

**The Professional Preparation of Junior Military
Officers in the Saudi Arabian National Guard:
King Khaled Military Academy**

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Abstract

This thesis is a contribution to cross-national studies of professional officer education and training. It describes and evaluates a junior officer preparation programme at King Khaled Military Academy (KKMA), Saudi Arabia, in a comprehensive way. Both positive and negative aspects of the programme are included in this study, along with an extensive literature survey highlighting common features of programme effectiveness and potential barriers to success.

The research develops an innovative five-point "star model" for the evaluation of junior officer preparation programmes, deemed appropriate for the investigation of five programme components: recruitment and selection, indoctrination, vocational preparation, liberal education, and physical fitness.

To obtain multiple viewpoints in evaluating KKMA's junior officer programme, the study adopts a multiple method design integrating the use of questionnaires, interviews, and documentary evidence, in order to permit triangulation. It is also guided by three questions: "How is it done?"; "How well is it done?"; and "How can it be improved?". In total, one hundred graduating cadets, forty seven teaching staff members, and three high-ranking military officers took part in this study.

The study is organised as follows. Chapter one introduces the research, chapter two explores issues surrounding the professional education and training of the modern military officer, chapter three surveys the relevant literature, chapter four explains the study's methodology, chapters five to nine present the results and chapter ten discusses the main findings and draws conclusions.

The major findings of this research are as follows: based mainly on the perceptions of the research participants, (1) KKMA's recruitment and selection system was judged to be unsystematic and ineffective despite the huge efforts and resources invested in it annually; (2) the evidence pointed to a mixed verdict with regard to KKMA's indoctrination programme, recognising that it was strong in terms of military culture, but weak because it emphasised soldiering over leadership training; (3) the Academy's vocational programme was overall rated as moderately effective and balanced, although improvements were needed in the provision of technical, technological, and leadership skills; (4) the liberal education programme was also judged to be on balance moderately effective despite imperfections, particularly in terms of relevance to military needs; finally (5) KKMA's physical fitness programme equally emerged as moderately effective despite weaknesses and barriers impeding its success, its greatest deficiency being that it did not teach cadets how to coach others.

Practical implications include the need to review and update every aspect of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme, if it is to continue to enjoy high esteem for excellence and integrity, and if its graduates are to merit the status of professionals.



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Abbreviations

ALDH	Army Leadership Development Handbook
BMT	Basic Military Training
CPME	Conference on Professional Military Education
KKMA	King Khaled Military Academy
KSAO's	Knowledges, Skills , abilities, and other characteristics
KSU	King Saud University
MOOTW	Military Operations other than War
RMAB	Royal Military Academy of Belgium
RMAS	Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst
RMC	Royal Military College of Canada
SANG	Saudi Arabia National Guard
USMA	United States Military Academy

Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Introduction

This research is an attempt to evaluate empirically the effectiveness of King Khaled Military Academy's junior officer preparation programme. This chapter provides an overview of the research from its inception to its completion. It begins with the background of the study and justifies the need for it. The research problem is then stated. Next, the major aim of this research and the research questions are addressed. Following that, the scope and limitations, the benefits, and an outline of the thesis are given.

1.2 Background of the Study

The Saudi National Guard (SANG) was founded in 1960. It represents a significant part of the Saudi military strength, and its key roles are the defence of Islam, the King and the homeland and its citizens, in conjunction with other armed and security forces of the country (Dahy 1988: 93). It is headed by Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz, its commander, who is also Deputy Prime Minister in the Saudi Government.

Since its creation, SANG has benefited from the experience and expertise of various countries in developing an adequate military training and education system for its members, particularly its officer corps. However, for over two decades, SANG's officer corps remained heavily dependent upon the military schools of friendly nations, namely those of Jordan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in preparing the bulk of its members. In 1983, King Khaled Military Academy (KKMA) was established. Its purpose was to train and educate professional SANG officers. KKMA is structured in the mould of most modern military academies in the world and shares many of their characteristics and goals. It produces between 300-400 officer cadets per year, and is staffed by over 100 senior military officers and 30 full-time post-graduate

civilian teachers and trainers.

As is the case with most modern military academies in the world, KKMA is keen to produce professional military leaders who are capable of performing their multiple functions in times of both peace and war. Emphasis is heavily laid on preparation for battle because a soldier's first task is to fight and win wars. However, considerable attention is also paid to preparing future officers to be responsible and well-adjusted citizens, who are comfortable as members of the military community, as well as members of the wider society which they are committed to protect, at the cost of their own lives should that be necessary. This dual function, professional and societal, emphasized by notable military writers (Janowitz 1960, Huntington 1957, Jordan 1971, Moskos and Wood 1988 etc) has been the basis upon which many officer preparation programmes have been designed in the military establishments of the Western World and other countries that have emulated them. Each country, however, including Saudi Arabia, has attempted to tailor its officer preparation programmes to suit its particular circumstances and needs.

As national security has become a matter of great concern because of the unprecedented complexity and ambiguity of the twenty-first century operational environment, increasing attention is paid to how best to educate and train military leaders. This is all the more important at a time of new regional and international groupings and alliances, and common security goals. Hence, there is a pressing need to update and harmonise military preparation programmes. Inevitably, military research efforts are aiming in this direction. It is against this background that the present research was conducted. A main motivation behind it is to provide empirical evidence of the state of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme at the dawn of the new century.

1.3 The Need for this Study

The preparation of SANG's officer corps is a vital part of Saudi military defence strategy. The quality of its members largely depends on their initial academy preparation. For this reason, it is important to ensure that the education and training

officer cadets go through is adequate. Currently, this means that they should be equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills they need to perform their duties as military leaders, without neglecting their growth and development as well-adjusted citizens of the wider society to which they belong. Twenty years after its birth, KKMA has not as yet conducted a single comprehensive evaluation of its junior officer preparation programme. According to Converse (1998), some form of evaluation of officer education and training is conducted at least once a year in Western military academies, particularly in the USA. This implies that it is high time to attempt to at least evaluate KKMA's junior officer preparation programme in the light of practices in other academies with long traditions of military professionalism and academic excellence, such as Sandhurst (UK) and West Point (US) and others, as well as of recent military theory.

1.4 Statement of the Problem

In a paper entitled "Why Arabs lose wars", Atkine (2000: 19) contends that leadership preparation may be the greatest weakness of Arab training systems. Without regular and systematic evaluations of its officer preparation programmes, KKMA's objective of producing capable and effective leaders is left to chance. In the USA, the military academies of West Point and Annapolis see their mission as to produce 'the best leaders in the world' and their programmes are geared to achieve just that (Thomas 2000: 14). How does KKMA know what kind of leaders it is producing? How does it know whether or not the various components of its officer preparation programme are based on sound theoretical foundations, and how does it know the extent to which it is being effective in the delivery of its programme? Is the cadets' learning environment conducive to effective learning? Is its military culture adequate, and are its indoctrination methods appropriate in the modern world? These are only a few of the questions for which there are no answers yet. One would expect a highly regarded military academy such as KKMA to have such knowledge available periodically if it is to attain high levels of performance and maintain its reputation for excellence.

1.5 Aims of the Study

The main aim of this investigation is to arrive at an empirically based assessment of the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme. It is suggested in this work that all education and training activities that cadets undergo could be grouped and studied under five components which form the basis of the theoretical framework. These are: (i) Recruitment and Selection; (ii) Indoctrination; (iii) General/Liberal Education; (iv) Vocational Education and Training; and (v) Physical Fitness Training.

One objective of this study is to gather a wealth of knowledge from theory and best practice in military literature that is relevant to each of the five components of junior officer preparation. It seeks to identify as many contributing factors to success as possible and use them as a basis for the evaluation of KKMA's performance in the design and delivery of its programmes. It also attempts to uncover the various barriers that reduce effectiveness and explores ways to improve the Academ's programmes.

Since the present researcher was unable to find a single study specifically related to the topic of this thesis, whether in Saudi Arabia or in any other Arab country, a fact also noticed by Converse (1998:294), another aim of this study is to fill that void with a first research attempt which, it is hoped, will stimulate future work. A further aim stemming from the discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme, and other insights, is that it is hoped that the relevant authorities will reflect on the findings of this study and begin a process of appropriate remedial action to enhance effectiveness.

1.6 Scope and Limitations

This research is limited to the evaluation of KKMA's regular-track junior officer preparation programme (see Fig. 5.1). It is assessed mainly through the attitudes and perceptions of a scientifically selected representative sample of cadets and their teachers and trainers, as well as through the views and attitudes of three senior military

commanders responsible for education and training. The programme is also assessed through the analysis of documentary evidence and on the basis of relevant military literature. This work, therefore, makes no claim that its findings are irrefutable, nor immune from possible perceptual or attitudinal bias. It is in no way comparable with an objective government report.

1.7 Research Questions

In the light of the aims and scope of this investigation, the following research questions have been developed:

RQ1 How effective are current recruitment and selection practices in KKMA?

RQ2 How effective is KKMA's indoctrination programme?

RQ3 How effective is KKMA's vocational programme?

RQ4 How effective is KKMA's liberal education programme?

RQ5 How effective is KKMA's physical fitness programme?

RQ6 What problems and obstacles impede the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme?

1.8 Overview of Methodology Used

The methodological approach used to achieve the research objectives and answer the research questions integrates the use of three instruments: questionnaire, interview, and documentary research. It could be described as "a multi-method evaluation design" (Robson 2000: 81). It is an approach that permits triangulation and provides a check on bias. The investigation begins with a survey of the literature on the professional education and training of military officers. The aim is to gather knowledge of and insights into the experiences of other countries in the field and to identify current trends and the rationales behind them, in order to provide a basis for the evaluation of current practices in KKMA.

Once the literature review is completed and the research design is finalized, preparations for a pilot study will begin. This will involve the design and construction

of a structured questionnaire, the main instrument for this study, which is to be completed by graduating third year-cadets (Class 1999) and members of the teaching staff. The second data collection instrument for this study consists of interviews with three military commanders who will be asked a fixed set of pre-determined questions on junior officer programme effectiveness. They will also be asked questions on how the programme could be improved. The third collection tool to be used in this study is documentary research. This consists of examining and analysing printed documents, such as syllabus details, manuals etc. The intention here is to obtain as full a picture of the programme as possible, and allow comments to be made on its nature and delivery in the light of the respondents' reactions.

The main field study will need to draw a representative sample of respondents from KKMA. For the survey, two independent sub samples are needed: cadets and teaching staff members. Random sampling will be used. Interviews with commanders need to be arranged, and data collection will make use of a tape recorder and/or note taking as a technique. Gathering documentary evidence will continue until the end of the field study. The whole data collecting process is expected to face no major problems, as the present researcher is himself a graduate of KKMA and a member of SANG.

Once all the relevant data are gathered, the survey results will be analysed quantitatively with the help of a computer, using frequency distribution and other relevant statistical techniques. The interview data will be processed qualitatively, as will the documentary evidence. Comparisons of results between cadets, teaching staff, and commanders' reactions will be made throughout the analysis. As a whole, the merit of the methodology used for this research is that it provides evidence from more than one perspective (cadets, teaching staff, commanders), and uses more than one investigatory technique (triangulation).

1.9 Outline of the Study

This research consists of ten chapters, as outlined below:

Chapter 1 introduces the study, its background, the need for conducting it, the research problem, the study's aims and objectives, its scope and limitations, and specifications of the research questions and the methodological approach and techniques to be used in order to achieve the desired goals.

Chapter 2 explores issues surrounding the professional education and training of the modern military officer and surveys relevant military literature. It also gives a general picture of the nature of officer preparation in military academies, as the present investigation is conducted in King Khaled Military Academy in Saudi Arabia. Arguments to justify the choice of a theoretical framework for this research are also offered here.

Chapter 3 continues the survey of military literature. It presents and discusses key features of effective junior officer preparation programmes in relation to each of the five components of officer preparation: Selection, Indoctrination, Vocational Education and Training, Liberal Education, and Physical Fitness. Obstacles to effectiveness are also addressed.

Chapter 4 explains and justifies the choice of research design and instruments for this study. It describes how the survey questionnaire was constructed and pilot tested, as well as how the other instruments are to be used. It also covers the issues of target population and sampling, the data analysis methods used, validity and reliability, and the ethical dimension of conducting this research.

Chapters 5-9 present the statistical results of this study together with their analyses. A separate chapter is devoted to the results of each of the five programme components.

Chapter 10 sums up and discusses the main findings and their implications, and draws conclusions for this study. It answers the research questions, specifies the limitations, states the contributions made, and ends with suggestions for future research.

Chapter Two

Professional Education and Training of Military Officers

2.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at a number of issues surrounding the professional education and training of the modern military officer. The notions of profession and professionalisation in general and in relation to the military are first discussed. Next, the distinctive aspects of military officer professionalism are highlighted. The chapter then gives an account of some contemporary trends affecting military professionalism and discusses their implications for officer preparation. It continues with a clarification of the purposes that training and education are designed to fulfil. The need for officer preparation to be broad-based, balanced, and of a high quality, together with the necessity for it to be continuous throughout the officer's career are explained next. This is followed by a general picture of the nature of officer preparation in military academies, because the present investigation is to be carried out in King Khaled Military Academy in Saudi Arabia. Finally, arguments are offered to justify the choice of a theoretical framework for this research.

2.2 The Concept of Profession

According to Dowens (1983: 1), much of our understanding of the notion of "military profession" and "military professionalism" derives from, or is based upon the stock of knowledge accumulated in the study of the general concepts of "profession" and "professionalism". This is not surprising since the military profession shares many of its features with the core characteristics of other long-established professions. However, like most other specialised occupations, the military profession can be separated from other activities by its own distinctive traits and functions.

Becker (1962:30) sees profession as a "scientific concept" that can be defined through a precise list of features; in other words, it is possible to isolate a particular occupation and subject it to detailed analysis in order to identify its constituents.

2.3 Components of Profession

Millerson (1964:15) proposed a list of six main basic features that contribute to the definition of what he referred to as a "true profession": a) skills, b) training, c) competence, d) recognised form of organisation, e) code of conduct, f) service to the community. Goode (1957:126) also described profession in terms of basic traits. He viewed a profession as "a community within a community", which implies a certain degree of independence of such an organisation from the larger community which it serves. With this focus on the group or "community" in mind, Goode outlined the main characteristics that typified any occupation that claimed to be a profession. He remarked that its members were bound by a strong sense of common identity. Once in it, members acquired a lifelong status and became tied by a commitment to serve it indefinitely. Members of a profession shared common values and its roles were clear and binding. It often possessed a common language, which was only partially understood by others. A profession was answerable to the community that it served. Its goals were reasonably clear. Finally, its members were recruited through selection, followed by a process of training and adult socialisation.

Criteria taken from several definitions of "true professions" can be condensed as follows. A profession possesses a degree of monopoly and control over a specific body of theoretical and practical knowledge. New recruits to the profession must undergo intensive, lengthy, formal education and training, at the end of which their knowledge and skills are formally assessed by qualified practitioners, and appropriately rewarded by the award of a professionally and socially recognised qualification. The activities of the profession must serve a vital need of the wider community and the role of the practitioner is in essence that of a servant to the community. A profession retains a significant level of autonomy in the way it runs its affairs, and over matters of recruitment, training, discipline, and the maintenance of professional standards. Further, it sees itself as, and is often organised into a distinctive group or community with an occupational consciousness, or mission. It has a distinctive culture that transmits its values, norms, and symbols. The profession is taken as a full-time, long-term or permanent career. Finally, a society approves of, endorses, and supports its activities as morally praiseworthy. It also grants it a status of high esteem, respect, confidence, prestige, and often privilege, too. (Dowens1983: 5, Sarkesian 1981: 6)

2.4 Professionalisation

Most professions rely heavily on higher education institutions for the development of a large part of the skills and knowledge required to sustain them. However, there are many exceptions. Some professions, such as the Military prefer to run their own general and specialist courses, although their institutions often emulate many of the characteristics of mainstream higher education systems. Such establishments, first and foremost aim for the preparation of recruits for membership of the profession. The increasingly complex nature of most professions and the tasks expected of them by society today make it essential for their recruits to undertake a lengthy, intensive, formal and practical programme of education and training.

The preparation process consists of three broad aspects: (a) a general and, according to Goode (1957:196) liberal education; (b) a specialised training in the specific theory and skills of the profession; and (c) the instilling of certain attitudes and patterns of behaviour designed to mould the initiates into the mentality and beliefs of the community of the profession they are about to join. Of the three main aspects of professional education and training, there is hardly any controversy over the importance of the third element, that of instilling standard patterns of behaviour and attitudes into students of the profession. However, it is unclear where the preparation of professionals ought to place greater emphasis, that is whether it should be on the first, the general, liberal education, or on the second, specific training.

Huntington (1979:13) emphasises the necessity of both general, liberal and specialist education. He takes this view for at least one very good reason, the fact that professional expertise is “a segment of the total cultural tradition of society”. He points out that a professional person can only apply his skill effectively if, and only if, he is fully aware of the broader culture and traditions of which he is part. Professional expertise must therefore be seen as an integral part of the total body of knowledge of the particular society in which it is practised, not as a separate body of knowledge that is unrelated to it.

The professionalisation of most occupations rests upon six fundamental elements, as Jenkins (1970:53-107) noted: structural, contextual, activity, ideological, educational, and behavioural (Figure 2.1). Below is a brief description of each, highlighting the

importance of fundamental elements in the light of professionalisation.




Figure 2-1 Elements of professionalisation

Structure

The extent to which an occupation demonstrates evidence of centralisation, standardisation, and specialisation largely reflects its degree of professionalisation. As far as the Military are concerned, centralisation and standardisation of their activities have long been associated with the appropriate government department or ministry, which has authority and control over them. Military activities are usually strictly conducted by prerogative, that is by permission, for example, of the head of state. A system of hierarchy and strict disciplinary rules and procedures covering both occupational and non-occupational conduct confirm the status of the Military as an authentic profession.

Context

Variations in space and time are of special significance for professions. Historical considerations demonstrate that professionalisation is a dynamic process. Viable criteria and the nature of the professional group may change over time and across countries. For these reasons, the task of establishing universal criteria for

professionalisation is not an easy one. Indeed, some of them may only have a limited applicability.

Activity

Practitioners belonging to professional groups and organisations often claim that the tasks they perform require specialist skills and knowledge that only they possess. As a result, many people tend to equate "specialisation" with "professionalism" and associate "professional" with a highly skilled, qualified and competent specialist.

Education

It could be said that the true difference between a highly professional group and other less professional groups is in their levels of education and expertise. Indeed, the high levels of knowledge and techniques expected from a professional group demand that substantial attention be paid to the acquisition of the relevant body of knowledge that would qualify them as professionals. High standards are crucial here to live up to expectations and to maintain the reputation and prestige of the group.

Ideology

Belief and pride in the professional status, goals, and ethics of the group by its members is a critical measure of its degree of professionalisation. A sense of common identity, involvement, shared values, the acceptance of an element of risk in some cases, and altruism all contribute towards a culture of high professionalism.

Behaviour

The behavioural element is naturally linked with the ideological element. However, while the ideological element refers to the beliefs of an occupational group, the behavioural element reflects the standards of performance of its members. This also includes their conduct towards their peers and other internal and external contacts. Groups with sophisticated codes of conduct, like the Military, can legitimately claim a higher level of professionalism than those who do not possess one.

2.5 The Military Profession

From the social sciences viewpoint, the military profession is a fascinating subject of study. Yet, remarkably some of the most insightful studies on the military profession and the education and training of officers dates back to the post-Second World War years, four decades ago or so. The ground-breaking works of Masland and Radway (1957), Janowitz (1960), and Huntington (1957) in particular stand out prominently in the literature on military professionalism. More recent valuable contributions are those of Sarkesian (1981), Dyer (1985), and Eitelberg *et al.* (1992).

In view of the global advances in science and technology, and the social changes that have occurred over the past decades, it stands to reason to expect the military profession to make all possible efforts to keep up with those changes in order to maintain its high standards and remain responsive to the needs of the contemporary world and the community it is destined to serve (Arnold 1993: 33). This is an issue of vital concern in the evaluation of current training and education programmes of military officers. But before delving into it in any detail, it is useful to cast an eye on some basic facts related to the military profession.

2.6 Legitimacy of the "Professional" Attribute

Arnold (1993:2), Dyer (1985: 23-147), and Sarkesian (1981:5) stress that "profession" is the correct attribute for the career officer today. The term applies to the Military in much the same way as it applies to other professions such as medicine and the law. The officer corps is mostly a self-regulating body employing members with expert knowledge and skills. Like most other disciplines, it has a monopoly over the exercise of its functions, as well as the exclusive right to select and train its aspiring members. Society at large is its ultimate employer and client (through the mediation of the state). In compensation for its services and loyalty, it is granted special privileges.

2.7 Hallmarks of Military Officer Professionalism

Huntington (1957:11) identified three main features of military officer professionalism: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness.

Expertise refers to the professional military officer's skills in the management of battles, including the care of personnel and logistics. Such skills are acquired through a long process of education and training. Much of this body of knowledge, Huntington points out, is universal, that is it is common to most military forces in the world. Thus, the military officer's functions include organising, equipping, training, planning, and leading in both combat and peace time. Huntington also distinguishes between the military officer's management of 'violence' in combat, and the application of it, which is mostly the preserve of enlisted personnel. Officers, he concludes, are more concerned with the knowledge and perception needed to lead operations than with the down-to-earth skills of firing a rifle (ibid: 12). Military officers therefore need to be acquainted with the theory of war as well as its practice.

Responsibility, the second feature of military professionalism, is what distinguishes the professional officer from other experts. If the management of violence is the primary skill that an officer must master, this cannot be conducted without a sense of responsibility and accountability to its main client, society. Mastery of this skill, the management of violence, carries risks, therefore it requires the acceptance of the responsibility that comes with it. In practice, responsibility for officers' actions is kept in check through codes of conduct, which delineate and limit the powers and actions of officers.

Corporateness, the third and final feature of the military profession identified by Huntington has to do with identity. Professional military officers perceive themselves as a unique group, distinct from laymen and lower-rank troops. They see themselves as skilled, qualified professionals with clear duties and responsibilities. In this sense they are no different in terms of professionalism from doctors, lawyers, or teachers. The bureaucratic machine of the Military is a further feature of its corporate nature. In addition to Huntington's three main features of the military profession, a fourth cardinal feature could be added, that of total commitment to serve the state and the community.

Earlier, it was stated that the primary orientation of any professional is altruism rather than self-interest, and to be a servant to the community. It is contended that this

characteristic is even more true of military professionalism than of any other profession. Indeed, as Moskos (1988: 30) points out, the military profession is “more than just a job”; it is, as Allen (1995: 26) stresses, “a calling” and “a fine and honourable profession to serve in defence of one’s country” as well as a duty. Dedication and commitment to the military profession goes beyond the duty of protecting the lives of civilians. It involves putting one’s life on the line for others, and if necessary sacrificing it for their sake. This feature is unique to the military profession.

2.8 Contemporary Trends in Military Professionalism

The second half of the twentieth century witnessed a tremendous number of innovations in the fields of science and technology, as well as in the social sciences and the humanities. The Military have not remained impervious to these changes. Quite the reverse: military weaponry became even more sophisticated, more complex, and more destructive than ever before, often radically changing the nature of battles and with it the preparation of the troops and the way they are deployed.

Janowitz (1960:16) signalled five main trends that could be observed in the evolution of the military profession. The first concerns a shift in the nature and use of authority by officers; the second relates to the narrowing of the skill differential between military and civilian elites; the third is the change in officer recruitment; the fourth is linked with changes in career patterns; and finally there is the place of politics in officer training, or political indoctrination. He observed that the Military no longer relied on extremely rigid and at times intolerant rules of authority and discipline to prepare their personnel. And, although standards of discipline must remain high, modern military officers are increasingly relying less and less on the principle of domination alone; that is, on issuing orders without giving reasons. Blind obedience, in other words, cannot always be expected, nor is it always appropriate. The Military, of course, continue to be concerned with combat readiness, but such readiness, it is believed, is enhanced by the humane treatment of subordinates and through instilling in them a sense of purpose and *esprit de corps*. Simply barking orders is no longer perceived as an effective method of bringing about unit cohesion and success.

Like their civilian counterparts, military officers are having to keep up with modern technology and science. The armed services nowadays include in their ranks qualified teachers, doctors, engineers, personnel administrators, technicians, and many other specialists in most fields of knowledge. Military officers need and make use of almost all the skills that are needed in the civilian sector of society.

Shifts in recruitment patterns are evident in the broader base and less discriminatory attitude to membership of the officer corps. In many countries, efforts are made to encourage candidates from all sections of society to join the ranks of officers, provided that they fulfil the necessary criteria. This democratic orientation carries its possible risks, but on the whole it is believed to have the potential to improve the profession, particularly in terms of its perception by the public at large.

As to the place of politics in the lives of military officers, Janowitz (1960: 16) contends that although the accepted wisdom is that the Military should not meddle in politics, this is no reason for them to be ignorant of it. Modern military officers are increasingly unlikely to view themselves as mere technicians. Internal as well as external politics impinge upon national security. The Military are expected to cope with the implications of political and military manoeuvres within and outside their state. Very often, as Jesse (1972:135) pointed out, they are called upon to make recommendations to their government in response to a potential threat or opportunity.

2.9 Civilianisation

Closer links and cooperation between the Military and the civilian world have prompted many observers to refer to this phenomenon as a process of civilianisation. The trend is singled out here for discussion in a separate section because of its importance and potential implications. Unlike other social researchers, Janowitz (1960: 424) does not see the so-called civilianisation of the Military as a threat to their corporate effectiveness, or to their combat performance. He showed that the fact that the contemporary Military are more and more a reflection of the society to which they belong does not mean that they are civilianised, or that they are the weaker for it. Quite the reverse in fact.

On the other hand, Huntington (1957:72), less enthusiastic for the civilianisation of the Military, advocates that the Military ought to stick to their traditional principles of military professionalism and remain somewhat aloof from the civilian world. They should steer clear of fashion and intellectual currents, and have no business with politics. In his view, the civilianisation of the Military is not the only way to ensure civilian, or what he calls ‘objective’ control of the Military. Military professionalism and commitment to serve the wider community will ensure this. In Huntington’s (ibid: 72) view, the duty of the Military is to offer the best advice and comply with the lawful civilian leadership’s decisions. Their primary responsibility ought to be confined to the defence of the state, rather than attempting to mirror it or become involved in politics. The political involvement of the Military, he concludes, can be lethal.

2.10 Implications of Modern Trends for Officer Preparation

Many of the fears related to the civilianisation of the Military are either exaggerated or unfounded. Change is painful, but it is occurring in all spheres of life. Many service academies of the developed world are liberalising their military training programmes to include more study in the social sciences and humanities. Masland and Radway called for these changes in 1957. Already, the heavy emphasis on military-specific training seems to be a thing of the past in the West.

As noted earlier, to meet the challenges of the modern world, military officers are nowadays developing many of the skills and capabilities traditionally associated with civilian professions and occupations. This entails a redressing of the balance between the teaching of military-specific knowledge and skills and the social sciences in the preparation of military officers. In other words, a more rounded education and training of officers is aimed for.

Over forty years ago, Janowitz (1960:137) already noted the eagerness of military service academies to increase the proportion of graduate recruits within the ranks of the Military, in the belief that a better-educated military force is a more effective one. He also observed that the Military were placing an increasingly strong emphasis on

academic education as a criterion for promotion to elite positions. Masland and Radway (1957: 502) also noted that US armed forces were using advanced education to prepare officers for senior roles.

More recently, in a large-scale study on the recruitment and career prospects of military officers in the United States, Eitelberg *et al.* (1992: 80) discovered, among many other things, that there was a correlation between officer candidate aptitudes, both at the recruitment stage and at the end of their preparation, in education and training programmes and retention, morale promotion, and future performance.

Clearly the Military have moved on from the outdated images of officers whose only concern is to manage discipline and battle, to one of an ideally well-rounded professional, an intellectual, and a gentleman. Strength of character and bravery are still desirable qualities, but they are no longer sufficient. To perform competently in their chosen occupations in our fast-changing, technologically sophisticated world, modern officers must go through a lengthy preparation programme consisting of formal education and practical training, as well as a socialisation process. They must become competent and informed, as well as educated professionals if they are to cope with the duties and responsibilities they will be expected to assume, not to mention enhancing their career prospects.

2.11 Purposes of Education and Training

The philosophy of the military training and education of officers-to-be in any country is generally rooted in the functions for which new entrants to the profession are prepared and the roles they will be called upon to perform in their future military careers (Jordan 1971: 211). It will be remembered that the primary domain of expertise of military officers is the "management of violence". However, as previously indicated, the contemporary definition of military expertise stretches beyond the battlefield roles that are traditionally associated with it. Indeed, according to Jordan (1971:212), the modern military officer is nowadays expected to fulfil a wide range of roles during his career, including: (a) applying scientific and technological knowledge to military problems; (b) training and complying with orders for the deployment and

use of military force for purposes of national security; and (c) helping to define the nature of the security tasks of the nation in the light of its political and strategic goals.

On the other hand, Masland and Radway (1957: 30-46) suggested that all military officers should be trained for three categories of qualification: (i) professional military qualification, which covers combat and leadership skills, and knowledge of the problems of enlisted personnel; (ii) general executive qualification, which includes the efficient management of people, information, and logistics, both in peacetime and in combat; and (iii) military executive qualification, which consists in obeying civilian superiors, contributing to the formulation of national security strategies, and bringing the most expert military judgement to bear on civilian policy decisions. The proceedings of the CPME for the Twenty-first Century Warrior (1998:1-2) suggest that contemporary officer development must instil the following vital attributes:

- First and foremost , fundamental competence as a soldier;
- Personal qualities that range from dedication to duty to adaptability to changing situations;
- Leadership ability;
- Education in subjects as disparate as military history and the place of the Military in society; and,
- In an era of revolutionary change, an increasingly sophisticated mastery of technology that qualifies officers, among other things, to make decisions about the best technologies to fill operational needs and to use technology in conducting operations.

All these roles inevitably have direct implications for military training and education, as will be further clarified in the forthcoming sections of this chapter.

An effective system of officer preparation must therefore be responsive to present-day national security concerns, as well as to various other functional and societal needs. Its mission cannot be restricted to preparation for war. To better serve their profession and its members, the Military must prepare its aspiring officers in essential military-specific competences, encompassing skills of leadership and battle, in the management of human and material resources, and in the mastery of science and technology to solve military problems. Like all other professions, they must rise to the challenges of the

twenty-first century in terms of knowledge, expertise, and readiness to fulfil multiple tasks, in times of both peace and war.

2.12 Rationale for a Balanced High Quality Officer Preparation Programme

Throughout history, the Military has endeavoured to reflect the needs of the society it serves and evolve just as society itself is evolving. Huntington (1957: 2) pointed out that the military institutions of any society are shaped essentially by two forces: a functional imperative and a societal imperative. The former stems from the threats to the security of the state and nation, and the latter arises from social forces, ideologies and institutions dominant in society. Huntington warned that military institutions that are shaped purely by functional imperatives may be impossible to contain under civilian control, while those that focus more on adjusting to and reflecting social values may become incapable of performing their military function effectively.

Finding the right balance between the functional and the societal imperatives is therefore vital both for the security of the state and for the effectiveness of the Military. Such a balance, according to Janowitz (1969: 10), is best achieved through the development of a professionally competent Military which is aware of both imperatives. Thus, the education of the military officer in modern times must not only equip him with the necessary military skills that he needs to perform his military duties, but also provide him with the essential knowledge that enables him to interact and have meaningful relations with the larger society that he is committed to serve.

Intellectual education, according to Clausewitz (1993: 117), is also vital for understanding behaviour on the battlefield itself. He explains that while generally "tactical rules" are useful skills as instruments of war, stereotyped reactions may not be appropriate in some situations. In fact, they may even prove counterproductive if they inhibit creative initiatives and the necessary flexibility to adapt to situations. Military leaders need to be educated in independent thinking in order to be able to respond positively and effectively to unexpected situations.

Strachan (1983:83) too, stresses that military leaders must not only possess or develop strength of will, but also cultivate the intellect and flair that will potentially enable them to improvise tactics, rather than attempt to impose prescribed solutions on every situation. Again, such knowledge, skills and flair can only be acquired through the development of their critical faculties.

Balancing military training and education with liberal education in the preparation of officers first emerged as a vital necessity during the military educational reforms of the nineteenth century (ibid: 70) when the enlightened Prussian aristocracy saw that the best way to ensure the democratic control of the Military was through the device of professionalisation. This was a revolutionary idea that was to gradually banish "noble birth" as the essential criterion for admission to military schools, as was the case in almost all European states.

The professionalisation of the Military meant that recruitment into the officer corps was to be based on similar principles to those of other professions, that is on abilities rather than social background. This required the provision of both general, liberal education and vocational education. This new military officer preparation philosophy quickly gave rise to the establishment of scores of cadet schools throughout Europe and the United States, all seeking to modernise their armed forces by means of the infusion of a professional element in the education and training of their officer recruits.

According to Hennessey (1987:75), more and more emerging armed forces began to abandon their concentration on classical education and training, their emphasis on the importance of character over knowledge, and their neglect of the sciences. Along with this change began the collapse of the principle of "blind obedience", previously deemed essential in commander-subordinate relationships. In its place, a less directive form of command and control was promoted, particularly by the Germans, who invented the concept of *Auftragstaktik*. The term refers to a higher quality of obedience based on intellectual and technical attributes that enable a subordinate commander to comprehend the key element of his superior's intentions, which he then converts into prompt action appropriate to the situation faced, and consistent with the overall military plan, which he fully understands.

Moreover, when Huntington (1957: 48) stated that military officers needed to develop their analytical skills and judgement through a broad-based education, in addition to their vocational training, what he was really saying was that such individuals would not be able to appreciate their professional role fully without exposure to both forms of training and education. A broad-based education, in the view of Sarkesian (1981:ix), ensures that the military professionals that our institutions produce are more than mindless battlefield technicians who treat moral and ethical criteria as matters of tactical expediency. Huntington went as far as to suggest that the neglect of social sciences in the preparation of officers could run the risk of producing "mercenaries", rather than responsible professionals who are aware of their obligations to society. On this issue, Janowitz (1960: 426) was in full agreement with Huntington and was generally in favour of the openness of the Military to the civilian world. This, he suggested, was achievable through education. In fact, Janowitz proposed that in preparing military officers, at least one year of the military academy course should be completed in a civilian university, and most, if not all postgraduate degrees should be obtained in civilian universities. Clearly, there seems to be considerable enthusiasm for the benefits of a broadly based education for the Military, including both vocational and liberal elements. One further reason for this, according to Janowitz (ibid: 435), is society's implicit fear of losing civilian control over the Military.

For most contemporary governments, however, especially those that have benefited from, and continue to enjoy a long history of stability, civilian control of the Military is unquestioned and professionally accepted. A more pragmatic reason for the promotion of a broad-based military education is the need for the Military to inspire confidence in their judgements by being thoroughly competent and professional in their role as advisors on strategic matters to the civilian leaders of their country.

2.13 Levels of Officer Training and Education

As Janowitz (1960:139) pointed out, since, generally speaking, the military hierarchy can be divided into three levels: tactical officers, middle-level or operational

commanders, and senior or strategic-level generals, the sequence of professional education necessarily fits this division. The training and education of officers is therefore a continuous process that spreads over their entire career life. Not only this, but such training and education are mandatory and essential for professional advancement and promotion (Arnold 1993:3). To take the Saudi example, at the tactical level, a career officer will first attend a service academy at which he takes specialist, basic, and advanced courses. Next, at the operational level, he will attend the General Command and Staff College. Finally, at the senior strategic level, selected second level officers will attend the War College. Apart from this, many officers in Saudi Arabia are offered generous opportunities to attend graduate and postgraduate courses at military and civilian institutions both at home and abroad throughout their careers. Figure 2.2 summarises the three levels of officer training and education.

Since this investigation proposes to focus on the preparation of National Guard officers at KKMA, the research scope will consequently be limited to the study of the first part of the first level of officer training and education, namely cadet commissioning.

				Professional (3) Strategic Level	
				Professional (2) Operational Level	
Professional (1) Tactical Level				War College and Strategic Study	
Military Academy	Specialisation	Basic Courses	Advanced Courses		
Cadet	Lieutenant to Captain			Major to Lieutenant Colonel	
				Colonel to General	

Figure 2-2 Levels of officer training and education

2.14 Elements of Officer Training and Education Programmes

Many military establishments around the world, including those of Saudi Arabia, have a comprehensive system of military officer preparation, where both training and education are provided to develop competent military cadres. As stated earlier, officer corps in most parts of the world over the past century, particularly after the Second World War, have evolved by updating and expanding their training and education systems, not only to reduce the gap between them and other professions in the civilian world, but also to keep up with the rapid advances and deepening complexities of strategic changes, science and technology. A consistent pattern in the preparation of officers in many countries is that professional courses tend to be a mixture of training and education at all levels, but with a stronger emphasis on training at the initial and lower levels of instruction, and gradually greater attention to professional education at higher levels (Jordan 1971: 218).

Training involves both the professional socialisation, or “indoctrination” of members of the Military, and the development of their physical capacities. It prepares them for coping with military life as well as for their soldiering role on the battlefield. Education, on the other hand, is mostly conducted in the classroom and primarily consists of technical, scientific subjects, usually closely related to military-specific needs. It will be referred to here as “professional” or “vocational” preparation, because it relates directly to the domain of expertise of the military profession, that of the management of battle. However, the requirement for the balanced education of military officers necessitates the inclusion of liberal education in their preparation programmes. Altogether, therefore, four fundamental components of military officer preparation can be distinguished: military socialisation/indoctrination; physical training and development; professional/vocational education; and general liberal education.

2.15 Officer Preparation in Military Academies - General Picture

Until the mid-eighteenth century, military training was restricted to repetitive skills and to acquiring knowledge of weaponry and tactics primarily from practical experience on the battlefield. Advances in technology and warfare, however, led to the establishment of service academies in the Western World specifically for training professional officers. The Prussians were pioneers in this field, founding the

Kriegsakademie (War Academy) in 1810.

Current trends in officer preparation reflect the rapid changes brought about by advances in the various fields of science and technology and are geared to meet national security requirements. Officer preparation programmes continue to stress the scientific character of their curricula, but recent curriculum changes have introduced greater emphasis on humanities and social science subjects.

Service academies are to some extent unique institutions, due to their strong academic orientation and overall high standards, combined with rigorous physical and character-building programmes. In many ways, the service academies set the standards of performance and behaviour for the whole military profession. Many of them in fact claim to rival the best civilian universities in the world. This is because they are generally extremely competitive and selective in terms of recruitment and promotion. Among the world-famous academies are West Point in the United States, Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, and St. Cyr in France, all founded in 1802.

Generally, cadet systems are tailored to the needs of each country. Because of this, the cadet syllabus may vary in terms of duration from a period of 12 months to 4-5 years, and may consist of two or more track systems within the same academy. Variations also exist in their staffing patterns, syllabus content, where and when the courses are held, and in their choices of, distribution, and emphasis of subject areas. Some academies, such as West Point in the USA and the Royal Military Academy of Belgium are more like military universities, conferring a Bachelor of Science degree on commission and offering their graduates further chances to extend their educational experience at postgraduate level at civilian colleges and universities.

2.16 Theoretical Framework for this Study

The discussion of military professionalism and officer training and education has emphasised the importance of a well-rounded and balanced preparation of military officers. This philosophy derives from the nature of military tasks in the modern world

and from societal expectations of the Military. High standards of expertise are essential for effective performance of military missions, hence the need to train and educate members of the profession in the theory and practice of the management and implementation of battle in all its technical and scientific aspects. This aspect of military officer preparation covers what has been referred to earlier as the professional/vocational element of military preparation, which is the first component of the proposed theoretical framework for this study.

The second crucial facet of military officer preparation relates to his transformation from a civilian into a soldier, a process known as "military socialisation" or "indoctrination". Its objectives are the internalisation of the ethos of the military profession, the assimilation of values associated with military service, and the overall conditioning of its members to fit into the mould of the Military (Ellis and Moore 1974: 79). In preparing an officer, socialisation begins from the first day of entry into the military institution and continues throughout his preparation.

Officer education is of course incomplete without general liberal education, as stressed by Strachan (1983: 83); Huntington (1957: 48); Janowitz (1960: 204) and Masland and Radway (1957: 30-46), who advocate a broad-based education for officers for the purpose of enhancing their mental and intellectual capacities and versatility to enable them to fulfil the diverse missions and tasks of their careers. Therefore, liberal education forms a third fundamental element of military officer preparation, and the third component of our present research.

It goes almost without saying that the physical training and development of new entrants to the profession are crucial for their ability as soldiers to survive and win on the battlefield (Field Manual 1992: iii). For this reason, fitness programmes are part and parcel of military culture. Military literature recognises that a high level of physical fitness has many benefits apart from improving the combat readiness and survivability of soldiers (Janowitz 1960: 130). Many believe that physical training invigorates individuals, enhances their productivity and mental alertness, promotes team cohesion (RMAB 2001), increases their stamina and power, and contributes positively to the development of character and sense of duty. Consequently, officer

preparation programmes in any military institution in the world always include a significant element of physical fitness nurturing. Hence, this is the fourth component of this study.

Finally, earlier it was indicated that one of the major criteria of professionalism for any organisation is the restricted entry into the profession (Denaro 1995: 37). It is also the view of many military experts that the preparation of military officers can be made more effective if it is subject to competition and rigorous selection both at the point of entry and throughout the programme of instruction. Selection is therefore the fifth and last component that completes the proposed theoretical framework for this study.

The five components briefly outlined above represent the foundation upon which most service academy officer preparation programmes are based. Significantly, most -if not all- curricular activities designed for training and educating cadets neatly fit into one of the five areas identified. This is why it is suggested that this investigation should be guided by and limited to the exploration of the theory and practice associated with these five dimensions of officer preparation. Altogether, they provide a comprehensive picture and a basis for the evaluation of the state of officer training and education at KKMA. The complete theoretical framework is shown in Figure 4.2 below. Notice that the proposed framework is deliberately shaped in the form of a five-pointed star model, which in a way symbolises the insignia for Second Lieutenant that is awarded in most service academies of the world to cadets who successfully complete their officer preparation programme on graduation day.




Figure 2-3 Theoretical framework for the evaluation of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme.

2.17 Conclusion

The present chapter has clarified what is meant by the professional education and training of military officers in contemporary times. It highlighted some distinctive features of professionalism, their bearing on the military profession and on the way officers are to be educated and trained to fulfil the roles expected of them effectively. On the basis of such knowledge, a theoretical framework has been derived to serve as a guide in the collection and analysis of empirical data for the evaluation of KKMA's junior officer programme.

Chapter Three

Features of Effective Junior Officer Preparation

3.1 Introduction

Effective junior officer education and training is concerned with questions such as: Who should and who should not be an officer? How should potential candidates be selected? How should they be indoctrinated into military culture and values? What should be the content of the vocational programme? How much theory and how much practice? How much general education is necessary and from what disciplines? What is the place of physical fitness in officer preparation? (Converse 1998: 7). These are only some of the questions answered in this chapter, based on military literature and the experiences of a number of successful military academies such as Sandhurst, UK and West Point, USA.

The chapter defines and explores each of the five officer preparation programme components (see Figure 2.3), their nature, elements, purposes and benefits, and conditions for success, and the potential barriers that can reduce or prevent their effectiveness. Where relevant, an account is also given of modern trends affecting certain aspects of the programme components, together with common reactions to them.

3.2 Junior Officer Recruitment and Selection

The use of sound recruitment and selection methods is an important prerequisite for effective junior officer preparation. Recruits represent the raw material from which future officers are developed. Inevitably, their quality will to some extent be reflected in the finished product (Cooper & Robson 1995:6). This section delves into why recruitment and selection must be approached systematically, and how this could be.

3.2.1 Importance of Systematic Officer Recruitment and Selection

Any organisation aiming for excellence must give the greatest possible attention to its recruitment and selection methods in order to attract and recruit high-quality candidates (RMC Report 1997: 32). Carrying out this twin process - recruitment and selection - systematically is very important, especially because each year military institutions must decide on the suitability of several hundred candidates, from which a small number is chosen. It is also important because those who are recruited are trained to become tomorrow's leaders.

Saier (1995:4) states that systematic methods of recruitment and selection are important for at least three reasons. First, they save considerable efforts, time, and money, which are spent on individuals who, in the end, prove to be incapable of fitting into military life and carrying out their duties properly. Secondly, and maybe more importantly, systematic recruitment and selection prevent great harm to the military, particularly to its reputation. Unsystematic selection may allow incompetent and undesirable candidates to join the military and subsequently tarnish its image. Thirdly, systematic recruitment and selection ensure that every new member is capable of making a contribution to the achievement of the mission, ideals and goals, and generally to the effectiveness of the military.

Moreover, all military institutions need assurance that those who begin training with them will finish training and be useful to them; after all they spend a lot of money on them. This is why the Military spare no efforts in looking for high-quality recruits, testing them rigorously to ascertain their physical and mental abilities, and choosing the best among them. It is a well-known fact that military academies, for example, have very low selection rates, precisely because they are very keen to select the best and not allow unsuitable recruits to join their ranks.

Not allowing unsuitable recruits to slip through the selection net is very important, according to Saier (ibid: 15), who explains how dangerous this can be by quoting the story of a West Point cadet who was described by people who knew him as "indifferent, easy-going, and happy-go-lucky". This cadet was later reported to have lost half of his regiment and surrendered himself and his men without seriously

engaging the enemy. Another example of bad selection mentioned by Noonan (2001:5) is the shocking involvement of three junior US officers serving in former Yugoslavia in the interrogation at gunpoint of an ethnic Albanian, and the rape of an eleven-year-old Kosovar girl. The cases caused great concern in America about the suitability of the officer selection procedure that allowed such men to be recruited into the Military.

Clearly, sound recruitment and selection methods must provide accurate assessment of recruits' values and abilities, as well as correct predictions about their future performance; otherwise mistakes of this kind will be repeated again and again (Cary *et al.* 1998: 589-90). A well-thought-out recruitment strategy and a systematic selection process are vital to attract and select candidates with the best potentials to make excellent future military officers. Definitions of recruitment and selection, and how their objectives can best be achieved are discussed in turn next.

3.2.2 Recruitment Methods

Recruitment refers to reaching out and attracting a pool of potential candidates from which to select the ones needed to satisfy the academy's needs (Millett 1992:87; Mosley *et al.* 1996: 301). Recruitment approaches can be classified into two main categories, passive and proactive. The passive recruitment approach relies on interested applicants who make personal inquiries directly to the academy, or indirectly through service families. The pro-active approach consists in seeking out or attracting potential candidates through various methods. Altogether, there are at least five main methods of recruiting candidates for officer training and education. The first is the referral method, that is the passive method, which relies on recommendations made by current members to friends and relatives who have the appropriate qualities and qualifications. However, although the referral method is an excellent way of recruiting cadets, because current academy members know the requirements of military life and the personal abilities needed to encourage those who would potentially make good officers, the method is not reliable enough to provide sufficient numbers of applicants to choose from each year.

The second recruitment method is through advertising in newspapers and magazines. This is a very effective, flexible, and relatively inexpensive method of recruitment.

However, other media can also be used, such as radio and television. These can be very effective and may include interviews with current academy cadets and feature the advantages and benefits of an officer career.

A third recruitment method is through schools, colleges, and universities. Most successful military academies in the world do some type of campus recruiting. These activities are usually coordinated by local career officers.

A fourth recruitment method is through Open Days, organised to bring people into the academies to see for themselves what they have to offer. Here, visitors are taken for a guided tour of the academies and given information on all aspects related to entry requirements, admission procedure, course contents, learning and sports facilities etc. The tours act as an exceptionally good recruitment tool, because they offer greater awareness and first-hand experience of military academy life to interested candidates.

A fifth, increasingly popular method of recruitment is through computerised databases using the Internet. For many Western academies, this is fast becoming the primary method of recruiting.

In their efforts to reach out to the best qualified candidates, successful military academies have a recruitment strategy that aims for the largest possible pool of applicants that not only enables them to choose the most suitable candidates, but also to show a high degree of selectivity in the eyes of the public and funding authorities. Effective recruitment campaigns prepare the way for effective selection, provided it too is conducted systematically.

3.2.3 Selection Procedure

Selection is about collecting and using information to make a decision on whether an applicant is suitable for cadetship. In theory, therefore, selection is simple: a number of criteria are used to separate applicants who fulfil them from those who do not by looking at their records of academic performance, character, and abilities. Unfortunately, selection is not that simple. Military academies that aim for excellence use a much more complicated process of selection to ensure that those that are

admitted into them possess high performance potentials, and at the same time keep out those who are undesirable.

To qualify for selection in most military academies, candidates must meet a number of eligibility criteria, including age limit, citizenship, marital and legal status, legal etc. They are also generally required to fill in a questionnaire or an application form before they are even considered for selection. From then on, if they qualify, they go through a battery of tests that have the effect of eliminating all but the most suitable candidates, who are eventually accepted.

For the staff involved in the selection process, selection means collecting data using a number of assessment methods that produce information relevant to the applicant's abilities to fit into the role for which they will be trained and educated in a military environment. Then, they need to combine that information in a way that reflects the applicant's overall suitability before a judgement is made on whether they are to be admitted into the academy or not.

According to Downes (1983:228), prior to World War II, the system of officer selection in many countries was unsystematic, relied on traditional recruitment sources (family members and relatives of serving officers), and was conducted by officers who tended to favour candidates with similar backgrounds to their own. The process was entirely subjective and rested on the results of a personal interview with senior officers, who made decisions on the suitability of prospective candidates. However, after the war, the need for a more reliable method of selection was strongly felt, especially when other professional organisations began to use effective recruitment techniques developed by human resource specialists. Today, military academies make use of a variety of techniques adapted for their purposes, in order to make their selections more effective.

A review of the relevant literature shows that most military establishments use at least 3 to 4 or more methods of selection, which they apply to all their applicants before they make a judgement on whether they are to be admitted or not. Altogether, it is possible to identify seven main selection methods which are widely used, not only in

the selection of military personnel, but also in other contexts. These methods fit neatly into a seven-step procedure adapted from Mosley *et al.* (1996) which suggests that all organisations ought to include most, and ideally all, the proposed steps to make good selections of personnel. Figure 3.1 below summarises these steps. It is then followed by a brief discussion of each selection step.

Selection steps	Some characteristics to look for
1. Application Form	Obvious misfits/clean record, interest
2. Medical Test	healthy, free from infectious diseases
3. Physical Fitness Test	Strength, endurance, stamina
4. Cognitive Assessment	Verbal and abstract reasoning, intelligence, memory
5. Socio-psychological Tests	Natural leadership, maturity, mental stability
6. In-depth Interview	Motivation, integrity
7. Selection Decision	Overall suitability

Figure 3-1 A suggested seven –step procedure for selecting cadets.

(Adapted from Mosley *et al.* 1996:304)

Application Form

Most military establishments begin the selection procedure by compiling a short list of potential candidates based on the examination of application forms, which in some cases are preceded by an initial interview. Both result in the elimination of obviously unsuitable applicants. Not meeting basic eligibility requirements, such as of nationality, age, and genuine interest in a military career leads to prompt rejection

(Woycheshim 1999: 1). The application form itself is a particularly useful tool, which usually starts a candidate file as soon as it is received (USMA Admissions 2001). Thompson (1999: 2) states that it should at least include: personal details, such as date and place of birth (verified), academic history (qualifications, involvement in sports, and extracurricular activities), employment- if applicable, civil/ police prosecutions, hobbies, and interests.

Medical Test

Candidates who are considered eligible are invited for a medical check-up to ensure that they meet medical standards. They are checked for vision, hearing, physical and mental disabilities, epidemic diseases etc. Lesceve (1999: 5) states that the main aim of this phase is basically economy and work saving. If there are any candidates who suffer from obvious disorders or abnormalities that can be detected at this stage, determining them early can save time and work. According to Williams *et al.* (1999:1), in some military establishments approximately 25% of candidates do not pass the medical test and are therefore rejected early in the process of selection.

Physical fitness Test

Most officer training institutions include a physical fitness test. This typically involves pull-ups to test strength, sit-ups to test endurance, a run to measure aerobic endurance, and an obstacle course to test agility. In some cases, these tests do not lead to direct pass or fail decisions, but candidates get a performance grade that is taken into account in the overall assessment (Bekmezci 1999: 5).

Cognitive Assessment

Here, the assessors want to obtain an evaluation of the intellectual potential of candidates. Tests used measure verbal and abstract reasoning, memory, organisational abilities, intelligence, etc. Computer-based tests now exist (Hardinge 1999:174; Devriendt 1999: 3; Bekmezci 1995: 5).

Socio-Psychological Tests

The vast majority of officer training and education institutions nowadays also make use of a battery of socio-psychological tests. The psychological tests attempt to

determine that the candidate is of adequate maturity for his/her age, is emotionally stable, independent, sociable, and generally capable of functioning in stressful situations. The social aspect relates to the individual's ability to interact and cooperate with others in a group. In many cases, candidates take a personality inventory test, which adds more sophistication to the selection process. Saier (1995: 16-30) argues that personality evaluations make admission procedures more systematic. He supports his view with research evidence that shows that the successful completion of cadet courses can be directly linked to the psychological makeup of candidates before training begins. He discusses the usefulness of at least four popular personality tests including the well-known Myers-Briggs-Type Indicator, The California Psychological Inventory, The Minnesota Multiphatic Personality Inventory, and the Sixteen Personality Factor Tests. The RMA of Belgium includes a Motivational Inventory to measure acceptance of the military way of living and vocational values (Devriendt 1999: 3). However, Cook and Klumper (1999: 8) warn of possible bias in these tests. This is why they suggest that their results should be used to indicate areas that should be further probed during the in-depth interview.

Both social and psychological information about the candidate can be obtained using the paper-and-pencil method, but also through situational role-play techniques, which are becoming more and more popular. They consist in mimicking realistic military tasks in which candidates take part while they are being observed by a number of assessors who will rate them for their performance and the appropriateness of their response in the situations. Other well-known situational techniques are the "structured discussion group" and the "leaderless group discussion". The point of these tests is to observe and rate participants on several aspects of their behaviour and contribution to the discussion. Another technique is the "videotape scenario", in which pauses are made and candidates are asked to indicate what action they would take if they were in the situation presented in the tape. Finally, the latest emerging technique for the 21st Century is the "computer-generated virtual reality" method. This is an even more sophisticated and cheaper alternative to the other time-consuming and resource-intensive situational tests (Coulton *et al.* 1995:4-22; Cook and Klumper 1999: 8; Devriendt 1999: 6; Akkerman 1993: 78). This group of tests is usually given great weight in the total assessment of candidates and is, according to Trusczyński &

Terelake (1999: 4), responsible for almost a fifth of all rejections in some military institutions.

The In-Depth Interview

The interview is the oldest and the most relied upon tool in military personnel selection (Bekmezci 1999: 6). It is also still the most successful selection tool. During the in-depth interview, all the information about the applicant is brought together at one point. It is also an opportunity to obtain clarifications and further checks on the candidate's attitudes, feelings, and intentions. Preparation for this phase of the selection, which comes before the final decision on the suitability of the candidate, is taken very seriously by assessors, and is based on all the information collected so far on him, including his application form, medical record, references, educational records, and performance in previous tests (Thompson 1999: 1-2). Some typical questions asked would be: "Why do you think you qualify to join the Academy? Which field of study are you interested in? Why? How would you like to contribute to the Military?" Other questions relate to the applicant's vision and capacity or potential for leadership (Carlsted & Widen 1999: 5).

The in-depth interview helps complete the picture of the candidates by revealing strengths or weaknesses, which will either increase or reduce the prospects of their trainability. It also allows the candidates a chance to ask questions, and acts as a final filter before a final judgement is made on whether to accept or reject them (Thompson 1999:1-2)

Some military establishments use the interview method for several data collection purposes, while others use it as a main selection instrument. Others still use it to make a psychological assessment of each candidate. To improve objectivity and accuracy, at least two assessors are used: one qualified psychologist and one experienced selection officer. The psychological interview is used to identify and evaluate a wide variety of personality traits that are presumed to relate to the requirements of the officer profession (Birke 1995: 5). Among the numerous and varied lists of qualities claimed to be assessed during the interview are: "sociological functioning, discipline, psychological stability, will to achieve, sportsmanship, suitability for international

missions, leadership capabilities, motivation for wishing to join the specific force, function hoping to train for, knowledge of the desired function” (Visser 1999: 2). Others have longer lists with many similar items. For example, Truzczynski (1999: 2) lists 17 traits, some positive, some negative, including “courage, leadership potential, maturity, ability to cope with stress and the unexpected” and “aggressiveness, egoism, intolerance, susceptibility to stress” and others.

The Selection Decision

Making the final selection decision involves both objective and subjective judgements on the part of the evaluators as to whether each applicant possesses or lacks the required knowledges, skills, abilities, and other characteristics known as KSAO’s. All the information about the applicant collected throughout the selection is taken into account. Evaluators use their experience in evaluating previous candidates (and their subsequent performance) to make the decision. The quality of their judgement depends upon their skill in integrating all the relevant information before acting on it. Experts insist that accuracy and fairness in selection require that all assessors who have participated in the procedure have a say in deciding on the suitability of candidates. Discussions between assessors should resolve any differences of opinion; if not, a vote can be taken (Birke 1999: 4; Thompson 1999: 4; Cook & Klumper 1999: 9)

An important consideration when information is combined to make selection decisions is whether to use a compensatory or a non-compensatory method. This is besides the fact that some KSAO’s are given greater weight than others. In a compensatory method, low levels on some KSAO’s can be compensated for by high levels on others, provided that there is motivation for improvement. In a non-compensatory method, the reverse applies (Cary *et al.* 1998: 589-90).

Validity and Reliability of Recruitment and Selection Instruments

Experts in military human resources advise that all recruitment and selection techniques must stand the test of validity and reliability if they are to be useful. They must be valid in the sense that they can be demonstrated to measure what they are intended to measure, and they must be reliable, that is accurate and dependable. What this means in practice is that recruiter and selectors must be well aware of the precise

qualities they are looking for, and that they are using appropriate instruments to reach and recruit those who possess them.

Moreover, all military establishments use a battery of tests, most deliberately chosen, and all aiming to identify hopefully the best trainable candidates with the best prospects for success, while at the same time avoiding costly mistakes. However, there is also agreement that there is no best way to predict future performance, nor is it possible to make 100% accurate predictions in this respect. To increase the likelihood of getting it right, measurements of KSAO's must be based on the equivalent of a "job analysis" of the future officer's duties, that is on the functions they will be performing, as well as the environment in which they will be operating. For these reasons, selection procedures must be reviewed periodically to examine whether they are successfully selecting high quality candidates now, and whether they are capable of selecting the best candidates for future needs. The danger is that some recruitment and selection procedures are rarely challenged and evaluated to verify their foundations (Rumsey 1999: 1-9; Truszczynski 1999: 4; Bailey 1999: 3-6; Cook & Klumper 1999: 2).

3.3 Indoctrination

As in other professions, military officer training and education includes an element of socialisation. In military literature, this is often referred to as 'indoctrination', but military indoctrination is not the same as 'brain-washing' even if it is usually intense and painful (Yardly 1987:108). Essentially indoctrination is a process of induction and assimilation (Kelly & Gibson 1996:8). It aims to transform the civilian recruits into military cadets who look, think, walk, talk, and act like soldiers. Researchers also use the terms 'military culture' and 'enculturation' in discussing indoctrination. The term military culture is useful because when new recruits enter a military academy, they know they must leave behind their civilian identity and ways of behaving because these are very different from how they will be expected to think and behave in a military environment. They actually enter a new culture, which is unique to the military profession (Zinni 2001:4). Culture is the way an organisation thinks and how it does things (Sutherland & Canwell 1997:217). It also includes norms of individual and collective behaviour (Snider *et al.* 1999:7). Military culture is something that all

military personnel and cadets share, but newcomers learn it gradually over the period of their training and education, although as a rule, like all soldiers, they receive a heavy dose of it upon entry to the academy. Before discussing the nature, functions, and problems associated with indoctrination, it is useful to begin with a brief introduction to military culture and to the agents of military culture, both of which are essential for understanding the process of military indoctrination.

3.3.1 Military Culture

Military establishments are strong organisations with strong cultures that dominate almost every aspect of the lives of their members (Handy 1985:142). Military culture is role and power-orientated. It is based on rigid hierarchy and control. It is also characterised by relative stability, predictability and strong values, such as loyalty, sacrifice and the like. The literature on organisational culture suggests that each organisation has its own particular ‘miniature society’ or community, which is unique to itself. It has its own beliefs, values, myths, heroes, and generally behaves very much like a larger form of society, or sub-culture (Sutherland and Canwell 1997:219). This is certainly true of military academies, although they very much share the features of the general military culture (Soesters and Recht 1998:183). The literature on military academies reveals that most western military academies like to portray themselves as having a strong military cultures and identities, and as having a reputation for upholding military values and a commitment to excellence. West Point (USA) and Sandhurst (UK) are examples of military academies with an international reputation for excellence in military culture.

The strong identity of the best military academies in the world is reinforced by what are known as cultural artefacts, which refer to a strict dress code (uniforms), the general appearance of the buildings, logos, Code of Honour, ceremonies, etc. Figure 3.2 below identifies some military artefacts:




Figure 3-2 Examples of military organisation artefacts

(based on Sutherland & Canwell 1997:220)

Military organisation artefacts, in turn, serve to reinforce the values of the military academy. Rites of passage, for example, mark changes of status and roles, e.g. from a civilian into a cadet upon entry into the academy and from a cadet into an officer on leaving the academy. One of the effects of socialisation is to introduce the newcomers to the culture of the academy and military culture in general. Military organisation artefacts act as agents of socialisation, but there are others, too.

3.3.2 Agents of Indoctrination

USMA Prospectus.2001 states that everyone cadets come in contact with during their training and education could potentially be an agent of socialisation. Other items in the environment also play a role in the socialisation of cadets. Figure 3.3 below shows some primary agents of cadet socialisation:




Figure 3-3 Some primary agents of military Indoctrination

(based on Sutherland & Canwell 1997:223)

Other influences on military culture in general are the general public, the press and the government, who may exercise pressure on military institutions to make them accountable for their standards and actions (Yardley 1987:249). Finally, the desire of the institution to be known as a professional organisation is a further influence on its culture and enculturation process.

3.3.3 Nature of the Indoctrination Process

For most recruits, military indoctrination begins from day one at the academy. While all aspects of the military environment, artefacts etc, contribute to their indoctrination throughout their training and education there is little doubt that the single most important and formative experience of their new life as aspiring officers is that of basic military training (BMT). This almost universally consists of six to eight weeks' intensive training and indoctrination intended to transform them from civilians into soldiers. The process is swift, abrupt and painful, and is designed to mark a complete break with civilian life and identity (Lovell 1979:96; Jordan, 1971:358). U'Ren (1974:18) describes this period as "the most shocking experience of a new cadet's life". Indeed, often within minutes of arriving at the academy, newcomers typically find themselves stripped of all possessions, standing to attention, unsuspecting that they are in for a ruthless reprogramming of their attitudes, thoughts, and behaviours,

which begins almost the instant they don their uniforms.

In describing indoctrination in West Point (USA), Downes (1983:309-10) notes that the new entrants are effectively relieved of their civilian identity and thrown immediately into an environment that does not recognise their past status and achievements. They are suddenly dressed and treated like hundreds of others from different backgrounds, and in no time, they learn that group identity, needs, pride, etc. must take precedence over individuality. They also learn to cope with exhaustion, fear of failure, deprivation, and stress. It is during this period too, that they learn the basic skills of soldiering and the rudiments of leadership (Goggin 1988:133).

Indoctrination is undoubtedly a very trying period, during which a great deal of physical and mental stress is placed upon the trainees, who must obey without questioning hundreds of orders and comply with rules and regulations instantly and faultlessly or face punishment. Downes (1983:310) notes that cadets learn almost in a 'Pavlovian manner' that punishment will always follow errors and failures to comply with orders or rules. An atmosphere of tension and anxiety dominates almost every minute of their time, day or night. Because of this they learn a valuable survival lesson: obey and conform, or face the consequences.

According to Ellis and Moore (1974:77), many military establishments have a tradition of inflicting stress and discomfort, and even tolerate a degree of bullying as part of new cadet indoctrination. They consider the ordeal they put them through an intrinsic part of military training (ibid: 364). For some cadets, this period of indoctrination can be decisive, forcing them to reconsider whether they have made the right decision in joining the military. At this point some resign, others are dismissed for reasons of incompatibility. Thus indoctrination has the function of a further selection step, rooting out those who may have slipped through the selection net and revealed themselves to be incapable of functioning under conditions of prolonged stress. But indoctrination has many other important functions.

3.3.4 Functions of Military Indoctrination

Ellis & Moore (1974:77) and Moss (1996:9) emphasise that behind the physical and mental pressures that have to be endured by the new cadets, initial indoctrination has many important functions, all of which are directly or indirectly linked with organisational and military effectiveness. In the view of many, the end result of the academy's apparent unreasonableness and the harassment of cadets is to instil in them the ability to manage time and make rapid decisions in moments of extreme stress, to prepare them as leaders and enable them to work against deadlines. It is a way of training them for what they probably will be doing for many years of their working lives. Initial indoctrination also conditions the new cadets for reflex action under extreme stress, which is likely to be useful for survival in combat situations. It leads to physical hardness and mental toughness. It is during this period, too, that group cohesion, loyalty, and effort coordination are developed and appreciated. Most of all, it is a period during which the foundations of military culture, i.e. its values, are assimilated (Goggin 1988:134)

Of all military values, obedience is perhaps the most crucial. Huntington (1957:74) describes it as a "supreme virtue", not just for ideological reasons, but because it is vital for discipline and control and for the successful management of mission operations. Williams (1995:25) and Van Loon (1997:18) state that professionalism involves the willingness to obey orders from superiors without which chaos may result. The second most emphasised value in military culture is uniformity, which is reflected in the correct wearing of uniforms, the care and presentation of military equipment, military rituals, and the courtesy of etiquette both within and outside of the institution. Downes (1983:318) notes that the military system seeks to remove the distinctions and differences individuals acquire in the civilian world, and create a uniformity of ideas, attitudes, actions, and reactions compatible with the values and ethos of the Military. She observes that the new entrants to the military institution often enter it as a disparate, disorganised group, but that within a short period of time, they are transformed into a homogeneous troop, "all marching to the beat of the same drummer". Most military writers also stress the importance of commitment to the military profession, which is strongly tested both during the selection process and during basic training (McAlister 1995:88). Military socialisation, which obviously

continues beyond basic training, although with much less intensity, fosters commitment to military values and to the military profession, the loss of which would be damaging to its credibility and combat effectiveness (Moss 1996:8-20).

Other military values which the cadets are likely to come across during their socialisation are competition, the importance of the mission, initiative, enthusiasm, team-spirit, tradition, valour, patriotism, decisiveness, will power and determination, confidence, the ability to communicate, sense of humour, and personality, not to mention integrity (U'ren 1974:5 Downes 1983:341, Moss 1996:8, Denaro 1995:38; Larson 1995: 34). Vitas (1999:49), on the other hand, sums up the most important military values as honour, obedience, integrity, loyalty, and service.

3.3.5 Blocks to Successful Indoctrination

It is important to bear in mind that the fundamental aim of military indoctrination is the effective transformation and preparation of civilian recruits first into cadets, and then into competent and confident officers who are useful to the units to which they are posted. To be successful, indoctrination will also need to weed out those who are unfit or unsuitable for a military career. It will avoid alienating recruits, and instead instil in them respect and pride in becoming new members of a unique organisation. It will therefore imbue them with the virtues of military culture and values. In summary, as indicated earlier in this section on indoctrination, it will successfully convert candidates who made it through the selection process into individuals who truly look, think, walk, talk, and act like military officers.

Effective indoctrination can, however, be hampered by a number of difficulties and obstacles. Forney (2000) conducted an in-depth historical study of the socialisation of cadets in which he identified at least ten major hurdles to successful indoctrination. Perhaps the first and most obvious source of difficulty is poor selection at the point of entry into the academy. Clearly, however good the indoctrination programme may be, it will still fail to make good officers of individuals who are unsuitable for military life because they lack the necessary qualities. A second obstacle is the perception that the socialisation system may be out of date and unrepresentative of society. If it is, it will fail to be accepted and internalised. Calls for indoctrination to be realistic, to be in step

with the times is a common theme in military literature. A third obstacle is that some harmful traditions and rituals that give a bad name to the Military are slow to die and are passed down from one class to another, even when they may be contrary to regulations, such as harsh punishments and abuses. A fourth related obstacle is the fact that in many academies the responsibility for cadet indoctrination is unduly left in the hands of the senior cadets (upperclassmen), who may be only two or three years older and not fully mature. In the worst situations they will tend to take their frustrations out on the junior cadets by subjecting them to cruel and unjustified punishments and bizarre rituals, sometimes to the point of driving them out of the academy. They will even compete on who is the harshest on the new cadets, sometimes under the approving eyes of commanding officers. A fifth obstacle is the often-noted ambivalence felt about harsh indoctrination by the cadets themselves, who, on the one hand have to suffer severe treatment at the hands of their trainers and upperclassmen, which at times they may find unbearable; on the other hand none of them wish to belong to a class of cadets who had an easy time, particularly during the intensive indoctrination period of basic training, a reputation that could follow them for years in their military careers. A sixth obstacle is the necessity to reconcile military goals with academic priorities. Both compete for cadet time and commitment, and both have for more than half a century been clashing with each other, with supporters on each side. The end result is that compromises have to be made, but one thing is certain: overemphasis on indoctrination at the expense of academics is no longer acceptable in most, if not all modern military academies in the world. A seventh obstacle is the feeling by cadets that they are always trying to cram thirty hours of work into a twenty-four hour day. Many feel overwhelmed by competing demands on their time. An eighth obstacle is the overemphasis on conformity and obedience at the expense of initiative and creativity. Good officer indoctrination must achieve a balance here. A ninth obstacle is military academies' tendency to be very resistant to change. Academy officials are generally very protective of their values and traditions, even if some of them are thought to have outlived their usefulness, or are based on unproven assumptions. Finally, a tenth obstacle is the low morale that is created by controversies and scandals following cheating incidents or breaches of academy rules and regulations by cadets or staff members. All have a negative effect on the socialisation process because they do not inspire confidence and trust in the system, which the

cadets are supposed to respect and conform to.

3.3.6 Changing Trends

The predominance of an authoritarian, punishment-oriented leadership style, perpetuated by military trainers and senior cadets in some military institutions, has come under severe criticism in recent years, and is nowadays increasingly viewed as inappropriate to contemporary needs. Thirty years ago, Janowitz (1971:xx iii) predicted that the modern trend was toward a gradual elimination of brutal induction procedures, excessive inspections, undue harassment, and degrading experiences. However, Ellis and Moore (1974: 74 - 79) reported strong resistance among many military officers and senior cadets to “being overly reasonable” in the socialisation of new recruits. They argued that to be a cadet one had to go through the “stress factor” and that to eliminate the traditional rites of passage would lead to deterioration in the standards of discipline, and to the loss of an important tool of military socialisation. Consequently, current socialisation processes are unlikely to display a substantial departure from the practices of the past. A second major shift in the patterns of military socialisation, as noted by Ellis and Moore (1974: 75), Williams (1995: 25), and Moss (1996: 12) is the realisation that a man can only be led by fear for so long, and that the emphasis now needs to be on identifying shared values, common goals, and nurturing team spirit without jeopardising authority.

3.4 Vocational Programme

Doctors, lawyers, teachers, and other professionals have their own specific domains of expertise, and so does the military officer. According to Huntington (1957:11), Hackett (1983:202) and Garnett (2001:1), the military officer is responsible for the ordered management of armed conflicts on behalf of the society he serves. As a servant of society, his principal role is to lead and win the nation's wars as, when and in the manner in which society expects him to. This is a function that distinguishes the military officer, and an activity that is vital to the survival of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its values, and the way of life that it holds dear. In recent times, the areas of expertise of the military officer have expanded into unconventional areas of activity, placing new demands on the capacity of military professionals and requiring constant adjustments of military officer preparation programmes. As in the presentation of other

pillars of officer preparation, the discussion begins with the elements of the professional component, continues with the requirements for a successful professional component programme, and ends with the potential blocks to a successful professional component programme.

3.4.1 Elements of the Vocational Programme

The professional component of officer preparation essentially consists of four elements: basic military skills, military knowledge, leadership, and the development of appropriate attitudes and character that go with professional officership (Yardley 1987:184; Schwarzkopf in Palmer 1992:9; Chilcot 1999: 59). To these nowadays are added other spheres of expertise, particularly management, communication skills, and various other skills related to military operations other than war (MOOTW) duties.

3.4.1.1 Basic Military Skills

Basic military training has been and always will be an essential part of the preparation of all officers (Yardley 1987:109). This is because the officer is first and foremost a soldier and a warrior (Kelley 1996:104). It includes infantry training, perfecting shooting skills, and drill. Janjua (1994) compared the training systems of six military academies: West Point, Sandhurst, and those of North Korea, Japan, Turkey, and Pakistan, and found that among their most salient features were that basic soldiering skills were mostly concentrated during the cadets' first year, with warfare training and exercises in five out of six academies being deferred to the summer months. From the second year onwards, all military training was geared towards leadership. RMC (2001), Yardley (1987), and Janjua (1994) also reported military academies' tendency to devote disproportionate attention to military drill and parades despite conflicting views on their usefulness.

3.4.1.2 Military Knowledge

This is essentially concerned with the technical and tactical aspects of military expertise, both in theory and practice. Here, cadets are trained and educated in understanding and using the technological "tools of the trade", that is all equipment,

weapon systems, the systems that operate and control weapon systems, computers, and other physical items that officers operate, manage, and control in a manner and to the standards expected. The objective here is to make sure that they are able to set up, operate, and maintain equipment and resources efficiently and effectively to support their soldiers. Tactical skills, on the other hand, have to do with movements, location and relocation, how to lay out a defensive perimeter to secure and protect an area against enemy attack and the like. Tactical skills also involve knowledge of how men fight with maximum energy and commitment, a knowledge derived from the experience of others and from historical lessons. The objective of the tactical aspect is to master the skill of combining technical skills with people and ideas and applying them to fight and win (ALDH 2001:39-43)

A review of how a number of military academies in the world cover this aspect of the professional preparation of officer cadets reveals that there are wide variations in the nature and extent of military knowledge content provided for cadets. Variations also sometimes exist within the same military academy from one course to another. Most importantly, content depends on the purpose of the programme. If the goal is to produce junior officers who, after completing the course, can join their operation units and immediately start performing as competent platoon leaders, and no more than that, then the military subjects in the curriculum will tend to focus on short-term usable technical and tactical skills, usually also placing an emphasis on the relevance to military needs in most, if not all aspects of officer preparation. On the other hand, if the preparation programme's goal is to groom cadets for a lifelong officer career, and for potentially higher-level responsibilities, then there will be as much concern with immediate military needs as with the long-term effectiveness of the military organisation, a concern that will be reflected in a more inter-disciplinary and broad-based programme than in the former model. In the latter case, the learning environment also tends to resemble that of a university rather than a barracks. The programme is also referred to as an undergraduate course, often ending with the award of a Bachelor's degree.

An undergraduate military course generally covers military-specific subjects such as

Military Science, Military History, Military Law, Terrain Analysis, etc. but also a range of general academic subjects such as Mathematics, Physics, Engineering, I.T, etc, which are thought to be of relevance to military science and technology thought processes. Hence, there is considerable overlap between the 'specifically military' and the 'general academic' aspects of military knowledge (RMC 2001:37), which is why both are covered in the development of military expertise. As a rule, the longer the time spent at a military academy, the more it is possible to aim for technical, tactical and academic brilliance. Conversely, the shorter the time, the more likely that the course will be more concerned with technical and tactical proficiency than with academic excellence (Dodd 1978:52; Yardley 1987:247; Janjua 1994:85).

Which specific subjects should be included in this aspect of the curriculum is a question that is best left to experienced military educationalists and commanders, because it appears that each military academy consciously tailors its programme content to suit the circumstances and needs of the country in terms of security and defence. This being said, it is useful to note that most respected military academies in the world, such as West Point in the USA, the Royal Military College of Canada, and the Japanese Military Academy attempt to draw their programmes directly from contemporary and anticipated future military needs. A second feature of their programmes is that they have a strong science/ engineering foundation (RMC 2001:15). Finally, they are all broad-based and varied, offering both breadth and depth as well as a degree of choice of specialisation. Solid military knowledge helps to foster good leadership, but it is only one of several other necessary ingredients of effective leadership.

3.4.1.3 Leadership

Leadership training must be central to everything that cadets do at the military academy (RMC 2001:45). Yardley (1987:197) notes that at Sandhurst, everything is taught through the medium of leadership, both theoretical and practical, with a strong emphasis on relevance to ensure that everything the cadets do has a useful purpose. Why is leadership so important? Because it is almost synonymous with officership,

and also because as a junior officer on his first assignment, the new graduate will be expected to be able to lead a platoon of about 40 soldiers, or/and be a technical service officer, or/and head a special branch, or hold a similar position of responsibility for men and resources. He may also serve as a deputy company commander, coordinating activities and leading tasks involving 150 to 200 soldiers (Pernsteiner 2001:82). Clearly, every cadet must learn how to confidently and competently organise and lead men, in times of both war and peace (Dodd 1978:54; Keller 2001:17)

All the military academies reviewed for this important portion of the professional component of officer preparation recognise the vital importance of leadership skills. However, not all of them provide the structures, the resources and the necessary programme to ensure that the objective of producing capable and effective leaders can be achieved. Many seem to expect leadership to simply emerge, while others, such as West Point (USA) and Annapolis (USA), for example, see their missions as to be the producers of the 'best leaders in the world' (Thomas 200:14). These academies actually have a separate department for leadership development. Palmer (1992:6) rightly sees that "the academies' very reason for being revolves around leadership", therefore it is essential for all military academies to have a serious leadership programme, both theoretical and practical.

Leadership is admittedly not an easy subject to teach. Yet, new officers would fail in their missions if they did not possess the adequate knowledge and skills to be effective leaders. And since experience is not enough, leadership can and must be taught (Taylor 1977:9), drawing on modern scientific theories and from sound analysis of historical examples of successful and unsuccessful leaderships (Garnett 2001:1-26). In a paper entitled "Why Arabs lose wars", Atkine (2000:19) contends that leadership may be the greatest weakness of Arab training systems and discusses several flaws in their leadership styles and approaches. Thus, it is useful to review the available methods of developing leadership, as well as the qualities of effective military leadership.

To begin with, the probability of producing superior leaders is greatly enhanced by starting with the best possible candidates, those with 'latent leadership abilities' or with the best potential to make good leaders (Dodd 1978:55; RMC 2001:17). Apart

from this, in most military academies in the world cadets are strongly encouraged to serve in positions of cadet leadership and to seek responsibility in a variety of activities, including sports and extra-curricular activities. For example, most make use of the practice of having upperclassmen. They are also offered opportunities to hold command positions during summer military training, military exercises and field training with operational troops (Janjua 1994:74).

Many researchers emphasise that leadership development is facilitated by setting exemplary role models, because cadets also learn leadership behaviour through observation and interaction with officers they come in contact with (RMC 2001: 8; Atkine 2000:22; Garnett 2001: ii; McCoy 1996:29; Ul'man 1990:29; Thomas 2000:8; Reimer 1998: 59). All potential role models, particularly company officers and instructors, must therefore be aware of the messages, good and bad, they are sending through their performance, conduct and attitudes, and the standards they set in front of cadets.

Experimentation with peers during practical sessions is also mentioned as a useful method of leadership development as it combines interaction, observation, and reflection. Theory, of course, is an important part of this learning process, and the literature contains a wide range of theories of leadership. Ideally, a balance should be maintained between theory and practice (Csoka 1985:2) and links between them should be frequently pointed out by instructors and company officers. Finally, Thomas (2000:55-60) cites recent initiatives taken by both West Point and Annapolis to enhance the development of leadership in their cadets. Among these are, first, the establishment of a leadership development department with an in-house library and research facilities. Secondly, leadership fellows, from among retired officers with command experience, were invited to participate in classroom teaching and serve as a mentoring resource. Thirdly, distinguished guest speakers were invited to address cadets on leadership topics throughout the academic year. Fourthly, video case studies were developed or acquired to serve as a teaching resource, bridging the gap between theory and practice. Fifthly, the idea of a conference, or a series of conferences on leadership was proposed. Together, these are thought to be a good way of bringing together the accumulated experiences and knowledge of many leadership experts for

the benefit of all participants.

As for the qualities of effective leadership military academies ought to aim for in developing cadets who will be tomorrow's leaders, there seems to be no doubt nowadays that outdated, purely authoritarian methods of leadership, based on fear and unquestioning obedience from followers is inappropriate and counter-productive (Atkine 2000: 20). Leadership is wrongly linked with privilege instead of responsibility by some officers, according to Thomas (2000: 44). It is also wrongly measured by "who has the shiniest shoes and does the most push-ups". It is too often characterised by distance, even contempt for the ordinary soldier by officers who, instead of leading by example, inspiring confidence, trust, and respect, "refuse to get their hands dirty" (Atkine 2000: 20 – 24). The modern enlightened view of successful leadership is one that can transform ordinary soldiers into extraordinary performers. USMA's (2001:95) vision of an effective leader is that he should be able to learn to lead by will, intellect, initiative, and boldness. He must be an inspiring leader who, through his competence and character, earns the respect and trust of his subordinates, and stimulates willing obedience and enthusiasm. He will be their teacher, trainer, and mentor. He will be aware that one of his most important responsibilities is to consider the well-being of his soldiers, without whom mission accomplishment would be impossible (Ganoczy 2001:73; Garnett 2001:1-26; Kelley 1996:107; Garnett 2001:1-26; Kelley 1996:107). Above all, according to Garnett (2001: vi); Woodward (1995:1), Carbuncle (1996:102) and Konig (2001:5), the modern leader must be taught not what to think but how to think. In *Educating Army Leaders for the 21st Century*, Dudevoir (2000:4) stresses that leadership development programmes must aim to produce leaders who are capable of thinking critically and creatively, and who can act independently in accordance with the intent of their superiors, rather than leaders that sit and wait for orders.

Leadership is the ordered application of military force. It was defined earlier as the primary duty of an officer. Beyond the battlefield, the modern officer is increasingly called upon to perform managerial, administrative duties which are also vital for the effective running of the military organisation to which he belongs (Keller 2001:17; Vitas 1999:47).

3.4.1.4 Management

The preparation of professional military officers nowadays includes equipping them with at least the basic principles of administration and management so that they can contribute to running the affairs of the Military, in times of both peace and war. Budget restrictions and downsized forces in many military organisations have led to the need for efficiency in managing human resources, equipment, supplies etc. and the need for the Military to be able to justify their expenditures, interact with other organisations and enter into negotiations with the government to secure resources and maintain their capabilities (Yardley 1987:118; Cvrcek 1991:145). Some military experts view this development with scepticism and some regret because cost-effectiveness does not in their opinion go well with operational effectiveness (Moss 1996:12; Hackett 1983:1995). Whether in the role of a manager or a leader, the officer needs good communication skills to interact at all levels.

3.4.1.5 Communication Skills

Developing good communication skills is an essential part of the preparation of the modern military officer. This is not new; the Military have always been aware of the importance of good communications for combat effectiveness and for survival. They know that good communication enables intentions and plans to be well understood, encouragement of and genuine concern for individuals to be conveyed, and morale to be lifted (Downey 1977:177; Hamilton 1986: 203). Recognising the importance of good communication, Sandhurst (UK) has for some years now had a separate communications department, which is responsible for the development of cadets' communication skills, particularly face-to-face interviewing, briefings, presentation etc. These are particularly important in image-conscious Western military institutions, whose staff need to be trained in coping with media and public scrutiny. Most military academies also provide a range of foreign language courses, which could prove useful in foreign postings and international missions (Yardley 1987:114).

3.4.1.6 New Areas of Expertise

Since the Military are no longer limited to fighting conventional wars against conventional enemies and are frequently expected to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW), such as pursuing terrorists or drug warlords, providing humanitarian relief, containing regional conflicts, peace keeping/making etc., military academies see it as their duty to equip future officers with the appropriate knowledge and skills to cope with this new mix of roles and commitments. Unfortunately, the essential competences required to succeed in carrying out such missions are still largely unknown, because the environments in which they take place are unpredictable, and full of ambiguity, uncertainty, and risk. What is known for certain is that such complex operations require leaders with greater intellectual capacity than ever before, so that they can make wise, responsible, and creative decisions (Garnett 2001:1-26).

Other unstoppable areas of change adding to the required competences of all present and future officers are information and technology, which are evolving at unprecedented levels of speed. According to Dudevoir (2001:7), if changes continue to increase at the present speed - and there is evidence that changes will progress at an even faster rate in the future - then military academies must reconsider their programmes in order to apply necessary modifications to them and ensure that they stay current with the important advances and concepts of the time. Professional military education and training must give the officers of the future the confidence they need to perform in new operating environments (Kelley 1996:107).

3.4.2 Requirements of a Successful Vocational Programme

A synthesis of the most important factors that can contribute to the successful development of the professional component part of officer preparation can be formulated as follows.

Firstly, an effective professional programme must be derived directly from the precise occupations and duties the junior officers are likely to be called on to perform after graduation. It must address specific military needs and reflect the attributes that the academy seeks to develop in its graduates. It must equally be consistent with the

current and anticipated future needs of the Military, if the officers are to be equipped with relevant and useful knowledge and skills.

Secondly, an effective professional component will strive to equip cadets with high levels of expertise, and recognise the need for flexibility in thought and action. It must encourage critical thinking, creativity, and adaptability to new situations. It must teach them how to think, rather than what to think.

Thirdly, an effective professional component must strike the right balance between theory and practice. It must encourage experimentation, provide constant feedback and reflection, and build the cadets' confidence in their growing theoretical and practical expertise in all aspects of this component.

Fourthly, an effective professional component teaches cadets that leadership is not, as viewed by some, a matter of status and privilege, but a position of responsibility. It encourages not distance between the leader and the led, but closeness, understanding, care, and cooperation. It relies on willing obedience and commitment, based on trust rather than on fear and forced compliance. Any deficiencies in the above-mentioned factors of effectiveness related to the professional component could reduce its successful development by the cadets. But there are also other factors that could hamper success in this area.

3.4.3 Blocks to a Successful Vocational Programme

Potentially the most serious block to a successful professional component is resistance to change, where change is needed to improve any aspect of this component. Not recognising the need to focus less on the superficial (drill, parades, etc.) and replacing it by more useful activities can reduce its effectiveness. Laying the accent on classroom teaching and the rote learning of training publications, instead of encouraging cadets to use their creative potentials can also have a negative effect on the effectiveness of this component. Finally, failing to provide a learning climate that aims for and demonstrates commitment to high standards of expertise will inevitably lead to a professional development that falls short of ever achieving excellence.

3.5 Liberal Education

Apart from the need for a solid grounding in professional military knowledge and skills, most academy officer preparation programmes in the world recognise the importance and value of liberal education in the overall professional development of aspiring officers. Most military educators see it as a requirement and even a necessity and consider that it plays an increasingly vital role in equipping current and future leaders with the knowledge and attitudes they need to meet the challenges of the modern world and have a successful military career. This section defines what liberal education is, then discusses its purposes, continues with an overview of the main features characterising an effective liberal education component, and ends with a review of potential constraints and concerns regarding certain aspects of liberal education programmes.

3.5.1 Defining Liberal Education

According to Adler (2002:2), liberal education has traditionally been defined as the study of any subject of knowledge that is not vocational, such as rhetoric, grammar, logic, and other disciplines intended to develop the faculties of the human mind, those powers of intelligence and imagination without which no intellectual work can be accomplished. Liberal education, he adds, is not tied to certain academic subjects, such as philosophy, history, literature, music, art, and other so-called “humanities”, because in the liberal arts tradition, scientific disciplines, such as mathematics and physics, are considered equally liberal, that is, equally able to develop the powers of the mind. Importantly also, Adler does not confine liberal education to intellectual education or to the cultivation of the mind. He extends it to include moral training, if its aim is to instil good moral habits or virtues such as prudence and integrity. The modern definition of liberal education, he also notes, encompasses many more sciences, both natural and social.

3.5.2 Purposes of Liberal Education

In a detailed analysis of the purposes and benefits of liberal education for all professionals, Harris (1991:4) argues that many students are surprised at the number of general education classes they must take in order to graduate. They wonder why they

have to take subjects that have apparently no link with their chosen professional field or major. Why study history, literature, philosophy, music, art, or any other subject that does not directly help to train them for a profession? Would it not be better to concentrate all efforts on acquiring and sharpening the specialised, vocational knowledge and skills specifically needed for the function or occupation one is hoping to be prepared for? Despite these objections, many military writers and educationalists are of the view that the preparation of officers would be incomplete without liberal education, which is why officer preparation programmes have undergone increasing liberalisation since the end of World War II. It is also for this reason that most military academies in the world incorporate an invariably strong liberal component in their officer preparation. From the literature, it is possible to identify general benefits common to all members of any profession, as well as benefits specific to aspiring professional military officers.

3.5.3 General Purposes

Harris (1991:5) enumerates seven major general benefits that a broad-based liberal education can provide. First, liberal education teaches us how to think. It broadens the mind, makes it better at grasping ideas, concentration, following arguments, and distinguishing what is important from what is trivial. It teaches us how to organise and structure our thoughts and arrive at sensible, rational solutions to problems. Crucially, it teaches us how to think for ourselves and form our own opinions, attitudes and beliefs, based not on the authority of others, but on our own comprehension and evaluation of arguments and evidence. The wider our knowledge of subject areas, the more we are able to think independently, make good judgements, and the less we are dazzled or overwhelmed by issues outside our discipline of specialty.

Second, liberal education teaches us how to learn and enhances our creative capacities. No institution, however great, can teach in three or four years everything we need to know now or in the future. Liberal education helps us to develop transferable learning habits to cope with new, difficult and unfamiliar knowledge. Knowledge of many subject areas also enables the cross-fertilisation of ideas, their extended applications and wider relevance to other areas (Lewis and Liegler 1998: 49).

Third, liberal education allows us to see things whole and makes us realise that our chosen field of knowledge is only an angle or a partial view, and that reality is more complex. It forces us to recognise that some problems require solutions combining a wide range of knowledge from diverse disciplines. It teaches us that to perform well in our jobs, we need more knowledge than that of one field.

Fourth, liberal education sows the seeds of wisdom and faith. It enhances the in-depth consideration of issues, separates the superficial from the significant, and stimulates us to seek evidence from every realm of knowledge before making a judgement or taking action. It also makes us marvel at the wonders of knowledge and creation.

Fifth, liberal education makes us better at imparting knowledge to others. It makes us better communicators and better listeners. It contributes, sixthly, to our happiness as individuals. It gives us a break from our narrow field of competence and provides us with opportunities to explore endless knowledge avenues for pleasure and improvement of our understanding of the world and of people. Seventh, it can enhance our understanding of the moral and spiritual dimensions of our actions. It can provide us with a useful framework, purpose and direction for difficult decisions.

Finally, Harris (*ibid*: 8) concludes that liberal education is without a doubt the best aid to any professional study. He asserts that a man who has learned to think, reason, compare, discriminate, who has refined his taste, formed his judgement, and sharpened his mental vision will not at once be a professional soldier, engineer, or other, but he will be placed in an ideal state of intellect that allows him to pursue any profession with ease, versatility, and success. In a similar vein, Adler (2002:2) stresses that the aim of liberal education is not to produce scientists or develop professional competence, although it is indispensable for any profession. It produces individuals who can do their jobs responsibly and who know how to use their minds and are able to think for themselves, whether they intend to be scientists or not.

Empirical support for the usefulness of liberal education comes from surveys and personal testimonies. Snider (1985:4-6) examined the results of several studies totalling over 88,000 top executives in the USA. Overall, the studies provided

evidence that the general intellectual skills developed through liberal education increased in importance over time, facilitated promotions to higher executive positions, and placed those who possessed them at a clear advantage over those whose backgrounds were narrowly vocational, such as engineers and business school graduates. They were, among other things, favoured for their superior coping abilities in the face of uncertainty and for their creativity and communication skills. Snider also reported the testimony of a very highly successful American executive who attributed his success to qualities of flexibility, adaptability, and creativity fostered by his strong broad-based liberal education background. He is quoted as saying, he said: “I have had nineteen jobs in my career, and at least seven of them were new. They had never existed before. How do you prepare for jobs like that? Well, based on my experience, you get an English degree..., and then you learn as much as you can about as many subjects as you can absorb.”

Now, if the benefits of liberal education are increasingly recognised in the civilian sector, the question is how much does this apply to military officers? Pritchard (1999: 23-6) considers that in the predominantly unpredictable twenty-first century world in which the Military has to perform more diversified combat and non-combat tasks, officer development must include at least four core competencies: (a) Tactical, technical and technological (incl. IT) proficiency; (b) Cognitive skills and abilities, such as numerical comprehension, oral communication and problem solving; (c) Interpersonal skills and abilities, such as skill in human relations and teamwork ability; and (d) Personal characteristics, such as decisiveness and tenacity.

In addition, Pritchard specifies ten “differentiating competencies” which he believes are necessary for high-performance leadership of change and people, qualities that will distinguish between superior and satisfactory leadership in the twenty-first century. These are: (1) Continuous learning - increasing current proficiencies, rapidly understanding and using new information and mastering new skills; (2) Awareness - knowing the interrelationships of and keeping current on key military, political, economic and social issues, trends and events that affect the military organisation; (3) Flexibility - being open to change and having a tolerance for ambiguity, as well as being able to adjust rapidly to new situations and priorities; (4) Resilience - recovering

quickly from setbacks and having the capacity to bounce back amid intense pressure; (5) Initiative - working without close supervision, always looking for ways to improve matters; (6) Creativity - generating original ideas or innovative solutions; (7) Entrepreneurship - identifying and taking prudent risks, and being unafraid to take responsibility for them; (8) Persuasive influence - the ability to affect the opinions, judgements or behaviours of others, for example in mediation; (9) Partnering - building and working with *ad hoc* coalitions and groups requiring rapid integration; and (10) Commitment - being a creator and sustainer of loyalty to organisational culture and values.

Pritchard concludes by saying that the effective junior leader in the coming decades of the 21st century will be sensitive to cultural diversity, race and other individual differences. He will have well-developed interpersonal skills, and will be able to adapt leadership style to a variety of situations. This new era leader will be able to tackle ambiguous problems in fluid situations, and be able to use independent, mature judgement and initiative with an awareness of the implications of his decisions and actions.

Despite the obvious differences between professional military and civilian managerial activities, in terms of the skills involved, values, outlooks etc, Vitas (1999: 48), Snider (1985: 6-7), and Masland and Radway (1957: 30-46) argue that there are fundamental similarities between the activities of military officers in peacetime and those of civilian corporate managers. Both need interpersonal and administrative skills, as well as the ability to use human and material resources effectively, although in different environments. Snider (1985:6-7) notes that a large and growing number of military positions are essentially managerial in character. They involve skills such as procurement, research and development, supply, maintenance, financial management, etc. all of which are common to both the civilian and military sectors. If anything, he stresses, such activities must be accomplished with greater efficiency for combat effectiveness, and for reasons of accountability at all times anyway. Vitas (1999: 50) goes even further, suggesting that although preparation for combat will always be the first role priority for officers and the military in general, the fact is that for most countries not engaged in conflict, combat operations have become and remain only a

fraction of armed forces activities nowadays. The military profession, he notes, cannot be limited to waging war, as it is expected to contribute to various aspects of national and international security matters, such as fighting terrorism and drug trafficking, peace-keeping, relief operations etc. All these new roles necessarily have implications for the early education of officers in which liberal education plays a vital part. All the preceding arguments lend support to the relevance of liberal education to the preparation of military officers. However, there are even more specific purposes for the importance of liberal education in preparing cadets for officership.

3.5.3.1 Military-Specific Purposes

Recognising the importance of liberal education in the preparation of officers does not mean that it can serve as a substitute for training in combat and leadership skills, or that intellectual skills will somehow eventually translate into effective leadership in battle (Rothenberg 1998: 153). However, generally, post-World War Two military analysts, historians, and educationalists seem to be convinced that liberal education has direct relevance to professional military effectiveness itself. They see it as an essential tool to educate the minds of future military leaders, to improve their performance as leaders of men, to guard against repetition of the costly mistakes of the past, and as a contributing factor to maintaining peace and harmony between the nations.

An adequate officer preparation programme, according to Vitas (1999: 51-2), stimulates value formation and strengthens qualities of integrity, discipline, honour, duty, justice and the like, inspired by patient and sensitive teachers. Most of these qualities can be acquired as a consequence – or even be the subject – of liberal arts classes. It is claimed that liberal education cultivates the ethos of service to state and people. It develops a sense that officers are not simply “trained killers” (ibid: 49) but trusted defenders of the state rather than a threat to it, and an embodiment of the values, common cause, and identity of the society that sends them into combat (Dingman 1998: 157). It fosters those attributes of mind that enable officers to understand what they are fighting for, and why force may be justly and rationally applied (Converse 1998: 57). It also teaches officers to treat ordinary soldiers as human beings and respect their dignity (Boog 1998: 120); the lack of this quality is a

particular weakness in Arab leadership, according to Atkine (2000: 19). Arab officers are allegedly noted for being rigid and distant from the men under their command, and for keeping contact with them through generally poorly educated and excessively harsh corporals and sergeants. This, according to Sullivan (1998: 78), usually produces brittle military forces in which command and control tend to collapse under severe battlefield conditions, as they did in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Insights from the social sciences may lead to more enlightened leadership that knows human nature, finds ways to maintain cohesion and motivates men to fight and win. These insights, in addition to other aspects of liberal education, can promote good communication skills and an appreciation of individual strengths and weaknesses.

Exposure to liberal education, it is hoped, enhances military officers' ability to think critically, and encourages creativity, innovation, and initiative, unless stifled by rigid supervision from above. Nothing is worse in battle than officers who stand still waiting for directions in emergency situations instead of exercising independent judgement (Kirkpatrick 1998: 104; Sullivan 1998: 77). The study of history, moreover, gives access to a wealth of learning on military strategies that worked or did not work, not least in terms of the training and education of officers. For example, the German experience in the Second World War was an example of the devastating effects of producing officers who were technically proficient but generally ignorant of war's political and strategic dimensions (Boog 1998: 127). At the other extreme is France's defeat in 1940, which military historians attribute to a "failure of leadership at every level", but more fundamentally to an educational philosophy that gave primacy to general education over practical military training (Converse 1998: 47). In contrast, Kirkpatrick (1998: 100) suggests that a key factor in American military success in the Second World War was its effective officer preparation programmes, which produced remarkable young men, most of whom had only trained to serve as company grade officers, who took the initiative and emerged rapidly to become generals who could organise, motivate, train, and lead divisions in battle. The history of military education also teaches us, among other things, that the separation of military officers from society, through elitism or alienation, is fraught with perils for both (Dingman 1998: 170). Japan before 1945 is a case in point, and so is Russia after the revolutions of 1917 and 1991.

Furthermore, liberal education introduces student officers to the world. It increases their knowledge and understanding of recent and ongoing historical events; it exposes them to the diverse cultures and behaviours of human kind; and it teaches them the challenges and delights of new languages. All these are intended to produce officers capable of meaningful action in a world of alliances, lethal weapons, and considerable environmental uncertainty.

Last but not least, military officers are not mere instruments of war. They are people, with families, occupational career needs, interests, and ambitions like any others. Many feel that being given the opportunity to learn transferable skills, partly through liberal education, is an added motivation to their commitment to service in the Military, and an important security factor to fall back on should they return to civilian life. This is an essential feature of an effective liberal education programme in the preparation of aspiring officers nowadays, but there are several others, discussed next.

3.5.4 Features of an Effective Liberal Education Programme

A thorough search for the essential characteristics of what constitutes an ideal liberal education programme component in the preparation of the officer of the twenty-first century reveals wide variations of views and practices among scholars and military academies. Some, as will be discussed in the final part of this section, would even favour reducing its size to a minimum or even eliminating it altogether from the military curriculum. Others see it as a key to the preparation of the whole man, the scholar and warrior he should be if he is to meet the challenges of the new century (Effland and Reed 2001: 82). Generally, however, most military academies in the world are attentive to the trends set by US service academies in particular, but none necessarily copy them since each has distinct needs and goals that determine the nature of its programmes. Still, it is instructive to bring together those features that characterise what is widely considered to be a forward-looking, modern liberal education component in the preparation of current and future military officers.

In a rare in-depth study of liberal education in the service academies in the United States, Simons (1965: 8-18) identified three main types of abilities and personality traits which liberal education might be expected to produce in those who have

undergone it. First, those who have had a liberal education should have acquired a broad knowledge of the various major areas of learning – the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities, including the fine arts. According to Shafer & Putnam (1998: 169), Dudevoir (2000: 14), (Wirth 1994: 595) and Snider (1985: 4), the broader the better, and the more it will contribute to producing well-rounded individuals. However, as Simons noted, in view of the rapidly accelerating rate of growth of knowledge, cadets cannot be expected to cover everything that is known in those areas during their preparation for officership. They can only be expected to become familiar with the basic facts and principles of the various disciplines. A cadet who completes three, four, or more years of a professional preparation with however distinguished a record in engineering, nuclear physics, or whatever, but with little or no knowledge of literature, history, philosophy, etc. cannot be said to be liberally educated. It is unlikely that he will be able to think and act effectively in his occupation and in many other life situations. Keller (2001: 29) and Albrecht (2001: 96) believe that the liberal component in officer preparation must ideally be equivalent to civilian programmes of the same level in terms of standard. It would also ideally include a wide range of attractive courses of contemporary interest and relevance. Mere possession of facts, however, does not guarantee the efficient and imaginative use of the mind.

Second, then, according to Simons (1965:8-18), liberal education ought to cultivate reasoning skills and habits, the capacity to think logically and clearly, and the ability to organise one's thoughts. It must enable cadets to order and interpret complex issues and bring their full intellectual resources skilfully to bear on the solution of a problem. Just as they must have some knowledge of many fields, they must also learn various forms of reasoning other than those of their main fields of interest. They must understand the appropriateness of objective and subjective evaluations, gain insights into human motivation, and know how to follow a scientific procedure, construct hypotheses, make accurate observations based on evidence, and arrive at conclusions. It must also equip the cadets with good communication skills, both oral and written, so that they can convey their knowledge effectively and fully understand the nuances and details of good communication.

In current and future military operating environments, characterised by rapid change

and intensifying complexity, a curriculum instruction that fosters reasoned, critical, and creative thinking is more needed than ever before. Knowledge obtained merely in the form of accumulated facts committed to memory is of limited use and has a short shelf life. Moreover, a good liberal education programme must encourage independent learning, intellectual curiosity, and continuous, lifelong learning (Garnett 2001: 1-28; Converse 1998: xi; Lamkin 1998: 16-50; Whiteman 1998: 18; Kenney 1996: 62). It should above all teach cadets how to think, not what to think (Harris 1991: 1).

Third, although a rich knowledge of facts, and good reasoning and communication skills are valuable intellectual assets, they must be complemented by the virtues of wisdom, tolerance, sensitivity and integrity. Larson (1995: 34 -7) states that a good liberal education should not miss opportunities to highlight the moral – ethical content or implications of issues. It should also encourage the learners to make them instinctively part of their judgements and decisions. Such qualities linked to personality and character must be cultivated throughout the cadets' education because they reflect the liberally educated person *par excellence*. Liberally educated people have certain values and have formed, or at least considered, a certain philosophy of life. They know their limitations and have respect for the views and rights of others. They are humbled by the vastness of the knowledge they do not know, and continually seek to learn and improve their understanding of people and the world they live in.

Whether the above three broad purposes of liberal education will really be achieved will largely depend on the cadets' teachers, their teaching methods and approaches, and on whether their environment is conducive to learning or not. It will depend on the extent to which teachers emphasise the interrelationships of subjects with one another, as well as their ethical dimensions. And, crucially, it will depend on whether teachers can resist the temptation to emphasise trivial details, fact memorisation, and the preoccupation with the cultivation of the specialised knowledge and techniques of their own narrow field of intellectual activity at the expense of the broader principles and objectives of liberal education.

In addition to the three broad conditions for a truly liberal education programme discussed so far, a number of other conditions are frequently mentioned in recent

literature. Thus, the fourth condition, in the belief of several researchers and writers, is that a liberal education programme should provide a balance of courses from the humanities and the social sciences on the one hand, and vocational-utilitarian subjects on the other hand. Neither should be allowed to overwhelm the other (Effland and Reed 2001: 86; Hall 2000: 3; Williams II 2000: 41).

Fifth, a good liberal education programme should include an element of choice. In this way, excessively heavy workloads can be avoided, interest and motivation to learn are maintained, and the risk of producing uniformed 'grey thinkers' (Vitas 1999: 7) forced into 'intellectual torture' (Kirkpatrick 1998: 102) is prevented. Most modern military academies also allow students the choice of in-depth study from among a number of liberal subjects in the form of a major (West Point Red Book, May 2001). Sixth, opinions vary on whether the content of liberal education, and anything included in the officer preparation programme generally, should stand the test of relevance or not. Some believe that many subjects may have no apparent, self-evident usefulness, because they are thought to have long-term value, or indirect benefits (Barker 2000: 10; Kenney 1996: 58). Others strongly insist on relevance (RMC Report 2001: 36), especially when financial limitations impose it (Downes 1998: 142; 1991: 136). However, Effland and Reed (2001: 88) state that if relevance is deemed important, then it must be emphasised. Relevance is also clearly related to the desired 'product' at the end of the initial officer preparation period. For example, in the USA both Spartan (warrior) and Athenian (intellectual) aspects of officer education and training are equally valued, because it is not unusual for military officers to take up civilian posts, either after a short commission or at a later stage of their careers. In the UK, on the other hand, where the curriculum for educating and training officers is strictly limited to military-relevant subjects and activities, there is no deliberate intent to prepare recruits for anything other than immediate military needs, which is why courses are on the whole comparatively short and vocationally based (RMAS 2002 Prospectus). A glimpse at the subjects offered by the Swiss Military College for preparing military officers also shows insistence on relevance since most of their liberal education courses are qualified as 'military', such as military sociology, military psychology, military didactics, military history, etc., all taught by senior military officers (Kach 2001: 32).

Not unrelated is the seventh and final criterion for a good liberal education programme, which is to equip officer aspirants with transferable skills. These are skills that can be transferred from one subject to another (Harris 1991: 3) and from one situation to another, such as from a military occupation to a civilian one. They lead to a fusion of capabilities (Kenney 1996: 58) and ensure professional flexibility. In this way, joining and leaving the Military is facilitated (Albrecht 1999: 95). It is also likely to make officer careers more attractive to high-quality candidates who would otherwise not opt for military commission and take up a military career (Steinkamm 1999: 16).

3.5.5 Constraints and Concerns regarding Liberal Education Programmes

As military academies continue to move towards greater liberalisation of their curricula and closer integration with civilian higher education, growing concern is felt by many traditionalists that such institutions are in danger of weakening their fundamental dedication to the distinct mission of the military profession. Some argue that change has gone too far in the wrong direction and even call for a return to more Spartan values and less emphasis on intellectual and occupational pursuits that have allegedly precipitated much of the erosion of the uniqueness of the military profession. Even what is arguably the best military academy in the world, West Point, was recently criticised as having too great a focus on intellectual subjects. In a 1998 White Paper compiled by USMA's Class of 1951, West Point's curriculum was judged to be "imbalanced in favour of academic versus military leadership training" and that it was "becoming too closely aligned with the academic concerns of public institutions and losing its focus on training future Army leaders" (Thomas 2000: 50).

Similarly, in a strongly critical paper, Smith (1996: 1-10) laments that the academies are becoming "mini-liberal arts universities instead of the military-technical institutions of yore". The author blames falling military standards and values on what he perceives to be the excessive liberalisation of the curriculum, which he claims has had counter-productive repercussions on many aspects of officer preparation, including a reduction in the rigour of indoctrination, cheating and other scandals reported over recent years, the easing of dress codes, etc. He is even in favour of terminating many of the freedoms that came with the liberalisation of the curriculum including all liberal arts degree programmes, and redirecting the curriculum towards an exclusive focus on

war sciences and technology. The Military, he stresses, must not forget that leadership in combat is the ultimate purpose of officer preparation, not intellectual sophistication.

Effland and Reed (2001: 88) point out that hard sciences and technology only address a portion of the skills needed for leadership in the twenty-first century but, they suggest, the balance in military education does not have to come from subjecting all future officers to in-depth liberal education, but can be found through forming an officer corps composed of widely assorted specialists. Military academies need to ask themselves whether they are preparing specialists or generalists (Snider 1985:4), and in any case need to strike the right balance between the proportion of generally professionally oriented instruction and that related to courses completely outside the military-occupational field, that is those designed to prepare cadets for the broad responsibilities of citizenship and for an informed and intelligent personal life (Simons 1965: xi).

Another major issue related to the teaching of liberal education as part of the preparation of junior officers is whether it is at all possible to offer a genuinely liberal education within a military environment, and whether it would be more appropriate and more effective to make arrangements for it to be obtained in civilian universities. Strong arguments exist on both sides (Cheeseman and Hall 1997:8; Kotze and Steele 1995: 24). Vitas (1999: 47) contends that the depth of insight and inquiry needed in dealing with modern and future military and non-military tasks is best found in civilian liberal arts institutions. Future military leaders, he argues, need a first-class liberal education that is unrestrained by the military environment. They need the same liberal education as their civilian peers in order to share the same values and awareness of the world, and so that in future they can be more effective in their role of “nudging political leaders toward sensible and realistic expectations and decisions” involving national security (ibid:51). Little surprise, therefore, that countries like the United Kingdom and Australia prefer to fund or recruit civilian university graduates before providing them with professional military education and training (Cheeseman & Hall 1997: 2). Kach (1999: 38) and RMC Report (2001: 36) oppose this approach, favouring the view that intellectual and professional military development should best go hand in hand, and that the military environment does not have to be the crippling

constraint it is made out to be. Officer aspirants must and can learn that there is a time for independent thought, imagination, ingenuity, and initiative, as well as a time for discipline, teamwork, conformity, and loyalty. These two sets of values are not incompatible but complementary in the preparation of officers (Mason 1986: 4-5). Some even feel that the military environment presents the advantage of being free from civilian distractions.

Finally, to provide good quality liberal education, time for thought and analysis, on which truly liberal learning depends, must be made available to cadets. With pressures from all sides, and the tendency to attempt to cover the maximum amount of subject matter in a minimum amount of time, courses often take on the character of a race that is not conducive to good learning. The hectic pace of life in a military academy also makes it sometimes very difficult for students to read or research in depth (Janjua 1994: 85; Downes 1991: 136; Simon 1965: 206-7; Caforio 1998: 160).

3.6 Physical Fitness

This is the fifth and last pillar of junior officer preparation, but by no means the least important one. Without it, military training is incomplete, which is why it is part of every officer preparation programme in the world. This section highlights why physical fitness is important, its benefits, the place it is accorded in some military academies, and what constitutes an ideal fitness programme, and reviews a number of barriers to its effectiveness.

3.6.1 Importance of Physical Fitness

Most people nowadays know about the importance of physical fitness for their good health but, for the Military, physical fitness is an essential element of soldier training. Military sport means more than improving the physique of the soldier. Military sport specialists strongly believe in the complementary value of physical training for military preparedness (Pope 1995: 441-8; Janowitz 1960: 130). They believe that developing needed physical strength, flexibility, and endurance transforms cadets into hardened men upon whom the safety of the nation may depend. They also believe that the sporting experience can help cadets relate to war pressures and that the experience of the playing field is in a way a framework for war experiences (USMA 2001: 1).

Moreover, because officers are soldiers who must always be ready to answer the call of duty and be able to cope with prolonged physical action in hostile and stressful situations, they must never allow themselves to be physically unfit. They must be able to function well under the most difficult and threatening situations, including in chemically or biologically contaminated environments. They cannot afford to stop for a break after every physical effort, and must keep going no matter how tired they are; otherwise, they may be endangering their own lives and those of their soldiers, and risk failing in their mission. As future leaders of troops, cadets must aim for the achievement of exemplary fitness (RMC Report 2001: 50; CFAO 2001: 1).

Despite these arguments in favour of physical fitness, there are some who mistakenly believe that modern battle techniques and technology have removed the need for it. Clearly, this is an ill-informed view that ignores the reality of war and the many benefits of physical fitness, not only for the individual soldier, but also for the military organisation as a whole.

3.6.2 Benefits of Physical Fitness

For the individual cadet or soldier, physical fitness is valuable because, among other things, it gives him energy, increases his productivity and alertness, and increases his stamina, power, and confidence (Field Manual 1992: iii). For the regiment and the academy, physical fitness not only improves combat readiness and survivability, but also contributes positively to the development of character, sense of duty, team cohesion, and team spirit. Physical fitness also leads to a healthy morale and can relieve the monotony of military drilling (Pope 1995: 447; RMAB 2001: 2). More benefits are revealed in the next section.

3.6.3 Components of Total Physical Fitness

Experts distinguish four components of total fitness. These are (1) cardiorespiratory fitness; (2) muscular fitness; (3) flexibility; and (4) body composition / weight control (Gindhart 1999: 3; Field Manual 1992: iii). Each component is now defined and discussed in terms of its importance and role in total fitness and good health.

3.6.3.1 Cardiorespiratory Fitness

This is the heart's ability to pump blood and deliver oxygen throughout the body. It allows the body to cope with tiredness and enables it to keep going. It makes it possible for the soldier to run, swim, climb, etc. for long periods of time without excessive discomfort. Good cardiorespiratory fitness is clearly essential for survival in combat. The way to achieve this aspect of fitness is through regular exercise. Research shows that regular exercise also positively affects the psychological well-being of the individual. It reduces stress, depression, and the chances of having a heart attack. Studies conducted in the United States showed significant improvements in the psychological health of subjects who regularly exercised. Test results showed decreased levels of anxiety, depression, fatigue, and confusion. Other studies also showed that regular exercise can help improve memory and other brain functions (Harig 2001: 6; Nieman 1986: 252).

3.6.3.2 Muscular Fitness

Muscular fitness is the strength and endurance of one's muscles. This can be shown in how many push-ups or sit-ups one can do, for example, or how good one is at pulling, pushing, or lifting heavy weights. Strength training, such as weight lifting, increases the muscles' size and power, and – among other things - improves the appearance and self-confidence of the individual, while at the same time reducing the amount of fat in the body. More importantly, while exercises such as jogging and walking are good for the lower body muscles and bones, weight training complements them by benefiting the other parts of the body, such as the arms, shoulders, etc. (Field Manual 1992:iii).

3.6.3.3 Flexibility

Flexibility is the ability of joints to articulate through the full range of their movements. Poor flexibility is common among inactive people. The problem with inactivity is that muscles settle into a permanent state of contraction. Stretching exercises help restore muscle flexibility, reduce tension and back pain, and prevent muscle injuries (Watney 1989: 15).

3.6.3.4 Body Composition / Weight Control

Body composition concerns the relative amounts of fat and lean body tissue that constitute the human body. It is expressed in a percentage of body fat measurement. Air Force pilots, for example, are familiar with this concept, as they are used to managing their body composition, which is believed to affect their flying skills.

3.6.4 Requirements for Physical Fitness Programme Success

Harig (2001: 4), Gindhart (1999:12), and Watney (1989: 15) emphasise that a complete physical fitness programme must include training, and observance of the requirements of the four components of total fitness just discussed. To ensure implementation, however, programmes must be supported by policies defining what physical fitness is, and how to achieve its goals. Next, it is important to establish a well-developed fitness plan requiring weekly, if not daily, participation in fitness training (at least 3-5 hours per week). Instructors implementing the fitness programme must be well trained and be able to set reasonably high standards, but they must also be careful not to force cadets to a point where serious injuries might occur. Regular fitness programme evaluations and feedbacks help keep cadets in good shape.

In addition to these requirements, guidelines for developing programmes to improve and maintain physical fitness levels for all military personnel, including cadets, emphasise the importance of certain basic physical training principles. These are: (1) regularity, that is the expectation that each of the four components must be practised at least three times per week; (2) progression, the gradual increase in intensity and / or duration of exercises; (3) balance, which ensures that none of the fitness components is ignored or overemphasised; (4) variety and choice, which increases motivation and progress and reduces boredom; (5) challenge, which is the opportunity to push oneself beyond one's limits to reach maximum performance, as far as possible (CAP Manual 50-18 1996).

The guidelines also stress that any fitness programme must observe four factors that promote success, easily remembered by their acronym FITT, which stands for Frequency, Intensity, Time, and Type of exercise. Briefly, frequency requires cadets to

exercise 3-5 times per week; intensity requires exercises to be hard enough to raise the heart rate reserve (HRR) (details of how this is calculated are given in Field Manual 1992); time depends on the type of exercise being done, but overall 20-30 minutes represent a minimum; and finally type refers to the kind of exercise performed, which must fit the target component (Field Manual 1992: 1-4; CAP Manual 1996: 3). A summary of the FITT factors applied to the components of total fitness is given in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3-1 FITT Factors Applied to Physical Conditioning Programme (CAP Manual 50-18 (1996):3)

	Cardiorespiratory Endurance	Muscular Strength	Muscular Endurance	Muscular Strength and Muscular Endurance	Flexibility
F	F requency 3-5 times/week	3 times/week	3-5 times/week	3 times/week	Warm-up and Cool-down Stretch before and after each exercise session. Development Stretching To improve flexibility, stretch 2-3 times/week.
I	I ntensity 60 – 90% HRR	3-7RM**	12+RM	8-12 RM	Tension and alight discomfort; NOT PAIN
T	T ime 20 minutes or more	The time required to do 3-7 repetitions of each exercise	The time required to do 12+ repetitions of each exercise	The time required to do 8-12 repetitions of each exercise	Warm-up and cool-down Stretches 10-15 seconds/stretch Developmental stretches 30- 60 Seconds/stretch
T	T ype Running Swimming Cross-country Skiing Rowing Bicycling Jumping Rope Walking/Hiking Stair Climbing	Free Weights Resistance-machines Partner-resisted Exercises Body-weight Exercises (Pushups/pull-ups/dips, etc.)			Stretching Static Passive P.N.F

Abbreviations

*HRR = Heart Rate Reserve

**RM = Repetition Maximum

***PNF = Proprioceptive Neuromuscular Facilitation

Having discussed the main factors that promote a successful cadet physical fitness programme, it is now useful to review some of the factors that prevent success.

3.6.5 Barriers to Physical Fitness

Kelley (2000) has reviewed the literature on the factors that present obstacles to physical fitness in the Military. She discusses many obstacles throughout her work, the most important of which is that policies for fitness programmes are sometimes not fully implemented or complied with, particularly at lower levels of command, or by physical trainers. The second most important factor is, she claims, cultural: one study conducted in the US by Duffy *et al.* (1996) in support of this view shows lower physical activity levels among Mexican Americans, compared to white and black Americans. Additionally, Kelley points out that some cultural environments tend to be more fitness-conscious than others. The third frequently mentioned barrier is geographic location and climate; the argument is that some are favourable and others are not.

Other, more specific barriers mentioned include the lack of role models among educators, trainers, and staff, failure to create an exercise-friendly environment, lack of access to physical fitness facilities, not exercising 3-5 times per week, cadets' lack of or insufficient awareness of the many benefits of fitness, or lack of confidence in their ability to be physically fit. To these barriers can be added that too often, physical activities are not enjoyed by all cadets, particularly if the element of choice is lacking, with the result that they may experience training sessions as a burden or a bore; worst of all perhaps, if additional physical training is wrongly used as punishment for inability to perform well, or for some other reason.

3.6.6 Military Academies' Physical Fitness Programmes

In the final part of this section, the physical fitness programmes provisions of four Western military academies are examined to see what can be learnt from their approach to planning and implementing this aspect of cadet preparation for officership. The first of these academies is the United States Military Academy of West Point (USMA) which boasts of its historical commitment to athletics. The academy strongly

emphasises the competitive aspect of cadets' physical training. Cadet teams take part in at least 26 competitive sports, in which about 30% of all academy cadets are involved. The Academy also competes in about 25 sports with other colleges both regionally and nationally. West Point is also proud that through its extensive athletics programme "every cadet competes and is challenged at the highest level of physical ability". It has a sports department that views athletics as an opportunity for all cadets to develop self-confidence and self-discipline, a sense of fair play, team spirit, and the ability to think and act under stress, all working towards the achievement of the mission and purpose of the military academy (West Point Prospectus 2001:1).

The second academy is the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst (RMAS), which is also for good reasons proud of its long tradition of excellence in all aspects of its training and education of officers, including physical fitness and sports. The Sandhurst Diary (2001: 1-5) indicates that the overall purpose of its physical fitness programme is "to ensure that every cadet leaves Sandhurst in top physical condition and will be able to supervise the fitness training of the soldiers who will be under their command". Thus, cadets are not only expected to achieve a high standard of physical fitness, but they also learn how to organise and conduct physical and recreational training. The physical fitness programme takes into account physical fitness activities such as the challenges of the obstacle course, long endurance marches, adventurous training expeditions, parachuting, gliding, sailing, aqua-diving, and even Scottish country dancing, not to mention parades and all intramural and extramural team sports. All these activities are part of the sports syllabus and are designed to build the confidence, courage, and resourcefulness of the leaders of the future.

The Royal Military College of Canada (RMC) also has a sports department to properly plan and implement its sports activities. In its four-year programme, the RMC aims "to enable each cadet to attain a high level of physical fitness and achieve a satisfactory level of sports skills". Like all members of the Canadian forces, its cadets are trained to be physically fit to meet future military operational requirements, so that they are well prepared to perform in prolonged and stressful situations. The programme includes basic knowledge of a wide variety of sports, and expects all cadets to participate in one or more competitive team sports within the college or between colleges and other

establishments (RMC Prospectus 2001:1). The RMC also stresses the recreational aspect of sports, and also rewards members who demonstrate exceptional levels of performance through awards and other encouragements (CFAO 50: 1-4).

Finally, the Royal Military Academy of Belgium (RMAB) aims for two goals in its physical fitness programme: to have the students reach a strong physical condition, and at the same time develop in them a liking for sports and outdoor activities. In its curriculum, five hours of physical training are prescribed, and cadets are expected to voluntarily spend extra time maintaining good physical fitness. The RMAB describes its programme as an attractive and balanced programme of physical education that “not only takes students to a high standard of physical fitness during their officer preparation, but also teaches them to coach others during sporting activities” (RMAB Prospectus 2001: 1).

Interestingly, during their first two years at RMAB, the cadets’ physical fitness programme is planned; after that they take responsibility for their own fitness, but must still do five hours of sports per week. The choice of activities is wide and includes swimming, judo, and martial arts, as well as competitive sports inside and outside the academy. The final year emphasises “sports methodology”, which is intended to prepare them to take responsibility for the physical training of their troops in the future.

The RMAB prospectus states that the “whole approach to physical education has a sound scientific basis”, monitored by its own team of experts, who ensure that progress and balance are achieved by all the cadets throughout their preparation as officers. It stresses that physical education is “a policy part of its integrated education” and that those cadets who do not meet the standards of the twice –yearly evaluations cannot become officers.

The physical fitness programmes just discussed are those of four of the best military academies in the world. It can be seen that they share many characteristics in terms of goals and how these are designed to be achieved. All four programmes seem to be well planned, stressing the importance of physical training as a preparation for military

readiness. Each also not only expects high standards of performance and the participation of all cadets in competitive sports, but also prepares them to coach others so that they can take care of the physical fitness of their own troops in the future. Another common point is that the academies appear to integrate well other physical activities in their fitness programmes. Finally, at least two out of the four academies explicitly stress that physical fitness activities can and should be enjoyable.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter completes the survey of military literature. It has attempted to offer a detailed account of the significance of and the role played by each of the five junior officer preparation programme components, with a particular emphasis on the features that make them effective and ineffective in the education and training of new recruits into the profession. Together with Chapter Two, it will constitute the basis upon which KKMA's junior officer programme will be assessed in terms of performance. The next chapter outlines and explains the research strategy and procedures chosen for gathering data to be used as evidence in the evaluation of KKMA's programme and in answering research questions of this study.

Chapter Four

Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

As discussed in Chapter One, the main objective of this study is to evaluate KKMA's junior officer preparation programme. This chapter outlines and explains the methodological procedures that were employed to collect and analyse the research data, which are subsequently used as evidence for the evaluation of the various aspects of the programme in question and for answering the research questions.

The early sections of the present chapter justify the study's choice of research design and data collection instruments. These are followed by a description of the stages and steps followed in constructing the main instrument of this study, the questionnaire, including its pilot testing. The research population and sample are then specified. Details of the field study implementation and the appropriate data analysis methods to be used are then presented. Next, issues of validity and reliability, as well as the ethical dimension of conducting this research are addressed.

4.2 Programme Evaluation - Value, Purposes and Focus

Robson (2002: 202-9) states that much social research endeavour can be thought of as some kind of evaluation, or as having an evaluative dimension. Evaluations are important because they help identify strengths and weaknesses in a particular programme. They may indicate that changes are needed in the programme, or that certain aspects of it work or do not work, or whether the programme meets the needs of those taking part in it or not; and thus may assist in its improvement. Evaluation necessarily requires systematic data collection relating to the various aspects of the programme. It also needs to be comprehensive, according to Harrison (1990: 271), and focus on its total value. This agrees with the intent of the present researcher, which has resulted in the decision to assess the effectiveness of all five components of KKMA's junior officer programme. In addition, each programme component is examined in terms of its content, delivery methods, the conditions under which it is delivered, and

outcomes. Finally, Robson (*ibid*) stresses that a proper evaluation must, among other things, be worthwhile and feasible, and carried out fairly, ethically and sensitively. This advice is incorporated within the guiding principles used in conducting this research.

4.3 Research Design

There are several types of research design in social research and researchers are expected to select or devise an appropriate one that will enable them to achieve their research objectives. A research design is basically a data collection approach or a “strategy”. Bell (2002: 7) and Brannen (2003: 3) stress that no single design is better or worse than any other. Different approaches also use different data collection methods, and no approach dictates or rejects the use of any particular method. Quantitative research, for example, is primarily concerned with quantified or statistical facts and generalisations, while qualitative research is essentially concerned with the individual's "perceptions of the world", rather than statistics. However, Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998: 5) point out that most social and behavioural science researchers now use multiple methods combining quantitative and qualitative techniques. In other words, they use whatever method or methods they deem appropriate for their investigations, instead of relying on one method exclusively.

Saunders *et al.* (2003: 88-91), Allan (1991: 177), Powell (1997: 144) and Robson (2002: 290) support the use of multiple method designs because it is advantageous to do so. The important thing is that the researcher has valid reasons for his or her research strategy decisions and that the general plan will enable him/her to answer the research questions. Robson (2002: 371) recommends the adoption of multiple methods because they can be used in complementary fashion to enhance the interpretability of the data obtained. Thus, in a primarily quantitative study such as the present one, the interpretation of statistical results can be enhanced by qualitative narrative accounts, or quotes from respondents.

4.4 Design Applicable to this Study

The design applicable to this research is a multiple method design integrating the use of three instruments: questionnaire, interview and documentary analysis. It could also be termed “a multi-method evaluation design” (Robson 2000: 81). It was chosen for this research because it permits triangulation, an issue to be discussed shortly. Before that, it is worth outlining Robson's five design components, which he stresses should be borne in mind when carrying out any research. These are: (1) the purpose of the study; (2) the theory, or conceptual framework linking the phenomena being studied; (3) the research questions; the data collection methods, how they are analysed and shown to be trustworthy; and (4) the sampling strategy. Figure 4.1 below shows how the five design components interact.




Figure 4-1 Research design framework (adopted from Robson 2002)

The purposes of the evaluation and the theoretical framework in this study helped determine the study's research questions. In turn, the research questions helped determine suitable methods of data collection (discussed below). They also helped to determine the necessary sampling strategy because it is impractical to collect information from everyone involved in KKMA's officer preparation programme.

The purpose of the evaluation was specified in Chapter One. The theoretical framework linking the five programme components was developed and discussed together with the research questions in Chapter Two. Only two of Robson's design

components remain to be discussed, the data collection methods and the sampling strategy. However, other associated issues are also examined.

Returning to the reasons for choosing a multiple method approach, its most obvious advantage, as many researchers argue, is that it allows triangulation (Robson 2002: 370, Cohen *et al.* 2000: 112, Brannen 2003: 11). This research in fact uses two types of triangulation mentioned by Denzin (1988, cited in Robson 2002: 174): data triangulation, i.e. the use of more than one method of data collection (survey, interview, documents); and methodological triangulation, i.e. combining quantitative and qualitative approaches.

Finally, this study's research design is also influenced by Downes' (1991: 2) suggestion that a programme evaluation should be guided by three key questions: "How is it done?"; "How well is it done?" and "How can it be improved?" These questions give further direction as to what kind of issues need to be investigated in relation to each of the five programme components, and narrow down its scope to the main concerns of the evaluation. Figure 4.2 adds these dimensions to the theoretical framework of the study.




Figure 4-2 Methodological Framework

4.5 Research Instruments

Having decided to conduct a programme evaluation and specified the research questions, the next step is to collect the evidence required. Decisions have to be made about which instruments are best for the purposes of this investigation, and then the data collecting instruments must be designed to do the job (Bell 2002: 101). Robson (2000: 82) cites essentially four broad ways of gathering information for evaluation research: (I) observing what is happening; (II) interviewing those involved; (III) getting views or opinions through a survey questionnaire; and (IV) getting hold of documents such as programme descriptions and the like. For practical reasons, namely limited time and resources, as well as infeasibility, observation of KKMA's officer preparation programme was ruled out. Additionally, being a graduate of the Academy, the researcher is unlikely to gain any knowledge through observation that is not already known to him.

4.5.1 Documents

The starting point in the programme evaluation is to get hold of the official written curriculum, course outlines, and other course documents to get a picture of the prescribed programme. These documents in effect constitute the objectives or targets the Academy sets itself to meet in implementing its junior officer training and education. Prescribed programmes also represent the ideal against which actual implementation could be compared (Saunders *et al.* 2003: 201). Their examination and comparison with questionnaire and interview data contribute to the task of evaluating the effectiveness of the various outcomes of junior officer preparation at KKMA.

4.5.2 Interviews

To obtain multiple viewpoints in evaluating the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer programme, three top military academy executives are interviewed: the Deputy Superintendent, the Director of Cadet Training and Education, and the Battalion Commander. These high-ranking officers are directly concerned with the programme to be evaluated. Their views and opinions are needed to establish convergence or divergence of results and add insights to the findings. Of the three basic types of interview, structured, semi-structured, and open or unstructured, the semi-structured format best serves the requirements of this study. It is the right form of interview because it allows both flexibility and control in the interviewer-interviewee interaction. Control is needed to ensure that the most important issues are covered, and flexibility is needed so that in-depth evidence is given, and potentially unexpected points are allowed to be made freely.

Semi-structured interviews require the use of predetermined questions with fixed wording. These are usually asked in a pre-set order, but this can be changed to suit the situation. A degree of skill is needed to make good use of the element of flexibility and yet remain focused on the agenda (Robson 2002: 273). Like all interviews, they require careful preparation. If possible, they should also be taped (*ibid*: 278). In situations where tape-recording is not possible detailed notes should be taken, preferably at the time of conducting the interview (Robson 2000: 94).

4.5.3 Questionnaire

The decision to use the questionnaire as the main instrument of data collection for this

study was forced by the need to extract evaluation data from a large number of graduating cadets and their trainers and instructors. The assumption is that these individuals have had first-hand experience of KKMA's officer preparation programme, therefore they are in an ideal position to express their views and opinions of it in terms of effectiveness. Moreover, as Saunders *et al.* (2003: 281) point out, the questionnaire provides an efficient and relatively inexpensive way of collecting responses from a large sample prior to quantitative analysis, usually by computer. Another advantage of the questionnaire is that it can be completed anonymously and can potentially result in the greater objectivity and accuracy of the responses.

The greatest incentive for choosing the questionnaire as the main data collection tool for this study is the almost guaranteed access to the desired population sample for the questionnaire since, in the words of Kidder & Judd (1986: 224), they are "captive" in the Academy. As a result, they feel obliged to respond. A very high response rate can thus be expected under these circumstances. The biggest hurdles are in the preparation stages that precede the questionnaire administration, including its construction and translation, selection of a representative sample, obtaining permission to conduct the survey, and making the necessary arrangements for the organised assembly of respondents in a suitable location to complete it. These are all issues considered in this chapter.

4.6 Questionnaire Construction

A questionnaire is not produced by sitting down and trying to think of some interesting questions to ask. Rather, the questions must be designed to help achieve the goals of the research and, in particular, to answer the research questions (Robson 2002: 141). To arrive at the final version of the questionnaire for this study, the construction process went through three stages: a planning stage, a designing stage, and a pilot testing stage.

4.6.1 Planning Stage

A good questionnaire needs to be well planned. Time spent planning precisely what data need to be collected ensures that no useless data are obtained (Saunders *et al.*

2003: 289). Adequate data will provide evidence on the basis of which the research questions can be answered. Steps taken to this effect for this research included a thorough review of military literature, academy curricula and internet sites, and visits to KKMA, the Egyptian Military Academy, and Sandhurst (UK). Identifying key areas to be covered by the questionnaire was a major concern. It was vital to remember that the questionnaire's mission was to tap the respondents' perceptions of the effectiveness or otherwise of five programme components: selection, indoctrination, vocational education, liberal education and physical fitness. Evaluations of each of these areas had to be detailed, precise and relevant.

4.6.2 Designing Stage

Questionnaire design begins with adopting, adapting, and/or developing suitable questions for inclusion in the instrument. It involves making several other decisions, such as on the appropriate wording of individual questions, structure, presentation, layout, choosing which other related questions need to be asked, choosing a method of asking questions, which questions need to be initially left open, the length of the questionnaire, choice of rating scale, and providing clear instructions. Concerning the present study, only a handful of existing questions was adopted (I/O questions, Part 1 Q2), the rest were all created by the researcher taking into account the principles of good questionnaire design, available in all good research methodology books. The researcher also derived ideas from past researchers' best practice and advice from his supervisor.

The questionnaire in its final form (see Appendix 1) was drafted and rewritten several times. It includes 146 items. Its length was a problem and participants were made aware of this at the outset. The time it took to complete ranged from one hour to one hour and a half. It needed to be completed in one sitting to avoid collusion and the contamination of results.

The structure of the questionnaire follows closely that of the theoretical framework. It contains five parts, each corresponding to a specific component of the framework. Part I deals with Recruitment and Selection, Part II with Military Indoctrination, Part III

with Vocational Education and Training, Part IV with Liberal Education, and Part V with Physical Fitness (see Table 4.1). Similar sets of questions were asked in the interests of consistency and easy completion. For example, each part (except Part I) begins by asking for perceptions of the importance of the officer preparation component in question, followed by an assessment of views and opinions on the effectiveness of key elements or aspects of the programme component, the approaches and methods used in their delivery, the emphasis or importance they are given by the Academy, whether the specific programme is yielding the expected outcomes or not, and a measurement of overall satisfaction, which also provides a consistency check regarding the respondents' answers. Each part ends with an assessment of the impacts of a number of obstacles on the effectiveness of the component. Additional specific questions were added to complete the picture for each component, for example on issues of balance in the programmes, relevance of certain elements, suitability of the learning environment, and others.

Each part of the questionnaire begins with a statement of purpose, and instructions on how to answer the questions. For most questions, respondents were asked to provide their responses by circling a number on a 5-point Likert scale. In this way, the responses obtained would be uniform and amenable to statistical analysis by computer. The questionnaire is accompanied by a covering letter, carefully worded to explain the purpose and potential value of the research, and stressing complete anonymity and confidentiality. The letter also urges respondents to give truthful responses. The questionnaire ends with a postscript expressing thanks.

Finally, before piloting the questionnaire, a draft version was circulated among a number of knowledgeable people for comments and suggestions. This step led to revisions, the rewording of certain questions and the removal of other defects. Details of the questionnaire scheme are given below:

Table 4-1 The scheme of the questionnaire

Part No.	Title	Questions No.
I	Selection and Recruitment	1 to 19
II	Indoctrination	20 to 59
III	Vocational Training	60 to 80
IV	Liberal Education	81 to 115
V	Physical Fitness	116 to 146

4.6.3 Pilot Testing Stage

According to Saunders *et al.* (2003: 308), Kidder & Judd (1986: 233) and Robson (2002: 254), pre-testing questionnaires is absolutely essential and should not be confused with its informal examination by "experts". Proper piloting involves respondents from the same population as the actual study. According to Salant & Dillman (1994), it needs to answer the following questions:

1. Does each question measure what it is intended to measure?
2. Do respondents understand all the words?
3. Are questions interpreted similarly by all respondents?
4. Does each close-ended question have an answer that applies to each respondent?
5. Does the questionnaire create a positive impression - one that motivates people to answer it?
6. Are the answers the respondents can choose from correct? (Are some missing? Do some elicit uninterpretable answers?)
7. Does any aspect of the questionnaire suggest bias on the part of the researcher?

In addition to the above, Bell (2002: 128) adds:

8. How long did the questionnaire take to complete?
9. Were the instructions clear?
10. Did the respondents object to answering any of the questions?
11. Were there any major topic omissions?
12. Was the layout clear/attractive?
13. Any other comments?

Responses to the above questions, according to their authors, should enable revision and improvements to the questionnaire, which will make it ready for the main field study. It could also save considerable time and effort at the analysis stage.

Armed with this wealth of advice, the present researcher conducted a pilot study at KKMA over a period of two weeks (from 4/4/02 to 19/4/02). Since the target population for this research is made up of two groups, Class 1999 final year cadets and teaching staff, fifteen cadets and six staff members were requested to participate in this phase. All enthusiastically agreed to take part by filling in the questionnaire and adding their views and comments on various aspects of the data-gathering instrument.

Reactions to the questionnaire were positive and encouraging. Respondents felt that issues of real concern to them had been covered and several suggestions were made for improving it. Most of them found the questionnaire long, but "interesting", and that the questionnaire content was generally appropriate and relevant. The questionnaires were completed by the cadets in the presence of the researcher, who to observed reactions and assisted if required. Staff members preferred to take the questionnaire home and returned it within three days. The cadets took up to ninety minutes to complete the questionnaire. No questions were left unanswered and none presented special difficulties.

Once the pilot study was completed, the present researcher took the data to the Department of Statistics at King Saud University (KSU) in Riyadh in order to assess it for reliability. With the help of an expert statistician, the questionnaire was evaluated for reliability section by section, then question by question. Some questions indicated low reliability, especially in sections I and II. As a result, some questions were removed and others were amended in order to ensure high reliability during the field study. Moreover, all open questions were closed on the basis of the answers obtained from the respondents. Apart from these changes, the questionnaire was satisfactory. Finally, the pilot study was an opportunity to make further contacts with the Academy authorities to ensure that the purpose of the survey was well understood and that there would be no problems of access during the field study.

4.7 Interview Questions

Preparation, needless to stress, is just as important for the interviews with the commanders as it is for the questionnaire. Bearing in mind that the purposes of the interviews in this study is to obtain the perspectives of three top military executives on the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme and to permit triangulation, the questions necessarily needed to be focused on essentially the same issues. Interviewees are, however, also to be asked Downes' third question "How can it be improved?" in relation to certain issues in each component. Naturally, a limit has to be placed on the number of questions to ensure willing co-operation and so that the agreed duration of the interaction will not be exceeded. Thus, between four to six questions were formulated for each programme component (see Appendix 2). The questions are all open-ended to allow for in-depth exploration.

4.8 Research Population and Sample

The previous sections have covered the methods and tools used in this study for collecting information to answer the research questions. It is now time to specify from whom the information is going to be gathered. In deciding to conduct this research, the present researcher chose to restrict the investigation to one institution, KKMA. Even so, it is impracticable to attempt to include all members of the Academy in the study, as in a census. For reasons of access, feasibility, costs, and time constraint, a sample will need to be drawn. However, this must be done in such a way that the selected sample of respondents is, as far as possible, representative of the population as a whole. Generalisations can then be made from the findings (Bell 2002: 126, Robson 2000: 101).

First, it is worth noting who, from among all the members of the Academy, are excluded from the investigation, namely non-teaching staff and mature, fast-track trainee officers. In other words, the target population for the survey comprises all Class 1999 cadets on the regular officer preparation programme. Thus, the population of the study consists of two groups or strata:

- (a) all teaching staff, both military and civilian directly involved with Class 1999

training and education, numbering 70 in total, of whom 50 are military officers and 20 are civilians;

- (b) all final year, Class 1999 cadets of the regular programme, numbering 400.

4.8.1 Sampling Method

For the purposes of this research, random sampling is appropriate because we wish to select a non-biased, representative sample of respondents. In this way, we can be reasonably confident that the findings in this research will be true of the whole population from which the sample was drawn. In random sampling, every individual has an equal chance of being selected, if the process is carried out properly (see Saunders *et al.* 2003: 150-187; Kidder & Judd 1986: 143-167 for detailed examples of procedures and other forms of sampling).

For obvious reasons, including triangulation in the analysis of results, two independent sub-samples are needed: cadets and teaching staff members. This means that the method needed can now be referred to as "stratified random sampling". In stratified random sampling, a simple random sample is taken from each sub-sample, and the sub-samples are then joined to form the total sample (Kidder & Judd 1986: 158). In view of the fact that the sub-samples are disproportionate in terms of numbers, stratified proportionate sampling is not appropriate. Instead, the decision was taken to include all members of teaching staff in the sample and randomly select 25% of the 400-strong cadet population. Robson (2002: 262) argues that it is perfectly acceptable to increase the number of elements in a group, as was done here, when using stratifying sampling because "it makes sense".

As for the precise random sampling method used to select cadets, the procedure was made simple by the fact that the cadets in the sampling frame are organised by the Academy into two separate companies, each comprising 200 cadets. The present researcher asked company commanders to select 50 cadets randomly from each company. To do this, it was suggested that they should select a digit (1 or 4) randomly, then select every fourth case (multiples of 4) right through their cadet list.

4.9 Main Field Study

The nature of the chosen research design for this study required the researcher to collect data through three instruments: a written structured questionnaire, a semi-structured interview, and documentary research. Arrangements were therefore made by the researcher to travel to Saudi Arabia to conduct the main field study between 20/5/02 and 31/8/02. This period coincided with two important events at King Khaled Military Academy. The first is the end of the preparation programme for Class 1999 cadets, the target population of this study. The timing was deliberate because it was judged that the cadets were at this particular juncture of their career in possession of a complete picture of KKMA's officer preparation programme, which they had experienced for three years. This period also coincided with the busy annual activities of the Academy's selection committee, which was beginning the laborious process of selecting new cadets for Class 2002.

4.9.1 Questionnaire Administration

Having carefully designed, pilot-tested and amended the questionnaire, and finalised the precise sampling strategy to be used, the researcher then proceeded with the main data collection operation. Saunders *et al.* (2003:310) point out that the way a questionnaire is administered will have a direct impact on the response rate and the quality of the data obtained. Consequently, to maximise response rate and data quality, the researcher first obtained official approval to go ahead with the field study implementation at the Academy. Next, arrangements were made to gather all the study sample cadets in a large hall in the presence of the present researcher and a number of colleagues who had agreed to lend a hand. Once all were seated, the present researcher explained the nature, purpose, and significance of the research, and requested the cadets' full co-operation, promising complete confidentiality and anonymity. In addition to reiterating the main points mentioned in the covering letter which precedes the questionnaire to encourage enthusiastic participation (see Appendix 1), the present researcher gave further instructions, stressing to the cadets the importance of filling in the questionnaire truthfully, to the best of their knowledge, and without consulting with their neighbours. They were also urged to answer all the questions without exception.

Self-completed questionnaires administered on a group basis in the presence of the present researcher present many advantages, according to research methodology writers (Saunders *et al.* 2003: 310; Bell 2002: 128; Robson 2002: 236; Kidder & Judd 1986: 224). The method raises the perceived importance of the study and gives the researcher the opportunity to monitor questionnaire completion, answer potential questions, and generally maximise the response rate. As predicted by Kidder & Judd (*ibid*: 224), under the circumstances, the researcher was able to obtain 100 per cent response rate from the cadets. As for the questionnaires intended to be distributed to the teaching staff sample, seventy in total, these were hand-delivered to them by the researcher. All completed questionnaires were returned within three weeks approximately. Table 4.2 below shows the distribution of survey questionnaires administered and returned.

Table 4-2 Questionnaire distribution and response rate

Participants	Questionnaires Distributed	Questionnaires Returned	Response Rate
Cadets	100	100	100%
Military Teaching Staff	50	40	80%
Civilian Teaching Staff	20	7	35%
Total	170	147	Average 86.4%

As the figures from the above table show, response rates were very satisfactory. Non-responses on the part of teaching staff were due to the fact that the data collection was conducted during the very busy period of the preparation for Class 1999 graduation, as well as the beginning of the annual leave for civilian staff.

4.9.2 Interviews with Commanders

Permission to interview top Academy officials was granted without hesitation by the Deputy Superintendent of KKMA (C1), who also agreed to be interviewed himself. Both the Director of Cadet Training and Education (C2), and the Battalion Commander (C3) confirmed their willingness to be interviewed upon request. It is worth reiterating that the purpose of the semi-structured interviews was to obtain their perspectives concerning the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer programme, which Class 1999 had only just completed. The interviews were conducted according to the following procedure:

- (i) After prior contacts to confirm participation in the study, interview appointments were arranged at the commander's convenience.
- (ii) On the agreed interview day, the researcher introduced himself and explained the aims of the study and the purpose of the interview. Assurance was given that no individuals would be identified in the results and that their answers would only be used for research purposes. By this time an initial rapport had been established
- (iii) The researcher then posed the interview questions (see Appendix 2), listening carefully and probing for specific examples.
- (iv) The interview was closed with a final question asking the interviewees if they had anything to add, at the end of which they were thanked for generously offering their time and contribution to the study.

The time needed to complete the interviews varied from ninety minutes to two hours. The commanders judged the use of the tape-recorder inappropriate but did not object to note-taking. The researcher was able to record exact quotes from the informants on various issues, first in brief note form, then completed them immediately after each interview session.

4.9.3 Examination of Documents

Much of the documentary evidence needed for this study had already been made available to the researcher during earlier visits to the Academy, particularly for the Pilot Study. Programme guides were accessible to anyone for academic and research

purposes. In some cases, the researcher was even allowed to examine and take notes from restricted distribution or classified documents once his credentials and his official permission to conduct the study were checked.

4.9.4 Data Analysis

Analysis of the qualitative data from both the semi-structured interviews and the documentary research was straightforward, since they were comparatively less voluminous than those gathered from the survey. Documentary analysis was simply a matter of selecting and summarising relevant data, then tabulating them where appropriate. They were intended to be displayed as the "official line" or the "how it is done" part of the results in relation to each component. "How well is it done?", it will be remembered, was to be obtained through the questionnaire and interviews. Since the interviews involved only three participants, no statistical analysis was needed, and analysis was restricted to highlighting significant qualitative quotes on key issues.

Analysis of the results of the survey questionnaire, however, proved more laborious and sophisticated, requiring the use of an SPSS computer package (statistics package for the Social Sciences). The following techniques were therefore used:

1. Data regarding the respondents' background were coded and entered into the computer. For example, staff member was coded 1 and cadets 2. SPSS package was used to calculate frequency percentages in each category of information.
2. Frequency tables: This is a method of summarising data for individual variables in a table form (frequency distribution) so that specific values can be read and interpreted. Percentage values were calculated and tabulated for all items pertaining to a respondent's perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes.
3. The mean is the simple average of all scores for a particular group. Its value takes into account the value of each individual score (Johnson 1977: 59). It is used to detect similarities and differences in group and overall scores. It was computed by adding all the scores for a particular variable together and

dividing them by the total number of respondents in each group, i.e. cadets and teaching staff, then for both groups combined, i.e. for the whole sample. To give a practical example, suppose we only had 10 respondents in each group, we add up all the relevant scores (e.g. 5+3+4+1 etc, as in the example below), then divide by the number of respondents (N). Thus, adding the scores together, we obtain the total:

$$5+3+4+1+2+4+2+3+5+4 = \text{Total } 33$$

$$\text{Mean} = \frac{\text{Score total}}{N(\text{respondents})} = \frac{33}{10} = 3.3 \text{ (Mean Value)}$$

4. Standard deviation (SD): This provides a measure of the extent to which scores are scattered around the mean. The greater the scatter of the mean, the greater the standard deviation. Its value reflects the deviation of scores from the mean. Thus, if the standard deviation is low, this means that the values considered are close to the mean, and the mean is an accurate reflection of the results.
5. The t-test: The t-test is a powerful statistical technique which is used to explore whether there are differences between the means of two unrelated samples (Oppenheim 1992: 287). It is a test that enables the researcher to compare two means to determine the probability that the difference between the means is a real one, i.e. one that would also be reflected in the whole population, rather than the result of chance (Tukman 1975: 231). For instance, suppose that we want to know how cadets and teaching staff differ in rating the overall effectiveness of KKMA's recruitment and selection system. To do so, we need to calculate the average cadet rating (mean) and that of the teaching staff, then look at the difference and its level of significance.
6. Significance level: Observing sample means is not enough to conclude that the difference is real and not a coincidence. We need to calculate probability, with a value ranging from zero to one. If the P (Probability) value is small, we conclude that the difference between the sample means is unlikely to be a coincidence. We conclude instead that the populations have different means,

or that the difference is significant. In this research, a probability $p \leq .05$ means that the difference is sufficiently high (significant). When P goes down as far as $p = .000$, this means that the differences are bigger and most obvious.

4.9.5 Credibility of the Research

The trustworthiness of a piece of research is usually measured by the extent to which it gives sufficient detail about procedures, equipment, etc. that warrant the conclusions reached and enable the reader to carry out an exact replication of the study if desired (Robson 2002: 109). This chapter and the appendices attached to the thesis do just that. For the qualitative data, evaluative criteria such as consistency of perceptions and triangulation between the research participants' views were used as evaluative criteria of credibility. In this respect, no significant inconsistencies or contradictions were detected in the findings that might cast doubt on the validity or reliability of the qualitative contributions offered by the research participants. For the quantitative data, other standard means of assuring validity and reliability were used (Robson 2002: 168).

4.9.6 Validity

The validity of this study's main instrument, the survey questionnaire, concerns the extent to which this instrument measures what it is intended to measure (Bell 2002: 104). To ensure the validity of the questionnaire in terms of content, format, question wording, sequence, length and so on a first draft was submitted for evaluation by at least two university staff members in the UK. The questionnaire was also pre-tested on three doctoral students. Several amendments were subsequently applied to it following comments and suggestions. Further evaluations of the questionnaire including its translated version in Arabic were carried out. Special emphasis was placed on the statistical analysability of the data that would be gathered by the questionnaire. Altogether, four individuals contributed to its improvement. Details of this are given below in Table 4.3.

Table 4-3 Contributors to the improvement of the questionnaire instrument

No.	Assessor	Position	Place of work
1	Dr Hussein Sirriyeh	Senior Lecturer, Department of Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies	University of Leeds
2	Lieutenant Colonel Dr Abdulkarim Alrumian	Cadet company commander, Senior Lecturer and member of Selection and Recruitment Committee	KKMA
3	Dr Obaid Alharbi	Senior Lecturer, Department of Statistics	King Saud University (KSU)
4	Dr H. Karamalla	Consultant Department of Statistic	Riyadh Chamber of Commerce

4.9.7 Reliability

Reliability has been defined by Eltinge & Roberts (1993: 72) as "the level of consistency or stability of an instrument". This means that the instrument in question, the survey questionnaire, should give similar results if it is applied again in a similar context (Cohen *et al* 2000: 117). For the purposes of this research, the researcher used the Cronbach Alpha to check internal consistency reliability. The findings revealed a reliability of 0.93. This value indicates the level of consistency of the participants' responses from item to item. The calculation is carried out by comparing the standard deviation for each item (Thorndike & Hagen 1977: 460). The 0.93 value resulting from Cronbach Alpha Coefficient tells us that there was agreement and internal consistency amongst the participants' responses in the study. It tells us that there was little variation between the test items, suggesting that the participants' responses were free from chance error. This is a high reliability value, sufficiently dependable for the statistical analysis to reach reasonable conclusions.

4.9.8 Ethics of the Research

Ethics refers to the appropriateness of the researcher's conduct throughout the research, particularly towards those who become the object of his/her work. However, ethical concerns permeate research, especially evaluation research, across all its stages from planning, seeking access to the organisation(s) and respondents, collecting, analysing, and reporting the data.

It must be appreciated that the decision to conduct this programme evaluation within SANG's military academy, KKMA, is a matter of considerable sensitivity. Yet, the researcher was granted official permission to conduct the research, and was provided with almost unrestricted access to information not ordinarily accessible to the general public, as long as it was used for academic purposes only. The Academy's authorities did not feel threatened by the evaluation of its programme. Quite the contrary; they expressed interest and readiness to welcome constructive criticism. Moreover, in administering the questionnaire and conducting interviews, the researcher assured the participants of confidentiality and anonymity in order to secure their informed consent and co-operation. In both cases, the researcher was placed in a position of trust. The ethical course for the researcher is to honour that trust, but at the same time try to seek an understanding of the situation by "telling it as it is" and as it is perceived by its sample of informants (Saunders *et al.* 2003; Robson 2002; Gill & Johnson 1997; Kidder & Judd 1986).

4.9.9 Conclusion

The credibility of a piece of research is closely linked with the methods and techniques it uses to collect and analyse valid and reliable evidence which forms the basis upon which the conclusions of the research are drawn. It also depends upon the extent to which it reflects principles of effective design accumulated from the experiences of other researchers. This chapter has attempted to show awareness of such considerations in making methodological decisions. It also demonstrated that the

research design and methods to be used in collecting and analysing data were necessarily shaped by feasibility constraints as well as by a balanced regard for objectivity and ethical considerations. Chapters Five to Nine present the statistical results of the study together with their analysis.

Chapter Five

Findings Related to Recruitment and Selection

5.1 Introduction

Chapter Five discusses the field study results related to the component of recruitment and selection obtained through the main instrument of this study, the questionnaire, as well as those gathered through face-to-face interviews with three military commanders and the examination of relevant documents by the present researcher.

The main body of the chapter consists of two parts. The first part is based on documentary data sources and essentially outlines the main routes to officership at KKMA and the methods used to attract and recruit candidates, and describes the selection procedure from the administrative pre-selection step through to how the final selection decision is made. The second part represents the bulk of this chapter. It gives and interprets the statistical findings derived from the survey participants' responses and the qualitative reactions of the commanders interviewed to the main issues covered.

5.2 Current Recruitment and Selection Practices at KKMA: Documents Analysis

In order to understand and place the present situation regarding KKMA's officer recruitment and selection system in proper perspective, the present researcher gathered relevant information by reviewing documentary evidence from the admissions office. The summary that follows outlines the main recruitment methods and selection instruments currently in use at the Academy. It also describes the decision process for accepting officer applicants and briefly discusses the cultural context within which the selection process is conducted.

5.2.1 Ways to Become an Officer

Generally, there are two ways to officership at KKMA: (a) the regular entry programme, and (b) the fast-track entry programme, (Figure 5.1).




Figure 5-1 Ways to become an officer at KKMA

The regular programme looks for applicants who have finished high school, which is typically completed at 17 or 18 years of age. This group represents the majority of applicants who receive training and education at KKMA. Successful applicants are exposed to intensive military training and education at a university level, covering a

wide range of subjects aimed at producing well-rounded officers. The programme lasts for three years leading to a Bachelor of Military Science Degree. Cadets receive free tuition, medical care, room and board, and are paid (2600 SR) monthly. Each year, approximately 300-400 recruits are enrolled through this programme, and the Academy annually produces 300-250 new SANG officers. Finally, these officers are entitled to a full career and can serve until retirement age. The fast-track programme, on the other hand, aims at recruiting specialists who already have a college or university degree in selected professions. These include doctors, dentists, engineers, computer specialists, psychologists, etc. For this programme, only approximately 50 recruits are accepted at a time in a year when the course is being held, since the intake depends on SANG needs, centrally. The fast-track programme runs entirely separate courses lasting one year only, at the end of which successful candidates receive second lieutenant and a Diploma in Military Sciences. These officers are also entitled to a full career with SANG and can serve until retirement age.

5.2.2 Recruitment Methods

Caruth *et al.* (1988: 127) define recruitment as a process of locating individuals with appropriate qualifications and in sufficient numbers, and encouraging them to apply for vacancies in a particular organisation. As a military organisation KKMA is fortunate to be in the position of a popular producer of military officers for a prestigious employer, SANG. Those who succeed in securing acceptance with it can, after graduation, look forward to lifelong guaranteed employment and high social status. As a consequence, the Academy attracts approximately 10,000 interested candidates annually. Its main concern, therefore, is with quality rather than quantity. The Academy uses a variety of recruitment methods, including advertising in the national newspapers, usually once or twice a year, broadcasting the offer of a tour around the Academy on national radio and television once a year, organising school visits and an open day, participating in exhibitions, and publishing articles and general information and admission requirements in the KKMA Quarterly Magazine and the National Guard Monthly Magazine. Finally, the Academy is publicised in all 'recruiting stations' located in the major cities of the Kingdom. These are places where applicants can receive information, talk to recruiters, and complete application forms. These recruiting stations do not perform selection operations. They merely provide

information, advice and help in completing application forms. Candidates thought to be ineligible may be discouraged or directed towards other service branches.

5.2.3 Selection Procedure

According to Caruth *et al.* (1988:149), selection is the process of choosing from a group of applicants those who are deemed to be the best qualified for positions in an organisation. Selection, they add, is a most difficult process because it involves making judgements about people, their abilities, character, potential, etc. The selection procedure at KKMA is handled locally by a commission of selectors. The Academy processes about 10,000 applications per year, but numbers are reduced gradually starting with pre-selection based on academic reports, character references, career orientation, general suitability and so on. KKMA has no specific profile of the ideal officer candidate, except that he should meet certain basic requirements that allow him to be trained and educated successfully. In other words, the emphasis is primarily on 'developing' military officers rather than seeking candidates with pre-existing officer qualities.

The selection procedure follows seven distinct steps, and the whole process from beginning to end takes up to three months to complete, that is before final enrolment decisions are officially known and communicated to competing candidates. These steps include (1) administrative pre-selection; (2) initial medical check up; (3) physical fitness test; (4) written test; (5) interview; (6) comprehensive medical assessment; and (7) the decision (Figure 5.2).




Figure 5-2 KKMA's seven-step officer cadet selection system

1. Administrative pre-selection

Like all military academies in the world, KKMA has certain pre-determined eligibility requirements that candidates must meet before entering into the selection process. The admission criteria are made available in print to all candidates through the various recruitment venues. Applicants are rejected only if they do not meet the set criteria. These criteria are that each candidate must:

Be a Saudi citizen by birth and origin. Exception is made for individuals born abroad

to Saudi parents working outside the Kingdom.

- Possess a General High School Certificate, with 80-85% overall grades in science subjects
- Be aged between 17-24 years of age for the regular programme, and not older than 27 for the fast-track programme
- Pass the medical tests
- Pass the written tests
- Pass the interview
- Be single
- Have good character and behaviour, and no criminal or previous prosecution record
- Not be excluded from another establishment

2. Initial medical check up

The purpose of the initial medical test is to identify obvious disabilities and limitations to avoid risks in the physical fitness test which immediately follows it. This is both a precautionary measure to avoid injuries and a means of eliminating those who fail from further consideration. During this stage, checks are made on minimum height (1.65m), eyes, nose, throat, chest, posture, blood pressure, heart diseases, skin diseases, deformities and disfigurements, and flat feet.

3. Physical fitness test

Physical fitness is assessed through four activities: twenty push-ups, twenty sit ups, a 3,200 meter run to be completed in maximum 12 minutes 15 second and a 1600 meter run to be completed in a maximum of 8 minutes.

4. Written test

This is a one-hour general knowledge assessment, covering language proficiency (Arabic and English), mathematics, and sciences. At the end of this test, candidates go straight to the interview.

5. Interview

This standard part of officer selection aims to probe and add information to that already collected from other sources. It incorporates, among other things, the assessment of the candidate's general appearance, confidence, mental agility, awareness, motivation, service compatibility, and the overall impression of his potential of successful cadetship. Subsequently, a list for the first 2,000 suitable candidates based on test results and performance at the interview is published together with a cumulative score. This is a pre-approval in principle, but the decision is still conditional upon clearance from the comprehensive medical assessment, final screening by the selection board, and confirmation of acceptance by the National Guard High Command.

6. Comprehensive medical assessment

This is conducted at King Fahad National Guard Hospital. Here, candidates are subjected to extensive medical examinations and tests, such as analysis of blood and urine, spine and chest radiography, cardiovascular functions, etc. The aim is to detect disorders and incapacities on the basis of which applicants may be considered unsuitable for the functions and responsibilities of a military officer.

7. The decision

Final screening for a decision is carried out by the selection board. This consists of a chairman who is a high-ranking officer, usually a Brigadier, together with an assistant, a secretary, eight officers, and three senior civilian teaching staff members. Their task includes reaching consensus decisions on uncertain cases and finalising a top-down list of suitable candidates for enrolment. The exact number of applicants to be enlisted is eventually forwarded together with their files, and objective and subjective assessments to the National Guard High Command, who have the final say on this matter. It is believed that among the concerns of the High Command are issues of strategic importance, such as demonstrating regional, ethnic and tribal balance, and fairness to all sections of the social strata of the Saudi nation.

5.2.4 Cultural Context


KKMA's selection process has been developed into what it is today: primarily influenced by military necessities and priorities, but also the result of cultural forces. Moral conduct, observance of Islamic teachings, and untainted reputation and honour play a vital role in the selection decision. However, there is a widespread belief that KKMA's selection system is not immune from the influence of *wāsta* or nepotism, a phenomenon that allegedly plagues many aspects of Saudi life. Whether real or imagined, there seems to be a perception that each year a number of recruits to the Academy are accepted irrespective of their aptitudes.

5.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings

The preceding section covered "How is the recruitment and selection process conducted at KKMA?" in theory. Now follows "How well is it being done?", that is its evaluation through the perceptions of the participants in this research.

5.3.1 How Class 1999 Was Recruited

In designing the survey questionnaire (see Appendix 1), it seemed appropriate to begin by asking the sample of selected cadets how they first knew about KKMA. The question included five possible avenues derived from the literature. Figure 5.3 shows the frequency distribution of Class 1999 cadets participating in this study by various methods of recruitment to KKMA.



**Figure 5-3 Distribution of Cadets by Various Methods of Recruitment to KKMA
(Class 1999) (A1-I.Q1).**

As the figure shows, just over half (51%) of all cadets surveyed indicated that they had first got to know about the Academy through personal inquiry, ranking first as a method of recruitment. This is followed by contacts with friends and relatives who are current Academy members (21%), ranking second in terms of frequency. The remaining 28% of cadets were recruited through media advertising, the open day tour of the Academy, or through an Academy representative's annual efforts to enlist new recruits from high schools. These results appear to suggest that KKMA relies primarily on passive methods of recruitment; that is, on the personal initiatives of potential recruits rather than on seeking and reaching them through active methods. The literature survey conducted for this study shows that modern trends in officer recruitment and selection tend to be increasingly pro-active to maximise the chances of identifying and recruiting the highest possible proportion of top-quality candidates.

Anticipating that passive methods of recruitment would be the predominant approach at KKMA, the researcher included a question in the interviews with the commanders inviting them to explain why the Academy does not adopt more pro-active methods of recruitment.

One commander (A2-C1) commented:

“We don’t see the need for aggressive recruitment techniques because we are already overwhelmed with applications. Each year, we receive in excess of 10,000 applications for officership of which 300 have to be turned down. Attracting more young people would only add to our costs and processing time.”

Another commander (A2-C3) also pointed out: “I know that other military academies, especially in Western countries, spend huge amounts of money on advertising and go out of their way to recruit officer cadets, but that is because military careers are not so popular there, with anti-militarism and so on. Here it’s different; more people want to become military officers than we can handle ...”

The question is, are passive recruitment approaches effective enough to guarantee high-quality officer recruits?

5.3.2 Institutionally or Occupationally Motivated Recruits?

The second question in the first part of this questionnaire is of special interest because underlying it is an issue that has received substantial attention in military research; that is, the institution / occupation issue (I/O). Basically, it is argued by some researchers in the military field that institutionally motivated candidates make better and more committed officers than occupationally orientated individuals. Others disagree, but a more recent and enlightened group sees that there is no harm in new military recruits being driven by both institutional and occupational motives, as long as these are at least evenly balanced. To assess candidates’ motivations along the I/O dimensions, the question asked them to rate six items adapted from Mosks & Wood (1988:30) in terms of their influence on their decision to join KKMA. The results are displayed in Table 5.1 below.

Table 5-1 Rating and ranking of cadets' reasons for joining KKMA (A1-I.Q2).

Reason	Mean	Std. Deviation	Ranking
Pride in being in Military	4.59	.60	1
Serve country	4.48	.59	2
More attractive than civilian	4.24	.90	3
Job security and retirement benefits	4.10	.97	4
Family traditions	3.36	1.22	5
Skills suitable in civilian world	2.85	1.30	6

Examination of Table 5.1 reveals that cadets' responses are evenly distributed on the six I/O measures, with "pride in being a military officer" (I) and "I wanted to serve my country" (I) ranking first and second on the list respectively (means 4.59 and 4.48). These are closely followed by equally high means for the two occupational measures "job opportunities more attractive than in civilian sector" and "long-term job security and retirement benefits."

The least frequent institutional motivation is "to continue a family tradition of service to the Military", although with a not inconsiderable mean of 3.36. The last of cadets' concerns is "developing skills utilisable in the civilian world at some time in the future" with a low to moderate 2.85 mean. These findings provide some evidence that KKMA cadets are neither idealistic nor merely attracted to officer careers for occupational reasons only. Their motivations could be described as healthily balanced.

5.3.3 Perceptions of Effectiveness of Key Aspects of KKMA's Recruitment and Selection

In describing the components of the system of recruitment and selection earlier, the emphasis was on "how is it done?" Now, attention shifts to "how well is it done?", which is why participants in this investigation were asked for their evaluations of various aspects of the system in question.

First, the survey respondents were requested to indicate their general perceptions of the extent to which KKMA genuinely gives the greatest possible attention to its recruitment and selection methods. Responses to this question are presented in Table 5.2 below:

Table 5-2 Respondents' perceptions of extent to which KKMA gives greatest attention to its recruitment and selection methods (A1-I.Q4-1).

	Strongly disagree %	Disagree %	Somewhat agree %	Agree %	Strongly agree %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	5	12	24	37	22	3.59	1.11	P=.228 (NS)
TS	6.5	8.7	13	41.3	30.4	3.80	1.16	
WS	5.5	11	20.5	38.4	24.7	3.65	1.12	

Note: C= cadet. TS= Training Staff. WS= whole sample. M= Mean. S.D = Standard Deviation. Sig.L = Significance level. P= Probability

Inspection of Table 5.2 shows that in all cases there is a larger proportion of support for the statement that KKMA gives the greatest attention to its recruitment and selection methods than there is for its rejection. Thus, a high 63.1% of all respondents agree or strongly agree, and a low 16.5% disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, with an overall relatively high mean of (3.65). Interestingly, it appears that the views of the teaching staff group are less extreme than those of the cadets surveyed on both sides of the rating scale. However, when the t-test for the differences between the means was applied, no significant differences between the two groups emerged (P=.228 (NS)). Nevertheless, it is perhaps worth wondering why 16.5% of all respondents disagree or strongly disagree and 20.5% of them are unsure on the question. Maybe an organisation that aims for excellence should expect an even higher vote of confidence (RMC Report 1997:32), otherwise there could be doubts about its image and its use of a fair and systematic system of selection (Saier 1995:4).

In interviews with the three high-ranking commanders at the Academy who agreed to take part in this study, A2-C1 asked whether in his view KKMA gave the greatest attention to its recruitment and selection methods, said: "I am satisfied that the

Academy does everything it can in terms of recruitment and selection, considering the pressures we are under. We respond to and seriously consider every application and inquiry we receive, and we are talking about thousands of them here. I am also sure that our local examiners and members of the selection board are competent and well-respected staff members who are aware of their responsibilities both to SANG and to the general public". A2-C2 and A2-C3 expressed much the same views on this question.

Next, the respondents were asked about their perception of the extent to which KKMA uses reliable methods to reach and recruit the very best candidates for officership. Their responses were as follows:

Table 5-3 Respondents' perceptions of extent to which KKMA uses reliable methods to recruit best candidates for officership (A1-I.Q4-2).

	Strongly disagree %	Disagree %	Somewhat agree %	Agree %	Strongly agree %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	26.3	22.2	22.2	23.2	6.1	2.60	1.26	P=.120 (NS)
TS	15.2	23.9	17	37	6.5	2.95	1.22	
WS	22.8	22.8	20.7	27.6	6.2	2.71	1.20	

Table 5.3 shows that more respondents disagree than agree with the view that KKMA uses reliable methods. Combined percentages give 45.6% versus 33.8% respectively and 20.7% with no clear-cut opinion, the mean for the whole sample being low to moderate (2.71). T-test used to assess the difference between cadets and teaching staff's mean scores, (2.60) and (2.95) respectively, revealed no statistically significant difference (P= .120 (NS)). This indicates agreement among a large proportion of respondents that despite the perception that the Academy does its best and gives the greatest attention to its recruitment and selection methods, the methods it uses for reaching the very best candidates are not perceived to be reliable enough. This perhaps suggests that the time may have come to consider reviewing and updating these methods.

However, during their interviews all three commanders, when questioned on this issue, were of the view that the Academy did not face problems in attracting recruits, which suggested that their recruiting methods were succeeding in attracting huge numbers of candidates from all walks of life and backgrounds.

A2-C1 explained: “Being a National Guard Officer is a very attractive thing nowadays in Saudi Arabia. Career benefits compare very favourably with civilian sector jobs, in addition to prestige and job security for life, as well as other fringe benefits, such as housing and so on. We not only attract a reasonable number of high-calibre candidates, but also many sons of powerful families in the Kingdom... Paradoxically, our problem is that too many young people apply, and all must be considered and be seen to be seriously considered.”

Continuing to probe the respondents’ perceptions of how good the current system of selection is, the next question asked them to say whether KKMA applies precise selection criteria in its admission procedure. Their responses produced the following results:

Table 5-4 Respondents’ perceptions of extent to which KKMA uses reliable methods to recruit best candidates for officership (A1-I.Q4-3).

	Strongly disagree %	Disagree %	Somewhat agree %	Agree %	Strongly agree %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	24.2	17.2	23.2	21.2	14.1	2.83	1.38	P= .031 (S)
TS	8.7	13	26.1	39.1	13	3.34	1.13	
WS	19.3	15.9	24.1	26.9	13.8	3.00	1.32	

Close examination of Table 5.4 reveals that overall, there is no overwhelming agreement among the respondents that KKMA applies precise criteria in its admission procedure, although more of them agree than disagree that this is the case, the overall mean being a lukewarm (3.00). Indeed, under half of them in total (40.7%) agree or strongly agree, and over a third (35.2%) disagree or strongly disagree with the

statement. The t-test for the difference between the means showed that there was a statistically significant difference between the results of the two groups of respondents ($P=.031$ (S)), with more teaching staff members tending to agree than disagree, while the reverse is true for candidates. Again, it is a matter of some concern that almost one fifth (19.3%) of all the respondents surveyed strongly dismiss the view that the Academy strictly applies its set selection criteria in its admission procedure. This is not to say that it does not have them, only that they are not always applied as they should be.

A2-C3 had this to say about KKMA's selection criteria: "Our selection criteria are, in theory, fine. They are comparable to those of many other military academies. The problem is in the application of these criteria. Unfortunately, we do not always have full control over this, especially when outsiders from the National Guard are involved in the selection process, including the selection board's decisions". A2-C1, A2-C2 also admitted that there were difficulties in applying the admission rules. Both were in favour of raising the admission criteria to accept only graduate students, an option which in their opinion presents many advantages, such as raising the level of maturity of applicants, as well as raising standards.

An important feature of a systematic and an effective selection system emphasised in the literature (Chapter 3, section 2.1) is that it spares no efforts in thoroughly assessing every aspect of the applicants' backgrounds, including physical and mental abilities, moral values, strengths, limitations, etc. No unsuitable recruits, it was stressed, ought to be allowed to slip through the net (Saier 1995:4, Noonan 2001:5, Cary *et al.* 1998:590). Hence, the respondents were asked to indicate their perceptions of the extent to which KKMA rigorously tests and chooses the best officer candidates before they are accepted to undergo officer training and education. Their responses yielded the following results:

Table 5-5 Respondents' perceptions of extent to which KKMA rigorously tests and chooses the best officer candidates at the point of entry during the admission procedure. (A1-I.Q4-4).

	Strongly disagree %	Disagree %	Somewhat agree %	Agree %	Strongly agree %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	24.2	28	25.3	16.2	6.1	2.67	1.20	P=.018 (S)
TS	13	15.2	37	26.1	8.7	3.02	1.14	
WS	20.7	24.1	29	19.3	6.9	2.67	1.20	

The data in Table 5.5 leaves no doubt that the surveyed respondents' perceptions lean towards scepticism regarding whether KKMA rigorously tests and chooses the best officer candidates before they begin training and education. The mean for the whole sample is a low to moderate (2.67) and it can be clearly seen that fewer respondents agreed or strongly agreed than disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. About a third of them (29%) only somewhat agree, implying that they may have reservations on the subject. Interestingly on this occasion, the cadets' views are predominantly negative (52.2%), while those of the teaching staff members are markedly less so (28.2%) in percentage terms, a discrepancy confirmed as significant by the t-test applied to the means of the two groups ($P = .018$ (S)). This is another severe judgement on the nature of KKMA's selection system.

Questioned on this point, A2-C2 argued: "Do we test and choose the best? Yes we do, but sometimes rules and guidelines are not observed and subjective judgements get the upper hand." A2-C1 observed: "We do our best, but we need to improve our methods, maybe introduce new ones used elsewhere, such as psychological assessments, so that we can be more accurate in our measurements."

The next two related questions were designed to elicit reactions towards the whole system of recruitment and selection. Beginning with the extent to which respondents believed that the present system was effective, Table 5.6 sums up their views on the issue:

Table 5-6 Respondents' perceptions of extent to which overall recruitment and selection system is effective (A1-I.Q4-5).

	Very ineffective %	Ineffective %	Somewhat effective %	Effective %	Very effective %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	22.4	27.6	30.6	15.3	4.1	2.51	1.12	P= .339(NS)
TS	13	26.1	41.3	17.4	2.2	2.69	.985	
WS	19.4	27.1	34	16	3.5	2.56	1.08	

Effective recruitment and selection is about attracting and choosing recruits with the best qualities and potentials to make excellent future military officers. It is about ensuring that only the most suitable candidates are screened in, and those who are undesirable or incompetent are screened out, so that those who are accepted will have no difficulty fitting into the roles for which they will be trained and educated. It is about meeting the central objective of identifying and offering places only on the basis of merit for the best trainable candidates with the best prospects for success.

Bearing in mind that no system is perfect, it is disappointing to note from Table 5.6 that less than one fifth of all the survey participants hold clearly favourable reactions to the extent to which KKMA's recruitment and selection is effective. Thus, 16% of them rated it "effective" and only 3.5% "very effective". At the opposite end of the scale, on the other hand, 27.1% of them evaluated the system as "ineffective" and 19.4% judged it to be "very ineffective". Unusually, over a third of all respondents assessed the system as "somewhat effective", a middle position indicating an inability to fully support it. The low to moderate overall mean for the whole sample removes doubts about the dominance of scepticism towards the effectiveness of KKMA's recruitment and selection system. A final look at Table 5.6 reveals that the t-test detected no statistically significant differences between the means for the two groups, cadets and teaching staff, regarding this issue (P= .399 (NS)). These results can only be seen as a depressing verdict on the nature of the current system of recruitment and selection.

On whether overall KKMA's recruitment and selection system is generally effective, the three commanders interviewed agreed that there was much room for improvement. A2-C2 bluntly rejected the idea that the current system was effective, giving these reasons: "It's not effective enough because there is little or no accountability. We need better and more accurate instruments of selection, more qualitative assessments, and less subjective decisions. Also, the frequent change of selection teams and Boards does not allow people to accumulate experience, learn and improve the whole process of selection." A2-C1 emphasised that the whole selection procedure should be left for KKMA to set up and manage without interference from above. As he pointed out: "We are trusted to run this Academy. So, we know perhaps better what information and measures are needed to judge whether certain candidates are suitable or not. It is after all we who bear responsibility for turning them into junior officers from day one till the day of their graduation."

Moving on to the assessment of the samples concerning the degree of satisfaction with KKMA's system of officer recruitment and selection, unsurprisingly similar findings were obtained (Table 5.7).

Table 5-7 Respondents' overall degree of satisfaction with current recruitment and selection at KKMA (A1-I.Q4-6).

	Very dissatisfied %	Dissatisfied %	Somewhat Satisfied %	Satisfied %	Very satisfied %	M	S.D	SIG.L
C	23.5	18.4	30.6	18.4	9.2	2.71	1.26	P= .829 (NS)
TS	17.4	15.2	43.5	21.7	2.2	2.76	1.05	
WS	21.5	17.4	34.7	19.4	6.9	2.72	1.20	

As might be expected, given the respondents' previous unfavourable evaluation of KKMA's current system of recruitment and selection, when they were asked to indicate their degree of satisfaction with it, it emerged that they were predominantly more "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" (38.9%) than "satisfied" or "very satisfied" (26.3%), with a large group – over a third of them – (34.7%) sitting on the fence. The

low to moderate overall mean (2.72) confirms the magnitude of the respondents' unhappiness with the system. The absence of a statistically significant difference between the means for the two groups ($P = .829$ (NS)), cadets and teaching staff, shows shared sentiments about the problem. Taken together with the results of Table 5.6, these findings send the message that there is substantial room for improvement with regard to the nature and manner in which officer recruitment and selection are conducted at KKMA.

So far, the analysis has covered the evaluation of a number of key aspects of the selection system for officer aspirants at KKMA through the perceptions of cadets and teaching staff. To complete the picture, the survey went on to identify precisely which factors in the respondents' opinions constitute obstacles to a more effective recruitment and selection procedure at their Academy. Five main reasons singled out during the pilot study were therefore included in the survey for assessment. These are now discussed.

5.3.4 Assessment of Negative Impact of Five Most Mentioned Factors on Recruitment and Selection at KKMA

The five factors are in order of severity: (1) *wāsta*, the Arabic word for 'nepotism'; (2) the lack of independence of the selection board's decisions; (3) the excessively long selection procedure; (4) the late announcement of acceptance results; and (5) the over-emphasis on academic performance. Foremost among all these blocks, according to the survey respondents, is the issue of *wāsta*. Table 5.8 summarises the perceived negative impact of this factor on recruitment and selection.

Table 5-8 Respondents' perceptions of negative impact of *wāsta* on recruitment and selection (A1-I.Q5-2).

	Very low %	Low %	Moderate amount %	High %	Very high %	M	S.D	SIG L
C	0	0	0	16.2	83.8	4.83	.369	P= .001(S)
TS	0	6.5	10.9	10.9	71.7	4.47	.936	
WS	0	2.1	3.4	14.5	80	4.72	.628	

No single issue related to selection was more strongly emphasised by the respondents than that of *wāsta*. Some explanation is needed here to clarify this complex issue; *wāsta* has been defined as 'nepotism' by Al-Medlej (1997: 151). It is a well-known phenomenon in Arab culture. Various dictionaries define it as favouritism, the use of influence, connections, good offices, leverage, and even as a form of corruption (Al-Ammaj 1993: 241-3). More precisely, it is what someone with power or authority does to give or obtain preferential treatment for members of his/her family, relatives or friends. According to both researchers, this behaviour has its roots in the tribal heritage of the Arabs. *wāsta* is generally seen as both an opportunity and a curse. It is viewed as an opportunity by those who benefit from it, and a curse by those who feel disadvantaged by it. It is tolerated because everybody makes use of it at some time in their life. *wāsta* is viewed as a form of loyalty to one's group, family, clan etc. and refusing to use it when needed means letting them down, an attitude that can lead to social isolation in Saudi culture.

In his study of decision-making in seven civilian Saudi higher education institutions, Al Medlej (1997:151) found that the majority of the participants in his study (69%) disapproved of *wāsta* and denied using it, yet they all thought that it existed on a large scale and that it influenced the decision-making process in their institution. On the other hand, a minority (11%) saw *wāsta* as a minor problem and a harmless part of Arab culture. Al Medlej relates several examples illustrative of *wāsta*. Here is one of them: " A student applies to become a member of a university sports centre. He is asked to go through the routine health check before being accepted. Subsequently, an outsider applies for membership by presenting a business card indicating his

relationship to a high level local manager. The result is that he is not only accepted straight away, but he is also exempt from going through the routine health check.” He adds that it is not unusual to see people handing over a written note ... or acting upon the recommendation of a highly placed official to “facilitate” a process or ensure preferential treatment (ibid: 161). He also notes that in Saudi Arabia, as in other Arab countries, there is a perception that placements and positions are often primarily obtained through *wāsta*, not earned through hard work and qualifications, especially in state run organisations (ibid:.156). Al-Ammaj (1993 : 218) quotes a Saudi Service Ten Year Report showing that 82% of public-sector personnel employed during the decade (1980-89) were not selected on the basis of a systematic merit system. He blames this on the vagueness or absence of a legal framework to regulate the system and prevent abuses, one of which he refers to as “the exercise of influence”, that is *wāsta*.

Bearing in mind that we are dealing with perceptions, which can be distorted at times, it is nevertheless alarming to see that every individual who took part in this survey recognises that *wāsta* plays a part in the recruitment and selection of cadets at KKMA. As Table 5.8 shows, perceptions of the extent of its negative impact are overwhelmingly strong among both cadets and teaching staff, rating it 83.8% and 71.7% “very high” respectively. The t-test for the significance between the means also shows a statistically significant difference between the two group means (P= .001(S)) indicating that the cadets viewed *wāsta* even more unfavourably than their teachers. The very high overall mean (4.72) places this factor as the number one obstacle to effective recruitment and selection at KKMA.

When this sensitive issue was raised in the interviews, A2-C1 and A2-C3 accepted that *wāsta* played a role in recruitment and selection, while A2-C2 downplayed its effect. Said A2-C1: “The truth has to be told. *wāsta* is a national problem, and as such we are not immune from it. Does anyone know how we can prevent it? Our job is to try to limit its effect, but we can’t have our eyes and ears everywhere”. A2-C3 gave a similar view stated: *wāsta* is an undeniable fact of life in our society, and there’s no law against it. It’s in our heritage. People say we’re only recommending someone, as you would when you write a reference, but the consequences of not complying are sometimes not easy to face. Indeed, sometimes you just have to do as you are told!”

A2-C2 took a relaxed view of the problem, claiming: “I think people are a little paranoid about *wāsta*. They blame everything on *wāsta*. You have to prove yourself anyway. In the end, the chances are that you won’t become an officer if you don’t deserve to be one.”

The second most serious factor perceived to negatively affect KKMA’s recruitment and selection is the lack of independence of the selection board’s decision making. Selection boards are generally made up of competent, experienced, and well-respected members of staff and are chaired by a high-ranking officer. They are the people with the huge responsibility of looking at all the information and measures relating to candidates and assessing their suitability and potential to make good quality officers-to-be. From experience, they can judge whether assessment standards are being met or not, and on the basis of merit they are able to make appropriate decisions. Their judgements can be trusted because they are normally fair and mostly objective. The fact that the respondents rated the lack of independence of the selection board in its deliberations the second most important obstacle seems to imply that the board at KKMA has no real teeth. Its power is reduced by the fact that the higher authorities have the final say, as well as possibly through the influence of *wāsta*. Table 5.9 displays the survey respondents’ assessment of the negative effect of this factor on recruitment and selection.

Table 5-9 Respondents’ perceptions of negative impact of the lack of independence of selection board decisions (A1-I.Q5-1).

	Very low %	Low %	Moderate amount %	High %	Very high %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	5.1	3	23.2	35.4	33.3	3.88	1.06	P=.514 (NS)
TS	2.2	15.2	21.7	26.1	34.8	3.76	1.15	
WS	4.1	6.9	22.8	32.4	33.8	3.84	1.09	

As can be seen from Table 5.9, a clear majority of all the respondents (66.2%) felt that the selection board did not have the influence it should have in matters of selection,

and that this negatively affected selection. The t-test revealed no significant difference between the two group means for cadets and teaching staff, (3.88) and (3.76) respectively, with (P= .514 (NS)). The overall mean is relatively high (3.84). These results point to the need for more independence for the role of the selection board in recruitment and selection.

The third obstacle is the excessively long selection procedure. This is not a problem that is unique to KKMA. However, in comparison with others, it seems to be much worse not only because of the very large number of applicants, approximately 10,000 a year, as noted earlier, but also because of the way it is applied. One member of the selection team told the researcher that the excessively long selection procedure was directly linked to the Academy's reluctance to deselect applicants too early for fear of upsetting their families. As a result, time, money, and efforts are stretched. This is a problem waiting for a solution. In the meantime, the respondents seem to be unanimous in thinking that it is a major obstacle to effective recruitment and selection. Table 5.10 shows the respondents' assessment of its negative impact.

Table 5-10 Respondents' assessment of the negative impact of the excessively long selection procedure. (A1-I.Q5-3).

	Very low %	Low %	Moderate amount %	High %	Very high %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	1	14.1	21.2	34.3	29.3	3.76	1.05	P=.078 (NS)
T.S	12.8	10.6	27.7	21.3	27.7	3.40	1.34	
W.S	4.8	13	23.3	30.1	28.8	3.65	1.16	

The figures in Table 5.10 once again show a majority consensus of 58.9% who rated the lengthy selection procedure as a major obstacle that is having a high or very high negative impact on recruitment and selection at KKMA. The differences between the mean responses for the two groups, cadets and teaching staff, as measured by the t-test remains negligible, (3.76) and (3.40) respectively, with (P= .078 (NS)). Again, the overall mean is relatively high (3.65).

A2-C1 justified the lengthy selection procedure: “I personally chaired a selection board for two years. Considering the thousands of applications we have to deal with, we are in fact very quick. You have to understand that the selection system here does not operate in the same way as in Europe for example. Applicants are not gradually deselected as they proceed through the selection process, in such a way that near the end you end up with a relatively manageable number of surviving candidates to choose from. Here, they have to be herded through virtually the whole process by the thousands. If you deselect them too soon, you’ll have hundreds of families attempting to and succeeding in reinstating their sons into the selection process through *wāsta*. Interviews have to be limited to ten or fifteen minutes, and two thousand ‘suitable’ candidates go through a medical examination at the rate of 100 per day. That’s a huge and time-consuming burden.”

The fourth obstacle to effective recruitment and selection at KKMA is the very late announcement of acceptance results each year. Obviously, this is linked with the lengthy selection procedure, particularly with the time it takes for the qualifying 2000 candidates to be comprehensively assessed medically. The unfortunate consequence of this is that some of the best candidates are offered placements elsewhere to the detriment of KKMA. This waste of talent is less frequent in military academies in Europe. In Belgium, for example, aspiring officers undergo the different elements of the selection procedure before July each year, at which time decisions are made on who will be enlisted, and basic training begins in mid August with a minimum loss of candidates (Lescreve 2001: 7). Likewise, in Germany, according to Birke (2001: 22) applicants who are assessed as “well-suited” or even “most suited” are formally informed of their success and offered a place the day after the decision to enlist them is made. Finally, according to Thompson *et al.* (2001: 26-7), successful candidates wishing to join the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst (RMAS) are so well selected that on qualification, they are virtually guaranteed a place at the Academy, and their pass is valid for a number of years, which means that they are to some extent in a position to choose when to enter the Academy. The delay in announcing results is clearly a serious obstacle confirmed in the views of the survey participants. Table 5.11 displays the respondents’ assessment of its negative influence.

Table 5-11 Respondents' assessment of the negative impact of very late announcement of acceptance results in selection (A1-I.Q5-4).

	Very low %	Low %	Moderate amount %	High %	Very high %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	8.1	13.1	19.2	26.3	33.3	3.63	1.28	P=.722 (NS)
TS	12.8	10.6	17	27.7	31.9	3.55	1.38	
WS	9.6	12.3	18.5	26.7	32.9	3.60	1.31	

The results for this factor, ranked third in order of seriousness and negative impact on recruitment and selection, are comparable to those found for the second factor (Table 5.11). Thus, a majority of 59.6% of respondents rated the late announcement of results as having a high or very high negative effect on recruitment and selection at KKMA. The t-test also found no significant differences between the mean scores of cadets and teaching staff, (3.63) and (3.55) respectively, with (P= .722 (NS)). The overall mean for the whole sample is also relatively high (3.60).

Asked if they had any comments to make about the late announcement of acceptance results, all three commanders interviewed were of the opinion that in view of the large number of applicants to be processed, delays were inevitable.

Finally, the fifth obstacle to effective recruitment and selection at KKMA is what is perceived to be an overemphasis on academic or intellectual performance over other eligibility factors. According to Devriendt (1999: 3) traditional examinations still play an important role in officer selection procedures in many academies. This is because they are practical and relatively quick to implement and assess. They also provide evidence of the intellectual and mental abilities of the candidate, who will be expected to absorb large amounts of military knowledge during their education and training. Academic grades are also a convenient objective means of deselecting candidates who are unsuccessful in this area. Of course, academic achievement is not all that is required to make a good military officer. Other military academies, such as West Point

and Sandhurst also look for leadership potential, sociability, problem-solving ability, stress resistance, physical strength and other specific skills. However the assessment of these skills is time-consuming and resource-intensive. One can see why these abilities cannot be adequately assessed if the Academy has to process eight to ten thousand candidates, with a system that is reluctant to dismiss candidates too soon. Nevertheless, the respondents judged this factor to be an obstacle to good recruitment and selection. Table 5.12 shows the respondents' perceptions of how negative the overemphasis on academic performance is on recruitment and selection at KKMA.

Table 5-12 Respondents' perceptions of negative effect of overemphasis on academic performance in selection (A1-I.Q5-5).

	Very low %	Low %	Moderate amount %	High %	Very high %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	27.3	18.2	26.3	13.1	15.2	2.70	1.3	P=.232 (NS)
TS	32.6	26.1	17.4	15.2	8.7	2.41	1.32	
WS	29	20.7	23.4	13.8	13.1	2.61	1.37	

Examination of Table 5.12 reveals no consensus on this issue among the respondents. Considering the whole sample, responses ranged from very low (29%) to very high (13.1%) with the two highest percentages occurring for moderate amount (23.4%) and low. The mean score is low to moderate (2.61). The t-test applied to the mean scores of the two groups, cadets (2.7) and teaching staff (2.41), showed no statistically significant difference between them (P= .232 (NS)). The results indicate that there is a perceived overemphasis on academic performance in the selection procedure of KKMA, but there are wide disagreements on the extent of its negative impact on selection. This suggests that a more balanced skills and abilities assessment is desirable in selection.

As stated earlier, an effective recruitment and selection programme is designed to prevent unsuitable and uncommitted individuals from joining a military academy, and possibly be a liability to it and to the Service that would employ them. Since the Class

1999 cadets were graduating shortly after this survey was conducted, it was considered appropriate to probe them on whether they would still come to KKMA if they could reconsider their decision. The thinking behind this is that the proportion of cadets who regret their decision to join KKMA may partly be a reflection of the ineffectiveness on the selection system of the Academy. This is so because the lack of total commitment on their part should have been detected early by the selection system. Table 5.13 gives the percentage distribution of cadets on whether or not they would make the same decision again.

Table 5-13 Cadets' responses on whether they would still come to KKMA if they could reconsider their decision (A1-I.Q3).

	Definitely not %	Probably not %	Unsure %	Probably yes %	Definitely yes %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	0	1	12	23	64	4.49	.747	P=.000 (S)

It is a relief to note that the overwhelming majority of cadets surveyed said they would still come to KKMA if they could reconsider their decision (87%). Only 1% of them replied "probably not" and 12% were "unsure". The mean for the whole group is high (4.49, $P = .000$ (S)). The very high significance level obtained by the application of the one sample t-test indicates that the overall mean is closer to the scale value 5 than 4. What these results possibly indicate is that despite its shortcomings KKMA is still for most cadets a positive and worthwhile experience.

5.4 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter contains two broad parts. The first one outlined the main recruitment methods and selection instruments currently in use at KKMA, described the decision process for accepting applicants, and briefly touched on the role of the local cultural context in the admissions procedure. It also mentioned the two main ways to become an officer at KKMA, that is the regular and fast track entry programmes. It related that KKMA used a variety of recruitment methods, which attract very large numbers of

interested candidates each year. This part also showed that the selection procedure for officers, which takes about three months to complete, follows familiar steps found in other military academies, although it does not operate in exactly the same way, and has similar admission criteria. The huge differences with other systems is that KKMA is forced not to deselect candidates until near the end of the process, not out of choice, but under pressure and powerful influences from the external environment.

The second part of this chapter presented an analysis of both survey and interview findings related to recruitment and selection. The presentation began with the examinations of how Class 1999 were recruited to KKMA and found that approximately three quarters of them approached the Academy through personal enquiry and contacts with current academy members than as a result of successful recruitment techniques used by the institution. Next, the cadets' motivations for joining KKMA were assessed. They were found to be evenly balanced between institutional and occupational measures. Following this, both cadets' and teaching staff's perceptions of the effectiveness of various aspects of KKMA's recruitment and selection were presented and interpreted.

The most salient findings are that the majority of the respondents who took part in this study believe that although KKMA appears to give great attention to its recruitment and selection methods, in practice its recruitment methods are not as effective as they could be if the Academy is to attract high quality recruits. Also, under half of all the respondents agreed that the Academy applied precise selection criteria, and less than a third of them were convinced that KKMA rigorously tested and chose from among the best candidates available only. Again, less than half of them judged that the overall system was effective. Unsurprisingly, 40% of them said they were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, almost 35% were only somewhat satisfied, and just over a quarter only (26.3%) claimed to be satisfied or very satisfied with the current recruitment and selection system (Table 5-7).

On the questions on the obstacles that block the effectiveness of recruitment and selection at KKMA, *wāsta* was ranked first as a major block to effectiveness by the vast majority of respondents, including two of the commanders interviewed, although

a third commander downplayed its effect. The lack of independence of the selection board in its deliberations was equally strongly emphasised by the majority of respondents, rating second in the extent of its negative effect on recruitment and selection. The excessively long selection procedure and the late announcement of acceptance results were rated the third and fourth most serious blocks respectively by a clear majority of respondents. The fifth obstacle was identified as an overemphasis on intellectual performance over other abilities and skills in the selection process. This was recognised to be the case by most respondents, but there was wide disagreement on the extent of its negative effect.

Interestingly, in eight out of the eleven questions put to both cadets and teaching staff, the t-test used to detect differences between their mean scores found no statistically significant differences, indicating broad agreement among all respondents on most issues related to recruitment and selection.

Finally, it is heartening to note that despite all the weaknesses identified so far, when the cadets were asked if they would still come to KKMA if they could rethink their decision, an overwhelming majority said yes.

Chapter Six presents the data analysis for the second component, “indoctrination”.

Chapter Six

Findings Related to Military Indoctrination

6.1 Introduction

This chapter reports the field study results connected with the component of military indoctrination. It consists of two major parts. The first half, based on an analysis of documentary evidence, describes the characteristics of military indoctrination at KKMA, the setting in which it takes place, and how it is done from the newcomer stage to the final preparation year. The second half gives and interprets the statistical results of the survey and the input from the commanders on a number of issues considered.

6.2 Military Indoctrination at KKMA : Documents Analysis

No comprehensive guide or manual for the indoctrination of cadets exists at KKMA, as far as the researcher knows. Desirable outcome goals and implementation instructions are patchy and scattered in a number of sources, some of which are classified. Three main references used to prepare this section can however be mentioned: KKMA Performance Guide (1999), Academy Education Guide (2001), and Graduate Report (2002). The brief overview that follows describes the indoctrination setting at KKMA, then how newcomer indoctrination is conducted and what its main purposes are. Finally, second and third year cadet indoctrination is outlined, together with the nature of discipline at the Academy.

6.2.1 Indoctrination Setting

At KKMA, cadets are grouped under a battalion structure of six companies. First year cadets belong to the Newcomer Company. The military indoctrination strategy for all cadets is planned at the Cadet Battalion Headquarters, which is also responsible for its implementation. The battalion command is in charge of and responsible for discipline

and order, inter-company relations, cadet morale, military ethos and teamwork, and leadership preparation. The Academy monitors and controls almost every aspect of cadet life and can be described as a “total institution” (Janowitz 1971:xx iii). Cadets are almost totally isolated from its external environment, and all aspects of life for them are conducted within its walls and under its single authority. Thus, cadets live, study, eat, and sleep inside the confines of the Academy. The authority that commands them is unambiguous, and the chain of command is clear to them, from the highest ranking to the lowest members of the Academy. All cadets are housed in residence halls and sleep in separate rooms. They wear military uniforms at all times and cannot leave the Academy without official permission. They are all exposed to a rigid system of military discipline throughout the day, and are subjected to numerous inspections of their rooms, uniforms, and equipment. It is not uncommon for them to participate in frequent drills and ceremonies, in addition to coursework.

6.2.2 Newcomer Indoctrination

The approach to newcomer indoctrination is marked by strict isolation from the rest of the Academy, particularly during Basic Military Training (BMT). Interactions with cadets of unequal status are restricted throughout officer preparation, but more so during early indoctrination. Violations of this rule lead to fixed penalties. The intention behind this approach is to protect newcomers from influences that might confuse them, and avoid distractions and interference with the indoctrination process. It maximises the focus on expected behaviour patterns, values, and attitudes. It also speeds up compliance and conformity.

At KKMA, as in other military academies, indoctrination begins with BMT. Here, it takes place during the first 45 days, during which cadets are exposed to intense physical and mental conditioning designed to strip them of their civilian identities and ways of thinking and behaving, and replacing them with new ones that are compatible with military culture. In short, they learn to be good soldiers. The stated goals of BMT at KKMA are specified in Graduate Report (2002:28) as follows:

- Physical preparation
- Introduction to military ethos and values

- Drill
- Light weapon handling
- Basic infantry skills

Official pamphlets stress the importance of ‘moulding’ the newcomers into military soldiers. They describe BMT as a period of challenges physical, mental and psychological and the ultimate test of whether the new recruit can endure the pressure and is ready and willing to continue or not. At this point, 10 to 15% leave the Academy through their own choice, having failed the physical or mental test. BMT, therefore, acts as a further selection step.

BMT is the basis on which much of subsequent officer preparation is built. Although pressure is a little reduced after BMT, as cadets begin to enjoy weekend leaves, training continues to be hard and intensive, with very little free time during week days. Almost all of their time is accounted for and all the day’s activities are tightly scheduled, with one activity following another at a prearranged time and place. There are even compulsory unscheduled evening lectures, as part of the indoctrination process.

Carefully selected and trained platoon sergeants play an important role in cadet indoctrination, using their skills and experience. Selected upperclassmen also take turns to practise their leadership skills by taking part in newcomer training and indoctrination. They are in turn closely watched and marked for their performance. Hazing, the excessive harassment and punishment of cadets, is officially “controlled”, but newcomers in particular do not have an easy time at the Academy.

6.2.3 Second and Third Year Cadet Indoctrination

There are no prescribed indoctrination programmes as such here either. The Academy at this point expects cadets to have internalised the values and customs of the military to a sufficient degree, so rule violations are not tolerated and are dealt with severely. The process is now one of consolidation and progress. In short, all the indoctrination activities of the first year continue, but with relatively less intensity. Leadership

training is limited to third year cadets, after the all-important indoctrination process has been successfully imprinted. However, academy discipline continues to be rigid for all the cadets, to such a degree that they have to wait for the order to undress before going to sleep at night. Punishment and avoidance of punishment condition and shape behaviour throughout the Academy experience. The system recognises achievements and sanctions failure, but is predominantly mistake-oriented.

In 1999, the Higher Council for Saudi Military Academies published a list of almost two hundred types of rule violations with their standardised corresponding sanctions applicable in all Saudi military academies. Their purpose is to regulate cadet behaviour in minute detail, from placing shoes or other items in the wrong place, incorrect standing or sitting position during assembly, prayer, or in the classroom, to absence without leave, the use of unauthorised medication, and lying or cheating. Nearly all rule violations lead to multiple sanctions, such as detention during normal weekend leave, chores or punishments during the mid-day heat, and deductions of marks from discipline grades, which count as part of their achievement records. Serious offences are punishable by expulsion from the Academy or demotion to a lower level of cadetship.

6.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings

The previous section covered “How is indoctrination done at KKMA?” What follows now considers “How well is it being done?” that is, the evaluation of the indoctrination programme through the perceptions of the research participants.

6.3.1 Importance of Military Indoctrination

Most officer preparation programmes regard indoctrination as a vital component. This is because every officer candidate must learn how to wear a uniform, maintain equipment, and live under military discipline (Downes 1991: 104). The objective of indoctrination was previously described as a process during which recruits are transformed from their civilian identities into individuals who look, think, walk, talk, and act like soldiers (see Chapter Three Section 3.3). Rather than make assumptions, respondents were asked for their views on the importance of military indoctrination.

The results are shown in Table 6.1 below.

Table 6-1 Respondents' perceptions of the importance of military indoctrination (A1-II.Q1).

	Of no importance %	Of little Importance %	Somewhat Important %	Important %	Very Important %	M	SD	SIG. L
C	-	-	2	6	92	4.61	.694	P=.010 (S)
TS	-	-	0	2.1	97.9	4.89	.374	
WS	-	-	1.4	4.8	93.9	4.70	.623	

As Table 6.1 shows, there is very strong support among the vast majority of both cadets and teaching staff for the idea that military indoctrination is important or very important, with a total percentage of 93.9% and a very high whole sample mean of (4.70). It is however worth noting that when the t-test was used to assess whether the two group means for cadets (4.61) and for teaching staff (4.89) differed significantly, it was found that the difference was significant at the 5% level (P= .010 (S)). Clearly, the difference is in emphasis, rather than indicating opposition, since both means are very high, with the teaching staff members viewing indoctrination as even more important than is acknowledged by the cadets. This recognition of the importance of indoctrination is in agreement with Ward's (1999:62) finding that when cadets successfully complete an indoctrination programme, they begin to feel like 'insiders' in their organisation. They tend to develop supportive attitudes towards indoctrination and to have personal values similar to those held by long-standing members of the military profession. On the importance of indoctrination, one of my interviewees (A2-C1) had this to say: "It is the heart of military preparation, the foundation upon which everything else depends, discipline, loyalty, teamwork, mission success, and so on. It is essential for military leadership because we are all soldiers to begin with, and naturally we must learn to conform and obey orders before we can start issuing them as leaders."

6.3.2 Aspects of KKMA's Military Culture Environment

A well-planned indoctrination programme leaves nothing to chance. It takes into account the fact that everything and everyone a cadet comes in contact with

(appearance of buildings, other officers, etc.) during their formative period at the academy may be a potential influence on his perception of military culture, values and ideals. Awareness and control of such sources of influence, referred to as “agents of socialisation/indoctrination” in Chapter Three (Figure 3.3 in particular) is a vital factor for effective indoctrination. In view of the importance of this factor, the survey participants were asked to rate KKMA’s level of awareness and control of these various sources of influence. Table 6.2 displays the results for this question.

Table 6-2 Respondents’ perceptions of KKMA’s level of awareness and control of socialisation agents (A1-II.Q2-1).

	Very low	Low	Moderate	High	Very high	Mean	SD	SIG. L
	%	%	%	%	%			
C	6	14	20	43	17	3.51	1.11	P=.041 (S)
T.S	0	6.5	21.7	47.8	23.9	3.89	.849	
W.S	4.1	11.6	20.5	44.5	19.2	3.63	1.050	

As can be seen from Table 6.2, 63.7% of all the respondents to the survey rated KKMA’s level of awareness and control of all potential socialisation agents as high or very high, 20.5% as moderate, and 15.7% as low or very low. The whole sample mean is relatively high (3.63). The mean score for cadets is moderate (3.51), while the teaching staff’s is higher (3.89). T-test applied to the two groups means revealed a statistically significant difference between the perceptions of the cadets and those of their teachers (P=.041 (S)), with the latter tending to be less critical of KKMA than the former. This indicates that although the majority of respondents said that they believed that KKMA was in control of this issue, there was still a substantial proportion of them who believed that it could do better.

A contributing factor to the effectiveness of an indoctrination programme is the way the institution is perceived by both its new and current members in terms of identity and reputation. Hence, the survey respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed that KKMA had a strong identity, a reputation, and a commitment

to excellence in terms of upholding military values and standards. Their reactions are shown in Table 6.3 below.

Table 6-3 Reactions to whether KKMA has strong identity, reputation, and commitment to excellence (A1-II.Q2-2).

	Strongly Disagree %	Disagree %	Somewhat Agree %	Agree %	Strongly Agree %	M	SD	SIG.L
C	2	3	14	43	38	4.12	.902	P=. 041 (S)
TS	2.1	2.1	10.6	61.7	23.4	4.02	.793	
WS	2	2.7	12.9	49	33.3	4.08	.867	

Remarkably, the combined results from Table 6.3 show that 82.3% of all the survey respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that KKMA was successful in projecting a strong identity, reputation, and commitment to excellence. The whole sample mean is high (4.08). The discrepancy between the mean scores for cadets (4.12) and teaching staff (4.02) proved to be statistically significant when the t-test was applied ($P = .041$ (S)), reflecting a tendency for cadets to hold their Academy in an even higher regard than teaching staff members did. This finding confirms the popularity of the Academy among young people in Saudi Arabia.

On this issue, A2-C3 commented: “The Academy has a very high reputation to uphold, both in the eyes of the higher authorities and the general public. Everybody is aware of this here, which is why we are expected to do everything in our power to maintain high standards, as well as the reason why there is zero tolerance for slackness of any kind and at any level here.”

6.3.3 Nature of Military Indoctrination at KKMA

While all aspects of the Academy environment, appearance of buildings, artefacts, identity and reputation, etc. play a part in the indoctrination of cadets throughout their officer preparation, the heaviest dose of indoctrination is inculcated during basic military training (BMT), starting from day one at the Academy. The purpose behind

the next four questions related to this component in the questionnaire was to determine the research participants' perceptions and evaluations of certain aspects of indoctrination at KKMA, including BMT. Table 6.4 summarises their responses to the four items in question.

Table 6-4 Reactions to four aspects of indoctrination at KKMA (A1-II.Q3-1to3-4)

No	Statement	SD	D	SMA	A	SA	C	TS	WS	SIG.L
		%	%	%	%	%	M	M	M	
1	BMT is the most shocking experience of a new cadet's life	-	-	2%	16.3	81.6	4.83	4.72	4.79	.184 (NS)
2	BMT. is an essential part of cadets' military preparation	0.7	0.7	1.4	13%	84.2	4.75	4.89	4.79	.159 (NS)
3	BMT. is harsh, brutal and negative in some respects	2.7	8.2	19.9	30.1	39	4.25	3.28	3.94	.000 (S)
4	Indoctrination has flaws, but overall is positive	4.1	4.1	15.8	42.5	33.6	3.87	4.19	3.97	.072 (NS)

SD= strongly disagree. D= disagree. SMA= somewhat agree. A= agree. SA = strongly agree.

Asked whether they thought BMT was the most shocking experience of a new cadet's life (No.1), a massive 81.6% of all respondents strongly agreed, and 16.3% agreed that it was the case, leaving only 2% unsure. The whole sample mean is very high (4.79). The t-test applied to the mean scores for the two groups, cadets (4.83) and teaching staff (4.72) showed no statistically significant difference between them (P= .184 (NS)), indicating high consensus on this point. This finding is consistent with U'Ren's (1974:18), Hayden's (2000:3), and Downes' (1991:104) observations that BMT is a particularly powerful and painful process, during which all recruits experience some degree of trauma and anxiety as they learn to live under military discipline.

A2-C3 explained: “BMT is very tough, but it cannot and must not be made easy. It is there for good purposes, one of which is to find out who can take the pressure and who cannot. It is a test of suitability for a military career and a chance to discover weaknesses so that they can be corrected. Those who feel unable to take the heat and adapt to the new conditions here can leave, and they do, which is better for everyone.”

Next, respondents were asked if BMT was nonetheless an essential part of cadets’ military preparation (No.2). A massive 84.2% of them strongly agreed, and 13% agreed that this was the case. The whole sample mean is very high (4.79), and the t-test found no statistically significant differences between the mean scores of cadets (4.75), and teaching staff members (4.89), resulting in ($P = .159$ (NS)). This finding is in agreement with many military writers’ convictions that BMT is a vital means of indoctrination, such as Ellis and Moore (1974:72), Moss (1996:9), Goggin (1998:134), and Smith (1998:4).

Following this, participants in this study were asked if they agreed that BMT tended to be harsh, brutal, and negative in some respects at KKMA (No.3). Perhaps not surprisingly, over two thirds of all respondents agreed, while 11% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition, and just under 20% who were uncertain. The whole sample mean obtained is relatively high (3.94). However, the t-test found a statistically significant difference between the two group scores, cadets (4.25) and teaching staff (3.28), with ($P = .000$ (S)). There are two possible interpretations for this result, either that teaching staff members underestimated the negative impact of some aspects of BMT, or that cadets had an exaggerated view of it. This is a much-debated issue in the literature. Writers such as Smith (1998:1), strongly believe that BMT and indoctrination in general must not be made easy. Others, such as Williams (1995:25) and Moss (1996:12) disagree.

Finally, the participants in this study were invited to state whether they were of the opinion that, although KKMA’s indoctrination programme had some flaws, these were on the whole outweighed by its positive outcomes (No.4). This resulted in well over three quarters of all respondents (76.1%) agreeing or strongly agreeing with this view, with a relatively high overall mean score of (3.97). According to Hayden (2000:8), this

type of attitude implies commitment and willingness to endure hardships and compliance with military discipline. However, as noted in the literature (Chapter Three), abuses do occur and some indoctrination systems may be unnecessarily harsh, which is why aspects of KKMA's indoctrination approach and methods were investigated.

6.3.4 Indoctrination Approach and Methods

This angle of indoctrination was explored through seven measures to establish whether in some respects KKMA's indoctrination was unduly harsh, outdated and counterproductive, or satisfactory (Tables 6.5 and 6.6).

Table 6-5 Reactions to whether KKMA indoctrination is unduly harsh in four specific areas (A1-II.Q4-1to4-4).

No.	Area	VR	R	SH	H	VH	C	TS	WS	SIG.L
		%	%	%	%	%	M	M	M	
1	In relation to discipline in general	-	1.4	27.9	44.9	25.9	4.03	3.55	3.87	.003 (S)
2	In relation to liberty infractions	-	4.8	30.2	35.6	29.5	4.11	3.08	3.78	.000 (S)
3	In enforcing rules and regulations	-	2.7	31.3	43.5	22.4	3.85	3.59	3.76	.134 (NS)
4	In relation to uniform appearance and grooming standards	-	4.8	42.7	34.5	17.9	3.45	3.56	3.48	.563 (NS)

VR=very relaxed. R= relaxed. SH= somewhat harsh. H= harsh. VH= very harsh.

A close look at Table 6.5 reveals that half or more of the respondents felt that the Academy was harsh or too harsh in all four areas considered. More specifically, in three out of four variables, approximately two thirds of them felt that KKMA was harsh or too harsh with regard to rule and regulation enforcement, liberty infractions, and discipline in general, while in relation to uniform appearance and grooming standards, over half of the respondents felt that the Academy was harsh or very harsh.

Furthermore, roughly a third of all the respondents felt that the Academy was somewhat harsh in all cases (except uniform appearance and grooming where the proportion was higher), and a minority of under 5% thought that the Academy was in their view relaxed with regard to all four variables.

Looking at the mean scores for the whole sample, first in ranking order among respondents' concerns in terms of harshness comes discipline in general, with a relatively high mean of (3.87), followed by liberty infractions (3.78), rules and regulations enforcement (3.76), and lastly uniform appearance and grooming standards (3.48). Interestingly, the t-test applied to the means showed statistically significant differences between the mean scores of cadets and teaching staff's mean scores in relation to discipline in general ($P = .003(S)$) and liberty infractions ($P = .000(S)$). The evidence so far is that indoctrination at KKMA is unduly harsh, with a tendency for the cadets to perceive it as slightly harsher than the Academy's teaching staff did.

Subsequently, the respondents' overall assessments of KKMA's indoctrination system and methods were requested. Thus, they were asked if they thought some of these were outdated and counterproductive, if indoctrination ought to be less harsh, and the extent to which they were generally satisfied with the methods used to indoctrinate cadets at KKMA (Table 6.6).

Table 6-6 Respondents' assessment of some aspects of KKMA's indoctrination programme

(A1-II.Q6-1to6-3).

No.	Statement	SD	D	SMA	A	SA	C	TS	WS	SIG.L
		%	%	%	%	%	M	M	M	
1	Indoctrination methods used outdated and counter-productive	-	10.9	16.3	36.1	36.7	4.26	3.40	3.98	.000 (S)
2	Indoctrination system ought to be less harsh	10.4	22.2	20.1	25	22.2	3.53	2.65	3.26	.000 (S)
3	I am satisfied with current KKMA indoctrination	8.2	11.6	32.9	34.9	12.3	3.27	3.41	3.31	.465 (NS)

Beginning with whether some indoctrination methods used at KKMA may be outdated and counterproductive (No.1), Table 6.6 shows that only 10.9% of all respondents clearly disagreed with this suggestion. Combined percentages also indicate that over two thirds (72.8%) agreed or strongly agreed with the suggestion; the rest (16.3%) somewhat agreed with it. On the other hand, the whole sample mean score is relatively high (3.98). The t-test applied to the mean showed a statistically significant difference ($P = .000(S)$) between the mean scores of cadets (4.26) and of teaching staff members (3.40), with the cadets expressing stronger reactions than their teachers. The reason for this may be that they are the ones who had recently been at the receiving end of indoctrination.

Since the researcher was to some extent expecting that KKMA would be judged as harsh in some respects, including BMT, the respondents were asked if the Academy would be moving in the right direction if it chose to reform its current indoctrination system to become less harsh (No.2). Surprisingly, no consensus emerged on this point, and less than half of the survey participants were favourable to the suggestion. The less

than clear-cut whole sample mean of (3.26) confirms the respondents' ambivalence on this issue. However, once again, the t-test used to detect significance between groups found a statistically significant difference between the mean scores of the cadets (3.53), and the teaching staff (2.65), with cadets tending to agree and teachers rather reluctant to agree that indoctrination be made less harsh.

During the interviews, A2-C2 conceded that the level of harshness of KKMA's current indoctrination system often made him feel uncomfortable and unsure of its effectiveness. He said: "I sometimes wonder if it wouldn't be better to focus on guiding and developing pride in the military profession, and effecting compliance less through fear of punishment and more through inner commitment, respect and enthusiasm for the leadership roles cadets are being prepared for." He also added: "In my view, there is excessive emphasis on fault-finding and punishment. However, I am not saying that rules must be relaxed in such a way that would diminish the importance of respect for order, discipline, proper appearance and conduct. I just think that we are in danger of creating a permanent atmosphere of tension and anxiety, which is hardly ideal for the development of professionally competent and confident junior officers." He then concluded his thought with the suggestion that harsh punishments ought to be reserved only for serious rule violations, not for petty matters of insignificant consequence.

Finally, the survey participants were invited to give their concluding assessment of the indoctrination methods used at KKMA in terms of overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction (No.3). As reactions have been mostly unfavourable on this issue so far, it was no surprise to find that the overall percentage of satisfaction was less than 50%, which is also reflected in the lukewarm whole sample mean of (3.31). No statistically significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (3.27) and teaching staff (3.41) was detected by the t-test ($P = .465$ (NS)), which indicates a similarity of views between them despite earlier differences. Lovell (1979:96) and Forney (2000) also found widespread ambivalence among their research subjects on issues related to indoctrination. This does not mean that there are no problems, as discussed later in the section on difficulties and obstacles to effective indoctrination (Section 6.3.7).

6.3.5 Place of Traditional Military Values

According to Jones (1998: 177), at a time when there appears to be a widening gap between the standards of conduct inside and outside the military academies, traditional military values such as courage, self-sacrifice, honour, duty, etc., are given special emphasis within any effective military establishment nowadays. Now more than ever, traditional military values are strongly promoted, not to keep past traditions only, but because of their strong link with “professionalism”, and because they have survival value, as well as promoting consistency and preventing chaos. The transmission of traditional military values is therefore a vital part of indoctrination. As part of the evaluation of this component, the respondents were asked first for their perceptions of the importance of traditional military values to KKMA, then for their assessment of their importance from their own points of view (Table 6.7).

Table 6-7 Respondents’ perceptions of the importance of traditional military values

(A1-II.Q5-1, 5-2).

No	Statement	NI	LI	SMI	I	VI	C	TS	WS	SIG.
		%	%	%	%	%	M	M	M	L
1	Importance of traditional military values to K.K.M.A.	0.7	4.1	2.7	33.3	59.2	4.52	4.34	4.46	.203 (NS)
2	Importance of traditional military values to myself.	-	0.7	11.6	38.1	49.7	4.27	4.57	4.36	.015 (S)

NI=not important. LI= little important. SMI= somewhat important. I= important. VI=very important.

Examination of Table 6.7 shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents to this survey (92.5%) estimated that traditional military values were either important or very important from KKMA’s point of view, with a high whole sample mean of (4.46). On this occasion, the group mean for cadets (4.52) and that of the teaching staff members (4.34) did not result in a statistically significant difference at the usual 5% level (P=.203 (NS)) when the t-test was applied.

Asked to comment on the importance of traditional military values, A2-C1 said: “This is an institution of character development. As professional soldiers, we value obedience, loyalty, service to Allāh, King, and Country, courage, patriotism, integrity, and the like. If you call these ‘traditional values’, then yes they are and always will be vital for us and for the Profession of Arms in general, I believe.”

Turning to the respondents’ perceptions of the importance of traditional military values from their personal viewpoints, here again a massive 87.8% of them felt that such values were important or very important. This is also reflected in the high whole sample mean of (4.36). Interestingly, however, a gap appeared between the group mean score of cadets (4.27) and that of the teaching staff members (4.57), confirmed as significant by the t-test ($P = .015$ (S)). It is possible that we have here a hint that traditional military values are not as important to cadets as they are to their teachers, although both groups rated them high in terms of importance. Comparing this finding with the earlier one also shows some difference between perceptions of the importance attached to traditional military values by KKMA and by members of staff and cadets, although again the gap is small.

At this point, the focus switches from the consideration of mainly general perceptions of KKMA’s indoctrination strategy, its nature, approaches and methods, and value orientations to more specific evaluations of the Academy’s level of success in inculcating certain military abilities, skills, and attitudes, which are all part of indoctrination.

6.3.6 Evaluation of KKMA’s Indoctrination Programme Outcomes

In this section, a list of fifteen indoctrination outcomes drawn from the literature was presented for evaluation by the participants in this survey. This is not a comprehensive list, but a reasonably varied one covering some important areas of military indoctrination. Its purpose was to judge how well KKMA was succeeding in achieving some of its major goals of indoctrination. Table 6.8 presents the findings from the replies to those questions.

Table 6-8 Perceptions of some aspects of KKMA's indoctrination performance

(A1-II.Q7-1to7-15).

No	Statement	VP %	P %	RW %	W %	VW %	C	TS	WS	SIG .L
							M	M	M	
1	Soldiering skills	-	3.4	17	49.7	29.9	4.11	3.95	4.06	.269 (NS)
2	Survival in combat	1.4	1.4	25.9	37.4	34	4.22	3.57	4.01	.000 (S)
3	Feeling proud of being a member of a professional institution	2.1	7.5	17.1	38.4	34.9	4.05	3.78	3.96	.136 (NS)
4	Respect and affection for KKMA.	1.4	8.9	17.8	34.2	37.7	4.07	3.78	3.97	.114 (NS)
5	Group cohesion and loyalty	0.7	7.5	27.9	38.8	25.2	3.89	3.61	3.80	.096 (NS)
6	Commitment to fundamental military values, e.g. duty, honour	4.1	5.5	28.1	34.9	27.4	3.82	3.63	3.76	.311 (NS)
7	Care and presentation of self and military equipment	2.8	5.5	33.8	31%	26.9	3.81	3.56	3.73	.160 (NS)
8	Sense of pride in belonging to a unique profession	4.1	9.7	26.2	39.3	20.7	3.77	3.30	3.62	.001 (S)
9	Leadership skills	5.4	14.3	25.2	37.4	17.7	3.50	3.42	3.47	.705 (NS)
10	Military courtesy and etiquette inside and outside the academy	6.2	13.7	29.5	34.2	16.4	3.47	3.28	3.41	.343 (NS)
11	Effort coordination	2.7	15.1	40.4	32.9	8.9	3.27	3.36	3.30	.549 (NS)
12	Working against dead-lines	4.1	17	34	34.7	10.2	3.27	3.36	3.29	.607 (NS)
13	Making rapid decisions under stress	5.4	23.1	38.1	22.4	10.9	3.07	3.17	3.10	.592 (NS)
14	Physical hardness	13.7	14.4	36.3	22.6	13	3.05	3.10	3.06	.785 (NS)
15	Mental hardness	11.6	22.6	41.1	17.1	7.5	2.80	3.00	2.86	.298 (NS)

VP= very poorly. P= poorly. RW= reasonably well. W= well. VW = very well.

Close study of Table 6.8 shows that it is possible to see that the respondents' perceptions of KKMA's indoctrination performance fall into three categories: where the Academy does well; where it does reasonably well; and where it does less well, judging by whole sample mean score results in particular. Starting with where the Academy appears to be doing well, four items (Nos.1, 2, 3, 4) with the highest mean scores on the list make up this category. It includes "Soldiering skills" (4.06), "Survival in combat" (4.01), "Feeling proud of being a member of a professional institution" (3.96), and "Respect and affection for KKMA" (3.97). Well over two thirds of the respondents rated each of these areas as well or very well taught by KKMA. Their mean scores are the highest on the list.

All except one, "Survival in combat" (No.2), were the object of consensus among both cadets and teaching staff, since t-tests applied to their group mean scores produced no statistically significant differences. Cadets' confidence in KKMA's teaching of "Survival in combat", as reflected in their mean score (4.22) as opposed to (3.57) by their teachers, with ($P = .000$ (S)) is a sign of a positive attitude. It is worth noting that this group of items shows an emphasis on soldiering and respect and pride in belonging to a much-respected Academy. Leadership skills, which are the primary focus of Sandhurst's indoctrination programme (RMAS Prospectus 2002), for example, are not included in this category.

The second category, where, according to the survey respondents generally, the Academy does reasonably well, consists of six items (Nos.5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10). These are, beginning with the highest whole sample mean score, "Group cohesion and loyalty" (3.80), "Commitment to fundamental military values" (3.76), "Care and presentation of self" (3.73), "Sense of pride in belonging to a unique profession" (3.62), "Leadership skills" (3.47), and "Military courtesy and etiquette" (3.41). Here, from 50.6% to 64% of all participants in the survey thought that KKMA performed well or very well in teaching these skills and values. All except one (No.8), "Sense of pride in belonging to a unique profession" were the object of consensus among both cadets and teaching staff, since t-tests applied to the group means yielded no statistically significant differences. Once again, the cadets' confidence in KKMA's ability to develop a sense of pride in becoming full members of the officer corps on graduation

was reflected in their higher mean score (3.77) as compared with that of their teachers (3.30), with ($P = .011$ (S)). This may be another sign of a positive self-image, a very short period away from graduation day. Note here that “Leadership skills” is in fifth position in this group of six items in this category. Also, the majority of the other items could be linked to “soldiering” rather than “officer skills” as such.

The third category, where according to the survey participants on the whole, the Academy does less well in terms of outcome performance, comprises five items (Nos.11, 12, 13, 14, 15). These are, starting with the highest whole sample mean score in this group, “Effort co-ordination” (3.30), “Working against deadlines” (3.29), “Making rapid decisions under stress” (3.10), “Physical hardness” (3.06), and “Mental hardness” (2.86). These are still clearly critical areas of military indoctrination, particularly in officer preparation. All the variables in the group were rated by under half of all respondents as well or very well taught at KKMA. More respondents also thought that these areas were poorly or very poorly taught at the Academy, up to 34.2% for “Mental hardness” for example. What is more, consensus was obtained among cadets and teaching staff on all these variables of the third category, since t-tests detected no statistically significant differences between their mean scores. These five variables can be considered as important leadership ingredients (rapid decision-making under mental and physical stress, coordination efforts, and meeting deadlines).

The main message from the three variable categories just discussed is that KKMA cadets seem to be better prepared for soldiering than for the leadership challenges ahead of them. Achieving the desired outcomes of indoctrination is not an easy task, especially when there are many obstacles to overcome, such as the ones discussed next.

6.3.7 Perceptions of Blocks to Effective Indoctrination

Everyone knows that military indoctrination is a unique and challenging experience fraught with difficulties that could reduce its effectiveness. Success often depends on control of the negative influence of certain variables that may hinder this process (Forney:2000). Measurement of this influence through the perceptions of participants in this research is the object of this final section. Table 6.9 presents the assessment

results for ten main familiar obstacles to successful indoctrination.

Table 6-9 Perceptions of obstacles to effective indoctrination at KKMA.(A1-II.Q8-1to8-10).

No.	Statement	N %	S %	RA %	Q A %	GD %	C	TS	WS	SIG. L
							M	M	M	
1	Poor selection at point of entry into KKMA.	-	5.4	12.9	25.2	56.5	4.34	4.29	4.32	.792 (NS)
2	Difficulty balancing indoctrination with academics	3.4	5.5	13	24.7	53.4	4.47	3.59	4.19	.000 (S)
3	Overemphasis on conformity and obedience at expense of creativity	6.8	3.4	1 2.2	23.8	53.7	4.47	3.44	4.14	.000 (S)
4	Too much to do and not enough time to do it	2.1	6.8	16.4	34.2	40.4	4.23	3.63	4.04	.001 (S)
5	Unwillingness to change outmoded values and traditions	8.2	8.2	12.2	28.6	42.9	4.29	3.06	3.89	.000 (S)
6	Cheating incidents and breaches of Academy rules	8.2	7.5	19.7	28.6	36.1	3.97	3.34	3.76	.004 (S)
7	System is out of date	3.4	11.6	23.1	40.8	21.1	3.87	3.17	3.64	.000 (S)
8	Excessive punishments and abuses	6.8	12.2	22.4	27.9	30.6	4.14	2.55	3.63	.000 (S)
9	Cadet's ambivalence about harsh indoctrination	7.6	13.9	30.6	27.8	20.1	3.64	2.84	3.38	.000 (S)
10	Indoctrination unduly left in the hands of senior cadets	12. 9	27.2	22.4	23.8	13.6	3.02	2.89	2.97	.572 (NS)

N=none S=some. RA= reasonable amount. QA = quite a lot. G.D = great deal.

Close inspection of Table 6.9 shows that from the respondents' perceptions, it is possible to separate two groups of obstacles to effective indoctrination at KKMA: "major obstacles", and "minor obstacles". Major obstacles are those whose whole sample means fall within the scale value 4 or above ; these were assessed as having "Quite a lot" of negative impact on indoctrination. Minor obstacles are those whose

whole sample means fall within the scale value plus or minus 3; these were thought to have relatively less negative effect on indoctrination. Major obstacles include six variables (Nos.1- 6): “Poor selection at point of entry into KKMA” (4.32), “Difficulty balancing indoctrination with academics” (4.19), “Overemphasis on conformity and obedience at expense of creativity” (4.14), “Too much to do and not enough time to do it” (4.04), “Unwillingness to change outmoded values and traditions”(3.89), and “Cheating incidents and breaches of Academy rules” (3.76).

A very high proportion of the respondents (from 64% to 81.7%) rated these six obstacles as having a substantial negative impact on indoctrination at KKMA. Their mean scores ranged from (4.32) to (3.76). Consensus was obtained on what was rated as the most serious of all obstacles, “Poor selection”, shown by the result of the t-test applied to the group mean scores of cadets (4.34) and teaching staff’s (4.29), with ($P=.792$ (NS)). This strongly confirms the statement in the literature that individuals who are unsuitable for military life make indoctrination very difficult because they lack the necessary qualities to fit in. They are time-wasters and a constant distraction. The other five variables in the major obstacles group were all given greater emphasis for their negative effects by the cadets than by their teachers. This is shown by the statistically significant differences found between the two group mean scores obtained for each variable. Perhaps the cadets’ perceptions were somewhat inflated because their memories of their frustrations with their own indoctrination experience and their ‘experiments’ with new cadets were still fresh. Their more mature teachers also probably tended to view things as less dramatic generally.

As for the nature of such obstacles, apart from the one relating to selection, two of them seem to be connected to time management and balancing priorities (Nos.3, 4) “Difficulty balancing indoctrination with academics” and “Too much to do and not enough time to do it”, both difficult in a three year course where other academies have four years. Another two obstacles (Nos.5, 6) “Unwilling to change outmoded values and traditions” and “Overemphasis on conformity and obedience at expense of creativity” could be seen as connected to change and the ability to adapt to the needs of the modern world, which calls for more emphasis on creativity and elimination of outmoded values and traditions. The last obstacle, in order of importance in this group,

concerns cheating incidents. This is obviously a serious problem in any institution, but the low emphasis on it here suggests that it may not be so common in KKMA.

Relatively minor obstacles to effective indoctrination at KKMA comprise four variables (Nos.7, 8, 9, 10). Beginning with the one with the most negative effect within this group, they are: “System is out of date” (3.64), “Excessively harsh punishments and abuses”(3.63), “Cadets’ ambivalence about harsh indoctrination” (3.38), and “Indoctrination unduly left in the hands of senior cadets” (2.97). The first three variables were somewhat underemphasized by teaching staff members in comparison with cadets’ views. This was evident because the t-test used to assess differences between the two group mean scores for each variable produced statistically significant differences, all ($P = .000$ (S)). The fourth variable, considered to be the least serious of all obstacles to successful indoctrination, “Indoctrination unduly left in the hands of senior cadets”, was the object of consensus ($P = .572$ (NS)). It could be that vested interests led to this result, or simply resistance to abandon a tradition. The other three minor obstacles are related to the issue of harshness and arguably the outdated nature of the indoctrination system, both very familiar themes in the evaluation of military indoctrination processes for many years.

The commanders interviewed for this research shared many of the concerns expressed by the survey respondents, particularly regarding the negative impact of poor selection, crammed programmes, and competing and sometimes conflicting demands on cadets. However, even more pressing in their views are three other issues. The first is that the Academy is clearly oversubscribed, stretching resources beyond capacity when space and staff numbers are limited. The second problem is the decline in recruit quality due to the national educational system in general, which puts more pressure on staff to raise standards. And finally, attention was also drawn to the fact that it was regrettable to see that much effort was devoted to producing a very detailed standardised punishment system, when it could have been more usefully concentrated on designing a well-thought-out and structured indoctrination guide or manual for instruction.

6.4 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter consists of two broad parts. In the first half, the main features of cadets' indoctrination experience were described, beginning with the setting in which it was conducted and how the process was implemented from the newcomer stage to the later stages of indoctrination at KKMA.

Documents analysis revealed the absence of a clearly defined and structured indoctrination strategy, and that evidence of how it was to be conducted was piecemeal and scattered in a number of sources, none detailed or comprehensive. In practice, however, cadet indoctrination at KKMA appears to be much the same as in other military academies elsewhere, starting with intense BMT and generally aiming to transform the civilian recruit into a soldier committed to the culture and values of the Military. It then continues in the second and third years with slightly less intensity but with no less rigidity, if not more. Discipline at the Academy was described as harsh and predominantly mistake-oriented. There was also a sense that almost every aspect of cadet life was regulated, and that any departure from expected behaviour was not tolerated in an effort to produce uniformity. True leadership training in indoctrination was noted to be limited since it was mainly reserved for selected upperclassmen.

The second half of this chapter presented a detailed analysis of both survey and interview findings related to indoctrination. Issues examined included participants' perceptions of the importance of indoctrination, which was confirmed as vital by almost all who took part in this study. Equally, a large majority of respondents were of the view that KKMA was in control of all potential agents of socialisation, and an even larger majority believed that the Academy was successful in projecting a strong identity, reputation, and commitment to excellence. One commander attributed this to KKMA's efforts and determination to adopt a zero tolerance of slackness.

Subsequently, key aspects of military indoctrination at KKMA were assessed through the views of the research participants. Thus, well over two thirds of them indicated that they felt that BMT was the most shocking experience of a new cadet's life, but that nonetheless it was an essential part of military preparation. A similar proportion of respondents also agreed that BMT tended to be harsh, brutal, and negative in some

respects at KKMA. Despite this, the same proportion of respondents were of the opinion that overall, KKMA indoctrination programme outcomes were more positive than negative.

Further scrutiny of the characteristics of KKMA's indoctrination system showed that a large majority of respondents consistently judged that the Academy was rather harsh with regard to rule and regulation enforcement, liberty infractions, and discipline in general.

The respondents' overall assessment of KKMA's indoctrination system and methods showed again that over two thirds of them believed that some indoctrination methods used were outdated and counterproductive. Surprisingly, less than half of them agreed that the system ought to be relaxed, reflecting a familiar ambivalence on the issue noted in other military academies elsewhere in the world. Less than half of them, however, stated that they were satisfied with the status quo. During the interviews conducted for this research, one commander admitted that he often felt uncomfortable with the level of harshness of the current indoctrination system and its mistake-oriented disciplinary regime.

The focus then moved to the evaluation of KKMA's indoctrination performance, as viewed by the survey participants. The Academy was judged by well over two thirds of the respondents to be generally doing well in terms of inculcating soldiering skills, survival in combat, instilling pride in belonging to a professional institution, and respect and affection for KKMA. It was rated by more than half of all the survey respondents as doing reasonably well in developing group cohesion, commitment to fundamental military values, care and presentation of self, sense of pride in belonging to a unique profession, leadership skills, and military courtesy and etiquette. Finally, the Academy was thought to be doing less well in areas such as developing effort coordination, working against deadlines, making rapid decisions under stress, and physical and mental hardness. One salient finding here is that cadets seem to be better prepared for soldiering skills than leadership.

The last but one section of this chapter gave an assessment of the obstacles to effective

indoctrination at KKMA. The analysis pointed to the presence of ‘major’ and relatively ‘minor’ obstacles. Under major obstacles fell poor selection, overemphasis of conformity and obedience at the expense of creativity, unwillingness to change outmoded values and traditions, and cheating incidents and breaches of Academy rules. Relatively minor obstacles included the perception that the whole system was out of date, the excessively harsh punishments and abuses, ambivalence about the harshness of indoctrination, and lastly the claim that indoctrination was often unduly left in the hands of senior cadets. The three commanders interviewed for this research shared some of the above concerns. In addition, they felt that things were made worse because the Academy was oversubscribed beyond capacity, because of poor recruit quality, and due to the absence of a specific, structured indoctrination programme.

Finally, it is to be noted with interest that out of forty-one questions asked on indoctrination to both cadets and teaching staff members, the t-test used to detect differences between the two group scores found no statistically significant differences in twenty-two cases, and discrepancies in nineteen cases. However, the differences were in all cases a matter of emphasis rather than substance. In other words, the two groups did not generally hold opposite views, only stronger or weaker views than one another in certain cases.

The next chapter will present the field study results for the third component, “Vocational Programme”.

Chapter Seven

Findings Related to KKMA's Vocational Programme

7.1 Introduction

This chapter reports the field study results and data analysis connected with KKMA's vocational programme. The first half, based on an analysis of documentary evidence, describes the elements of the vocational programme at KKMA and the distribution of course subjects throughout the three years of officer preparation. The second half gives and interprets the statistical results of the survey and the input from the commanders interviewed on a number of vocational programme issues considered.

7.2 Vocational Programme at KKMA: Aims and Structure

According to KKMA's General Programme Outline (2001:2), the vocational programme aims to provide cadets with the necessary skills and crafts that will enable them to lead an infantry platoon on graduation from the Academy. The vocational programme (military-specific programme) particularly covers tactical subjects focused on the squadron and the platoon. The programme however does not underestimate the importance of widening the cadets' knowledge and understanding of general military subjects such as Foundations of Military Organization, Military Management, Military Regulations, Intelligence, Fire Support, Engineering, Military History and Military Geography. The vocational programme represents two thirds of the whole KKMA curriculum. In total, the programme consists of 1456 hours: 1114 hours of theory and 342 practice hours. The programme consists of 26 subjects besides field training. These 26 subjects are divided over a period of 3 years, each year consisting of two semesters.

Table 7.1 below shows the distribution of military specific course subjects offered at KKMA.

Table 7-1 Distribution of vocational programme at KKMA Source: KKMA's General Programme Outline (2001:1).

Area of Vocational Programme	Course Subject	Total Hours	
		Theory	Practice
Basic Military Skills (670 hours)	Drill	208	
	Shooting		60
	General health and first aid	20	
	Map reading	95	20
	Weapons	108	
	Field skills	33	22
	Signal	46	3
	Battle technique	34	21
Military Knowledge (406 hours)	Fire support	28	
	Light infantry tactics	85	20
	Mechanized infantry tactics	56	12
	Field engineering	38	
	Logistical support	22	
	Military patrols	28	34
	Nuclear biological & chemical war	22	
	Military symbols	23	
	Intelligence	14	
	Military geography	24	
Leadership (77 hours)	Military history	26	
	Military leadership	21	
	Staff missions	30	
Management (88 hours)	Military management	27	
	Military regulations	18	
	Organization of military units	43	
Communication Skills (25 hours)	Military instructor training course	25	
MOOTW (40 hours)	Internal security	40	
Field Training (150 hours)	Field exercises		150
Total	27	1114	342

7.2.1 First Year Programme

The first year vocational programme at KKMA consists of two semesters totalling 519 teaching hours. The first semester comprises 250 hours: 220 theory and 30 practice. During this semester, training concentrates on basic military skills. The second semester consists of 269 hours: 187 theory and 82 practice. In addition to the basic military skills, cadets are introduced to battle skills, shooting with live ammunition and basic military organisation. Table 7.2 below shows the distribution of subjects taught in the first year with their specific details.

Table 7-2 First year vocational programme at KKMA

Area of Vocational Programme	Course subject	Semester1		Semester2		Total hours
		Theory	Practice	Theory	Practice	
Basic military skills (453 hours)	Drill	44		44		88
	Weapons	70		13		83
	Shooting				18	18
	General health and first aid	20				20
	Field skills	33	22			55
	Map reading	33	8	44		85
	Signals	20		26	3	49
	Battle technique			34	21	55
Management (26 hours)	Organization of military units			26		26
Field training (40 hours)	Basic military skills exercise				40	40
Totals	10	220	30	187	82	519

7.2.2 Second Year Programme

The second year vocational programme at KKMA consists of two semesters totalling 454 teaching hours. The first semester comprises 204 hours: 164 theory and 40 hours practice. During this semester, training in basic military skills continues but the emphasis is on military knowledge, both tactical and technical. Moreover, cadets are introduced to the principles of organization of military units at the end of the semester.

Further live ammunition shooting practice is also provided. The second semester comprises 250 hours: 146 theory and 104 practice. In addition to military knowledge and military management, cadets are instructed on nuclear, chemical and biological war. By the end of the semester, the first tactical exercise is conducted to put into practice what they have learned. Table 7.3 below presents the details of all the vocational programme subjects taught in the second year of officer preparation.

Table 7-3 Second year vocational programme at KKMA

Area of vocational programme	Course subject	Semester1		Semester2		Total Hours
		Theory	Practice	Theory	Practice	
Basic military skills (121 hours)	Drill	30		30		60
	Weapons	25				25
	Shooting		24			24
	Map reading	6	6			12
Military knowledge (264 hours)	Intelligence	14				14
	Military patrols			28	34	62
	Field engineering	14		24		38
	Light infantry Tactics	49	10	36	10	105
	Nuclear & chemical and biological war			22		22
	Military symbol.	23				23
Management (9 hours)	Organization of Military units	3		6		9
Field training (60 hours)	First tactical Exercise				60	60
Total	12	164	40	146	104	454

7.2.3 Third Year Programme

The third year vocational programme at KKMA consists of two semesters totaling 493 teaching hours. The first semester comprises 325 hours: 235 theory and 90 hours practice. During this semester, military knowledge classes continue and training in MOOTW is offered. By the end of this semester, cadets take part in practical military

exercises to implement what they have learned in class. Shooting with live ammunition continues and concludes with a final assessment. The second semester comprises 168 hours: 162 theory and 6 practice. Leadership training (military leadership, military history, staff missions) are introduced here together with communication skills and instructor training. Table 7.4 below shows the details of all the vocational subjects taught in the third year of officer preparation.

Table 7-4 Third year vocational programme at KKMA

Area of vocational programme	Course subject	Semester1		Semester2		Total Hours
		Theory	Practice	Theory	Practice	
Basic military skills. (96 hours)	Drill	30		30		60
	Shooting		18			18
	Map reading			12	6	18
Military knowledge (142 hours)	Fire support	28				28
	Mechanized infantry tactics	56	12			68
	Logistical support	22				22
	Military geography	24				24
Leadership (77 hours)	Staff missions			30		30
	Military history			26		26
	Military leadership			21		21
Management (53 hours)	Organization of military units	8				8
	Military management	27				27
	Military regulations			18		18
Communication skills (25 hours)	Instructor training			25		25
MOOTW (40 hours)	Internal security	40				40
Field training (60 hours)	Second tactical exercise		60			60
Total	16	235	90	162	6	493

7.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings

The previous section covered “How is the vocational programme done at KKMA?” in theory. What follows now considers “How well is it being done?” that is, the evaluation of the vocational education programme through the perceptions of the research participants. This is done by examining first to what extent the vocational programme is perceived as important for officership. Second, perceptions of the adequacy of the contents of the elements of the vocational programme are assessed, that is basic military skills, military knowledge, and leadership. Third, evaluations of management and communication skills and other skills related to military operations other than war (MOOTW) are looked at. Fourth, the overall balance of the vocational programme in terms of theory and practice and the suitability of the learning environment at KKMA are considered. Finally, the respondents’ overall satisfaction with the vocational programme in general is assessed.

7.3.1 Importance of vocational education for officer preparation

High standards of vocational expertise are essential for effective performance in military missions, hence the need to train and educate new members of the profession in the theory and practice of the management and implementation of battle in all its technical and scientific aspects. Before tapping the respondents’ views on the vocational programme offered at KKMA, they were first asked to rate the programme in terms of overall importance. The results are shown in Table 7.5 below.

Table 7-5 Respondents’ perceptions of the importance of the vocational programme (A1-III.Q1)

	Of no importance	Of little importance	Somewhat important	Important	Very Important	M	S.D	SIG.L
	%	%	%	%	%			
C	-	-	6	13	81	4.75	.557	P=.
TS	-	-	2.1	10.6	87.2	4.85	.415	217
WS	-	-	4.8	12.2	83	4.78	.517	(NS)

As Table 7.5 shows, there is strong support among the vast majority of both cadets and teaching staff that vocational education is important or very important, with a total percentage of 95.5% and a high whole sample mean of (4.78). The t-test applied to the mean scores for the two groups, cadets (4.75) and teaching staff (4.85) showed no statistically significant difference between them ($P=.217(\text{NS})$), indicating a strong consensus on this point. This is further supported by interview statements made by the interviewed Commanders at KKMA who agreed that vocational education was not only central to the Academy, but also essential for the task of developing leadership.

Once the respondents' perceptions on the importance of the vocational programme had been tapped, their attentions was directed towards the evaluation of the specific elements and aspects of KKMA's vocational programme.

7.3.2 Assessment of Elements of KKMA's Vocational Programme

KKMA's vocational programme for the preparation of officers essentially consists of three elements: basic military skills, military knowledge, and leadership (Yardley 1987:184; Schwarzkopf, in Palmer 1992:9). Each of these areas is assessed in turn next.

7.3.2.1 Basic Military Skills

Basic military training has been and always will be an essential part of the preparation of all officers (Yardley 1987:109). This is because the officer is first and foremost a soldier and a warrior (Kelley 1996:104). It includes infantry training, perfecting shooting skills, and drill. The following table summarises the respondents' reactions to a number of statements on KKMA's basic military skills.

Table 7-6 Respondents' assessments of KKMA's effectiveness in basic military skills

(A1-III.Q2-1 to 2-3)

No.	Statement	SD	D	SMA	A	S.A	C	TS	WS	SIG.
		%	%	%	%	%	M	M	M	L
1	KKMA has a high standard in military drill and parades	2.7	2	10.9	36.1	48.3	4.26	4.23	4.25	.875 (NS)
2	KKMA has a high standard in infantry training	-	3.4	21.8	42.9	32	4.00	4.10	4.03	.467 (NS)
3	KKMA has a high standard in shooting skills	4.8	10.9	27.9	33.3	23.1	3.52	3.74	3.59	.251 (NS)

First, the combined results from Table 7.6 show that 84.4% of all survey respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that KKMA's vocational programme provides a high standard in military drill and parades (No.1). The whole sample mean is a high (4.25) rating first in all basic skills. The t-test applied to the mean scores for the two groups, cadets (4.26) and teaching staff (4.23), showed no statistically significant difference between them ($P = .875$ (NS)), indicating a strong consensus on this point. This result indicates that KKMA attaches a great deal of importance to military drill and parades. This is further supported by documentary evidence that shows that the Academy allocates 208 hours to this aspect of officer preparation.

Next, the respondents were asked if KKMA provided a high standard in infantry training (No.2). 74.9% of the survey respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that this was the case. The whole sample mean was high (4.03), rating infantry training as second in order of emphasis as viewed by the respondents. This reflects the importance that KKMA attaches to infantry training in officer preparation. The t-test found no statistically significant differences between the mean scores of cadets (4.00), and teaching staff members (4.23), resulting in ($P = .467$ (NS)).

Finally, the participants in the study were asked if KKMA provided a high standard in military shooting (No.3). 56.4% of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that this was the case, whereas 27.9% of them somewhat agreed, which suggests that almost a third of them had some reservations on the subject. This is further confirmed by the moderate to high whole sample mean score of (3.59). When the t-test was conducted, no statistically significant differences between the mean scores of the cadets (3.52) and the teaching staff group (3.74) were found, ($P=.251$ (NS)). These results indicate that training in shooting ranked lowest among all basic military skills at KKMA.

Overall it appears that KKMA provides high-quality basic military skills, i.e. drills and parades, infantry skills and shooting. This is consistent with Janjua (1994:82), who compared the training systems of six military academies, including West Point, Sandhurst, and those of North Korea, Japan, Turkey, and Pakistan, and found that they offered high quality training in basic military skills in their officer preparation. However, RMC (2001:37), Yardley (1987:109), and Janjua (1994:85) also reported military academies' tendency to pay disproportionate attention to military drill and parades, and conflicting views on their usefulness.

7.3.2.2 Military Knowledge

This is essentially concerned with the technical and tactical aspects of military expertise, both in theory and practice. Here, cadets are trained and educated in understanding and using the technological "tools of the trade". Tactical skills involve knowledge of how men fight with maximum energy and commitment. The objective of the tactical aspect is to master the skill of combining technical skills with people and ideas and applying them to fight and win (ALDH 2001: 39-43). The survey respondents were asked for their views on both technical and tactical aspects of KKMA's vocational programme. The results are shown below in Table 7.7.

Table 7-7 Respondents' assessments of KKMA's effectiveness in basic military skills

(A1.III.Q2-4 and 2-5).

Statement	SD	D	SMA	A	SA	C	TS	WS	SIG.L
	%	%	%	%	%	M	M	M	
KKMA offers high level of tactical military expertise	4.8	6.1	23.8	38.1	27.2	3.74	3.82	3.76	.636 (NS)
KKMA offers high level of technical military expertise	16.3	19	29.9	21.1	13.6	2.96	2.97	2.96	.934 (NS)

Examination of Table 7.7 shows that almost two thirds of all the respondents (65.3%) agreed or strongly agreed that KKMA offered a high level of tactical military expertise with a relatively high whole sample mean of (3.76). When the t-test was applied between the group mean for cadets (3.74) and that of the teaching staff group (3.82), it did not result in a statistically significant difference at the usual 5% level ($P = .636$ (NS)). Considering the amount of time allocated for this element of the vocational programme at KKMA, it is not surprising that there was full agreement between teaching staff and cadets in its evaluation.

When the respondents were asked if the Academy offered a high level of technical military expertise, there was no overwhelming agreement between them. Only a third of them agreed or strongly agreed (34.7%), another third preferred to sit on the fence (29.9% somewhat agreed), and the last third disagreed or strongly disagreed (35.31%). This is also reflected in the low to moderate mean of the whole sample (2.96). However, no statistically significant differences appeared between the group mean score of the cadets (2.96) and that of the teaching staff group (2.97). The t-test confirmed the consensus between the two groups ($P = .934$ (NS)). Comparing this finding with the earlier one reveals that the vocational programme at KKMA offers a lower standard of technical training and knowledge than that provided for tactical training. A military academy that is aspiring to professionalism ideally requires a balance between the provision of technical and tactical knowledge.

Providing cadets with basic military skills and military knowledge alone is not enough for officership. Officers require leadership training in order to lead their men and win wars. RMC (2001:45) states that leadership training must be central to everything that cadets do at the military academy. Yardley (1987:197) also maintains that, in the British Military Academy of Sandhurst, everything is taught through the medium of leadership, both theory and practice, with a strong emphasis on relevance to ensure that everything the cadets do has a useful purpose. The next section interprets the respondents' assessment of the quality of the leadership programme at KKMA in relation to three relevant aspects: theory, process and implementation, and outcome.

7.3.2.3 Leadership

All the military academies reviewed for this important portion of the vocational component of officer preparation recognise the vital importance of leadership skills. However, not all of them provide the structures, the resources, and the necessary programmes to ensure that the objective of producing capable and effective leaders can be achieved. Many seem to expect leadership to simply emerge, while others, such as West Point (USA) and Annapolis (USA), for example, see their missions as producers of the 'best leaders in the world' (Thomas 2000:14). These academies, as we have noted, have a separate department for leadership development. Palmer (1992:6) rightly "sees that the academies' very reason for being revolves around leadership", therefore, it is essential for all military academies to have a serious leadership programme, both theoretical and practical. Respondents' perceptions of the theoretical aspect of leadership training at KKMA are shown in Table 7.8 below:

Table 7-8 Respondents' assessment of the theoretical aspect of leadership at KKMA

(A1-III.Q3-1 and 3-2).

Statement	SD	D	SMA	A	SA	C	TS	WS	SIG.
	%	%	%	%	%	M	M	M	L
KKMA leadership preparation provides adequate knowledge & skills	2.7	58.5	29.3	6.1	2.7	2.28	2.89	2.47	.000 (S)
KKMA leadership training draws from modern scientific theories and sound analysis of historical examples	4.8	61.2	30.6	2	.7	2.21	2.56	2.39	.001 (S)

Beginning with whether KKMA offers adequate knowledge and skills to produce capable military leaders, Table 7.8 shows that only 8.8% of all respondents clearly agreed or strongly agreed that this was the case. The combined percentages on the other hand indicate that almost two thirds disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that KKMA provided adequate leadership preparation for cadets; the rest (29.3%) somewhat agreed with the statement. The whole sample mean score was relatively low (2.47). The t-test applied to the mean showed a statistically significant difference ($P = .000(S)$) between the mean scores of cadets (2.28) and that of teaching staff members (2.89), with cadets expressing more criticisms than their teachers. The reason for this may be that they were the ones who had recently been at the receiving end of leadership training at KKMA.

The respondents then were asked if the Academy provided a leadership programme that was drawn from modern scientific theories and sound analysis of historical examples of leadership. Surprisingly, the vast majority of the respondents (65.4%) either disagreed or strongly disagreed that this was the case. This was also confirmed by the relatively low whole sample mean of (2.39). However, once again, the t-test used to detect significance ($P = .001(S)$) between groups found a statistically significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (2.21), and the teaching staff (2.56), with

cadets tending to be more critical of the programme than their instructors.

The implications of these findings can be considered as serious for KKMA. As Taylor (1977:9) states, leadership is admittedly not an easy subject to teach. Yet, new officers would fail in their missions if they did not possess adequate knowledge and skills for effective leadership. And since experience is not enough, leadership can and must be taught, drawing on modern scientific theories and from sound analysis of historical examples of successful and unsuccessful leadership.

Next, the respondents were asked for their assessment of the practical aspect of the leadership programme at KKMA. Table 7.9 shows the results of their perceptions on this issue.

Table 7-9 Respondents' assessment of practical aspects of leadership at KKMA

(A1-III.Q3-3 to 3-6)

No.	Statement	SD	D	SMA	A	SA	C	TS	WS	SIG.
		%	%	%	%	%	M	M	M	L
1	KKMA tends to overemphasize authoritarian methods of leadership based on fear and obedience	9.6	15.1	18.5	29.5	27.4	3.63	3.21	3.50	.074 (NS)
2	KKMA offers cadets ample opportunities to hold command positions in various activities	7.5	63.9	23.8	1.4	2	2.13	2.52	2.32	.002 (S)
3	All officers in contact with cadets provide good role model of leadership at KKMA	9.7	16.6	30.3	24.8	18.6	3.16	3.47	3.26	.146 (NS)
4	KKMA provides adequate practical experimentation	9.5	62.6	23.8	2.7	.7	2.10	2.47	2.29	.002 (S)

Asked whether the Academy tended to overemphasize authoritarian methods of leadership based on fear and unquestioning obedience (No.1), over half of the respondents (56.9%) agreed or strongly agreed, and 18.5% somewhat agreed that it was the case, leaving 24.7% in disagreement with the statement. The whole sample mean is moderate to high (3.50). The t-test applied to the mean scores for the two groups, cadets (3.63) and teaching staff (3.21), showed no statistically significant difference between them ($P = .074$ (NS)), indicating high consensus on this point. This finding is in contradiction with Atkine (2000:20), who believes that military academies that aim at developing cadets who will be tomorrow's leaders, ought not to use outdated, purely authoritarian methods of leadership, based on fear and unquestioned obedience from followers because they are inappropriate and counterproductive in modern times.

Next, the respondents were asked if KKMA's leadership preparation programme offered cadets ample opportunities to hold command positions in a variety of activities (No.2). A massive 70.8% of them disagreed or strongly disagreed. This is further confirmed by the relatively low whole sample mean (2.32). The t-test found statistically significant differences between the mean scores of cadets (2.13) and teaching staff members (2.52), resulting in ($P = .002$ (S)). This finding is inconsistent with many military writers such as Junjua (1994:74); Dodd (1978:52); RMC (2001: 17), who believe that in most military academies in the world cadets are strongly encouraged to serve in positions of cadet leadership and to seek responsibility in a variety of activities, including sports and extra-curricular activities. For example, most make use of the practice of having upperclassmen. They are also offered opportunities to hold command positions during summer military training, military and exercises and during field training with operational troops.

Following this, the participants in this study were asked if they agreed that all the officers cadets came in contact with provided good role models of leadership (No.3). No consensus was found among the respondents surveyed on this issue. Thus, 43.4% agreed or strongly agreed, 30.3% somewhat agreed, and 26.3% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement. The whole sample mean obtained was moderate (3.26). However, the t-test found no statistically significant difference between the two group

scores, cadets (3.16) and teaching staff (3.47), with ($P = .146(\text{NS})$).

During the interviews, Commander A2-C3 admitted that not all officers at KKMA provided good role models of leadership. This is inconsistent with research that emphasises that leadership development is facilitated by providing exemplary role models, because cadets also learn leadership behaviour through observation and interaction with officers they come in contact with (RMC 2001:8; Atkine 2000:22; Garnett 2001:ii; McCoy 1996:29; Ulman 1990:29; Thomas 2000:8).

Finally, the participants in this study were asked if KKMA's leadership programme provided adequate practical experimentation with regard to different leadership approaches (No.4). Almost three quarters of all respondents (72.1%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that this was the case. The low overall mean score of (2.29) rules out any doubt about the weakness of the programme in this respect. Although the t-test found a statistically significant difference between the two group scores, cadets (2.10) and teaching staff (2.47) with ($P = .002(\text{S})$), both, however, saw it as a weak programme. This finding contrasts with the view of (Coska 1985:2). Subsequently, the respondents were asked for their assessment of the quality of the outcomes of the leadership programme at KKMA. Their perceptions are shown in Table 7.10 below:

**Table 7-10 Respondents' assessment of KKMA's leadership programme outcome
(A1-III.Q3-7,8).**

Statement	SD	D	SMA	A	S.A	C	TS	WS	SIG. L
						M	M	M	
KKMA cadets feel confident and can organize and lead men during times of war and peace	8.8	52.4	30.6	6.1	1.4	2.15	2.89	2.38	.000 (S)
KKMA produces leaders who are capable of critical and creative thinking	11.6	50.3	34	2	.7	2.15	2.58	2.37	.001 (S)

First, the survey participants were asked if KKMA's leadership programme produced leaders who were confident, and able to organise and lead men in times of both war and peace. Following their negative assessment of both the theoretical and practical aspects of the leadership programme so far, it was no surprise to find that two thirds (65.9%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that KKMA achieved this goal. This is also reflected in the relatively low whole sample mean of (2.38). There was however, a statistically significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (2.15) and teaching staff (2.89), detected by the t-test ($P = .000$ (S)), with cadets expressing lower confidence in the leadership programme outcome than their teachers. This finding is inconsistent with Dodd (1978:54) and Keller (2001:17), who state that every cadet must learn how to organise confidently and completely and lead men in times of both war and peace before graduation.

Next, the survey participants were asked if KKMA's leadership programme produced leaders who were capable of thinking critically and creatively, and who could act independently in accordance with the intent of their superiors. Almost two thirds of all the respondents (61.9%) disagreed or strongly disagreed that KKMA achieved this goal, with a relatively low whole sample mean of (2.37). The t-test indicated a difference between the cadets' mean (2.15) and that of the teaching staff (2.58). This difference was in emphasis rather than indication opposition since both means were relatively low. This finding is inconsistent with the views of military writers such as Garnett (2001: vi) and Konig (2001:5), who maintain that the modern leader must be taught not what to think but how to think. In *Educating Army Leaders for the 21st Century*, Dudevoir (2000:4) stresses that leadership development programmes must aim to produce leaders who are capable of thinking critically and creatively, and who can act independently in accordance with the intent of their superiors, rather than sitting and waiting for orders.

When this issue was raised in the interviews with the KKMA commanders, A2-C1 admitted: "As a theory creative leadership is okay, but problems arise in implementation. The large number of cadets at the Academy does not permit us to provide sufficient opportunities for leadership practice and learning its art. We are however going to establish a new department for leadership in the Academy soon and,

hopefully, this will enhance leadership training and creativity in this field”.

On the other hand, A2-C3 pinpointed a number of reasons for the weaknesses of KKMA’s leadership programme. He considered that lack of planning and implementation control were major reasons for its ineffectiveness. KKMA’s crowded 3-year programme does not allow sufficient opportunities to put theory into practice and refine it in terms of creativity through experimentation. In contrast, A2-C2 offered a different view: “We need to bear in mind that the cadet is going to be a platoon leader. I think that the current programme is suitable. Also it is important to remember that officer education does not end at the Academy”.

7.3.3 New Elements of Expertise

Vocational military programmes nowadays include new spheres of expertise, particularly management, communication skills, and various other skills related to military operations other than war (MOOTW). This section covers the respondents’ perceptions of the adequacy of KKMA’s education and training provision with regard to management, communications, and MOOTW.

7.3.4 Management

The preparation of professional military officers nowadays includes equipping them with at least the basic principles of administration and management so that they can contribute to running the affairs of the Military, in times of both peace and war. First the respondents were asked for their views on how important it is for cadets to be equipped with at least the basic principles of administration and management. Their answers are displayed in Table 7.11 below:

**Table 7-11 Importance of basic principles of administration and management for cadets
(A1-III.Q4).**

	Of no importance %	Of little importance %	Somewhat important %	Important %	Very important %	M	S.D	SIG L
C	3	6	15	30	46	4.10	1.05	P= .148 (NS)
TS	2.1	4.3	4.3	34	55.3	4.36	.919	
WS	2.7	5.4	11.6	31.3	49	4.18	1.02	

As Table 7.11 shows, there is strong support among the vast majority of both cadets and teaching staff for the idea that basic principles of administration and management are important or very important, with a total percentage of 80.3% and a high whole sample mean of (4.18). When the t-test was used to assess whether the two group means, for cadets (4.10) and for teaching staff (4.36) differed significantly, it was found that there was no significant difference at the 5% level (P= .148 (NS)). Clearly, both recognised the importance of administration and management. This recognition is in agreement with the views of Yardley (1987:118) and Cvrcek (1991:145).

Questioned on this point, A2-C1 said “Administration and management skills are not just important, they are essential,” while A2-C2 said “They are essential; that is why we teach military management and personnel management, as well as basic organisational management.”

Next, the respondents were asked for their assessment of the adequacy of administration and management skills as provided by KKMA. Table 7.12 summarises their views.

**Table 7-12 Respondents' assessment of administration and management skills at KKMA
(A1-III.Q5).**

	Very poor %	Poor %	Reasonably good %	Good %	Very good %	Mean	S.D	SIG.L
C	7	19	46	24	4	2.99	.937	P=. 649 (NS)
TS	6.4	10.6	57.4	21.3	4.3	3.06	.869	
WS	6.8	16.3	49.7	23.1	4.1	3.01	.914	

As can be seen from the above Table, only (27.2%) of all respondents thought that the academy provided good or very good administration and management skills as part of its vocational programme. On the other side of the scale, (23.1%) thought that it was poor or very poor. Just under half (49.7%) thought that the Academy was doing reasonably well in this respect. The moderate sample mean score of (3.01) confirmed that the Academy needs to give more attention to its teaching of administration and management skills. Consensus between the two groups of respondents was evident when the t-test was used to detect differences between the means for the cadets (2.99) and for the teaching staff (3.06), no significant difference was found at the 5% level (P= .649 (NS)). This indicates that both cadets and teaching staff were in agreement on this issue.

All three commanders interviewed also confirmed these results. A2-C1 stated: "The reasons why I am not totally satisfied with the quality of administration and management skills provided at KKMA is because we don't have a separate department for teaching these subjects. Fortunately, we are going to have one soon".

A2-C2 added, "KKMA's basic administration and management programmes are sound, theoretically. However, due to time limitations and cadet numbers, we are unable to offer sufficient knowledge and practice in this regard". A2-C3 expressed his dissatisfaction by saying: "We are currently not giving our cadets the opportunity to practise how to manage their time, their troops, their organisation and their resources. You can only do so much in three years".

Whether in the role of manager or leader, the officer needs good communication skills to interact at all levels. The assessment of this programme aspect is discussed next.

7.3.5 Communication Skills

Developing good communication skills is an essential part of the preparation of the modern military officer. This is not new; the Military has always been aware of the importance of good communication for combat effectiveness and for survival. Thus, the respondents were asked how well communication skills were taught at KKMA. Their answers are summarized in Table 7.13 below.

Table 7-13 Respondents' assessment of communication skills at KKMA

(A1-III.Q6).

	Very poor %	Poor %	Reasonably good %	Good %	Very good %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	24.2	25.3	28.3	16.2	6.1	2.54	1.19	P=.882 (NS)
TS	10.6	36.2	38.3	14.9	-	2.57	.878	
WS	19.9	28.8	31.5	15.8	4.1	2.55	1.10	

Table 7.13 shows that almost half of respondents (48.7%) thought that the Academy provided poor or very poor communication skills in its vocational programme. Only one fifth of them (19.9%) thought that this aspect was good or very good. Finally, a third (31.5%) thought that it was reasonably good. The low to moderate whole sample mean score of (2.55) confirmed the weaknesses of communication skills training at KKMA. When the t-test was used to assess whether the two group means, for cadets (2.54) and for teaching staff (2.57) differed significantly, it was found that there was no significant difference at the 5% level (P= .882 (NS)). This agreement between the two groups indicates that communication skills training at KKMA needs to be improved. This finding is inconsistent with Downey (1977:177), who says that good communication enables intentions and plans to be well understood, encouragement and

genuine concern for individuals to be conveyed, and morale to be lifted. It is also inconsistent with Yardley (1987:114), who says that Sandhurst (UK) recognizes the importance of good communication and has for some years now had a separate communications department which is responsible for the development of cadets' communication skills, particularly training in face-to-face interviewing, briefings, presentations etc.

Confirming the finding of the questionnaire, all three commanders interviewed agreed that the Academy was not doing well in its provision of communication skills. They attributed this to the lack of time, shortage of equipment, and lack of specialist instructors in this field.

7.3.3.3 MOOTW Training

The Military are no longer limited to fighting conventional wars against conventional enemies. They are frequently expected to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW), such as pursuing terrorists and drug war lords, providing humanitarian relief, containing regional conflicts, peace keeping/making etc. All military academies see it as their duty to equip future officers with the appropriate knowledge and skills to cope with this new mix of roles and commitments. Respondent were asked if KKMA's vocational programme adequately equipped aspiring officers with these roles. Their views are summarised in table 7.14 below:

Table 7-14 Respondents' perception of the quality of MOOTW training at KKMA

(A1-II.Q7).

	Very poor %	Poor %	Reasonably good %	Good %	Very good %	Mean	S.D	SIG. L
C	36	17	26	13	8	2.40	1.31	P=. 710 (NS)
TS	27.7	23.4	40.4	6.4	2.1	2.31	1.02	
WS	33.3	19	30.6	10.9	6.1	2.37	1.22	

As can be seen from Table 7.14, 52.3% of all respondents surveyed rated KKMA's quality of MOOTW training as poor or very poor, 30.6% as reasonably good, and only 17% as good or very good. The whole sample mean was relatively low (2.37). The t-test was used to assess whether the two group means for cadets (2.40) and for teaching staff (2.37) differed significantly. It was found that there was no significant difference at the 5% level ($P = .710$ (NS)). This agreement between the respondents indicates that the academy must reconsider its programme to ensure that it remains updated with current concepts of MOOTW training. Kelley (1996:107) maintains that professional military education and training must give officers of the future the confidence they need to perform in new operating environments.

Questioned on this point, A2-C1 stated: "We train for security during protests and the road safety. We sometimes participate in security during Haj (annual pilgrimage to Mecca) and we also train our cadets in how to fight in buildings and cities". A2-C2 added: "Our programme considers training for war against smuggling. We practise some of our exercises in difficult topography and in difficult seasons such as summer and winter ". A2-C3 supported the survey findings: "We are doing well in security training but I also think that there is a need for MOOTW training at KKMA, particularly training for relief and humanitarian operations".

7.3.6 Balance Between Theory and Practice and the Learning Environment

An effective vocational programme must strike the right balance between theory and practice. It must encourage experimentation, provide constant feedback and reflection and build cadets' confidence in their growing theoretical and practical expertise in all aspects of this component. It also needs an encouraging learning environment. Failing to provide a learning climate that aims for and demonstrates commitment to high standards of expertise will inevitably lead to a professional development that falls short of ever achieving excellence. The respondents were asked first to assess to what extent KKMA offered an adequate balance between theory and practice in its vocational programme (military skills, knowledge, leadership, management, communication skills, and MOOTW). Table 7.15 displays the results for this question.

Table 7-15 Respondents' perceptions on whether KKMA's vocational programme is balanced (A1-III.Q8).

	Not balanced at all %	Poorly balanced %	Reasonably balanced %	Balanced %	Well balanced %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	6	12	42	28	12	3.28	1.02	P=. 713 (NS)
T.S	-	10.6	44.7	44.7	-	3.34	.668	
W.S	4.1	11.6	42.9	33.3	8.2	3.29	.924	

Close examination of Table 7.15 shows that overall, there was no overwhelming agreement among the respondents that KKMA offered an adequately balanced vocational programme. Indeed, under half of them in total (41.5%) perceived it as balanced or well balanced. Almost the same proportion (42.9%) perceived it as reasonably balanced, the rest (15.7%) perceived it as poorly balanced or not balanced at all. The moderate overall mean for the whole sample (3.29) removes doubts about the dominance of scepticism towards the effectiveness of KKMA in offering an adequately balanced vocational programme. A final look at Table 7.15 reveals that the t-test detected no statistically significant differences between the means for the two groups, cadets and teaching staff with regard to this issue (P= .713 (NS)). These results can only be seen as a call for KKMA to strike the right balance in its vocational programme.

A2-C3 had this to say about the issue of balance in KKMA's vocational programme: "There is too much theory and too little practice. There are some theoretical subjects beyond the cadets' tactical level. We could reduce the theoretical aspects in favour of more time spent on the practical aspects of leadership for example. In order to meet the challenges of the 21st century, I think we need to improve the balance of our vocational programme and we also need to improve our field and training provisions".

Next, the respondents were asked to what extent they thought that the learning environment at KKMA was conducive to the development of a high level of

professional military expertise in its future leaders. The results are displayed in Table 7.16 below.

**Table 7-16 Respondents' perceptions of the learning environment at KKMA
(A1.III.Q9).**

	Not helpful at all %	A little helpful %	Reasonably helpful %	Helpful %	Very helpful %	Mean	S.D	SIG. L
C	4	20	41	25	10	3.17	.995	P=. 319 (NS)
TS	2.1	14.9	36.2	40.4	6.4	3.34	.891	
WS	3.4	18.4	39.5	29.9	8.8	3.22	.963	

As can be seen from Table 7.16, 38.7% of all the respondents believed that the learning environment at KKMA was helpful or very helpful, 21.8% as a little helpful or not helpful at all, and 39.5% as reasonably helpful. This is also reflected in the lukewarm whole sample mean of (3.22). Furthermore, a statistically significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (3.17) and teaching staff (3.34) was detected by the t-test (P=. 319 (NS)). Subsequently, the respondents' overall assessment of KKMA's vocational programme was requested. Thus, they were asked to indicate the extent to which they were generally satisfied with the vocational programme at KKMA. Table 7.17 gives the results of their responses

**Table 7-17 Respondents' overall satisfaction with KKMA's vocational programme
(A1-III.Q10).**

	Very dissatisfied %	Dissatisfied %	Somewhat Satisfied %	Satisfied %	Very satisfied %	Mean	S.D	SIG. L
C	8	13	37	33	9	3.22	1.05	P=. 350 (NS)
TS	2.1	8.5	44.7	38.3	6.4	3.38	.822	
WS	6.1	11.6	39.5	34.7	8.2	3.27	.983	

Asked to give their concluding assessment of the vocational programme at KKMA in terms of overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction, 42.9% of the respondents stated that they were either satisfied or very satisfied, 39.5% sat on the fence (somewhat satisfied), 17.7% were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. As reactions were generally moderate on this issue so far, it was no surprise to find that the overall mean was lukewarm (3.27). No statistically significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (3.22) and teaching staff (3.38) was detected by the t-test ($P = .350$ (NS)), which indicates a similarity of views between them.

Speaking about the vocational programme as a whole, A2-C1 stated: "I believe our vocational programme is essentially sound. However, we do need to review it more often and update it to keep up with the advances in military weapons and technology". A2-C2 also expressed his support for the vocational programme in these terms: "I am satisfied that KKMA's vocational programme is well-balanced and covers all the requirements for new officers". However, A2-C3 expressed his dissatisfaction with the vocational programme for both qualitative and quantitative reasons: "Some subjects are beyond the cadets' level of understanding and should be taught at a higher level and not at the Academy. We also need to review our programmes and make them more relevant. More importantly, we need to redress the balance between theory and practice for all military subjects, particularly leadership training."

7.4 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter consists of two broad parts. In the first half, the main outline of the cadets' vocational programme was described, beginning with the aims and structure of the vocational programme, how it was conducted and how the subjects were distributed throughout the three years officer preparation at KKMA.

Documents analysis revealed that KKMA provides a wide variety of subjects in its vocational programme, which represents two thirds of its whole curriculum. However, the Academy seems to concentrate on basic military skills, devoting almost half of its vocational programme to them (670 hours). The Academy also pays great attention to military knowledge, allocating 406 hours to it, while leadership is allocated only 77

hours. Management and communication skills are allocated 88 and 25 hours respectively. Regarding MOOTW subjects, the Academy only teaches internal security (40 hours). Over the three officer preparation years, the theory versus practice proportion is 1114 hours/ 342 hours, an enormous imbalance in favour of theory.

The second part of this chapter presented a detailed analysis of both survey and interview findings related to the vocational programme. The presentation began with an examination of the respondents' views on the importance of the vocational programme to officership and found that 95% of both cadets and teaching staff members agreed on the importance of this programme to any military academy. (Table 7.5). The commanders interviewed concluded that vocational education was not only central to the main mission of the Academy, but was also essential for developing leadership roles.

Next, a general assessment of the elements of KKMA's vocational programme including basic military skills, military knowledge and leadership was conducted. Starting with the basic military skills at KKMA, the results showed that a large majority of respondents consistently judged that the Academy provided a high standard in all military skills, that is drill and parades, infantry training, and shooting. This was not surprising due to the large number of hours devoted to basic military skills (670 hours).

Following this, an assessment of military knowledge at KKMA was elicited. It showed that almost two thirds of all respondents (65.3%) agreed that KKMA offered a high level of tactical military expertise, but when the respondents were asked if the Academy provided a high level of technical military expertise, there was no overwhelming agreement between them. (Table 7.7). This indicates the need for a balanced programme both tactically and technically.

The most salient findings in this chapter were that the majority of respondents who took part in this study believed that KKMA was not providing adequate knowledge and skills to produce capable military leaders, particularly with regard to the leadership programme which, was not deemed to be sufficiently drawn from modern scientific

theories and sound analysis of historical examples of leadership. The respondents' assessment of the practical aspect of leadership at KKMA also showed that the programme overemphasised authoritarian methods of leadership based on fear and unquestioning obedience and did not offer cadets ample opportunities to hold command positions in a variety of activities. Critically, no overwhelming agreement was obtained among the respondents on whether all the officers cadets came in contact with provided good role models of leadership. Moreover, when they were asked if the programme provided adequate practical experimentation opportunities with regard to different leadership approaches, almost three quarters (72.1%) said no. (Table 7.9).

Again, the respondents' views on the outcome of the leadership programme at KKMA showed that they thought that it did not produce leaders who were confident and able to organise and lead men in times of both war and peace. Nor did they think that it produced leaders capable of thinking critically and creatively, and who could act independently in accordance with the intent of their superiors. All three commanders interviewed admitted that KKMA's leadership programme did not provide cadets with sufficient opportunity to practise leadership and learn its art due to the large number of cadets enrolled each year, the lack of a separate department for leadership training and the tight three-year preparation programme.

Subsequently, new elements of expertise including management, communication skills, and MOOTW were assessed for their adequacy at KKMA. All participants agreed on the importance of management courses and their value in equipping them with at least the basic principles of administration and management operations. However, they thought that this was not well provided at KKMA. All three commanders interviewed also thought that the Academy needed to update its management courses both theoretically and practically. Moreover, almost half of all respondents (48.7%) thought that the Academy's provision of communication skills was poor or very poor. All three commanders interviewed also agreed that the Academy was not doing well in communication skills training. Another significant finding was that 52.3% of all respondents surveyed rated KKMA's MOOTW training as poor or very poor, a view supported by A2-C3, who thought that there was a need for more training on MOOTW, particularly training for relief and humanitarian

operations. (Tables 7.13,14,15).

On the balance between theory and practice in KKMA's vocational programme, no overwhelming agreement was found. However, A2-C3 pointed out that there was too much theory and too little practice and that there were some theoretical subjects beyond the cadets' tactical level. Furthermore the respondents believed that the learning environment at KKMA was not conducive to the development of a high level of professional military expertise in its future leaders.

The respondents' concluding assessment of the vocational programme at KKMA in terms of overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction showed generally moderate levels of satisfaction. Two commanders expressed satisfaction with it, while the third expressed his dissatisfaction.

Finally, it is to be noted with interest that out of 19 questions on the vocational programme put to both cadets and teaching staff members, the t-test used to detect differences between the two group scores found no statistically significant differences in 15 cases, and discrepancies in 4 cases only. However, the differences were in all cases a matter of emphasis, rather than substance. In other words, the two groups did not generally hold opposite views, only stronger or weaker views than one another in certain cases.

The following chapter will present and analyse the field study results for the fourth component, "Liberal education".

Chapter Eight

Findings Related to KKMA's Liberal Education programme

8.1 Introduction

The present chapter presents and interprets the findings regarding the liberal education programme. The first half of this chapter, based on the analysis of documentary evidence, outlines the aims and structure of the liberal education programme at KKMA and the distribution of the subjects throughout the three years. The second half gives and interprets the quantitative and qualitative results of the survey and the input from the interviewed commanders interviewed on a number of issues relevant to the discussion.

8.2 Liberal Education Programme at KKMA: Aims and Structure

KKMA's liberal education programme aims to provide cadets with a broad range of knowledge of the human and natural sciences in order to broaden their minds and enable them to interact with both the military and civilian communities in the future (KKMA Guide 1999:38). The programme is not intended to specialise the cadets in any particular field; it is intended to extend their knowledge and give them foundation knowledge in the sciences (General Programme Outline 2000:1). KKMA's liberal education programme consists of 16 subjects, totalling 857 course hours distributed over three years. The Academy offers this programme in two civilian departments. The first is the Human Sciences Department, which states its mission as follows: "to strengthen cadets' religious and intellectual capacities through a programme of natural sciences and teachings of Islam". The programme aims to connect them with their world geographically, legally, administratively and economically. In addition, it gives the cadets a sound knowledge of history. The department also teaches English language because of its importance to the officer of the 21st century (Academy Education Guide 2001:12). It is responsible for teaching 10 subjects, which are listed in Table 8.1 below. The second department is the Sciences Department, which is

responsible for providing cadets with the foundations of a variety of science subjects such as mathematics, computer studies, geology, biology, chemistry, and physics. Table 8.1 below shows the distribution of the liberal education course subjects at KKMA.

Table 8-1 Distribution of Liberal Education programme modules at KKMA

Area of liberal education programme	Subjects	Total hours
Human sciences (517 hours)	Holy Qur'ān	70
	Islamic studies	72
	Arabic language	33
	English	80
	History	38
	Geography	37
	International law	27
	Public administration	54
	Psychology	54
	Economics	26
Other sciences (340 hours)	Chemistry	81
	Mathematics	81
	Physics	81
	Geology	28
	Biology	28
	Computer studies	41
Total	16	857

8.2.1 First Year Programme

In the first year the liberal education programme mainly covers human science subjects, such as Qur'ān, Islamic studies, Arabic language, History, Geography and English. In addition to these subjects, Mathematics is introduced in the second semester. Bearing in mind that it is during the first year that most of the indoctrination programme is implemented, for this reason the liberal education programme is deliberately not very substantial. Table 8.2 below displays the liberal education subjects that are taught in the first preparation year at KKMA.

Table 8-2 First-year liberal education programme at KKMA

Area of liberal education	Subjects	Semester 1	Semester 2	Total
Human sciences (160 hours)	Qur'ān	20		20
	Islamic studies	20	26	46
	English		26	26
	Arabic Language	20	13	33
	History	11		11
	Geography	11	13	24
Other sciences (39 hours)	Mathematics		39	39
Total	7	82	117	199

8.2.2 Second Year Programme

This is the year where cadets take most subjects of liberal education, with nine subjects totaling 377 hours. Science subjects receive more attention here with 232 hours in subjects such as Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry and Geology. Table 8.3 below gives the details of all the liberal education subjects taught in the second year.

Table 8-3 Second-year liberal education programme at KKMA

Area of liberal education	Subjects	Semester 1	Semester 2	Total
Human sciences (145 hours)	Qur'ān	24		24
	International law	14	13	27
	English	28	26	54
	History	14	13	27
	Geography		13	13
Other sciences (232 hours)	Mathematics	42		42
	Physics	42	39	81
	Chemistry	42	39	81
	Geology	28		28
Total	9	210	167	377

8.2.3 Third-Year Programme

During this year, seven liberal education subjects are taught, five of them in the human sciences and the other two in other sciences. Also, during this year public Administration, Economics and Psychology are introduced to cadets because they go in parallel with leadership education and training. In addition, Computer Studies are also offered during this year. Table 8.4 below gives details of all the liberal education subjects taught in the third year.

Table 8-4 Third-year liberal education programme at KKMA

Area of liberal education	Subjects	Semester 1	Semester 2	Total
Human sciences (186 hours)	Qur'ān		26	26
	Islamic study		26	26
	Economics		26	26
	Public Administration	28	26	54
	Psychology	28	26	54
Other sciences (95 hours)	Biology	28	26	54
	Computer Studies	28	13	41
Total	7	112	169	281

8.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings

The previous section covered “How is the liberal education programme done at KKMA?”. What follows now relates “How well is it being done?”, that is the evaluation of the liberal education programme through the perceptions of the participants.

8.3.1 Importance of Liberal Education for Cadets

Apart from the need for a solid grounding in professional military knowledge and skills, most academy officer preparation programmes in the world recognise the importance and value of liberal education in the overall professional development of

aspiring officers. Most military educators see it as a requirement and a necessity and consider that it plays an increasingly vital role in equipping current and future leaders with the knowledge and attitudes they need to meet the challenges of the modern world and have a successful military career. The respondents were asked for their views on the importance of liberal education at KKMA. The results are shown in Table 8.5 below.

Table 8-5 Respondents' perceptions of the importance of liberal education

(A1-IV.Q1)

	Of no importance %	Of little importance %	Somewhat important %	Important %	Very important %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	15.2	36.4	17.2	11.1	20.2	2.48	1.37	P=. 005 (S)
TS	2.1	19.1	27.7	27.7	23.4	3.51	1.12	
WS	11	30.8	20.5	16.4	21.2	3.06	1.32	

As Table 8.5 shows, 51.6% of the cadets see liberal education as of little or no importance with a relatively low mean of (2.48), whereas 51.1% of their teachers see it as important or very important with a relatively high mean of (3.51). When the t-test was used to assess whether the two group means, for cadets and for teaching staff differed significantly, it was found that the difference was significant at the 5% level (P= .005 (S)). This is consistent with Harris's (1991:4) argument that many cadets are surprised at the number of general education classes they must take in order to graduate. They wonder why they have to take subjects that have apparently no link with their chosen professional career. Subjects such as history, literature, philosophy, music, art, etc. are generally not perceived as being directly helpful in training them for the military profession.

However, the three Commanders interviewed for this research took the opposite view. A2-C1 stated: "Liberal education is important because it is complementary to the preparation of the officer". A2-C2 added: "It is important because it provides cadets

with general knowledge and improves their intellectual abilities”. A2-C3 shared similar views but with the proviso that some attention must be paid to the issue of relevance in the choice of subjects and their delivery.

8.3.2 Assessment of Five Key Features of Liberal Education at KKMA

The purpose behind the next five questions related to this component in the questionnaire was to determine the participants’ perceptions and evaluations of general features of liberal education at KKMA. Table 8.6 summarises the results for the five items in question.

Table 8-6 Respondents' perceptions of five key features of KKMA's liberal education

(A1-IV.Q2-1to2-5).

No.	Statement	SD %	D %	SMA %	A %	SA %	C	TS	WS	SIG.L
							M	M	M	
1	KKMA offers a broad coverage of branches of knowledge	6.8	15.6	29.3	36.7	11.6	3.21	3.51	3.30	.117 (NS)
2	Offers a rich variety of interesting and valuable courses	10.2	26.5	30.6	23.1	9.5	2.95	2.95	2.95	.971 (NS)
3	Overall contents of general education programme is equivalent to university courses	23.8	19	32 %	19	6.1	2.58	2.78	2.64	.334 (NS)
4	Offers a good understanding of current technology and its impact	29.5	18.5	28.8	15.8	7.5	2.36	2.89	2.53	.018 (S)
5	Offers a solid foundation in computer literacy	35.4	21.1	17.7	12.9	12.9	2.21	3.02	2.46	.001 (S)

Asked whether KKMA's liberal education programme offered a broad coverage of the major branches of learning (No.1), 48.3% agreed or strongly agreed, and 29.3% somewhat agreed, leaving only 22.4% strongly disagreeing or disagreeing. The whole sample mean was lukewarm (3.30), which means that there was uncertainty among the respondents on this issue. The absence of a statistically significant difference between cadets and teaching staff members ($P = .117$ (NS)) also indicates that both groups of respondents had some reservations about the programme.

Next, the respondents were asked if KKMA offered a rich variety of interesting and

valuable courses in its liberal education programme (No.2). Almost a third of them (32.6%) strongly agreed or agreed, the other third (30.6%) were uncertain and 36.7% disagreed or strongly disagreed. The whole sample mean is a low to moderate (2.95). Interestingly, all means were identical, which means that there was full consensus among the participants on this question. This finding indicates that there is still room for improvement for KKMA to introduce a rich variety of interesting and valuable courses in its liberal programme as been emphasised by many writers in military literature such as Simons: (1965:8-18), Shafer and Putnam (1998: 169), Dudevoir (2000: 14), and Snider (1985: 4).

Following this, the participants in this study were asked if KKMA offered a liberal education programme that was equivalent to civilian programmes of the same level in terms of standards (No.3). Perhaps not surprisingly, almost half of all respondents strongly disagreed or disagreed (42.8%), as opposed to 25.1% who strongly agreed or agreed with the proposition, leaving just over a third of them (32%) uncertain. The whole sample mean obtained was a low to moderate (2.64). The t-test found no statistically significant difference between the two groups on this occasion ($P = .334$ (NS)). This indicates that both staff members and cadets think that the Academy needs to raise the level of its liberal education programme in order to bring it to a university standard.

Next, the participants in this study were asked if KKMA offered a liberal education programme that gave cadets a good understanding of current technology and its impact (No.4). Almost half of all the survey participants (48%) strongly disagreed or disagreed and at the opposite end of the scale, just 23.3% strongly agreed or agreed with the statement leaving almost a third of them (28.8%) uncertain (somewhat agreed). The whole sample mean obtained was also low (2.53). The t-test, however, found a statistically significant difference between the two group scores, cadets (2.36) and teaching staff (2.89), with ($P = .018$ (S)). Clearly the difference is in emphasis rather than indicating opposition. This indicates that both staff members and cadets agree that KKMA needs to give more attention to current technology subjects and their impact in its liberal education programme.

Finally, the participants in this study were invited to state whether KKMA offered a solid foundation in computer literacy in its liberal education programme (No.5). The majority of all respondents (56.5%) strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement, while 17.7% were uncertain (somewhat agreed), and a quarter of them (25.8%) strongly agreed or agreed that this was the case. The whole sample mean obtained was a relatively low (2.46). The t-test used to assess the difference between cadets' and teaching staff's means scores (2.21) and (3.02) respectively revealed a significant difference ($P = .001(S)$), with cadets seeing the need for improvement even more than their teachers. This is further confirmed by A2-C3, who stressed that the Academy needed to allocate more hours to information technology in its liberal education programme in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century. A2-C3 added that the nature of battle was changing and computers were playing an increasingly vital role in military affairs, hence the need for greater mastery of IT skills.

8.3.3 Liberal Education Programme Effectiveness in Teaching Reasoning Skills and Intellectual Habits

Part of liberal education is to offer cadets tuition in reasoning skills and healthy intellectual habits. These, it was argued in the literature survey, are vital elements in the preparation of young officers; they enable them to make sound judgements, sharpen their vision and think for themselves when required to make decisions as leaders. The opinions and views of the respondents are summarized in Table 8.7 below.

Table 8-7 Perceptions of effectiveness of KKMA liberal education programme in eight selected areas (A1-IV.Q3-1to3-8).

No.	Statement	SD %	D %	SMA %	A %	SA %	C	TS	WS	SIG. L
							M	M	M	
1	KKMA's liberal education programme teaches cadets how to think for themselves and form their own measured judgments	4.8	13.6	38.1%	30.6	12.9	3.33	3.34	3.33	.954 (NS)
2	How to follow structured scientific procedure and arrive at sensible conclusions	2.7	17.8	38.4%	32.2	8.9	3.27	3.25	3.26	.918 (NS)
3	How to think clearly and logically, how to organize thoughts, and how to distinguish between the important and the trivial	5.4	16.3	36.1	34.7	7.5	3.25	3.17	3.22	.651 (NS)
4	How to reason critically, unafraid of expressing disagreement	11	17.1	33.6	26.7	11.6	3.07	3.19	3.10	.558 (NS)
5	Good communication skills in speech and writing	9.5	20.4	33.3	24.5	12.2	3.09	3.10	3.09	.936 (NS)
6	Appropriateness of objective and subjective evaluation	5.5	23.3	37	25.3	8.9	3.09	3.08	3.08	.975 (NS)
7	Insights into human nature and motivation	9.6	17.1	36.3	28.8	8.2	3.05	3.17	3.08	.534 (NS)
8	Broaden cadets' minds and develop intellectual curiosity	11.6	15	38.1	26.5	8.8	3.00	3.19	3.06	.332 (S)

A close examination of Table 8.7 shows that when the respondents to the survey were asked whether they were taught to think for themselves and form their own measured judgments (No.1), 43.5% strongly agreed or agreed, while 38.1% somewhat agreed, leaving only 18.4% strongly disagreeing or disagreeing with this statement. The whole

sample mean was moderate (3.33), which means that both cadets and staff were uncertain about the effectiveness of the liberal education programme in instilling these skills.

When the respondents were asked whether they were taught to follow structured scientific procedures and arrive at sensible conclusions (No.2), more than a third of them (41.1%) strongly agreed or agreed, 38.4% somewhat agreed and 20.5% disagreed or strongly disagreed. The whole sample means is a moderate 3.26, indicating respondents' uncertainty on KKMA's effectiveness on this subject.

Following this, the participants in this study were asked if KKMA offered a liberal education programme which allowed cadets to think, organise thoughts, and distinguish between the important and the trivial (No.3). Again, 42.2% of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed, 36.1%, strongly disagreed or disagreed, and 21.7% were unsure. The whole sample mean obtained was also moderate (3.22). The results show consistent uncertainty about the effectiveness of the liberal education programme in teaching reasoning skills.

Next, the participants were asked if KKMA offered a liberal education programme that taught cadets how to reason critically and be unafraid of expressing disagreement (No.4). More than a third of all survey respondents (38.3%) either strongly agreed or agreed, a third (33.6%) somewhat agreed and under a third (28.1%) strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement. The whole sample mean was again moderate (3.10) which reflects reservations on KKMA's performance in this regard.

Continuing the investigation, the participants were asked to give their views on whether KKMA offered good communication skills in speech and writing in its liberal education programme (No.5). Here again, a third of all respondents (36.7%) strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, a third (33.3%) were uncertain (somewhat agreed), and just under a third of them (29.9%) strongly disagreed or disagreed. The moderate whole sample mean obtained (3.09) once again indicates that there was uncertainty among the survey respondents about KKMA's effectiveness in delivering these skills in its liberal education programme.

The survey participants were then asked whether KKMA taught them the appropriateness of objective and subjective evaluations (No.6). Again, 34.2% strongly agreed or agreed, 37% were uncertain, and 28.8% strongly disagreed or disagreed that KKMA taught them such skills. The moderate whole sample mean value (3.08) indicates uncertainty about the effectiveness of KKMA's liberal education programme in this respect, too.

When the survey participants were asked if KKMA taught them insights into human nature and motivation (No.7), a third of them (37.0 %) strongly agreed or agreed, another third of them (36.3%) were uncertain (somewhat agreed) and the remaining 26.7% strongly disagreed or disagreed. The mean for the whole sample was once again moderate (3.08).

Finally, the survey participants were asked to give their views on whether KKMA's liberal education programme helped broaden cadets' minds and encouraged their intellectual curiosity (No.8). Here, the results show that more respondents were uncertain (38.1%) than strongly agreed or agreed (35.3%), leaving 26.6% of them strongly disagreeing or disagreeing. The whole sample mean was also a lukewarm (3.06).

Interestingly, for all the variables just analysed, responses were the object of consensus among cadets and teaching staff members, since the t-test applied to their group mean scores produced no statistically significant differences.

8.3.4 Perceptions of Effectiveness of KKMA's Liberal Education Programme in Instilling Moral-ethical Principles, Wisdom and Self-knowledge

A good officer preparation programme, according to Vitas (1999:7) encourages value formation and strengthens qualities of integrity, discipline, honour, duty, justice and the like, instilled by patient and sensitive teachers. Almost all of these qualities can be acquired as a result, or even be the subject, of liberal arts classes. Continuing the evaluation of KKMA's liberal education programme, the survey participants were next

questioned on the extent to which KKMA's general education programme was used as a vehicle to emphasise attitudes, values, and other character traits.

The results are presented in Table 8.8.

Table 8-8 Perceptions' of extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme stimulates eight character traits (A1-VI.Q4-1to4-8).

No.	Statement	SD	D	SMA	A	SA	C	TS	WS	SIG.
		%	%	%	%	%	M	M	M	L
1	KKMA's liberal education programme emphasises the moral ethical aspect and implications of behaviour	5.4	7.5	28.6	42.2	16.3	3.49	3.72	3.56	.200 (NS)
2	Prepares and motivates cadets' for future learning	4.8	11.6	26	43.2	14.4	3.44	3.63	3.50	.291 (NS)
3	Inculcates respect for the views and rights of others tolerance and sensitivity	4.8	12.2	29.9	35.4	17.7	3.47	3.53	3.48	.744 (NS)
4	Enhances their sense of responsibility to society	4.8	10.3	32.4	35.9	16.6	3.47	3.52	3.48	.801 (NS)
5	Improves understanding of people and the world they live in	6.8	13	30.1	39.7	10.3	3.26	3.48	3.33	.225 (NS)
6	Develops integrity, honesty and good citizenship	7.5	16.3	27.2	33.3	15.6	3.23	3.55	3.33	.112 (NS)
7	Raises awareness of one's own strength and weakness	8.8	17.7	26.5	31.3	15.6	3.26	3.29	3.27	.857 (NS)
8	Develops wisdom	9.7	16.6	30.3	30.3	13.1	3.17	3.27	3.20	.618 (S)

As shown in Table 8.8, more than half of both cadets and teaching staff members strongly agreed or agreed that KKMA used liberal education to emphasise the moral-ethical aspect and implications of behaviour (No.1), with a total percentage of 58.5%, leaving only 28.6% on the fence and 12.9% strongly disagreeing or disagreeing that this was the case. The whole sample mean proved to be relatively high (3.56), indicating a positive consensus on this issue.

Questioned on the extent to which the Academy prepared and motivated cadets for future learning (No.2), 57.6% of all survey respondents either strongly agreed or agreed that KKMA did this. The whole sample mean was also moderate (3.50).

Next, the respondents' views on the extent to which KKMA inculcated respect for the opinions, rights, tolerance and sensitivity to others were sought (No.3). Here 53.1% of them agreed or strongly agreed that it did, whereas 29.9% of them somewhat agreed, leaving 17.0% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. The whole sample mean was moderate (3.48).

The respondents were then questioned on the extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme enhanced their sense of responsibility towards society (No.4). Here 52.5% of all respondents strongly agreed or agreed, 32.4% were unsure, and 15.1% strongly disagreed or disagreed that this was the case. The whole sample mean score, however, remained relatively high (3.48).

KKMA can take some comfort in the fact that the clear majority of its recently educated and trained officers tended to believe that its liberal education programme enhanced their sense of responsibility towards society, rather than allowing them to become mere trained killers (Vitas 1999:49; Dingham 1998:157) (No.5). However, some explanations are needed to account for the opinions of those who took a different view, an issue that will be returned to in the discussion chapter.

Pursuing further questions in this area, the survey participants were asked about the extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme improved their understanding of people and the world they lived in (No.6). On this, 50.0% of them strongly agreed

or agreed, 30.1% were uncertain and 19.8% disagreed or strongly disagreed that it did so. The whole sample mean score was a moderate 3.33.

In a world of diverse cultures, alliances, lethal weapons, and considerable environmental uncertainty, one would expect newly qualified officers to be confident of their knowledge of the world so that they are capable of meaningful action (Dingham 1998:ibid). This does not appear to be the case for all surveyed KKMA cadets. Moreover, the participants were asked if the Academy's liberal education programme helped them develop integrity, honesty and good citizenship. Less than half of the respondents (48.9%) strongly agreed or agreed that this occurred, 27.2% were uncertain, and 23.8% strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement. The whole sample mean was moderate (3.33).

The last but one question assessed the extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme helped raise cadets' awareness of their own strengths and weaknesses (No.7). Here again less than half of all respondents (46.9%) replied affirmatively, while 53% of them strongly disagreed or disagreed that it had this effect. The whole sample mean declined to (3.27).

Finally, the survey participants were asked if the liberal education programme helped them develop wisdom (No.8). 43.4% of all respondents strongly agreed or agreed, 30.3% were uncertain and 26.3% strongly disagreed or disagreed. The whole sample mean was a moderate 3.20.

Interestingly, seven out of the eight variables in this area were the object of consensus among cadets and teaching staff, since the t-tests applied to their group mean scores revealed no statistically significant differences.

8.3.5 Issues of Balance, Choice, Relevance, and Skills Transferability

Among the most debated issues at all levels by cadets, teaching staff, commanders and military educationalists today are those of disciplines balance, the element of choice in major and minor subjects, content relevance to military needs, and skills transferability in the teaching of liberal education. These issues are immensely important because of

their impacts on course content, motivation to learn, and career prospects. The research participants were questioned on all four issues, beginning with course content balance.

8.3.5.1 Balance Between Humanities Courses and Natural Sciences

Asked for their views on the extent to which the general education programme offered at KKMA provided a balance of courses in the humanities and the social sciences on the one hand, and other natural and theoretical scientific disciplines on the other hand, the respondents produced the following results shown in Table 8.9 below.

Table 8-9 Balance between Humanities and Social Science courses and Natural Sciences

(A1-VI.Q5).

	Not balanced at all %	Poorly balanced %	Reasonably balanced %	Balanced %	Well balanced %	M	S.D	SIG.L
C	15	11	36	30	8	3.05	1.15	P=. 178 (NS)
TS	4.3	6.5	43.5	45.7	-	3.30	.785	
WS	11.6	9.6	38.4	34.9	5.5	3.13	1.05	

A close examination of Table 8.9 shows that, overall, there is no overwhelming agreement among the respondents that KKMA provides a balance of courses from the humanities and the social sciences on the one hand, and other natural and theoretical scientific disciplines on the other hand, although more of them agreed than disagreed on this question. The overall sample mean was a moderate (3.13). Indeed, less than half of them in total (40.4%) said that it was balanced or well balanced, over a third (38.4%) said that it was reasonably balanced, and 21.2% of them said that it was poorly balanced or not balanced at all. The t-test used to assess the difference between cadets' and teaching staff's means scores (3.05) and (3.30) respectively, revealed no statistically significant difference (P= .178(NS)). The lukewarm mean, together with the 21.2% who said that it was not balanced and the number of hours allocated to each

of them (517 Human Sciences, 340 Natural Sciences) in Table 8.1 confirm that KKMA needs to strike the right balance between human science subjects and natural science subjects in its liberal education programme.

8.3.5.2 Military Relevance

Next, the respondents to this study were asked to assess the extent to which they felt that military relevance was emphasised in all subjects taught at KKMA. Table 8.10 summaries the results of their answers.

Table 8-10 Respondents' perceptions of military relevance in course contents

(A1-VI.Q6).

	Of no importance %	Of little importance %	Important %	Very important %	Extremely important %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	8	7	26	26	33	3.69	1.22	P=. 187 (NS)
TS	-	6.5	19.6	45.7	28.3	3.95	.868	
WS	5.5	6.8	24	32.2	31.5	3.77	1.13	

The results in Table 8.10 show that 63.7% of all respondents to the survey rated military relevance as very important or extremely important, 24% as somewhat important, and 12.3% as of little or no importance at all. The whole sample mean is moderate to high (3.77). This indicates that the vast majority of the respondents insisted on military relevance in all subjects taught at KKMA. This is inconsistent with (RMC Report 2001:36) and Downes (1998:142; 1991:136). It is however consistent with military academy policy in the UK, where the curriculum for educating and training officers is strictly limited to military relevant subjects and activities, which is why courses are on the whole comparatively shorter and vocationally based (RMA 2002 Prospectus). Similarly, subjects offered by the Swiss Military College for preparing military officers also show insistence on relevance since most of their liberal education courses are qualified as “military”, such as military sociology, military psychology, etc., all taught by senior military officers (Kach 1999:32).

The commanders interviewed for this study shared the same view as the survey respondents. In this respect, A2-C1 said: "I think there must be relevance to military needs. The liberal programme should serve the main aim of the Academy". A2-C2 added: "We should concentrate on the subjects that are applicable to the military context and those that serve the main mission of the Academy". A2-C3 expressed much the same general view on relevance, urging that "We should always remember that our mission is to prepare leaders who are capable of leading men in both peace and war".

8.3.5.3 Element of Choice

The best military academies in the world, such as West Point, offer cadets the opportunity to major in liberal arts, social science subjects, or in other sciences and technology subjects. This is absent at KKMA but both cadets and staff at the Academy often voice the need for it. In view of this, the survey participants were questioned on the extent to which they felt it was important to introduce an element of choice in the curriculum to allow aspiring officers the chance to specialize in their subjects of choice if they so wished. Table 8.11 gives the results for this question.

Table 8-11 Respondents' perceptions of the element of choice in liberal education (A1.VI.Q7).

	Of no importance	Of little importance	Somewhat important	Important	Very important	M	S.D	SIG. L
	%	%	%	%	%			
C	9	5	17	25	44	3.90	1.27	P=. 004 (S)
TS	21.7	8.7	23.9	19.6	26.1	3.19	1.48	
WS	13	6.2	19.2	23.3	38.4	3.67	1.37	

As can be seen in Table 8.11, 61.7% of all respondents to the survey rated the introduction of the element of choice in the curriculum as important or very important, 19.2% somewhat important, and 19.2% as of little or no importance. The whole sample mean is relatively high (3.67). When the t-test was applied to both groups'

means, cadets (3.90), and the teaching staff (3.19), it yielded a statistically significant difference between them ($P = .004$ (S)). The figures show a positive consensus among cadets and training staff on the element of choice in liberal education, with cadets tending to be more in favour of it than the training staff members of KKMA.

In the interviews with the three high-ranking commanders at KKMA on the need to introduce an element of choice, it transpired that they had mixed views on the issue. However, they were all in agreement that offering choice would require greater resources, more staff, and ideally a fourth academic year.

8.3.5.4 Transferable Skills

Transferable skills are those that are valuable in both military and civilian occupations. The following two sub-sections are related to “how important transferable skills are to officers” and “how well they are offered at KKMA”.

Importance of Transferable Skills

Respondents were asked first for their views on the importance of transferable skills. The results of their views are shown in Table 8.12 below.

Table 8-12 Respondents' perceptions of the importance of transferable skills

(A1-VI.Q8-1).

	Of no importance %	Of little Importance %	Somewhat Important %	Important %	Very important %	M	S.D	Sig. L
C	3	2	15	17	63	4.35	1.00	P=.081 (NS)
TS	-	-	4.3	28.3	67.4	4.63	.571	
WS	2.1	1.4	11.6	20.5	64.4	4.43	.901	

The figures in Table 8.12 show that there is an overwhelming consensus of 84.9% among cadets and training staff that transferable skills are important or very important, with a very high overall mean of (4.43). This is consistent with Harris's (1991:3), and

Kenney (1996:58) views on this issue.

How Well are Transferable Skills Taught at KKMA

Next, the respondents were asked how well transferable skills were offered at KKMA.

Their responses are shown in Table 8.13 below.

Table 8-13 Respondents' assessment of how well transferable skills are taught at KKMA

(A1-VI.Q8-2).

	Very poor %	Poor %	Reasonably good %	Good %	Very good %	M	S.D	SIG.L
C	16	27	27	16	14	2.85	1.27	P=. 232 (NS)
TS	4.3	26.1	34.8	23.9	10.9	3.10	1.05	
WS	12.3	26.7	29.5	18.5	13	2.93	1.21	

The combined percentages from Table 8.13 indicate that the respondents' views were almost evenly split on how well KKMA taught transferable skills to cadets. However, the familiar tendency for teaching staff members to express less severe opinions was in evidence in these results, too, with comparable proportions rating KKMA's performance as reasonably good (34.8%), good or very good (34%), and as poor or very poor (30.4%). On the other hand, the cadets notably rated KKMA's performance on this matter as poor or very poor (43%), reasonably good (27%), and good or very good (30%). The mean for the whole sample was unsurprisingly low to moderate (2.93). Bearing in mind the perceptions of the importance of transferable skills expressed by the respondents, this finding indicates that the Academy needs to improve the delivery of such fundamental skills. It suggests that the time has perhaps come to consider reviewing and updating the way transferable skills are taught in its liberal education programme.

8.3.6 Intellectual Versus Occupational Orientations

As military academies continue to evolve towards a greater liberalisation of their curricula and closer integration with civilian higher education, many traditionalist voices are expressing concern that such institutions are in danger of weakening their dedication to the distinct mission of the military profession, that of forming warriors rather than sophisticated intellectuals. The aim behind the next five selected statements is to determine the research participants' perceptions of the orientation of the liberal education programme at KKMA. Table 8.14 summarises the ratings on those issues.

Table 8-14 Respondents' attitude towards the orientation of liberal education

(A1-VI.Q9-1 to 9-5).

No.	Statement	SD %	D %	SMA %	A %	SA %	C	TS	WS	SIG. L
							M	M	M	
1	The large volume of liberal education weakens military mission focus	6.9	12.4	27.6	27.6	25.5	3.61	3.32	3.52	.175 (NS)
2	KKMA should not align itself with civilian academic institutions and focus more on military sciences and technology	6.8	19.9	19.2	26.7	27.4	3.46	3.52	3.47	.786 (NS)
3	KKMA should focus on producing employable military specialists rather than generalists	9	20.7	17.9	22.1	30.3	3.60	3.08	3.44	.030 (S)
4	Excessive liberalisation of curriculum has negative effects on military standards and values	5.5	18.6	28.3	24.1	23.4	3.55	3.10	3.41	.035 (S)
5	KKMA should concentrate on martial values rather than on intellectual and occupational pursuits	9	26.2	16.6	29	19.3	3.44	2.77	3.23	.004 (S)

Table 8.14 shows that reactions to the statement that too much general education in KKMA's officer preparation programme could threaten its fundamental dedication to its specific military mission (No.1) resulted in 53.1% of respondents agreeing or strongly agreeing with it, 27.6% somewhat agreed with it, and 19.3% disagreed or strongly disagreed with it. The whole sample mean was a moderate to high (3.52). The t-test used to detect significance between the two group means found none between cadets and teaching staff members. This finding is consistent with Thomas' (2000:50) view that some military academies may have incorporated an excessive intellectual focus into their programmes.

Since the main objection of the opponents of the introduction of a wide liberal education programme in military officer preparation programmes concerns its close integration with civilian higher education, the research asked the participants in this study for their reactions on whether KKMA should not align itself with civilian academic institutions and focus more on military sciences and technology instead (No.3). The combined percentages indicate that 54.1% of the participants strongly agreed or agreed with the statement that the KKMA should distance itself from civilian curricula, while 26.7% strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement, leaving 19.2% who felt undecided on the issue. The whole sample mean was a moderate (3.47). This finding shows that the majority of survey participants opposed any strong association of military academies with civilian institutions. It is also consistent with Smith's (1996:1-10) criticism that the academies are becoming "mini-liberal arts universities instead of the military technical institutions of yore".

Continuing this theme, the participants in this study were asked for their opinions on whether KKMA should focus on producing employable military specialists rather than generalists (No.4). Not surprisingly, attitudes remained stable. Thus, 52.4% strongly agreed or agreed, 17.9% were undecided and 29.7% strongly disagreed or disagreed on the issue. The whole sample mean was also moderate (3.44), and when the t-test was applied to both mean scores, cadets (3.60) and teaching staff (3.08) it showed that there was a statistically significant difference between the two groups ($P = .030$ (S)). Clearly the difference was one of emphasis rather than indicating opposing views. This indicates that both training staff members and cadets agreed on the need for KKMA to

focus on military requirements rather than on identifying with civilian occupations. This finding strengthens the case for Thomas' (2000:50) and Smith's (1996:7) recommendations that the military should not lose their focus on military subjects.

Predictably, the survey participants' reactions to the statement that excessive liberalisation of the curriculum has a negative effect on military standards and values produced 47.5% who strongly agreed or agreed with it, 28.3% undecided, and 24.1% who strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement. The whole sample mean was moderate (3.41). The t-test showed that there was a statistically significant difference between the two group mean scores for cadets (3.55) and teaching staff members (3.10) ($P = .035$ (S)). This finding is consistent with Smith (1996:10) for example, who blames falling military standards and values on what he perceives to be the excessive liberalisation of the curriculum, which he claims has had counter-productive repercussions on many aspects of officer preparation.

To conclude on this issue, the survey participants were asked for their opinion on whether KKMA should concentrate on military values rather than on intellectual and occupational pursuits (No.5). 48.3% strongly agreed or agreed, 16.6% were undecided and for the first time the number of those who strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement increased to more than a third (35.2%), with a lower whole sample mean than for the other variables on the list (3.23). There was also a statistically significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (3.44) and teaching staff (2.77) produced by the t-test ($P = .004$ (S)), with cadets tending to agree, and teachers rather reluctant to agree with the statement.

Despite the earlier differences between the two groups, the results indicate more similarity of views on the issue than differences. This finding therefore remains consistent with Thomas (2000), who calls for a return to more basic military values and less emphasis on intellectual and occupational pursuits that have allegedly precipitated much of the erosion of the uniqueness of the military profession.

A2-C1 had this to say about this topic: "I think there is an excessive load of liberal education subjects in our academy which distracts cadets from military subjects". A2-

C2 also stated that in his view there was too much emphasis on general education with adverse effects on military subjects. A2-C3 agreed, suggesting a reduction in the liberal education programme and more focus just on teaching information technology and languages, which are more relevant to the Academy's mission in the 21st century.

8.3.7 The Academy Environment

If liberal education is to flourish, it must be offered in an appropriate environment. Opinions are divided among educationalists on whether a regimented military environment can be compatible with free liberal educational instruction. Some experts suggest that it is more effective and cheaper to seek it outside military institutions. Others see dangers in such a proposition and argue that the military environment is in fact ideal for liberal education because it is free from distractions. Consequently, the participants in this survey were asked for their opinions on the extent to which KKMA's environment provided a first-class, unrestrained instruction in liberal education. The results of their views are summarized in Table 8.15 below.

Table 8-15 Respondents' perceptions of the adequacy of KKMA's environment for liberal education (A1-VI.Q10-1, 2).

Statement	SD	D	SMA	A	SA	C	TS	WS	SIG. L
						M	M	M	
KKMA provides first class environment for unrestrained liberal education	6.8	19.2	39	24.7	10.3	3.10	3.17	3.12	.696 (NS)
KKMA makes adequate provision for time for thought, reading, research and analysis	17.1	26.7	33.6	16.4	6.2	2.68	2.67	2.67	.976 (NS)

A close examination of Table 8.15 shows that more than a third (39%) of the survey participants questioned on the extent to which they agreed that KKMA provided a suitable liberal education environment somewhat agreed that this was the case, 35% agreed or strongly agreed and only 26% disagreed or strongly disagreed that this was the case. The whole sample mean obtained was moderate (3.12). No statistically

significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (3.10) and teaching staff members (3.17) was detected by the t-test ($P = .696$ (NS)), which indicates a similarity of views.

Next, the respondents were asked about the extent to which they agreed that KKMA made adequate provision for time for thought, reading, research and analysis. Unsurprisingly, 43.8% of them disagreed or strongly disagreed that such provisions existed at KKMA. Only 22.6% agreed or strongly agreed that such conditions existed, even less than those who were not certain (33.6%). This is also reflected in the low to moderate whole sample mean of (2.67). Again, the t-test found no statistically significant difference between the mean scores of cadets (2.68) and the teaching staff members (2.67) with ($P = .976$ (NS)). This is a sign that the learning environment at KKMA should be re-examined for its suitability for liberal education.

8.3.8 Perceptions of Overall Satisfaction with KKMA's Liberal Education Programme

Having completed the assessment of the various aspects and elements of KKMA's liberal education programme, the participants in this research were subsequently requested to rate their overall satisfaction with this component of officer preparation. Table 8.16 summarises the results of their reactions.

Table 8-16 Respondents' levels of satisfaction with KKMA's liberal education programme

(A1-VI.Q11).

	Very dissatisfied %	Dissatisfied %	Somewhat satisfied %	Satisfied %	Very satisfied %	M	S.D	SIG.L
C	23	24	29	15	9	2.63	1.24	P=. 139 (NS)
TS	4.3	28.3	39.1	26.1	2.2	2.93	.904	
WS	17.1	25.3	32.2	18.5	6.8	2.72	1.15	

The combined percentages show that 42.4% of all respondents were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, a third of them (32.2%) were uncertain, and only 25.3% were satisfied or very satisfied with KKMA's liberal education programme. The mean for the whole sample was relatively low to moderate (2.72). The t-test used to assess the difference between the mean scores of cadets (2.63) and teaching staff members (2.93) revealed no statistically significant difference ($P = .120$). This indicates agreement among a large proportion of the respondents that they were not entirely satisfied with KKMA's liberal education programme. This result is further confirmed by A2-C2, who expressed this view: "I am not satisfied because it is more than what is needed and it goes beyond our cadets' capacities. We also suffer because of the increasing number of cadets who do not pass exams due to their level of difficulty. It is a real distraction from the military-specific programme, as it forces cadets to devote their efforts to liberal education in order to pass exams. Sharing this view, A2-C3 criticised the liberal education programme in these terms: "I am not satisfied with the liberal education programme because I think it is excessive in volume and most of it has no relevance at all to military needs."

8.3.9 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has consisted of two broad parts. In the first half, the main outline of KKMA's liberal education programme was described, starting with its aims and structure, how it was conducted, and how the subjects were distributed over the three-year officer preparation at KKMA.

Documents analysis revealed that KKMA provided a wide variety of subjects in its liberal education programme, which represents a third of the whole curriculum. However, the Academy seems to concentrate on human sciences, for which it allocates two thirds of the liberal education programme (517 hours), whereas it assigns only 340 teaching hours to the natural sciences (see Table 8.1).

The second part of this chapter presented a detailed analysis of both survey and interview findings related to the liberal education programme. The presentation began with an examination of the respondents' views on the importance of the liberal education programme to officership and found that there was a wide difference

between cadets and teaching staff members regarding this issue, with cadets underestimating the importance of the liberal education programme, whereas their teachers considered it essential to officer preparation. The commanders interviewed for this study described it almost as important as military-specific subjects, as long as sufficient effort was made to link it to the needs of the Military.

Next, the participants' perceptions and evaluations of certain features of the liberal education programme at KKMA were assessed. The respondents had some reservations when asked whether KKMA's liberal education programme offered a broad coverage of the major branches of learning and a rich variety of interesting and valuable courses. Their views indicated that there was room for improvement. Both staff members and cadets thought that the Academy needed to raise the level of its liberal education programme in order for it to attain levels similar to university standards. They also agreed that KKMA needed to improve its teaching of information technology subjects. This view was further confirmed in the interviews with the commanders, who stressed that the Academy needed to allocate more hours to information technology in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Examination of the participants' views of how well KKMA's liberal education programme taught cadets reasoning skills and good intellectual habits, showed that the overall mean was moderate for all variables with no statistically significant differences between the research participants, which means that both cadets and teaching staff were uncertain about KKMA's effectiveness in teaching such skills.

Subsequently, perceptions of the effectiveness of the moral aspects of the programme (attitudes, values, and character traits) were assessed. The Academy was found to be effective in both emphasising its moral-ethical aspect and its implications for behaviour and preparing and motivating cadets for future learning. The overall means for other related aspects were moderate with no statistically significant differences between research participants.

Following that, issues of programme balance, choice, relevance, and skills transferability were assessed. It was found that there was a need for KKMA to strike

the right balance between human sciences and natural sciences in its liberal education programme. On the relevance issue, nearly a majority of respondents saw military relevance as important or very important. The commanders interviewed during this study shared these views. Positive consensus was evident among cadets and training staff on the element of choice in the liberal education programme, with the cadets tending to be more in favour of it than the training staff. All the commanders however saw it as necessary, but they believed also that the Academy to extend the length of its officer preparation programme to four years in order to meet such requirements. As for the teaching of transferable skills at KKMA, the majority of responses considered it important or very important. However, the research participants indicated that the Academy needed to improve the way it delivered such fundamental skills.

On the intellectual versus occupational orientation issue, the respondents believed that the large volume of the general education programme tended to weaken KKMA's mission, and that it should not align itself too closely with civilian academic institutions. Instead, it should concentrate on military sciences and technology. They stressed that the Academy should focus more on producing employable military specialists rather than generalists. Not surprisingly, the participants also largely agreed that excessive liberalisation of the curriculum had negative effects on military standards and values leading to falling military standards. Moreover, the three commanders interviewed for this study thought that there was an excessive load of liberal education subjects in the Academy. They were rather more in favour of reducing the liberal education programme and concentrating on teaching information technology and languages in order not to deviate from the Academy's mission.

Regarding the educational environment at KKMA the research participants believed that the military environment did not particularly restrain cadets from getting a first-class liberal education. However, the Academy did not make adequate provision for time for thought, reading, research, and analysis.

The respondents' concluding assessment of the liberal education programme at KKMA in terms of overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction showed agreement among a large

proportion of respondents that they were not quite satisfied. This result was further confirmed by the three commanders interviewed as they expressed their dissatisfaction with the liberal education programme in terms of quantity and quality.

Finally, it is to be noted with interest that out of the 35 questions asked on the liberal education programme put to both cadets and teaching staff members, the t-test used to detect differences between the two group scores found no statistically significant differences in 28 cases, and discrepancies in 7 cases. However, the differences were in most cases a matter of emphasis rather than substance. In other words, the two groups did not generally hold opposite views, only stronger or weaker views than one another on the various issues explored.

The fifth component, “Physical fitness programme” will be discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter Nine

Findings Related to KKMA's Physical Fitness Programme

9.1 Introduction

The present chapter reports the field study results connected with the component of physical fitness at KKMA. The first half, based on the analysis of documentary evidence, describes KKMA's physical fitness programme, the types of training exercises, the extra-curricular sports activities and the types of tests used to ensure cadets' fitness at the Academy. The second half describes and interprets the statistical results of the survey and the views of three military commanders interviewed on the Academy's physical fitness programme for cadets.

9.2 Physical Fitness Programme at KKMA: Aims and Approaches

According to the KKMA General Training Plan and Programme Schedule 2002, Sports Wing Pamphlet 2002, the Sports Wing is responsible for planning and preparing the cadets' physical fitness programme. The Sports Wing states its programme aims as follows:

Developing cadets' physical fitness;

- Training cadets to master movement skills through various physical activities
- Training cadets to master how to coach and organise physical fitness activities and organise sports competitions
- Providing cadets with skills that enable them to use their weapons and equipment effectively with the minimum amount of effort
- Creating and encouraging fair competition among cadets through various sports activities
- Providing cadets with theoretical knowledge of health and sports
- Preparing and coordinating the physical fitness programme with other academic programmes
- Evaluating and monitoring cadets' physical fitness and participation in sports competitions

- Providing physiotherapy treatment for injured cadets and staff members.

In order to implement these objectives the programme uses two approaches that complement one another. The first one is the programmed and evaluated approach where cadets are prepared through four types of physical activity. These are: body exercises, endurance exercises, fighting spirit exercises and swimming. The second approach is the extra-curricular activities approach, where cadets participate in various kinds of sports and activities and are encouraged to take part in competitions.

9.2.1 Programmed Activities

Table 9.1 below summarises KKMA's programmed approach to cadets' physical fitness in detail.

Table 9-1 KKMA's programmed approach to physical fitness

Physical Activity	Types of Exercise	Purpose	Frequency
1- Body exercises Muscular fitness Strength exercises Skills exercises	Jogging, sit-ups, push-ups Rifle exercise, climbing wood poles, pulling and pushing, climbing, pull-ups, exercise in difficult environment (climbing mountains, step climbing) Sprinting runs, flexibility, military sport skills	To strengthen the muscles	Every morning According to a gradual plan and programme throughout the year.
2-Endurance exercises	Cross-country, challenges of military obstacles, long endurance, marches (day and night), and athletic sports.	Conducted in all kinds of weather and terrain conditions to strengthen cadets' endurance	5 times a year 2 times a year
3-Fighting spirit exercises	Judo, engagement, karate, wrestling	To build cadets' self-confidence, determination and courage	
4- Swimming	All types of swimming	To be able to rescue, and face all kinds of water obstacles	

9.2.2 Extra-curricular Sports Activities

Besides scheduled exercise the Sports Wing of the Academy provides cadets with the following extra curricular sports activities;

- a- Football, volleyball, handball, basketball, tennis, squash.
- b- Recreational competition activities, such as short runs, group running, and water sports.

9.2.3 Sports Competitions

There are two types of competition at KKMA. First, there are internal competitions, such as platoon and company competitions. In order to increase the competitive spirit among cadets at all levels, the Sports Wing offers prizes for winners. The Sports Wing also offers medals for those who excel physically and morally in physical fitness, competitions, cross-country, long marches (day and night), rope pulling, karate, wrestling, football, volleyball, tennis, squash, swimming, and athletic championships (throwing the javelin, long jump, high jump etc).

The second type of competition is the external competition, which is held with other military institutions and involve different kinds of sports and championships such as: participation in both the Military Academies League and the National Guard League, in order to familiarise cadets with sports competitions and increase their confidence and competitive spirit.

9.2.4 Physical Fitness Tests

There are two types of physical fitness tests:

- 1- Endurance test (cross country running). This type of scheduled test is conducted five times a year. Each run is 7200 metres. It is intended to evaluate cadet fitness levels, physical ability, and to help those who are not doing well by giving them extra training. A maximum of 10 credits is attached to all five cross-country runs.
- 2- Physical fitness test. This is conducted each year at the end of the second semester. It includes push-up tests, sit-up tests, and running 3200 metres in the same day. Physical fitness tests are allocated a maximum of 90 points, 30 for each of the tests.

Physical fitness activities are given the same importance as other subjects at KKMA, such as vocational education, liberal education etc. Cadets who fail this part of the syllabus are given the opportunity to retake the tests. If they fail again, they cannot continue into the next year.

9.3 Main Survey and Interview Findings

The previous section dealt with “How the military physical fitness programme at KKMA is done” in theory. In the following sections, we look at it through the views and attitudes of cadets and training staff in terms of “How well it is done”. The analysis begins by examining first to what extent is KKMA’s physical fitness programme important both to participants and to the Academy; second, by investigating the structure and balance of the programme; third, by assessing its characteristics; fourth, by determining what are the main obstacles facing KKMA's physical fitness programme; fifth, by assessing the respondents’ overall satisfaction with the programme in general and finally, the cadets’ satisfaction with their own level of physical fitness is measured.

9.3.1 Perceptions of Importance of Physical Fitness

Most instructors supervising physical fitness programmes worldwide agree that it is vital to keep soldiers fit and well to face difficulties when they occur. They believe physical strength, flexibility, and endurance serve the purpose of hardening men upon whom the safety of the nation may rely. They also believe that many sporting activities are related to war pressures scenes (Sandhurst Diary 2001:1-5; RMC Prospectus 2001:1). Physical fitness is also a valuable asset to all soldiers. It gives them energy, raises their productivity and alertness, and increases their stamina, power and confidence (Field Manual 1992: iii). In short, physical fitness is crucial for cadets’ health and military readiness. The following two sub-sections look at the research participants’ perceptions of the importance of the physical fitness programme both to KKMA and to themselves.

9.3.1.1 Respondents’ Perceptions of Importance of Physical Fitness Programme to KMAA

As explained in the literature review chapters, all military academies pay significant attention to their physical fitness programmes, stressing its link with military readiness (USMA; Sandhurst Diary 2001:1-5; RMC Prospectus 2001:1; RMAB Prospectus 2001:1). In view of this, the participants were asked for their views on how much

importance is officially attached to the physical fitness programme by KKMA. The results are shown in Table 9.2 below.

Table 9-2 Perceptions of importance of physical fitness programme to KKMA

(A1-V.Q1).

	Of no importance %	Of little importance %	Somewhat important %	Important %	Very important %	M	S.D	SIG.L
C	3	20	34	25	18	3.35	1.08	P=.882 (NS)
TS	2.2	13.3	40	33.3	11.1	3.37	.936	
WS	2.8	17.9	35.9	27.6	15.9	3.35	1.03	

Looking at Table 9.2, one can see that under half of all respondents (43.5%) believe that the Academy views physical fitness as important or very important, giving rise to a moderate whole sample mean of (3.35). When the t-test was used to assess whether the two group means, for cadets (3.35) and teaching staff (3.37) differed significantly, it was found that there was no difference (P= .882 (NS)). Bearing in mind the moderate whole sample mean obtained, it is a matter of concern that over one fifth of all respondents (20.7%) thought that physical fitness is given little or no importance by the Academy. This result is not totally surprising. Commander A2-C3 had this to say on this issue: “Admittedly, this is an area where improvements could be made. Ideally, the physical fitness programme should be given the same importance as other aspects of officer preparation.”

9.3.1.2 Respondents' Own Perceptions of Importance of Physical Fitness

The literature on the importance of physical fitness for soldiers is unanimous that it is an essential element in their preparation. As future professional fighters they must be 100% fit to be able to cope with the challenges of difficult and hostile situations. As the Field Manual (1992: iii) states, for the individual cadet, or soldier, physical fitness is vital because it ensures that he has the energy, alertness, stamina, power, and confidence to fight and win. These may be obvious facts. However, there are those

who hold the view that modern warfare techniques and technology make physical fitness inessential, which may be why they are relaxed about it. To see if this is an emerging trend among the research participants, they were asked to rate its importance to them as members of the SANG. The results are shown in Table 9.3 below

Table 9-3 Respondents' perceptions of importance of physical fitness

(A1-V.Q2).

	Of no importance %	Of little importance %	Somewhat important %	Important %	Very important %	M	S.D	Sig. L
C	2	1	3	16	78	4.67	.766	P= .300 (NS)
TS	-	-	4.4	11.1	84.4	4.80	.504	
WS	1.4	.7	3.4	14.5	80	4.71	.696	

As Table 9.3 shows, there is strong support among the vast majority of both cadets and teaching staff members for the idea that physical fitness is important or very important, with a total percentage of 80% and a very high whole sample mean of (4.71). The t-test showed no significant difference (P= .300 (NS)) between the cadets' mean (4.67) and that of the teaching staff (4.80), which means that they were in agreement on the importance of physical fitness. This strong recognition of the importance of physical fitness by both cadets and teaching staff shows that there is a gap between the importance it is given officially, and the importance it ought to be given from the research participants' viewpoint. All three commanders interviewed also expressed unequivocal views on the importance of physical fitness for KKMA cadets. All three of them equally stressed the link between physical fitness and mission success. Commander A2-C2 added, "An officer needs physical fitness as much as his mental hardness and intellect".

9.3.2 Structure and Balance of Physical Fitness Programme

As Harig (2001:4), Gindhart (1999:12) and Watney (1989:15) emphasise, a complete physical fitness programme must include training and observance supported by

policies defining what physical fitness is and how to achieve its goals. In addition, guidelines for a development programme to improve and maintain physical fitness, it is important to have certain basic physical training principles such as regularity, progression, variety and choice, challenge etc. In order to assess to what extent such requirements exist within KKMA's physical fitness programme, participants were asked for their views on its level of structure and balance. The results are summarised in Table 9.4 below.

Table 9-4 Respondents' perceptions on whether KKMA's physical fitness programme is well structured and balanced

(A1-V.Q3).

	Not balanced at all	Poorly balanced	Reasonably balanced	Balanced	Well balanced	M	S.D	SIG. L
	%	%	%	%	%			
C	10	17	36	26	11	3.11	1.12	P=.916 (NS)
TS	8.9	17.8	35.6	31.1	6.7	3.08	1.06	
WS	9.7	17.2	35.9	27.6	9.7	3.10	1.10	

Close examination of Table 9.4 shows that overall there is no overwhelming agreement among the respondents that KKMA offers a well-structured and balanced physical fitness programme. Indeed, only a third of them in total, approximately (37.3%), perceive it as balanced or well balanced. Almost the same proportion (35.9%) perceive it as reasonably balanced, implying that they may have some reservations on the subject. The rest (26.9%) perceive it as poorly balanced or not balanced at all. The lukewarm mean for the whole sample (3.10) casts doubts about the effectiveness of KKMA in offering a well-structured and balanced physical fitness programme. A final look at Table 9.4 reveals that the t-test detected no statistically significant differences between the means for the two groups, cadets and teaching staff, regarding this issue (P= .916 (NS)).

9.3.3 Features of KKMA's Physical Fitness Programme

In addition to the above, a list of eleven physical fitness features drawn from the literature was presented to the participants to evaluate KKMA's physical fitness programme in this survey. It is not a comprehensive list, but it covers some important areas of the cadets' physical fitness programme. Its purpose is to evaluate how well KKMA is succeeding in achieving some of its major physical fitness programme goals. The findings for these questions are displayed in Table 9.5.

**Table 9-5 Perceptions of eleven performance features of KKMA's physical fitness programme
(A1-V.Q4-1 to4-11)**

No.	Statement	SD %	D %	SMA %	A %	SA %	C	T.S	WS	SIG.L
							M	M	M	
1	KKMA provides professional instructors	6.3	12.5	18.1	40.3	22.9	3.63	3.56	3.61	.768 (NS)
2	Includes a wide variety of sports in its physical fitness programme.	4.2	11.1	26.4	43.8	14.6	3.51	3.57	3.53	.731 (NS)
3	Encourages liking for sports and outdoor activities	6.2	14.5	29.7	35.9	13.8	3.32	3.46	3.36	.453 (NS)
4	Improves the cadets' skills	9.9	14.8	31	27.5	16.9	3.24	3.31	3.26	.737 (NS)
5	Makes sure that all cadets participate in at least one competitive sport	11.8	13.9	33.3	27.8	13.2	3.17	3.15	3.16	.940 (NS)
6	Provides a basic knowledge of a wide variety of sports	16.8	13.3	27.3	26.6	16.1	3.12	3.11	3.11	.975 (NS)
7	Allocates enough time for physical training	10.6	24.6	24.6	26.1	14.1	3.12	3.00	3.08	.577 (NS)
8	Allows choice in physical fitness activities	16.9	21.1	17.6	26.8	17.6	3.11	2.97	3.07	.588 (NS)
9	Integrates well other physical activities in its physical fitness programme (e.g. obstacle drills, endurance marches etc.)	13.1	21.4	28.3	28.3	9	2.84	3.31	2.98	.025 (S)
10	Ensures that cadets are never allowed to be physically unfit	24.1	15.9	20	19.3	20.7	2.96	2.97	2.96	.947 (NS)
11	Teaches cadets to coach others to be able to train their troops in the future	23.1	25.9	20.3	22.4	8.4	2.65	2.70	2.67	.837 (NS)

Inspection of the whole sample mean score results in Table 9.5 showing the respondents' perceptions of KKMA's physical fitness programme performance indicates that they could be classified into three categories. The first category, covering where the Academy appears to be doing well, consists of two items with the highest mean scores on the list (Nos.1,2). It includes "KKMA provides professional instructors" (3.61) and "Includes a wide variety of sports in its physical fitness programme" (3.53). More than half of the respondents (58.4%) rated each of these areas positively.

These results show that there is consensus among cadets and teaching staff members, since t-tests applied to their group mean scores produced no significant difference ($P = .768$ (NS) and $P = .731$ (NS)) respectively. In this respect, KKMA fares well compared with the physical fitness programmes of the best military academies in the world (RMA Prospectus 2002; USMA Prospectus 2002).

The second category, where the Academy according to the survey respondents appears to be doing reasonably well, consists of six items with the second highest whole sample mean scores on the list (Nos.3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8). These are: "Encourages liking for sports and outdoor activities" (3.36), "Improves the cadets' skills" (3.26), "Makes sure that all cadets participate in at least one competitive sport" (3.16), "Provides basic knowledge of a wide variety of sports" (3.11), "Allocates enough time for physical training" (3.08), and finally "Allows choice in physical fitness activities" (3.07).

The results show that there is consensus among both cadets and teaching staff members, since t-tests applied to their group mean scores produced no statistically significant differences in relation to the six items in this category. Overall, almost half of the participants in the survey, with an average of 43.75%, agree or strongly agree that KKMA's physical fitness programme requires better implementation policies with regard to the physical fitness programme.

Finally, the third performance category consisting of three items with lower whole sample mean scores (Nos. 9, 10, 11) comprises: "Integrates well other physical activities in its physical fitness programme (e.g. obstacle drills, endurance marches

etc.)" (2.98), "ensures that cadets are never allowed to be physically unfit" (2.96) and "teaches cadets to coach others to be able to train their troops in the future" (2.67).

Clearly, the low to moderate mean scores for the items in this category are an indication of the presence of shortcomings. They are serious because they are strategic. The combined percentages reveal that well over a third of all respondents (almost half in the case of the third item) do not believe that KKMA integrates well other physical activities in its physical fitness programme, nor does it ensure that cadets are never allowed to be physically unfit. Worst of all perhaps is the fact that they do not think that the Academy teaches cadets to coach others so that they can train own soldiers in the future. Ideally, cadets are not only expected to achieve a high standard of physical fitness, but they are also expected to learn how to organise and conduct physical and recreational training.

All items in the third category except one, "Integrates well other physical activities in its physical fitness programme (e.g. obstacle drills, endurance marches etc.)", were the object of consensus among both cadets and teaching staff members, since t-tests applied to their group mean scores produced no statistically significant differences.

9.3.4 Obstacles Facing KKMA's Physical Fitness Programme

KKMA's physical fitness programme has its strengths and weaknesses, as the survey results for this component of officer preparation programme have shown so far. It also faces a number of obstacles that hinder the achievement of its goals. These range from attitudinal, motivational, and cultural obstacles, to those that are due to the nature of its content, variety, infrastructure, diet, medical care, and others. Survey participants were asked to rate 15 items identified during the pilot study. The results of their views are summarised in Table 9.6 below

Table 9-6 Respondents assessment of obstacles facing KKMA's physical fitness programme(A1-V.Q5-1 to 5-15).

No.	Statement	N %	S %	RA %	QA %	GD %	C	TS	WS	SIG. L
							M	M	M	
1	Lack of awareness of physical fitness benefits among cadets	1.4	2.9	12.9	39.3	43.6	4.23	4.13	4.20	.520 (NS)
2	Lack of adequate access to physical fitness facilities	.7	6.2	15.9	33.8	43.4	4.35	3.64	4.13	.000 (S)
3	Fitness activities are not designed in a way that makes them attractive and enjoyable	2.1	5.6	16.8	30.8	44.8	4.30	3.65	4.10	.000 (S)
4	Lack of sports infrastructure	4.2	4.9	16	27.1	47.9	4.15	3.97	4.09	.381 (NS)
5	Cadets not willing to put in necessary effort	2.8	4.9	19	31	42.3	4.07	4.00	4.04	.705 (NS)
6	Lack of a fitness-friendly environment	1.4	4.9	2 2.2	3 3.3	38.2	4.08	3.88	4.02	.268 (NS)
7	Poor medical care	3.4	5.5	16.6	35.2	39.3	4.10	3.82	4.01	.140 (NS)
8	Unsuitable diet	4.8	4.8	18.6	31.7	40	4.07	3.75	3.97	.113 (NS)
9	The feeling that physical fitness sessions are a burden to be endured	2.1	8.4	21.7	32.2	35.7	4.10	3.46	3.90	.001 (S)
10	Lack of variety in physical fitness programme	1.4	9.7	18.8	37.5	32.6	3.96	3.77	3.90	.308 (NS)
11	The use of additional exercises as a form of punishment.	5.6	6.3	23.1	25.9	39.2	4.17	3.18	3.86	.000 (S)
12	Hot climate is not suitable for vigorous fitness exercises	3.5	8.3	30.6	25	32.6	3.87	3.47	3.75	.049 (S)
13	Sports instructors are not good role models of fitness themselves	6.3	11.8	22.9	29.9	29.2	3.75	3.38	3.63	.093 (NS)
14	The Academy is not seriously committed to physical training and education	10.6	13.5	22	28.4	25.5	3.57	3.15	3.44	.076 (NS)
15	Our culture does not encourage physical fitness	10.4	16.7	24.3	27.8	20.8	3.30	3.36	3.31	.782 (NS)

N= none. S= some. RA = reasonable amount. QA = quite a lot. GD = great deal

A close look at the whole sample mean score results of cadets and training staff shown in Table 9.6 suggests that the respondents' perceptions of KKMA's physical fitness programme performance could be grouped into three categories: The first category (Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7) could be described as "major obstacles". Major obstacles are those whose whole sample means fall within the scale value 4 or above. These were assessed as having 'Quite a lot' of negative impact on the physical fitness programme. Seven items with the highest mean scores on the list form this category. They comprise "Lack of awareness of the benefits of physical fitness among cadets" (4.20), "Lack of adequate access to physical fitness facilities" (4.13), "Fitness activities are not designed in a way that makes them attractive and enjoyable" (4.10), "Lack of sports infrastructure" (4.09), "Cadets are not willing to put in the necessary effort" (4.04), "Lack of fitness-friendly environment" (4.02), and "Poor medical care" (4.01).

A very high proportion of respondents, that is from 71.5 % to 82.9% rated these seven obstacles as having a substantial negative impact on the physical fitness programme at KKMA. Their mean scores range from (4.20) to (4.01). Consensus was obtained on all items except "Lack of adequate access to physical fitness facilities" ($P = .000(S)$), and "Fitness activities are not designed in a way that makes them attractive and enjoyable" ($P = .000(S)$). They were given greater emphasis for their negative effects by the cadets than by their teachers. This is shown by the statistically significant differences found between the two group mean scores obtained for each variable. Perhaps the cadets' perceptions were somewhat inflated because their memories of and frustrations with their own physical fitness experiences were still fresh.

The second group of items (Nos.8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13) represent 'minor obstacles'. Minor obstacles are those whose whole sample means fall within the scale value 3.5 or above. These were rated as having minor negative impacts on the physical fitness programme. Six items with the second highest mean scores on the list form this category. They include "Unsuitable diet" (3.97), "The feeling that physical fitness sessions are a burden to be endured" (3.90), "Lack of variety in the physical fitness programme" (3.90), "The use of additional exercises as a form of punishment" (3.86), "Hot climate is not suitable for vigorous fitness exercises" (3.75), "Sports instructors are not good role models of fitness themselves" (3.63).

Statistically significant differences were found between the cadets' and teaching staff's scores when t-tests were conducted on three variables: "The feeling that physical fitness sessions are a burden to endured" ($P=.001$ (S)), "The use of additional exercises as a form of punishment" ($P = .000$ (S)) and "Hot climate is not suitable for vigorous fitness exercises" ($P = .049$ (S)). The variables in this category were to some extent underemphasized by teaching staff members in comparison with the cadets' views. In terms of both views, the differences seem to converge towards the negative, rating those variables as the second variables in this category, which are hindering the success of KKMA's physical fitness programme. Consensus was obtained on the other three variables.

The third category consists of two items with the lowest whole sample mean scores on the list (Nos.14, 15). "The Academy is not seriously committed to physical training and education" (3.44), and "Our culture does not encourage physical fitness" (3.31). The t-test used to assess differences between the two group mean scores for each variable showed no significant differences. The scores were $P=.076$ (NS) for the first variable, and $P = .782$ (NS) for the second. The three Commanders interviewed for this research shared many of the concerns expressed by the survey respondents about the negative impacts of certain obstacles. For example, they emphasised the massive number of cadets, lack of training facilities, not enough instructors, and the lack of coordination between the physical fitness programme and the nutrition programme.

9.3.5 Overall Satisfaction with KKMA's Physical Fitness Programme

In the previous sections of this chapter, the research participants' views on various aspects of KKMA's physical fitness programme were described. In this section, the research participants' measurements of their satisfaction levels with KKMA's physical fitness programme are presented. Table 9.7 is a summary of their ratings:

Table 9-7 Overall satisfaction with KKMA's physical fitness programme

(A1-V.Q6).

	Very dissatisfied %	Dissatisfied %	Somewhat satisfied %	Satisfied %	Very satisfied %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	10	15	37	21	17	3.20	1.18	P=. 350 (NS)
TS	8.9	13.3	28.9	40	8.9	3.26	1.09	
WS	9.7	14.5	34.5	26.9	14.5	3.22	1.15	

Table 9.7 shows that 41.4% of the cadets and teaching staff members stated that they were generally satisfied or very satisfied with KKMA's physical fitness programme, while 34.5% were somewhat satisfied, and 24.2% dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. The whole sample mean is a moderate 3.22, with 3.20 for cadets and 3.26 for teaching staff members. The mean scores for both cadets and training staff showed no statistically significant differences when the t-test was applied (P = .350 (NS)).

9.3.6 Perceptions of Cadets' Level of Physical Fitness

The final question in the evaluation of KKMA's physical fitness programme aimed to elicit the cadets' assessment of their own levels of physical fitness. Bearing in mind that they were upperclassmen about to graduate, their views could be taken as a measure of the success or failure of the whole physical fitness programme in terms of outcome. The results of their views are summarised in Table 9.8 below.

Table 9-8 Cadets' assessment of their physical fitness level (A1-V.Q7)

	Very poor %	Poor %	Reasonably good %	Good %	Very good %	M	S.D	SIG. L
C	6	13	39	31	11	3.28	1.02	P=. 008 (S)

Table 9.8 shows that when percentages are combined, only 42% of all the soon to be military officers joining the ranks of the prestigious SANG rated their physical fitness as good or very good at the completion of KKMA's physical fitness programme. A similar proportion of the cadets (39%) rated their fitness state as reasonably good. The remaining 19%, in contrast, described it as poor or very poor. The whole sample mean is a moderate (3.28, $P = .008(S)$). Overall, these results are by no means disastrous, but they are disappointing if the aim is to achieve high levels of fitness and confidence for all young officers about to become leaders of platoons.

9.4 Summary and Conclusion

This chapter has been presented in two broad parts. The first one outlined the main objectives of KKMA's physical fitness programme, described its two implementation approaches and contents, and highlighted the role of competition and the types of tests used to ensure fitness among cadets.

Documents analysis revealed that KKMA had two approaches that complemented one another. The first one is the programmed and evaluated approach, where cadets are prepared through four types of physical activities. These are: body exercises, endurance exercises, fighting spirit-enhancing exercises and swimming. The second approach concerns extra-curricular activities, where cadets participate in a variety of sports and are encouraged to take part in competitions. In order to increase the competitive spirit among cadets, the Academy has also two types of competition, internal and external; the former between cadet platoons and companies and the latter with other military institutions. In theory, the physical fitness programme is given the same importance as other components of the officer preparation programme. Cadets need to pass the physical fitness test in order to continue into the next year.

The second part of this chapter presented a detailed analysis of both survey and interview findings related to KKMA's physical fitness programme. The presentation began with the analysis of the research participants' perceptions of the official position of the Academy towards the cadets' physical fitness programme. Surprisingly, under half of them, including one interviewed commander, recognised that KKMA did not

pay sufficient attention to this programme component. One in five cadets went as far as to say that the Academy gave little or no importance to it. In contrast, the respondents' personal views on the importance of the programme was recognised by 94.5% of both cadets and teaching staff members. (Table 9.3). Regarding the question of whether KKMA offered a well-structured and balanced physical fitness programme, opinions were split, with under 40% of the participants responding affirmatively, and just over a quarter of them rating it as poor or very poor.

Measured against eleven performance criteria (Table 9.5), KKMA's physical fitness programme appeared to fare well in two respects: "Provides professional instructors" and "Includes a wide variety of sports in its physical fitness programme". The survey respondents also rated KKMA as doing reasonably well in six other variables. These are: "Encourages liking for sports and outdoor activities", "Improves the cadets' skills", "Makes sure that all cadets participate in at least one competitive sport", "Provides a basic knowledge of a wide variety of sports", "Allocates enough time for physical training", and "Allows choice in physical fitness activities". However, the Academy fared less well in terms of programme outcome particularly with regard to three items: "Integrates well other physical activities in its physical fitness programme (e.g. obstacle drills, endurance marches etc.)", "Ensures that cadets are never allowed to be physically unfit" and "Teaches cadets to coach others to be able to train their troops in the future".

On the question of obstacles that block the effectiveness of the physical fitness programme at KKMA (Table 9.6), the research participants emphasised that there were seven 'major obstacles' that had a serious negative impact: "Lack of awareness of the benefits of physical fitness among cadets", "Lack of adequate access to physical fitness facilities", "Fitness activities are not designed in a way that makes them attractive and enjoyable", "Lack of sports infrastructure", "Cadets are not willing to put in the necessary effort", "Lack of a fitness friendly environment" and "Poor medical care".

According to the survey results, the Academy also appears to face 'minor obstacles', with a minor negative impact on the physical fitness programme: "Unsuitable food", "The feeling that physical fitness sessions are a burden to endured", "Lack of variety in

the physical fitness programme”, “The use of additional exercises as a form of punishment”, “Hot climate is not suitable for vigorous fitness exercises” and “Sports instructors are not good role models of fitness themselves”. The remaining two items identified as having the least negative impact are: “The Academy is not seriously committed to physical training and education” and “Our culture does not encourage physical fitness”. All three commanders interviewed admitted that there were many obstacles that reduced the effectiveness of the physical fitness programme at KKMA, emphasising particularly four variables: "the large number of cadets", "the lack of training facilities", "not enough instructors", and "the lack of co-ordination between the physical programme and nutrition".

The respondents' concluding assessment of the physical fitness programme at KKMA in terms of overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction showed that on average they were somewhat satisfied, with an overall moderate mean (3.22). All three commanders interviewed, however, expressed some reservations due to the lack of facilities, the large number of cadets and the lack of coordination. When the cadets were asked to rate their physical fitness level and say to what extent the programme was beneficial to them, ratings were moderate with a mean score of (3.28) (Table 9.8). This is an indication of the need to improve KKMA's physical fitness programme in order to raise the fitness level of the future leaders of the Saudi National Guard.

Finally, it is worth noting that out of the thirty one questions asked on the physical fitness programme put to both cadets and teaching staff members, the t-tests used to detect differences between the two group scores found no statistically significant differences in twenty four cases and discrepancies in seven cases. However, the differences were in all cases a matter of emphasis rather than substance. In other words, the two groups did not generally hold opposite views, only stronger or weaker views than one another in certain cases.

The final chapter will summarize the main findings, draw a number of conclusions, and consider the implications of this study.

Chapter Ten


Main findings and Implications

10.1 Introduction

In Chapter Two of this thesis, a research model designed to elucidate the exploration and evaluation of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme was developed and a number of research questions were proposed. These were investigated using a multiple method approach involving survey, interview, and documentary research. The results were presented in Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. This chapter sums up and discusses the main findings, draws conclusions based upon them, and considers their implication.

The chapter summarizes the major findings derived from the data for each of the five officer preparation programme components, as well as the main blocks to their effectiveness. These are then examined for their significance and implications. Following this, each relevant research question is answered. Finally, the general research implications, limitations and contributions are considered, and the study ends with suggestions for future research.

For ease of reference, both the research model and research questions are reproduced below.



10.2 Research Questions

- RQ1 How effective is KKMA's recruitment and selection system?
- RQ2 How effective is KKMA's indoctrination programme?
- RQ3 How effective is KKMA's vocational programme?
- RQ4 How effective is KKMA's liberal education programme?
- RQ5 How effective is KKMA's physical fitness programme?
- RQ6 What obstacles, if any, impede the effective preparation of junior officers at KKMA?

10.3 Major Findings

10.3.1 Recruitment and Selection

Analysis of the data on the recruitment and selection of Class 1999 revealed several significant findings. Among the most important of these were the following:

1. Just over a quarter of all Class 1999 survey respondents (26.3%) said they were generally satisfied or very satisfied with KKMA's recruitment and selection system.
2. Less than a fifth of all respondents (19.5%) judged it to be effective.
3. KKMA's recruitment and selection procedures were deemed inefficient in their implementation and imprecise in reaching and selecting the best possible candidates for cadetship.
4. The cadets' motivations for joining KKMA were found to be evenly balanced between institutional and occupational measures.

Clearly, the very low level of satisfaction with KKMA's recruitment and selection system is a matter of concern. The findings indicate that although a majority of respondents (63.1%) acknowledged that the Academy paid a fair amount of attention to its recruitment and selection methods, nevertheless almost three quarters of them either expressed dissatisfaction or were neutral in their reactions to them.

Consistent with this, a mere 19.5% of the respondents judged KKMA's recruitment and selection system to be effective, while the rest mostly thought that it was ineffective (46.5%) or were unsure (34%). More than half of all the respondents were unconvinced that KKMA rigorously tested and chose only the best candidates for cadetship. They blamed the ineffectiveness of the system largely on the unreliable methods used, as well as poor implementation of the Academy's selection criteria.

Part of the explanation for KKMA's ineffective and unsatisfactory recruitment and selection system may be found in the evidence gathered by this investigation. It shows that the Academy primarily relies on passive methods of recruitment, that is mainly on the personal initiatives of interested candidates, rather than seeking and reaching them

actively. Indeed, the results indicate that over 70% of class 1999 first got to know about the Academy either through personal inquiry, or from friends and relatives who were current members of the Academy. The literature review conducted for this research reveals that in our increasingly competitive world, the most effective recruitment and selection methods are those that are proactive. Only such methods can reliably maximise the chances of identifying and recruiting the highest possible proportion of top quality candidates for officership (Mosley *et al.*, 1996:301).

Comments made in the interviews with the commanders who took part in this study suggest that they misunderstood the purpose of proactive approaches to recruitment and selection. Their concern was that if these were to be adopted by KKMA, the already oversubscribed Academy would be flooded with even more than the average 10,000 applicants processed annually. Proactive techniques are not primarily intended to increase numbers but to focus on and target candidates with the best potentials to make good leaders in the prestigious organisation of SANG. As for the fear of being flooded with applicants, it is surprising that in the age of computers this is an issue at all. Regardless of how many apply, surely a simple database could be devised and used to sort candidates who fulfil certain criteria of excellence from those who do not and numbers could, in theory, be reduced to a manageable selected few of the very best individuals to groom for officership each year.

Again, in the interviews for this research, all three commanders readily agreed that there was much room for improvement with regard to the whole process of recruitment and selection, including the instruments used, monitoring, and final decision-making on the suitability of candidates. The commanders stressed that their selection criteria were sound, but that the weakness lay in their implementation. This research confirms that KKMA's selection criteria are comparable to those of other military academies in the world, as evidenced in the literature. The system is, however, undermined by a number of obstacles, the most serious of which is the insidious and seemingly insoluble cultural phenomenon of *wāsta*, or nepotism (see Section 10.3.6 in this chapter).

The loud and clear message that emerges from the research findings is that KKMA's

recruitment and selection system is defective in its implementation. On the positive side, if Mosks and Wood's (1988:30) enlightened premise that there is no harm in new military recruits being driven by both institutional and occupational motives is to be given credence, then the Academy can take comfort in the finding that Class 1999 proved to be neither idealistic nor attracted to an officer career in SANG purely for occupational reasons.

At this point, it is appropriate to answer the first research question, which asks:

RQ1: How effective is KKMA's recruitment and selection system?

The findings and conclusions derived from the data on the recruitment and selection of Class 1999 force the judgement that it was unsystematic and ineffective in its implementation. Class 1999 recognised that KKMA invested huge resources, time and efforts on recruitment and selection, but that in effect, it relied mainly on passive and unreliable methods of recruitment. It was also perceived by the majority of the research participants as generally ineffective in selecting the very best candidates for cadetship. Most of them were dissatisfied with the system above all because they believed that it was vulnerable to external pressure.

10.3.2 Indoctrination

The investigation of KKMA's Class 1999 indoctrination programme yielded several important findings. The most compelling of them are the following:

1. Overall, Class 1999 and their teachers were moderately satisfied with KKMA's indoctrination programme.
2. According to the vast majority of participants in this research, KKMA tends to use overly harsh and outdated methods of military indoctrination.
3. KKMA's indoctrination process focuses more on soldiering skills than on the all-important preparation of cadets for leadership.
4. There is a pronounced overemphasis on conformity and obedience at the expense of creativity and personal initiative.
5. KKMA was found to have a strong military culture and identity. It places a strong emphasis on traditional military values.

First of all, it is worth noting that the vast majority of the survey participants (93.9%)

as well as commanders interviewed for this study recognised the crucial importance of the indoctrination programme in the preparation of cadets as soldiers and leaders. Over two thirds of them (81.6%) also described basic military training (BMT), where a heavy dose of indoctrination is inculcated, as undoubtedly the most shocking experience of a new cadet's life. They conceded, however, that it is an essential part of military preparation. Senior officers described it as the heart of military preparation, the foundation upon which everything else depends: discipline, loyalty, teamwork, and ultimately mission success. This is in line with professional military thinking and practices elsewhere (Lovell 1979:96; Jordan 1971: 358; U'Ren 1971: 18; Downes 1983: 310). Having said this, only 47.2% of the survey respondents were unequivocal in expressing satisfaction with KKMA's indoctrination programme. However, the whole sample mean for this item reached a moderate level (3.31).

On the other hand, a large majority of the respondents consistently judged that KKMA was unduly harsh, particularly with regard to rule and regulation enforcement (65.9%), liberty infractions (65.1%), discipline in general (70.8%), and in relation to uniform appearance and grooming standards (52.4%). In fact, nearly two thirds of them (72.8%) considered that some of the indoctrination methods and practices used by KKMA were clearly outdated and counterproductive.

This last finding was confirmed in the interviews with the commanders as one of them recognised that he often felt uncomfortable with the level of harshness cadets were subjected to under KKMA's current indoctrination system. He also saw the disciplinary regime as too mistake-oriented, giving the impression that almost every aspect of cadet life was regulated. Reducing the level of harshness evident in KKMA's efforts to inculcate military culture in its aspiring officers would seem to be a reasonable thing to do. However, as Ellis and More (1974: 77) found in their in-depth study of American military academies, albeit over thirty years ago, any change in this direction usually meets with fierce resistance among officers and senior cadets. They would argue that it is dangerous to "go soft" on new recruits, that turning them into hardened men who could take the pain and successfully overcome the "stress factor" is part and parcel of military indoctrination and a necessary part of battlefield preparation. They might even oppose any attempt to eliminate traditional rites of passage, even excesses in this

regard, and turn a blind eye to them. Like others before them, they would argue that such a change would lead to poor standards of discipline and to the loss of an important military indoctrination tool. Reformers would have a hard job to initiate any significant departures from current indoctrination practices, as they are typically entrenched and rooted in tradition.

The majority consensus as well as the admission by senior officers that KKMA's indoctrination was too harsh, authoritarian, and predominantly punishment-oriented call for reflection. As noted in the literature survey, the military expert Janowitz (1971: xx iii) over thirty years ago rightly predicted that future military preparation programmes would gradually eliminate brutal induction procedures, excessive inspections, undue harassment, and subjecting recruits to degrading experiences. Inculcating military values and discipline through fear has only limited effectiveness. As pointed out by Ellis and More (1974:75), Williams (1995:25), and Moss (1996:12), 'you can only lead a man by fear for so long'. New ways of achieving indoctrination goals ought to be explored and experimented with, such as – the just-cited authors have suggested - identifying shared values and common goals, and generating motivation and team spirit through other means than authoritarianism without jeopardising authority.

The finding that KKMA's indoctrination process focuses more on soldiering skills than on the all-important preparation of cadets for leadership may be viewed as a predictable consequence of the absence of an officially structured indoctrination strategy. Only upperclassmen, and not every one of them, get a chance to practise indoctrinating new recruits, which they often take as an opportunity to inflict on others the cruelties inflicted upon them rather than true indoctrination. There seems to be an assumption that making good soldiers of cadets is bound to make good leaders of them, or that there will be ample time for them to practise leadership in future. In contrast with Sandhurst's and West point's indoctrination programmes, which stress leadership roles almost from day one, and where almost everything is taught through leadership (RMC 2001:45, Yardley 1987:197), KKMA is doing less than enough to systematically prepare its cadets for indoctrinating their own troops in future.

On the positive side, KKMA was found to have a strong military culture and identity. There was also much evidence that it placed a strong emphasis on traditional military values. KKMA's impressive modern buildings stand as awesome, proud monuments with gleaming symbols and logos. They project an unmistakable message of prestige, discipline, and high standards. More than half of all the survey respondents (mean, 3.63) judged that KKMA was successful in inspiring in them respect and affection for the Academy, as well as in instilling pride in belonging to it and to its parent institution SANG. Well over 80% (mean, 4.08) of them agreed that the Academy successfully projected a strong identity, reputation, and commitment to excellence. The commanders interviewed for this study stressed their acute awareness that the Academy had a very high reputation to uphold, both in the eyes of the higher authorities and the public.

Finally, traditionalists might rejoice in the finding that traditional military values are alive and well at KKMA. An impressive 87.8% (mean, 4.36) of the respondents believed that these were important or very important, with only a small difference in their perceptions of their importance from KKMA's point of view (92.5%) (mean, 4.46). This is good news for the Academy at a time when - at least as reported in the Western world - there appears to be a widening gap between the standards of conduct inside and outside military academies, and the perceived deterioration of values such as courage, self-sacrifice, honour, duty, and so on. (Jones 1998: 181).

It is now appropriate to attempt to answer the second research question of this study, which asks:

RQ2 How effective is KKMA's indoctrination programme?

The evidence obtained from the data on the indoctrination of Class 1999 points to a mixed verdict; that is, neither effective enough, nor wholly ineffective. The research participants' reactions were positive in relation to several important variables, such as control over all potential agents of socialisation, inculcating soldiering skills, military values, pride in the profession, and projecting a strong identity, reputation and commitment to excellence. On the other hand, they were in favour of some measures

for change, particularly with regard to outdated and excessively harsh indoctrination methods and the overemphasis on conformity and obedience. The most serious shortcoming was that the system better prepared cadets for soldiering than for indoctrinating their own troops in future as junior leaders.

10.3.3 Vocational Programme

Analysis of the data on the vocational programme for Class 1999 uncovered several notable findings. The most salient of them are:

- 1- Class 1999's and their teachers' overall level of satisfaction with KKMA's vocational programme was moderate.
- 2- KKMA provides high-quality basic military skills, namely drills and parades, infantry skills and shooting.
- 3- KKMA offers adequate tactical knowledge and training, but it falls short of providing equally good technical knowledge and training.
- 4- KKMA's leadership programme is weak and is not given the primacy it deserves.
- 5- The provision of management and communication skills is disappointing.
- 6- KKMA's MOOTW training is unduly limited to internal security, with no attention to potential involvement in international roles.

The importance of the vocational programme in the preparation of junior officers is evident, which is why KKMA devotes virtually two thirds of its entire officer preparation programme to it. It includes, among other things, basic military skills, technical and tactical knowledge and skills, leadership training, mastery of management and communication skills, and grounding in the essentials of MOOTW. A total percentage of 95% (mean, 4.78) of the respondents judged vocational education as important or very important, while the commanders interviewed for this study described it as the vital ingredient for competent leadership and the Academy's major area of emphasis. The findings of this study reveal that Class 1999 were only moderately satisfied with KKMA's performance with regard to the provision of this component. In fact, less than half of all the respondents, including teaching staff members, were unquestionably supportive of it (42.9%) (mean, 3.27). For a fundamental component of officer preparation, this is somewhat disappointing.

There are various reasons for the lukewarm reaction to the vocational programme. Among some of the general criticisms levelled at it were that it did not provide a balance between theory and practice and that the learning environment was less than fully supportive of serious uninterrupted study. Apart from this, according to the participants in this research, it appears that KKMA offers a high standard in basic military skills, including infantry and shooting skills with live ammunition. The results, supported by documentary evidence, also indicated that the Academy paid disproportionate attention to military drill and parades, a common practice in other military academies, too (RMC 2001:37, Yardley 1987:109, Janjua 1994:85), with arguably limited benefits other than ceremony and fanfare. Altogether, KKMA devotes almost half of its vocational programme volume to basic military skills (670 hours).

In striking contrast, KKMA was found to set aside only 406 hours for military knowledge, combining technical and tactical military expertise. Still, this reflects significant attention to these subjects of study. Technical skills, it is worth remembering, have to do with the acquisition of the 'tools of the trade' so to speak, weapon systems, control systems, computers, etc. Tactical skills refer to troop movements, location and relocation, defence strategies, and so on. Both sets of skills are clearly complementary and must be mastered to a high degree of aptitude so that they can be applied in fighting and winning wars (ALDH 2001; 39-43). The respondents' overall assessment of these two crucial vocational components was that KKMA offered adequate tactical knowledge and training, but that it fell short of providing equally good technical expertise. Surely these two aspects of vocational education must receive equal attention if the aim is to produce all-round professionally competent junior officers.

At the heart of the vocational programmes in preparation of junior officers is leadership training and instruction. The best military academies in the world accord leadership central importance in their programmes (RMC 2001:45, Yardley 1987:197). Indeed, as stressed by Palmer (1992:6), the military academies' very reason being should be grounded in leadership. They are, after all, in the business of producing tomorrow's leaders (Atkine 2000:19).

This aspect of the vocational component of KKMA's officer preparation was found to be particularly weak in more than one respect. It was no surprise, therefore, that more than 60% of respondents stated that the Academy failed to provide adequate leadership knowledge and skill. An even higher percentage, over 65%, considered that the leadership programme was not sufficiently rich in modern scientific theories and analysis of historical examples of leadership. In addition, well over half of them took the view that the practical side of leadership was predominantly based on authoritarian styles, rule by fear and unquestioning obedience. Worse still, over 70% of the research participants indicated that KKMA provided cadets with insufficient practical experimentation opportunities. Not only this, but they also criticised the leadership programme for failing to achieve a balance between theory and practice. Furthermore, more than a quarter of the respondents, backed by a commander, were of the opinion that not all the officers cadets came in contact with provided exemplary role models. Finally, almost 66% of them believed that KKMA's vocational programme was not particularly conducive to the development of confident junior officers, equipped to lead men in times of both war and peace. It was least able to teach and train them to think creatively and act on their own initiative in accordance with the intent of their superiors, should the situation require it.

The above findings can be seen as chilling reminders why leadership may be the greatest weakness of Arab training systems, as noted by Atkine (2000:20). The road to improvement undoubtedly lies through the establishment of a well-thought-out leadership programme, both theoretical and practical. Ideally, this should be devised and overseen by a separate leadership department, well equipped with a library and various other resources for study and research. Thomas (2000:14) suggests such a department could bring together the experiences and knowledge of many leadership experts in conferences, for example, or special addresses to cadets on leadership topics and experiences. Such a wealth of knowledge and experience would quickly demonstrate the futility of authoritarian methods of leadership, their inappropriateness and their counter-productiveness in modern times. It would also undoubtedly show that effective modern leadership styles rely on subordinates' willing obedience and commitment, based on trust and shared goals, rather than on fear and forced compliance (Atkine 2000; 20-24).

The point was made in the literature review (Chapter Three, Sec.3.4.1.4) that the preparation of professional military officers nowadays requires equipping them with the necessary principles of administration and management to enable them to run the affairs of the Military, whether in times of war or peace. The perception of the importance of this element of the vocational component is visible in the 80.3% support for it by the survey respondents in this study. Their assessment of KKMA's performance in this regard produced mixed reactions, with just over a quarter of them rating it as good or very good, while almost another quarter took the opposite view, seeing it as poor or very poor, and the rest - that is very nearly half of all respondents considering it neither good nor bad; hardly a positive endorsement.

The commanders interviewed for this study also expressed split reactions, one maintaining that management courses at KKMA were sound considering the time limitations and the crammed syllabus A2-C1, another while recognising the same constraints still lamented its failure to give cadets sufficient opportunity to practise managing time and resources A2-C3. It has to be admitted that in a hurried three-year preparation programme, there is only so much one can do; just one argument among many for extending the programme to four years.

Another weakness in KKMA's programme equally attributed to time limitations, among other reasons given by the three commanders interviewed for this study, is the provision of communication skills. It is needless to stress how important good communication skills are for combat effectiveness and survival in the battlefield, as well as public relations (PR) (see Sect.3.4.1.5). Suffice it to recall that the British Military Academy at Sandhurst for some years assigned it a separate department to ensure its success. Yet again, both survey respondents and interviewed commanders generally gave it the thumbs down. Thus, almost half of them judged it to be substandard and unsatisfactory, with no more than a third of them rating it as acceptable. The commanders admitted that more could be done to enhance the effectiveness of this component. The present researcher is in no doubt that improvements in this area are crucial not only for the individual aspiring officers, but also for the images of KKMA and SANG, as more and more military staff are expected to be able to cope with the media, public scrutiny, and the requirements of

participation in allied mission and international actions (Downey 1997:177, Yardley 1987:114).

Finally, since military objectives nowadays are no longer restricted to fighting conventional wars, as discussed in the literature survey (Chapter Three, Sec. 3.4.1.6), this study asked the participants whether KKMA's vocational programme adequately prepared cadets for the new mix of roles and demands of MOOTW (military operations other than war). Regrettably again, over half of all the respondents rated KKMA's provision in this regard as poor, and less than 20% of them as good or very good (overall mean 2.37 only). On the whole, the respondents felt that the Academy did not properly equip them with the knowledge, skill, and confidence they needed to perform in the new operating environments of the 21st century. To be fair, KKMA does provide some training in internal security, war against drugs and smuggling, terrorism etc., but its focus is admittedly limited to protection of the Kingdom, the state, and the public. A2-C3 conceded that there is a need to extend such training to cover competence in performance in foreign postings and international missions. Tomorrow's military officers might well be called upon to perform humanitarian relief operations, contain regional conflicts or carry out peace-keeping/making missions in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, or Africa. This is another argument in favour of extending the officer preparation programme to four years.

It is now possible to answer the third research question of this study, which asks:

RQ3 How effective is KKMA's vocational programme?

Bearing in mind all the evidence presented in Chapter seven, and the analysis and discussion of the major findings put forward above, the indications are that KKMA's vocational programme for Class 1999 was overall moderately effective, although it suffered from a number of shortfalls. It was rated highly effective in some respects, such as in providing high standards of military drills, parades, infantry skills, shooting, and tactical knowledge, while its provision of technical knowledge and skills and leadership training were considered less than satisfactory. The programme was also on the whole found to be fairly balanced, although more emphasis on practice was

needed. In terms of satisfaction with this component, reactions were moderately favourable.

10.3.4 Liberal Education

Analysis of the data on the liberal education component, which forms a substantial portion of the officer preparation programme, has produced many valuable results. The most prominent of them are summed up below:

1. The importance of liberal education was perceived as low or very low by more than half of all cadets surveyed, in sharp contrast to the perceptions of their instructors and the Academy's official stance.
2. The data on the survey respondents' overall level of satisfaction with KKMA's liberal education programme show that only a quarter of them were unreservedly satisfied with its provision.
3. On whether KKMA lived up to the expectation of providing a strong, rich, interesting, and up-to-date broad-based liberal education programme, the research participants' views were roughly evenly split among those who agreed that it did, those who disagreed, and those who were unsure.
4. On the extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme was effective in teaching reasoning skills and other useful intellectual habits, success was generally deemed modest.
5. The respondents' perceptions of the effectiveness of KKMA's liberal education programme in instilling moral-ethical principles, wisdom and self-knowledge were broadly favourable.
6. According to the research participants, the Academy's liberal education programme contains a balance of human and natural science subjects, but should ideally include an element of choice.
7. The majority of research participants were opposed to greater liberalisation of KKMA's programmes. At the same time, they rejected the suggestion that the Academy should concentrate on military values rather than on intellectual and occupational pursuits.

KKMA's recognition of the importance of liberal education in the development of its junior officers is unambiguous and is well reflected in its allocation of 857 course hours to it, distributed over three years and representing one third of the entire officer preparation programme. Three of its main programme guides (KKMA Guide 1999:38, General Programme Guide 2000:1, and Academy Instruction Guide 2001:12) clearly emphasise its importance and specify its aims as 'providing cadets with a broad-based liberal education, covering various branches of knowledge, including natural and social sciences, history, religion, and English language'. The programme guides also stipulate that its objectives are to enrich the cadets' knowledge of the society and world they live in, to broaden their minds and intellectual capacities, and to enable them to interact effectively both as future military leaders and subjects of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Looking at the summarised contents and structure of KKMA's liberal education programme, it is possible to describe it as capable of meeting the desired objectives and even as an ambitious programme. It includes a wide variety of subjects from a broad range of branches of knowledge.

However, the benefits of a strong, broad-based liberal education in the preparation of junior officers does not appear to be evident for graduating Class 1999 cadets. Quite the contrary, as more than half of all cadets surveyed rated its importance to them as low or very low (mean = 2.48), as opposed to their instructors, who rated it significantly higher (mean= 3.51, $p = .005$ (s)), and in contrast with the Academy's officially favourable stance. This result raises a number of questions why the value of liberal education does not seem to be fully appreciated by at least the majority of cadets. Objectively, however, this is no serious cause for concern since, as discussed in the literature survey, there are wide variations of views on the importance of liberal education in the preparation of junior officers among scholars and military academies all over the world (Efland and Reed 2001:86). Moreover, it is not unlikely that their views will change later on as they mature and progress in their careers. Perhaps the teaching staff's judgements are evidence of this.

What is clearly disturbing is the low overall level of satisfaction shown by the vast majority of respondents with the liberal education programme provision. Indeed, the figures show a consensus among both cadets and teaching staff ($p = .139$ (NS)) that

KKMA's liberal education programme in its present form is only moderately satisfactory, with slightly over a quarter of them only satisfied or very satisfied (25.3%); the rest either expressed reservations or were thoroughly dissatisfied with it. The reasons for dissatisfaction are multiple. Often, as will be shown, they are due to the arguably over ambitious nature of the programme (an admission by A2-C2 and A2-C3), to some other weaknesses in its provision, but also to the length of the whole officer preparation programme and to the environmental conditions under which cadets are educated.

Earlier, based on documentary evidence gathered for this research, it was argued that KKMA's liberal education programme could in theory be described as potentially broad-based and ambitious. In practice, there was no overwhelming consensus among the survey participants that the Academy met with such high expectations, despite its undoubtedly laudable efforts. The literature emphasises that a successful liberal education programme ought to offer a broad coverage of various branches of knowledge, a rich variety of interesting and valuable courses, a good understanding of current technology and its impacts, a solid foundation in computer literacy, and that its overall content must be equivalent to civilian university education (Keller 2001:29, Albrecht 2001:96).

When KKMA's performance was assessed against such criteria, it was found that the participant's views were roughly evenly split among those who agreed that it did, those who disagreed, and those who were unsure. What is more, for three out of these five related issues, there was no significant difference between the reactions of cadets and the teaching staff who took part in the survey. There was only disagreement over whether KKMA offered a good understanding of current technology and its impact, and a solid foundation in computer literacy, with the teaching staff tending to agree more that this was the case than the cadets. No real enthusiasm was detected with regard to these aspects of KKMA's liberal education programme, least of all in relation to the provision of a solid foundation in computer literacy (mean= 2.46), with only 41 teaching hours in total, which is a less than satisfactory performance. A noteworthy point in this respect is that only one in four survey participants believed that KKMA's liberal education programme was as good as that offered in civilian universities. In a

world where the Military increasingly depend on technology and information, it is of some concern that the respondents to this survey felt that KKMA cadets were ill-prepared for the technological and informational explosions of the new century. Their counterparts in Western military academies are already beginning to train and experiment with computer simulations and virtual reality training and education resources (Michael 1995:30). For all these reasons and others that follow, it is crucial to identify the reasons why perceptions of the liberal education programme are disappointingly mediocre. The views of cadets and teaching staff could be very informative.

Bearing in mind such deficiencies, it was not surprising to observe similar reactions by the respondents in their assessment of the effectiveness of KKMA in teaching useful reasoning skills and intellectual habits. The eight specific areas selected for measurement were taken as predictable benefits that could be expected to result from a strong broad-based liberal education programme. Regrettably, the Academy's success with regard to its performance was judged to be modest. The highest whole sample mean only reached a moderate (3.33) in connection to the extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme taught cadets how to think for themselves and form their own measured judgements. The lowest whole sample mean was still a moderate (mean=3.06). It related to the extent to which KKMA's liberal education programme broadened cadets' minds and made them intellectually curious. Is it any wonder that only a quarter of them said they were satisfied with it and that more than half of them rated it as unimportant?

KKMA would do well to discover why the participants in this study were of the view that its liberal education programme did not teach cadets well enough how to think and form independent judgements, how to follow a structured scientific procedure and arrive at sensible conclusions, how to think clearly and logically, how to organise their thoughts and how to distinguish between the important and the trivial. These are vital intellectual skills for all decision makers and leaders of men, particularly military leaders. Of particular concern is their belief that their preparation programme did not train them to reason critically without fear of expressing disagreement. This could be considered as a major deficiency since one of the principal purposes of liberal

education is to encourage creativity and innovation and to enhance cadets' ability to think critically, form independent judgements, and take suitable initiatives with full knowledge of their consequences (Kirkpatrick 1998:104, Sullivan 1998:77).

Other deficiencies were also noted, such as equipping cadets with only average communication skills, as the findings appear to show. How could junior officers destined to become future leaders be expected to meet the expectations of high-performance leadership in the 21st century and make wise and informed decisions with only an average knowledge of the appropriateness of objective evaluations, and with less than first-class insights into human nature and motivation? How effective, finally, is a liberal education programme that only partially succeeds in broadening cadets' minds and instilling intellectual curiosity and love of learning? Not effective enough to produce excellent leaders, present-day military educationalists suggest (Vitas 1999:49, Converse 1998:57, Boog 1998:120).

Moreover, contemporary military literature indicates that an effective liberal education programme not only educates the minds of future military leaders (Rothenberg 1998:153), but also stimulates value formation and strengthens desirable character traits, such as integrity, discipline, honour, duty, justice, etc. (Vitas 1999:51-2). It should draw attention to the moral-ethical content or implications of issues, and encourage them to make them instinctively part of their judgements and decisions (Larson 1995:34-7). It should, according to Adler (2002:2), enhance our understanding of the moral and spiritual dimensions of our actions as well as instil wisdom and knowledge of ourselves and others.

The results of this study show that the respondents' perceptions of KKMA's liberal education programme performance in instilling such qualities and others related to them were largely favourable, with an overall percentage of 58.5%. However, when asked to assess the Academy's influence in specific areas such as enhancing their sense of responsibility towards society, tolerance and sensitivity to others, understanding people and the world they live in, percentages somewhat declined, although the whole sample mean scores remained relatively moderate.

Percentages and mean scores dropped to below 50%, and in one case down to 43.4 % (whether KKMA's liberal education helped develop 'wisdom'). Incidentally, consensus among all the respondents was obtained in seven out of eight issues in this area. One likely explanation for this may be that the respondents were reluctant to attribute such effects exclusively to the Academy, although they would not deny that it upheld and possibly strengthened the values and qualities in question. This is not implausible because moral values are strongly inculcated from a very early age in Saudi Arabia, both inside and outside the family and throughout schooling, and in all education and training institutions. Still, the figures may well be interpreted as disclosing areas of weaknesses in KKMA's liberal education programme, indicating a need to improve performance in developing integrity, honesty and good citizenship, in raising cadets' awareness of their own strengths and weaknesses, and in cultivating wisdom.

Other interesting results were found concerning the issues of balance, relevance to military needs, choice, and skills transferability. Here, a clear majority of the research participants acknowledged that KKMA offered a broad coverage of the major branches of learning in its syllabus, but that there was room for improvement particularly in terms of the quality of delivery. In view of the short length of KKMA's officer preparation programme, the participants placed a high premium on relevance to military needs, with 63.7% of them rating it as important or very important (mean, 3.77). Their insistence on relevance is consistent with the UK's strictly vocationally-based officer preparation programmes (RMA 2002 Prospectus) and that of the Swiss military college (Kach 1999:32), to name only two examples.

One commander interviewed for this research (A2-C1) also stressed that every subject taught at KKMA should be relevant to the main mission of the Academy. In addition, the respondents also felt by a majority of almost 62% that an element of choice ought to be introduced (mean, 3.67). This way, according to Vistas (1999:7) and Kirkpatrick (1998:102), excessive workloads and 'intellectual torture' could be avoided. It would also reduce the risk of producing uniformed 'grey thinkers'. An exclusive focus on military-relevant subjects and activities may however miss out on the long term non-apparent benefits of a truly broad-based liberal education programme (Barker 2000:10, Kenney 1996:58). But, in a crammed three-year programme, relevance is inevitably

deemed important. If so, according to Effland and Reed (2001:88), then it must be emphasised. A broad-based liberal programme is only realistically possible if a fourth year is introduced.

The research participants generally were equally on the whole opposed to the greater liberalisation of KKMA's programmes. Thus, more than half of them felt that this could threaten its fundamental dedication to Spartan values. A similar percentage also believed that KKMA should not align itself too closely with civilian academic institutions and programmes, and favoured more focus on military sciences and technology. However, when they were asked for their opinion on whether KKMA should concentrate on military values rather than on intellectual and occupational pursuits, only 48.3% agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition. This is remarkably consistent with the earlier finding that the cadets' motivations for joining KKMA were healthily balanced between occupational and institutional factors (Chapter Five, Sec. 5.3.2). They appeared to share the view that a good liberal education programme should equip cadets with transferable skills which ensure professional flexibility and security for the future in case they moved into a civilian occupation at some stage in their careers. Liberal education was clearly not rejected as irrelevant to cadets' needs, but its excessive volume in a three-year compulsory programme was.

It is now fitting to attempt to answer the fourth research question in this study, which asks:

RQ4 How effective is KKMA's liberal education programme?

Taking into account all the variables measuring KKMA's Class 1999 liberal education programme outcomes, it is possible to infer that on balance the programme was moderately effective despite its imperfections. The main criticisms levelled at it were that it paid insufficient attention to relevance to military needs, and that it was probably too ambitious in terms of volume and content within a tightly packed three-year officer preparation programme.

10.3.5 Physical Fitness

Analysis of the data on the physical fitness programme brought to light several important findings. The most noteworthy of them can be summarised as follows:

- 1- There are significant differences between the official importance given to the physical fitness programme, the perceptions of the importance it is given in practice, and the personal rating of its importance by the research participants.
- 2- On the whole, Class 1999 and their instructors were moderately satisfied with KKMA's physical fitness programme.
- 3- Approximately four out of ten Class 1999 cadets rated their own level of physical fitness before graduation as good or very good; a similar proportion felt it to be reasonably good; and only about one fifth judged it to be poor or very poor.
- 4- On programme structure and balance the respondents' views were split, with over a third of them rating it as well structured and balanced, a similar proportion as reasonably well structured and balanced, and just over a quarter as poorly or very poorly structured and balanced.

Like other military academies in the world, KKMA regards physical fitness as an integral part of the education and training of junior officers. This is not merely for health reasons, as argued in the literature chapters, but also because of the widely held theory that there is a link between physical fitness and military preparedness (Pope 1995:441-8, Janowitz 1960:130, USMA Prospectus 2001:1, Sandhurst Diary 2001:1, RMC Prospectus 2001:50, RMAB Prospectus 2001:2). Physical fitness is an essential element of soldier training. As soldiers and future leaders, military academy graduates are expected to function well under the most difficult and threatening situations. Physical fitness gives them the energy, power, and confidence they need to meet operational requirements and perform effectively under those conditions (Field Manual 1992: iii). Few people would question its value for survival in the battlefield. Its importance is further increased by claims that it contributes positively to the development of character, sense of duty, team cohesion, team spirit, self-discipline, and morale, as well as the physical condition and appearance of aspiring officers (Chapter Three Sec. 3.6.2).

Examination of the documentary evidence relevant to KKMA's official physical fitness programme reveals that the Academy in theory spares no efforts in offering a well-structured, varied, and attractive physical fitness plan for cadets throughout their three-year officer preparation (Chapter Nine Sec. 9.2). It appears to meet the main requirements of 'Total Physical Fitness' (Chapter Three Sec. 3.6.3) although no explicit mention is made of the fourth component, i.e. the monitoring of body composition/weight control (Gindhat 1999:12, Filed Manual 1992:1-4), despite the fact the researcher knows well that this is done regularly at the Academy. Crucially, KKMA's physical fitness programme distinctly states its second aim to be "Training cadets on how to coach others in a variety of sports and in organising sports competitions" (KKMA General training Plan and Programme Schedule 2002). To its credit, the programme also includes regular physical fitness tests and first-rate health and safety checks and care as part of its commitment and goals (Chapter Nine Sec. 9.2-9.2.2). In theory, therefore, KKMA's physical fitness programme is capable of successfully contributing to the professional preparation of cadets for officership.

As just indicated, KKMA clearly endorses the importance of physical fitness for the health and military readiness of cadets in their future roles as soldiers and troop leaders. However, this research found that there were significant differences between the importance it is given officially by the Academy, the perceptions of the importance it is given in practice, and the personal ratings of its importance by the research participants. When the survey participants were asked for their views on how much importance is officially attached to the physical fitness programme by KKMA, less than half of them (43.5%) stated that the Academy considered it as important or very important. What is more, just over one fifth of them (20.7%) distressingly saw that the Academy gave little or no importance to its physical fitness programme. The whole sample mean was a moderate (3.35).

In contrast to this, 94.5% of them regarded it personally as important or very important in officer preparation, resulting in a very high whole sample mean with no detected statistically significant difference between the views of cadets and their tutors (4.71)($P = .300$ (NS)). The obvious implication is that physical fitness ought to have been given greater attention in practice by the Academy. It means that its performance

in this respect was below expectations, according to Class 1999, and their teachers. Both A2-C2 and A2-C3 conceded that more could have been done, stressing that an officer needs physical fitness as much as mental hardness and intellect; a reference to indoctrination, vocational and liberal education.

Nevertheless, when the respondents were asked to assess their overall level of satisfaction with KKMA's physical fitness programme, 41.4% stated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with it, and over a third of them (34.4%) said they were somewhat satisfied. However, almost a quarter (24.4%) were dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the programme provision (mean, 3.22). As an added measure of the Academy's performance in relation to its physical fitness programme, the cadets were asked to rate their own levels of physical fitness since they were just about to graduate at the time the survey was conducted for this research. Remarkably, a similar percentage of them (42%) rated it as good or very good. The next highest proportion of them (39%) felt that their level of physical fitness was reasonably good, and less than a quarter (19%) judged their fitness to be poor or very poor. The whole sample mean was moderate (3.28). As mentioned in the previous chapter, these results are by no means disastrous. One would expect, however, that every cadet who leaves KKMA should leave it in top physical condition. Sandhurst has this as a goal commitment for its graduating cadets (Sandhurst Diary 2001:5). KKMA ought to follow suit.

There are numerous reasons for the deficiencies and negative perceptions of KKMA's physical fitness programme. These came to light when the respondents were asked how well structured and balanced the Academy's physical fitness programme was, as well as in answers to a range of other questions on specific areas of performance in this respect. On programme structure and balance, views were split, with over a third of the respondents (37.3%) rating it as well structured and balanced, a similar proportion (35.9%) rating it as reasonably well structured and balanced, and just over a quarter (26.9%) severely critical of it, judging it inadequately structured and balanced or not well structured and balanced at all. The overall mean was moderate (3.10), with no significant differences between the views of cadets and their tutors ($p = .916$ (NS)).

In an assessment of a non-comprehensive list of eleven performance variables derived from features of successful physical fitness programmes promoted by knowledgeable writers (Harig 2001:4, Gindhart 1999:12, Wateny 1989:15) and applied in military academies in the developed world (sections 3.6 & 9.3.3), the respondents admitted that KKMA provided professional physical fitness instructors and included a wide variety of sports in its fitness programme. In all the remaining areas of performance except three (Chapter Nine Sec. 9.3.3), which will be returned to shortly, KKMA performed moderately well according to the survey respondents. They included encouraging cadets to develop a liking for sport and outdoor activities, providing a basic knowledge of a wide variety of sports, allocating time for physical training, and allowing choice in physical fitness activities. All were the object of consensus between cadets and teaching staff.

The lowest whole sample mean scores (under 3.00) were however obtained in three key areas of importance: on whether KKMA integrates well other physical activities in its physical fitness programme (e.g. obstacle drills, endurance marches etc. (mean, 2.98)), whether it ensured that cadets were never allowed to be physically unfit (mean, 2.96), and whether it taught them to coach others so that they could train their own troops in future (mean, 2.67). This finding is at odds with the literature, which shows for example that at Sandhurst, the overall purpose of the physical fitness programme is “to ensure that every cadet leaves Sandhurst in top physical condition and will be able to supervise the fitness training of the soldiers who will be under their command” (Sandhurst Diary 2001:2). The scores could be interpreted as indicating failure to meet at least two programme goals adequately: (1) developing cadets’ physical fitness, and (2) training cadets on how to coach and organise physical fitness activities and organise sports competitions. It is clear that the weaknesses are in the implementation of the programme, rather than in its design, although greater emphasis on training future trainers might have engendered a better focus on these requirements.

Finally, it is time to answer the fifth research question of this study which asks:

RQ5 How effective is KKMA's physical fitness programme?

On the basis of all the evidence derived from the data on KKMA's Class 1999 physical fitness programme, it is possible to describe it as moderately effective despite suffering from a number of weaknesses and facing numerous obstacles. The main criticisms of the programme were that it allowed little choice for fitness activities; it was not well integrated with other physical activities, such as obstacle drills and endurance marches, and most importantly it did not sufficiently teach cadets how to coach others to enable them to train their own troops in future.

10.3.6 Obstacles

No officer preparation programme is immune from imperfections and KKMA is no exception. Because of their importance, this research has undertaken an extensive search for the most common blocks to effectiveness potentially affecting the five components of officership, namely recruitment and selection, indoctrination, vocational and liberal education, and physical fitness. Those that were found to have a direct influence on KKMA's programmes were assessed for their impacts and discussed in some detail in relevant sections of the data analysis findings. They all represent challenges and difficulties to be faced during the difficult task of selecting, training and educating recruits for officership. This section will only focus on the top ten impediments - two from each component - with the most serious effects on KKMA's officer preparation, as perceived by Class 1999 and their instructors.

Wāsta

With regard to recruitment and selection and ahead of all the issues with the most negative impacts on the officer preparation programme, *wāsta* (the Arabic word for nepotism) emerged as the most disturbing and the most intractable of all (Chapter Five Sec. 5.3.4). It is a pervasive and complex cultural phenomenon rooted in tribal tradition and is a fact of life in Saudi Arabia and in other Arab countries. As Al-Medlej (1997:151) claims, most Saudis to some degree comply with it even though they may disapprove of it, because the costs of non-compliance may be too heavy. There are of course those who argue that its influence is in fact blown out of proportion, as one commander interviewed for this research maintained.

Nevertheless, it is impossible to dismiss the results of this study on this issue as the product of the respondent's imagination. And, regardless of the extent to which *wāsta* plays a role in KKMA's admission procedure, the perception of its existence and influence on selection decisions makes a mockery of the whole lengthy and costly recruitment and selection process. The implications of a selection system affected by *wāsta* can be considered very serious. As Lescreve (2001:94) argues, an unscientific selection process is no better than a random process. It is a defective system that could allow persons unfit for the profession to enter it. Cook and Klumper (2000:27-10) make the same point, adding that the consequences of allowing such people into the officer profession can be very high, and not in terms of money alone. Thus, a selection system where *wāsta* plays a role, rather than being based on competence and merit, represents many threats to its credibility, fairness and efficiency, and to the image and professionalism of the Academy and its graduates.

Unsystematic Selection Instruments

The second major obstacle to effective recruitment and selection at KKMA was brought to light through documentary evidence. This was the Academy's reliance on unsystematic selection procedures and techniques (Chapter Five Sec. 5.2.2 and 5.2.3). Because of the huge number of applicants processed annually (10,000 candidates on average), paper and pen instruments of selection tend to predominate. This leaves no room for the use of more sophisticated and arguably more systematic selection tools, such as the socio-psychological tests discussed in the literature (Chapter 3). It is perhaps time to challenge the validity and reliability of the recruitment and selection methods currently in use at KKMA and to experiment with other instruments used particularly in military academies of the Western world, such as personality tests and computer-based tests.

Absence of Indoctrination Guide

The fact that no comprehensive guide or manual for the indoctrination of cadets exists at KKMA, to the best of the present researcher's knowledge, could be viewed as the reason for many shortcomings in the indoctrination programme (Chapter Six Sec. 6.2). Responsibility for the design and implementation of the indoctrination strategy for all cadets rests with Battalion Headquarters. All attempts made by the researcher to get

hold of evidence of the existence of a specific, structured indoctrination programme were in vain. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that the indoctrination programme was judged to be plagued by excessive harshness and inconsistencies since instructors and upperclassmen were left with virtually a free hand to indoctrinate as they saw fit, although the punishment system was regulated.

Overemphasis on Conformity and Obedience

The reactions of the research participants indicated that an unrelenting overemphasis on conformity and obedience in the indoctrination of cadets throughout their three years of officer preparation may be short-sighted and unproductive. It is an approach that is limited in its effectiveness and one that stifles creativity and progress towards more subtle, positive and enduring methods of indoctrination which are more in tune with the needs of the modern world. Perpetuating outmoded values and traditions without questioning their usefulness shows an inability to change and move with the times. This is a difficult obstacle to overcome in a process driven by traditions renowned for resistance to change.

Authoritarian Leadership

Leadership is almost synonymous with officer vocation (Pernsteiner 2001:82, RMC 2001:45, Yardley 1987:197). Excessive stress on soldiering skills and overemphasis of authoritarian methods of leadership based on fear and obedience were found to be major impediments to the development of effective vocational knowledge and skills at KKMA. If Atkine (2000) is to be believed when he argues that leadership may be the greatest weakness of Arab training systems, then outdated, purely authoritarian methods of leadership, based on fear and unquestioning obedience, and characterised by distance and contempt for subordinates, must be replaced by more enlightened leadership which inspires respect and trust and stimulates obedience and enthusiasm.

Few Opportunities for Leadership Practice

“Too much theory and too little practice” is how A2-C3 described KKMA's vocational programme (Chapter Seven Sec. 7.3.4). The research participants lamented the lack of opportunities for cadets to hold command positions and experiment with different leadership approaches. This is not surprising in a system that overemphasises

soldiering skills and expects leadership simply to emerge. Not placing leadership at the heart of the vocational programme, and almost everything else cadets do and learn at the Academy is a serious obstacle to professional officership.

Lack of Enthusiasm for Liberal Education

KKMA's three-year officer preparation programme is crammed. Its attempt to include a range of subjects many military academies in the world cover in four years has implications for almost every aspect of officer preparation. One casualty is liberal education, which is as a result perceived as a luxury at best and a distraction from vocational education at worst. The fact that more than half all the cadets surveyed rated its importance as low or very low may be evidence of this (Table 8.5). Their insistence on relevance to military needs and on the introduction of an element of choice can also be understood due to time limitations (Chapter Eight Sec. 8.3.5.2-3). Lack of enthusiasm for a truly broad-based liberal education programme, however justified it may be, is an obstacle to complete officer preparation.

KKMA Environment's Incompatibility with Intellectual Pursuits

Although the respondents' views on whether KKMA was in theory capable of offering genuine liberal education within its strictly regimented environment were split, a greater proportion of them felt that the Academy did not make adequate provision for time for thought, reading, research and analysis. No doubt this situation is exacerbated by the crammed three-year programme.

Undervalued Physical Fitness

Whether accurate or not, the perception that the physical fitness programme is not valued equally to other components of officer preparation constitutes a potential threat to its success. The participants in this research placed the lack of awareness of the benefits of physical fitness among cadets at the top of 15 obstacles facing KKMA's physical fitness programme. However, they did not take full responsibility for its shortcomings. They blamed them mostly on the lack of access to physical fitness facilities, the fact that fitness activities were not designed in a way that made them attractive and enjoyable, the lack of a sports infrastructure, the lack of a fitness-friendly environment, and on poor medical care. This can be backed by their earlier

perception that the Academy in practice attached less importance to physical fitness than they did (see Section 9.3.1).

Time Pressure

The analysis of evidence from the survey, interviews, and programme documents has time and time again prompted the researcher to question whether KKMA's officer preparation programme was too ambitious in its tendency to cover the maximum amount of subject matter in a three-year period. The impact of time pressure is felt in every aspect of cadet training and education. It is a hectic pace of life that leaves little room for reflection or relaxation. Under such conditions, quantity takes precedence over quality of instruction, theory over practice and rote learning over creative learning.

Finally, the sixth research question of this study asks the question:

RQ6 What obstacles - if any - impede the effective preparation of junior officers at KKMA?

The summary and discussion of the major obstacles derived from the data on all the five components of officer preparation investigated for this study provide a detailed answer.

10.4 Implications

The research findings have enabled the researcher to answer six research questions. These appear to indicate that the Class 1999 officer preparation programme fell short of obtaining the outstanding results that might have been expected from an institution with a reputation for rigour and excellence. No doubt the very high expectations placed upon it had played a part in some of the severe criticisms levelled at it.

The study presents both theoretical and practical implications for the evaluation of junior officer preparation programmes in Saudi Arabia and beyond, particularly in other Arab countries of the Middle East with similar military cultures. On the

theoretical aspect, the study raises awareness of the importance of examining all aspects of an officer preparation programme to get a full picture of its effectiveness, its strengths and weaknesses. This was done in this research using a unique Star Model symbolising both aspirations and officership.

The study findings provide ample evidence that KKMA operates by and large in accordance with contemporary theories of how military officers should be professionally trained and educated. Its officer preparation programme pays substantial attention to the acquisition of military knowledge and expertise (vocational component) without neglecting to complement it with a broad-based liberal education, both being necessary to qualify its future members as professionals (Jenkins 1970:53-107). The findings also confirm that KKMA possesses all the hallmarks of a professional organisation in terms of corporate identity, culture, socialisation process, ethics, service and mission. Its weaknesses are a separate issue.

Since professionalism has also come to be associated with competence (Barber 1963:671, Goode 1957:126), judgement on the level of professionalism of Class 1999 must be linked with their assessment of their own preparation programme provision and its outcomes. The results obtained speak for themselves. They indicate that KKMA's performance needs to be improved considerably before its graduates can be described as highly professional and on a par with their counterparts in Western world military academies.

Practical implications include the need to review every aspect of junior officer preparation at KKMA if it is to continue to enjoy high esteem for excellence and integrity, and if its graduates are to merit the status of professionals. In particular, KKMA ought to do everything it can to reduce dramatically or eliminate the effects of *wāsta* on its recruitment and selection system. This phenomenon causes a huge drain on the Academy's resources, undermines efforts, dents morale and perceptions of fairness, and represents a potential threat with far-reaching implications if, as a result of it, unsuitable candidates are allowed to join the ranks of officers.

Another practical implication that follows from the findings of this research is the

necessity for KKMA to tone down its level of harshness in indoctrinating cadets, without compromising discipline. The findings also highlighted the need for KKMA to place leadership at the heart of everything cadets do and learn, giving more emphasis to developing leaders who are capable of thinking critically, creatively, and independently. As for the liberal education programme, it is essential either to reduce its volume and focus on quality and relevance of subjects taught within the existing three year programme, or/and introduce an element of choice (major/minor subjects), or perhaps better still extend the programme by introducing a fourth year. Updating its content in terms of information technology and advanced technology is crucial. Physical fitness could also be improved by removing the barriers to its effectiveness. Introducing an element of choice, improving access to sports facilities and putting more emphasis on teaching cadets how to coach others would go a long way towards making it more effective.

10.5 Limitations

All research has its limitations and the present one is no exception. The choice of a specific research strategy inevitably imposes certain limitations (Gill & Johnson 1997: ix). Thus, the findings of this study must be considered bearing in mind the following limitations. First, this study focuses on one military academy officer preparation programme, KKMA's Class 1999 regular junior officer programme. Therefore, the findings and conclusions obtained strictly speaking only apply to the mentioned programme regardless of resemblances to KKMA's graduate fast-track programme (see Fig. 5.1). Other than this, there may or may not be similarities with other officer preparation programmes within and outside Saudi Arabia. Only further research can establish whether the findings of this research are consistent with the realities of other contexts.

Moreover, since the research participants for this study were selected using stratified random sampling, bias in their responses could not be totally ruled out. It is possible that the respondents who took part in this study were better or worse than those who were not selected, in that they may have been more or less objective in their reactions. However, the researcher's presence during the completion of the research questionnaires preceded by an insistence on objectivity and truthful responses may

have reduced this threat to internal validity. To minimise it further, the respondents and interviewees were also reassured that their individual responses would be kept strictly confidential and anonymous, and that no names would be mentioned in the results.

10.6 Contributions

This research has made a number of contributions to what is a developing and expanding area of military research. First, it makes a valuable contribution to scarce cross-cultural studies of officer training and education (Converse 1998:3). Secondly, it proposes a distinctive theoretical framework and a comprehensive questionnaire which can readily be used as diagnostic tools for the evaluation of other officer preparation programmes in other military institutions, and other national and cultural contexts. Thirdly, the findings of this research have identified numerous areas of strength which should be acknowledged and consolidated, while at the same time they also highlighted many areas of programme weaknesses which, if acted upon, could lead to the enhancement of KKMA's junior officer preparation programmes. Fourthly, this research provides an invaluable starting point for further and more focussed research by KKMA graduates, since it is the first attempt of its kind at the Academy and, as far as the researcher knows, throughout the Saudi armed forces.

10.7 Future Research

In bringing this work to an end, it is hoped that this research effort will stimulate more interest in the evaluation of officer preparation programmes and serve as a foundation for future research. Long before the study was completed, the researcher realised that each of the five components of officer preparation investigated was a major area of research in its own right. Each area could therefore be the subject of detailed study offering interesting and worthwhile opportunities for empirical investigation. Apart from this, there are still many other avenues for future research, such as the following:

- A replication of this study in any other Arab or Third World country.

- A comparative study evaluating and comparing the effectiveness of the fast-track officer preparation programme with that of the regular programme at KKMA.
- A comparative study between KKMA's junior officer preparation programme and that of one of the other service branch academies in Saudi Arabia. A similar study could also be conducted by other researchers outside the Kingdom.
- A multiple case study investigating trends in the indoctrination processes of cadets across a number of service branches in Saudi Arabia.
- An investigation specifically focussing on leadership training and education in one or more military academies in Saudi Arabia.

Conclusion

This study, believed to be the first of its kind in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, aimed to an empirically based assessment of the effectiveness of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme. It has dealt with a topic of vital importance to SANG and sought to make a valuable contribution to military literature. To this effect, an extensive cross-national and cultural literature review was conducted. It brought together theoretical and practical insights from a multitude of military writers and experts and from the accumulated experiences of several military academies from around the world. Out of this wealth of knowledge, features of programme effectiveness and potential barriers to success were derived and used as a basis for evaluation.

An innovative "star model" was then proposed to focus the research on its five constituting components: recruitment and selection, indoctrination, vocational preparation, liberal education, and physical fitness. Together with a carefully constructed, validated and pilot-tested questionnaire, they served as the main diagnostic tools for this research. In addition, to further enhance the validity and reliability of the conclusions drawn from the empirically gathered data, multiple data sources and triangulation integrating questionnaires, interviews, and documentary evidence were used. The investigation was also guided by Dowens' three evaluative questions: "How is it done?"; "How well is it done?"; and "how can it be improved?".

Based on the perceptions of the research participants, including one hundred graduating cadets, forty seven teaching staff members, and three high-ranking military officers, the findings indicated that KKMA's performance in accomplishing its mission to provide aspiring officers with the values, knowledge and skills deemed essential for their profession was nowhere near the apex of excellence yet. The results showed plainly that KKMA's recruitment and selection system on which the programme outcomes depend heavily was fundamentally defective due to cultural phenomenon of *wāsta*. Its indoctrination programme, on the other hand, produced mixed reactions, while the remaining three components, the vocational programme, the

liberal education programme, and the physical fitness programme emerged as merely moderately effective with many areas of imperfection needing to be addressed. Critically, the Academy's emphasis on soldiering rather than on leadership training and education is indefensible. Experts stress that everything the military academy does should be geared towards leadership training. Altogether, if we adhere to the view that competence is vital element of professionalism, then KKMA's officer preparation programme for class 1999 provided a level of professionalism below that which is required for excellence and for meeting the challenges of the 21st century.

This study has answered the research questions it set out to answer following a rigorous research methodology in gathering supporting evidence. It has increased our knowledge of the contributing factors to success and those that could impede it in training and educating military leaders of the future. It has provided a comprehensive picture of the reality of KKMA's junior officer preparation programme. The present researcher hopes that the Academy will see the value of an uninhibited self-assessment of its performance reflecting real concerns and issues that need to be addressed. Its findings are unlikely to be brushed aside as they are not contrary to expectations admitted by high-ranking officers at the outset of this investigation.

In the researcher's view, however damning the findings of this study may appear to be, they ought to be seen as opportunities for remedial action and reform to correct deficiencies in areas of weakness, and for self-congratulation and consolidation in areas of strength, all for the good of KKMA, its graduates, and for the security of Kingdom as a whole.

It is hoped that this study will serve as a stimulus for positive change, encourage the adoption of new training and education approaches and concepts, and bring about much needed programme content change, restructuring and updating. These measures are vital to drag the Academy into the 21st century so that it can adequately prepare future SANG leaders for the challenges of the complex operational environments ahead. SANG officer education and training of course continue beyond the academy experience, but historical evidence tells us that the seeds of enlightened, creative, and effective leadership are planted and nurtured from the beginning of an officer career,

that is at the academy. It is therefore imperative to get KKMA's junior officer programme content, structure, and delivery right.

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Appendix 1: KKMA Questionnaire

General Instructions: Please answer all the questions in this questionnaire by circling the appropriate response number, or by filling the blank space provided. Select the response that is most correct for you. It is important that your responses reflect reality 'as it is', rather than 'in a favourable light'. The information obtained through this questionnaire will remain confidential. Tick where indicated and circle a number from 1 to 5 (please note 5 is the highest).

PART I

Recruitment and Selection

1. How did you first get to know about KKMA? (Tick one)

- (1-1) through personal inquiry -----
- (1-2) through friends, relatives -----
- (1-3) through media advertising -----
- (1-4) following an open day tour at the Academy -----
- (1-5) Other -----

2. How important were the following considerations in your decision to join KKMA?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important,
4.= important 5 = very important)

<u>Reasons for joining Academy</u>	<u>Influence Assessment</u>
(2-1) wanted to serve my country	1 2 3 4 5
(2-2) the feeling of pride derived from being a military officer	1 2 3 4 5
(2-3) to continue a family tradition of service to the Military	1 2 3 4 5
(2-4) job opportunities more attractive than in civilian sector	1 2 3 4 5
(2-5) long-term job security and retirement benefits	1 2 3 4 5
(2-6) developing skills utilisable in the civilian world at sometime in the future	1 2 3 4 5

3. What is your overall level of satisfaction about your decision to join KKMA?

(1 = very dissatisfied, 2.= dissatisfied, 3 = somewhat satisfied, , 4 = satisfied, 5 = very satisfied)

1 2 3 4 5

4. Each year, KKMA must decide on the suitability of thousands of applicants wishing to become military officers, of whom only a small number is chosen. Below are statements describing some aspects of KKMA's recruitment and selection.

On a 1 to 5 scale, please indicate your views by circling one number for each item.

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

Statement	<u>Extent of (dis)agreement</u>
(4-1) KKMA gives the greatest attention to its recruitment and selection methods	1 2 3 4 5
(4-2) KKMA uses reliable methods to reach and recruit potentially the best officer candidates	1 2 3 4 5
(4-3) KKMA has precise criteria which candidates must meet before being accepted	1 2 3 4 5
(4-4) KKMA tests all candidates rigorously and chooses the best among them	1 2 3 4 5
(4-5) Overall, KKMA's recruitment and selection processes are effective in identifying and admitting a majority of high-quality officer candidates with the best prospects for success	1 2 3 4 5
(4-6) I am satisfied with KKMA's selection and recruitment process in general.	1 2 3 4 5

5 The selection and recruitment of cadets today faces a number of difficulties and obstacles. Below are some factors that could potentially adversely affect this process. Please circle a number for each item to indicate your assessment of the negative influence of each factor in KKMA . (1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = moderate amount, 4= high, 5= very high).

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| (5.1) Lack of independence of the committee's decisions | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (5.2) Nepotism | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (5.3) Poor and lengthy procedure | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (5.4) Being late in announcing the accepted names | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (5.5) Selecting only among high-scoring students | 1 2 3 4 5 |

PART II

MILITARY INDOCTRINATION

In this part of the questionnaire, you are requested to supply information about the cadet's experience of transformation from a civilian into a soldier at KKMA.

1. On a 1 to 5 scale, how important do you regard the military indoctrination of the preparation of cadets for officership?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important,
4 = important 5 = very important)

1 2 3 4 5

2. Experts say that effective military indoctrination requires that everything and everyone a cadet comes in contact with (appearance of buildings, other officers, etc) during their formative period at the Academy should be considered as a potential influence on his perception of military culture, values and ideals.

2-1. How do you rate KKMA's level of awareness and control of these various sources of influence?

(1 = very low, 2 = low, 3 = moderate, 4 = high, 5 = very high).

1 2 3 4 5

2-2. KKMA has a strong identity and a reputation and a commitment to excellence in terms of upholding military values and standards

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

1 2 3 4 5

3. The heaviest dose of indoctrination is inculcated during Basic Military Training (BMT), which starts from day one at the Academy. Please rate each statement below as to its accuracy in describing some aspect of BMT. Use the usual 5 to 1 scale (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

<u>Statement</u>	<u>Extent of (dis)agreement</u>
(3-1) BMT is probably the most shocking experience of a new cadet's life at KKMA	1 2 3 4 5
(3-2) BMT is an essential part of cadets' military preparation	1 2 3 4 5
(3-3) BMT tends to be too harsh, brutal, and negative in some respects	1 2 3 4 5
(3-4) Although KKMA's indoctrination programme has its flaws, they are outweighed by its positive outcomes	1 2 3 4 5

4. To what extent do you feel that KKMA is unduly harsh in the following areas of indoctrination on a 5 to 1 scale

(1 = very relaxed, 2 = relaxed, 3 = somewhat harsh, 4 = harsh, 5 = very harsh).

KKMA is harsh in:

(4-1) enforcing rules and regulations	1 2 3 4 5
(4-2) relation to discipline in general	1 2 3 4 5
(4-3) relation to uniform appearance and grooming standards	1 2 3 4 5
(4-4) relation to liberty infractions	1 2 3 4 5

5. How important are traditional military values (absolute obedience, sacrifice, loyalty, military rituals, etc) to KKMA and to yourself?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = important, 5 = very important).

(5-1) Importance of traditional military values to KKMA	1 2 3 4 5
(5-2) Importance of traditional military values to me	1 2 3 4 5

6. The following statements measure some aspect of military indoctrination in KKMA. Please circle the appropriate answer.

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

(6-1) Some indoctrination methods used at KKMA may be outdated and counterproductive. 1 2 3 4 5

(6-2) If KKMA chose to reform its current indoctrination system to become less harsh, it would be moving in a positive direction. 1 2 3 4 5

(6-3) I am satisfied with the methods used to indoctrinate cadets at KKMA. 1 2 3 4 5

7. How well does KKMA's indoctrination programme teach cadets each of the following abilities, skills, and attitudes? Please circle the number on the 1 to 5 scale that best reflects your assessment of KKMA's performance for each item.

(1 = very poorly, 2 = poorly, 3 = reasonably well, 4 = well, 5 = very well).

<u>Ability/skill/attitude</u>	<u>Your assessment</u>
(7-1) Soldiering skills	1 2 3 4 5
(7-2) Leadership skills	1 2 3 4 5
(7-3) Survival in combat	1 2 3 4 5
(7-4) Group cohesion and loyalty	1 2 3 4 5
(7-5) Effort co-ordination	1 2 3 4 5
(7-6) Making rapid decisions under stress	1 2 3 4 5
(7-7) Working against deadlines	1 2 3 4 5
(7-8) Physical hardness	1 2 3 4 5
(7-9) Mental hardness	5 4 3 2 1
(7-10) Care and presentation of self and military equipment	1 2 3 4 5
(7-11) Military courtesy and etiquette inside and outside the Academy	1 2 3 4 5
(7-12) Commitment to fundamental military values, such as duty, honour, and country	1 2 3 4 5
(7-13) Pride in being a member of a professional institution	1 2 3 4 5
(7-14) Respect and affection for KKMA	1 2 3 4 5
(7-15) Sense of pride in belonging to a unique profession	1 2 3 4 5

8. The military indoctrination of KKMA cadets today faces a number of difficulties and obstacles. Below are ten factors that could potentially adversely affect this process. Please circle a number for each item to indicate your assessment of the negative influence of each factor on the adequate indoctrination of cadets (1 = none, 2 = some, 3 = a reasonable amount, 4 = quite a lot, 5 = a great deal).

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Extent of negative influence</u>
(8-1) Poor selection at the point of entry into KKMA	1 2 3 4 5
(8-2) System is out of date	1 2 3 4 5
(8-3) Excessively harsh punishments and abuses	1 2 3 4 5
(8-4) Responsibility for indoctrination unduly left in the hands of senior cadets	1 2 3 4 5
(8-5) Uncertainty among cadets themselves about whether harsh indoctrination is necessary	1 2 3 4 5
(8-6) Difficulty of balancing indoctrination activities with academic priorities	1 2 3 4 5
(8-7) The feeling that there is too much to do and not enough time to do it	1 2 3 4 5
(8-8) The overemphasis on conformity and obedience at the expense of initiative and creativity	1 2 3 4 5
(8-9) The unwillingness of some staff to change certain values and traditions that may have outlived their usefulness	1 2 3 4 5
(8-10) Cheating incidents and breaches of Academy rules by Academy members	1 2 3 4 5

PART III
Vocational Preparation

The questions in this part are about the education and training of cadets in the specific areas of military expertise and other functions of the modern military officer.

1. On a 1 to 5 scale, how important do you regard this aspect of the preparation of cadets for officership?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = important
5 = very important)

1 2 3 4 5

2. The following statements measure some aspect of vocational programme in KKMA. Please circle the appropriate answer.

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree)

<u>Description</u>	<u>Extent of (dis)agreement</u>
(2-1) a high standard in infantry training (warfare training and exercises)	1 2 3 4 5
(2-2) a high standard in shooting skills	1 2 3 4 5
(2-3) a high standard in military drill and parades	1 2 3 4 5
(2-4) a high level of technical military expertise	1 2 3 4 5
(2-5) a high level of tactical military expertise	1 2 3 4 5

3. Please assess the following statements as to their accuracy with regard to leadership preparation.

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree)

<u>Description</u>	<u>Extent of (dis)agreement</u>
(3-1) KKMA's professional programme provides adequate knowledge and skills to produce capable military leaders	1 2 3 4 5
(3-2) The leadership preparation draws on modern scientific theories and sound analysis of historical examples of leadership	1 2 3 4 5
(3-3) The leadership preparation offers cadets ample opportunities	

- to hold command positions in a variety of activities 1 2 3 4 5
- (3-4) The leadership preparation provides adequate practical experimentation with different leadership approaches 1 2 3 4 5
- (3-5) All officers cadets come in contact with provide good role models of leadership through their conduct and the standards they set 1 2 3 4 5
- (3-6) The leadership preparation tends to overemphasise authoritarian methods of leadership based on fear and unquestioning obedience 1 2 3 4 5
- (3-7) The leadership preparation produces leaders who are capable of thinking critically and creatively, and who can act independently in accordance with the intent of their superiors 1 2 3 4 5
- (3-8) On graduation, cadets feel that they are confident and can organise and lead men in times of both war and peace. 1 2 3 4 5

4. In your view, how important is it for cadets to be equipped with at least basic principles of administration and management to perform future officer duties?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = important
5 = very important) 1 2 3 4 5

5. How well are administration and management skills provided at KKMA?

(1 = very poorly, 2 = poorly, 3 = reasonably well, 4 = well, 5 = very well). 1 2 3 4 5

6. How well are communication skills taught at KKMA? 1 2 3 4 5

(1 = very poorly, 2 = poorly, 3 = reasonably well, 4 = well, 5 = very well).

7. The 21st century Military is often expected to conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW). How well do you feel that KKMA's professional programme adequately equips aspiring officers to cope with the new mix of roles and commitments, such as pursuing terrorists and drug warlords, carrying out peace-keeping missions, etc.

(1 = very poorly, 2 = Poorly, 3 = reasonably well, 4 = well, 5 = very well). 1 2 3 4 5

8. Overall, to what extent does KKMA offer adequately balanced theoretical and practical expertise in all aspects of the professional component of officer preparation (military skills, knowledge, leadership)?

(1 = not balanced at all, 2 = poorly balanced, 3 = reasonably well balanced, 4 = well balanced, 5 = very well balanced). 1 2 3 4 5

9. To what extent is the learning environment at KKMA conducive to the development of desirable high levels of professional military expertise in its future leaders?

(1=not helpful at all, 2 = a little helpful, 3 = reasonably helpful, 4 = helpful. 5 = very helpful).

1 2 3 4 5

10. On the usual 1 to 5 scale, please rate your overall satisfaction with KKMA's professional aspect of officer preparation (military skills, military knowledge, leadership).

(1 = very dissatisfied, 2.= dissatisfied, 3 = somewhat satisfied, , 4 = satisfied, 5 = very satisfied)

1 2 3 4 5

PART IV Liberal Education

This part concerns general, non-military-specific education, which is designed to develop the whole person.

1. On a 1 to 5 scale, how important do you regard this aspect of the preparation of cadets for officership?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important, 4 = important
5 = very important)

1 2 3 4 5

2. Please rate all the following statements as to their accuracy in describing the general education programme offered to cadets at KKMA.

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree)

Liberal education in this Academy offers:

<u>Description</u>	<u>Extent of (dis)agreement</u>
(2-1) a broad coverage of the major branches of learning	1 2 3 4 5
(2-2) a rich variety of interesting and valuable courses	1 2 3 4 5
(2-3) a solid foundation in computer literacy (IT)	1 2 3 4 5
(2-4) a broad understanding of current technology and its various impacts	1 2 3 4 5
(2-5) an overall general education programme content that is equivalent to that of civilian undergraduate instruction	1 2 3 4 5

3. General education aims to teach cadets reasoning skills and good intellectual habits. How well does the general education offered at KKMA teach cadets:

<u>Statement</u>	<u>Extent of (dis)agreement</u>
(3-1) how to think clearly and logically, how to organise their thoughts, and how to distinguish the important from the trivial in complex situations	1 2 3 4 5
(3-2) how to follow a structured, scientific procedure and arrive at sensible conclusions using traceable evidence	1 2 3 4 5
(3-3) how to think for themselves and form their own measured judgements	1 2 3 4 5

- | | |
|--|-----------|
| (3-4) how to reason critically and creatively, unafraid of expressing disagreement | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (3-5) the appropriateness of objective and subjective evaluation | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (3-6) to broaden their minds and be intellectually curious | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (3-7) insights into human nature and motivation | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (3-8) good communication skills | 1 2 3 4 5 |

4. General education can cultivate desirable attitudes, values, and character traits. To what extent do you agree that KKMA's general education programme is used as a vehicle to:

- | <u>Statement</u> | <u>Extent of (dis)agreement</u> |
|--|---------------------------------|
| (4-1) emphasise the moral-ethical aspects and implications of behaviour | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-2) instil respect for the views and rights of others, tolerance and sensitivity | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-3) improve understanding of people and the world they live in | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-4) raise awareness of one's own strengths and weaknesses | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-5) develop wisdom | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-6) develop integrity, honesty, and good citizenship | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-7) prepare and motivate cadets for future learning | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-8) enhance their sense of responsibility to society | 1 2 3 4 5 |

5. To what extent do you agree that the general education programme offered at KKMA provides a balance of courses from the humanities and the social sciences on the one hand, and other natural and theoretical scientific disciplines on the other hand?

(1=not balanced at all, 2 = poorly balanced, 3 = reasonably well balanced, 4 = well balanced, 5 = very well balanced).

1 2 3 4 5

6. Many general education courses appear to have no self-evident immediate usefulness because their benefits may be indirect or have only a long-term value. To what extent do you feel that it is important that military relevance be emphasised in all subjects taught?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important, 4.= important 5 = very important)

1 2 3 4 5

7. To what extent do you feel that there is a need to introduce an element of choice in the curriculum to allow cadets the opportunity to major in liberal arts, social science subjects, or in other sciences and technology subjects if they wish to?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important, 4.= important 5 = very important)

1 2 3 4 5

8. Transferable skills are those that are usually valuable both in military and civilian occupations (as well as across subjects).

(8-1) How important are transferable skills to you?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important, 4.= important 5 = very important)

1 2 3 4 5

(8-2) How well they are taught at KKMA?

(1= very poorly, 2 = poorly, 3 = reasonably well, 4= well, 5 = very well)

1 2 3 4 5

9. Below are now some statements regarding certain aspects of the general education programme at KKMA. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement by circling the appropriate number

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

Statement

Extent of (dis)agreement

(9-1) The large volume of the general education programme in KKMA is in danger of weakening cadets' fundamental dedication to the unique purpose of the military mission

1 2 3 4 5

(9-2) KKMA should concentrate more on martial values than on intellectual and occupational pursuits

1 2 3 4 5

(9-3) KKMA should not align itself too closely with the academic

- concerns of civilian education institutions and focus more
on military sciences and technology 1 2 3 4 5
- (9-4) Excessive liberalisation of the curriculum has had a negative
effect on military standards and values 1 2 3 4 5
- (9-5) KKMA ought to focus on producing immediately employable
specialists, rather than generalists 1 2 3 4 5

10. Truly liberal education depends upon an environment that is conducive to its development.

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree)

- (10-1) To what extent do you agree that the military Academy environment does
provide first-class, unrestrained instruction in this regard?

1 2 3 4 5

- (10-2) Good quality liberal education necessitates time for thought, reading, research
and analysis. To what extent do you agree that KKMA makes adequate
provision for these considerations in its curriculum?

1 2 3 4 5

11. On a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest, please rate your
overall satisfaction with KKMA's general education aspect of officer preparation:

(1 = very dissatisfied, 2 = dissatisfied, 3 = somewhat satisfied, 4 = satisfied, 5 = very satisfied)

1 2 3 4 5

PART V PHYSICAL FITNESS

This part of the questionnaire asks you about KMMA's physical fitness programme and its effectiveness. Please answer all the questions.

1. In your view, important is physical fitness officially considered by KKMA?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important, 4.= important 5 = very important)

1 2 3 4 5

2 . In your personal view how important is physical fitness in the preparation of cadets for officership?

(1 = of no importance, 2 = of little importance, 3 = somewhat important, 4.= important, 5 = very important)

1 2 3 4 5

3. To what extent is KKMA's physical fitness programme well structured and balanced?

(1=not balanced at all, 2 = poorly balanced, 3 = reasonably well balanced, 4 = well balanced,5 = very well balanced).

1 2 3 4 5

4. Please indicate your level of (dis)agreement with each of the following statements describing KKMA's physical fitness programme.

(1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

Statement

Extent of (dis)agreement

KKMA:

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| (4-1) includes a wide variety of sports in its fitness programme | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-2) integrates well other physical activities in its physical fitness programme (e.g. obstacle course, endurance marches etc) | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-3) encourages a liking for sports and outdoor activities | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-4) gives enough time for physical training | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-5) provides professional instructors | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-6) allows for choice in physical fitness activities | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-7) provides a basic knowledge of a wide variety of sports | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-8) teaches cadets how to coach others so that they will be able to train their own troops in the future | 1 2 3 4 5 |

- | | |
|---|-----------|
| (4-9) improves the cadet's skills | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-10) makes sure that all cadets participate in at least one competitive sport | 1 2 3 4 5 |
| (4-11) ensures that cadets are never allowed to be physically unfit | 1 2 3 4 5 |

5. KKMA's physical fitness programme faces a number of barriers which can cause it to be less effective or fail. Please assess the following factors in terms of negative impact by circling the number that reflects your assessment of each item.

(1 = none, 2 = some, 3 = a reasonable amount, 4 = quite a lot, 5= a great deal).

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Negative impact strength</u>
(5-1) Lack or insufficient awareness of the many benefits of physical fitness among cadets	1 2 3 4 5
(5-2) Lack of adequate access to physical fitness facilities	1 2 3 4 5
(5-3) Lack of sports infrastructure	1 2 3 4 5
(5-4) Lack of variety in the physical fitness programme	1 2 3 4 5
(5-5) Lack of a fitness-friendly environment	1 2 3 4 5
(5-6) Our culture is indifferent to physical fitness	1 2 3 4 5
(5-7) Unsuitable diet	1 2 3 4 5
(5-8) Poor medical care	1 2 3 4 5
(5-9) Our hot climate is unsuitable for vigorous fitness exercises	1 2 3 4 5
(5-10) The perception that fitness sessions are a burden to be endured	1 2 3 4 5
(5-11) Fitness activities are not designed in a way that makes them attractive and enjoyable	1 2 3 4 5
(5-12) Sports instructors are not good role models of fitness themselves	1 2 3 4 5
(5-13) The Academy is not seriously committed to physical education and training	1 2 3 4 5
(5-14) The use of additional exercises as a form of punishment	1 2 3 4 5
(5-15) Cadets not willing to put in necessary effort	1 2 3 4 5

6 Overall how satisfied are you with KKMA's physical fitness programme?

(1 = very dissatisfied, 2.= dissatisfied, 3 = somewhat satisfied, , 4 = satisfied, 5 = very satisfied)

1 2 3 4 5

7. How would rate your overall physical fitness level?

(1 = very poor, 2.= poor, 3 = reasonably good, , 4 = good, 5 = very good)

1 2 3 4 5

Appendix 2: Interview Questions

SELECTION

- What is the overall objective of the recruitment and selection processes?
(Selecting only the best, and only those with the best prospects for success)
- How effective would you say are your recruitment methods? (Give reasons)
- How effective are your selection methods? (Give reasons)
- Are you satisfied with the standard of recruits that come to KKMA?
- Is there a problem of attrition at KKMA? How serious is it?
- What needs to be done to improve the recruitment and selection methods at KKMA?
- How important are the recruitment and selection processes in relation to the overall officer preparation programme?
- How many cadets are achieving success in your programme? How many are failing?

INDOCTRINATION

- How important is military indoctrination in relation to the overall officer preparation programme?
- How effective would you say your indoctrination programme is?
- How satisfied are you with the indoctrination programme at KKMA?
- How satisfied are you with the indoctrination methods used at KKMA?
- To what extent do you feel that some indoctrination methods used at KKMA may be outdated and counterproductive?
- To what extent do you believe that if KKMA chose to reform its current indoctrination system to become less harsh, it would be moving in a positive direction? Please give reasons for your answer.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

- How important is professional preparation in relation to the overall officer preparation programme?
- How satisfied are you with the professional preparation programme at KKMA?
- To what extent are the stated goals of this programme being achieved?
- To what extent would you say that the programme produces confident and capable junior leaders who can organise and lead men both in times of war and peace? (Please give reasons for your answer.)
- The 21st century military is often expected to conduct military operations other than war (MOOYW). To what extent do you feel that KKMA's professional programme adequately equips aspiring officers to cope with the new mix of roles and commitments, such as pursuing terrorists, drug war lords?

LIBERAL EDUCATION

- How important is liberal education in relation to the overall officer preparation programme?
- How satisfied are you with the liberal education programme at KKMA?
- To what extent are the stated goals of this programme being achieved?
- To what extent would you say that the programme contributes to producing well-rounded junior officers and citizens (officers and scholars)?
- Many military Academies in the world have incorporated an element of choice in their officer preparation programmes (electives). That is, they have a core curriculum (compulsory subjects) and the option to major either in the sciences or arts subjects. Would it be a good idea for KKMA to adopt a similar system?
- What changes need to be made to improve the existing professional preparation programme?

PHYSICAL FITNESS PROGRAMME

- How important is the physical fitness programme in the preparation of cadets for officership?
- How satisfied are you with the physical fitness programme at KKMA?
- To what extent would you say that the stated goals of the physical fitness programme are being met? (Explain gap, if there is one.)
- What needs to be done to improve KKMA's physical fitness programme?