Safety First
How local processes of securitization have affected the position and
role of Dutch mayors

Ruth Prins

Safety First
How local processes of securitization have affected the position and
role of Dutch mayors

Veiligheid voorop
Hoe lokale processen van verveiliging de positie en rol van
Nederlandse burgemeesters hebben beïnvloed

Thesis

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Preface

It is two a.m., and the phone rings. The mayor and his wife wake up. He grabs his phone. It is a police officer informing him about a violent incident that had taken place an hour before. An inhabitant had seriously molested his wife that night. Their 14-year-old daughter managed to call 112, and when the police arrived at their house, it was clear that immediate crisis intervention was necessary. The mayor gives his permission for the police to implement a home restriction order. Consequently, the husband is not allowed to be at home, or to contact his immediate family for the next ten days. The mayor hangs up the phone and goes back to bed, hoping to get some sleep before another busy day.

Temporary home restrictions for perpetrators of domestic violence is just one example of the many new powers that have been given to Dutch mayors in the past 15 years. These powers are meant to address a wide range of new public safety problems that have arisen in the last two to three decades. This book describes a four-year research project focusing on Dutch mayors in public safety governance. Because mayors are responsible for providing order and safety in local society, all eyes generally turn to them when a new safety problem arises in Dutch society, and these have affected the position and role of Dutch mayors profoundly.

Studying the way Dutch mayors are addressing local safety problems is important for several reasons. First, in the last two decades, Dutch citizens have become increasingly worried about a wide variety of public safety problems (van den Brink, 2002; Pieterman, 2008). Second, a new policy domain regarding local public safety has emerged and established itself in the Netherlands in the past 15 years. Public expenditure on local safety have grown from 552 million euros in 1997, to 1347 million euros in 2007 (CBS, 2008). Third, Dutch mayors hold a prominent position within this policy domain. They were assigned the task of coordinating the entire policy process, and the national government has granted them various powers to ensure this. However, not all sections of Dutch society are happy with these powers, and a public debate was triggered in which the Dutch mayors were accused of behaving more like local sheriffs, and less in accordance with their traditional role of shepherd[1] of local community.

This book describes a research project combining local and national studies on the position and role of Dutch mayors in local safety governance in the Netherlands between the years 1990 and 2010. The overall finding is that an ever growing trend of securitizing local issues has fostered an expansion of the mayor's formal position, as well as his practical actions in public safety governance.

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[1]   In Dutch: Burgervader.

Part I – Introduction and context

The first part of the book provides a general introduction to the research project. Chapter one introduces the research problem, its implications for theory and practice, and it provides a general outline of the book. Chapter two provides a detailed description of the research domain of local safety governance in the Netherlands, which came into place and has been continually professionalized since the early 1990s.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1 Providing local order and safety: a mayor's responsibility

Dutch Mayors have been responsible for ensuring local safety and order since the introduction of the first Local Government Act in 1851 (Local Government Act, Section 172). Taking care of public safety and order is a mayor's core task, alongside that of enhancing the quality of local government, and representing their municipality (Local Government Act, Section 170). During the past twenty years, the societal, administrative and political environment in which the Dutch mayors' address local order and safety has changed drastically.

Although Dutch mayors used to react to local manifestations of crime and disorder more or less individually, things have changed dramatically in recent years, and they now coordinate local safety policy processes and cooperate with various actors from the public and private sector on a daily basis. A policy domain regarding public safety at the municipal level has developed in the Netherlands in the past twenty years (Cachet and Ringeling, 2004). A so called 'integral policy approach' has become the dominant policy strategy for public safety governance. Core aspects of this policy approach are that it targets a wide variety of safety problems (objective and subjective risk, social problems, physical dangers), and that it addresses them at the local administrative level of cities and municipalities with administrative, societal and private actors collaborating in 'local safety networks' (Prins and Cachet, 2011). Local governments – especially mayors with a formal responsibility for local order and safety – are made responsible for coordinating the effort to design, implement and evaluate integral approaches to public safety.

In the past 15 years, Dutch mayors received multiple new powers to address specific local safety problems (Mein, 2010; Sackers 2010a/b). These include the power to temporarily hold specific groups and individuals in custody if they are considered a threat to public safety and order (implemented in2000 under the Local Government Act, Sections 154a and 176a). Another power granted in 2002 gave police the right to carry out preventive body searches in specific public areas to weed out the possibility of weapon related crimes (Local Government Act, Section 151b). Another new power granted in 2008 was that of restricting committers of domestic violence from returning home for period of ten days after the assault (Law on Temporary Home Restrictions). Two final examples of new laws enacted are that granting the mayor the right to temporarily hold specific persons and groups in custody for preventative purposes, and the right to issue reporting duties to individuals causing the nuisance introduced in 2010 (Local Government Act, 173 a, b).

These new powers have been both welcomed and criticized, with mayors themselves being roughly divided into two groups. The mayors of large cities were mostly welcoming of the new powers. Some took a key role in their initiation in order to address what they saw as highly complex public safety problems, and a need to meet the societal demand for public safety. Others were more reluctant and spoke up against the infringements of privacy

and warned of a poor understanding of the long term outcomes of these far reaching powers (Bandell In van der Zwan, 2007 , van Rehwinkel in De Volkskrant, 2010). Moreover, the Dutch mayors' traditional role of shepherd would be overshadowed by their new role of local sheriff or 'superman' in their push to get tough on crime and quell any other threats to public order and safety (c.f. Sackers, 2010A).

2 A changing perspective on public safety

The new policies emerged against the background of changing perspectives on public safety, both in and outside of the Netherlands. A number of factors including modernization, the end of the Cold War, secularization, individualization and terrorist attacks led to increasing societal and political attention to issues of safety and security. Nowadays, citizens, politicians and governments in many Western- European counties feel that their societies are being challenged by persistent problems of safety (c.f. Cachet, de Kimpe, Ponsaers and Ringeling, 2008). However, public safety issues have not always been given as much attention as they are due. It was more common in the past for victims of crime and the larger society to accepted their fate and regard the risk of something untoward happening as a fact of life, or an act of God. Society's attitude towards risk and safety problems changed, and in this process, *matters* of public safety became *problems* of public safety (c.f. Dery, 1984). This problem-oriented perspective on public safety required a collective response from various levels of government.

Between the end of the Second World War and the 1960s, local governments in the Netherlands were able to respond relatively effectively to public safety problems as they faced relatively low crime rates, and saw mainly minor disturbances of public order. Formal policies regarding public safety were non-existent (Cachet and Ringeling, 2004) at the time, but this started to shift in the 1960s and 1970s when crime rates rose rapidly and new public safety problems manifested themselves in Dutch society. Examples of the latter are traffic accidents, riots caused by squatter movements, disturbances of public order by demonstrations (such as that held against the Vietnam War), and the hostage takings by South Moluccan activists. Consequently, Dutch citizens started to pay more attention to public safety issues, and they developed increasingly greater expectations of the Dutch governments (van de Brink, 2002; Pieterman, 2008).

By the late 1980s, it became apparent that a formal and hierarchically coordinated policy would be necessary to tackle the undesired phenomena (Cachet in Cachet et al., 2008) and meet citizen's demands. Consequently, a substantial policy domain for addressing local, regional and national public safety problems emerged in the past twenty years. Every city in the Netherlands has a policy aimed specifically at improving the public safety situation. The number of laws, regulations, policies, programs and instruments addressing public safety has increased substantially, and is still growing.

While formal policy responses to public safety problems became a daily reality for local governments in the 1990s and 2000s, the nature of issues considered to be public safety problems changed (Residohardjo, 2011;

Resodiahrdjo and Kors-Walraven 2012; Timmermans, Breeman and Dalfsen 2011). Traditional public safety problems, such as theft and riots were soon complemented by newer concerns. A quick look at local public safety related policy documents reveals new safety problems, such noise, drugs, litter on the streets, the illegal transportation of chemicals, the influx of people from specific ethnic backgrounds, and the religious radicalization of specific citizen groups. Consequently, local safety problems have become highly complex, unpredictable (van Asselt, 2007), and technological (Perrow, 1984). Although the labels 'safety' and 'security' are widely used, what they refer to has changed, and the contemporary safety governance issues are dynamic, fuzzy, and variable (Cachet et. al., 2008). Society's perspective on public safety problems has changed drastically, and public safety has became a container concept (c.f. Boutellier's 'semantic net', 2005). As a result, the mayors' traditional responsibility for local order and safety now extends to a much wider variety of local safety problems.

3 Securitization and the power of problem definition

The range of issues on the current public safety governance agenda shows a trend of defining societal phenomena in terms of (threats to) public safety (van Dijk en Hoogewoning, 2009). In the mid 1990s, several scholars gathered at the Copenhagen School described this trend as one of increasing 'securitization'. They defined securitization as a "process of social construction involving those who carry out the speech act ('securitizing actors') to articulate an existential threat to a referent object" (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 23-24). The introduction of the concept of securitization highlighted the widening of the concept of public safety. The so-called referent object could be anything from a person, country or an event. Moreover, the concept of securitization demonstrated the power of labeling something as a safety threat. By presenting an issue as a threat to public safety and order, it becomes justifiable to call upon the use of specific instruments and mobilize certain actors from the safety domain. A successful act of securitization thus opens the doors to a wide range of potential security measures taken by actors such as the police and the military (Buzan et al., 1998).

    More in general, defining something as a public problem is to explicitly make a case for (governmental) action. This points at the power of problem definitions as richly described in the literature on agenda setting and governance dynamics. Problem definitions can be seen as "descriptions or constructions of the world sustaining some patterns of social action and excluding others" (Burr, 2003:5). This literature views policy making as a "constant struggle over the criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories, and the definition of ideas that guide the way people behave" (Stone, 2002:11). Problem definitions not only point to a certain perspective on the problem itself, they also promote a certain course of action and legitimize certain actors as 'fixers' of the problem, giving them new authority, power, and resources (Stone, 2002:209).

    How one defines a policy problem thus affects the selection of suitable solutions and influences who is responsible for taking remedial action.

The research problem describes in the next section strongly relies on the theoretical assumption that problem definitions have significant consequences for actors' positions and roles in the policy process (c.f. Gusfield, 1981; Weis, 1989; Cobb and Elder,1993; Stone, 2002). This assumption places the mayor's position and role in local safety governance in the past two decades against the background of a changing perspective on public safety in the Netherlands. Such a changing perspective on local safety has brought about new definitions of safety problems which are expected to affect the position and role of the Dutch mayor.

4 Research questions and scope

The objective of this study is to describe, analyze and understand how the position and role of mayors within local safety governance has been affected by shifting definitions of local public safety problems between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands. This span of twenty years covers both the emergence and development of a comprehensive policy domain surrounding local public safety governance in the Netherlands. This period is also characterized by a shifting perspective on public safety problems, as well as by fundamental changes in the mayor's position within the policy domain. The central question of the research project is as follows:

How have definitions of local safety problems changed and how, to what extent and why has this affected the position and role of mayors in local safety governance in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010?

The central question is followed up by five sub-questions:

1 - How did the policy domain regarding local public safety evolve between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands, and what has been the mayor's formal position in it?

To begin answering our research question, the empirical context of the research project needed to be introduced first. The first sub question thus addresses the domain of local safety governance, which is understood as a collection of policies, practices and actors coordinated by local authorities in order to tackle threats, risks and actual problems endangering local order and safety within the boundaries of a municipality. The first sub question facilitates a general description of the emergence of local safety governance, and the key developments to take place between 1990 and 2010. Special attention was paid to the development of the mayor's formal position within this policy domain. The latter is understood as the formal status in a governance network characterized by formal tasks, powers and responsibilities which come along with a certain position in a given social structure (Merton, 1957; Kuper and Kuper, 2010).

2 - What is the expected role of problem definitions during policy processes, and how are these expected to affect the position and role of individual actors in a policy network?

This second question addresses the need to review theoretical knowledge in order to understand in which way, and to what extent definitions of local safety problems potentially affected the mayors' position and role. The power of problem definitions as documented in the literature on problem definitions, policy dynamics, framing and governance networks are explored, and a conceptual model is created to map out how new or shifting problem definitions are expected to affect actor's positions and roles in governance networks.

3 - Which problems have been listed for local safety governance in the Netherlands, and what shifts have taken place between 1990 and 2010?

Sub question three is answered by an effort to gather empirical data on the definitions of local safety problems and changes therein. Data providing insight into definitions of local public safety problems were gathered and analyzed. Special attention was paid to the so called 'dominant definitions' of local public safety problems since these definitions were most likely to be subject to local policy interventions by the mayor and his safety partners.

4 - How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes and how and to what extent and why did they affect the position and role of mayors in the practice of local safety governance?

A second round of data collection and analysis was conducted to address this question and to clarify if and how dominant definitions of public safety problems actually influenced the mayor's role and position. Although the formal position and role of the mayor in local safety governance is prescribed by the national law which applies equally to every mayor, in reality, each mayor's practice is expected to differ across time and place. Therefore multiple case studies had to be conducted to examine the mayor's role in practice through the lens of several dominant problem definitions. The mayor's role in practice was defined as the actions he/she[2] had and had not actually undertaken in order to address a public problem. These actions may or may not have been in line with behaviors expected from the formal definition of their tasks, powers and responsibilities (as indicated by answering sub question 1).
The final sub question read as follows:

5 - Which factors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the course, content and outcome of local framing processes, as well as the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance?

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[2] Please read for he/him she/her as well. Almost 20% of Dutch mayors are female (Van Bennekom 2010).

A look beyond the municipal boundaries was needed to fully grasp the course and content of local policy processes around new problems, and the mayors' role in addressing these. Although the current project explicitly focuses on Dutch mayors and their local practices, these practices are closely connected to the policy dynamics of the wider regional, national and even those dominant in the international policy arena. As further explained in the next chapter, in the past two decades, actors from the supra local administrative levels have become more and more involved with public safety problems located at the municipal level (Cachet and Prins, 2009). The national government, for example, indirectly addresses local public safety problems by setting local priorities and by giving mayors formal powers to address these. The fact that the research domain is called *local* public safety governance does not imply that only local actors and resources are involved. Therefore sub question five focuses on the interplay between factors from the local as well as the external policy arena on local governance processes during which dominant problem definitions are created, and the mayor takes up a specific role.

5 Relevance for theory

The study takes its cues from four branches of literature, and it is hoped that the findings will contribute in return to each of these areas. First of all, we aim to contribute to the securitization literature (Buzan et al., 1998; William, 2003; Balzaq, 2005). Securitization is a concept that is embedded in the field of Security Studies, which is in turn part of the larger field of International Relations. Both bodies of knowledge focus on war and within-state conflicts, and they study the dynamics of safety and security governance at the nation state level as well as more macro levels above (c.f. Grey, 2009). Since the 1980s, the field of Securities Studies has broadened its scope considerably as multiple scholars attempt to move beyond this state centered focus and push the focus toward a wider range of threats (c.f. Grey, 2009). Scholars from this field united in the Copenhagen School where they introduced securitization as a new framework of analysis that would move the focus beyond the primacy of states and military interventions in conceptualizing security (Buzan et al., 1998). The authors explicitly mentioned that securitization was open to any level of analysis ranging from local, to regional, to global (ibid). However, even now, the concept of securitization is still mostly applied to the governance dynamics around national and international safety threats. These threats include those related to the availability of fresh water (Stetter, Herschinger, Teichler and M. Albert, 2011) and energy (Phillips, 2013), issues of migration (Huysmans, 2000; Weaver, 1996; Loader, 2002), and the policies of foreign powers that can sometimes endanger nation states. The examples above point to securitization as a concept used by scholars to unravel 'supra local security dynamics'. Nevertheless, securitization as a mechanism of labeling something as a safety problem, calling for safety measures, and mobilizing actors can be observed closer to home. This research project aims to identify which issues were successfully labeled as threats to local safety at the Dutch municipal level, and to observe the changes that took place between

1990 and 2010. In doing so, the current study will connect the concept of securitization from security studies with local governance practices by exploring the potential empirical manifestation of a local variant of securitization at the most local level of governance in the Netherlands.

Secondly, this study is built on the theoretical assumption that problem definitions have clear consequences for policy design as well as practice. The power of problem definition is widely described in the literature on agenda setting and policy dynamics. Scholars in this field provide multiple models of how problem definitions rise and fall on the policy agendas (Parsons, 1995; Cobb and Elder, 1972; Kingdon, 1984; Cohen, March and Olson, 1972), and how definitions of public problems compete with each other and change with time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). More importantly, they all stressed that a certain problem definition impacts the choice of strategies, tools, actors and practices adopted in the implementation of a particular policy. This research project builds upon agenda setting literature by presenting a conceptual model mapping out how problem definitions structure strategies and actor roles during the policy development and implementation processes. Applying this conceptual model to real life cases of local safety governance will provide further insight into the empirical manifestation of the power of problem definitions.

Thirdly, the concept of framing is adopted in this conceptual model in an attempt to better understand the power of problem definitions at a deeper, or more fundamental level. The framing literature points to frames as images of reality that color perceptions and link them to appropriate actions (Goffman, 1974; Snow and Benford, 1988). Whereas the psychological strand of the framing literature studies how frames structure our cognitive attempts to understand reality, the sociological strand of the framing literature looks at the impact of frames on the interaction between individuals, and on the impact of frames on the collective processes of policy making and implementation. The latter strand in the framing literature is most closely related to public administration, and contains multiple studies on how policy frames steer perceptions of local policy alternatives (Hajer, 1989), and target groups of social policies (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). How and to what extent policy frames can be linked to the actions of policy actors in practice is crucial to our understanding of the power of problem definition in the collective setting of policy making and implementation. This study appeals to this body of knowledge and aims to further our understanding of how policy frames affect the behaviour of individual policy actors in the collective setting of policy networks. The application of the conceptual model to the practical role of Dutch mayors in the local governance networks will show us to what extent, under which conditions and how their actions were structured by these policy frames.

Fourthly, the role of state actors in multi-level networks is a highly debated topic in both the public administration literature and the safety and security studies literature. The fact that contemporary governance settings are characterized by public, private and civil actors from various administrative levels pooling resources and aligning actions leads scholars to wonder what happened to the previously dominant position held by state actors

who were the traditional providers of governance. Do state actors still hold extraordinary positions in governance settings? This fundamental question was raised frequently in both the literature on fragmented network governance (Peters and Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1996), and in that related to the pluralization of policing (Dupont, 2004; Rhodes, 1996; Crawford and Lister, 2005). The multiple case studies conducted as part of this study provide an empirical basis by which to answer the question as it pertains to Dutch mayors involved in rather horizontal, multi-actor safety networks. Does the mayor (as the number one representative of the state and the traditional provider of the classical state task) hold an extraordinary position, or does he simply become one of many mutually dependent providers of local safety?

6 Relevance for practice

Alongside the theoretical implications outlined above, the current study contributes to the body of knowledge on local safety governance in the Netherlands. The research project's historical perspective on local safety problems offers a detailed, empirical overview of the emergence of safety as an encompassing policy concept (Resodihardjo and Prins, 2014). Research findings will indicate which types of issues were successfully securitized over the years, and which issues dominated the overall agenda for local safety governance. Combining this knowledge with our case studies of the governance processes in local safety networks will generate important insights into how the government large cities have been dealing with and have been affected by new safety problems in local society.

A second contribution of the case studies would be the insights they provide as to how Dutch mayors operate in their practice of public safety governance. Existing knowledge of Dutch mayors focuses strongly on the institutional characteristics of the mayors' position in local governance, and has only roughly outlined the actual workings of the mayors and other actors involved (Muller, Rogier, Kummeling, Dammen, Bron, Woltjer and Kalkhoven, 2007; Sackers 2010A; Mein, 2010). This study aims to show both whether and how shifts in the institutional and formal characteristics of local leadership altered the Dutch mayors' role in policy and practice. This will be done by studying whether and how new formal powers were adopted by the mayors in our case studies, and how these affected their role in local safety governance.

A third area in which the current study aims to make contributions is the unresolved question of whether Dutch mayors behave like local sheriffs. As the mayor's task of overseeing local safety and order became more prominent, an active public debate emerged in which mayors, administrators and scholars expressed their wishes and worries in this regard. The expansion of the mayors' powers in local safety governance triggered mainly critical remarks, and both practitioners and scholars feared that Dutch mayors would become local sheriffs implementing repressive powers in reaction to each and every threat to local order and safety (Sackers 2010a). Moreover, the mayors' new role in relation to local order and safety appears incompatible with their traditionally softer role of father figure (Sackers, 2010B). This research

project aims to contribute to these discussions by providing a historical analysis of the mayors' role in local safety governance, both as it is outlined on paper and what occurs in practice. Empirical analysis will be employed to shed light on whether new local safety problems affect local mayors, and whether new powers actually matter in practice. Other pertinent questions include whether they implemented the new policies, and if so, whether these policies then changed the mayors' role and position in the governance networks. Finally, we address the pertinent question of whether Dutch mayors actually behave like local sheriffs.

7 Structure of the book

This book consists of five parts. The first part provides an overall introduction to the research project. The central questions, and the project's implications for theory and practice were presented in this first chapter. The second chapter explains the empirical context of the study by providing a description of the emergence of the local policy domain and the mayor's formal position within it in the years between 1990 and 2010.

The second part of the book deals with the theoretical context of the research project by exploring the literature on problem definitions, policy dynamics, framing and governance networks. These theoretical concepts are discussed and used in combination as building blocks of the conceptual model that is presented in part three of the book.

Part three builds upon the literature review by presenting a conceptual model that maps out the power of problem definitions on actors' roles and positions in governance networks. This part focuses on the link between theory and practice, and the concepts and variables of the model are operationalized into researchable indicators. The research design is presented thereafter, and it is characterized by a realistic view of the processes of social constructivism. This design combines desk research and case study methods. The reasons for choosing this form of design will be provided in the chapter.

The fourth part of the book provides a description and analysis of the empirical data. First, the findings from our analysis of long-term data on the shifting definitions of local safety problems in the Netherlands are discussed. This is followed by multiple in depth case study reports on mayors' roles and actions when addressing several new public safety problems. Insights are gleaned from both sources of data and compared to produce overall research findings.

In the fifth and final part of the book, the central research question is answered before conclusions are drawn. Implications for theory and practice are discussed thereafter.

Chapter 2: Local safety governance and the Dutch mayor between 1990 and 2010[3]

1 Introduction

This chapter describes the empirical context of the research project. It starts with a detailed description of the research domain of local safety governance. Based on relevant literature and policy documents, a description will be given on what public safety governance entails and how it evolved during the past two decades. This is followed by a discussion of the mayor's position in local governance in general, which is strongly characterized by his responsibility for maintaining local safety and order. Special attention will go out to the mayor's formal position regarding local safety and order as described in laws and policies in order to sketch the formal context in which every Dutch mayor operates. Together, this provides an answer to the second sub question of the research project: *How did the policy domain regarding local public safety evolve between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands and what has been the mayor's formal position in it?*

2 Local safety governance in the Netherlands

Local safety governance is understood as a collection of policies, practices and actors coordinated by local authorities in order to tackle threats, risks and actual problems endangering local order and safety within the boundaries of a municipality. Before exploring the characteristics of local safety governance, we have to explain what is actually meant by the term 'local'. The Dutch system of public administration is characterized by three layers of government: national, provincial and local government. The local government is the main unit of analysis in this research project It consists of the over 400 municipalities and cities which are considered the most basic level of governance in the Netherlands, and the level closest to the Dutch citizens (CBS, 2010). Local government knows three independent governing bodies,

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[3] This chapter is strongly based on several publications:
- Cachet, A. and R.S. Prins (2012) *Ontwikkeling van het lokaal veiligheidsbeleid*. In: E. Muller (Ed.), Veiligheid en veiligheidsbeleid in Nederland (pp. 477-495). Deventer: Kluwer.
- Prins, R.S., A. cachet, P. Ponsaers and G. Hughes (2012) *Fragmentation and Interconnection in Public Safety Governance in The Netherlands, Belgium and England.* In: Fenger, M. and V. Bekkers Beyond Fragmentation and interconnectivity. Public governance and the search of connective capacity.IOS Press.
- Prins, R.S., C. Van der Linden, A. Cachet, T. Tudsjman, V. Bekkers (2012). Nationale wetten versus lokale besluiten: Een spanningsveld voor burgemeesters . Onderzoeksrapport in opdracht van het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties. Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam.
- Resodihardjo , S. and R.S. Prins (2014) 'Surrounded by Safety: Safety as an encompassing policy concept in the Netherlands' *European Journal of Policing Studies. 1*(3)*,* 225-248.

namely the local council (representative), the board of mayor and aldermen (executive) and the mayor (Neelen, Rutgers and Tuurenhout, 2003). Traditionally, actors at both the local and national level were involved with public safety governance. The provinces have never been crucial players in the field of societal safety governance since they never held formal tasks or powers regarding crime and other social threats to order and safety.[4] Nevertheless, the regional policy level did gain importance in the practice of public safety governance as regional collaboration arrangements between multiple municipalities became more popular over the years (Cachet and Prins, 2009).

During the past twenty years, a policy domain has developed through which local governments and other parties address a wide variety of safety problems that have emerged. Nowadays, each municipality in the Netherlands has something of a formal policy aimed at improving the local safety situation. The next section discusses the triggers, defining characteristics and policy history of local public safety governance in the Netherlands. Through this exploration, it becomes clear that although local government is fully and formally responsible for local safety and order, local safety governance is considered a multi-level governance practice (Cachet and Prins, 2009). All three separate, though strongly connected governance levels in the Netherlands affect the way in which local safety problems are defined and addressed.

2.1 A short history of local safety governance in the Netherlands

Half a century ago, local safety governance in the Netherlands was a simple and almost invisibly enacted task.[5] Policy or politics had no significance on the governance of public safety. The number of actors involved was small, and political or societal debate about local safety was almost non-existent. How different is today's picture. Safety and security occupy prominent places on the local and national political and societal agenda, and public safety has become a highly politicized issue. At the local level, a large number of different actors is involved in keeping peace and controlling disorder or crime. This section chronologically summarizes significant local level happenings of the past decade, and how things have evolved today.

2.1.1 Societal changes fuelling the need for policy and collaboration

Crime and disorder have not historically been issues of high importance in local governance. Local Dutch authorities, specifically the mayor, public prosecutor and police, appeared to easily cope with the extent of crime and disorder they encountered. Safety governance was neither an issue in politics nor in policy. Full enforcement was the rule. Both the police and the system of criminal justice did what they had to do and nobody worried about it. Rather unexpectedly and suddenly however, Dutch society begun to change in the

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[4]   The regional level gained some importance since the introduction of the Law on Safety Regions which formalized the regional administrative structures for crisis preparation and response.

[5]   This is in line with 19th century Dutch liberal statesman's Thorbecke's dictum that: 'we want a police that comes to our attention as little as possible'.

second half of the 1960s. The usual problems of safety increased in magnitude, and new threats came to the fore. This changing society altered the perspective of citizens, politicians and civil servants, including those at the local level. As a result, politicians and policy makers at all levels started to pay more attention to public safety. Local authorities were so greatly affected by the societal changes, they were eventually granted new powers that gave them an important role in safeguarding local society. The following section describes the societal changes that fuelled the need for policy changes and greater governmental collaboration in the Netherlands.

As in many Western European countries, the attention to safety and security increased against the background of several intertwined developments. Firstly, the industrialized society brought about a rather pessimistic view of technology and science. Modern life became inherently connected to matters of risk and safety. People no longer accepted a certain degree of risk as a fact of life, and the (possible) risks of modern life were in greater focus than any of the opportunities it had to offer (Beck, 1992). Secondly, several key events altered 'the landscape of security' drastically (Zedner, 2003:153). These events included the end of the cold war, which led to a shift in attention from military and nuclear threats to more domestic threats to safety and order (ibid). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 further eroded the distinction between internal and external threats (ibid). Thirdly, our perspective of safety and security changed tremendously because of various societal developments. The safety once offered by political, religious and societal movements faded in the postmodern, globalized and individualized societies (Boutellier, 2005). Both our focus on risks and our growing demand for safety resulted in an ongoing effort to prevent us from any kind of harm (Wildavsky, 1988; Pieterman, 2008). Fourthly, Dutch police statistics showed that the number of registered crimes had increased from roughly 132.000 in 1960 to 1,3 million in 1999 in the Netherlands (Bruinsma, van de Bunt and Haen Marshall, 2001). Further, physical safetyrelated risks increased and became less predictable as a result of the increasing mobility of people, and the rise of high tech industries.[6]

Problems of law and order grew quickly in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s, making the fast rising crime rate among the most urgent problems in the Netherlands. While safety problems expanded in terms of numbers and severity, citizens had high expectations of their government to safeguard them from various potential harms (Pieterman, 2008). As a result, the formerly stable societal order of the heavily 'pillarized' Dutch society (Lijphart, 1966; Goudsblom, 1967) was contested in the Netherlands. Traditional keepers of peace, law, and order were not able to adequately meet the new challenges, and the rising tide of crime effectively put an end to the fiction of full enforcement.

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[6]   Ira Helsoot defined physical safety as "threats to health and goods caused by accidents" which contrasts with social safety which is about "threats to health and goods caused by intentional actions" (2007: 11). Physical safety is a term often used in the Netherlands for describing management structures for crisis management.

By the late 1980s, Dutch authorities realized they would never be able to effectively handle the growing problems. From that point on, authorities decided that they had to choose what to enforce and sanction, and what not to. This was a revolutionary change, starting first in the juridical sphere with the introduction of the 'positive opportunity principle' ('t Hart, 1994). Under this principle, enforcement and prosecution would take place only if the public interest was involved, and if there was a reasonable chance of success. The revolution continued in the policy making arena when it became necessary to be clear on which local safety problems were to be addressed, by whom and how (Commissie Peper, 1981). This led to of a long sequence of policy projects, plans and programs which shaped and structured local policy ambitions and practices (see Section 2.2 on policy history).

While these societal changes challenged local authorities by bringing about new threats to local order and safety, they not only fuelled the need for policy planning, they fostered collaboration between multiple actors in and outside of governmental spheres as well. The government's monopoly (if ever it had one) on the provision of safety broke down as the traditional governmental representatives were no longer independently able to successfully address (new) threats to local order and safety. Many other actors became involved, such as housing corporations, schools, neighbourhood organizations, storekeepers, welfare workers and citizens. Today, more or less horizontal relations between public, private and societal actors dominate the governance of the local public safety scene (Hoogenboom, 2009).

2.1.2 The entrance of multiple new providers of local safety

While the police traditionally had something of a monopoly on law enforcement in relation to any threats to local order and public safety, this was no longer feasible as crime rates rose rapidly and new public safety problems entered the scene. This problematic situation became more pressing in the early 1980s and after, eventually leading to a public debate about the police's 'core tasks'. In this debate, the police argued that they should be able to share the law enforcement burden with parties other than members of the criminal justice system. The police felt they should focus on their core tasks, and that the responsibility for public safety should be more broadly deployed (van der Torre, J. Kuppens , H.B. Ferwerda, and V. J. van Bolhuis, 2007). In the first instance, local governments were encouraged to take greater responsibility for local safety and order (Commission Roethof, 1984).

Traditionally, a mayor and public prosecutor would seek to maintain peace and order with the help of the police and the criminal justice system. As part of the local administration, the fire brigade would also play a role, as did building inspectorates and a small number of other specialized offices within the administration. The system had a largely chain-like character: the mayor gave instructions to the police, the police brought offenders to the public prosecutor, and the public prosecutor brought it to court. Non-governmental actors did not play a role at all in this old chain of command. However, the scene quickly changed from a closed and rather orderly affair, and morphed into an open and often very complex network. In an attempt to increase their problem solving capacity, local authorities started to invite multiple so called

'partners' from different backgrounds into the discussion, and this fostered a trend of multi actor public safety governance and policing since the 1990s.

Consequently, the practice of governing local order and safety gradually expanded to encompass many governmental, quasi-governmental and non-governmental actors. Scholars mention the entrance of citizens (van Caem, 2008; van Steden, 2009; Terpstra, 2010), private security companies (van Steden, 2007), new forms of public police auxiliaries employed by municipalities and other non-police bodies (Jones, van Steden, and Boutellier, 2009) and many 'societal actors' in the local safety networks. Shopkeepers were forced to protect their premises, football stadiums had to create their own safety provisions, and private citizens were invited, for example, to make their homes burglar-proof. This trend was described by criminologist David Garland as the 'reponsibilization strategy,' (2001). From a governance perspective, we saw new actors and organizations entering into stable cooperative relations with the police in order to ensure safety in business parks, to bring youthful offenders back on the right path, to prevent the deterioration of neighborhoods, or to solve conflicts between neighbors.

2.1.3 The need for policy planning

The fast rising demand for order maintenance and crime control made public safety governance a political activity (cf. Reiner, 1985). Choices had to be made about what to do and what not to do, and this burden of choice could no longer be left to the operational executive police officers. Much that was left implicit in the past now had to become explicit, and political administrators now had to be accountable for the choices that were made. This need for explicit and accountable choices led to the rise of an elaborate system of police and safety planning or policy formation in the Netherlands.

The notion of police and safety policy was introduced during the second half of the 1900s (Commissie Peper, 1981). Police planning was stimulated by the 1994 police reform that introduced regional police forces. From the early 1990s, the national government also begun to help local governments to develop local safety policies of their own.[7] Gradually many local governments introduced local safety policy plans, also known as integrated safety policy plans, with the with the large cities moving more quickly in this regard than smaller cities and villages (SGBO, 2000). At the same time, the national government began to introduce policy programs to strengthen its own steering of the police and (local) safety. As a result, the overall amount of planning and steering increased drastically. Tensions between national and local steering and control bodies increased in the Netherlands, as well as in other Western-European countries (Cachet, Van Sluis, Jochoms, Sey and Ringeling, 2009; Cachet and Prins, 2010).

In sum, local safety governance emerged from the late 1980s and onwards. The practice of local safety governance is characterized by local governments attempting to tackle a wide variety of threats to local order and safety in close

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[7]   Amongst which: Integral Safety Report, 1993 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1993) and Public Safety Policy, 1995-1998 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1995).

collaboration with many others from different governmental levels and sectors. In the next section, a detailed description is provided of the local policy ambitions of the 'integral approach'.

2.2 Towards local safety policies: a series of policy plans

The emergence of the policy domain of local safety governance is strongly defined by the introduction and further professionalization of the 'integral approach'. This was an inclusive approach in which local authorities and the mayor are granted a prominent role. A formal and coordinated policy approach was deemed necessary to tackle the undesired phenomena (Cachet in Cachet, de Kimpe, Ponsaers and Ringeling, 2008). This was one of countless steps in a long process of meeting citizen's demands and responding to the government's view and that of many others' that it was increasingly necessary to invest in tackling safety problems. The policy path of local safety governance thus knows a long history of policy projects, plans and programs which shaped and structured local policy ambitions and practices. In this section, we will discuss the chronological development of the most important policy documents. It is striking that most of these were introduced by the national government. In fact, it will become clear in the next section that the policy history of local safety governance is strongly affected by national policy ambitions.

Figure 1: Overview of key policy documents on the governance of local public safety in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010

1984: The Roethof Comittee
The emergence of a policy domain around local safety issues started with the installation of the so called 'Roethof committee' as a response to the rapid increase in small crimes, and the less rapid increase of heavy crime in the

Netherlands. [8] In the committee's interim report (1984), it was concluded that the Dutch government was limited in her capacity to effectively address rapidly increasing crime rates, and therefore needed to actively seek out collaborative partnerships.

1985: Society and Crime
The ruling coalition responded to the findings of the Roethof committee with the program 'Society and Crime' in 1985. Both petty and organized crime were prioritized highly for government intervention. Petty crimes were to be tackled by the so called 'administrative, preventive approach' in which the police worked in close cooperation with the public prosecutor, municipalities, private organizations, societal organizations and citizens. [9]

1993: Integral Safety Report
The integral approach to public safety was initiated by the Integral Safety Report of 1993. Although this report presented facts and figures regarding public safety and crime, it could be best characterized as an action program introducing and structuring the integral policy approach to public safety. Raising awareness for public safety amongst local authorities was its key ambition. The integral policy strategy aimed for a less compartmentalized approach to public safety that would work in part by increasing cooperation between multiple parties, especially at the local level. The police and public prosecutor no longer would have to feel like they were facing the rapidly rising crime rates on their own. Besides new alliances among providers of public safety, this integral approach sought a combination of administrative and technical interventions. It conceptualizing safety as an encompassing policy concept, and established a cross sectorial approach to safety chain management. See Section 2.3 for a detailed explanation of all five key components of the integral approach).

1994: Step by Step Plan for Integral Safety
Under this plan, the integral policy ambitions as introduced in 1993 were operationalized and tested in a few pilot municipalities including Nijmegen, Eindhoven, Velsen and Rotterdam.

1994: Integral Safety Report
The second Integral Safety Report was published in the same year. While the first such report was rather thin and had the main purpose of outlining the facts and figures of public safety in the Netherlands, it was followed by multiple reports looking at public safety trends and the progress of municipal policies in

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[8]   Committee was named after its president: Hein Roethof.
[9]   In Dutch 'Bestuurlijke Preventie'. This is the predecessor of what was named the 'integral safety strategy' in the mid 1990s. The administrative, preventive approach solely addressed social types of public safety problems. The integral approach aimed for a boarder perspective on public safety as explained in Section 2.3.

this regard (Integral Safety Reports, Police monitors, National Integral Safety Monitor) .

1995: Pubic Safety Policy 1995-1998
The very first official policy documents regarding public safety appeared in the Netherlands in 1995. This policy marks the institutionalization of the integral approach because it explicitly formulated it as "a concrete problem focused approach coordinated by public administrators with attention for each and every link of the safety chain" (Min BZK, 1995: 10 - translation RP). The policy perceived public safety not only in terms of objective facts such as crime rates, it also incorporated risks and subjective feelings of safety as well. The policy listed ambitions and instruments relating to five priorities: youngsters, drugs, the living environment, risk management and surveillance. Responsibility for creating integral policies was granted to local authorities who were given the freedom to make political-administrative choices which best suited their local needs. The policy document triggered a series of four-year public safety policy plans that corresponded to the term of office of each ruling coalition.

1999: Integral Safety Program
The national coalition ruled by Prime Minister Kok presented a public safety policy plan using the slogan 'The Netherlands must become safer'. Continuing the integral philosophy, this plan argued that public safety governance was a matter of collaboration among multiple partners. It sought specifically to address existing priorities in relation to youth, and the drug-related nuisance. Again, the policy provided a long list of responsibilities and tasks for each 'partner' in safety governance. What was new however, was the strong emphasis on collaboration between public and private providers of safety, the attention paid to law enforcement by administrative actors[10], and the policy instruments implemented to support these goals. Although the coalition attempted to introduce the topic of physical safety, attention for more social types of safety concerns dominated the policy ambitions.

2002: Towards a Safer Society
The policy plan was produced by the first Balkenende Administration composed of the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Liberal Party (VVD) and the List Pim Fortuyn (LPF). It was called, 'Towards a Safer Society'. The policy continued the trend of centrally steering local safety and police policies. Except for a move towards more prevention instead of repression in governmental intervention, the administration's policy ambitions did not differ much from that of its predecessors in terms of priorities, goals and instruments. Moreover, the policy goals were formulated in terms of measurable units, and these again led to a long lists of interventions to be carried out by various actors. Again, core responsibility for most forms of public safety was granted to local authorities. The central government aimed to facilitate and stimulate them in the local policy process. 'Towards a Safer Society' was published in

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[10] In Dutch: Bestuurlijke handhaving

2002 and served as the central public safety policy for the first, second and third administration of prime minister Balkenende, even though each of his terms composed of a different coalition of political parties.

2007: Safety Starts With Prevention
In 2007, the fourth Balkenende Administration composed of the Christian Democrats (CDA), the Labor party (PvdA) and the Christian Party (CU) introduced a new central public safety policy named 'Safety Starts With Prevention'. The overall ambition of this policy was to reduce crime and nuisance by 25% against the rate reported in 2002. Six topics were prioritized: aggression and violence, theft, crime against enterprises, nuisances leading to the deterioration[11] of public spaces, a personal approach to at-risk youth and repeated offenders, and severe crimes. Prevention was put forward as an important way of going about public safety governance. Again, the local authorities were granted an important role.

2.2.1 Central government initiating and steering local public safety governance
The policy path just described mirrors that of the central government which aimed to initiate and steer local authorities to address local safety and order concerns by adopting an integral policy strategy.[12] The central government sometimes used more coercive methods of steering by prioritizing safety issues which were to be addressed by local authorities. More frequently, a wide variety of facilitative policy instruments for local authorities was developed by the central government. These were less coercive, and local authorities were free to either adopt them or not adopt them. Examples of the latter were the multiple new powers granted to mayors, as well as the models or samples of integral safety policies, certification methods to address safety in effect reports, and programs for initiating the administrative approach to organized crime.

2.3 The integral policy ambition
Overall, the central government succeeded in stimulating local authorities to address local order and safety. The large number of central reports and instruments seems to have had a positive effect on the creation of local, integral safety polities. Nowadays, managing public safety is part and parcel of the daily business of running a municipality, and each municipality has its own tailor-made integrated public safety policy (Terpstra, 2010). The emergence of the policy domain of local safety governance became strongly defined by its structural attempts to create and implement a so called 'integral safety strategy' to public safety problems. The integrated policy ambition is an ambitious one which can be broken down into at least five different policy objectives (Prins and Cachet 2011) as outlined below:

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[11]   In Dutch: Verloedering
[12]   Read Cachet and Ringeling (2004) for a detailed description of national influences on local public safety governance through the years.

Combining technical and administrative approaches: Traditionally, professionals such as the police and ire department were responsible for safety. Their approach to safety was to simply deal with actual safety issues as they occurred. The idea behind an integrated safety approach is to actively involve other actors who can bring a more holistic, administrative approach to the table. Involving local government would add a structural policy strategy in which safety issues are constantly managed, or even prevented rather than merely reacted to (Cachet, Van Geest, Koppenjan, Mesu, Ringeling, and Smit, 1995).

Safety as an encompassing policy concept: An integrated perspective on public safety goes beyond traditional public safety issues such as recorded crime and disorderly behavior. Integrated safety policy deals with matters of objective and subjective safety, and would require the consideration, for example, of whether citizens actually feel safe in the context of the efforts being made to ensure their safety. In this view, problems of safety can result from both human behaviors, and natural events such as floods (Ministry of Internal Affairs 1993; Cachet et al., 1995). This mirrors the semantic flexibility of the concept of safety, which makes it possible to label a wide variety of problems from terrorism to littering as concerns of safety (c.f. Boutellier's 'semantic net', 2005).

Cross-sectoral approach: The integrated safety approach is broader than the traditional focus of the police and the public prosecutor's office, and policy sectors such as the environment, transportation, education, and social welfare are also included (Cachet et al., 1995). The integrated safety approach combines policy efforts within these various sectors in order to improve local safety. Educational programs at secondary schools, for example, have a clear role in securing a safer local society. Those that inform students of the tactics of lover boys (young pimps who charm and then force vulnerable girls into prostitution) serve to reduce the potential number of victims of sexual violence. Considering the many policy sectors involved, fragmentation becomes a real risk. It is avoided to an extent by the combination and coordination of various safety measures into a single integrated safety approach.

Governing safety by chain management: Under this approach, the management of safety is understood as requiring attention to be paid to all the following interconnected links: pro-action, prevention, preparation, reaction, and recovery (Integral Safety Report, 1996).[13] Each link represents a particular phase in the processes of safety management, and the integrated approach requires that equal attention be paid to all phases.

New alliances among providers of public safety: An integrated approach also requires cooperation and the forming of partnerships between various actors (Cachet et al., 1995). Within the local safety networks, (non)governmental actors, including the police, members of the judiciary, local authorities, security companies, schools, citizens, shop owners, and housing corporations are brought together. Terpstra (2010) identified a number of

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[13] This type of chain management was created by the American Federal Emergency Management Agency as a process approach for disaster management.

distinct types of safety networks, ranging from institutional networks in which more or less formal and professional organizations participate, to networks which incorporate the participation of citizens as well. These networks either aim to prevent public safety problems from happening, or they take a more reactive approach.

Taken together, the integrated safety policy strategy as initiated by the 'Integral Safety Report' in 1993 is a complex, ambitious, and encompassing one. The complexity arises not just in terms of issues involved, but also because of the numbers of actors participating in the policy. Most importantly however, it made the ambition of fostering cooperation between various actors from both inside and outside government a reality (Prins and Cachet, 2011). The resulting landscape is comprised of horizontally linked, more or less autonomous organizations, or networks encompassing many different types of organizations where hierarchy or hierarchical steering is almost always lacking (Terpstra and Kouwenhoven, 2004), and in which traditional modes of steering give way to more networked forms of governance (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004).

Scholars have labeled these collective approaches in multiple ways. They have been called the multi-agency approach, plural policing (Crawford and Lister, 2005), policing assemblages (van Steden, Wood, Schearing and Boutellier, 2013) and third party policing (Mazerolle and Ranseley, 2005) and have even been compared to soccer teams as well as orchestras (Boutellier, 2011). However, a major controversy in the international body of knowledge on these multi-actor arrangements is the position of state actors and their steering capacities (Dupont, 2004; Rhodes, 1996). In such a multi-agency safety arrangement, do the police or the government still hold a monopoly on policing, or have the final say? The next section seeks to address this question by exploring the coordination of local safety governance.

2.4 Local government's coordination of local safety governance

That different levels of governmental organizations are involved in the development and execution of local safety policies is clear, along with the involvement of many semi-governmental, even non-governmental and private actors. Bringing them all together and steering and coordinating their actions in accordance with agreed upon safety policies is probably the biggest challenge facing contemporary local safety governance. Local governments can no longer depend exclusively on the traditional method of command and control as many of the organizations involved in local safety networks are autonomous vis-à-vis the local government.

Both the design and implementation of public safety policies show features of complex decision making (Muller, 1990). There is a network of multiple actors who have to work in alignment in order to effectively solve safety problems (Terpstra en Kouwenhoven, 2004). Local authorities play a difficult, but highly important role in this network, as they are both politically and administratively responsible for ensuring local order and safety. Local administrators, including the mayor, are held accountable by the local city council (Local Government Act, Section 169).

This coordinating task is made more challenging for local authorities by the lack of direct control over their multiple partners. Such horizontal forms of collaboration are characterized by non-hierarchical relationships between actors. Where previously they issued commands and assumed control, the local government now has to bring the many different actors together by softer means of persuasion and seduction (c.f. Pröpper, Litjens and Weststeijn, 2004). The coordinating role of local governments proved naturally to be a complicated task (AEF, 2005; AEF, 2006; Algemene Rekenkamer, 2007; Terpstra and Krommendijk, 2010; Broekhuizen, van Steden and Boutellier, 2010). The lack of a formal law has meant that the local authorities today continue to attempt to coordinate safety governance without formal control over others. Although the Balkenende IV administration put together a law to formalize the coordinating role of local authorities in public safety governance (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2010, a and b; Raad van State, 2010), this law was never realized and was eventually cancelled in 2013 (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2013).

In the Netherlands, like in many other countries, citizens demand strong and decisive leadership from their local government, particularly the mayor. They take a harsh view, particularly of standstills and deadlocks (Cachet, Karsten and Schaap, 2010). The role of the Dutch mayor has evolved significantly in this context, and the next paragraph provides a detailed description of the position of the Dutch mayor in local safety governance.

3 Dutch mayors and local safety

The traditional position of the Dutch mayor in local governance is formally described as follows by the Dutch Local Government act: Together with the city council and the board of mayor and aldermen, the mayor is one of the three administrative bodies of the local government. Dutch mayors are responsible by law for the quality of the local government, and of local policies (Local Government Act, Section 170). They chair the municipal legislative body (city council) and the municipal executive body (board of mayor and aldermen) and are the representatives of the city as well (Local Government Act, Sections 9 and 34). Dutch mayors are meant to be neutral or apolitical actors, and so they are appointed by the Crown for a six year period (Cachet and Schaap, 2006). Their term stands in contrast to city council members who have to be elected every four years, and their appointment varies dramatically from that of mayors' in many other western European countries where mayors are elected directly by the citizens. One of the main arguments for the mayor being appointed by the Crown instead of directly by the people is that public policy on local order and safety should be neutral and de-politicized, and therefore kept at arm's length from the political arena (van Sluis, Cachet, Noppe, Schaap and Ringeling, 2003).

The following Section provides a short discussion of the position of Dutch mayors in local governance, a detailed description of their formal position in the local policy domain around order and safety issues, the changes in their formal powers that occurred between 1990 and 2010, and the public debate that was triggered by these changes.

3.1 A short history of the mayor's role in local governance

Traditionally, Dutch mayors were regents from aristocratic families and later on 'technocratic administrators'. Over time, they became more and more grounded in local society, policy and politics (Korsten, Schoenmaker, Boumans and Resoort, 2012). Where they once sought to make sure local decisions and laws did not conflict with national ones, being the 'keeper of national laws and regulations' is no longer manageable today because of the dramatic expansion of national laws, policies and jurisdictions (ibid). Despite several attempts to have Dutch mayors publicly elected (Tweede Kamer, 2002/3) Dutch mayors today continue to be appointed by the Crown. Although not democratically elected, the function of mayors gained greater democratic accountability over time, as the city council became more influential in the mayors' appointments and resignations (Prins et al., 2012). This embedded the mayors' functions even further in the local governance level. Contemporary mayors are balancing multiple roles. They have been described as shepherds in the mornings, keepers of local order in the afternoons, and process managers or administrative team leaders in the evening (Korsten et al., 2012). Also referring to the different roles mayors play on a daily basis, Cachet et al. (2009) categorized the mayors' domains of work as follows: *local government*, *local society* and *external* as summarized in table 1.

Table 1: Typology of the roles of Dutch mayors (Cachet, Schaap and Karsten, 2009)

	Local government		**Local society**		**External**
	Relation to city council	*Relation to the board of mayors and aldermen*	*Positive*	*Negative*	
Strong	President	Boss	Leader	Law enforcer	Demander
			Sheppard / father figure	Sherriff	
Weak	Chairman	Primus inter pares	Ombudsman	Manager of complaints	Networker
	Coach	Administrator			Connector
	Keeper of quality	Process keeper	Symbol		Facilitator

In the research period spanning between 1990 and 2010, Dutch mayors were observed to be juggling between these rather broad sets of potential roles (Cachet et al., 2009). Moreover, the selection of particular roles by the mayor is expected to be highly situational and contingent on personal, institutional, societal and political factors. The literature on local leadership mentions a wide variety of factors as shaping the way in which local leaders operate, including their personality, their personal capabilities, the institutional design of the local government, and the broader political context including the specific political constellations in local society (Greasley and Stroker, 2008;

Steyvers, Bergström, Bäck, Boogers, Riano de la Fuente and Schaap, 2008; Karsten, Schaap and Verheul, 2010).

3.2 The mayors' contemporary playing field

The selection of the mayor's role and his fulfillment of it is shaped largely by the complex playing field in which Dutch mayors have been operating in the past two decades. We will briefly outline this context, dividing it into the categories of larger societal trends, trends in local governance and developments in the mayor's function.

3.2.1 Trends in local society

Mayors are confronted by the societal unrest caused by a wide range of contemporary public safety problems and risks. Modern citizens are demanding of their governments (Boutellier, 2005; Van den Brink, 2002). They have more than once been described as having 'a limited tolerance of risk,' and as wanting the government to 'fiercely pull the strings' (Ministry of Internal Affairs, 2009 - translation RP). Pieterman (2008) described this societal trend as a 'prevention culture' that creates high expectations of the government that are often unrealistic (c.f. Cachet and Schaap, 2006). Consequently, mayors are not only held responsible for their personal efforts to safeguard local society, they also have to defend the decisions of the council, board and the policies of the local government as a whole. In the worst cases, unmet expectations have led to personal and physical threats to the mayors' own safety (Bovenkerk, 2005; Van den Tillaart et al., 2012).

As well as operating under the critical eye of his citizens, Dutch mayors have increasingly had to operate under the spotlights of the media. As the media becomes a fundamental pillar of contemporary society, the daily functions of public administration gets more and more affected by the logic and demands of the media (Cook, 2005). On the one hand, local authorities and the mayor have to operate under close inspection of the old and new media which can have a catalyzing effect on public issues and challenge the relationship between political and administrative actors. On the other hand, the new media offers administrators and politicians new opportunities, including that of communicating directly with citizens during times of crisis (ROB, 2012), gathering real time information about threats to local order by monitoring the social media updates of known hooligans, and enhancing transparency in the daily business of local governance through the personal blogs an the mayors' twitter feed for example.

3.2.2 Trends in local government

A first trend is that of the increasingly networked character of contemporary governance. As described in the theoretical framework of this book, local safety networks have been conceptualized as thematic manifestations of policy networks. This implies that Dutch mayors operate in local governance networks that increase their dependency on other actors to effectively solve local problems (Prins and Cachet, 2011), and that call for greater efforts at coordination (Terpstra and Krommendijk, 2010). In the case of local safety

governance, such public private partnerships do not limit themselves solely to participants at the local level. Motivated by a lack of individual effectiveness and a need for greater efficiency, local governments are increasingly involved in inter-municipal or supra local collaboration initiatives (Cachet, 2009, Cachet and Prins, 2009). Examples of the practice of local safety governance are Regional Information and Expertise Centers (RIEC) which pool information and resources to address severe forms of crime as well as safety regulations addressing physical challenges to local safety.

A second trend challenging local administrators is the increasing manifestation of populist parties and rhetoric in local society (Van Ostaijen and Scholten, 2012; Uitermark, Oudenampsen, Van Heerikhuizen en Van Reekum, 2012). Dutch mayors have seen populist political parties entering local councils and boards, and they have had to function within the context of a rising societal movement of individuals objecting to the ruling elite, and other groups that promote traditional Dutch or local identities as supreme. In this context, the Dutch mayors again had to take the role of 'shepherd' and maintain the unity of the local government and the society. They had also to protect the local society from the effects of their increasing distrust of government, citizen's feelings of alienation, and the tensions that arise between groups of citizens as a result of populism (Leterme and Burgmeesterslezing, 2009).

3.2.3 Trends regarding the mayor's function

Since 2001, the city council has had the role of recommending who they feel should be appointed as mayor to the Minister of Internal Affairs (Local Government Act, Section 61). This role has proven to be of great importance as appointments of the Crown were previously often followed by resignations. The city council gained influence over the mayor's position, and the 'rule of trust' that applies in the case of ministers and parliament is now applicable to mayors as well. One could even argue that a mayor now takes the role of an aldermen who acts on the basis of the trust placed in him by the city council (Korsten and Aardema, 2006). A consequence of the increased influence of the city council is that the mayor's position has become more vulnerable as his actions and non-actions are widely discussed and criticized by members of the council (Cachet, Schaap and Karsten, 2009).

The mayor's position has become increasingly politicized over the years, and this politicization has extended especially to the policy domain of public safety and order. Part of the reason for the growing political interest in their role is the fact that mayors were granted multiple new powers to address specific safety problems (NGB, 2010; Mein, 2010; Sackers, 2010A). Their implementation of these powers was sometimes controversial. For example, they could involve interventions in the private lives of citizens in case of home restrictions for domestic violence, or they could deal with sensitive topics such as communicating the return of known pedophiles to local society. The mayor's actions are therefore political, both in case of intervention and non-intervention. These political risks were compounded as well by a number of new juridical challenges that mayors' could personally face. For example, if a

mayor is accused of "unjust decisions" he runs the risk of being sued almost immediately (Engels In Burgemeestersblad, 2008).

Alongside the political and judicial consequences, the mayors' greater powers also came with a number of implications for the mayor as a private person. The call for governmental action on a broad range of public problems invites mayors to profile themselves as strong and capable (Cachet et al., 2009). More than ever, this puts the mayor into the spotlight, even when multiple actors are involved and mayors are directly and personally held responsible for local governance. Mayors experience a 'psychologisation' of their function[14] which implies that the administrator has to keep in mind that his words, decisions and non-decisions being judged. Whether or not he demonstrates sufficient empathy, whether he shows his emotions, and how he appears to the public and explains his actions is also fodder for public judgment (Korsten, Schoenmaker, Bouwmans and Resoort, 2012). This holds for processional as well as private actions. In the most negative sense, these judgments can bring about the risk of personal threats and aggression (Bovenkerk, 2005; Van den Tillaart et al., 2012). The increasing influence of the city council and the personalization of the mayor would lead one to expect that the position of Dutch mayor has become increasingly vulnerable. Nevertheless, studies have indicated that despite these challenges relatively few mayors actually fail in their role and have to step down (Korsten and Aardema, 2006; Korsten, 2010).

3.3 The mayor's formal powers and responsibilities for local order and safety

This section describes the mayor's formal powers and responsibilities in the realm of local order and safety. Being an independent administrative authority, the mayor individually holds the responsibility for maintaining public order and safety (Local Government Act, Section 172). This is the only policy domain in which the mayor takes individual responsibility, as all other policy domains in the Netherlands are covered by aldermen. In order to carry out their responsibilities to local order and safety, Dutch mayors hold authority over the police and issue instructions accordingly (Police Act 1994, Section 12).[15]

During the past two decades the mayors' traditional responsibility of maintaining local order and safety has become more important. This was subscribed by central government who formalized several new, sometimes far reaching powers regarding specific safety problems between the years 2002 and 2010. Examples of such powers include designating specific public areas at which the police are entitled to preventively search individuals, closing

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[14]   In Dutch: psychologisering van het ambt

[15]   Formally, the mayor's responsibility is solely for the maintenance of *public order*. Legally speaking, order is a mayor's individual responsibility, whereas public safety can be handled by other administrators, such as an aldermen. This has been the practice in a few Dutch municipalities for a long time. However, in recent years, public safety has become closely associated with, and related to governing local order and both are therefore now addressed by the mayor in almost all municipalities in the Netherlands.

buildings known to house illegal drug related activity, allowing for the installation of surveillance cameras in public areas, imposing temporary home restrictions for perpetrators of domestic violence and imposing a curfew on youngsters found to be causing severe forms of nuisance. Table 2 provides an overview of the most important new powers to address local order and safety formalized between 1990 and 2010[16]. Some of these powers are to be enforced by the mayor himself whereas others should be implemented in close collaboration between the mayor and the city council, public prosecutor or police.

Table 2: Tasks, powers and responsibilities of Dutch mayors formalized between 1990 and 2010

Year	Law	Task and or responsibility for Dutch mayor
1997	Local Government Act, Section 174a (Wet Victoria)	Closing houses in case of (grounded fear of) disruption of local order caused by behavior in and around the house
1999	Opium Law, Section 13b (Wet Damocles)	Closing buildings open to the public and houses (since 2007) in case of drugs and/or drugs trade
2000	Local Government Act, Sections 154a and 176a	Holding groups of people (potentially) disturbing local order by temporary in custody (mayor needs approval of city council beforehand)
2002	Local Government Act, Section 151b	Appointing a risk area where the public prosecutor can allow the police to carry out preventative body searches (mayor needs approval of city council beforehand)
2002	Law on Enhancing Integrity Assessments by Public Administration (BIBOB)	Declining a request for a permit of subsidy and withdrawal of those already in place when these (might be) used for illegal activities or criminal offences (power for mayor as well of board of mayor and aldermen)
2006	Local Government Act, Section 151c	Installing surveillance cameras in public spaces in order to safeguard local order and safety (mayor needs approval of city council beforehand)
2008	Law on Temporary Home Restrictions	Issuing temporary home restrictions to a person posing significant danger to his or her fellow residents
2009	Local Government Act, Section 154b	Administrative fine for small annoyances and nuisance in public space mentioned in Municipal Law (council formalizes power, power is implemented by board of mayor and aldermen and in some cases by mayor individually)

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[16] According to the scope of the research project this overview excluded the mayor's powers for managing physical safety and crises.

2010	Local Government Act, Sections 172a,b	Several tools for addressing disruption of local order by football hooligans and youngsters: Area restrictions, group restrictions, reporting duties, the imposition of curfews and the supervision of minors in cases of (or fear of) serious nuisance.

3.4 The public debate: From shepherd to local sheriff?

While the local safety policy domain evolved and matured between 1990 and 2010, the substantive expansion of the mayors' formal powers in this regard did not remain without criticism. Several scholars warned, first of all, against mixing interventions based on administrative and criminal law into a sort of 'administrative sanction law'[17] (Sackers, 2010a; Muller, Rogier, Kummeling, Dammen, Bron, Woltjer and Kalkhoven, 2007). A second related concern was that the mayors' powers had an increasingly punitive flavor, such as the power to issue home restrictions and refusing to give out permits. The implication was that the mayors' role in local safety governance would no longer be a purely preventative one, and the mayor would 'defriend' in record tempo (Sackers In Burgemeestersblad, 2010). Thirdly, the implementation of the new powers would transform mayors into local sheriffs, a role seen by some as being incompatible with their symbolic and 'softer' role as shepherd or father figure, and representative of the local community (Sackers, 2010a/b). More generally, scholars pointed at the negative effects the new administrative instruments would have on the basic principles of legality and legal certainty.[18] These instruments included the bans on meetings, area restrictions, and home restrictions put in place to combat nuisance, deprived living conditions and disturbances of local order in problematic neighborhoods (Schilder, 2009).

Practitioners, such as the Dutch Association of Mayors (NGB) also recognized the increased emphasis on the mayors' role of 'law enforcer,' and the toll this might take on the mayors' focus on other roles and responsibilities (Bandell In van der Zwan, 2007; Sackers, 2010a). However, they also recognized that shifting between various roles is a defining feature of mayors, but appeared more worried about potentially endangering the mayors' 'natural authority' by granting them more and more formal powers (Bandell, 2008). More generally, the Dutch Association for Municipalities (VNG) warned of the need to be cautious about the accumulation of mayors' powers particularly when these powers are created in an incident-driven fashion (Centrum voor Criminaliteit en Veiligheid, 2010).

Mayor's themselves seem to hold different opinions of their new powers and can be roughly divided into two groups. On the one hand, there are those (mainly mayors working in the larger cities) who claim that the new powers are necessary to address today's highly complex problems of public safety, and to meet societies' demand for public safety. These individuals are explicitly asking for more powers to address public safety problems and want to, for example, be informed about the return of former child sex abusers into

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[17]   In Dutch: adminstratief sanctierecht

the local society (Van den Tillaard, Schreijenberg and Homburg, 2010). Others do not see the necessity of the new powers, and instead highlight their far reaching implications for both mayors and citizens. A mayor would no longer only address public safety at the general level of street, neighbourhood and the municipality, but they can now intervene in the lives of individuals in ways that restrict personal information and privacy related rights (Rehwinkel In De Volkskrant, 2010).

4 Summary

This chapter described the context of the research project in order to answer sub question two: *How did the policy domain regarding local public safety evolve between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands and what has been the mayor's formal position in it?* The policy domain surrounding local order and safety in the Netherlands was triggered by the fast rising crime rates and the introduction of new threats to public safety fueling the need for policy planning in the late 1980s. Between 1990 and 2010, the policy domain around local order and safety emerged and evolved, and was structured by the so called 'integral policy ambition'. This policy ambition promoted a broad perspective on public safety including risks, social safety crises and physical safety. These problems were to be addressed using a cross-sectoral approach, aligning actors from various backgrounds in local safety networks, and ideally paying attention to all phases of safety management ranging from prevention to recovery. Local authorities, more precisely, Dutch mayors, were assigned the task of coordinating this all-encompassing tasks of local safety governance. This brought us to the formal position of Dutch mayors who were traditionally responsible by law for safeguarding local order by means of their authority over the police. This traditional task is mentioned in Dutch municipal laws dating back to 1851, and was formalized in the first decade of the 21st century with the expansion of the powers of Dutch mayors to address specific problems endangering local order and safety. Examples of such powers include that of conducting preventive body searches in cases of suspected weapon concealment, and temporary home restrictions in case of domestic violence. The expansion of the mayors' powers was not welcomed by all mayors, or by scholars, and a public debate emerged around the question of whether or not Dutch mayors had changed their dominant role from that of a shepherd or father figure to a local sheriff.

At this point, the research questions and empirical context of the project have been described in chapters 1 and 2. The next part of the book provides the theoretical background for analyzing how new definitions of local safety problems affected Dutch mayors. A literature review is conducted to explore agenda setting, policy dynamics, framing and network governance, and the information used to guide the selection of the building blocks of a conceptual model that maps out how problem definitions affect the position and role of individual actors in policy networks.

Part II - Theory

The second part of this book deals with the theoretical context of the research project. The following two chapters provide a theoretical lens through which to understand how the shifting definition of local safety problems may have affected the mayor's position and role. Chapter3 deals with problem definitions and their role in the policy process. Chapter 4 conceptualizes the mayor's position and role in the governance networks. Together these chapters provide a knowledge base from the literature and an identification of the building blocks of a conceptual model that will in turn be the basis of the empirical analysis that will be conducted in the third part of this book.

Chapter 3: The Power of problem definition

1 Introduction

A basic assumption of the current project is that problem definitions have important consequences for key aspects of the policy process. This chapter aims to present the theoretical background of this assumption by exploring the literature on problem definition and framing. In doing so, an answer the first part of the second sub question is given: *What is the expected role of problem definitions in policy processes, and how are these definitions expected to affect the position and role of individual actors in a policy network?*

2 Problem definition

Citizens, civil servants and politicians encounter an enormous number of issues both in their private and professional lives which they define as problematic. Once an issue is labeled as such, it often becomes a public problem that is in need of public intervention (Stone, 1989). Problem definition is the transformation of real-world conditions into solvable problems (Blumer, 1971, 1996) which affect social behavior once they become institutionalized into social facts (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Durkheim, 1964). Consequently, a problem definition is the description of a situation, person, location or anything else as an undesired phenomenon. The next sections explore key aspects of the definition of public problems by describing the process by which such problems are socially constructed.

2.1 From conditions to problems

Sociologists have long debated the nature of social problems. The rationality perspective on troubling social conditions described social problems as: "reflections of objectively measurable conditions" (c.f. Dery, 1984; Rochefort and Cobb, 1993). This rational or functional perspective was criticized by multiple scholars who argued that social problems are very much social constructions (Blumer, 1971; Kitsuse and Spektor, 1973; Schneider 1985; Hilgartner and Bosk, 1988). They stressed that there is a key difference between objectively measurable conditions, and our subjective perceptions of what is problematic in society (c.f. Bulmer 1971; Schneider, 1985). According to this social constructionist perspective, problems are subjective displays and interpretations of reality. Problems do not randomly exist out there, or as Dery noted a long time ago: "Problems do not come with a tag identifying them as such" (Dery, 1984:62). Actors attach this socially created tag to an undesired phenomenon during the processes of problem definition. It is through this process that conditions about which little can/has been done are transformed into problems to be addressed (Brikland, 2001).

Following the sociologist perspective, problem definitions can be characterized as *social constructions* of collective sentiments, rather than objective measurements of societal conditions (c.f. Bulmer 1971). Qualifying social problems as social constructions hints at a level of flexibility in problem definition. In other words, definitions of public issues are malleable to a large

extent, as they are open to both competing interpretations and factual distortions (Cobb and Elder, 1983:55). According to Dery's idea of qualified relativism, many problem definitions are possible, as long as they meet a few basic criteria − namely that they set a problem and provide an intervention perspective that readies them for the policy making processes (1983:21). This implies that a single situation can potentially generate a number of different problem definitions. The definitions that resonate with the wider context of policy processes are most likely to gain significance in politics and policy, or as Birkland stated: "The social construction of a problem is linked to the existing social, political, and ideological structures of time" (2001:122).

In the case of public policy, conditions have to be successfully described as problematic by a person or group in order to become amenable to public intervention. The age of an individual shopping at the liquor store, for example can be objectively 'measured', and is not problematic in itself. "Problem definitions are not objective statements" said Portz (1996:372), and in this case, it is only when interest groups or government actors recognize youngsters buying alcohol as an undesired phenomenon that it becomes a public problem requiring public intervention. In fact, the struggle to define public problems in a way of one's choosing lies at the heart of policy processes. Actors vie to gain political and policy attention for their particular perspective of the problem. According to Portz, "Problem definitions and the competition among definitions plays a critical role in shaping politics and the policy process" (1996:82).

2.2 From problem definition to social 'facts'

The process through which socially constructed problem definitions go from being general conditions to social facts that will potentially shape policy can be understood as a process of institutionalization. Sociologists Berger and Luckmann (1967) conceptualized the social construction of reality in collective settings as having three phases of institutionalization. The three dialectic moments during which our knowledge of reality is socially constructed and institutionalized into social facts are: externalization, objectification and internalization.

The first dialectic moment is *externalization* which refers to the subjective process of making sense of everyday reality. This takes place typically during face to face interactions between individuals who implicitly negotiate their typifications of external reality. The sum of these typifications forms our schemes and categories for understanding everyday life. These subjective typifications often become objective, social facts when transmitted to a wider audience, and this occurs during the *objectification* phase. When removed from the analysis of the mind, knowledge of everyday life is experienced as objective reality. Social structure becomes objective in the sense that it is "objectively available beyond the expression of subjective intentions, here and now" (Berger and Luckmann, 1976: 51). The third moment is *internalization.* The process of institutionalization perfects itself when the structures of objective reality (as produced through externalizations and objectivations) become embedded in the structures of the subjective

consciousness (i.e. internalized). This occurs through a process of socialization (ibid).

This process of institutionalization explains how problem definitions shape policy actions during the policy process. Once socially constructed problem definitions become institutionalized in the policy agenda and in policy practices, they begin to function like nonmaterial social facts such as values, norms and other conceptual beliefs (Durkheim, 1964). They exist beyond the individual perceptions of politicians and civil servants, and shape both their thoughts and their actions (ibid). From a public administration perspective, such institutionalized problem definitions are expected to affect key aspects of the policy process. Kirp (1982) summarized it as such: "The way in which a problem gets defined says a great deal about how it will be resolved" (1982:137 cited by Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). What aspects of public policy problems these definitions are expected to influence will be discussed in Section 3.4. Several models of agenda setting will be first discussed in order to understand how definitions of public problems may end up on the public policy agenda.

3 Agenda setting [19]

From a public administration perspective, socially constructed problem definitions vie for the attention of politicians and policy makers. As political attention is fluid and government resources are scarce, no public administration is able to address all possible problems in all possible ways (c.f. Birkland, 2001). Consequently, not every problem defined by citizens, politicians and civil servants is transformed into public policies. Some issues are deliberately moved from the public agenda by (elite) groups and placed into the category of the taboo (c.f. non decision making, Bachratz and Baratz, 1963). In its broadest sense, agenda setting can be defined as "the process by which problems and alternative solutions gain or lose attention" (Birkland, 2001:106).

The fact that some issues are subject to political decision making and public policy, and others not, points to a certain bias in the agenda setting process. In fact, according to Schattschneider, agenda setting can be described as the mobilization of bias. "Some issues are organized into politics, and others are organized out" (1960:71, Bekkers, 2007). Which bias is dominant during the agenda setting process depends on the outcome of the competition, and the strategic behavior of groups of stakeholders. After all, in contemporary western democracies, no single actor is able to single handedly set all political agendas and policy plans. Elite groups holding varying bases of power compete with each other to generate attention for their perceptions of public problems, and they compete also to present their favored solutions in the agenda setting processes (c. f. Dahl, 1961).

Before discussing classical models of agenda setting, we will first explain what constitutes an agenda itself. Cobb and Elder (1983) distinguished

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[19]   This discussion of agenda setting literature is strongly built upon Bekkers' chapter on 'Policy problems and agenda setting,' (2007: 123-152).

between multiple forms of interrelated agendas in the public sphere. The *agenda universe* covers a wide range of issues which could be brought to the table by multiple actors convinced that these issue merit political attention. Birkland described the agenda universe as: "All ideas that could possibly be brought up and discussed in a society or political system" (2001: 107). Some issues are more likely to receive political attention than others. Some may not sit well with public values, and others may conflict with the constitutional law or other fundamental conventions (Bekkers, 2007). The *systemic agenda* consists of "all issues that are commonly perceived as meriting public attention and as involving matters within the legitimate jurisdiction of existing governmental authority" (Cobb and Elder, 1983: 85). The *institutional agenda* unites those issues seriously considered as potential objects of public decision-making. This agenda is a political one reflecting issues filtered from the systemic agenda by politicians and administrators (Cobb and Elder, 1983). Finally, the *decision agenda* covers all issues on which political and administrative stakeholders agree should be the subject of public policies and government interventions.

Following Cobb and Elder's (1983) distinction of agendas, it is clear that issues have to make it to the decision agenda in order to become priorities for public policy. However, a place on the decision making agenda does not immediately imply that an issue has indeed become an object of public policy. Because the current project focuses solely on problem definitions and safety problems that have actually influenced local safety policies, the *policy agenda* was added to the typification of agendas (c.f. Bekkers, 2007). The policy agenda represents those issues that end up in formal policy plans describing their causes, characteristics as well as a plan of attack. Once a socially constructed problem ends up on the policy agenda, it becomes institutionalized into public policy and is expected to shape the thought and behavior of politicians and civil servants (c.f. Berger and Luckmann, 1967).

Figure 2: Agendas in public policy processes (combination of Birkland, 2001 and Bekkers, 2007)

Figure 2 presents the interrelation of public agendas, ranging from the macro to the micro level. During the agenda setting processes, issues are moved back and forward between the various agendas. These dynamics can be analytically divided into moves from the outside in, and those from the inside out (Bekkers, 2007). The outside in movement follows a classical perspective on agenda setting during which publicly debated issues are subjected to political decision making, and they make their way onto the policy agenda. The converse inside out dynamic refers to cases in which policy makers pose issues which require political attention and merit public debate. This model aside, the overall process of agenda setting has been given many different shapes and forms in the public administration and political science literature. Such models can be divided into those that portray agenda setting as a linear process, and those that stress the rather chaotic character of the agenda setting process.

3.1 Agenda setting as a linear process

Classic conceptions of agenda setting in public administration and political science portray a rather linear process through which issues move from the political agenda to the policy agenda (Van der Eijk and Kok 1975; Parsons, 1995; Bekkers, 2007). These so called 'barrier' or 'phase' models describe a sequential set of steps through which an undesired phenomenon or issue makes its way into the public policy agenda. Crucial factors or barriers along the way are the level of attention a potential agenda item receives from the public and the media, as well as the level of access proponents of the agenda have to politicians and policy makers. Other barriers include the specific characteristics of the issue such as its societal impact, and the level expert knowledge required to understand the issue (Van der Eijk and Kok 1975; Parsons, 1995).

Multiple aspects of this initial conception of agenda setting have been criticized (Bekkers, 2007). The predominant focus on linearity and historical sequentiality in the movement of individual issues from the agenda universe to the policy agenda underplays key characteristics of agenda setting as it takes place in real life (Bekkers, 2007). The possibility of multiple issues competing for policy attention is neglected by the focus on the movement of a single issues from one stage to another. Furthermore, barrier models tend to view the agenda setting as a one way process, and as something initiated from the outside (i.e. from societal worries) and moved into the public policy arena, when it could well take place the other way around (c.f. outside versus inside initiation model Howlett and Ramish, 1995). Finally, the model's focus on problems with a predefined image rules out the possibility of solutions instead of problems being the starting point of the agenda setting process.

3.2 Agenda setting as a chaotic process

The second stream of agenda setting models view the agenda setting process as messy and contingent on multiple factors. Kingdon (1984) introduced the stream model which characterized the agenda setting process as one in which ad hoc connections are made amongst problem perceptions, policy ideas, and the political events floating in and around organizations. A policy window is

created when political events bring problem perceptions, policy solutions and actors together in a so called package deal. By stressing the role of policy entrepreneurs who play an important part in creating these policy windows and composing package deals, this model demonstrates an explicit appreciation of the strategic behavior of individual actors in the agenda-setting processes. Kingdon's stream model was inspired by the work of scholars Cohen, March and Olson, who compared organizations to 'garbage cans'filled with potential decisions, stakeholders, problem perceptions and potential solutions (Cohen, March and Olson, 1972). They saw organizations as organized anarchies in which trial and error and random connections between ideas, people and events characterize daily business more than rational decision making.

Just as the barrier models were criticized, models portraying agenda setting as a rather chaotic process have also been criticized mainly for their outside oriented focus of the agenda setting process. Such open models of agenda setting tend to attribute all agenda dynamics to contingencies and random influences, and thereby overlook the role of formal rules, institutions and conventions of the policy arena (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). This institutional perspective of policy processes is further explained in Section 3.5 on policy dynamics.

The main difference between the barrier model and the stream model is that the first points to the circumstances under which an issue fails to become a policy object, while the latter focuses on how issues end up actually affecting public polices (Bekkers, 2007). Nevertheless, both models make it clear that agenda setting is about gaining scarce attention for particular conceptions of a problem, and particular solutions. One way or the other, agenda setting is about actors struggling over the composition of the policy agenda in order to gain scarce attention for their often normative and manipulated problem definitions, and for their preferred course of action (Stone, 1989; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009, Portz, 1996). Symbols and rhetoric play an important role in such an agenda setting processes. Actors attempt to make a strong and convincing case by using metaphors, causal stories, numbers, and images (Stone, 2002). In fact, according to Stone, the essence of policy making is in fact this *struggle over ideas* (2002: 11). The concept of frames is included in this theoretical framework as a perspective by which to understand this struggle over ideas in a subsequent section, but first, we will look at problem definitions themselves and how they structure public policy.

4 How problem definitions structure public policy

Agenda setting processes determine which problem definitions survive and become seen as being most politically relevant. At this point, socially constructed problem definitions would have found a place in the policy agenda, and be embedded in policy programs. They would no longer just be socially constructed definitions of public problems. They became social facts with real life consequences for policy design and implementation. The following sections describe the way in which these definitions shape further policy actions.

According to Weiss (1989: 97-98), "A problem definition at the outset of a policy process has implications for later stages: which kinds of evidence bear of the problem, which solutions are considered effective and feasible, who participates in the decision process, how policies are implemented, and by which criteria they are assessed". In order to understand the power of problem definitions, we will take a closer look at the 'anatomy' of a problem description as conceptualized by Cobb and Elder (1993). A problem definition consists of five dimensions of a problem. Firstly, it sheds light on the *cause of the problem*. A problem definition includes a statement about its origin (Cobb and Elder, 1983). By pointing out what or whom caused a problem, responsibility is assigned to a group, individual or technology assumed to trigger the problem (ibid). Secondly, a problem definition somehow qualifies the *nature of the problem*, affecting its chance of being subjected to public intervention, and influences the form of the policy design. The nature of the problem can be expressed along many dimensions, such as severity, incidence, novelty, proximity or crisis (ibid). Thirdly, problem definitions sketch the *characteristics of the problem population*. The perception of the problem shapes the usage of policy tools (ibid). Social constructions of target groups, for example, whether they are deemed worthy or unworthy, affects the selection of policy tools as well as the rationale that legitimatizes policy choices (Schneider and Ingram, 1993). Fourthly, problem definitions contain the *means-ends orientation of the problem definer*. As problem definitions are subjective interpretations of reality, they capture the preferences of the 'definer' about the means and or ends of the problem. Fifthly, the *nature of the solution* is greatly influenced by the definition of the problem. Only when political agreement is reached on the qualities of the solution does governmental action become possible. A problem description somehow mirrors opinions about the feasibility of a solution, its acceptability in terms of existing codes of behavior, as well as it affordability (ibid).

The anatomy of problem descriptions leads to two specific expectations about its power: First, problem definitions shape *the policy strategy* in terms of its goals, design and the selection of policy tools. Definitions of policy problems are expected to point at a specific policy strategy including a specific objective, type of solution and the instruments considered most effective (Stone, 2002). Second, problem definitions are assumed to affect the *division of responsibility* in the policy process. Problem definitions are attributed with the power of allocating ownership and blame, thereby legitimatizing and empowering certain actors as fixers of the problem (Weis, 1989; Stone 1989/2002). In other words, the perspective of a problem serves to legitimize the choice of actors. Further, problem definitions are malleable (Cobb and Elder, 1993) and shift over time, giving them the potential to trigger high impact changes, including shifts in strategy, and in the roles and positions of actors.

5 Stability and change in problem definitions

Once institutionalized into social facts in policy programs, problem definitions are assumed to be rather stable perspectives on reality. Nevertheless, even

institutionalized definitions laid out in policy plans change as the policy evolves. Such a shift in problem definition may hold huge consequences for the design of the policy strategy, and the selection of responsible actors. This paragraph discusses several models of policy dynamics in order to understand stability and change in the policy process.

5.1 Self-enforcing policy paths

Stability in policy processes can be explained by means of the concept of path dependency. Pierson conceptualized path dependency as a "social process grounded in the dynamic of 'increasing returns'" (2000: 251). Increasing returns refer to the relative benefits of a current activity in relation to an optional other activity (ibid). The concept of path dependency was originally introduced in the field of economics and later on applied to address political decision making and policy processes (Pierson, 2000; Pollit, 2008). According to Pierson (2000), the mechanism of increasing returns is applicable to politics and it explains why a chosen policy direction is relatively stable, and how it guides future policy decisions.

Stability in the policy processes can be explained by the concept of path dependency as follows.
Public policies are designed, implemented and revised within a context of historically developed routines, procedures, decisions, traditions and systems. They constitute important rules of the game (Kay, 2005:557) limiting the freedom of choice (c.f. bounded rationality: Simon, 1961) as well as providing opportunities for learning during policy processes (c.f. Hall, 1993). Historically developed institutional structures influence the interaction between policy actors, decision making processes as well as formulation and implementation of policy (Kay, 2005). Even past policy decisions are seen as institutions in terms of current policy decisions, as "they can act as structures that can limit or shape current policy options" (Kay, 2005: 557).

In this research project, the concept of path dependency is adopted to understand why the specific problem definition – once firmly embedded in the policy strategy – is able to structure the perspective of both the problem and the solution for a certain amount of time. As Kay stated: "A process is path dependent if initial moves in one direction elicit further moves in that same direction; in other words the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point constrains the trajectory after that point" (Kay, 2005: 553).

5.2 Policy change

Seen through the lens of path-dependency and the power of institutions, policy processes are relatively static or self-enforcing. However, even long term policy stability can be disturbed and changed dramatically. As Weiss noted: "Problem definitions cannot be definitively settled and locked in at the beginning [...] as the policy process unfolds, problem definitions may remain open to question" (Weiss: 1989:98).[20] Dominant, institutionalized problem

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[20]   According to Weiss, problem definitions have several powers which may reoccur

definitions may indeed shift, and thereby alter fundamental aspects of the policy approach. According to the agenda dynamics literature, policy change may be brought about by several factors.

First and foremost, external triggers are assumed to break the self-enforcing policy process. Since policy processes are built on internal self-enforcing mechanisms, a shift in policy has to be brought about by external actors or factors. In this respect, Sabatier and Jenkins Smith (1993) pointed to changes in economic conditions, public opinion and external events that affect interaction and policy making in the policy subsystem. Other scholars point at focusing events as triggers for the processes of reformulation or even policy change. Sudden, external events, such as terrorist attacks or technological innovations, put forward new types of policy problems, or make previously unsuitable solutions preferable. These external triggers create a window of opportunity to connect formerly distanced problem perceptions and potential solutions (Kingdon, 1984; Bekkers).

Second, interactions between groups of policy actors may lead to policy-related learning, which is assumed to foster incremental policy change (Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993). Sabatier and Jenkins Smith pointed out that groups of actors, so called advocacy coalitions, are the driving force behind policy change. Advocacy coalitions consist of actors from different backgrounds sharing a belief system. The latter is characterized as a set of value priorities and causal assumptions regarding public policy consisting of three layers: 1) a deep core of fundamental, normative beliefs and axiom's, and 2) a near policy core holding strategies and preferences regarding policies based on the deep core and 3) a secondary system of instrumental decisions and research to implement policy. Mediated by policy brokers, these coalitions interact while seeking to influence governmental decisions in a policy arena, also called the policy subsystem. Policy change occurs as a results of changes in the belief system of the advocacy coalition. Interaction fosters policy learning, and actors alter either their perceptions of the problem, or its cause. Actors may also experience shifts in their political values or the understanding of the effects of policy solutions. They change their policies both incrementally, as well as fundamentally as a result of this (Bekkers, 2007 discusses ACF Sabatier). However, most frequently it is the strategic positions and secondary systems that change, rather than the more entrenched deep core. For the deep core to change, such a change has to be triggered by external events rather than internal cognitions.

Thirdly, strategic communication, interaction and power play can foster a sudden and fundamental change after a long period of policy stability. Inspired by evolutionary biology in which ecosystems are said to show severe shifts after long periods of stability, Baumgartner and Jones posited that long term policy stability can be fundamentally broken down by sudden shifts in basic policy (1993). A policy equilibrium is the result of an incremental process of agenda setting. Although it is vulnerable, it can be longstanding. A group of powerful actors form a so called iron triangle of experts and stakeholders safeguarding existing policy practices by means of a powerful

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through the policy process: overture, weapon and outcome (1989:118).

idea. It is this carefully constructed paradigm that legitimizes their dominant position in the political and policy process for a long time. However, a sudden negative event can, due to bounded rationality, gain momentum and alter the long term policy paradigm. Views or information contrasting with the current paradigm can be picked up by other actors from specific individuals or the media, and this can have a snowball effect that suddenly challenges the existing policy paradigm and break down the policy monopoly held by the iron triangle. A long-term period of stability can thus be altered by a sudden, fundamental policy change. Once such a change triggers a shift in problem definition, huge consequences arise for actors in the policy process. Baumgartner and Jones demonstrated that shifts in the policy image can dramatically alter the composition of the policy venue, iron triangle and advocacy coalition that unite institutions and groups with the authority to make decisions (1993). This points to an important connection between the policy image (aka the problem definition) and the policy venue (selection of actors holding responsibility and power). Policy change is the outcome of interactions between policy images and policy venues (Princen, 2010), and a shift in the image alters the policy venue. Therefore, actors show strategic behavior and competition called venue shopping. By portraying another image of the problem, they hope to move an issue into a new policy arena, to be addressed by new actors, institutions and rules (Pralle, 2006).

In summary, shifts in public policies can be brought along by multiple factors and actors both in and outside of the policy arena. These can be roughly divided into external triggers and cognitive aspects internal to the actors interacting in the policy arena. Both the Advocacy Coalition Framework and the Punctuated Equilibrium model point out that strategic interactions between groups of policy actors as well as their underlying ideas, beliefs, perspectives, paradigms and images are of great importance to the stability of policies. A shift in the policy image would potentially be of great consequence to the policy strategy and the distribution of responsibility. A shift in the problem definition – whether is it is the introduction of a completely new definition, or the alteration of an existing one – is also likely to have great consequences for design of policy strategy and selection of policy actors. The question that remains unanswered then is how do problem definitions promote specific actions and actors whilst downplaying others? The remaining paragraphs explain the value of framing theory in fostering a deeper understanding of the power of problem definitions.

6 Why framing theory?

The fact that a single issue can be translated into multiple problem definitions, which can be redefined again in time (Weiss 1989; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Rochefort and Cobb, 1993) points toward the subjectivity and contingency inherent in socially constructed problem definitions. For example, individuals suffering from what we nowadays refer to as 'psychological disorders' have been described as being raised improperly, being crazy, having neuro-biological problems, or simply having dark drives. Each image of the

problem points towards a completely different solution, as well as to potential policy tools and actors from the medical, psychiatric or psychosocial domain. The key to understanding the power of problem definitions thus lies in the image a definition portrays of the issue at hand. It is this image that makes certain solutions more likely than others (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Stone, 1989).

In order to fully understand how and why certain definitions make way for specific solutions and actors while excluding others, we need to take a closer look at the image of the problem that is put forward by the definition. Such an image represents a deeper understanding of reality that can be conceptualized as a frame. Several scholars acknowledged the importance of frames in defining problems. Dery stated that "problems are […] the product of imposing certain frames of reference on reality" (Dery, 1984: 4). According to Portz, "Framing original questions is what problem definitions are all about" (1996: 382). Weiss emphasized that it is the frame which grants a problem definition its directive power: "By the frame imposed on circumstances, a problem definition highlights some aspects of the situation while throwing other aspects into the shadows" (1989: 97).

Problem definitions thus derive from a policy frame their normative perspective on a societal issue and the way it has to be dealt with. In other words, it is the frame that colors the problem definition. The concept of frames is adopted to better illuminate the power of problem definitions in the policy process. The following paragraphs we will discuss what frames are, how framing processes evolve, the importance of frame shifts, and how framing and reframing is affected by contextual aspects. Finally, the specific activity of framing problems in terms of safety will be introduced; securitization.

7 Framing: making sense of reality

The term 'frame' was originally introduced by Bateson (1955) "to explain how individuals exchange signals that allow them to agree upon the level of abstraction at which any message is intended" (Tannen, 1993:18). The concept of framing was further developed to understand processes of social interaction and communication in various disciplines such, as organizational behavior, political science, psychology, and sociology (Hallahan and Donsback, 2008; Hajer and Laws, 2006). Using the analogy of the picture frame, a frame can be seen as a boundary in the way a picture frame fixes our attention and tells us what to disregard (Hajer and Laws, 2006: 257). Apart from structuring our perception of reality, frames promote a course of action by, "providing a sense of what the problem is, and what should be done about it" (Ibid).

7.1 What is a frame?

Frames are can be described as social constructions that reflect normal and desired actions. They provide a general, broad and normative perspective on what the problem and course of action should be. Just like problem definitions, frames are by no means neutral, factual or objective displays of reality. Rather, they are interpretative schemes for making sense of reality (Goffman, 1974). They enable people "to locate, perceive, identify and label a seemingly infinite

number of occurrences" in their real life situation and context (Snow et al., 1986: 464 cite Goffman, 1974). In terms of public policy, frames are ordering devices or schema for interpretation for public officials, policy analysts, researchers and stakeholders through which they make sense of an ambivalent reality. Frames are a useful concept for studying how policy actors make sense of reality as they are the "conceptual tools that analysts use to capture how policy actors deal with ambiguity and allocate particular significance to specific social of physical events" (Hajer and Laws, 2006: 252). In policy settings, framing is about labeling problems in a specific way: "A frame is an account for ordering that makes sense in the domain of policy and that describes the move from diffuse worries to actionable beliefs" (Hajer and Laws, 2006: 256).

7.2 Two core functions of frames: diagnostic and prognostic messages

The way in which actors in social settings make meaning of a certain issue or situation can be studied through the concept of framing (Goffman, 1974). Frames have various functions which can be roughly divided into those related to understanding what is going on, and those related to deciding what to do. Firstly, the *'diagnostic message'* of a frame makes sense of social reality by identifying what is problematic (Snow and Benford, 1988). The first function of a frame is to identify what is going on, and to diagnose an event or aspect of social life as problematic and requiring change (Snow and Benford, 1988). This is about focusing or changing one's attention by articulating a specific perspective on reality. Policy actors use various techniques to do this, such as naming, categorizing, assigning attributes, telling casual stories, classifying and presenting statistics (Stone, 2002, 1989).

Secondly, the *'prognostic message'* of a frame promotes a certain course of action. It stipulates specific remedies and goals as well as means and tactics for addressing the problem (ibid). In that sense, the prognostic message maps out a 'plan of attack' by articulating a proposed solution to the problem (ibid). It is this prognostic message that characterizes the positions of actors in a given policy domain, and that prescribes a certain course of action. Actors responsible for dealing with the issue are selected through the second function of the frame. Together, these two core functions of framing summarize the relevant dimensions of the autonomy of a problem definition as set out by Cobb and Elder (1993).

7.3 Two faces of framing: individual and collective

The concept of framing parses the process of making sense of external reality, and selecting appropriate solutions. Such a framing process can take place both inside the minds of individuals as well as in collective settings. The first level refers to the psychological aspects of framing. This psychological strand of the framing literature highlights the cognitive aspect of framing. It sheds light on the underlying subjective images and normative ideas structuring an individual's interpretation of reality. It is not possible for individuals to understand the world objectively or completely, so life experiences are interpreted according to the lens of previous experiences or beliefs. It is

assumed that individuals hold a certain frame of reference in order to make sense of reality. Entman (1993:53) described these frames as "mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide an individual's processing of information".

A second strand in the framing literature is the symbolic interactionist strand. Goffman (1974) saw frames as products of interpersonal, face-to-face, social interactions. In his view, frames are the outcomes of social interactions, and they function like symbolic, interactional units with social meaning that are shared within certain groups in society. Once produced, these frames of reference or primary frameworks get entrenched and become broad schemes for interpretation by which individuals determine what is going. Scholars using the work of Goffman scaled up his interactionist perspective on frames and applied it to the collective setting of policy making (Hajer and Laws, 2006). In this respect, Baumgartner and Mahoney (2008) stated that framing can also we take place on a more collective level of issue definition, for example amongst various competing actors involved in the policy process.

Processes of sense making could thus be analyzed at two levels: the individual and the collective. Since this research project aims to study framing during the policy processes, the focus lies on the collective level. Such a collective perspective on framing during the policy processes allows to grasp the strategic interaction between actors striving to gain support for certain frames over others.

8 Framing public problems in collective settings

Public problems are framed during interactions between policy actors. Groups of actors often hold different perspectives on an issue. Through their interactions, their different frames meet, and get strengthened, adapted or even ruled out. The following sections outline the roles of discourse coalitions, frame alignment, frame shifts and contextual factors in the framing of public problems in collective settings.

8.1 Frame alignment

Frame alignment is the process through which multiple frames meet, interact and converge into a common frame (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986). Frame alignment results in a shared interpretation of a problem, and shared guidelines for addressing it. The process of frame alignment can take multiple shapes and forms. Snow et al. (1968), introduced several mechanisms through which frames are linked, and alignment is created. The first type is *frame bridging,* in which formerly separate but ideologically compatible frames align. The linked frame links two or more previously unconnected but congruent frames. The second is *frame amplification,* which occurs when existing frames are communicated and strengthened. In this process, the individual frame is invigorated or strengthened into the collective frame. The third is *frame extension* which is about expanding a frame in order to make it more attractive for individual actors who did not previously align themselves with it. The collective frame is an extension of individual frames, and maintains a link between individual frames. Fourth, during *frame*

transformation, the content or meaning of a frame can be altered deliberately. During this type of frame alignment, individual frames are transformed into a collective frame with completely new content.

Regardless of which form it takes, frame alignment is expected to result in a common shared frame which structurally influences the collective perspective of reality (diagnostic message) and the course of action that has to follow (prognostic message). Such a policy frame forms the basis for governance actions, and sets the boundaries for the policy approach since dominant frames are assumed to affect the distribution of influence and resources (Hajer and Laws, 2006)

8.2 Discourse coalitions

The course and outcome of problem framing processes is best understood by looking at the various groups of actors who promote particular policy problems and solutions. Actors tend somehow to gather around specific interpretations of reality, and in the competitive political environment, they attempt to impose their vision on others (Hajer, 1989). The formation and interaction of so called discourse coalitions affects the extent to which certain interpretations of reality gain popularity, and may affect politics and policy (ibid). Therefore the concept of discourse coalitions is a suitable analytical tool by which to map out the metal mental maps or frames that arise in the world of policy and politics.

When defining public problems, actors seek support from each other, and form what is known as discourse coalitions. A discourse coalition is "the ensemble of a set of storylines, the actors that utter these storylines, and the practices that conform to these storylines, all organized around a discourse" (Hajer, 1993:47). In order to dominate their playing field, a discourse coalition has to meet two conditions. First, all policy actors have to accept the power of the discourse, and second, this discourse has to be reflected in the institutional practices of the policy process (Hajer, 1993: 48). In doing so, these coalitions are involved in processes of social construction or framing during which various actors strive for their definition and solution to find favor. These actors align themselves into discourse coalition sometimes explicitly, but more often implicitly. Interactions between discourse coalitions eventually result in a shared frame which is embraced by a majority of the policy actors in a process called discourse structuration (ibid). This shared frame influences policy formation and implementation, which Hajer names discourse institutionalization (ibid).

Discourse coalitions are the mechanisms that mobilize and promote a specific view (frame) of a policy problem, and the preferable policy solution. As explained in Paragraph 3.5, interactions between groups of actors -and their policy frames- influences the outcome of policy formulation and change (Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1999; Baumganters and Jones, 2009). This research project embraces the idea of discourse coalitions as a means of understanding how certain policy frames come about. Their actions, interactions and storylines reveal their individual frames, and speak to the

collective framing process that takes place. This will be further outlined in Chapter 5.

8.3 Frame shifts

Both individual and shared policy frames can change over time, bringing about a frame shift. Frames shifts may occur for many reasons. Existing frames might lose their utility and basis for action, creating a need for a new frame (Rein and Schön, 1977). A frame shift can also be the result of power play and strategic attempts to reframe an issue (Van Hulst and Yanov, 2008). Whether or not fundamental frame shifts are indeed possible is debatable. On the one hand, Miller (1985) stated that it is impossible to move completely beyond existing frames. Schön (1979/93) on the other hand, forwarded the idea of re-framing as something that occurs when completely new views on reality, or perspectives that go beyond existing views of reality become established. Because frames tend to reflect deeper beliefs and grounded perspectives, frame shifts are assumed to be difficult to bring about. However, once an existing policy frame is altered, it is likely to influence the policy approach greatly by bringing about a new perspective on reality (diagnostic message) and course of action for addressing it (prognostic message). Furthermore, because the diagnostic and prognostic messages are tightly related (ibid), a shift in the diagnostic message (what is a public safety problem?) will alter the prognostic message of the frame (how should this problem be addressed and by whom?).

8.4 Context matters

Not every frame owes its roots solely to the collective framing processes. Various contextual factors are part of the structural setting in which discourse coalitions interact: "The framing of a policy issue always takes part within a nested context. Policy issues arise in connection with governmental programs, which exist in some policy environments, which is part of a broader political and economic setting, which is located, in turn, within a historical era" (Rein and Schon, 1994: 154). This implies that framing of policy issues is responsive to (accumulating) shifts in (particular parts of) the larger context of policy and governance (Scholten, 2007: 154). Contextual factors affect which problem frames as promoted by discourse coalitions and influence which are more likely to come about than others.

      In their literature review on framing processes and social movements, Snow and Benford (2000) argue that various contextual factors constrain and facilitate framing processes. Although many factors might be of influence, they state that three factors are of particular importance. The political opportunity structure created by the institutional structure and/or the informal relations of a political system influence which frames are likely come about, to change, to resonate with a wider audience and which are not. The same holds for the cultural context in which framing processes are embedded. Since frames are grounded in cultural values and myths and "framing processes typically reflect wider cultural values and changes" (ibid: 629). The audience to which framing processes are targeted also play a part in deciding which frame is likely to become widely adopted, which frames are changed, and

which fall to the way side. To sum up, multiple contextual factors surrounding the collective process of framing will therefore affect how actors frame an issue, which actors are conferred legitimacy as participants, and what role they take up (Scholten, 2007).

9 Framing safety problems: securitization

Having explored the dynamics of the framing of public problems in general, we now turn to the concept of securitization. Securitization refers to "the process through which particular issues become constituted as security issues, and are seen as amenable to security solution" (Grey, 2009:307). In this project, securitization is viewed as a specific form of framing as it activates the public safety frame and puts forward safety actors and tools. Loader described the link between framing and securitization as "a process that entails 'framing' selected social problems […] in ways that dramatize the threat they pose […] and criminal-justice-centered responses are made to seem both urgent and inevitable" (2002:135).

The concept of securitization was introduced by The Copenhagen School of scholars with roots in International Relations. In their book, 'Security: a frameworks for analysis" (1998), Buzan, Waever and de Wilde introduced the concept of securitization, which they defined as: "The process of social construction involving those who carry out the speech act (securitizing actors) to articulate an existential threat to a referent object" (Buzan et al., 1998:23-24). Successful efforts at securitization result in an inter-subjective understanding of what is a public safety problem. Qualifying something as a matter of public safety has strong implications for the selection of policy solutions and actors, or as Lucia Zedner once wrote: "security licenses" (2003:176). More specifically, a 'safety label' does not license any public instrument or actor. It merely legitimizes those extraordinary ones belonging to the policy domain of public policing. Framing public issues as a matter of safety and security makes a strong and powerful statement since it "takes politics beyond the established rules of the game, and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics" (Buzan et al., 1998:23).[21]

The most important aspects of securitization are the referent object, the securitizing actor and the functional actors (ibid). *Referent objects* are "things that are seen to be existentially threatened, and that have a legitimate claim to survival" (Buzan et al., 1998: 36). In principle, any issue that demands survival could be securitized (Waever, 1996). During times of war, for example, the referent object is likely to be the sovereign nation state. *Securitizing actors* are those actors "who securitize issues by declaring something – a referent object – as being existentially threatened" (Buzan et al., 1998). Various actors can make a securitizing move, such as state actors, politicians, bureaucracies, lobbyists and pressure groups (Buzan et al., 1998). *Functional actors* are those players who affect the dynamics and decisions in

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[21] Buzan et al. make a clear distinction between politicization and securitization. Securitization is a further intensification of politicization since it takes the issue out of the sphere of 'normal' politics' (Buzan et al., 1998).

the field of security and safety without actually being the referent object or securitizing actor (ibid). Without the audience accepting that a referent object is existentially threatened, one cannot claim that a speech act of securitization has been successful (ibid).

The Copenhagen School explicitly adopted a social constructionist perspective, stating that processes of securitization are by no means based on objective facts.[22] Communicated threats to referent objects are predictions of future public safety problems that are highly subjective. In other words, safety is a political construction which is open for exploitation, "given the open textured nature of the concept" (Zedner, 2003:158). Moreover, the so called referent object in processes of securitization could be of any kind, ranging from a person, to a country, or an event. In adopting this broad and open perspective, the Copenhagen School widened the traditionally military and state centered perspective of security studies and distinguished five sectors in which the processes of securitization could occur: the military, politics, economics, society and the environment. Other scholars have pointed to securitization in other arenas, such as migration threatening European society, Asia's energy consumption threatening regional stability (Philips, 2013), and national development policies in the UK that threaten homeland security (Pugh, Gabay, and Williams, 2013).

Regardless of the context, the concept of securitization points directly at the strategic component of problem framing. Attempts at securitization are motivated by the advantage this confers, such as gaining attention for a particular issues, mobilizing power, gaining endorsement for special measures, and skipping a rule that would otherwise apply to the securing actor (Buzan et al., 1998; Loader, 2002: 143). For this reason, scholars have described the safety frame a dangerous one, pointing out that all too often, an issue can be handled without democratic control, and without constraints by means of successful securitization (Buzal et al., 1998: 29). For example, labeling groups of people in terms of the potential security threats they pose may justify their subsequent exclusion (Huysmans, 2000). Some have even criticized the Copenhagen School for not adequately recognizing the ethical dimension of securitization enough, and for overlooking its location within an a broader setting of discursive legitimatization and the practical ethics of dialogue: "In presenting security as a speech act, the Copenhagen School is doing more than developing a sociological thesis: it is presenting a political ethic" (Williams, 2003).

In general, it can be argued that the introduction of the concept of securitization brought attention to the widening concerns of public safety, which forms the heart of this research project. While the body of knowledge on securitization is closely related to the field of security studies and

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[22]   This distinction was strongly opposed by Knudsen 2001, who disagreed with the idea that security is a politically constructed concept. Knudsen argued that attention must be paid to the 'reality of security' by making sure that the concept of threat is based on an objective, empirical foundation. Also Balzaq similarly argued that the objective context in which security agents are located is often overlooked by the Copenhagen School (2005).

international relations which holds a supra local perspective, the current research project aims to shed light on the local dynamics of securitization by studying which issues have successfully been framed as threats to local order and safety. This study adopts the general mechanism of securitization, which is that framing something as a safety matter promotes the taking of specific safety measures and the activation of safety actors. Securitization is thus adopted as a specific way of thematically framing an issue that consequently legitimizing actions and actors in the domain of public policing.

10 Summary

This chapter answered the first part of the second sub question: *What is the expected role of problem definitions in the policy process?* Problem definitions are fundamental aspects of public policies that shape key aspects of the overall policy strategy, and that affect the distribution of responsibility among actors. The power of problem definitions can be understood through the concept of frames. Frames highlight the normative image of the cause, features and potential solutions associated with problem descriptions that form the heart of a specific policy program.

This chapters posed three theoretical expectations regarding the role of problem definitions that will be used as building blocks for our conceptual model. The first expectation is that problem definitions are socially constructed, and therefore subjective displays of reality putting forward a specific cause and solution for issues considered undesirable. Second, the concept of frames maps out the perspective imposed by the problem definition on both the problem (diagnostic message) and the solution (prognostic message). Third, the conceptualization of shared policy frames is the outcome of negotiated interactions between discourse coalitions during the agenda setting processes.

Studying the way in which definitions of safety problems affect the position and role of the mayor requires an understanding of both the position and role of individual actors in policy networks. Chapter 4 puts forward networked governance and the role of stat) actors as a second step towards the construction of our conceptual model. The conceptual model will be presented in Chapter 5, and will map out how problem definitions shape actors' positions and roles.

Chapter 4: The position and role of state actors in policy networks

1 Introduction

The previous chapter argued that problem frames structure key aspects of the policy strategy, including the distribution of tasks, responsibilities and powers amongst actors. Problem frames thus indirectly shape the position and role of actors in policy processes. Before providing a detailed model of the expected interrelation between problem definitions and positions and roles, we seek first to define the concept of positions and roles in governance networks. This chapter introduces the perspective of networked governance for two reasons. First, in order to define what is actually meant by positions and roles in policy settings, and second, as a means of understanding how the composition of actors' positions and roles is shaped by both internal and extern dynamics of policy networks. In doing so, we outline the theoretical building blocks that will assist us in answering the second part of sub question two: *What is the expected role of problem definitions during policy processes and how are these expected to affect the position and role of individual actors in a policy network?*

2 A short history of the concept of governance

From a public administration perspective, speaking about governance implies talking about the activity of steering society and addressing public issues. In the broadest sense of the word, governance thus refers to a model of social coordination (Hoppe, 2010). More specially, contemporary usage of the term governance is closely related to the rise of a new paradigm in public administration, focusing on the horizontal and multi-actor characteristics of steering (post)modern society. This paragraph provides a short history of the concept of governance in the public administration literature.

2.1 Defining governance

Harlan Cleveland is thought to have first introduced the term governance in the 1990s, using it in place of the more commonly used term, 'public administration' (c.f. Friedrichson, 2005; Fenger and Bekkers, 2007). The term entered the scene just as the classical 'Weberian' model of national government steering society in a rather neutral, technocratic and hierarchical manner ran out of fashion. The term governance is strongly related to the introduction of a new perspective on public administration and focused on pluri-centric rather than uni-centric collectivities uniting autonomous yet interdependent actors in their efforts to steer society (Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004). Governance no longer solely refers to central or top-down steering by the national government, but to multiple descriptions of a new process of governing as well (Rhodes, 1997). As Friedrichson said, "Instead of governance replacing public administration, governance is a kind of public administration" (2005:295). More specifically, governance is characterized by more horizontally structured collaboration arrangements between public, private and societal actors.

2.2 The shift from government to governance

The so called shift 'from government to governance' refers to the breakdown in the 1990s of the previously dominant perspective of top-down, hierarchical governments, and the rise of horizontal, multi-actor models of government. The rationale for this shift can be found in the recognition that there are limits to the controlling capacity of the nation state. The old model of public administration was seen as having delivered disappointing results, and was suffering from an identity crisis (Peters, 1996; Friedrichson, 2005).

A confluence of events made modern society appear far less controllable than in previous periods, and this resulted in a fundamental rethinking of the traditional models of governance in the years between 1980 and 1990 (Peters, 2001). Fenger and Bekkers (2007: 19) grouped various economic, societal and historical events into five crises of state which highlighted the limits of the steering capacity of the welfare state: 1) a financial crisis in the mid-1980s led to the withdrawal of government from expensive welfare systems, 2) a regulatory crisis in the same period demonstrated the inability of governmental command and control mechanisms to influence key societal developments, 3) a rationality crisis that demonstrated that not every consequence of policy interventions is knowable), 4) an implementation crisis that showed the implementation of policy to be far more than the simple activation of the governmental machinery, and therefore also far from being politically neutral or technocratic, and 5) a complexity crisis in which the modernization processes that took place in the twentieth century led to a fragmented domain of specialized processes and organizations and new, complex societal problems. Together, these crises forced "a shift in the dominant steering paradigm of the welfare state […] and resulted in the emergence of specific governance arrangements" (Fenger and Bekkers, 2007: 19).

2.3 Multiple models of governance

It became widely recognized that the old model of public administration had floundered. The old model was characterized by an institutionalized and apolitical civil service, organizational and hierarchical rules, a preoccupation with permanence and stability, and a breadth of internal regulations (Peters, 1996). But what exactly happened to the old steering paradigm? The answer can be summarized as a combination of efforts at less government, and converse efforts at more governance. Governance moved 'upwards' from nation states towards international public institutions such as the European Union or the World Trade Organization. At the same time, it moved 'downwards' from the national level to regional and local levels. 'Horizontal' changes were also made in which responsibility was shifted towards other governmental actors, (semi)public organizations, private organizations and/or civil society (van Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004, Fenger and Bekkers, 2007).

This diversion of the loci of power has taken place in a variety of ways. Bekkers and Fenger (2007) describe five modes of governance (Bekkers and Fenger, 2007). The first is the *governance at a distance model* which is

strongly based on steering on parameters such as input and output. The national government transfers specific tasks to organizations that enjoy a certain amount of freedom to develop and implement their policies, while still being hierarchically steered by the nation state. Secondly, the model of *multi-level governance* is about "cooperative rather than hierarchical relations between governmental units attached to different territorial levels" (Papadopoulos, 2003:473). The national government shares problem solving responsibilities and capacities with governmental actors from other levels. There can be a shift upwards to the international level, or downwards to actors from the regional and local levels. Thirdly, the *market model* introduces classical market mechanisms of supply and demand into public policy. Fourthly, under the *societal self-governance model,* the government facilitates and enables policy initiatives developed and implemented within local communities. This model is strongly characterized by the notion of self-regulation in policy networks, and stresses the self-regulating capacity of societal, public and even private actors (Fenger and Bekkers, 2007). Finally, there is the model of *networked governance* referring to "sustainment, co-ordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with different purposes and objectives, such as political actors and institutions, corporate interests, civil society, and transnational governments" (Pierre 2000: 3–4). Although they act fairly autonomously, the various actors develop and implement policy together. This model strongly relies on the co-operation of actors from different backgrounds, and those who holding dramatically different perspectives, powers and goals.

This short history of the concept of governance points to the many shapes and forms that the concept can take. What these various models have in common is that the government is no longer a single entity, but a conglomerate of actors representing the government, market, society and citizens who co-produce public policy (Bekkers et al., 2007). Governance models stress a level of horizontal collaboration between actors from different backgrounds. The current study strongly relies on this networked aspect of governance, and embraces governance as a joint venture of actors of different sectors (public, private, and hybrid organizations) who are forced to blend their recourses (Peters and Pierre, 1998) in order to address public problems effectively.

3. What do new forms of governance mean for the government?

What does the shift from government to governance mean for state actors as classical providers of governmental steering? The most general answer is that public policy is a joint action by public, semi- public and private actors, but and the exact role of state actors in governance networks is highly debated in the public administration literature. The next section points to the implications of more or less horizontal forms of governance for state actors. This is of great importance given the objective of the current study to study local governance networks with a specific focus on mayors as the first representatives of government.

3.1 State actors in networked governance

Hope (2010) defined governance as "patterns of interaction in which political and traditional hierarchical governing and societal self-organization are complementary" (2010:14). This definition has important implications for the distribution of "responsibility and accountability for interventions" (Hoppe, 2010:14). Some scholars argue that as a result of the paradigm shift from government to governance, state actors lost their ability to steer society. They complain of a hollowing out of the state, and speak of governance without government as a consequence of privatization, contracting out and public-private partnerships (Rhodes, Peters and Pierre, 1998). In such a paradigm, state actors become just one of many mutually dependent actors.

These claims were criticized by other scholars, who argued instead that government actors are "important actors among many others" (c.f. Kersbergen and van Waarden 2004:152). Although upwards, downward and horizontal shifts in steering activities and power have caused national governments to lose their monopoly in defining society interests, allocating public value, and implementing policy, national governments remain importantly unique players in the public domain by the fact that they possess important resources such as legitimacy and authority backed up by formal laws, constitutions, taxation and the ability to use physical force (Hoppe, 2010). Despite losing some of their direct controls, state actors still hold a central position because of their exclusive powers and resources (Peters and Pierre, 1998; Rhodes, 1997).

Either way, questions of legitimacy are raised when a nation state shares or even transfers its problem solving capacity to other actors. The shift from government to governance could result in networks with little transparency and no clear loci of power, decision making and responsibility. In this respect, "the blurring of the distinctions between public and private organizations" in governance settings triggers questions of individual accountability (Friedrichson 2005:283) as traditional checks and balances on power and accountability become less effective (Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). Papadopoulos (2003) describes the democratic deficits of the governance approach, both in terms of responsiveness (where policymaking in governance collective settings is not sensitive enough to the people's demands) as well as accountability (referring to the legitimacy of the process of policy formation and democratic control).

3.2 The call for leadership in local governance networks

When it comes to local governance the shift towards governance has often been associated in Western Europe with a trend toward the establishment of stronger local leaders (Borraz and John, 2004; Steyvers et al., 2008; Alonso and Mendieta, 2010). In order to be able to formulate and implement public policies in contemporary governance settings, local authorities must engage in inter organization, inter-governmental relations as well as actively address civil society (Alonso and Mendieta, 2010). Strong local leadership would provide the most logical answer to such a fragmented picture of governance and society (Steyvers et al., 2008). In fact, political leadership was labeled as

one of the most principal elements of urban governance in such a fragmented context (Alonso and Menieta, 2010). Strong local leadership would manifest itself in both institutional as well as personal aspects (Steyvers et al., 2008). The former refers to the personalization of leadership by direct election, and the provision of the individual leaders with executive powers. The latter refers to taking the lead in partnerships by fostering collective modes of decision making.

If leadership is placed on a continuum, ranging from a directive, decisive and individual mode of decision making on the one hand, to participative, collective and facilitative ways on the other (Karsten, 2013), 'strong' leadership in horizontal, multi actors governance settings would clearly to be found in the latter corner. Strength describes the ability of 'urban leaders' to "to make sense of the complexity and bring together a disparate set of potential participants" (John and Cole, 1999:99). The fragmented character of contemporary local governance would call for plural forms of leadership (Borraz and John, 2004) which focus on bringing it all together. Strong leaders should function as synthesizers or political brokers providing a vision and empowering collectivities to act on it (Steyvers et al., 2008). In this respect, John and Cole (2008) speak of local leaders as consensual facilitators valuing partnerships and networks. This implies that they have to be responsive to stakeholders from the local and national level, and generate governance capacity by persuasion and finding the best in others. Greasley and Stroker argue that a facilitative leadership style is central to modern urban governance, because of its demanding and complex environment. It would require a facilitative style of local, political leadership that is visible, outward looking, open and less partisan than more established forms" (2008: 723-724). Facilitative leadership is characterized by regime building across institutional boundaries, pulling together a fragmented set of partners around a shared vision and blending resources to achieve common purposes (ibid).

4 Roles and positions in networked governance

An actor's ability to steer society is thus inherently related to his position and role in a governance network. Before turning to the mayor's role in local safety governance, the position and role of actors in governance networks has first to be explored. This section argues that the research object of local safety governance can be seen as a thematic manifestation of policy networks as described in the public administration literature. Such networks gather around specific policy problems which require orchestrated action because of their complex nature-. It is within such networks that individual actors such as the mayor take on their position and role. These roles are defined according to the sociological perspective on policy networks as social structures guiding actors' behaviors.

4.1 Tackling public problems in policy networks

Contemporary policy problems, including public safety problems, are often characterized by their wickedness of and complexity (Rittel and Webber, 1973). Consequently, policy makers are challenged with limited knowledge

regarding their causes and policy actors are in discontent about the norms and values at stake (c.f. untamed problems, Hoppe, 1989). Networked governance can be seen as a response to such complexity (Hoppe 2010:13). Since contemporary public problems "cut across the jurisdictions of organizations and cross the traditional boundaries between the private and the public sector" a wide variety of actors have to align their interests, poers and resources in governance networks (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004: 1).

Governance networks focusing on specific public problems are called 'policy networks'. A policy network can be seen as a "web of on-going relationships which mobilize dispersed resources so that collective (or parallel) action can be orchestrated toward the solution of a common policy problem" (Kennis and Schneider, 1991: 36). Mutual resource dependency between actors (Rhodes, 1997) creates the need for interaction and cooperation in a governance network (Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). Governance in such policy networks creates "mutual leveraging of resources and the blending of public and private attributes in ways that might not be possible in more conventional structural arrangements" and enables "the use of a wider repertoire of instruments" (Peters and Pierre, 1998:226/227).

Besides getting policy actors to align their structural arrangements, mutual resource dependency leads to specific power relations between actors in policy networks (c.f. Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Relationships in policy networks are strongly characterized by the ownership of or ability to control resources (Bekkers, 2007:171; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003:262). Actors holding exclusive powers have powerful positions in governance networks (Pieters and Piere, 1998) and are assumed to have a strong say in the collective definition of policy objectives, and in the selection of policy measures. This implies that the position and role an actor holds within a policy network is strongly characterized by his possession of powers and resources, and by the level of dependency on others that these assets confer.

4.2 Positions and roles in social structures

From a sociological perspective, a policy network is a social structure consisting of positions and roles. According to Merton, "contemporary sociological theorists are largely at one in adopting the premise that social statuses [c.f. position RP] and social roles comprise major building blocks of social structure"(1957:110). A social structure is thus a collectivity of interpersonal interactions and relations in which individuals have a certain status or position. *Positions* within a social structure can range from the informal, such as a friend or a soul mate, to the more recognized, such as the position of a judge or policeman. All positions are accompanied by a description of expected behaviors, which constitute a *role* in the societal structure. The concept of positions and role are thus closely related. It is a "long recognized and basic fact that each person in society inevitably occupies multiple statuses and that each of these statuses is accompanied by an associated role" (Merton, 1957:110 describes Linton). Any role taken up in society is thus characterized by the expected behavior associated with the social position (Kuper and Kuper, 2010:891; Macionis and Plummer, 2008).

Just as a teacher is expected to educate a student, a president is expected to lead a nation, and a parent is expected to raise a child.

A social role can thus be defined as "a comprehensive pattern of behaviors and attitudes constituting a strategy for coping with a recurrent set of situations" (Turner, 1990: 87). An individual can hold multiple roles at the same time. First, a person can have various roles associated with different statuses or positions. One can have the role of a mother, ex-wife, lawyer, volunteer at the local fire brigade, and member of the labor party, all at the same time. Second, a complex variety of roles can be linked to a single social position (Merton, 1957). Sociologist Merton describes this as a role set, by which he means the "complement of role-relationships in which persons are involved by virtue of occupying a particular social status" (1957:110). He describes the example of a medical student (position) who holds multiple role-relationships with his teachers, roles relating him to fellow students, and roles relating him to the medical technicians. The multiple roles associated with one's various positions in society, or even the many behaviors demanded by a single role may be compatible or conflicting. The former is described as an external role conflict (Van Doorn and Lammers, 1976) while the latter can be seen as internal role conflict (ibid), or role strain (Merton, 1957).

Turner (1990) distinguishes four types of social roles: basic, structural, functional, and value roles. Basic roles can be distinguished based on the individual's gender and age, such as being female, a teenager, or elderly. Structural status roles tend to be attached to an individual's position in particular organizational or family settings, such as being a lawyer, a CEO, or the grandfather in a family. Functional group roles are not attached to formal group positions and take on more of an informal and cultural flavor. Such roles include that of a mediator and devil's advocate. These are comparable to value roles such as that of the hero and criminal.

More in general, each role comes along with a certain set of tasks, powers, and responsibilities, highlighting the expected behaviors of someone from a certain position in society (van Doorn and Lammers, 1976). These norms and expectations of the personal behavior of individuals in certain societal positions can be formally described in laws as well as shaped by expectations of individuals in practice (ibid). In whatever form, expectations about behavior clarify and structure social interactions and the concept of role therefore "supplies a major basis for identifying and placing persons in a group, organization or society" (Turner, 1990: 87). Roles elucidate a certain pattern of behavior, thereby representing social relations in a social structure (Kuper and Kuper, 2010).

4.3 Conceptualizing roles and position in policy networks

Following this line of reasoning, a general description of roles and positions in governance networks can be formulated as follows: In policy networks, individual actors engage in multiple interactions and relationships in order to address public problems. This leads to a policy network around a certain policy problem. This more or less formalized governance structure resembles a social structure in which individual actors take particular positions and roles.

The roles actors have in a governance structure are often associated with the formal status of their organizational or occupational background (c.f. structural status role; Turner, 1990). An actor's *position* can be described as his or her formal status in a governance network, as characterized by their formal tasks, powers and responsibilities. Consequentially an actor's *role* can be described as the behavior of a person holding that position.

5 The benefits of a networked perspective on local governance

Adopting a network perspective on policy processes does not only allow one to conceptualize and indicate the position and role of actors in the network. As explained earlier in this section, it enables us to fully grasp the contextual dynamics affecting the content and course of local policy processes both 'internally' (in terms of the rules of the game inside a local policy network), as well as 'externally' (in terms of the larger policy context).

5.1 Local policy networks: a framework for action

Local safety governance has been described as a manifestation of a policy network in which actors occupy certain positions and roles. It is the interaction between actors who pool resources in such policy networks that enables the collective processes of policy making and implementation. The position and role that an actor such as the mayor holds is affected by both individual and collective aspects of the policy network. As explained in the previous section, an actor's individual ownership of resources, or his ability to control them characterizes his position in a local policy network (Bekkers, 2007; Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). On a more collective level, an actor's behavior is guided by a set of historically developed rules for conduct within the policy network. Structural interaction between actors within policy networks leads to the creation and maintenance of a so called 'institutional frameworks for action' which form the rules of the game. Such a framework "facilitates and constrains (political) interaction and thus affects the production of the outputs and outcomes of governance networks" (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007: 25). This framework for action brings along *regulative* standards (rules, roles, procedures), *normative codes* (norms, values, standards) and *cognitive understandings* (codes, concepts and specialized knowledge) that shape the perception of problems, influence the selection of appropriate actions, foster the development of identities, and builds the capacities of actors in governance networks (ibid). Such institutional frameworks are by no means static, or purely external structures. They are created and revised during the ongoing interactions between actors during the policy processes (ibid). Together, they form the institutional aspects of the policy network, shaping the actors' behavior within it. Studying this network regime explains how decisions and roles in policy processes are shaped by a set of historically grown formal and informal institutions described as "cognitive, normative and regulative structures that provide stability and meaning to social behavior" (Scott, 1995: 33).

5.2 Supra local institutional arrangements

Local policy networks are relatively open forms of governance which are assumed to be affected by the larger institutional environment in which they are embedded. From a new institutionalism perspective, governance processes in local policy networks are affected by macro environmental influences (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). This perspective stresses that the context matters greatly for the outcome: "Environments, in this view, are more subtle in their influence; rather than being co-opted by organizations, they penetrate the organization, creating the lenses through which actors view the world and the very categories of structure, action, and thought" (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991:13). The so called 'institutional context' is of importance when studying local policy processes since actors participating in this process anticipate their choice of actions from the rules that predominate the context (Bekkers, 2007).

In the case of local safety governance in the Netherlands, this institutional context is provided on the regional and national public safety policy arena through the supra local rules that manifest themselves in the local game, and in the form of formal laws, regulations and policy programs, as well as informal policy practices and policy frames. These formal and informal institutions are assumed to be 'omnipresent' throughout the entire policy process. They order reality, reduce variability, and structure action (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). This implies that they are expected to affect the processes of problem framing, policy design, and implementation as well. In relation to problem framing, existing policy programs and policy ideas in the local and supra local policy arenas partially shape which problems are subjected to public interventions, and how they are framed in the local policy networks. This assumption that is supported by the literature on both problem definitions and framing stresses that context matters during the social construction of public problems (Birkland, 2001; Benford and Snow, 2000). Local policy on paper and in practice are assumed to be structured by formal powers, budgets and laws as present in local government, as well as in the larger policy domain of public safety in the Netherlands. Taken together, institutional arrangements present in the larger policy domain set the boundaries for local safety governance.

6 Summary

Chapter 4 detailed the concept of network governance, and the role of state actors within the network as a crucial step towards the construction of a conceptual model. In doing so, this chapter conceptualized the second part of the sub question: *What is the expected role of problem definitions during policy processes and how are they expected to affect the position and role of individual actors in a policy network?* We concluded that actors from various backgrounds gather around public problems in contemporary horizontal and networked forms of governance. It is within such interrelational policy networks that actors take in a certain positions and role. What this position and role looks like depends on an actor's possession of resources and powers, and on the boundaries set by the institutional framework for action in the local

policy network, as well as on the wider institutional arrangements present in supra local policy arenas.

In respect to the conceptual model, this chapter indicated three theoretical lessons that will be incorporated in the conceptual model. Firstly, the concept of policy networks is adopted as a thematic manifestation of a social structure in which actors hold a certain position and role. This concept fits the 'integral policy strategy' which, as explained in chapter two, characterizes local policy processes regarding safety problem, fostering the formation of safety networks in which actors form various backgrounds joined forces between 1990 and 2010. Secondly, a little side step into the realm of sociology resulted in a clear cut definition of positions and roles in local policy networks. An actor's position is understood as his formal status in a governance network as characterized by formal tasks, powers and responsibilities. Consequentially an actor's role is described as the generally expected behavior of a person holding that position. Thirdly, network perspectives of local governance processes were explicitly taken on board to understand what kind of settings local policy problems are framed within, and in what context actors take on their positions and roles. This allows us to illuminate the institutional arrangements at the local and supra local level that affect the content, course and outcome of policy processes in policy networks.

The next chapter presents, explains and operationalizes a conceptual model mapping out how problem definitions are expected to shape actors' positions and roles in governance networks. This is followed by a detailed description of the overall research design.

Part III - Research Design

The literature on problem definition, framing and governance networks has been discussed in the previous part of this book. These theoretical concepts come together as the building blocks of a conceptual model that will be presented in chapter 5. The model maps out the power of problem frames in shaping actors' roles and positions in governance networks. Chapter 6 presents the research design. The study takes a realistic perspective of the processes of social construction, and combines research strategies of historical desk research and case study.

Chapter 5: Towards a conceptual model

1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to present a conceptual model for studying how new definitions of safety problems are framed, and how this local framing process affects the mayors' role and position in local governance networks. In doing so, the second sub question of the research project will be answered: *What is the expected role of problem definitions in policy processes, and how are these expected to influence the position and role of individual actors in a policy network?* This chapter is structured as follows. Section two revisits the theoretical building blocks of the conceptual model. Section three stresses the interrelation between these concepts and presents the conceptual model. Section four operationalizes key aspects of the model into researchable indicators in order to enable data collection and analysis. The design of the research effort which will be presented in Chapter 6.

2 Building blocks

The theoretical concepts derived from the previous two chapters are briefly revisited in this section, looking specifically at the role of mayors in local safety governance in the Netherlands between the years 1990 and 2010. The interrelations between the building blocks is explained by the presentation of the conceptual model.

2.1 Problem definition

The power of problem definitions lies at the heart of this research project. In Chapter 4, problem definitions were conceptualized as socially constructed and subjective displays of reality qualifying a person, group or any other issue as problematic and therefore in need of intervention (Dery, 1984 Schneider, 1985; Bulmer, 1971). Once a problem definition is institutionalized into a social fact on the public policy agenda (Berger and Luckmann, 1976), it holds the power to shape certain key aspects of the policy approach, such as the selection of policy tools and responsible actors (Cobb and Elder, 1993; Weiss, 1989; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009).

In this research project, the power of definitions of *local safety problems* is studied. Local safety problems are considered a threat to the order and safety of society. Labeling certain issues as safety problems serves to securitize them, and this act of securitization is potent in that it calls for and justifies the strong action of powerful figures such as the police, the mayor and the public prosecutor (Buzan et al., 1998).

2.2 Framing

In order to fully understand how and why certain definitions lead to specific solutions, and why certain definitions involve certain actors while excluding others, we need to take a closer look at the image of the problem that is put forward by the definition. In Chapter 4, such images were conceptualized as frames, or "descriptions or constructions of the world" which "sustain some

patterns of social action and exclude others" (Burr, 1993:5). Frames are subjective displays of reality which structure a problem definition by stressing two important messages: The diagnostic message of a frame makes sense of social reality by identifying what is problematic, and the prognostic message stipulates specific remedies and goals as well as means of addressing the problem (Snow and Benford, 1988).

The concept of framing helps to explain the power of securitization at a deeper level. Studying the frames of local safety problem definitions helps us to understand how these shape the position and role of the mayor in local safety governance. The social construction of local safety problems is mediated by frames which provide a perspective on the problem and a course of action to address it. As this frame changes over time, the policy approach alters as well.

2.3 Policy networks

A network perspective is adopted in order to capture the specific dynamics of the framing of public safety problems, and the processes of local safety governance in general. As argued in Chapter Four, contemporary forms of governance around complex and wicked problems such as public safety take the form of a horizontal assemblage of actors of various backgrounds who align their activities and resources(Rhodes, 1996). Following from this, contemporary practices of integrated safety governance are conceptualized as policy networks. Policy networks are social systems in which mutually dependent actors (Rhodes, 1997) develop patterns of interaction and communication aimed at governing a certain policy problem, carrying out a policy program or implementing a set of policy instruments (Kennis and Schneider, 1991). Mutual resource dependency is created by the fact that policy resources and powers are dispersed amongst multiple actors, including representatives of the government, the private sector and civil society. This forces them to communicate and collaborate (Rhodes; 1997; Kenis and Schneider, 1991), and leads to strategic interaction between (groups) of actors holding distinct interests, powers, and resources.

The conceptual model adopts a network perspective of the process of problem and role structuration for several reasons. Firstly, such a perspectives allows us to look at the composition of a local policy network, to identify the actors who participated in the policy process, outline their belief frames, as well as look at how they eventually aligned themselves in the discourse coalitions. Secondly, a network perspective helps uncover the often hidden institutional frameworks for action which serve to guide both the perceptions and actions of local policy actors and coalitions (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007).

2.4 Discourse coalitions

Policy networks unite actors from multiple backgrounds who engage in strategic interactions throughout the policy process. Their definitions of public problems are debated, negotiated and selected for policy interventions during the agenda setting process (Parsons, 1995; Cobb and Elder, 1972; Kingdon, 1984; Cohen, March and Olson, 1972). This implies that the course and

outcome of problem framing processes in policy networks are structured by groups of actors united by a specific belief system (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993), who promote a certain policy image, and who push forward a specific problem definition and its related solutions (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). The concept of discourse coalitions was introduced in chapter four to conceptualize such collective and interactive processes of problem framing. A discourse coalition is a group of actors united by a shared problem frame attempting to mobilize support for their specific frame, and their preferred policy solution (Hajer, 1993). Interaction between discourse coalitions eventually results in a specific frame that is embraced by the multiple policy actors (discourse structuration), and that consequently influences policy formation and implementation (discourse institutionalization) (ibid). In order to understand how certain policy frames come about, we focus on the discourse coalitions attempting to affect the policy decisions and practices.

An important advantage of the concept of discourse coalitions is that "it illuminates how different actors and organizational practices help to reproduce or fight a given bias without necessarily orchestrating or coordinating their actions, or without necessarily sharing deep value" (Hajer, 1993:48). In the current project, discourse coalitions are conceptualized as collectivities of individuals connected through their shared perspectives of a public problem and/or solution as revealed by their individual communications, and their interactions with others during policy debates. Policy discourses will be analyzed in order to indicate how local safety issues were framed, and by whom. We will look also at which frames disappeared, which frames were aligned with others, and which eventually dominated the local policy strategy. Our analysis will focus also on the coalition's interests and the distribution of power and resources within its members as these are likely to explain the extent to which coalitions are successful in affecting the course and outcome of agenda setting processes.

2.5 Roles and positions

The concept of positions and roles in governance settings follows the sociological concept of social structure. Policy networks have been defined here as social structures in which actors take on certain positions and roles. A position in such a structure is indicated by an actor's formal tasks, powers and responsibilities as determined by the actor's organizational or occupational background (c.f. structural status role; Turner, 1990). Consequently, an actor's role is the actual behavior of a person holding that position.

Studying the mayor's position and role in local safety governance requires looking at several formal and practical aspects of his behavior. Tasks, powers and responsibilities as stated in formal laws and regulations constitute the *formal position* of the safety network. Given the fact that written policies may differ dramatically from how they materialize in practice, the mayor's role can be further divided into his *expected role* and his *role in practice* An actor's role in practice is thus described by the actions he or she actually undertakes, the actions he does not undertake, and how he goes about these choices. This may or may not be aligned with the behaviors expected of him

based on formal tasks, powers and responsibilities. In studying the mayor's role, we look at both what is expected according to his position in the local safety policy strategy, as well as what actions he took in practice.

2.6 Institutional context

In order to fully grasp their course and content, attention should be paid to the institutional context in which local policy processes are embedded. Structural interaction between actors within policy networks leads to the creation and revision of a so called 'institutional framework for action' that brings about regulative, normative and cognitive rules (Sorensen and Torfing, 2007: 25). These rules guide the perception of problems, the selection of actions, and the development of both the identities and capacities of actors in the governance networks (ibid). Moreover, local policy networks are embedded within the wider institutional context of a policy domain, and the nation state ((Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). This implies that national laws and regulations affect local safety governance as well as the existing policy ambitions, values and practices of actors in the Dutch safety related policy domain. In order to understand the dynamics of local safety networks, such institutional arrangements as located at the regional and national policy arena should be taken into account as well.

In sum, institutional arrangements both inside and outside of the policy network set the boundaries for the processes of problem framing and role structuration. Together, they form the contextual structure in which discourse coalitions interact, local safety problems are problematized, and mayors' take on their specific position and role.

3 Conceptual model

In this section, the conceptual model is presented. The conceptual model maps out how new and shifting definitions of safety problems are expected to shape mayors' positions and roles in governance networks. As indicated by the literature review, such processes of problem and role structuration could be understood by studying both the *cognitive aspects of problem framing* by discourse coalitions, as well as the *institutional context* in which these processes take place (c.f.Singer, 1990). Both conditions are illuminated in the case studies, and efforts are made to understand the changes in the mayors' position and role in relation to the efforts of discourse coalitions to frame their policy agendas, and in relation to the larger policy context.

The conceptual model describes the process in which problem and role structuration take place. The process goes through three phases: First, a local policy debate takes place, during which local safety problems are framed and placed on the safety-related policy agenda. Second, share problem frames that emerge from the debate get institutionalization as official public policies. Third, these policies are implemented by the mayor and his partners. Each phase is discussed separately in the following sections. It is important to note here that the model allows for an alternative sequence of these phases than the one presented below, and this flexibility will be discussed at the end.

Phase A: Framing safety problems in local policy networks
The framing of local safety problems in local policy networks eventually results in shared definitions of local safety problems that serve to shape the policy agenda. Actors strategically align themselves into discourse coalitions and strive for their favorable definition and solution to be widely accepted through the local policy debates. Each coalition is assumed to hold an implicit or explicit problem frame. The process through which these frames meet and connect in order to create a collective frame is called frame alignment (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986) or discourse structuration (Hajer, 1993). Frame alignment results in a common frame being embraced by key actors in the policy domain. Figure 3 illustrates the policy debate that occurs in local networks during which the policy agenda is set.

Figure 3: Local policy debate

Phase B: The institutionalization of shared problem frames into public policy
The diagnostic and prognostic messages of the problem frame that eventually becomes dominant amongst key players in the policy network structure the policy strategy. But first, the shared problem frame has to be formalized in the local safety policy documents and reach the status of a 'social fact' (Durkheim, 1964). This process is called discourse institutionalization (Hajer, 1993). Once a shared policy frame has been institutionalized into a formal policy strategy, the formal policy frame stresses a specific perspective of the policy problem and prescribes a policy solution which in turn characterizes the expected role of policy actors, including that of the mayor. The latter consist of the mayors' tasks, responsibilities and instruments as described in the policy plan. Figure 4 illustrates this process of discourse institutionalization.

Figure 4: Discourse gets institutionalized into public policy

Local policy network

Policy debate

Coalition E

Coalition D

Coalition A

Coalition B   Frame alignment   Coalition C

Discourse institutionalization

Policy strategy

Policy frame

Expected role mayor

Phase C: Enactment by mayor and partners during the process of policy implementation

The policy strategy forms the starting point for the policy practice. Although, the formal policy strategy describes the mayor's expected role, policy on paper and in practice are not always in line with each other. The mayor's role in practice is constituted by the actions he actually does and does not undertake during the process of policy preparation and implementation. The level of frame enactment indicates to what extent his policy actions are in line with what is expected of him from the formal policy frame. Figure 5 summarizes the process of problem and role structuration in a local governance network.

Figure 5: Problem framing and role structuration in a local governance network

Local policy network

Policy debate

Including the supra local policy context

Thus far, the model has focused on the process of problem framing and role structuration in local policy networks. However, networked forms of governance have relatively open and strong connections with the wider context within which they exist. Supra local policy contexts are expected to affect local processes of problem and role structuration. The model's network perspective allows one to zoom out from the local policy dynamics and look at the larger regional and national policy arena. This implies taking into account the formal and informal institutional arrangements present at the regional, national and even international policy domain of public safety governance that potentially shape public safety governance in local policy networks. In sum, the conceptual model maps out how formal institutions such as laws, policies and regulation as well as informal institutions such as alternative policy ideas and former policy practices that exist both at the local and supra local policy arena affect each other, and thereby affect the local process of problem framing and role structuration.

The following conceptual model summarizes the expected relationship between problem definitions, frames, discourse coalitions, governance networks, actors' roles, positions and prevailing institutional arrangements (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Conceptual model

3.1 A flexible model

Although initially presented in linear order in the three phases of (A) problem framing, (B) institutionalization into policy and (C) frame enactment these phases are not expected to necessarily manifest themselves in this strict order. Following from current conceptualizations of agenda setting and policy processes as being ad hoc, contingent and competitive, problem frames would not necessarily be the starting point of local policy processes (Kingdon, 1984; Cohen, March and Olson, 1972). Policy processes in networked settings instead evolve in an iterative and messy way. This implies for example, that policy practices guided by new conceptions of safety problems may come into place before such a new policy frame is formally institutionalized in the policy documents. In order to capture this flexibility, the conceptual model functions like 'rotator,' or is said to assume a 'patchwork' model in which the policy phases can be repositioned according to their empirical manifestation. This implies that the 'basic' model presented as figure 6 may take different forms and shapes according to the empirical dynamics of local public safety governance. Figure 7 clarifies the flexibility of the conceptual model by

displaying several potential compositions of the model pointing out a variable interrelation between the multiple phases of problem definition and role structuration.

Figure 7: A flexible model

This conceptual model will be applied to both the initial framing process when a specific safety problem is first subject to the local policy process, and to subsequent frame shifts that follow. The reason for applying the conceptual model several times to the same sub case lies in the historical nature of this study and the changeable character of policy processes in general. Although local actors are expected to embrace and enact a shared policy frame for some time, even long term stability is not guaranteed and this stability may be affected by incremental or even fundamental policy changes. Existing policy strategies and the distribution of responsibility among actors in public safety governance is challenged by both cognitive and institutional factors, as indicated by the various models explaining policy dynamics. Think for example, of coalitions of actors successfully presenting alternative policy images (Baumgartner and Jones, 2009), instances of policy learning altering the belief systems of key actors (Sabatier and Jenkins Smith, 1993), focusing events such as elections or unexpected safety incidents that create a policy window (Kingdon, 1984), or shifts in formal institutional arrangements such as new laws and regulations in the policy domain. Such factors can cause an institutionalized policy frame to no longer be appropriate or adequate, and may necessitate the forwarding of an alternative policy perspective. Once this leads to a frame shift, it has major consequences for problem definitions, policy strategies and the mayor's role. The 'flexible model' aims to provide a 'snapshot' or 'picture' is of how new safety problems are framed, and to what extent, how and why they affect the position and role of the mayor in curial moments of the local policy path.

3.2 Operationalization

While the conceptual model presented in this chapter model maps out how the local framing process potentially affects the mayor's role and position in the local policy strategy and practice, by no means does the model suggest a simple and direct relationship between problem definitions and the mayor's role and position. On the contrary, the model aims to fully capture the richness of context, with multiple actors, perceptions, policy ambitions, rules and

regulations that affect the dynamics of the local governance networks. As argued in the next chapter, in depth case study is a suitable research strategy for studying such a rich and complex social processes.

In order to enable data collection and analysis for case study, the conceptual model was operationalized into a number of real world indicators. These indicators provide clues as to where to find the empirical data that can shed light on important aspects of the model, such as problem definitions, frames and actor's roles and positions. The table 3 provides a detailed overview of this operationalization process.

Table 3: Operationalization of conceptual model

Theoretical concept	Problem definition	Problem frame	Frame alignment	Frame enactment
Definition	The qualification of an issue as a threat to local safety and order	Perspective on policy problem itself as well as the solution	The process in which individual frames interact resulting in the establishment of a collective and shared frame	The extent to which a policy actor's behavior is in line with the policy frame as mirrored by the formal policy plan
Manifestation / Key components	*Whatever issue* is considered a local safety problem	– Diagnostic message – Prognostic message	– Frame bridging – Frame amplification – Frame extension – Frame transformation	– Full enactment – Partial enactment – No enactment
Indicators	Whom or what is considered a threat to local order and safety in formal policy documents	– Written and oral statements regarding the characteristics of the problem and its causes – Written and oral statements by regarding the preferable solution and actors responsible for implementing it.	Comparison of individual and policy frame: – Collective frame links two or more individual unconnected but congruent frames – Invigoration or strengthening of individual frame regarding a particular issue, problem or set of events into the collective frame – Collective frame is extension of individual frames – Individual frames are transformed into a collective frame with a completely new content	Comparison of actions and role in practice with formal policy strategy: – The mayor's actions are completely in line with all aspects of the policy strategy – The mayor's actions are in line with specific aspects of the policy strategy – The mayor's actions are not in line with any of the policy strategy
Data sources	– National policy plans – Explanatory memoranda of Minister Internal Affairs and Ministry of Justice	– Reports of local meetings – Interviews with actors involved with local safety governance	– Reports of local meetings – Interviews with actors involved with local safety governance	– Interviews with actors involved with local safety governance – Evaluation reports of local policy practices

Theoretical concept	Discourse coalition	Policy strategy	Discourse institutionalization	Position (mayor)
Definition	A group of actors united by a shared problem frame attempting to mobilize support for their specific bias regarding a policy problem and preferable policy solution	A policy plan to address the policy problem consisting of a problem definition and solution	The process during which problem frames are adopted in formal policy strategies	Formal recognized status in local safety network based on laws, rules and regulation
Manifestation / Key components	Collection of: – Individual actors – Individual storylines / problem frames – Powers and resources	– Diagnostic message policy frame – Prognostic message policy frame	– Full institutionalization of shared frame – Partial institutionalization of shared frame – No institutionalization of shared frame	– Formal task – Formal responsibilities – Formal powers
Indicators	– Comparable story lines of individual actors during local policy debate – Interaction between actors during local policy debate – Strategic cooperation between actors during policy preparation	Core assumptions local policy strategy as stated in formal policy plan: –Causes and effects of the policy problem – Relation between policy tools and policy goals – Division of tasks and responsibilities among actors as described in the formal policy	Comparison of diagnostic and prognostic message of aligned frames during policy debate and formal policy frame.	Statements in policies, laws and regulation regarding the mayor's: formal task, responsibilities and powers regarding in local safety governance and regarding specific public safety problems
Data sources	– Reports of local meetings – Evaluation reports of local policy practices	– Local policy documents regarding local order and safety / new safety problem	– Reports of local meetings – Local policy documents regarding local order and safety / new safety problem	Formal law: Local Government Act, Opium law, Police Act

Theoretical concept	Expected role (mayor)	Role in practice (mayor)	Local policy arena	Supra local policy arena
Definition	Expected course of action of mayor for addressing new safety problem of mayor in local society based on position (see position)	Action and non-actions of mayor in policy practice	Institutional arrangements present in local policy network setting the boundaries for local processes of policy formation, role structuring and role fulfillment	Institutional arrangements of regional, national and international policy arena affecting local processes of policy formation, role structuring and role fulfillment
Manifestation / Key components	– Expected behavior in local and supra local policy arenas – Expected behavior regarding safety problem	– Actions in local and supra local policy arenas – Actions regarding new safety problem – Non actions when actions were expected (see expected role)	– Policy actors – Regulative aspects – Normative aspects – Cognitive aspects	– Policy actors – Regulative aspects – Normative aspects – Cognitive aspects
Indicators	Statements in local policy documents about the mayor's tasks and tools regarding a new safety problem	All of the mayor's (non)actions regarding policy regarding safety problems and on all policy arenas as mentioned in documents, during interviews or observed.	– Local actors involved in the policy process regarding the safety problem. – Regulative aspects: law, regulation, procedures, budgets, policy problems, policy instruments. – Normative aspects: norms, values, standards. – Cognitive aspects: codes, concepts (frames), specialized knowledge	– International, national and regional actors involved in the policy process regarding the safety problem. – Regulative aspects: law, regulation, procedures, budgets, policy problems, policy instruments – Normative aspects: norms, values, standards. – Cognitive aspects: codes, concepts (frames), specialized knowledge
Data sources	– Local policy documents regarding local order and safety / new safety problem	– Interviews with actors involved with local safety governance – Reports of local meetings – Evaluation reports of local policy practices	– International, national, regional and local policy plans – National, regional and local law and regulation – Interviews with actors involved with local safety governance – Reports of meetings – Evaluation reports of policy practices	– International, national, regional and local policy plans – National, regional and local law and regulation – Interviews with actors involved with local safety governance – Reports of meetings – Evaluation reports of policy practices

4 Summary

By presenting a conceptual model, this chapter provided a theoretical answer to the sub question: *What is the expected role of problem definitions in policy processes, and how are they expected to influence the position and role of individual actors in a policy network?* The conceptual model maps how problem definitions are expected to shape actors' positions and roles through three interchangeable policy process phases that occur in the local policy networks: discourse coalitions that take sides in the framing of public problems during local policy debates, the institutionalization of shared problems into formal policy strategies, and frame enactment by the mayor and his partners during the process of policy implementation. The content, course and outcome of these interrelated processes of problem framing and role structuration are affected by several institutional features of the environment, both formal and informal. These are the rules, values and norms put forward by the institutional framework for action within the local policy network, as well as the institutional arrangements present in the supra local policy arena for governing safety and order, such as laws, rules, policy ideas and practices. The model was operationalized into researchable indicators ready to be applied to empirical research. The following chapter presents the overall research design, and explains how the conceptual model will be used for data collection and analysis.

Chapter 6: Research design

1 Introduction

This chapter describes the overall design of the research project. The research perspective is first discussed, followed by a general outlay of a twofold research design that combines desk research with multiple in depth case studies. Thereafter, the method of data collection and analysis for both the historical data analysis and the case studies is described in detail. Finally, a reflection on the main characteristics of the research design is provided in the summary.

2 Research perspective

As explained in Chapter 3, the current project holds the *ontological position* that problem definitions are social constructs. In line with the realist strand of the social construction literature, issues are thought to be present in our external reality, but these issues are interpreted and characterized by actors in various ways (c. f. Burr, 1995). Consequently, our knowledge of reality is socially constructed, as are our problem definitions. According to Parsons: "Problems involve perceptions, and perceptions involve constructions" (1995:87). In the case of public safety problems, societal issues are not objective matters of public safety, but are qualified as such by citizens, government or others. Following this line of reason, a problem definition on the agenda for public safety is seen in this research project as being the result of a process of social construction that takes place among various actors who qualify the issue as a problem of public safety. The project thereby builds upon the Thomas Theorem, claiming that once an actor defines such problems as real, it becomes real in its consequences (Thomas, 1966). This implies that socially constructed problem definitions can generate real life consequences that affect the course and content of local policy processes, including the position and role of Dutch mayors.

According to the *epistemological perspective* of this research project, socially constructed problem definitions and their real life consequences are observable to the researcher. As Schneider and Ingram argued: "Social constructions are matters of empirical analysis, (Schneider and Ingram, 1993: 335). This implies that socially constructed definitions of public safety problems are assumed to be empirically present on the policy agenda, as well as in the institutionalized policies and practice. Moreover, these socially constructed definitions of safety problems are created by means of language and rhetoric (Rochefort and Cobb, 1993) during the speech act of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998). This points to the importance of the language and discourse adopted by actors during the process of meaning making which can be studied though formalized policy documents, transcripts of meetings, and by informational interviews.

3 A two-fold research design

A twofold research design was developed to meet the research objective of describing, analyzing and understanding how the mayor's position and role in local safety governance has been affected by shifting definitions of local public safety problems. As a first step, a *macro study* was conducted to identify large shifts in the definitions of safety problems in the Netherlands in the years between 1990 and 2010. In order to understand and analyze how such shifts affected the mayor's role, we have to look more deeply at the local practice of safety governance. Three representative problem definitions were selected from the findings of the macro study, and *case studies* were compiled on the process by which these definitions were accepted. The case study approach allows for the gathering and presentation of in-depth information on the cognitive aspects of framing public problems, as well as more tangible information such as the mayor's actions in local safety governance. Figure 8 presents the overall research strategy.

Figure 8: Research design

Both the macro study and the case studies adopt a span of twenty years. Long term analysis allows us to demonstrate shifts in socially constructed problems and their implications for policy actors as such a definition and redefinition of issues take time (Pralle, 2006). Hajer stressed the importance of long term discourse, saying, "Social constructions do not arise

in a historical vacuum. They emerge in the context of historical discourses which contain knowledge of how similar phenomena were dealt with in the past" (Hajer, 1993: 45). This implies that previous policy practices can help explain (to an extent) both current and future policy developments (c.f. path dependency, Pierson, 2000).

Before describing the details of the research strategy, it is important to discuss the multi-level aspect of the design. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the local safety governance policy domain is strongly connected to policy actors, ambitions and resources that exist at the supra local policy arena. Therefore one has to look beyond the local, municipal level alone in order to fully grasp the dynamics of governance processes around local safety problems. The current study is thus designed to take into account these supra local elements. A data set consisting of national policy documents is analyzed in the macro study to indicate which definitions of local safety problems were prioritized for local safety governance in each Dutch municipality. These definitions then guided the process of data gathering for the case studies in which data on policy strategies, actors, resources and policy tools from the local level as well as those from national and regional level were collected and analyzed. The overall rule of thumb was that data sources would be taken into account regardless of level (international, national, regional, local) and background (public, private, civil), as long as they were somehow involved in the process of local public safety governance.

4 Macro study design

The macro study aims to identify shifts in the definitions of local safety problems in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010. Several Dutch scholars have made previous attempts to assess the changes in the safety problems on the public policy agenda. Such studies described the level of attention paid to safety issues by national governments from the end of World War II, demonstrating an increase in the level of attention, and a general expansion of the concept of safety itself (Resodihardjo, 2011, Resodihardjo and Kors-Walraven, 2012; Breeman, Timmermans and Dalfsen, 2011). Outside the Netherlands, scholars have also pointed to an increasing tendency to label various issues as threats to safety and security (c.f. securitization - Buzan et al., 1998). The macro study focuses specifically on the *local* agenda for public safety governance in order to indicate which problems have been listed for local safety governance, and what shifts have taken place between 1990 and 2010. This will allow us to grasp the dynamics of securitization at the local level. The next section provides a detailed description of the research strategy and techniques for data collection and analysis adopted in the macro study.

4.1 Research strategy: desk research

The policy agenda for local safety policies in the Netherlands was studied by means of historical desk research. Information from policy documents and newspaper articles (Van Thiel, 2007; Robson, 2005) was analyzed instead of primary research data for two important reasons. First, the use of existing sources allowed for the collection and analysis of data covering an extended

period of time (van Thiel, 2007; Bauer, 2000). In other words, it allowed for a historical analysis of issues prioritized for local safety governance between the years 1990 and 2010. Second, the use of desk research freed the data from the effects of observation. The use of historical data is an unobtrusive or non-reactive strategy in that it does not involve direct contact with the research object (Robson, 2005; Verschuren, 2005). The removal of the researcher minimizes the role of interpretation and the reliance on memories. It also reduces the impetus for sources of information such as policy actors to present a politically correct, or whitewashed account of the processes.

4.2 Data collection

Policy documents outlining the agenda for local safety policies was used as the primary data source. Two types of policy documents were gathered, both shedding light on the local safety governance agenda. These were explanatory memoranda of the annual budgets of the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Internal Affairs as well as national policy documents regarding public safety provided by the national administration. It might surprise the reader that policy documents produced by the central government were used as a primary data source for a study on the local safety governance policy agenda. For practical reasons, it was not feasible to analyze twenty years of policy agenda's produced by over 400 local governments in the Netherlands. Given the limited time and resources, it was deemed more feasible to analyse national policy documents as priorities for local safety policies were set out in these documents that were meant for local authorities to take into account. It was assumed that a structural analysis of issues prioritized for local safety governance by the central government would provide a general overview of the agenda for local safety governance in the Netherlands. As explained in Chapter 2, the central government sets out overall priorities to be addressed by local authorities and their partners in each and every municipality. The central government's policies and budgets mention safety issues to be tackled by authorities from the national, regional as well as the local administrative level. A distinction can thus be made between the level of the securitized issue (local), and the level of the securitizing actor (national government) (Buzan et al., 1998). In sum, an analysis of national policy documents allows us to discern overall trends in the definition of local safety issues. This in turn allows us to select and make a selection of sub cases the subject of in depth analysis in the second phase of the research project.

Explanatory memoranda on the budgets of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice were first collected. The budgets of both Ministries set out the government's ambitions and goals for public safety for which money has been reserved, including the priorities for local governance. In their annual budgets, the two Ministries dealing with public safety in the Netherlands describe which safety problems and strategies will receive funding. [23] The budgets are published each year and thus provide an annual description of the agenda for public safety governance.

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[23]   The Ministry of Justice became the Ministry of Safety and Justice in October

However, because public safety is just one of many policy topics covered by these budgets, we also include policy documents in our study that more directly addressed public safety. These national public safety policy documents were collected as a second source of macro data. Public safety policies created by the ruling coalition provided insight into the government's priorities and their concrete plans for addressing public safety and order. Whereas the budgets only generally address public safety problems, these policy documents elaborated on the central government's policy ambitions for the local, regional and national level. Some also alluded to the Netherlands' more internationally oriented safety policy ambitions.

Together, these two forms of provided a concrete indication of the priorities and plans set out for local authorities, as well as guidelines for how to implement these. This includes priorities for all municipalities, and for every mayor in the Netherlands. It is important to note here that the documents covered different time periods. While the budgets describing safety priorities for a single year, the safety guidelines stipulated in policy documents could remain valid for a number of years. It is therefore important to consider when a document was valid when coding the data within it. Appendix A provides an overview of the documents coded for this investigation, along with information on when these documents were binding or active.

4.3 Data analysis

All documents were analyzed by means of content analysis (Krippendorff and Bock, 2009; Bauer, 2000), in which specific codes were used as data labeling and retrieval devices (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The codes functioned as descriptive summaries of segments of data to which they are attached. The coding techniques was inductive, and sought to stay true to the ontological and epistemological position of the research project. A computer program for qualitative analysis – Atlas.Ti – facilitated the process of drawing findings from the large quantity of data accumulated for the study.

Phase 1: Coding the relevant sections
Since the majority of the documents covered issues outside of local safety governance, relevant sections or units of observation had to be identified that shed light on the definitions of safety problems to be tackled by local authorities. Each document was searched for chapters and specific sections addressing public safety at the local level. To make sure that no relevant sections were unintendedly left out, the entire content of each document was electronically searched using multiple key words selected from the Dutch local safety governance jargon.[24] Once the relevant sections were identified, they

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2010. Full responsibility for public safety, both prevention as well as prosecution, is now localized at this ministry, including responsibility over the police. Before such an integration, prevention and administrative actions fell under the minister of Internal Affairs, and prosecution and criminal justice was the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. To keep the text legible, we use Ministry of Justice throughout the article.

[24] Key words in Dutch: veilig, veiligheidsbeleid, veiligheid, lokaal, openbare orde,

were assigned the general code of LSP, which stands for 'Local Safety Policy'. This general code helped to indicate all relevant sections that would provide a chronological overview of local safety relevant information.

Phase 2: Clustering and counting
After having narrowed down the relevant sections, the content of these was studied to determine which safety problems were mentioned for action by local authorities. A list of categorical codes was inductively created to describe the various safety issues mentioned. In line with social construction, this process of categorizing took a bottom-up approach so that the categorical codes remained as close to their empirical manifestation as possible, and were not subject to specific pre-defined categories.

Categories were created and assigned as follows: To determine which category or code to assign to a safety issue, we looked at the overall theme of the section. If a section, for example, addressed the safety issues surrounding prostitution, the category 'sex' was assigned to it. This process of categorization resulted in the creation of over thirty categories, which together reflected the various safety issues covered by the safety policy documents. Please note that a single category could potentially cover a variety of safety issues. The category of 'crime', for example, covers everything from bicycle theft to financial crimes. Conversely, a single issue such as youth crime can be part of multiple categories, including 'crime' and 'youth'. Its specific placement would depend on where and when the issue is addressed in government documents.

The assignment of such categorical codes followed the technique of 'clustering' (Miles and Huberman, 1987). Clustering is a process of forming categories and sorting events, actors, processes, and settings into categories which are either predefined, or found to be emerging from the empirical data (Miles and Huberman, 1987). The technique of clustering local safety problems into thematical categories was adopted in this study to move beyond the simple listing of all issues prioritized for local safety governance. Clustering by means of categorical codes allows us to reach a higher level of abstraction in our deduction of the issues that have been defined as local safety problems over the years, and it allows us to answer the first part of the third sub question: *Which problems have been listed for local safety governance between the years 1990 and 2010?*

Another technique, *counting,* was adopted to highlight the main shifts in the definitions of local safety problems. Counting is a simple and straightforward way of identifying patterns in data (Miles and Huberman 1987). It helps us to rapidly spot trends within a large volume of data, and helps to protect against researcher bias (ibid). Patterns of attention to public safety issues in general, as well to specific categories were identified by counting the number of references to public safety problems that were made each year, as well as the number of references in each category by year. See Appendix B on the macro study protocol for a detailed explanation of the counting techniques and related research findings. The technique of counting

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gemeente, burgemeester

provided an answer to the second part of the third sub question, namely: *What shift took place in the definition of local safety problems between 1990 and 2020?*

Phase 3: Second round of analysis and reliability check
As a third step, results of the macro study were checked and validated. Multiple rounds of analysis were undertaken, and the analysis from phase one and two were repeated several times. Raw coding and analysis took place during the first phase, which resulted in the development of a specific coding method. The initial coding provided a first impression of the data and its potential findings. In the second round, codes and categories were refined and outliers were checked in order to generate more feasible results. A second coder repeated the data analysis process according to the method laid out in phase one and two, and thus assessed the replication level and checked for researcher bias.

Rather than analyzing the securitization process itself, when completed, these three phases of the macro study served to identify the outcomes of the securitization processes by identifying the issues that were successfully labeled as safety issues and institutionalized into public policies. The issues that were successfully presented as a threat to local order and safety and accepted as such by functional actors in the local safety governance successfully ended up on the local policy agenda. The macro study adopts the constructivist approach of viewing securitization as a process of social construction (Buzan et al., 1998). It identified securitized issues by inductively categorizing local safety problems as they appeared in documents, and by avoiding pre-defined categories. The implications of successful attempts securitization for the dynamic governance process was subsequently analyzed through the case studies.

4.4 Measurers taken to enhance validity and reliability

Several measures were taken to improve the validity and reliability of the macro study findings. Several measures were taken in order to improve the *reliability* of the macro study findings which refers to the quality of the measurement methods (Babbie, 2004). A macro study protocol describing how to analyze each document in a likewise manner was used during data collection and analysis. This protocol described the overall strategy for selecting policy documents, and for analyzing their content by coding, clustering and counting problem definitions (see Appendix B). In this way, it was ensured that each document was analyzed by means of a similar set of criteria and techniques. A computer program was adopted to facilitate the uniform analysis of all documents.

Phase one and two of analysis were carried out twice in order to refine the general approach to selecting relevant text parts and codes. Outliers were identified and corrected if necessary. Although these steps were taken to enhance the quality of the measurements, some contextual knowledge of the codes as well as a certain amount of interpretation (for example, to decide when something is a local problem of public safety) was necessary. A second

coder was recruited in order to check for researcher bias, and to indicate the level of replication achievable in the macro study results (Miles and Huberman, 1989). There were some minor differences in coding and categorization between the two coders, but these were acceptable considering the fact that all inductive analysis requires interpretation. The extra coding did not yield any new categories or trends.

Some measures were taken to improve the *validity* of the macro study as well. Valid measurements are those which accurately reflect the concepts they intend to measure (Babbie, 2004). In case of the macro study, these are definitions of local safety problems. The macro study incorporated two types of documents (budgets and safety policies) which enabled a triangulation of the information to ensure its validity (construct validity, Yin, 2009). The macro study protocol included several criteria for identifying the relevant sections of the text, mainly those that described local safety governance and definitions of local safety problems. The coding process was guided by several operationalized indicators of factors from the conceptual model.

5 Case study design

Shifts in the definitions of local safety problems were apparent from the results of the macro study. A multiple case study strategy was designed to meet the research objective, which was to understand why and how new definitions of local safety problems affect the mayor's role and position in safety governance. Several problem definitions representing dominant shifts in the definition of local public safety problems between 1990 and 2010 were selected from the macro study findings, and subjected to in-depth case studies to map out why and how they affected the role and position of the mayor.

This section provides a detailed description of why case studies were selected as a research strategy for this research project. The case design is discussed, followed by how the cases and sub cases were selected. Thereafter, a detailed description of the data collection and analysis procedures is provided. Finally, the measures used to enhance the reliability, validity and generalizability of the case studies are discussed.

5.1 Research strategy: case studies

The research strategy of case study has been defined as "an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth, and within its real life context" (Yin, 2009:18). It has also been described as "a research strategy which focuses on understanding dynamics present within single settings" (Eisenhart, 1989:534). Case studies are the most suitable strategy for meeting the research project's objective of understanding why and how the mayor's position and role in local governance was affected by shifting definitions of local safety problems for several reasons.

First of all, case studies are conducted in order to *understand specific phenomena*. Case studies enable the researcher to study specific real-life situations, to pay attention to the wealth of associated details, and to develop a nuanced view of human behavior and other aspects of reality (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This research project aims also to clarify how several individual Dutch

mayors in specific local municipalities dealt with three specific types of public safety problems selected from a macro study in the time between 1990 at 2010.

Second, case studies result in *in-depth knowledge.* Case studies involve intense levels of data generation in order to create and in-depth knowledge of "several objects or processes that are restricted in time and space" (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2005: 163). Case studies thus aim to clarify "the deeper causes behind a given problem and its consequences, rather than describe the symptoms of the problem and how frequently they occur" (Flyvbjerg, 2006: 229). When looking for such in depth knowledge, studying and comparing a few cases intensively is potentially more fruitful than studying many cases superficially, for example, by means of statistical analysis (Lijphart, 1971:685). This research project calls for such an intensive case study in order to understand how frames underlying socially constructed problem definitions make way for certain positions and roles in a governance settings.

Third, case studies allow us to take *contextual factors* into account. They do so by (Flyvbjerg, 2006:223) enabling the study of real life phenomena in the real world context (van Thiel, 2007; Yin, 2009). When the phenomena to be studied are too complex and too context-bound to study quantitatively, case studies are often adopted as a more encompassing approach (Ragin, 1999:1139). As discussed in chapters four and five, local policy processes are surrounded by multiple local and supra local aspects which shape their content and course. Such factors include national policies, regional collaboration practices as well as local political relations and power battles. Knowledge of such contextual factors is needed in order to truly understand how a local problem is framed, and the specific position and role a mayor is likely to hold when addressing it.

5.2 Case study design: multiple & embedded

Through our case studies, the conceptual model (that maps out how frames underlying problem definitions promote a certain course of action) will be applied to the empirical world of local safety governance. The model is based on the public administration literature stressing the power of problem definitions to shape important aspects of the policy approach, such as the selection of policy goals, measures and actors involved (Cobb and Elder, 1993; Weiss, 1989; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). Despite the wide recognition of the power of problem definition and framing, to date, little empirical research has been done on the mechanisms by which problem definitions actually influence policy practice (see the section on theoretical relevance in Paragraph 5 of Chapter 1). As a first step, this research project applies the conceptual model to real life governance processes around local safety problems in an exploratory manner. A *multiple, embedded case study* design was developed to this end.

In order to determine what constitutes a relevant case for this research project, we looked at the organizational design of public administration in the Netherlands and found municipalities to be the organizational level at which local public safety governance is located. Therefore, Dutch *municipalities are*

c*ases*. Within these cases however, we focused specific units of analysis, specifically local governance networks that address public safety problems. Within the units of analysis lie individual units of observation, which in our case, are the definitions of public safety problems, and the mayor's position and role in the governance networks.

Once the cases and units of analysis were identified, either a case-oriented or a variable-oriented strategy had to be adopted. The former is concerned with the deep understanding of a small number of cases, whereas the latter assesses a smaller number of specific factors by drawing upon a large number of cases in order document general patterns characterizing a population (Ragin, 1999). The *case oriented strategy* was adopted for this research project to meet the case study objective of understanding the consequences of changing problem definitions for the mayor's position and role. As mentioned before, an understanding of how socially constructed problem definitions influence a single actor's role can only be acquired by means of intensive research which limits the scope to several in-depth case studies. As Ragin stated, a case oriented strategy is essential when one aims to make the facts of a case or a small number of related cases understandable (1999: 1139).

Thirdly, multiple case study results provide a stronger base for analytical generalization than a single case study (Yin, 2009). The case study results of multiple case study designs are regarded as stronger evidence as they account for the risk of the single case study being a unique case, or an unusual special occurrence. Comparing the results of several interrelated case studies allows us to detect similarities and differences across study results (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2005; Lijphart, 1971). In the current context, similarities and differences can be identified in how changing problem definitions lead to changes in the mayor's position and role in local public safety governance.

Fourthly, an *embedded or nested case study design* implies that multiple units of analysis will be studied within each case (Gerring, 2007*;* Swanborn, 2008). Within each municipality, (case) several problem definitions (sub cases) are prioritized. Our sub cases present shifts in the problem definitions that occurred at the beginning (1990), middle (2000) and end (2010) of the research period.

Given our little knowledge of the empirical process in which policy frames influence an actor's position and role, these processes will be studied across a number of *similar settings* first (c.f. comparable cases strategy, Lijphart, 1975). Given this explorative nature of these case studies, we selected municipalities (cases) of a similar size, and in which similar public safety problems (sub cases) were being addressed.

5.3 Selection of cases and sub cases

Case selection took place in two steps, namely the selection of sub cases (problem definitions) and the selection of cases (municipalities). This section will describe the criteria and outcome of the selection procedure. The selection of sub cases is presented first as our selection of cases is partially based on the presence of these sub cases.

Selection of sub cases

Sub cases are local safety problem definitions that had undergone a dominant shift in our study period. These sub cases were selected from the macro study findings according to the following criteria.

Firstly, a *shift* in the definition of public safety problems had to have taken place. The macro study pointed to the presence of two types of shifts. The first is a new category appearing at a specific point in time, marking a change in the definition of public safety problems in general. A change in the type of problem belonging to existing categories also indicated shifts in the definition of public safety problems as well. Therefore problem definitions that belong to a new category in themselves, as well as those that are new within an existing category represent major changes in the definition of public safety problems, and would qualify as sub cases.

Secondly, the problem definition selected has to *represent a dominant shift*. A single new or deviant category would be unlikely to influence the role and position of actors in governance settings. In order to make sure the selected definition represented a major shift, only the problem definitions that were most often listed in the various documents were selected.

Thirdly, a shift in the definition of public safety problems has to be present during a *specific moment in the time in the years between 1990 and 2010*. Dominant shifts were identified that occurred either at the beginning (1990-1995), middle (around 2000) or near the end (towards 2010) of the research period. Nonetheless, it may be some time before these definitions manifest themselves in the practice of local safety governance.

Based on these criteria, we identified the following sub cases: drug-related nuisance (which emerged as a new category in 1995), domestic violence (which represented a shift in the definition of the existing category of violence around 2002), and organized crime (which emerged as an entirely new category in 2007). Table 4 provides a short summary of the selection process. This process is explained in further detail in Chapter Seven which presents results of the macro study.

Table 4: Selection of sub cases

Selection criterion / Sub case	Type of shift	Dominance	Period
Drug-related nuisance	Frequently mentioned definition in the new category 'drugs'	Category introduced and dominant since 1995. Various forms of drug-related nuisances were frequently mentioned within this category.	1990-1995
Domestic violence	Shift within the existing category 'violence'	Category introduced and dominant since 1995. Problem definition of domestic violence frequently mentioned since 2002	1998-2002
Organized crime	Emergence of new and immediately dominant category	Category introduced and *most* dominant since 2007	2005-2010

Case selection

Aiming to enhance the theoretical generalizability of our case study findings, we selected our cases (municipalities) on theoretical grounds (Yin, 2009). Selection was closely related to the key concepts of the conceptual model, which were 1) governance networks, 2) problem definitions and 3) the role and position of the mayor. These concepts had to manifest themselves in a municipality in such a way that it was possible to analyze the local policy processes during which shifts in problem definitions might appear. These shifts were expected to influence the role and position of the mayor in the governance network. This led to the following criteria for case selection:

First a *governance network addressing public safety problems* had to be present in the selected municipalities throughout the research period of 1990 to 2010. Such governance networks were most likely to exist in the larger municipalities housing over 100,000 inhabitants. Public safety issues tend to be more relevant in such municipalities, and the related policies are more likely to be adopted (Cachet and Ringeling, 2004). Secondly, these governance networks had to address the specific problem definitions representing major shifts as selected from the macro study. In other words, the governance network present in a municipality had to address a wide range of public safety problems in order to be selected. This excluded both the smallest as well as the largest municipalities from the case studies as they tended to be somewhat atypical in terms of the public safety problems they had to address. Smaller municipalities were excluded because they simply did not cover as broad a range of public safety problems as larger ones. At the same time, many of the biggest municipalities were excluded because they tended to deal with more intense or complex public safety problems that are characteristic of larger cities, and that are less likely to be present in other municipalities. To summarize, municipalities (cases) which are large (first criterion) though not the largest (second criterion) were selected. The selected municipalities house

100.000 or more inhabitants, with the exception of the four largest municipalities which each house over 300.000 people[25].

Thirdly, local authorities, particularly the mayor, had to be *accessible to the researcher*. To be included, local authorities had to give their permission and cooperate with the author. The mayors of each municipality had to make themselves available as respondents. As a result, only municipalities with a low turnover of mayors, and with ex-mayors who were still alive and available for interviews were selected. Taken together, this led to the selection of Haarlem and Breda as cases as summarized in Table 5. See Appendix C for more details of case selection.

Table 5: Selection of cases

Case / Selection criterion	Haarlem	Breda
Number of inhabitants 100,000 -300,000 between 1990 and 12010	+/- 150,000	120,000 (1995) 170,000 (2010)
Sub case: drug-related nuisance, early 1990s	First mentioned in local safety policies in 1992	First mentioned in local safety policies in 1991
Sub case: domestic violence, around 2000	First mentioned in local safety policies in 1997	First mentioned in local safety policies in 2003
Sub case: organized crime, late 2000s	First mentioned in local safety policies in 2005	First mentioned in local safety policies in 2008
Accessible for research purposes	Permission for research (yes) Mayor A (not accessible) Mayor B (accessible) Mayor C (accessible)	Permission for research (yes) Mayor D (accessible) Mayor E (accessible) Mayor F (accessible)

[25] Statistics Netherlands (CSB) groups municipalities into the following categories:
- less than 5,000 inhabitants
- between 5,000 - 20,000 inhabitants
- between 20,000 - 50,000 inhabitants
- between 50,000 - 100,000 inhabitants
- over 100,000 inhabitants
- *over 300,000 [category added by researcher to filter out the biggest cities]*

5.4 Data collection

A major advantage of the case study method adopted is that it allows for the integration of various sources of information, including interviews, questionnaires, archival data and observations (Eisenhart, 1989:534). The case studies in this research project are built on two types of data sources, namely documents and interviews.

Various types of *documents* provided information about the empirical practice of local safety governance, and the mayor's position and role within it. Local documents in which the sub cases of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime were labeled as a safety problem between 1900 and 2010 were subjected to case study. This implied the collection of local policy programs regarding safety in general, specific policy programs regarding the sub cases, documents evaluating these policy programs, transcripts of council and committee meetings, internal correspondence between local authorities and stakeholders as well as policy documents and policy evaluations from other actors collaborating with local government actors, such as the police and public prosecutor. Together, these documents provide information about the frames of the local discourse coalitions as expressed in the local policy debates, the frames that came to be commonly shared and institutionalized into local public policies and that eventually influenced expectations of the mayors' role, as well as the frames that influenced policy practices and the mayor's actual actions therein.

Information about the practical aspects of the policy implementation phase was gathered by means of *interviews.* These interviews provided both the mayor's perspective of his role and position in practice when addressing public safety problems, as well as that of his partners. Along with current and former mayors, at least one additional representative was selected from all key actors involved in the governance network addressing the problem definition (sub case). These could be civil servants advising the mayor on public safety matters, parties responsible for implementing public safety policies such as the local police chief and the public prosecutor, or actors from outside the governmental spheres including housing corporations and social workers. Appendix D provides a list of all 41 respondents and appendix E entails a list of selection criteria.

The interviews were semi-structured according to a topic list derived from the conceptual model (see appendix E). Such an approach was adopted in order to maintain a focus on indicators relevant to the conceptual model, while also ensuring a degree of flexibility and openness towards potentially important situations and contexts. It is important to note here that the mayors and other actors interviewed were not limited to the current governance networks. Given the historical nature of the analysis, our interviews covered former mayors, police chiefs and council members as well. This created some practical difficulties and challenges with construct validity that will be described in Section 5.7.

5.5 Data analysis

All data collected were analyzed according to three steps using a hierarchical method for multiple case analysis and comparison (Verschuren and Doorewaard, 2005). According to this method, individual cases are to be studied independently from each other, but preferably using the same pattern. This allows for a subsequent higher-order comparison of the case studies. Figure 6 summarizes the processes of data analysis.

Table 6: Case analysis

Municipality / Problem definition	Haarlem	Breda
Drug-related nuisance	Sub case analysis 1	Sub case analysis 4
Domestic violence	Sub case analysis 2	Sub case analysis 5
Organized crime	Sub case analysis 3	Sub case analysis 6

Across case comparison

Within case comparison

Step 1: Individual sub case analysis

The six sub cases to be analyzed were local governance processes regarding the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime in both Haarlem and Breda. Each sub case was studied individually, resulting in a historical overview of how new safety problems were framed and reframed in the local governance processes taking place between 1990 and 2010. During sub case analysis, relevant documents and interview transcripts were subjected to content analysis using a coding scheme corresponding with the operationalized indicators of the conceptual model (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Bauer, 2000). This resulted in insights into the impact of new definitions, how they were framed, and how these definitions affected the local policy strategy, specifically the mayor's theoretical role, and his actual practice.

Step 2: Within case comparison

The knowledge gained from each of the six resulting sub cases was compared by means of a within case comparison. The differences and similarities in the framing process that took place for each of the three new local safety problems were discerned, first within the context of each municipality. The same was done to determine how these framing processes affected the role and position of the mayor. The similarities and differences observed across the sub cases were interpreted through the theoretical lens of the conceptual model. This

advanced our understanding of how different definitions of local safety problems affected the mayor's role and position in the same municipality.

Step 3: Cross-case comparison
A cross-case analysis was conducted in order to generate a number of key insights. The level of analysis was scaled up from the earlier comparison between sub cases, to a comparison of overall findings across the two municipalities. This resulted in a general indication of the generalizability of our findings, and prompted a number of refinements in the conceptual model. It also resulted in the identification of three mechanisms that explain why, how and to what extent the framing of public problems shape actors' roles and positions.

5.6 Measures taken to enhance validity and reliability
Several measures were taken to improve the reliability and validity of the case studies. In order to improve their *reliability*, a case study protocol was created (appendix E), and all data analysis was conducted using a computer program (atlas.ti) in the same structured manner. The case study protocol was tested during a pilot run in order to refine plans for data collection and analysis before these plans were applied to the cases of Haarlem and Breda. This pilot study was conducted in the municipality of Nieuwegein in April 2012. A draft version of the conceptual model was applied to the coding of a governance network around the local safety problem of youngsters hanging around a neighborhood causing residents to feel unsafe. This effort to pilot the analysis method resulted in refinements in the data collection and analysis strategy, as well as adjustments in the conceptual model.

During this pilot study, the individual frames of policy actors were assessed using a questionnaire that was followed by an interview. These methods proved to be less than optimal as individual frames could not be identified from the limited number of predefined categories included in the questionnaire. Further, asking respondents about their perspectives on safety generated only a glimpse of their current frame, and prompted a large number of socially desirable answers. Rather than in conversation with the researcher, it was then hypothesized that the frames structuring policy processes would most clearly show themselves in records of how policy actors interacted with each othe. Data capturing this interaction was thought to provide a more genuine picture of their frames. This led to a selection of reports from council meetings and other forms of correspondence between key actors in the policy network. These documents provided an indication of the frames that existed at different times in history, and provided a valuable primary data sources for frame analysis.

The conceptual model was also refined as a result of the pilot study. The analysis of the pilot case resulted in a straightforward description of how the youngsters caused trouble, and how the mayor of Nieuwegein and his partners dealt with this menace. However, it did little to explain the course and nuances of this local policy process, and how it affected the position and role of the mayor. Further, the application of the conceptual model did not provide

any explanatory power because it was focused only on the local policy process. It was then deduced that the course and content of the local governance processes cannot be isolated from the supra local context. A new building block called 'supra local policy arenas' (Chapter Five, Section 3, Figure 6) was added to the conceptual model which previously presented a rather isolated process of problem framing and policy implementation in a local policy network. With the addition of the supra local factors, the open character of the local policy networks was emphasized.

Finally, various measures were taken to improve the *validity* of the case study results. Valid measurements are those which accurately reflect the concepts they intend to measure (Babbie, 2004). Theoretical concepts from the model were operationalized as real life indicators to make sure that the empirical manifestation of problem definitions, frames and the mayor's role and position were fully captured. The coding scheme and interview protocol for data collection and analysis was built upon these indicators (see Appendix E) and eacg interview was transcribed in complete detail. Finally, a triangulation of data sources was ensured through the examination of a combination of policy documents, transcripts of council meetings and interview transcripts. Data from these sources were combined and verified for construct validity before analytical generalization.

5.7 Generalization of case study findings

The generalization of case study results can generally be divided into theoretical and statistical forms of generalization (Yin, 2009). Statistical generalization implies that the results of a particular case study apply to similar units of analysis beyond those that have been studied (Ragin, 1999), while analytical generalization means that case study findings are "generalizable to theoretical propositions, and not generally to populations or universes" (Yin, 2009: 38).

Since the units of analysis in case studies are not a representative sample of a larger population (all municipalities in The Netherlands), statistical generalization is not the aim of this research project. Instead, the aim is analytical generalization, as the findings of case studies like the present one contribute to theory development. Case study results should provide either empirical confirmation or grounds for revising the theoretical expectations summarized in the conceptual model. The case study results should thus be regarded as either empirical confirmation or ground for revision of the theoretical expectations mapping how frames underlying problem definitions make way certain roles and positions in networked governance.

The external validity of the case study's findings, in terms of their relevance to other Dutch municipalities, is limited. This is because the findings are context-bound and therefore do not account for every Dutch municipality. This implies that the indicated consequences of changing problem definitions for the position and role of mayors in local safety governance accounts for those cases actually studied. Nevertheless, since these findings are based on multiple case studies, the overall conclusions are most likely to be found in

comparable settings, that is, mayors of medium to large sized municipalities who have to address drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime. However, whether or not the role and positions of these mayors were indeed affected in the same way as in Haarlem and Breda remains an empirical issue.

6 Summary

This chapter presented a twofold research strategy combining a macro study of existing historical policy documents with in-depth case studies. Together, the macro study and multiple case studies cover the research objective of *describing* and *understanding the* consequences of changing problem definitions for the role of mayors in local public safety governance between 1990 and 2010. The macro study provided a general picture of the changes in the definitions of local safety problems, from which a few exemplary problems which represented the dominant shifts in the definitions of problems of local public safety in that time were selected. These were studied more deeply in multiple, embedded case studies that shed light on the consequences of new and shifting definitions of public safety problems for the position and role of mayors in local policy networks. Qualitative methods were employed (van Thiel, 2007) to study problem definitions and the positions and roles of actors. Ontologically, problem definitions were viewed as social constructions, but epistemologically, the material was assumed to be amenable to study in a distanced, objective and structured manner. A triangulation of methods ensured that research findings were robust.

The next part of the book describes the findings of our research. Chapter7 discusses the results of the macro study, while Chapters 8 and 9 present the within case study analyses.

Part IIII - Research Findings

The fourth part of the book provides a description and analysis of the empirical findings of the research project. The macro study findings are presented and discussed in Chapter 7. The macro study is a longitudinal study of policy documents chronicling the shifting definitions of local safety problems in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010. Three new safety problems were selected based on the results of this macro study. Chapters 8 and 9 present the process of policy making that took place in relation to each of these three safety problems, and the impact of these new problem definitions on the local policy strategy, especially the mayors' role in paper as well as in practice.

Chapter 7: Macro study

1 Introduction

This chapter describes the findings of the macro study which represents the first phase of data collection and analysis. The macro study aimed to empirically study the trend of securitization in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010, and thereby answer sub question three: *Which safety problems have been listed for local safety governance in the Netherlands, and what shifts have taken place between 1990 and 2010?* Special attention was paid to the dominant definitions of local safety problems as these were considered most likely to be subject to policy intervention by the mayor and his partners.

This chapter is structured as follows. The next section discusses overall trends in the definition of problems for local safety governance between 1990 and 2010. In the subsequent section, three problem definitions that represent major shifts on the policy agenda for local safety governance are selected for analysis through case studies. The fourth and final section summarizes the most important findings of the macro study in order to answer sub question three.

2 Defining local safety problems between 1990 and 2010

The macro study entailed a content analysis of 47 national policy documents representing the policy agenda for local public safety governance between 1990 and 2010. These national policy documents provided key information on the concerns that were labelled as safety problems to be addressed by local governments. Three rounds of inductive coding showed that both the number and type of issues defined as local safety problems increased tremendously in this time. A trend of 'issue expansion' and 'issue dominance' is observable.

2.1 Issue presence

The macro study showed a general increase in the number of references to local safety in the policy documents published between 1990 and 2010. Despite the presence of the occasional decline, figure 9 shows that the absolute number of references to local safety problems grew from 4 in 1990, to 175 in 2010. This points at an overall trend of issue presence, and the fact that a growing amount of policy attention was paid to local safety problems, with local authorities increasingly being asked to address public safety problems.

Figure 9: Absolute number of problem definitions mentioned between 1990 and 2010

2.2 Issue expansion

In looking both at the issues that were mentioned as public safety problems over the years, as well as at the changes that took place therein, a second important trend in the definition of local safety problems was indicated, namely that of issue expansion. Figure 10 illustrates this expansion. By means of an inductive coding strategy, 33 'categories' were identified, each representing a type of safety problem. The category 'sex' for example, covers sex-related issues such as prostitution, rape and lover boys. Overall, the number of categories increased from 2 in 1990, to 33 in 2010 as new issues were labelled as local safety problems over time.

Figure 10: Expansion of the definition of 'local safety' concerns between 1990 and 2010

Two categories of safety issues, disaster and crime were prominent at the start, although they were not mentioned every year. *Disaster* refers to disasters, accidents, and crises in general, while *crime* covers issues such as petty crime, youth crime, financial crime, cyber-crime and factors potentially resulting in criminal behavior.

The number of categories started to expand in 1991 when *fire* was added to the mix. In 1993, this expansion continued with the introduction of specific target groups and locations. The documents stated that more attention needed to be paid to *target groups* including repeat offenders and young individuals from specific ethnic backgrounds with a history of committing crimes or causing trouble. *Location* arose as a category as a result of a focus on safety issues arising at specific locations, such as large municipalities, schools and homes.

In 1995, the safety policies expanded even further with the introduction of five new safety categories: public nuisance, subjective safety, drugs, youth, and theft. The category *public nuisance* covers problems caused by the deterioration of public space as well as by people such as psychiatric patients, homeless people, and youngsters hanging around. *Subjective safety* is about citizens feeling safe. *Drugs* is about drug use and the existence of phenomena like coffee shops and drugs tourism. *Youth* covers a wide range of youth related issues, including dropping out of school and youth crime. *Theft* refers to burglaries and the stealing of various items such as cars and bicycles.

Safety policies expanded further in 1996 by the addition of the categories of objective safety and the environment. In contrast to subjective safety, *objective safety* is not about perceptions of safety, but about ways in which to objectively measure safety using numbers such as crime rates. *Environment* addresses the need to prevent local environmental mishaps such as by collecting garbage and limiting air and ground pollution.

In 1997, new risks and physical safety concerns were again introduced. The category of *risks* stresses the increasing importance of managing possible future threats to local safety that are not already apparent. The category of *physical safety* was mentioned, referring to unintentionally caused safety problems that are either accidents, or acts of nature and not clearly attributable to the actions of individuals (c.f. Helsloot, 2007).

In 1999, integrated safety policy substantially increased thanks to the introduction of safety problems related to alcohol, traffic, violence, public order, small annoyances, and sex. *Alcohol* relates to safety problems caused by, for instance, instances of alcohol abuse and store owners selling alcohol to under-aged individuals. Drinking and driving is the most frequently mentioned issue when it comes to *traffic*. *Violence* covers violence in both public (such as on the streets, or in clubs) and private (such as domestic abuse) domain. *Public order* refers to substantial disturbances of the public order, of which demonstrations are the most common manifestation. Offences that are subject to fines issued by the local authorities, such as double parking, littering, and cycling were all placed in the *small annoyances* category. *Sex* refers to safety issues related to prostitution, rape and lover boys.

In 2000, another two new categories were mentioned for the first time. The category *football* related mainly to hooliganism, whereas the category of *integrity* reflects the need for governments to screen citizens and companies to avoid accidentally supporting illegal activities, for example, by giving permits to criminals.

A further expansion took place in 2002 when social safety, public transport, weapons, recreation, and events were added to the safety policies.

The category of s*ocial safety* captures general remarks related to safety problems caused by intentional behavior, such as violence and theft (in contrast to accidentally caused safety problems). The category of p*ublic transportation* mainly focuses on safety in trains and buses. The category of *weapons* mostly deals with the illegal ownership of weapons, while *recreation* and *events* point to safety problems that could arise, for example, from sporting events and festivals respectively.

In 2003, social integration was mentioned for the first time. The category of *social integration* includes issues such as the polarization and segregation of (ethnic or religious) groups in society. *Conviction* became part of the integrated safety concept in 2006. This category covers perceived safety arising from the strong beliefs of individuals, for example, about human rights, animal rights or religion.

In 2007, organized crime, aftercare, and terrorism were introduced. *Organized crime* refers to crimes that include human trafficking and the work of criminal organizations. *Aftercare* deals with the issue of former prisoners returning to society. *Terrorism* was another obviously defined category.

In the final year of the study period (2010), an interesting new category was introduced to the integrated safety policy, namely that of *integrated* problems. After twenty years of professionalizing local safety governance, and looking beyond traditional domains of safety concerns, national policy documents started to simply use the words 'integrated safety'. This shift demonstrated the wide acceptance of a pillars of the integrated policy strategy, which is an encompassing perspective on safety covering various forms of safety concerns, resulting in the institutionalization of public safety into policy plans.

2.3 Issue dominance

The high level of issue expansion, both in terms of amount and variety, came about because issues formerly belonging to other policy domains such as city planning, transportation and recreation were incorporated to the policy domain of local safety and order.

However, not all types of safety issues were granted the same level of attention over the years. Some categories were mentioned more frequently in the policy documents, and others less. In order to determine which safety issues were more greatly problematized, we studied the number of references to the safety categories. The total number of references made to each safety problem was counted for each year, together with the total number of categories addressed in that year. Based on these numbers, it was possible to calculate the average number of references made to each category in every year. The average indicates the number of references each category could have received in a single year if all categories received the same amount of attention. Since attention differed per category, the actual number of references made to a category was compared with the average number to determine whether a category received more or less attention than it would have received if all categories received the same amount of attention. A category qualifies as having been *dominant in a single* year if it received more than the average

number of references in that year. A category qualifies as being *overall dominant* if it was dominant in more than 50% of the years since the first time the category was mentioned in the policy documents. Table 7 provides information on each category on the year in which the category was first mentioned, the years in which the category was dominant, and whether the category was dominant overall.

Table 7: Overview of categories of local safety problems

Category	First mentioned	Dominant in year	Overall dominance?
Disaster	Before 1990	1990/92/93 2002/03/04/05	No
Crime	Before 1990	1991/92/93/96/97/99 2000/01/02/03/04/05/06/07/08/09	**Yes**
Fire	1991	2006/07/08	No
Target groups	1993	1993 2004	No
Location	1993	1996/97/98 2000/01	No
Public nuisance	1995	1999 2000/01/02/03/04/05/06/07/08/09/10	**Yes**
Subjective safety	1995	-	No
Drugs	1995	1995/96/97/98 2002/03/04/05/06/07/08	**Yes**
Youth	1995	1995/96/9/98/99 2000/01/02/03/04/05/06/07	**Yes**
Theft	1995	1999 2000/01/02	No
Objective safety	1996	-	No
Environment	1996	-	No
Risk	1997	-	No
Physical safety	1997	-	No
Alcohol	1999	2008/09/10	No
Traffic	1999	-	No
Violence	1999	1999 2000/01/02/03/04/05/07/08/10	**Yes**
Public order	1999	-	No
Small annoyances	1999	1999 2000/01/02/03/04/05/06	**Yes**
Sex	1999	-	No
Football	2000	2003/06	No
Integrity	2000	-	No
Social safety	2002	-	No
Public Transportation	2002	2005	No
Weapons	2002	-	No
Recreation	2002	-	No
Events	2002	-	No
Social	2003	2010	No

integration			
Conviction	2006	2006/10	No
Organized crime	2007	2007/08/09/10	**Yes**
After care	2007	-	No
Terrorism	2007	-	No
Integrated	2010	-	No

The macro study pointed to the dominance of seven out of 33 categories in the policy discourse, namely c*rime, nuisance, drugs, youth, violence, small annoyances,* and *organized crime.* These categories show a move from the traditional (e.g. crime and violence) to the more unconventional. The new category of small annoyances came to be dominant because softer issues such as that of litter on the streets and noisy neighbors were increasingly considered as safety problems. The dominant category of youth demonstrates the perceived vulnerability of children from specific ethnic backgrounds. While they were traditionally the concern of the social and welfare policy domain of local governance, the activities of these youth were increasingly securitized. Local authorities were also required to pay attention to completely new concerns. The categories of organized crime and terrorism indicate that several, supra local problems that used to be the domain of the national government and international governmental actors now had to be dealt with by local governments as well. Local authorities had to take part in, for example, in programs targeting human trafficking, and the increasing radicalization of citizens.

3 From macro to micro: selection of sub cases

Several problem definitions were selected from the macro study findings. These problem definitions were subjected to in-depth case studies in order to meet the research objective of studying the impact of new definitions of the mayors' role in local safety governance (Chapters 8 and 9). These problem definitions or 'sub cases' were selected according to three criteria. First, the problem definition has to represent a *shift* in the definition of local safety problems. Second, the new problem definition has to represent *dominant* in that it had to be frequently mentioned in the different policy documents. Third, the three definitions had to *span the entire research period* between 1990 and 2010. Therefore definitions representing dominant shifts that took place in the beginning (1990-1995), middle (1998-2002) and end (towards 2005- 2010) of this twenty year period were selected. Table 8 summarizes the selection process.

Table 8: Summary of selection process of sub cases

Selection criterion / Sub case	Type of shift	Dominance	Period
Drug-related nuisance	Frequently mentioned definition in the new category, 'drugs'	Category introduced and dominant since 1995. Various forms of drug-related nuisance frequently mentioned within this category ever since.	1990-1995
Domestic violence	Shift within the existing category, 'violence'	Category introduced and dominant since 1995. Problem definition of domestic violence frequently mentioned since 2002	1998-2002
Organized crime	Emergence of a new and category that became immediately dominant	Category introduced and *most* dominant since 2007	2005-2010

Following the application of the selection criteria, *drug-related nuisance*, *domestic violence* and *organized crime* were selected as sub cases representing a dominant shift in the definition of local safety problems. The drug-related nuisance was a new, dominant problem definition that arose in the early 1990s. Domestic violence was frequently mentioned within the category of violence between the late 1990s and early 2000s. The new definition reflected the shift in the focus from violent behavior in public spaces, to violence in more private spheres. The third sub case concerns organized crime, which is an entirely new category that first emerged in 2007. Although it is a new safety problem for local government actors which has not yet been defined in detail, it has been dominant ever since its inception.

4 Summary

The macro study provided a longitudinal analysis of problem definitions in public safety policies. It demonstrated that perspectives of local safety changed drastically between 1990 and 2010. This section summarizes the main shifts in the definition of local safety problems, and in doing so, answers sub question three: *Which safety problems have been listed for local safety governance in the Netherlands and what shifts have taken place between 1990 and 2010?* It can be concluded that the empirical trend of securitizing local issues is characterized by a growing *issue presence* which points at a growing amount of policy attention being paid to local safety problems. Second, securitization led to expansion in the variety of issues defined as local safety concerns. The

trend of *issue expansion* demonstrated how traditional local safety problems as crime and theft were accompanied by a wide variety of new issues ranging from nuisance to terrorism. Finally, the macro study pointed to the *dominance* of categories in the policy discourse, namely c*rime, nuisance, drugs, youth, violence, small annoyances,* and *organized crime.*

Taken together, the macro study provided clear indication of the issues that were successfully securitized as local safety problems between 1990 and 2010. Three issues representing a shift in the definition of local safety problems were selected from the dominant categories, namely drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime. The next chapters describe in-depth case-studies analyzing how these new definitions affected the mayor's position and role in local safety governance.

Chapter 8: Case study findings Haarlem

1 Introduction

This chapter presents the first of two case studies building towards an explanation of how the mayors' role and position in local safety governance have been influenced by shifting definitions of safety problems between 1990 and 2010. By applying the conceptual model onto the empirical sub cases, we answer the fourth sub question: *How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes and why, how, and to what extent did they affect the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance?* This section addresses also the fifth sub question: *Which factors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the course, content and outcome of local framing processes, as well as the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance?* The following sections provide a description of the local framing process, policy strategies and the mayor's actions in relation to the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime in Haarlem.

Before turning to these descriptions of the sub cases, some general information about the setting of these concerns, namely Haarlem, is provided. The municipality of Haarlem is located in the north-western part of the Netherlands and its number of inhabitants hovered around 150,000 in the period between 1990 and 2010. Following the case selection criteria, Haarlem represents a large city that had t[26]hree mayors in the time between 1990 and 2010. Mayor A (Labour Party) has been the mayor from 1985 to 1995, Mayor B (Labour Party) took over until 2006, after which Mayor C (Labour Party) took over as the mayor of Haarlem. As Haarlem is the largest, and most central city[27] in the region of Noord-Holland, its mayors have had command and control of the regional police force since the Police Act of 1994. Prior to the enactment of this act, Dutch mayors had control and command over their own local municipal police force (Police Act, 1957). Table 9 summarizes the extent of the policy attention that has been paid to the three identified sub cases in Haarlem between 1990 and 2010. It shows that each sub case entered the local policy approach at different points in time, and were all framed and reframed multiple times.

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[26]   (CBS – Statline)
       1990: 149,269 inhabitants
       2010: 149,579 inhabitants

[27]   The Police Act 1994 entailed a regional organization structure for the Dutch police and was in place from 1994 until 2011. Within this structure, mayors of the largest municipality in each of the 25 largest regional police forces held several roles relating to the organizational, policy, financial and personnel aspects of the regional police force. A national police force was created by the Police Act of 2012 and is not covered by the research period of 1990-2010.

Table 9: Overview of policy attention paid to the Haarlem sub cases

Mayor	A	A	A	A	A	A/B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B	B/C	C	C	C	C
Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Drugs related nuisance																					
Domestic violence																					
Organised crime																					

initital frame
frame shift
attention for sub case in local policy

The following sub case descriptions provide a detailed account of what these framing processes looked like, how the mayors of Haarlem were expected to handle the new public safety problems of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime, as well as what actions the mayors did and did not undertake in practice. Each sub case analysis is structured according to the key concepts of the conceptual model. Firstly, a general *case description* is provided of the local policy developments, outlining the initial policy frames, as well as the shifts in frame that followed between 1990 and 2020. Thereafter, the conceptual model is applied as a guide for the gathering of all data relevant to the sub cases. This is discussed in the paragraphs that follow. First an overview is provided of the framing process including its triggers, context, discourse coalitions, processes of frame alignment and institutionalization. Thereafter, the mayor's role on paper as well as in practice is described. This entails an indication of the mayor's expected role as well as the level of frame enactment as indicated by his actions or non-action in the practice of local safety governance. This is followed by a discussion of the institutional arrangements of the local as well as supra local policy arena's affecting the course and outcome of local processes of problem and role structuration. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the case of Haarlem. The information gathered in this chapter forms the basis for the case analysis that presents a preliminary answer to sub questions four and five.

2 Sub Case 1 – Drug-related nuisance in Haarlem

The drug-related nuisances has been the subject of policy interventions in Haarlem for over twenty years. The local policy approach to drugs was first outlined in 1993 in the first formal policy document called 'Policy on Coffee Shops' (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993). This policy document listed various forms of nuisance related to soft-drugs to be addressed by local government. The main objective of the initial policy strategy was to decrease the number of coffee shops, and to regulate the usage and trade of soft drugs by implementing several national criteria for coffee shops to follow (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993). This approach continues to be dominant today, albeit with a few minor modifications.

A few years later, in 1997, the local government mentioned a new type of drug-related nuisance in their policy document entitled 'Strategy for Drug Buildings' (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). This type of nuisance was related to the usage and trade of both soft and hard drugs in particular buildings. The policy strategy put forward a new power for Dutch mayors, specifically that to

close down buildings known to be related to drug-related nuisances (Local Government Act, Section 174a). This power was to be implemented in close cooperation with other local authorities including the police, public prosecutor and housing corporations.

The initial 'Policy on Coffee Shops' dating from 1993 was renewed in 1999 (Gemeente Haarlem, 1999). This document adopted a new law from the national 'Opium Act,' allowing mayors to intervene in public building, specifically coffee shops in case of drug-related problems (Opium Act, Section 13B). Again, new actors were mentioned as partners of local government in the local policy document, such as the public health case service, agencies providing care to addicts and youth care.

Finally, another policy called the 'Enforcement[28] Policy for Coffee Shops' introduced a new regime for controlling and sanctioning coffee shops in 2009 (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). This document communicated a formal plan to tighten the existing policy approach to coffee shops, in which the mayor and the police were listed as primary actors. Based on this formal policy, a so called 'integral team' consisting of local authorities, police, juridical actors and the tax agencies had to check several times a year to see whether or not shop owners obeyed the rules, and they had the power to impose sanctions as necessary.

The policy path just described shows at least three key moments at which the policy frame regarding drug-related nuisances underwent substantial change. Table 10 provides a general overview of these policy frames and frame shifts. The initial frame of the early 1990s focused strongly on coffee shops and soft drugs, and sought address from the local government using local and national policy instruments. When Mayor A was the mayor of Haarlem, this initial frame underwent at least two frame shifts related to changing perspectives on the nature of the problem and the preferable solution. First, the diagnostic message of the initial policy frame was expanded in the late 1990s with a brief, but strong, focus on nuisances caused by the use and trade of hard and soft drugs in homes. This local problem was subsequently addressed by Mayor B who rarely used his new powers to address these issues. Second, in the late 2000s, the prognostic message of the policy frame was altered by the introduction of a tight sanctioning regime that was implemented in relation to local coffee shops by the local authorities acting in collaboration with many others. This time, Mayor C was the mayor of Haarlem. All framing processes will be individually described according to the key concepts of the conceptual model in the following three sections.

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[28] In Dutch: handhaving

Table 10: Overview of the policy frames related to the drug-related nuisance in Haarlem between 1990 and 2010.

Time period	Topic policy frame	Policy frame: diagnostic & prognostic message
Early 1990s	Coffee shops and soft drugs	*Diagnostic message:* coffee shops cause various types of nuisance which affect local order and safety *Prognostic message:* local government should regulate the trade of soft drugs and limit the number of coffee shops *(Policy on Coffee Shops 1993, Gemeente Haarlem)*
Late 1990s	Houses and hard drugs	*Diagnostic message:* drugs usage and trading in houses causes nuisance in local neighborhoods *Prognostic message:* the mayor should use his power to close public buildings in case of extreme nuisance, when all other measures have failed. *(Strategy for Drug-related Buildings 1997, Gemeente Haarlem)*
Late 2000s	Behavior of coffee shop owners	*Diagnostic message:* rule violation by coffee shop owners *Prognostic message:* tighter regime of control and sanctioning *(Enforcement Policy for Coffee Shops 2009, Gemeente Haarlem)*

2.1 Coffee shops causing trouble in the early 1990s

In order to understand local policies regarding soft drugs, one has to be acquainted with the 'Dutch Policy of Tolerance'[29] towards soft drugs. Since the 1970s, the Dutch 'Opium Act' has made a distinction between hard drugs and soft drugs (Opium Act, 1976). The former were qualified as illegal, while the latter were tolerated to an extent. The classification of some drugs as soft led to the implication that although trading, production and possession of large quantities soft drugs was illegal, their usage was not. The trade of soft drugs in coffee shops was tolerated and regulated by means of several formal criteria introduced by the Public Prosecutor in 1992 (AHOJ-criteria). These criteria provided detailed instructions under which the trade in soft drugs would be tolerated, such as the amount that can be sold per costumer, and the customer's minimum age. This created a niche market for many coffee shops in the Netherlands, as well as in Haarlem.

2.1.1 Initial framing process

While the trade and use of drugs was generally tolerated, in 1993, Mayor A informed the city council that the number of coffee shops in the city of Haarlem had grown to 22, with 13 of these shops running close to the center (College van B&W, 1993). This rapid expansion in the number of coffee shops triggered a problematization of these coffee shops, and a policy process was initiated that eventually subjected them to local policy programs combining

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[29] In Dutch: gedoogbeleid.

national policy guidelines and local policy ambitions. Figure 11 provides a general overview of this initial framing process using the conceptual model.

Figure 11: Initial framing of the drug-related nuisance in Haarlem in the early 1990s

Discourse coalitions & frame alignment
The drug-related problems were first discussed in a modest policy debate that was carried out in in anticipation of Haarlem's first official coffee shop related policy document (Haarlem, 1993). Transcripts of the local council and commission indicate the worries of the mayor and several council members in relation to the presence of coffee shops and soft drugs. From the content of individual communications, and the interactions between key policy actors in the local debates, it is possible to distinguish two local discourse coalitions.

Discourse coalition A: inhabitants, mayor & council members
The first and largest coalition consisted of Mayor A, local inhabitants and various members who saw the nuisance caused by local coffee shops as a safety problem. It started with citizens expressing their feeling of being in danger to local government, and with complaints registered with the police.

These were eventually used as a justification, or a call for action by Mayor A: *"Inhabitants experience various forms of nuisance caused by coffee shops. Although this nuisance might objectively be qualified as not severe, it causes fear and feelings of unsafely among inhabitants. [...] a structural approach to coffee shops in the entire city is needed"* (Mayor A in College B&W, 1993 – translation RP).

The mayor as well as various council members described coffee shops as a safety problem causing nuisance, feelings of unsafety and endangering the local quality of life[30]. They strongly favored local government taking an active role in regulating local coffee shops. During a council meeting, the mayor proposed to reduce the number of coffee shops in Haarlem in order to *"limit the nuisance and increase the local quality of life"* (Mayor A, Gemeenteraad, 1993 - translation RP). Council members supported the mayor. One council member described the mayor's proposal as *"offering maximal possibility to regulate the amount of coffee shops and prevent the soft drugs circuit from falling into illegal and criminal spheres [..] this is of outmost importance"* (Council Member Bakker – Gemeenteraad, 1993 – translation RP). His view clearly resembled the central government's policy of tolerance toward coffee shops, but strict regulation. Local actors feared that the alternative solution of forbidding coffee shops would push soft drugs into illegal and uncontrollable spheres. Mayor A clearly stressed the importance of not starting a war on coffee shops when regulating their numbers so as not to risk pushing towards illegal and criminal activities (Commissie ABZ, 1993). It is this acceptance of the existence of coffee shops and the sale of soft drugs that most clearly divided the frames of coalitions A and B.

Discourse coalition B: single actor coalition
A single council member representing the Christian Democratic party (CDA) expressed his strong objections to the policy of reducing and regulating coffee shops as proposed by coalition A. Similar to the members of this coalition, she problematized coffee shops as follows during a council meeting: *"The constant usage of soft-drugs has negative consequences for physical and mental health"* (Council Member Elshout, Gemeenteraad 1993 – translation RP). She focused keenly on the health problems caused by the use of soft drugs, and proposed an alternative approach, namely the adoption of a firm, anti-drug policy: *"All coffee shops in Haarlem should immediately be closed [..] this will decrease crime as well"* (Council Member Elshout, Gemeenteraad 1993 – translation RP).

The initial policy debate shows the process of frame alignment and frame bridging that occurred between local members of coalition A, and the more national Dutch policy of tolerance. Members of discourse coalition A shared the basic assumption that coffee shops cause a nuisance, but that this should be addressed by regulation, and not an outright ban. This points at a process of frame bridging between compatible, but formerly disconnected national policy

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[30]   In Dutch: leefbaarheid

ideas, and a local coalition that had significant agenda setting power. This coalition had the majority of votes in the city council, and thus ruled out Coalition B, which was effectively that of a single actor.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
The policy debate as just described was followed by the introduction of Haarlem's first policy plan to address the drug-related nuisance, 'Policy on Coffee Shops' (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993) which laid out the policy perspective on coffee shops, and the way to approach them. The local city council approved this policy on the 14th of June, 1993 (Gemeenteraad, 1993). The *diagnostic message* of this policy frame points at the various forms of nuisance caused by coffee shops, such as the intimidation of local inhabitants, noise, feelings of insecurity amongst local inhabitants, parking related nuisances and litter on the streets (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993). As stated in the policy document, these types of nuisance are caused specifically by the trade of soft drugs, and would endangering the quality of life for those living nearby the coffee shops.

The *prognostic message* of the policy document was *"to restrict the number of coffee shops in which soft drugs are sold and used."* The policy goal was specifically *"to decrease nuisance and increase feelings of safety"* (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993:1– translation RP). The policy listed multiple already existing local administrative and juridical instruments, such as the rules set out for hotels, restaurants and bars. It also pointed to a new policy strategy to decrease the number of coffee shops from 22 to 15, of which 10 would be allowed in the city center. This reduction in the number of coffee shops was to be carried out by the setting of specific criteria such as a maximal amount of stock, and a minimum age for customers. These local criteria for regulating coffee shops were inspired by national guidelines for coffee shops created by the Ministry of Justice (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993; OM, 1992).

The diagnostic and prognostic message of the policy frame as just described clearly follows discourse coalition A's perspective on coffee shops. It also resembles the national policy ideas. Haarlem's initial policy strategy was thus designed in such a way that it fit into the boundaries set by the national 'policy of tolerance'. This implies that the frame of the mayor, several council members and inhabitants, and the national policy ideas became *institutionalized into the policy frame* of Haarlem's first formal policy on the drug-related nuisance.

2.1.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
Mayor A was granted a role in the first formal policy strategy, and he undertook various actions in practice. Although data from the early 1990s is limited, the following section presents the clues derived from the policy documents of the mayor's expected role, and her role in practice.

Expected role
The new policy strategy regarding coffee shops was combined with existing policy instruments from policy domains outside of public safety (recreation, urban planning). Non-drug related problems that arose in relation to the coffee

shops, such as their violation of closing hours, were to be addressed and sanctioned by the mayor and civil servants based on other existing policy instruments (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993). For example, the set up of a coffee shop required a license, and the regulations for receiving this license was based on that for hotels, restaurants and bars. Since 1993, nuisances arising from the use of soft-drugs was regulated by means of the new policy strategy for coffee shops which mentioned the mayor as the central actor whose task it is to give out permits, as well as to temporarily or permanently close coffee shops when owners flout these rules (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993).

Role in practice: enactment
The mayor's role in practice appears from the transcripts of local government meetings, internal correspondences and policy reports to be an active one, both in the policy design stage, and during implementation. The mayor played a central role especially during the policy preparation phase, opening up dialogue with both local authorities and the coffees shop owners. Several transcripts from both council and commission meetings indicate that she chaired large meetings with all these actors, some of whom were members of the city council, council commission, police, coffee shop owners and residents (Commissie ABZ, 1993; Gemeenteraad, 1993). Although no data was available on the mayor's role in policy implementation, we assume that Mayor A was involved directly in closing several shops since the number of coffee shops decreased in this period. This was confirmed in interviews with a former civil servant from Haarlem (civil servant 1, interview April 2012). It can be concluded then that the mayor's expected role of regulating coffee shops was enacted to a high level in practice.

2.1.3 Institutional arrangements
As briefly summarized, factors from both the local and national policy arena played a role in Haarlem's very fist policy on drug-related nuisances.

Local arena
At least two local factors played a major role in the initial policy process. First, the initial framing process was triggered by local cognitive aspects, more specifically, local knowledge of the growing number of coffee shops. Second, the frame of discourse coalition A was eventually institutionalized into the formal policy strategy 'Policy Coffee Shops' partly because of the distribution of resources in this local policy network. Coalition's dominance of the policy debate and strategy can be partly explained by the composition of this coalition which comprised the local mayor and a majority of the local city council. These actors had formal powers to shape the policy agenda and make policy decisions. As discussed in the next section, coalition A took advantage of a process of frame bridging through which salient ideas in the national arena were used to support their policy frame.

National arena
The content of the local policy debate, and the resulting policy strategy were both connected to regulative aspects of the national policy context. Local

policy actors referred to the national 'Policy of Tolerance' in the local policy debates. Only those frames that were compatible with national policy ideas made it into the dominant discourse coalition and policy documents. The prognostic message of the formal policy document subsequently copied the national criteria for coffee shops (OM, 1992), with 'Policy Coffee Shops' (Gemeente Haarlem, 1993) effectively adopting and implementing national policy tools.

2.2 New powers for the mayor to tackle hard drugs in the late 1990s

In 1997, a new power was created for Dutch mayors to address drug-related nuisances (Local Government Act, Section 174a). Since that time, all Dutch mayors can close down buildings when local order is harmed. Examples of nuisances that could be classified as harming local order are drug trading and prostitution. The mayor is supposed to use this power when all other means of addressing nuisance have run out (NGB, 2008). It is the introduction of this new power that triggered an expansion of the formal drug policy frame in Haarlem.

2.2.1 Frame expansion process

In the late 1990s, local authorities in Haarlem introduced a new policy document to tackle the drug-related nuisance named the 'Strategy for Drug-Related Buildings' (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). The existing policy frame was expanded with the introduction of this new document. The framing process surrounding this expansion was triggered by the initial expansion of the formal policy frame on paper, which was followed by the initiation of a modest policy debate. This policy subsequently saw a low level of enactment by the mayor in practice. Figure 12 summarizes this process of frame expansion. The next sections present a chronological description of each phase.

Figure 12: Frame expansion of the drug-related nuisance in Haarlem in the late 1990s

National arena

Local Government Act 174a: Close houses

Institutionalizes

Local policy debate

Policy strategy

'Strategy for Drug Buildings' 1997

Coalition A
Police, mayor, council members

Local policy network

NO enactment

FULL enactment

Policy in practice

Mayor hardly uses new power

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization

The new power for Dutch mayors to address drug houses was soon adopted into the local policy document, 'Strategy for Drug Buildings' (Haarlem, 1997). The goal of the overall policy was to close down buildings in cases of severe nuisance threatening local order: *"A building in which drugs are used and/or sold can cause severe nuisance […] which might disturb local order. The objective of this approach is to stop nuisance causing activities in order to restore local order. The closing or clearance of a building by the mayor is the ultimate way to achieve this goal"* (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997- translation RP).

The *diagnostic message* of the initial policy frame was expanded in relation to the nuisance caused by selling and using hard drugs in public buildings. The policy document claimed that *"drugs traded in neighborhoods frequently bring about severe forms of disturbances of local order, and a devaluation of the living environment" (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997 - translation RP).* In order to address this nuisance, the new power introduced by the national government was adopted in the local policy strategy the same year.

Consequently, the *prognostic message* regarding the drug-related nuisance was expanded. However, it was stressed that this was a power that the mayor should implement with great restraint and great care: *"The mayor's power is of the last resort, to be wielded when all other means to limit the nuisance have run out. This implies as well that once a procedure to close has started and the effect has been created, the procedure no longer needs to be continued" (ibid).*

In contrast to the initial framing forces, the new power for Dutch mayors was adopted by local policy makers without much policy debate. Local actors did not attempt to 'customize' or 'shape' the debate according to their desires or particular frames. A local information brochure reported that the new policy tool related to the drug-related nuisance in buildings was being directly adopted by the local authorities in close cooperation with the police, Ministry of Justice and housing corporations (Gemeente Haarlem, 2000). Civil servants involved in the policy reflected in individual interviews that these powers were likely not discussed by the board of mayor and aldermen, but simply adopted as a new local policy tool (civil servant 2, Interview April 2012). This claim is confirmed by an examination of transcripts of local council and commission meetings that took place in 1997, and in which the problem of drugs was mentioned. No mention was found to the drug houses, or to the mayor's new power to close them down in the data set on Haarlem. This implies that the power to close buildings was institutionalized directly into Haarlem's local policy plan in the form forwarded by the central government.

Discourse coalitions & frame alignment
However, after this new policy strategy came into effect, members of a discourse coalition (made up of the police, the mayor and a council member) were recorded to have commented on the matter, and the formalization of this new power into local policy triggered a minor policy debate. A single council member briefly mentioned the drug nuisance as it pertained to buildings as a safety problem (councillor Nietshoven, Commissie ABZ 1999). The police and the mayor made further references to drugs and drug-related buildings once or twice as well (Commissie OWSR, 1999). Their individual frames aligned in that they all described the drug nuisance related to buildings as a minor, or even nonexistent problem at that time (the late 1990s). As Mayor B said in an interview, *"There were few problems with drugs usage or trading in houses"* (Mayor B, Interview- August 2012 translation RP). The police confirmed this view by stating that *"arrangements have been made, and there is no nuisance anymore"* (Police officer Lodder, Commissie OWSR, 1999).
` There was no processes of frame alignment between local discourse coalitions in Haarlem in the late 1990s. There was only one coalition that ever referred to the topic of drugs houses, and this group appeared to downplay the problem. Because a substantial policy debate on the use and trade of drugs in drug houses appears not to have taken place, we conclude that this was not regarded as a major policy problem in Haarlem in the late 1990s. However, this does not necessarily mean that the drug-related nuisance did not manifest in buildings in the neighborhoods of Haarlem.

2.2.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice

An expansion of the prognostic message through the addition of the mayor's new power broadened the mayor's overall scope of potential interventions. In this section, we look at both the mayor's expected role on paper, and his actions in practice.

Expected role

The policy document, 'Strategy on Drugs Buildings' (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997) described a local working group consisting of the police, housing corporations and the local government who screened cases that could be subject to the enactment of the mayoral power to close the building down (Drugspandennota, 1997). The mayor was expected to use this new power in close cooperation with the various public actors: *"The mayor decides to close a house, building [...] and the police, public prosecutor and landlord deliver evidence to support this procedure" (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997-vertaling RP). The mayor also decides on the duration of the closing, with the penalty being* light in the case of first offenders, and tough when the problems occur more frequently (ibid).

Role in practice: low level of frame enactment

The mayor rarely used his power to close down buildings in practice. There are few known cases in which the mayor either warned of such an interventions or implemented it as such. Multiple respondents including Mayor B himself acknowledged that the power to close down buildings was hardly used (civil servant 1, 2, 3 and mayor B, interviews 2012). The data set collected for this case study reflects only a single report of the mayor sending a letter to a citizen communicating that he will close his house if the local authorities received another report of a drug-related nuisance arising because of him (Gemeente Haarlem, 2000). Such a limited use of this power demonstrates a low level of frame enactment. The mayor's actions were in line with the frames of the mayor and police who did not recognize drug-related houses as a persistent problem in the local society (discourse coalition a) .

2.2.3 Institutional arrangements

As just described, various factors arising in the local and national policy arena played a role in Haarlem's very fist policy process about the drug-related nuisance. In this section, we briefly show that while the national policy context tends to structure the form that policies take on paper, it is factors relevant to the local arena that play a greater role in shaping the policy in practice.

National arena

The policy frame adopted by the 'Strategy for Drug Buildings' clearly mirrored that of the national policy tools. Using the terminology of the conceptual model, it can be said that regulative aspects of the national policy context triggered a formal frame expansion. The introduction by the national government of the new mayoral power to close buildings led to the creation of a specific policy document regarding drugs in buildings (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997) that was strongly based on the national policy strategy as laid down in

the Local Government Act (Section 174a). This points at a rather top down process in which national policy ideas were directly institutionalized into local policy plans, thereby expanding the local policy frame.

Local arena

Although national acts and policy strategies have influenced the policy frame, this expanded frame is hardy enacted in practice. This shows that cognitive aspects (frames) in the local policy network structured the practice of policy implementation. The fact that the drug nuisance in buildings was not recognized as a pressing problem by most of the key policy players (mayor, police, civil servants united by their membership in coalition A) explains the subsequently low level of frame enactment by the mayor. However, there was a higher level of enactment on alternative policy frames in the local policy network with which the mayor and key players were more aligned. This shows that cognitive aspects, specifically the frames of actors who hold the agenda setting power and responsibility for implementation, strongly affects the policy in practice. It is this local power that then counterbalances the more formal and national policy frames.

2.3 Towards a regime of tight control and sanctions: the late 2000s

The local policy frame regarding the drug-related nuisance underwent a third shift in the late 2000s. The national policy towards soft drugs started to change slightly at this time as an advisory committee appointed by the ministers of public health, as well as of justice and interior affairs concluded that the policy of tolerance was in need of revision (Commission Van den Donk, 2009). This commission stated that amongst other measures, the usage of drugs among youngsters should be addressed more firmly, drug-related tourism should be reduced, and organized crime related to the illegal production and marketing of soft drugs should be combated in a professional and structured manner. This was followed by the introduction of various measures by the national government that signaled a move towards more restrictive policy interventions towards coffee shops and drugs in general (Kabinet Rutte I, 2010). Coffee shops were required in 2012 to be located at least 350 meters away from schools (Tweede Kamer, 2011), customers were obliged to registers as member of a coffee shops in order to buy soft drugs in 2012 (only the local Dutch residents could do this). However, this ruling was soon abolished by a new government who took control later in 2012. Nonetheless, the spirit of these expansions continued as a policy program was implemented to address the problem of criminal networks producing and trading drugs (Taskforce-see case Breda).

2.3.1 Frame hardening process

The frame shift began with the mayor undertaking several policy actions in practice. These actions triggered a policy debate that eventually resulted in a formalization of the policy approach already in practice. A new policy document called 'Enforcement Policy for Coffee Shops' (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009) indicated a formal frame shift towards tighter control and sanctioning of

the rules for coffee shop owners. This overall process of frame change is presented in figure 13.

Figure 13: The shift in the frame for drug-related nuisance that occurred in the late 2000s in Haarlem

The mayor's actions in practice - Part 1
When a new mayor came into office in 2006 he started a tight regime of control and sanctioning, or as he explained himself: *"You start as the mayor and then you want to get an oversight of what is going on in the city. [...] When controlling coffee shops, we were frequently told of rule violations. I thought: that is not a good thing, we need to strengthen our policy interventions. This resulted in quite a number of coffee shops being closed"* (Mayor C, interview August 2012 - translation RP). Many of the civil servants who served as sources for this study explained that shortly after the new mayor took office, integral teams were created who visited coffee shops and pointed to rule violations (Civil servant 3, interview July 2012). As reported in both the reports of council meetings and in interviews with the mayor himself, the

mayor actively closed several coffee shops for specific periods in late 2000s (Gemeenteraad, 3 april 2008; Mayor C, interview August 2012). The mayor's decision to close down certain coffee shops resulted in the enactment of several juridical procedures. This generated both support as well as criticism in city council meetings (Gemeenteraad, 2008/9/11, Commissie Bestuur, 2011). The introduction of this tight reign on coffee shops eventually led to a policy debate in which local authorities and coffee shop owners were clearly divided into several discourse coalitions.

Discourse coalitions & frame alignment
The tightened reign on coffee shops triggered a policy debate in which various actors, such as council members, the mayor, as well as coffee shop owners, expressed their differing perspectives on the problems (diagnostic message) and solutions (prognostic message) relevant to the drug-related nuisance. Based on the content of their policy frames as well as their interactions, four discourse coalitions can be distinguished. This section discusses their appearance in the debate in chronological order.

Discourse coalition A: mayor
The first coalition consisted of the mayor. The violation of rules for coffee shops was problematic in the view of the new mayor, and in need of a strict regime of control and sanctions: "*My opinion is that coffee shop policies must be strict, but fair*" (Mayor C - Gemeenteraad, 2011 – translation RP). The mayor explicitly pointed at the frequency with which shop owners violated the rules, such as by selling drugs to youngsters, or exceeding the stock limit. In order to address these problems, the mayor favored a tight regime of control and sanctioning of the coffee shops.

Discourse Coalition B: individual coffee shop owners
The second discourse coalition consisted of a few individual coffee shop owners who were not satisfied with the policy interventions of the mayor and local authorities. Some of them started a juridical procedure to fight the early closing penalty inflicted because they exceeded the maximal amount of stock (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). However, according to the local mayor, these suits were all won by the government (Mayor C, interview August 2012). Nevertheless, a judge concluded that the local government should create a formal policy document that clearly outlines the rules and sanctions to provide a basis for fair implementation and clarity for shop owners.

Discourse coalition C: other council members
When the new coffee shop related policy was eventually discussed in the city council in 2009 and again in 2011, various council members strongly critiqued the tough stance that had been adopted (Gemeenteraad, 2009/11). The mayor himself acknowledged this criticism: "*Many of you [council members] think I am way too strict*" (Mayor C, Gemeenteraad, 2011 – translation RP). Council members representing the Labour Pary (PvdA), the Socialist Party (SP) and the local Action Party (Actiepartij) communicated their preference to return to the older, more tolerant approach to coffee shops in Haarlem (ibid).

Discourse coalition D: united coffee shop owners
After the implementation of the formally expanded 'Policy Plan for Coffee shops' in 2009, local coffee shop owners became more willing to contribute to the policy attempts to regulate their businesses. Haarlem's Association of Coffee Shop Owners (Team Haarlemse Coffeeshops) explicitly stated that they were making an effort to obey the rules, and that they wished to cooperate with the local authorities: *"The coffee shops in Haarlem want to cooperate with each other, local authorities and the police, and they do their utmost best to obey the rules"* (Miss Alphen - Commissie Bestuur, 2011- translation RP). This helping hand was offered during a commission meeting at the city hall to which coffee shop owners were invited as well.

Overall, this policy debate shows little frame alignment apart from the initiation of a dialogue between local authorities and coffee shops owners. However, the third round of framing saw a far greater degree of frame bridging occurring between the two local discourse collations. Through this process, the individual frames of the mayor and the council (coalition A) and the coalition of coffee shop owners (coalition D) became more aligned as a result of their willingness to engage in dialogue and to cooperate. As explained in the next section, this enabled the mayor and coffee shop owners to pool their resources and ideas on the regulation of coffee shop in preparation for the subsequent establishment of the local 'quality label'.

Policy frame and discourse institutionalization
The judge's verdict in favor of the government eventually resulted in the formulation of the new 'Enforcement Policy for Coffee Shops' in which the tight sanctioning of coffee shops that was already in practice became formalized (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). This document did not describe the problem of the drug-related nuisance at all. Instead, it focused solely on the *prognostic message* of the policy frame, which was clearly focused on controlling and sanctioning coffee shops: *"With the creation and announcement of this policy, the mayor is able to unambiguously, persistently and consequently address the violations of the policy rules for coffee shops. The mayor aims to tighten the local controlling regime to ensure that the rules are obeyed by the coffee shops. The policy communicates firm sanctions in case of rule violation" (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009 – translation RP).* As before, a coffee shop would be closed either temporally or permanently as a result of rule violation, but the new policy formalized the period of closure that would apply for various types of rule violation. In doing so, local authorities explicitly demonstrated their new determination to address the drug-related nuisance through the previously defined prognostic message of regulating soft drugs and coffee shops.

In comparing this renewed policy frame to the frames presented by the discourse coalitions, a process of frame amplification becomes apparent during which the frames of the mayor supported by that of the council members (coalition A) became formalized or institutionalized.

2.3.2 The mayors role on paper and in practice –part 2

The policy practice in place prior to this formalization continued after. In the following sections, we look again at the mayor's expected role and role in practice when addressing the drug-related nuisance after its passing.

Expected role

According to the formal policy document, the expected role for the mayor in this tight regime of control and sanctioning was to exert 'administrative power'[31] over public buildings as outlined in Section 13b of the Opium Act. The mayor was allowed to determine the sanction periods in case of serious disturbances of local order, and he could empower the police to physically close a coffee shop on his behalf.

Role in practice: Frame enactment through formalization

Once the new regime towards coffee shops was formalized in a policy document the mayor undertook various administrative and operational actions. He made a great effort to justify his new policy approach. He informed the local council and commission ABZ of the new policy, published the 'Enforcement Policy for Coffee Shops' in the local newspaper, issued a press statement, and sent a copy of the policy to all shop owners (Commissie ABZ, 2009; Besluitenlijstlijst N&W, 2009).

      Once the mayor deemed the tightening of the regime to be successful in reducing the number of rule violations, he began to personally re-engage in dialogue with the shop owners (Gemeenteraad, 2011; Mayor C, interview August 2012). This resulted in multiple meetings of the local government, police and the association of coffee shop owners in 2010, 2011 and 2012. The coffee shop owners were encouraged by the mayor to develop a 'Quality Label' for coffee shops that he explicitly described as a local alternative to the national coffee shop club card (ibid). The mayor can be said to have enacted the policy frame to a high degree as it was in effect, a formal institutionalization of his individual frame. This might be better described as a process of formalization of policy interventions in practice rather than a process of frame enactment since the mayor had already introduced the strict regime of control and had been sanctioning coffee shops for a significant period before such actions were formalized in the official policy documents.

2.3.3 Institutional arrangements

Various factors salient in the local and national policy arena influenced the processes of frame expansion as just described.

Local arena

The shift was triggered and steered primarily by dynamics in the local policy context. The entrance of a new and powerful actor in the local policy network altered the normative aspects of local policy practices. Mayor C' own rather intolerant stance (his personal frame) on the nuisance caused by coffee shops was mirrored by the tough new policy practices he instated. A shift in the

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[31]   In Dutch: bestuursdwang

composition of the local network can thus have huge consequences for policy practices, especially when new actors have significant powers to shape local agendas and implement policy tools. The tougher new practices were further formalized because of the attempt of local coffee shop owners to legally dispute them. Thus, regulative aspects in the form of juridical procedures within the local policy network brought about the formalization of the tightened stance in a new policy for the management of coffee shops.

National arena

This process of frame hardening was not directly affected by factors of the national policy context. However, the tightening of the local policy on coffee shops fit the national movement that took place in the late 2000s towards a more restrictive approach to soft drugs. These local policy strategies showed a bottom up process. Although the local quality label for coffee shops was created to address local problems as well to foster greater dialogue between local authorities and coffee shop owners, the mayor held additional ambitions to present the label as a best practice, or a local alternative to the national government policy tool of issuing membership cards to customers of coffee shops (Mayor C, interview August 2012).

2.4 Research findings sub case 1

Reconstructing the initial process through which the drug-related nuisance was framed as a local safety problem, and the two frame shifts that followed brought to light several aspects of how frame shifts affect the mayor's role and position in local safety governance.

First of all it became evident that three major shifts in the local policy frame on drug-related nuisances that took place between 1990 and 2010. The diagnostic message of the policy strategy was initially confined to nuisances caused by coffee shops (1992), but this frame was later expanded to include nuisances arising from the usage and trade of hard drugs in public buildings (1997). The focus shifted a third time subsequently toward the neglect of rules by coffee shop owners (2009). The prognostic message of the policy strategy was initially just to regulate coffee shops for the first time (1993), but this was later expanded by the mayoral power to close down buildings in case the usage of hard drugs created a public nuisance (1997). This expansion of power too place mostly on paper, and was hardly used in practice, but the focus subsequently shifted towards tighter control and sanctioning of rule violations by shop owners (2009). As the frames in the policy debate and strategy changed between 1990 and 2010, so did the mayor's role and position. The mayor's formal powers were expanded with the introduction of new powers to close down buildings in the case of drug-related nuisances.

Secondly, the local policy arena expanded with the introduction of many new actors, both those listed in the policy strategies, as well as those who were collaborating with the mayor in practice. As a result, the mayor's position changed from that of a solo actor assisted mainly by local government actors (1993 - initial frame), to one of close cooperation with many others outside of local government. The mayor had to work with many others in order

to close down buildings (1997 frame expansion) and control and sanction coffee shops (2009 frame shift), including the police, juridical actors, housing corporations, residents, and coffee shop owners.

Thirdly, the mayor's role has changed over the years from merely one of policy formulation and enforcement policy (initial frame) to one of more direct involvement in that the mayor had a key role in approving the closure and sanctioning of such premises. This expansion in both the policy frame as well as the mayor's position and role in practice can be explained by an interplay of actors and factors located in both the local and national policy arena.

Finally, the application of the conceptual model on this very first sub case leads us to conclude that the local framing process is triggered and shaped by factors from both the local and national policy context. This sub case showed in particular that issues in local society as well as national policies initiated a local policy process during which the drug-related nuisance was framed and (re)framed as a local safety problem.

In general, national policy ideas affect the interaction and outcome of local framing processes involving divergent discourse coalitions. This sub case demonstrated that the frames of the local discourse coalitions frequently merged with national policy frames. The frames of the local discourse coalitions that were in line with national policy strategies ended up dominating the local policy debates, and were eventually institutionalized into the local policies. This resulted in local policy strategies resembling national policy instruments.

Also, regulative aspects of the national policy became institutionalized into the formal policy frame, thereby directly shaping the mayor's expected role. The mayor's expected role in local safety governance was partially shaped by the national policy arena providing new powers for the mayor and incentives for a strict policy strategy to coffee shops. However, while the formal policy approach was heavily structured by national rules and regulations, the mayor's role in practice was largely affected by dynamics within the local policy network. This sub case showed that there can be a difference between policies on paper, and how they are enforced in practice. The availability of formal powers created by the national government are not necessarily implemented in practice, even if these powers are officially adopted into local policy. The power to close buildings provides a clear example of this.

Finally, the distribution of powers in the local policy network matters. This sub case revealed that actors with formal powers to set the local policy agenda and make policy decisions tend to see their problem definitions and preferred solutions represented in formal policy documents. Likewise, the frame of the most powerful discourse coalition was always enacted in practice. The mayor's actions in practice were always in line with the frames of local discourse coalitions consisting of himself and other powerful actors such as the police, even when their individual frames contrasted with national and/or other local policy frames. This points at a certain a level of freedom for the Dutch mayor to implement a local 'tailor-made' policy approach that suits his personal frame in the process of policy implementation.

3 Sub case 2 – Domestic violence in Haarlem

Violence against women has long been a topic of interest for the local government in Haarlem. Here follows a short history of this local policy domain, followed by a description of the initial policy frame, and the frame shifts that followed between 1990 and 2020.

Housing the largest number of inhabitants in the region, 'Kennemerland' Haarlem is considered the central city of this region[32]. Being the main city in this region comes with specific responsibilities as well as monetary resources from the national government to manage a number of public services for the region. This included the creation of a regional shelter for female victims of domestic violence and their children.

Long before a formal policy program was first created, multiple organizations had been united in a lose network of professional organizations to address various social problems, including that of domestic violence. This 'Network Against Sexual Violence' provided shelter and mental health care to female victims of sexual violence and included collaborations amongst social workers, women's shelters and the Institute for Ambulant Mental Health Care. At the same time, other organizations, such as Youth Care, the Public Health Service and the Child Care and Protection Board were united in a regional prevention platform dealing with child abuse as well as children who use violence against their parents.

In the early days of Haarlem's policy approach to domestic violence, Mayor B was the mayor. In 1997, Haarlem introduced the policy 'Violence in the Family', specifically aimed at addressing *domestic violence* (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997), becoming the first city in the Netherlands to do so (Trimbos, 2005). Haarlem's initial policy plan described the inclusion of over twenty organizations from both the social and safety domains who would cooperate to address domestic violence (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). Examples of such organizations are the Public Health Care Service, the public prosecutor and social workers.

This cooperation initiated a big spin off in the local policy domain of domestic violence, and many organizations, policy projects and instruments were subsequently introduced. For example, informational phone services were set up for victims, perpetrators as well as any others who sought to report or ask questions about domestic violence. This was followed by a so called 'Abused Women Active Response' (AWARE) system which was introduced in the early 2000s. AWARE provides a mobile emergency system by which the police are alerted in cases of domestic violence. Other efforts included that of a legal aid service for victims, a project studying the cultural and other factors contributing to cases of domestic violence, a training program for police officers and others to recognize and address domestic violence, and platforms for the cooperation of multiple organizations in these matters. Many more initiatives followed in the years thereafter (Trimbos, 2005).

In the late 2000s, the Haarlem's local policy approach to domestic violence was formally expanded to encompass the regional policy arena.

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[32]   In Dutch: centrumgemeente.

Representatives of several local municipalities and multiple professional organizations signed a formal collaboration agreement (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010), and as the largest city in the region, Haarlem was assigned the role of coordinator (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009/10). The creation of this regional collaboration agreement was triggered by the new policy tool of temporary home restrictions to committers of domestic violence as introduced by national government in 2009. By adopting the mayoral power of home restrictions into the regional policy approach (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009), the mayors in the region Kennemerland were for the first time granted formal powers to address domestic violence. The mayor of Haarlem at the time was Mayor C.

The policy path just described shows at least two key moments when the policy frame regarding domestic violence underwent substantial changes. The first was in 1997 when Haarlem's local policy approach, 'Violence in the Family' first described domestic violence as a policy problem. In doing so, the existing focus on domestic violence as an important social problem was augmented by a focus on public safety. In terms of framing, there was an expansion of the problem from one solely relating to female victims, to one that concerned children and perpetrators as well (Gemeente Haarlem, 2007). As a result, the existing prognostic message of the policy frame of crisis response and help for victims was expanded to include an emphasis on prevention and the prosecution of perpetrators.

The second key moment occurred in the late 2000s when Haarlem's local policy approach was formally expanded to the region. The prognostic measures that were accepted regionally included in 2009 the power of the mayor to issue temporary home restrictions to offenders of domestic violence. Table 11 provides an overview of the shifts that took place in Haarlem's policy frame on domestic violence between 1990 and 2010.

Table 11: Overview of the policy frames on domestic violence between 1990 and 2010 in Haarlem

Time period	Topic policy frame	Policy frame: diagnostic & prognostic message
Late 1990s	Domestic violence as a policy problem	*Diagnostic message:* Various forms of violence are considered both a social and a safety problem. *Prognostic message:* Combine shelter and social support structures for victims with a dual emphasis on prevention as well as a prosecution of committers. *(Violence in the Family, Gemeente Haarlem, 2007)*
Late 2000s	The mayor's power of issuing home restrictions included in the regional approach	*Diagnostic message:* Various forms of violence considered both a social and a safety problem. *Prognostic message:* Regional approach combining existing policies and the work of existing organisations with new powers, including that of temporary home restrictions by the mayor. Coordination by municipality of Haarlem. *(Collabaration Agreement Safety Region Kennemerland, Gemeente Haarlem, 2010)*

3.1 Safety-related perspectives on domestic violence in the late 1990s

Before 1996, no national policy rules or programs were in place that specifically targeted domestic violence. However, a number of widely publicized incidents resulting in the death of two former residents of a woman's shelter in 1996 triggered a heightened level of policy attention for domestic violence in Haarlem. While Haarlem created its first policy approach in this time, the macro study (described in Chapter 7) indicates that the national government only started to label domestic violence as a local safety problem in 2002.

3.1.1 Initial framing process

The process was started effectively with a news bulletin that mentioned two lethal instances of domestic violence in Haarlem.[33] Triggered by these incidents, the local shelter for females organized a conference on domestic violence during which an interdisciplinary working group was formed which had the task of putting together their vision for addressing domestic violence in Haarlem. A local process of policy debate and design followed, and eventually resulted in Haarlem's first policy document regarding domestic violence being accepted by the local triangle consultation as well as the board of mayor and aldermen in 1997 (College B&W, 1997). This local policy practice in Haarlem inspired the national government as well as other local governments in the Netherland to pay attention to domestic violence and create their own policy plans. Figure X summarizes the initial framing process which was triggered locally, inspired by international policy practices and copied nationally.

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[33]   Almost every policy document regarding domestic violence in Haarlem refers to the death of two women due to domestic violence in 1996.

Figure 14: Initial framing process of the problem of domestic violence in Haarlem in the late 1990s

Discourse coalitions & frame alignment
In preparation of the first formal policy 'Violence in the Family' (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997), various actors expressed their individual frames of domestic violence as a policy problem, as well as their views of a suitable policy. Looking at the contents of the individual frames, as well as interactions between policy actors, two discourse coalitions can be identified, the professional pioneers and local authorities.

Discourse coalition A: Alliance of professional pioneers
After the two lethal incidents of domestic violence in 1996, several professionals from different organizations voluntarily joined forces. Key actors within this alliance included the head of the local safety department of Haarlem, the director of the woman's shelter, a representative of the Ministry of Justice, and someone representing Youth Care and the Public Health Service (Gemeente Haarlem, 2003). Together these individuals organized a conference as well as multiple meetings which eventually resulted in the policy program 'Violence in the Family' (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). Many of the interviewees described this group as '*pioneers*' in the policy domain: *"It was a matter of the right people being at the right place at the right time [...] According to them, domestic violence was not acceptable and government*

should do something about it [...] *That was an important starting point"* (employee public health service, interview July 2012 – translation RP).

Written correspondence between these pioneers revealed that they initiated a working group in which actors from the local government (Department of Order and Public Safety), regional organizations (a women's shelter and the Public Health Service) and representatives from the national government were invited to participate (Werkgroep geweld in het gezin, 1996a-d). Although the transcripts of their meetings do not show any fundamental disagreement or debates on how the problem of domestic violence should be defined, each party appeared to have a different focus in their proposed efforts to address domestic violence, each related to their particular background. The Child Care and Protection Board focused on children, the police focused on female victims, and the Department of Order and Public Safety focused on violence in general. Nevertheless, the various actors found in each other the common recognition of domestic safety as a policy problem with many manifestations. This coalition was further united by their normative standpoint which was to break with the traditional convention that governments should not intervene in people's homes. Overall, the policy project was intended to be an "*eye opener"* and a "*conversation starter among professional organizations and local politics*" (Gemeente Haarlem 1997:2).

The perspective of domestic violence as a safety problem was inspired by foreign policies on this matter: *"Domestic violence in the Netherlands is hardy considered a safety issue [...] In England as well as in Canada and New Zealand, various domestic violence interventions form a key pillar of the public safety policy"* (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997: 5/6 – translation RP). The head of the safety department of local government was described by multiple respondents to this study as a key player in this coalition (employee public health service, civil servant 6 and Mayor B – Interviews 2012). He gathered international policy examples and proved to be successful in arguing for the adoption of a safety perspective on domestic violence that included a preventative focus, as well as a combined focus on both victim and perpetrators. See the description of the policy frame in the next section (Werkgroep geweld in het gezin, 1996 a-d).

Discourse collation B: Local authorities as critical supporters
Local authorities and providers of public safety critically supported the policy ambitions of Coalition B in 1997 by formally approving the policy document 'Violence in the Family' (College van B&W, 1997). However, this approval was not without a disclaimer. The mayor, police chef and deputy of justice united in the local triangle warned the actors *"not to expect miracles from criminal prosecutions in this matter" (*College van B&W, 1997 – translation RP*)*. This implied that the mayor, chief of the regional police and deputy of justice were doubtful of this new perspective of domestic violence as a public safety issue.

The strong focus on interventions from a safety and criminal justice perspective was also the subject of debate amongst local council members who were less critical in their remarks during commission meetings the matter (Commissie Welzijn, 1997). Council members eventually supported the

policy program: *"I praise this policy approach: we should take action and stop talking"* (Mr Beenhakker, Commissie Welzijn, 1997 – translation RP). They also appeared to support the implementation of interventions from a public safety perspective: *"When it comes to the criminal act, each discipline has its own methods which should be taken seriously"* (Councillor van Perle, Commissie Welzijn, 1997). The majority of the members explicitly supported this policy approach by highlighting the importance of prevention and/or help in their comments. More importantly however, nobody opposed.

The initial policy debate shows frame alignment between local coalitions as well as international policy ideas entering the local policy arena. The frame of critical supporters in local coalition B was invigorated by the professional pioneers in coalition A. Frame bridging took place when the local professional actors learned about existing domestic violence policies in place in England, Canada and New Zealand. These international policy ideas were adopted into the frames of the local coalitions who now recognized the need to address domestic violence as a public safety matter as well.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
The policy debate eventually resulted in Haarlem's first policy on domestic violence titled 'Violence in the Family' being passed in 1997 (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). For the first time, this document expressed the formal policy frame of domestic violence being both an individual policy object, and a public safety issue. The *diagnostic message* of the policy frame promotes a broad perspective on domestic violence: *"By domestic violence we generally mean physical violence, sexual abuse, humiliation, isolation and neglect in domestic situations. Unequal relationships are a permanent crucial factor. [..] The term 'domestic/family' does not only refer to married couples, but also to other situation on which people live (or used to live) together"* (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997: 3 – translation RP). The policy document went further in mentioning multiple groups of potential victims, including children, elderly people and immigrants.

The *prognostic message* of the policy frame was that the local government should intervene in private situations that occur in the confines of a home (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). The frame further pushed for the labeling of the domestic violence problem as both a social and safety concern: *"There is a lot to say for addressing domestic violence not only as a matter of help and care, but as a matter of public safety as well. The latter implies that more policy instruments aimed at proactive action and prevention should be developed. Furthermore, policy interventions should focus on more than the reduction of harm to victims. They should be concerned also with the victim's environment and the (potential) perpetrator"* (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997: 8 – translation RP). The definition of domestic violence as a safety problem thus resulted in a policy strategy that combined social (crisis intervention, care of victims) and safety (persecution of committers) aspects. The policy frame thus implies that the entire 'safety chain' of prevention, pro-action, intervention,

aftercare and repression has to be activated in the effort to address domestic violence (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997).

The policy frame as just described clearly resembles the frame of discourse coalition A that was made up of the professional pioneer who singly handedly composed the policy strategy. This points to a process of discourse institutionalization that included also elements of foreign or international policy in the formal policy plans.

3.1.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
The following sections present empirical clues of the mayor's expected role and role in practice.

Expected role
The policy document 'Violence in the Family' partially qualified domestic violence as a public safety problem, thus making it very much the core business of the mayor. Interestingly however, the mayor was not mentioned in the policy plan (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997). Neither was he closely involved in policy practice. Instead, the alderman of Social Affairs was mentioned as the principal of the new policy towards domestic violence, and The Public Health Service was listed as being responsible for the daily work of developing the new policy approach (College B&W, 1997; Gemeente Haarlem, 1997).

Role in practice: high level of frame enactment by non action
The policy strategy regarding domestic violence was indeed carried out by the Social and Health departments of the municipality of Haarlem. The alderman took political responsibility for the policy 'Violence in the Family', and he was the spokesperson for the plan during local council and commission meetings related to social and health issues (Commissie welzijn, 1996). The mayor was involved in the policy process only in his capacity as a member of the board of mayor and alderman and as a member of the consultation group who discussed and approved the policy. However, mayor B did take an active stance in that he promoted Haarlem's approach to domestic violence as a shining example at the national Organization for Dutch Municipalities (VNG). One of his few comments on the matter were made in a Haarlem city council meeting when he said: "*I can announce that tomorrow I will have the pleasure of giving in a speech at a conference about domestic violence in Rotterdam. This is the kick off by the VNG to present a program for municipalities who are not as prepared as Haarlem to deal with the problems of domestic violence*" (Mayor B, Gemeenteraad, 2003 – translation RP). Nonetheless, his involvement in the policy reflected his role as a representative of local government, and not so much his responsibility for local order and safety. Thus his low level of involvement with the implementation of the policy on domestic violence was very much in line with what was outlined in the policy document which indicates a high level of frame enactment by low involvement.

3.1.3 Institutional arrangements

Various factors arising at the local, national and even international policy arena played a role in the Haarlem's very first policy process regarding the drug-related nuisance as just described.

Local arena

High impact events in the local policy arena triggered a local framing process during which domestic violence was first labeled as a safety matter in Haarlem. Two highly cases of domestic violence were deemed so horrible that various professionals argued that a policy program was needed in order to prevent such incidents from happening again. Moreover, it made them reformulate the existing normative position that governments should not intervene in matters arising in the privacy of people's homes.

International policy arena

The content of the local policy frame was inspired by regulative aspects (policy strategies) that had been adopted in a number of other countries. Although the Dutch national government had not yet labeled domestic violence as a public safety problem in the late 1990s, governments in other countries had. Foreign policy practices strongly affected the local framing process, including strategies from England, Canada, USA and New Zealand which were eventually incorporated into the policy adopted in Haarlem. International policy practices were thus a major source of inspiration for the local professional pioneers in Haarlem whose frame was eventually institutionalized into the formal policy strategy of Haarlem in the late 1990s.

National arena

While the local policy debate and policy frame on domestic violence was not modeled on any existing policies from the national policy arena, the implementation of the resultant policy was however impacted by several crucial interactions between the local and national policy arenas.

First, a representative from the Ministry of Justice participated (on the invitation of local authorities) in the multidisciplinary work group tasked in 1996 to create a local policy strategy regarding domestic violence (Werkgroep geweld in het gezin, 1996 a-d). Subsequently, the head of the Department of Order and Public Safety in Haarlem was invited into a national committee tasked to supervise a large national research project on domestic violence (Intomart, 1997). This created a link between the local policy practices and the national government, leading to a cross fertilization of policy development efforts in the two arenas. Second, the national government honored a call by local authorities in Haarlem to provide additional funding for the implementation the new domestic violence policy project (Gemeente Haarlem, 1997b). Thus to an extent, the national budget enabled the actual implementation of the local policy frame. Third, the national government created its own policy guidelines on domestic violence by modeling Haarlem's approach. Further, Haarlem's approach was copied by other Dutch municipalities. Local authorities in Haarlem actively engaged in national policy processes and Mayor B promoted the local approach among other local

governments. This shows the impact local policy frames can have on national policy dynamics. Using the terminology of the conceptual model, local regulative aspects triggered the national policy practices and were diffused and adopted elsewhere in the country.

3.2 The regional approach of the late 2000s

Domestic violence was a fully-fledged policy topic in both the local and national policy arenas by the end of the 21st century. The national government undertook various policy initiatives, amongst which was the policy called 'Advice and Support Points on Domestic Violence' and the national policy program 'Protected and Empowered' (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 2007). At the same time, it ran various public campaigns and published clear guidelines on child abuse, domestic violence and honor killings (Openbaar Ministerie, 2010). Most significantly for Haarlem, the national government created a new power for Dutch mayors in 2009 to issue temporary home restrictions for domestic violence perpetrators. This allowed mayors across the Netherlands to restrict the behavior of domestic violence perpetrators and keep them from home for ten days or longer as deemed necessary (Law on Temporary Home Restrictions).

3.2.1 Frame expansion

It is within this context that the initial policy frame as reflected in Haarlem's first domestic violence policy document 'Violence in the Family' came to be expanded. Triggered and steered by new actors in the regional policy arena, it saw the introduction of temporary home restrictions (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009) and further expanded into a regional policy approach covering the region of Kennemerland (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010). It is within this expanded approach that the mayor of Haarlem became seriously involved with domestic violence for the first time. Figure 15 summarizes this policy processes by means of the conceptual model.

Figure 15: Frame expansion of the problem of domestic violence in Haarlem in the late 1990s

Discourse coalitions & frame alignment
Whereas Haarlem pioneered the policy domain of domestic violence in the late 1990s, ten years later, several policy actors maintain that it still lacks spirit and has been limited in its progress. These sentiments were expressed in a local policy debate in which several council members, as well as the aldermen focused less on the problem definition of domestic violence, and more on the policy strategies that have been put in place.

Discourse Coalition B: Critical but supportive council members and Aldermen
Local council members from the Christian Democratic Party, the party for the Elderly, the Labor Party, the Green Left Party and the Alderman of Social and Welfare Affairs formed the first discourse coalition. They found common ground in their conviction that the progress brought about by the existing policy approach to domestic violence in Haarlem had come to a standstill. A

single council member representing the Green Left Party explicitly stated her disappointment during a council meeting: "*When I read this policy plan, I can do nothing but wonder what happened over the past three years. Everything mentioned in this plan we already proposed to do before"* (councillor de Jong, Gemeenteraad, 2008). Another council member stated: "In our view, *Haarlem has lost its pioneer position in addressing domestic violence"* (Councillor Koper Gemeenteraad, 2008).

The policy standstill was recognized as well by the former project managers of the GGD (employee public health service, interview July 2012), and the Social Department of Haarlem (civil servant 6, interview July 2012). According to them, organizational problems such as inactive civil servants and those on maternity leaves caused a policy standstill. In 2007, the Christian Democratic and Party for the Elderly sought actively to regain political and policy attention for domestic violence. During a council meeting, they argued that domestic violence was a substantive societal problem and called upon "*the board of mayor and aldermen to make domestic violence a number one priority in their social policy in light of the national policy"* (Gemeenteraad, 2007). This proposal was responded to by the Aldermen for Social Affairs who stated that domestic violence was already a priority in Haarlem (ibid).

Although the council approved the renewed regional policy strategy on domestic violence, various aspects of the regional policy approach were heavily critiqued. First, it was said that the regional approach would bring along the risk of 'free riding municipalities' (Councillor Pen, Gemeenteraad 2008), 'extra expenses for Haarlem because of its role as the central city (Councillor Koper, Councillor Heiligers, Gemeenteraad 2008). Concerns were raised also that 'decreasing national budgets' would endanger proper policy interventions (Councillor Pen and Councillor van Zetten, Gemeenteraad 2008). Furthermore, a long list of difficulties relating to the coordination of the regional approach were discussed. Complaints included that of 'failing coordination' by the central city of Haarlem, a shortage of shelters for victims of domestic violence, a lack of manpower in the police force to support the implementation of home restrictions and 'failing cooperation', particularly that between the police and shelters in particular (Gemeenteraad, 2008/9, Commissie, 2010).

The prognostic frame as expressed by discourse coalition B was mostly built on criticisms of the existing state of affairs, instead of constructive policy advice that could potentially become institutionalized into the formal policy. Nonetheless, their criticisms provided fruitful ground for policy change, and enabled supra local policy ideas to become institutionalized into the local policies. More specifically, it prompted the adoption of home restrictions into both the regional and local policy strategies.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
The grumblings of dissatisfied council members, a shift in the composition of regional policy actors and the introduction of temporary home restrictions by the central government eventually triggered a renewed policy strategy: *"The introduction of the temporary home restrictions by the 1st of January 2009 are*

the reasons to renew the policy regarding domestic violence. There is a window of opportunity to design the policy for a regional scope with the municipality of Haarlem as the center city" (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). This new policy strategy was formulated in several regional policy documents. Various actors, including the local authorities of Haarlem, formally committed themselves to regional cooperation (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009; Gemeente Haarlem, 2010). Sixteen professional organizations and ten municipalities[34] singed the formal agreement on regional policy ambitions, again reflecting the fact that the local domestic violence policies were adopted into the regional frame: *"The locally designed approach to domestic violence expanded throughout the region of Kennemerland in the late 1990s. Based on cooperation between local and regional parties, agreements were made and formalized in conventions"* (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009: 29 –translation RP).

The *diagnostic message* of the policy frame remained more or less the same over the years. The regional cooperation agreement defined domestic violence as follows: *"Domestic violence is violence which is committed by someone from the domestic sphere of the victim. By the domestic sphere, we mean (ex) partners, family and friends of the family. The term 'domestic' does not refer to the exact location in which violence takes place, but to the relationship between victim and committer. Domestic violence can be child abuse, sexual abuse, violence between (ex) partners in all possible forms, and the abuse or neglect of the elderly. Domestic violence can take a physical form, such as assault and threatening (stalking). It can also take the form of honor killings, victimization by pimps, forced marriage and female genital mutilation as well. This implies that domestic violence is a broad policy domain which is connected to multiple others"* (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010: 4). Thus, domestic violence was qualified as both a social and safety problem consisting of various types of violence taking place in different types of relationships.

The *prognostic message* of the policy continued to combine elements of care and prosecution (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010). The various activities and policies of the large number of organizations involved in the effort were somehow harmonized into a single, regional approach to domestic violence. This resulted in the structuring of cooperation efforts, and professionalizing of their approach with the introduction of the 'systemic or full approach'. This approach focused on the victim, the perpetrator, as well as on their environment: *"The problem should be approached as a whole, and should*

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[34] Algemeen Maatschappelijk Werk (Stichting Kontext, SMD Midden-Kennemerland en Stichting Meerwaarde), Brijder Verslavingszorg, Palier, Bureau Jeugdzorg (Noord-Holland en Agglomeratie Amsterdam), GGD, Kennemerland, GGZ (Parnassia BavoGroep en GGZ InGeest), Politie Kennemerland, Raad voor de Kinderbescherming, Reclassering Nederland regio Alkmaar – Haarlem, Slachtofferhulp Nederland, Steunpunt Huiselijk Geweld Kennemerland, Vrouwenopvang: Blijf Groep, De Waag, Mee, Lijn 5, Jeugdriagg Noord Holland Zuid, Gemeente Beverwijk, Gemeente Bloemendaal, Gemeente Haarlemmerliede en Spaarnwoude, Gemeente Haarlem, Gemeente Heemskerk, Gemeente Heemstede, Gemeente Uitgeest, Gemeente Velsen, Gemeente Zandvoort.

consider the family, the relationship of the partners, and the role of the larger family in the case of honor killing. A systemic approach is needed to structurally solve the problem. In such an approach, the focus is not only on providing help and care, it focuses strongly on prevention as well, by means of communication and education, for example" (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009: 5). A completely new element was further added to the prognostic frame, namely that of crisis intervention by means of the policy instrument of temporary home restrictions. This instrument was meant to *"create peace in the family, as well as a way to organize help both for the person banned from the home and the people who stay behind"* (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009:8).

Taken together, this implies that the renewed policy strategy to domestic violence was strongly characterized by supra local aspects as the new power of home restrictions was directly institutionalized into the regional policy plans, and local authorities started formal collaboration with multiple regional partners.

3.2.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
In the following sections the mayor's expected role and role in practice are discussed.

Expected role
A new element in this regional policy approach is the power for mayors to temporarily restrict committers of domestic violence from being at home (Law on Temporary Home Restrictions). The regional policy strategy against domestic violence states that the mayor can decide whether or not to give out a home restriction, and he is to do so in close cooperation with his regional partners. In fact, all mayors in the region Kennemerland decided to partially delegate the preparation, implementation and control of these home restriction to the police (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009). The police conduct risk assessments in cases of domestic violence, and the mayors are then advised whether or not to apply a home restriction. The mayors would then have to make their own decision of whether to issue a restriction order. The adoption of this new power into the regional policy strategies prompted the mayor of Haarlem to get involved with the policy approach regarding domestic violence, as the former head of Haarlem's department of local safety and order explained: *"In Haarlem, domestic violence was long part of the portfolio of the aldermen. Only when the temporary home restrictions were introduced, our mayor got involved"* (Civil servant 4, interview July 2012-translation RP).

Role in practice: full enactment
With the introduction of the temporary home restrictions in 2009, the mayor of Haarlem got involved with domestic violence in a direct and operational manner. Mayor C was similarly in favor of home restrictions: *"I think home restrictions are a good instrument. Before, the police experienced problems because there were too few instruments to address the problem. […] I think it good that mayors receive more tools with which to govern. […] people expect active involvement by government when there are problems"* (Mayor C,

Interview August 2012 – translation RP). He enacted his expected role by giving out multiple home restrictions during his tenure, all in consultation with the police. The way it worked in practice, the mayor had a mobile phone application which made it possible for him to respond to requests by the police at any time, and to review the risk assessment they had conducted. The mayor was known to respond to these requests even at nights and during meetings: *"It comes down to an app on my phone […] I log on, check the risk assessment report and push red in case of 'no', an green in case of a 'yes' for home restriction"* (Mayor C, Interview August 2012 – translation RP). This type of involvement in individual cases of domestic violence is in line with the expected role of the mayor in the regional policy approach.

In sum, the mayor's role in practice is best characterized by his structural involvement through the temporal home restrictions, which implies operational involvement and full frame enactment. He enacted his expected role in collaboration with two key partners, primarily the local Department of Social Affairs, and the police who implemented the home restrictions. Other aspects of the effort, including policy design and the coordination of the care and help structures were generally carried out by others (civil servant 6 and 7, employee public health service, police chief 1 and Mayor C – interviews 2012)

3.2.3 Institutional arrangements
Various factors arising in the local and national policy arena influenced the processes of frame expansion as just described.

Local arena
Dissatisfaction about existing policy strategies and practices among local council members fostered the expansion of the domestic violence frame in Haarlem. According to various key actors, by the mid-2000s, the local policy approach was found not to be running effectively or efficiently. Cognitive aspects expressed by local stakeholders cleared the way for participation in regional collaboration structures in an attempt to improve local policies and embrace new policy tools.

Regional arena
Haarlem's participation in the regional policy efforts to address domestic violence prompted the mayor of Haarlem to address domestic violence in several ways. First, the local implementation of the regional strategy for addressing domestic violence created a role for Mayor C, both on paper and in practice. Secondly, the mayor's playing field expanded to include participation in regional policy strategies which, thirdly, brought to the fore new partners with whom he could collaborate.

National arena
The introduction of the temporary home restrictions in 2009 triggered the expansion of the initial policy frame by adding a new instrument to the diagnostic message which promoted active involvement by the mayor. Regulative aspects of the national policy context thus brought along a role for the mayor in local policies towards domestic violence as formally described in

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the regional policy strategies (Gemeente Haarlem, 2009 / 2010). Adoption of the new power activated the mayor to get involved with addressing domestic violence in practice.

3.3 Research findings sub case 2

In reconstructing the initial framing process of domestic violence, several preliminary conclusions can be made about how frame shifts affect the mayor's role and position. First, the sub case analysis points to two major frame shifts in the local policy frame regarding domestic violence between 1990 and 2010. In 1997, domestic violence was defined as an individual policy object for the first time and qualified as a both a social as well as a public safety problem that manifests itself in many types of violent behavior in the domestic sphere. This initial policy frame combined existing help and crisis structures for victims with new strategies for the prevention of domestic violence, and for the prosecution of perpetrators. In the late 2000s, this policy frame was expanded by the introduction of a regional policy against domestic violence. A large regional collaboration network uniting local governments and many other actors was created, and all mayors in the region were expected to implement their new power of temporary home restrictions in a similar manner. This meant close collaboration with the police in making risk assessments.

Initially, the policy frame reflecting domestic violence as a matter of public safety did not prescribe a major role for the mayors of Haarlem. However, this changed when the second framing process took place in the late 2000s. While the aldermen of Social Affairs and the Public Health Organization was initially given formal responsibility for policy development and implementation, a fundamental transformation in the mayor's role took place in the late 2000s by the incorporation of home restrictions into the regional policy approach. The mayor's role regarding domestic violence changed from a nonexistent one, to one explicitly mentioned in the formal policy strategies. The mayors became involved in making decisions on individual cases of domestic violence and worked closely with the police and the Municipal Department of Social Issues in this regard.

These changes in both the policy frame as well as the mayor's role and position on paper and in practice can be explained by an interplay between the national and local policy arena's shaping of the process of problem framing and role structuration. The application of the conceptual model on this first sub case points to the following research findings: First of all, the framing of domestic violence as a local policy problem was *triggered* by *events* in the *local arena* (lethal incidents of domestic violence), which brought about a cognitive processes during which various discourse coalitions altered their perspective. Secondly, *regulative aspects* of the *international and national policy arena* were incorporated into the initial policy frame (late 1990s) as well as the expanded policy frame (late 2000s), such that the local domestic violence policy frame comprised a mixture of local and external policy ideas. Cross fertilization took place in both a both bottom up as well as top down manner as a result of institutional arrangements that promoted the interaction

and cooperation of individual actors from the local and national policy arenas. Thirdly, local enactment of the initial policy frame was also enabled by *regulative aspects of the national policy arena,* specifically a measure of financial support. The resultant local policy strategies in turn affected regulative aspects of the national arena and regional policy dynamics. Fourthly, in the selection of actors to be responsible for crafting the very first policy strategy on domestic violence in the late 1990s, *historical policy practices* far *overweighed the outcome of local framing processes.* Path dependency in the local policy arena explains why the mayor and other safety actors were not initially activated, and why the new policy frame placed the policy problem of domestic violence clearly outside of their radius of action. Instead, actors who more traditionally dealt with victims of violence were held responsible for the policy approach. Finally, changes in mayor's role as promoted by the expanded policy frame in the late 2000s can be most clearly explained by examining the *regulative aspects of the national policy context.* A rather top down process created a role for the mayor of Haarlem, by which powers created by the national government were adopted into regional policy practices and implemented by the local government. This sub case demonstrated that the mayor was not activated by the safety frame until formal powers to take action on it were available.

4 Sub case 3 – Organized crime in Haarlem

Out of the three sub cases in Haarlem, organized crime is the 'newest' public safety problem to be addressed by the local government. This section presents a short history of this policy domain, followed by a first indication of the initial policy frames and potential frame shifts that followed between 1990 and 2020. It was not until 2005 that the local government in Haarlem got involved with addressing severe forms of crime which used to be dealt with by the police and Ministry of Justice at the national level. Between 2005 and 2010, the mayor and other local authorities in Haarlem developed an expanding set of policy instruments and strategies to address multiple manifestations of severe criminal behavior.

The first step towards a local approach to organized crime came with the adoption of BIBOB legislation into local policies in Haarlem (College B&W, 2005a/b). With the introduction of the BIBOB Act in the Netherlands earlier in 2002, local authorities were able to screen applicants for government permits for criminal ties and illegal behavior. Local authorities could then withdraw or refuse to give out a permit, subsidy or tender when there was sufficient grounds to suspect that the applicant may use the permit for illegal activities (Law on Enhancing the Integrity of Assessments by the Public Administration – BIBOB). Preparations for the adoption of BIBOB in Haarlem took place between 2005 and 2006, which were the final years of the tenure of Mayor B. Local authorities in Haarlem decided to implement this act in stages, first addressing sectors which were deemed most susceptible to organized crime, namely gambling houses, hotels, restaurants, bars and coffee shops (College B&W, 2005 a/b; Gemeente Haarlem, 2006). In 2008, this initial BIBOB approach was evaluated and slightly adjusted (Gemeente

Haarlem, 2008). In 2009, local authorities expanded the reach of the BIBOB instrument when they decided to use it in relation to smart and head shops. These shops were increasingly being seen as possible venues for organized crime related to the production of soft drugs (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010).

In the late 2000s, the municipality of Haarlem joined a regional collaboration structure of government actors that sought to address organized crime. In doing so, Haarlem's local approach to organized crime became more or less incorporated into a interregional collaborative network that combined administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions. Formalized by a collaboration agreement, they aimed to tackle various forms of crime undertaken by criminal networks, such as human trafficking, the production and trade of soft drugs, fraud and illegal prostitution (Regionaal convenant, 2009). A key component of this approach was the pooling of information from the three domains in order to improve the likelihood of tracing criminal networks.

The policy path as just described shows at least two key moments when the policy frame regarding domestic violence underwent substantial changes. In general, the policy frame expanded from one focused on the need for the integrity of local government to be addressed primarily by local government itself, to an expanded focus on severe forms of organized crime that require cohesive interregional cooperation to be effectively addressed. The local government's policies were first framed by a suspected relationship between the legal activities of local authorities in specific sectors, and the illegal activities of criminal groups. This problem was to be addressed from 2006 by the careful screening of applicants seeking municipal permits by the application of the BIBOB criteria. Second, the local policy efforts carried out in Haarlem were to be incorporated into a larger collaborative network that sought to address a wide variety of criminal activities. The perceived problems related to organized crime were broadened in the local policy frame to include human trafficking, fraud, and illegal prostitution. The local policy strategy was expanded further by a combination of fiscal, administrative and crime related intelligence and instruments. Table 12 provides an overview of these shifts in Haarlem's policy frame between 1990 and 2010.

Table 12: Overview of the policy frames on organized crime between 1990 and 2010 in Haarlem

Time period	Topic policy frame	Policy frame: diagnostic & prognostic message
2005	Unintended governmental support for illegal activities	*Diagnostic message:* Criminals are using governmental services for illegal activities. *Prognostic message:* BIBOB screening before giving out licenses, permits and tenders in multiple sectors: hotels, bars, restaurants, prostitution, gambling houses and coffee shops. *(Toepassing BIBOB-instrument Openbare Orde – Gemeente Haarlem, 2010)*
Late 2010	Criminal networks	*Diagnostic message:* Criminal networks are undertaking illegal activities such as human trafficking, the illegal production of soft drugs and fraud. *Prognostic message:* A regional approach is necessary, combining information and instruments from local administrative, criminal justice and fiscal actors. *(Regionaal Convenant Geïntegreerde Decentralisatie aanpak Georganiseerde Misdaad – Regionaal convenant, 2009)*

4.1 Preventing unintended governmental support for illegal activities mid-2000s

Traditional state actors such as the police and public prosecutor have long held a monopoly on the tracking and prosecuting of organized crime. However, in the early 1990s, the importance of administrative actions focusing on the prevention of unintended governmental support for illegal activities was argued in several studies and policy documents (Stuiksma, 1994; PEO, 1995; Fijnaut, 2002). Consequently, in the past two decades, a set of policy tools has been developed that create a so called 'administrative approach to organized crime' in which local municipalities are granted an important role (Huisman, 2010). The most important administrative tool for municipalities is the BIBOB Act which aims to protect the government's integrity. BIBOB was introduced in 2002, and allows local authorities to withdraw or refuse to give out a permit, subsidy or tender in case of suspicion that the applicant may use the permit for illegal activities (Law on Enhancing the Integrity of Assessments by the Public Administration – BIBOB). As a result of this law, local authorities can also seek the assistance a national BIBOB office to conduct more extended, national-level screenings of applicants seeking local permits.

4.1.1 Initial framing process
It is within this larger policy context that local authorities in Haarlem decided to implement the BIBOB Act in 2005 (College B&W, 2005a/b). This implementation resulted in the creation of a local policy approach to aspects of organized crime that were manifesting in local society. This local policy

framing process took place in a rather top down manner in that the national policy ideas were adopted into local policy plans. However, only when local actors recognized organized crime as a local policy problem did their frames merge with the national policy frames and the way was paved for actual policy implementation. Figure 16 summarizes this policy process in terms of the key concepts of the conceptual model.

Figure 16: Initial framing process of domestic violence in Haarlem in the mid-2000s

Discourse coalitions & frame alignment
Various actors in the local policy network expressed their individual frames on organized crime during policy discussions surrounding the implementation of BIBOB in Haarlem. These frames came along with their own prognostic messages. In examining the frames of key individuals, and the interaction between policy actors, we can identify several discourse coalitions who made their arguments between the start of policy discussions in 2005, and policy implementation in 2008.

Discourse Coalition A: mayor sees little organized crime in local society
The first coalition was a single actor coalition comprising Mayor B. Although the mayor recognized that organized crime was a public safety problem in the Netherlands, he deemed its manifestation to be limited or even absent. The mayor's personal frame was that there was no immediate danger, and as such, no real reason to adopt BIBOB as a local instrument to address organized crime. As he stated in an interview conducted for the purpose of this study: *"I*

*knew about crime in Haarlem. There were general reports about it and I always received information about the 'big guys' in Haarlem. However, this was not a big deal and I was not waiting for it [BIBOB instrument]" (*Mayor B, Interview – August 2012 – translation RP).

Discourse Coalition B: Local council supports BIBOB policy
The second discourse coalition consisted of a majority of local council members. They shared a frame or prognostic message that supported the adoption of the BIBOB instrument. During the commission meeting, these council members asked only questions relating to specific details of the BIBOB procedure such as who finances the expenses arising from the checks, and whether or not civil servants would be educated on the workings of the act (Commissie ABZ, 2005). The absence of a substantive policy debate about whether or not to adopt BIBOB demonstrated the local council's support of the adoption of this instrument in Haarlem. Both the commission and council approved the policy without much debate, with the commission going so far as to state: *"The commission expresses her thankfulness for this policy document. The members of the commission state that it is sad these measures are needed however they deem that it is sensible to do so*." (Commissie ABZ, 2005: 2 – translation RP). During the council meeting in which the BIBOB policy was approved, only one council member representing the liberal party (VVD) expressed his personal view that the BIBOB policy would be important to apply in efforts to address problems present in the prostitution sector (Gemeenteraad, 2005).

Discourse coalition C: A new board of mayor and alderman prioritize BIBOB
Just after the BIBOB policies were formally approved in 2006, a new board of Mayor and Aldermen came into office. These actors were united by their frame, or their (implicit) recognition that organized crime is a serious concern in local society, and their prognostic message, which was *"to implement the BIBOB Act to sectors of business vulnerable to (organized) crime"* (Coalitieakkoord 2006: 7 – translation RP). The new mayor promoted an active use of the BIBOB instrument: *"You could have read in the coalition agreement that the BIBOB instrument will be implemented in Haarlem. Preparations have been made. There is a policy plan called BIBOB, and manpower has been allocated. This means that we are actively going to implement BIBO"* (Mayor C – Gemeenteraad, 2006: 934 – translation RP).

Discourse coalition D: Council members wanting to expand BIBOB
A few years after BIBOB was adopted, representatives of the Liberal Party and the Action Party expressed their continued support for the BIBOB instrument itself, but criticized the lack of reporting to the city council of details of its implementation. They criticized also the absence of a thorough evaluation of its effectiveness (Action Party - gemeenteraad 2008/ 2009). Nonetheless, they wanted to expand the implementation of BIBOB in general (Action Party – gemeenteraad 2008; Liberal Party – Gemeenteraad 2009), as well as in relation to specific concerns such as prostitution (Action Party – Gemeenteraad, 2007).

During the policy debate surrounding the local adoption and implementation of the BIBOB instrument, two instances of frame alignment took place. First was the alignment between national and local policy frames which occurred when council members supported the implementation of the National BIBOB law. Second, the new board of mayor and alderman aligned themselves with the national frame when they explicitly prioritized BIBOB in their coalition agreement. In both cases, local frames were invigorated by national policy ideas.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
Haarlem's first formal steps towards a local administrative approach to organized crime was in the adoption of the BIBOB act. Policy guidelines (College B&W, 2005a/b) and implementation rules (Gemeente Haarlem, 2006) were issued by the board of mayor and aldermen that mirrored the initial policy frame on organized crime.

The *diagnostic message* of the policy frame mirrored by these documents concentrates on the 'integrity of local government'. Local authorities problematized the potential interconnection between the workings of the government and the world of crime: "*Just like anywhere else, the municipality of Haarlem can be confronted with criminals and criminal enterprises. […] They are strongly connected to the municipal context: they function as a legal businesses and interact in any possible way with their legal context* (College B&W, 2005b: 1– translation RP). The government was said to risk unintendedly facilitating illegal activities and criminal behavior. For instance, when permits are given out by the local government to set up a new bar, and the place is used for the drug trade, or money laundering. The policy frame problematizes several domains amenable to organized crime, such as the bars, coffee shops, gambling houses and real estate (Gemeente Haarlem, 2006).

The *prognostic message* of the policy frame was to screen applications for permits and subsidies in these branches by means of the BIBOB instruments. If there was grounds to suspect that governmentally approved facilities could be used for illegal and criminal activities, local government could withdraw permits, or refuse to issue them. The local authorities in Haarlem decided to implement BIBOB in two phases starting with the policy sectors most vulnerable to illegal activities (College B&W, 2005). First, BIBOB would be applied to applications of new permits in the branches deemed most sensitive: hotels, restaurant, bars, coffee shops, the prostitution sector, and gambling houses (Gemeente Haarlem, 2006). Later on, BIBOB would be applied to the environmental and real estate sector. The policy frame stressed that a BIBOB screening is a 'severe measure' that imposes upon the 'private sphere' and should therefore be implemented based on the 'principles of good governance' (Gemeente Haarlem, 2006). A BIBOB screening by the nation BIBOB office should therefore only be used as an ultimate remedium: "*First of all, an internal screening for potential grounds for refusal or withdrawal should be conducted by the local municipality. When this offers no*

solution, one can revert to the national BIBOB office" (College B&W, 2005b – translation RP).

The initial framing process resulted in the institutionalization of national policy ideas into local policies. The national BIBOB instrument was agreed upon and customized for local implementation by local authorities (Coalition B and C). This resulted in local policy plans that resembled the national BIBOB strategy, and also signaled the initiation of a local administrative approach to organized crime.

4.1.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
In the following sections the mayor's expected role and role in practice are discussed.

Expected role
As stated in national and local BIBOB policies, the mayor is expected to decide upon the implementation of BIBOB in individual cases. The board of mayor and alderman as well as the mayor can decide to withdraw or refuse a permit or subsidy either independently, or they can ask the national BIBOB office for advice based on their more extensive BIBOB screening (College B&W, 2005b; Gemeente Haarlem, 2006).

Role in practice: variation in frame enactment
Both mayors were involved with policy preparation regarding BIBOB. Policy guidelines for a local implementation of the 'new' BIBOB was created during Mayor B's tenure. Although he formalized local BIBOB policies, he hardly used this new power in practice. As he states himself: *"I was only involved with the policy preparation, I cannot remember any BIBOB case" (*Mayor B, Interview – August 2012 – translation RP*).* This can be explained by the fact that the policy program was 'under construction' in his time as mayor, and so he was not yet able to enact the policy. However, the BIBOB instrument has been available to every subsequent Dutch mayor since its formal introduction in 2003. It took a few years before local authorities in Haarlem recognized BIBOB it as a valuable policy tool and adopted it into their local policy approach.

Mayor Schneider's was involved with actual implementation of the BIBOB instrument. For example, he closed several coffee shops and withdrew permits for café's and bars based on the BIBOB Act (Gemeentraad, 2009) and ask for support of the national BIBOB office. Mayor C also made the decision to formally expand Haarlem's BIBOB powers with the introduction of exploitation permits for grow shops, which allowed local authorities to subject them to BIBOB screenings (Gemeente Haarlem, 2010). Taken together, these activities imply full enactment by Mayor C of the role laid out for him in the official policy frame.

4.1.3 Institutional arrangements

The initial framing process of organized crime is closely linked to developments in the local and national policy arena.

National arena

This sub case showed a rather top down process of frame alignment during which *regulative aspects* of the national policy arena created awareness and actions regarding organized crime in the local policy network. Local implementation of the national BIBOB instrument implied a mere adoption of the national policy frame regarding an administrative approach to organized crime into local policy documents. Facilitated by national policy tools, local authorities in Haarlem slowly recognized organized crime as local policy topic in Haarlem for the first time. Before, organized crime was only addressed by international and national governments.

Local arena

Several aspects of the local policy arena affected the way in which the national policy frame regarding organized crime and BIBOB was enacted upon by local authorizes and the mayors themselves.

The rather late adoption of the BIBOB law in Haarlem can be explained by *cognitive factors* related to powerful actors in the local policy arena. It was a few years after the national government introduced BIBOB as an instrument for local authorities in 2003 that local authorities in Haarlem adopted it into their local approach. It was another year before local actors actually enacted upon this frame. Prior to 2005, local authorities in Haarlem did not generally consider organized crime as a pertinent local problem in the local municipality. This view of the problem as nonexistent explains both the delay in adopting the national BIBOB instruments, as well as the low level of frame enactment by mayor B. Only when multiple council members started to align their frames with national BIBOB legislation did this start to change, and BIBOB was formally adopted. Nevertheless, mayor B's personal frame did not recognize organized crime as a pressing problem in local society which explains why he did not use this new power in practice. A few years later, a new board of mayor and aldermen came to power, and they held a different frame that was more aligned with the national BIBOB strategies. They started to realize that organized crime did in fact exist in Haarlem, and they made use of the BIBOB tool.

This implies that local frames have to resonate with the national policy strategies in order for the national policy tools to be actually implement in the local policy networks. More precisely, the frames of powerful policy actors who bear significant responsibility for local governance, and who have a say in daily policy practices, have to be aligned with the national ideas to some extent. Finally, this sub case demonstrated that such a top down process of frame alignment between national and local policy frames may often require the passage of time.

4.2 A regional approach to various forms of organized crime during the late 2000s

4.2.1 Frame expansion
In the late 2000s, the Balkenende IV administration prioritized the problem of organized crime and encouraged the Dutch municipalities to play an important part in tackling this problem. In the national policy document titled 'Administrative Approach to Organized Crime,' it was argued that organized crime manifest themselves in municipalities and local communities: *"Organized crime has almost always roots on the local level"* (Programma bestuurlijke aanpak georganiseerde misdaad, 2008:2 –translation RP). This national, integral approach to organized crime prioritized specific areas including human trafficking, the organized production of soft drugs, and fraud in real estate. Within this program, municipalities were granted the role of coordinators of the administrative approach (CCV, 2010). A National and Regional Center of Information and Expertise were created to support the large governance networks bringing together local authorities and many other players. Inspired by this national program, the mayor of Haarlem signed a regional collaboration agreement between 51 municipalities located in four police regions, all of whom agreed to implement this administrative, integral approach to organized crime in 2009 (Regionaal Convenant, 2010). In doing so, Haarlem's local 'BIBOB' approach to organized crime was now incorporated into a regional collaboration network striving to combine administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions.

The local framing process underlying this policy expansion is best summarized again, as a top down process in which the national government initiated and facilitated local involvement. Figure 17 summarizes the process of frame expansion.

Figure 17: Frame expansion of Organized Crime in Haarlem in the late 2000s

Discourse coalitions and frame alignment

Organized crime became a frequently debated topic in the local policy arena in the late 2000s. Several discourse coalitions can be distinguished based on actor's points of view and their interactions.

Discourse coalition A: Growing attention for organized crime among local politicians

Various local political parties expressed their worries about the manifestation of organized crime in Haarlem. More specifically, their statements and interactions indicate the belief that the problem was brought to Haarlem as a result of neighbor municipality Amsterdam implementing a tough program of measures restricting such activities within its borders. Council members of the Liberal Party, the Christian Democratic Party, the Socialist Party, the Labour Party and the Local Action Party warned against the so called 'water bed effect': "*It is evident that the stronger approach taken against organized crime in Amsterdam makes criminals and criminal organizations turn to Haarlem*" (Gemeenteraad, 2007) and, "*Everything that was over there [Amsterdam], comes over here now* (Gemeenteraad, 2008)".

The frames of local political parties met as well in the conviction that the local government should undertake action. According to these parties, the local administrative approach was deemed not yet effective and efficient and they demanded that the local government: "*Keep the bad guys outside of Haarlem."* (Gemeenteraad, 2007 – tranlsation RP). Representatives of the local parties explicitly argued that this would require more than the existing BIBOB tool, and asked that the administrative approach be intensified by combining administrative and juridical interventions, and cooperation with other governments. In the debates that followed, local parties called upon the board of mayor an aldermen to optimize the local government's information position (Christian Democratic and Liberal Party – Gemeentraad, 2006), create a detailed policy plan (Action Party – Gemeentraad, 2008), safeguard the financing of this effort (Christian Democratic and Liberal Party – Gemeentraad,, 2008), as well as create a whistle blowing arrangement (Action Party – Gemeentraad, 2008).

Coalition B: Mayor responds to local and national calls
Within the local policy debate, the mayor responded to the various request made by political parties by acknowledging that organized crime is a local policy problem in Haarlem. His personal frame regarding organized crime was that while it certainly takes place in Haarlem, it is difficult to detect: "*Also in Haarlem there is severe and organized crime. We do not see it but we have to be alert*" (Schneiders – Gemeenteraad, 2007). "*It is the tip of the ice berg, I think that a lot is going on which is not seen or addressed*" (Mayor C, Interview August 2012 – translation RP). He supported the regional scale administrative approach as well as the policy instruments such as BIBOB and RIEC (Commissie Bestuur 2007; Gemeenteraad, 2007).

Although Mayor C's personal frame shows a prognostic message favoring involvement by the local government in addressing organized crime by supporting the adoption of national instruments and regional cooperation he held a critical stance towards local government's role as well: "*It starts with an criminal justice approach and off course local government should use its instruments as well to hinder organized crime. However, nowadays is seems like it is the other way around. [..] To me that is the wrong order. It think that there should always be a sequence. It is simply is juridical task. Not our primary but secondary responsibility*" (Mayor C, Interview August 2012 – translation RP).

First of all, the frames expressed by local policy parties united in coalition A aligned with the mayor's frame. Mayor C agreed upon the manifestation of organized crime in Haarlem, agreed that local authorities should play a role in addressing it and pointed at national policy tools to be adopted by local government. This implies a process of frame bridging between coalition A and B. Moreover, these local frames of both local coalitions were compatible with the national policy frame promoting the administrative approach as well. The local frames of local policy parties and -later on- the mayor create solid ground

for the national 'administrative approach to organized crime' to be adopted into local governance activities.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
The expanded policy frame regarding organized crime is expressed in the regional collaboration agreement between a large number of municipalities divided over four police regions. All parties expressed the importance of "*recognizing the need of an integrated approach of organized crime by combining administrative, criminal justice and fiscal interventions*" (Regional Convenant, 2009:4 – translation RP). The *diagnostic message* of the policy frame was 'inspired' by the set of priorities listed in the national program administrative approach (Programma bestuurlijke aanpak georganiseerde criminaliteit, 2008). The regional collaboration agreement defined organized crime as the main policy problem to be addressed and agreed to focus on several of the activities undertaken by criminal networks including human trafficking, the production of soft drugs, fraud in real estate, money laundering and other financial crimes as well as other manifestations (Regionaal Convenant, 2009).

   The *prognostic message* of the policy frame was to create an 'integrated approach' in which criminal justice, administrative and fiscal resources are combined to address the problem of organized crime (Regionaal Convenant, 2009). This implies the cooperation of local government with various actors, including the local police, the juridical system and the tax collector's office. Their coordinated activities were to be supported by the pooling of their expertise, resources and information. In fact, the pooling of information was deemed a key approach to tracking and tracing criminal activities and networks. This integrated approach had to take place on a interregional level in order to tackle the problem because the region of Noord Holland was deemed particularly vulnerable as it housed several 'risky locations', including the airport at Schiphol and the harbors leading to the North Sea (Regionaal Convenant, 2009). The regional approach was deemed appropriate and mandatory because confining interventions locally would simply push criminals from one place to another and create a 'water bed' effect.

4.2.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
In the following sections the mayor's expected role and role in practice are discussed.

Expected role
Collaborative efforts demand a high level of coordination when they involve 51 municipalities, four police regions, three regional and two national juridical departments, one province, multiple divisions of the Tax Collector's Office and others demands. It is the local Haarlem government's role to serve as the coordinator within this large collaboration network, (Regionaal Convenant, 2009). Because the municipality of Haarlem sits at the center city of its police region, Mayor Schneider was formally assigned this role. Together with the mayors of Amsterdam, Zaanstad and Alkmaar, Mayor C was made responsible for the administrative approach towards organized crime, and he was expected

to take the lead in the steering group coordinating the regionally integrated effort. The task of this steering group was to steer the regional collaboration as well as to set the general objectives and coordinate the process of information sharing (Regionaal convenant, 2009). All four mayors assigned this task represented a police region in which an 'information node' was located, named the Regional Information and Expertise Centre. This implies that Mayor C has a supporting and mediating role towards the other municipalities in his own police region as well.

Role in practice: frame enactment
The majority of Mayor C's actions regarding organized crime in the late 2000s can be labeled as administrative involvement. The mayor participated in the initiation of the regional collaboration structure, and in the signing of the collaboration agreement (Regionaal Convenant, 2009). He also chaired the steering group of the Regional Centre for Information and Expertise located in Haarlem (Mayor C, Interview August 2012; Public Prosecutor 2, Interview August 2012), participated in the making of decisions relevant to the strategies and priorities of the RIEC (Police Officer 1, Interview August 2012), and facilitated the RIEC by providing both the location and manpower for its work (Civil servant 8 – Interview June 2012). Suspicions surrounding the role of organized crime and criminal networks were discussed during meeting of the local triangle consolation (Public Prosecutor 2, Interview August 2012, Civil servant 4 – Interview July 2012) and the mayor closed several shops, houses and a sports canteen with ties to organized crime (Police Officer 1, Interview August 2012). Taken together, these actions indicate full enactment upon his expected role.

4.2.3 Institutional arrangements
This paragraph provides a summary of the institutional arrangements located in the regional, national and local arena that affected the course and content of the local framing process.

Regional arena
Policy practices in the regional arena triggered a local policy debate regarding organized crime in Haarlem. The fact that neighboring municipality of Amsterdam implemented a tough policy on organized crime was discussed by many of the local Haarlem politicians. In particular, they feared that criminals and criminal networks would leave Amsterdam and come to Haarlem because the local authorities here were less active in addressing organized crime. These players thus made a case for intensifying Haarlem's local policy approach to organized crime along the lines of what had been done in Amsterdam. In terms of the conceptual model, this implied that *policy practices* in the regional policy arena triggered a local policy debate that subsequently provided solid grounds for the adaption of regional and national policy strategies.

National policy context
The national policy program called the 'Administrative Approach to Organized Crime' (2008) resulted in a pilot effort at regional collaboration in

the province of Noord in Holland. National priorities for addressing organized crime as well as the national RIEC structure were adopted into the regional policy plans. Haarlem's participation in this regional collaboration structure implied a top down process of frame expansion in which the national policy ideas were mediated by regional policy ambitions, which then had the effect of expanding the local policy frames and practices. The mayor's role in addressing organized crime was expanded in this process of frame expansion, both formally as well as in practice. More specifically, his role in addressing local manifestations of organized crime in Haarlem was now incorporated into his administrative actions in close collaboration with many others on a regional scale.

Local policy network
Although this sub case shows the influence of multiple factors from the national and regional policy arena, local frames were also found to be crucial in determining the level of local participation in these regional policy programs. The fact that local discourse coalitions A and B prioritized organized crime as a local problem and called for an increase in local policy involvement provided a solid foundation for the adaption of national policy strategies into the regional and local policy practices. Again, the compatibility of the local and supra local policy frames proved to be a crucial precondition for the enactment of supra local policy frames by actors in the local policy arena. The formal position of Mayor C partially in charge of command and control of the police also increased his involvement in administrative actions on a regional scale. This implies that the formal position of a key local actor, specifically the mayor, can affect his expected role in the regional policy strategy.

4.3 Research findings – Sub Case 3

Reconstructing the initial framing process of organized crime as a public safety problem, and the frame expansion which followed points to several preliminary conclusions for the case Haarlem. The framing of organized crime as a local public safety problem that took place between 2005 and 2010 can be described as follows: The diagnostic message of the initial policy frame focused on the integrity of the local government (2005). The usage of local government services for illegal activities was problematized in the municipality of Haarlem. In 2009, the diagnostic message was expanded with criminal networks undertaking severe types of organized crime, such as human trafficking, fraud in real estate and the production of soft drugs. The prognostic message of the policy frame started in 2005 with the local adoption of the BIBOB tool. In 2009, this local approach in Haarlem was expanded with the participation of local actors in a regional collaboration program combining information and instruments from a local administrative, criminal justice and fiscal perspective.

As the frames in the policy debate and strategy changed between 2005 and 2010, so did the mayor's role and position. The mayor's role in addressing organized crime in Haarlem expanded from a non-existent one, to one

encompassing both formal and practical involvement in the local and regional policy strategies to address organized crime. This role change can be tracked over three shifts that took place between 2005 and 2010, which covered part of the terms of two mayors. Firstly, the introduction of BIBOB changed the level of Mayor B's involvement from its previously low levels. However, the mayor only formalized BIBOB, and never implemented its new powers. Second, once organized crime came to be recognized as a relevant policy topic by local policy actors, Mayor C started to implement and expand the BIBOB approach. This points to a clear role shift. Third, national policy frames were adopted into the regional policy program against organized crime, and this expanded the mayor's 'playing field' from the local municipality of Haarlem to the (inter)regional level. This implied that the mayor now participated in the local as well as regional policy arena when addressing organized crime, both on paper and in practice. He now collaborated with various new partners, such as mayors from neighboring municipalities, neighboring police forces, the tax-payers' office and national juridical actors.

Following from our conceptual model, the policy frames as well as the mayor's role on paper and in practice can be explained as the outcome of an interplay between local framing processes between local discourse coalitions on the one hand, and institutional structure as provided by the local, regional and national policy network in which these interactions took place on the other. These revealed a rather top down process during which national policy strategies were adopted by local policy actors in regional and local policy plans and were enacted upon in practice. First, the framing of organized crime as a local policy topic was *triggered* by regulative aspects *external* to the local policy arena. The initial framing process was triggered by the introduction of the BIBOB tool by national government, which allowed the local government to start addressing organized crime. Later on, policy practices in the *regional policy arena* triggered a local policy debate which provided a solid base for expanding the local policy frame. Policy strategies from the regional collaboration program were adopted, which were in turn strongly based on the national policy program, 'Administrative Approach To Organized Crime' (2008). This implies that the framing and reframing of organized crime as a local policy problem in Haarlem was by no means a bottom up and purely local process, but was brought about by external triggers. Secondly, this sub case shows a high level of *discourse institutionalization of national policy frames into regional and local policy frames*. The content of the local and regional policy frames relied heavily on national policy frames. National policy priorities and strategies were largely adopted into the local policy plans (BIBOB) and practices (RIEC). Thirdly, although the local framing processes were both triggered by national policies which also heavily steered their outcomes, the frames of powerful policy actors and coalitions in the local policy arena enabled frame expansion as well as enactment in practice. Fourthly, this sub case showed that the frames of powerful policy actors or coalitions in the local arena had to align or at least be compatible with supra local policy frames in order for the latter to be institutionalize into local policies and be enacted upon by the mayor and others. In other words,

cognitive aspects (frames) of the *local policy arena* affected whether and how the mayor and other enacted the new, nationally driven policy frames.

Chapter 9: Case study findings Breda

1 Introduction

This chapter is the second of two case studies building towards an explanation of how the mayor's role and position in local safety governance has been influenced by shifting definitions of safety problems between 1990 and 2010. The conceptual model will be applied to the data from Haarlem and Breda to answer the fourth sub-question: *How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes and why, how and to what extent did they affect the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance?* and the fifth sub-question of the research project: *Which factors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the course, content and outcome of local framing processes as well as the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance?*. The following paragraphs provide a description of the local framing process, policy strategies and the mayor's actions regarding the three sub cases of drugs-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime in Breda.

Before turning to the in-depth case descriptions, some general information about the Breda case is provided. Breda is located in the southern part of the Netherlands and its population increased from 123,025 in 1990 to 173,299 in 2010 (CBS). Following the case selection criteria, Breda represents a medium-large city which has had three mayors between 1990 and 2010. Mayor D (VVD) was the mayor from 1990 to 1995, Mayor E (VVD) took over until 2004 and Mayor F (PvdA) has been the mayor of Breda since 2004. Drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime have all been subject to local safety policies in Breda between 1990 and 2010. Table 13 summarizes the policies put in place to address these three issues between 1990 and 2010. It shows that each policy problem entered the local policy approach in Breda at a different moment in time and was reframed along the way.

Table 13: Overview of policy attention paid to the Breda sub cases

Mayor	D	D	D	D	D	D	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	F	F	F	F	F	F
Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Drugs related nuisance																					
Domestic violence																					
Organised crime																					

initital framing	
present in safety policy	
frameshift	

The sub case descriptions that follow provide a detailed account of what these framing processes looked like, how the mayors of Breda were expected to handle drug related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime as well as how they did in practice. Each sub case analysis is structured according to the key concepts of the conceptual model. Firstly, a general *case description* is provided of the local policy developments, outlining the initial policy frames, as well as the shifts in frame that followed between 1990 and 2020. Thereafter, the conceptual model is applied as a guide for the gathering of all data relevant

to the sub cases. This is discussed in the paragraphs that follow. First an overview is provided of the framing process including its triggers, context, discourse coalitions, processes of frame alignment and institutionalization. Thereafter, the mayor's role on paper as well as in practice is described. This entails an indication of the mayor's expected role as well as the level of frame enactment as indicated by his actions or non-action in the practice of local safety governance. This is followed by a discussion of the institutional arrangements of the local as well as supra local policy arena's affecting the course and outcome of local processes of problem and role structuration. Finally, the chapter concludes with a summary of the case of Breda. The information gathered in this chapter forms the basis for the case analysis that presents a preliminary answer to sub questions four and five.

2 Sub case 4 – Drug-related nuisance in Breda

As in Haarlem, drugs-related nuisance have been addressed by local policy interventions in Breda for over twenty years. Since 1986, the local government act allowed the mayor of Breda to close public buildings, including coffee shops, when they formed a threat to local order and the living climate (Gemeente Breda, 1986). A local policy strategy specifically aimed at reducing drugs-related nuisance caused by coffee shops officially started in 1991, when the first policy document regarding coffee shops was approved by the local city council (Gemeente Breda, 1991). This initial policy plan was entitled 'Closing Policy Coffee Shops', and listed various forms of nuisance related to coffee shops, from noise and litter to trade of weapons in and around coffee shops. These types of nuisance were to be tackled by a regulative and restrictive policy approach based on several 'closing criteria'. Using these criteria, local government could close coffee shops until the maximum of 20 coffee shops was reached. The criteria included endangering local order and advertising criminal activities and were a mixture of local and national rules regarding coffee shops.

This initial policy of regulating and limiting the number of local coffee shops has been continued and expanded. Over the years, several aspects of the policy have been altered. For example, the number of coffee shops allowed was decreased from twenty in 1991 to eight in 2005 (Gemeente Breda, 2005). The closing criteria were expanded (Gemeente Breda 1991; 1997a) and the newly introduced opium law was adopted as the formal basis for the mayor's actions on drugs. The controlling regime regarding coffee shops has also been enhanced recently (Gemeente Breda, 2005; 2009).

While the policy regarding soft drugs was further developed, local authorities in Breda also expanded their focus on drug-related problems. In the late 1990s, the initial focus on coffee shops and soft drugs was expanded as Breda's local authorities aligned their policies with attempts to harmonize and coordinate local drugs policies on a regional scale (Gemeente Tilburg, 1997). The initial focus on nuisance related to soft drugs in coffee shops was enlarged to accommodate other drug-related problems, such as 'new drugs' (eco drugs, growshops, smartshops) and hard drugs used in house parties, bars and public buildings. Meanwhile, the new powers for mayors to close public buildings

because of drug-related nuisance were adopted into local policy plans, inspired by regional policy ambitions (Gemeente Breda, 1997a).

From 2008 onwards, drugs in and around Breda became a topic of debate again. A series of regional and national events and trends affected local policy strategies regarding drugs in Breda. Its neighboring cities, Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom, abolished their 'policy of tolerance' regarding soft drugs, triggering a series of studies on drug problems in Brabant (COT, 2009; Commissie Fränzel, 2009; Politie en Wetenschap, 2010). The five biggest cities in the region scored high on crime indices, which were linked to drug-related crime (Politie en Wetenschap, 2010). This resulted in the creation of a 'Task Force' in which these cities and the national government aligned their forces to 'combat' drug-related problems in the region. Meanwhile, the Minister of Safety and Justice announced a more restrictive policy regarding soft drugs, which was to be implemented in the Brabant region at first (Commissie van den Donk, 2009; Tweede Kamer, 2011b). Altogether, these events resulted in an adjustment of Breda's local approach towards drugs in general and a slightly stricter policy regarding local coffee shops (Gemeente Breda, 2005; 2005/9).

During the past twenty years, various other drug-related issues have been topics of policy attention or intervention in the local governance of Breda. These included drug tourism, drug addiction and the drug trade by criminal networks. However, these issues are outside of the scope of this case since they were either not labeled as safety issues or were not connected to any drug-related nuisance. Drug tourism never qualified as a pressing topic that caused severe nuisance in Breda. This might be explained by the fact that various respondents argued that drugs tourism manifested itself only marginally in Breda, (civil servant 1, interview August 2012; civil servant 2, interview March 2013), especially in comparison to neighboring cities that were closer to the Belgian border (Mayor E - Interview June 2013). Drug addiction has been the focus of various policy programs over the years, but has dominantly been framed as a social or health-related issue (Gemeente Haarlem, 1992). Breda has been confronted with severe forms of drug-related crime, such as (hard) drugs in bars, criminal networks trading cocaine and heroin, drug-related shootings and ripdeals (Civil servant 1 Interview August 2012; Civil servant 2 – Interview March 2013, Mayor D – Interview April 2013). However, given the violent and organized character, these criminal acts were not labeled as drug-related nuisance, but rather as organized crime and therefore belong to sub case 6.

The policy path just described shows at least three key moments when the local policy frame regarding drug-related nuisance change substantially. First of all, the *initial frame* during the early 1990s focused strongly on coffee shops and soft drugs. The policy frame problematized various types of nuisance caused by coffee shops. Mayor D, who was the mayor of Breda during this initial period, started to restrict the number of coffee shops and regulate their activities through Breda's first policy document that introduced various 'closing criteria' (Gemeente Breda, 1991). This initial policy frame regarding drug-related nuisance in Breda was expanded in many ways during

the past twenty years. First of all, regional drug policies were created in the late 1990s. This implied that local authorities in Breda were no longer solely in charge of regulating coffee shops, and neither were their activities limited by the municipal boundaries of Breda. The regional policy document '*Dealing with drugs in the region*' in 1997 promoted harmonization and coordination of local drug policies in the Mid and West Brabant region (Gemeente Tilburg, 1997). Besides coffee shops, this document listed several new types of drug-related problems, such as hard drugs in bars and at house parties, new types of drugs (eco, grow, smart) as well as the trade of soft drugs in public buildings. These problems were to be addressed by local authorities in the region in a similar manner. When Breda aligned its local policy with these regional plans on handling drugs, a new power for the mayor was included: closing public buildings in case of drug-related nuisance (Local Government Act, Section 174a).

Second, in the early 2010s, two neighboring cities, Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom, closed all of their coffee shops and the national government became less tolerant of soft drugs. This resulted in a revival of the policy debate regarding drugs in and around Breda and series of advisory committees, research reports and collaboration projects regarding drug-related problems followed. Consequently, the local approach to drugs in general was revised (Gemeente Breda, 2009), and the local coffee shop policy adopted distance criteria and membership card for customers of coffee shops as introduced by the national government (Gemeente Breda, 2012). Table 14 provides a general overview of these policy frames and the next paragraphs provides an in-depth analysis of the framing processes related to them.

Table 14: Overview of the policy frames related to the drug-related nuisance in Haarlem between 1990 and 2010.

Time period	Topic policy frame	Policy frame: diagnostic & prognostic message
Early 1990s	Coffee shops causing nuisance in Breda	*Diagnostic message:* An increasing number of coffee shops causes various types of drug-related nuisance: parking, noise, litter, feelings of unsafety, weapons in shops, health risks for youngsters and drugs tourism. *Prognostic message:* local government should regulate and maximize coffee shops by means of 'closing criteria' (*Closing policy coffee shops 1991 – Gemeente Breda*)
Late 1990s	Soft, hard en new drugs in the region	*Diagnostic message:* various problems related to soft, hard and new drugs threaten local order, health and living climate in the region Mid and West Brabant *Prognostic message:* regional coordination and harmonization of local interventions regarding various types of drugs (*Dealing with Drugs in the region, 1997 –Gemeente Tilburg) (Closing Policy Coffee Shops, 1997 – Gemeente Breda) (Local Drugs Policy, 1997 - Gemeente Breda*)
Early 2010s	Strengthening of local drugs policies	*Diagnostic message:* party drugs, drugs usage and trade, coffee shops, production of soft drugs, drugs tourism, criminal networks *Prognostic message:* Integral approach to various forms of drugs related problems and a more restrictive policy approach to local coffee shop (*Action Program Drugs,2009 - Gemeente Breda)(Coffee Shop Policy 2012 – Gemeente Breda*)

2.1 Coffee shops causing trouble early 1990s

When local authorities in Breda framed local coffee shops as a policy problem, a national 'policy of tolerance' regarding soft drugs was in place in the Netherlands. Since the 1970s, the Dutch 'Opium Act' made a distinction between hard drugs and soft drugs (Opium Act, 1976). The former were illegal, while the latter were tolerated to some extent. This implied that although the trading, production and possession of soft drugs was illegal, their consumption was not. The trade of soft drugs in coffee shops was tolerated and regulated by means of several formal criteria introduced by the Public Prosecutor in 1992 (AHOJ-criteria). These criteria provided detailed instructions under which the trade in soft drugs was tolerated, such as the amount of soft drugs per costumer and the minimum age of a costumer. This created a niche for the existence of many coffee shops in the Netherlands including those in Breda.

2.1.1 Initial local framing process
Between 1987 and 1990, the number of coffee shops in Breda almost doubled to 24 (Gemeente Breda, 1991). According to local authorities, these shops

created a nuisance which had to be reduced and prevented in the future (Mayor D- Interview April 2013). However, existing policies were deemed insufficient for doing so. This triggered a framing process in which coffee shops and soft drugs were problematized and eventually subjected to local policy programs. Powerful actors, as the mayor, the police chief and public prosecutor, initiated and implemented the first policy program regarding soft drugs in coffee shops, entitled '*Closing Policy Coffee Shops*' (Gemeente Breda, 1991). Figure 18 provides an overview of this largely locally-driven framing process structured by the conceptual model.

Figure 18: Initial framing of the drug-related nuisance in Breda in the early 1990s

Discourse coalitions & frame alignment
The creation of the very first formal policy regarding drug-related nuisance in the early 1990s was not preceded by a substantive policy debate. Nevertheless, several local parties expressed their frames regarding coffee shops and drug-related nuisance.

Discourse coalition A: Mayor and 'safety partners'
Initiated by the mayor, coffee shops were problematized in Breda. Coffee shops were deemed to cause a nuisance and an increase in the number of coffee shops would lead to various forms of nuisance. As Mayor D described later on: *"When I arrived in Breda, I encountered several problems. One of them was coffee shops causing nuisance"* […] *"There was a certain level of nuisance which I found unacceptable. This was the case for coffee shops and*

pleasure houses[35]" (Mayor D - Interview April 2013). This individual frame of the mayor was supported by other local actors. Together with his chief of cabinet and the juridical advisor in the local government, Mayor D designed a local policy for coffee shops. They deliberated and coordinated their policy approach with the local police and public prosecutor (Mayor D- Interview April 2013; Civil servant 2, interview March 2013). The mayor felt that the local government should set norms for coffee shops and proposed a sort of a 'license' for coffee shops based on a set of criteria. As he said: "*I was not against coffee shops, but against shops in the wrong places and those who messed up*" (Mayor D- Interview April 2013). According to the head of the mayor's cabinet, Mayor D was a governor who, despite his membership of the Liberal Party, choose to set clear rules and follow up on them (Civil servant 2, Interview March 2013). This is clearly what the mayor did when introducing the local policy of regulating and restricting local coffee shops. The mayor himself said that he wanted to support the 'bourgeoisie and liveliness' of the city center but felt the need to set some general rules and limits to maintain local order and safety (Mayor D- Interview April 2013).

Discourse coalition B: Council members approve the policy with little debate
The records of local council meetings show that council members formally approved the initial policy without fundamental debate and critique: "*The closing policy for coffee shops is duly noted by the commission*" (Commissie AZ/OO, 1991:4). The lack of a substantial debate by the local council shows that drug-related nuisance was not (yet) a 'hot topic' for council members and city inhabitants. This paved the way for Mayor D to enforce his policy ambitions, or as he mentioned himself: "*The city council never blocked the policy proposals in any way*" (Mayor D – Interview April 2013). The fact that drug-related nuisance was not a topic of local debate can, according to the mayor, be explained by the invisibility of drug-related nuisance and crime for many of Breda's citizens and council members (Mayor D – Interview April 2013).

During the initial framing process, the frames of local policy actors were aligned with each other. When local council members approved the policy on coffee shops proposed by the mayor and his safety partners, their individual frames were strengthened into a collective policy frame. This points at a process of *frame amplification* during which the individual frames of local council members on drug-related nuisance were strengthened by the collective frame of the mayor, his civil servants and partners at the police and public prosecutor's office, as reflected in the first policy document.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
The local policy frame underlying the initial policy document '*Closing Policy Coffee Shops 1991*' reveals the initial diagnostic and prognostic message regarding drug-related nuisance. The overall policy problem were the so-called

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[35]   In Dutch: bordelen.

'side effects' of drug trading in the coffee shops. These included the risk of drug addiction, the health risks of using soft drugs, and multiple forms of nuisance in and around coffee shops, including (illegal) parking, noise, litter on the streets and criminal activities, such as possession of weapons and the trade of stolen goods (Gemeente Breda, 1991). All these activities were deemed to devalue local order and the living climate. They were also seen to be especially harmful for youngsters, in terms of health risks and the exposure to criminal activities in coffee shops. The policy summarizes all existing policy instruments which, as they conclude, are insufficient for addressing these 'unintended effects' of soft drugs in coffee shops. The most important instrument of closing coffee shops based on local legislation[36] was deemed to be too 'severe' for controlling nuisance in and around coffee shops, too focused on issues of local order and excluding health aspects, too much work for the police, and not specific enough for targeting coffee shops (Gemeente Breda, 1991). The 'Closing Policy for Coffee Shops' was introduced in 1991 to fill in this gap: *The growing demand of soft drugs and the lack of effective controlling mechanisms […] causes unintended side effects [of trading soft drugs] that have hardly been addressed* (Gemeente Breda, 1991:1 – translation RP). The prognostic message of this policy approach is that local government regulates coffee shops by using 'closing criteria'. These criteria aim to regulate existing coffee shops, and to reduce the number of coffee shops from 24 to 20. The local policy combines national and local criteria. The national criteria set by national Public Prosecutor included these conditions: not selling hard drugs, not selling soft drugs to youths below 16, and not advertising the trade of soft drugs. The local criteria included: not disturbing local order and the living climate, owners not to have any criminal records, and specifications on location, such as shops being at a minimum distance from schools (Gemeente Breda, 1991). This new policy was to be enforced with administrative sanctions available to local government, in collaboration with the police and public prosecutor.

The initial policy frame more or less represented the individual frames of coalition A. This points at a process of *discourse institutionalization* during which the frame of the most powerful local discourse coalition was clearly represented in the first policy document regarding coffee shops. In practice, this meant that the mayor's frame structured the minor local policy debate as well as the local policy strategy. In addition, national guidelines regarding coffee shops were incorporated as well. This implies the institutionalization of regulative aspects of the national policy arena into the local policy frame. However, these rules were mixed with local criteria and formed just a small part of the local policy strategy.

2.1.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
The following sections present empirical clues of the mayor's expected role and role in practice.

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[36]   In Dutch: Algemene Plaatselijke Verordening

Expected role

Although the first formal policy document regarding coffee shops in Breda was initiated by the mayor and mirrored his personal framing of drug-related nuisance, the mayor was not mentioned in the policy document itself. This implies that the mayor was not formally assigned a role in the policy.

Role in practice: full enactment

The mayor was, as he himself said, very involved with local order and safety (Mayor D − Interview April 2013). During his five years as the mayor of Breda, the mayor was actively involved with drug-related issues. In close cooperation with the local police and the public prosecutor, he designed the first formal policy regarding drugs in Breda. On the 19th of February 1991, the mayor and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen established the very first policy strategy (Gemeente Breda, 1991). Once it was approved by the city council in the same year, this policy was implemented. Several respondents described this as 'cleaning up' the coffee shops in Breda by closing the ones causing trouble (Civil servant 1 Interview August 2012; Civil servant 2 − Interview March 2013).

The mayor's role in practice was initiating, designing and implementing certain aspects of the policy. After initiating the policy, he closed various coffee shops and participated in planning interventions in local bars where drugs were traded or used (Mayor D − Interview April 2013). The mayor closed several shops based on the 'closing criteria' and several shops decided to close once the new policy was announced (Mayor D − Interview April 2013). This indicates the full enactment of the local policy's frame and the mayor's personal frame. Taken together, the mayor's role in addressing drug-related nuisance can be termed as being a 'hands-on initiator' of local strategies on drug-related nuisance.

2.1.3 Institutional arrangements

Both the initial framing process and the mayor's position and role regarding drug-related nuisance were mostly affected by factors in the local policy arena.

Local arena

The initial framing process was triggered by the increase in the number of coffee shops. This was deemed to bring along various forms of nuisance by the mayor and other powerful policy actors. In terms of the conceptual model, this event points to the *cognitive aspects of the local policy arena*, which trigger a local policy process during which drug-related nuisance was framed as a policy topic. The policy debate that followed was marginal and purely local. Two local discourse coalitions were apparent, and the policy plans of coalition A were approved by coalition B without much debate. In this way, coalition A was able to impose its individual frame onto the policy frame. The fact that the actors united in coalition A were influential during the policy process can be explained by the *distribution of policy resources* in the local policy network. The possession of formal powers to create, propose and implement local policies of the member of coalition A (mayor, police, and public prosecutor),

combined with the asymmetry of knowledge of the policy problem amongst the members of coalition B, resulted in the dominance of coalition A. This explains the domination of coalition A's frames of discourse during the process of frame alignment and discourse institutionalization.

National arena
National criteria regarding coffee shops were combined with criteria developed by local authorities in Breda. In terms of the conceptual model, this points to the adoption of *regulative aspects* of the nation policy arena into the local policy frame.

2.2 Soft, hard and new drugs in the region in the late 1990s

During the late 1990s, local authorities aimed to coordinate their local activities regarding drugs on a regional scale. This led to a regional policy strategy titled 'Dealing with Drugs in the Region' formalized by all mayors who were part of the Regional Board of the Police Region Mid-West Brabant (Gemeente Tilburg, 1997). Furthermore, a new power for the mayor to close buildings in case of drugs was developed by national government and adopted into this regional strategy, as well as into local policy documents in Breda (Gemeente Breda, 1997a-b). As a result, the local focus on coffee shops expanded with attention devoted to policies to deal with hard drugs, new types of drugs and the specific forms of drug-related nuisance caused by drug usage and trade in houses and drugs tourism. This expansion took place while Mayor E was the mayor of Breda.

The expansion of the local policy frame was both triggered and heavily influenced by the national policy on drugs. In 1996, the national parliament approved a National Drugs Policy which paid special attention to drug-related nuisance taking place at the municipal level, designer drugs and the link between drugs and organized crime (Tweede Kamer, 1995). This policy strategy was to be translated into regional and local policy practices in the Mid and West Brabant region. A regional working group with mayors from several municipalities, the police and the Ministry of Justice was asked to come up with recommendations for regional and local drug policies (Gemeente Tilburg, 1997). A year later, a new power for mayors was created by the national government in 1997 (Local Government Act, Section 174a): all Dutch mayors were now allowed to close permanently houses and buildings that were open to the public when local order was harmed in such a way that it creates a serious nuisance, or fear of it. Examples of such nuisance are trading drugs and prostitution. The mayor is supposed to use this power when all other means to address the nuisance have been unsuccessful, as he has to warn the inhabitants before taking his action (NGB, 2010).

2.2.1 Frame expansion
It is within this context that the regional approach to drugs in Brabant, which expanded the local policy approach to drugs in Breda, was created. The local framing process was characterized as a rather top down process of frame alignment between the national, regional and local policy frames. Figure 19

provides an overview of this framing process, as structured by the conceptual model.

Figure 19: Initial framing of the drug-related nuisance in Breda in the late 1990s

Several discourse coalitions consisting of actors from different policy arenas interacted during the process of frame expansion.

Coalition A: Regional, interdisciplinary working group on drugs
The Regional Board of the Police of Mid-West Brabant installed a working group on drugs. This working group consisted of mayors, public prosecutors, civil servants and police chiefs. They translated national policy strategies into recommendations for regional and local policy practices. They aimed to harmonize and coordinate police, juridical and administrative policy strategies

on hard, soft and eco drugs (Gemeente Tilburg, 1997). The overall goal was regional coordination and harmonization of drugs policies, and the overall policy on drugs relied heavily on national guidelines (Tweede Kamer, 1995).

Coalition B: Local authorities Breda expanding local policies
The second discourse coalition consisted of the board of the mayor and aldermen in Breda. They formally proposed to expand local policies on drugs inspired by the regional policy strategy proposed by coalition A. The local city council approved without much debate.

Frame alignment

National and regional policy frames were adopted into local policies by local policy actors. This points at a *top-down process of frame alignment* between national, regional and local policy frames. First, the national policy frames of the national drugs policy (Tweede Kamer, 1995) and the power to close buildings in case of drug-related nuisance (Local Government Act, Section 174a) were adopted into the regional policy strategies (Gemeente Tilburg, 1997). Second, Breda adjusted its local policy programs to the regional policy strategy by introducing a new local drugs policy, which resembled the national and regional policy strategy (Gemeente Breda, 1997a-b).

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
The local policy plans titled 'Closing policy coffee shops' and ' Local Drugs Policy (Gemeente Breda, 1997a-b) show the diagnostic and prognostic message of the renewed policy frame on drug-related nuisance. Various problems related to soft, hard and new drugs that threatened local order, health and the living climate were diagnosed as drug-related problems that should be addressed by means of regionally aligned interventions by the police, public prosecutor and local governments. A result of aligning the local drugs policy in Breda to the regional policy was that the local policy frame relating to drugs expanded. More specifically, supra local problem definitions and instruments institutionalized into the local policy frame. The scope of the initial local policy frame was expanded beyond coffee shops by problematizing hard and eco drugs as problems, and national policy instruments in terms of closing criteria for local coffee shops and the ability of mayors to close buildings by the entered the local policy frame (Gemeente Breda, 1997a-b).

2.2.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
The mayor of Breda was expected to use his new power to close buildings open to the public in case of severe drug-related nuisance (Gemeente Breda, 1997a-b). However according to many respondents, Mayor E was, in sharp contrast to Mayor D, involved with governing local order and safety at an arm's length. This was supported by the fact that the mayor appointed a local aldermen to take on the responsibilities for 'integrated safety'. The Aldermen of Integral Safety managed all the issues relating to local order and safety, although the mayor remained formally responsible for this policy domain. Alderman responsible for Integral Safety initiated local, integral safety policies

in which drugs problems were listed as a high priority. His ambition was to create integrated teams and appoint hands-on professionals to deal with the drugs problems in local neighborhoods (Civil servant 3 – Interview March 2013; Interview Alderman – May 2013). Meanwhile, the mayor used his powers to close coffee shops and public buildings related to drug problems, initiated and prepared by the aldermen and his crew (Interview Mayor E – Interview June; Alderman-Interview May 2013). Taken together, the role of Mayor E can be described as governing at arm's length regarding public order and safety in general, and drug-related nuisance more specifically. This implies he only had a marginal enactment of the formal policy frame and his expected role in it.

2.2.3 Institutional arrangements
Several factors from the local, regional and national policy arenas affected the course and content of the frame expansion process and the mayor's role.

National arena
First of all, national drug guidelines, policies and instruments triggered and shaped the creation of a regional policy strategy on drugs, which later expanded to cover Breda's local policy frame. In terms of the conceptual model, we can conclude that the *regulative aspects* of the national policy arena have institutionalized into the regional and local policy frame.

Regional arena
Regional collaboration practices between the police, public prosecutor and local governments in Mid-West Brabant were a crucial practice for fostering and shaping a local process of frame expansion in Breda. This implies that *regional policy ambitions* strongly shaped the diagnostic and prognostic message of the new policy frame on drugs as proposed and adopted by local authorities in Breda during the late 1990s.

Local policy arena
The distribution of tasks and responsibilities in the local policy network strongly affected the mayor's role regarding local order and safety. The fact that Mayor E appointed an aldermen to be responsible for integrated safety policy made the Alderman of Integral Safety instead of the mayor himself more closely involved with policy formation and coordination for safeguarding local order and safety.

2.3 Revision of the local drugs policy in the late 2000s
The policy frame regarding drug-related nuisance had a third and final transformation in the late 2000s. This shift in the local policy frame is closely related to a series of regional and national trends around drug-related problems and policies. It began when the neighboring cities, Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom, abolished their policy of tolerating coffee shops in 2009. This led to the closure of all coffee shops in these cities. Local authorities in Breda feared that this would increase the level of drug-related nuisance as more people would

turn to the coffee shops in Breda. They thus initiated a screening of the local and regional drugs scenes (COT, 2009) and put in place an advisory that updated the regional drugs policy (Commissie Fränzel, 2009). Meanwhile, national drugs policies were adjusted as well (Commissie Van den Donk, 2009). The Rutte I administration introduced various measures that were more restrictive towards coffee shops and drugs in general (Kabinet Rutte, 2010I). For example, it announced a 'distance criterion' that required coffee shops not to be located near schools and required customers of coffee shops to have membership cards that could be issued only to Dutch citizens[37](Tweede Kamer, 2011b).

2.3.1 Frame expansion process
Within this national and regional policy context, the third framing process in Breda took place and led to the creation of local action plans regarding drugs in general and the reformulation of the existing policy towards coffee shops (Gemeente Breda, 2009; 2012).The latter implied that local authorities in Breda started to move towards a stricter policy regarding local coffee shops. Figure 20 provides an overview of this framing process.

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[37]   Abolished by a new national administration in 2012

Figure 20: Frame expansion of the drug-related nuisance in Breda in the late 2000s

Coalition A: Board of mayor and Aldermen Breda
A shift in the drug policies in Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom triggered the Board of Mayor and Aldermen in Breda to pay extra attention to the local drugs scene in Breda. They feared that the radical policy shift by their neighbor cities would lead to a disproportional level of drug-related nuisance and drug tourism in Breda. They therefore initiated a study of the local drugs scene in Breda (College van B&W, 2009). The board then proposed a new and strict policy strategy towards coffee shops in Breda (Gemeente Breda, 2005/9). Local council members in coalition C shared their worries regarding drugs and approved the intention to participate in regional and national attempts to address drug-related nuisance and tighten Breda's local policy approach to coffee shops (Commissie Bestuur, 2009).

Coalition B: Alliance B5
Local governments of the five largest cities in the region created the so-called 'Alliance B5' to study drug-related nuisance problems in the region and proposed regional solutions. The regional board of the Brabant police force, on which the mayors of all five cities sat, appointed an advisory committee, and assigned it the task of updating the regional policy strategy on drugs (Commission Fränzel, 2009). Based on a screening of the local and regional

drugs scene, the committee acknowledged that they were confronted with criminal networks producing and trading drugs (Commission Fränzel, 2009). Consequently, they initiated a collaborative program, in which information, manpower and interventions by local government, tax authorities, public prosecutor and the police were combined to tackle the criminal networks. This program was called 'Taskforce Brabant' and mostly focused on networks of organized crime that dealt in drugs (see sub case 6). Alongside this, several measures on coffee shops and drug-related nuisance were introduced within this regional framework. These had implications for Breda's drugs policy as well. To be more precise, the national government introduced more restrictions on coffee shops, including membership cards for customers and a minimum distance between coffee shops and schools (Kabinet Rutte I, 2010). These measures were agreed upon by the alliance B5 and therefore could be implemented by local governments in the Brabant region.

Frame alignment
The third process of reframing shows frame alignment as a sequential process of frame bridging between the local and regional discourse coalitions, with the latter partly inspired by the national ambition to strengthen the approach to coffee shops and soft drugs. The frame of the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen in Breda (coalition A) was compatible with other local governments in the region that were concerned about drug-related problems (coalition B). The frame of regional coalition B also aligned with national policy ideas about tightening the Dutch policy of tolerance.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
While local authorities in Breda adjusted their coffee shop policy in 2009, they explicitly chose not to follow the example set by their neighbor cities of abolishing their policy of tolerance towards coffee shops: *"For a city like Breda it is unrealistic to impose a zero tolerance policy on coffee shops. The demand for coffee shops will stay. This would lead to an undesired satiation of poor controllability, decrease of livability and declining oversight on trade in soft drugs. Trade in soft drugs would end up in criminal circuits and merge with the tough and criminal hard drugs scene. (Gemeente Breda 2005/9: 11).* This policy frame did problematize coffee shops as being a nuisance, disturbing local order and safety, negatively affecting the local living climate, and creating the impression of a lack of safety (Gemeente Breda, 2005/9). The new policy tolerated coffee shops but had a more strict approach than before. The most substantial shift was freezing the number of shops to the current number of eight coffee shops, adopting a membership card for customers, and introducing a distance criterion between coffee shops and schools (Gemeente Breda, 2005/9).

Both regional and national policy ideas were institutionalized into the local policy frame as described previously. National policy ideas regarding drugs and coffee shops were institutionalized into regional policy strategies that were later adopted by local authorities in Breda. These came about when coalition B united the local governments of the five largest cities in the region, and aligned its frame with the national objective to have a stricter policy to soft

drugs by being the first region to adopt the membership card and distance criterion.

2.3.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
The following sections present empirical clues of the mayor's expected role and role in practice.

Expected role
The new policy on coffee shops expected the Mayor of Breda to formulate local coffee shop policy after consulting the police and public prosecutor, taking the national guidelines for coffee shops into account, and using his power to close buildings because of any drug-related nuisance (Gemeente Breda, 2005/9).

Role in practice: high enactment
When Mayor F became mayor of Breda, he 'abolished' the mayor's responsibility for integrated safety. He viewed local order and safety as an important policy domain, and wanted to address local safety issues by himself. Regarding drugs, Mayor F undertook both administrative and operational actions. The former indicate participation in the local arena, where he initiated studies of the drugs scene and amended local coffee shop policy to required coffee shops to have membership cards, in collaboration with the Board of Mayor and Aldermen and the local city council (College van B&W, 2009). At the regional level, he participated in the Alliance B5 by creating a regional policy program on various manifestations of drug-related problems in the Brabant region. Finally, he lowered the maximum number of coffee shops allowed to eight and closed several coffee shops and public buildings because of drug-related nuisance (Gemeente Breda, 2005). Taken together, these changes show a high level of frame alignment. They also point out that the mayor fulfilled the role of being a connector between local, regional and national policy arenas in dealing with drug-related problems in and around Breda.

2.3.3 Institutional arrangements
Several issues from the national, regional and local policy arena affected the course and outcome of the local framing process and the mayor's role.

Regional arena
A radical shift in *policy practices* undertaken by municipalities in the regional policy arena shifted local attention onto drug-related problems and policies in and around Breda. Thereafter, the findings of a study of the regional drugs scene influenced Breda's local policy frame.

Local arena
The *cognitive aspects of key actors in* the local policy networks triggered a local policy process and allowed the formalization of new policies regarding drugs. The fact that the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen was worried by the introduction of a zero tolerance policy in neighboring cities triggered both

local and regional policy attention onto drug-related issues. The fact that council members were concerned about drug-related problems enabled new policies to be formalized. The frames of both actors that had agenda-setting and decision-making power were aligned with each other and with the supra local policy frames, enabling a local frame expansion process.

National arena
The *regulative aspects* of the national policy arena slowly institutionalized into regional and later local policy frames. The local policy on coffee shops was tightened by reducing the maximum number of coffee shops and adopting the national policies of membership cards and distance criteria.

2.4 Findings of sub case 4
Reconstructing the initial framing process and the two frame shifts that followed provides preliminary evidence of the frame shifts that affected the mayor's role and position in local safety governance. The problem definition or diagnostic message of the policy strategy was initially formulated as nuisance caused by coffee shops (1991), expanded later to include problems related to other types of drugs (1997) and finally shifted towards renewed policy attention on various regional forms of drugs problems (2009). The solution or prognostic message of the local policy was initially limiting and regulating coffee shops (1991). This later changed to the harmonization of drug policies in the region and the mayor's power to close buildings (1997), and eventually to the expansion and tightening of Breda's local drugs policy (2009).

At the same time as the policy frames changed between 1990 and 2010, the mayor's position and role also changed. First of all, the *mayor's formal position expanded* with the introduction of several new laws (Local Government Act, 174A and Opium Law 13B). Second, the *mayor's playing field expanded* from the local policy arena to policy actors, strategies and actions on the regional and national level as well. As time went by, the mayors of Breda had to deal with or act on regional and national policy, and the mayor's position changed from being a local administrator collaborating with the local police and public prosecutor to becoming a networker or policy broker operating in close cooperation with many other bodies on the regional and national level. Third, the mayor's *role in practice differed* with each individual mayor. Mayor D (1990-1995) had a hands-on style for safety problems and initiated local policy plans on drugs. Mayor E (1995-2004) governed local safety problems at arm's length, while Mayor F's (2004-2013) activities on drugs made him a connector between local, regional and national trends on drugs. These differences imply a sharp contrast between the mayor's role in practice and in theory. Although Mayor E had more formal powers on drugs, he was less involved than Mayor D who did not have these powers. Moreover, while Mayors D and F took care of local public order and safety themselves, Mayor E left the policy-making part to one of his aldermen.

These changes in the policy frames and the mayor's position and role can be explained as the outcome of an interplay between the local framing

process among local discourse coalitions and the institutional structure in which these interactions take place, as provided by the local, regional and national policy network. This sub case demonstrated that Breda's local policy frame regarding drug-related nuisance was *strongly characterized by supra local policy frames*. The frames of powerful actors in the local policy network embraced and approved the regulative aspects of the national arena and policy ambitions, and policy strategies were created at the regional arena time after time. Moreover, both frame expansion processes were, in contrast to the initial framing process, triggered by supra local policy programs introduced by the national government and regional policy practices. The expansion of the mayor's formal position on drug-related nuisance can be explained as a *top-down process* in which new powers for Dutch mayors were adopted into regional and local policy strategies in the late 1990s. This sub case depicts a *strong regional policy* arena around drug-related issues which both filtered national policy ideas into ready-made strategies for local governments and increasingly characterized the mayor's role in practice over time. The mayor's role in practice showed a high degree of variety which can be explained by the *distribution of tasks and powers in the local arena* as well as the supra local policy context in place. Regarding the first, the level of hands-on involvement with drug-related nuisance was higher once the mayor was personally involved with public safety policy (Mayor D and Mayor F), instead of an Alderman (Mayor E). Furthermore, once supra local policy arrangements on drug-related issues in the region came into place over time, the mayor of Breda became increasingly involved in *networking and brokering* between the local and supra local policy arenas (Mayor F).

3 Sub case 5 – Domestic violence in Breda

Breda's policy approach on domestic violence was preceded by a regional policy on violence against women for the region of West Brabant. A regional collaboration that united many social organizations, juridical actors and local governments had been in place since the early 1990s. Breda was appointed as the 'center city' in the region by the national government and was therefore responsible for initiating, designing and coordinating facilities for vulnerable groups in society. Using the slogan 'Can I stay here for a while?', a program of shelter and support was provided to various groups, such as the homeless, former psychiatric patients and alcohol addicts (Gemeente Breda, 2002). Traditionally, female victims of violence and their children were one of these groups. The policy intervention for them and other target groups can be characterized as merely reactive, and supply oriented with a strong focus on victims.

In 2003, a two-year long project titled 'Stop Domestic Violence' was introduced (GGD West Brabant, 2003). This was the first policy document specifically labeling domestic violence as a policy problem. It aimed to develop an integral, regional policy approach to domestic violence, which was seen as both a social and a safety issue. In a formal collaboration agreement, 23 organizations ranging from municipalities to the police and the child

protection agency agreed to adopt the regional policy's ambitions into their regular activities (Convenant SHG, 2003).

In 2005, the policy approach to domestic violence was expanded when local authorities in Breda used the national budget to create a so called 'Advise and Support Point Domestic Violence' for the West Brabant region (Convenant ASHG, 2005). This was part of a national policy program to provide national money and guidelines to centre cities across the country to create a national network. The policy ambitions this time were to adopt a so called 'chain approach' to domestic violence. This implied that prevention, repression and everything in between was to be carried out by multiple organizations and coordinated by local government (Convenant ASHG, 2005). Again, the center city Breda was granted the role of coordinator in this approach.

In 2008 and 2009, the policy approach to domestic violence was professionalized even further. The local government of Breda initiated a regional working procedure for the upcoming 'Law Temporary Home Restrictions' to be given out by the mayor (Handleiding WTHV, 2008). In creating a regional strategy for implementing this national power, the mayor was given a prominent position in the regional policy approach to domestic violence for the first time. Furthermore, a new regional policy on domestic violence entitled 'Dependent and Safe' was created (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 2009). The core of this plan was a so called 'systemic approach' addressing not only the victim, assailant, and the children, but the entire family and social system surrounding them. Prevention and early signaling were important policy objectives as well. This time, all partner organizations, again coordinated by Breda, were aiming to integrate their activities into a program, instead of implementing their own part as was the case previously (GGD West-Brabant 2003).

Focusing on the securitization of local issues and the shifts in the mayor's role, this policy had at least two relevant shifts. The first is labeling domestic violence as a local policy problem for the first time in 2003. In the initial policy frame, domestic violence was partially securitized by qualifying it as both a social and safety issue (and in that order). However, it was first of all qualified as a social issue and the policy mainly mentioned interventions and actors from the policy domain of social issues and welfare. Secondly, this initial policy frame was expanded over the years, with the peak being the introduction of a systematic approach in 2009. This time, the safety perspective was emphasized a bit more since the mayor and other municipal actors from the safety domain were brought into the picture, with the temporary home restrictions in the regional policy approach (Handleiding WTHV, 2008). Table 15 provides a general overview of these policy frames and the text that follow provide an in-depth analysis of the framing processes surrounding them.

Table 15: Overview of the policy frames related to domestic violence in Breda between 1990 and 2010.

Time period	Topic policy frame	Policy frame: diagnostic and prognostic message
2003	initial frame Domestic violence as a policy problem in the region	Diagnostic Message: Mental and physical violence in family spheres labeled as a social and safety issue. Prognostic Message: Initiation of integral collaboration by 23 organization in the region of West Brabant coordinated by municipality of Breda. *(Stop Domestic Violence, 2003 – Gemeente Breda)*
2009	frame shift Systemic approach including home restrictions	Diagnostic Message: Various forms of violence in dependent relationships qualify as both as safety and a social matter. Prognostic Message: Systemic approach focusing on entire social system & introducing home restrictions by mayor and safety authorities. *(Dependent and Safe, 2009 – Gemeente Breda)* *(Mannual Law Temoperary Home Restrction, 2008 – Gemeente Breda)*

3.1 Initial local framing process of domestic violence as a policy problem in the early 2000s

In 2003, domestic violence was introduced as a local policy issue and partly qualified as a safety matter. The initial regional policy frame on domestic violence in West Brabant was developed alongside several national policy developments on this topic. In 2002, the national government published the 'Private Violence, Public Task' program, where domestic violence was explicitly qualified as a public problem for the first time and municipalities were activated to address it (Tweede Kamer, 2002). The national policy program described, based on several pilot projects, an 'integral approach' to effectively address and prevent domestic violence. 'Integral' was understood to mean collaboration between national, regional and local actors to apply an inclusive approach to victims, aggressors and their social environment. The national government granted "local authorities a special responsibility to initiate initiatives for collaboration" (Tweede Kamer, 2002: 12 – translation RP), encouraging local government actors and societal organizations to address this formerly private matter.

While the national government formulated this program and set aside funds for local policy initiatives, policy attention on domestic violence at the regional level only came about slowly. A regional platform uniting actors from

the social policy domain combating sexual violence and child abuse created a working group on domestic violence in. This working group studied the prevalence of domestic violence in the region and the policy and aid structures for it in West Brabant (Gemeente Breda, 2002). The working group created a policy plan for domestic violence based on the national policy guidelines provided by the ministry of juridical affairs. Meanwhile, local authorities in centre city Breda mentioned domestic violence in their policy documents as well. All of these policy initiatives eventually came together in the formal policy program and collaboratin agreement 'Stop Domestic Violence' in 2003 (GGD West Brabant, 2003). Figure 21 summarizes the initial framing process which is explained in the next few paragraphs.

Figure 21: Initial framing process of the problem of domestic violence in Breda in the early 2000s

3.1.1 Inital framing process

During the initial framing process, domestic violence itself was not really a topic of intense policy debate in the local political arena. Policy processes and debates concentrated on social care[38] in general. However, domestic violence started to generate more policy attention as it was explicitly mentioned by several actors during local council meetings. Based on their interactions, three discourse coalitions were apparent.

Coalition A: Professionals in the region

Various organizations handling youth care, public health care and social care have offered shelters and support for women in West Brabant. United in the 'Working group on Domestic Violence', they created the first policy ambitions regarding domestic violence as a regional policy problem after studying the manifestation of domestic violence in the region and the policies in place in 2002 (Werkgroep Huiselijk Geweld Regio Breda, 2002) Their report mirrors the shared policy frame of the professionals.

In defining domestic violence, the professionals literally adopted the national government's description: "*violence [mental, physical, sexual] committed by someone from the victim's domestic sphere*" (Werkgroep Huiselijk Geweld Regio Breda, 2002: 1). This definition is presented as the shared and regional working definition of domestic violence. In addressing this type of violence, the working group signaled several weaknesses in the policy approach in Breda. Collaboration between the multiple organizations and gaps in the prevention and aid supply structures were the most important. They recommended stronger collaboration between various partners and disciplines, the formalizing and coordination of this collaboration, and better information exchange between the police, juridical and aid organizations: "*The ambition of the 'Working Group on Domestic Violence' is to create a plan to come to an integral offer of activities regarding domestic violence by actors involved*" (Werkgroep Huiselijk Geweld Regio Breda, 2002: 2). The working group proposed a detailed plan including preventative measures, information campaigns, support for victims, an enhancement of professionalism and a registration point. The plan was structured by national policy guidelines as provided by the ministry of juridical affairs (Ministerie van Justitie, 2000). Taken together, this is supposed to serve the greater goal of "*preventing and combating domestic violence by means of an integral approach in the region of Breda*" (Werkgroep Huiselijk Geweld Regio Breda, 2002: 2).

Coalition B: A pioneering civil servant

Policy attention to domestic violence at the very local level of the municipality in Breda was initiated by a single pioneering civil servant. She paved the way for policies in Breda by explicitly mentioning victims of domestic violence as an important target group when updating the regional policy strategy for social care. This level of attention on domestic violence at the municipal level was, according the civil servant herself as well as by others (Civil servant 5 –

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[38]   In Dutch: maatschappelijke opvang.

Interview November 2012; Civil servant 4 – Interview August 2012;), inspired by the national government's promotion of the responsibility of local authorities in this topic (Tweede Kamer, 2002). Later, she would describe her actions as: "*I got the policy 'private violence, a public matter' by the ministry of justice. It stated that they expected a bit more from local government in addressing domestic violence. [...]. I thought, if I want to do something with it, I have to embed this into policy. Then I mentioned victims of domestic violence as an important target group. Then I could rightfully address it*" (Civil servant 5 – Interview November 2012 – translation RP). According to this civil servant, domestic violence was to be stopped before women eventually arrived in safe houses. In advocating the attention of local policymakers on domestic violence, she experienced some resistance among local politicians who showed "*risk averse behavior and no priority for domestic violence*" and fellow civil servants who "*did not see domestic violence as a municipal task*" (Civil Servant 5 – Interview November 2012 – translation RP).

Discourse coalition C: Local authorities reactively supporting a policy approach
Local authorities in Breda did not exhaustively debate domestic violence. However, there has been some outspoken as well as silent support for (regional) policy intervention regarding domestic violence.

While discussing the social care policy in the city council, three council members pointed at domestic violence and the need for local policy intervention. A council member from the Labor Party expressed his worries regarding the growing amount of victims from domestic violence. He asked for a policy approach specifically for victims of domestic violence, stating that: "a *policy approach regarding victims of domestic violence is of huge importance*" (Councillor Jackson – Gemeenteraad, 2003 – translation RP). His colleague, council member Schoenmakers, representing local party Breda '97, expressed the need for domestic violence as well: "*Whatever bad happens behind the front door, abuse of both women and children, molestation of elderly people and sexual violence, should be firmly addressed and opposed*" (Councillor Schoenmakers – Gemeenteraad 2003 – translation RP). He favored involvement by local authorities by referring to the national policy that appointed local governments as the coordinator of policies on domestic violence. Moreover, he linked these issues to local government's responsibility for local order and safety. Council Member de Boer, representing local party Leefbaar Breda, problematized the growing number of female victims in social care programs. According to him, men molesting their wives should be restricted from their homes: "*not the woman and children should leave the house, but the man using violence should*" [...] "*We hope that this problem is tackled by national government, because that is where the solution should come from*" (Councillor de Boer – Gemeenteraad, 2003 – translation RP). He explicitly located the responsibility for creating a policy approach at national government.

Although not actively addressing domestic violence in the local policy debate, the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen implicitly recognized the need

for policy intervention as well. One aldermen reacted to the remarks of the council members by mentioning that he had filed for a national subsidy for a local program against domestic violence. The Board of Mayor and Aldermen proposed to. Together with the council members, some of whom explicitly mentioned their support, they can be seen as reactive (and silent) supporters of local policy on domestic violence.

Frame alignment
The members of coalition A and B found each other recognizing the need to create public policy on domestic violence. Meanwhile, the fact that a civil servant mentioned domestic violence in a local policy document on social care (coalition B) inspired several council members (coalition C) to pay attention to domestic violence as well. Moreover, all three coalitions were to some extent inspired by national policy ideas for tackling domestic violence. This implies frame alignment between national policy ideas and coalitions A, B and C in the form of frame amplification. This points to the strengthening of regional and local individual frames by national policy ideas.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
In 2003, a two year project 'Stop Domestic Violence' was introduced. This project had to initiate and enhance policy collaboration and alignment between various parties in the social policy domain to address domestic violence as a new policy problem. The overall policy goals was to: *"develop an integral approach to domestic violence in West-Brabant: to offer a coordinated, mutually linked supply of prevention, shelter, help and after care for victims, offenders and children"* (Convenant SHG, 2003: 1 – translation RP). The collaboration agreement formulated a clear problem definition and policy solutions which together characterize the policy frame.

Its *diagnostic message* was that domestic violence taking place in the private sphere and setting was now regarded as a public problem. Domestic violence was defined as "*violence committed by someone from the private sphere*" (GGD West Brabant, 2003:7 – translation RP). This violence could be mental, physical or sexual, and the private sphere consisted of (former) partners, members of the family and friends of the family (ibid). In describing this new policy problem, the national definition of domestic violence as posed by the Ministry of Juridical Affairs was used. Moreover, domestic violence was considered to cross the boundaries of that private sphere, thereby making it amenable to government intervention. It was a public problem linked to the domain of public health, local order and safety as well as shelter for women (Convenant SHG, 2003).

The main objective of the initial policy program was to create a collaboration network to address domestic violence. The collaboration described 'integral cooperation' between 23 organizations in the West Brabant region, including the police and public prosecutor and multiple social sector organizations: youth care, social care, public health care, women's shelter, council for child protection and many more (Convenant SHG, 2003). Together, these organizations aim to prevent and stop the escalation of domestic violence as early as possible, by means of collaboration on a regional

scale (GGD West Brabant, 2003). Coordinated by local government, these activities focus on victims as well as aggressors, and children witnessing and or experiencing violence. Although the project aims to initiate regional collaboration and align activities in the policy domain of social care and shelter, it was a temporary two-year project and all participants are supposed adopt their share of policy implementation into their regular activities.

In terms of discourse institutionalization, the initial policy program 'Stop Domestic Violence' was a mixture of national and local policy ideas. The policy answered the national call for local authorities to address domestic violence. Breda took up its responsibility as a center city to initiate and coordinate policy actions on domestic violence. It adopted the national definition of domestic violence. However, the exact content of the policy program was given a regional touch as these national policy ideas were to be embedded in more or less existing regional collaboration structures in which many actors from the social policy domain were already in place.

3.1.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
The initial framing process resulted in the first regional policy ambitions regarding domestic violence. The following sections describe whether and how they affected the mayor's position and role, both on paper as well as in practice. During policy preparation and the first year of its implementation, Mayor E was in place.

Expected role
The mayor was not granted any role in the first policy document 'Stop Domestic Violence' in 2003. The document does not list any tasks or responsibilities for the mayor, nor does it address the case of domestic violence or administrative activities during the policy process. The aldermen for Welfare and Youth, on the other hand, was mentioned as the first responsible representative of local government. Administrative coordination of the regional project on domestic violence was taken care of by a 'steering group' preceded by a representative from the social department of the municipality of Breda. Implementation of the project was to be led by the regional public health service (GGD West Brabant, 2003).

Role in practice: little action, high enactment
Only one action undertaken by the mayor on domestic violence was mentioned in the complete data set on domestic violence in Breda. This was the fact that the mayor formally mandated Alderman Heerkens, who was responsible for Welfare and Youth, to sign the collaboration agreement and to participate in the project 'Stop Domestic Violence' (Conventant SHG, 2003). Later on, ex-Mayor E, when asked whether he was involved with the new approach to domestic violence in early 2003, would reply: *"barely, this was taken care of by aldermen Heerkens.* […] *Every once in a while I learned there was domestic violence going somewhere, but that was about it"* (Mayor E – Interview June 2013 – translation RP). Furthermore, he stated that he regarded domestic violence as social and not a safety matter. The aldermen, who was responsible for local order and safety during that period, stated that he did not

carry out any activities regarding domestic violence during this initial period. Only later on, when he replaced the mayor in the late 2000s, did he act by including home restrictions (Alderman – Interview May 2013).

Both the expanded role and the mayor's role in practice are comparable in the sense that the mayor was not simply a structural feature in policy and practice in the area of domestic violence. The low level of involvement of the mayor when the first policy on domestic violence was introduced and implemented implies a high level of frame enactment, since he was not provided any formal role at all in the plan.

3.1.3 Institutional arrangements in the early 2000s
Various issues from the national, regional and local policy arena affected the course and outcome of the local framing process and the mayor's role.

National arena
The emerging national policy on domestic violence affected the local framing and the policy process in several ways. The *regulative and budgetary aspects* of the national policy were prominent. The national program 'Private Violence, Public Matter' (Tweede Kamer, 2002) encouraged local authorities to address domestic violence. Moreover, national guidelines structured the regional policy on domestic violence (Ministerie van Justitie, 2000), and funding from the national government supported the regional activities.

Regional arena
New plans and activities on domestic violence where prepared and implemented with existing policy structures and actors dealing with social care and shelter for females in West Brabant. This implied that *existing regional policy practices* structured the new policy to domestic violence.

Local arena
Breda's role as the city center in West Brabant provided local government with a coordinating role in the regional domestic violence project. The fact that the local frames of the pioneering civil servant, local council members, and the Board of the Mayor and Alderman were compatible with both regional and national policies on domestic violence ensured local participation and adoption of the new project 'Stop Domestic Violence'. More specifically, the single actor coalition consisting of a pioneering civil servant fulfilled the role of broker by connecting local policy frames with external ones. This implies that *cognitive aspects* in the local policy network played a crucial role.

3.2 Mayors and home restrictions in the late 2000s
During the mid and late 2000s, the national government undertook various policy initiatives on domestic violence. These included the introduction of the Advice and Support Points Domestic Violence, the introduction of the national policy program 'Protected and Empowered' (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport, 2007), various other public campaigns, and the publication

of guidelines on child abuse, domestic violence and honor killing (Openbaar Ministerie, 2010). The national government also empowered Dutch mayors with the power to impose temporary home restrictions in 2009- mayors could restrict offenders of domestic violence from their homes for ten days or longer when deeded necessary (Law temporary home restrictions, 2009).

In the regional policy arena of West Brabant, the formal collaboration agreement on domestic violence was coming to an end in 2009 (Commissie MM, 2009). Local authorities in Breda that wanted to continue the policy approach anticipated this by initiating the new program 'Enforcing Approach Domestic Violence'. This program had several objectives, such as improving the prevention of violence in dependent relationships and preparing for the new temporary home restrictions law (Handleiding WTHV, 2008; College B&W, 2009). This confluence of local, regional and national policy developments strengthened the wish to further professionalize and the recognition of the need to enhance collaboration on domestic violence (College B&W 2009). This resulted in a new program 'Dependent and Safe' that introduced a systemic approach to domestic violence and regional guidelines for implementing temporary home. This time, the safety aspects of domestic violence were increasingly emphasized, as the mayor and other municipal actors from the safety domain enforced temporary home restrictions on offenders of domestic violence (Handleiding WTHV, 2008). Figure 21 maps the process of frame expansion surrounding the new home restriction policy.

Figure 22 Frame expansion domestic violence late 2000s, Breda

3.2.1 Frame expansion

An analysis of reports from meetings of councils and commissions and interviews with the actors involved does not reveal any pattern of interaction and communication between the discourse coalitions that discussed the renewed regional policy on domestic violence or the adoption of home restrictions in West Brabant. This implies that the frame expansion regarding domestic violence was not surrounded by a substantive policy debate. Local authorities supported the renewed regional approach since they formally approved and adopted it into the local policy arena. This implies that the frame expansion process is not characterized by frame alignment between multiple discourse coalitions.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
During the late 2000s, a new program for domestic violence titled 'Dependent and Safe' was created (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 2009; Convenant HGK, 2009; Visiedocument HGK, 2009). In addition, a detailed manual on the implementation of the new temporary home restriction scheme was introduced (Handleiding WTHV, 2008). Together, these policies mirror the diagnostic and prognostic message of the policy frame in Breda at that time.

The policy frame indicated an intolerant and very broad perspective on domestic violence: *"Domestic violence and child abuse are never unacceptable, whatever the circumstances and against whomever. Character, psychiatric problems, financial issues, alcohol- or drugs consumption, religion or culture: none of them is an excuse"* (Visiedocument HGK, 2009:1). Domestic violence is seen as a social problem taking place in private spheres in all layers of societies and cultures (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 2009; Visiedocumen HGKt, 2009). Everyone is seen as a potential victim – men, women, children, the elderly, people with disabilities – upon whom any form of physical, mental, or sexual violence could be inflicted by a member of their familiar sphere (Visiedocument HGK, 2009). The aggressor could be a direct family member, blood relative or someone socially related to their family (Convenant HGK, 2009). Moreover, the physical and mental consequences of domestic violence are not limited only to the victim, and include the victim's environment as well (Visiedocument HGK, 2009). Child abuse is now frequently mentioned separately along with domestic violence (Visiedocument, HGK, 2009; Convenant HGK, 2009).

The range of solutions for tackling domestic violence is wide and inclusive as well. In a general sense, domestic violence is labeled as a safety and public health topic for local government (Convenant HGK, 2009). Local authorities are responsible for the creation of an integrated approach to domestic violence. According to the collaboration agreement, this responsibility is based on the municipality's responsibility for both public safety and health (Convenant HGK, 2009).

The 'Dependent and Safe' policy, in its call for an 'integral approach in the broadest sense' (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 2009), clearly aims to intensify coordination and collaboration between various organizations in West Brabant to address domestic violence. All of these organizations aim to adopt a 'systemic' approach. This implies they take the whole family as their object of their interventions by focusing on the victim, the aggressor, and witnesses at the same time. Together, they aim to improve *'"awareness prevention, early signaling, crisis intervention, shelter, help/treatment, prosecution and after care"* in that order (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 2009:1). Prevention and early warnings are crucial to prevent harm and repetition and to stop violence. The interests of children are labeled as the number one priority in stopping domestic violence (Visiedocument HGK, 2009).

A new policy tool adopted in this regional approach is the use of temporary home restrictions. The local adoption of this policy was agreed upon by all mayors of the region in the regional board of mayors on 25th of September. The implementation of these home restrictions is structured by a

regional manual for all mayors to enact in the same manner (Handleiding WTHV, 2008). The policy frame of the instructions clearly mirrors a preventive focus as well. Home restrictions are supposed to prevent escalation in terms of violence or stop violence in the early stages. Finally, local authorities in Breda are supposed to coordinate both the new policy program and home restrictions in West Brabant (Handleiding WTHV, 2008).

National policy ideas were institutionalized in the regional policy program on domestic violence through the adoption of temporary home restrictions and the systemic approach to domestic violence. Whereas home restriction were formalized in national law, the systemic approach was promoted by national policies on domestic violence from the early 2000s onwards (GGD West Brabant, 2003; Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 2009). These were directly adopted into the regional collaboration strategies on domestic violence. This link between national policy frames and regional policy documents points to a top-down process of discourse institutionalization.

3.2.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice

During the frame expansion of the late 2000s, Mayor F was the mayor of Breda. With the introduction of home restrictions into the local policy, the mayor was now expected to participate in the local and regional approach to domestic violence for the first time.

Expected role

The regional guidelines for implementing home restrictions in West Brabant had a formal role for the mayor in addressing domestic violence. All mayors, including the mayor of Breda, formally approved a so-called 'half mandate construction' as proposed in the regional guidelines (Handleiding WTHV, 2008). Mayors were expected to confirm or reject a home restriction as prepared and proposed by the police. The same held for extensions of the restriction. Moreover, mayors had to institute home restrictions to create peace and initiate assistance and help trajectories.

Nevertheless, the mayor's expected role in addressing domestic violence was limited to home restrictions, as other local actors were responsible for the overall policy approach to domestic violence. Breda's alderman for Welfare and Youth was formally responsible for this program on behalf of the 18 other municipalities in Brabant West. The program was supervised by a steering group led by the municipality of Breda (again on behalf of the other participating municipalities) and united a wide variety of organizations providing social and health care and actors from the criminal law community (police, public prosecutor and rehabilitation office) (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 2009).

Mayor's role in practice: full frame enactment

The mayor's role in practice came down to several operational as well as administrative activities. First, the mayor issued multiple home restrictions. During the first year, 35 home restrictions were given out to citizens of Breda, which made up 47,3 % of the region (Bureau Queste, 2010). These restrictions

were indeed carried out according to the 'half-mandate construction', which calls for the police to use a checklist to determine whether or not the threat of (recurrent) violent behavior was high enough to issue a home restriction. When a home restriction is given out, the police officer deliberates with the mayor, who usually approves them. Once the police officer signs the mayoral decision, the home restriction is in place (Civil servant 2 and 4 – Interviews August 2012; Mayor F – Interview May 2013).

With these actions, the mayor of Breda became operationally involved with domestic violence for the first time. According to many of the actors involved, the adoption of home restrictions has activated the mayor's involvement in this policy domain, as they were a *"boost which strengthened the relationship between the approach to domestic violence and the mayor since he has to have an opinion about every case"* (Head Advise and Support Point Domestic Violence – Interview April 2013 – translation RP). As the mayor himself described: *"I think it became more visible. Before I would not know what was going on. Then the police just removed the victim from the house. [..] Now cases of domestic violence are presented to me"* (Mayor F – Interview May 2013 – translation RP). The actors involved also mentioned that this type of involvement made the mayor's position vulnerable. Both the police and the mayor stated that after each incident of domestic violence, the public would look at the municipality and mayor and ask: 'what have you done to prevent this?' (Police officer 1 – Interview March 2013; Mayor F – Interview May 2013). Moreover, the social work organization signaled that mayors became hesitant to issue home restrictions, fearing legal obstacles (Head of Social Work Organization – Interview April 2013).

Besides implementing home restrictions in individual cases of domestic violence, the mayor was also involved with domestic violence at the administrative level as well. He put the project 'Enforcing Approach Domestic Violence' on the agenda of the regional police board and asked his fellow mayors in the region to discuss it at their municipal Boards of Mayor and Aldermen, as he himself did (College B&W, 2009). Furthermore, he attended two meeting for mayors in the region to discuss and evaluate the new policy tool of temporary home restrictions (Civil servant 4, 5 – Interviews August and November 2012; Head Advise and Support Point Domestic Violence – Interview April 2013).

Although the mayor and other safety actors are in place now, the aldermen of Welfare and Youth retains responsibility for policies regarding domestic violence (Commissie MM, 2009). The ownership of the policy is located within the aldermen and the local policy domains of youth and welfare. The aldermen signed the collaboration agreement (Convenant HGK, 2009), coordinated policies (Commissie MM, 2009) and represented the municipality of Breda throughout the entire policy process (Head Advise and Support Point Domestic Violence - Interview April 2013). Only the home restrictions were handled by the mayor and his staff. Finally, as the mayor came into play, actors from the local department of public safety became involved with policy intervention regarding domestic violence to handle the home restrictions.

In sum, both the mayor's operational, administrative and political activities show a great deal of involvement regarding domestic violence. Comparing this role in practice to the expected role as promoted by the policy frame, Mayor F fully enacted the policy frame by issuing home restrictions.

3.2.3 Institutional arrangements
Various aspects of the national and regional policy arena affected the course and outcome of the local framing process and the mayor's role.

National arena
National policy programs and laws structured the approach to domestic violence in several ways. National policy programs both triggered and structured regional and local policy attention to domestic violence during the early 2000s. Later on, temporary home restrictions activated the mayor to become more closely involved in addressing domestic violence. This implies a top down process of policy and role structuration by *regulative aspects* from the national policy arena. Furthermore, the national government provided the budget for the center city Breda to organize social care, and part of it was used to finance regional policy programs for domestic violence national budgets for (College B&W, 2010).

Regional arena
Design and implementation of new policy programs for domestic violence were adopted into existing policy practices for providing social care and shelter to women in West Brabant. The fact that Breda was the center city within this policy domain resulted in aldermen and later on the mayor of Breda being responsible for initiating and coordinating regional policies regarding domestic violence. This implies that the existing practices of the regional policies structured the role of the mayor in this sub case.

3.3 Findings Sub Case 5
Reconstructing the frame shifts and the mayor's role regarding domestic violence provided some preliminary research findings. The overall sub case of domestic violence showed an expansion of the policy frame regarding domestic violence in many ways between the 2002 and 2009.

The *diagnostic message* expanded from female victims of violent behavior by their partners (Gemeente Breda, 2002) to all forms of violence in dependent relationships (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 2009). Along the way, the focus of the policy program expanded from offenders, children and others attached to the social system in which the violence takes place (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 2009). The *prognostic message* of the policy frame shifted from being reactive and supply-driven, offering shelter and support to females (Gemeente Breda, 2002) to a demand-driven chain approach aiming to prevent or stop violence. Only as a last resort is shelter provided to victims of domestic violence (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig, 2009). Policy actors began collaborating more intensively as the policy programs were further developed and professionalized over the years. This sub

case showed a shift from more or less aligned action carried out by individual organizations (GGD West Brabant, 2003) to far reaching collaboration and integrated actions on a regional scale (Stuurgroep afhankelijk en veilig 2009, Handleiding WTHV, 2008). As the policy frame on domestic violence expanded and shifted, the *mayor's role* did as well, both on paper and in practice. The mayor's role shifted from no involvement to carrying out operational and administrative actions on domestic violence. This shift can largely be explained as a top-down process in which nationally-created policy tools were adopted into the regional policy approach. As soon as temporary home restrictions came into the picture, the mayor was activated. He was granted a role in the policy programs for giving out home restrictions which he fully enacted. In addition, he was actively involved in designing the regional policy strategy 'Dependent and Safe' and the regional manual for issuing home restrictions.

Based on the conceptual model, we analyzed these changes in both the policy frames as well as the mayor's role and position in practice as the outcome of an interplay between local framing process among local discourse coalitions and the institutional structure in which these interactions took place. Overall, this sub case shows a *top down process of policy- and role structuration* by national policy ambitions and instruments in both framing processes during the 21st century. First, the regulative aspects of the national policy arena triggered and shaped regional and local policy ambitions and practices regarding domestic violence. The initial framing process during which domestic violence was labeled as a policy object was triggered by the national government promoting the involvement of local government. Consequently, national problem definitions and policy goals were adopted into regional policy plans. The frame expansion process is characterized by the regional and local implementation of the nationally-created policy instrument of temporary home restrictions that involved the mayor. This implies a process of top-down role structuration for the mayor. Second, that *solely labeling domestic violence as a matter of safety was not enough to affect the mayor's role on paper and in practice*. Although domestic violence was partially framed as a safety problem by actors in the local policy arena during the initial framing process, the mayor, as the actor responsible for local order and safety, was neither granted a role on paper nor actively involved in practice. Only when temporary home restrictions were adopted did the mayor and civil servants from the policy domain of public order and safety become involved. The fact that the mayor was only activated by the time national policy tools in the form of home restrictions were introduced implies that framing local issues as safety problems needed to be backed up by real-life policy tools to alter an actor's role, at least on paper. Thirdly, nati*onal policy ideas and practices were adopted into the existing policy structures and practices of the regional and local policy arena* in the field of social care during the initial policy framing process. This indicates path dependency, making it more likely that the aldermen and not the mayor were actively involved with domestic violence policies in practice.

4 Sub case 6 – Organized crime in Breda

This paragraph provides a short summary of Breda's policy approach to organized crime between 1990 and 2010. Local government and the police suspected that severe and organized crime was present in local society throughout the entire research period starting from 1990 onwards. Multiple respondents mentioned their suspicion of criminal networks being linked to drugs, local bars, coffee shops, trailer camps, prostitution and specific local families (Civil servant 2, Police officer 3, Mayor D and Mayor E – Interviews 2012/2013). Every once in a while, local government, the police and the public prosecutor undertook rather repressive actions by, for example, arresting people and closing and confiscating trailers. Despite this, "*it remained rather difficult to get a grip on organized crime*" during the early 1990s, according to former Mayor D (Mayor D – Interview April 2013 – translation RP). Existing administrative instruments, such as local legislation and local allocation plans, were used to follow up on suspicions of organized or severe crime more preventatively but on an ad hoc basis (Mayor E, Alderman and Police officer 3 – Interviews 2013). Furthermore, many respondents mentioned that Mayor D received personal threats from local criminals and that civil servants and aldermen had been reluctant to tackle severe crime because of a fear of repercussions.

Compared to the other cases, Breda's policy path on organized crime is relatively short. Formal attention on an organized crime policy emerged in the late 2000s, with incidental mentions in formal policy plans. Breda's first BIBOB in the 2004 policy referred to the financial and economic aspects of organized crime (Gemeente Breda, 2004). This was followed by the regional collaboration agreements on cannabis that referred to criminal networks behind the production and trade of soft drugs in 2008 (Convenant cannabis, 2008). In the same year, a regional collaboration agreement regarding the problem of so-called 'free havens' was created in which Mayor F took an initiating and leading role (Convenant vrijplaatsen, 2008).[39] In 2009, a Regional Centre for Information and Expertise (RIEC) was created to support information exchange between government actors to enforce a local, administrative approach to organized crime (Convenant RIEC, 2010). Finally, the regional Brabant Taskforce for Organized Crime was introduced in 2010. This taskforce comprised the Minister of Safety and Justice, the mayors of the five largest cities in the region, the public prosecutor, the police, and the tax authority. They joined forces to combat organized drug-related crime (Tweede Kamer, 2011a). This was the first time organized crime in the Brabant region, including Breda, had become a central policy objective for local, regional and even national actors.

Taken together, the formal policy approach on organized crime developed slowly but steadily in the late 2000s. The initial policy frame on organized crime was rather 'low key'. When the BIBOB law was included as

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[39]   Free havens are locations where local authorties are not (able to) enforce local legislation and control activities, thereby providing opportunities for illegal behavior.

part of local policies in 2004, the financial and economic aspects of organized crime were briefly mentioned in the formal policy strategy. These were to be handled by administrative tools implemented by local government in Breda. This initial policy frame points at local government's initial policy ambitions regarding organized crime. A few years later, organized crime was mentioned in regional and regional policy plans and programs. Breda participated in a regional network on cannabis which was later embedded into the regional Brabant Taskforce for Organized Crime (Convenant cannabis, 2008; Tweede Kamer, 2011a). This implied participation in a further professionalized and integrated policy strategy towards criminal networks that produce and trade drugs. Local governments and mayors played a crucial part by implementing administrative tools besides juridical and fiscal instruments to prevent or discourage organized crime. Overall, organized crime was a new policy domain for local governments and only became a substantive policy objective with the creation of the taskforce in 2010. Table 16 summarizes the initial and expanded policy frames of this policy domain for local governments.

Table 16: Overview of policy frames on organized crime for Breda

Time period	Topic policy frame	Policy frame: diagnostic & prognostic message
2004	Administrative approach to organized crime at local level	Diagnostic Message: usage of legal facilities and services provided by local government to create financial gains from organized crime Prognostic Message: Local governments in Breda became involved with the administrative approach to organized crime (using BIBOB) *(Policy Rules Bibob 2004 – Gemeente Breda)*
2009	A regional approach to criminal networks	Diagnostic Message: invisible criminal networks cause high crime rates in the region Prognostic Message: taskforce combining administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions on a regional scale *(Adressing Organized Crime 2011 - Tweede Kamer)*

4.1 Local government adopts the first administrative tools on organized crime in the early 2000s

Traditional state actors such as the police and public prosecutor have long held a monopoly on the tracking and prosecuting of organized crime. However, in the early 1990s, the importance of administrative actions focusing on the prevention of unintended governmental support for illegal activities was argued in several studies and policy documents (Stuiksma, 1994; PEO, 1995; Fijnaut, 2002). Consequently, in the past two decades, a set of policy tools has been developed that create a so called 'administrative approach to organized crime' in which local municipalities are granted an important role (Huisman, 2010). The most important administrative tool for municipalities is the BIBOB Act which aims to protect the government's integrity. BIBOB was introduced in 2002, and allows local authorities to withdraw or refuse to give out a permit, subsidy or tender in case of suspicion that the applicant may use the permit for

illegal activities (Law on Enhancing the Integrity of Assessments by the Public Administration – BIBOB). As a result of this law, local authorities can also seek the assistance a national BIBOB office to conduct more extended, national-level screenings of applicants seeking local permits.

4.1.1 Initial local framing process

It is in this national policy context that local authorities in Breda took their first steps into the policy domain of organized crime by adopting the BIBOB tool. In 2003, the Board of Mayor and Alderman in Breda installed a local working group to prepare BIBOB policies which were eventually formally adopted in 2004 (Gemeente Breda, 2004). The adoption of the BIBOB instrument locally meant that local policy attention on specific aspects of organized crime was triggered by national policy tools. Figure 23 summarizes this initial framing process.

Figure 23: Initial framing process on organized crime at Breda

A content analysis of local council and commission meetings, as well as interviews with local policy actors, indicates that the adoption of the BIBOB tool in local plans in 2003 and 2004 was not preceded or followed by any policy debate during which frames could potentially align. The absence of local policy actors or coalitions expressing their views on organized crime and

BIBOB indicates a direct and instrumental adoption of national policy tools in the local policy space.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization

The first policy document in which organized crime was specifically mentioned is 'Policy approach to cafés, bars, prostitution and casinos by means of BIBOB' in 2004 (Gemeente Breda, 2004). This document presents the initial policy frame on organized crime in Breda.

Crime in general, whether organized or not, is problematized in the policy guidelines for BIBOB. It focused on the financial and economic aspects of crime, which touch upon the legal aspects of (local) government. In their diagnostic message local authorities followed the conclusions of the Van Traa parliamentary commission that focused on the financial gains from organized crime to create positions of economic power (PEO, 1996). These positions could 'infiltrate' society using legal facilities and services provided by local government, such as subsidies and permits. This threatens the integrity of local governments since criminal activities may be unintentionally supported by local authorities: *"Crime, organized crime, does not take place on an island. There are many interfaces between crime and what we call the juridical environment"* (Gemeente Breda, 2004:2 – translation RP).

When it comes to the diagnostic message, the policy documents makes a case for activating local government to address such (organized) crime: *"For a long time, prevention and repression of crime has been a task for solely the police and ministry of justice. Only in the past few years has the idea that local government can play a part in this become apparent. After all, local is ONE government together with the policy and juridical actors. One government that is responsible for setting norms and values. Once these norms and values are violated, local government as well has to respond"* (Gemeente Breda, 2004:1 – translation RP). The interfaces between crime and its legal environment offer possibilities for prevention and repression. Administrative tools, such as subsidies and permits, should be used for crime prevention. The adoption of the national BIBOB law would offer new possibilities for local government to prevent unintentional support of criminals and criminal organizations by creating new grounds for the refusal or withdrawal of municipal permits. Based on national law, the 'vulnerable sectors' in which this unwanted connection between the 'under' and 'upper' world may be present and should be assessed for include hotels, restaurants, bars, prostitution and casinos (Gemeente Breda, 2004). The policy document distinguished between a heavy and light BIBOB screening and included guidelines to define when the mayor can ask the national BIBOB office for a screening.

In terms of discourse institutionalization, the initial policy program in which local government first displayed its ambitions on crime and organized crime was highly affected by national policy ideas. The diagnostic message of the policy approach's focus on financial aspects of organized crime derived strongly from the conclusions of national inquiries into crime in the Netherlands, which pointed at its financial and economic aspects (PEO, 1996). The prognostic message of the approach was heavily structured by the inclusion of the BIBOB law into local policy in Breda. This instrument has

been more or less literarily copied from the national version into the local policy. More generally, the idea of the administrative approach, in which local governments use their administrative tools to prevent crime, was introduced and encouraged by the national government as well. This implies a voluntary process of top-down discourse institutionalization of national policy frames into the local policy process

4.1.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice
During the initial framing process, Mayor E was the mayor of Breda. The formal BIBOB policy set out several responsibilities and tasks for the mayor. The level to which his actions in practice mirrored what was expected of him is the level of frame enactment.

Expected role
In line with the national BIBOB law, the local BIBOB guidelines led to the individual mayor and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen being appointed as the administrative actors responsible for the local implementation of BIBOB policies and for requesting the national BIBOB office to screen a local case (Gemeente Breda, 2004). The mayor of Breda was thus granted a formal role in Breda's first policy approach to organized crime.

Role in practice: low frame enactment
In practice, however, Mayor E was little involved with the implementation of the BIBOB tool, besides formally approving the local BIBOB policy plan (Gemeente, 2004). The mayor's activities regarding BIBOB were limited and solely administrative. Together with the aldermen, he formally approved the BIBOB policy which was barely implemented. This indicates a lower level of frame enactment that can be explained by his personal frame on the policy tool, which he expressed in retrospect: "*BIBOB was barely used because it was too difficult*" (Mayor E – Interview June 2013).

4.1.3 Institutional arrangements in the early 2000s
Several aspects of the national, regional and local policy arena affected the course and outcome of the local framing process and the mayor's role.

National arena
The initial framing of organized crime as a local policy problem was both triggered and heavily structured by the BIBOB tool that was designed and introduced by national government. This implies that the *regulative aspects* of the national policy arena triggered and structured local policy attention on organized crime, in which the mayor was granted a formal role.

Local arena
Although the national BIBOB instrument was approved by the local authorities in Breda and expanded their collection of local tools, Mayor E did not immediately implement it in practice. This might be explained by the fact that the personal frame of this dominant actor in the local policy network did not

align with the policy frame. This points to the importance of the *cognitive aspects* for the level of enactment by the mayor.

4.2 Task Force for Organized Crime in the late 2000s

This section describes the characteristics of the frame expansion process during which organized crime became a full-grown policy topic for local authorities in Breda. This frame expansion process took place within a national policy context of expanding attention on organized crime and the encouragement of local authorities to take on a strong role.

In the late 2000s, the Balkenende IV administration prioritized the problem of organized crime and encouraged the Dutch municipalities to play an important part in tackling this problem. In the national policy document titled 'Administrative Approach to Organized Crime,' it was argued that organized crime manifest themselves in municipalities and local communities: *"Organized crime has almost always roots on the local level"* (Programma bestuurlijke aanpak georganiseerde misdaad, 2008:2 – translation RP). This national, integral approach to organized crime prioritized specific areas including human trafficking, the organized production of soft drugs, and fraud in real estate. Within this program, municipalities were granted the role of coordinators of the administrative approach (CCV, 2010). To support these large governance networks that brought together local authorities and others parties, National and Regional Centers of Information and Expertise were created.

4.2.1 Frame expansion

In the region of Mid-West Brabant, organized crime was subjected to a series of regional studies and policy plans. A research report on drug-related nuisance pointed to the supra local character of drug-related problems as well (COT, 2009). More specifically, it pointed to the production of cannabis and trade in amphetamine by criminal networks. These signals were picked up local governments in the region, and they created a regional commission led by Mayor Fränzel. The commission recommended the creation of a programmatic, systematic and integrated approach to organized crime in Mid-West Brabant, and promoted the participation of local governments in the RIEC as information-based governance was deemed crucial (Commissie Fränzel, 2009).

Local governments of the four cities in Mid-West Brabant scored high in the municipal safety index[40] and were worried and requested a scrutinization of the causes of these high crime rates. Research revealed that that the high crime rates in these large cities were strongly connected to organized crime (P&W, 2010). This report was soon followed by policy developments on drug-related organized crime. Triggered by the discontent with the high crime rates combined with a series of aggressive incidents[41], the mayors of the five

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[40]   Den Bosch, Breda, Eindhoven en Tilburg (gemeentelijke veiligheidsindex (COT, 2009).
[41]   Including: Criminal liquidations and utered threath adressed to mayors (Gemeente Breda, 1010, Tweede Kamer, 2010).

largest cities expressed their worries and wishes to the Minister of Safety and Justice (Tweede kamer, 2010, Mayor F, 2009). This led to the creation of the regional Taskforce for Organized Crime. In this taskforce, the mayors of five cities, which included Breda, the Minister of Safety and Justice, the public prosecutor, the police and the tax authorities joined forces to fight criminal networks linked to drugs (Tweede Kamer, 2010). The existing regional agreement regarding cannabis was adopted by this task force. Figure 24 summarizes this process of frame expansion.

Figure 24: frame expansion on organized crime, Breda late 2000s

Several discourse coalitions consisting of actors from different policy arenas interacted during the processes of frame expansion.

Coalition A: Mayors of the region Mid-West Brabant
The mayors of the Brabant region collaborated in the regional board of the police and expressed their shared understanding of drugs and crime. Their common frame relied heavily on the studies they initiated and financed

together (Commissie Fränzel, 2009; COT, 2009; P&W, 2010). Following the conclusions of the research reports, they problematized the invisible criminal structures around cannabis which created the visibly high crime rates in the region (Commissie Fränzel, 2010). The acknowledgment of the supra local character of drug-related problems went hand-in-hand with the ambition to cooperate on a regional scale. More specifically, the mayors pointed to the importance of aligning administrative, fiscal and judicial instruments to systematically restrict organized crime's drug-related activities in the region: *"The benefits of a regional approach include: finding solutions for problems manifesting on a region scale. Municipalities can learn from each other in designing and implementing policies and prevent individual actions to create a water bed effect"* (Commissie Fränzel, 2010 – translation RP).

Coalition B: Local authorities in Breda
Mayor F represented his municipality in regional coalition A. He was also part of the local coalition B that united the local authorities of Breda to bring regional ambitions and plans to the local arena. In the local policy arena, the city council and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen were key players who discussed and supported regional policy ambitions on organized crime. The Board of Mayor and Aldermen more or less followed the regional policy by problematizing the supra local character of drug-related crime and formulated the goal to address criminal networks dealing in cannabis in the region (College van B&W, 2010). In line with coalition A, they pointed to the scarce police capacity and proposed to follow up on the Fränzel commission's call to municipalities to participate in the RIEC and implement the BIBOB for matters of organized crime (ibid).

The mayor himself expressed his worries about the "*drugs trade as the engine of crime in the region*" and pointed to "*the tremendous criminalization of drugs trade is the largest problem*" during a local meeting with council members (Commissie Bestuur, 2010:12 – translation RP). He recognized the supra local character of the problem and the need to combine prevention, enforcement and criminal pursuit as stressed by the COT report (Mayor F, 2009). Although Breda is not an island and the problem manifests itself in the city, he suspected that the problem was less severe in Breda than in other cities. Nevertheless, he supported the taskforce and the regional network: "*I fully supported the taskforce. It is a catalyst for addressing matters that are severe in a better way*" (Mayor F – Interview May 2013 – translation RP).

The frames of the local political parties on organized crime were mirrored by the reactions of local council members on the boards to the organized crime policies. The Socialist Party saw the 'emergence of organized crime as a concern' and supported maximal effort on prevention (Commissie Bestuur, 2009). The Green Left Party problematized organized crime around cannabis which "*would not come without nuisance and crime*" (Commissie Bestuur, 2010:11 – transaltion RP). The Labor Party recognized organized crime related to cannabis as well and advised coordination of policy interventions at the regional level. According to the Christian Democratic Party, "*a lot of money circulates in the drugs circuit and criminals would get a*

growing grip on society through drugs money" (Commissie Bestuur, 2010: 12-translation RP). They proposed a 'tough policy' on this issue. Parties Democrats '66 and Breda '97 were annoyed by the restricted police capacity. Altogether, this implies that the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, the mayor himself and the city council supported the policy ambitions of coalition A.

Discourse coalition C: Minister of Safety and Justice
The Minister of Safety and Justice, Ivo Opstelten, recognized "*organized crime in Brabant as a severe and serious problem*" and fully supported the task force which he described as "*an institution which maximally uses all administrative, fiscal and criminal justice instruments throughout the region. Off course, these efforts have to result into a more structural grounds for a collective approach on regional level*" (Tweede Kamer 2011a:1 – translation RP). In supporting and facilitating the taskforce with money and manpower, the minister managed to squeeze in the national government's plans regarding coffee shops as well. As mentioned in sub case 5 on the drug-related nuisance in Breda, the national government introduced memberships cards and distance criteria for coffee shops, which were first implemented in the Brabant region: "*It was agreed that this government's strengthened policy towards coffee shops will be implemented in Brabant*" (Tweede Kamer, 2011:1).

During the policy debate, the frames of national, regional and local discourse coalitions were in alignment. The process of frame alignment went through two phases. Firstly, the collective regional frame recognizing the need of collaboration to address drug-related organized crime cascaded to the local level of Breda. The mayor of Breda enhanced the process of frame alignment by introducing and explaining the regional policy ambitions of coalition A in the local policy network, where coalition B was present. Secondly, the regional and local recognition of the need for regional collaboration and extra policy capacity was actively communicated to decision-makers in the national policy arena in the person of Minister Opstelten (coalition C). During this phase, regional policy goals on organized crime aligned with national goals on coffee shops in the Netherlands. Altogether, this implies the bridging of compatible but formerly unconnected frames from three discourse coalitions located in different policy arenas.

Local policy frame & discourse institutionalization
In the late 2000s, several policies were created to address organized crime with an administrative approach. These were the regional collaboration agreements on free havens and cannabis and the policy ambitions of the Taskforce on Organized Crime. Together, these three policies mirrored the policy frame(s) on organized crime as described below.

The diagnostic message pointed at two phenomena associated with organized crime: free havens and cannabis plantations. It started with the identification of free havens, which are "*locations, groups of persons, branches or specific appointed topics where effective government intervention is impeded which leads to unwanted situations in society of which structural fraud is an important one*" (Convenant vrijplaatsen, 2008:2). Such free havens

can manifest themselves in various sectors, such as prostitution, deprived neighborhoods, recreational bungalow parks, illegal casinos and real estate. Meanwhile, a regional collaboration agreement on cannabis was in place (Convenant cannabis, 2008). Cannabis plantations were problematized for being illegal and causing a nuisance and being a threat to local order, public safety and public health as well as undermining the rule of law. They were linked to criminal networks suspected of engaging in the profitable but illegal activity of producing soft drugs. In 2010, the cannabis agreement was embedded into the Brabant Taskforce for Organized Crime. In their internal and external communication, members of the taskforce linked 'drug-related organized crime' with the 'organized production of cannabis' and this form of organized crime was described as a 'severe societal problem' causing *"a lot of nuisance and feelings of in safety among citizens"* and being a *"creeping danger for the integrity of society"* (Tweede Kamer, 2011a:1 – translation RP).

The prognostic message of the taskforce was to take an integrated approach on drug-related crime to 'the next level' by combining administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions (on an supra regional level with strong ties to the national government: *"The taskforce, led by the Minister of Safety and Justice and the mayor of Tilburg, will initiate all necessary actions together with the largest municipalities in Brabant, the police (national and regional), public prosecutor, constabulary and the tax agencies* (Tweede Kamer, 2010: 1 – translation RP). Based on a pooled information supply (RIEC), the strategy of the Taskforce can be divided into three objectives: 1: to apprehend the criminal gangs behind the production and trade of cannabis, 2: to break down the underlying criminal structures in the region and 3: to confiscate criminal possessions (Tweede Kamer, 2010). Mayor Noordanus of Tilburg presided over the taskforce, together with the Minister of Safety and Justice.

Both regional and national policy ideas institutionalized into the policies on organized crime that were created between 2008 and 2010. The policy documents on free havens and cannabis and the Taskforce collaboration agreement clearly resemble the regional policy frame that expressed the need for a supra local collaborative approach on criminal networks, as introduced by coalition A. In turn, this regional policy frame was heavily inspired by research findings, pointing out the regional character of drug-related problems in the region for the first time (COT, 2009), the presence of organized criminal networks and the insufficiency of the existing approach of local governments and the police (P&W, 2010). A smaller aspect of the expansion of the regional policy frame was the adoption of new national criteria for coffee shops in the southern provinces, among which Brabant was the first (Tweede Kamer, 2011b). When the Minister of Safety and Justice supported the Taskforce with funds and manpower, he managed to add national policy ideas to the regional program on drug-related crime. Overall, this points to the discourse institutionalization of mainly regional and some national policy ideas into the regional policy strategy on organized crime in Brabant.

4.2.2 The mayor's role on paper and in practice

The following sections describe whether and how the frame expansion affected the mayor's position and role, both on paper as well as in practice.

Expected role

In the policy programs on free havens and cannabis and in the Taskforce, the mayor of Breda was expected to address organized crime. The collaboration agreement on free havens granted the mayor of Breda the responsibility for administrative coordination of the regional approach. This implied that he had to coordinate all practical issues, such as the enlistment of new participants, communicating with the public about actual enforcement actions regarding free havens, and making sure the agreement was evaluated every two years (Convenant vrijplaatsen, 2008). The documents explicitly stated that these tasks were to be handled by the mayor's cabinet under the supervision of the mayor himself. The regional cannabis agreement aimed to clear as many cannabis plantations as possible, an activity which should be administratively handled by the local Boards of Mayor and Aldermen in the region (Evaluatie convenant cannabis 2009/11). In 2010, the free haven and cannabis agreements were embedded into the Taskforce for Organized Crime. The expected role of local governments in the taskforce, which included the mayor of Breda, was to close coffee shops and buildings with severe drug-related nuisance, and implement the BIBOB tool (Tweede Kamer, 2010).

Role in practice: high frame enactment

The mayor of Breda carried out administrative as well as operational activities relating to organized crime in the late 2000s. In 2008, the mayor signed the regional collaboration agreement on free havens and cannabis (Convenant cannbasi 2008; Convenant vrijplaatsen, 2008). The latter implied that by the power of the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen of Breda, multiple cannabis productions were cleared, decreasing the total number from 88 in 2009 to 59 in 2010 (Evaluatie convenant cannabis 2009/11). In 2009, the Mayor of Breda requested Minister Opstelten not to further reduce police capacity in the region, referring to a research report demonstrating the supra local level of the problem (Mayor F, 2009). A year later, the mayor acted as substitute police chief when signing the letter to the Minister of Safety and Justice in which the safeguarding of police capacity on organized crime related to cannabis was again proposed (Mayor F, 2010). In general, the mayor's local partners described his role in addressing organized crime as decisive (Public Prosecutor, Interview May 2013) strongly oriented on free havens (Employee Tax Collectors Office – Interview August 2013) and inclined to collaborate at a regional scale (Civil servant 6 – Interview August 2012).

On the 7th of December, the mayor of Breda attended an instant meeting between the mayors of the five biggest cities and the Minister of Safety and Justice to discuss the problem of drug-related crime in the region (Tweede Kamer, 2010). This eventually led to the creation of the Brabant Taskforce for Organized Crime (Tweede Kamer 2010/2011a). According to almost all of the respondents, Mayor F's role within the taskforce was merely an administrative one Public Prosecutor, Interview May 2013; Employee Tax

Collectors Office –Interview August 2013 ; Civil servant 6 – Interview August 2012). He was a member of the steering committee that brought together mayors, police chiefs, public prosecutors and the Minister of Safety and Justice and met four times a year to set the priorities of the task force and monitor its progress . The mayor described his own role in the Task Force as *"participating constructively and being supportive, although Tilburg was leading and one has to know his role"* (Mayor F – Interview May 2013 – translation RP).

The mayor's administrative activities on organized crime were connected to the local policy arena in Breda as well. A few days after the meeting between the mayors and the minister, the mayor informed the local city council about the Task Force and its ambitions (Gemeente Breda, 2010). The implementation and progress of the free haven agreement and the task force were discussed in the local triangle consolation (Public Prosecutor, Interview May 2013; Employee Task Force B5 – Interview April 2013).

Overall, the mayor's administrative activities at the supra local and local levels show a high level of frame enactment of the policy frames set out by the agreements on free havens, cannabis and the Taskforce. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that these were only the first steps that local government took to address organized crime. Although the taskforce gave a boost to the actual implementation of the administrative approach in Breda and the other cities in the region in 2010, this resulted in the creation of formal arrangements and the formulation of shared ambitions between participating organizations in the Taskforce (Head RIEC – Interview May 2013). Only later did the Taskforce became operational and addressed actual cases of organized crime, including some in Breda (Employee Task Force B5 – Interview April 2013).[42]

4.2.3 Institutional arrangements in the late 2000s
Various aspects of the regional, national and local policy arenas affected the course and outcome of the local framing process as well as the mayor's role.

Regional arena
Regional governing bodies and collaboration structures initiated and structured the way in which organized crime was framed and addressed in and around Breda. The regional board of the police initiated and funded research on drug-related organized crime in the region and made a case for intensifying integrated regional collaboration. The mayors of the five largest cities in Brabant placed organized crime on the national policy agenda and in doing so, triggered the creation of the Brabant Taskforce for Organized Crime. These *regional policy dynamics* structured the regional collaboration agreements on free havens, cannabis and the Taskforce, in which the local Breda authorities participated.

National arena

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[42]   These events are beyond the research period (1990 to 2010).

The encouragement of the participation of local and regional authorities was shaped by the Balkenende IV administration and Rutte I administration, which prioritized the problem of organized crime and offered support in terms of money, manpower and commitment. These facilitated the creation of the regional Taskforce for Organized Crime. Moreover, the nationally-created Regional Information and Expertise Centers supported the taskforce's ambitions, and national policies on coffee shops partially shaped the regional policy frame of the Taskforce in terms of dealing with soft drugs. This implies that *regulative aspects* in the form of policy plans on organized crime and soft drugs and the *national budget* affected regional policy plans and practices.

Local arena
The mayor of Breda participated in the initiation, creation and implementation of regional policy strategies on organized crime. This active involvement in the regional policy arena and his ongoing attempts to make a case for regional policy ambitions among local stakeholders can be explained by his personal frame and professional experience. The mayor was strongly rooted in the region where he was born and valued the regional tradition of supra local collaboration between local governments (Civil servant 6 – Interview August 2012). Moreover, he has been the mayor of Bergen op Zoom, Nieuw-Ginneken and Rosmalen, which are all located in the Brabant region. This gave him knowledge of the policy dynamics and a large professional network in the regional arena. This implies that *cognitive aspects* were shaped by the *personal and professional experiences* of the mayor as a key player in the local governance network. This enhanced Breda's participation in the overall regional approach to organized crime.

4.3 Findings of sub case 6
Reconstructing the frame shifts and the mayor's role on organized crime provided some preliminary research findings. First, the *diagnostic message* on organized crime shifted from being non-existent to modest policy attention for the financial and economic aspects of organized crime and free havens during the initial framing process in 2004. In the late 2000s, the diagnostic message expanded with a full focus on drug-related organized crime and criminal networks. The *prognostic message* initially focused on the local implementation of the BIBOB tool in 2004. The local administrative approach to organized crime expanded with the growth of regional collaboration combining administrative, fiscal and criminal justice instruments in the form of the Taskforce for Organized Crime that was supported and partially financed by the national government in 2010. Second, as the policy frame on organized crime expanded, the *mayor's role* did as well. His expected role as described in the policy documents shifted from having no role, because organized crime was not a key topic of local public policies (Mayor D), to deploying the BIBOB instrument to administratively address the financial and economic gains obtained through organized crime (Mayors E and F). Later on, the mayor was eventually granted an administrative role to jointly choose and monitor the priorities of the regional taskforce on organized crime (Mayor F).

Overall, the mayors of Breda enacted their expected roles, although some did so more than others. Consequently, the mayor's role in practice shifted from incidental participation in repressive actions by police and criminal justice actors regarding organized crime (Mayor D) to preparing BIBOB instruments in the local arena (Mayor E) and participating in regional collaboration with the police, public prosecutor, tax authorities and the Minister of Safety and Justice (Mayor F). These actions of the various mayors expanded their policy network in terms of size and number of actors. The mayors' activities expanded from local to regional and the supra regional level. In doing so, his role shifted from a rather isolated actor implementing his administrative tools and powers within the boundaries of his municipality to pooling these instruments with juridical, fiscal and other actors on a regional scale.

Based on this sub case, we found several explanatory mechanisms which reveal an interesting interplay between national, regional and local policy arenas in shaping the cognitive process of framing new local safety problems and the mayor's role in addressing these problems.

Firstly, *local policy history affected the speed and extent of adopting regional and national policy plans and tools in the local policy arena.* Organized crime had not been a traditional issue for local government actors. Therefore, it took a while before BIBOB was adopted and implemented in the local arena. This explains why actors, including the mayor, needed some time to shift their attitude from passively following national policy trends during the initial framing process (BIBOB) to actively initiating policy expansion later on (through the Taskforce).

Secondly, *frame expansion was triggered by administrative actors from the regional policy arena*, that is, the mayors. Only when they framed organized crime as a policy problem occurring in their region and expressed the need for serious policy interventions did local governments become actively involved in addressing organized crime. Their shared frames, heavily relying on several research reports, were a prerequisite for this shift from the passive to active involvement of the mayor of Breda and other (administrative) actors in the region. This implies that the cognitive aspects (frames) of the regional policy arena are important for local governments to engage with when addressing criminal networks.

Thirdly, *various aspects of the national policy arena affected the content of regional and local framing processes*. In general, the content of the local and regional policy plans was strongly shaped by national policy ideas (administrative approach to organized crime) and tools (BIBOB). Moreover, the implementation of the first full-grown policy strategy in which local authorities actively addressed organized crime (the Taskforce) was enabled by means of national funds, manpower and symbolic support.

Part V – Analysis

How have definitions of local safety problems changed and how, to what extent and why has this affected the mayor's position and role in local safety governance in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010? This central question structures the entire research project. A theoretical answer was formulated in part II of the book by the introduction of a conceptual model explaining the power of problem definitions in shaping actors' roles and positions in governance networks. Part III outlined in detail how the conceptual model was applied to data collection and analysis (research design). Part IV presented the findings of both the macro study and the three case studies.

In the fifth part of the book, the theoretical and empirical findings as presented in Part II and IV are combined to provide a more substantive answer to the central research question. Chapters 10 and 11 present within case analyses of Haarlem and Breda. The similarities and differences between the sub cases are identified and explained for each key concept of the conceptual model in order to answer sub question four: *How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes and how does this affect the mayors' role in and position in policy and practice?* and sub question five: *Which (f)actors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the content, course and outcome of these framing processes?* This is followed by a cross case analysis that outlines the similarities and differences between the case studies in Chapter 12. The main purpose of this cross case comparison is to refine the conceptual model and outline the theoretical implications of the case studies.

Chapter 10: Within case comparison of Haarlem

1 Introduction

This chapter presents a within case analysis of how the mayors of Haarlem addressed the drug related nuisance, increasing domestic violence and organized crime in the years between 1990 and 2010. The mayor's position and role in local governance structures is compared across the three separate problems of drugs related nuisances, domestic violence and organized crime. It is hoped that such a comparison will advance our understanding of how shifting definitions of local safety problems affected the mayor's role and position in local governance practices over time. These similarities and differences are interpreted by means of a conceptual model that helps us to map out the impact of frame shifts on the mayor's position and roles in the network settings.

This chapter is structured by the conceptual model. Section two focuses on the process of problem framing in local policy networks during which discourse coalitions vie for dominance. These fames may then get aligned with the frames of other key actors, and be institutionalized into a formal policy. Section three focuses on the mayors' role on paper and in practice, and whether and how this reflects the policy frame. The fourth paragraph focuses on the institutional arrangements affecting these local policy processes. The fifth and final paragraph summarizes the research findings by providing a preliminary answer to sub question 4 and 5 based on the findings from Haarlem.

2 Problem framing in the local policy network

This paragraph focuses on the course and outcome of framing process within the local policy networks. The conceptual model stresses that the impact of shifting definitions of safety problems on the mayor's position and role in governance networks can be understood as the outcome of the framing processes that occur in the local policy network. During such local policy debates, several discourse coalitions (each holding their own perspective) interact in order to create policy strategies to be executed by the mayor and others. This interaction is expected to enhance frame alignment and create a shared understanding of the policy problem, as well as bring to light the most favorable solution. Discourse institutionalization takes place when such a common frame is formalized into policy plans. The following sections show how each of these aspects of the local framing process manifested themselves in all three sub cases in Haarlem. The sections also show the similarities and differences in the problem triggers, coalitions, level of frame alignment and process of discourse institutionalization between the sub cases.

2.1 Triggers

New safety issues arising in Haarlem were subjected to the framing process during the time span of this study. The triggers for the various problems

differed from each other, and over time. Table 17 provides an overview of these various triggers.

Table 17: Triggers Haarlem

	Drug-related Nuisances	Domestic Violence	Organized Crime
Trigger initial framing process	The number of coffee shops causing drug-related nuisances expanded too quickly according to the local government.	Death of two women due to domestic violence in Haarlem	National government introduced the BIBOB law
Trigger reframing	National government introduced the power to close drug buildings	National government introduced temporary home restrictions	Introduction of a regional policy program regarding organized crime
	A new mayor implemented new policy interventions regarding coffee shops		

The *initial framing processes* during which the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime were labeled as a local safety problems was triggered by either local or national-level policy factors. The policy debate in preparation of Haarlem's first policy document regarding coffee shops was triggered by dissatisfaction among local authorities with the rising number of coffee shops. These coffee shops were thought to make local residents feel unsafe. Haarlem's first policy approach to domestic violence was triggered locally as well by the death of two female residents. In contrast, the framing of organized crime as a local policy problem was not triggered locally, but at the national level by the introduction of a national law authorizing local authorities to prevent the unintended governmental support of criminal activities (BIBOB). Following the terminology of the conceptual model, the triggers were classified as being *cognitive interpretations in the local arena*, *incidents in the local arena*, and *regulative aspects from the national policy arena respectively*.

As time went by, all three sub cases were *reframed at least once*. While the initial triggers for their inclusion in the policy framing process varied, their reformulation had very similar impetus, in that they were all brought about by *regulative aspects of the supra local arenas*. Another striking similarity amongst these frame shifts is that they all entailed a frame expansion. Because of a shift in the prognostic message of the policy frame in each sub case, the expectations of the mayor's role was dramatically expanded. For example, the shift in the policy frame on drug-related nuisances was triggered by the introduction of a new formal power for Dutch mayors that was created by the national government. The prognostic message of the policy frame on domestic violence was expanded when local authorities in Haarlem

adopted temporary home restrictions as introduced in national law. The frame shift regarding organized crime was triggered by the introduction of a regional policy program that encouraged local authorities to collaborate more extensively in addressing organized crime.

Finally, the *number of frame shifts differed* amongst the sub cases. While the policy frame on domestic violence and organized crime was expanded once, the frame relating to drug-related nuisances shifted twice. This second frame shift was brought about by a change in the *composition of the local policy network*. A new mayor took office, and his strong emphasis on addressing the problem of drugs greatly impacted the policy approach. Across the three subcases, the changes demonstrate that the longer a problem is the topic of policy processes, the more often it is likely to be reframed.

Taken together, it is clear that frame shifts in Haarlem, both at the stage of initial framing and during frame expansion, were brought along by different triggers. Attention to new local safety problems was not always initiated by local policy actors, or by local policy events. In fact, in a majority of frame shifts, local policy attention was fostered more by the introduction of national rules and regulations.

2.2 Discourse coalitions in the local policy debate

During the local policy debates on drugs, violence and crime, several discourse coalitions expressed their frames of the problem at hand along with their most favored policy solutions. This section compares the compositions of these discourse coalitions across our three sub cases.

Table 18: Discourse coalitions Haarlem

	Drug-related Nuisances	Domestic Violence	Organized Crime
Initial framing process	**Coalition A** Actors: mayor, council members and inhabitants

Frame: coffee shops are a safety problem that needs to be addressed and citizens feel unsafe

Coalition B Actor: single council member

Frame: close all coffee shops because soft drugs damage health | **Coalition A** Actors: professional pioneers

Frame: a safety approach for addressing domestic violence

Coalition B Actors: local authorities

Frame: critical supporters | **Coalition A** Actor: mayor

Frame: little organized crime in Haarlem

Coalition B Actors: council members

Frame: support BIBOB

Coalition C Actors: new board M&A

Frame: BIBOB is priority

Coalition D Actors: council members

Frame: expanding BIBOB |

Frame shift 1	Little policy debate. **Coalition A** Actors: police, mayor and council members Frame: drugs in houses is not a safety problem that is widely faced in Haarlem	**Coalition A** Actors: council members and aldermen: Frame: critical supporters of the new policy	**Coalition A** Actors: local politicians Frame: pay attention to organized crime **Coalition B** Actor: mayor Frame: response to the local and national call
Frame shift 2	**Coalition A** Actors: mayor and council members Frame: control coffee shops and sanction rule violation **Coalition B** Actors: shop owners Frame: dissatisfaction with renewed policy actions **Coalition C** Actors: council members Frame: turn to the older, loser approach to coffee shops **Coalition D** Actors: united coffee shop owners Frame: cooperate with authorities		

Drug-related nuisances

The policy strategy on drug-related nuisances was (re)framed twice between 1990 and 2010. In two of these three times, the shifts in frame were preceded by a substantive policy debate in which several discourse coalitions expressed their views. The first policy debate was dominated by local authorities, citizens and coffee shop owners interacting in the early 1990s. A coalition consisting of the mayor and a majority of council members claimed that coffee shops were a safety problem to be addressed by a policy of tolerance (coalition A). In doing so, the coalition conflicted with the views of citizens who were expressing their feelings of being unsafe in relation to drugs and the coffee shops. A 'single actor coalition' (coalition B) consisting of a council member

opposed these policy ambitions of the mayor and council by pointing out that coffee shops damage public health and should therefore be closed.

The second frame shift was not preceded by a substantive policy debate. In the mid-1990s the policy frame was expanded to cover the presence of hard drugs in public buildings as a result of the local adoption of the nationally created power to close drugs houses. Surprisingly, neither the mayor, the city council, nor the police saw drugs houses as a severe problem in Haarlem (coalition A).

In the second reframing, local discourse coalitions debated the renewed policy practices of the mayor in the late 2000s. A coalition consisting of the new mayor and local council members introduced a tight regime focused on rule violations by coffee shop owners (coalition A). First, a coalition of coffee shops owners expressed their dissatisfaction with the renewed policy actions (coalition B). Then, a second coalition of council members further opposed the practices by favoring the former, loser approach to the governance of coffee shops (coalition C). Despite the opposition, local authorities were able to formalize their regime in the form of an official policy. Their success came about in part through their efforts to engage in dialogue with a coalition of united coffee shop owners who were subsequently prepared to collaborate with local authorities to address the drug-related nuisance (coalition D).

Domestic violence

The local policy debates preceding the two policy frames in relation to *domestic violence were* dominated by a number of local actors. During the initial framing process that took place in 1996/7, local authorities debated with each other, and with professionals in the policy domains of both social and safety matters. Although all the key actors in this debate were from the local policy arena, some of their frames relied heavily on international policy ideas. The initial framing process took place toward the end of the 1990s, fuelled by a discourse coalition consisting of local professionals from the safety and social policy domain (coalition A). These professional pioneers introduced a new perspective on domestic violence, and made a case for adopting a safety approach into the local policy framework. Their frame was supported by a coalition of local authorities, the mayor, the police and the public prosecutor who questioned the power of local authorities to appropriately prosecute domestic violence perpetrators (coalition B).

This initial frame was expanded in 2009 with the adoption of temporary home restrictions and regional collaboration. During this latest policy debate, the local coalition of policy parties (coalition A) expressed their dissatisfaction with the 'policy standstill' that had arisen in relation to domestic violence, and they opposed coalition B who were critically supporting the policy expansion.

Organized crime

The policy frames regarding *organized crime* were once again debated among local authorities united in different discourse coalitions. During the initial framing process in the mid 2000s, a coalition comprising the mayor and several civil servants prepared BIBOB policies (coalition A). A coalition of

council members supported this first approach to organized crime in Haarlem (coalition B). However, the mayor's frame did not fully embrace this policy topic as he was of the view that here was very little actual organized crime in Haarlem. Only when a new board of mayor and aldermen that included Mayor C came into town did BIBOB get prioritized and promoted in the local policy arena (coalition C). This development was supported by a discourse coalition comprising local council members favoring the expansion of BIBOB practices (coalition D).

Towards the late 2000s, a coalition of local politicians started to pay attention to organized crime in Haarlem (Coalition A), and they asked their board of mayor and alderman to address it more actively. A coalition that comprised the mayor and local council members (coalition D) responded to this local call by adopting the national policy strategies to organized crime, and incorporating this into Haarlem's policy approach. This implied an expansion of the initial policy frame on organized crime.

Comparison
When comparing the composition of local discourse coalitions across the three safety concerns, it becomes clear that local authorities such as the mayor, council members and civil servants were constantly present in the local debates. Although they occasionally interacted with other actors outside local government and sometimes even shared their frames with these 'external actors', the *local authorities were most frequently present in the* local *discourse coalitions*. More than other actors, local authorities put forth their frames of new local safety problems in each sub case. This can be explained by the formal, institutional structures that exist in local policy networks for local politics and policy making. The institutionalized democratic procedures for local policy decision-making put these local authorities forward as key actors in charge of decision- and policy making.

Along with the dominance of local authorities, the Haarlem cases also show differences in *the manifestation and timing of the local policy debates*. While the majority of shifts in the policy frame were either preceded or followed by a local policy debate, there were two instances of frame expansion concerning the drugs-related nuisances. The first frame expansion was not preceded by extensive policy debate, and was created by directly adopting into local policies a new mayoral power to close drug-related buildings. After the policy was implemented, local public safety providers were noted making statements indicating a lack of understanding of the problem that this policy tool was created to target. The lack of policy debate can thus be explained by a lack of recognition of the policy problem among local stakeholders, and the instrumental adoption of central policy tools. The second frame expansion regarding drugs was different in that it was in fact actively debated, but this debate only manifested itself once the policy adopted was altered in practice. These modified practices were critically discussed and subsequently formalized into policy plans. This implies that local governance processes in the same municipal context can take different shapes and forms, and they do not always follow the classic order of debate, decision, design and implement. More specifically, local policy debates in which discourse coalitions express

their frames are not always the starting point of shifts in policy frames and practices. Instead, they are often either absent or triggered subsequently by issues arising during policy implementation.

2.3 Frame alignment

When discourse coalitions interact during local policy debates, some of their frames merge with one another, or even with 'external' policy frames. This paragraph discusses the processes of frame alignment in Haarlem.

Table 19: Frame alignment Haarlem

	Drug-related Nuisances	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Initial framing process	The frame of the local coalition comprising the mayor, council and citizens was amplified by the national policy frame	The frame of the coalition of professional pioneers was aligned with international policy frames. Subsequently, frame bridging took place between coalition pioneers and local authorities	Frame bridging took place between national policy frames, and local coalitions uniting local authorities
Frame shift 1	No alignment	No clear alignment. Local frames were only receptive to national policy ideas	Frame bridging between local politicians and the mayor of Haarlem. Local frames were receptive to the national policy ideas
Frame shift 2	Frame bridging took place between the coalition consisting of the mayor and council members, and that of the coalition consisting of local coffee shop owners		

Drug-related nuisance
An analysis of the sub case of drug-related nuisances shows two processes of frame alignment. During the initial framing process, local authorities embraced the citizens' perceived feelings of being unsafe. In doing so, they formed a discourse coalition whose frame was amplified by the national policy frame in favor of regulating of soft drugs. As a result, the alternative frame presented by the third local discourse coalition (comprising of a single council member) was ruled out. Subsequently, there was little local policy debate during the frame expansion process. The absence of a debate meant that little frame alignment took place amongst the discourse coalitions, and the national policy ideas were directly institutionalized into local policies. The third round of framing was

characterized by frame bridging that took place between two local discourse collations. This bridging united the individual frames of the mayor and council with that of the united collation of coffee shop owners, as took place largely because both parties were willing to engage in dialogue and cooperate.

Domestic violence
The sub case of domestic violence demonstrated a slightly different process of frame alignment, incorporating external policy frames into the local policy arena. During the initial framing process, an alliance of local professionals embraced international policy ideas regarding domestic violence. Local authorities eventually aligned with this new and internationally inspired frame by supporting the proposed policies of the professional pioneers whilst retaining a critical stance. During the frame expansion phase a few years later, a single local coalition expressed its frame regarding the domestic violence policies. Local political parties problematized a local 'policy stand still' and various council member supported this regional approach which provided solid ground for local authorities to expand their policy strategy. The cognitive aspect of dissatisfaction with the former policy practice thus enabled this frame expansion.

Organized crime
The subcase of organized crime can be best described as a process in which national policy frames of the local mayor and the national policy program aligned. However, it took a while before local authorities embraced national policy frames during the initial framing process. During the reframing process a new board of mayor and aldermen recognized organized crime as a local issue and consequently the frames of local authorities merged with the national policy ideas regarding the matter. This was when supra local policy tools were implemented. A discourse collation of local political parties clearly recognized organized crime as a policy topic and the mayor was willing to respond to national calls inviting local authorities to engage in fighting it. The national policy frame on organized crime extended the frames of these two local discourse collations into a mixture of local and national policy ideas dominated by the latter.

Comparison
In each subcase, the frames of the various local discourse coalitions merged with each other as well as with frames presented in the supra local policy. However, the level to which local, powerful frames aligned with these external policy frames differed across the subcases we studied in Haarlem. Two mechanisms were observed:

First, we saw a *bottom up process of frame alignment* during which local authorities expanded their frames using external ideas as mediated by professionals in the policy domain. During the initial framing process, local coalitions involved in addressing issues of domestic violence looked explicitly for supra local policy frames to structure Haarlem's local policy strategy. Second, in the case of drugs (minor) and organized crime (major) we saw a *top down process of frame alignment* during which local coalitions eventually

embraced policy frames from the national policy arena. In these subcases, local discourse coalitions whose frames resonated with that of the external policy ideas were most likely to survive and shape policy than coalitions with less compatible ideas.

Over time, local safety governance in Haarlem became more and more networked, and the government collaborated with many other parties external to the local governance network. Consequently, local discourse coalitions merged more frequently with supra local policy frames (international, national, and regional). The relatively 'younger' sub cases of domestic violence and organized crime were more likely to adopt the supra local policy ideas. This implies that local authorities in Haarlem appeared to become more responsive to the problem frames of others over the years.

2.4 Discourse institutionalization into the local policy frame

As a result of frame alignment, 'supra local' policy ideas merged with local frames. Consequently, a mixture of local, regional, national and even international frames ended up in Haarlem's formal policy documents regarding drugs, violence and crime. Table 20 summarizes these processes of discourse institutionalization in Haarlem.

Table 20: Discourse institutionalization Haarlem

	Drug-related Nuisance	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Initial framing process	National policy frame (policy of tolerance) institutionalized into the local policy approach through frame alignment with local authorities	International policy frames institutionalized into local policy strategies through frame alignment with local professionals and local authorities	National policy frame institutionalized into the local policy approach (BIBOB)
Frame shift 1	National policy frame was adopted into local policy (power to close buildings in cases of drug-related nuisance)	National policy ideas institutionalized into regional and local policy plans	National policy frames institutionalized into a regional and local policy approach
Frame shift 2	Local policy frames institutionalized into local policy strategy		

The initial policy frame for *drug-related nuisances* shows a combination of local policy frames and the national policy of tolerance towards soft drugs. The subsequent expansion in the late 1990s of the local frame to include the power to close drug-related buildings shows an even greater institutionalization of national policy ideas into local policy frames. In contrast, when a new policy frame regarding coffee shops was created in the late 2000s, local policy ideas and practices that had already been previously implemented were institutionalized into the local policy frame. In the second

sub case *of domestic violence*, international policy ideas labelling domestic violence as a safety problem were institutionalized into the initial policy frame regarding domestic violence. Subsequently, national and regional policy plans shaped local policy strategies. Likewise, the policy frame regarding *organized crime* was also strongly affected by external policy ideas as well. The policy ideas behind the BIBOB law and the administrative approach to organized crime were both created by the national government and institutionalized into Haarlem's local policy approach resulting in a new local policy frame.

In sum, all three sub cases show a *substantial number of supra local or external policy ideas being institutionalized into the local policy frames*. The policy strategies or formal powers created by the *national government* heavily structured local policy frames. Examples of this include the powers for the mayor that were introduced by the national government (closing public buildings in case of drugs, home restrictions in case of domestic violence, and BIBOB in case of organized crime), as well as national policy programs (the national policy of tolerance regarding soft drugs, and the administrative approach to organized crime). Besides national policy ideas, local frames also influenced by policy frames from the regional policy arena (e.g. temporary home restrictions), and from the international policy domain (e.g. approach to domestic violence).

When we compare the content of local policy frames to the frames of the various discourse coalitions present in the debate, it becomes clear that the coalitions who were successful in setting the frame were those in which the majority of local council members and the boards of mayor and aldermen were represented. Along the way, the contrasting frames of citizens, single council members and coffee shop owners were either incorporated or ruled out. From a network perspective, this implies that variations in the level of institutionalization of a coalition's policy frame into formal policy plans can be understood as variations in the different coalitions' resources and powers in the local policy network. In other words, the distribution of crucial resources in the local policy arena affected the level of a coalition's influence during the frame alignment and institutionalization processes. The dominance of local authorities in such processes can be explained by their agenda setting- and decision making power in local policy processes. This explains why their ideas were formalized into policies.

Moreover it points at the dependency of other coalitions on them for a chance to see their frames mirrored in public policy. Only when local authorities embraced the idea of citizens feeling unsafe near coffee shops, when they recognized the value of professional advice on how to combat domestic violence, and when they began to see national policy ideas on how to address organize crime as relevant, did these issues get institutionalized into the local policy frame. Nonetheless, the local policy networks can be said to be relatively open to ideas and resources from other policy levels. In the Haarlem case, although all discourse coalitions were composed of local actors, their frames were partially structured by supra local policy ideas. Paragraph four looks at the supra local institutional arrangements that had the biggest role in shaping the local policy process.

3 The mayor's role on paper and in practice

Local policy strategies are structured by a certain policy frame which shapes the local policy approach, including the mayor's expected role. Table 21 summarizes the policy frames that were dominant in Haarlem. These frames consist of a problem definition (diagnostic message) and solution (prognostic message). In the following section, the mayor's role on paper and in practice are summarized briefly, and subject to comparison across the three sub cases. This allows us to observe the extent to which the mayors of Haarlem acted in accordance with their expected role, also known as their level of frame enactment.

Table 21: Policy frames Haarlem

	Drug-related Nuisance	Domestic Violence	Organized Crime
Initial frame	DM: coffee shops cause a nuisance and endanger local order PM: regulate and close coffee shops	DM: various forms of violence in domestic spheres are both a social and safety problem PM: combine the availability of crisis response teams with specific steps that help victims prevent further violence, and ease the way for efforts to prosecute the perpetrator	DM: unintended government support for criminal behavior PM: BIBOB screenings to be conducted before the issuance of permits, tenders and subsidies in risky sectors
Frame shift 1	DM: the use and trade of drugs in residential houses creates a public nuisance and attracts crime to residential neighborhoods PM: mayor to have the power to close such buildings	DM: various forms of violence in the domestic sphere are both a social and safety problem PM: regional approach including temporary home restrictions	DM: criminal networks undertaking illegal activities PM: combine administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions on a regional scale
Frame shift 2	DM: rule violation by coffee shop owners PM: tight regime of control and sanctioning of coffee shops		

DM: diagnostic message PM: prognostic message

3.1 Mayor's expected role on paper

The policy frame entails an expected role for the mayor which is either enacted or not enacted in practice. Table 22 summarizes the mayor's expected role in each Haarlem sub case.

Table 22: Roles expected of the mayors in Haarlem

	Drugs-related Nuisance	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Initial frame	Implementing new coffee shop policy by closing coffee shops when needed	None. Alderman of social affairs and public health service are expected to coordinate and implement policies	Withdrawal or refuse permits and subsidies as well as requesting national BIBOB screenings
Frame shift 1	Deciding whether or not to close a public building and for what period	Giving out home restrictions when needed	Coordinating regional collaboration and set objectives
Frame shift 2	Deciding whether or not to close a public building and for what period		

The case study of Haarlem demonstrates two clear similarities in the mayor's formal position in the local policy strategy. Firstly, the sub cases show a *recurring pattern of expansion of the mayor's formal powers* to address local safety problems. The introduction of new powers for the Dutch mayors in all three subcases gave the mayors' new options and tools by which to address the safety problems in local safety governance. These powers either expanded the mayor's formal role in addressing traditional public safety problems (closing buildings in the case of drugs), or they facilitated the mayors' involvement with new safety problems (domestic violence, organized crime).

Secondly, a process of frame expansion took place which expanded the ma*yors' playing field* beyond the local policy arena. In each case, the mayor was accompanied in his efforts to address local safety problems by a growing number of public and semi-public actors from the local, regional and national level. In two out of the three sub cases (domestic violence and organized crime), the mayor's 'playing field' expanded from the local policy arena to the regional arena, both on paper and in practice. His partners in the creation and implementation of local policy strategy expanded to include regional and national actors from both governmental and societal spheres. In the third case (drugs), the mayor's playing field remained rather local. Nevertheless, his position shifted from a rather individualistic position, to one of close collaboration with many actors from outside local government, such as the police, residents, shop owners and housing corporations. In general thus, it appears that as the mayor was confronted with new safety problems, his policy tools and range of partners expanded.

Moreover, across the three sub cases, there was a striking difference in the mayor's expected role. In labeling drugs and organized crime as a safety matter, the mayor had a clear role according to the local policy documents as he is responsible for local order and safety. However, the explicit qualification of domestic violence as a safety problem did not immediately yield a role for the mayor in the local policy strategy. In this sub case, the alderman of social affairs was appointed as the actor responsible for dealing with domestic violence. This can be explained as a matter of historical precedent, as it has traditionally been the aldermen who deals with matters of violence against women. Moreover, the mayor did not yet have any formal powers to structure this prognostic part of the policy frame qualifying domestic violence as a local safety issue. From this case, it appears that the securitizing of local policy problems does not necessarily empower or place additional responsibility on the mayor.

3.2 Mayor's actual role in practice

New types of drug-related problems, domestic violence and organized crime all eventually triggered administrative and operational actions on the part of the mayors of Haarlem. Table 23 summarizes the mayor's actions in practice and indicates what these actions implied for the level of enactment on the mayor's expected role as stated by the formal policy frame.

Table 23: Role of the mayors of Haarlem as it was practiced & level of frame enactment

	Drugs-related Nuisance	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Initial frame	**Mayor A** Administrative actions: preparing policy Operational actions: closing coffee shops →high frame enactment	**Mayor B** None. Mayor not involved. →high frame enactment	**Mayor B** Administrative actions: Policy preparation → low frame enactment **Mayor C** Administrative & Operational: Policy expansion and implementation →high frame enactment

Frame shift 1	Mayor B Mayor hardly used power → low frame enactment	Mayor C Operational actions: mayor issued many home restrictions →high frame enactment	Mayor C Administrative actions: on the local and inter-regional level Operational actions: implementation of BIBOB →frame enactmen
Frame shift 2	Mayor C Administrative actions: formalizing new approach to coffee shops, re-engaging in dialogue with coffee shop owners Operational actions: (temporary) closing coffee shops → High frame enactment		

The case study of Haarlem shows that the mayor does not necessarily enact his new role exactly as expected from the formal policy frame. The level of frame enactment differed greatly, not only between sub cases, but also between mayors in each sub case. In the sub case of the *drug-related nuisance*, Mayor A enacted the policy frame firmly by closing several coffee shops. Subsequently, Mayor B's actions reflected a lower level of frame enactment, as he rarely used his power to close drugs buildings. Nonetheless, Mayor B benefitted from the previous mayor's enacted practice of intensifying the regime of control and sanctions that applied to coffee shops that were subsequently formalized into a policy strategy.

In the sub case of *domestic violence*, the mayors of Haarlem both showed a high level of frame enactment, however, their behaviors were very different in practice. During Mayor B's tenure, domestic violence was first presented as a local safety issue. The formal policy document that resulted did not assign any role to the mayor, but instead placed responsibility at the feet of the alderman of social affairs. This explained both Mayor B's limited administrative and practical actions, as well as the conclusion that he exhibited a high level of frame enactment. Mayor Schneider's subsequently implemented his powers of temporary home restriction, and this was viewed also as a high level of frame enactment, specifically in relation to the expanded policy frame.

In relation to *organized crime*, Mayor B showed a low level of frame alignment in that he did not implement the BIBOB law. In contrast, Mayor

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Schneider's reign saw a high level of frame enactment resulting from his more faithful implementation of the same strategies. Mayor Schneider's further enacted upon the subsequently expanded policy frame by participating in the regional policy program regarding organized crime.

Comparison

Variations in the level of frame alignment can be explained by several practicalities. The progress from the stage of (re)framing policy strategies on paper, to the enactment stage takes time. This *time factor* partially explains the variation in the level of enactment amongst the mayors of Haarlem of the same policy problem. It explains to an extent why Mayor B did not enact his brand new BIBOB role, and why Mayor C subsequently did. The expected role did not change, but it took some time before the role of the mayor as prescribed by the new policies was institutionalized into local policy practices.

Furthermore, we can derive a pattern out of these three sub cases which points to the idea that f*rame alignment between the mayor's frame and the policy frame is a precondition for enactment*. There was a high level of frame enactment when the policy frame was compatible with the mayor's individual frame as expressed during the local policy debate and/or when the framing process was triggered locally. A low level of frame enactment was detected when discourse collations including the mayor held a different frame (no alignment) and therefore did not recognize the new policy problem. Any differentiation between the policy and personal frame resulted in a low(er) level of enactment. In other words, the mayor enacted upon the policy frame when it was compatible to his own. The fact that the mayor is able to enact on his very personal frame – which may or may not be in line with the policy frame – is enabled by his individual responsibility for local order and safety as well as his possession of key resources. This makes him the most powerful actors in the local policy networks during policy implementation. In the end, it is the mayor who decides to act and whether or not to implement his powers.

4 Institutional arrangements in local policy networks and the supra local policy arenas

This paragraphs is devoted to the various aspects from the local policy network and supra local policy arenas that affected the course and outcome of local policy processes in Haarlem. Table 24 provides a summary of all institutional arrangements in place and the following sections compare these arrangements between sub cases per policy level .

Table 24: Summary of local and supra local institutional arrangements Haarlem

	Drug-related Nuisance	Domestic Violence	Organized Crime
Local policy network	Cognitive factors arising from the local policy arena triggered the initial framing process Shifts in composition of actors in the local arena triggered frame expansion, along with the introduction of a new mayor Division of powers between actors in the local policy arena explains why contrasting frames disappeared Local policy practice triggered new policy debates and an expansion of the policy frame: new actors entered the network with different normative standpoints Regulative events in the local arena triggered policy formalization (juridical procedures) Cognitive aspects of powerful actors affect level of frame enactment	Incidents in the local policy arena triggered the initial framing process Cognitive aspects of the local arena (dissatisfaction with policy practice) provided solid ground for frame expansion	Not present
Regional arena		Participation in the regional collaboration structure for implementing temporary home restrictions shaped the mayor's expected role	Practical aspects of the regional policy arena triggered policy debate and impacted practice. Amsterdam's regional policy approach triggered frame expansion and regional collaboration and agreement

National arena	Regulative aspects of the national policy approach triggered frame expansion: closing buildings Regulative aspects of national policy arena shaped local policy frame: closing buildings Tight regime fits the tightening national debate, and local alternatives to the national policies are presented (quality label)	Regulative aspect of national policy arena triggered frame expansion: temporary home restrictions Regulative aspect of national arena activated the mayor in relation to domestic violence Various aspects enabled local policy implementation including budget, and manpower, Haarlem's local innovative approach had national spin off	Regulative aspects of national policy arena trigger and shaped the local policy frame: BIBOB law Regulative aspects of national policy arena shaped the local policy frame: Administrative approach, RIEC and funding
International arena	Not present	Practical aspects of the international policy arena shaped local policy frame	Not present

Local policy arena
Multiple aspects from the local policy arena affected the course and outcome of local policy processes in two out of three sub cases in Haarlem. The setting of the initial *drug-related frame*, as well as two subsequent processes of frame expansion was heavily influenced by a wide range of local factors, amongst which were cognitive, practical and regulative aspects, including the local division of resources. The policy dynamics surrounding the sub case of drug-related nuisance was thus most anchored in the local policy arena. In the sub case of *domestic violence*, two lethal cases of violence triggered the initial policy frame, and led to the labeling of domestic violence as a safety matter. Later on, the frames of local discourse coalitions in which local authorities were represented provided solid ground for frame expansion. The sub case of *organized crime* was not triggered or dominantly shaped by local factors.

Regional policy arena
Influences from the regional policy arena were again present in two out of three sub cases, specifically *domestic violence* and *organized crime*. The creation of a regional collaboration agreement eventually resulted in a process of frame expansion affecting the local policy process regarding domestic violence in Haarlem. In the sub case of organized crime, regional policy practices triggered a local policy debate eventually leading to local policies and strategies. Policy practices in the regional arena thus triggered local

involvement. The sub case of *drug-related nuisance* was not triggered or shaped by regional factors.

National policy arena
The national policy context clearly triggered and shaped policy processes in all three sub cases. The initial policy frame regarding *coffee shops* reflected the national policy of tolerance towards soft drugs. Subsequent frame expansion was triggered by the introduction of the power to close drugs houses. This points to the role of regulative arrangements from the central government in both triggering and shaping local drug policies. In the sub case of *domestic violence*, the introduction of home restrictions triggered frame expansion and activated the mayor of Haarlem to get involved with this policy problem. Along with these regulative aspects, resources in the form of money and manpower enabled the design and implementation of Haarlem's initial policy strategy regarding domestic violence. Later on, the national government promoted this approach as a best practice, and encouraged other Dutch municipalities to adopt it. The sub case of *organized crime* was dominated solely by regulations from the national policy arena. The introduction of the BIBOB law triggered an initial framing process, and heavily structured the local policy frame. Subsequently, the national policy program that promoted the administrative approach to organized crime, and that provided the funding for regional and local governments shaped local policy practices as well.

International policy arena
The international policy arena has played a modest role in the case of Haarlem, and only manifested itself in the sub case of *domestic violence.* As local authorities in Haarlem pioneered the design of a public safety approach to domestic violence in the Netherlands, they found inspiration from far beyond their region and nation. Consequently, the international policy practices around domestic violence as a matter of public safety became institutionalized into the local policy frame in Haarlem.

Overall institutional arrangements
In each sub case in Haarlem, the local framing processes were triggered and shaped by a mixture of institutional factors from at least two different policy arenas. The course and content of the local framing processes in Haarlem were thus strongly connected to institutional aspects of the supra local policy arenas. The most striking similarity is that regulative aspects of the national policy arena strongly affected the (expansion) of the policy frames in all sub cases. An important difference between sub cases is the level of local versus supra local influences that shaped the policy and roles in local safety governance. In other words, sub cases differed in the extent to which local processes were affected by the institutional arrangements of 'external' policy arenas.

The sub cases of drug-related nuisance and domestic violence were both shaped by a mixture of local and external factors. This implies a high sense of urgency and of involvement among local actors. The sub case of organized crime seems to be more removed from the local policy arena as it was entirely structured by supra local aspects. This can be explained by the

fact that organized crime is a relatively new problem in the local policy arena. In some local policy processes, the influence appears to be bidirectional. While local authorities took their cue from the regional and national policy arenas, at the same time, locally designed policy practices were picked up by actors in the supra local policy arena and presented as best practices or guiding examples. This happened during Haarlem's pioneering of domestic violence policy in the early 1990s, and with the introduction of a quality label for coffee shops in the late 2000s.

5 Conclusions case Haarlem

This within case comparison leads to a preliminary answer to sub question 4 and 5 based on the findings from Haarlem.

5.1 Preliminary answer to sub question four

This case comparison points to several preliminary research findings relevant to sub question four: *How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes, and how does this framing affect the mayor's role and position in policy and practice?* The general answer is that the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime were all framed as local safety problems in the years between 1990 and 2010. Our review of the Haarlem case demonstrated that *frames are not static,* and that the same issue could be defined in many ways. Two of our three policy frames were expanded once, and the third, drug-related nuisance, was expanded twice. This particular problem may have seen more revision because it was both the first, and longest running topic of local safety in Haarlem. We can perhaps conclude that the longer a problem is the topic of policy processes, the more often it is reframed. More importantly, in each sub case such a securitization and expansion of local policy frames affected the position and role of the mayors of Haarlem in several ways. The mayors' role was *expanded in terms of his powers, the extent of his playing field, and the range of policy partners* he could engage to address the new local safety problems. This shift in the mayors' position can in most cases be seen as the outcome of the adoption of powers and policy strategies created by the national government. This shows a top down process of role structuration brought about by the adoption of regulations from the national policy arena.

Second, *the degree to which a formal role* is adopted as a result of the local policy strategy differed from mayor to mayor in Haarlem. Framing a local issue as a safety problem did not automatically lead to the establishment of a formal role for the mayor. For example, describing domestic violence as a local safety problem did not immediately imply that the mayor had a clear role in the policy program. The mayor was 'activated' only a few years later when the national government introduced special mayoral powers targeting domestic violence. This is in sharp contrast to the sub cases of drug-related nuisance and organized crime in which the mayor was immediately activated. This implies that the '*safety frame' does not guarantee a role for the mayor in the policy strategy*. This finding stands in contrast to the assumption of the conceptual model that local safety problems will activate local safety actors, particularly

the mayor. Variations in the level of the mayors' involvement in newly framed safety problems can be explained by the concept of *path dependency*. Whereas issues such as crime and drugs have traditionally been a part of the mayor's domain of local order and safety, domestic violence is not (yet) completely. The policy path in this area was paved by other actors, and the historical guardians of this domain continued to play an active role after the securitization. The finding implies that mayors are likely to continue operating as they did as long as key actors in the policy network fail to recognize their new roles, or as long as their new roles are not formally laid out in the policy documents.

Third, the level of *frame enactment* differed over time, between mayors and between sub cases. A shift in the mayor's expected role as a resulted of changes in the policy documents, and a shift in the availability of powers and policy resources does not automatically mean that the mayor will use these in practice. The practical argument that it takes time for policy frames to be enacted only partially explains the variations in the level of frame enactment. Moreover, the extent to which the mayor's personal frame is compatible with the policy frame (including his expected role) explains his level of enactment. This was found to be true in every sub case. As long as he recognized the problem as serious, and agreed with the favored solution, the mayor of Haarlem carried out his expected role. This implies that Haarlem's mayors were not passive puppets of national government, but that they had a big role in shaping their own policy actions. In more theoretical terms, this implies that the mayor's frame has to align with (national) policy frames for these to be enacted in practice.

5.2 Preliminary answer to sub question five

This case comparison provides several preliminary research findings that are relevant to sub question five: *Which (f)actors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the content, course and outcome of these framing processes?* Our application of the conceptual model showed an interplay between the cognitive framing process, and institutional influences arising from several policy arenas. A look at the policy strategies in Haarlem showed that the establishment of the local policy frames regarding new safety problems was *by no means a strictly local endeavor.* Various processes of discourse institutionalization resulted in a mixture of local and external policy ideas being adopted into the local policy strategies. Each of the Haarlem sub cases was subject to significant supra local policy influences. In particular, the sub case of organized crime was almost entirely shaped by supra local arrangements. It is striking that in each sub case, frame expansion was brought along by regulative aspects of the supra local level. These regulative aspects shaped Haarlem's policy frame at some point in time (policy of tolerance, power to close drug buildings, temporary home restrictions, BIBOB). When national frames were nonexistent, such as during the initial framing process of domestic violence, the international policy arena became relevant and provided structure to the local policy approach.

Finally, the overall dynamics of the Haarlem case can be summarized as follows: National policy strategies and powers served to bring attention to problems of public safety, as well as provided the resources to address them. Local authorities adopted these national policy ideas and tools into their policy frames. Although international, national and regional policy strategies reached the local policy arena, local policy implementation still remained a local decision. Whether or not, as well as how new policy frames were enacted by the mayors was strongly affected by the mayors' local frames, and that of the most powerful discourse coalitions in the local policy network. Taken together, we can conclude that the local policy frames and the mayor's *formal position are strongly shaped by national policy ideas.* However, the *level and form of enactment* of these policies by the mayor is very much dependent on the *dynamics of the local policy arena*. We conclude that both local framing processes and the mayor's position and role are affected by various policy arenas which are connected, and where networked actors exchange policy ideas, practices and resources.

Chapter 11 Within case comparison: Breda

1 Introduction

The overall objective of the case study is to understand how the role and position of mayors has been affected as the definitions of local safety problems have changed. This chapter presents the within-case analysis of how the mayors of Breda addressed drugs-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime between 1990 and 2010. This within-case analysis aims to uncover any similarities or differences in the local framing and policy processes across the three sub cases within the context of the city of Breda. This will help clarify the impact of frame shifts on the positions and roles of actors in networks.

This chapter is structured by the theoretical building blocks of the conceptual model. Sections two and three cover the framing process and the mayor's position and role in the local policy arena. Section two focuses on the process of problem framing in local policy networks during which discourse coalitions align their frames that may institutionalize into formal policies. Section three focuses on the mayor's role on paper and in practice and whether and how this reflects the policy frame. The fourth section focuses on the institutional arrangements affecting these local policy processes. The fifth and final paragraph summarizes the research findings by providing a preliminary answer to sub question 4 and 5 based on cases set in Breda.

2 Problem framing in the local policy network

This paragraph focuses on the course and outcome of the framing process within the local policy networks. The conceptual model stresses that the impact of shifting definitions of safety problems on the mayor's position and role in governance networks can be understood as the outcome of framing processes in the local policy network. During local policy debates, discourse coalitions with their own perspective on the problem and solution interact to create strategies to be executed by the mayor and others. This interaction is expected to enhance frame alignment and create a shared understanding of the policy problem as well as the most favorable solution. Discourse institutionalization takes place when such a common frame is formalized into policy plans. The following sections show how each of these aspects of the local framing process manifested themselves in all three sub cases in Breda. The similarities and differences on the triggers, coalitions, level of frame alignment and process of discourse institutionalization between the sub cases are presented and interpreted. Together, these aspects reflect phase one and two of the conceptual model as explained in Chapter 6.

2.1 Triggers

In all three sub cases in Breda, new issues were subjected to a local framing process during which they partially or entirely qualified as safety problems at some point in time between 1990 and 2010. The trigger initiating the

(re)formulation of local policy frames on differed between the sub cases and over time. Table 25 provides an overview of these various triggers.

Table 25: Triggers Breda

	Drug-Related Nuisance	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Trigger initial framing process	Actors in local governance network problematized expanding number of coffee shops causing a nuisance	National policy plans affect professionals in the regional arena and local civil servant Breda to generate policy attention to domestic violence	Introduction of BIBOB law by national government
Trigger reframing process	National policy programs triggered harmonization of regional and local polices Radical shift in policy strategies of two neighboring cities was deemed to generate problematic consequences in Breda	Local policy cycle in combination with national policy ideas	Regional crime rates lead to a series of screenings and reports about criminal networks in the region which together with several incidents triggered frame expansion

The initial framing processes during which drugs, domestic violence and organized crime were partially or completely labeled as a local safety issues were triggered by different aspects in the local and national policy arena. Breda's first policy document on coffee shops was triggered by a new mayor problematizing the expanding number of coffee shops. In the sub case on domestic violence, national policy documents triggered regional and local policy attention for domestic violence as a safety matter. The sub case of organized crime showed how the adoption of the national BIBOB tool triggered initial remarks about organized crime in local society. In terms of the conceptual model, this implies that the initial framing processes were triggered by cognitive aspects in the local policy arena in the sub case of drug-related nuisance and by regulative aspects of national policy in the sub cases of domestic violence and organized crime.

As time went by, all three sub cases showed *a process of reframing* triggered by aspects of the local, regional or national policy arena. Moreover, the number of frame shifts differed between the sub- cases. The framing on drug-related nuisance shifted twice, whereas the policy frame on domestic violence and organized crime were each expanded once. The first adjustment to the policy frame on drug-related nuisance was triggered by national policy programs that allowed mayors to close buildings in case of severe drug-related nuisance. This policy frame was expanded once more when it was triggered by a radical shift in the policy strategy of two neighboring cities to adopt a zero-tolerance policy on coffee shops. In terms of the conceptual model, frame

expansion in the sub case of drug-related nuisance took place following regulative aspects from the national policy arena and policy practices in the regional policy arena. Expansion of the policy framework on domestic violence was triggered by local policy cycles arriving at a point of policy renewal as the existing policy strategy was coming to an end. This provided an opportunity to anticipate the introduction of a nationally-created policy tool for mayors: home restrictions. In this case, frame expansion was triggered by a combination of regulative aspects from the local and national policy arenas. The frame on organized crime changed because of regional crime rates, triggering a scrutinization of the causes of crime and eventually leading to a policy expansion process. In other words, incidents and cognitive aspects in the regional policy arena triggered frame expansion processes on organized crime.

Overall, the case of Breda shows that a variety of triggers from multiple policy areas initiated local framing processes. This implies that policy attention for new safety problems in the local policy arena was not always triggered by local policy actors or local policy events. More often, local policy attention was fostered by incidents, practices and policy tools that diffused from regional and national policy arenas. Furthermore, the longer the problem was a topic of local governance, the more often it was reframed as triggered by of supra local (f)actors.

2.2 Discourse coalitions in local policy debate

During local policy debates on drugs, violence and crime, several discourse coalitions expressed their frames on the problem at hand and their most favorable policy solutions. This section compares the compositions of these discourse coalitions between the sub cases before summarizing the similarities and differences.

Table 26: Discourse coalitions Breda

	Drug-related nuisance	Domestic Violence	Organized Crime
Initial framing process	**Coalition A** Actors: Mayor, Police and Public Prosecutor Frame: initiate local policy **Coalition B** Actors: local city council Frame: agrees on Breda's first policy document on coffee shops	**Coalition A** Actors: Professionals in the region Frame: initiate a policy plan on domestic violence **Coalition B** Actors: local professionals Frame: initiate local policy attention	Hardly any debate

		Coalition C Actors: local authorities Frame: reactive supporters	
Frame shift 1	**Coalition A** Actors: regional working group Frame: recommends adjustment of local and regional drugs policies **Coalition B** Actors: Board of Mayor and Aldermen Breda and local city council Breda Frame: local adoption of regional policy ambitions	Hardly any debate	**Coalition A** Actors: mayors of the region Frame: persistent problems require supra local approach **Coalition B** Actors: local authorities frame: supportive adopters of regional policy ambitions **Coalition C** Actor: Minister of Safety and Justice Frame: supporter of regional policy ambitions and favors strict coffee shop policy
Frame shift 2	**Coalition A** Actors: Alliance B5 Frame: initiate collaboration and screenings **Coalition B** Actors: Board of Mayor and Aldermen Breda and City Council Frame: worried about potential increase of drug-related nuisance and approves new and strict approach to coffee shops		

Drug-related nuisance

The framing of drug-related nuisance took place when the discourse coalitions from the local, regional and national policy actors interacted. The initial policy frame on drug-related nuisance was created during a modest debate between solely local actors in Breda. Coalition A consisted of the mayor who proposed

the initial policy program on coffee shops in consultation with the chief of the local police and the public prosecutor. Members of the local city council united in coalition B and agreed with this policy.

The first process of frame expansion was debated among three discourse coalitions including actors from the supra local policy arenas. Coalition A was a regional working group that united professionals from local government, the police and the public prosecutor. It recommended coordination and the expansion of local policy approaches on drugs in the region. Coalition B consisted of the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen and proposed the local implementation of the regional policy ambitions that were later approved by the council members.

The second process of frame expansion in the case of drug-related nuisance was characterized by interaction between regional, local and national coalitions. Coalition A consisted of the local governments of the five largest cities in the region who were worried about drugs related crime. Together, they studied the drug problems and proposed common regional solutions. Coalition B consisted of Breda's Board of Mayor and Aldermen and expressed their worries about the increase in drug-related nuisance as a result of the announced zero tolerance policy on coffees shops in the neighboring municipalities, Bergen op Zoom and Roosendaal. Their perspective was similar to the other three coalitions. They were supported by local council members having worries on drugs and approving regional and national attempts to further address drug-related nuisance.

Domestic violence
The local policy debate preceding the initial policy frame on domestic violence occurred between three discourse coalitions. Coalition A consisted of various professionals operating on a regional scale in Mid-West Brabant, who had been working on various societal problems for a long time. Inspired by national policy ideas that promoted local intervention in cases of domestic violence, they initiated the first regional policy plan on domestic violence. Meanwhile, a civil servant in the local policy arena was inspired by the national call for local government to deal with domestic violence. This crucial local actor included domestic violence in the updated policy plan for societal care shelters (coalition B). The local authorities in Breda united in coalition C were more reactive and supported these regional and local initiatives.

The expansion of this initial policy frame took place without any policy debate. The home restrictions as designed and formalized by national government were adopted into regional and local policies without any discussion between local policy actors in Breda.

Organized crime
Similar to the domestic violence sub case, the organized crime sub case demonstrated the formalization of a new local policy frame that was preceded by little debate. The initial framing process during which the financial aspects of organized crime were mentioned as a local policy problem occurred when the local government adopted the national BIBOB tool without a substantive discussion between local policy actors.

On the contrary, the process of frame expansion a few years later was preceded by an intense policy debate between four coalitions representing actors from the local, regional and national policy arenas. Coalition A consisted of the mayors of the five largest cities in the region. They problematized the supra local character of organized crime behind drugs production and trade which required a coordinated approach. The local authorities in Breda united in coalition B and supported this frame. The Minister of Safety and Justice supported their policy ambitions as well. On top of that, he introduced the national policy plan to tighten the rules on coffee shops into the policy debate (coalition C). Finally, Mayor F, who was part of both coalition A and B, acted as a policy broker to align the local policy frame of coalition B with the policy ambitions of coalition A and C.

Comparison

When comparing the composition of the discourse coalitions between the three sub cases, it becomes clear that there was *variation in the level of policy debate* surrounding the processes of initial framing and frame expansion in Breda. While some framing processes required a modest or even substantial policy debate, others were mere formal expansions of policy frames without a substantial discussion between stakeholders. All framing processes within the drug-related nuisance sub case were debated, whereas the domestic violence and organized crime sub cases both showed a framing process that was debated and one that was not debated. In the domestic violence and organized crime sub case, there was no policy debate when national policy tools were directly adopted into local policy strategies. Instead of extensively debating or modifying such optional, not compulsory, policy tools, local authorities implicitly embraced them by directly formalizing them into local policy plans, which were to be executed by the mayor himself or in close cooperation with the local Board of Mayor and Aldermen. This implies that supra local policy tools can directly affect the mayor's position in local policy strategies without any local debate.

When discourse coalitions expressed their frames during policy debates, *actors from multiple policy arenas interacted*. Local authorities, such as the mayor, council members and civil servants, were constantly present in these local debates. Although they occasionally interacted with other actors in- and outside the local policy network, *local authorities were most frequently present in discourse coalitions* expressing their frames on new local safety problems in each sub case. This can be explained by the formal, institutional structures for local politics and policy-making in local policy networks. The institutional layout of the democratic procedures for local policy and decision making placed these local authorities as formal key actors in charge of policy making.

Besides an almost entirely local policy debate during the initial framing process on drug-related nuisance in the early 1990s, local policy frames were later on given form and shape during the interaction between local government actors as well as between professionals and administrative actors from the regional arena in each sub case. The actual participation of regional policy actors and their frames in local policy networks in Breda can be

explained by means of path dependency. The Breda region has a tradition of regional collaboration between public and private actors in various policy domains. As regional policy practices have been in place before and in other policy domains, local safety issues were picked up in this way as well. In theoretical terms, this can be seen as an empirical manifestation of *path dependency in policy processes*.

2.3 Frame alignment

While discourse coalitions interacted during local policy debates, some of their frames merged with one another while others were ruled out. This paragraph discusses and compares these processes of frame alignment. This section first recapitulates frame alignment for each sub case, followed by a comparison.

Table 27: Frame alignment Breda

	Drug-related nuisance	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Initial framing process	Frames of mayor, board and council align	Frame alignment between national policy ideas and regional professional as well as local professionals and authorities in the form	No alignment
Frame shift 1	Frame of regional and local actors aligned with national policy guidelines and powers	No alignment	Regional frames connected with national policy ideas, both of which both were which is approved by local authorities
Frame shift 2	Sequential process of frame bridging between local and regional discourse coalitions of which the latter was partly inspired by the national policy ambitions		

Drug-related nuisance

The initial framing process on drug-related nuisance shows a process of frame amplification between two local discourse coalitions. The frame of the city councillors (coalition B) was strengthened by the frame of Mayor D and his local partners when the local council approved Breda's first policy on coffee shops proposed by the mayor and his partners. The latter were able to pioneer and design their own policies since drug-related problems were classic matters of local governance and supra local policy networks and guidelines were (barely) in place during the early 1990s. Moreover, these were powerful actors given their powers to set the local agenda and together had good information on drugs and crime in Breda. Local discourse collations were strongly and solely represented during this initial framing processes.

Frame expansion during the late 1990s was preceded by a process of frame alignment in which regional actors expanded the policy frame (coalition A) which was adopted into local policy strategy by the Board of Mayor and Aldermen (coalition B) and approved by the local council Breda (coalition C). This implies a top down process of frame alignment between national, regional, and local policy frames in that order. The strong presence of the regional discourse coalition can be explained by the close ties between public actors in the region of Brabant. During this frame expansion process, they were united by the Franzel Commission, which aimed to align drugs policies in the region. This which turned out to be a powerful discourse coalition closely related to local government of Breda which followed their advice.

The second process of frame expansion in the late 2000s was a mixture of local, regional and national frames. However, this frame alignment process was not as top down as during the late 1990. This time, a sequential process of frame bridging took place between local and regional discourse coalitions, which were both worried about drug-related problems in the region and favored an integrated approach proposed by the mayors of the five largest cities in Brabant. The latter were partly inspired by the national policy ambition to strengthen the approach to coffee shops and soft drugs. This mixture of frames was eventually approved by the local councillors of Breda.

Domestic violence

The domestic violence sub case showed a two-step process of frame alignment. First of all, regional professionals (coalition A) and a pioneering local civil servant (coalition B) aligned when they almost simultaneously adopted national policy frames on domestic violence into their policy plans. Regional policy actors were able to successfully participate in the policy debates surrounding domestic violence, as this new topic was adopted into the existing regional policy structures that provided social care for vulnerable females in the Brabant region. This points to a process of path dependency that legitimized regional actors as key actors in the policy process. Secondly, mediated by a modest local policy debate, local authorities (coalition C) reactively supported the proposed policy plans on domestic violence as a safety matter and thereby aligned with local and regional policy frames.

The process of frame expansion was hardly surrounded by any local policy debate which explains the absence of frame alignment and shows a direct process of top down structuration of local policies by supra local policy tools (home restrictions).

Organized crime

The organized crime sub case shows a framing process without frame alignment as well. The initial policy frame on organized crime as a local safety issue came about by adopting the national BIBOB tool in local policies. This adoption was not debated by any discourse coalition and therefore was a process of top-down policy structuration.

The frame expansion process, in contrast, was highly debated. Regional policy frames asking for supra local policy interventions (coalition A) were supported by the mayor of Breda, who acted as a policy broker. He

aligned the regional policy frame with the local authorities in Breda (coalition B). Meanwhile, coalition A contacted the Minister of Safety and Justice (coalition C) who aligned his frame and added national policy ambitions on coffee shops to the policy mix. This resulted in frame alignment between three formerly disconnected but compatible frames from multiple policy arenas.

The impact of regional actors in the organized crime sub case can be explained by the strong ties in the region. Once local governments recognized their shared problem of drug-related crime, they began collaborating. Meanwhile, the national government promoted an administrative approach to organized crime at a regional level. The fact that national policy actors were successful in structuring the expansion of the regional policy frame can be explained by resource dependency. The local administrations needed support from the national government as they did not possess enough resources to address organized crime. This provided an opportunity for the minister to implement the new policies of the national government on coffee shops in this region.

Comparison

Taken together, the majority of the shifts in policy frames in Breda were preceded by some level of policy debate. In these policy debates, discourse coalitions that united local and regional actors interacted. This resulted in a process of frame alignment in which local and regional coalitions were able to successfully merge their personal frames into a shared frame. Moreover, national policy ideas were added to this shared frame as either local or/and regional coalitions incorporated them into their own frames. Eventually, this resulted in a common frame characterized by a *mixture of local, regional and sometimes national policy ideas*.

From a network perspective, the composition of this mix can be explained by the distribution of resources and power in the local policy network. Local coalitions were able to impose their frames during the frame alignment processes because they possessed agenda-setting- and decision-making powers. One way or another, local actors have to embrace and approve policy strategies on local safety issues. The dominance of frames from regional coalitions can be explained by the strong ties in the Brabant region and the long tradition of regional collaboration within and beyond the policy domain of local order and safety. This regional context affects the local policy network around safety issues to a large extent. Furthermore, national policy ideas aligned with those of local and regional coalitions as a result of resource dependency, as both local and regional actors depended on national commitment in terms of policy priorities, policy tools and financial means to address drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime.

The few framing processes which were hardly subjected to policy debate showed policy processes during which supra local policy ideas were directly adopted into local policy strategies. This implies that local governance processes in the same municipal context took different shapes and forms, some of which did not follow the classic 'debate, design, implement' structure. More specifically, local policy debates in which discourse coalitions expressed their frames were not always the starting point of frames shifts in

policies and practices. Whether debated or not, the fact that local policy frames were to some extent affected by external policy frames brings us to the next section that discusses the processes of discourse institutionalization in further detail.

2.4 Discourse institutionalization into local policy frame

Regardless of the extent to which they underwent a process of frame alignment, local policy strategies on the drugs, violence and organized crime sub cases entailed a mixture of local and supra local frames. This implies that the various frames eventually institutionalized into formal policy strategies. Table 28 provides an overview.

Table 28: Discourse institutionalization Breda

	Drug-related nuisance	Domestic Violence	Organized Crime
Initial framing process	Mixture of frames of local coalitions and national guidelines adopted into policy strategy	National policy programs in existing regional policy structures of the social policy domain	National policy tool institutionalized in local policy approach
Frame shift 1	National policy strategy and power structured regional and local policy plans	National policy ideas institutionalized into regional and local policy arena	Combination of regional and national policy ideas institutionalized in regional task force
Frame shift 2	Recommendations from regional research reports and new national rules on coffee shops were adopted into local policy strategy		

Drug-related nuisance
The initial policy frame on drug-related nuisance shows a mixture of frames from local dominant discourse coalitions and national policy guidelines. The policy frame of the mayor and other key actors in the policy domain of local order and safety was institutionalized into the local policy. Their policy frame was partially inspired by national guidelines on soft drugs in the Netherlands. This implies that local cognitive aspects of the most powerful policy coalition and national regulative aspects were institutionalized into Breda's initial policy frame.

The expanded policy frame in the late 1990s shows a mix of national and regional policy ideas again. The frame proposed by coalition A to create a regional coalition to enhance and harmonize local drugs policies, which was heavily structured by national policy plans on various new types of drugs, was adopted into local policy plans. The same holds for the national power to close public buildings in case of any drug-related nuisance. This implies that

regulative aspects of the national and regional policy arena institutionalized into local policies as these were adopted and translated into policy strategies.

The frame expansion during the late 2000s was characterized by national and regional policy ideas as well. National policy ambitions on coffee shops and recommendations from regional research reports institutionalized into the local policy approach on drugs. This implies, again, a process of top down policy structuration by regulative aspects of the national and regional policy arena.

Domestic violence
Both the initial and expanded policy frames on domestic violence show a high level of national policy ideas on structuring the regional and thereby local policy approach to domestic violence. The initial policy frame on domestic violence is characterized by national policy ideas picked up by the regional and local discourse coalitions. These ideas were more or less institutionalized into local policy plans and practices while local government actors of the Breda municipality both participated in and were responsible for the regional approach to domestic violence. While national policy ideas were filtered by the frames of regional and local discourse coalitions during the initial framing process, the frame expansion process that followed was characterized by a process of top-down institutionalization of national policy ideas. This time, the policy tool of home restrictions as introduced by national government was adopted directly into regional and local policies without substantive local policy debate.

Organized crime
The local policy frame on organized crime was highly affected by regulative aspects of supra local policy arenas. During the initial framing process, the BIBOB tool was adopted almost literarily into regional and local policies without any local debate. This points to an institutionalization process where national policy ideas structured local policies directly. The frame expansion process that followed was a matter of regional and national coalitions aligning their frames, which thereafter institutionalized into the Taskforce initiative. The regulative aspects towards organized crime from the regional and national policy arena were institutionalized into Breda's local policy arena as local authorities triggered and participated in this regional collaboration project.

Comparison
Taken together, the three sub cases in Breda show a high level of *'supra local'* or *'external' policy frames* becoming institutionalized in local policy frames. National policy ambitions and tools and regional research reports and policy ambitions affected Breda's local policy frames on drugs, violence and organized crime. None of the framing processes resulted in a purely local policy frame.

Generally, the regulative aspects of supra local policy arenas structured local policy frames. This implies that the formal policy strategy and the mayor's position were shaped by a mixture of local, regional and national policy frames. Over the years, external discourse coalitions and supra local

policy ideas entered the local policy debate more frequently. Sometimes, regional and national policy frames were even completely and directly adopted into local policy plans without any policy debate. This resulted in local policy frames which were almost entirely characterized by supra local policy ideas. This shows that local safety governance in Breda became increasingly intertwined with actors and frames of supra local policy arenas over time.

When we compare the exact content of local policy frames with the frames of discourse coalitions, it becomes clear that the two types of coalitions saw their ideas most represented in local policy strategies: a) coalitions made up of the majority of local council members and the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, and b) coalitions representing members of public authorities in the Brabant region. From a network perspective, the differentiation of the level of institutionalization of a coalition's policy frame can be explained by their resources and powers in the local policy network. The *overall presence of local authorities* can be seen as a result of their agenda-setting and decision-making power in local policy processes. Other coalitions, such as civil servants stressing the importance of domestic violence and Ministers planning to tighten local coffee shop policies, depended on the acceptance and formal approval of the local city council and Board of Alderman to become institutionalized into local policies.

However, *the role and impact of local government actors shifted* over the years. In the drug-related nuisance case, local coalitions were able to design and formalize their own policy ideas into Breda's first policy plan to a large extent. In contrast to their initiating role during the early drugs policies, local policy actors were more willing to adopt supra local policy ideas on drugs, domestic violence and organized crime into local policy strategies. When new safety problems were introduced in the local policy arena by external policy arenas, local policy actors took up a more distant role as (critical) followers and participants. Nevertheless, in order for external policy actors and ideas to affect policies, formal approval by local council and board was necessary.

The *strong influence of regional coaliti*ons on local policy frames can be explained by the wider context in the Brabant region having a long tradition of regional collaboration within and beyond the policy domain of local order and safety. Local governments have long attempted to increase their effectiveness in addressing a variety of policy issues by pooling resources, such as information, money and policy instruments. This explains why the policy frames of local and regional coalitions merged frequently and were formalized into policies.

Furthermore, the Breda sub cases showed national policy ideas becoming institutionalized in local policy frames in each sub case. This can be described as a process in which regional and local coalitions adopted national policy ideas and tools, often without a substantive policy debate. From a network perspective, this can be explained by the reciprocal relationship of local policy networks with their external policy arrangements. Section four further compares the supra local institutional arrangements that shaped public safety governance in Breda.

Finally, the *mayor of Breda acted like a policy broker* in connecting the frames, resources and powers of regional and supra local coalitions in specific sub cases. The personal perspectives and experiences of this powerful player, who had responsibilities and controlled resources and policy tools in local safety networks, fostered a tendency towards regional collaboration.

3 The mayor's role on paper and in practice

Local policy strategies are structured by a certain policy frame which shapes the local policy approach including the mayor's expected role. Table 29 summarizes the policy frames of case in Breda, and consists of a problem definition (diagnostic message) and a solution (prognostic message). In the following paragraphs, the mayor's role on paper and in practice are summarized before they are compared across the three sub cases. In this way, we are able to indicate the extent to which the mayors of Breda enacted their expected role and compare the level of frame enactment.

Table 29: Policy frames Breda

	Drug-related nuisance	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Initial frame	DM: coffee shops cause nuisance PM: local government should regulate and limit the number of coffee shops	DM: Mental and physical violence were labeled a social and safety issue PM: regional collaboration between various actors and organizations within the policy domain of social care	DM: Financial and economic aspects of organized crime were labeled a local safety problem PM: administrative approach involving local government implementing the BIBOB tool
Frame shift 1	DM: Various problems related to soft, hard and new drugs threaten local order, health and living climate PM: regional coordination and harmonization of local interventions on drugs	DM: various forms of violence in dependent relationships were labeled a social and a safety issue PM: a systemic approach including home restrictions issued by the mayor.	DM: criminal networks causing high crime rates in region (drug-related) PM: combining administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions on a regional scale
Frame shift 2	DM: party drugs, drugs usage and trade in coffee shops, production of drugs, drugs tourism and criminal networks		

	PM: Integrated approach to various forms of drug-related issues and a stricter coffee shop policy		

DM: Diagnostic message PM: Prognostic message

3.1 Mayor's expected role

The policy frame entails the role the mayor was expected to play, which may or may not be enacted in practice. Table 30 summarizes the mayor's expected role in each sub case in Breda.

Table 30: Roles expected of mayors of Breda

	Drug-related nuisance	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Initial frame	Not explicitly mentioned in first policy on coffee shops	None on paper	Implementation of BIBOB
Frame shift 1	Closing buildings in case of drug-related nuisance or fear thereof	Implement his power to issue home restrictions to offenders of domestic violence	Coordinate free haven approach, participate in cannabis agreement, and be responsible for administrative interventions by local government in Taskforce for Organized Crime
Frame shift 2	Enact administrative power on drugs houses & formulation of coffee shop criteria		

DM: diagnostic message PM: prognostic message

The sub cases of Breda show two similarities when it comes to the expected role of the mayor. First of all, the *mayor was eventually granted a role* on each sub case at some point in time. This implies that labeling drugs, domestic violence and organized crime as local safety issues did eventually affect the mayor's role, at least on paper. Secondly, the *mayor's expected role on new safety issues was expanded* by the adoption of new formal powers in each sub case. These were, respectively, the power to close buildings in case of drug-related nuisance, the power of temporarily restrict offenders of domestic violence from being at home, and the BIBOB law granting the mayor the power to install BIB screening and reject or withdraw subsidies and permits.

The comparison of the three sub cases shows several differences between the expected role of the mayor as described in the policy documents as well. First of all, *the level of attention* paid to the mayor's role differs from the formal policy plans. The mayor's role in tackling drug-related nuisance is not explicitly mentioned in policy documents on coffee shops. There is a more or less implicit policy assumption among local stakeholders, built upon the

major's responsibility for local order and safety. His expected roles on organized crime and later on domestic violence, however, have been literally mentioned in various agreements, policy ambitions and guidelines. A practical explanation can be the novelty of the local safety problem. Whereas drugs are a traditional safety issue in the Netherlands and immediately fall under the purview of the mayor, issues such as domestic violence and organized crime are new topics for local government. They required explicit policy plans for selecting the responsible actors and led to an explicit formulation of the expected role that should be undertaken by the mayor.

Furthermore, in each case, the mayor was not immediately granted a role on paper when a *new 'safety problem' entered the local policy agenda*. The sub case of domestic violence demonstrates that labeling something as a local safety problem did not immediately imply that the mayor was put forward as the first responsible actor in formal policy strategies. The initial policy frame on domestic violence appointed an alderman and not the mayor as the responsible actor from local government. The mayor was not given any formal role during the initial framing process on domestic violence, since the new safety issue was included within existing social care policies, where an alderman was responsible, not the mayor. Again, this can be explained a matter of path dependency when new issues are embedded in traditional policy paths and ongoing practices.

3.2 Mayor's role in practice

The local governance practices in each sub case shows that the mayor sooner or later became involved with new safety problems in all three cases. New types of drugs related problems, domestic violence and organized crime were all subjected to administrative and even operational actions undertaken by the mayors of Breda at some point in time. Table 31 summarizes the Mayors' actions in practice.

Table 31: Role of the mayors of Breda as it was practiced & level of frame enactment

	Drugs-related Nuisance	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Initial frame	**Mayor D** Administrative actions: initiating and designing policy Breda Operational actions: closing coffee shops → High enactment	**Mayor E** No actions on domestic violence → High enactment	**Mayor E** Administrative actions: approving BIBOB as part of mayor and aldermen → Low enactment

Frame shift 1	**Mayor E** Mayor at arm's length → Low enactment	**Mayor F** Administrative actions: regional coordination and local adoption home restrictions Operational actions: issuing home restrictions → High enactment	**Mayor F** Administrative actions: signing free haven and cannabis agreement, requesting police capacity, informing local authorities about the taskforce, initiating the taskforce, being a member of the steering committee for the taskforce Operational actions: administrative clearance of cannabis farms → High enactment
Frame shift 2	**Mayor F** Administrative actions: alter maximum amount of coffee shops and connector between local and supra local policy initiatives Operational actions: closing two illegal sites of drugs trade → High enactment		

The actions undertaken by the mayors of Breda are characterized by so called '*administrative' and 'operational' actions* in each sub case. The former imply actions on public policy including policy preparation and formalization. The latter are interventions in real-life cases of drugs, violence and crime. The mayor's traditional administrative and political role was expanded with 'operational' activities on specific problems. As the mayors implemented their new formal powers on drugs, violence and crime, their operational involvement expanded besides their traditional role of safeguarding the quality and coordination of local safety policies. The implementation of the mayor's new powers resulted in actions towards concrete, individual instances of resolving local safety problems, such as closing a house, issuing a home restriction to a citizen or refusing a permit for example.

The mayor's role in practice differed in terms of activities on the supra local policy level and collaboration with external partners. The drug-related nuisance in Breda, even when national and regional policy ideas institutionalized into local policies, was addressed by the mayor in cooperation with his traditional partners that were focused on local drug problems. Domestic violence and organized crime, however, were tackled by the mayor participating in regional collaboration structures, including new partners addressing these problems on a more regional scale. This implies that the

mayor is *participating in multiple policy arenas* together with regional and national policy actors.

Moreover, it was mostly Mayor F who expanded his playing field in terms of supra local policy arenas and partners to address these non-traditional safety problems. His personal perspective and experiences fostered these mainly regional activities. Mayor F himself, as well as many of his partners, mentioned the great emphasis he put on tackling policy problems together with his regional partners. Mayor F had strong personal and professional ties to the region as he was born in Bergen op Zoom and used to be the mayor of several municipalities in the region before he came to Breda. This indicates the receptiveness of powerful actors of the local policy arena to policy trends in the regional policy arena.

However, actual involvement in local safety governance does not necessarily mean that the mayor enacted upon his expected role as prescribed by the formal policy frame. Comparison of the mayor's role in practice with his expected role in the policy strategy results in a level of frame enactment for the mayor on each sub case. The overall picture is that the *mayors of Breda enacted their expected role* on drugs, domestic violence and organized crime and that this enactment mostly manifested itself in administrative and operational actions. However, there were some exceptions to this overall conclusion in either the form or level of frame enactment between sub cases and mayors. In the sub case of domestic violence, the absence of mayoral actions implied a high level of frame enactment as the policy document did not grant the mayor any role. The fact that Mayor E did not undertake any action on domestic violence during the early 2000s implied full enactment of the policy frame. Furthermore, a low level of frame enactment was discerned during the initial framing process in the sub case of organized crime. Although the mayor's expected role was to implement the BIBOB tool, the mayor did not execute this instrument because he believed it was too complicated.

A pattern on frame enactment can be derived from these three sub cases. The case of Breda showed that frame alignment between the mayor's personal frame and the policy frame was followed by a high level of frame enactment and the other way around. There was a high level of frame enactment when the policy frame was compatible with the mayor's individual frame as expressed during the local policy debate and/or when the framing process was triggered locally. A low level of frame enactment was detected when discourse coalitions including the mayor did not recognize the new policy problem and thus held a different frame. Any *differentiation between the policy and the mayor's personal frame resulted in a low(er) level of enactment* and the mayors only enacted the policy frame when it was comparable to their own. The mayor's ability to enact his personal frame, which may or may not have been in line with the policy frame, is due to his individual responsibility for local order and safety as well as his control over resources. This makes him the most powerful actor in local policy networks during policy implementation. In the end, it is the mayor who decides to act and whether or not to implement his powers.

4 Institutional arrangements in local policy networks and supra local policy arenas

The conceptual model explicitly adopted a network perspective to local policy processes around new safety issues. The relatively openness of policy networks towards external actors and ideas and resources shifts our attention to the supra local arrangements that affect local policy processes, such as problem definitions and differences between expected (on paper) and enacted (in practice) roles. The previous paragraphs mentioned several aspects that shape local policy processes. This paragraph compares how the course and content of local framing processes and the mayor's position and role in local safety governance in Breda were affected by these institutional arrangements. Table 32 provides an overall summary.

Table 32: Summary of local and supra local institutional arrangements Breda

	Drug-related nuisance	**Domestic Violence**	**Organized Crime**
Local arena	Cognitive aspects in local policy network triggered initial framing process Distribution of powers and resources in local network foster discourse institutionalization of frame coalition A during initial framing process Distribution of tasks and responsibilities in local policy network affect mayor's role Cognitive aspects of key actors in the local policy networks both triggered a local policy process and allowed formalization of new policies	Local civil servant pioneered and brokered interaction between external and local policy arenas during the initial framing process of domestic violence as a safety issue	Cognitive aspects shaped by personal and professional experience of the mayor affected Breda's participation in the regional approach to organized crime
Regional arena	Policy practices in region arena trigger frame expansion process	Existing policy structures and practices in region shaped policy practice on domestic	Regional governing bodies and collaboration structures initiated and structured process of frame expansion.

		violence during both framing processes Regional policy cycle fostered policy expansion	
	Regional ambition to harmonize drugs policies structures local policies Regional research reports affect content of regional and local policy frames		
National arena	Regulative aspects of national policy network triggered harmonization of local and regional policy during frame expansion Regulative aspects affected content of national arena were adopted into local policy frame during both the initial and frame expansion processes	Regulative aspects of national arena institutionalized into regional and local policy plans during both framing processes	Regulative aspects of national arena triggered and shaped local policy frame during initial policy process Regulative aspects proposed by minister of Safety and Justice partially shaped frame expansion National support, manpower and money enabled implementation Task Force

Local policy arena
Multiple aspects of the local policy arena affected the local framing process in each sub case. The initial framing process around *drug-related nuisance* was structured by local actors signaling drug-related nuisance and the mayor being able to institutionalize his personal frame into formal policy. This implies that mostly cognitive aspects and the distribution of powers in the local network were in place. Moreover, the practical distribution of tasks and responsibilities in the local policy network mattered. Given the extraordinary division of labor in the Board of Mayor and Aldermen, an 'aldermen of local safety' responsible for the creation and implementation of local safety policies was set up during the late 1990s. This explains why the mayor's role in practice was characterized during that time by little administrative as well as operational activities on drug-related nuisance.

Local aspects were also present in the sub case of *domestic violence*. A pioneering local civil servant introduced the national policy frame on domestic violence into the local arena during the initial framing process. In doing so, this servant connected supra local and local policy ambitions on domestic violence as a safety problem. This points to the effects of individual local actors behaving like policy brokers.

In contrast to the sub cases of drug-related nuisance and domestic violence, the sub case of *organized crime* only modestly included aspects of the local arena. Also in this sub case, the cognitive aspects of the powerful actor in the local policy network mattered. Since Mayor E did not embrace the BIBOB tool, it was hardly implemented in the local policy arena when it was

first adopted in local policy plans. In contrast, the personal frame and professional experience of Mayor F enhanced Breda's participation in the overall regional approach to organized crime later on.

Regional policy arena

The regional arena has been of great importance for local safety policies and the mayor's role in Breda. In case of *drug-related nuisance*, the unconventional policy strategies of neighbor cities triggered frame expansion in Breda. Moreover, regional policy ambitions on this topic as expressed by regional committees and reports were institutionalized into local policy frames. In the sub case of *domestic violence*, the safety aspects of domestic violence were addressed by existing policy practices in the field of social care. Later on, the regional policy cycle fostered the frame expansion process when the adoption of home restrictions was anticipated during the updating of the regional policy. In the sub case of *organized crime*, the mayors of the largest cities in the region initiated several research reports that structured and institutionalized their policy frames, as well as initiating national commitment and resources to implement this policy on a regional level.

This implies that actors, policy practices and the existing policy structures in the regional arena initiated and shaped the policy frames and the mayor's role. Each sub case shows some level of regional coordination or collaboration. The emphasis on regional collaboration shaped local policies, practices as well as the mayor's role in practice and can be explained by the strong ties between local and regional government actors in Brabant. As regional policy practices have been in place before and in other policy domains, local safety issues are handled in the same way. In more theoretical terms, this can be seen as an empirical manifestation of path dependency in regional policy processes. Moreover, the manifestation of powerful actors in the local policy arena supporting this tradition of regional collaboration, such as Mayor F, explains the mayor's investments in regional collaboration in all three sub cases, as well as his role as a policy broker between regional policy ambitions on the one hand and local or national policy dynamics on the other during the late 2000s.

National policy arena

Regulative aspects from the national policy arena were strongly present in each sub case. National policy criteria and powers on *drugs* were institutionalized into the initial policy frame on coffee shops, and triggered and structured the two processes of frame expansion that followed. In the sub case of *domestic violence*, the national policy ambitions of local governments on domestic violence triggered and structured the initial framing process in Breda. Moreover, national budgets and arrangements shaped local policy practices in general and temporal home restrictions structured the mayor's formal role on paper as well as in practice. In the sub case of *organized crime*, the BIBOB law triggered local policy attention for the matter and national policy plans were institutionalized into regional and local policy plans, thereby creating local involvement. Furthermore, national support, manpower and funds

enabled regional local policy practices to address various forms of organized crime.

Overall, local policy processes in all three Breda sub cases were more or less characterized by a mixture of institutional arrangements from multiple policy arenas. This implies that local frames and the mayor's role and position on the new safety problems were mediated and characterized by local, regional and national policy ideas, guidelines and powers. The presence of supra local arrangements can be explained as the outcome of both direct and indirect processes of top-down policy and role structuration by supra local powers, policy ambitions and resources.

5 Conclusions – case Breda

In this within-case comparison, the findings based on the three Breda sub cases were compared to each other. Together, these research findings offer us several preliminary answers to sub-questions four and five.

5.1 Preliminary answer to sub-question four

Sub-question four was: *How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes and how does this affect the mayor's role and position in policy and practice?* The general answer to this sub-question is that the sub cases of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime were sooner or later framed as local safety problems, in some cases more explicitly than others. Nevertheless, by securitizing these issues, they immediately belonged to the policy domain of local order and safety for which the mayor is traditionally held responsible.

The Breda case analysis showed that the mayors of Breda had an *expected role* in the local policy strategies on these newly securitized issues as their formal powers expanded in each sub case. Moreover, the mayors enacted their expected roles as promoted by the policy strategy in mostof the sub cases. [43] In more theoretical terms, the mayors' actions showed a high level of enactment of their expected role as characterized by the policy frame. This implies that both the mayor's role on paper as well as his *actions in practice were affected by the introduction of new local safety problems* into local safety governance. More specifically, the analysis of the mayor's role in practice showed that his 'operational' actions on local safety problems were emphasized. With the implementation of new powers, such as closing buildings, issuing temporal home restrictions, and using the BIBOB tools, mayors intervened in concrete and individual cases of public safety. The implementation of new powers thus enhanced their operational and hands-on involvement in local safety governance.

Moreover, the mayors' actions, both administrative as well as operational, were (to be) carried out at the local *and supra local levels*. The sub cases of non-traditional and nationally triggered problems of domestic violence and

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[43]   Only Mayor E did not fully enact the policy frame on organized crime during the early 2000s.

organized crime showed a high level of supra local activities undertaken by the mayor. This implied that the mayor was active in multiple policy arenas and fulfilled the role of policy broker between them. While acting in regional and sometimes even national policy arenas, the number and type of the mayors' partners in public safety governance increased as well. Over time, the mayors of Breda became more dependent on supra local actors and their resources to solve local safety problems effectively.

However, the Breda case showed some exceptions to the overall expansion of the mayor's expected and practical role. The mayor was not devoted to any role or did not undertake action in two specific local policy processes around the new safety problems of domestic violence and organized crime. These can be explained by the processes of path dependency- granting an alderman instead of the mayor responsibility for domestic violence - and a low level of frame alignment between the mayor's personal frame and the policy frame on the policy tool of BIBOB. More in general, these exceptions took place during the initial framing processes of non-traditional safety problems in local safety governance, indicating that it took some time before the mayors became actively involved with domestic violence and organized crime, which were traditionally dealt with by other actors from the local and national policy arenas respectively.

5.2 Preliminary answer to sub question five

The application of the conceptual model showed an interplay between framing processes, the mayor's role and institutional aspects from several policy arenas. This results in several preliminary research findings for sub-question five: *Which (f)actors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the content, course and outcome of these framing processes?* The overall dynamics of the Breda case show a *high level of 'supra local', regulative aspects* institutionalizing into local policy strategies and shaping the mayor's role both on paper as well as in practice. As mentioned above, these supra local elements in the local policy strategy expanded the mayor's role in many ways. We can explain this by means of several mechanisms which characterize the interplay between (f)actors from the local, regional and national policy domains in the Breda case.

First, the Breda case has shown two types of top-down policy and role structuration. During such processes, regulative aspects (powers, reports, policy programs) of supra local policy arenas shaped local policies including the mayor's position and role. The sub cases showed both *direct* and *indirect* cases of structuration. The distinction lies in variation in the level of policy debate. In the case of direct policy and role structuration, a local debate did not take place. National policy tools were directly adopted into local policy plans. Indirect policy and role structuration refer to framing processes during which regional and national policy frames aligned with local frames during policy debates. The majority of the framing processes were surrounded by some level of policy debate during which local, regional and national discourse coalitions presented their policy frames. This resulted into the institutionalization of a mixture of local and supra local frames into local policy strategies. During

indirect policy structuration, the local policy debate during which local, regional and national policy discourse coalitions interacted and aligned their frames formed a 'filter' through which supra local policy ideas were processed into suitable policy strategies for local governance.

Second, these top-down processes of policy and role structuration were mostly present in the sub cases of domestic violence and organized crime and to a lesser extent in the sub case of drug-related nuisance (only late 2000s). This implies that local authorities in Breda fell back on existing policy structures in the domain of public safety and order when a 'traditional' problem as drugs came along. However, when their actions on *non-traditional safety issues* as domestic violence and organized crime were initiated by supra local actors, they had to develop new policy plans and practices for which they relied heavily on *supra local partners and guidelines and tools*. This explains the high level of regulative aspects from national and regional policy arenas that became institutionalized into local policy strategies. It also explains why the mayor participated with new actors on supra local policy arenas more often.

Third, in the mixture of local, regional and national policy frames as shown by these two mechanisms, *especially regional policy actors, frames, tools and practices* are very important for the local policy approach to new local safety problems. Especially the tradition and tendency to collaborate on a regional scale structured: 1) the local policy frame and the mayor's role in practice on domestic violence, 2) supported the administrative approach to organized crime on a regional level and 3) enabled the execution of regional policy ambitions on drug-related nuisance in Breda. In theoretical terms, this can be seen as an empirical manifestation of path dependency in policy processes as well as the expanding multi-level character of public safety governance. Moreover, mayor F's perspectives and experiences on regional collaboration fostered these regional activities as well.

Fourth, *a* single *bottom-up* process of policy and role structuration was present as well. In the sub case of organized crime, the policy initiatives of mayors of five cities in the region were embraced and facilitated by national government. In this case, local actors collaborated in the regional policy arena and successfully invigorated the frame of national policy actors to generate national support for their policy ambitions. Meanwhile, this led to policy expansion by adopting some national policy ambitions as well.

Chapter 12 Cross case comparison

1 Introduction

This chapter compares the findings from cases Haarlem and Breda to further our understanding of how the mayor's role and position in local governance has been affected by shifting definitions of local safety problems. Moreover, case study findings *are related to our* conceptual model that provides a generalizable framework of this process. The comparison is structured according to the main components of the conceptual model. The next section compares the framing processes in Haarlem and Breda during which the sub cases of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime were labeled as local safety problems by their relevant discourse coalitions. The effects of securitization on the mayor's position and role in local safety governance networks will then be compared across the two cases. The fourth section compares the institutional arrangements that affected the local policy process that defined the mayors' role and position. Sub questions four and five are addressed in each section before the implications of the overall case study findings for the conceptual model are discussed in the final section.

2 How new safety problems were framed in local policy networks

This section compares the local policy debates in Haarlem and Breda during which discourse coalitions defined local safety problems and formalized them into formal policy strategies. Table 33 summarizes how drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime ended up as formal policy topics as well as how formal policy frames shifted over time in both cities.

Table 33: Comparison of the local framing processes resulting in formal policy frames in Haarlem and Breda

Drug-related nuisance	Haarlem	Breda
Initial framing process	Process: frames of local coalitions aligned with supra local policy ideas and became institutionalized in local policies Policy frame: local authorities regulate and/or closing coffee shops that were causing nuisance	Process: frames of local coalitions aligned with supra local policy ideas and became institutionalized in local policies Policy frame: local authorities regulate and closing coffee shops that were causing nuisance
Frame shift 1	Process: no debate took place, resulting in the direct institutionalization of supra local policy tools into local policies Policy frame: mayor closes drugs buildings as last resort against drug-related nuisance	Process: the frames of the local and regional coalitions aligned with each other and with supra local policy ideas, and were subsequently institutionalized in the local policies Policy frame: harmonization of regional and local interventions to soft, hard and new types of

		drugs
Frame shift 2	Process: frames of local coalitions aligned during local policy debate and were formalized into local policies Policy frame: tight regime of local authorities controlling and sanctioning rule violations by coffee shop owners	Process: frames of local and regional and national coalitions aligned with each other and institutionalized in local policies Policy frame: integral approach to various drug-related problems and a strengthening of policies relating to coffee shops
Domestic violence	**Haarlem**	**Breda**
Initial framing process	Process: frames of local coalitions aligned with supra local policy ideas and became institutionalized in local policies Policy frame: crisis response to victims combined with the prevention and prosecution of offenders of various forms of domestic violence	Process: frames of local and regional coalitions aligned with supra local policy ideas and became institutionalized in local policies Policy frame: regional collaboration amongst various actors from the social care services to address the problem of domestic violence
Frame shift 1	Process: hardly any policy debate took place, leading to the direct institutionalization of supra local policy tools into the local policy plans Policy frame: regional collaboration strategy to support mayors in implementing their power of temporal home restrictions	Process: no debate thus direct institutionalization of the supra local policy tools into local polices Policy frame: home restrictions given out by the mayor as part of systematic approach to various forms of domestic violence
Organized crime	**Haarlem**	**Breda**
Initial framing process	Process: little local debate, leading to the direct institutionalization of supra local policy tools in the local policy plans Policy frame: BIBOB as a means of preventing unintended support for criminal activities	Process: no debate took place, leading to a direct institutionalization of supra local policy tools into the local policy plans Policy frame: an administrative approach was taken to the financial and economic aspects of organized crime by the local government in their implementation of the BIBOB tool

Frame shift 1	Process: frames of local coalitions were aligned with supra local policy ideas, and institutionalized in local policies	Process: frames of the local, regional and national coalitions aligned with each other and became institutionalized in local policies
	Policy frame: administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions were implemented on a regional scale	Policy frame: regional collaboration to allow for unified actions including administrative, juridical and fiscal interventions

The cross case comparison leads to several conclusions relevant to the first part of the fourth sub question: *How have new local safety problems been framed in the local policy processes [...]?* First, all six sub cases show successful efforts at securitization as the three problems of the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime all ended up becoming policy objects in the local safety policies in both Haarlem and Brede at some point between 1990 and 2010. In both settings, the contents of these policy frames was dynamic. After they were successfully securitized as local safety problems, their initial frames altered at least once. The policy frames in fact shifted twice in the sub case of drugs which was introduced as a policy objective in the early 1990s. Domestic violence and organized crime are more recent concerns that manifested in the 21st century. It can be concluded therefore, that across the two municipalities, the longer a safety problem is subject to local governance, the more frequently its policy frames shift.

Secondly, in both Haarlem and Breda, some discourse coalitions saw their frames become formalized in policy, and others did not. Overall, three types of discourse coalitions can be distinguished in the policy debates. These range from the individually dominant, to coalitions that are dependent on others. Both cases showed in particular that it were the *discourse coalitions that united a majority of local authorities* who had the most impact in *translating their frames into public policy*. The dominance of these coalitions be explained by the high level of formal agenda setting and decision making powers they held in comparison to other coalitions in the policy network. Furthermore, in both cases, *coalitions composed of civil servants* were repeatedly successful in shaping *specific aspects of the local policy* frames. The sub case of domestic violence in Haarlem and Beda both show the important role of coalitions of professionals who successfully pioneered efforts in relation to domestic violence and successfully presented it as a safety issue. Although these professionals were as much dependent on local authorities for formalizing their frames into local policies, their chances of affecting the local policy frame were increased by a local incident in the form of a death caused by domestic violence that served to highlight the problem. Their case was bolstered also by the supra local policy (powers for the mayor, international policy practices) that provided a ready course of action that could be modeled locally.

Thirdly, *non-government actors participated in local policy debates* every once in a while, such as citizens, and coffee shop owners. They were the least effective in directly shaping the local policy frame. Haarlem and Breda.

These actors communicated their interests during the initial stages of the local policy debates but they were either ruled out, or incorporated by coalitions with more formal decision-making powers. At best, they were able to set the agenda of the debate itself and saw their frames represented by other powerful actors in the local network. Taken together, each coalition's level of formal agenda setting and decision making power in the local policy processes strongly affected its chance of formalizing its perspectives on the problem and solution in the formal policy frame, regardless of the level of interests that was at stake.

Finally, the *level of policy debate preceding the institutionalization* of our three public safety problems was variable across Haarlem and Breda. In contrast to the prediction of the conceptual model, local policy debates during which coalitions aligned their frames were not always present each time a policy frame was initiated or reframed. This implies that shifts in local policy frames were brought about by actors other than local discourse coalitions. In other words, the framing of local safety problems and policies was by no means a purely local endeavor. Even when local policy debate was active, local actors embraced supra local policy ideas. In both Haarlem and Breda, the framing processes were all characterized by a mixture of local and supra local policy actors, goals and tools. Overall, the more recent the framing process and the less traditional the safety issue, the greater the supra local influence in local policies. This points to the importance of the Zeitgeist and current constellations of institutional arrangements in shaping the processes of problem farming and role structuration. This is discussed further in Section 4.

3 How new definitions affected the mayor's role on paper and in practice

According to the conceptual model, the securitization of local issues affects the mayor's role and position in local safety governance. Table 34 provides an overview of the case study results on how new definitions of local safety problems affected the mayor's role on paper as well in practice. The former is referred to as the mayors expected role as mentioned in the formal policy strategy. The latter is the mayor's role in practice as characterized by his actual actions or lack thereof. In the next sections, the similarities and differences between the two the mayors identified and explained.

Table 34: Comparison of mayor's role on paper and in practice

Drug-related nuisance	Haarlem		Breda	
	Expected role	*Role in practice*	*Expected role*	*Role in practice*
Initial framing process	implementation of new coffee shop policy by closing coffee shops	creation and formalization of policy and the closing several coffee shops →high enactment	local government regulates coffee shops, mayor not explicitly mentioned	Initiation and designing policy and closing coffee shops → full enactment
Frame shift 1	new power to decide whether or not to close a public building, and for what period	power hardly implemented →low enactment	new power to close buildings in case of drug-related nuisance, or fear thereof	mayor at arm's length → low enactment
Frame shift 2	deciding whether or not to close a public building and for what period	introduction and implementation of restrictive approach → full enactment in reversed order	closing buildings in case of drug-related nuisance or fear thereof, and the formulation of rules for coffee shops owners	altered maximum amount of coffee shops, connected local and supra local policy initiatives and closed two illegal sites of drugs trade → high enactment
Domestic violence	Haarlem		Breda	
	Expected role	*Role in practice*	*Expected role*	*Role in practice*
Initial framing process	none	no actions → high enactment	none	no actions → high enactment
Frame shift 1	Implementation of new power to implement home restrictions	issuing of home restrictions → high enactment	Implementation of home restrictions for offenders of domestic violence, and the coordination of a regional approach	implementing home restrictions → high enactment

Organized crime	Haarlem		Breda	
	Expected role	*Role in practice*	*Expected role*	*Role in practice*
Initial framing process	implementation of new powers from the BIBOB law allowing the withdrawal and refusal of permit, and facilitating BIBOB screening	policy preparation by Mayor B, no implementation of BIBOB tool → low enactment Policy expansion and implementation of BIBOB tool by mayor C → high enactment	new BIBOB power adopted	no implementation of BIBOB → low enactment
Frame shift 1	Coordination of regional collaboration and set objectives	administrative actions on local and interregional level and implementation of BIBOB → enactment	Coordination of free the haven approach, participate in cannabis agreements and and responsible for administrative interventions by the local government in Task Force organized Crime	administrative and partially operational actions in the local, regional and national arena → high, mainly administrative enactment

3.1 Drug-related nuisance

The securitization of the drug-related nuisance affected the mayors in Breda and Haarlem in two very similar ways. First, both mayors were called upon to design and implement the first policy on coffee shops. They took administrative action during the policy formation process, and they took operational actions in closing coffee shops that flouted the new policy. This activation can be explained as the outcome of local framing processes during which local policy actors (including the mayors themselves) problematized the expanding number of coffee shops and called for an intervention by the local government. Second, although the new power to close drug buildings in case of the drug-related nuisance was adopted into local policies, it was minimally implemented by the mayors in both municipalities. This points at a gap between the mayors' expected role as stated in local policy plans and their role in practice. This gap can be explained by low frame alignment between the formal policy frame on the one hand, and the mayor's individual frame on either drug-related problems or public safety governance in general on the other hand. The mayor of Haarlem did not explicitly recognize the drug-related nuisance as a pressing one. This is demonstrated by the absence of a local

policy debate on drugs in the late 1990s. The mayor of Breda's personal view on local safety governance was that an integrated safety policy can and should be dealt with by a local alderman, and this view explains his low involvement in the policy matter.

The mayor's involvement at supra local policy arenas relevant to the drug-related nuisance differed between the two municipalities from the mid-1990s onwards. The mayors of Haarlem tackled drugs in collaboration with traditional partners from or closely related to the local policy arena. Mayors in Breda, however, were firmly embedded in regional collaboration structures regarding drugs in which public problems were assumed to belong to policy domains other than public safety. The high level of supra local policy actions and the great number of partners involved in efforts to tackle the drug problems in Breda can therefore be explained as a matter of path dependency in regional and local policy practices.

3.2 Domestic violence

The sub case of domestic violence shows a striking similarity across both cases. Partially framing domestic violence as a local safety problem did not immediately affect the mayors' position and role in local governance. This is in sharp contrast to the expectation of the conceptual model that defining something as a local safety problem will clearly impact the mayor's role and position. This unexpected finding is another manifestation of path dependency and can be explained by the power of historical and existing policy practices. Before it was securitized, domestic violence in both cases had long been a policy topic in the social welfare policy domain for which an alderman was responsible. In line with this traditional role, the alderman rather than the mayor was responsible for domestic violence when it was first was labeled as a safety matter.

However, it was not long before both mayors became active in addressing domestic violence. Both were granted the power to issue home restrictions through the adoption of this into local policy plans. Not only were the mayors now expected to address domestic violence as laid down in formal policy documents, they both frequently gave out home restrictions to offenders of domestic violence in their local society. Personal frame alignment came into play as in both cases as the mayors came to recognize the problem of domestic violence as a serious one and they exhibited a high level of enactment of the formal policy frame.

Despite these similarities, the mayors differed as well in the way in which they addressed domestic violence. In both cases, local governments started to collaborate with other municipalities in order to harmonize the way in which mayors implement temporal home restrictions. However, the extent to which mayors were involved in this administrative processes in the regional policy arena differed. Whereas the mayor of Haarlem delegated the administrative coordination of home restrictions to a colleague in the region, the mayor of Breda fulfilled this job himself. This difference in the mayors' behavior can be explained by their personal frames on domestic violence. Whereas C described it as an important matter that sits at the edge of the

public safety domain (Interview August 2012), Mayor F argued that domestic violence was a matter of high importance, and one that he had long been addressing as mayor of several municipalities in Brabant (Interview May 2013).

3.3 Organized crime

Framing organized crime as a local safety issue affected the mayors in Breda and Haarlem in similar ways, primarily in that it resulted in an expansion of their role in this regard. This overall expansion of can be explained as the outcome of the adoption of the national BIBOB law in local policies in both cases.

The mayors' role in practice eventually showed activities regarding organized crime. However, it took a while before mayors became actively involved as both mayors solely administratively approved the new BIBOB power as part of local policies without actually implementing it during its early days. This low level of enactment can be explained by low level of personal alignment as mayors simply held the opinion that organized crime did not take place in their local society. Later on, both municipalities had new mayors who became actively involved with addressing organized crime. They did this operationally by implementing BIBOB and using it in relation to local cases, as well as administratively by participating in and coordinating regional collaboration structures set up to tackle various forms of organized crime.

This shift in the mayor's role in practice from a rather inactive one to one demonstrating active involvement can again be explained by the individual mayors' level of personal alignment. New mayors entered the scene in both cases, and these mayors had personal frames that more greatly acknowledged the need for local administrative interventions targeted at severe forms of crime. Time played a role as well, as the introduction of organized crime as a nontraditional safety issue in the local policy arena took time to be embraced by key actors in the local public safety and order domain, including the local mayor.

Although mayors in both cases became actively involved in addressing organized crime, they differed slightly in their level of involvement and type of actions. The mayor of Haarlem responded actively to the national ambition by supporting the creation of a regional policy structure once this was introduced and promoted by the national government. The mayor of Breda, however, took it a step further by initiating and promoting interventions regarding free havens and drug-related crime at the local, regional and national level. Whereas the mayor of Haarlem was an early adopter and active supporter, the mayor of Breda is better described as an initiator and co-designer of the administrative approach to organized crime. This difference might be explained by the collaboration structures that were put in place. The fact that Mayor F took up this role can be explained in part by his participation in close regional collaboration structures regarding public safety, and in other policy domains. This reason was less prominent in the case of mayor C who attempted to encourage the active involvement of other stakeholders in the

region to create a regional collaboration structure for common interventions regarding organized crime.

3.4 Overall findings

Similarities and differences that arise in the cases of Haarlem and Breda provide an overall answer to the second part of sub question four: *[…] to what extent, how and why did they [new local safety problems] affect the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance?* Overall, the case study findings demonstrate that the mayor's expected role and his behavior in practice were indeed affected by the securitization of new issues. The in-depth analysis of the process of securitization and the creation of new policies in Haarlem and Breda affected the mayor's role and position in at least five ways:

1) Expansion of the mayor's expected role 'on paper' as described in the local policy strategy. The mayors were eventually granted a role in local policy plans in all six sub cases. More specifically, the mayors' position was expanded by the adoption of a new power introduced by national government. These powers formalized the mayors' responsibilities, specified their expected course of action and provided them with extra tools to address the new safety problems of the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime.

2) Mayors got involved with addressing the new safety issues through administrative as well as operational activities. The former refers to preparing and formalizing policies, while the latter points to more hands on involvement such as closing shops, giving out restrictions and allowing BIBOB screenings. The implementation of new powers led in particular to an increase in the mayor's operational involvement with individual, real life cases in local safety governance.

3) The mayor's 'playing field' expanded with the involvement of new partners from local as well as regional, national and sometimes even international policy arenas. The securitization of 'nontraditional'[44] safety issues expanded the mayor's role in practice this way. As result mayors became actively involved in various collaborative structures set up at the supra local policy level, and they started to tailor their local interventions according to the input of new actors including the tax authorities and the Minister of Safety and Justice. At the same, this led to an increasing level of dependency on others to effectively address local issues.

4) The cross case comparison showed that expanding the mayor's expected role did not automatically lead to an alteration in his actions in practice. Mayors differed in the extent to which they enacted their expected role as portrayed in the formal policy strategies. While the mayors of Breda were found to enact upon their expected role in six out of seven times, the mayors of Haarlem showed a lower level of frame enactment. Such variation in the level

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[44]   Domestic violence and organized crime.

of enactment can be explained by a level of disagreement between personal and policy frame. The case studies show that the mayor's personal frame had to align with the policy frame for his expected role to be carried out in practice. Whereas the mayor's expected role might have affected the securitization of local issues in local policy plans, it was not immediately implied that the mayor's role in practice would be shaped by new problems definitions as well.

5) Both cases showed one similar exception to which conclusions 1 – 4 do not fully apply. The fact that the partial securitization of domestic violence did not immediately lead to the creation of an expected role for the mayor in the local policy strategy makes this sub case different from the other ones. The initial framing processes of domestic violence in both Haarlem and Breda contrasted with the theoretical assumption that the securitization of local problems would affect the mayor. Although domestic violence was partially labeled as a safety problem, both mayors were not granted a role in addressing this new safety problem in the initial framing process. Instead an aldermen responsible for social care was appointed as the one responsible for the policy approach to domestic violence. Not until the national power of temporary home restrictions was adopted in the frame expansion processes were the mayors activated in both municipalities. The fact that the securitization of domestic violence initially (re)activated the aldermen instead of the mayor can be explained as being the result of path dependency.

4 How institutional arrangements affected local policy processes

This paragraph deals with how institutional arrangements from multiple policy arenas affected the course and outcome of local processes of problem framing and role structuration. Local governance in the Netherlands is closely impacted by actors and resources from other policy arenas. Case studies demonstrated how local problem frames and the roles of police actors in local policy networks were affected by policy dynamics in the regional, national and the international policy arena. In the terminology of the conceptual model, these are supra local institutional arrangements affecting local processes of problem framing and role structuration on paper and in practice. Table 35 provides an overview of the institutional arrangements located in the local and supra local policy arenas affecting local policy processes regarding the securitized issues of the drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime. In the next sections, the similarities and differences between the cases in terms of these institutional arrangements will be detected and explained for each policy arena. This provides an overall answer to sub question five: *Which factors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the course, content and outcome of local framing processes as well as the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance?*

Table 35: Comparison of institutional arrangements present in Haarlem and Breda

	Haarlem	Breda
Local arena	**Drug-related Nuisance**	
	Sub case 1	Sub case 4
	Local policy debate	Local Policy debate
	Cognitive aspects of the local policy arena triggered the initial framing process	Cognitive aspects in local policy network triggered initial framing process
	Shift in the composition of actors in the local arena (new mayor) triggered frame expansion	Distribution of powers and resources in local network fostered the institutionalization of the frame of Discourse Coalition A.
	The division of power between actors in the local policy arena explains why contrasting frames disappeared	Distribution of tasks and responsibilities in local policy network affected the mayor's role
	Local policy practices triggered a policy debate and an expansion of the policy frame to include new actors with different normative standpoints	Cognitive aspects of key actors in the local policy networks both triggered a local policy process and allowed for a formalization of new policies
	Regulative events in local arena triggered policy formalization	
	Cognitive aspects or the individual frames of powerful actors affected level of frame enactment	
	Domestic Violence	
	Sub case 2	Sub case 5
	Modest local policy debate	Local civil servant pioneered and brokered between the external and local policy arena during the initial framing process of domestic violence as a safety issue
	Incidents in the local policy arena triggered the initial framing process	
	Cognitive aspects in the local arena (dissatisfaction with policy practice) provided solid ground for frame expansion	The frame expansion process went ahead without local policy debate
	Organized Crime	
	Sub case 3	**Sub case 6**
	Local Policy debate	Initial framing process lacked a substantive local policy debate

			Cognitive aspects shaped by the personal and professional experience of the mayor affected Breda's participation in the overall regional approach to organized crime
Regional arena	**Drug-related Nuisance**		
	Sub case 1		Sub case 4
			Policy practices in the regional arena triggered the frame expansion process The regional ambition to harmonize drug policies structured local policies Regional research reports affected the content of both regional and local policy frames
	Domestic Violence		
	Sub case 2		Sub case 5
	Participation in the regional collaboration structure for implementing temporary home restrictions shaped the mayor's expected role		Existing policy structures and practices in the region shaped policy practice regarding domestic violence during the framing processes The regional policy cycle fostered policy expansion
	Organized Crime		
	Sub case 3		Sub case 3
	Practical aspects of regional policy arena triggered policy debate around policy practice in Amsterdam Regulative aspects of the regional policy approach triggered frame expansion and resulted in a regional collaboration agreement		Regional governing bodies and collaboration structures initiated and structured the process of frame expansion

National arena	Drug-related Nuisance	
	Sub case 1	Sub case 4
	Regulative aspects of the national policy approach triggered frame expansion and resulted in the policy of closing buildings Regulative aspects of the national policy arena shaped the local policy frame, specifically closing buildings The tight regime fit the tightening national debate and practice, and a local alternative was presented	Regulative aspects of the national policy network triggered a harmonization of local and regional policy during frame expansion Regulative aspects from the national arena were adopted into the local policy frame during both the initial and frame expansion processes.
	Domestic Violence	
	Sub case 2	Sub case 2
	Regulative aspect of the national policy arena triggered frame expansion and resulted in the implementation of temporary home restrictions Regulative aspect of the national arena activated the mayor regarding domestic violence Various aspects enabled local policy implementation: budget, manpower Haarlem's local innovative approach had a national spin off	Regulative aspects of the national arena were institutionalized into the regional and local policy plans during both framing processes
	Organized Crime	
	Sub case 3	Sub case 3
	Regulative aspects of the national policy arena triggered the initial framing process and the adoption of the BIBOB Law Regulative aspects of national policy arena triggered and shaped local policy frame: BIBOB law Regulative aspects of the national policy arena shaped local policy frame: dministrative approach, RIEC and funding	Regulative aspects of the national arena triggered and shaped the local policy frame in the initial policy process. Regulative aspects proposed by the Minister of Safety and Justice partially shaped the frame expansion National support, manpower and money enabled the implementation of the task force

International arena	Domestic Violence	
	Sub case 2	Sub case 5
	Practical aspects of international policy arena shaped the local policy frame	

4.1 Local arena

All three sub cases were eventually labeled as a safety concerns worthy of specific local policy strategies in both Haarlem and Breda in a clear process of securitization. While these certainly affected the mayor's role on paper and in practice, the local processes of problem framing and role structuration were also shaped by various (f)actors in the local policy arena.

Both cases showed several local triggers that initiated the local policy process. These triggers include the problematization of local issues by local stakeholders (cognitive aspects), incidents in local society, informal policy practices that generated policy debate, as well as the pioneering work of civil servants to generate policy attention for new problems. Both cases were strikingly similar in that new policy frames were frequently preceded by local policy debates in which discourse coalitions consisting of local authorities successfully managed to institutionalize their frames. This led to the creation of custom-made approaches in local policy. The coalitions that were successful in framing issues usually consisted of local authorities who had formal agenda setting and decision making power. Other actors from the local or supra local arena had to align their frames with that of the local authorities or risk being excluded or ruled out. From a network perspective, the possession of formal powers for agenda setting and decision-making, or having close connections with such actors greatly affected a discourse coalition's chances of institutionalizing its frame into local policy plans.

However, the extent to which local authorities affected the course and outcome of the framing process varied between Haarlem and Breda. This difference can be explained by differences in the level of local policy debate observed in each municipality. Whereas each sub case in Haarlem featured a local debate in which several discourse coalitions expressed their frames and their desired solutions, this was not the case in Breda. The frame expansion process for domestic violence and the initial framing process for organized crime in Breda was not preceded by a substantive local policy debate. The policy frames in Breda were a little less influenced by the frames of local discourse coalitions, and a little more influenced by the frame of supra local policy coalitions from the regional and national arena as explained in the following sections.

4.2 Regional arena

Over time, both cases were characterized by the expanding influence of regional policy actors, ambitions, practices and resources. This can be explained by a national trend of 'scaling up' local safety governance that took place across the Netherlands in the 2000s. Local authorities were encouraged

by the national government and the police to collaborate with many others actors from the public, private and social welfare spheres in order to increase their problem solving capacities (see chapter two on integral policy ambitions in public safety governance). As these so called 'integral strategies' to tackle contemporary safety problems were picked up in both Haarlem and Breda, local safety governance became less of a local endeavor over the years and the playing field for the mayors aiming to address new local safety problems expanded to the regional policy arena as well.

Nevertheless, the largest difference across Haarlem and Breda had to do with the composition of the local and regional elements. Compared to Haarlem, institutional arrangements from the regional arena shaped local policy frames and practices more greatly in Breda. This was especially visible in the sub case of the drug-related nuisance which was dominated by local actors and policies in Haarlem, but more deeply affected by regional collaboration structures in Breda. This trend started in the mid-1990s when drugs first entered the policy domain, and continues until today. This difference can be explained by a strong tradition of regional collaboration in Brabant which enabled regional actors and policy ambitions to have a more ready influence on the structure of Breda's policies practices and the actions of its mayors. Given their tradition of regional collaboration, there was a basic level of familiarity and trust between partners in the region that naturally allowed for the new public safety problems to be addressed on a regional scale.

4.3 National arena

Local policies and practices in Haarlem and Breda were strongly influenced by regulative aspects of the national policy arena, including national policy programs and powers which shaped the local policy strategies, including the mayor's expected role. National budget and manpower facilitated regional and local policy implementation. In all six sub cases new powers regarding drugs, violence and crime were adopted into local policy strategies somewhere between 1990 and 2010. These powers gave the mayors of Haarlem and Breda tools and responsibilities to address these safety issues that they either held themselves, or that they shared with the board and council. This similarity can largely be explained by the influence of the Dutch national governmental system which formalized these tools by law and therefore made them uniformly applicable to every mayor in the Netherlands. Together, this points at a top down process of policy structuration during which institutional arrangements from the national policy arena triggered attention to new safety problems, shaped local policy strategies (including the mayor's expected role), and enabled the local implementation of new policy frames.

Although both cases adopted these regulative and facilitative aspects from the national policy arena, the case of Haarlem differed from Breda in that Haarlem's local policy initiatives (themselves inspired by international policy practices) had a supra local spin off in that it was adopted in the national sphere, and subsequently also influenced the local polices in other municipalities. Haarlem's local 'innovations' for addressing domestic violence were picked up and adopted by policy actors at the regional and national

policy arena. This bottom up mechanism can be explained by the fact that Haarlem was dealing with domestic violence by taking a public safety perspective well before other public actors in the Netherlands did.

4.4 International arena

The international arena's main influence in Haarlem was in the institutionalization of foreign policy practices in its local policies on domestic violence. Professional groups in Haarlem had to turn to international policy for a framework for their first safety oriented approach to domestic violence as there were none to model closer to home. This points to the importance of the timing of local policy processes in relation to the supra local policy context.

4.5 Mixture of institutional arrangements

Both cases demonstrated that the framing of local problems as safety issues was indeed a multi-level governance activity which blended aspects of several policy arenas and affected the local policy frame as well as the mayors' role. A mixture of institutional arrangements shaped 'local' processes of problem framing and role structuration in both cases. Regulative aspects of the national policy arena structured local framing processes by introducing new policy topics and/or policy ambitions to be carried out by local governments. The new powers created in the national arena also structured the mayor's role on paper as well as in practice in Haarlem and Breda.

Although both cases are characterized by a mixture of institutional arrangements from multiple policy arenas, Haarlem and Breda differed in the specific compositions of local and supra local elements that defined both the local policy and the mayors' role. The difference lies in the manifestation of regional influences on local policies. Whereas Breda knows a strong tradition of regional collaboration, regional actors, reports and policy ambitions were of less influence in structuring local policies and roles in Haarlem. Therefore local actors in Haarlem dominated local policies and practices to a higher degree that those in Breda. Taken together, the case Breda is characterized by a relatively higher level of supra local institutional arrangements compared to Haarlem. Nevertheless, Haarlem's local policy frames and practices were characterized by supra local arrangements and it even adopted some international policy ideas regarding domestic violence.

5 Implications for the conceptual model

This cross case comparison resulted in the identification of several similarities and differences between Haarlem and Breda that have implications for the conceptual model. As explained in the research design presented in Chapter 6, the case studies were selected for their analytical generalizability. They aimed to refine the theoretical expectations of the conceptual model. This section deals with the question of whether or not the empirical findings matched the theoretical expectations of the conceptual model, and presents the theoretical implications of our case study findings. This is the first step towards establishing the theoretical implications of study as presented in the conclusions.

5.1 Securitization of local issues does indeed affect the mayor's position and role

The conceptual model combined several concepts from the literature on policy dynamics, framing and networked governance, mapping out how problem definitions were expected to influence the role and position of actors in a policy network. Both case studies supported the general assumption that shifting definitions of local safety policy problems affect the mayor's role in local safety governance. The conclusion we draw from the cases is that the mayors of Breda got more formal powers and expanded their administrative and operational activities to address new local safety problems. This points at an expansion of both the mayor's expected role as well as his role in practice (c.f. van Doorn and Lammers, 1976). In other words, securitization of new issues granted the mayor an expected role in local policy strategies and encouraged him to undertake both administrative and operational actions. Moreover, mayors got involved in cooperation with many new policy actors from supra local policy arenas. The latter implies that shifting problem definitions altered the composition of the policy venue (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), locating the mayor in multi actor and multi-level collaboration networks (c.f. multi-level governance Bekkers and Fenger, 2007).

5.2 Three mechanisms of multi-level problem and role structuration

The case studies point to three distinct mechanisms of so called 'policy and role structuration' during which a mixture of institutional arrangements from the local, regional, national and international arena shaped local safety policies and the mayor's role in it:

1) Top down policy and role structuration occurred when supra local policy ideas become directly institutionalized into the local policy strategies. International, national and/or regional policy ideas were directly adopted into the local policy strategies. A substantive policy debate in which local stakeholders expressed their worries and wishes regarding the matter did not manifest itself in the local policy arena. Local authorities simply copied nationally created powers and regional policy ambitions into local policy plans without much fuss. The fact that supra local policy frames were directly institutionalized into local policy documents implies that they shape local strategies and the mayors' expected role to a large extent. Whether or not this affected the mayor's behavior in practice depended on the level of personal alignment as explained in Section 5.4. This type of policy and role structuration was mostly present during the initial framing processes of nontraditional safety problems.

2) Mediated policy and role structuration refers to process during which local discourse coalitions aligned their frames with supra local policy ideas, thereby creating a shared policy frame. During the local policy debates, the frames of local coalitions became aligned with supra local policy ideas present at the international, national and regional policy arenas. The local debate creates a 'filter' through which supra local policy ideas are processed into suitable

policy strategies for local governance. Once institutionalized into formal policy plans, this customized frame represents a mixture of local and supra local policy ideas structuring the overall policy strategy including the mayor's expected role in it. Mediated processes of policy and role structuration were triggered by both local and supra local factors and flourished when local stakeholders were heavily engaged with the problem at hand, and when they strove publicly to gain prominence for their favored problem definitions and solutions. This type of direct policy and role structuring reflects the multi-level character of local safety governance in the Netherlands, and was most commonly present in both cases.

3) Bottom up policy and role structuration: This occurs when new practices in the local policy networks get adopted in the supra local policy arenas. Case studies demonstrated that locally developed policy frames and practices were sometimes picked up by other municipalities as well as facilitated and actively promoted by national governments. In this way, local initiatives by the mayor and his partners became a guiding example for others. This type of policy and role structuration took place when supra local policy ideas, tools and structures were absent. This fostered a purely local process of frame alignment, institutionalization and enactment, leading to local policy innovations being necessary means of dealing with new safety problems. This type of policy and role structuration was dominant in the early days of local safety governance when supra local policy programs, tools and structures were not yet in place.

5.3 Local debate is a sufficient condition for discourse institutionalization

In contrast to the expectations of the conceptual model, the two case studies have shown that the institutionalization of new policy frames is not necessarily preceded by local policy debates during which local discourse coalitions frame new safety problems (Hajer, 1989; 1993). Supra local policy frames can directly structure local policy, including the mayor's expected role, according to the mechanism of 'direct problem and role structuration'. This implies that local policy debates in which discourse coalitions interact and align their frame (one of the three phases outlined by the conceptual model) are a sufficient, but not vital condition for shifts in local policy frames. However, the case studies also revealed that such processes of direct policy and role structuration were followed by the lowest levels of frame enactment by the mayors in practice. This points at variations in the extent to which the mayors' expected role and role in practice are structured by newly securitized issues as further explained in the next section.

5.4 Personal alignment is a vital condition for frame enactment

The conceptual model stressed the importance of frame alignment between discourse coalitions as a crucial step towards the creation of a shared policy frame. Such a shared frame was conceived as being more likely to become institutionalize into formal policy plans, and more likely also to shape the mayors' role on paper and in practice. However, frame alignment (Snow et al., 1986) proved to be a crucial element during the policy implementation phase

as well. The case studies showed that the mayors' held a certain level of 'freedom to act' in the practice of local safety governance. The mayor's role in practice mirrored his personal frame. His actions did not immediately follow the policy frame. Mayors only enacted upon the policy frame once their personal frames were compatible with the diagnostic and prognostic message of the policy. The level of alignment between the mayor's individual frame and the policy frame explained whether a new or shifted policy frame would affect the mayor's role in practice. In other words, 'personal frame alignment' was a vital or necessary condition for complete role structuration in newly securitized issues. While role structuration proved to be possible on paper without such personal alignment, 'personal alignment' is a prerequisite if new policy frames are to affect the mayors' actions in practice as well.

5.5 Time affects the local framing process in multiple ways

Our historical analysis of the local governance processes demonstrates four striking ways in which time affected local policy. Time's first impact came from the fact that local actors needed a period to adjust their frames of the new safety problems and align them with that of key others before their new shared problem frames could be institutionalized into formal policy strategies, and before they could actually enact these new problem frames in practice. Especially when concern over new safety problems was triggered by supra local factors, or when the newly securitized issues were traditionally managed under a different policy domain, local actors needed time to embrace the new policy frames and make the new policy topic and approach their own.

Secondly, and quite literally as well, the passing of time reveals frame shifts. Historical analysis revealed that initial policy frames in all six sub cases changed (expanded) at least once or twice over our 20-year time frame. The longer security related issues were subject to local policies, the more often the policy frame shifted. This confirms the expectation that problem definitions are not static, but that they are constantly challenged and shift over time (Weiss, 1989).

Thirdly, 'timing' or 'Zeitgeist' affected what the local processes of securitization looked like. 'Bottom up' mechanisms flourished in times when the policy domain of local safety governance was not yet closely regulated or professionalized in the early 1990s. National and regional frameworks for addressing new types of safety problem were not yet widely present and their absence left room for local experiments. In contrast, the local safety policy processes taking place currently tend to be more highly professionalized, regulated and regionalized. The policy domain of local safety governance is now more frequently characterized by direct and mediated processes of policy and role structuration, with supra local policy ideas, actors and tools entering the local policy arena.

Fourthly, time matters in the sense that policy history matters. The practice of local safety governance is inevitably characterized by the policy context and history of the municipality (c.f. Pierson, 2000) and its institutions (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991 Scott, 1995). The case studies indicate that historically developed policy practices affected the extent, speed and way in

which the securitization of news issues affected local policy strategies and practices. Examples of this include the existing policy practice of organizing social care on a regional scale, the long-standing division of labor in the policy domain of local order and safety between the mayor and alderman, as well as the local tradition of participating in regional collaboration structures in order to effectively address commonly shared problems.

Part VI Conclusions

This final section of the book details the overall conclusions of the study and its theoretical and practical implications. The findings of the macro study and the multiple case studies are integrated to answer the sub-questions and central research question of the study.

Chapter 13 Conclusion

1 Introduction

This research project started by posing the central research objective: *to describe, analyze and understand how the position and role of mayors within local safety governance has been affected by shifting definitions of local public safety problems between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands*. This was followed by a literature review on the concepts of policy dynamics, problem framing and governance networks in part two of the book. Thereafter, theoretical expectations were combined into a conceptual model and the research design was presented in part three. Part four of the book presented the findings. First, the findings of the macro study on changes in the definition of local safety problems in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010 were presented. This was followed by the analysis and comparison of the six sub cases that explained how Dutch mayors addressed several new local safety problems. In this final chapter, the long-term macro study findings and in-depth case study results are combined to answer the central research question of this research project:

How have definitions of local safety problems changed and how, to what extent and why has this affected the position and role of mayors in local safety governance in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010?

In the following paragraphs, the sub questions and central research question will be answered. Next, the theoretical and practical implications of the research project are discussed.

2 Answers to sub-questions

The answers to the various sub questions were detailed in the separate chapters on the macro study and sub case studies, and are summarized in this section. This will help to integrate them so as to surface the overall conclusions of the research project. The first sub question focused on the empirical context of the research project:

1. How did the policy domain regarding local public safety evolve between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands and what has been the mayor's formal position in it?

The domain of local public safety governance is understood as the collective of policies, practices and actors that address public safety problems within the boundaries of a municipality. The domain of local policies focusing on local safety issues emerged between 1990 and 2010 in the Netherlands. The rapid expansion of safety problems since the mid-1980s, both quantitatively and qualitatively, forced Dutch governments to make choices and formulate policy ambitions regarding local safety for the first time. Choices were deemed necessary as crime rates increased and new types of safety problems came forward. This growing attention for public safety has brought along a growing

trend of issues being framed in terms of threats to local order and safety thereby calling for government action. Such a process is called securitization (Buzan et al., 1998).

The report of the Roethoff committee in 1984 was the first in a series of reports and policy programs in which policy ambitions on an expanding range of crimes and other safety issues were formulated. The committee stated that public safety was to be tackled by local governments in close collaboration with partners from the public, private and societal sectors. Consequently, the national government and the police encouraged local governments to take up a leading role in the practice of local safety governance. Local governments were expected to initiate preventative interventions regarding safety (administrative prevention - Roethof, 1994), collaborate with others (Integral Safety Report, 1993; Integral Safety Program 1999), formulate local safety policies (Pubic Safety Policy 1995-1998; Towards a Safer Society, 2002) and coordinate and direct the ambitions and activities of all partners involved. Today, governing local safety is daily business for local governments in the Netherlands. Almost all of the over 400 municipalities have a local safety policy which relies on the policy ambitions of this integrated approach.

The emergence of the policy domain of local safety governance in the Netherlands is strongly characterized by the introduction and professionalization of this integrated policy strategy. The concept of integrated safety was introduced during the early 1990s and can be best explained by its five objectives:

- combining technical and administrative interventions;
- addressing safety as an encompassing concept;
- a cross-sectorial approach;
- governing safety by 'chained'- or 'joined-up' management;
- new alliances among providers of safety.

The last objective has had a strong impact on policy practices in local safety governance in the past 25 years (Prins and Cachet, 2011). It led to the creation of various forms of alliances and networks in which government actors collaborated increasingly with actors from the public, private and societal sectors, including citizens, private companies and housing corporations. Local authorities were granted the task of coordinating policy design and implementation in close cooperation with their many partners. Overall, local government has been given an important role in governing a wide variety of local safety problems over the past two decades.

Meanwhile, Dutch mayors, who are formally responsible for local order and safety since the municipal law in 1851, obtained greater powers. The national government has introduced multiple formal powers for Dutch mayors to address specific local safety problems over the last 15 years. Examples include ordering preventive body searches for weapons, issuing temporary home restrictions in case of domestic violence, and mandating area restrictions because of the high risk of severe nuisance in public spaces. This expansion of the formal powers of the mayors mirrors the growing importance of their

responsibly for local order and safety over the past decades. In fact, this change was marked as the largest change in the formal position of mayors in local safety governance, and has been highly debated in Dutch society (Mein, 2010; Sackers 2010a/b; Bandell in van der Zwan, 2007; CCV, 2010).

The second sub question was about theoretical expectations of the ability of problem definitions to shape the position and role of government actors in governance networks:

2. What is the expected role of problem definitions during policy processes and how are they expected to affect the position and role of individual actors in a policy network?

A problem definition is more than just a simple description of an undesired situation according to many scholars of agenda-setting and policy dynamics. Problem definitions are social constructions of reality that portray one of many possible perspectives on a public problem (Dery, 1984 Schneider, 1985; Bulmer, 1971). Therefore, the adoption of a specific problem definition in public policy has far-reaching consequences for the design and implementation of policies. By presenting a specific perspective on a public problem, problem definitions make a certain selection of policy tools a well as a distribution of responsibilities more amenable while downplaying others (Cobb and Elder, 1993; Weiss, 1989; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009). In other words, the problem definition shapes how a problem is seen and addressed and by whom.

This so-called 'power of problem definitions' can be further understood through the concept of 'frames'. Frames are images of reality providing a perspective on the problem at hand, as well as on the most suitable solution (Burr, 1995). Policy problems are mediated by these frames that structure a policy program according to their diagnostic (what is going on?) and prognostic (what should be done about it?) messages (Snow and Benford, 1988). In short, definitions of public problems subject to public policy, that is "policy problems", are expected to shape several key aspects of the policy strategy, including the roles and positions of the actors involved.

The influence of problem frames on the position and role of actors in policy networks can be understood as the outcome of interaction between groups of actors in a policy network. Many scholars have argued that contemporary public problems, such as public safety issues, are characterized by a high level of complexity and wickedness (Rittel and Weber, 1973; Hoppe, 1989), which require the orchestrated action of multiple policy actors united in governance networks (Rhodes, 1996; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004). It is in such collective and more-or-less horizontal policy networks that public problems are framed, and actors take up certain roles and positions during policy processes.

A combination of the literature on agenda-setting, policy dynamics, framing and governance networks resulted in a conceptual model mapping out three interchangeable phases during which problem frames are expected to shape local policy strategies, including actors' roles. Although presented in this order, the three phases do not necessarily evolve in the 'classic' or 'rational' order of agenda setting, policy design and policy implementation.

First, once an undesired issue pops up in (local) society, its definition is debated among actors, each holding their individual perspective or frame on the issue at hand. During local policy processes, these actors strategically align in discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1993), striving for their favorable definitions and solution. Interaction between groups of actors will eventually result in a common frame embraced by key actors in the policy domain. The process through which individual frames meet and merge, resulting in the establishment of a collective frame, is called frame alignment (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986) or discourse structuration (Hajer, 1993).

Second, this shared or common frame is most likely to be formalized into local safety policy documents; this process is called discourse institutionalization (Hajer, 1993). This formal policy frame then shapes the policy strategy by stressing a specific perspective on: a policy problem and the policy approach that shapes the formal position of the policy actors characterized in terms of tasks, responsibilities and instruments.

Third, an actor's role in the policy practice takes shape during the daily implementation processes. Although the formal policy strategy is the starting point for such policy intervention, policies on paper are not necessarily line with and practice. The mayor's role in practice is therefore first of all constituted by the actions he did and did not undertake. The level of role fulfillment or frame enactment indicates the extent to which the mayor's policy actions are in line with his expected role, as specified by the formal policy frame.

In sum, the outcome of this three-staged problem framing process is a specific problem definition that structures the position and role of actors involved. This is not a fixed or static outcome, since problem frames are not a static state of mind and policy. Existing policy frames and practices are challenged by cognitive and institutional aspects located in local and supra local policy arenas at all times. As a result, frames in local policy debates, documents and practices can alter and even shift over time, which may significantly affect policy strategies and actors' roles.

Furthermore, changes in problem definitions and solutions that shape the mayor's role and position in policy and practice are shaped by more than the cognitive process of problem framing. Public problems are framed and roles and positions are created during local policy processes in local policy networks that are located in the larger context of a policy domain. Local policy networks bring along a framework for action (Sørensen and Torfing, 2007) and the larger policy context provides institutional arrangements that set the boundaries for the local processes of problem framing and role structuration (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). This expands the study's scope from the local policy arena to the institutional arrangements, such as rules, regulation and resources, of policy arenas at the regional, national and even international policy levels as well. This implies a multi-level perspective on governing local safety problems to truly understand local governance processes.

After exploring both the empirical and theoretical context of the research project, sub question three pointed out the first step of gathering and analyzing empirical data:

3. Which safety problems have been listed for local safety governance in the Netherlands and what shifts have taken place between 1990 and 2010?

The macro study explored the empirical manifestation of securitizing issues as 'threats' to the 'referent object' of local safety and order in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010 (c.f. Buzan et al., 1998). This longitudinal analysis of the definitions of local safety problems indicated that the perspective on public safety changed drastically in the Netherlands. The Dutch perspective on local safety showed a move from crime and disasters, to more and unconventional safety issues, such as small annoyances (like illegal parking) and severe problems, such as as organized crime, that used to be handled by national government actors. More specifically, the macro study showed three main shifts in the definitions of local safety problems over the past twenty years.

First, we identified a drastic expansion of the frequency of issues labelled as a local safety problem. The absolute number of references to the definitions of safety problems that should be addressed by local government grew from 4 in 1990 to 175 in 2010. This implies that the so-called *'issue presence'* of local safety problems in national policy documents expanded tremendously over the years.

Second, there was a substantive expansion in the variety of issues defined as local safety problems. The variation in 'safety categories' increased from 2 in 1990 to 33 in 2010. Classic local safety problems, labelled as 'crime' or 'disasters', were accompanied by over thirty new categories of local safety problems. Examples of new categories are public nuisance (1995), traffic (1999), social integration (2003) and organized crime (2007). This shows a process of *'issue expansion'* which implies that the national policy frame on local safety became more inclusive in the Netherlands over the past twenty years.

Third, some types of safety problems were mentioned more often than others, demonstrating a trend of *'issue dominance'*. Local safety problems categorized as nuisance, drugs, youth, violence, small annoyances, and organized crime dominated the agenda for local safety governance in the past twenty years. These categories represent a shift in local safety problems at various points in time between 1990 and 2010. Therefore, three definitions belonging to these dominant categories were selected to be studied for their implications on the role and position of mayors in local safety governance by means of detailed case studies. These were the definitions of: drug-related nuisance (early 1990s), domestic violence (around 2000) and organized crime (late 2000s). This brings us to the fourth sub-question:

4. How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes and how and to what extent and why did they affect the position and role of mayors in the practice of local safety governance?

Multiple, embedded case studies provided the answers to sub questions four and five. The following is a step-by-step presentation of the case study findings to fully answer sub question four.

First, knowledge of how new safety problems were framed in local safety governance networks was gained. The embedded case studies showed that drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime, each representing a dominant shift in the definition of local safety problems, were all framed as local safety problems in Haarlem and Breda. This affected the role and position of the mayors in local safety governance, both on paper and in practice.

Second, the case studies analyzed how these new local safety problems affected the mayor's position and role. Both the mayor's expected role in policy plans and his role in practice changed to tackle new local safety problems. Mayors were given a formal role in local policy strategies to address drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime in both cases. This *expected role* for the mayor was strongly shaped by the adoption of national powers that provided the mayors with new tools and responsibilities for these safety problems. In the majority of the sub cases, the mayors enacted these roles in practice. This implies that the mayor's role on paper as well as his *actions in practice* were shaped by the securitization of local issues. Overall, this implies that the mayor's role in practice was expanded to tackle new safety problems. More specifically, the mayor's operational and hands-on involvement in public safety problems increased, he collaborated with new types of actors and increased his involvement in supra local policy arenas as well.

Third, cases studies assessed the extent to which the mayor's role and position were affected by new local safety problems. It turned out that the mayors did not enact their expected role as described in the local policy plan each and every time. They did not enact or acted differently when their personal frames did not align with the policy frame that promoted a certain role for them. This gap indicates variation in the extent to which new definitions of public safety problems affected the mayor's role in local safety governance. Whereas his expected role was in each sub case expanded by new policy frames, his role in practice only altered once he personally acknowledged the new problem and the proposed course of action.

Fourth, the case studies explained why new local safety problems affected the position and role of the mayor. By securitizing new issues as a threat to local order and safety, sooner or later, they belonged to the policy domain of local order and safety, for which the mayor is traditionally and formally held responsible (Local Government Act, Section 172). As a result, the mayor was now directly responsible for these new safety problems, his expected role in local policy plans was expanded by the introduction of new powers, and he eventually actively addressed the new safety problems of drug-

related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime in local policy practices.

5. Which factors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the course, content and outcome of local framing processes, and the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance?
The case studies demonstrated that local safety governance was by no means a purely local and isolated policy process. They indicated that institutional arrangements provided by local, regional, national and even international policy arenas affected policy dynamics in local safety networks. This implies that local processes of problem framing and role structuration were indeed shaped by a mixture of multi-level, institutional arrangements. Given the wealth and variation in their manifestations, it would be impossible to discuss all institutional arrangements of the local, and supra local level which manifested themselves in the sub cases (please see Table 33 in Chapter 12 for an overall summary). However, it is worth noticing especially that *regulative aspects* from the *national policy arena* shaped local framing processes in all six sub cases by either introducing new policy topics or policy tools to the local policy arena. For the mayors, regulative aspects in the form of new powers created in the national arena structured their role on paper and in policy practice in Haarlem and Breda. This observation points to a reciprocal relationship between local and national government, both of which were involved with local safety governance as further explained in Section 4.2. The cross-case comparison resulted in the uncovering of three mechanisms that structured local policies and roles and were affected by a specific constellation of local and supra institutional arrangements (Chapter 12, Section 5.2 for a detailed description of these mechanisms and see Section 4.2 of this chapter for their theoretical implications).

3 Answer to the central question
The central question of the research project is: *How have definitions of local safety problems changed and how, to what extent and why has this affected the position and role of mayors in local safety governance in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010?* This question will be answered by breaking it down into its components.
How have definitions of local safety problems changed? The macros study demonstrated that definitions of local safety problems have changed tremendously during the past twenty years. An analysis of the agenda for local safety governance in the Netherlands showed three important trends between 1990 and 2010:

- *Growing issue presence* pointing to a drastic increase of the frequency of prioritizing public safety problems for local safety governance.
- *Issue expansion* indicating a substantial expansion in the variety of issues defined as local safety problems. Traditional problems of crime and disaster are now accompanied by many new definitions of local safety problems, such as sex, foreigners and football.

- *Issue dominance* some of these new definitions dominated the policy agenda. Dominant definitions belonged to the categories of nuisance; drugs; youth; violence; small annoyances; and organized crime.

Together, they characterize the expansion of the agenda for local safety governance over the past two decades. In other words, these issues best represent the local trends of securitization in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010.

How did new definitions of local safety problems affect the position and role of mayors? The formal position of Dutch mayors was strengthened by the introduction of various new powers to tackle a wide range of new safety problems. The case study analysis of the mayors' roles in handling drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime, three exemplars for the expansion of the agenda for local safety governance, showed that securitization affected the mayor's role in practice. The implementation of new formal powers forced mayors to become involved with individual, real life cases. This fostered operational activities and hands-on involvement with concrete safety problems in local society, besides their administrative and political actions in governing local order and safety. Furthermore, tackling new safety problems led to greater emphasis on the mayor's role as policy broker (Kingdon, 1984) between local and supra local policy arenas to tackle new and nontraditional safety problems. After all, the multi-level character of local safety governance implied that mayors became more dependent on multiple actors and their resources from local and supra local policy arenas for solving local safety problems (c.f. multi-level governance Bekkers and Fenger, 2007).

To what extent did new definitions of local safety problems affect the position and role of mayors? The case studies demonstrated that although the mayor's formal position was expanded by new policy frames in all cases, his role in practice only altered once he personally acknowledged the new safety problem and the proposed course of action. This gap between the mayor's expected and practical role points to a classic distinction between the policy on paper and in practice. More important, it implies variation in the extent to which shifting policy frames affected concrete actions in local safety governance explained by the level of alignment between the policy frame and the mayor's personal frame (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986). The reach of the impact of new policy frames on the mayor's formal position and expected role on paper and his behavior in practice depended on this level of '*personal alignment*'.

Why did new definitions of local safety problems affect the mayor's position and role? The combined research findings of the macro study and case studies indicate that the changing perspective on local safety problems did not remain without consequences for Dutch mayors. The conclusion that the mayors were affected by this changing perspective on public safety in the Netherlands can be explained by the institutional fact that they are responsible for local order

and safety as formally stated in the local government act of 1851. The individual core task for the mayor as an independent body of local government now covers a wide variety of new safety problems. The mayor's expected role as described in policy plans as well as his actual actions in local safety governance expanded in several ways to address new local safety problems representing dominant shifts in defining public safety between 1990 and 2010.

Taken together, these literal answers to the central research question imply that a changing perspective on local safety in the Netherlands coincided with several shifts in the mayor's position and role between 1990 and 2010. While the mayor's formal task of maintaining local order and safety remained unchanged, the agenda for local safety governance expanded substantially between 1990 and 2010. Over the years, the definitions of local safety problems were mentioned more frequently and the variation in safety problems expanded tremendously. For Dutch mayors, this implied that their task of maintaining local order and safety was stretched out over more and more issues over time. To address these new safety issues, such as domestic violence, weapons and youngsters causing nuisance, the national government formalized multiple new powers for Dutch mayors into formal laws. In-depth case analysis has shown that these general trends in the field of local safety governance, as indicated by the macro study, had several far-reaching consequences for the mayors of Haarlem and Breda.

First, the mayor's position in local safety governance changed *from a rather solitary actor to a participant in collaborative arrangements in multiple supra local policy arenas*. Over time, mayors increasingly collaborated with public, societal and sometimes private partners from supra local policy arenas, such as other mayors in the region, representatives of the regional tax offices and national ministers. These collaborative engagements were a necessary attempt to effectively pool resources, such as money, manpower and tools, to address contemporary complex safety problems. While attempting to increase their grasp on local safety and order in this way, mayors became more dependent on other actors and their resources to address new safety problems occurring in their locality. Second, in-depth case analysis demonstrated that these multi-actor and multi-level aspects of contemporary 'local' safety networks fostered the importance of the mayor's role as '*external role' as 'connecter'* over the years (Cachet et al., 2009). The Dutch case of local safety governance indeed confirmed the claim of Greasley and Stroker (2008) that local leadership in contemporary, fragmented local governance emphasizes the facilitative leadership style, which is strongly focused on bringing it all together in terms of actors, resources, goals (Steyvers et al., 2009). Third, *the expansion of the mayor's formal powers increased the mayor's operational actions* in local safety governance. Besides their traditional administrative and political activities, they were now frequently taking hands-on decisions and actions in specific cases of unsafety as well, such as issuing home restriction orders to offenders of domestic violence or closing houses where drugs were used and traded.

4 Theoretical implications

Besides an answer to the central question the research project provided multiple theoretical insights. This section presents the theoretical implications of both the macro study and the case studies.

4.1 Implications of the macro study

The macro study explored the empirical manifestation of the concept of securitization in local safety governance in the Netherlands. The s*ecuritization literature* is closely related to the body of knowledge called 'security studies' and 'international relations' and has a strong focus on supra local security dynamics (Grey, 2009). Consequently, the securitization literature points to the securitization of issues at the nation-state level and above, such as water as a source of conflict in Spain, Egypt and Sudan (Stetter, Herschinger, Teichler and Albert, 2013); the environment in South East Asia (Hameiri and Jones, 2013), climate change on global level (Mason, 2013); natural gas resources in the Middle East (Christou and Adamides, 2013); national development policies in UK (Pugh, Gabay, Alison and Williams, 2013) and labeling migration as a security threat to national societies (Karyotis, 2013) as well as to European community (Huysmans, 2000; Weaver, 1996; loader, 2002).

This research project demonstrated that the widening of the concept of security, as widely proclaimed by scholars of securitization (Buzan et al., 1998), is not exclusively limited to such a supra local governance level. The macro study indicated that a substantive widening of the safety agenda manifested itself at the most local level of public administration in the Netherlands. In other words, local manifestations of securitization proved to be present. In the case of the Netherlands, the speech act of securitization was successfully conducted as more and a greater variety of issues ended up on the local policy agenda or local safety governance. Issues belonging to the categories of nuisance; drugs; youth; violence; small annoyances; and organized crime mirror this local trend of securitization in the Netherlands as these were most often successfully securitized as threats to the referent object of local safety and order between 1990 and 2010.

After indicating the outcomes of a local variant of securitization, the follow-up question would be: where are security dynamics located and what do security dynamics look like if one drops focus on nation state? At least, that is the fundamental question behind securitization as framework for analysis (Buzan et al., 1998). The case studies, whose theoretical implications are discussed in depth below, showed that safety networks composed of public, private and societal actors from local, regional and national levels collaborated in policy networks. In terms of securitization, we found empirical manifestation of so-called 'heterogeneous complexes' integrating different types of actors interacting across sectors, instead of isolated, sector bound 'homogenous complexes' dominated by nation states (c.f. Buzan et al., 1998). This research project demonstrated that is what the security complexes look like in the case of local safety governance in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010.

4.2 Implications of case studies

The application of the conceptual model in the in-depth case analysis and cross-case comparison provided several implications for the agenda setting literature, the framing literature and the literature on state actors in governance networks. The implications for the conceptual model itself have been discussed in Chapter 12 (Paragraph 5) and here, they are related to the theoretical backgrounds on which the conceptual model was built.

Agenda setting literature

The research project appeals to the international body of knowledge regarding agenda setting. Multiple scholars argued that problem definitions are a crucial aspect of public policy since they structure public policy by making a specific selection of policy goals, instruments, and distribution of responsibilities most amenable (Weiss, 1989; Schneider and Ingram, 1993; Baumgartner and Jones, 2009; Stone 1989, 2002). On a theoretical level, the way in which a problem definition was expected to shape local policy strategies and practices was conceptualized as a process during which (f)actors located in multiple arenas shape processes of problem framing and role structuration. This model conceptualized the power of local safety problems as an interplay between cognitive and institutional aspects of the local policy network and supra local policy arenas, shaping which perspective on the problem and solution dominated the local policy process (see the answer to sub question two for a summary of the conceptual model and Paragraph five of Chapter 12 for its refinements based on the findings of the case study).

Applying this conceptual model to real life cases of local safety governance provided empirical insights into the manifestation of the power of problem definitions. More specifically, the application of the model on multiple case studies resulted in the identification of three mechanisms: '*top down*', '*mediated*' and '*bottom up*' policy and role structuration. These three mechanisms explain how a specific mixture of local and supra local arrangements affected the policy practice of local safety governance. First, direct policy and role structuration is the purest form of supra local policy ideas that directly institutionalize local policy strategies. National and/or regional policy frames were directly adopted into local policy documents and shaped local policy strategies including the mayor's expected role to a large extent. Second, mediated policy and role structuration refers to processes during which supra local policy ideas aligned with local discourse coalitions, thereby creating a shared policy frame. International, national and regional policy ideas were mediated by local policy debates before (partially) institutionalizing into local policy strategies. The local policy debate created a 'filter' through which supra local policy ideas are processed into suitable policy strategies for local governance. Third, bottom up policy- and role structuration during which local innovations created by the mayor and his partners became guiding examples for others located at supra local policy arenas. Locally triggered frame shifts led to local pioneering with a spin-off at the supra local policy arenas. It is through these three mechanisms that one can understand how a specific problem definition made way for specific strategies,

tools, actors and practices over others during operational policy processes in local public safety governance in the Netherlands.

Furthermore, the historical perspective of the case studies demonstrated that time is an important factor for the manifestation of these mechanisms. It took some time before local actors embraced new safety frames and made them their own, as well as implemented them in practice. Once this happened, the longer a new securitized issue was subjected to local safety governance, the higher the chances the initial frame was reframed. Moreover, the exact manifestation of the mechanisms for policy and role structuration depended on the 'Zeitgeist' as it was shaped by the constellation of current institutional arrangements in multiple interlinked policy arenas. Bottom-up mechanisms flourished during the early 1990s, when the policy domain of local safety governance was not yet well-regulated or professionalized. Thereafter, direct and mediated processes of policy and role structuration took place more frequently as multi-level governance structures emerged in the policy domain of local safety governance over the years. Furthermore, historically grown policy practices affected the speed and extent of local securitization processes as well, which points to the importance of path dependency in the functioning of these mechanisms.

Framing literature

The power of problem definitions was understood by looking at the image a problem definition put forward. This image was conceptualized as a frame. As argued in the framing literature, a frame gives direction to a problem definition in the sense that it puts forward a certain perspective of the problem and the most suitable solution (Bur, 1993). The research project, more specifically the conceptual model, was partially built upon framing literature. Applying the conceptual model on the aspects of the mayor's role in handling newly securitized issues refined our expectations on the links between shared policy frames and the behavior of individual policy actors in collective policy settings, at least in the field of public safety governance on municipal level in the Netherlands.

The case studies showed that *personal frame alignment* with the policy frame is a necessary condition for affecting an actor's role in collective policy practices. Problem frames indeed structured actors' roles, but the sub cases differed in the extent to which behavior in practice was actually affected. While the new policy frames always structured the mayor' expected roles as described in the policy program, an extra step proved necessary for the mayor to enact this policy frame and thus actually alter his behavior. Only when his personal frame aligned with both the diagnostic and prognostic message of the commonly shared policy frame would the mayor's actions in practice be affected by the new policy frames. The case studies proved that it is much easier to affect an actor's formal and expected role in local policy plans than change the individual actions of policy actors in practice. For the specific case of Dutch mayors in local safety governance, this implied that these policy actors were not simply subjected to the courses of action that new policy frames put forward. They were independent and critical actors, deciding

whether or not to embrace the new and expanded policy frames in their daily actions.

Whereas personal alignment is a vital condition for policy frames to affect an actor's behavior, in practice, *frame alignment between discourse* coalitions proved to be a sufficient condition for policy and role structuration by new policy frames. In contrast to the expectation of the conceptual model that local actors needed to somehow align their frames to 'customize' new problem frames before subjecting them to local polices and practice (c.f. Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford, 1986; Hajer, 1993), case studies showed some frame processes lacking such a policy debate while altering the mayor's expected role as described by an new policy frame. The case studies demonstrated that policy frames can shift without policy debates. This implies that supra local policy frames may directly institutionalize into local policy strategies and structure the expected roles of local policy actors. Whether or not these expected roles were enacted in practice still depended on the level of personal alignment.

State actors in networked safety governance
A key question frequently raised in both the literature on fragmented governance (Peters and Pierre,1998; Rhodes, 1996) and the pluralization of policing (Dupont, 2004; Crawford and Lister, 2005) is whether state actors in horizontal, networked forms of governance hold extraordinary positions or became one of many in multi-actor governance arrangements. This project provides useful insights into the specific case of Dutch mayors as the foremost representative of local government in integral safety networks.

The case studies have shown that the increasingly fragmented character of public safety governance has affected Dutch mayors in multiple ways. Dutch mayors changed from individual actors closely collaborating with police and public prosecutor as their traditional partners to participants in multi-actor and multi-level alliances called 'integrated safety networks'. This implied that the mayor's dependency on actors from the public, private and societal sectors increased. Taking care of local safety problems forced the mayor to function as a 'policy broker' (Kingdon, 1984) between local and supra local actors, resources and tools. However, Dutch mayors in local safety networks were clearly not just one of many actors. Although their dependency on others actors increased, they distinguished themselves from their partners by coordinating local safety policies and governance¨ Although attempts to formalize this task in law failed, this task is generally recognized as one for local government in general and the mayor specifically by professionals and scholars in the field of public safety governance. Another aspect that separates mayors from their partners are their powers for addressing specific local safety problems. National governments granted Dutch mayors more policy instruments to handle specific safety problems, thereby separating the mayor from other actors in the policy network as a powerful player. The case studies indicated that the expansion of these powers enforced their formal position and enhanced their hands-on involvement in local policy practice.

5 Implications for practice

The practice of local safety governance in the Netherlands is characterized by several stakeholders expressing their wishes and worries regarding the changing role of the Dutch mayor and the expansion of the mayor's powers. The findings provide multiple implications for the practice of local governance of public safety problems as thematically discussed in this section.

The implications of local processes of securitization
The macro study indicated an increasing trend of securitizing a wide variety of issues as local safety problems. It was concluded that safety issues belonging to the categories of nuisance; drugs; youth; violence; small annoyances; and organized crime represented the encompassing perspective on public safety, as promoted by the integrated approach to public safety emerging between 1990 and 2010.

The case studies demonstrated that specific new safety problems selected from the macro study were indeed subjected to policy strategies and affected the behavior of policy actors in practice. In other words, this research project demonstrated that framing local issues in terms of safety problems had consequences for both government and citizen. Successfully labeling issues as safety problems gave them a specific prominence and a sense of urgency – 'safety first!' – and activated actors and justified policy instruments from the policy domain of local order and safety. In terms of government responses, this implies the activation and legitimization of the actors, which in the case of local governance, were the mayor, police and public prosecutor as the local providers of safety and order. For citizens of municipalities, this implied that these providers of public safety were allowed to take sometimes far-reaching measures to address anything that was considered a threat to local order and safety. The securitization of local issues thus called for extraordinary measures with far-reaching consequences including surveillance cameras, preventative body searches, area restrictions and home restrictions, being part of the new powers of Dutch mayors. Many policy measures allowed local providers of public safety to intervene into the public living space of citizens and even their private homes. It was because of these far reaching implications of the speech act of securitization that the Copenhagen School considered securitization to be a failure of dealing with public issues by normal political means. They were worried about presenting security as a 'good and desired thing to which all reaction should move' and were in favor of 'desecuritizing' public issues whenever possible (Buzan et al., 2008).

New powers created by central government matter in local policy practices
Existing knowledge on Dutch mayors focuses strongly on the institutional characteristics of the mayor's position in local (safety) governance, and scholars have only roughly sketched the empirical implications for mayors and other actors involved (Muller, Rogier, Kummeling, Dammen, Bron, Woltjer and. Kalkhoven, 2007; Sackers 2010a; Mein, 2010). This research project showed how shifts in the institutional, formal characteristics of local leadership in the form of Dutch mayors altered their role in policy and

practice. This effect was most clearly visible in the expansion of the mayors' powers to maintain local order and safety that can be characterized as the largest shift in their formal position in the past decades. The case studies showed that these powers were adopted into local policies, thereby expanding the mayor's expected role in local safety governance. Moreover, the case studies indicated as well that these powers were regularly implemented in practice, thereby affecting the mayor's daily actions as well. The fact that local authorities adopted these new powers introduced by central government implies that national policy instruments, whether initiated by mayors or national ministers, mattered in local safety networks. The local implementation of supra local policy tools contrasts with the fears that central government would provide instruments which made no sense, would not work, and were not desired in the local arena (c.f. Prins et al., 2013) and that mayors would become 'puppets' of national government. Rather, this points to a reciprocal relationship between national and local governments in which the former aims to facilitate and the latter critically decides whether or not to go along. National governments facilitated local authorities by creating formal powers for each and every Dutch Mayor.

However, these national policy tools only made their way down to local policy practices once local actors – including the mayor – recognized the problem they attempt to address as a pressing issue in local society and the new power as the most desirable solution. Moreover, this process evolved in a rather ad hoc fashion. Once local authorities were confronted with a specific problem, they took the power from the shelves (c.f. garbage can, Cohen, March, Olson, 1972). A power which indeed was lying on the local shelf as local authorities formally adopted new powers into their local policy approach, although they were not immediately implemented in practice as there was no personal alignment or local recognition of the problem.

Dutch mayors as local sheriffs?

As the mayor's task of ensuring local order and safety became more prominent during the past twenty years, mayors, administrators and scholars expressed their wishes and worries regarding the matter. Mayors, policy makers and scholars feared that the expansion of the mayor's formal powers would make contemporary Dutch mayors 'local sheriffs' that were tough on crime and any other threat to local order and safety. Their prominent position in the policy domain of local order and safety would overshadow their successful fulfillment of their 'softer roles' of shepherds and symbols of the local community. This research project demonstrated that safety indeed manifested itself as a major topic in the daily operations of mayors of large municipalities and that they took far-reaching decisions to intervene in people's lives, such as issuing home restrictions in case of domestic violence and closing houses in case of drugs-related nuisances. However, they did not become solo actors 'firing with big guns at everything they do not like'. Today, their expanded powers and activities in the policy domain of local safety are, in practice, counterbalanced by new dependencies and supra local influences in local safety networks (c.f. paradox Korsten, 2009a/b). In fact, the mutual resource dependency and multi-level aspect of contemporary public safety governance

calls for a local leadership style as connector, broker and facilitator, instead of more authoritative, directive leadership (Greasly and Stroker, 2008; Steyvers et al., 2008) .

6 Reflections

Now the central question has been answered, conclusions have been drawn and their theoretical and practical implications discussed, this paragraph offers some thoughts on the topic of local safety governance and the research design that do not easily fit the overall conclusions.

6.1 Research object of local safety governance

The policy domain of local safety governance is constantly changing, professionalizing and expanding. Politicians, administrator and citizens prioritize new safety problems every day. These days, cybercrime and pedophiles retuning to local society after finishing their prison sentence are deemed important safety problems in local society. Furthermore, new policy tools, partnerships and organizational structures continue to be introduced. Consider the recent substitution of the regional police force by a national police organization in the Netherlands , for example. This dynamic character of the research object of public safety governance implies that the case study findings provide 'snapshots' of local governance processes regarding new safety problems. Nevertheless, their historical perspective and selection criteria of the case study design made sure these were representative snapshots of governance processes regarding new and dominant definitions of local safety problems (sub cases) in medium to large municipalities (cases) at crucial moments in time between 1990 and 2010.

Furthermore, this research project implicitly pointed out several practical and moral dilemmas in local safety governance. From a practical perspective, the empirical trend of the local processes of securitization as indicated by the macro study may eventually reach the boundaries of the governing capacity of the local providers of public safety. Including more and more issues in the policy domain of local order and safety may lead to overloading the mayor, police, public prosecutor and their partners, who together only posses a scarce amount of time, money and policy tools. From a psychosocial perspective, this may also downplay the sense of urgency that comes along with labeling something as a threat to local order and safety. After all, if almost everything is a threat to local safety and order requiring extraordinary and immediate intervention by providers of local policing, the exclusiveness of this policy domain breaks down and the 'red button effect' of escalating public issues into matters of public safety fades away. From a normative perspective, framing a local issue as a safety problem – securitization – is a powerful act which raises high expectations. After all, it appeals to the most fundamental task of government that is to provide 'securitas' or public safety. Securitization is thus about promising safety, which might also be qualified as an everlasting or even false promise. Since 100% safety does not exist, labeling an issue in terms of safety may be a tactical act of ultimate (self) legitimization. More neutrally expressed, this

points to the strategic component of labeling a public problem in terms of safety, calling for safety actors to implement their safety powers and tools.

Finally, this research project encountered a potential democratic deficit in 'local' safety governance by focusing on the multi level aspects of safety networks. This multi level context in which contemporary mayors operate fosters questions about democratic accountability. The case studies demonstrated how mayors became increasingly engaged in supra local policy initiatives to effectively address local safety problems. At the same time, they are held responsible by their local city council. Such traditional checks and balances of power and accountability may become less effective due to an upward shift in the mayor's activities by participating in supra local policy arenas to increase local governance capacity (c.f. Kersbergen and Van Waarden, 2004). This could result in a blurring of the distinction between governance arenas, raising the question of how the mayor's individual accountability in multi-actor and multi-level collaboration networks should be managed (c.f. Friedrichson, 2005; Cachet and Prins, 2009). Are local councils able to effectively monitor and judge the mayor's supra local actions? Is the local arena still the most suitable place for the mayor to justify his actions? These questions become even more prominent in the light of the far-reaching powers applied to securitized issues by Dutch mayors in contemporary safety governance. The increasing multi level and multi-actor aspects of local safety governance in the integrated networks in which Dutch mayors operate should be subjected to further empirical research and scrutinized for such potential democratic deficits.

6.2 Research design

This research project was built on a twofold research design combining historical desk research with multiple, embedded case studies. Designing this as well as any other research project implicates making choices which enable and limit at the same time. The macro study proved to be a necessary and useful first step to indicate shifts in defining local safety problems, of which some could be selected for in-depth case studies. These case studies proved to be a suitable research strategy to analyze how and why new definitions of local safety problems affected the mayor's position and role in local governance networks. They allowed an in-depth analysis of the composition of discourse coalitions, the institutionalization of policy frames, and the level of frame enactment by the mayors. Moreover, the case studies showed the local and supra local contextual arrangements in which these processes of problem and role structuration were embedded. Nevertheless, the multiple, embedded case study design had some limitations as well.

A multiple case study design of two cases and six sub cases allowed us to compare results to build compelling conclusions. However, the initial research design consisted of a 3 x 3 case study design; three cases each consisting of three sub cases. As the research project was carried out between 2010 and 2013, the third case was dropped. This decision was made in favor of providing more room for in-depth analysis of the first two cases, but at the cost of more generic research findings, was motivated by three reasons. Firstly, a

case study is a time-consuming activity especially when it requires historical analysis over twenty years. Moreover, case studies were preceded by a large time spent on desk research, which took up time and space in this research project as well. Secondly, the number of cases was decreased to invest in the quality of the analysis of the six sub cases. Studying the processes of framing and social construction required in-depth analysis and thick description. Only by limiting the research scope from nine to six sub cases would the research objective of understanding the course and outcome of local framing processes be met. Thirdly, the alternative option of more case studies would only allow a more generic approach to the case studies which most likely would not result in the desired level of thoroughness of the case studies as referred to in the previous argument.

Furthermore, the historical aspect of the case studies brought along some limitations in terms of both validity and practicalities. The further the case analysis went back in time, the more limited the possibilities there were for gathering data by means of interviewing. This was because the mayors and other actors involved were no longer working in their roles, untraceable, or uninterested in the topic of interest. This implies a lack of accessibility of informants and documents, which were the main data sources for the more historical sub cases. For more recent sub cases, however, the triangulation of data sources was possible by combining interviews and documents as complementary data. Nevertheless, the historical aspect of long-term case study analysis affected the validity of the case study findings. The further back in history the manifestation of the public safety problems to be studied lay, the more challenging it was to gather enough data to provide reliable insights. Vice versa, the more recent the governance network studied, the more valid the case study results are.

Finally, the possibility of analytical generalization of research findings of a small number of exploratory case studies remains rather limited. The refinements of the conceptual model and related implications for theory must at this point be qualified as suggestions to be subjected to large-scale empirical testing.

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Appendix A: List of documents macro study

Explanatory memoranda of the annual budget of the Ministry of Justice 1990-2010

- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1989-1990, 21 300 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1990]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1990-1991, 21 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1991]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1991-1992, 22 300 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1992]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1992-1993, 22 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1993]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1993-1994, 23 400 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1994]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1994-1995, 23 900 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1995]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1995-1996, 24 400 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1996]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996-1997, 25 000 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1997]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1997-1998, 25 600 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1998]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1998–1999, 26 200 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 1999]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2000]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27 400 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2001]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 28 000 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2002]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 28 600 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2003]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29 200 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2004]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 29 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2005]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 30 300 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2006]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 30 800 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2007]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 31 200 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2008]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008-2009, 31 700 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2 [time period: 2009]

- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2009-2010, 32 123 hoofdstuk VI, nr. 2
  [time period: 2010]

Explanatory memoranda of the annual budget of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 1990-2010

- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1989-1990, 21 300 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1990]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1990-1991, 21 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1991]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1991-1992, 22 300 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1992]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1992-1993, 22 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1993]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1993-1994, 23400 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1994]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1994-1995, 23 900 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1995]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1995-1996, 24 400 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1996]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1996-1997, 25 000 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1997]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1997-1998, 25 600 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1998]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1998-1999, 26 200 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 1999]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1999-2000, 26 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2000]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2000-2001, 27 400 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2001]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2001-2002, 28 000 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2002]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2002-2003, 28 600 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2003]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, 29 200 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2004]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2004-2005, 29 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2005]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, 30 300 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2006]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, 30 800 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2007]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, 31 200 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2008]
- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2008-2009, 31 700 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2
  [time period: 2009]

- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2009-2010, 32 123 hoofdstuk VII, nr. 2 [time period: 2010]

National policy documents regarding public safety between 1990-2010

- Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 1992-1993, 23096, *Integrale veiligheidsrapportage 1993*. [time period:1993]
- Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken (1995) *Nota Veiligheidsbeleid 1995-1998, Veiligheid door Samenwerking.* [time period: 1995-1998]
- Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (1999) *Integraal Veiligheidsprogramma*. [time period:1999-2002]
- Ministerie van Justitie, Ministerie van Justitie en Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2002) *Naar een Veiliger Samenleving.* [time period: 2002-2007]
- Ministerie van Justitie, Directoraat-Generaal Rechtspleging en Rechtshandhaving, (2007) *Veiligheid begint bij voorkomen.* Brief aan voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal. 5513871/07/VbbV/6 november [time period: 2007-2010]

Appendix B: Macro study protocol

This document provides the approach for data collection and analysis of the macro study. This way, all relevant data is gathered according to the same criteria and each document is analysis in a likewise manner. The next sections summarize the main characteristics of the macro study, the protocols for data collection and -analysis and an detailed coding scheme for content analysis is provided.

Main characteristics of the macro study

Macro study objective	To indicate shifts in definitions of local safety problems in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2010 by means of historical desk research
Macro study question	Which problems have been listed for local safety governance in the Netherlands and what shifts have taken place between 1990-2010? (sub question three).
Research strategy	Historical desk research
Unit of analysis	Agenda for local public safety governance in the Netherlands between 1990-2010.
Units of observation	Definitions of safety problems to be addressed by local, municipal authorities

Data collection procedures

Type of data: existing material in the form of policy documents
Criteria for data selection:

- Policy documents providing information on safety problems to be addressed by local authorities at the local, municipal level
- Policy documents setting the agenda for local governance in each municipality in the Netherlands.
- Policy documents covering the entire research period of 1990-2010

Data sources:

- Explanatory memoranda of the budgets the budgets of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Justice's 1990-2010 (appear annually)
- Explanatory memoranda of the budgets the budgets of the Ministry of Justice's 1990-2010 (appear annually)
- National safety policies provided of requested by the ruling coalition between 1990 and *2010 (appear every four years, or more often in case a coalition doesn't make it's term)*

Data analysis procedures

Overall method of analysis: content analysis by means of techniques of coding, clustering and counting.

Phase 1: coding individual documents
Reading the content of each document in order to sort out relevant data for the search project according to the following steps:
- Select chapters covering public safety
- Select relevant sections referring to safety governance at local level and assig general code LSP (Local Safey Prolicy)
- Double check by means of digital search using key words: veilig, veiligheid, orde, openbare orde, lokaal lokale, burgemeester, gemeente, lokaal bestuur, ..

Phase 2: clustering and counting
Analyzing each relevant section in order to indicate definitions of local safety problems by means of clustering by means of the following steps:
- Select issues mentioned as a safety problem to be addressed by local authorities
- Assign this problem definition a categorical code named after the overall theme of the section

Indicate shifts in defining local safety problems by means of counting according to the following steps:
- Count the total number of references to all categories per year
- Count number of references to each individual category per year
- Calculate the average number of reference that each category would have received in a single year when all categories would have received the same amount of attention.
- A category qualifies as a dominant in a single year if it received more than the average amount of references in that year
- A category qualifies as overall dominant if it was dominant in over 50 % of the years since the first time a category was mentioned

Phase 3: second round of analysis & reliability check
The macro study findings are to be checked, refined and validated by means of two additional steps:
- Repeating phase one and two by first coder
- Check for randomly selected documents by second coder

Coding scheme

Code	Explanation
LSG	- General code standing for 'Local Safety Governance' - Attach to text parts describe aspects of local safety governance
PD	- Categorical code standing for 'Problem Definition' - Attach to description of issues prioritized for local safety governance

Appendix C: Case selection

Municipality	Year	Number of inhabitants (CBS)	Potential case based on number of inhabitants?	Turnover mayors	Accessible for research?
Almere	1990	71,086	No		
Almere	2010	188,160			
Amersfoort	1990	99,403	No		
Amersfoort	2010	144,862			
Amsterdam	1990	695,162	No		
Amsterdam	2010	767,457			
Apeldoorn	1990	147,586	Yes	Medium	
Apeldoorn	2010	155,726			
Arnhem	1990	130,220	Yes	Low	No
Arnhem	2010	147,018			
Breda	1990	123,025	Yes	Low	Yes
Breda	2010	173,299			
Dordrecht	1990	109,285	Yes	Low	No
Dordrecht	2010	118,480			
Ede	1990	93,377	No		
Ede	2010	107,756			
Eindhoven	1990	191,467	Yes	Medium	
Eindhoven	2010	213,809			
Emmen	1990	92,807	No		
Emmen	2010	109,491			
Enschede	1990	146,010	Yes	Low	No
Enschede	2010	157,052			
's-Gravenhage	1990	441,506	No		
's-Gravenhage	2010	488,553			
Groningen	1990	167,872	Yes	Medium	
Groningen	2010	187,298			
Haarlem	1990	149,269	Yes	Low	High
Haarlem	2010	149,579			
Haarlemmermeer	1990	95,782	No		
Haarlemmermeer	2010	142,788			
's-Hertogenbosch	1990	91,113	No		
's-Hertogenbosch	2010	139,607			
Leiden	1990	110,423	Yes	Medium	
Leiden	2010	117,123			
Maastricht	1990	117,008	Yes	Medium	
Maastricht	2010	118,533			
Nijmegen	1990	144,748	Yes	Low	No
Nijmegen	2010	162,963			
Rotterdam	1990	579,179	No		
Rotterdam	2010	593,049			
Tilburg	1990	156,421	Yes	High	
Tilburg	2010	204,853			

Utrecht	1990	230,358	No		
Utrecht	2010	307,081			
Venlo	1990	63,918	No		
Venlo	2010	100,301			
Zaanstad	1990	130,007	Yes	High	
Zaanstad	2010	145,332			
Zoetermeer	1990	96,292	No		
Zoetermeer	2010	121,532			
Zwolle	1990	94,131	No		
Zwolle	2010	119,030			

Appendix D: List of respondents and documents case studies

CASE HAARLEM

Respondents
- Civil servant 1 − Department of Safety and Order − Interview 4 April 2012
- Civil servant 2 − Department of Safety and Order − Interview 4 April 2012
- Civil servant 3 − Department of Safety and Order - Interview 27 June 2012
- Civil servant 4 − Head of Department of Safety and Order − Interview 25 July 2012
- Civil servant 5 − Department of Safety and Order − Interview 23 July 2012
- Civil servant 6 − Policy advisor on welfare and health issues – Interviews on 4 April and 21 Augustus 2012
- Civil servant 7 − Manager safety and youth between − Interview 2 October 2012
- Civil servant 8 − Manager RIEC − Interview 27 June 2012
- Employee housing corporation − Interview 18 July 2012
- Employee public health service − Interview July 2012
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- Police chief 2 − Interview24 September 2012
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Respondents
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- Civil servant 1 – Department of Local Order and Safety – Interview 30 August 2012
- Civil servant 2 – Head Administrative and Juridical Affairs / Head Cabinet of the Mayor – Interview 29 March 2013
- Civil Servant 3 – juridical advisor and coordinator of safety policies – Interview 1 March 2013
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- Employee Tax Collectors Office – Interview 17 Augustus 2013
- Head Advise and Report Point Child Abuse – Interview 12 March 2013
- Head Advise and Support Point Domestic Violence – Interview 3 April 2013
- Head of Social Work Organization – Interview 12 April 2013
- Head RIEC – Interview 16 May 2013
- Civil servant 6 – Interview 31 August 2012
- Mayor D – Interview 29 April 2013
- Mayor E – Interview 7 June 2013
- Mayor F – Interview 29 May 2013
- Police officer 1 – Interview 14 March 2013
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Appendix E: Case study protocol

This case study protocol was created to ensure all cases and sub cases are studied in a similar and structured manner. The case study protocol is based on the conceptual model which is operationalized and translated into a coding scheme for analyzing interview transcripts and documents. This way, theoretical framework provides "a standard agenda for the investigators line of inquiry" (Yin, 2009:80) which later on enables analytical generalization of case study results.

Main characteristics of the case studies

Case study objective	To analyze and understand how *and* why new definitions of local safety problems affect the mayor's role and position for the mayor in local governance networks.
Case study questions	-How have new local safety problems been framed in local policy processes and how, to what extent and why did they affect the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance? (sub question four) -Which factors of the local, regional and national policy arena affected the course, content and outcome of local framing processes as well as the mayor's position and role in the practice of local safety governance? (sub question five)
Research strategy	Multiple, embedded case studies – two cases each composed of three sub cases
Data sources	Various types of documents and interview transcripts
Unit of analysis	Local governance networks addressing public safety problems
Units of observation	Definitions of public safety problems and the mayor's position and role in governance networks

Data collection procedure for documents

Documents to be collected have to either address public safety in general or the sub case of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and organized crime qualified as a local safety issue.

Criteria for document selection

Relevant documents provide information about:
- the course of the local policy debate regarding the sub cases of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and/or organized crime between 1900 and 2010
- local policy ambitions regarding the sub cases of drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and/or organized crime between 1900 and 2010
- the practice of local safety governance between 1990 and 2010
- the mayor's actions in local safety governance between 1990 and 2010

Data set
This leads to the following set of documents together providing information about the key aspects of the conceptual model.

Topic of interest according	Type of document
Local policy debate: discourse coalitions, frames, frame alignment	- Transcripts of council and committee meetings regarding sub cases
Local policy strategy: policy frame and expected role mayor	- Local policy programs - Specific policy programs regarding the sub cases
Policy in practice: actors involved and actions of mayor	- Evaluations of policy programs - Internal correspondence - Policy documents and evaluation from collaborating partners, such as the police and public prosecutor
Supra local policy ambitions and practices: supra local institutional arrangements	- Regional, national and international policy programs and evaluations

Data collection procedure for interviews

Criteria for selecting respondents:
A representative from each partner in the governance network addressing a sub case at a particular point in time.
- Personal involvement with governing related nuisance, domestic violence and/or organized crime between 1900 and 2010
- Personal collaboration with the mayor or well informed about the mayor's actions while governing drug-related nuisance, domestic violence and/or organized crime between 1900 and 2010
- The following actors are to be selected as respondents:
  - Inside municipality: mayors, civil servants advising the mayor on public safety matters, council members, as well as civil servants from the public safety department of the municipal apparatus designing and/or implementing public safety policy.
  - Outside municipality: actors working closely with the mayor in addressing the dominant definition of public safety problems, such as the local police chief, the public prosecutor and actors representing various social organizations.

Topic list interviews
Introduction
- General explanation research project & interview
- Permission to tape interview
Respondent's involvement and role regarding sub case
- Function
- Time and place of involvement

Respondent's perspective on sub case (problem definition)
- Causes and characteristics of safety problem
- Suitable and favourable solutions

Respondent's experience / knowledge of governance practices
- Policy debate and coalitions
- Policy strategy and partners
- Examples, stories about policy in practice

Description of mayor's role in practice
- Mayor's involvement with policy and problem
- Examples of mayor's actions in practice
- Respondents perspective on how an which mayor takes this role

Wrap up

Data analysis procedures – documents

Overall method of analysis: content analysis of documents and interview transcripts followed by within and cross case comparison.

Step 1: sub case analysis
Data of each sub case was analyzed by means of the following coding scheme.

Code	Concept	Description
PD	Problem Definition	Description of issues considered as a threat to / risk for local order and safety
DC	Discourse coalition	Group of actors with compatible frames (both in terms of content and strategic collaboration)
IF–DM	Individual Frame – Diagnostic Message	Perspective on cause and characteristics of local safety problem held by individual actor
IFéPM	Individual Frame – Prognostic message	Perspective on preferable solution to local safety problem held by individual actor
PF–DM	Policy frame – Diagnostic Message	Perspective on cause and characteristics of local safety problem held as stated in public policies
PF–PM	Policy frame – Prognostic message	Perspective solution for local safety problem held as stated in public policies
LPS	Policy strategy	Formal, local policy strategy describing policy object, solutions and solutors regarding safety in general or specifically design for addressing a drug-related nuisance, domestic violence or organized crime.
ERM	Expected role – mayor	The mayor's expected behavior in policy arena and regarding safety problem characterized by task and powers attributed to him in local policy strategy
RIP–M	Role in practice – mayor	The mayor actions and non actions regarding local safety problem in policy practice

LPA	Local policy arena	Institutional arrangements of local governance network regarding drug-related nuisance, documents violence and organized crime
LPA − R *LPA −C* *LPA −N*		Regulative aspects Cognitive aspects Normative aspects
RPA	Regional policy arena	Institutional arrangements of regional governance network regarding drug-related nuisance, documents violence and organized crime
RPA –R *NPA –C* *NPA –N*		Regulative aspects Cognitive aspects Normative aspects
NPA	National policy arena	Institutional arrangements of national governance network regarding drug-related nuisance, documents violence and organized crime
NPA − R *NPA −C* *NPA −N*		Regulative aspects Cognitive aspects Normative aspects

Step 2: within case analysis
Sub case findings were compared on key concepts of conceptual model within each case

	Local Framing Process				The mayor's role on paper and in practice		Institutional arrangements		
	Trigger	*Discourse coalitions*	*Frame alignment*	*Discourse institutiona-lization into local policy frame*	*Expected role mayor*	*Mayor's role in practice - Level of alignment*	*Local arena*	*Regional arena*	*National arena*
Sub case 1									
Sub case 2									
Sub case 3									
Similarities & differences									

Step 3 cross case analysis
Case study results were compared in order to generate overall research findings.

	Municipality Haarlem			Municipality Breda		
	How new safety problems were framed in local policy processes (sub question 4-first part)	*How new definitions affect the mayor's position and role on paper and in practice (sub question 4-second part)*	*How institutional arrangements affected local policy processes and mayor's position and role (sub question5)*	*How new safety problems were framed in local policy processes (sub question 4-first part)*	*How new definitions affect the mayor's position and role on paper and in practice (sub question 4-second part)*	*How institutional arrangements affected local policy processes and mayor's position and role (sub question5)*
Sub case drug-related nuisance						
Sub case domestic violence						
Sub case organized crime						
Similarities and differences						

All schemes for generating and comparing case study results are based on key concept of conceptual model. This way, the conceptual model is confronted with empirical data which enables answering sub question four and five as well as refinement of the model.

Samenvatting (Summary - in Dutch)

Inleiding

Sinds de eerste gemeentewet uit 1851 zijn Nederlandse burgemeesters verantwoordelijk voor de lokale orde. Bewaken van de openbare orde is een kerntaak van de burgemeester als zelfstandig orgaan binnen het lokale bestuur. Dat geldt eveneens voor het vertegenwoordigen van de lokale gemeenschap en het borgen van de kwaliteit van het lokale bestuur. Daarnaast deelt de burgemeester verschillende taken en bevoegdheden met de gemeenteraad en het college van burgemeester en wethouders, die eveneens zelfstandige bestuursorganen op het lokale bestuursniveau zijn.

In Nederland is de aandacht voor openbare orde en veiligheid de afgelopen 25 jaar enorm toegenomen. Op gemeentelijk bestuursniveau ontstond een volwaardig en omvangrijk beleidsterrein rond openbare orde en veiligheid. Volwaardig, omdat er veel beleidsprogramma's en (integrale) samenwerkingsstrategieën zijn ontwikkeld om lokale veiligheidsproblemen aan te pakken door het gemeentebestuur in samenwerking met lokale, regionale en landelijke partners uit de publieke en private sector. Omvangrijk, omdat een breed scala aan issues de afgelopen decennia onder de noemer veiligheid is gebracht. Daarmee is het begrip openbare orde in de loop der tijd opgerekt en wordt het in een adem genoemd met veiligheid en soms zelfs met leefbaarheid. Een snelle blik op recente veiligheidsplannen leert dat zowel staatverlichting, graffiti, evenementen, brandveiligheid en radicalisering, als georganiseerde misdaad tot het beleidsdomein van lokale orde en veiligheid zijn gaan behoren. Deze brede kijk op lokale veiligheidsproblemen is onlosmakelijk verbonden met het veranderende perspectief op veiligheid en risico in de (post)moderne samenleving.

Voor de burgemeester betekende dit dat zijn eigenstandige verantwoordelijkheid voor lokale orde en veiligheid inmiddels een breed palet aan zogenoemde veiligheidsproblemen beslaat. Bovendien is zijn instrumentarium ter handhaving van de openbare orde en veiligheid flink uitgebreid. Gedurende de afgelopen 15 jaar heeft de wetgever verschillende nieuwe ´burgemeestersbevoegdheden´ gecreëerd, waaronder de mogelijkheid tot aanwijzen van veiligheidsrisicogebieden voor preventief fouilleren (gemeentewet 151b), het instellen van een tijdelijk huisverbod inzake huiselijk geweld (Wet Tijdelijk Huisverbod), alsook een meldingsplicht en avondklok om zware overlast en dreiging daarvan te adresseren (Wet Bestrijding Voetbalvandalisme en Zware Overlast).

Probleemstelling

Vanuit bestuurskundig perspectief is de veranderende definiëring van veiligheidsproblemen interessant. Wetenschappelijke literatuur over agendavorming en beleidsdynamiek leert ons dat de manier waarop burgers, beleidsmakers en politici een publiek probleem definiëren, gevolgen heeft voor de wijze waarop het probleem wordt aangepakt en wiens verantwoordelijkheid dat is. Een probleemdefinitie maakt specifieke

beleidsinstrumenten en beleidsactoren aannemelijker dan andere oplossingsrichtingen. Een eenvoudig voorbeeld kan deze kracht van probleemdefinities duidelijk maken. Wanneer u op een verlaten bankje in een park een man aantreft die een naald in zijn arm prikt, dan kunt u deze persoon definiëren als een verwarde drugsverslaafde met gevaar voor uw veiligheid, maar evengoed als iemand met een medische aandoening, namelijk suikerziekte. In het eerste geval zou u de politie kunnen bellen terwijl u in het tweede geval doorloopt in de veronderstelling dat deze man onder behandeling staat van een gediplomeerd arts. Dit voorbeeld toont dat dezelfde situatie op uiteenlopende wijze gedefinieerd kan worden en dat de gekozen probleemdefinitie implicaties heeft voor de manier waarop we een situatie adresseren en wie we daarvoor verantwoordelijk achten.

Deze kracht van de probleemdefinities maakt ze tot een fundamenteel onderdeel van agenda- en beleidsvorming evenals subject van strijd en strategisch gedrag in de politieke- en beleidsarena. Vanuit bestuurskundig perspectief is de veronderstelling dan ook gerechtvaardigd dat veranderende definiëring van lokale veiligheid van invloed zal zijn op de positie en rol van de eerstverantwoordelijke op het lokale bestuursniveau: de burgemeester. Dit leidde tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag:

Hoe zijn de definities van lokale veiligheidsproblemen veranderd en hoe, in welke mate en waarom heeft dat de positie en rol van de burgemeester binnen de lokale veiligheidszorg beïnvloed in Nederland tussen 1990 en 2010?

Onderzoeksopzet en bevindingen

Om deze onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden zijn verschillende stappen gezet. Allereerst is de dynamiek van beleidsagenda voor lokaal veiligheidsbeleid in kaart gebracht middels een omvangrijk *desk research project*. Doel van deze zogenoemde *macrostudie* was na te gaan welke lokale veiligheidsproblemen tussen 1990 en 2010 als prioriteiten voor lokaal veiligheidsbeleid werden benoemd. De macrostudie beoogde daarmee de zo vaak veronderstelde en slechts gedeeltelijk of anekdotisch beschreven veranderingen in het denken over lokale veiligheid door empirisch onderzoek gedetailleerd in kaart te brengen. De inhoud van 47 landelijke beleidsdocumenten is onderzocht met behulp van drie analyserondes, een inductief codeerschema en controle door een tweede codeur. Weloverwogen is gekozen voor *inhoudsanalyse* van landelijke documenten in de vorm van regeringsbeleid en de memories van toelichting bij de begrotingen van de ministeries voor Binnenlandse Zaken en Justitie tussen 1990 en 2010. Tezamen vormen deze documenten een afspiegeling van de lokale veiligheidsagenda in Nederland omdat ze periodiek en jaarlijks onder meer de prioriteiten voor lokaal veiligheidsbeleid benoemen.

Kernbevindingen van de macrostudie zijn dat de *frequentie*, de *variëteit* en de *dominantie* van lokale veiligheidsproblemen op de landelijke agenda voor lokaal veiligheidsbeleid drastisch veranderde tussen 1990 en 2010. De Macro Studie wees uit dat het totale aantal genoemde veiligheidsproblemen op gemeentelijk niveau klom van 4 in 1990 naar 175 in 2010 (*issue presence*). Tegelijkertijd steeg het aantal categorieën van door de lokale overheden aan te pakken typen veiligheidsproblemen, van 2 in 1990

naar 33 in 2010 (*issue expansion*). De meest genoemde, dus dominante categorieën over deze periode zijn overlast, drugs, jeugd, geweld, kleine ergernissen en georganiseerde criminaliteit (*issue dominance*). Daarmee wees de Macro Studie uit dat steeds meer en steeds meer verschillende issues als lokaal veiligheidsprobleem zijn benoemd. Dit duidt op een *toenemend proces van securitization of verveiliging* op lokaal niveau waarbij nieuwe zaken onder de noemer van veiligheid op de beleidsagenda terecht komen. Traditionele veiligheidsproblemen als ordeverstoring en gangbare vormen van criminaliteit worden vergezeld door 'zachte' issues als parkeeroverlast en rommel op straat. Tegelijkertijd deed 'zwaardere' problematiek, als georganiseerde criminaliteit en radicalisering, haar intrede in het beleidsdomein lokale orde en veiligheid.

Uit de macrostudieresultaten is vervolgens een drietal definities van lokale veiligheidsproblemen geselecteerd die dominante omslagpunten vertegenwoordigen in het perspectief op lokale veiligheid op verschillen momenten tussen 1990 en 2010. Allereerst werd *drugsoverlast* geselecteerd als een van de eerste uitbreidingen eind jaren '90 van de vorige eeuw. Ten tweede is rond de eeuwwisseling gekozen voor *huiselijk geweld* als omslagpunt in de aandacht voor veiligheidsproblemen die zich louter in het publieke domein afspelen, naar aandacht voor geweld achter de voordeur. Ten slotte viel de keuze op *georganiseerde criminaliteit* als een voorheen bovenlokaal probleem, naar recentelijk ook een dominant agendapunt voor lokaal veiligheidsbeleid.

De manier waarop deze nieuwe probleemdefinities de positie en rol van de Nederlandse burgemeester hebben beïnvloed, is diepgaand onderzocht middels een *meervoudige en nested case studie strategie*. Binnen twee gemeenten – Haarlem en Breda (cases) – is onderzocht wanneer en hoe drugsoverlast, huiselijk geweld en georganiseerde criminaliteit (subcases) gedefinieerd zijn als veiligheidsproblemen en hoe burgemeesters ermee omgingen tussen 1990 en 2010. Dataverzameling vond plaats door middel van interviews met burgemeesters en samenwerkingspartners alsook inhoudsanalyse van lokale raadstukken en beleidsdocumenten met betrekking tot drie subcases voor de periode 1990-2010. Een vergelijking van casestudiebevindingen binnen en tussen de cases leidde tot inzicht in de manier waarop nieuwe veiligheidsproblemen de positie en rol van de burgmeester al dan niet beïnvloedden.

De in totaal zes subcases zijn geanalyseerd en vergeleken aan de hand van een *analysemodel*. Dit model veronderstelt dat probleemdefinities sociale constructies met levensechte beleidsgevolgen zijn. Het model combineert literatuur over *agenda setting, beleidsdynamiek, framing* en *networked governance* om de verwachte invloed van probleemdefinities op posities en rollen van actoren in de publieke sector in kaart te brengen. De kern van het model is dat de kracht van probleemdefinities in het structureren van posities en rollen binnen governance netwerken kan worden begrepen als de uitkomst van een lokaal framingproces. Dat framingproces vindt plaats tijdens interactie tussen verschillende discours coalities bestaande uit bestuurders, burgers en/of bedrijven met min of meer dezelfde overtuigingen die hun frame voor het

voetlicht proberen te brengen. Tijdens het beleidsdebat kunnen hun frames versmelten, verdwijnen dan wel domineren (frame alignment),wat leidt tot een gedeeld frame dat wordt omgezet in formeel beleid (discourse institutionalisering). Dit beleidsframe kleurt de verwachte rol van de verantwoordelijke beleidsactoren waaronder de burgemeester. De mate waarin dit beleidsframe de rolvervulling door de burgemeesters in de beleidspraktijk daadwerkelijk beïnvloedt (frame enactment), hangt af van de mate waarin het persoonlijk handelen van de burgemeester in overeenstemming is met het beleidsframe. Het analysemodel beschrijft een min of meer cognitief proces van debat, framing, alignment en enactment dat verschillende volgorden kan aannemen en dat beïnvloed wordt door de institutionele kaders aanwezig in omringende lokale en bovenlokale beleidsnetwerken. Bovendien is de uitkomst van dit framingproces geen statisch gegeven. Het bestaande beleidsframe en de beleidspraktijk worden contant uitgedaagd door alternatieve frames en veranderen in de loop van de tijd, met bijbehorende implicaties voor de burgemeestersrol.

De belangrijkste bevindingen van de casusonderzoeken zijn dat in beide cases drugsoverlast, huiselijk geweld en georganiseerde criminaliteit vroeger of later zijn geframed als lokale veiligheidsproblemen. Dit beïnvloedde de rol van de burgemeester zowel op papier als in de praktijk. De burgmeester kreeg in de *formele veiligheidsplannen een rol toebedeeld* om deze nieuwe veiligheidsproblemen aan te pakken. Deze verwachte rol is sterk beïnvloed door de adoptie van nieuwe bevoegdheden in lokale beleidsplannen. Deze bevoegdheden gelden voor alle Nederlandse burgemeesters en stippelen het instrumentarium en de verantwoordelijkheid voor onder meer drugsoverlast (sluiten panden), huiselijk geweld (huisverbod) en verwevenheid tussen boven en onderwereld (BIBOB) uit. In de meerderheid van de subcases hebben burgemeesters daadwerkelijk uitvoering gegeven aan de van hen verwachte rol zoals opgeschreven in beleidsplannen. Dit betekent dat ook het *handelen van de burgemeesters in de lokale beleidspraktijk werd beïnvloed* door nieuw verveiligde beleidsproblemen en bijbehorende nieuwe beleidsinstrumenten. Deze praktijkrol werd bovendien gekenmerkt door *'hands-on' betrokkenheid* bij individuele en veiligheidsproblemen, bij implementatie van nieuwe bevoegdheden evenals door samenwerking tussen burgemeester en uiteenlopende publieke en private partners en dat alles in toenemende mate op regionaal en zelfs landelijk niveau.

Tegelijkertijd wijzen enkele subcases op een verschil tussen beleidsplannen en beleidspraktijken. Niet in alle gevallen heeft de burgemeester zijn verwachte rol uitgevoerd, wat duidt op het klassieke onderscheid tussen beleid op papier en in de uitvoeringspraktijk. Dit verschil maakt duidelijk dat *beleidsframes kunnen verschillen in reikwijdte*, dat wil zeggen de mate waarin ze de verwachte rol, dan wel het doen en laten van beleidsactoren kenmerken. Casusanalyse en vergelijking wees uit dat de mate van frame alignement de reikwijdte van het beleidsframe bepaalt. Met andere woorden, hoe meer persoonlijk alignment, des te meer enactment door de burgemeester. Burgemeesters zijn geen willoze uitvoerders, maar kritische adopters van lokale en landelijke beleidsthema´s en bevoegdheden.

Conclusies en implicaties voor theorie en praktijk

De combinatie van de macro- en casestudiebevindingen leidt tot de volgende overkoepelende conclusies. Hoewel de formele verantwoordelijkheid voor lokale orde en veiligheid van de burgemeester − zoals sinds jaar en dag vastgelegd in de gemeentewet − niet veranderde, is de definitie van lokale veiligheidsproblemen aanzienlijk verbreed. Dit veranderende perspectief op lokale veiligheid ging gepaard met verschillende veranderingen in de positie en rol van de Nederlandse burgemeester. Nederlandse burgemeesters werden eigenstandig verantwoordelijk voor een breed scala aan nieuwe veiligheidsproblemen. Tegelijkertijd formaliseerde de nationale overheid grofweg 15 nieuwe wettelijke bevoegdheden voor Nederlandse burgemeesters voor meerdere van deze nieuwe veiligheidsproblemen.

Casusonderzoek wijst uit dat de positie van de burgemeesters van Haarlem en Breda veranderde van min of meer solistisch opererende actoren naar participanten in lokale en bovenlokale samenwerkingsverbanden met uiteenlopende partners, zoals de belastingdienst, de GGD en de woningbouwvereniging. Terwijl burgemeesters poogden lokale veiligheid zo effectief mogen te adresseren door informatie, instrumenten en strategieën af te stemmen met hun partners, werden ze tegelijkertijd afhankelijk van vele anderen om nieuwe veiligheidsproblemen in hun lokale gemeenschap op effectieve wijze aan te pakken. Deze multi-actor en multi-level samenwerkingsverbanden stimuleerden vooral de externe burgemeestersrol van *netwerker* en *verbinder*. Burgemeesters in moderne veiligheidsnetwerken vertonen daarmee voornamelijk een *faciliterende leiderschapsstijl* gericht op het samenbrengen van actoren, middelen en doelen om hun verantwoordelijkheid voor lokale orde en veiligheid waar te maken. Daarnaast werkten nieuwe bevoegdheden ook een nieuwe rol in de hand, namelijk die van operationele betrokkenheid. Naast de politieke en bestuurlijke taken op het vlak van openbare orde en veiligheid raakten burgemeesters ook in operationele zin bij individuele gevallen betrokken door implementatie van nieuwe bevoegdheden. Bijvoorbeeld door huisverboden voor daders van huiselijk geweld in te stellen, bouwvergunningen in te trekken of drugspanden te sluiten.

De zojuist beschreven onderzoeksresultaten hebben implicaties voor theoretische kennisvorming in verschillende onderzoeksgebieden. Allereerst draagt de macrostudie bij aan de internationale literatuur over securitization die zich voornamelijk richt op veiligheidsproblemen op landelijk niveau en daarboven. Deze studie toont dat empirische processen van *verbreding van het veiligheidsconcept − securitization − ook op lokaal beleidsniveau* plaatsvinden. Zo zien we dat naast de verveiliging van militaire dreiging, immigratie en olievoorraden, ook lokale zaken als rommel op straat en loverboys succesvol worden geframed als veiligheidsproblemen en daarmee onder de verantwoordelijkheid van lokale veiligheidsactoren, onder wie de burgemeester, worden gebracht.

Ten tweede, door de kracht van probleemdefinities te vangen in een conceptueel model, brachten de casestudies nieuwe inzichten mee voor de

internationale literatuur over agendavorming. Het model poogt een stap verder te gaan dan de reeds veronderstelde kracht van probleemdefinities op cruciale beleidskeuzen, door te analyseren op welke manier bepaalde oplossingsrichtingen en actoren in de operationele beleidspraktijk naar voren worden geschoven. Dit resulteerde in de identificatie van een drietal mechanismen die tonen hoe beleidsframes de rollen van actoren structureren. Het *'top-down' mechanisme* laat zien dat beleid en beleidrollen direct gestructureerd worden door bovenlokale beleidsframes en daarmee het lokale beleid en de burgemeestersrol volledig inkleuren. Het *'mediated' mechanisme* laat een uitgebalanceerde mix zien tussen lokale en bovenlokale beleidsideeën en instrumenten. In dit geval versmelten lokale en bovenlokale beleidsframes en -instrumenten tot een op maat gemaakte mix, passend bij de lokale situatie. Het *'bottom up' mechanisme* beschrijft lokale beleidsideeën en –praktijken die door bovenlokale actoren worden overgenomen, waardoor lokale innovaties en pionierschappen breder kunnen worden uitgerold. Al met al blijkt dat lokale beleidsprocessen en hun onderliggende framingsprocessen doorgaans geen pure lokale aangelegenheid zijn. Ze worden linksom of rechtsom gekenmerkt door een mix van lokale en bovenlokale beleidsideeën en -praktijken. Bovendien blijkt tijd een belangrijke factor. In historische zin omdat vroegere beleidsprocessen meer ruimte laten voor lokaal pionierschap (bottom up) en latere beleidsprocessen gekenmerkt worden door een zekere lokale padafhankelijkheid (mediated) alsook in letterlijke zin omdat het simpelweg enige tijd vergt voordat bovenlokale zaken lokaal omarmd worden, zeker in de uitvoeringspraktijk (top down).

Ten derde appelleren de casestudieresultaten aan de internationale literatuur over framing. Hoewel deze body of knowledge veronderstelt dat frames het handelen van individuen beïnvloeden, is nog onbekend of en hoe het handelen van beleidsactoren in collectieve settings al dan niet wordt gestructureerd door beleidsframes. Het casusonderzoek toont dat de invloed van beleidsframes op de rol van beleidsactoren een uiteenlopende reikwijdte kent. Waar de formele, gedeelde beleidsframes in alle gevallen de verwachte rol van beleidsactoren op papier vormgeven, blijkt dat beleidsframes niet zonder meer de acties in de beleidspraktijk van de desbetreffende actor beïnvloeden. *Persoonlijke alignment* met het beleidsframe blijkt een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor het handelen naar het beleidsframe en dus rolstructurering van alledaagse handelingen in de beleidspraktijk.

Ten slotte bieden de casestudies empirische inzichten in de veel bediscussieerde rol van klassieke overheidspartijen in governance netwerken. Zowel in de internationale veiligheidsliteratuur, als de bestuurskundige literatuur over netwerken vragen wetenschappers zich af wat het multi-actor en mulit-level karakter van governance netwerken betekent voor de rol en positie van overheidspartijen. De casusonderzoeken laten zien dat de burgemeester in veiligheidsnetwerken als eerste vertegenwoordiger van de lokale overheid een *sterke, maar tegelijkertijd afhankelijke partij* is. De burgemeester ontleent een bijzonder positie aan zijn eigenstandige bevoegdheid voor lokale orde en veiligheid en bezit veel en verregaande bevoegdheden met betrekking tot specifieke problemen rond lokale orde en veiligheid. Tegelijkertijd wordt zijn 'papieren invloed' en daarmee 'veronderstelde daadkracht' in de praktijk

afgezwakt door zijn afhankelijkheid van vele anderen op zowel lokaal als regionaal en landelijk niveau. Omdat de burgemeester wel verantwoordelijkheid voor de coördinatie van lokaal veiligheidsbeleid draagt, maar deze niet ondersteunt wordt door formele doorzettingsmacht voor regie over lokale veiligheidsnetwerken is hij een belangrijke, maar geen allesbepalende speler.

Naast wetenschappelijke inzichten bracht het onderzoek een aantal implicaties voor de beleidspraktijk van lokaal veiligheidsbeleid naar voren. Allereerst heeft securitzation van lokale issues vergaande gevolgen voor bestuurders en burger met zich meegebracht. Door allerhande zaken aan te merken als lokaal veiligheidsprobleem werd een *zekere mate van urgentie gecreëerd* en zijn lokale actoren en maatregelen behorende tot het beleidsdomein van openbare orde en veiligheid in stelling gebracht. Voor burgemeesters betekende dit dat uiteenlopende zaken die voorheen niet als veiligheidsprobleem beschouwd werden – zoals overlast op straat, jeugdproblemen en geweld in de huiselijke sfeer – nu ook onder hun eigenstandige verantwoordelijkheid voor lokale orde en veiligheid vallen. Dientengevolge werden burgemeesters direct verantwoordelijk gesteld voor een steeds breder palet aan zware en minder zware 'veiligheidsproblemen'. Tegelijkertijd groeide hun handelingsmogelijkheden met de komst van een flink aantal nieuwe bevoegdheden. Dit schepte nieuwe verantwoordelijkheden en verwachtingen van het lokale bestuur en burgemeesters in het bijzonder als het gaat om de zorg voor lokale veiligheid. Voor de burger betekende een lokale trend van securitization inzet van veiligheidsmaatregelen met soms verregaande gevolgen voor de gemeenschap als geheel dan wel voor specifieke individuen in het bijzonder. Burgemeestersbevoegdheden, waaronder preventief fouilleren, sluiten van drugspanden en uitgeven van huisverboden, interveniëren in de publieke leefomgeving en reiken soms tot ver achter de voordeur.

Ten tweede wijst de uitbreiding van burgemeestersbevoegdheden op een wederkerig samenspel tussen het landelijke en het lokale bestuursniveau. Waar in dat verband vaak wordt gevreesd voor landelijk beleid dat slecht of zelfs averechts werkt in de lokale beleidspraktijk, laten de casestudies zien dat door nationale overheid gecreëerde burgemeestersbevoegdheden in meerdere gevallen relevant en nuttig werden geacht. Zij het dat landelijke bevoegdheden door burgemeester werden geïmplementeerd op een moment en wijze passend bij de lokale situatie. Dat betekent dat *landelijk beleid voornamelijk faciliterend werkt* wanneer lokale bestuurders deze nuttig en nodig achten.

Tot slot vreesde menig bestuurder, burger en onderzoeker dat Nederlandse burgemeesters zouden verworden tot lokale sheriffs die met een 'zero tolerance' attitude eigenhandig de meest verregaande beleidsinstrumenten zouden inzetten in de aanpak van criminaliteit en ieder ander veiligheidsprobleem dat zich voordeed binnen de lokale gemeenschap. Dergelijk handelen zou volgens hen afbreuk doen aan de 'zachtere' rol van de burgemeester als hoeder van de lokale gemeenschap. Uit casusonderzoeken blijkt dat veiligheid inderdaad een kernthema is geworden in het dagelijks opereren van burgemeesters en dat ze meer dan eens gebruik maakten van hun

nieuwe bevoegdheden. Echter, casusonderzoek liet ook zien dat burgemeesters daarmee niet veranderden in solisten die met grof geschut optreden tegen ieder mogelijk veiligheidsprobleem. De veronderstelde macht die gepaard zou gaan met de uitdijing van veiligheidsproblemen en bevoegdheden wordt in de praktijk afgezwakt door *nieuwe afhankelijkheden* en *bovenlokale beleidsinvloeden* in de lokale veiligheidszorg. Zoals reeds beschreven, Nederlandse burgemeesters zijn veelal 'verbinders' en 'facilitators' in brede veiligheidsnetwerken in plaats van 'solistisch opererende sheriffs´.

Samenvattend, dit onderzoek toont aan dat de lokale trend van verveiliging allerhande zaken tot onderwerp maakte van 'lokale veiligheidsnetwerken' die allerminst een puur lokale aangelegenheid zijn. Lokaal veiligheidsbeleid blijkt voordeel te hebben van regionale samenwerkingsverbanden, landelijk aangereikte instrumenten en zelfs inspiratie te putten uit internationale beleidspraktijken. Dit betekent dat Nederlandse burgemeesters lokaal veiligheidsbeleid voeren met een multi-level karakter. Zij functioneren in deze setting eerder als wederzijds afhankelijke super-netwerkers en kritische gebruikers van bovenlokale instrumenten, dan als de door sommigen gevreesde willoze uitvoerders van bovenlokaal beleid, dan wel lokale sheriffs.

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