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**Australian press constructions of the 2002 Bali bombing: differing imaginings of the nation
and its place in the world**

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Abstract

The thesis undertakes a detailed textual analysis of the coverage of the 2002 Bali bombing in three Australian newspapers. It compares two Sydney newspapers - the tabloid *Daily Telegraph* and the broadsheet *Sydney Morning Herald* - and the national broadsheet, the *Australian*. The central research questions are: how do the three newspapers construct the 2002 Bali bombing; and how does their coverage invoke or participate in discourses of the nation? The thesis investigates each newspaper's coverage under three headings: its representations of Australian victims, of Bali and Indonesia, and of terrorism and politics. It argues that in each of these fields the newspapers address their readers in distinctive ways.

Methodologically, the thesis acknowledges the semiotic complexity of the newspaper texts and of the everyday experience of reading them. The analysis therefore takes in not just journalists' words, but also images (photographs, cartoons, drawings, maps, diagrams), captions, page layout and headers, font size, especially of headlines, combinations of word and image, and narrative sequencing of articles and pages. In order to do this, original paper and microfilm sources were accessed, rather than on-line databases. The central methodology of detailed textual analysis is supplemented by content analyses.

On the first mode of address, to the Australian as mourner, the thesis compares the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sydney Morning Herald* in terms of how affectively-oriented that address is and what implications flow from it. The second comparison concerns the papers' constructions of Bali and Indonesia. The differences hinge on divergent approaches to ethnicity and nation. Whereas the first paper's ethnocentric address leads to its substantial ignoring of the state of Indonesia and to a patronising construction of Balinese, the *Sydney Morning Herald's* multicultural and cosmopolitan address constructs Balinese sympathetically and investigates the complexities of Indonesia's nascent democracy. Thirdly, the thesis explores differences in how the two papers construct terrorism and politics. The key variant here is the papers' degree of adherence or otherwise to the principles of the US discourse of the "war on terror". This entails quite distinct approaches to the force of condemnation of those suspected of the bombing, and to the importance of fear of future attacks, as well as to connections made between the Bali atrocity and the USA's proposals to invade Iraq for its supposed weapons of mass destruction.

Rounding out the *Daily Telegraph/Sydney Morning Herald* comparison is an analysis of the *Australian's* representations of the bombing. The newspaper differs from the other two in being

nationally distributed, but resembles the *Daily Telegraph* as another publication from News Ltd, and the *Sydney Morning Herald* as another broadsheet. The thesis investigates how far its constructions of Australian victims and of Bali and Indonesia align with those of its sister paper or those of its broadsheet competitor. The question here is the degree of pluralism or otherwise in its understandings of the province and the state. On terrorism and politics, the key question is the extent to which the US discourse of the “war on terror” affects the paper’s accounts of these issues.

The conclusions draw together the comparisons between the three Australian newspapers in terms of issues of tabloid and broadsheet, of press pluralism and partisanship, of conceptions of citizenship in a social democracy, and of the principles of the fourth estate.

Declaration by author

This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.

I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.

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Australian print journalism, textual analysis, Bali bombing, discourse, nation, tabloid, broadsheet

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CHAPTER 1: PARAMETERS, CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGY

1. Orientation

This study undertakes a detailed textual analysis of the coverage of the 2002 Bali bombing in three Australian newspapers: the Sydney tabloid *Daily Telegraph*, the broadsheet *Sydney Morning Herald* and the national broadsheet, the *Australian*. The central research questions are: how do the three newspapers construct the 2002 Bali bombing; and how does their coverage invoke or participate in discourses of the nation? The topic is defined by three parameters: the decision to focus on the press rather than other media forms, the selection of the three newspapers for detailed analysis and the choice of the Bali bombing as the focal event. Each will be considered in turn.

Why study the press? In fact, one strong argument would support the examination of *television*: namely, that it was at the time Australians' principal source of daily news. However, this is countervailed by three other arguments. Firstly, the press still – and certainly in 2002 – substantially sets the agenda and often the tone of coverage for television news, as it also supplies the material for internet news outside newspapers' own websites. Secondly, where television might be called “headline news”, newspapers provide far more extensive coverage of topics and the issues arising from them. The third argument is the difficulty and cost of accessing television material from 2002.

Detailed textual analysis of newspapers may seem less than prepossessing, even unusual. But one might challenge the cultural assumptions underlying such judgements. One perception involves a certain cultural snobbery applied to the popular press in particular, criticising its sensationalism or lack of journalistic rigour, for example. Yet the undoubted influence of newspapers suggests that they should be examined rather than dismissed. For millions still actually buy newspapers, a fact sometimes overlooked by enthusiastic students of newer media, whose preferences also contribute to the apparent unfashionability of the kind of analysis engaged here. Further, it may be thought that only literary and “artistic” texts merit detailed textual analysis. But the analytical tools of close textual analysis applied to texts within the western art tradition can also be used independently of

any high-cultural evaluations associated with them, and can greatly enhance understanding of journalistic texts.¹

This study claims some originality in its comprehensively detailed examination of a corpus of newspaper texts. For each newspaper, the analysis engages with *all* the reports, editorials, comment and opinion pieces, photographs and other visual materials, and any other item treating the Bali bombing, except for Letters to the Editor, which are not systematically covered for reasons of space. This textual evidence comprises 1218 news items, features and images, plus scores of editorials and opinion pieces in the first week's coverage of the bombing. Reporting in all three newspapers tails off sharply thereafter; items from later weeks are mentioned only where relevant. The textual analysis examines both the semiotic processes – the rhetorics, discourses, narrative structures and the texture and mechanisms of the production of meaning – as well as the meanings they generate. Crucially, it considers the importance of visual as well as verbal aspects of the papers, including photographs, graphics, cartoons, diagrams, maps, page layout, font sizes and verbal/visual juxtapositions.

The comprehensiveness of this analysis has significant entailments concerning the everyday experience of reading a newspaper. In 2002, before on-line reading became commonplace, it was the printed version that reached most newspaper readers. As Robert Manne comments, “[r]eaders understand the newspaper they read every morning better than researchers relying on electronic print-outs of old issues ever can” (2005: 94). Rather than decontextualised extracts as delivered by Factiva, the printed version offers an experience that is visual before it is verbal.² Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen note that newspaper pages are “*scanned* before they are read”, and refer to a page’s “reading path”, in which photographs play a leading role in guiding the reader’s eye (1998: 205; italics original). In other words, newspapers’ visual presentation – including page layout, use of photographs, varied font sizes and so on – is crucial to the reading experience. I have therefore worked from original newsprint where available, and microfilm where it was not. These allow the researcher – from an appropriate critical distance – to approximate the print reading experience.

¹ As Colin Mercer remarks: “Thin as a commodity and as an aesthetic object, the newspaper is thick in cultural history” (1992: 33).

² Factiva, the most commonly used newspaper database, is not a reliable archive (*Factiva*). The same search on successive days for material from 2002 could yield variations in the numbers of items retrieved by as much as 20%. The database indiscriminately mixes items from first and final editions of the papers without labelling them as such (final editions of the three newspapers were used). It includes no images of any kind and gives no idea of layout beyond page number – although it does include some captions for the photographs it does not show! I should add that using print and microfilm versions of the newspapers denied me the word-search and word-count functions of an electronic database.

Why these newspapers? The thesis compares two Sydney newspapers – the tabloid *Daily Telegraph* and the broadsheet *Sydney Morning Herald* – and the national broadsheet, the *Australian*. All compete for readers within the same Sydney/New South Wales market. Both the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Australian* are published by News Ltd, and the *Sydney Morning Herald* by Fairfax. The analysis enables us to see the similarities and differences in how each paper addresses its reader. Chapters 2-4 compare the News Ltd tabloid with the Fairfax broadsheet. The *Australian* is examined separately in Chapter 5, both because it is a national newspaper and because it lies, as it were, between the other two: as a broadsheet it has affinities with the *Sydney Morning Herald*, and as a News Ltd publication it has affinities with the *Daily Telegraph*. The three-way comparison also deflects any inclination to place undue emphasis on a tabloid/broadsheet binary. Indeed, some aspects of the *Australian* suggest a greater investment in certain tabloid tendencies than might be expected.

Why this event? More Australians were killed in the Bali bombing than on any one day outside war, more Australians were killed than any other nationality (88 out of 202) and Australians may well have been specifically targeted. As a major national crisis, the bombing constituted a “decisive and critical turning point in the course of events” (Raboy and Dagenais 1992: 3), a moment when what Michael Billig calls everyday, “banal nationalism” is foregrounded and made explicit: “Sudden crises can produce quickly sharpened stereotypes, as, for example, the emergence of ‘the Argie’ [Argentinian] in the British media during the Falklands War. The quickly summoned stereotype will build upon older cultural myths” (1995: 81). The crisis also defines temporal limits which make the research more easily contained and hence more feasible. Additionally, as will be elaborated later, 2002 marks something of an historical high point for the fourth estate in Australia, notably in the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

Some terminological clarifications are necessary at the outset. Nationalism belongs to a cluster of terms central to this study: the nation, the national, nationalism, national identities, nationhood. In the interests of simplicity, and inspired by Eric Hobsbawm’s and Paul James’ use of the synoptic phrase “the national question” in referring to the relevant literature, I often use “the national” as shorthand for those terms (Hobsbawm 1972; James 1996). The national necessarily invokes the state, another crucial term, referring not to states within a federal system, but to what is commonly called the nation-state. I avoid that term, however, because it problematically glosses over the contentious issue of the world’s many *multi*-national states, including the “United” Kingdom. Benedict Anderson’s definition of the nation is justly famous:

[A]n imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is *imagined* because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.... [I]t is imagined as a *community*, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship (1983: 15-16; italics original).

The state is usefully defined by Frank Parkin as

the whole complex of administrative, judicial, and law-enforcement agencies.... The state should not be thought of as a clearly bounded institution separate from and independent of the industrial, legal, educational, and political sectors of society; it is more usefully thought of as the institutional embodiment of all these sectors (1972 [1971]: 26-7).

The nation, then, concerns the social aspects, and the state the institutional aspects.

This chapter first explicates the discursive nature of the national, then the key aspects of journalism relevant to the analysis, and lastly the methodology of the thesis.

2. The national as discourse

The term discourse carries several meanings. It is understood here not in Emile Benveniste's sense of language in action between interlocutors, which has led into its standard usage as speech in much linguistics; nor in the Russian Formalist sense of *syuzhet* (the plot's presentation of the story material) as distinct from *fabula* (what fictionally happened) (Benveniste 1974; Shklovsky 1972 [1919]). It is understood in Michel Foucault's sense of the large and complex patterns of cultural thinking which superintend the production of such traditional, unitary categories as the sovereign subject, the author and the "particular spirit of the age" (1972 [1969]: 15, 23-4, 80).

John Hartley sees Foucault's concept of discourse as challenging the assumptions of idealist philosophy. The latter posits the individual as the source of human action, "fails to account for the role played by social relations ... in determining, regulating and producing what a 'thinking subject'

can be” and divides the world “between subject and object” (1994: 309). Instead of positing the subject as a “site of consciousness ... [t]he theory of discourse proposes that individuality itself is the site ... on which socially produced and historically established discourses are reproduced and regulated” (Hartley 1994: 309, 94). However, it is not so much that discourses “think” us than that we think *through* discourses. They substantially shape and frame our world-views, but do not determine them. Kenan Malik offers a valuable, non-determinist account of discourse as “a coherent body of knowledge which shapes and limits the ways of understanding a particular topic” (1996: 233). Applying this understanding of discourse to the nation, Yael Tamir observes that a “national culture is not a prison and cultural ties are not shackles” (1993: 37). A formal definition is proposed by John Fiske:

A discourse is a socially produced way of talking or thinking about a topic. It is defined by reference to the area of social experience it makes sense of, to the social location from which that sense is made, and to the linguistic or signifying system by which that sense is made and circulated.... A discourse, then, is a socially located way of making sense of an important area of social experience (1992 [1987]: 301).

Importantly, Hartley shows how discourses may be contested: “[M]uch of the social sense-making we’re subjected to – in the media, at school, in conversation – is the working through of [a] struggle between discourses: a good contemporary example is that between the discourses of patriarchy (legitimated, naturalised) and (emergent, marginalised) feminism” (1994: 94). This quotation points also to institutional agencies which mobilise and influence discourses.

Two general comments on discourses remain. Firstly, Anthony Giddens writes of “the intersection between discursive consciousness and ‘lived experience’” (1985: 220). Discourses impinge untidily, contingently and approximately on people’s everyday lived experience, and mostly work unconsciously – if less so for many in advertising, public relations and politics (Hall 1977: 344). They never produce a complete or coherent subjectivity, but one which performs in contradictory and context-dependent ways. As Hobsbawm reminds us, “official ideologies of states and movements are not guides to what is in the minds of even the most loyal citizens” (1990: 11). The second comment is that discourses have real effects. In seeking, as here, to stress the constructedness of discourses, we should not dismiss them as fictional or invented in the sense of non-existent. Perhaps the most striking real effect of the national is its capacity to recruit citizens willing to die in war.

Anderson has described nationalism as “certainly the most powerful political force of modern times” (1993: 616) – which undoubtedly it is – but it has also been described, by Craig Calhoun, as a *cultural form* rather than a political content, as “the ‘discursive formation’ that has helped structure the whole modern era, providing a common rhetoric to diverse movements and policies” (1997: 7). As befits a thesis in media studies, it is the cultural and discursive dimension of nationalism which is more relevant to the present argument than its idealist conception as a political project. Calhoun conceives nationalism in these terms:

[N]ationalism as discourse [concerns] the production of a cultural understanding and rhetoric which leads people throughout the world to think ... in terms of the idea of nation and national identity, and the production of particular versions of nationalist thought and language in particular settings and traditions.... Breton separatism, pan-Arab nationalism and the declarations of Chinese student protesters that they were willing to die for the future of China each arise in different historical trajectories and from different circumstances, but are joined by the use of a common rhetoric [which] helps to constitute [actions and events] through cultural framing.... Nationalist discourse is not reducible to state formation or political manipulation; it has autonomous significance, appears in cultural arenas not directly defined by state-making projects, and has often informed popular action to reform or resist state-making projects.... Nationalism is not just a doctrine ... but a more basic way of talking, thinking and acting (1997: 6, 22, 11).

Such a conceptualisation is flexible enough to encompass not only the mobilisation of nationalist discourses by state and anti-state interests – as in the containment or promotion of secessionist aspirations – but also media mobilisations of nationalism, as in telethons for natural disasters or for national teams at the Olympics.³ This study will examine not only discourses of the national as such, but also connected discourses overlapping with them and often deployed in their service, including those of racism and multiculturalism when used as definers of national belonging, and of terrorism and asylum-seekers/immigrants constructed as a threat to nations.

One specific dimension of the national needs particular emphasis: its mediatisation. Media representations – initially the newspaper and subsequently in other media forms – are the absolute precondition of knowledge of the national: “[T]here is no alternative to the mass media for knowing about the world outside of our immediate surroundings” (Sparks 2000b: 211). Yet the literature on

³ On telethons, see Perry (1994: 18-28).

the national has a remarkable epistemological blind spot about mediatisation. Geoff Eley and Roland Grigor Suny – together with Anderson – are exceptional in noting how media representations daily construct the national: “We are ‘national’ when we ... watch the six o’clock news, follow the national sport, observe (while barely noticing) the repeated iconographies of landscape and history in TV commercials, imbibe the visual archive of reference and citation in the movies” (1996: 29).

Finally, a note about the literature on the national in relation to disciplines and their epistemologies. Concepts of discourse, with their emphasis on constructedness, stand opposed to essentialist categories. While the constructivist paradigm is very familiar in media studies, it has been a decided latecomer to political science, the principal disciplinary input into the literature on the national. Encapsulating the essentialist assumptions of the mainstream literature is Ernest Gellner’s untroubled assertion: “The national state, identified with a national culture and committed to its protection, is the natural political unit” (1993: 409). “The essentialist problem,” Louis Pinto writes, “arises [partly] from the spontaneous tendency to conceive groups in a naively realist manner, as if they exist with no outside source of explanation; but equally, it results from the ideologically anointed logic which celebrates group identities at the expense of acknowledging the contingencies of history” (1986: 45).⁴ The analytical incapacities of this approach may explain what Anderson calls the “philosophical poverty” of nationalism, which “has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbeses, no Tocquevilles, Marxes or Webers” (1983: 14).

3. Discourses of the idealised nation

How might we explain the power of discourses of the national? Alongside their mediatisation, the crucial factors have been their longevity and cultural ubiquity in the west. This arises historically from the quasi- and post-religious status of these discourses in predominantly secular societies since – in Anderson’s words – “Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordered dynastic realm” (1983: 16). Further, as Calhoun remarks on the historical coincidence of nationalism and individualism, “the modern idea of nation arises in tandem with modern ideas of the ‘punctual self’ or individual. The two match each other” (1997: 44-5). We

⁴ Apart from Anderson, Calhoun and Pinto, other writers on the national who adopt a constructivist approach include Hobsbawm and Ranger (1992 [1983]), Brubaker (1996), Eley and Suny (1996), Kaes (1997) and James (1996, 2006). Significant figures in the mainstream include Breuilly 1985 [1982], Chatterjee 1993, Gellner 1983 and Smith 1981, 1986, 1991, 2001.

could add that surely the unified sovereign subject and the unified sovereign nation discursively reinforce each other.

Etienne Balibar analyses this nexus in ways which point not just to the structures underpinning the powerful appeals of discourses of the national, but also to their address to the citizen. He argues that nationalist discourses inscribe

a sense of belonging in the double sense of the term – both what it is that makes one belong to oneself and also what makes one belong to other fellow human beings. Which means that one can be interpellated [addressed], as an individual, *in the name of* the collectivity whose name one bears. The naturalisation of belonging and the sublimation of the ideal nation are two aspects of the same process. (1991 [1988]: 96; italics original).

The underlying structures at work here can be clarified by reference to psychoanalytic accounts of narcissism and sublimation. The superimposition of collective on individual finds support in Sigmund Freud's comments on the likeness of ego-based narcissistic structures at both individual and national levels (1984 [1914]: 96). Sara Ahmed invokes Freud in noting that the "attachment to others ... in the emotional life of narcissism [works] precisely through imaging the faces of the community made up of other 'me's', of others that are loved *as if they were me*" (2004: 52; italics original). On sublimation, Freud observes how the process imagines unity: "*sublimated* energy ... helps towards establishing the unity, or tendency to unity, which is particularly characteristic of the ego" (1984 [1923]: 386; italics original). J Laplanche and J-B Pontalis elaborate on the idealisation of the sublimated object: "[S]ublimation depends to a high degree on the narcissistic dimension of the ego, and ... consequently the object of the sublimated activity may be expected to display the same appearance of a beautiful whole which Freud here assigns to the ego" (1973 [1967]: 433). So both individual and nation are idealised, and conceived as unitary. Discursively underwriting each other, the unified sovereign subject and the unified sovereign nation enable nationality to be experienced both individually and collectively, and national belonging to be naturalised. Ghassan Hage sums up the fascinating appeal of nationalism: "The national 'we' magically enables the 'I' of the national to do things it can never hope to be able to do as an individual 'I'", as in "We [Australia] beat the Poms!" (2003: 13).

Two issues arise here. Firstly, Balibar's dual individual/national address is profoundly reinforced – and historically partly generated – by the everyday experience of newspaper-reading. Anderson

explains how in reading the newspaper “each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he [*sic*] performs ... in silent privacy ... is being replicated by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion.... What more vivid figure for the secular, historically-clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?” (1983: 39). The national newspaper as cultural phenomenon daily reiterates the national. Its dual address would explain the discursive ease with which media reports can assert that “the nation mourns” a lost soldier or celebrity, and with which the Sydney *Daily Telegraph*, for instance, binds together mourners and victims of the Bali bombing – and indeed the reader and the text – *as* national.

Secondly, the unitary, idealised constructions of national unity may well not be supported by empirical evidence about national populations. In Philip Schlesinger’s words: “National cultures are not simply repositories of shared symbols to which the entire population stands in identical relation. Rather, they are to be approached as sites of contestation in which competition over definitions takes place” (1991: 174). As Billig elaborates: “Different fractions, whether classes, religions, regions, genders or ethnicities, always struggle for the power to speak for the nation, and to present their voice as the voice of the national whole, defining the history of the other sub-sections accordingly” (1995: 71). But power is differentially distributed: Giddens observes that “dominant classes have much less difficulty representing their own policies as in the ‘national interest’ than do oppositional groups, since they have much more influence” (1985: 221). Historiographically in the Australian context, David Carter gives careful attention to indigenous, settler and multicultural narratives of the national (2006: 8-19; cf Hutchinson 1994: 188-90). Whatever the discursive power of idealised unitary fictions of the national, they need to be disaggregated.⁵

4. Entrenching national fictions

Two additional features of discourses of the national entrench this idealised unity of the national. These are the naturalisation of the national, and the self/other schema as a way of conceiving international relations. Both are summarised by Pinto:

National histories can appear as a never-ending struggle both between national self-assertion and its denial by foreigners, and between the oppressed and the powerful. Need it be said that these opposites can be variously advanced for popular attention in

⁵ Writing about the 1995 Oklahoma bombing, Edward Linenthal comments that “a nationwide bereaved community ... is one of the only ways Americans can imagine themselves as one” (2001: 111).

support of either “traditional” or “progressive” values?... Since the carving up of populations between different sovereign states cannot be justified by rational argument, the only way of giving it any basis at all is to constitute the social order as quasi-natural: more precisely, the nation is what enables both the “politicisation” of “natural” differences (language and customs, in short “culture”) and the naturalisation of “political” differences (citizenship) (1986: 45, 50).

The naturalisation of the national needs some enlargement here. Lest we forget the mainstream approach in the literature on the national, recall Gellner’s sturdy assertion: “The national state, identified with a national culture and committed to its protection, is the natural political unit” (1993: 409). Conversely, in Hartley’s summary, naturalisation is “[t]he process of representing the cultural and historical as natural” (1994: 198). The discursive power of the national is so pervasive and utterly familiar, so taken for granted, as to appear endemic. So commonsensical has the national become within many academic disciplines that Calhoun can point to “the methodological nationalism that leads historians to organise history as stories in or of nations and social scientists to approach comparative research with data sets in which the units are almost always nations” (2007: 27; Chernilo 2007).

What is routinely naturalised is Anderson’s “imagined community” of a unified people with shared culture and history, if not also territory (1983: 15). Billig valuably explains the discursive familiarity of such assumptions through his stress on “banal nationalism”, by which he refers to politicians’ use of the national “we” and “our”, newspapers’ separating off “foreign” from “home” news, even the use of the definite article before “country” in weather reports – or at a slightly more “flag-waving” level, barracking for one’s national team in international sports events (1995: 100, 107, 117-8; Law 2001). What discourses of the national also routinely naturalise is the state. As Pinto shows, citizenship ostensibly neutralises social differences, and thus naturalises the state as guardian of the individual.

The second feature is the self/other schema as a way of structuring international relations. Pinto’s “struggle ... between national self-affirmation and its denial by foreigners” points plainly to the othering rhetorics typically at work between states (1986: 45). Billig describes the internationally diacritical basis of many nationalist discourses: “The general forms of nationalist thinking ... include ways of conceiving of ‘us, the nation’, which is said to have its unique destiny (or identity); it also involves conceiving of ‘them, the foreigners’, from whom ‘we’ identify ‘ourselves’ as different” (1995: 61). Self/other is not an analytical tool so much as a *description* of certain

historically specific discursive arrangements. The classic statement of this structural model is Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978). As intellectual discipline and discursive framework, Orientalism dehumanises, reifies and dehistoricises the "east" as a means of controlling it, and establishes the "studying subject" as "transcendent" (Malek 1963: 112-3; Said 1978: 108). Self/other is neither a universal, ahistorical category, nor an "epistemological constant, built into human 'nature'" (Malik 1996: 223). Very many forms of co-operative political and social organisation, including multiculturalism, clearly demonstrate otherwise. Yet self/other has become a widespread discursive structure, a deeply ingrained way of thinking. Its counterpart, the discourse of common humanity, is far weaker (Hage 2003: 140). So familiar is the self/other schema that, for example, even in a recent UK book on newspapers, *The Language of the News*, it is naturalised as "a fundamental part of the function of the newspaper in constructing its sense of community. Without outsiders there would be no core audience" (Conboy 2007: 175). This startling assertion either defines community as dependent upon exclusion, or colludes in newspapers' supposedly treating it as such. Subsequent chapters will demonstrate more nuanced and less binarised versions of difference at work in discursive practice.⁶

In the history of international politics, it could be argued that self/other structures arise in part out of conscious foreign policy choices. Such relationships are instanced in some profound war-like currents running through international relations: colonialism, the Cold War, post-1970s international terrorism and the US "war on terror" (Moeller 2004: 63). The last of these, as will be seen, substantially informs Australian newspaper responses to the Bali bombing. As Said argues, the "reified polarities" which self/other schemas produce in the USA's international relations extend at least till that time (1978: 322, 326; 1993: 48; 1997; 2004: 291-3).

Nationalist rhetoric and othering converged with an implicit discourse of national unity in a critical speech in the 2001 Australian election campaign, during which, in Robert Manne's words, "the Howard government used the war on terror to underline the significance of its new tough line on asylum seekers" (2004: 41). Prime Minister John Howard's crucial words were: "We decide who comes here and the circumstances in which they come" (quoted by Manne 2004: 41). While such a statement could describe regular operations of the state, in the form of immigration policy, it is here a rhetoric addressed to the *nation*, and erects discursive barriers at the borders, defining the national

⁶ Binary logics centrally inform critical discourse analysis' studies of racism, even in more sophisticated variants such as Teun van Dijk's "ideological square" and John Richardson's "proxy split", and are traceable to the discipline's foundations in structural linguistics (van Dijk 1998: 33; Richardson 2004: 113-14; Saussure 1974 [1915]: 121). Yet even in structural linguistics many differentiations are more complex, supple and varied than such binaries, as witness different languages' varying demarcations of colours across the spectrum "on which each language arbitrarily sets its boundaries" (Hjelmslev 1969 [1943]: 52).

as “we”, who are “here” in our homeland, and othering the foreigner as “they” who belong elsewhere.

5. Recent forms of the national

Recent forms of the national in the west have been greatly influenced by economic globalisation and an intensified mediatisation. Before treating these in turn, however, it should be noted that it is a *cultural* rather than political nationalism that is relevant to press coverage at the time of the Bali bombing. At the turn of the millennium in the west, untroubled by wars or secessionist movements, political nationalism was rare. Conversely, cultural nationalism, which rarely challenges the state concerned, was widespread. Nevertheless, the west’s cultural nationalisms were themselves heavily influenced by west-bound refugees from the collapse of the Soviet empire and wars in the middle east.

Manuel Castells explains the rise of cultural nationalism in the west since the mid-1980s in terms of the intersection of the political economy of globalisation with everyday lived experience (2000 [1996], 2004 [1997], 2000 [1998]).⁷ The crux of his argument is that the hugely expanded operations of neo-liberal finance capital have delegitimated the western state and undermined the trust of its citizens:

The privatisation of public agencies and the attack on the welfare state ... probably the main building block of [the state’s] legitimacy in industrialised countries ... worsen living conditions for the majority of citizens, break the historic contract between capital, labour and the state, and remove much of the social safety net, the nuts and bolts of legitimate government for the common people (2004 [1997]: 419, 312).

There has been a peeling away of national community from states acting less in the interest of their citizens than of transnational corporations. At the same time, incomes for the majority outside “the technocratic-financial-managerial elite [occupying] the leading positions in our societies” have been static, if not declining, while the elites’ incomes have greatly increased (Castells 2000 [1996]: 445, 93).⁸

⁷ Castells’ observations apply to the USA, the UK and New Zealand as well as Australia. I have presented some of this section’s arguments in Crofts 2012.

⁸ In the USA, for instance, between 1983 and 2005 there was a marked and increasing divergence between real hourly compensation and output per hour – to the detriment of workers’ pay – and simultaneously an increase in the pay

Everyday lived experience for the majority has been adversely affected by these changes: citizens feeling electorally disenchanted and abandoned by a less caring state; workers increasingly insecure and fearful about the availability and conditions of work and income; people anxious about growing indebtedness and diminishing welfare provision in health, education and social services; and the growing under-classes of the under-employed, unemployed and homeless (Castells 2000 [1996]: 296-302; 2004 [1997]: 403-11; 2000 [1998]: 377; Corner 2007; Harvey 1989: 150-5). Moreover, neo-liberal practices have undermined civil society and the social cohesion it generated through civic associations, co-operatives and labour unions, political parties and traditional religion (Castells 2004 [1997]: 11; Eley and Suny 1996: 31). Contemporaneously, “the transformation of women’s work and ... of women’s consciousness [have entailed] a profound redefinition of family, gender relationships, sexuality, and, thus, personality [and so have] shake[n] the foundations of personal security” (Castells 2004 [1997]: 193, 420; 2000 [1998]: 379).

When people experience such disruptions, fears, alienation and insecurities, the national can appeal, in Castells’ words, as “more often than not a reaction against global elites” (2004 [1997]: 33).⁹ Other new forms of association have been to identity politics (especially gender and ethnic) and activist social movements challenging the global order (feminist, environmentalist, anti-globalisation, terrorist) (Castells 2004 [1997]: 71-302). And other movements have reacted against that order by largely opting out of it, as in religious fundamentalism and territorial communes. In these two movements and in cultural nationalism, Castells argues, “[t]he search for [meaningful identity] takes place ... in the reconstruction of defensive identities around communal principles” offering “refuge, solace, certainty and protection” (2004 [1997]: 11, 69-70). This cultural nationalism may well appeal to many of those whose everyday lived experience has been adversely affected by globalisation.¹⁰

It is here that the period’s intensified mediatisation, marked by the near-ubiquity of television, converges with cultural nationalism. Addressing the defensive identities just described – and doubtless encouraging them – are four new modes of cultural nationalism. All depend on media representations, and some have been initiated by media institutions. All could be called

differential between average top executives and average workers from roughly 65:1 in the 1980s to roughly 365:1 in 2000-03 (Reich 2008: 103, 109).

⁹ Even in Japan, strongly traditional and ethnically homogeneous, cultural nationalism, or *nihonjiron*, has aimed “to regenerate a national community” perceived to be threatened (Yoshino 1992: 1).

¹⁰ How far dominant discourses of neo-liberalism, consumerism, celebrity and so on gloss over, inflect or confirm these everyday experiences is a matter of how discourses impinge untidily, contingently and approximately on people’s lived experience.

diversionary or compensatory in relation to people's everyday lived experience and eroded senses of national community. All might be described in Raymond Williams' forthright terms as "superficial ... rhetoric ... overriding all the real and increasing divisions and conflicts of interest within what might be the true nation" (1985 [1983]: 192). The first two modes emanate from the fiscally beleaguered state, which keenly reasserts images of sovereignty by appropriating national traditions. Firstly, public pageants such as bicentennial celebrations and Olympics events offer what James calls a "pastiche" nationalism (1996: 106) brimming with patriotic images of heritage, armed forces, flags and so on. The second mode intertwines state with commercial interests. Tourism promotion, with its national branding, advances leisure and heritage images of the nation for both national and international consumption. The remaining two modes originate from media institutions, "too intent on maximising audiences to ignore popular sentiment" (Perry 1994: 17). They offer versions of the national – and much else – which allow escape from people's everyday travails. One mode displaces attention to leisure (a marked upsurge in sporting nationalism with the much increased televising of sports), and the other to the past (growing volumes of historical documentaries, and in fictional genres, heritage dramas and films with nostalgic evocations of a typically rural and routinely idealised – indeed, sublimated – past for the nation). Providing "myths of ancestry, kinship, permanence and home" (Brown 2000: 22), these various representations of the national could offer a supportive community: indeed the national "we", not the solitary "I".

A less sanguine input into this cultural nationalism has been the politics of fear. Alongside a traditional politics of hope in the form of new programmes benefitting the majority, western states have since the 1990s increasingly advanced a politics of fear – of crime, of immigrants and, since 2001, of terrorists and Islam – backed by growing discourses and institutional powers of law and order (Castells 2000 [1998]: 378-9; Glassner 1999; Lawrence 2006).¹¹ The politics of fear have been keenly stoked by popular media outlets, extending it into a politics of blame or scapegoating. These play deeply into self/other scenarios. Writing about Australia, Hage argues that the politics of hope have been white-anted by those of fear, and a caring society by a "defensive society [which] creates citizens who see threats everywhere [and] generates worrying citizens and a paranoid nationalism" (2003: 3).

¹¹ Adam Curtis offers a slogan summarising the change: "Politicians used to sell dreams; now they sell fantasies of protection from nightmares" (2004). Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant describe US society as being characterised by "the deliberate dismantling of the social state and the correlative hypertrophy of the penal state" (2001 [2000]: 3). The remarks apply less intensely to the other states treated here.

The rise of this cultural nationalism of defensive refuge has significant entailments in Australia, as set out in later chapters. We might also note its stark difference from an earlier, pre-globalisation form of cultural nationalism, namely Australian assertions of national pride in the 1960s and 1970s.

6. Journalistic practices and principles

This section examines conceptions of broadsheet and tabloid newspapers, and the relevance of principles of the fourth estate to reporting of the Bali bombing.

Colin Sparks presents a model of broadsheet and tabloid newspapers which avoids the simple binary oppositions (information/entertainment, public/private, reason/emotion, citizen/consumer) afflicting much discussion of the topic (2000a: 13-15). He distinguishes five types of paper distributed across axes of public life-private life and politics/economics/society-scandal/sport/entertainment. At opposite ends of the spectrum are the US supermarket tabloid and the newspaper of “hard” news only, instanced by the UK *Financial Times*. Based on UK, US and a few European papers, his model does not quite fit with the smaller range of Australian papers (cf Lawrence and Burns 2008). Nevertheless, the two broadsheets, the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Australian*, correspond to Sparks’ second category with its “high concentration on the content characteristic of the serious press, but with ... an increasing amount of soft news and feature articles”. The *Daily Telegraph* straddles Sparks’ third and fourth categories, newspapers with “a large dose of scandal, sports and entertainment” but also “elements of the news values of the serious press: they actively campaign on political issues and in elections, for example”; these elements go together with “a strong stress upon visual design”. Another general marker of difference between the two broadsheets and the tabloid, corresponding to differing educational levels in the readerships they address, is in sentence length and syntactic complexity (van Dijk 1991: 215). The following chapters will touch on how far “broadsheet” or “tabloid” textual characteristics, notably around the reason/emotion binary, are or are not to be found where expected in the three papers. I try as far as possible to use the terms only descriptively – as indicating page size – so as to avoid the evaluative connotations that each carries.

Journalistic principles of news media centring on ideas of the fourth estate inform the examinations of the three newspapers’ coverage of the Bali bombing in later chapters. What follows here is a historical sketch of the fourth estate and a setting out of its principles as applicable to the press in 2002. Since its emergence in the UK in the mid-nineteenth century, the fourth estate has been a

much-debated and historically variable term promoting the freedom of the press and news media in general (Schultz 1998).¹² It is seen as a vital component of civil society and as belonging to a national community rather than the state (Rosen 2005: 26). In Australia its institutional exemplar has been the ABC, whose *Mediawatch* is a weekly reminder of various of its principles. The fourth estate flourished particularly in two decades preceding the Bali bombing. With the rise of investigative journalism in the 1980s, this was a period when “Australian journalism moved to assert its place as an equal contender in the political process” (Schultz 1998: 195). 2002, the year of the Bali bombing, represented something of a high point of the fourth estate. Its decline began shortly thereafter. For Margo Kingston, 2003 marked a decisive moment: newspapers ceased being “papers of record ... when Fairfax failed to have a reporter at [Pauline] Hanson’s fraud trial, despite the fact that her rise had dominated the news for years” (2005: 78). There were several reasons for the decline. Threats to “well-resourced high-quality journalism” arose from the economic pressures of classified advertising’s migration to the internet (Beecher 2005: 73-4).¹³ David McKnight observes a growing “commercial mentality” emerging in November 2002 when the Fairfax newspapers CEO, Fred Hilmer, publisher of the *Sydney Morning Herald*, “referred to journalists as ‘content providers’ and newspapers as ‘advertising platforms’” (2005b: 35). There were also broader demographic and social changes (Rundle 2005b, 88-92; Lewis and Woods 2012). Most influential, however, were factors elaborated in later chapters: the growing prominence of commercial talkback radio, the growth of a powerful right commentariat in the media, and their frequent attacks on the ABC.

It is from that twenty-year period of the fourth estate that we can draw two fundamental principles relevant to the Australian press at the time of the Bali bombing. These are its public interest and its watchdog roles. The first stresses the idea of citizens’ active participation in public debate in a social democracy. It maintains that the news media “should contain information and other material that help citizens learn about the world, debate their responses to it, and reach informed decisions about what courses of action to adopt” (Rooney 2000: 102). The second asserts the journalistic principle of holding “truth to power”, of ensuring the accountability of governments and other powerful institutions to their constituents. Both principles depend on accurate, evidence-based, fair and balanced reporting. The three papers’ coverage of the bombing is assessed in the following chapters with reference to these principles.

¹² The first three estates were the Church, the House of Lords and the House of Commons. In the USA, freedom of the press was protected by the Constitution’s First Amendment.

¹³ In 2002 this was only just beginning (Clark 2005: 113). Web publisher, Stephen Mayne of crikey.com.au, lamented at the time of the bombing: “All the resources go into the papers and little into the internet sites” (*Australian* 17 October, pM5).

7. Methodology

This study's central methodology is a fine-grained and non-formalist textual analysis of the newspaper texts concerned. It examines how discourses (eg nationalism, ethnicity, mateship) inform and structure these texts. It also contextualises these discourses historically within the contemporary Australian cultural formation. In these ways, it avoids the pitfalls of a textual formalism which, in Greg Philo's words, is content "to analyse individual texts in isolation from the study of the wider systems ... which informed them" (2007: 115). The attention to texts and discourses in the context of the cultural formation avoids collapsing any of these orders into any other. Various disciplines informing the textual analysis as appropriate are the disciplines of literary studies, film and media studies, art history, linguistics, grammar and critical discourse analysis; and informing the contextualisation are history, sociology, political science and cultural studies.¹⁴ The central methodology of detailed textual analysis is supplemented by content analysis, which is explained in the following chapter.

The analysis acknowledges the newspaper's textual specificities and semiotic complexity: its use of layout, captions and headings to point meanings and give prominence to some items rather than others; its adoption of page headers to thematise material; its use of varying font sizes and other printing devices to highlight items; its narrative orderings of material in relations between facing pages or between groups of pages; and so on. It incorporates examination of the vitally important component of photography in newspapers, which in Roland Barthes' words, "has a power to convert which must be analysed", and it considers the papers' sometimes complex combinations of words and images (1957: 161). It thus attends to the processes of the production of meaning as well as to the meanings generated. These meanings are sometimes specific to a given paper and sometimes not, and are often informed, but not wholly determined by contemporary discourses. These discourses traverse, inform and structure the newspaper texts in varied and complex ways.

The idea of address is vital to this textual analysis. Balibar has already been quoted saying that discourses of the national "interpellate" or "hail" the reader. So too do newspapers. They do indeed centrally describe a world "out there" – what Roman Jakobson calls the "referential" function of language – but another of his linguistic functions is the "conative", whose "orientation towards the addressee" well describes their simultaneous targeting of the reader (1960: 355). The

¹⁴ Critical discourse analysis supplies some valuable ideas, such as nominalisation, but is often hampered by a textual formalism (Philo 2007: 119, 125).

newspaper reader considered here is what has long been called the implied, notional or preferred reader, that presupposed by the textual construction as it addresses us (Chatman 1978: 149-50). It is not the empirical reader, s/he who may reject or negotiate the meanings which the text proposes (Hall 1980 [1973]; Morley 1980). The argument is that the textual constructions *encourage* certain readings. On the topic of the Bali bombings, the reader is primarily addressed as national.¹⁵ That only one of the three newspapers examined, the *Australian*, is a national paper makes little difference, as all three papers treat the event as a major national crisis.

How does this study differ from others in the field? There is one study parallel to the present one. Sonya de Masi's thesis (2005) and Jeff Lewis and Sonya de Masi's article based on it (2007) analyse two Melbourne newspapers' coverage of the bombing. The writers show how the press coverage invokes Australian discourses of mateship and innocence, as well as the discourse of the "war on terror". However, they tend to construe the journalistic texts primarily as a direct expression of cultural and political discourses. Nor do they differentiate between the broadsheet *Age* and the tabloid *Herald-Sun*, and their citing of selected texts precludes an understanding of how representative they are of the newspapers' coverage.

There are several publications on related topics. Two analytically sophisticated analyses of Sydney press constructions of ethnicity are Greg Noble and Scott Poynting's article on coverage of Lebanese "gangs" (2003) and Peter Manning's monograph on reporting of Arab and Muslim people (2004). Yet in quoting from the newspapers both publications decontextualise the material selected. They therefore rarely indicate, for instance, a given item's prominence in the paper or any countervailing items. In both the focus is on discourses as revealed by the texts, whereas the present thesis focuses also on the production of meanings. Also missing from both, as from de Masi and Lewis, is any examination of visual elements. Nor are these covered by Teun van Dijk's otherwise comprehensive discourse analysis of racism in the 1980s English and Dutch press (1991), by Nick Couldry and John Downey's rewarding examination of UK press views on the proposed 2003 US invasion of Iraq (2004) or by Martin Conboy's account of British tabloids (2006). My approach takes its distance also on some discourse analyses of newspaper texts which focus exclusively and in detail on one or a handful of items, for example Kress and van Leeuwen on front pages (1998) and van Dijk on one editorial (1998). While these analyses generate most valuable insights, they abstract the chosen items from the broader newspaper text of which they form a part, and which inform the ways in which they would have been read.

¹⁵ Of course, the address can be dual or fungible, as in a local paper treating local victims of the Bali bombing, where a reader might be addressed as a member of the local community and/or as an Australian.

The sense of national crisis occasioned by the bombing provides the central focus for the analysis which follows. The methodology's detailed and comprehensive coverage is appropriate to a sample of texts of this size, and allows for the complex relations between texts, discourses and cultural formation, and between visual and verbal rhetorics to become apparent. Similarly for the differences between the three newspapers and their varied mobilisations of cultural nationalism. Differences in approach to the fourth estate remain a touchstone throughout.

CHAPTER 2:
“THE NATION MOURNS”:
THE MEDIATION OF MOURNING IN THE *DAILY TELEGRAPH*
AND THE *SYDNEY MORNING HERALD*

1. Overview: what content do the papers offer their readers?

While the principal methodology in this study is the textual analysis outlined in Chapter 1, an additional methodology, content analysis, plays a supporting role. A quantitative account of the topics covered and images shown by the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Australian* offers a valuable empirical overview of their content, as understood in common-sense terms shared by journalists and readers of newspapers. It shows what Bernard Berelson calls the “manifest content” that the papers present to their readers (1966 [1952]: 262).

The content analysis focuses on news and feature items and all visual material, comprising photographs, drawings, cartoons, maps and diagrams, in the three papers. However, written *commentary* – in the forms of editorials and opinion pieces – is not included.¹ These items have a conceptual, argumentative logic distinct from the expository logic of reporting, and cannot be readily subsumed into the necessarily simplifying categories of content analysis.² Items of commentary will be examined in the course of the textual analysis following the content analysis.

The content analysis examines the three papers’ coverage of the Bali bombing between Monday 14th and Saturday 19th October 2002. The nine questions (A-I) set out below organise the twenty-one content categories of the analysis.³ The questions are basic journalistic questions in reporting a major event such as this terrorist bombing. Questions and content categories are summarised below, followed by the content analysis itself (Table 1).

¹ Space precludes systematic analysis of Letters to the Editor. They are sometimes mentioned for comparative purposes.

² The expository logic of reporting is usually called the “inverted pyramid”, the longstanding convention of presenting information in a descending order of importance, beginning with basics of who, what, when, where, why and how (van Dijk 1988: 65; Zelizer and Allan 2010: 61).

³ News and feature articles were coded as instancing only one topic each, according to the major emphasis of the item concerned. Graphic material was coded similarly, except where a photo gives equal prominence to different figures, for example representatives of Indonesian and Australian authorities. With the exception of by-line photographs of celebrity journalists, each individual photo was counted, irrespective of its size or belonging to a larger composite, such as the *Daily Telegraph*’s and the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s front pages of faces of Australian victims (15 October), or the former paper’s 22 photos in one jigsaw composite about global terror (19 October, p4).

- A. What happened? This question generates categories 1 and 2: the bombing and the property destruction caused; and the principal target, the Sari Club. In fact, three bombs were exploded almost simultaneously. Two targeted neighbouring Kuta nightclubs, one inside Paddy's Irish Club, "in which up to 40 tourists died" (*Sydney Morning Herald* 16 October, p5), none of them Australians;⁴ and a much larger one outside the Sari Club, which killed more Australians than any other nationality. The third, outside the US consulate in Denpasar, caused only minor property damage. Details of the *execution* of the bombing appear in category 7, the investigation. Photographs amply illustrate the devastating effects of the blasts, several adopting the trope of before-and-after familiar from disaster reporting (Pantti 2011: 225).
- B. Who suffered? What was the human cost? These questions lead directly to categories 3, Victims and Related: Australian, and 4, Victims and Related: Other, and indirectly to categories 5, Mourning Ceremonies, and 6, US Empathy. The first categories are called "victims and related" to encompass articles both on the dead, injured, missing and survivors, and on bereaved families and friends, notably those searching for news of the missing. All three papers include lists of the dead and injured. The *Daily Telegraph* includes also testimonials and "messages from around the world to grieving families" (eg 16 October, p12). Category 5 reports mourning ceremonies and memorial services in Bali and Australia. Category 6 reports expressions of empathy from the USA, including survivors of 11 September 2001.
- C. The investigation, category 7, covers the criminal enquiries made by various police forces, centrally Indonesian and Australian, and also raises questions about appropriate cross-jurisdictional command structures.
- C1. Who or what group was responsible for the bombing? Unsurprisingly, the first week after the event led to no identification, arrest or conviction of any perpetrator. In this absence, category 8 canvasses possible suspects.
- C2. Why? What were the motives? Why questions are typically the province of the argumentative mode of editorials and opinion pieces, which are not included in the content analysis. Yet several items offer historical accounts of recent terrorism, category 9.

⁴ This study references newspaper texts as above, by date and page number, and by paper name when not clear from the context. The three papers' lack of attention to Paddy's is taken up in Chapter 3.

- C3. What forewarning was there of the bombing? Category 10, security intelligence, raises questions about intelligence services' prior knowledge of, and governmental travel advisories in relation to the bombing.
- D. How did states respond? Categories 11, 12 and 13 consider the political and diplomatic responses respectively of Australia, of the USA and the west, and of other states.
- E. How did crisis and recovery authorities respond? Categories 14 and 15 treat the work respectively of Australian and Indonesian military, police, emergency, medical and paramedic authorities charged with rescue and recovery.
- F. How did civil society respond? Categories 16, 17 and 18 describe the work respectively of Balinese, Australian and other volunteers.
- G. What consequences have there been in Australia? The articles instancing category 19, Australian race hate, arise from attacks on Muslim institutions.
- H. What consequences have there been in Bali? What effects has the bombing had on tourism in Bali (category 20)?
- I. How did media outside Australia cover the bombing? Category 21 considers media coverage from around the world.

The figures in the table that follows provide a valuably non-impressionistic, empirical comparison of the *Daily Telegraph's* with the *Sydney Morning Herald's* coverage of the bombing, and give significant indications of their priorities.⁵ Conclusions from this content analysis will be distributed as appropriate through the ensuing textual analysis, which enables a far more substantial and nuanced account than quantitative analysis alone can provide. The textual analysis will show the rhetorics adopted, the discourses mobilised and the visual and narrative elements deployed by the newspaper texts. It gives senses of the details, texture and mechanisms of the papers' coverage of the bombing, especially their discursive complexity and density, routinely articulated under nationalist banners. Content analysis, in short, provides an empirical base and a partial scaffold for the textual analysis.

⁵ The figures for the *Australian* appear in Appendix 1.

Table 1: Content analysis of news, features and images on the Bali bombing, the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14-19 October 2002⁶

Question	Topic		Daily Telegraph				Sydney Morning Herald			
			NF	Im	Tot	%	NF	Im	Tot	%
What happened?	1	Bombing and destruction	4	22	26	6.2%	3.4	10.5	13.9	3.8%
	2	Sari Club	6	20	26	6.2%	0	2	2	0.5%
Who suffered?	3	Victims and related: Australian	64	199	263	62.2%	56.5	138	194.5	52.6%
	4	Victims and related: other	0	0	0	0%	12.6	12.5	25.1	6.8%
	5	Mourning ceremonies	2	7	9	2.1%	5	3	8	2.2%
	6	US empathy	1	1	2	0.5%	0	0	0	0%
Investigation	7	Investigation	5	1	6	1.4%	6.2	4	10.2	2.7%
1. Who?	8	Suspects	8	9	17	4.0%	8	2	10	2.7%
2. Why?	9	Terrorism	1	31	32	7.6%	9.2	3	12.2	3.2%
3. Fore-warning?	10	Security intelligence	5	0	5	1.2%	12.2	0	12.2	3.2%
How did states respond?	11	Politics and diplomacy: Australian	6	4	10	2.4%	12.6	8	20.6	5.6%
	12	Politics and diplomacy: US and west	1	1	2	0.5%	3.2	4	7.2	1.9%
	13	Politics and diplomacy: other	1	1	2	0.5%	4.2	4	8.2	2.2%
How did crisis authorities respond?	14	Crisis authorities: Australian	0	6	6	1.4%	10.6	7	17.6	4.7%
	15	Crisis authorities: Indonesian	0	1.5	1.5	0.4%	2.2	3.5	5.7	1.5%

⁶ Under the newspaper titles, the following abbreviations apply: “NF” = news and feature items; “Im” = Images; “Tot” = Total; “%” = percentage of the newspaper’s coverage. Fractions of 0.5 arise where an image illustrates two topics with equal prominence.

Fractions of 0.2 are used for the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s short news items, variously called briefs or nibs (news in brief), only one or two sentences long, and usually grouped as a “sidebar” running down a page’s outside column.

Some anomalous and statistically insignificant material was omitted from the table, for instance two features from the *Daily Telegraph*’s educational History section, on Bali and on Kuta (18 October, p46; 19 October, p71) and from the *Sydney Morning Herald* an item on the expatriate Australian population in Indonesia and three drawings whose obscurity made them impossible to classify (14 October, p4; 15 October, p13; 18 October, p15).

How did civil society respond?	16	Volunteers: Balinese	1	1.5	2.5	0.6%	0.2	0	0.2	<0.1%
	17	Volunteers: Australian	2	0	2	0.5%	6.8	9	15.8	4.3%
	18	Volunteers: other	0	2	2	0.5%	0	0	0	0%
What consequences?	19	Australian race hate	1	0	1	0.2%	1	1	2	0.5%
	20	Tourism in Bali	0	0	0	0%	3.2	2	5.2	1.4%
How covered?	21	Media coverage	1	7	8	1.9%	0	0	0	0%
Totals			109	314	423		157.1	213.5	370.6	

Historical, cultural and political contextualisation will be provided below to indicate significant factors impinging on the work of the newspapers. It is not presented at the outset, for to do so might imply a naïve reflectionism or a historical determinism which would collapse cultural formation into discourse and text, and therefore be unable to account for differences between the papers and indeed within the pages of each paper. This and the following chapters examine each paper’s central modes of address to the reader: as an Australian mourner (this chapter), as an Australian at home or facing the world (Chapter 3), and as an Australian responding to terrorism (Chapter 4). The same modes of address are analysed in the *Australian* in Chapter 5.

2. The *Daily Telegraph*: Australian victims and mourners

The content analysis shows that the *Daily Telegraph*’s coverage of the bombing is hugely biased towards category 3, the Australian dead, injured or missing and survivors, as well as their families and friends. This one category attracts 62.2% of the articles and images in the week’s Bali coverage. It is supplemented by the cognate categories of Mourning Ceremonies and US Empathy, making a total of 64.8%.

It was suggested in Chapter 1 that a “decisive and critical turning point in the course of events”, such as the Bali bombing, might not only crystallise and foreground everyday discourses of nationalism but also deepen and extend them (Raboy and Dagenais 1992: 3; Billig 1995: 81). How far, and in what ways does the *Daily Telegraph*’s coverage “Australianise” its national victims? At this point we need to recall earlier accounts of nationalism as a mode of address. What is habitually addressed – and also naturalised – is the “imagined community” of a unified people with shared culture and history, if not also territory (Anderson 1983). When treating the nation – rather than

writing of regional or local issues for regional or local readerships – newspapers do not just write *about* the nation, but also *to* it, and in so doing performatively invoke it.⁷ Not only does the *Daily Telegraph* identify Bali victims as Australian by city/town/suburb, friendship networks and so on, but it also significantly addresses its reader as an *Australian mourner* of victims of the bombing. Witness the front page of 15 October. The caption to the photographs of 44 Australians announces: “THESE are the faces of our dead, missing and survivors who began returning home to Australia yesterday to their loved ones.... But more than 100 of us are believed to have perished in the Sari Club blast. These are victims of an act of war which has plunged our nation into mourning.” Readers are addressed as members of “our nation in mourning”; the national “us” and the repeated “our” underline this, as does the nationally designated “home” with “loved ones”.⁸ The redundancy and reiteration emphatically seek to bind together Australian mourner and Australian victim. To say this is not to deny the strong factual pressures urging the journalistic “nation-ing” of the bombing: that more Australians were killed than on any one day outside war, that more Australians were killed than any other nationality, and that Australians may well have been specifically targeted. But it is to point to the paper’s insistent and emphatic rhetoric in “Australianising” the event; or put differently, to its energetic exploitation of nationalism’s unitary, dual address to the “I” and the “we” comprising the nation.

The term “victim” is culturally very significant. Contrast it lexically with, say, “casualty”. The latter is a more neutral term than the former, carrying connotations of randomness. Victim, conversely, not only implies a perpetrator, an agency responsible for producing the victims, but also suggests the innocence and defencelessness of those so designated, thus inviting empathy with them. Victims, then, are likely to be blameless and right, and if the agency responsible is human – rather than, say, a cyclone – victims probably of evil actions.⁹ Culturally in Australia, the notion of victimhood is unlikely to have become so large a category in the paper’s coverage without Australian victimhood already having a strong discursive traction. It is certainly the case that victimhood was at the time a major discourse in news representations, not least after 11 September 2001, and the connected and contemporaneous discourse of the vulnerable individual is foundational to what Frank Furedi analyses as “therapy culture” (2004). Yet in Australia

⁷ Judith Butler defines performativity as “that power of discourse to produce effects through reiteration ... a reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (1993: 21, 2).

⁸ In quoting from newspapers, I use small capitals to give some visual approximation of the very large font capitals of front-page headlines. I capitalise major words in headers to represent their large font capitals, and reproduce headlines as they are printed, with the first word capitalised. The quotation well exemplifies the discursive density at work in newspapers. Multiple discourses – nation, family, war – criss-cross and overlay each other within a few, simple words. The final count of Australian deaths was 88.

⁹ The more so, surely, given the physical horrors reported as resulting from the bombing: “body parts scattered”, “another woman running with her clothes burned on to her body”, “so many bodies were just black mounds, some were red”, “the smell of burnt flesh” (14 October, pp2, 21, 7, 8).

victimhood long predates the events of 2001 in the prevalence of several kinds of news story, such as crime and disasters, highlighting a sense of impersonal forces weighing down on the powerless individual.¹⁰ These news stories likely derive much of their discursive purchase from the numerous popular white Australian narratives of victimhood and heroic defeat – such as the stories of Burke and Wills, Gallipoli and Phar Lap – analysed by Ann Curthoys (2000). The *Daily Telegraph* uses “victim” on countless occasions during the week, and hardly ever uses “casualty” (eg 15 October, p12). While the discourse of victimhood obviously circulates beyond the *Daily Telegraph*’s journalists and editors, it evidently appeals less to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, as the following section will show.

There is a range of familiar discourses of Australian identity invoked in the *Daily Telegraph*’s coverage of Australian victims of the bombing: egalitarianism, mateship, sport, innocence and Anzac – discourses which have been elevated to the status of (white) Australian mythologies – and some less nationally specific discourses such as family and community, although as we shall see, these too can be “made national”. Not only do these discourses intensify nationalist sentiment; they are also discourses of a certain *kind* of national unity. Further, three discourses – egalitarianism, family and community – are prominent in the generic conventions of news reporting of disasters, conventions surely informing accounts of the Bali bombing by virtue of the large number of people killed and injured at the same time.¹¹ The following paragraphs will examine in turn the paper’s constructions of egalitarianism, family and community, mateship and sport, and innocence and Anzac – with occasional departures to cover rhetorical devices – before drawing conclusions about the larger issues emerging from this material.

As well as being a resonant discourse of the Australian imaginary, egalitarianism is a conventional assumption brought to the Bali reports from disaster news. The idea informs the reporting of a terrorist bombing for two reasons. The explosion has a random impact: anyone could be a victim. And attacks on so-called “soft” targets almost by definition aim at ordinary people. These generic news conventions mesh closely with the Australian discourse of egalitarianism, ordinariness being “the most pervasive way in which egalitarianism is represented in Australian culture”, based on an egalitarianism of manners (Carter 2006: 358; Hirst 1988: 74). Two issues arise here. The first is demographic: which Australians does the *Daily Telegraph* select to report on? The second is discursive: how does it represent them?

¹⁰ John Langer develops this argument about Melbourne television news over the period 1978-90 (1998: 74-103). I have applied it to news constructions of the 2005 Schapelle Corby trial (Crofts 2006: 10-13).

¹¹ A study of US news coverage of natural disasters through the 1990s reveals the same concerns as those in the Australian coverage of Bali: counting the numbers of dead, heroic rescues and sacrifices, and remembrances of lives lost (Kitch and Hume 2008: 3-20).

The demographic issue is important for what it suggests about the paper's readership, especially as compared with that of the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The *Daily Telegraph*'s selection of victims may not be as even-handedly egalitarian as it might at first appear. Apart from two of the three football teams prominently covered – the Kingsley, Perth, AFL club and the Forbes, NSW, rugby union club – almost all of the paper's selected victims come from such working-class Sydney suburbs as Malabar, Maroubra and Chifley in the east, and Bankstown, Croydon and Blacktown in the west (eg 17 October, pp8-9; 19 October, pp25-31). Exemplifying this working-class orientation is an article carrying the headline: "A chain of grief links families and suburbs" (17 October, pp8-9). It highlights victims from the working-class suburbs on the Bondi-Chifley axis, including the third football club, the Coogee Dolphins rugby league team. Stressing community solidarity, the article differentiates Malabar in particular, home to several victims – "This really still is like a country town, a village" – from the better-known eastern suburbs, which it censures as "a wealthy domain obsessed with style and dismissive of substance. A hedonistic playground of transients." Interestingly in this vein, Adam Howard, the Coogee Dolphins' manager, who was one of the six team members killed and who lived in wealthy Double Bay (19 October, p26), is not mentioned in the article, and figures only in one of the photographs of team members and others superimposed on the accompanying map, which runs south from Coogee to Matraville. Similarly, another article on team members who died mentions him only in passing (17 October, p4).

The paper's orientation towards working-class victims contrasts with the people cited by the *Daily Telegraph*'s sister paper, the *Australian*, also owned by Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd but addressing a different readership, being both broadsheet and national. This paper quotes "a business banker" as its first eyewitness, and shortly thereafter a respectable-looking, middle-aged telecommunications consultant (14 October, pp1, 3). Such occupations differ noticeably from the less prestigious jobs identified in the *Daily Telegraph*. It could be argued that the *Daily Telegraph* thus addresses a different "nation" from the *Australian*. But of course the *segments* of the nation addressed are those of the respective newspapers' target markets, their readerships presented as *standing for* the general public, as each paper seeks to distinguish itself from its market competitors. As differentiated from those of the *Australian* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the readership of the *Daily Telegraph*, like the Kuta victims and holidaymakers it represents, would largely be what Belinda Probert calls "working class" in a scheme which differentiates "overclass", "middle class", "working class" and "underclass" segments in Australian society, and where working-class people are likely to lack tertiary qualifications and to be working in banks, call centres, retail, factories,

cleaning, hospitality or tourism (2001: 35-36).¹² The paper's class address, then, appears to be strongly inflected towards its (substantially) working-class readership, with its selection of victims skewed in that direction; it contrasts, as we shall see, with the *Sydney Morning Herald's* more balanced selection.¹³

Discursively, the *Daily Telegraph* represents its Australian victims as "ordinary Aussies". The strategies it deploys suggest that it does so both in relation to its class readership and in terms of address to the Australian mourner. One strategy is its sparing use of occupation as a descriptor of people in its coverage. Its indifference to such a marker of social status could perhaps be a kind of social leveller, but more likely reveals the paper's operative assumptions about its readers' attitudes to work and lack of interest in status careers. Occupation is certainly outranked as a descriptor in the paper's coverage by – in rough ascending order – local community, place of residence, football team membership, and family and friends. This ranking would derive in part from the fact of who died in the bombing, and in part from the paper's working priorities, but the effect of both the limited range of descriptors and the prime position of family and friends is to encourage a more *direct* identification of the (primarily working-class) reader with the human stories of Australian victims and mourners, at the same time as the absence of class or occupational markers normalises this address. These victims and mourners are principally constructed as ordinary emblems of victimhood. Thus an early list of the missing describes Robyn Webster simply as a "Marrickville mother" (14 October, p4). Of the few occupations which *are* given, football officials (eg 14 October, pp4, 8) outnumber the rest, and working-class occupations, including a bar manager, a newsagent and two saleswomen (19 October, p27; 17 October, pp8-9; 15 October, p4), far outnumber the two middle-class professions recorded, namely those of a teacher and a business bank manager (14 October, p21; 18 October, p6). One "design student" is described as such, perhaps in a gesture of journalistic gratitude, for Kayte Dodd, from middle-class Sylvania, supplies an articulate two-page article and six photographs reporting on her lucky escape with a friend (15 October, pp6-7). In this celebrity-free zone, probably the best-known of the victims and mourners

¹² Probert reframes class in terms of the economic globalisation described above, and particularly after 1996 when Australian employers (successfully) urged "the retreat from any commitment to employment security as the key to citizenship and the rejection of state interference in wage setting" (2001: 30). The "overclass" consists of the older "employing class ... the managers of capital" and an emergent group of "individuals who earn very large salaries or fees and invest in shares as a major source of long-term security" (2001: 30-32). The "middle class [is] defined increasingly by their tertiary educational credentials or cultural capital", and includes not only traditional middle-class occupations but also IT-based managers, professionals and technicians and the self-employed small business sector (2001: 32-34). Primarily defining the "underclass" is their "tenuous relationship with employment": the unemployed and the insecurely employed, casual and temporary workers, those who are "involuntarily working less than full-time", discouraged job seekers and the working poor relying on welfare support (2001: 36-7).

¹³ The most useful differentiating marker between working- and middle-class as seen by Probert is tertiary education. Sean Scalmer and Murray Goot give a 2002 figure of 24% of tertiary-educated among *Daily Telegraph* readers (2004: 143). The closest available comparison for *Sydney Morning Herald* readers is from 1999 and assimilates the paper with the *Australian* and the Melbourne *Age* for a figure of 55.1% (Bennett et al 1999: 157).

is Craig Salvatori whose wife, Kathy, was killed, and who emerges as a energetic spokesperson for the frustrations of searching for one's missing loved ones; otherwise he is identified only as a former rugby league international. In not mentioning that he owns BMG, a building maintenance service (*Sydney Morning Herald* 19-20 October, p6), the paper constructs him as an everyday representative of bereaved grief in a foreign land, while his league credentials mark him as working- rather than middle-class. In conclusion, both the paper's few descriptors of occupation and its promotion of others, especially family and community, encourage a more direct, more affective response to the human story, an issue to be developed shortly.¹⁴

The discourse of ordinariness extends to the paper's use of vox pops and the Australian vernacular.¹⁵ Numerous eye-witness observations offer an ordinary person's point of view on the bombing and its aftermath. As well as eye-witnesses being quoted by journalists, two whole articles are credited to eye-witnesses, and one page assembles various such reports (15 October, pp6-7; 17 October, p5; 15 October, p11). There are six pages of vox pop tributes and testimonials from ordinary mourner-readers which the paper, in populist manner, invites onto its news pages, saying "This is your place to share memories and pay respects" (15 October, p12; eg 16 October, p10; 18 October, p11).¹⁶ Writing of two missing friends on these pages, journalist Rachel Morris adopts the vernacular: "Lizzy was always up for a laugh [and] Dimmy ... is a gold medal dynamo" (15 October, p12). Appearing under such page headers as "Sharing our Grief", these tributes almost all come from working-class Sydney suburbs. Peter Lalor's weekend Bali Disaster feature adds his own demotic contributions: one "motor racing nut ... decided to kick on" and one footballer "locked in on a drop dead gorgeous 22 year-old Swedish blonde" (19 October, pp28, 31). In a more elegiac mode, consider the bland vernacular of the memorialising and the familiar modes of characterisation in a report beginning "Dean Kefford smiles sadly as he looks at the last photo taken of his footy mates", and continuing with his recollections of them, which invoke national commonplaces of bush/city, family and plain speaking: "David ... was a fun-loving country boy, wouldn't hurt a fly. He was always generous and loved his family so much, a really funny bloke.... Josh was your typical city bloke. He was very popular with the girls.... Adam was straight-up and always up-front ... he would tell you how it is" (17 October, p4). The paper's vernacular address

¹⁴ I generally use "affective" rather than "emotional" to avoid the individualism and essentialism of psychological accounts. Sara Ahmed argues that emotions are not personal belongings or privatised or interior states, but framed by wider linguistic and discursive arrangements (2004: 9), and Deborah Lupton that the "emotional self is shaped and reshaped ... through discourses on emotions" (1998: 26).

¹⁵ Vox pops, based on the Latin for the voice of the people, is a television term for interviews with the "person-in-the-street". As John Hartley notes, "they serve as potential *points of identification* for the audience" (1982: 90; italics original).

¹⁶ The paper also prints "Messages from around the world to grieving families", whose letters commemorating Australian victims fill two pages outside the dedicated Letters pages (16 October, p12; 17 October, p13).

seeks to represent and echo the everyday idioms of readers' speech, while the ordinariness of its characterisations of victims and mourners serves almost as a *tabula rasa*, offering ready foci of identification for readers addressed as Australian mourners.

Robert Jay Lifton's remark that "scenes of killing and dying [...] can make us *survivors by proxy*" points to an important discursive dimension of egalitarianism in the paper's address to the Australian mourner, one it shares with the generic conventions of disaster and crime stories in news (1992: 26; my italics). It is a victim-oriented and egalitarian mode of address, that of "Lucky me/There but for the grace of god go I": any one of us could be a victim. The headline "Every father's nightmare" epitomises this address (15 October, p4). It recurs in several tales of lucky escape (eg 15 October, pp6-7). Similarly, the forms of most of the numerous photographs of victims – snaps taken on holidays, often with friends, a few at weddings, even passport photos – resonate through their very familiarity – "They look just like ours" – while for the bereaved they poignantly date from happier times. Sharply highlighting the mutability of fate are the paper's stories about Maria Elfes' loss of her four bridesmaids on holiday in Bali only ten days after her wedding (eg 19 October, p28). The providential address of these various constructions significantly blurs the lines between actual and putative victims. In so doing it not only posits a victim-oriented form of egalitarianism, but also underwrites the paper's mapping of mourner onto victim. The mourners and bereaved described *in* the text become central foci of identification for readers *of* the text, and so intensify the affective sense of grieving. In such a discourse of fate, moreover, it is a short step from "There but for the grace of God" to "Ours is not to reason why". If fate controls human affairs, it limits human agency, like the impersonal forces weighing down on the powerless individual in Langer's news analysis mentioned above. A discourse of fate therefore has far-reaching socio-political implications. As Curran et al observe of the popular press (1980: 310), it can play a major role in naturalising – and so not explaining – the socio-political world as it is, an issue developed later in comparison with the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

The *Daily Telegraph*'s amplification of grief through the mourner/victim overlay works especially through family and friendship networks, which are the social groups most immediately affected by deaths. While family and friends are an inevitable focus, in the pages of the newspaper they *also* function powerfully as metonyms for the nation, standing in for a loss widely represented as a national loss. That they can do so testifies in part to the power of mass-mediated discourses of the national and to the paper's national address on Australian victims. But another factor is also in play: the declining actual and discursive role of social entities *between* "face-to-face" communities – family, friends, locality – and the grand abstract of the nation. As set out in Chapter 1, key

institutions of civil society, especially traditional religion, which encouraged social engagement and cohesion, have declined under the pressures of neo-liberal policies and practices (Castells 2004 [1997]: 8-9, 420). Probert notes the decline in senses of workplace community: “Concepts of solidarity, egalitarianism and the right to a decent wage simply have no place in the new world of work” (2001: 38). This hollowing out of civil society is evidenced by the appearance in the *Daily Telegraph* of family, friends, football team, pub, local shops and commemoration services as its only institutional loci. This in turn forces back more attention on family and friends. It is the hollowing out of civil society and the concurrent rise of a cultural nationalism of “refuge” which make the metonym possible (Castells 2004 [1997]: 33, 70).¹⁷

The paper’s address to the Australian mourner reverberates through stories of loss for families, friends and communities. The following headlines typify dozens of reports during the week: “Search for Craig and the cruellest call to a family” and “Voice in the dark that calls for Chloe” (16 October, pp2, 5). These articles are illustrated by large photographs, respectively of a family friend searching for the missing youth and holding up a sketch of him, and of the anguished mother displaying photographs of her missing daughter. At the bottom of these pages are epilogues, in reverse text, with large-font quotations from relatives which amplify the sense of loss: “‘It doesn’t give you much to hope for’ – Craig Dunn’s aunt” and “‘We’re keeping her room exactly as she left it’ – Chloe’s brother”.¹⁸ Family and friends appear very frequently in the newspaper’s photographs. Before the bombing they are usually seen relaxing, smiling and laughing, as in a “beach memories” picture of Kathy Salvatori’s friends (16 October, p4). Afterwards, they express grief or, as in airport reunions, a range of emotions from grief to relief: “Waiting families show the stress,” reads one caption (15 October, p8). Community loss is signalled in the headline “Six faces missing at the bar” where the Coogee Dolphins would, in a strangely coy turn of phrase, “be enjoying an ale” (15 October, p4); or in “the chain of grief link[ing] families and suburbs” in Sydney’s east: “They were ... a proud tribe ... twelve ordinary people, but meant so much to so many hundreds in the tight community in which they lived” (17 October, pp8-9). The paper prints several photographs of communities of grief, at church services and the Kuta bomb site (eg 14 October, p13; 16 October, p9).

¹⁷ The same combination underwrites the “nation-as-home” discourse analysed in Chapter 3.

¹⁸ Reverse text is printing in white on a dark background (Downman 2008: 62), as it were in photographic negative. The paper adopts the novel device of using straps – a “line of words across the top of a page” (Downman 2008: 39) – across the *bottom* of the page. Since these lack a regular journalistic label, I call them epilogues, in the literary-critical sense of the conclusion of a fable pointing a moral. Printed from 15 October onwards in reverse text matching the headers at the top, these both visually frame the Bali pages and reinforce connotations of reversal, upset and death. All are quotations, with resonances often reaching beyond the individual page. Like headlines I reproduce epilogues as they are printed, with the first word capitalised.

Two aesthetic devices contribute to the tragic tone of the paper's address to the Australian mourner. One device is dramatic or tragic irony. The paper often plays on the reader knowing in advance the likely fate of people described in their holiday innocence: death, injury, loss, bereavement. One example of this narrational mode is a front-page photograph of some of the Coogee Dolphins relaxing with female friends in a pool, taken hours before several of them were killed, with the caption, "Final Moments of a Party in Paradise", printed in reverse text (17 October, p1). This device receives its most extended treatment in the seven-page feature reconstructing the story of various Australians who converged on the Sari Club that fateful night: "how the iconic Australian holiday turned to horror ... Everywhere you looked on Saturday night in Kuta people were making fateful decisions" (19 October, pp26, 28). The better known (or guessable) a narrative resolution, the greater the attention drawn to the human actants and to the accompanying affective register, here the Australian victims and a fated, tragic tone which reinforces identifications with them.¹⁹ Given the youth of most of the victims, this register is deepened by the trope of lives-that-could-have-been. Another device, visually enhancing the same affective register, is the reverse text of all the front-page photographs, with their connotations of death and destruction, and crucially of the upsetting of the everyday, with the paper's words looming up out of darkness as if struggling to describe the loss and horror; and also, the epitaph-like "framing" uses of headers and epilogues, these latter in reverse text, as cited above with reference to Craig and Chloe. Occasional relief from the gloom of these tales appears in the generic form of those staples of disaster reporting: the narrow escape, the heroic rescue and bravely fighting for one's life (eg 15 October, pp6-7; 17 October, p4; 18 October, p7).

Discourses of sport and mateship play a major role in the *Daily Telegraph's* reader address. Male football teams of most codes – rugby league, rugby union and AFL, but not soccer, and no female teams – were in Kuta for their post-season holiday at the time of the bombing; a large number of players were killed. This source material lends itself to mythological treatment in terms of mateship – a distinctive, though not exclusively Australian social value – and of sport, which enjoys a quite different cultural status in Australia than in, say, Japan (Grant 1988: 90).²⁰ The final edition of page 2 on 14 October, for instance, was re-edited to centre the story on discourses of mateship and sport: "Young mates killed as dream tourist resort is torn to shreds", the headline in reverse text

¹⁹ I use the term actant to designate a conception of person within a text in terms of what the narrative requires of it, as distinct from the individualised conception of "character" with narrative agency preferred by humanist literary criticism, as also from the highly abstracted structuralist models of AJ Greimas (1966: 172-191; 1970: 157-183; cf Chatman 1978: 116).

²⁰ A common historical explanation of sport's major cultural importance in Australia is summarised by Peter Kell: "In the absence of a defining war of independence, which can bestow nationhood on the victor, victory and dominance in sporting contests provide a poor substitute for blood sacrifice as a defining moment of nationalism" (2000: 24; cf Adair and Vamplew 1997: 11).

and a very large font, accompanied by a photograph of the Coogee Dolphins team. The same day includes another full-page article memorialising four football clubs (14 October, p12). Numerous other articles treat these young men in terms of mateship. Thus Josh, one of the Coogee Dolphins, “was a ‘lovely bloke’ who copped a ribbing from his mates for his looks – dubbed ‘the male model’” (15 October, p4). Additionally, given its leisure status, amateur sport carries connotations of innocence, which reinforce those of innocent victimhood.

Potentially working against these connotations, however, are the less savoury aspects of football “bloviness”, especially on holiday in Kuta. One might surmise that this aspect of the *Daily Telegraph*’s reporting was somewhat sanitised. In familiar human terms, the prime explanation would be respect for the dead and grieving, but discursively a sense of Australian innocence, sharpened by the bombing being overseas, would also contribute significantly. Thus drunkenness is barely ever mentioned in these reports on Australian victims, nor drug taking or sexual seduction or coupling, except at the bland level, for instance that the “footy mates ... met two girls from Melbourne ... and became fast friends” (17 October, p4). “Fun” is a common gloss, as in the headline “Timing turns post-season fun into a date with danger” (14 October, p12). A rare exception to this pattern of euphemism during the week is doubly distanced, both presented as a quotation and coming from a star: “[f]ormer Hawthorn star Dermott Brereton” speaking of “not-so-well behaved footballers’ fill[ing] the Sari Club” (14 October, p12). At the end of the week, in Saturday’s seven-page feature, the paper admits a less circumspect account of the club – “Naturally it’s a meat market. Everybody gets loose. Some get too loose” – and prints a photograph of “partying” Coogee Dolphins striking macho poses (19 October, p28, 30). By week’s end, it seems, in a feature rather than a news report, these “understandable” interests of youth on holiday can be made explicit.

One vital “amplifier” of national victimhood in the paper’s address to the Australian mourner is a discourse of innocence which draws on Australia’s particular history of war, the expeditionary tradition which goes back as far as involvement in the Boer War, and subsequently has seen soldiers sent to fight with Britain in two world wars, and in five US-led wars.²¹ For the *Daily Telegraph* the losses in Bali resonate with the tradition’s long-standing trope of innocent Australians dying abroad for a sacrificial patriotism, and especially with the Anzac tradition’s founding myth of nation, namely Gallipoli (Curthoys 2000: 27). Of that mythology, Fiona Nicoll notes that its principal historian, Charles Bean, “was able to present the Great War as the nation’s first war only by effacing the land wars that accompanied European settlement” (2001: 175). The Anzac myth thus

²¹ Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Iraq, Afghanistan.

stands in for the largely repressed history of the colonial frontier wars, the former's innocence masking the violence of the latter. For all that the frontier violence historically undercuts this central discourse of innocence informing Australian identities, white "self-innocenting narratives" (Lake 2003: 164) continue to exercise a very powerful discursive hold on the Australian imaginary.²² The Anzac myth resonates with connotations of courage and loyalty in adversity.

The expeditionary tradition, especially of the Anzacs, surely underpins discourses of victimhood and innocence in the *Daily Telegraph's* coverage of the bombing. The phrase "innocent victims" tolls constantly through reports addressed to the Australian mourner, and the concept bulks much larger than a computer word search would reveal: "Their only crime was to go on holiday"; "Young revellers stumbling dazed and bleeding from the wreckage of the Sari Club"; the epilogue "'Jessica was always laughing and smiling' – Michele O'Donnell, of her daughter", visually and semantically echoing the page header, "Loss of Innocence" (15 October, p1; 16 October, p1; 17 October, p4). At the end of his weekend feature, Lalor speculates whether "this place [Kuta] where we were so carefree and alive will now be remembered like some sort of Gallipoli" (19 October, p31).

Likewise echoing the discourse of Anzac, the 14 October editorial "nationalises" the innocence it ascribes to the victims in exactly the terms commonly used to represent the national significance of Anzac: "[W]e have lost our innocence. It has made us realise our vulnerability" (p20).

War is in fact mentioned only rarely during the week, and then in regular combination with the idea of victimhood: the "VICTIMS OF WAR" proclaimed in the front page headline of 14 October, for example, "the victims of an act of war" declared on the next day's front page, or the headers for tributes and valedictories, "Tributes to the Fallen" and "Honouring the Fallen" (eg 16 October, p10; 18 October, p11). Unsurprisingly, the nation of Anzac and Gallipoli, whose expeditionary tradition involved lending (usually minor) support in wars initiated by greater powers, differs strikingly from the USA's (mostly) triumphal military history.²³ The Anzac myth celebrates the *sacrifices* of war, and so transmutes military defeat into moral victory. The sole *Daily Telegraph* article to discuss war invokes Anzac by likening Australian surfers in Bali to World War One diggers (16 October, p35). For an historian, seeing the surfer as a continuation of the digger tradition surely draws rather a long bow. Richard White, for example, traces a lineage from digger to surf lifesaver as male

²² Marilyn Lake applies "self-innocenting" from Jacqueline Rose, whose adoption of the phrase "violent innocence" works well for such myth-making, as "one way of describing a canon of literature shedding, blinding itself to, the unspoken or even violent histories out of which it is made" (1996: 63, 60).

²³ Along with its frontier wars, Australia's regional relations with small Pacific states have been less than innocent. The USA manifestly has ampler discourses of heroism than Australia, such that from the senses of victimhood and wounded innocence arising from the events of 11 September 2001, heroism *had* to be generated. Jeffrey Melnick neatly summarises the dominant national "script" as "one that turns all victims into heroes and all of the dead into saints" (2009: 134).

Australian character type, but *not* to surfer (1981: 154-5).²⁴ Rhetorically however, the feature article, prominently placed opposite the Editorial page and illustrated with a large drawing identifying surfer with lifesaver, marks the ongoing discursive power of Anzac, which the *Daily Telegraph* calls up in a time of perceived national crisis; when the nation feels itself threatened, it harks back to its founding myth.

Just as “‘the Anzac spirit’ [celebrates] ordinary soldiers and their mateship” (Carter 2006: 359), so it is the discourse of mateship which by the end of the week is commandingly mobilised to unify the nation in victimhood and mourning. On 18 October the *Daily Telegraph* presents a forceful image of the unity of people and state in grief: a photo covering 60% of the front page showing the Prime Minister “REACHING OUT” (headline) “to comfort a grieving relative at the memorial service in Kuta last night” (caption). Howard assured his audience that “the Australian spirit has not been broken. The Australian spirit will remain strong and open and free” (18 October, p1).²⁵ Set between mirroring photographs of the two men, the following day’s front-page introduction reads “What John Howard told the grief-stricken father of bomb victim Jodie Wallace. You’ve got...” and then declares, in the second largest font used in the week, “NINETEEN MILLION MATES” (19 October, p1; dots original).²⁶ This is a very forceful, some might say hyperbolic, assertion of total national unity in grief. Howard’s Kuta visit highlights also how the interventions of political leaders and their reported utterances can empower discourses of nationalism with the emblematic force of the state.²⁷ Reinforcing the notion of national unity in grief is a free tribute poster on 18 October. This reproduces the Australian flag with “BALI, October 12, 2002” and the *Daily Telegraph* masthead in reverse text along the top, and across the bottom “AUSTRALIANS TOGETHER”.

We can now address some broader issues arising from the *Daily Telegraph*’s representations of Australian victims. These concern arguments about the paper’s assimilationist nationalism, its metaphysical-moral world-view, its use of personalisation and affect, and its populism. Firstly, assimilationist nationalism. As pointed out in Chapter 1, discourses of national unity spirit away all

²⁴ The ABC’s *Mediawatch* described the surfer/digger comparison as “silly” (21 October 2002).

²⁵ According to Malcolm Farr, the paper’s Chief Political Reporter, Howard’s “last-minute scramble” to reach the Bali service “was a response to ... angry ... complaints in Bali of the relatives and friends of the bombing victims who demanded the Government do more” (18 October, p3).

²⁶ The largest font occurs on 17 October, and consists of only two words – “BUS BOMB” – whose brevity allows the two words to be spread more easily across the page (such headlines are called “hammer heads” in the trade). The *Daily Telegraph* does not quote Howard’s actual words, but rather as they were *reported* by Mr Wallace: “‘For me, the most significant thing he said was, ‘when you get home, don’t forget you have 19½ million mates waiting for you’” (19 October, p2). Howard’s speech included the following: “‘[T]here are 19½ million Australians who are trying, however inadequately, to feel for you and to support you at this time of unbearable grief and pain’” (*Australian* 18 October, p6).

²⁷ Contrast President George W Bush doing anything but reach out to the victims of hurricane Katrina, and his decisive loss of electoral support thereafter.

manner of differences within the country concerned (Williams 1985 [1983]: 192; Schlesinger 1991: 170-4; Billig 1995: 71). Differences of ethnicity, class, gender, religion, region and politics can all disappear under the icon of the nation. The principal difference relevant to the *Daily Telegraph's* constructions of the nation concerns ethnicity. I suggested above that the cluster of discourses – egalitarianism, mateship, sport, innocence and Anzac – which it associates with Australian victimhood are informed by a certain kind of national unity. Most have the status of white Australian mythologies, and thus arguably exclude, at the very least, indigenous, recent immigrant – and given their gendered bases, many female – members of the population. If all the headline's nineteen million Australians are to belong to this imagined national unity, it could only be on an *assimilationist* basis, on the basis of a unitary rather than pluralist conception of the nation, not on an indigenous and/or multicultural basis that would recognise racial difference within the country. This racial “whitening” will be elaborated in the next chapter.

The paper's deployment of discourses of Australian innocence and victimhood posits a metaphysical-moral – rather than historical-political – world-view. As Steven Poole observes: “But to say ‘innocent’ *tout court*, rather than ‘innocent of a particular crime’, turns innocence from a legal to a metaphysical category.... To speak of ‘innocent victims’ is to veer into a moralising terminology, to imply good on our side and hence evil on the other” (2006: 129).²⁸ In this schema, national innocence and victimhood become axiomatically good and right, as numerous earlier quotations show. An implicit self/other structure is at work here. Innocence and victimhood thus do not even need to be explicitly counter-posed to the “evil” of terrorism – as they are, for example, in an editorial commenting on “the loss of innocent people who have become victims of Islamic fundamentalism” (16 October, p34). Writing of disaster news, Mervi Pantti appears to take such moralising parameters as a given: “The discourse of compassion promotes a sense of moral national community” (2011: 234). In this imagined community, readers care about the victims, and console themselves and other nationals; and their caring as mourners both mitigates anxiety about the event and proposes a positive moral response (Pantti 2011: 229). Less metaphysical world-views might pose questions of such a moralising account: what if we, the victims/nation, are not always right? what if our “innocence” is violent? does the “other” have a point of view to put alongside ours?

The *Daily Telegraph's* constructions of Australian victims adopt two features of journalism's human interest story, with its stress on individual experience and its presentation of events “in terms of human emotion” (Curran et al 1980: 305-316). While “personalised drama” (Curran et al 1980:

²⁸ Scott Poynting et al observe similarly: “The idea of innocence gives its bearer a human-ness that is morally pure” (2004: 44).

308) is to be expected in journalistic accounts of an event such as the Bali bombing, the paper runs countless human interest stories, which urge the reader to identify empathetically with the individual victims and grieving families and friends. This affective empathy is like a glue seeking to bind together Australian mourners and victims, reader and text.

To note this affective mode of reader address is not to deny that the paper for the most part reports neutrally on Australian victims, as witness the measured “grisly aftermath” caption to an aerial photograph of the destruction, or the account of “the bodies ... lined up along an open corridor in ... Denpasar General Hospital” (14 October, pp3, 6).²⁹ Pantti distinguishes “three ways of reporting emotions”: directly through quotation, “allowing the news subjects to describe their emotional states and, thus, retaining [journalistic] ‘objectivity’”; indirectly, “by interpreting individual and collective emotions (eg references to the public mood)”; or via “‘authorial emotions’, such as when the journalists express their own emotions” (2011: 224). Illustrating the first way, countless reports quote from eyewitnesses, victims, families and friends, for example in the headline: “The roof was on top of me and flames all around” (October 14, p8). That the third way, journalists expressing their own emotions, occurs three times during the week perhaps attests to the value which the paper attributes to the affective (15 October, pp4-5, 12; 19 October, pp8-9). Lalor’s frank statements, for example, are prominently printed across the top of a double-page spread: “Tomorrow I promise I will be hard-nosed. Today I have to grieve with all these people. My people...” (15 October, pp4-5; dots original). It is the second, in-between way of reporting emotions, “interpreting individual and collective emotions”, which proves problematic in the paper. Although in its reporting the paper largely adheres to versions of journalistically neutral formulations such as “The mood here is...”, there is also some blurring of neutral and partisan representations, a kind of projective editorialising which skews the material towards affective appeals to the mourner-reader.³⁰ Such editorialising is unrestrained in the moralistic nationalism of a call for vox pop contributions to “a community bulletin board”, inviting “all Australians to pay ... your respects to innocent victims ... of a horrific war on our individual liberties, our freedom and our Australian way of life ... [victims who] have paid the ultimate price in a war which edges ever closer to our shores” (15 October, p12).

This editorialising within the news pages is of a piece with that of the editorials proper.

²⁹ This is a far cry from the blatant fabrication of some US supermarket tabloid articles, eg “Doctor cuts out own appendix in traffic jam” (*Truth* 4 October 1986, p1). Such publications lie at the outer edge of Colin Sparks’s spectrum of broadsheet and tabloid publications (2000a: 14-15).

³⁰ Zelizer and Allan define editorialising as articulating “partisan statements which detract from balance and impartiality” (2010: 34).

Insofar as editorials represent the institutional voice of the newspaper, the *Daily Telegraph* would appear to be primarily interested in addressing, promoting and performatively invoking a national community of mourners. Its concern with Australian victims is a theme which recurs throughout the week's editorials, and marginally outranks its concern about the need to fight terrorism. The paper urges the reader to empathise affectively with Australian victims in sombre, compassionate tones, and with an array of literary devices (martial simile, alliteration, iambic rhythms and anaphoric reiteration): "Like an army back from battle, the strained survivors are streaming home.... For most, the first sight of their loved ones pressing in unleashes the flood. They cry and they cry as if the tears have no end. They cry for the horror of their ordeal, they cry for the friends who have lost their lives, and they cry with relief that they are safe and home at last" (17 October, p34). The grief is "nationalised": "We have responded to this tragedy in unanimous grief.... In every state, every town and suburb, every office tower, in any crowd of Australians, expect to find the sombre shadow which this terror attack has cast" (19 October, p20; 17 October, p34). The paper proposes a kind of national grief counselling: "Our first duty is to fold in our collective embrace the loved ones of those who lost lives, and to lend whatever help and support to those who lived through this ordeal" (15 October, p20). And the state is represented as endorsing this view: an Editorial page cartoon entitled "Mates" has mourners gathered together in the shape of a map of Australia, all consoling a man wearing a "Bali" T-shirt, who, in a clear restatement of that day's "nineteen million mates" front page and its mirroring photographs described above, is embraced by a figure with the eyebrows regularly used in contemporary cartoons to identify Howard (19 October, p20). The *Daily Telegraph's* urging of an affective empathy with a national community of mourners contrasts with – some would say, short-changes – traditional editorial schemas of conceptually defining, explaining and offering recommendations about the issue concerned (van Dijk 1991: 133).

Affective appeals also figure conspicuously in what are probably the most read portions of the paper, namely headlines and headers, which are the responsibility of sub-editors rather than reporters. From examples already cited, consider the cumulative force of the arguably sentimental selection of details ("Voice in the dark that calls for Chloe", "Six faces missing at the bar", "Jessica was always laughing and smiling"); of the repeated, emphatic ostensives and the collusive first person plurals ("These are the faces of our dead, missing and survivors.... These are victims of an act of war"); of the invocation of discourses such as those of mateship and holiday culture ("Young mates killed as dream tourist resort is torn to shreds"); or of the repeated assertions of innocent victimhood ("Their only crime was to go on holiday") (16 October, p5; 15 October, p4; 17 October, p4; 15 October, p1; 14 October, p2; 15 October, p1). Witness also, from the first day's reporting,

the following uses of hyperbole and metaphor: a headline referring to “a bomb crater that is now Ground Zero”; the header used through the week, “Terror on our Doorstep”; the “VICTIMS OF WAR” proclaimed in the front-page headline; a headline “Denpasar Hospital: families search in hell”; and the repeated header, “Paradise Blown Apart” (October 14, pp13, 2-3, 1, 6, 12-13). Such rhetoric operates in a register designed to evoke affective empathy towards the subject, and on an almost apocalyptic scale. Its emphatic insistence is evident in several forms of reiteration. The following examples are all from headlines and epilogues: alliteration and rhyme in “Terrible tragedy” or “Tearful and fearful Australians” (17 October, p13; 16 October, pp8-9), near-tautology in “Torment and heartbreak” (16 October, p4) and the recycling of key phrases in the epilogues printed in reverse text on almost every page of the paper’s Bali coverage.³¹ Affective visuals include such metonyms of loss and destruction as a one-third page photograph of unclaimed luggage at a hotel, and one of an “unbroken bowl [which] sits among the rubble” (17 October, p7; 18 October, p8).³²

Several features of the *Daily Telegraph*’s representations of Australian victims are clearly populist: the class skewing of its chosen victims, the scores of vox pops in the “community bulletin boards” and the editorials dedicated to constructing a national community of mourners, in a clear departure from the more traditional terms of editorial address to the citizen-voter (van Dijk 1991: 140). By standard definitions of populism, the paper certainly seeks “direct contact with ‘the people’”, but it does not adopt another populist journalistic convention, that of condemning “the corruption and betrayal of existing politics” (Markus 2001: 143). Thus its cartoon of “nineteen million mates” invokes an entire national population, but puts Howard at the centre of them with a bereaved father. The paper’s approach meshes closely with what Robert Manne calls Howard’s “conservative populism” (2004: 44).

The reader of the *Daily Telegraph*’s coverage of the Bali bombing, then, is primarily addressed – to the mathematical tune of some 64.8%³³ – as an Australian mourner urged to empathise affectively with the death, loss, suffering and bereavement of Australian victims. So extensively is this address reiterated and so natural does it appear, that we may need to remind ourselves that it is not an ontological category, but a discursive construction. In this exercise of mediated mourning, the

³¹ Epilogues appear at the bottom of every page of the paper’s Bali news coverage from page 3 on 14 October, and reverse text is used consistently for them from 15 October onwards.

³² Some readers may find the affective register cloying. Consider, for example, the critical distance taken on dominant US discourses after 11 September 2001 by the demythologising protagonist of Sherman Alexie’s short story, “Can I Get a Witness?”. She deconsecrates Ground Zero: “After the Trade Center, it was all about the innocent victims, all the innocent victims.... Didn’t you get sick of all the news about the Trade Center?... It was awful and obscene, all of it, it was grief porn” (2003: 91-2).

³³ 64.8%, that is, of its articles, features and images; a comparable proportion of editorials and opinion pieces addresses the topic.

appeals of an array of largely white Australian discourses boost the victim identifications proposed: egalitarianism, sport and mateship, Anzac and innocence, plus family and community bonds. Deepening these identifications are the insistent personalisation, the continual affective appeals, the metaphysical-moral orientation, the fateful rhetoric of dramatic irony and the presentational devices of reverse text in front pages, page headers and epilogues. These strategies intensify the binding together of individual and collective described in Chapter 1 as being built into discourses of the national. The result here is that reader and text, mourner and victim, individual and nation, are enclosed in a mutually reinforcing identificatory circuit. Aside from the generic relief of the narrow escape, the heroic rescue and bravely fighting for one's life, scant respite is offered from this near-totalising closure. The paper promotes an intense, affectively and morally charged account of national belonging, even as its assimilationist premises disenfranchise large sectors of the population.

3. The *Sydney Morning Herald*: Australian casualties and mourners

The Australian Victims category accounts for 52.6% of the *Sydney Morning Herald's* coverage of the bombing. While more than half the total, this is almost 10% less than the *Daily Telegraph's*. Mourning Ceremonies add much the same as the *Daily Telegraph's* (category 5: 2.1% as against 2.2%), and the paper has no equivalent of the feature about survivors of 11 September 2001 feeling for Australians (category 6). The totals across these three content categories – 64.8% for the *Daily Telegraph* and 54.8% for the *Sydney Morning Herald* – reveal a differential of exactly 10%. This section will show that the latter paper's representations of Australian victims and mourners are qualitatively as well as quantitatively less intense than those of its counterpart.

Before comparing the *Sydney Morning Herald's* representations of Australian victims with the *Daily Telegraph's*, however, we need to consider how far the paper's target readerships bear upon its selection of Australian victims. For newspapers clearly develop and refine their textual address – how they write for their readerships – so as best to sell to their target markets. As noted above, the bulk of the *Daily Telegraph's* victims are from working-class suburbs of western and eastern Sydney. The *Sydney Morning Herald* covers broader geographical and class ranges.

Geographically, the victims in its articles extend beyond the *Daily Telegraph's* five mainland states, to report on a missing Tasmanian and a Gold Coast expatriate living in Jakarta (15 October, p4; 16 October, p2). The paper's Sydney coverage includes the same victims as in the *Daily Telegraph*, those from such working-class suburbs as Malabar, Blacktown and Tempe (eg 14 October, p3; 19

October, p6; 15 October, p3), but also enlarges on that paper's range by including many stories of victims from Sutherland Shire, from middle-class suburbs such as Caringbah, Bangor and Menai which receive only glancing attention at most in the other paper (eg 15 October, p2; 16 October, p6). In terms of occupations similarly, the paper's victims instance not only working-class jobs, including a glazier, a nurse, an electrician, a waitress and two carpenters (15 October, p7; 17 October, p5; 19 October, p6), but also many middle-class professions, such as a mortgage analyst, an IT analyst, a civil engineer, a teacher and a lawyer (15 October, p2; 16 October, p2; 19 October, p12; 15 October, p4). This inclusion of both class groupings, as indicated by suburb and occupation, suggests that the *Sydney Morning Herald's* coverage is more even-handed than the *Daily Telegraph's*, that it is less homogeneous and more pluralist, less populist and more genuinely egalitarian.³⁴ Its greater use of occupation as a descriptor of victims compared to its Sydney rival suggests that like its fellow broadsheet, the *Australian*, it views its readership as being more interested in employment status, and/or it has a more variegated view of Australian social structures.³⁵

The combination of working-class and middle-class occupations and suburbs detailed above doubtless correspond to the paper's target readerships, which include higher educational and cultural levels than those addressed by the *Daily Telegraph*.³⁶ Witness the general avoidance of vernacular – and certainly no equivalent of Lalor's demotic strain – not to mention one opinion piece quoting Marcel Proust on grief's strengthening of mental power (19-20 October, p1). In Probert's terms, the paper's class address would be partly working-class, primarily middle-class and probably extending to her "overclass". One aspect of the paper's address, pursued at greater length in the next chapter's examination of its multiculturalism, might be seen in the broader ethnic range of victims covered. Although both papers cover Kathy and Craig Salvatori and Christine Betmalik, the *Sydney Morning Herald* adds the four Sumer brothers from Kings Langley, whose given names suggest Turkish origins, and Françoise Dahan from Caringbah, and more fully covers the Golotta family from South Australia (15 October, p2; 15 October, p3).³⁷ Such multicultural concerns are

³⁴ One report on the Coogee Dolphins includes revealing information on both the team's regional composition – "Half the players hailed from rural NSW, the others were eastern suburbs beach boys who loved their 'footy', Mr Blake said yesterday" – and its class composition, mixing a greenkeeper with a stockbroker and an apprentice plumber with a wine sales representative (15 October, p5). These examples show a strikingly wider cross-section in the rugby league club than allowed for by the *Daily Telegraph's* articles, especially that celebrating working-class community in the eastern suburbs (17 October, pp8-9).

³⁵ That said, it is not obsessed with occupation. For instance, there is no mention of jobs in many articles where family grief is the key focus (eg 15 October, p3).

³⁶ As an earlier footnote indicates, approximate figures for the tertiary-educated among the readerships of the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Daily Telegraph* are respectively 55% and 24%.

³⁷ A list of the Australian dead from Bali suggests that Kuta holiday-makers were overwhelmingly of Anglo-Celtic and European descent. The 88 names include 71 of apparent Anglo-Celtic descent, six Italian, four Greek, one French, one Slavic or Turkish and five uncertain, and no names that are recognisably of Arabic or Asian descent (*Daily Telegraph*

part of a long-standing left-liberal tradition which the paper shares with its Fairfax sister paper, the *Melbourne Age*. Overall, then, although several sets of victims are treated at length in both papers – including the Salvatoris and the three football clubs, from Coogee, Perth and Forbes – a sizeable number of (mainly middle-class) victims appear only in the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s articles and not in the *Daily Telegraph*'s. Conversely, there are only a few in the latter's articles which do not figure in the former's, for example the story of survivor Dean Kefford (17 October, p4). From their selection of victims, then, the two papers represent and address constituencies of different sizes and different structures, with substantial overlap but also different class orientations.

There is a fascinating postscript to add here. One aspect of the vernacular aligns the paper more closely with the *Daily Telegraph* than with the *Australian*: it uses "mate" almost as frequently as the former and far more than the latter. Excluding its use in quotations from others, the paper's 24 uses of "mate" and its variants include three in headlines. The contexts are victimhood and rescue, and especially sport, but never a nation of "nineteen million mates". This strong identification of the rhetorics of mateship and sport suggests that the sports readership was a possible area of competition between the three papers in the Sydney market, and one appealing across the class range.

How do the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s discursive and stylistic constructions of Australian victims compare with the *Daily Telegraph*'s? Two principal discursive drivers of the latter's coverage of Australian victims are those it takes from the human interest story: the personalisation of death and suffering, and affective appeals to the reader. The *Sydney Morning Herald* adopts these less wholeheartedly than the *Daily Telegraph*. While it is a broadsheet, it is not at the *Financial Times-Wall Street Journal* end of the spectrum as described by Colin Sparks (2000a: 9-16). Targeting precise, specialised markets in much larger financial centres than Australia has, these papers eschew affective appeals and the personalisation of issues, unless the latter figures in profiles of business leaders.³⁸ As a broadsheet, then, the *Sydney Morning Herald* qualifies the *Daily Telegraph*'s approach, but does not stand it on its head. The paper counts amongst its target readerships those who would expect coverage of international, national and local politics, as well as of various social issues, from the serious, such as health, to gossip about celebrities, plus substantial sports coverage. Given its readerships, the paper's reports of victims and their families and friends, like the *Daily Telegraph*'s, do substantially adopt the mode of personalisation and are often affective in their

2008). There would appear to be a stronger correlation of ethnic background between the Kuta holidaymakers and the readership of the *Daily Telegraph* than that of the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

³⁸ The *Australian Financial Review*, Australia's closest equivalent to the *Financial Times* and the *Wall Street Journal*, in fact carries large numbers of personalised stories of Australian victims during the week.

address. Yet it *offsets* both: the personalisation is offset by many general articles about victims of the bombing, and the affective address by a far more sparing use of rhetorics of innocence and victimhood than is found in the *Daily Telegraph*, and by a lesser investment in providentialism. Each of these modifications will be analysed below. So too will the paper's sharper divergences from the *Daily Telegraph*: its reworking of dramatic irony, its indifference to the discourse of fate, its avoidance of articles consisting of mourner vox pops and its alternative readings of Australian history.

The following paragraphs examine firstly the paper's treatment of the cluster of personalisation, affective appeals and providentialism, its refusal of vox pops and then the second grouping: the substantive issues of the paper's invocations of the nation and national histories, and discourses of war, innocence and victimhood. The last of these subsumes a consideration of dramatic irony and the discourse of fate. A final section contrasts the paper's use of photography with that of the *Daily Telegraph*.

The *Sydney Morning Herald's* use of personalisation is markedly less insistent than in the *Daily Telegraph*, which devotes only 3 of its 64 articles and features on Australian victims to general rather than individualised matters (16 October, p11; 17 October, pp6, 11).³⁹ Some 14 of the *Sydney Morning Herald's* 56.5 articles on Australian victims – just under 25% – are general articles. They provide information about the forensic difficulties in identifying dead bodies (eg 15 October, p2; 18 October, p3), about the physiology and treatment of burns and the processes of triage (eg 15 October, p3; 19-20 October, p12), about insurance claims, embalming procedures and the scheduling patterns of football clubs' end-of-season Bali trips (15 October, p7; 18 October, p6; 14 October, p2).⁴⁰ Note the relative prominence given to these items, mostly run on earlier rather than later pages in the day's Bali coverage. Such informative writing valuably contextualises and generalises the personalised tales of suffering. Some of it, as on burns, can be disturbing reading, yet significantly not in a personalised way, but rather in a generalised manner applicable to many human beings in many different contexts. These articles perform a significant public education role. Items such as those on the difficulties in overseas forensic identification of bodies reflect critically, for example, on a *Daily Telegraph* opinion piece by Carly Chynoweth (19 October, pp8-9). This latter piece empathises deeply with the “overwhelming pain and grief” of Australians searching to identify the bodies of loved ones in Bali, and goes on to endorse their anger at “red

³⁹ These articles report how “war’ injuries shock surgeon”, and advise about post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety.

⁴⁰ The paper's informational, explanatory role is seen in its printing more maps and diagrams than its counterpart, for instance an illustration of how bio-engineered skin and skin grafts work to heal burns, and the air evacuation routes from Denpasar (16 October, p6; 15 October, p3).

tape” in a near-vigilanteist manner: “It seemed like every official answer was an excuse, another reason international protocol meant something couldn’t be organised. Screw international protocol.” This is perhaps an unfortunate example of the violence of “innocence” described in the previous section, an occasion where journalistic empathy with victims who are axiomatically constructed as innocent can have disturbing legal and diplomatic implications.⁴¹ On the question of personalisation, then, the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s coverage broadens, contextualises and relativises that of its comparator.

Affective appeals to the reader in both papers encourage empathetic identification with Australian victims. No single comparison of their treatment of the same victim ideally encapsulates their differences in affective address, but the following comparison illustrates some of them. It concerns Jodie Cearn, who at the time of writing, according to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, had severe burns to 90% of her body, shrapnel in her stomach, a broken right leg, an amputated left leg and a broken pelvis, and had survived two airlifts (17 October, p6). The *Daily Telegraph* additionally mentions a lost eye, collapsed lungs and kidney failure (17 October, p5).⁴²

The two papers reported on the same day. Relative to each paper’s norms, the reports evince the *Sydney Morning Herald* at its most tellingly restrained and the *Daily Telegraph* at the less sentimental end of its range. In lead sentences, Cearn’s “see-sawing battle for survival” in the *Sydney Morning Herald* becomes the more affective “amazing battle for survival” in the *Daily Telegraph*. Both lead sentences mention her being the step-daughter of Olympic gold medallist, Glynis Nunn-Cearn, though the *Daily Telegraph* headline has already mentioned the Olympic connection: “Olympian step-daughter’s fighting spirit”. That reference aside, the *Sydney Morning Herald* headline deploys a similar image: “Jodie the fighter looks to be beating the toughest odds”. The *Sydney Morning Herald* report itself is consistently calm and clinically factual, detailing the injuries described above and doctors’ prognoses at various stages. The *Daily Telegraph*’s report is rather shorter and sketchier about details and chronology. Interesting differences emerge in the choice of quotations from relatives. The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s report uses not one emotive word or affective appeal; its final paragraph quotes Cearn’s sister saying that “her heart is good because she’s still in there fighting”. Conversely, the *Daily Telegraph* reports her father’s words: “he believed that Jodie’s inner strength and the prayers of Australians were helping keep her alive”. The paper then adds: “‘I think that’s why she has made it,’ he said.” If this addition is semantically

⁴¹ The *Sydney Morning Herald* reveals that the two Denpasar-based consular staff, the target of much of the Australian anger, had, according to a spokesman, been working “‘16 and 17-hour shifts’”, and that “fourteen more had arrived within 48 hours of the bombing” (18 October, p4). The *Daily Telegraph* presents no such mitigating information explaining the officials’ actual situation, which they dismiss in terms of “red tape”.

⁴² Jodie Cearn died six days after these reports (*Sydney Morning Herald* 24 October, p8).

redundant, it is also rhetorically emphatic. As regards page layout, both papers run the story last on the page, towards the end of their Bali reports. Small photographs illustrate both articles. The *Sydney Morning Herald* shows Cearns “two weeks ago, cuddling her new nephew”. The *Daily Telegraph* does not actually show her, but rather step-mother “Glynis and Jodie’s sister greet[ing] Amanda Bool”, and does not explain Bool’s identity.⁴³ The *Sydney Morning Herald* report, then, is more rigorously neutral and rhetorically less emphatic and repetitive than the *Daily Telegraph*’s; it sources a photograph actually showing her rather than her relatives; and it makes no affective appeal to an imagined national community of the prayerful.

More generally, how does the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s affective address compare with the *Daily Telegraph*’s? In terms of Pantti’s three ways of reporting emotions, the paper reports extensively through quotation. Significantly, it has no journalists expressing their own emotions in the manner of Lalor and his two colleagues. As regards “interpreting individual and collective emotions”, it amplifies Pantti’s category with its non-sentimental selection of telling details, as on Cearns above, or, in another instance of moving restraint, on the Golotta family (15 October, p3). In these cases it adheres more than the *Daily Telegraph* to journalistically “objective” formulations. But a projective editorialising quite often skews the material to encourage affective empathy in the mourner-reader. Witness the (formulaic) hyperbole of its “Dubbo grieves” headline, the hyperbolic cliché of “the hole blown through the heart of one Geelong family by the Bali bombers”, or, illustrating an article about one of four missing bridesmaids, the large sentimental photograph captioned “Christine Betmalik’s teddy bear lies on her bed”, with her portrait laid next to it (19 October, p3; 17 October, p4; 16 October, p5). Similarly, a front-page story opens with two tense sentences with no main verb – “Six mothers gone. Their teenage daughters, stranded on the burning roof of the Sari Club” – followed by the historic present and reiteration of “They start screaming; screaming for their mothers” (16 October, p1).⁴⁴ Overall, the *Sydney Morning Herald* urges affective empathy in a less categorical and less fulsome manner than the *Daily Telegraph*. In this respect the paper *qualifies* rather than reverses the principal discursive and rhetorical emphases of its counterpart.

Providentialism remains to be considered. This affectively-oriented mode of address is less sharply articulated in the *Sydney Morning Herald* than in the *Daily Telegraph*, despite the fact that the

⁴³ On the Saturday the paper uses a substantially cropped version – face only, without nephew – of the *Sydney Morning Herald* Cearns photograph (19 October, p26).

⁴⁴ The paper devotes as much space to family and community grief as its counterpart. As indicated, the tone is less consistently intense. On the institutions of community and civil society as treated above, the *Sydney Morning Herald* includes only family, friends, football team and commemoration services; it excludes the pub and local shops mentioned by its counterpart.

paper actually prints *two* variants on the mutability of fate theme where its counterpart has only the first: it supplements the (working-class) story of Maria Elfes' missing bridesmaids with a (middle-class) doubling of misfortune tale under the headline "Holiday to beat the wedding blues" after Charmaine Whitton's "wedding plans fell through" (16 October, p5; 16 October, p6). Yet the paper generally plays down matters of providential fate. For instance, it reports of Craig Salvatori that "the last time he saw his wife [had been] at the dinner [before] the women had decided to go into town for a night of dancing", but does not embellish this with any commentary about the fatefulness of their decision (14 October, p3). No report that the paper runs about lucky escapes from the bombing is as long as the *Daily Telegraph's* double-page spread on Kayte Dodd, and the articles and photographs it does print stress not so much any element of luck, but rather the sense of relief felt by relatives (eg 17 October, pp1, 4; 19 October, p9).

The paper's editorials devote *far* less attention to Australian victims and affective empathy with them than do the *Daily Telegraph's*. For the latter paper, they are the prime concern throughout the week. Tuesday's editorial laments the "loss of life" caused by the bombing, with no national specification (15 October, p12). Only Thursday's editorial specifies Australian victims (17 October, p16). The affective investment of the three sentences is moderate: "The horror of the two blasts last Saturday endures, and the pain of loss is repeated many times in Australia as families and friends receive confirmation that their loved ones will not return. As each day passes, the hopes of many die. But against the darkness of pain and sorrow inflicted by murderers, the human spirit asserts itself." The editorial adds two paragraphs of praise for Australian volunteers and rescuers. The affective investment is clear in the sombre, compassionate tone the editorial shares with the *Daily Telegraph*, but it is far more sparing in its use of literary "amplifiers": the three sentences just quoted economically abridge the other paper's dozens of paragraphs of rhetorical variations on the theme. Also, the *Sydney Morning Herald's* editorials never mention innocence, Australian or otherwise. Where the *Daily Telegraph* editorials' primary address urges affective empathy on the reader, and constructs an imagined national community of grief, those of the *Sydney Morning Herald* address the reader in the more traditional terms cited from van Dijk: as a citizen-voter concerned with a range of political and other issues (1991: 140). As will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters, this address presumes and respects a democratic polity, whereas the other paper centrally posits a homogeneous but delimited national community. It contributes to rational public debate, rather than serving as an echo chamber for personal feelings.

It is unsurprising, then, that the *Sydney Morning Herald* shows no interest in the vox pops mode. The paper runs none of the dedicated pages of vox pops tributes and testimonials of its comparator;

indeed, these eight items almost exactly account for the difference in numbers of articles and features on Australian victims through the week: 56.5 in the *Sydney Morning Herald* as against 64 in the *Daily Telegraph*. The paper's closest approximation are two overseas (UK and US) letters printed as briefs and one short "Mother's letter" to her dead son (16 October, p4; 18 October, p2).

The *Sydney Morning Herald*'s invocations of the national in relation to Australian victims distinguish it from its competitor in two crucial respects. The first is rhetorical, the second historical. National rhetorics exhibit the idealised, unitary nation; but histories can expose the underlying fault-lines and the comforting mythologies of those rhetorics.

The *Sydney Morning Herald* is less declamatory in its national rhetorics than the *Daily Telegraph*. Recall here the first-person national address of "THESE are the faces of our dead" quoted above from the *Daily Telegraph*, whose tone approaches the direct vocative of "Your country needs you" in Lord Kitchener's famed World War One recruiting poster. The same day's *Sydney Morning Herald* heads its own front-page photographs of the missing with the rather more subdued caption: "SMILES FOREVER LOST" (15 October, p1). One of the paper's rare uses of the national "we" occurs towards the end of an article on casualty numbers, and is more reflective than declamatory in commenting that "we're ... a society, with a collective soul" (17 October, p5). In the more familiar third-person national mode of the nation/the country/Australia, the paper frequently invokes national suffering. Witness these front-page uses: the regular page header for the week, "Australia in Mourning", supplemented one day by the sub-header "National Outpouring of Grief" (15-18 October, p1; 16 October, p1). Overall, however, the paper's invocations of national mourning are less insistent and emphatic than the *Daily Telegraph*'s. It lacks its counterpart's energetic binding together of mourner and victim under the sign of national grief.

The *Sydney Morning Herald* directs its energies differently: to *opening up* histories of the nation. It was argued above that the *Daily Telegraph* deploys discourses of Australian innocence and victimhood positing a metaphysical-moral world-view. Conversely, the *Sydney Morning Herald* adopts a historical-political world-view alert to historical change and contingency. Accordingly, it offers a different historiography than its comparator's white Australian mythologies of war, innocence and victimhood. Let us consider each of these in turn. On the significance of Australia's martial traditions, the paper clearly differentiates itself from the *Daily Telegraph*. It does not invoke war in relation to Australian victims, although as Chapter 4 will show, it does use the then standard term "war on terror". The closest approach is its description of the Kingsley AFL team, who made a pact to find their fellow team members before leaving Kuta, as "brothers in

arms” (15 October, p4). It never describes Australian victims as “fallen”. It does not mention the Anzac myth, and refers to Anzac Day merely as a day of remembrance, commenting that “[o]utside of Anzac Day patriotism was not much part of our culture” (19-20 October, p1).

The paper demythologises “innocence” at the same time that it exposes the fundamental historical fault-line of Australian fictions of national unity: indigenous/settler difference. The front pages of the two papers’ Saturday editions epitomise the divergences between their constructions of innocence and mateship in relation to national histories. Whereas the *Daily Telegraph*, beneath photographs of Howard and a bereaved white Australian father, proclaims that the national population are “nineteen million mates”, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, beneath a two-thirds page photograph of Balinese mourning, runs an extended, reflective opinion piece by Tony Stephens which opens in discursively familiar terms: “The nation in mourning struggles to prise meaning from all its melancholy” (19-20 October, p1). However, the nation of which Stephens writes is different from and more inclusive than the white assimilationist nation of the *Daily Telegraph*, and brings with it a rethinking of national “innocence”. Stephens steers the argument away from invocations of innocence such as the *Daily Telegraph* offers in abundance, towards a recognition that “[w]e mourn ... if not a loss of innocence, a loss of certainty about the island continent’s safety” (19-20 October, p12). En route, significantly, he notes the frequency with which Australia has been said to have “lost” its (white) “innocence”, including the Hilton bombing and the Port Arthur and Hoddle Street massacres. He continues: “It was said of Gallipoli. It might have been said when the Aboriginal people were virtually wiped out in Tasmania.” He also cites the 1928 Coniston massacre. Although the contrast between the indicative “was” and the subjunctive “might have been” marks precisely the contemporary discursive unfamiliarity of setting massacres of (and mostly by) white Australians alongside those of black Australians (by whites), what Stephens does here is to expose the “violent innocence” referenced above, suggesting how white violence undercuts innocence, one of the key tenets of Australian mythology. His comments thus stand as a corrective to the repressions of the *Daily Telegraph*’s white history and its strenuous invocations of “innocence”.

Further, the paper *internationalises* the idea of innocence. Its Australian applications include a father describing his dead child as “innocent” and the phrase “Toll of the innocents” appearing on the same front page as Stephens’ article, announcing a full list of the dead (15 October, p3; 19-20 October, p1). And the term is reported from Howard on no fewer than five occasions in speeches reported on the Monday, Tuesday and Saturday. Yet interestingly – and here we anticipate one of the concerns of Chapter 3 – the paper also applies the term to non-Australians. It is used in a

Balinese plea that Balinese be recognised as innocent of the bombing; in a comment that the Sari Club was “not quite ... innocent” in its policy of excluding Balinese in favour of foreigners; and of Muslims killed by US invasions and bombings, as in Afghanistan (16 October, p5; 19 October, p4; 14 October, p5). Lastly, Alan Ramsey, the paper’s veteran Canberra correspondent, neatly segues from discursively familiar applications of the term “innocent” to the unfamiliar. He quotes Howard telling parliament that “[n]o cause ... can possibly justify the indiscriminate, unprovoked slaughter of innocent people”, and in commentary concludes with a reference to the government’s support for the proposed invasion of Iraq: “It never can, Prime Minister – in Bali or New York or Israel or Palestinian refugee camps or Iraq” (19-20 October, p17).

The paper also distances itself from the rhetoric and discourse of Australian victimhood. “Victim” is writ large in only one headline, on the front page of 15 October: “And still there are many, many more victims”. Otherwise it figures far less often than in the *Daily Telegraph*’s pages. It is used only seven times overall, while the more neutral “casualty” appears five times (eg 14 October, p2; 17 October, p2). Hence the appearance of the latter word in this section’s heading. The paper’s limited use of the term “victim” marks less urging of the reader to empathise with Australian victimhood.

The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s resistance to discourses of victimhood informs its treatment of the contentious question of travel advisories. The issue receives detailed examination in Chapter 5, where the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s account is compared with the *Australian*’s, but briefly the matter concerned a possible intelligence failure concerning travel advisories and a subsequent government cover-up. The *Daily Telegraph* gives the question only piecemeal and cautious coverage, such that although it might be possible to guess at the seriousness of the issue, one could barely substantiate it (eg 17 October, p3; 18 October, p26; 19 October, p20). At the end of the week, when the *Daily Telegraph* was concentrating on Howard’s Kuta visit and addressing its “nineteen million mates” (eg 17 October, p1; 18 October p1), the *Sydney Morning Herald* was devoting considerable space to travel advisories (eg 17 October, p1; 18 October p4; 19-20 October, pp2, 3, 5). The week’s revelations are summarised in a Weekend Edition article, “Why didn’t they tell us what they knew?” (19-20 October, p5). As criticism of the adequacy of travel advisory warnings escalated on the Tuesday and Wednesday, Howard, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and Attorney-General Daryl Williams all “said they had no knowledge of a United States intelligence report, based on a CIA communications intercept that mentioned Bali among targets for an impending attack just two weeks before the blast. Then, on Wednesday afternoon, Mr Howard admitted to a hushed Parliament that the Government *did* receive the US intelligence. It was

analysed by intelligence assessors, but they decided that travel warnings did not need to be upgraded” (italics original). A timeline includes details of US travel warnings: “September 26: US issues new travel warning for Indonesia, urging Americans and Westerners to ‘avoid large gatherings known to cater primarily to a Western clientele, including certain bars, restaurants and tourist areas’. October 10: US Embassy in Jakarta relays global warning of increased terrorist threat based on al-Qaeda tapes. Warns terrorists may seek ‘soft targets’ such as clubs...” (19-20 October, p5).

The present argument concerns the ways in which the paper accommodates a critical reading of the travel advisories issue. Firstly, it refuses the *Daily Telegraph*'s discourse of fate. It does not use reverse text for its cover photographs, with their fateful sense of the upsetting of the everyday, nor epilogues, with their emphatic reverse-text reiterations of typically sombre and alarming material. It likewise has a limited engagement with providential address. Where the discourse of fate naturalises the existing socio-political world, the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s approach opens up conceptual spaces for *explaining* that world. It examines at length the existing evidence about travel advisories and considers what the consequences might have been had the advice been updated. Rather than acquiescing in a fated victimhood, the paper implies that we might examine and question – among other things – the issue of travel advisories.

Secondly, dramatic irony is the means by which the paper draws attention to travel advisories as a general political issue as well as one about individual victims. As applied to individuals, the trope is adopted less regularly in the *Sydney Morning Herald* than in the *Daily Telegraph* (eg 14 October, p1; 15 October, p3; 17 October, p2). One example is the photograph captioned “Last moments: The happy smiles that cannot be extinguished”, showing some of the Coogee Dolphins who died “just hours after” it was taken (17 October, p3). Elsewhere, however, dramatic irony is used less in personalised terms but rather to underline the political issue of travel advisories. The news format which most lends itself to dramatic irony is the narrative feature story on the fateful choices leading people to their deaths in the Sari Club (19-20 October, pp6-8), the counterpart to the *Daily Telegraph*'s “fateful night” account discussed above. Here, though, the fate of Australian victims – “But fate had a different cast [for these people] unsullied by life” – is specified in political terms: “[N]o-one knew that two weeks earlier, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency had ... for the first time put Bali on the danger list. The Australian Government had not released the warning” (19-20 October, p6). This application of dramatic irony goes to explain victimhood and individual suffering in terms of (one aspect of) political causality, and directs possible responsibility for that suffering to what the paper reads as government/state withholding of intelligence.

Lastly, the *Sydney Morning Herald's* photographs of Australian victims differ somewhat from their counterpart's. They fall into the same broad generic groupings as the *Daily Telegraph's* discussed above: victims, families and friends before and after the bombing, grieving at sites of commemoration, and a few of the injured after hospital treatment. But although considerably fewer in number – 138 as against 199 – the photographs depict a broader geographic, class and ethnic range of victims and mourners. And not just of Australians: witness a visually striking image of an Indonesian woman “plac[ing] a candle in front of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta” (16 October, p5). Many of the paper's photographs evince more visual imagination than the *Daily Telegraph's*.⁴⁵ Whereas the latter uses four standard frontal, posed pictures of football teams to illustrate one article, for instance (14 October, p12), the *Sydney Morning Herald* presents a shot of the Forbes team president at the side in the foreground set against an expanse of bare grass with the club building in the background to suggest the sense of loss; and a visually rich picture of club members in a “huddle after laying a wreath at the scene of the blast”, arms on shoulders dominating the foreground, a few sad faces visible on the other side of the men's circle and the background blurred out to stress their solidarity and private grief (14 October, p3; 16 October, p9). Another visually telling arrangement illustrates the front-page article on daughters who lost mothers cited above (16 October, p1). A very large photograph shows one such daughter, Ashley Airlie, disconsolate back at home, her eyeline directing the reader to a much smaller shot of her suntanned mother brightly smiling in happier times, its edge partly superimposed on the shot of her daughter. While the *Daily Telegraph* was at pains to identify Howard with mourners on his visit to Bali – recall the front pages examined above (18, 19 October) – the *Sydney Morning Herald* presents him as far more detached, albeit appearing sad and reflective: walking with a security guard to the service, alone at what looks like the airport, and alone behind his limousine window “on his way to the memorial service” (18 October, p1; 19-20 October, p2, p5). The paper also prints slightly grimmer photographs of death and injury – though certainly no gore – in pictures of a line of body bags and of injured Australians awaiting evacuation at Denpasar airport (14 October, p3; 19-20 October, p11).

In conclusion, one vital difference between the *Daily Telegraph's* renderings of Australian victims and the *Sydney Morning Herald's* is nicely epitomised in a cartoon. This is the *Sydney Morning Herald's* sole cartoon representing Australian victims. It shows a wounded man being stretchered across airport tarmac asking on his mobile phone: “Jeez... And what did Gilly score?” (16 October,

⁴⁵ This was a time of some experimentation in press photography. Jessica Hromas' metaphorical representations of financial moods and processes for the *Australian Financial Review*, for example, were exhibited in 1997.

p16). Entitled “The spirit of Australia”, it jokingly references the mythology of a national sports obsession with a kind of larrikin spirit, and points to lighter, wittier versions of Australian identities than the other paper allows. While it does not rank cricket above the Kuta tragedy, the cartoon does allow room for irony and levity. This contrasts sharply with the seriousness, the tonal homogeneity and the near-totalising closure of the *Daily Telegraph*’s constructions of Australian victimhood, where affective empathy towards Australian victims is seemingly axiomatic and excludes all other considerations. Stylistically, the *Sydney Morning Herald* avoids the *Daily Telegraph*’s closure of emphatic reiteration, of the fateful reverse text of front-page photos and of sombre page-closing epilogues. It offsets its affective coverage of Australian victims both with the general information on, say, the physiology of burns and the regional and class composition of the Coogee Dolphins club, and by examining possible motivations behind the bombing (five analysis pieces in addition to regular editorials and opinion pieces on 14 October alone). Information and explanation, in other words, complement and qualify affective empathy. In its reader address, the paper’s predominantly neutral and dispassionate tone mark it out from the partisanship of its comparator. Its pluralist non-partisanship is evident in the demographically egalitarian coverage of victims it offers as compared with the more selectively populist *Daily Telegraph*. It likewise avoids the other paper’s populist appeals in its avoidance of vox pop tributes pages, printing only two messages from around the world to grieving families. It presumes and respects a democratic polity, and contributes to rational public debate. Discursively, the paper does not strive for any performative unity of the nation, and avoids the *Daily Telegraph*’s white assimilationist rendering of it. The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s Australia is an inclusive one which advances beyond the mythologies of white Australia and recognises the original owners of the land. It extends attributions of innocence beyond white Australian victims, to include Balinese and Muslims. Its ethnic openness is pursued in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3:
ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL DIFFERENCE
IN THE *DAILY TELEGRAPH* AND THE *SYDNEY MORNING HERALD*

The last chapter showed that for both the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sydney Morning Herald* the dominant category of the content analysis, Australian Victims, was the foundation of the central mode of address to the reader as mourner. As such, it attracted many discourses to itself. But discourses of ethnic, religious and national difference in the two papers' coverage traverse many of the smaller content categories set out in Table 1. In this chapter, the key organising principle will be the two papers' constructions of non-white ethnic, religious and national groups in Australia and overseas. Sections 2 and 3 compare the two papers' representations of Balinese and Sydney Muslims, and Sections 4 and 5 their constructions of Indonesia, the state where the bombing took place. Section 1 presents important contextualisation about mainstream Australian thinking concerning ethnic, religious and national difference at the time of the bombing. On these matters, the *Daily Telegraph's* central mode of address may be summed up as ethnocentric, the *Sydney Morning Herald's* as multicultural.

1. Mainstream Australian thinking about the foreign in 2002

This section builds on the *Sydney Morning Herald's* departures from the *Daily Telegraph's* mythologies of the nation discussed in the previous chapter. The latter paper's constructions of Australian victims demonstrate how these familiar features of the white national imaginary have a problematic relation with history. Witness the contradiction sketched above between the paper's discursive promotion of the self-innocenting Anzac myth and the historical violence of the frontier wars. This chapter draws greater attention to the histories which, in Ross Gibson's words, "help us analyse persistent contradictions" in discourses of nationalism (2002: 171).¹ The very familiarity of mythologised versions of Australian history is something of which Tony Stephens' paralleling of white and black massacres appears to be keenly aware. His careful, nuanced argument – unexceptionable opening, development through gradual accumulation of examples, judicious apposition of indicative and subjunctive in broaching the major issue of Aboriginal dispossession –

¹ "Myths help us live with contradictions, whereas histories help us analyse persistent contradictions so that we might avoid being lulled and ruled by the myths that we use to console and enable ourselves" (Gibson 2002: 171).

well illustrate the contemporary discursive difficulties of broaching such issues in the mainstream media.

Some historical contextualisation of recent racist discourses in Australia vis-à-vis “foreign” nations, ethnicities and religions is necessary here. A long-standing primary discourse in Australian identity formations and national definition is invasion anxiety. For centuries Australia’s economic, cultural and military-diplomatic attachments have been to two white, anglophone super-powers on the other sides of the world. This acute geographical-cultural anomaly has left the Australian nation and state still having difficulty engaging with the cultural, civic and religious traditions of its closer neighbours.² Jeff Lewis notes that with its “profound sense of being culturally isolated within the Asia-Pacific region ... Australia’s own history of decolonisation, immigration and foreign relations is marked by a profound invasion anxiety” (2005: 191). Invasion anxiety has a sound material basis, insofar as the “island-continent” claims sovereign rights over more waters than any other state, and it has had a long and influential history (Perera 2009: 94; Walker 1999). The sense of isolation underpinning invasion anxiety generates a particular form of racism – probably restricted to island states – which has long enabled constructions of the country’s neighbours as a threat, a source of yellow/red/brown perils (eg respectively China via Vietnam, Soviet Afghanistan, Indonesia). Racist discourses in Australia were historically entrenched by the White Australia Policy of 1901-66.³ An overview of polls about immigration taken between 1984 and 1996 shows opposition to immigration consistently in the range of 60-70% (Markus 2001: 207; cf Manne 1998: 101). In the final sentence of his 2003 *North of Capricorn*, Henry Reynolds connects the invasion anxiety of the contemporary alarms about “border protection” to the history of Aboriginal dispossession: “ancestral unease about an empty and vulnerable north continues to reside just beneath the surface of the Australian psyche” (2003: 193).⁴ Thus the repression of Aboriginal dispossession by white notions of the “empty north” returns in the anxieties of the discourse of border protection.

By the time of the Bali bombing, racist discourses, directed particularly against Asian immigrants and those of Muslim religion and Arab descent, had come to dominate public debate. This discursive development arose from a complex meshing of political and media factors – and the surprise election of independent MP Pauline Hanson and the *Tampa*’s fortuitous arrival in Australian waters (Markus 2001: 222-5).

² Alison Broinowski amply details the ensuing diplomatic difficulties in Asia (2003).

³ Ghassan Hage incisively summarises its central assumptions (2003: 52-8).

⁴ In the penultimate sentence of his *Against Paranoid Nationalism* Hage makes a similar point about Aboriginality: “[U]ntil we choose to face and deal with the consequences of our theft, it will remain the ultimate source of our debilitating paranoia” (2003: 152).

The relevant politics was that of multiculturalism. After a period of bipartisan agreement on multiculturalism lasting from 1973 to 1996, Prime Minister John Howard in his first year cut immigration programmes and abolished two major federal multicultural offices (Markus 2001: 98-9). He pointedly did not criticise Hanson's maiden speech to Parliament – “We are in danger of being swamped by Asians” – but rather defended her right to free speech, and so licensed and partially co-opted Hansonism's populist politics of grievance (Crofts 1998; Markus 2001: 99-101; Macintyre & Clark 2003: 140; Rundle 2004: 40, 61). In the anti-Muslim shadow of the events of 11 September 2001 and with the arrival of the *Tampa* in Australian waters, Howard adopted for the November election the isolationist “border protection” policy summed up in his election motto: “We decide who comes here and the circumstances in which they come” (Rundle 2001: 3; Manne 2004: 41-2; Manne and Corlett 2004: 81).⁵ David Carter suggests that his stress on monolingualism, with its insistence that immigrants learn English, pushed multiculturalism in the direction of an assimilationist “social harmony” based on “shared values” (2011: 102). Similarly, writing on multiculturalism soon after Howard's election, Mary Kalantzis and Bill Cope foresaw that “[t]he language of pluralism is to be replaced by a revived language of a singular and unitary nation” (1997: 63). This meshed closely with Howard's own approach. His preferred “sources of Australia's national identity ... great traumatic events, such as Gallipoli, and ‘long usage and custom’, such as our tradition of ‘informal mateship and egalitarianism’”, Judith Brett writes, “are problematic in relation to recent immigrants” (2003: 196). Mick Dodson is more critical, describing Howard's “essentially divided conception of Australia as a mainstream community with shared values under siege from minorities such as Aboriginal peoples” (2004: 132).⁶ After the 2001 “border protection” election, Robert Manne discerns in Howard's cultural agenda a “transition from old-style Australian liberalism to a kind of conservative populism.... [A] different kind of political culture had been born” (2004: 44).

⁵ Clearly, Prime Minister John Howard was not solely responsible for many developments under his watch, though many have argued that he was an adept exploiter of opportunities (Rundle 2001; Marr and Wilkinson 2003; Quiggin 2004: 180). He was well attuned to what he called “mainstream Australia” through listening to commercial talkback radio, and preferred to speak on it rather than at press conferences (Ward 2002). Steve Mickler critically comments that this outlet “is the least likely to entail serious criticism of any claims to be ‘in the national interest’ or in the service of ‘ordinary Australians’” (2004: 97).

⁶ Andrew Markus makes a similar critique, arguing against Howard's criticisms of “political correctness” while promoting a unitary, rather than pluralistic cultural polity (2001: 200, 104). Damien Cahill elaborates the idea of a “new-class” discourse which “has provided the Australian right with the rhetorical arsenal to demonise opponents of neo-liberalism” (2004: 77). The shifts in multicultural politics were accompanied by declining recognition of Aborigines. On three key issues, as Mick Dodson argues, the Howard government “cut away at the protection of native title” in its legislation following the 1996 High Court Wik decision; responded with “minimal acknowledgements and copious extenuations” to the 1997 “Stolen Children” Report; and rejected the central proposals of the 2000 Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation Report, in particular “a formal apology to Indigenous peoples for past injustices” (2004: 124, 130, 135; National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families 1997).

Correlatively in the media, new vernacular television genres such as lifestyle, variety, home improvements and reality television were rating highly at the turn of the millennium, promoting an ethnocentric focus on the local, the everyday, the domestic, the familiar and the familial (P Bell 1998). Moreover in this period, as Carter points out, there was “a formidable consolidation of neo-conservative opinion-making, integrated with government and sections of the media, if not in unprecedented ways, then certainly in a powerful convergence of interests” (2004: 23). The nation’s prime exemplar of the fourth estate, the ABC, came under particular attack from the Howard government, influential conservative columnists, and commercial radio talkback hosts such as Alan Jones.⁷ Campaigns from the last two groups were increasingly pushing public discourses of the nation in ethnocentric directions.⁸ As a result, according to Graeme Turner, “[s]ince 1996 we have seen the mainstreaming of the attack on multiculturalism, on cultural pluralism and the ethics of social justice” (2003: 414).

Some results of this complex of political and media factors are set out in Peter Manning’s valuable analysis of Sydney newspapers’ 2000-02 reporting on Arab and Muslim people, which exposes extensive racism in constructions of asylum seekers, Lebanese “rape gangs” and many other news topics involving ethnicity and foreignness (2004).⁹ His study draws conclusions which many would find disturbing. One is the more than six-fold increase in the newspapers’ correlations of the terms “Muslim/Islam” and “extremist/fundamentalist/terrorist” (and their derivatives) after the events of 11 September 2001 as compared with before (2004: 12). Another is the frequent, unnecessary and prejudicial addition of the descriptor “Muslim” to “Indonesia” (2004: 43). “Foreigners”, inside and outside Australian borders, were increasingly constructed as a threat. It seemed that despite the development of multiculturalism promoted by the Hawke-Keating governments of 1983-96, a new discourse of white Australia – though not an official policy – was asserting itself. In this period Ghassan Hage notes several factors which “revived ... the old paranoid fears of cultural extinction”: worsening economic conditions for many, increased Asian immigration, the Labor government’s

⁷ A salient rhetorical strategy was to “to speak on behalf of ordinary Australians” as against certain “social elites” (Lucy and Mickler 2006: 5-6; cf Ester 2007: 109-22).

⁸ The cultural nationalism of disenchantment with party politics described in Chapter 1 finds a particular outlet in commercial talkback. Mickler argues that the rise of “talkback-radio populism from the mid-1980s was a response to [the effects of] financial deregulation, privatisation and economic rationalism [on] unemployment and underemployment, job insecurity and declining working conditions” (2004: 98). Its power lies in the fact that for those negatively affected by neo-liberalism “talkback is activist [in] that it can appear to function as an extra-parliamentary political leadership of whole sections of society” (2004: 102). Of the right commentariat, Manne criticises it as “increasingly strident” in this period. He maintains that Rupert Murdoch, whose News Ltd press outlets host most of these views, and which “presently owns 70 per cent of the mainstream press in Australia ... has self-consciously used his media power to promote the ideas of American neo-conservatism across the globe” (2005a: 2; also McKnight 2005a).

⁹ The papers include the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The period studied stops just short of the Bali bombing.

positive response to the 1993 High Court Mabo judgement and republicanism's threat to old, familiar ties with the UK monarchy (2003: 61-2). Andrew Markus observes that with "Pauline Hanson's victory in the 1996 federal election race-based nationalism reclaimed a central place in public life, a position it had not occupied since the political demise of Robert Menzies and Arthur Calwell in the mid-1960s" (2001: 146). This resurgence of racist discourses does not represent the totality of discourses on race within the cultural formation at the time of the Bali bombing, but it does represent the dominant or at least the most prominent strain. Writing in 2003, Turner regards this resurgence with some alarm: "[W]here multiculturalism provided a kind of hermeneutic that educated Australians about difference and assisted in the process of negotiating how they might live with it, there is no such hermeneutic in place now – and little sign of one on the horizon" (2003: 416).

How does the resurgence of racist discourses work in practice? Crucially, it articulates concerns about "foreigners" – overseas and in Australia – by positing and addressing a "homely" Australian, one who feels, or feels that they ought to feel, a comfortable sense of national belonging. The discourse of nation-as-home finds its *locus classicus* in Hanson's maiden parliamentary speech: "[I]f I can invite whom I want into my home, then I should have the right to have a say in who comes into my country" (1996). As George Lakoff notes, metaphor – and likewise metonymy – can powerfully frame our thinking: "What metaphor does is limit what we notice, highlight what we do see, and provide part of the inferential structure that we reason with" (1991: 8). The representation of the nation as if it were one's "home" is discursively potent enough – speaking literally – to collapse state and nation into the private space of the home. Underwriting this referential elasticity are powerful connotations of "familiarity, security and community [since] 'home' refers more to a structure of feelings than a physical, house-like construct.... The discourse of 'home' is one of the most pervasive and well-known elements of nationalist practices" (Hage 1998: 39-40).¹⁰ In Hage's analysis, the discourse of nation-as-home allows for the articulation less of a traditional, colonial mode of racism founded on a belief in "natural" racial superiority, than of an anxious feeling among white Australians of declining influence as regards non-white immigration, a Hansonite sense of its unhomely threat to their "governmental ... fantasy [as] guardians of the national order" (1998: 46, 48, 55).¹¹ This anxiety arguably marks the return of the

¹⁰ Perhaps significantly, by far the most successful locally-produced Australian film of this period was *The Castle* (1997), whose white battlers' home is comedically saved from resumption by being defended in court precisely as a "home, not a house".

¹¹ As argued in Chapter 1, such national identifications can be a "refuge" (Castells 2004 [1997]: 70). For driving this racialising of the nation may well be many *non*-racial factors. I have argued elsewhere that the scatter-gun of grievances animating Hansonism includes substantial material influences on everyday life, many resulting from neo-liberal policies and practices – a felt decline of control over availability and conditions of employment, declining social, health, welfare and educational services, and so on – for which, given that skin pigmentation and physiognomy

repressed of ethnic difference – whether Aboriginal or Asian – referenced above in connection with invasion anxiety. Indeed, the unhomely translates Sigmund Freud’s *Unheimliche*, the “unhomely/uncanny”, with its stress on the mechanism of repression as a crucial means of avoiding anxiety:

[T]his uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression.... [I]t was the anxiety that made the repression.... [T]he essence of repression lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it a distance from the conscious (1987 [1919]: 363-4; 1973 [1933]: 118; 1984 [1915]: 147).¹²

The effort of repressing the anxiety surely informs the hyperbole of fears of “invasion”, of “illegal” asylum seekers, of being “swamped by Asians”, fears historically underwritten by long-standing invasion anxieties.¹³ The imagined “purity” of a Hansonite national order rests on a notion of “non-contamination” across borders and within suburbs. In statements like “I’ve got nothing against Asians, but they just don’t fit in here”, the grounds for exclusion are couched in cultural rather than explicitly racial terms. The nation is thereby racialised, without reference to, say, skin colour, as instanced above in the *Daily Telegraph*’s white assimilationist rendering of “nineteen million” national mourners.

The discursive mechanism producing this imagined whiteness of the nation can be seen as what Roland Barthes calls “ex-nomination”. It defines whiteness as the ethnic class “which does not want to be named” (1957: 225).¹⁴ It naturalises whiteness as the ethnic status which need *not* name itself. Whiteness thus attains default status. So indeed the nation is racialised. What this discursive manoeuvre does culturally, socially and politically is to repress the idea of ethnic difference and to disregard non-white ethnicities. It seeks to render invisible those constituencies within the population of “nineteen million” who would dispute its naturalised “truth”.

are such obvious markers of difference, non-white immigration could provide a convenient scapegoat (Crofts 1998: 8-9; cf Probert 2001: 41; Brett 2003: 167-75).

¹² Ken Gelder and Jane Jacobs apply arguments about the uncanny in relation to Aboriginality (1998: 23-7). Constructing non-whites as “bad objects” would constitute, in Melanie Klein’s account, a primary mode of defence against the anxiety generated by the threat they are perceived to represent; and the mental constructs involved are what she calls “imagos ... a phantastically distorted picture of the real objects upon which they are based” (1952: 199-203; 1950 [1934]: 282).

¹³ Compounding the sense of invasion is a discourse of victimhood. Sara Ahmed observes in a UK context how metaphors of swamp, flood and overwhelming “create associations between asylum [seekers] and loss of control and hence work by mobilising fear, or the anxiety of being overwhelmed by the actual or potential proximity of others” (2004: 46).

¹⁴ In Barthes’ example, the bourgeoisie is the social class which naturalises itself *as* the nation.

This disregarding of ethnic difference, whether within the nation or between nations, marks an *ethnocentric* mode of thinking. It becomes a *sotto voce* mode of racism. Such thinking patrols national borders and excludes the foreign as being of no interest in and of itself. In shrivelling mental maps of the world to Australia and an undifferentiated remainder, this indifferent *ignoring* may lack the detailed (if partial) description of the “other” characterising orientalist studies (Said 1978); nonetheless, it still conforms to the standard racialised binary separating “us” from “them” and asserting the former’s superiority over the latter (Martin-Rojo 1995: 50), here the familiar national home (to be protected) over the foreign other (to be excluded or rendered invisible). There is a kind of (white) national cultural solipsism at work here, whereby the wilful ignoring, or wishing away, of the “foreign” denies non-Australians and non-white Australians both humanity and agency. In this frame of thinking, foreigners signify only *in relation to* white Australians. The foreign other matters, it would seem, only insofar as it may threaten “us at home”. The naturalised whiteness of ex-nomination, then, reinforces the discourse of nation-as-home to address Australian citizens and residents as being ethnocentric and white.¹⁵ It is this mode of address which is principally disengaged in the following analysis of the *Daily Telegraph*’s constructions of national/ethnic/religious groups, while the more familiar, explicit self/other structures will bulk larger in the following chapter on terrorism.

2: The *Daily Telegraph* on Bali and Sydney Muslims: lonely on the planet?

The most striking figures in Table 1 are surely those in categories 3 and 4: the 263 news/feature items and images the *Daily Telegraph* devotes to Australian victims as against zero treating victims of other nationalities.¹⁶ The absolute ethnocentrism this evidences is barely qualified by a tiny handful of passing references to other countries’ victims in reports focussing centrally on other topics, one of the longest being: “Most of the non-Australian victims were tourists from Japan and Europe” (14 October, p2; cf 14 October, p6; 18 October, p8). Again, a handful of non-Australian eyewitnesses to the destruction are quoted (eg 14 October, pp8-9, 21; 15 October, p11).¹⁷ It may be salutary to recall that although 88 Australians died, so too did 38 Indonesians, predominantly Balinese, 27 Britons, 7 Americans, 6 Germans, 5 Swedes and 30 people from 17 other nations

¹⁵ As Julia Kristeva points out, many states deny citizenship status to many residents, such as guest-workers and asylum-seekers (1988: 140-51). Also, Hage’s “white nation fantasy”, being an often *aspirational* mental construct, may be subscribed to by many with non-white skin pigmentation (1998: 57-60).

¹⁶ It may be relevant to note that in late 2002 the *Daily Telegraph*’s foreign news followed the astrology page after the op-ed section, and ran from one to three tabloid pages in length.

¹⁷ In terms of Mourning Ceremonies (category 5), Australians dominate the articles, and the few non-Australians shown in the photographs are white-skinned Canadians and Norwegians rather than Balinese (14 October, p13; 16 October, p9).

(Wikipedia 2011; Encyclopaedia Britannica 2014). Flying in the face of these human figures, the *Daily Telegraph* in these two major content categories of victims of the bombing addresses its reader not as an Australian citizen of the world – compare the *Sydney Morning Herald* in the next section – but as an ethnocentric Australian exclusively concerned with “home”.

The *Daily Telegraph*'s ethnocentric address is illustrated in this section by its reporting of Balinese, while a certain sensitivity to problems of religious/ethnic difference will be seen in its account of Muslim reactions to an attack on a religious school in Sydney's western suburbs. Its representations of Indonesia will be examined in Section 4 below.

As regards the Balinese, the paper clearly differentiates Bali from Indonesia. The former features as a favourite destination for Australian holidaymakers; the latter as the state blamed, in line with the US diplomatic view, for harbouring terrorists. In religion Bali is predominantly Hindu, Indonesia predominantly Muslim. Bali is widely seen in the Australian imaginary as “our island of domesticated exotica” (Vickers 2003: 107). Its cultural-religious predispositions to deference readily accommodate an international tourist economy (Lewis 2005: 175-6). Kuta being so tourist-oriented that Australian holidaymakers need learn no Balinese and can settle bills in Australian dollars, it figures in the *Daily Telegraph* as a kind of Bateman's Bay in the tropics. An editorial on the first day of reporting the bombing maintains that Bali “has a place in our hearts. For many it is the first overseas holiday, a rite of passage for young Australians” (14 October, p20).¹⁸ While the paper does not “other” Bali, and while it is a tourist home-away-from-home, Bali is nevertheless not home, not Australia, so the paper's renderings of the island's residents repay careful and detailed attention.

Bali's liminal status is marked in two distinct kinds of coverage, of the Sari Club on the one hand, and of the island's residents on the other, the contrast pinpointed in the paper's allocation of no less than 6.2% of its articles and images to the club and its cultural significance for Australians, and none to the Balinese who died there (categories 2 and 4). Converging in the two accounts quoted below are, first, a feeling of cultural entitlement akin to *sahib* culture in British colonial India and, second, discourses of egalitarianism, mateship and a hedonistic leisure/holiday culture whose sense of licence was captured in the title of Ronald Conway's *Land of the Long Weekend* (1978).¹⁹

¹⁸ This idea recurs quite often in the paper (eg 14 October, p13), but only once in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (19-20 October, p2), suggesting that the culture of Kuta appeals in varying degrees to the different newspaper readerships.

¹⁹ This culture is supported by an open-air lifestyle, and by beach and sporting cultures. It also carries strong connotations of innocence reinforcing those already associated with the paper's constructions of Australian victimhood examined above.

Australia's little piece of paradise lost ... Bali these days is considered almost a satellite Australian state.... This annual pilgrimage of sun, sex and super-sized beers has been halted by the Kuta bombing (16 October, p35).

In its own way the bombing of the Sari Club is an attack as symbolic for generations of Australians as the destruction of the World Trade Centre is to Americans. [It was the] symbolic centre of Australian holiday culture ... which embodies the heart of Australian attitudes. The Sari Club was a democracy of beer and T-shirts ... businessman and brickie, 10-visit Indo-veterans and package tour innocents (15 October, pp6-7).

These whole-hearted accounts seem untroubled in appropriating Bali as a "satellite Australian state" or "symbolic centre of Australian holiday culture"; and the club's egalitarian "democracy" is for Australians only: "locals are not admitted" and "crowd around the front offering 'transport', 'grass', 'hashish', 'woman'" (14 October, p8; 19 October, p29).

The Balinese exclusion from this centre of Australian holiday culture is reinforced in one of the articles just quoted, which fails to consider Balinese livelihoods alongside the perceived threat to "\$12 million in commission to Australian travel agents" (16 October, p35). After all, reasonable journalistic questions would ask the club's manager and owner to comment on the deaths of their employees, the property destruction and the effect on their tourist industry.²⁰ The sheer number of photographs, twenty in all, of the destroyed Sari Club contrasts with the invisibility of Balinese victims and mourners in the paper.²¹ It could license a reading that damage to this site – a metonym, perhaps, for Australian senses of hedonism, entitlement and victimhood – ranks above that to Balinese people. "Locals", the term regularly used to designate Balinese, has connotations somewhere between patronising and dismissive. It is applicable in any "foreign" country, and denies any cultural specificity. It also affords no sense of Balinese as hosts. Overall, an ethnocentric sense of entitlement and an "innocently" hedonistic culture of "dancing and partying" (14 October, p8) take precedence over a recognition of the newsworthiness of Kuta's Balinese residents.

²⁰ Jeff Lewis points out that "[a]round 30,000 Balinese lost their jobs as a immediate effect of the bombings, and a mood of desperation fell across the island" (2005: 183). The newspaper makes a few references to the financial impact on the Balinese tourist industry (eg 14 October, p20), but none to those working within it.

²¹ The paper memorialises the destruction of the Sari Club in several before-and after photographic pairings. Supplementing this is a rhetoric of the transformation of Bali from paradise to hell: the front-page caption-cum-title "INSIDE HELL", or "Doctor flies into the jaws of hell" (16 October, p1; 17 October, p11).

How are Balinese constructed across other content categories? One role is as helpers in the central drama of Australian victimhood, including rescuing Australians (eg 18 October, p27). They are constructed also as occasional exotic backdrop, as in “Balinese locals conducted a Hindu prayer ceremony” (14 October, p13). The sole article about Balinese appeared on the Wednesday. It concerns their work as volunteers at the morgue (category 16). Entitled “Bali comes out to help in the chaos” – almost as if this were the only such instance – it is one of the few occasions where residents are given a voice: “You have to do something” (16 October, p11).²² By contrast with the *Daily Telegraph*, Dewi Anggraeni records many volunteers’ probably heroic assistance to the injured several days before this report; they include Kuta’s traffic chief and three Denpasar-based journalists (2003: 91-2, 31-4).²³ One role which the paper does clearly recognise, re-printing it as an epilogue, is that of the embarrassed host: “Bali is not supposed to be like this. Everyone’s sad,” says one man (16 October, p8). One might wonder what space the paper accords to Balinese beyond the roles of helper, volunteer, exotic backdrop and embarrassed host – all roles axiomatically, ethnocentrically organised around Australian tourist-victims.

Significantly, the paper does not recognise Balinese medical professionals, seeing them as part of an emergency medical system that fails adequately to serve Australian needs. It thus makes no mention of the work of medical staff at Sanglah Hospital and clinics in Denpasar coping with a surely unprecedented influx of wounded desperately needing attention. Instead, an Australian homecoming narrative is deployed – “Air force lifts our injured home to safety” – while the Denpasar wards “were mosquito-ridden and stank of urine” (14 October, p7; 15 October, p8-9).²⁴ Underlining the values of the national “home” is a quotation used as an epilogue, in reverse text: “We’ve got to get them back here for some proper medical treatment” (14 October, p6). Probably informing these constructions of Bali hospitals was the anger experienced by bereaved Australian relatives about gaining access to identify bodies, and about the lengthy bureaucratic requirements for the correct identification of corpses. The reality of this felt anger is reiterated by *Sydney Morning Herald* reports, notably involving Craig Salvatori (17 October, p1). As seen in the last chapter, Carly Chynoweth’s piece in the *Daily Telegraph* virtually licenses a vigilanteist response (19 October, pp8-9), whereas the *Sydney Morning Herald* articles explain the reasons for the delays.

²² This occurs only four other times in the week’s coverage (14 October, p 9; 16 October, pp7, 8; 18 October, p5). The first of these is quoted solely as an eye-witness to the destruction. The last two, however, are printed as epilogues, one affirming the importance of “respecting others”.

²³ The *Daily Telegraph*’s limited attention to Balinese may find explanations in its primary concern with Australian victims and/or in its reporters’ linguistic ignorance of Bahasa Bali and Bahasa Indonesian. In the latter respect, it may be significant that the Bounty Hotel, location of a story about unclaimed luggage, was managed by an expatriate Australian, and that a family of Balinese Muslims briefly reported mourning for the bombing victims included an Australian-born wife, Glenis (17 October, p16; 19 October, p3).

²⁴ One could pause to speculate whether, if they had been Australian, the hospital, rescue and fire workers would have been heroised as was the New York Fire Department after 11 September 2001.

In political coverage, Balinese and their deaths are acknowledged once in passing in a report on Australian political responses: Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri goes to Bali “to offer condolences for the deaths of her people”; and on one atypical occasion, they are referred to on a par with Australian deaths: “[T]he Balinese, the delightful people of the resort ... also are wailing for their dead” (14 October, pp10, 20). In her article on her lucky escape from the bombing, student Kayte Dodd expresses a refreshingly non-patronising and genuinely human empathy with the people of Kuta: “I gave the hotel employees the money I had left, but what’s that? They don’t deserve this. That night will have a huge effect on them” (15 October, p7). The paper’s general approach, though, is signalled in the elisions in the 14 October editorial’s lament for the loss of Australian life, where the first-person plurals are exclusively Australian: “It makes little difference that the attacks were on Indonesian soil; our tears flow for the innocent victims. We also cry for the fact that we, too, have lost our innocence” (p20).

The paper’s deployment of ethnocentrism, ex-nomination and the discourse of the nation-as-home generates some interesting differentiations of national belonging in Kuta as between Balinese, Australians and other nationalities. The ethnocentric naturalisation of Australians in the editorial just quoted admits victims of other nationalities, including Balinese, only as an unnamed, possible sub-category of “the innocent victims”. There is a parallel naturalisation of Australian belonging in the description of a “German student [who] was one of many international visitors” to the Kuta commemoration site (16 October, p8). Australians are *not* deemed “international visitors”. They are ex-nominated and consequently naturalised in their home-away-from-home, in their “satellite state”. The discourse of nation-as-home – and its repressions – amplify and complicate these assertions in the long Saturday feature article by Peter Lalor. Among Kuta tourists from the (largely white) Sydney suburb of Malabar, like the Salvatoris, he writes about a strong sense of community, and also addresses such a community with his vernacular and familiar, second-person address: “They kept bumping into people who knew people who knew people, it could be your own suburb some nights here” (19 October, p27). Yet this reassuring homeliness is uneasily articulated against two kinds of foreignness. For ethnic difference seemingly haunts this white community both at home and abroad: “Sometimes it seems there’s [*sic*] more European-Australians in the Sari Club than in some suburbs of Sydney and Melbourne. They don’t let the locals in” (19 October, p29). The instant, fearful slide here between strongly immigrant Australian suburbs and Balinese suggests deep anxieties for the paper’s favoured tourist-victims and its readers.

We can conclude that the ethnocentric thinking outlined above denies Balinese agency, and so ignores their humanity, individuality and experience. In this frame of thinking, foreigners signify only *in relation to* Australians. Balinese are allowed certain roles, constructed around the Australian tourist-victim, but their agency and status as professional medical experts, for example, is seemingly overridden by the discursive requirements of articulating Australian victimhood and mourning. The attribution of at least some roles to Balinese makes of this a positive form of ethnocentrism, as compared with that applied to Indonesia, as seen below.

The paper extends this mode of ethnocentrism to embrace certain chosen nations on its imaginary map of the world, to those nations which “are most like us”. Thus the paper places prominently on an op-ed page, with his photograph, the thoughts for Australians of a US man whose wife died on 11 September 2001 (category 6; 19 October, p21). And under the header “Sharing our Grief”, an “Emails from around the world” item includes seven emails from the USA, one from Canada and one from South Africa – together with three from Australian expatriates (17 October, p13). The paper welcomes overseas recognition of Australian victimhood from these three territories, which could be thought of as white, anglophone and historically linked to the UK (even though whites and anglophones in South Africa are demographically outnumbered).²⁵ In similar vein, it may be recalled that white-skinned Canadians and Norwegians were the most prominent non-Australians in the paper’s photographs of mourners. Nevertheless, while whites and anglophones are welcomed onto the paper’s pages as *mourners* for Australians, the paper gives detailed attention to only one casualty of the bombing from these countries (27 Britons were killed, 2 Canadians and 2 South Africans; Wikipedia 2011). This is the British boyfriend of an Australian student, Hanabeth Luke: “the dreamy end of their holiday became a hellish nightmare” (17 October, p4). One might conclude that the non-Australian victim is admitted to the *Daily Telegraph*’s pages only by virtue of being romantically linked to an Australian mourning her loss.

In sum, the *Daily Telegraph* addresses its reader and organises its representations of Balinese and preferred non-Australians through the filters of a naturalised whiteness and an ethnocentric nationalism made widely available by the cultural imaginary of Australia at the turn of the millennium. Yet Bali’s “satellite state” role and the perceived whiteness of certain other nations gives this ethnocentrism a positive inflection.

²⁵ That the paper so welcomes overseas recognition might mark what used to be called “cultural cringe” and what might now be called an ongoing post-colonial anxiety (“post-” in the historical sense).

Fascinatingly, the paper's one article during the week demonstrating concern about religious/ethnic prejudice deals precisely with one *result* of ethnocentric ways of thinking. To mix a couple of metaphors, this is rather like chickens coming home to roost, then shutting the stable door too late! The article concerned is that comprising category 19, Australian Race Hate. Under the headline "Muslims live in fear", it reports that "Sydney Muslims are sleeping overnight in local mosques to escape race hate attacks in the wake of the Bali bombings" (17 October, p11). It appears second of three articles on page 11, almost at the end of the day's Bali coverage, and consists of only four sentences. It does not interview the victims – I use the word advisedly – nor does it elaborate on their experience. Only in its final sentence does it mention "an apparent race-related attack on an Islamic school in Sydney's west this week". Unlike the previous day's report in the *Daily Telegraph*'s sister paper, the *Australian* (16 October, p2), it gives no details of the attack on Imam Ahmed Shabbir's residence and school in Rooty Hill. The lack of details, notably of name and place, and the distancing "apparent" surely seek to undercut the event's ethnic significance. Nevertheless, the article does speak, not of Australians in the white assimilationist manner discussed above, but of an under-represented and frequently misrepresented sector of the Australian population, namely fearful Muslim-Australians. Unlike any other article in the *Daily Telegraph*, this one addresses a concerned non-ethnocentric citizen in much the same manner as articles in the *Sydney Morning Herald* examined in the next section. However, this one brief article is both evasive about the issue of racism and massively outweighed by the paper's overwhelmingly ethnocentric mode of address.²⁶

This anomalous article arguably exposes a contradiction between the paper's routine assumption of an ethnocentric whiteness and what one would take to be its felt need to report news from Sydney's western suburbs, a very significant sales area and one which is home to most of the city's Arabs/Muslims. The paper appears to acknowledge this community in its Letters pages, which include a fair sprinkling of writers with Arabic names, and some who write very movingly about the everyday experience of racism (eg 17 October, p37). Its 19 October editorial criticises "random attacks on people because of their race or religion" (p20). However, the linguistic constructions here are questionably vague. In failing to specify as Arab/Muslim the "people" being attacked and also, as in the "race hate" article, in nominalising "attacks" – that is, removing any sense of agency from the action described (Fairclough 2000: 26) – the editorial leaves the (presumed white) perpetrators unspecified and unaccountable, linguistically almost exonerated.

²⁶ The Rooty Hill attack was only the beginning of an anti-Muslim backlash. A week later the paper printed a much longer, illustrated article, "Bali bombs spark 40 attacks on Muslims" (28 October, p6).

3. The *Sydney Morning Herald* on Bali and Sydney Muslims: multicultural and cosmopolitan Australia

The *Sydney Morning Herald*'s representations of Australian victims were characterised in the last chapter as being similar to, but less intense than the *Daily Telegraph*'s. By contrast, the differences between the two papers' representations of Balinese and Sydney Muslims are closer to being diametrically opposed. Where the *Daily Telegraph* resolutely assumes a monocultural, ethnocentric conception of a white Australia with scant regard for the foreign, the *Sydney Morning Herald* works from a multicultural and cosmopolitan conception of Australia which acknowledges cultural difference and cultural pluralism within and beyond its borders. Although such a conception may be a minority viewpoint relative to the resurgent racist discourses which inform the *Daily Telegraph*, it nevertheless accords with a substantial majority of recent scholarly literature about the nation and the polity.²⁷

The *Sydney Morning Herald* therefore by-passes the underlying conceptual structure of its counterpart's representations of Balinese: the complex of the discourses of invasion anxiety and nation-as-home, with the accompanying ex-nomination of the non-white, and the resulting ethnocentric mode of address.²⁸ The multicultural paradigm allows for, indeed encourages, empathy with the non-Australian and the non-white Australian. Instead of constructing the foreign exclusively in relation to the Australian, the *Sydney Morning Herald* extends empathy, understanding and compassion to Balinese and to those in Australia whom the *Daily Telegraph* might seem to wish away. Instead of an Australian cultural solipsism, the paper attributes agency and selfhood to Balinese. They are no longer confined to the servicing roles of helper or volunteer, but are recognised in many roles including as medical professionals. A discourse of common humanity replaces binaries of ethnic, religious and national divisiveness.

The differences between the papers are most apparent in the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s treatment of two areas of Bali which the *Daily Telegraph* marks respectively as "home" and "not-home", namely the Sari Club and the local hospitals. Where the Sari Club attracts 26 items (6.2%) of the *Daily Telegraph*'s news coverage, it attracts only 2 items (0.5%) of the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s. The

²⁷ Amongst many others, Eva Cox and John Keane, Graeme Turner, Francis Castles et al and Scott Poynting et al advance non-ethnocentric, cosmopolitan and pluralist ways of thinking (1995; 2003; 2003; 1988; 2004). Applying these principles specifically to the Bali bombing are, for instance, Carmen Lawrence (2006: 127) and Anthony Burke (2008: 240-44). Peter Manning points to ways of thinking less racist journalism (2004: 27).

²⁸ In the context of the attack, the *Sydney Morning Herald* uses "home" in its page headers "Terrorism Strikes Home" but does not adopt the conceptual structure of the nation-as-home.

paper includes only one elegy for the club. This is a noticeably less fulsome celebration than the *Daily Telegraph*'s "satellite state" renderings: "[F]or young Australians, the Sari Club was always a fun place to be.... The mood was always light-hearted, if hardly sophisticated" (16 October, p4).²⁹ The paper sees the Sari Club not as a lost "home", a memorial to Australian hedonism and entitlement, but rather as a place where Balinese worked, and which contributed vitally to the Balinese economy.

Accordingly, the *Sydney Morning Herald* offers its reader three dedicated articles on tourism in Bali, as well as many observations in other articles (category 20; 14 October, p6; 15 October, p7; 19-20 October, p4); the *Daily Telegraph* offers no dedicated articles, and when it mentions the topic, it speaks of the bombing's effects on Australian tourism operators rather than on Balinese owners and employees (eg 16 October, p35). The *Sydney Morning Herald*'s coverage is both general and statistical, and also personalised:

a crippling blow to a national economy that has been mired in depression for four years (14 October, p6).

Bali is preparing for a devastating drop in tourist income after only recently recovering from the slump that followed the September 11 terrorist attacks.... [F]our out of six people in Bali depend on tourism for their livelihood (15 October, p7).

Sintha Mahardani, 18, has not made a single sale [in the six days] since Saturday's tragedy – even with the booth open until 11pm (19-20 October, p4).

Illustrating the last article, a large photograph fills the centre of the page. It shows Mahardani at her stall, with an expression of tense despair. The paper also sympathetically interviews the owners of both the Sari Club and Paddy's Irish Club, Soeprobo and Kadek Wiranatha (16 October, p5; 18 October, p5); the *Daily Telegraph* interviews neither. Wiranatha, Bali's largest employer, is reported as being upset though philosophical about his business prospects. The paper notes his empathy with his staff, "sitting with families of the wounded at a hospital. [He] cannot believe his good fortune. 'I thank God ... I didn't lose any of my staff although I understand around 40 tourists died in Paddy's'" (18 October, p5).³⁰ He is quoted in a headline: "Please understand that 'the

²⁹ Especially in its (culturally snobbish?) concern about "sophistication", such a comment highlights the two papers' different readerships.

³⁰ Paddy's Irish Club is curiously overlooked in all three papers' coverage. In an early report the *Sydney Morning Herald* describes Paddy's as "popular with Indonesians", and later reports that "up to 40 tourists died" there (October

Balinese are innocent” (16 October, p5). In these accounts of the two clubs and of Kuta tourism, the paper clearly establishes that their “home” is indeed in Bali rather than in an Australian offshore protectorate.

In describing Bali hospitals, the *Daily Telegraph* deploys a homecoming narrative which locates “home” squarely in Australia, and consistently derogates the quality of Bali’s medical services, with no regard to the unprecedented circumstances prevailing. In one report the *Sydney Morning Herald* sets the circumstances in perspective. It quotes Alexis Gray, a former trauma nurse at the Royal Melbourne Hospital who lives in Bali: “Even the Royal Melbourne and the [Sydney Royal Prince] Alfred would have been overwhelmed, especially with something out of the blue like this.... So many people, so many languages, so many terrible injuries. It’s impossible” (15 October, p7). The paper presents a fuller and appreciably less partial coverage of the topic than its counterpart. Across five articles discussing how Bali’s hospitals coped with the crisis, the *Sydney Morning Herald* prints a few critical comments, such as referring to “Bali’s chaotic hospital system” and “Sanglah’s primitive morgue” (14 October, p2; 16 October, p3). Yet these are outweighed by many positive comments, including the realistic appraisal of “a Third World medical system creaking under the weight of a severe medical emergency” (19-20 October, p11). Even an article headlined “Nation’s [Australia’s] hospitals on full alert as evacuation of casualties begins” remains studiously non-judgemental about Bali’s hospitals, and resists any homecoming narrative (15 October, p3). Unlike the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Sydney Morning Herald* extends recognition to the medical profession in Bali: “Dr Arya Suhartika, the doctor in charge on Saturday night, praised [the volunteers’] efforts. ‘They really, really helped me,’ he said” (15 October, p7). Interestingly, one doctor from San Francisco is quoted saying that the doctors “took care of the Westerners first”, though this is not confirmed elsewhere (19-20 October, p11). In refusing the *Daily Telegraph*’s binary of home/not-home, then, the *Sydney Morning Herald* coverage of Bali hospitals is fuller, more empathetic and less insensitive than its competitor’s.

The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s constructions of the Sari Club and Bali’s hospitals implicitly criticise the ethnocentrism and sense of entitlement informing the *Daily Telegraph*’s coverage. The paper also prints a comment piece which *explicitly* criticises these assumptions (18 October, p4).

14, p3; October 16, p5). The three papers concentrate on the Sari Club, where more were killed, and where infinitely more Australians were killed. The *Daily Telegraph* and the *Australian* (eg 17 October, p7) mention Paddy’s barely at all, and the *Sydney Morning Herald* rarely outside the Wiranatha connection. Even the detailed diagrammatic map of the bombing in its Weekend Edition mentions no deaths there (19-20 October, p7). The near-disappearance of Paddy’s from Australian newspaper accounts is evident also in the frequency of reference to a single “bomb” or “the Kuta blast”. In seeking a reason for these oversights, it is hard to avoid seeing an ethnocentric concern in *all* papers to focus on Australian victims. The *Sydney Morning Herald* provides the least inadequate reports of the 38 Indonesian/Balinese deaths and hundreds of injuries.

Deborah Cameron's "Unfair anger aimed at a cheap holiday destination" focuses on the Australian anger described above about the (necessarily protracted) procedures required for the correct identification of bodies, the anger with which the *Daily Telegraph's* Chynoweth strongly identified (19 October, pp8-9). "Every emotion is justified," Cameron writes, "except [people's] unfair anger and criticism of Bali and the Australian officials who are helping them.... Some families have demanded that Australia march in to run the morgue, take charge of repatriating the human remains and impose controls. Of no apparent account is Indonesia's sovereignty and its role in resolving this tragedy." She points out that "Indonesia is a developing country" and that Bali "is not capable of an Australian standard of response to an emergency of any type, let alone a catastrophe of world scale". She seeks to lay to rest the "satellite state" trope, commenting that "for all the ocker mood of Kuta [it] is not Australia ... [F]or many of those swept up in this tragedy, Bali, and particularly Kuta, was a little Australia. It was. And then suddenly it wasn't."

How much space does the paper extend to Balinese victims? Where the *Daily Telegraph* devotes no news/feature items or images to non-Australian victims, the *Sydney Morning Herald* presents 25, as compared with 195 depicting its Australian victims. Of these 25 many are general items, a few treat victims of particular nationalities, several are images, but eight are accounted for by four illustrated articles on Balinese running as a regular feature from the Wednesday through to the Saturday (16 October, p5; 17 October, p3; 18 October, p5; 19-20 October, p 4). Three are given strong visual prominence on their respective pages, and three of the photographs are considerably larger than the paper's average. As might be expected, they take second place to articles and images of Australian victims. Thus on Monday, the first day's reporting, two articles on Australian victims mention no Balinese victims (14 October, pp2, 4), and the next day, when news emerges of many identified Australian victims, these dominate the coverage (15 October, pp3, 4, 5, 7). Nor do Balinese victims appear on the paper's front pages. Nonetheless, the paper includes at least three references to a *human equivalence* between Balinese and non-Balinese victims, such as this remark: "At the hospitals it was hard to tell if there were more Indonesians or Westerners hurt" (14 October, p3; 15 October, pp7, 13). And Monday's opening article on the bombing includes the observation that Balinese "shopkeepers and their families were incinerated" by the conflagration spreading from the Sari Club (14 October, pp1, 7).

Of the four dedicated articles, the report on Sintha Mahardini instances a Balinese personalisation of the economic effects of tourists deserting Kuta (19-20 October, p4). The other three articles represent Balinese victims in perhaps surprising ways. They not only extend empathy, understanding and compassion to Balinese, giving their subjective and sometimes emotional points

of view, but also afford insights into Balinese culture and civil society that significantly reach beyond western stereotypes.

An article focused principally on the Sari Club exemplifies most of the themes emerging in the paper's coverage of Balinese (18 October, p5). It illustrates the injuries, death and bereavement suffered by Balinese and the paper's encouragement of affective identification with them, as well as workers' fears of unemployment, employers caring for their employees, and the centrality of religion in Balinese life. The human damage is personalised in a club cashier, Ayu Sila. A striking photograph, artfully composed and side-lit, runs across most of the top of the page. It sets her against a dark background, and highlights the contrast between her graceful face and the ugly burns on her forearm. The observation that she "knows of only three of some 35 colleagues still alive" gives some measure of the numbers of Balinese working at the club who were killed (the final death toll of Indonesians was 38). The individual injury and pain are thus generalised, as is the affective investment encouraged with her, an investment on a par with that with the paper's treatment of Australian victims. The article's opening line – "Tears are never far from Ayu Sila's eyes as she relives the agony of last Saturday night" – is as sentimentalised as one finds in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, but it characterises a Balinese, not an Australian. Further, there is "the loss of secure employment": she is "worried about my job and what the future holds. I don't want to go back to my village and be a farmer like my parents." The article also includes details of how the club owner cares for and supports his workers' families: "Mr Soeprobo was yesterday trying to calm anxious family members who, *like the many grieving Australian families*, are waiting for the dead to be identified and released" (my italics). The photograph's caption signals a key theme in the paper's coverage of Balinese victims: "Unsettled spirits... Ayu Sila, a 21-year-old cashier, recovers at home" (dots original). The article treats her religious beliefs as neither exotic nor outlandish. It explains how, through two purification ceremonies, she has "tried to settle the spirits she believes were shaken from her body by shock when she was thrown unconscious to the floor of the nightclub".

Another article extends similar empathy and understanding to a woman suffering quite differently from the bombing (17 October, p3). After the bombing killed her taxi-driver husband, Ketut Nanawijaya, Wayan Rasti and her two children face a struggle for survival: "For now I cannot think about [work] but maybe I will do some tailoring." Her children "are crying – they want to see their papa... We say he has gone to work far, far away," Made Sukarama, Ketut's brother, said." The article names the children and shows them with their mother in a medium-sized photograph. The image confirms the opening sentence's observation that she "is only 27 but yesterday looked drawn

and over-tired". Again, the paper adopts the strategy of affective personalisation followed by typification.³¹ Rasti's bereavement is generalised: in the village outside Kuta where she lives, "eight people were lost in the bombing... [A]long with the other wives, a vital source of income is lost." With its discourse of common humanity, the paper observes that, like Australians searching for missing relatives and friends, the family made "daily visits to every local hospital in the area" in search of Ketut. The article's coverage of religion again demonstrates its centrality to everyday life. Family members consulted with "a spirit guide" who advised that Ketut "was dead and his body could never be recovered". The article describes a family shrine typical of "every Hindu home in Bali ... where all ceremonies from birth to death are performed. [The] *balae adat* ... resembles a four-poster bed, is decorated in cloths woven in vivid pinks and gold. A framed photograph of Ketut rests at the shrine's head." The layout of this page, however, is noteworthy. The Rasti article appears on the lower half of the page, and is overshadowed by a visually dominant one about Australian victims, "Last moments: The happy smiles that cannot be extinguished", with a much larger and more colourful photograph of the Coogee Dolphins who died "just hours after" it was taken. Australian victims in the *Sydney Morning Herald* do generally take precedence over Balinese ones, but unlike the *Daily Telegraph*, this paper accords the latter meaningful human and cultural recognition.

Such recognition outstrips western stereotypes. The descriptions of Balinese Hinduism set out above go beyond the stereotype, typified by the *Daily Telegraph*, of seeing it from the outside, merely as an exotic backdrop. The *Sydney Morning Herald* recognises religion's integration into the experience and texture of everyday life. It notes the consoling power of Wiranatha's religion and reports that "[d]espite his economic fears, spiritual demons are also pressing on Mr Wiranatha. On Monday, the day of the full moon, he will make prayers with his staff" (16 October, p5; 18 October, p5). Another article, a before-and-after account of Kuta's tourist strip, explains that this purification ceremony aims "to restore the harmonious balance between humanity and nature and humanity and the Creator" (19-20 October, p4). An Editorial page cartoon likewise exemplifies the paper's respect for Hinduism: entitled "Paradise Lost", it shows a god kneeling in prayer before a large pool of spilt blood (15 October, p12).

A second stereotype is that of Balinese as pacific and acquiescent. The last of the four articles dedicated to Balinese addresses this (16 October, p5). Beyond the *politesse*, the formal politeness of expressions of shock, sadness and loss, plus senses of shame and embarrassment ("Tourists were

³¹ This is a journalistic version of the novelistic mode of characterisation by social type which Georg Lukács describes (1963 [1956]: 122-3).

our friends”), the paper records not only the more private feelings of Desak Made, a hospitalised woman having nightmares of the event, but also written messages of bewilderment and deep anger: “‘Why?’ ... ‘F--- the terroris [*sic*]. Bring my Bali back.’” Similar feelings are spoken, too: “‘You know I want to kill the terrorists who killed the people,’ said 17-year-old Wiwin Saputra [who] lost two friends who were inside Paddy’s” (16 October, p5; also 18 October, p5). Such anger belies the supposed passivity of Balinese. By way of historical contextualisation, the paper also notes outbreaks of violence flowing from the severe 1997 economic collapse: poor Muslim economic refugees left Java for the adjacent island of Bali, with resulting “[c]onflicts over food and market stalls ... often leading to arson and violence” (15 October, p12).

There is a third stereotype which the paper endorses rather than challenges, namely the photogenic oriental woman. The prematurely aged Wayan Rasti may well be far more typical of the appearance of Balinese women than Ayu Sila or the mourners shown (17 October, p5; 18 October, p5; 16 October, p5). That the latter appear at the top of their pages in larger photographs than Wayan Rasti may well indicate the extent to which the *Sydney Morning Herald* subscribes to the Orientalist stereotype, especially when the photograph which displaces Rasti to the lower half of the page prominently shows two bikini-clad Australian women.

The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s sympathetic consideration of victims’ responses in a different culture yields insights into a different national formation of civil society. Civil society for Australians in both papers is effectively limited to family, friends, pub, football club, local shops and commemoration services. Balinese civil society is portrayed by the *Sydney Morning Herald* as including institutions and forms of association with far less purchase in the Australian cultural formation: a strong, pervasive religion with elaborate communal rituals, a caring, paternalist workplace culture, as well as family and village community.³² The impression the paper gives is of a less anomic, more cohesive and altogether stronger community than typically found in white Australia.

The *Sydney Morning Herald* admits Balinese as mourners as well as victims. Where the *Daily Telegraph* writes twice of Balinese mourners (18 October, p4; 19 October, p3) and shows none – seemingly preferring the white-skinned mourners mentioned above – the *Sydney Morning Herald* writes of them more often and shows them in several photographs (eg 16 October, p5; 18 October,

³² The omissions from the Australian instances – pubs, football clubs, local shops – bespeak the differences between a deeply religious, basically agrarian society and a “developed”, secular, consumerist one. Alison Broinowski notes the perceived decadence for Balinese of some tourists’ self-indulgent “drinking, dancing, drug-taking, and public near-nudity” (2003: 193-4).

p14; 19-20 October, p1). The first two of the photographs stretch across most of the top of the page concerned, one showing a woman who “places a candle in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta”, and the last photograph fills three-quarters of the Weekend Edition’s front page, showing a woman and two children at the candlelit memorial shrine in Kuta, the headline-caption reading “THE MOURNING AFTER”.

Corresponding with these non-ethnocentric constructions of Balinese is a multicultural construction of Australia. The *Sydney Morning Herald* devotes an article to Balinese-Australians, “Local Balinese watch in muted disbelief”, accompanied by a photograph of a serene-looking Nyomin Suarjaya in prayerful pose (18 October, p6). The first named of a group of Australian “flying doctors treat[ing] injured on their way home” is Dr Minh Tran, a Vietnamese-Australian anaesthetist, whose photograph appears in this and in a later article (16 October, p6; 19-20 October, p7). In a reminder of how readily nationality can elude the borders of the given state, the paper runs a brief article on expatriate Australians working in Indonesia, and a longer item on twelve rugby union clubs of expatriates from many countries based in south-east Asian capitals who were playing in the Bali Tens Tournament; two Australians were killed in the bombing and five were missing (14 October, p4; 18 October, p3). The *Daily Telegraph* includes no such transnational items.

Perhaps the most remarkable of all articles treating non-Australians describes an Iranian asylum-seeker in Woomera detention centre (18 October, p5). An article unimaginable in the *Daily Telegraph*, it not only acknowledges a non-Australian, but also one interned under the Australian regime of “border protection”. The story involves an extraordinary concatenation of misfortune surely surpassing the paper’s doubling-of-misfortune tale cited earlier of Charmaine Whitton’s death on the holiday intended “to beat the wedding blues” after her wedding plans fell through (16 October, p6). Ibrahim – his family name is not given – “said he had met his wife nine years ago, and they had two children, a boy, 7, and a girl, 3. He had been jailed as an illegal immigrant in Indonesia and sought asylum in Australia, hoping to secure a life for his family.” At a Federal Court appeal “he was found to be a witness of truth, but lacking evidence his life was in danger in Iran”. His wife went to Bali to meet a lawyer to discuss their case. Ibrahim explains the plan: “She cannot come to Australia, so I would go back to Indonesia.” She was near the Sari Club when the bombs exploded and died after suffering burns to 60% of her body. Granted “leave to visit his Javanese wife”, he is worried about the visa conditions:

“They say they will give me a two-month visa, but after two months, who will care about me again? No travel documents, then I will go to jail again, and what will

happen to my children?... Now she die, my lovely wife,” the devastated man said....
 “We have always been having a very difficult life.” His children are with his elderly mother-in-law in the poor Javanese village [his wife came from]. He said his son required hospital treatment every two weeks for hepatitis. “I want to go, to see my children, but what will I do after that?”

In this tale, surely grimmer than that of any Australian bereaved by the bombing, and perhaps the more moving for the neutral restraint of the writing, Ibrahim’s loss of his wife is compounded by the asylum-seeker’s imprisonment and lack of citizenship status, with their severe constraints and anxieties, and the likely impossibility of seeing his children.

The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s multicultural inclusiveness recognises Muslims in Australia. A report on mourning ceremonies instances such concerns. It adopts an ecumenical approach, including comments from the Uniting Church, the Lebanese Muslim Association and the Sydney Great Synagogue (16 October, p2). The paper reports the attack on Imam Ahmed Shabbir’s residence and school in Rooty Hill on the same day as the *Australian*, and the day before the *Daily Telegraph*’s version analysed above (*Sydney Morning Herald* 16 October, p3; *Australian* 16 October, p2; *Daily Telegraph* 17 October, p11). The coverage is a little more detailed than that in the other broadsheet, but its informational directness contrasts with the vagueness and equivocations of the *Daily Telegraph*’s report. The header’s terminology, “Early Morning Terror”, implicitly likens the attack, presumably by Anglo-Australians, to a terrorist attack, and invokes strong empathy for the victim. The headline makes the agents of the action as clear as available information would allow: “Mob drives Muslim leader out of home”. In other words, there is none of the *Daily Telegraph*’s quasi-exoneration of the perpetrators. The *Sydney Morning Herald* prints a small photograph of Dr Ahmed, whose caption underlines his alarm: “Dr Ahmed ... rang neighbours as desperation rose” (dots original). Unlike the *Daily Telegraph*, then, the *Sydney Morning Herald* makes clear who was attacked and where the attack took place, and encourages empathy with the Muslim victim. It does not use nominalisations to disguise agency, nor does it cast doubt on the event as being “an *apparent* race-related attack” (my italics). Where the *Daily Telegraph* guardedly speaks of fearful, but anonymous, Muslim-Australians, the *Sydney Morning Herald* straightforwardly names Dr Ahmed and treats him as an Australian. The *Daily Telegraph* does not mention the response of NSW Premier, Bob Carr, to the attack. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, under the header “Community Harmony”, prints his unequivocal response: “‘Intolerance, racism and hatred have no place here. This is the most harmonious place in the world,’ he said. ‘We deplore any recriminations against any part of the Australian community, including Australians

of the Islamic faith” (18 October, p3). With similar forthrightness an editorial the following day attacks “the mindless attempts to scapegoat vulnerable minorities” (19-20 October, p58).

The *Sydney Morning Herald*'s personalising of Balinese and of the Iranian asylum-seeker addresses a debate from the aesthetics of political representation in media studies. It centres on whether the personalisation of issues, usually accompanied by the urging of affective empathy with the individuals represented, *necessarily*, as argued by James Curran et al, occludes awareness of the economic, political and cultural structures impinging on those individuals (1980: 306-11).³³ The issue breaks down into two questions. What space does the textual construction allow for the individual to be seen to represent something outside or beyond her/himself? And does that something raise discursively familiar, or less familiar and more politically critical questions, whether concerning class, gender, ethnicity or other axes of social division? As regards the first question, both newspapers demonstrate that there is space, and answer the second by constructing most victims of the bombing in the discursively very familiar terms of Australian nationality – if with differing degrees of intensity. This is where the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s heed of Balinese victims critically differentiates it from the *Daily Telegraph*. In constructing their Australian victims both papers adopt the human interest story's textual strategies of personalisation and affective empathy. Indeed, in most newspapers, both strategies are so culturally powerful and routine as to be almost unavoidable. In the *Daily Telegraph*, these strategies work like a glue seeking to bind together Australian mourners and victims, individual and nation, reader and text. Their discursive function in the paper is to embrace the reader in a monocultural Australian grief. The *Sydney Morning Herald* applies these textual strategies less intensely to its Australian victims, which allows space for it to apply the same strategies to *Balinese* victims constructed as socially typical, to those outside the Australian cocoon, to people the *Daily Telegraph* indifferently ignores as “foreign”. Consequently, the paper can stress the humanity common to Balinese and Australians, and perhaps most memorably, to the Iranian asylum-seeker. This strategy constructively serves a politics of anti-ethnocentrism. Personalisation and affective empathy here become means whereby the *Sydney Morning Herald* encourages a positive understanding of another culture.

Unsurprisingly, the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s multicultural paradigm yields far more insight into, understanding of and empathy towards Balinese than does the *Daily Telegraph*'s white cultural solipsism. Although it privileges Australian victims, the *Sydney Morning Herald* presents different

³³ The debate goes back as far as Richard Hoggart's *The Uses of Literacy* (1963 [1957]: 197-200). Within media studies it was long mired in various intractable binaries – reason/emotion, broadsheet/tabloid, public/private – which the contemporary cinematic social realism of Ken Loach and others effortlessly circumvented by adopting a class-based, socially typical mode of characterisation à la Lukács. Myra Macdonald valuably returns media studies' attention to “forms of interconnectedness between human agency and wider social political processes and structures” (2000: 261).

senses of national belonging. It repatriates the Sari Club to Bali. It also acknowledges Balinese living in Australia, Muslims living in Australia and Australians living overseas. And it treats the tortuous national affiliations of a bereaved Iranian refugee detained in Australia and wanting to be reunited with his Javanese children. Freed from the *Daily Telegraph*'s defensive anxieties about the "foreign", the multicultural paradigm simply sidesteps the manifold ethnic, religious and national repressions of the nation-as-home syndrome. The *Sydney Morning Herald*'s discourse of common humanity posits an inclusive "both-and", not a divisive binary of "us/them". Finally, the inclusiveness affords insights into a civil society interestingly different from Australia's.

4. The *Daily Telegraph* on Indonesia: somewhere in Asia

Indonesia is examined separately because it is a state, a geo-political entity, not an ethnic/religious group. As seen above, representations of the ethnic/religious groups of Balinese and Sydney Muslims have their own politics and histories. But states are far more complex, geo-political structures, with historically embedded political, economic and cultural formations. Discussions of Indonesia, then, require not only some understanding of these elaborate formations – which *include* matters of national/ethnic/religious difference – but also an understanding of historical causality, of the complex of factors historically explaining them. As we shall see, the two papers' representations of Indonesia treat these understandings very differently.

It is worth recalling that Indonesia is not only the state where the bombing took place; it is also Australia's nearest and largest neighbour, and therefore a state of considerable diplomatic concern. Its major geo-political, political, economic and cultural characteristics may be cursorily summarised as follows. At the time of the bombing Indonesia had – and still has – a very large and powerful military; control of crucial world shipping lanes; the fourth largest population in the world (then 212 million), including the world's largest Muslim population; and enormous ethno-cultural, linguistic and religious diversity distributed across a far-flung archipelago of 17,000 islands, with separatist and irredentist national movements. It was, moreover, a developing country with widespread poverty, and experiencing considerable problems establishing democratic institutions after decades of despotic rule under President Soeharto, who had resigned only in 1998.

How does the *Daily Telegraph* construct its Indonesia? Indonesia's appearances in the paper are perhaps most notable for being so few in number. The coverage splits into two kinds. Editorials, as the official voice of the newspaper, and some opinion pieces sometimes adopt a measured and

understanding tone, while other opinion pieces and the news items and photographs are more tendentious. The two modes of address may be characterised on the one hand, as serious and objective, and on the other, as ethnocentrically dismissive.

In the first case the paper adheres to the traditional mode of editorial address to the citizen-voter cited from Teun van Dijk in the last chapter, a mode explaining and offering recommendations about the topic at hand (1991: 140, 133). The reader is very briefly addressed in this way on Indonesia. The last two sentences of the first day's editorial offer a realistic assessment that President Megawati Sukarnoputri has not clamped down on radical Islamic groups for fear of offending moderate Muslims, and it adds a measured concern that the "atrocities – and its impact on tourism in Bali – will hopefully force [the government] to rethink its policies" (14 October, p20). An opinion piece on the same page reiterates this concern, and criticises Indonesian failure to heed US advice about a likely terrorist attack. A later piece observes that Sukarnoputri "is hanging on by a thread", and that the country is "in economic turmoil" and vulnerable to "a military resurgence" (17 October, p34).

These half-dozen sentences are heavily outweighed by the *Daily Telegraph's* second mode of address on Indonesia: its ethnocentric address to the white Australian reader. Such a world-view generally strives to render the non-Australian discursively invisible. In the case of Bali, discourses of hedonism and holiday culture, with the associated claims of entitlement over the holiday resort, license a degree of visibility to Balinese, within the patronising limits of servicing Australians. This world-view encounters greater problems, however, in relation to an entity, the Indonesian state, which is not assimilable to the paper's preferred discourses, over which the paper can claim no entitlement, and in which it has limited interest. A sense of journalistic responsibility requires the paper to give the Indonesian state some attention, but beyond the material covered in the previous paragraph, it does so minimally and negatively. If its representations of Balinese could be characterised in terms of a positive ethnocentrism, those of Indonesia constitute a negative mode. Indonesians representing the state, as officials of various kinds, are denied almost any agency or humanity. Their treatment verges on a self/other construction, although it lacks the demonising or criminalising in terms of which the paper constructs its suspected terrorists. It would seem that when the *Daily Telegraph* is obliged to recognise Indonesia and Indonesians, this negative ethnocentrism takes the form of dismissiveness. Conversely, it licenses some exercises of Australian self-promotion at the expense of Indonesia. Given the tensions between the topic and its representability in terms of the paper's preferred modes of address, it may not surprise that the

paper's constructions of Indonesia deploy some complicated discursive and rhetorical manoeuvres, verbal and visual.

The paper's two opinion pieces on Indonesia abandon the tone of reasoned, diplomatic discussion of the sentences cited above in favour of its ethnocentrically dismissive mode of address. In the first piece this address takes the form of a blithe ignorance. Imported from Rupert Murdoch's UK *Sun*, it dismisses Indonesia as a "failed state" (17 October, p9). The only evidence it offers supporting this assertion is that in Indonesia, as in "Somalia, the Sudan and, until this year, Afghanistan, there is no resistance to the likes of bin Laden". While Indonesia's democracy at the time was indeed fragile, it manifestly differed from the anarchy and/or tyranny of the states cited. From a later week, an openly hectoring opinion piece on Indonesia dismissively tells Sukarnoputri to "clean out the snake pit" of terrorists before Australia would be prepared "to lift current warnings to tourists about travelling in her country" (29 October, p16).

The paper's sole news item concerning Indonesia is categorised by the content analysis in the Political-Diplomatic: Other category (category 13). But this nominal designation is discursively overridden to become an item addressed to the Australian mourner-reader who may seek licence to direct anger against Indonesia. It is a short report of local Australian objections to the delay by the Indonesian Consulate-General in Maroubra in lowering its flag to half-mast out of respect for the Australian dead (17 October, p9). Maroubra, it will be remembered, is at the heart of the paper's map of Australian victims from Sydney's eastern suburbs. A comparison with articles on the Sari Club here reveals some telling assumptions. By international legal arrangements the Consulate-General is on sovereign Indonesian land; and the Sari Club is in Indonesia. Yet the paper asserts entitlement over both territories: Australians are reported both criticising the Consulate-General's (assumed) lack of respect for Australian victims – it ignores any concern Indonesia may have about its own victims – and treating the Sari Club as an Australian "satellite state". Illustrating the article is a small photograph of the Consulate-General building with the flag at full mast. Just to the left of this photograph, and of matching height but three times as wide, is an image of local residents, Australian victim Kathy Salvatori and her sister, whose bright photogenic faces outshine the blurred picture of the Consulate-General building. It would appear that in the *Daily Telegraph's* news pages Indonesia is an admissible journalistic topic only as a target of Australian mourners' anger.

The paper's dismissiveness of the Indonesian state palpably informs its photographic representations. Apart from the building just mentioned, these representations of Indonesia take the form of individuals representing the state. The paper prints no photographs of the head of state,

President Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose visit to Bali, it will be recalled, is mentioned only *in passing* in a report on Australian political responses to the bombing (14 October, p10). Indonesian and Balinese police, investigators and emergency workers – all uniformed emblems of the state – can be seen in photographs showing the destruction caused by the bombing (eg 14 October pp8, 9, 21).³⁴ Only one of the four photographs on these pages shows any Indonesian official clearly and as having any clear agency: an “Indonesian policeman examines the ruins”. While these various officials are evidently not posing for the cameras and the nature of their investigative work mostly directs their gaze downwards towards the rubble, most of them are small within the photographic frame and so figure as incidental backdrop to the property damage, especially the “wreckage of the Sari Club” to which one caption explicitly directs attention. Moreover, most of these photographs are small on the page. There is only one full-face shot, of an Indonesian para-medical, centred in the composition and wearing a white shirt, flanked by two Australians wearing darker shirts, all attending to an injured man; the caption reads: “RAAF medical personnel help a critically injured Australian” (14 October, p7). This caption is a quite remarkable exercise in seeking to *deny* the visually obvious.³⁵ In light of the centrality of the human face to ideas of identity, individuality and humanity, it is worth comparing the facial visibility of key national/ethnic groups in the paper. Countless Australians are facially identified; no Balinese are; and representatives of the Indonesian state remain virtually faceless.³⁶

Only with the arrival in Kuta of *Australian* investigators do any state officials take on unchallenged visual prominence or significant agency. This raises the issue of a certain boosterism accompanying an ethnocentric mode of address, for the visual representation of Australian investigators contrasts starkly with that of their Indonesian counterparts. Witness a large photograph captioned “Investigators... members of the Australian Federal Police arrive in Bali”, in which the men are compositionally centred and stride purposefully forward as if running the investigation (17 October, p2). The same day’s op-ed page displays another large photograph with a similar caption, “Australian forensic investigators arrive at the Bali bomb scene”, the personnel again dominating the frame and the event highlighted by the use of reverse text (17 October, p35). The accompanying feature claims that Indonesians have “an extremely poorly-developed forensics investigation capability”, though it offers no substantiating evidence. And it insists that there be only one leader of the Australian-Indonesian investigation, with the unavoidable implication that

³⁴ I make no attempt here to differentiate federal Indonesian from provincial Balinese officials; captions and lack of photographic resolution are of little assistance. All such officials are described as Indonesian. Indonesia in the national sense includes Bali, though each has its own police force.

³⁵ This alarmingly epitomises the importance of captions in “anchoring” the meaning of news photos (Barthes 1964: 45).

³⁶ Those Indonesians the paper suspects of terrorism will be discussed in Chapter 4.

this should be an Australian. It is as if the paper's ethnocentric world-view feels threatened by the possibility of the foreign holding equal status, and so reasserts the Australian. Such boosterism is evident also in an "exclusive" article entitled "SAS to train Indonesians" (16 October, p7). The headline implies a future indicative, but the article gradually reveals it to be a desiring subjunctive: "Senior ministers will *insist* ... will *present* a detailed task force *blueprint* ... Senior officials confirmed the task force was a crucial *objective* ..." (my italics). The paper prints no follow-up item confirming these hopes.³⁷

The *Daily Telegraph* includes one item on Indonesian history. It appears in the paper's educational section for schools (17 October, p46). Under the headline "Tortured Paradise", the article lists a jumbled catalogue of bloody past events in Bali over many centuries, including anti-colonial wars and a volcanic eruption. It recounts a few in some detail and leaves most with negligible historical explanation. Seemingly unconnected to the rest of the article – a sub-editor's contribution, perhaps? – the lead sentence reiterates a familiar theme in the paper's coverage of Bali: "The recent bombings are just another of many disasters that have interrupted the pursuit of pleasure on the island." The hedonism this retrospectively ascribes to the island would appear to be restricted to its foreign tourists, who started arriving in any number only in the 1970s (Vickers 2003: 109). It is hardly likely to apply to Bali's inhabitants working in agriculture or later in the service of tourists. Even this historical account of Bali, then, ethnocentrically treats it as a "satellite state".

The *Daily Telegraph's* patronising mode of ethnocentrism allowed a limited recognition of Balinese. As regards Indonesia, however, there seems to be a fundamental incompatibility between the paper's dismissive ethnocentrism and the foreignness of a large, powerful, neighbouring sovereign state. Apart from a handful of sentences of serious commentary on its op-ed pages, the paper's discursive response appears to be to deny Indonesian sovereignty while asserting Australia's. Much as Lalor observed of the streets of Kuta, a deep anxiety about the "foreign" seems to be at work here. While the paper shows Australian investigators striding forth on Indonesian soil, it virtually denies sovereignty to Indonesia's Consulate-General building, and seeks to efface the sole representative of the Indonesian state, the para-medic, who it does clearly show.

³⁷ Comparably influential Australian diplomacy is implied, but again not confirmed, on the same page in an article headed "UN to list group as terrorists" about Australia's urging that Jemaah Islamiyah be so listed.

5. The *Sydney Morning Herald* on Indonesia: a part of our world

The *Sydney Morning Herald* addresses its reader as a cosmopolitan Australian citizen wishing to be informed about the country's nearest and largest neighbour, and about a state crucial to Australian diplomacy. It therefore provides an extensive account of the complexities of Indonesian politics, economics and culture, including valuable insights into Bali. Importantly, these are almost entirely understood *in their own terms*, not western terms, still less those of the *Daily Telegraph's* ethnocentrism. In this, the *Sydney Morning Herald's* account surely benefits from having an Indonesian correspondent, Matthew Moore (de Masi 2005: 132), and doubtless also from the quality independent journalism of such Indonesian publications as the *Jakarta Post*, *Tempo* and *Kompas*. During the week, the paper devotes many column-inches to Indonesian history, revealing vital understandings of historical causality, showing how Indonesia's past informs the present of the bombing. In the field of historical analysis, such understandings are of a piece with the paper's empathetic representations of Balinese victims of the bombing. Its focus on Indonesian history is elaborated across news as well as editorial and opinion items. Marking its commitment to matters Indonesian is the inclusion on the first day's reporting of no fewer than four "Analysis" contributions by its regular journalists, as well as two opinion pieces from non-staff contributors (14 October, pp3, 4, 5, 6, 15).

The paper's coverage of Indonesian history can be summarised under four headings: Indonesia's post-independence political instability, the power of the military and its relations with government, the effects of the 1997 Asian economic collapse, and the history of radical Islamist movements. All are shown to bear upon the present of the bombing, particularly in Indonesian government responses, and to some extent in Australian diplomacy vis-à-vis Indonesia. The paper presents this wealth of historical material in a carefully neutral, non-partisan manner, addressing the reader as one who will make up her/his mind on the basis of the facts presented.

Of the political instability, one opinion piece remarks that with the bombing a "new element has been introduced into an already unstable polity" (15 October, p13). An editorial on the same day summarises: "Murder, intimidation and terrorism are part of the fabric of Indonesian politics.... Indonesia has struggled to but not yet become a mature democracy under the rule of law.... The military ... is still not fully subordinate to civilian authority ... and remains an active player in Indonesia's murky and often violent politics" (15 October, p12). It can be noted that these three summary sentences alone correct the *Daily Telegraph's* typical misapprehensions and partisan

derogation by *specifying* some of Indonesia's political complexities. The strong terms used here – “intimidation”, “terrorism”, “murky”, “violent” – are descriptive rather than judgemental.

The paper outlines the historically key role of the military in Indonesian politics. Its most savage moment was the 1965 repression which killed as many as half a million communists and suspected sympathisers, and in which “[t]he Balinese suffered terribly” (15 October, pp12, 13).³⁸ One report points out that the “army is reliably estimated to make some 70 per cent of its income from business operations, legal and illegal” (19-20 October, p10). Under the headline, “In the shadow of the generals”, an opinion writer observes that the administration of Sukarnoputri's predecessor, President Abdurrahman Wahid, was destabilised by a “radical Islamist militia” backed by generals objecting to his proposed “reforms within the military”, while Sukarnoputri, by contrast, “enjoyed strong ties with the military [and] was left in peace” (14 October, p15). The historical power of the military underpins the suspicions mooted in one opinion piece of the possibility of some military involvement in the Bali bombing, and in three others of the possibility of a military coup (16 October, p17; 14 October, p4; 17 October, p17; 19-20 October, p3).

The effects of Indonesia's 1997 economic crisis are explained in an opinion piece by Princeton University professor, Paul Krugman, which the paper reprints from the *New York Times* (16 October, p17). In the country which “became the biggest victim of the Asian financial crisis”, big companies dependent on foreign capital “found that their debts had ballooned to unpayable levels [but] smaller enterprises saw ... the weak currency as an export opportunity”. Bali's tourist industry therefore flourished “as an affordable destination for foreigners”, until the bombing “effectively destroyed one of the country's key industries”. Krugman concludes that the nation's “severe economic, political and social problems ... could radicalise the population and turn it into a terrorist asset”.

The paper demonstrates how these political and economic conditions have informed the emergence of radical Islamists in the country. While most Islamic parties “reject calls for Indonesia to become a radical Islamist state” (14 October, p15), historically, radical Islam has exercised considerable influence on Indonesian politics. Under President Sukarno, Darul Islam “fought a bitter but unsuccessful 14-year (1948-62) campaign to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia” (14 October, p5). The same article cites the International Crisis Group's research suggesting that “the men directing the current Islamic unrest in Indonesia draw their inspiration from Darul Islam”. In the

³⁸ “Reliable estimates suggest that as many as half a million PKI members and sympathisers have been slaughtered.... In Bali reliable estimates put the figure killed at 150,000. Whole Balinese villages have been depopulated” (Rey 1966: 35; also Emmerson 1993: 422).

1970s and 1980s, “the Soeharto regime enticed radical Islamists out into the open saying their help was needed to combat the (mythical) resurgent communists, only to arrest and jail many of the leading figures such as Abu Bakar Bashir”, one of the principal suspects for the Bali bombing (14 October, p15). Another analyst writes of how these “so-called ‘jihad’ warriors have been largely supported and manipulated by Jakarta’s politicians to fuel religious and ethnic tensions in the tinderbox of multicultural, religiously diverse Indonesia ... to discredit the Government or strengthen the hand of the military” (14 October, p4). The writer goes on to observe that “the extraordinary economic collapse of the 1997 financial crisis ... threw millions out of work. Poverty has disempowered young Muslim men, and the ‘jihad’ offers them authority, arms and, in many cases, financial support for their families.” With the fall of the authoritarian Soeharto regime the following year, hard-line Islamic groups found it easier to recruit such impoverished, disaffected people (14 October, pp4, 15). The appeal of these groups was heightened by the “US ‘war on terrorism’.... When the bombing of Afghanistan began, many Indonesians saw the ‘war’ as an attack on Islam and many of the victims on the ground as innocent Muslim victims” (14 October, p4). The historical tradition of governments exploiting radical Islam, coupled with the country’s political instability and its long-standing resistance to US foreign policy, would explain both the Sukarnoputri government’s denial of terrorist activity within its borders before the bombing, and then the “Security Minister, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, admit[ting] Indonesia had not taken terrorism seriously and that cabinet members often used the issue to pursue their own political agendas” (15 October, p3).

In these ways the *Sydney Morning Herald* offers its citizen-reader a substantial historical contextualisation of the bombing, an awareness of the extraordinary complexities of Indonesian politics and an understanding of the factors encouraging radical Islam in the country. As seen above, the *Daily Telegraph*, with its primary address to a mourning Australian reader and its ethnocentric dismissiveness towards Indonesia, offers only a *very* few, fragmentary insights, which lack any historically explanatory power. The *Sydney Morning Herald*, conversely, disaggregates the multiple factors explaining the difficult present circumstances in which the Indonesian government was having to operate. Its understandings are part and parcel of the newspaper’s neutral address informing the reader and hence enabling informed political debate.

Within this remit, the paper has to negotiate the complexities of international diplomacy and its own position in relation to them. Balanced against the understandings of Indonesian politics, economics and culture set out above, there are the differing perspectives of Australian diplomacy and those of other states. Involved here is a debate about a major diplomatic question, namely the extent to

which Australian foreign policy should follow US foreign policy. While the *Daily Telegraph* endorses the Howard government's alignment of Australian with US foreign policy (16 October, p34, 18 October, p26), the *Sydney Morning Herald* often criticises this alignment – though more on the issue of the “war on terror” than in relation to Indonesia.³⁹ Where the *Daily Telegraph* condemns Indonesia for not heeding US diplomatic advice and for harbouring terrorists who killed Australians (14 October, p20), the *Sydney Morning Herald* balances against this understandings of Indonesia which make it less wholeheartedly accepting of US foreign policy.

These journalistic issues are focussed during the week in the *Sydney Morning Herald's* representations of the head of state, President Megawati Sukarnoputri. The paper offers an impartial and delicately balanced reporting of opposing viewpoints and evidence. Supporting the US perspective are neutral, non-critical reports on the US Ambassador Ralph Boyce's exasperation at the President's vacillations in the face of rising terrorist threats (14 October, p3; 16 October, p8). And a satirical cartoon entitled “The war on terror” depicts her as the Hindu god Vishnu with multiple arms, but reworked in terms of the Chinese three wise monkeys, with three pairs of hands covering the relevant sense organs, seeing, hearing and speaking no evil (17 October, p16). On the other hand, several pieces supply Indonesian/historical contextualisation explaining how the unstable polity sketched above constrains her scope for manoeuvre. Sukarnoputri is described as being wary that “any general security crackdown on Islamic extremists at the behest of the United States or Australia could provoke a dangerous backlash”; there were also “widespread reports of serious divisions between [cabinet] ministers about the extent to which radical Muslim groups should be targeted”; and Sukarnoputri, herself half-Balinese, “has often spoken of previous attempts ... to destabilise her presidency by provoking violence in Bali” (14 October, p14; 19-20 October, p3; 16 October, p5; 15 October, p12).

A long article in the Weekend Edition by Moore exemplifies this delicate balancing (19-20 October, p10). It opens with the US-Australian view. Most immediately obvious are the title, “Megawati stumbles in her darkest hour,” and a large photograph of her visiting Sanglah Hospital captioned “Token gesture ...” (dots original); both title and caption were probably contributed by sub-editors. The article's first nine paragraphs criticise the President's inactivity, thus echoing the dismayed US diplomatic view of her as having failed to prevent the bombing and as having done little since to apprehend the perpetrators.⁴⁰ However, there follow ten paragraphs conceding her parlous position running a minority government which nevertheless “delivers her country a period of relative

³⁹ Alison Broinowski has criticised the US alliance as “Canberra's ventriloquist mouthing of Washington's worldview” (2003: 230-1).

⁴⁰ Some Indonesian media, as cited later, share this view.

stability”, and acknowledging both the ongoing legacy of the Soeharto regime in “security forces and courts that are steeped in corruption” and the vulnerability of the country’s economy, “hit far harder than any other” in the 1997 Asian crisis. The article impartially balances pro-US/Australian and historically contextualising approaches. A further argument could maintain that the sequencing – Indonesian contextualisation follows the US diplomatic view – represents a segue from the US diplomatic view to an oblique critique of it. This may or may not be so. What matters for the present argument is that the paper provides evidence supporting both viewpoints, and thus enables the reader to make up his/her mind. In striking contrast with the *Daily Telegraph*’s one-sided view, the paper’s pluralism supplies the Indonesian view alongside the US view. Matching this detailed consideration of the President, Sukarnoputri is shown in four photographs, four more than appear in the other paper (14 October, pp2, 4; 15 October, p12; 19-20 October, p10).

Australian diplomatic engagement with Indonesia had never been straightforward, even with the *rapprochement* between Soeharto and Prime Minister Paul Keating, but under the Howard government it became decidedly fraught, in part due to disagreement over East Timor, but also because of the US orientations of Howard’s diplomacy and Indonesian alarm at racist attacks on their nationals in Australia after the rise of Hanson (Hardjono 1992; Broinowski 2003; Ricklefs 2004). In contrast to the *Daily Telegraph*’s hectoring cited above, the *Sydney Morning Herald* both acknowledges the importance of diplomacy and of open debate about it. One report notes the delicate diplomacy now required: “Australia is trying to tread a fine line between quietly urging the Indonesians to do more without being seen to publicly criticise the authority of President Megawati Soekarnoputri” (16 October, p3; also 17 October, p17). An editorial seeks to encourage debate about the US alignment in stressing that Australia’s strategic and foreign policy priorities lie in the Asian region, arguing that despite the rift caused by “Australia’s decision to break off ties with Indonesia’s military over the atrocities in East Timor ... there must be vigorous debate and policy flexibility” (16 October, p16).

A salient issue in bilateral relations is the joint Indonesian-Australian leadership of the investigation into the bombing. That Indonesia conceded an equal role to the Australian Federal Police for an investigation on its soil is seen to indicate its government’s weakened bargaining power given its sense of shame about the bombing (19-20 October, p10), an explanation which undercuts the *Daily Telegraph*’s boosterist suggestions that Australia should lead the enquiry. The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s appraisal is altogether more nuanced and evidence-based. An article headed “Police chiefs know each other’s language, culture” notes several qualities *shared* by the AFP and Indonesian joint leaders of the investigation, although it does observe en route that the latter “is

seen as *relatively* straightforward and trustworthy” (18 October, p3; my italics). A second article realistically observes “how difficult the biggest enquiry in the 23-year history of the Australian Federal Police is going to be”, citing inadequate preservation of the crime scene, and difficulties as regards “language and communication” and “coping with the politics of the Indonesian police and military”, including contradictory actions by Indonesian and Balinese police (19-20 October, p4). The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s photographs of the AFP do not subscribe to the *Daily Telegraph*’s boosterism. It prints only two very small images, one of officers at work, the other of the Australian co-chair of the investigation, Graham Ashton (17 October, p3; 18 October, p3). Factual explanation displaces the other paper’s ethnocentrism.

The paper’s concern to understand Indonesia substantially in its own terms finds its corollary in less negative photographic representations of Indonesians than the *Daily Telegraph* prints. Except for the Jakarta mourner described above, all are representatives of the state, and aside from Sukarnoputri, all are police, investigators and emergency workers in Kuta. These officials are given greater visual prominence in their six photographs than by the *Daily Telegraph* in its four (14 October, pp3, 5, 6, 7, 15; 18 October, p3). As in the *Daily Telegraph*, these are evidently not posed photographs. Most of them are larger than in the other paper, and within the frame they regularly show the officials in larger scale relative to their background than do their *Daily Telegraph* counterparts, so that Indonesians appear rather more as active agents than as incidental to images of the destruction. Two show officials’ faces clearly: men carrying a body on a stretcher away from the rubble and a policeman on guard duty, who dominates the large image and looks more nervous than threatening (14 October, pp7, 15). Except for the last photograph, which carries no caption, the captions acknowledge these Indonesians.

Unlike its counterpart, the *Sydney Morning Herald* has one report on Indonesian civil society, on national, as opposed to state, responses to the bombing. Moore points out that “while Australia has lost much, Indonesia is hurting too, not only from its own death toll, but from the shame and economic instability the bombing has brought.... Indonesians realise the potential for a massive flight of capital” (16 October, p5).⁴¹ He also cites media criticism of “the Government and intelligence agencies for ignoring the months of warnings from the United States that Indonesia was at risk of a serious terrorist attack”. The paper highlights commonalities and exchange between Indonesia and Australia: student exchanges are welcomed by Indonesians, and Australian Treasurer

⁴¹ Witness the conclusion to the *Jakarta Post*’s first editorial on the bombing, advancing a somewhat abashed national realism: “Now, we have to brace ourselves for the many domestic and international repercussions. Besides condemnation, we can expect more serious action that will hurt our political and economic standing. We do not know even half the story yet” (14 October, p6).

Peter Costello, is quoted saying that Indonesia's "problems are ours" (16 October, p5; 19-20 October, p12).⁴² This joins with the paper's well-informed and even-handed reporting to set it apart from the *Daily Telegraph*.

Complementing the paper's accounts of Indonesian history and politics is commentary on US economic and diplomatic power and Australian diplomacy as they affect both Indonesia and wider political debate. This broad geo-political perspective reaches beyond those of the diplomacy practised by individual states. It hardly needs saying that such an approach is inconceivable in the *Daily Telegraph*. A regular *Sydney Morning Herald* columnist, Adele Horin, widens the scope of the paper's discussion of Indonesia's economic crisis by pointing out that the country's debt repayments to western financial institutions – under terms set by the US-based International Monetary Fund – were, even before the bombing, already seriously undermining its expenditures on health, education and social services (19-20 October, p59). "[T]he gross inequality between nations," she adds, fuels "jealousy and hatred of the West." Guy Rundle extends these points, arguing that "[m]ilitant Islamic fundamentalism is a potent ideology for people battered by the extension of Western power and money into every area of global social life" (16 October, p17). He further argues that Australia should accept responsibility for some of the effects of its aid programmes to Indonesia and its training of their military. For decades, he writes, "our governments have supported the repressive role of the military in Indonesian life and helped to forestall the emergence of full civil society", including the Australian military's role in training "not only regular soldiers, but the thugs and torturers of Kopassus", well known for the brutal repression of East Timorese which in part prompted Australian support for the province's independence (16 October, p17). With these articles the paper not only includes accounts of major geo-political issues, but also shows itself to be unafraid to exercise its fourth estate function in printing opinion pieces which seek to hold governments and economic powers to account.

Throughout this chapter, the *pluralism* of the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s multicultural paradigm contrasts with the *partisanship* of the *Daily Telegraph*'s ethnocentrism. The one represses ethnic, religious and national difference; the other openly recognises and accepts them. The partisanship/pluralism contrast extends into the two papers' different modes of address to their readers. The *Daily Telegraph*'s primary address is to the reader as ethnocentric Australian mourner. The tone it adopts towards Indonesia is often less than diplomatic because it addresses an Australian readership considered – and encouraged – to have no interest in the "foreign", such that events there emerge out of an historical vacuum. Conversely, the *Sydney Morning Herald* presents

⁴² M C Ricklefs refreshingly describes the bombing as "Australia's and Indonesia's shared September 11" (2004: 284).

a wealth of contextual and historical material in a neutral, non-partisan manner, addressing the reader as a cosmopolitan citizen of the world who will make up her/his mind on the basis of the evidence presented, for example about the complex history of terrorism in Indonesia and the difficult present circumstances in which the Indonesian government was having to operate. The paper presents its material so as to encourage intellectual and political debate. Some of the differences between the two papers' reader address on overseas matters are suggested by two grammatical modalities of verbs, namely the interrogative and the imperative. Where the *Sydney Morning Herald's* pluralist mode encourages an enquiring reader, whether about Balinese culture or Indonesian history, the *Daily Telegraph's* partisanship reiterates viewpoints with which readers are expected to agree, as on the Sari Club or Sanglah Hospital, while giving them a narrower range of evidence on the basis of which to make up their mind. The paper expects assent. The closure of the affective identificatory circuit analysed in the last chapter is intensified by the similarly closed approach to ethnicity, religion and nationality treated in this chapter. The *Daily Telegraph's* white cultural solipsism is not open to debate.

CHAPTER 4:
THE *DAILY TELEGRAPH* AND THE *SYDNEY MORNING HERALD*
ON TERRORISM AND POLITICS

1. Orientation

The discourse of the war on terror circulated extensively in Australia after 11 September 2001 and was fully available as a mode of comprehending the Bali bombing. It is the dominant discourse informing the *Daily Telegraph*'s constructions of terrorism, and bears on those of the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The Kuta bombing was the world's biggest terrorist attack after that in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. Nine days after those attacks, President George W Bush announced the military campaign of the "war on terror". The associated discourse was hugely influential in the west, not least due to the global power of US media and diplomacy, especially in states such as Australia which joined the USA's "coalition of the willing" in sending troops to attack Afghanistan and later Iraq.¹ The discourse therefore set the template for western reporting of subsequent terrorist attacks. It is the single most influential discourse treated in this chapter. Of its historically exceptional standing, Joanna Bourke writes: "The spectre of 'the Terrorist' has taken on a god-like power, equivalent to the plague of earlier times or the Satan of religion" (2006 [2005]: x). In large part, this is due to its phenomenal media and political exposure, which she describes as "disproportionate" (2006 [2005]: 365).

Media representations of the "war on terror" had forceful antecedents in discourses of terrorism and fundamentalism predating the 11 September attacks by almost two decades. As early as 1993, Edward Said noted the

out-of-scale transnational images that are now re-orienting international social discourse and process. Take ... the categories and images of "terrorism" and "fundamentalism", which derived entirely from the concerns and intellectual factories in metropolitan centres like Washington and London.... [They] are fearful images that lack discriminate contents or definition ... the figures of an international or transnational imaginary made up of foreign devils (1993: 375).²

¹ In the following pages I usually write of "the discourse of the war on terror", but sometimes use the abbreviation: "the 'war on terror'".

² The demonising images included those of "rogue states" (eg Iran, Iraq, Libya) and their leaders.

Consequently, even before the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, “‘terrorism’ [had] displaced Communism as public enemy number one” (Said 1988: 149).³ The “out-of-scale” images and categories Said describes prefigured and lay the foundations for the discourse of the war on terror inaugurated in 2001. Tariq Ali was not alone in describing the media coverage of the 11 September attacks as “hyperbole”, including their routine solemnising as “changing the world forever” (2002: 290).⁴ There can be very few in the west unfamiliar with the images of planes flying into the twin towers of the World Trade Center. The archetypal status of those images epitomises the power of the discourse of the war on terror. A salient marker of its influence in Australia is registered in Peter Manning’s findings of the *six-fold* increase in Sydney newspapers in verbal correlations of the terms “Muslim/Islam” and “extremist/fundamentalist/terrorist” (and their derivatives) after 11 September 2001 (2004: 12).

Needless to say, the discourse of the war on terror affected journalists, editors and readers of Australian newspapers. It supplies the two key modes of address adopted in both the *Daily Telegraph*’s and the *Australian*’s coverage of the Bali bombing: forceful condemnation of the foreign terrorists held responsible, and invocations of fear (of more attacks). The terrorists constitute a defined enemy, violently forced on Australian attention, and a self/other construction is thereby invoked. In the *Daily Telegraph*, this polarised structure retains the idea of the national home as outlined in the last chapter, but replaces its vague category of the foreign with an enemy who targets Australians. The two modes of address, the discourses of fear and condemnation, complement each other in that fear operates in a passive manner, condemnation in a reactive manner. The *Sydney Morning Herald* subscribes less to these modes of address.

2. The discourse of the war on terror

Understanding the discursive operations of the war on terror requires examining three of its basic mechanisms. All concern the textually identifiable actants it deploys: the binaries of victim/villain,

³ Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass show that by 1986 the *New York Times* “was running on average four terrorism stories daily”, and that “[d]uring the four years 1989-1992 in which there was not a single fatality caused by terrorism in the United States, and in which thirty-four Americans were killed worldwide, American libraries catalogued 1,332 new book titles under the rubric ‘terrorism’” (1996: 13, 31). They point out also that in 1980 the CIA changed its definition of terrorist events to include threats and hoaxes, such that in one year the number of terrorist incidents increased by 50.3% (1996: 23).

⁴ Jeffrey Mueller likewise uses the term “hyperbole” on the grounds that “[t]he number of Americans killed by terrorism since the late 1960s is about the same as the number of Americans killed over the same period by lightning, accident-causing deer, or severe allergic reaction to peanuts” (2004: 42). Toby Miller details the hyperbole of US media representations of the “war on terror” (2007: 81-111).

innocence/guilt, good/evil, rationality/fanaticism, and its promotion of western political and religious values in binaries of west/east, democracy/terrorism, democracy/theocracy, democracy/dictatorship, Christianity/Islam and so on.⁵ The first mechanism is familiar from the general principles of how self/other constructions work, namely the mutually reinforcing construction of terms on opposite sides of the binary divide. Eva Cox thus develops the implications of the innocence/guilt binary: “Demonising the Other allows us to be ‘innocent’, and therefore take no responsibility for what others do, or even what we do” (1995: 67). The second mechanism is the moral judgementalism foundational to the constructions of good self/bad other (Martin-Rojo 1995: 50). The third mechanism concerns the commonality of the terms on either side of the “us”/“them” divide. This mechanism maps the positive terms in the binary sets onto each other and the negative terms likewise, thus aligning and identifying good-innocent-western-victim on the side of “us”, while the corresponding negative terms, evil-guilty-eastern-villain, are aligned to characterise “them”. But there are differential discursive power relations at work. Since self/other structures assume that “they” exist *only in relation* to “us”, existing only by “our” literal say-so, the schema barely recognises such signifiers as terrorist and Muslim as having meaning in and of themselves. It leaches away their denotative signifieds and replaces these with highly connotative signifieds, culturally charged with meanings attributed to them by powerful discourses, including the demonising kind. They thus become more affective than referential, or in Said’s terms, “images ... that lack discriminate contents or definition” (1993: 375). They are used in ways which produce signifieds which the referents, the people so described, may simply not recognise. Drained of denotative meaning and reframed in connotative and affective terms, such signifiers are readily merged and contagiously associated with each other, subject to a constant semantic slippage. Manning’s findings just cited show how readily associated have been the terms “Islam” and “terrorism”. Such sets of terms can be called “affective economies”.⁶

To adequately understand the *power* of the discourse of the war on terror as the then-dominant western discourse of international relations, we need to analyse the processes producing it. Investigating the structure generating the discourse of the war on terror can explain the power it exerts on related discourses in the broader national and international discursive formations in which it works. Within such force-fields, stronger discourses may promote, absent or modify other discourses. So for example, within the USA, Australia and the UK over the last two decades, discourses of consumerism, neo-liberalism and indeed celebrity virtually stifled the emergence of

⁵ In their analysis of the Melbourne papers, the *Age* and the *Herald-Sun*, Jeff Lewis and Sonja de Masi argue for the centrality of a west/east divide (2007: 59-60).

⁶ I borrow the term “affective economy” from Sara Ahmed, who applies it rather differently (2004: 44-9).

any discourse of poverty prior to the 2011 Occupy movement.⁷ Importantly, such an analysis of the underlying structure of the discourse of the “war on terror” can unveil the viewpoints – of others – which its self/other structure axiomatically conceals.⁸

How do we make sense of the generative structure of the “war on terror”? Greg Noble and Scott Poynting have a very suggestive comment in their account of the Australian moral panic around “border protection” concerning asylum-seekers. They discern a reductionist process which not only “racialised issues around global inequalities, humanitarian policy, cultural difference and so on, but *articulated* them as issues of right and wrong, villain and victim” (2003: 115; italics original). The two discursive operations of this process, then, are racialisation and a form of moralising. To clarify their workings, some psychoanalytic concepts – repression, displacement and cathexis – are used below to account for the often unconscious processes at work in the generation of ideas within discourses which are naturalised as “common sense”.

What processes underlie the racialising effected by the discourse of border protection? The geo-political causes underlying asylum-seeking and national policy responses to it – the global inequalities between Australia and impoverished, war-torn countries such as Afghanistan, the cultural differences between, say, Afghans and Australians, the humanitarian policies which could help asylum-seekers and, indeed, Australia’s involvement in the US-led war in Afghanistan since 2001 – are *displaced* and *dissimulated* by a racialisation of these issues. Psychoanalysis adds resonances to the dictionary sense of displacement, suggesting the (largely unconscious) process of discursively channelling mental energy away from less culturally acceptable ideas to more acceptable ones. The discipline describes this process as cathexis, of which Charles Rycroft defines one form as “the defensive manoeuvre of investing in one process in order to facilitate repression of another” (1972 [1968]: 16).⁹ The discursive cathexis therefore channels mental energy away from – indeed represses – geo-political and diplomatic issues, and invests instead in a culturally defensive racialisation of the issues involved. International differences of economic, cultural and military kinds, including Australian involvement in the war, are transmuted into solely racial differences.

⁷ Stuart Hall remarks on the importance of historical analysis of “the discursive formations of ‘common sense’” and John Hartley on the “struggle between discourses: a good contemporary example is that between the discourses of patriarchy (legitimated, naturalised) and (emergent, marginalised) feminism” (Hall 1982: 77; Hartley 1994: 94).

⁸ Some examples have already been seen in footnotes above, where they are necessary for proper historical contextualisation. Another critical repression from the realm of western “common sense” was the idea that the attacks were not universally condemned. Ghassan Hage observes that they “were supported by large sections of the Arab population” (2003: 142). Tariq Ali mentions responses from various parts of the world – New York, Greece, China and across Latin America – which “celebrated [or] were unmoved by what took place” (2002: 291-2, 2-3).

⁹ Rycroft calls this variant “hyper-cathexis”, but the simpler term will suffice for present purposes. For Freud, displacement presupposes “a cathectic energy able to detach itself from ideas and to run along associative pathways” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973 [1967]: 121). On repression, psychoanalysis supplies senses beyond dictionary definitions of “restrain” or “quell” to point to the active exclusion of ideas from conscious thought processes.

The cathexis from geo-political issues to their reductive racialisation, then, attests to the discursive power of the latter and the weakness of the former. Dissimulation refers to the resulting concealment of substantive historical and political causalities. In John Thompson's words, it is a means whereby geo-political power relations "may be established and sustained ... by being represented in a way which deflects attention from or glosses over existing relations or processes" (1990: 62). Not only does the racialising effected by the discourse of border protection dehumanise asylum-seekers as no more than foreign threats to Australia's borders; the cathexis also represses consideration of the reasons *why* people seek asylum. In short, all such issues are dehistoricised and depoliticised. Driving the displacement-dissimulation are the anxieties examined in Chapter 3 about losing a white Australian national pride. In the manner of paranoid nationalism, the discourse of border protection seeks to ease the anxieties of the racially-defined national subject at the expense of the foreigner, who is thereby cast as a distant but alarming threat. The discursive costs should be noted alongside the obvious human ones. Crucially, categories of explanation and understanding are displaced by judgemental and affectively-oriented forms of address.

This leads to the second aspect of the process: Noble and Poynting's "articulation" of the issues in good/evil, victim/villain terms, whereby historical and political issues surrounding the seeking of asylum are displaced-dissimulated as simple *moral judgements* against foreigners. They are "moralistic" in Chantal Mouffe's sense: "limited to the denunciation of evil" and refusing "to engage in debate with those who disagree" (2005: 58). Even as it occurs simultaneously with the displacement-dissimulation process, analytically speaking this moral judgementalism is a distinct feature. It draws on pervasive and powerful metaphysical-moral discourses sustained by centuries-old western religious and philosophical traditions. As in Steven Poole's observations of general discourses of terrorism cited below, the processes of displacement-dissimulation and moralism involve a "twisting of social categories into metaphysical ones" (2006: 129).¹⁰

In many respects the generative structure of the US discourse of the war on terror is similar to that of border protection in Australia. It adopts the same processes of displacement-dissimulation and of moralism. Moreover, the geo-political causes that can reasonably be seen to have prompted the events of 11 September 2001 resemble the issues displaced-dissimulated in the discourse of border protection, namely global economic, political and military inequalities, in particular those arising from US foreign policy and economic practices in Arab and Muslim countries. In response to these practices, terrorist acts can be seen as "blowback", retaliations against post-1989 US interference

¹⁰ The processes of displacement-dissimulation and a scapegoating form of moralism apply also to the repression of neo-liberal causalities described in Chapter 3. Hage describes the philosophical approach as one of historical idealism (2003: 72).

abroad: notably invasions and bombing campaigns (including Iraq twice, Afghanistan, Somalia), support for many corrupt, despotic leaders (including President Hosni Mubarak, the House of Saud) in defence of its economic and strategic interests, especially access to oil resources, and the sensed injustice towards Palestinians exercised by the USA's unconditional support of Israel (Thussu and Freedman 2003: 2-3).¹¹ Much as the discourse of border protection dissimulates Australia's (very modest) contribution to the war in Afghanistan, so that of the war on terror dissimulates the USA's far greater foreign policy and economic engagements. But while the discursive source of the "war on terror" bears some resemblance to the fear of foreigners driving Australian "border protection", the cathexis here is far more intense and more affectively charged, for the blowback killed 2,996 people in New York and Washington. In Marshall Berman's words, this was "[m]ainland America's first great air raid" (2002: 4). The attacks shocked and dumbfounded the world's sole superpower, then at the zenith of its economic, political, military and media power (Anderson 2002: 24; Hobsbawm 2008 [2007]: 116). The events of 11 September 2001 severely wounded US senses of national pride and invulnerability, and were construed as an attack on national tenets of democracy, freedom and innocence.¹² The lethal immediacy and the shock of this national affront sharply differentiate the discourse of the war on terror from that of border protection.

As indicated, the discourse of the war on terror has two primary modes of address: condemnation of terrorists and fear of future attacks. The first takes the form of moral outrage and unequivocal condemnation of the attacks and their perpetrators. This is condemnation in a strong sense, far closer to damnation than to mere disapproval. Commenting on the earlier discourse of terrorism, Said shows how it attributes moral authority to the self and moral opprobrium to the other: the "out-of-scale transnational images ... of foreign devils" he observes "signify moral power and approval for whoever uses them, moral defensiveness and criminalisation for whomever they designate.... [T]his dynamic imbues 'us' with a righteous anger and defensiveness in which 'others' are seen as

¹¹ 1989 marks the end of the Soviet empire and the USA's rise to the status of sole superpower. "Blowback" is briskly explained by black US rapper, Mr Lif; Jeffrey Melnick describes Lif's "Home of the Brave" as answering "the most ubiquitous and pernicious of post-9/11 nationalistic rhetorical questions: '[T]hey killed us because we've been killing them for years'" (2009: 102). The term originated within the CIA to refer to "the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people" (Johnson 2000: 8). Mr Lif shows how *reversing* the self/other optic exposes its blind spots and allows for conceptual understanding. Otherwise, as Zulaika and Douglass argue, "no commentary on [terrorism's] discursive configuration seems ... conceivable, because we remain trapped by a perspective that is 'internal to the game'" (1996: 30).

¹² Accounts of the intense shock of US reactions appear in Shmemann 2001, Ali 2002: 291-2, Ahmad 2003: 16-19, Lewis 2005: 94-6, Melnick 2009 and Moeller 2009: 184-5. As I commented at the time, coverage by CNN – then the US and western news media leader – during the week following the attacks confirmed the profound shock of sudden victimhood: "The unthinkable nature of the attack is evidenced in the [network's] uncomprehending senses ... of innocence inexplicably violated, of outrage perpetrated against revered notions of freedom and democracy" (Crofts 2001: 16). What for CNN was "unthinkable" can alternatively be described as that which was discursively *repressed*; Chalmers Johnson was one of very few who anticipated the 11 September attacks as a logical consequence of US foreign policy (2000).

enemies, bent on destroying our civilisation and way of life” (1993: 375-6). The events of 2001 undoubtedly intensified this anger and condemnation. The “war on terror” incontrovertibly installs a bad other, and is militaristically conceived as a war against an enemy or enemies, the term war stressing “the otherness of the other” (Hage 2003: 141). With the excessive cathexis marking the displacement-dissimulation process, outstripping the intention of “finding those responsible”, the condemnation of Osama bin Laden/al-Qaeda/Taliban as terrorists takes the form of a fierce and almost primeval demonising.¹³

This condemnation activates a Manichean dichotomising of global geo-politics: good/evil, victim/villain, west/east, Christianity/Islam and so on. Poole observes how the discourse of the war on terror virtually theologises the response in a manner both primal and absolutist:

The phrase ... sounded awesome, evoking a picture of an apocalyptic fight of good against evil. “Terror” was reified as an implacable, chthonic force infecting the globe. This theological application was explicitly illustrated when George W Bush announced: “Our war is against evil”.... To call a person evil is to shut down argument, to deny forever the possibility of negotiation, to go on the theological offensive.... Whatever political grievances or struggle for liberation the person or group is trying to draw attention to by their actions is shut out by the absolute condemnation of ... the word “terrorist” (2006: 160-1, 135, 139)

As Hage points out, the moral outrage built “in the rush to condemnation” denies any “sense of common humanity” (2003: 140). As with Australian “border protection”, the discursive cathexis of the war on terror displaces the historical-political with the metaphysical-moral, and categories of explanation and understanding with affectively-oriented and moralistic forms of address.

The discourse of condemnation has two more facets relevant to this chapter. Firstly, its intensity brings with it a closing down of public debate. For the more forceful the affectively-oriented outcome (condemnation of terrorists), the more vigorous the repression of categories of explanation (denial of any national responsibility in the form of US foreign policy and practice). This is especially so when the discourse of the war on terror is accompanied by a major military campaign

¹³ The indeterminacy of the targets arises both from uncertainty about who was actually responsible for the 11 September events, and from the dubious legal basis of a professed war against a “tactic”, namely terror. The UK Lord Chief Justice, Peter Goldsmith, questioned the vagueness of a war against “a tactic ... not a person [or] a country [or] a group” (quoted by Moeller 2009: 27).

of retribution.¹⁴ Bush's declaration when announcing the "war on terror" that "[e]ither you are with us or you are with the terrorists" extends the condemnation of the foreign terrorist to include the possible domestic fellow traveller, as in Cold War censoring of liberals (quoted by Moeller 2004: 63). Thomas Foster argues that the "post-9/11 discourse of 'evil' [is] an explicit technique of policing what can and cannot be intellectually analysed" (2005: 281; cf Said 2004: 149). Toby Miller's findings on media representations of the "war on terror" exhaustively evidence these discursive constraints (2007: 81-111).

Secondly, the discourse of condemnation has disturbing implications for questions of innocence and guilt. In the name of the "war on terror", it crucially reframes the legal presumption of innocence obtaining in most western jurisdictions including the USA. The crisis and shock of 11 September 2001 appear to have occasioned a statist redefinition of legal process for those deemed responsible for the attacks, a redefinition which undercuts long-held beliefs in the legal presumption of innocence. Thus CIA Director George Tenet said the case against Osama bin Laden was "a slam dunk", and a senior US official made clear that the Administration's concern was not with legal process and finding evidence of guilt or innocence, but with retaliation and summary execution: "The criminal case is irrelevant. The plan is to wipe out Mr bin Laden and his organisation" (Cloud et al 2001: A1). Such pronouncements of the short-circuiting of legal process both attest to the discursive power of the cathexis, and enable the automatic demonisation of those alleged to be terrorists. At the same time, the foreign policy and practice which occasioned the blowback are diacritically constructed as innocent. In Noam Chomsky's words, "we can think of the United States as an 'innocent victim' only if we adopt the convenient path of ignoring the record of its actions and those of its allies" (2001: 35). Intriguingly, Jeffrey Melnick suggests that compared with the constantly recycled images of the World Trade Center, the "relative dearth of Pentagon visuals" in media coverage of the 11 September attacks arose in part "from its status as a visible marker of America's military power; this meant that the people who died inside were not completely available to the media as 'innocent victims'" (2009: 79).

The other key mode of address of the discourse of the war on terror is fear. Examining this requires some preliminary clarifications. Firstly, in terms of individuals' felt experience, there may well be other emotional resonances engaged than fear: notably anxiety, together with senses of insecurity,

¹⁴ Before the military campaign was narrowed down to bombing Afghanistan, where the Taliban were thought to be harbouring bin Laden, Bush and Vice-President Dick Cheney spoke publicly about the possibility of waging war against as many as 60 countries (Ahmad 2003: 16). Civilian deaths from the retaliatory bombing in Afghanistan exceeded 3,000 in the first twenty weeks (Herold 2002: 626).

nervousness, uncertainty and threat.¹⁵ Fear will be used here to comprise all these senses. Secondly, by way of reminder of the self/other structure of the “war on terror”, Bourke comments that “when we identify the emotion of fear it is our fear that concerns us. It is the fear *of* something that may befall us, rather than fear *for* others, those people on whom we inflict suffering” (2006 [2005]: x; italics original). Lastly and pivotally, it is necessary to pause over the “may” of Bourke’s “may befall us”. For the discourse of fear is a discourse of the subjunctive mood, not the indicative, of the putative rather than the actual. While fear is normally defined by an immediate threat, any threat terrorism represents may very well *not* be immediate, but is rather the *possibility* of a future attack. This leads Hugh Mackay to write of an “inhibitory” rather than “anticipatory” fear “generated by terrorism”, a fear whose source is unknown and whose timing is unpredictable (Mackay 2001). Where the discourse of condemnation looks back with undeniable certainty at an event which *has* happened, that of fear looks forward with an unfocused trepidation. This raises the cardinal question of the reasons underlying the astonishing power of the discourse of fear, for its “disproportionate” “hyperbole” and “out-of-scale” images (Bourke 2006 [2005]: 365; Ali 2002: 290; Said 1993: 375).

The discourse’s power and pervasiveness have several explanations. In the broader culture of the time Carmen Lawrence, former Premier of West Australia, observed a widespread “heightened collective fear”, listing – with some satirical flippancy – “fears about terrorists and obesity, about flu pandemics and paedophiles, about flesh-eating viruses, and so on” (2006: 5, 9; Glassner 1999). On the discourse of fear in the war on terror, Susan Moeller points to its ready exploitation by all parties concerned: “One could ... neatly sum up the most essential element in our experience of terrorism in one phrase: fear-mongering. Fear-mongering by the terrorists themselves, by governments, by media” (2009: 184). Pivotally in a mass-mediated culture, the discourse of fear is continually disseminated far and wide by television, the press and other media. Vivially amplified by media representations were the institutions of securitisation to which the discourse contributed – the apparatuses of homeland security, tightened border controls, expanded surveillance systems and increased powers of law-enforcement agencies – which themselves unquestionably expanded the discourse’s reach. Eric Hobsbawm explicitly charges that with the “war on terror” “government and media unite to create a climate of ... irrational fear ... for their own purposes by giving [terrorist acts] maximum publicity” (2008 [2007]: 136-7).¹⁶ In Poole’s view, such developments

¹⁵ There is general agreement among writers from various disciplines that fear and anxiety are proximate emotions, and that fear is defined by an immediate objective threat while anxiety refers to an anticipated, subjective threat (Strongman 2003: 135; Bourke 2006 [2005]: 189; Laplanche and Pontalis 1973 [1967]: 379). However, Bourke also notes the two emotions’ convertibility as well as their historical and situational mutability (2006 [2005]: 189-91).

¹⁶ Miller comprehensively details how US media representations almost entirely excluded viewpoints critical of the Administration’s accounts of the “war on terror” (2007: 81-111). Said comments of the earlier phase of terrorism that

“prepare the public for a potentially indefinite state of emergency” and work “not to dispel fear but actually to induce it” (2006: 153). So the contagious power of fear assists in making the discourse remarkably performative, and its subjunctive mood greatly boosts these capacities.¹⁷ Consider the routine, shadowy narrative that “the terrorist ‘could be’ anyone and anywhere” (Ahmed 2004: 79), or continual news reports of “new security fears”, “a new security alert” and so on. Such recurrent tropes actually present the subjunctive as if it were indicative. They are surely affective rather than referential constructs.

The following sections will consider the extent to which the two Australian newspapers adopt the assumptions and modes of address of the discourse of the war on terror, and the ways in which they do so.

3. The *Daily Telegraph* on terrorism and politics: fear and loathing?

The *Daily Telegraph*'s representations of terrorism and politics very substantially echo the discourse of the war on terror and its central modes of address: fear and condemnation (in the strong sense).¹⁸ These two discourses are reinforced by the major modes of address analysed in the last two chapters. For the dual, passive address to Australians as mourning national victims and as anxious about immigrants and foreigners compounds the discourse of fear, while the racialised address of nation-as-home feeds into and strengthens the reactive discourse condemning the foreign terrorists suspected of the bombing. These earlier modes of address – themselves partly built on the discourse of border protection – intensify the affective force of the “war on terror” discourse.

Yet, before fear and condemnation, there is a prior, more general appropriation from the discourse of the war on terror. Circulated so extensively in the west, the discourse provides the vocabulary with which to try to grasp the *shock* of the Bali attack. This is most evident in the paper's first day of reporting. The reifying noun “terrorism” bulks large, like the personification of Evil in medieval morality plays, especially in the paper's headlines and page headers. With its primal, implacable connotations, it both supplants more specific descriptors of the event like “the Bali bombing” or “attacks on Kuta tourists”, and is accorded such syntactic power as to reduce Australian victims to its hapless predicate. Witness the front-page headline “Terrorism struck home to Australia” (14

“the elevation of terrorism to the status of a national security threat ... has deflected careful scrutiny of the government's domestic and foreign policies” (1988: 149).

¹⁷ Judith Butler defines performativity as “that power of discourse to produce effects through reiteration ... a reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names” (1993: 21, 2).

¹⁸ The content categories for the news pages are numbered 8-9 and 11-13 in Table 1.

October, p1). A “Terrorism on Our Doorstep” header is used on the Editorial and other pages (eg 14 October, pp2, 3, 20). It is the header most used through the week, and the phrase appears daily as the generic title for all Bali coverage in the paper’s page 2 List of Contents. One factor explaining the shock would be the long-held belief that Australia’s distance from most of the world guaranteed it immunity from the violence of war and, after 11 September 2001, from terrorism. There is also the liminal status of Kuta as “home” examined above. In the words of Jeff Lewis and Sonya de Masi, the “shock of the attacks was so severe not only because it was unexpected and contiguous, but because it so powerfully challenged Australians’ inchoate but significant sense of regional belonging” (2007: 62). This uneasy sense of belonging could explain why the tropes of “home” and “doorstep” attain such remarkable metonymic elasticity, seemingly able to telescope the 4,700 kilometres between Bali and Sydney. “Home” and “doorstep” for the *Daily Telegraph*, then, mark the filtering of the shock through the Australian discourse of invasion anxiety and the paper’s anxieties about foreign threats to “Australians-at-home”.

The discourse of fear from the “war on terror” appears to have landed on particularly fertile ground in the *Daily Telegraph*, with its fearful anxiety about “foreigners” as a major interpretive frame for constructing those from overseas in general and, by very ready extension, those suspected of the Bali bombing in particular.¹⁹ This affective register would readily transmute the indicative of shock at what *has* happened into the subjunctive of fear of what *might* happen, the more so given the paper’s strongly affective mourning of Australian victims and the providential trope of the lucky escape encouraging stronger identification by the unharmed with those who were harmed, and so implying fear for all. Fear is a pervasive mode of address throughout the week. The paper’s first article on political responses to the bombing, for instance, has a large-font banner headline reading “It’s on our doorstep”, with the smaller-font sub-head: “PM orders urgent terror alert review” (14 October, p10). This item follows nine pages devoted to reporting and showing Australian victims and nightclub destruction, including a photographic sequence entitled “Safe”, which shows many who escaped unharmed, highlighting the providentialism of fate in Kuta (14 October, p5). Immediately under the Editorial page header, “Terrorism on Our Doorstep”, a cartoon literalises the doorstep image: a skeletal hand stretches out from a black sleeve marked “TERROR” and raps the knocker on a door marked “AUSTRALIA”; a primed bomb lies on the doormat. There follows an opinion piece whose title, “Gutless evil that stalks our shores”, adopts another absolute abstract noun from the war on terror discourse (14 October, p20). The article advises: “Don’t think [the

¹⁹ Manning’s description of his study of 2000-2002 (pre-Bali) Sydney newspapers as “a portrait of deep and sustained fear” would have applied far more to the *Daily Telegraph* than to the *Sydney Morning Herald* (2004: 45). There seems to be no way of disengaging the inputs of discourses of racial difference and of the “war on terror” beyond saying that they surely overlay and intensify each other.

terrorists] won't come for us." Four items can be cited from very many later in the week which instance the felt "immediacy" of the putative threat which the paper constructs. An epilogue highlights Howard saying: "It can happen here. We are more at risk than we were" (16 October, p3). An editorial varies the doorstep trope in warning that "dangers lap at our shores" (15 October, p20). An Editorial page has the header "Opinion: our Fears" (16 October, p34). And the performative effects of fear may very well be evidenced in the responses printed to a Vote-Line question asking readers if "you think it is inevitable that terrorists will strike on the Australian mainland": 89% answered yes (18 October, p29). This community of voters stands for that larger community addressed by the *Daily Telegraph's* discourse of fear from the "war on terror", which is already strengthened by the paper's dual address to Australian mourners who are fearful of foreigners.

It was argued above that the discourse of the war on terror encourages affective responses rather than offering forms of explanation. The paper's one general article on terrorism amply demonstrates how the discourse of fear affectively displaces categories of explanation (19 October, p4). Although the article lists many terrorist "attempts to kill westerners" over the previous thirteen months from New York to the Philippines, it offers no analysis of any possible reasons behind terrorist acts, certainly none of blowback from Arab/Muslim communities against western states or interests. Instead, its discourse of fear asserts that terrorism's "motive [is] unclear", that no "theory" of links between attacks is "too ludicrous", that "nowhere is safe" and that "this is an era where anything is possible, and terror has a devastating effect on communities gripped by fear". Typically of the "war on terror" and its self/other structure, the article closes down the possibility of discussion by consigning categories of explanation to the realm of the inexplicable, a matter of no interest because their proponents are deemed to be "not rational". The article's account of terrorism would indeed seem to be performative along the lines of Poole's argument that one effect of the "war on terror" was "not to dispel fear but actually to induce it" (2006: 153). In the news pages' representations of terrorism, then, the mode of address of fear is strongly inflected by national discourses based on distance and remoteness (invasion anxiety and fear of foreigners). In this way the discourse of border protection meshes with and intensifies that of the war on terror.²⁰

The other side of fear in the discourse of the war on terror is what Said calls "a righteous anger and defensiveness in which 'others' are seen as enemies, bent on destroying our civilisation and way of life" (1993: 376). The *Daily Telegraph's* reports of political leaders' responses to the bombing are

²⁰ Suvendrini Perera observed later in 2002 a "campaign of fear [which] conflated asylum-seekers, people of 'Middle Eastern appearance' and terrorists" (2009: 108). This evidences a powerful affective economy at work.

the first aspect of this condemnatory mode of address. The reports are extensively informed by the western discourse of the war on terror, and at the same time “Australianised”. Firstly, Prime Minister Howard is quoted describing the attacks in depoliticised, moral terms: as “‘wicked’, ‘cowardly’ and ‘barbaric ... indiscriminate, brutal and despicable’” (14 October, p2). Secondly, he is reported calling for “unrelenting vigour and unconditional commitment in the war on terrorism” (14 October, p10). Thirdly, he is quoted invoking a unified national community – “I know I speak for all Australians ... in expressing a sense of outrage, sadness and horror” – which prefigures the paper’s “nineteen million mates” (14 October, p2). In the same vein, the paper stresses the “unity” of condemnation. The headline to edited extracts of speeches by Howard and Opposition Leader Simon Crean notes that they “unite in condemnation” of the bombing, though neither is actually quoted using the word “condemn” (15 October, p13). A report of the responses of prime ministers, presidents or foreign ministers of the USA, the UK, Germany, France, Russia, Pakistan and India is similarly headlined: “World leaders unite in condemnation of terror” (14 October, p10).²¹ It will be noted that with the move from passive to reactive the syntax of condemnation reverses that of fear: the west is shown to take a stand against terrorism. Where the discourse of fear attends to the self, that of condemnation roundly dismisses the other.²² The reader is invited to join national and (predominantly western) international communities in their denunciation of the bombing. What Mervi Pantti calls the “moral national community” regularly addressed in disaster reporting is here enlarged to embrace an international community (2011: 234).²³ The metaphysical-moral world-view depoliticises and dehistoricises accounts of the bombing.

The mode of address condemning the bombers backs up the editorials’ primary mode of address to a national community of mourners, examined in Chapter 2. The two work together almost like a spinning coin: tails you mourn; heads you blame. The paper’s grieving Australians are thus invited to condemn terrorism as “horrific, gutless, mindless” and its actors as “blackhearted zealots”, and the binaries of the “war on terror” structure material in familiar ways to reassert western values (14 October, p20; 18 October, p26). One editorial, for example, invokes innocent Christian victims vs guilty Islamist villains when speaking of “the loss of innocent people who have become victims of

²¹ Only the USA, the UK and Pakistan are quoted using the word “condemn”.

²² The two modes of address often operate in concert. The article considered above, “It’s on our doorstep”, appears on a page headed “Targeting the Bombers”, a photograph of Howard is captioned “Condemnation ...” and so on (14 October, p10; dots original).

²³ Yet condemnation appears to be nuanced at one point. After reporting the condemnation of the bombing by Howard, by Foreign Minister Alexander Downer and by Simon Crean, the last three sentences of a report of politicians’ responses to the bombing note that “Greens Leader, Bob Brown, condemned the ‘inexcusable hate’ of the terrorists”, but also “urged the Government to switch its security focus from Iraq to the near region” including Indonesia (14 October, p10). However, Brown’s nuance may not be of great import for *Daily Telegraph* readers, who would be used to his being routinely disparaged for his left political stands (eg 16 October, p36) – as would readers of the *Australian* (eg 16 October, pp10, 14).

Islamic fundamentalism”: it further counterposes western secular democracy to a putative eastern theocratic dictatorship in asserting that “we are a Western democracy that recognises the necessary separation of church and state and is opposed to regimes that restrict individual freedom” (16 October, p34; cf 14 October, p20). The comment piece imported from the UK *Sun* similarly contrasts foreign “fanatics” with “peace-loving” Australians (17 October, pp8-9).

The *Daily Telegraph* devotes very many words and photographs to suspects for the bombing in a series of four articles. Here the paper does not so much report condemnation as it itself condemns. The articles’ unusual visual presentation will be examined shortly. But initially, let us consider their verbal content. Trying to identify possible suspects for the Bali attacks is an entirely laudable journalistic project. In line with Moeller’s “fear-mongering” as practised by terrorists (2009: 184), no group claimed responsibility. Speculation was therefore rife. In the first four days of reporting on the bombing, the paper canvasses four different suspects: the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) group; Abu Bakar Bashir, JI’s leader; Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, bin Laden’s military chief; and “disaffected sections of the Indonesian military” (14 October, p11; 15 October, p21; 16 October, pp6-7; 17 October, p35). All are identified as Muslim, which, in light of Manning’s findings about the widespread conflation of the terms, could easily be read in this newspaper as code for terrorist. The paper’s demonisation of those it suspects of terrorism exceeds the disdain of its negative ethnocentrism towards Indonesians discussed in the last chapter.

The discourse of the war on terror informs the verbal content of these articles in four ways. The first concerns the representation of the suspects’ motives, which the paper treats cursorily. For these are constructed largely in terms of the binaries of west/east, democracy/Islam, rationality/fanaticism and so on, binaries which see the other as having meaning *only in relation to* Australia/the west, that is, as a threat. Thus JI and Bashir are said to wish to establish an Islamic state across south-east Asia, and Mohammed to be directing “symbolic attacks against the west” (14 October, p11; 15 October, p21; 16 October, pp6-7; 17 October, p34; 19 October, p20). The motives ascribed to disaffected fractions of the Indonesian military are that the attack was either a means of destabilising the government prior to a military coup, or retaliation against “Australia and the West [for the] severe loss of face in East Timor” (17 October, p35). The last motive verges on recognising the idea of blowback, but this is overridden by a sense of pride in “our beliefs” justifying the Australian contribution to the military intervention, and likewise to “[o]ur involvement in military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan [which] angered Muslims” (16 October, p34). The paper’s general disdain for any explanation beyond something which threatens Australia is evident not only in the limited attention given to motives, but also in the *singularity* of

motives attributed to most of the parties suspected, in the monocausal assumption that terrorists could have only one motive. Yet, was it not possible that the bombers wished to attack the west in general, for its bombing of Afghanistan for instance, *and* to attack Australia in particular, for its lead role in the East Timor intervention, for its fighting in Afghanistan and for its recently-professed support role in the proposed US-led invasion of Iraq, *and* locally, in the short term, to destabilise the Sukarnoputri government and in the longer term to build towards an Islamic caliphate?²⁴ Instead in these articles, the paper gives its suspects' motives short shrift in favour of demonising catalogues of their past alleged crimes.

A second way in which the “war on terror” bears upon the paper’s verbal representations of suspects is its challenges to the legal presumption of innocence described above. This manifests itself particularly in the article on Mohammed (16 October, pp6-7). The two-page banner headline, “Agent of evil behind the atrocity,” explicitly declares his guilt in very large font and reverse text, even though the sub-head qualifies the charge in calling him “[t]he main suspect in Bali bombing”. Following this introductory demonisation of Mohammed are several similar slippages from a legally *alleged* guilt to a media-*asserted* guilt. The article concludes, for example, by reporting President George W Bush saying that that “he *assumed* the deadly blasts were the work of al-Qaeda” (my italics). It then not only quotes Bush in its last sentence saying “These are nothing but cold-blooded killers”, but also endorses that presumption of guilt by highlighting it in a reverse-text epilogue. Elsewhere successive sentences read: “Mohammed ... *has* targeted Australia before. He was *allegedly involved* in co-ordinating the plot to bomb the Australian, US and UK embassies in Singapore in January, 2002” (my italics). Such attributions of guilt are compounded by the article’s visual elements examined below.

The third aspect of the “war on terror” impinging on the written texts emerges in the *serial* presentation of the paper’s suspects. It is hard not to wonder whether a certain discursive compulsion to blame informs the paper’s display of four different suspects on successive days. Each is treated as highly suspect, if not as guilty. Each is presented *separately*, and no article pursues suggestions of links between parties. For instance, the Mohammed piece mentions al-Qaeda “sponsor[ing]” JI, but quickly returns to focus exclusively on Mohammed. And the paper’s separation of JI from its leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, would seem perverse. Furthermore, the paper offers no *comparative* appraisal of which party is more likely to be responsible or why. The

²⁴ Another possible motive, not attributed to any party, is that the bombing might have been designed to spark a backlash against Hindus in Bali (16 October, p7). Jeff Lewis and Alison Broinowski mention two additional possibilities: resentment against the influence of Jakartan Chinese investments in Balinese tourism, and “the longstanding hostility of many Indonesians towards Australia” (Lewis 2005: 176; Broinowski 2003: 231). The national affront represented by the latter may explain why the *Daily Telegraph* does not mention it.

inclusion of Mohammed, together with the actual overlapping of JI and Bashir, could create the impression of a newspaper caught in a contagion of blame and proliferating suspects – all of whom it finds guilty.

The last way in which the discourse of the war on terror informs the written texts concerns the adequacy of the paper's research into its security intelligence sources. Only one article sifts and evaluates information from the security experts quoted, because it draws on the work of the International Crisis Group, which already does precisely this (October 15, p21). The other three articles use less scholarly sources. These sources are consistently taken at face value, thus overlooking and naturalising any strategic interests they may represent: all are western. Some anomalies arise. The article blaming Mohammed, for instance, draws almost entirely on the Israeli International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, which appears to have no interest in terrorist activity outside the middle east-USA axis (16 October, p7). The article quotes the Indonesian Defence Minister, Matori Abdul Djilil, saying "[w]e are sure al-Qaeda is here" without questioning that Indonesia might at the time have been anxious to deflect blame to a globally famous, non-Indonesian terrorist group (16 October, p6). Although this may support the article's construction of Mohammed as guilty, the next day's article cites "Australian military experts" who are "suspicious of the Indonesian Government being so quick to declare al-Qaeda terrorists were responsible for carrying out the attack" (17 October, p35). The paper's casual failure to question its security sources both generates unreliable "information", and facilitates the demonisation of all those the paper chooses to suspect.

Beyond the written word, the *Daily Telegraph's* representations of its suspects clearly demonstrate the importance of layout and photographs in the service of the moralistic discourse of condemnation. The following examples illustrate respectively the importance of page sequencing, of photographs, and of layout and photographs combined. All deploy various of the binaries of the discourse of the war on terror in their condemnation of suspects. In terms of page sequencing firstly, a villain/victim narrative of blame has both JI and Mohammed appear following and preceding pages covering Australian victims, mourning ceremonies and the destruction of the Sari Club, as if both suspects bore responsibility for the pain, death and destruction (14 October, p11; 16 October, pp6-7).

On photographs, it is likely that many actual readers of newspapers read little beyond the headlines and photographs. Roland Barthes comments on their rhetorical force: in Stuart Hall's synopsis, "they are more imperative than writing, they impose meaning at one stroke, without analysing or

diluting it” (Hall 1972: 53 summarising Barthes 1957: 161). The affective power of photographs is a very influential, if overlooked, force in journalism. Photographs of those suspected of terrorist acts can far more directly and affectively attribute guilt than such staples of verbal reporting on terrorism as “has been linked to” and “bears the hallmarks of”. Of moment here is the *Daily Telegraph*’s photographic representations of Indonesians suspected of terrorism.²⁵ The three JI members presented as suspects are exhibited in criminalising mug-shots, and Bashir, with sinister grin, is photographed in front of Koranic scripture (understandably, there are no photos of Indonesian military suspects) (14 October, p11; 15 October, p21; also 17 October, p2; 19 October, p4). Furthermore, these four men are the only people the paper shows full-face whom it identifies as Indonesian – including Balinese – during the entire week’s reporting. The paper, it will be remembered, carries no photographs of President Megawati Sukarnoputri, and the only representative of the Indonesian state whose face is shown – the para-medical discussed in the last chapter – has his existence denied by the photograph’s caption (14 October, p7). So the four men suspected of terrorism are the *only* Indonesians given full-face recognition by the paper. This licenses a reading that “terrorism is the true face of Indonesia”. It endorses pictorially the assertion, by the comment piece reprinted from the UK *Sun*, that Indonesia is a “failed state” (17 October, p9). It invokes an international democracy/terrorism binary which goes beyond the paper’s aforementioned account of Indonesia as being guilty of harbouring terrorists: while Australia remains an implied home of democracy, Indonesia is photographically represented as consisting only of (those suspected of being) terrorists.

More broadly, the paper’s choice of photographs of non-Australians vigorously promotes the subjunctive stress on overseas threats to Australians. The vast majority of its 314 photographs are of Australians – a familiar ethnocentrism – while those of non-Australians count for less than 10%, and fall into three groups. The first category comprises the largely ignored Indonesian emergency workers discussed in Chapter 3. The second group consists of white-skinned mourners for Australian victims: the two photographs of Canadians and Norwegians mentioned above, and one of President Bush (14 October, p13; 16 October, p9; 14 October, p10). The third category comprises photographs of those the paper accuses of terrorism: the four Indonesians; eleven people in tiny mug-shots, presumably suspects, appearing in the elaborate illustration of the terrorism article (19 October, p4); two of Osama bin Laden, one captioned “the face of terrorism”, the other apparently presiding over images of death and destruction visually attributed to him (14 October, p11; 19 October, p4); and two of Mohammed considered in the next paragraph. The most numerous and prominent of these three groups is thus the last: photographs of the accused. The

²⁵ Poole cautions against the prejudicial use of the phrase “terrorist suspect” (2006: 143-51).

world beyond Australian shores, in other words, appears to be overwhelmingly peopled by terrorists. This paranoid world view seemingly finds little comfort in the Australian-US alliance. Illustrating the first page dealing with political responses to the bombing – the articles headed “It’s on our doorstep” and “World leaders unite in condemnation of terror” – are an upward-angle photograph of a statesmanlike Howard captioned “Condemnation ...” which dominates the page, filling over a quarter of it; and at the bottom right-hand corner of the page, the paper’s only photograph of Bush, a very small image of a recessive-looking President captioned “Sorrow...” (14 October, p10; dots original). The relationship between the two images could license interesting conclusions about power relations within the US-Australian alliance. Those alarmed by the visual belittling of the US President may perhaps take comfort in the photograph of Prime Minister Howard as well as those described above of members of the AFP striding into Indonesia. Overall, the paper carries photographically ominous implications about Australians under threat from terrorism.

The article on Kuwait-born Mohammed displays one of the paper’s most elaborate uses of photographs and layout during the week (16 October, pp6-7).²⁶ The paper visually attributes guilt by association to him. Immediately below the first word of the large-font, reverse-text headline, “Agent of evil behind the atrocity”, which stretches across almost all the two-page spread – under the page headers “Hunt for the Killers” – there are two large photographs of the Kuta devastation which dominate the left-hand page. The black frame of the reverse text extends down, epitaph-like, to frame both photographs. From the right-hand end of the same headline on the facing page the same black frame extends down to highlight two mug-shot photographs of a sinister-looking Mohammed, the first in traditional Arab robes, the second wearing western collar and tie, whose caption racialises the shifty and devious: “Disguise... Khalid Shaikh Mohammed in western mode” (dots original). The pairs of photographs on the two facing pages, of devastation and of Mohammed, create a telling diptych, effectively “framing” him for the bombing. Guilt by association for bin Laden’s military chief is redoubled by five captioned photographs of earlier destruction in “Al-Qaeda’s terror targets” running down the far left-hand column of the double-page spread. One might wonder whether the lavishly illustrated two-page spread has more to do with the ready availability of photographs which might be connected to Mohammed than with the fact that

²⁶ The other is the terrorism article, whose 22 photographs are laid out as a “bloody jigsaw,” an “evil picture” exhibiting suspects for the Bali bombing (19 October, p4). The number of photographs explains why the topic ranks second in the content analysis table, with 7.6% of the paper’s total coverage. Read top left to bottom right, the almost-finished jigsaw puzzle leads the reader from bin Laden presiding over images of destruction including the World Trade Center, through US flags and mug-shots of many suspected of terrorism, to Bashir and the flattened Kuta nightclubs. This narrative of blame is pointed by being printed on a left-hand page with three reports about Australian victims on the facing page under the header “Devastated by Horror”, and carries the affective force of 22 photographs of destruction, western patriotic symbols and demonised suspects.

he was the least likely of the four suspects. It is surely likely that many readers who scanned the photographs, captions and headline of the Mohammed article drew conclusions about the suspect's guilt.

In the paper's representations of those it suspects of committing terrorist acts, then, the "moral power" and "righteous anger" (Said 1993: 375-6) of the discourse condemning them displaces concern with legal process. No charges were actually laid against anyone until 30 April 2003 (Wikipedia 2011), after which date guilt was proven in court. But the paper implicitly and sometimes explicitly charges all its various suspects in the week after the bombing. In the manner of the discourse of the war on terror, these suspects lose any presumption of innocence. Innocence is naturalised as belonging to Australians and the west, metaphysically rendered as transcending any category of explanation. The paper's renditions of those suspected of terrorism suggest an anxious vigilanteist conception of justice.

While suspects' likely motives are treated in a cursory manner, there is one possible motive which the paper extensively *denies*. No fewer than four editorial and opinion items assert, in the words of one editorial writer, that "Australia is a target not for any support of a US-led invasion of Iraq" (16 October, p34; also 17 October, p34; 19 October, p20; 14 October, p20).²⁷ Both discursive and political reasons can be identified for this denial. Discursively, the Iraq invasion would represent another milestone in the history of the Australian expeditionary tradition – all of whose endeavours since 1945 had been conducted in alliance with the USA – and so resonates with the proud discourse of Anzac, the founding myth of the nation, noted above as underpinning discourses of victimhood and innocence in the *Daily Telegraph's* coverage of Australian victims of the bombing. The political factors mesh with the discursive, and may need some contextualisation. At the time, the Bush administration was exerting diplomatic pressure on the Howard government to join the proposed invasion. As already signalled, the *Daily Telegraph* was a strong supporter of Howard's coalition government, of his pro-US foreign policy and of his support for sending Australian troops to Iraq. Fortuitously on the weekend of the Bali bombing there were worldwide demonstrations against this proposed invasion, including a rally in Melbourne where "more than 30,000 people gathered to voice their opposition to Australia's involvement in any war against Iraq" (ABC TV

²⁷ The only heterodox view appearing in the paper is that of the head of the Anglican Church, Dr Peter Carnley. He is hastily reported – in one of those "in other developments" sentences appended to long articles on other topics – "blam[ing] the Bali attack on the Howard Government's support for the US over Iraq" (19 October, p2). On the broader issue of the proposed Iraq invasion, the Letters pages print sixteen letters criticising the invasion and fourteen supporting it. An explanation may lie in a concern, for the Letters pages, of a certain pluralism of commentary, rather than any preference for left views. Thus, for example, views expressed include attacks on *all* Muslims (twice on 17 October, p36, for example) without the then regular distinction between "moderate" and "extreme" adherents to the religion.

News, 13 October). Howard's own awareness of widespread opposition to the proposed war is perhaps indicated by his not allowing a parliamentary vote on the issue (Manne 2011b: 245-6).

On Monday 14 October the *Daily Telegraph's* chief political reporter, Malcolm Farr, anticipates that with the "strong bipartisanship [typical of] a time of crisis and uncertainty ... [t]he political consequences of [the Bali] attack will be seen immediately by a shutdown of dissent on Government policy to join the US-led war on terrorism" (14 October, p20). Farr's use of the incisive words "immediately" and "shutdown" suggests a certain impatience or possibly triumphalism in line with the op-ed pages' strenuous denial of the Iraq issue's importance as a motive behind the bombing. There is no suggestion here of censorship or even self-censorship; rather, the paper follows its policy of supporting the Howard government.²⁸ For the present argument, it matters not whether Australia's potential Iraq involvement *was* a reason behind the attack, but that both government and newspaper were keen that it not *appear* to be a possibility. The insistent denials of the Iraq motive serve both the discursive investment in the expeditionary tradition, and the political accommodation between newspaper and government. But these denials do close down debate, in the manner of the discourse of the war on terror, and restrict voices of political difference and dissent.

One opinion piece dealing with the Iraq invasion issue offers the opportunity to analyse discursive and rhetorical treatments of this and connected political topics in the paper. Entitled "Sympathy for the devil in disguise", it is one of two pieces written during the week by one of the *Daily Telegraph's* best known columnists, Piers Akerman (17 October, p34; also 15 October, p20). Akerman was at the time typical of the paper's columnists in both political stance and rhetorical moves, though he was both more controversial and printed more often than others.²⁹ His contribution well exemplifies how far the paper subscribes to the tenets of the "war on terror". Unusually, it makes explicit categories of explanation which that discourse more typically represses. So its project is an intellectual one seeking to rebut opposing arguments, though it does not actually *engage with* them. It repudiates rather than refutes.³⁰ Its central aim is to reject any explanation of the bombing which seeks "to sheet home responsibility for these barbaric acts to Prime Minister John Howard, the Australian Government, the US Government and Western society in general" (note the rhetorically climactic style of ironic ridicule). The discursive structure which

²⁸ John Keane points out that in western democracies informal advice and/or self-censorship routinely operate in government-press relations (1992: 17).

²⁹ Rhetorically, Akerman shares with Malcolm Farr (14 October, p20), for instance, the pattern of opening denunciation and caricatural misrepresentation of the position under attack, and then either climactic or bathetic ridicule of it.

³⁰ By contrast in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, Guy Rundle, for example, both summarises his opponents' points and argues his case against them (16 October, p17).

the piece adopts thus rejects any idea of blowback against western interests or provocations. To this end it repudiates the arguments that access to oil was a motive for US interests in Iraq, and that terrorism might arise in part from wealth differentials between the west and other countries.

The article devotes several paragraphs to denying the Iraq invasion as a motive for the bombing. Its rhetorical and discursive manoeuvres are evident in the opening sentence of this section:

“According to a number of ovine voices, Mr Howard is responsible for the Bali bombing because he has enunciated Australia’s support for the US opposition to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.” The initial rhetorical move is to describe critics as “a number of ovine voices”: derogating as sheep-like the view about to be represented.³¹ There follows a caricatural misrepresentation, a *reductio ad absurdum* which ironically inflates statements of diplomacy into a terrorist act, as well as reducing a complex of possible motives to just one. Mobilising the binaries of good/evil, democracy/dictatorship and west/east, this sentence assumes as axiomatic the desirability of unseating a president shortly afterwards characterised as “the world’s worst dictator, the most brutal, the most dangerous, the most psychotic”. On the good side of the binary are the USA, Australia and the respectfully designated “Mr Howard”; on the other, the affective economy of a demonised President Hussein, the Bali bombers and various unnamed “ovine” fellow travellers familiar from the discourse of the war on terror. The argument pivots on a tendentious identification between “Mr Howard” and “Australia”, asserting that he is the spokesperson for – he “enunciates” rather than “argues” – “Australia’s support” for the war. By naturalising the governmental head of state as expressing the will of the people, the piece endorses an authoritarian populist version of government rather than one of representative democracy. One might recall that Howard had not allowed a parliamentary vote on the topic.

There is space for no more than brief rebuttals of Akerman’s three supporting arguments. What may appear to be breezily selective historicising is in fact centrally structured by the “war on terror” and the historical evidence it selectively proscribes. The longest of Akerman’s arguments reiterates that Hussein should be toppled, for reasons including the characterisations quoted. To claim that he is “the world’s worst dictator”, though, does beg comparative questions with the contemporary leaders of at least North Korea, say, or Myanmar. The second argument concerns the US-alleged plot by JI to bomb the Australian High Commission in Singapore in 2001, together with the embassies of the USA and the UK.³² The article maintains that the High Commission “was targeted

³¹ The use of “ovine” recalls the rhetorical trope which Barthes, in his compendium of classical rhetoric, designates “*egressio* ... whose function is to make the orator shine” (1970: 213).

³² In an article treated in the following section, the *Sydney Morning Herald* had three days previously expressed caution about attributing guilt to JI on the basis of US allegations (14 October, p6).

... before Mr Howard made any mention of Iraq”. This is surely true, but it begs the question as to why the Iraq motive could not have *intensified* the earlier terrorist animus against Australia – which Akerman does not mention – for joining those other states in the “coalition of the willing” which bombed Afghanistan. The third argument censures al-Qaeda for its 1998 bombings in east Africa without stating, let alone proving, any connection between the organisation and *either* the Bali bombing *or* Hussein.³³

In general, then, the larger discursive structures informing the article’s arguments instance the discourse of the war on terror. They rest primarily on a discursive cathexis dissimulating any western responsibility and displacing western geo-political interests into a condemnation of President Saddam Hussein; secondarily on an affective economy involving a slippage between bad objects whereby he is rhetorically, but not evidentially, connected with the Bali bombing and al-Qaeda; and lastly on the familiar self/other binaries of good/evil, innocence/guilt, democracy/dictatorship and west/east.

These oppositions underpin the central reason Akerman advances *for* the attack: the terrorists’ “[a]nti-Western sentiment” which opposes democracy, gender equality and freedom of thought and religion (17 October, p34). His conclusion – “The innocent Kuta victims were killed because they were at liberty to enjoy themselves” – extends to Australian tourists the innocence already routinely attributed to US/Australian foreign policy by the discourse of the war on terror. If we reverse the self/other optic, we can see that the discourse of innocence here represses another likely Australian/western provocation to the terrorists beyond the Iraq issue, namely the perceived decadence of some tourists’ self-indulgent “drinking, dancing, drug-taking, and public near-nudity” (Broinowski 2003: 193-4; Anggraeni 2003: 79, 87).³⁴ So, as the piece denies the Iraq invasion issue as a motive for the bombing, it simultaneously naturalises offending western mores, and invokes familiar, ethnocentric discourses of innocent victimhood. Reading the piece, one might recall earlier comments about white settler narratives and their “violent innocence”. Two comments remain. Noting Akerman’s routine refusal to engage with opposing arguments, Dennis Glover remarks that he “doesn’t seem to believe in pluralism [and] seems to want democratic debate only on his terms” (2005: 202). More broadly, we can suggest that for the *Daily Telegraph*’s constructions of terrorism, in the words of Joseba Zulaika and William Douglass, “no commentary

³³ The previous day, Rundle maintained that Iraq had “no significant connection to Indonesia and no proven political links with the likely culprits” (*Sydney Morning Herald* 16 October, p17). Akerman’s piece shows no signs of recognising Rundle’s (historically accurate) comments.

³⁴ This was also offensive also to many Balinese, as were the culturally and environmentally destructive effects of western tourism, often seen as an extension of western economic power into the realm of leisure (Lewis 2005: 173, 188; Perera 2009: 102).

on [terrorism's] discursive configuration seems ... conceivable, because we remain trapped by a perspective that is 'internal to the game'" (1996: 30).

In conclusion, the discourse of the war on terror extensively and deeply informs the *Daily Telegraph's* coverage of the bombing in its news and op-ed pages, its articles and its photographs. Complementing the mode of address of fear is that of the strong condemnation of suspects. Inwardly focused on "home", the discourse of fear is accorded more Australian inflections than that of condemnation, which is directed outwards against foreigners. That of fear operates powerfully in the subjunctive mood, that of condemnation in the demonising mode. The paper constructs communities of both fear and condemnation. The discursive cathexis of the "war on terror" allows the affective emphases of both modes of address to substantially displace categories of explanation and understanding. Consequently, terrorism is both depoliticised and dehistoricised, and instead is moralised. Self/other binaries work to dismiss motives that might explain the bombing; demonise whomever is imagined responsible, irrespective of evidence; and axiomatically attribute innocence to western diplomacy and foreign policy. The rhetorical strain of that political commitment is evident in the paper's coverage of the potential US-led invasion of Iraq, where – aside from its Letters pages – the paper is insistently partisan in repressing debate. Facilitating the paper's affective short-circuiting of reasoned political debate about terrorism are the near-totalising closure around Australian victims and foreigners observed in the last two chapters, and the powerful restrictions on such debate imposed by the "war on terror". In the paper's photographs, the same closure again combines with that discourse to mask out the rest of the world – represented as consisting almost entirely of terrorists – and so construct the nation as paranoid, racialised and readily succumbing to subjunctive threats. The discourse of the war on terror in the paper is considerably more forceful than that of border protection, and almost as intense and Manichean as it was in the USA in late 2001.

Finally, the *Daily Telegraph's* promotion of affective address over categories of explanation has major implications for the ethics and politics of journalism. It frequently dispenses with the criterion of the need for evidence to support a case. It undermines the fourth estate responsibility to report fairly and frankly what is happening in the world, and so disenfranchises the reader as informed citizen. Correlatively, it contributes to reducing government accountability to its citizens. These features find their echo in the occasions where the paper addresses its reader in terms of an authoritarian populism rather than of representative democracy.

4. The *Sydney Morning Herald* on terrorism and politics: understanding a complex world

Some critical differences in journalistic approach distinguishing the *Sydney Morning Herald's* representations of terrorism and politics from those of the *Daily Telegraph* can be illustrated by two articles from its first day's reporting on the bombing. The first of these exemplifies the paper's role as a pluralist forum for debate and its acknowledgement of the complexities of politics, and the second its concerns with impartially presenting evidence and prioritising information and explanation over affective engagement with the material. The paper addresses its reader as a cosmopolitan Australian citizen.

The first article reports various political responses to the bombing, and so stands as the exact counterpart to the *Daily Telegraph's* report discussed above of the responses of Howard, Downer, Crean and Brown (14 October, p5; cf *Daily Telegraph* 14 October, p10). The *Daily Telegraph* reports the views of only four politicians, and presents them serially with no sense of interaction or debate, such that the arguments of the Greens leader against the proposed Iraq invasion, because politically critical, sound a discordant note following the preceding consensus of solemn alarm about the event. The *Sydney Morning Herald* reports Brown's same arguments, but then prints Howard's rebuttal of them as a "totally inaccurate proposition", with two fairly detailed supporting arguments. The *Sydney Morning Herald's* attentive reporting reveals marginal differences emerging between government ministers, one seemingly abetting alarm and the other reassuring against it. Thus while Howard maintains that "[p]eople should get it out their mind that it can't happen here. It can ...", "a spokeswoman for the federal Attorney-General Daryl Williams said no specific threat of terrorist acts on Australian soil had been identified".³⁵ Whereas the *Daily Telegraph* restricts itself to quoting leaders of the three main federal parties and the Foreign Affairs Minister, the *Sydney Morning Herald* adds the comments of New South Wales Labor Premier, Bob Carr, averring that "Sydney now has to be considered a major target". The paper offers a corrective to any ethnocentric assumptions by adding the observations of non-Australians: comments by US officials and some Indonesian politicians that "US interests and the presidency of Ms Megawati [Sukarnoputri] may have been in the terrorists' sights, not Australia". While the *Daily Telegraph's* banner headline deploys the discourse of fear – "It's on our doorstep" – the *Sydney Morning Herald's* regular-size headline gives prominence to an issue for debate: "Stance on Iraq 'not a factor'". Whereas the *Daily Telegraph's* sub-head again plays on fear – "PM orders urgent terror alert review" – the *Sydney Morning Herald* covers the terror review in its report but accords it no

³⁵ The message of the fridge magnet which the government distributed to all Australian households – "Be alert, not alarmed" – closely matches this combination of alarm checked by reassurance. Alternatively, its message could be read rhetorically as assertion by denial, with the magnet bringing an emblem of fear into every Australian home.

special status. All in all, this report offers a far more complex image of political responses to the bombing than the *Daily Telegraph*'s: not only in the multiplicity of respondents and their political perspectives, including overseas ones, but also in the sense of difference and debate generated by their juxtaposition. The *Sydney Morning Herald* approach is more pluralist and multi-perspectival, more open to discussion of issues; the *Daily Telegraph* approach more serial and reiterative, more closed. These differences will be elaborated below.

The second example is an Analysis piece on the following page (14 October, p6). It is an exemplar of the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s cautious agnosticism in assessing evidence and its informational rather than affective priorities. Focussing on suspects for the bombing, the article's opening clause strikingly contrasts with the *Daily Telegraph*'s ready presumption of guilt for all four of its suspects: "Whoever ultimately is found responsible for the devastating bomb attacks in Bali at the weekend ...". It mentions that "no evidence has yet been produced" that they were involved in the bombing before even naming "Jemaah Islamiah" and "Abu Bakar Bashir". It enables assessment of strategic interests by citing national sources – "Washington and Singapore insist ..." – before detailing alleged crimes, and it explains some of the "purported" evidence supporting those charges. On al-Qaeda's possible involvement, it judiciously notes that "some security analysts remain sceptical about the extent of al-Qaeda's links in South East Asia". Two more examples of the paper's approach can be given from articles later in the week. One opinion piece nicely mentions "some evidence (but by no means conclusive)", and one by Hugh Mackay urges readers to beware quick, easy answers, especially in rushing to demonise alleged terrorists (14 October, p15; 19-20 October, p54). Such measured sifting and assessing of a wide range of security data and caution about jumping to conclusions manifestly contrast with the *Daily Telegraph*'s use of a limited number of security sources, its preparedness to take them at face value and its ready leaps to condemning all its suspects.

Almost all of the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s coverage of terrorism and politics – as with other topics – is informed by the journalistic values set out above: a pluralist openness to debate, an awareness of the complexities of politics in Australia and overseas, and concerns with assessing evidence and with impartial, informational reporting rather than an affective engagement with the material. As seen in its Indonesia coverage, the *Sydney Morning Herald* addresses its reader as a cosmopolitan Australian citizen wishing to be informed about international news and issues. So how compatible are such journalistic principles with the discourse and modes of address of the war of terror? In what ways does the paper differ from the *Daily Telegraph* in representing issues of terrorism and politics?

Like the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Sydney Morning Herald* registers the first day of shock at the bombing by making considerable use both of the awesome, reifying noun “terrorism” and the Australianising metonyms of “home” and “doorstep”, and does so as alarmedly as the other paper. Its front page headline, in very large font on two lines, is “TERRORISM STRIKES HOME”, and it adopts “Terror Strikes Home” as the header for each page of the paper’s Bali coverage until its weekend edition, when it switches to headers thematised by page content, such as “The Aftermath”, “Caught Napping” and “Nightmare in Kuta” (19-20 October, pp2-8). On the first day’s reporting, Howard is quoted saying “Terrorism ... has happened to our own, on our doorstep” and that day’s editorial on the bombing picks up the term “doorstep” (14 October, pp1, 14; dots original). The front-page report adds personification to metonym: “The bomb blast ... stamp[ed] terrorism’s bloody fingerprint on Australia’s door” (14 October, p1). In later days’ reporting, though, the paper mentions “home” only in the page headers noted above, and “doorstep” not at all. As with the *Daily Telegraph*, these markers of shock fade away. That both papers use the terms “home” and “doorstep” bespeaks the shock of the event and the discourse of invasion anxiety.

The discourse of fear from the “war on terror” meshed neatly with the *Daily Telegraph*’s ethnocentric anxiety about “foreigners”, especially those suspected of the Bali bombing. The *Sydney Morning Herald* has no such fearful cast as regards the non-Australian. Indeed, it barely invokes the discourse of fear at all. It appears five times, four of these occurring in quotations from politicians. Howard and Carr have been quoted above. In another article Howard is quoted saying that “[w]e are more at risk than we were”, and Daryl Williams is reported saying that “active [JI] members could be [in Australia] still” (16 October, p8). Unlike the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Sydney Morning Herald* does not reiterate and highlight these quotations in headlines or in epilogues; it simply reports them and then leaves them be. While the paper certainly carries no equivalent of the *Daily Telegraph*’s fear-laden article on terrorism, it does print one article mobilising the discourse of fear. This reports security analysts’ alarm over the vulnerability of Sydney to terrorist attack: “Almost without exception this week, local security and strategic analysts told the *Herald* they had been bracing for some kind of strike against Australian interests” (19-20 October, p5). The headline is “Deadly complacency”, and the accompanying scenic photograph of Sydney’s CBD seen from Darling Harbour carries the ominous caption: “Sydney presents many targets for the new breed of terrorist”. The article adduces much evidence of lax security in the city. Perhaps curiously, it does not indicate the vested interests of the experts it cites. Overall, though, the affective discourse of fear is of little interest to the paper.

The discourse of strong condemnation figures even less in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. That discourse, as seen in the “war on terror” and in the *Daily Telegraph*’s representations of those it suspects of the Bali bombing, adopts condemnation in the strong sense, one which does not just blame but *others* those whom it so treats. Outside quotations from Howard discussed below, the *Sydney Morning Herald* adopts less strenuous forms of condemnation, with none of the discourse’s absolute moralism, its own terms closer to disapproval or criticism. Its most forceful condemnation is of “wild-eyed psychopaths” (19-20 October, p50). It adopts such rhetoric on only one other occasion, in the sarcasm of calling JI “a fire-breathing revolutionary force” aiming to resist “the wicked ways of the secular world” (15 October, p7). Nowhere does the paper condone the bombing. But it avoids the demonising affect of the *Daily Telegraph*’s phrases, “horrific, gutless, mindless” and “blackhearted zealots” (14 October, p20; 18 October, p26). Typical descriptions are less hyperbolic, as of the bombers’ “vile crimes” and “pitiless hatred” (18 October, p15; 19-20 October, p58).

The *Sydney Morning Herald* also devotes fewer words to political-diplomatic condemnation of the bombing than does the *Daily Telegraph*. Its coverage tones down the other paper’s. Its first article on the bombing prints all of the extracts from Howard’s statement quoted above from the *Daily Telegraph*, including his condemning the bombing in the name of the nation – “an act of barbarity [which] will, I know, deeply shock all Australians” – but the *Sydney Morning Herald* does not endorse this “nation-ing” of the discourse of condemnation with the same stress on national unity found in the other paper (14 October, p1). Instead of a dedicated article with the headline underlining that Howard and Crean “unite in condemnation”, for instance, the *Sydney Morning Herald* concisely quotes their key comments as part of the more general article examined above on Australian and other responses (14 October, p5). Only one headline highlights condemnation: “US condemns ‘despicable act’” (14 October, p4). More concisely again, the paper quotes the presidents, deputy president and foreign minister of France, Italy, South Korea, Malaysia and Germany in a series of briefs without headline down the side of the page (15 October, p2). In a marked departure from the *Daily Telegraph*, which prints neither the diplomatic response of Indonesian President Sukarnoputri nor any photograph of her, the *Sydney Morning Herald* both quotes her describing the bombing as “a brutal act...”, and prints a small photograph (14 October, p4). The *Sydney Morning Herald* seeks to construct no community of condemnation in the *Daily Telegraph* manner. The paper, then, is substantially indifferent to the key modes of address of the discourse of the war on terror in which its counterpart invests so deeply. Its cosmopolitan address marks it out, too, from the other paper’s ethnocentric discourse of “home” and its attendant assumptions about racial difference.

The *Sydney Morning Herald*'s own approach is revealed in the content analysis' comparisons between the two papers' representations of terrorism and suspects (categories 8-9 in the table in Chapter 2). The papers' fundamentally different priorities of affect and explanation respectively can be productively mapped onto the numbers and relative proportions of articles and photographs on these two topics. The content analysis points up some striking divergences. On terrorism, there is a remarkable differential between the *Daily Telegraph*'s sole, fear-laden article and the nine analytical pieces from the *Sydney Morning Herald*. There is an equally remarkable differential between the numbers of photographs of terrorism and suspects in the two papers: forty in the *Daily Telegraph* as against five in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. On terrorism, photographs of terrorist targets, destruction and death in the *Daily Telegraph* outnumber those in the *Sydney Morning Herald* by thirty-one to three, thus multiplying the very strong affective potential of such images by a factor of ten. Moreover, these figures *exclude* the photographs of the Bali bombing itself, of which the *Daily Telegraph* prints forty-two as against the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s thirteen (categories 1-2). On suspects for the bombing, the *Daily Telegraph* prints three times as many photographs as its counterpart, with conspicuous qualitative contrasts between the two papers. The *Daily Telegraph*'s photographs of JI members and Mohammed are criminalising mug-shots, and the largest, most prominent image of Bashir reveals a sinister grin. The *Sydney Morning Herald* prints photographs only of Bashir, which do not demonise him as sinister. Several observations flow from the above. The first concerns the relative proportions found in each paper of images to words about terrorism and suspects: the *Daily Telegraph* covers considerably larger proportions of its average page with photographs than does the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Secondly, the *Daily Telegraph* exploits the affective potential of photographs – notably of destruction and of suspects in mug-shots – while the *Sydney Morning Herald* focuses more on the informational capacities of the written word. Thirdly, the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s relative uninterest in (affective) images of terrorism and suspects leaves it more space to present information on them.

Although the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s suspects for the bombing are the same as those covered by the *Daily Telegraph* – JI and Abu Bakar Bashir, al-Qaeda and sections of the Indonesian military – the coverage is very different. Centrally informing it are the paper's concerns with sifting evidence and avoiding both the affective register and any presumption of guilt for the suspects. The closest the paper comes to implying guilt is at the end of an article on Bashir's beliefs and career (19-20 October, p9). This article is a model of factual, measured journalistic research, even using "extremist" in a descriptive rather than affective manner, but it does conclude: "His every word is a bomb." Apart from this comment, the papers differ thoroughly. By contrast with the *Daily*

Telegraph's serial separating out of its four parties across four separate articles, the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s first article covers all four suspect parties and their likely basic motives in twelve paragraphs (14 October, p2). Rather than the *Daily Telegraph*'s bizarre separating out of JI and Bashir, the article makes clear the relationship: JI "is run by the radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir", the connection confirmed in several other articles (14 October, p6; 15 October pp7, 12; 19-20 October, p9). Al-Qaeda, considering its international infamy after 11 September 2001, is liable to be more readily invoked as a suspect than evidence supports. Recall the *Daily Telegraph* dedicating a double-page spread to its military chief (16 October, pp6-7). The *Sydney Morning Herald*, conversely, specifies for its reader the national interests informing the claims being made against al-Qaeda: the USA (al-Qaeda as an object of early speculation), Australia (Howard "suspects") and Indonesia (as quoted from – and taken at face value by – the *Daily Telegraph*) (14 October, p1; 15 October, p3; 16 October, p8; *Daily Telegraph* 16 October, p6). The paper does not subscribe to the idea of al-Qaeda bearing any primary responsibility for the bombing, but does suggest the likelihood of its sponsoring JI (14 October, p2; 19-20 October, p9). The paper gives Rohan Gunaratna, author of a book on al-Qaeda, his own comment piece in which he sketches a history of links between al-Qaeda and JI, maintaining that "Al-Qaeda co-opted the co-founders of JI, including its leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, and provided training and money" (16 October, p6). The *Daily Telegraph* provides no such history.

Again in contrast to the *Daily Telegraph*, suspicions of the military are sourced not from "Australian military experts", but from Indonesians including "Wimar Wiloelar, a close confidant of former Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wadid" (14 October, p2; also p15; *Daily Telegraph* 17 October, p35). Hamish McDonald takes up the history of collusion between Islamic terrorists and parts of the Indonesian military outlined in the last chapter, and makes a stronger, historically-based argument for the latter being considered as suspects than the *Daily Telegraph*'s speculations based on comments by "a former Australian defence intelligence officer" (17 October, p4; *Daily Telegraph* 17 October, p35). And when McDonald mentions that the military "itself carr[ies] out state terror as in Aceh, Ambon and East Timor – either itself or through militia proxies", the existence of non-state terror becomes more understandable. Elsewhere, an editorial describes military violence as "often, in effect, terrorism" (15 October, p12).

The *Sydney Morning Herald*, then, demonstrates the value of culturally-specific, historically-informed research in investigating possible suspects for the bombing. The paper's method of sifting security data maintains a cautious agnosticism about the party/ies responsible. It offers only indications of who might be the most likely suspect. These focus on Bashir: the comment about

“words” as “bombs”, and the fact that he is the only suspect whose photographs the paper prints (14 October, p6; 15 October, p7; 19-20 October, p9).³⁶ These photographs show him looking wise, reflective and distinguished. So the paper rejects the unproven presumptions of guilt found in the US discourse of the war on terror and in the *Daily Telegraph*.

The paper’s promotion of explanation over affect is evident, too, in its coverage of politics and diplomacy. On these topics the content analysis table again shows substantial differences: fourteen items, or 3.4% of total coverage in the *Daily Telegraph*, as compared with thirty-six items, or 9.7%, in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (categories 11-13). On Australian politics and diplomacy the figures are 2.4% as against 5.6%, and those of other nations 1% as against 4.1%. In its news items, then, the *Sydney Morning Herald* offers over twice as much Australian material as the *Daily Telegraph*, and on non-Australian material just over four times as much. Such evident concerns both with politics and with non-ethnocentric conceptions of politics are greatly augmented in the paper’s op-ed pages. These carry far more items than does the *Daily Telegraph*. Where the *Daily Telegraph* offers six editorials and nine opinion pieces – fifteen items through the week – the *Sydney Morning Herald* runs two editorials on most days and prints three or four opinion pieces on weekdays, with six in the Weekend Edition, plus six Analysis pieces in the news pages: in total well over twice as many items as its competitor. While all of the former paper’s editorials and opinion pieces discuss the bombing, the latter ranges across other topics as well, including state government proposals for school closures and allegations of sexual abuse committed by Cardinal George Pell (18 October, p15; 17 October, p17). Even so, three-quarters of these items discuss the bombing and related issues of terrorism, politics and diplomacy. The space thus made available allows for a wealth of commentary on the implications of the bombing, and without the affective orientation of the dominant address of its competitor’s editorials to a national community of mourners keen to see vengeance. The topics covered range from politics and diplomacy, in Australia and abroad, to the terrorists’ motives, blowback and the proposed Iraq invasion.

Firstly, then, Australian politics and diplomacy. Contrasting with the *Daily Telegraph*’s unreserved support for the Howard government, the *Sydney Morning Herald* is somewhat more balanced. One editorial praises Howard’s leadership of mourning Australians through the crisis, and another supports his call for effective action against the bombers, though it does contextualise this in terms of the fraught complexities of Indonesian politics outlined in Chapter 3 (19-20 October, p58; 15 October, p12). It advises cautious Australian diplomacy vis-à-vis Indonesia (17 October, p17; 19-

³⁶ Syamsuddin Aziz notes that in the three Indonesian newspapers, *Kompas*, *Republika* and the *Bali Post*, Bashir “was the only name to appear ... as a possible suspect” (2007: 93).

20 October, p3). An article by Louise Williams warns of the prodigious difficulties involved: complex historical and religious resentments, poverty, limited democratic institutions and rule of law fuelling terrorism, state and non-state, and military/civilian tensions, together with Howard's turn from Asian engagement to "reinvigorated security ties with Washington" – all these pose huge questions for Australian engagement with Indonesia and co-operation on terrorism (19-20 October, p9).

The paper's pluralist range of views on government includes several which are markedly more critical than the *Daily Telegraph* allows. For example, the paper prints objections to the proposed ASIO bill (17 October, p6). The *Daily Telegraph* shuns any mention of Professor George Williams' warnings that "[t]ougher laws won't scare off terrorism" and in terms of civil liberties "may well introduce an internal danger to our democracy". Where the *Daily Telegraph* naturalises the racist discourses underpinning the discourse of border protection, Geoff Kitney in the *Sydney Morning Herald* criticises Howard for exploiting the fears invoked by that discourse (18 October, p15). The "disproportionate sense of fear fed by the border protection debate," he maintains, has led to "dangerous ... expressions of intolerance and racial and religious bigotry [which] will feed off the vile crimes committed in Bali". And in an argument recalling Mick Dodson cited in the last chapter, he chastises Howard for his "wedge politics ... at the cost of a nation more passionately divided over politics than at any time since 1975". Perhaps curiously, the two papers carry only one other reference to border protection. That the policy so eludes attention may be explained in some quarters by its naturalisation as right and proper – there are no references to it in the *Daily Telegraph* – but also by its supersession by a much greater crisis. Yet regular columnist Mike Carlton makes the connection, mocking the wastage of "hundreds of millions of dollars on border protection ... when we were confronted by a far graver peril than a few refugee boats" (19-20 October, p50).

Secondly, unlike the *Daily Telegraph*, the paper carefully details the complicated diplomacy involved between the USA and Indonesia. Mentioned in Chapter 3 were the paper's reports of the US Ambassador Ralph Boyce's exasperation at Indonesian reluctance to confront possible terrorist threats to its interests, reaching the point where he closed the US embassy (14 October, p3; 16 October, p8). In terms of Indonesian action to calm US annoyance and to cover its own embarrassment about its failure to prevent the attacks, the paper reports President Megawati Sukarnoputri's issuing "an emergency decree giving police wide powers to act against terrorist suspects" (18 October, p3; cf 14 October, p3; 16 October, p8; 14 October, p14; 15 October, p3). The paper shows US Ambassador Ralph Boyce in two photographs, and President Sukarnoputri in

four (14 October, p3; 16 October, p8; 14 October, pp2, 4; 15 October, p12; 19-20 October, p10). The *Daily Telegraph* prints no photographs of either, just the small one of Bush mentioned above (14 October, p10). The *Sydney Morning Herald's* invocation of a complex world of conflicting political interests in which Australia might *not* be a central player contrasts with the *Daily Telegraph's* boosterist nationalism.

The question of terrorists' motives is something of a litmus test of political analysis of the bombing. For this is where serious, reasoned discussion is of paramount importance in efforts to prevent terrorism, the dominant news topic of the time. In Tariq Ali's commentary about 11 September 2001: "If Western politicians remain ignorant of the causes and carry on as before, there will be repetitions" (2002: 3). The Kuta bombing was the first major terrorist attack after those in New York and Washington. The *Sydney Morning Herald's* investigation of motives behind the bombing is appreciably more complex and nuanced than the *Daily Telegraph's*. The basic motives of each suspect party are the same in both papers: JI and Bashir seeking to establish an Islamic state, al-Qaeda seeking to attack the USA and states supporting it, and fractions of the Indonesian military aiming towards a military coup and/or retaliating against Australia for its role in East Timor (all but the last covered on 14 October, p2 and elsewhere; East Timor mentioned on 17 October, p17). The *Sydney Morning Herald* covers all the other motives adduced by the *Daily Telegraph* except for the idea that the bombing might have been designed to spark a backlash against Hindus in Bali (16 October, p7). But crucially the *Sydney Morning Herald* advances beyond the *Daily Telegraph's* cursory attribution of motives, and transcends its self/other constructions. A small but significant index of the latter is that the paper twice references Muslim objections to western decadence, in a descriptive, non-moralising way which is clearly counterposed to Akerman's naturalisation of the offending mores. An editorial, for instance, comments that "[h]ardline Islamic groups see such clubs [as the Sari Club] as potent symbols of Western 'moral decay'" (14 October, p14; also 19-20 October, p9). More substantially, the paper advances beyond the simple dismissal of "They're attacking the west for our freedom" to understand this as blowback and therefore to investigate the reasons behind it and suggest degrees of western culpability.

Blowback is never examined by the *Daily Telegraph* – or raised only to be dismissed – for it is screened off by the self/other constructs the paper adopts from the discourse of the war on terror, whose cathexis dissimulates any western responsibility. By contrast, the *Sydney Morning Herald* in its first editorial on Bali questions whether the "present aggressive direction of US foreign policy" is not "counterproductive" (14 October, p14). It will be recalled from Chapter 3 on the paper's Indonesian coverage that the bombing of Afghanistan was seen as significantly contributing to

recruitment to terrorist groups. Brigadier Adrian d'Hagé, who planned defence security for the Sydney Olympics, explains the basis of blowback when he urges the reader to “get on the other side of the fence and come to terms with how hated the US is in many parts of the world.... US administrations and the CIA ... have either directly or indirectly assisted in gross acts of terror against ordinary people” (19-20 October, p10). Carlton broadens the account:

Australians, Americans, Europeans, we are the fortunate heirs to centuries of liberal democratic thought and advancing prosperity. The bombers view us from the dark side of a vast economic, cultural, social and – yes – religious chasm, and hate us for our wealth, health and happiness. So terror will happen wherever there are wild-eyed psychopaths to convince ardent young men that they can right the injustices of the world and attain a heroic martyrdom by mass murder (19-20 October, p50).³⁷

The *Sydney Morning Herald* clearly recognises blowback as one likely motive for the Bali bombing.

The paper advances significantly beyond the discursive purview of the war on terror and the US-Australian alliance to connect the Bali bombing with the then dominant topic of international debate: whether or not the USA and its allies should invade Iraq. The first dimension of this topic concerns the question of whether the proposed invasion was a likely motive behind the bombing. Whereas the *Daily Telegraph* represses this possibility, the *Sydney Morning Herald* adduces the motive in reporting comments from the USA. In an article reprinted from the *New York Times* called “Threat to ‘America and its allies’”, “United States officials” draw attention to an “audio tape ... broadcast in the previous week ... of Osama bin Laden’s closest lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, [which] threatened continued attacks on ‘America and its allies’ and denounced US plans to attack Iraq” (14 October, p2). Elsewhere on the same page Gunaratna is reported maintaining that Australia “was on al-Qaeda’s list of nations sympathetic to the US” (14 October, p2). The *Sydney Morning Herald* also reports that the Bali attack “has ... spawned deep public concern that the country’s strong support for the United States’ policies of terrorism and Iraq has made it a terrorist target” (15 October, p3). Where the *Daily Telegraph* denies four times that the proposed invasion of Iraq may be a motive for the attack, the *Sydney Morning Herald* prints two denials. One is in reporting Howard, as cited above (14 October, p5). The other is from regular columnist PP McGuinness. Like Akerman, McGuinness dismisses the argument, but with a different rationale:

³⁷ Ghassan Hage points out that in the west with the “rise and dominance of neo-liberal economic policy and its replacement of the welfare state by the penal state”, such *social* explanations as these fall victim to a discourse of “zero tolerance towards crime.... In a war/siege culture, understanding of the other is a luxury that cannot be afforded” (2003: 140-41).

“This is a fairly contemptible approach, which implies that we should cringe before threats of terrorism” (15 October, p13). While this proposition may be criticised for conceptually confusing reaction with cause, the paper’s inclusion of such views marks a greater pluralism than its counterpart offers. So the paper leaves open the possibility that Australia’s support for the Iraq invasion may be one reason behind the bombing.

Secondly, the *Sydney Morning Herald* prints several reports through the week on international political debate about the advisability of the proposed invasion. Where the *Daily Telegraph*’s commitment to the US alliance and the “war of terror” represses debate about the issue, the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s internationalism gives voice to others across the world. This global remit contrasts with the *Daily Telegraph*’s tendencies towards a national solipsism. One article critically reverses the self/other optic by giving voice to the Iraqi view. The paper’s correspondent in Baghdad, Paul McGeogh, quotes Abdul Al-Hashimi, a senior adviser to Saddam Hussein, rejecting all the accusations then being made by the USA: “We have answered them on weapons of mass destruction.... We have no interests in giving weapons to any other party.... [W]e have never supported [terrorist] organisations [such as al-Qaeda] in the last 30 years” (17 October, p7). These statements are historically correct: Iraq had neither weapons of mass destruction nor contacts with al-Qaeda. The paper’s Washington correspondent, Marian Wilkinson, conveys a fine sense of the complexity of political debate about Iraq on Capitol Hill and in the United Nations during the week (19-20 October, p9). While “the hawks in [Bush’s] cabinet” remained adamant that the invasion must proceed, Bush himself vacillated, or at least sought to appease, in the face of the French refusal at the United Nations Security Council “to accept wording from the US that it called ‘a blank cheque’ for military action”. Amongst representatives of the west she reports “[d]eep concerns ... expressed by some US Democrats, military and intelligence officials along with America’s allies that the threat of war on Iraq is already undermining the fight against terrorism and the fragile coalition supporting it”. Across representatives of Arab and Muslim states she notes “a sense of frustration, from Jordan to Malaysia, that ... a military strike will spark a massive upsurge in terrorist activity”. Wilkinson’s report makes clear that in terms of numbers of states, the USA, the UK and Australia were an isolated minority – an insight unimaginable from the pages of the *Daily Telegraph*.³⁸ Australia remained steadfast in its support of the USA. The Australian

³⁸ The importance the *Daily Telegraph* attached at this time to foreign news may be gauged by its placement in the paper: after the horoscope after the Letters page. It consisted of between one and three (tabloid) pages. The paper’s coverage of the Iraq debate is meagre and partisan. The debate figures as no more than a sketchy backdrop to one very short item, “Allies bomb Iraq on election day” (17 October, p39). The other, equally brief report focuses solely on Bush’s “nuclear dilemma”: as “he seeks UN support for his plans to invade Iraq on the grounds that it has been acquiring weapons of mass destruction, he must now face the possibility of North Korea being at least an equal threat” (19 October, p18). Alongside these martial excitements, the paper mentions no diplomatic objections to the Bush Administration’s proposals.

ambassador to the United Nations, John Dauth, “reinforced the message from the White House that Saddam Hussein could pass chemical, biological or nuclear weapons to terrorist groups” (also 18 October, p5).³⁹ These reports vitally enlarge the evidence available for serious political debate about the proposed invasion.

In its commentary on the Iraq question, the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s pluralism distinguishes it from the *Daily Telegraph*. It was argued above that in the latter paper the discourse of the war on terror closes down debate. Akerman's column, for example, promotes arguments for the invasion, but travesties those opposing it (17 October, p34). The *Sydney Morning Herald* acknowledges the pro-invasion case in a commentary by regular columnist, Gerard Henderson. In a piece headed “Leftist luvvies exposed as fools,” he maintains that the USA is under various threats, “whether from al-Qaeda terrorism or Saddam's Hussein's weapons of mass destruction or whatever” (15 October, p13). But the paper's editorials and opinion pieces predominantly canvass the anti-invasion case. The reprinting of overseas articles on this crucial international issue is another example of the paper's pluralism. One piece, reprinted from the UK *Guardian* and headed “High cost in lives of targeting the wrong enemy”, argues that the Bali bombing is a “horrific” reminder that the resources of certain states have been misdirected: “[W]hile Western intelligence agencies have been trying to track the movements of al-Qaeda sympathisers, their governments have been preoccupied by quite another matter – Saddam and his weapons of mass destruction” (15 October, p13). The same article notes the USA's diplomatic power: “No one in any competent position in the British Government believes there is any link between al-Qaeda and Saddam. They do not want this said publicly for fear of upsetting the Bush administration. President Bush [claims that] toppling Saddam is part of the war on terrorism. But Afghanistan is not dealt with – it remains unstable.” In a piece entitled “Shrewd enemy gains power as US fixates on a diversion,” Paul Krugman makes a parallel argument against the proposed war: “The [US] Administration ... want to fight a conventional war; since al-Qaeda won't oblige, they'll attack someone else who will.... [T]he terrorists are pleased” (16 October, p17). An editorial likewise argues that “an ever-widening ‘war on terrorism’ ... is mistaken” (15 October, p12). The paper's pluralism on this issue may be limited, but it still outstrips the *Daily Telegraph*'s. It leaves its reader to judge the evidence

³⁹ If the discourse of fear operates in the subjunctive mode, with scant evidence, it could be said that the case the US Administration constructed against Iraq worked in remarkably similar ways. Thus Douglas Kellner writes of the 1990 Iraq War as a textual construction: “The war against Iraq can be read as a text produced by the Bush Administration, the Pentagon, and the media...” (1995: 199). Two comments arise. Firstly, these same agencies would have likely had institutional memories in producing their “text” advocating the 2003 invasion, and secondly the justifications for the 2003 invasion, like those of 1990, are founded less in empirical reality than in textual-discursive constructs. Robert Manne confronts the hypothetical with international law: “[T]he new US strategic doctrine of the pre-emptive strike, which justified waging war on the basis of an imagined future threat ... would overturn any civilised conception of international law” (2011a: 18, 25).

presented. Moreover, its international perspectives contribute ideas to the debate – about the diplomacy of the Bush Administration and its preferred military strategies – which the other paper’s self/other structures render inadmissible.

The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s commentary includes both Gerard Henderson and PP McGuinness arguing for the importance of the US-Australian alliance (both 15 October, p13), while its editorial line largely queries it. One editorial and one opinion piece urge a policy of strategic home defence, like that of Bob Brown: that the threat of regional terrorism be given priority over joining the Iraq invasion (16 October, p16; 18 October, p15; cf 14 October, p5). In a similar vein, d’Hagé gives forceful expression to the idea of an independent foreign policy: “It is time for Australia to be seen as Australia, backing the notion of fair play, rather than some poodle yapping at the heels of the US” (19-20 October, p10). With comparable commitment, Guy Rundle warns against what he calls the “patriotic dumbness” of refusing to critique “the Howard government’s ... pro-US policy [for being] immoral and support[ing] a repressive neo-imperial vision” (16 October, p17).

The introduction to this section set out the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s journalistic principles: a pluralist openness to debate, awareness of political complexities overseas and in Australia, concerns with even-handedly sifting evidence and commitment to informational and explanatory, rather than affective engagement with its material. It posed the question of the compatibility of these principles with the discourse of the war on terror informing the *Daily Telegraph*’s constructions of terrorism and politics. In fact, the most striking feature distinguishing the two papers’ treatment of these topics is the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s liberation from the discursive constraints of the “war on terror” and its self/other schema, constraints intensified in the other paper by the ethnocentric discourse of “home”. The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s lack of investment in the discursive cathexis of the “war on terror” allows it to escape the national solipsism of its counterpart, and to report and comment in international terms and therefore to *reveal* what that discursive structure axiomatically dissimulates. It provides global perspectives on the relative isolation of the US-led “coalition of the willing” at the UN. It explains blowback and its socio-political origins in overseas states. With its lack of interest in addressing its reader as unquestioningly condemning all available suspects, the paper impartially presents evidence with an appropriately cautious agnosticism, as on Bashir. Rundle, though not discussing the *Daily Telegraph*’s promotion of affect in its discourses of fear and condemnation, directly addresses the distinction between registers of explanation and of affect: “In the wake of the Bali bombings we are being asked to choose between heart and head” (16 October, p17). In line with the paper’s balanced internationalist perspective, he proposes “cool and

calm reflection on our own place in the world”.⁴⁰ Refusing the moralistic binaries of the “war on terror” enables the paper to honour its fourth estate commitment to holding government to account on the US-Australia alliance and Iraq invasion questions. This refusal embodies a critique of the right’s desire to foreclose political debate with its objection to “any form of analysis of the conditions within which terrorist groups form.... [A]ny analysis that looks at Western political behaviour which the terrorists may be targeting is seen as tantamount to giving aid and comfort to the enemy” (16 October, p17).⁴¹

On matters of pluralism and partisanship, the two papers can be summed up as follows. The *Daily Telegraph*’s narrow partisanship, its unqualified commitments to the US-Australian alliance and to the “war on terror”, closes down debate in line with the latter’s self/other structure. The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s pluralism is evident both in its impartial and very broad reporting, and in its more generous canvassing of opponents’ views.

The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s political-discursive positioning relative to its newspaper competitors remains to be considered. Its policy stances on the US alliance and the proposed Iraq invasion might be expected from a paper committed to left-liberal traditions and to a readership upholding these. It also presents itself as a fourth estate institution unafraid to hold governments to account. Another factor in its publishing context concerns what David Carter calls “a formidable consolidation of neo-conservative opinion-making, integrated with government and sections of the media” (2004: 23). The paper would be well aware of its differences on the Iraq and alliance questions from the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Australian*, both of which strongly support both policies, as well as from government, which disallowed a parliamentary vote on the Iraq issue.⁴² Opposed on both issues, the *Sydney Morning Herald* is discursively positioned in the minority.

⁴⁰ In simultaneously standing outside both his own culture and, as seen in Chapter 3, that of Indonesia, Rundle well exemplifies the “double-outsideness” which Paul Willemsen sees as crucial to any proper understanding of cross-cultural difference (1994: 212-16; cf Braudel 1972 [1958]: 24).

⁴¹ In her defence of the principle of explaining and understanding terrorists’ motives, Carmen Lawrence likewise critiques “an obdurate refusal to acknowledge the difference between explanation and justification, and consequently label anyone who [seeks to explain] an apologist for terrorists” (2006: 96).

⁴² Geoff Kitney, the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s political editor, secured some fascinating insights into government thinking on the Iraq issue after the bombing (18 October, p15). He reports an acute governmental understanding of (what this thesis analyses as) the political-discursive moment and the affective economy attaching to the Iraq issue. His source is a “senior Government politician” who says: “The distinction between Saddam and Osama bin Laden that some of the commentators make is not there in the community’s mind.... I think after Bali the community’s outrage about terrorism will provide a strong electoral platform for joining a war against one of the world’s greatest symbols of terror.” These comments provide a remarkably explicit insight into government calculations about “community” ignorance of the differences between foreign “terrorists”. The observations appear to assume that the “community” imagines all foreigners to be the same, and that state terror is the same as non-state terror. They further presume likely “electoral” acquiescence in Australia’s joining the Iraq invasion. In suggesting also the government’s understanding of its own distance – and that of “the community” – from “some of the commentators” (such as those of the *Sydney Morning Herald*?), the comments point to the alignment between the government’s appeal to certain “electoral” assumptions and those addressed by the *Daily Telegraph*.

Despite this positioning, it adopts the pluralist approach illustrated above, canvassing views opposing its own editorial stances. That history has proved the *Sydney Morning Herald's* Iraq stance correct points to the importance of its commitments to a nuanced internationalism and to principles of the fourth estate absent from the *Daily Telegraph* and arguably, as we shall see, from the *Australian*.

CHAPTER 5: THE AUSTRALIAN COVERS THE BALI BOMBING

1. Introduction

The *Australian* differs from the two newspapers examined so far in being nationally distributed, but it resembles the *Sydney Morning Herald* in being a broadsheet and the *Daily Telegraph* in being published by News Ltd. Three assumptions or hypotheses could flow from these comparisons. One might expect, firstly, that with its nationwide circulation the paper will have a significantly broader geographical coverage than the Sydney-based papers; secondly, that it might share with the *Sydney Morning Herald* a broadsheet style of neutral journalism; and thirdly, that it might share with the *Daily Telegraph* a partisan politics, while perhaps not subscribing to that paper's populist address. The findings of this chapter analysing the *Australian*'s coverage of the Bali bombing broadly confirm these assumptions or hypotheses, but also seriously modify and complicate them.

The complications lie above all in the paper's reader address and a certain pluralism on the political coverage it takes as central to its remit. Its class address has two dimensions. The first readership targeted is the market demographic of readers and advertisers for which it competes in NSW with the broadsheet *Sydney Morning Herald*. This largely middle-class address, in Belinda Probert's terms set out earlier, targets a demographic conceived in terms of higher levels of cultural and educational capital.¹ A textual indicator of broadsheet similarity between the two papers is that they hardly ever adopt the vernacular. One slight difference is that where the *Australian* uses the term "mate" only twice without any distancing quotation marks (15 October, p3; 18 October, p1), whereas the other (more sports-oriented?) broadsheet adopts it some 24 times. The second dimension of the paper's address is to the readership Robert Manne calls "the political class": "The *Australian* is ... the only newspaper that is read by virtually all members of the group of insiders I call the political class, a group that includes politicians, leading public servants, business people and the most politically engaged citizens" (2011a: 5).² Manne notes also the paper's substantial role in

¹ The most useful differentiating marker between working- and middle-class as seen by Probert is tertiary education (2001: 32-34). Sean Scalmer and Murray Goot give a 2002 figure of 67% of tertiary-educated among *Australian* readers (2004: 143). The closest available comparison for *Sydney Morning Herald* readers is from 1999 and assimilates the paper with the *Australian* and the *Melbourne Age* for a figure of 55.1% (Bennett et al 1999: 157). These figures suggest that the *Australian* may reach more of Probert's "overclass", and the *Sydney Morning Herald* more working-class readers.

² Manne writes of 2002-2011 period, during which the paper would have consolidated its position.

setting the Australian political agenda, especially through News Ltd's other newspapers, such as the *Daily Telegraph*, and their influence on other media outlets "which rely on the daily papers for content ... and, more deeply, for the way they interpret the world" (2011a: 112).³ This chapter suggests that in this week in 2002 the *Australian* deploys a limited, or managed, pluralism on several political and ethnic issues, and thereby targets multiple readerships. A snappy characterisation would describe the *Daily Telegraph* as a consistently centre-right News Ltd tabloid and the *Sydney Morning Herald* as a predominantly left-liberal Fairfax broadsheet. By contrast, the *Australian* figures less straightforwardly, as a News Ltd broadsheet whose political stance is inconsistently – but intensely – centre-right.⁴

To sharpen the comparison between the *Australian* and the other two newspapers, this chapter will examine in sequence the paper's representations of Australian victims, of ethnicity, and of terrorism and politics. There follows a case-study analysing in detail how the paper deploys verbal and visual rhetorics on a key political issue. This chapter's analysis builds on familiarity with the discursive categories, rhetorical modes and many specific examples analysed in detail in the previous three chapters. It concentrates on the *Australian*'s differences from the other papers.

2. Australian victims

The percentage of news and feature items and images which the *Australian* devotes to Australian victims of the bombing (dead, injured or missing and survivors, as well as their families and friends) is appreciably smaller than those of the other papers: 44.3% as against the *Daily Telegraph*'s 62.2% and the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s 52.6%.⁵ This is marginally compensated for by its greater, nationwide coverage of Mourning Ceremonies – 3.5% as against 2.1% and 2.2% in the other papers – but it is primarily accounted for by its greater emphasis on such categories as Politics and Diplomacy: Australia, Terrorism, and Bombing and Destruction which accord with its address to the political class.

The *Australian*'s nationwide remit leads to coverage of a wider geographical range of Australian victims than the other two papers. The *Daily Telegraph* mentions few victims from outside Sydney unless they belong to football teams, and while the *Sydney Morning Herald* covers considerably

³ Thus Piers Akerman recycles an argument about Iraq from Paul Kelly (*Daily Telegraph* 17 October, p34; *Australian* 16 October, p15).

⁴ These characterisations exclude the typically more pluralist zone of the Letters pages.

⁵ The Appendix presents a content analysis table comparing the three papers, adding figures for the *Australian* to those for the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sydney Morning Herald* which appeared in Chapter 2.

more than that, the *Australian* includes the Melbourne Demons AFL team and many West Australian victims who are not reported by the other papers (eg 18 October, p4; 19-20 October, p2; 15 October, p3). Its national network of reporters enables it also to include some heroic rescue efforts at the Sari Club recalled by a West Australian policeman, and a policewoman's grief at seeing wounded survivors at the Royal Darwin Hospital (16 October, p5; 15 October, p4). The paper's selection reveals none of the populist working-class bias of the *Daily Telegraph*; it ranges from the business banker and telecommunications consultant cited in Chapter 2 to an abattoir worker and an apprentice boilermaker (14 October, p1; 14 October, p3; 15 October, p3).

In most respects the paper's constructions of Australian victims more closely resemble those of the broadsheet *Sydney Morning Herald* than the tabloid *Daily Telegraph*, the class address doubtless being the determining factor. Two topics should suffice to demonstrate the point: affect and euphemism.⁶ As in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the human interest story is used frequently, and with similarly limited affective indulgence. The *Australian* invokes affect, but in a soberly contained manner, as in the sub-header "Our Saddest Week" (19-20 October, pp3-8). Only occasionally does the paper engage in sentimental description of emotional states, as in "tore at the heart of" or "went through hell" (both 15 October, p3). More typically, it practices the telling selection of external detail characterising the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s reporting, as seen in moving accounts of Craig Salvatori's grief and Jodi Cearn's injuries (15 October, p1; 17 October, p4). The *Australian* likewise joins with the *Sydney Morning Herald* in bypassing the *Daily Telegraph*'s euphemistic renderings of drunkenness and sexual activity. The frankness which the tabloid withholds until its Saturday edition is already available in its stable-mate on the Wednesday: "[T]he Sari Club was the usual raucous mass ... heaving to the music and drinking the house brew ... that is the fuel for all-night partying" (15 October, p8). If the terms "raucous mass" and "heaving" carry an edge of cultural snobbery, this would echo the *Sydney Morning Herald*, suggesting that few broadsheet readers would enjoy the Sari Club.

The *Australian*'s distinctive variation on the other papers' accounts lies in its inflection of Australian victimhood towards the discourse of the war on terror. The paper's constructions of Australian national mythologies play a support role here. It evinces none of the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s critical approach to mythologies of innocence and war, but at the same time it invests far less in these mythologies than does the *Daily Telegraph*. Only once, for instance, does the paper refer to Anzac (19-20 October, p18). It avoids its sister paper's persistent refrain of "innocent

⁶ Representations of sport, mateship and family and community follow the idiom of the *Sydney Morning Herald* rather than the *Daily Telegraph*.

victims”, and uses the term “war” as a description of the bombing less promiscuously than the *Daily Telegraph* (eg 14 October, p3). The paper’s indifference to a *historical* national mythology makes space for its resolutely contemporary focus, the new mythology of the “war on terror”.

It is in the paper’s invocations of national unity on its op-ed pages that the discourse of the war on terror most clearly inflects its representations of Australian victims. Where the *Sydney Morning Herald* subscribes sparingly to fictions of national unity, the *Australian* does invest in them. But at the same time it remains almost entirely indifferent to the *Daily Telegraph*’s primary mode of address to a national community of *mourners*.⁷ The *Australian*’s nation of victims is represented as unified not so much in grief as in (desired) *political* response to the bombing. The textual evidence suggests that it seeks to transform a passive national victimhood not just into a reactive condemnation – however forceful – but into a pro-actively engaged political programme. In this it recalls the argument that in the USA after 11 September 2001 the “war on terror” channelled grief into a desire for national retribution (cf Lewis 2005: 109). One editorial and one opinion piece typify this construction. The first day’s editorial, “We must remain firm in the face of terror”, opens with the sentence “Australia is in mourning”, but rapidly leaves grief behind to focus on political purpose: “There is no safety in retreating from what unites us with the Americans, the French, the British, the Canadians and the vast majority of peace-loving Muslims living in Indonesia and other parts of the world. The terrorist threat is widespread and the various fronts cannot be separated” (14 October, p14). This is an international, US-led political programme rather than a matter of national mourning. The discourse of the war on terror also underlies an opinion piece by Greg Sheridan with a strong affective charge (17 October, p13). Carrying the headline “The nation we love must face the threat, and fight” and the sub-head “The war on terror is a battle for all that we cherish about Australia”, it is illustrated by a large drawing of a powerful kangaroo flexing its muscles. In the face of the foreign threat, Sheridan subscribes to God and country: “I’m proud ... that our soldiers are always brave, proud that we always win at cricket.... [O]f all the families in the world, God chose this one for me.... So, too, he chose this nation for me and I accepted his choice....” He proceeds to extol the “war on terror” at length.⁸ The *Australian*, then, politicises its nation as part of the “war on terror” project, and occasionally with a degree of affective hyperbole that recalls the *Daily Telegraph*’s grieving representations of Australian victims.

⁷ The exception is its Weekend editorial, headed “Australians united share the sorrow of Bali” (19-20 October, p18). That the *Australian*’s op-ed pages first adopt this empathetic approach to Australian victims only at the end of the week suggests the possibility of criticism – perhaps in unpublished letters to the editor – for an “insensitive” approach. This hypothesis would find supporting evidence in the editorial’s (defensively?) taking the unusual step within the genre of detailing the losses of three named families.

⁸ One letter-writer describes Sheridan’s jingoistic rhapsodising as “nauseating rhetoric” (18 October, p16).

Augmenting these “war on terror” inflections is the paper’s promotion of US empathy for Australian victims. The content analysis (2 items, totalling 0.5%) belies the full extent of this initiative by the paper, its affective and political reach far outstripping the *Daily Telegraph*’s feature about a survivor of the events of 11 September 2001 and several US contributions to its vox pop “tributes and memories” items (19 October, p21; 16 October, p12; 17 October, p13). Besides the two articles, the Letters pages print a total of 34 letters from US addresses across every day of the week, out of “nearly 1000 received” (16 October, p8; 19-20 October, p18). The paper publicises this “enormous outpouring of empathy from Americans” in a front-page header, “American Letters from the Heart”, and in an editorial (16 October, pp8, 1; 19-20 October, p18). Typical headlines are “We’re with you, declare Americans” and “America mourns for a loyal friend in need” (16 October, p8; 17 October, p12). The letters’ principal theme is the parallel between the Bali bombing and the events of 11 September 2001. Eleven letters explicitly express commitment to a military response and/or to the “war on terror”, one writer saying that he will join the Marines “today”. In the field of what might be called “long-distance”, mediated grieving – ie beyond the face-to-face communities of family, friends and neighbourhood – grieving for Australian victims is Americanised. The 34 US letters far outnumber the three grieving letters published from Australian addresses, as well as all the overseas letters printed by the other two papers. It is not that these letters undercut the paper’s empathy with Australian victims in its *reporting*; rather, they enhance it. But they also humanise and naturalise the US-Australia alliance, and endorse the pro-“war on terror” line which dominates the paper’s editorials, opinion pieces and Letters pages. As in Sheridan’s opinion piece, the paper mobilises affect in its Letters pages to serve a political agenda, one pursued by Dennis Shanahan in an opinion piece entitled “Empathy brings us closer to US: How the Bali bombing will reshape Australian politics”, which declares growing Australian assent to invading Iraq (17 October, p17). This agenda has a further dimension. None of the letters printed even hints at blowback against US militarism around the world. In a cathexis typical of the “war on terror”, blowback is displaced-dissimulated and moralised as compassion and empathy. These selected, compassionate expressions of US civil society render “innocent” the actions of the US military.

3. Ethnicity and a certain internationalism

The content analysis figures for the *Australian*’s coverage of non-Australian victims of the bombing total 3.8%, roughly half of the *Sydney Morning Herald* percentage but 3.8% more than that of the *Daily Telegraph*. The paper’s ethnic representations take complicated forms, which are less

amenable to generalisation than the relatively non-contentious issue of Australian victims. Key groups examined here are Balinese and Australians of non-white ethnic descent. While the *Australian* reveals none of the *Sydney Morning Herald's* multicultural empathy with, or human interest stories about Balinese, its constructions of Balinese are less ethnocentric than those of the *Daily Telegraph*. In fact, these representations are curiously split, between a sometimes empathetic concern and a substantial indifference.

While the paper dedicates no articles to Balinese victims, one editorial expresses concern that “at least nine Indonesians died in the blast, and dozens more were critically burned” (16 October, p14).⁹ A report headed “Torrent of tears as island in mourning”, on a conference of local community leaders, cites one leader saying that “everyone was crying not only because of the shock and horror of the blast, but because so many people were missing” (17 October, p7). Another article praises the work of Anak Agung Ngurah Asmaraja, head of plastic surgery at Denpasar’s Sanglah hospital (19-20 October, p8). Its accounts of Sanglah Hospital are as neutral as the *Sydney Morning Herald's*, with none of the *Daily Telegraph's* ethnocentric disparagement or grateful homecoming narratives (eg 14 October, p3; 15 October, p4).

Elsewhere, indifference marks the paper’s accounts of Balinese. They are routinely referred to as “locals”, and Australian expatriates are interviewed in their stead about “the Balinese mood” after the bombing (17 October, p7). One report ex-nominates Australians mourning Australian victims, and then glides past Balinese victims. “Downer shares grief at bomb-site tribute” speaks of the Foreign Minister consoling “family members” for most of the article, then mentions that “[t]he grief was shared by hundreds of Indonesian mourners” (16 October, p3). With no Balinese deaths mentioned, the article invites its reader to infer that the national object of Balinese mourning was Australians.

Boosting the *Australian's* substantial indifference to Bali are the *images* it offers of the island. These representations can be broached through a comparison with the *Daily Telegraph*. The tabloid’s working-class address urges its readers to a hedonistic identification with the Sari Club and Kuta as a “satellite state” of Australia, while the broadsheet instead directs its Bali tourists to Ubud or Sanur (14 October, p6; 19-20 October, p27).¹⁰ The Sari Club thus figures in the broadsheet as an object of journalistic documentation rather than of affection for its readers. It prints three articles and four images (1.6% of its coverage) as against the tabloid’s six articles and

⁹ 38 Indonesians/Balinese finally died from the bombing.

¹⁰ The ethnocentric assumptions typifying tourism journalism are modified in Jim Schumann’s sophisticated understandings of Balinese culture (19-20 October, p27).

twenty images (6.2%). Crucially, the broadsheet dissolves the tabloid's differentiation of Kuta/Bali (as "home away from home") from Indonesia (as the state blamed for harbouring terrorists). For the *Daily Telegraph* Kuta belongs to Australia; for the *Australian* it belongs to Indonesia and south-east Asian terrorism. Accordingly, two devices play down the ethnic and cultural specificity of Balinese: the paper makes almost no mention of Hindu religion or religious rituals, and frequently describes the island's inhabitants as "Indonesian", unlike the other papers, which consistently acknowledge "Balinese". Where the *Daily Telegraph* nostalgically prints several tourist photographs of the island paradise before the bombing, the *Australian* publishes only one such image, a small photograph of dancing at the Sari Club in the Weekend edition's narrative feature about the bombing (19-20 October, p24). Two drawings encapsulate the *Australian's* differences from its sister paper. Both drawings reframe tourist images of Bali in terms of the discourse of the war on terror. In one the outline of a military helmet literally frames an idyllic palm-fringed beach at sunset, and in the other, referencing the events of 11 September 2001, a plane flies into tall twin palms, illustrating an opinion piece headed "The Islamic front is at our back door" (16 October, p15; 19-20 October, p30).

The *Australian's* photographs of Bali are a reminder of the affective power of photographs in journalism. Almost all fall into three groups – destruction, death and potential violence – and so address the reader in terms of the discourses of strong condemnation and fear from the "war on terror". Of the destruction caused by the bombing, firstly, the paper displays twenty-two photographs, the same number as the *Daily Telegraph* and twelve more than the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Moreover, every page header of its Bali news coverage after the front pages includes a thumbnail photograph showing the flames from the blast. Together with its articles and features, these photographs comprise a remarkable 8.3% of its total coverage of the event, compared with 6.2% in the *Daily Telegraph* and 3.8% in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Secondly, on death, the paper prints no fewer than ten photographs inside and outside Denpasar morgue, including one with a headline breaking the widespread journalistic convention of not reporting the sense of smell, "Reeking testimony to murder", and one very large photograph on the front page of the Weekend Inquirer section (15 October, p2; 19-20 October, p19).

The third photographic theme, potential violence, is based on the perceived need for state protection against further, possibly terrorist violence after the bombing.¹¹ A law and order discourse authorised by the "war on terror", this theme displaces the concerns for Balinese civil society found both in the *Daily Telegraph's* reports and photographs of helpers and volunteers, and in the *Sydney*

¹¹ One article, "Distraught locals fear riots", explores these fears (17 October, p7).

Morning Herald's of purification rituals and family and workplace support systems; just one small photograph depicts "a Western victim ... helped by a local" (14 October, p6). Not only do photographs of representatives of the state far outnumber those of civil society – reduced to a handful showing mourners and onlookers at the morgue (eg 16 October, p7; 19-20 October, p19) – but the majority of these photographs represent the state as potentially more violent than caring.¹² Of the eleven photographs involved, eight depict military activity, all of them medium or large images. One shows a warship (19-20 October, p20) and seven show soldiers and police, all armed with machine-guns, guarding the bomb site and mourners, the morgue and the airport – far more than in either of the other papers.¹³ In four of the seven images these armed men visually dominate the frame, filling at least half its width as well as occupying the foreground plane, their guns prominent, sometimes overbearing (16 October, p6; 18 October, p2; 17 October, p7; 19-20 October, p21). The Indonesian state, then, is represented as militarised and potentially violent. Since all these images are from Bali, they undercut the tourist image of the innocent pacific paradise. Irrespective of the armed men's protective role, their threatening appearance aligns Bali with the terrorist threat which the paper perceives across the south-east Asia region: "Hydra now thinking with one world goal", as one headline puts it, an alarm elaborated in several other articles and photographs (19-20 October, p26; 17 October, p7; three articles on 14 October, p7).

The remaining three of the eleven photographs reinforce the stress on death; moreover, they contrast with those of Australian crisis authorities. They portray workers carrying corpses, mostly at the morgue (14 October, p1; two on 17 October, p3). The images of Indonesian crisis authorities include none of the more "caring" and "professional" roles of paramedics and ambulance workers seen in the other two papers. Australians have a photographic monopoly on these roles, which the paper as it were repatriates to Darwin, Melbourne and Sydney airports (15 October, p4; 16 October, p1; 16 October, p5). This international distribution of contrasting roles generates an Indonesian violence/Australian caring binary, which is intensified by senses of overseas danger – victims suffering "[j]ust hours after arriving" in Kuta, or after "barely eight hours overseas" (14 October, p2) – as well as by the 95 photographs of Australian victims interleaved with those of foreigners looking threatening. Similarly contrasted with the armed Indonesians are two large photographs, one of them dominating the front page, of AFP members in Bali looking sturdily reassuring and apparently not armed (17 October, p1; 19-20 October, p23).¹⁴

¹² The paper shows negligible general interest in civil society: it prints one article on volunteers, totalling 0.2% of its coverage, as compared with 1.6% in the *Daily Telegraph* and 4.3% in the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

¹³ This count omits the armed escorts for Sukarnoputri, Howard and Downer.

¹⁴ The *Australian's* national boosterism is less defensive than the *Daily Telegraph's*, doubtless because its ethnocentrism is not that of Australia alone, but of the USA's "international community". So the paper takes pride in

What do these constructions of Balinese suggest about the paper's representations of ethnicity? Where the *Daily Telegraph* racialises Balinese as a hospitable other, the *Australian's* images politicise them as Indonesian and thus as being closer to a threatening other. This aligns the broadsheet with its stable-mate's dismissiveness of Indonesians. Nevertheless, its photographs do not indulge in that paper's visual rendering of Indonesians as comprising only suspected terrorists. That it prints three photographs of President Megawati Sukarnoputri marks its broadsheet commitment to a certain internationalism, albeit one framed by the US alliance and the "war on terror". While this last discourse also hugely influences the *Daily Telegraph's* reader address of fear and strong condemnation, the tabloid lacks the broadsheet's commitment to the *political* programme of the "war on terror". So the *Australian* is not ethnocentric in the white solipsist manner of the *Daily Telegraph*, but it is ethnocentric politically, *as part of* the USA's "western" conception of global politics, widely promoted then and since as "the international community".¹⁵ In its international political representations, then, the paper applies the US binary of "west"/"east"-plus-terrorists. It subordinates questions of ethnicity to those of politics. Hence its "Indonesianisation" of Bali.

Hence, too, its generous coverage of three US victims of the bombing, two dead and one missing, who, perhaps surprisingly, are not covered by the other two papers. The *Australian's* Los Angeles correspondent, Robert Lusetich, reports on local responses to the losses; a very large photograph shows the homecoming of an injured survivor; and two small ones show his friends (17 October, p7). Occupying central position on the page, six columns wide out of eight, article and photographs squeeze out two Bali reports to the edges.

What remain to be examined in this section are the *Australian's* representations of non-white ethnicities within Australia. Its reports on the Iranian asylum seeker covered in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, on Australian Muslims who are victims of race hate attacks, and on a Balinese expatriate exhibit varying degrees of multicultural commitment. The first two are represented distantly, with none of the generous multicultural empathy of the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The plight of Ebrahim Sammaki, the Iranian asylum seeker interviewed at moving length by that paper is resumed very

Australia being a regional leader, as seen in the headlines "PM urges regional heavy hand" and "We should lead the regional fight" (15 October, pp6, 15).

¹⁵ An alternative view may be worth recalling. In 2002, Perry Anderson described the USA at the zenith of its power: "American hegemony has for the first time been able to impose its self-description as a global norm. With the UN as fig-leaf, a compliant regime funded in Russia, troops in Germany and Japan, an offshore protectorate in China, bases in a dizzying array of client states, and fire power several times that of potential rivals combined, the will of the United States has been re-baptised in a euphemism worthy of the co-prosperity sphere. Today its synonym is simply – nothing less than – the 'international community' itself" (2002: 24).

briefly in the *Australian*, in only seven sentences, with no interview giving his point of view (18 October, p3). Similarly, the paper's articles on race hate attacks on the Umma Islamic Centre in outer Melbourne and in Rooty Hill in Sydney are considerably less sympathetic towards Muslim victims than the *Sydney Morning Herald's* reporting on the latter (18 October, p5; 16 October, p2).¹⁶ The articles accord the victims no photographic recognition. Conversely, the paper does print a medium-sized picture of an unnamed, respectably-dressed, middle-aged white man at Sydney airport who had just returned from Bali (17 October, p3). It shows him, looking more surprised than aggressive, being "subdued by police" after "allegedly" attacking "a group of Middle Eastern-looking men". The report says: "He kept shouting: 'I saw dead bodies all over [in Bali]. They [middle-eastern-looking men] come into our country.'" The paper's description of his "distress", its failure to present the views of those supposedly attacked, its lack of any reference to race hate, and its headline, "Relief boils up to anger at airport" – all these normalise rather than criticise his "alleged" attack.¹⁷ Lastly, in a variant of the Indonesian violence/Australian caring binary, a pacific Balinese community leader in Victoria, Wayne Tedja, is given three paragraphs in an item reporting a Melbourne mourning ceremony, including a text break-out – "The Balinese community have never been against anyone.... Why us?" – which is unlike almost anything reported by the paper from its "Indonesian-ised" Bali (18 October, p5; cf 17 October, p7).¹⁸ This unusual move exports the pacific version of Bali to Australia, and so implies the multicultural tolerance of the man's new home.

In comparison with the *Daily Telegraph*, these four ethnic representations may appear multicultural insofar as they acknowledge the existence of people of non-white ethnic descent in Australia. But they hardly help readers to understand those people's lived experience, and thus fall short of the *Sydney Morning Herald's* humanist multiculturalism. In terms of such a cultural politics, moreover, these representations appear to be inconsistent, and distributed on a scale from the less to the more racist: from a modest concern with the victims of attacks on Muslim institutions and, with Wayne Tedja, a seeming endorsement of multicultural tolerance, to the chilly indifference to the plight of Ebrahim Sammaki and the virtual licensing of race hate in the account of the "distressed" white man. The presence of such a variety of stances finds a partial explanation in the *Australian's* political imperative – the US "war on terror" with its self/other structures – which represses the

¹⁶ The paper's nationwide remit explains the fairly high percentage of items on race hate (1.2% as against the *Daily Telegraph's* 0.2% and 0.5% in the *Sydney Morning Herald*).

¹⁷ The paper does not follow up on this story, and the other two papers do not mention it.

¹⁸ Text break-outs highlight an important phrase or sentence from an article by reprinting it as an inset in large bold font. The *Sydney Morning Herald* does not use them, the *Daily Telegraph* only on its op-ed pages, and the *Australian* in a few articles and features, and in several opinion pieces.

discourse of universal humanity underpinning the *Sydney Morning Herald's* multicultural paradigm. Multicultural representations for the *Australian* are therefore not a matter of principle.

Instead, the paper offers a flexible discourse that can embrace a certain limited form of multiculturalism, but which leaves an ethnocentric conception of the nation substantially untroubled. This discourse is neither explicitly pluralist/anti-racist like the *Sydney Morning Herald*, nor explicitly racist/anti-multicultural like Pauline Hanson. The range of its ethnic representations avoids items from both ends of the spectrum. In terms of possible address to the political class this perhaps avoids causing “offence” to middle-of-the-road readers. And within its restricted range the approach could be called discretionary – or having a bob each way – appealing to readers supporting “moderately” multicultural views *and* those supporting “moderately” racist views. This flexible construction instances the paper’s managed pluralism.

4. Terrorism and politics: Indonesia

We have already seen how the *Australian's* commitment to the US-Australia alliance and to the “war on terror” – in effect to US foreign policy – substantially shapes the paper’s constructions of the province of Bali. So too with its constructions of the state of Indonesia. In contrast to the *Sydney Morning Herald's* broad and generous accounts of Indonesian history, politics and culture, the *Australian's* US optic substantially blinkers its view of Australia’s closest neighbour and the world’s fourth most populous state. If less bluntly than the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Australian* defines Indonesia in terms of “terrorism”, and defines that word in US terms as attacks on “our western” interests. Occasionally – one distinguished exception will be treated shortly – Indonesia is represented in terms of its *own* political interests and the history informing them. On the one hand, then, this section demonstrates how the “war on terror” can repress national histories; on the other, it illustrates how the paper’s political pluralism modifies this restriction. The next two paragraphs concentrate on the contributions of the paper’s staff writers.

In line with US policy, the paper roundly condemns the Indonesian government for its lax approach in allowing terrorist groups to flourish and for failing to heed US warnings. There are no fewer than fourteen such condemnations over the six days in the sample, eleven of these appearing in the first three days – that is, almost four every day – before the news that President Megawati Sukarnoputri was expected to approve indefinite detention for those suspected of terrorism (17 October, p2). Of the fourteen, only two are news items: “US questions Jakarta’s commitment to

war on terror” and “Indonesians refused to heed US intelligence” (16 October, p7; 17 October, p5). The condemnations appear in ten opinion pieces and two editorials, seven of which are dedicated to the topic. Of the fourteen items, eleven are by staff writers, including some of the paper’s best-known journalists, with editor-at-large Paul Kelly, foreign editor Greg Sheridan, Jakarta correspondent Don Greenlees and Washington correspondent Roy Eccleston each contributing two pieces treating the topic.¹⁹ These staff writers are unanimous in their censure. The tone of their commentary is typified by exasperation at the government which edges over into slurs on the President – a headline announces “Evidence even Megawati can’t keep ignoring” – and the lofty assertion that an “Indonesian leader of any competence would be able to polarise the Indonesian mainstream against the Islamic extremists” (14 October, p7; 15 October, p7).²⁰ The journalistic energy dedicated to all this criticism of the Indonesian government exceeds the concern expressed in the major US broadsheets, the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, where references are both far less frequent and less strident in tone (eg *Times* 15 October, ppA12, A26; *Post* 14 October, pA1). In reiterative intensity, the condemnation recalls the *Daily Telegraph*’s affectively-oriented, moralistic mode of address in forcefully condemning terrorists, a mode of address which overrides categories of explanation and understanding.

Explanation and understanding do not inform the paper’s staff writers’ substantial indifference to the specificities of the Indonesian political context. On the one hand, this contrasts with the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s interest in historical causality. On the other hand, these writers do not, in the *Daily Telegraph* manner, categorically ignore the Indonesian state. Four items do mention the President’s likely fears of a moderate Muslim backlash if she were to “crack down hard” on those suspected of terrorism (14 October, p15; two articles on 15 October, p7; 17 October, p2). However, these references are not elaborated. They remain perfunctory, gesturing towards an understanding of the complex actualities of Indonesian politics, but not engaging with them *on their own terms*. Thus in an article headed “Blind eye bolstered militants” and promoted on the front-page header as “Indonesia: Seedbed of Terrorism”, Greenlees acknowledges Indonesian leaders “struggling to make their way to democracy and reconcile deep political, religious and ethnic divides”, but investigates neither the depth and complexity of these divisions, nor the difficulties of establishing democratic institutions and habits of thinking after decades of authoritarian rule (19-20 October,

¹⁹ One of the three non-staff comments is an excerpt from the *Jakarta Post*, whose expression of shame at national complacency about terrorism confirms the *Australian*’s stance (15 October, p15; *Jakarta Post* 14 October, p6, editorial). The other two are from Clive Williams and Andrew Macintyre, both of whom provide culturally sensitive contextualisation lacking in the staff contributions (14 October, p15; 16 October, p15).

²⁰ The paper personalises its criticism of the President more than the *Sydney Morning Herald* or indeed the *New York Times*. Two of the paper’s three photographs of her are neutrally presented, but the third is aligned immediately beneath the opening words of a headline referring not to her but to her Vice-President; it reads “All talk, no action...” (14 October, p7; 17 October, p2; 18 October; p1).

pp21, 1).²¹ Where the *Daily Telegraph* dismisses Indonesia, the *Australian* patronises it. As argued above, the paper's conception of international politics is the US's "international community", filtered by the discursive limits of the "war on terror".

For all this, the views of the paper's staff writers do not represent the whole picture in the *Australian*, even if they dominate it. The paper's pluralism includes commentary from guest contributors. On the first day's reporting of the bombing, the paper prints a heterodox piece by Dewi Anggraeni, Australian correspondent of *Tempo* and a contributor to the *Jakarta Post* (14 October, p15). In seeing unemployment as one driver of Indonesian terrorism, she proposes the kind of social explanation for terrorist actions which, as Ghassan Hage notes, supplies a sense of common humanity repressed by the "war on terror" (2003: 124-43). Two other heterodox contributors are cited below. Later in the week, Richard Lloyd Parry offers an exemplary challenge to the staff's "war on terror" line. Reprinted from News Ltd's London *Times*, Parry's article marshals a cogent historical argument about the complexities of Indonesian politics and culture as they explain local attitudes to the bombing (19-20 October, p28). Appearing on the same day as Greenlees' "Blind eye" piece, it arguably offers a corrective to the assumptions of the paper's Jakarta correspondent. Where Greenlees merely alludes to "deep political, religious and ethnic divides", Parry *explains* the roots of their violence in the 32-year presidency of Suharto: "Under the dictator, the myriad differences of race, religion and politics had been suspended as in a deep freeze.... With his fall ... with the thaw, the old, unresolved conflicts came back to life", as they had in the Balkans and former Soviet republics. He goes on to specify such conflicts as the guerrilla campaigns for independence in Aceh and Papua, and the Christian-Muslim battles which "have transformed Ambon into a tropical Beirut".²²

Unsurprisingly, an even sharper contrast between the two articles emerges on the questions of US diplomacy in Indonesia and representations of the President. Greenlees blithely overlooks Indonesian sovereignty when he chastises Vice-President Hamzah Haz, leader of UDP, the largest Muslim party, for "def[y]ing] foreign sentiment by paying [Abu Bakar] Bashir a highly symbolic visit". Parry, conversely, restores agency and subjectivity to Indonesian politicians, noting that most actually dislike the USA and *explaining* that antipathy.²³ In the Suharto era, he writes, "[t]he

²¹ One might wonder whether the US neo-imperial discourse of "bringing democracy" to many regions of the world (the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq) blinds its proponents to the length of time required to actually build democracy.

²² Anggraeni adds "terrorist attacks in various parts of Jakarta, and also Maluku and Sulawesi that claimed thousands of victims long before September 11 last year" (14 October, p15). Her US reference makes clear that Indonesia was well familiar with terrorism before the USA became concerned with it there as part of its "war on terror".

²³ In the large sample of his analysis of three Indonesian newspapers' reports on the Bali bombing (*Kompas*, *Republika*, *Bali Post*), Syamsuddin Aziz finds only five articles paying attention to the US discourse of the war on terror (2007: 153).

powerful countries of the West colluded” in his “ruthlessly suppress[ing]” all political opposition in return for “access to his growing markets and passive but uncomprehending support in the Cold War”. Throughout 2002

the US Government has been antagonising Indonesians with its insistence that it root out the Islamic extremists in their midst.... It is hard not to sympathise with an instinctive Indonesian suspicion of the war on terror and the motives behind it. Having been colonised by Europeans, sold to Suharto during the Cold War and abandoned by foreign capital during the economic crisis, it is not surprising that the West’s latest demands should have Indonesians asking what is in it for them.²⁴

Parry calls Sukarnoputri a “stalwart” following two weak presidents, and shows an understanding of her position unguessable from the *Australian*’s staff writers: “As a secular-minded woman leading a largely Muslim country, Megawati faces enough criticism from conservative male clerics without giving them the chance to paint her as a US lackey.”²⁵ These insights reveal the blinkered partisanship of the paper’s staff writers. Parry’s conclusions mobilise his broad sense of history, and expose the mechanisms of displacement-dissimulation and moralism in the promotion of western innocence by the discourse of the war on terror. Where Greenlees concludes by lamenting “Australia’s blackest day of terrorism”, saying that the President’s indefinite detention decree “comes too late to save the victims of October 12, 2002”, Parry historicises and criticises the neo-imperial underpinnings of such conclusions: “But the warriors against terror will miss the point if they regard the killings in Bali as no more than a tragic vindication of their demands. No less than in Afghanistan ... the West has the Indonesia which it has allowed to come into being.” It is no small credit to the *Australian*’s pluralism that it prints this article – and Anggraeni’s – so radically at variance with its predominant line on Indonesia. Nevertheless, such contributions are in a minority.

5. Terrorism and politics: the ubiquitous threat of terrorism

Previous sections have demonstrated how the *Australian*’s commitment to the US-Australia alliance and the “war on terror” inflects its constructions of Australian victims and ethnicity, and determines

²⁴ The *Australian* carries no equivalent of the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s (19-20 October, p59) critiques of US-led economic pressures on the Indonesian economy.

²⁵ Other non-staff contributors join Parry in not derogating the President. Andrew Macintyre mentions her “wariness of US bullying” and Harold Crouch praises her “canny” politics (16 October, p15; 17 October, p13).

its representations of Bali and Indonesia. On issues of terrorism and politics, the discourse of the war on terror very substantially constructs reader address in terms of fear and strong condemnation of the Bali bombing, and very largely it determines representations of the bombers' motives and suspects for the attack, as well as the paper's views on the Bush Administration's proposed Iraq invasion and on the possibility of this being one motive for the bombing. Where the determination is less than total, this is a mark of the paper's pluralism. But this pluralism works within limits which rarely allow debate to step outside the "war on terror" and its self/other conceptual frame. The six issues listed above – the discourse of fear, that of condemnation, motives, suspects, the Iraq invasion and its possibility as a motive – are now examined in sequence.

The *Australian's* mode of address of fear from the "war on terror" is analysed in detail for several reasons. Firstly, detailing the rhetoric gives a sense of its extent and cumulative force. Secondly, important issues arise about journalism and evidence. Thirdly, it is argued that the affective register of fear largely overrides those of information and explanation, and therefore works to sway the political agenda, as seen with the paper's decision to feature letters of US empathy for Australian victims. The last chapter cited criticisms of US media representations of the events of 11 September 2001 as being "disproportionate" and "out-of-scale ... hyperbole" (Bourke 2006 [2005]: 365; Said 1993: 375; Ali 2002: 290). Does the *Australian's* mobilisation of the discourse of fear in relation to the Bali bombing justify similar criticisms?

Like the *Daily Telegraph* but unlike the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the paper invests very heavily in the discourse of fear. Its primary alarm concerns Australia being a terrorist target. On the first day's reporting of the bombing, a large cartoon shows a gigantic primed bomb being dropped onto Australia (indeed an "out-of-scale" image); in similar vein, Howard is quoted saying that "no country could expect to be immune from terrorism ... no one is safe anywhere ... 'We are living in a more dangerous world....'"; Sheridan's opinion piece leading the Worldwide section has the banner headline "A threat we ignore at our peril", and its opening sentence hyperbolically announces that the "terrorist empire has struck back" (14 October, pp15, 4, 11). The page header "Terror Hits Home" appears on all news pages and all the Weekend Inquirer's pages about the bombing, and also as a column-wide inset on Opinion pages treating the topic. Through the week, headlines vigorously deny the subjunctive status of fear. Consider two from the Weekend edition: "The Islamic front *is* at our back door" and "Security before the *next* wave" (19-20 October, pp30, 20; my italics). These fears of a terrorist attack manifestly exploit the register of affect.

A range of powerful historical and discursive factors would explain the fears: the numbers of Australians killed and injured by the Bali bombing, the strong likelihood that Australians were specifically targeted, the shock of the attack in a part of the world considered safe from terrorism, the discourse of border protection underwritten by invasion anxiety, and, after 11 September 2001, anti-Muslim/Arab discourses. There are also two pivotal features of the self/other structure of the “war on terror” at work. One of these is more semiotic, the other more discursive. Semiotically, it was argued in Chapter 4 that the self/other schema does not recognise such signifiers as “terrorist”, “Islamist” and “Muslim” as having meaning *in and for* themselves. It leaches away their denotative signifieds and replaces these with highly *connotative* signifieds such as the frightening and menacing: “foreign devils”, as Edward Said calls them (1993: 375). In short, they become far more affective than referential. In the resulting fog of fear, much can be overblown. More discursively, the self/other structure of the “war on terror” inhibits paying serious attention to the motives of those deemed “terrorists”.²⁶ The mindset focuses on notions of “homeland defence” against an enemy other.

There is a risk that these immensely powerful factors exaggerate perceptions of the likelihood of an attack on Australia, and particularly of “home grown” terrorist action. Indeed, the *Australian* mentions the alleged presence in Australia of al-Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiyah activists in no fewer than seven articles through the week, mostly as unchallenged fact, sometimes citing security sources (eg respectively 16 October, p7; 19-20 October, p23). Conversely, only one expert quoted by the paper takes an agnostic position, suggesting that south-east Asian terrorists probably had *no interest* in attacking Australia. David Wright-Neville is reported arguing that “Islamist terrorism was directed ... at ejecting Western influences from Muslim nations.... Australia was not an ideal target because we did not have a large Muslim community in which terrorists could camouflage themselves, nor a major dispute with Islamic groups around the world” (15 October, p6). This attention to Islamists’ motives is somewhat downplayed within the article in which these insights appear. It follows lengthier arguments by Rohan Gunaratna that Australia is “a prime target for terror attacks in the region”; and the headline quotes him and asserts: “‘Matter of time’ before Australia a direct target”. If true, Wright-Neville’s reading of south-east Asian terrorism radically – in the literal sense – neutralises the fear of a local attack. His remarks exemplify the leftwards limits of the paper’s pluralism. As with Parry on Indonesia, these comments from a non-staff source present a historical perspective outside and beyond that of the US-centred “international community” and the self/other frame of its “war on terror”.

²⁶ The motives which the paper ascribes are covered later.

The mode of address of fear also extensively affects the paper's representations of securitisation, Australians in Indonesia, US politicians' comments and general items on terrorism. We saw in the last chapter how in the USA after 11 September 2001 state apparatuses of securitisation flourished in the atmosphere of pervasive fear. Similarly after 12 October 2002 in Australia. What is at issue in the *Australian's* accounts of these actions by government and state is not so much what is reported, but the volume of the reporting, its framing, its omissions and any commentary on the actions. Its coverage of the issue is more extensive and detailed than in the other two papers. The focus of this fear is more on political preparedness than on individual safety. Reports of the reviews of national security and of national defence strategy ordered respectively by Howard and Defence Minister Robert Hill are both framed in terms of possible domestic terrorism (14 October, p4; 18 October, p5). An article headed "Migrants, visas under suspicion" invokes the discourse of border protection and the associated fears of hostile foreigners in our midst (19-20 October, p20). Meanwhile, "Australia's counter-terrorism nerve centre ... [t]he Protective Security Co-ordination Centre ... has moved to 24-hour watch and states are reviewing security at sites considered *potential targets*" (15 October, p7; my italics). In addition to the "doubling of counter-terrorist capabilities since September 11", Sheridan in commentary argues for further increased funding for ASIO and the Office of National Assessments (18 October, p5; 19-20 October, p20). The paper does not criticise government and state actions or the discourse of fear in any way. Where it reports that recent parliamentary debate about anti-terror legislation excited "controversy about its possible encroachment on civil liberties", the article's conclusion quotes Hill defending "*modifi[cations]* of our traditional freedoms" (16 October, p5; my italics). By contrast, it is worth recalling the *Sydney Morning Herald's* unqualified quotation of Professor George Williams' disquiet about the potential erosion of civil liberties by this legislation (17 October, p6).

Earlier sections of this chapter examined the paper's constructions of Bali, Indonesia and the terrorist "hydra" of south-east Asia as general threats to Australia. At the end of the week Australians are more directly addressed as rightly fearful: Foreign Minister Alexander Downer announces an upgraded travel advisory for Indonesia urging compatriots "to exercise extreme caution ... in areas ... frequented by foreigners such as clubs, restaurants, bars, schools, places of worship, outdoor recreation events and tourist areas" (18 October, p2). The headline reads "More attacks likely: Downer"; there is a front-page header, "Official Warning: Get out of Indonesia", and a text break-out about "very real risks"; the accompanying photograph of police guarding Denpasar airport is dominated by their guns; and a new sub-header, "The Fear Spreads", is adopted for most pages of that day's Bali coverage (18 October, pp1-5). The following day the paper quotes Howard (surely hyperbolically) saying that the Indonesian "situation is infinitely more dangerous ... than it

has been at any time in the past” (19 October, p6). Elsewhere a large photograph, captioned “High alert”, shows security officials checking cars entering the Australian embassy in Jakarta (15 October, p7).

The paper’s commitment to the US alliance extends its address of fear to embrace reports on US politicians: an article headed “Bombing fans flames of fear in US”; another quoting US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage asserting that “there’s a very good possibility of further attacks”; and on the Weekend edition’s front page some apocalyptic flavourings in a header promoting later items, “Days of Living Dangerously” and “Now We Are At War”, and a banner headline, “World alert: season of terror”, for an article stressing that “CIA director George Tenet has warned the international terrorist threat from al-Qa’ida ‘is as bad as it was last summer – the summer before 9/11.... You see it in Bali, you see it in Kuwait. They plan in multiple theatres of operations”” (15 October, p6; 18 October, p1; 19-20 October, p1). The frame of the discourse of fear ensures that it is extended across the west.

Additional evidence of the paper deploying this mode of address lies in the numerous items it devotes to terrorism: sixteen articles and nine images, seven and six more respectively than in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Supplementing these are two editorials and three opinion pieces dedicated to the topic (eg 14 October, pp14, 7; 17 October, p13). There are also two opinion pieces on terrorism in Indonesia (both 16 October, p15). The above figures include the five items on south-east Asian terrorism cited in the preceding section on Bali. Recall also the remarkably high number of 22 photographs of the bombing. Among the five articles and five images on terrorism not mentioned at all so far are a timeline of “Terrorism’s new offensive” illustrated with three photographs, including one of Osama bin Laden, and Tim Blair’s opinion piece advancing a bluntly simple solution to terrorism: “Killing and jailing terrorists wipes out terror” (14 October, p11; 17 October, p13).

The opening of this section asked whether the discourse of fear which the paper mobilises around the Bali attack justifies criticisms of being “disproportionate” and “out-of-scale ... hyperbole” (Bourke 2006 [2005]: 365; Said 1993: 375; Ali 2002: 290). It does. The paper invests massively in the discourse of fear, perhaps more than the *Daily Telegraph*, and yet in the form of more neutral reporting. In other words, the constant reiteration of the topic ensures that affect here does indeed override information and explanation. The discourse works performatively in the paper “not to dispel fear but actually to induce it” (Poole 2006: 153). It manifestly informs the paper’s political agenda. Firstly, as Shanahan observes with a confident future predictive, “the insecurity will help

to entrench the incumbent Coalition and John Howard” (18 October, p17). Secondly, the discourse of fear would similarly encourage support for measures of securitisation and anti-terror legislation. Lastly and more broadly, it might well *disable* the capacity for rational reading of other articles on terrorism and politics, perhaps especially those critical of the assumptions of the “war on terror”.

Insofar as the discourse of fear contributes to a political passivity, it finds an ally in the discourse of fate. The paper applies this discourse more emphatically to its Australian victims than the *Daily Telegraph*, and far more so than the *Sydney Morning Herald*. There are no fewer than fifteen instances in the first three days’ reporting, and many thereafter. These range from a recurrent stress on the tragic irony of suffering the attack “[j]ust hours after arriving” in Kuta, being “barely eight hours overseas” or “only ten hours overseas”; to the doubling of family misfortune (“We lost his twin brother four years ago”, reinforced by an old photograph captioned “Double loss”); a sense of fate hanging over families waiting for news of the missing, as in these adjacent headlines: “Hopes fade as the day passes” and “Families’ grim wait to identify victims”; and reiterations of the “if only” trope : “[H]e told me he wanted to marry me. He said this was the last time he would ever leave me” (all examples from 14 October, pp2, 3; 15 October, pp2, 3). If fate controls human affairs, it limits human agency. Repeated invocations of the discourse of fate, as of fear, work to undercut political agency outside government and state.

The next two features of the *Australian*’s constructions of terrorism can be examined far more briefly as they conform to more predictable patterns. They concern the mode of address of condemnation and the bombers’ likely motives. The strong condemnation of the bombing which might be expected from the paper’s politics combines with its broadsheet address to generate incisive but usually circumspect condemnation, with phrases such as “this abhorrent act” (15 October, p14). Only occasionally is the rhetoric more overtly affective, as in “utter barbarism” and “murderous lunatics” (17 October, pp12, 13).

It is no great surprise that forceful condemnation is matched by relative uninterest in the bombers’ motives. As in the *Daily Telegraph*, the cathexis of the “war on terror” dissimulates any western responsibility for the bombing, the self/other structure repressing any awareness of blowback. One motive the paper cites verges on recognising a reason for blowback – “Australia’s high-profile role in helping facilitate independence for East Timor” – but the evident pride in this intervention is pointedly and positively contrasted with the “simmering anger” attributed to the bombers (15 October, p7). The same binary of honourable western intervention vs irrational eastern response helps Gunaratna downplay blowback when he writes of the “US-led *anti-terrorist*

campaign in Afghanistan” and “the *angry* reaction of Muslims” (15 October, p15; my italics). The other possible motives the paper adduces are the targeting of the Bali tourist industry, and JI/Bashir seeking to “wreck the government of Megawati Sukarnoputri”, “foment a religious civil war” and “create an Islamic state” (16 October, p15; 19-20 October, p21; 15 October, p7). The possibility of the proposed Iraq invasion being one motive for the bombing is treated separately later.

The last three aspects of the *Australian*'s representations of terrorism are rather less straightforward. These are its accounts of suspects, of the proposal to invade Iraq and of this being a possible motive for the bombing. The paper's identification of suspects for the attack is oddly both clear and somewhat confusing. As early as the Tuesday, the paper clearly states its belief in the responsibility of JI and its leader Bashir, and through the week prints three photographs of him, one of him looking wise and two looking sinister, including the largest, captioned “Bashir, flanked by some of his henchmen” (15 October, p7; 16 October, p1; 19 October, p2). Yet the article's headline, “Al-Qa'ida associate main suspect”, and its lead paragraph subordinate JI to al-Qaeda (15 October, p7).²⁷ This is where confusion may arise, for the paper continues to highlight al-Qaeda throughout the week. It blames the group alone or with other, unspecified parties on some fifteen occasions; with JI eight times; and JI/Bashir on ten occasions. This promotion of al-Qaeda as lead suspect distinguishes it both from the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*, and also from the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* (eg *Times* 14 October, pA1; *Post* 14 October, ppA1, A28).

There are three possible reasons for this; all mark the paper's intense commitment to the “war on terror” and to belonging to the US' “international community”. After 11 September 2001 the discourse of the war on terror made al-Qaeda the most infamous and demonised entity in the western world. The promotion of al-Qaeda as lead suspect for the Bali bombing implies an identification of Bali with New York and Washington, and so harnesses the apocalyptic opprobrium and apprehension – the modes of address of strong condemnation and fear – to readings of the Bali bombing for Australians. Additionally, the paper's line accords with the five US Republicans and Republican appointees it quotes during the week. Unlike the Democrat-leaning US newspapers just cited, Bush, Armitage and Tenet, as quoted earlier, together with Senator Richard Shelby and Ralph Boyce, US Ambassador to Indonesia, are all quoted referring responsibility to al-Qaeda and *not* to JI (16 October, p1, 18 October, p1; 19-20 October, p1; 15 October, p6; 16 October, p7). ““I think we have to assume it's al-Qa'ida,” Mr Bush said” (16 October, p1). This would suggest a very

²⁷ The paper's spelling of the terrorist group may be phonetically more accurate than the normal one, but is not found elsewhere.

strong dedication by the paper to contemporary US foreign policy.²⁸ A third effect is to depict al-Qaeda as a kind of global terrorist octopus, “[t]he terrorist empire” of which Sheridan writes (14 October, p11). An editorial claims: “The sickening reality is that al-Qa’ida has moved from Afghanistan into south-east Asia, and as far as Australia [*sic*]” (14 October, p14). Such assertions perhaps make the group more an affective than a referential construct.

On the issue of the proposed invasion of Iraq, the *Australian* offers a limited pluralism. It prints the stated intentions of Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell to invade Iraq as well as to fight al-Qaeda (17 October, p8). By way of commentary, the paper presents six items expressing explicit support for the invasion – plus some asserting justifications for it – and four opposing it. As with the condemnation of Indonesia, staff writers express unanimous support: Dennis Shanahan twice, plus Angela Shanahan, Sheridan, Kelly and an editorial writer. The case against is made by two guest opinion contributors and in reports covering two groups, the Labor Party and Muslim leaders. The proponents’ justifications are subjunctive and lack supporting evidence: “Iraq remains the most *likely* source of WMDs for al-Qa’ida.... *If... terrorists had weapons of mass destruction courtesy of Saddam Hussein.... The possibility is....*” (14 October, pp11, 14; 15 October, p15; my italics). The assertion that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction serves as justification for invasion in several items on the Tuesday: a report of Deputy Prime Minister John Anderson referring without question to “Iraq’s possession of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction”, alongside a confirmatory editorial and a cartoon portraying Hussein sitting on a black drum of such weapons (15 October, pp6, 14). In two further pro-invasion comments writers simply invoke the higher authority of the US alliance (14 October, p4; 19-20 October, p30). The paper’s lack of evidence to support its assertions about Iraqi WMDs and a Hussein/al-Qaeda connection is explained by the fact that there was no evidence, as set out in the previous chapter.²⁹

The opposing comments are all from non-staff writers. They are not committed to the “war on terror” and generally advise caution about invading Iraq. One Muslim leader, Gabrel Gafi, is briefly quoted suggesting some of the unspoken arguments for invasion and argues the irrelevance of the Hussein/al-Qaeda link, saying that “there is no justifiable reason to attack [Iraq].... This is a war for popularity, a war for elections, a war about money, oil, control. It’s nothing to do with terrorists” (15 October, p6). The Labor Party supports regional diplomacy over the “war on terror” (18 October, p5). Both opinion writers share such views about the region. Clive Williams pursues

²⁸ Philip and Roger Bell remark on Australia’s history of “docile emulation” of US foreign policy, including “lobb[ying] strenuously in Washington” for requests to be sent that it dispatch troops to the Vietnam and Gulf Wars (1993: 150-2).

²⁹ Manne traces the *Australian*’s reluctant eventual admission that its Iraq *casus belli*, Hussein’s “possession” of WMD, was based on a major failure of western intelligence (2011a: 23-6).

the implications for Australia of the US aim “to secure its oil interests in the Gulf” and concludes that any military commitment may not be “worth the trade loss and the backlash from the Muslim world” (14 October, p15). Doug Bandow argues that “Canberra should act not as Washington’s deputy, but as an independent player” fighting against south-east Asian terrorism (18 October, p17). He sees no “evidence of a connection between Hussein and al-Qa’ida” and argues that invading Iraq “would foolishly divert resources” from the fight against terrorism. Above all, “an invasion would inflame Islamic hatreds and aid terrorist recruitment”.

The paper’s limited pluralism allows these heterodox views to indirectly question the assertions of the staff line. But they are given little space in which to develop arguments and adduce evidence. Notably, Gafi’s comments criticise the self/other structure of the “war on terror” and its neo-imperialist basis, but his remarks are presented in so compressed a form that while they could confirm beliefs already held by a like-minded reader, they would barely persuade an agnostic. Overall, these heterodox views fall far short of the spacious and comprehensive criticisms offered by the *Sydney Morning Herald*, which *reveals* what the “war of terror” axiomatically dissimulates. The *Australian* provides none of the empirical evidence which would support such commentary. Compare the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s report on the Iraqi leader rejecting all the USA’s accusations, for example, or Marian Wilkinson’s evidence of how isolated the US “war on terror” line was in debates at the UN. The UN figures in the *Australian* only to be dismissed, along with the “flaccid church”, for opposing a “just war” (15 October, p15). The limitations of the paper’s pluralism short-change debate on the Iraq invasion issue both empirically and conceptually.

A pointed remark by columnist Emma Tom requires mention here. At the time, together with Matt Price, she figured in the paper as a witty, often irreverent, sometimes left-leaning commentator.³⁰ She criticises the western tendency to sanitise death and injury seen in coverage of the Bali bombing: “[W]e need to see the explicit photographs and to read the gut-wrenching reportage. It might be disturbing, but then again, it should be. And it’s the only way we’ll even get close to understanding the true ramifications of disasters and war” (15 October, p15). This is an argument about common humanity which becomes an anti-invasion argument: “[W]e must do everything in our power to prevent other human beings having to endure a similar hell. Iraqis included.”³¹ This column also illustrates something of the left-liberal reaches of the paper’s pluralist range – short of

³⁰ Price, for instance, argues cogently against an Andrew Bolt attack on Bob Brown, who is much maligned elsewhere in the *Australian* and routinely so in the *Daily Telegraph*, as seen in the previous chapter (19-20 October, p20).

³¹ For Ghassan Hage, it will be recalled, “common humanity” is denied by the moral outrage of the address of strong condemnation (2003: 141).

the consistently centre-left Philip Adams, whose column appears right at the end of the Weekend edition and does not discuss Iraq (19-20 October, pR32).

The *Australian* devotes far less attention than its sister paper to denying the Iraq invasion as a motive behind the bombing; the *Sydney Morning Herald* leaves the question open. Pluralistically, the paper includes some voices arguing that it *was* a motive, including Labor and Hanabeth Luke's father from Byron Bay (16 October, p6; 15 October, p8). They sit alongside rather more expressions of denial, as from Howard, Sheridan and Kelly (14 October pp4, 11; 16 October, p15). Kelly's denial is remarkable for its assault on free speech; it also illustrates a recurrent trope of the paper's argumentative rhetoric, and more widely that of the right commentariat. In an uncharacteristically intemperate, if revealing manner Kelly criticises those arguing that the proposed invasion was a motive behind the bombing as "an effort to *slander* their own Government.... No *obscenity* is too *vile* or too *irrational* for the *Howard haters* and *US haters*" (my italics). Three rhetorical moves converge in this violent attack on freedom of speech. The comments vilify a snappily-labelled political position of the left. They assert support for a political position of the right which is assumed as a given and not argued for. And invective and caricature reinforce the attack and deflect attention from the lack of argument offered for the position adopted.³² The trope amounts to a kind of cross between shooting the messenger and electoral attack advertisements. It recurs in the paper's editorial on travel advisories.

6. Terrorism and politics: the issue of travel advisories

The *Australian's* construction of the travel advisories issue is chosen as a case-study for several reasons. The issue was a delicate and potentially embarrassing one for the government during the week, and its representation in a paper strongly supportive of the government appears to have been quite testing. It exemplifies the paper's representations of government and state, which bulk large: Australian politics and diplomacy account for 7.5% of its coverage, as compared with 5.6% in the *Sydney Morning Herald* and 2.4% in the *Daily Telegraph*. In its layout and photographs, its reporting and editorial commentary, the paper adopts a range of questionable rhetorical practices, including highly selective use of evidence. These rhetorics can be appreciated only through detailed textual analysis. The reporting of the issue is illuminated by comparing it with that of the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

³² These moves recall the invective and caricatural misrepresentations by Piers Akerman in the *Daily Telegraph*, also denying the Iraq invasion as one motive behind the bombing. His and Kelly's comments represent an outspoken version of the *ad hominem* rhetoric common in editorials (van Dijk 1991: 129).

As seen with the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *Daily Telegraph* in Chapter 2, travel advisories were a politically sensitive issue for the government during the week. In parliament on Wednesday 16 October, Howard admitted that he had, despite his and other ministers' previous denials, received US intelligence about an increased terrorist threat to tourists in Indonesia, even though Australian travel advisories had not been upgraded. The *Australian's* report on this news and the accompanying editorial are the key texts for analysis here (17 October, pp5, 12). Both play down this politically sensitive issue. The report will be examined first.³³ It appears on a page whose layout is unusual enough to warrant consideration before treating the article's words.

In their discussion of newspaper page layouts, Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen note that newspaper pages are "*scanned* before they are read", and refer to a page's "reading path", in which photographs play a leading role in guiding the reader's eye (1998: 205; italics original). On the page in question, the advisories article visually recedes, sidelined by a bold layout which draws the eye away from it. Several techniques are at work here. The upper two-thirds of the page is split vertically: the advisories article small on the left, and other reports far larger on the right. The article is only two columns wide, and runs down the inside, the less noticeable side of the right-hand page, alongside the newspaper's fold. The article's positioning is a bit like a bicycle lane left alone by the major traffic. The small photograph illustrating it shows a bespectacled bureaucrat in a grey suit against a muted background (more about him shortly). Dwarfing this image, nineteen times larger and stretching across the outer three quarters of the page, is a photograph with bold colours and dynamic composition showing Kingsley AFL footballers arriving back at Perth airport after abandoning their search for missing team-mates in Bali; at the time, six were missing, presumed dead. The photograph is visually striking: the footballers' bright red, blue and white shirts are set off against a night sky, their expressions are pained and grim, and their eye-lines look off left out of frame. Immediately beneath it appears a smaller photograph, but still almost four times larger than that of the bureaucrat, again brighter and more colourful, showing team supporters, their arms upraised, looking right out of frame and so matching the footballers' eye-lines as if welcoming the survivors back home. Already, then, the page exhibits a striking contrast

³³ It is typical of the paper's news items touching on the topic. Five references through the week to government/state failures to act on intelligence warnings – three quoting Labor sources and two people returning from Bali – are all very brief, all but one printed at the ends of the articles concerned and thereby treated as incidental (16 October, p6; 18 October, p5; 17 October, p3; 18 October, pp2, 5). An article headed "Indonesians refuse to heed US intelligence" glancingly raises the issue of whether Bali should have been specified in travel notices as a possible terrorist target (17 October, p5). Only in the Weekend edition does the paper report that "the US and Australia received telephone intercepts signalling attacks on tourist sites in Indonesia"; the same opinion piece offers the explanation that "Canberra's intelligence community did not believe that Australia would be targeted" and quotes Gunaratna's belief that "the Bali bombing amounts to a massive failure of intelligence" (19-20 October, p29). In general the paper seeks to defuse, rather than promote the issue.

between bright/neutral colours, bold composition/formal head-and-shoulders picture, strong directionality/stasis, affect (grief and relief)/professional detachment.

The visual dominance of the footballers' side of the page is boosted in other ways. There is an emphatic vertical alignment of items down the left-hand edge of their part of the page which separates it from the "political" side of the page. For the left-hand edges of page header, sub-header, headline and both photographs all line up vertically, like a fence between the bicycle lane and the major traffic.³⁴ This is reinforced by an exact colour match between the red of the header's *Australian* logo (an outline map of Australia) and the blues of header and sub-header at the top of the page, and the colours of the footballers' shirts in the main photograph. The words used at the top – "Terror Hits Home / Amid the Wreckage / Dark homecoming for club's surviving sons" – intensify the affective appeal of this visually dominant three quarters of the page. So too does the page's next most prominent item: "A heroine's bittersweet return", about the homecoming to Byron Bay of Hanabeth Luke after both rescuing a stranger and losing her boyfriend in Kuta. The warm colours of the accompanying photographs (yellow, blue, orange, rainforest green) outshine the dull tones of the bureaucrat's photograph and draw the reader's eye diagonally down away from the advisories article towards the lower right corner of the page. The diagonal line of this reading path is even reinforced by a visual rhyme between the red *Australian* logo of the page header and its re-appearance in the paper's reprinting of its front page from 14 October, whose photograph featured Luke rescuing the stranger from the Kuta blaze. The line is further stressed by the matching blues and whites of header and sub-header at the top, and of the 14 October newspaper title at the bottom, with the blues and whites of the footballers' shirts acting as a relay between them. Australian survivors, families and friends figure in bold, bright, dynamic images on this page; the workings of politics in far smaller images, nondescript and static, visually and affectively sidelined.

If these visual techniques and affective appeals distract the reader's eye from the advisories article, what does the article actually say? How does it represent the Howard government and the apparatuses of state, notably the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and intelligence agencies? Answers to these questions are clarified by comparing the article with its exact counterpart from the *Sydney Morning Herald* on the same day (17 October, p1).

There are several similarities in the two papers' reporting on the intelligence and the advisories. Their leading paragraphs are almost identical: that recent US intelligence had earlier identified Bali

³⁴ This precise vertical alignment is made possible by a shift from the previous four pages' use of seven columns across the page to eight; at the bottom of the advisories article the page reverts to seven columns.

as a possible terrorist target. Both articles criticise the adequacy of the existing travel advisories which maintained that tourist services were “operating normally” in Bali. Both cite Howard telling parliament that “there had been no intelligence that ‘specifically warned’ of a bomb attack in Bali on October 12” (*Sydney Morning Herald* 17 October, p1).³⁵ And both report Howard also saying that “the only possibly relevant reference to Bali in recent intelligence reporting was its inclusion, along with tourist and cultural locations across Indonesia, for possible terrorist activity against United States tourists” (*Australian* 17 October, p5).

The two papers differ in adducing contrasting versions of US intelligence. Towards the end of the *Australian* article, just after the Howard quotation about a “specific” warning and “the only possibly relevant reference to Bali”, the paper cites US sources which endorse his statements: “The US State Department also denied yesterday that its intelligence services received any *specific* information of a planned bombing in Bali” (my italics). The next paragraph rather vaguely mentions an earlier CIA report – “[A] *Washington Post* report ... *suggested* the CIA had issued a report listing Bali as a possible terrorist attack target just two weeks before the bombings” (my italics) – but does not elaborate on it.³⁶ It is this intelligence report, however, and the consequent *revision* of US travel advisories on 26 September, which are central to the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s argument. Close to the beginning of its article, the paper poses the question as to why this US material was not incorporated into Australian travel advisories, which had remained unchanged since 20 September: “The US changed its travel notice ... in response to threats identified by the CIA.... The US warning urged Americans and Westerners to ‘avoid large gatherings known to cater primarily to a Western clientele, including certain bars, restaurants and tourist areas’.”³⁷ By contrast, the *Australian* mentions the CIA report only in a distancing, slightly sceptical manner, entirely ignores the 26 September US travel advisory warning a “Western clientele” and cites a recent US statement seemingly exculpating the Australian government/state of any responsibility.³⁸ The paper would appear to be glossing over, not to say repressing the evidence of this “overlooked” intelligence and possible Australian culpability on the part of intelligence agencies and/or DFAT. And where it

³⁵ It would have to be said that no terrorist group is likely to broadcast in advance the “specific” time and location of an attack.

³⁶ “US intelligence officials said they intercepted communications in late September signalling a strike on a Western tourist site. Bali was mentioned in the US intelligence report, officials said” (*Washington Post* 15 October, pA1). The *New York Times* prints a very similar report on the same day (15 October, pA12).

³⁷ The US advisory is uncannily echoed and elaborated three weeks later in the upgraded Australian advisory for Indonesia quoted above, with Foreign Minister Downer urging Australians “to exercise extreme caution ... in areas ... frequented by foreigners such as clubs, restaurants, bars, schools, places of worship, outdoor recreation events and tourist areas” (*Australian* 18 October, p2).

³⁸ Given the very close intelligence ties between the USA and Australia, it is hard to imagine that DFAT was unaware of the 26 September US travel advisories or the intelligence on which they were based.

quotes Howard's specification of "*United States* tourists", the *Sydney Morning Herald* quotes both Howard and the US advisory's significantly broader "*Western* clientele" description (my italics).

Underlying these different versions of US intelligence is a fundamental divergence in whose point of view each paper urges its reader to adopt in considering the revelations about the "overlooked" intelligence. For the *Australian*, the issue is construed as a worry for government and state; for the *Sydney Morning Herald* as a civic concern for those killed, injured and bereaved by the bombing. These two standpoints imbue their reports with strikingly different senses of the importance of the news. By printing its article on page 5 the *Australian* patently plays down the topic, and the page layout there does nothing to highlight the material. The article's tone is one of slightly discomfited reassurance: whatever the manifest inadequacies of DFAT's travel advisories, the Prime Minister's words can assure the reader that nobody could have predicted the "specific" attack; his advice from Australian intelligence to that effect is confirmed by the USA; and the matter is now in the hands of an inquiry he has set up. This temporal frame crucially shifts the reader's attention from the past (regrettable mistakes may have been made) and the present (any embarrassment felt by government/state) to the future (the inquiry will report in the fullness of time). The future orientation may even explain the paper's otherwise strange illustration of the article not with a photograph of Howard – as was routinely used in newspapers when reporting his speeches in parliament – but one of Bill Blick, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security assigned by Howard to investigate the matter. The *Australian's* article addresses its reader as an axiomatically trusting supporter of (coalition) government and state.

On this topic, as on many others, the *Sydney Morning Herald* addresses its reader as a citizen-voter. Its central focus is whether a correction of Australian advisories in line with US ones could have saved Australian lives. Evidently convinced of the importance of this topic, the paper prints its article as its front-page lead story, under the banner headline "The warning tourists never heard". Rather than endorse government/state, the paper seeks to align the reader with citizen-victims and to hold those institutions to account for having possibly let them down, as summarised in Chapter 2. Unlike the *Australian*, it points out the numbers at risk: "Up to 20,000 Australians were on the island at the time of bombing" while according to travel advisories "tourist services were 'operating normally'". Again in contrast to the *Australian*, it makes explicit the government's economy with the truth. Its second paragraph reports: "The revelation [of Bali as a possible target] came a day after Mr Howard, along with other members of cabinet and the US ambassador to Australia, Tom

Schieffer, said they had been unaware of any such intelligence.”³⁹ The paper marks the impact of Howard “admitting to a *silent* parliament that his Government had received the US intelligence” (my italics) while the *Australian* accords parliament no subjectivity: Howard simply “told parliament”.⁴⁰ In mentioning the review, it neither names Blick nor prints his photograph. Against the *Australian*’s deferral of the issue to the future, the *Sydney Morning Herald* concentrates on the evidence then available about what did or did not happen. In particular, it devotes three paragraphs to a possible *explanation* of the DFAT “oversight”, a more critical analysis than any the *Australian* offers during the week. This is a comment by Andrew Plunkett, a former army intelligence officer in East Timor, who “said the lack of a more specific warning based on the intelligence at hand constituted ‘another tragic intelligence failure’”. He is quoted suspecting “careerist departmental officers ... in the Department of Foreign Affairs [who] for political purposes ... water down the intelligence so as not to upset the Indonesians and because they place the narrow short-term business interests of Australian companies in Indonesia ahead of human security and our long-term national interest”. What for the *Australian* is a political-bureaucratic question deferred to the future is treated by the *Sydney Morning Herald* as a current investigation into one factor that may have contributed to Australian deaths, injuries and suffering.

Adjacent articles on the two pages being compared play significant support roles. While the *Australian*’s items on Australian survivors and mourners deflect attention from the advisories article, another item downplays the issue. It is a comment piece from Canberra, and appears on the “political” side of the page, below the advisories report (17 October, p5). Headed “Spirit of bipartisanship weakens”, it reproves Labor’s pursuit of the intelligence briefings issue as “a move which threatens to breach the political bipartisanship adopted since the weekend”.⁴¹ Three times Labor’s stance in raising questions about government/DFAT/intelligence agencies is dubbed “more aggressive” than previously, and senior figures supporting the stance are called “unapologetic” rather than, say, “principled” or “committed to holding the government to account”. The criticism

³⁹ It was doubtless the previously mentioned *Washington Post* and *New York Times* articles which made the revelation public knowledge. Remarkably, the *New York Times* also reports that the “Western clientele” warning “was reinforced just a day before the Bali attack in a message delivered personally to the Australian government by the United States ambassador, J Thomas Schieffer, which spoke of an increased threat to ‘soft targets’ in Indonesia” (20 October, pA14). It may be that the underlying purpose of the US State Department declaration cited by the *Australian* in support of Howard was to normalise the restricted circulation of intelligence information. This appears to be confirmed in the *Daily Telegraph*, which cites Howard asserting that “[t]here has been no breakdown’ [in the] close intelligence sharing between the two countries” (October 17, p3).

⁴⁰ Less circumspectly, the *Washington Post* describes the revelation as “caus[ing] a flap in Parliament” (17 October, pA1). If this sounds like second-hand reporting, other articles from the paper indicate that it used a stringer in Australia.

⁴¹ The paper quotes Howard the previous day calling recent parliamentary sessions “some kind of bipartisan nirvana” (16 October, p6).

of Labor for pursuing the issue complements the advisories article's glossing over of any past "oversights".

There would appear to be a pattern of unquestioning support for the coalition government. This might explain what is otherwise a bizarre selection and arrangement of photographs illustrating the advisories report and the Canberra comment piece. There is a kind of symptomatic displacement at work here which follows a logic of partisan politics rather than journalistic conventions of illustration. Conventionally, a photograph of Howard (as on 16 October, p5) would have accompanied the article on advisories which extensively quotes him, and one of the leader of the opposition Simon Crean would have accompanied the commentary piece about Labor's critical inquiries about advisories. Yet as we have seen, the paper illustrates the advisories article with the Blick photograph pointing to the future of the inquiry. A photograph of Howard illustrating the advisories article might have been expected to show some embarrassment about having previously misled the public. However, it does not – or at least not there. A second shift has the expected Crean photograph displaced by one of Howard, head in hands in parliament, and printed in a miniscule, thumbnail size, six times smaller than that of Blick and 117 times smaller than that of the footballers; the embarrassment may be acknowledged, but is virtually invisible. The structure is clear enough: the future orientation displaces attention from any past mistakes for which the government/state might be held responsible; a certain embarrassment is recognised, but almost invisibly; and the opposition leader is visually disappeared. This radical break from journalistic convention serves a partisan politics.

The *Sydney Morning Herald* lays out its front page on the same day with the advisories lead story running down the two left-hand columns. Mirroring this on the right side of the page is an article two columns wide which reports Australian anger at bureaucratic delays in identifying victims' bodies: "Fury clouds the tears as families tell Canberra: look after our people", illustrated by a small photograph of bombing victim, Kathy Salvatori. Between the two articles, four columns wide and dominating the page, is a photograph of distraught-looking husband Craig Salvatori at the Denpasar morgue, frustrated by the protocols of identifying his wife's body. Anger at the bureaucratic delays peaked on that day, Salvatori was its most energetic spokesperson, and the combination of newsworthiness and visual balance – all these would explain the mirror-like complementarity in this page layout.⁴² However, such mirroring implies similarity or equivalence, and the *Sydney Morning Herald* surely seeks also to bolster its case for anger about inadequate travel advisories by

⁴² The *Australian* runs a parallel story, "Salvatori's fury over ID blunder", as well as "Red tape angers relatives" (17 October, pp3, 1).

bracketing it with the already widely-known anger about delays in identifying bodies. The Salvatori photograph relays this association, not least since no photograph illustrates the advisories article. An arguable sleight-of-hand here serves the paper's citizen-oriented stance on the advisories issue.

The *Australian's* editorial on advisories has the same partisan intent as its article, but its rhetorical manoeuvres are more obvious (17 October, p12). This arises in large part from the generic differences between the two forms. The editorial's discursive format of logical argumentation is quite distinct from the expository format of reporting.⁴³ The latter has a somewhat dispersed conceptual logic and a fragmented narrative temporality: structurally closer to a collage than to an essay. In the advisories article, this makes the repression of the "Western clientele" evidence and of questions about government/state accountability less noticeable than in the editorial, whose ideally logical format more clearly exposes symptomatic traces of the repressions, in the form of dubious, sometimes specious logic and rhetorical excesses.⁴⁴ The point here is not to disagree with the editorial's partisan position, but to analyse how its rhetorics and discourses work in relation to the evidence available in the public domain.

The editorial begins and ends with sober and reasonable recognition of various possible shortcomings about advisories: "If our security agencies are found to be wanting ... or there has been a breakdown in sharing of information between the Australian and US intelligence community.... If the warning ... were lost in the fine print...." The same authoritative tone applies in praising the wisdom of establishing the Blick review – "The Government is to be applauded" – and of Australia's investigative, legislative and security interventions after the bombing. Between introduction and conclusion, however, a different tone emerges – more captious and zealous – with three lengthy attacks on real and imagined sets of opposing views. It may well be argued that "daily mockery of opponents is one of the most potent means by which the paper's ideological and political agenda is advanced" (Manne 2011a: 50), but in this editorial attacks on opposing views serve rather to deflect or displace questions of government/state accountability, while one attack functions more through scapegoating.

⁴³ The "inverted pyramid" convention presents information in a descending order of importance – beginning with basics of who, what, when, where, why and how – and so adopts an achronological sequence which may well play down causal factors (Van Dijk 1988: 65; Bell 1991: 168-9, 172; Zelizer and Allan 2010: 61). Allan Bell notes elsewhere how the structure can allow less rigorous reporters to include logical "inconsistencies, incoherence, gaps and ambiguities" in a news story (1998: 9).

⁴⁴ Freud defines a symptom as a "a sign of, and a substitute for, an instinctual satisfaction which has remained in abeyance; it is a consequence of the process of repression" (1979 [1926]: 242).

How do these attacks work? The first is preceded – arguably generated – by a fascinating comment on the forthcoming Blick review. Some contextualisation is in order. As in the advisories article, the editorial’s focus on the review deflects attention from past and present to future, and its headline, “No stone unturned in Bali terror probe”, promises a rigorous investigation of the evidence. Yet the comment concerned seemingly pre-judges the review’s conclusions: “Such a review is necessary to remove any doubts in the public’s mind that our diplomatic and security networks are up to the task of protecting Australians at home and abroad.” On a quick reading this asserts the state’s blamelessness. A more careful reading would note that the clause “remove any doubts in the public’s mind” does not mean “prove without doubt”. This reading might recall suspicions that governments are rarely known to establish inquiries whose outcome they cannot rely on to support their own case, and might suggest that the inquiry report would be more an exercise in public reassurance than a rigorous, comprehensive, evidence-based investigation. Insofar as what is *actually* said may well represent a wish-fulfilment – despite the evident inappropriateness of saying so – it might constitute a slip of the keyboard, a parapraxis where “incompletely suppressed psychical material ... although pushed away by consciousness, has nevertheless ... express[ed] itself” (Freud 1975 [1901]: 344). As if to deny this slip, the editorial instantly switches into attack mode on the very question of evidence. The attack also displaces anxiety about any questions of government/state accountability by ridiculing opposing views based on the evidence then available: “But to conclude before there is *sufficient* evidence that the Bali bombing was the result of a *massive* intelligence failure is *living dangerously*” (my italics). This assertion might wish to encourage the reader to believe that there is no evidence already in the public domain – the editorial glosses over the US travel advisories – that the government is not being economical with the truth, and that the inquiry will confirm all this. But the parapraxis leaves its symptomatic traces here in the hyperbole caricaturing the opposing viewpoint. And the hyperbole and parapraxis both undermine the editorial’s authoritative assertions, belying its sober expressions of concern about possible shortcomings in the provision of advisories.

The second attack, on Labor’s pursuit of the issue, solemnly invokes an affective rendering of national unity to displace attention from questions of the available evidence: “In this darkest hour there is no room for political point-scoring on who should bear the blame for the Bali murders.” More overtly than in the news report, this remark reasserts the primacy of government/state over parliamentary debate. The third attack finds a scapegoat to displace calls for accountability that could be levelled at government/state. It slurs “complacent ... Australian travellers” in some striking sophistries and hyperbole that verge on blaming the victims: “[W]ith DFAT travel advisories currently applying to around 120 countries, it is *little wonder* that Australian travellers

have grown complacent over the years. Had a stronger travel advice on Indonesia urging Australians to defer *all* travel or advising those in the country to leave been issued based on *inconclusive* intelligence, *charges of over-reaction* would have been flying thick and fast” (my italics). The editorial seemingly sets up this last set of imaginary critics to displace the real critics reported in the *Sydney Morning Herald* who suffered in and from the bombing, which itself is surely *conclusive* evidence of the correctness of the intelligence which advised US, but not Australian travellers away from certain places in Indonesia including Bali and places attracting a “Western clientele”.⁴⁵

7. Conclusions

This chapter set out to test three hypotheses: that the *Australian*'s nationwide circulation might have a significantly broader geographical coverage than the Sydney-based papers; that it might share with the *Sydney Morning Herald* a broadsheet style of neutral, objective journalism; and that it might share with the *Daily Telegraph* a partisan politics, while not subscribing to its populist address. Firstly, the paper's reports on various West Australian and US victims of the bombing evince a broader geographical range than the other two papers, though actually not much broader than that of the *Sydney Morning Herald*. Secondly, the paper's repression of evidence in its rendering of the travel advisories issue suggest that it is not always reliably neutral or balanced. Thirdly, that same coverage shows that it shares with the *Daily Telegraph* an evident partisanship for the coalition government. In foreign policy, too, both papers adopt a partisan position in support of the “war on terror”. But these partisan stances are complicated in the *Australian*'s case by the paper's pluralism and its address to the political class.

This partisanship/pluralism relationship will be pursued in Chapter 6 in comparison with the other two papers. So too will questions of affect and journalistic evidence. The *Australian*'s distinctive world-view, however, should be stressed here. Its intense commitment to the US alliance and the “war on terror” are manifest through the week's coverage of the Bali bombing. The discourse of the war on terror substantially inflects the paper's constructions of Australian victims, Bali and the repeatedly condemned Indonesia. On Australian victims, the US letters of condolence represent US

⁴⁵ The Blick inquiry reported in December. According to a report in the *Age*, “Australian intelligence received no advance warning of the Bali bombings, an inquiry exonerating the spy agencies has found” (11 December, p1). However, the inquiry “*did not examine* government travel warnings, nor the American travel advice to avoid bars frequented by tourists, government sources confirmed. US intelligence had received several general warnings about likely terror attacks in Indonesia on ‘soft targets’ that led to its warnings” (my italics).

civil society as compassionate and caring, and so naturalise and render “innocent” the military actions of the US Administration before and after the events of 11 September 2001. In a cathexis typical of the “war on terror”, blowback is displaced-dissimulated and moralised as compassion and empathy. On Bali, the paper pictorially militarises and “Indonesian-es” the tourist resort. This assimilates the pacific paradise into the “east”-plus-terrorists side opposing the “west” in the division of the world effected by the “war on terror”. With this move, Bali loses the innocence attributed to it by the other two papers. The *Australian*’s advocacy for invading Iraq and the otherwise bizarre promotion of al-Qaeda as its main suspect for the bombing suggest a strong identification with the USA’s Republican Administration. Further, its political imperatives and their self/other structure displace the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s humanist multicultural paradigm concerning ethnic representations. Questions of affect – most conspicuously in the mode of address of fear – are developed in Chapter 6.

The paper’s world-view is larger than that of its News Ltd stable-mate, the *Daily Telegraph*, but smaller than that of the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The former’s white cultural solipsism acknowledges little outside Australia unless it is constructed as a threat. The latter offers a nuanced global internationalism which seeks to understand the complexities of overseas politics and embraces many nations and states which the *Australian*’s self/other schema ignores, for the “international community” adopted by the paper from the USA is highly selective.

The *Australian*’s view of government and state is clear from its renderings of the touchstone issue of travel advisories. Its repression of evidence about “overlooked” intelligence illustrates its unquestioning support for the coalition government and the apparatuses of state. Its constructions of Labor suggest a grudging recognition of parliamentary democracy and so of social democracy. Where the *Sydney Morning Herald* sides with the citizen-voter, the *Australian* sides with government and state.

CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS

It is to be hoped that this study demonstrates the value of detailed textual analysis of newspapers, both historically for 2002 and in the present. Despite extensive changes in the mediascape in recent years, it remains the case that newspapers still largely set the agenda for news presented in other media forms. The analysis conducted above shows the complexity of the newspaper text – including its generic variety, its visual/verbal relationships and its discursive richness – as well as the importance of using original sources to approximate the reading experience involved.

The following conclusions principally compare the three newspapers in terms of their governing modes of reader address, that is, in terms of their individual approaches to questions of partisanship and pluralism. This entails examination of their varying approaches to questions of journalistic evidence and of the significance of affective writing. The papers are also compared in terms of their commitment to principles of the fourth estate. The *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sydney Morning Herald* can be directly contrasted in terms of their governing modes of reader address, defined respectively as partisanship and pluralism. The *Australian*, however, has a quite different system which intricates both modes of address, and so requires separate analysis. The chapter is rounded out by an examination of differences between tabloid and broadsheet, and a finale about the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

1. The partisan *Daily Telegraph* and the pluralist *Sydney Morning Herald*

The *Daily Telegraph*'s partisanship can be briefly resumed. In its unwavering commitment to address Australians as mourners, as ethnocentric and as subscribing to the “war on terror”, the paper projects a remarkable uniformity of views. Almost all its news items and photographs, and all of its editorials, cartoons and opinion pieces assert these partisan commitments. The paper's only pluralist zone is its Letters pages. The consistent repetition of its uniform views may be regarded as dependable and reassuring. Nevertheless, it crucially denies debate. In discouraging questioning, it entrenches its partisan positions. Affective appeals are a vital feature of these operations. As argued with reference to its white cultural solipsism in Chapter 3, the paper expects assent.

In terms of partisanship and pluralism, the *Daily Telegraph*'s differences from the *Sydney Morning Herald* can be illustrated in overseas and Australian examples: constructions of Indonesia and of the Howard government. In terms of Indonesia, the inclusive pluralism of the *Sydney Morning Herald*'s multicultural paradigm contrasts with the exclusive partisanship of the *Daily Telegraph*'s ethnocentrism. As an exemplar of the former paper's even-handed pluralism, recall its appraisal of President Megawati Sukarnoputri in relation to the USA's diplomatic pressure on Indonesia. Its journalistic balance not only fairly represents opposing views (the US and Indonesian states on terrorism), but succeeds in doing so across incompatible cultural understandings of history (the USA says this, but these are the reasons why Indonesia says that). The *Daily Telegraph*, on the other hand, accords no agency, humanity or history to the foreign. Perhaps its most egregious construction of Indonesia is to represent it photographically as virtually consisting *only* of terrorists. On the Howard government the *Daily Telegraph* is consistently supportive, and admits no contrary evidence – beyond the obligatory reporting of Labor views and some variant views in its Letters pages – and is thus partisan. On the other hand, the *Sydney Morning Herald* is largely, though by no means wholly critical of the government and does admit evidence and viewpoints opposing its own, and is thus pluralist.

On the domestic front, there is one crucial means by which the *Daily Telegraph* may appear *not* to be partisan: by deploying discourses of national unity which critically depend on assimilationism and its processes of ex-nomination. There is a *pretence* of inclusiveness here which requires analysis. It was argued earlier that this assimilationism performatively spirits away ethnic and political forms of difference repressed by the paper's rhetoric of "nineteen million mates". Howard's populist invocations of "ordinary Australians", "the battlers" and "the mainstream" replay this assimilationism.¹ As Cathy Greenfield and Peter Williams point out, this rhetoric entails – is indeed built on – exclusions: "The policies ... are relentlessly assimilationist.... Hence the attacks on 'elites' and groups scathingly referred to as 'industries': academics, ABC audiences, Aborigines, social security recipients" (2001: 41-2; cf Cahill 2004). The apparently inclusive is actually partisan, founded on disenfranchising and othering certain social groups. Ethnically, the paper's discourse of nation-as-home wishes away non-white Australians if it does not demonise them, as in its constructions of Arabs/Muslims. It dismisses foreigners. It invokes national communities unified by condemnation of foreigners it holds responsible for the bombing. Politically, disenfranchisement and othering are central to what Dennis Glover calls tabloids' "divisive right-wing populism [which is] designed to show the need for firm government" (2005:

¹ Donald Horne argues that the social effects of such rhetoric were both divisive and unjust: "[T]he mainstream idea was producing concepts of an Australian normality that made it un-Australian for certain kinds of people to put up a case for themselves" (2001: 11).

214). The paper's comments on the Iraq invasion disenfranchise the citizen-voter in a representative democracy by endorsing the transfer of power from parliament to a Prime Minister who refused parliamentary debate on the topic but nonetheless "has *enunciated Australia's* support" for the invasion (17 October, p34; my italics). There is an authoritarian populism at work here, and it is matched by the paper's own reader address: both expecting readers' assent to its views and withholding opposing evidence. Assent is perhaps secured by the strongly affective orientation of the unitary, idealised community of Australian mourners which the paper constructs.

As a central tenet of the fourth estate, evidence-based reporting comes under challenge from affective writing. Such writing raises the question of falsifiability or testability, which Karl Popper argues to be the key criterion of empirically testing the viability of a scientific hypothesis (1976 [1963]: 36-7).² This methodology is remarkably similar to that of evidence-based research in journalism. The problem of affective writing is starkly demonstrated by comparing how the two papers construct suspects for the bombing. Where the *Daily Telegraph* blithely multiplies the number of suspects on a daily basis with scant evidence and ample affective drive, the *Sydney Morning Herald* exercises a cautious agnosticism in its empirical, evidential testing of material, including from security experts, on suspects for the bombing. That is, it continually tests hypotheses for their falsifiability. The *Daily Telegraph* addresses its reader affectively in three principal areas: as Australian victim, as an Australia "at home" fearful of another attack, and as an Australian roundly condemning those it charges with terrorism. Neither the mourning nor the subjunctive fears can be logically proven right or wrong. Whatever their affective resonances, they are, in Popper's terms, unfalsifiable propositions, untestable because "there is no possible observation which would falsify them" (Warburton 1992: 92). Likewise unfalsifiable, until legal deliberations are concluded, is the condemnation of those suspected of terrorism. Nevertheless, a range of textual strategies urge reader identification with various affective foci. There is constant textual reiteration which works through several powerful discourses (victimhood, nationalism, the "war on terror") and the communities of mourning, fear and condemnation which the paper sets up for its reader. Those communities were examined above as operating as closed circuits. All seek to affectively bind together nation with individual, newspaper with reader. Across the three communities, key discursive terms – the west/Australia, innocence, victimhood, goodness, rightness – form an affective economy of continual mutual reinforcement. For many readers, then, the combination of discourses mobilised, communities invoked and reiteration may prove winningly plausible.

² Popper sees falsifiability as a way of "distinguishing rational science from various forms of superstition" (1976 [1963]: 228).

The *Daily Telegraph*'s investment in affect has disturbing implications for the fourth estate. What unfalsifiable affect displaces in general is the logical-empirical. The *Daily Telegraph* also adopts the subjunctive in its mode of address of fear and in, say, its boosterism about Australian diplomacy (eg 16 October, p7). What the subjunctive – likewise unfalsifiable – displaces is the indicative. Together, the logical-empirical and the indicative constitute the absolute staples of journalism, the world out there which can be reported on in news and debated in editorials and opinion pieces. In Roman Jakobson's linguistic terms, the *Daily Telegraph*'s affective emphases challenge news media's referential function with the conative, undercutting the referential with affective address to the reader (1960: 355). Serving largely as an echo chamber for personal feelings, such address barely contributes to rational public debate.

The fourth estate in a social democracy asserts the journalistic principle of holding “truth to power”, of ensuring the accountability of governments and other powerful institutions to their constituents, and doing so through balanced and evidence-based reporting and commentary. How do the two papers' pluralist and partisan modes of address to the reader relate to the fourth estate? The *Sydney Morning Herald* serves as a pluralist forum for ideas, as what Guy Rundle in a general context calls “a forum for liberal and open discourse [serving] an open society promoting a vigorous public sphere” (2005a: 49, 44). Such a conception allows the paper to criticise government positions, notably on the Iraq invasion and government travel advisories, while providing evidence supporting both sides of the arguments. The partisan *Daily Telegraph* evidently falls short of the expectations of the fourth estate. In aligning itself with government policy on the Iraq issue, it fails to acknowledge any alternative views outside its Letters pages. Similarly, it raises very few questions about the adequacy of government travel advisories. Moreover, it habitually attacks Australia's prime exemplar of the fourth estate, the ABC. No fewer than three of the week's six Editorial page opinion pieces go out of their logical way to condemn the broadcaster (15 October, p20; 17 October, p34; 19 October, p20).³ Rundle sets out key criteria of a pluralist, fourth estate standpoint: “Even if a paper has a conservative or a liberal point of view, it is vital that a genuine exchange of voices and positions be presented. This the Murdoch papers signally failed to do” (2005a: 44). The liberal *Sydney Morning Herald* passes this test, the conservative *Daily Telegraph* fails it and the *Australian*, as we shall see, barely passes it.

³ In a lecture celebrating the ABC's seventieth birthday, historian Ken Inglis points out that such criticisms were typical of the News Ltd press, publisher of the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Australian* (2002).

2. The *Australian's* managed pluralism

We can now investigate how the *Australian* presents a different configuration of partisanship and pluralism than the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*. This section also shows how the paper uses evidence, mobilises affect and approaches the fourth estate in ways perhaps closer to its tabloid stable-mate than to its broadsheet competitor.

The *Australian* is more pluralist than might be expected of a strongly partisan paper. This apparent contradiction arises from a tension between its political address and its preferred reader. In the other two papers these coalesce, so that the papers can be characterised as substantially addressing centre-right and left-liberal political readerships respectively. But the *Australian's* address to what Robert Manne calls the “political class” would include readers from the left *as well as* the right, while the paper’s preferred reader, s/he who agrees with its editorial line, is manifestly centre-right. This multiple address underlies the paper’s managed pluralism. What is of moment here is opinion pieces rather than news items. Nevertheless, such pieces do raise questions about supporting evidence.

In terms of a general left-right political spectrum the paper’s staff writers are overwhelmingly of the centre-right. Of the staff writers mentioned in the last chapter with left leanings, only Emma Tom writes during the week of the Bali bombing. Apart from her, it is *guest* contributors who provide all of the opinion pieces politically to the left of the paper’s preferred stance; conversely though, by no means all guest contributors are of the left, for example Rohan Gunaratna. Importantly, guest contributors add expertise appropriate to a broadsheet paper. Yet since few are likely to be celebrities – and none during this week – they may lack the benefits of status and name familiarity which staff writers offer to the paper’s regular readers. Nor does the *Australian* accord any of the week’s guest contributors any special recognition, as seen in the front-page header which promotes Don Greenlees’ opinion piece on Indonesia, but not Richard Lloyd Parry’s (19-20 October, p1). Interview material, with Labor spokespeople for instance, provide other sources of left views.

How does the *Australian* accommodate its left-of-centre readers? In general, identifiably left items are doubtless included to attract and retain left readers. At the same time, the paper may well hope to persuade left-inclined – and agnostic and middle-of-the-road – readers towards the centre-right views of almost all its staff writers, including those writing its editorials. During the week after the bombing, there are three terrorism-related topics on which the paper hosts some debate, and where some left-of-centre views are invoked. Two topics are defined by the paper’s commitment to the

“war on terror”: its support for the proposed Iraq invasion and its condemnation of Indonesia. The third is the possibility of a terrorist act in Australia. How balanced are these debates? We can roughly quantify the arguments for and against on the three issues, together with the contributions of staff writers to these arguments. On Iraq, the paper is relatively balanced although it offers the reader more pro-invasion than anti-invasion views: eight against five. All the former are from staff writers; Tom is their only dissenter. However, most non-staff opponents are given less space to develop their case, as shown in the interview extracts from Gabrel Gafi and Labor. On Indonesia, the paper presents fourteen condemnations, all from staff writers, and four contributions which do not condemn: the articles by Dewi Anggraeni and Parry, and passing comments from two other guests, Clive Williams and Andrew Macintyre. On the possibility of domestic terrorism, the imbalance is greater, with only David Wright-Neville opposed, while almost all of the seven maintaining its strong likelihood are staff writers.

There is clear partisanship here, but also a degree of pluralism. Could it be argued that the paper is just as pluralist as the *Sydney Morning Herald*, that the *Australian* is no more imbalanced, just that its politics point in the opposite direction? After all, in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, centre-right commentators such as PP McGuinness and Gerard Henderson are outnumbered by centre-left and left-liberal contributors including Mike Carlton, Guy Rundle, Geoff Kitney and Adrian d’Hagé. Thus far the argument holds. However, there are three countervailing strategies found in the *Australian* that are not present in the *Sydney Morning Herald*.

The first is the intensity of the paper’s reiteration of its preferred stances: the fourteen condemnations of Indonesia, for instance, and the seven assertions of the likelihood of domestic terrorist acts, together with the negative framing of Wright-Neville’s counter-arguments, which undermine those alarmed assertions. While the paper’s style remains largely respectful and restrained, such relentless reiteration is less characteristic of neutral broadsheet practice than of large tabloid headlines.

The second strategy concerns the provision of evidence about a given issue on the basis of which the reader can agree or disagree with the positions adopted by the paper. We have already seen how the paper’s staff writers fail to provide the information that Parry supplies on the specificities of Indonesian history and culture, evidence that undercuts their condemnations. Wright-Neville’s information similarly challenges the paper’s alarm about the likelihood of domestic terrorism. On the Iraq invasion issue, by contrast with the *Australian*, the *Sydney Morning Herald* supplies evidence of the predominantly non-US views obtaining at the UN, for example. The *Australian*

offers its reader no such contextualising evidence. Nor is it able to substantiate the justifications it asserts for invading Iraq: President Saddam Hussein allegedly having WMDs and collaborating with al-Qaeda. By contrast, the *Sydney Morning Herald* prints Iraq's detailed denial of both claims.

Thirdly, there is the paper's mobilisation of affect in relation to the "war on terror". It was argued earlier that the *Daily Telegraph*'s affectively-oriented, moralistic modes of address of fear and of absolute condemnation override categories of explanation and understanding. This applies also to the News Ltd broadsheet. It does not apply to the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The intensity of the *Australian*'s condemnation of the bombers and al-Qaeda, and of Iraq and Indonesia transforms these entities into "foreign devils" and so displaces debate with statements of faith (Said 1993: 375). As regards the discourse of fear, the paper's investment is at least the equal of the *Daily Telegraph*'s, even while adopting the more neutral, less hyperbolic broadsheet style. Its constant return to the register of fear ensures that the discourse works performatively to induce more fear. Additionally, the affective power of photographs is used to "Indonesian-ise" Bali and subsume it into the "war on terror". So the paper uses affect to bolster its political agenda, whether in forcefully condemning al-Qaeda or in invoking fears of domestic terrorism which might "justify" the proposed Iraq invasion, or indeed in the US condolence letters which naturalise the "war on terror".

These three strategies fall seriously short of the broadsheet principles of objective, informational reporting and commentary that might be expected of the fourth estate. All flow directly from the self/other structure of the "war on terror", on which the paper takes a very firm partisan stance. The tone of the paper's staff writers of editorials and opinion pieces could well play a significant role in relation to these strategies. Not only is the tone measured and calm in the broadsheet style; it is also confident, authoritative and serious.⁴ It is typified in the future predictive already seen in Dennis Shanahan's comments on how the post-bombing "insecurity will entrench the incumbent Coalition" (18 October, p17). Or consider Kelly ingeniously tracing the likely effects of the subjunctive of a terrorist presence in Australia into the indicative, a future predictive, of its cultural effects: "The *prospect* that al-Qa'ida operates in Australia *will* evolve into *possibly* the most severe test so far for Australian multiculturalism. It *will* inject an urgency into the debate..." (16 October, p15; my italics). Such fluent and assured writing may readily dispel readers' doubts about al-Qaeda's (alleged) presence in Australia; or elsewhere it may "legitimise" assertions about the supposed

⁴ *Almost* always measured and calm! Two exceptions quoted earlier are from Greg Sheridan cherishing Australia and Paul Kelly opposing freedom of speech.

necessity of invading Iraq. The authoritative tone may reassure and direct wavering views among the paper's readers.

On the travel advisories issue, the *Australian* allows a partisan editorial line on party politics and the state to distort its news reporting. Its article represses available evidence which would point towards government/state culpability. It admits no criticisms of the Howard government beyond the obligatory reporting of Labor's views. These it criticises for their "aggressive" lack of "political bipartisanship". Visually, an intricate page layout deflects attention from the article, and a series of photographs break radically with journalistic convention – that of illustrating the main figure mentioned in a given article – so as to play down any government embarrassment or possible culpability. This outright editorialising of reporting is matched by the accompanying editorial's repression of the same evidence and by a range of deflecting, smearing and scapegoating tactics.

The *Australian* seems content to assert partisanship on some issues in ways that more closely resemble its sister tabloid than its broadsheet competitor, and have little connection to principles of the fourth estate.

3. Tabloid/broadsheet and finale

It could be tempting to use the three case studies to generalise about tabloid and broadsheet newspapers. Yet such a project would immediately confront the question of how reliable a basis for generalisation is the sample used in this study. One week could perhaps constitute a valid sample size for such a project, but not a week dominated by a national crisis, which invokes considerably more political coverage – national and international responses especially – than would appear in most newspaper weeks. Furthermore, the sample is limited to the papers' coverage of the Bali bombing. It thus overlooks such topics as celebrities, lifestyle, national and regional affairs, social issues, scandal and sport which might be expected in varying degrees in tabloids and broadsheets. Clearly, then, the findings of the present investigation are a thoroughly inadequate basis for any serious tabloid/broadsheet comparison.

That said, what can be taken from the present study into such a comparison would be a set of journalistic tropes which might be defined as typically – not essentially – "tabloid". The current *Daily Telegraph* sample would suggest the following: a higher proportion of photographs to words on each page than is found in broadsheets, a more conversational style involving the vernacular, a

greater stress on “ordinary Aussies” and the use of vox pops. These tropes would find an explanation in the newspaper’s working assumptions about the educational levels and cultural predispositions of the readerships targeted. There are two related discourses found in the *Daily Telegraph*. One is the ethnocentric discourse of nation-as-home. The second is that promoting metaphysical-moral over political-historical world-views. Different analytical samples would doubtless modify this set of tropes and discourses, none of which should be taken as necessary or sufficient conditions for what might define “tabloid”.⁵

However, a second set of the *Daily Telegraph*’s “tabloid” tropes is *shared* with the two broadsheets. This instantly dissolves one of the principal binaries associated with broadsheet/tabloid distinctions, namely reason/emotion. All three papers in their constructions of Australian victims use affective address to the reader, if with varying degrees of intensity. The use of affect applies also to the modes of address of strong condemnation and fear from the “war on terror” seen in both the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Australian*, though not in the *Sydney Morning Herald*. The first two papers also adopt the discourse of fate, which the last ignores. All three papers use personalisation, but the *Sydney Morning Herald* differs from the others by applying it not just to Australian victims, but also to non-Australians, from Bali and Iran. Moreover, both the *Daily Telegraph* and the *Australian* editorialise within their news pages, the former more than the latter. These various “boundary-crossers” confound the binary thinking informing many tabloid/broadsheet distinctions and confirm the spectrum model advanced by Colin Sparks (2000a: 13-15). In a Sydney version of this model, the *Daily Telegraph* would appear at one end, the *Sydney Morning Herald* at the other, with the *Australian* in between, closer to its broadsheet rival than to its sister paper. While there are clear dangers in designating any given trope as intrinsically tabloid – witness the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s political re-purposing of personalisation – it is equally true that the tropes described above play crucial roles in framing journalistic constructions of events.

Sparks makes an uncompromising political critique of UK tabloids which is worth comparing with the three Australian papers. He writes: “It is not simply that tabloids constitute a threat to an existing democracy; rather they make its practical functioning an impossibility because they are unable to provide the audience with the kinds of knowledge that are essential to the exercise of their rights as citizens” (2000a: 28). The civic-political disabling described here indeed applies to the *Daily Telegraph*. Such depoliticising is very much a function of the paper’s promotion of

⁵ The definition has become more complicated with the rise of “compact” formats and new tabloid formats for former broadsheets.

metaphysical-moral over political-historical world-views. This stands as the most important discourse associated with a “tabloid” approach.

To ask how far this discourse applies to the *Australian*’s political coverage may at first seem surprising. Yet its partisanship does often pull its coverage towards the metaphysical-moral, towards the faith-based rather than the evidence-based. In foreign affairs, with its commitment to the USA’s “international community” and to the self/other schema of the “war on terror”, the paper does substantially – that is, with a few exceptions from guest contributors such as Parry – depoliticise and dehistoricise large portions of the globe. And at home, the unquestioning faith in government and state which the paper shares with the *Daily Telegraph* again disenfranchises the citizen-voter. Which is not to deny that there is a wealth of information and ideas in the paper; but it is to say that, as the travel advisories coverage demonstrates, the reader may need to be very wary. It is noteworthy that the only civil society which the *Australian* acknowledges during the week is that of US citizens sending letters of condolence to Australian victims of the bombing.

What of the *Sydney Morning Herald*? Apart from the personalisation of its Australian – and Balinese and Iranian – victims, the paper avoids any of the “tabloid” tropes described above. These human interest stories aside, it exemplifies a “broadsheet” discourse in consistently promoting political-historical over metaphysical-moral world-views. In encouraging civic involvement in politics, it stands as the precise opposite of Sparks’ characterisation of tabloids.

This returns us, by way of ending, to a consideration of the *Sydney Morning Herald* as an exemplar of the fourth estate, and to the idea of 2002 marking a high point of those principles. As outlined in previous chapters, a range of factors, but especially the “powerful convergence of interests [between] neo-conservative opinion-making [and] government and sections of the media” (Carter 2004: 23), have had disturbing effects on the fourth estate. The *Sydney Morning Herald*’s positioning vis-à-vis both government and its newspaper competitors, the *Australian* and the *Daily Telegraph*, meant that it could exert limited power in the struggle for ideas that set the agenda for public debate. The longer historical process, as Rundle observes in 2005, involved the shifting to the right of the fulcrum of public debate, led by the News Ltd press: “The spirit of pluralism – of having genuine left (rather than centrist with a leftist tinge) voices to balance out the right – is absent, and needs to be absent since the intent is not simply to advance a right-wing message but to shift the entire public sphere rightwards, so that debates all occur that side of the line” (2005a: 46). In his brief history of “a consistent rhetorical attack on the supposed left-wing bias of the ABC”, Manne in effect adds a confirmatory post-script to Rundle’s comments (2011b: 184-9). In this

context especially, the *Sydney Morning Herald's* Bali coverage should be praised as exemplary in its upholding of fourth estate principles: a genuine pluralism, a clear articulation of editorial line with pluralist reporting and commentary, and a principled commitment to holding governments to account.

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APPENDIX 1

Table 2: Content analysis of news, features and images on the Bali bombing, the *Daily Telegraph*, the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Australian*, 14-19 October 2002¹

Question	Topic		Daily Telegraph				Sydney Morning Herald				Australian			
			NF	Im	Tot	%	NF	Im	Tot	%	NF	Im	Tot	%
What happened?	1	Bombing and destruction	4	22	26	6.2%	3.4	10.5	13.9	3.8%	6	29.4	35.4	8.3%
	2	Sari Club	6	20	26	6.2%	0	2	2	0.5%	3	4	7	1.6%
Who suffered?	3	Victims and related: Australian	64	199	263	62.2%	56.5	138	194.5	52.6%	93	95	188	44.3%
	4	Victims and related: other	0	0	0	0%	12.6	12.5	25.1	6.8%	7	9	16	3.8%
	5	Mourning ceremonies	2	7	9	2.1%	5	3	8	2.2%	8	7	15	3.5%
	6	US empathy	1	1	2	0.5%	0	0	0	0%	2	0	2	0.5%
Investigation	7	Investigation	5	1	6	1.4%	6.2	4	10.2	2.7%	6	0	6	1.4%
1. Who?	8	Suspects	8	9	17	4.0%	8	2	10	2.7%	7	7	14	3.3%
2. Why?	9	Terrorism	1	31	32	7.6%	9.2	3	12.2	3.2%	16	9	25	5.9%
3. Forewarning?	10	Security intelligence	5	0	5	1.2%	12.2	0	12.2	3.2%	5	3	8	1.9%

¹ Under the newspaper titles, the following abbreviations apply: “NF” = news and feature items; “Im” = Images; “Tot” = Total; “%” = percentage of the newspaper’s coverage. Fractions of 0.5 arise where an image illustrates two topics with equal prominence.

Fractions of 0.2 are used for the *Sydney Morning Herald*’s short news items, variously called briefs or nibs (news in brief), only one or two sentences long, and usually grouped as a “sidebar” running down a page’s outside column.

Some anomalous and statistically insignificant material was omitted from the table, for instance two features from the *Daily Telegraph*’s educational History section, on Bali and on Kuta (18 October, p46; 19 October, p71) and from the *Sydney Morning Herald* an item on the expatriate Australian population in Indonesia and three drawings whose obscurity made them impossible to classify (14 October, p4; 15 October, p13; 18 October, p15).

How did states respond?	11	Politics and diplomacy: Australian	6	4	10	2.4%	12.6	8	20.6	5.6%	14	18	32	7.5%
	12	Politics and diplomacy: US and west	1	1	2	0.5%	3.2	4	7.2	1.9%	4	7	11	2.6%
	13	Politics and diplomacy: other	1	1	2	0.5%	4.2	4	8.2	2.2%	3	4	7	1.6%
How did crisis authorities respond?	14	Crisis authorities: Australian	0	6	6	1.4%	10.6	7	17.6	4.7%	5	6	11	2.6%
	15	Crisis authorities: Indonesian	0	1.5	1.5	0.4%	2.2	3.5	5.7	1.5%	0	12	12	2.8%
How did civil society respond?	16	Volunteers: Balinese	1	1.5	2.5	0.6%	0.2	0	0.2	<0.1%	0	0	0	0%
	17	Volunteers: Australian	2	0	2	0.5%	6.8	9	15.8	4.3%	1	0	1	0.2%
	18	Volunteers: other	0	2	2	0.5%	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0	0%
What consequences?	19	Australian race hate	1	0	1	0.2%	1	1	2	0.5%	4	1	5	1.2%
	20	Tourism in Bali	0	0	0	0%	3.2	2	5.2	1.4%	7	4	11	2.6%
How covered?	21	Media coverage	1	7	8	1.9%	0	0	0	0%	4	14	18	4.2%
Totals			109	314	423		157.1	213.5	370.6		195	229.4	424.4	