exist in every substrate. But to remain in a substrate and to be a "necessary pressure", a pressure which is inherent and proper to a given substrate—as, for instance, the pressure of a slope, which is proper to that slope; a slope always "pushes" downhill what is found on it, whereas the human hand, for instance, does not always and necessarily push things forward; therefore, the pressure of a slope is necessary and remaining, whereas the pressure of the hand is not—it needs something in its

¹⁴⁴ "*Al-muktavv bi-jîha*", this is taken from the works of Abû Hâsim, but 'Abd al-Jabbâr apparently agrees with it *Mugnî* IX, 140

¹⁴⁵ "*Mâ yabîn* (or, as vocalized in the text as edited, "*nubîn*" - we distinguish) *bihâ al-mudâfa'a*" See *Mugnî* IX, 141 As an example is given "the pressure of something heavy on the back of one of us"

¹⁴⁶ See *Mugnî* IX, 141 "movement belongs to the same genus as becoming (the *kawn* in its absolute sense, see p 99, in the printed text one must delete the words '*min jms as-sukûn allađî yabda' ijâduh fi l-mahall*'), the bringing into existence of which is beginning (the existence), and to the same genus as the immobility, when it is not possible that these two (becoming and immobility) have a direction, the same has to be said about movement"

substrate, as, for instance, a special structure. When pressure is used to produce an effect in something else, it needs a form of touching. When we, human beings, want to produce something in another substrate—not the substrate in which the ability to produce that act inheres—we must use a “cause” (*sabab*). This cause is pressure, since only pressure can cause changement of place.¹⁴⁷ When pressure thus is used to generate an effect in something else (another pressure, a mode of being, or a sound), it needs a form of “touching” (*mumâssa*) or “contact” (*ittisâf*).¹⁴⁸ The effect concerned does not need this touching in order to come into existence; the effect can occur after some delay so that in the meantime there comes an end to the touching or even to the existence of the cause.¹⁴⁹

When pressure generates movement in something else, it does not do so in the point where it touches only, but in all atoms of that substance: when we throw a stone, all atoms of that stone are moving.¹⁵⁰ Pressure can move the object concerned in one moment only one place further: it moves the object to the nearest place in front of itself.¹⁵¹

Apart from the examples of the human hand, the slope of a hill, the burden on one's shoulders, 'Abd al-Jabbâr also mentions the shooting of an arrow. This example clarifies what we already said about pressure. “... the pressure of the arrow in its penetrating: the shooting subject makes pressure in it at the moment it is fired from the string of the bow; afterwards it penetrates (something) without the pressure being renewed from him (the shooting person).” In this case, we conclude that one pressure generates another, and this one another, until the target is reached, and the last pressure generates a mode of being: separation.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ See *Šarh* 453 “*ta'diyat al-fi'l 'an mahall al-qudra lâ yumkin illâ bi-l-i'timâd'*”

¹⁴⁸ See *Muhit* I, 81 “it belongs to the conditions of a pressure in its generating what it generates in another substrate than its own, that there is a touching (*mumâssa*) and contact (*ittisâf*)” Also *Muhit* I, 408

¹⁴⁹ See *Mugni* VII, 36 “we only say that it needs a *ma'nâ* other than itself in its necessity and its remaining (*fî luzûmih wa-baqâ'ih*), in its existence (*fî wujûdih*) it does not need that”

¹⁵⁰ See *Muhit* I, 85-86

¹⁵¹ See *Mugni* IX, 27 “although the pressure can necessitate the movement of the substrate in (all) the directions, it only necessitates (in fact) in one moment its movement to the nearest place in front of it because it is characterized by the fact that it generates in its direction”

¹⁵² This text is taken from *Muhit* I, 367, both this edition and the Egyptian edition (page 351) here use the root *hdd*, to define I suggest that we read the root *jdd*, to renew. An entire passage in that text is dedicated to the difference between generated

Ṣawt : sound ¹⁵³ Sound is the last of the five "acts of the limbs", and contrary to the colours, odours, tastes, it can be produced by man. Sounds are not direct (*mubāṣir*) acts, but they are produced by means of a cause which generates (*ʿallad*) the sound. This cause must always be a pressure (*i'timād*)

Sound is an accident that does not remain ¹⁵⁴ If it could remain, it would cause great difficulties for the hearing subject. Perceptible things remain perceptible as long as they exist. If sound were to remain, it would remain perceptible, and that implies that speech would no longer be understandable, because the sequence of the letters, which is their appearing and disappearing, would be disturbed, one would hear all letters of a word at the same time ¹⁵⁵

Sound is a perceptible accident, it is *mudrak*. Human beings and other living beings need the instrument of the ear to perceive it. The way it is perceived is not as the way warmth and coldness, tastes and odours are perceived. These accidents are with their substrates brought to the perceiving subject and perceived by this "transportation" (*bi-l-Intiqāl*), sound, however, is perceived in the way colours are they are perceived at the place they are ¹⁵⁶ If we would hear the sound only "by way of transportation", we would not be able to discern from which side it comes. But, when we are in the vicinity of audible things, ¹⁵⁷ we know that they are on the right or on the left side, consequently, we must hear them at the place they are ¹⁵⁸

things which have to be caused again by the subject at every moment, as, e.g., speech, and generated things in which that is not necessary

¹⁵³ Speech (*kalām*) belongs to the genus sound (*ṣawt*), *Mugni* VII, passim and *Muhit* I, 320-326

¹⁵⁴ See *Muhit* I, 323 and *Mugni* VII, 5, 24. Accidents do not remain as substances do. When accidents are said to remain (*baqā*), this means that they do not disappear without any influence from outside, they fall back into non-existence when their opposite comes into existence (mostly on the same substrate). Other accidents remain only for some moments and then disappear, these are called "non-remaining". To this latter category belongs sound.

¹⁵⁵ This argumentation is given in *Muhit* I, 323 and *Mugni* VII, 24. The same argumentation is given, to prove that sound and speech cannot be substances (for substances, by their very essence, are remaining) nor remaining accidents. The example given by 'Abd al-Jabbār both in the text of the *Mugni* and that of the *Muhit* is the impossibility to discern whether the name *ṣayd* when it is pronounced really is *ṣayd*, or *d:ay*, or *ʿzad*, or still something else.

¹⁵⁶ In Arabic *bi-hayt huw*, *Muhit* I, 324

¹⁵⁷ Read in *Muhit* I, 324, line 11 *jāwārnā* "to be in the direct vicinity, to be neighbours" instead of *jāwāznā*. It is remarkable that here the Egyptian edition makes the same mistake (p. 313).

¹⁵⁸ This argument is given in *Muhit* I, 324 and *Mugni* VII, 24-25

The genus "sound" occurs in various ways;¹⁵⁹ it may be a fluent¹⁶⁰ sound, it may be a regularly articulated sound, it may be an irregularly articulated sound¹⁶¹ which shows sometimes connection and sometimes separations, it may also constitute letters and in that way lay the foundation for what we call speech.

Like the other "acts of the limbs", sound in order to exist only needs a substrate, a substance to inhere in; it does not need a living being.¹⁶² But the question arises whether sound can exist in any substrate; or can it inhere only in substrates which have a certain structure (*hinya*) or at least a certain solidity (*ṣalāba*)? And does it need movement to exist?¹⁶³ Abū 'Alī held that sound can exist in every substrate¹⁶⁴ but always needs movement. To explain the latter half of this statement, he appeals to human experience: if we knock on a brass basin, it gives a sound; if we stop its movement, sound ceases also.¹⁶⁵ Moreover: we know that we cannot produce sound without movement. This movement is, however, not the cause we use and which generates the sound; therefore, it must be a necessary condition: sound must need (*ihtāj*) it.¹⁶⁶ Although sound in general does not need a special structure and solidity in its substrate, some forms of it do need a special structure (so, for instance, the various letters of speech) or a certain solidity (the sound of a brass basin, for instance, needs this solidity).¹⁶⁷

Abū Hāšim does not agree with Abū 'Alī's statements; in his opinion, sound does not need movement. Three different arguments

¹⁵⁹ This distinction is given by 'Abd al-Jabbār in *Muḡnī* VII, 6

¹⁶⁰ Read here (*Muḡnī* VII, 6) *muḡarvad* (fluent) instead of *mufīd* (communicative), which can by no means be the opposite of "articulated" Here is meant a sound that is not "cut" (*muḡatta'*), the word we render by "articulated"

¹⁶¹ In *Muḡnī* VII, 6, line 18, delete the words "fi jms" I think that these two words are derived from the text of line 17, where they follow the word *muḡatta'* In line 18 they do not make any sense, and their presence there can be explained as an error of a copyist

¹⁶² See *Muḡnī* VII, 26-30

¹⁶³ These questions are discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbār in *Muḡnī* VII, 31-42

¹⁶⁴ His words seem to indicate this See *Muḡnī* VII, 31 This is deduced by 'Abd al-Jabbār from "zāhir kalāmih", the external meaning of Abū 'Alī's words

¹⁶⁵ *Muḡnī* VII, 31

¹⁶⁶ "Because one of us (a human being) can only bring it into existence together with movement, although this is not a cause (*sabab*) of it, that supposes its (sound's) need for it (movement)" *Muḡnī* VII, 31

¹⁶⁷ Here Abū 'Alī again appeals to experience, we know that letters cannot exist in every place, but only in places which are built in a special way, as the human mouth, tongue, etc We also know that the sound of a brass basin cannot exist in water, this sound needs the solidity of brass *Muḡnī* VII, 32

are given for this thesis. First: if sound would need movement, it could not exist together with its opposite; the various movements are each other's opposite; so, in that case, sound could not exist together with another movement. That contradicts our experience, because we know that a substrate in which sound exists can move in space at the same time.¹⁶⁸

Second: movement is a *kawn*, a mode of being. If sound would need movement, it would need its genus (*kawn*), not the occurrence of that genus in a certain way (viz., as movement); consequently, it could occur with immobility (*sukûn*) instead of movement.¹⁶⁹ It will be apparent that these two arguments depend on the manner movement is conceived: as a "mode of being", as the substrate's being *hic et nunc*, its being now in this concrete place. The whole argument is based on this conception of movement.

The third argument is different. Movement is related, in its connection with sound, to the cause we use and to the instrument we need. God does not need an instrument nor a cause, and consequently, He can produce sound without movement. When God can do so, sound in its essence does not need movement.¹⁷⁰

Sound does not need a special structure nor a certain solidity of its substrate, for "everything that characterizes a substrate and does not necessitate a state for the living being, to exist only needs its substrate."¹⁷¹

'Abd al-Jabbâr agrees with Abû Hâsim that sound only needs a

¹⁶⁸ All depends in this argumentation upon Abû Hâsim's (and 'Abd al-Jabbâr's) ideas about the essence of movement. For him two movements exclude each other in the same substrate because movement is a *kawn*, the substance's being in a concrete place. It cannot be in two places at the same time. When the substance in which the sound inheres moves in space, it gets another, "opposite" movement. See *Muğni* VII, 33.

¹⁶⁹ This argument is based on a generally applicable thesis: "every *ma'nâ* which needs something else in its existence needs the genus of that something else, not its occurring in a certain way" (*kull ma'nâ yahtâj fi wujûdih ilâ ġayrih, yahtâj ilâ jins dâlik al-ġayr, dûn wuqû'ih 'alâ wajh maḡsûs*): see *Muğni* VII, 34.

For Abû Hâsim (and 'Abd al-Jabbâr), movement is not a genus of its own but only a way in which the genus *kawn* (being in space) occurs; the conclusion would be that sound only needs *kawn* (being in space), and in that case sound could exist together with immobility (also a mode of being) instead of movement.

¹⁷⁰ *Muğni* VII, 34.

¹⁷¹ This general thesis is given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr on page 36 of *Muğni* VII. He proves this thesis by pointing to the colours, modes of being, tastes, and odours and by showing that arguments against this thesis are not tenable. Another argument is given in *Muğni* VII, 38 ff.: in Abû Hâsim's opinion sounds are each other's opposite; when something needs something else in its substrate to exist, its opposite needs the same thing: this would imply that all sounds need the same structure in their substrate.

substrate, no movement, no structure, no solidity.¹⁷² This statement of 'Abd al-Jabbâr influences greatly his conception of what speech is, and consequently his conception of God's speech.

Human beings, and other living beings, which are able (*qâdir*) by an ability and not per se cannot produce sound directly; they need the use of a cause which generates sound. This cause, in fact, is the pressure (*i'timâd*).¹⁷³ Not every pressure, however, can generate sound; to generate sound, it must occur in a certain way, it must constitute "knocking" (*muṣâkka*). When pressure occurs in the way of knocking, movement is connected with it.¹⁷⁴ Therefore, although movement is not the cause which generates the sound, it is a condition for the possibility of generating it. So we can say that it is as necessary as the cause itself; movement is as necessary as pressure.¹⁷⁵ This implies, that God, who does not need the use of instruments and causes, does not need movement to produce sound.¹⁷⁶

The fact that we can only produce sound by means of pressure, and the fact that pressure can only generate by way of a certain form of touching of two substrates, whereby the effect is originated in the second substrate (not the substrate of the ability), prove that sound exists in a substrate.¹⁷⁷

Summarizing: sound is a perceptible accident that does not remain. Human beings are able to produce it by means of knocking (*muṣâkka*), which is a form of pressure (*i'timâd*) connected with movement (*ḥaraka*).

¹⁷² *Muḡnî* VII, 42

¹⁷³ Sound is an act produced not "in the place of the ability", the substrate in which the ability inheres. Therefore a "pressure" (*i'timâd*) is needed to cause the transition from the one substrate to the other. See also *Muḡnî* VII, 26-30

¹⁷⁴ Read in the text of *Muḡnî* VII, 34, line 10 *muqâ'ana* instead of *mufâraqa*, "connection" instead of "separation". This emendation of the text is an evident necessity in the whole context.

¹⁷⁵ See *Muḡnî* VII, 34

¹⁷⁶ *Muḡnî* VII, 34 "It is certain that God does not need a cause to bring speech (and consequently also sound) into existence, consequently, the existence of speech (and sound) from His side must be possible together with the non-existence of movement just as it is possible together with the non-existence of pressure, and just as it can exist from His side without an instrument (*âla*), although we (human beings) need an instrument to bring it into existence"

¹⁷⁷ See *Muḡnî* VII, 26. The argumentation given in the text does not prove that sound cannot exist without a substrate because God can produce sound without using pressure. That sound cannot exist without a substrate is proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the rest of that chapter p. 27-30. The general thesis is that everything that characterizes a substrate, notwithstanding the differences, has in common that it cannot exist outside a substrate (*lâ fi mahall*)

The genus sound, however, does not absolutely need movement, nor a special structure, nor solidity; it can exist in every substrate.

After this discussion of the five acts of the limbs, I finish this section with two qualifications given to accidents which frequently occur in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations. These two are the concepts of "being opposite" and "being other, being something else".

Didd: opposite. The concept of "being opposite" is expressed and elaborated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by means of the term "*tanâfî*", mutual exclusion.¹⁷⁸ Two things are "opposite" when they cannot exist together. This mutual exclusion can be restricted to a concrete substrate (*maḥall*):¹⁷⁹ two opposite accidents cannot inhere in one and the same substrate at the same time. When the second one comes into existence in that substrate, the first must fall back into non-existence. This is the case, for instance, with the modes of being.¹⁸⁰

Two things can also be opposite "without a substrate":¹⁸¹ two things can exclude each other without existing in the same substrate. This is the case when two different accidents inhere in two different substrates, but both characterize the same living being; they may inhere in two substrates of that living being, but also in a substrate outside it; thus speech characterizes a speaking subject, even when it exists outside him. Consequently, speech may be said to be the opposite of silence which characterizes the same person. These two—with slight restrictions—cannot exist together.¹⁸²

From 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of the term, it becomes apparent that "opposite" does not indicate a pure denial, nor the absolute contrary of the thing concerned.¹⁸³ This is confirmed by the thesis that, when

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., *Muḡnî* VII, 27

¹⁷⁹ The substrate is said to be the "condition" (*ṣart*) of the mutual exclusion, *Muḡnî* VII, 27

¹⁸⁰ This relation between two opposite accidents becomes most clear in the matter of remaining accidents (see p. 125), it is evident that such accidents can or cannot exist together because we know that, when a new accident comes into existence, the former either remains or disappears. In the case of non-remaining accidents, the relation between different accidents is not as manifest as in the other case. This explains the hesitation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr when the sounds (which are non-remaining accidents) are concerned. It is not self-evident that they exclude each other. Cf. *Muḡnî* VII, 28

¹⁸¹ The substrate is said not to be the condition (*ṣart*) of their mutual exclusion, *Muḡnî* VII, 27

¹⁸² About *kalâm* and *sukût* (speech and silence) I speak in my next chapter.

¹⁸³ The text of *Šarḥ* 109, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the possibility of an opposite of "eternal" (*qadîm*), points in the direction of this meaning of "opposite" as "absolute contrary". Here the words *bi-l-'aks* are used

something needs something else on its substrate to exist, its opposite needs the same.¹⁸⁴ Two things which are opposite are two things which are related to each other and as such exclude each other.

From all this it is clear that "opposition" is not an accident inhering in a substrate; it does not characterize a substance. The term only indicates a relationship between two things, be it substances or accidents.

Ġayr: else, other.¹⁸⁵ First of all, when we consider the vocabulary of everyday language—'Abd al-Jabbâr's usual starting-point—to be "something else" or to be "other" is a purely terminological matter, based on a conclusion of the subject who gives these names. We call two things "other" when they are not one and the same thing and one is not a part (*ba'd*) of the other. The difference between a description as "part" or as "other" depends entirely upon the name—'Abd al-Jabbâr says: the mention (*dikr*)—we choose to compare both things and to describe their relationship; it depends on the angle from which we view the two things concerned. So we sometimes call the human hand a part (*ba'd*) of the human body, but we also call the hand "other" (*ġayr*) than the remaining limbs of the body. For the actual relationship between, for instance, hand and feet, this does not make any difference.¹⁸⁶

Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives for "*ġayr*" (other or else) the following definition: "when in any pair of mentioned things one of them distinguishes itself from its companion by a 'mention' which

¹⁸⁴ *Muġni* VII, 38

¹⁸⁵ This term is frequently used in the discussions about the essence of God's qualities and the essence of the Qur'ân. All parties involved in these theological discussions had to describe the relationship between God and His qualities without touching God's unity and uniqueness. The denial that His qualities and the Qur'ân are something else than God played in these discussions a fundamental part. 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives ten pages to the description of the meaning of this concept in *Muġni* VII, 119-129, in discussing the relationship between God and His speech.

¹⁸⁶ This example is mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Muġni* VII, 120, in the course of his argumentation he again returns to this example. The second example he gives is less concrete: "One says about one of the ten that it (the one) is a part of it (the ten) and not other than it. And if one gives it a mention of its own, one says that it is other than the (remaining) nine. But its relationship to (*hâluh ma'*) the nine (in the manuscript can be read also *at-us'a* instead of the *as-sab'a*, which is printed in the edition, the mention of seven does not make any sense, the reading nine seems evident) does not differ in the two cases. Therefore, one says about the eleventh that it is other than the ten, and one does not say this about the tenth because one of them falls under the ten and the other does not fall under it." See *Muġni* VII, 120.

characterizes it, each of them must be other than its companion."¹⁸⁷ For: "what does not fall under the thing mentioned, is other (something else); what falls under it, is a part of it."¹⁸⁸

So much for the meaning of this word as used in everyday language. When we leave the terminology and concentrate on the reality behind the words, we discover that there are not three, but only two possibilities; two things are either one and the same or something else (or other). When we know that a certain thing is characterized, or can be characterized, by qualities by which the second thing is not characterized, each must be something else, other than its companion.¹⁸⁹ While names can be chosen at will, qualities cannot. Therefore, what is called a "part" because of the name chosen, is in fact "other" because both the "part" and the "whole" can have qualities its companion has not.

The being "other" of two things is not based upon an accident "*ğayriya*" ("otherness") that would inhere in the substance,¹⁹⁰ for they cannot be "non-other"; they cannot stop being other and become one and the same.¹⁹¹

4. QUALITIES

This section not only deals with the relation between accidents and substances and the way in which the inhering of accidents in a substance determines the qualities of that substance, but also with any other way in which a "thing" (including also God Himself) can be qualified and be characterized by a certain description.

When we try to follow the footsteps of 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his elaboration of the concept of "quality"—a concept which has constituted

¹⁸⁷ *Muğni* VII, 119: "*kull maḍkûravn yumayyaz ahaduhumâ bi-mâ yağuşuş min ad-ğikr 'an sāhibih, fa-yajib kawn kull wāhid minhumâ gayran li-l-âğar*"

¹⁸⁸ *Muğni* VII, 120: "*mâ lâ yaḍğul taht al-maḍkûr kân gayrah, wa-mâ dağal tahtah kân ba'dah*"

¹⁸⁹ *Muğni* VII, 123: "Every qualified thing (*mawsûf*) which is known to be characterized by judgements (*ahkâm*) and qualities (*şfât*) by which the other is not characterized—or when this is possible for them—each of them is other than its companion in reality (*fî l-ma'nâ*)".

¹⁹⁰ The thesis that something is *ğayr* because of an accident *ğayriya* inhering in it, is refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Muğni* VII, 127-129. Before (*Muğni* VII, 123-127), he already refuted the definition of two other things running "the existence of one of which is possible together with the non-existence of the other".

¹⁹¹ Consequently, this qualification is said to be "because of its essence" and not "because of a cause".

one of the major points of dispute between Mu'tazila and their opponents and among Mu'tazila too because of the implications it has for the discussions about God's qualities—we have to start from direct human experience, which forms the foundation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system.

There are two different starting-points in this matter, each of which has its own function and its own implications; together they form the basis of all further elaboration. These two starting-points are: the known state (*hâl*) and the perceived accident ('*araḍ mudrak*).

Hâl: state.¹⁹² It is not a pure coincidence that this term is at the same

¹⁹² 'Abd al-Jabbâr's "teacher" Abû Hâsim is the one who became famous on account of his theory of "states" (*ahwâl*), he used this concept especially to explain the essence of God's qualities. I or Abû Hâsim's doctrine, which is not entirely followed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr see, apart from the passages concerned in the handbooks M. Horten, *Die Modus-theorie des Abû Hâschim*, ZDMG 63 (1909), 303-324, M. Horten, *Neues zur Modus-theorie des Abû Hâschim*, *Beiträge Gesch. Philos. Mittelalt.* Supplement 1913, 45-53, D. Gimaret, *La théorie des ahwâl d'Abû Hâsim al-Ghubbâ'i d'après des sources ar̄arites*, JA 258 (1970), 47-86.

It was only after I had finished my manuscript that the acts of the *Fourth Congress of Arabic and Islamic Studies* were published, Richard Frank's contribution deals with the theory of the "*ahwâl*" and gives an excellent survey of the contents and the function of this theory. It is because of my great appreciation for this article, which, moreover, has been written nearly ten years ago—that I make here a few short annotations. For the background of these observations it may suffice to refer to the relevant passages in our own study.

P 88 According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr an existent (*mawjûd*) being is not existent because of the inhering of an accident "existence" (*wujûd*), but "by an acting subject" (*bi-fâ'il*), because some able subject brought it into existence. Consequently, it is preferable not to say that something "has" existence (*wujûd*). P 90 The term "*sifa*", which indicates a description, cannot be compared with either the "state" or the "accident". See also p 92. P 90-91 Frank's interpretation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text is not entirely accurate. The passage about the "*ta'fir*" which the accident necessitating the composite totality to be in a state has on its substrate, must be interpreted in the sense that this accident *also* has an influence upon its own individual substrate. The difference discussed here is that the accident "life", besides necessitating the composite whole to be living, also causes its individual substrate to be living, whereas the accident knowledge necessitates the composite whole to be knowing without causing its substrate (the heart) to be knowing too. P 97 I think that also the state *mutahayyiz* supposes that the substance concerned is existent.

As a translation I use the term "state", which is generally accepted in some form or other. Although the word possibly is not used in exactly the way in which Abû Hâsim used it, it is also for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a technical term so that the remark of Hourani (who renders the term *hâl* by "condition", "state", and "status"; see *Ethics*, 62 and 67) is not correct. "There is no need to look here for a technical meaning of *hâl* (pl. *ahwâl*). The meaning can be induced from the examples, in all of which it refers to a permanent state of the agent in relation to another being. Perhaps it can best be translated as 'status'" (Hourani, *Ethics*, 67). The *hâl* mostly does not indicate a relation to another being, and it is not always permanent.

time used in the Arabic grammar too. Many Mu'tazila were very well versed in the science of the Arabic grammar, and the philosophy and theology of 'Abd al-Jabbâr—like those of most of the Mu'tazila—are greatly influenced by the views of the grammarians.

When we, therefore, look into the way grammarians use the word *hâl* in their explanations of the structures of the Arabic language, we see that it usually indicates an active participle or another adjective expressing a transitory state (*hâl muntaqila*)—although it may indicate also a permanent state (*hâl ġayr muntaqila*)—of the subject (or object) of the sentence.¹⁹³

This meaning is implied in the philosophical concept of *hâl* as 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses it. We, human beings, know that we are at a certain moment in a "state"; this can be expressed by the use of an active participle or another adjective.¹⁹⁴ That we are in such a state and can be called with such an adjective, is known by direct necessary knowledge, a certain knowledge we cannot banish from our soul. So we perhaps can even say that what we really know is that a certain adjective, used in the language as a *hâl*, is at this moment applicable to us. At this moment the active participle "knowing", "being convinced", or "reflecting" is applicable, to mention some examples we already discussed before. And in the same way we know the difference between the various states; we know, for instance, that our being knowing is different from our being reflecting. So both the fact that we are in a certain state and the difference between the states is based upon our direct experience and therefore known by necessary knowledge, guaranteed by God.

Our first knowledge of the existence of such "states" being based upon our self-experience—an experience expressed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by the verb *wajad nafсах*: to find oneself (to be in a certain state)¹⁹⁵—we can acquire further knowledge of states we or other human beings

¹⁹³ See, e.g., Wright, *A Grammar of the Arabic Language*, II, 114

¹⁹⁴ Mostly participles are used; see the instances we have discussed already. *'âlm* (knowing), *mu'taqid* (being convinced), *zânn* (assuming), *sâkim* (immobile), *mutaharrik* (moving), etc. In some cases adjectives are used (this depends upon the common usage and has no philosophical implications), for instance, *hayy* (living), or passive participles as *mawjûd* (existing)

¹⁹⁵ For the use of the expression *wajad nafсах*, "to find oneself", see pp. 41 and 54

¹⁹⁶ Every composite body (*jumla*) is living. Cf. p. 174 and also Frank, *Kalâm*, 307. When a composite body is in a state, it is not necessary that the cause of that state inheres in every part of it. In some cases it does so (the accident "life"), but in other cases the accident inheres in a part of it but, nevertheless, causes the composite body to

or other living beings are in by way of reflection and argumentation. And in that way, we discover that not only living beings, composite bodies (*jumla*, plural : *jumal*),¹⁹⁶ but also simple atoms are in certain states.¹⁹⁷

But all these states, be it the state of a simple substance or of a living being, have in common that what is primarily known is the state itself and not something that causes this state; the causes, if any, can only be deduced by way of reflection and argumentation.¹⁹⁸

What exactly are these states? A state is not something outside the substrate, not something added to it, but only a state it is in. A state is not "something" besides the substances and accidents, for all "things" in this world are either substance or accident. Hence we cannot say that these states are existent (*mawjûd*)—nor that they are non-existent (*ma'dûm*)—or come into being (*hâdit*). For their "beginning" other terms have to be used, "*tajaddad*" (to be new) or "*ḥaṣal*" (to result). But, notwithstanding all this, such a state is not a pure abstraction; for 'Abd al-Jabbâr it is the name for and an expression of a necessary self-experience. Therefore, it is not necessary to describe or define what is a state; everybody, every human being who is *compos mentis*, must know what it is.

By the same self-experience which taught us the states we are in, we know that some of these states are permanent and others are not. Most states are transitory : at some time we are in that state, at other times we are not. We know that, though we are now in that state, it is possible that at some time we are not. Our being "knowing", "reflecting", "moving" are examples of such transitory states.¹⁹⁹ But, on the contrary, our being "what we are" and our being "human" is not transitory but permanent : we cannot not-be in that state.

When a state is permanent, it is entirely connected with our being "ourselves", or, generally spoken, with the thing's being what it is, with its "essence" : the thing cannot cease to be in that state without at the same time ceasing to be what it is. Therefore, it is said to be in such a state "because of its essence" or "per se" (*li-dâtih* or *li-nafsih*). When a state, however, is not permanent but transitory, and the thing's

be in that state (the accident "knowledge", inhering in the human heart). See *Muḡni* VII, 43-47.

¹⁹⁷ A simple atom can be, for instance, "moving", or "being in space" as we have seen in our discussion of the "modes of being".

¹⁹⁸ See, e.g., *Muḡni* VII, 44 and XII, 5.

¹⁹⁹ See *Muḡni* XII, 5.

being in that state is not connected with its essence, there must be a reason why it sometimes is in that state and sometimes not: something must be the cause of it. This can be an acting subject who, by his very act, causes the thing to be in a certain state without producing an accident related to that state. This especially is the case in causing something to be existent (*mawjûd*) or coming into existence (*hâdî*). When, however, a transitory state is not caused by an acting subject, but by the inhering of an accident in the substance concerned, this cause is called a "illa" and the thing is said to be in that state "li-'illa", "because of a cause" or "per accidens", the cause always being an accident.²⁰⁰ This "cause" is often expressed by the verbal noun (*maşdar*) corresponding to the participle used to indicate the state.

Li-dâtih or **li-nafsih**:²⁰¹ by its essence or per se. Both of these terms seem to be used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr indifferently, without any difference in the meaning.²⁰² When the expression *li-nafsih* is used, however, in its strictest sense and does indicate "because of its soul", it can be used for a living being only because the word *nafs* or "soul" indicates the totality of the living being.²⁰³ But, just as the word *nafs* is used in a more general way to indicate "itself", so this expression can be used in the meaning of "per se". The other term, *li-dâtih*, points to the "essence" (*dât*) of the thing concerned; this word is used to indicate "what the thing is", not in concreto, but fundamentally; it indicates that which makes the thing what it is, independently of all changing elements. But in fact both of these expressions are used as synonyms.

That something is in a state, not because of a cause, but per se, because of its essence has as a consequence that that state is not restricted. According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr a state is restricted by the cause of that state, the 'illa: our being knowing is restricted by the knowledge which is the cause of our being knowing. The causes ('*ilal*) constitute at the same time the causing and the restricting element

²⁰⁰ This is the way in which the existence of imperceptible accidents is deduced; so, e.g., the "modes of being" (*aknân*): pp 98-101.

²⁰¹ This term seems to have a Greek background just as many of the terms used in Mu'tazilî theology, although the meaning of these terms has frequently changed. See for this expression · H. Wolfson, *Philosophical Implications of the Problem of Divine Attributes in the Kalâm*, *JAOS* 79 (1959), 73-80

²⁰² See, e.g., *Muğni* VII, 82-83. In the first line of page 83 one must probably read *dâtuh* instead of *adâtuh* although the first *alif* is found in the manuscript.

²⁰³ See *Muğni* XII, 22

in our states. When a thing is, however, *per se* in a state, it lacks the restricting element and is in that state without any restrictions.²⁰⁴

Consequently, being in a state *per se* or because of its essence implies two things: the thing concerned is always in that state and cannot not-be in that state and, second, it is not restricted in being in that state.

'*Illa*: cause.²⁰⁵ In the case of a transitory state, the term '*illa* indicates the accident which causes the thing concerned to be in a certain state. The '*illa* does so by inhering in a substrate, which is not necessarily the thing which is in that state.²⁰⁶ But when this cause exists, the thing is in the state related to that cause; when it ceases to exist, the thing ceases to be in that state. For it belongs to the essence of a cause ('*illa*) that it necessarily, and immediately, is followed by its effect, and that its ceasing involves the ceasing of the effect. It indicates a direct and necessary relationship.²⁰⁷ When discussing in this way the essence of the cause, we must not forget that what is known first is the state, the cause being deduced as the metaphysically necessary condition.²⁰⁸

Hence, we can say that in this part of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology the word '*illa* (cause) is used for an accident which is not perceptible, but the existence of which is postulated to explain the thing's being in a certain transitory state. But if we formulate it in this way, our

²⁰⁴ This is the reason why God knows everything and we do not, and why God is able to every kind of act and we are not. In the same way our being what we are is not restricted, nor our being "human", "blackness" is not restricted in its "blackness" because it is so because of its essence (*Mugni* VII, 127)

²⁰⁵ Some very fundamental remarks about the meaning of the term '*illa* are found in Frank, *Ma'nâ*, *JAOS* 87 (1967), 248-259 and especially on pp 250-251 "Most importantly, the '*illa* is most often (almost by definition) an intrinsic cause, it is interior to the thing and automatically produces its effect", and "'*Illa*, on the other hand, is used, when used in a strict sense, most commonly as the direct or primary determinant cause that produces its effect (*ma'lûl*) immediately and necessarily, without the intervention of any other causal factor, the existence of the '*illa* necessitates that of the *ma'lûl* and a single '*illa*, in contrast to *sahab*, can produce but a single effect" See also, in a broader context, van Ess, *Logical Structure*, 37 Cf also Gimaret, *La théorie des ahwâl*, especially pp 52-53

²⁰⁶ A composite body can be in a certain state because of an accident which inheres in a part of it. There was a dispute about the question whether God can be in a certain state by an accident which does not inhere at all. Cf pp 273-276

²⁰⁷ See *Mugni* XII, 5

²⁰⁸ See, e.g., Gimaret, *La théorie des ahwâl*, 52-53. In the case of a transitory state 'Abd al-Jabbâr's position corresponds with the views accepted by most Muslim theologians, but a distinction is made between a permanent and a transitory state, and it is in the case of the permanent state that the Mu'tazila, and among them 'Abd al-Jabbâr, do not agree with many other theologians

description is too narrow; it has a much broader use than this; it can be said to be any accident which causes a thing to be characterized (*iktas̄s*) by this accident and to get a name derived from this accident.²⁰⁹ In this context the word *'illa* (cause) is used to indicate the accident in its relation to the "thing" it characterizes, whatever this might be.

In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion there are four possible kinds of relationship between an accident and the thing characterized by it.²¹⁰ One of these four has been discussed above: an accident characterizes something because it causes it to be in a certain state.

Three other possibilities remain; what they have in common is that first the accident is known (by knowledge based on perception), and that afterwards one comes to the conclusion that something is characterized by it. Whereas in the case of the transitory state 'Abd al-Jabbâr followed the way from the characterized thing to the characterizing thing, here he has to go the other way round: from the characterizing to the characterized thing.

Once we know the accident, we can come to the conclusion that what is characterized by it is either the substrate in which it inheres, or a composite body (a living being) in a part of which it exists, or the subject who made it.²¹¹

In this case the accidents are known and one asks the question which thing is characterized and described (*mawṣûf*) by it; and here the common language is of great importance for 'Abd al-Jabbâr; his confidence in the language corresponding with reality becomes manifest: that thing is said to be "qualified" by the presence of an accident which in common language is "described" by it. And by using these terms, corresponding with the Arabic root "wṣf", we come to the word "*ṣifa*" (quality, description) upon which many fierce disputes in matters of theology had been centred.

²⁰⁹ See *Mugni* VII, 50. The names meant here are frequently participles related to the names of the accidents. Names which are used in the common language play a very important part.

²¹⁰ These four are mentioned in *Mugni* VII, 50 and elaborated on this and the following page. "Moreover, we know that speech has a connection with the speaking (subject) which supposes that he (this subject) is more likely to be speaking by it than something else. This connection must be knowable (*ma'qûl*, knowable by a knowledge based ultimately on human intuition), therefore, it can only be qualified by it either because it (speech) inheres in him, or because it inheres in a part (*ba'd*) of him, or because it necessitates for him a state, or because he made it, other aspects of connection can have no place in this matter"

²¹¹ The question can be formulated also: once we know the accident and know which

Şifa: quality ²¹² 'Abd al-Jabbâr's most fundamental statement about the essence of the qualities is. "the quality is the word (*qawl*), like it (the word) is the qualification (*wasf*)"²¹³ Since the root to which the words *sifa* and *wasf* belong (the root *w.s.f*) literally means "to describe", a quality is nothing else but a qualification and a qualification nothing else but a description. Consequently, a quality is not something in the thing described, but only a word which describes a thing as it is

adjective or participle is related to it, to which thing must this adjective or participle be applied?

²¹² The qualities (*sifât*) belong without any doubt to the most discussed subjects in Islamic theology. The discussions amply elaborated in the handbooks are always centred upon God's qualities. But also about the concept of "quality" in general and as applicable to things in this world much can be said, 'Abd al-Jabbâr even observes that it is not possible to deal with God's qualities before having studied the essence of qualities in this world (See *Mugni* VII, 53. "We already explained in the chapter about the qualities that the reality (*haqîqa*) of the quality cannot be different in the present (world) and the absent (world))

A very thorough and detailed study of the discussions about the essence of God's qualities—not involving however, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's position in this matter—was written by Michel Allard, his book is called *Le problème des attributs divins dans la doctrine d'Al Aş'arî et de ses premiers grands disciples* (Bevrouth 1965). The title of this book already betrays what will be its inconvenience for our present study. Allard wrote his book from the standpoint of the Aş'arî school and this involves that the impression one gets of the Mu'tazilî position will be rather negative and somewhat coloured. But that does not alter the fact that, especially for the understanding of the Aş'arî theology, the work of Allard is of great importance. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's views on the qualities, especially on God's qualities, are treated by 'Abd al-Karim 'Uymân *Nazarîyat at-taklîf* 169-304.

For the translation of the word *sifa* I had the choice out of some alternatives: "description", "attribute", and "quality" have been used by modern authors. The word "description" corresponds with the meaning of the root 'w.s.f' in its non-technical use and remains very close to the meaning the technical term has in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works but this translation may cause—exactly because of its being so clearly defined—some ambiguity when used in discussions between 'Abd al-Jabbâr and his opponents. The terms "attribute" and "quality" are both somewhat vaguer and capable of various interpretations. My choice of "quality" is influenced by the easy way its derivatives can be used in English and made to correspond with the Arabic words *sifa* (quality) *wasf* (qualification) and *wasaf* (to qualify).

²¹³ *Mugni* VII 117 *li-ann as-sifa hiy al-qawl, kamâ annah al-wasf*. The argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives to prove the identification of the two terms *wasf* and *sifa* is based on the use of these words by linguists (*ahl al-luġa*). "We gave as an indication to this (the identification of the two terms) the word of the linguists: somebody describes somebody else with a good quality or with a good qualification (both terms are used in the Arabic grammar to indicate the adjective, see next note and Wright, *Grammar*, I, 105). A second argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives is based on the fact that someone who is dumb cannot describe, he concludes that dumbness prevents the "quality" (*sifa*). Consequently, "quality" must be a "word" (*qawl*). See for both these arguments *Mugni* VII, 117. Cf. also al-Aş'arî *Maqâlât* 172. "The Mu'tazilî and the Kawärîj said: names and qualities are words."

The terms *wasf* and *ṣifa* are also used by Arab grammarians, and in the grammar too they can be used as synonyms.²¹⁴ When we look for the meaning of the word *ṣifa* as used in the technical vocabulary of the old Arab grammarians, we discover that it indicated the active participle; but it was generalized so that the word became applicable to all participles and adjectives.²¹⁵ This corresponds with what we said above about the relation between an accident and the thing which is characterized by it.²¹⁶

But should we conclude from all this that the qualities are the result of a purely intellectual activity which gives names to things, or even worse: should we conclude that the qualities are only names and words arbitrarily given? Not at all. A quality is the expression of a reality which is known, *ma'qûl*, known by knowledge based on human intuition. And we have to remember that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr knowledge implies certainty and correspondence with reality. The reality which is expressed in the quality can be a state or a relation of the thing concerned to a given accident.²¹⁷

This really known reality behind the qualities, which constitutes the basis of our actual description, is expressed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by means of the verb "*istahaqq*", "to be entitled to". The quality, conceived as a description, is not an arbitrary act of a subject who decides or does not decide to describe or qualify the thing concerned. That thing is entitled to this quality, entirely independently of the actual description or qualification by a describing subject.²¹⁸ Because we know that a thing is entitled to a quality, we can qualify it in that way.

²¹⁴ See Wright, *Grammar*, I, 105, where both terms are used to indicate the adjectives. But see also, especially for the history of the word *ṣifa* and its use in the works of the old Arab grammarians, Fleisch, *Traité de Philologie Arabe*, 265-266

²¹⁵ Cf Allard, *Problème*, p 3 and Fleisch, *Traité*, p. 265-266 Allard makes the following remark: "... le terme *ṣifa*, pour les grammairiens arabes, désigne par priorité des participes actifs ou passifs, et secondairement de véritables adjectifs qui, grammaticalement, sont traités comme des mots ressemblant aux participes (*al-muṣabbaha bi'tsm al-fâ'il*)" (p 3; his argumentation is based upon the work of Fleisch) See, however, also W. Diem, *Nomen, Substantiv und Adjektiv bei den arabischen Grammatikern, Oriens* 23-24 (1974) 312-332, esp 313-316.

²¹⁶ See our discussions of the *ḥâl* (state) and the *'illa* (cause) We already pointed to the fact that in most cases active participles are used to indicate the characterized thing, and verbal nouns to indicate the characterizing thing.

²¹⁷ See *Mugnî* VII, 50. See also Frank's reaction to the view expressed in the book of Allard that this *ṣifa* is "une opération de l'esprit": "When *al-Ġubbâ'i* insists that the attribute (*ṣifa*) is really our act of attribution (*wasf*), he does not mean at all that it is nothing but 'une opération de l'esprit'" Frank, *Kalâm*, 299.

²¹⁸ Al-Bâqillâni seems to deny this reality behind the actual descriptions in *Mu'tazilî*

In this *istihqâq* (being entitled) two aspects are to be distinguished : the thing which is entitled to the quality and the reason why it is entitled to it.²¹⁹ This concept of *istihqâq* is also used to distinguish between the different qualities ; if a thing can in any case be entitled to a quality without at the same time being entitled to the other one, the two qualities are different ; if this is not possible and a thing, whenever it is entitled to the first, is also entitled to the second, the two qualities must be identical, as we have seen in the case of the two qualities "reflecting" (*nâzir*) and "thinking" (*mufakkir*).²²⁰

In depending upon the reason why a thing is entitled to a certain quality, we divide the qualities of that thing into three categories, corresponding to three different reasons :

first, the qualities to which it is entitled because of its essence (*li-dâtih*), as its being what it is ;

second, the qualities to which it is entitled because of an accident which characterizes it,²²¹ as its being moving ;

third, the qualities to which it is entitled "by the doer" (*bi-l-fâ'il*), because someone else made it to be so, this is the case with the quality "existing" to which does not correspond an accident "existence".

Here we have to notice that from another point of view also the qualities of the second category may be said to be "by the doer" because the presence of the accidents is also caused by an acting subject ; the distinction here is made to point to the fact that some qualities result without the producing of an accident.²²²

theology See, e.g., the appendix to the article of Tritton, *The Speech of God*, in *SI* 36 (1972), 21-22. "According to al-Bâqillâni the Mu'tazila affirmed that God had no names or qualities till He created speech with which other parts of His creation could talk about Him. It seems that al-Bâqillâni felt that a quality was somehow mixed up with speech, with the ability to talk about it"

²¹⁹ See *Muhit* I, 100, *Mugni* VII, 53

²²⁰ For the identification between the two qualities "reflecting" and "thinking", see *Mugni* XII, 4 "li-annah lâ nâzir bi-qalbih illâ mufakkiran wa-lâ mufakkir illâ nâziran bi-qalbih" The general statement on which this actual identification is based, is found in *Mugni* IV, 33 "Know that, when a qualified (object) can in any way be entitled to a quality, whatever it is, although it does not receive another quality, one has to decide that the contents of the one of them are not the contents of the other; in this way one comes to know the difference between the contents of the qualities. "

The distinction between two qualities can also be made when the qualified thing is not entitled to both qualities in the same way. See *Muhit* I, 100. So "blackness" is entitled to the quality "being blackness" because of its essence, and to the quality "existing" (*ma'jud*) because of the doer (*al-fâ'il*). See also note 222

²²¹ The word used here in the Arabic text of the *Muhit* is *ma'nâ*, I explain this word at the end of this paragraph

²²² The distinction made here is found in *Muhit* I, 100. Another distinction

When we take into account both the reason why a thing is entitled to a quality and the thing which is entitled to it, we come to the following division :²²³

First, there are the qualities to which a substrate (*maḥall*) is entitled; these can be subdivided into qualities to which it is entitled because of its essence and qualities to which it is entitled because of an accident which inheres in it. This latter case can be subdivided again, according to whether this accident causes it to be in a state or not.²²⁴

Second, there are the qualities to which a living being is entitled; some of them indicate something that has an influence upon the instruments (*al-âlat*) a living being needs to act, especially a defect of such an instrument; all others indicate that the living being is in a certain state (*ḥâl*).²²⁵

In the third and last place, there are the qualities to which the doer, the acting subject (*al-fâ'il*), is entitled; they are all of the same kind: they all indicate the occurring of the act from him without causing him to be in a certain state.²²⁶

The objection made by Hišâm bn al-Ḥakam that nothing can be said about a quality, because that would mean a description (*wasf*) or quality (*ṣifa*) of that quality (*ṣifa*) and consequently an inhering of

mentioned there is qualities to which it is entitled because of its essence, qualities to which it is entitled because of a *ma'nâ*, and qualities to which it is entitled neither by its essence nor by a *ma'nâ*. The last category can be subdivided, first, the quality of the coming into existence by a doer (*mâ huw bi-l-fâ'il min al-hudût*) and second, what is influenced by another quality. All this too can be condensed into two categories: what is connected to the essence and what is connected to the acts. Consequently, 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks in three different ways about acts when discussing the qualities. he may mean qualities caused by the act of someone which does not result in an accident, he may mean besides what is mentioned above, also all accidents which make the thing be entitled to a quality, every quality except the essential qualities; or he may mean the accidents by which the doer is qualified and not the substrate in which it inheres (as, for instance, speech)

²²³ This division can be found in *Mugnî* VII, 53. The category "*bi-l-fâ'il*" is missing here.

²²⁴ 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives one single example here, and this is meant for the accident which causes a state. He mentions the quality "being (in space)" (*kâ'm*). The printed text adds "*fî ba'd al-muhâdatâit*", this expression can have no function in the context. The normally used specification of *kâ'm* runs *fî ba'd al-juhât* (in some direction). See therefore also pp 128-129. Possibly we have to read in our present text *fî ba'd al-muhâdîvât*.

²²⁵ As instance of the first kind 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the living being's being dumb or being blind. Instances of the second kind which we met already are: knowing, being convinced, reflecting, assuming, etc

²²⁶ So, e.g., "beating" (*dârib*) and "speaking" (*mutakallim*)

an accident (*ṣifa*) in another accident (*ṣifa*),²²⁷ cannot be levelled against the descriptions of the qualities given by 'Abd al-Jabbār since in his view a quality is not an accident but a description to which a certain thing is entitled. Therefore a description of a quality must be compared with an information about an information.²²⁸

Hukm : judgement.²²⁹ While the term *ṣifa* (quality) appeared to have a strong connection with the science of Arabic grammar, the word *ḥukm* seems to be derived from the vocabulary of Islamic legislation (*ṣar'iyât*).²³⁰ For, besides its use in the matter of the "names and judgements" (*al-asmâ' wa-l-ahkâm*), which constitutes the foundation of the intermediate position (*al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn*), which again is said to be on the basis of the origins of the Mu'tazila,²³¹ the word *ḥukm* plays an important rôle in the analogical reasoning used in the science of Islamic legislation.²³² In the description of this analogical reasoning or *qiyâs* we find besides the term *ḥukm* also the term 'illa (cause): the judgement about the legal and moral value of an act (*ḥukm*) is said to be dependent on the presence of a certain cause ('illa) in that act. For example, the drinking of wine can be said to be forbidden (the *ḥukm*) because of its being intoxicating (the 'illa); consequently, whenever this 'illa is present, the act is entitled to this *ḥukm*.

²²⁷ See, e.g., *Mugni* VII, 3 Cf also Pretzl, *Attributenlehre*, 17 For Hišâm bn al-Hakam as for many other Muslim theologians the *ṣifât* are the accidents

²²⁸ Hišâm's arguments and those of his followers are refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* VII, 117-119 The description of a quality, or the qualification of a quality also does not necessitate an endless chain of descriptions or qualifications "That matter would only be necessary if we had said that a quality must be qualified because it is a quality, as we said about the necessity of a connection between the produced things and the producer (*ta'alluq al-muḥdaḡât bi-l-muḥdiḡ*) We explained that, when that (connection) is not necessary, it is analogous to the admitting of an information (*ḡabar*) about an information, and that (read *an* instead of *in*) this does not lead to an endless chain" *Mugni* VII, 117

²²⁹ For the meaning of the word *ḥukm* in this context, see for instance van Ess, *Logical Structure*, 48 Hourani, *Ethics*, 39, renders the plural *ahkâm* as "the broadest categories" This is not correct See also his p 62 Von Grunebaum, *Observations on the Muslim Concept of Evil*, *SI* 31 (1970), 117-134, translates the word as "status" and places much emphasis on its relationship to legislation I chose myself the term "judgement" since this translation indicates its original meaning which is still supposed in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of this term, it corresponds to its use both in matters of legislation and in philosophical texts, both in *ṣar'iyât* and in *'aqliyât*

²³⁰ It can be used as a grammatical term and in that case be translated as "predicament" See Lane, 617 and Cachia, *The Monitor*, 33 of the Arabic part But it did not belong to the commonly used vocabulary of the grammarians

²³¹ See, e.g., Massignon, *La Passion d'Al-Hallâj*, 706-710

²³² Cf *Mugni* XVII See also pp 71-72

The presence of the 'illa (cause) immediately and necessarily causes the being entitled to the judgement, for, as was the case with the quality or *sifa*, the actual pronouncement of a judgement is not necessary, it is the being entitled to it (*istihqāq*) which matters.

When the term *hukm* is used outside the realm of legislation, it is used in an analogical way it indicates a judgement to which a thing is entitled because of the presence of a 'illa (cause).²³³ Hence, in fact, it is nearly a synonym of "quality": every quality a thing is entitled to because of a 'illa (cause) can be called a *hukm*. The difference may be found in the fact that the use of the term *hukm* places special emphasis on the fact that it is caused by a 'illa: it is the consequence of the 'illa.

Ma'nā: qualifier,²³⁴ accident which causes something to be entitled

²³³ See *Mugnī* IV, 8 " the need of a thing, in the originating of a judgement for it, for a cause " (*Ammā hājat aš-šay' fī husūl al-hukm lah ilā 'illa*) and *Mugnī* IV, 59 " the originating of the judgements at the coming into existence of the *ma'āni* (here used as a synonym for 'illa, plural 'ilal wa-husūl al-ahkām 'ind hudūt al-ma'āni) Together these two short quotations describe the relationship between 'illa and *hukm*

²³⁴ In the course of this century some authors have been intrigued by this obscure concept, which could point in the direction of Greek philosophy (with the Platonic concept of the "ideas"), but which at the same time appears to be far removed from a possibly Greek origin Especially its use in the theology of the Mu'tazilī Mu'ammār received some attention In 1909 Horovitz wrote in his book *Über den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalām* some ten pages (44-54) about the Greek background of the *ma'nā* In the same year Horten wrote *Die sogenannte Ideenlehre des Muammār (Archiv für systematische Philosophie* XV, 469-484), the next year followed by *Was bedeutet ma'nā als philosophischer Terminus?* (*ZDMG* 64 (1910), 391-396) While Horovitz places much emphasis upon a possibly Greek origin of the concept, Horten looks for that origin in the Indian philosophy, as he often does

In 1940 appeared Pretzl's *Die frühislamische Attributenlehre, ihre Weltanschaulichen Grundlagen und Wirkungen*, in which he discussed the use of *ma'nā*, basing himself on the text of al-Aš'arī's *Maqālāt* In 1965 Wolfson published his article *Mu'ammār's Theory of Ma'nā* in the *Studies in Honor of Hamilton A R Gibb*, as a reaction Frank wrote his thorough and elaborate article, which summarized the former discussion and gave it a conclusion This article appeared in *JAOS* 87 (1967), 248-259 under the title *Al-Ma'nā, some reflections on the technical meanings of the term in the Kalām and its use in the Physics of Mu'ammār*

To give a correct and clear translation of the word *ma'nā* is very difficult Translation by 'idea' is confusing since that might point to the meaning this word has in Greek philosophy The terms "form" (Watt, *Formative Period*, 245), "Moment" (van Ess, *Ibn Kullāb*, 111), and "ground" (Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 63, wrongly he compares in that text *uajh* with 'illa and *ma'nā*) are more vague and therefore usable, if well defined Frank describes rather than translates this word by calling it "an intrinsic determinant cause of some real aspect of the being of the subject" (*Ma'nā*, 252) or "the intrinsic causal determinants of the thing's being-so" (*Ma'nā* 250) I chose the word "qualifier" in an attempt to make clear the function of the *ma'nā* in the chosen translation itself

to a quality. When I use the word "qualifier", I do not use it in its grammatical sense, but, literally, as that which makes something to be qualified, to be entitled to a qualification.

In a non-technical vocabulary, the word *ma'nâ* is used as the contrary of *ism* (name) or *lafz* (words) to indicate the reality which is to be found behind these words, the "meaning", be it a reality in the mind or a reality outside it, which for 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not make a big difference.²³⁵

As a terminus technicus in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's philosophical vocabulary, it stands for an accident considered from a certain point of view. A *ma'nâ* must be, without any doubt, an accident;²³⁶ the point of view from which it is considered is its relation to a quality or judgement: it is the accident in as far a quality comes forth (*şâdira*) from it or a judgement (*hukm*) is necessitated (*awjab*) by it.²³⁷ When we know something to be in a given transitory state, we postulate this thing to be in that state because of a qualifier (*ma'nâ*).

From what is said above and what we remarked before about the essence of the *'illa* and its use as a philosophical terminus technicus, it becomes apparent that both these terms are used in the same cases. *Ma'nâ*, in fact, is frequently used as an equivalent of *'illa* (cause); both words are used even in one and the same sentence, evidently as synonyms.²³⁸ A thing is entitled to a quality, either by its essence, or by a qualifier (*ma'nâ*) or by a doer (*fâ'il*); thus 'Abd al-Jabbâr points to the equivalence of *'illa* and *ma'nâ* and to the fact that any accident, in its relation to the thing which is characterized by it and is entitled by it to a quality, is called a qualifier and *ma'nâ*.²³⁹ It may be an accident which inheres in the substrate that is qualified, but it may also inhere in another substrate, the connection with the qualified thing

²³⁵ For the non-technical use of this word, see, e.g. *Muğni* VII, 3: the "meaning" of God's speech must be understood Cf. van Ess, *Logical Structure*, 33; van Ess clearly speaks about the non-technical use of *ma'nâ* when he compares it with the Greek *lekton*.

²³⁶ See, e.g., *Muğni* VII, 8: "With 'special arrangement' we do not mean a qualifier (*ma'nâ*) other than the letters, . . . for the letters are an accident and an accident cannot inhere in it" So, evidently, a *ma'nâ* must be an accident. See also Pretzl, *Attributenlehre*, 39.

²³⁷ See *Şarh* 533 "For, if the qualifier (*ma'nâ*) is not necessarily known, the way to (know) it must be either a quality coming forth from it, or a judgement it (the qualifier) has necessitated". See also *Muğni* IV, 22.

²³⁸ See *Muğni* XII, 5 "just as he must be willing by a *ma'nâ* and being convinced by a *ma'nâ*, so he must be reflecting by a *'illa*" See also Frank, *Ma'nâ*, 250, "In this sense, the term is an equivalent to the term "cause" (*'illa*)"

²³⁹ See *Muhit* I, 100 and our discussion of that text on p. 153

being the connection between an act and its doer. A living being is qualified as "speaking" (*mutakallim*) because of a qualifier (*ma'nā*; here: *kalām*) which inheres in another substrate.²⁴⁰

By way of conclusion we hold that a qualifier (*ma'nā*) is that kind of cause (*'illa*) that makes a thing entitled to a quality. And just as the *ma'nā* is related to the *'illa*, so the *ṣifa* is related to the *ḥukm*.

²⁴⁰ See *Muḡni* VII, 82, where speech is said to be the *ma'nā* by which the speaking subject (*al-mutakallim*) becomes entitled to this quality because he made it. In that context also the relation between the two terms *ma'nā* and *'illa* becomes apparent; see *Muḡni* VII, 62-83.

See *Muḡni* VII, 82: "That God cannot be speaking 'neither per se nor by a cause (*'illa*). What we already indicated— that the establishing that He is speaking is the establishing of His speech, and that He has no state by which He would be characterized and which could be the meaning of our word speaking—refutes this statement. It (also) explains that He must be speaking by a *ma'nā*, when it exists, He must be qualified by that, and when it is non-existent, He must not be (qualified) thus"

C. ANTHROPOLOGY

It is characteristic of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's fundamentally theological way of thinking and of his orientation towards an ultimately theocentric world view, that the context in which he expressly discusses the essence and qualities of man is his treatise on the *taklif*, God's charging mankind with duties. It is in this context that man is described as the one who is charged (*al-mukallaf*).¹ 'Abd al-Jabbâr even goes so far that he deduces the qualities of man from his being charged by God.

But besides this theological starting-point,² there is also a second one which like the first is characteristic of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology: his phenomenal starting-point; the evidences of our direct experience and the knowledge based on perception constitute also a foundation of his discussions about the essence of man.

From his theological principle that man is charged by God with duties, that man—in consequence—is responsible (*mukallaf*), and that in this respect he is comparable with the angels,³ 'Abd al-Jabbâr deduces that man (just as the angels) must be able, knowing, perceiving, living, and willing. A responsible subject must be able to perform the act he is charged with, he must know how it is (its *kayfiya*), and he must be willing to produce that act in a certain way. The other two qualities mentioned are deduced from the responsible subject's being able: in order to be able he has to be living (this is a necessary condition), and a living being can only be distinguished from other beings by its being perceiving.⁴

¹ The general principles of the *taklif* are discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the eleventh part of the *Muġni*. In that context he discusses besides the *taklif* also the *mukallif* (God, who charges) and the *mukallaf* (the living beings which are charged by God with duties). About the *mukallaf*—and in fact the human being is discussed there—is spoken in *Muġni* XI, 309-406. In the *Šarh* and in the now published part of the *Muġi* there are no elaborate treatises on the human being comparable to the one we find in the *Muġni*. See also 'Abd al-Karim 'Uġmân. *Nazarîyat at-taklif*, 305-408, where he deals with the human being under the general heading of the *mukallaf*.

² In the eleventh part of the *Muġni* 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the so-called *taklif 'aqli*, the *taklif* in as far as it is independent of revelation and knowable on the basis of human intuition. Although 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology can be called in its quasi-totality a "theological" anthropology, it cannot be called a "revealed" anthropology.

³ "In this chapter it is not allowed to qualify him (the responsible subject, *al-mukallaf*) as 'man' (*msân*) because angels are also responsible subjects, and they are not qualified as such (sc as 'man')." *Muġni* XI, 309

⁴ "For He (God) only charged with an act the (subject who is) able (*qâdir*) to bring it

As for 'Abd al-Jabbâr's second starting-point, which we call with a modern term "phenomenal" because of his appeal to the "phenomena" of the world, our perception tells us that man resembles the animals, which are living beings like him, but that he is distinguished from them by the way he is built. Besides the question of what is a human being, one may also ask which things belong to the human being, which things are a necessary condition, and which things are neither part of the human being nor a condition.⁵

This latter question as to what in fact a human being is, constitutes together with the five qualities deduced from man's being responsible, the contents of this paragraph, which will be divided accordingly into six sections.

1. THE ESSENCE OF MAN

Insân : man, human being.⁶ 'Abd al-Jabbâr admits not to be interested in the use and the meaning of the word *insân*. What he is interested in, is the responsible person (*al-mukallaf*) and his qualities. *Insân* is only a name which, like other names, is given to a certain number of things. Here we must not take into consideration the names, but the *ma'nâ*, the reality behind the names, and that reality is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the able living being (*al-ḥayy al-qâdir*) who is responsible. What urges 'Abd al-Jabbâr nevertheless to discuss the meaning of that "name", is that other theologians apply this name to the able living being.⁷

(the act) into existence, knowing (*'âlim*) how it is (*kayfiya*), willing (*murid*) to produce it in this and not in another way, an able subject (*qâdir*) is only able when he is (also) living. And the state of the 'living' (*ḥayy*) can only be distinguished from others by his being perceiving (*mudrik*) the perceptible things when the hinderings are taken away, and by the possibility of his being knowing and able" *Mugni* XI, 309

⁵ "Man is the living being, he is this person (*ṣaḥs*) structured by this special structure" (*Mugni* XI, 321) See also *Mugni* XI, 311, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives the opinion of "our teachers" and where is added to the definition given above "through which he is different from the other animals" The characteristic element in this definition is the repetition of the demonstrative pronoun "this" person with "this" structure, which points to the phenomenal character of this description

⁶ See also 'Abd al-Karim 'Uṭmân, *Nazarīyat at-taklif*, 309-316, the author does not make a distinction between the name *insân* and the description of the responsible person as "the able living being", a distinction 'Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly makes in the text of the *Mugni*

⁷ See *Mugni* XI, 309 "We only mention the disagreement about what man is because they disagree about what the able living being (*al-ḥayy al-qâdir*, the description of the responsible person) is, and everybody who says what he has to say about him (sc the able living being) qualifies him as 'man' (*insân*)"

So it is because of his opponents, especially that he might be able to refute them, that 'Abd al-Jabbâr is going to use and explain the word *insân*, man.⁸ But this description of the meaning and use of the name *insân* will not teach us what exactly is the responsible person; 'Abd al-Jabbâr discovers that both terms are not coextensive. In order to know what "we" really are, we have to start from the concept of *taklif*, and deduce in that way our qualities.

Whenever we want to know the meaning of a name, we have to appeal to the philologists (*ahl al-luġa*)⁹ for an answer. We necessarily know that they, in qualifying a human being as human being, mean "this"¹⁰ shape, which is structured with "this" structure by which it is distinguished from other animals.¹¹ The difference between this definition and the definition of the responsible person we gave above,¹² is that this definition has as its basic term not "person" (*ṣakṣ*) but "shape" (*ṣûra*) so that this definition points yet more clearly to the outward appearance (which is not only the outward surface) as the element which constitutes the basis of the distinction made between different living beings.¹³

The word *insân* indicates the whole living being, not a part of him,

⁸ "We explained before what in this chapter is connected with the reality behind the names (*al-ma'nâ*), and we indicated that the able living being is this person, and we refuted the statement of him who says that it is a qualifier (*ma'nâ*) in him (the person), or a qualifier which directs him without being in him, or the person and a qualifier in him. This is sufficient for the aspect we meant. For we wanted in this way to explain the essence (*ba'ân mâ'î'a*) of the responsible person in order that it will be possible afterwards to mention his qualifications and conditions (*awsâfah wa-ṣurûtah*). Names have no place in this chapter, although we mentioned a number of them because they are so much discussed by some people." See also *Mugni* XI, 310.

⁹ Literally the people of the language. The translation "philologists" is proposed by Frank (*Fundamental Assumptions*, 11). But possibly what is meant is the people who speak this language as their own, who really know this language without it being stipulated that they have made a scientific study of that language. See Lane, 121, where this example, however, is not mentioned.

¹⁰ The use of the demonstrative pronoun is an indication that this definition does not more than point to the perceived reality and the use of the word in the vocabulary of every day.

¹¹ See *Mugni* XI, 359. See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Nazarîvat at-taklif*, 311, where he mentions a description found in the not yet published part of the *Muhit*: "Man (*al-insân*) is the composite body (*al-jumla*) we see, not something outside it or something inside it, the most lucid indication to him is the pointing (*iṣâra*) to this special structure".

¹² See note 5. In *Mugni* XI, 311 this is said to be the able living being, in *Mugni* XI, 321 it is said to be man, but also in this latter instance the discussion is not about the meaning of the word, but about the *ma'nâ* behind the names.

¹³ Cf. *Mugni* XI, 359. The distinction between the living beings is made "*bi-s-sûra az-zâhira*", the outward appearing shape.

and certainly not something hidden in him.¹⁴ There was some difference of opinion among Mu'tazila concerning some "parts" belonging to the *insân*, or constituting a condition for him, or having no essential connection with him at all. Abû 'Alî, for instance, stated that all that grows with the growing of the totality belongs to it. Abû Hâsim, on the contrary, restricts it to the atoms which are living and by which the subject is, consequently, perceiving.¹⁵ But one can say that a man is still called man when he is dead, so long as the shape is remaining; he is then called a "dead man"; and now one can discuss again what exactly belongs to that "shape". But, although there is some disagreement, which is always possible when we are concerned with names, everybody knows in general what is indicated by the word *insân*. It suffices to point to that necessary knowledge everybody has.

When we leave the question of names for what it is, and direct our attention to the reality, the theological and metaphysical reality, we see that 'Abd al-Jabbâr has chosen as his starting-point the *taklîf* and the person who is charged by this *taklîf*, the *mukallaf* or responsible person. In order that this *taklîf*, this charging of persons with duties, can be good (*hasan*), the responsible person must be able, knowing, willing, living, and perceiving.¹⁶ For his description of the responsible person 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses two of these qualities: this person is *al-hayy al-qâdir*: the able living being.¹⁷ On this concept in fact 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology is built.

The able living being is "this" person, structured by "this" special structure through which he is distinguished from other animals; to him are directed command and prohibition, blame and praise; and though he is only living and able by qualifiers in him, this does not fall under the definition;¹⁸ to the composite whole of the living being only belongs that in which life inheres, nothing else. This description of the able living being, attributed to "our teachers", is most probably accepted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.¹⁹

It will be manifest that a similar description can lead to endless

¹⁴ See *Muğni* XI, 358 and 363-364.

¹⁵ See *Muğni* XI, 364 About the essence of "being living" and its connection with "being perceiving": cf. the following sections of this paragraph.

¹⁶ See *Muğni* XI, 309, translated in note 4.

¹⁷ See *Muğni* XI, 309 and the discussion which follows there

¹⁸ The Arabic text (*Muğni* XI, 311) gives: "wa-in kân lâ yakûn hayyan qâdiran illâ li-ma'âni fih, lâkinn dâlik lâ yadkûl taht al-hadd"; seen from the purely theoretical conditions deduced from the *taklîf*, this is not necessary.

¹⁹ *Muğni* XI, 311.

discussions about some concrete atoms being a substrate in which life inheres or not. The hairs (*šā'ar*), bones, and blood of the human body have constituted in this way the object of disputes about their belonging to the person on the basis of their being living or not. The way in which one can make a distinction between what is living and what is not, is by establishing whether it is perceiving or not. Some forms of perception—seeing, hearing, tasting, and smelling—need a special organism, a special instrument, built in a special manner, but other forms of perception do not. These are used as the distinctive mark between what is living and what is not, they are the perception of warmth, coldness, and pain. In this way the level on which the discussion is held changes, not the discussion itself, for the question to be answered now runs, for instance, do we feel pain in our bones and in our blood?²⁰ 'Abd al-Jabbâr's teachers Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâšim agree that we do not perceive with our blood, but that, nevertheless, blood is a necessary condition for the living being to be living.²¹

For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the able living being is, consequently, the person we see and know. It is the body, in the general sense of that word and not as opposed to spirit, a composite whole (*jumla*) of substances and their inhering accidents. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr man is a material unity. Man is not a combination of a material and a spiritual element, nor does there exist something inside or outside the body which really would be the able living being. No, the body as we know it, that is the able living being. That should be called "man."²²

In the *Mugni* we find two basic arguments to prove this view: first, the knowledge of a quality is said to be based upon the knowledge of the thing which has this quality;²³ the relationship between the two sorts of knowledge is that between *asl* and *far'*, root and branch, basic knowledge and derived knowledge. When we know the able living being to be living (and to be able), we must know that being before,

²⁰ For the opinions of Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâšim *Mugni* XI, 311-312, in the case of the bones e.g. the tooth-ache is discussed.

²¹ One might say that the "structure" mentioned in the definition of the human being implies that he is built from flesh and blood. See *Mugni* XI, 312.

²² See *Mugni* XI, 358.

²³ See *Mugni* XI, 312. This is based on the general principle that "the establishing of what cannot be known, neither by necessary knowledge nor by indication, is not possible." A quality supposes a qualified thing, to establish the existence of that qualified thing, we have to know it.

and the only thing we do know is the person (*šaks*), the composite body.²⁴

The second argument maintains that the fact that we know something to be perceiving, just as the fact that activity is possible for it,²⁵ indicates that it is living. 'Abd al-Jabbâr takes being perceiving as the characteristic feature by which the living being is distinguished from other things. As for the possibility of activity, this indicates its being able, and something cannot be able without being living. When, consequently, both perception and possibility of acts are the indications of the living being, and both perception and possibility of acts characterize the composite body of the living being, this composite body must be the living being.²⁶

Afterwards, 'Abd al-Jabbâr refutes the theses of his opponents who deny that the able living being, or the human being, is the composite body, nothing else and nothing more.

In these refutations, he starts from the fact that the life of a living being in this world is not unrestricted and not necessary; therefore, this living being must be living by a "life", a qualifier which causes the being to be living. Therefore, living in this world is that thing in which life inheres. Together with the principle that the qualified thing, the living being, must be something known, and the thesis that the distinctive feature of the living being is its being perceiving, this starting-point constitutes the basis of these refutations.²⁷

Rûh : spirit. The word *rûh*, which for other Mu'tazilî and non-Mu'tazilî theologians—especially the older Mu'tazila—indicated something different from the body, sometimes even of an entirely different kind, something constituting the principle of life,²⁸ is used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr

²⁴ *Mugni* XI, 312-313

²⁵ Perception is not an act. In this way one can make a distinction between something being perceiving and being able, the latter term meaning being thus that acts are possible for it. So, it is theoretically possible that something is perceiving without being able.

²⁶ See *Mugni* XI, 313, this argument is elaborated and objections against it are refuted in *Mugni* XI, 313-320.

²⁷ The theses of the opponents who state that the living being or the human being is an element that directs the body, an atom of the heart, a spirit (*rûh*) in the heart, the spirit, the spirit and the body, or the spirit which interpenetrates the body, are mentioned and discussed in *Mugni* XI, 321-344.

²⁸ Some of these opinions are recorded by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* XI, 310-311. According to an-Nazzâm the spirit would be "life, interwoven (*musâbika*) with this body (*yasad*), it is in the body by way of penetration (*mudâkâla*), it is one substance without different or opposite (parts), it is strong (*qawî*, comparable to the term *qâdir*),

for something material, based as his philosophy is on the thesis that the entire world is built from substances and their inhering accidents.²⁹ Therefore, spirit, whatever it be, must be substance and accidents or one of the two.

In fact, 'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes that spirit is a substance characterized by the quality "subtlety" (*riqqa*).³⁰ It is nothing else but breath which goes in and out the body (*an-nafas al-mutaraddid*). It belongs to the genus "wind" (*rih*), and it is only called "spirit" (*rûh*) when it exists in the body of a living being.³¹

Spirit itself is not living and consequently not a part of the composite body of the living being. The arguments leading to this conclusion are that we cannot perceive with this spirit,³² it misses the structure and also the "wetness" (*rutûba*) necessary for a living being.³³ But, 'Abd al-Jabbâr says, just as blood, which also is not living and not a part of the living being, spirit is needed for life; life can only exist in a composite body when there is spirit in the orifices (*makâriq*: especially the mouth and the nose are meant) of the body.³⁴ In this way the concept of "spirit" existing in the able living being does not contradict 'Abd al-Jabbâr's thesis that that being is a material unity.

Nafs: soul. Just as the term "spirit" (*rûh*), the term "soul" (*nafs*) is used by others to indicate an immaterial element in the human being and in other living beings.³⁵ It frequently occurs in that way in the

living, and knowing by its essence" Bišr bn al-Mu'tamir held the view—and some other authors held similar views— that the spirit is the element by which the body is living

²⁹ Cf *Muḥit* I, 28

³⁰ See *Muḥit* XI, 331

³¹ The identification between the spirit and the breath is explicitly made in *Muḥit* XI, 336 "wa-'alimnâ ann ar-rûh huw an-nafas al-mutaraddid" This identification is less clear in *Muḥit* XI, 331 where one could translate "it is only qualified by that (sc being spirit) when it originates in the living being, otherwise (wa-illâ) it belongs to the genus of the wind and the breath which goes in and out" But against the background of the entire chapter of the *Muḥit*, we must conclude that surely the breath is meant by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and that we have to translate "wa-illâ fa-huw" as "and unless"

³² See *Muḥit* XI, 336 "When we know that one does not perceive by it (the spirit) as one does not perceive by the hair, one must judge that there in no way is life in it, and when there is no life in it, it cannot be counted to (belong to) the composite body of the living being"

³³ *Muḥit* XI, 331 "life needs wetness and structure, and that does not exist in the spirit"

³⁴ Cf *Muḥit* XI, 331 and 335

³⁵ See Calverley, art *Nafs*, in *Et*, III, 827-830

books of philosophers of the Aristotelian tradition, who even called their books on anthropology, in imitation of Aristoteles, "*kitâb an-nafs*", "book on the soul".³⁶ For these thinkers the word *nafs* is the translation of the greek "*psychè*".

To protect his own concept of the unity of the human person, 'Abd al-Jabbâr has to reject this meaning of the term *nafs*. Sometimes he uses the word *nafs* as an equivalent to the word *qalb* (heart);³⁷ in other places, however, he explicitly denies this identification and states that the word *nafs* indicates the totality of the living being.³⁸ This latter meaning of the word is confirmed by its use as the reflexive pronoun indicating the "self", and in the expression *li-nafsih*, which can be translated as "per se".³⁹ In other contexts it is not clear what exactly he means when using the word *nafs*,⁴⁰ but it will never be an immaterial element in the human being.

Qalb : heart. The word *qalb* seems, notwithstanding all that has been said above, to indicate a dichotomy in the human being; 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a distinction between the acts of the heart (*af'âl al-qalb*) and the acts of the limbs (*af'âl al-jawârih*).⁴¹ The acts of the heart being, for instance, knowledge and will, 'Abd al-Jabbâr seems to introduce here an element that is characterized by immateriality

This, however, is not the case; 'Abd al-Jabbâr sticks to his principle. It is not the heart that is knowing or willing, but the entire person, the composite whole. Nor is the heart an instrument by which man

³⁶ 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions this in *Mugnî* XI, 312. See the references in *GAL* S III, 1013. See also Afnan, *Philosophical Lexicon*, 294-295.

³⁷ So, for instance, in *Mugnî* VII, 14-20, a chapter entitled "Refutation of the statement that speech is a qualifier existing in the soul (*nafs*)", in this chapter the words *nafs* and *qalb* are used alternately and obviously as equivalents, where the statement of the title of the chapter is repeated on page 15, the word *qalb* is used instead of *nafs*.

³⁸ So in *Mugnî* XII, 22 "its meaning is the composite whole (*al-jumla*) because that is expressed by means of 'soul'" 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses there the meaning of the expression *sukûn an-nafs* and explains why he uses "tranquility of the soul" and not "tranquility of the heart". The principal reason why he does not use there the word *qalb* probably is that "tranquility of the heart" would be conceived too physically as the stopping of its beating. "The tranquility, when connected with the heart (to constitute together an expression tranquility of the heart), is understood in another way than the tranquility of the soul". In this context he states that the word *nafs* indicates the totality, which the word heart certainly does not.

³⁹ See *Mugnî* XII, 22 and our page 148.

⁴⁰ In the expression *hadîq an-nafs* (talk of the soul) the exact meaning of this "soul" is not clear. See pp 62-63.

⁴¹ See for instance *Muhit* I, 366-367.

can produce these acts;⁴² the heart is a substrate like any other substrate; it is only built in such a way that accidents as knowledge and will can inhere in it. The only reason why knowledge and will inhere in the heart and not in other parts of the body or in lifeless things, is that the heart alone has the required structure (*binya*).⁴³

When we read the word *qalb* in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, we have to realize that what is meant is the physical heart of the human body, which is structured in such a way that the accidents which are called "the acts of the heart" can inhere in it. The heart has its function just as other parts of the human body and is not essentially different from the other parts.⁴⁴

Binya: structure.⁴⁵ The word *binya* or structure 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses in his description of the able living being, and by which he distinguishes between the heart and the other parts of the human person, belongs to the category of concepts which can be called physical. We have already seen that he uses in his philosophy, besides the metaphysical concepts, words like "body" (*jism*) and atom (*juz*), which seem to be derived from a physical world-view. These are names given to the directly perceived reality, as becomes manifest from 'Abd al-Jabbâr's appealing to that reality by speaking about "this structure", "*hâdih al-binya*", and pointing in this way to the perceived reality. Our perception tells us that the world is built from composite bodies which

⁴² *Muhit* I, 366 if it were an instrument, God, who acts without instruments, would be able to produce these acts of the heart also in other substrates. This is impossible, therefore, the reason must be that they can only inhere in something that has this special structure which we meet in the human heart.

⁴³ See, e.g., *Šarh* 220 "The same can be said about knowledge, for the only reason why it cannot exist in the hand is that it needs to exist a structure as the structure of the heart. This may be explained by the fact that if we could structure (*nabni*) the hand in the same way the heart is structured these qualifiers could exist in it" See also *Mugnî* IV, 33.

⁴⁴ See *Mugnî* XI, 329.

⁴⁵ Frank (*Ma'nâ*, 249) translates the word *binya* as "organism". This translation can be correct when we discuss the *binya* of the human body which is needed for the inhering of "life" in it. The word *binya* is also used for the structure of very small parts in the body, so, e.g., when 'Abd al-Jabbâr observes that the production of any letter by a human being needs its own *binya* (*Mugnî* VII, 38). Even lifeless bodies can be said to have a special *binya* as, for instance, the place where an echo can exist. Therefore, it is better to translate the word as "structure". For Frank's opinion on the composite body of the living being as having a structure, see *Kalâm*, 307: "The body as an organic unit, capable of life and of being the subject of those other accidents that qualify the whole in the unity of its being, is generally referred to as *binya*." It is preferable to say that the body is referred to as *mabni* (structured) or having a certain structure because the body is not the structure.

have a special structure by which we distinguish among the different kinds of bodies. We also see that living beings have a special structure, and that parts of the living being have each their own structure necessary to fulfil their task, the structure of the eye is other than the structure of the hand. The reason therefore can be that something or some part of the body has to be used as an instrument and therefore needs a special structure, as for instance the tongue, the mouth, and the teeth, which are used as an instrument (*âla*) for the production of speech. Our various functions require various instruments, each with its own structure.⁴⁶ Other structured parts are not used as instrument, but require nevertheless their special structure to be the substrate in which certain accidents can inhere. This, for instance, is the case with the human heart, in which the acts of the heart inhere, and with the totality of the living being, in which the accident "life" inheres.⁴⁷ With these last examples we leave the physical level and come to the metaphysical, where we discuss the inhering of accidents in substances. Our conclusion is that this concept of "structure", derived from the physical reality and based upon the data of the perception, loses its clearness by its use in metaphysical contexts.⁴⁸

2 MAN IS LIVING

Hayy: living⁴⁹ Whenever 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the terms "living" (*hayy*) and "life" (*hayât*), he seems to have in mind almost exclusively God and man, in the case of "life" only man. Sometimes we find mention made of the animals, which are also reckoned among the

⁴⁶ About the special structure which speech needs when it is produced by human beings, the reason of this need being that we have to use instruments to produce speech, instruments which must be "structured", 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks in *Mugni* VII, 31-42. Therefore, God, who does not need instruments, can produce speech on every substrate.

⁴⁷ See *Mugni* VII, 40 and *Muhit* I, 366, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues that the heart cannot be an instrument. For a discussion of the substrates of life and knowledge (resp. the living being and the heart), see also *Šarh* 220.

⁴⁸ The metaphysical character of this argument (the substrate which needs a special structure) is confirmed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations to prove that this substrate does need this special structure. The reason therefore is that this accident must cause a "state" (*hâl*) for the living being, and to be able to cause that state it must exist on a substrate which has a special structure. See *Mugni* VII, 34, *Muhit* I, 366.

⁴⁹ About "living" and "life" 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks mainly in discussing God's being living (especially in *Muhit* I, 121-128 and *Šarh* 160-167, see also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Nazariyat at-taklîf*, 209-211) and in discussing the responsible person (*Mugni* XI, 309-367).

living beings;⁵⁰ plants are not discussed at all as far as I have been able to verify. The reason of this "negligence" on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's part has to be looked for in his basically theological orientation; his main interest is the relationship between God and mankind and furthermore the essence of man as the living being who is responsible towards God.

The meaning of the word "living" and the difference between what is living and what is lifeless matter is "necessarily" known. When the general knowledge of what is "living" is concerned, no dispute is possible.⁵¹ Everybody must agree.

But, though the general knowledge is necessary, the detailed is not. To acquire a detailed knowledge of "living", we need reflection and argumentation. For what does the statement that something is living, exactly mean? And how can we know what exactly has this quality?

According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, "living" is not an equivalent to "able", although every able thing is also necessarily living;⁵² but living is another quality, added to the quality of being able. As a definition of "living" he gives: "(the quality) with which (the subject), when he is characterized by it, can be knowing and able."⁵³ This definition implies that whatever is knowing or able, is also living. But, since the definition mentions also the word "can", we cannot conclude that what is not knowing or able is not living. The quality of being living constitutes a fundamental condition for the possibility of the other two qualities, not more.

⁵⁰ See *Mugni* XI, 312, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr quotes Abû Hâšim in a text of his *Bagdâdiyât*, and seems to agree with him about that statement "The theologians call the able living being man, and they give the treatise about it the name 'treatise on man' (*al-kalâm fî l-insân*), although the animals which are living are not a man, but they mean (*murâduhum*) the living being, be it man or animal"

⁵¹ "Know that this quality is known in general (*'alâ tariq al-jumla*) necessarily in this world" *Muhit* I, 121 The detailed knowledge (*tafsîl*) is only known by acquired knowledge, we need a *dalâla*

⁵² There are three ways to make a distinction between two different qualities; if in none of these three ways a distinction can be made, they must be synonyms. The first is the perception, perception tells us that black and white are two different qualities. The second is the self-experience (*wajad nafsaḥ*, see p 54), by this self-experience (the verbal noun used here is *al-wijdân min an-nafs*), one knows that being willing is different from being non-willing. The third is that both qualities have another consequence or judgement (*hukm*), the quality "able" is entitled to the judgement that acts are possible, the quality "knowing" that acts are possible in a precise manner. The difference between the qualities "able" (*qâdir*) and "living" (*ḥayy*) can only be made in the third way: the judgement on "able" is that acts are possible, the judgement on "living" that perception is possible. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr perception is not an act. See *Šarḥ* 165

⁵³ *Muhit* I, 312. "*mâ ma'ah yasihh 'ind al-iḳtîsâs biḥ kawnuh 'âlîman wa-qâdiran*". This definition is applicable both to living beings in this world and to God

In fact we can say⁵⁴ that by the presence of a quality which requires a living being we know that the qualified thing is living. In such an argumentation we cannot use any quality which requires a living being, because there are qualities of God which we cannot know before we know that He is living, such as, for instance, His being perceiving⁵⁵

When 'Abd al-Jabbâr looks for a distinctive feature which makes it possible to distinguish between the living and the non-living, he discovers the "possibility of being knowing and able" because that is the only characteristic feature which the temporal and the eternal living beings have in common, and which in both cases can be known before one knows that the being concerned is living⁵⁶

But the pure metaphysical possibility (*shha*) of a quality (in case the qualities of being knowing and being able) is not easily discernible, therefore 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions a second distinctive feature "being perceiving". This characteristic is derived, not from metaphysical argumentations, but from the physical reality and the perception of that reality. It is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's phenomenal conclusion that what is living in this world distinguishes itself from the non-living by its being perceiving⁵⁷. Its non-metaphysical character is confirmed by the fact that we cannot know that God is perceiving but by way of a conclusion from the fact that He is living⁵⁸. Consequently, to distinguish living beings in this world, we can appeal to their being perceiving, to prove that God is living, we must argue from His being knowing and able⁵⁹.

⁵⁴ The opinion recorded here is the opinion of Abû Abdallâh al-Basrî, Abd al-Jabbâr's direct teacher. Abd al-Jabbâr seems to agree with his teacher. See *Muht* I, 121.

⁵⁵ *Muht* I 121-122. 'One can infer that one of us is living by his being able, knowing, willing, non-willing, perceiving, reflecting, desiring, feeling, aversion because the knowledge of all that may originate though one does not know in detail that he is living. As for the Eternal some of these qualities are not applicable to Him and what is applicable to Him can be divided into two parts: one of these two can be known before one knows that He is living; consequently it is possible to infer from it that He is living so, for instance His being able and knowing. The second cannot be known before one knows that He is living, so, for instance his being perceiving for we only know that He is perceiving when we know that He is living, and we only know that He is willing after we know that He is living.

⁵⁶ See the text of *Muht* I, 121-122 which we translated in the previous note. See also *Mugnî* XI 309.

⁵⁷ See *Mugnî* XI, 335, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses what is living in this world. In this case perception is limited by the instruments we need for our perception. The discussion on pp. 335 and 336 is built on physical arguments.

⁵⁸ See *Muht* I 122, the essence of perception and the way in which we know that God is perceiving will be discussed later.

⁵⁹ Therefore 'Abd al-Jabbâr states: 'The state of living can only be distinguished

Our being living is a state; we know that we are living before we know "life". God must be in that state because of His essence or per se: He cannot be non-knowing nor non-able. therefore His being living, too, must be a permanent state.

For us, human beings and other living beings in this world, the state of "living" is a transitory state; we know that we are not necessarily living and that we can stop being living, while the possibility to be living remains.⁶⁰ This is the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues that we are in a certain state "*li-'illa*" (because of a cause) or "*li-ma'nâ*" (because of a qualifier). The cause or qualifier the presence of which in the composite body makes it to be living, while its disappearance makes it to stop living, is called "*hayât*" or "life", in accordance with 'Abd al-Jabbâr's usual way of treating the states.

That a living being in this world cannot be living "per se" (*li-nafsih*), is proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in two groups of arguments—both dependent on the same general principle running: "it is not permitted (possible) that two things have in common one of the essential qualities (a quality both have per se) without (having in common) the other essential qualities."⁶¹ When two things have one essential quality in common, they must be similar and have all essential qualities in common. When both God and man would be essentially or per se living, one could draw two conclusions: God would have human qualities and man would have divine qualities. God would be temporal and at the same time eternal; He would have needs; He would be a body; He could do what is bad. Man, on the other hand, would be essentially able and therefore almighty; he would know everything; he would be eternal and live for ever. Because we know that all these conclusions are false, we know that the premise must be false.⁶²

from others by his being perceiving the perceptible things when the hindrances are taken away, and by the possibility that he is knowing (and) able" *Mugni* XI, 309 Here the two distinctive features are taken together and combined

Frank (*Fundamental Assumptions*, 6) places most emphasis on perception as the distinctive feature and comes to the conclusion that "this implies a fundamental outward orientation of the living being, an orientation towards the world and some form of action" We must observe that living for 'Abd al-Jabbâr is not identical with perceiving nor with knowing and able, it is the quality which makes the other qualities possible, and which also makes an orientation towards the world possible, as it makes, e g, the self-experience and self-determination possible

⁶⁰ *Mugni* XI, 324 we know that man can leave (*karaj*) his state of being living

⁶¹ See *Mugni* XI, 323 "*lâ yajûz fî š-say'ayn an yaštarikâ fî šifa min šifât an-nafs dîn šâ'ir šifât an-nafs*" In other places (also on the same page) this general principle is formulated in different ways, the tendency always being the same

⁶² All these arguments are found in *Mugni* XI, 322-325

When 'Abd al-Jabbâr has proved in this way that a worldly living being is only living because of a qualifier which exists in him, and that this qualifier must be an accident which inheres in a (material) substrate, it follows that this qualifier is not only the cause of the being's being living, but also the reason of its limitedness: by its being bound to materiality and its being limited to a concrete substrate, in which inhere other accidents too, the qualifier can only partially realize the possibilities of the quality. The qualifier is called the "determinant", but at the same time it is the principle of fragmentation in time and space.⁶³

The qualifier "life" (*hayât*), which inheres in a being, causes it to be living, makes it possible that it is knowing and able, ties it to materiality, and submits it to the rules of materiality—but at the same time this being is nothing more and nothing else than materiality.⁶⁴ To the rules of materiality belongs that the accident "life" can only inhere in a substrate that is a "composite body" (*jumla*), built from several atoms and having a certain structure (*binya*). Therefore, something that is "living by life", a worldly living being, needs a strictly definable structure;⁶⁵ it must be composed of flesh, have a certain wetness, need blood—though the blood does not belong to the composite body of the living being—and have a heart.⁶⁶ A living being in this world is not the separate atoms, it is not some part of the body, nor is it something inside or outside the body that directs the body. The living being is the totality, the composite body.⁶⁷

Finally, two conclusions can be drawn, one on the metaphysical level, the other on the physical.⁶⁸

On the metaphysical level: as the substance's being spatial (its *tahayyuz*) is the firm and stable basis which makes the various modes of being (*akwân*) and their alternation and succession possible, without

⁶³ See Frank's article *Ma'nâ* and our pp 156-158

⁶⁴ See *Muhit* I, 121 and 126 About its being pure materiality, see our discussion of the essence of man, especially p 163

⁶⁵ See *Muhit* I, 125 and *Šarh* 220

⁶⁶ See for some details *Muhit* I, 128

⁶⁷ See, e.g., *Muhit* I, 313 and *Šarh* 161 Frank (*Fundamental Assumptions*, 6) states: "The living being (he means the living being in this world) is strictly conceived as a structural unity of material parts (), it is not identified with any simple component, whether a material organ, 'spirit', or whatever else"

⁶⁸ The text of the *Muhit* is interested mainly in the metaphysical point of view, while the eleventh part of the *Muğni* gives much of its attention to the physical problems connected with the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr sees the essence of man and of living beings in general

having itself an opposite (*ḍidd*) which could make it disappear from the substrate and cause it to be itself also a stage in a succession,⁶⁹ so the composite body's being living and the inherence of the qualifier "life" constitute the firm and stable basis which makes the succession of the various "knowledges" and "abilities" in this body possible. Being living, as being in space, has no opposite, is not a stage in a succession,⁷⁰ and in this way can form the "remaining" basis⁷¹ about which 'Abd al-Jabbâr can say, speaking on a metaphysical level, that it makes knowledge and ability (if only living beings in this world are concerned) or being knowing and able (to make it applicable to God too), possible.⁷²

On the physical level: just as the composition (*ta'lif*) of single atoms can constitute a body (*jism*) which may receive qualities a single atom cannot have, so the combination of several bodies can constitute a *jumla* or composite body,⁷³ which can have qualities, as for instance the basic quality of being living, the separate parts of this composite body cannot have. The reason is that some qualities need a structure; only when this structure is realized by the combination of several bodies into a whole which has the required structure, the qualifier "life" can inhere in it and make this combination of lifeless bodies into a living being. Therefore, the atoms or parts of the living being cannot remain living when separated from the composite body.⁷⁴

Mayyit: dead. When we use the term "death" (*mawt*) in everyday language, we mean something that makes a living being cease being living without the disappearance of the structure (*bniya*) which is

⁶⁹ A substance— even the single atom—is always spatial. This does not change nor disappear. What disappears and changes is the exact place where the substances are in space, but this is expressed by the modes of being or *akwân*, which succeed one another on the substrate. But a substance or atom, whenever it exists, is necessarily *matahaviḥ*, spatial.

⁷⁰ Death is not the opposite of life, nor being dead the opposite of being living, see below where we make some remarks about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's description of death.

⁷¹ It is an accident, which consequently cannot remain as the substances remain, but we can say that this accident remains as long as the living being remains a living being.

⁷² See *Muhit* I, 121. "This quality (sc. being living) became the principle of the possibility of these qualities (sc. being knowing and being able) which succeed each other and are each other's opposite in the composite body (*al-jumla*) just as its being immobile and moving, combined and separated is possible because of the being spatial (*tahaviḥ*)". See also *Muhit* I, 126.

⁷³ According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr a composite body (*jumla*) becomes only a composite body by the existence of the qualifier life in it. *Muhit* I, 126. "ma'lûm annahâ innamâ tasîḥ jumlatan ba'd wujûd al-hayât fihâ" (or, maybe better *fihâ*). See also *Mugnî* I, 127.

⁷⁴ See *Mugnî* XI, 356 and 327-329.

needed for life.⁷⁵ So we use it for something momentary, and in fact we do not know what it exactly is.

Philosophically, it is clear that being dead (*mayyit*) is not a state the composite body (*al-jumla*) is in; the composite body only becomes a composite body by the inhering of the quality "life".⁷⁶ So one can say with Abû Hâsim that by death the substrate ceases to be the composite body of a living being.⁷⁷ Life needs and characterizes a composite body which has a certain structure, death does not. Therefore, one cannot say that a composite body is dead, but only that the atoms which once constituted the composite body are dead, meaning that they once formed part of the composite body of a living being.⁷⁸ 'Abd al-Jabbâr therefore remarks that death has the same influence as has the separation of a part of the living being from the living being; through this separation it ceases to be living as it ceases to be a part of the living being.⁷⁹

Because we cannot establish a state of being dead, we cannot establish a qualifier "death". The only thing we can say is that life can disappear from a substrate without the loss of something it needs—a loss that could explain its disappearance. Because there is no clearly discernible reason for that disappearance, we say it is caused by "death".⁸⁰ Because of all that is said above, it will be apparent that death can by no means be the opposite of life.⁸¹

⁷⁵ *Muḡni* VII, 37.

⁷⁶ See *Muḡni* VII, 37: "For it (sc death) is not a state in which life disappears from the composite body of the living being or from a part of it which is cut off" I read *li-annah lâ bi-hâl* instead of *li-annah lâ hâl*, in the manuscript there is a small stroke before the letter *hâ'* which can be a *hâ'*. The interpunction in this paragraph of the printed text is confusing and not correct

⁷⁷ *Muḡni* XI, 355 "annah *vukriḡ al-mahall min an vakûn jumlat al-hayv fayasîr fî hukm at-tabâyun*"

⁷⁸ Cf *Muḡni* XI, 355. life characterizes a perceiving composite body, death evidently does not "When they qualify the composite body as dead, the meaning of it is that every atom of it is dead" The qualifying of a composite body as living is not a qualifying of every single atom but of the composite body. See also *Muhit* I, 127

⁷⁹ *Muḡni* VII, 39: "It (death) only influences the substrate just as the separation (*al-*mfisâl**) from the living being, it makes it cease to be a part (read *ba'd* instead of *naqîd*, this appears in the manuscript and from the sense of the context) of it".

⁸⁰ *Muḡni* VII, 37 "Moreover, it (sc life) disappears while everything it needs is as it was before, therefore, one can conclude that it notwithstanding the fact that it is (a) remaining (accident)- only disappeared by death There is no other possibility to establish it (sc death)"

⁸¹ *Muhit* I, 126-127. See also *Muḡni* VII, 37 and 39

3. MAN IS PERCEIVING

Mudrik : perceiving.⁸² Although 'Abd al-Jabbâr defines, and confines, the living being by means of being perceiving—and in this manner he even excludes from the composite body of the living being those parts by which the living being is not perceiving⁸³—and although he thus makes perception the distinctive feature of what is living, perceiving is another quality than living, however strong the relationship between both may be.

We know by inner experience (*wijdân an-nafs*) that we are sometimes in the state (*hâl*) of being perceiving, and that at other moments we are not in this state. Consequently, we know that this is a transitory state. We also know that our state of being living has a more permanent character, and can only come to an end by what we call "death". This implies, as we also know by inner experience, that we can be living without perceiving. The conclusion can be drawn that "perceiving" (*mudrik*) and "living" (*hayy*) are two different qualities.⁸⁴

In the normal course of his argumentation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr would now deduce from the fact that perceiving is a transitory state that we are perceiving because of a qualifier (*li-ma'nâ*) the presence of which makes us to be perceiving, while its disappearance makes us cease to be thus. But in this case the conclusion cannot be drawn. Perception (*idrâk*) is not a qualifier.⁸⁵ For, if perception would be a qualifier, it would be possible that we had the qualifier "life" (*hayât*) and consequently were living, but that we had not the qualifier "perception" (*idrâk*). That implies that it would be possible that we are living, that perceptible things are present, our senses are in perfect condition, and

⁸² About perceiving (*mudrik*) and perception (*idrâk*) 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks in some detail when discussing two important themes of his theodicy. The first theme is the discussion about God's qualities and the question whether He can be called "perceiving" and whether that is something other than to call Him "knowing". This question, which is answered by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the affirmative but by Mu'tazila from the Bagdâdî branch in the negative, is discussed in *Šarh* 167-175 and *Muhit* I, 129-132 while the corresponding part of the *Muğni* is missing. The second theme is the question whether God can be seen in paradise; this was a matter of dispute between traditionalists and the Aš'ariya on the one side and the Mu'tazilî theologians on the other. See for this subject *Šarh* 232-277, *Muhit* 206-211, and *Muğni* IV, 33-240.

See also some remarks on this matter in 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Nazarîvat at-taklîf*, 65-74 and M. Bernard, *Le savoir entre la volonté et la spontanéité selon an-Nazzâm et al-Ġâhîz*, *SI* 39 (1974), 25-57.

⁸³ Cf. *Muğni* XI, 311-312.

⁸⁴ See, e.g., *Šarh* 168. "wa-ann kawnah mudrikan sifa zâ'ida 'alâ kawnih hayyan".

⁸⁵ See *Muhit* I. 129.

no outward hindrances occur, and that we, nevertheless, would not perceive those perceptible things because we miss the qualifier "perception". This is not possible; we necessarily perceive the perceptible things which are present when our senses are in good condition and there are no hindrances. Hence is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's conclusion that we are perceiving by our being living under certain conditions.⁸⁶

Therefore, being living not only makes possible that one is perceiving, but even makes this necessary if the conditions are fulfilled. Perceiving is not an act, nor the result of a free choice, but the consequence of the being living under certain conditions.⁸⁷

There are three categories of these conditions; the first concerns the perceiving subject; this subject cannot have a defect (*âfa*) that has an influence upon the possibility to perceive, as in living beings in this world, for instance, blindness. The second category concerns the perceptible object; the only condition to be fulfilled here is that it is existent. The third category concerns conditions which are related to the instruments living beings in this world have to use in perceiving: the exclusion of "hindrances" (*mawâni*) which we will discuss later on.⁸⁸ But we can already conclude that God, who cannot have a defect and does not need instruments in perceiving,⁸⁹ necessarily perceives all existent perceptible things.⁹⁰

But what exactly does 'Abd al-Jabbâr mean when he uses the term perception (*idrâk*) or the term perceiving (*mudrik*)? As he does in similar cases, he remarks that he cannot give a definition, because every definition one could give of perception would be more complicated and more obscure than the term "perception" itself. And it belongs to the essence of a definition that it is clearer and more revealing than the term to be defined;⁹¹ nothing, however, can be clearer than the term "perception" because every human being who is *compos mentis* knows by self-experience that he sometimes is perceiving, and that it is not the same as being knowing, just as he

⁸⁶ This is argued, e.g., in *Muğni* IV, 50-58.

⁸⁷ Cf. *Muḥit* I, 130.

⁸⁸ These conditions are mentioned in various places in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works in various forms. See, e.g., *Muḥit* I, 130-131.

⁸⁹ God is *per se* or essentially living, but cannot be said to be *per se* or essentially perceiving because He only is perceiving when perceptible things do exist. See also what we observe under the headings "*baṣîr*" and "*samî*". Therefore, God is called perceiving on the condition that perceptible things exist; thus He is called "perceiving" now.

⁹⁰ See *Muḥit* I, 129-132 and *Šarḥ* 167-175.

⁹¹ See pp. 76-78.

knows the difference between being seeing and being hearing or other forms of perception.⁹²

Perception is not knowledge, nor an act.⁹³ We can try to describe 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion by saying that it is the fundamental openness of the living being towards the outer world.⁹⁴ It is the fundamental openness of the living being, and just as the composite body of the living being in this world is the living subject, it is the totality of the living being—or in this world the composite body—that is perceiving. What is perceiving is not the heart, nor the spirit, nor the senses, but the totality: I see, I hear, I perceive, indeed by means of my senses, but the perceiving subject is me, in my totality as a material unity.⁹⁵

When we know by self-experience that we are perceiving, we also know that we need instruments, senses, for this perception. The reason for this need of instruments is to be found in our being living through a life that as an accident inheres in us. When we are perceiving, we are thus through this life, which is bound to a material substrate. Therefore, we have to use the substrate of this qualifier "life" as an instrument for our perception. Consequently, the presence of the qualifier "life" makes it possible that the living being is perceiving, but at the same time it limits its possibilities by connecting it with materiality. Therefore, we have to use the substrate of the accident life, and that means the composite body of the living being, as an instrument for our perception.⁹⁶

⁹² "As for the seeing (subject), he is only qualified (in this way) because of the originating of the special state (read *al-hâl* instead of *al-kâl*) which his being living supposes. The difference between his being perceiving the other perceptible things (and his being seeing) every person who is *compos mentis* knows from himself, as he knows the difference between his being perceiving and his being knowing and what is analogous to this. The pointing to this makes it superfluous to define it in expressions, for in this occurs more disclosure and revealing than occurs in expressions" *Muġni* IV, 81

⁹³ Cf., for instance, *Šarh* 165-166

⁹⁴ While the living being as living is not essentially connected with ('Abd al-Jabbâr uses the word *ta'alluq*) something else outside the living being (see *Muġit* I, 129), as perceiving it has this connection and is connected with a thing (see *Muġni* VII, 24) This connection is even a fundamental openness since it is not based upon a free choice, the possibility at the same time is necessity (See *Muġni* IV, 39)

⁹⁵ See *Muġni* XI, 313

⁹⁶ See *Muġni* IV, 36-38 "The Eternal can only see the things notwithstanding His being elevated above the possibility of senses, because He is essentially living, as He does not need life and its substrate in His being living, so He does not need to use the substrate of life as a means (read *at-tawassul* instead of *at-tawassul*) to perceive the visible things. The state of one of us is not thus, for he is living by a life that inheres in a part of him (*fî ba'dih*), therefore he needs in the perception of the perceptible things the use of the substrate of life in the perception of them so that it becomes an instrument for him" (*Muġni* IV, 36)

So far we discussed the perceiving subject, which, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, is the living being that under certain conditions perceives all existent perceptible things (*mudrakât*).

The next question that arises is which things are perceptible and, therefore, must be perceived if the conditions are fulfilled. We know from experience that not every existent thing is perceptible.⁹⁷ We know that there are accidents, as for instance the acts of the heart (knowledge, will, etc.), which are imperceptible. The perceptible things are: substances and the seven genera of accidents which 'Abd al-Jabbâr called the perceptible accidents.⁹⁸ These are: colour (*lawn*), sound (*ṣawt*), odour (*râ'iḥa*), taste (*ṭa'm*), warmth (*ḥarâra*), coldness (*burûda*), and pain (*alam*). Everything that is perceptible is perceived according to its most characteristic quality,⁹⁹ the characteristic of its genus.¹⁰⁰ This implies, for instance, that a substance is perceived because of its being spatial, and that what is perceived of the substance is exactly its being spatial.¹⁰¹ What is perceived of speech is its being sounds, speech belonging to the genus sound.¹⁰²

So there are various kinds of perceptible things the difference among which lies in the perceived things themselves, not in the perceiving subject, nor is it caused by the perception or by the senses used. The perception, which fundamentally is one and the same, is called by various names according to the object of the perception. When we perceive a colour, we are seeing, and when we perceive a sound, we are hearing. Basically, this is independent of the use of the corresponding sense; therefore, God can be called "seeing" and "hearing" although He perceives without using senses.¹⁰³

We, living beings in this world, have to use—as we already said—the substrate of our qualifier "life" as an instrument in perceiving.

⁹⁷ See *Muġnî* IV, 83-88, a chapter where 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the question of the quality which something must have to be visible (and perceptible) In the title of this chapter read (as also in the indices on pp. 4 and 350) "*fî bayân as-sifa allatî li-kawn al-mar'î 'alayhâ yurâ*" instead of "*allatî yakûn*"

⁹⁸ See pp 124-125 See also *Šarḥ* 92.

⁹⁹ Cf *Muġnî* VII, 24. "*Al-idrâk yata'allaq bi-ṣ-ṣay' 'alâ aḳṣaw aw sāfih*", "perception is connected with the thing (perceived) according to its (sc the thing's) most characteristic qualification".

¹⁰⁰ Cf *Muġnî* IV, 83 we perceive things "*li-mâ hiy 'alayh fî naṣṣihâ*". See the following argumentation on pp. 83-84

¹⁰¹ It is the most characteristic quality of the substance, more characteristic than being existent; *Muġnî* IV, 84

¹⁰² See *Muġnî* VII, 21-23.

¹⁰³ See *Šarḥ* 167-168 and 174.

Four kinds of perceptible things do not need a special structure to be perceived and can be perceived by means of every part of the composite living body; these are substances, warmth, coldness, and pain¹⁰⁴ The other accidents, however, need a special structure and cannot be perceived by means of every living substrate, perception of colours needs the structure of the eye, perception of sounds the structure of the ear, of odours the nose, and of tastes the mouth¹⁰⁵ Moreover, the eye is also used as a means in perceiving the substances, so that substances are perceived by means of both the eye and the other parts of the body¹⁰⁶

The fact that we have to use the composite body or even some special parts which are structured in a complicated way, forms the basis for the defects and hindrances which can prevent the perception¹⁰⁷

By way of conclusion we hold that the perceiving subject is a unity, and that fundamentally there is only one kind of perception, consisting in the openness of the living being towards the outer world The difference we experience comes from the difference of perceptible objects, which necessitates the difference of our senses

The relationship between the two qualities "perceiving" (*mudrik*) and "knowing" (*'ālim*) has been discussed when we treated perception among the sources of human knowledge¹⁰⁸

In short, being perceiving is not the same as being knowing "The perceiving (subject) has, by his being perceiving, a quality more than his being knowing the perceptible things"¹⁰⁹ We know this from experience, for we can know something without perceiving it,¹¹⁰ and

¹⁰⁴ See *Mugni* IV, 37 and XI, 311-312, *Muhit* I 131

¹⁰⁵ See *Muhit* I, 131, *Mugni* IV, 38 In this context the term *hāssa*, plural *hawāss* is used It is the word we translate as "senses" The five senses are parts of the composite body which are structured in a special way to constitute eye, ear, nose, and mouth in as far as these are used as means for perception, the fifth sense (*lams*, touching) is present in every part of the living body and does not need a special structure, this last sense is used to perceive substances, warmth, coldness, and pain

¹⁰⁶ See *Muhit* I, 131 and *Mugni* IV, 83-84

¹⁰⁷ The most important defects and hindrances occur in seeing and hearing, the most complicated forms of perception in this world These two forms of perception will be treated separately

¹⁰⁸ See pp 93-95

¹⁰⁹ See *Mugni* IV, 33 "*fī ann li-l-mudrik bi-kawnih mudrikan šifatan zā'idatan 'alā kawnih 'āliman bi-l-mudrakāt*"

¹¹⁰ Knowledge may remain after perception of the known object has come to an end and even after the loss of our sense, see *Mugni* IV, 34 We can also know God, the

we can perceive something without knowing it.¹¹¹ In this way we know that perceiving and knowing do not indicate the same quality.¹¹²

But perception is a way to knowledge (*ṭariq li-l-'ilm*), and, when a living subject who is *compos mentis* clearly perceives something without there being any vagueness, God necessarily creates in him the knowledge of the perceived object. When in concreto God creates that knowledge and when He does not, is known by inner experience, for in the first case we discover in ourselves the tranquillity of the soul, which is connected with real knowledge, and in the second case we do not.¹¹³

After this general discussion of the quality "perceiving" (*mudrik*) we now discuss in some more detail two forms of perceiving: perceiving colours and substances (seeing) and perceiving sounds (hearing). It will be clear that we have to say a few words on "hearing" because of the part it plays in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's treatise on speech and sound, while seeing is used in those discussions as a point of reference and is the form of perceiving 'Abd al-Jabbâr most explicitly discusses. To the other three forms of perceiving 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not pay much attention.

Baṣîr: having the metaphysical possibility to see¹¹⁴ When a being is living and has no defects, it necessarily has the possibility to see the existent visible things. This quality, which indicates that the qualified

single atom, many imperceptible accidents, and even the non-existent things without being able to perceive them See *Šarh* 169

¹¹¹ The reason may be that the perceiving subject is not *compos mentis* (*'âqil*), or at a certain moment is not thus, thus a sleeping person can perceive the stinging of a flea without knowing it. Or there may be a "vagueness" (*iltihâs*) in the perceived object related to the fact that we do have to use instruments in perceiving, thus the distance between the perceiving subject and the perceived object may be the cause of the perception's unclarity, and therefore not leading to knowledge. See *Šarh* 169 and also *Mugni* IV, 70-79

¹¹² This is based upon a general principle running "Know that every quality a qualified subject can be entitled to in some way without receiving another quality, must indicate something else than the other indicates, this is the conclusion" See *Mugni* IV, 33

¹¹³ About perception as a way to knowledge, see *Mugni* IV, 72. The tranquillity of the soul as the criterion to distinguish between perception which leads to knowledge and perception which does not, is mentioned in *Mugni* IV, 72. In *Mugni* IV, 70-79 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the causes of the vagueness (*iltihâs*) in the perception. His conclusion on p. 78 says that one cannot perceive something as other than it is, but that other things may influence the perception.

¹¹⁴ I did not find an appropriate English translation for this word, its definition can be found in *Šarh* 167

subject is in a certain state (*hâl*) by which it is possible for him to see the existent visible things,¹¹⁵ is used to show that God has the possibility to see, even when—before the creation—there is nothing that can be seen. It indicates a real possibility in God, which can only be realized after the creation of the world. This term is used to safeguard God's unity and His being Himself before and after the creation.¹¹⁶

Just as God is essentially and per se living, so He is also essentially and per se *bašîr*; living beings in this world, which are living through a life, are also *bašîr* through that life and therefore limitedly *bašîr*.

Mubšîr or Râ'i: seeing.¹¹⁷ On the metaphysical level not much is added here to what is said already in our discussion of the quality "perceiving" (*mudrik*). The subject who perceives colours and substances¹¹⁸ is called "seeing". God, who is essentially living and therefore perceiving all perceptible things which are existent, necessarily perceives and sees all existent substances and colours. In His seeing, He does not need any instruments or "senses" because those form part of materiality and of material subjects.¹¹⁹

Human beings and other living beings in this world are living through a life, and in their perceiving they need the use of the substrate in which that qualifier "life" inheres, as an instrument. To perceive visible things (colours and substances), that instrument must have a special structure as experience tells us; we can only see through that part of

¹¹⁵ See *Šarh* 167 "*ammâ l-basîr, fa-huwa al-muqtasv bi-hâl li-kawnih 'alayhâ yashih an . yubšir al-mubšar idâ wujûdâ* (the verb is in the dual form, because of the connection made between the possibilities to be seeing and hearing)" Because the pure possibility is meant, Abû 'Alî said (and this statement is approved of by 'Abd al-Jabbâr) that this term is "intransitive" (*gâ'ir muta'addî*) while the term "seeing" (*mubšir*) is transitive. See *Šarh* 168

¹¹⁶ See also Frank, *Kalâm*, 299, where he states that this distinction between *basîr* and *mubšir* (having the possibility to see and actually seeing)—just as the similar distinction between *samî*' and *sâmî*' in the matter of hearing represents "an attempt to deal with the metaphysical problems involved in the relationship between God's being as essentially eternal and the temporal reality of creatures"

¹¹⁷ The choice between the two words *mubšir* and *râ'i* (from the verb *ra'â*), which are both used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr to indicate the actual seeing of visible things, seems to be dictated by the tradition which finds its basis in the way both words are used in the Qur'ân. In fact, *mubšir* is used when 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls God "seeing", while he uses *ra'â* especially when he argues that God Himself cannot be seen. For references, see our section about *mudrik* (perceiving)

¹¹⁸ Substances are perceived both by seeing and by touching. See p. 179

¹¹⁹ Cf., for instance, *Muğni* IV, 36 "As He in being living does not need life and its substrate, so He does not need the use of the substrate of life to perceive the visible things"

our body that has the structure of the eye. If the eye, which is our instrument, is healthy (*ṣaḥīḥ*) and there are no hindrances (*mawâni'*), we can see the visible objects; we even have to see them, because we are not seeing through a qualifier "sight" which might be present in us or not, but through our life, which necessarily is present as long as we live. Therefore, whenever we can perceive something, we must perceive it; whenever we can see something, we must see it.¹²⁰

So far for the metaphysical level. But the problems arise for 'Abd al-Jabbâr when he leaves the metaphysical level—where no real difference is found with perceiving in general and the other forms of perceiving—and comes to explain the way in which we actually and physically see some object.

It is not necessary to give a definition of what exactly is meant when a subject is called "seeing"; this belongs to the data of the human intuition as one of the things everybody knows by self-experience. The same applies to the knowledge of the difference between seeing and perceiving the other kinds of perceptible things.¹²¹ What we see are substances and colours.¹²² But in which way do we, living beings in this world, actually see things by using our senses?

'Abd al-Jabbâr does not seem to feel at home in this physical matter; the vocabulary he uses in his description is not his own. He seems to have adopted the entire argumentation without even translating its vocabulary into his own philosophical language.¹²³

¹²⁰ See *Muḡni* IV, 50 "Know that the seeing (subject) from among us only sees a thing if his sense is healthy and the hindrances are taken away, in his being seeing and perceiving he does not need a cause ('illa) by which he becomes thus, for then it would be possible that it (here must be meant the cause, 'illa, so that we have to read *tūjad* instead of *yūjad*) would not exist notwithstanding the healthiness of his sense, the presence of the visible thing before him, and the being removed of the hindrances, and he would not see in any way We already explained that that is impossible"

¹²¹ See *Muḡni* IV, 81

¹²² See *Muḡni* IV, 83

¹²³ For a description of the way in which living beings in this world see—we always have to bear in mind that God does not need an instrument to see, and that everything we are going to say about the physical aspects of seeing is not applicable to God—see also Vajda, *Le problème de la vision de Dieu d'après Yūsuf al-Basīr*, in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, 473-489, where he translates the corresponding passage of Yūsuf al-Basīr (see our p 24) and compares it with the argumentation given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr Both theologians show a great similarity even in the wording of their arguments

'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses this problem of the physical aspects of human seeing especially in part IV of the *Muḡni*. Some examples of the unusual vocabulary he uses in this context, a vocabulary which is nearly unchanged throughout the texts concerned the formula "*lays baynah wa-bayn al-mar'î sâtir wa-lâ makân yasluh an yakûn fih sâtir*",

We know from experience that we cannot see by means of every part of our body, but only by our eyes. This implies that a certain structure (*binya*) is required to make it possible that the substrate is used as an instrument in seeing.

Whereas we perceive odours, tastes, warmth, coldness, pain, and substances (when these substances are perceived by touching and not by seeing) by means of "transportation" (*intiqaâl*)—the object which has to be perceived is brought to the substrate or sense and perceived in direct contact—seeing, just as hearing, does not happen by way of transportation and direct contact. The visible thing is perceived at the place where it is, at a distance from the instrument, the eye.¹²⁴

How is this done? It belongs to the completeness (*tamâm*) of the instrument of the seeing subject that rays separate themselves (*infaṣal*) from it; these rays can reach (*ittaṣal*) a visible object.¹²⁵ Because these rays belong to the completeness of the instrument, they must always separate themselves from it and reach something whenever the instrument is sound and complete.¹²⁶ This is the only way in which living beings in this world can see a visible object.¹²⁷ Such rays are "a thin luminous body"¹²⁸ consisting of several atoms, some of which can be separated from the body.¹²⁹ It is conceived to be a moving body, departing from the eye, possibly reflected in a mirror or some other polished surface, and reaching the visible object. It is not a remaining "link" made by a ray or a beam of rays, but a body that departs from its starting-point and arrives at its target.

'Abd al-Jabbâr summarizes his point of view as follows: "The rays

which returns, unchanged, in the most varied parts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works. He possibly uses the word *qâ'ida* to indicate a substrate, the same holds true of the noun *makân*, while the corresponding verb *kân* seems to be used instead of *hall* to indicate the inhering of an accident.

¹²⁴ See *Muḥiṭ* I, 324

¹²⁵ See *Muḡni* IV, 69. "It belongs to the reality (*haqq*) of the rays which belong to the completeness of the instrument of the seeing (subject) that they originate in as far as there is no concealing (substance) between them and the visible (object), and no substrate in which rightly a concealing (accident) inheres". See also *Muḡni* IV, 57-58.

¹²⁶ See, e.g., *Muḡni* IV, 69.

¹²⁷ See *Muḡni* IV, 59, where the title of the chapter runs: "The mention of the indication that the seeing (subject) among us (sc in this world) only sees by rays which separate themselves from his eye in a special way, and related subjects"

¹²⁸ "'*alimnâ ann aṣ-ṣu'â' jsm latif munîr*", *Muḡni* IV, 58

¹²⁹ See, for instance, *Muḡni* IV, 66, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the possibility that some atoms of rays which are reflected in a mirror can stay behind in that mirror so that the mirror itself is also seen.

which separate themselves from the pupil of the eye, which are called 'the angle of the rays',¹³⁰ separate themselves from it in a straight line, the rays reach a special quantity (*qadr*), and their substrate originates in a way that between them and the visible (object) there is no concealing (substance) and no substrate which is so prepared that a concealing (accident) inheres in it. If the situation is as we mentioned, he (sc the perceiving subject) perceives the visible object with his sight, if there is a certain distance between it and the pupil of the eye, and he perceives by it (sc his sight) what is on its line and not what is outside it."¹³¹

We will now discuss the various elements of this description: the rays "separating themselves" from the eye, the straight line in which they move, the quantity of rays required for the actual seeing, the possibility of concealing, the required distance, and the question whether the rays must actually reach the visible object or not.

First, the rays, which consist of atoms, come from the eye. In the text the verb "*infasal*", to separate oneself from something else, is used. This seems to imply that these rays formed before a part of the eye or were connected with it. 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that this is the way in which we see by pointing to what happens when we see something in a mirror. If the mirror is well polished, we can see our face, if it is not, we cannot see it. The reason is that in the second case no rays go out from the mirror. In the first case, when we look into a well polished mirror, the mirror functions as if it were an eye; it does so by reflecting the rays which come from our eye.¹³² He also points to the example of deforming mirrors (as for instance the blade of a sword), where it becomes clear that we see according to the way in which the rays go out from that mirror.¹³³ To see things as they really are— and not double—the two beams of rays which come from our two eyes must fall together. This also proves that we see by rays

¹³⁰ Grammatically the words "which is called the angle of the rays" indicate either the "rays" mentioned or the "eye". This term is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugnî* IV, 76-77, where he deals with the reason why we see things smaller when they are at a distance. His answer is that we then exercise some pressure upon the "angle of the rays", by which this angle becomes thinner, and he compares it with the pressure someone exercises when he is going to jump. I think that the most probable explanation is that 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers here to the possibility of the pupil of the eye to become wider or narrower. The changing of the pupil would in that case cause the changing of the form of the rays.

¹³¹ *Mugnî* IV, 64.

¹³² Cf. *Mugnî* IV, 59 and *Šarh* 249.

¹³³ Cf. *Mugnî* IV, 60.

which come from our eyes. When we find ourselves on a rolling ship, the rays move with the ship and we think that the sky and the sky-line move.¹³⁴ And, finally, when we see in the dark the eyes of a cat or a lion, we see that they give light and that rays are coming from them.¹³⁵ By all these data of our perception, it becomes clear that we are seeing by means of rays which separate themselves from our eye.

Second, the conclusion that the rays move in a straight line is also based on our experience (*iktibâr*). We see what is directly in front of the eye and we do not see what is outside that line. When we use a mirror, we use that as a means (*wâsi'a*) which is going to function as the eye so that we see what is directly in front of that mirror. We know that, when the object we see moves, we have to move our eye too in order to move in that way the line of the rays.¹³⁶

Third, the rays which come from our eye are not strong enough to make something actually seen; therefore in darkness, when there are no other rays than those which come from our eye, we cannot see. A cat, because of the fact that the rays which come from its eyes are stronger and have a greater quantity, can see in the darkness.¹³⁷ Because the quantity of rays coming from our eyes is not sufficient, we need extra rays, which come from the sun or from lamps, to make it possible that we actually see. The quantity of light needed for seeing knows a minimum but also a maximum; when there are too many rays, as for instance when we look directly into the sun, the actual seeing is no longer possible.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ In the first case 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that the *tarf* of one of the eyes is broken so that the rays from that eye are curved. Probably with *tarf* is meant the way of looking. See *Mugni* IV, 61. After the mentioning of the man on the rolling ship, who thinks that the sky moves, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions also the looking into the water, which gives the impression that things are broken. *Mugni* IV, 61

¹³⁵ What we see are the rays which separate themselves from the eyes of these animals; from the eyes of these animals alone come enough rays to make them visible. In this way they can also see in darkness. *Mugni* IV, 61.

¹³⁶ See *Šarh* 248-249 and *Mugni* IV, 65. One of the ways in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves with rational arguments that God cannot be seen is based on this condition. See also *Muĥit* I, 208.

¹³⁷ *Mugni* IV, 61. "What separates itself from our eyes in the night becomes dispersed because of its weakness, therefore we only see the visible (object) in darkness when the rays of our sight are made stronger by a strenght of rays (sc. : when the rays coming from our eyes are reinforced by the strong rays coming from the visible object) Therefore, we see the eye of a cat because the rays separating themselves from its eye are stronger and become a component of the rays of our sight" *Mugni* IV, 61-62

¹³⁸ See *Mugni* IV, 62-63. Darkness is not a "hindrance" for the rays (according to

Fourth, the expression used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr when he mentions the possibility that there may be between the eye and the visible object something that makes the actual seeing of that object impossible, is rather cryptic. The reason therefore is possibly that he deviates here from his usual vocabulary and records only some standard formula. The text runs in Arabic "*wa-tahsul qâ'idatuh bi-hayl lays baynah wa-bayn al-mar'i sâtur wa-lâ makân yslh an yakûn fih sâtur*"¹³⁹ A literal translation of this formula runs "and their (sc the rays') basis results in so far there is between them (sc the rays) and the visible (object) no concealing (thing), nor a place in which it is good¹⁴⁰ that there is a concealing (thing)"

The first difficulty is presented by the word *qâ'ida* or "basis" in this text. When 'Abd al-Jabbâr repeats this formula,¹⁴¹ the word *qâ'ida* is omitted, consequently, it does not seem to form an integral part of the description, the expression "the basis of the rays" being replaced by "the rays". I suggest that we see it as an equivalent of the term *mahall* and render it by "substrate"¹⁴²

The second difficulty is found at the end of the formula "a place in which it is good that there is a concealing (thing)". Once, when 'Abd al-Jabbâr repeats the formula, he uses instead of this phrase "*mâ yajri majrâ s-sâtur*", "what is analogous to a concealing (thing)", what behaves in the same way¹⁴³ The word *makân* (place) seems to be in this formula a synonym for *mahall*, though the use of this word (*makân*) leaves the possibility of an accident existing not on a substrate¹⁴⁴ It is probable that, whereas the first "concealing" (*sâtur*) is

'Abd al-Jabbâr darkness is a thin body, *jism latif*, which forms no hindrance for the rays as the experience shows), therefore the reason must be that in darkness there is not a sufficient quantity of rays. The quantity of rays separating themselves from our eye and the fact of their separating themselves from it is not our act and not dependent upon our free choice. It is, consequently, God's act.

¹³⁹ *Mugni* IV, 64. I did not vocalize the word *yslh* because different meanings are possible according to the way it is vocalized.

¹⁴⁰ To fill in in this translation the word *yslh* (see previous note), I translated it by the basic meaning it has in the first form of the verb: to be good.

¹⁴¹ He does so in *Mugni* IV, 66 where the formula is repeated without the term *qâ'ida*. Also in *Mugni* IV, 66, where an objection is formulated, saying that, when we see our face in a mirror, the "basis of the rays" comes into contact (*muttasila*) with the face and not with the mirror. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is that some atoms may remain in the mirror. This use of the expression confirms its possible meaning of "substrate".

¹⁴² In *Mugni* IV, 66 also the expression "*irq as-sû'â*" occurs, the meaning of which is not clear either.

¹⁴³ *Mugni* IV, 67.

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., *Mugni* IV, 66 "without any doubt it must come into contact with

used to indicate a substance which can be somewhere without needing therefore something else, the second "concealing" is meant to be an accident which inheres in a substance.¹⁴⁵ Remains the meaning of the verb "yṣlah"; no ethical meaning seems to be possible in this context, nor a judgement on the correctness of the inhering,¹⁴⁶ only the actuality of the inhering appears to be important in this formula. I propose, therefore, to read here the passive of the fourth form of the verb: *yuslah*, which might be translated as: the place which is so prepared that in it a concealing (accident) inheres.

Fifth, just as the quantity of the rays required for the actual seeing has a maximum and a minimum, so the distance at which something actually can be seen ranges between a certain minimum and a maximum. When the distance between the eye and the visible object is extremely small, we cannot see it;¹⁴⁷ nor can we see it when the distance is extremely large, though the seeing on earth is more limited by distance than the seeing into the sky—where we see sun, moon, and stars—because of the haze and the dust which hinder the seeing on the surface of the earth.¹⁴⁸

Sixth, a last question is whether it is a condition for the actual seeing of a visible object that the rays reach that object and come into contact with it (*ittaṣal*). Here a philosophical problem arises; a colour can be seen, but being an accident, it is not possible that something comes into contact with it; contact only is possible with substances. And if we say that the rays must come into contact with the substrate of the visible thing, it is not applicable to the substances which can also be seen.¹⁴⁹ Nor can we take both expressions together and conclude that it is a condition that the rays come into contact either

it if it is a substance, or with its place (*makānih*) if it is an accident" See also the next sentences on pp 66-67.

¹⁴⁵ Then the verb *kān* and its local substantive *makān* are in fact used as synonyms for the verb *hall* and its local substantive *mahall*.

¹⁴⁶ The usual meaning of this verb expresses ethical goodness, aptitude, or technical correctness See Lane, 1714

¹⁴⁷ See *Mugni* IV, 66 "In this way we said that he only sees things between which and his two eyes a certain distance (*furja*) exists, for we know from experience that he cannot see what is between his two eyes, and his eye itself he cannot see (I read *yarāh* instead of *tarāh*), he only sees by it something else if there is between them a kind of distance, though it is possible that he sees the eye itself in the mirror as we said before" In *Mugni* IV, 116 he calls this "*al-qurb al-mufrī*", the excessive nearness, which hinders the actual seeing

¹⁴⁸ See *Mugni* IV, 119-121 about the way in which the "excessive distance" (*al-bu'd al-mufrī*) makes it impossible to see

¹⁴⁹ See *Mugni* IV, 67; this argumentation was used by Abū 'Abdallāh

with the visible object itself or with its substrate. One cannot say this because the condition under which something is perceived must be the same in all cases.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, if a colour could exist without a substrate, it nevertheless could be seen. And this possibility is not accounted for in any of the two expressions.¹⁵¹

Therefore, in order to give a philosophically sure solution, 'Abd al-Jabbâr confines himself, in describing this condition of the actual seeing, to mentioning that there cannot be a concealing substance or accident between the eye and the visible object.¹⁵²

As we said before,¹⁵³ if the eye, the instrument we use in seeing, is healthy (*ṣaḥīḥ*) and there are no hindrances (*mawâni*'), we necessarily see the visible objects. Therefore, the final words in our discussion of seeing will be dedicated to these *mawâni*' which can prevent the actual seeing. 'Abd al-Jabbâr knows six or seven of these hindrances, and the six of them are mentioned in the three theological works which are still at our disposal.¹⁵⁴

The first category of hindrances are things which make it impossible that the rays are resulting in the way that there is no concealing substance or accident between them and the visible object.¹⁵⁵ To this

¹⁵⁰ The general principle which is applied here runs "It belongs to the essence (*haqq*) of the sense when by it something is perceived, that the way in which is perceived what is perceived by it does not differ" (*min haqq al-hâssa idâ udrik bihâ an takûn kayfiyat idrâk mâ yudrak bihâ lâ taḡtaliḡ*) See *Muḡni* IV, 67

¹⁵¹ This is an observation made by Abû Hâšim, *Muḡni* IV, 68

¹⁵² It remains true that when the conditions are fulfilled and the visible object is a substance, the rays will come into contact with it (cf *Muḡni* IV, 68), but this cannot be formulated as a condition as is expressed also in *Muḡni* IV, 144

¹⁵³ See p 182

¹⁵⁴ See *Šarḥ* 257-261 On pp 257-258 six hindrances are discussed, and on p 257 'Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly states that there are six hindrances

In *Muḡni* IV, 116-133 seven hindrances are mentioned (see p 116), the excessive nearness (*al-qurb al-mufrûḡ*) is not mentioned in the two other works

Muḥit I, 208-209 The text of the *Muḥit* is discussed by Vajda in *Le probleme de la vision de Dieu*, see especially pp 479-480 and note 54

¹⁵⁵ See *Muḥit* I, 209 "Fither they (sc the hindrances) are preventing the rays to result in relation to the visible (object) in the way we mentioned before" (*fa-immâ an takûn qâti'an li-ḡ-ṡu'â 'an ḡuṡliḡ ma' al-mar'i 'alâ l-waḡḡ allaḡi ḡakarnâḡ*) This "way" 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions here is explained on p 208 and corresponds with what we said above that there is no concealing substance or accident between the rays and the visible object In *Muḥit* I, 208 he says "that way is that they result in relation to the visible (object) in as far as there is no concealing (thing) nor something in which that is supposed to be (*wa-lâ mâ yuḡaddar ḡâliḡ ḡiḡ*)" Of this last sentence Vajda did not grasp the philosophical implications (the distinction between substances and accidents), where he renders "Nous entendons par là que ce rayon doit être realise de telle façon qu'il n'y ait la rien qui puisse cacher (l'object visible) ni rien dont on puisse supposer

category belong the excessive distance, the screen, and the excessive nearness (the last one is mentioned only in the text of the *Muğnī*).¹⁵⁶ These hindrances are already discussed above.

The second category is related to the fact that the rays move in a straight line, exactly in front of the seeing subject.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, a thing cannot be seen when it is "in another direction than exactly opposite the seeing" subject.¹⁵⁸ This condition too has been discussed above.

The third category of hindrances is that which disperses the rays and makes them lose their arrangement.¹⁵⁹ The reason is that the quantity of rays is too small; if this quantity is increased and the rays become stronger, it is possible to see the things in question.¹⁶⁰ 'Abd al-Jabbār calls this hindrance "subtlety" (*riqqa*); the examples he gives of such subtle bodies are angels and demons.¹⁶¹ We cannot see them because our rays are too weak; they are mixed with the subtle body, are dispersed, and lose thereby the quality which makes it possible that they function as an instrument in seeing.¹⁶² But if God makes the rays

qu'il le fasse". (p. 479). Also his translation of the other sentence mentioned above is not entirely correct: "Ou bien c'est quelque chose qui interrompt le rayon, si bien que celui-ci ne peut rejoindre l'objet visible de la manière que nous avons dite" There is no question of cutting rays nor of their reaching the object.

¹⁵⁶ See *Muḥit* I, 209 *Muğnī* IV, 116 mentions the three of them "*al-qurb al-mufrīt wa-l-bu'd al-mufrīt wa-l-ḥijāb*". *Šarḥ* 257 mentions besides the *ḥijāb* also *al-ḥasr al-mufrīt*, as becomes clear from the discussion of this hindrance on p. 259, we have to read here as in the other places *al-bu'd al-mufrīt*. See also Vajda, *Le problème*, 487, note 54. The division into various categories of hindrances is derived from the text of *Muḥit* I, 209.

¹⁵⁷ 'Abd al-Jabbār's wording is rather obscure "*immā an yakūn mu'abbiran (?) lah 'an samth*" (*Muḥit* I, 209). On p. 208 he says: "This will only happen when they (the rays) go their way (*dāhīb fī samth*) and result in relation to it (sc the visible object) in a way in which there comes (*yarūd* instead of *varudd*) no gap (between the rays and the visible object)". Consequently, the *samt* is the straight line in which the rays move. So, possibly the Arabic phrase mentioned above can be translated as "or it (sc the hindrance) is an expression for it about its way".

¹⁵⁸ This is the wording of the *Šarḥ* (259) and the *Muğnī* (IV, 116), for the term "opposite" the Arabic text has *muhādāt*. The text of the *Muḥit* (I, 209), which is less clear, uses the term *muqābala*. Against the background of the texts of the *Šarḥ* and the *Muğnī* in particular, Vajda's translation of the text of the *Muḥit* (see *Le problème*, 480) does not appear to be correct.

¹⁵⁹ See *Muḥit* I, 209: "*wa-immā an yufarriq aš-šu'ā'* (instead of *al-mš'ā'*) '*an nuzāmih*'"

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., *Muğnī* IV, 122; also *Šarḥ* 259. This hindrance is not per se a hindrance but by something else (*bi-ḡayrithā*), the weakness of the rays and their small quantity.

¹⁶¹ See *Muğnī* IV, 117 and 121-122, *Šarḥ* 259.

¹⁶² In *Muğnī* IV, 117-118 'Abd al-Jabbār also speaks about the dispersion of the rays as the cause that something is not seen. In that paragraph he mentions and discusses

separating from the eye of the prophet stronger, he can see angels. In the same way demons can see each other because their rays are stronger than ours.¹⁶³

The fourth category preventing the visible object to be clearly seen is a confusion (*iltibâs*) between the object and the rays; consequently, one cannot distinguish between the object and the rays.¹⁶⁴ These things 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls "thin" (*latîf*); they are small or uncompact things, the opposite of this term being *katîf*, thick or compact.¹⁶⁵ So the single, separate atom is called "thin", and we already saw that

all hindrances, subtlety alone is not dealt with. The dispersion is given as the reason why distance is a hindering. So one could assume that the text is distorted here, and that what is said about the dispersion of the rays has to be applied to the subtlety, while the distance must be brought together with the screen, just as 'Abd al-Jabbâr does in the text of the *Muhit* (see above). I think, however, that this is not the case. 'Abd al-Jabbâr states here that, if we want to see something at a great distance, we have to exercise some pressure (read in the text *ya'tamid . i'timâd* instead of *ya'tamil . i'timâl*, see also note 130), and this has as a consequence that the rays separating themselves from our eyes become subtler; and because of the small quantity (read *li-qilla* instead of *li-'illa*) of the rays they become dispersed. Our conclusion is that the distance as a hindrance is discussed in two different ways in the *Muhit* and the *Mugni*, and that in this context in the *Mugni* the subtlety is not dealt with. But, nevertheless, the dispersion of the rays in fact prevents the actual seeing.

The reason of this dispersion in the case of the subtlety appears to be that the rays are mixed (*iktalât*) with the subtle (read *bi-r-raqiâ* instead of *bi-d-daqiâ*) body; *Muhit* I, 209

¹⁶³ See *Mugni* IV, 121-122.

¹⁶⁴ See *Muhit* I, 209 "or that it (the visible thing) is confused with the rays, as the 'thin' (object), in which case what is seen does not distinguish itself from that by which it is seen" Notwithstanding the obscurity of this expression, it is clear that a confusion is meant between the rays by which something is seen and the visible objects. Vajda (*Le problème*, 480) is not exact enough when he translates "Enfin il arrive que le rayon ne procure qu'une vision confuse, notamment lorsque la ténuité de l'objet ne permet pas de distinguer ce qui s'y voit"

See also *Mugni* IV, 118 "It belongs to the essence (*haqq*) of the rays that they only come in contact with the thin (thing) in a way that they remain distinct from it (*'alâ wajh yanfasul muh*), as they remain distinct from the thick (thing) when the rays are strong. Consequently, when they are strong, he sees the thin (thing), and when they are weak, he does not see" The difficulty of this sentence is presented by the verb *infasal* (to separate oneself). When we compare this text with the *Muhit*, I believe my translation to be right.

¹⁶⁵ *Šarh* 257 mentions as one of the six hindrances the "*katâfa*" in the place where one supposes to find the "*latâfa*". That we have to read here in fact *latâfa* becomes clear when we compare this text with what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says on p. 259. Not only does he mention there the *latâfa* as a hindrance, but in the same paragraph he states that the *katâfa* even makes the actual seeing possible. Moreover, it is not understandable how the thickness could possibly prevent the actual seeing. Vajda (*Le problème*, 487, note 54) did not notice this error, and therefore he has great difficulty in finding the parallelism between the texts in the *Šarh* and the *Muhit*.

also rays and darkness are called "thin" bodies.¹⁶⁶ The reason that we cannot see these bodies, is that the rays separating from our eyes are not strong enough to make it possible for us to see the rays and the visible object separately.¹⁶⁷

All these kinds of hindrances we have mentioned, are restricted to substances; they are not applicable to visible accidents, the colours. Therefore, to complete this enumeration 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds a last kind of hindrance, applicable to accidents only: the substrate in which the visible accident inheres has one of the five above mentioned qualities which prevent the actual seeing.¹⁶⁸

So much for our discussion of the quality "seeing". We have given much attention to it in the hope that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's physical interpretation of the distinction between seeing and hearing becomes clear. The insight into this distinction is of great importance for the understanding of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations on the essence of speech.

Samî': having the metaphysical possibility to hear.¹⁶⁹ This quality indicates a state (*ḥâl*); when the subject is in this state, it is possible for him to hear the existent audible things. It is the openness of the living subject towards audible things, sounds (*aṣwât*). A subject is in this state because of his being living. Just as the term *baṣîr*, so this term is especially used to describe God before He created the world and the sounds.

¹⁶⁶ The single atom is called *latif* in *Šarh* 259. For the rays, see p. 183 and note 128 of this section. For the darkness, see note 138 of this section.

¹⁶⁷ See *Šarh* 260.

¹⁶⁸ See *Mugni* IV, 116. "The judgement on the accident which inheres in a substrate concerning the way in which it is seen, is the same judgement as the one on the substrate. What hinders the seeing of the substrate and has an influence upon it, hinders the seeing of the inhering (accident). So it (the accident) follows it (the substrate) in the aspects in which the seeing of it is possible or hindered. Therefore, we did not mention there something by which it (the accident) is characterized and not its substrate. For it is certain that all hindrances we mentioned only hinder the seeing of the visible (object) because of the aspect we explained: that the instrument receives a quality which makes it impossible that it is an instrument in its seeing when it is in this state, when its state changes, it is no longer impossible that it is an instrument therein." I quoted this passage in full to show how in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentation physical and metaphysical arguments go hand in hand.

See also *Šarh* 258, where as one of the hindrances is given "that its substrate has one of these qualifications (sc. one of the other five hindrances mentioned)". The Arabic text runs "*wa-kawn mahallih bi-ba'd ḥāḍih al-awsāf*", we have to read *bi-ba'd* and not *yanqud* as in the printed text, see therefore also the rest of p. 258.

¹⁶⁹ See *Šarh* 167. "*ammā s-samī'* , *fa-huw al-muqtas bi-hāl li-kawnih 'alayhā yasihh an yasma' al-masmū'* . *idā wujudā*" See also note 115 of this section.

Sâmi': hearing ¹⁷⁰ When we start again on the metaphysical level, we can say that "hearing" is a state one can be in, it is not possible to give a definition of "hearing" because the reference to the experience every human being has is more revealing than any expression ¹⁷¹

So far as a living being actually perceives audible things—and that is to say sounds (*aswât*)—he is called "hearing" Hearing in this way being a kind of perceiving, and the difference between the various kinds of perceiving essentially being determined by the perceived object, one must conclude that God necessarily is hearing, and that He is hearing all audible things because he does not need instruments in order to perceive But living beings in this world, which by their being living through a qualified life inhering in a substance, are tied to materiality, have to use the (material) substrate in which their "life" inheres as an instrument in perceiving Our experience tells us that we cannot perceive audible things with every part of our body, but that we need an instrument, the ear, which is structured in such a way that it can be used as an instrument in hearing

Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr can draw the conclusion that, if our ear is healthy and there is no hindrance, we, living beings in this world, necessarily hear the audible things—the sounds ¹⁷²

When we come to the physical elaboration of this theory, 'Abd al-Jabbâr first states that hearing corresponds to seeing in as far as the perceived object is perceived in the place where it is (*bi-hayt huw*), a transportation towards the instrument of perception—necessary when one perceives the odours, tastes, warmth, coldness, and pain, which are perceived by direct contact—is possible but not necessary for the hearing ¹⁷³ To make transportation towards the ear a condition for

¹⁷⁰ For details about 'Abd al Jabbâr's opinions about hearing we have to look both into his treatises on the essence of speech (and the Qur'ân as God's speech) and into his treatises on perception and seeing, where hearing mainly is discussed to emphasize the difference between seeing and hearing See, e.g., *Mugni* IV, 67-68, 119-120, 134-138, and other passages, all in the context of a discussion of perception and seeing, so also *Muhit* I, 320-326, *Mugni* VII, 24-25, and *passim* in the context of discussions on speech See also what we already said about perception and the quality perceiving in general on pp 175-180

¹⁷¹ See *Mugni* IV, 81

¹⁷² See *Mugni* IV, 119-120 "For sound is perceived on its substrate, if the instrument is healthy, and there is no hindrance analogous to the closing of the ear-opening, it is heard"

¹⁷³ See *Muhit* I, 324 "As for the way in which it is perceived, this is different from the perception of warmth, coldness, tastes, and odours and similar (read *mušabbaha*) to the perception of colour in as far as sound is perceived where it is (*bi-hayt huw*) just as colour is perceived, we do not need in the (perception of) sound transportation

and the only possibility of perception of the audible things, leads to numerous absurdities as 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows.¹⁷⁴

But besides this similarity between seeing and hearing, 'Abd al-Jabbâr also sees a great difference between the physical realization of these two forms of perception. While the actual seeing results by means of rays separating themselves from the eye, the instrument of seeing, and coming into contact with the visible object—and this implies that there is some form of contact between the seeing subject and the seen object, be it directly or indirectly, and that seeing corresponds in this way to the other forms of perception mentioned above in the actual need for contact—hearing does not need any form of contact (*ittiṣâl*) at all, neither directly nor by rays, air, or something else.¹⁷⁵

In our discussion of seeing we dealt with a number of hindrances (*mawâni*) which prevent the actual seeing; all these hindrances were related to the rays and expressed their weakness or the impossibility to reach the visible object in a way they could be used as an instrument in seeing. Since hearing does not need such an instrument that makes the contact between the perceiving subject and the perceived object, there will not be as many hindrances as in the case of seeing. We can hear sound coming from all directions, a screen does not hinder our hearing. 'Abd al-Jabbâr only mentions as a hindrance for hearing the closing of the ear-opening and what is analogous to this.¹⁷⁶ Besides that, 'Abd al-Jabbâr also mentions the blowing of the wind in the direction of the audible thing; this resembles a screen and as such is a hindrance.¹⁷⁷ In other places, he also discusses the "hidden speech" (*kalâm kaḥfî*) we cannot hear, though for instance angels and demons may hear it.¹⁷⁸ But the way in which this "being hidden" prevents us to hear it is not explained further.

of its substrate We do not deny the possibility of its perception when its substrate is transported towards the aperture of the eye, but we do not make that a condition so that it could only in this way be perceived".

¹⁷⁴ See *Muhit* I, 324 and *Muḡni* VII, 24-25.

¹⁷⁵ Cf *Muḡni* IV, 136 "It belongs to our essence (*min haqqinā*) that we hear the audible (thing) without needing in our hearing the coming into contact (*ittiṣâl*) of rays or air (*hawâ*), therefore, one of us perceives the sound in its substrate and distinguishes by the perception between it and the direction in which the sound did not originate, notwithstanding the possibility" See also *Muḡni* IV, 67-68

¹⁷⁶ *Muḡni* IV, 119. "wa-lays hunāk mân' yajri majrâ sadd qarq al-uḡn".

¹⁷⁷ *Muhit* I, 324 "When our perception of sound is not possible at the blowing of the wind (*hubûb ar-rih*) in another direction than that of the speech, the reason is that this air becomes like a screen (*ka-l-hijâb*)".

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., *Muḡni* VII, 16 There are mentioned as examples of this hidden speech :

Finally the distance; is not the excessive distance (*al-bu'd al-mufrīṭ*) a hindrance for hearing just as it is a hindrance for seeing? No, for here is no difference in the aspects because of which something is heard be it near or at a distance; because there is no condition for hearing, as was the case with seeing, there cannot be an essential difference which really makes hearing impossible.¹⁷⁹ But we have to admit also that, whenever a sound comes nearer to our ear, it comes also nearer to perception, because it is perceived on the place where it is; therefore, there will be a difference in the way something is heard, according to the distance of the place where it is. But, essentially, distance cannot be said to be a hindrance.¹⁸⁰

By way of conclusion: the only audible object is the accident sound. Sound being a non-remaining accident, it is heard when it comes into existence and in the place where it exists.

4. MAN IS ABLE

In our discussion of "man", we followed 'Abd al-Jabbār, dealing with man in his treatise on the person on which God has imposed His duties and who in this way becomes responsible. This *mukallaf*—and not only human beings are responsible persons but angels and demons too—is described by him as "the able living being" (*al-ḥayy al-qâdir*).¹⁸¹ Therefore, we first discussed the living being, and because the distinctive feature of a living being is his being perceiving, we added a section on perceiving. We now come to the second quality 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions: his being able (*qâdir*). This quality is not identical nor coextensive with the quality "living": it is possible that a living being is not able.¹⁸²

warning (*kâfir*; see our pp. 63-65), talk of the soul (*hadīṭ an-nafs*; see our pp. 62-63), and the speech of angels and demons

¹⁷⁹ *Muḡnī* IV, 119-120: "If the instrument is healthy and there is no hindrance analogous to the closing of the ear-opening, it (sound) must be heard even when it is at an excessive distance. This is because of the occurring (*huṣūl*) of the aspect because of which (also) the sound that is near is heard, for the near (sound) is only heard for this cause. When the distant (sound) corresponds with the near (sound), it must be heard". The aspect because of which it is heard is that the instrument is healthy and there is no hindrance. This aspect remains the same in both cases

¹⁸⁰ See *Muḡnī* IV, 68.

¹⁸¹ See p 162. Cf. *Muḡnī* XI, 309

¹⁸² Something that is able is also living. "The able (person) can only be able if he is living" (*wa-lā yakūn al-qâdir qâdiran illâ wa-huw hayy*); *Muḡnī* XI, 309 But what is living is not necessarily able, see, e g., *Muḥiṭ* I, 103

The responsible person, upon whom God has imposed His duties, must be able.¹⁸³ For, if God imposes His duties and man is not able to perform the required acts, God's *taklif*, His imposing, would be evil (*qabih*), but we know that God performs no evil acts. Therefore, the responsible subject must be able.

In this section we discuss the quality "able" and the realization of the possibility which is expressed by the quality able: the acts and the way in which we, able living beings in this world, produce them.

Qâdir: able.¹⁸⁴ We know that there are living beings in this world for which acting is possible, and that there are others for which it is not possible. The reason must be that some living beings are in a state (*ḥâl*) in which others are not, and that they by being in that state have a quality which others do not have. This quality is called "able" (*qâdir*).¹⁸⁵

How can we know that this quality is distinguished from other qualities? Not by inner experience, the way in which we know the difference between knowing and reflecting, seeing and hearing; it is not in this way that we know that we are able. We only know it by deduction: we only know that acting is possible by the actual happening of acts. Nevertheless, this actual happening of acts is not the distinctive feature of someone's being able.¹⁸⁶ It can only be an indication that the acting subject was able just the moment before he acted. Hence, we cannot make this distinction by inner experience because we can only know afterwards that we were able before.

It is impossible to define the quality "able" because there is no

¹⁸³ Cf *Mugni* XI, 367-370

¹⁸⁴ The quality "able" is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his discussion of God's qualities, see *Muhit* I, 103-112 and *Šarh* 151-156, see also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṣmân, *Nazariyat at-taklif*, 199-202. The quality is also discussed when 'Abd al-Jabbâr treats the human acts and man's ability to act. See *Šarh* 323-417. Human acts are discussed in *Mugni* VIII and IX and in *Muhit* I, 356-444 (the end of the first part). In *Mugni* VIII, 59 'Abd al-Jabbâr announces a chapter on the ability (*bâb al-istitâ'a*), we assume that this chapter is in fact the tenth, still missing part of the *Mugni*. Also the second part of the *Muhit* begins with a chapter on the ability, see *Muhit* I, 444 in the notes. For the discussion of man's ability, see also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṣmân, *Nazariyat at-taklif*, 317-332.

¹⁸⁵ *Muhit* I, 103

¹⁸⁶ Cf *Muhit* I, 103-104. "As for the indication that the able (subject) is able, this is the possibility of acting (*sihhat al-fî'l*) for him, this possibility, though it can only be known after the occurring is known, is the (indicating) aspect in the indication and not the occurring, thus, if it would be possible to know it without knowing (the occurring), it would be an indication" See also *Šarh* 151. If the act happens from someone in a way that it is necessitated (*'alâ tariq al-wujûb*), it does not indicate that the subject was able.

expression which is more revealing than the term "able". The only way to distinguish the quality "able", is to describe it by pointing to its implications, the result it has for the qualified object; and, though this is not a real definition, one can describe the able subject as "who is characterized by a state; because of his being in it acting is possible for him if it is not hindered."¹⁸⁷

From what is said above it is clear that the thing qualified is the entire person of the living being. Just as it is the composite body, the whole person, which is living and perceiving, so it is the composite body which is able, not a part of it, nor something inside or outside it; it is a quality that characterizes and requires the composite body of a living being.¹⁸⁸

To continue the explanation of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's description of the quality "able": this quality, which requires and characterizes an entire person,—the description begins with "*man*", "who"—is attributed to a state (*hâl*) the living being is in.¹⁸⁹ By attributing it to a state, 'Abd al-Jabbâr points to the fact that a subject is not called "able" because there would exist somewhere a qualifier (*ma'nâ*) "ability", through its connection with which a subject would be called "able",¹⁹⁰ but because we know by argumentation that the subject must be called by this active participle (*qâdir*), and therefore must be qualified and distinguished from other subjects by a state.¹⁹¹ The argumentation through which we know that a subject is in a state by its being in which he is called able, can be summarized as follows: we know that a given

¹⁸⁷ See *Muhit* I, 103 This manner of describing something is called a definition if it is more revealing than the original term, although it describes something by way of a *hukm*, a judgement, caused by the quality See also *Mugni* VIII, 59

¹⁸⁸ 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses this together with his discussion about the living being, he shows that the able living being must be the *jumla*, the composite body See pp 163-164 and the references given there

¹⁸⁹ For a discussion of the "state" (*hâl*), see pp 145-148 The state of being able differs from other states a living being can be in by the fact that most of those states are known by inner experience, whereas this state is only known by way of argumentation and deduction

¹⁹⁰ 'Abd al-Jabbâr will prove that living beings in this world are able by a qualifier "ability", however, not our being able leads to the conclusion that there must be such a qualifier, but the fact that it is possible that we are not able Therefore God, who is always able, does not have such a qualifier See pp 148-150

¹⁹¹ By mentioning as the cause of the subject's being qualified as able the state he is in, 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects the opinions of some other Mu'tazila, as for instance that of Bišr bn al-Mu'tamir, who held that it expresses the health of the limbs and the freedom from defects (See, e.g., Frank, *Remarks*, 320-321 and Watt, *Free Will*, 75) 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects this restriction of the quality able to the purely physical level

human being is acting,¹⁹² whereas this is impossible for another human being. This implies that it was possible for the first person and impossible for the second.¹⁹³ This difference between the two cannot be essential because both, being human beings, have the same essence; nor can this difference be attributed to a qualifier which exists somewhere because the subject's being able to act requires and characterizes a whole living being. Therefore, the difference must be found in the one person being in a certain state, whereas the second is not.¹⁹⁴

By being in this state, the subject has a relationship with acting, a relationship which does not concern its actuality but its possibility. Therefore, the conclusion we draw, when we know that someone has done an act, is that he was able the one moment just before the act if the act concerned is a direct act, or the one moment just before the producing of the cause if the act concerned is an indirect one.¹⁹⁵ Therefore, it is possible that at the moment of the act the subject is no longer able;¹⁹⁶ and though it is possible that the subject was able during more moments, during a longer time before the actual acting,¹⁹⁷ the only conclusion we can draw is that the acting subject was able the one moment just before the moment of the act.¹⁹⁸

A third element, mentioned in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's description of the quality "able", is the act (*fi'l*). Being able indicates a certain relationship with acts. But what are these acts? An act is a substance or accident; and by calling it an act, it is emphasized that it is not only temporal and brought into existence, but that we know also that in its

¹⁹² In this context 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the term *fi'l*. For him the act is the thing done. See pp. 115-116

¹⁹³ The perceived and known fact on which this discussion is based, is not the difference between the occurring and the non-occurring of an act (for non-occurring does not say impossibility), nor the difference between possibility and impossibility of the act (for the possibility cannot be perceived), but the difference between the occurring and the impossibility. See *Muhit* I, 104

¹⁹⁴ *Muhit* I, 104-105

¹⁹⁵ About these two kinds of acts we speak later on in this section. An example of the second kind when we shoot an arrow which hits the target, the hitting is our act, nevertheless, we were only able the moment before we shot, we cannot conclude that we were able the moment before the arrow hit

¹⁹⁶ This implies, for instance, that there can exist speech coming from a person who at the same moment becomes dumb or dies but the moment before was still able. See, e.g., *Mugnî* VII, 47. Cf. also what Watt (*Free Will*, 71) says about the opinion of Abû l-Hudayl.

¹⁹⁷ This is based on the fact that the subject's being able gives information about the possibility (*sihha*) of the act, not about its necessity (*wujûb*). The possibility implies that something else is required before the act actually occurs. See also *Muhit* I, 106

¹⁹⁸ See *Muhit* I, 105-106, also *Šarḥ* 324 and 412

being brought into existence it has a relationship with a subject who did this.¹⁹⁹ The acting or doing subject (*fâ'il*) makes something (a substance or an accident) that was non-existent (*ma'dûm*) existent (*mawjûd*). So, in fact, the able subject is able to bring into existence (*ihdât*) and to make existent (*ijâd*).²⁰⁰ This is the only thing an acting subject does: bring something non-existent into existence.²⁰¹ Hence, we can say that the able subject has a relation only with non-existent things. For, when the things come into existence or exist, the relation will be that between the acting subject and the act. Non-existent things need an able subject to be brought into existence; when they are coming into existence or are existent, they no longer need such a subject.²⁰²

Since 'Abd al-Jabbâr sees every act as something brought into existence, he makes no difference between God's acts and the acts of man. Both God and man bring into existence; the difference cannot be found in what they do, but only in the genera and the number of things they can do.²⁰³ Because man, just as God, brings into existence, one can even say that he "creates" (*kalaq*) his acts although the term is in fact not used.²⁰⁴

Acts, being either substances or accidents, are bound to materiality which forms the principle of concretization and fragmentation. Therefore, one can say both with reference to God and man that they are able in general, but also that they are able to concrete acts; one can discuss the relationship between God or man and concrete non-existent things. A very important part of the discussions 'Abd al-Jabbâr writes down in

¹⁹⁹ See *Muhit* I, 229 and *Šarh* 324. An act is something that comes into existence and, therefore, a substance or an accident. The fact that in the definition of act the term "able" is used, and in the definition of the quality able the term "act", might lead to a definition of the thing by itself, had not 'Abd al-Jabbâr observed that the meaning of "able" is evident and cannot be defined by an expression more revealing than the term "able" itself.

²⁰⁰ See also what Frank says about the position of Abû 'Alî: "What he says—and he was the first, I think, to put the matter in these blunt terms—is that *qudra*, in the human agent, is the power to realise the existence of the act—it is *qudra 'alâ ijâdih 'alâ ihdâih*" (Frank, *Remarks*, 321, I adapted the transliteration of the Arabic words).

²⁰¹ Such a statement supposes a doctrine of the reality of the non-existent things, see pp. 107-109.

²⁰² See *Šarh* 412. "The act only needs the ability to go out from non-existence into existence." This statement is proved on the page mentioned and the pages following it.

²⁰³ A subject who is essentially able knows no restrictions in genera or number; a subject, however, who is able by a cause—called ability—is restricted in his being able and so are all able living beings in this world. See, e.g., *Šarh* 156.

²⁰⁴ *Mugni* VII, 208-223.

his chapters on being able and on human acts, is given to problems related to this concretization of being able into being able to concrete acts.²⁰⁵

The relationship between the able subject and the act is, as we already saw, not a relationship of actuality—and therefore it is not correct to translate *al-qâdir* as the able agent²⁰⁶—but one of possibility (*siḥha*). ‘Abd al-Jabbâr himself states that the meaning of the word “possible” in this context has to be understood as “not impossible”.²⁰⁷ Consequently, when he states that able is “who is characterized by a state; because of his being in it acting is possible”, he points to the ontological possibility of acting,²⁰⁸ when he says that a concrete act is possible for an able person who is able to that concrete act, he means that this person has the ontological possibility to do this act, while its realization is dependent upon the motive that invites him to act. Therefore, when an act comes from us, but not by way of possibility, but because it is necessitated in us, we cannot say that we were able (*qâdir*) to do that act.²⁰⁹ That not the purely physical possibility of the act is meant becomes clear when we take into consideration that a subject is still called able when the actual act is hindered by hindrances outside the subject.

These hindrances are the last element mentioned by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr. “*Man*” or “hinder” is an accident because of the substrate of which the act is impossible for the able subject.²¹⁰ Because of this accident

²⁰⁵ So, e.g., the discussion about the thesis that it is not possible that two able persons are able to (produce) the same thing. The main goal of all these discussions is to safeguard man’s own responsibility for his acts, for he, and nobody else, is the one who does and can do these acts. Therefore, these discussions form in ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s theological works part of the treatise on God’s justice, which supposes man to be responsible for his own acts.

²⁰⁶ So, e.g., Hourani in his *Islamic Rationalism*, 102.

²⁰⁷ *Šarh* 395 “One may mention the possibility (*siḥha*) and mean by it the denial of impossibility, as one can say ‘the act is possible for the able (subject), namely, it is not impossible (*lā yastahîl*), one may (also) mention it and mean by it that its occurring is expected, as one can say that the creation of the world was possible for God in eternity, namely, its occurring was expected from Him”. The remark in *Mugni* VI/1, 33-34 is not very enlightening in this context. “When one says about the act that it is possible (*sahîh*) for its doer, this means that he is able to (do) it”.

²⁰⁸ See, e.g., Frank, *Fundamental Assumptions*, 10, where he translates “the original ontological possibility of action”. Vajda seems to point more to the possibility of concrete acts when he says that it is “concevable logiquement aussi possibilité de réalisation concrète” (Vajda, *Parole de Dieu*, 64).

²⁰⁹ See *Muhit* I, 104, also *Šarh* 151.

²¹⁰ *Šarh* 393 “*al-man*” *huwa mā yata’addar ‘alā l-qâdir li-makânih al-fi’l ‘alā wajh law-lâh la-mâ ta’addar wa-hâlatuh ilk*” ‘Abd al-Jabbâr clearly takes the *man*’ to be an accident which causes the substances in which it inheres to hinder the act.

the substance can be called "*mâni*", hindrance. There are two kinds; the first kind is a hindrance by way of binding or holding back; one can bind someone and prevent him to walk. The second kind is called "by the opposite or what is analogous to it"; if it is by the opposite,²¹¹ it is like the trying to move something when someone else who is stronger tries to keep it immobile; what is analogous to the opposite is, for instance, the missing of an instrument one requires for the act, for example, a pen for writing.²¹²

But notwithstanding these hindrances which prevent the actual occurring of the act the subject remains able.

So far we have spoken about the state and quality "able" (*qâdir*) and not about the accident and qualifier "ability" (*qudra*), for one has to discuss first the general principles before paying attention to the difference between the way God is able and other living beings are. The more so, because one of the main objectives of 'Abd al-Jabbâr is here to show that both God and man are able, that both can act, and both are able to bring into existence; for only on the basis of this principle his discussion of the reality of human acting and man's real responsibility for his acts is possible.

Qudra: ability. We, human beings, know by deduction that we are able, but we also know that we are not necessarily able; it would be possible that we were not, without this making any difference for the other states we are in, and independently of the being fulfilled or not of some condition or other. Therefore, we cannot be essentially able; consequently, we must be able through a cause (*'illa*), a qualifier (*ma'nâ*). If this qualifier inheres in us, we are able; if it disappears, we are no longer able.²¹³ In the same way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr showed in general that we can only be in a transitory state because of a cause, a qualifier, an accident inhering in us, he shows that we must be able by a qualifier "ability".

Just as the other qualifiers, this qualifier too, by needing a substrate to inhere in, links the quality to materiality, the principle of differentiation and limitation. By being tied to the material substrate, the realization of our being able in concrete acts has to make use of that substrate, which limits its possibilities.

²¹¹ The printed text gives twice the word *qayd* where we have to read *didd*: in lines 14 and 17. Our reading is necessitated by the sense of the context (*Šarh* 393).

²¹² For this argument see *Šarh* 393. One expects "what is analogous to binding (*qayd*)" instead of "opposite" (*didd*).

²¹³ See *Šarh* 391, where this argument is summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.

Also by pointing to the fact that our being able is limited by and related to the substrate which is the composite body, 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows that human beings must be able by a qualifier. In his *Šarḥ* he mentions two such arguments. First, we can perform certain acts by one of our limbs, but not by other ones; this difference cannot be caused by our being able, but only by the fact that our being able is tied to materiality and therefore limited.²¹⁴ The second argument draws our attention to the fact that some able persons are stronger, "have more ability", than others, while all of them are able. The difference cannot be found in their being able, for they are all able, but must be found in the limitedness of their being able, which is caused by its being tied to materiality.²¹⁵

Consequently, the fact that we are able is both determined and limited by the qualifier "ability", which inheres in us. Fundamentally, this ability is not a power in us and not an imperfection or pure possibility; it is an accident which is said to inhere in us in order to explain that our being able, which is a perfection because it is an expression of our possibility to bring things into existence, is not a permanent and necessary state, and is limited qua genera and qua number of things we can bring into existence.²¹⁶

This qualifier, the inhering of which in us causes us to be able, has been given several names; besides *qudra* (ability) it is also called *qûwa* (might), *istiḥâ'a* (faculty), and *ḥâqa* (capability).²¹⁷

The first aspect of ability (*qudra*) is that its inherence in a living

²¹⁴ *Šarḥ* 391.

²¹⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that the stronger person has "more ability" (*ziyâdat al-qudra*). Here, as in other contexts too, he is inclined to "fill up" the rather empty concept of "qualifier". *Šarḥ* 391

²¹⁶ See also Frank, *Causality*, 19, where he says: "Most importantly, this active quality of *qudra* ... is not strictly taken in the *kalâm* as a power or potentiality to become other but as an "accident" (*'arad*) or attribute, and so designates the actuality of a state of being in the subject, viz., the actuality of being able to effect the realisation of some act". In some other texts Frank, just as 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself, tends to fill up this concept and to consider it as the power in the subject (See *Kalâm*, 300 and *Fundamental Assumptions*, 10). This ability is more than the soundness of the structure and the healthiness of the limbs, though this structure is a condition for the qualifiers which require a living being; otherwise they cannot inhere in it. See, e.g., aš-Šahrastâni, *al-Milal*, I, 100, where he discusses the opinion of Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâšim. Nader (*Système philosophique*, 261) did not understand this correctly.

²¹⁷ *Šarḥ* 393. The English terms are chosen somewhat at random in trying to find some English equivalents for the term "ability". The verb corresponding to *ḥâqa* (*atâq* with the active participle *muḥiq*) is not used for God because this verb is only used concerning acts for which one has to make some effort.

being makes acts possible. This implies that "ability precedes the act and does not necessitate it"²¹⁸ The quality "able" implies, in the eyes of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, that for the subject that is qualified as able an act is possible; that means that the act can occur or not. Therefore, the ability cannot necessitate the act; in that case the act would not be possible but necessary.²¹⁹

Ability must precede the act. For, if it were simultaneous with the act, no real possibility would be left.²²⁰ One may argue, too, the other way round, starting from the act: the act needs an ability to come into existence, but it does not need it when it is already existent nor at the moment it comes into existence; therefore, it must need it when it is still non-existent. Consequently, ability must precede the act.²²¹ Another consequence is that ability is not restricted to one concrete determined act: an ability²²² has the possibility to two opposite acts; the ability to be unbelieving is the ability to be believing, the ability to move something is also the ability to make it immobile.²²³ Or, as 'Abd al-Jabbâr says in a more general statement, a concrete ability is connected with similar, different, and opposite things.²²⁴

By describing human ability in this way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr lays the

²¹⁸ "*Al-qudra sâbiqa li-l-fi'l wa-laysat mawjibatan lah*", *Muhit* I, 364 Instead of the term *sâbiqa* 'Abd al-Jabbâr also uses the term *mutaqaddima*, which has the same meaning, *Šarh* 390

²¹⁹ See *Šarh* 151

²²⁰ "If the ability were simultaneous with its object (*maqdûr*), the obligation God imposes upon an unbeliever to believe would be an imposing of something to which he has no capability For if he (the unbeliever) were capable, it would occur from him, and because it did not occur from him, this indicates that he is not able to (do) it" *Šarh* 396

²²¹ See *Šarh* 412. 'Abd al-Jabbâr compares in this context the different qualifiers required for the occurring of the act (ability, knowledge, will) with the instruments (*âlât*) needed some of them are needed before the act, some only during the act, and some both before and during the act The ability only is needed before the act Some examples to confirm this are given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr on pp 414-415

²²² When 'Abd al-Jabbâr speaks about various "abilities" (in the plural), it is because the "being able", by its connection with the material substrate, is divided into separate abilities to concrete acts

²²³ See *Šarh* 396 ff See also note 220 The argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives here states that God could not oblige the unbeliever to believe, for this would be an obligation to something he is not able to For, if he would be able to believe, he would actually believe God imposes upon the unbelievers the obligation to believe and His imposing cannot be bad, therefore, they must be able to believe Who is able to be unbelieving is also able to believe 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls this "*qudra sâliha li-d-diddayn*"

²²⁴ See *Šarh* 415-416 "*al-qudra 'indaná muta'alliqa bi-l-mutamâtil wa-l-muktâlif wa-l-mutadâd*" In his elaboration of this statement he is mixing up the ability to do something and the actual doing, and that makes his argumentation rather confusing

basis for his doctrine that man really has a free choice in his acting, and that he is really responsible for his acts

The other aspect of the qualifier ability is that it, besides causing the subject in which it inheres to be able, also limits that subject in its being able. The reason is that, as an accident, it needs a substrate and that this substrate can itself hinder the act or being hindered from outside.

Just as, for instance, the qualifier "life" (*hayât*), the ability needs a substrate, structured in a special way, to inhere in it can inhere only in the composite body (*jumla*) of a living being, our experience tells us that only living beings can be able.²²⁵ This implies that in acting we have to make use of this substrate, and that we cannot act without that substrate.²²⁶ In this way our acts, and therefore also the possibility of acts, our ability, are restricted and limited. This restriction is made concrete by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as follows: "Without any doubt, that to which he (the subject who is able by an ability, *qâdir bi-l-qudra*) is able, is restricted in genus and in number, the direct producing outside the acting subject (*al-iḳtirâ'*)"²²⁷ is impracticable and impossible for him, hindering him is possible, without any doubt, he must make use of the substrate of his ability in the act or the cause."²²⁸

The genera of acts which are really possible to us, are restricted. We cannot produce substances, nor can we produce all genera of accidents. We already saw that 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions eleven genera of accidents we are not able to produce, and ten genera we are able to produce. These ten genera are subdivided into five acts of the limbs (modes of being, pressure, composition, sound, and pain) and five acts of the hearts (will, non-will, conviction, opinion, reflection).²²⁹

That these acts are also "restricted in number (*'adaad*)" means that the volume, content, or in general the number of "atoms"²³⁰ of which the acts we are able to produce consist, are limited. Our acts can never be infinite; they even cannot exceed given measures.²³¹

²²⁵ Cf. *Šarh* 392-393

²²⁶ Cf. *Muhit* I, 107

²²⁷ See, e.g., *Šarh* 323, 'Abd al-Jabbâr knows three ways of acting: producing something in the substrate of the ability, producing something outside that substrate by using means, and producing something outside it without using means. This last form of direct acting outside the substrate is called "*iḳtirâ'*", and is impossible for living beings in this world. We deal with these three ways of acting when treating the "*maqdûrât*", the acts we are able to do.

²²⁸ *Muhit* I, 107

²²⁹ We have dealt with these genera on p. 127

²³⁰ 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows a tendency in his works to describe everything by way of quantities, see therefore, for instance, *Šarh* 416 and 393

²³¹ See *Šarh* 415-416

We cannot produce something outside the substrate of our ability without using a means, without there being any form of direct or indirect contact. Directly we can produce something in ourselves, in the substrate of the ability; outside that substrate we have to use a means or cause (*sabab*).²³²

The substrate we have to use in acting being material, can be hindered from outside: it can be bound or held back; in the acts in which we have to use a cause, this cause can be missing or be taken away. So, because of the use of the substrate, hindering is possible.

Finally, because we have to make use of that substrate, every imperfection and every illness of that substrate will influence our being able. In this way the qualifier "ability" (*qudra*) is at the same time the cause of the human being's being able and the reason why he in his being able is restricted and limited.

Maqdûr : possible. The *maqdûr* is something which to produce someone is able. Consequently, it must be non-existent, for we cannot be able to produce something that exists already. It is something non-existent that can come into existence because there is some able subject who is able to produce it, to bring it into existence.²³³ Every individual possible thing²³⁴ has a relationship to an individual able being, and it is called "*maqdûr*" because of that relationship; it can only have such a relationship with one single able being, because it is not possible that two living beings are able to produce the same possible thing, be it in the same or in another way.²³⁵

What is caused in an act, when an able person produces it, is only

²³² See note 227 Cf *Muhit* I, 367-368

²³³ I rank, *Fundamental Assumptions*, 11, states that the *maqdûrât* are "pure possibles, grounded in the power of efficient causality" See also his *Remarks*, 323-329

²³⁴ This theory is based on the assumption that there are individual non-existent things and that those non-existent things already have a kind of essence and a kind of individuality. Acting by God or man means the bringing from non-existence into existence of such a non-existent thing. The inverse is not possible—as far as we know by our human reason—when the act really is remaining (substances), some accidents fall back into non-existence without influence from outside, others only when their opposite is produced. But acting is always "bringing into existence", *ihdât*.

²³⁵ This general principle, which is often used in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations, is discussed in *Mugnî* IV, 254-266, in as far as the impossibility that two able beings are able to produce the same possible thing in the same way is concerned. The addition "or in another way" is made to exclude a kind of cooperation between God and man in producing the acts of man. This is dealt with in *Mugnî* VIII, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses among other subjects the doctrine of the *kash*, which knows some kind of such a cooperation (*Mugnî* VIII, 162-168)

its coming into existence (*ḥudûṭ*); it is possible that an act, when it comes into existence, is characterized in other ways too, as for instance as good or bad, but that is not dependent upon the subject's being able but upon other states the subject is in. For we know that the subject is able because he produced the act, and we know that it is he who produced it because its coming into existence corresponds with his intention and motives. Therefore, its coming into existence is the characteristic caused by the subject's being able.²³⁶

The possible things (*maqḍûrât*) can be divided into two categories according to the way they have to be done, the way they have to be brought into existence. 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls these categories "*mubtada*" and "*mutawallid*".²³⁷ The term *mubtada*' can be rendered as "immediate"; such a possible thing can be brought into existence without the use of a "medium", a "*sabab*" or secondary cause. The term *mutawallid*, on the contrary, should be translated as "mediate" though this translation does not correspond with the Arabic word used, meaning "generated"—because it indicates that such a thing can only be brought into existence by an acting subject who uses a "medium", a "*sabab*".

The first category is called *mubtada*', literally "begun", because the acting subject begins with doing it without having to do something else before, which is going to function as a secondary cause.²³⁸ In this category two sub-categories are distinguished according to the place where the act is produced and its relationship with the substrate in which the ability inheres; the act is produced either in that substrate, and in that case it is said to be *mubâšir* (direct),²³⁹ or not in such a substrate, and in that case it is said to be *muḳtara*'. Because human beings and other living beings in this world, as we have seen, have to use always the substrate of their ability in acting, the last sub-category (*muḳtara*') is not possible for them.²⁴⁰ When they produce something

²³⁶ Cf especially *Muḡni* VIII, 63 but also the rest of that chapter pp 64-73 "That on which an act is originated by the acting (subject) can be divided into two, on one of them it is originated only because he is able, on the other it is originated because of other states by which he is characterized, as, e.g., his being knowing and willing, about both of them is said that they are by the acting (subject)" (*Muḡni* VIII, 63)

²³⁷ See *Šarḥ* 391 "*al-maqḍûrât 'alâ dawḥayn mubtada' ka-l-irâda wa-mutawallid ka-s-sawt*"

²³⁸ Cf *Muḥit* I, 367, where it is said to be "*mm dūn fī'l swāḥi*" the acting subject does it "without doing something else"

²³⁹ See *Šarḥ* 223 "*Mubâšara* means that the act is done through the ability in its (the ability's) substrate"

²⁴⁰ Cf *Muḥit* I, 368 "It is that by which the able (subject) begins without it being in

outside the substrate of their ability, surely when they do so outside the composite body, they have to use that body as a secondary cause to produce it

'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions four genera of acts we can only do directly (*'alâ tariq al-mubâšara*), and in which the use of secondary causes is not possible. These are four genera from among the acts of the hearts: will (*irâda*), non-will (*karâha*), assumption (*zann*), and reflection (*naẓar*). Three genera can only be done indirectly, by making use of secondary causes; these are sounds (*aswât*), pain (*alam*), and composition (*ta'lif*). The other acts which are possible for human beings, and which belong to the genera conviction (*i'tiqâd*), pressure (*i'timâd*), and modes of being (*akwân*) can be produced either directly or by using secondary causes²⁴¹

Mutawallid: generated.²⁴² Generated acts are accidents²⁴³ which are not directly brought into existence by the able subject, but by means of another act, another accident, which functions as a secondary cause, a *sabab*. The able subject produces an accident, which again generates (*wallad*²⁴⁴) another accident; this latter accident is called *mutawallid*.

the substrate of the ability" And, 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds, it therefore is only possible for a subject who is essentially able and not by an ability. Consequently, God alone can do things in this way. See also *Šarh* 223 "For it is the 'doing exist' (*ijâd*) of an act which goes out from him (*muta'addi 'anh*) without a secondary cause" This is not possible for beings who are able by an ability, for in that case we would be able to prevent someone else to do something without touching him directly or indirectly

²⁴¹ Cf. *Muġnî* IX, 124. Instead of the conviction 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the knowledge (*'ulûm*) among the acts which can be done either directly or by using secondary causes. But because knowledge belongs to the genus conviction, I mentioned the genus instead of the species. In this category it is not so that every individual act can be done either directly or by using secondary causes, but in these three genera some acts have to be done directly and others indirectly.

²⁴² Both in his *Muġnî* and in his *Muhit* 'Abd al-Jabbâr devotes several chapters to the "generating" (*tawlid*), mainly with the objective to show that also the generated acts can really be the acts of man. See *Muġnî* IX and *Muhit* I, 399-444.

²⁴³ Bodies cannot be produced by generating (*tawlid*) but only by *iktirâ'*, direct production not in the substrate of the ability. This is proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Šarh* 223. Therefore, generated acts must always be accidents, every act being either a substance or an accident. In fact, only six genera of accidents can be generated: sound, pain, composition, conviction, pressure, and mode of being. See our discussion of *maqdur*.

²⁴⁴ If we take the words in their strict sense, we cannot say that the cause generates (*wallad*) the generated act because this term can only be applied to acting subjects, and therefore it should be applied to the acting subject who produces the cause. The use of "generated" (*mutawallid*) for the effect is, however, correct, independently of the calling of the acting subject or the cause by the name "generating" (*muwallid*). See therefore *Muhit* I, 422, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that this is a question of names, not of realities.

So the secondary cause which is used here is not what we normally call an instrument (in Arabic called : *âla*); it is an accident by means of which we produce another accident in the same or in another substrate. In the example of the shooting of an arrow which hits the target, we can say that the shooting person produces directly pressure (*i'timâd*) in his arm; by means of this pressure he produces pressure in the bow, which again causes pressure in the arrow when it is shot, and this pressure can cause a separation (*iftirâq*) in the target. Consequently, the secondary causes we use to produce the separation in the target, are a series of pressures in various substrates.²⁴⁵

The generated act has therefore two relations; a relation to the secondary cause, and a relation to the acting subject who really is the one that produces and generates it.

The relation between the generated act and its cause can be proved by the fact that the generated act results at (simultaneous with) the cause (*'ind as-sabab*²⁴⁶), according to that cause, and always in the same way, if there are no hindrances which prevent it.²⁴⁷ If these three conditions are fulfilled, the relationship between the two accidents must be a relationship between cause and generated effect.²⁴⁸

We can know the relation between the generated act and an acting subject, and prove that the subject who makes the cause is also the producer of the effect, by pointing to the fact that the generated act occurs according to his states (*ahwâl*), motives (*dawâ'î*), intention (*qasd*), and will (*irâda*).²⁴⁹ This is the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr always shows that an act is the act of a certain acting subject. When either a direct (*mubâsir*) or a generated act occurs in this way, we can deduce that it is the act of the subject concerned.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁵ In this example, by a series of pressures (*i'timâdât*) we produce a mode of being (*kawn*, in fact here *iftirâq*) in another body, it is not done by direct contact, but by indirect contact - we touch what at its turn touches something else. See *Muhit* I, 367

²⁴⁶ The preposition is not easy to translate, one could describe it as "when the cause is present"

²⁴⁷ See *Muhit* I, 400

²⁴⁸ In this way 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves in *Mugni* XII, 77, that reflection generates knowledge - at the same reflections the same knowledge results, it results when the reflection exists, and its contents correspond with the contents of the reflection

²⁴⁹ The terms 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses in various contexts vary. In *Mugni* XI, 37, for instance, he uses the terms "intention" (*qasd*) and "will" (*irâda*). In the *Muhit* he prefers the term "states" (*ahwâl*) because it is broader and makes it possible to ascribe also the less intended and less conscious acts to the acting subject. See *Muhit* I, 70-72. Therefore, he mentions in this context (*Muhit* I, 400) only the "states" (*ahwâl*) and "motives" (*dawâ'î*)

²⁵⁰ In this respect there is no difference between the direct and the generated act. This is discussed in *Mugni* IV, 37-63

As the immediate act (*mubtada'*), so the generated act too can come into existence either in the substrate the ability inheres in or not in such a substrate.²⁵¹ When able subjects who are able by an ability—that is to say every able subject besides God—produce generated acts, they first produce directly (*bi-tariq al-mubâšara*) a cause, which is an accident, in the substrate of the ability. When this cause is not characterized by "direction" (*jiha*), the generated accident results in the same place, in the same substrate. Therefore, reflection (*nazar*) can only cause knowledge (*'ilm*) in its own substrate, the heart of the living being. When this cause, however, is characterized by direction (*jiha*)—and only pressure (*i'timâd*) is characterized in this way²⁵²—and there is a touching between the substrate of the ability (which also is the substrate in which the direct act inheres) and another body, a generated accident may come into existence in the other body.²⁵³

As we already mentioned, sound, pain, and composition are always generated acts, while conviction, pressure, and mode of being may be either generated or direct acts.²⁵⁴

Sabab: secondary cause.²⁵⁵ The secondary cause being an accident that is used to generate another accident in the same or another substrate, it will be evident that it must not be confounded with an instrument (*âla*). It is an accident the acting subject produces to produce by it another accident.

We have to be aware too of the difference between the *sabab* and the *'illa*—two totally different concepts though both can be rendered as "cause". Both are accidents, but whereas the secondary cause (*sabab*) generates another accident, the *'illa* only causes something to have a certain quality. The *'illa* as *'illa* does not generate, is not used to bring something into existence, but only is the reason why something is entitled to a certain qualification. Therefore, the "causing"

²⁵¹ See *Muhit* I, 367. One cannot say "in the substrate the ability inheres in, or outside that substrate" because such a formula would be applicable to able beings in this world alone who are able by an ability, but not to God, who is essentially able. Therefore, the formulation has to be vaguer.

²⁵² Cf. p. 136. The conclusion is that we can only produce something outside our own body by using pressure (*i'timâd*) as a secondary cause.

²⁵³ See *Muhit* I, 367.

²⁵⁴ See p. 206.

²⁵⁵ See also what Frank says in his article *Ma'nâ*, especially on p. 251: "The relation of the *sabab* to its result (*musabbab*) need not to be necessary, i.e., the term, per se, does not imply that the result follows immediately and inevitably from the *sabab* or the sequence of *asbâb*, nor, again, is the *sabab* necessarily the cause of but a single effect."

of the *'illa* is necessary, cannot be hindered, and occurs at the moment the *'illa* itself comes into existence.²⁵⁶ The result of a secondary cause can be hindered, and it is possible that it results after the coming into existence of the cause itself.²⁵⁷ To give an example: reflection (*naẓar*) can be called both *sabab* and *'illa*; as a *sabab* it generates knowledge in the heart of the human being in which it inheres, whereas as a *'illa* it only causes that human being to be "reflecting" (*nāẓir*).

Among the acts of the hearts one only can be a secondary cause: reflection; the one result possible is knowledge.²⁵⁸ Among the acts of the limbs only two can be used as a secondary cause: pressure and modes of being.²⁵⁹ The pressure, being the only accident that is characterized by "direction" (*jiha*),²⁶⁰ is the one cause we can use to bring something into existence outside the substrate of our ability; all our acts outside our own body need such a pressure. By means of pressure we can produce another pressure, a mode of being, or sound. The way in which we know that they are generated by means of a pressure, is that we know that they come into existence simultaneous with the pressure, always in the same way, and also according to the pressure, e.g., in direction and in strength.²⁶¹ The modes of being, in fact the combination and the separation, can only generate something in the place they are; the combination generates composition (*ta'lif*), the separation generates pain (*alam*).

Fâ'il: doing. Whereas the quality "able" (*qâdir*) indicates the possibility that acts come from the living being who is qualified in this way, and whereas it may also be used to indicate a connection of the living being with a certain individual non-existent thing he can bring into existence, the quality "doing" indicates a connection with a certain individual act the subject brings or has brought into existence.²⁶²

When we qualify someone as "doing" or "acting", we do so because

²⁵⁶ See also Frank, *Ma'nâ*, 250-251

²⁵⁷ *Muhit* I, 408

²⁵⁸ *Mugni* IX, 125-126, *Muhit* I, 408. See also *Mugni* XII, 104-118, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows that the reflection can only generate knowledge and not something else

²⁵⁹ This is discussed in *Mugni* IX, 138-160 See also *Muhit* I, 408

²⁶⁰ See p 136.

²⁶¹ See *Mugni* IX, 140

²⁶² This connection (*ta'alluq*) is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* VII, 50 We know that there must be a connection between the acting subject and the act which makes that this subject and not someone else is said to be the acting subject of this act Since this connection cannot be that the act exists in him or in a part of him, nor that it causes him to be in a state, the connection must be that he made it There are no other possibilities

of a momentaneous fact, because at a certain moment of time he has brought into existence the substance²⁶³ or accident concerned. By being "doing" the subject is not in a state, for the fact that he has done something makes no real difference. When he would be in a state by being "doing", we would have to know that state either by necessary or by acquired knowledge. In fact we do not know such a state; therefore we must conclude that this connection with the act does not really change the subject.²⁶⁴

The only way in which we can know that someone is "doing" is by knowing that an act has come from him, that he has made something; the way we can know that an act came from him, is by knowing that that act corresponds with his motives and his states.²⁶⁵

This quality is called "a quality related to the act" (*ṣifāt al-fi'īl*), it is attributed to the subject "under the aspect of activity" (*'alâ jihat al-fi'īliya*).²⁶⁶ Such qualities do not characterize the substrate, nor the living being, but only the acting subject. They all indicate that an act comes from the subject, and they do not indicate that he is in a certain state.²⁶⁷

According to the accidents we produce, the quality doing has various names: when someone is making speech (*jâ'il al-kalâm*), he is called "speaking" (*mutakallim*), and in a similar way he is called "beating" (*dârib*), "moving" (*muḥarrrik*: moving something else), or "making immobile" (*musakkin*).²⁶⁸ When a subject is qualified by one of these qualities, the reason is that he made the corresponding accident, and not that he would be in a certain state.

²⁶³ See also note 243. We cannot produce substances, the only one who can do that being God.

²⁶⁴ 'Abd al-Jabbâr's main argument that such an accident cannot cause the subject to be in a state, is that one should be able to know that state. See *Mugnî* VII, 43-44.

²⁶⁵ About the vocabulary 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses to describe this, see note 249. In *Mugnî* VII, 48 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "The way to know that something is attributed to the living being under the aspect of activity is when we know its occurring from him according to his intention, will, and motives, he is qualified by it".

²⁶⁶ See p 153, where we discussed the different kinds of qualities. Cf also *Mugnî* VII, 48.

²⁶⁷ *Mugnî* VII, 53 "wa-ammâ ṣifât al-fâ'il fa-jam'uhû tufid wuqû' al-fi'l minh wa-lâ tufid lah hâlan".

²⁶⁸ These examples are mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugnî* VII, 48; they are used throughout his discussions about the quality "speaking" to elucidate what he is going to say about this quality.

5 MAN IS KNOWING

The quality "knowing" and its qualifier "knowledge" (respectively 'âlm and 'ilm) have been already discussed in detail in the first paragraph of this chapter, the paragraph about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine on logic²⁶⁹ In that paragraph we also discussed the genus to which knowledge belongs, conviction (i'tiqâd), as also two other genera from among the "acts of the hearts" (af'âl al-qulûb), reflection (nazar) and assumption (zann) The two remaining acts of the hearts will be discussed in our next section

One short remark should still be made about the responsible person (*mukallaf*) as knowing Besides the fact that we can know that human beings are knowing either by inner experience or by the fact that they do precise acts, we also know by deduction that the responsible person, upon whom God has imposed His duties, must be knowing²⁷⁰ For the execution of these obligations it is necessary that the responsible person can know the obliged act, its qualities, and its difference from other things Only in this way can he make the intention to execute this duty and know that he has executed it This implies that God, in order that His imposing of duties be good, has to give man (and other beings upon whom He imposes His obligations) the knowledge necessary to execute these duties This knowledge is called, as we have seen, intuition ('aql)²⁷¹

6 MAN IS WILLING

Murid : willing²⁷² Every person who is compos mentis ('âqil) knows by necessary knowledge, based on his inner self-experience (*wijdân*

²⁶⁹ See especially pp 47-55, and also what we said about the intuition ('aql) on pp 92-93

²⁷⁰ See *Mugni* XI, 371-387

²⁷¹ See *Mugni* XI, 309 and 371-372 The definition of intuition ('aql) can be found in *Mugni* XI, 375

²⁷² 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals especially with the quality "willing" when treating God's will So he does in *Mugni* VI/2 (the whole of the second volume of this part of the *Mugni* is given to the will), in *Muhit* I, 267-288, and in *Šarh* 431-477 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân deals with this divine quality in *Nazariyat at-taklif*, 222-229 and with the will of responsible (human) beings on pp 353-367

'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with this subject in his treatise on God's justice, which in the *Mugni* begins with part VI, and not in his treatise on God's unity For, according to him, being willing should not be reckoned among God's essential qualities, but among the qualities which are related to His acts God's will is His act as we shall see in our paragraph on the theodicy The importance of this subject for 'Abd al-Jabbâr and other

*an-nafs*²⁷³), that he is willing. It is not necessary to look for some indication to prove that; it is a necessary knowledge which everybody has and nobody can banish from his soul.²⁷⁴ Our being willing is known in the way we know all states we are in: before knowing the existence of "will", we know our own state as being willing.

Because everybody knows this state clearly and distinctly when he is in this state, it is not possible to give a definition of what is this quality "willing", for it belongs to the essential conditions for a good definition that it is clearer and more revealing than the term to be defined; but no expression can be clearer and more revealing than our simple term "willing".²⁷⁵ Nevertheless, one can try to describe it, and this 'Abd al-Jabbâr does, saying that willing is "who is characterized by a quality because of his having which it is possible for him to act in this way and not in another."²⁷⁶ This rather cryptic expression can be explained by saying that it is possible for the "willing" subject to give his act some extra qualifications above its being existent; by willing he can make his speech to be a command or an information about a given person or thing; by willing he can give his act a certain "intention".

The meaning of the term "willing" is explained by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by mentioning two other terms which he considers to be synonyms of the term *murîd*, namely "*qâsid*" or intending and "*muḳtâr*" or choosing²⁷⁷

thinkers is somewhat poetically expressed by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uḡmân where he says "The divine will belongs to the most important topics about which the opinions of Muslim philosophers and thinkers differ, the reason is that it is the quality by means of which the heavens meet the world and by which is realized the creation with man, animals, and lifeless matter on it" (*Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 222)

The opinion that willing is an essential quality could lead to the conclusion that the world, which is willed by God, must be willed from all eternity and therefore be itself eternal

²⁷³ Cf pp 54-55

²⁷⁴ See *Muhîṭ* I, 267, *Šarh* 431-432. *Mugni* VI 2, 8 Against his opponent who says that this knowledge is not necessary and that not everybody admits it, 'Abd al-Jabbâr states "Somebody who is compos mentis cannot deny that he is intending (*qâsid*) an act, willing (*murîd*) it, and choosing (*muḳtâr*), he makes a distinction between his being in this state and his being non-willing (*kârth*), and he makes a distinction between what he wills from himself and what he wills from someone else. When his motives for a thing are strong (enough), he surely wills it, just as he does not will it when his motive holds him back from the thing, and maybe he non-wills it" (*Mugni* VI 2, 8)

²⁷⁵ Cf *Šarh* 432. See also what we said in our discussion about the conditions of a good definition on pp 76-78

²⁷⁶ *Šarh* 432 "*al-muḳtass bi-sifa li-kawmih 'alavhâ vastth minh al-fi'l 'alâ wajh dâm wajh*"

²⁷⁷ 'Abd al-Jabbâr says so in *Mugni* VI 2, 8 in a passage we translated in note 274 of this section (see above)

Though everybody necessarily knows this state of being willing; it is possible that one does not make a clear distinction between this state and other states one is in, and that one needs some reflection to discover this distinction.²⁷⁸

Thus we discover that being willing is not the same as being knowing (*'âlim*). One could think that willing is nothing else but knowing that an act has some benefit for the acting subject; this is not true, for it is possible that one knows a long time that something has some benefit without being willing it, while at a given moment one also becomes willing it.²⁷⁹

Being willing also is not the same as being able (*qâdir*), for we can be able to do something without willing it, and we can be willing to do something without being able to do it. This is the way we know that two qualities are different.²⁸⁰

Being willing must not be confounded with being desiring (*muštahî*). Desiring implies that one perceives something and that one's nature (*taḥ*) is attracted by it because it is of direct benefit for him.²⁸¹ One can, however, will something that at this moment is rather harmful, but the result of which will be advantageous; one can also will without perceiving; one can will something that is of benefit for someone else; one can also will something that has no reality, but that one is convinced to be existent. In this way the difference between the qualities willing and desiring becomes crystal clear.²⁸²

The quality we thus discovered must be caused by our being in a state (*hâl*); for, we know that the totality of our person is characterized by this quality: we are willing, not a part of us, nor something outside us. In that case there are three possibilities:²⁸³ it can be

²⁷⁸ "One only needs meditation (*ta'ammul*) about the distinction between it (*viç* being willing) and the states of the living being which can be confounded with it, meditation as we mentioned about the being perceiving of the perceiving (person)" *Muḡnî* VI 2, 8

²⁷⁹ Cf. *Šarh* 434 and *Muḡnî* VI 2, 8-9

²⁸⁰ See *Šarh* 434

²⁸¹ A whole series of differences between will and desire (*irâda* and *šahwa*) is mentioned in *Muḡnî* VI 2, 35-36. One can base oneself on this list to make a similar list of differences between the two qualities "willing" and "desiring"

²⁸² See *Muḡnî* VI 2, 9. Concrete examples from which appears the difference between being willing and being desiring are given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Šarh* 433: one can will what one does not desire, for instance, many of the repugnant medicines, one can also desire what one does not will, for instance, adultery, drinking wine, drinking cold water when it is very hot but one is fasting

²⁸³ See p. 154

because of a state, because of a defect in the instruments we have to use, or because we made something. The second possibility can be excluded; we are also not qualified as willing "under the aspect of activity": being willing does not mean that we made something; moreover, in that case we should know the act (will) before knowing the quality (willing), just as we know speech before knowing that we are speaking. The only possibility that remains, therefore, is that we are willing because of a state we are in.²⁸⁴

We know by necessary knowledge, by direct self-experience (*wijdān an-nafs*), that we ourselves are willing. But how do we know someone else to be willing? There are two possibilities: we know that either by necessary or by acquired knowledge.

By necessary knowledge: we know whom and what someone else intends (his *maqāṣid*) by his words and by his acts. Therefore we know he is intending (*qāṣid*), and since intending is a form of willing,²⁸⁵ we also know he is willing. 'Abd al-Jabbār gives some examples: when someone speaks to me, I know I am the person to whom he directs his words; I know that he "intends" me. When I enter a room, and someone who is there stands up to honour me, I know his intention by that act.²⁸⁶ Moreover, there are many acts which are only what they are by the intention of the acting subject; for example, a command or information only is a command or information because the speaking subject intends it to be so. Hence, when we know by necessary knowledge that something is a command or information, we also know that the speaking subject is willing.²⁸⁷

By acquired knowledge: the only indication (*dalīl*) that points to the fact that someone is willing, is that he is just and wise (*ādil* and *ḥakīm*). But this way to argue that someone else is willing is only usable in the case of God and His prophet Muḥammad.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁴ Cf. *Muḡnī* VI:2, 22.

²⁸⁵ See *Muḡnī* VI 2, 58: "al-qaṣd irādat fi'l al-insān fi hālih aw hāl musabbabih" the intention is the will of the act of man at the moment (it happens) or at the moment its effect (happens)

²⁸⁶ See *Muḡnī* VI 2, 10 and also *Muḥit* I, 267, where this is very briefly summarized. We must know these intentions, for, if we could not know these intentions, we certainly could not know the motives, and we have to know the motives in order to know that that person is the acting subject of that act. See also note 249

²⁸⁷ It is not the outward form of speech which determines it to be a command, information, or something else; it can have the same form and yet be in one case an information and in another case a command or an information about something else See *Muḡnī* VI:2, 10

²⁸⁸ See *Šarḥ* 433 and *Muḥit* I, 267 and 268.

By way of conclusion : we can know three states the living being is in when we know his acts :

because these acts were possible for the acting subject, this subject was able (*qâdir*);

when this act occurs in a precise (*muḥkam*) way, he is knowing (*âlim*);

when this act occurs in a special way (*'alâ wajh maḳṣûṣ*), he is willing (*murîd*).²⁸⁹

Finally, if God's imposing duties on mankind is really good, it supposes that man can do his act in a special way by which it is good and according to those duties. This also requires that man is willing.²⁹⁰

Irâda : will. We know that we are willing, but at the same time we know that we are not necessarily willing, that it would be possible that we were not willing. Our being willing or not willing at this moment is not dependent on another state we are in, nor on some condition which has to be fulfilled. Therefore, the only reason why we are willing now is the presence of a cause (*'illa*), a qualifier (*ma'nâ*) in us.²⁹¹ Consequently, while we know our being willing and also the being willing of other persons by necessary knowledge, the will can only be known by acquired knowledge, by argumentation.²⁹² For the will is nothing else than the qualifier the inherence of which makes us to be willing, while its disappearance makes us cease to be willing.²⁹³

Our will being a qualifier and, therefore, an accident, inheres in a substrate. Without the assistance of divine revelation we cannot know in which part of us it in fact does inhere. We might assume that it inheres somewhere in our breast,²⁹⁴ but only revelation tells us that the exact place in which will, knowledge, and other "acts of the hearts" (*af'âl al-qulûb*) inhere is the human heart.²⁹⁵

²⁸⁹ Cf *Mugni* VI 2, 22

²⁹⁰ Cf *Mugni* XI, 309

²⁹¹ Cf *Mugni* VI:2, 24, *Muhit* I, 268, *Šarh* 432-433

²⁹² Therefore, 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uḡmân's explanation is not correct (*Nazarîvat at-taklif*, 354) He states that every person who is compos mentis knows the will by inner experience. What he knows is, in fact, his being willing. The will can be known by acquired knowledge only.

²⁹³ Cf *Šarh* 431 · "fa-l-irâda huw mâ yûṭh kaww aḳ-dât murîdan"

²⁹⁴ Cf *Muhit* I, 268 In *Mugni* VI:2, 28 'Abd al-Jabbâr explains that we, when we are willing or thinking, may feel a kind of tiredness in our breast

²⁹⁵ In *Mugni* VI 2, 28 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the text from the Qur'ân "They have hearts, but do not understand with them" (*Sûrat al-a'râf*, verse 179), in *Muhit* I, 268 we find "saying with their mouths that which never was in their hearts" (*Sûrat Al 'Imrân*, verse 167)

The will is one of the acts of the hearts, an accident we bring into existence, it belongs to our own acts and not to the acts of God ²⁹⁶ Therefore, one can say that the will has a twofold connection: it has a connection with the motives why we produce this accident "will", and it has a connection with the thing willed (*al-murâd*) We discuss briefly this double connection.

The motives (*ad-dawâ'i*) are not really the cause of the will, they do not necessitate the will, nor do they necessitate us to be willing. But these motives which, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, are either a conviction or a knowledge or an assumption that a certain act will be of some benefit for us, urge the subject to will the act concerned. ²⁹⁷ If the motives for a certain act are strong enough and there are no motives against that act, we surely produce the corresponding will and will that act. But it is possible that the motives against that act or the motives for an opposite act are stronger, and in that case we produce the other will.

Consequently, our being willing is not a deliberation, and we could even say it is not free, determined as it is by the motives. Nevertheless, 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that the will is not entirely determined because the motives may vary and change, and so also the will may change. ²⁹⁸

On the other hand, the will also has a connection with the willed object (*al-murâd*) But to understand what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says here, it is very important to bear in mind that in his opinion it is possible to will an act of someone else. Consequently, willing is not the decision to do something, nor the link between the motives and the act, for these things are not possible when we will an act of someone else.

²⁹⁶ There are five acts of the hearts which to do we, able beings in this world, are able: conviction, assumption, reflection, will, and non-will, see also p. 127. Desire and aversion do not fall under our power and, therefore, are created in us by God.

²⁹⁷ See *Muhit* I, 70. Motives are "*mâ na'lamuh aw na'taqduh aw nazunnuh min naf lanâ aw daf' darar*", the benefit or repulsion of harm for us we know, are convinced about, or assume. The motives urge (*yad'û*, the verb corresponding with the noun used in Arabic for the motives) the subject to will, see *Mugnî* XI, 400. See also *Muhit* I, 268 and *Mugnî* VI 2, 24.

²⁹⁸ Cf. *Muhit* I, 268, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponent objects that 'Abd al-Jabbâr thus can no longer say that one is willing while it is possible that one is not. (In his argumentation that we are willing because of a qualifier will he used this as an argument.) 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that the motives can change so that the subject is no longer willing. Therefore, one can say that he is willing while it would be possible that he is not, when we take the motives into consideration (*'alâ taqdîr tagyîr ad-dawâ'i*) Nevertheless, in this case too the will remains determined by the motives. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the will is not a link between the motives and the act, and the act is directly urged by the motives without intervention of the will.

Hence, the connection between the will and the thing willed is not a connection between cause and effect; the will does not necessitate the act. One could easily think that the will does this when we look into our will and our acts; when we will an act of ourselves, an act we really can do, we necessarily do that act.²⁹⁹ Nevertheless, there is no causal relationship between the two, but both acts—the will and the other act—are urged by the same motives. The main argument to prove that the will does not cause the act, is that we ourselves cannot do everything we will and certainly not the acts of someone else.³⁰⁰

When 'Abd al-Jabbâr in this way considers the will to be a second act, besides the act which is willed, and denies a causal connection between the two, it will be evident that it is not necessary that the will precedes the act; for the same motives which urge us to do something also urge us to will something. This has as consequence that both the will and the act can be produced at the same time.³⁰¹ Nevertheless, it is also possible that the will precedes the act willed.³⁰²

But notwithstanding all this, the will can in some cases have influence upon the act.³⁰³ If we will an act of someone else, such an influence is impossible. If the will precedes the act, the influence is impossible too: the will only has influence on an act which really comes into existence and is really produced by the willing subject at the same time as the will itself. In this way, for instance, speech can become a command or information, and our act of standing up can become an act of honouring somebody who enters.³⁰⁴

In this way, by a contemporary will, an act can become good or bad, as we already saw. Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr can say that, when we know that God cannot do evil acts and that all His acts are good,

²⁹⁹ Cf *Mugni* VI/2, 86.

³⁰⁰ *Mugni* VI 2, 84, if the will would necessitate the act, it would necessitate every act the subject wills, every act it has a relation with.

³⁰¹ "Because of what the act is done, because of that the will is done", *Mugni* VI/2, 89 In that case the will is contemporary and concomitant with the act

³⁰² Cf *Mugni* VI/2, 90 we can will something for the future; we can will the effect at the moment we will the cause; we can will all the letters of a word at the moment we produce the first of them

³⁰³ Cf *Mugni* VI/2, 91-93.

³⁰⁴ This is the way we can know that someone is willing, when his willing is contemporary with his acting, his will can have an influence upon his act which changes that act. By perceiving such an influenced act, we know that the acting subject is willing. The will has no influence upon the occurring of an act, but only upon a certain intended way it occurs. Cf. also *Mugni* VI/2, 92-93.

we deduce that He is willing because the qualification of an act as good or bad depends partially on the will or intention of the acting subject.³⁰⁵

Dâ'i: motive. A motive is said to be "the benefit or repulsion of harm for us which we know, are convinced about, or assume (to be) in an act."³⁰⁶ The Arabic word literally means "what invites" or "what urges" to do something. As a technical term it is only used for something inside the subject, telling him that there is benefit in a certain act. These motives not only invite us to act but also, and even more often, to will something. Motives can tell us that an act which in fact is impossible for us—such as the acts of someone else—would have some benefit for us; though we are not able to do that act, we can always will it.³⁰⁷ Against this background, it is clear why 'Abd al-Jabbâr compares this motive with the objectives (*ağrâd*).³⁰⁸

Such motives, which exist in our heart, can be produced either by ourselves or by God. We know that the necessary knowledge (*al-'ilm aq-darûri*) must be produced by God in our heart, whereas the other kinds of motives (acquired knowledge, conviction, opinion) can be produced by ourselves too.³⁰⁹ Besides this way in which God influences our will and our acts, He also does so in a direct way, by directly speaking to us, as we already saw. This inner speech is called "*kâfir*" or "warning".³¹⁰

A motive does not necessitate the subject to perform a certain act, and even not to will a certain act. When there is a motive inviting us to do an act, and there is no motive that holds us back from that

³⁰⁵ See pp 88-89

³⁰⁶ Cf *Muhit* I, 70 See note 297 In that context the motives are discussed in their relation to the act. We shall show that the motives lead more to willing than to acting, the reason is that many acts are *murâd* for us (we can will them) without being *maqdûr* (we can produce them) So we can will, but not produce, the *maqdûrât* of someone else, the things he can produce, the things which eventually will become his acts.

³⁰⁷ Cf, for instance, *Mugnî* XI, 400 and *Mugnî* VI/2, 88 See also Frank, *Fundamental Assumptions*, 13. "The motive (*ad-dâ'i*) is the reason for which the act is performed (. .) and as such is a state of the agent rather than the object or act (. .), it is taken generally to be the knowledge, conviction, or opinion of the desired object as the agent is aware of his desire" As we shall see below, in this description the term "desire" cannot be a translation of "*šahwa*" One must restrict oneself here to the mentioning of the benefit (or the repulsion of harm) because this can also be found in or behind a non-desirable thing See also Gimaret, *Ilğâ'*, 36-37

³⁰⁸ Cf *Mugnî* XI, 400.

³⁰⁹ Cf *Mugnî* VI/2, 88

³¹⁰ See pp 63-65

act or invites to its opposite, we certainly will that act. But, when there is a stronger motive against that act or for its opposite, we do not will it. So the combination of motives determines whether we will and what we will.³¹¹

The relation of the motives to the act is somewhat different. When the motives invite us to an act which to do is possible for us, we certainly do that act when there is no stronger motive against it or for its opposite. But when the act is not possible for us, for instance because it is the act of someone else, his actual *maqdûr*, the motives can urge us to will that act, but that act in fact will not occur.³¹²

Murâd: willed. From what we said above about the motives (*ad-dawâ'î*), it is clear that the thing willed is the same as the motive.³¹³ So one can will something one knows, is convinced about, or assumes.

When we discuss, however, the meaning of the term *murâd*, and maintain that it is something with which the will has a connection, the *murâd* must be a thing. That is to say that it is either existent, or non-existent, or coming into existence. Since the will is connected with the coming into existence of something,³¹⁴ and we know that it can precede or be contemporary with the coming into existence of the thing willed,³¹⁵ we conclude that the willed thing (*al-murâd*) must be either non-existent or coming into existence. If it is non-existent—and here we have to pay attention to the definition of the non-existent things—³¹⁶ it must be known, and it must be possible that it comes into existence. Against this background we have to understand 'Abd al-Jabbâr's statement: "Know that what can be willed is every thing the possibility of the coming into existence of which is known; thereby we mean that coming into existence is not impossible for it."³¹⁷ We can will something to come into existence, and we can will that it comes into existence in a special way so that by the intention speech becomes command or information, or an act becomes good or evil.

From the condition we mentioned one can deduce that it is possible to will an act we cannot produce ourselves, if it can be produced by someone else; on the contrary we cannot will an act that cannot occur

³¹¹ Cf *Mugni* VI/2, 24-25.

³¹² Cf *Mugni* VI/1, 187; *Mugni* VI/2, 88

³¹³ Cf *Mugni* VI/2, 68

³¹⁴ This is discussed in *Mugni* VI/2, 68-77

³¹⁵ Cf *Mugni* VI/2, 89-90

³¹⁶ See pp 107-109

³¹⁷ Cf *Mugni* VI/2, 78.

and come into existence because such an act is not possible, and even is not "some thing" at all.

To clarify the meaning which the term *irâda* has for 'Abd al-Jabbâr, I mention briefly seven other terms, each of which is used as a name for the will although most of them are only used in a special context and indicate a special aspect of the will.³¹⁸

Maḥabba : love. The term *maḥabba* is an equivalent for *irâda*. This can easily be proved : everybody knows that one cannot will without at the same time being loving, and one cannot love without being willing.³¹⁹ When 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponent remarks that we say that we love somebody, while it is, nevertheless, impossible that we will him—because we cannot will what exists and is remaining—'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that this expression really means that we will the benefit for somebody and the repulsion of harm from him.³²⁰

Riḍâ : contentment. This term is only used to indicate the will when the thing willed (*al-murâd*) is existent. The fact that the term is only used in this case, does not mean that the two terms are not identical; for we know that we cannot be willing without being content or being content without being willing.³²¹

Iktiyâr : free choice. Though this term too is an equivalent of the term "will" (*irâda*), it is only used when one wants to emphasize that one prefers one act above another act.³²²

Wilâya : "*pietas*".³²³ This word is used when someone wills reward, glorification, and veneration for someone else. So we can say that God

³¹⁸ These terms are dealt with in *Mugni* VI 2, 51-59

³¹⁹ Cf. *Mugni* VI 2, 51

³²⁰ Cf. *Mugni* VI 2, 53-54, the addition that it also means, besides the willing of someone's benefit, that one does not will his harm, is made by Abû Hâsim

³²¹ When it is used with this meaning it is construed with the preposition *bi* followed by a name of an act. The verb may, however, also be construed with the preposition '*an* followed by a name of a person, in that case it means to will the glorification and veneration of that person since that person merits a reward. See *Mugni* VI 2, 54-56

³²² The term is also used as the opposite of *ilyâ'* (constraint). According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, however, one can make a choice even when one is under constraint. When someone is constraint by fear to flee, he nevertheless can choose the way to flee

³²³ It is very difficult to translate this word because it is used both for the relation God has with believers and for the relation man has with God and his fellow-believers. Therefore, I chose the Latin term *pietas*, which has the double meaning

has "*pietas*" for believers (He will reward for them), and they have "*pietas*" for Him (they will glorification and veneration for Him).³²⁴

Qaṣd: intention. It is the will of the act of a human being at the moment it comes into existence or at the moment its cause³²⁵ comes into existence. This is the way in which, as we already saw, the will can exert influence upon the act. By this intention, which is the concomitant will, acts become good or bad and speech becomes, for instance, a command or information about something.³²⁶

'Azm: decision. It is used for the will of a human being when he wills an act of himself before he produces the act and before he produces the cause of this act.³²⁷

Ītār: preference. This word is used when we will something we choose above something else.³²⁸

After these seven words indicating a way in which the will may occur, I mention two other terms which might be confused with the will and with the words mentioned above, but which in fact are something else.³²⁹

Ṣāhwa: desire. The desire is one of the acts of the hearts (*af'āl al-qulūb*), but, unlike the will, it does not fall under the power of a human being. Consequently, the desire is produced in our heart by God.³³⁰ It is the desire of our nature for the perceived object, because this is of immediate benefit for ourselves.³³¹

Tamannī: wish. This term is used for a wish that cannot be fulfilled because it is connected either with something that did not happen in the past or with something that cannot possibly exist.³³²

³²⁴ When it is said about a believer who has *pietas* for another believer, it indicates that he wills benefits for him in the field of religion, as, for instance, some support for and defence of it. See *Mugni* VI 2, 58.

³²⁵ Read *sababih* instead of *musabbabih* in *Mugni* VI 2, 58, line 8. The sense of the statement given there necessitates this emendation.

³²⁶ See *Mugni* VI 2, 10-11.

³²⁷ This is not possible for God. *Mugni* VI 2, 58.

³²⁸ This term is, consequently, synonymous with the term *iktinār* mentioned above.

³²⁹ This is discussed in *Mugni* VI 2, 35-39.

³³⁰ Cf. *Mugni* VI 2, 36.

³³¹ This and more features of the desire are mentioned in *Mugni* VI 2, 35-37, where 'Abd al-Jabbār discusses the differences between desire and will.

³³² 'Abd al-Jabbār states that it is, or is expressed by, a sentence beginning with *laʾi*, the introduction of a wish that cannot possibly be fulfilled. *Mugni* VI 2, 37.

Some disagreement arose about the question whether such a wish is only a word or some words spoken, or a qualifier in the human heart.³³³ But also if it is more than words and in fact a qualifier in the heart, the difference between the will and the wish is evident because of the difference between their objects: the will has as object something that can exist, the wish something that cannot exist.³³⁴

What remains now is to say some final words about the opposite of the terms discussed until now in this section—about non-willing and the concepts related to it. We can be very short here; the similarity between the two series of concepts is almost complete. Therefore, we summarize here only some basic facts without further argumentation since this argumentation already has been given above.

Kârih: non-willing. We know by self-experience when we are non-willing, that it is other than willing, and also that it is other than the denial of willing. It is a positive quality.

Our being non-willing must be caused by a state we are in since we know our being non-willing before we know some non-will.

Karâha: non-will. We know that we are non-willing, but we also know that we are not always and not necessarily so. Therefore we must be non-willing because of a qualifier which we call non-will (*karâha*). This qualifier is an accident existing in our heart, one of the acts of the hearts we are able to produce. Just as the will, so the non-will is based upon the motives which invite us to a non-will. The object of our non-will, the "*makrûh*", non-willed object, can be described in the same way as the *murâd* was: it must be known and its occurring must be possible.

Sakât: detestation. Just as love is the same as will, detestation is the same as non-will. It is not possible that we are non-willing without being detesting, nor is it possible that we are detesting without being non-willing.³³⁵

³³³ Abû 'Alî has held both positions as appears from his works; according to Abû Hâšim, the wish is a qualifier in the heart corresponding with a sentence beginning with *layt*. *Muğni* VI/2, 37

³³⁴ If the wish consists only in words, the difference with the will is evident; if it is a qualifier, the wish also can exert no influence upon the wished thing (the will can have such an influence as we already saw) and does not suppose that an act happens in a certain way (as the will does).

³³⁵ Cf. *Muğni* VI/2, 60.

Nafra : aversion. This accident corresponds with the desire (*śahwa*); it is an act of the heart which does not fall under our power, and therefore must be created by God. It is the aversion of our nature when we perceive an object because something harming is expected to come from it.

D. THEODICY

This paragraph deals with that part of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system which one could call in a narrower sense of the word his rational theology—although this term can surely be used in a broader sense to indicate the whole of his thinking on God and His creation as found in his theological works, based as his doctrine is upon his conviction that God occupies the central place in this world which comes from Him and shows a fundamental relationship with Him, that He continuously takes care of this world, and that human life in this world is characterized by God's *taklif*, the duties God imposed upon the able living beings He created. This paragraph will, however, be devoted to God Himself and try to answer the question how we can know Him and what we can say about Him; all this on the sole basis of human intuition (*'aql*) and reflection (*nazar*), to the exclusion of everything divine revelation could tell us about this matter.

I see 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theodicy as based upon three general principles, which exert their influence throughout his theological thinking. The first principle is the principle of God's transcendence: God is infinitely far above this world, especially above all its imperfections; He is not worldly and His creating in this world comes from outside this world. The second principle is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's full confidence in human intuition and in the reflection on the data of this intuition, guaranteed as these ultimately are by God Himself. The third principle, related to the second one, is his relying on this perceptible worldly reality as a true and reliable source of real knowledge. Upon these three principles 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theodicy is built.

These principles have as a first consequence that God, because of His transcendence, is not necessarily known and certainly not perceptible;¹ but, nevertheless, God can be known by acquired knowledge when we follow in our reflection the perceptible indications God laid down in this world and which point towards Him. All our knowledge about God is ultimately based upon these indications we find and upon our reflection on these indications; there is no direct knowledge of God.

¹ What is perceptible is either substance or accident; God can be neither a substance nor an accident, both implying some form of imperfection. That we have also no other kind of necessary knowledge of God is evident from our experience.

Our knowledge of God is, therefore, marked by our knowledge of this world. It is man's first duty to reflect upon these indications and to come in this way to a real knowledge of God. This duty is the basis of every *taklif*, every duty God imposed upon responsible persons.²

It is also this human intuition and human reflection which can show us—and which have to show us—that God's revelation, the message He entrusts to His prophets to transmit to their peoples, must be trustworthy. But only after one has proved this revelation to be reliable and a real source of knowledge, can one use the data of this revelation as arguments. This implies that revelation only gives confirmation of what we already knew and some additions to that knowledge, the basic knowledge about God and His qualities has to be grounded, however, on acquired knowledge and reflection on the data of human intuition.³

In our discussion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theodicy we follow in main outlines his discussions of the object. After having discussed the way we can know something about the other (God's) world and the way we can speak about it, we deal with the arguments that are used to prove that there is a god. Then we treat God's permanent and essential states; the question of His "qualities" is discussed in a separate section. Then we mention some qualifications which have to be denied about God, we deal with His acts, and, finally, we make some remarks on the use of arguments derived from divine revelation in the theodicy.⁴ Thus, this paragraph is divided into seven sections according to the subjects mentioned above.

1. OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE OTHER WORLD

Before dealing with the possibility of knowing something about other worlds than the world we live in, we have to say something about

² See p. 61.

³ See pp. 95-100 about the function of revelation in the whole of human knowledge and also about the contents of revelation.

⁴ The three theological works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr which are still at our disposition are structured in the same way. The chapters on God's qualities based on His permanent and essential states can be found in the *Šarh* and in the first part of the *Muhit*, while their structure in the *Mugni* can be deduced from 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussion of the divine names in *Mugni* V, 204-258, the corresponding chapters about the qualities being lost. The chapters about God's acts and the qualities related to those acts are preserved in the *Šarh* and partially also in the *Mugni* and the first part of the *Muhit*. The qualifications which have to be denied can be found discussed in all three works. The discussion of the way we can prove there is a God is missing in the *Mugni* and must have been treated at the beginning of that work.

the meaning of the term used to indicate the other world, "*al-ġâ'ib*", and about its opposite, "*aš-šâhid*".

Aš-šâhid: the present world, this world. The word *aš-šâhid* can be translated literally as "the present" or "what is present"; when 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses this term in his argumentations, he does not use it to indicate what is visible or perceptible. He admits that one can use it for what is known, *al-ma'lûm*;⁵ but in a theological context it is better to use it for "what is among us".⁶ From this description, which we meet several times in his works, and from his discussions of it, we can deduce that what he understands by it is the whole of this world with all its substances and accidents, perceptible or not, actually known or not.⁷

Al-ġâ'ib or **al-ġayb**: the absent world, the other world. These terms are the contrary of the term *aš-šâhid*, mentioned above, and literally mean "the absent" or "what is absent". Although *al-ġâ'ib* is imperceptible, we cannot say that both of these terms are equivalent because the imperceptible accidents (as knowledge, will, life) do belong to this world (*aš-šâhid*). And though the term may be used to indicate the unknown,⁸ *al-ġâ'ib* actually can be known⁹ without ceasing to be *ġâ'ib*. Therefore, we have to take it, as the term *aš-šâhid*, in an almost spatial sense: it is "what is not among us", the world that is not

⁵ Cf. *Muĥit* I, 165.

⁶ *fî-mâ baynanâ* as 'Umar 'Azmi reads in the Egyptian edition of the *Muĥit* (I, 167). Houben (Lebanese edition, I, 165) did not understand this correctly, he also wrongly read *wa-l-ûlâ* ("and the first") instead of *wa-l-awlâ* ("and the best"). As a consequence, he also wrongly begins a new paragraph here. This paragraph actually should begin in the fourth line from the bottom with the words *fa-l-awwal* ("and the first"). The expression *fî-mâ baynanâ* is a usual equivalent for *aš-šâhid* in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works.

⁷ Cf. *Muĥit* I, 165-167. Frank (*Kalâm*, 297) renders the term *aš-šâhid* by "the phenomenal"; if he means by this term "the perceptible", this translation does not correspond with the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the term because the imperceptible accidents nevertheless belong to *aš-šâhid*. Van Ess (*Logical Structure*, 34) renders the term by "the 'present' or apperceptible world"; here the same remark has to be made: if the author means the perceptible things, his translation does not correspond with the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the term.

⁸ Cf. *Muĥit* I, 165.

⁹ Consequently, Frank's description of this term in the doctrine of Abû l-Hudhayl (*Abû l-Hudhayl*, 7) does not correspond with 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of this term. Frank notices: "Taking *al-ġayb* as the non-present, the non-phenomenal: that aspect of the Creator which remains completely transcendent and which He does not make manifest to man". According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr God's acts (His creation, His speech) belong to *aš-šâhid*, how God is in Himself we can come to know by reflecting on the indications God placed in this world and by divine revelation.

here.¹⁰ From 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions, it becomes clear that he uses this term actually when speaking about God.¹¹ *Al-gâ'ib* in fact is God as He is in Himself to the exclusion of His acts in this (present) world.

Consequently, possibly the best translation we can give of the two terms *aş-şâhid* and *al-gâ'ib*, besides the literal translation "the present" and "the absent", is : this world and the other world. In this translation we evidently do not use the term "world" for a totality of material bodies and accidents, but for a totality which is closed in itself though a relationship with the other world is not excluded.¹²

'Ilm al-ğayb : knowledge of the other world. It is not possible to know the other world, or God, by necessary knowledge.¹³ We already saw that necessary knowledge is a knowledge which occurs in us not from ourselves, and which we cannot in any way banish from our soul.¹⁴ To the necessary knowledge belongs the knowledge which constitutes the completeness of the intuition (*kamâl al-'aql*); this is the knowledge every person who is *compos mentis* necessarily has.

It is evident that the knowledge of the other world does not belong to the completeness of the intuition, for not every person who is *compos mentis* has this knowledge.¹⁵ Nor can the other world be known by a knowledge which is based on perception, because, as we will show later, it cannot be perceived. Other forms of necessary knowledge remain; can the other world be known by one of these forms? It is very difficult to prove by positive arguments the impossibility of a necessary knowledge. Even the argument that it is evident that this

¹⁰ For the translation of *al-gâ'ib* by "the non-phenomenal" (Frank, *Kalâm*, 297) or by "the 'hidden', inapperceptible things" (Van Ess, *Logical Structure*, 34), see what we said in note 7

¹¹ See, e g , *Muht* I, 165-166

¹² This term is not a translation of an Arabic equivalent, I added it myself for clarity's sake.

¹³ *Şarh* 48-55

¹⁴ Cf page 54 See also *Şarh* 48-49.

¹⁵ This is discussed in *Şarh* 55 One cannot use this argument to prove that the knowledge of the other world cannot be necessary, for not every necessary knowledge belongs to the completeness of the intuition, but only the *bidâyat al-'uqûl* as 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it here On p 54 he gives a similar argument saying that this knowledge cannot be a necessary knowledge because there is some difference of opinion between persons who all are *compos mentis* Here it is not the difference between knowing and not-knowing but between having one opinion and having another opinion 'Abd al-Jabbâr seems to accept this argument though the same objection as given above is possible here

knowledge can be banished from the soul, as appears from the life of believers who became apostates and banished the knowledge of God from their souls, cannot safely be used as 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows.¹⁶ Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr takes his refuge to another argumentation; he tries to show that the knowledge of God is always acquired knowledge and, therefore, cannot be necessary.¹⁷

He mentions two arguments to prove this, both leading to the conclusion that our knowledge of the other world is our act and cannot possibly be necessary, since the definition of necessary knowledge says that it is a knowledge which occurs in us not from ourselves so that it cannot be our act.

His first argument is that this knowledge is generated (*mutawallid*) from a cause which is our act; consequently, the generated result also is our act. Our knowledge of the other world is generated from our reflection, because it occurs at (simultaneous with) that reflection, according to that reflection, and always in the same way; when these three conditions are fulfilled, the connection described is that between the secondary cause (*sabab*) and its effect.¹⁸ We know the reflection to be our act; therefore, the knowledge of the other world also is.

The second argument directly shows that this knowledge is our act. We already saw that something is our act when it occurs according to our states, intentions, motives, or will.¹⁹ Since we know that this knowledge occurs according to our intentions and motives, and disappears according to our non-will and the motives that hold us back from it, we deduce that this knowledge is our act.²⁰

'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions also one argumentum ad hominem: if this knowledge would be necessary and, consequently, given by God,

¹⁶ Cf. *Šarh* 55. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponent objects that some necessary knowledge cannot be banished because the knowledge which God creates in the human heart is greater than the opposite of it which man can produce himself. If, however, man can produce more of its opposite than God actually creates of this necessary knowledge, man can banish it by producing its opposite. See also what we said on p. 125 about the manner in which accidents can be brought back into non-existence.

¹⁷ Cf. *Šarh* 52-53.

¹⁸ These three conditions are described on p. 207. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's present argument can be found in *Šarh* 52-53; he mentions here that the knowledge occurs according to our reflection, in one way, and in a continuous manner ('*alâ . watîra mustamirra*). I think that this last condition corresponds to the condition that it must occur at ('*ind*) the secondary cause: there cannot be a gap, a lapse of time between both.

¹⁹ Cf. what we said on pp. 209-210 about the way in which we can know that something is the act of an acting subject. Here, in *Šarh* 53, we find the terms "intentions" (*qusûd*) and "motives" (*dawâ'i*).

²⁰ Cf. *Šarh* 53.

any person who lacks this knowledge must be excused, because that must be in accordance with God's choice. It would not be possible that the unbelievers lack this knowledge by their own fault, because they renounce it, though it is given by God; renouncing is only possible for small amounts of given knowledge and not for a knowledge such as that of the other world and God.²¹ The opponent therefore has to admit that all unbelievers are excused; but nobody can admit that. He therefore is forced to admit, that his premise was wrong.²²

So, if knowledge of other worlds and of a god is possible, it surely is not necessary knowledge but acquired. This implies that we have to generate that knowledge by reflection (*naẓar*) and inference (*istidlâl*): we have to follow indications in this world, indications which point to that other world; we have to use inferences from this present world towards the other, absent, world: *istidlâl bi-š-šâhid 'alâ l-ġâ'ib*.²³ How can this be done? How can we infer from indications in this world conclusions about the other world? First, this is only possible on the condition that these indications are present, for an indication is something that in itself already points to something else.²⁴

In his *Muĥîṭ* 'Abd al-Jabbâr distinguishes between four ways in which we can know something about the other world—four ways of inference.²⁵ All of them can be described as a form of "analogy" (*qiyâs*) if we take this term in a broader sense; if we take it in the strict sense of the word, only the second one of these four forms of inference can be called analogy because only that form is based upon the having in common of a 'illa (cause); and this is said to be the distinctive feature of the real analogy. But all four forms draw a conclusion about something in the other world, in a way similar to that in which the conclusion is drawn in this world, and, consequently, can be called a form of analogy.

The first form is said to be founded on the having in common of

²¹ Literally 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "Renouncing (*al-juhûd*) only is permitted (possible) of a slight number ('*alâ l-'adad al-yasîr*), of a great number and a large quantity not" *Šarh* 54

²² *Šarh* 54 Admitting that all unbelievers are excused, in fact is itself unbelief (*kufr*) Though this argument seems to be based on revealed premises, it certainly is not According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the reflection to generate a knowledge of God is a duty for every responsible person, a duty we can know on the basis of our intuition without the data of revelation

²³ Cf *Muĥîṭ* I, 165

²⁴ Cf pp 65-68 about the *dalîl* or indication

²⁵ Cf *Muĥîṭ* I, 165-166

an indication; we know that in this world a certain indication points to something indicated, indicates that something has a given judgement (*ḥukm*). If we know the same indication in the other world, we conclude to the same thing indicated, to the same judgement. Therefore, this form is also called: the having in common of the way in which the judgement is known.²⁶ This is the way in which we can know God's essential qualities; we know, for instance, that someone in this world for whom acting is possible must be able. When we know that for God acting is possible, He must be able too.²⁷ In both cases the indication (the possibility of the act) is known; in this world the indication points to a thing indicated (being able); consequently, it must do the same in the other world.

The second form is the real analogy, and therefore it is said to be founded on a having in common of a cause (*'illa*). When we know that something in this world has a certain judgement (*ḥukm*), we can deduce that this must be caused by a certain cause (*'illa*). When we know the same cause to exist in the other world, we can conclude to the same judgement.²⁸ This form 'Abd al-Jabbār uses especially in discussing God's justice, His acts, and His qualities that are connected with His acts. A man does no evil act when he knows it to be evil and he does not need that act; when we know that this cause (*'illa*) is present in God (He knows such an act to be evil and He does not need it), we conclude that God does no evil.²⁹

The third form is very much like the second, only there is no question of a cause. We know something in this world to have a certain quality, and we deduce that because of that quality it is entitled to a certain judgement. When we know the same judgement in the other world, we can conclude there to the same quality. For instance, we know that we are willing, and we conclude that we can consequently do acts which occur in a special way (as command, information, good, or

²⁶ Cf. *Muḥit* I, 165: "*al-iṣtirāk fī tariq ma'rifa al-ḥukm*".

²⁷ Cf. *Muḥit* I, 165, this example is given there. 'Abd al-Jabbār observes that this form is used in most questions concerning the principle of God's unity (*at-tawḥid*).

²⁸ This form of argumentation can be called linear rather than parallel. From a *ḥukm* in this world is concluded to a *'illa*, which is compared with a *'illa* in the other world, from which we conclude to a *ḥukm* in the other world. Cf. *Muḥit* I, 165-166.

²⁹ This example is mentioned in *Muḥit* I, 166, where 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions two other examples too. He summarizes: "We necessarily know the judgement in this world and we need an indication to the causes (maybe we have to read *'ilal* instead of the *'alil* of the Lebanese and the *ta'ilil* of the Egyptian edition, p. 168), then we compare the other world with it because they have the cause in common." The interpolation and the dividing of the text into paragraphs in the Egyptian edition is misleading.

bad³⁰); when we know that God does such acts, we deduce that He is willing. Because of the similarity between this form of inference and the second form, this one is said to be based on "what is analogous to the cause".³¹

The fourth and last form is described by 'Abd al-Jabbâr as follows: "In this world the judgement is connected with something; then there exists³² in the other world something that is intenser (*ablag̃*) than this thing". The example 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives of this fourth form is that, when something is good when we assume something, it also will be good when we know that, because knowledge is stronger (*aqwâ*) than assumption.³³ We can call this a conclusion from the weaker to the stronger.

If these are the ways in which we draw conclusions about the other world, it is evident that everything we can say about it, will be based upon this world, our knowledge of this world, and the way things are in this world. We must know, for instance, what a word or a name means in this world before we can apply it in the other world; we have to know what a quality means in this world before discussing God's qualities. Hence, we can say that in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology this world has the logical priority, though God has the ontological priority. And therefore we discussed 'Abd al-Jabbâr's logic, cosmology, and anthropology before dealing with his theodicy.

2. God

Allâh: God. The proofs 'Abd al-Jabbar gives for the existence of God are based on the fact that our world in its totality is temporal and brought into existence (*muḥdaṭ*). There are things in this world that can be brought into existence by acting subjects in this world; but there are others which do not fall under the ability of an able subject in this world. Therefore, when they are temporal and existent, they must have been brought into existence by someone else from outside this world. And this someone is God.³⁴

³⁰ See p 214 By a concomitant will speech becomes a command or an information about something, by will it is directed to someone, by will some acts become good or evil This is meant when 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that an act occurs "in a special way"

³¹ *Muhit* I, 165 "wa-*immâ an yakûn fî-mâ ṡajrî majrâ l-'illa*"

³² Cf *Muhit* I, 165 Read *yûjad* (there exists) instead of *nûjd* (we make exist).

³³ Cf *Muhit* I, 166

³⁴ The arguments used to prove the existence of God can be found in the beginning of the *Muhit* and the *Ṣarḥ Muhit* I, 28-93 and *Ṣarḥ* 87-120 Since the first parts of the *Mugnî* are still missing, we have to be satisfied with the texts of the two other theological

'Abd al-Jabbâr's main argument,³⁵ the argument he elaborates in detail, serves to prove that the bodies in our world are temporal and must have been brought into existence by God because able subjects in this world are not able to produce substances and bodies. This argument was first used by Abû l-Hudayl, and he was followed herein by the great majority of Mu'tazilî scholars.³⁶

This argument starts by establishing the modes of being, the so-called *akwân*, as accidents inhering in the body. We already discussed this and proved the existence of these four modes of being, movement and immobility, combination and separation.³⁷

We also saw that a body cannot exist without a mode of being because these modes of being are the realization of the body's being spatial. And since we know that a body by definition (it is "what is characterized by length, breadth, and depth") is spatial, it cannot be without a mode of being.³⁸

Since the modes of being cannot be eternal –it is possible that they are non-existent,³⁹ whereas what is eternal is essentially eternal⁴⁰ and

works 'Abd al-Jabbâr's arguments are summarized by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Utmân in *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 158-163. Badawî, *Histoire*, 208-215 follows the text of the *Šarh*.

³⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr also mentions another argument, in which he argues that there are accidents that do not fall under the ability of an able subject in this world. These accidents need someone from outside this world who actually brought them into existence, this person is God. As we already noticed (cf. p. 112), 'Abd al-Jabbâr realized –as appears from the text of the *Muhîl*–that this argument seems to be very simple and convincing, but in fact was fiercely attacked by his opponents, and that, moreover, their arguments were not easy to refute, founded as they were on an entirely different point of view concerning the accidents.

³⁶ *Šarh* 95. See also our pp. 112-113.

³⁷ See p. 112, also pp. 128-130.

³⁸ See also the other arguments in *Šarh* 111-113, these arguments are translated in Badawî, *Histoire*, 210-211.

³⁹ When something that was moving becomes immobile, the "movement" cannot remain in that substrate, for in that case the substrate would be at the same time moving and immobile, which is not possible. Therefore, the movement must disappear from the substrate. This cannot happen by way of transportation (*mtiqâl*) because an accident (as movement is) cannot be transported from one substrate to another. Therefore, it can only disappear from that substrate by falling back into non-existence; there is no other possibility left.

In *Muhîl* I, 50 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives another argument for the being temporal of the modes of being, where he does not need this detour via the possibility of non-existence, and the proof that what is eternal cannot be non-existent. He states there that these accidents "become" on their substrates (read in *Muhîl* I, 50, line 15: *bi-tariqat tayaddudihâ*; every time the printed text reads in this context the verb *taħaddad*, one has to read *tayaddad*); this cannot happen by way of transportation from another substrate; therefore, it must happen by their coming into existence. Consequently, they are temporal. 'Abd al-Jabbâr, nevertheless, prefers the other argumentation; *Muhîl* I, 50-51.

cannot be non-existent—they must be temporal (*muḥdaṭ*) because this is a yes-no-division where no third possibility can be found.⁴¹

By way of conclusion: since bodies cannot be without a mode of being, and since the modes of being must be temporal, bodies also must be temporal.⁴²

A second step in this argumentation is to prove that what is temporal needs someone who brought it into existence, who produced it: that the *muḥdaṭ* needs a *muḥdiṭ*. 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves this by means of a real analogical reasoning as we already discussed.⁴³ This argument is, in a simplified form, recorded in the *Šarḥ*:⁴⁴ "... our free acts in this world need us and have a connection with us; they only need us because of their coming into existence (*li-ḥudûṭihâ*); everything that shares with them (sc. our free acts) the coming into existence,⁴⁵ must share with them the need for a producer and doer; the bodies share with them the coming into existence and therefore they must need a producer and doer."⁴⁶

The third step is constituted by the argument that able beings in this world are not able to produce bodies.⁴⁷ We already discussed 'Abd

⁴⁰ Cf. *Muḥiṭ* I, 54-55. 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two arguments to show that what is eternal must be essentially eternal and not by a cause (*'illa*); if it were eternal by a cause, cause and caused would both be eternal and one could not know which of them would be the cause and which the effect; if something were eternal because of an eternal cause, that cause would again be eternal by an eternal cause and that would lead to an endless series, which, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, is not possible. Cf. also *Šarḥ* 108.

Something cannot be eternal because someone else made it such, for in that case the acting subject would precede the eternal thing and that is not possible. Therefore, what is eternal must be essentially and per se eternal.

⁴¹ About this kind of division, see p. 73.

⁴² Since the body does not precede the temporal modes of being, it must be similar to them in its kind of existence and also be temporal (*Muḥiṭ* I, 58; *Šarḥ* 113-114 adds: "like twins"). Another argument says: if the bodies were eternal, they would precede the modes of being, for what is eternal precedes what is temporal by, if there were moments of time, an endless amount of moments. Otherwise one could point to a moment that would be the first of its existence. *Muḥiṭ* I, 57-58.

⁴³ See page 114, where we showed that this world because of its being temporal must also have someone who produced it, brought it into existence. Our text was mainly based on the argumentation of the *Muḥiṭ* (see I, 68-79) as being the most elaborate.

⁴⁴ The text of the *Šarḥ* concerning this argumentation (pp. 118-119) is rather short and simple in comparison with the elaborate and complicated argumentation one finds in the *Muḥiṭ*. The *Muḥiṭ* gives more nuances in the argumentation and anticipates the attacks of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents.

⁴⁵ Probably, we have to read in *Šarḥ* 118, line 8 *fī l-ḥudûṭ* instead of *fī l-ḥadaṭ*.

⁴⁶ *Šarḥ* 118. This argument is translated by Badawi (*Histoire*, 213); his translation (e.g., "... ils ont besoin de nous pour les engendrer ...") is not exact.

⁴⁷ The argumentation in the *Šarḥ* (p. 119) is again very brief and simple and

al-Jabbâr's argumentation that bodies cannot be essentially and per se able, but must be so because of a 'illa which is called ability.⁴⁸ We also saw that a subject who is able by an ability (*qâdir bi-qudra*) can only produce something either by bringing it directly into existence in the substrate in which the ability inheres (*mubâsaratan*), or by producing a cause in this substrate by which he generates another act in the substrate of the ability or outside that substrate in a substrate that touches the substrate of the ability.⁴⁹ In none of these three ways bodies can be produced, for that would imply that a body inheres in another body, and this is not possible.⁵⁰ Bodies, consequently, can only be produced by *iktirâ'*, direct production without the use of a substrate in which an ability inheres. But for able subjects in this world, who are able by an ability and who have to make use of the substrate of that ability in acting, producing by *iktirâ'* is not possible.⁵¹

Because bodies are not able to produce bodies, and because accidents too are not able to produce them—if accidents were able, they could not be essentially so, but should be so because of a qualifier inhering in them; it is, however, excluded that accidents inhere in accidents—⁵² and because all temporal things are either substance or accident, we must draw the conclusion that bodies cannot be produced by temporal subjects. Since 'Abd al-Jabbâr, nevertheless, has shown that bodies

appeals directly to our experience. If able beings in this world were able to produce bodies, we would be able to produce them now. And this implies that we could produce for ourselves any sons or possessions we like. Here also the text of the *Muhit* (I, 79-88) is much more detailed and elaborated.

⁴⁸ Cf pp 200-201. We discussed there the able living being, but in order to be able by an ability, the subject must be a body. Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr here can speak about able "bodies" (*ajsâm*). Cf also *Muhit* I, 80, an able body must be able by an ability because it cannot be essentially able (in that case every atom of the body would be able), nor able by a doer who makes it able (then it would remain able, and also in this case every atom of the body would be able). There is no fourth alternative.

⁴⁹ Cf pp 204-206.

⁵⁰ That is contrary to the definitions of the substrate and the accident, cf., for instance, pp 119-120.

⁵¹ Cf *Muhit* I, 81. We know also by our own experience that there must be some form of contact when we produce something outside ourselves. We cannot produce immobility in a body that is at a distance from us without there being any form of contact between us and that body.

⁵² Cf *Muhit* I, 88-89. The argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions here to show that an accident cannot be essentially able, is based upon something he is going to prove later, viz., that there cannot be two gods. One can object here that he uses that argument to prove that there is a god, while his second argument starts from there being a god. 'Abd al-Jabbâr also shows (*Muhit* I, 89-90) that an accident cannot be able "by a doer" (*bi-l-fâ'il*).

need someone who produced them, a producer (*muhđit*) and doer (*fā'il*), the conclusion becomes inevitable, and he states that the bodies must be produced by someone who is eternal.⁵³

We also discussed the fact that bodies can only be produced by *iktirā'*, a form of production that is outside the possibilities of subjects who are able by an ability. Therefore, they must have been produced by someone who is not able by an ability but is essentially so

'Abd al-Jabbār's conclusion is that the bodies have a producer and doer who is eternal and essentially able. And because there only can be one person who is eternal and essentially able—as 'Abd al-Jabbār will prove in the course of his discussions about God's qualities—⁵⁴ all bodies are produced by one producer and doer, whom we call God, and who is eternal and essentially able.

3. GOD'S PERMANENT STATES

Starting from the way in which we discovered God as Him who produced the bodies in this world, 'Abd al-Jabbār comes to the discussion of the qualities of this God. I follow here in his footsteps and begin with the qualities God is entitled to because of a permanent state He is in. 'Abd al-Jabbār deals with these qualities in the order in which they can be deduced from the starting-point that He has brought the bodies into existence.

Qādir: able.⁵⁵ What in this world indicates (is an indication, *dalil*) that someone is able, is the fact that acts are possible for him.⁵⁶

⁵³ Cf *Muhit* I, 88

⁵⁴ Cf *Muhit* I, 90, he announces that he will discuss this question in his *bāb nafy al-ignayn* We deal with that subject in the course of this paragraph

⁵⁵ The question of God's being able is treated by 'Abd al-Jabbār in *Šarh* 151-156, this passage is summarized and partially translated by Badawi, *Histoire*, 215-216 The *Muhit* deals with this subject in I, 103-112 'Abd al-Karīm 'Utmān (*Nazariyat at-taklif*, 199-202) takes this text as his starting-point, as I shall do myself, 'Abd al-Jabbār's way of thinking apparently having matured between his writing of the *Šarh* and that of the *Muhit* Cf *Mugni* V, 204-218, where 'Abd al-Jabbār deals with the "name" *qādir* and with related names which can justly be applied to God Cf also our discussions of the quality "able", the first part of which concerns this quality in general, the able subject being either God or a being in this world

⁵⁶ Cf pp 196-198, where we explained the various aspects of this description One of these aspects was the "possibility" (*sihha*) We stated there that this possibility is an ontological possibility and excludes besides the impossibility also the necessity Therefore, being able does not necessitate the act, it even ceases when the act is produced the subject is able before the act Badawi did not understand this when he

From the fact that acts are possible, we conclude to the subject's being in a state; and so 'Abd al-Jabbār can say that the meaning of the quality "able" is that the subject is characterized by a state because of his being in which the producing of acts is possible for him.⁵⁷

We already observed that one of the ways in which we draw conclusions about the other world, is founded on the fact that an indication always indicates the same thing, be it in this world or in the other one.⁵⁸ When in this world the possibility of acts indicates that the subject concerned is able, the same must hold true of the other world: when we know that acts were possible for God, because He produced them, He must have been able.⁵⁹

Because God produced the bodies, He was able before the creation of this world. If one assumes that He were so by a temporal qualifier, He must have produced this qualifier Himself; but He could not do so before being able. So the assumption leads to an impossibility. It is also not possible that He is able by an eternal qualifier, someone who is able by an ability must, as we already discussed before,⁶⁰ use the substrate of his ability in acting; this would imply that God is a substrate and a substance; and this is impossible. Moreover, we came to know God because the bodies cannot be produced by a subject who is able by an ability, and therefore must have been produced by a subject who is able, but not by an ability.⁶¹ When, consequently, God is not

made the following remark (*Histoire*, 215-216) "Dieu est puissant de toute éternité, car Il mérite cet attribut pour Lui-même, et 'ce qui fait partie de l'essence ne peut jamais s'en séparer' Mais il faut noter que cette affirmation est étrange 'de celui qui nie l'éternité du monde sur la base de l'éternité du Créateur puissant' En effet, si cette puissance est un attribut éternel de Dieu, il doit exercer sa puissance de toute éternité, sinon ce serait une puissance sans objet!"

⁵⁷ Cf *Mughni* V, 204

⁵⁸ Cf pp 229-230

⁵⁹ Cf *Muhit* I, 103-104 The real indication is the possibility of acting, it is, however, not possible for us to know that acts are possible for God before we know that He did them The only thing we can correctly deduce from the fact that God, or someone else, did some act is that he was able the one moment before the production of the act or the production of the cause (*sabah*) if the act concerned is a generated act (*mutawallid*) We discussed this on p 197 To prove that God now is able and always will remain able, the argument given above does not suffice, we must demonstrate that God is per se able Only in that case can we conclude that He cannot cease being able

⁶⁰ Cf p 203

⁶¹ God cannot be able by a temporal qualifier, this is argued in *Muhit* I, 106 The proofs that God cannot be able by an eternal qualifier, an eternal ability, are given in *Muhit* I, 170-184 The two arguments I mentioned in the text can be found on pp 180-181 See also the very short argument in *Šarh* 201 Cf also what we already

able by a temporal, nor by an eternal qualifier, He must be able per se. And when He is per se able, he cannot cease to be so and, consequently, must also be able now and remain able in all eternity.⁶²

Earlier we discussed the consequences which the being able has for the subject that is able.⁶³ But above the judgements (*aḥkâm*) every able subject is entitled to, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions some judgements which are restricted to the subject who is per se able and which are not applicable to subjects which are able by an ability.⁶⁴ The ability (*qudra*) as a qualifier being the principle of determination and limitation, one might suppose that someone who is able per se, without such a qualifier, is not limited in his being able and therefore can be called "almighty".⁶⁵ One must make here, however, one restriction: because of his being able per se, there are no limitations in him; but this does not alter the fact that the possible things, the *maqdûrât*,⁶⁶ are limited. For only that thing is possible which can really exist. Hence, everything that seems to constitute a limitation of his being able, in fact is not; it is related to the impossibility of the existence of the things concerned.

Being able per se, without an ability, has some consequences we briefly mention here.⁶⁷

First, who is able per se is able to produce acts by way of *iktirâ'*, direct production without using the substrate of an ability either as the substrate in which one produces or as a secondary cause to produce

stated in the preceding section, viz., that bodies can be produced only by a subject who is essentially able

⁶² Cf. *Muhit* I, 106

⁶³ See pp. 195-200. Cf. also *Muhit* I, 107

⁶⁴ Cf. *Muhit* I, 107. "To the judgements of His being able per se (belongs) the possibility of the *iktirâ'*, that what is possible for Him is infinite in genus and number, the impossibility of hinder, and similar things." In the same context 'Abd al-Jabbâr also discusses the judgements peculiar to the subject who is able by an ability, and he states there that these have to be denied when we deal with God as being able. There he mentions the being able by an ability, the limitation of what is possible for the subject in genus and in number, the impossibility of *iktirâ'*, the possibility of hinder against it, and the necessity to use the substrate of the ability in acting. Cf. also pp. 203-204.

⁶⁵ In his discussions 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses no term that is comparable to the English word "almighty" he only repeats every time that the things which are possible for Him are infinite and not restricted in genus and number. When discussing the names we can give God he mentions among other names *qadir*, a form of the same root as *qâdir*, and he states that this word is used only for God because it indicates an intensity outside the reach of able beings in this world. This word, consequently, comes close to the meaning of the English word "almighty". See *Mugni* V, 206.

⁶⁶ Cf. pp. 204-206. Possible things are non-existent things which can come into existence because someone is able to produce them.

⁶⁷ Cf. *Muhit* I, 107-112

an act in another substrate. This has as a consequence that this person can produce bodies.

Second, he must be able to an endless amount of things, the limitation being given by the possibility of existing alone. He is able to acts similar to those falling under the ability of any person who is able by an ability, and even to more than that, because any person able by an ability is in himself limited in his being able. Who is able per se is able to everything falling under the ability, and to more than that. When we have to admit that he cannot produce in fact everything he is able to, nor even two opposite things he is, nevertheless, able to, this does not indicate that his being able is limited, but that these things cannot exist together.⁶⁸ He is able to produce any genus of acts. That is evident for the acts a subject who is able by an ability is not able to; but also the acts we are also able to are possible for him; he even is more able than we to produce them.⁶⁹ The acts to which he is able are not restricted in number because this restriction is also dependent upon the ability.⁷⁰ This term "number" (*'adad*) must be seen against the background of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's form of atomism, in which these "numbers" can also indicate the strength of something or the number of moments it remains.

Third, he cannot be hindered; he does not need a substrate that could be bound, and he is always able to more and stronger acts than a subject trying to hinder can produce.

A person who is per se able is, however, not able to a possible thing (*maqđûr*) someone else is able to; he is able to similar things, but not to that thing itself. The reason is that this is impossible in the thing itself; it is something that cannot exist. A possible thing cannot be possible for two able subjects; for this would lead to impossible conclusions, supposing that both subjects are really going to produce

⁶⁸ *Muhit* I, 108.

⁶⁹ Acts that do not fall under the ability must be possible for someone who is able per se, without such an ability. In this way 'Abd al-Jabbâr proved that there is a god. God also produced modes of being (e.g., movement) and pain, he also produced pressure (as the weight and the pressure of the fire), composition (the composition of the animals, surely that of the first living being), sounds, and speech. He also produced his own will and non-will (as we shall see) and convictions in us. He is able to assumption (if it is a genus of its own, it is the opposite of knowledge; who is able to something, is also able to its opposite) and reflection (who is able to produce the effect, is able to produce the cause, when God is able to produce knowledge. He is able to produce reflection) Cf *Muhit* I, 108-109

⁷⁰ *Muhit* I, 109

the possible thing concerned.⁷¹ So God is able to every genus of acts, He is able to everything able beings in this world are able to, not to these things themselves, however, but to similar things and to more than that. He cannot produce what cannot exist at all, and He cannot produce together what cannot exist together.

'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes his treatise on God's unity (*at-tawhîd*) and His essential qualities in the *Mugnî* with a discussion of a great number of names which we can give to God, and which are in some form or other related to God's qualities which he discussed in the first parts of the *Mugnî*.⁷² He starts there with the names he considers to be synonyms of the name *qâdir* (able) or to indicate some aspect of this quality.⁷³

The names he mentions as equivalents of the name *qâdir* are: "*qawî*" (strong), "*malik*" (king), "*mâlik*" (possessor), "*rabb*" (lord), "*sayyid*" (master), "*samad*" (Lord),⁷⁴ and five names all meaning great, namely: "*kabîr*", "*azîm*", "*jalîl*", "*mutakabbir*", and "*mutajabbir*".

Besides these words, there is one word that because of its intensity is only used for God, who is per se able, and not for any able being in this world; this word is, as we already saw above, the name "*qâdir*", which can be translated as "almighty"⁷⁵

Another series of names is used to point to the fact that the named subject is stronger than others and that others cannot hinder him. First, there is a name derived from the same root as *qâdir* and *qadir*; this name "*muqtadir*" could be rendered by a neologism "over-mighty"; the same general meaning is given to "*qâhir*" (overpowering), "*mustaw-lî*" (overwhelming), and three names all meaning "exalted": "*âlî*", "*âli*", and "*muta'âlî*" from the root of "being high".⁷⁶

Other names indicate that the subject, besides being able, is also considered to be without any blame; these are "*azîz*" (mighty),

⁷¹ Cf *Mugnî* V, 254-266 and *Muhit* I, 372-381

⁷² Cf *Mugnî* V, 204-258

⁷³ Cf *Mugnî* V, 204-218

⁷⁴ When the word *samad* is not taken in the sense of "Lord", but in the sense of *al-masmûd ilayh*. He to whom one applies in need, the word has to be discussed in the treatise on God's acts Cf *Mugnî* V, 210

⁷⁵ Cf *Mugnî* V, 206, see also note 65

⁷⁶ Cf *Mugnî* V, 214-215, one cannot apply these words to God when they are conceived as indicating the place of the subject in space, "high" One can only say this about substances

"*karîm*" (noble).⁷⁷ "*majîd*" (glorious); the word "*jabbâr*" (omnipotent) points, moreover, to the fact that the subject cannot be hindered in his acting.

Two names remain – two names which deserve some special attention because they are the names which are used explicitly to indicate God; these names are "*ilâh*" (god) and "*Allâh*" (God). According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, these two names too are applied to God because He is able, and they do not tell us anything more than that.

Ilâh : god. This name, which really is a qualification and not a proper name, is applied to someone who is entitled to and worthy of worship.⁷⁸ When we take into consideration that the heathens call their idols "gods", and that they only call them by that name because they are convinced that those idols are entitled to worship, we must come to the conclusion that this is the real meaning of the name "*ilâh*". The formula 'Abd al-Jabbâr has chosen (to be entitled to; in Arabic: *haqq lah*) does not imply that there is something because of which He actually deserves it; this would be the case, always according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, if he would have used the verb "deserve" (in Arabic: *istahaqq*), because the use of that verb implies that there is something for which one deserves something (*al-mustahaqq 'alayh*).⁷⁹ Therefore, it is not a condition for His being entitled to worship and for His being god that He has done something before, something by which He deserves worship. The verb 'Abd al-Jabbâr chooses only points to the fact that God essentially can bestow favours by which He deserves worship when He actually bestows them. He is able to bestow such favours because He is able to produce bodies, to make living, and to give those great favours by which one deserves worship.⁸⁰ Therefore, because God is per se and eternally able, He can be called "*ilâh*" in all eternity.

Allâh : God. Though this name is usually mentioned as a proper name for Him who has produced the world, the name also indicates a quality.

⁷⁷ The word *karîm* can also be used for someone who gives benefits, who is generous; in that case it has to be dealt with in the chapter on God's acts. Cf. *Muğni* V, 213.

⁷⁸ *Muğni* V, 210 "*annah mumman tahuqq lah al-'ibâda wa-taliq bih*"

⁷⁹ Consequently, one cannot say that God eternally deserves worship (using the verb *istahaqq*), but one can say that He is eternally entitled to it (using the verb *haqq*); *Muğni* V, 210

⁸⁰ About the special favours which God gives us and by giving which he deserves that we worship Him, see, for instance, *Šarh* 83. The first favour God gives us is that He creates us, living, for our benefit.

In fact, it indicates the same quality as the name *ilāh* : viz., that He is entitled to worship because He is per se able.⁸¹

‘*Ālim* : knowing.⁸² There is one indication in this world we have to look for when we want to know whether someone else⁸³ is knowing; that indication is a precise act (*fi’l muḥkam*) produced by him. A precise act is an act that shows such an arrangement and such a regularity as cannot have been produced by someone who is not knowing.⁸⁴ Therefore, one can describe the knowing subject, by pointing to the consequence of his being knowing, as him who is in a state by his being in which precise acts are possible for him.⁸⁵

When the precise act is in this world the indication to someone’s being knowing, it must be so in the other world too. We know that God performed precise acts, which show arrangement and regularity : His speech clearly is arranged : what happens in the nature, the ripening of the seeds, the production of fruits, the desires of animals, everything has its regularity and happens every time in the same way. All these precise acts, produced by God, indicate that He is knowing.⁸⁶

But, just as the occurrence of an act only indicates that the acting subject was able the moment before the occurrence of the act or the moment before the occurrence of the secondary cause, the occurrence of the precise act only indicates that the subject was knowing the one moment before the occurrence of the act or before the occurrence of the secondary cause.⁸⁷ We can deduce, however, that God must be

⁸¹ Cf *Muḡnī* V, 212

⁸² See as regards the arguments for God’s being knowing per se all knowable things *Muḡnī* I, 113-120, *Šarḥ* 156-160, and *Muḡnī* V, 219-228. See also ‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uṭmān, *Nazarīyat at-taklīf*, 202-209, Badawi, *Histoire*, 216-217, and our discussion of the knowledge on pp 47-53

⁸³ This is the only way in which we can know that someone else is knowing, that we are knowing, we know by direct self-experience (*wiḡḡān an-naḡs*), finding that we are convinced of something and that our soul is tranquil at that conviction. Cf p 47. The concept of the tranquillity of the soul is restricted to subjects who are able by an ability. We cannot use this concept when dealing with God as knowing. Cf *Muḡnī* V, 221. ‘Abd al-Jabbār uses the concept of the tranquillity of the soul when describing the qualifier knowledge (*‘ilm*), not when describing the quality knowing (*‘ālim*).

⁸⁴ The definition ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives of the precise act is “*mā lā yata’attā min kull qādir ‘alā qālik an-nizām*” (*Muḡnī* I, 113). Besides the word *nizām* ‘Abd al-Jabbār also uses the word *tarīḡ*.

⁸⁵ Cf, for instance, *Muḡnī* I, 113 and *Muḡnī* V, 219. Slight variations occur in the wording, those are always concerned with terminology, not with the meaning of the description.

⁸⁶ Cf *Muḡnī* I, 114. See also *Šarḥ* 158 for other examples derived from the course of events in nature.

⁸⁷ Cf *Muḡnī* I, 117.

always knowing; for, if He would not be always so, His becoming so must be by a temporal qualifier, by a condition which has to be fulfilled, or by an acting subject. None of these is possible; therefore God must be eternally knowing.⁸⁸

And because God cannot be knowing by an eternal qualifier, an eternal knowledge, He must be per se knowing.⁸⁹

Because everything, existent or non-existent, principally is knowable (*ma'lûm*), and because it can be known by every knowing subject without any restriction to a special subject—as is the case with the connection between the able subject and the possible things to which he is able—and since we know that the fact that our knowledge is limited is caused by the fact that we are knowing by a qualifier knowledge, which at the same time limits our being knowing, we conclude that God must know everything that is knowable because there are no restrictions, neither in the knowing subject, nor in the known object. God knows everything, be it existent or non-existent, be it occurring now, in the future, or in the past.⁹⁰

As God is called by a number of names because of His being able, we can also apply to Him some names because He is knowing. Not every name, however, which indicates that someone in this world is knowing, can be applied to God since many of these names can only be used for the imperfect way knowing beings in this world are knowing, knowing as they are by a knowledge (*'ilm*) which restricts their being knowing.

Since "'*ârif*" and "'*dâri*" are synonyms of '*âlim*,⁹¹ God, being eternally and per se '*âlim*, also eternally and per se is '*ârif* and '*dâri*.

⁸⁸ If God were knowing by a temporal qualifier, He would have produced this qualifier Himself, for able beings who are able by an ability can only produce knowledge in the substrate of their ability and, moreover, they must have first been produced by God, who therefore has to be knowing. It cannot be because of the being fulfilled of a condition either, because everything, existing or non-existing, is knowable. An acting subject cannot produce such a knowledge for God as we saw above Cf. *Muḥit* I, 118 'Abd al-Jabbār does not explicitly explain here why God cannot produce such a qualifier for Himself. In any case, there would be no reason why God would do such a thing.

⁸⁹ This subject is amply discussed in *Muḥit* I, 170-184; see also *Šarḥ* 201-203. So, for instance, God could only have one knowledge (as the opponents say), consequently, He only can know one thing; this would also imply that this knowledge can have an opposite, and this leads to evidently false conclusions Cf. *Muḥit* I, 182.

⁹⁰ Cf. *Muḥit* I, 119-120

⁹¹ Cf. p. 56 Also *Muḡnī* V, 221-222 and XII, 16

⁹² Cf. pp. 180-181. When related to the quality "perceiving" (*mudrik*), the word *basir* is used for "having the metaphysical possibility to see"

Besides these synonyms, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions three names which can be used as synonyms of 'âlim, but which can also be used in relation to being perceiving; they are "baṣîr" (having insight⁹²), "wâjjid" (finding), and "râ'i" (seeing).⁹³ When they are used as synonyms of 'âlim, one can say that God is eternally and per se qualified in these ways.

Also the name "ḥakîm" (wise) can be used as a synonym of "'âlim"; however, it can also be used in the meaning of "doing precise and wise acts", and in that case it has to be discussed among the names given to God because of His acts.⁹⁴

Finally, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions a great number of names which can only be applied to God metaphorically, or even cannot be applied to Him at all because they imply some imperfection in the being knowing, which has to be denied about Him who is per se and eternally knowing.

Ḥayy: living.⁹⁵ Being living is a quality which indicates that the qualified thing is in a certain state (*ḥâl*) because of its being in which it can be able and knowing.⁹⁶ Since in this way the state of being living is a necessary condition for both the being knowing and the being able, and because God is able and knowing, He also must be living; for when a given indication in this world indicates something else, the same indication indicates the same thing in the other world⁹⁷

Because God is eternally and per se able and knowing, He must, consequently, be eternally and per se living.

There are no names that can be given to God because of His being living except the name *ḥayy* (living) itself.⁹⁸

Mudrik: perceiving.⁹⁹ Being perceiving is the fundamental openness

⁹³ Cf *Mugni* V, 222-223

⁹⁴ Cf *Mugni* V, 222

⁹⁵ God's being living is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Muhit* I, 121-128 and *Ṣarḥ* 160-167, this is briefly summarized in *Mugni* V, 229-231. See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṣmân, *Nazariyat at-taklîf*, 209-212 and Badawi, *Histoire*, 217. See also our pp 168-173

⁹⁶ Cf p 169

⁹⁷ Cf p 230. Badawi's renderings (*Histoire*, 217) "ce qui tombe sous les sens" and "ce qui ne tombe pas sous les sens" are not correct and exact renderings of *aṣ-ṣâhid* and *al-gayb*. Cf pp 226-227

⁹⁸ Cf *Mugni* V, 229-231

⁹⁹ God's being perceiving in its various forms, and with the possibility that He is not so, is—with the different names one can give Him because of it—discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Muhit* I, 129-132 and *Ṣarḥ* 167-175, this is summarized in *Mugni* V, 241-243

of the living being to the outer world,¹⁰⁰ to the existent perceptible things. Because all reasons why a living being in this world does not perceive all perceptible things that are existent are related to the fact that he must use the substrate of his qualifier "life" in perceiving, so that thereby his being perceiving is limited, God, who is eternally and per se living, is free from such limitations and must perceive all existent perceptible things. No limitation being possible in God, in His being perceiving, the only restrictions of His being perceiving are to be found in the objects. When something is non-existent, it cannot be perceived; and also among the existent things there are accidents that cannot be perceived.¹⁰¹ Because of these restrictions we cannot state that God is eternally and per se perceiving; no, He is said to be perceiving "*alâ šurʿ*" (on a condition), namely, on the condition that at least one perceptible thing is existent.¹⁰² Consequently, before the creation of the world God was not perceiving (He Himself is not perceptible, as we shall see), but now He necessarily is.

Bašîr: having the fundamental possibility to see.¹⁰³ Because God necessarily perceives all existent visible things, all substances and colours, He must have, eternally and per se, the possibility to perceive them, and therefore He is eternally and per se *bašîr*.

Mubšîr or **Râʿî**: seeing. Because God necessarily perceives all existent visible things and seeing means perceiving the visible things—¹⁰⁴ He is seeing "*alâ šurʿ*", on the condition that at least one visible thing is existent. Therefore, at this moment, after the creation of the world, God is necessarily seeing.¹⁰⁵

Samî: having the metaphysical possibility to hear. Just as God necessarily perceives all existent visible things, He necessarily perceives all existent audible things, all sounds. He, therefore, must have eternally

Though 'Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly discusses this subject in his three theological works, Badawî does not mention it while 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân only makes some slight remarks in his treatise on God as living; see *Nazarîvat at-taklîf*, 211-212

¹⁰⁰ Cf p 177

¹⁰¹ Cf p 178

¹⁰² Cf *Muhît* I, 130-131, also *Muḡnî* V, 243

¹⁰³ The word *bašîr* can also be used as a synonym for '*âlim*', in that case one can render it by "having insight" Cf. p. 243 Cf also *Muḡnî* V, 222 and compare *Muḡnî* V, 242.

¹⁰⁴ The distinction between seeing and hearing (and the other forms of perception) must not be looked for in the perceiving subject, but in the perceived object. Cf p 178.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. for instance, *Šarh* 174 and *Muḡnî* V, 241

and per se the possibility to perceive them and is called eternally and per se *samī*.¹⁰⁶

Sāmi: hearing. Since God necessarily perceives all existent audible things, He is called "hearing" on the condition that at least one audible thing is existent. Consequently, He was not hearing before the creation, but He is now since He created the world.¹⁰⁷

Though God also perceives all things that are perceived by touching, smelling, and tasting, He cannot be called "touching", "smelling", or "tasting" because these terms indicate that the perceived object is brought into contact with the substrate of the perceiving subject. This is not possible in God. For the same reason we cannot call Him "sensorily perceiving" (*hāss*) because He does not use senses in perceiving. We have to deny every term that implies some form of corporality, and we can accept as names for God only those terms which do not necessarily imply corporality.¹⁰⁸

Mawjūd: existent.¹⁰⁹ Things in this world which are existent are not essentially so since they all are *muhdat*, temporal, and, consequently, had a beginning. Nor are they existent by a qualifier "existence"; but they are so "*bi-l-fā'il*", by a doer. They are existent because some acting agent brought them from non-existence into existence.

The perceptible things we perceive, we know to be existent; but, since God cannot be perceived, we cannot know in that way that He is existent. We must acquire that knowledge through argumentation. One can say that every thing that is able and knowing must be existent. We know that God is able and knowing; ergo, He must be existent.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶ Cf p 191. See also *Šarh* 174.

¹⁰⁷ Cf p 192. See also *Šarh* 174, *Muḡni* V, 241.

¹⁰⁸ This is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbār in *Muḡni* V, 242-243. Thus, we have to deny also that God is *nāzir* (looking), since this implies the directing of the eye towards something.

¹⁰⁹ When 'Abd al-Jabbār discusses God's being existent in the *Muḡni* (I. 133-143) and the *Muḡni* (V. 232-240) he takes God's being eternal together with His being existent, His being eternal being the way He is existent, viz. without a beginning. Thus also 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṡmān (*Nazarīyat at-taklīf*, 212-214). It is only in the *Šarh* that 'Abd al-Jabbār devotes to these two qualities two different chapters (*Šarh* 175-181 and 181-182). Badawī (*Histoire*, 217-218 and 218-219) follows the text of the *Šarh*. See what we said about the quality "existent" on pp 106-107.

¹¹⁰ This argument is called by 'Abd al-Jabbār "general" (*'ilm al-jumla*). Cf *Muḡni* I, 133, for the common believer this kind of argumentation suffices. The theologian and scholar have to go deeper and look for a detailed knowledge. See also *Šarh* 177 and Badawī, *Histoire*, 217.

But what is the basic reason why we know that something is existent? According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr the distinctive feature is its having a connection with something else. Therefore, when we perceive something, there is a connection (*ta'alluq*), and both the perceiving subject and the perceived object are known to be existent. And when we know that God has connections by His being perceiving, willing, knowing, or able, we know that He is existent.¹¹¹

When we know through this argumentation that God is existent, we ask the question whether His being existent has had a beginning or not. What has a beginning once came into existence and is temporal; according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, everything that is temporal and came into existence needed someone else to bring it into existence.¹¹² And since we know that God is not brought into existence, because that would lead to an endless series of producers, we know that His being existent did not have a beginning.¹¹³ Since we know that God's being existent had no beginning, we conclude that He cannot be existent by a doer (*bi-l-fâ'il*) or by a temporal qualifier. And because He also cannot be existent by an eternal qualifier—if God would be existent by an eternal qualifier, this qualifier would also be eternally existent by a qualifier, and so on in an endless series—He must be existent per se.¹¹⁴ This implies that His existence neither had a beginning nor will have an end.

Qadim: eternal. In everyday language the word *qadim* is used to indicate that something is old, that it came into existence "before".¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Cf *Muhit* I, 133 and 135 Cf also *Mugnî* V, 232

¹¹² Cf *Muhit* I, 138-139 See also our pp 113-115, where we demonstrated that what came into existence and is temporal is also produced

¹¹³ Cf *Muhit* I, 138-139 If someone denies this, he has to deny one of three accepted principles—either he has to admit that there can be a temporal thing that does not need a producing subject (and in this way one makes it impossible to establish the existence of God), or one has to accept an endless series of producers of producers of producers (and this implies that there is an endless amount of existent things, that is not true, for this amount can be augmented), or one has to accept that the world cannot exist because its existence would be connected with the existence of something endless, the endless series of producers

¹¹⁴ Cf *Muhit* I, 139-140 The same reason why existent beings in this world cannot be existent by a qualifier (viz. that this would lead to an endless series because the existent qualifier would be existent by another qualifier, etc.) makes it impossible too that God is existent by a qualifier, be it temporal or eternal. Nor can He be existent by a doer, a subject who brings into existence, as is the case with existent things in this world because that subject would precede Him, which is not possible. Therefore, He must be so per se (*li-nafsih*)

¹¹⁵ In Arabic *mâ taqâdam wujûduh* (*Sharh* 181) The sixth form of this root is used to indicate that something happened very long ago

Its use as a terminus technicus in theological thinking is related to the use in everyday language : it is used for what came into existence before any other thing; in fact, for what had no beginning at all.¹¹⁶ Since God's being existent had no beginning, we can call Him eternal, and state that He is per se eternal; it is the way He exists.¹¹⁷

Besides the names *mawjūd* and *qadīm*, 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions some other names we can give to God because of His being existent.

When we use the terms "*kā'in*" (being) and "*ṭābit*" (standing firm), not in the technical way in which they are used when applied to substances,¹¹⁸ but with the simple meaning of "existent", they can be applied to God.¹¹⁹

'Abd al-Jabbār mentions also four names, all indicating that God preceded everything that came into existence; these names are "*sābiq*", "*mutaqaddim*", "*aqdam*", and "*mutaqādim*".¹²⁰

The name "*bāqī*" (remaining) can be applied to God because it says that the existence of the subject concerned is not renewed every time,¹²¹ while the name "*dā'im*" (lasting) indicates that the such qualified subject does not fall back into non-existence or will have no end.¹²² This name too can be applied to God.

Finally, the names "*qā'im*"¹²³ (standing) and "*qayyūm*" (everlasting) are said to mean "*dā'im*" (lasting) so that they can be applied to God too. The word *qayyūm* indicates a greater intensity than *qā'im*.¹²⁴

¹¹⁶ See, e.g., *Šarh* 181 *mā lā awwal li-wujūdih* *Mugnī* IV, 250 adds *wa-lā ihtudā'*

¹¹⁷ Cf also *Mugnī* IV, 250-251 What is eternal, must be per se eternal, this is already implied by the concept itself One can apply here the same argument 'Abd al-Jabbār used to show that God must be per se existent If something is eternal, it cannot be so by a doer (*bi-l-fā'il*) or by a temporal qualifier (they would have to precede the eternal thing concerned), nor by an eternal qualifier (which would be eternal by another qualifier, etc.)

¹¹⁸ Cf pp 109-110 for the meaning of the term *kā'in* when applied to substances, it is used for their being in a certain place If one might assume that its application to God is meant in this way, one better adds another term to make its meaning clear (*Mugnī* V, 232)

¹¹⁹ Cf *Mugnī* V, 232 The real meaning of *ṭābit* is said to be "existent" Other uses are called metaphorical

¹²⁰ Cf *Mugnī* V, 238 If we describe by these names things whose existence had a beginning but which preceded other things, we certainly can call by these names God who had no beginning and preceded all other things

¹²¹ Cf *Mugnī* V, 236

¹²² Cf *Mugnī* V, 239 The difference between the two explanations is discussed there

¹²³ The printed text (*Mugnī* V, 239, line 13) reads *qadīm*, the discussions in this and the next paragraphs of the text suggest that originally the text had *qā'im*

¹²⁴ Cf *Mugnī* V, 239 In the meaning of "standing right" one cannot apply the name *qā'im* to God One says that God is *qā'im bi-nafsih* to indicate that He does not need

When trying to summarize what we have come to know about God's permanent states—though the states indicated by the qualities perceiving, seeing, and hearing, are not fully permanent but "on condition"—we hold that God is existent, and that He had no beginning and will have no end; this is expressed by the word "eternal". He is living without any restriction and, consequently, perceiving all that can be perceived, all existent perceptible things. He is knowing all knowable things, and able to every genus of acts and to an infinite number of acts from each genus, but not to the individual things to which other subjects are able.

What is missing here in this list of God's permanent states is the quality "willing" and also the quality "non-willing". The reason is that 'Abd al-Jabbâr considers the will to be an act of the subject, as we saw above. Consequently, the will and the non-will are dealt with in the section on God's acts.

But first, we now discuss the question what exactly are these permanent states and these qualities which God is said to have per se. Are they purely names or is there a reality behind these names?

4. GOD'S QUALITIES

Sifât Allâh: God's qualities.¹²⁵ Among the various distinctions that can be made between several categories of divine qualities, the one upon which the arrangement of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works has been built is the traditional distinction between God's essential qualities

a place or substrate (the expression *qâm bi* is used for the inhering of accidents in substances), not in the meaning that He inheres

¹²⁵ Most information about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's position in the dispute concerning God's qualities can be found in *Muhit* I, 97-102 and 157-190, see also *Šarh* 182-213. For a discussion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's point of view against the background of the preceding Islamic tradition, see 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uymân, *Nazarivat at-taklif*, 169-196. See also what we already observed about the qualities in general, pp 150-154. I mention one book and three articles which are among the most important studies Western Islamologists have devoted to this subject.

First, an older article that remains important: Otto Pretzl, *Die fruhsislamische Attributenlehre*, Munchen 1940, in modern times we have three works, each dealing with a special scholar or school, but dealing with this subject against a wider background of the totality of Islamic tradition in this field: Michel Allard, *Le problème des attributs divins dans la doctrine d'Al-As'ari et de ses premiers grands disciples*, Beyrouth 1965, Josef van Ess, *Ibn Kullâh und die Mihna*, *Oriens* 18-19 (1967), 92-142, Richard M. Frank, *The Divine Attributes according to the Teaching of Abû l-Hudhayl al-'Allâf*, *Le Muséon* 82 (1969), 451-506.

(*ṣifât aḍ-ḍât*) and His factual qualities (*ṣifât al-ḥîl*).¹²⁶ This distinction is based on the fact that some qualities "follow the existence of an act from Him" whereas others do not.¹²⁷

Especially this latter category, the qualities that do not follow the existence of an act—the so-called essential qualities—has caused many a fierce dispute among Muslim theologians, and when we hear of disputes on God's qualities, these essential qualities are particularly in question. The problems to be solved in these disputes were: which are God's essential qualities? what are these qualities? what is their relation with God? and what is their relation to each other? I shall discuss in this order the answers 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives to these questions.

The first question: which are God's essential qualities?

The only way we can come to know something about God and His qualities is, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, by starting from His acts, and by following the indications we find in those acts. There is no other way to know something about Him.¹²⁸ When we know His acts, we also know directly His factual qualities: when we know He brought the world into existence, we know He is "bringing into existence" (*muhḍi*). But here we are interested, not in His factual, but in His essential qualities, and to discover those we have to follow indications. An act coming from God in itself indicates directly that God is able; its occurring in a special way indicates that He is knowing and willing or non-willing; by argumentation from these data we come to the knowledge that He is living and existent; and, in the third line, by argumentation from these last data, we come to know that He is

¹²⁶ For the distinctions made by 'Abd al-Jabbâr between several categories of qualities, see 'Abd al-Karim 'Uḡmân, *Nazariyat at-taklif*, 194-196; see also *Muhit* I, 97-102. We discussed this already on pp. 150-154.

The distinction between the two categories (essential and factual qualities) is said to have been made by "the teachers". This distinction is complete if the factual qualities are defined as "what follows the existence of an act from Him": it is not complete if we define them as what is caused by His doing an act; for God's being willing follows the existence of the will He made, but, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, God is not called willing because He made will, but because of a qualifier will. Therefore, it is better to say that He is entitled to qualities because of His essence, because of a qualifier, and neither because of His essence nor because of a qualifier. Cf. *Muhit* I, 100. For the distinction between two categories, see, e.g., Bouman, *Bâqillâni*, 14; also Pretzl, *Attributenlehre*, 9. The same distinction was also made by non-Mu'tazilî authors; see, e.g., al-Bâqillâni, *Kitâb at-tamhid*, 262-263.

¹²⁷ *Muhit* I, 100. This expression is chosen to include the qualities "willing" and "non-willing" (*murid* and *kârih*) in the factual qualities. See also the preceding note.

¹²⁸ Cf. pp. 227-231. See also *Muhit* I, 155.

perceiving.¹²⁹ In this way, we cannot come to know more qualities because in similar cases in this world, too, we cannot know more than these seven qualities.¹³⁰

So, by starting from God's acts, 'Abd al-Jabbâr establishes the existence of seven qualities behind those acts. Willing and non-willing, however, cannot be reckoned among the essential qualities because God is entitled to them, not per se, but because of a qualifier.¹³¹ Consequently, there remain five essential qualities: able, knowing, living, existent, and perceiving. Because of some of these qualities God can be entitled to more names, as we already saw;¹³² but, fundamentally, the essential qualities are—contrary to the larger number mentioned by the Aš'ariya and theologians of a similar tendency—¹³³ restricted to the five discussed in the preceding section.

The second question: what are God's qualities?

'Abd al-Jabbâr clearly states—and this and other similar expressions in his works do not leave the slightest doubt about his doctrinal position—that "the quality (*sifa*) is a word (*qawf*), just as the qualification (*wasf*)."¹³⁴ A quality is a name—mostly an active participle or an adjective—something is entitled to because of some reason or

¹²⁹ This argument can be found in *Muhit* I, 155 Cf also our discussions of these qualities in the preceding section, where we deduced them in the way mentioned here

¹³⁰ All knowledge about the other world must be based upon a knowledge of this world; afterwards we can in four ways make the link towards the other world Cf pp 229-231

¹³¹ God is not per se willing or non-willing but because of a qualifier He makes Because this quality follows the existence of an act, this quality will be dealt with in the section on God's acts. Cf *Muhit* I, 100

¹³² We treated those names in the preceding paragraph So, "eternal" is a name for His being existent, "god" for His being able, "seeing" for His being perceiving, and "wise" for His being knowing These names do not indicate separate qualities

¹³³ So, for instance, al-Bâqillâni, *Kitâb at-tamhîd*, 262 He mentions life, knowledge, ability, hearing, seeing, speech, will, remaining, face, eyes, hands, anger, contentment, pity, wrath, pietas, hostility, love, preference, volition, perception Besides the difference qua contents between this list and that of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, it is significant that al-Bâqillâni mentions nouns, while 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions adjectives (mainly active participles) This difference indicates the wholly different way in which both theologians see the essence of qualities

Most qualities mentioned by the Aš'ariya and scholars of similar inspiration, are derived from the text of the Qur'ân: "On trouve, en effet, à côté de ce que nous appellerions 'attributs', des actions divines présentées, dans le Coran, par des verbes actifs, et dont les théologiens tirent des participes présents . . . des descriptions anthropomorphiques de Dieu . . . enfin, des actions ou des états de Dieu qui sont difficile à ranger dans une catégorie . ." (Allard, *Le problème*, 5-6)

¹³⁴ *Mugni* VII, 117

other; it is a name that can be applied because of some reason in the reality.

By describing the quality as a qualification or a word, 'Abd al-Jabbâr clearly stands in the tradition of the Mu'tazila, and follows the opinions of his "two teachers" Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâsim.¹³⁵ For, whereas many of the Mu'tazila's opponents advocated the real existence of God's knowledge, ability, and other qualities,¹³⁶ the principal aim of the Mu'tazilî theologians was the defence of God's unity and unicity: the essential qualities cannot have such an independence or existence of their own that the acceptance of them constitutes a danger for the theory of God's absolute unity and unicity.¹³⁷ Therefore, they either reduce the qualities to names,¹³⁸ or they assert that God really is knowing by a knowledge, but that this knowledge, this "quality", is identical with God himself.¹³⁹ Hence, there arose some confusion

¹³⁵ Cf. al-Aš'arî, *Maqâlât*, 172: "Those who do not say that the names and qualities are the Creator disagree about what the names and qualities are, there are two opinions. the Mu'tazila and the Kawârîj say that the names and the qualities are words (*aqwâl*) and that they are our word 'God is knowing', 'God is able', etc.". Other Mu'tazila, however, say that the qualities are God Himself, as we shall show below. Cf. also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Nazariyat at-taklîf*, 183-184, where he treats the positions of Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâsim, who both denied the existence of knowledge or similar qualities in God, but made the words the qualities; they only disagreed about the reason why God is entitled to those qualities. Here Abû Hâsim proposed his well-known theory of the "states" (*aḥwâl*), in which he is followed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr and most of the later Mu'tazila.

¹³⁶ One of the most famous among them was Ibn Kullâb, who said that "the names of God are His qualities and these are knowledge, ability, life, hearing, seeing, and His other qualities" (al-Aš'arî, *Maqâlât*, 173). "Ibn Kullâb sagte, dass die Aussage 'Gott ist wissend' zugleich meine 'Gott hat Wissen'—und so für all seine Attribute in konkreter-einzelnder Aufzählung (...), oder wenn er meinte, dass 'Namen' auch (reale) 'Attribute' voraussetzten, wie überhaupt jegliches Ding, wenn es beeigenschaftet (mauṣûf) ... ist, dies nur wegen eines bestimmten 'Momentes' (*ma'nâ*) sein könne, eben wegen einer Eigenschaft (...), eines 'Dinges' (*šai'*), eines 'Akzidents' ... die in ihm subsistieren" (Van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 110-111) Ibn Kullâb is followed in this doctrine by al-Aš'arî and his school.

¹³⁷ Cf., e.g., Bouman, *Bâqillânî*, 13.

¹³⁸ So, for instance, 'Abbâd bn Sulaymân; cf. al-Aš'arî, *Maqâlât*, 188. See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Nazariyat at-taklîf*, 182. So also Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâsim; cf. note 135. Cf. also Nader, *Le système*, 57.

¹³⁹ So says Abû l-Hudayl. Cf. Frank, *Divine Attributes*, 472: "In his conception, the divine unity is more compact; God's self (*nafs*) is He as His eternity (*qidam*) is He, as He is one and identical with Himself, and so also His knowledge, power, grandeur, etc., are likewise God Himself". Cf. also al-Aš'arî, *Maqâlât*, 187-188. He mentions four solutions for the problem of the divine attributes as given by Mu'tazila. Besides the two mentioned in our text, he also gives the identification between knowledge and known object, ability and object to which one is able, and the doctrine that the expression "God has a knowledge" etc. is only meant to say that God is knowing. This thesis

about the use of the term quality (*ṣifa*): whereas for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the quality is, for instance, "knowing" or "living", his opponents use the term for "knowledge" and "life", and so they say that 'Abd al-Jabbâr, just as some other Mu'tazila, denies the qualities while in fact he dedicates many pages of his works to the "qualities".

The third question: what is the relation of these qualities with God?

Evidently, this question is an entirely different one, whether applied to the qualities as al-Aš'arî and Ibn Kullâb consider them to be—a knowledge by which God is knowing, an ability by which He is able—or to the qualities we came to know in the works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. We do not discuss here the first conception of qualities, but we restrict ourselves to the treating of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's position.¹⁴⁰ The question then becomes: why is God entitled to these qualities?¹⁴¹

Whereas Abû Hâšim holds the thesis that there is only one quality God is entitled to because of His essence (*li-dâtih* or *li-nafsih*)—and this quality, which is denied by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, is His being Himself, the essential quality (*aṣ-ṣifa aḍ-dâtiya*) by which He is fundamentally different from other beings—¹⁴² and that God is existent, living, knowing, and able because of His states (*aḥwâl*) or, in other words, "by that on which He is in His essence" (*li-mâ huw 'alayh fî dâtih*),¹⁴³

is advocated by an-Nazzâm and by, as al-Aš'arî states, most of the Mu'tazila from both the branch of al-Bašra and that of Baġdâd.

¹⁴⁰ This question of the relationship between God and His knowledge, ability, etc., is amply discussed by van Ess in his article about Ibn Kullâb. He summarizes his conclusions on p. 118 in a very visual way.

¹⁴¹ This is discussed in *Muḥiṭ* I, 170-190 and *Šarḥ* 182-213. It is summarized in *Muḥiṭ* I, 170 as follows: "... His qualities either are because of the essence (*li-d-dât*) in the real sense of the word, as Abû Hâšim says about the quality he established (viz., the so-called "essential quality" by which He is different from others), or they are among those which are said to be 'per se', but by him (Abû Hâšim) 'because of that upon which He is in His self', as His being knowing, able, living, and existent; or they are neither per se nor by a qualifier, as His being perceiving—though there is some disagreement about this as was mentioned above; or they are because of a qualifier, as His being willing and non-willing". Cf. *Šarḥ* 129, where this is mentioned as the opinion of Abû Hâšim; there His being perceiving is said to be "because of His being living on the condition that the perceptible thing exists".

¹⁴² This quality is discussed (and denied) in *Muḥiṭ* I, 152-154. It is the quality "by which He is different from what is different from Him (read *muḳâlifaḥ* instead of *muḳâlafa*) and would correspond with what corresponds with Him (*muwâfiqaḥ* instead of *muwâfaqa*) if there were something corresponding with Him; but He is too high for that". *Šarḥ* 129.

¹⁴³ Cf. *Muḥiṭ* I, 170; *Šarḥ* 129 and 182. See also the literature mentioned in note 192 on page 145, where some works are mentioned which pay attention to Abû Hâšim's theory of states.

Abû 'Alî states that God is existent, living, knowing, and able because of His essence (*li-dâtihi*).¹⁴⁴ If we look into the position 'Abd al-Jabbâr chooses in this discussion, we see that he follows Abû Hâšim's way of thinking: God is, just as human beings, qualified as existent, living, able, and knowing because of His being in a state. But when discussing the question whether there is a difference between God's being in that state and our being in the same state, he arrives at the conclusion that God is in that state because of His essence or per se, but that we are so because of a qualifier inhering in us. Consequently, he can say that, finally, God is qualified as existent etc. because of His essence, and that we are qualified in that way because of a qualifier; and so he uses in fact Abû 'Alî's terminology, though, most probably, the more complicated formula used by Abû Hâšim would be more accurate here.¹⁴⁵ But what is really meant by the formula "per se" or "essentially", is that it is not necessary—and even not possible—to assume the presence of a qualifier in order to explain how the subject can be entitled to the quality concerned.¹⁴⁶

The fourth question: what is the relation among these four essential qualities?¹⁴⁷

A first answer we give is that these four qualities are different from each other, for they indicate four different states God is in. But, nevertheless, He is in any of these four states per se and because of His essence; if that is true, how can we possibly know that these states and the qualities He is entitled to because of His being in these states are really different from each other? 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *Šarh* 129 and 182

¹⁴⁵ One sometimes receives the impression that 'Abd al-Jabbâr also accepts the formula Abû Hâšim used, and that he admits that he himself uses the terms "per se" and "essentially" in the broader sense of the word. See therefore, e.g., *Šarh* 129 and *Muhit* I, 170. I think it is saying too much when Badawî remarks "Il nous suffit de dire ici que 'Abd al-Jabbâr a adopté l'attitude d'Abû 'Alî al-Jubbâ'i, a savoir que Dieu mérite les quatre attributs puissant, savant, vivant et existant, pour Lui-même, tandis que son fils Abû Hâšim disait que Dieu les mérite de par ce qu'il est en Lui-même. Pour une fois, 'Abd al-Jabbâr se range du côté du père et non du fils" (*Histoire*, 220). 'Abd al-Jabbâr follows Abû Hâšim, but not in the establishing of the "essential quality". Therefore, he does not have to accept the difference between the one quality that is because of the essence and the four others that are because of "what He is upon in His essence". Consequently, 'Abd al-Jabbâr can say that they are because of His essence though he follows Abû Hâšim in stating that God can be qualified as knowing etc., and is entitled to these qualifications because of the states He essentially and per se is in

¹⁴⁶ See also Pretzl, *Attributenlehre*, 15

¹⁴⁷ See especially *Muhit* I, 157-162

to this question runs: as we can distinguish¹⁴⁸ between various essences (*dawât*)¹⁴⁹ on the basis of their qualities, by knowing that one essence is characterized by a quality the other is not characterized by so that they must be distinguished from each other, so in a similar way we can make a distinction between different qualities by paying attention to the consequences they have for the subject which is qualified by them; 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls these consequences the "judgements" (*ahkâm*) the subjects concerned are entitled to. If the one quality has a consequence which the other has not—and here 'Abd al-Jabbâr means the fundamental consequence a quality has, a consequence so fundamental that it can be used as a kind of definition for the quality—¹⁵⁰ the two qualities must be different and distinct from each other.¹⁵¹ What remains to do here is to show that God's four essential qualities have four different consequences.

The consequence of God's being able is the possibility of acting; for a subject who is qualified as able acting is possible, and, on the other hand, a subject for whom acting is possible is called able. Consequently, this really is the fundamental judgement (*hukm*).

The consequence of God's being knowing is that He can make occur what he knows in a precise way, supposed that He is able to it.¹⁵²

The consequence of God's being existent is the appearing of the judgements of His essence.¹⁵³

The consequence of God's being living is the possibility of His being knowing and able, and His being perceiving when something perceptible exists.¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁸ In this context (*Muhit* I, 157-162) 'Abd al-Jabbâr mostly uses the term *tamyîz*, "to make a distinction between several things" Nevertheless, he also mentions the more usable word *muḳâlafa*, indicating that two things are different, in such a way that we can assume that both terms are equivalents Cf *Muhit* I, 157

¹⁴⁹ 'Abd al-Jabbâr here (*Muhit* I, 157) uses the term "essence" for "what can be qualified, what can be entitled to a quality" Possibly, he uses this word to encompass in this way both God and the substances

¹⁵⁰ 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the word *haqiqa* We already discussed this on pp 78-79 and came to the conclusion that it indicates a kind of definition

¹⁵¹ Cf *Muhit* I, 157

¹⁵² What is meant here, is the "precise act" (*al-fi'l al-muhkam*) 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that one can take here some precautions by adding to the judgement mentioned "by realization or by some kind of implication" (*'alâ t-tahqiq aw 'alâ darb min at-taqdir*) In this way one includes the atoms of an act, which in itself cannot be precise, but which can be so by the joining with something else (*Muhit* I, 158)

¹⁵³ An essence is entitled in itself to a number of qualities and judgements, but these only "appear" when the essence is existent (*Muhit* I, 159-160)

¹⁵⁴ God's being living necessitates (*yûjib*) His being perceiving on condition that

Because these four judgements or consequences are different, the four qualities must be different too.

By way of conclusion, we maintain that God is entitled to four different essential qualities or qualifications because of four different permanent states He essentially and per se is in; these four states and qualities must be distinct from each other because they have different consequences. Besides these four qualities (existent, living, able, knowing), God is also entitled to the quality "perceiving"; this quality is based on a state He is in because of His being living on the condition that something perceptible does exist.

All other qualities God is entitled to are either because of a qualifier, or because of an act He did, or they indicate that one must deny something about God.

5. WHAT HAS TO BE DENIED ABOUT GOD

'Abd al-Jabbâr pays relatively much attention and devotes many pages to the discussion of a number of statements about God that have to be denied.¹⁵⁵ Most of these pages are filled with refutations

something perceptible exists. One cannot make the same statement concerning His being able and knowing, for these two qualities are necessitated by "what the Eternal is upon in His self" (*li-mâ huw 'alayh al-qadîm fî nafsih*). Here 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the expression Abû Hâsîm forged in order to indicate the reason why God is entitled to His qualities (*Muḥîṭ* I, 160).

¹⁵⁵ In *Muḥîṭ* I, 191-226 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals, subsequently, with the following statements that have to be denied about God: that He can be knowing etc. because of eternal qualifiers, that He can be a substance, body, accident, or substrate, that He can be seen, that He can need something, and that there can be a second one like Him, in the last part are included the refutations of the non-Islamic religions.

In *Šarḥ* 213-298 he discusses the following theses: God can need something, He is a body or an accident, He can be seen, there can be a second one like Him (here again the refutation of the non-Islamic religions is included). The fourth part of the *Muḥîṭ* (the first one of what remains from this work) starts in the midst of these discussions, in it 'Abd al-Jabbâr refutes the theses that God can need something (*Muḥîṭ* IV, 7-32), that He can be seen (*Muḥîṭ* IV, 33-240), and that there can be a second one like Him (*Muḥîṭ* IV, 241-346), the first half of the fifth part of the *Muḥîṭ* comprises the refutations of the non-Islamic religions.

'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Naẓariyat at-taklîf*, 243-304, is very much interested in the passages from the text of the Qur'ân used in these discussions. He also discusses a number of statements formulated on the basis of the Qur'ân and some statements concerning God's acts. Badawî, *Histoire*, 220-224, follows, as he usually does, the text of the *Šarḥ*, he begins, however, after the discussion of the thesis that God can need something, and gives most of his attention to the proofs for God's unicity and the refutation of the non-Muslim opponents.

of the theses of his opponents, just as the choice of some of the statements he discusses is inspired by the doctrine of these opponents. They are both the adherents and scholars of other religions who in his opinion do not accept the unity and unicity of God, and those scholars inside the Islamic community who, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, take the message of the Qur'ân too literally, and misinterpret it by deducing from its text a number of divine qualities.

We discuss briefly the most important among the statements treated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, in so far as they may throw more light on his own position in these discussions and his own theodicy. We deal subsequently with the denial of the following theses: God is a substance, He is a substrate, He is an accident, He can be seen, He can need something, and, finally, there can be a second god besides God.

Lays bi-jawhar wa-lays bi-jism: He is not a substance nor a body. All arguments are based on the same principle, viz., that God should in that case have the essential qualities of a body and bodies should have the essential qualities of God, for, if two things have one essential quality in common, they must have all essential qualities in common.

Therefore, if God were a substance or a body, He ought to have the essential quality of bodies, their being spatial (*mutahavyrîz*), and consequently, as we already saw,¹⁵⁶ he should be "being" (*kâ'm*), and because something can only be being by a "mode of being" (*kawn*) of which we proved that it must be temporal, God Himself would be temporal, this statement is a contradiction so that the premises must be false.

Or, from the other side, since God is essentially eternal, all bodies would be eternal, this again is a contradiction. For the same reason all bodies would be essentially and per se able. And, when we deny this, the conclusion again would be that God, too, is not essentially able, but because of an ability, that would imply that He cannot produce bodies. This again is a contradiction because we came to know Him as the producer of the bodies.¹⁵⁷ In the same way, one should conclude that either all bodies are living, or that God is not essentially living but by a life.

These and other similar conclusions which have to be drawn from

¹⁵⁶ See pp 119-123 and p 112. Cf 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussion of this subject in *Muḥiṭ* I, 197-198 and *Šarḥ* 217-224.

¹⁵⁷ Cf *Muḥiṭ* I, 198, *Šarḥ* 221-224, see also pp 231-235.

the statement that God is a body, are in contradiction with what we discovered above about God.

That we have to deny that God is a body, implies that we also must deny everything that is characteristic of bodies and can only be applied to bodies. When the text of the Qur'ân seems to tell such a thing about God, we have to explain that passage and to examine the text for the real meaning of such an expression.¹⁵⁸

Lays bi-'arad : He is not an accident. We already saw that for an accident it is possible to be non-existent, the accident being the element of change in this world. If God were an accident, the conclusion should be either that God is not eternal or that the accidents are eternal. Both statements are in contradiction with the descriptions we gave of them in the course of our present study.¹⁵⁹

Lays bi-mahall : He is not a substrate. Since "substrate" is a name for substances or bodies considered in their relation to accidents inhering in them, and since God cannot be a substance or a body, He cannot be a substrate for accidents either.

The reason is that the possibility of the substance's being a substrate depends on its being spatial, its *tahayyuz*. What is spatial (*mutahayyuz*) can be a substrate for accidents, whereas what is not spatial cannot be a substrate. This becomes apparent in the fact that a body or substance cannot be a substrate when it is non-existent and, consequently, is not spatial; for the same reason an accident cannot inhere in another accident, so that the second one would be a substrate.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Cf. *Muhit* I, 199 "If there occur in the Qur'ân verses that suppose by their outward meaning a similarity (*at-tašbih*: similarity between God and this world), they must be interpreted (*wajab ta'wiluhâ*) because words can be interpreted in more ways and the indication of the intuition is far from being interpreted in more ways" This, evidently, is a very important principle in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of the Qur'ân in theological argumentations.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. *Muhit* I, 201-202. See also *Šarh* 230-232, where the argument is given in a somewhat different way.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. *Muhit* I, 202 the acceptance of the possibility that an accident inheres in an accident is not only in contradiction with the principles on which the distinction of substances and accidents and the division of all things in this world into substances and accidents is founded, but it also leads to absurdities in as far as by this inhering opposites would no longer exclude each other. A substrate cannot be at the same time black and white because the two opposite accidents, blackness and whiteness, cannot inhere in one and the same substance at the same time. If, however, blackness could inhere in whiteness, a substance could at the same time be white and black. The principle at stake is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr "*at-tadâdd bayn al-mutadâddât*" See also pp. 142-143.

Hence, since being spatial (*tahayyuz*) is a necessary condition to be a substrate, God evidently cannot be a substrate and cannot bear accidents.¹⁶¹

Lâ yurâ : He cannot be seen.¹⁶² The question whether we, human beings, can see God in this world or after our death, was the subject of many disputes among Muslims and among Muslim theologians. These disputes were based in large part on texts from the Qur'ân or the Tradition which sometimes seem to contradict one another. There are texts that apparently affirm the possibility to see Him, while others apparently deny it. It is therefore not very surprising that a considerable part of the discussions 'Abd al-Jabbâr records in his works, is related to arguments that are called "*sam'î*" (based on revelation), more than is the case with the discussions on other subjects.¹⁶³ But notwithstanding this, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions—both in his *Muḥit* and his *Šarḥ*—¹⁶⁴ two "rational" (*'aqlî*) arguments, based on

¹⁶¹ Cf *Muḥit* I, 202 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions still another argument if God were a substrate, He would have to be a substrate for any accident, in that case He could be, for instance, desiring and having aversion by the inhering of the accidents concerned in Him It is, however, somewhat difficult to use this argument because it is possible and even an established fact, in the opinion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, that not every accident can inhere in any substrate, but that accidents can require special substrates Cf p 123

¹⁶² For the argumentations that God cannot be seen, see *Muḥit* IV, 33-240, *Muḥit* I, 206-211, and *Šarḥ* 232-277 See also 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṣmān, *Nazarīyat at-taklīf*, 269-287, Badawi, *Histoire*, 223-224, Vajda, *Le problème de la vision de Dieu d'après Yūsuf al-Basīr*, 478-482, where he translates the arguments given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, especially those of the *Muḥit* See also what we already said about seeing on pp 181-191

¹⁶³ So, for instance, in the *Šarḥ* pages 233-248 are given to a discussion of the revealed texts, for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a very large part of the 55 pages he devotes to the subject

¹⁶⁴ In the *Muḥit* all arguments and discussions and counter-arguments are discussed in much detail In *Muḥit* IV, 98, 'Abd al-Jabbâr introduces his main argument, which he will elaborate in the three following chapters This argument, which is somewhat different in its form and formulation from the arguments mentioned in the two other works, is in fact of the same kind as the one called the argument from the hindrances, it is only more generally and broadly elaborated here This argument is founded upon four theses which 'Abd al-Jabbâr successively proves we do not see God now, it is not because of something in us that we do see Him now (not because we miss, for instance, a special instrument, a sixth sense), it is not because of some hindrance (*māni'*) that we do not see Him now, and, finally, it is not because of something in Him that we do not see Him now The conclusion of all this can only be that it is because it in itself is not possible to see Him, neither now nor later

'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṣmān, *Nazarīyat at-taklīf*, 280-282, gives four arguments, the second and the third ones are those mentioned in our text, the first says that God would be necessarily known if He were seen, which is not possible What he calls the fourth argument, the refutation of the thesis that God can be seen by a sixth sense, is treated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr not as an argument, but among the refutations of his opponents'

human intuition; these two arguments are called the argument of "being in front of" (*al-muqâbala*) and the argument from "the hindrances" (*al-mawâni*).

The first argument can be summarized as follows:¹⁶⁵ when we, living beings in this world, who have to make use of the substrate of our life in perceiving, see something, either the object seen must be directly in front of us, or it must inhere in a substrate that is directly in front of us, or it must be entitled to the judgement that it is in front of us, for instance, when it is in front of a mirror we look into.¹⁶⁶ This implies that the object seen must be a substance (only substances can be "in front of" because of their occupying a certain place) or an accident that inheres in such a substance. And since God can be neither a substance nor an accident, He cannot be seen.

The second argument¹⁶⁷ is based on the fact that a living subject that has no defects and the instrument (sense) of which is healthy necessarily sees all existent visible things if there are no hindrances. When we consider the hindrances we already discussed, we see that they are all related to the rays, which function for us as a kind of instrument in seeing, and we also see that all these hindrances can only be concerned with substances and their inhering accidents, for they all suppose that the visible object is in a certain place or has a certain material structure.¹⁶⁸

Therefore, because no hindrances are possible that can prevent the seeing of God, a living being that has no defects and the sense of which is healthy must see God if He is visible and existent. Because

opinions The first argument 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân mentions does not more than show that we do not see God now Badawi, *Histoire*, 223-224, follows as usually the text of the *Šarh*, but he restricts himself to the first argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives there, the argument from the *muqâbala*

¹⁶⁵ In the formulation of the *Muhit* it is translated by Vajda, cf *Le problème*, 478-479

¹⁶⁶ Cf about this *muqâbala* and the fact that the rays separating themselves from our eye move in a straight line, but can be reflected by some objects, such as mirrors pp 185 and 189 This argument is given in *Muhit* I, 208 and *Šarh* 248 ff The formulation given in the *Šarh* is *iqâ kân muqâbilan aw hâllan fî l-muqâbil aw fî hukm al-muqâbil* The meaning of the second part ("or inhering in what is in front") indicates the possibility that it is an accident, the third part is less clear, but it is explained in *Šarh* 249 by the example of the mirror, also a comparison with the text of the *Muhit* shows that this must be the meaning of these words Therefore, Badawi's rendering is less accurate "en vis-à-vis, ni dans une position de vis-à-vis" (*Histoire*, 223)

¹⁶⁷ See *Muhit* I, 208-209 This text is translated by Vajda, *Le problème*, 479-480 This translation is not always accurate, I have pointed out some misinterpretations in my section about "seeing" in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology

¹⁶⁸ Cf pp. 188-191.

we know that we do not see Him—though He is existent—He must be invisible and it must be absolutely impossible to see Him.

Lâ yudrak : He cannot be perceived.¹⁶⁹ Besides not being visible, God also is not perceptible to the other senses. He evidently cannot be perceived by touching, smelling, or tasting, because these forms of perception suppose a direct contact between the sensory instrument of the perceiving subject and the perceived substance or the substrate of the perceived accident.¹⁷⁰ Consequently, God cannot possibly be perceived by these three forms of perception.

But more generally, we can use for all forms of perception—consequently also for hearing—an argument similar to the latter one we discussed in our demonstration that God cannot be seen.¹⁷¹ When there is nothing in God nor in us, the perceiving subjects, that makes the actual perceiving now impossible, and when there is no hindrance, God must be perceived now if He is perceptible at all. "What can be perceived, must be perceived if the perceiving subject¹⁷² has the quality because of which he can perceive, and the perceptible object has the quality because of which it can be perceived. About what is in this state and nevertheless is not perceived, we must conclude that it is in itself (per se) imperceptible. Concerning something that cannot be perceived because of a known obstacle without (the intervention of) which we surely would perceive it, we know that the reason why we do not perceive it is not because in its essence it is imperceptible, but because there is a hindering."¹⁷³

Lâ yajûz 'alayh al-ĥâja : He can have no need.¹⁷⁴ The 'argument to prove that God has no need or that He is not needing (*muhtâj*) is one and the same in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's three theological works; it is best summarized in *Muĥit* I, 212: "It (viz. : need, *al-ĥâja*) follows¹⁷⁵ benefit

¹⁶⁹ This subject is explicitly discussed in *Mugnî* IV, 134-138 after 'Abd al-Jabbâr has discussed the thesis that God cannot be seen. He could have restricted himself to the general thesis that God cannot be perceived, because this implies that He cannot be seen. The choice of his main subject here was evidently caused by the actual theological discussions.

¹⁷⁰ Cf. *Muĥit* I, 324 and also note 173 on p. 192.

¹⁷¹ Cf. *Muĥit* I, 207 and *Mugnî* IV, 134.

¹⁷² The text reads "the seeing subject" (*ar-râ'î*). What is meant here, in this general discussion of perception, is evidently "the perceiving subject" (*al-mudrik*)

¹⁷³ *Mugnî* IV, 134.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *Mugnî* IV, 7-32, *Muĥit* I, 211-214; *Šarĥ* 213-216. See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 287-289.

¹⁷⁵ The Arabic text uses here several times the verb *taba'*, meaning "to follow". For a good understanding of the text one can replace it by the verb "suppose" (*Muĥit* I, 212).

and repulsion of harm, these two follow pleasure and pain, and these two follow desire and aversion. And since desire is impossible for Him, need is impossible for Him (too)."¹⁷⁶ From this summary it becomes clear that 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses here the term "need" (*hâja*) in a special technical way. In other contexts he will use it to indicate that "something needs something else to exist, or its doer to come into existence, or a cause to receive a judgement, or a secondary cause to come into existence, or similar things".¹⁷⁷ In the present context, however, it is used for the one who "needs to procure benefits and the happiness that follows, or the repulsion of harm and the sorrow that follows";¹⁷⁸ the term is also used for the need for acts or instruments used to procure those benefits and to repulse those harms.¹⁷⁹

By defining "need" in this manner, 'Abd al-Jabbâr connects it with benefit and harm. We already saw that he defines benefit by "pleasure, happiness, or what leads to both or to one of them", and harm by "pain or sorrow, or what leads to both of them".¹⁸⁰ We also saw that pain is based upon perception together with an aversion of nature, whereas pleasure is also based upon perception, but this time together with a desire of nature.¹⁸¹ This implies that, by the succession of definitions 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives, need (*hâja*) supposes desire and aversion.

Desire is not possible for God; to prove this statement, 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses an argumentation wrought by Abû Ishâq.¹⁸² God cannot be per se desiring; for, when a knowing subject knows something to be a benefit without there being any harm, he necessarily does it. So God would be compelled to that act, which would imply that He precedes His act by only one moment, and that implies that He cannot possibly be eternal, for that which is eternal must precede that which is temporal by an infinite number of moments if there were

¹⁷⁶ *Muhit* I, 212, see the rather similar text in *Mugnî* IV, 8

¹⁷⁷ *Mugnî* IV, 8

¹⁷⁸ *Mugnî* IV, 11

¹⁷⁹ He mentions, for instance, knowledge, convictions, perception, senses. It is not necessary that the subject himself does the act by which he gets the benefits, so, for instance, he can be obedient in order to receive a reward which is a benefit for him. Cf. *Mugnî* IV, 11

¹⁸⁰ Cf. p. 91 and note 284 on p. 91. See also *Mugnî* IV, 14 and *Mugnî* XIV, 34

¹⁸¹ Cf. pp. 134-135

¹⁸² Cf. *Šâh* 214, *Muhit* I, 212. He also mentions an argument given by Abû Hâšim, saying that desire implies an addition, which would imply that God were a body. 'Abd al-Jabbâr, however, prefers the argument given by Abû Ishâq.

moments.¹⁸³ The same argument holds true for the assumption that He would be desiring by an eternal desire.¹⁸⁴ Nor can He be desiring by a temporal desire, for then He would be compelled to produce that desire and the thing desired because He would know that to be a benefit.¹⁸⁵

The conclusion from all this is that God cannot be desiring and therefore can have no need.

Ġani: self-sufficient.¹⁸⁶ The word self-sufficient is for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the opposite and the negation of the word "needing" (*muhtâj*), and just as the quality needing supposes and characterizes a perceiving, and therefore living, being,¹⁸⁷ its opposite "self-sufficient" also supposes a living being. When a living being is not needing, it is called self-sufficient; this quality, this name, is not based upon the existence of something in the reality, but upon its non-existence.¹⁸⁸

Therefore, "self-sufficient" must be called a negative quality (*ṣifat an-nafy*); a subject cannot be said to be entitled to such a quality per se, or by a doer, or by a qualifier, but only because of the negation of something. Thus we cannot say that God is per se self-sufficient;¹⁸⁹ we can only say that He is self-sufficient because He is not needing, though He could be so because He is living.

The name "self-sufficient" is the only name we can give to God in this context; but 'Abd al-Jabbâr does mention here a number of names which cannot be used for Him. Besides the names we discussed already, such as desiring and having aversion, having pain and having pleasure, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions some other names which are

¹⁸³ Cf *Muhit* I, 57-58, also note 42 on p 233

¹⁸⁴ In the *Šarh* 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions on p 215 a second argument if this qualifier were eternal, it would be similar to God because it would have an essential quality (being eternal which necessarily is an essential quality, cf note 117, p 247) in common. Consequently, it would be a second god besides God, which is not possible as we shall show

¹⁸⁵ Cf *Šarh* 215, *Mugni* IV, 20-21, *Muhit* I, 213

¹⁸⁶ Cf *Mugni* IV, 8-10, V, 247-248, *Muhit* I, 211-212, *Šarh* 213

¹⁸⁷ Need supposes pain and pleasure, and these two suppose a form of perception as we saw above. See also *Mugni* IV, 8 and *Šarh* 213

¹⁸⁸ The term *gani* can also be used with the preposition 'an and a following noun or pronoun. In that case it means that one is free from want of the thing mentioned, that one does not need it. When it is used absolutely, it indicates that one does not need anything at all, and in this way it is only applicable to God. See also *Mugni* V, 247 and *Šarh* 213

¹⁸⁹ Cf *Muhit* I, 211-212. When we say that God is "per se" self-sufficient, we mean that He "per se" is so that He cannot be needing, neither now nor at any other moment. But "self-sufficient" is not a really essential quality

connected with these concepts and consequently have to be denied: God cannot take pleasure (*yusarr*), be glad (*yafrāḥ*), fear (*yaḳāf*), hope (*yarjū*), worry (*yaḡtamm*), feel anxiety (*yuṣfiq*), be jealous (*ḡayūr*), or courageous (*ṣujāʿ*), because all these names indicate or imply some form of need, benefit and harm, or desire and aversion.¹⁹⁰

Lā ṭānī lah: He is second to none.¹⁹¹ The expression “He is second to none” is meant to indicate that there is no second one who shares with God His being eternal or His being god.¹⁹² The arguments ‘Abd al-Jabbār gives to prove this statement are in fact based on the conclusion that the assumption of the existence of such a “second one” would imply that this second one must also be essentially and per se able, and the acceptance of two essentially able subjects leads to two different absurdities.¹⁹³

The basis of this argumentation, the part both arguments have in common, is most clearly summarized by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in his *Šarḥ*:¹⁹⁴ “If there were together with God a second eternal (being), it would be similar to Him because being eternal is one of the essential qualities, and the sharing of it necessitates the being similar and the sharing of the other essential qualities. When this is true and the Eternal is essentially able, the second one also must be essentially able.”¹⁹⁵

Being able is an essential quality; we saw above that God is essen-

¹⁹⁰ Cf *Muḡni* V, 247-248

¹⁹¹ Cf *Muḡni* IV, 241-346 and *Muḡni* V, 244-246. In *Muḡni* V, 9-159 ‘Abd al-Jabbār refutes the theses of those who, according to him, believe in more than one God. See also *Šarḥ* 277-291 and *Šarḥ* 291-298 for the refutation of those who deny the unity and uniqueness of God: cf. *Muḥit* I, 215-226 Cf ‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uṭmān, *Nazariyat at-taklif*, 244-252 and also 252-257 for the refutations. Badawī gives in his *Histoire* very much attention to the refutations, much more than ‘Abd al-Jabbār himself, so that his record of ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s doctrine seems to make it an apology instead of a really theological form of thinking. Badawī discusses the argument for the thesis that there is no second one in *Histoire*, 224-226 and devotes pp. 226-240 to the refutations

Vajda, too, discusses in his *La démonstration de l’unité divine d’après Yūsuf al-Basīr* ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s texts on this subject, comparing the structure of those three texts.

¹⁹² See, for instance, the title in *Muḡni* IV, 241: *al-kalām fī annah ta’âlā wāḥid lā ṭānī lah fī l-qīdam wa-l-ilāhiya*

¹⁹³ These are the “two arguments” Vajda distinguishes in his article. See, for instance, the text of the *Muḡni* where the distinction between two arguments is most clearly made. On p. 275 of *Muḡni* IV the second argument begins; it is introduced and summarized on that page. The first argument is summarized by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in *Muḡni* IV, 267-268.

¹⁹⁴ This text is translated by Vajda, *La démonstration*, 309-310, but he omits the first more general sentences, and starts with the last sentence we translate in our text. See also Badawī, *Histoire*, 224-225, who translates the entire text.

¹⁹⁵ *Šarḥ* 278

tially able¹⁹⁶ What remains to be proved is the general statement that the sharing of one essential quality necessitates the sharing of all essential qualities 'Abd al-Jabbâr considers the essence (*ḍât*) to be something indivisible, the expression "per se" or "because of the essence" is here not considered to be purely the negation of a qualifier and the negation of the possibility to lose this quality,¹⁹⁷ but the essence here has its own characteristic¹⁹⁸ And, 'Abd al-Jabbâr says, when two things are similar to each other because of their—indivisible—essences, for instance, being both by their essence eternal, these essences must be similar and cannot be at the same time the reason why the two things are different, one of them having an essential quality the other has not¹⁹⁹ Summarizing, the one and indivisible essence cannot be, at the same time, the reason why the thing is similar with and the reason why it is different from something else

After this basic argumentation leading to the conclusion that the acceptance of a second eternal or divine²⁰⁰ being implies the acceptance of two beings who are both essentially able, one may choose one of two ways to continue the argumentation

The first argument says that God has a connection with the things He is able to produce, His "*maqḍûrât*", which is because of His essence²⁰¹ If the "second one" has the same essence as God, he must be able to produce the same possible things God is able to produce This implies the acceptance that one non-existent, possible thing is *maqḍûr* of two different able subjects, and that two able subjects are able to produce the same thing And this is excluded²⁰²

The second argument, which is called the argument from the "mutual hindering" (*at-tamânu*),²⁰³ is based on the fact that the subject who is able to produce something, is able to produce the genus of that something and its opposite—if there is an opposite. This implies that

¹⁹⁶ Cf pp 236-237

¹⁹⁷ Cf p 252

¹⁹⁸ See *Mugni* IV, 252 The essence is, however, not something inside the being, a kind of kernel, but the being itself which can be qualified See p 148

¹⁹⁹ Cf *Mugni* IV, 252-253

²⁰⁰ We already saw that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the name "god" (*ilâh*) directly implies that the subject is essentially and per se able, cf p 240 So, if one starts not from the second one's being eternal, but from his being god, the argumentation will be simpler yet

²⁰¹ Cf pp 204-206 and 237-239

²⁰² Cf *Mugni* IV, 254-275 See also pp 237-239

²⁰³ For this argument, see Vajda, *La démonstration*, 309-311 and Badawi, *Histoire*, 224-226

it is possible that God wants to move something while the "second one" wants to keep it immobile. This is called the "mutual hindering", for the object cannot be moving and immobile at the same time. Consequently, what will happen is what one of them wants, while the other one is hindered. And so it becomes apparent that the one whose will happens is essentially able and god, whereas the other one is not because he must be able by an ability and consequently be a body.²⁰⁴ This implies that the premise is false, and that there can be no second one besides God.

Wâhid: one. The original meaning²⁰⁵ of the term *wâhid* is said to be that the thing thus called cannot be divided into atoms or parts,²⁰⁶ or, eventually, that the thing thus called cannot be divided without ceasing to be what it is.²⁰⁷ It is evident that, just as the quality "self-sufficient" (*ġani*), so the quality "one" (*wâhid*) too is a negative quality, and that, consequently, God cannot be said to be *wâhid* per se or essentially, nor because of a qualifier.²⁰⁸

If we use this name for a human being, we can do so to express that he cannot be divided, but also to indicate that he is unique, that he has qualities no one else has.²⁰⁹ When theologians say that God is *wâhid*, they mostly use it in this second way, and then it is preferable to translate this term as "unique". Consequently, since we know from the above mentioned argumentation that there is no "second one", we call God "unique" (*wâhid*).

Besides this name, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions two others that can be applied to God because they are both synonyms of His name *wâhid*; these names are . "fard" (unique) and "wahîd" (alone).²¹⁰

²⁰⁴ Cf. *Šarh* 278, *Mugni* IV, 275-276. The argument is elaborated in *Mugni* IV, 277-346. See also *Muhit* I, 216.

²⁰⁵ In Arabic 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls this *al-haqîqa*. Abû Hâšim held the opinion that the original meaning was the second one mentioned in our text. Cf. *Mugni* V, 245.

²⁰⁶ *Wâhid* is that which *lâ yatajazza' wa-lâ yataba'ad*, the first verb using the root *ĵz'*, from which the noun *juz'* (atom) is derived, the other one using the less specific root *b'd*. Cf. *Šarh* 277. In this way the single atom can be called *wâhid*.

²⁰⁷ When we call a human being *wâhid*—or, for instance, the ten *wâhid*—we indicate—according to the thesis of Abû Hâšim—that the parts into which it can be divided do not have the same name as the totality. Cf. *Mugni* V, 244-245.

²⁰⁸ *Mugni* V, 244 and *Mugni* IV, 247-249.

²⁰⁹ Thus the word *wâhid* is used when we say that someone is *wâhid* in his time or in his era. Cf. *Šarh* 277 and *Mugni* V, 245.

²¹⁰ Cf. *Mugni* V, 245-246.

6. GOD'S ACTS

Very much can be said about God's acts,²¹¹ not because there are so many different acts—every act is either a substance or one of the known accidents, and the only thing the acting subject actually does is to bring them into existence—but because these acts can be characterized in various ways by the function they have in the relationship between God and the world.²¹² And possibly even more can be said about the acts God actually does not produce, but which, nevertheless, fill many pages in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works.

And just as acting subjects in this world are qualified by certain qualities corresponding to the acts they do or did,²¹³ God is also qualified by these qualities based upon the acts He did, His "factual qualities" (*ṣifât al-fî'l*). The reason that we qualify Him in this way, is that we know that acts came from Him, that at a given moment He brought into existence the substances or accidents concerned. As we qualify Him with one of the essential qualities because we came to know that He is in the corresponding state, we qualify Him with one of the factual qualities because we came to know that something is His act. Therefore, a factual quality does not mean more than that the act concerned came from Him.²¹⁴ And as the acts can have different characteristics, so the qualities and names for God vary with them.

We deal only with the general principles of God's acting and leave aside most of the secondary characteristics. We only discuss God's acts in general, and the thesis that all His acts are good and that He performs no evil acts. And although being willing and non-willing are not really factual qualities—we know that God is in a state before we know the act "will" or "non-will", just as we know first that a human being is willing and just as we only after knowing that state deduce

²¹¹ In the *Muğni* the discussions about God's unity and His essential qualities occupy the first five parts of the work, while the remaining fifteen parts are filled with discussions that have one relation or other with God's acts, also by being, e g., the answer of a human being to God's acts. In the *Šarh*, the discussions about God's Justice are found on pp 299-608, but also in the treatises on the three following Mu'tazilî principles much will be said about God's acts.

²¹² Thus the qualification of acts in categories of good and evil; also God's *taklif*, His imposing duties, and the characteristics which acts may get because of their being involved in the interrelationship of God and man which is expressed by the term *taklif*

²¹³ Cf. p 210, where I mentioned as examples of such qualities: speaking (*mutakallim*), beating (*dârib*), moving (*muharrîk*), and making immobile (*musakkîn*)

²¹⁴ Cf. the discussion on the quality *fâ'il*. pp 209-210.

the existence of an act and qualifier “will” or “non-will”²¹⁵—we here discuss God’s will and non-will, just as ‘Abd al-Jabbâr does. The will and non-will also are God’s own acts though it is better not to say that God’s being willing is a factual quality, but to say that He is willing and non-willing “because of a qualifier”²¹⁶

In the present context ‘Abd al-Jabbâr also pays much attention to another one among God’s acts, His speech, mainly with the intention to show that His speech really is His act, and that His being speaking really is a factual quality. God’s speech and His quality “speaking” will form the subject of our next chapter.

Fâ’il: doing. Since we came to know God as the One who brought the bodies in this world into existence, and since we concluded with ‘Abd al-Jabbâr that besides God there can be no second one who would be per se and essentially able, everything in our world living beings who are able by an ability are not able to—that is to say, all bodies and most of the accidents—²¹⁷ must be brought into existence and “done” by God. Consequently, we can call Him “doing”²¹⁸

But, since one only can be qualified as “doing” (*fâ’il*) when we know that he did some act, and since one only is entitled to this quality because of an act one brought into existence, God only is entitled to the quality “doing” from the first moment of His creation. Before that moment God was not doing, He was only able.

Besides the fact that there is a difference between the acts God can do and the acts we can do—God is able to do everything we can do, but we cannot do everything He can do—there is also a difference between the way God acts and the way we act. God being essentially and per se able, does not have to make use of the substrate of an ability to produce acts, He can act without such a substrate, a way of acting that is called *iktirâ’*²¹⁹. God acts directly, by *iktirâ’*, but not exclusively, He can also use secondary causes in His acting and produce things by “generation” (*tawlid*)²²⁰

²¹⁵ As regards the way in which we can know that someone is willing, cf p 211 about the way we know that we ourselves are willing (or non-willing) and p 214 about the way we know someone else to be willing (or non-willing)

²¹⁶ About the division of God’s qualities into two (essential and factual qualities) or into three (essential, because of a qualifier, and none of these two) categories, see note 126 and *Muhit* I, 100

²¹⁷ Cf pp 127-128

²¹⁸ The quality *fâ’il* is discussed by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* XX/2, 187-189

²¹⁹ Cf p 203

²²⁰ This is discussed in *Mugni* IX, 94-101

We already saw that God, since He is essentially able, can produce every genus of acts and any number of it. By deduction we know which acts He in fact has done, but the question remains whether we can say, a priori, that God will do some acts and will not do some other concrete acts. This question is discussed below.

Because "doing" implies that the act becomes existent (*mawjûd*), God is called "*mûjid*"²²¹ (making existent), and because His acts are coming into existence and brought into existence (*hâdiḡ wa-muḡdatḡ*), He is called "*muḡdiḡ*" (bringing into existence)²²²

If we look into the way He acts, we call Him "*mukṡari*" (acting directly without the use of the substrate of an ability) and "*muwalliḡ*" (generating).²²³

God can also be qualified as "*mubdi*" (originating), meaning that He is the first who did a special act²²⁴ We call Him "*kâliḡ*" (creating) because this quality indicates that He does an act in a "determined" (*muḡaddar*) way; this name is more specially applied to God²²⁵

Finally, we conclude that words which indicate that the act exists or that it exists in a way which is found in all His acts or in some of them, can be applied to God. What indicates something more and in fact is related to an ability, the substrate of an act, hard labor (*ta'ab*), and the use of instruments or limbs, all that has to be denied and cannot be applied to God²²⁶

²²¹ The printed text reads (*Muḡni* XX 2, 187) *mawjûd* (existent), when we try to find an interpretation of this word in the context, it becomes apparent that we have to read instead of it *mûjid* (making existent) Cf pp 106-107

²²² Cf pp 110-115, where we already argued that everything that is temporal and once came into existence needs someone who in fact brought it into existence, every *muḡdat* needs a *muḡdiḡ*

Cf *Muḡni* XX 2, 187

²²³ Cf *Muḡni* XX 2, 190-191 One can use the name *muwalliḡ* (generating) for God, for it is the subject that makes the secondary cause (*sabab*) which is said to generate the effect One has to be prudent in the use of this name because the word is also used for the begetting of a child The word *mubâsir* cannot be used for God One has to correct the reading of *Muḡni* XX 2, 190, line 19 Most probably we have to read there *wa-lâ vuḡâl fî fî'lih innah mubâsir*, *wa-lâ fîh innah mubâsir li-fî'lih* one cannot say about His act that it is direct (viz on the substrate of the ability), nor about Him that He is directly producing His act

²²⁴ Cf *Muḡni* XX 2, 191

²²⁵ Cf our discussion of the meaning of the verb *kalaḡ* (to create) on pp 117-119 Cf also *Muḡni* XX 2, 192-193

²²⁶ *Muḡni* XX 2, 193 194 In this context we mention some other names that can be applied to God, as synonyms for *jâ'il* are mentioned *munṡi*, *sâni*, and *'âmil*, though the use of these words is restricted to some individual subjects, to indicate some special aspect we say that God is *mudabbir* (arranging His act), *muḡaddir* (determining His act), *mukawwim* (bringing into being, cause to be *kâ'im*), and *muḡbit* (producing

Lâ yaf'al al-qabiḥ: He does no evil.²²⁷ An act is, as we already saw, never evil in itself, essentially; it can only be evil because it occurs in a certain way, because it has a certain aspect (*wajh*). As the most important aspects that make an act evil, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions: wrongdoing (*ẓulm*), uselessness (*'abat*), lying (*kaḍīb*), ingratitude for a favour (*kufr an-ni'ma*), positive ignorance (*jahl*), willing evil (*irâdat al-qabiḥ*), commanding evil (*amr bi-l-qabiḥ*), and imposing unattainable duties (*taklîf mâ lâ yuṭâq*).²²⁸ That these aspects, the occurring of an act in this way, make the act evil, is apparent from our experience in this world. An act by which the acting subject does not deserve any blame can become the cause of blame for the acting subject if it occurs in one of the above mentioned ways. Information becomes evil if it occurs in such a way that it does not correspond with reality; it is lying and in that case the informing subject deserves blame. If the information is given according to reality, but at a moment that no one hears it and also the informing subject has no use of it, it is useless and consequently also evil.²²⁹

Because evil acts belong to the same genus as good acts, the qualifications good and evil being dependent upon the way in which they are done, and because it can be the same act that is good or evil according to the way in which it is done, it is clear that God is able to do acts that would be evil if He were to do them.²³⁰

But in fact, and this is the general doctrine of the Mu'tazila,²³¹ God performs no evil act. The argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives is the same in the *Muḡnî*, the *Muḥîṭ*, and the *Šarḥ*: because God knows the being evil of the evil (thing), and because He does not need it and knows that He does not need it, He surely will not choose it.²³²

something so, that it is *ṭābit*, firmly existing) Cf., for all these qualities, *Muḡnî* XX 2, 191-193

²²⁷ Cf. *Muḡnî* VI 1, 177-180 Cf. also *Muḥîṭ* I, 257-261, in the context of pp. 229-266, also *Šarḥ* 302-316 'Abd al-Jabbâr's position and argumentation are discussed by 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uḡmân (*Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 294-296) and Hourani (*Islamic Rationalism*, 97-102)

²²⁸ Cf. note 269 on p. 88 See also *Muḡnî* VI 1, 61-69 and Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 69-70

²²⁹ For the last example, see *Muḡnî* VII, 182-184

²³⁰ This is mentioned in *Šarḥ* 313-316, *Muḥîṭ* I, 246-252, *Muḡnî* VI 1, 127-134 The formulation is carefully chosen by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, he does not say that God is able to do evil acts, the acts which He is able to do are non-existent and therefore cannot be evil, for they only become evil by the way in which they are done

²³¹ This is implied in the second of their five principles, the principle of God's Justice See also, e.g., Hourani, *Islamic Rationalism*, 100-101

²³² Cf. *Šarḥ* 302 The knowledge that He does not need it has to be added, for, if one

God knows everything and, consequently, also the being evil of evil things; He does not need the evil thing: He is self-sufficient and does not need anything at all,²³³ and, since He is knowing everything, He must know also that He does not need it. The only element of the argumentation given above that remains to be proved, is the validity of the conclusion. To prove this 'Abd al-Jabbār appeals to the evidences of this world, and by means of some examples he shows that, if the two conditions mentioned in the argumentation are fulfilled, man will necessarily not choose the evil thing because his motives, his *dawā'ī*—here: knowledge—²³⁴ do not urge him to that evil act, but hold him back from it. Then we can draw our conclusion that the same must be the case with God, because the same indications indicate the same thing both in this and in the other world. Moreover, the indications are even stronger in the other world because God knows everything and does not need anything at all. Therefore, the conclusion is surely correct.²³⁵

We already saw that 'Abd al-Jabbār leaves the possibility open that there are neutral acts, which are neither good nor evil. Some acts become good or evil, become value-acts, through the knowledge, conviction, or intention of the doing subject. If these acts lack knowledge and conviction (because they are done by an unconscious person, a little child), they remain neutral. The acts concerned are mostly insignificant acts, most acts not receiving their value from the knowledge, conviction, or intention of the acting subject, but from their aspect, the way they occur.²³⁶

Because it is certain that God cannot do such a neutral act, and because we proved that He does no evil acts, all His acts must be necessarily good (*ḥasan*).²³⁷

Because all God's acts are good, He is entitled to several names expressing this judgement on His acts: we call Him "*muḥsin*" (doing good), "*mun'im*", "*mufaḍḍil*", and "*mutafaḍḍil*" (all meaning: giving

does not need it but one is in positive ignorance and consequently one is convinced that one does need it, one can choose it. Therefore this addition has to be made. Cf *Muhit* I, 257

²³³ Cf pp 260-263

²³⁴ About the motives cf pp 218-219

²³⁵ We can see this as an example of the fourth form of inference from this world towards the other one, see p 231

²³⁶ Cf pp 88-89 and notes 271 and 272

²³⁷ Cf *Muhit* I, 262-264

favours), or “*nāfi*” (giving benefits). We also call Him “*musib*” (acting rightly), “*ḥakīm*” (acting wisely²³⁸), and “*ādil*” (acting justly).²³⁹

Murid: willing.²⁴⁰ ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s most elaborate argumentation proving that God is really willing, is to be found in his *Muḥit*.²⁴¹ There he mentions two arguments; the first argument is entirely a posteriori, whereas the second has a moment of a priori-argumentation in it.

The first way to prove that God is willing, corresponds with the way we can know that human beings are willing, viz., by the occurring of acts in such a special way in which they cannot occur when the acting subject is not willing. We mentioned, for instance, the occurring of speech as information about something individual or as a command to do something. Both among the data of divine revelation and among those of human intuition, we can find some that indicate in this way that God must be willing.

We discover in the text of the Qur’ān that God is informing and commanding; this immediately leads to the conclusion that He must

²³⁸ The name *hakīm* can also be used as an equivalent for ‘*ālim*, as we already saw on p 243, in that case it has to be translated as “wise” Cf also *Mugni* XX/2, 195

²³⁹ These names are discussed by ‘Abd al-Jabbār in *Mugni* XX/2, 194-196

²⁴⁰ For a discussion of God’s being willing and the qualifier by which He is willing, see *Mugni* VI 2 (the entire volume is devoted to this subject), *Muḥit* I, 267-288, *Šarḥ* 431-455 See also ‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uṣmān, *Nazariyat at-taklīf*, 222-229 and Frank, *The Divine Attributes*, especially 496-506

²⁴¹ In *Mugni* VI 2, 104-111 ‘Abd al-Jabbār restricts himself to the first argument mentioned in the *Muḥit*, and he does not make a clear distinction between the arguments based on the data of human intuition and those based on the data of divine revelation His argumentation is founded on the fact that God is informing (*muḥbir*) so that his speech occurs as information (*ḵabar*), His acts also occur as address to someone (*ḵitāb*), command (*amr*), imposing of duties (*taklīf*), reward (*ṭawāb*), punishment (*‘iqāb*), praise (*madḥ*), and blame (*ḡamm*) All these acts require a willing subject as the one who produced them

The *Muḥit* treats two arguments to prove that God is willing, accepting both of them They are found in *Muḥit* I, 269-272 It is very regrettable that Houben, the editor of the Lebanese edition, did not entirely understand the very complicated argumentation ‘Abd al-Jabbār wrought so that some faults crept into this edition, the Egyptian edition of the work (I, 265-268) shows that its editor, ‘Umar ‘Azmi, had less difficulties with this chapter

‘Abd al-Jabbār uses two arguments, the first one is introduced p 269, lines 5-8, and is elaborated pp 269, line 23 - 272, line 5 This argument is subdivided into two parts, one concerned with the data of divine revelation (pp 270, line 1 - 271, line 20), the other with the data of human intuition (pp 271, line 21 - 272, line 5) The second argument can be found p 269, lines 9-23 The division of this chapter into paragraphs and the printing of some words in fat types should be corrected and adapted to the above mentioned interpretation of the text

be willing, for only in that way His speech can occur as information or command.²⁴²

But also the data of human intuition and the argumentation based on those data, inevitably lead to the conclusion that God's acts occur in such a way that He must be willing. A first example consists in the evidence that He creates things that are of some benefit for a concrete person. This implies that He intends this, and we already saw that intention is a name for the will when it occurs in a special way, so that someone who is intending (*qâṣid*) also must be willing (*murîd*).²⁴³ A second example is the creation by God of the desire for something bad in the heart of a human being. It is evident that He must have a goal (*ğaraḍ*) to do that. He²⁴⁴ creates this desire either to tempt us, or to open the possibility²⁴⁵ of reward because we, notwithstanding that desire for something evil, abstain from that evil and do what is obligatory. And this also implies a kind of intention (*qasḍ*) in God. And, in general, since we know from His imposing duties that His acts can be reward or punishment, that they can be exaltation and praise, we know for certain that He is willing because acts can only be characterized in this special way because of His will.²⁴⁶

The second argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions is that "if one of us knows what he does, while it (the act) can be intended in itself and there is no hindrance²⁴⁷ between him and his will, that which²⁴⁸ incites him to the act also incites him to the will of it." The same motives that incite to the act, must also incite to the will, if three conditions are fulfilled: one knows the act, it is possible to intend it, and the subject is not hindered in his willing.²⁴⁹

²⁴² Cf. *Muḥit* I, 270-271.

²⁴³ We discussed the meaning of the *qasḍ* on p. 221. We described the *qasḍ* there as the concomitant will, viz., concomitant with the coming into existence of the act or of its secondary cause (*sabab*)

²⁴⁴ Read *ṣaf'alah* instead of *naḥ'alah* ("He" instead of "we"); *Muḥit* I, 271, line 26.

²⁴⁵ Read *at-ta'riḍ* instead of *at-tağriḍ* ("exposing or making liable to something" instead of "making into a goal"), *Muḥit* I, 272, line 1

²⁴⁶ Read *bi-l-irâda* instead of *wa-l-irâda* ("by the will" instead of "and the will"); *Muḥit* I, 272, line 5.

²⁴⁷ The Arabic text runs here (*Muḥit* I, 269). "*wa-t-tağḥiya baynah wa-bayn irâdatih qâ'ima*" (the Egyptian edition reads *tağḥiya* instead of *tağḥya*, the latter is surely the correct reading). "the leaving to him of free access to his will is existent" That this expression is meant to exclude a hindrance becomes apparent from the further elaboration by 'Abd al-Jabbâr and the example he mentions. See also note 243.

²⁴⁸ Read here *fa-mâ* instead of *fi-mâ*. "that which" instead of "in what"; *Muḥit* I, 269, line 11

²⁴⁹ The text quoted, which can be found in *Muḥit* I, 269, is explained and argued by

We know that it is not impossible that God is willing, for willing only supposes that the subject is living;²⁵⁰ we also know that God necessarily knows everything, and that He cannot be hindered. Consequently, because He did acts that can have a goal and can be intended, He must be willing. For when an indication indicates something in this world, it must indicate the same thing in the other world too.

Irāda : will. To prove how God is willing, 'Abd al-Jabbār makes use of the method of division (*taqṣīm*) of the question into its various possible solutions, and of exclusion of all possibilities except one, which, consequently, must be the right solution.²⁵¹ He argues as follows: God cannot be per se willing, nor can He be willing "neither²⁵² per se nor by a cause", nor can He be willing by a non-existent cause, a non-existent will, nor can He be willing by an eternal cause, an eternal will. When he has excluded all these possibilities, he comes to the conclusion that the only remaining solution must be the right one,

'Abd al-Jabbār in the following sentences. "If he were unconscious of the act, he could not be willing let alone that he should be so, if he were knowing, and the thing not intended (*maqsūd ilāhī*) and the goal not connected with it—as the will itself and as what comes from the cleaving caused by a wound and from beating caused by the shaking off (read *naḥḍ* instead of *ba'd*) of dust, or pain it is not necessary that he wills (read *urīdah* instead of *uzīdah*) because the goal is not connected with it, and if he were hindered from (*mammū' min*) the will, he would not be willing, as we say about him who stands on the border of Paradise, while the will to enter it is made unattainable for him, without a will" (*Muhīt* I, 269)

The second condition may present a difficulty here and in the text of the argumentation itself it is mentioned as a condition that the act must be *maqsūd*. When we take this literally, in its purely passive sense, it means that the act must be "intended"; but, because the intention is the will itself, it certainly is willed. In that case, there is no need for the remainder of the argumentation and it is not easy to apply it to God. Consequently, we most probably must translate it as indicating the possibility, it is possible that it is intended; this interpretation is confirmed by the examples given and by the addition in the text of the argument that the act must be *maqsūd "fī nafsih"* (in itself).

²⁵⁰ The argumentation is only valid when God actually can be willing. But in our discussion of the quality "willing" in 'Abd al-Jabbār's anthropology, we already saw that this quality only supposes a living being. Consequently, God can be willing.

²⁵¹ Cf. *Muhīt* I, 274, where 'Abd al-Jabbār also mentions, very briefly, a second argument: God is willing, but He is not necessarily willing. The influence of the will on the acts that occur in a special way by the concomitant will, is a necessary influence (*'alā tariq al-ijāh*). If God would be necessarily willing, no possibility of choosing (read *taḥayyur* instead of *tahayyuz* in *Muhīt* I, 274, line 6) would remain so that His information could not be this time about this Zayd and another time about another Zayd, while the form of the information remains the same (for instance, "Zayd is great").

²⁵² I added here *lā* (*Muhīt* I, 274, line 10) and I read: ". an yakūn murīdan li-nafsih, wa-lā lā li-nafsih wa-lā li-'illa ..."

which is that God must be willing by a temporal will, a will that comes into existence (*hādī*).

When we look into the various rejected possibilities, we first meet the statement that God cannot be per se willing. If He were so, He should be willing everything that can be willed, everything that some other willing subject wills, because a willed object is not restricted to one willing subject but can be willed by every willing subject. This conclusion, at its turn, leads to a great number of absurd consequences, as, for instance, that God should will every act He is able to, and consequently also should produce every act He is able to.²⁵³

Another argument is said to be that in the same way in which we came to the conclusion that God is willing, we also must come to the conclusion that He is non-willing (for instance, because He is known to be prohibiting). That implies that, even if God is not per se non-willing, He certainly must will the acts He is non-willing. And that evidently is absurd.²⁵⁴

Nor is it possible that God would be willing "neither per se nor by a cause"²⁵⁵—just as He is perceiving neither per se nor by a cause—for in that case, that which makes that He wills some things and does not will others, and that He wills something at a given moment after He did not will it—and this is a cause (*'illa*) or qualifier (*ma'nā*)—would be absent, and God should will everything that can be willed at every moment. And that leads, as we already saw, to absurd con-

²⁵³ Cf *Muhit* I, 275 and *Muḡni* VI:2, 111. As absurd conclusions from the thesis that God would be per se willing and consequently willing everything that can be willed, 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions.

When we will something for ourselves (possessions, children), God must will it too, and because He can produce it, He must produce it (*Muḡni* VI 2, 111 and *Muhit* I, 275). God should produce more than He actually did, He should have given us more life, knowledge, ability, etc. (*Muḡni* VI:2, 111 and *Muhit* I, 275). He should have produced things before the time He actually produced them, even from all eternity (*Muḡni* VI:2, 111-112 and *Muhit* I, 276). Because one of us can will the opposite of what someone else wills, God would have to will opposite things at the same time, this argument is said to be used by the teachers (*ṣuyūk*) (*Muḡni* VI 2, 112 and *Muhit* I, 277). God would also have to will everything that actually comes into existence and thus, for instance, also the unbelief of the unbelievers and the evil acts of human beings. This is not possible although some of 'Abd al-Jabbār's opponents—the Aš'ariya—maintain that God wills indeed every thing that comes into existence (*Muhit* I, 278).

²⁵⁴ Cf *Muḡni* VI:2, 130 and *Muhit* I, 276.

²⁵⁵ The sequence of the chapters in the *Muhit* is not logical; in this work 'Abd al-Jabbār first discusses the assumption that God would be willing by an eternal will (*Muhit* I, 279), and only afterwards he proves that He is not willing "neither per se nor by a cause" (*Muhit* I, 280-281).

clusions ²⁵⁶ God's being willing cannot be compared with His being perceiving, for in the case of perceiving we met a condition that had to be fulfilled to make the actual perception possible, viz, the existence of at least one perceptible thing. Concerning His being willing, however, no such condition is possible since one can will what is non-existent as what is existent ²⁵⁷

When God is known to be willing, and 'Abd al-Jabbâr proved that He cannot be per se willing, and that He cannot be willing "neither per se nor by a cause", we necessarily must draw the conclusion that He is willing by a cause or qualifier

This cause cannot be non-existent, for in that case it lacks the influence needed to restrict the number and actuality of things willed, something non-existent being excluded from any real influence on existed things ²⁵⁸ Consequently, the cause must be existent, this implies that it is either eternal or temporal

God cannot be willing by an eternal cause, that would lead to the same conclusions as the assumption that He knows by an eternal cause what is eternal must be similar to Him, and must be the "second one" the impossibility of whose existence we already demonstrated ²⁵⁹ We would also have to accept that there was only one will and, consequently, only one thing willed. Moreover, if God would be willing by an eternal cause, He must be willing in all eternity, and this leads to the same conclusions as the assumption that He were willing per se ²⁶⁰

The conclusion must be drawn here that God is willing by a temporal (*hâdiq* or *muhdat* ²⁶¹) will. This will cannot inhere in God, for He cannot be a substrate for accidents. Nor can this will inhere in a substrate that is lifeless (*jamâd*), because the will characterizes a living being and therefore cannot exist in a lifeless substrate ²⁶² If this will

²⁵⁶ Cf *Mugnî* VI 2, 134-135 and *Muhîr* I, 281. See also note 253

²⁵⁷ Cf *Mugnî* VI/2, 135-136 and *Muhîr* 280-281

²⁵⁸ This is discussed briefly in *Muhîr* I, 282 and in *Šarh* 448

²⁵⁹ Cf pp 263-265. The thesis that God is willing by an eternal will is said to be adhered to by the Aš'ariya, *Šarh* 447

²⁶⁰ *Mugnî* VI 2, 137, *Muhîr* I, 279, and *Šarh* 447-448

²⁶¹ While the *Mugnî* in this context consistently uses the word *muhdat* (the "normal" word in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's vocabulary), the *Muhîr* here prefers the word *hâdiq*. For 'Abd al-Jabbâr this difference in the vocabulary used does not imply a difference in the meaning, for in both works the will is said to be God's act and therefore not only "coming into existence" but also "brought into existence". The *Sarh* also uses the term "*muhdat*"

²⁶² Cf *Mugnî* VI/2, 149-173 and *Muhîr* I, 282-283

were to inhere in a living substrate, it would be that substrate which would be willing by it, and not God. Therefore, the only possibility that remains is that this will, this qualifier, this accident is existent without inhering in a substrate (*mawjûd lâ fî maḥall*). This conclusion may seem strange, but, 'Abd al-Jabbâr nearly apologizes, the conclusion is evident and inevitable.²⁶³ God is willing by a temporal will, which is existent without inhering in a substrate.

7. THE USE OF "REVEALED" ARGUMENTS IN THEODICY

Let us conclude this paragraph and this chapter with a short recapitulation of what we said in the first paragraph of this chapter about the use of the data of divine revelation (*as-sam'*) as indications in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological argumentation,²⁶⁴ by including in it the conclusions we reached in the course of this last paragraph.

When the contemporaries of the prophet Muḥammad witnessed some acts which a human being who is able by an ability is not able to produce, and when Muslims of all centuries witnessed to the Holy Qur'ân as a miracle that no human being or any other being that is able by an ability is able to produce, we must conclude that they are made by God, the only one who is essentially able.

When these acts of God indicate that a given message is His message, and since we know that He is wise (*ḥakîm*) and just (*'âdil*), knows everything and will not deceive, we must come to the conclusion that this message is His message and that its contents are the truth. This message is the Qur'ân.

Not every verse in the Qur'ân forms in itself an indication and an argument; some verses are obscure and require a careful interpretation. This is evidently the case when a given text in the Qur'ân seems to contradict a conclusion based on the data of human intuition. The verse in question has to be interpreted because both forms of knowledge, both intuitive (*'aqlî*) and revealed (*sam'î*), are guaranteed

²⁶³ Cf *Muḡni* VI 2, 162, where a number of difficulties is mentioned which seem to contradict the assumption of an accident and qualifier existing not in a substrate. He tries to refute these in the remainder of the chapter. To the thesis that an accident cannot exist without a substrate he gives as his answer that the only thing accidents necessarily have in common is the fact that they are not remaining. Therefore, it is not a priori excluded that some accidents could exist without a substrate. Cf *Muḡni* VI 2, 166-167. See also *Sharḥ* 449-455.

²⁶⁴ Cf pp 95-104

by God Himself and, therefore, cannot be contradictory. Since the conclusion drawn from a correct argumentation cannot be interpreted, whereas words can be interpreted because they can have various meanings, it is evident that it is the text in the Qur'ân that needs an interpretation.²⁶⁵

When 'Abd al-Jabbâr has proved that the Qur'ân is a trustworthy source of knowledge, he can use it to confirm his theses, which he showed to be correct by a rational argumentation based on the data of human intuition, and he can discover the supplementary knowledge God gives us by His revelation, a knowledge that cannot be reached by reflection on human intuition alone.

In the same way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr can also make use of the two other sources of revealed knowledge, the "*Sunna*" and the "*Ijmâ*", which both are guaranteed by the Qur'ân, and can be used in the argumentations just as the Qur'ân itself can be used.²⁶⁶

²⁶⁵ See *Muhit* I, 199 Cf also p. 102.

²⁶⁶ Cf pp 102-104

THE QUR'ÂN AND GOD'S OTHER SPEECH

The title of this chapter is derived from the texts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's *Muġnî* and his *Muĥîṭ*, where the discussions on God being speaking and on His speech are introduced in this way.¹ The fact that the sections concerned bear this title already indicates that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the Qur'ân really is God's speech and that, moreover, God has more speech than the Qur'ân alone. And though the discussions among Muslim theologians in this matter were centred upon the Qur'ân—probably the reason why it is mentioned here in the first place too—, 'Abd al-Jabbâr clearly puts this question about the essence of the Qur'ân in the broader context of a discussion of speech and the quality "speaking" in general, and God's speech and His quality "speaking" in particular.

Against the background of the survey of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's "philosophy" which we elaborated in the preceding chapter—in fact this is the background against which 'Abd al-Jabbâr places his treatise on God's speech and the Qur'ân—it must be possible to understand clearly and correctly the rather complex argumentations concerning speech and speaking, both in this and in the other world, as we find them in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works. After our study of the terminology he uses and of his views upon the world, man, and God, we elaborate one concrete topic from the many dealt with in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works in order to discover how he elaborates a concrete subject, how he sharpens his arguments, and attacks his opponents. The broader exposition of a single subject elucidates his methodical approach.

The subject of this chapter, God's speech, has not been chosen entirely at random; in fact, it was a central topic in the early theo-

¹ Cf. *Muġnî* VII, 3 and *Muĥîṭ* I, 316. There is not much literature available dealing expressly with this matter, besides the work of 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân (*Nazarîyat at-taklîf*), two articles should be mentioned here: J. Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr on the Qur'ân as the Created Word of Allâh*, an article which he wrote in *Verbum*, Utrecht 1964, 67-86 and which is concerned with the text of the *Muġnî*, the second article is G. Vajda, *La parole créée de Dieu d'après le théologien Karaïte Yûsuf al-Basîr*, *SI* 39 (1974), 59-76, Vajda compares the text of Yûsuf al-Basîr with the three texts composed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.

logical discussions, and it has its links with nearly all aspects of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's "philosophy".²

The subject being dealt with in each of the three theological works of 'Abd al-Jabbâr that are at our disposal at the moment, the *Šarḥ*, the *Muğni*, and the *Muḥit*, we discuss them all, though we base ourselves mainly upon the text of the *Muğni*, which is by far the most elaborate. It is hoped that in this way the characteristics of each of these three works become more manifest, and hopefully also the evolution in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological thinking will come to light.

In this chapter, we first discuss the three texts concerned; after this introduction, we follow 'Abd al-Jabbâr's line of argumentation in the *Muğni* (and in the *Muḥit*³): we treat the accident speech as we know it in this world and the quality speaking also as we know it in this world; then we follow 'Abd al-Jabbâr in drawing his conclusions about the quality speaking in the other world, when applied to God, and about the essence of God's speech. We conclude this chapter with some final questions 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds to his discussions on this subject.

A. THE TEXTS

Šarḥ al-uşûl al-ḳamsa.⁴ 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text on the Qur'ân and God's speech we find in *Šarḥ al-uşûl al-ḳamsa* seems to be the oldest among the three texts that are still at our disposal. 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself, at the end of the dictation of his voluminous work, the *Muğni*, makes a remark implying that he dictated the text of the *Šarḥ* during the time he also dictated the *Muğni*, a dictation which took some twenty years.⁵ Unhappily, from the text of the *Muğni* it does not become clear whether the *Šarḥ* was composed before or after the dictation of the seventh part of the *Muğni*, dealing with the same subject. When

² Speech being a perceptible accident and belonging to the genus sound, the discussions of it will be based on 'Abd al-Jabbâr's cosmology, while the discussion of the quality speaking has its connections with his anthropology. The whole discussion about God's speech and His being speaking is evidently based on his theodicy.

³ The outlines of the sections concerned in both the *Muğni* and the *Muḥit* correspond, while those of the *Šarḥ* are evidently different as we will show below.

⁴ Badawî (*Histoire*, 253-255) deals with the chapter concerned of the *Šarḥ*, his discussion is, however, very short and does not deal with the general structure of the text concerned, nor with its place in the whole of the *Šarḥ*.

⁵ Cf. *Muğni* XX 2, 258. Among the works mentioned there as written before or during the dictation of the *Muğni*, the *Muḥit* is not mentioned. The list, however, does not pretend to be complete.

we look, however, into the form and composition of both works, and when we study the argumentations given, it becomes obvious that the argumentation in the *Šarh* does not show the same rigid order and evidence we find in the *Mugnî* and the *Muhît*. The argumentations appear to be simpler and less elaborate. The reason for this relatively simple form of argumentation could be that this work is meant to be more "popular" and more "practical" than the two other works. It mentions, for example, at the end of many chapters in a concise form what everybody has to know about the subject treated.⁶ Therefore, we are permitted to state that the *Šarh*, be it written before or after the seventh part of the *Mugnî*, represents a simpler form of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, which will be elaborated in breadth and in depth in both the *Mugnî* and the *Muhît*. It is easy to see that the *Mugnî* and the *Muhît* show much more correspondance than the *Šarh* and either the *Mugnî* or the *Muhît*. Therefore, I mention here the *Šarh* in the first place before the two other theological works.

The text on the Qur'ân which is found in *Šarh* 527-563 comprises only one single chapter (*fasl*), this chapter bears the title "The Qur'ân and the mention of the disagreement about it"⁷. Thus, in this title only the Qur'ân is mentioned as the subject of the chapter.

This chapter found its place in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's treatise on God's Justice (*al-'adl*), the second one of the five Mu'tazilî principles treated in this work.⁸ 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions two reasons why he gave it this place. First, the Qur'ân is one of God's acts, as an act it could be good or evil according to the way it happens, because the discussion of God's Justice is concerned with His acts and the fact that they only occur in such a way that they are good, the Qur'ân has to be dealt with in this context to show how it must occur to be really good.⁹

⁶ See, for instance *Šarh* 155, 160, 166, and many other instances. See also *Šarh* 34, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr begins the text of the *Šarh* in such a way that it could confirm this aspect of the work.

⁷ *Šarh* 527. '*Fasl fî l-Qur'ân wa-dîkr al-ķilâf fih*' Badawî (*Histoire*, 253) gives his paragraph the heading "La création du Coran". This not only does not correspond with the Arabic heading of the chapter, but also does not cover its real contents as we shall see below.

⁸ God's Justice, the second from the five Mu'tazilî principles dealt with in the *Šarh*, is discussed on pp. 299-608.

⁹ Cf. *Šarh* 527. "the Qur'ân is one of God's acts which can (*yasihh*, the metaphysical possibility) occur in a way it is good and in another way it is evil, the chapter about the Justice is about His acts and what He can (*yajûz* it is permitted, the factual possibility) do and what he cannot". Acts are not good or evil in themselves, but because they occur in a certain way.

The second reason why 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the Qur'ân here, is said to be that it belongs to God's major favours and His favours are dealt with in the treatise on His Justice because we can know by it some moral rules and some moral judgements.¹⁰ By mentioning this second reason, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a connection between the Qur'ân as God's speech and the Qur'ân as a source of human knowledge. As a consequence, he treats both these aspects of the Qur'ân—which in the *Muğni* and the *Muḥîṭ* are treated separately—¹¹ together. Therefore, this chapter on the Qur'ân as God's speech is followed immediately by some chapters on the Qur'ân as a source of knowledge: why God reveals, how we can know that something is His revelation, how we can know that the Qur'ân we know is really His speech, and how we must explain the text of the Qur'ân.¹² All this together is dealt with at the end of the treatise on God's Justice; after the discussions of God's acts, what He does and what He does not do, these chapters on the Qur'ân conclude the treatise on God's Justice.

The internal structure of the chapter about the essence of the Qur'ân as God's speech—the chapter that we are interested in in the context of this study—at first sight is not very clear.¹³ However, this chapter of the *Šarḥ* can be divided into three sections: first, a short introduction containing also the opinions of the opponents and those of the Mu'tazila (pp. 527-528); second, follows his own argumentation (pp. 528-531); finally, the third and last section, and by far the longest one, is an elaborate refutation of the opinions of his opponents (pp. 531-563).

'Abd al-Jabbâr's own argumentation is very short; it takes two pages and a half. In comparison with the texts of the *Muğni* and the *Muḥîṭ* it is also rather simple: after a discussion of speech in general—what

¹⁰ See *Šarḥ* 527. So, besides dealing with the Qur'ân as God's speech (the first reason given), he also deals with the Qur'ân as a source of knowledge (the second reason).

¹¹ In the *Muğni* these topics are treated, respectively, in *Muğni* VII and in *Muğni* (XV and) XVI.

¹² *Šarḥ* 563-608.

¹³ In the printed text one finds written in the margin from time to time some important words taken from the text. These words suggest a division of the text into separate sections. In fact, they are rather confusing and they do not mark the real division of the text, nor the really important topics. The same holds true of the table of contents; the indications given there seem to be chosen sometimes completely at random. See, for instance, six topics mentioned as sections of this chapter on p. 826, which by no means indicate the real division. Especially the mention of *al-kalâm fi l-kalq wa-l-maklûq* is out of place.

it is, how to formulate a definition—he comes to speak about God's speech which He revealed to His prophet, and from the fact that it—as all God's acts— must be good, he draws his conclusions as to how this divine speech actually must be : the same kind of speech as we find in this world.¹⁴

As for his opponents, who receive most of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's attention in this chapter, he mentions in his introduction to this chapter two groups of them : first, the Ḥašwîya or anthropomorphists,¹⁵ who hold the opinion that the text of the Qur'ân, even the text that is recited and written down, is eternal and uncreated; second, the adherents of Ibn Kullâb and al-Aš'arî,¹⁶ who state that God is speaking by an eternal speech, an eternal qualifier inhering in His essence (*ma'nâ qadîm qâ'im bi-dâtih*),¹⁷ and that the recited and written texts of the Qur'ân are either a reproduction (*hikâya*; this is the opinion of the Kullâbiya) or an expression (*'ibâra*; this is the opinion of the Aš'arîya, a correction upon the doctrine of the Kullâbiya) of God's eternal speech. Thus, whereas the Ḥašwîya speak about an eternal Qur'ân, even in its material form, the Kullâbiya and Aš'arîya speak about an eternal Qur'ân inhering in God Himself, which is one and indivisible and of which the Qur'ân (and the Jewish and Christian scriptures) which God revealed and we hear and recite is a reproduction or an expression.

In his refutations—the third section of this chapter—'Abd al-Jabbâr first deals with the thesis that the revealed Qur'ân is eternal;¹⁸ next

¹⁴ Cf. *Šarh* 531. "God's speech cannot be without a meaning (*ġā'ida*). He also cannot address us by His message and then will nothing at all by it, or will something else than the outward meaning of the text without explaining this" In that case, God's speech would be useless (*'abaṭ*) and, consequently, evil (Cf. p. 90) 'Abd al-Jabbâr's conclusion is that God's speech therefore in order to be good must be "according to the definition we mentioned" of our human speech.

¹⁵ Cf. *Šarh* 527. 'Abd al-Jabbâr calls these opponents "*al-Ḥašwîya an-Nawâbit min al-Ḥanâbila*". Cf. pp. 22-23.

¹⁶ Al-Aš'arî is mentioned here to follow the same doctrine as Ibn Kullâb and his followers did, he only changed the expression "reproduction" to indicate the relation between God's eternal speech and the Qur'ân in "expression" because, according to him (and to 'Abd al-Jabbâr), the use of the term "reproduction" (*hikâya*) implies that both God's speech and the Qur'ân are either eternal or created, both being necessarily of the same genus. 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that the same holds true when one uses the term "expression" (*'ibâra*) instead of "reproduction" Cf. *Šarh* 528.

¹⁷ Badawi, *Histoire*, 254, renders this expression by "une idée existante par soi". Evidently, the expression *bi-dâtih* must indicate the essence of God, not that of speech. In *Histoire*, 253, Badawi renders "une idée existante en Dieu", here only the translation of *ma'nâ* by "idée" can be questioned.

¹⁸ Cf. *Šarh* 531-532. This is introduced by the words "Concerning the refutation of the first group, who say that the Qur'ân is eternal together with God . ." (*Šarh* 531).

he deals with the thesis that God is speaking by an eternal qualifier inhering in His essence, in which context he also argues that the quality speaking only indicates that the qualified subject made speech (*mutakallim* means *fa'il kalâm*).¹⁹ Then he discusses the arguments brought into the field by the adherents of the thesis that the revealed Qur'ân is eternal,²⁰ and in this context he also shows that the Qur'ân can be said to be created (*maklûq*). Then he turns again to the other group of opponents, to prove that God's speech (even when taken as an eternal qualifier) cannot really be eternal, and here he deals briefly with the concepts of reproduction and expression, used by respectively the Kullâbiya and the Aš'ariya in their description of the Qur'ân.²¹ 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions next a thesis he did not mention before, implying that God is speaking "by His essence", per se and essentially; this doctrine is ascribed to Muhammad bn 'Îsâ al-Burgûṭi.²² Finally 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with some arguments used by the Aš'ariya to prove their thesis that God's speech is an eternal qualifier inhering in His essence.²³

Thus we can render the structure of this chapter in the following schematic way (the numbers indicate the pages in the printed text):

I. INTRODUCTION	527-528
opinion of the Ḥašwîya (the revealed Qur'ân is eternal)	527
opinion of the Kullâbiya and Aš'ariya (God's speech is eternal and inheres in His essence)	527-528
opinion of the Mu'tazila	528

¹⁹ This text is introduced by the statement "Concerning the refutation of him who says that God's speech is a qualifier inhering in His essence, " Here the eternity of this qualifier is not directly at stake, its eternity will be dealt with below, the argumentation is concerned with its inhering in God's essence and the reason why someone is qualified as speaking either by the inhering of a qualifier or because he made it (Cf *Šarh* 532-542)

²⁰ Cf *Šarh* 542 "He who disagrees on the eternity of the Qur'ân has (advanced some) sophisms " The statement that the Qur'ân is said to be created—a general Mu'tazili doctrine—is discussed in *Šarh* 545-549

²¹ Cf *Šarh* 549 "And after all this we return to the indications which indicate that God's speech cannot (*lâ yajûz* a factual impossibility) be eternal"

²² According to Watt (*Formative Period*, 203), he was a pupil of an-Najjâr, an early theologian, who did not belong to the Mu'tazila; he died in 854 or 855 AD Cf also *Šarh* 551-552

²³ These arguments are concerned with the whole theory of the Aš'ariya about God's speech, its eternity and its inhering in God's essence "Maybe these Aš'ariya who established God's speech as an eternal qualifier inhering in His essence say " (*Šarh* 558)

II. ARGUMENTATION	528-531
speech	528-530
God's speech	530-531
III. REFUTATIONS	531-563
The revealed Qur'ân is not eternal (against the Ḥašwiya)	531-532
God's speech does not inhere in Him (against the Kullâbiya and Aš'ariya) but speaking means: making speech	532-542
Arguments of the Ḥašwiya refuted (Qur'ân is created)	542-549
God's speech is not eternal (against Kullâbiya and Aš'ariya)	549-551
God is not essentially speaking (against al-Burgûṭ)	551-558
Arguments of the Aš'ariya refuted	558-563

Al-Muḡni fī abwâb at-tawḥīd wa-l-'adl.²⁴ We already saw that the text about the Qur'ân we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's *Muḡni* is not evidently of a later date than the text written down in his *Šarḥ*, this last work being dictated during the time the *Muḡni* was composed.²⁵ But whereas the *Šarḥ* seems to be rather popular and shows the character of a handbook, the *Muḡni* is clearly intended to be a real "*summa theologica*", in which all problems are dealt with and the opinions of all possible opponents broadly discussed and refuted. The text, consequently, is much more elaborate than the text of the *Šarḥ*. Most probably, however, the *Muḥiṭ* has been composed after the *Muḡni*; not only is the *Muḥiṭ* not mentioned when 'Abd al-Jabbâr at the end of his dictation of the *Muḡni* mentions the works he wrote during his dictation of this *summa* and some works he wrote before,²⁶ but, notwithstanding the great resemblance between the *Muḡni* and the *Muḥiṭ* in their treatment of most questions, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's way of thinking appears to have ripened meanwhile, and have become more philosophical; the author seems to rectify some statements and opinions

²⁴ Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, deals with the part of the *Muḡni* concerning God's speech and the Qur'ân (the seventh part). He is mainly interested in the chapters where 'Abd al-Jabbâr attacks the opponents, especially the Aš'ariya, and tries to refute their arguments.

²⁵ Cf. our p. 279 and *Muḡni* XX 2, 258.

²⁶ Cf. *Muḡni* XX 2, 258, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the works he wrote during the time he dictated the *Muḡni* as an excuse why this dictation lasted for some twenty years. He would not have forgotten so voluminous a work as the *Muḥiṭ* actually is.

propagated in the *Muḡnī*, but without mentioning that book, as far as I have been able to verify.²⁷

The text is found in the seventh part of the *Muḡnī*, which it entirely fills. It covers 222 pages and is divided into 23 chapters. The manuscript bears the title "About the Qur'ân and God's other speech" (*Al-kalâm fî l-Qur'ân wa-sâ'ir kalâm Allâh subhânah wa-ta'âlâ*).²⁸ Whereas the title of this text in the *Šarḥ* is restricted to the mention of the Qur'ân, here God's speech in general is explicitly mentioned too.

As in the *Šarḥ*, here also God's speech and the Qur'ân are treated in the broader context of God's Justice. Having dealt with acts in general and with the judgements about their value, especially the judgements good and evil, and having proved that God will do no evil acts and surely will do what is obligatory,²⁹ 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses some acts to prove that they are either really God's acts or human acts, to treat afterwards the value of these acts and the characteristics related to these values. All this is announced by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the beginning of his treatise on Gods Justice (His 'adl).³⁰ The first act he deals with is God's will, which he proves to be God's good act, and the consequences of which being good he discusses. Next he turns to God's speech to prove that His speech too is His good act, and to discuss its consequences. Having discussed these two divine acts, he comes to speak about human acts, proving that they are really human and not in any way God's acts. In this context he does not discuss the Qur'ân as a source of knowledge: "we postpone the discussion of the inimitability (*i'jâz*) of the Qur'ân, the related question of the aspect (*wajh*) of its inimitability, the cessation of the attacks of those who attack it, and the mention of its judgements till the chapter on the prophecies, God willing."³¹

The internal structure of this seventh part of the *Muḡnī* is not

²⁷ Cf 'Abd al-Karim 'Uṣmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 69 See, for instance, the way 'Abd al-Jabbâr describes the relation between the acting subject and his act, and the way we can know that a given act is actually the act of a certain subject Cf. note 249 on p 207

²⁸ For more details about the manuscript of this part of the *Muḡnī*, about its edition and the title given to the printed text of this part in comparison with the title mentioned in the manuscript pp 35-38

²⁹ All this is treated in *Muḡnī* VI 1, in *Muḡnī* VI:2 the divine will is discussed and in *Muḡnī* VII God's speech

³⁰ Cf *Muḡnī* VI 1, 3-4 "It is not possible to declare that He refrains from many acts, unless we explained before that they are acts This supposes that we explain that speech is His act and does not belong to the qualities of His essence" (*Muḡnī* VI 1, 4)

³¹ Cf *Muḡnī* VII, 5, read *nu'aḳḳir* (we postpone") instead of *nūṭir* ("we summarize")

self-evident, although 'Abd al-Jabbâr divided it into chapters, bearing titles that indicate the subject dealt with in the chapter concerned, and, moreover, in his introductory chapter described the contents of this part of his *Muġnî*.³² Its structure is obscured by the many argumentations directed against the opponents and the addition of entire chapters to refute their doctrine.³³ In consequence, the opinions of the opponents to be refuted determine for a great deal the structure of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text.

Nevertheless, it becomes clear that this seventh part of the *Muġnî* is divided into three major parts. After an introduction, it first deals with speech and the quality speaking as we know them in this world; the second part deals with God's speech and His quality speaking, and the last part draws the consequences from the general statement that His acts are necessarily good, and that, consequently, His speech, too, must be good.³⁴

In his section on speech and the quality speaking in this world, 'Abd al-Jabbâr opens with a definition of speech. Then he refutes the

³² Cf. *Muġnî* VII, 5. "There is no way by which we can say something about God's speech and its qualifications, unless we explained first the definition of speech in this world (chapter 2), that it belongs to the genus sound (chapter 4), that man is able to (do) it (chapter 5), that it is a perceptible accident that does not remain (chapters 3 and 5), that it belongs to what characterizes a substrate (chapter 6) and does not entail a state for the composite whole (sc. the living being, chapter 8), and that who is qualified by it is only qualified (such) because he made and produced it (chapter 9)

Afterwards we explain that He is speaking (chapters 10 and 11): that He is not per se speaking (chapter 12), nor by eternal speech (chapter 15), that He is speaking by temporal speech, and that the way to establish that He is speaking is to establish His speech as coming into existence from His side

We explain the way in which His speech can (*yashihh*, the metaphysical possibility) exist (one can translate also be found, this reading corresponds with the actual division of the book into chapters, but besides the fact that it would be a very unusual use of this term inside 'Abd al-Jabbâr's philosophical vocabulary, the use of the verb *yashihh* and the connection with the following sentence seem to indicate that we, nevertheless, have to understand this term as "exist"), and the way in which it is good and evil (chapter 19), and that (read *wa-innah* instead of *fa-innah*) He only can make us know what He wills by His speech (chapter 20), and we shall explain how we can know what He wills by His speech (chapter 20) Afterwards we give the treatise on the reproduction and the reproduced and some questions dependent upon this one (chapter 21) We explain the falseness of their mad assertion that God's speech is not God and not something other than He, and other opinions of our opponents (chapters 16-17)" It is very remarkable that in this list even the mention of the createdness of the Qur'ân is missing

³³ The following chapters seem to be added only for the sake of refuting the theses of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents. chapters 3, 5, 16, 17, 22

³⁴ Cf. also Bouman, *The doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 72, who makes a similar division of the text

thesis that speech is a qualifier in the heart or in the soul.³⁵ Speech belongs to the genus of the accident sound (*ṣawt*), and, consequently, cannot be a substance. Having thus defined and described speech as it occurs in this world, he comes to speak about the quality speaking. We already saw that some accidents need a substrate to inhere in, whereas others need a substrate that has a special structure or a living being; we also saw that some accidents give a qualification to the substrate in which they inhere, while others give it to the subject that is in a certain state because of this accident, and others yet give it to the subject who made it.³⁶ Here 'Abd al-Jabbâr first proves that speech needs and characterizes a substrate, that it can exist in any substrate, and does not entail a state for a living being, but that the subject who is qualified by it as speaking actually is the subject who made it. Therefore speaking means : making speech.

In his second section, 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows that God is able to make speech as we know it in this world, and that He actually made such speech, and therefore can be qualified as speaking. There follows a long and elaborate *taqṣīm* and the refutation of the various theses of his opponents.

In the third section, 'Abd al-Jabbâr first discusses the way in which we can know God's speech; then he explains how God's speech can be good, namely, by communicating a certain meaning and by communicating what God wills; therefore, he adds a chapter to discuss the question of how we can know what God wills by His speech. The treatment of the subject is now complete, but 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds two long chapters, one about the relationship between reproduction and reproduced,³⁷ and the other about the term "created" (*maḳlûq*).³⁸ This part of the *Muḡnī* is actually concluded by a very short final chapter, functioning as a kind of general conclusion, adding only that God must create angels, human beings, or demons who can

³⁵ Both terms occur in this chapter a qualifier in the soul (*fī n-nafs*) and a qualifier in the heart (*fī l-qalb*), respectively in *Muḡnī* VII, 14 and 15. Compare this with what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says about the so-called "acts of the heart" (*aḳ'âl al-qulûb*) Cf pp 127 and 128

³⁶ Cf p 154

³⁷ According to the *Kullâbiya*, the Qur'ân is a reproduction of God's eternal speech. To refute that thesis 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the relation between the reproduction and what is reproduced.

³⁸ For 'Abd al-Jabbâr this is not a new question in the course of his argumentations, it is not a matter of *ma'nâ* (the reality behind the words), but only a matter of giving names (*ism*) Cf *Muḡnī* VII, 208

hear God's speech, before He speaks, for speaking before the creation of living beings that can hear His speech and for whom it can be useful, would be useless and, consequently, evil.

Against this background the structure of this part of the *Muğni* can be schematically shown as follows :

I. INTRODUCTION	ch.1
opinions of the opponents and the Mu'tazila	ch. 1
II. SPEECH AND THE QUALITY SPEAKING IN THIS WORLD	ch. 2-9
definition of speech	ch. 2
(refutation) it is not a qualifier in the soul	ch. 3
it is sound	ch. 4
(refutation) it is not a substance	ch. 5
it needs and characterizes a substrate	ch. 6
it can exist on any substrate	ch. 7
it does not entail a state for a living being	ch. 8
the qualification "speaking" is factual (making speech)	ch. 9
III. SPEECH AND THE QUALITY SPEAKING IN THE OTHER WORLD	ch.10-17
God can produce this kind of speech	ch. 10
God made this kind of speech and, consequently, is speaking	ch. 11
God is not speaking per se	ch. 12
God is not speaking "neither per se nor by a cause"	ch. 13
God is not speaking by eternal speech	ch. 14
God is not eternally speaking by speech that is different from human speech	ch. 15
(refutation) one cannot say that God's speech cannot be qualified, or that it is not other than God	ch. 16
(refutation) discussion of the arguments the opponents bring into the field to prove that God is speaking by eternal speech	ch. 17
IV. GOD'S SPEECH IS GOOD	ch. 18-23
the way we know God's speech	ch. 18
consequences of God's speech being good	ch. 19
how we can know what God wills by His speech	ch. 20
(appendix) about reproduction (<i>hikâya</i>)	ch. 21

- (appendix) God's speech and the Qur'ân are rightly called created (*maḳlûq*) ch 22
- (conclusion) the Qur'ân is created by God for the benefit of His servants, consequently, it is created after the creation of at least one of these servants ch 23

Al-Majmû' fi l-muḥit bi-t-taklif. The text concerning the essence of the Qur'ân and God's speech in general we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's *Muḥit*, is probably the latest among the three texts which 'Abd al-Jabbâr dictated on this subject and which are still at our disposal³⁹ The *Muḥit* as a whole is considerably shorter than the *Mugnî*, one of the main reasons is that it gives less attention to disputes with and refutations of the opponents. The argumentation in the *Muḥit* appears to be not only more philosophical,⁴⁰ but also more "quiet", more logical and clearly structured, and mainly centred upon 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own opinions and those of other Mu'tazilî theologians⁴¹

The text of the *Muḥit* we are interested in is to be found in *Muḥit* I, 316-355, it consists of one entire section (introduced by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by the expression "*al-kalâm fî*"), which is divided into ten chapters (*abwâb*). The section bears a title which is nearly identical with that of the seventh part of the *Mugnî*: "*Al-kalâm fî l-Qur'ân wa-sâ'ir kalâm Allâh ta'âlâ*"⁴²

As he did in the *Šarḥ* and in the *Mugnî*, 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses God's speech in his treatise on God's Justice. The context and the place this section has in the treatise on God's Justice is exactly the same as what we found in the *Mugnî*; having dealt with acts in general and with the judgements on their value, 'Abd al-Jabbâr goes on to prove that first God's will, and second God's speech are really God's (good) acts, to continue afterwards with a demonstration that human acts are really human and not made in any way by God⁴³

³⁹ Cf. above in our discussions of the *Mugnî* (pp. 284-285)

⁴⁰ When comparing, for instance, the definitions given of "speech" in the *Mugnî* and the *Muḥit* and the way this matter is dealt with, one surely gets the impression that the text of the *Muḥit* is more "philosophical", less "physical", and that the use of terminology is more careful.

⁴¹ Cf. also Houben in his introduction to the edition of the *Muḥit* *Muḥit* I, 8 (of the French part) which corresponds to page *d* of the Arabic part.

⁴² Cf. *Muḥit* I, 316. The references given are— if not especially marked— to the Lebanese edition, edited by J. J. A. M. Houben. In the Egyptian edition, edited by 'Umar 'Azmi, this text is found in *Muḥit* I, 306-339.

⁴³ Cf. *Muḥit* I, 316. "Know that the reason why this chapter is joined to the chapter about the will is that speech, in our opinion, belongs to the totality of His acts, just as

The internal structure of this passage in the *Muḥit* is more logical and consistent than the structures of the passages concerned in the *Šarḥ* and the *Muḡnī*. One can easily divide the text into some major parts. This division runs parallel with the one we discovered in the text of the *Muḡnī*: first, 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with speech and the quality speaking in this world; in the second part, he discusses God's speech and His quality speaking, and in the third part, he draws his conclusions about God's speech, conclusions based on the fact that God's acts must be good.

We are not confronted in the beginning of the text with a description of the opinions of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents, nor with a description of his own doctrine; the text starts almost directly with the definition of speech in this world (chapter 1; here also some definitions of other theologians are discussed). Then he comes to the quality "speaking" and explains that it indicates that the qualified subject made speech, not that it is in a certain state, not that it is a substrate of speech, and not something else yet (chapter 2). He concludes this first part by discussing some judgements speech is entitled to, as, for instance, that it is sound, does not remain, that it is perceived in a certain way, that it is an indication under certain conditions, and that it exists in a certain way (chapter 3).

In his second part, 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows that God not only is able to make speech we know in this world, but that He actually did make it and, consequently, is speaking (chapter 4). In this context, he refutes the theses that God is per se speaking, that He is speaking by eternal speech (chapter 5), or that He is speaking "neither per se nor because of a cause" (chapter 6).

When 'Abd al-Jabbâr has established that God is speaking because He made speech, he can now conclude that this speech is necessarily good because all God's acts must be good. From this conclusion he derives some judgements about God's speech (chapter 7).

In a kind of appendix,⁴⁴ he deals with the reproduction and the

the will" Cf also *Muḥit* I, 227-228, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr at the beginning of his treatise on God's Justice states that four questions must be dealt with in this treatise: first the acts, second the judgements on the acts, third the way in which God is served, and fourth what is ascribed to God and what is not. About the first question 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "Sometimes there is some disagreement about it because we establish something to be an act whereas they (the opponents) deny it, such as will and speech for they say that He is essentially willing and essentially speaking" (*Muḥit* I, 227)

⁴⁴ We incorporated these appendices (that they really are appendices for 'Abd al-Jabbâr becomes clear at the beginning of the chapters 8 and 9 *Muḥit* I, 341 and

reproduced, with the name "creation" (*kalq*) as applicable to God's speech and the Qur'ân (respectively chapters 8 and 9), and, finally, with the arguments (*šubah* : "sophisms") of his opponents (chapter 10).

Schematically we summarize this as follows :

I. SPEECH AND THE QUALITY SPEAKING IN THIS WORLD	ch. 1-3
definition of speech	ch. 1
the quality speaking is factual	ch. 2
some judgements about speech	ch. 3
II. SPEECH AND THE QUALITY SPEAKING IN THE OTHER WORLD	ch. 4-6
God is able to make the speech we know in this world and He actually made it (and is speaking)	ch. 4
God is not per se speaking, nor by eternal speech	ch. 5
God is not speaking "neither per se nor by a cause"	ch. 6
III. GOD'S SPEECH IS GOOD	ch. 7-10
some judgements about God's speech as good	ch. 7
(appendix) reproduction and reproduced	ch. 8
(appendix) the term " <i>kalq</i> " (creation)	ch. 9
(refutation) arguments of the opponents refuted	ch. 10

Conclusions :

In any one of the three texts discussed, the Qur'ân as being God's speech is treated in the same broader context : in the treatise on God's Justice (His *'adl*). The reason is that God's speech is His act, and that He is qualified as speaking because He made speech.

The link between the Qur'ân as God's speech and as a source of revealed knowledge, which is emphasized in the *Šarḥ* by treating both subjects together, receives less attention in the other two works, where both subjects are discussed separately. That can be the reason why in the title of this section in the *Šarḥ* only the Qur'ân is mentioned, whereas the other two works mention the Qur'ân in the context of God's speech.

The three texts have in their argumentation the same basic structure : a discussion of speech and speaking in this world, a discussion of God's

345) in the third part, though they are not directly related to this part. In the text of the *Muğni* they are incorporated in the last part by way of the final concluding chapter.

speech and His being speaking, and, finally, some conclusions drawn from His speech being good.

The *Muġni* and the *Muĥiġ* resemble each other in their structure of the discussion. It is quite acceptable to follow this structure in our own discussions.

The text of the *Muġni* being the most elaborate, especially because of the ample disputes with the opponents, we can make it the basis of our discussion. But, since the *Muĥiġ* seems to make some corrections upon the statements and opinions adhered to in the *Muġni*, we surely have to take that text into account. The text of the *Šarĥ* is, in this context, of considerably less importance, and has to be used mainly for the sake of comparison.

B. SPEECH IN THIS WORLD

If we want to follow 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his discussion of God's speech, we have to start with a discussion of the essence of speech in this world, especially human speech.¹ Only after acquiring real knowledge of this speech, can we try to make the jump towards the other world, and from indications found in this world deduce something about God and His speech. According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr and most of the Mu'tazila, God's speech belongs to the same genus as human speech;² we deal with his argumentations therefore in the course of this chapter.

In this paragraph on speech as we know it in this world and as we produce it in this world,³ we deal, subsequently, with four definitions of speech we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works—four definitions he adheres to—with the further description of speech, next to the formal definitions, and, finally, with the opinions of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents which are discussed and refuted

In this paragraph one could deal also with the kind of substrate which speech requires to inhere in, with the question whether speech entails a state for someone and other related questions. However, we postpone the discussion of these questions till the next paragraph about the quality speaking because of the relation they have with the questions treated in that paragraph.

1. THE DEFINITION OF SPEECH

Kalâm: speech.⁴ Besides the various ways in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr

¹ According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, angels and demons too produce speech though we normally cannot hear this speech. The same holds true of God's speech when He talks to angles or demons. Cf., for instance, *Mugnî* VII, 16.

² Cf. *Mugnî* VII, 3. "The doctrine of our teachers is that God's speech is of the genus of speech intuitively known in this world. According to them, it is not possible to establish eternal speech different from our (human) speech." Cf. also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Ulmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 231.

³ God's speech, too, exists in this world because according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr God can only speak when talking to human beings, angels, or demons who can hear His speech. Just as God's other acts, for instance the bodies He created, belong to this world and not to the other one, so His speech too belongs to this world (*al-sâhid*), though our discussion on God's quality "speaking" and on the way He is speaking, are really discussions about the other world (*al-gâ'ib*).

⁴ The Arabic term *kalâm* is, in a special technical sense, also used to indicate Islamic

describes speech, and which are sometimes called its "reality" (*ḥaqīqa*),⁵ and besides a number of definitions he rejects, one finds in his three theological works that survived four different definitions of speech which explicitly are thus called, and which can be said to be corresponding in their great outlines and to be different only in some details. I mention these four definitions and compare their contents.⁶

In the *Šarḥ* we find two definitions :

1. "*mâ ntaẓâm min ḥarfayn fa-šâ'idan*": what is arranged from two or more letters;
2. "*mâ lah niẓâm min al-ḥurûf maḳṣûs*": what has a special arrangement of the letters.⁷

The third definition is found in the *Muġnî* :

3. "*mâ ḥaṣal fiḥ niẓâm maḳṣûs min hâdih al-ḥurûf al-ma'qûla, ḥaṣal fi ḥarfayn aw ḥurûf*": in what a special arrangement of these intuitively known letters occurs; be it occurring in two letters or (more) letters.⁸

The fourth and last definition is taken from the *Muḥit* :

4. "*mâ yaḥṣul min al-ḥurûf al-ma'qûla lah niẓâm maḳṣûs*": what occurs from the intuitively known letters and has a special arrangement.⁹

In these four definitions, which were all at a certain moment for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the accepted definition, we distinguish four elements : first, the letters, the number of which in the first and third definition is explicitly said to be two or more; second, the arrangement; third, the mention of something being intuitively known (*ma'qûl*); fourth, the mention that speech occurs or results (*ḥaṣal*). From these four elements the first two are mentioned in all four definitions, the third element is mentioned in the last two definitions and possibly alluded

theology Cf pp 3-4. In the present context we use this term in its non-technical sense of "speech"

⁵ Cf. *Šarḥ* 528 and *Muġnî* VII, 6 For the meaning of the term *ḥaqīqa*, see pp 78-79

⁶ Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 72-73, mentions as a definition "that speech is a particular order of intelligible letters" and gives as a reference *Muġnî* VII, 6 This rendering of the definition is not quite correct because it is not the "order" which is speech, but the letters which are put in this order. Cf also 'Abd al-Karim 'Utmân, *Naẓarîvat at-taklîf*, 231-233 On p 232 the author mentions three out of the four definitions we shall give, the definition from the *Muġnî* is missing. The references given in the notes are not accurate

⁷ Cf. *Šarḥ* 528

⁸ Cf *Muġnî* VII, 6.

⁹ Cf *Muḥit* I, 316

to in the second one, while the fourth element is only mentioned in the last two definitions. Subsequently, we now discuss these four elements of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's definition of speech.¹⁰

Ḥarf (plural : *ḥurûf*) : letter. According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, letters are intuitively known (*ma'qûl*) and, consequently, known by necessary knowledge, a knowledge every sane person must have and nobody can banish from his soul;¹¹ therefore, it will be superfluous to try to give a definition of what a letter is; most probably, this even is not possible, since no expression is possibly more clear and more revealing than the simple term "letter" (*ḥarf*).

When 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers in this way to knowledge every sane person has, we have to look for the meaning this word had for the Arabic-speaking people in his days; then we discover in the works of the Arab philologists and grammarians¹² a use of this term which is different from its use in a description of our modern European languages. For them a letter (*ḥarf*) is what we call a consonant; the Arabic alphabet knows twenty-eight of these letters. The Arab philologists do not know vowels which are—just as is the case in European languages—separate letters besides the consonants. What we call vowel is explained by them in the following way : a letter can occur in two basically different ways, either moving (*mutaḥarrik*) or immobile (*sâkin*). A moving letter is what we call the sequence of a consonant and a short vowel, an immobile letter is only a consonant.¹³ This analysis of the Arabic language by the philologists and its division into separate letters coincides entirely with the Arabic writing system : only the letters, the consonants, are written; for clarity's sake one may, if one wants to do so, add above and beneath the letters some signs indicating their being immobile or moving in a certain way.¹⁴

¹⁰ If the order of the three theological works really is as we mentioned before, we can say that all four elements are present in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's two latest definitions, and that we can take these four elements as representative of his ripened way of thinking about the reality of speech.

¹¹ That the letters are *ma'qûl*, is mentioned explicitly in the third and fourth definitions of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. For the meaning of *ma'qûl* pp 82-84

¹² Many Mu'tazilî theologians were also versed in matters of philology, and this part of the *Mugnî* is, as will become clear, strongly influenced by philological arguments and considerations. 'Abd al-Jabbâr has a great confidence in the structures of the Arabic language and of its writing system. Just as he has great confidence in the Arabic language corresponding with reality, he also considers the written text to be corresponding to the spoken speech.

¹³ See, for instance, Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, I, 8 and 13

¹⁴ A letter can be "moving" in three different ways, indicating the three different "vowels" that can be added

This writing system, most probably derived from the way Arabs saw their own language, in its turn again influences the doctrine of the essence of speech, both that of 'Abd al-Jabbâr and that of many other scholars, philologists and theologians.

According to the philologists, letters result from the influence our articulatory organs exert on the sound that is in the breath, comes from the breast, and is going out through the throat and the mouth.¹⁵ It is clear that the Arab philologists consider the letters to be a form of sound and 'Abd al-Jabbâr is in agreement with them: for him letters are only a special way in which sound comes into existence. This comes to the light when he describes the relation between letters and sound.¹⁶ "The way in which the genus sound comes into existence varies: it may be a fluent¹⁷ and non-articulated sound; it may be articulated in one genus; it may be articulated¹⁸ so that it is sometimes connected and sometimes separated; it may come into existence so that it is a letter or (more) letters, and it may come into existence so that it is not qualified (described) in this way, for instance, the creaking of a door, although it belongs to the genus of one of the letters. Letters are only discovered because the sound (in that case) comes into existence in a special structure (*hinya*) and in special orifices, such as, for instance, the structure of the mouth."

¹⁵ One of the greatest European scholars in the field of classical Arabic philology is, without any doubt, Henri Fleisch. For a description of the ideas of the older Arab philologists on letters, see, among the many works Fleisch wrote in this field, especially his *Traité de Philologie Arabe*, from which work so far only the first volume appeared "Ibn Ğinni, par son *Sirr sinâ'at al-'i'râb*, précité, nous permet de présenter les notions de phonétique générale suivante (d'après la conception arabe) Les unités phonétiques, au sens propre, ne sont que d'une seule classe les *hurûf*. L'alphabet arabe ne contient que des *hurûf* (sing *harf*). Le *harf* est le produit d'un *maqta'* (lieu de coupure), sur le *sawt* (résonance émise de la poitrine), véhiculé continuellement par le *nafas* (souffle) en ascension dans la gorge, puis dans la bouche. Il y a *harf*, partout où les organes articulaires opposent ce *maqta'* au *sawt* en mouvement. Ce qui constitue proprement le *harf* est un son particulier (*ġars*), conséquence de l'appuiement des organes en ce lieu du *maqta'*. *ġars* différents suivant les différents *maqâti'*, pour chaque *maqta'* un *ġars*, un *harf*" (Fleisch, *Traité*, 204). Cf. also Fleisch, *Ibn Ğinni*, 102.

¹⁶ For the following quotation translated from the Arabic text of *Mugni* VII, 6-7, see also pp. 138-139.

¹⁷ Read here *muqayyad* (linked together) instead of *mufid* (communicative, having a meaning). Cf. note 160 on page 138. The meaning of this word must be "non-articulated" as appears from the context. One might also think of the root *qyd*, meaning "to flow", but in that case one has to change the text of the manuscript. This word is the opposite of the word *muqatta'* in its literal sense (respectively "linked" and "cut"). My translation is rather *ad sensum*.

¹⁸ I suggest to delete the words *fî jins*. Cf. note 161 on p. 139.

From this long quotation we conclude that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr letters are sound that occurs in a special way, and that sound only is called speech— but this is a matter of names —when it occurs in the human articulatory organism.¹⁹

This identification of letters and sounds was not self-evident, even not among Mu'tazila. One of the two Mu'tazilî scholars 'Abd al-Jabbâr often refers to as his "two teachers", Abû 'Alî, advocated the opinion that speech is letters, but that letters are something else than sounds. Speech may occur together with sounds and then be audible speech, but it may also occur as written or memorized (*maḥfûz*), in which case no sounds exist together with it; in the three cases speech is letters.²⁰ 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects this thesis, as we shall see when discussing the further description of speech.

When speech consists of letters, one may ask how many letters are in fact required to constitute speech.

One letter, be it moving or immobile (consisting of a consonant and a vowel or of a consonant alone), cannot in any case be speech. Some particles—adverbs, prepositions, or conjunctions—²¹ consist of one letter, but in the Arabic writing system they are joined to the word immediately following and written as one word. Therefore, they are not considered to be separate words or speech. There are, however, in Arabic a few words that only have one letter; these words are imperative forms of double weak verbs. 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the words "i" and "qi".²² Various arguments are given to prove that these forms are not really speech. When the forms are used absolutely without being linked with something following, they are written respec-

¹⁹ What 'Abd al-Jabbâr described is the normal use of this word in everyday language. In his philosophical discussion, he deals in detail with the question whether speech and letters can exist in every substrate or only in specially structured substrates.

²⁰ Cf. for instance, *Muḡni* VII, 7. See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Naẓariyat at-taklif*, 231.

In the text of *Muḡni* VII, 7 the author or a copyist made a mistake, in line 19 we have to read *li-ann al-kalâm huw al-hurûf 'indah*, "because according to him (sc Abû 'Alî) speech is the letters" (and not ' the sound, *as-sawt*, as the manuscript reads). Evidently, we have to read in the same line 19 *yaqûl* ("he, sc Abû 'Alî, says") instead of *naqûl* ("we say").

²¹ Cf. Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, I, 279 (prepositions), 282-283 (adverbs), and 290-291 (conjunctions).

²² Cf. Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, I, 93-94, where he mentions more double weak verbs the imperative forms of which consist of one letter, to which a *h* may be added when they are used in the *waqf* or pause position. The two examples 'i and qi are mentioned in all three texts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr.

tively “*ih*” and “*qih*”, and thus consist of two letters. When they are used without the “*h*” they are only speech because this “*h*” is implied. Another argument, based also on the Arabic grammar, says: every word in Arabic must begin with a “moving” letter and, if it is absolutely used or at the end of a coherent composite of speech, it must end with an “immobile” letter. This proves that speech must consist of at least two letters. A third argument is an argumentum ad hominem; his opponents hold that speech must always communicate something, must have a meaning (it must be “*mufîd*”), and they will have to admit that the forms “*i*” and “*qi*” cannot be said to communicate something and have a meaning.²³

But, though speech cannot consist of one letter, it can consist of two, even of twice the same letter.²⁴ The number of meaningful forms in Arabic that consist of two letters is very large and need not be dealt with here. This is the reason why ‘Abd al-Jabbâr mentioned in his first and third definitions that speech in fact can be two letters or more; this must be mentioned explicitly since the Arabic plural form indicates a totality of three or more, while the dual form indicates a totality of two. Apparently, in ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s second and fourth definitions, speech consisting of two letters is excluded; this is, however, not the case since in those definitions it is emphasized that speech is something in which occurs a special arrangement of letters, the word arrangement being used for a combination of two or more. In these formulae not the word “letters” but the mentioning of the arrangement determines the number of letters needed. This implies that in the third definition the addition “be it occurring in two letters or (more) letters” is superfluous.

An extra problem is presented by the fact that in the science of the Arabic grammar and its technical vocabulary the word *ḥarf* is also used to indicate a “particle”. Arab philologists divided speech into three parts (*aqsâm*): “*ism*” (nouns and pronouns), “*fi’l*” (verbs), and “*ḥarf jā’ li-ma’nâ*”.²⁵ The particle, to which belong adverbs,

²³ Cf. *Šarḥ* 529, *Muğni* VII, 9-10, and *Muḥit* I, 317. The division of the text of the *Muğni* into paragraphs is very confusing; the argument of the opponent is found in *Muğni* VII, 9 lines 9-18; ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s answer, introduced by *qil lahum*, is given in *Muğni* VII, 9 line 19 - 10, line 5. In *Muğni* VII, 9 line 13 we must read *qâl lakum* instead of *qâl lahum* as the manuscript reads.

²⁴ Cf. *Šarḥ* 530; Abû Hâšim seems to have excluded this last possibility in some places in his works. ‘Abd al-Jabbâr shows that it is possible.

²⁵ Cf. *Muğni* VII, 9 and *Muḥit* I, 317. The *Muḥit* reads “*wa-ḥarf ḥâ li-ma’nâ*”; this has to be corrected. In the orthography of the edition one must read *wa-ḥarf jā’*

prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections,²⁶ sometimes consists of one letter only.²⁷ It is however, not permitted to use this division, as 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents seem to do, as an argument showing that a single letter can be speech. For, 'Abd al-Jabbâr says, this is not what the philologists have in mind when giving this definition,²⁸ and—he adds in the *Muḥit*—this division does not mean that the parts by themselves are speech, but only that speech can be divided into these parts, and that the parts through composition with others can become speech; also a noun cannot be speech by itself, and in the same way a particle becomes speech only by composition with something else.²⁹ This is, however, not 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own argumentation and opinion; he only explains what the philologists mean.³⁰

Nizâm: arrangement. The second element, mentioned in all four definitions we recorded above, is the fact that the letters must be arranged or have an arrangement in order to constitute speech.³¹ This arrangement evidently cannot be an accident, as, for instance, the accident "composition" (*ta'lif*), which is an accident inhering in two substances together and causing them to be composed.³² But, since letters are sounds and, consequently, accidents,³³ and no accident can inhere in another accident, this arrangement cannot be an accident

li-ma'nâ For this rather cryptic expression *harf jā' li-ma'nâ*, cf especially the discussion of the different views propagated in H. Gätje, *Die Gliederung der sprachlichen Zeichen nach al-Fârâbî*, *Isl* 47 (1971), 1-24, especially 6-8. See also W. Diem, *Nomen, Substantiv und Adjektiv bei den arabischen Grammatikern*, *Oriens* 23-24 (1974), 312-332, especially 321-322.

²⁶ Cf Wright, *Arabic Grammar*, I, 278.

²⁷ Cf p. 297 and note 21 of this section.

²⁸ *Mugni* VII, 9. 'Abd al-Jabbâr draws the following conclusion: "Nobody can say they (sc. the philologists) call what is one letter—and not more letters—speech." This translation implies, however, that the words *hurūf* and *harf* (respectively in line 7 and line 8) have to change places. (The printed text corresponds with the manuscript.)

²⁹ Cf *Muḥit* I, 317. A verb by itself can be speech because it can have a meaning, so, for instance, an imperative. The same cannot be said about nouns and particles. This is the opinion of the philologists.

³⁰ According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, speech that has no meaning is nevertheless speech (cf *Mugni* VII, 10-11). But in the argumentation mentioned in the text he starts from the presuppositions of the philologists whose opinions he treats here.

³¹ The first definition uses the verb *ntazam*. The other three definitions mention the noun *nizâm*. The meaning of this *nizâm* is discussed in *Mugni* VII, 8, line 16 - 9, line 3. The division of the text into paragraphs has to be adjusted.

³² Cf pp. 132-134.

³³ This is explicitly dealt with in chapter 5 of *Mugni* VII, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that speech cannot be a substance, in chapter 4 he proves speech to be sounds, and since sounds are accidents, speech must be an accident too.

or qualifier. What is meant by this arrangement is that one letter comes into existence immediately after the other one, without interruption.³⁴ Therefore, no accident is needed.

Ma'qûl: intuitively known. By calling the letters in the third and fourth definitions *ma'qûl*, 'Abd al-Jabbâr emphasizes the phenomenal character of these definitions; he refers to something everybody knows through his own experience. The use of the article in the second definition has a similar function, and indicates that the letters concerned are known.

Ḥaṣal: to occur or to result. Probably, this verb is introduced in the third and fourth definitions to emphasize that speech does not remain, and also that speech is the result of the letters' being arranged; when letters are produced without interruption (and are thus arranged), speech results.

To prove that his definition is correct, 'Abd al-Jabbâr appeals to human experience, to what every sane person necessarily knows. Everybody knows what letters are and what is arrangement, and also that both the letters and their being arranged are necessary to constitute speech.³⁵

2. FURTHER DESCRIPTION OF SPEECH

When 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his introductory chapter to the seventh part of his *Muḡni* mentions a number of characteristics of speech as we meet it in this world, he starts with "that it belongs to the genus sound, and that it is possible (*maqḍûr*) for man; it is a perceptible accident that does not remain...".³⁶ Another aspect of speech that has to be dealt with, is its being communicative (*mufîd*): it has a meaning and can convey this meaning to someone else. A final

³⁴ Cf *Muḡni* VII, 8-9: a comparison is made with bodies which are so close to each other that they touch one another without there remaining any space between them. They can be called in that case "arranged" This is not the "mode of being" (*kawn*) "combination" (*yitma'*), because the latter indicates the place where the body is in space: the bodies concerned are "combined", but that is not what is expressed by the term *nizâm*.

³⁵ Cf *Muḡni* I, 316, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr says among other things. "For, if one of us speaks at this moment a letter and then stops before the second letter and produces this one after some time, what he makes is not reckoned to be speech" Cf. also *Muḡni* VII, 13

³⁶ *Muḡni* VII, 5.

question to be answered is where, on which substrates, speech in fact exists.³⁷ All these subjects will be treated in this section.

Şawt : sound.³⁸ Speech is a form of sound; it belongs to the genus sound. In this point 'Abd al-Jabbâr follows his teacher Abû Hâşim. The argumentation is very simple : if speech were something else than articulated sounds, articulated sounds could exist without speech and speech without articulated sounds. This is not the case. When two things cannot exist separately—without there being a connection between them which makes that they cannot exist separately—³⁹ they must be one and the same genus.⁴⁰ There is no such connection between sounds and speech;⁴¹ consequently, they must be one and the same genus.

Speech belongs to the genus sound; therefore, every speech is sound, but not every sound is speech; only articulated sounds are speech.⁴² All counter-arguments which do not take this distinction into account, are easily refuted.⁴³

³⁷ This question and the way in which speech can be communicative are dealt with in *Muĥiṭ* I, 323-326 together with the points mentioned in the *Muġni*. The *Muġni* uses the term *mufīd* to indicate that speech is communicative and conveys a meaning; the *Muĥiṭ* says that it is an "indication" (*dalil*).

³⁸ Cf. pp. 137-142. This matter is treated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr especially in *Muġni* VII, 21-23, the fourth chapter.

³⁹ There are a number of connections between two things which make that one of them cannot exist without the other. The *Muĥiṭ* gives no details, but the text of the *Muġni* mentions eight of these connections. These are :

a) the first needs the second to exist (e.g., will needs life to exist); b) the connection between cause (*sabab*) and result (*musabbab*); c) the first includes (*damman*) the other, as substance the *kawn*; d) the connection between able subject and act; e) the connection between ability and act; f) the connection between knowing subject, precise act, and knowledge; g) who makes the first, necessarily also makes the second. Cf. *Muġni* VII, 21-22.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Muĥiṭ* I, 323 and *Muġni* VII, 21-22. The text of the *Muġni* does not speak about "two genera" but about "two things" (*şay'ayn*), about which 'Abd al-Jabbâr tries to show that they are one and the same. Only in his conclusion (*Muġni* VII, 22, line 2) he uses the word *jins* (genus). For, ultimately, he has to show that speech in general belongs to the genus sound in general, not that two concrete occurrences are identical.

⁴¹ With all connections mentioned in note 39, one of the two can exist in any form without the other. But speech can in no way exist without articulated sounds and articulated sounds without speech (*Muġni* VII, 21-22). In his discussions he always speaks about "articulated sounds" and thus makes an identification between speech and articulated sounds. He seems to deny this in *Muġni* VII, 7, line 13 : "it may be thus (articulated sounds) and not be speech". The difficulty can be again that speech, which really is arranged letters, is not always called speech.

⁴² Therefore, sometimes the articulated sounds are mentioned in definitions of speech; 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects these definitions.

⁴³ Cf. *Muġni* VII, 22-23. Therefore, it is possible that one needs for speech

According to Abû 'Alî speech is not sound because speech and letters can occur in writing and as memorized; but, 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers, a written text only is a sign (*amâra*) of the letters, while memory is only the knowledge of how speech is.⁴⁴

Speech is said to be "articulated" sound (*ṣawt muqatta'*). About the meaning of this being articulated, the texts of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological works leave us in the dark. Once again we have to turn to the philologists for a further explanation. Literally, this word means "cut"; from 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions it becomes clear that this does not mean "cut into pieces" or separated.⁴⁵ But the sound is articulated through passing by a "*maqta'*" (place of cutting, place of articulation), which is different for every letter. This *maqta'* "turns it away from its being extended and its being elongated".⁴⁶ The sound that normally goes free and unhindered is now at a certain place obstructed and cut into a certain form.

'**Arad**: accident. Speech is an accident.⁴⁷ Since speech is sound, and sound is an accident, speech too must be an accident. 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions five arguments to prove that speech cannot possibly be a substance, and that it, consequently since it is temporal—must be an accident. These five arguments⁴⁸ have all the same structure:

something one does not need for other forms of sound A baby can make sound but not speech, for he lacks the necessary knowledge and his instrument is not yet complete To make speech we need instruments which we do not need when making other forms of sound (In *Mugni* VII, 23, line 6 one better deletes the last word *ilavh*, which is found in the manuscript but does not belong to the text)

⁴⁴ *Mugni* VII, 23

⁴⁵ Cf., for instance, *Mugni* VII, 6, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a distinction between *muqatta'* and *vanfasil*

⁴⁶ Cf. Fleisch, *Ibn Ğinnî*, 79 Fleisch quotes here an expression of Ibn Ğinnî "On commence ce *ṣawt* depuis la partie la plus basse de la gorge (*ḥalq*) Sur son chemin, gorge, bouche, lèvres, il peut rencontrer un *maqta'* (pl. *maqâti'*) proprement 'lieu de coupure', 'qui l'infléchit de sa continuité' (*taḡnîh 'an umtûdâdh wa stûâlâth* p. 6, l. 3)"

⁴⁷ There was some discussion about this subject See, for instance, al-Aṣ'arî, *Maqâlât*, 425 "They disagreed about speech of man, whether it is sound or is not sound, and whether the sound is a body or an accident" Cf. also al-Aṣ'arî's following lines, where he gives more details about the various opinions 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses this subject in his fifth chapter (*Mugni* VII, 24-25)

⁴⁸ These five arguments are given in *Mugni* VII, 24-25 The division of the text into sentences and paragraphs should be based on these five arguments They begin, respectively, in line 6 and 10 of page 24 and line 8, 10, and 11 of page 25 The last argument continues up to the end of the chapter Also the interpunction has to be adjusted, one must replace the full stop in line 8 of page 24 by a comma, and the comma in line 10 by a full stop In general, a more accurate interpunction and division of the text into paragraphs would greatly facilitate the very difficult understanding of the text

they draw conclusions from the supposition that speech is a substance This, namely, implies that speech has the characteristics of substances and substances have the characteristics of speech, when the basic characteristics that all subcategories of a genus have in common are concerned Everything is perceived according to its most characteristic qualifications, as we saw,⁴⁹ and, therefore, all substances must be perceived in the way speech is perceived Moreover, speech would remain just as the substances, but our perception tells us that this is not the case,⁵⁰ accidents could inhere in speech as they do in substances, man⁵¹ would not be able to produce speech since he is not able to produce substances, finally, speech would be perceived by transportation just as the substances,⁵² and in that case one could no longer discern from which side speech comes These five arguments show that speech cannot be a substance and must be an accident

Mudrak : perceptible Since speech is sound, it must be perceptible as sound is and be perceived in the same way in the place where it is and not by being transported towards the instrument of the perceiving subject, in this case towards the ear Were that the case, then we could not know from which side speech we hear actually comes⁵³

⁴⁹ Cf p 178 We cannot say that substances must have all the characteristics speech has (speech is according to the opponents only a form of substance) but since perception happens according to the most specific qualification all individuals of a given genus must be perceived in the same way So, the first argument 'Abd al Jabbār gives is more complicated than the other four, the first saying that all substances must correspond with speech while the other four say that speech would have the characteristics of a substance

⁵⁰ Read in *Mugni* VII, 24 line 11 *bi kīlaf* instead of *kīlāf* The manuscript has this reading and it is also grammatically necessary the word *dalala* being the subject of this sentence

If speech were remaining a correct perception would no longer be possible (cf p 138) In that case the sequence of the letters would no longer be discernible One cannot say that it is perceived according to a transportation towards the ear (*intiqāl*) speech is not perceived by transportation (cf p 192) In that case all letters could remain in the ear and again the sequence would no longer be discernible it would also be possible that speech was not transported to the ears of one person while it is transported to the ears of someone else, so that the first one does not hear it while the second one does This leads to a number of absurd conclusions Cf *Mugni* VII 25

⁵¹ Read *li-l-'ibād* instead of *li l-fanā* in *Mugni* VII 25, line 11 This reading is clear from the manuscript and necessary for a good understanding

⁵² Besides being perceived by transportation (*bi l intiqāl*)—when they namely, are perceived by touching—they are also perceived at the place where they are, namely, when they are perceived by seeing Cf p 181

⁵³ Cf p 138 about the accident sound and pp 192-193 about the perception of sounds See also *Muhit* I, 324 The problems arising from the supposition that speech

Lâ yabqâ: it does not remain We already proved that sound, and consequently also speech, is a non-remaining accident Were it remaining, then the sequence of the letters, necessary for the understanding of the meaning of speech, would no longer be discernible ⁵⁴

Maqdûr li-l-'abd: possible for man, man is able to produce it This is apparent from our direct self-experience, for we know that we sometimes produce speech ⁵⁵

Mufid: communicative ⁵⁶ Speech can be communicative it can have a meaning and convey this meaning to someone else But speech is not necessarily and per se communicative, for speech can be divided, and actually is divided by the philologists, into speech that is "muhmal" (inoperative) and speech that is "musta'mal" (operative) ⁵⁷ The difference between these two categories, which in fact is the difference between speech that is not communicative and speech that is communicative, is said to be dependent upon one condition, which is described as "muwâda'a" or "tawâdu'" (convention) ⁵⁸ People must agree on the meaning of concrete combinations of letters, they must agree on a system that we call "language", and the letters they make must be corresponding to the laws of this agreement, of this language Only in that case speech becomes communicative and correct (*sahih*) But also when it is not communicative, it is speech just as movement and writing, for instance, which can be communicative, are also movement and writing when they are in certain cases not communicative 'Abd al-Jabbâr summarizes "The Arabs agreed (*tawâda'*) on speech, in consequence it became communicative by the convention (*bi-l-muwâda'a*) and speech (became) correct (*sahih*)" ⁵⁹

For 'Abd al-Jabbâr languages are made by man though God gave

is perceived by transportation towards the ear, are discussed in *Mugni* VII, 25 and *Muhit* I, 324 See also note 50

⁵⁴ Cf p 138 about sound in general See also *Muhit* I, 323-324 The consequences of the supposition that speech remains are discussed in the context of the discussion of speech as a substance Cf *Mugni* VII, 24 Cf also note 50

⁵⁵ Cf *Mugni* VII, 25

⁵⁶ Cf *Muhit* I, 324-325 and *Mugni* VII, 10 and 182-183

⁵⁷ For the term *muhmal* and its translation, see Cachia, *The Monitor*, 104 of the Arabic part

⁵⁸ Cf *Mugni* VII, 10 As the contrary of these terms one sometimes finds the term *tawqif*, indicating God's activity in the creation of language Cf, for instance, Fleisch, *Traite*, 17, Massignon, *Passion*, 711, and Arnaldez, *Grammaire*, 37 Arnaldez translates *tawqif* as "une institution venant de Dieu"

⁵⁹ Most probably this is said by one of the philologists, but the phrase introducing this statement is not entirely clear *Mugni* VII, 10

him the possibility to make letters, only when people are agreed on a system that is a language, God can speak to them. And just like man, God has to speak according to the laws of this system people are agreed upon, in order to make His speech communicative.⁶⁰

Maḥall al-kalām: the substrate of speech.⁶¹ This subject will be discussed below in more detail when we deal with the way in which speech is the cause of the quality speaking. For the moment suffice it to say that we, human beings, can only produce speech by way of generating (*tawliḍ*). Our speech is *mutawallid*, and therefore it necessarily exists in a substrate. In fact, we even need a special instrument to produce speech, an instrument that has a special structure (*biḥya*), we need the organism of our "voice" (throat, tongue, lips, etc.) to produce the various letters.

3 REPUTATION OF OPPONENTS

After discussing in this section some definitions which qua intention of their authors roughly correspond with speech as 'Abd al-Jabbār has defined it, we also give some attention to the opinions of those scholars whose doctrine on speech is evidently different from that of 'Abd al-Jabbār.

Other definitions

The first definition discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbār in his *Muḡnī* was used among Mu'tazilites⁶² and also by the Karaitic theologian Yūsuf al-Basīr.⁶³ It runs "speech is arranged letters and articulated sounds" (*hurūf manzūma wa-aswāt muqatta'a*) and is discussed in everyone of the three theological works used.⁶⁴ For 'Abd al-Jabbār this definition is not correct. On the one hand, it does not mention enough

⁶⁰ Cf. *Muḥit* I, 325, *Muḡnī* VII, 182-183. To the rules of the language system are reckoned too for instance that the combinations verb-plus-verb, particle-plus-particle, or noun-plus-particle are not communicative. Speech, to be correct and to be communicative must be corresponding to these laws concerning the outward form (*ṣura*) of the language on which people are agreed.

⁶¹ Cf. *Muḥit* I, 325-326.

⁶² Cf. *Saḥ* 528-529. Cf. also Bouman, *Le conflit*, 14. "Ash-Shahrastānī nous rapporte que les Mu'tazilites ont décrit le parler (*al-kalām*) comme des mots arrangés et des sons articulés qui ont été créés se trouvant dans un substrat temporel" (*Vihaya* 288).

⁶³ Cf. Vajda, *La parole crée*, 61. "des sons articulés et des lettres disposées en ordre, qui peuvent, par convention, exprimer (un sens)" and in a note the Arabic text "*aswāt muqatta'a wa huruf manzūma ḡashih an tufīd bi l muwāda'a*"

⁶⁴ *Saḥ* 529, *Muḡnī* VII 7, and *Muḥit* I, 317.

speech consisting of two letters is excluded by this definition; but on the other hand, it mentions too much: the second half of the definition is superfluous,⁶⁵ arranged letters necessarily being articulated sounds. And, according to the strict rules 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses to decide whether a definition is correct or not, it is not permitted to add something superfluous.⁶⁶ One can add something that is superfluous for clarity's sake, and in order to make the defined object clearer for the one to whom the definition is given. So does, for instance, Abû Hâšim when he mentions this double definition, but even in that case the definition is less correct.⁶⁷ A third argument against this definition seems to be less logical; though 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects the thesis of Abû 'Alî that speech is something other than sound, he prefers a definition to be used among Mu'tazila which even includes the doctrine of Abû 'Alî. The mention of arranged letters could be accepted as a definition of speech, even by Abû 'Alî; but he could not in any way accept a definition in which sounds are mentioned.⁶⁸

Other definitions are rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr because they do not circumscribe the defined object, speech, correctly. The definition that speech is "arranged letters when they occur as communicative", is rejected because it is too narrow; speech can be non-communicative—when it is inoperative—and nevertheless be speech.⁶⁹ Also definitions, stating only that speech is what is communicative,⁷⁰ are not correct because on the one hand not every speech is communicative,

⁶⁵ In *Mugni* VII, 7 'Abd al-Jabbâr apparently states that there can be articulated sounds which are not letters Cf note 41

⁶⁶ Cf p 78

⁶⁷ Cf *Mugni* VII, 8 According to Abû Hâšim speech really is the letters as appears from his statement "if in two or more letters this intuitively known kind of arrangement occurs, it must be speech, it cannot have these qualities (*sifât*) unless it is articulated sounds"

⁶⁸ All three arguments are mentioned both in the *Mugni* and in the *Muhit* This last argument is probably meant to show that this definition, used among Mu'tazila, could not be used as generally applicable to their doctrine

⁶⁹ Cf *Mugni* VII, 10 "*al-hurûf al-manzûma idâ hasalat musfidatan*" Cf pp 304-305 For a good understanding of the argumentation given in the *Mugni*, one has to make some corrections into the text *Mugni* VII, 10, line 7 read *yanurr* instead of *amma*, as appears in the manuscript In line 17, one better reads *nuyb* instead of *yuyab*, page 11, line 10 read *al-hudûd* instead of *al-hurûf* (as appears from the manuscript and the context) "it is not possible to make an analogy between one definition (not letter) and another, but for everything one aims to define we have to look for an indication that is characteristic of it"

⁷⁰ This definition is formulated in different ways Abû Hâšim is said to have used the definition *mâ yufîd* (*Muhit* I, 317) In the *Mugni* are recorded *mâ afâd murâd al-mutakallim* and *mâ vufham bih* (instead of *minh*, as appears in the manuscript) *maqâsid al-mutakallim* (*Mugni* VII, 11)

and on the other hand not everything that is communicative is speech. So, for instance, writing and signs may be communicative, they even can be said to communicate what a speaking subject wills, but they, evidently, are not speech.

A last category of definitions rejected in the *Muġnī*, is said to be incorrect because they contain something that it is not permitted to mention in the text of a correct definition, as, for instance, the place where the object to be defined is, something it needs, its cause, or an instrument by which it is made. For this reason, and also because they are only applicable to human speech and exclude God's speech, restricted as they are to speech that is made by the instruments we need to produce speech, the following definitions are rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr: "special movements",⁷¹ "movements that strike the breath and occur in the air with the articulation of the air so that it is heard as speech",⁷² "letters that go out from a special orifice",⁷³ and "what comes into existence from a knocking in special orifices".⁷⁴

Other opinions

Besides the disagreement that existed about the exact text of the definition of speech, a deeper disagreement existed among Muslim theologians, a disagreement about the essence of speech. While 'Abd al-Jabbâr considers it to be sound and, consequently, an accident, others held the opinion that speech is a substance, others again that it is an accident but not identical with sound, whereas a last thesis says that speech, as knowledge and will, is a qualifier in the soul.⁷⁵

⁷¹ *Muġnī* VII, 11 In Arabic *harakât maḵsûsa* This definition is discussed from p 11 line 16 up to p 12 line 6 One has to adapt the division of the text

⁷² *Muġnī* VII, 12, lines 7-11 In line 9 read *fī l-jins* instead of *fī l-hiss* speech and movements are different in genus

⁷³ This definition is rejected because speech, being an accident, cannot really be moving or going out, only substances can. *Muġnī* VII, 12

⁷⁴ In this definition the secondary cause (*sabab*) is mentioned

⁷⁵ In the first chapter of *Muġnī* VII 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the opinions of his opponents; but he restricts himself mainly to their opinions on the Qur'ân and on God's speech, he only incidentally mentions speech in general Cf *Muġnī* VII, 4-5

Al-Aṣ'arî, in his *Maqâlât*, summarizes the different opinions propagated up to his own time "Some say speech of man is sound, and that is an accident, it may be on the tongue as heard, on paper as written, and in the hearts as memorized, it inheres in these places by writing, memory, and pronouncing (*talâwa* or loud reading) Others say speech of man is not sound, it is an accident and sound too is an accident, it exists only on the tongue Others say sound is a thin body and speech of man is the articulating of sound and is an accident, this is the opinion of an-Nazzâm Others say it is a qualifier

In the course of our discussion we already saw how 'Abd al-Jabbâr refuted the theses that speech is a substance, or that it is an accident but something other than sound. What remains is the discussion and the refutation of the doctrine that speech is a qualifier in the soul.

Ma'nâ qâ'im fi n-nafs : a qualifier existing in the soul.⁷⁶ The terminology used in this thesis is not chosen by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, but it is the wording of his opponents, a wording which varies;⁷⁷ 'Abd al-Jabbâr would probably call it a qualifier in the heart.⁷⁸ This opinion is discussed in the *Muġnî* because of its importance for 'Abd al-Jabbâr's further argumentation. It is his conviction—and upon this conviction his entire argumentation is founded—that speech can be nothing else but the speech we hear, but sounds. The acceptance of some other kind of speech takes away the foundation of this doctrine. When an opponent, therefore, tries to establish something in the human interior different from audible speech, and calls this "speech", he attacks 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system in its very centre.

The structure of the special chapter of the *Muġnî* devoted to this refutation, can be summarized as follows : after a general introduction stating that one cannot establish the existence of something one does not know, 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses four arguments brought into the field by his opponents, then he briefly mentions some arguments showing that the thesis of his opponents cannot be correct—arguments of the kind of "il-zâm" —⁷⁹ and he concludes with a final remark based on the *Ijmâ'*, the consensus of the believers.⁸⁰

existing in the soul, not inhering in the tongue; it is an accident and something other than sound". (*Maqâlât*, 425)

⁷⁶ *Šarh* 532-535, *Muġnî* VII, 14-20 (the entire third chapter); *Muġit* I, 317-319. Cf., for instance, al-Bâqillânî, *al-Insâf*, 96-98, where he gives his arguments for his thesis that speech is a qualifier in the soul. Besides some texts from the Qur'ân and the *Sunna* he mentions some sentences used by Arabs (in my soul was speech, a word, or talk : *kalâm, qawl, hadîth*) and a verse from a poem by al-Akṭal. See also Allard, *Le problème*, 310, where he refers to another text of al-Bâqillânî (*Tamhîd*, 251)

⁷⁷ That the words used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr are the original ones of his opponents appears from al-As'ari's text (*Maqâlât*, 425, quoted in note 75), which has the same formula. The *Muġit* mentions *ma'nâ fi n-nafs*, the *Šarh* also *ma'nâ qâ'im bi-dâtih* when God's speech is meant

⁷⁸ Cf. *Muġnî* VII, 15. 'Abd al-Jabbâr prefers not to use the verb *qâm*, cf. *Šarh* 535.

⁷⁹ That is to say . he draws from the theory adhered to by his opponents conclusions which those opponents cannot accept. Therefore, they have to admit that their theory was wrong | Cf pp 74-75

⁸⁰ In the text of the *Šarh* 'Abd al-Jabbâr starts with his general introduction about the way in which we can establish the existence of something, and then he discusses the arguments given by his opponents (*Šarh* 532-535) In the *Muġit* he starts with his own arguments, and then discusses those of his opponents (*Muġit* I, 317-319)

In his introduction, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's starting-point is that "it is not possible to establish (the existence of) something to the knowledge of which there is no way, neither necessary nor acquired (knowledge)".⁸¹ For, he argues, if that were possible, it would lead to a number of absurd consequences and make every argumentation impossible and unreliable,⁸² for it leaves the possibility open to everybody to establish the existence of whatever he wants.

Consequently, the opponents have to show whether and how one can know this speech in the soul.

The first argument they give states that the knowledge of this speech existing in the soul is a necessary knowledge, and that it is known just as will and knowledge. But, 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers, in the case of will and knowledge we started from a state (*hâl*) everybody knows, and because of its being a transitory state we concluded to the existence of a qualifier. But in the case of speech, which is comparable with, for instance, movement, there is no such state, and the only thing it indicates is that one is able, knowing, willing, etc.⁸³

The opponents' second argument maintains that every person who is *compos mentis* necessarily knows that there is in his soul something that corresponds (*yuṭâbiq*) with the letters; he knows this from his own experience at the moment some idea occurs in him, or when he "talks in his soul"⁸⁴ what he wants to utter in speech. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is that everything one discovers in this way is either hidden speech, which, however, is the same speech as audible speech, or thinking about speech.⁸⁵ Also knowledge, intention, and similar acts of the heart may be confounded and considered to be "speech in the soul".⁸⁶ The opponents answer, in their turn, that it is evident that people have this experience. To prove this, they appeal to a text of the Qur'ân "they say with their tongues what is not in their hearts"⁸⁷ and to some expressions used in everyday language: "in my soul is speech that I will say or will not say", "in the soul of so

⁸¹ *Mugnî* VII, 14.

⁸² In *Mugnî* VII, 14, line 16 one better reads *fî l-'ibârât* ("about the expressions") instead of *fî l-'ibâdât* ("about the acts by which we serve God") This sentence introduces the next one about the reliability of names and words.

⁸³ Cf. *Mugnî* VII, 15 See also *Šarh* 533 and *Muhîṭ* I, 318

⁸⁴ 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to the "talk of the soul" (*ḥadīṭ an-nafs*); see pp 62-63.

⁸⁵ In *Mugnî* VII, 16, line 7 read *wa-t-tafkîr fih* (eventually one could read *tafakkur*) instead of *bi-t-tafakkur fih* Cf. p. 62

⁸⁶ Cf. *Šarh* 533 and *Muhîṭ* I, 318

⁸⁷ *Sūrat al-fath*, verse 11

and so is speech that he hides and does not reveal"; one says that someone is speaking (*mutakallim*⁸⁸) even when he is actually silent;⁸⁹ one also says that somebody arranges speech in his soul, and then speaks it, and that somebody begins to speak without reflection. According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents, all these expressions indicate that people who know the Arabic language⁹⁰ know that there is speech in their interior. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is rather simple; first, it is not permitted to deduce the existence of something from a terminology used; second, if this knowledge were necessary, as the opponents assert, he should have that knowledge too. Finally, he shows how the expressions used in fact must be understood and explained.⁹¹

The third argument postulates speech in the soul as a necessary medium between thought and its expression. Before expressing a thought we have, we have to reflect upon it and arrange it;⁹² only after doing so can we communicate it in expressions. But for 'Abd al-Jabbâr this is only either a second thought⁹³—because the first was not exhaustive, or because we have to think about something else yet—or the talk of the soul, which is not different from audible speech.

The last argument used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents entirely corresponds to the argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself used to establish the qualifier "ability" (*qudra*).⁹⁴ Someone from whom speech actually comes must be different from someone for whom this is not possible. This must be caused by a state the first subject is in, and this state

⁸⁸ In *Mugni* VII, 16, line 17 read *mutakallim* ("speaking") instead of *yatakallam* ("he speaks"). Cf *Mugni* VII, 17-18. The word *yatakallam* indicates that the subject actually speaks, whereas the active participle *mutakallim* may indicate that he is someone who easily speaks or who is disposed to speak.

⁸⁹ Read in *Mugni* VII, 16, line 17 *sâkit* ("silent") instead of *sâkin* ("immobile").

⁹⁰ These expressions are ascribed in the *Šarh* (533) to the *ahl al-luga* and in the *Mugni* to the *'uqalâ'* (VII, 16). This suggests that with the *ahl al-luga* not the philologists are meant but the people who use this language in a correct way.

⁹¹ Cf *Mugni* VII, 17-18. The Qur'ân-text only says that they lie about that which is in their hearts. "in my soul is speech" means that I know something that I want to reveal in words, the participle "speaking" (*mutakallim*) may be used to indicate that someone easily speaks and is disposed to speak, the expressions indicating that someone arranges (*rattab*) speech before speaking it, mean that he arranges the *ma'nâ* (the meaning or contents) of speech, not speech itself. Finally, the reflection mentioned is either thought or hidden speech. (This last expression is discussed in *Mugni* VII, 19). Cf also *Šarh* 533-534 and *Muhit* I, 318.

⁹² In *Mugni* VII, 18, line 16 and also in *Muhit* I, 318, line 5, we read forms of the verb *dabbar* instead of the verb *adâr*, the verb *dabbar* meaning to reflect upon something and to arrange it. Cf. Lane. 844

⁹³ Read *tâni* ("second") instead of *tâmm* ("complete") in *Mugni* VII, 18, line 18

⁹⁴ Cf pp 196-197 and 200

must be caused by a cause ('*illa*); the state we call "*mutakallim*" and the cause "*kalâm*". 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is that the first person can speak because he is able (*qâdir*) and knowing ('*âlim*); in this respect, speech is comparable with handicraft and building, which only suppose that the acting subject is able and knowing, and not that he is in a state and that a qualifier exists in his soul.⁹⁵

Among the counter-arguments 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions to prove that the thesis of his opponents is untenable, the main argument that is mentioned and discussed in each of the three theological works at our disposition⁹⁶ discusses the relation between speech on the one hand and dumbness (*ḡaras*) and silence (*sukût*) on the other. Dumbness is attributed to an unsoundness affecting the instrument of speech, while silence is defined as "that one does not use the instrument of speech in a situation in which one has the ability to use it".⁹⁷ If speech were something in the soul, it would no longer be impossible that someone is at the same time speaking and silent or dumb,⁹⁸ for something concerning the instruments cannot prevent something else in the soul.

A whole list of other short arguments is given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr to prove, mainly by *ilzâmât*, that speech cannot be something in the soul, and that the way his opponents argue to prove their position is not correct.⁹⁹ The last argument mentioned in this series is based on the *Ijmâ'*, the consensus of the Islamic community; the entire community agreed that God's speech is heard and read; who says

⁹⁵ *Muḡni* VII, 19, lines 7-14. In line 14 the manuscript gives a full stop (three points) and an extra large space. The printed edition only gives a comma. Here the interpunction has to be adapted.

⁹⁶ *Šarh* 534; in this work this argument is first given as an argument of the opponents; they establish the existence of speech in the soul as the opposite of dumbness and silence. 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that, if they had an opposite, this opposite would be the speech we hear. Cf. also *Muhit* I, 317-318 and *Muḡni* VII, 19.

⁹⁷ Cf. *Šarh* 354: "*inn al-marja' bi-l-ḡaras ilâ fasâd valhaq âlat al-kalâm, wa-s-sukût huw an lâ yasta'mil âlat al-kalâm fî (instead of fih) hâlat qudratih 'alâ sti'mâlih*"

⁹⁸ 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers here to the actually being speaking of the subject, not to the way in which it can be used in non-technical language as we saw above (cf. notes 88 and 91 of this section). In a broader sense the term *mutakallim* can be used as are the words indicating a profession: a carpenter and tailor are called by that name also at the moment they do not actually exercise this profession. (The words *najjâr* and *ḡayyât* in *Muhit* I, 318 are used to indicate someone who has the corresponding profession, they are not used as proper names.)

⁹⁹ One finds this list of arguments in *Muḡni* VII, 19-20. In *Muḡni* VII, 20, line 3 read *qasd* instead of *fasl*, it is by intention (*qasd*) that speech becomes command or information. Cf. p. 217.

that God has other speech than that, places himself outside the community of believers.¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Mugni* VII, 20. A later disagreement after a former consensus leaves the consensus intact as 'Abd al-Jabbâr notices.

In the *Muhit* another formula for this opinion discussed here by 'Abd al-Jabbâr is mentioned: speech is *mâ qâm bi-l-mutakallim* (*Muhit* I, 318). But in this way one cannot circumscribe speech, for many things are existing in the speaking person. Moreover, one first has to define something before ascribing it to someone, as is done in this case.

C THE QUALITY SPEAKING IN THIS WORLD

After discussing the essence and the definition of speech as we know and produce it in this world, 'Abd al-Jabbâr touches upon the question of which subject has to be qualified by this speech as "speaking" (*mutakallim*), and why so.¹

'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion is that the subject who makes speech (*ġā'il al-kalâm*) is qualified as speaking, and that he is qualified in this way because he made it. His main argument to prove this thesis is a direct one, and is based on the use of the term "speaking" (*mutakallim*) by the Arabs. Here again appears that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr a quality is a name, and also that he has every confidence in the truthfulness of the Arabic language and in its being conform to something in the reality.

He mentions, however, an indirect argumentation too. By way of "*taqsîm*" (division and exclusion) he enumerates all possibilities for a connection between qualifier and qualified object; he excludes all these possibilities except one, which must be the correct one.² Something can be qualified by a qualifier or cause (*ma'nâ* or *'illa*),³ either because the qualifier inheres in it or in a part of it, or because the qualifier necessitates it to be in a certain state (*hâl*), or because it is a defect in the necessary instruments, or because it made the qualifier. Speech cannot indicate a defect in the instruments so that only three real possibilities remain.⁴

Consequently, the question to be dealt with in this paragraph is: is the substrate in which speech inheres (or in a part of which it inheres) called speaking? Is a living being called speaking because of a state it is in? Is a living being called speaking because it made speech? We discuss these three questions successively.

¹ *Šarh* 535-542, *Mugni* VII, 26-54, and *Muhit* I, 320-322.

² The method of *taqsîm* is described on pp 72-74. The *Muhit* does not give this argument. What 'Abd al-Jabbâr does there, is to refute the other possibilities not as parts of a *taqsîm* but as arguments of his opponents. Cf. *Muhit* I, 320.

³ For the various connections between a qualifier and something that is qualified by it, see p 154.

⁴ The opponents mention other possible connections upon which would be based the qualification, as, for instance, that the qualifier is existent in (*mawjûd bi* or *qâ'im bi*) the subject, that it needs the subject, or that it belongs to the subject.

1. SPEECH MAY INHERE IN ANY SUBSTRATE

Speech inheres in a substrate, and it cannot exist without inhering in a substrate; it can inhere in any substrate; the substrate is not qualified by it as speaking (*mutakallim*).⁵ These are the items that have to be discussed in this section, and which may shed some light on the place of speech and speaking in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system of qualities.

"Know that speech is entitled to the same judgement as the other perceptible things are: it exists in a substrate and it cannot possibly exist 'not in a substrate', it does not necessitate its substrate to be in a state, nor a living being, and it is only ascribed to its maker (*fâ'il*) because he made it ('*alâ jihat al-fi'liya*: in the way of 'factuality')." ⁶ With these words 'Abd al-Jabbâr begins the discussion of this subject, in this way already indicating in advance the conclusions he will reach.

Speech inheres in a substrate. It does not suffice to state here that speech is an accident, as we already saw, and, consequently, must inhere in a substrate; for, though accidents mostly do inhere in a substrate, their inhering does not belong to the characteristics of their genus, and accidents do not necessarily inhere in a substrate.

'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two arguments to prove that speech, nevertheless, does inhere in a substrate. First, speech, as sound in general, is produced by us by way of generating; in fact we produce it by pressure and knocking (*i'timâd* and *mušâkka*) of one body upon another one. We already proved, that in this way the effect can only be produced in the second body.⁷ We conclude that speech which is produced in this way necessarily exists in a substrate.

⁵ The thesis that speech inheres in a substrate and cannot exist without a substrate or—as 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "not in a substrate" (*lâ fi mahall*), is treated in *Mugnî* VII, 26-30, the sixth chapter of this part of the *Mugnî*. The division and structure of this chapter is not clearly indicated by its division into sentences and paragraphs. This structure can be summarized as follows (interpunction and division of the printed text have to be adjusted accordingly):

I speech inheres in a substrate, two arguments are given p 26, lines 7-11 and p 26, lines 12-21

II speech cannot exist without inhering in a substrate; argumentation pp 27, line 1 – 28, line 6, follows an objection in p 28, lines 7-12.

Two arguments that would prove 'Abd al-Jabbâr's thesis are rejected as incorrect pp 28, line 12 – 29, line 9, and p 29, lines 9-16. Finally two counter-arguments of the opponents are refuted pp 29, line 17 – 30, line 7, and p 30, lines 8-11

⁶ Cf *Mugnî* VII, 26

⁷ Cf pp 135-137 about pressure (*i'timâd*), the accident we have to use when producing something outside the substrate of our ability, and pp 206-208 about *mutawallid*, acts produced by generating

The second argument states, appealing to the experience, that sounds are different according to the substrate in which they exist: sound existing in copper is different from sound existing in stone. Existence of speech in the echo is dependent upon the substrate; not in every place speech can exist as in echo. Also every letter needs its special structure and zone of articulation⁸ of the body, and letters are different according to the difference of those zones. Letters need breath to inhere in; otherwise the instruments could not have the influence they have and, moreover, speech could exist without there being any breath.

And therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes, sound and speech correspond with colours and modes of being in their inhering in a substrate.⁹

Speech cannot exist without inhering in a substrate. Even the fact that an accident—sometimes—inheres in a substrate does not prove that it cannot exist “not in a substrate” (*lâ fi maḥall*); we saw that a will can exist either in a substrate or “not in a substrate”.¹⁰ To show that speech cannot exist “not in a substrate”, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a kind of analogical reasoning in which he compares speech (and sounds) with colours.

Colours cannot exist without a substrate; if it were possible, they could no longer be each other's opposite (*didd*).¹¹ For if they only exclude each other in a substrate, they would no longer be opposite when one colour exists not in a substrate; and if the substrate is not a condition for their being opposite, they even would exclude each other when they existed in two different substrates. In both cases colours would no longer be each other's opposite in the way they really are. Therefore, colours must inhere in a substrate. Everything that corresponds with the colours in existing in a substrate, in not necessitating a living being to be in a certain state, and in existing in a lifeless substrate, must correspond with them in the impossibility

⁸ The word here translated by “zone of articulation” is the Arabic word *maḥraj*, plural *maḥaraj*, literally translated, it stands for the places where something goes out. As a technical term—and as such we discuss this term later—it is the place in the vocal organism of a human being where a given letter is articulated. Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that every letter has its own *maḥraj*, zone of articulation from which it “goes out” Cf. *Mugni* VII, 26

⁹ *Mugni* VII, 26

¹⁰ Cf. pp 273-276

¹¹ About the concept of being “opposite” (*didd*) see pp 142-143

to exist not in a substrate That holds true of sounds and speech too.¹² The reason why 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a detour via the colours is that, according to him, it is not self-evident that sounds and letters exclude one another so that he could formulate about them the argumentation he actually gave for the colours.¹³

Evidently, objections we meet in this chapter try to make a comparison between speech and will, the will being the only accident we met hitherto that can exist without a substrate¹⁴

¹² Cf *Mugni* VII, 27 That speech and sound do not necessitate a living being to be in a certain state and can exist in a lifeless substrate, is argued in the next two chapters of the seventh part of the *Mugni* Cf pp 139-140

¹³ Abû Hâsim is said to have accepted the mutual exclusion and the being opposite of various sounds and letters and to have based his argumentations on this premise Cf *Mugni* VII, 27-28

¹⁴ The first objection made against 'Abd al-Jabbâr's thesis (cf note 5 of this section) runs one perceives sound without perceiving its substrate, perception of sound in a substrate or not in a substrate would not make any difference 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that this is correct, but that his argumentation was not built on perception but on mutual exclusion Next 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects two arguments that might be used to prove his own thesis the first one starts from the supposition that sound and speech are heard by the transportation of the substrate of that sound or speech towards the ear, this implies that sound and speech must exist in a substrate to be heard 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentation in rejecting this argument is threefold first, sound and speech are not perceived by transportation (cf pp 138 and 303), second, even if sound and speech were perceived in that way, God, who does not use instruments, could nevertheless perceive it, third, one could say that this transportation of the substrate only is a condition for sound and speech which inhere in a substrate and not for speech which does not inhere in a substrate (read in *Mugni* VII, 29, line 4 *jakun* instead of *takun* the subject being *sawt*, there is no reason at all to begin a new sentence in line 4, let alone a new paragraph)

The second argument in favour of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theory, but which is nevertheless rejected, states that the existence of speech not in a substrate corresponds with its being non-existent in as far as in both cases it is not entitled to any judgement at all (the two dashes in *Mugni* VII, 29 line 9, added by the editor are not correct and insinuate a misinterpretation of the text by making the four words between these dashes a parenthetical clause, which they actually are not literally translated, the text runs 'its existence not in a substrate and (sc its existence) when it would not exist is in one situation in so far it has no judgement') This implies that this accident in its being existent corresponds with how it is when it is non-existent This is not possible because, when being existent, it must be entitled to some judgements based on its genus to which it is not entitled when it is non-existent (cf pp 106-107) 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is that it is perceptible when it is existent and imperceptible when it is non-existent This proves that it is entitled to a judgement to which it is not entitled when it is non-existent

Finally 'Abd al-Jabbâr refutes two arguments of his opponents, based on a comparison made between speech on the one side and will on the other side The difference between speech and will is, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, that the will necessitates the living being to be in a state, whereas speech does not Wills and non-wills also do not exclude one another under the condition of a substrate Therefore 'Abd al-Jabbâr's conclusion is

Speech can inhere in any substrate ¹⁵ By adhering to this thesis 'Abd al-Jabbâr follows Abû Hâšim in his later works, after he abandoned the doctrine propagated by his father Abû 'Alî. ¹⁶ This latter doctrine consisted in the assumption that speech, when heard and consequently linked with sound, ¹⁷ needs movement and a certain structure; some forms of sound need a special hardness of their substrate (thus, for instance, the sound of copper, which cannot exist in cotton). Sound in general can, however, occur in any substrate. 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes a distinction, following his teacher Abû Hâšim: when we, human beings, who have to use secondary causes and instruments to produce speech, actually produce speech, it needs movement and a certain structure. But when it is made by someone who needs no secondary causes or instruments (and so does God alone), it does not need movement or structure; only, 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds in the *Muhît*, when God uses nevertheless secondary causes, His speech too needs a special structure. ¹⁸ Sound does not need hardness on its substrate.

Speech does not need movement. When analysing 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentation in proving this thesis to be correct, there are two things

that it is not correct to compare sound (read *as-sawt* in *Mugni* VII, 30, line 10, instead of *as-sawar*, which is found in the manuscript) and speech with will

¹⁵ This subject is discussed in *Mugni* VII, 31-42, chapter 7 of this part of the *Mugni*. The structure of this chapter can be summarized as follows: after a short introduction summarizing the positions of Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâšim, 'Abd al-Jabbâr first discusses the doctrine and arguments of Abû 'Alî (pp. 31, line 14–32, line 20). The rest of the chapter is given to the doctrine of Abû Hâšim, which is adhered to by 'Abd al-Jabbâr: first, he proves that speech does not need movement (*hawaka*), next that it does not need a special structure (*bmva*), and, finally, that sound can exist in any substrate (these three subjects are treated respectively in pp. 33, line 1–36, line 3, pp. 36, line 4–42, line 8, and p. 42, lines 9-11). Cf. also *Šarh* 540-541 and *Muhit* I, 326.

¹⁶ Cf. *Šarh* 540, *Mugni* VII, 36, and *Muhit* I, 326. The doctrine of Abû 'Alî is founded upon our experience in this world and does not take into account that God's speech may occur in a way which is different from the way in which our speech occurs. His arguments are summarized by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* VII, 31-32. For an accurate understanding of that text, one has to make two corrections: in *Mugni* VII 32, line 11 read *mahallhîmâ* ("their substrate") instead of *mahallayhîmâ* ("their two substrates"), it is essential in the argumentation that the possibility is mentioned of two letters existing in one and the same substrate. On the same page, line 15, read *wa-naqûl* ("and he, sc. Abû 'Alî, says") instead of *wa-naqûl* ("and we say").

¹⁷ For Abû 'Alî speech is not sound, but it can be linked with sound and in that case be heard, it can, however, also occur as written or as memorized. Cf. *Mugni* VII, 31-32 and p. 297.

¹⁸ Cf. *Muhit* I, 326. 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not speak in this context about this speech also needing movement, but we can assume that this is the case too.

we have to bear in mind. First, we have to pay attention to the way he describes and defines "movement" (*ḥaraka*):¹⁹ it is "being" (*kawn*) and in fact it is the being of a substance in a concrete place after it was in another place the moment just before, but, first of all, it indicates the concrete delimited place the substance is in at this moment. The second point to bear in mind is the meaning of the verb "to need" (*ihtâj*); this verb does not indicate here that something is needed as a secondary cause or an instrument, but that it is needed to exist (*fî l-wujûd*); it is a necessary condition at every moment and in every form the "needing" subject exists. Against this background we have to read the arguments of Abû Hâsim which are used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.²⁰

The first argument holds: if a letter would need movement to exist, it could not exist with this movement and with its opposite (and we know that all movements are each other's opposite because they exclude each other in one and the same substrate).²¹ But, when a speaking person moves through space, the same letter exists with different movements; in every place he can produce all letters. Therefore, speech does not²² need movement to exist.²³

A second argument starts from the general thesis that, if something needs something else to exist, it does not need a certain concrete form of it, but any individual of the genus concerned in any way it can occur. (If knowledge needs life to exist, it can exist with any form of life.) And because movement is not a genus of its own, but belongs

¹⁹ Cf p 130, where we discussed 'Abd al-Jabbâr's use of the term movement (*ḥaraka*)

²⁰ That the arguments given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr really are Abû Hâsim's, appears from the way they are introduced. Cf *Mugni* VII, 33, line 1, 34, line 8 (one has to read here *bayyan* instead of *buyun*), 35, lines 4 and 6

²¹ Cf p 142 in our discussion of the term *didd* (opposite)

²² In *Mugni* VII, 33, line 4 add the word *lâ* before *ḥihtâj*, the word is also missing in the manuscript

²³ In the text (*Mugni* VII, 33) an objection is made, stating that the accident composition (*ta'lif*) can exist with different "vicinities" (*muḥâwarât*) and nevertheless needs vicinity to exist. We already saw that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr "vicinity" also is a "being" (*kawn*), just as movement (cf p 131) it is another name for "combination" or *ittimâ'*). The composition remains, though the actual "vicinities" always change when the composed totality moves in space. But, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer runs, composition (*ta'lif*) does not need "vicinity", but only that the two substrates are "in each other's vicinity" (*mutaḥâwaravn*, "touching each other") whatever the concrete "vicinities" are. Composition does not need vicinity, it only needs that there be vicinity. It does not need a concrete vicinity, but only that the substrates concerned have any form of vicinity

to the genus "being" (*kawn*), speech could exist with any kind of "being" and, consequently, also with immobility (*sukûn*), which is also one of the modes of being.²⁴

The third argument starts from our experience that human speech needs movement because this movement is analogous with a secondary cause (*sabab*). We produce speech by way of generating (*tawlid*), and the secondary cause we use is pressure (*i'timâd*); but we can only generate speech by pressure when it occurs as knocking (*muṣâkka*), and this implies that it is linked²⁵ with movement. Consequently, though movement is not itself the secondary cause, it makes it possible that we generate through the secondary cause which is the pressure. Therefore, it is needed just as the secondary cause is needed. From such a connection between secondary cause and result, one cannot deduce that the result needs the secondary cause to exist. Moreover, if someone can produce speech without the use of secondary causes (and God can do so), His speech can exist without movement, and speech in general cannot need movement to exist.

A fourth argument is in fact an argumentum ad hominem against Abû 'Alî, who, basing himself on the evidences of his world, came to the conclusion that speech needs movement to exist. His son, Abû Hâsim, asks him whether the force of the movement and the force of the sound correspond with each other. Does much sound need much movement and little sound little movement? If he gives a negative answer, he is in contradiction with the evidences of this world on which he based himself in his own argumentation. If he answers in the positive, he has to admit that God also can only produce speech by way of pressure and movement and needs secondary causes. Moreover, the general thesis that much of the "needing" needs much of the "needed" and little of the "needing" little of the "needed", is not correct since much or little knowledge only needs one and the same life to exist.

²⁴ An opponent may object against the axioma used here that life needs a special composition to exist since it cannot exist in every substrate. But, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, life does not need a special composition, nor does composition need a special vicinity. But life only needs a special structure (*binyâ*), and that is to say that the substances touch each other (are in each other's vicinity) in a special way. Life does not need that structure to exist, but to give the totality a special characteristic, and when something makes it impossible for life to give that characteristic (because the structure is missing), it makes it impossible for life to exist.

²⁵ In *Mugni* VII, 34, line 10 read *muqârana* ("being linked") instead of *mufâraqa* ("being different").

A last argument states that speech cannot exist with every concrete movement, but only with movement that occurs in a way in which it generates or makes possible that the pressure generates. Therefore, speech can only need it as a secondary cause and does not need it in general nor to exist.

Speech does not need a special structure. It does not need it generally, because of its genus, but it may need it when it occurs in a special way as we saw above about movement.

A first argument²⁶ 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives to prove this thesis, is founded on the principle that everything that is confined to (*yaktaşş*) a substrate and does not necessitate a living being to be in a state (*hâl*), to exist only needs its substrate. To prove this principle, 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to the colours, the modes of being, the tastes, and the odours; he discusses the examples adduced by his opponents to prove that this principle is not generally applicable, and he shows that they cannot be used as arguments.²⁷ Speech is confined to a substrate (as we already saw) and does not necessitate a living being to be in a state (as we shall see below); therefore, to exist it does not need anything except its substrate.

The second argument²⁸ also starts from a general principle: if something needs something in its substrate, its opposite also needs it. 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that this general principle is correct by referring

²⁶ *Mugni* VII, 36, line 4 - 37, line 19

²⁷ 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents adduce four examples, four things that are, according to them, confined to a substrate, do not necessitate a living being to be in a state, and, nevertheless, need more than a simple substrate

Composition (*ta'lif*) needs vicinity 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies this. Composition does not need vicinity, but only two substances which touch each other and therefore behave like one substrate Cf note 23 of this section and also what is said on pp 132-134 about composition

Pressure (*i'timâd*) needs something else According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, it only needs something else to be necessary and remaining in a given substance (like, e.g., the pressure in the slope of a hill), to exist it does not need something else Cf pp 135-137

Pain (*alam*) needs to be perceived with an aversion of nature and therefore needs life on its substrate 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that only in that case we call it pain, but it can also exist on lifeless substrates. Cf pp 134-135

Death (*mawt*), (this argument begins in *Mugni* VII, 37, line 3 after the full stop The first half of this line belongs to the preceding paragraph) We cannot say that death needs a certain structure because it is not possible to establish death as a separate genus Nor can we say that a composite whole is dead; only the various atoms can be said to be so because they once belonged to a composite whole that was a living being. Cf p 174

²⁸ *Mugni* VII, 38, line 1 - 40, line 3

to will and non-will²⁹ and to conviction and its opposites, and by refuting the arguments of his opponents who try to show, by adducing concrete examples, that the principle is not generally applicable³⁰ Because sounds, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, are each other's opposite, every individual letter must need the same structure in its substrate as the other letters need This leads to the conclusion that all letters need the same structure in their substrate But we know that every letter we, human beings, produce, needs a special structure, different from the structure any other letter needs

The third argument³¹ makes a distinction between three categories

²⁹ It is not clear why the editor corrects the word *wa-l-karâha* in the manuscript and reads *wa-l-karâhîva* (*Mugni* VII, 38 line 3 and note 1 of that same page) One better reads with the manuscript *wa-l-karâha*

³⁰ Five examples are given by the opponents where according to them something needs something else on its substrate which its opposite does not need

Knowledge of the state in which something is needs the knowledge of the essence of that something, while its opposite (oblivion positive ignorance, or opinion) does not need it 'Abd al-Jabbâr answers that the one knowledge does not need the other knowledge, but being knowing the state something is in supposes that one knows the essence of that something One can also give as an answer that knowledge of the state only needs knowledge of the essence in order to be knowledge, not in order to exist (as its genus, conviction) To exist it only needs the conviction of the essence, positive ignorance and oblivion of the state need the same conviction of the essence

Necessary knowledge of the state something is in needs necessary knowledge of its essence, while its opposite does not 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is similar to the preceding one the one knowledge does not need the other one in order to exist, moreover, the knowledge of the essence must be necessary in order that the knowledge of the state be necessary, not in order that it exists The knowledge of the state may even be necessary, though the knowledge of the essence is acquired, it can be necessary, though it cannot prevent in that case the banishing of the knowledge of the essence (for only necessary knowledge cannot be denied and banished from the soul cf pp 53-54)

Death does not need the same things on its substrate as its opposite, life, does The answer is first, we cannot establish death (note 27 of this section) and, second, it is not the opposite of life (cf p 174) This argument is given in *Mugni* VII, 39, line 8, where it begins after the comma (the addition of the preposition *bi* by the editor is not necessary), up to line 12 Interpunction has to be corrected here

Annihilation (*fanâ*) does need something else than its opposite, substance 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is that annihilation and substances do not inhere in a substrate, whereas the principle explicitly mentioned the substrate

Separation (*yfirâq*) does not need the same on its substrate as its opposite, composition (*ta'lif*) The answer is twofold first, separation (one of the *akwân*) is not the opposite of composition (the argument to prove this seems to have disappeared from the manuscript, cf *Mugni* VII, 40, lines 1-2), second, just as separation, composition does not need anything on its substrate (cf note 23 of this section)

³¹ *Mugni* VII, 40, lines 3-11 The division of the text into paragraphs has to be adjusted

As examples of the three categories of accidents can be mentioned, respectively, knowledge, movement, and sound

of accidents: first, accidents that are confined to a composite body (*jumla*) because they necessitate it to be in a certain state; second, accidents that are confined to a substrate and necessitate it to be in a certain state; third, accidents that are confined to a substrate and do not necessitate it to be in a state. Only the first category mentioned needs something in its substrate, in order to make the connection it has with the totality possible. The other two categories do not have any connection except with their substrate; therefore, they do not need anything except that substrate.

A fourth argument³² starts from our knowledge that the acts of the heart need something in their substrate in order to exist; in fact, they need the structure of the heart and they cannot exist, either made by God or by man, except in a substrate structured as the heart is.³³

In this respect speech, however, cannot be compared with the acts of the heart. The reason why the acts of the heart can only exist in a specially structured substrate is that they need it to exist, while the reason why speech which we make exists only in specially structured substrates (the organism of our voice and the echo) is that only those places can function as an instrument (*âla*) to produce speech.³⁴ Therefore, we cannot produce speech in every substrate but only in substrates that can be structured to function as an instrument; we always have to produce it by generating (*tawlid*), be it on the tongue or in the echo.³⁵

But because speech only needs a structure in its substrate when this substrate is used as an instrument, not because speech needs it to exist, God,³⁶ who does not need the use of instruments or secondary causes since He is per se and essentially able, can produce speech in any substrate.

The instruments we need to produce speech are described by 'Abd

³² *Mugni* VII, 40, line 12-41, line 15

³³ About the heart and its function as a substrate: pp. 166-167

One cannot say that the heart functions as an instrument, for some acts of the heart are produced immediately in the substrate of the ability. (cf. *Mugni* VII, 40)

³⁴ If speech were not produced by us by means of instruments and secondary causes, we could only produce it in the substrate of the ability. The fact that we can produce speech outside that substrate shows that we produce it by generating (*tawlid*) and by the use of instruments (*âlât*) and secondary causes (*ashâh*).

³⁵ In *Mugni* VII, 41, line 10 read *an yaf'alah 'alayh* ("the way in which he can make it") instead of *an taf'alah 'illatuh* ("its cause can make it").

³⁶ In *Mugni* VII, 41, lines 12 and 14 one has to read twice a third person (*yûjid* and *yaf'al*) instead of the first person of the plural. Evidently, not "we" can produce speech and writing without instruments and in any substrate, but only "He" (God)

al-Jabbâr as, for instance, tongue (*lisân*) and uvulae (*lahawât*);³⁷ also he frequently mentions the “*maḳârij*”, the places where something goes out. Any letter is said to have its own *maḳraj*, which is structured in a special way different from the other *maḳârij*. This term is used by the philologists to indicate a certain zone in the organism of the human voice, a zone in which the letter concerned is articulated, and from which it “goes out”.³⁸

The fifth and last argument³⁹ is in fact directed against Abû ‘Alî, who held that speech, when pronounced, needs a special structure. The argument runs that if something needs something else to exist, it needs it because of its genus, not because of a special way in which this genus occurs. Therefore, any individual of that genus must need it. This implies that God’s speech needs this special structure; that sound (the genus to which speech belongs) needs the same structure as speech; finally, that speech, when written or memorized (for Abû ‘Alî that also is real speech), needs the same structures it needs when it is pronounced. Because Abû ‘Alî must deny these conclusions, he must admit that his premise was not correct.

Speech (and sound) does not need hardness. We already saw that speech can exist in any substrate; consequently, it cannot need hardness (*salâba*) or solidity of its substrate.⁴⁰

*The substrate of speech is not qualified as speaking (mutakallim).*⁴¹ If the substrate of speech would be qualified as speaking, not the human being but the tongue would be qualified as speaking and, consequently, also as informing, commanding, prohibiting;⁴² the tongue also should be praised or blamed for good or evil speech

³⁷ *Mugni* VII, 40

³⁸ For the use of the term *maḳraj* by the Arab grammarians, especially by Sibawayhi, cf. Fleisch, *Traité*, 208-209 “Pour *mahrağ* nous disons “point d’articulation” Sibawayhi (et toute la tradition grammaticale) voit dans le *mahrağ* une zone, une region à délimiter” Sibawayhi mentions sixteen different *maḳârij* in the throat, tongue, and lips Cf. also Fleisch, *La conception phonétique*, 81

³⁹ *Mugni* VII, 41, line 15 – 42, line 8 It begins in line 15 after the full stop

⁴⁰ *Mugni* VII, 42, lines 9-11

⁴¹ *Mugni* VII, 50, line 10 – 51, line 10. Cf. also *Šarh* 537 and *Muhit* I, 321

⁴² Informing (*muḳbir*), commanding (*âmir*), and prohibiting (*nâhi*) are said to be “parts” (*aqsâm*) of speech, more correctly the corresponding *masdar* is called thus *ḳabar*, *amr*, *nahy*. It indicates a division of speech into several sub-categories

inhering in it. Moreover, nothing could be qualified as speaking because a substrate can only be the substrate of one letter—every letter needing its own structure—and one letter cannot be speech; therefore at least two letters are needed, but two letters cannot inhere in one and the same substrate. Consequently, no substrate at all can be called speaking.

Nor can we say that speaking is “he in a part of whom speech inheres” (*man ḥall ba‘dah*) because also in that case the tongue would be called speaking since speech inheres in a part of it.

In both cases (either when speaking is said to be the substrate, or a totality of which the substrate is a part), the echo would also be qualified as speaking, whereas God cannot⁴³ be speaking since speech cannot inhere in Him nor in a part of Him.

Similar expressions used to describe the subject who is qualified as “speaking” are also rejected by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr; one cannot say that a subject is “speaking” because speech is “*mawjûd bih*”⁴⁴ or “*qâ'im bih*”.⁴⁵

2. SPEECH DOES NOT NECESSITATE A LIVING BEING TO BE IN A STATE

The thesis that speech necessitates a composite body and living being⁴⁶ to be in a state, is refuted by ‘Abd al-Jabbâr in seven arguments, the first two of which prove directly that such a state is not possible and cannot be established, while the other five show the

⁴³ In *Mugnî* VII, 51, line 8, add the negation, which is found in the manuscript but missing in the printed text, read *an lâ yûsaf*.

⁴⁴ The expression *mawjûd bih* can have a double meaning in Arabic, either “existent on” or “existent by” If the first interpretation is meant, it has to be rejected since that corresponds with inhering, the second interpretation can be seen as corresponding with ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s own opinion that he made it Cf *Muḥit* I, 322 See also *Šarḥ* 538

⁴⁵ The expression *qâ'im bih* is poly-interpretable (in *Mugnî* VII, 51, line 14 one better corrects *muhtamal*, “poly-interpretable”, cf also *Mugnî* VII, 52, line 3 In *Šarḥ* 538 read in line 13 *qâ'im* instead of *qadim*) It can be used to indicate that it inheres (is located in), or that it is remaining and permanent—but remaining and permanence, *baqâ' wa-dawâm*, are impossible for speech or it can be an equivalent for *mawjûd bih*, or it can mean that it is governed by someone—and that also is impossible for speech—or that it comes from someone, this last interpretation corresponds with ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s doctrine But, since this expression is poly-interpretable, one cannot use it to describe the speaking subject

⁴⁶ Both the composite body (*al-jumla*) and the living being (*al-hayy*) are mentioned in the title of the eighth chapter of *Mugnî* VII, “*fî ann al-kalâm lâ yujib li-l-jumla wa-li-l-hayy ḥâlan*” (*Mugnî* VII, 43) For ‘Abd al-Jabbâr a composite body necessarily is a living being Cf p 174

incorrectness of this thesis by way of *ilzâm*, by showing the implications of it, implications that cannot be accepted.⁴⁷ We mention these seven arguments successively.

'Abd al-Jabbâr's first argument states that there is no way to know this state the living being should be in. If we could have this knowledge, it should be either necessary or acquired.⁴⁸ It is not known by necessary knowledge: when we are speaking or when someone else is speaking, we know nothing by necessary intuitive knowledge except the speech coming from the speaking subject; we know no state, just as we do not know any state when someone is moving something, bringing to rest, or beating.⁴⁹ Nor can it be known by acquired knowledge because the acts and the way in which they occur do not indicate such a state,⁵⁰ and no other state the living being is in supposes this being to be in such a state. Consequently, because we cannot know such a state, neither by necessary nor by acquired knowledge, we have to deny it.

The second argument⁵¹ has as starting-point the general principle: whenever a qualifier necessitates a living being to be in a state, the living being can be known to be in that state although one does not know the qualifier. This principle is proved by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by referring to the states "able" (*qâdir*)⁵² and "knowing" (*'âlim*), and by comparing speech with movement (*ḥaraka*) and beating (*ḍarb*).

⁴⁷ Cf. *Muḡni* VII, 43-47 (chapter 8), where the seven arguments are given. In *Šarḥ* 536-537 the first two arguments are mentioned; in *Muḥiṭ* I, 320-321 we find five arguments, corresponding with the first four mentioned in the *Muḡni*. The third argument of the *Muḥiṭ* can be found in the first argument of the *Muḡni*, in which the first and the third of the *Muḥiṭ* are combined into one.

⁴⁸ Thus the state of knowing (*'âlim*) is known by necessary knowledge when our own state is concerned, and by acquired knowledge when the state of someone else is concerned. The state of able (*qâdir*) is always known by acquired knowledge. In the *Muḥiṭ* we find a threefold division: a state can be known either by self-experience (*wijdân an-nafs*), or on the basis of perception, or because of a judgement that indicates it. This last is the case, e.g., when from the fact that someone is entitled to the judgement that precise acts are possible for him, is deduced that he is knowing. Cf. *Muḥiṭ* I, 320.

⁴⁹ This is the third argument mentioned in the *Muḥiṭ*: if speech were to necessitate the living being to be in a state, other acts he produces should necessitate the same (*Muḥiṭ* I, 321).

⁵⁰ So, for instance, acts indicate that the acting subject was in the state of being able; the occurring of an act in a precise way indicates that the subject was knowing; the occurring of an act in special ways (e.g., as a command) indicates that the subject is willing. We discussed all this in our paragraph about 'Abd al-Jabbâr's anthropology.

⁵¹ *Muḡni* VII, 44, line 1 45, line 9.

⁵² In *Muḡni* VII, 44, line 2 read with the manuscript *wa-lâ na'lam al-quḍra* instead of *aw lâ na'lam al-quḍra*.

The examples adduced by opponents which are based on the works of Abû Hâšim, are discussed and rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.⁵³

The third argument⁵⁴ starts from the principle that everything that necessitates a living being to be in a state, cannot possibly exist in a lifeless substrate.⁵⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr cannot directly state that it must exist in a part of the subject that is in that state, for there is one exception: God's will, which necessitates Him to be willing, does not exist in a part of Him, but without a substrate. But the will also cannot exist in a lifeless substrate. Thus, a qualifier existing in a part of a living being necessitates that being to be in a state; when it exists without a substrate, it necessitates God to be in a state. Nevertheless, speech can exist in a lifeless substrate, such as the echo, the breath, and the air in the mouth. Consequently, it cannot necessitate a living being to be in a state.

A fourth argument,⁵⁶ which is said to have been used by Abû Hâšim, holds that God can create two instruments to speak in a human being (as He can create two hands and two eyes); in that case, the human being can speak with two opposite letters at the same time, and this again implies that he would be at the same moment in

⁵³ Four examples are adduced by the opponents: first, unconsciousness (*sahn*), which is said to necessitate a state without there being a way to know it. 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that Abû Hâšim's opinion varied. Sometimes he denied unconsciousness to necessitate a state, when he, however, affirms that it necessitates a state, it is said to be the opposite of knowledge, in that case it can be known. Abû Ishâq even denies that it is anything at all. The opponents adduce three other examples: will (*irâda*), reflection (*nazar*), and inability (*'ajz*) do not necessitate the living being to be in a state though they need and are confined to living beings, always in the opinion of Abû Hâšim. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is twofold. Abû Hâšim later held that will and inability do necessitate a state, and, moreover, the real question is entirely different, for the examples adduced by the opponents do not necessitate the living being to be in a state. The states of being unconscious and of being unable can be known because they are the opposites of states known: being knowing and being able. As for reflection, according to Abû Hâšim it is an act and the quality reflecting is a factual quality, just as speaking is, for 'Abd al-Jabbâr it is a qualifier necessitating the living being to be in a state, which is known by self-experience as we already saw (Cf pp. 40-41).

⁵⁴ Cf *Mugnî* VII, 45, line 10 - 46, line 8.

⁵⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents try to make an objection against this principle on the basis of the divine will. 'Abd al-Jabbâr had already formulated his principle in a way that this objection could not be valid. Moreover, though he says that will existing without a substrate necessitates God to be in a state, his opponents will surely not affirm that speech existing in a lifeless substrate (such as echo and breath) necessitates God to be in a state.

⁵⁶ Cf *Mugnî* VII, 46, lines 9-20.

two opposite states, which is impossible, for both would characterize the whole person.⁵⁷

The fifth argument⁵⁸ states that the speech of two persons can exist in one and the same body; this leads to the conclusion that a subject could be at one and the same moment in two opposite states.⁵⁹

The sixth argument⁶⁰ concludes from the thesis of the opponents that no speech could exist after death; one knows, nevertheless, that this is possible ('Abd al-Jabbâr does not explain how).⁶¹

The seventh and last argument is composed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself as he with some pride remarks;⁶² it runs: letters are different from each other, but they all belong to the genus sound. This implies that every letter would cause the living being to be in a different state, and that other kinds of sound we make (screaming or even clapping hands) would also necessitate us to be in a state.

*The quality speaking does not indicate the subject to be in a state.*⁶³ It is not necessary to elaborate this statement; we saw above that there is no such state; consequently, the quality "speaking" cannot refer to and be based upon such a state.

3. SPEAKING MEANS MAKING SPEECH

When a given subject is said to be entitled to the quality "speaking" (*mutakallim*), and when this quality is applied to this subject, the reason must be that the subject is "making speech" (*fâ'il kalâm*) or "that speech existed from his side according to his intention and his will".⁶⁴

⁵⁷ Cf. also *Muḥiṭ* I, 321, where one has to read in line 10 *kuḥḥat* instead of *kuḥfat*.

⁵⁸ *Muḡni* VII, 47, lines 1-2.

⁵⁹ One might suppose that 'Abd al-Jabbâr here thinks of the echo, where the speech of two people can exist at the same time. It is not clear which subject would be in a state because of this double speech.

⁶⁰ *Muḡni* VII, 47, lines 3-4

⁶¹ Perhaps this argument was originally made by someone who was an adherent of Abû 'Alî's theory that speech can also exist as written or memorized. Otherwise, we have to think of speech which is still present the moment just after the death of the speaking subject, speech remaining longer than one time-atom.

⁶² *Muḡni* VII, 47, lines 4-12 (it begins in line 4 after the comma). After giving this argument he says: "this indication belongs to the strongest which are given in this chapter, I did not know it to be mentioned in the books". This remark may shed some light on the way 'Abd al-Jabbâr habitually works. In *Muḡni* VII, 47, line 14, read with the manuscript *mâ ḏakarâh* instead of *mâ ḏakarah*.

⁶³ Cf. *Muḡni* VII, 51

⁶⁴ This is the formula used in the title of the chapter in the *Muḡni* concerning

We already saw how 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves this thesis to be correct, arguing by means of a *taqsim*, by way of division and exclusion:⁶⁵ when the connection between speech and the subject qualified as speaking cannot be that speech inheres in the speaking subject or in a part of this subject, nor that speech necessitates the subject to be in a state, the only remaining possibility is that the connection is the one between the acting subject and the act. Consequently, the speaking subject is qualified in this way because he made speech.

Another argument, showing some similarity with the preceding one, makes also use of the method of *taqsim*.⁶⁶ It is an established and incontestable fact that there is speech in the echo. The substrate in which that speech inheres cannot be qualified as speaking, nor can the totality in a part of which it inheres. God also cannot be qualified by this speech since speech in the echo can be evil and God cannot be qualified by something evil. Therefore, only man can be qualified by it, and only the one according to whose intentions that speech occurs in the echo. He is qualified as speaking because he made that speech.

this subject "*fi ann haqiqat al-mutakallim annah yûjad al-kalâm min jhatih wa-bi-hasab qasdh wa-irâdatih*" (*Mugni* VII, 48)

The way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr describes the connection between an act and its acting subject may be slightly different in his various works (Cf p 207 and note 249 on p 207) In the present context the *Šarh* uses the expression '*alâ dawâ'ih*' (on his motives, *Šarh* 539), the *Mugni* gives a formula which is more elaborate than the one mentioned above *bi-hasab qasdh wa-irâdatih wa-dawâ'ih* (according to his intention, his will, and his motives, *Mugni* VII, 48, line 5), the *Muhit* keeps to its own vocabulary and gives *bi-hasab ahwâlîh* (according to his states, *Muhit* I, 320) This subject is discussed in *Šarh* 535-539, *Mugni* VII, 48-54, *Muhit* I, 320-322 The three works all mention the argument based on the *taqsim* and the one based upon the use of the term *mutakallim* by the *ahl al-luga*, the *Mugni* and the *Muhit* also give the argument based on the "parts of speech"

⁶⁵ We already discussed this *taqsim* on p 313 It is elaborated in *Šarh* 536-539 and in *Mugni* VII, 50, line 7-52, line 21 In the *Muhit* it is only mentioned (*Muhit* I, 320) To make the *taqsim* correct and valid, one has to show that it covers all possibilities Besides a number of instances adduced by the opponents, which according to them are not covered by this *taqsim*, and which are discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in *Mugni* VII, 52, one definition of "speaking" remains that we have not yet mentioned This definition has that speaking means "having speech" *al-mutakallim man kalâm lah* (*Muhit* I, 322, cf *Mugni* VII, 52 *lah kalâm*, *Šarh* 538-539 *al-kalâm kalâmuh aw kalâm lah*) This definition is rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr because it is poly-interpretable, the *Muhit* mentions three different meanings possession (*mulk*), contact (*ittišâf*), and act (*fi'l*), the *Šarh* distinguishes in the contact between contact (*ittišâf*) and characterizing (*iktisâs*) As instances of possession are mentioned a servant and a horse, as instances of contact the parts of the body. One might draw the conclusion that "vision" (*ra'y*) and "governing" (*sivâsa*) are instances of "characterizing" (*iktisâs*) and that the text of *Mugni* VII, 52, line 5, has to be completed accordingly *bi-ma'nâ l-iktisâs* instead of *bi-ma'nâ t-tafkir* as proposed by al-Abyârî

⁶⁶ *Mugni* VII, 50, lines 1-6

Besides these two indirect arguments, 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives in the *Muğni* two direct arguments to prove his thesis.⁶⁷ The first argument⁶⁸ appeals to the people who really have knowledge of the Arabic language, the *ahl al-luġa*;⁶⁹ they call someone speaking when they know that speech occurs according to his intention, will, and motives; when they do not know this, they do not call him speaking. They do not draw the conclusion that this implies that the subject to be qualified produced and made that speech. This conclusion supposes a reflection, and only people who have knowledge of reflection, the "*ahl an-naẓar*", draw this conclusion. But the manner in which these *ahl al-luġa* apply this name shows that they apply it to the subjects who made speech. They say, for instance, that a demon⁷⁰ is speaking on the tongue of a possessed lunatic (*maṣrû*). 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies this,⁷¹ but from this example it becomes clear how they use the word speaking: they perceive the speech coming from the lunatic, but they ascribe it to a demon because they are convinced that the demon,⁷² and not the lunatic, made it. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's last argument⁷³ is concerned with the "parts of speech" (*aqsâm al-kalâm*), the different ways in which speech can occur determined by the concomitant will, the intention. Speech can only occur as command (*amr*), prohibition (*nahy*), or information (*ḵabar*) because of the influence which the intention and the state of being intending have on this speech. This state can only have influence on the acts which the subject that is in this state performs.⁷⁴ Therefore, the speaking (and commanding, prohibiting, and informing) subject must be the subject who made speech, and who made it belong to one of the "parts of speech" by the concomitant will.

⁶⁷ These two arguments are both found in the *Muḥit*. But in that work the argument based on the vocabulary of the *ahl al-luġa* is not mentioned among the arguments concerning the reality behind the names (*al-mā'nâ*), but among the arguments concerning the names (*al-asmâ'*). Cf. *Muḥit* I, 320 and 322.

⁶⁸ *Muğni* VII, 48, line 7-49, line 20. Cf. also *Muḥit* I, 322 and *Šarḥ* 535-536.

⁶⁹ In this text *ahl al-luġa* is used and also *ahl an-naẓar* for people who really know the language and people who really know reflection, it is not clear whether he has in mind the respective scholars, philologists and philosophers theologians, or that the expression is broader.

⁷⁰ In *Muğni* VII, 48, line 17 read with the manuscript *al-jinnî* instead of *al-jinn*.

⁷¹ Cf. *Muğni* VII, 49.

⁷² In the context it is not possible to read *al-hayy* in *Muğni* VII, 48, line 19; one evidently has to correct the text and read *al-jinnî*.

⁷³ *Muğni* VII, 53, lines 1-3. Cf. *Muḥit* I, 320.

⁷⁴ Cf. *Muḥit* I, 320.

D. GOD IS SPEAKING BY TEMPORAL SPEECH

After discussing speech as we make it, and the quality speaking as it is applied to speaking subjects in this world, we must now take the step towards the other world, and try to deal with God's speech and His being speaking on the basis of what we came to know about the reality of this world.¹

For Muslims the Qur'ân is God's speech though some theologians make a distinction between God's eternal speech (the eternal Qur'ân) on the one hand and the Qur'ân which is revealed and which we hear and recite on the other.² For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, the Qur'ân is God's speech, though not His only speech; God made other speech too.³ Because 'Abd al-Jabbâr treats God's speech and the original Qur'ân together, we do the same in this paragraph. The Qur'ân we hear and recite is treated in the section about reproduction.

In a first section we give a status questionis; we summarize the opinion of the Mu'tazila and of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and mention the doctrine of the opponents with whom 'Abd al-Jabbâr goes into discussion.⁴

After this introduction we discuss first the direct argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives to prove that God is speaking: the fact that He made speech. One could call this argument "a posteriori".

In a third section we deal with his second argument, an indirect argument following the methods of the *taqsim*. It is the same *taqsim* we already met when we discussed God's other qualities: God can be entitled to a quality either per se, or by a cause, or "neither per se nor by a cause"; when He is entitled to it by a cause, this cause is either eternal or temporal. In this way, too, 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that God is speaking by a temporal speech.

¹ The greatest part of *Mugnî* VII is devoted to this subject, especially because of the attention given to the arguments of the opponents and their refutation *Mugnî* VII, 58-180 Cf also *Šarh* 530-545 and *Muhîr* I, 327-336 and 349-355 See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Ulmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 234-240. Bouman's article *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr* is mainly devoted to this subject

² Thus, for instance, the Aš'ariya, who state that God has an eternal speech which is one and indivisible, and that the Qur'ân which is revealed and which we recite and hear is an expression (*'ibâra*) of it Cf. p 282

³ Cf the title of *Mugnî* VII. "*al-kalâm fî l-Qur'ân wa-sâ'ir kalâm Allâh subhânah wa-ta'âlâ*"

⁴ *Mugnî* VII, 3-5.

Finally, in a last section of this paragraph we mention the arguments of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents to prove their own theses in so far they are discussed and refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr; these especially are the arguments used by the adherents of Ibn Kullâb and al-Aš'arî.

1. VARIOUS OPINIONS ABOUT GOD'S SPEECH

The way 'Abd al-Jabbâr records the various opinions adhered to concerning the essence of God's speech and the Qur'ân,⁵ is not a historical survey or an exhaustive list of names. It is an enumeration of all the details about which there was disagreement, but only the most important opponents are mentioned by name.⁶ For the moment suffice it to compare the different doctrines in this one point, the one detail of God's speech and the Qur'ân.

The first opponent mentioned is Hišâm bn al-Ḥakam.⁷ For him a quality (*sifa*) is an accident inhering in a substance. He distinguishes between the eternal Qur'ân and what we hear and recite on earth.⁸ He states: the Qur'ân is God's quality and cannot have itself a quality (since an accident cannot inhere in an accident). Therefore, we can say nothing about it.

Next mention is made of Ibn Kullâb and his theological school, the Kullâbiya,⁹ who apparently function as 'Abd al-Jabbâr's main opponents.¹⁰ For Ibn Kullâb, too, a quality is an accident. Speech is a quality of God, not created, and not produced. It cannot have the quality "eternity" because an accident cannot inhere in an accident, but it is eternal by God's eternity, by an accident not inhering in itself but in God's essence. God's speech is not identical with God, not a part of Him, and not something other than Him.¹¹ God's speech is

⁵ Cf *Mugnî* VII, 3-5 and also *Šarḥ* 527-528

⁶ For a survey of the various opinions adhered to up to the time of al-Aš'arî, both in respect to the Qur'ân which we hear and recite and in respect to God's speech, cf al-Aš'arî, *Maqâlât*, 582-611, and for a discussion and rendering of this text, Pretzl, *Attributenlehre*, 27-35 Cf also Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Fisal*, III, 4-5 Bouman's book *Le conflit autour du Coran* also gives a good survey

⁷ Cf *Mugnî* VII, 3 See also our p 22 and al-Aš'arî, *Maqâlât*, 40

⁸ He knows a distinction between the eternal Qur'ân and what we hear in this world, this is a trace (*rasm*) of the Qur'ân, and since it is sounds, it is created Cf al-Aš'arî, *Maqâlât*, 40

⁹ Cf *Mugnî* VII, 4 and *Šarḥ* 527-528 See also our pp 21-22

¹⁰ They are mentioned even in the title of chapter 15 of *Mugnî* VII "against the Kullâbiya" (*Mugnî* VII, 95)

¹¹ Because the term Qur'ân is used to indicate both God's own speech and what

one and indivisible, the earthly Qur'ân, revealed by God, is a reproduction (*hikâya*) of it¹²

Among the followers of Ibn Kullâb is reckoned al-Aš'arî¹³ As he makes a difference in this world between *al-kalâm an-nafsi* (speech in the soul) and *al-kalâm al-lafzi* (pronounced speech), so he does in the discussion of God's speech God's "inner speech" is an eternal quality, inhering in His essence, the revealed Qur'ân is an expression (*'ibâra*) of it.¹⁴ God's eternal speech¹⁵ is not God, nor something other than God, God is not His speech, nor something other than His speech¹⁶

In the same line of tradition we meet al-Bâqillâni, a contemporary of 'Abd al-Jabbâr (he died in 403 AH/ 1013 AD), who is not mentioned by name in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's summing up, but who certainly was very important among the Aš'ariya¹⁷ In his *Insâf* he states: "Know that—according to the *Ahl as-Sunna wa-l-jamâ'a*—¹⁸ God is speaking, having speech, and that his speech is eternal, not created, not made, and not temporal,¹⁹ but His speech is eternal, one of His essential

we hear when the text of the Qur'ân is recited, the texts sometimes are ambiguous In *Mugni* VII 4 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the Qur'ân, we have to understand this as the eternal Qur'ân, God's eternal speech The statement that the Qur'ân is not God Himself nor a part of Him is directed against the Hašwiya as we shall see below

¹² Cf *Šarh* 527 See also Allard, *Le probleme*, 147-152, Tritton, *The Speech of God*, 11 Van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 110, describes his doctrine against the background of the doctrine about God's qualities as follows "(Ibn Kullâb) sieht alle Aussagen über den Koran im grosseren Zusammenhang der allgemeinen Attributenlehre, und hier liess sich kaum mit solchen ungelenken Termini wie 'Teil' arbeiten Namen und Attribute Gottes sind allesamt nicht von Gott verschieden, aber doch auch nicht mit ihm identisch man musste ja sonst die Eigenschaften unter sich austauschen können, sein Wissen etwa mit seiner Allmacht gleichsetzen, und das geht doch nicht an Die Attribute sind weder gleich Gott noch nicht gleich Positiv ausgedrückt Gott und seine Attribute haben etwas gemeinsames, so wie jene unter sich etwas gemeinsames haben, sie subsistieren allesamt in Gott (*qâ'im billâh*), ohne selbst noch einmal ineinander subsistieren zu können 'Gott redet' heisst in Gott subsistiert das Attribut Rede', und so für alle anderen Attribute, aber damit ist nicht gesagt, dass er nun mit seinem Willen oder mit seiner Allmacht rede" Cf also pp 105 and 106 of this article

¹³ Cf *Mugni* VII 4 and *Šarh* 528 See also pp 20-21

¹⁴ Cf especially *Šarh* 528 See also Ahmed *A Survey*, 102

¹⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr (*Mugni* VII, 4) uses here the term 'al-Qur'ân' What is meant is not the worldly expression but God's own speech

¹⁶ Cf Tritton *The Speech of God*, 13, also Laoust, *Les schismes*, 129-130, and the book of Allard about al-Aš'arî

¹⁷ Cf Sezgin, *GAS* I, 608-610, his full name and title are al-Qâdi Abû Bakr Muhammad bn at-Tayyib bn Muhammad al-Bâqillâni

¹⁸ Literally "the people of the *Sunna* and the community", al-Bâqillâni qualifies his own doctrine as that of the people who follow Muhammad and the doctrine of the great majority of Muslims

¹⁹ The three terms denied here (*maklûq, maf'ûl muhdat*) are the three terms used by the Mu'tazila and by 'Abd al-Jabbâr to describe the Qur'ân Cf *Mugni* VII, 3

qualities, just as His knowledge, His ability, His will, and other similar essential qualities. It is not permitted to say that God's speech is an expression nor that it is a reproduction;²⁰ it is not qualified by something from the qualities of creation. It is not permitted to say: my pronunciation of the Qur'ân is created, nor that it is uncreated; nor: I speak by God's speech."²¹

This can be said to be a summary of the doctrine of the Aš'arîya, against which 'Abd al-Jabbâr has to defend the Mu'tazilî doctrine.

A second category and historical line of opponents, besides the line which derived its name from Ibn Kullâb and al-Aš'arî, is called by 'Abd al-Jabbâr that of the Ḥašwîya.²² They are the strict traditionalists who are said to be related to the famous collector of traditions, Ibn Ḥanbal, who played an important part in the discussions about the Qur'ân during the period of the *Mihna*.²³ 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes the reproach that they identified the Qur'ân with God or called it a part of Him.²⁴ We have to bear in mind, however, that they made a difference between the Qur'ân as God's speech existing with God, and the Qur'ân as the text we read, memorize, and recite here on earth. The Mu'tazila, in their attacks on this doctrine, did not always do justice to this distinction.²⁵ About the Qur'ân as God's speech "in heaven" they say that it is identical with God or a part of Him—this is denied by Ibn Kullâb and by al-Aš'arî in their expression that the Qur'ân is neither God, nor a part of Him, nor something other than God—²⁶ and some of them say that it is a body, others that it is neither body nor accident; some say that it exists in one place, others that it does exist in several places.²⁷ Also about the Qur'ân as we know it in this

²⁰ The term expression (*'ihâra*) was used by al-Aš'arî to indicate the text of the Qur'ân in this world, the term reproduction (*hikâya*) was used by Ibn Kullâb and by some Mu'tazila, among whom 'Abd al-Jabbâr Cf also 'Abd al-Karim 'Uṭmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklif*, 239-240

²¹ Al-Bâqillânî, *al-Insâf*, 62 See also pp 23-24 and 33 of the same work and pp 26-27 of al-Bâqillânî's *at-Tamhîd*

²² Cf for a discussion of this name and the trend of Islamic thinking which is indicated by it pp 22-23

²³ See our p 1 Laoust, *La profession de foi*, 83 gives a list of some sources where the doctrine of the Ḥanâbila concerning God's speech and the Qur'ân can be found

²⁴ *Mugnî* VII, 4

²⁵ This distinction is emphasized by van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 102-103

²⁶ Cf *Mugnî* VII, 4 The expressions mentioned and ascribed to respectively Ibn Kullâb and al-Aš'arî do not make much difference Al-Aš'arî excludes explicitly the possibility that God were a part of the Qur'ân (His name being written in it), cf van Ess, *Ibn Kullâb*, 109, basing himself on the text of al-Aš'arî's *Maqâlât*

²⁷ *Mugnî* VII, 4

world they disagree with the Kullâbiya and Aš'ariya; according to them the Qur'ân we recite, write down, or remember is uncreated, non-temporal, but co-eternal with God.²⁸

'Abd al-Jabbâr does not mention the names of representatives of this doctrine,²⁹ but we find these ideas in the traditionalist confessions of faith, the so-called "aqâ'id", which summarize the most important and disputed points of traditionalist Islamic faith.³⁰ Further, we have to mention Ibn Ḥanbal, who gave his name to a trend of Islamic thinking where this doctrine was accepted.³¹ From among his followers we mention Ibn Baṭṭa;³² and though he does not belong to the Ḥanâbila (the followers of Ibn Ḥanbal), we have to mention here Ibn Ḥazm, who stands in the same line of tradition.³³ He was younger than 'Abd

²⁸ Cf *Šarh* 527

²⁹ He only ascribes this opinion in *Šarh* 527 to a special category of adherents of Ibn Ḥanbal

³⁰ About these short summaries of the main points of Islamic faith about which there was some difference of opinion among Muslims, we spoke already on p 0-0. There we gave a translation of art 9 of the so-called *Wasīyat Abi Ḥanīfa*, which was composed about 210 AH/ 825 AD during the lifetime of Ibn Ḥanbal. Cf also *al-Fiqh al-Akbar II*, which according to Watt, art 'Akīda, *EP*², I, 335, was composed in about 350 AH/ 961 AD. In the second article of this creed we read "He speaks by virtue of His speech. His speech being an eternal quality" Cf Wensinck, *The Muslim Creed*, 188, who made the translation

³¹ Ahmad bn Ḥanbal lived from 164 AH/ 780 AD to 241 AH/ 855 AD. He is famous as a collector of *hadīṭ* (traditions), but besides this, a school of Islamic jurisprudence received his name, he became known as a theologian who opposed the Mu'tazila and the caliphs who supported them during the time of the *Mihna*. Michel Allard translated a saying of his about the Qur'ân as it was recorded in the *Tabaqât al-Ḥanâbila* I, 29: "Le Coran est la parole de Dieu, celle qu'il a proférée, il n'est pas créé. Celui qui prétend que le Coran est crée, est un ġahmite et un infidèle. Celui qui dit que le Coran est la parole de Dieu, mais qui ne va pas plus loin et ne dit pas qu'il n'est pas crée, son opinion est pire que la précédente. Celui qui prétend que notre prononciation du Coran et notre récitation sont créées, alors que le Coran est la parole de Dieu, est ġahmite. Et celui qui ne traite pas tous ces gens-là d'infidèles est comme eux" Allard, *Le problème*, 100.

³² About Ibn Batta, see Laoust, *La profession de foi*. Cf also his article in *EP*², I, 734-735. Ibn Batta was a theologian and juriscult and a follower of Ibn Ḥanbal. He lived from 304 AH/ 917 AD to 387 AH/ 997 AD. In his *credo* we read "It (the Qur'ân) is knowledge of His knowledge, uncreated, and how it may be read, how it may be written, and where ever it is recited and in whatever place it may be, be it in heaven or on earth, be it guarded on the preserved tablet or drawn on the sheets of paper or the tablets of children, or carved out in stone, in all situations and in all places it is God's uncreated speech" Cf Laoust, *La profession de foi*, p 0, where the Arabic text is given. The translation of the *credo* on pp 83-87 is not entirely correct, one better takes the original text.

³³ Ibn Ḥazm lived from 384 AH/ 994 AD to 456 AH/ 1064 AD and so was a younger contemporary of 'Abd al-Jabbâr. Cf Arnaldez, *Grammaire et théologie*, and also his article in *EP*², III, 790-799.

al-Jabbâr and lived in another part of the Islamic world, but we can quote his words as representative of the doctrine of this category of opponents. He summarizes: "When someone uses the word 'the Qur'ân' or the word 'God's speech', both sayings have the same meaning, the words are different; the Qur'ân really—and not metaphorically—is God's speech."³⁴ "God's knowledge is eternal; it is God's speech; it is the Qur'ân; it is not created; it is in no way something other than God.... We say that God really has speech, and that He really and not metaphorically spoke to Moses and to prophets and angels to whom He spoke, with a speech to them (*taklîm*, not *kalâm*, the usual word for speech³⁵)".³⁶

The third and last line of opponents is that of the Naturalists,³⁷ who state that the Qur'ân cannot possibly be God's act. With these opponents 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not enter into discussion in the seventh part of the *Muğni* and in the parallel texts of the *Muḥîṭ* and the *Šarḥ*. He does this later when discussing the indications to distinguish real prophecy, and to prove that the Qur'ân really is God's speech.³⁸

If we compare the way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses the doctrine of his various opponents in the *Muğni* with the way he does so in the *Šarḥ*, we come to the conclusion that in the *Šarḥ* he is strongly interested in the text of the Qur'ân on earth, whereas the *Muğni* has a broader field of interest but is mostly concerned with God's speech in itself, without paying much attention to its being recited, written down, or memorized on earth.

When we now come to the doctrine of the Mu'tazila, we conclude with 'Abd al-Jabbâr that there is some clear agreement between Mu'tazila notwithstanding some difference of opinion in the way the general principles are elaborated.³⁹ The general principles adhered to

³⁴ Cf *Kitâb al-Fisal*, III, 7

³⁵ The difference between *kalâm* and *taklîm*, respectively speech and speech directed to someone, plays a part in the discussion whether eternal speech is possible or not. Some theologians admit that *taklîm* requires the existence of a person who can be addressed, meanwhile urging that that is not required for *kalâm*.

³⁶ Cf Ibn Ḥazm, *Kitâb al-Fisal*, III, 9. Ibn Ḥazm's adhering to the literal text of the Qur'ân becomes apparent on the same page of his *Kitâb al-Fisal* where he says: "it is not permitted to say absolutely that God is speaking (*mutakallim*) since He did not call Himself such (sc in the text of the Qur'ân)".

³⁷ Cf p 23 about this category of opponents

³⁸ The prophecies and the proofs of the inimitability of the Qur'ân (the main argument to show that the Qur'ân really is God's speech) are discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in the fifteenth and sixteenth parts of his *Muğni*.

³⁹ Cf *Muğni* VII, 3. See also al-Aš'arî, *Maqâlât*, 185-186 and 191-192, where a

by all Mu'tazila are very well summarized in the introduction to the seventh part of the *Muğni*; all elements are gathered together, and expressed against the background of the discussions about this subject: God is speaking; He is so by temporal speech He made as His act and which can be called created; He made it for the benefit of mankind, and thus it is His good act Suffice it to quote that text here in full: "Among the adherents of the (God's) Justice there is no disagreement at all about the fact that the Qur'ân is created, produced (*muḥḍaḍ*: produced or temporal), and made; that it was after it was not; that it is something other than God; that God produced it in accordance with the interests of mankind; that He is able to produce similar things, and that He is qualified as informing, saying, commanding, and prohibiting by it, because He made it. All are unanimous in saying that God is speaking by the Qur'ân".⁴⁰

2 GOD IS SPEAKING SINCE HE MADE SPEECH

The argument we discuss in this section is the one first mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his *Muğni*;⁴¹ this argument can be said to be "a posteriori": from the fact that we know that God made speech, speech as we know it in this world and as 'Abd al-Jabbâr defined and described it, we conclude that God is entitled to the quality speaking (*mutakallim*) in the same way we are entitled to it.

In the text of the *Muğni* this argument is divided into two sections, corresponding to two different chapters. In the first chapter 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves that God is able to produce speech, and in the second that He actually produced it and therefore is qualified as speaking.⁴² He does not explicitly state why he makes this division, nor why he first proves that God is able to produce speech, though the only thing he needs in order to prove that God is speaking is the knowledge

number of details is mentioned about which there was some disagreement among Mu'tazila

⁴⁰ This text is found in *Muğni* VII, 3 Cf also *Šarh* 528 See also al-Bâqillâni, *Kitâb at-tamhîd*, 253 and aš-Šahrastâni, *Kitâb al-milâl wa-n-nihal*, I, 99 See also Tritton, *The Speech of God*, 10-13

⁴¹ *Muğni* VII, 55-61 Cf also *Muḥit* I, 327-328. 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṣmân, *Nazariyat at-taklîf*, 234-235 takes the two arguments given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr together

⁴² The first chapter (the tenth of this part of the *Muğni*) is found in *Muğni* VII, 55-57 and bears the title "The Eternal is able to produce speech the reality of which we explained", the second chapter (chapter eleven of this part of the *Muğni*) is found in *Muğni* VII, 58-61 and bears the title "The Eternal made speech and became by it speaking"

that He made speech.⁴³ There may be two reasons for including the first chapter and making it precede the second one.⁴⁴ The first reason is that in this way he shows that God essentially, per se, and eternally has the metaphysical possibility to produce speech and to become entitled to the quality speaking. It is like the difference between the qualities “*bašîr*” and “*muhşîr*”, “*samî*” and “*sâmî*”; in this case something is said about God’s essence.⁴⁵ The second reason is that he has to show that God’s speech is possible for Him and not necessary, for, if it were necessary, the judgements “good” and “evil” could not be applied to it, and certainly not to God because of His speech.⁴⁶

We already saw that the quality “speaking” only means “making speech”, and that it does not imply the use of secondary causes, instruments, or a special organism.⁴⁷ If God is able to produce speech in any way, He can become speaking; if He actually produced speech in any way, He is entitled to the quality “speaking”.

God is able to produce speech. To prove the correctness of this statement, ‘Abd al-Jabbâr gives three different arguments. The first argument⁴⁸ deduces from the fact that God is essentially able and, therefore, able to produce anything a subject that is able by an ability is able to produce—except the individual things someone else is able to produce—that He must be able to produce the genus speech since human beings are able to produce it.

The second argument⁴⁹ starts from the general principle that who is able to produce a secondary cause (*sabab*), is also able to produce its effect. Since God is able to produce pressure (*i’timâd*) and knocking

⁴³ Cf. *Mugni* VII, 58: “The method to establish that He is speaking, is the knowledge of the existence of speech from Him, and nothing else”

⁴⁴ Compare this structure with what ‘Abd al-Jabbâr says in *Mugni* VI:1, 3 where he explains why he first shows that God is able to produce acts that would be evil if He produced them, to show afterwards that He actually does not produce such acts

⁴⁵ Cf. especially pp. 180-181 and 191

⁴⁶ Cf. the definitions of evil and good mentioned on pp. 87-88. In these definitions it is explicitly stated that the subject must be able or that it is his act, and we know that the term act indicates in itself the relation with an able subject (cf. p. 116)

⁴⁷ Cf. *Mugni* VII, 56-57 and also *Muhit* I, 327. In the *Muhit* ‘Abd al-Jabbâr mentions as an argument that instruments cannot be mentioned in the text of a definition. Speaking cannot be “making speech by an instrument or by the tongue”, but it can only be defined as “making speech”. Cf. also our pp. 77-78, about the conditions for a definition to be correct

⁴⁸ Cf. *Mugni* VII, 55, lines 3-11

⁴⁹ Cf. *Mugni* VII, 55, lines 12-14

(*musâkka*)—the secondary causes of speech—⁵⁰ He is able to produce speech. The third argument states that every indication indicating that God actually made speech, also indicates that He is able to make and produce it.⁵¹

When the opponents attack 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine by comparing as they frequently do—speech with knowledge and the quality speaking with knowing, 'Abd al-Jabbâr emphasizes again the difference between the two qualities.⁵²

When the opponents state that the quality speaking cannot be applied to God since it implies the use of instruments or since other factual qualities, too, cannot be applied to Him, his answer runs that the quality speaking does not imply anything except the pure "factuality" that the qualified subject made speech. Therefore, God can be qualified as speaking when He makes speech.⁵³

*God made speech and by it became speaking*⁵⁴ We saw above that

⁵⁰ Cf p 314

⁵¹ This argument is given in *Mugni* VII, 56, lines 10 (after the full stop)-11. In this context 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives an *argumentum ad hominem*. The same opponent who denies that God can produce speech and become in that way speaking states that God has power over (is able to) the acts of man, and, consequently, also his speech. This opponent must be someone from the school of Ibn Kullâb or al-Aṣ'arî as appears also from the mention of the "*kaṣb*".

⁵² The opponents appeal to the fact that the Mu'tazila say (read in *Mugni* VII, 55, line 16 *tuhilân* instead of *juhilân*) that God cannot produce His own knowledge, ability, and life because He is essentially knowing, able, and living. He is not able to produce those accidents. In a similar way one can say that God is not able to produce speech since He is speaking per se or by (read in *Mugni* VII, 55, line 16 *bi-kalâm* instead of *li-kalâm*) eternal speech. In his answer 'Abd al-Jabbâr points to two differences between speech and knowledge: first, knowledge must inhere in the subject who is qualified by it as knowing, whereas speech may inhere in any substrate because the acting agent is qualified by it; second, speech does not entail a state for the qualified subject so that there can be no chance that a subject would be at the same time in two different states, whereas knowledge does entail a state.

⁵³ Speech only needs a substrate as we saw before. God can produce it in a substrate without using instruments. When He produces it in a specially structured (read in *Mugni* VII, 57, line 6 *al-mahni'a* instead of *al-mubayyana*) substrate as the tongue, He does not need this as an instrument, although we do need this as such.

The opponents say that God cannot be qualified as "serving" (*âbid*), "obeying" (*ḡādî*) or "thanking" (*ṣâkir*). 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies, that these qualities do not indicate only (read *tuḡid* instead of *ta'dû* in *Mugni* VII, 57, line 11, this emendation is required both by the text of the manuscript and the sense of the context) the doing of an act but other things too. That is not the case with the qualification "speaking", which only indicates the occurring of the act, consequently, God is able to become (read in *Mugni* VII, 57, line 14 *vasir* instead of *nasir*) speaking.

⁵⁴ *Mugni* VII, chapter 11 (58-61). The chapter consists of two parts, the first part dealing with the way in which we can establish that God is speaking, the second part (which starts in *Mugni* VII, 59, line 15) actually establishing that God is speaking.

the quality "speaking" belongs to the factual qualities, which indicate that the qualified subject did a given act. The only way we can establish that a subject is entitled to a factual quality is by establishing the existence of the act concerned as coming from this subject. The way in which the act is established is not important, be it based on intuition (*'aql*) or on revelation (*sam'*), be it by truthful information, by perception, by argumentation, or by any other way;⁵⁵ only by establishing the existence of the act in any way—there is no other method—⁵⁶ can one establish that a subject is entitled to the quality concerned. Consequently, the only method to establish that God is entitled to the quality speaking, is to establish the existence of speech coming from Him.

The next question arises : how can we know that God actually made speech? Because man is also able to produce speech, we can never be sure that God made it.⁵⁷ For 'Abd al-Jabbâr, one way remains to

⁵⁵ Read in *Muğni* VII, 58, line 8 *nakbur* (we know by experience) instead of *nuji:* (we admit).

⁵⁶ Opponents mention two other possible ways to establish that God is speaking first, because other acts or qualities indicate that He is speaking, and, second, by denying that He is dumb and silent. The first method is used to prove that God is able (based on His acts) and living (based on His being knowing and able), the second method is said to be used to prove that God is perceiving (by denying defects) and knowing (by denying the opposites). 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer to the first suggestion is that God's being speaking does not make any act possible nor any other quality. His answer to the second suggestion is that this distinction is only applicable to living beings that speak with instruments and not (one has to add the negation *lâ* in *Muğni* VII, 59, line 8, before the verbal form *yajub*, the negation is absent from the manuscript too) to God, who does not need the use of instruments. Moreover, a living being can be without any of the three qualities speaking, silent, dumb. We shall see that later on, 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that he already explained this in his *naqd al-luma'* (*Muğni* VII, 59, line 12, to correct in this way, instead of *ba'd al-luma'*). This work of 'Abd al-Jabbâr is mentioned in *Muğni* XX/2, 258, where it is said to have been written before the *Muğni*. Probably it is an answer to al-Aš'arî's *Kutâb al-luma'*. Cf also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Ujmân, *Qâdî l-Qudât*, 71.

⁵⁷ The argument is given in the form of an objection and the answer of 'Abd al-Jabbâr to that objection. Al-Abyârî misunderstood the structure of this argument and added in *Muğni* VII, 59, line 19 the word *qil* to introduce the answer. This is not correct since the answer is introduced by the word *qil* in *Muğni* VII, 60, line 14.

The objection can be schematized as follows. You cannot know that something is God's speech since man is able to produce speech and speech always can be produced by man. If you appeal to its (the Qur'ân's) extreme eloquence, I answer that God can make it possible for, e.g., an angel to make it. If you say that you know it by the words of the prophet and the consensus of the Muslims, I answer that you have to establish a chain of sure witnesses from the first one who really knew it was God's speech. That is not possible.

The answer given by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, and which can be found in our text, is not as simple as the two suggested by his opponent.

discover that some speech really is God's speech : when speech occurs in a miraculous, inimitable way, and when it indicates the trustworthiness of the prophet who informs us that it is God's speech and that God did not give him the knowledge necessary to make something similar.⁵⁸ The Qur'ân fulfils all these conditions : it is inimitable⁵⁹ and informs us that God is speaking by it;⁶⁰ it also indicates the trustworthiness of the prophet. The text we hear is, however, not God's speech, but only a reproduction of God's speech (*hikâyat kalâm Allâh*); that does not contradict the fact that the Qur'ân, the original one directly made by God and given to the angel, is really God's speech, and that we through this reproduction really know God's speech.⁶¹

This is the only way we can know that something is God's speech : a revealed text is revealed as a real miracle, fulfilling the conditions which have to be fulfilled to make a miracle a real miracle.⁶² Therefore, to prove that God is speaking we cannot argue on the basis of the occurring of a "warning" (*kâfir*)⁶³ in our soul, for we can never know that it comes from God and not from an angel.⁶⁴

3. GOD CAN ONLY BE SPEAKING BY A TEMPORAL SPEECH

Besides the rather short direct argument, just discussed, to prove that God is speaking by temporal speech He made, 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives a second argument, much longer;⁶⁵ this argument can be called "a priori" since it deals in an a priori way with the manner in which God can be speaking.⁶⁶

⁵⁸ Cf *Mugni* VII, 60 Cf also our pp 97-99, where we spoke about the way in which the Qur'ân can be said to be a miracle and about the meaning of the root 'z

⁵⁹ We do not discuss this subject in the present study 'Abd al-Jabbâr postpones the discussion of the so-called *t'jâz al-Qur'ân* till the sixteenth part of the *Mugni*

⁶⁰ To prove this 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions some verses from the *Qur'ân*, a tradition about Muhammad, and the consensus (*Ijmâ'*) of the Muslims Cf *Mugni* VII, 61

⁶¹ One cannot say that Muhammad, since his indicating the text of the Qur'ân on this earth as God's speech is metaphorically meant, (the addition of the particle *law* by the editor in *Mugni* VII, 61, line 4 is the result of a misinterpretation of the text, it has to be deleted) can also mean something else by this and similar sayings It is clear that for Muhammad in any case the Qur'ân, be it a reproduction or the original, really was God's speech We discuss the relation between reproduction and reproduced later in this chapter

⁶² Cf our p 98 for the five criteria for real miracles

⁶³ About this "warning" cf pp 63-65.

⁶⁴ *Mugni* VII, 61, lines 1-2

⁶⁵ *Mugni* VII, 62-94

⁶⁶ There is in this argument an element of a posteriori argumentation The argument

This second argument is the same we already met when discussing God's other qualities; it is structured according to the rules of the *taqsim* method of division and elimination. 'Abd al-Jabbâr starts from the assumption that God is speaking and looks for the various ways in which He could be so. He comes to the conclusion that God could be speaking either per se (*li-nafsih*; eventually: essentially, *li-dâtihi*), or by a cause (*li-'illa*; eventually: by a qualifier, *li-ma'nâ*), or neither per se nor by a cause. When the first and the third alternatives are eliminated, he concludes that God can only be speaking by a cause. This cause is either eternal or temporal. By proving that it cannot be eternal, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to his conclusion that God can only be speaking by a temporal cause. We now follow 'Abd al-Jabbâr in discussing the various alternatives in the logical order mentioned above.

*God cannot be speaking per se.*⁶⁷ To bring some order in the many arguments and counter-arguments we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's discussions of this subject, we distinguish among four categories of arguments:⁶⁸ the first category points to the fact that it is not possible to establish this essential quality "speaking"; the second shows that this quality speaking would be in contradiction with its definition if it were essential; the third category comes to the conclusion that God would in that case have the same qualities as speech, and considers the consequences of this conclusion; the last states that, being speaking per se, God would be speaking with all parts and kinds of speech anywhere, at any time, and to anyone.

The first category: it is not possible to establish that God is per se speaking.⁶⁹ The way we establish the essential qualities is by estab-

only shows that the only way in which God can be speaking is by temporal speech, it does not prove that He is actually speaking. To prove that God is actually speaking by temporal speech, we have to establish that He is speaking as we did in the preceding section.

⁶⁷ This thesis is said to be adhered to by Muhammad bn 'Îsâ al-Burgût (cf. note 22 on p. 283). 'Abd al-Karim 'Ulmân adds (*Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 235) and the Aš'ariya. Most of the Aš'ariya held that God is speaking by eternal speech, not per se.

This subject is discussed in *Mugni* VII, 62-81 (chapter 12), the chapter can be divided into 12 different arguments. I shall try to gather them together in some categories, to show the connection between various arguments and the great outlines of the argumentation. See also *Muhit* I, 329-330 and *Šarh* 552-554.

⁶⁸ These four categories can be found both in the *Mugni* and in the *Muhit*, the *Šarh* lacks the third category.

⁶⁹ In this category we take together three arguments from the *Mugni*, respectively the first (*Mugni* VII, 62, lines 3-10), the eighth (*Mugni* VII, 64, lines 5-6), and the ninth (*Mugni* VII, 64, lines 7-16). See also *Šarh* 552 and *Muhit* I, 329.

lishing that the subject is in a certain state, and by proving that he per se must be in that state. The quality speaking is not established in this way; it is not established as a state, but as the doing of an act; we already saw that speech does not entail a state.

According to Abû Hâšim, there is only one way to establish God's essential qualities. The only way we can know God is through the acts He produced in this world. Consequently, we can only know essential qualities which are required by His acts, be it directly or indirectly. No such act can be found which would, directly or indirectly, require that the subject is speaking.⁷⁰

The second category also comes from Abû Hâšim.⁷¹ Being entitled to a quality per se or essentially, implies that there is no cause or qualifier; consequently, the assumption that God would be per se speaking implies the denial of speech, just as the knowledge that God is per se knowing implies the denial of knowledge. Since the definition of speaking is "making speech", the assumption that someone is per se speaking leads to a contradiction.

The third category of arguments comes from Abû Ishâq.⁷² When a speaking subject is not in a state because of his being speaking, he can derive this quality only from actual speech; if God is called speaking per se or essentially, it implies that His essence, which is the cause of His being speaking, must have the same qualities as speech.⁷³

This conclusion has several consequences which are all impossible to accept: God must be temporal (or speech in this world eternal), He must have opposite qualities since the letters are opposite,⁷⁴ God's essence must have a certain order because only in that way speech can have its parts (*aqsâm*) and kinds (*durûb*), His essence also must come into existence in a certain order to make His being speaking communicative, and, finally, His essence must have a quality indicating

⁷⁰ In *Muhit* I, 329, line 9 read *far'* instead of *faz'*, in *Mugni* VII, 64, line 16 the full stop has to be removed after *sifâtih* and to be placed at the very end of that line

⁷¹ This is the second argument from the *Mugni* (*Mugni* VII, 62, lines 10-16) Cf also *Muhit* I, 329 and *Šarh* 552

⁷² Cf *Muhit* I, 329 I made a combination of the arguments 3-7 from the *Mugni* (*Mugni* VII, 62, line 16-64, line 4)

⁷³ The texts in the *Mugni* and the *Muhit* are somewhat ambiguous. I tried to render their argumentation, a correct translation of the passages concerned will not be easy

⁷⁴ The letters are opposite (*did*) according to Abû Hâšim as 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds in *Mugni* VII, 63 According to himself, this being opposite of various sounds and letters is not evident Cf p 316

a defect⁷⁵ since speech is useless when nobody has some profit of it, and we know that before the creation nobody would

The fourth category contains the three longest arguments. If God is per se speaking, there can be in Him⁷⁶ no restriction in His being speaking. He can speak with all parts of speech (*aqsâm al-kalâm*, these are the various forms in which speech occurs, the examples mentioned are mainly information, command, and prohibition⁷⁷) and all kinds of speech (*durûb al-kalâm*, these are the various forms in which the relation between the parts of speech and the reality occurs: information about some concrete object, command of something good or something evil, information as lie or as truth⁷⁸). He can speak at any moment, at any place, and to anyone. But in the case of an essential quality we have to add that what is possible is also necessary⁷⁹. Therefore, God not only can speak in all those ways, He even has to do so if there are no restrictions in the object.⁸⁰ That God must be speaking in all those ways evidently leads to conclusions that cannot possibly be accepted.

A first conclusion is that God must be speaking by lie and truth, by a command of something evil and a prohibition of something good, moreover, He must inform us about anything informing about which is possible, and He must command us everything that can be commanded.⁸¹ We know that in fact He does not so as He confirms

⁷⁵ The word transcribed by al-Abyârî in *Muḡni* VII 63 line 18 as *fa-yafriduh* is the last one of the page in the manuscript and rather vague. I suggest to read *manqusa* (a quality) 'indicating a defect' the term *naqs* also being used in line 19.

⁷⁶ The restricting element in the qualified person is the *illa* or *ma nâ*. When someone has such a quality per se or essentially, there is no restriction in himself though there may be a restriction in the object. So for instance since one possible thing only can be possible for one subject, God, who is per se able nevertheless is not able to produce things which other beings are able to produce or things that cannot exist (cf pp 238-239) but these restrictions are restrictions in the object not in the subject. In the same way God cannot speak the concrete individual speech somebody else is speaking, but He can produce similar speech and more than that.

⁷⁷ In Arabic *ḡabar amr nahî*. Cf for instance *Muḡni* VII 65.

⁷⁸ The term *darb* is translated by Frank *Kalam* 356 as 'kind' and by Brunschvig *Mu tazihme et optimum* 14 by 'type'. While the *aqsâm* or parts indicate the form of the sentence and what it is meant to be (according to Abd al Jabbâr speech becomes one of these parts by the concomitant will the intention), the *durûb* indicate the kind of relationship with the reality expressed by this speech.

⁷⁹ Cf *Muhit* I 329 '*ma sahh fi sifat an nafs wajib*', 'what is (metaphysically) possible in the essential qualities is necessary'.

⁸⁰ The only restriction can be that a given speech is possible (*maqḡûr*) for someone else so that God cannot produce it. But He is surely able to produce any part and any kind in any circumstance.

⁸¹ In *Muḡni* VII, 65 line 6 we probably have to delete the words from *an kull* till the full stop. These words belong in line 4 and are by mistake repeated here. The correction proposed by al-Abyârî is in that case not necessary.

Himself in the text of the Qur'ân "About some of them We told you, and about some of them We did not tell you" ⁸²

A second conclusion ⁸³ would be that God is addressing (*mukallim*)⁸⁴ per se and essentially, and that He, consequently, must address ⁸⁵ every one at every moment in every way Since addressing is one of the parts of speech (*aqsâm al-kalâm*), God must per se address if He is per se speaking We know that God does not address every one at every moment in every way so that we conclude that He is not per se addressing and, consequently, not per se speaking

The opponents still have two ways to escape either they deny that addressing is one of the parts of speech—and they try to prove their point by comparing, for grammatical reasons, two forms of the verb "to speak", *takallam* and *kallam*, with two forms of the verb "to know", 'alim and 'allam, a comparison which is rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr ⁸⁶—or they admit that God actually is per se addressing In this case, when they admit that God is addressing per se, they can

⁸² Cf *sûrat Gâfir*, verse 78

⁸³ Cf *Mugni* VII 66, line 3 - 71, line 9 (after the full stop), see also *Šarh* 552-553 and *Muhit* I, 330

⁸⁴ The word we translate by addressing is the Arabic word *mukallim*, the second form of the verb of which *mutakallim* (speaking) is the fifth form The similarity between the two forms as one finds it in Arabic, cannot be satisfactorily rendered in English Whereas the fifth form simply means "to speak", the second one implies that one speaks to something or someone, so that the participles could be rendered as, respectively, "speaking" and "speaking to" The similarity between the two terms, especially in the Arabic writing, has caused some errors, both in the manuscript (errors probably due to the inattentiveness of a copyist) and in the edition of the text (in places where the manuscript is correct)

⁸⁵ Read in *Mugni* VII 66, line 3 *mukallim* instead of *mutakallim* (correct in the manuscript) and in *Mugni* VII, 66, line 4 *al-mukallamin* instead of *al-mutakallimîn* (not correct in the manuscript) As for the interpunction in *Mugni* VII, 66, line 7 one has to remove the full stop, in line 8, one has to start with a new paragraph after the first comma

⁸⁶ The argumentation of the opponent is as follows 'allam (the second form of the verb) means "to teach" and is different from 'alim (the first form of the verb) meaning "to know" The fact that God is essentially and per se "knowing" ('alim) does not imply that He is per se "teaching" (*mu'allim*) In the same way the fact that God is per se speaking (*mutakallim*, fifth form) does not imply that He is per se addressing (*mukallim*, second form) Evidently, 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies the possibility of making here a comparison, and he argues himself not on the basis of names, but on the basis of the reality behind these names

In this argument the following corrections have to be made *Mugni* VII, 66, line 16 read *mukallim* instead of *mutakallim* (not correct in the manuscript), line 17 read *na'tamidah* instead of *na'taddah*, line 20 the word *mutakallim* is crossed out in the manuscript and has to be removed from the text, line 20 read *yukallim* instead of *yatakallim* (correct in the manuscript), in *Mugni* VII, 67, line 5 read *at-taklîm* instead of *al-mutakallim* (not correct in the manuscript)

either try to show that God addresses every one at every moment in every way⁸⁷ - and they will not succeed—or they can mention some restricting elements outside God which restrict His being addressing as, for instance, the existence or being understanding of the addressed object, just as the existence and the visibility of an object are conditions for God's being seeing.⁸⁸ 'Abd al-Jabbâr will show that these arguments are not correct and also that they are not sufficient to explain the way in which God actually addresses people. His conclusion, therefore, is that a speaking subject only becomes addressing, commanding, or prohibiting by his intention and by nothing else, and that everything, be it living or lifeless, existent or non-existent, can be addressed.⁸⁹

A third conclusion⁹⁰ drawn by 'Abd al-Jabbâr from the supposition that God is essentially and per se speaking, is that He must be lying;

⁸⁷ This is done in *Muġnî* VII, 67, lines 11-20. Their examples are not complete, first, they say that God addresses everybody by imposing duties, by commanding, and prohibiting. But, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies, God must address everything at every moment in every way (for instance, everything at every moment in the way He addressed Moses). He would also have to address him who is not compos mentis, though this addressing would be useless and, consequently, evil (Read in *Muġnî* VII, 67, line 15 *yaqbuḥ* instead of *yushih*). When the opponents say that God addresses everything with the creative word *kun* (be) because He creates everything in this way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies that God addresses everything in this way (we shall see this later), and he remarks that God would also address everything with any other speech at any other moment.

⁸⁸ We distinguish four arguments of the opponents with 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answers: a) *Muġnî* VII, 68, lines 1-17: the addressed object must be existent, the answer is twofold: God would in that case address all existent things without making any difference (read in *Muġnî* VII, 68, line 8 *taḳṣîr* instead of *taḳṣûs*), and in fact we can address non-existent things. b) *Muġnî* VII, 68, line 18 - 69, line 7: the addressed object must understand what is said (read in *Muġnî* VII, 68, line 19 *yukallam* instead of *takallam*), the answer again is twofold: God would inform the understanding object about everything, command everything, etc., and, though it is useless and, consequently, evil (read in *Muġnî* VII, 69, line 3 and line 6 twice *yaqbuḥ* instead of *yashih*) to address something that does not understand, it is possible. c) *Muġnî* VII, 69, line 8 - 70, line 4: compare with the "message" (*kitâb*), which is only such when it is understood (In *Muġnî* VII, 69, line 11 the word *l-dâlik* has to be removed, it must be added after *fahmih* in line 10). According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, this is a question of names: when it is not understood, it is not called "message", but it does exist so that it cannot be used as an argument by the opponents. d) *Muġnî* VII, 70, lines 5-19: compare with a command (*amr*), which only becomes such by the existing of the commanded person or by *ta'mîr*, the premises are rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr: one can command when the person commanded does not (yet) exist, and there is no relation at all with the *ta'mîr* (making someone commander).

⁸⁹ Cf. *Muġnî* VII, 70-71.

⁹⁰ This argument is given in *Muġnî* VII, 71, line 9 (after the second full stop) till 81, line 7 (after the comma). The division and interpunctuation of the text is very confusing. See also *Šarḥ* 553-555 and *Muḥîṭ* I, 330.

in that case one can no longer trust God's words, His promise and His threat, and this can in no way be accepted.⁹¹

In two entirely different ways 'Abd al-Jabbâr deduces from the thesis of his opponents that God must be lying.

The first way can be summarized as follows: lie (*kaḏīb*) is one of the kinds of speech (*durūb al-kalām*), being the kind of information that does not correspond with reality.⁹² If God is per se speaking, He must be per se lying (*kāḏīb*).⁹³

'Abd al-Jabbâr's opponents try to refute this argument by stating that God is per se veracious (*sādiq*) and, consequently, cannot be lying. They make a comparison with God's being per se knowing excluding the possibility that He is in positive ignorance. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's refutation of this argument is fourfold. First, they have no possibility to prove that God is veracious, let alone that He is per se veracious.⁹⁴ Second, he asks his opponents whether according to them God actually informs veraciously about everything about which informing is possible, or only informs about some things; the choices, both for the first and for the second possibility, imply that God can be lying.⁹⁵ Third, one

⁹¹ In *Muḡni* VII, 71, line 13 read *bi-annah* instead of *annah*, as appears in the manuscript

⁹² Cf for a description of the quality "lying" (*kāḏīb*) *Muḡni* VII, 78 "that he gives information about a thing as it is not" (*li-ann haqīqat al-kāḏīb huw an yuḵbir 'an aṣ-ṣav' 'alā mā lays bih*)

⁹³ One of the parts of speech (*aqsām al-kalām*) is information, when it occurs corresponding with reality, it is called veracity (*ṣidq*), when it occurs not corresponding with reality, it is called lie (*kaḏīb*) If God were essentially and per se speaking, He must be per se speaking by all parts and kinds of speech, besides being per se lying, He must also be per se veracious, He must be commanding and prohibiting one and the same thing, He must command what is evil and prohibit what is good, etc Cf *Muḡni* VII, 71

⁹⁴ Cf *Muḡni* VII, 71, line 21 - 74, line 2 The opponents appeal to the text of the Qur'ân—which informs about facts we are able to verify so that we know God is veracious in saying them, and which also directly states that God is veracious (*sūrat Qāf*, verse 29 and *sūrat al-A'rāf*, verse 44) to the opinion of Muhammad, and to the consensus of the Muslims 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that one must first know that God is veracious before one can prove that the sources mentioned are veracious and trustworthy The more so because the opponents concerned admit that God can do evil acts and, therefore, can guide us in a wrong way

In this argument some corrections have to be made *Muḡni* VII, 72, line 1 read *wa-an* instead of *wa-in*, *Muḡni* VII, 72, line 8 read *al-qubā'ih* instead of *as-sālih* (cf also the manuscript), *Muḡni* VII, 72, line 12 *bi-sīgatih* instead of *bi-sīfatih* (the manuscript seems to give our form, which fits better in the context), *Muḡni* VII, 73, line 6 read *nafs* instead of *ta'yīn* (see also for this correction the text of the manuscript)

⁹⁵ Cf *Muḡni* VII, 74, line 3 - 76, line 3 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the method of *taqṣīm* to show that all possibilities are false and, therefore, the premise must be false If God is informing veraciously about everything informing about which is possible

cannot make a comparison with being knowing since being knowing entails a state which may exclude another state, but being veracious does not entail a state.⁹⁶ Fourth, we know that concrete forms of speech can only exclude one another in a substrate; in this way speech must be compared with movement and not with knowledge; being lying and being veracious do not exclude one another when they are directed towards two substrates.⁹⁷

The second way 'Abd al-Jabbâr follows to prove that the thesis of his opponents implies that God is lying,⁹⁸ is based on the text of the Qur'ân. In the Qur'ân God says that He did some things in the past using a verb in the past tense;⁹⁹ if He were per se and, consequently, in all eternity speaking, He would be lying in this kind of sentences since the fact described did not happen yet and He nevertheless informed that it did happen. Since, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, God did not create the Qur'ân before other things, but has created these parts of the Qur'ân after the event mentioned actually happened, and since God is able to change the Qur'ân, the argument cannot be directed against 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself as the opponents try to do.¹⁰⁰

because He is per se speaking, we conclude that He is also lying in His informing about everything informing about which is possible, using the same argument. Moreover, we know that God does not inform in every way at every moment about everything informing about which is possible. If God only is informing veraciously about some things, it is not excluded that He is lying about other things.

In this argument one has to make the following corrections: *Mugni* VII, 74, line 4 read *yabqâ* instead of *yanfî*, in *Mugni* VII, 75, line 5 read *bi-kull* instead of *li-kull*, in *Mugni* VII, 75, line 9 read *tajwîz* instead of *tahwîr*.

⁹⁶ Cf *Mugni* VII, 76, lines 4-20. Two corrections have to be made in the text in *Mugni* VII, 76, line 14 the preposition *fî*, added by the editor, is superfluous and can be deleted, in *Mugni* VII, 76, line 17 read *bi-kawnih* instead of *yakûnuh*.

⁹⁷ Cf *Mugni* VII, 77 line 1 - 78, line 4. In *Mugni* VII, 77, line 17 add the preposition *fî* at the end of the line (the preposition is found in the manuscript), in *Mugni* VII, 78, line 1 read *ukrâ* (with the manuscript) instead of *âkar*.

⁹⁸ Cf *Mugni* VII, 78, line 5 - 81, line 7. Since speech is nothing else but letters, one cannot say that the letters change according to the fact whether something happened, is happening, or will happen, but that the speech remains the same.

⁹⁹ The example given is the text from *sûrat Nûh*, verse 1 "We sent Noah to his people".

¹⁰⁰ As an argument in this discussion is used the word of Muhammad "God was and nothing else, then He created the *Dîkr* (explained as a name for the Qur'ân)". This does not imply that He created the Qur'ân before anything else, we even know by knowledge based on intuition that, to be good, the Qur'ân can only be created when there is someone who can hear and understand it. In *Mugni* VII, 78, line 11 read *bi-mîlîh* instead of *li-mîlîh*, in *Mugni* VII, 79, line 13 read *qawlikum* instead of *qawmikum*, in *Mugni* VII, 80, lines 5-6 the sentence continues no full stop, no new paragraph. In *Mugni* VII, 80, line 6 one has to remove the full stop.

'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes his chapter by stating once again that the only way in which we can come to know that God is speaking, is by establishing His speech; this makes it impossible¹⁰¹ that He is per se speaking.

*God cannot be speaking "neither per se nor by a cause".*¹⁰² The only quality God is said to be entitled to "neither per se nor by a cause" (*lâ li-nafsih wa-lâ li-'illa*) is the quality "perceiving" (*mudrik*). God is entitled to this quality because of His being living on the condition that something perceptible is existent. Such a condition is not possible with reference to the quality speaking since this quality has no connection with something else. 'Abd al-Jabbâr proves this by way of a *taqsîm*: God is either necessarily speaking in every state or He is speaking after He was not; in the first case He is per se and essentially¹⁰³ speaking. In the second case God is either necessarily speaking at the moment He becomes so, or He is not necessarily speaking but He only can be so; in the latter case He must be speaking by a temporal qualifier or cause. The other case is the one mentioned as "neither per se nor by a cause"; it implies that God is entitled to this quality according to the existence (and not entitled to it according to the non-existence) of something else. This supposes a connection¹⁰⁴ with something else, which speech actually has not. Therefore, God must be speaking by a temporal qualifier.

Further, 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to the arguments he used in the preceding chapter to show that God is not per se speaking, and to those in the next chapter to show that He is not speaking by eternal speech; many of them can be applied here. The quality speaking is

¹⁰¹ Read in *Mugni* VII, 80, line 8 *yuhil* (with the manuscript) instead of *mahall*. This last paragraph begins in *Mugni* VII, 80, line 7, after the comma. The interpunction has to be corrected.

¹⁰² Cf *Mugni* VII, 82-83 (chapter 13), this chapter is divided into six arguments, beginning respectively in *Mugni* VII, 82, lines 3, 8, 11, and 17 and *Mugni* VII, 83, lines 9 and 14. Cf also *Muhit* I, 334-336. This chapter is somewhat broader in its concept. It compares the quality speaking not only with the quality perceiving but also with the quality "willing" (*murid*), to which God is said to be entitled because of a cause but not because He made this cause. This comparison too is rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.

¹⁰³ Read in *Mugni* VII, 83, line 1 *dâtuh* instead of *adâtuh*; this emendation is necessary for a logical context.

¹⁰⁴ In *Mugni* VII, 83, line 6 both the manuscript and the printed text read *lâ yata'allaq*; this makes no sense in the context since the connection here has to be affirmed, possibly one has to read *li-t-ta'alluq*.

established by establishing speech, the cause.¹⁰⁵ To say that it is "not by a cause" implies a contradiction. If it is "not by a cause", it must be because of a state, but we know that being speaking is not a state. Speaking "not by a cause" implies that the subject must be speaking with all parts¹⁰⁶ and kinds of speech and at every moment, so that he is no longer able to produce it. All this shows that God can only be speaking by a cause. That this cause can only be temporal is proved again by a *taq̣sīm*: in fact by showing that it cannot be eternal.

*God cannot be speaking by eternal speech.*¹⁰⁷ In this chapter 'Abd al-Jabbâr attacks those theologians who state that God is speaking by eternal speech which is, nevertheless, of the same genus as our speech; therefore, it is directed mainly against the Ḥašwīya and not against the Kullâbiya, who assert that God is speaking by different speech¹⁰⁸

To prove that this alternative in his *taq̣sīm* is not correct, and that God, consequently, must be speaking by temporal speech, 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives five kinds of argumentation in the following order: first, he shows that God's speech, being of the genus of our speech, must be temporal; second, he shows that the Qur'ân (the original one, not the reproduction of it in this world) cannot be eternal, third, he discusses some verses from the Qur'ân which show that God's speech is temporal; fourth, he mentions some texts from the *ḥadīṭ*; fifth, he discusses the consensus of the Muslims, and he concludes with some additional arguments.

The first argument¹⁰⁹ states that God's speech, belonging to the

¹⁰⁵ Read in *Mugnî* VII, 82, line 6 *yûḍduh* and *yaf'aluh* (He, sc God, produces and makes it, sc, the qualifier mentioned) instead of *tûḍduh* and *taf'aluh*

¹⁰⁶ In *Mugnî* VII, 83, line 9 add after *bi-sâ'ir* the word *aqsâm* In the manuscript the copyist first wrote *bi-sâ'ir du'ûbih* He added afterwards between the two words *al-kalâm wa-* Evidently, he forgot to add the other word

¹⁰⁷ We have to prove that God cannot be speaking by an eternal cause ('illa) or qualifier (*ma'nâ*) Since such causes and qualifiers derive their names from the qualities concerned, we call this cause or qualifier "speech" (*kalâm*) Cf pp 147-148 This question is dealt with in *Mugnî* VII, 84-94 (chapter 14) Cf also *Šarh* 549-551, where the order of the various arguments is similar to that found in the *Mugnî*, and *Muhit* I, 330-332 See also 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uḡmân, *Nazarīvat at-taklīf*, 238-239

¹⁰⁸ Al-Aṣ'arī does not assert that there is a difference between our speech and God's speech, but according to him also our human speech is not what is heard, but something in the soul For the Ḥašwīya God's speech is of the same kind as our human speech, but it is eternal Mainly against this doctrine 'Abd al-Jabbâr directs his arguments in this chapter

¹⁰⁹ Cf *Mugnî* VII, 84 line 3 85, line 20 In this argument some corrections have to be made in *Mugnî* VII, 84, line 5 read *fi-mâ* instead of *mim-mâ*, in *Mugnî* VII, 84,

same genus as human speech, cannot be eternal when our speech is temporal since being eternal is an essential quality. That our human speech is temporal is apparent from our discussions of that speech: letters and sounds can be non-existent, they are non-remaining (as is evident in the perception of them), they need a substrate, and are ascribed to a subject because he made them. Consequently, our human speech, and God's speech too, must be temporal.

The second argument¹¹⁰ proves with rational arguments that the Qur'ân (not the reproduction of it here on earth but God's original speech) cannot be eternal. The Qur'ân consists of several and different parts, and this is impossible for something eternal.¹¹¹ Moreover, God is able to produce speech; when He produces it, it is not something different from the Qur'ân, and it must be temporal.¹¹² Moreover, God and the Qur'ân have different qualities;¹¹³ and, since being eternal is an essential quality and two things that have one essential quality in common must have all essential qualities in common, the Qur'ân cannot be eternal. If the Qur'ân is different from God and something other than Him, it must be temporal, and with this all Muslims agree¹¹⁴

The third argument¹¹⁵ can be called "sam'î", based on revelation; from the text of the Qur'ân arguments are gathered to show that,

line 15 *fa-mâ* instead of *mum-mâ*, in *Mugni* VII, 84, line 19 *ṣabqâ* instead of *ṣantafî* (the text of the manuscript is not very clear, our suggestion seems self-evident in the context), in *Mugni* VII, 85, line 12 *uhdiṭ* ("it is produced", the manuscript has a first letter *ah*) instead of *hadat*

¹¹⁰ Cf *Mugni* VII, 86, line 1 - 87, line 8

¹¹¹ In that case also a human being could be eternal, notwithstanding his being composed *Mugni* VII, 86

¹¹² Read in *Mugni* VII, 86, line 4 *bi-miṭl* instead of *li-miṭl*

¹¹³ God is said to be knowing, able, living, seeing, etc., whereas the Qur'ân is said to be, for instance, structured and composed, audible and perceptible, command, etc. The qualities mentioned about God are not applicable to the Qur'ân and those mentioned about the Qur'ân are not applicable to God

¹¹⁴ Read in *Mugni* VII, 87, lines 5 and 8 twice *gayran lah* ("something other than He", sc., God) instead of *gayr ilâh* ("not a god") Both expressions are written in the same way, but my suggestion fits better into the context and in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's usual vocabulary. All Muslims are agreed that something which is different from God and something other than God cannot be eternal, they may disagree on the question whether the Qur'ân can be said to be something other than God

¹¹⁵ Cf *Mugni* VII, 87, line 9 - 91, line 9. In this argumentation the following corrections have to be made: in *Mugni* VII, 89, line 6 read *fih* instead of *minh*, in *Mugni* VII, 89, line 12 read *bi-juz'* instead of *ṣaytazi'*, in *Mugni* VII, 90, line 1 read *ṣatakallam* instead of *mutakallim* (the text evidently indicating something in the future), in *Mugni* VII, 90, line 2 the word *mâ* has to be added after *kân* (cf. the text of the manuscript)

according to this text, God's speech is not eternal but temporal. A first series of verses apply to the Qur'ân—by whatever name it is mentioned—¹¹⁶ a number of judgements (*aḥkâm*), all of them more or less directly indicating that it is temporal: it is said to be *muhḍat* (temporal),¹¹⁷ *maf'ûl* (made),¹¹⁸ *maqḍûr* (produced by someone who was able to do so),¹¹⁹ *ḥadîṭ* (new),¹²⁰ *muhkam* (precise), *mufaṣṣal* (divided), and *muwaṣṣal* (made to arrive).¹²¹ Other verses say in some way that God produced it: He arranges it (*yudabbir*),¹²² made it Arabic (*ja'alah*), and created it (*kalaq*).¹²³ Other verses imply that it did not exist from all eternity: the book of Moses preceded it (*min qablih*),¹²⁴ and it can be linked with something temporal.¹²⁵ All verses implying that God is able to produce something similar, that He was able to produce the Qur'ân, that He is able to impose duties, that He can change the Qur'ân, or that He can challenge others to produce something similar, indicate that His speech is temporal.¹²⁶ Also the verses saying that He commands or prohibits do so because speech becomes command or prohibition only by being produced together with a concomitant will, an intention. Other verses imply that God will speak in the future,¹²⁷ or imply for grammatical reasons that God

¹¹⁶ It is called *Qur'ân*, *dîkr*, *kitâb*, or *amr*

¹¹⁷ Cf. *sûrat al-anbiyâ'*, verse 2 and *sûrat aṣ-ṣu'arâ'*, verse 5

¹¹⁸ Cf. *sûrat al-ahzâb*, verse 37.

¹¹⁹ Cf. *sûrat al-ahzâb*, verse 38

¹²⁰ Cf. *sûrat az-zumar* (not *al-muzammil*, as is mentioned in a note in *Muḡni VII*, 89), verse 23, and *sûrat al-a'râf*, verse 185. The word used here, *ḥadîṭ*, which means tradition, tale, or account, can also be used with the meaning "new"; it is for this reason that 'Abd al-Jabbâr says it is even more clear than the word *muhḍat*

¹²¹ These terms are mentioned without references to the verses in which they occur. For the related term "*uḥkîmat*", *sûrat Hûd*, verse 1 is quoted

¹²² Cf. *sûrat as-sajda*, vers 5

¹²³ Cf. *sûrat al-'alaq*, vers 1. The verb *kalaq* is said to have as object, though not expressed, "*ism rabbik*"

¹²⁴ Cf. *sûrat Hûd*, verse 17

¹²⁵ Cf. *sûrat al-qasas*, verse 30.

¹²⁶ Cf. *sûrat al-kaḥf*, verse 109, *sûrat Luqmân*, verse 27, *sûrat al-baqara*, verse 106; *sûrat at-Tûr*, verse 34

¹²⁷ Cf. *sûrat al-hy'r*, verse 92 and also *sûrat an-nahl* (not *an-naml*, as is mentioned in a note in *Muḡni VII*, 90), verse 40. The latter verse, which can be translated as "Our (sc God's) word to something when We will it, only is that We say to it 'be', and it will be", plays an important part in the discussions. Here 'Abd al-Jabbâr says that the word's being linked with the will indicates that it is temporal, and that the grammatical form (both the preposition "when", *idâ*, and the expression "that We say to it", "*an naqûl lah*") indicates the future. 'Abd al-Jabbâr, however, denies the existence of such a creative word "*kun*" (be) as we shall see later on

produces His speech.¹²⁸ But in all these cases the text of the Qur'ân itself witnesses that God's speech is temporal.

The fourth argument¹²⁹ appeals to some traditions about the sayings of Muhammad implying that the Qur'ân is created (*maklûq*),¹³⁰ and to the consensus of his companions, who considered the Qur'ân to be an act of God by which He distinguished¹³¹ Muḥammad from other people and indicated him to be a prophet.

The fifth argument¹³² comes to the conclusion that all Muslims in some general consensus say that God is "the Lord of *Tâhâ*, *Yâsîn*, and the great Qur'ân".¹³³

An additional argument¹³⁴ starts from the Qur'ân as we know it in this world. When this Qur'ân is said to be the speech of God itself, as the Ḥašwiya say, God's speech must be produced in substrates and cannot be eternal.¹³⁵ If this Qur'ân, however, is said to be a reproduction of God's speech, as the Kullâbiya and with a slight modification also the Aš'ariya say, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that the reproduced must be similar to the reproduction, and consequently be temporal when the reproduction is so.

After all these arguments a last section is added;¹³⁶ this section records other arguments from the Qur'ân, from the consensus of the

¹²⁸ Cf *sûrat an-nisâ'*, verse 164, the second form and the *masdar* used indicate that it is produced

¹²⁹ Cf *Mugni* VII, 91, line 10 – 92, line 1 (up to the end of the line, this line belongs to the preceding paragraph) The manuscript has in *Mugni* VII, 91, lines 12 and 14 the form *hadaṭ*, where the edition has *hudûṭ*

¹³⁰ For instance, the famous traditions "God was and nothing else, then He created the *Ḍikr*" and "God did not create in heaven or earth something greater than the verse of the throne in (*sûrat*) *al-baqara*"

¹³¹ Read *yubinah* instead of *yunbi'ah* in *Mugni* VII, 91, line 19 The manuscript permits both readings, my suggestion fits into the present context

¹³² Cf *Mugni* VII, 92, lines 2-4

¹³³ "*Tâhâ*" and "*Yâsîn*" are the names for two chapters of the Qur'ân

¹³⁴ Cf *Mugni* VII, 92, lines 5-14

¹³⁵ This doctrine is said to be in accordance with the Christian doctrine of the "*tahaddâ*" What is probably meant is the doctrine of the incarnation, the divine word inhering in a worldly substrate Possibly, we have to read (*Mugni* VII, 92, line 7) "*al-tajassud*" or "*al-itthâd*" (cf note 141)

¹³⁶ Cf *Mugni* VII, 92, line 14 – 94, line 19 Read in *Mugni* VII, 94, line 6 *kitâba* (writing) instead of *kitâb* (book) as also appears in the manuscript, the comparison is not between Gods speech and His book (the Qur'ân) but between His speech and His writing In *Mugni* VII, 94, line 14 the edition reads *hudûṭih*, where the manuscript reads *hadaṭih*, in *Mugni* VII, 94, line 17 the edition reads *hudûṭ*, where the manuscript reads *hadaṭ* The rational arguments mentioned here are those based on the fact that it must be communicative, and that, to be good, it supposes that someone exists who has some benefit from it

Muslims, and also rational arguments, which partially had been mentioned before in some way or other. They appear to have been added without much order. Maybe this is a result of the compilatory way in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr worked. Anyhow, the arguments mentioned here do not contain any really new elements.

One might suppose that 'Abd al-Jabbâr, having proved that God cannot be speaking by eternal speech, comes to the conclusion that God can only be speaking by temporal speech. He still has to cope, however, with the doctrine of the Kullâbiya, who assert that God is speaking by an eternal cause, a cause they call speech but which is entirely different from the speech we know in this world. In the chapter just discussed, 'Abd al-Jabbâr started from the assumption that speech can only be of the genus we know in this world (for 'Abd al-Jabbâr this is evident), and that the text of the Qur'ân is really God's speech or a reproduction similar to it. It is because he has to take the arguments of his opponents into account, that he now must prove that God cannot be speaking by an eternal cause different from speech as we know it in this world.

*God cannot be eternally speaking by speech different from human speech.*¹³⁷ If one can deduce from the way 'Abd al-Jabbâr argues something about the opponents with whom he enters into discussion, we conclude that there is a clear distinction between those he attacked in the preceding chapter (the Ḥašwîya) and those he attacks in this (the Kullâbiya). In the preceding chapter he made use of arguments from the revelation and from the sources authorized by the orthodox scholars in Islâm. In this chapter he only uses rational arguments, his argumentation is clear and sharp, and the chapter clearly and strictly structured. The opponents in this chapter are much more similar to 'Abd al-Jabbâr in their way of thinking and arguing.

The chapter in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr treats this question can be divided into five sections, according to the five arguments he mentions to refute the thesis of the Kullâbiya. Since this chapter has a distinct

¹³⁷ This point is discussed in *Mugnî* VII, 95-116 (chapter 15) Cf also *Muḥit* I, 330-333 and 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 237-238. According to the title of the chapter in the *Mugnî* "*Fasl 'alâ l-Kullâbiya fî ibtâl qawlihîm minah ta'âlâ mutakallim lam yazal bi-kalâm muḡâlîf li-kalâminâ*", 'Abd al-Jabbâr enters into discussion with the Kullâbiya. The formulation is not that God's speech is eternal, since according to Ibn Kullâb God's speech in itself cannot be eternal but it can only be such by God's eternity (cf p 331). 'Abd al-Jabbâr directs his argumentation in this chapter also against al-Aṣ'arî and his followers. In *Mugnî* VII, 99, the opponent who speaks there uses the word *'ibâra* (characteristic for al-Aṣ'arî against Ibn Kullâb).

structure, it is possible to render its argumentation in a schematic way.

The first argument¹³⁸ states that it is not possible to establish the existence of speech different from human speech. The phrase "speech different from human speech" even contains a contradiction since speech cannot be different from what we established and defined above.

First objection: that which communicates what the subject wills is speech. Answer: we already proved that being communicative is not a distinctive feature of speech.

Second objection: God is a speaking subject different from other speaking subjects; consequently, He can have speech different from other speech. Answer: speaking means "making speech", "different" means in that case that His essence is different from the essence of other speaking subjects. Speech, however, means "arranged letters", and in this case there is no essence that can be different.¹³⁹

Third objection: speech consists of several genera (*ajná's*), which are different; consequently, we can establish for God speech that is different from all speech we meet in this world. Answer: all forms of speech we find in this world correspond in being arranged letters; the establishing of speech different from all this would be the establishing of speech that does not have the characteristics of speech.

Fourth objection: you admit that God is able to produce a colour different from the colours we know; you now have to admit that He can also have speech different from the speech we know. Answer: that colour would correspond with the other ones in being an appearance (*hay'a*) for a substrate; since all colours are opposite, it is possible for God to produce more opposites. The difference between colours and speech is that we are able to produce speech, but not to produce colours. If other kinds of speech were possible, we would be able to produce them.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Cf. *Muğni* VII, 95, line 3 - 101, line 17.

¹³⁹ To prove his position, 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to other acts produced by God, for instance, his favours, which are not entirely different from favours produced by man. *Muğni* VII, 96.

¹⁴⁰ Just as all possible colours have to be "appearance" of a substrate, so all possible speech has to be arranged letters. We are able to produce letters and, since he who is able to produce something also is able to produce its opposite, we are also able to produce any other letter that is possible. Consequently, if there were speech different from what we actually make, we would be able to make it, since it would be arranged letters. Cf. *Muğni* VII, 97.

Fifth objection: one can establish something eternal that is not a substance, not a body, and not an accident; consequently, we can establish eternal speech different from our speech. Answer: we established God on the basis of indications and attributed to Him only known qualities.

Sixth objection: I establish something known (*ma'qûl*) by an indication, and I call that speech though it is not arranged letters; but that is a matter of terms. Answer: what you want to establish is not *ma'qûl*, not known by intuition, for in that case we should know it too, and in fact we do not.¹⁴¹

Seventh objection: Abû Hâšim established that God in His essence is in a state which entails that He is eternally knowing, eternal, living, and having the possibilities to hear and to see; yet nothing is known by intuition except the indication. Answer: the entire argumentation is analogous with the argumentation about essences in this world. We always start from known judgements (*ahkâm*) to deduce from them the qualities as we do in this world.

Eighth objection: the expressions we hear are an indication of His speech just as the possibility to act is an indication of His being able. Answer: in that case the same would hold true in this world, and we already proved that that is not the case.¹⁴²

Ninth objection: the denying of dumbness and silence supposes the establishing of speech. Answer: in this way we can only establish something that is known by intuition;¹⁴³ the speech they try to establish is not known. One can never establish something that is not known by denying the existence of something that is known;¹⁴⁴ if we were to admit this possibility, one could establish whatever one wants to establish.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ In that case one could establish whatever one wants to, even the incarnation of Jesus (*al-ittihâd*), and that God has a son who is His speech *Mugni* VII, 98

¹⁴² Cf pp 308-312 This thesis is advocated by the Aš'ariya

¹⁴³ The example discussed in this context is the establishing that somebody is perceiving (*mudrik*) when he is living and defects have to be denied But in that case perceiving is a known quality

¹⁴⁴ Read in *Mugni* VII, 100, line 9 *bi-nafy* instead of *nafy*, the preposition is not found in the manuscript. In *Mugni* VII, 100, line 11 one has to read *bi-nafy* instead of *bi-ittihât*, which the manuscript and the edition read

¹⁴⁵ 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives a list of examples, also from the doctrine of the Christians and the anthropomorphists Two corrections have to be made in *Mugni* VII, 101, line 2 add after *'alâ wajh lâ yu'qal*, these words are missing in the manuscript and the edition In *Mugni* VII, 101, line 7 the particle *wa* before *'alâ* (found in the manuscript too) has to be removed

The second argument¹⁴⁶ shows that the speech which is established by the Kullâbiya cannot be communicative (*mufîd*), cannot convey a meaning. To prove this point, 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions four arguments.

The first proof:¹⁴⁷ speech can only become communicative through a convention (*muwâda'a*), because people agreed about a concrete meaning to be given to certain signs. This implies that it must be produced since one can only make a convention about something one will produce later on. When there is not a conventional language according to which speech is produced, it cannot be communicative.

The second proof:¹⁴⁸ since God's speech as the opponent has defined it is one and indivisible, it cannot communicate the various parts (*aqsâm*) of speech since one indivisible thing cannot be at the same time command, prohibition, and information. The outward (grammatical) form of the command¹⁴⁹ cannot become a prohibition without losing its quality of being a command.¹⁵⁰ Speech becomes command, prohibition, and information through the intention, the concomitant will; through this intention the grammatical form of a command can also be used metaphorically as a prohibition. This intention is the only condition for speech to occur as command, prohibition, or information.¹⁵¹

The third proof¹⁵² states that speech can only occur as command, prohibition, or information when it occurs as "arranged things" (*ašyâ' manzûma*); this is not possible for something indivisible.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁶ Cf *Mugni* VII, 101, line 18–105, line 19. At the beginning of this argument the interjection of the printed text has to be changed. The argument is divided into four proofs, each of them introduced by the term "mu-hâ"

¹⁴⁷ Cf *Mugni* VII, 101, line 18–102, line 19. In this section read in *Mugni* VII, 102, line 3 "faqd al-'âlim al-'arabî li-muwâda'at al-fars" instead of "faqd al-'ilm al-'arabî muwâda'at al-fars", the preposition *li* is found in the manuscript, the *alif* of the word 'âlim not in *Mugni* VII, 102, line 14 read *yatajaddad* instead of *yatahaddad* and in line 11 with the manuscript *uqû'* instead of *qû'*. In *Mugni* VII, 102, line 16 one probably better reads *bi-dîkr* instead of *fa-dakar*.

¹⁴⁸ *Mugni* VII, 102, line 20–104, line 3.

¹⁴⁹ 'Abd al-Jabbâr has here in mind the so-called *amr* (command) as grammatical term the imperative form of the verb.

¹⁵⁰ 'Abd al-Jabbâr compares in this respect speech with other indivisible qualifiers, such as knowledge and ability, which also cannot communicate different things. Read in *Mugni* VII, 103, line 4 *bi-manzila* instead of *li-manzila* (the difference between these two words is not easily discernible in the manuscript).

¹⁵¹ The existence of the object commanded, the person to whom the command is directed, or the *ta'mir*, is not a condition for speech to become a command. The same holds good of the other parts of speech.

¹⁵² *Mugni* VII, 104, lines 4–20.

¹⁵³ When the opponents object that one letter can also be speech, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that that is not true (cf p. 297); even if it were true, a single letter is not indivisible.

The fourth proof:¹⁵⁴ speech can only be communicative—contrary to, for instance, writing¹⁵⁵ by coming into existence in a certain order, one part after the other. If God's speech would be existent¹⁵⁶ and not coming into existence, it could, consequently, not be communicative.

The third argument:¹⁵⁷ after proving that God's speech—as the Kullâbiya describe it—cannot exist and that it, if it could exist, could not be communicative, 'Abd al-Jabbâr again takes one step backwards: even if it could be communicative, it could not communicate the various things we find in the Qur'ân, and about which they say that God communicates them. This speech would correspond with speech which only occurs in one special way, and which, therefore, can only communicate one kind of things since on such a speech only one convention is possible.¹⁵⁸

since it has a beginning and an end. Moreover, the opponents will not admit that God's speech is one letter (read in *Mugnî* VII, 104, line 11 *harf* instead of *hurûf*, which the manuscript and the printed text have), and if they were to admit that, God's speech could only be a command since the only examples given for an eventual speech consisting of one letter are imperative forms. Moreover, 'Abd al-Jabbâr already proved that such an imperative is only communicative since something else is implied and not expressed (read in *Mugnî* VII, 104, line 19 with the manuscript *al-muqaddar* instead of *vuqaddar* of the printed text). The suggestion of al-Abyârî to read in *Mugnî* VII, 104, line 5 *allađi* instead of *dâlik* appears to be correct.

¹⁵⁴ *Mugnî* VII, 105, lines 1-12, the argument is concluded in *Mugnî* VII, 105, lines 13-19 (a misprint in *Mugnî* VII, 105, line 16 gives *mutâl* instead of *mutl*).

¹⁵⁵ Writing (*kitâba*) is communicative, but in another way than speech, writing can be communicative when it exists, not only when it comes into being, since a reading subject can see the totality and distinguish its order. In this context 'Abd al-Jabbâr has a strange but very characteristic argument. Speech can only be communicative when coming into existence, in writing it can even be so that what comes into existence is not communicative, and that what remains (*al-bâqî*) is communicative. In this statement he has in mind the carving of a stone in such a way that the background of the letters is cut away (this is something new, something coming into existence), whereas the letters which appear now on and above the background of the stone are what remains, untouched, nothing happened with them, nevertheless they are what is communicative. Read in *Mugnî* VII, 105, line 11 *al-muhaddaf* (what is cut away) instead of *al-muhdat* (in the manuscript both readings are possible), in *Mugnî* VII, 105, line 10 the correction of *'alavh* into *'alavhâ*, suggested by al-Abyârî, is not correct.

¹⁵⁶ I suggest to read in *Mugnî* VII, 4, line 4 *mawjûda* instead of *wa-hudddat*. The text of the manuscript is somewhat vague here, a letter is, however, discernible before the first *wâw*, it can be a *mîm*. The last letter of the word seems to be a *tâ'*, and above the second *wâw* (it seems to be a *wâw* and not a *dâl*) we find a *šadda*, which can be of a later date than the original text of the manuscript.

¹⁵⁷ *Mugnî* VII, 105, line 20—108, line 17.

¹⁵⁸ Therefore, speech is the most apt medium for conventions, since it can be divided into so many forms according to what one wants to communicate. In *Mugnî* VII, 105, line 8 read *al-a'râd* instead of *al-agrâd*, in *Mugnî* VII, 105, line 13 *at-tafsil* instead of *at-tafđil*.

The fourth argument:¹⁵⁹ even if that speech of God could communicate all those things, we could in no way know what it communicates, and God would not be able to teach us its meaning. What, according to the Kullâbiya, indicates the existence of this speech does not indicate that it is communicative and surely not what it communicates.¹⁶⁰

First objection: it must be communicative since the speaking subject is wise. Answer: that is true in this world since here the speaking subject chooses his speech, and, when he is wise, he will choose it in a way that it is not evil¹⁶¹ and therefore useful. In the opinion of the opponents, God does not freely choose His speech. Moreover, even if it is communicative, we do not know what it communicates.

Second objection: God's speech cannot be useless and, consequently, evil. Answer: this only applies to speech that is freely chosen.¹⁶²

Third objection: we know what it communicates through other speech. Answer: this other speech can only be speech God produces; this implies that He is speaking because He made this speech; and this refutes the argument of the Kullâbiya to prove that God must be speaking by speech different from ours.¹⁶³

Fourth objection: we know what it communicates by expressions (*'ibârât*) which are not speech. Answer: we showed that only these "expressions" are real speech.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, what would be the connection (*ta'alluq*) between the expression and the eternal speech which necessitates that the expressions are an indication of that speech?¹⁶⁵

¹⁵⁹ *Mugni* VII, 106, line 18–110, line 4. 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions seven objections, the interpunction of the text has to be adjusted accordingly

¹⁶⁰ Speech is not per se communicative, cf pp 304-305

¹⁶¹ Read in *Mugni* VII, 107, line 8 *vaqbuh* instead of *yasihh*

¹⁶² This objection is made with reference to God's justice (*'adl*) 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that in that case too we have to start from God's just acts which we can know (In *Mugni* VII, 107, line 18 read *'âdl* instead of *'adl*)

¹⁶³ Their argument was that God must be speaking by speech different from ours since He cannot be speaking by temporal speech (In *Mugni* VII, 108, line 9 add the word *mu'ûb* after the preposition *ilâ*, this word is found in the manuscript)

¹⁶⁴ Cf pp 308-312 The "older ones" (in fact the Kullâbiya) are said to agree, whereas the "later ones" (the Aš'ariya) are said to disagree with 'Abd al-Jabbâr about the essence of speech in this world

¹⁶⁵ Cf pp 66-67 about the various possible connections between indication (*dalil*) and object indicated, without one of these connections no real indication is possible

Fifth objection: we know what it communicates through writing. Answer: here also there is no connection between this writing and the alleged speech; the only thing writing can be an indication to is letters. And the opponents deny that God's speech is letters.

Sixth objection: we know what it communicates through a gesture (*išāra*). Answer: making gestures is not possible for God.¹⁶⁶

Seventh objection: we know what it communicates through necessary knowledge. Answer: then we should know it too; moreover: if the knowledge of God's essence is acquired, the knowledge of His speech probably also has to be acquired.

Through these four arguments 'Abd al-Jabbār showed that his opponents cannot establish the existence of speech in God different from human speech, and which, nevertheless, would be real speech. Therefore, he compares this speech as something that cannot be proved and is only asserted without any real argument, with the "kasb" of an-Najjār,¹⁶⁷ the "nature" of the Naturalists, and the "trinity" of the Christians.

In his other five arguments 'Abd al-Jabbār proves with rational arguments that God's speech cannot be eternal.

The fifth argument¹⁶⁸ starts from the general principle that two things which have one essential quality in common must have all essential qualities in common and, therefore, be similar.¹⁶⁹ If God

¹⁶⁶ Gestures characterize the hands or similar things (in *Mugni* VII, 109, line 12 one probably must read *bi-avdi*, certainly not *bi-llāh* because this results in a non-sense) Moreover, in a gesture the intention can be known by necessary knowledge Both things are impossible for God

¹⁶⁷ The text-edition has *al-bihār* We surely have to read here "*an-Najjār*", one of the earlier, non-Mu'tazilī theologians, who held the doctrine of the "kasb" (acquisition of the acts made by God, by the responsible human being), cf. Watt, *Formative Period*, 199-201 about Ḥusayn an-Najjār, and especially p. 201 about his doctrine of "kasb".

¹⁶⁸ *Mugni* VII, 110, line 5 - 113, line 18.

¹⁶⁹ We discussed this principle on pp 263-264 The counter-arguments directed against the validity of this principle which are discussed in the present context, are all concerned with qualities which by 'Abd al-Jabbār are said to be not essential. Thus, for instance, the real prophet and the one who only claims to be a prophet cannot be said to be both prophets since being a prophet is not an essential quality (in *Mugni* VII, 112, line 12 read *fa-wajab* instead of *mūjib*) Other examples are rejected since being living is not for living beings in this world an essential quality

When the opponents deny this general principle, they have no way to prove that there cannot be a second eternal being besides God which is unable (*ʿāmir*) They cannot say that this quality indicates a defect since we only know that it indicates a defect in this world, nor can they say that this is only possible for temporal beings since the most they can assert is that this temporal form is only possible for temporal beings, not an eternally being unable. Even if they can make objections against the wording

and His speech, consequently, both are eternal,¹⁷⁰ and being eternal is an essential quality, God and His speech must have all essential qualities in common¹⁷¹ so that His speech is a second god besides Him, which the Kullābiya and any other Muslim—cannot possibly admit.¹⁷²

The sixth argument:¹⁷³ speech only becomes command, prohibition, or information by the influence of a concomitant will; since the will can only have influence on things coming into being, and God's will itself is temporal, God's speech must be temporal too.

The seventh argument:¹⁷⁴ speaking without there being anybody who can hear it and gain profit from it is useless and, consequently, evil. Therefore, God cannot be speaking before the creation of other living beings, and His speech cannot be eternal.

The eighth argument¹⁷⁵ recapitulates the various alternatives of the *taqṣīm* concerning the ways in which speech might be ascribed to the speaking subject, and comes to the conclusion that it can only be since the speaking subject made it. Therefore, it cannot be eternal.

A ninth and last argument,¹⁷⁶ used by the teachers of 'Abd al-Jabbār but not accepted by him since it is concerned with terminology and not with the reality behind this terminology, states that speech is something other than God, and that all Muslims are in agreement that something that is other than God cannot be eternal. The difficulty, however, is found in the first premise.¹⁷⁷

Now 'Abd al-Jabbār can conclude that God must be speaking

of the argument (in *Muḡni* VII, 113, line 17 read with the manuscript *as-sīga* instead of *as-sa'ba*), they have to admit the accuracy of its contents

¹⁷⁰ In *Muḡni* VII, 110, line 6 read *ṭāni* instead of *bāqi*

¹⁷¹ The corrections proposed by al-Abyārī in *Muḡni* VII, 111, line 6 are not necessary and do not improve the course of the argumentation. The text must be "wa-kull dālik jāyib kawn al-kalām al-qadīm 'alayh" "the eternal speech must have all those (qualities)" In *Muḡni* VII, 111, line 5 one has to add *yājib* after the word *mawjūd*, the word is found in the manuscript

¹⁷² Evidently, this argument can only be used when the term "*qadīm*" is used as meaning "essentially existent" and not when it is used to convey that something is old. As an example 'Abd al-Jabbār mentions "the old (*qadīm*) palmtree" in *sūrat Yāsīn*, verse 39

¹⁷³ *Muḡni* VII, 113, line 19 – 114, line 7

¹⁷⁴ *Muḡni* VII, 114, lines 8-14

¹⁷⁵ *Muḡni* VII, 114, line 15 – 116, line 3 Cf pp 313-329 In *Muḡni* VII, 115, line 3 read *yahulluh* instead of *mahalluh*, in *Muḡni* VII, 116, line 1 read *ja-yunbi* instead of *ja-yubnā*

¹⁷⁶ *Muḡni* VII, 116, lines 12-19

¹⁷⁷ About the meaning of the term "other" (*gayr*) or "else" 'Abd al-Jabbār will speak in his following chapter Cf also pp 143-144

by a temporal speech if He is speaking; He cannot be essentially speaking. He cannot be speaking "neither per se nor by a cause", He cannot be speaking by speech like ours but eternal, and He cannot be speaking by speech different from ours. Therefore, the only conclusion that remains is that God must be speaking, if He is speaking, by a speech like ours, temporal like ours. What 'Abd al-Jabbâr will now discuss are two opinions which in some way or other deny that this conclusion must be drawn, either because it is not possible to qualify God's speech in whatever way—the doctrine of Hišâm bn al-Hakam—or because God's speech cannot be said to be something other than God—the doctrine of Ibn Kullâb and al-Aš'arî and their followers —.

*One cannot say : God's speech cannot be qualified.*¹⁷⁸ This argument is directed against Hišâm bn al-Hakam and his followers, among whom also Ibn Kullâb seems to be reckoned. According to Hišâm, God's speech, just as His other qualities, cannot be qualified since this would lead to an endless series of qualities of qualities of qualities, and since a quality cannot inhere in a quality.

We already saw that an endless series is not necessary since the quality of a quality corresponds with an information about an information; moreover, qualities are for 'Abd al-Jabbâr not accidents but names.¹⁷⁹ These arguments are recapitulated by 'Abd al-Jabbâr together with some arguments from the preceding chapter.

He also argues with an argumentum ad hominem that the followers of Hišâm do qualify God's speech, for instance, as promise and threat, command and prohibition. Moreover: everything that is existent must be qualified either as eternal or as temporal; no third alternative can exist.

In this context 'Abd al-Jabbâr also recapitulates a thesis ascribed in his introduction to Ibn Kullâb, that something eternal is eternal by an eternity inhering in it. This is refuted.

*One cannot say : God's speech is not something other than God.*¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Cf *Muğni* VII, 117-119, line 17, this is the first section of the sixteenth chapter. In this chapter 'Abd al-Jabbâr takes two theses together, since both deny that we can say something about God's speech, and since he considers both to belong to the same "school". The first thesis is ascribed to Hišâm, the second one to al-Aš'arî and Ibn Kullâb (*Muğni* VII, 3-4). Cf also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uṭmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 237.

¹⁷⁹ Cf pp 150-154 about the *siġât* (qualities).

¹⁸⁰ Cf. *Muğni* VII, 119, line 18—132, line 6. See also pp 143-144 about the term *gayr* and pp. 331-332 about the doctrine of Ibn Kullâb and al-Aš'arî.

We already saw that one can treat the "being other" of two things in two different ways, either giving attention to the meaning of the word "gayr" in language, or by penetrating into the reality behind this word. When we first take the word *gayr* as it is used in the Arabic language, it can be defined as follows: "when in any pair of mentioned things one of them distinguishes itself from its companion by a 'mention' which characterizes it, each of them must be other than its companion"¹⁸¹ Since the name "God" cannot be applied to His speech and the name "speech" not to Him,¹⁸² each of them must be something other than its companion.

The objection that the name "God" (*Allâh*) can be applied to God's speech, is easily refuted by 'Abd al-Jabbâr by drawing a number of conclusions from that statement which the opponent cannot possibly accept: one could no longer say that God is one (*wâhid*), He could be called "speech" and be addressed as "speech",¹⁸³ since what is said about His speech can also be said, and is said, about His other qualities, He would consist of many things (*ma'ânî*), either His speech in itself would be entitled to worship,¹⁸⁴ or His speech in combination with His essence and His other qualities as a totality, which again would imply that God has a structure (*binya*) and, consequently, must be a body, everything that is necessary for God would be necessary for His speech (and His other qualities), finally, there would be no reason why the qualities were the qualities of God and not He¹⁸⁵ a quality of them.

To a second objection, saying "when He only becomes god (*ilâh*) since He is characterized by qualities which He only gets by these qualities, they must fall under our term 'god'",¹⁸⁶ 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that the reason why one is entitled to a quality does not fall under its definition. In this case, when they define the concept of "being other" as they do, the opponents cannot prove that speech is something other than the Creator and something other than the essentially knowing person.

A second argument, based on the works of Abû Hâšim,¹⁸⁷ says

¹⁸¹ Cf. *Mugni* VII, 119 and the translation on p. 143 of our text.

¹⁸² In *Mugni* VII, 120, line 13 the inverted commas evidently have to be closed after the word *Allâh*, not after *al-kalâm*.

¹⁸³ In *Mugni* VII, 121, line 3 read *la-sahh* instead of *vasihh*.

¹⁸⁴ This is the meaning of the word "god", cf. p. 240.

¹⁸⁵ Read in *Mugni* VII, 121, line 13 *vakûn* (He is) instead of *takûn* (they are).

¹⁸⁶ Cf. *Mugni* VII, 121.

¹⁸⁷ *Mugni* VII, 122, line 6 (after the first comma) till 123, line 5. Here the interpunction

that two things which are different (*mukhtalif*) in their essence, must also be "other" (*gavr*)¹⁸⁸ Since God and His speech are different, He must be other than His speech

So far we dealt with the term "other" or "something else" as it is used in the common language, which knows a division into three possible relations other than, a part of, and identical with¹⁸⁹

If we look, however, into the reality behind the names, we meet only two alternatives two things either are identical or they are other In this respect 'Abd al-Jabbâr says "every qualified object about which one knows that it is characterized by a judgement and quality the other qualified object is not characterized by, or that it is possible for them, must be other than its companion and vice versa"¹⁹⁰ Since God's speech is entitled to judgements God is not entitled to, and since God is entitled to qualities and judgements His speech is not entitled to, His speech must be something other than He and He something other than His speech

A final conclusion of this long section is that God, when He is speaking, can only be speaking by a temporal qualifier He made, this qualifier, which can be qualified and is something other than God, is speech as the speech we know and produce in this world

4 ARGUMENTS OF THE OPPONENTS

At the end of his own discussions, 'Abd al-Jabbâr pays much attention to the arguments of his opponents, especially the arguments they bring into the field to prove that God's speech and the Qur'ân

has to be changed in the printed text, moreover in *Mugnî* VII, 122 lines 7 and 9 the dashes have to be removed since they suggest an incorrect reading of this text in *Mugnî* VII, 122 line 14 the suggestion to add a letter *alif* has to be rejected since the sentence continues as follows ' *min ann yad al-insân la yajrib an takun gayran lah*' This argument (two things which are different are other) cannot be used as a definition since, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr two things which are similar can also be other

¹⁸⁸ The addition 'in their essence' is made by 'Abd al-Jabbâr to exclude the possibility of two things, the one being a part of the other being different and yet not being other In these arguments 'Abd al-Jabbâr deals with the term 'other' (*gayr*) as used in common language, in this case there are three possibilities

¹⁸⁹ There can even be said to be a fourth possibility, as appears in *Mugnî* VII, 122, lines 20-22 A thing can be identical with a second thing, it can be other than it it can be a part of it, or it can be a totality of which the second one is a part Therefore, one cannot say that "other" is everything that is not the thing concerned and not a part of it

¹⁹⁰ Cf *Mugnî* VII, 123

are eternal.¹⁹¹ He does not mention anywhere the sources he used nor does he give many details about the opponents whose arguments are discussed and refuted; in the *Muğni* he refers to them with an impersonal form in the heading of the chapter concerned by saying "about the mention of their sophisms that He is speaking by eternal speech"; in the *Muḥit* they are referred to as "the people" (*al-qawm*).¹⁹² In both works we find a reference to another book by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, "*Naqd al-luma*",¹⁹³ which may suggest that the argument concerned is directed against al-Aš'arî and his school. Moreover, in the *Muḥit* al-Aš'arî is once mentioned as opponent.¹⁹⁴ More information, though still not very much and not very concrete, is found in the *Šarḥ*; in this work 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two series of arguments, the first series being related in some way or other to the followers of Ibn Ḥanbal, the other to the Aš'arîya.¹⁹⁵

When we compare the arguments we find in the three mentioned works, we easily come to the conclusion that the *Muğni* is the most complete and mentions most arguments: against the nine arguments found in the *Muğni* we only find five in the *Šarḥ* and three in the *Muḥit*. We distinguish in these arguments six categories, which are summarized as follows:

a. Since God cannot be silent or dumb, He must be speaking from all eternity (the first argument of the *Muğni*, the first one of the *Muḥit*, the first one of the second series—ascribed to the Aš'arîya—in the *Šarḥ*).

b. A *taqsim*: since God cannot be essentially speaking nor by temporal speech, He must be speaking by eternal speech (second and

¹⁹¹ These arguments are called *šubah* (sophisms) by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, who by using this term already gives his judgement on their value. They are discussed in *Muğni* VII, 133-179 (chapter 17) after he has proved that God is speaking by temporal speech. He made. In the *Muḥit* we find these arguments in I, 349-355 at the very end of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's chapters on God's speech and the Qur'ân. In the *Šarḥ* we find two series of arguments, the first concerning the being eternal of the Qur'ân in this world (pp. 542-545), the second concerning the being eternal of the Qur'ân in the other world (pp. 555-563). See also Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 75-84, where he discusses the passage concerned from the *Muğni*. Badawi, *Histoire*, 254-255, discusses as usually the text of the *Šarḥ*, but only gives his attention to the first series of arguments.

¹⁹² *Muğni* VII, 133. "*Fasl fî dîkr šubahihim annah ta'âlâ mutakallim bi-kalâm qadîm*". The title of the preceding chapter has also an impersonal form in its wording, only in the heading of chapter 15 a name is mentioned: the Kullâbiya. Cf. *Muḥit* I, 349. "*Bâb fî dîkr šubah al-qawm wa-hallihâ*" (not *jallihâ* as the Lebanese edition reads).

¹⁹³ *Muğni* VII, 148 and *Muḥit* I, 351. The title of this book is "*Naqd* (not: *ba'd* or *naqs*) *al-luma*". Cf. also note 56 on p. 339.

¹⁹⁴ *Muḥit* I, 352, cf. notes 228-229 of this section.

¹⁹⁵ Cf., respectively, *Šarḥ* 544 and 558.

third arguments of the *Muğni*, second one of the *Muḥiṭ*, second one of the second series in the *Šarḥ*).

c. The name "God" is mentioned in the Qur'ān; consequently, it must be eternal (fourth argument in the *Muğni*, first one of the first series—asccribed to the followers of Ibn Ḥanbal—in the *Šarḥ*).

d. God's creative word "be" (*kun*) makes it necessary that God's speech is eternal (fifth argument of the *Muğni*, third argument of the second series in the *Šarḥ*).

e. Not being speaking is a defect for a living being and, consequently, has to be denied about God (arguments six, eight, and nine from the *Muğni*; third argument of the *Muḥiṭ*).

f. Some texts from the Qur'ān suggest that God's speech and the Qur'ān are eternal (seventh argument of the *Muğni*, second one of the first series in the *Šarḥ*).

From this summary one can deduce that in the text of the *Muḥiṭ* only arguments of the Aš'arīya are discussed, whereas in the *Muğni* both kinds of arguments (to prove that the revealed Qur'ān is eternal and to prove that the Qur'ān which is in the other world is so) are intermingled.

When we compare this with some texts from the Aš'arī tradition, we notice that the arguments al-Aš'arī uses in his "*Kitāb al-luma*" are the same three arguments discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbār in his second series of the *Šarḥ*: the categories a, b, and d.¹⁹⁶ In his "*Ibāna*" Al-Aš'arī mentions more arguments, among them also the other three categories;¹⁹⁷ evidently, he comes in this work much closer to the opinion and arguments of the Ḥanābila. When we look into the works of al-Bāqillānī,¹⁹⁸ we see that the arguments given by him are similar to those discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbār, though he mentions more arguments than 'Abd al-Jabbār discusses in the present context.

I deal with the nine arguments mentioned and refuted in the *Muğni*, in the same order in which 'Abd al-Jabbār deals with them, paying most attention to the way in which he refutes them.

*The first argument*¹⁹⁹

The first argument the opponents use to prove that God is speaking by eternal speech, states "If He were not speaking in eternity, He must

¹⁹⁶ Cf. in the edition of McCarthy, pp. 17-22

¹⁹⁷ Cf. *Ibāna*, 20-33

¹⁹⁸ Cf. *al-Insāf*, 62-63 and *at-Tamhid*, 26-29 and 237-251

¹⁹⁹ This argument is found in *Muğni* VII, 133-150, *Muḥiṭ* I, 349-352, and *Šarḥ* 555-558

be dumb (*aḡras*) or silent (*sâkit*) since a living being, if it has no defect, must be speaking or silent, just as it, if it has no defect, must be seeing the existent visible things ... and when it is not possible that He is speaking per se or with temporal speech, He must be speaking by eternal speech".²⁰⁰

'Abd al-Jabbâr first tries to show in four arguments that their premise saying that a living being, if it has no defect, must be speaking or silent, is not correct.²⁰¹

First:²⁰² dumb (*aḡras*) is someone in whose instrument to speak inability (*'ajz*, the opposite of *qudra*) inheres, or whose instrument is attained by an unsoundness (*fasâd*) which prevents its use. Silent is someone who refrains from making speech with his instrument notwithstanding the fact that he is able to do so. Against this background, 'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks that ability always must precede the act,²⁰³ this implies that in that very first moment of our being able we are neither speaking, nor silent, nor dumb since speaking is not yet possible, although the living being has no defect. Consequently, the opponents cannot take their premise for granted.²⁰⁴

The structure of the section concerned in the *Mugnî* can be summarized as follows having described the argument of the opponents (*Mugnî* VII, 133, lines 4-18), 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives four arguments to show that the premise his opponents use is not correct (*Mugnî* VII, 133, line 19 - 142, line 11), next, he mentions three arguments showing that the argumentation of his opponents is not correct (*Mugnî* VII, 142, line 12 - 148, line 10), to end with six *ilzâmât* (argumenta ad hominem) which were used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr's teachers (*Mugnî* VII, 148, line 11 - 150, line 5)

²⁰⁰ *Mugnî* VII, 133, lines 4-6 In *Mugnî* VII, 133, line 7 the addition of *an* suggested by al-Abyârî is superfluous and breaks the grammatical order of the sentence, in *Mugnî* VII, 133, line 8 add (with the manuscript) *lâ* after the word *mum-man* At the end of the argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds that some of these opponents come to the conclusion that the audible speech cannot be eternal and that therefore God's speech must be different from it

²⁰¹ The four arguments are introduced in a similar way 'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks every time that the opponents restrict themselves to the giving of an allegation (*da'wâ*) without any proof on which they build their argumentation

²⁰² *Mugnî* VII, 134, line 1 - 135, line 9

²⁰³ Cf pp 201-202

²⁰⁴ Other formulations of this premise are rejected by 'Abd al-Jabbâr since the formulation itself is not correct a) a living being without a defect must be speaking, this leaves the possibility open that it is silent, b) a living being without a defect that is not dumb and silent must be speaking, this is not correct since the denial of dumbness is already implied in the denial of the defects, c) a living being that is neither dumb nor silent must be speaking, a baby has another defect by which he cannot speak, d) a living being that is not crying (like a baby), not dumb, and not silent must be speaking, someone who is totally unable (*'âmir*) cannot be called dumb, but is not speaking. Consequently, the only correct formulation they can choose, though the contents will be rejected, is the one mentioned in the text

Second:²⁰⁵ the opponents have to admit that their *taqsim* is only valid when the subject concerned can be speaking. Therefore, they first have to prove that God can be speaking in eternity; and this is what 'Abd al-Jabbâr denies. They cannot say that it must be possible for God in eternity since it is possible for Him now,²⁰⁶ for some qualities are always necessary for Him (as knowing or living), others are always impossible for Him (as being immobile or moving), and others are impossible for Him in eternity (before the creation) and possible now (from the moment of the creation). To this last category all God's acts belong. Consequently, it does not suffice to prove that God can be speaking; one has to prove that He can be speaking in eternity.²⁰⁷ And proving that is not possible.

Third:²⁰⁸ a living being does not necessarily have one of a series of opposite qualities: it can lack all of them; it is possible that a living being is neither willing nor non-willing, neither knowing nor characterized by its opposites. The present qualities are not comparable with seeing, where one can say that a living being, when it is living and has no defects and something visible is existent, must be seeing. The reason is that being living supposes being perceiving and seeing under certain conditions which are known; being perceiving can be said to belong to the essence of being living. Something like this cannot be said about speaking; speaking does not belong to the essence of being living, and is not supposed by it under some known conditions. Another difference between speaking and perceiving is said to be that speaking is the result of a free choice, and that one does not necessarily speak with all parts and kinds of speech, whereas perceiving is necessary, and one necessarily perceives all that can be

²⁰⁵ *Muḡnī* VII, 135, line 10 - 137, line 10. Cf. Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 76 His translation of *yasihh* by "is suitable" instead of "is possible" and his translation of *yastahil* by "is absurd" instead of "is impossible" is, to say the least, confusing. These words are used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr to indicate metaphysical possibility and impossibility.

²⁰⁶ In *Muḡnī* VII, 136, line 5 add instead of the *wa* proposed by al-Abyârî "*wa-law kân yastahil fi-mâ lam yazal*" This addition is necessary to get a, qua meaning, correct sentence.

²⁰⁷ If it would be sufficient to prove that God can be speaking without making any difference between eternity and time, we could argue in the same way that a dead man must be speaking since he can be speaking (sc. in the state of being living) and silence and dumbness have to be denied about him. In *Muḡnī* VII, 136, line 15 read *wa-lam abnû* instead of *wa-lam ubayyin*. My suggestion corresponds with the manuscript.

²⁰⁸ *Muḡnī* VII, 137, line 11 - 139, line 18.

perceived. Summarizing : the connection between living and perceiving is different from the connection between living and speaking.²⁰⁹

Fourth :²¹⁰ dumbness and silence are related to the instruments, not to the living being as we saw in the definitions mentioned above. Also, speech characterizes and requires a substrate. Therefore, they cannot exclude each other and be each other's opposite in the living being. If the opponents say that they exclude each other and are each other's opposite, not in a living being, but in a substrate, 'Abd al-Jabbâr shows that they do not exclude each other in this way : when someone is dumb or silent, and his tongue does, consequently, not function as an instrument, speech can exist in his tongue, either because one nevertheless can make a little bit of it, or because God made it there since He does not need instruments or a specially structured substrate.²¹¹ If they were each other's opposite in a substrate, they would be perceived in the same way; we know this is not the case. In that case lisping would be the opposite of a letter and, consequently, the opposite of all letters since the opposite of something's opposite is also the opposite of the thing concerned. The fact that one usually is not both speaking and dumb or silent at the same moment does not have to be caused by a being opposite, either in a living being or in a substrate;²¹² it may have other causes too. Moreover, we know that we can be dumb and speaking, or silent and speaking, at one and the same moment, either since it is possible that God gives a man two tongues so that he can be silent or dumb with one tongue and speaking with the other one,²¹³ or because we can still be speaking with speech we made in the echo while at the same moment we are already silent or even dumb.

²⁰⁹ 'Abd al-Jabbâr adds that the quality "knowing", with which they compare speaking in this respect, supposes that the knowing subject knows what he can know, therefore, God knows everything

²¹⁰ *Muğni* VII, 139, line 19 142, line 11. Cf Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 76-77; 'he did not understand correctly the passage he translated here; consequently, he misunderstood the construction of this sentence and translated *siħha* by "health" (instead of "possibility") and 'aj- by "weakness" instead of "inability".

²¹¹ In *Muğni* VII, 140, line 9, where the printed text reads *didd al-man'*, the *alif* belongs to the first word, so that one has to read *diddan la-mana'*; in *Muğni* VII, 140, line 14 the particle *lâ* after *wa-innamâ*, found both in the manuscript and in the printed text, has to be removed to get a correct sentence; in *Muğni* VII, 140, line 19 read *muqâranatuh* instead of *muqârabatuh*.

²¹² For the two kinds of being opposite (*didd*) : p. 142.

²¹³ In *Muğni* VII, 141, line 19 add the conjunction *wa* before *yatakallam* instead of the addition proposed by al-Abyârî.

Having rejected the premise on which his opponents founded their argumentation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr now attacks the argumentation itself, especially the way in which they argue by an analogical reasoning (*qinâs*) He does so in three arguments

First ²¹⁴ the argumentation of the opponents is entirely based on the supposition that the subject is speaking through an instrument, he can either make speech through it, or refrain from using it while it is nevertheless possible to use it, or even be prevented to use it by an inability or unsoundness that affected the instrument Since God does not speak through instruments, this analogical reasoning is not possible

Second ²¹⁵ in the argumentation of the opponents the living being is said to be speaking when he is neither dumb nor silent, in this case speaking means making speech as we already saw before and also in the immediately preceding argument An analogical reasoning would lead to the conclusion that God in eternity is making speech, and everybody has to admit that this is not possible

Third ²¹⁶ the analogical reasoning of the opponents is in itself not correct, what they establish in this world is that the known kind of speech (*al-kalâm al-ma'qûl*), the known kind of dumbness, and the known kind of silence are opposites and exclude each other in the living being

The older Kullâbiya establish in God an unknown kind of speech, different from the speech we know on earth Therefore, the analogical reasoning is not correct, and could be used to establish in God whatever one wants to "in a different way" To make this clear 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses a *taqsim* the different kind of speech they establish can ²¹⁷ either exclude dumbness and silence of a different kind than we know in this world, or exclude dumbness and silence of the same kind, or exclude both the different and the same kind If one says that it excludes silence and dumbness of the same kind, one can reply that one cannot prove this, and that God in such a case can nevertheless be silent and dumb by silence or dumbness

²¹⁴ *Muḡnī* VII 142 lines 12-16 Cf Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 77

²¹⁵ *Muḡnī* VII 142 line 17 - 143, line 21 Cf Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr* 77

²¹⁶ *Muḡnī* VII 144 line 1 - 148 line 10 Cf Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 77 his translations are however not entirely correct

²¹⁷ In *Muḡnī* VII 144 line 14 the edited text reads with the manuscript *li-tujīb* I suggest *am yûjīb* which fits better into the context

of a different kind than we know in this world.²¹⁸ If one maintains that it excludes silence and dumbness of a different kind, one can reply that there is no way to know that they exclude one another,²¹⁹ and that God in that case can be silent and dumb by silence and dumbness as we know them in this world. If one says that it excludes both kinds, one can reply that it is not possible to make an analogical reasoning between something known and something unknown which is different.²²⁰

About something unknown, different from what we know in this world, one could say whatever one wants to, even that such speech would require silence and dumbness.²²¹ The opponents cannot object that speech, silence, and dumbness are opposites, for they admit that God is able to produce opposites;²²² they cannot object either that it would be contrary to the essence of its genus, for they admit that God is able to produce even that; nor can they object that these things are different from the things we know in this world, for they also establish speech different from the speech in this world.

The later Kullâbiya, however,—probably the Aš'ariya—did not establish in God a speech different from human speech, since for them human speech too is a qualifier in the soul; against them 'Abd al-Jabbâr objects that then dumbness and silence do not exclude speech, even in this world, for speech in the soul does not exclude dumbness or silence in the tongue. When they in their opinion establish dumbness or silence in the soul, they establish something unknown, about which we cannot prove that it excludes speech. Moreover, the establishing of unknown things which are different from the things we know in this world makes it possible to establish whatever one wants to, unknown and different from what we know in this world.²²³

²¹⁸ In *Mugni* VII, 144, line 17 the addition made by al-Abyârî is superfluous

²¹⁹ In *Mugni* VII, 145, line 4 read *mâ na'qiluh* instead of *mâ yaf'aluh*

²²⁰ Each whiteness excludes each blackness in a substrate if the whiteness and blackness are not entirely different from the kind of whiteness and blackness we know in this world. Otherwise, we cannot know that. In *Mugni* VII, 145, line 15 the edition reads *wa-lan sâr bih*, the first *wâw* is not found in the manuscript and the entire expression does not make any sense. I suggest to read *aw dâddath*, it is possible to read this in the manuscript.

²²¹ In *Mugni* VII, 145, line 19 the printed text reads (with the manuscript) *al-hawâss*, probably, we have to read *al-kars*

²²² In *Mugni* VII, 146, line 7 the printed text has *al-qidam*, this does not correspond with the manuscript, the last letter evidently being a *râ'*. Therefore, one must read *al-qudar* (a plural of *qudra'*) or make a slight correction in order to read *al-qudra*

²²³ 'Abd al-Jabbâr ends by saying that many arguments can be given yet to refute this

Having proved that both the premise and the argumentation of the opponents are not correct, 'Abd al-Jabbâr completes his discussion of this first argument with six *ilzâmât* which had already been used by his teachers. These *ilzâmât* use the same argumentation which is used by the Kullâbiya and try to show, by the absurdity of the conclusions to which they lead, that it cannot be correct.²²⁴

First *ilzâm*: God must be acting in eternity since leaving behind (*tark*) must be denied about Him.²²⁵

Second *ilzâm*: God must be avaricious (*baqîl*) in eternity since in eternity giving favours must be denied about Him.

Third *ilzâm*: God must be sterile (*'aqîm*) in an unknown way since the having of a child must be denied about Him.

Fourth *ilzâm*: God is in eternity unable (*'âjiz*) since in eternity acting and leaving behind (*tark*) must be denied about Him.

Fifth *ilzâm*: God must be crying (*sâ'ih*) and screaming (*sâriq*) in eternity since silence and defects must be denied about Him, and crying and screaming are opposites of dumbness and silence.

Sixth *ilzâm*: God must be unjust (*jâ'ir*) in eternity since justice must be denied in eternity.²²⁶

*The second argument*²²⁷

This argument, which is ascribed to the Aš'ariya but apparently also to the older Kullâbiya,²²⁸ takes the form of a *taqsim* though it does not have the same strict structure as the one we saw before in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own demonstration that God can only be speaking by temporal speech of the same genus as our speech; but it is possible to compare both argumentations.

theory, for those arguments he refers to his book "*Naqd al-luma*" Cf also note 56 on p 339

²²⁴ *Mugnî* VII, 148, line 11 – 150, line 5

²²⁵ The opponents reply that leaving behind is also an act and, therefore, cannot be its opposite, in fact, they are opposites, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies again, since someone who is able either can be acting or leaving behind In *Mugnî* VII, 148, line 14 read *yudâdd al-fi'l* instead of *yudâf al-fi'l*, which al-Abyârî reads meanwhile suggesting to correct it into *yudâf li-l-fi'l*. In *Mugnî* VII, 148, line 16, the addition *min* made by al-Abyârî is superfluous since the manuscript reads here *bi-tibâth* In *Mugnî* VII, 148, line 17 the word *hâdâ* is not found in the manuscript

²²⁶ In *Mugnî* VII, 150, line 4 read *yuhilû* instead of *taqayyalû*

²²⁷ *Mugnî* VII, 150, line 6 – 163, line 12 Cf also *Šarh* 558-560 and *Muhit* I, 352-354 See also Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 78-80

²²⁸ Cf *Šarh* 558 In *Muhit* I, 352 Ibn Abî Bišr (a name for al-Aš'arî, cf for instance Sezgin, *GAS*, I, 603) is said to belong to the later ones who used this argument, this implies that it was used by the older Kullâbiya too

The argument runs, schematically, as follows :

God is speaking by speech.

God's speech is either temporal or eternal.

If it were temporal, it could not exist without a substrate since it is an accident and accidents can only inhere in substrates.

If it were temporal, it could not inhere in God since God is not a substrate in which accidents can inhere.

If it were temporal, it could not inhere in a substrate since in that case this substrate—or the totality of which it is part²²⁹—must have a name derived from that speech and be called speaking, commanding, prohibiting.²³⁰

It even must be called by its most specific qualification.²³¹

The only alternative that remains is that God is speaking by eternal speech and, since our speech cannot be eternal, it must be different from our speech.

As 'Abd al-Jabbâr does himself, we deal with the various parts of this argument in the order mentioned above.

"God is speaking by speech"²³² This starting-point of the *taqsim* is not correct since it is not complete. The opponent first has to prove that God cannot be per se speaking nor "neither per se nor by a cause".²³³ Concerning this latter alternative they cannot say that this absolutely and a priori is impossible. Concerning the first alternative they cannot say that it is not possible that God is per se speaking since every argument proving that God cannot be per se speaking also can be used to prove that He cannot be speaking by eternal speech. One can even say: when someone says that God is per se speaking, he deviates in one aspect from the known reality in this world; when someone says that God is speaking by eternal speech, he does so in many aspects since many characteristics of speech are

²²⁹ Cf. *Muhit* I, 352 This is said to be an addition made by al-A's'arî (Ibn Abî Bišr) Cf. the preceding note

²³⁰ Read in *Mugni* VII, 150, line 16 *vaštaqq* instead of *vasbaq*

²³¹ As these most specific qualifications (*akars al-awšaf*) are mentioned speech, command, and prohibition (*Mugni* VII, 150, line 15)

²³² *Mugni* VII, 151, line 1—152, line 13 A similar argument is mentioned in *Šarh* 558, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr remarks that a correct *taqsim* must mention and discuss also the theses of the opponents This *taqsim* does not do this

²³³ In *Mugni* VII, 151, lines 1-2 we have to keep to the reading of the manuscript, "annah lays bi-mutakallim li-nafsih wa-lâ lâ li-nafsih wa-lâ li-'illa", two alternatives have been omitted by the opponent God is per se speaking and God is speaking "neither per se nor by a cause" In the note al-Abyârî omitted one *lâ* from this formula, while in the text he suggests to abridge it

no longer applicable.²³⁴ One also cannot say that God cannot be qualified by essential qualities at all since we proved that He is qualified by a number of essential qualities.

"God's speech is either temporal or eternal".²³⁵ In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's eyes this *taqsim* is not correct since the temporal speech mentioned in this formula is something we know in this world, whereas the eternal speech is something entirely different and unknown.²³⁶ To make such a *taqsim* correct one first has to know the thing concerned and to know that it exists; only then can one ask whether it is temporal or eternal; only in such a case this *taqsim* will be correct.²³⁷ But in fact, the opponents bring together in this *taqsim* two different things which cannot be compared.

"If it were temporal, it could not exist without a substrate since it is an accident and accidents can only inhere in substrates".²³⁸ If an accident is temporal, it must either inhere in God, or in a substrate, or exist without inhering at all. The opponents discuss subsequently these three alternatives. 'Abd al-Jabbâr already proved in his treatise on God's will that accidents can exist without inhering in a substrate. Moreover, when they say that God's speech is different from our speech and can be eternal, it can also be an accident different from other accidents, and exist without inhering in a substrate. Our speech cannot exist without inhering in a substrate, but possibly speech that is different can.²³⁹

²³⁴ In *Muḡnī* VII, 152, line 11 read with the manuscript *wa-l-qawl* instead of *fa-l-qawl*

²³⁵ *Muḡnī* VII, 152, line 14 154, line 2 The translation of a sentence from this argument by Bouman (*The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr* 78-79) is not entirely correct, this is caused by a misinterpretation of some words in this sentence and by the fact that it is not complete as we show in our next note

²³⁶ In *Muḡnī* VII, 152, line 15 read *kalâmih muhdaṭ mustahîl* instead of *kalâmih mustahîl* A correct translation gives "Their establishing that He has an eternal speech which is one qualifier since it is not correct to state that His speech is temporal, is impossible, for what cannot be said correctly to be temporal (always according to the opponents) is the speech we know (by intuition) to be speech, command, and prohibition"

²³⁷ Here also the translation of Bouman (*The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr* 78) has to be corrected, especially where it adds the word "eternal" temporal and eternal are the two ways in which something can be existent (*mawjûd*)

²³⁸ *Muḡnī* VII, 154, line 3 155, line 9 (at the end also the next part of the opponents' argumentation is included) See also note 239

²³⁹ The text of *Muḡnī* VII, 155, lines 1-9 constitutes one long sentence, which is structured as follows "*wa matâ qîl wa-kaḏâlik fa-law qâl qâ'il lam yakun bayn qawlih wa-bayn mâ qâlih fa'l* " In this way the alternative we discuss here and the next one are grammatically connected This interpretation of the text supposes that one reads in *Muḡnī* VII, 155, line 3 *tata'allaqîn* instead of *ṣata'allaqîn* and that the addition of the conjunction *wa* in *Muḡnī* VII, 155, line 7, made by al-Abyârî, should not be made

"If it were temporal, it could not inhere in God since God is not a substrate in which accidents can inhere".²⁴⁰ The speech we know in this world cannot inhere in God, but possibly speech that is different from this speech can inhere in Him, as, according to the opponents, also God's knowledge inheres in Him, though they may use another term to indicate this inhering.²⁴¹

"If it were temporal, it could not inhere in a substrate since in that case this substrate—or the totality of which it is a part—must have a name derived from that speech".²⁴² This thesis of his opponents is discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in detail since here his own doctrine evidently is attacked.

'Abd al-Jabbâr begins by attacking his opponents; they give one argument to refute his opinion, but he gives many arguments to refute their opinion; since the refutation of both opinions would lead to the conclusion that God has no speech at all, one of these opinions must be correct. When comparing the arguments against both opinions, 'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes that his own opinion must be correct.²⁴³

Next 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes some remarks on the doctrine of the opponents that God's speech would be eternal. The only manner to establish God's speech is by establishing speech as we know it in this world and proving that the way it occurs makes it impossible for beings which are able by an ability. There is no other way to establish God's speech, and this makes it impossible that His speech is eternal. Moreover, this eternal speech must, according to the opponents, be reproduced in letters. Since reproduction and reproduced must be similar, and something eternal cannot be similar to letters, God's speech cannot be eternal.²⁴⁴

After attacking his opponents directly in this way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr also refutes the argument they gave to attack his doctrine. He does so in a number of separate arguments.²⁴⁵ Some qualities are caused

²⁴⁰ *Mugnî* VII, 155, lines 4-9.

²⁴¹ This argument is mentioned in *Šarh* 559. The opponents use the term *qâ'im bi* instead of *hâll bi*

²⁴² *Mugnî* VII, 155, line 10 – 162, line 3 This part of the argumentation receives a great deal of attention in the *Muhîr*; cf. I, 352-354

²⁴³ The opponents say that what 'Abd al-Jabbâr actually proved is that the speech we know in this world cannot be eternal; therefore, they established a different kind of speech which can be eternal 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that in the same way they only prove that speech as we know it in this world cannot inhere in a substrate; by proving this, they never can establish a different kind of speech.

²⁴⁴ In *Mugnî* VII, 156, line 19 read *as-sîga* instead of *as-san'a*

²⁴⁵ *Mugnî* VII, 157, line 2 – 162, line 3

by the inhering of a qualifier, others by the subject's being in a state, and others again by the fact that the subject made something.²⁴⁶ Consequently, not every accident gives its substrate a name.

Moreover, one can never prove the presence or absence of something by starting from names; first, the realities have to be proved, afterwards names can be given. It is possible that the people who gave these names were mistaken or had some reason or other not to give a certain name, though it was possible, the giving of names being a matter of free choice, not of necessity.²⁴⁷

When we make a comparison with human speech, we notice that the tongue, the substrate of speech, is not called "speaking", nor the heart by those who say that speech is something in the heart or the soul.²⁴⁸ Some qualifiers give a name both to the substrate and to the one who made it, while others only give it to one of them, according to Abū Hāsim.²⁴⁹ When some aspects of a qualifier give a name to its substrate while others do not, it must also be possible that the qualifier does not give a name at all.²⁵⁰ Other acts of God give only a name to Him; this can also be the case with His speech.²⁵¹

The reason why the substrate does not receive a name from the speech inhering in it, is that it is perceived together with the speech—according to Abū Ishâq—so that the giving of a name is not necessary. Thus, it may be ascribed to some substrate without that substrate being qualified by it.²⁵²

The opponents must admit that what 'Abd al-Jabbâr says is correct as regards what they call the reproduction or expression of God's speech; but in fact, that is God's speech.

²⁴⁶ Cf. for instance, p 153 In *Mugni* VII, 157, line 11 one probably must add the negation *lâ* before the verb *yaṣtaqq*

²⁴⁷ Cf also *Muhit* I, 353

²⁴⁸ The opponents cannot make a difference between this world and the other world since this would then be possible in the giving of all names The doctrine that speech is a qualifier in the soul, has already been refuted

²⁴⁹ According to him the qualifier "sound" (*ṣawt*) gives a name both to its substrate and to the one who makes it

²⁵⁰ In *Mugni* VII, 161, line 1 one probably has to read *illâ li-l-fâ'il* instead of *lâ li-l-fâ'il*

²⁵¹ As an example he gives that God is said to be "doing good" (*muḥsin*) by creating (*br-ḳalq* instead of *yaḳluq* in *Mugni* VII 161, line 4) bodies, such as instruments and possessions, whereas nobody else is qualified by it

In *Mugni* VII, 161, line 6 add with the manuscript the preposition *fi* before *al-iṣtiqâq* This makes the addition of *ilâ an*, which is made by al-Abyârî, superfluous

²⁵² In *Mugni* VII, 161, line 17 one probably must add the negation *mâ* before *wasafû*

When it is possible that some qualifiers give two names to the same substrate (blackness, for instance, gives it the names coloured and black), it is possible that other qualifiers do not give any name at all to their substrate

With all these short arguments 'Abd al-Jabbâr proved that the argument of his opponents to exclude this alternative is not correct, and that God can be speaking by temporal speech inhering in a substrate

"It even must be called by its most specific qualifications", and these qualifications are speech, command, and prohibition²⁵³ We know from our experience that this is not true, substances are called "moving" though this is not the most specific qualification of movement²⁵⁴ Moreover, the word speech too does not belong to the most characteristic descriptions since command and prohibition are more characteristic than speech But this again is a question of terminology and of words, by which nothing at all can be proved about the reality²⁵⁵

Finally, 'Abd al-Jabbâr compares speech with writing the substrate of writing does not receive any name from the writing inhering in it, and even if it were called "combined" (*mujtami'*), this surely is not the most characteristic qualification of writing

*The third argument*²⁵⁶

The opponents state that God, if He had become speaking after He was not, would need an instrument, which implies²⁵⁷ that He is a body 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that we need an instrument, not because we become speaking after we were not, but because we have to use the substrate of our ability in acting since we are able by an ability. God is essentially able and cannot need an instrument If it were necessary for the act itself that the substrate of an ability is used, God could not act at all in eternity through lack of such a substrate

²⁵³ *Mugni* VII, 162, line 4 163, line 12

²⁵⁴ In *Mugni* VII, 162, line 5 the printed text has *li-allâ*, the manuscript is not very clear at this place, we may safely assume that it begins here with *li-annah*, what follows is very difficult to decipher, and it even is possible that it is crossed out For sure, one may replace *li-allâ* by *li-annah*

²⁵⁵ In *Mugni* VII, 162, line 16 read with the manuscript *wa-lâ yamtani'* instead of *wa-lâ yamma'*

²⁵⁶ *Mugni* VII, 163, line 13 164, line 6

²⁵⁷ In *Mugni* VII, 163, line 16 read with the manuscript *yûjub* instead of *awjab*

*The fourth argument*²⁵⁸

This argument is ascribed to the Ḥanâbila, but it is used by the Aš'ariya too;²⁵⁹ it runs: if the Qur'ân were temporal and created, while in the Qur'ân (the word) "God" is found, God, consequently, must be temporal and created too. 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that in the Qur'ân God is not really present since His name is entitled to many judgements He Himself is not entitled to, and vice versa.²⁶⁰

When the opponents advocate the general principle "the name is the named" (*al-ism huw al-musammâ*), he replies that it evidently is not true, neither with regard to God—since He is one and has many names which can be on many tongues—nor with regard to other beings—"fire" we pronounce does not burn our mouth.²⁶¹ If God's name were Him, we could say the same about His acts. Moreover, we could also argue that the Qur'ân must be temporal and created since²⁶² in it the names of many temporal and created things are found.

*The fifth argument*²⁶³

In this argument the opponents refer to two verses from the Qur'ân: "When He willed something, His command only was that He says to it 'Be' (*kun*), and it will be"²⁶⁴ and "Our word to a thing when we will it only is that We say to it 'Be' (*kun*), and it will be".²⁶⁵ If the Qur'ân and God's speech were created, the word "*kun*" would be created too, and it would be created by another *kun*,²⁶⁶ which leads

²⁵⁸ *Muğni* VII, 164, line 7 – 165, line 15 See also *Šarh* 542-544, where 'Abd al-Jabbâr also mentions and discusses the arguments of his opponents which they use to prove that "a name is the named" They base themselves, for instance, on the formula of an oath, where the name of God can be mentioned while God is meant

²⁵⁹ Cf pp 364-365.

²⁶⁰ The correction suggested by al-Abyârî for *Muğni* VII, 165, line 2 (cf note 1 of that page) is preferably not accepted, the original text being better: God's name, like any speech, only remains a moment and then falls back into non-existence (it becomes non-existent in the second moment) In *Muğni* VII, 165, line 3 read with the manuscript *kalma* instead of *kulluh*

²⁶¹ In *Muğni* VII, 165, line 10 add the negation *lâ* between *innah* and *ğayruh*. This seems necessary for a correct context. This argument is only mentioned in *Šarh* 543.

²⁶² In *Muğni* VII, 165, line 13 I suggest to delete the word *wa* before *li-ann*; evidently, the interrogation-mark has to be removed too.

²⁶³ *Muğni* VII, 165, line 16 – 176, line 13, see also *Šarh* 560-563. Cf. Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 82-84.

²⁶⁴ *Sûrat Yâsin*, verse 82

²⁶⁵ *Sûrat an-naḥl* (not *an-naml*), verse 40.

²⁶⁶ Read in *Muğni* VII, 165, line 19 *bi-kun âkar* and not *bi-kawn âkar*.

to an endless series. Therefore, one *kun* must be eternal and uncreated; and from this conclusion one deduces that all God's speech is eternal and uncreated.

'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer is that the expression "that We say to it '*kun*'" has to be interpreted as : that We make it be and will its coming into existence. He proves his point by five kinds of argument : first, he proves that it is not necessary to understand the expression concerned literally; next, he argues that a literal interpretation of the text leads to the conclusion that God needs instruments; moreover, the literal interpretation and grammatical analysis of this text rather leads to the conclusion that God's speech is temporal; then he discusses the possibility of the existence of such a creative word as *kun*, and finally, he asks his opponents whether God created by the word *kun* itself or by something of which the word *kun* is a reproduction or expression.

It is not necessary to understand literally this expression "that we say to it '*kun*'". To prove this, 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to a verse from the Qur'ân where we read that heaven and earth "say",²⁶⁷ and to some examples from the Arabic poetry and other expressions where the verb "to say" (*qâl*) cannot be understood literally.²⁶⁸

A literal interpretation of the expressions concerned leads to the conclusion that God must use the word *kun* as an instrument in producing things, while we, human beings, who normally need instruments in acting while God does not, do not need the word *kun* as an instrument in producing.²⁶⁹ One cannot object that God does not produce by (*bi-*), but at (*ind*) the word *kun*, since in that case there is no evident connection between that word and the things produced by God.

'Abd al-Jabbâr also gives a *taqsim* : if someone states that God produces "at" the word *kun*, he has to admit that this word is either eternal or temporal; when it is eternal, it corresponds with His ability and will in as far as God produces by it; when it is temporal, it is either said at everything God produces—and that makes it to be useless and evil when there is not yet something which can hear it—or it is only said at the production of some things and not at the

²⁶⁷ *Sûrat fuṣṣilat*, verse 11.

²⁶⁸ Cf. *Šarḥ* 561-562, where some examples are mentioned in which the verb *qâl* is used to indicate quickness of response

²⁶⁹ *Muğni* VII, 166, line 14 - 167, line 15

production of other things—and this is in contradiction with the literal interpretation of the verse from the Qur'ân.

An analysis of the two verses from the Qur'ân used by the opponents in their argumentation leads to the conclusion that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's interpretation of these verses must be correct, and that they indicate that God's speech is temporal rather than that it is eternal.

In this argumentation 'Abd al-Jabbâr uses the verse "Our word to a thing when We will it only is that We say to it 'Be' ('*kun*'), and it will be".²⁷⁰

If this verse were to be taken literally,²⁷¹ we should have to conclude that *kun* is a command, directed by God to the things and imposing upon them the duty to produce themselves. The absurdity of this conclusion proves that this verse cannot be understood in its literal sense.²⁷²

Moreover, the opponents' interpretation of this verse seems to imply that God has a defect²⁷³ since the being eternal of this word makes it impossible for Him to make His own choice; 'Abd al-Jabbâr's interpretation, on the contrary, implies that this verse praises God for His might. The conclusion must be that it is better to accept 'Abd al-Jabbâr's interpretation, which makes it a praise of God, than a literal understanding implying that it indicates a defect in God.²⁷⁴

Moreover, a grammatical analysis of this verse leads to the conclusion that God's speech is temporal rather than that it is eternal, though, according to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, it has to be interpreted in a way

²⁷⁰ *Mugni* VII, 166, line 14 – 170, line 12 The text from the Qur'ân, quoted here, is *sûrat an-nahl*, verse 40 Cf also Bouman, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 82-83 See also *Šarh* 561, where especially the grammatical arguments discussed below are mentioned Another argument is given too, which as such is not found in the *Mugni* if God's word *kun* were to have an influence on the coming into existence of His acts, our word *kun* would have a similar influence upon the coming into existence of our acts

²⁷¹ The addition *al-kaḥq* in *Mugni* VII, 167, line 14, made by al-Abyârî, is not correct, no addition at all is necessary, since the sentence indicates that the verse in its totality—or the word *kun*—is understood literally, if one wants to add something for clarity's sake, it will be better to add *an yaqûl lah kun*

²⁷² For, either they can obey, which implies that they can produce bodies (which is not the case since God alone can do so), or they cannot obey and God commands something the subject addressed cannot do, and this leads to the conclusion that His command is evil (cf note 269 on p 88 The translation made by Bouman (*The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr*, 83) is not entirely intelligible and needs some correction

²⁷³ In *Mugni* VII, 168, line 6 read *an-naqs* instead of *al-ba'd*

²⁷⁴ The correction of *ikrâjah* into *aḳrajah* in *Mugni* VII, 168, line 9, which is suggested by al-Abyârî, does not fit into the grammatical context of the sentence (*fa-idâ awjab hamluhum ikrâjah .*), and has to be rejected

that it does not indicate at all that God has speech, let alone that it indicates that this speech has a certain quality. Five of these grammatical arguments are mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr :

First : God's word *kun* is made dependent upon His will; His being willing is introduced by the conjunction "when" (*idâ*); this conjunction cannot indicate something remaining that also was before; it can only indicate something that comes into being, and it is mostly used to indicate the future. Consequently, the will and also the word *kun* must be temporal.

Second : we proved that God's will is temporal; in this verse God's word *kun* is linked with His will and so must be temporal too.

Third : the use of the conjunction "that" (*an*) with the present tense indicates, according to a general agreement of the linguists, the future.

Fourth : the form "we say" (*naqûl*) indicates, according to some linguists, the future; according to others, either future or present; both suppose that the thing mentioned comes into existence.

Fifth : the conjunction "and" used here (the Arabic "*fa*") indicates that what is mentioned after it immediately follows what is mentioned before; in fact, the "being" of the things immediately, in the very next moment, must follow the word *kun*. This is not possible if *kun* were eternal.²⁷⁵ From these arguments one might deduce that God's creative word *kun* is temporal; 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not do that since he denies the possibility of such a creative word.

An eternal creative word *kun* is not possible.²⁷⁶ Such a word would be necessitating (*mûjib*) the things to come into existence. The assumption that God creates by such an eternal necessitating word, leads to a number of absurd conclusions :

all things produced would be eternal, since they all are linked with an eternal necessitating word;²⁷⁷

we know three ways in which something can necessitate something else : first, by being its *'illa*, but this necessitates a state, which here

²⁷⁵ According to 'Abd al-Jabbâr, we would find between what is eternal and what is temporal an endless amount of moments, if there were moments before the creation. 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not use this verse as an argument to prove that God's speech is temporal. He only tries to refute the argument used by his opponents.

²⁷⁶ *Muqni* VII, 170, line 13 - 172, line 19

²⁷⁷ When the necessitating cause and the necessitated effect can exist together, they must exist together, only when they cannot exist together, the effect must come into being the moment just after the disappearance of the cause. This is the case of reflection generating knowledge or one pressure generating another pressure.

is not the case; moreover, it causes without delay, which leads to the conclusion that an eternal *'illa* causes an eternal *ma'lûl*; second, by generating at the moment itself the cause becomes cause; this would lead to the conclusion that the bodies would be eternal if God's creative word were eternal; third, the cause generates the moment just after its own existence: this is not possible in eternity and there is no reason for such a delay;²⁷⁸

since there would be no reason why this word would necessitate at one moment and not at another moment, it would either necessitate in all eternity or necessitate never;²⁷⁹

no earlier and later would be possible in the production of things; there would be no reason why only a given amount of things would be produced and not more (or less);

no addition or reduction would be possible afterwards so that God could not be called "able" (*qâdir*).

From all these arguments one can deduce that God cannot possibly bring the things into existence by an eternal creative word.

Finally, 'Abd al-Jabbâr asks his opponents whether they assume that God produces things by a word *kun*, as we know it in this world, or by something else of which this word *kun* is said to be a reproduction or expression.²⁸⁰ If they say that God creates by the word *kun* itself, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that, if it were eternal, it could not have this outward form.²⁸¹ Nor would there be a reason why it would be "*kun*" and not "*nuk*". If they were to say that only the first letter, the "*kâf*", is eternal while the second letter, the "*nûn*", is temporal, they cannot constitute together one word.²⁸² Moreover, the question then becomes: how did the *nûn* come into existence, by the *kâf* (which is against the

²⁷⁸ In *Mugni* VII, 172, line 1 read *tûjbahâ* instead of *nûjbahâ*, the subject of this verb evidently is *kun*. For the same reason read in *Mugni* VII, 172, line 2 *tûjbhâ* instead of *nûjbhâ*.

²⁷⁹ In *Mugni* VII, 172, line 6 read *bi-annah* instead of *fa-annah*.

²⁸⁰ *Mugni* VII, 173, line 1–175, line 13. This is also treated in *Šarh* 560–561.

²⁸¹ We already discussed similar subjects when dealing with the impossibility of speech being a substance or being remaining. Cf. p. 303. In *Šarh* 560, 'Abd al-Jabbâr makes concrete what he says here in the *Mugni*: if this word were eternal, there could be no earlier or later, which is necessary to constitute this word, the *kâf* could not fall into non-existence to make the *nûn* to come into being after it, one could not come forward with the same word afterwards. In *Mugni* VII, 173, line 7 the word *ta'âlâ*, which is found in the printed text, was crossed out in the manuscript since the word *al-qadim* used here does not apply to God alone, but to everything eternal, everything one might suppose to be eternal.

²⁸² Read in *Mugni* VII, 173, line 16 *bi-sifa* instead of *bi-sifa*, which form is found in the manuscript and the printed text.

literal meaning of the verse), by a *kun* (which gives the same difficulty concerning the *nûn* of that word), or by something else (and then they leave the literal understanding of the verse).²⁸³

If they say that God creates the things by something else of which our word *kun* is a reproduction or expression, 'Abd al-Jabbâr asks them which indication they find in the verse concerned to assume a reference to such an eternal thing²⁸⁴ of which, moreover, the word *kun* would be a reproduction or expression. Evidently, this verse in itself cannot be used as an argument.²⁸⁵

When they try to escape the assumption of an endless series of *kun* by saying that things are not created by *kun* but by something of which *kun* is an expression, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that they in that case leave the literal understanding of this verse and that they, therefore, cannot prohibit him to do the same. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's interpretation, moreover, is the more logical one since it corresponds with what we know about the reality in this world.²⁸⁶

The sixth argument ²⁸⁷

This argument resembles the first one discussed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, but is more general in its wording. It says that God must be speaking since He is perfect and every defect has to be denied about Him.

For the refutation of this argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers mainly to the things he already mentioned in his refutation of the first argument. Moreover, one can say that the assumption that God would be speaking in all eternity implies a defect, since speaking is useless when there is nobody who can hear it and take some profit from it.²⁸⁸

²⁸³ In *Mugnî* VII, 173, line 20 read *yakûn* instead of *bi-kawn*; in *Mugnî* VII, 174, line 3 read *yukawwimuhâ* instead of *bi-kun bi-hâ*

²⁸⁴ In *Mugnî* VII, 174, line 10 read with the manuscript 'alâ before *annah*

²⁸⁵ In *Mugnî* VII, 174, line 20 the addition *wa-huw* suggested by al-Abyârî is grammatically not correct, the sentence running *wa-an yakûn dikruh la-hâ 'abaṭ* (or better *'abaṭan*) " When the opponents say that they establish this other eternal speech by another argument, 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that the mention of this text from the Qur'ân is useless since it does not prove anything at all

²⁸⁶ In *Mugnî* VII, 175, line 7 read with the manuscript *lâ* instead of *law*, in *Mugnî* VII, 175, line 9 read with the manuscript *fî-hâ* (sc in the verse) instead of *fî-himâ*

²⁸⁷ *Mugnî* VII, 175, line 14 - 176, line 5 Cf *Muhit* I, 354

²⁸⁸ The last argument is the only one mentioned in *Muhit* I, 354.

The seventh argument ²⁸⁹

This argument is ascribed in the *Šarḥ* to the Ḥanâbila, but it was used by al-Aš'arî and al-Bâqillânî too. To prove that God's speech and the Qur'ân are not created, two texts from the Qur'ân are quoted: "Has He not the creation and the command?"²⁹⁰ and "Ar-Raḥmân taught the Qur'ân and created man".²⁹¹ From the way in which God's speech is mentioned, separately from something created or the creation, the opponents deduce that it is not created.

'Abd al-Jabbâr replies first that, if a literal interpretation of these verses as they explain them does indicate anything, it indicates that the Qur'ân we know in this world is uncreated; the opponents deny this. But their argumentation in itself is not valid, as appears when we treat in the same way other texts from the Qur'ân; it is clear that one can mention something separately without indicating that it is something else; one may do that for some purpose. An analysis of these verses also elucidates why they cannot base themselves upon them; the expression "He has the command" means that He made it; the word "*amr*", here rendered by "command", is also used to indicate some other act; one cannot base oneself on these two verses, while many other texts say that God's command is temporal;²⁹² according to some theologians there is a difference between "creation" (*kalq*) and "created" (*maḳlûq*);²⁹³ the expression "ar-Raḥmân taught the Qur'ân" indicates that it is temporal, and when we want to glorify God by it, it must indicate that He and not someone else produced and made it.²⁹⁴

The eighth argument ²⁹⁵

Being speaking characterizes a living being; the qualities of a living being which do not indicate a defect must be used for God, since He is entitled to them in eternity.

²⁸⁹ *Mugni* VII, 176, line 6 – 178, line 7 Cf *Šarḥ* 544-545.

²⁹⁰ *Sûrat al-a'râf*, verse 54

²⁹¹ *Sûrat ar-Raḥmân*, verses 1-3

²⁹² Cf p 351, where some of these texts have already been mentioned

²⁹³ We already saw that for 'Abd al-Jabbâr there is no such difference of meaning, just as there is no difference between the words *fi'l* (act) and *ma'ûl* (made)

²⁹⁴ According to the text of the *Šarḥ* one can only teach something temporal, according to the *Mugni* the *ta'zim* (making great) of God supposes that He produced it Himself

²⁹⁵ *Mugni* VII, 178, line 8 179, line 7

To this argument 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that speaking indicates that the subject made speech; since this is not possible in eternity, God cannot be speaking in eternity. God is entitled to some of His positive qualities because of His essence, and this implies that He is so in eternity; but to other positive qualities He is entitled since He made something by which He deserves praise. To these qualities He cannot be entitled in eternity. We already saw that the quality speaking belongs to the second category.²⁹⁶

*The ninth argument*²⁹⁷

This last argument also states that it would be a defect when God were not speaking in eternity. The difference is that this argument starts from the assumption that in this world speech is a qualifier in the soul.

'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that he has proved in much detail that speech is not a qualifier in the soul so that the starting-point of this argument is not correct.

²⁹⁶ Cf pp 327-329

²⁹⁷ *Mugnî* VII, 179, lines 8-21

E GOD'S SPEECH IS GOOD

Speech belongs to the genus sound and consists in arranged letters. it is not a qualifier in the human interior Only the living being who actually made speech is entitled to the quality "speaking", he is entitled to it because he made it

Since God made speech of the same kind as the speech human beings make, He is entitled to the quality "speaking", He is neither essentially speaking, nor by eternal speech, nor by speech different from human speech

What remains to be done in this last paragraph, is to apply the general principle that God's acts must be good (*hasan*), and draw the conclusions for His speech God's speech, about which 'Abd al-Jabbâr proved in much detail that it cannot be but His act, must be good speech

In the discussions of this subject we follow again 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentation as we find it in the *Mugni* - the *Muhit* runs parallel with it — after discussing the being good of God's speech 'Abd al-Jabbâr discusses in two appendices the relation between our reproduction of God's speech and His speech as He made it Himself, and the question whether His speech can be called "created" (*maḳlûq*) In a short final chapter he resumes some of his conclusions ¹

1. GOD'S SPEECH IS COMMUNICATIVE

Arriving at the central question of his discussions on God's speech, 'Abd al-Jabbâr first, before dealing with the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order that God's speech be really good, recapitulates what he already said before about the way in which we can distinguish God's speech, and know that speech we hear is really His speech ² This speech must occur with such a purity of language and such an eloquence of style (*fasâha wa-balâga*) as is not found among the real Arabs, who are the masters of language. When someone in whom

¹ For the structure of the *Mugni*, *Šarh*, and *Muhit* pp 279-291

² *Mugni* VII, 180-181 (chapter 18 of *Mugni* VII), cf *Muhit* I, 337 'Abd al-Jabbâr discussed this before the long treatise on the doctrines of his opponents, cf pp 338-340

this speech appears claims to be a prophet and states that this speech is God's speech, it must be true.

Next, 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to the question of how God's speech can be good.³ Speech, to be good, must be useful for someone who benefits by it. This may be either the speaking person himself or someone else. The speaking person may benefit by his own speech since it can help him memorize a text, prevent him from forgetting it, or habituate him to perform what he says. Someone else may benefit by it if this speech communicates him something that is useful for him. Only in these two ways can speech be good.⁴

It is evident that God's speech cannot be useful for Himself in one of the ways mentioned above; consequently, to be good His speech must be communicative (*mufîd*) and communicate to some hearing subject something the knowledge of which is useful for him.⁵

The principle that God's speech must be communicative leads to two conclusions :

First, since we cannot know by necessary knowledge what God wills by His speech, we have to know this by acquired knowledge; since, moreover, God cannot make gestures to elucidate the meaning of His speech, we can only know what it means by this speech itself.⁶ This implies that He must speak in a language which is already known and which, consequently, must be made by convention (*muwâda'a*) between men.⁷ As a consequence, at least one language is not made by God; when human beings made one language by convention, God can teach them all other languages through the one they made. 'Abd al-Jabbâr rejects the absolute "*tawqîf*" (God made Himself all lan-

³ To this subject 'Abd al-Jabbâr devotes two chapters, both of them very short *Mugnî* VII, 182-186 (chapters 19 and 20), cf. *Muhîr* I, 337-340 and *Sharh* 528 and 530-531

⁴ 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives some examples to prove this statement if speech were not communicative, it would be like making sound (*taswîr*), like speech that cannot be understood since no convention about it is made, like speaking to someone in a language he does not know, there could be no command, prohibition, or information in it *Mugnî* VII, 182, cf. *Muhîr* I, 338-339

⁵ One cannot turn this argument the other way round and say that what is communicative is per se good, one also has to exclude the other "aspects" (*nujûh*) that can make an act evil, as, for instance, lying. Moreover, if God were lying, this would make His speech cease to be communicative since it would become unreliable

⁶ God cannot communicate it by other acts, nor by speech in general or a form in which it occurs, He only can do so by the speech itself. This implies that this speech is in itself communicative, which supposes a conventional language

⁷ *Mugnî* VII, 182-183. See also what we already said on pp. 304-305 about *mufîd* and *muwâda'a*

guages) and is an adherent of the theory of “*muwâda'a*” (man comes to a convention and in this way makes a language).⁸

Another consequence is that God's speech has to be interpreted according to the rules of that convention, the rules of the language.⁹ If God's speech has no context (*qarîna*), it must be interpreted according to the rules of languages; if it has a context, it must be interpreted in that context. In matters of revelation we first have to try to interpret the text concerned against the background of the entire revelation; if this is not possible, we have to use linguistic arguments in the interpretation; if this too does not lead to a result, and there are indications that it has to be interpreted metaphorically, we have to interpret it according to those indications.

Second, God can only speak when there is someone who can hear His speech and benefit by it¹⁰ (and a substrate in which it can inhere¹¹). Otherwise, His speech would be useless and, consequently, evil.

If the question is asked at which moment God made the Qur'ân,¹² one can answer basing oneself on human intuition (*'aql*) that He must have made it either at the moment He sent it down to His prophet or before that moment, but not before making someone who can hear it and benefit by it. Revelation narrows the conclusions reached by reflection upon the intuition, by stating that God created it before He sent it down.

⁸ For a survey of the discussions between Muslims about the origin of language and a description of the various positions adopted, see Bernard G. Weiss, *Medieval Muslim Discussions of the Origin of Language*, ZDMG 124 (1974), 33-41. Besides the “conventionalist” view (first advanced by Abû Hâsim, who in this respect was followed by 'Abd al-Jabbâr) and the “revelationist” one (the *tawqîf*, adhered to by both Abû 'Alî and al-Aš'arî), the author mentions—following the use of Islamic handbooks—a “naturalist”, a “revelationist-conventionalist”, and a “non-committal” theory. He points to the connection between the doctrines of the eternity or createdness of the Qur'ân and God's speech on the one hand and the theories about the origin of language on the other, this connection was brought to an end by the later Aš'ariya, who redefined God's speech and made it “an abstract quality inhering in the divine nature” (p. 41).

⁹ *Muğni* VII, 185-186 (chapter 20). 'Abd al-Jabbâr himself states that he restricts himself in this chapter to some remarks on the subject, and that he will deal with it later in the course of his work.

¹⁰ *Muğni* VII, 184 and also the last chapter of this part of the *Muğni* (VII, 224). See also *Muhîr* I, 337-338.

¹¹ This argument, which falls outside the present context but is also used to prove that God cannot have created the Qur'ân before all other things, is only mentioned in the *Muhîr* (I, 338).

¹² *Muhîr* I, 337-338, see also *Muğni* VII, 224.

2. THE REPRODUCTION OF GOD'S SPEECH

The reason why 'Abd al-Jabbâr comes to speak about the relation between reproduction and reproduced (*al-hikâya wa-l-mahkî*)¹³ is the disagreement among Muslims, and even among Mu'tazila, about the question whether what we hear in this world is really God's speech or something else that has the same form as His speech.¹⁴

In this way it also becomes clear what 'Abd al-Jabbâr understands by this reproduction; God's speech and the Qur'ân, which have been discussed until now, are for him the audible speech God Himself made and which cannot remain. What we hear in this world, what the angel revealed to Muḥammad, and what we recite ourselves is a reproduction of God's speech. When this reproduction is called by Muslims "the Qur'ân" and "God's speech", one must look for the relationship between this reproduction and what is reproduced, sc., the speech God once made.

Abû 'Alî is said to have adhered successively to two different theories.¹⁵ First, he supported the opinion that the reproduction is identical with the reproduced. The reproduced being the letters alone, which according to him can remain, it can be linked with something else,¹⁶ sound, writing, or memory, and in this way exist in many places, even at one and the same moment in one and the same place, since sound, writing, and memory do not exclude one another.¹⁷ Consequently,

¹³ *Mugni* VII, 187-207 (chapter 21) Cf. *Muhit* I, 341-344 and *Šarih* 551. See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Uḡmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 239-240. For a list of some opinions (prior to 'Abd al-Jabbâr), see al-Aṣ'arî, *Maqâlât*, 193-194. The structure of this chapter is rather simple: having discussed the doctrines of, successively, Abû 'Alî and Abû Hâsim with their arguments, he concludes by describing his own doctrine.

For the translation of the term *hikâya*, see, for instance, Watt, *Formative Period*, 284, who renders it as "imitation or rather reproduction". We use the English term "imitation" to translate the Arabic word *ihidâ'*.

¹⁴ Cf. *Muhit* I, 341.

¹⁵ *Mugni* VII, 187, line 3-191, line 14 deals with Abû 'Alî's theories. Both in the *Mugni* and in the *Muhit* 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that the information about the two theories of Abû 'Alî comes from his son Abû Hâsim. According to *Mugni* VII, 191 and *Muhit* I, 341, the same doctrine as Abû 'Alî held first was propagated by Abû l-Hudayl and his followers.

¹⁶ The word *bi-gayrih*, mentioned by al-Abyârî in a note in *Mugni* VII, 187, belongs in the text (line 6 after *h-'aynih*) notwithstanding the fact that at the end of the line it is written above the other words, this is not unusual.

¹⁷ In *Mugni* VII, 187, line 9 read *lâkinn* instead of *li-kaḏib* (the manuscript is not easy to read). Abû 'Alî compares speech with substances, which can be in different places "by something else", but since these "something else" are opposite and exclude each other, a substance cannot be at one and the same moment in different places. The

what we pronounce, write, or memorize is really the act of the subject who originally (*ibtidâ'an*) made it, and whose speech we intend to reproduce; it is linked with sound, writing, or memory, which are produced by the reproducing subject.

To prove this, Abû 'Alî gives four arguments :

first, if it really were the act of the reproducing person, he could make something similar to it, for instance, something similar to the Qur'ân or to a poem of Imru' al-Qays;

second, the Qur'ân¹⁸ and the *Ijmâ'* (consensus of the Muslims) tell us that what we hear is really God's speech;

third, the Qur'ân cannot be evil, but the recitation can be evil; this implies that there is a difference between the recitation (the sounds) and what is recited (the letters);

fourth, since human beings would be able to produce something similar to the Qur'ân, the Qur'ân would not be inimitable and the prophet could not challenge the unbelieving Arabs to make something similar to it.

In this first period, the presence of the reproduced speech in the reproduction was for Abû 'Alî dependent upon the intention of the subject to reproduce or not. In a second period he discovered that the intention can have no influence upon the relation between a cause (*sabab*) and its effect.¹⁹ Therefore, the intention to reproduce cannot prevent that the organism of speech really produces letters, just as it does when such an intention is not present. Abû 'Alî comes to the conclusion that in the case of reproducing we find in the reproduction both the speech (and for him speech is letters) of the reproducing subject and the speech of the subject whose speech is reproduced. We can summarize this by saying that the reproduction is the reproduced plus speech of the reproducing person.

'Abd al-Jabbâr concludes that, though Abû 'Alî maintains that the second theory is based upon the first one, the arguments given to prove the first one contradict the second one;²⁰ consequently, both theories have to be rejected.

"something else" by which speech is in different places knows no mutual exclusion, so that speech can be at one and the same moment in different places

¹⁸ The text quoted is *sûrat at-tawba*, verse 6 "Grant him asylum so that he may hear God's speech"

¹⁹ In *Mughnî* VII, 188, line 19 read *musabbab* instead of *sabab*

²⁰ One would be able to produce something similar to God's speech, the thesis is not in correspondence with the Qur'ân and the Consensus, which do not admit that what is heard is both God's speech and human speech, the reproduction can be evil,

But, since the four arguments mentioned above can also be used against 'Abd al-Jabbâr's own doctrine, he has to show that they are not correct and cannot be used against him.

The first argument : 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that one can only produce something similar by way of imitation, not by producing it originally. To show that this is true, he compares it with weaving, building,²¹ and writing; as a consequence of Abû 'Alî's theory we even could not make speech at all, since every word we produce is in some way or other a reproduction of what the Arabs made.

The second argument : to this one he replies that the expression "God's speech" (*kalâm Allâh*) means that God produced it, but it is also used for a reproduction of the speech He made.

The third argument :²² what is similar to something good (the Qur'ân God made), nevertheless can be evil (our reproduction of the Qur'ân).

The fourth argument : the inimitability of the Qur'ân and the challenge to produce something similar are concerned only with the production of something similar originally and not reproducing or imitating.

Abû Hâšim.²³ For Abû Hâšim, who disagrees about this subject with his father Abû 'Alî, the reproduction is not the reproduced, for speech is only sound, what is heard from a reproducing subject is his act, and no difference can be made between the recitation (*qirâ'a* : the sound) and the recited text (*maqrû'* : the letters).²⁴ Since speech is sound, it cannot remain or exist in more places. Since speech is sound, writing

the Qur'ân would not be inimitable, the challenge by the prophet would be impossible Cf *Muğni* VII, 189

²¹ In *Muğni* VII, 189, line 17 read *al-bâni* instead of *aṭ-ṭâni*

²² In the *Muğni* first the fourth argument is treated and afterwards the third one. We changed the order to adapt it to the order in which Abû 'Alî's arguments were given first

²³ Cf *Muğni* VII, 191, line 14 200, line 23, cf also *Muḥit* I, 341. The same doctrine was propagated by other Mu'tazila, as both Ja'far's, Abû Ja'far al-Iskâfî (*Muğni* VII, 191), Abû l-Qâsim al-Balkî and the Iḳšîdiyya (*Muḥit* I, 341) (For the Iḳšîdiyya Ibn al-Murtadâ, *Tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, 100, 107, and 114-115)

²⁴ The distinction between reproduction and reproduced (*hukâya* and *mahkî*) is not the same one as the one between recitation and recited (*qirâ'a* and *maqrû'*). To emphasize the difference one can say that in the reproduction (*hukâya*) one can distinguish between the recitation and the recited, if one wants to make a difference—as Abû 'Alî does—between what comes from the reproducing subject in the reproduction and what comes from the subject whose text is reproduced. Consequently, for Abû 'Alî reproduction is identical with reproduced and recitation is different from recited, for Abû Hâšim the reproduction is not the reproduced and recitation is the recited

can only be a sign (*amâra*) of speech, memory only the knowledge how speech was and how it was arranged.

To prove this, Abû Hâsim gives ten arguments, numbered in the *Muğni* from one to ten.

First: speech is nothing else but sound since speech cannot occur without articulated sounds and sounds articulated in a certain way cannot occur without speech. We already saw this before. Three objections, stating that either letters or sounds are entitled to judgments the others are not entitled to, are refuted.²⁵

Second: speech is nothing else but sound since speech is perceived by hearing and something written or memorized cannot be perceived in that way. Two objections, stating that speech is not perceptible or that it is only perceptible when linked with sound, are refuted.²⁶

Third: there is no real difference between speech that is made originally and speech that is made by way of reproduction, since what is heard is the act of the speaking subject alone. The secondary cause being necessitating (*mûjib*), intention, free choice, or knowledge cannot have any influence on its generating its effect. Therefore, reproduction contains only one speech, the speech of the reproducing subject.²⁷

Fourth: there can be no speech in writing; since similar secondary causes generate similar effects and the intention can have no influence upon this generating, and since the written signs for some letters are

²⁵ This argument is given in *Muğni* VII, 192, line 1-193, line 13, cf also our p 301 First objection the delicacy of the voice and purity of the throat appear in the sound, not in speech Answer the letters are also described in this way, moreover, one must not base oneself on names and words but on the reality, and there sounds and speech are not different Second objection sound is one genus, speech are more genera Answer Abû Hâsim says that sounds and letters correspond in the way they are similar to each other and exclude one another 'Abd al-Jabbâr proved this by a comparison with colours (cf pp 315-316) The division into genera does not add something to this Third objection letters can be moving or immobile, sounds cannot Answer this also is a question of names, of terminology Letters are not really moving or immobile, these terms only indicate that something is or is not added to it (we would say a vocal is or is not added to the consonant)

²⁶ This argument is given in *Muğni* VII, 193, line 14 - 194, line 11 First objection speech is not heard, only sound is heard Answer this does not correspond with perception, where we perceive the difference between two letters just as we perceive the difference between two sounds Second objection speech is only heard when it is linked with sound (Read in *Muğni* VII, 194, line 1 *yuqârin* instead of *yuqâriq*) Answer no such condition is possible in perceiving, only the things concerned have to be existent, but existence is not something linked with it

²⁷ *Muğni* VII, 194, line 12 - 195, line 4 Objection in the reproduction we also find the speech of the person whose speech is reproduced Answer there is no difference at all in what we hear

similar in the old Arabic writing system, they cannot be the cause of different letters; one has to know the convention before being able to read it.²⁸

Fifth : there can be no speech in writing. A written letter consisting of many dots, one may ask by which dot the real letter is generated. If it is the first one or the last one, the remainder of the written letter is superfluous. Nor can one say that all dots together generate the letter, since one secondary cause (*sabah*) can only generate one effect, and one effect cannot be generated by more secondary causes.²⁹ One cannot say that the first dot³⁰ generates the real letter, but that the remainder is also necessary either to make the generating possible or to make the written letter a sign, since such a condition is not possible in generating; it is possible for a sign, but this leads to the conclusion that a written letter is really a sign, which is denied by the opponents. This argument is based on the supposition that a real letter is one thing, not consisting in parts, whereas the written letter consists of many dots

Sixth : there can be no speech in writing. To generate speech, writing has to come into existence, but we already saw that writing does not always come into existence.³¹ Moreover, if the letters were to come into existence on the paper by the moving of the pen and its pressure on the paper, they also would come into existence when someone writes without using ink; if the letters were to come into existence in the ink, one could write on a surface of water too.³² Consequently, no speech comes into existence, writing only is a sign.

Seventh : there can be no speech in writing. Speech becomes communicative by coming into existence in a certain order; writing can be communicative too when its totality comes into existence at one and the same moment, or when it comes into existence in the inverse order.³³

²⁸ *Mugni* VII, 195, lines 5-13 In *Mugni* VII, 195, line 8, add after *ilayh* the word *ar-râ'*, which is missing both in the manuscript and in the printed text

²⁹ *Mugni* VII, 195, line 14 – 196, line 8 In *Mugni* VII, 195, line 17 read with the manuscript *aw âkîrih* instead of *wa-âkîrih* This argument is based on the principle that one cause only has one effect, just as one ability has only one *maqdûr* and vice versa

³⁰ In *Mugni* VII, 196, line 3 delete *wa-l-âkîr*, found in the manuscript and the printed text, since it does not fit, qua meaning and grammatically, into the structure of this sentence

³¹ Cf note 155 on p 357

³² *Mugni* VII, 196, line 9 – 197, line 21

³³ *Mugni* VII, 189, lines 1-9

Eighth there can be no speech in writing. In speech every letter needs its own specially structured substrate, in writing some letters need one and the same structure in the same writing system, and one letter needs different structures in different writing systems. If speech does not need specially structured substrates, such as throat and tongue, any sign can be said to be linked with speech.³⁴

Ninth the reproduction is not the reproduced.³⁵ If we reproduce the speech of two subjects, there is no reason why the speech present would be the speech of one of them, so it must be the speech of both of them, and the letters must be double and stronger than speech we made originally or we reproduced from only one subject. Since there are only single letters, we could not reproduce the speech of two subjects. Abû Hâšim³⁶ also proved this by a *taqsim* when we make a child repeat a verse that is used both by the poet Imru' al-Qays and by Tarafa without telling him who made it, whose speech will be present in the child's recitation of the verse? It cannot be the speech of both of them, since that leads to the assumption that two subjects produce one and the same act. If it is the speech of one of them, there must be a reason why it is the speech of the one poet and not of the other. It cannot be the one whom the teaching person had in mind, for he can have someone else in mind, or himself, or none of them, or even both, this would imply that, if he has the one in mind and the child intends to reproduce the speech of the other, the child would not be able to do that. Neither can it be the one whom the child intends, since the child does not know whose it is and does not intend to reproduce. Thus, no alternative is left, and we must conclude that the reproduction cannot be the reproduced.

Tenth the reproduction is not the reproduced, for this would imply that God and we could not make speech, since He and we always reproduce speech that was already made by the old Arabs who made their convention on the Arabic language.³⁷

³⁴ *Mugni* VII, 198, line 10 – 199, line 6. The letters are different according to the exact place in throat or mouth where they are articulated. In the old Arabic writing system, there was no difference, for instance, between the *râ* and the *zâ*, the *sâd* and the *dad*, the *sin* and the *šin* (these examples are mentioned by 'Abd al-Jabbâr; others may be added), in two different writing systems (the Arabs knew different systems for different purposes) the same letter can have a different form.

³⁵ This argument (*Mugni* VII, 199, line 7 – 200, line 15) and the next one are directed against Abû 'Alî's thesis that the reproduction is the reproduced.

³⁶ There is no reason to correct *wa-qâl* (and he, sc., Abû Hâšim) in *Mugni* VII, 199, line 15 into *wa-yuqâl*.

³⁷ *Mugni* VII, 200, lines 16-23. An objection is made stating that the reproduction

After these ten arguments, numbered by 'Abd al-Jabbâr from one to ten, two other arguments follow which are also ascribed to Abû Hâšim.³⁸

The first argument proves that speech cannot remain. If speech were one genus and would remain, it must remain when it is produced audible as it remains when it is produced written; and just as speech when it is written remains, though it may be recited afterwards and the recitation disappears, in the same way it would remain when it is first made as audible speech, the sound disappears,³⁹ and it is written down afterwards.

The second argument says that it does not make any difference with regard to what a subject makes or someone else hears, whether he makes speech originally or he reproduces the speech of someone else. If somebody says that, nevertheless, there is the speech of the other person together with the speech of the reproducing subject, one could say in a similar way about someone who imitates a movement or the way of walking of someone else, that in his movement or way of walking we find also the movement or way of walking of the other person.

Next we find in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's text four objections with their answers. It does not become clear whether these answers are also ascribed to Abû Hâšim.⁴⁰

First objection: God's speech is on the "preserved tablet" (*al-lawh al-mahfûz*); this implies that it is written and remains. Answer: God once made speech for the angels and afterwards wrote⁴¹ it down on a tablet. Metaphorically, one can say that He writes His speech on that tablet.⁴²

is only concerned with the totality, not with the words 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that possibly the totality is not from one person, but it can be from them all together. A second objection runs that God does not intend to reproduce 'Abd al-Jabbâr replies that to make the intention a condition in reproducing is in contradiction with their doctrine.

³⁸ *Mugnî* VII, 201, lines 1-16. That they are ascribed to Abû Hâšim becomes clear in the introduction of the first one *wa-qad qâl* (and he, sc., Abû Hâšim, said).

³⁹ In *Mugnî* VII, 201, line 4 read with the manuscript *naqad* instead of *baqî*, cf. line 3 of the same page.

⁴⁰ *Mugnî* VII, 201, line 16 – 204, line 6.

⁴¹ In *Mugnî* VII, 201, line 19 read *yaktubuh* instead of *taktubuh*, since in the next line God is said to have written the Qur'ân on the preserved tablet.

⁴² *Mugnî* VII, 201, line 16 – 202, line 8, after the comma. That it can be understood metaphorically is proved by some examples from the Qur'ân and the common language, so, for instance, the texts of the Qur'ân (*sûrat al-a'râf*, verse 104 and *sûrat al-qasas*, verse 38) rendering in Arabic what Moses and the Pharaoh said in Hebrew. At the end of this answer we find as a final remark that someone who reproduces a command is not necessarily commanding, for he only becomes so by intention and will. This

Second objection:⁴³ when someone reads aloud an insult someone else wrote down, the reading subject is not called "insulting"; it must be the person who wrote it down. This proves that there is speech in writing. Answer: speech can be similar to an insult without being an insult since the subject does not intend it to be an insult.⁴⁴ The writing person is called "insulting" since he made a sign of an insult which, when it is read aloud, becomes an insult. In a similar way, one calls someone "insulting" when he makes other signs to which is given a similar meaning.⁴⁵

Third objection: if the reproduction is the act of the reproducing subject, man can make similar things and even make something similar to the Qur'ân. Answer: we already said that this is possible by way of imitating, not by producing originally.⁴⁶

Fourth objection: the challenge by the prophet to produce something like the Qur'ân would not be possible. Answer: this argument too has been refuted before; the challenge is not concerned with imitation but with original speech, as was the case when the bedouins challenged each other to make poems or public addresses.⁴⁷

'Abd al-Jabbâr,⁴⁸ who follows Abû Hâšim in this matter, adds some remarks to clarify his own position:

Memory (*hifẓ*) is the knowledge of how speech was described and of its arrangement.⁴⁹ Who knows this is qualified as "*hâfiẓ*", who does not know it is not qualified in this way. Knowledge is only called "memory" when it is possible for us to re-produce what we know; consequently, the knowledge we have about persons is not called

remark, which has to be separated in the text from the preceding objection and its answer, seems to function as an introduction to the second objection

⁴³ *Mugni* VII, 202, line 8 (after the comma) – 203, line 6

⁴⁴ Read in *Mugni* VII, 202, line 16 *šâtim* instead of *muḵbir*, which word is found both in the manuscript and in the printed text

⁴⁵ For instance, by cutting parts of a tree away so that what remains has the form of letters forming an insult. The interpunction has to be changed here, the full stop in *Mugni* VII, 203, line 1 has to be removed

⁴⁶ *Mugni* VII, 203, lines 7-12. In *Mugni* VII, 203, line 12 read *bi-n-nisâja* instead of *bi-s-sâja*, since weaving was the example given. Cf p 390

⁴⁷ *Mugni* VII, 203, line 13 – 204, line 6

⁴⁸ Cf *Mugni* VII, 204, line 7 – 207, line 21. From this moment on 'Abd al-Jabbâr no longer uses the third person of the verb but the first person, he once explicitly mentions Abû Hâšim, finally, he opens here with the word *i'lam*, often used to introduce his own thesis (See, e.g., *Mugni* VII, 14 and 26)

⁴⁹ In Arabic this definition runs "*al-'ilm bi-kayfiyat wasf al-kalâm wa-tartibih*" (*Mugni* VII, 204)

“memory”.⁵⁰ Therefore, in memory there is no speech, but memory makes it possible for us to produce speech.⁵¹

Something similar can be said about writing: no speech is in it, but the knowledge of its conventions makes it possible for us to produce real speech.

Though one may say that someone is reproducing when he produces a famous text already made by someone else, or when he renders the meaning of a text in his own words, reproducing in the strict sense means to make the same letters someone else made⁵² and in the same order, meanwhile intending to reproduce that speech of someone else.

'Abd al-Jabbâr ends this chapter by discussing three objections.

First objection: though our speech cannot remain or exist in more places, God's speech can. Answer: God's speech being of the same genus as our human speech, this cannot be possible. If a text from the revelation in its broadest sense implies that God's speech remains or exists in more places, this text has to be interpreted according to the indications we found by reflection upon the data of human intuition.

Second objection: letters are not speech, they become speech only by the inhering of the accident composition (*ta'lif*) in them. Answer: since letters are accidents, no accident can inhere in them.⁵³

Third objection: if the Qur'ân heard by the contemporaries of Muḥammad were the act of the prophet and not God's act, the challenge would not be possible. This challenge has to prove that the Qur'ân is a miracle and, therefore, God's act. Answer: in this respect no difference can be found between God's speech and a reproduction of it; with a reproduction, too, this challenge is possible. This is confirmed by a text from the Qur'ân itself: “this surely is the word of a noble prophet”.⁵⁴ When the Qur'ân can be called God's speech and, nevertheless, can be the word and the act of the prophet, it can be God's

⁵⁰ In *Muḡnī* VII, 204, lines 10-11 the preposition *'alâ* once has to be removed

⁵¹ Evidently, we must have the possibility to produce speech our organism to produce speech must be sound

⁵² According to Abū Hāšim, it is permitted to add something, but not to change something. Therefore, one can add a *tanwīn*, but not change or omit a *haraka* (vowel), since a moving letter (a consonant plus vowel) is different from an immobile letter (a consonant without vowel), and a letter with vowel *a* is different from the letter with vowel *i* or *u*. Assimilation, melody, doubling of letters, their beauty or power (described as the number of atoms of which the letter consists) are not something outside the letters or added to them, so that they could be mentioned separately

⁵³ Cf. the way in which we explained the arrangement of the letters on pp. 299-300

⁵⁴ *Sūrat at-takwīr*, verse 19

speech and, nevertheless, our act and our speech when we recite it. We make it, intending to reproduce God's speech and producing the same letters in the same order; this makes it possible to call it God's speech.

3. GOD'S SPEECH IS CALLED "CREATED"

'Abd al-Jabbâr lays much emphasis upon the fact that to call the Qur'ân and God's speech in general "created" (*maklûq*),⁵⁵ does not add something new to the discussions of the Qur'ân; it is only a matter of terminology. Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not enter again into discussion with all those opponents who deny that the Qur'ân is God's act, produced by Him, and who state that the Qur'ân is eternal: he already refuted their statements. The discussion held in this chapter is with those opponents who agree with 'Abd al-Jabbâr that the Qur'ân and all God's speech is His act and is temporal, but who deny that the Qur'ân can therefore be called "created" (*maklûq*).

Having established the definition of "created" as "the act which is determined (*muqaddar*) by the purpose and the motive which correspond with it in a way that nothing is added to it and nothing is lacking from it",⁵⁶ or "what happens in the way of determination", and having refuted other proposed definitions of this term,⁵⁷ 'Abd al-Jabbâr is going to discuss the arguments his opponents bring into the field to show why they do not apply the qualification "created" to the Qur'ân and God's speech.⁵⁸

First objection:⁵⁹ one cannot call the Qur'ân and God's speech

⁵⁵ Cf. *Mugnî* VII, 208-223 (chapter 22), *Šah* 545-549, and *Muhit* I, 345-346. See also 'Abd al-Karîm 'Ulmân, *Nazarîyat at-taklîf*, 240-242. See also our pp. 117-119, where we discussed the meaning of *maklûq*. This chapter is not concerned with the contents of the term "created" these have been discussed before but only with the name. The discussion, therefore, is not between the adherents of an eternal Qur'ân and the adherents of a temporal Qur'ân, but it is a discussion among adherents of a temporal Qur'ân concerning the question whether this temporal Qur'ân, made by God, can be called created or not.

⁵⁶ This first definition is the one given in the *Šah*, which is the most elaborate and explains the word *muqaddar* (determined). The second definition mentioned is the one given in the *Mugnî*.

⁵⁷ We discussed this on pp. 118-119. It can be found in *Mugnî* VII, 208, line 4-215, line 2.

⁵⁸ *Mugnî* VII, 215, line 3-223, line 5.

⁵⁹ *Mugnî* VII, 215, line 3-216, line 2.

“created”, since the sources of our revealed knowledge (*aš-šar'*) do not use this term for it. Answer: the use of terms is not dependent upon its use in revealed texts; a term has a meaning and can be applied to every object that is characterized by it. Moreover, this term is mentioned in the sources of our revealed knowledge and applied there to the Qur'ân. We read in the Qur'ân: “Creator of every thing”.⁶⁰ Three traditions about the prophet give respectively: “God was and nothing else; then He created the *Dikr*”, “God did not create in heaven or on earth something greater than the verse of the throne”, and “God created the Qur'ân Arabic”.⁶¹ When we come to the next source, the *Ijmâ'*, we discover that those among the first generations⁶² of believers who believed the Qur'ân to be God's act called it “created”, whereas those who believed it to be eternal did not call it created. But there was no one who believed it to be temporal and God's act, and who nevertheless did not call it created.⁶³

Second objection: ⁶⁴ the use of the term “created” for God's speech can suggest that it is a lie; therefore, it is better not to use it. To confirm this statement the opponents use several arguments, which are discussed again by 'Abd al-Jabbâr.

First argument: the text of the Qur'ân says “you create falsehood”.⁶⁵ Consequently, the use of the verb “create” suggests that the object of this verb is a lie. Answer: the meaning of “falsehood” in this verse is not “lie” but the idols they made.⁶⁶ Moreover, since created means determined (*muqaddar*), both lie and truth can be called created; the use of other verbs (as “to say”, “*qâl*”) to indicate a lie, is no reason not to use them in describing God's speech.

Second argument: in the Arabic language one uses *kalaq* and the eighth form of this verb, *iktalaq*, to describe that one “makes” a lie. Answer: there is no reason to say that it can only be used in that way.

⁶⁰ “*Ķâlûq kull šay' sūrat ar-ra'd*, verse 16

⁶¹ Also traditions which are based on the authority of only one person, and which only are admitted when they deal with human acts, have to be accepted here since the applying of names also is an act

⁶² In *Mugni* VII, 215, line 18 read *immâ* instead of *ammâ*, this also makes the addition in line 19, suggested by al-Abyârî, superfluous

⁶³ The interpunction of the text in *Mugni* VII, 215, line 18 216, line 2 is very confusing, anyhow, the full stops in *Mugni* VII, 215, line 19 and 216, line 2 have to be removed

⁶⁴ *Mugni* VII, 216, line 3 218, line 8

⁶⁵ “*Takluqûn ifkan*” *sūrat al-'ankabût*, verse 17

⁶⁶ 'Abd al-Jabbâr refers to *sūrat as-sâffât*, verse 86 (not 76 as we read in the printed text) In *Mugni* VII, 216, line 5 read with the manuscript *yasna'ûnah* instead of *yasifûnah*

Third argument · you now have to call all informations and all other things which are determined (*muqaddar*) “created” Answer · so we do, though this qualification is not used very often (just as, for instance, the qualification “made” for information ⁶⁷)

Fourth argument when a poem is said to be “created” (*maklûq*), it must be a lie ⁶⁸ Answer the expression is abridged, fully it would run “the poem is created or determined as a lie” This expression can also be used when the contents of the poem are true (its “information”), but when it is attributed not to the poet who made it but to someone else

Fifth argument the eighth form of this verb, *iktalaq*, per se means to lie ⁶⁹ Answer · even if this were true, there is no reason why the first form of the verb, *kalaq*, would be pejorative too ⁷⁰

Sixth argument the Qur’ân says “this only is the *kuluq* of the first ones”, ⁷¹ meaning their lies Answer what is meant is their fate, the way they are born, die, and are not revived

Seventh argument the linguists use it only in this way Answer very great and famous linguists apply it to the Qur’ân, without intending to say it is a lie al-Akfaš, Abû Zayd, Qutrûb, and al-Mubarrad ⁷²

Third objection ⁷³ the majority of the Islamic community does not apply the qualification “created” to the Qur’ân Answer it is not a duty to follow the majority, only to follow a general consensus Moreover, many scholars, even most of them, do apply it in this way

Fourth objection ⁷⁴ if one calls the Qur’ân created, one may be suspected of unbelief, therefore, it is better not to use this term Answer on the contrary, who says that the Qur’ân is not created may be suspected of unbelief, since this statement suggests that he is a dualist, believing in a second eternal being besides God

Fifth objection ⁷⁵ the companions of Muhammad and the believers of the second generation did not use this qualification for the Qur’ân Answer they also did not call it “temporal” (*muhdat*), “made”

⁶⁷ In *Mugni* VII, 217 line 3 read *maf’ûla* instead of *ma’qûla*

⁶⁸ In *Mugni* VII 217 line 9 read *bih* instead of *fih*

⁶⁹ To show this, the opponent refers to *sûrat Sâd*, verse 7 (not verse 38 as is mentioned in the edition)

⁷⁰ So, for instance, the forms *taqawûal* and *ifta’al* may be said to be pejorative, which does not imply that the verbs *qâl* and *fa’al* are also pejorative

⁷¹ *Sûrat as-su’arâ* verse 137

⁷² About these famous Arab grammarians, see, for instance, Fleisch *Traite*, 30-32

⁷³ *Mugni* VII 218, lines 9-13

⁷⁴ *Mugni* VII 218, lines 14-21

⁷⁵ *Mugni* VII 219 lines 1-17

(*maf'ûl*), or "being after it was not". But they said it was God's act, and they were agreed that all God's acts were created. The only reason why it is not mentioned in some text or other, is that there was no disagreement at all about this subject. Moreover, Muḥammad himself did say that the Qur'ân was created.⁷⁶

Sixth objection:⁷⁷ the definition of "*maḳlûq*" as "*muqaddar*" leads to a number of false conclusions: we can determine (*qaddar*) an act of someone else, two persons can determine the same act, one can determine something non-existent, one even can determine the creation (*al-ḳalq*);⁷⁸ this last conclusion leads to an endless series.

Answer: 'Abd al-Jabbâr gives two answers, one on the authority of Abû Hâšim, the other on the authority of Abû 'Alî; 'Abd al-Jabbâr does not try to decide which is the correct one since both refute the objection.

Abû Hâšim's answer: since he, just as 'Abd al-Jabbâr, holds that the measuring of leather to cut it is the original meaning of the term *ḳalaq*, he answers that man can "create" leather which was already created (made) by God, and that two people can "create" the same part of leather. To create is to determine something existent, and this term cannot be used for something non-existent.⁷⁹ Creation⁸⁰ is not created since creation is for Abû Hâšim the will, which cannot be willed.

Abû 'Alî's answer: no qualifier "creation" (*ḳalq*) exists. The qualification *maḳlûq* only says that the qualified object came into existence from its acting agent as determined. The use of "create" for leather has to be understood metaphorically. By the way in which he defined the qualification "created" the objections are made to lose their conclusive force.

Seventh objection:⁸¹ the Qur'ân makes a distinction between to

⁷⁶ Cf. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's answer to the first objection.

⁷⁷ *Muḡni* VII, 219, line 18 – 220, line 20

⁷⁸ Read in *Muḡni* VII, 220, line 1 *al-ḳalq* instead of *al-ḳâlq*, which is found in the manuscript and the printed text. The course of the argumentation requires this correction.

⁷⁹ "Determine" is only called "create" when the object is something existent; in the same way—to give an example—"will" is only called "determination" (*'azm*) when the object is non-existent. (Cf. p. 221). Read in *Muḡni* VII, 220, line 8 *'azm* instead of *'adam*.

⁸⁰ Read in *Muḡni* VII, 220, line 11 *bi-ḳalq* instead of *yaḳluq*.

⁸¹ *Muḡni* VII, 221, lines 1-9.

create and to determine by mentioning them separately.⁸² Answer: the conclusion cannot be drawn as one can explain with other verses from the Qur'ân where, for instance, Qur'ân and *Dikr* are mentioned separately while they nevertheless are one and the same.⁸³

Eighth objection: ⁸⁴ applying the name "created" to the Qur'ân would imply that it could die. Answer (on the authority of Abû 'Alî): in that case also death would die and also the death of death, which leads to an endless series. But also accidents, lifeless matter, and people in hell or heaven either would die or would not be called created.

Ninth objection:⁸⁵ the Qur'ân is eternal and cannot be called created. Answer: this has been refuted before and does not belong in this chapter.

Tenth objection: ⁸⁶ which is called created, the separate letters or only the totality? A separate letter cannot be called "determined", but one also cannot call the totality created without calling the parts created. Answer: each letter is called created since it is determined together with the other letters. To this extent God's speech corresponds with His other acts.

Eleventh objection: ⁸⁷ we do not find it mentioned with reference to the prophet and the first generation of Muslims. Answer: the reason is that it was evident.

Twelfth objection: ⁸⁸ our speech would be called created, since it too is determined. Answer: it can be called created though this qualification is not much used.

A final remark is made by 'Abd al-Jabbâr at the end of this chapter, where he mentions another text from the tradition, in which Muḥammad says: "God created the Tora with His own hand". This implies that He also created the Qur'ân with His own hand, the addition "with His own hand" being made to give it more emphasis.

⁸² Cf. *sûrat al-furqân*, verse 2 and *sûrat 'abasa*, verse 19. In *Muḡni* VII, 221, line 3 delete the letter *wa* of *wa-huw* at the end of the line; this letter is found both in the manuscript and in the printed text, but has to be removed in order to arrive at a correct sentence.

⁸³ *Sûrat Yâsin*, verse 69.

⁸⁴ *Muḡni* VII, 221, line 10 – 222, line 2.

⁸⁵ *Muḡni* VII, 222, lines 3-5.

⁸⁶ *Muḡni* VII, 222, lines 6-15.

⁸⁷ *Muḡni* VII, 222, lines 16-21.

⁸⁸ *Muḡni* VII, 223, lines 1-5.

4. CONCLUSION

We can do no better here than to translate in its entirety the very short final chapter of the seventh part of the *Mugni*, a chapter which—after all that has been said before—proves to be a good conclusion of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's treatise on the Qur'ân and God's other speech.⁸⁹

“Chapter about : He created the Qur'ân and produced it for the benefit of the (sc. His) servants.

Know that we already explained that, if He had spoken by that (sc. the Qur'ân) and produced it without there being a responsible person (who could be addressed by it), it (sc. the Qur'ân) would have been useless. Therefore, He must produce it when there is someone who benefits by it in one of two ways: either by taking it upon himself⁹⁰ and bringing it to someone else so that that becomes an imposing of duties (*taklif*), or because he understands its meaning and obeys it since he is addressed by it and it will be useful for him, or because of both things together. But His producing it (sc., the Qur'ân) when both ways are lacking would be useless, and God is far above that. Therefore, one must conclude that He produced the Qur'ân when there was someone, be it an angel, human being, or demon, who had the quality we mentioned”.

⁸⁹ *Mugni* VII, 224 This short chapter appears to be a good conclusion of this part of the *Mugni*, every detail has been dealt with, also when we compare it with the texts from the *Šarh* and the *Muhit*. For arguments which are used to prove that originally this was not the end of this part of the *Mugni*, cf p *d* and *h* of the edition of *Mugni* VII, these arguments are, however, not entirely convincing.

⁹⁰ I read in the manuscript *yatahammalah* instead of *yahmilah*. For the meaning of the text this does not make much difference. Cf also *Mugni* VII, 3 what 'Abd al-Jabbâr has in mind is the fact that an angel brings the Qur'ân (or better a reproduction of it) to the prophets.

SOME MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF 'ABD AL-JABBÂR'S THEOLOGY

It is quite impossible to summarize in a few final pages all the conclusions we have drawn in the course of the present study, every short passage in which we discussed a philosophical or theological term and concept had its own conclusion, our third chapter aimed, moreover, at analysing 'Abd al-Jabbâr's style of arguing about a concrete subject, and this also is very difficult to summarize

The important task of making a comparison between 'Abd al-Jabbâr's thought and that of other Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers theologians and philosophers—requires a thorough investigation and a profound knowledge of their ideas, or even the writing of a monograph on those ideas, all this was beyond the scope of the present study

Thus, the best thing we can now do to conclude this study and to satisfy the interested reader, is to give a general survey of some major peculiarities of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, and to gather them together in a synthetical view During our study some general trends became apparent throughout 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works, these constitute the basis of this final chapter

I CHARACTERISTICS OF 'ABD AL-JABBAR'S METHOD

Theological

First of all, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's method of thinking should be called theological This qualification is used to indicate a kind of human reflection which, next to other subjects, deals with God or whatever name might be given to the Supreme Being If the term theological is understood in this way, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's way of thinking is rightly called theological he amply discusses God, His qualities, and His acts, and these discussions are given a great and central place in his works More appropriately it can be called theological since the divine element is not added as a kind of crowning touch to a "philo-

sophical" system, but it plays its part from the very beginning. The divine element appears to be given not only the ontological priority—God is the creator of all bodies in this world—but also in certain cases a kind of logical priority—one has to know God before being able to discuss and to know, in all implications, a number of qualities in this world.

This is apparent when 'Abd al-Jabbâr—describing the human being—takes him as a primarily theological being, as the person upon whom God has imposed duties and who is bound to perform them. This is 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological starting-point in his discussions on the essence and the qualities of man; from this point he deduces the various qualities of the human being.¹ At the very beginning of his works he already shows that human reflection, which actually is a necessary condition for every form of theological and philosophical thinking, is the first and basic religious duty imposed by God on every adult human being.²

If one takes, however, the qualification "theological" as implying reflection on the data of a divine revelation, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's works are still entitled to this qualification. In this respect, too, his method is truly theological. He accepts the Islamic revelation and reflects on its sources and on its contents; he uses it in his argumentations. But one has to bear in mind that the Islamic revelation is not as "exclusive" as the Christian revelation pretends to be. No real mysteries are revealed and not much entirely new knowledge is supplied to mankind. As we saw, for 'Abd al-Jabbâr the revelation is above all a confirmation of things which one can know by reflection, without any information through that revelation.³

Phenomenal

When we use this rather modern term to describe 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, this can suggest a contradiction in terms. If one takes "phenomenal" as "phenomenalistic", one may with good reason ask the question whether such a doctrine can be theological. In the strict sense of the word, this evidently is not possible since God is not a phenomenon, not an immediate object of perception.

Nevertheless, I keep to the term phenomenal in order to emphasize

¹ Cf p 59

² Cf p 61

³ Cf pp 95-102

the importance of perceived reality in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology as well as his conviction that perception necessarily leads to (he calls it "a way to") true and certain knowledge.⁴ Hence, perception and knowledge based on perception are most frequently used as foundations even for strictly theological arguments, and the whole of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological system is firmly based upon the foundation of human perception. Our perception of this world and our reflection upon the knowledge based on this perception lead us to the knowledge that the bodies in our world are produced by someone whom we call God.⁵

This is not incompatible with the basically theological character of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's doctrine, nor with his theological views on man and cosmos. Knowledge which is based on perception is divine and directly given by God; this knowledge is not caused by perception, nor the result of human efforts, but it is a gift from God, created in the human heart. Thus, phenomenal knowledge is truly divine and guaranteed by God Himself.⁶ Moreover, perceived reality is full of indications which point to God and which guide us in our thinking about this world. God Himself intentionally made this world to be an indication to Him in order that a thinking human person, by perceiving these indications and by reflecting upon them, can finally arrive at a sure knowledge of God.

Consequently, it even is the combination of the theological and the phenomenal and the intertwining of both these elements, which constitute one of the main features of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's way of thinking.

Intuitional

Besides the knowledge which is based on perception, God creates other forms of knowledge in the human heart. This knowledge, which is not based upon something else, but is as it were "immediate", can be called "intuition" in the strictest sense of the word. This intuition, to which belong, for instance, the principles of argumentation and general ethical axiomata, is directly created and guaranteed by God and used by 'Abd al-Jabbâr in his argumentations.⁷

⁴ Cf pp 93-95

⁵ Cf pp 231-235

⁶ Cf pp 53-55.

⁷ Cf pp 92-93.

Discursive

Thus, the basic human knowledge is given knowledge; this knowledge is either given immediately—intuition in the strict sense of the word—or given on the basis of perception, or transmitted by prophets—the revelation—, but all three forms are gifts from God. On this basic knowledge reflection is possible, through which man by his own efforts acquires further knowledge.

Reflection is possible since God does not directly give knowledge of everything which exists and can be known: there are things man does not know yet. But, on the other hand, God has placed in this world a great number of “indications”, things which, if they are known, point to something else that is not yet known, and by following these indications one can proceed from one knowledge to another. Thus, this world in itself has a structure in which things point to other things and ultimately to God. The reflecting human person has nothing to do but to follow the indications he perceives and knows to be indications; he follows a route which is mapped out for him, and finally he will arrive at a sure knowledge of God and this world.⁸

God made this reflection not only a possibility for man, He made it an obligation. Reflection is man's first and principal duty. Since not everything is known through given knowledge, man is bound to make efforts to arrive at fuller knowledge, and above all at knowledge of God. Knowledge of God, which is necessary and obligatory, cannot by any means be given knowledge; it necessarily is acquired knowledge, reached by discursive thinking. Therefore, reflection to arrive at this knowledge really is a religious duty.⁹

We conclude, first, that human beings in their reflection and argumentation do not arrive at a knowledge which is really new; they only follow indications, and if they do it correctly, they will arrive via an already beaten track at the knowledge which they find at the end of this road;

second, reality—both God and the cosmos—can be known through argumentation and reasoning which are based upon some kind of given knowledge. It can be known, blind faith is not necessary. It is man's duty to think, to reflect, and in that way to know, to know even God Himself. God does not demand implicit and blind faith, but He demands man's effort in order to arrive at real knowledge.

⁸ Cf. pp. 65-68.

⁹ Cf. p. 61.

Islamic

A last question to be answered here is whether 'Abd al-Jabbâr's way of thinking should be called Islamic. Evidently, Islamic thinking is not uniform, nor does it consist in a uniform method. Its characteristics rather have to be looked for in some underlying general trends, both in matter of contents and in its methods. At the end of this chapter we deal with the contents of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, here we can restrict ourselves to his method.

This method surely should be called Islamic, for not only is the revelation which is accepted, discussed, and used as a source of knowledge actually the Islamic revelation, but 'Abd al-Jabbâr's views on the essence of revelation—not so much as a revelation of mysteries, but as a confirmation of human knowledge and a religious exhortation—has to be called Islamic too.

Moreover, the way in which his thinking on God and His acts penetrates the whole of his theology, together with his confidence in the truthfulness of this world and the perception of it, is also truly Islamic. Consequently, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological method of thinking is entitled to the qualification "Islamic".

2 UNITY OF ALL EXISTENT THINGS

The cosmos of 'Abd al-Jabbâr, as one discovers it in his books, might give the impression of being rather fundamentally divided and atomized. All bodies in this world consist of atoms—the smallest possible and indivisible parts of matter—which apparently do not show much coherence with each other. Time also appears to be divided, and to consist of separate moments, which simply follow upon each other as a kind of time-atoms. Moreover, the whole universe of existent things seems to be divided into two quite different worlds, the present one and the absent one, our world and the world of God.

Nevertheless, this duality in the existent reality and this splitting up of our world into separate atoms find their place only inside a fundamental unity, which characterizes all existent things.

*The two worlds*¹⁰

'Abd al-Jabbâr himself does not speak about two different "worlds"; he does not use the term world, but only mentions "the present" and

¹⁰ Cf pp 226-227

“the absent”, the absent being God and God alone as He is in Himself, the present including the whole of our world with all its lifeless things, its plants, animals, people, and also angels and demons. God’s acts, too, belong to this present world.

If we look for the difference between both these worlds, we discover that our world is characterized by materiality, whereas God is not characterized by it, but is purely immaterial. Fundamentally, this is the one and only difference between God and this world. In this world everything is material or bound to materiality—even angels and demons are material beings ; God, however, is immaterial. In actual fact, this is what causes the distance between God and man. Since man, as being part of this world, is material, he cannot be, or become, divine or immaterial. It also is absolutely impossible that God would be or become a human being: any form of incarnation—in the Christian sense of the word—is excluded, since incarnation would make God material; this would make Him cease to be God, for being immaterial is God’s characteristic quality and the basis of all difference between Him and the world.

But notwithstanding all this, matter as such is not evil. Matter is not the principle of evil, immateriality is not the principle of good. Matter and the material world are fundamentally good; they are good from the very beginning and have never turned evil, not even through the sins of human beings. Therefore, the Christian concepts of the Fall, original sin, and redemption cannot have a place in the theological system of ‘Abd al-Jabbâr, as they are rejected in the general belief of Islâm. The human person, too, is fundamentally good, and sins are not caused by a principle of evil in the human interior; sins are explained mostly by a lack of knowledge in the sinning subject.¹¹ Thus, matter is not evil; it even is not pure imperfection. Matter is a positive principle, the principle of division and individualization.

The difference between God and this world is fundamentally the difference between what is immaterial and what is material; apart from this difference, God and this world can be said to be similar.¹² God is not absolutely different, though materiality causes an unbridgeable gap which prevents the one to become like the other. But, if we take into account all consequences of materiality and immateriality, a complete analogy can be drawn between God and this world: in

¹¹ Cf. pp. 269-270.

¹² Cf. pp. 229-231.

both cases the same argumentations hold true, and similar conclusions must be drawn from similar premises. This analogy is based on the fundamental unity of all existent things, God included, this analogy makes it possible that we know God and discuss His qualities and His acts. God forms part of the reality, which as a fundamental unity is knowable for reflecting human beings.

Atomism

Everything existent is either an atom, or an accident, or God. This implies that the whole of our material world consists of atoms and accidents. All atoms are similar and identical, the number of different accidents is restricted.¹³ To produce something really new is impossible, since to produce or to make is nothing else but to bring into existence something—a substance or an accident—that was non-existent. To change something is to bring an accident from non-existence into existence, which causes a former accident to fall back into non-existence. This leads to the conclusion that there is a basic uniformity in this world, that variations and changes are possible, but that the number of possibilities is restricted and finite, moreover, the creation of something really new is impossible. Consequently, the term creation is not understood as indicating the production of something new out of nothing, but as indicating the bringing into existence of something non-existent, and that in an intentional way. Thus man is able to create, although this verb usually is not employed for human acts.¹⁴

Besides this uniformity, there is also a kind of unity in this world, the fragmentarization is bridged, man, for instance, is more than a number of separate atoms with their inhering accidents. But how can this be true when the whole of this world consists only of atoms and accidents?

A first form of unification and coherence is caused by the accident "composition". Unlike other accidents, composition does not inhere in one separate atom but in two atoms together, in this way, this accident is the principle of material coherence in this world.¹⁵ But in no way can this accident produce a composite whole which is

¹³ Cf pp 119-121 and 127

¹⁴ Cf p 119

¹⁵ Cf pp 132-134

essentially different from the atoms of which it is composed. A composition of atoms cannot produce a living being.

Therefore, 'Abd al-Jabbâr advances his theory of the "states". States are not something existent—they are neither substances nor accidents—but they are only a state something is in, and as such they can characterize a composite whole.¹⁶ A composite whole can be in a state in which the separate atoms cannot be, e.g., the state of being living. Such a state, which is also a principle of unification and coherence, is said to need a composite whole composed in a strictly defined way, in order that the composite whole can be in that state.

Finally, the atomism in time is bridged, because the atoms constitute an element of permanence; they are remaining and are not created anew at every moment. Also some of the accidents remain for a longer time than one single moment, in fact until they are brought back into non-existence. Moreover, the fragmentarization of time is overcome by the so-called *tawlid*, which makes real causality in this world possible.¹⁷

Man

In his discussions of man, 'Abd al-Jabbâr affirms again and again that man is a unity. It is with much emphasis that he rejects every form of dualism, every duality in the human being; man does not consist of two elements, spirit and body, nor of higher and lower levels in his person; he is an absolute unity. And this unity is entirely material.¹⁸ Man is a material unity without any immaterial element, for immateriality is a quality proper to God alone.

Man also has no separate "faculties", such as intellect and will—as they are understood, e.g., in Scholastic theology—but it is the entire person who thinks, wills, perceives; it is the entire material unity. Thus, whenever 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions the human heart as the seat of knowledge or will, he definitely means the material, organic heart, in the atoms of which the accidents knowledge and will inhere.¹⁹

Consequently, man is not divided in himself; no struggle between body and spirit, between good and evil takes place in his person; he only experiences in himself opposite desires which push him in one

¹⁶ Cf. pp. 145-148.

¹⁷ Cf. pp. 206-208.

¹⁸ Cf. pp. 160-164.

¹⁹ Cf. pp. 166-167.

direction or the other, but never does this lead to a splitting up or a division of his person.

It also is unthinkable that man should struggle to rise above his own materiality, for he is nothing else but materiality; to rise above materiality would mean to rise above his own essence. Man essentially is part of this world; he is not *in* this world, he is *of* this world. Therefore, he must accept this world as part of his life without trying to free himself from it.

As part of the material universe, man has a fundamental openness towards all other material things; this openness is called perception. Things present themselves to the human person—some things do not present themselves and are called imperceptible—and then he necessarily perceives them. Thus, in perception the initiative is with the things perceived, the perceiving subject is purely receptive.²⁰

God

For 'Abd al-Jabbâr—just as for all other Mu'tazila—God is an absolute and immaterial unity. This is one of their basic principles. This principle implies that there can be no second god, no principle of evil or darkness besides God as the principle of good and light. God is unique. But it implies also that there can be no division at all inside God: thus the concept of a Trinity in God has to be rejected since it affects the fundamental unity of God.²¹ For the same reason, there can be in God no knowledge, no will, nor can there exist in Him an eternal word or speech. The idea of God's word existing in Him from all eternity and revealed later on to mankind, is incompatible with the belief in God's absolute unity. Just as all God's acts are done outside Himself, in this world, because acts inside God would affect His unity, so God's word, too, is created in this world.

We conclude that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology—in spite of the impression of great division it may give at first sight—is characterized by an idea of unity which pervades the discussions of the various subjects treated in his theological works. The affirmation of this unity appears to be one of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's main objectives.

²⁰ Cf pp 175-180

²¹ Cf p 265.

3. DETERMINISM

One of the major problems which every form of theological thinking has to cope with, is the relationship between the notion of God's omnipotence on the one hand and the notion of man's responsibility for his acts on the other. For, if man is really responsible for the acts he performs, and if God, consequently, rightly rewards and punishes man for those acts, man must be truly free in the choice of his acts. But how can this free choice be compatible with God's omnipotence?

The theological school of the Mu'tazila, to which 'Abd al-Jabbâr belongs, risks to over-emphasize human freedom to the detriment of the notion of God's omnipotence. One of their main principles is the belief in God's justice: all God's acts necessarily are just and good. God's reward and punishment can be good only when the person rewarded or punished really was responsible for his acts. Consequently, the Mu'tazila strongly reject the principle of God's absolute predestination of all events happening in this world, human acts included.

'Abd al-Jabbâr's point of view appears to be somewhat ambiguous. He keeps to the general principle of the Mu'tazila and affirms that God is just, and that man must be responsible for his own acts. But if we try to analyse his notions about the essence of acts, the way in which they happen, how they are caused and performed, or if we analyse his notions about the will both human and divine —, we cannot help receiving the impression that he risks to be rather a determinist; he himself appears to be aware of this risk, and to try to keep, nevertheless, to the principle of human free choice.

Human acts

Before discussing the way in which acts are performed and the reason why, we have to take into account the fundamental difference between our notion of "act" and 'Abd al-Jabbâr's. For him an act is either a substance or an accident which has been brought into existence by an acting subject; it is not the activity but the result of this activity: namely the substance or the accident concerned in their being existent. To act, consequently, simply means to bring something non-existent into existence. This implies a great, but finite, potential of non-existent things—"possible" things— which can be brought into existence.²² But a subject cannot bring into existence any non-

²² Cf. pp. 204-206.

existent thing he would like to; to bring into existence is possible only because the acting subject already had a relation with the thing concerned in its non-existence. This relation is expressed by the term "being able" to (bring into existence) something. Thus, each able subject has his proper relations with his proper non-existent things, which he, and he alone, can bring into existence. Non-existent things which are "possible" for the one subject are impossible for any other subject. This already implies a kind of determination and limitation of free choice; the things to which a given human being is able, are determined beforehand, and he is not able to perform an act which somebody else is actually able to perform ²³

Man does not bring into existence all things he can bring into existence, he does not perform all acts he can perform. Why certain acts are performed while other acts are not, is determined by the motives which urge the able subject to perform a given act, or hold him back from performing it. A motive is knowledge, conviction, or assumption that a given act has some benefit for the subject concerned. These motives are either created by God in the human heart—the "given knowledge" is necessarily created by God—or produced by man himself. The strength of the motive to perform a certain act, the strength of the motive to do the opposite act, and the strength of the motive to abstain from performing the act, in fact determine which act the subject will perform ²⁴

All these motives are related to what we would call the intellectual faculties ('Abd al-Jabbâr does not use a similar term or a similar division), and they are concerned with the benefit of the able subject himself. They determine, moreover, the performing of an act without any real intervention of the will. This exclusion of the will from the process of human acting leads to determinism, acts are not chosen by the human will, but determined by knowledge, assumption, and conviction.

Human will ²⁵

In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, the will does not make a choice between two (or more) possible acts, we saw that the will has no function at all in the decision which act will be performed, the more so because will

²³ Cf pp 238-239

²⁴ Cf pp 218-219

²⁵ Cf pp 215-218

—as also intellect—is not a “faculty” of the human person Will is an act performed, an imperceptible accident brought into existence Thus, ‘Abd al-Jabbâr’s notion of the human will is quite different from the notion of that will in the European Scholastic tradition, it is, however, not so easy to define what it really is

In fact, we can best describe it as a wish, not an impossible wish which cannot be fulfilled—‘Abd al-Jabbâr explicitly excludes this kind of wish from the will²⁶—but as a wish which can be fulfilled Therefore, one can will the act of someone else, just as one can will one’s own act The will, consequently, is not making a comparison between the motives, but the same motives which urge to the act or hold back from it, also urge to the will or hold back from it, when the act itself is impossible for the subject moved by the motives— for instance, because it is the act of someone else—, the motives still make him will the act concerned There is one case in which the will can have some influence on the act performed, not on the choice of the act but on the way it is performed This is the case when the subject wills an act while performing it ‘Abd al-Jabbâr then calls the will intention, such an intention can give to an act an extra qualification, such as an extra ethical qualification²⁷

*Human responsibility*²⁸

How can ‘Abd al-Jabbâr in this context still speak about human responsibility? His answer is that a motive does not cause the act, there is no causal relationship between the motive and the act Therefore, motives do not necessitate, nor determine For, if there is a stronger motive against the act, the first motive does not cause anything at all, and the subject does not perform the act Moreover, motives may vary and change If we have to look somewhere for some kind of human freedom, we have to look for it in these motives and in the fact that they do not necessitate a given act But the question remains whether there really is some free choice in the motives—and if so, how can it be made, when a will has no influence upon it?—and whether the combination of two or more motives must not be said to be as necessitating and determining as could be a single motive Anyhow, ‘Abd al-Jabbâr does not make clear where exactly in the process of human acting free choice and responsibility can exert their influence.

²⁶ Cf pp 221-222

²⁷ Cf p 221

²⁸ Cf pp 216-217

*Ethics*²⁹

What we have said just now evidently has its consequences for 'Abd al-Jabbār's doctrine of ethics. Since every act is either a substance or an accident, and since the whole of our world fundamentally is not evil, no act in itself will be evil. Acts become good or evil and have some ethical qualification because of the way they are brought into existence. This rather vague term "way" mostly indicates a kind of relationship between the act and something else in this world; thus, for instance, an information which is in accordance with the reality is good, but an information which is not in accordance with the reality is a lie and, consequently, evil. Since the will does not have much influence upon human acts, it is evident that ethical qualifications are given more on the basis of the acts themselves and the way in which they are performed than on the basis of human will. Only in some minor cases in which will and intention do have some influence on the acts performed, the will can add something to the ethical qualification of the act concerned.

Moreover, in a system in which God's acts are determined too—as we shall see below—ethics will be rather objective and not subjective: acts performed will be good or evil in themselves and not because God commanded or forbade them. The terms good and evil indicate the place an act has in the whole of reality; they do not indicate in the first place a relation between the act and the will of God.

Divine acts

Taking into account that God is immaterial and human beings material—man's possibility of acting is restricted because of his being material—we can say that God's acting is analogous to man's. God's acts, too, are determined by His motives, His being knowing the benefits of all possible acts. This benefit cannot be a benefit for Himself since He Himself is self-sufficient and does not need anything at all for Himself; therefore, it must be the benefit of someone else, man, angels, or demons. Since God is omniscient, He knows the benefit of every possible act, and thus the act He performs will be the absolutely most beneficial act possible. Because God knows everything and does not need anything at all for Himself, His acts necessarily are good; otherwise, He would not perform them.³⁰

²⁹ Cf pp 85-89

³⁰ Cf pp 269-270

Against this background it becomes clear that God's acts are predictable: somebody who would know all possible acts and all motives concerned could predict all God's acts. Thus, 'Abd al-Jabbâr states that certain acts are obligatory for God; He must perform them. One of his conclusions is, for instance, that God is bound to reveal what He actually revealed. God's revelation is not His free act, but, since He knows that this revelation is for the benefit of mankind, He necessarily must give it to them.³¹

In this way we can say that God's acts are determined. Moreover, when 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions God's omnipotence, he means by this term that there is no restriction in God Himself concerning what He can bring into existence; but there is a restriction in the objects He can bring into existence. These objects are limited; God also has His own potential of non-existent things which He can bring into existence. He has no power at all over things possible for other able beings. God cannot perform acts which a given human being can perform; He can perform similar acts, but not these acts themselves.³²

Divine will

There is no fundamental difference between human and divine will; they function in exactly the same way. God, too, cannot do everything He wills; there are acts which are possible for human beings and, consequently, impossible for Him. His will, too, is rather His wish and not a choice between various possible acts.³³

Divine freedom

God, just as human beings, is not really free in his acting. Since He knows everything—also the benefits of all possible acts—, He is entirely determined by the whole of the existent and non-existent reality. For not-knowing some benefit or assuming that in some act there is a kind of benefit which actually is not in that act, is impossible for God. His acts are determined by what really is the most beneficial for beings in this world.

Determinism

We conclude that 'Abd al-Jabbâr's determinism is not an attempt to defend the notion of God's omnipotence or to uphold the theory

³¹ Cf. pp. 95-96.

³² Cf. pp. 238-239.

³³ Cf. pp. 271-273.

of absolute predestination; God is as determined as human beings and other acting beings in this world. This determinism has to be explained through 'Abd al-Jabbâr's desire to create a coherent system. In this system, in which both God and the world find their place, everything is fundamentally knowable and predictable. Thus, it is in order to create this coherent and logical theological system, in which nothing escapes the laws of logic and which leaves no room for mysteries, that 'Abd al-Jabbâr arrives at this doctrine, which involves an actual determinism, although he in principle denies that acts are entirely determined.

4. GOD'S SPEECH AND HIS REVELATION

God's speech

God's speech is one of His acts, and just as all His acts, God brings it into existence not in Himself—that would affect His unity—but in this world. Since God's speech is really speech existing in this world, it must be of the same genus—the same kind—as other speech existing here, human speech (and the speech of angels and demons). Consequently, it is audible spoken speech and it belongs to the accident sound.³⁴ Speech, in the strict sense of the word, is only what is spoken and heard, not what is written down or what is memorized. This implies that speech is not something remaining; sound and spoken words are produced and disappear again, the latter taking place without any intervention of an acting subject. Therefore, God's speech can be neither a book—a written text is not speech, but only a sign of speech once spoken—nor a person; it is neither an eternal law, nor God. God's speech cannot be eternal.³⁵

When God performs an act, He must do it because of some benefit He finds in the act concerned. This cannot be His own benefit; hence, it must be the benefit of other beings. Consequently, whenever God makes speech, He necessarily does so for the benefit of human beings or for the benefit of other understanding beings (angels or demons); this implies that God cannot speak before the creation of at least one of those beings or without one of them at least listening to Him.³⁶

³⁴ Cf. pp. 293-305.

³⁵ Cf. p. 341.

³⁶ Cf. p. 402.

Moreover, to be good and have some benefit, God's speech must be communicative and understandable for human beings; therefore, God must speak in an accepted human language. Such a language cannot have been created by God, for in that case it would be impossible for Him to teach man this language; consequently, language has been composed by man—'Abd al-Jabbâr calls it a convention—in order that God might use it in His speech and in His revelation to mankind.³⁷

Revelation

For 'Abd al-Jabbâr revelation is speech; it is not the self-revealing of a divine being, not some form of emanation or incarnation, but pure information and exhortation expressed in human language. The fact and the contents of this revelation form an integral part of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theological system. Most objects and structures of this world—and God Himself—are known by man through given knowledge, knowledge directly given by God—be it on the basis of perception or not—and through acquired knowledge, knowledge resulting from further reflection upon the data of given knowledge. But some minor details are not known and cannot be known through this twofold knowledge. Because these are, nevertheless, of some importance for the human being, God is bound to reveal them in another way, in fact through his prophets. The things concerned are not real mysteries, but rather some ethical details which are contained in religious prescriptions and laws. Besides these, revelation contains some other information, —such as the fact that knowledge inheres in the heart and not in some other part of the body—which cannot be discovered without the assistance of this revelation. Besides this aspect of giving additional information, God's revelation shows an aspect of confirmation: it confirms the knowledge we already had about other things. Finally, revelation contains religious exhortations which can function as a kind of motives in our acting.³⁸ But anyhow, in any form revelation must be for the benefit of mankind and, consequently, understandable for human beings.

Evidently, when 'Abd al-Jabbâr mentions God's speech and His revelation, he thinks first of all of the Qur'ân, God's revelation transmitted by the angel to His prophet Muḥammad, but he explicitly mentions also the other sacred books (such as the sacred books of

³⁷ Cf pp 304-305

³⁸ Cf pp 100-102

Jews and Christians) as also other ways in which God can speak to human beings.³⁹

Knowledge and revelation

Revelation can lead to real knowledge, but in itself it cannot give this knowledge; it needs the assistance of knowledge which is based on intuition (in the larger sense of the word, knowledge based on perception included) and reflection upon it. For in order to be able to use revelation as a source of knowledge, one has to be sure that this concrete revelation is true and authentic. This cannot be proved by the revelation itself, but only by reflection upon intuitional knowledge. By this reflection one discovers that a miracle is needed to make the distinction between true and false revelation. By this reflection, too, one analyses the conditions which have to be fulfilled to make something a genuine miracle and the way in which it has to occur to prove the authenticity of a given revelation. Only if one has established that a given assumed revelation fulfils all conditions, one can rightly conclude—again by this reflection—that this revelation is genuine and can be used as a source of knowledge.⁴⁰

A problem for every kind of theological reflection is the relationship between "reason" and "belief", in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's terminology between intuitional knowledge and revealed texts. What to do when these two are in contradiction with each other? For 'Abd al-Jabbâr this is no real problem: such a conflict can only seem to be a contradiction, for both intuitional knowledge and revelation are given by God and guaranteed by Him. In order to solve such an apparent contradiction, one has to interpret one of the two contradicting data. Intuitional knowledge is not capable of more interpretations, while revelation, which is language, text, can as such be interpreted in various ways. Therefore, in the case of such an apparent contradiction 'Abd al-Jabbâr interprets the revealed text according to its context and according to the laws of the language system. In this way every conflict between intuitional knowledge and revelation can be solved.⁴¹

Knowledge or belief

In a theology without real mysteries, a theology in which only a small part of the truth is reserved for revelation, belief does not play

³⁹ Cf p 285

⁴⁰ Cf pp 276-277

⁴¹ Cf pp 385-387.

an important part. God does not demand blind submission nor implicit belief. 'Abd al-Jabbâr strongly reacts against what we called traditionalism and uncritical belief, two forms of accepting dogmas without further inquisition and proof. Such kind of belief is not according to God's will.⁴²

God demands that we reflect and thus come to real knowledge of Him, ourselves, and this world, for everything is fundamentally knowable. Revelation is proved by reflection and fits into the whole of the knowable system. Belief without argument or proof has no place in this theological system.

The submission of man to God, his "Islâm", is not found in the submission of his knowledge, but in his submission to God's will in all his acts.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The entire reality, both God and this world with its human beings, its angels, and its demons—who as material beings form part of this world—constitute a closed system which forms a fundamental unity and obeys the "natural laws" of the system. If a reflecting person discovers these laws during his philosophical and theological thinking, he can know the structures of the system, and if he could know all details, he could predict everything that will happen in it. Everything has its place in this all-embracing system, even revelation. It is the task of man to reflect on what he knows of this world, and to know God through this reflection. Through the same reflection he can try to understand the whole system.

Knowledge plays a central part in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology. Real knowledge is guaranteed by God Himself and is, consequently, absolutely certain. Knowledge is proved to be true by the so-called tranquillity of the soul, which forms an absolute, but subjective, criterion of real knowledge.⁴³ Because of the great esteem in which 'Abd al-Jabbâr holds knowledge, it is understandable that natural theology—knowledge of God and reflection upon that knowledge without any assistance of a revelation—in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's opinion is very well possible.

In 'Abd al-Jabbâr's method the perceived and known reality has

⁴² Cf pp 43-45

⁴³ Cf pp. 47-49

absolute priority. This reality is known to human beings, the most fundamental things in this world are known by everybody through direct experience, and can form the basis of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's system without demanding definitions or further explications⁴⁴. Knowledge of God, however, does not belong to these direct experiences, God has to be discovered through reflection.

In the course of 'Abd al-Jabbâr's argumentations we find many arguments which are based on the conclusions of the science of Arabic grammar or on the structures of the Arabic language, language functions as a kind of mirror for reality. 'Abd al-Jabbâr has great confidence in the structures of language as presenting an image of the structures of reality. He is even convinced that the Arabic writing system is an adequate reproduction of the language itself, and thus of reality.⁴⁵ Thus, language and writing system can play their part in his argumentation.

Finally, 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology is truly Islamic. Evidently, it is different from the Christian Scholastic theological systems, it shows a great number of features which are truly Islamic. The unity of God and His unicity, which are firmly adhered to and strongly defended by 'Abd al-Jabbâr, form a central theme in the Islamic revelation. 'Abd al-Jabbâr's notion of revelation as a reminder and exhortation and not as a revelation of mysteries, is consistent with the message of the Qur'ân and with the Islamic tradition. In Islâm, just as in 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology, man forms part of this world and does not belong to another world, while the divine penetrates everything in this world and all acts of man, consequently, there is no fundamental difference between the field of God, religion, theology, and the field of worldly matters and philosophy. The importance of language, too, can be mentioned as an Islamic feature, because of the central rôle of the Qur'ân in Islâm, much attention has always been given to the study of the Arabic language and language in general.

Muslim readers may object that some of the theses adhered to by 'Abd al-Jabbâr and the Mu'tazila are not orthodox; I ask them to study 'Abd al-Jabbâr's theology as an honest attempt to reflect upon the Islamic revelation and upon his own personal convictions, the convictions of a believing and convinced Muslim.

⁴⁴ Cf p 54

⁴⁵ Cf pp 295-298

BIBLIOGRAPHY

a Books and Articles written in Arabic

- 'Abd al-Jabbār, Qādī l-Qudāt 'Imād ad-Dīn Abū l-Hasan bn Ahmad *Kitāb fadh al-Ḥiẓāḥ wa-tabaqāt al-Mu'tazila wa-mubāyanatihim li-sā'ir al-muḥalifin* in *Fadh al-Ḥiẓāḥ wa-tabaqāt al-Mu'tazila*, edited by Fu'ād Sayyid, Tūnis 1974 AD, 135-350
- 'Abd al-Jabbār, Abū l-Hasan bn Ahmad *Kitāb al-majmu' fī l-muhit bi-t-taklif*, edited by J J Houben, volume I, Bayrūt 1965 AD
- 'Abd al-Jabbār, Abū l-Hasan, *Al-Mugni fī abwāb at-tawhīd wa-l-'adl*, various editors, 16 volumes, al-Qāhira 1380-1389 AH 1960-1969 AD
- 'Abd al-Jabbār, al-Qādī, *Al-Muhit bi-t-taklif* edited by 'Uṭmān as-Sayyid 'Azmi, volume I, al-Qāhira 1965 AD
- 'Abd al-Jabbār bn Ahmad al-Hamaḡānī, *Mutašābih al-Qur'ān*, edited by 'Adnān Muhammad Zarzūr, two volumes, al-Qāhira 1969 AD
- 'Abd al-Jabbār bn Ahmad, *Šarh al-usūl al-ḡamsa*, edited by 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṭmān, al-Qāhira 1384 AH 1965 AD
- 'Abd al-Jabbār, 'Imād ad-Dīn Abū l-Hasan — bn Ahmad, *Tanzīh al-Qur'ān 'an al-matā'in*, Mīsr 1329 AH
- 'Abd al-Jabbār bn Ahmad al-Hamaḡānī, *Taḡhīt dalā'il an-nubūwa*, edited by 'Abd al-Karīm 'Uṭmān, two volumes, Bayrūt 1386 AH 1966 AD
- Amin, Ahmad, *Duhā l-Islām*, 3 volumes, al-Qāhira 1956 AD⁵
- Amin, Ahmad, *Fajr al-Islām*, al-Qāhira 1374 AH 1955 AD⁷
- al-Aš'arī, Abū l-Hasan 'Alī bn Ismā'il, *Al-Ibāna 'an usūl ad-diyāna*, Mīsr 1348 AH and various other editions
- English translation W C Klein, *Abū 'l-Hasan 'Alī ibn Ismā'il al-Aš'ari's Al-Ibānah 'an Usūl ad-Diyānah*, New Haven 1940
- al-Aš'arī, Abū l-Hasan 'Alī bn Ismā'il, *Kitāb al-luma' fī r-radd 'alā ahl az-zayg wa-l-bida'*, in R J McCarthy, *The Theology of Al-Ash'ari*, Beyrouth 1953 (Arabic text 3-83, English translation 3-116)
- al-Aš'arī, Abū l-Hasan 'Alī bn Ismā'il, *Kitāb maqālāt al-Islāmiyin wa-ḡtilāf al-musallīn*, edited by Helmut Ritter, two volumes, Istanbul 1929-1930
- al-Aš'arī, Abū l-Hasan 'Alī bn Ismā'il, *Risāla fī stīhsān al-ḡawd fī 'ilm al-kalām*, in R J McCarthy, *The Theology of Al-Ash'ari*, Beyrouth 1953 (Arabic text 85-97, English translation 117-134)
- al-Baḡdādī, Abū Mansūr 'Abd al-Qāhīr, *Al-Farq bayn al-firaq wa-bayān al-firqa annā'iya minhūm*, al-Qāhira, 1367 AH 1948 AD
- al-Baḡdādī, Abū Mansūr 'Abd al-Qāhīr, *Kitāb al-mīlal wa-n-nīhal*, edited by Albert N Nader, Bayrūt 1970 AD
- al-Baḡdādī, Abū Mansūr 'Abd al-Qāhīr, *Kitāb usūl ad-dīn*, Istanbul 1346 AH 1928 AD
- al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr Muhammad bn at-Ṭayyīb, *Al-Insāf fī-mā yajīb i'tiqāduh wa-lā yajūz al-jahl bih*, al-Qāhira 1369 AH¹ 1950 AD
- al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr Muhammad bn at-Ṭayyīb, *Kitāb al-bayān 'an al-farq bayn al-mu'jizāt wa-l-karāmāt wa-l-hayl wa-l-ḡahāna wa-s-sīhr wa-n-naranjāt*, edited by R J McCarthy, Beyrouth 1958
- al-Bāqillānī, Abū Bakr Muhammad bn at-Ṭayyīb, *Kitāb at-tamhīd*, edited by R J McCarthy, Beyrouth 1957
- al-Bayhaḡī, Abū Bakr Ahmad bn al-Husayn, *Kitāb al-asmā' wa-s-sifāt*, Mīsr n d
- ad-Dārimī, Abū Sa'īd 'Uṭmān bn Sa'īd, *Kitāb ar-radd 'alā l-Jahmiya*, edited by Gosta Vitestam, Lund-Leiden 1960

- al-Fârâbî, Abû Nasr, *Kitâb al-hurûf*, edited by Muhsin Mahdî, Bayrût 1970
- al-Ġurâbâ, 'Alî Mustafâ, *Abû l-Huḍayl al-'Allâf*, Mîsr 1369 AH 1949 AD
- al-Ġurâbâ, 'Alî Mustafâ, *Al-A'arî*, al-Qâhira 1953 AD
- (al-Hâkîm) Abû s-Sa'd al-Muhsin bn Muhammad Karâma al-Juṣamî al-Bayhaqî, *Šarh al-'uyûn* (fragments), in *Fadl al-Ġ'izâl wa-tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, edited by Fu'âd Sayyid, Tûnis 1974, 363-393
- Ibn 'Asâkir, *Tabayîn kaḍîb al-muftarî fi-mâ nusib ilâ l-Imâm Abî l-Ḥasan al-Aš'arî*, Dîmašq aš-Šâm 1347 AH
- Also Mehren, M A F, *Exposé de la réforme de l'Islamisme commecée au III^e siecle de l'Hégire par Abu-'l-Hasan Ali el-Ash'ari et continuee par son ecole avec des extraits du texte arabe d Ibn Asâkir*, Paris 1878
- Ibn al-Aġîr, *Al-Kâmil fi t-târik*, Bayrût 1385-1387 AH/ 1965-1967 AD (is *Ibn-el-Athiri Chronicon quod perfectissimum inscribitur*, edidit C J Tornberg, Lugduni Batavorum 1851-1874, 12 volumes)
- Ibn Hazm, Abû Muhammad 'Alî bn Ahmad, *Kitâb al-fisal fi l-milal wa-l-ahwâ' wa-n-nihal*, 5 parts, Mîsr 1317-1321 AH
- Ibn Kallikân, *Wafâyât al-a'yân wa-anbâ' abnâ' az-zamân*, Bayrût 1971, translated by M G de Slane, *Ibn Khallikan's Bibliographical Dictionary*, Paris 1842-1871, reprint New York-London 1961, 4 volumes
- Ibn Kaġîr, *Al-Bidâya wa-n-nihâya*, 14 volumes, al-Qâhira 1351-1358 AH 1932-1939 AD
- Ibn al-Murtadâ, Ahmad bn Yahyâ, *Kitâb tabaqât al-Mu'tazila*, edited by Susanna Dîwald-Wilzer Bayrût 1380 AH 1961 AD
- Ibn an-Nadîm, *Kitâb al-fihrist*, edited by G Flugel, 2 volumes, Leipzig 1871-1872
- al-Isfarâ'îni, Abû l-Muzaffar, *At-Tabsîr fi d-dîn wa-tamyîz al-firqa an-nâjîya 'an al-firqa al-hâlikîn*, al-Qâhira, 1359 AH 1940 AD
- Jâr Allâh, Zuḥdî Hasan, *Al-Mu'tazila*, al-Qâhira 1366 AH 1947 AD
- al-Juwaynî, Imâm al-Haramayn, *Al-Irsâd*, edited by J D Luciani Paris 1938
- al-Juwaynî, Imâm al-Haramayn, *Kitâb al-lumâ' fi qawâ'id ahl' as-Sunna wa-l-jamâ'a*, in M Allard, *Textes apologetiques de Ġuwanî*, Beyrouth 1968 101-195
- al-Juwaynî, Imâm al-Haramayn, *As-Sâmil fi usûl ad-dîn*, edited by 'Alî Sâmi an-Naššâr, Faysal 'Awn, and Suhayr Muġtâr, al-Iskandariya 1969 AD
- al-Ķatîb al-Bagdâdî, *Ta'rik Bagdâd*, al-Qâhira 1349 AH 1931 AD, 14 volumes
- al-Ķayyât, Abû l-Hasan 'Abd ar-Rahmân bn Muhammad, *Kitâb al-intisâr wa-r-radd 'alâ Ibn ar-Rawandî al-mulhid*, edited and translated into French by A N Nader, Beyrouth 1957
- al-Kindî, *Rasâ'il al-Kindî al-falsafiya*, edited by Muhammad 'Abd al-Hâdî Abû Rîda, two volumes, al-Qâhira 1369-1372 AH 1950-1953 AD
- al-Mâtûrîdî, Abû Mansûr Muhammad bn Muhammad bn Mahmûd, *Kitâb at-tawhîd*, edited by Fath Allâh Ķulayf, Bayrût 1970
- al-Mubarrad, Abû l-'Abbâs Muhammad bn Yazîd, *Al-Kitâb al-kâmil*, edited for the German Oriental Society from the manuscripts of Leyden, St Petersburg, Cambridge, and Berlin by W Wright, Leipzig 1864
- Nâmî, Ķalîl Yahyâ, *Al-Ba'ta al-musriya li-taswir al-maġtûât al-'arabiya fi bilâd al-Yaman*, al-Qâhira 1952 AD
- an-Nâšî' al-Akbar, *Masâ'il al-imâma wa-muqtatafât min al-kitâb al-awsat fi l-maqâlât*, edited by Josef van Ess in *Frûhe Mu'tazilitische Haresiographie*, Beirut-Wiesbaden 1971
- an-Nisâbûrî, Abû Rašîd, *Fi t-tawhîd*, edited by Abû Rîda, al-Qâhira 1969
- Rasâ'il al-'adl wa-t-tawhîd*, edited by Muhammad 'Imâra, two volumes, al-Qâhira 1971 AD
- ar-Râzî, Faġr ad-Dîn, *Ġiġâdât firaq al-Muṣlîmîn wa-l-mušrikîn*, al-Qâhira 1356 AH 1938 AD
- aš-Šahrastâni, Abû l-Fath Muhammad bn 'Abd al-Karîm, *Kitâb al-milal wa-n-nihal*, two volumes, Mîsr 1317-1321 AH

- aš-Šahrastāni, 'Abd al-Karīm, *Kitāb nihāyat al-iqdām fī 'ilm al-kalām*, edited by A Guillaume, Oxford 1934
- at-Ṭabarī, Abū Ja'far Muhammad bn Jarīr, *Jāmi' al-bayān 'an ta'wīl al-Qur'ān*, edited by Mahmūd Muhammad Šākīr and Ahmad Muhammad Šākīr, 15 volumes, al-Qāhira 1374 AH 1960 AD
- 'Uṭmān, 'Abd al-Karīm, *Nazarīyat at-taklīf, 'Ārā' al-Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār al-kalāmiya*, Bayrūt 1391 AH 1971 AD
- 'Uṭmān, 'Abd al-Karīm, *Qādī l-Qudāt 'Abd al-Jabbār bn Ahmad al-Hamaḍāni*, Bayrūt 1386 AH 1967 AD
- Yāqūt ar-Rūmī, *Kitāb iršād al-arīb ilā ma'rīfat al-adīb*, edited by D S Margoliouth, seven volumes, Cairo-Leiden-London 1907-1926 AD
- az-Zamaḡšarī, Abū l-Qāsim Jār Allāh, *Al-Kaššāf 'an haqā'iq at-tanzīl*, two volumes, Calcutta 1272 AH 1856 AD

b *Books and Articles written in European Languages*

- Abdus Subhan, *New Sources for the History of the Mu'tazila Movement*, IC 12 (1938), 444-446
- 'Abdus-Subhān, *The Relation of God to Time and Space, as seen by the Mu'tazilites*, IC 17 (1943), 152-165
- Affifi, A E, *The Influence of Hermetic Literature on Moslem Thought*, BSOAS 13 (1949-1950), 840-855
- Afnan, Soheil M., *A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic*, Beirut 1969
- Afnan, Soheil M., *Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian*, Leiden 1964
- Ahmed, Ziauddin, *A Survey of the Development of Theology in Islam*, IS 11 (1972), 93-111
- Allard, M., *Le probleme des attributs divins dans la doctrine d Al-Aš'ari et de ses premiers grands disciples*, Beyrouth 1965
- Amine, Osman, *Le stoicisme et la pensee islamique*, *Revue Thomiste* 59 (1959), 79-97
- Anawati, G., *Une œuvre mu'tazilite medite le Mugni du Qādī 'Abd al-Ġabbār*, in *Akten des vierundzwanzigsten Internationalen Orientalisten-Kongresses*, München 28 August bis 4 September 1957, ed by H Franke, Wiesbaden 1959, 288-292
- Anawati, G C, R Caspar, Mahmūd el-Khodeiri, *Une somme medite de theologie mo'tazilite Le Moghni du Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār* MIDEO 4 (1957), 281-316
- Arnaldez, Roger, *Grammaire et theologie chez Ibn Haḍm de Cordoue, Essai sur la structure et les conditions de la pensee musulmane*, Paris 1956
- Badawi, 'Abdurrahmān, *Histoire de la philosophie en Islam*, 2 volumes, Paris 1972
- Becker, C H., *Christliche Polemik und islamische Dogmenbildung in Islamstudien Vom Werden und Wcsen der islamischen Welt*, Leipzig 1924, I, 432-449
- Ben-Shammai, H., *A Note on some Karate Copies of Mu'tazilite Writings*, BSOAS 37 (1974), 295-304
- Bernand, Marie, *L iġmā' chez 'Abd al-Ġabbār et l'objection d an-Nazzām*, SI 30 (1969), 27-38
- Bernand, Marie, *La notion de 'ilm chez les premiers Mu'tazilites*, SI 36 (1972), 23-45
- Bernand, Marie, *Nouvelles remarques sur l iġmā' chez le qādī 'Abd al-Ġabbār*, *Arabica* 19 (1972), 78-85
- Bernand, Marie *Le savoir entre la volonte et la spontaneite selon an-Nazzām et al-Ġāhiz*, SI 39 (1974) 25-57
- Biram Arthur, *Die atomistische Substanzenlehre aus dem Buch der Streitfragen zwischen Basrensern und Bagdadensern*, Berlin 1902
- Boer, T J de, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam*, Stuttgart 1901
- Bouman, J., *Le conflit autour du Coran et la solution d Al-Bāqillāni*, Amsterdam 1959

- Bouman, J, *The Doctrine of 'Abd al-Djabbâr on the Qur'ân as the Created Word of Allâh*, in *Verbum, essays on some aspects of the religious function of words, dedicated to Dr H W Obbink*, Utrecht 1964, 67-86
- Brockelmann, C, *Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur*, 5 volumes, Leiden 1937-1949
- Brunschvig, Robert, *Mu'tazilisme et A'arisme a Bagdâd*, *Arabica* 9 (1962), 345-356
- Brunschvig, Robert, *Mu'tazilisme et Optimum (al-aslah)*, *SI* 39 (1974), 5-23
- Brunschvig, Robert, *Rationalite et tradition dans l'analogie juridico-religieuse chez le mu'tazilite 'Abd al-Gabbâr*, *Arabica* 19 (1972), 213-221
- Busse, Heribert, *Chalif und Grosskonig Die Buyiden im Irak, 945-1055*, Wiesbaden 1969
- Cachia, Pierre, *The Monitor, a dictionary of Arabic grammatical terms*, Beirut-London 1973
- Cahen, Cl, *Buwayhids or Bûyids*, *EP*², I, 1350-1357
- Cahen, Cl, *Fakhr al-Dawla* *EP*², II, 748-749
- Cahen, Cl and Ch Pellat, *Ibn 'Abbâd*, *EP*², III, 671-673
- Canard, M, *Bagdâd au IV^e siecle de l'hégire (X^e siecle de l'ere chretienne)*, *Arabica* 9 (1962), 267-287
- Caspar, R, *Un aspect de la pensee musulmane moderne le renouveau du Mo'tazilisme*, *MIDEO* 4 (1957), 141-201
- Cremonesi, Vanna, *Un antico documento ibâdita sul Corana creato La Risâlah dell'imâm rustemide Muhammad Abu l Yaqzân*, in *Studi Magrebin* I, Napoli 1966, 133-178
- Diem, W, *Nomen, Substantiv und Adjektiv bei den arabischen Grammatikern*, *Oriens* 23-24 (1974), 312-332
- L'Élaboration de l'Islam*, Colloque de Strasbourg 12-13-14 juin 1959, Paris 1961
- The Encyclopaedia of Islâm*, four volumes, Leyden-London 1913-1934¹ (*EP*¹)
- The Encyclopaedia of Islâm*, New Edition, Leiden-London since 1960 (*EP*²)
- Ess, Josef van, *Dirâr b 'Amr und die "Cahmiya Biographie einer vergessenen Schule*, *Isl* 43 (1967), 241-279 and *Isl* 44 (1968), 1-70 and 318-320
- Ess, Josef van, *Die Erkenntnislehre des 'Adudaddîn al-Îci*, Wiesbaden 1966
- Ess, Josef van, *Fruhe Mu'tazilitische Haresiographie, Zwei Werke des Nâsi' al-Akbar (gest 293 H)* Beirut 1971
- Ess, Josef van *Ġâhiz und die Ashâb al-ma'ârif* *Isl* 42 (1966), 169-178
- Ess, Josef van, *Die Gedankenwelt des Hârîṭ al-Muhâsibî*, Bonn 1961
- Ess, Josef van, *Ibn Kullâb und die Mihna*, *Oriens* 18-19 (1967), 92-142
- Ess, Josef van, *The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology*, in G E von Grunebaum (ed), *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, Wiesbaden 1970, 21-50
- Ess, Josef van, *'Umar II and his Epistle against the Qadarîya*, *Abr-Nahram* 12 (1971-1972), 19-26
- Ess, Josef van, *Ein unbekanntes Fragment des Nazzâm*, in *Der Orient in der Forschung*, Festschrift für O Spies Wiesbaden 1967, 170-201
- Ess, Josef van, *Zwischen Hadîṭ und Theologie Studien zum Entstehen prädestinationistischer U berlieferung*, Berlin-New York 1975
- Fakhry Majid, *Some Paradoxical Implications of the Mu'tazilite View of Free Will*, *MW* 43 (1953), 95-109
- Fazlur Rahman *The Post-formative Developments in Islam*, *IS* 1 (1962), 4, 1-23 and *IS* 2 (1963), 297-316
- Fleisch, H, *La conception phonétique des Arabes d'après le Sirr sinâ'at al-r'âb d Ibn Ġinnî* *ZDMG* 108 (1958), 74-105
- Fleisch, Henri, *Traite de philologie arabe, vol I preliminaires, phonétique, morphologie nominale* Beyrouth 1961
- Frank, Richard M, *Abu Hashim's Theory of "States" Its structure and function in Actas do IV Congresso de Estudos Arabes e Islâmicos, Coimbra-Lisboa 1 a 8 de setembro de 1968, Leiden 1971* 85-100

- Frank, Richard M , *The Divine Attributes according to the Teaching of Abū l-Hudhayl al-'Allāf*, *Le Museon* 82 (1969), 451-506
- Frank, R M , *The Kalām, an art of contradiction-making or theological science? Some remarks on the question*, *JAOS* 88 (1968), 295-309
- Frank, R M , "Al-Ma'nā", *some reflections on the technical meanings of the term in the Kalām and its use in the physics of Mu'ammār*, *JAOS* 87 (1967), 248-259
- Frank, Richard M , *The Metaphysics of Created Being according to Abū l-Hudhayl al-'Allāf, a philosophical study of the earliest Kalām*, Istanbul 1966
- Frank, Richard M , *The Neoplatonism of Ġāhm ibn Safwān*, *Le Muséon* 78 (1965), 395-424
- Frank, R M , *Review of George F Hourani. Islamic Rationalism*, *BJOR* 29 (1972), 354-356
- Frank, Richard M , *Remarks on the Early Development of the Kalām*, in *Atti del terzo Congresso di studi arabi e islamici*, Ravello, 1-6 Settembre 1966, Napoli 1967, 315-329
- Frank, R M , *Several Fundamental Assumptions of the Basra School of the Mu'tazila*, *SI* 33 (1971), 5-18
- Frank, R M , *The Structure of Created Causality according to al-Aṣ'arī An analysis of the Kitāb al-Lumā'*, §§ 82-164, *SI* 25 (1966), 13-75
- Fuck, Johann, *Review of Ibn al-Murtadā, Die Klassen der Mu'taziliten*, *OLZ* 59 (1964), 371-374
- Fuck, J W , *Some hitherto Unpublished Texts on the Mu'tazilite Movement from Ibn al-Nadīm s Kitāb al-Fihrist*, in *Professor Muhammad Shafī' presentation volume*, edited by Dr S M Abdullah, Lahore 1955, 51-74
- Fuck, J , *Neue Materialien zum Fihrist*, *ZDMG* 90 (1936), 298-321
- Galland, Henri, *Essai sur les Mo'tazelites, les Rationalistes de l'Islam*, Geneve 1906
- Gardet, L , *Allāh*, *EP*², I, 406-417
- Gardet, Louis, *Dieu et la destinee de l'homme*, Paris 1967
- Gardet, L , *Al-Djubbā'i*, *EP*², II, 569-570
- Gardet, L , *'Ilm al-kalām*, *EP*², III, 1141-1150
- Gardet, Louis, *Quelques reflexions sur la place du 'Ilm al-Kalām dans les "sciences religieuses" musulmanes*, in *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A R Gibb*, Leiden 1965, 258-269
- Gardet, L , *Raison et foi en Islam*, *Revue Thomiste* 43 (1937), 437-478
- Gardet, Louis, *Signification du "renouveau Mu'tazilite" dans la pensée musulmane contemporaine*, in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, Oxford 1972, 63-75
- Gardet, L and M M Anawati, *Introduction à la theologie musulmane, essai de theologie comparee*, Paris 1948
- Gatej, Helmut, *Die Gliederung der sprachlichen Zeichen nach al-Fārābī*, *Isl* 47 (1971), 1-24
- Ghoraba, Hammouda, *Al-Asch'arī s Kitāb al-Lumā'*, *IQ* 1 (1954), 191-194
- Ghoraba, Hammouda, *Al-Ash'arī s method*, *IQ* 1 (1954), 140-143
- Gibb, H A R , *The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam*, *MW* 38 (1948), 17-28, 113-123, 185-197, 280-291, reprinted in *Studies on the Civilisation of Islam*, London 1962, 176-218
- Gimaret, Daniel *La notion d'"impulsion irrésistible" (ilgā') dans l'ethique mu'tazilite*, *JA* 259 (1971), 25-62
- Gimaret, Daniel *La theorie des ahwāl d'Abū Hāṣim al-Ġubbā'i d'apres des sources aṣ'arites*, *JA* 258 (1970), 47-86
- Goichon, A -M , *Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sinā (Avicenne)*, Paris 1938
- Goichon, A -M , *Vocabulaires comparés d'Aristote et d'Ibn Sinā, supplement au lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sinā*, Paris 1939
- Goldziher, Ignaz, *Vorlesungen über den Islam*, Heidelberg 1910, zweite umgearbeitete Auflage von Dr Franz Babinger, Heidelberg 1925

- Grunebaum, G E von (ed) *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, first Giorgio Levi Della Vida biennial conference, Wiesbaden 1970
- Grunebaum G E von, *Observations on the Muslim Concept of Evil*, *SI* 31 (1970), 117-134
- Halkin, A S, *The Hashwiya*, *JAOS* 54 (1934), 1-28
- Horowitz, S, *Über den Einfluss der griechischen Philosophie auf die Entwicklung des Kalam*, *Jahres-Bericht des jüdisch-theologischen Seminars Fraenckelscher Stiftung*, Breslau 1909
- Horten, M, *Die Erkenntnistheorie des abu Raschid (um 1068)*, *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam*, *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 24 (1911), 433-448
- Horten, M, *Die Modus-theorie des Abū Hāschim (933†)*, *Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam*, *ZDMG* 63 (1909), 303-324
- Horten, M, *Neues zur Modus-theorie des Abū Hāschim (933†)*, *Beiträge Gesch Phil Mittelalt* Supplement 1913, 45-53
- Horten, M, *Die Philosophie des abū Raschid*, aus dem Arabischen übersetzt und erläutert von Dr Max Horten, Bonn 1910
- Horten, M, *Die philosophischen Systeme der spekulativen Theologen im Islam*, Bonn 1912
- Horten, M, *Die sogenannte Ideenlehre des Muammar (850†)*, *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* 15 (1909), 469-484
- Horten, M, *Die spekulative und positive Theologie des Islam nach Razi (1209†) und ihre Kritik durch Tusi (1273†)*, Leipzig 1912
- Horten, M, *Was bedeutet al-kaun als philosophischer Terminus? Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Philosophie im Islam*, *ZDMG* 65 (1911), 539-549
- Horten, M, *Was bedeutet ma'nā als philosophischer Terminus? Eine Studie zur Geschichte der islamischen Philosophie*, *ZDMG* 64 (1910), 391-396
- Houben, J J A M, *De Koran als het woord van God*, Nijmegen-Utrecht 1953
- Houben J J A M, *Supra-naturalistic Tendencies of Islāmic Theological Thought* (in manuscript, unpublished)
- Hourani, George F, *The Basis of Authority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam*, *SI* 21 (1964), 13-60
- Hourani, George F, *Islamic Rationalism, the ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbār*, Oxford 1971
- Hourani, George F, *The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbār*, in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, Oxford 1972, 105-115
- Houtsma, M Th, *Die Hashwiya*, *ZA* 26 (1912), 196-202
- Houtsma, M Th, *De strijd over het dogma in den Islām tot op El-Ash'ari*, Leiden 1875
- Husik, Isaac, *A History of Mediaeval Jewish Philosophy*, Philadelphia 1946⁵
- Jadaane, Fehmi, *L influence du stoïcisme sur la pensee musulmane*, Beyrouth 1968
- Khâlid, Detlev, *Some Aspects of Neo-mu'tazilism*, *IS* 8 (1969), 319-347
- Khodeiri, Mahmoud el-, *Deux nouvelles sections du Moghni du Qâdi 'Abd al-Jabbâr*, *MIDEO* 5 (1958), 417-424
- Krehl, L, *Beiträge zur muhammedanischen Dogmatik*, Leipzig 1885
- Kremer, Alfred von, *Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams der Gottesbegriff, die Propheie und Staatsidee*, Leipzig 1868
- Lane, E W, *An Arabic-English Lexicon*, 8 volumes, London 1863-1893
- Laoust, Henri, *Les premieres professions de foi hanbalites*, in *Melanges Louis Massignon*, Damas 1957, III, 7-35
- Laoust, Henri, *La profession de foi d'Ibn Batta*, Damas 1958
- Laoust, Henri, *Les schismes dans l'Islam, introduction a une étude de la religion musulmane*, Paris 1965
- Lewin, Bernhard, *La notion de muhdaṭ dans le kalām et dans la philosophie un petit traité inédit du philosophe chrétien Ibn Suwâr*, *Orientalia Suecana* 3 (1954), 84-93
- Lewis, B, *'Abbāsids*, *EP*², I, 15-23
- Macdonald, Duncan B, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, London 1903

- Macdonald, D B. *Kalâm*, *EI*¹, II, 670-675 and *Sh EI* 210-214
- Madelung, Wilferd. *Der Imam al-Qâsim ibn Ibrâhîm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen*, Berlin 1965
- Madelung, W. *Imâma*, *EI*², III, 1163-1169
- Madelung, Wilferd, *The Origins of the Controversy concerning the Creation of the Koran*, in *Orientalia Hispanica*, volumen I, Pars Prior, Leiden 1974, 504-525
- Mahdi, Mushin, *Language and Logic in Classical Islam* in G E von Grunchebaum (ed.), *Logic in Classical Islamic Culture*, Wiesbaden 1970, 51-83
- Massignon, Louis. *La passion d'Al-Hallâj*, Paris 1914-1921
- McCarthy, Richard J, *The Theology of al-Ash'ari*, Beyrouth 1953
- Nader, A N. *Le système philosophique des Mu'tazila (premiers penseurs de l'Islam)*, Beyrouth 1956
- Nyberg, H S. *Al-Mu'tazila*, *EI*¹, III, 787-793, *Sh EI*, 421-427
- O'Shaugnessy Thomas, *The Koranic Concept of the Word of God* Rome 1948
- Paret, Rudi, *Der Standpunkt al-Bâqillânî s in der Lehre vom Koran*, in *Studi orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi Della Vida*, vol II, Roma 1956, 294-303
- Patton, Walter M. *Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and the Mihna*, Leiden 1897
- Pellat, *Le muheu basrien et la formation de Ġâhiz*, Paris 1953
- Peters, F E. *Aristotle and the Arabs the Aristotelian tradition in Islam*, New York 1968
- Pines, Salomon, *Beitrage zur islamischen Atomenlehre*, Berlin 1936
- Pines, Shlomo, *The Jewish Christians of the Early Centuries of Christianity according to a New Source*, in *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities*, II, Jerusalem 1968, 237-310
- Pines, Shlomo, *A Note on an Early Meaning of the Term Mutakallim*, *Israel Oriental Studies* I (1971) 224-240
- Pines S, *Some Problems of Islamic Philosophy*, *IC* 11 (1937), 66-67
- Pollak, Isidor, *Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der Arabischen Übersetzung des Ishâk Ibn Honam*, Leipzig 1913
- Pretzl, Otto, *Die frühislamische Atomenlehre*, *Isl* 19 (1931), 117-130
- Pretzl, Otto, *Die frühislamische Attributenlehre, ihre weltanschaulichen Grundlagen und Wirkungen*, *Sitzungsbericht der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Abteilung*, 1940, 4, München 1940
- Rescher, Nicholas, *Studies in Arabic Philosophy*, Pittsburgh 1967
- Ritter, H. *Muhammedanische Haresiographien*, *Isl* 18 (1929), 34-59
- Rosenthal, Franz, *Knowledge Triumphant, the concept of knowledge in medieval Islam*, Leiden 1970
- Schacht, Joseph. *New Sources for the History of Muhammadan Theology*, *SI* 1 (1953), 23-42
- Schacht, Joseph. *Zur Geschichte des islamischen Dogmas*, *Isl* 21 (1933), 286-291
- Schwarz, Michael, *Some Notes on the Notion of Iljâ' (constraint) in Mu'tazilite kalâm*, *Israel Oriental Studies* 2 (1972), 413-427
- Seale, Morris S. *Muslim Theology, a study of origins with reference to the Church Fathers*, London 1964
- Sezgin, Fuat, *Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums*, Band I *Qur'ânwissenschaften, Hadîf, Geschichte, Fiqh, Dogmatik, Mystik, bis ca 430 H*, Leiden 1967
- Sharif, M M (ed), *A History of Muslim Philosophy, with short accounts of other disciplines and the modern Renaissance in muslim lands*, 2 vol., Wiesbaden 1963
- Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam*, edited by H A R Gibb and J H Kramers, Leiden-London 1961 (*Sh EI*)
- Siddiqi, Mazher-ud-din, *Some Aspects of the Mu'tazilî Interpretation of the Qur'an*, *IS* 2 (1963), 95-120
- Sirat, Colette, *Les théories des visions surnaturelles dans la pensée juive du moyen âge*, Leyde 1969

- Sourdel Dominique, *La politique religieuse du calife Abbaside al-Ma'mûn*, REI 30 (1962), 27-48
- Steiner Heinrich, *Die Mu'taziliten oder die Freidenker im Islâm*, Leipzig 1865
- Stern, S M, 'Abd al-Djabbâr b Ahmad, EI², I, 59-60
- Stern, S M 'Abd al-Jabbâr's Account of how Christ's Religion was falsified by the Adoption of Roman Customs, JTS, new series 19 (1968) 128-185
- Stern, S M, New Information about the Authors of the "Epistles of the Sincere Brethren", IS 3 (1964) 405-428
- Stern, S M Quotations from Apocryphal Gospels in 'Abd al-Jabbâr, JTS new series, 18 (1967), 34-57
- Steglecker, Hermann, *Die Glaubenslehren des Islam*, Paderborn-München-Wien 1962
- Strothmann R., *Die Literatur der Zaiditen*, Isl 1 (1910) 354-368, 2 (1911), 49-78
- Sweetman, J W, *Islam and Christian Theology*, London 1945-1967
- Thomson William, *Al-Ash'arî and his al-Ibânah*, MW 32 (1942), 242-260
- Tritton, A S *Man, Nafs, Rûh*, 'Aql, BSOAS 34 (1971), 491-495
- Tritton, A S, *Muslim Theology*, London 1947
- Tritton, *An-Nâbita*, JRAS 1932, 137
- Tritton, A S, *Some Mu'tazilî Ideas about Religion, in particular about knowledge based on general report*, BSOAS 14 (1952), 612-622
- Tritton, A S *The Speech of God*, SI 36 (1972), 5-22
- Vajda, Georges, *Autour de la theorie de la connaissance chez Saadia* REJ 126 (1967), 135-189 and 375-397
- Vajda, Georges, *La connaissance naturelle de Dieu selon al-Ghâzî critiquee par les Mu'tazilités*, SI 24 (1966), 19-33
- Vajda, G., *La demonstration de l'unité divine d'après Yûsuf al-Basîr in Studies in Mysticism and Religion presented to G G Scholem on his seventieth birthday*, Jerusalem 1967, 285-315
- Vajda, G., *La parole creee de Dieu d'après le theologien Karaïte Yûsuf al-Basîr*, SI 39 (1974) 59-76
- Vajda, Georges, *Le probleme de la vision de Dieu d'après Yûsuf al-Basîr*, in *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, Oxford 1972, 473-489
- Walzer, Richard, *Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition*, essays presented by his friends and pupils to Richard Walzer on his seventieth birthday, Oxford 1972
- Watt, W Montgomery, 'Akîda, EI², I, 332-336
- Watt, W Montgomery, *Djabbârîya*, EI², II, 365
- Watt, W Montgomery, *Early Discussions about the Qur'ân*, MW 40 (1950), 27-40 and 96-105
- Watt, W Montgomery, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, Edinburgh 1973
- Watt, W Montgomery, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam*, London 1948
- Watt, W Montgomery, *The Great Community and the Sects*, in *Theology and Law in Islam*, Wiesbaden 1971, 25-36
- Watt, W Montgomery, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*, Edinburgh 1962
- Watt, W Montgomery, *The Political Attitudes of the Mu'tazilah*, JRAS 1963, 38-57
- Watt, W Montgomery, *The Râfidites a preliminary study*, Oriens 16 (1963), 110-121
- Watt, W Montgomery, *The Study of the Development of the Islamic Sects*, in *Acta Orientalia Neerlandica*, Leiden 1971, 82-91
- Weiss, Bernard G., *Medieval Muslim Discussions on the Origin of Language*, ZDMG 124 (1974), 33-41
- Wensinck, A J., *The Muslim Creed, its genesis and historical development*, London 1965²
- Wolfson, Harry A., *Mu'ammâr's Theory of Ma'nâ*, in *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A R Gibb*, Leiden 1965, 673-688
- Wolfson, Harry A., *Philosophical Implications of the Problem of Divine Attributes in the Kalam*, JAOS 79 (1959), 73-80

INDEX

A INDEX OF PROPER NAMES

- 'Abd al-Jabbār
 as a theologian 7-8
 his life 8-10
 his name 8-9
 his doctrine 14-16
 his teachers 16-19
 his opponents 19-23
 his disciples 23-25
 as *Qādī l-Qudāt* 9-10
 his works 10-14
 Mutašābih al-Qur'ān 11-12
 Tanzih al-Qur'ān 'an al-matā'im 11-12
 Taḥbīḥ dalā'il an-nubūwa 12-13
 Faḍl al-Ḥizāl 13
 Sarh al-usūl al-kāmsa 13, 29, 30, 32,
 61, 279-284, 291, 292, 335
 Al-Muḥīṭ bi-t-taklīf 8, 10, 14, 30, 280,
 284, 289-292
 Al-Muḡnī 14, 25-38, 279, 280, 284-289,
 291, 292, 335
 Muḡnī VII 35-38, 285-289
 al-Abyārī, I 36-38
 Abū 'Abdallāh al-Basrī 9, 17, 52, 107,
 108, 170, 187
 Abū 'Alī al-Jubbā'ī 17, 18-19, 20, 47, 51,
 69, 118, 135, 139, 152, 162, 163, 181,
 198, 201, 222, 251, 253, 297, 302, 306,
 317, 319, 323, 327, 387, 388-390, 400
 Abū Hanīfa 2, 334
 Abū Hāsim 17, 18, 19, 47, 52, 59, 79,
 136, 139, 140, 145, 162, 163, 169, 174,
 188, 201, 220, 222, 251, 252, 253, 255,
 261, 265, 298, 301, 306, 316, 317, 319,
 326, 342, 355, 362, 375, 387, 388, 390-395,
 396, 400
 Abū l-Hudayl 17, 113, 128, 226, 232, 251,
 388
 Abū Ishāq bn 'Ayyāš 9, 17, 261, 326, 342,
 375
 Abū Rašīd an-Nisābūrī 23-24
 Abū Rīda 24
 Abū Zayd 399
 al-Aḳfaš 399
 Allard, M 19, 20, 21, 151, 152, 250, 334
 Amin, Ahmad 6
 Anawati, G 26
 al-Aš'arī 6, 9, 15, 18, 20-21, 22, 251, 252,
 282, 331, 332, 333, 338, 349, 353, 361,
 364, 365, 371, 383, 387
 Aš'arīya 175, 250, 274, 275, 282, 283,
 284, 330, 332, 333, 334, 352, 355, 358,
 364, 365, 370, 371, 377, 387
 Ashāb at-tabā'ī' (Naturalists) 22, 23, 117,
 335, 359
 Badawī, A 10, 233, 235-236, 243, 253,
 259, 263, 280, 282
 al-Bāqillānī 152, 250, 332, 365, 383
 al-Bayhaqī cf al-Hākīm
 Ben Shammai, H 14, 27, 32
 Bernand, M 42, 49, 57, 103, 128
 Bīram, A 24
 Bīr bn al-Mu'tamir 165, 196
 Bouman, J 36, 38, 294, 305, 367, 368, 373
 Brunschwig, R 72, 90
 al-Burgū, Muhammad bn 'Isā 283, 341
 Dahriya (Materialists) 23
 Ess, J van 21-22, 42, 43, 49, 53, 57, 58,
 65, 67, 69, 73, 156, 157, 226, 251, 252,
 332
 Falāṣifa (Philosophers) 23
 al-Farzāqī, Abū Muhammad bn Ismā'il
 'Alī 13
 Fleisch, H 296, 302, 323
 Frank, R 4, 49, 53, 57, 67, 68, 82, 83, 89,
 128, 145, 149, 152, 156, 157, 167, 171,
 172, 181, 198, 199, 201, 204, 208, 218,
 226, 251
 Fu'ād Sayyid 17, 26
 al-Hākīm Abū Sa'd al-Muhsin al-Juṣamī
 al-Bayhaqī 5
 Hanābila 365, 377, 383
 Hašwiya 22-23, 282, 283, 284, 332, 333,
 349, 352, 353, 355
 Hišām bn al-Ḥakam 22, 155, 331, 361
 Horowitz, S 132, 135, 156
 Horten, M 24, 128
 Houben, J 24
 Hourani, G 8, 9, 42, 43, 47, 49, 50, 53,
 54, 55, 57, 85, 86, 87, 90, 95, 113, 116,
 145, 155, 156

- Husayn, Ṭāhā 25, 27, 36
 Ibn 'Abbād, Abū l-Qāsim Ismā'il at-Talaqāni 9-10, 28
 Ibn Baṭṭa 334
 Ibn Hanbal 2, 11, 20, 23, 330, 334, 364, 365
 Ibn Hazm 334-335
 Ibn Kullāb, Abū Muhammad 'Abdallāh al-Qattān 21-22, 251, 252, 282, 331, 332, 333, 338, 353, 361
 Ibn Mattawayh, Abū Muhammad al-Hasan 14, 24
 Ibn al-Murtadā 5
 al-Jāhūz 56
 al-Jubbā'i cf Abū 'Alī and Abū Hāšim
 al-Ka'bi, Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkī 17
 Karaism 25
 el-Khodeiri, M 26, 27
 Kullābiya 20, 21, 282, 283, 284, 287, 331, 334, 349, 352, 353, 356, 357, 358, 360, 364, 369, 371
 Laoust, H 334
 al-Ma'mūn 2-3
 Mānkdim, Qawām ad-Din Ahmad bn al-Husayn Ṣašāw 13, 107
 Martin, R 24
 Mihna (Inquisition) 1, 2, 5, 6, 22, 333
 al-Mubarrad 19, 399
 Muhaddiṭūn 1, 6
 Muḥbira (Jabriya) 11, 117, 118
 al-Mutawakkil 6
 Mu'tazila 4-7, 25, 29
 Nader, A 128, 201
 an-Najjār 283, 359
 Nawābit 23, 282
 an-Nazzām 112, 135, 164, 252, 307
 Peters, F 56, 57
 Qutrub 399
 Rosenthal, F 42, 49, 69, 113
 as-Sāhib cf Ibn 'Abbād
 aš-Šahhām 18
 as-Saqqā, M 8
 Ši'a 6, 7, 22
 Tritton, A 110, 113, 153
 'Uṣmān, Abd al-Karīm 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 55, 85, 120, 151, 160, 161, 212, 215, 258-259, 294
 Vajda, G 25, 42, 43, 45, 49, 57, 58, 60, 188-189, 190, 199, 259, 305
 Watt, W 20, 21, 113, 156
 Weiss, B 387
 Wensinck, A 2, 334
 Yūsuf al-Basīr 24-25, 182, 305
 Zaydiya 7, 26

B INDEX OF ARABIC TERMS

(arranged according to the use in Arabic dictionaries)

- 'ir *itār* (preference) 221
 'jl *ājal* (appointed time) 32
 'sl *asl* ("root") 54, 71
 'lf *ta'lif* (composition) 121, 123, 127, 128, 132-133, 173, 206, 209, 238, 299, 318, 319, 320, 321, 396, 409-410
 'lm *alam* (pain) 33, 125, 127, 128, 134-135, 163, 178, 179, 206, 209, 238, 261, 320
 'lh *ilāh* (god) 240, 263, 264, 265, 362
Allāh (God) 16, 214, 224-225, 227, 231-235, 240-241, 324, 355, 362, 365, 374, 375, 377, 411
 'mm *imāma* 34
 'mr *amr* (command) 214, 217, 219, 221, 271, 272, 329, 343, 345, 351, 356, 360, 376, 383
amr bi-l-qabih (commanding evil) 88, 269
amr bi-l-ma'rūf (the command to do what is approved) 5
umūr ad-dunyā (matters of this world) 58-59
umūr ad-dīn (matters of religion) 58-59, 61
amāra (sign) 46, 64, 302, 390, 392, 393, 395
āmīr (commanding) 336, 345
 'ml *ta'ammul* (contemplation) 57, 58
 'ns *insān* (man) 16, 159, 160-164, 402, 404, 410-411, 415
 'hl *ahl al-luga* (philologists, grammarians) 161, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 302, 310, 313, 323, 329, 379-380, 399
ahl an-nazar (people who have knowledge of reflection) 58, 329
 'wf *āfa* (defect) 176, 179, 204, 259, 313, 339, 355, 365, 366, 382, 383, 384

- '*wl* *āla* (instrument) 78, 82, 154, 166-167, 168, 177, 183, 191, 192, 202, 207, 208, 259, 268, 302, 305, 307, 313, 315, 317, 322, 326, 337, 338, 339, 366, 368, 369, 376, 378
ta'wīl (interpretation) 257, 277, 387, 419
bhḡ *bahḡ* (investigation) 57
bkt *tabkīt* (uncritical belief) 43-44, 46, 47, 56, 420
bd' *ibtudā'* (imitative) 94, 389, 390, 391, 394, 395
mubtada' (immediate) 205-206, 208
brd *burūda* (coldness) 125, 127, 128, 163, 178, 179
bṣr *mubāšara* (directly) 116, 203, 204, 205-206, 207, 208, 234, 268
bṣr *baṣīr* (having the metaphysical possibility to see) 180-181, 191, 243, 244
mubṣīr (seeing) 181-191, 244
btl *butlān* (incorrectness) 80
ibtāl (demonstration that something is incorrect) 80
bātil (incorrect) 79-80
al-bātil (the ontological untruth) 79-80
b'd *mubā'ada* (being distant from) 132
bu'd (distance) 187, 189, 194
b'd *ba'd* (part) 143-144, 150, 265, 324, 332, 333
bq' *lā yabqā* (does not remain) 300, 304, 394, 417
bāqī (permanent, remaining) of substances 123, 124, 247, 303, 394, 396, 410, of accidents 124, 125-126, 138
blg *balāga* (eloquence) 339, 385
bnv *binva* (structure) 139, 140, 167-168, 172, 173, 174, 183, 296, 305, 317, 319, 320-323, 362
bwh *muhāh* (permissible) 31, 86, 88
byn *bayān* (explain) 70-71
bayān (explanation) 70
ḡbt *ḡbat* (be certain) 69
aḡbat (establish) 69, 84
uḡbāt (establishing) 309, 341-342, 354-355, 374
ḡābit (certain) 84, 247
ḡn *ḡnī* (second) 263-265, 275, 360, 399
lā ḡnī lah (He is second to none) 263-265, 267, 411
ḡwb *tawāb* (reward) 33, 271, 272
jdd *taḡaddad* (become, originate) 115, 137, 147, 232
jz' *juz'* (atom) 120, 121-122, 146, 190, 191, 265, 407, 409
jsm *jism* (body) 112, 113, 115, 120, 121, 122-123, 173, 206, 232, 233, 234, 256-257, 302, 303, 407
jmd *jamād* (lifeless matter) 275, 326
jm' *Ijmā'* (Consensus) 67, 68, 91, 100, 102, 103-104, 277, 311-312, 339, 340, 346, 352, 389, 398, 399
ytumā' (combination) 73-74, 131, 133-134, 209, 300
jml *jumla* (aggregate, composite body) 82, 123, 126, 146, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 172, 173, 174, 177, 196, 200, 201, 203, 320, 322, 324-327, 410
jnn *jinn* (demons) 189, 193, 194, 287-288, 293, 329, 402, 408, 415, 417
jns *jns* (genus) 124, 125, 237, 239, 301, 318, 349, 354, 391, 394, 396
jhl *jahl* (positive ignorance) 43, 46, 56, 88, 269, 321, 346
ḡwr *muḡwara* (vicinity) 131, 133, 134, 318, 320
ḡwz *jāz* (be permitted, factual possibility) 280, 283
taḡwīz (admitting that it may be otherwise) 46, 75
jwhr *jawhar* (substance) 82, 119-121, 122, 123, 165, 178, 179, 181, 182, 187, 197, 203, 206, 210, 232, 256-257, 259, 307, 321
hbb *mahabba* (love) 220
hdd *hadd* (definition) 58, 70, 76-78, 79, 294, 305-307
hdḡ *hadīt an-naḡs* (talk of the soul) 62-63, 194, 309, 310
hudūt (coming into existence) 111, 115, 202, 205, 233
ihlāt (bringing into existence) 198, 204, 402, 409, 412
hādḡ (coming into existence, temporal) 106, 110-113, 114, 116, 117, 119, 147, 198, 219, 275, 357, 392
muhdīt (producer, bringing into existence) 113, 114-115, 116, 232, 233, 235, 246, 249, 268
muhdāḡ (produced, brought into existence, temporal) 106, 110, 113-115, 116, 117, 119, 232, 233, 245, 246, 256, 275, 332, 336, 351, 352, 373, 397, 399
hdw *tahaddī* (challenge) 389-390, 395, 396
hdw *ihudā'* (imitation) 388, 390, 394, 395

- hri hanâ'a* (warmth) 125, 127, 128, 163, 178, 179
hrf harf (letter) 294, 295-299, 300-307, 316, 318, 321, 324, 326, 327, 350, 354, 357, 359, 368, 374, 385, 388, 389, 391, 392, 393, 396, 397, 401
hrk haraka (movement) 113, 130-131, 136, 139, 141, 304, 307, 309, 317-320, 325, 347, 394
hss hâssa (sense) 82, 179, 245, 258, 260
hsn hasan (good) 31, 67, 85, 88, 219, 221, 266, 270-271, 282, 286, 287, 288, 290, 336, 337, 385, 386-387, 412, 415
ihsân (doing good) 86
hsl hasal (originate) 110, 116, 147, 294, 300
hfz hafz (memory) 302, 388, 389, 391, 395-396
mahfûz (memorized) 297, 302, 323, 391
haqq haqq li (be entitled to) 240
istahaqq (deserve, be entitled to) 85-86, 87, 88, 152-153, 240
haqiqa (reality) 58, 77, 78-79, 118, 294
hkm hukm (judgement) 71-72, 89, 115, 155-156, 158, 169, 230, 254, 255, 316, 325, 351
muhkam (precise) 102, 215, 241, 351
hk1 hikâ'a (reproduction) 99, 282, 283, 286, 287, 290, 332, 333, 340, 352, 353, 375, 382, 388-397
mahki (reproduced) 388, 389, 390, 393, 394
hll hall (inhere) 123, 124, 259, 313, 314-317, 324, 331, 361
halâl (permitted) 86
mahall (substrate). 121, 123, 126, '27-128, 132, 139, 142, 154, 167, 168, 172, 186, 187-188, 191, 203, 215, 257-258, 275-276, 287, 288, 301, 305, 313, 314-324, 326, 328, 352, 368, 373, 374, 375, 376, 393
hmd Muhammad 214, 276, 339, 340, 352, 388, 396, 400, 401
hwj ihtâj (need) 318
hâja (need) 260-262, 269-270
muhtâj (needing) 260-262
hwl hâl (state) 114, 116, 117, 125, 145-148, 154, 171, 175, 195, 196, 197, 207, 210, 213, 214, 228, 235-248, 251, 252, 253, 266, 286, 309, 313, 314, 320, 321, 322, 324-327, 328, 329, 338, 342, 347, 349, 374, 410
hyy hayy (living) 126, 127-128, 134, 135, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 168-173, 174, 175, 243, 244, 247, 249, 254, 275-276, 313, 324-327, 348, 355, 366, 367, 368, 410
havât (life) 127, 128, 164, 168-173, 174, 177, 181, 192, 319, 320, 321
havawân (animal) 159, 160, 168-169
hi: tahawûz (being spatial) 120, 121, 172, 178, 257, 258
mutahawûz (spatial) 110, 112, 120, 122, 123, 145, 256, 257
khbr khabar (information) 34, 214, 217, 219, 221, 269, 271, 272, 329, 343, 356, 360, 398, 399
mu'khbir (informing) 336, 346
khrij mah'raj (zone of articulation) 296, 307, 315, 323
krv karas (dumbness) 151, 311, 355, 368, 369, 370
akras (dumb) 339, 364, 366, 368, 369, 370
kr' iktirâ' (direct immediate production) 99, 116, 118, 203, 204, 205, 206, 234, 237, 238, 256, 267
krv iktavv (be confined to, characterize) 320, 322, 328, 362, 368, 383
akass al-awsâf (the most characteristic qualification) 77, 178, 303, 376
akass al-'ibârât (the most characteristic expression) 77
kitb kitâb (message) 99, 102, 271, 276, 345
ktir kâtir (warning) 63-65, 194, 218, 340
klf mukâlif (different) 353-360
klq kalq (creation) 117-119, 198, 291, 383, 400, 401, 409
kâliq (creator) 119, 268
maklûq (created) 110, 117-119, 283, 287, 289, 332, 333, 336, 351, 352, 383, 397-401
kwf kâwf (fear) 46
kvv iktivâr (free choice) 67, 101, 220, 221, 367, 391, 414, 416
mu'ktâr (choosing) 212
dbr tadabbur (consideration) 57
drk lâ yudrak (imperceptible) 260
idrâk (perception) 54, 93-94, 164, 175-177, 224, 303, 316, 325, 405, 407, 411, 420-421
mudrik (perceiving) 159, 160, 162, 164, 170, 175-180, 243-244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 254, 260, 275, 348, 355, 367, 411
mudrak (perceptible) 106, 124-125, 138,

- 145, 178-179, 224, 244, 246, 260, 300, 303, 391, 404-405
- d'w* *da'wā* (allegation) 366
- dā'i* (motive) 65, 67, 114, 199, 205, 207, 210, 212, 216, 218-219, 222, 228, 270, 272, 328, 329, 413, 414, 415
- df* *daf ad-darr* (repulsion of harm) 91, 216, 218, 260-261
- dll* *dall* (indicate) 65, 70, 71
- istadall* (infer) 65, 68, 81, 92, 229, 270
- dalil* (indication) 46, 59, 60, 65-68, 69, 70, 75, 81, 84, 92, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 224-225, 229, 230, 270, 276, 290, 301, 355, 358, 359, 405, 406
- dalāla* (indication) 59, 65-68, 91, 99
- madlūl* (indicated) 59, 60, 65, 66, 68, 70, 81, 84
- dkr* *tadakkur* (remembrance) 62
- qmm* *qamm* (blame) 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 269, 271
- q̄w* *q̄āt* (essence) 148, 254, 264, 274, 321
- li-dāth* (per se, by its essence) 147, 148-149, 153, 233, 237, 242, 243, 244, 250, 252, 253, 256, 261, 262, 263, 341-348
- r'y* *lā yurā* (invisible) 258-260
- ru'ya* (inspection, seeing) 71, 94
- mir'āt* (mirror) 183, 184, 186, 259
- rā'i* (seeing) 178, 180, 181-191, 243, 244, 259
- rzq* *rizq* (sustenance) 32
- rsl* *rasūl* (prophet) 95
- rsm* *rasm* (trace) 331
- rdy* *ridā* (contentment) 220
- rib* *rutūba* (wetness) 127, 128, 165
- rqq* *riqqa* (subtlety) 165, 189, 190
- raqiq* (subtle) 190
- rūh* *rūh* (spirit) 164-165, 410
- rā'iha* (odour) 125, 127, 128, 178, 179, 320
- rwd* *irāda* (will) 127, 128, 206, 207, 212, 213, 215-218, 220, 221, 222, 228, 266-267, 272, 273-276, 315, 316, 326, 327-328, 329, 360, 380, 400, 413, 415, 416
- irādāt al-qabih* (willing evil) 88, 269
- murīd* (willing) 159, 160, 162, 211-215, 246, 249, 250, 266-267, 271-273, 274-276, 348
- murād* (willed) 216, 217, 218, 219-220, 274, 287
- shh* *sabab* (secondary cause) 78, 133, 134, 136-137, 141, 149, 197, 204, 205, 206-207, 208-209, 217, 228, 236, 301, 307, 319, 322, 337, 381, 389, 391, 392
- str* *sātir* (concealing) 186, 187, 188, 189
- skt* *saḡat* (detestation) 222
- srr* *surūr* (happiness) 91, 261
- skt* *sukūt* (silence) 142, 311, 355, 368, 369, 370
- sākit* (silent) 310, 339, 364, 366, 368, 369, 370
- skn* *sukūn* (immobility) 49, 129, 130, 140, 319
- sukūn an-nafs* (tranquillity of the soul) 43, 45, 47, 48-50, 52, 59, 166, 180, 241
- slm* *islāmī* (Islamic) 407, 421
- sm* *ism* (name) 30, 157, 160, 161, 162, 251, 266, 298-299, 310, 374-376, 377, 391, 397, 398
- smt* *samt* (straight line) 183, 185, 189
- sm'* *sam'* (revelation) 15, 35, 91, 92, 95-100, 215, 224, 225, 276-277, 387, 398, 404, 407, 416, 417-420
- sam'i* (known by revelation) 91, 100, 101, 258, 276-277, 350, 404
- samī'* (having the metaphysical possibility to hear) 191, 244-245
- sāmi'* (hearing) 178, 180, 192-194, 245
- snn* *Sunna* (the "way" of the prophet) 6, 67, 91, 100, 102-103, 104, 277, 339, 346, 352, 398
- snni* (related to the Sunna) 6, 20
- shw* *sahw* (unconsciousness, oblivion) 321, 326
- šbh* *šubha* (sophism) 59, 75, 94, 364
- mutasābih* (obscure) 11, 102, 276-277
- štm* *šātim* (insulting) 395
- sks* *saḡs* (person) 160, 161, 162, 164
- srt* *šari* (condition) 244, 245, 248, 255, 275, 345, 348, 367
- šr'* *šar'i* (related to divine legislation) 34, 66, 71, 96, 155, 398
- š"* *šū'ā'* (rays) 183-191, 259
- šqq* *istaqq* (get a name) 375-376
- škk* *šakk* (doubt) 42, 45, 47, 94
- šhd* *aš-šāhid* (this world) 72, 226, 243, 293, 407-409
- šhw* *šahwa* (desire) 127, 128, 213, 216, 221-222, 223, 261, 262, 272
- muštahī* (desiring) 213, 261-262
- šwr* *isāra* (gesture, pointing) 161, 359, 386
- šy'* *šay'* (thing) 106, 144, 219
- syk* *šayk* (teacher) 16-17
- shh* *sahh* (be correct, be possible) 80, 280, 286
- sihha* (correctness, possibility, soundness) 59, 66, 67, 80, 94, 170, 195,

- 196, 197, 199, 202, 235, 236, 254, 337, 368
sahih (correct) 9, 60, 80-81, 182, 188, 192, 304
tashih (demonstration that something is correct) 80
sdq *ṣādiq* (veracious) 346-347
ṣdy *saddā* (echo) 315, 322, 324, 326, 327, 328, 368
skk *musākka* (striking) 141, 307, 314, 319, 337-338
slb *salāba* (solidity, hardness) 139, 140, 317, 323
slh *salāh* (advantage) 89, 90, 91
swt *sawt* (sound) 125, 126, 127, 128, 138-142, 178, 179, 191, 192-194, 206, 238, 286, 287, 288, 290, 296, 297, 299, 301-302, 303, 305, 306, 314, 315, 316, 317, 319, 321, 323, 327, 350, 375, 385, 388, 389, 390, 391, 394, 417
swr *sūra* (shape) 161-162
ddd *didd* (opposite) 111, 133, 142-143, 173, 202, 238, 257, 264, 315, 316, 318, 320, 321, 339, 342, 354, 367, 368, 370
drr *darr* (harm) 89, 91, 223
drb *darb* (kind) 343, 346, 349, 367
trq *tariq* (way) 93, 94, 180
t'm *ta'm* (taste) 125, 127, 128, 178, 179, 320
rw' *raṭawu'* (voluntary good deed) 86
istū'a (faculty) 32, 201
rwq *rāqa* (capability) 201
zlm *zulm* (wrongdoing) 88, 269
zulma (darkness) 185-186
znn *zann* (assumption) 45-47, 56, 127, 128, 206, 216, 218, 238
zann sawdāwi (melancholic assumption) 46
zhr *zāhir* (self-evident) 84
'bt *'abaṭ* (uselessness) 88, 89-90, 269, 282, 288, 343, 345, 358, 360, 382, 387, 402
'br *'ibāra* (expression) 282, 283, 330, 332, 333, 358, 375, 382
'jz *'ajz* (inability) 326, 366, 368
ījāz (inimitability) 99, 285, 340, 389, 390, 395
mu'jiz (miracle) 96, 97-99, 276, 340, 419
'dd *'adad* (number) 203, 237, 238
'dl *'adl* (justice) 4, 5, 29, 30, 31, 32-35, 37, 269, 276, 280, 281, 285, 289, 291, 412
'dm *ma'dūm* (non-existent): 106, 107-109, 111, 116, 147, 198, 204, 209, 219, 275, 316, 345, 409, 412-413
'rd *'arad* (accident) 111, 119, 123-128, 145, 149, 150, 157, 191, 197, 203, 206, 207, 208-209, 210, 232, 234, 257, 258, 259, 287, 288, 299, 300, 302-303, 307, 314, 331, 373, 396, 409
'rf *ma'rifa* (cognition) 51, 56, 82
ma'rūf (known) 82
'zm *'azm* (decision) 221
'qd *i'tiqād* (conviction) 41-56, 82, 89, 127, 128, 206, 211, 216, 218, 238, 321
mu'taqid (convinced) 40-42
'ql *'aql* (intuition) 15, 82-83, 86, 91, 92-93, 211, 224, 405, 419
hujjat al-'aql 67, 91, 100
'aqli (based on intuition) 66, 67, 71, 91, 100, 101, 258, 276-277, 405
'āql (compos mentis) 54-55, 83-84, 93, 94, 180, 211
ma'qūl (known by intuition, reasonable) 82-84, 90, 152, 294, 300, 355, 369
'll *i'tall* (to mention as the cause) 68-69
'illa (cause) 41, 66, 67, 68, 71, 115, 126, 148, 149-150, 155, 156, 182, 208-209, 215, 229, 230, 231, 274, 275, 311, 313, 342, 343, 380, 381
li-'illa (because of a cause, per accidens) 148, 153, 156-158, 171, 200, 233, 234, 349
ma'lūl (effect) 68, 69, 149-150, 381
'lq *ta'alluq* (connection) 41, 209, 210, 246, 264, 301, 322, 348, 358, 359
'ilm *'ilm* (knowledge) 15, 47-56, 57, 74, 82, 83, 89, 167, 173, 209, 211, 216, 218, 241, 242, 251, 301, 309, 321, 338, 391, 405, 406, 420
'ilm darūri (necessary knowledge) 53-55, 91, 92, 93, 218, 227, 228, 229, 309, 310, 321, 325, 359, 405, 406, 418
'ilm muktasab (acquired knowledge) 53, 55, 91, 95, 229, 321, 325, 406, 418, 419
'ālim (knowing) 50, 159, 160, 162, 169, 179-180, 211, 213, 215, 241-243, 245, 246, 249, 250, 254, 270, 301, 325, 338, 346
ma'lūm (known) 81-82, 108, 242
ma'lūm bi-l-idtirār (necessarily known) 81
ma'lūm bi-l-iktisāb (known by acquired knowledge) 81
'md *i'timād* (pressure) 127, 128, 135-137,

- 138, 141, 190, 206, 208, 209, 238, 314, 319, 320, 337
- '*ml* *musta'mal* (operative) 304
- '*ny* *ma'nā* (meaning) 12, 30, 117, 196, 298
- ma'nā* (qualifier) 42, 50, 94, 112, 130, 156-158, 171, 172, 175, 200, 215, 236, 242, 246, 247, 252, 262, 267, 274, 275, 307-312, 313, 325, 342, 343, 349, 356, 374, 375, 384
- '*nd* '*āda* (usage) 98
- '*nd* '*iwad* (compensation) 33
- grd* *garad* (objective) 218, 272
- gny* *gani* (self-sufficient) 262-263, 270, 415
- gyb* *al-gayb* and *al-gā'ib* (the other world) 72, 101, 226-227, 243, 293, 330, 407-409
- '*ilm* *al-ḡayb* (knowledge of the other world) 227-231, 270
- gyr* *gavr* (other) 143-144, 331, 332, 336, 350, 360, 361-363
- fr'* *far'* (derivative) 54, 71
- frq* *mufāraqa* (separation from) 132
- iftirāq* (separation) 132, 134, 135, 137, 209, 321
- fsd* *fasād* (wrongness, unsoundness) 80, 311, 366
- fāsīd* (wrong) 80
- fsr* *tafsīr* (commentary) 12, 78, 102
- fsh* *fasāha* (purity of language) 385
- fsj* *mfasal* (separate oneself from) 183, 184-185, 190
- fdl* *tafaddul* (favour) 33, 86, 281
- fl* *fīl* (act) 31, 114, 115-117, 123, 127, 195, 196, 197-198, 199, 203, 205, 209, 216, 217, 219, 249, 266-271, 289, 291, 298-299, 301, 325, 328, 337, 339, 342, 360, 374, 383, 397, 412-413, 414, 415, 416
- fīl mukham* (precise act) 51-52, 241, 254, 301, 325
- af'āl al-jawāriḥ* (acts of the limbs) 127, 132, 166, 203
- af'āl al-qulūb* (acts of the heart) 127, 166, 203, 215, 216, 221, 322
- fī'līya* ("factuality") 314, 338, 339
- fā'il* (acting subject, doer, maker) 114, 116, 154, 196-197, 198, 204, 205, 209-210, 232, 233, 235, 266, 267-268, 287, 288, 291, 313, 314, 327-329, 337, 338, 342, 369, 375
- bi-l-fā'il* ("by the doer", because of the acting subject) 147, 153, 234, 245, 246, 247, 262
- maf'ūl* (made) 110, 115-117, 119, 331-332, 336, 351, 383, 400
- fskr* *fīkr* (thought) 58, 62
- tafkīr* (thought) 57, 62, 309, 310
- tafakkur* (thought) 62
- fnī* *fanā'* (annihilation) 108, 127, 321
- fīd* *fā'ida* (meaning) 282, 298, 301, 304
- mufīd* (communicative) 298, 300, 301, 304-305, 306, 307, 354, 356, 357, 358, 359, 386-387, 392, 418
- qbh* *qabih* (evil) 31, 85, 87-88, 219, 221, 266, 272, 337, 345, 358, 360, 389, 399, 415
- lā 'af'al al-qabih* (He does no evil) 269-271
- qbl* *muqābala* (being in front of) 259
- qdr* *qudra* (ability) 127, 128, 164, 173, 198, 200-204, 209, 234, 237, 238, 310, 366, 376
- qadīr* (almighty) 237, 239
- taqdīr* (determination) 118, 397, 401
- qādir* (able) 31, 141, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 169, 195-200, 201-205, 209, 213, 215, 230, 234, 235-240, 243-250, 254, 263, 264-267, 274, 301, 325, 336, 337, 338, 351, 366, 370, 381, 413, 416
- maqādir* (possible) 202, 203, 204-206, 218, 219, 237, 238, 264, 300, 304, 351, 413, 416
- muqaddar* (determined) 118-119, 268, 397, 398, 399, 400
- qdm* *qadīm* (eternal) 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 232, 233, 235, 246-247, 248, 256, 257, 261-262, 263, 264, 275, 282, 284, 334, 335, 349-353, 354, 355, 359, 360, 361, 364, 365, 373, 374, 378, 401
- qr'* *qirā'a* (recitation) 389, 390, 394
- Qur'ān* 99-102, 104, 115, 257, 271-272, 276, 277, chapter three
- Qur'ān* (discussions about its being created) 1-3, 37-38, 117-118, 286, 397-401
- maqrū'* (recited) 389, 390, 394
- qrb* *qurb* (nearness) 131, 187, 188, 189
- muqārabā* (proximity) 131
- qrn* *qarīna* (context) 102, 387
- qsm* *qism* (part) 298, 299, 329, 343, 344, 346, 349, 356, 367
- qisma* cf *taqsim*
- taqsim* (division) 71, 72-74, 79, 88, 313, 328, 341
- qsd* *qasd* (intention) 89, 114, 205, 207, 212, 214, 218, 221, 228, 272, 309, 327-328, 329, 345, 351, 356, 389, 391, 396, 397, 414
- qāsīd* (intending) 212, 214, 272

- qī' maqtā'* (place of articulation) : 296, 302
muqtatā' (articulated) : 138-139, 296, 301, 302, 305, 391
qād qā'ida (basis) : 183, 186
qalb qalb (heart) : 49, 166-167, 172, 215, 287, 308, 322, 410
qlid taqlid (traditionalism) : 43-44, 46, 47, 56, 420
qwī. qūwa (might, faculty) : 82, 201
qvs qivās (analogy, deduction through analogy) : 71-72, 100, 155, 229, 230-231, 369, 370, 408, 409
ktb ktāba (writing) : 295, 296, 302, 304, 357, 359, 376, 388, 389, 390-391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 421
maktūb (written) : 297, 302, 323, 391, 394
ktf kaṭīf (thick, compact) : 190-191
kāb kaḍīb (lie) : 88, 269, 343, 346-347, 386, 398, 399, 415
kāḍīb (lying) : 345-347, 386
krh karāha (non-will) : 127, 128, 206, 222, 266-267
ikrāh (compulsion) : 89
kārīh (non-willing) : 212, 222, 249, 250, 266-267, 274
ksh kasb (acquisition) : 31, 204, 338, 359
kfr kufr an-ni'ma (ingratitude) : 88, 269
klf taklīf (imposing duties) : 8, 32-35, 40, 96-97, 159, 161, 162, 195, 202, 211, 215, 224, 225, 266, 271, 272, 345, 351, 402
taklīf 'aqli wa-taklīf sam'i : 33, 39
taklīf mā lā yutāq (imposing unattainable duties) : 88, 269, 379
mukallaf (responsible) : 103, 159-164, 194, 195, 202-203, 211, 402, 404, 414
klm kalām (speech) : 100, 125, 126, 137, 142, 157, 178, 238, 267, chapter three, 411, 417-420
kalām (speculative theology) : 3-4, 10, 11, 15, 39, 224
kalām kāfī (hidden speech) : 62-63, 193, 309
kalām nafsī wa-kalām laf'ī : 332, 349
taklīm (addressing, speech to someone) : 335, 344, 345
mukallim (addressing) : 344, 345
mutakallim (speaking) : 158, 210, 267, 278, 279, 283, 284, 286, 287, 290, 291, 310, 311, 312, 313-329, 330, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340-348
kml kamāl al-'aql (completeness of the intuition) : 55, 92-93, 227
kwn kun (be') : 345, 351, 365, 377-382
kawn (mode of being) : 109-110, 111-114, 120, 122, 125, 127, 128-130, 131, 132, 133, 140, 172, 206, 209, 232, 233, 238, 256, 301, 318-320
makān (place) : 186, 187, 333
kām (being in space) : 109-110, 120, 154, 247, 256
fk ma'ak (angel) : 159, 189, 190, 193, 194, 287-288, 293, 340, 388, 402, 408, 415, 417
lbs. itībās (ambiguity, vagueness) : 94, 180, 190
lī' iljā' (constraint) : 89, 220
ldd ladḍa (pleasure) : 91, 134, 261
lzm ilzām (argumentum ad hominem) : 71, 74-75, 228-229, 371
lsv lsvān (tongue) : 322, 323-324, 368, 393
līf lūf (divine assistance) : 33
latīf (thin) : 183, 186, 190-191
lḡw luḡa (language) : 109, 295, 304, 305, 356, 362-363, 386, 387, 418, 421
luh. lawḥ (tablet) : 394
lwn lawn (colour) : 125, 127, 128, 138, 178-182, 187-191, 315-316, 320, 354
mdh madh (praise) : 85-89, 271
ms. mumsāsa (touching) : 132-133, 137, 208, 234
mn' man' (hinder) : 60, 61, 196, 199-200, 203, 204, 209, 237, 238
tamānu' (mutual hindering) : 264-265
mānī' (hindrance) : 176, 179, 182, 185-186, 188-191, 192, 193-194, 199-200, 207, 258, 259, 260, 272, 273
mnw tamannī (wish) : 221
mwt mawt (death) : 173-174, 175, 320, 321, 327, 401
mayyit (dead) : 173-174
nbw nabi (prophet) : 95, 190, 225, 386
nubūwa (prophecy) : 95-100
ndb nadb (recommended) : 31, 86-87
nzl al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn (the intermediate position) : 5, 155
nzh tanzh (de-anthropomorphism) : 12
nzr nazar (reflection) : 15-16, 55, 57-61, 62, 64, 68, 71, 92, 127, 128, 206, 208, 209, 229, 238, 326, 404, 406, 419, 420
nā'ir (reflecting) : 40, 41, 52, 57, 406
nzm nizām (arrangement) : 241, 294, 298, 299-300, 392
manzūm (arranged) : 305, 306, 356
n'm in'am (benefaction) : 86
nfr nafra (aversion) : 127, 128, 134-135, 216, 223, 261, 320
nufūr : cf. *nafra*

- nfs nafs* (soul) 49, 148, 165-166, 287, 308, 384
li-nafsih (per se) 147, 148-149, 153, 166, 171, 246, 264, 341-348, 372
lâ li-nafsih wa-lâ li-'illa 348-349, 372
nafas (breath) 165, 315, 326
nf naf (benefit) 88-90, 91, 213, 216, 218, 221 260-261, 386, 387, 413
manfa'a (benefit) 91
nfl nafl (supererogation) 87
nfy tanâfi (mutual exclusion) 142, 347, 368, 369, 370, 388
nql intiqâl (transportation) 138, 183, 192-193, 232, 303, 316
nhy nahy (prohibition) 329, 343, 345, 351, 356, 360, 376
nâhi (prohibiting) 336, 345
hml muhmal (inoperative) 304, 306
wjw wujûb (necessity) 66, 195, 197, 199, 375, 380-381, 391
ijâh (reductio ad absurdum) 75
wâjib (obligatory) 31, 33, 87, 416
wâjib mukayyar wa-wâjib mudayyaq 31, 87
wjd wajad nafsah (to find oneself) 41, 45, 54-55, 57, 146, 147, 169, 195, 211-212, 309, 325
wjydân min an-nafs (direct self-experience) cf *wajad nafsah*
wujûd (existence) 107, 145, 153
ijâd (making existent) 198, 206, 268
mawjûd (existent) 106-107, 108, 110, 117, 119, 145, 147, 153, 198, 245-246, 247-250, 254, 259-260, 324
wjh jiha (direction, place) 129, 136, 208, 209
wajh (way, aspect) 52-53, 87, 89, 269, 386, 415
whd tawhid (belief in God's unity) 4, 5, 29, 34, 251, 411
utthâd (incarnation) 352, 355, 408
wâhid (one, unique) 265
wshw waswâs (whispering, temptation by a demon) 64
wsf sifa (quality) 31, 144, 145, 151-155, 155-158, 170, 180, 230, 248-255, 331-333, 361, 374-375, 384
as-sifa ad-dâtîya (the essential quality) 252
sifat ad-dât (essential quality) 31, 171, 248-249, 256, 263, 264, 266, 341, 342, 343, 350, 359-360
sifat al-fi'l (factual quality) 31, 210, 248-249, 266, 338, 367
sifat an-nafv (negative quality) 262
sifât ar-rasûl (qualities of the prophet) 102-103
wasf (qualification) 67, 151-154, 250, 251
mansûf (qualified) 150, 313
wsl utisâl (contact) 137, 183, 186, 187-188, 193, 328
wdh awdah (elucidate) 70, 71
wâ' muwâda'a (convention) 304, 305, 356, 357, 386-387, 392, 393, 396, 418
w'd wa'd (promise) 5, 101
wa'id (threat) 5, 101
wqt waqt (time-atom) 129-130, 197
wqf taqwîf (creation of language) 304, 386-387
wld tawlid (generating) 32, 60-61, 116, 133, 134, 137, 138, 197, 203, 204, 206-208, 228, 234, 267, 305, 319, 322, 381, 391, 392, 410
muwallid (generating) 268
mutawallid (generated) 197, 203, 205, 206-208, 228, 236, 305, 314
wly wilâya (pietas) 220-221
whm tawahhum (suspicion) 46
whw wahâ (cleavage) 134-135
ybs jubûsa (dryness) 127, 128

C INDEX OF ENGLISH TERMS

- ability *qadra*
 able *qâdir*
 accident 'arad
 acquired *muktasab*
 acquisition *kasb*
 act *fi'l*
 acts of the heart *af'âl al-qulûb*
 acts of the limbs *af'âl al-jawârih*
 acting subject *fâ'il*
 actor *fâ'il*
 admitting that it may be otherwise *tajwiz*
 addressing *taklîm, mukallim*
 advantage *salâh*
 aggregate *jumla*

- allegation *dā'wā*
 almighty *qadīr*
 ambiguity *iltibās*
 analogy *qiyās*
 angel *mal'ak*
 animal *hayawān*
 annihilation *fanā'*
 argumentum ad hominem *ilzām*
 arranged *manzūm*
 arrangement *nizām*
 articulated *muqatta'*
 articulation (place of) *maqta'*
 assistance (divine) *lutf*
 assumption *zann*
 assumption (melancholic) *zann sawdāwī*
 atom *juz'*
 atomism 121, 129-130, 131, 409-410
 aversion *nafra, nufūr*
 basis *qā'ida*
 be! *kun*
 become *tajaddad, hawal*
 being in space *kā'im*
 belief (uncritical) *tabkīr*
 benefaction *in'ām*
 benefit *manfa'a, naf'*
 blame *damm*
 body *jism*
 breath *nafas*
 bring into existence *ihdāt*
 cause 'illa
 cause (secondary) *sabab*
 certain *ībāt*
 challenge *tuhaddī*
 characteristic (the most) *aḳass*
 characterize *iktass*
 choice *iktivār*
 choosing *mukhtār*
 cleavage *wahā*
 cognition *ma'rifa*
 coldness *hurūda*
 colour *lawṇ*
 combination *uṭimā'*
 coming into existence *hādīf, hudūt*
 commanding *āmīr*
 commanding evil *al-amr bi-l-qabih*
 communicative *mufīd*
 compact *kaṭīf*
 compensation *'imad*
 compos mentis *'āqil*
 composite body *jumla*
 composition *ta'līf*
 compulsion *ikrāh*
 condition *ṣart*
 confined (to be) *iktass*
 confirmation *ta'kid*
 connection *ta'alluq*
 Consensus *Ijmā'*
 consideration *tadabbur*
 constraint *ilhā'*
 contact *ittisāl*
 contemplation *ta'ammul*
 contentment *ridā*
 context *qarina*
 convention *muwāda'a*
 conviction *ītiqād*
 convinced *mu'taqid*
 correct *sahih*
 cosmos 105-106
 created *maḳlūq*
 creation *ḳalq*
 creation of language *tanqīf*
 creator *ḳāliq*
 darkness *zulma*
 dead *maṭūt*
 de-anthropomorphism *tanziḥ*
 death *maṭ*
 decision *'azm*
 defect *āfa*
 definition *hadd*
 demons *jinn*
 derivative *far'*
 deserve *istahaqq*
 determinism 412-417
 direction *jha*
 directly *mubāṣara*
 desire *ṣahwa*
 desiring *muṣṭahī*
 determination *taqdir*
 determined *muqaddar*
 detestation *sakāt*
 discursive 406
 distance *bu'd*
 distant (being) *mubā'ada*
 division *taqsīm*
 doer *fā'il*
 doubt *ṣakk*
 dryness *yubūsa*
 dumb *aḳras*
 dumbness *ḳaras*
 effect *ma'lul*
 eloquence *balāga*
 elucidate *awdah*
 entitled to (to be) *haqq li, istahaqq*
 essence *ḳat*
 establish *aṭbat*
 establishing *uṭbāt*

- eternal *qadīm*
 ethics 415
 etymology 98, 109
 evil *qabīh*
 exclusion (mutual) *tanāfi*
 existence *wujūd*
 existent *mawjūd*
 explain *bayyan*
 explanation *bayān*
 expression *'ibāra*
 factuality *fi'līya*
 faculty *qūwa, istitā'a*
 flavour *tafaddul*
 fear *ḥawf*
 free choice *iktivār*
 generated *mutawallid*
 generating *tawlid, muwallid*
 genus *jins*
 gesture *isāra*
 god *ilāh*
 God *Allāh*
 good *hasan*
 grammar 145-146, 151-152, 351-352, 356,
 379-380
 grammarians *ahl al-luġa*
 happiness *surūr*
 hardness *ṣalāha*
 harm *darr*
 hearing *sāmi'*
 heart *qalb*
 hinder *man'*
 hindering (mutual) *tamānu'*
 hindrance *māni'*
 ignorance (positive) *jahl*
 immediate *muhtada'*
 immobility *sukūn*
 imperceptible *lā yudrak*
 imposing duties *taklif*
 inability *'aḥz*
 incorrect *ḥatīl*
 incorrectness *butlān*
 indicate *dall*
 indicated *madlūl*
 indication *dalil, dalāla*
 infer *istadall*
 information *ḵabar*
 ingratitude *kufr an-ni'ma*
 inhere *hall*
 inimitability *i'jāz*
 initiative *ibtidā*
 inoperative *muhmal*
 inspection *ru'ya*
 instrument *āla*
 insulting *ṣātim*
 intending *qāsid*
 intention *qasd*
 interpretation *ta'wīl*
 intuition *'aql*
 investigation *bahī*
 invisible *lā yurā*
 judgement *hukm*
 justice *'adl*
 kind *darb*
 knowing *'ālim*
 knowledge *'ilm*
 knowledge (necessary) *'ilm darūri*
 knowledge (acquired) *'ilm muktasab*
 known *ma'lūm, ma'rūf*
 known by intuition *ma'qūl*
 language *luġa*
 legislation *ṣar'*
 lie *kadīb*
 life *hayāt*
 lifeless *jamād*
 linguists *ahl al-luġa*
 living *hayy*
 love *mahabba*
 lying *kāḍib*
 made *maf'ūl*
 make existent *ijād*
 maker *fā'il*
 man *insān*
 meaning *ma'nā, fā'ida, haqīqa*
 memorized *mahfūz*
 memory *ḥifz*
 message *ḵutāb*
 might *quwa*
 miracle *mu'jiz*
 mirror *mir'āt*
 mode of being *kawn*
 motive *dā'i*
 movement *haraka*
 name *ism*
 name (get a) *istaqq*
 nearness *qurb*
 necessary *darūi*
 necessity *wujūb*
 need *ihtaj*
 neutral acts 86, 88-89, 270
 non-existent *ma dūm*
 non-will *karāha*
 non-willing *kārīh*
 number *'adad*
 obligatory *wājib*
 obscure *mutašābih*
 odour *rā'iha*

- one *wāhid*
 operative *musta'mal*
 opposite *didd*
 orifice *maḳraj*
 originate *hasal, tajaddad*
 other *ḡayr*
 pain *alam*
 part *ḡa'd*
 per se *li-nafsih li-dāth*
 perceiving *mudrik*
 perceptible *mudrak*
 perception *idrāk*
 permanent *ḡāqī*
 permissible *mubāh*
 permitted *halāl*
 person *ṣāḡs*
 pietas *wilāya*
 phenomenal 404-405
 philologists *ahl al-luga*
 place *makān*
 pleasure *ladda*
 pointing *isāra*
 possible *maqdūr*
 possible (metaphysically) *sahh*
 possible (factually) *jāz*
 praise *madh*
 precise *muhkam*
 preference *u'ār*
 pressure *i'timād*
 produced *muhdat*
 producer *muhdit*
 production (direct immediate) *iktirā'*
 prohibition *nahy*
 promise *wā'd*
 prophecy *nubūwa*
 prophet *nabi rasūl*
 proximity *muqāraba*
 purity of language *fasāha*
 qualification *wasf*
 qualified *mawṣūf*
 qualifier *ma'nā*
 quality *ṣifa*
 rays *su'ā'*
 reality *ḡaqīqa*
 reasonable *ma'qūl*
 recitation *qir'ā'a*
 recited *maqrū*
 recommended *nadb*
 reductio ad absurdum *ijāb*
 reflecting *nāzir*
 reflection *nāzar*
 remembrance *tadakkur*
 reproduced *mahkū*
 reproduction *ḡukāya*
 repulsion of harm *daf ad-darr*
 responsible *mukallaf*
 revelation *sam'*
 reward *tawāb*
 second *ṡānī*
 seeing *rā'i, mubṣir, ru'ya*
 self-evident *zāhir*
 self-experience *wjdan min an-nafs*
 self-sufficient *ḡanī*
 sense *ḡāssa*
 separate oneself from *infasal*
 separation *istirāq, mufāraqa*
 shape *sūra*
 sign *amāra*
 silence *sukūt*
 silent *sākīt*
 solidity *ṣalāba*
 sophism *ṡubha*
 soul *nafs*
 sound *sawt*
 spatial *mutahayyiz*
 speaking *mutakallim*
 speech *kalām*
 spirit *rūh*
 state *ḡāl*
 straight line *samt*
 striking *musākka*
 structure *ḡimya*
 substance *ḡawhar*
 substrate *mahall*
 subtle *raqīq*
 subtlety *riqqa*
 supererogation *nafil*
 suspicion *tawahhum*
 sustenance *riṡq*
 tablet *lawh*
 talk of the soul *ḡadīṡ an-nafs*
 taste *ṡā'm*
 temporal *ḡādīṡ, muhdat*
 temptation *waswās*
 theological 403-404
 theology *kalām*
 thick *katīf*
 thin *latīf*
 thing *ṡay'*
 thought *fīkr, tafkīr, tafakkur*
 threat *wā'id*
 time-atom *waqt*
 touching *mumāssa*
 traditionalism *taqlid*
 tranquillity of the soul *sukūn an-nafs*
 transcendence 224

transportation <i>mtiqāl</i>	way <i>wajh, tariq</i>
unconsciousness <i>sahw</i>	wetness <i>rutūba</i>
unique <i>wāhid</i>	whispering <i>waswās</i>
unity 407-411	will <i>irāda</i>
unsoundness <i>fasād</i>	willed <i>murād</i>
untruth <i>bātil</i>	willing <i>murīd</i>
usage <i>'āda</i>	wish <i>tamannī</i>
uselessness <i>'abaṭ</i>	world (this) <i>aš-šāhid</i>
vagueness <i>iltibās</i>	world (the other) <i>al-gayb, al-gā'ib</i>
value acts 88-89	written <i>maktūb</i>
vicinity <i>mujāwara</i>	wrong <i>fāsid</i>
voluntary good deed <i>tatawwu'</i>	wrongdoing <i>zulm</i>
warmth <i>harāra</i>	wrongness <i>fasād</i>
warning <i>kātur</i>	zone of articulation <i>maḵraj</i>

D INDEX OF TEXTS QUOTED, TRANSLATED, OR DISCUSSED

<i>Mugni</i> IV, 8	156, 261	26	87
11	261	31	88
14	91	31-32	86
15	91, 135	33-34	199
33	153, 179, 180	37	87
36	177, 181	38	86
50	182	<i>Mugni</i> VI/2, 8	212, 213
58	183	58	214
59	156, 183	78	219
61	185	89	217
64	184, 186	351	37
66	186, 186-187, 187	<i>Mugni</i> VII, 3	293, 336
67	186, 188	4	20
69	183	5	285, 286
70	93	6	70, 72, 76, 112, 122
76-77	184	6-7	296
81	93, 177	7	70, 78, 78-79, 301
83	178	8	70, 78, 157, 306
116	189, 191	9	299
117-118	189-190	10	304, 306
118	190	11	306, 307
119	193	12	80-81, 307
119-120	192, 194	14	69, 166
134	260	15	166
136	193	16	62
241	263	24	178
250	247	29	316
<i>Mugni</i> V, 210	240	31	139
259	29	32	69
<i>Mugni</i> VI 1, 3	33	34	140, 141
4	285	36	132, 133, 137
5	116	37	135, 174

- 39 174
 43 324
 47 327
 48 210, 327-328, 328
 49 80
 50 150
 52 328
 53 150-151, 210
 55 336
 58 336-337
 78 346
 82 158
 95 353
 117 151, 155, 250
 119 143-144
 120 143-144
 121 362
 123 144, 363
 133 364
 148-150 75
 152 373
 155 373
 204 395
 208 118
 210 118
 224 402
Mugni VIII, 63 205
Mugni IX, 27 137
 52 135
 60 135
 140 136
 141 136
Mugni XI, 64 89, 90
 191 90
 309 159, 159-160, 171, 194
 310 161
 310-311 164
 311 160, 162
 312 169
 321 160
 323 171
 331 165
 336 165
 355 127
 359 161
 375 82
 379 82
 380 93
 384 86, 93
 386 83
Mugni XII, 4 58, 77, 79, 153
 5 40-41, 157
 8 63
 9 41
 12 60
 13 48
 14 78
 15-16 47-48
 16 56
 20 49, 50
 22 49, 166
 23 49, 51
 25 43, 47
 28 41
 29 41
 34 52
 34-35 52
 36 80
 37 56
 43 45, 46
 59 94
 67-68 55, 57
 69 59
 69-70 60
 77 61
 100 60
 123-126 44
 386 64
 386-387 64
 410 64
Mugni XIV, 35 90
 461 33
Mugni XV, 17 97
 19-21 96
Mugni XVI, 433 33
Mugni XVII, 4 34
 92 34
 94 101, 102
 153 103
 280 71
Mugni XX/2, 255-257 15
 259 34
 262 28
Muhit I, 7 100
 14 91-92
 28 123
 29 112
 33 109, 129, 130, 131, 132
 38 84
 49 65, 66, 67
 49-50 67
 50 67
 69 114
 70 114, 216, 218
 73 115
 81 137

- 100 153
 103 196
 103-104 195
 107 203, 237
 113 51, 241
 121 169, 173
 121-122 170
 126 127
 138 110, 111
 157 254
 158 254
 160 255
 165 230, 231
 166 230
 198 122-123
 208 188
 208-209 189
 209 188, 189, 190
 212 261
 227 290
 229 116, 117
 230 117
 230-231 89
 269 272, 273
 274 273
 312 169
 316 289, 289-290, 294, 300
 318 312
 320 328
 322 328
 324 192-193, 193
 329 343
 345 117
 364 202
 366 132, 134
 367 132, 205
 368 205-206
Śarh, 39 61
 40-41 77
 41 87
 43 79
 45 57, 58, 59, 79
 46 48, 77
 46-47 48
 48-49 54, 81
 51 55
 52-53 228
 54 229
 61 44
 73 46
 80 91
 87 59, 66
 87-88 65
 88 91
 90 126
 92 69
 93 111
 95 113
 98 74
 98-99 74
 100 111
 109 142
 112 110
 114 110, 114
 118 233
 119 120
 122-125 5
 129 252
 151 195
 156 51
 167 181, 191
 168 175
 176 107, 108, 109
 181 110-111, 246, 247
 190 74
 190-191 52
 191 53
 191-192 52
 217 122
 219 121
 220 121, 167
 223 205, 206
 230 125
 230-231 120
 248 259
 258 191
 259 189
 278 263
 324 116
 324-325 114, 117
 354 311
 367 137
 391 205
 393 199
 395 45, 46, 199
 396 202
 412 198, 202
 415-416 202
 431 215
 432 212
 453 137
 494 76
 514 89-90
 527 23, 280
 528 294
 531 282

532	283	826	281
533	157	<i>Tanzih al-Qur'an</i>	3-4 11-12
538-539	328	al-Aṣ'arī	<i>Maqālāt</i> 172 151, 251
539	328		173 251
542	283		425 302 307-308
548	117, 118	al-Bāqillānī	<i>Tamhīd</i> 262 250
549	283		<i>Insāf</i> 62 332-333
558	283	Ibn Hazm	<i>al-Fisal</i> III, 7 335
564	96-97		9 335
569	98	Ibn al-Murtadā	<i>Tabaqāt</i> 112 7
570	98		113 8
573	103		105-107 17-19
576	103	at-Tabarī	<i>Annales</i> III, 1112-1113 2-3
600	102	<i>Wasīat Abi Hanīfa</i> ,	article 9 2

F INDEX OF EMENDATIONS SUGGESTED

<i>Mugni</i> IV, 4	178	29	316
	15	30	317
	36	32	317
	50	33	318
	66	34	141, 318, 319
	81	37	174, 320
	83	38	321
	134	39	174, 321
	189-190	40	321
	190	41	322
	350	44	325
<i>Mugni</i> V, 239	247	47	327
<i>Mugni</i> VI 1, 38	86	48	329
	43	51	324
<i>Mugni</i> VI 2, 58	221	52	328
<i>Mugni</i> VII, 5	285, 286	53	154
	6	55	338
	7	57	338
	9	58	339
	9-10	59	339
	10	61	340
	11	63	343
	12	64	342
	14	65	343
	16	66	344
	16	67	344, 345
	18	68	345
	19	69	345
	20	71	346
	23	72	346
	24	73	346
	24-25	74	347
	25		
	26-30		

- 75 347
 76 347
 77 347
 78 347
 79 347
 80 347, 348
 82 349
 82-83 148
 83 348 349
 84 349, 350
 85 350
 86 350
 87 350
 89 350, 351
 90 350, 351
 91 352
 92 352
 94 352
 100 355
 101 355, 356
 102 356
 103 356
 104 357
 105 357
 107 358
 108 358
 109 359
 110 360
 111 360
 112 359
 113 360
 115 360
 120 362
 121 362
 122 363
 133 366
 136 367
 140 368
 141 368
 144 369, 370
 145 370
 146 370
 148 371
 150 371, 372
 151 372
 152 373
 155 373
 156 374
 157 375
 161 375
 162 376
 163 376
 165 377
- 167 379
 168 379
 172 381
 173 381, 382
 174 382
 175 382
 187 388
 188 389
 189 390
 194 391
 195 392
 196 392
 199 393
 201 394
 202 395
 203 395
 204 396
 215 398
 216 398
 217 399
 220 400
 221 401
 224 402
- Mugni IX*, 60 135
 141 136
- Mugni XII*, 7 63
 14 87
 25 43
 59 94
 77 61
 386-387 64
- Mugni XX/2*, 187 268
 190 268
 255 15
- Muhit I*, 33 131
 41 (Egyptian edition) 130
 50 232
 165 226, 231
 166 230
 168 (Egyptian edition) 230
 198 123
 208 189
 209 189, 190
 230-231 89
 265 (Egyptian edition) 272
 269 272, 273
 269-272 271
 271 272
 272 272
 274 273
 313 (Egyptian edition) 138
 317 298-299
 321 327

324	138, 192	<i>Šarh</i> ,	129	252
329	342		219	120
349	364		220	121
351 (Egyptian edition)	137		257	190
367	137		354	311
393	200		538	324

CURRICULUM VITAE

Johannes Reinier Theodorus Maria Peters werd op 1 oktober 1940 te Nijmegen geboren. Na zijn gymnasiale studies te Sint Michielsgestel studeerde hij filosofie en theologie op het Groot Seminarie te Haaren en de filosofische faculteit "Berchmanianum" te Nijmegen. Hij studeerde Arabisch aan de CREA te Bikfaya en de Universit  St. Joseph te Beirut. Van 1967 tot 1972 studeerde hij aan de Katholieke Universiteit te Nijmegen theologie (specialisatie exegeze) en semitische taal- en letterkunde. Momenteel is hij werkzaam als wetenschappelijk medewerker aan het Instituut voor Talen en Culturen van het Midden Oosten van de Katholieke Universiteit. Sinds 1961 is hij lid van de Soci teit van Jesus.

STELLINGEN

I

Voor de vervaardiging van een correcte editie van oude, onvolledig van diacritische punten voorziene, Arabische manuscripten is het noodzakelijk, dat de bewerker de inhoud van de te editeren teksten volledig begrijpt, alvorens hij een begin maakt met de reconstructie ervan

II

De bestudering van 'Abd al-Jabbâr en zijn œuvre binnen de Perzische religieus- en cultuurhistorische context kan een zeer waardevolle bijdrage leveren tot een vollediger begrip van deze auteur en van de latere Mu'tazila, deze studie dient echter gebaseerd te zijn op een nauwkeurige terminologische en inhoudelijke analyse van zijn werken

(Cf Guy Monnot, *Penseurs Musulmans et religions iraniennes*, Paris-Le Caire-Beyrouth 1974)

III

De toepassing van een literair-stilistische analyse op het œuvre van al-Ġazâlî — en dat van andere moslim-auteurs — om de authenticiteit van bepaalde werken te toetsen zal het meeste resultaat hebben, wanneer deze zich concentreert op het consequent en accuraat gebruik van het technische wetenschappelijke vocabulaire in de betreffende werken

(Cf H Lazarus-Yafeh, *Studies in al-Ghazzali*, Jerusalem 1975)

IV

Voor een goed begrip van de traditie betreffende al-Aš'arî's bekering en de verschillende fasen daarvan dient in de beschrijving van de drie verschijningen van de profeet Muhammad het woord *dalil* te worden verstaan in de technische betekenis van « rationeel argument »

(Cf Ibn 'Asakir, *Tabîn kađib al-muftarî fi-mâ nusib ilâ l-îmâm Abî l-Hasan al-Aš'arî*, Dimašq 1347 AH, 40-41)

V

De ideeën van Mohammed Arkoun betreffende de mogelijkheid en noodzakelijkheid van een « toegepaste islamologie » (*islamologie appli-*

quée) bieden een goede basis om het samenspel tussen westerse islamologen en moslim-theologen opnieuw te doordenken en vorm te geven.

(Cf. Mohammed Arkoun, *Essais sur la pensée islamique*, Paris 1973.)

VI

Een adequate vertaling van klassieke Arabische poëzie blijkt vaak onmogelijk, wanneer men ook het spel met de Arabische wortels en hun semantisch spectrum tot zijn recht zou willen laten komen.

(Cf. bijv. A. J. Arberry, *Poems of al-Mutanabbi*, Cambridge 1967, 110-111.)

VII

De mogelijkheden die de Arabische taal biedt tot verregaande toepassingen van de methoden van de computer-linguïstiek wijzen op haar sterk formaliseerbare karakter en op de mogelijkheid haar op een relatief eenvoudige wijze in haar morfemen te ontleden.

VIII

Aangezien de Nederlandse termen « barmhartigheid » en « erbarmer » te zeer het idee van zonde en vergiffenis oproepen, verdient het aanbeveling — tegen de achtergrond van de tekst van de Qur'ân en de betekenis van de wortel *rahm* in het oude Arabisch — in religieuze teksten *rahim* te vertalen als « goed » en *rahma* als « goedheid ».

IX

Het blijkt niet mogelijk de analyse van het gebruik en de functie van de verdubbelingsstam (*fa'al*), zoals deze door Jenni voor het Hebreeuws is ontwikkeld, toe te passen op de Arabische tekst van de Qur'ân.

(Cf. E. Jenni, *Das Hebräische Pi'el*, Zürich 1968.)

X

Het feit dat de liturgie van de Maronieten is doordrenkt van zonde- en schuldbesef en dat gebeden om vergiffenis een zeer grote plaats erin innemen kan mede worden verklaard vanuit de sociale en politieke situatie waarin deze christenen in vroeger eeuwen hebben geleefd.

XI

Het Aramees van de Qumrân-targum van het boek Job (11Qtg Job) staat in het gebruik van status emphaticus en status absolutus nog zeer dicht bij het Rijks-Aramees; van een vervaging van het verschil tussen beide status is nog niet of nauwelijks sprake.

(Cf. *Le Targum de Job de la Grotte XI de Qumrân*, édité et traduit par J. P. M. van der Ploeg O.P. et A. S. van der Woude, Leiden 1971, 4.)

XII

Louis Gardet blijkt met zijn eigen, « inlevende » benadering van de Islâm in staat te zijn de geloofsinhoud van de Islâm en van islamitische religieuze teksten in te voelen en over te dragen; zijn benadering loopt echter tevens het risico de eigenheid van het islamitische denken uit het oog te verliezen.

XIII

De Universit  St. Joseph te Beyrouth heeft de afgelopen eeuw ook een belangrijke positieve rol vervuld binnen de Libanese maatschappij, waar zij in theorie en praktijk een centrum van  cumene en menselijke samenleving is geweest, zowel tussen de diverse christelijke confessionele groeperingen als tussen christenen en moslims.

XIV

De rol van de ergotherapie, die zich binnen het revalidatieproces uitdrukkelijk richt op de mens als totaliteit en die als zodanig binnen dat proces een centrale functie kan vervullen, dient met name in een academisch ziekenhuis en binnen de opleiding van toekomstige medici ook structureel te worden erkend.

XV

Naast andere vormen van religieus leven dienen ook kleine experimentele leefgroepen een eerlijke kans te krijgen, aangezien deze met hun eigen mogelijkheden van openheid en gastvrijheid eigen aspecten van christelijk leven kunnen vertolken.

Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift van J. R. T. M. Peters.

