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Heidegger's Philosophy of Disclosedness: a Relational Interpretation of *Being and Time*

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Abstract

Due to the lack of an established philosophical tradition in Australia, Heideggerian scholarship has relied heavily on readings coming from abroad, especially from North America. However, the same lack has granted a certain intellectual freedom, and some novel and exciting ideas have been able to emerge, a relatively large portion of which has been more or less directly influenced by Heidegger's thought. This makes it all the more urgent for an independent interpretation of *Being and Time* to emerge within the Australian context. Needless to say, such a new and independent interpretation of *Being and Time* requires a careful engagement with those readings currently dominating Heideggerian scholarship. And since no influence has been stronger in Australia than that of commentators working in the United States, the primary aim of this dissertation will be to define and assess the major currents in the contemporary North American interpretation of *Being and Time*.

Accordingly, I shall firstly identify four main readings of *Being and Time* which will be exemplified by the four scholars who I believe embody these readings most comprehensively. These are, the Pragmatic reading of Hubert Dreyfus, the Epistemological reading of Cristina Lafont, the Hermeneutical reading of Stephen Crowell and the Ethical reading of François Raffoul. Of these four interpretative trends, at least the first two, and to a lesser degree also the third, tend to pay excessive attention to Heidegger's notion of understanding. Such readings run the risk of reducing Heidegger's work to a search for that ground which allows for the discoveredness of entities in their 'truth'. Once this reduction is carried out, the focus of *Being and Time* comes implicitly yet inevitably to shift from ontology to epistemology. As a result, the notion of Being developed in the Pragmatic and the Hermeneutic interpretation, as well as, partially, in the Phenomenological reading, is an incomplete one. For Dreyfus, Being is nothing more than the unspoken social background, a sort of preconscious knowing-how, which determines the 'what' of things. For Lafont, it is merely the function of a Language which determines the being of entities by conditioning the means through which entities are interpretatively understood by Dasein. In both cases, Being is reduced to the quasi-transcendental condition of the correctness of human understanding and Heidegger's greatest

achievement would be that of having definitively and inextricably bound human subjectivity to such a condition, lest it not be at all. Similarly, also Crowell runs the risk of reducing Being to a mere grounding space, i.e. the 'space of meaning', a transcendental-phenomenological clearing where entities can be discovered as what they 'are'. It must be said, however, that the Phenomenological interpretation of *Being and Time*, far from Dreyfus' and Lafont's unsophisticated approaches, has the great merit of having released the study of Heidegger's philosophy to the necessary confrontation with Husserl's phenomenology, without which a satisfactory interpretation of *Being and Time* cannot be achieved. On the other hand, Raffoul's Ethical reading, by paying close attention to the analysis of authentic Disclosedness, especially in relation to the call-response dynamic which characterises Dasein fundamental openness to its Being, shows Dasein's existential subjectivity not as a static essence that Dasein 'has' and that can be 'known', but as the existential relation to that alterity which is Dasein's own Being.

Building upon some of Raffoul's insights, this dissertation aims to demonstrate that, *firstly*, much of the interpretative tradition which has influenced the current Australian understanding of *Being and Time* has mistakenly taken the analysis of discoveredness as the principal aim of Heidegger's book rather than his starting point, and overlooked the strategic role of the concept of Disclosedness in the economy of the book's ontological project. *Secondly,* by conducting a critical study of the notion of Disclosedness and its constituents, paying special attention to Heidegger's analysis of authentic Disclosedness, this essay attempts to bring to the fore what I believe is Heidegger's fundamental concern, namely, that of constructing a phenomenology of the transcendent ground of phenomenology itself. As such, Disclosedness constitutes the bridging notion between the phenomenological 'space of meaning' and the ethical 'call-response of alterity', the unifying space of Heidegger's phenomenological and mystical voice. Yet this unification can be achieved only if the notion of Disclosedness is interpreted not as the openness which results from having merely understood something, but as the existential relation with that otherness which characterises Dasein in its transcendence and, as such, manifests Dasein in its Being. This otherness is Dasein's Being.

In order to explore this relation more thoroughly, I shall introduce the notion of Otherness in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This may seem an arbitrary move, but, as I shall demonstrate, the comparison between Levinas' analysis of Alterity and Heidegger's treatment of authentic Disclosedness proves extremely useful in justifying the grounding nature of the disclosing relation between Dasein and its Being, in respect to discoveredness of intraworldly entities, the Disclosedness of the World and, ultimately, the Disclosedness of Being itself. With the help of Levinas' philosophy, this dissertation will show that while Heidegger begins his analysis with a study of the human understanding, initially described as grounded in a pre-emptive understanding-of-Being [Seinsverständnis], in *Being and Time* his final goal is the overcoming of a notion of the human existence centred exclusively on understanding in favour of a 'relational' interpretation of Dasein. Therefore, Dasein's existential openness to its Being is no longer characterised as an understanding of Being but in terms of the relation of Disclosedness between Dasein itself and its Being [Seinserschlossenheit]. This is not merely a terminological shift, but constitutes an attempt to pay closer attention to what I believe is Heidegger's original avenue for overcoming transcendental philosophy and paves the way to a true philosophy of the transcendent. *Being and Time* tries to achieve this quasi-mystical goal by radicalising the phenomenological notion of intentional space in terms of the disclosive relation between Dasein and its Being. As such, in this dissertation I shall, finally, propose a reading of *Being and Time* centred on the notion of Disclosedness, able therefore not only to acknowledge the presence of Heidegger's two voices, but also to bring to the fore Heidegger's effort to reconcile them.

<u>Declaration by author</u>

This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis.

I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award.

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Publications during candidature

Peer-Reviewed Journals
- Marco Motta "Clear and Distinct Perceptions and Clear and Distinct Ideas: The Cartesian Circle", *Crossroads*, Forthcoming

Conference Abstracts
- Marco Motta "Dasein and its Other", *Perspectives on Power*, Brisbane: The University of Queensland, 2011
- Marco Motta "Dasein and its Other", *ASCP*, Brisbane: The University of Queensland, 2010
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Lastly, I want to thank God for granting me to be an instrument in His hands. To Him and them this dissertation is dedicated.

To Ellen, Emmanuel, Matilda and Ruben.

I could not have done it without you.

And to God.

Signor, tu lo Spirito sei
et io la tromba.
Ma senza il fiato tuo
nulla rimbomba.

(Attributed to Saint Joseph of Copertino)

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INTRODUCTION

"Do not read *Being and Time*!" proclaimed Jeff Malpas from the heights of his key-note address at a meeting of the Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP) in 2009. I am still not exactly sure what he meant. Perhaps, that the Heidegger 'after' *Being and Time* is the more dependable Heidegger. Certainly, the later Heidegger is currently the most fashionable, especially among English-speaking philosophers. Perhaps Malpas' statement was intended to prevent researchers, whether Heideggerian or not, from wasting time on what he believed to be a philosophical dead end. Indeed many contemporary commentators of *Being and Time* have disguised the poverty of their interpretations behind the unfinished nature of this book.

In the last three decades there has been a progressive rise in Heideggerian scholarship within the Australian context, as shown, for example, by the large number of papers on Heidegger at the most recent ASCP Conference in 2013. Although most of the attention seems to have been devoted to Heidegger's later essays - such as the *Letter on Humanism*, *The Question Concerning Technology*, *The Origin of the Work of Art,* and the like - *Being and Time* has also attracted its share of attention. Certainly, it remains one of the major contributions to philosophy in the twentieth century, and a fundamental reading for anyone who is seriously interested in engaging with Heidegger's thought.

There are, of course, different views as to why this is the case. To cite a few, Jean-Paul Sartre believed that *Being and Time* constituted a penetrating phenomenological analysis of the Cartesian subject; Hans Georg Gadamer considered it as the stepping stone for modern hermeneutics; Derrida regarded Heidegger's masterwork to be an inspiring attempt towards the ultimate deconstruction of Western metaphysics; and Gianni Vattimo finds in the analytics of Dasein the roots of that 'Week Thought' [*Pensiero Debole*] which constitutes the core of his own philosophy. In addition, the influence of *Being and Time* has been felt beyond

the domain of pure philosophy, from art to psychology, from architecture to pedagogy, from literary theory to psychology, and from neuroscience to theology.

Despite the importance of *Being and Time* within contemporary philosophical debate, very few writers have seriously engaged in an in-depth study of the text, and little work has been done to compile a consistent interpretation of it. This has left Heideggerian scholarship in a state of confusion, particularly among relatively recent academic communities where the lack of an established philosophical tradition has further prevented engagement with demanding philosophical texts such as the one in question. This has been especially true in Australia where Heideggerian scholarship has relied heavily on major interpretations coming from North America. Much of our research and teaching has been influenced by what and how the 'Americans' are reading. In addition, although the magnitude of Heidegger's masterwork and its large influence continue to draw the attention of many, most of the explorations conducted on *Being and Time* have been subsidiary to other, more contemporary and often tangential research interests. As a result, the task of carefully interpreting *Being and Time* has been neglected. Because of this, much Australian Heideggerian scholarship suffers from an over reliance on second hand accounts, employed as convenient shortcuts. What this ultimately means is that, aside from some noteworthy exceptions including Bruin Christensen, Richard Colledge, Ingo Farin and, more recently, Paolo Diego Bubbio, we have largely failed to do the important work of engaging with the most challenging ideas and passages from *Being and Time*.

While there are difficulties with how we currently read Heidegger, there are some positives as well. The lack of an established philosophical tradition in Australia has granted a certain intellectual freedom, and some novel and exciting ideas have been able to emerge. A great deal of radical philosophical work is produced in our country each year in the field of Continental Philosophy, and a relatively large portion of this is more or less directly influenced by Heidegger's thought. Therefore, I believe that anyone who is genuinely committed to supporting the rise of an original scholarly tradition in Australia, especially within the field of Continental philosophy, can no longer elude a serious confrontation with Heidegger's more challenging works, particularly *Being and Time*. This makes it all the more urgent for an independent interpretation of *Being and Time* to emerge within the Australian context.

Needless to say, a new and independent interpretation of *Being and Time* requires a careful engagement with those readings currently dominating Heideggerian scholarship. And since no influence has been stronger in Australia than that of commentators working in the United States, the primary aim of my work in this dissertation will be to define and assess the major currents in the contemporary North American interpretation of *Being and Time*.

The picture I intend to sketch is deliberately an abridged one, in the attempt to focus the reader's attention on the major trends in the field. This will be achieved by identifying each of these trends with the work of the most representative proponents of each. Indeed, since a comprehensive assessment of the Anglo-American interpretation of *Being and Time* is still largely uncharted territory, such an approach should help presenting all major interpretations in the clearest, most accessible way, while avoiding the risk of wandering too far into the details of each particular interpretation. Accordingly, I shall identify four main readings of *Being and Time* which will be exemplified by the four scholars who I believe embody these readings most comprehensively.

The first of the readings I shall engage with will be that of Hubert Dreyfus in his book *Being-in-the-World*.[1] In spite of what is arguably a lack of sophistication, Dreyfus' so called pragmatic reading of *Being and Time* has certainly been one of the most influential within the English-speaking philosophical world. In *Being-in-the World* Dreyfus focuses almost exclusively on Division One of *Being and Time* where, according to him, Heidegger moves from a description of Dasein's everyday relation with intraworldly entities to the exploration of the general constitution of the intelligibility of entities in general. The core of the Pragmatic Interpretation consists in the analysis of this potentiality for intelligibly in terms of the shared and unspoken cultural background which makes of an entity a human Dasein. Being a Dasein means to be always, already socialised according to that 'normal knowing-how' which constitutes Dasein's world, and according to which entities are understood in terms of what 'one does' with them. In other words, entities are what they are, i.e. have Being, according to the average cultural preconceptions from which Dasein approaches them, and can be approached only within the limits defined by this unconscious, unspoken understanding. In this way the Pragmatic Interpretation equates Being to the World, that is, the shared horizon within which entities are understood as the entities they are. As such, the

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[1] Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).

term 'Being-in-the-world' would supposedly indicate the givenness of that background from which Dasein's understanding depends. This notion, which Dreyfus takes as the most original contribution of the book, is then exploited in order to construct *Being and Time* as an attempt to validate pragmatic truth in terms of the human understanding of intraworldly entities. The second interpretative trend which I shall examine is that discussed by Cristina Lafont in her book *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*.[2] Like Dreyfus, Lafont focuses primarily on Division One of *Being and Time* and on Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's understanding of intraworldly entities, in an attempt to explore the notion of truth that this analysis yields. Unlike Dreyfus', Lafont's interpretation concentrates on the phenomenon of 'Discourse',[3] construed as both the fundamental structure of intelligibility and the limiting horizon which actively determines the possible ways in which a given entity can be understood by Dasein. As such, Lafont names her reading 'hermeneutic', supporting the view that discovering an entity in its Being always requires a prior understanding of Being – a pre-interpretational ground upon which the entity itself can emerge as what it is for Dasein. Hence, understanding does not mean finding out 'what' that entity is but uncovering the way in which the Being of that entity is understood by Dasein. This 'way' in which an entity enters into the intelligibility of Dasein is the meaning of that entity.[4] From this Lafont infers that the way the Being of an entity is understood, that is to say, the interpretation of that entity according to its meaning, determines what the entity itself 'is', i.e. the reference of that meaning. And, moving from Heidegger's assertion that "[d]iscourse is the Articulation of intelligibility",[5] Lafont concludes that what determines our understanding of an entity as such is the possibility of Articulation provided by Discourse. And what actually gets articulated through Discourse in Language [Sprache] is the entity itself as meaning. In other words, Lafont takes Heidegger's hermeneutic intuition concerning the way in which Dasein discoveringly understands entities to mean that Dasein's understanding is ultimately determined by the Language through which that act of understanding is Articulated. The all-encompassing notion of Discourse which results from this interpretation is more or less explicitly equated by Lafont to that understanding-of-Being [Seinsverständnis] which at the

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[2]Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. G. Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

[3]While Lafont's usage of the terms Discourse and Language is at best confusing, her main argument concerns what I will refer throughout this dissertation as 'Discourse', i.e. the ontological ground of Language and languages.

[4]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.152.

[5]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.203-204, H.161.

outset of *Being and Time* is described as the foundation of the hermeneutic understanding typical of Dasein. This hermeneutic foundation of knowledge is then likened by Lafont to the Kantian transcendental schema, that is, the grounding structure of the truth concerning any object of knowledge.[6] Yet, whereas Kant's schemas can rely on the necessary nature of the unity of apperception which grounds it in order to yield objective truth, Heideggerian Language is only capable of yielding a historically-relative truth, due to the factical nature of Dasein. Finally, insofar as Discourse is both normatively constitutive for the Being of entities and generally all-encompassing, Lafont interprets *Being and Time* as a desperate attempt to ground true knowledge upon a relative foundation which cannot be internally revised; this is achieved by appealing to a concept of truth which is not the result of an internal learning process driven by Dasein but the event of an independent breakthrough of the system itself. This is what Lafont calls Heidegger's 'reification' of Discourse.[7] In other words, according to Lafont, the overall consistency of *Being and Time*'s philosophy requires Discourse to be not only an analytic constituent of Disclosedness but the active drive of all events of Disclosedness according to a 'fate' for which Dasein is not responsible, albeit being ultimately thrown into it.

The third interpretation of *Being and Time* that I shall consider is, I contend, definitely more comprehensive and sophisticated, despite the fact that it is less well-known and commented upon. This reading has been developed by Steven Crowell in his book *Heidegger, Husserl and the Space of Meaning*,[8] and in a few of Crowell's published articles.[9] While Dreyfus and Lafont, as well as many others, take *Being and Time* to be at bottom a reaction against phenomenology, Crowell believes that Heidegger's philosophy is fundamentally in keeping with the spirit of Husserl's phenomenological research. The reading of *Being and Time* that Crowell develops, which for obvious reasons I will refer to as the Phenomenological Reading, interprets Heidegger's philosophy as a transcendental-phenomenological attempt to describe the conditions of possibility of the discoveredness of entities, as well as the Disclosedness of Being, to Dasein. Since Heidegger defines the latter as an entity whose

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[6]Cfr: Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. G. Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.22-23.
[7]Lafont however refers to it as 'the reification of Language'. Cfr: Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. G. Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.1, 105, 246.
[8]Steven Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 2001).
[9]Cfr: Steven Crowell, "Meaning and the Ontological Difference", *Tulane Studies in Philosophy* 32 (1984), pp.37-44.

Being consists in an intrinsic openness to the manifestness of both Being and, as a consequence, entities, Crowell believes Dasein to be, strictly speaking, a form of intentionality, albeit a radicalised version. In this sense, Dasein would be capable not only of directing itself towards the 'wherein' within which entities are discovered but also, and most importantly, of disclosing the space which allows the manifestation of the ground of intentionality itself, i.e. Being. This ground is always, already manifested to Dasein, a fact which constitutes that existential character of Dasein's intentionality to which Heidegger refers, depending on the context, as 'understanding-of-Being', 'Being-in-the-world', or 'Care'.

Crowell believes this to be nothing more than a radicalisation of Husserl's transcendental reduction, which consists in a reduction of 'in-themselves' to the way in which consciousness is intentionally directed towards them as 'phenomena'. What would set Heidegger apart from Husserl is the method used to achieve the reduction: while Husserl's starting point is still the Cartesian schema comprising of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*, thus requiring an epoché in order to clear out the field of intentionality, Heidegger begins by assuming that in fact the phenomenological field is more fundamental than Descartes' and as such does not actually require to be justified through the epoché. This basic assumption is discussed by Heidegger in terms of the 'always, already' of Dasein, in relation to its Being-in-the-World and its understanding of Being. From this it would follow that the ground itself, i.e. Being, and the way in which the latter is understood by Dasein, namely, its meaning, can be fundamentally equated. As such, Crowell proposes to understand Being in terms of both its meaning as well as the space of all meaning, thus reducing Being solely to its Disclosedness within the intentional space, as the ground of that space itself.

The fourth and final reading of Heidegger's masterwork which I shall examine has been developed by François Raffoul during the course of his career, and has recently gained some visibility thanks to Raffoul's book *The Origin of Responsibility*.[10] In spite of sharing some of Crowell's views on the relation between Heidegger and Phenomenology, Raffoul's approach to *Being and Time* is radically different from the other three interpretations mentioned thus far. By reading the text through the lens of the longstanding French Heideggerian tradition, spanning from Sartre, Ricoeur and Levinas to Derrida, Badiou and Dastur, Raffoul creates

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[10]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010).

something of a counterpoint to other Anglo-American interpretations in their tendency to concentrate excessively on the analysis of Dasein's discoveredness of intraworldly entities and of the background which allows it. Raffoul shifts the interpretational focus to Division Two of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger pays closer attention to Dasein in terms of its authentic transcendence as the meaning of Dasein's Being, i.e. its temporality. On this ground, Raffoul attempts a reinterpretation of the concept of Dasein as a transcendental-phenomenological subjectivity, capable of an essential openness towards 'otherness'. This is at the basis of Raffoul's claim that Heidegger's ontology is at bottom not a question concerning Dasein's understanding of Being but, most importantly, a question concerning responsibility; that is to say, Dasein's responsiveness to the call of another. To be called, according to Raffoul, is to be 'thrown'. In other words, Dasein is existentially factical insofar as its Being is both essentially finite and existentially responsible for the null ground of that finitude. The null ground that Dasein is called to take up is the fundamental alterity to which Dasein is to respond; and this 'Other' that in the call calls Dasein to itself is nothing other than Dasein's Being. As such, Raffoul radically redefines *Being and Time*'s philosophy in terms of the call and response between Dasein and its Being, dubbing it Originary Ethics. For this I will name this fourth and final interpretation as the Ethical Reading of *Being and Time*.

Certainly, there are many and very noteworthy commentators working in the United States who have been left out of this picture, including Charles de Guignon, Mark Wrathall, William Blattner, Theodore Kisiel, Daniel Dahlstorm, Leslie MacAvoy, Robert Bernasconi, Taylor Carman, Simon Critchley, Thomas Sheehan, Mark Okrent, Frederick Olafson only to name a few. These and others have not been cited as their interpretations seem to fit under one or more of the interpretative trends I have mentioned, without representing a clear cut example of any of them. Nonetheless, a special mention should be made for Theodore Kisiel, whose painstaking work on the thought of the early Heidegger and, especially, on the chronological evolution of *Being and Time* has constituted an enormous advancement for the understanding of Heidegger's masterwork. The more historical nature of Kisiel's work implies that his research does not intend to support any general interpretative line on *Being and Time*, so that Kisiel does not figure prominently in this dissertation. This is in no way diminishing of the relevance of Kisiel's research, whose findings constitute a constant point of reference for much of the original interpretation developed in the present dissertation.

Now, if I have been able to convince the reader that one should indeed read *Being and Time*, it is also important to mention that there are ways in which one should *not* read it. I have already said that of the four interpretative trends discussed above at least the first two, and possibly also the third, tend to pay excessive attention to Heidegger's notion of understanding. Such readings run the risk of reducing Heidegger's work to a mere search for the ground which allows for the discoveredness of entities in their 'truth'. Once this reduction is carried out, the focus of *Being and Time* shifts implicitly yet inevitably from ontology to epistemology. As a result, the notion of Being developed in the Pragmatic and the Hermeneutic interpretation, as well as, partially, in the Phenomenological reading, is an incomplete one. For Dreyfus, Being is nothing more than an unspoken social background, a sort of preconscious knowing-how, which determines the 'what' of things. For Lafont, it is merely the function of a Language which determines the being of entities by conditioning the means through which entities are interpretatively understood by Dasein. In both cases, Being is reduced to the quasi-transcendental condition of the correctness of human understanding and Heidegger's greatest achievement would be that of having definitively and inextricably bound human subjectivity to such a condition, lest it not be at all. Similarly, also Crowell runs the risk of reducing Being to a mere grounding space, i.e. the 'space of meaning', a transcendental-phenomenological clearing where entities can be discovered as what they 'are'. It must be said, however, that the Phenomenological interpretation of *Being and Time* is far from Dreyfus' and Lafont's unsophisticated approaches, as Crowell genuinely attempts to engage with the notion of Being not only in relation to the discoveredness of intraworldly entities but also in terms of the Disclosedness of Being itself to Dasein. In addition, the phenomenological approach has the great merit of having released the study of Heidegger's philosophy to the necessary confrontation with Husserl's phenomenology, without which a satisfactory interpretation of *Being and Time* cannot be achieved. Nonetheless, Crowell's interpretation of Being in terms of the ground of understanding, prevents him from developing a full discussion of Being in its relation of Disclosedness to Dasein.

Indeed, any reading of *Being and Time* which construes the book's ontological philosophy in epistemological terms is bound to lose sight of Heidegger's most important effort, namely, using phenomenological means to go beyond transcendental idealism and tap into the transcendent itself. As such, Heidegger's method results in a certain ambiguity concerning the way some of the fundamental issues are approached in *Being and Time*. Crowell readily recognises this duality, something that he names 'Heidegger's two voices', i.e. the

phenomenological and the mystical one.[11] Yet, Crowell chooses to actively pursue only one of these. Worse still, in my opinion, Lafont and Dreyfus dismiss the mystical voice in Heidegger as misleading, and proceed to construe an expurgated version of *Being and Time* which engages with the only half of the book that makes sense in epistemological terms, i.e. Division One.

In this interpretative milieu, Raffoul's Ethical Reading comes as a wakeup call. His insistence on the subjective nature of Dasein has the effect of arousing interest around the ethical characters of Heidegger's philosophy, most eminently shown in the analysis of the existential relation between Dasein and its Being carried out in Division Two. Certainly, as I shall attempt to show throughout my work, Raffoul's Ethical Interpretation runs the risk of reducing the fundamental otherness of Being to an internal movement of Dasein's subjectivity. However, it has the great merit of paying close attention to the analysis of authentic Disclosedness, especially in relation to the call/response dynamic which characterises Dasein's fundamental openness to its Being. From this, Raffoul begins to construct Dasein's existential subjectivity in terms of a constant movement of transcendence which constitutes what Dasein is, as disclosed to itself in its Being. Hence, the latter is not a static essence that Dasein 'has' and that can be 'known', but an existential relation to that alterity which is Dasein's own Being.

Building upon some of Raffoul's insights, this dissertation begins from a thorough study of the notion of Disclosedness, both in its existential and existentiell forms. This will constitute the backbone for the examination of the four chosen readings of *Being and Time*. This dissertation aims to demonstrate that, firstly, much of the interpretative tradition which has influenced the current Australian understanding of *Being and Time* has mistakenly taken the analysis of discoveredness as the principal aim of Heidegger's book rather than his starting point, and overlooked the strategic role of the concept of Disclosedness in the economy of *Being and Time*'s ontological project. Secondly, by conducting a critical study of the notion of Disclosedness and its constituents, paying special attention to Heidegger's analysis of authentic Disclosedness, this dissertation attempts to brings to the fore what I believe is Heidegger's fundamental concern, namely, that of constructing a phenomenology of the transcendent ground of phenomenology itself. As such, Disclosedness constitutes the

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[11]Steven Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning* (Evanston: Northwest University Press, 2001), p.7.

bridging notion between the phenomenological 'space of meaning' and the ethical 'call/response of alterity', the unifying space of Heidegger's phenomenological and mystical voice. Yet this unification can be achieved only if the notion of Disclosedness is interpreted not as the openness which results from having merely understood something, but as the existential relation with that otherness which characterises Dasein in its transcendence and, therefore, manifests Dasein in its Being. This otherness is Dasein's Being.

In order to explore this relation more thoroughly, I shall introduce the notion of otherness in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This may seem an arbitrary move, but, as I shall demonstrate, the comparison between Levinas' analysis of alterity and Heidegger's treatment of authentic Disclosedness proves extremely useful in justifying the grounding nature of the disclosing relation between Dasein and its Being, in respect to discoveredness of intraworldly entities, the Disclosedness of the World and, ultimately, the Disclosedness of Being itself. The comparison between Heidegger's and Levinas' philosophies on the subject of otherness does not intend to be an in-depth confrontation of these two writers, even though such a confrontation is possible, and indeed would be greatly desirable. Rather, I intend to employ Levinas' philosophy as an instrument for exploring *Being and Time* from a new perspective. In this sense, Levinas will be used strategically, as a 'tool at hand', in order to throw some light on the difficult relation between Dasein and its Being within the field of that relation itself. Accordingly, I make no claims for this being the only or even the best possible tool, but rather the most useful currently available to me. Karl Jasper, Gabriel Marcel, Jacques Derrida or indeed some authors from the analytic tradition could certainly be other possible means to the same end, namely, analysing the phenomenon of Disclosedness in order to expose its role in relation to the Being of Dasein.

Nevertheless, as it shall become clear in the course of this dissertation, my choice to engage with Levinas' philosophy is far from arbitrary but is rather a necessary move which will advance us in the new interpretational path inaugurated by Raffoul. By reframing the concept of Dasein's Being in term of alterity, I will show that, while Heidegger's analysis begins with a study of the human understanding in terms of its groundedness in a pre-emptive understanding-of-Being, *Being and Time*'s final goal is that of overcoming a notion of the human existence centred exclusively on understanding in favour of a 'relational' interpretation of Dasein. Therefore, Dasein's existential openness to its Being is no longer characterised as an understanding of Being but in terms of the relation of Disclosedness

between Dasein itself and its Being [Seinserschlossenheit]. This is not a merely terminological shift, but constitutes an attempt to pay closer attention to what I believe is Heidegger's original avenue for overcoming transcendental philosophy and pave the way to a true philosophy of the transcendent. *Being and Time* tries to achieve this quasi-mystical goal by radicalising the phenomenological notion of intentional space in terms of the disclosive relation between Dasein and its Being. As such, in this dissertation I shall, finally, propose a reading of *Being and Time* centred on the notion of Disclosedness, able therefore not only to acknowledge the presence of Heidegger's two voices, but also to bring to the fore Heidegger's effort to reconcile them. The fundamental argument I shall present throughout this work is that any interpretation of *Being and Time* attempting a radical separation of Heidegger's two voices or, worse, the silencing of one in favour of the other, ends up overlooking the true depths of *Being and Time*'s philosophy, reducing Heidegger's thought to a straw-man, useful only for scaring away analytic philosophy's bigoted crows or continental philosophy's weak-minded sparrows. Regrettably, the 'sorrowful figure' of this reading of Heidegger's work has wandered about Anglo-American circles for too many years, so that it is not too strong a statement if I say, half provocatively and half seriously, that reading *Being and Time* in the shadow of this gloomy 'Sir Knight' is the prime example of how it should not be read.

Perhaps this is what Malpas was trying to say: that it is better not to read *Being and Time* if one can read it only according to the interpretations that for so long have been plaguing our universities. Or perhaps Malpas thinks that there is in fact no other way of reading *Being and Time*, except as the impossible analysis of the foundation of human understanding. Fortunately, I believe there is another way to read *Being and Time* and this dissertation is an attempt to mark the contours of this path.

1. THE CONSTITUTION OF DISCLOSEDNESS

It is rather unusual for a dissertation concerning *Being and Time* to begin by discussing the notion of Disclosedness. Commentators tend to focus primarily on concepts such as Being-in-the-World, Care and Temporality, which on the surface seem more central to the analytic of Dasein. A more careful study of the text, however, shows that on the one hand all these notions constitute progressive attempts to explain the very same fundamental phenomenon, namely, the Being of the human Dasein; and that, on the other hand, the concept of Disclosedness fulfils this task most comprehensively. For as this dissertation attempts to demonstrate, Heidegger's attempt to overcome traditional epistemology by means of a radicalised version of Husserlian phenomenology leverages on the articulated structure of Disclosedness to describe the complex relation between Dasein, its Being and the 'relational space' between the two without either falling into realism or idealism, as well as attempting to overcome the limit of transcendental philosophy. Heidegger achieves this by both insisting on the unitary nature of Disclosedness as well as maintaining the composite nature of its structure. This double movement is consistently upheld by means of the concept of equiprimordiality, which describes the inalienable interrelatedness of the constituents of Disclosedness. These constituents are Disposition [Befindlichkeit], Understanding [Verstehen], Discourse [Rede] and Falling [Verfallen]. The equiprimordial nature which underlies the constitution of Disclosedness ensures that there is no one particular way of the manifestation of Being which can be taken as paradigmatic or more fundamental than the others. Overlooking this simple fact has the effect of breaking an already precarious balance and turning the philosophy of *Being and Time* into a parody of itself. Hence, before I begin studying the different possible reading of Heidegger's book, which I have outlined in the introduction, it is necessary to take a step back and outline a preparatory study of the notion of Disclosedness and its equiprimordial constituents.

i.   Dasein, Disclosedness and its Equiprimordial Constitution

In §16 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger clarifies that "'Disclose' and 'Disclosedness' will be used as technical terms in the passages that follow, and shall signify 'to lay open' and 'the character of having been laid open'" and that "'to disclose' never means anything like 'to obtain indirectly by inference'."[12] Then, in §28, he establishes a connection between the 'There' [Da] of *Da*-sein and Disclosedness:

> In the expression 'there' we have in view this essential disclosedness. By reason of this disclosedness, this entity (Dasein), together with the Being-there of the world, is 'there' for itself. … By its very nature, Dasein brings its 'there' along with it. If it lacks its 'there', it is not factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. *Dasein is its disclosedness.* … But in so far as the essence of this entity is existence, the existential proposition, 'Dasein *is* its disclosedness', means at the same time that the Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is to be its 'there'.[13]

But what does it mean for Disclosedness to be the 'Da' of Dasein? And, prior to that, in what sense *is* Dasein its 'Da' and, therefore, its own Disclosedness?
In order to answer these questions, it is important to note that the discussion on Disclosedness falls within the scope of Heidegger's inquiry concerning Being-in [In-Sein] as such. The analysis of this phenomenon is especially important within the more general inquiry on the fundamental character of Dasein, i.e. Being-in-the-World.

After having clarified the notion of World in §§13-24 and the role of Dasein as the entity 'Who' is-in-the-World in §§25-27, Heidegger introduces the notion of Being-in to clarify the *way* in which Dasein is *in*-the-World. This 'in' has no spatial significance, insofar as the phenomenon of Being-in-the-World cannot be taken to characterize "the present-at-hand insideness of something present-at-hand 'in' something else that is present-at-hand";[14] that is,

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[12]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.105, H.75.
[13]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.171, H.132-133.
[14]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.170, H.132.

Dasein cannot be taken to be *in*-the-World in the same way that water is *in* the glass.[15] Yet, if not spatially, how is Dasein *in*-the-World then?

In §18 Heidegger interestingly defines World as "...that in terms of which the ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand";[16] thus, whenever Dasein discovers something ready-to-hand, Dasein also discloses the world in terms of which that ready-to-hand entity is ready-to-hand. In this sense the term 'world' can be taken to mean something like the horizon of significance [Bedeutsamkeit] which defines the Totality-of-Involvement [Bewandtnisganzheit] that is determined by the meaning of Dasein's Being. This should not be taken to mean that a world is disclosed whenever an entity is discovered, but rather the opposite, which is to say that the World is always, already disclosed, though non-thematically, whenever Dasein sets forth to discover an entity. The character of this 'always, already' in regards to the phenomenon of the World is especially important, since it constitutes the way of Dasein's being-in-the-World as utterly immersed in what Heidegger initially calls understanding of Being. This character is fundamentally ingrained in the make-up of Dasein, which is "…that [entity] which, in its very Being, its Being is an issue for it."[17] As such, Dasein is, by definition, constantly in relation with Being, and this relationship is constitutive for the Being of Dasein itself. The inalienable nature of this relationship is ultimately the meaning of the term Being-in-the-World. I shall return to this point.

However, the very character of this relationship proves to be somewhat elusive, as Heidegger employs different strategies in attempting to define it. As I shall outline in the course of this dissertation, Heidegger begins in §4 by discussing this relation in terms of Dasein's pre-ontological understanding-of-Being [Seinsverständnis]. "Understanding of Being" Heidegger says "is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being";[18] Heidegger calls this characteristic 'being ontological' and it is so intrinsic to Dasein's Being that Heidegger defines it as an existentiale of Dasein. Then, in the course of Division Two, Heidegger fades the notion of pre-ontological understanding of Being in favour of the more comprehensive analysis of

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[15]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.79, H.54.

[16]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.114, H.83.

[17]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32, H.11.

[18]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32, H.11.

Disclosedness, of which understanding is only one of the equiprimordial constituents. A thorough account of this transition will be attempted later in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.

Interestingly enough, in expressing the foundational character of the world, its 'always, already', Heidegger says: "In anything ready-to-hand the world is always 'there'."[19] What is remarkable in this sentence is the use of the 'there' [da], which refers to the 'early character' of the World in relation to the discoveredness of entities. According to Heidegger "…the 'there' points to a 'here' and a 'yonder'. The 'here' of an 'I-here' is always understood in relation to a 'yonder' ready-to-hand, in the sense of a Being towards this 'yonder'…"[20] This represents the way in which Dasein reaches out to ready-to-hand entities for-the-sake-of its own Being. Nonetheless, this 'reaching out' is possible only because the space 'between' the 'here' and the 'yonder' is always, already a 'common space'. As Heidegger puts it: " 'Here' and 'yonder' are possible only in a 'there'…"[21] Is this 'there' therefore the World? Whenever something ready-to-hand is discovered, the world is already 'there'. But strictly speaking what is 'there' is not the world but Dasein, and this is the case because Dasein is, in its Being by being in-the-world. This fact provides also a provisional answer concerning the question of the way in which Dasein is in-the-world; that is, Dasein is in-the-world in a way as to be its 'there', i.e. being the openness through which a World is disclosed, which in turn allows the possibility of a relation between Dasein itself and ready-to-hand entities.

The way in which Dasein is its 'there' is what Heidegger calls Disclosedness. This refers, most generally, to the essential character of openness of Dasein to its own Being, that is, the fact that Dasein is ontological. The ontological character of Dasein results in an openness towards ready-to-hand entities. Nevertheless the latter should not be confused with Disclosedness itself; rather, the latter is a particular kind of Disclosedness which Heidegger calls the Disclosedness of the World, defined as the 'wherein' in which entities are discovered. With this I have achieved an answer, albeit a partial one, of the question concerning the nature of Dasein's Being-in, i.e. the 'how' of Dasein's Being-in-the-World. That is, Dasein is *in*-the-world as to allow the possibility of discoveredness of entities and the Disclosedness of the World. In this way Dasein is 'there'. Indeed, Dasein is *its* 'there',

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[19]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.114, H.83.
[20]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.171, H.132.
[21]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.171, H.132.

because its own Being is constantly and fundamentally disclosed to it. As such, Dasein is 'its *own* there', by playing a fundamental part in allowing the Disclosedness of its own Being, which in turns grounds the Disclosedness of the World and the discoveredness of entities. In this sense, Disclosedness is what Being-in ultimately amounts to.

Once Heidegger has established that the question of Being-in is fundamentally a question of Disclosedness, he then proceeds to analyse Disclosedness itself in terms of its 'existential constitution'. This analysis consists, firstly, in the study of its equiprimordial constituents conducted in §§29-38. In these sections, traditionally reckoned to be at the core of Heidegger's analysis of Disclosedness, the latter is initially broken up into three equiprimordial constituents, i.e. Disposition, Understanding and Discourse, which are examined, firstly, in general, and, secondly, in their fallen [verfallen][22] everydayness. As such, Falling also comes to feature in the constitution of Disclosedness in §38, although this is not clearly acknowledged as a constituent until §54 of Division Two.

Before I proceed to the analysis of this set of constituents, the question we need to ask is: in what sense is Disclosedness constituted? This cannot certainly mean that a number of phenomena are the 'cause' of Disclosedness. For if Disclosedness, as I hope to demonstrate, is that primordial relation between Dasein and its Being, which Heidegger defines as Dasein's ontological character, exemplified in the *always, already* of Dasein's Being-in of its *Being-in*-the-World, then Disclosedness, just like Dasein's most primordial being ontological, cannot be derived from any other phenomena. Heidegger is clear on this point:

> If we inquire about Being-in as our theme, we cannot indeed consent to nullify the primordial character of this phenomenon by deriving it from others-that is to say, by an inappropriate analysis, in the sense of a dissolving or breaking up.[23]

Yet, if Disclosedness cannot be derived from its constituents, how am I to understand this constitutive relation between Disclosedness itself and the phenomena of Disposition, Understanding, Discourse and Falling? "But the fact that something primordial is underivable

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[22]Despite not being named as a constituent of Disclosedness in Division One, Falling is nevertheless said to be "…a basic kind of Being of the 'there' … [which] shows a movement which is existentially its own" [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.172 ,H134.].

[23]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.170, H.131.

does not rule out the possibility that a multiplicity of characteristics of Being may be constitutive for it. If these show themselves, then existentially they are equiprimordial."[24] Hence, even though Disclosedness cannot be grounded in any of its constituents,[25] it may still be analysed further; such an analysis would not find anything 'more primordial' than Disclosedness but will show Disclosedness itself in its articulated structure. The elements of this articulation are what Heidegger calls the 'equiprimordial constituents' of Disclosedness. Heidegger's neologism 'equiprimordial' suggests that the elements of this articulated structure are both mutually sustaining and holistically united. As such the equiprimordial constituent of a primordial phenomenon are never 'more primordial' than the primordial phenomenon itself. Thus, although it is impossible to account for a primordial phenomenon only through its equiprimordial constituents, an analysis of the latter can provide the reader with a more profound insight in the nature of the given primordial phenomenon. In other words, analytically breaking up Disclosedness into its constituents will not result in the discovery of a more primordial 'ground', so to speak; yet, this study should provide a deeper insight into the nature of Disclosedness itself. And if, as I have anticipated, Disclosedness is the primordial character of Dasein, an inquiry into its structure could be the stepping stone for working out the structural totality of Dasein's Being. Having clarified the notion of 'constitution', I may now turn to the actual analysis of Disclosedness, as it is conducted in §§29-38.

ii.   Disposition and the Thrownness of Dasein

The first constituent of Disclosedness which Heidegger analyses is Disposition. The term is the nominal form of the verb *befinden*, which, as Macquarrie and Robinson tell the readers of the 1962 English translation of *Being and Time* in a footnote, is most commonly used in the phrase 'Wie befinden Sie sich?', to ask 'how are you?' or, 'how are you feeling?'.[26] Hence, traditionally, English renderings of the term Befindlichkeit range from 'findedness' and 'being-at-ness' to 'state-of-mind'. More recently, thanks to Kisiel's thorough study of the transcripts from Heidegger's early lectures, the term 'Befindlichkeit' has been closely

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[24]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.170, H.131.
[25]In Chapter 5 of this dissertation I shall attempt to clarify whether or not Disclosedness may be grounded in understanding-of-Being.
[26]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), note 2, p.172.

associated with Aristotle's metaphysics, since it is the word that Heidegger adopts to translate Aristotle's *diathésis*. The latter is defined in *Metaphysics* 5.19.1022b as:

> …the arrangement [*diathésis*] of that which has parts, either in space or in potentiality or in form. For it must be a kind of position, as indeed is clear from the word, 'disposition.'[27]

This is clearly nothing more than a generic definition of the notion of *diathésis*, which encompasses both physical and moral disposition, which is not surprising given that book Delta of the *Metaphysics* is supposed to be a lexicon of ground concepts. Nonetheless, a more careful analysis of Aristotle's quote in relation to Heidegger's notion of Disposition within the context of *Being and Time*, shows a lot more than a superficial consonance between the two. Hence, I have chosen to render the term 'Befindlichkeit' with the English 'Disposition', rather than the more standard 'state-of-mind' used by Macquarrie and Robinson.

Concerning Disposition, Heidegger states that, ontically, this term refers to the familiar phenomenon of Dasein's having a mood [Stimmung] or, which is the same, Being-attuned [Gestimmtsein].[28] But what, in fact, does Heidegger mean by 'mood' [Stimmung]? In what way is Dasein attuned? and to what? Heidegger explicitly rejects any reductions of moods to the mere psychological phenomena of 'affects' or 'feelings', which do no more than accompany the primary acts of cognition. Instead, moods constitute a genuinely fundamental way of Dasein's Disclosedness. Yet, it is still unclear just how Dasein's 'having a mood' would actually contribute to its Disclosedness. Here is where Aristotle's definition of *diathésis* becomes helpful. I have explained that *diathésis* is defined as a kind of 'position' [*thésis*]. In relation to 'that which has parts' a *thésis* is that of a something in relation to its parts, and of the parts among themselves. In relation to the phenomenon of the Disclosedness of Dasein's Being, the *thésis* becomes that of Dasein in relation, initially, to entities, both intraworldly entities and other Daseins; secondly, to the World; and, ultimately, to its own Being. As such, having a mood means finding oneself in a given 'position' relatively to other entities, to the world, and to Being. It does not amount to being affected by an entity but implies that, whenever an entity is discovered by Dasein, that entity stands always, already in a relation with Dasein itself. This relation is not a one-sided Kantian Sensibility

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[27]Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 5.19.1022b.

[28]It should be noted that, according to Heidegger, it is because Dasein had a mood that entities, the world and indeed Being itself can matter to it.

[Sinnlichkeit], which proceeds from 'outside' to 'inside'; for Disposition does not name the way in which Dasein is affected by 'something else'. In other words, Disposition does not name the relation *in between* Dasein and its 'object', something which necessarily implies the void of a separation, but the givenness of Dasein's existential situation as being always, already in-the-World. Hence, to be precise, Dasein's being-attuned is not essentially directed towards intraworldly entities. For while their discovery provides a first important clue about Disposition, the latter refers more generally to the facticity of the Disclosedness of Being to Dasein. Hence, what are commonly called moods, such as fear, boredom, joy etc., constitute the ontical manifestation of Dasein's Being-in, in the sense of its being always, already in that space which is conducive to the disclosure of Being.

Then, it should not be difficult to see why Heidegger believes that Disposition brings "Dasein before itself… [yet] not in the sense of coming across itself by perceiving itself, but in the sense of finding itself in the mood that it has".[29] In other words, by revealing to Dasein its own being attuned with its *there-in*, moods contribute to Dasein's Disclosedness of its Being as *Being-in*-the-World. In this sense, Heidegger says, "the Being of the 'there'…", which is to say, the ground of Dasein's Disclosedness, "…is disclosed moodwise in its 'that-it-is'".[30]This 'that-it-is' ['das Dass'] is nothing but the thrownness of Dasein into its 'There'.[31] 'Thrownness' is an existentiale of Dasein and indicates the impossibility of Dasein to be otherwise than 'what' it is, i.e. an ontological Being-in-the-World. This is true in spite of the ever-potential character of Dasein's existence. Indeed, as I shall argue in the following section, Dasein is thrown into nothing else but its being-possible. Ontically, this means that moods have the function of manifesting the inevitability of the affective relation between Dasein and everything which is significant to Dasein within its hermeneutical situation, i.e. its world. [32] As such, moods prove to Dasein the fact of its relatedness with everything which shows up in its world. Ontologically, Disposition consists in the disclosure of Dasein's existential thrownness into the inevitability of its Being as being-ontologically-in-the-world.

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[29]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.174, H.135.
[30]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.173, H.135,
[31]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.174, H.135.
[32]Alfred Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, (London: The Scarecrow Press, 2000), p.244.

What this ultimately discloses is Dasein's inalienable relation with its 'that it is and it has to be', namely, its Being.

iii.   Heidegger's conception of Understanding

The second constituent of Disclosedness that Heidegger considers is Understanding [Verstehen]. In §31 the reader is immediately told by Heidegger that "[a] state of mind always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed. Understanding always has its mood".[33] This does not mean, trivially, that whenever one understands something, one's understanding, "in the sense of *one* possible kind of cognizing",[34] is always intermingled with one's, so to speak, 'gut feelings', and vice versa. This is not to say that this facile interpretation is altogether false either. However, the point Heidegger is trying to make is that the superficial combination of moods and understanding, which is so familiar in our everyday experience, is grounded in a deeper link between Understanding and Disposition. Since the concept of Disposition has already been analysed, I shall now turn to that of Understanding and then, in turn, will attempt to shed some light on the 'deeper link' between these two constituents.

Very early in §31, Heidegger clarifies that the notion of Understanding he is interested to elucidate is what he calls "primordial Understanding" [ursprüngliche Verstehen].[35] In an attempt to explain what this primordial understanding actually is, Heidegger states:

> To say that in existing, Dasein is its 'there', is equivalent to saying that the world is 'there'; its *Being-there* is Being-in, and the latter is likewise 'there', as for the sake of which Dasein is. In the 'for-the-sake-of-which', existing Being-in-the-world is disclosed as such, and this Disclosedness we have called 'understanding'.[36]

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[33]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.182, H.142-143.
[34]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.182,, H.143.
[35]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.182,, H.143.
[36]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.182,, H.143.

The term 'for-the-sake-of-which' refers to Dasein insofar as it functions as the ultimate 'reason' according to which entities, or Being, are understood by Dasein. This 'reason' is what Heidegger calls 'Bewandtnis', a notion which will be fully discussed in the following chapter. Leaving Heidegger's complex terminology aside, what the aforementioned quote highlights is that understanding is at bottom not about the mere discoveredness of this or that object, but the Disclosedness of Dasein's Being as the ultimate Bewandtnis according to which all discoveredness and Disclosedness happen. Hence, what Heidegger calls Understanding in its most primordial sense is not about intraworldly entities but about the Being of Dasein.

This is not to say that once the 'essence' of Dasein is 'disclosed' intraworldly entities will be finally completely 'understood'. This is because the phenomenon of Understanding is not directed at a static object to behold, but towards the Being of that entity whose Being is constantly an issue for it. Loosely speaking, Dasein's Being is nothing static, but rather the pre-emptive totality of Dasein's existence.[37] In this sense, the phenomenon of Understanding consists fundamentally in Dasein's openness to its own *potentiality-for-Being*. This is expressed by Heidegger in the following quote:

> When we are talking ontically we sometimes use the expression 'understanding something' with the signification of 'being able to manage something', 'being a match for it', 'being competent to do something'. In understanding, as an *existentiale*, that which we have such competence over is not a 'what', but Being as existing. The kind of Being which Dasein has, as potentiality-for-Being, lies existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible.[38]

Understanding, therefore, does not depend on intraworldly entities and it is not primarily about them, i.e. it is not about finally grasping 'some-thing'. Indeed, the fact that Dasein has and understanding of intraworldly entities consists in the merely ontic manifestation of a

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[37]This does not imply that Dasein can never hold a clear understanding of the world. The reason for this should be obvious, as long as we keep in mind that Heidegger's working-notion of Dasein's Being is fundamentally a dynamic one. Now, if Understanding is a constituent of the Disclosedness of Dasein's world and, perhaps, even of Dasein's own Being, on the ground of *Dasein's Being* itself, then it is possible for Dasein to hold a clear Understanding.

[38]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.183, H.143.

deeper ontological structure. The latter consists in Dasein's 'having competence over Being as existing' or, which is the same, taking up its own Being in its possibilities. As such what Dasein primarily understands is nothing but its own Being,[39] which in turn determines the way in which entities are understood. Heidegger exemplifies this point by saying that the fact that I use a hammer to hammer a nail, makes clear that I understand the hammer in terms of its possible use, i.e. to hammer nails; this understanding does not exhaust all the possible uses of the hammer, but shows the way in which the hammer is manifested to a particular Dasein, who is engaged in a particular task, i.e. building something. In the context of building something, therefore, the hammer is shown in its 'hammering', i.e. its Bewandtnis. This particular Bewandtnis would be proper to a Dasein whose primary task is that of building, but it would not be so to a Dasein whose task at hand is that of studying archaeological artefacts; to the latter, the hammer, given the case it was an ancient tool, may be understood as a means to date a certain layer of soil, or to demonstrate the stage of technological development in a certain area. Hence, the hammer is ultimately understood in terms of Dasein and what it itself *is*. But what *is* Dasein? Certainly I cannot answer this question by reducing Dasein's Being to what Dasein actually 'devotes its life', as Jean-Paul Sartre does in *Being and Nothingness*.[40] Heidegger is not trying to argue that the Being of a given entity depends on whether I 'am' a builder, an archaeologist, a postman etc.[41] Rather the point is more general and consists, to put it bluntly, in that Dasein's understanding depends on Dasein's Being. Later in this dissertation I shall comment on the meaning of this word 'depends'.

I have mentioned already that according to Heidegger the Being of Dasein is not something 'static', which may be known in its objective totality once and for all.[42] This is due to the fact that Dasein is essentially existing, so that, insofar as it 'daseins', it cannot be, so to speak, 'complete' or, as Heidegger says, it cannot yet 'be-a-whole' [Ganzsein]; so that, it is always possible for Dasein to 'be something else'. This essential characteristic of the existing Dasein is what Heidegger calls potentiality-for-Being [Seinskönnen]. "*Understanding*" Heidegger says, "*is the existential Being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-Being; and it is so*

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[39] Yet not as one understands something, but as one relates to another. Understanding Being means essentially to exist, where existence is maintaining Being as an issue, that is, relating understandingly to one's Being.

[40] Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: an essay on phenomenological ontology*, trans. H. Barnes, (London: Methuen, 1957), pp.462-463.

[41] This is true to an extent, but only trivially and in the second-degree.

[42] This is not entirely correct, insofar as Dasein's Being does eventually become a whole, but only with Dasein's death. Yet, since understanding is proper only to Dasein, its Being cannot be 'grasped' in its totality as an object. It may be at most 'taken up' in Dasein's Being-towards-death.

in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its being is capable of".[43] The reader should remember at this point that Understanding is one of the constituents of Disclosedness. In other words, Understanding is one of the ways in which Dasein *is-in*. What is therefore the 'understanding-way' of Being-in? What does Understanding actually disclose? The answer is that Understanding discloses Dasein's Being in terms of its potentiality-for-Being. The latter consists in nothing but Dasein's transcendental-ontological character which is at the basis of Heidegger's famous claim that Dasein's essence is its existence. The correctness and importance of the connection between Understanding and Dasein's transcendental-ontological character will be clearer when I come to discuss the temporal [zeitlich] character of Disclosedness as shown primarily in its authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. What is important to highlight for now is that Heidegger's notion of Understanding consists in a clear break with traditional epistemology, which focuses exclusively on the relation between, in Heideggerian terms, Dasein and intraworldly entities. Conversely, the phenomenon of Understanding which Heidegger describes is concerned primarily with the disclosive relation between Dasein and its Being, specifically as a potentiality-for-Being. In fact, Dasein's phenomenon Understanding is the clearest example of its ontological nature, its continuous disclosive directedness towards its Being.[44] The disclosure of Dasein's Being in terms of its potentiality-for-Being is what constitutes the horizon for the discoveredness of intraworldly entities. As a mode of Disclosedness, Understanding fulfils this function because it "has itself the existential-ontological structure which we call 'projection' [Entwurf]".[45] This is intended as an act of projection upon [auf] a meaning [Sinn];[46] that is to say: Dasein's understanding of its own Being results from Dasein projecting it upon its meaning, where meaning is taken to be the horizon of any understanding projection. In its Being, Dasein discloses itself in terms of a fore-having, a fore-sight and a fore-conception, which are connected to the tripartite structure of temporality.[47] I will come back to this point in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. As such, what Dasein actually 'understands' is primarily its ontological Being, that is, its existential potentiality-for-Being. On this ground the World, as the hermeneutical horizon of entities, is disclosed. Finally, the horizontal space opened by the disclosure of the

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[43]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.184, H.144.
[44]In this sense Heidegger's notion of understanding unmistakably echoes Husserl's notion of intentionality.
[45]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.184-185, H.145.
[46]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.151.
[47]This is because the meaning of the Being of Dasein is Temporality. This will be discussed further in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

World allows intraworldly entities to be discovered by Dasein and, as such, understood in their possibilities, that is, in relation to the understanding projection of Dasein's Being.

Does this mean that Understanding belongs to Dasein and to Dasein only? Yet 'possibilities' seem to be proper to all entities, even those without the character of Dasein. Heidegger confirms this point in §32:

> In the projecting of the understanding, entities are disclosed in their possibilities. The character of the possibility corresponds, on each occasion, with the kind of Being of the entity which is understood.[48]

However, intraworldly entities, i.e. those which do not have the character of Dasein, do have possibilities only insofar as they "are projected upon the world –that is, upon a whole of significance, to whose reference-relations concern, as Being-in-the-world, has been tied up in advance."[49] This is the point I have made initially in this section and I will study this in more depth in the following chapter, namely, that entities are discovered only in view of the World which is in view of the disclosure of Dasein's Being as a 'for-the-sake-of-which'. For this, entities have possibilities only insofar as they have been discovered according to Dasein's as a 'for-the-sake-of-which'. Hence, Heidegger can say that intraworldly entities come to be understood when they are discovered along with the Being of Dasein.[50] In other words, entities different from Dasein have possibilities insofar as they are projected and understood. But only Dasein, strictly speaking, projects and understands, and what is projected and understood most primordially is the Being of Dasein. As such, all understanding depends,[51] ultimately, on Dasein's understanding of its Being [Seinsverständis], i.e. on the way in which the Being of Dasein has been taken over in its possibilities and, thus, 'understood'.

It is important to keep in mind, as I have already indicated, that the projection of the possibilities of Dasein's Being, or, which is the same, Dasein's understanding-of-Being, does

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[48]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.192, H.151.
[49]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.192, H.151.
[50]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.151.
[51]This does not mean that they depend on Dasein itself; rather they depend on the relation between Dasein and its Being. More on this will be said in Chapter 5 of the present dissertation.

not necessarily amount to a Sartrean 'life-project': "[p]rojecting", Heidegger argues, "has nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan that has been thought out, and in accordance with which Dasein arranges its Being. On the contrary, any Dasein has, as Dasein, already projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting".[52] In other words, Dasein, as long as it is a Dasein, has to project and cannot 'choose otherwise'. Can the fact that Dasein is always thrown in this 'projecting' be connected to the phenomenon of Dasein's thrownness, discussed in the previous section of this chapter? Is Dasein's thrownness, perhaps, exactly this: that Dasein is always, already thrown to project its possibilities according to its potentiality-for-Being? This obviously sounds paradoxical. Nevertheless such a paradox may begin to shed some light on the strict interconnectedness between Disposition and Understanding.

> Possibility, as an *existentiale*, does not signify a free-floating potentiality-for-Being, in the sense of the 'liberty of indifference' (*libertas indifferentiae*). In every case Dasein as essentially having a state-of-mind, has already got itself into definite possibilities."[53]

To be sure the expression 'definite possibilities' does not only name what is *factually actual* for a given Dasein –one's body-weight, one's parents, one's country of birth, one's past experiences etc. Michael Gelven is not altogether wrong when, in his *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, he argues that Disposition discloses Dasein's *actuality*, whereas Understanding discloses its *possibility*.[54] But what Gelven fails to point out, however, is that, at a more structural level, what is truly *actual* about Dasein is that it is *possible*. This is because, insofar as Dasein's Being is essentially 'projecting', Dasein is existentially a potentiality-for-Being.

Here the reader may finally begin to glimpse the structural connection between Disposition and Understanding within the constitution of Disclosedness. This is to say, while Disposition discloses the Being-in of Dasein in terms of the givenness of Dasein's condition as 'thrown' [geworfen] Being-in-the-World, Understanding discloses Being-in-the-world according to the

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[52]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.185, H.145.
[53]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.183, H.144
[54]Cfr: Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, (De Kalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989) pp.75-93.

projective nature of Dasein, whose Being 'in-the-world' is essentially a Being-in-possibilities, i.e. a 'potentiality-for-Being'.

iv.   Discourse and Language

The third constituent of Disclosedness which Heidegger analyses is Discourse [Rede]. This is defined, in §32 as "the articulation of Intelligibility"[55] and is said to be "*existentially equiprimordial with Disposition and understanding*".[56]

During the course of his analysis, Heidegger seems to deduce Discourse from the phenomenon of assertion [Aussage], which is an extreme case of interpretation [Auslegung], which, in turn, is ultimately grounded in Dasein's Understanding. As such, Discourse appears, at first, to be a third order phenomenon grounded in Understanding. However, Discourse is a third order phenomenon only, so to speak, analytically, which is to say, only insofar as the economy of the investigation often requires that the most primordial elements be grasped through the study of those more trivial phenomena with which one is generally acquainted. Indeed, Heidegger explicitly states that Discourse, as the articulation of intelligibility, "underlies both interpretation and assertion".[57] Later in this section I shall show the full importance of this point.

What needs to be clarified is whether Discourse may actually be dependent on Understanding and Disposition. In §28 Heidegger seems explicitly to state the opposite:

> State-of-mind and understanding are characterized equiprimordially by discourse.[58]

This statement is especially controversial and, as I shall show in this dissertation, it has been used by some commentators in order to justify a purely linguistic interpretation of *Being and*

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[55]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.203-204, H.161.
[56]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.203, H.161.
[57]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.204, H.161.
[58]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.172, H.133.

Time. It is important therefore to clarify in what way Discourse may be equiprimordial to Disposition and Understanding, while 'characterizing' [bestimmen] equiprimordially the last two constituents.

Now, the reader is told by Heidegger that Discourse is a constituent of Disclosedness or, which is the same, a 'way' of Being-in. I have also already explained that the constituents of Disclosedness –or Being-in- are equiprimordial; as such, any event of Disclosedness can be split in the different ways in which this very event is manifested. With any event of Disclosedness, these 'ways' are always given together, and since there is nothing more primordial than Disclosedness -or Being-in-, then none of the components can ever be more primordial than the other, unless becoming, in a way, more primordial than Disclosedness itself. The constituents may still be analysed singularly, as long as one is careful to stress the inalienable unity which grounds the possibility of such an analysis. I can now ask what it means that "State-of-mind and understanding are characterized equiprimordially by *discourse*".[59] It obviously cannot signify that the first two constituents are 'grounded' in the latter. One must pay attention to Heidegger's choice of words here, since the verb used is not 'ground' [grunden] but 'characterise' [bestimmen]. The latter term does not necessarily imply an idea of causation, as if Disposition and Understanding were 'effects' of Discourse. Indeed, both the original German 'bestimmen' and the English 'characterise' do not suggest a strictly causal relation. Rather, the emphasis is on the fact that Discourse gives to Disposition and Understanding a particular 'character' [Bestimmung]. What is this character?

The verb *bestimmen* and its derivative have a wide range of meanings which, however, essentially revolve around the root-noun *Stimme*, which simply means 'voice'. Thus *be-stimmen* means: 'to induce', in the sense of *talking* someone into something; 'to determine', in the sense of *voicing* a resolution; 'to dispose' in the sense of *uttering* an order; 'to organize', in the sense of dividing a choir in different *voices* or *voicing* a piece of music; 'to choose' in the sense of having a *vocation*. Is Heidegger arguing that, through Discourse, both Disposition and Understanding are given a 'voice', are rendered 'expressible', or are supplied at least with the possibility of being expressible? Yes and no. After having disclosed something mood-wise and having understood it, Dasein is granted by Discourse the possibility of *expressing* this event of disclosure. However, the word 'expressing' here does

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[59]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.172, H.133.

not merely mean 'putting into words', despite the fact that the latter may be a possible way of expression. Strictly speaking, the reason why a disposing-understanding [befindlichen-verstanden] Disclosedness of something can be, so to speak, put into words, is that Discourse, first and foremost, confers to that Disclosedness its 'character'. This is the character of 'being articulated', as Discourse is, states Heidegger, "the Articulation of Intelligibility"[60] and, more generally, of Disclosedness *tout court*.[61] Importantly, Articulation is not firstly to do with expressing oneself with words but constitutes the ground of the possibility of *analysis*. Hence, Discourse, insofar as it possesses 'the character of articulation', grants that Disclosedness itself may be articulated in its equiprimordial constituents. In other words, without Discourse no articulation is possible; and without articulation, no analysis can be achieved. In this sense, for Discourse to 'characterise' Disposition and Understanding means, first and foremost, to organize Disclosedness in its parts, in its 'voices'. The articulation of Disclosedness allowed by Discourse makes possible for the former to be analysed in terms of its constituents or, which is the same, for Being-in to be analysed in terms of equiprimordial 'ways of Being-in'. Since Being-in is nothing but Dasein's essential way of existing as a Being-in-the-World, then the analysis of Being-in/Disclosedness[62] consists ultimately in an analysis of Dasein's Being-in-the-World as that entity whose Being is an issue for it.[63] This is not to say, as is argued by commentators such as Cristina Lafont, that the constitutive role of Discourse can be interpreted as grounding in respect with Disclosedness. In Chapter 3 of this dissertation I will attempt to demonstrate the shortcomings of Lafont's reading of *Being and Time*, specifically in respect to this point. For now I shall try to clarify why, at least at a technical level, it is not possible for Heidegger to hold the strong claim that Discourse grounds Disclosedness.

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[60]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.203-204, H.161.

[61]Cfr: "In discourse the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world (an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind) is articulated according to significations; and discourse is this articulation." [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.206, H.162.

[62]As outlined in Section i. of the present chapter, Disclosedness in general and Being-in are two ways to call the same ontological phenomenon which is connatural to Dasein.

[63]It is important to keep in mind that the analysis of Disclosedness in its equiprimordial constituents is made possible by the articulation supplied with Discourse and is not a mere *diagnostic* exercise. Instead, it provides Heidegger's analysis with a 'voiced score' of that unitary symphony which is the Being of Dasein. In Chapter 5 of this dissertation I shall show that the analysis of Being-in/Disclosedness, which lays open Dasein's way of Being as a Being-in-the-World, will be of paramount importance as Heidegger attempts to answer the question concerning the meaning of Dasein's Being in terms temporality. For the analysis of Disclosedness in its unitary articulation will be mirrored in the ecstatic structure of temporality.

At the outset of the present section, Discourse has been defined as that which allows a given Disclosedness to be made intelligible by means of an articulation. The fact that Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility implies, strictly speaking, that Disclosedness, as the unitary phenomenon which includes the thrown projection [geworfenen Entwurf] of a 'disposing intelligibility' [befindlichen Verständlichkeit], may be in some way *independent* from its articulation.[64] Clearly, given the constituting status of Discourse in relation to Disclosedness, it is not possible to disclose anything without it being articulated in Discourse. At the same time, it is also not possible to articulate anything without at once understanding it and 'disposing' one's self in relation to it. However, deducing from this that the constituents of Disclosedness actually 'cause' the latter to be in one way or another, is to have completely misunderstood the intention of Heidegger's analysis of Being-in. For the constituents themselves are nothing but the way in which the unitary-everyday phenomenon of Disclosedness is analytically interpreted. Importantly, the analysis of a primordial phenomenon, by definition, does not and cannot discover phenomena that are more primordial but can only afford better access to the unitary phenomenon itself. Heidegger is clearly supporting this point as he argues that analysis does not necessarily get to more fundamental phenomena; indeed, the reverse is always true in the case of primordial phenomena such as Being-in and Disclosedness.[65]

Finally, I must devote a few lines in order to clarify where I believe the Heidegger of *Being and Time* stands on the rapport between Discourse and Language. Such a discussion will be propaedeutic to both my critique of Lafont's Hermeneutic Interpretation, which will be developed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, as well as to the very important discussion of the role of Discourse in relation to the phenomenon of authentic [eigentlich] Disclosedness which constitutes an important component of the central claim of the present work, and will be expounded in Chapter 4. Discourse, Heidegger argues in §34, is "[t]he existential-ontological foundation of language",[66] and is "the way in which discourse gets expressed".[67] Understood

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[64]However, this is true only analytically.

[65]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.170, H.131.

[66]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.203. H.161.

[67]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.204. H.161.

in terms of 'Expression' [Aussprechen], [68] Language is ultimately the existentiell-ontic embodiment of the way of Being-in which is 'Discourse'. Hence, the distinction between Discourse and Language may be successfully likened to Saussure's dualism of *Langue* and *Parole*, or to Humboldt's dialectic of *enérgeia* and *érgon*. In other words, Language refers to 'actual' ways of expressing Disclosedness, namely, languages, signs, body-language, facial expressions, art, etc. Language is ontic as it is discovered in its intraworldly embodiments, i.e. a road sign, a written word, a national language etc.; as such its character is essentially 'worldly'.[69] Furthermore, Language is existentiell: this means that *having* language is not an intrinsic character of Dasein's Being, as I will attempt to demonstrate in what follows. Discourse, on the other hand, is nothing but the articulation which allows a disposing-understanding Disclosedness to be 'expressed'.[70] Hence, while Language consists in the actual 'expression' of Disclosedness, Discourse amounts to that 'potentially for expression' that is grounded in an articulation of intelligibility. This potentiality of expression is both existential, insofar as Dasein must have discourse [reden] in order to be a Dasein, and ontological, as it is a necessary element of that fundamental Disclosedness of Being which makes Dasein what it is, i.e. an ontological entity.

The question now is whether or not the distinction drawn by Heidegger between Discourse and Language implies Discourse to be a *pre-predicative* phenomenon. In other words, I need to clarify if Discourse requires necessarily to be expressed as Language, lest not to *be* at all. Furthermore, due to the constitutive role of Discourse, this problem invests the totality of Disclosedness. As such, our analysis will ultimately have to elucidate whether Disclosedness constitutes the ground of expression or whether Language warrants the Disclosedness of anything. In order to assess Heidegger's position on the matter, I shall begin by quoting an often misinterpreted passage from *Being and Time*:

> The task of *liberating* grammar from logic requires *beforehand* a *positive*
> understanding of the basic *a priori* structure of discourse [Rede] in general as an

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[68]Expression is in turn characterised by Heidegger in terms of assertion [Aussage]. The latter is threefold in character, as discussed in §30 [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.179-182, H.140-142].

[69]Note: the single quotation marks here indicate 'world' in its meaning of 'a collection of all Seiendes' as opposed to worldly without quotation marks. The latter is used in relation to Discourse. Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.204 ,H.161.

[70]This is fundamental if ontology is to be possible as the Disclosedness of Dasein's Being to Dasein, and if Being can be disclosed as a relation of Disclosedness with Dasein.

existentiale. It is not a task that can be carried through later on by improving and rounding out what has been handed down. Bearing this in mind, we must inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything understandable, and to do so in accordance with significations; and this articulation must not be confined to entities within-the-world which we cognize by considering them theoretically, and which we express in sentences. A doctrine of signification will not emerge automatically even if we make a comprehensive comparison of as many languages as possible, and those which are most exotic. To accept, let us say, the philosophical horizon within which W. von Humboldt made language a problem, would be no less inadequate. The doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein. Whether it prospers or decays depends on the fate of this ontology.[71]

Commentators often take this passage as a plain dismissal of von Humboldt's philosophy of language.[72] This seems all the more inexplicable given that Heidegger's conception of Discourse and Language appears at times extremely close to von Humboldt's. In my view the point Heidegger is trying to make in this passage is slightly more subtle. Heidegger does not disagree with von Humboldt's results. Indeed, Heidegger's analysis of Signification and the distinction between Discourse and Language owe very much to von Humboldt's work. Instead, Heidegger must disagree with von Humboldt's method, namely, the studying of ontic-existentiell linguistic instances (Language) in the hope of uncovering its underlying ontological structure (Discourse). Insofar as Language is essentially ontic and 'worldly', devoting oneself to the study of it would essentially reinforce what Heidegger calls Dasein's fascination for the world of intraworldly entities, i.e. its Fallenness. Certainly, as I shall clarify, Dasein's average *fallen* [verfallen] state consists in a necessary launching pad towards the Disclosedness of Dasein's Being. Nevertheless, Heidegger is clear that the ontic by itself cannot bring about the disclosure of the ontological, just as much as the discoveredness of intraworldly entities cannot on its own yield the Disclosedness of Being. Therefore, the most comprehensive study of Language will never by itself provide a substantial insight into the ontological nature of Discourse. Conversely Heidegger believes that, since Discourse is a way of Being-in of that Being-in-the-world which is Dasein in its

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[71]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.209. H.165-166.
[72]Cfr: Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. G. Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.71-84.

Disclosedness, Discourse may itself be more successfully grasped through the study of the phenomenon of Disclosedness in terms of the ontological structure of Dasein.[73]

I have already mentioned that Dasein does not *necessarily* have language, i.e. it does not necessarily need to express itself to be a Dasein. Heidegger's seems explicitly to reject this point when he states plainly: "Dasein has language".[74] It is important therefore to clarify what I mean when I say that, for Heidegger, Dasein does not *necessarily* have language. The sentence preceding the latter quote can be of assistance here:

> Because discourse is constitutive for the Being of the 'there' (that is, for disposition and understanding), while 'Dasein' means Being-in-the-world, Dasein as discursive Being-in, has already expressed itself.[75]

Dasein's Disclosedness is always necessarily articulated in Discourse, so that the possibility of expressing itself is connatural to Dasein itself, so that Dasein may express itself *without fail*. Nonetheless, the fact that Dasein expresses itself without fail does not imply that it must necessarily do so. Even less, it entails that its discursive Being can be studied beginning from the phenomenon of expression. Finally, this cannot mean, as commentators such as Cristina Lafont have argued, that the discursive Being of Dasein can be derived from the 'fact' that it expresses itself. This is because, as I shall soon explain, it is possible for Dasein's potentiality for expression, i.e. for Discourse, not to expresses itself. Heidegger calls this exception the phenomenon of 'keeping silent' [Schweigen].[76] Keeping silent manifests Discourse in a dimension different from that of expression, in which it lingers for the most part. Heidegger refers to this other dimension of discourse as Hearing [Hören]. Hearing, Heidegger says, as well as expression "...is constitutive for discourse"[77] and it is "the primary and authentic way

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[73]To put it more explicitly we may say that Disclosedness is essentially Dasein as Being-in-the-world, i.e. its 'there' [Da]. Hence. In order to study the phenomenon of Discourse, Heidegger thinks one should begin with the study of the Being of that entity which is its 'there' rather than concentrating on Discourse's ontic expression, i.e. Language. For by being its 'there', i.e. its Disclosedness, that entity is *also* a *zoón lógon echón*. This entity which 'has' *lógos* is, obviously, Dasein, and the study of its Being is what Heidegger calls the 'ontology of Dasein'.

[74]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.208, H.165.

[75]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.208, H.165.

[76]This is the way in which a discursive entity maintains itself essentially open to Disclosedness, especially to the Disclosedness of its own Being [Seinserschlossenhiet].

[77]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.206, H.163.

in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being -as in hearing the voice of the friend whom every Dasein carries with it."[78] In other words, just as much as expression, hearing is a fundamental way of discourse.[79] Now, if hearing and expression are, in some way, distinct, then keeping silent must itself be a form of discourse, albeit not 'expressive'. As such the phenomenon of keeping silent constitutes the way in which Discourse is ontically and existentiell-y hearing. These phenomena of hearing and keeping silent will be especially important later in this dissertation. In the course of the analysis of the notions of 'Being-towards-death' and that of the 'call of conscience', which shall be conducted in Chapters 4 and 5 of this dissertation, I will ask whether hearing constitutes the primary authentic [eigentlich] way in which Dasein is open for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, a potentiality-for-Being which in turn characterises Dasein's Disclosedness of Being, and whether this implies that Language and expression are in some respect inauthentic ways of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being and, therefore, of its Disclosedness of Being [Seinserschlossenheit]. There I will show that the phenomenon of keeping silent represents a key moment of that which Heidegger calls Dasein's *authentic* Disclosedness of its Being.

v.   The Status of Falling

Having analysed the three general constituents of Disclosedness, i.e. Disposition, Understanding and Discourse, Heidegger moves on to consider each constituent in its everydayness. As such, Disposition is discussed in terms of ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit], Understanding in terms of curiosity [Neugier] and Discourse as idle talk [Gerede]. Heidegger says:

> Idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity characterize the way in which, in an everyday manner, Dasein is its 'there' -the Disclosedness of Being-in-the-world. As definite existential characteristics, these are not present-at-hand in Dasein, but help to make up its Being. In these, and in the way they are interconnected in their Being, there is

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[78]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.206, H.163.
[79]This is clear if we keep in mind the meaning of 'constitutive' as discussed in the case of the constituents of Disclosedness.

revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness; we call this the *"falling"* of Dasein.[80]

In other words, the way in which the constituents of Disclosedness manifest themselves inauthentically in Dasein's everydayness shows forth a further fundamental character of Disclosedness itself, i.e. falling. The latter names two important tendencies of Dasein: first, its inclination to lose itself in the 'world', alongside intraworldly entities, and interpret itself in terms of such entities; second, the propensity to fleeing its existential unsettledness which constitutes the core of its Being and hiding in the homely publicness of das Man.

Nevertheless, "[t]he phenomenon of falling", Heidegger assures, "does not give us something like a 'night view' of Dasein"[81] and "...makes no assertion about the 'corruption of human nature'...".[82] For this phenomenon is prior to moral assertions regarding corruption or honesty and is rather "conceived ontologically as a kind of motion".[83] This motion is one in which Dasein forgets its fundamental transcendence and resigns itself to the way in which both the world and its Being are disclosed according to the average 'one feels' (disposition), 'one knows' (understanding) and 'one says' (discourse) of das Man. This average Disclosedness, Heidegger argues, is alienating and tranquillizing as it covers up the fundamental unsettledness which constitutes the core of Dasein's Being in its fundamental 'being at issue', its existence, its transcendence.

Hence, the question is: how can a phenomenon such as Disclosedness, apt at manifesting and uncovering, be constituted by an essentially concealing phenomenon such as falling? Heidegger is adamant concerning the status of falling as he affirms:

> In falling, nothing other than our potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world is the issue, even if in the mode of inauthenticity. ... On the other hand, *authentic* existence is not

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[80]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.219, H.175.
[81]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.224, H.179.
[82]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.224, H.179.
[83]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.224, H.180.

something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such an everydayness is seized upon.[84]

But in what way is Dasein's Disclosedness essentially 'falling'? If one takes Heidegger analysis of everydayness seriously, it is clear that Dasein's Disclosedness does not begin with an original quasi-platonic openness that is subsequently lost and needs being regained; it is instead a phenomenon whose primary status is that of fallen everydayness, in which all is first disclosed according to the way in which Dasein discloses the world and its Being in falling. As such, falling is never an utter covering-over, or complete closedness. In falling 'something' is still disclosed according the fundamental constituents of Disclosedness itself, namely, disposition and understanding, and is still discursively articulated. Falling corresponds to a peculiar way of disclosing both the world and Dasein's Being which consists in fleeing away from one's ownmost potentiality for being, towards the 'world' understood in terms of Das Man as a mere collection of entities. The peculiarity of this 'falling Disclosedness' consists in that its disposition, its understanding and its discourse are not determined by a comprehensive Disclosedness of Dasein's own Being, but by the average 'world', according to a principle which Heidegger names das Man.[85] Nevertheless, the superficiality of the falling way of Disclosedness does not make this constituent any less fundamental. On the contrary, being-in-this-average-'world' still represents the *primary way* in which something is articulatingly disclosed to Dasein in terms of disposition and understanding, even though only inauthentically. This is to say that, this particular way of disclosing the World, even though only as 'world', as well as Dasein's Being, even though only as a being-in-an-average-'world', i.e. a das Man, does not merely consist in an accidental phenomenon of Dasein's Disclosedness, but in a necessary fact of Dasein's Being as Being-in-the-World. For this, falling is also numbered by Heidegger among the existentiales of Dasein. Heidegger's position in this respect is clear, as he reckons falling not only among the constituents of Disclosedness but also within the structural elements of Dasein's Being, namely, the phenomenon which he defines by the term Care.

In this, the reader may begin to see the importance of the connection between the phenomenon of Disclosedness and that of Care, which shall be considered in Chapter 4 this

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[84]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.224, H.179.
[85]Literally, 'the One', with reference to the impersonal form 'one does'. We will study this phenomenon more in depth in Chapter 2 of this dissertation.

dissertation. What I may attempt to clarify for now is the reason why the phenomenon of falling is also one of the elements of the structure of Care.

As I shall demonstrate in Chapter 3 of the present work, Care refers to the way in which Dasein takes issue [es geht] with its own Being as Being-in-the-world. Hence, for falling to be a structural element of Care, it must consist in *a particular way* in which Dasein's Being matters to Dasein itself. What is this way? Heidegger answers quite explicitly in what follows:

> Dasein's absorption in the "they"… make[s] manifest something like a *fleeing* of Dasein in the face of itself -of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self.[86]
> …
> [Dasein] does not flee *in the face of* entities within-the-world; these are precisely what it flees *towards* -as entities alongside which our concern, lost in the "they", can dwell in tranquillized familiarity. When in falling we flee *into* the "at-home" of publicness, we flee *in the face of* the "not-at-home"; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein -in Dasein as thrown Being-in-the-world, which has been delivered over to itself in its Being.[87]

However, this implies also that, in falling, Dasein also takes issue with its own Being-in-the-world by *trying not to take issue with it*, as it flees in the face of its Being towards intraworldly entities. Lost in the averageness of das Man, Dasein forgets its own Being and becomes fascinated with the 'world', an attitude that Heidegger calls 'Being-alongside'. Am I saying that falling can be understood as a 'taking-issue-with' Dasein's own Being merely because, in falling, Dasein *does* not take issue with its Being? Is falling part of the structure of Care only in virtue of such a sophism? Not exactly. Rather, what Heidegger argues is that whenever Dasein flees in the face of its own Being, thus attempting not to take issue with it, "[t]hat in the face of which Dasein flees, is precisely what comes up 'behind'. Only to the extent that Dasein has been brought before itself in an ontologically essential manner through whatever Disclosedness belongs to it," Heidegger continues, "*can* it flee *in*

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[86]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.229, H.184.
[87]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.233-234, H.189.

the face of that in the face of which it flees".[88] In other words, in fleeing, a Disclosedness of what one flees away from is always implied.[89] Similarly, by fleeing away from its own Being-in-the-world, Dasein must have already taken issue with that very Being-in-the-world; therefore, "in turning away from it, it is disclosed 'there'".[90]

In falling, Dasein's essential attitude is that of trying to avoid the question concerning one's own Being, in order to escape one's ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The latter can be authentically taken up only in the anticipatory resoluteness which lets Dasein be a 'being-towards-its-death'. However, as Dasein in its fallenness struggles not to let its Being matter to it, this still attests that, to an extent, that very Being does essentially matter to Dasein itself. The existential stand of the phenomenon of falling within the constitution of Disclosedness and the structure of Care appears also to imply the stronger claim that the falling Disclosedness brought about by das Man constitutes the sufficient ground for the authentic Disclosedness of Dasein's Being. As I shall argue in the next chapter, this is the position maintained by Hubert Dreyfus, which constitutes the basic assumption guiding Dreyfus' Pragmatic Interpretation of *Being and Time* as it is developed in his famous *Being-in-the-world*.

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[88]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.229, H. 184-185.
[89]This is consistent with the circular (hermeneutical) structure of the call of conscience. The latter will be discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
[90]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.229, H.185.

2. INAUTHENTIC DISCLOSEDNESS

The phenomenon of Disclosedness, which I have taken to be one of the most fundamental facts about Dasein, if not indeed the most fundamental, refers, as I have said, to the mode of that relation between Dasein and both intraworldly entities, other Daseins and Being. At the outset of *Being and Time* Heidegger makes an important point concerning the relation between Dasein and its Being when he states: "To be sure, [Dasein's] ownmost Being is such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if its being has been interpreted in some manner."[91] This is to say, Being must be already 'known' to Dasein whenever Dasein sets itself to inquiring about Being, be its own Being or the Being of intraworldly entities. In other words, knowledge never begins with total ignorance, it never springs from two poles, i.e. subject and object, which are totally indifferent to each other and are brought together for the first time by an act of understanding. Heidegger's first and fundamental intuition consists in this simple yet powerful hypothesis: when Dasein asks itself for the first time how it is possible to know anything, that question already presupposes a certain degree of acquaintance with the 'thing' of the 'any-thing'. Similarly, when in the *Meditations*[92] Descartes wonders about the possibility of the relation between the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*, what, according to Heidegger, escapes him is that the question itself requires that relation to be, to some degree, already in place.

Yet, would it be then sufficient to get to know this relation, that is, to reflect more deeply on our acquaintance with 'things', in order to provide an answer to the Cartesian problem which has plagued philosophy for centuries - i.e. how can a subject relate to an object?

> But we are certainly not saying that when Dasein's own Being is thus interpreted pre-
> ontologically in the way which lies closest, this interpretation can be taken over as an

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[91] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.36, H.15.

[92] Cfr: René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, VI.

appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what must emerge when one's ownmost state of Being is considered as an ontological theme.[93]

Hence, according to Heidegger, to affirm that Dasein always, already understands [versteht] what 'things' *are*, by always, already understanding their Being and, as I shall show, Being itself, does not entail that Dasein in any way 'knows' Being. Indeed, the understanding of Being which constitutes the basis of Dasein's relation to anything and which Heidegger often characterizes with the adjective pre-ontological, cannot be thematised in the same way scholastic philosophy could thematise *essentia* and find out the common 'what' of all things. Understanding Being pre-ontologically does not disclose Being *immediately*; rather it results in Being itself being covered-over in favour of Dasein's fascination with the 'world' of intraworldly entities. This is not to lessen the importance of this pre-ontological understanding of Being, which remains necessary and fundamentally a 'first step', but to draw attention to the inauthenticity of this pre-emptive Disclosedness.

As I have briefly mentioned when discussing the notion of Falling, inauthenticity partly consists in that tendency of Dasein to be fascinated with intraworldly entities in such a way as to cover up the fundamental Disclosedness which is the source of their discoveredness. Hence, Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of Being manifests itself first and foremost in intraworldly entities, as they are primarily encountered by Dasein in its everydayness. But what is the primary way in which intraworldly entities are manifested to Dasein?

Traditionally, philosophy has investigated our access to objects outside ourselves in terms of knowledge [Erkentnis], which in turn has been understood as "[the] 'relation between subject and Object'."[94] The phenomenon of knowing consists in a subject entering into a relation with something which is external to it, and aims at re-constructing a mental representation of the object itself, i.e. an *idea*; the more accurate the representation, the more precise is the knowledge the subject possesses of the given object. For this reason, traditional epistemology begins by assuming a fundamental separateness between subject and object. This assumption is at the basis of the primacy of so-called detached knowledge, namely, the lesser the knower's interference with the object, the more precise the mental representation will be.

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[93]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.36, H.15.
[94]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.87. H.60.

Heidegger rejects this traditional subject-object dynamics and develops a hermeneutically driven conception of the understanding according to which the human Dasein stands always, already in a relation with other entities, encountered firstly as equipment [Zeug]; that is, in the immediacy of their utility and the involvement of their referentiality among intraworldly entities and towards Dasein.

Contemporary Anglophone Heideggerian scholars such as Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carman and Mark Okrent, in their interpretations of *Being and Time*, take the concept of equipment to be the pivot of Heidegger's critique of traditional epistemology, partially reversing Heidegger's strategy. This well known stream of scholarship, famous for what is commonly referred to as the pragmatic interpretation of *Being and Time*, interprets the Heideggerian analysis of Disclosedness as the way in which entities are discovered by Dasein on the basis of that pre-emptive Disclosedness which falls within Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of Being, and further reducing the latter to a shared cultural background, which equates roughly to Heidegger's concept of das Man.

In an attempt to show the shortcomings of the pragmatic interpretation, especially in its Dreyfusian incarnation, I will firstly summarise Heidegger's discussion of equipment, in Section i. of the present chapter. In section ii. I will then sketch the connection between equipment and Dasein's understanding-of-Being, while in Section iii. I will give a brief overview on the notion of das Man and its role in the economy of *Being and Time*. Finally, in section iv., I will attempt to show that, by overstressing the importance of the analysis of equipment and interpreting das Man as the fundamental background of discoveredness of intraworldly entities and Disclosedness of the World, the pragmatic reading of *Being and Time* is doomed to grossly misinterpret the fundamental intention of Heidegger's masterwork.

i.   Intraworldly entities and Dasein

Entities are primarily discovered by Dasein in what Heidegger calls their alongsidedness with Dasein within the World. As I shall explain further in this chapter, this alongsidedness is possible as Dasein is not only a Being-in-the-world, i.e. it is always, already immersed within an understanding of Being, but it is also itself an entity. This is what Heidegger means when he says that Dasein is both ontological and ontic. Indeed, Dasein's discovery of intraworldly

entities can take place since Dasein itself is, partly, *the same as* intraworldly entities. This 'discovery', however, does not amount to the objective knowledge of an object by a subject, since the latter would require a difference between the knower and the known, a distance, which contradicts the alongsidedness Heidegger is suggesting. But how are entities discovered in their alongsidedness if they do not come to be, strictly speaking, 'known'? Given that Dasein's Being consists, existentially, in a Being-in-the-world and that in virtue of its Being-in-the-world Dasein is always, already alongside intraworldly entities, Dasein itself no longer needs to 'get to' entities; and, as such, Dasein does not gain a better access to intraworldly entities by alienating from the way in which it encounters them in its everydayness. It is rather in Dasein's most customary dealings with intraworldly entities that the latter reveal most primordially what they are. For this Heidegger believes that:

> The kind of dealing which is closest to us is … not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use … .[95]

The way in which entities are revealed to Dasein in its 'concern' is called by Heidegger 'readiness-to-hand' [Zuhandenheit]; and in this way entities are discovered as 'equipment' [Zeug], in the fundamentally referential sense of 'something in-order-to…' [»etwas, um zu…«].[96] This is in direct opposition to the way in which traditional epistemology reduces entities to mere 'things' by taking them in abstraction and, so to speak, objectively. On the other hand, when Dasein encounters an entity in its everyday dealings, it never encounters an entity in isolation, but always in terms of what Heidegger calls a 'totality of equipment' [Zeugganzheit]. That is to say, entities do not appear first in isolation only to later intermingle with other objects, but are discovered primarily within a referential 'context', within a totality of equipment. Indeed, "Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as *an* equipment;"[97] this is consistent with the definition of equipment as 'something in-order-to…',[98] which implies that the single item of equipment is, in its Being, always in view of something other than itself.

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[95]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.95, H.67.

[96]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.97, H.68.

[97]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 96, H.68.

[98]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.97, H.68.

> Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is *in terms of* its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room. These 'Things' never show themselves proximally as they are for themselves, so as to add up to a sum of *realia* and fill up a room. What we encounter as closest to us (though not as something taken as a theme) is the room; and we encounter it not as something 'between four walls' in a geometrical spatial sense, but as equipment for residing. Out of this the 'arrangement' emerges, and it is this that any 'individual' item of equipment shows itself. *Before* it does so a totality of equipment has already been discovered.[99]

The being always in view of something else which characterises equipment is what Heidegger calls 'reference' [Verweisung].[100] Despite the difficulties in rendering the meaning of 'Verweisung' in translation, there cannot be much doubt that the *Verweisung von etwas auf etwas* is characteristic not only of the structure of the in-order-to [Um-zu], but also, more in general, of the way in which entities are ready-to-hand, as Heidegger in the example of the equipment for writing [Schreibzeug] cited above.

In keeping with this principle, §18 of *Being and Time* affirms that "[a]n entity is discovered when it has been assigned or referred to something, and referred as that entity which it is".[101] As such, intraworldly entities cannot be discovered as equipment unless, like in the schreibzeug-example, it refers to [verweist auf] other entities. In everyday German, the verb verweisen, of which Verwiesung is the noun-derivative, has a range of meanings which span from 'referring to something or someone' [Verweisen auf], to 'relegating' [Verweisen an]. Yet Heidegger seems to be using this term here in a more etymological sense, as a compound of *weisen*; the latter means something like to point, to locate, to direct, with a particular attention to either the physical or the figurative direction of the pointing, locating, directing. Understood in this way, the meaning of the verb verweisen would be more akin to 'pointing-away-to' [ver-weisen auf/an]. This is exactly the meaning that seems to emerge in the schreibzeug-example, where the totality of equipment is described in terms of the way in which equipment *points* [weisen] *away* [ver-] from itself, *to* [auf/an] some other pieces of

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[99]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 97-98, H.68-69.

[100]Cfr: "Equipment is essentially 'something in-order-to…'." [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.97, H.68].

[101]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.115, H.84.

equipment –i.e. the ink to the inkstand, the inkstand to the pen, the pen to the paper, the paper to the blotting pad etc. Hence, in order to deal with something in terms of what that something is, Dasein must have always, already, to some extent, discovered all those other pieces of equipment which are connected to that something in the task at hand. This is not to say that Dasein by dealing with a piece of paper must have necessarily dealt with a pen before, but rather that, faced with the task of writing, Dasein interprets different tools as reciprocally connected, in the perspective of the task at hand. This perspective is what Heidegger calls 'Bewandtnis'.

The term 'Bewandtnis' is admittedly one of the most challenging for the translators of *Being and Time*. It comes from the verb 'bewanden', which is used almost only in the idiomatic expression 'bewanden lassen', which means 'letting be', 'letting go', 'letting rest' etc. Etymologically, it is connected with the verb wanden which means 'to turn', hence the English translation used by Macquarrie and Robinson, namely, 'involvement' –from the Latin in-volvere. Yet a mere technical translation is still insufficient to capture Heidegger's usage. This is because the term 'bewandtnis', on the one hand, has a meaning that stretches through a multiplicity of semantic realms and, on the other hand, comes from a longstanding philosophical tradition which has exploited its plurisemic qualities.

As Theodore Kisiel has amply demonstrated,[102] Heidegger inherits this term from Emil Lask, who, broadly speaking, employs it as synonymous with the categorial or logical 'form'.[103] In general, Bewandtnis is the formal condition of a material object; it names the relevance of the matter in relation to the truth of the object which is made relevant –in the etymological sense of throwing something into relief [rilevare]. More subtly, however, Bewandtnis has an array of meanings which can be used to extend the concept of 'form' into that of intentionality, embracing at once the noematic and the noetic aspect of intentionality itself, as well as its general character of directedness.[104]

Heidegger uses the wide spectrum of this term, which had been already pointed out by Lask, in order to bring together empiricism and idealism into the embrace of transcendental-hermeneutical phenomenology. In other words, Bewandtnis is Heidegger's alternative term to

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[102]Cfr: Theodore Kisiel, "Why students of Heidegger will have to read Emil Lask", in *Man and World* 28, pp. 197-240.

[103]Cfr: Emil Lask, *Die Logik der Philosophie und die Kategorienlehre*, (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1923), p.66.

[104]Cfr: Theodore Kisiel, "Why students of Heidegger will have to read Emil Lask", in *Man and World* 28, p.216.

name the intentional character of that intentionality which is no other than Dasein itself, in its being ontologically as Being-in-the-World.

Given the lack of an English term capable of capturing the whole semantic space marked by the German 'Bewandtnis', I will leave the term untranslated for the purpose of this dissertation. In spite of the term's extreme resistance to translation, it is not too difficult to understand the way in which Heidegger employs it, when he states:

> …*with* this thing, for instance, which is ready-to-hand, and which we accordingly call a 'hammer', there is an involvement [Bewandtnis] in hammering; with hammering, there is an involvement [Bewandtnis] in doing something fast; with making something fast, there is an involvement [Bewandtnis] in protection against bad weather; and this protection is for the sake of providing shelter for Dasein –that is to say, for the sake of a possibility of Dasein's Being.[105]

This is to say that the Being of entities in their readiness-to-hand is revealed only in the equipmentality of their in-order-to [um-zu]; which means that a piece of equipment is in itself [an-sich] only in terms of some 'thing' else. The structure of Bewandtnis clearly underlies the fact that the condition of possibility which allows entities to be discovered most primordially in their Being is not, as for traditional epistemology, something contained within the thing itself. Rather, the condition of possibility by which an entity is what it is, consists, primarily, in the task at hand. This is also the reason why the totality of equipment, which can now be understood as the totality of tools organized in view of their Bewandtnis, is so to speak *'earlier'* than the single pieces of equipment; since tools are the tools they are only in view of the task at hand; or, better, they are only on the basis of their Bewandtnis.

Therefore, it is never possible to single out a tool, for its being-a-tool always refers 'away-from' itself, 'to' the task at hand; the latter constitutes the organizing principle of a totality of equipment, which, in turn, is the unity of all equipment taken in the perspective of the given task at hand. Thus, dealing appropriately with some equipment entails not only a reference to all other pieces of equipment, but it also, most importantly, requires that the given equipment be discovered in connection with its Bewandtnis.

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[105]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.116, H.84.

Now, according to Heidegger, there can be different Bewandtnisse, which can be, so to speak, horizontally or vertically interconnected. Nevertheless:

> …the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 'towards-which' in which there is *no* further involvement: this 'towards-which' is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of Being, worldhood itself belongs. This primary 'towards-which' is not just another 'towards-this' as something in which an involvement is possible. This primary 'towards-which' is a 'for-the-sake-of-which'[106]

This primary 'towards-which', which is a 'for-the-sake-of-which', is nothing other than Dasein; it pertains to its Being, insofar as "…in its Being, that very Being is an issue for it".[107]

A full explanation of this vertical structure would require an extensive discussion of a few important notions, namely Understanding, Truth [Wahrheit], Care, Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] etc., which will be taken up only much later in this dissertation. Yet the following quote may suffice in explaining the importance of the vertical relation between intraworldly entities and Dasein, as well as justifying Heidegger's conviction that equipment is the primary mode in which entities are discovered by Dasein.

> Any discovering of a totality of involvements goes back to a 'for-the-sake-of-which'; and on the understanding of such 'for-the-sake-of-which' is based in turn the understanding of significance as the disclosedness of the current world. In seeking shelter, sustenance, livelihood, we do so 'for the sake of' constant possibilities of Dasein which are very close to it; upon these the entity for which its own Being is an issue, has already projected itself.[108]

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[106]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 116, H.84.

[107]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 117, H.84.

[108]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.344, H.297.

When Heidegger says that Dasein is the primary 'towards-which' of a totality of Bewandtnis, which is a 'for-the-sake-of-which', he means that the way in which all entities are discovered *to* Dasein depends on Dasein's Being. As we know, the peculiarity of Dasein's Being is that its own Being is an issue for it; this is to say, Dasein's Being is its potentiality-for-Being, which refers to the fact that Dasein understands its Being always in terms of its possibilities to be. Hence, by stating that "…the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 'towards-which' in which there is *no* further involvement",[109] Heidegger implies that the way in which entities *are*, which depends directly on their Bewandtnis, i.e. the condition for entities to be discovered in their Being, is ultimately grounded in the possibilities of Dasein's Being. But why is there no further Bewandtnis beyond Dasein's Being?

If the Bewandtnis of a given entity consists in that condition through which that entity is discovered within a world in terms of Dasein's possibilities, then no entity can be discovered if Dasein has not already been disclosed in its possibilities, that is to say, in its Being. Let us go back now to the discussion concerning the primacy of readiness-to-hand as a mode of the discoveredness of entities. The statement "Taken strictly, there 'is' no such thing as *an* equipment"[110] may appear less arbitrary if one agrees with Heidegger that Dasein's relation to entities depends on Dasein's having always, already a certain understanding of Being. From this, Heidegger's attempts to demonstrate that Dasein's primary way to discover entities is such as to show the origin of this discoveredness in Dasein's own understanding of Being.

As already mentioned, equipment constantly refers [verweist] to other items of equipment, and ultimately to the totality of equipment which is constructed in view of its Bewandtnis. Equipment is discovered in its Bewandtnis, when that equipment shows itself within a system of reference [Verweisung]. The ontological structure that underlies this totality of Bewandtnis consists in this vertical relationship of the 'in-order-to', the 'towards-which', the 'towards-this', and the 'for-the-sake-of'.[111] This underlying referential [Verweisung], relational structure, where Dasein constitutes the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which of all Bewandtnis, is called by Heidegger 'significance' [Bedeutsamkeit]. In §18 Heidegger adds

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[109]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.116, H.84.
[110]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.96, H.68.
[111]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.415, H.364.

that significance, showing forth in the totality of all Bewandtnis, is constitutive for what Heidegger calls the ontological basis of the world, that is, its worldhood. This is not surprising if one keeps in mind that, according to Heidegger, the world is not the totality of entities, but the relational space wherein entities can be disclosed in their Being.[112] Indeed, the ontological basis underlying the totality of Bewandtnis is nothing else but the totality of the conditions within which entities are discovered in their Being; the totality of these conditions is the world in its worldhood and consists in that background according to which entities are disclosed in their being. In this way, through the reference to the totality of equipment and in connection with the structure of significance as the totality of Bewandtnis, equipment is grounded in the world in terms of its worldhood; its ready-to-hand character, openly shows that equipment is grounded in the world itself.

On the other hand, Heidegger is adamant in affirming that the character of the present-at-hand consists in nothing more than a *deficient* way of disclosing entities. This is because, in order to apprehend an entity as an object present-at-hand [Vorhanden Objekten], it is necessary to abstract that entity from its relations 1) with other entities, 2) 'in-order-to' the totality of all entities in their Bewandtnis, 3) for-the-sake-of Dasein, and consider that very entity only in itself, that is, in terms of itself. Hence, an object present-at-hand amounts to nothing more than an item of equipment taken in abstraction from its World.

ii.   Intraworldly entities and Dasein's understanding-of-Being

As I have demonstrated in the previous section, the worldhood of the world is nothing but the Being of the world, intended as "...that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be discovered at all."[113] Disclosing a world in its Being, that is, in its

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[112]As I have previously mentioned, the being always, already immersed in an understanding, or for that matter a Disclosedness, of Being which is proper of Dasein, is what the term World loosely refers to. The World is the space in which entities are discovered as they are. If this is correct, than entities, in order to be the entities they are, must be discovered within the world; that is to say, their being depends on Dasein's understanding of Being. This conclusion is contrary to the way in which traditional epistemology has supposed to gain a primordial access to the nature of entities, believing that the Being of entities could only be found once the object was freed from its context and taken in isolation, i.e. presence-at-hand. On the other hand if entities are discovered primordially, in their being only insofar as Dasein has already an understanding of their Being, which is to say, only insofar as Dasein discovers them alongside [bei] itself in-the-World. Hence, this more primordial way of accessing entities should be one which somehow bears a trace of the connection with the world and, consequently, with Dasein's understanding of Being.

[113]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.121, H.88.

worldhood, means something like disclosing the condition of possibility of the totality of all systems of reference [Verweisung]. Insofar as any system of reference depends hierarchically on Dasein, the disclosure of the world in its worldhood is possible only 'according to Dasein' [bei Dasein]. As such, any Bewandtnis ultimately refers [verweisen] to Dasein's Being as its 'for-the-sake-of-which'; and the discoveredness of ready-to-hand entities in their Bewandtnis, which is grounded in a Disclosedness of the world in its worldhood, strictly depends on the understanding projection of Dasein's own Being. This is to say that, for example, what a hammer 'is' is grounded in its Bewandtnis, i.e. in 'hammering'; 'hammering', in turn, makes sense only within the context of those activities which have to do with building. Ultimately, all possible activities, and not only those, but indeed all possible Bewandtnis, 'make sense' solely in connection with Dasein's needs, expectations, projects, dreams; in short, with Dasein's Being, which in turn is nothing but the continuous 'projection of this very Being into possibilities'. [114]

Now, the fact that Dasein's Being is, in some sense, the ground of the discoveredness of the intraworldly entities, as well as of the Disclosedness of the world, helps us to understand why Heidegger defines Dasein as "…essentially its [own] disclosedness."[115] For, if Dasein's Being consists in a continual ontological projection into its possibilities, and this projection, in turn, grounds the Disclosedness of the world, as well as the possibility of the discoveredness of Entities, then that openness which frees the space for all understanding projection, and which Heidegger calls the 'there', is not merely a property of Dasein's Being; rather, insofar as Dasein's Being consists in an 'understanding projection' of its own Being, it names an existential character of Dasein itself. As I shall explain in a moment, this is what Heidegger calls the ontological character of Dasein. This character does not consist in the Disclosedness *of* anything, but refers to the potentiality of any Disclosedness, which, in turn, grounds the discoveredness of all entities. This is the same as saying that discoveredness, as well as Disclosedness, is grounded in that for Dasein "…in its very Being, its Being is an issue."[116]

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[114]To understand these possibilities in terms of the Sartrian 'life-project' may be helpful at this stage in order to understand some of the final connections between the Disclosedness of the totality of Bewadntnis and the understanding-of-Being. Nevertheless, such an approach is reductive and should not be taken as Heidegger's own.

[115]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.263, H.221.

[116]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32, H.11.

Later in this dissertation I will return to the fact that this 'being an issue' refers to Dasein's fundamental relationality to its Being.

I can, at this point, establish a further connection between the discoveredness of entities, especially as ready-to-hand equipment, and Dasein's Being, since the latter stands as the ultimate ground of the discoveredness of entities. On the basis of this inference, one may further argue that the discoveredness of all entities 'depends', strictly speaking, on Dasein, or, at least, on its Being. But in what sense do entities 'depend' on Dasein, or on its Being? Does this 'dependence' necessarily entail that, for Heidegger, the way in which Dasein understands entities causes the way these entities *actually are* in their Being? Does this position Heidegger as an idealist? In order to answer these questions, this 'dependence', which I have already mentioned in the previous section, needs to be further analysed.

Let us start with an excerpt from *Being and Time*, already mentioned in the previous section, which seems to spell out the way in which Heidegger conceives this 'dependence'. In §39 Heidegger says: "[e]ntities *are*, quite independently of the experience by which they are disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in which their nature is ascertained."[117] But he immediately adds: "...Being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs."[118] Hence, the question is: how can intraworldly entities 'be' independently from their being-discovered (disclosed or grasped), if their Being depends on Dasein's understanding of Being, which is in turn the condition of possibility of any discoveredness (Disclosedness or grasping)? Indeed, it appears at best contradictory to maintain that intraworldly entities –such as birds, planets, hammers, etc.- would continue to be independently of whether or not Dasein existed, while that which allows intraworldly entities to be, namely, Being, is strictly dependent on Dasein's understanding of it; so much so that "only as long as Dasein *is* (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), 'is there' Being."[119] Is Heidegger suggesting that intraworldly entities somehow 'are' *in-themselves*, yet they *exist* for Dasein only as long as they are understood against an *a priori condition* which allows these entities

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[117]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.228, H.183.

[118]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.228, H.183.

[119]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.255, H.212.

to be what they are *for* Dasein? If this were the case, Heidegger's philosophy would not be very far from Kant's transcendental idealism.[120]

In his essay "Heidegger's Kantian Idealism Revised", William Blattner suggests a different approach. According to him, the only plausible interpretation of the aforementioned excerpt from *Being and Time* relies on the fact that:

> …dependence and independence are concepts that are in turn defined in terms of existence. For *x* to be dependent on *y* is for it to be the case that *x* would not exist, if *y* did not. Likewise, if *x* is independent of *y*, then *x* can exist, even when *y* does not. This means that dependence and independence are concepts that are defined in terms of further concepts (existence and non-existence) that are themselves undefined, when the conception of objectivity or understanding of being (the rules of the existence game, as it were) are suspended.[121]

Heidegger makes the same point in §43, albeit in a rather more cryptic manner, when he states:

> Only because Being is 'in the consciousness' – that is to say, only because it is understandable in Dasein – can Dasein also understand and conceptualize such characteristics of being as independence, the 'in-itself', and Reality in general. Only because of this are 'independent' entities, as encountered within-the-world, accessible to circumspection.[122]

And further:

> When Dasein does not exist, 'independence' 'is' not, nor 'is' the 'in-itself. In such a case this sort of things can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor hidden. *In such a case* it

[120]There is indeed a transcendental 'signature' in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, which may have to do with the transcendental reduction typical of phenomenology. However, the innovation of Heidgger's philosophy consists in maintaining the possibility of a *transcendent*. The latter consists in the basis -not the ground- of any Disclosedness of Being.

[121]William Blattner, "Heidegger's Kantian idealism revisited", *Inquiry* 47:4 (2004), p.326.

[122]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 251, H.207-208.

cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. But now, as long there is an understanding of Being and therefore an understanding of presence-at-hand, it can indeed be said that *in this case* entities will still continue to be.[123]

A passage from Blattner's paper helps to clarify Heidegger's final sentence further:

> Right now, as I look out of the window of my study, I see a house finch at my bird feeder. Neither the feeder nor the finch depends on me or my mind; in fact, neither depends on the existence of human beings at all. All human beings could simultaneously cease to exist right now, and the finch and the feeder would persist. In order to assert in this way the independence of the finch and feeder from my mind, I have to assume a set of causal facts about the world: although my psychological states are sustained in existence by the operation of my mind, and therefore depend upon my mind, neither the finch nor the feeder are thus sustained. They are causally independent of me, indeed, of us. We thus see that if we take for granted our basic conception of objectivity, the world is mostly independent of us. [124]

In other words, entities *are* independent of Dasein's discoveredness of them; yet, their *being independent* is possible only insofar as a certain understanding-of-Being already belongs to Dasein. The reason for this lies in the fact that, as I have demonstrated previously in this chapter, Dasein's continual standing within an understanding [Verständnis] of its own Being [Sein] results in that projection [Entwurf] according to which a world is disclosed in its significance. On the basis of this disclosure of the world, intraworldly entities are discovered in their Bewandtnis. This is because it is only through a disclosure of the world in its worldhood -i.e. according to significance- that a 'potentiality for discoveredness' can be established. In this sense, entities may be encountered independently from Dasein only there where the possibility for their discoveredness has already been established; only there where a world has already been disclosed in its worldhood.[125]

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[123]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.255, H.212.
[124]William Blattner, "Heidegger's Kantian idealism revisited", *Inquiry* 47:4 (2004), p.324.
[125]While Heidegger's approach here is certainly somehow at odds with Cartesian philosophy and Transcendental Idealism, it is strongly influenced by a Hegel's Absolute Idealism, especially in its social grounding of the meaning of entities, as recently argued by Robert Pippin in "On Being Anti-Cartesian: Heidegger, Hegel, Subjectivity and Sociality", in *Idealism as Modernism: Hegelian Variations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.375-394, and echoed by Terry Pinkard in German Philosophy 1760-1860: *The Legacy of Idealism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp.216-304 . However, it must be clarified that, in

I have already mentioned that the Disclosedness of the world in its worldhood is possible only on the ground of Dasein being its 'there'. This 'there' names Dasein's fundamentally ontological character, that is, Dasein's fundamental Being consists in its taking issue with its very own Being; or, which is the same, in always, already entertaining a *relation* with that Being. Dasein takes issue with its own Being by projecting its possibilities according to the meaning of its very Being; as such, this kind of projecting is intrinsically 'understanding'. This understanding projection signals the fact that Dasein's own Being is constantly 'an issue for it'. Hence, this projecting understanding is strictly speaking Dasein's understanding-of-Being. In this understanding relation with, or projection of its own Being, Dasein *is* that Disclosedness which grounds the disclosure of the world in its worldhood, in its significance for Dasein; and this disclosure, in turn, grounds the potentiality for the discoveredness of entities. The question one needs to ask now is: in what way does Dasein *always, already* possess a fundamental understanding-of-Being?

iii.   Dasein's Pre-Ontological understanding-of-Being and das Man

At the outset of *Being and Time* the dependence of the Disclosedness of the world in its worldhood from Dasein is interpreted in light of Dasein's understanding-of-Being [Seinsverständins]. This understanding-of-Being is defined as pre-ontological, as it fundamentally precedes Dasein's explicit questioning regarding its Being. This is to say that, in Heidegger's words, "...the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein –the pre-ontological understanding of Being".[126] This is what, at the outset of this chapter, I have called Heidegger's first and fundamental intuition, namely, that Dasein behaves as if its Being has always, already been interpretatively understood.[127] Thanks to its pre-ontological understanding-of-Being, Dasein can explicitly raise the question of Being; the latter affords Dasein its primacy among all other entities, as the only entity which can both ask and answer the question of Being. This

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my view, the fundamental sociality on which Heidegger grounds all meaningful practices is at bottom not the mere relation between Daseins (which is rather a consequence) but the relationality between Dasein and its Being.

[126]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.35, H.15.

[127]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 36, H.15.

primacy does not depend on an explicit theory about Being which is in some way 'innate' to Dasein, but on Dasein's innate possibility to develop an ontology, starting from this pre-ontological understanding.

The 'discovery' of the pre-ontological basis of ontology, constitutes Heidegger's crucial premise in view of his fierce critique of traditional –especially Cartesian- epistemology, because it undercuts one its most fundamental issues, namely the epistemological connection between subject and object. For Heidegger, Dasein is always, already alongside other entities, in a world where a certain understanding of the Being of these entities has always, already been disclosed to Dasein itself. Hence, the primary concern of philosophy would no longer be to establish the nature of the connection between subject and object, but would consist in attempting to render explicit the disclosing relation between the human Dasein and the ground of all Disclosedness, its Being. Within this framework, Dasein's pre-ontological understanding of Being should be interpreted as a special kind of disclosing relation between Dasein and its Being.

Nonetheless, it is important to clarify that, while this pre-ontological relation of understanding constitutes the launching pad of Heidegger's innovative philosophical expedition, it does not and cannot constitute its fundamental ground. This point is clearly expressed by Heidegger in §5 of *Being and Time*, when referring to Dasein, he states:

> To be sure, its [Dasein's] ownmost Being is such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if its Being has been interpreted in some manner. But we are certainly not saying that when Dasein's own Being is thus interpreted pre-ontologically in the way which lies closest, this interpretation can be taken over as an appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what must emerge when one's ownmost state of Being is considered- as an ontological theme. The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is rather such that, in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant-in terms of the 'world'. [128]

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[128]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 36 H.15.

Hence, despite emphasising the important role which Dasein's pre-ontological understanding-of-Being plays in the development of an explicit ontology, Heidegger certainly has no intention of reducing ontology to a pre-ontological phenomenon. In fact, the pre-ontological understanding-of-Being, which functions as the primary way in which Dasein understands its Being, does not render Dasein's Being in any way explicit; its outcome is a basic discoveredness of entities in the world, which effectively conceals the Disclosedness of Being within which it is grounded.

In the previous section, I have established that entities are primarily discovered according to the world; the latter is that 'significant space' within which all entities, including Dasein, are manifested. Such a space is fundamentally grounded in Dasein's own understanding relationship with its Being. Hence, entities are discovered according to the way in which Dasein understands its Being. Now, as specified in the previous quote, Dasein has the tendency to understand its Being in terms of intraworldly entities, which, in their everydayness, are primarily discovered as equipment, that is, according to their ready-to-hand character. Since all discoveredness of entities ultimately depends on Dasein's understanding of Being, there has to be a corresponding primary, everyday way in which Dasein understands itself in its Being. This is what Heidegger calls das Man. Despite there being still much disagreement among scholars regarding the interpretation of the phenomenon of das Man, it is possible to provide an uncontroversial description concerning its general features.

In relation to equipment, das Man refers to that pre-ontological ground according to which entities are discovered in terms of what 'one does' with them, 'one understands' of them, 'one says' about them. In this sense entities such as forks, hammers, nails, houses, art, happiness, are what they are, i.e. have Being, insofar as an average Dasein would relate to them in accordance with a set of 'standard aims', or, with Heidegger, a set of normal 'in-order-tos' [Um-zu]. Now, as I have stated more than once in the course of this dissertation, all 'in-order-tos' ultimately depend on that 'for-the-sake-of-which' that is Dasein itself. Das Man is nothing but the way in which Dasein, through its pre-ontological, average understanding of Being, constitutes the 'for-the-sake-of-which' of a set of average ways to discover entities according to their average 'in-order-tos'. For this reason, das Man is,

according to Heidegger, the answer to the question "*who* it is that Dasein is in its everydayness?"[129]

As I shall consider more thoroughly later in this chapter, through this phenomenon, Heidegger begins to highlight the fact that, even in its average everydayness, Dasein's primary way to disclose its Being and discover intraworldly entities is not isolating, as is supposed by traditional epistemology. Instead, it strongly relies on a shared 'background', so connatural to Dasein that is itself an existential way of Dasein's Being. This is what Heidegger names Dasein's Being-with [Mitsein]. In its everydayness, however, as Dasein's Being remains fundamentally hidden, what shows itself as das Man is the pre-ontological understanding of intraworldly entities which Dasein shares with other Daseins, in its indistinguishableness from them. As such, das Man neither refers to a particular Dasein, nor to the totality of Daseins, but to 'any Dasein', in the sense of what 'anyone does'. Additionally, it is fair to define das Man as an essentially inauthentic phenomenon, since the pre-ontological shared Disclosedness of Being granted to Dasein in a 'das Man' state-of Being is one that interprets Dasein in terms of the shared world, by covering up Being itself.[130]

The fact that the phenomenon of das Man is rooted in inauthenticity does not mean that das Man is itself a negative phenomenon. Far from it, das Man is what affords Dasein's primary discoveredness of entities in their ready-to-hand everydayness, that is, according to the way in which 'anyone discovers' them. This is because, at bottom, das Man represents the primary, everyday way a Dasein understands its Being. Hence, insofar as the primary way in which Dasein understands its Being is pre-ontological, it should be fair to define das Man as pre-ontological. By the same token, since das Man is classified by Heidegger as the inauthentic way in which Dasein at once reveals and conceals its own Being, I may argue that Dasein's pre-ontological understanding-of-Being needs be at bottom inauthentic. And given that all understanding-of-Being is, more appropriately, a Disclosedness of the latter, then I may be entitled to define Dasein's pre-ontological understanding-of-Being as an inauthentic Disclosedness.

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[129]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 149, H.114.
[130]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.168 H.130.

The importance of this interpretation will be clear as the present analysis progresses. For now, I shall attempt to illustrate how an interpretation which overstates the importance of the inauthentic Disclosedness afforded by das Man inherently misses the central aim of Heidegger's enterprise. One such interpretation is that of Huber Dreyfus.

iv. Disclosing as 'they do': the Pragmatic Interpretation of *Being and Time*

Long before its publication in 1991 under the title *Being-in-the-World*, Hubert Dreyfus' commentary was already considered one of the most influential readings of *Being and Time* written or translated in English. Still today Dreyfus' work needs to be included in any respectable bibliography of a study on *Being and Time*, and any scholar who dares to undertake an interpretation of this philosophical masterpiece in English must to a certain extent measure his or her own analysis against Dreyfus' reading.

Dreyfus develops his reading pivoting on Heidegger's notions of equipment [Zeug] and das Man or, as he translates it, 'the they'. The latter is particularly important, since Dreyfus' answer to Heidegger's ontological questions is based on a peculiar interpretation of the concept of das Man. In the previous section, I provided a general overview of the concept of das Man. In this present section, I aim to show that Dreyfus' interpretation engages only with one half of Heidegger's analysis and that, importantly, the questions he raises in relation to Heidegger's masterwork can be better clarified through a careful reading of the Division Two of *Being and Time*.

Dreyfus begins his analysis from the concept of existence. "For Heidegger," he says "existence does not mean simply to be real. Stones and God do not exist in his sense of the term. Only self-interpreting beings exist".[131] Indeed, strictly speaking, only Dasein exists. But what does it mean for Dasein to exist in this way? Or else, what does it mean for Dasein to be a self-interpreting entity? In Heidegger's words, "to be sure, [Dasein's] ownmost Being is such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case as if

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[131]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.15.

its being has been interpreted in some manner."[132] This is, according to Heidegger, what distinguish Dasein from those things which do not, so to speak, 'dasein',[133] namely, intraworldly entities. In this sense, Heidegger affirms that "Dasein is ontically distinctive" from intraworldly entities "in that it *is* ontological".[134] 'Being ontological' means nothing but to have an understanding-of-Being. Hence, the issue is to clarify what an understanding-of-Being actually consists in. Dreyfus begins explaining his view with an example taken from Caudill's and Weinstein's *Maternal Care and Infant Behaviour in Japan and in America*.

> A Japanese baby seems passive… He lies quietly… while his mother, in her care, does [a great deal of] lulling, carrying, and rocking of her baby. She seems to try to soothe and quiet the child, and to communicate with him physically rather than verbally. On the other hand, the American infant is more active… and exploring of his environment, and his mother, in her care, does more looking at and chatting to her baby. She seems to stimulate the baby to activity and vocal response. It is as if the American mother wanted to have a vocal active baby, and the Japanese mother wanted to have a quiet, contented baby. In terms of styles of care-taking of the mothers in the two cultures, they get what they apparently want… A great deal of cultural learning has taken place by three to four months of age… babies have learned by this time to be Japanese and American babies.[135]

The way in which Americans and Japanese would relate to the world of objects would fit in to their respective understanding of what it means to be a human being. "It would make no sense for Americans" Dreyfus says, "who we are supposing to be active, independent, and aggressive –constantly striving to cultivate and satisfy their desires- to relate to things, [such as a tea cup], the way the Japanese do, or for the Japanese (before their understanding of being was interfered with by ours) to invent and prefer styrofoam tea cups".[136]

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[132]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.36, H.15.
[133] Here the term 'dasein' is used as a verb.
[134]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32, H.12.
[135]W. Caudill and H. Weinstein, *Maternal Care and Infant Behavoius in Japan and in America*, as quoted in: Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.17.
[136]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.18.

More broadly, this suggests that the way in which our world is disclosed, as well as the way in which we discover entities in this world, is implicitly rooted in an ontology, that is, in a Disclosedness of Being. In itself, this is nothing new: from Plato to Husserl, philosophers have thought there was 'something' which grounded our knowledge. As such, the way in which objects are understood by a subject strictly depends on something like a system of beliefs, where the latter is constantly present to the subject whenever the subject itself is engaged in an intention of an object.

Conversely, Dreyfus argues that according to Heidegger, Dasein's discoveredness of entities is not determined by a pervasive system of rules, which can be brought to consciousness and studied at will. Rather, as in the example of the Japanese and the American tea cup, the underlying understanding-of-Being, from which all discoveredness of entities depends, remains for the most part in the background and "is contained in our knowing-how-to-cope in various domains, [rather] … than in a set of beliefs that such and such is the case".[137] In this sense the terms 'American' and 'Japanese' seem to "embody an understanding of Being which no one has in mind".[138] Having established this point, Dreyfus attempts to clarify the nature of this understanding-of-Being by drawing on another phenomenon developed by Heidegger in *Being and Time*, that of circumspection [Umsicht]. Circumspection names the fact that Dasein is always already aware of other entities in terms of their readiness-to-hand. Dreyfus then tries to explain what circumspection means byway of the following example:

> A person in the midst of the flow of experience is both keenly aware of his or her own actions and oblivious to that awareness itself. One rock climber remarks: "you are so involved in what you are doing you aren't thinking of yourself as separate from the immediate activity… You don't see yourself as separate from what you are doing".[139]

The merits of this example need be investigated further. As it stands, Dreyfus risks stressing excessively the athlete's unawareness of the set of rules and techniques which are generally associated with rock-climbing, concealing, on the other hand, the particular kind of

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[137]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.18.

[138]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.18.

[139]Richard Mitchell, *Mountain Experience, The Psychology and Sociology of Adventure*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); quoted in: Hubert Dreyfus*, Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.66.

awareness which is characteristic of circumspection. Heidegger explicitly addresses this second aspect in §15, when he argues"

> 'Practical' behaviour is not 'atheoretical' in the sense of 'sightlessness'. The way it differs from theoretical behaviour does not lie simply in the fact that in theoretical behaviour one observes, while in practical behaviour one acts, and that action must employ theoretical cognition if it is not to remain blind; for the fact that observation is a kind of concern is just as primordial as the fact that action has *its own* kind of sight.[140]

Yet, in what sense can this 'sight' be both 'theoretical' [theoretisch] and 'a-theoretical' [atheoretisch]? Dreyfus settles the question by appealing to the notion of the 'knowing-how', intended as a way of engaging with entities which does not involve explicit mental contents but a mere implicit understanding of how to perform a certain action, as in the example of the rock-climber. The fact that this understanding may be taught and learnt and, therefore, expressed explicitly as a set of rules or beliefs does not exclude the fact that, after having learnt how to do something, the given action can be performed, and indeed is best performed, without an explicit awareness of the set of rules and beliefs that are involved in the action itself.

Nevertheless, it is important to notice that, in the example of the rock-climber, despite the fact that the action performed almost necessitates the lack of an explicit mental content to accompany the performance of the action itself, the very same action does rely on an implicit understanding. But what, then, is this implicit understanding? To answer this question, Dreyfus draws once again from Heidegger's discussion of readiness-to-hand, where Dasein's primary relation to entities is described in terms of practical engagement rather than detached contemplation. According to Dreyfus, within the context of this discussion, Heidegger replaces "the constituting activity of detached transcendental consciousness with the constituting activity of involved existential Dasein".[141] This is to say that whenever Dasein is, for example, hammering a nail, the hammer and the nail are discovered by Dasein in their Being, within the context of the activity of hammering. However, the hammer and the nail are

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[140]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.99, H.69.

[141]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.141.

not manifested as objects, so to speak, abstractly. Rather, as I have as already discussed in the previous sections of this chapter, their primordial discoveredness shows them in terms of their relation to other entities, whose reciprocal reference [Verwesisung] is grounded in the world, disclosed according to Dasein's Being. Keeping this in mind, let us turn to Dreyfus' analysis of circumspection, beginning with the following passage:

> For Husserl the intentional content of individual transcendental consciousness was self-sufficient, intelligible, immediately and indubitably given to phenomenological reflection, and could be made explicit. The skills of Dasein, on the other hand, have been shown to be neither self-sufficient (since they are not analysable in terms of intentional content), nor intelligible apart from the world (which is not directly given but necessarily stays in the background), nor explicable (since they do not involve conscious or unconscious beliefs and rules). [142]

Circumspection is therefore that implicit understanding which gives 'sight' to Dasein's practical involvement with intraworldly entities in terms of their ready-to-hand equipmentality. The kind of circumspection described by Dreyfus is fundamentally a 'know-how' which is not in a subject's mind, but consists in the primary relation between Dasein and intraworldly entities.

Regrettably, Dreyfus does not explore the actual ground of the possibility of this relation. Such an exploration is necessary given that, if a certain 'knowing-how' is always, already implied whenever Dasein relates to entities, it is unclear whether this background may be initially learnt, as Dreyfus seems to suggest. [143] Undoubtedly, all relations between Dasein and intraworldly entities imply always, already some form of knowing-how. Is Dasein's understanding therefore just 'given'? If so, then it cannot be wholly learnt. Yet, all human Daseins certainly do seem to learn what a hammer is and how to use it. In order to avoid this impasse, Dreyfus' interpretation appeals to the notion of das Man.

For Dreyfus, das Man essentially equates to a broad concept of society, in which the most common 'knowing-hows' come to be shared as what 'one does'. In this sense, the concept of

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[142]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.141.

[143]Hubert Dreyfus *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.145.

das Man refers to the 'normal user', "as in 'one eats one's peas with a fork'".[144] What this 'normal user' amounts to is dependent on a set of normal 'for-the-sake-of-whichs', that are not personal to individual Dasein, but are instead "provided by society".[145] More importantly, according to Dreyfus, someone is a Dasein only insofar as he or she is socialized into these 'for-the-sake-of-whichs'. This fact also implies that Dasein does not actually *become* socialized, but rather, it finds itself always already socialized insofar as it is a Dasein.

> Public skills and for-the-sake-of-whichs must be taken over (presumably by imitation) before there can be any Dasein with thoughts and activities at all. Society is the ontological source of familiarity and readiness that makes the ontological discovering of entities, of others, and even of myself possible.[146]

This passage constitutes the heart of Dreyfus' interpretation of *Being and Time*. In it, Dreyfus summarily argues that das Man, understood as a sort of social principle, is the source of that average understanding which constitutes the basis for the Disclosedness of the world as the totality of the 'normal' Bewandtnis according to [*bei*] Dasein'; this, in turn, grounds the possibility of discoveredness of all entities in their Being. Yet this does not mean that das Man is the source of an explicit set of rules and norms which can be shared or taught 'in theory'. Rather, since the for-the-sake-of-whichs that determine the Being of an entity must be taken over 'presumably by imitation', Dasein can uncover entities only by practically engaging with them in a way which does not involve an explicit mental content, i.e. in action.[147]

Now, Dreyfus insists that the Disclosedness of the World can happen only against the background of shared cultural practices which, in Dreyfus' interpretation, coincides with das Man. In what follows, I hope to demonstrate that, whilst a dependable interpretation of this

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[144]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.151.

[145]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.144.

[146]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.145.

[147]The phenomenon in which Dasein engages with intraworldly entities 'in action' is referred to by Heidegger as circumspection [Vorsicht]. Dreyfus seems to extend the terms of this phenomenon beyond the simple pre-ontological awareness of intraworldly entities, to the understanding of the Being of those entities which are ontological, i.e. Dasein itself. Insofar as das Man something like an 'ontological source' of circumspection, it also, and more in general, becomes the source of Dasein's understanding of others' Being, that is also its Being.

phenomenon would constitute the necessary basis for a consistent reading of *Being and Time*, Dreyfus fails to provide a sound interpretation of Heidegger's text concerning the phenomenon of Disclosedness itself.

In the previous section, I have clarified in what sense Heidegger suggests that discoveredness of intraworldly entities is dependent on Dasein's Being, even though intraworldly entities may 'be' independently of it. I have also reached a further conclusion concerning the nature Disclosedness; that is, while it is true that Dasein's Being 'is' the ground of the Disclosedness of the world, and the discoveredness of entities, it is so only on the basis of its having an understanding relation with its Being. The question is whether such an understanding relation may be equated with das Man, as Dreyfus seems to suggest, and whether this interpretation is ultimately in keeping with the intention of Heidegger's text, as I have presented it in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.

Dreyfus does indeed identify the grounding structure which goes from the discoveredness of intraworldly entities to the understanding relation between Dasein and its Being, passing through the Disclosure of the world in its worldhood as significance, in terms of Dasein's understanding projections. He writes:

> The basic idea is that for a particular person to be directed towards a particular piece of equipment, whether using it, perceiving it, or whatever, there must be a correlation between that person's general skills for coping and the interconnected equipmental whole in which the thing has a place. On the side of Dasein's, originary transcendence (*disclosing*) is the condition of the possibility of ontic transcendence (*discovering*), and on the side of the world, *disclosedness* is the condition of the possibility of anything being *discovered*.[148]

The hierarchy that Dreyfus proposes here is therefore identical to what I have already established in the course of this dissertation. Furthermore, in his final conclusions, Dreyfus establishes a grounding connection between what he calls "Dasein's pre-ontological

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[148]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.102.

understanding of various ways of being"[149] – something that probably coincides with what Heidegger more often calls understanding-of-Being – and "the disclosedness opened by Dasein's self-interpreting activity".[150] Indeed, according to him, "[t]here would be no understanding of being without primordial disclosedness, and no disclosedness without this understanding of being, and both depend on Dasein".[151]

While this is superficially correct, Dreyfus' interpretation appears more preoccupied with answering the pragmatic and analytic question 'why we understand things the way we do?' rather than focus on the central issue of Being. This is reinforced by Dreyfus' apparent obliviousness to the constitutive connection between the phenomenon of understanding and that of Disclosedness, as well as his utter disregard for Division Two of *Being and Time* where the discussion about Dasein's understanding of entities is to an extent superseded by the more foundational investigation concerning the Being of Dasein and its meaning.

Guided by his concern to ground the average human understanding of intraworldly entities, Dreyfus' reading of *Being and Time* completely strays from Heidegger's intention, and from my interpretation, as it considers the dependence of Disclosedness from Dasein to be grounded wholly in Dasein's thrownness, determined inauthentically by its existential falling; that is to say, within the phenomenon of das Man. In other words, according to Dreyfus, intraworldly entities are understood/discovered only insofar as Dasein is, so to speak, 'socialized' in a world in which everything already possesses a '*normal* way of being', which would determine the way entities are discovered 'for any-one'. The average understanding which is provided by das Man would afford Dasein a kind of pre-emptive knowledge concerning what entities 'are', or, which is the same, concerning their Being. In this sense, the term das Man refers to Dasein as it understands its Being in a pre-given, average way. Yet, is the latter not just what Heidegger refers to with the phrase 'pre-ontological understanding-of-Being? For this phrase names nothing but that existential phenomenon for which Dasein finds itself always, already thrown into an understanding relationship with Being prior to having 'consciously' taken it up. Arguing that, to Dasein, this understanding is always necessarily given, implies that entities are always, already uncovered for it, as well as

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[149]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.280.
[150]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.280.
[151]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), p.280.

that, to it, a world is always, in some sense, disclosed. As such, Dreyfus is correct in arguing that das Man constitutes that background which first allows Dasein to enter into a relationship of discoveredness with intraworldly entities, and to find out a world in its Disclosedness.

Nevertheless, this should not be taken to mean, as Dreyfus does, that das Man would in fact constitute the *definitive* ground for the discoveredness of all entities, the Disclosedness of the world, as well as, ultimately, the Disclosedness of Being, in general. Rather, if das Man can be associated with the phenomenon of the pre-ontological understanding-of-Being as the 'who' of such understanding, it may be legitimate to infer that das Man itself engenders nothing more than *a particular kind* of understanding-of-Being; indeed, this kind of understanding is not necessarily the most primordial, despite being the first which Dasein happens to encounter. This is in line with Heidegger's peculiar understanding of 'first phenomena', where their being 'first' is due to their being encountered in the first instance rather than to their being more 'ontologically grounding'. This is consistent with Heidegger's belief that what is ontologically most primordial, i.e. Being, is at first hidden, as it is primarily covered over.

Therefore, it may be fair to define Dreyfus' interpretation as only superficially correct, since it mistakenly takes das Man to be what grounds the Disclosedness of Being in general. Since by Disclosedness of Being in general what I refer to is the condition of possibility for the emergence of truth, which *is* Dasein itself, due to its being ontological -i.e. always having an understanding relation to its Being-, then das Man itself has surely to do with the notion of understanding-of-Being. Yet, the phenomenon of das Man merely names that condition of Dasein in which its Being, i.e. the fact that it has always already an understanding relation with its Being, is constantly assumed, covered-over, and neglected. Surely, das Man names a fundamental way of Dasein's Being, which consists in the inalienable starting point for any question concerning Dasein's Being and a necessary condition for the possibility of any ontological Disclosedness.[152] However, das Man constitutes the subject only of a mere subspecies of Disclosedness, that is, the kind of inauthentic Disclosedness which we have

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[152]Cfr: "From this kind of Being which belongs to the 'they –the kind which is closest- everyday Dasein draws its pre-ontological way of interpreting its Being. In the first instance ontological Interpretation follows the tendency to interpret in this way: it understands Dasein in terms of the world and comes across it as an entity within the world. But this is not all: even that meaning of Being on the basis of which these 'subject' entities get understood, is one which that ontology of Dasein which is 'closest' to us lets itself present in terms of the 'world'." [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.168, H.129-130].

equated with Dasein's pre-ontological understanding-of-Being. Now, if Heidegger's project is at all feasible, if Dasein does indeed have a chance to formulate correctly the question of Being, or, even further, devise an *explicit* ontology, then a pre-ontological understanding of Being cannot be but a starting point, and cannot certainly be taken as the ultimate ground onto which Dasein may stand in its openness to the truth of Being. For, if Dasein in its Disclosedness can in fact be the clearing within which the truth of Being may be manifested in terms of an ontology, then the Disclosedness which is to allow for such an ontology cannot be closed in principle to an explicit understanding of Being.

For the reasons I have outlined above, Dreyfus' interpretation concerning das Man as the fundamental way of Dasein in its understanding, disclosing relation with its Being must ultimately be rejected. In other words, Dasein's 'das Man' way of Being, which shows itself in that pre-ontological understanding-of-Being which I have termed 'inauthentic Disclosedness', cannot be taken to be paradigmatic in respect with that Disclosedness of Dasein's Being which Heidegger refers to with the words "[Dasein] is its 'there'."[153] On the other hand, Dreyfus makes his position clear when, in a crucial section of *Being-in-the-world* he writes "…human beings, by the time they have Dasein in them, are 'always, already' socialized. … One cannot ask: 'at what age does Dasein get socialized? *Babies* get socialized, but they do not Dasein [verb] until they are *already* socialized."[154] Yet this cannot be taken to imply that Dasein's Being can be ultimately disclosed solely within the horizon of an inauthentic Disclosedness, that is, pre-ontologically. Indeed Heidegger is quite explicit on this point as he argues:

> But we are certainly not saying that when Dasein's own Being is thus interpreted pre-ontologically in the way which lies closest, this interpretation can be taken over as an appropriate clue, as if this way of understanding Being is what must emerge when one's ownmost state of Being is considered as an ontological theme.[155]

Dasein must instead develop an explicit ontology which is to reveal the meaning of its own Being. And this can only be achieved if Dasein can be found to entertain an explicit

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[153]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.263, H.220.

[154]Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), pp.144-145.

[155]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 36, H.15.

understanding relation with its Being, through which its own Being is constantly projected upon its meaning. As I will attempt to show in the following chapter, this relation is in fact one of Disclosedness and depends upon the specific meaning of Dasein's Being, namely, temporality.

3. DISCLOSEDNESS AND THE MEANING OF BEING

If the conclusion of the preceding chapter is correct, any discussion concerning the role of the phenomenon of Disclosedness in *Being and Time* cannot be attempted without having first carried out a thorough analysis of the concept of meaning [Sinn] and its role in the broader economy of Heidegger's masterwork. For whenever something is disclosed, it is always so *as* that which that something *is*, that is, in accordance with its 'meaning'. The hermeneutical model implicit in this statement entails a fundamental shift away from the traditional correspondence theory of truth, where the latter depends on the correct access of the understanding to the 'in-itself' of its object.

As previously described, whilst Heidegger does not believe this model to be inherently incorrect, in *Being and Time* he questions the primacy of the separateness between subject and object on which any correspondence theory of truth is based. Conversely, hermeneutic truth is grounded in the fundamental unity which in the previous chapter has been identified with Dasein's Being-in-the-World. This is because the world is Dasein's *hermeneutic situation*,[156] where entities are discovered and Being is disclosed according to the projectual 'aim' of the possibilities of Dasein's Being, that is to say, in terms of meaning. This meaning is nothing other than Dasein's Being itself as it enters into a relation of intelligibility with Dasein, which is possible 1) on the ground of Dasein's primordial falling, 2) on the basis of Dasein's fundamental disposition, and 3) in such a way as to be inherently expressible in language. From this, commentators such as Cristina Lafont have inferred that, according to Heidegger, meaning must fundamentally determine the Being of entities, so much as to be the primary source of truth. Building on the connection between meaning and language, Lafont has proposed a model where truth is not only hermeneutically but also linguistically construed. In the context of this model language becomes the limiting space within which anything can be articulated. Keeping in mind that according to Heidegger meaning is "that

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[156]Cfr: Alfred Denker, *Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy*, (London: The Scarecrow Press, 2000), p.244.

which can be Articulated in interpretation",[157] Lafont has further argued that, firstly, anything can be discovered or disclosed only within the framework of language and that, secondly, language determines the way in which anything is actually discovered or disclosed.

Other commentators, such as Steven Crowell, have also engaged seriously with the connection between truth and meaning, albeit less radically. Crowell himself interprets the phenomenon of Disclosedness in terms of meaning, and defines it as 'the space of meaning'. This space, which is essentially phenomenological, enshrines the fundamental relation between the intentional subject, Dasein, and its transcendental ground, Being.

In the present chapter I intend to demonstrate that, whilst some of the core tenets of Lafont's interpretation are deeply flawed, Crowell's research into the phenomenological roots of Heidegger's philosophy of meaning puts us on the route towards a more comprehensive interpretation of *Being and Time*. In an attempt to demonstrate these points, I will begin with an analysis of the concept of meaning, by expounding on the connections between meaning, understanding and articulation, in Section i.; in Section ii. I will consider the role of the concept of meaning in relation to Dasein's Being, namely, Care, which will lead me into a discussion concerning the very meaning of Care, i.e. temporality. This will help me to set the scene for a direct analysis of Lafont's and Crowell's interpretations which I will undertake in final two sections, Section iii. and Section iv, and this will assist me to ascertain their relevance in the context of my own attempt to develop a more relational reading of *Being and Time*.

i.   Meaning, Understanding and Articulation

The concept of 'meaning' in *Being and Time* is possibly one of the most central and yet one of the most elusive notions in the book. Despite seemingly framing the entire discussion concerning the question of Being [Seinsfrage] from the onset of the book, the concept of meaning itself does not begin to be investigated until §32, in the course of Heidegger's analysis of Understanding and Interpretation. According to Heidegger, "[w]hen entities within the world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein –that is, when they have

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[157]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.204, H.161.

come to be understood- we say that they have *meaning* [Sinn]."[158] Since the meaning of something is primarily attributed to the something itself, traditional notions of meaning tend to interpret it as that which an entity 'possesses'. Conversely, Heidegger insists that meaning is not a "property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'."[159] Hence, an understanding interpretation does not deal with a mere 'mental image' of that which is understood, as if meaning were a middle realm between res cogitans and res extensa. Rather it shows the thing itself "as it enters into the intelligibility of Dasein".[160] Indeed, whenever something is understood in its meaning, what is understood "taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or, alternatively, Being." [161] When something enters into the intelligibility of Dasein, it means that it has been understood, that is to say, it has been projected according to its ownmost possibilities. These possibilities are interpreted according to a formal existential framework which "makes possible what has been projected".[162] This formal existential framework is nothing other than 'meaning', that is, *"the 'upon-which' of a primary projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something"*.[163]

In this way, meaning comes to be understood as a kind of transcendental condition of possibility, in that it allows something to be manifested in its ownmost possibilities, as what that something is. Hence, entities 'are in-themselves' as they are understood and interpreted within the space of significance which is open in accordance with the projectual Disclosedness of Dasein's Being. Here Heidegger demonstrates a very phenomenological point, that is, entities do not have meaning independently from Dasein, as their significance consists in their being understood according to their for-the-sake-of-which, that is, according to Dasein's 'intentions'. As such, only Dasein *has* meaning, since entities become significant only within Dasein's projectual Disclosedness.[164] As such, while Signification [Bedeutung] is

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[158]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.192-193, H.151.
[159]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.151.
[160]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.152.
[161] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.192-193, H.151.
[162]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.371, H.324.
[163] Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.151
[164] As such, while Signification [Bedeutung] is what is *ontically* articulated when something is made intelligible, meaning is the horizon of that which can become intelligible to Dasein in a phenomenon of Disclosedness.

what is *ontically* articulated when something is made intelligible, meaning is that which in an understanding disclosure *can* be articulated, and as such is what defines the general field of articulateness.

In Chapter 1. of the present dissertation, I have shown how the articulation of the intelligibility of an understanding projection is itself a constituent of Disclosedness, that is, Discourse.[165] Since meaning can be roughly defined as the condition of possibility of articulation, i.e. the where-upon any articulation rests, it follows that Discourse itself rests upon meaning. It is important to remember that Heidegger's notion of articulation is not primarily about expression but *analysis*. Therefore, as meaning opens up the field of what can be articulated, it simultaneously makes possible the analysis of Disclosedness according to its constituents, releasing Dasein to the fundamental relation with its Being.

However, not only entities are discovered according to their meaning. Rather, insofar as Heidegger's attempt is that of developing an explicit ontology, Being also comes to be understandingly projected upon a meaning. Indeed, since meaning is ultimately something which only belongs to Dasein in its 'there' [Da], the meaning of Dasein's Being represents the most fundamental field of Disclosedness, which defines the way in which Being can be explicitly articulated as to become the subject of an ontology. This does not mean, however, that meaning is something more primordial than Being. Rather, it is Being itself in the potentiality of its Disclosedness, that is, as part of a disclosing relation with Dasein. As such, in considering its meaning, Being becomes the theme of an ontological enquiry which is made explicit as a questioning concerning Being.

The fact that when asking about Being what one ultimately finds out is its meaning, does not entail that something 'deeper' than Being itself has been attained;[166] rather, the question about the meaning of Being "asks about Being itself in so far as Being *enters into the intelligibility* of Dasein".[167] In this Heidegger shows most eminently the phenomenological roots of his thinking. For just as it is for Husserl, a phenomenon is such only as it entertains a

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[165]Cfr: "In discourse the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world (an intelligibility which goes with a state-of-mind) is articulated according to significations; and discourse is this articulation." [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 206, H.162.]

[166]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.152.

[167]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.152.

relation to a consciousness through an intention; for Heidegger nothing is intelligible unless through the Disclosedness of Dasein which opens up the field of articulation, i.e. meaning, upon-which a relationship between Dasein and its Being is possible. Yet what is specifically the meaning of Dasein's Being?

ii.   Care and the Question of the Meaning of Dasein's Being

While in the course of *Being and Time* the question concerning the meaning of the Being of Dasein is tackled multiple times and at different levels, it is possible to identify two main phases: the first, where Heidegger equates Dasein's Being with the phenomenon of Care; and the second in which the meaning of Care is fleshed out through the concept of Dasein's *temporality*. Let us begin, therefore, with a short summary of Heidegger's concept of Care and then proceed to discuss the reasons behind the equation between temporality and the meaning of Dasein's Being, i.e. Care.

In the final chapter of Division One of *Being and Time*, following from the discussion regarding the structural totality of Dasein's Being, Heidegger declares:

> [t]he formal existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must… be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world).[168]

This tripartite structure is in keeping with the structure of Disclosedness which Heidegger discusses in the chapter that precedes this quote; hence, while providing a more existential and unitary outlook to the structure of Disclosedness, this quote does not add anything entirely novel to the discussion developed in Division One, Chapter V.

Then, abruptly, Heidegger adds: "[t]his Being fills in the signification of the term 'care', which is used in a purely existential manner."[169] To be fair, this is not the first time in which the term 'Care' is mentioned in *Being and Time*; it is however the first time in which the

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[168]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.237, H192.
[169]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.237, H192.

discussion regarding the phenomenon of care is developed beyond the mere, undiscussed equation between Care and Dasein's Being. In keeping with the previous passage, the term Care names the structural whole of what I could call a 'disclosing structure', insofar as the three components of this very structure mirror the three fundamental constituents of Disclosedness. But where the structure of Disclosedness describes the way in which entities, in general, manifest themselves in their Being, the structure of Care names the way in which Disclosedness takes place *for* Dasein, that is, existentially. As such, the phenomenon of understanding shows itself existentially as Dasein's Being-ahead-of-itself; Being-already-in-(the-world) names Dasein's existential disposition; while Being-alongside designates Dasein's existential way of Falling. These existential ways of Disclosedness correspond to Dasein's three fundamental characteristics of existentiality, facticity and Being-fallen, which in turn coincide with the three constituting elements of the structure of Care proper. These are: *existence*, which names Dasein's fundamental projecting attitude, as it constantly maintains itself, its Being and its world open in their possibilities; *facticity*, which defines Dasein's existential situation of projecting itself from a set of pre-existing possibilities which Dasein itself has not chosen; and *falling*, which designates Dasein's inalienable tendency to lose itself in the world of entities, thereby trading its ownmost possibilities for those of the Das Man's world.

In this sense I can say that Care consists in a definite kind of Disclosedness which is, so to speak, 'Dasein-specific', that is, purely existential. As such, Care is nothing more than the term signalling the unitary structure of Dasein's Being in its fundamental disclosing attitude. This attitude is what Heidegger defines from the outset of *Being and Time* in terms of that 'taking issue' which figures in the definition of Dasein as 'that entity for which, in its being, that very being is an issue'.[170] As previously discussed, this is connected with Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, which refers to the fact that Dasein understands its Being always in terms of its possibilities to be. These possibilities exist only as part of Dasein's existential project, in which the world in general is disclosed in terms of Dasein's fundamental Disclosedness; through such a disclosure, Dasein takes care of its world by both concerning [besorgen] itself with entities and being solicitous [fürsorgen] towards other Daseins.

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[170]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32 H.12.

It should be clear, therefore, that the structure of Care *is* that of Disclosedness, yet as in a mirror, since the attention has moved from entities, the world or Being, to Dasein itself. As such, while the notion of Care helps Heidegger to shift the focus of his analysis from the question 'about' the discoveredness of entities and the Disclosedness of the world and Being, to the question concerning Dasein's existential 'who', I may say that Heidegger's discussion of Care does not fundamentally add anything to what has already been said concerning Dasein's fundamental disclosing attitude. This is not to deny the significance of this notion at a purely philosophical level, but rather to reframe its importance in the economy of *Being and Time*. For the structure of Care is no more than a half-way step between the analysis of Disclosedness and the discussion of temporality. This is why, in spite of the relevance many commentators have attributed to the phenomenon of Care, the present dissertation will not analyse this notion further, but, in keeping with the spirit of Heidegger's discussion, will proceed to utilise the structural analysis of Care in order to tackle the more central question regarding the meaning of Dasein's Being.

By way of analysing the structure of Disclosedness and Dasein's primordial mode of inauthentic being-in-the-world, the first division of *Being and Time* provides, if not an actual demonstration, at least a profound insight into Dasein's fundamental way of Being. This insight is that for Dasein, in its Being, that very Being is an issue; and this 'taking issue' is what the term 'Care' stands for. From this staring point, Heidegger proceeds to argue that an entity whose Being is Care has a tendency towards existential wholeness. For by constantly taking issue with its own Being, Dasein continually projects itself towards those possibilities which are proper (or improper) to its Being. The final resolution of these possibilities into a resolved totality, what Aristotle would call a pure actuality, on the one hand projectingly drives Dasein ahead-of-itself into its possibilities, while on the other hand constitutes the upper limit of Dasein's possibilities of Being. Yet this totality is achieved only when Dasein no longer 'is'; that is, when it can no longer take issue with its possibilities of Being. While a more extensive discussion on this topic of will be tackled in the following chapters of this dissertation, what is important to underline at this point is that this potential wholeness, which is inseparable from Dasein's Being, constitutes the basis for what I could call Dasein's existential finitude. The latter must not be understood as a mere characteristic of Dasein; rather, as I will see later in this dissertation, this finitude constitutes the inalienable character which makes Care, i.e. Dasein's constant taking issue with its possibilities of Being, possible.

The finite character of Care is itself a further unitary structure and is defined as Having-Been, Future and Making-Present,[171] and is what Heidegger calls 'temporality'.

> Temporality makes possible the unity of existence, facticity and falling, and in this way constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of Care… [Yet] temporality 'is' not an entity at all. It is not but temporalizes itself. Nevertheless, we cannot avoid saying, 'Temporality 'is'… the meaning of care', 'Temporality 'is' … defined in such and such a way'. [However we can say that] temporality temporalizes, and indeed it temporalizes possible ways of itself.[172]

Temporality is not an entity, but a phenomenon that relates to entities. This is why, strictly speaking, one cannot say that temporality *is*. Yet, what does it mean for temporality to 'temporalize' itself? While the standard English translation seems merely tautological, a closer analysis of the German verb 'zeitigen' may shed some light on the very meaning of temporality and the role it plays in the analytic of Dasein. While the ordinary meaning of this verb is that of 'bringing to fruition', in the second division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger attempts to disconnect the term from its original meaning and to exploit the connection with the term's etymological root 'Zeit', meaning 'Time'. Yet, what a number of commentators[173] have not recognised is that, in itself, this connection not only fails to provide the reader with any information concerning the very role of temporality, but reduces Heidegger's discussion to an empty play on words. It may be possible to avoid this by reconnecting the term to its ordinary meaning, arguing that Heidegger's intent is to establish temporality as a kind of transcendental structure which is 'fulfilled' through its concrete ecstases, that is, as having-been, future and making-present. While I do not intend to downplay the importance of the single ecstases in concretely manifesting the unitary phenomenon of temporality, this approach fails to recognise the primary reason for which the question concerning temporality has been raised by Heidegger: that is, providing a ground for the unity of the structure of Care. As such, explaining temporality in terms of its ecstatic fulfilment only begs the

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[171]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.375, H.327.
[172]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.376-377, H.328.
[173]Cfr: Michael Inwwod, *A Heidegger Dictonary*, (Oxford: Blackwood Publisher, 1999); William Blattner, *Heidegger's Temporal Idealism,* (Cambridge: Cambridge Universirty Press, 1999).

question as to how the individual phenomena of having-been, future and making-present can constitute a unitary whole which underpins the totality of Dasein's Being as Care.

A possible solution is to connect the verb 'zeitigen' not only with the noun 'Zeit', but also with the adverb 'zeitig', meaning 'early'. This would suggest a certain priority of the phenomenon of temporality as it 'makes itself earlier' [zeitig-en] than the 'possible ways of itself', that is, earlier than its structural components, the ecstases. This priority must be interpreted in a structural-transcendental sense, where temporality is nothing but the condition of possibility of its ecstases. In turn, the latter constitutes the concrete ways in which Dasein *is* in its possibilities. These are intended as 1) existential possibilities, which show themselves as future possibilities; 2) factical possibilities, which consist in what is possible due to the limits imposed on Dasein by its having-been; and 3) fallen possibilities, which are manifested both in Dasein's lack of genuine possibilities and in its escaping from its finitude – the lack of infinite possibilities.

Now, as I have discussed in the previous section, Heidegger applies the term 'meaning' to those phenomena which constitute the condition of possibility for something to be the something that it is. I can call this, with Kant, the 'transcendental condition', or I can define it, with Heidegger, as the 'upon-which of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something'.[174] If this is correct, the question concerning the meaning of Dasein's Being can therefore be made explicit by asking: what makes Dasein possible as being-possible? This question has already been answered when, in the course of this section, Dasein's finitude has been defined as the drive of all possibilities of Dasein's Being as well as their fundamental limit. Hence, Dasein's finite temporality is what makes Dasein's Being fundamentally possible, as it makes its concrete possibilities significant in so far as they come to be articulated according to the upon-which of all of possibilities of Dasein, i.e. Dasein's potentiality-to-be a finite whole. As such, temporality is nothing but Dasein's fundamental horizon, that is, the condition of possibility according to which Dasein's Being can be disclosed in terms of its possibilities; and for this, temporality can be defined as the meaning of Care, that is, as the meaning of Dasein's Being.

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[174]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.151.

While the above certainly cannot be considered an exhaustive analysis of the notions of temporality and meaning, the elements which have been discussed should be sufficient to inform my discussion, as I shall now move on to analyse two more possible interpretations of *Being and Time*.

iii.   Discourse and Truth: the Hermeneutic Interpretation of *Being and Time*

In recent years a new interpretation of *Being and Time* has surfaced within the Anglo-American tradition, thanks to a Spanish scholar working first in Germany and, more recently, in the United States, namely, Cristina Lafont. In her book *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*,[175] Lafont argues in favour a strong continuity between the so called first and second Heidegger - particularly concerning the issue of language. More or less explicitly she also rejects Dreyfus' pragmatic interpretation, arguing for what she calls a 'hermeneutical reading'. It should be noted that Lafont's hermeneutical approach is certainly not the only such approach in Heidegger's scholarship. A large number of commentators have supported what they have defined as a hermeneutical reading of *Being and Time*, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gianni Vattimo, Karl-Otto Apel, and Thomas Sheehan, and their understandings of what constitutes a 'hermeneutical interpretation' of Heidegger are extremely different from Lafont's and from each other's. Indeed, when compared to other hermeneutical readings of *Being and Time*, especially those from the European tradition, Lafont's interpretation is possibly not the most exemplary overall. Nevertheless, its significance and influence in the Anglo-American tradition makes it paradigmatic for the purpose of this dissertation.

I have argued in the previous chapter that Dreyfus reads Heidegger as grounding all Disclosedness on a set of socially determined 'knowing-hows', which never constitute explicit mental contents, Lafont argues that Being must be linguistically structured and, at least potentially, expressible. This is because, according to Lafont, Language, or Discourse, is not only an ontic phenomenon, namely, a system of signs which can be used as equipment in-order-to 'showing', but also an ontological one, as it represents a necessary condition for any understanding of Being. Therefore Heidegger, Lafont says, would distinguish between an ontic side of articulation, which he calls language [Sprache], and an ontological side, to

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[175]Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

which he would refer to with the term discourse [Rede]. Any understanding would be linguistically structured since the possibility of any understanding is grounded in discourse, intended in the sense of what Humboldt would call Energéia. This is not to say that any understanding must be *actually* expressed in a linguistic form before it can understood, but rather that its being understood is grounded in that it has a *potentiality* to be linguistically expressed.

Despite the fact that I believe Lafont's use of the term ontological in this context is, at best, spurious, I nevertheless agree with her account, up to this point. What I find more difficult to consent to is the claim that Lafont wants to derive from the aforementioned discussion. Lafont argues that, given that world's Disclosedness, which in turns grounds discoveredness of entities in their Being, is founded on a previous understanding of Being, then language, or better, discourse must *determine* the way in which the world is disclosed and, consequently, the way in which entities are discovered in their Being, since all understanding is linguistically structured.

The correctness of this inference depends on the correct interpretation of this word 'to determine'. Now, Heidegger himself implies that entities 'are' only where Dasein 'is', insofar as "Being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs";[176] this understanding Disclosedness of Being is, in fact, what essentially constitutes Dasein. If all understanding is linguistically structured, which is to say, if all understanding is grounded in the expressible-ness of what is understood, then discourse must indeed play a fundamental role in determining what can be understood and therefore disclosed, insofar as all that is understandingly disclosed must fall within the domain of discourse.

Prioritizing language is, according to Lafont, a move Heidegger is forced to make, as it is required in order for him to challenge the model of perception championed by traditional epistemology. According to this model, empirical knowledge of objects is always constructed out of the synthesis of what one may refer to as simple perceptions. These are no more than immediate snapshots of perceptual experience, like the different visual impressions one gets walking around a statue, or the single notes of a symphony. Heidegger is very clear in

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[176]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.228, H.183.

reversing this paradigm, arguing that the 'simple seeing' of immediate perceptions is no more than an abstraction from what he calls the 'as'. Famously, Heidegger argues that one never hears a bare sound, which one then interprets as the engine of a car or the whistle of the train. Rather, one always first hears the whistle of the train or the noise of the car. In other words, entities are accessible only insofar as they are interpreted *as* what they are, which is to say, insofar as they are 'understood'. Yet, understanding in the sense of the 'as' can never consist in the understanding of a single entity in isolation: rather, the pen is understood in its reference [Verweisung] to the ink, the notepad, the desk, and all these things can be taken in reference to each other since they are all ultimately 'involved' [Bewandtnis haben] in the action of writing. The totality of the way in which entities are 'involved', which is to say, the totality of Bewandtnis, constitutes the worldhood of the World. In other words, entities cannot be 'understood' *as* the entities they are unless from within a world in its worldhood. This is why Heidegger can say that the Disclosedness of the world, i.e. the primordial openness of the space in which entities can be 'understood', or better, discovered, grounds the discoveredness of entities.

Yet, in what way is that totality of involvements [Bewandtnisganzheit] which constitutes the worldhood of the World first disclosed? Briefly, all Bewandtnis corresponds to a projection of the understanding, which renders an entity intelligible according to its meaning. The one who understands is Dasein, which, therefore, projects according to the meaning of its own Being, in such a way as to open up that totality of Bewandtnis in-which Dasein always, already, essentially is, i.e. the world in its worldhood. From this, Lafont affirms, infamously, that, if "the meaning 'in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something' not only is involved de facto in our understanding of intraworldly entities, but also enjoys a *constitutive* role for our access to them… [then] the meaning in question becomes a prior determinative for all attainable a posteriori knowledge (about those entities)."[177] With a more effective yet perhaps confusing formula, Lafont says that, for Heidegger, meaning must determine reference.

There is little doubt that meaning plays a constitutive role in the Disclosedness of the world as well as in the discoveredness of entities. However, this should not necessarily entail, as Lafont seems to believe, that meaning, strictly speaking, determines the very Being of

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[177]Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.188.

entities; or, which is the same, that Heidegger's notion of understanding forces him to agree that discourse *shapes* what is understood through and through. Indeed, should the latter be the case, would the way in which Being is understood also be determined by the very discourse which is said to be grounded in Dasein's understanding of Being?

Before attempting to clarify these matters and make sense of Lafont's interpretation of *Being and Time*, I must clarify the following two issues: first, in what sense understanding-of-Being is a form of understanding; and second, whether or not Heidegger actually holds that all intelligibility is linguistically structured.

In order to address the first problem, let us begin by quoting Heidegger when in §44 he writes:

> Our early analysis of the worldhood of the world and of entities within-the-world has shown… that the uncoveredness of entities within-the-world is *grounded* in the world's disclosedness. But disclosedness is that basic character of Dasein according to which it is its 'there'. *Disclosedness is constituted by state of mind, understanding and discourse*, and pertains equiprimordially to world, Being-in and the Self.[178]

If understanding is merely *one* of the constituents of the phenomenon of Disclosedness, then how can an expression of such an understanding, namely understanding-of-Being, be itself the ground of Disclosedness in general. And furthermore, if world's Disclosedness must be analysed in terms of all the three constituents of Disclosedness, why would Being only be understood, rather than being itself disclosed? The solution to these problems will nevertheless have to be delayed for the moment, as this constitutes the final aim of the present dissertation. On the other hand, the second issue, concerning whether Heidegger holds that all intelligibility is linguistically structured, may be addressed in the present section. According to Lafont:

> Entities that are equipment for us can surely exist without language, they can even be used in their function by creatures who do not have language, but they cannot be experienced *as the equipment that they are* by those who do not have an

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[178]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.263, H.220.

understanding of being, those who do not have the possibility for the manifestness of beings.[179]

Indeed, within the context *Being and Time*, it is not hard to find textual evidence suggesting that, without an understanding of Being, entities do not manifest themselves as the entities they are, i.e. in their Being. On the other hand, Heidegger never openly affirms in *Being and Time* that Dasein's having an understanding-of-Being is directly connected with the phenomenon of discourse. Nevertheless, if entities are discovered on the ground of Disclosedness, and if Disclosedness is constituted by "state-of-mind, understanding and discourse",[180] then discourse must indeed play a role in the Disclosedness of the world, as well as in the discoveredness of entities.

Yet, this does not provide an explicit connection between Dasein's understanding-of-Being and discourse. The reader may however reflect on the fact that, within the analysis of the everydayness of Dasein, the understanding-of-Being is discussed not in the sense of Dasein's understanding of Being *in general*, an understanding which is never attained in *Being and Time*, but only insofar as it names that 'relation' between Being and Dasein, to whom "in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it".[181] In this sense, by opening up the meaning of Dasein's Being to Dasein,[182] an understanding-of-Being *discloses* a totality of Bewandtnis, i.e. a world, within which particular entities can be uncovered in their Being. In this sense Dasein's understanding of Being names nothing else but the primary emergence of that very Disclosedness which manifests itself always in terms disposition, understanding and, also, discourse. What remains to be justified is why the phenomenon of discourse should hold any priority among the three constituents of Disclosedness. Indeed, how can Lafont justify her claim that Disclosedness is not only necessarily linguistically structured, but that discourse shapes Disclosedness through and through? Additionally, would this be connected with her interpretation of Heidegger as holding that meaning determines reference?

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[179]Cristina Lafont, "Replies", in *Inquiry* 45, no. 2 (2002), p.236.
[180]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.263, H.220.
[181]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32, H.12.
[182]It should be noted that the meaning of something is for Heidegger the way in which that something is given to Dasein. Therefore, the fact that Dasein understands Being does not mean that Being is given 'in-itself' to Dasein, but rather that Dasein gains access to the meaning of its Being.

Lafont interprets the notion of meaning in connection with that of discourse. However, as I have stated in section i. of the present chapter, the most extensive treatment of meaning within *Being and Time* can be found in the context of Heidegger's discussion about the phenomenon of understanding, in connection with his explication of the notion of interpretation. In §32 Heidegger characterizes meaning as "that which can be Articulated in a disclosure by which we understand..." and "...the '*upon-which' of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something*".[183] As I have explained in the previous section, this projection is that through which the world is disclosed in the light of Dasein's existential project, i.e. its *towards-which*. According to the latter's disclosure of the world, entities become intelligible [verständlich], and thus can be articulated. This does not mean that entities must first be understood in order to be discovered according to the meaning of Dasein's Being through an articulation. Rather, as one can be infer from the aforementioned excerpt, any understanding projection can be pro-jected only insofar as there is a meaning 'upon-which' that very projection can be pro-jected. This is to say that not only in the absence of a projection no meaning can be articulated, but also that without meaning, projections lacks their pro-, i.e. the ground which pro-pels them forward and to which projections ultimately return.

Since meaning is strictly connected with the phenomenon of articulation, Lafont infers that meaning must be inseparable from discourse/language. Despite the fact that this formulation may be misguiding, insofar as meaning is an essential element not only of discourse but also of disposition and understanding, affirming that meaning is inseparable from discourse/language is to some extent unproblematic. Less justifiable is Lafont's connection between the fundamental relation of meaning and discourse, and what she calls "the world-disclosing function of language (as the bearer of an 'interpretedness,' of an understanding of being that discloses the world to Dasein)".[184] What is hard to substantiate is not so much the inference itself, but the reason why discourse/language should be so radically severed from the other two constituents of Disclosedness and thus bear the whole weight of Disclosedness, as if the former would entirely determine the latter's constituents.[185]

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[183]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.151.
[184]Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.70
[185]Cfr: "Discourse is constitutive for the Being of the 'there' (that is, for states-of-mind and understanding)." [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.208, H.165].

This interpretative line is rendered possible thanks to the way in which Lafont silences the relation between meaning and the other two components of Disclosedness, and propounds a notion of meaning which is entirely discourse-oriented. On the strength of this omission, Lafont can then equate the fact that Dasein "'is never able to withdraw from' this interpretedness [the one of which language, in its world-disclosing function, is the bearer] that 'determines what and how one 'sees'''",[186] with Dasein's inability of separating the ontic from the ontological, insofar as all that has meaning must necessarily be articulated. In other words, according to Lafont, Heidegger's conception of discourse/language carries implicitly with it the fatal reduction of the ontic to the ontological. In other words, if all entities are discovered on the ground of the world, which, in turn, is disclosed according to the meaning of the Being of Dasein,[187] once meaning is reduced to the mere content of linguistic articulation, and exists only dependently on the latter, then language does certainly bear the whole weight of the Disclosedness of the world and Being in general; therefore, language is taken to be the sufficient condition for the discovery of entities. By this interpretation, however, the other two constituents of Disclosedness, i.e. disposition and understanding, become secondary and ultimately subsidiary to the phenomenon of discourse.

But perhaps Lafont's interpretation of the notion of discourse/language in Heidegger can be broadened in order to include disposition and understanding as well. Despite the stark contradiction between such an interpretation and Heidegger's clear-cut distinction of the constituents of Disclosedness, such a broadened notion of language would be consistent with Lafont's critique of the reduction of the ontic to the ontological. In this sense, for entities to *be* anything, they must be uncovered according to the meaning of Dasein's Being. This is to say, in order to be, entities need to be uncovered on the ground of an ontological Disclosedness. Indeed, Disclosedness for Heidegger is an ontological phenomenon. Nevertheless, the ontological nature of the phenomenon of Disclosedness, together with its primordial character, need not be taken as to imply a reduction of the ontic to the ontological, but can be interpreted to underline the more primordial nature of the ontological in respect with the ontic. In other words, the fact that the phenomenon of Disclosedness is ontological and that entities, in order to be, need to be uncovered on the ground of an ontologically

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[186]Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.79-80.
[187]The meaning of the Being of Dasein, i.e. temporality, is at the same time the meaning of the Being of the entities that are uncovered, and is, in this sense, *their meaning*.

disclosed world, implies that the ontic manifestation of entities as present-at-hand is merely derivative on their discoveredness as ready-to-hand items of equipment on the ground of the world, disclosed by Dasein's Being. In this sense, Lafont's argument seems even more surprising insofar as, since the very first pages of *Being and Time*, Heidegger explicitly acknowledges this hierarchy.

Nonetheless, it must also be acknowledged that Heidegger's discussion concerning the priority of the ontological discoveredness operated by Dasein over the ontic manifestation of entities, often runs the risk of falling into idealism. Now, the notion of facticity [Faktizität] constitutes Heidegger's attempt to avoid the charge of idealism. The point is that Dasein, despite being in some sense the necessary condition of possibility for the Disclosedness of the world, is itself always already in-the-world. This is to say that whatever world is disclosed by Dasein, it is disclosed according to the factual possibilities in which Dasein is always, already *thrown* [werfen]. In this sense, facticity constitutes, if not the actual *Realia* which determine Dasein's possibility of Disclosedness -as much as, for example, an 'actual' electron would determine the way in which the scientist describes its properties-, at least the background which constitutes the formal limit of any possibility of Disclosedness. This background is Dasein's 'projectiveness' and is fundamentally transcendent. This is to say, it is not 'caused' by Dasein despite fundamentally constituting the latter. More on this will be said later in the present dissertation.

Despite agreeing that the notion of facticity may actually deliver Heidegger from the charge of idealism, Lafont believes that such a discussion prevents the philosophy of *Being and Time* from transcending the immanent possibilities of understanding from 'within'. In other words, if the 'possibilities of knowledge' are not set by Dasein itself, then Dasein on its own cannot revise these very possibilities and challenge the boundaries of what is possible to know. Nonetheless, modern science and the scientific method would provide proof of the opposite. Indeed, if one was to limit their analysis to Division One of *Being and Time*, Lafont's critique is definitely justified. Nevertheless, Heidegger's main aim in *Being and Time* is to overcome both realism and idealism –including transcendental idealism; and certainly, in the context of Heidegger's struggle to do just that, he seems now to support one side, now to champion the other. Yet, despite not being able, at least within Division One, to show a path towards a possible synthesis, he makes clear that the weight of Disclosedness, i.e. its ground, cannot be laid either upon Dasein, or merely on the factical element of Dasein's Being. Later in this

dissertation I will discuss how Division Two contains some of the elements of a possible solution. I will explain this with reference to the Call of Conscience, in which Dasein is urged to take up its own null basis. For now, I will devote the remainder of this chapter to considering the shortcomings of Lafont's readings of *Being and Time*, particularly in the light of the issues concerning the nature of the ground of the world's Disclosedness, as the condition of possibility of the discoveredness of entities to Dasein.

Certainly, Lafont's interpretation has the important merit of having clearly highlighted Heidegger's paradigm-shift from a philosophy of perception to a philosophy of understanding Disclosedness.[188] She consistently acknowledges the fundamental disclosive function of the notion of understanding-of-being in Heidegger, and goes as far as to say that "[our prior understanding] fulfils a *world-disclosing* function, for it is only through understanding that intraworldly entities become accessible as such".[189] However, Lafont goes a step further, and argues that "...discourse or language contains an interpretedness in itself, which 'is just as little only present-at-hand as language is; rather, its being has itself the character of Dasein.'[190] In this way language comes to be identified in its ontic and at the same time ontological status as responsible for Dasein's particular understanding of being...".[191] In this sense, Lafont wants to ground Dasein's understanding-of-Being on that fundamental intelligibility [Verständlichkeit] which, according to Lafont, is provided by discourse.[192] The justification for this funding connection lies, however, in a third term which links understanding [Verständnis] with discourse [Rede], i.e. meaning [Sinn]. Indeed, as I have already mentioned, meaning is what defines the framework of understandableness of an entity that is disclosed and, as such, can be articulated: that is, analysed in terms of the

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[188]Cfr: Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.179.

[189]Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.179.

[190] Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.211, H.167. Let the reader note, however, that in context the sentence may be interpreted also to mean that 'in language there is a hidden way (in the sense that language is grounded in a way…) in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted.

[191]Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.79.

[192]It should be noted that Lafont often couples discourse with language and refers to both phenomena at once as 'language/discourse'. This is because Lafont wants to argue that the split between Language [Sprache} and Discourse [Rede] characteristic of *Being and Time*, comes to be conflated in the later Heidegger, who refers to both phenomena with the term Language [Sprache]. According to Lafont, this would be symptomatic of the fact that Heidegger would have recognized the impossibility of actually distinguishing, from within a given language, between the potentiality for expression and the concrete languages. However, in keeping with *Being and Time*, I will maintain the split between language and discourse.

constituting parts of that Disclosedness. Conversely, Lafont takes the phenomenon of articulation to be somewhat equivalent to that of expression, and exploits the connection between meaning and articulation in order to define meaning in terms of discourse/language. According to her, "the knowledge of meaning contained in a language provides the ontological framework for anything that can be referred to within such a language, such a projection of meaning".[193] It is language/discourse that, according to Lafont, 'contains' that knowledge of meaning which constitutes "the necessary and sufficient condition for the identification of the referent".[194] With this move, Lafont succeeds in detaching the phenomenon of meaning from two of the three constituents of Disclosedness, thus restricting meaning to a phenomenon wholly dependent on language/discourse. From this it is only natural to infer that, if meaning is grounded in language/discourse, then Disclosedness and discoveredness are also fundamentally linguistic phenomena.

As I have previously argued, the main problem of Dreyfus' interpretation consisted in the lack of a ground which would grant the possibility of an explicit ontology beyond that of everyday Dasein in which Being is constantly hidden. Hence, it may seem that Lafont's choice of privileging language/discourse as the grounding constituent of Disclosedness overcomes the main issue of Dreyfus' reading. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that, according to Heidegger's definition, meaning refers only to 'that which can be articulated [Articulierbare]',[195] while "that which gets articulated [Gegliederte] as such in discursive Articulation, we call the 'totality-of-significations".[196] In this sense, meaning [Sinn] constitutes a horizon of possibility of discursive (linguistic) articulation. Yet how can something be at once the horizon of a certain phenomenon, i.e. language/discourse, while depending from the phenomenon itself? Perhaps Lafont would admit that meaning is not merely contained within language/discourse, and that it is indeed a notion which characterises all three constituents of Disclosedness and, in a way which I shall explore later in this dissertation, underpins them.

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[193]Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.183.
[194]Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.207.
[195]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.204, H.16;. Literally: 'Articulative-ness'.
[196]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.204, H.161. Note the difference between Artikulierbare and Gegliederte.

On the other hand, I may grant to Lafont that 'meaning determines reference'. Yet, strictly speaking only Dasein 'has' meaning.[197] Entities do not 'have' meaning, but when they are discovered "…along with the Being of Dasein –that is when they have come to be understood – we say that they have meaning [Sinn]".[198] Thus, meaning certainly determines reference: but this is not due to the fact that something like a language supplies a set of pre-given meanings which Dasein applies to entities in order to discover them within their referential totality, which constitutes significance. Rather, insofar as only Dasein 'has' meaning, then the only meaning which is, strictly speaking, involved in a projection of the understanding is that of the Being of Dasein.

Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, the 'meaning' of Being, or that of an entity names nothing but the way in which Being, or that entity, enters into the intelligibility of Dasein.[199] Hence, when Heidegger talks about the meaning of Dasein's Being, he is referring to Dasein's Being itself, in its being understood by Dasein. But, in this sense, the meaning of the Being of Dasein, which, as explained in the previous section, is temporality [Zeitlichkeit], stands in close relationship to the fundamental phenomena of understanding-of-Being and Disclosedness. Indeed, to say that Dasein's Being has a meaning is to say nothing other than that Dasein stands in a relation of understanding Disclosedness to its Being. From the fact that an understanding-of-Being always already belongs to Dasein, it follows that Dasein, in its Being, 'has' a meaning, which is the meaning of its Being. According to this meaning, a world in its worldhood, is disclosed, and entities are discovered within it. But it is only because Dasein stands always already in a relation to its Being that Dasein's Being can be disclosed according to discourse [Rede], understanding [Verstehen] and disposition [Befindlichkeit] and may belong to Dasein itself in terms of the primordial openness through which the world is disclosed and entities are discovered. This does not mean that Dasein's understanding-of-Being needs being prior to any discourse, understanding and disposition; rather the former grounds the latter three only insofar as those grant the former to disclose itself. But in no way can discourse, or understanding, or disposition, on their own ground the disclosing relation between Dasein and its Being that primarily manifests itself in Dasein's understanding-of-Being or, less confusingly, in its Disclosedness of Being. Because of this,

[197]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.151.
[198]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.192, H.151.
[199]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.152.

Lafont's interpretation must also be rejected, at least concerning its main line of argument. In this sense, the fundamental shortcoming of Lafont's interpretation is that of conferring a foundational role to discourse/language, based on its alleged dual status, i.e. ontic and ontological, and therefore disregarding the grounding status of the phenomenon of Disclosedness and the equiprimordiality of its constituting elements. As such, Lafont's reading, just like Dreyfus', overlooks the importance of Disclosedness in the economy of *Being and Time* and fails to deliver a consistent interpretation of Heidegger's masterwork, by limiting its analysis to only one of the constituents of this phenomenon, i.e. discourse, without ever considering Disclosedness in its entirety.

iv. The space of Meaning: the Phenomenological Interpretation of *Being and Time*

Many commentators, especially those of the Dreyfus' school, have interpreted the philosophy of *Being and Time* as a more or less explicit critique of Husserl's phenomenology. One commentator within the Anglo-American tradition who in recent years has attempted to reverse this paradigm is Steven Crowell. Throughout his work, Crowell engages in a reading of Heidegger's masterwork in terms of its transcendental-phenomenological inspiration, in order to show that Heidegger's philosophy: first, is ultimately transcendental, which is to say, concerned with the description of the conditions of possibility of the manifestness of entities, and Being, *as* they are; second, is still importantly engaged in an analysis of intentionality, albeit in terms of the human Dasein; third, does not reject the transcendental reduction, although does away with Husserl's version of it; fourth, is based on a notion of Being better understood in terms of Meaning or, as Crowell calls it, 'Space of Meaning'. One can easily agree with the first point, although a thorough discussion of it would be beyond the scope of the present dissertation. The second point is slightly more controversial. The difficulty lies in whether or not Dasein can be appropriately described as 'intentional'. In order to assess whether or not this is the case I must begin by clarifying Husserl's notion of intentionality.

According to Husserl, "Intentionality [is] the unique peculiarity of experiences 'to be the consciousness *of* something'."[200] The term refers therefore to the intrinsic directedness of

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[200]Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*, trans. W. Boyce Gibson, (Newyork: Macmillian, 1931), p.242.

consciousness towards its object. Yet the object itself is nothing 'outside' consciousness, but is internal to an intentional experience (or act). All intentional experiences in this sense are 'conscious experiences', yet "...not every real phase of the concrete unity of an intentional experience has itself the basic character of intentionality, the property of being a 'consciousness of something'. This is the case, for instance, with all sensory data, which play so great a part in the perceptive intuitions of things."[201] The question Crowell poses then is whether Dasein, as Heidegger understands it, may be considered in some sense an intentional consciousness. To rephrase this question in more Heideggerian terms I may ask: can Dasein be best described in terms of its *directedness-towards…*?

In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I have analysed the way in which Dasein, in its everydayness, is directed towards intraworldly entities. Thus directed, Dasein primarily discovers entities in its engagement with them as ready-to-hand equipment. This is because, according to Heidegger, an entity can be discovered *as* it is *in-itself* only in terms of 'something other than itself'. As it has been said more than once in the course of this dissertation, all entities 'are' in terms of that for-the-sake-of-which that is Dasein, or, which is the same, according to a certain interpretedness of their Being in the light of Dasein's Being. Hence, if one takes Husserl's intentionality to refer eminently to the way a conscience and its object are necessarily intertwined, Dasein, at least in its everydayness, may be accurately described in terms of its directedness towards intraworldly entities, and of the dependence of the former's and the latter's Being on this directedness.

As I have previously mentioned, for Heidegger, the discoveredness of entities is possible only insofar as Dasein finds itself always, already in-the-World, alongside entities which are significant for Dasein itself. Dasein's fundamental character of Being-in-the-world refers to Dasein's existential situation of finding itself always, already within a certain, often pre-ontological, Disclosedness of Being. This Disclosedness may still be interpreted as implying a certain 'directedness towards...' although the object of this directedness is no longer an entity but Being itself. This does, however, not contradict Heidegger's discussion of understanding in §§31-32, where this constituent of Disclosedness is described as pro-jectedness upon meaning. Thus, Dasein's understanding Disclosedness of Being, and for that matter of anything, does not consists for Heidegger in a conscious appropriation of an

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[201]Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*, trans. W. Boyce Gibson, (Newyork: Macmillian, 1931), p.121.

external object through the confrontation of the object itself with an internal mental content, i.e. its meaning. Rather, understanding, as Heidegger wants it, implies Dasein's self-projection towards what is understood; while the jetting of the projection is 'directed' by the meaning of what is understood.

This existential projectedness of Dasein towards its Being (from itself and beyond itself), that is to say, Dasein's transcendence, constitutes a fundamental character of Dasein's Being, which Heidegger names the 'Da' of Dasein. As the reader knows, the 'Da' makes reference to the phenomenon of Disclosedness; and insofar as Dasein, in its Being, is so necessarily disclosive as to be 'its own Disclosedness', its Being itself can be understood as Care.

In his book *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, Crowell insists on this point, namely, that Heidegger does analyse Dasein as a consciousness directed intentionally towards... . Yet, Crowell believes that *Being and Time* constitutes an attempt to go beyond Husserl's epistemological version of intentionality. Crowell states:

> Instead of starting with a being who doubts, knows, and thus *posits* the world, Heidegger identifies the philosophically more primary sense in which the beginning philosopher is a *questioner.* To ask about the meaning of being is thus first to ask about the being of the one who raises the question, and that means, about the conditions for the possibility of raising questions at all. The systematic heart of *Being and Time* lies in the idea of a "preontological" understanding of being (*Seinsverständnis*) as the first such condition that any entity capable of raising the question of being must fulfill. For this reason Heidegger introduces "Dasein" as a *terminus technicus* to indicate that being for whom "in its very being that being is an issue for it," namely, a *being for whom questioning is possible.*[202]

Dasein can be described as an intentional consciousness; nonetheless, its intentions are not merely directed towards the discoveredness of entities in the world, but also, and in this case authentically, towards the Disclosedness of its World and its Being as Being-in-the-World. This is confirmed by Crowell as he argues:

> Finally, being-in-the-world can be conceived according to the character of its "in," the Da (here/there) of Dasein. Taking aim at the tradition that sees this phenomenon

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[202]Steven Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning* (Evanston, Northwest University Press, 2001), p.207.

primarily in terms of consciousness viewed on the model of a subject knowing an object, Heidegger shows how *consciousness*, *intentionality*, itself derives from a more complex structure, whose aspects he terms "disposition" (*Befindlichkeit*), "understanding" (*Verstehen*), and "discourse" (*Rede*). These aspects—which must ultimately be understood as modes of Dasein's temporality—together yield that space of meaning thanks to which both subjects and objects can be encountered.[203]

Hence, according to Crowell, Heidegger does not abandon the intentional-consciousness model typical of phenomenology, but radicalises it in order to describe not only the 'wherein' within which entities are discovered, but also and most importantly the space which allows for the manifestation of the ground of intentionality itself. This is what Heidegger calls Authentic Disclosedness [Entschlossenheit], and in it both Dasein and its Being are manifested intentionally, that is to say, in their inextricably intertwined relation. In this interpretation of *Being and Time*, Dasein is described therefore as a radical intentional consciousness, directed not only towards entities in their discoveredness, or towards itself in its peculiar transcendental-ontological character - something which Husserl already discusses in terms of the self-directedness of consciousness, but also towards the transcendent ground of its very intentionality. This is because to direct one's consciousness towards one's Being, or towards Being in general is indeed still an intentional act, albeit of a special kind.

Some commentators disagree with Crowell on this point, arguing that Dasein cannot be understood in terms of intentional consciousness. I have already argued that Dreyfus[204] in his interpretation of *Being and Time* insists on the fact that Dasein's understanding is primarily non-conscious and can be better understood in terms of a 'knowing-how' which depends on an unreflected background. This is essentially the way in which Dreyfus understands the distinction between 'knowledge' and 'understanding', as a distinction between conscious beliefs which are present in the mind of the believer, and background beliefs that can never

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[203]Steven Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning* (Evanston, Northwest University Press, 2001), p.213.

[204]But also, in some way: Mark Wrathall, "Intentionality without Representations: Heidegger's Account of Perception", in *Philosophy Today,* Vol.42 (1998); Taylor Carman, *Hediegger's Analytic: Intepretations, Discourse and Authenticity in* Being and Time, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Sean Kelly, "Husserl and Phenomenology", in R. Solomon, D. Sherman (eds.), *Blackwell Guide to Continental Philosophy*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002); Daniel Dhalstorm, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

be brought to consciousness. Other commentators such as Theodore Kisiel, dispute that Husserl's understanding of consciousness is irreflexive enough for Heidegger to agree on.

Nonetheless, I must hold fast to the core of Husserl's understanding of intentionality as it is defined in *Ideas I*, namely, as "the unique peculiarity of experiences 'to be the consciousness *of* something'."[205] The point is that, if one buys into Husserl's essential definition of intentionality, it is hard to refuse the intentional nature of Dasein's Disclosedness of Being, even though it has the peculiarity of being the foundation of all intentional acts of that consciousness, i.e. Dasein. Certainly Dasein's intentionality is not that of Husserl's pure consciousness, which is essentially constituting for all phenomena. For Heidegger, Crowell believes, Dasein is, in the authentic Disclosedness of its Being, something like the facilitator rather than the ground of its 'Da', which Crowell calls 'the space of meaning'. This definition brings me to the third point of my summary of Crowell's phenomenological interpretation of *Being and Time*. This point is at the heart of Crowell's interpretation and constitutes its most controversial tenet. According to him, Heidegger, in *Being and Time*, would maintain Husserl's transcendental reduction. But what is exactly this 'transcendental reduction'? The latter is achieved by means of a suspension of judgement concerning the existence of the World; this is Husserl's famous epoché. By means of the epoché, the philosopher discovers the so called Pure Consciousness, as a residuum of the bracketing out of the 'real' from all theoretical concerns. This pure consciousness is not, so to speak, subjective –despite the fact that Husserl often describes it in subjective rather than objective terms. For Husserl's discovery is that once judgement of the 'real' is suspended, philosophy is left with a 'transcendental field of activity' in which subject and object are subsumed within the unitary structure of consciousness. Yet how can one reconcile Husserl's epoché with a philosophy, such as Heidegger's, aimed at reconnecting the human Dasein with both its Being-in-the-World, entities and other human Daseins, as discovered and disclosed on the background of the fundamental Disclosedness of the World?

Obviously, if one interprets Husserl's notion of pure consciousness as an attempt to reduce *res extensa* to *res cogitans*, then Heidegger is just as far from Husserl as he is from Descartes. While Husserl at times brings the charge of idealism on himself, many commentators, including Crowell, have been extremely successful in distinguishing between

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[205]Edmund Husserl, *Ideas*, trans. W. Boyce Gibson, (New York: Macmillian, 1931), p.242.

Phenomenology and Idealism –albeit perhaps not Transcendental Idealism. The point is, once the epoché is carried out, according to Husserl, what is manifested is no longer objects but phenomena, that is to say, entities which are shown in the way a consciousness is directed towards them, i.e. intentionally. At the same time, consciousness itself does not appear 'absolutely', but is itself revealed only in terms of phenomena, as an 'intentional consciousness'; that is to say in its 'directedness-towards' phenomena. Yet Pure Consciousness for Husserl is not synonymous with either subject or object. Rather, as Ryan Gable puts it:

> [It] encompasses both ends or 'poles' of the intentional relationship of consciousness to its object, but each term considered in its purity, that is, only as correlative to the other (its status as an existent in the world being excluded). Thus, real objects are considered only insofar as they are meaningful unities of sense for consciousness, that is, in their phenomenality or appearing to consciousness, while my own actual, empirical ego and its conscious activities are considered only as correlative to the objects to which they are directed, that is, as 'pure', 'transcendental' consciousness."[206]

Hence, bracketing the World does not imply a reduction of the World to Consciousness, but the discovery of a new approach where it is possible to overcome subject-object dualism in view of the unified field of consciousness. The epoché is only a method to attain the perspectival shift that is the transcendental reduction. Indeed, as Gable suggests, the term 'reduction' here must be understood in its etymological sense of bringing-back [re-ducere]. Hence, by bracketing the World as it is taken to be 'in reality', Husserl attempts to bring back the World to the transcendental space where it belongs. This is by no means a reduction in the sense of a narrowing down of theoretical reflection to a less comprehensive space, but exactly the opposite; namely, the regaining of a broader understanding of entities by means of a more exhaustive and, so to speak, primordial structure. Hence, the transcendental reduction has the specific goal of showing that "all the world, and therefore whatever exists naturally, exists for me only as accepted by me, with the sense it has for me at the time –that it exists for me only

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[206]Ryan Gable, *Being and Husserl's Transcendental Reduction*, (*Fordham University:* Doctoral Dissertation, 2006), p.158

as *cogitatum* of my changing and, while changing, interconnected *cogitationes*."[207]
Understood in this way, the transcendental reduction, at least in its intent, is certainly not far
from Heidegger's conception of Dasein as Being-in-the-World. As I have already discussed,
the latter term refers to the inevitability for human Dasein to be always already within a
horizon in which entities can be discovered in their Bewandtnis to Dasein, which in turn
depends on their significance. Outside this inalienable 'within', neither human Dasein 'is',
nor other entities 'are'. This is because in order for anything to be manifested, discovered or
disclosed, that is to say, in order for anything to be a phenomenon, something has to fall
inside the horizon within which things may 'be'. This is not altogether different from saying
that a phenomenon can appear only there where the condition of possibilities for its
appearance are fulfilled -only within the transcendental field of intentional consciousness.

If there is a difference between Husserl and Heidegger, this is certainly not in the outcome
but in the method. For Heidegger, as argued by Crowell, following Tugendath, "no longer
needed the *epoché* in order to investigate the dimension of modes of givenness because . . . he
stands within it from the outset."[208] The term Being-in-the-World means precisely this,
namely, that Dasein, in its Being, is always already within a transcendental field of
Disclosedness and, as a consequence, discoveredness. For this, Crowell believes, rightly I
think, that Disclosedness for Heidegger can be said to coincide with the field of
consciousness. Yet Heidegger is keen to stress that Disclosedness, just as much as
consciousness, if one understands the latter radically enough, is not merely an
epistemological notion, but has, as Crowell puts it, "a more complex structure whose aspects
he terms 'disposition' (*Befindlichkeit*), 'understanding' (*Verstehen*), and 'discourse'
(*Rede*)."[209] This shift is important, as it marks the difference between Heidegger's and
Husserl's brands of phenomenology. This is not to say that Husserl's phenomenology is
merely epistemological rather than ontological. Crowell insists that phenomenology, even in
its Husserlian version, is at bottom ontological.[210] What is different about Heidegger's
approach is the way in which ontology is understood, namely, as a complex, structured

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[207]Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns, (London: Martin Nijohff Publishers, 1982),
p.37.
[208]Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, (Berlin: De Gruyer, 1970), p.263; Quoted
in: Steven Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, (Evaston, Illinois: Northern University Press,
2001), p.200.
[209]Steven Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, (Evaston, Illinois: Northern University Press,
2001), p.213.
[210]Cfr: Steven Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, (Evaston, Illinois: Northern University
Press, 2001), p.201.

relation between Dasein and its Being, which cannot be reduced to a 'pure' understanding of Being. In the final chapters of this dissertation I will analyse this point further, as I hope this shall help to clear the way for a more satisfactory interpretation of *Being and Time*.

From here, Crowell takes a further step in his interpretation of *Being and Time*. This brings me to discuss the fourth and final point of Crowell's phenomenological reading of Heidegger. According to this reading, it is by embracing Husserl's transcendental reduction, albeit in its radically ontological form, that Heidegger comes to the realization that ontology must be understood in terms of the (intentional) relation between Dasein and Being, taken as the ground of all Disclosedness. It is only within the transcendental field of this relation -a field identified earlier with the 'Da' of Dasein, i.e. its Disclosedness- that the Being of Dasein is itself disclosed as it enters the intelligibility of Dasein in terms of its 'meaning'. Indeed, according to Heidegger, anything that enters within the intelligibility of Dasein does so as 'meaning'.

As I have already discussed in the course of the present chapter, Heidegger's notion of meaning is constructed in order to provide an alternative to the correspondence theory of truth, one which would avoid both crude realism and psychological idealism. Crowell agrees on this point and, discussing Heidegger's early notion of meaning, remarks:

> The transcendental-logical explication of the correspondence theory demands that the object itself be seen as meaning. Heidegger supports such an equivalence between the object as such and truth (valid meaning) as such by an appeal to the scholastic notion of the' covertability' of *ens* and *verum*. … The 'difference' between the ens and the verum is no 'real' difference, but only the reflective recognition of the object's essential relation to the subject.[211]

Crowell continues:

> …[T]he object in the regulative sense necessary as the criterion of correspondence simply *is* meaning. Meaning is the 'being' of the object. … [Nonetheless] Heidegger

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[211]Steven Crowell, "Meaning and the Ontological difference", in *Tulane Studies in Philosophy*, Val.32 (1984), p.41.

emphasizes the 'idea of immanence'[212], i.e. the recognition that the 'object as meaning' cannot be understood apart from a serious phenomenological reflection on the subjectivity of the subject[213].[214]

It is clear therefore why Crowell names the transcendental field of Disclosedness, within which entities are discovered to Dasein, the 'space of meaning'. Indeed, neither discoveredness nor Disclosedness are possible if not in terms of 'meaning'. This is the case also for the Disclosedness of Being, despite it being the ground of all possible Disclosedness. Heidegger confirms this point in §32:

> [I]f we are inquiring about the meaning of Being, our investigation ... asks about Being itself in so far as Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein. This meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities or with Being as the 'ground' which gives entities support, for a ground becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness"[215]

It is worthwhile now to compare this last quote with another excerpt from §39. I have argued many times in this dissertation that Dasein stands, without fail, within an understanding of Being, lest it be not Dasein at all. Heidegger makes this point once more, albeit in a slightly different way, when he argues:

> …Being 'is' only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being something like an understanding of Being belongs. Hence Being can be something unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be understood."[216]

This cross-reference is particularly instructive. For, if Being is always already understood [verstanden] by Dasein, and if meaning is Being itself, as it enters into the intelligibility

[212]Martin Heidegger, "Die Kategorien- und Bedeutunggslehre des Duns Scotus", in *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), p.349.

[213]Martin Heidegger, "Die Kategorien- und Bedeutunggslehre des Duns Scotus", in *Frühe Schriften* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), p.342.

[214]Steven Crowell, "Meaning and the Ontological difference", in Tulane Studies in Philosophy, 32, 1984, pp.41-42.

[215]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 193-194, H. 152.

[216]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.228, H.183.

[verständlichkeit] of Dasein, I can conclude that it is not possible, at least from the standpoint of the human Dasein, to distinguish between Being and *its* meaning. For this, Crowell believes that if one agrees that Heidegger in *Being and Time* supports a version of the transcendental reduction, one must also agree that, within this reduction Being must manifest itself only in terms of 'meaning'; that is to say, in terms of a relation of Disclosedness between Being itself and Dasein. Yet, by identifying Being and meaning, or, better, Being and the 'space of meaning' within which that Being is disclosed to Dasein in terms of meaning, Crowell is not pursuing a mere terminological equivalence, but rather making a point concerning the importance of the transcendental space of Disclosedness as opposed to the two poles between which this space has been traditionally split. This point constitutes the important lesson that a phenomenological reading of *Being and Time* can teach, namely, that for Heidegger what is important is not Being as the objective counterpart of a subjective Dasein, nor Being as the mere bridge between a subjective sphere and an objective sphere, but *Being as the transcendent ground of Disclosedness*, within which the subjective and objective spheres are rejected in favour of a sphere of significance - a sphere which is metaphysically and epistemologically foundational in respect with the split between subject and object. This phenomenological interpretation is confirmed by Heidegger when he argues that "...for a ground becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness."[217] Indeed, maintaining this correspondence between Being as the ground of all Disclosedness and meaning is paramount, if one does not want to forfeit the ontological difference. Crowell's phenomenological interpretation succeeds exactly in avoiding turning Being into 'something' in order to talk about it. Being, understood as the transcendental field of Disclosedness, 'is' only insofar it enters within the intelligibility of Dasein *as* its meaning. And insofar as the meaning of Being turns out to be itself that transcendental field of Disclosedness itself, i.e. what Crowell calls the 'space of meaning', then Being itself is disclosed within this 'space of meaning' as the 'space of meaning' itself -or, which is the same, as the *ground of all Disclosedness*.

But if all of the above is correct, why then does Heidegger maintain a terminological difference between meaning and Being, or indeed between meaning and any entity which is discovered from within the field of Disclosedness? Shouldn't Heidegger explicitly develop an ontology of meaning rather than a hermeneutical ontology? Indeed, despite the important

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[217]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.194, H. 152.

merits of Crowell's interpretation in tracing the connection between Being and meaning, the phenomenological reading of *Being and Time* does not appear to provide a satisfactory answer to the questions I have just raised. Certainly Heidegger explicitly states that Being as "ground becomes accessible only as meaning…"[218] Nevertheless, this does not seem to urge Heidegger to collapse terminologically 'meaning' into 'Being' or vice versa. This may indicate that indeed Heidegger wants to maintain some difference between Being and meaning. Yet if Being as ground enters within the intelligibility of Dasein only as meaning, and if one agrees with Heidegger's commitment to the spirit of the transcendental reduction, one must admit that the distinction between Being and meaning is at best superfluous. This would be correct unless 'being a ground' is not all there is about Being; unless, in other words, I can demonstrate that, despite the fact that Being, understood as the transcendental ground of all Disclosedness, must be equated with meaning; or, as Crowell would say, with the 'space of meaning', the notion of Being itself is not completely exhausted by that of 'ground'. If this is the case there may be 'something else' to Being, a residual difference that would prevent a complete equation between Being and the way that very Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein. Hence, there could be a sense in which Being lies utterly 'beyond' the transcendental space of meaning. Yet if Being can be disclosed only within the space that it itself grounds, how can there 'be' anything beyond that space? And insofar as Being itself, as ground, is the condition of possibility of its own Disclosedness, how can Being 'be', so to speak, 'beyond itself'?

This profound tension within Heidegger's masterwork is noted by Crowell:

> Readers of Heidegger quickly sense the presence of two voices in his work. There is, first, the Heidegger who seeks the proper name of being; the Heidegger who, in spite of his best insights into the ontological difference, often seems to imagine being as some sort of primal cosmic "event," a hidden source or power. Seeking the "meaning of being," this Heidegger appears to want philosophy to "eff the ineffable." There is, second, the Heidegger who is concerned with the reflexive issue of the possibility of philosophy itself, the Heidegger who constantly chastises other thinkers for not being rigorous enough, for succumbing to metaphysical prejudice and losing sight of the things themselves. This Heidegger seems precisely to shun the excesses of what the

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[218]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.194, H. 152.

first Heidegger appears to embrace. Though these voices are indelibly entwined in Heidegger's text, there is a real temptation to separate them out and to weight them relative to each other.[219]

Crowell obviously actively pursues the second 'voice', through which Heidegger discusses ontology in terms of the transcendental field of Disclosedness defined by the 'object' of ontology itself. And his conclusion is that *Being and Time* should be read as a fundamental attempt to redefine philosophy from within itself. In order to achieve this, Heidegger's first voice remains partly neglected by Crowell. Nevertheless, I maintain that it remains a fundamental aspect of *Being and Time* and must be taken into account. The question is what does this voice say? Where and how can one hear it?

I have already mentioned that if Heidegger's notion of Being is to allow for some difference with the 'space of meaning' within which that notion itself appears, then 'something' about Being must be 'beyond' that very 'space of meaning'. And where is Being discussed in terms of this 'beyond'? As I will analyse in depth in the following chapters, this is the case in the context of the discussion of authentic Disclosedness, where through the analysis of the Call of Consciousness, Being is discussed in terms of its relationship with Dasein. It is Being that, so to speak, initiates this relation, to which Dasein has to respond. But this does not entail that Being is the ground of this relationship. Indeed, if one takes Crowell's point on the transcendental reduction, the relationship itself is this transcendental ground. On the other hand, Being itself remains fundamentally 'beyond' this ground, and yet it discloses itself *as* this very ground, that is, in terms of meaning. Beginning from the next chapter, I shall attempt to show the importance of the point I have just raised.

Nevertheless, this does not imply that the phenomenological interpretation of *Being and Time* is to be dismissed. Indeed, attempting to read Heidegger's text against phenomenology by championing only the Being that emerges from the discussion on authentic Disclosedness, would mean to present a crudely mystical and unfair version of *Being and Time*. Rather what I am suggesting here is the project of enhancing the phenomenological reading through a careful analysis of those sections where Heidegger discusses the concept of authentic Disclosedness, in order to provide an interpretation of *Being and Time* that does not shy away

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[219]Steven Crowell, "Meaning and the Ontological difference", in *Tulane Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 32 (1984), p.7.

from that intimate and irreducible tension which is, according to Crowell, at the core of the book itself. Indeed, in what follows I will attempt to show just how the juxtaposition of Heidegger's 'two voices', namely the mystical and the phenomenological, opens a space in *Being and Time* within which it is possible to ask the timeless question of the 'source of the ground' in such a way as to bring philosophy, so to speak, into its post-metaphysical era.

4. AUTHENTIC DISCLOSEDNESS

It should be clear by now that any effort to provide an exhaustive interpretation of *Being and Time* without paying close attention to the notions of temporality, finitude and death, are doomed to misconstrue Heidegger's fundamental intention. For, while the analysis of the discoveredness of entities and the Disclosedness of Dasein's world carried out in Division One is certainly ground-breaking, any attempt to achieve an explicit formulation of the concept of Being is unattainable without an appropriate understanding of the *meaning* of that very Being. This is clearly stated as early as §2, where the meaning of Being is taken to be the answer to the fundamental question of ontology. As I have explained in the previous chapter, the phenomenon of temporality constitutes the meaning of Dasein's Being, insofar as it grounds the unity of the structure of that very Being, i.e. Care. The notion of temporality names neither a mere system of reference for counting time nor a simple intuition which provides a general framework for human understanding. Rather, it is defined in terms of its existential significance for Dasein, which is why its definition as the meaning of Care is justified. In analysing this notion, Heidegger harnesses the concept of finitude to define the temporal nature of Dasein in terms of its possibilities, most importantly, the possibility of being-a-whole which finds its fulfilment in Dasein's death. As I shall discuss shortly, death itself is not a 'time' of Dasein's life, nor the sheer lack of life, but a possibility, indeed the most proper possibility of Dasein's life. In anticipatorily facing the possibility of dying, Dasein discloses the profound, authentic significance of its finite life. Nonetheless, due to its fallen nature, Dasein constantly avoids facing the deep groundlessness brought about by the finitude which death defines. Dasein must therefore be called out to face itself. The phenomena of the call, finitude and death are among those terms most often overlooked by Anglo-American commentators, who rather tend to focus their attention on the gnoseological dimension of Dasein. Nevertheless, a new wave has recently begun to wash the Western shores, thanks most eminently to the work of François Raffoul. As I shall explain in the course of the present chapter, what I consider to be Raffoul's more 'ethical' reading will provide some important insights regarding the connection between call, finitude and death with that of Disclosedness of Being. Drawing on the long-standing French interpretative

tradition of the Heideggerian text, Raffoul begins redefining the disclosive relation between Dasein and its Being in terms of an ethical relation between one and 'another'. As will become clear, the themes which Raffoul considers, along with his interpretative insights will constitute the basis from where, in the final chapter of this dissertation, I shall launch my own reading of *Being and Time*.

It is my intention to present some of Raffoul's important findings and I shall do so in the following manner: I will begin in Section i. by defining the concept of Anxiety in connection with Dasein's death and will proceed to provide a brief overview of Heidegger's definition of death. In so doing it will become clear that while death is not a moment in Dasein's life, it is, however, the most proper possibility of its Being, which Dasein itself must take up in order to attain an authentic Disclosedness of its Being. In Section ii. I shall harness notions of Guilt and the Call to demonstrate the need for a fallen Dasein to be 'called out' of itself in order to face its death and, in so doing, to disclose itself in its finitude. This will provide a sufficient introduction for my discussion of Raffoul's interpretation of *Being and Time* which I shall develop in Section 3. and through which I hope to begin demonstrating the importance of the relational, ethical dimension of Dasein's Disclossedness.

i.   Dasein's Anxiety and Death[220]

In §40 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger turns his attention to a particular mood of Dasein, namely, Anxiety [Angst]. As I have already mentioned in the previous chapters, moods are always strictly connected with the phenomenon of understanding, so much so that it is not possible to understand something unless, at the same time, that something presents itself mood-wise. Therefore, it is only natural that, in enquiring about the meaning of Dasein's Being or, which is the same, about the way in which Being enters into the intelligibility [verständ-lichkeit] of Dasein, Heidegger begins by attempting to spell out the mood which accompanies Dasein's understanding of its own Being; this mood is Anxiety. Anxiety is

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[220]This section will attempt to provide some insight into Heidegger's notion of death which will be propaedeutic to the Relational Interpretation of *Being and Time* which will be advocated in the final chapter of this dissertation. While a more detailed discussion on the concept of death is not possible within the scope of the present work, a number of comprehensive studies on the subject are available, including: Havi Carel, *Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger*, (New York: Radopi, 2006); Françoise Dastur, *Death: an Essay on Finitude*, trans. J. Llewelyn, (London: Athlone Press, 1996); George Pattison, *Heidegger on Death: A Critical Theological Essay*, (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2013); Paul Edwards, *Heidegger on Death: a Critical Evaluation* (US: Hegel Institute, 1979).

distinguished from the mood of fear [Furcht], insofar as fear is always directed toward an entity within-the-world; hence, while the latter is a shrinking back from an entity which is detrimental to Dasein itself, it is still a mood in which Dasein remains essentially concerned with intraworldy entities. As such, fear is a mood of Dasein's falling, insofar as, in the face of something fearsome, Dasein becomes so concerned with the entity it fears as to flee in the face of itself towards those intrawordly entities which are threatening.

On the other hand, when Dasein is in the grip of Anxiety, what presents itself as detrimental is not an entity within-the-world, that is, an entity which is capable of having a Bewandtnis. In this state Dasein is not anxious about the specific threat of a definite, factical potentiality-for-Being and is not concerned with the detrimentatlity of a particular possibility of an entity or, even, of its own Being. Rather, in the grip of Anxiety, Dasein is anxious about something completely indefinite, as the threat itself does not seem to come from an entity within-the-world. "*That in the face of which one has anxiety*", Heidegger says, "*is Being-in-the-World as such*".[221] In this sense, Anxeity is an authentic mood of Dasein, insofar as, in experiencing it, Dasein does not become concerned with any intraworldly entity as such. Rather, given Anxiety's indefinite threat, intraworldly entities become absolutely irrelevant. Yet, in what way can Dasein be anxious about its fundamental character of Being, one of its deepest existentiales, namely Being-in-the-World? It is important here not to lose sight of Heidegger's analysis of Being-in-the-world conducted in the five chapters which precede the discussion concerning Anxiety. In these chapters, the term 'World', strictly speaking, is used by Heidegger to refer to "that *'wherein'* a factical Dasein … can be said to 'live'";[222] the 'a priori character' of the world is its Worldhood, which is defined by Heidegger as that totality of Significance upon which a totality of Bewandtnis is grounded. In other words, the World is nothing but the concrete totality of the ways in which entities within-the-world are significant to Dasein. For an entity to be significant means that it has been discovered according to the way in which Dasein is in-the-world. Heidegger refers to this as Disclosedness and describes it according to the structure the reader should know so well by now. Heidegger's study of this structure is of paramount importance as it shows that Dasein's way of Being-in-the-World is not according to a fixed background in terms of which entities are discovered. Rather this very background, the World, depends on Dasein's understanding projection, a projection

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[221]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.230, H.186.
[222]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.93, H.65.

which, as the reader knows, is both thrown moodwise and articulated. This projection is always according to the *possibilities* of Dasein's own Being, and for this reason one can say that Dasein *is*-in-the-world in such a way that its very Being(-in-the-World) is constantly at issue [es geht]. As I have argued in the preceding chapter, this phenomenon is what Heidegger calls Care, and it constitutes the very Being of Dasein. If this is right, the underlying structure of Dasein's way of Being-in-the-world is nothing but Dasein's potentiality-for-Being, namely, that openness of Dasein which makes Dasein's thrown articulated projection of Being possible.

From this it should be clear that, if the phenomenon of Being-in-the-world is inextricably linked to Dasein's Being as openness to potentiality, what Dasein must be anxious about is nothing but that potentiality-for-Being which makes of Dasein's very Being-in-the-world an issue for Dasein itself. "Therefore", Heidegger states, "with that which it is anxious about, anxiety discloses Dasein as *Being-possible* ... [and] makes manifest in Dasein its *Being towards* its ownmost potentiality-for-Being".[223] This does not mean that Dasein is anxious about some particular possibilities which it may or may not 'actualize'. Rather, Dasein's Anxiety is essentially about nothing in particular, and its threat comes from nowhere.

> Accordingly, when something threatening brings itself close, anxiety does not 'see' any definite 'here' or 'yonder' from which it comes. That in the face of which one has anxiety is characterized by the fact that what threatens is *nowhere.* Anxiety 'does not know' what that in the face of which it is anxious is. 'Nowhere', however, does not signify nothing: this is where any region lies, and there too lies any disclosedness of the world for essentially spatial Being-in. Therefore that which threatens cannot bring itself close from a definite direction within what is close by; it is already 'there', and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one's breath, and yet it is nowhere.
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> In that in the face of which one has anxiety, the 'It is nothing and nowhere' becomes manifest. The obstinacy of the 'nothing and nowhere within-the-world' means as a phenomenon that *the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety.* The utter insignificance which makes itself known in the 'nothing and nowhere', does not signify that the world is absent, but tells us that entities within-the-world are of so

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[223]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.232, H.187-188.

little importance in themselves that on the basis of this *insignificance* of what is within-the-world, the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself.[224]

What anxiety is anxious about is Dasein's own Being, which is to say, the way in which Dasein *is*-in-the-world, and this Being is characterized at bottom by unsettledness, summarized in the formula: 'Dasein is that entity for which, in its being, that very being is an issue'.[225]

According to Heidegger, Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with itself, which is to say, face to face with its own 'being an issue for itself', thus showing the fundamental unsettledness of that articulated projective thrownness by which Dasein is thrust towards its authentic potentiality-for-Being itself. Now, if Dasein, through its Anxiety, is to be brought face to face with itself, or better, with its own Being, this means that the phenomenon of Anxiety must manifest Dasein's Being, so to speak, in its totality. While the question concerning the possibility of disclosing Dasein's Being as a whole has already been discussed in the previous chapter, any attempt to solve the issue has been delayed until now. We must now try to understand in what way Anxiety may be able to bring Dasein face to face with its own Being as-a-whole.

In the first chapter of the second Division of *Being and Time*, Heidegger tries to clarify the way in which it may be possible for Dasein to grasp itself as a whole. Despite the fact that it may seem paradoxical to look for the totality of an entity whose Being is existence, which is to say, whose Being is that of being constantly ahead-of-itself, Heidegger believes that it is precisely because this entity is constantly ahead-of-itself that Dasein may be able to grasp itself as a whole. This is because, in being-ahead-of-itself, Dasein is constantly a potentiality-for-Being, which is a Being-towards.

In Heidegger's view, what Dasein is constantly towards is nothing but its own 'end', that is, its death [Tod]. Heidegger distinguishes death from 1) 'perishing' [Verenden], which refers to the event of the ending of those intraworldly entities which live, and 2) 'demise'

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[224]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.231, H. 186-187.
[225]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32, H.12.

[Ableben], which names the event of the ending of ontological entities.[226] The reader must keep in mind here that an 'event' must necessarily be contained within the experiential horizon of Dasein. On the other hand, death signifies the 'end of Dasein' proper. And since Dasein in its 'there' [Da] constitutes its own horizon, the end of Dasein can in no way fall within the very horizon which it annihilates. Despite the fact that there is still disagreement among scholars concerning the correct interpretation of the term 'death', it is clear from Heidegger's text that, insofar as it consists in the end of those ontological entities whose essential structural character is existing as thrown and fallen, death at its most basic level is Dasein's impossibility to have any more possibilities; that is, the impossibility of existing any longer, of being ahead-of-itself.[227] As such, the notion of death refers to nothing which can be experienced by Dasein; for when Dasein comes to its end in death, that is, once Dasein's possibilities have been exhausted, Dasein exists no longer. Therefore, strictly speaking, death is not an event of Dasein's life, for it is the impossibility of Dasein's living further.

Yet, since Dasein exists constantly ahead-of-itself, death represents that possibility which is constantly impending on all other possibilities. Now, Dasein's Being, i.e. Care, is the way in which Dasein's Being-in-the-world is an issue to Dasein itself. From this one can infer that death must also be an essential possibility of such a Being. For death is that "possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world ..., [as] the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there".[228] In this sense, death consists in what Heidegger calls the 'Dasein's ownmost possibility', insofar as it is that possibility (of impossibility) towards which Dasein's existence is constantly projected.

Nevertheless, if death is essentially 'nothing' to Dasein, i.e. not-an-event, or the impossibility of all possibility, why should it consist in Dasein's ownmost possibility? Indeed, how can death be a possibility at all? Many have criticized Heidegger on the ground that his discussion of death is nothing more than a play on words[229] containing flagrant

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[226]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.291, H.247.

[227]It should also be noted that the phenomenon of Dasein's death is described by Heidegger as, 1) essentially individualizing and 2) not to be outstripped. This is to say that to die is a possibility which is unavoidably 'mine'; hence I die *alone* and no one can die *for me*.

[228]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.294, H.250.

[229]Cfr: Hermann Philipse, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p.354.

contradiction.[230] Certainly one must agree that Heidegger's discussion of death often dances on the edge of the paradoxical. Nonetheless, it may seem much less contradictory if this phenomenon is analysed while keeping in mind the ultimate aim of Heidegger's discussion of death. For what Heidegger is attempting through his discussion of death is to offer an analysis of death which manages to describe it ontologically, without excluding altogether the everyday understanding of this notion. As such, death is ontologically that possibility towards-which Dasein is constantly ahead-of-itself. Now, if one considers this through the lens of the phenomenon of finite temporality which I have discussed in the preceding chapter of this dissertation, it is clear that death cannot be taken as a point in a future which is 'not-yet' but that, at some point in time, will be 'now'. As I have said, authentic temporality, by temporalizing itself into strictly interconnected ecstases, constitutes the essential unity which grounds the unitary structure of Dasein's Being, i.e. the Care-structure. For this, death shows itself as the aim of Dasein's fundamental way of Being, that is, 'Being-towards'; and the latter in turn constitutes the essential character of the Care-structure.

In this sense, Dasein's Being-towards-Death is fundamentally ahead-of-itself, thrown and fallen. It is fallen because Dasein, being fascinated with intrawordly entities in its everydayness, cannot face death, as the latter is nothing-in-the-world, and reduces it to the experience or potential experience of a worldly event, i.e. Perishing or Demise. It is thrown for it is a possibility which is essentially unavoidable and into which Dasein constantly finds itself, since as long Dasein lives it is 'dying'. Most importantly, it is ahead-of-itself. This does not necessarily mean that Dasein actively projects itself towards its own death, nor that Dasein actively strives to actualize its own death. The fundamental point to be understood here is that, for Heidegger, death is not an event of Dasein's life, nor a possibility in the sense of a possible event which can be 'actualized'. Instead, death is the lack of all possibility; is the "the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of [Dasein's] existence".[231] This lack is not something which Dasein needs to 'fill in' or overcome but is deeply rooted in that condition of possibility of Dasein's Being which has been called its 'meaning', that is, Dasein's finite temporality. In this sense, Dasein dies because the condition under which its Being can be a unitary phenomenon is the *finitude of temporality*. Insofar as temporality is finite, Dasein's Being is fundamentally 'possible', and its concrete possibilities are significant; this is to say,

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[230]Cfr: Paul Edwards, *Heidegger on Death: a Critical Evaluation* (US: Hegel Institute, 1979) pp.50-60.
[231]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.310, H.266.

they have been articulated according to meaningful projection of the understanding, that is, a projection according to that horizon upon which Dasein's Being can be disclosed. This horizon is nothing but the meaning of Dasein's Being which, as I have said, is temporality. To put it more plainly, albeit more simplistically, I may argue that an atemporal or temporally infinite Dasein would not be 'possible' in the way a finitely temporal Dasein can be. For without temporal differentiation there can only be unchanged actuality, whereas with infinite time no possibility is more significant than another, as all possibilities will eventually be fulfilled. Hence, it is only against the background of finite temporality that Dasein's Being is significantly 'at stake', and that it makes sense for Dasein to take issue with its possibilities. From this it is clear why death is the essential possibility for an entity such as Dasein, whose temporality is fundamentally finite. Indeed, it is because Dasein's temporality is finite that Dasein may be-a-whole, as death constitutes the necessary element of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. However, this is not because, by anticipating its own death, Dasein can imagine a state of itself in which all its possibilities have been 'actualized', but because by taking up death as one of its essential possibilities, it is possible for Dasein itself to grasp this complete lack of possibility as one of its possibilities, so that by anticipating death and being towards it, Dasein is made 'whole'. Yet, this is not to say that in anticipation all of Dasein's possibilities are actually grasped; rather by being towards death Dasein takes up *all the 'possible possibilities' of its Being*, including the total lack of possibility. Indeed, death, as a possibility of Dasein, is peculiar in that it cannot be actualized in Dasein's existence; rather, it is "*the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all*".[232] In this sense, by Being-towards-death, Dasein is essentially taking up its finitude, hence its temporality; and insofar as the latter constitutes the meaning of Dasein's Being, when Dasein acknowledges its death it enters into a disclosing relationship with its Being as it becomes intelligible as its meaning.

Indeed, according to Heidegger, by existing towards-its-death Dasein constitutes, in a way, the basis of its own Being. For it is only by existing that Dasein is a potentiality-for-Being, and it is only through being a potentiality-for-Being that the ultimate finitude of its existence can be disclosed so that Dasein itself may be delivered over to it. This basis, that is, Dasein's finite temporality as it is disclosed in being-towards-death, is obviously a ground that Dasein itself has not laid. This is the same as to say that Dasein's being-towards-death is fundamentally a possibility into which Dasein is thrown 'for as long as it lives'. And yet, in

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[232]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.307, H.262.

order to die, Dasein has to live. This is the reason why in §58 of *Being and Time* Heidegger states that Dasein, "[a]lthough it has not laid that basis itself, it reposes in the weight of it...".[233] This is to say, Dasein is the basis of its own Being, because by existing Dasein *is*. Yet, it has not chosen its own Being. Hence, in existing as a potentiality-for-Being(-a-whole), Dasein may choose one possibility or another, but it cannot choose whether or not to be a potentiality-for-being, which is to say, whether or not to choose possibilities *tout court*. This interpretation is confirmed by Heidegger:

> Freedom ... *is* only in the choice of one possibility that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them. In the structure of thrownness, as in that of projection, there lies essentially a nullity.[234]

In other words, Dasein's basis is essentially thrown in its finitude and projected towards this finitude itself. For this Heidegger can affirm that Care –Dasein's Being- "*is permeated with nullity through and through*";[235] this is because, in its very Being, Dasein is both: 1) the basis of a nullity, namely itself as being-towards the impossibility of all possibility -i.e. its death-; and 2) is itself null, by being itself a thrown basis, as it is not able to choose its own self from the ground up.

The fact that the Being of Dasein is described in terms of nullity is important and requires special attention. What does it mean in fact to say that Dasein's being is fundamentally 'null'? The answer to this question requires a partial step back. In the course of the present section, I have argued that Being-towards-death means: to be brought face-to-face with the fundamental groundlessness of Dasein's Being, with the 'lack' which stands beyond the temporal finitude of Dasein as its limit. In being-towards-death Dasein faces its ownmost possibility; yet this possibility is essentially nothing, namely, not a thing (in the world). However, if the reader recalls the discussion about Anxiety conducted in this section, it should be quite clear that, in being-towards-death, Dasein is fundamentally anxious. And, insofar as Anxiety forces Dasein to face its own Being in its fundamental nullity -that is, in that constant lack which is structural for an entity that exists as constantly ahead of itself into

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[233]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.33, H.284.

[234]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.331, H.285.

[235]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.331, H.285.

possibilities-, then it is the same Anxiety that forces Dasein to face its own death. As such, in facing the abyss of its own ultimate impossibility of existence, Dasein comes face to face with its very own Being in terms of its meaning, that is, as the finitude of Dasein's temporality.

The Being which comes to be disclosed thus is therefore nothing in the world, and it is fundamentally null, as it consists in the thrown impossibility not to choose possibilities as projected towards the ultimate impossibility of all possibilities. In this way Heidegger seems to anticipate something that will be clearly formulated only after the publication of *Being and Time*, in the famous address entitled *What is Metaphysics?*, where Heidegger states Dasein's Being to be essentially *Nothing*.[236] While a thorough discussion concerning the status of Being in the context of *What is Metaphysics?* falls outside the scope of the present dissertation, it is evident that once one accepts that the Being of Dasein, in its meaning as finite temporality, is essentially Nothing, one is left with the difficult problem of whether anything can be said of this Being and whether ontology is at all possible. I shall attempt to answer this fundamental question in the following chapter. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to analyse in more depth the fundamental nullity of Dasein's Being and, in particular, the way in which Dasein comes to face itself as this nullity.

ii.   The Call of Conscience and Dasein's Vocation

I have shown that, in the phenomenon of Anxiety which characterizes Dasein's way of Being-towards-death, Dasein comes to face its groundlessness. As an entity whose existence is thrown and fallen, Dasein is constantly thrown towards a nullity, namely, towards the possibility of the impossibility of all possibilities, i.e. Being-towards-Death. Additionally, Dasein is thrown into nullity, that is, in the impossibility of not being-towards-possibilities. In this way, Dasein comes face to face with its Being in terms of the meaning of this Being itself, and in so doing, comes face to face with the finite temporality which constitutes its potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the context of the previous section, Dasein itself has to exist as thrown and fallen in order for its grounding finitude to 'be'. This is why I have agreed with Heidegger that Dasein 'is the null basis of a nullity'. I

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[236]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics*"*, trans. D. Krell, in W. McNeil (ed.) *Pathmarks*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

have also explained that the Being which Dasein is by existing is fundamentally defined in terms of a 'not', that is, as finitude. The fact that Dasein, in existing as thrown and fallen, must take up its own null Being-a-basis is what Heidegger names Guilt [Schuldig]. This definition is stated plainly by Heidegger in §57 of *Being and Time*, where he states: "…we define the formally existential idea of the 'Guilty!' as 'Being-the-basis for a Being which has been defined by a 'not' –that is to say as *'Being-the-basis of a nullity'*".[237]

Heidegger uses the term Guilt in connection with its root 'schuld', meaning 'debt'. Being-guilty means 'to be indebted', in the sense of the expression 'schuld haben an' which in ordinary German means 'to be blamed for...', but which can be taken in a more neutral sense as 'to be responsible for'. Hence, Dasein is 'guilty' because by being its-own-basis it is also, in a technical sense, 'responsible for' the way it itself is, that is, it is responsible for its Being. Yet the use of the word Schuldig to describe the way in which Dasein is 'responsible for' its Being also draws attention to the fact that, in its Being-the-basis of its Being, Dasein is fundamentally 'in debt'; this is because it 'owes' that Being-a-basis *not* to itself. Dasein can therefore appropriately be said to be guilty, insofar as its Being, of which Dasein itself is the ground, contains within itself a fundamental lack.[238] Yet this lack, this indebtedness, is what actually makes Dasein its-self, i.e. that entity for which in its Being that Being is an issue,[239] or, which is the same, that ontological, finite entity which exists as thrown and fallen.

Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, Dasein, in its fallen everydayness, cannot face the nullity of its Being. This impossibility is implicit in that, when falling, Dasein falls alongside intraworldly entities and becomes fascinated with them; so much so that it wants to ground its Being and Being in general in the totality of those entities which Heidegger calls the 'world'. Being thus entangled in the 'world', all that Dasein faces are those entities within-the-world. Nonetheless, since its Being, which is ontologically different from entities, is essentially nothing in the world, Dasein, being fallen, cannot face its own Being unless in the 'reflection' that intraworldly entities give of it, as in a mirror. In falling, Dasein is absorbed in the 'world' and covers up what is most authentic to, that is to say, most proper [eigentlich] of, its own

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[237]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.329, H.283.
[238]Cfr: Havi Carel, *Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger*, (New York: Radopi, 2006), p.87.
[239]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32, H.12.

Being -namely, its Being-an-issue-for-itself, its potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, its Being-towards-Death, and its finite temporality.

Yet, falling is at the same time a fundamental constituent of the structure of Care. This is because, according to Heidegger, falling is the inevitable starting point of his phenomenological ontology; or, which is the same, the necessary launching pad from which Dasein is able to discover and disclose entities and its own Being. The reader may begin to understand what Heidegger is getting at by saying that, loosely speaking, it is not possible to uncover something which is not covered-up, as it is not possible to disclose what is not closed over. Yet Heidegger is not merely asserting the dependence of two opposites, but making a crucial point concerning the nature of the human Dasein; that is, authentic Disclosedness of Being, despite being essential to Dasein in both its inauthentic and authentic Self, is not intrinsic to Dasein but can happen only insofar as the Being of that Dasein is initially closed-off to it. The question now is under what circumstances can Dasein 'disclose' out of its closedness? Is it a case of Dasein bootstrapping itself out of its closedness and into Dis-closedness, as in the adventures of a famous Baron, or is this transition dependent on factors that are extrinsic to Dasein? It must be clear by now that nothing, i.e. nothing in-the-world, is extrinsic to Dasein, insofar as the discoveredness of everything in the world is strictly dependent on the Disclosedness of Dasein's Being. If the transition from closedness into Dis-closedness must be brought about from something outside Dasein, then it means that nothing can make Dasein's Disclosedness happen. That is, nothing in the World, but also no-thing in the sense of not-an-entity, be it an intraworldly entity or an ontological entity like Dasein. Yet, what does it mean to say that 'nothing' is responsible for Dasein's Dislcosedness? While this cannot refer to an absence of external intervention, it must be attributed to an intervention that cannot be tracked down to anything from within the horizon of Dasein. However, if this question is to be pursued further we need to find a way to speak positively of this nothing, at least insofar as its intervention can be ascertained from within the horizon of Dasein.

Let us begin by asking how Dasein can become aware of its being guilty; according to the definition of Guilt, this is the same as asking how Dasein's basic nullity is manifested to Dasein. According to Heidegger, Dasein, in its everydayness, is fallen away from itself and alongside the 'world'. In this situation Dasein is lost in the average interpretation of its Being which is given to it, which consists in the phenomenon Heidegger has called Das Man. Heidegger says:

> [B]ecause Dasein is *lost* in the "they", it must first find itself. In order to find *itself* at all, it must be 'shown' [gezeigt] to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its *possibility,* Dasein *is* already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested.[240]

It should be noted that Dasein's potentiality-for-Being-its-Self is nothing other than its potentiality for 'Being-a-finite-whole'. The question is, how is this potentiality 'pointed out' [gezeigt] or attested to Dasein? According to Heidegger, it is so by that which he calls the 'voice of conscience' [Stimme des Gewissens].[241] But what is this phenomenon? And in what way does it attest to Dasein its lostness in the 'world' as it is interpreted by Das Man? Heidegger continues:

> Conscience gives us 'something' to understand; it *discloses.* By characterizing this phenomenon formally in this way, we find ourselves enjoined to take it back into the *disclosedness* of Dasein. This disclosedness, as a basic state of that entity which we ourselves are, is constituted by state-of-mind, understanding, falling, and discourse. If we analyse conscience more penetratingly, it is revealed as a *call [Ruf].* Calling is a mode of *discourse.* The call of conscience has the character of an *appeal* to Dasein by calling it to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self; and this is done by way of *summoning* it to its ownmost Being-guilty.[242]

In other words, the call of conscience calls Dasein to that guilt which constitutes Dasein authentically as the 'null basis of a nullity'. In this sense, this call is nothing but a call for Dasein to face its temporal finitude which underpins its Being, i.e. Care, through and through, and which grants Dasein's authentic Being-towards-Death. In this sense the call is also an appeal to authenticity, or, as Heidegger puts it, a call "to [Dasein's] ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self".[243]

[240]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.313, H.268.
[241]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.313, H.268.
[242]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.314, H.269.
[243]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.314, H.269.

Now, Dasein's *ownmost* potentiality-for-Being-its-Self is the same as Dasein's Being-towards-its-ownmost-potentiality-for-Being-a-whole; and the latter is nothing but Dasein's Being-towards-death. I can say, therefore, that the call of conscience, through an appeal to Dasein' Guilt, calls Dasein to face its own death. Yet, what does it mean for Dasein to be *called* to face its death? In the course of this dissertation some hints have been offered. I have said that death is not an event of Dasein's life and that to face death does not mean striving to actualize it. I have also said that it is rather in anticipating the possibility of death by being towards it that Dasein faces the nullity of the finite temporality which constitutes the condition of possibility of its Being. What I am now able to argue is that, through the call of conscience, Dasein is called to face its Guilt, to take responsibility for the nullity of its Being by taking up this nullity by choice. But in what way does Conscience call Dasein to face this nullity? With Heidegger:

> *What* does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. Least of all does it try to set going a 'soliloquy' in the Self to which it has appealed. 'Nothing' gets called *to* [zu-gerufen] this Self, but it has been *summoned [aufgerufen]* to itself -that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being... The call dispenses with any kind of utterance. It does not put itself into words at all; yet it remains nothing less than obscure and indefinite. *Conscience discourses solely and constantly in the mode of keeping silent.*[244]

Silence is a fundamental mode of discourse, where what is articulated is not expressed in language.[245] At the same time it is still unclear whether something that calls by keeping silent may actually be heard by Dasein so that Dasein may take up the nullity to which this call calls it to, as the basis of its own Being. Yet, in order to take up something, be it a nullity, Dasein still needs to have heard the call, or, which is the same, it must have in some sense 'grasped' this nullity. Yet a nullity is certainly 'nothing' which can be grasped in the sense that it can be 'made present' in a ready-to-hand fashion; for it cannot be turned into an intraworldly entity. How then can this nullity be 'grasped'?

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[244]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.318, H. 273.
[245]Cfr: Chapter 1, Section iv. of this dissertation.

I have discussed different ways in which nullity 'shows' itself to Dasein. In Anxiety Dasein faces the nullity that grounds its finitude in a Disposition in which its mood is directed towards nothing in the world, but rather towards the impossibility of its possibilities. Furthermore, in my analysis of the phenomenon of Being-Guilty I have explained that Dasein comes to project itself upon the nullity of its finitude, and this nullity is discovered as the basis of Dasein's potentiality for Being. Hence. Being-guilty consists in the projection of Dasein's Being upon its nullity. This projection is what I could call 'the understanding of nullity'. In addition, in the call of conscience, Dasein is *silently called* to its being-guilty, and this call is a mode of Discourse. Finally, I have argued that Anxiety, being-guilty and the call are all phenomena in the face of which Dasein, in its everydayness, constantly flees. Insofar as all the elements which have been named can be subsumed under one of the constituents of Disclosedness, I may be confident in affirming that the nullity of Dasein's Being can be grasped in terms of its Disclosedness.

I must note, however, that the Disclosedness of nullity is itself a special case of Disclosedness in general. This special case, Heidegger argues, consists in Dasein's choice of taking up the nullity which is manifested in terms of Guilt, as the basis of Dasein's own Being.[246] This choice can arise in Dasein only as a response to the conscience which, in calling Dasein, attests to it the possibility of an authentic Disclosedness of its Being. The particular kind of Disclosedness which discloses Dasein's nullity is called by Heidegger Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit]. With this term Heidegger means the "*reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety*".[247] Resoluteness is 'reticent' insofar as it projects its Disclosedness upon Dasein's Being-guilty, that is, upon the nullity of its finitude. Resoluteness is also ready-for-anxiety since, by projecting Dasein's Being upon the nullity of its finitude, it brings Dasein constantly in the face of its nullity. In bringing Dasein face to face with that nullity which constitutes the basis of the finitude of its temporality, Resoluteness discloses Dasein in its potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. In this sense, Resoluteness is necessarily 'anticipatory', and it is so in two ways: firstly, in that it projects Dasein 'right to the end', as a finitude which is whole only in the constant anticipation of its potentiality-for-annihilation, i.e. as a Being-towards-Death;

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[246]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.342-345, H.296-298.
[247]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.343, H.296-297.

secondly, in that it constantly discloses Dasein, as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, in a projection which can never be concluded within Dasein's existence, since the conclusion of that projection is the impossibility of any further projection and, as such, of Dasein itself.

Now, despite the fact that in anticipatory Resoluteness Dasein 'choses' the call of consciousness, the call itself is still something which does not belong to Dasein in the sense that Dasein causes it. While conscience is indeed something which belongs to the Being of Dasein, indeed one of its existentiales, this does not mean it is a mere phenomenon of Dasein's existence, nor that Dasein can decide whether to be called or not. This is why I have said that the call of conscience is external to Dasein. In turn, this underlies even further the nullity which structures Dasein's essential finitude through and through. But if this is true, then, 'who' calls Dasein?

The answer to this question requires us to look more carefully at the nature of the call. I have already said that the call says nothing, in that it remains silent. The reader must not forget that remaining silent is in fact a mode of Discourse, and it is that specific mode in which something is articulated without being expressed in Language. But what does the silence of the call articulate? In an attempt to answer this question it may be useful to refer to §56 of *Being and Time*, where Heidegger states:

> One must keep in mind that when we designate the conscience as a "call", this call is an appeal to the they-self in its Self; as such an appeal, it summons the Self to its potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, and thus calls Dasein forth to its possibilities.[248]

Perhaps, then, what the call *articulates* is Dasein itself, in its twofold nature as inauthentic das Man and authentic its-Self. Heidegger asks: "Shall we say that its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self functions as the caller?"[249] Would this ultimately mean that Dasein, in conscience, calls itself?[250] While this, as I shall argue in a moment, is in fact partially the case, there is still something fundamentally 'other' about the nature of the call of conscience,

[248]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p319, H.274.

[249]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.320, H.275.

[250]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.320, H.275.

as well as about the nature of the caller. Heidegger seems to agree on this point when he writes:

> Indeed the call is precisely something which *we ourselves* have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so. 'It' calls, against our expectations and even against our will. On the other hand, the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes *from* me and yet *from beyond me.*[251]

Certainly it is Dasein that calls itself to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, which is grounded in its nullity, through and through. But the one that calls may itself be a nullity, insofar as it is essentially beyond Dasein. This nullity which essentially calls Dasein to its thrown, null potentiality-for-Being towards-death, is therefore fundamentally nothing (in-the-world). But what is this 'nothing'? The answer to this question is complicated by the fact that Heidegger wants to maintain a double provenance of the call, i.e. 'from me and yet from beyond me', which seems contradictory at best. While in fact one cannot deny that the call comes from something external to Dasein, i.e. a nullity, Heidegger makes clear this nullity is something which belongs essentially to Dasein. In what way therefore can the call come both from Dasein and from beyond Dasein? The answer lies in the interpretation of the fundamental 'nothing' from which and to which Dasein is called. While in *Being and Time* the question concerning the nature of this 'nothing' is not addressed directly, I may wish to draw the reader's attention once more to Heidegger's address *What is Metaphysics?* where the concept of 'nothing' is equated to Being itself. This is in keeping with the fundamental tenet of *Being and Time* fundamental, namely, that Being is not an entity.

Once the identity between Being and nothing is established, one can finally address the question of 'who' calls Dasein at once from Dasein itself and yet from beyond Dasein. It is Dasein's Being that calls, calling Dasein to its ownmost potentiality for Being. In this sense, the call does belong to Dasein; indeed it is a fundamental existentiale of Dasein's Being. Therefore, the call is internal to Dasein. Nevertheless, Dasein's Being is essentially null through and through, where the call calls Dasein to face this essential nullity. As such, Dasein's finite totality is grounded in that which is *not* within that very totality and cannot be

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[251]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.320, H.275.

taken up within that totality, while still constituting that same totality through and through. Hence, the 'nothing' which calls Dasein to its null finitude is, strictly speaking, the very Being of Dasein. Being is the basic 'not', the nullity that grounds the finitude of temporality which characterizes Dasein's very Being. For this I can say that Being is in fact nothing. The Call of Conscience is a call which essentially does not come from Dasein and which calls Dasein to something which is the possibility of the impossibility of its being a Dasein, i.e. death and finitude. Taken strictly this means that what the call calls to is Dasein's very Being, and it calls it out of the nothing that that Being itself is.

It is nothing therefore that calls Dasein to the nothing of its finitude. This is the same as saying: Dasein's Being calls Dasein out of itself (as a das-Man-self), towards something which is beyond itself and yet fundamentally its very own; that is, towards Dasein's ownmost Being as its-(authentic)-self. In other words, while it Being that calls Dasein from beyond Dasein itself, that very Being is that which is constantly at issue for Dasein; it is Dasein itself in its finite authenticity which calls Dasein to be, in anticipation, what Dasein must be.

iii.   Being-with Being: the Ethical Interpretation of *Being and Time*

As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, in the last decade a new and important influence has entered Anglo-American Heideggerian scholarship, most eminently through the work of the French born philosopher François Raffoul. Now, Raffoul's reading of *Being and Time* would certainly not seem entirely novel to a French audience, however in the Anglo-American context in which he works his understanding of Heidegger's masterwork promises to provide the Anglophone philosophical world with an important alternative to the dominant readings of Dreyfus and Lafont.

Many scholars[252] have bitterly criticised Heidegger's philosophy, and especially *Being and Time*, for its lack of engagement with the topic of ethics. Indeed, Heidegger systematically rejects any interpretation of his terminology in ethical terms -most famously in the case of the

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[252]Cfr: Richard Bernstein, *The New Constellation*, (Cambridge, Massachussetts: MIT Press, 1992); Luk Bouckaert, "Ontology and Ethics: Reflections on Levinas' Critique of Heidegger", in *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol.10 (1970); Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Victor Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); Emmanuel Levinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, trans. A. Aronowicz. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). p. 25. 1991.

notions of authenticity and inauthenticity.[253] This reading is supported by two points that Heidegger makes concerning Dasein: firstly, that Dasein is that entity that, in its being, is always mine.[254] And, second, that Dasein's authentic being its-self can only be 'achieved' by facing up to that individualizing phenomenon which is death. Both characterizations do indeed confer a certain aura of individualism to the analysis of Dasein, and have often been used to support charges of solipsism against Heidegger's philosophy.

In his book *The Origin of Responsibility*[255] Raffoul acknowledges that "Heidegger has often been reproached for his alleged *neglect* of ethical issues, specifically his inability to provide or articulate an ethics, or even a perspective for practical engagement in the world."[256] Certainly, there are places in *Being and Time* where Heidegger at least attempts to describe Dasein's engagement with other Daseins. In this sense, the concept of being-with [mit-Sein] is a clear example of Heidegger's attempt to make sense of Dasein's relations with others. Nevertheless, Heidegger may appear not to develop this concept adequately, as the discussion of being-with remains confined to the realm of das Man and is not developed in terms of authenticity. On the back of this, Dreyfus, who believes das Man is all there is to say about being-with, is somewhat justified when he quickly provides his readers with a social reading of Dasein. And indeed, it is hard to deny that Division Two of *Being and Time* paints a rather isolating, if not solipsistic, picture of Dasein in its authenticity. Hence, if being-with were merely an inauthentic character of Dasein, then Heidegger would be sorely mistaken to define it as an existentiale of Dasein. What needs to be clarified therefore is in what way, if any, Dasein 'is-with...' in its authenticity. This is to ask: in what way can Heidegger maintain both that Dasein can only be called to itself by facing up to its own individualising death, and that Dasein is existentially being-with, namely, that, in its Being, it is never 'alone'?

In an attempt to reject this mainstream reading and showing that Heidegger, already in *Being and Time*, is deeply concerned with Dasein's ethical dimension, Raffoul approaches the notion of being-with in terms of its being constitutive for the Being of Dasein. According to Raffoul, Dasein's "being is from the outset a relation to an alterity, from the outset a *being-*

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[253]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.210, H.167.

[254]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.67 H. 41.

[255]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).

[256]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.221.

with (others)."[257] Yet Dasein, in its Being, is so always fundamentally 'mine', in a formulation that Raffoul calls 'existential solipsism'. However, Raffoul believes that:

> [this] so-called 'existential solipsism' does not indicate Dasein's closure on itself, but designates instead the solitude, isolation, or individuation of the *existent.* Now since the existent is defined by the *openness* to beings, it becomes necessary to think of the individuation of the self and the openness to the other being - and to the other- *at the same time.* Care supposes such an openness, and to that extent implies the relation to the other. This is why Dasein is constitutively being-with. *Existential* solipsism posits that Dasein, in its being-singular and in this very solitude, is being-with. It is as that singular entity that I am with the other.[258]

Understood in this way, the concept of being-with does not merely apply to the relation between Daseins, but it has been broadened to encompass Dasein's fundamental tendency to relate with something *other than itself.* The notion of being-with, understood in Raffoul's terms, is indeed not simply a mere 'inclination' of Dasein, but that existential character which Heidegger on some occasions refers to as 'transcendence'. As such, achieving a proper understanding of the concept of being-with represents the first step in illuminating the true relation between Heidegger's philosophy and ethics.

Concerning this relation, Raffoul argues, following Jean-Luc Nancy, that:

> Heidegger does not propose moral norms, but attempts to rethink the very site of ethics; by way of a critique of the metaphysical tradition, he attempts to re-appropriate the phenomenological and ontological origins of what has been called "ethics" in our tradition. ... Ethics is understood in terms of being and of what Heidegger calls Dasein, that is, the human being conceived in its relation to being itself.[259]

This fundamental relation of Dasein with Being is referred to by Raffoul as 'originary ethics', according to Heidegger's own definition in the *Letter on Humanism*.[260] This relation,

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[257]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.206.
[258]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.209.
[259]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.222.
[260]Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", in D. Krell (ed.), *Basic Writings,* (San Francisco: Harper, 1993), p.258.

according to Raffoul's reading, is originary in the sense that it represents an original phenomenon of Dasein, rather than a mere expounding of ontology. Nonetheless, the term 'originary ethics' does not refer to a set of moral norms; for Heidegger is certainly not concerned with providing a set of normative claims on how Dasein should or should not live. Rather, if anything like an ethics is developed by Heidegger, this should be understood as the description of the space of a relation of openness towards alterity. Taken in this way, ethics is a fundamental element, indeed, as I shall soon show, *the* fundamental element of the analytic of Dasein. If one understands ethics in the way of 'originary ethics', that is to say, the space in which Dasein 'is' being-with by relating with alterity, one cannot deny that *Being and Time* is concerned indeed with ethics, just as it is undeniable that Dasein has, as its fundamental existentiale, *being-with*. Having clarified this point, Raffoul sets himself to prove that the analytic of Dasein is fundamentally concerned with originary eithics, or better, with ontology as an originary ethics, so that the question concerning ontology is reframed in terms of Dasein 'being' authentically being-with. In order to do this, Raffoul begins by exploring Heidegger's analysis of authentic Disclosedness.

In the present chapter, I have already illustrated in detail the Heideggerian analysis of authenticity in terms of Anxiety, Being-Guilty and the Call of Conscience, which together constitute the tripartite structure of authentic Disclosedness. However, within the discussion of authenticity, the use of the term Disclosedness is potentially misleading, since the latter is an existential phenomenon of Dasein, which is therefore neither authentic nor inauthentic per se. Therefore, when talking about authentic Disclosedness, Heidegger uses the less misleading term of anticipatory resoluteness [Ent-sholossenheit]. In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein takes up its being-towards-death by facing the ownmost finitude disclosed through Guilt. However, given Dasein's fundamental lostness in das Man, this is not achievable by means of an autonomous effort from the part of Dasein. Dasein must rather *be called*; and what Dasein is called to is 'being-guilty', that is, taking up its own null basis in an anticipatory 'disclosedness' (resoluteness) of its finite wholeness.

Yet in what way can Dasein be something which it never actually is, such as being that finite whole which includes its very own basis, by merely resolving itself onto it? And how can Dasein 'be' anything by merely anticipating? In order to answer these questions and appreciate Heidegger's point, the reader must remember that while Dasein can be described as present-at-hand entity its fundamental nature is that of being that entity whose Being lies

in its possibilities, in its potentiality-for-Being. As such, it is possible for Dasein to 'be' something which it may not be now yet. This is true especially of Dasein's ownmost possibility of being-a-whole which is at once most proper and most 'other' to Dasein, as it is at once Dasein's deepest possibility and its complete annihilation.

The notion of being-with, understood in the extended sense suggested by Raffoul, does not only refer to the inescapable socialisation of every Dasein, but, more broadly, to the fact that Dasein, through anticipation of its own potential totality and annihilation, is constantly in a relation with something essentially other from itself. This rereading of the notion of being-with also shows that Disclosedness is itself Dasein's very way of being-with..., as it refers to Dasein's constant openness to alterity. While this is certainly true of the inauthentic 'Disclosedness' of das Man, in which Dasein is open to other Daseins in a way as not to distinguish itself from 'them', it is especially true for authentic Disclosedness, namely, anticipatory resoluteness, in which Dasein is called to confront the ultimate 'otherness' of its own fundamental nullity, and its groundedness in such a nullity. As such, the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness has a clear transcendental connotation, since what resoluteness really discloses is what appears to be constantly hidden in the negative language that Heidegger has to employ to describe it. Hence, I can legitimately ask what anticipatory resoluteness discloses, through Call, Guilt and Anxiety. Raffoul answers this question in the following way:

> In its very eventfulness, being withdraws, is the mystery; and such a withdrawal, as Heidegger stresses, *calls us.* The event of being thus immediately engages an originary responsibility, a responsibility for being. Responsibility will have to be taken in terms of a responsiveness to this call of being, that is, from the withdrawal of being (for it is the withdrawal itself that calls us, "pulls" us toward it, as Heidegger explains in *What is Called Thinking?*). Original responsibility is a corresponding to this call, arising out of the withdrawal of being... .[261]

As partially mentioned in section ii. of this chapter, the call of conscience initiates a fundamental relation of Disclosedness between the caller and the one called. As I shall discuss in more depth in the next chapter, this relation constitutes the heart of the analysis of

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[261]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.241.

Dasein developed in *Being and Time*. Raffoul is clear on this point and he attempts to analyse this relation by pivoting on the notion of responsibility. This will incidentally show that the ontology developed in *Being and Time* is indeed ethical, insofar as the authentic 'disclosedness' of Being amounts to *a relation of responsiveness towards otherness*. Thus understood, "[r]esponsibility will then manifest the essential exposure of human beings to an inappropriable that always remains 'other' for them".[262] This is what differentiates Heideggerian responsibility from mere accountability. For whereas the latter is concerned, to a certain degree, with one's autonomy from a conditioning ground, the former indicates "the very movement of a radically finite existence having to come to itself, and to itself as other, from an inappropriable (and thus always 'other') ground."[263] In this sense, Responsiveness and Responsibility are two different ways of defining the same phenomenon, namely, Dasein's authentic answering to that call which lies at the heart of resoluteness, namely, the call of consciousness.

The analysis I have developed in the present chapter is strongly inspired by Raffoul's original analysis of the call, as is clear in the following passage from *The Origin of Responsibility:*

> The one summoned is Dasein lost in the They, called back to its ownmost being. The call of conscience is thus above all a call *of* the self, in both senses of the genitive. The self is not the author of the call, but is announced *in* and *as* the call, since the caller disappears in the calling. Therefore what is at issue in the call is nothing but the coming to oneself as such. This is ultimately the meaning of the ... passage in which Heidegger states that Dasein "calls itself." In the call, Dasein's being-a-self is at issue and in play; the call is the space or the dimension of selfhood. *Yet the self is not the (ontical) origin of the call.* [264]

Raffoul continues:

> The author of the call remains foreign, "absolutely distances any kind of becoming familiar" (SZ, 275). The 'caller' evades any attempt of identification simply because there is no 'author' of the call, no 'who' of the call—no God, no ego, no subject, no

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[262]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.268-269.
[263]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.269.
[264]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.251 [emphasis mine].

other person or other being whatsoever within the world. There is an origin to the call, but no agent. This agent is *other,* not as an anthropological or ontic other (for it does not let itself be identified as a 'who') but as *uncanny.*

The 'caller' in fact merges with the calling itself, it is instead the very movement of the call which brings a self-to-come, it is the impersonal or pre-personal event of being that precedes and exceeds the one who will have to assume it as its own.[265]

The relation of Disclosedness constituted by the response of Dasein to the call of consciousness is certainly one of fundamental openness towards the call of *another*. And this other does indeed withdraw in the event of the call itself. This is patent in that what shows through anticipatory resoluteness is that nullity which grounds Dasein's finitude. Nonetheless, one must be careful not to interpret such an alterity as a sort of Sartrean fissure of nothingness within the totality of Dasein, as if Dasein could ever be a 'for-itself' in Sartre's sense of the term. Certainly the caller which calls Dasein to responsibility is nothing-in-the-World, i.e. it is neither an entity that Dasein can discover, nor an anthropological other that Dasein can 'inauthentically be-with'.

Yet, the caller is still not 'nothing at all'. Dasein responds to the call of the 'caller', by resolving itself on its utmost potentiality-for-Being, represented by the null ground of its finitude. This is possible because between the caller and the called one there exists a relationship. The latter term must be used carefully, as it may seem to suggest the independence of the 'relata' and their possible subsistence *independently* from and even *prior* to the relation itself. Indeed, the later Heidegger in *Contributions to Philosophy*[266] will reject this term entirely, since any "talk of a relation of Da-sein to be-ing is misleading, insofar as this suggests that be-ing holds sway 'for itself' and that Da-sein takes up the relating to be-ing".[267] The reader must keep this point firmly in mind in order not to understand the term 'relation' in the sense which Heidegger openly opposes. This requirement is somewhat reinforced by Heidegger's definition of Dasein's death as Dasein's ownmost non-relational possibility. When facing its own death, Dasein is cut off from its relationship with other

[265]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.252.
[266]Martin Heidegger, *Contribution to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, trans. P. Emad, K. Maly, (Bloomington and Indianapolus: Indiana University Press, 1999).
[267]Martin Heidegger, *Contribution to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, trans. P. Emad, K. Maly, (Bloomington and Indianapolus: Indiana University Press, 1999), p. 179.

Daseins, although this quite possibly refers to Dasein's inauthentic relations *rather than its existential being-with*.

Nonetheless, it must be said that, in the context of *Being and Time*, Heidegger takes a more lenient view on the topic, and often relies on the terms 'relation' [Beziehung] and 'relationship' [Verhältnis] in order to capture the inextricable interaction of constituents which appears within a certain existential structure. Most importantly, the constitutive state for which Dasein's Being is constantly an issue for Dasein itself, i.e. Dasein's understanding-of-Being, is paraphrased, at the outset of *Being and Time*, with the expression: "Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship towards that Being -a relationship [Verhältnis] which itself is one of Being."[268] In much the same way, the phenomenon which takes place between the caller and the called one is defined by the term 'relationship' [»Verhältnis«], albeit this time in inverted commas.[269] Finally, the term Dasein itself has a 'relational' character, as argued by Raffoul himself:

> *The very concept of Dasein ... includes a relation to the other:* to the other entity, to the other Daseins, and also to itself as other. This relation-to-another is not accidental: in so far as it is itself, Dasein is opened to otherness.[270]

And in his book *The Origin of Responsibility*, Raffoul brilliantly explains:

> With the choice of this term [Dasein], it was a matter for him of seizing the human being no longer as subject but in terms of the openness of being as such, and only in this respect. This is why the term, in later writings, is often hyphenated as Da-sein in order to stress the sheer relatedness to being, a relatedness that is not posited or initiated by us. Heidegger explained in a later text that with the term Dasein, it was a question for him of characterizing "with a *single* term both the relation [*Bezug*] of Being to the essence of man and the essential relation [*Wesenverhältnis*] of man to the openness ('there' [*Da*]) of Being [*Sein*] as such." To that end, "the name of 'Dasein' [there-being] was chosen for the essential realm [*Wesenbereich*] in which man stands

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[268]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32, H.12.
[269]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.319, H.274.
[270]François Raffoul, "Otherness and Individuation in Heidegger", in *Man and World,* Vol.28, (1995), p.346.

as man."[271] That relation is not posited by human Dasein, but belongs to being itself.[272]

In the following chapter I will analyse in more detail the connection between the 'relationship' between the caller and the called one and the relationship of understanding between Dasein and its being [Seinverständnis], and I will clarify further how the two converge in the phenomenon of authentic Disclosedness.

Nonetheless, the aforementioned passage already attests Raffoul's recognition of an implicit connection between the openness of the human Dasein to the call, namely, *responsibility*, and the indissoluble bond between Dasein and its Being, that is, Dasein's disclosive understanding-of-Being. Raffoul also clearly sees that the phenomenon of authentic Disclosedness, which is central to the analysis of finite temporality in terms of the meaning of the Being of Dasein, is itself an 'ethical' phenomenon in that it is a fundamentally relational one. For, as I shall soon clarify, authentic Disclosedness is nothing but the relational space between the caller and the called one. This is what Raffoul calls the space of responsibility and is that which manifests itself as Dasein's taking up the fundamental nullity of its basis by acknowledging its own finitude. In this context finitude must then be understood as the meaning-giving basis of Dasein's Being, i.e. Care, in terms of the finite unity of the structure of Care, namely, temporality. However, similarly to Crowell, the above does not mean that the space of Disclosedness is engendered by the encounter of two *relata*, namely Being and Dasein, nor that the anticipatory resoluteness discloses Being and Dasein as two 'in-themselves' which can be taken apart from each other. Rather the analysis of authentic Disclosedness is possible only in terms of the atomic entanglement of the terms that appear within it, namely Being and Dasein. Nevertheless, by insisting on Dasein's ownership of the call and its essential involvement in both sides of it, as the one called and the caller, Raffoul's interpretation seems at times to run the risk of reducing the fundamental otherness of Being to an internal movement of Dasein's subjectivity. This risk is evident in a passage such as the following:

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[271]Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," introduction to *What is Metaphysics?* (1949) in W. McNeill (ed.), *Pathmarks,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.283..

[272]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.243; Also Cfr: François Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject*, trans. D. Pettigrew, G. Recco, (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), pp.12-.14.

As conscience, Dasein calls from the bottom of its being; the one who calls is neither a 'who' nor a 'what', but Dasein itself in its bare 'that', in its sheer thrownness.[273] … What I have to be, then, what I have to assume, is precisely my Being-thrown as such. *What is 'mine' is thus what can never belong to me, what evades me, what will always have escaped me.*[274]

Resolving itself onto its own potentiality for finitude constitutes Dasein's very own disclosing responsibility. Yet this entails, according to Raffoul, Dasein's taking on its own inappropriable potentiality and appropriating what is *inappropriable*. If by this one mean that responsibility consists in Dasein's relation to its Being as an issue for Dasein itself, this formulation is certainly quite appropriate. Indeed, it may then be possible to analyse this relation of responsibility in these terms and, through such an analysis, attempt a description of the Being of Dasein as the 'inappropriable' which Dasein must appropriate in order to be its-self. Now, according to Raffoul, the appropriation of the inappropriable in responsibility is possible only in terms of Dasein's facticity. Indeed, it is possible *as* an appropriation *of* Dasein's own facticity.[275]

To be thrown (facticity) means to be called (responsibility), they are one and the same phenomenon; hence the "facticity of responsibility." ... Ultimately, the motif of facticity indicates that I am responsible for finitude itself, that responsibility is in a sense identical to finitude. The call manifests the essential finitude of Dasein, thrown into *its* Being and having to "carry" it as its own.[276]

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[273]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.251; Also Cfr: François Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject*, trans. D. Pettigrew, G. Recco, (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), p.229.

[274]François Raffoul, *Heidegger and the Subject*, trans. D. Pettigrew, G. Recco, (New York: Humanity Books, 1998), p.233.

[275]Cfr: "What Dasein has to be, and what it has to be responsible for, then, is precisely its very facticity, its being-thrown as such. What I have to make my own is thus what can never belong to me, what evades me, what will always have escaped me. As we saw, Heidegger underscored this incommensurability when he claimed that 'The self, which as such has to lay the basis for itself, can never get that basis into its power; *and yet, as existing, it must take over being-a-basis*' (SZ, 284; my emphasis). For Heidegger, I am not thrown once to then exist freely, as Sartre believed; rather, I am delivered over to an existence that, because it has no ground, puts me in the situation of having to appropriate this absence of ground. As Agamben explains: 'Everything is complicated, in Heidegger, by the fact that Dasein is not simply, as in Sartre, thrown into the 'there' of a given contingency; instead, Dasein must rather itself be its 'there,' be the 'there' (*Da*) of Being'" [François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.274].

[276]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.275.

Hence, Dasein's responsiveness to the alterity which shows itself forth through the call, does not imply that the 'other which calls' is a *substantial* other. Rather, according to Raffoul, responsibility is the existential gesture of Dasein's acknowledgment of its own finitude. As it should by now be clear, the term finitude does not mean here 'incompleteness'. Instead, it points, so to speak, in two directions: on the one hand, it names the fullness of Dasein's potentiality-to-be-a-whole; on the other hand it indicates the lack of a worldly ground for Dasein's wholeness. Hence, it is by 'accepting' the nullity of the origin of its own Being as a fundamental character of its own 'being-a-Dasein' that Dasein can truly come to itself as an entity [Seiendes] whose very Being [Sein] is constantly at issue.

Nonetheless, as I have explained in the course of this dissertation, what is at issue for Dasein's Being consists in nothing else but that very Being, and this fundamental fact of Dasein's constitution is characterized by Heidegger in terms of Care. While, the structure of Care does itself include facticity, the latter is only one of the elements of a tripartite structure that includes existence and falling. This fact should immediately warn us against treating facticity in isolation from the totality of the structure of Care. The question therefore is whether or not Raffoul's analysis of responsibility, despite its undeniable merits, may indeed run the risk of falling into a reductionist position concerning the relation between Dasein's responsibility and finitude on one side, and facticity on the other.

While I am do not agree with Raffoul's attempt to equate responsibility and finitude - two quite different characters of Dasein, I have no objection to Raffoul's connection between responsibility and finitude.[277] It is clear, in fact, that what Dasein responds to in the call is the finitude which shows through the nullity of Dasein's own basis. To exist finitely means to have responded to the call which urges Dasein to take up its very own lack of (a worldly) ground. Nevertheless, I believe that Raffoul's reduction of responsibility and finitude to facticity is untenable. This should not suggest that there is indeed no connection between responsibility, finitude and facticity, but rather that the analysis needs to be broadened in order to embrace the totality of the structure of Care, including the phenomena of existence and falling.

As such, I am certainly not denying the truly inspired and inspiring contribution of Raffoul's analysis to current Anglo-American Heidegger Scholarship. For Raffoul is the first scholar

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[277]Indeed, finitude constitutes the common element of the structure of Dasein's potentiality-for-being-a-whole, which finds its unity in the meaning of the Being of Dasein, namely, finite temporality.

working in the Anglo-American context to take a serious look at the connection between the phenomenon of authentic Disclosedness and the fundamental openness of Dasein to alterity, especially that of Being. Nonetheless, concerning the specific problematic of *Being and Time*, I believe that a more comprehensive approach than Raffoul's to the phenomenon of Disclosedness is required in order not to overlook the unitary constitution of Disclosedness and its 'mirroring' into the tripartite structure of finite temporality. For, as I shall argue in the final chapter of this dissertation, finitude must be understood in relation to temporality, that is, the totality of the structure of temporality, which includes not only the 'time' of Dasein's thrownness, namely, its 'having been', but also the 'time' of its projecting understanding, i.e. its 'being-ahead-of-itself', and its present falling. In other words, the totality of that relation of Disclosedness which is opened through the three elements of Anxiety, Call and Responsibility, together with the general fallenness of Dasein, must indeed be considered in terms of that fundamental openness to alterity which is Disclosedness itself, understood in terms of the relationship between Dasein and Being. Indeed, this fundamental relationship must be explored, so to allow the structural elements of this relationship to manifest themselves in the phenomenon of authentic Disclosedness, i.e. anticipatory resoluteness, through its finitely temporal structure. Such an exploration should allow my research to reach 'higher ground', wherefrom it should be possible to develop a reading of Heidegger's masterwork which may be both ethical and phenomenological. I shall call this reading 'relational', not because it will focus on the 'relata', but rather because it will emphasise the 'manifestational space' within which the elements of this 'relation' may show themselves as 'related' in some way. And I shall devote the following chapter precisely to this task.

5. A RELATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF *BEING AND TIME*

The four interpretations of *Being and Time* considered thus far have been presented in order of merit. While the historical importance of Dreyfus' interpretation within the Anglo-American context cannot be denied, his focus on Dasein's inauthentic existence prevents him from engaging with the second and most important division of Heidegger's masterwork. Similarly, Lafont takes Division Two to be a mere repetition of Heidegger's analysis of Dasein in its inauthenticity; nevertheless, her study concerning the concepts of language and meaning begins to show the importance of the phenomenon of Disclosedness, albeit implicitly. The same concept of meaning is what guides Crowell to take a more phenomenological approach to *Being and Time* and through this he comes to appreciate the primacy of Disclosedness. The latter is defined in terms of the phenomenological space of meaning, within which everything, including Being, is understood/disclosed. While Crowell acknowledges Heidegger's attempts to venture outside the disclosive space to reach its source, i.e. Being, his investigation remains confined within the limits of an implicit epoché. Finally, by engaging more thoroughly with *Being and Time* as a whole, Raffoul redefines the analysis of Dasein in terms of the ethical engagement between Dasein and what lies beyond it. In his analysis, the notions of Anxiety, Guilt, Death and Resoluteness are studied in the wider context of *Being and Time*'s ontological focus, and the question concerning what lies beyond the phenomenological space of Disclosedness is raised explicitly for the first time in terms of the alterity of Being. But while Raffoul concentrates his analysis on Dasein's own alterity in relation to its potentiality for Being-its-Self, the disclosive relation between Dasein and its Being as an alterity is not examined in its own right, running the risk of annulling the ontological distinction between Being and Dasein as an entity.

The present chapter will therefore engage in a study of Dasein's Being in terms of its alterity, in order to demonstrate that the emergence of a relational space between Being and Dasein requires neither the complete bracketing out of what is beyond the space itself nor the reduction of Dasein's Being to a function of Dasein itself.

Achieving this will require my analysis to move, so to speak, sideways to take advantage of the achievements of possibly the most novel and direct analysis of the concept of 'beyond' in the history of Western philosophy, namely, Emmanuel Levinas' study of alterity carried out in his book *Totality and Infinity*.[278] This will constitute a powerful tool I expect will enable me to build on Crowell's and Raffoul's achievements while at the same time avoiding some of the inconsistencies I have highlighted in their works. In this way I hope finally to be able to ferry Heidegger's analysis of Dasein from hermeneutic epistemology to relational ethics, from a philosophy of the understanding to a philosophy of Disclosedness.

In an effort to achieve my final aim, this chapter will firstly present a snapshot of Levinas' philosophy by mapping some of its key concepts against Heidegger's own, in Section i. This will allow me to establish some important points of contact between the two, thus opening the possibility to utilise Levinas' findings to further my interpretation of *Being and Time*. In particular the concept of alterity will be utilised in Section ii. in order to clarify Heidegger's discussion of the Call of Conscience and its origin 'beyond' Dasein. Through this Levinasean-influenced analysis of the Call, Being will be found to be Dasein's Other, as it calls Dasein from beyond itself to its-Self. In Section iii. I will then attempt to clarify what it means for Being to be Dasein's Other, while Section iv. will demonstrate how this definition can provide a more expansive interpretation of *Being and Time* which focuses on the disclosive relatedness between Dasein and its Being, without necessarily undermining the ontological difference on which the philosophy of *Being and Time* is fundamentally grounded.

i.   Levinas: the Same and the Face of the Other

In an attempt to further Raffoul's ethical interpretation of *Being and Time*, let us now turn to Levinas, and in particular, to his book *Totality and Infinity*. As the title of this book partially suggests, in this work Levinas engages in a critical dialogue with *Being and Time*. Although Levinas is openly dismissive of Heidegger's philosophy throughout the book, I shall explain how many important notions discussed in *Totality and Infinity* expand on some of the crucial ideas of *Being and Time*. As such, the contention of the present chapter is that, by analysing

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[278]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979).

closely Levinas' critique of the concepts of Totality and Being, it may be possible to throw some light on that fundamental relationship between Dasein and its Being that Heidegger discusses in terms of both understanding-of-Being and Disclosedness, and that underpins all the ontological structures I have discussed thus far. This is not to say that Levinas' philosophy can be reduced to Heidegger's; even less that either philosophy should be 'corrected' from the standpoint of the other. Hence, the present work will not consist in a systematic comparison between Levinas and Heidegger nor will it attempt a philosophical *rapprochement* between the two. Rather, I shall try to draw the reader's attention to some features of Levinas' philosophy which will help me enlighten a number of issues from *Being and Time* which come to light in the course of this dissertation.

A further disclaimer is necessary here: there are certainly a number of other philosophies and philosophers that could be used to the same effect. For example, Karl Jasper's concepts of 'Transcendence' and 'limit-situation',[279] or Gabriel Marcel notion of 'Mystery of Being'[280] may prove fruitful to further the concept of authentic Disclosedness in view of Dasein's finitude and its consequent Call to accept its Guilt. Similarly, Derrida's philosophy of the '*Différance*' and the 'trace'[281] could be profitably exploited to explain Heidegger's use of the term 'beyond' and the questions around sameness and difference between Dasein and its Being. Yet, in my view, none of these approaches provides the ethico-relational connotations which Raffoul has discovered in *Being and Time* and which, far from being my own personal interpretative preference, appears to be the only appropriate way to clarify some of the apparent contradictions present in Heidegger's discussion of Dasein's Disclosedness of Being as Call of Conscience. Conversely, some of Levinas' concepts will prove to be a helpful tool to this end, and this section and the next intend to show precisely this.

Explicitly, Levinas' thought is founded upon one fundamental critique of Heideggerian philosophy, which is summarized in Levinas' fierce attack against the notion of Ontology. In *Totality and Infinity* he writes:

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[279]Cfr: Karl Jasper, *Philosophy*, trans. E. Ashton, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969–1971); Karl Jasper, *Philosophy of Existence*, trans. R. Grabau, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971).
[280]Cfr: Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being, Vol. 1, Reflection and Mystery,* trans. G. Fraser, (London: The Harvill Press, 1951); Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being, Vol. 2, Faith and Reality,* trans. R. Hague, (London: The Harvill Press, 1951).
[281]Cfr: Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference*, trans. A. Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).

> Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the
> same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of
> being. ... That reason in the last analysis would be the manifestation of freedom,
> neutralizing the other and encompassing him, can come as no surprise once it was laid
> down that sovereign reason knows only itself, that nothing other limits it. ... The
> relation of Being that is enacted as ontology consists in neutralizing the existent in
> order to comprehend or grasp it. It is hence not a relation with the other as such but
> the reduction of the other to the same.[282]

The achievement of 'Totality' represents, therefore, the aim of ontology, by suppressing all differences in order to absorb everything into the homogeneity of what 'is'. In this sense, a theory of ontology does not have actual limits, since all that may be grasped must, in a certain way, already belong to the horizon of Being, even if it belongs to it as a mere being-not. What instead does not belong to this very horizon neither 'is' nor 'is not', hence it just has no standing at all.

Against the framework of traditional ontology, Levinas counterposes his fundamental intuition of a 'radical alterity'. The latter is found in the encounter of an I with what defies any attempt of being grasped in terms of that very I, of being surmised into the 'horizon of Being'. This 'defiance' is what Levinas calls the Other [Autrui]; and 'Infinity' is what characterizes the relation of the Other with the 'I'; this is because between the I and the other, if it is to be a truly 'Other', there must be something like a distance which can never be completely bridged, a void which can never be wholly filled, a desire which is never totally fulfilled. In this sense the term Infinity means irreducibility, or, as Levinas calls it, absolute transcendence. The experience that the I, which I myself always am, has of this infinite, irreducible defiance which is the Other, a relation which Levinas calls Metaphysics,[283] is, according to him, foundational in respect to ontology. This argument constitutes the heart of Levinas' critique of Heidegger, as it is summarized in *Totality and Infinity*:

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[282]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), 43-45.

[283]Cfr: Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.52.

The relationship with a being infinitely distant, that is overflowing its idea, is such that its authority as an existence is already invoked in every question we could raise concerning the meaning of its Being. One does not question oneself concerning him; one questions him. Always he faces. If ontology – the comprehension, the embracing of Being – is impossible, it is ... because the comprehension of Being in general cannot *dominate* the relationship with the Other. The latter relationship commands the first. I cannot disentangle myself from society with the Other, even when I consider the Being of the existent he is. Already the comprehension of Being is said to the existent, who again arises behind the theme in which he is presented. This 'saying to the Other' – this relationship with the Other as interlocutor, this relation with an existent – precedes ontology; it is the ultimate relation in Being. Ontology presupposes metaphysics.[284]

We therefore are ... radically opposed to Heidegger who subordinates the relation with the Other to ontology (which, moreover, he determines as though the relation with the interlocutor and the Master could be reduced to it)…[285]

Beginning from this fundamental opposition to Heidegger, Levinas develops a particularr philosophy of alterity, based on the relation between what he calls the I [le moi] or the Same [le même] and the Other [Autrui]. In the first instance, the former names the kind of subject which is so central to philosophy since Descartes. The I consists essentially in a 'knowing subject', whose primary goal is to thematise everything under his gaze. Knowing something is, according to Levinas, having comprehended – etymologically speaking - that something within the totality of a common horizon. In the history of philosophy this 'common horizon', be it an omniscient God or a transcendental Subject, is what remains constant throughout the cognitive experience and renders it 'objective'. Hence, the I is also called by Levinas the Same. The latter term does not only allude to the constancy of the knowing-I, but, most importantly, refers to this epistemological tendency of the knowing-I itself to reduce everything to that totality which it itself constitutes.

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[284]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.47-48.
[285]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.89.

In opposition to this totalizing movement is what Levinas calls the Other. The otherness of this Other is not the same as that of other worldly objects; the latter, says Levinas, is only a formal alterity, insofar as for him, like for Heidegger, objects exist only within the gaze of a Dasein, that is, only in relation to Dasein's existential project. Nor is the Other the negation of the Same; for, says Levinas "the negator and the negated are posited together" and together they "form a system, that is, a totality".[286] Finally, the Other cannot be constituted only in terms of resistance to the Same, since any resistance, as a limitation, requires a common ground which may be 'limited'. Rather, for Levinas, the term 'Other' refers to "the absolutely other".[287] "He and I do not form a number",[288] states Levinas, for the radical alterity of the Other prevents the establishment of any totality within which the Other itself may be compared to the Same. Hence, in relation to the Same, the Other is said by Levinas to be transcendent, not because the Same lacks the power to wholly grasp the Other, but because the Other is essentially Infinite and therefore inherently defies any attempt of being grasped in its fullness. While this Infinity, as an infinite distance, is what factually prevents the integration of the Other into the Same, according to Levinas, this distance does not destroy the relation between the Other and the Same and is not itself destroyed by the relation itself, as would happen with relations within the same.[289]

But what sort of relation can exist where the relata are so different as to deny the existence of any common ground between them? In order to clarify the terms of Levinas' answer to this question, the reader must turn their attention to his description of the way in which the Other presents itself to the Same, namely as a *face* [visage]. The term 'face', Levinas states, names "[t]he way in which the other presents himself, exceeding *the idea of the other in me*".[290] This is to say that, through the manifestation of its face, the Other manifests itself according to itself, overflowing all pre-emptive ideas the Same has concerning this very manifestation; for any idea the Same may have of it would reduce that very manifestation to sameness. This is what Levinas calls *expression*, where the term suggests an external pressure [ex-pressio], a force which exceeds the capacity of the receiver, or the unerthening of something hidden. By saying that the face of the Other is essentially 'expression', Levinas echoes Descartes' second ontological argument from the *Meditations*, where the reality of God is proven by the

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[286]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.41.
[287]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.39.
[288]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.39.
[289]Cfr: Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.41.
[290]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.50.

existence of an infinite idea of God within the res cogitans. Yet, Levinas is not trying to prove the existence of the Other, but only describing the way in which his[291] transcendent, infinite manifestation, namely, his face, cannot be deduced from, reduced to, or contained within the Same, contrary to what all philosophy beginning with Socrates' maieutics has traditionally believed. The manifestation of the Other through his face is not a matter of unearthing something from within the depth of the Same. In other words, the Other is not internal to the Same, or, so to speak, a fact of the Same's interiority –an interiority which corresponds to an all-encompassing totality; rather the former is essentially external to the latter. As such, the face offers something to the Same which lies beyond the latter, exceeding the latter himself and coming from outside him. The face represents, therefore, the fact that the Other is essentially external to any all-encompassing horizon or totality, a fact which Levinas calls 'exteriority' [exteriorité].

When the Other presents itself to the Same through his face, a certain relation between the two is established. Yet, according to Levinas, the relation which is established in the face of the Other is not one which ultimately can be referred back to the totality of a system of relata. Instead, the face of the Other 'faces' the Same. This is to say, it comes from outside the system within which the totality of the Same rests. Hence, the only relation between the Same and the Other that Levinas' philosophy can admit is "[a] relation whose terms do not form a totality..., [which proceeds] from the I to the Other, ... as delineating a distance in depth ... irreducible to the distance the synthetic activity of the understanding established between the diverse terms, other with respect to one another, that lend themselves to its synoptic operation".[292]

This relation is what Levinas calls a *face to face* between the Same and the Other. This 'facing position', where the Same and the Other are figuratively opposed, does not imply a confrontation of the Same with the Other, where the distance between the two may be reduced to the commonality of a genus encompassing both parties; rather, if the face of the Other is essentially its 'ex-pression', a lance thrust from the outside of its infinity, piercing right through the undisturbed totality of the Same, then it is easy to see why Levinas believes that the face to face stance is essentially conducive to what he refers to as language, discourse, speech or dialogue. More or less consistently, these terms all fundamentally refer

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[291]The masculine is used to refer to the Other following Levinas' own usage in *Totality and Infinity*.
[292]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.39.

to the mode of a relation where the relata are neither limitrophe, nor bound within a common totality, but where the distance between the two –between the I and the Other- is maintained by virtue of the relation itself, i.e. a face to face relation. Dialogue, according to Levinas, is the bridge which connects without uniting, for in it the Same is *called* by the manifestation of the Other's face.[293] In other words, language, speech, discourse and dialogue are primarily responses to the *call* that the face of the Other issues to the Same.

Yet, what does this 'call' amount to? I know that it is from the face of the Other that the call is issued, and that, through the manifestation of the face, the infinity of the Other infiltrates the totality of the Same. But what is the Same called to by the presence of the Other's face? According to Levinas the face of the Other calls the Same to responsibility for the Other itself. But what does Levians mean by 'responsibility'? Levinas explains:

> It is only in approaching the Other that I attend to myself. … The face I welcome makes me pass from phenomenon to being in another sense: in discourse I expose myself to the questioning of the Other, and this urgency of the response -acuteness of the present-engenders me for responsibility; as responsible I am brought to my final reality. This extreme attention does not actualize what was in potency, for it is not conceivable without the other. Being attentive signifies a surplus of consciousness, and presupposes the call of the other.[294]

Responsibility, therefore means to 'respond' to the call of the Other. But what does the call of the face of the Other says to the Same? It enjoins not to commit murder, not to kill the Other.[295]

> To kill is not to dominate but to annihilate; it is to renounce comprehension absolutely. Murder exercises a power over what escapes power. I can wish to kill only an existent absolutely independent, which exceeds my powers infinitely, and therefore

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[293]Cfr: Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.171.

[294]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.178.

[295]Cfr: Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.303.

does not oppose them but paralyzes the very power of power. The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill.[296]

The Same, intrinsically, wishes to kill the Other, in order to obtain the all-encompassing freedom in a tendency that is connatural to his very being and is suggested in his name. Instead, the emergence of the face breaks the utter solitude of the Same and calls him to acknowledge the limits of his freedom. Through this movement, the freedom of the Same is changed from arbitrariness to responsibility and the Same's self-contained all-encompassing independence is destroyed to make room for a dialogical relation. Nevertheless, one must be careful not to interpret this as the dialogue between two equivalent interlocutors. Since the same cannot independently initiate this dialogue, something which is fundamentally impossible due to absolute alterity of the Other, the Same must be called so that a dialogical relation may be initiated. The complete independence of the Other and yet the complete dependence of the Same to him make the relation fundamentally asymmetrical, where only I am responsible to and for the other. The Other does not and cannot reciprocate, since reciprocation can happen only if both the Same and the Other belonged, so to speak, to a common plane. As I have already explained, this is not possible due to the radical difference that Levinas wants to maintain between the Same and the Other.

However, the last consideration engenders one further question, namely, how can a radical distance be maintained there where a relation is in place? In order to understand how this is indeed possible, Levinas asks his reader to accomplish a radical shift, abandoning the traditional epistemological framework which denies any meaningful relations outside the self-sufficient plane of the subject/object, within which the truth is guaranteed by the ignorance of its provenance. Indeed, the I-think is self-sufficient only when judging his own self-sufficiency from the interiority of its totality, and only thanks to an epoché which blinds him to the externality of its essential source. Instead, in acknowledging the finitude of its freedom by responding to the call of the face of the Other, Levinas believes that a different kind of relation is established, indeed a foundational one. As its provenance cannot be charted from inside that subjective horizon afforded by the Cartesian self, the Kantian subject or the phenomenological Ego, this very ignorance signals the upper limit of traditional epistemology and the novel ethical approach on which Levinas' philosophy relies. While the

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[296]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.198.

Other remains epistemologically transcendent, its effects on the Same are undeniable as it defines the very nature of the Same in terms of responsibility and, therefore, finitude. This means that the relation between the Same and the Other does not exist 'in spite of' their radical distance; instead it is due to this very distance that the Same finds itself limited and can therefore respond to the negative manifestation of the other. The comprehensive kind of relation which belonged to epistemology is here abandoned and in its place and new type of relation is found, namely, *the ethical relation*.

ii.   Calling (Levinas) from Beyond

The Call of Conscience discloses to Dasein the finite temporality which constitutes the nullity of its null basis. By being called, Dasein is summoned from the inauthenticity of das Man to the authenticity of its-Self. After having been called out of its fallenness through the silence of the Call, Dasein can face the ownmost possibility of its Death as a Being-towards-death, which is grounded in the finitude of its temporality; and by disclosing its very Death in anticipation Dasein discloses itself as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Heidegger refers to this specific kind of Disclosedness by the expression 'Anticipatory Resoluteness', where the term Resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] refers to that specific kind of Disclosedness [Er-schlossenheit] which is not a more or less passive discovering of the world as it gives itself to Dasein but the fundamental openness of Being on the basis of Dasein's existential choice of itself as potentially and finitely whole. Nevertheless, due to its existential fallennes, Dasein is unable to make this choice on its own 'strength' and, in order to choose its-Self, it needs to be called from beyond itself by something, in a way, 'other' than itself.

Seemingly in contradiction with this last point, Heidegger states that the 'caller' is no one other than Dasein in its potentiality-to-be-authentically-its-Self.[297] However, as previously clarified in this dissertation, the contradiction is only apparent insofar as the discursive nature of the Call of Conscience affords Dasein a fundamental 'articulation', distinguishing between two existentiell constituents of it, i.e. inauthentic das Man and authentic its-Self. While this

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[297]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.320, H.275.

should not be taken to mean that Dasein's Being is severed, the duality afforded by the articulateness of the Call allows Heidegger to 'position' Dasein at both ends. Hence, what calls is at once Dasein itself as a fallen das-Man-self, and *beyond* itself, as an authentic its-Self, which already is, in anticipation, the finite completeness that calls Dasein to *be* itself. While in this dissertation I have extensively dealt with Dasein as it needs to be called out of its fallennes and into its authenticity, I have not dealt explicitly with the nature of what lies beyond Dasein itself as Dasein's own Being. As such, in the remainder of this chapter I will attempt to analyse the nature of this 'other' Dasein, as well as the nature of the relationship which Dasein entertains with that which lies *beyond*. In order to shed some light on the former issue let us start with analysing the latter.

I have said that, by facing its own death, Dasein discloses its finite temporality as the meaning of its Being; by 'meaning' here I denote the condition of possibility for something to be understood as it is by Dasein. As such, finite temporality represents the horizon which grants to Dasein the possibility of having an understanding disclosure of its own Being, within which Dasein is disclosed as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole.[298] Yet, if Dasein in its Being has the potentiality for constituting a totality, then whatever is beyond Dasein would necessarily fall outside the 'wholeness' of its Being, that is, the totality of Dasein itself. In this sense, it would seem that whatever is beyond Dasein does not actually belong to Dasein, let alone be itself Dasein, but it would be strictly speaking 'other' than Dasein. If my goal, therefore, is clarifying the relation between Dasein and that which lies beyond it, my analysis must attempt to grasp the relation between Dasein and that which falls entirely outside the totality which is achieved by Dasein in Anticipatory Resoluteness.

Yet, if my analysis is thus far correct, it may be possible, and indeed fruitful, to study the relation between Dasein and its beyond in terms of the relation between a totality and its alterity. Thus, I may be able to employ some of the concepts of Levinas' ethical philosophy as tools, in order to, firstly, elucidate the kind of relation which Dasein entertains with its

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[298]There is definitely a connection between the finitude of temporality and the totality of Dasein, since to be-a-whole one has also to be finite. Nevertheless Heidegger is not entirely clear regarding the finitude of temporality, since the latter is described as 1) the condition of possibility of Dasein's Being as it is, i.e. possibility-for-being-a-whole (always unsettled beyond itself/towards-itself, always as a potentiality for Being - itself or not itself-, etc,) and 2) Dasein's Being itself as it enters into the intelligibility of Dasein. Hence, there seems to be a distinction between an ontic and an ontological temporality which is however doubly involved, as the ontic temporality is what is found out through an analysis of the ontological and vice versa.

beyond, and, secondly, spell out the nature of the beyond itself. While in section i. of the present chapter, some of the fundamental concepts of Levinas' philosophy have been discussed, if I am to explain how these notions can help me understand the provenance of Dasein's call of conscience and the nature of the caller, I must, first of all, map some of these concepts onto Heidegger's philosophy to find how this tool may be more effectively applied. Let us start from the notion of the Call. Similarly to Heidegger, in fact, Levinas uses the term 'call' and 'calling'. This call is for Levinas a 'calling into question'. What is called into question is the totality of the same in relation to the infinity of the Other which is manifested in the face. In this sense the call is not a critical attitude in which the I recognizes its limitedness in relation to another totality; this calling is rather "[a] calling into question of the same –which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same- [and] is brought about by the other."[299] It is the Other, therefore, that calls into question the spontaneous totality of the Same, that is, it calls into question the I's freedom. Does this imply that for Levinas the I is not free? Certainly not; for in the face to face in which the Other asks to be welcomed, the I is called to take responsibility for the Other. Freedom is not the lack of responsibility and is not arbritrariness, since the totality of the I is not self-constituted but has an origin in the relation with the Other that calls me to responsibility, hence to freedom. In this sense the totality of the I is limited by the infinity of the Other insofar as that the totality of the I is no longer admissible following the I's encounter with the Other. The relation between the finite I and the infinite Other, says Levinas, "does not consist in the finite being absorbed in what faces him, but in remaining in his own being".[300] Yet the infinity of the other does not simply call into question the totality of the I but grounds it, insofar as it allows the I to discover its totality in terms of the essential finitude which makes any totality possible.

Similarly, in *Being and Time* the Call of Consciousness is directed to Dasein's ownmost Being-guilty. Being guilty consists in 'being the null basis of a nullity'. Therefore, Heidegger's Call of Consciousness is itself also a call for Dasein to take responsibility for the essential finitude of its being-a-whole by being-towards the nullity which grounds it. In this sense, just as for Levinas, what grounds the finitude of Dasein's totality is essentially something which can never be included within that totality itself, not even as a mere negation of the totality. The nullity of Dasein's Being is not in fact a 'not-being-a-whole', but something which transcends the totality of Dasein by remaining foundational to it. By being

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[299]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.43.
[300]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.292.

called to face the fundamental nullity of its Being, Dasein is urged to choose its-Self in anticipation. In choosing its-Self, Dasein answers the Call by taking responsibility for its finite totality, i.e. anticipatory resoluteness, so as to be free for its authentic Self. Does this mean that Dasein is self-grounding? Or that it can chose itself from the ground up? Not at all. As for Levinas, the freedom that comes from the Call does not consist in arbitrariness, but in responsibility, that is, in the consciousness of one's own limitedness in the face of what grounds one. In this sense, facing nullity, or to be the null basis of the nullity, does not mean to renounce oneself. Just as the infinity of the Other does not make the Same anything but himself, nullity does not negate Dasein's Being but makes Dasein itself; that is to say, an entity for which its Being(-in-the-world) is an issue; or, which is the same, an entity whose possibilities, due to the finitude of its Being (temporality), are fundamentally finite and, therefore, significant.

Therefore, in order to be its-Self, Dasein must in a certain way face the nullity which grounds its fundamental finitude by being-towards that nullity itself. In this way Dasein is called to take responsibility [Being guilty] for its indebtness [Guilt=debt] with the nullity of its ground. "The calling into question of the I, coextensive with the manifestation of the Other in the face", says Levinas "we call language".[301] As I have already mentioned in section i. of this chapter, by 'language' Levinas refers to a dialogical relation which originates in the face to face encounter between the I and the Other. Indeed, Language essentially comes from the Other,[302] insofar as it is in an epiphany of the face that the 'face to face' is first established. Yet the face-to-face relation is itself language insofar as it is a relation where the distance between the Other and the I is not destroyed by the relatedness. Analogously, for Heidegger a dialogue is established through the Call of Consciousness where the caller calls by keeping silent and Dasein must listen by hearkening and respond in anticipatory resoluteness. And similarly to the dialogical relation established between an I and the Other, the Call of Consciousness maintains a fundamental distance between the caller and the called one, so that the caller is not reduced to the called one but remains essentially *beyond* its totality.[303]

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[301]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.171.

[302]Cfr: Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.204.

[303]One may notice here some similarities with Levinas' notion of exteriority in general, especially in relation to the radical exteriority of the Other which is announced in the Other's face.

In the language of the Other, says Levinas, "the world is offered...; it is borne by propositions. The other is the principle of phenomena".[304] And a few pages later Levinas remarks: "The Other, the signifier, manifests himself in speech by speaking of the world and not of himself; he manifests himself by proposing the world, by thematizing it".[305] This does not mean that the world, ontologically speaking, is 'a consequence' of the relation established between the I and the Other. Rather, the world signifies merely the space of this relationship, a space in which phenomena are disclosed. This is confirmed by what Levinas says in Chapter D. of *Totality and Infinity*: "The relationship with the Other is not produced outside of the world, but puts into question the world possessed",[306] that is to say, it calls the I to question the ground of Disclosedness. Indeed, following the encounter with the Other, the I, as is the case with Dasein, can no longer pretend the world is his own creation, or depends entirely on his beliefs and knowledge of it. In the same way, the I, or Dasein, does not 'own' the manifestation of his own self as he fundamentally relies on something other than or beyond himself to discover the ultimate finitude which characterises its Being. In this sense Levinas argues that "[t]he relationship with the Other is not produced outside of the world but puts in question the world possessed. The relationship with the Other, transcendence, consists in speaking the world to the Other",[307] while the Other at the same time speaks the world to the I. Similarly in §43 *Being and Time* Heidegger argues:

> To be sure, the pre-ontological understanding of Being embraces all entities which are essentially disclosed in Dasein; but the understanding of Being has not yet Articulated itself in a way which corresponds to the various modes of Being.
> At the same time our interpretation of understanding has shown that, in accordance with its falling kind of Being it has, proximally and for the most part, diverted itself into an understanding of the 'world'. Even where the issue is not only one of ontical experience but also one of ontological understanding, the interpretation of Being takes its orientation in the first instance from the Being of entities within-the-world.[308]

[304]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.92.
[305]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.96.
[306]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.96.
[307]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.173.
[308]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.245, H.201.

While Being needs to be somehow 'understood' prior to the world showing itself forth, it is only insofar as Dasein stands into a disclosing relation with its Being that the 'world' of phenomena can be discovered. This very relation of understanding Disclosedness is what strictly speaking is called the world, as that relational space in which phenomena can be discovered; this is explicitly confirmed by Heidegger in his 1927 Marburg lectures reprinted under the title of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, where he states "…Being-in-the-world is already, as such, understanding of Being."[309]

Now, the Disclosing relationship between Dasein and its Being in which the 'world' of phenomena is constituted and that Levinas has called 'language', is said by Levinas to be a relation which puts into question the possession of the world by the I. In more Heideggerian terms, any Disclosedness of Being, even the less authentic which can inferred from the discovering of intraworldly entities, in some way puts into question Dasein's epistemological independence and its existence as a self-constituted ground of the phenomenal world. Furthermore, authentic Disclosedness openly questions its very origin, as it calls Dasein to take up that ground that Dasein itself is not (i.e. the null basis of a nullity) by facing its own Being in its fundamental finitude as a being-towards-death. Indeed, it is the relational nature of Disclosedness which points to a term which is external to Dasein itself. Indeed, Disclosedness always consists in a relation between Dasein and the Being that is disclosed by Dasein, be it even a mere pre-ontological understanding, making of Being the 'other term' of any disclosing relationship. Within such a relationship, it must be Dasein's Being itself, as both other to Dasein and yet its authentic its-Self, that calls into question Dasein as a self-constituted basis. This same relationship is the premise on which the Call of Conscience deals a final blow to the post-Cartesian self by putting into question Dasein's self-constitution in the most radical way. However, it must be clear by now *who* is the only one that can call Dasein to take up the nullity which grounds its finitude, to renounce to its illusion of being an all-encompassing whole and accept its finite totality as the proof of what calls it from beyond itself. That is, nothing other than Being itself. And indeed, if my use of Levinas terminology still holds, that which calls Dasein into question from an unreachable beyond as the very Other to Dasein, is indeed Being. That is to say: *Being is Dasein's Other*.[310]

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[309]Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. A. Hofstadter (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1982), p.292.

[310]One possible objection to using Levinas' categories to argue my point is that these cannot be applied directly to Heidegger's philosophy. For Levinas' philosophy is only concerned with my relation to another human to whom I am in debt, a thematic that is not clearly apparent in Heidegger's work. This objection, however, rests

iii.   The Alterity of Being

Yet, what does it mean exactly for Being to be Dasein's Other? Certainly, it does not mean that Being and Dasein belong to two planes which are irremediably irreconcilable. Indeed, strictly speaking, "…the call undoubtedly does not come from someone else who is with me in the world. The call comes *from* me… ."[311] Hence, if Being in its otherness is the caller, then the previous quote would imply that Being, strictly speaking, *belongs* to Dasein. In other words, if Being is the caller and if the call comes from Dasein itself, then Being and Dasein must be somehow the same. But how can Being be at once Dasein's Other and Dasein itself? Is Heidegger falling into a sort of Hegelian subjectivism? Is Dasein's Being just so totalizing to include in itself even its Other? If this were the case, the analytic of Dasein developed in *Being and Time* would be entirely sufficient to manifest the totality of Being itself. On the other hand, if this is not the case, then, in spite of a certain fundamental connection between Dasein and its Being, the latter cannot be identical to the former. Indeed, this must be the case, not only in view of Heidegger's insistence on the difference between the analytic of Dasein's Being developed in *Being and Time* and the analytic of Being proper, which Heidegger was unable to develop within the framework of this book; but also in order to avoid a fatal contradiction with Heidegger's main tenet of the ontological difference. And indeed, since Dasein is ultimately still an entity, albeit a special one, no identification between Being and Dasein is possible if the ontological difference is to be maintained.

I am presented therefore with a striking issue as I must clarify in what way Dasein can, without being the same as its Being, be at once the called one, and the Other which calls itself from beyond itself. In order to come out of this impasse, let us take a cue from Raffoul who, in his article *Responsibility between Levinas and Heidegger*,[312] devises a compelling

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on the assumption that the Other [Autrui] is only the human other [l'Autre]. It is certainly the case that Levinas' explicit concern is that of the relation between humans, and that it is through the human other (or even the divine other) that we discover the Other. Yet this Other is not only human (or divine), but is primordially, even though perhaps not primarily, a transcendental and possibly transcendent Other [Autrui]. Achieving a description of this 'beyond' is, in my view, the main purpose of *Totality and Infinity* and, more in general of Levinas' Philosophy.

[311]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.320, H.275.

[312]François Raffoul, "The Question of Responsibility between Levinas and Heidegger", in *Between Levinas and Heidegger,* ed. E. S. Nelson, J. Drabinski, (Albany: SUNY Press, Forthcoming).

interpretation concerning the source of the call and the status of Being in relation to Dasein. Raffoul states:

> Heidegger does not say simply that the call comes "from me." Rather, the call is said to come from the being "which I am each time." Now, as we know, I am this being only in the mode of a zu-sein, a having-to-be, that is, in the manner of a possibility to be. [313]

Dasein in its Being, i.e. Care, is constantly unsettled into a possibility-to-be, so much so that this Being-possible is indeed the fundamental character of its Being. This very Being is *constantly more* than what Dasein is at any moment. In this sense Being is to Dasein that which at all times *is not* Dasein, is *other than* Dasein, and is constantly *transcendent in respect with* Dasein. And yet, insofar as Dasein's Being-possible is what Dasein *is* in its Being, i.e. Care, as it is constantly thrown and projected transcendentally, then this Being itself is, strictly speaking, 'of Dasein'. Indeed, as Raffoul says:

> I have to assume this being, whether authentically or inauthentically. [Yet] It does not ... "belong to me," if what is meant by this is projected by me. When Heidegger writes that Dasein "calls itself," it does not mean that the "I," as author, is the origin of the call (…he on the contrary insists that there is no author of the call), or even that there is a strict identity between the caller and the called one.[314]

Nevertheless, Dasein must entertain an original relationship with its Being, insofar as it is through that relationship that Dasein is constituted as its-self. Since, as I have discussed in the previous sections, Dasein is its-self authentically by responding to the call of its Being, that is to say, by taking responsibility for its being-fundamentally-unsettled, i.e. Being-guilty, then any possible relationship between Dasein and its Being has a 'transcendental posture', so to speak; this is because Dasein can never 'actually' (that is to say, 'presently-at-hand') be its-self in its Being, for that Being is constantly beyond Dasein's reach. This is the reason for which Dasein 'exists', where by 'existence' Heidegger means the constancy of Dasein's relationship with the transcendence of its Being. In this sense, one can refer to Being as

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[313] Francois Raffoul, "The Question of Responsibility between Levinas and Heidegger", in *Between Levinas and Heidegger,* ed. E. S. Nelson, J. Drabinski, (Albany: SUNY Press, Forthcoming), p.37.

[314] Francois Raffoul, "The Question of Responsibility between Levinas and Heidegger", in *Between Levinas and Heidegger,* ed. E. S. Nelson, J. Drabinski, (Albany: SUNY Press, Forthcoming), p.37.

Dasein's Other, insofar as Dasein consists, existentially, in a relationship with what it itself 'is-not'; and yet, that which Dasein constantly is-not is also what Dasein 'potentially is' at any time. This may seem contradictory. For, in what sense is Being other to Dasein if, potentially, Dasein 'has', in itself, that very Being as its own? In answering this question I need to point out, with Raffoul, that this identity cannot be conceived as that of two different entities, nor can the phenomenon of the Call of Conscience be conceived in terms of the relation between two individual relata:

> The call of conscience is … above all a call *of* the self, in both senses of the genitive. The self is not the author of the call, but is announced *in* and *as* the call, since the caller disappears in the calling. Therefore what is at issue in the call is nothing but the coming to oneself as such. … In the call, Dasein's being-a-self is at issue and in play; the call is the space or the dimension of selfhood.[315]

Yet the Call is only possible if Dasein is in some way always, already open to the otherness of the caller. While Dasein's self is defined within the call, its otherness precedes it and must be defined independently from selfhood. Indeed, Dasein is not a self in any post-Cartesian sense of the word, but an entity whose primary Being is Care. This definition is crucial as it constitutes the basis for Heidegger's anthropologico-philosophical shift away from the autonomous self, towards a relational entity whose fundamental trait is openness to alterity. Indeed, the phenomenon of Care signals Dasein's inescapable relation of Disclosedness with other entities, other Daseins and, ultimately, with its own Being as another.[316] The latter is the most basic type of Care, which shows itself as Dasein's primary character of Being as being at issue and which I have previously referred to as a disclosing relation of Being to Dasein. As such, just as Dasein is defined by nullity through and through, its Being is defined by alterity through and through; so much so that the meaning of its very Being is nothing other than the manifestation of its intrinsic heteronomy, namely, finitude. Hence, while maintaining a certain identity between Dasein and its Other, i.e. its Being, this is far from constituting the wholeness of an autonomous, self-enclosed I. It is instead a commonness which is engendered within the Disclosedness of Being to Dasein, understood as the phenomenological space which defines both the caller and the called one, alterity and

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[315]François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.251.
[316]Cfr: François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.258.

openness to it. In this sense, the otherness of Dasein's Being seems vaguely to echo Saint Augustine when he declares:

> Late have I loved you, O Beauty so ancient and new; late have I loved you! For Behold you were within me. And I outside; and I thought you outside and in my ugliness fell upon those lovely things that you have made. You were with me and I was not with you. I was kept from you by those things, yet had they not been in you, they would not have been at all. You called and cried to me and broke open my deafness.[317]

But where Augustine can address this alterity personally by the 'Thou', within the present dissertation I have only been able to discuss Dasein's alterity, namely, its Being, in terms of Dasein itself. While this is all that was traditionally believed to be possible within the unfinished framework of *Being and Time*, Levinas has shown a glimpse of what can be achieved when one dares to stare transcendence in the eye or, better, face-to-face. Certainly, one cannot deny that Raffoul's interpretation of *Being and Time* has achieved much of what is achievable within the traditionally accepted framework of the book, which only allows for an explicit treatment of Being from Dasein. However, following Levinas' example, I may venture to ask whether or not is possible to describe Being in terms of alterity, not only negatively but also positively. The answer to such a question does not only affect my ability to provide a positive description of Dasein's Being in terms of its own alterity, but it has important ramifications for Heidegger's scholarship, as it would prove that *Being and Time* contains the means to answer the question which Heidegger fully tackles only following the Kere. The importance of this point cannot be overstated: it is undeniable that at no point in *Being and Time* Heidegger ventures to describe Being positively; indeed, he explicitly rejects this possibility as outside the scope of the book. Nonetheless, if my analysis is correct, the theoretical gap which separates the philosophy of *Being and Time* from that of the *Contributions to Philosophy*[318] is in fact quite narrow and the turn [Kere] much less sharp that what Heidegger himself may have believed. And while it is true that the avenue I am proposing has not been pursued directly by Heidegger, what this dissertation aims at demonstrating is that a positive answer to the question of Being is possible within the context

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[317]St Augustine of Hippo, *Confessions* 10: 27.38.
[318]Martin Heidegger, *Contribution to Philosophy (From Enowning)*, trans. P. Emad, K. Maly, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999).

of *Being and Time* and indeed it is entirely achievable within a strict Heideggerian framework.

Let us start by saying that, within *Being and Time*, I am aware of a few reasons why Being *is not* Dasein. Firstly, Being is not an entity, unlike Dasein which is so, albeit an ontological entity. Secondly, in the Call of Conscience, Being -at least the Being of Dasein- is disclosed to Dasein as null through and through.[319] This obviously does not mean that Dasein is itself nothing but that its Being is nothing, i.e. not-a-thing; indeed, strictly speaking, it is incorrect to say that 'Being is...'. This does not imply that Being has simply vanished into non-being -a contradiction in terms. Rather, Being is nothing because is not-a-thing-in-the-World, unlike Dasein who is and cannot not be-in-the-World.

Thirdly, I have mentioned already that, for Heidegger, the meaning of Dasein's Being, i.e. temporality, constitutes the condition of possibility for Dasein to be the entity it is. As a consequence, in the course of this dissertation I have established that Dasein is, existentially, a finite entity, a fact which is disclosed in the Call in terms of Dasein's 'Being-guilty'. Being-guilty means that, in spite of Dasein's obligation to take up its own basis, that very basis lies fundamentally outside Dasein's power, for it has not been authored by Dasein itself. But now, if the condition of possibility of Dasein's Being itself, i.e. its 'Basis', is the meaning of its own Being, i.e. temporality, and given that the meaning of something is that very something as it enters the intelligibility of Dasein, then we infer that the null basis of Dasein is Dasein's very Being, insofar as it is disclosed understandingly by Dasein. From this I gather that Being itself must, in some sense, fall outside Dasein's power, or, which is to say the same, is external, transcendental, or beyond Dasein.

Having now provided an exhaustive summary of the negative characterisation of Being contained within the pages of *Being and Time*, let us turn to the more arduous task of providing a positive characterization of the alterity of Dasein's Being. While the unfinished nature of the book seems to warn against attempting such a feat, we learn from *Being and Time* that "'Nullity' does not signify anything like not-Being-present-at-hand or not-subsisting; what one has in view here is rather a "not" which is constitutive for this *Being* of

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[319]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.331, H.285.

Dasein…"[320] A few years later, Heidegger will expand on this point when, in *What is Metaphysics?*, he will argue that the topic of metaphysics is this very nothing, i.e. Being.[321] Hence, there has to be a positive way in which Heidegger may be able to hint to the alterity of Being. Certainly, this cannot mean that *Being and Time* can provide a positive characterization of Being in general. This is indeed not the task of the published divisions of *Being and Time* -even though as von Herrmann points out in his book *Heideggers "Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie"*,[322] it may be possible to partially reconstruct Heidegger's general position concerning the missing divisions. However, within the framework of *Being and Time*, I may still be able to provide a positive characterization of Dasein's Being in its alterity.

In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I have characterised the Being of Dasein as Care. As reaffirmed in the present section, this term names nothing other than Dasein's fundamental Being, which consists in that this very Being is constantly an issue for Dasein itself. As Care, Dasein is constantly projected transcendentally, that is, beyond itself and towards its Being, as a potentiality-for-Being-a-whole. I have explained how this implies the fact that Dasein's Being consists in entraining a fundamental relation to that Being which Dasein itself is, and towards-which is projected beyond itself. This fundamental relation is initially named by Heidegger 'understanding-of-Being'. The relation between Dasein's projectedness and understanding-of-Being is confirmed by the fact that an act of understanding [Verstehen], of which understanding [Verständnis] is the potentiality, is defined by Heidegger as a projection of possibility upon the meaning of that which is projected. Hence, understanding-of-Being is initially characterised by Heidegger as the ground of possibility of all projections and, more in general, a fundamental constituent of all Disclosdeness. Yet, understanding-of-Being is not, so to speak, anything in-itself; rather it is an ontological structure that needs necessarily to be actualized every time in a particular Dasein through an act of (understanding) Disclosedness.[323]

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[320]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.330, H.284.

[321]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics", trans. D. Krell, in W. McNeil (ed.) *Pathmarks*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[322]Cfr: Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Heideggers "Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie"*, (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991).

[323]This is the meaning of the concept of 'minenness' which Heidegger attributes to Dasein.

The point is that, Dasein, in order to be a Dasein, has to entertain a relation to its Being, and to Being in general, not only 'potentially', but through a concrete projectedness *beyond...* and *towards...*, which is carried out in a concrete disclosedness, which is constituted by concrete moods and concrete acts of understanding, as well as a concrete falling and a concrete call-out-from this fallenness. If such a concrete Disclosedness has to be carried out, there has to be a meaning which any of Dasein's acts of understanding may be 'upon'. As previously argued, temporality is the meaning of Care, and as such is both the ground of Dasein's taking issue with its Being and the way in which that very Being enters into an understanding relation with Dasein. In other words, Dasein, in order to be what it is, has to constantly project itself beyond itself and towards its Being; that is, it has to entertain an understanding relation with its Being through a concrete act of understanding of Being. By means of this projection, Dasein's Being is disclosed as that temporality which constitutes the ground of all understandingly disclosive projections. Dasein's Being resides, therefore, in a relation with its (finite) temporality, which Dasein discovers by responding to the Call of Conscience and anticipating its end, i.e. its death. Indeed, Dasein's Being is disclosed in terms of Dasein's temporality, and *as* Dasein's temporality.

Now, if my discussion thus far is correct, there should be no contradiction in affirming that Dasein's Being, which Heidegger defines as Care, consists fundamentally in that Being which is constantly at stake for Dasein. This very phenomenon has been explained in terms of Dasein's potentiality-for-being-a whole; and of this potentiality I have said that it can never be attained until Dasein's end, that is until Dasein 'is' no longer. This however poses another problem, namely, whether one can affirm without contradiction that Dasein, in resolute anticipation, may be a whole. For how can the alterity of what lies beyond Dasein be, in some way, attained by Dasein? As we have seen with both Levinas and Heidegger, this is possible only if one maintains that the way in which Dasein's Time unfolds is different from the simple flow of 'nows' that is traditionally used to characterise the phenomenon of time. Indeed, the fact that Dasein is *existentially* in an understanding relation to its Being, i.e. understating-of-Being, whether ontologically or pre-ontologically, implies that it is possible for Dasein to positively disclose that very Being. Through this Disclosedness, Dasein projects itself towards its being-a-whole, even though this consists in that the totality of Dasein's being is, in its Being, constantly unsettled and never whole. Yet, Dasein gains a hint of its wholeness by means of the relationship which it entertains with its being. For wholeness here does not mean 'completeness', as if Dasein may be an all-encompassing, self-enclosed

system, but 'finitude', which is disclosed when Dasein resolutely stares into its nothing and takes up that ultimate event which is its death.

Nonetheless, if it is possible for Dasein to disclose its finitude, there must also be a way in which Dasein may entertain a relationship with that which Dasein itself is constantly 'not'. This way is what Heidegger calls authentic Disclosedness or anticipatory resoluteness, which is possible only because in disclosing its Being, Dasein finds the meaning of that very Being, namely, its temporality; the latter is Being itself as it is disclosed by Dasein to itself in intelligibility. *Is temporality therefore a positive way in which Dasein's Being can characterized by Dasein to itself?* While this is certainly true, it implies that the phenomenon of temporality, like Being, can also be characterised in terms of alterity. This implies that temporality is also a positive way in which the alterity of Dasein's Being may be understood or, more generally, disclosed to Dasein.

As I have previously argued in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, temporality is not an ever-changing flow which requires a substantial self to travel through it; rather, it itself constitutes that unity which is proper of Dasein in its Being. This unity is what allows Dasein to grasp itself as a whole, that is, what allows anticipatory resoluteness. This in turn is what makes Dasein able to entertain a relation with something that Dasein, ontically, is not, at any point *in time.* Hence, temporality constitutes the way in which the alterity of Dasein's Being enters into Dasein's intelligibility. More than that, Dasein's temporality is what grounds the possibility of the Call of Conscience, insofar as its unitary structure makes it possible for Dasein to: first, to be *kairotically* opened to the beyond from which the Call comes, in the present of its fallen state; second, to take responsibility for its Being as having-been (null through and through, i.e. guilty) by responding to the call itself; and third, be able to futurally anticipate its own death by 'resolving' itself unto it. This does not mean, as Heidegger remarks, that Dasein wants to bring about its own demise. Indeed, it should be clear by now that by death Heidegger does not refer to a moment of Dasein's life, or even an event outside of it. Rather, Death consists in nothing else but the revelation of the fundamental finitude which characterizes Dasein's Being and which is disclosed in the unity of Dasein's finite temporality. For this, Death is not 'something' that Dasein will be 'sometime', but the fundamental and unitary character of Dasein's Being which I have called finitude. Hence by anticipating its own death, that is, by taking responsibility for its own finitude, Dasein

discloses its Being ontologically and 'is' its-Self, in spite of the fact that, ontically, as it is always still outstanding, Dasein is never wholly its-Self.

Finally, it is by understanding temporality as the unitary structure of Dasein's Being, that Heidegger can argue that Dasein may effectively relate to the something which, at all times, is beyond itself and yet determines its-Self in that existential potentiality-for-Being which characterizes the Being of Dasein as an issue for it, i.e. Care. In other words, it is through the unity of temporality that Dasein can paradoxically relate to its Being in its fundamental alterity.

Yet any careful reader of Levinas would remark that if temporality is interpreted as that common unitary ground which allows Being to be anticipatingly included within the horizon of Dasein's Disclosedness, then the relation between Dasein and its Other, i.e. its Being, would not be what Levians calls a relation with a primordially *absolute*, etymologically understood, alterity. If temporality constitutes nothing but the common plane between Dasein and Being, then Levinas can rightly complain that:

> Western philosophy has most often been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being.[324]

Certainly, it is possible to read Heidegger in this way. Yet, if one wants to argue that Being, at least in the sense of the Being of Dasein, can be characterized in terms of that radical alterity that Levinas names 'the Other', one cannot maintain that temporality is merely the ground of understanding-of-Being. Nevertheless one cannot simply reject Levinas' most important characteristics of the notion of alterity, insofar as these are supposed to help in clarifying: 1) why for anything to be discovered or disclosed, Dasein must always already entertain a relation of Disclosedness with its Being; and 2) why this relation of Disclosedness is essentially the response of Dasein to the Call of its own Death through which its Being is manifest in terms of finite temporality. In order to do this, I must explain in what sense temporality grounds the relationship between Dasein and its Other without being external to this relationship itself. The answer however is relatively straightforward if one pays attention

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[324]Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis, (London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1979), p.43.

to Heidegger's definition of the term 'meaning'. In §32, a section that in this dissertation we have returned to again and again, Heidegger says:

> When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein -that is, when they have come to be understood- we say that they have *meaning [Sinn]*. But that which is understood, taken strictly is not the meaning but the entity, or alternatively, Being. Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility [Verstandlichkeit] of something maintains itself. …Meaning is an *existentiale* of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'. Dasein only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of Being-in-the-world can be 'filled in' by the entities discoverable in that disclosedness. … And if we are inquiring about the meaning of Being, our investigation does not then become a "deep" one, nor does it puzzle out what stands behind Being. It asks about Being itself in so far as Being enters into the intelligibility of Dasein. The meaning of Being can never be contrasted with entities, or with Being as the 'ground' which gives entities support; for a 'ground' becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness.[325]

By extension I may say that, temporality is not a property of Dasein, something 'in between' Dasein and its Being or, with Levinas, a middle and neutral term that ensures the comprehension of being. When Dasein authentically discloses its Being in anticipatory resoluteness, and can therefore 'be its-Self', what is disclosed is in fact Dasein's Being; yet the way in which this Being is disclosed is *'as'* temporality. This is to say that, when Dasein, by facing its finitude, discloses its-Self in its Being as the *unity of its possibility*, that is, as a potentiality-for-being-a-whole, what is disclosed amounts to its Being, i.e. Care, in that which renders it possible, i.e. the unitary structure of temporality.

Nonetheless, "[t]he meaning of Being can never be contrasted… with Being as the 'ground' which gives entities support; for a 'ground' becomes accessible only as meaning…"[326] For the meaning of something, according to Heidegger, is not another entity, separate from the something itself, but the entity itself as it is apprehended ontologically, namely, in its Being,

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[325]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp.192-194, H.151-152.
[326]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193-194, H. 152.

by Dasein. Similarly, temporality is not substantially distinct from Care but Care itself in its apprehension, or better, in its relation of Disclosedness to Dasein. Heidegger confirms this when he states:

> The meaning of Dasein's Being is not something free-floating which is other than and 'outside of' itself, but is the self-understanding of Dasein itself.[327]

Indeed what is specific about the meaning of Dasein's Being is not that it is 'any meaning' but the meaning of the Being of that entity which asks the question about Being -about its own Being. And the peculiarity lies in that the meaning of the entity which asks about that meaning cannot be apprehended or known as entities are known or apprehended; indeed, to disclose the meaning of the entity whose Being is that of inquiring about its own meaning consists in letting that entity 'be its own Being'. This meaning is therefore not something that can be disclosed once and for all; rather it manifests itself in the existence of the entity whose being is to enquire about that meaning.

If one applies this reasoning explicitly to the concept of temporality, this means that temporality itself is fully disclosed only in the totality of Dasein's existence. This is to say: temporality is disclosed through Dasein's very existence as the unity of that existence; and that unity is that anticipating-projecting potentiality-to-be-a-whole that I have called Care, and that is nothing else but the Being of Dasein. As Temporality 'is' Dasein's Being in the way that it enters the intelligibility of Dasein, it temporalizes itself as Dasein. Hence, ontically, there is no difference between Dasein's Care and its temporality, insofar as Care is possible only as Dasein's Being is finite, and can be positively disclosed to Dasein only in terms of finitude. And since the finite temporality in which Care is disclosed to Dasein is nothing but that nullity which Care is through and through, one can finally begin to see that temporality itself is an alterity, just as much as Care is alterity.

Indeed, temporality is not something within which Dasein is, but something Dasein 'is' in its Being. Yet it is something that is constantly beyond Dasein: this is clear if one considers the way temporality temporalizes itself in the different ecstasies, that is, in the concreteness of Dasein's existence. That is, in the past Dasein is thrown from beyond itself towards itself,

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[327]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.372, H.325.

that is towards its existential potentiality-for-Being which is always outstanding, since in the present Dasein is either fallen away from itself or thrust in an anticipatory resoluteness of itself as an entity which is constantly unsettled. However, since it is the totality of the ecstasies which constitute the unity of temporality, then Dasein can be its-Self, not as a static or substantial identity which remains constant through continuous change, but as 'being a constant unsettledness' and being thus wholly at any moment. In that, Dasein is its-Self, that is, it entertains a primordial relation with the alterity of what it is, i.e. its Being.

I may argue, therefore, that temporality is the 'way of being' of that relation between Being and Dasein which I have called Disclosedness, for it is as temporality that Dasein's Being is understandingly disclosed to Dasein, i.e. in the possibility to respond/'take respons-ability' for its constant unsettledness. Hence, temporality is what calls Dasein beyond itself to itself, by allowing Dasein to transcend itself towards its-Self. But what is transcendent is temporality and not Dasein. Hence, temporality is constantly transcendent, external, beyond, other than... Dasein. This is because temporality can never temporalize itself wholly in Dasein's existence, except through the impossibility of that existence. Similarly, Dasein's Being is transcendent, external, beyond, other than… Dasein, insofar as Dasein is never its totality-of-Being except in its potentiality for Being-its-self, a potentiality which is never resolved within Dasein's existence, but whose resolution constitutes the fundamental meaning of Dasein's existence, a meaning which can be taken up at any moment by Dasein through responding to the call of Being that projects Dasein towards its own Self, that is, towards the unsettled finitude which gives meaning to the finite totality of Dasein's existence. But now, if I define temporality as the relation of alterity that Dasein has with its Being, am I not equating temporality with understanding Disclosedness? Certainly not. Rather, temporality is the way in which Dasein relates to the fundamental relation that is the Disclosdendess of its Being. In other words, the way the ground of the relationship of Disclosedness that Dasein entertains with its Being is itself disclosed to Dasein in terms of the meaning of its Being, the meaning of Care, that is to say, in terms of temporality.

iv.   The Relation between Dasein and its Being: Disclosedness

As I have explained earlier in this dissertation, in her book *Heidegger, Language and World Disclosure* Cristina Lafont writes that Heidegger substitutes a philosophy of perception for a

philosophy of understanding.[328] Hence, the way in which entities are manifested to Dasein does not depend, as with Kant, on the way in which they are given to perception, but according to the way these are understood in their Being. Through this shift, Lafont argues, Heidegger reformulates epistemology in terms of hermeneutics, where entities are understood [verstehen] rather than known [erkennen].[329] Lafont's considerations are consistent with the term Heidegger uses in the early sections of Division One of *Being and Time* to indicate the foundational relation of Dasein with its Being, i.e. understanding-of-Being [Seins-Verständnis].

At the outset of this dissertation I have indicated understanding-of-Being to be the ground of Disclosedness, where by this I meant that no Disclosedness, either of Dasein's world or of its Being, is possible without a certain pre-ontological openness of Dasein to its Being. This point is well summarized by Levinas in his essay *God, Death and Time* when he states:

> ...the verb 'to be' is comprehended by men before any explicit ontology. It is comprehended preontologically, and thus without a full understanding but, on the contrary, with the subsistence of a question. In the preontological comprehension of being, there is the question itself of being, which is therefore a question possessing a pre-response.[330]

Nevertheless, after having studied more thoroughly the analysis of Disclosedness developed by Heidegger in §§28-38, the reader has become aware of the equiprimordiality of an act of understanding with the other three constituents of Disclosedness, namely, Disposition, Discourse and Falling. In other words, when something is understood by Dasein, this understanding gives itself always together with the other three constituents of Disclosedness. This means that, whenever something is understood it is also, and at the same time, disclosed in its Being. This point needs to be stressed: understanding is possible only as Disclosedness. Hence, Dasein's understanding of Being, even if only pre-ontological, must be accompanied by Disposition, Discourse and Falling. In other words, an understanding-of-Being cannot be

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[328]Cfr: Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.53.
[329]Cfr : Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, trans. Graham Harman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.179-180.
[330]Emmanuel Levinas, *God, Death and Time*, trans. B. Bergo, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), p.23.

an isolated phenomenon, but it is possible only within that constituted whole that I have named Disclosedness of Being [Seinserschlossenheit].

This last point may appear to undermine the central tenet of this dissertation, namely that understanding-of-Being grounds Disclosedness. However, so long as one correctly interprets Heidegger's use of the term understanding-of-Beings, this contradiction is only apparent. Indeed, I have mentioned more than once that by understanding-of-Beings I take Heidegger to refer to that fundamental relation between Dasein and its Being, a relation that must be in place if Dasein is able to disclose its Being and its World, as well as discovering entities within that world. Most notably, Heidegger analyses the anatomy of this relationship in his discussion concerning the authentic Disclosedness of Dasein's Being. This disclosing relationship takes place in the silent discourse that is the Call of conscience, which calls Dasein out of its fallenness to the anticipating authenticity of its finitude and is heard by Dasein insofar as it finds itself in the disclosing mood of Anxiety. As such, the composite interdependency of the constituting elements of authentic Disclosedness should be a clear indication of the complexity of the relation between Dasein and its Being; this strongly suggests that 'understanding-of-Being' is for Heidegger only a temporary term to indicate this fundamental relation, as this is clearly more than a simple understanding of Being. Indeed, if the Call of Conscience and the response which follows, i.e. Dasein's Anticipatory Resoluteness, represent the fundamental way in which the relationship between Dasein and its Being is enacted, then I may have some ground to disagree with Lafont's hermeneutic interpretation of *Being and Time*. This is not to say that the philosophy of *Being and Time* is not concerned with Dasein's understanding-of-Being. For the ultimate goal of *Being and Time* is that of developing a fundamental ontology, which is to say, a philosophy of the way in which Being is understood. Indeed, there are numerous places in the text where Heidegger stresses the importance of the notion of understanding, the analysis of which is vital to the development of the concept of hermeneutical projection seen in §32 and is thus fundamentally connected with Dasein's possibilities and its temporality. In addition, the centrality of understanding within the Heideggerian project is also consistent with a more phenomenological interpretation of *Being and Time*, such as the one developed by Crowell and discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.

In spite of this, I wish to argue that the full development of the analysis of Dasein in its authenticity, which I have considered in the preceding sections, brings about a fundamental

advancement of Heidegger's understanding concerning the nature of the relation between Dasein and its Being. This is because, if one takes seriously Heidegger's discussion on Dasein's authentic Disclosedness of its Being, it becomes clear that Dasein cannot merely 'understands' its Being. For whenever Dasein 'understands' its Being, whether pre-ontologically or authentically, it has to have been already called by it through the silent discourse that allows Dasein's Being to affect Dasein itself in terms of Anxiety -a call that Dasein can either respond to or ignore. In other words, I am suggesting here that Heidegger's notion of understanding-of-Being should be revised in the light of Heidegger's study of Dasein's authenticity.[331] Such an exegesis is based on two assumptions: first, that Dasein's authentic being its-Self is fundamentally a phenomenon of Disclosedness, specifically, a Disclosedness of Dasein's own Being. This supposition is easily confirmed by tracing down the phenomena of Anxiety, Call and Anticipatory Resoluteness to the general constitution of Disclosedness. Second, that, for the purpose of an accurate description of Dasein's relation to Being, i.e. ontology, it is legitimate to consider the analysis of Dasein's authentic Disclosedness as an advancement over the everyday average Disclosedness afforded by das Man. This latter point is in direct opposition to a certain stream in the Anglo-American interpretation of Heidegger often, but not always, connected with Dreyfus' interpretation of *Being and Time*. This is because in championing a non-representational model of consciousness, Dreyfus over-emphasizes the importance of das Man, so much so that he ends up interpreting das Man itself as the horizon of all possible Disclosedness, including that of Being itself. I must say, in Dreyfus' defence, that Heidegger himself is not entirely clear on this matter; hence, a further explanation is needed at this point. In support of his reading of the concept of das Man, Dreyfus quotes §27 of *Being and Time* in which Heidegger states:

> *Authentic Being-one's-Self* does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; *it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they'- of the 'they' as an essential existential.*[332]

The reader must remember that by 'existentiell' Heidegger means a character of Dasein which may or may not be fulfilled by a concrete Dasein, that is in its meineness

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[331]This is what Levinas wishes to do, while ignoring Heidegger's attempts to do so as well. This is because, Levinas, like Lafont, interprets Heidegger's text as mostly concerned with Dasein understanding-of-Being rather than its Disclosedness.

[332]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.168, H.130.

[jemeinigkeit]. But Dreyfus also notes a contradiction within the text when in §64 Heidegger affirms:

> It has been shown that proximally and for the most part Dasein is *not* itself but is lost in the they-self, which is an existentiell modification of the authentic Self.[333]

The apparent contradiction of these two passages has been partially unravelled by Charles de Guignon in his paper *Heidegger's Authenticity Revisited*.[334] Guignon's strategy consists in distinguishing between das Man and the one-self, as well as between the authentic self (i.e. its-Self) and authentic Being-one-self.[335] According to Guignon, while authentic Being-one's-self [eigentlichen Selbstein] is an existentiell modification of das Man, the one-self [Man-Selbst] is, on the other hand, an existentiell modification of the authentic self [eigentlichen Selbst]. Despite the fact that Guignon's argument may strike the reader as a clever piece of scholastic trickery, the position which can be inferred from this distinction is one that Heidegger's argument fundamentally requires. Let us proceed cautiously.

Heidegger explicitly rejects a hierarchy between existentiell and existential phenomena, as well as between authenticity and inauthenticity. Authentic and inauthentic phenomena are, according to Heidegger, existentiell modifications of the Disclosedness of a particular Dasein, rather than existential characters of the structure of Dasein in general. The former are not less important than the latter but they are of a different order; that is, the latter are the ontic enactment of ontological phenomena within the concrete existence of a particular Dasein, while the former constitutes the general ontological structure which makes Dasein what it is. Now, Heidegger explicitly names das Man among the existentials of Dasein, for reasons which I have considered in the previous chapters of this dissertation. This implies that it is not possible for Dasein not to be within the general Disclosedness of das Man. Hence, das Man can be, strictly speaking, neither inauthentic nor authentic.

On the other hand, if Guignon's distinction can really save Heidegger from a patent contradiction, the same argument must apply to the concept of authentic self, of which the

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[333]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.365, H.317.
[334]Charles de Guignon "Heidegger's Authenticity Revisited", in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Dec., 1984), pp.321-339.
[335]Note however that while the first distinction is maintained consistently throughout *Being and Time*, the second is neither used consistently in German, nor can be traced back to any discussion in the text.

one-self is said to be an existentiell modification. Nevertheless, is it correct to argue that the authentic self is an existential of Dasein, hence, neither authentic nor inauthentic? Heidegger's choice of words does not really help, since, by definition, what is either authentic or inauthentic is existentiell and not existential. However, if this exegesis is not a mere exercise of logic, I may attempt to run a looser argument which will hopefully help to go beyond the superficially contradictory nature of Heidegger's statements, in order to understand his deep intentions.

In this sense, Dreyfus is certainly right in pointing out that, in and through das Man, Dasein entertains a certain relation of Disclosedness with its Being. This is constituted by Dasein's falling away from its own Self and its Being, which becomes hidden, and towards the world of intraworldly entities with which Dasein is fascinated. While Being itself, and therefore Dasein's own Being, remains hidden, in Falling Dasein still maintains a fundamental 'insight of Being', through the Being of intraworldly entities. This 'insight of Being', which indicates a fundamental relation between Dasein and its Being, is what Heidegger calls, using perhaps a misleading term, pre-ontological understanding-of-Being. However, if my discussion thus far is correct, this pre-ontological understanding-of-Being is nothing other than an instance, albeit a negative instance, of that phenomenon which I have called Disclosedness of Being. Does this mean, therefore, that through das Man a certain Disclosedness of being is achieved? Certainly. Although I must be clear that this is essentially negative, i.e. hiddenness. Yet this hiddenness is a fundamental step of any authentic Disclosedness, as it is only from das Man that Dasein can be called. The fact that das Man is a way in which Being is disclosed to Dasein may be confirmed by and explain the inclusion of Falling among the constituents of Disclosedness. For how can Dasein 'flee' *from its Being* and 'hide' *from it* if it has not been already called? By the same token, however, how can the Call take effect if it does not call Dasein *from* das Man? The analysis of the phenomenon of the Call which I have carried out in the previous chapter has confirmed that the phenomenon of das Man is connatural to the Call of Consciousness; for the Call always calls Dasein *from* its falleness within das Man. In other words, for a Call to be possible, Dasein must be lost there where the Call may call it from. On the other hand, the hiddenness of Being and the fallenness *away from itself*, which Heidegger uses to characterize the fallen state of Dasein within das Man, appear to intrinsically require Dasein to have been already called to what it hides and falls away from.

Let us remind the reader that my concern here is not so much with the status of das Man *per se*, but with its standing within the context of my discussion about the grounding nature of the Disclosedness of Being, as well as with the justification of the ontological primacy of authentic Disclosedness over inauthentic Disclosedness. Therefore, in order not to reduce Heidegger's argument to one of circularity, the reader must recall at this point the role that Falling plays in the general constitution of Disclosedness.

I have mentioned already that all the constituents of Disclosedness are equiprimordial. This means that, while it may be possible to analyse each of these singularly, it is actually impossible to prioritize any of them in respect to their unitary constitution. This fact also implies that Disclosedness is given always and solely as constituted by the totality of its constituents; hence it is not possible to eliminate one of them without also getting rid of Disclosedness *tout court*. As a consequence, given the existential status of Disclosedness, one must take Heidegger not to be saying that Falling, and for that matter das Man, are inauthentic phenomena; for, as a constituent of Disclosedness, Falling does itself enjoy existential status, which means it can be neither authentic nor inauthentic. Rather, what is authentic or inauthentic is the Self that a concrete Dasein becomes once it chooses either to follow or to reject the Call. In this sense, any concrete Dasein must be both fallen and called at once, if it may entertain that fundamental relation of Disclosedness with its Being which makes of it what it is. For there simply cannot be any Disclosedness except as a call from the fallenness of Das Man. Nonetheless, it is also true that there cannot be any fallenness unless as a *turning away from a call* of Dasein *to* the authentic Disclosedness of its Being. These two facts are, so to speak, equiprimordially intertwined. Hence it is neither authentic nor inauthentic Disclosedness which grounds Dasein's possibility of Disclosedness in general, but rather Disclosedness in the totality of its constituents. This is why, if what I have argued so far is correct, it is possible to redefine the relation between Dasein and its Being no longer as a mere understanding-of-Being but, rather, in terms of a phenomenon of Disclosedness, specifically, Disclosedness of Being.

Yet why should one take the analysis of authentic Disclosedness as the model of the relation between Dasein and its Being? Why should it hold any ontological priority over the Disclosedness which, as I have shown, belongs to Dasein in its fallenness within das Man? The answer is simple: through an analysis of authentic Disclosedness one can understand more openly the structure of the relation between Dasein and its Being than it is possible in

the hiddenness of Das Man, where this very relation is constantly covered over and forgotten in favour of Dasein's fascination with intraworldly entities. Nevertheless, the last point is correct only insofar as it is not taken to mean that Falling and das Man are irrelevant to the relation of Disclosedness that Dasein entertains with its Being; indeed I have demonstrated that both are fundamental elements of the Disclosedness of Dasein, for it is only as a call from its fallenness within das Man that Being can be disclosed to a concrete Dasein. Hence neither Falling nor the Call are in themselves authentic or inauthentic: what is either authentic or inauthentic is Dasein's concrete response/lack-of-response to the Call from its fallenness. This response, which Raffoul calls 'responsibility', or the lack of this response that consists in 'fleeing in the face of...', is what distinguishes the authentic self (its-Self)[336] from the one-self, which are respectively authentic and inauthentic.

Keeping this in mind, we can turn to §§ 54-60, in which Heidegger tracks back the structure of Anticipatory Resoluteness (in terms of Anxiety, Being-Guilty and Call, together with the fallenness of the 'failing to hear')[337] to the constituents of Disclosedness in general. If I am correct, this should provide a description of the fundamental relation between Dasein and its Being which I have defined as a relation of radical alterity. Let us begin with a passage from §60 in which Heidegger summarises these points clearly:

> The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience, is thus constituted by anxiety as a state-of-mind, by understanding as a projection of oneself upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself by conscience –*this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety*- we call *'resoluteness'*.[338]

In Resoluteness Dasein discloses its Being to itself, as it is called to resolve itself over its ownmost possibility which is, paradoxically, the end of its Being, and which is marked by the impossibility of Dasein's existence. Through resoluteness Dasein takes up its own Being by taking up its own finitude. This finitude is understood as Being Guilty, as the latter is nothing

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[336]Guignon would call it 'authentic Being-one's-Self'.
[337]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.316, H.271.
[338]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.343, H.296-297.

but authentic understanding in which Dasein's Being is projected understandingly by Dasein itself as the null basis of the totality of Dasein's finite temporality, by which the 'jetting' of the pro-ject is determined. In other words, Dasein's Being Guilty is nothing else but authentic understanding-of-Being, in which Dasein's Being is understood as the null limit of Dasein's wholeness. In it the Being of Dasein is disclosed to Dasein authentically, from which both the world is disclosed and intraworldly entities are discovered.

Nonetheless, it has already been established that understanding is not something which is ever actually disconnected from the other constituents of Disclosedness. Hence, if Being Guilty constitutes an authentic understanding of Being, it must also always be accompanied by Disposition, Discourse and Falling. From the passage cited above, we can determine that Anxiety is the authentic mood which accompanies the understanding of Being Guilty, and that that reticence, which is nothing other than the silence of the Call, is the discourse through which authentic Disclosedness is articulated. In addition, I have demonstrated that the call itself requires Falling from which Dasein may be called from, and towards which Dasein may flee, so that Falling has to also be included in the structure of authentic Disclosedness. From this, it becomes evident that insofar as Dasein's authentic relation to its Being is constituted authentically -not only in terms of the understanding of Being Guilty but also by Anxiety, a kind of Disposition, the Call, a kind of Discourse, as well as the fallenness required by the Call- then this relation cannot be a mere understanding of Being but must be taken in a wider sense as authentic Disclosedness of Being. As I have previously hinted, this is what Heidegger refers to as Authentic Resoluteness.

We are now faced with a final problem: how can Disclosedness be interpreted in terms of a relation to a radical alterity? In other words, can Levinas help us to confirm the legitimacy of the shift I am proposing from understanding-of-Being to Disclosedness of Being?
Yet there seems to be nothing more contradictory than to call Disclosedness that relation between Dasein and its Being which I have interpreted as a relation with a radical alterity. This would seem the case especially if one takes the relation between Dasein and Being as a full manifestation of Being to Dasein. The Other, for Levinas, can never be fully manifest, fully transparent, lest not to maintain the fundamental distance which grants the irreducibility of the Other to the totality of the Same.

This objection provides me an opportunity to clarify a few points concerning Disclosedness. First, Disclosedness does not mean transparency. Indeed this is often discussed together with

A-letheia,[339] a word which, according to Heidegger, underlines the constant presence of hiddenness in any phenomenon of manifestation. Disclosedness is, in this sense, a fundamental relation of response, or a failing-to-hear of what is transcendent; that is to say, ultimately, Being. Yet, Being itself, even in authentic Disclosedness, remains inevitably *beyond* that Disclosedness itself by grounding it. While Dasein may take up the ground of this Disclosedness, i.e. Being, this is not to say that Dasein can make Being transparent. Rather, in responding to the call issued by its Being, what comes to be manifested is nothing but the fundamental finitude of temporality which is the meaning of Dasein's Being, and in terms of which Dasein's explicit relation with this Being is carried out.

In addition, this helps me to clarify why I should consider the phenomenon of Disclosedness as essentially a relational phenomenon. Indeed, as it is made especially clear in the analysis of authentic Disclosedness, Disclosedness in general is not the result of an *effort* made by Dasein, nor the *effect* of a supernatural cause. Rather, it consists in a spontaneous engagement which engenders that freedom to be its-Self which Heidegger calls 'responsibility'. The latter is, like for Levinas, asymmetrical, for only he who is called can respond. The caller and the called never coincide, and respons-ability is only a response of he who is called, i.e. Dasein, so that the one is not collapsed into the other. Rather, through its response –which may also consist in 'avoiding to respond'-, Dasein establishes a relation with its Being. Such a relation, once again, is possible only thanks to the unitary nature of finite temporality, which guarantees Dasein both the nearness of its resoluteness for 'possibility', as well as the distance of its transcendent null basis, i.e. its Guilt.[340]

In this sense, one cannot simply interpret the phenomenon of Disclosedness of Being as the momentary 'enlightenment' of Dasein in a vision of truth about its Being, as perhaps the analysis of Anticipatory Resoluteness may seem at times to suggest. The 'Augenblick' which refers to the crucial 'moment' in which the event of Disclosedness is carried out authentically through the resoluteness of a concrete Dasein, is not a 'point in time', but a kairological

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[339]Cfr: "...we have Interpreted disclosedness existentially as the *primordial truth*, such truth is primarily not a quality of judgement nor of any definite way of behaving, but something essentially constitutive for Being-in-the-world as such." [Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.343, H.297].

[340]The notion of Guilt is indeed not very far from Levinas' notion of 'debt'. This is because the Same, when faced with the infinity of another human being, is not necessarily 'in debt' towards that concrete person but to the fundamental Otherness that shines through the face of that concrete human other, calling the Same to responsibility.

instant in which the totality of temporality is present. Yet Disclosedness is there all along in the totality of temporality, albeit often hidden in the fallenness of das Man. By the same token, Disclosedness must not be reduced to the authentic manifestation which happens through the Call of Consciousness; the latter is only one aspect of Dasein's disclosive relation with its Being. Rather, since Dasein is what it is only insofar as its Being is constantly at stake, then the Disclosedness of Being must be interpreted as an ongoing process in which Dasein is itself by *existing finitely*. This point is crucial and needs to be stressed further: the fact that Dasein 'is' only in terms of a constant relation to its Being as possibility, that is, as constantly transcending/beyond Dasein itself, implies that the relation that I have called Disclosedness of Being is the constant Disclosedness of Dasein's finitude. This is engendered either authentically, by responding to the beyond in which this finitude has its external limit, or inauthentically, by denying this finitude and fleeing within the all-encompassing totalitarian language of das Man. In this sense, the Disclosedness of Dasein's finitude is the Disclosedness –or the hiddenness- of that Being which is 'on the other side of its finitude', the relation with whose nullity grounds Dasein's finitude itself. This fact clarifies why temporality is the meaning of Dasein's Being, i.e. what is manifested to Dasein when its Being is disclosed. For temporality, which is the unitary structure that allows Dasein to relate to Being, is in turn Dasein's finitude itself, that is, the unitary wholeness that can only be appropriated in anticipatory resoluteness, and that, on the other hand, grounds the way in which Dasein is its-Self or one-self. This way is nothing other than Dasein's relation to its Being, that is to say, its Disclosedness of Being.

CONCLUSIONS

In this dissertation I have attempted to provide an in-depth study of Heidegger's *Being and Time* with the aim, first and foremost, of compiling a dependable interpretation of that text. This effort has been primarily guided by Heidegger's questioning of Being, with the view of providing an insight regarding the disclosing character of Dasein and the disclosive relation between the latter and its Being. Indeed, if there is one point Heidegger is not shy to stress in *Being and Time* it is that the ability to ask the question 'What is Being?' requires a basic level of relatedness between the one who is asking the question and the object of the question itself. In view of this, my work has demonstrated that, for Heidegger, the fundamental relatedness between Dasein and Being is intrinsically disclosive, insofar as it is not possible for Dasein to 'be' without in some way manifesting its Being by taking issue with it. While it is likely that many scholars would not disagree with this structural point, the more philosophically challenging and controversial quest is what constitutes the ground of this Disclosedness of Being.

This problem has informed my analysis of those readings of *Being and Time* which I have identified as some of the most influential within the Anglo-American tradition, and has proved to be a fruitful ground to assess both their merits and their shortcomings. Whereas Dreyfus, Lafont, and, to some degree Crowell, argue that the basis of any Disclosedness of Being is a certain pre-ontological understanding of Being, be it pragmatic (in terms of entities), hermeneutical (in terms of language) or phenomenological (in terms of meaning and its space), Raffoul paves the way to interpret Disclosedness in a novel way, namely, as an ethical relation with alterity.

The detailed study of these interpretations of Heidegger's masterwork has further afforded me with the opportunity to address a number of minor but interrelated issues, the solution of which has ultimately proved vital in responding to the question concerning the nature of the disclosive relation between Being and Dasein, and has additionally assisted in marking the path for a positive response regarding the question of Being. The constitutive structure of Disclosedness with its four key elements of Disposition, Understanding, Discourse and

Falling is recognised to be the fundamental structure which is mirrored in the articulation of das Man, Care, Temporality and, ultimately, Anticipatory Resoluteness. These findings, combined with Raffoul's innovative approach, constitute something like a launching pad to broaden the discussion concerning the manifestation of Being to Dasein in terms of alterity, and demonstrate the intrinsic connection between the Disclosedness of Being and Dasein's ontological meaning of it's Being, i.e. Care, as finite temporality.

My contention has been that a more careful study of the phenomenon of Dasein's authentic Disclosedness, i.e. Anticipatory Resoluteness, is the basis from where a positive response to the question concerning the ground of Being's Disclosedness to Dasein may be provided. Such a response engenders what I have called a relational interpretation of *Being and Time*, according to which Disclosedness consists in a relation between the entity whose Being depends on its Disclosedness and that 'beyond' which grounds Disclosedness itself.

In concluding this dissertation, I will dedicate the first section of these final remarks to providing a summary of the shortcomings of the four interpretations previously discussed, stressing the necessity to address some of these issues in order to provide a firmer grounding for any future Heideggerian scholarship. Following this, in section ii. I will summarise my own interpretation and clarify the way in which it address all the shortcomings of the other four interpretations. Finally, in the third section of this concluding chapter, I will address any gaps in the interpretation I have proposed, as well as outlining some scope for future research which may stem from or enrich the latter.

i.   Shortcomings of the current Anglo-American interpretation of *Being and Time* and the relevance of Levinas

I have argued that the unfinished nature of Heidegger's *Being and Time*, coupled with Heidegger's convoluted reasoning and awkward terminology, has proven to be fertile ground for innovative ideas as well as a number of serious misinterpretations. In this dissertation, I have considered four readings of *Being and Time* which I believe to be most representative of the different interpretative tendencies currently existing in the United States. In so doing, I have uncovered a number of inconsistencies and issues, dependent in most cases on the propensity to overlook the ontological primacy of Disclosedness due to the propaedeutic

priority of the analysis of discoveredness. This interpretational error is manifest in a general tendency for interpreting Heidegger's theory in epistemological terms.

This tendency is prominent in Dreyfus' interpretation of *Being and Time*, and indeed I contend that it constitutes the foundation of his reading. While Dreyfus seems to appreciate the hierarchy of discoveredness and Disclosedness, his interpretation is unable to adequately position the phenomenon of understanding, and especially pre-ontological understanding, in relation to Disclosedness. In this way, Dreyfus ends up steering Heidegger's philosophy back towards that epistemological framework from which it is so strenuously trying to escape. In so doing, Heidegger's ontological efforts to address the question of Being are reduced to what *Being and Time* has rejected at the outset, namely, the study of Being in terms of entities. Dreyfus excuses himself from engaging with Division Two of Heidegger's masterwork due to what he identifies as the less polished nature of the division, and because Heidegger's account of originary temporality leads him too far from the phenomenon of everyday temporality to fit comfortably with his own approach.[341] What I argue is that Dreyfus' pragmatic/epistemological agenda prevents him from appropriately engaging with the analysis of authentic Disclosedness. Because of this, in an attempt to make his interpretation more complete, he resorts to the patch-work solution of having a former student sweep the issue under the rug by treating Division Two as irrelevant existentialist nonsense, and additionally, to piggyback off someone else's, i.e. William Blattner's, original research on temporality.[342]

Indeed, while the historical importance of Dreyfus' interpretation of *Being and Time* is undeniable, the lack of appropriate engagement with the analysis of authentic Disclosedness blinds his reading to the significance of Disclosedness over the simple understanding of Being as a function of an average discoveredness of entities. This results in Dreyfus attempting to ground all Disclosedness in the average understanding that characterises Dasein's discoveredness of entities, namely, das Man. As the latter is characterised in terms of a paradigmatic hiddenness and closedness, it is clear that Dreyfus' proposition effectively runs counter to Heidegger's intention of developing an explicit ontology. For the reasons

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[341] Cfr: Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), Preface.
[342] Cfr: Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I,* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991), Preface.

outlined above I have come to consider Dreyfus' reading of *Being and Time* as untenable and, due to its widespread influence, in urgent need of response.

Lafont's hermeneutic interpretation is similarly entangled in the same tendency, albeit in a more subtle and nuanced way. As I have demonstrated, the flaw of Lafont's reading is, as it is for Dreyfus', primarily dependent on a lack of engagement with the second Division of *Being and Time*, and this fatally skews her interpretative focus towards Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's understanding of intraworldly entities. In turn, this has the unwelcome effect of interpreting Heidegger's philosophy in open contradiction with one of its central tenets (i.e. it is not possible to achieve an adequate ontology by merely considering the Being of intraworldly entities), and against its primary aim of achieving an explicit understanding, or better Disclosedness, of Being, rather than merely the discoveredness of entities. Set off-course in this way, Lafont incorrectly connects the notion of meaning with the hermeneutical truth concerning intraworldly entities, rather than interpreting it as the intelligible manifestation of Dasein's Being to Dasein, upon which the discoveredness of entities 'as they are' ultimately depends. As a result, the concept of meaning is absolved from its role within the phenomenon of Disclosedness in general and is subsumed under one of Disclosedness' constituents, i.e. Discourse. Through the warped lens of Lafont's interpretation, the latter becomes the bearer of all possible truth concerning entities, as it pre-determines the possible ways in which Dasein can understand entities themselves. Certainly, I have not denied the merits of Lafont's reading in recognising that this truth does not amount to the mere correspondence between a perception and its object, according to a pre-given schema, but is achieved only as entities are found always, already alongside their Dasein, pre-interpreted in some way. However, Lafont overlooks Heidegger's attempts to reassess the question of truth in terms of that Alétheia which ultimately coincides with the Disclosedness of Being.[343] In this sense, the phenomenon of Discourse, instead of being assessed within the constitutive structure of Disclosedness, is erroneously equated with that pre-ontological understanding-of-Being which is nothing other than a proto-form of Disclosedness itself. Hence, I have demonstrated that Lafont's hermeneutical interpretation is also victim of the same epistemological tendency which invalidates, or makes problematic, Dreyfus' reading. As I have argued in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, in spite of some remarkable intuitions

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[343]With regards to the notion of Alétheia and its relation to Heidegger's philosophy cfr: Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. J. Weinsheimer & D. Marshall, (London, Continuum, 2006); Jacques Derrida, *The Truth in Painting*, trans. G. Bennington & I. McLoed, (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1987); Gianni Vattimo, *A Farewell to Truth*, trans. W. McCuaig, (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011).

concerning the hermeneutical nature of truth, understanding and discourse, this error prevents Lafont from engaging with the phenomenon of Disclosedness in its entirety, so that she fails to deliver a dependable interpretation of Heidegger's masterwork.

Despite continuing the negative trend of engaging only with Division One of *Being and Time*, Crowell's approach presents what I believe to be a far more sophisticated reading than either of Dreyfus' or Lafont's. As I have demonstrated, by means of a careful comparison between Heidegger's and Husserl's philosophy Crowell begins to rephrase the analytic of Dasein in more relational terms. In this sense, Crowell's phenomenological reading finally shows that the central aim of *Being and Time* is not merely that of achieving a firmer ground for objective truth, be it a pragmatic or a hermeneutical one, but that of reassessing the question of truth altogether. Thus the focus becomes one of overcoming the epistemological distinction between the subjective and the objective sphere in favour of a sphere of significance which underlies the relational nature of Being and of Dasein. According to Crowell, Heidegger achieves this aim by adopting a radicalised version of Husserl's transcendental reduction, abandoning the study of entities or Being 'in-themselves' in order to pursue the primary question of Being in terms of Dasein's intentional relation with it. Indeed, Heidegger's reduction is so radical that it no longer requires being treated as a provisional step which may ultimately be overturned, but one that must instead be conceived as connatural to the way in which the human Dasein understandingly engages with its Being. Insofar as meaning is the way in which something is when is intelligible for Dasein,[344] Crowell comes to equate Being with meaning in general, as the space within which things become intelligible for Dasein. For the same reason, the possibility of any ontology, that is, the explicit Disclosedness of Being to Dasein, rests on the possibility of Being entering within the intelligibility of Dasein *as* its meaning, disclosed within the 'space of meaning' as the ground of its Disclosedness.

Unlike Dreyfus' and Lafont's reading, Crowell's radical interpretation of Being in terms of its disclosing interaction with Dasein has the merit of demonstrating that there is no conflict between the ontological difference and the possibility of ontology. Unfortunately, just as with Dreyfus and Lafont, Crowell's unwillingness to engage with Heidegger's more 'mystical' sections from Division Two causes him to risk reducing Being to a mere epistemological

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[344]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.152.

grounding space. While this is certainly not the simple epistemological error of interpreting Heidegger's ontology as a function of the discoveredness of entities, by equating Being and meaning, the phenomenological interpretation nonetheless effectively limits ontology to the field of intelligibility. Even admitting that Crowell is willing to expand the reference of the space of meaning from mere intelligibility to the entire phenomenon of Disclosedness, I have demonstrated the inadequacy of this approach in accounting for the terminological difference between the concept of 'Being' and that of 'meaning'. Collapsing the two entirely risks irremediably confining ontology to the realm of Dasein's own Disclosedness of Being, forever forfeiting the possibility of addressing the question of Being as the outside source of Disclosedness itself. This does not mean that Crowell's theory is unsound: indeed the reading of *Being and Time* I have proposed in this dissertation relies heavily on the phenomenological relatedness between Being and Dasein championed by Crowell himself. Nevertheless, the risk is that, by focussing exclusively on the Disclosedness that is achievable in terms of meaning, the question concerning the Being of Dasein still remains partially unanswered.

While the tendency to interpret the philosophy of *Being and Time* in epistemological terms has some unwelcomed consequences, and must in general be avoided, it should be noticed that Heidegger himself somewhat contributes to this confusion by not appropriately distinguishing between the concept of understanding-of-Being, especially in its pre-ontological form, and that of Disclosedness. As I have argued in the present dissertation, discussing Dasein's engagement with Being in terms of 'understanding' is merely propaedeutic and, following the discussion on the constitutive structure of Disclosedness, is effectively replaced with the more faceted concepts of Disclosedness of Being. However, the presence of a certain terminological ambiguity concerning the way in which Being and Dasein are related suggests Heidegger himself may not have been able to reach an entirely satisfying solution prior to the publication of *Being and Time*. Although this may partially excuse the epistemological tendency identified in all the interpretations I have listed above, I believe this does not entirely justify these readings, so that I have been forced to press forward in search of a more comprehensive approach to the question of Being and the source of its relatedness to Dasein.

Raffoul's ethical reading has proved in a certain way to be exactly such a step forward. By focusing his attention to the second Division of *Being and Time*, Raffoul draws some important connections between Dasein's finitude, the Call of Conscience and the fundamental

nullity that Dasein discovers in the Call. From this, the concept of Dasein is reassessed in terms of its essential openness towards the 'beyond' which calls it to take up its finitude by manifesting its lack of a (worldly) ground. What is beyond is fundamentally 'other', so that Raffoul partially exploits the concept of alterity to overcome the notion of the autonomous subject in favour of a responsive Dasein whose Being lies beyond autonomy and heteronomy. Yet, the fact that Being lies 'beyond' Dasein does not entail an actual separation between the two outside the articulateness available as part of an event of Disclosedness. As in the case of Crowell, I have demonstrated that for Raffoul there are no 'in-themselves', but both Being and Dasein are bound in the relation that at once is manifest in their Disclosedness and renders their very Disclosedness possible. While this approach provides an elegant explanation as to why the Call of Conscience can be said to come "*from* me and yet *from beyond me,*"[345] I have argued that it is practically impossible for Raffoul to avoid reducing Being's alterity to a sort of dialectical effort, entirely internal to Dasein.

Nevertheless, from the stand-point of the inextricable relationship between Dasein and its Being, Raffoul reinterprets the problem of ontology as a question concerning Dasein's responsiveness to the Call of Being, rather than as the attainment of a mere 'understanding' of Being. In responding to the alterity from where the Call originates, Dasein enters into an explicit relation with its Being and becomes 'responsible' for its Disclosedness. As I have argued in the present dissertation, this is not to say that Dasein actively 'determines' its Being; rather, Raffoul believes that in choosing to accept its grounding finitude, Dasein chooses to become its-Self as it factically is. Nevertheless, facticity is only one of the elements of the structure of Dasein's Being which also includes 'existence' and 'falling'. Therefore, in this dissertation I have challenged the correctness of Raffoul's attempt to reduce Dasein's responsibility to the mere acceptance of facticity. This is not because responding to the call of Being does not engender such an acceptance, but because reducing the Call of Conscience to a call to facticity runs the risk of concealing the disclosive nature of the call and the anticipatory resoluteness which Dasein embraces in responding. This has provided me with the opportunity to go beyond Raffoul's innovative reading and approach the question of Being from the standpoint of a Disclosedness of alterity.

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[345]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.320, H. 275.

In order to facilitate this task, it seemed appropriate to me to employ Levinas' ethical philosophy and, especially, his discussion of 'otherness'. In spite of it being explicitly opposed to Heidegger's analysis, Levinas' philosophy has proven to be a useful starting point as I have attempted to understand how Being can be at once contained within Dasein's Disclosedness of it and yet fundamentally beyond Dasein. Through the comparison between the notion of Being and that of otherness, I have not only demonstrated the fruitfulness of the interpretational shift from an epistemological to a relational reading of *Being and Time*, but I have also shown that the within the confines of the text it is possible to provide a positive answer to the question of Being. This response has been pursued as part of what I have called the 'relational reading' of *Being and Time*, where I have reassessed the concept of understanding-of-Being in view of Heidegger's discussion of authentic Disclosedness and the notions of 'beyond' and 'nullity'.

ii.   Main Findings: the Relational Interpretation of *Being and Time*

The main theoretical aim of the present dissertation has been that of establishing the nature of the ground of Being's Disclosedness to Dasein. My contention is that a relational interpretation of *Being and Time* provides the best account of what this ground consist in. Incidentally, along this journey, a number of additional findings have emerged and proven to be instrumental in achieving my goal.

I began by studying the general constitution of Disclosedness. Initially, I found that this phenomenon could be characterised in terms of the 'there' [Da] of Dasein, signalling the inalienable openness of Dasein to its own Being. This fact was referred to as Dasein's Being-in, namely the way in which Dasein is unable to 'be' except in terms of its being-within the openness of the World. I then proceeded to review Heidegger's analysis of Disclosedness in terms of its constituents. Firstly, I considered the concept of Disposition in view of Heidegger's discussion on moods. I concluded that Disposition consists in the way in which Dasein is affected as part of a disclosure or discovering of something. As such, I argued that this constituent signals Dasein's existential thrownness, that is to say, the inevitability of its being-in-the-world as an ontological, i.e. disclosing, entity. Secondly, I defined the constituent of Understanding in terms of Dasein's taking up its Being in its possibilities. I

found that the role of Understanding as a constituent of Disclosedness is that of revealing Dasein's Being in terms of its potentiality-for-Being, that is to say, in terms of a projection of possibilities according to the meaning of Dasein's Being. As such, I agreed that, while Disposition disclosed Dasein's *actuality*, Understanding disclosed its *possibility*.[346] However, I pointed out that it is Dasein's *being possible* that is truly *actual* for it.

Further to this, I reviewed the notion of Discourse as that which grants an event of disclosure with the possibility of being *expressed*. I argued that the possibility of expression, not to be confused with expression itself, does not merely signify the condition of possibility for linguistic utterance but, rather, consists in 'the character of articulation'. This explained why, according to Heidegger, Discourse characterises [bestimmt] Disposition and Understanding, since in articulation Disclosedness is broken up into its different 'voices' [Stimmen] and can be analysed in terms of its equiprimordial 'ways of Being-in', i.e. its constituents. From this, I drew a distinction between the terms Discourse and Language, where the latter was defined as the existentiell-ontic embodiment of the way of Being-in, which is 'Discourse'. While Language was said to be merely expressive, Discourse was defined as the ontological ground for expression which can also manifest itself in keeping silence. Finally, I turned my attention to the phenomenon of Falling, which I argued names: 1) Dasein's inclination to lose itself in the 'world' of intraworldly entities; and 2) its tendency to flee unsettledness and hide in the publicness of das Man. Importantly, I noticed that, in spite of Heidegger's negative characterisation of Falling, this constituent is an existential of Dasein, which provides the only possible launching pad from which the dis-closedness of anticipatory resoluteness may be achieved.

After having analysed the concept of Disclosedness in its constituents, my research moved to engage with what Heidegger considers the most primary way, albeit not the most originary, in which Dasein is engaged in Disclosedness, that is, through the discoveredness of equipment. I defined the latter in terms of its reference to other equipment and ultimately to the totality of equipment which is in view of its Bewandtnis. I argued that there is for Heidegger a vertical structure which underlies the significance of a piece of equipment for Dasein, where the latter constitutes the ultimate for-the-sake-of-which of all Bewandtnis. The fact that the discoveredness of entities, especially as ready-to-hand equipment, depended on their

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[346]Cfr: Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time*, (De Kalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989) pp.75-93.

significance 1) clearly shows their relatedness to Dasein's Being, and 2) demonstrates that the discoveredness of all entities 'depends', strictly speaking, on Dasein. While this does not mandate that each entity be dependent of Dasein's discoveredness of them, their *being independent* is possible only on the ground of the possibility of this discoveredness.

Through the discussion of equipment, I found that Dasein is always, already alongside other entities, in such a way that the being of these entities has always, already been somewhat understood. This is what at the outset of *Being and Time* Heidegger defines by the phrase 'pre-ontological understanding-of-Being'. While the latter names the primary way in which Dasein is always, already related to its Being, this does not mean that Dasein's Being is always, already understood explicitly. On the contrary, I have shown that the outcome of Dasein's pre-ontological understanding-of-Being is a basic discoveredness of entities in the world which effectively conceals the Disclosedness of Being on which it is grounded. This tendency to understand Being in terms of intraworldly entities is explained by Heidegger through the notion of das Man. I defined this as a way of Being according to which Dasein comports itself as 'any Dasein', in the sense of what 'anyone does'. While it is fair to define das Man as essentially inauthentic, I have clarified that das Man is not for this a negative phenomenon, since it affords Dasein a primary discoveredness of entities according to the way in which 'anyone discovers' them, in their ready-to-hand everydayness. As such, I argued that, insofar as the primary way in which Dasein understands its Being is pre-ontological, das Man is also to be defined as a pre-ontological phenomenon. Similarly, since das Man is classified by Heidegger as the inauthentic way in which Dasein at once reveals and conceals its own Being, I claimed that Dasein's pre-ontological understanding-of-Being is itself inauthentic. Since all understanding-of-Being is at bottom a Disclosedness of the latter, I concluded that Dasein's pre-ontological understanding-of-Being can be defined as an inauthentic Disclosedness.

Further, I moved on to analyse the way in which Dasein's Being is authentically disclosed. In order to do this, I began by considering the notion of meaning. I explained that according to Heidegger entities or Being come to be understood as 'meaning'; the latter is nothing other than the entity itself, or Being as it becomes intelligible to Dasein. This means that the entity or Being comes to be projected in terms of their ownmost possibilities and according to a

formal existential framework which makes what is projected possible.[347] This framework is nothing other than 'meaning' and was described as "*the 'upon-which' of a primary projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something*".[348] As such, meaning was defined as the condition of possibility of articulation, i.e. of analysis.

Following on from this, I considered the concept of Care. I found that Care names the totality of what I argued is a 'disclosing structure', as it mirrors the fundamental constituents of Disclosedness. I indicated that while the structure of Disclosedness describes the way in which anything, in general, is manifested in its Being, Care consists in a 'Dasein-specific' Disclosedness which signals the unitary structure of Dasein's Being in its fundamental disclosing attitude. I argued this to be nothing other than Dasein's constant 'taking issue' as 'that entity for which, in its being, that very being is an issue'.[349] In spite of the high philosophical relevance of the notion of Care, I concluded that Care is only a half-way step, albeit a fundamental one, between Heidegger's analysis of Disclosedness and his discussion of temporality.

Further to this, Temporality was found to constitute the condition of possibility of the structure of Care as a unity. This is because, in defining Dasein's finitude, temporality makes Dasein's Being fundamentally possible, as it makes its concrete possibilities significant. This fact was clarified in terms of the articulation of these possibilities according to Dasein's potentiality-to-be a finite whole, which constitutes the 'upon-which' of all of possibilities of Dasein. I concluded that temporality itself is the condition of possibility according to which Dasein's Being can be disclosed. This is clearly expressed in Heidegger's formulation: 'temporality temporalizes [zeitigt] itself', which I understood in the sense that temporality makes itself 'early' [zeitig], that is, foundational in relation to the unitary structures of Disclosedness and Care. From this I determined that temporality is to be defined as the meaning of Care, that is, as the meaning of Dasein's Being.

Having established this point, I attempted to clarify the nature of the Disclosedness which provides the concrete Dasein with a vision of its Being as temporality. Firstly, I studied Heidegger's discussion of Anxiety, where he argues it to be the disposition of an authentic

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[347]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.371, H.324.
[348]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.193, H.151.
[349]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32 H.12.

Disclosedness which is independent from anything in the world and directed towards nothing in particular –a threat that comes from nowhere. From this I established that what anxiety is anxious about is the way in which Dasein *is*-in-the-world, which is characterized by the unsettledness of its constant 'being at issue'.[350] I explained that the role of Anxiety is that of bringing Dasein face to face with the unsettledness of its articulated projective thrownness and in this way it manifests for the first time Dasein's potentiality-for-Being itself in its totality. What is manifest, however, is 'nothing', namely, the fundamental nullity of Dasein's Being, a nullity which I found was structural, given that Dasein is that entity whose essence is its existence and is therefore constantly ahead of itself in its possibilities. From this I deduced that Anxiety forces Dasein face to face with the nullity of its very own Being in terms of its meaning, that is, as the finitude of Dasein's temporality; and I interpreted the latter as the abyss of Dasein's ultimate impossibility of existence, namely, its death. This phenomenon was described as Dasein's Being-towards-its end in terms of its potentiality to be-a-whole. This dissertation found that Dasein dies because the condition under which its Being, i.e. Care, can be a unitary phenomenon is the *finitude of temporality*. It is because Dasein's temporality is finite that its Being is 'possible' and its possibilities are significant, insofar as they have been articulated according the meaningful, temporal horizon upon which Dasein's Being can be disclosed.

Secondly, I investigated Heidegger's notions of Guilt and the Call of Conscience. I learnt that as Anxiety provides an initial clue for Dasein's authentic Disclosedness of its Being in terms of temporality, Dasein finds itself called to take up the grounding nullity revealed by Anxiety. Dasein's movement of taking up its own null Being-a-basis is what has been termed 'Guilt'. This phenomenon is brought to light through a call which directs Dasein to face the temporal finitude which underpins its Being, i.e. Care, as Being-towards-death. I concluded therefore that the Call of Conscience amounts to a call for Dasein to embrace it ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self,[351] as being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-a-whole, in Being-towards-death. I can say, therefore, that the call of conscience, through an appeal to Dasein' Guilt, calls Dasein to authenticity by enjoining it to face its own death.

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[350]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.32 H.12.
[351]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.314, H.269.

Finally, I established that the nullity of Dasein's Being can be thought in terms of Disclosedness, albeit a distinctive case of it, on the basis that the phenomena of anxiety, being-guilty, the call and Dasein's constant fleeing can be mapped against the constitutive structure of Disclosedness in general. I explained that this peculiar case is called by Heidegger 'Resoluteness' [Entschlossenheit] and is defined as 'reticent', insofar as it projects its Disclosedness upon the nullity of its finitude, 'ready-for-anxiety'. In its reticence, Resoluteness brings Dasein to face its nullity, and 'self-projecting', as it discloses Dasein in its potentiality-for-Being-a-whole in terms of Dasein's being-Guilty.[352] Resoluteness was also said to be necessarily 'anticipatory' since it projects Dasein towards the finite completeness underpinned by it potentiality-for-annihilation, something which can never be attained within Dasein's existence.

During the structural analysis of anticipatory resoluteness, I came across Heidegger's discussion concerning the provenance of the Call of Conscience. According to Heidegger, the Call comes at once from Dasein and from beyond it, so that the problem for my dissertation was to ascertain whether Dasein could in fact be at once the caller and the called one. The matter was further complicated by Heidegger's insistence on the external nature of the caller in respect with the called one, defined as 'beyond'. Resolving the issue concerning the nature of the beyond proved important not just in order to rescue Heidegger from a logical contradiction, but since it turned out to be connected with the more positive question concerning what is disclosed in anticipatory resoluteness.

In order to explain Heidegger's intention and avoid a patent contradiction, I considered the fundamental openness of Being afforded to Dasein by its choice to take itself up as potentially and finitely 'whole' in anticipatory resoluteness. I explained that, in order to choose its-Self, Dasein needs to be called out of its fallenness by something which is itself not fallen, something 'other' than itself. I found that the contradiction is only apparent insofar as the discursive nature of the Call of Conscience affords Dasein a fundamental 'articulation', distinguishing between two existentiell constituents of it, i.e. inauthentic das Man and authentic its-Self. Hence, Dasein is called out of its fallenness to attain its authentic its-Self. Hence, in a certain way, it can be said that Dasein calls itself from itself to its-Self. Indeed, I argued that in order to be constituted as its-Self, Dasein must entertain an original

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[352]Cfr: Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p.342-344, H.296-297.

relationship with its Being, by responding to the call of its Being, that is to say, by taking responsibility for its being-fundamentally-unsettled, or 'Guilty!'.

Since Dasein can never 'actually' be itself in its Being, its relation to its Being is said to be 'transcendental', a fact which reinforces Dasein's existential nature, where by 'existence' Heidegger means the constancy of Dasein's relationship with the transcendence of its Being. the one who calls is said to be itself a nullity, insofar as it is essentially beyond Dasein and therefore fundamentally nothing (in-the-world). I then leveraged on Heidegger's tenet of the ontological difference between Being and entities to argue that this nothing in the world is in fact Being itself. By establishing this identity, I was able to clarify that who calls Dasein out of its fallenness and towards its-Self is nothing other than Dasein's very Being. In this way, I demonstrated that the call belongs to Dasein as one of its fundamental existentiale of its Being. However, due to its structural nullity, Dasein's existential totality is effectively grounded by what is *not* within that very totality, while still constituting this very totality through and through. Hence, I showed that the 'nothing' which calls Dasein to its null finitude is the very Being of Dasein, a nullity which grounds the finitude of Dasein's temporality.

In this sense, Dasein consists, existentially, in a relationship with what it itself 'is-not'; and yet, that which Dasein constantly is-not is also what Dasein 'potentially is' at any time. As such, I took a step further and defined Being as Dasein's Other. This move was justified in terms of Dasein's Care, as this signals Dasein's essential relation with other entities, other Daseins and, ultimately, with its own Being as another.[353] I identified the latter to be the most basic type of Care, underpinning Dasein's ontological character. Indeed, I found the nullity of Dasein to depend on the fundamental alterity of its Being, a heteronomy signalled by the very meaning of Dasein's Being, i.e. finite temporality.

Having established the alterity of Being in relation to Dasein, I first attempted to spell out the nature of this Being in terms of what it is 'not'. I argued that, according to Heidegger, Being, unlike Dasein, *is not* an entity and is disclosed as 'nothing', so much so that it cannot be said that 'Being is…'. This is because, unlike Dasein who is and cannot not be-in-the-World, Being is not-a-thing-in-the-World. For these reasons I believed that the definition of Being in terms of its otherness to Dasein was justifiable and indeed had already been attempted by

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[353]Cfr: François Raffoul, *The Origin of Responsibility*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.258.

Raffoul before me. However, in discussing Raffoul's interpretation of *Being and Time*, it became clear to me that, while his reading had achieved a dependable reading of Heidegger's explicit treatment of Dasein's Being from within Dasein's understanding Disclosedness, a positive description of Being had remained unattempted. However, my contention was that, by applying Levinas' notion of 'Other' to Heidegger's Being, it was possible to achieve just such a thing.

In order to do this, I turned once more to the notion of Care, in terms of which Dasein is constantly projected beyond itself and towards its Being, and noted that this notion implies an inalienable relation to that which Dasein itself is constantly 'not'. I demonstrated that, while this relation underpins the entirety of Dasein's existence, it shows itself openly only in authenticity, in terms of the disclosive relation which Heidegger calls 'anticipatory resoluteness'. Through this phenomenon, Being is disclosed by Dasein in the only way Dasein can disclose anything, i.e. in terms of its meaning; hence, what Dasein discovers in anticipatory resoluteness is its own finite temporality. I argued that the latter provides the unitary framework (having-been, making present and future) within which Dasein is capable of grasping itself in terms of its possibilities and as a whole. This in turn is what makes Dasein able to entertain a relation with something that, ontically, surpasses Dasein at any point *in time*, while ontologically *being* Dasein. Hence, I argued that temporality constitutes the way in which the alterity of Being enters into Dasein's intelligibility, as well as the grounding condition of Dasein's Call as open (in the present of its fallen state), responsible (in taking responsibility for its having-been by responding to the call itself), and resolute (by futurally anticipating its own death and itself unto it).

In this way I demonstrated that, by understanding temporality as the unitary structure of Dasein's Being, Heidegger's position is justified, in that Dasein can effectively relate to that which is beyond itself and yet *is* its-Self anticipatorily, as well as , paradoxically, to its Being in its fundamental alterity. Nevertheless, temporality is neither a property of Dasein nor an external term which allows for objective comprehension, but rather Being itself as it enters the intelligibility of Dasein. As such, I inferred that when Dasein, by facing its finitude, discloses its-Self in its Being as the *unity of its possibility*, what is disclosed amounts to Dasein's very Being (Care) in that which renders it possible, namely, temporality.

I also remarked that, while this demonstration was carried out in terms of the intelligibility of temporality, understanding-of-Being cannot be an isolated phenomenon, but is possible only within the constituted totality of Disclosedness. I took this to suggest that the notion of 'understanding-of-Being' is for Heidegger only a temporary way to define the fundamental relation which is later expanded in terms of Disclosedness. Indeed, unlike traditional understanding, Disclosedness in general is not the result of an *effort* made by Dasein, nor the *effect* of a supernatural cause, but the spontaneous and asymmetrical engagement between the caller and the called one. By responding, or not responding, to the call of its Being, Dasein establishes a relation with its other. In it, Dasein is both near to its Being in resoluteness and far from it due to its transcendent nullity.

In this way, I demonstrated that the basis of Dasein's Being is not mere understanding, but a complex relation of openness to something 'other'. While, within such a relation, Being and Dasein are not *relata*, they are distinguished in terms of the discursive nature of the Call of Conscience, which separates Dasein from the null ground which lies beyond it. This separation, however, is not that of a subject from its object, so that it is only within the limitedness of a purely ontological perspective that a relational interpretation of *Being and Time* runs the risk of objectifying Being. This is where Crowell's phenomenological interpretation shows its importance, as Dasein and its Being 'are not' separate, but can 'be' only as part of that common relation of Disclosedness within which the alterity of the one and the sameness of the other are articulated. Indeed, the two are themselves this relation, where the separation/analysis exists because of the unity, and the unity is disclosed through the analysis.

Raffoul calls this disclosive relation 'responsibility', stressing the mechanism of the call which engenders a response. And indeed, I demonstrated that it is within this vocational dialogue that the totality of the possibilities of Dasein come to maturity [zeitigen] in anticipation. Nevertheless, it is only as part of this responsive relatedness that Being and Dasein 'are' and can be disclosed ontologically. Indeed, their disclosure is itself Disclosedness, that is, the fundamental relation in which the two terms show themselves as finite temporality. On the basis of this, I can finally argue that the ground of Disclosedness is nothing other than Disclosedness itself, as a relation of alterity between Dasein and its Being, in which the relation is not engendered by its *relata* but where the terms of the relation are the result of a discursive analysis of the relation itself. For this reason I have chosen to call my

interpretation of *Being and Time* 'relational', as it maintains the primacy of the phenomenological space of Disclosedness without sacrificing the analytical separateness between Dasein and its Being.

iii.   Final Remarks: issues, limitations and recommendation for future research

I think that the exegesis of *Being and Time* proposed in this dissertation provides greater dependability and breadth than those currently widespread within US Heideggerian scholarship. Indeed, I have demonstrated that a shift from an epistemological to a relational interpretation allows for a comprehensive engagement with both published Divisions of Heidegger's masterwork, and this seems more consistent with Heidegger's intentions. However, this same approach carries with it a number of inevitable risks and shortcomings for which a solution is ultimately impossible within the scope of this dissertation. I hope that my open acknowledgment of what I understand to be these shortcomings will suffice in the context of the present work, while opening the possibility for future thought on these matters. In what follows, despite conceding a partial defeat, I hope the reader will nevertheless be satisfied that, until such time that a better approach is devised, the benefits of a relational reading of *Being and Time* greatly outweigh its risks and shortcomings.

Certainly, the major theoretical risk that a relational interpretation of *Being and Time* runs is that, by relying too heavily on relational metaphors, the fragile balance of sameness and otherness is broken in favour of a more simplistic connectedness of *relata*. While in the present dissertation I have attempted to tread as carefully as possible along this fine line, I acknowledge that in many places this delicate equilibrium may have not been achieved, and a more simplistic and ultimately incorrect picture may have been painted. This is especially true in those final sections where the discussion of the relation between Dasein and its Being in terms of alterity is at its most complex. Unfortunately, this risk is so deeply enshrined within the overall approach, that any attempt to avoid it entirely would necessarily require the abandonment of my interpretative line tout court.

Further to this, I must also acknowledge that, while the influence of US Heideggerian scholarship in Australia is undeniable, European and especially French Heideggerian

scholarship has also had an impact, albeit arguably a more subtle one. As such, the fact that in this dissertation I do not directly deal with Heidegger's continental reception is certainly an important shortcoming. In spite of the benefits which a more comprehensive discussion of Heidegger's interpretation may have engendered, the decision not to openly engage with the European tradition has been deliberate and has been motivated by two factors. Firstly, any attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of the interpretation of *Being and Time* within European scholarship would have forced me to engage with nothing less than the entire history of continental philosophy from Sartre to Vattimo, an enterprise which would have quickly outgrown a single doctoral thesis and, possibly, the lifetime of a single scholar. Secondly, I firmly believe that, even in the Australian context where European interpretations have been acknowledged, US Heidegger scholarship still dominates the larger percentage of our local reading of Heidegger's major text.

In addition, I believe that while this dissertation aims to provide as comprehensive as possible a discussion of all topics which have been considered, an exhaustive treatment of each of these would have required a dedicated monograph. For example, a discussion of the notion of 'meaning' and its connections with other notions such as Care, temporality, understanding and significance is one that I feel has not been completely developed within the present work. A study of this notion in its own right would definitely clarify the exact role of meaning within the economy of *Being and Time* and would better show the mechanics of its connection with Dasein's Being. In my dissertation I have only been able to hint at these mechanisms. Additionally, the topic of Dasein's finite temporality could be discussed in relation to one of the notions my dissertation has not been able to address, namely, History. Such a discussion would help to show that Heidegger's analysis, while extremely theoretical, is ultimately motivated by an understanding of human Dasein as a concrete, specific individual. Furthermore, the connection between Dasein's temporality and spatiality may provide fertile ground to review Heidegger's position in the light of other influential philosophers, such as Descartes, Kant and Bergson. On the basis of this, it may be possible to expand on Heidegger's anthropological analysis in order to tackle a number of questions Heidegger purposefully avoids, especially those concerning Dasein's body.

Finally, when in the present dissertation I introduced Levinas' philosophy, I did so noting that I would attempt a very limited engagement of his work with Heidegger's, focussing on those aspects of Levinas' work which were relevant to my discussion concerning the disclosive

relation between Dasein and its Being. Nevertheless, in the course of my research, it has become apparent to me that the relation between Levinas and Heidegger represents an extremely rich topic for future research, insofar as there seem to be a number of opportunities where comparing one with the other may prove beneficial to our understanding of both. There are certainly a number philosophical and theoretical limits to such an enterprise and I am in no way suggesting that the thought of either of these philosophers be entirely reduced to the other. However, I believe that the boundaries of such an exploration cannot be appropriately set until this is actually attempted. In this sense, while outside the scope of the present dissertation, further research into this relation is not only recommended but indeed strongly encouraged.

In spite of the shortcomings I have briefly outlined, the present dissertation has engaged with a number of topics from *Being and Time* which have been discussed in light of the four major interpretative streams currently available within Anglo-American Heideggerian scholarship. In this work, I have concluded that a further interpretative stream is needed to ensure future scholarship will focus on the relation between Dasein and its Being and the Disclosedness that this relation grounds. If I have been able to demonstrate one thing through this dissertation I hope it to be that it is only by seriously and methodically engaging with Heidegger's *Being and Time* in its entirety that Heideggerian scholarship and, more in general, phenomenology can flourish within the context of today's philosophical research. Such engagement is all the more important in Australia, where I have argued that the relatively small number of Heideggerian scholars of an international calibre has meant we tend to rely disproportionately on those dominant readings coming from the North-American context. My hope is that, by clarifying the shortcoming of the most widespread interpretation of *Being and Time*, as well as proposing a viable alternative which focuses on the disclosive relation between Dasein and its Being, I have succeeded in providing a 'grounding clearing' on which newer and better attempts to understand the nature of human Dasein and its Being may stand tall on the shoulders of this giant.

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While both the original version and three translations of *Sein und Zeit* have been used in the course of my research for the present dissertation, to avoid unnecessary complications for Anglophone readers, all passages have been quoted from *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (London: SCM Press, 1962), which is considered the classic English translation of *Being and Time*.

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APPENDICES

<u>Glossary</u>

Resoluteness: Entscholssenheit
Anxiety: Angst
fear: furcht
intraworldly: Innerweltlich
Disposition*: Befindlichkeit[354]
Disclosedness: Erschlossenheit
Discoveredness *: Endecktheit[355]
thrownness: Geworfenheit
Intelligibility: Verständnlichkeit
understanding-of-Being: Seinsverständnis
understanding [an]: Verstandnis
Understanding [existential phenomenon of]: Verstehen
Understanding [common]: Verstand
Significance: Bedeutsmakeit
fallenness: Verfallenheit
falling: Verfallen
Existentiale: Existenzial
Existentiell: Existenziell
Totality-of-Involvement: Bewandtnisganzheit
Bewandtnis *: Bewandtnis[356]
For-the-sake-of-which:
voice of conscience: Stimme des Gewissens
temporal: zeitlich
temporality: Zeitlichkeit
Temporality: Temporalität
authenticity: Eigentlichkeit
Discourse: Rede
Language: Sprache
assertion: Aussage
interpretation: Auslegung
Interpretation: Interpretation
ntelligibility: verständlichkeit
characterise: bestimmen
character: Bestimmung
das Man: das Man
one-self: Manselbst
Being-one's-self: Selbstsein

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[354] Macquarrie & Robinson: 'State-of-Mind'; Stambaugh: 'Attunement'
[355] Macquarrie & Robinson: *also* 'Uncoveredness'; Stambaugh: 'Discoveredness'; Kisiel: *also* 'Uncoveredness'.
[356] Macquarrie & Robinson: 'Involvement'; Stambaugh: 'Relevance'

A Comparative Table of *Being and Time* Analytical Structures

Disclosedness	Dasein's way of Being	Care	Temporality	Anticipatory Resoluteness
Disposition	Being-already-in	Facticity	Having-Been	Anxiety
Understanding	Being-ahead-of-itself	Existence	Future	Being Guilty
Falling	Being-alongside	Fallenness	Making Present	Failing to hear
Discourse	Expressibility	Articulatedness	Ecstatic Articulation	Call of Conscience