

THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING IN CRIME

PREVENTION BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE

by

NTJA PATRICK MASHILOANE

Submitted in accordance with the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR OF LITERATURE AND PHILOSOPHY

in the subject of

POLICE SCIENCE

at the

UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA

PROMOTER: PROF M MONTESH

SEPTEMBER 2014

DECLARATION

I, **NTJA PATRICK MASHILOANE**, declare that this thesis: **THE USE OF INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING IN CRIME PREVENTION BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE**, is my own work and that all the sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.

.....
Signature
N.P MASHILOANE

2014-09-11

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the following persons for the assistance and support they provided during this study.

- ❖ Professor Moses Montesh, my supervisor for efficient guidance, enthusiasm and encouragement.
- ❖ My brother Prof David Masiloane for his encouragement.
- ❖ My colleagues in the South African Police Service who gave up their time to be interviewed for this thesis.
- ❖ Lastly, I want to thank my wife, Matsie Mashiloane, my son Papi Elliot Mashiloane and my daughter Relebohile Refiloe Disebo Mashiloane for their understanding when I was always glued to my books in the study room. Their understanding is appreciated because without their support, I would not be where I am today. Thank you very much.

DEDICATION

This study is dedicated to my late parents, Elliot and Matubatsi Josephine Mashiloane for raising me to be who I am today. “Mme le Ntate” you are and will always be my heroes and role models.

ABSTRACT

The advent of democracy in South Africa brought hope for freedom and prosperity for millions of South Africans. The country also experienced an increase in violent crime during those early years of democracy. In order to deal with the threat of crime the government had to develop policing strategies which would eradicate crime and fear of crime. As a young democracy South Africa had to look for policing models which has successfully decreased the high crime rate in developed countries. Fortunately the western democracies like the United Kingdom, United States of America and Australia had some of these answers. Firstly it was community policing, then sector policing, and finally intelligence led policing. This research focuses on the intelligence led policing model by discussing its building blocks in chronological order as follows. Firstly is the historical background of intelligence; Secondly, is information collection; Thirdly is crime analysis; and Fourthly is the Intelligence-cycle, with specific focus on the implementation process in England in the United Kingdom; New Jersey in the United States of America, South Australia State in Australia; and in the Republic of South Africa. A questionnaire was used to collect data on the implementation of intelligence led policing by the South African Police Service.

OPSOMING

Met die koms van demokrasie in Suid-Afrika het dit hoop en voorspoed vir miljoene Suid-Afrikaners gebring. Die land het 'n styging in geweldsmisdade beleef in die skemer jare van demokrasie. Om in oorleg te tree met die dreigende stygende van misdaad, moes die staat polisieërings strategieë ontwikkel wat misdaad en die vrees daarvoor sou stop sit. As 'n jong demokrasie, moes Suid-Afrika kyk na polisieërings modelle, van ander ontwikkelde lande, wat die misdaad kan laat daal. Gelukkig het die Westerse lande soos Verenigde Koningryk, Verenigde State van Amerika en Australië die antwoorde gehad. Om die plaag van misdaad in Suid-Afrika op te los, moes Suid-Afrika, polisieërings modelle aanneem wat gewerk het in die Westerse demokrasie. Eerstens was die Gemeenskaps Polisieëring, tweedens, was dit Sektor Polisieëring en derdens Intelligensie gedrewe Polisieëring. Dié navorsing fokus op die Intelligensie gedrewe polisieëring. Die volgende bou blokke van van die model was volledig, in kronologiese volgorde bespreek in verskillende hoofstukke, soos volg. Eerstens die historiese agtergrond van intelligensie; Tweedens is inligting versameling; Derdens is dit misdaad analisering; Vierdends die intelligensie siklus en laastens, is dit die intelligensie gedrewe polisieërings model, met spesifieke fokus op die implementerings proses in Engeland in die Veregde Koningryk; New Jersey in die Verenigde State van Amerika, Suid Australiese Staat in Australië en in die Republiek van Suid Afrika. 'N vraelys was gebruik om die data aangaande die implementering van die Intelligensie gedrewe Polisieëring in die Suid Afrikaanse Polisie Diens in te vorder.

KEY CONCEPTS

- Intelligence led Policing
- Intelligence
- Crime Analysis
- Intelligence cycle
- Crime Intelligence

ABBREVIATIONS

ABCI	:	Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence
ACID	:	Australian Criminal Intelligence Database
AD	:	Anno Domini (In the year since the birth of Christ)
ACPO	:	Association of Chief Police Officers
ASIO	:	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
ATM	:	Automated Teller Machine
AZAPO	:	Azania People Organisation
ANC	:	African National Congress
BC	:	Before the birth of Christ
BCU	:	<i>Borough Command Unit/ Basic Command Unit</i>
BOSS	:	Bureau for State Security
CAS	:	Crime Administration System
CIS	:	Crime Intelligence Station
CCTV	:	Closed Circuit Television
CFR	:	Code of Federal Regulations
CIA	:	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMO	:	Crime Information Management Office
CIO	:	Crime Information Office
COMPSTAT	:	Comparison of Computer Statistics
CPF	:	Community Police Forum
CPTED	:	Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design
CRIM	:	Criminal Record System
CSC	:	Community Service Centre
DMI	:	Directorate of Military Intelligence
DONS	:	Department of National Security
ELINT	:	Electronic Intelligence
ENATIS	:	Electronic National Traffic Information System
FBI	:	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIB	:	Force Intelligence Bureaux
FIFA	:	Fe'de'ration Internationale de Football Association
FIRT	:	Force Intelligence Review Team

GIS	:	Geographic Information System
HMIC	:	Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies
HUMINT	:	Human Intelligence
ILP	:	Intelligence led Policing
IQ	:	Intelligence Quotient
ISIS	:	Individual Structure Information System
KGB	:	Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security).
KPM	:	Kent Policing Model
MEC	:	Member of Executive Committee
MISS	:	Minimum Information Security Standards
MK	:	Umkonto Wesizwe
NCIS	:	National Criminal Intelligence Service/ National Crime Investigation Service
NIE	:	National Intelligence Estimate
NIM	:	National Intelligence Model
NICOC	:	National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee
NCIS	:	National Crime Investigation Service
NIS	:	National Intelligence Service
NSA	:	National Security Agency
OIAC	:	Operational Information Analysis Centre
OSINT	:	Open Source Intelligence
PAC	:	Pan Africanist Congress
RI	:	Republican Intelligence
ROIC	:	Regional Operations and Intelligence Centre
RSA	:	Republic of South Africa
SACP	:	South African Communist Party
SADF	:	South African Defence Force
SAP	:	South African Police
SAPS	:	South African Police Service
SIGINT	:	Signals Intelligence
SIMS	:	Statewide Intelligence Management System
TECHINT	:	Technical Intelligence

T & CG : Tasking and Co-ordination Group
USA : United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS	PAGE
Declaration	i
Acknowledgements	ii
Dedication	iii
Abstract	iv
Opsoming	v
Key Concepts	vi
Abbreviations	vii
 CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION	
1.1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY	2
1.3 HYPOTHESES	3
1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES	4
1.5 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH	4
1.5.1 Value to the Researcher	4
1.5.2 Value to the University	4

1.5.3	Value to the South African Police Service	5
1.5.4	Value to the Scholarly and Academic Community	5
1.6	KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS	5
1.6.1	Intelligence led policing	6
1.6.2	Crime Intelligence	6
1.6.3	Crime analysis	6
1.6.4	Information	6
1.6.5	Intelligence	7
1.6.6	Intelligence cycle	7
1.7	CHAPTER LAYOUT	7
1.8	CONCLUSION	9

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1	INTRODUCTION	10
2.2	RESEARCH METHODOLOGY	10
2.2.1	Research approach and design	11

2.2.2	Population and sampling	13
2.2.3	Sampling size	14
2.2.4	Method of data collection	15
2.2.5	Data analysis	15
2.2.6	Method used to ensure validity and reliability	16
2.2.7	Ethical considerations	17
2.3	LITERATURE REVIEW	17
2.3.1	Intelligence led policing in the United Kingdom	17
2.3.2	Intelligence led policing in the United States of America	18
2.3.3	Intelligence led policing in Australia	19
2.4	CONCLUSION	19
 CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INTELLIGENCE		
3.1	INTRODUCTION	20
3.2	INTELLIGENCE AND THE HUMAN RACE	20
3.3	INTELLIGENCE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD	21

3.3.1	Egypt	22
3.3.2	Rome	23
3.3.3	Greece	25
3.3.4	Ancient China	25
3.4	DARK AGES	27
3.4.1	Byzantine Empire	27
3.4.2	Mongols	28
3.5	MIDDLE AGES	29
3.6	RENAISSANCE	30
3.7	BIRTH OF MODERN INTELLIGENCE	31
3.8	EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE IN AMERICA	32
3.8.1	Congressional inquiries into intelligence activities	35
3.8.2	Crime commissions	36
3.8.3	Introduction of intelligence led policing in the United States of America	41
3.9	EVOLUTION OF POLICE INTELLIGENCE UNITS IN BRITAIN	41
3.10	INFORMATION COLLECTION IN AUSTRALIA	42

3.11	INFORMATION COLLECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA	42
3.11.1	Functions of the security branch	43
3.11.2	South African intelligence community	44
3.11.3	Regime change and policing	48
3.11.4	Crime intelligence division of the South African Police Service	49
3.12	CONCLUSION	50

CHAPTER 4: INFORMATION COLLECTION

4.1	INTRODUCTION	51
4.2	DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE	51
4.2.1	Crime intelligence	52
4.3	SOURCES OF INFORMATION	53
4.3.1	Open sources of information	53
4.3.2	Closed Sources of Information	54
4.3.3	Nature of information	55
4.4	INFORMATION COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES	58
4.4.1	Encoding	59
4.4.2	Encrypting	59

4.4.3	Covert channels	60
4.4.4	Steganography	60
4.5	BASIC PROCESSES OF GATHERING INFORMATION	61
4.6	CONTROLLED ACCESS TO INFORMATION	62
4.6.1	Need-to-know	63
4.6.2	Right-to-know	63
4.6.3	Third party information	64
4.7	INFORMATION COLLECTION	64
4.7.1	Open source collection	66
4.7.2	Closed source collection	68
4.8	INFORMATION COLLECTION TECHNIQUES	70
4.8.1	Electronic collection	71
4.8.2	Surveillance	76
4.8.3	Infiltration collections	78
4.8.4	Social engineering	80
4.8.5	Human sources	83
4.8.6	Extraction of information from human beings	97

4.8.7	Direct collections	98
4.8.8	Prisoner/ Detainee interviews	100
4.8.9	Dumpster diving	100
4.8.10	Field reports	101
4.8.11	Field officer/agent interview	101
4.8.12	Internal document review	101
4.8.13	Personal network	102
4.8.14	“Covert channel” observation	102
4.9	CONCLUSION	102

CHAPTER 5: CRIME ANALYSIS

5.1	INTRODUCTION	103
5.2	HISTORY OF CRIME ANALYSIS	103
5.2.1	Britain	103
5.2.2	United States of America	104
5.2.3	Australia	106
5.2.4	South Africa	107

5.3	DISCIPLINE OF CRIME ANALYSIS	109
5.3.1	Purpose of crime analysis	110
5.4	DEFINITION OF CRIME ANALYSIS	112
5.5	TYPES OF CRIME ANALYSIS	113
5.5.1	Tactical crime analysis	113
5.5.2	Strategic crime analysis	115
5.5.3	Administrative crime analysis	116
5.5.4	Investigative crime analysis	117
5.5.5	Intelligence analysis	117
5.5.6	Operations analysis	118
5.6	ROLE OF THEORY IN CRIME ANALYSIS	119
5.6.1	Environmental criminology	119
5.7	THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY	122
5.8	ROLE OF PLACE IN THE COMMISSION OF CRIME	123
5.8.1	Rational choice theory	123
5.8.2	Routine activity theory	126
5.8.3	Crime pattern theory	127

5.9	CRIME ANALYSIS PROCESS	128
5.9.1	Data collection	129
5.9.2	Data collation	130
5.9.3	Analysis	131
5.9.4	Dissemination	132
5.9.5	Feedback	133
5.10	CRIME LINKAGES	134
5.10.1	Trend	134
5.10.2	Pattern	134
5.10.3	Series	134
5.10.4	Spree	135
5.10.5	Hot spot	135
5.10.6	Criminogen	135
5.10.7	Criminal organisation/ conspiracy	135
5.11	INFORMATION ANALYSIS	136
5.11.1	Information analysis techniques/ methodologies	136
5.12	CRIME MAPPING	145

5.12.1	Manual pin mapping	145
5.12.2	Computer mapping	146
5.13	CONCLUSION	148

CHAPTER 6: INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

6.1	INTRODUCTION	149
6.2	DEFINITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE	149
6.3	INTELLIGENCE CYCLE PROCESS	150
6.3.1	Planning	151
6.3.2	Collection	154
6.3.3	Verification of information	155
6.3.4	Processing/ collation	156
6.3.5	Analysis	157
6.3.6	Assessment of analytical rigor and value	167
6.3.7	Distribution/ dissemination	167
6.3.8	Application of intelligence	168
6.3.9	Re-evaluation	168
6.4	CONCLUSION	169

CHAPTER 7: INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING

7.1	INTRODUCTION	170
7.2	USE OF INTELLIGENCE IN POLICING	170
7.3	DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING	171
7.3.1	An operational definition of intelligence led policing	172
7.4	EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING	174
7.4.1	Kent constabulary	175
7.4.2	Kent policing model	175
7.4.3	Audit commission report	177
7.4.4	Origin of National intelligence model	177
7.5	INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING CONCEPT	179
7.5.1	Features of intelligence led policing model	180
7.5.2	Intelligence led policing process	181
7.6	PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING	185
7.6.1	National intelligence model process	185
7.6.2	Intelligence products	192

7.7	COMPARATIVE INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING MODELS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.	195
7.7.1	Policing in Britain	195
7.7.2	Policing in the United States of America	201
7.7.3	Policing in Australia	213
7.7.4	Policing in South Africa	218
7.8	CONCLUSION	232

CHAPTER 8: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

8.1	INTRODUCTION	233
8.2	ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA	233
8.2.1	Characteristics of the study group	234
8.2.2	Knowledge of the concept of intelligence led policing	237
8.2.3	Utilisation of intelligence products (Section C)	238
8.2.4	Intelligence products	241
8.2.5	Application of the concept of intelligence led policing	246
8.2.6	Observations	249
8.2.7	Perusal of intelligence products	251

8.3	CONCLUSION	253
-----	------------	-----

CHAPTER 9: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1	INTRODUCTION	254
-----	--------------	-----

9.2	RESEARCH OVERVIEW	254
-----	-------------------	-----

9.2.1	Overview of the South African Police Service	254
-------	--	-----

9.2.2	Crime situation in South Africa	255
-------	---------------------------------	-----

9.3	FINDINGS	257
-----	----------	-----

9.3.1	Hypotheses	257
-------	------------	-----

9.3.2	Aims and objectives of the study	259
-------	----------------------------------	-----

9.4	RECOMMENDATIONS	260
-----	-----------------	-----

9.4.1	Integrated crime and information analysis	260
-------	---	-----

9.4.2	Staffing of the Crime Intelligence Office	260
-------	---	-----

9.4.3	Inculcate the culture of information collection in the South African Police	261
-------	---	-----

9.5	PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING MODEL FOR SOUTH AFRICA	261
-----	---	-----

9.5.1	Intelligence led policing model	262
-------	---------------------------------	-----

9.5.2	Guiding principles	262
-------	--------------------	-----

9.5.3	Role players	263
9.5.4	Roles and functions	263
9.5.5	Implementation process	267
9.6	CONCLUSION	275
REFERENCES		276
 FIGURES		
	Figure 5.1 Crime Triangle	121
	Figure 5.2 Association Chart	137
	Figure 5.3 Cellular Phone Record Chart	139
	Figure 5.4 Timeline Chart	141
	Figure 6.1 Intelligence Cycle	151
	Figure 7.1 3-i Model (Ratcliffe, 2011:12).	185
	Figure 7.2 Illustration of National Intelligence Model Process by Osborn (2012: 19).	187
	Figure 7.3 Tasking and Co-ordination Group by Osborn (2012-23).	190
	Figure 7.4 Australian Criminal Intelligence Model in Burns <i>et al</i> (2012:24)	215

Figure 7.5 Effective ILP Activities and Strategies by Doherty and Roche (2003: 59).	217
Figure 8.1 Genders	235
Figure 8.2 Races	235
Figure 8.3 Rank	236
Figure 8.4 Position Occupied by Respondents	237
Figure 8.5 Knowledge of the Concept of Intelligence led Policing	238
Figure 9.1 National Crime Statistics for the Past Six Years	255
Figure 9.2 Contact Crimes for 2011/212 Financial Year	256
Figure 9.3 Property Crimes for 2011/212 Financial Year	256
Figure 9.4 Crimes Heavily Dependent on Police Action for Detection for 2011/212 Financial Year.	257
Figure 9.5 Proposed Structure of Crime Intelligence at Cluster Level	269
Figure 9.6 Sector Intelligence Concept	270
Figure 9.7 Information Flow Process	271
Figure 9.8 Generation/Production of basic intelligence products	272

TABLES

Table 7.1 Strategic Assessment	192
Table 7.2 Tactical Assessment	193
Table 7.3 Problem Profile	194
Table 7.4 Target Profile	195
Table 8.1 Role players in the crime combating meeting	247

ANNEXURES

Station Crime Intelligence Profile	Annexure A
Individual/Target Profile	Annexure B
Tactical Assessment Document	Annexure C
Strategic Assessment Document	Annexure D
Curriculum Vitae of the Author	Annexure E

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL ORIENTATION

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Policing around the world is facing enormous challenges as the criminals are developing and inventing new strategies to commit crime. In order to prevent and combat crime the police and social scientists should also develop new policing philosophies or models that will address the needs of policing in the twenty first century. In order to make strides in crime prevention, the police should engage in a pro-active rather than re-active method of policing.

The changing nature of communities and, the shifting characteristics of crime and violence that affect these communities require advanced policing strategies. Strategies that worked in the past are not always effective today. The level, nature, and the changing character of communities require the police to seek more effective methods of preventing and combating crime.

Developments in crime and terrorist tactics require progressive strategies by the police. The terrorist attacks in the United States of America and elsewhere in the world serve as a wakeup call to the police and the intelligence community about the capabilities of criminals. In relation to the terrorist attack in the United States of America on the 11th September 2001, Peterson (2005:1) pointed out that four critical lessons are to be learned from that tragedy. The first is that, intelligence collection is everyone's job; secondly, a culture of intelligence and collaboration is necessary to protect the United States from all types of crime and threats; thirdly, for intelligence to be effective, it should support the law enforcement agency's entire operation; and, lastly, crime prevention and deterrence should be based on all-source information gathering and analysis.

As a way forward, the police had to develop a policing concept that embraces intelligence as its cornerstone. The policing philosophy which encourages and stresses the use of intelligence as an effective tool in preventing crime is the

Intelligence led policing model which originated in the United Kingdom. Faced with the challenge of high and violent crimes, South Africa also needs to revamp its policing. In order to combat and reduce crime levels, the South African Police Service needs to find and apply an effective policing strategy. The adoption of the intelligence led policing concept may be an answer to the high crime rate in South Africa. Intelligence led policing, also known as intelligence driven policing, has been proved internationally to be one of the most effective policing models for reducing crime.

1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

According to Vithal and Jansen in (Maree, 2007:28), a research rationale serves as an answer to two questions, the first relates to how a researcher developed an interest in a particular topic; and the second precisely why a researcher believes the research is worth conducting. As a police officer attached to the Crime Intelligence Unit of the SAPS, I believe that crime intelligence can play a pivotal role in the prevention of crime if it is properly managed and used. Berger (2006:113) also held the same view-point by stating that “proactive policing can lead to the arrest of potential offenders where good and timely intelligence enables the police to arrest a potential offender before the actual commission of the crime”.

Intelligence led policing has gradually established itself as the modern approach to crime management. Its principle is that the police should not try to police an entire community, but instead use the crime intelligence products, like crime pattern analysis, crime threat analysis, and the Station Crime Intelligence Profile to police identified crime “hot spots” and known criminals or gangs.

Intelligence led policing has a number of advantages over the traditional approach of policing. The first advantage is that policing resources are used more realistically and more effectively; the second is that, when criminal behaviour is being investigated, intelligence led policing seeks to establish links and patterns between individual crimes, by identifying crime series; the third is that it takes a long-term view of combating crime by supplying a range of preventative measures, including recommending legislative and policing changes, implementing neighbourhood watch

schemes, using closed circuit television systems, and using more direct patrols (Zinn, 2010:120-121). As a commander of a Crime Intelligence Station, I have first- hand experience of the high level of crime and its effect on society. This can be attributed to the defective use of crime intelligence in the fight against crime in South Africa. The high level of crime in the country is an indication of the failure of the state, through its organs like the police, to protect its citizens. This is further confirmed by electronic and print media which show horrific scenes and tell heart breaking stories of people who are raped, robbed, and murdered on a daily basis.

1.3 HYPOTHESES

There is a growing realisation that the increasing pace of social change and its world-wide effect on almost all areas of life is a universal phenomenon. Crime is a universal phenomenon which affects human beings, animals, and plants alike, irrespective of which part of the world they inhabit. The researcher conducted a comparative study of intelligence led policing in South Africa with other states in different countries which have been successful in reducing crime levels. Sarantakos (1998:101) describe a hypothesis as an assumption about the possible outcome of the study and provides a guideline for the research process. This study was guided by the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis no 1: There is no integrated approach to information collection or gathering within the police in South Africa, as it is perceived to be the responsibility of Crime Intelligence. (Information collection is not seen as everyone's job).

Hypothesis no 2: The SAPS utilises crime intelligence products in planning and executing crime prevention and combatting operations.

Hypothesis no 3: Crime intelligence products which are used to plan and execute crime prevention operations in South Africa do not provide adequate information, which has a negative impact on crime reduction.

1.4 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The main aim of this study has been to conduct an extensive study of the existing literature covering the use of intelligence to prevent and combat crime. The study has also covered the empirical dimension by collecting data consisting of detailed descriptions of situations, events, people, interactions, experiences, attitudes, and observed behaviour of respondents. A thorough review of literature on the intelligence led policing concept was conducted. This concept was examined in order to obtain a full and thorough understanding of its implementation which has led to successful crime prevention in other countries. In addition the researcher has done the following:

- ♦ A comparative study between South Africa and other countries or states such as New Jersey in the United States of America, South Australia State in Australia, and England in the United Kingdom;
- ♦ Developed a model for intelligence led policing in South Africa; and
- ♦ Made a contribution to the field of study of Intelligence led Policing.

1.5 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH

Fruition of this study will bring a better understanding of intelligence led policing to different people and groups involved in policing. Thus the value of the research is outlined as follows:

1.5.1 Value to the Researcher

As the initiator of this project, the researcher has benefited through the self-development of skills, expertise, and academic qualification, with the view of applying the skills in the working environment.

1.5.2 Value to the University

According to Bak in Maree (2007:41), the principal academic purpose of a dissertation or similar research is to investigate an issue “worthy of academic investigation”. The research has served as part of the literature on the intelligence led

policing concept. Thus the research has contributed as a point of reference for future research on intelligence led policing. Furthermore the research has shown that the proper implementation of intelligence led policing could lead to effective policing, which will reduce the high level of crime in South Africa.

1.5.3 Value to the South African Police Service

The outcome of the research has provided a rich and detailed description of the successful implementation of intelligence led policing in South Africa. The ultimate goal of the research is to contribute towards successful and sustainable crime reduction in South Africa. Thus the SAPS will be able to refer to the research to assist in the implementation of intelligence led policing.

1.5.4 Value to the Scholarly and Academic Community

The report and results has benefited scholars and the academic community in terms of knowledge and an understanding of the concept of intelligence led policing.

1.6 KEY THEORETICAL CONCEPTS

Every profession or discipline has its own specialised language and key concepts. For instance most people in the legal fraternity use Latin terms, such as “*nullum crimen sine lege*” which means that there is no crime without a legal provision, whilst, in the police environment, terms such as “*modus operandi*” which means a way of behaving or doing something that is typical of a person or group are common. This implies that in order to participate or work effectively in a particular environment one needs to familiarise him/herself with the language used in that environment (Maree, 2007:15). The theoretical concepts in the next sub-paragraphs form the base of this study.

1.6.1 Intelligence led policing

Intelligence led policing is the application of criminal intelligence analysis as an objective decision-making tool in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects drawn from an evidential base (Ratcliffe, 2003:2).

1.6.2 Crime intelligence

Crime intelligence is information about crime that has been systematically processed into a form that can be readily accessed and used to track down criminals and combat crime (Zinn, 2010:120).

1.6.3 Crime analysis

Johnson, in O'Connor (2005:2), defines crime analysis as the process of evaluating data for reliability, validity, and relevance; integrating and analysing it; and converting the product of this effort into a meaningful whole, which includes assessment of events and the implications of the information collected. Boba, in Ratcliffe (2007:13), describes crime analysis as the systematic study of crime and disorder problems as well as other police-related issues, including socio-demographic, spatial, and temporal factors to assist the police in criminal apprehension, crime and disorder reduction, crime prevention, and evaluation.

1.6.4 Information

The Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners defines "information" as knowledge or facts about someone or something (Rundell & Fox, 2005:735).

1.6.5 Intelligence

Troy, in O'Connor (2005:1), defines "intelligence" as "secret knowledge of the enemy, a kind of knowledge which stands independently of the means by which it is obtained and the process by which it is distilled". Champagne (2009:4) describes intelligence as the collection and analysis of information.

1.6.6 Intelligence cycle

Champagne (2009:4) describes an intelligence cycle as a process consisting of five steps, namely, planning, collecting, processing, analysing, and distribution of information.

1.7 CHAPTER LAYOUT

The thesis consists of nine chapters which are briefly summarized in their chronological order as follows;

Chapter 1: General Orientation

This chapter describes the general orientation of the study, which includes introduction, background of the study, hypothesis, research aim and objectives, value of the research, and key theoretical concepts.

Chapter 2: Research Methodology

Chapter two gives a detailed explanation of the research methodology of the study. It includes research approach and design; population and sampling; sampling size; method of data collection; data analysis; method used to ensure validity and reliability; ethical considerations; and literature review.

Chapter 3: Historical Background of Intelligence

This chapter provides the historical background of intelligence, from its inception until the birth of modern day intelligence, evolution of police intelligence units, and the contemporary use of intelligence in policing.

Chapter 4: Information Collection

This chapter describes the information collection process, which includes sources of information and information collection techniques.

Chapter 5: Crime Analysis

This chapter gives a detailed explanation of crime analysis process. It starts with the history of crime analysis, and describes the different types of crime analysis.

Chapter 6: Intelligence Cycle

This chapter describe the intelligence cycle. It gives a detailed explanation of the nine stages of the intelligence cycle.

Chapter 7: Intelligence led Policing

This chapter discusses the evolution of intelligence led policing model, and its practical implementation in the United Kingdom, United States of America, Australia, and South Africa.

Chapter 8: Data Analysis and Interpretation.

This chapter explains the processes followed in analysing data collected by means questionnaire and the interpretation thereof. It also highlights the experiences of respondents.

Chapter 9: Findings and Recommendations

This chapter discusses the findings of the research and recommendations for the implementation of intelligence led policing concept by the SAPS.

1.8 CONCLUSION

Like other fields of study policing is also undergoing changes in order to acclimatise with the challenges of the modern world. Continuous research in the field of policing will enable the police to deal with the threat posed by the sophisticated criminal networks effectively. At the same time it will also help to build an effective and professional police service. Continuous research resulted in the development of Intelligence led policing model which is the focus of this study. Intelligence led policing is one of the policing models used by different countries around the world to successfully decrease crime. Intelligence is the nucleus of this model of policing. The next chapter will outline the research methodology of this study.

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This is a study of the application of intelligence led policing concept which has sought to understand how the concept is applied in preventing crime by the SAPS. The study was conducted at station and cluster level where the actual policing takes place, and where policing, is practically implemented. The purpose of conducting a study at such a “basic” level is that the battle against crime is lost or won at station and cluster level. Furthermore the success or failure of a concept depends on its implementation or operationalisation which takes place at local police station level. Although not much operational policing takes place at cluster level, components such as Crime Intelligence operate at that level. This chapter outlines the methodology for this study, detailing the procedures and techniques of research, data collection, and analysis.

2.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Methodology is the art of selecting the appropriate method for the research that needs to be completed. In this study it was necessary to do a literature survey to reach all the objectives of the content preceding the research. According to Bailey (1994:34) the researcher’s methodology determines factors such as how he or she formulates the hypothesis and what level of evidence is necessary to make the decision of whether or not to accept these hypotheses. Sarantakos (1998:33-34) further states that methodology offers the research principles which are related closely to a distinct paradigm translated clearly and accurately down to guidelines on acceptable research practices. Methodology, therefore, is not determined by the research model but rather by the principles of research entailed in a paradigm. The methodology used in this study is qualitative research design. As the study was explorative in nature, qualitative research methods were used, with the aim of determining the use of crime intelligence in crime prevention. According to Patton (1996:22), qualitative data consists of detailed descriptions of situations, events, people, interactions, and observed behaviours, and also uses direct quotations from

people about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts. Researchers who use these methods of qualitative measurement use raw data from the empirical world. Qualitative data provide depth and detail which emerge through direct quotation and careful description. Aligning himself with the above opinion, Bailey (1994:244) states that “The primary nature of the relationship between the observer and the subject allows an in-depth study of the whole individual.” In-depth interviews were conducted with respondents who are key people in generating crime intelligence products and those who utilise the generated crime intelligence to prevent crime. After considering these modes of inquiry, the researcher explain why he has chosen the above mentioned research method, and briefly describes the entire research strategy and tactics in the following steps.

2.2.1 Research approach and design

Research procedures refer to the different steps and phases in a research project. There are a number of research methods, but this research is a combination of two methods chosen from a number of research methods. These methods are qualitative and quantitative research methods. Babbie (1998:37) describes qualitative data as non-numerical data and quantitative data as numerical data. These research methods are briefly described in the next subparagraphs.

2.2.1.1 Qualitative Research

Sarantakos (1998:6) describes this type of research as a combination of a number of methodological approaches based on diverse theoretical principles such as phenomenology, hermeneutics, and social interactionism, employing data collection and analysis methods that are non-quantitative, aiming towards the exploration of social relations, and describing reality as it is experienced by the respondents. Maree (2007:257) goes further by stating that the goal of this type of research is to explore and understand a central phenomenon, which is the focus of the study. The sample size is small and it is purposefully selected from individuals who have the most experience with the studied phenomenon. In addition, data are collected from people immersed in the setting of everyday life in which the study is framed.

2.2.1.2 *Quantitative Research*

Maree (2007:145) defines quantitative research as a process that is systematic and objective in the way it uses numerical data from a selected subgroup of a universe or population only to generalise the findings to the universe that is being studied. Sarantakos (1998:6) points out that this type of research is based on the methodological principles of positivism, and it adheres to the standards of strict research design developed before the research begins. It employs quantitative measurement and the use of statistical analysis. The main characteristic of this type of research is that it uses numerical data. The Macmillan English dictionary for advanced learners defines “numerical” as anything expressed as numbers or consisting of numbers (Rundell & Fox, 2002:970). Therefore the types of data used in this type of research are numbers or figures.

2.2.1.3 *Triangulation*

Triangulation is the technique of using quantitative and qualitative research methods simultaneously in a study or research project. This combination increases the researcher’s ability to rule out rival explanations for phenomena, and enables the researcher to come up with strong research findings (Nieswiadomy, 1993:160). Although quantitative and qualitative methods differ in specific areas, they are capable of complementing each other. This multiple method of research is mostly used when it is difficult to study a phenomenon in its totality using one method only. Triangulation is also used to denote various measuring instruments for collecting data (Collins, du Plooy, Grobbelaar, Puttergill, Terre Blanche, van Eeden, van Rensburg & Wigston, 2000:91-92). In this study the triangulation technique was applied as follows:-

Qualitative research: This has been a qualitative research study as the researcher collected data firstly by conducting a literature review (documents) on the concept of intelligence led policing. (See chapter 3 to 8). Secondly, interviews with police officials who are involved in the implementation of intelligence led policing in South Africa were conducted. These are police officials who are immersed in intelligence led

policing on a daily basis. Thirdly, different Cluster Offices, Crime Intelligence Stations, and Police Stations were visited for observation purposes, and the recording of what was observed. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the production of intelligence, structured interviews employing closed-ended and open-ended questions were conducted with the selected respondents. According to Castle (1996:31) the aim of qualitative research is to gain insights from people who will enrich and illuminate our understanding of actions, concepts, events, and practices. The issue of validity and reliability arises from a need to persuade researchers of the authenticity and trustworthiness of the methods of collecting and presenting information and the interpretations that are derived from it. In order to ensure the relevance of the posed questions, as well as their validity and reliability, intensive literature research on information collection; and intelligence products and how they are produced was conducted prior to the formulation of questions. Furthermore, the researcher conducted fieldwork observations on the execution of crime prevention operations, after the interviews in order to verify and confirm the conclusions made thus far. The interviews were conducted by the researcher himself and notes were taken during all the interviews.

Quantitative research: Quantitative methods were used to complement the qualitative methods used in this study, firstly by adhering to the standards of strict research design developed before the research begins (See chapter 1), and, secondly, by using numerical data in the form of numbers and percentages during data analysis and findings (See chapter 8 and 9). This research has, therefore, employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. Seventy per cent (70%) of the study utilised qualitative research method and thirty per cent (30%) employed the quantitative research method.

2.2.2 Population and sampling

In order to obtain a sample of population which has suitable characteristics, the following criteria were used: firstly, respondents had to be police officials; secondly they had to be working in the operational environment like crime prevention and visible policing or the operational support environment such as crime intelligence,

and, finally, the sample population consisted of participants on different levels, in terms of rank and working environments. This was a qualitative study of a sample of twenty five (25) respondents from seven (07) police stations, three (03) clusters, and four (04) crime intelligence stations in the following provinces, Free State, North West, Mpumalanga, Gauteng, and Kwazulu-Natal. The identified police stations have a high report rate of contact and property related crimes. In order to ensure that the sample was representative with regard to rank, race, age and gender, the following Operational Commanders who are involved in the generation of crime intelligence products and crime prevention, participated in the research, namely, Commanders of Crime Intelligence Stations, Commanders of Overt Intelligence Collection, Commanders Crime Information Management Offices, Crime Information officials, Station Commanders, Visible Policing Commanders, as well as Cluster Commanders. Thus the sample was representative of rank, race, age, gender, and years of experience in policing.

2.2.3 Sampling size

The sample size consisted of twenty five (25) police officials of different ranks, race, age, and gender from the visible policing and crime intelligence environments. This sample was representative of all police officials who are involved in intelligence led policing in South Africa. The sample consisted of suitable respondents who are relevant to the research because of their experience and working environment in the Police. The twenty five (25) respondents met the following criteria to ensure suitability. Firstly, respondents were police officials, and, secondly, they were working in the operational environment like crime prevention and visible policing or operational support environment such as crime intelligence.

Finally, the sample population consisted of participants on different levels, according to rank and work environments. Patton, in Maree (2007:79-80), states that criterion sampling implies that the researcher decides at the design stage of the study about the typical characteristics and number of the participants to be included. Purposive sampling is used to select the region, which is South Africa, and the sample which consists of the police officials. Purposive and convenient samplings were used to get

suitable, relevant, and available respondents, who are physically involved in intelligence led policing.

2.2.4 Method of data collection

Data collection refers to the survey method that is developed and utilised to obtain information. The methods that were utilised in this study were:

- Structured interviews employing close-ended and open-ended questions with commanders in the following positions, crime intelligence station, overt intelligence collection, crime information management offices, crime information offices, station commanders, visible policing commanders, as well as cluster commanders.
- Observations were conducted by the researcher himself during the planning and execution of crime prevention operations. Crime prevention operations were compared with strategic and tactical intelligence products to determine whether they were intelligence led operations or not. In order to keep a proper record of the observation, a schedule with the following columns was used, time (days, weeks, and months, etcetera), place, type of event, and subjects, who are people observed.
- Literature studies, where the researcher utilised journals, books, government documents, legislation, policy reports, presented papers and the Internet were used.

2.2.5 Data analysis

As has already been mentioned in the previous sections, data was collected by means of interviews and observations. The following steps were used in analysing data:

- Transcription
The first step was to transcribe the data from the tape onto paper. The purpose was to clean and edit the manuscripts by eliminating typographical errors and contradictions.
- Checking and editing
The next step was to check and edit transcripts, preparing data for further analysis.

➤ Analysis and interpretation

Categories were developed, coding and data reduction was completed, and trends in the data were identified. During this process the researcher took all the collected data, including field notes and interview transcripts, and began to form a clear understanding of the information. The researcher coded the data, conducting content analysis by looking for specific words from which themes can be identified.

➤ Generalisation

The findings of individual interviews were generalised and differences and similarities identified, allowing for the development of typologies.

➤ Verification

During this step the researcher embarked on a process of checking the validity of interpretations by going through the transcripts again. This allowed the researcher to verify or modify hypotheses already arrived at previously.

2.2.6 Method used to ensure validity and reliability

According to Castle (1996:31), the aim of qualitative research is to gain insights from people who will enrich and illuminate our understanding of actions, concepts, events and practices. The issue of validity and reliability arises from a need to persuade researchers of the authenticity and trustworthiness of the methods of collecting and presenting information and the interpretations that are derived from it. In order to ensure the relevance of the questions as well as their validity and reliability, intensive literature research was conducted on the intelligence led policing concept prior to the formulation of questions. Furthermore, the researcher conducted fieldwork observations after the interviews to verify and confirm the conclusions made thus far. The interviews were conducted by the researcher himself, they were recorded and notes were also taken during all the interviews. According to Maree (2007:80), the reliability and validity of a research instrument is a crucial aspect in quantitative research. On the other hand, validity and reliability in qualitative research are referred to as providing credible and trustworthy research because the researcher is the data gathering instrument. Lincon and Guba in Maree (2007:80) include credibility, applicability, dependability, and conformability as key criteria of trustworthiness, and these are constructed to parallel the conventional criteria of inquiry which are internal

and external validity, reliability and neutrality respectively. They further claim that, “Since there can be no validity without reliability, a demonstration of the former (validity) is sufficient to establish the latter (reliability)”. So in order to ensure trustworthiness as validity the researcher conducted multiple methods of data collection such as observation, interviews, and document analysis. In addition, other researchers were used to give opinions on the interpreted data.

2.2.7 Ethical considerations

The identity of the respondents was treated with confidentiality, and prior permission was obtained from the respondents and their commanders before the interviews were conducted. The researcher also complied with the SAPS Policy on research, namely National Instruction 1/2006, before conducting the research on the activities of the police.

2.3 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review related to the origin and implementation of the concept of intelligence led policing. A systematic process of literature review used in this study revealed that intelligence led policing has been shown, internationally, to be one of the most effective ways of reducing crime. A short summary of the origin of intelligence led policing in the United Kingdom, United States of America, and Australia who forms part of the comparative study is as follows.

2.3.1 Intelligence led policing in the United Kingdom

Intelligence led policing, which is also known as intelligence driven policing model, entered the policing circle in the 1990's. This model originated in the United Kingdom. Factors, such as the rise of crime during the late 1980's and early 1990's and the increasing calls for police to be more effective, and cost efficient, led to the establishment of this model of policing in the United Kingdom. The driving forces for this move to a new strategy were both external and internal to policing.

External drivers included an inability of the traditional, reactive model of policing to cope with rapid changes in globalisation which have increased opportunities for transnational organised crime and removed physical and technological barriers across the policing domain. Internally, the rapid growth of private sector security and the loss of confidence by the public in the police as a result of increasing crime rate was a driving force. The 1993 Audit Commission report on the effectiveness of the police provided a strategy which helped the police to reduce crime and gain public confidence. The Commission recorded the following three findings which are regarded as the corner stones of intelligence led policing, namely;

- Existing roles and the level of accountability lacked integration and efficiency;
- The police were failing to make the best use of resources ; and
- Greater emphasis on tackling criminals would be more effective than focusing on crimes (Retcliff, 2003:1-2).

2.3.2 Intelligence led policing in the United States of America

In March 2002 an intelligence sharing summit was held in the United States of America. One hundred (100) intelligence experts attended the summit, representing, Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement experts from the United States and Europe. These experts examined the General Criminal Intelligence Plan and the United Kingdom's National Intelligence Model as potential blueprints for intelligence led policing in the United States. The summit came up with the following recommendations:

- Promote intelligence led policing;
- Provide the critical counterbalance of civil rights;
- Increase opportunities for building trust;
- Remedy analytic and information deficits; and
- Address training and technology issues.

The recommendations of the summit suggested major changes in the way policing should be approached in the United States of America (Peterson, 2005:5-6).

2.3.3 Intelligence led policing in Australia

In Australia, intelligence led policing started in the late 1990's, advocated by a number of police commissioners. Its adoption included new accountability structures at local level, a greater integration of intelligence and investigation, and improved targeting of daily police efforts through the dissemination of intelligence. Performance outcome reviews, including more dynamic features, were incorporated in a number of Australian jurisdictions in various formats, such as operations and crime reviews (Retcliff, 2003:2).

2.4 CONCLUSION

Research methodology is the vital part of the research project. It serves as a guiding document which indicates the research approach. This study is a combination of quantitative and qualitative research. A systematic process of literature review was used as a method of gathering information about the implementation of intelligence led policing in other countries. The next chapter will discuss the evolution of intelligence, from the ancient world until the birth of modern intelligence.

CHAPTER 3: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF INTELLIGENCE

3.1. INTRODUCTION

Intelligence collection in the form of espionage is one of the oldest professions in the history of mankind. Historical records show that it is the second oldest profession after prostitution (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:15). The creation of kings and emperors, and, later on kingdoms, empires, and states led to the institutionalisation of intelligence as a means of controlling and ruling others. Intelligence has always been, and will always be, the vital tool for victory in war and in peace. This chapter covers the origin, development, and use of intelligence in the ancient world, during the dark ages, the middle ages, the renaissance, and up until the birth of modern intelligence and criminal intelligence.

3.2. INTELLIGENCE AND THE HUMAN RACE

Bowers (1984:168) states that, the collection of intelligence dates back to the beginning of mankind. Primitive man sought answers to questions relating to his survival and comfort. The need to know is, thus, deeply embedded in the human biological and social make up as much as the need to reproduce. In order to survive, human beings need information about their surroundings, with regard to threats and food supply for instance. Thus, collecting information on these basic needs is a key to survival. As one of mankind's basic survival instincts, intelligence is as old as humanity itself (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:15). Naturally, human beings and their institutions have their own secrets which are things that are hidden from one human being to another, one institution to another, and from one nation or state to another. The wish to conceal things from one another is caused by fear, weakness, greed, or shame. On the other hand, humans also have the inherited traits of curiosity. This is also a natural instinct of wanting to know the secrets of the other side and explore them. The existence of these two mutually-opposing forces, namely (curiosity versus secrecy), led to natural competition amongst enemies and sometimes amongst friends and allies (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:15-17). The next paragraph will explore the evolution of information collection from the ancient world up to the modern age.

3.3. INTELLIGENCE IN THE ANCIENT WORLD

Throughout history, intelligence has been defined as the collection, culling, analysis, and dissemination of critical and strategic information (Lerner, 2010:1). Information was primarily collected about the threats against the ruling regimes. The practice of collecting information about the threats against the ruling regimes and kings started 6000 years ago in Mesopotamia. This was done by establishing institutions and assigning individual persons to collect information on any threats, either individuals or nations, threatening the security of the ruling regime. The oldest form of information collection is espionage, which is well documented in political and military arts (Lerner, 2010:1).

Crowdy (2006:15) agrees with Cardwell (2004:1-2) that the first documented story of spies in the bible appears in the book of Genesis, when Joseph accused his brothers of being Canaanite spies reconnoitring for unprotected spots along the Egyptian border. This story confirms the fact that Ancient Egypt was concerned about foreign spies infiltrating its borders. Cardwell (2004:1-2) went further to state that the first actual act of spying took place under the direction of Moses who sent twelve spies, each from the twelve tribes of Israel to the promised land. The second act took place under the leadership of Joshua who sent two spies to Jericho before launching a military campaign to conquer the city.

According to Crowdy (2006:15) another record of the use of spies in the ancient world is the story of the battle of Kadesh. In this story the Egyptians under the leadership of Pharaoh Rameses managed to defeat the Hittite of king Muwatallis. King Muwatallis sent two spies who disguised as deserters from the Hittite army. They told Pharaoh Rameses that the Hittite army is still far away with the intention of ambushing the Egyptian army. Rameses believed what they told him, but fortunately the Egyptian army managed to avert the ambush after another two spies were captured and told the truth about the ambush during the interrogation.

Sheldon (2011:50-51) describes the importance and dangers of intelligence work in the ancient world by stating that “ancient spies, unlike their modern counter parts, did

not retire and write memoirs about their experiences. Their failure meant their execution or a major military disaster". This statement is an indication of how intelligence work is valued. Victory and defeat in battle depends on proper and accurate intelligence. Intelligence has always formed part of statecraft and warfare. It was a vital tool to rulers, of ancient empires or even cities. It was used to control the inhabitants, keep the rulers abreast of political developments abroad, and informed of the internal security of their regimes. Every possible way of gathering information was used to enable them to make informed decisions. There are four main civilisations which contributed greatly to the intelligence tradecraft. These are Egypt, Rome, Greece, and Ancient China.

3.3.1 Egypt

Spies and acts of information collection appear in some of the world's earliest recorded history. Egyptian hieroglyphs reveal the presence of court spies, as do papyri describing ancient Egypt's extensive military and slave trade operations. Early Egyptian Pharaohs employed the agents of espionage to collect or gather information about disloyal subjects and to identify tribes that could be conquered and enslaved (Lerner, 2010:1). From 1000 BC onwards, Egyptian espionage operations focused on foreign intelligence about the political and military strength of their rivals, Greece and Rome. Egyptian spies made significant contributions to espionage trade craft.

Owing to the fact that the ancient civilisations of Egypt, Greece, and Rome employed literate subjects in their civil service, many spies dealt with written communications to gather the required information. The use of written messages brought some challenges to the intelligence environment which led to the development of codes, disguised writing, trick inks, and hidden compartments in clothing. Egyptian spies were the first to develop the extensive use of poison, including toxins derived from plants and snakes, to carry-out assassinations and acts of sabotage (Lerner, 2010:1-2). Hieroglyphs show the practice of intelligence during ancient times. These ancient writings tell a story of the triumphant campaign against the Syrian uprising of 1488 BC by Tutmoses III (a pharaoh).

According to the hieroglyphs, the secret agents of the pharaoh in Megiddo informed him about the rebellion months before it started. These undercover spies noted Kadesh's growing army in the north and immediately rode south to warn the Egyptian outpost Fort at Tjuru, near present day Port Said, of the gathering storm. The speedy reaction of the pharaoh to the intelligence given made it possible to crush the rebellion (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:26).

3.3.2 Rome

The first real "national" intelligence system for Rome was developed by Julius Caesar. This was influenced and prompted by the fact that, as a successful soldier, Caesar realised the importance of timely, accurate information about his enemies, and the need for fast secure communications to keep his own plans secret (Lerner, 2010:3). Julius Caesar complemented the interrogation of prisoners and local inhabitants during his campaign in Gaul by employing scouts. The main responsibility of the scouts was to collect information which was consistently fed to the advancing army. Commanders of these scouts had direct access to Caesar in order to keep him abreast about the situation in the empire and other states (Crowdy, 2006:38).

Rome is one of the civilisations in the ancient world, which relied heavily on intelligence. In over a millennium, the Romans created the largest empire of the ancient world, necessitating the governance of the most expansive infrastructure, military and bureaucracy. A famous case of intelligence failure in ancient Rome is the assassination of Julius Caesar on 15 March 44 BC. Records about the assassination established that the Roman Intelligence community knew of the plot and even provided intelligence to Caesar or his assistants providing the names of several conspirators (Lerner, 2010:3-4). The ignoring of the information from the intelligence community led to the assassination of Julius Caesar.

The Roman Empire often spied on its neighbours. The intelligence community provided comprehensive reports on the military strength and resources of those outside the empire. Informers were also employed by the military to infiltrate tribal organisations and convince leaders to join the alliance with Rome. If the group or

individuals were found to be hostile to the Roman Empire, the military would be informed, and the opposing forces would be engaged. This type of intelligence campaign was very successful in the Italian Peninsula during the fourth century BC (Lerner, 2010:3-4).

After the murder of Julius Caesar in 44 BC, his successor, Octavius, who became known as Caesar Augustus, rapidly drew all the existing military and diplomatic intelligence services into his own hands and established an empire-wide network of information collectors, known as *Cursus Publicus* which became the core of Imperial Rome's Secret Service (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:31). The fact that most Roman emperors were victims of assassinations during the imperial period caused paranoia. This paranoia prompted them to have spies in and outside the empire. Ultimately this situation led to the organised spying activity, in the form of a secret police, known as the *frumentarii*. This secret police was established during the reign of Emperor Domitian who ruled from AD 81-96. It consisted of non-commissioned officers and centurions who were primarily responsible for the purchasing of grain for the legions. The commander of this secret police organisation was a *prince peregrinorum*, who was a senior centurion directly responsible to the emperor (Crowdy, 2006:38).

Imperial Rome built a recognisable police and intelligence service designed to give early warning of any threats to the Imperial throne and of corruption and unrest in the Empire on the foundations laid by Caesar. Trojan and his successors further refined the Roman secret service with a network of spies and informers to cover the civilised world in support of their central needs for imperial security and commerce, and to back up the legions guarding the long frontiers (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:31). The *frumentarii* was Rome's secret police unit. Its function was to collect information and hunt down revolutionaries. During the first century AD, this police unit was hunting down Christians, because they were regarded as a threat to the Roman Empire. Any political movement that advocated the equality and freedom of slaves and the existence of some heavenly kingdom clearly posed a serious challenge to the Roman order, and, as such, it was considered to be deeply subversive to domestic security. Owing to its unpopularity the *frumentarii* was disbanded and replaced by *agentes in rebus* which was a civilian secret police. The *peregrini* were the secret military police

and enforcement unit for the Emperor's orders anywhere in the Roman Empire (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:31-33).

3.3.3 Greece

New concepts of government and law enforcement were developed by the rise of Greek civilisation between 1500 BC and 1200 BC (Lerner, 2010:1). Owing to many wars experienced by the Greek during that time, new military and intelligence strategies were developed. The early Greeks relied on deception as a primary means of achieving surprise attacks on their enemies. Greek literature from antiquity celebrated its intelligence exploits, owing to its successful deceptive strategies which led to resounding victories over their rivals (Lerner, 2010:1). The shining example of a masterpiece of deceptive strategy by the Greeks is the legendary incident of the "Trojan Horse". In this incident, a wooden structure of a horse was given to the city of Troy as a gift. Inside this "wooden horse" there were several hundred Greek soldiers seeking safe entrance into the heavily fortified rival city of Troy. As a result they managed to enter the city safely. The "Trojan Horse" story became a symbol of Grecian intelligence prowess (Lerner, 2010:1-2).

In the era of democratic Greek city states, espionage was chiefly employed as a political tool. Agents of espionage spied on rival city-states, providing rulers with information on military strength and defences. One of the outstanding and unmatched inventions of the Greek intelligence community until the modern era is the semaphore. This was the form of communication that utilised signals to convey messages. Semaphore was the means of communication between cities (Lerner, 2010:1-2).

3.3.4 Ancient China

According to Hughes-Wilson (2005:41), Sun Tsu is known to be the first codifier of intelligence in the ancient world. He was a military strategist who lived and fought around the Yellow River province of Wu around 500 BC. He emphasised that intelligence was a vital tool either in winning or losing a battle. One of his classic books about the use of intelligence is *Ping Fa*, meaning "the art of war" in English.

Crowdy (2006:15) supports this view on the need for proper intelligence or foreknowledge on the enemy by quoting these words from the great Chinese warrior *“Thus what enables the wise sovereign and good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits, it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, not by any means of calculation. Knowledge of the enemy’s disposition can only be obtained from other men”*.

According to Burds (2011:12) Sun Tsu was the first writer in history to emphasize the necessity of avoiding all military engagements not based upon extensive, detailed analysis of the strategic situation, tactical options, and military capabilities.

Hughes-Wilson (2005:41-43) states that Sun Tsu’s deep thought about intelligence, made it a priority for soldiers and statesmen alike. His information collection agents were classified into five main groups, namely:

- Local inhabitants;
- Government officials in the enemy camp who would betray their government in order to stay in their jobs;
- Enemy spies who could be “turned ” and doubled to play back disinformation;
- Expendable agents who could be sacrificed to feed false information to the enemy; and
- Spies who could be relied upon to penetrate the enemy, survive, and report accurately from inside the enemy camp.

He used the following words when commenting about the skills that the spy should have, which distinguish him as the great intelligence philosopher of all times, *‘As living spies we must recruit men who are intelligent but appear to be stupid; men who seem to be dull but have strong hearts; men who are physically fit, vigorous, tough and brave; and men who can live a simple life and survive, enduring cold, hunger, dirt and humiliation.*

Sun Tsu’s intelligence system was founded upon the principle of compartmentalisation. According to this system none of the spies knew everything, and even if they were captured by the enemy, none can discover the secret system. He called this system “divine manipulation of the threads” (Burds, 2011:13). This system helped Sun Tsu and the ancient Chinese to have an upper hand over their

enemies. A captured spy could only disclose what he knew and what his assignment was.

3.4 DARK AGES

During this period, developments in the intelligence field were marked by the Byzantine Empire's secret weapon as well as the effective and efficient information collection and analysis by the Mongols.

3.4.1 Byzantine Empire

The fall of the Roman Empire in 476 AD ended the western half of the Roman Empire and the Eastern half continued as the Byzantine Empire, with Constantinople as its capital. Intelligence played a pivotal role in the survival of the Byzantine Empire. According to Hughes-Wilson (2005:34), the history of the Byzantine has two clear and long-lasting themes in its intelligence activities. The first one is the need to preserve the secret of Greek fire. Secondly is the requirement to report the constant threat from Islam and heirs of Prophet Mohammed. Burds (2011:14) states that constant threats by the Arabs in 678 AD to the Byzantine Empire led to the development of a secret weapon, known as the "Greek Fire". This weapon was invented by a Greek architect or engineer by the name of Kallinikos. It is described as a vicious liquid mixture of naphtha, liquid bitumen, and turpentine resin from pine trees, sulphur, and liquid lime. It could be dropped on to men or ships in clay pots, flung from catapults, and, suitably diluted, even be projected from siphons like a flame thrower. "Greek fire" was regarded as an effective and terrifying secret weapon. By using this secret weapon the Greeks were able to repel Arab forces. For nearly four hundred years the Byzantine Empire prevented the secret formula of its ultimate terror weapon, known as the "Greek Fire" from falling into the hands of their Islamic enemies. It is only through the use of intelligence that this secret was guarded well for years, and never landed in the hands of the enemies. Byzantine's great intelligence preoccupation highlights the mirror image of intelligence in the form of security. (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:34-35).

3.4.2 Mongols

In 1256 AD, the Mongols, under the leadership of the Great Khan, occupied Northern Persia. They established an elaborate system of information gathering to discover the strengths and weaknesses of their enemies (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:38). They used agents and informers to gather information, within and outside the borders of the Mongol Empire, even deep inside Europe. For instance, they exploited the Venetians, who wanted to gain commercial advantage over their rivals, the Genoese, by paying those (Venetians) as an undercover European Intelligence Service. Ye Lui Chatsai, one of the Mongol Empire intelligence co-coordinators ran an effective and efficient information network (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:38-39).

For over a decade, his agents had penetrated virtually every European court and major city, and revealed European capabilities and intentions as well as their fears. Europe was an open book for them. They knew that the Pope was delaying a call for a Holy war against the Mongol Horde to defend Christendom because he hoped to convert them to Christianity as a result of effective information collection (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:39). According to Hughes-Wilson (2005:39), two great Mongol generals, Subutai and Chutsai, appear to have been running a remarkably integrated and modern intelligence operation, building up a detailed intelligence picture of their next conquest, and running advance spoiling operations against potential adversaries in Europe as the Horde's seemingly inexorable assault rode westwards.

According to the account of Fra Caprini, who was a Venetian envoy to the Mongols, (Hughes-Wilson, 2005:39-40), the Mongol intelligence system operated as follows: the merchant spies conducted surveillance on the target land, and in the process collected every piece of information about their target. This included topography, climate, roads, bridges, cities, political and demographic make-up of the region and the loyalty of its tribes. The main focus of the information collection process was the military forces, weapons, and fighting ability of the target nation. The collected information was reported back to the Mongol's front commanders by means of commercial codes used by merchants travelling along the great caravan routes of Asia. At the Mongol's headquarters such reported information was carefully and independently checked against the testimony of any captives or informers to double

check its accuracy and veracity. This is a shining example of critical analysis and source evaluation which is still applicable today.

3.5. MIDDLE AGES

After the collapse of the Roman Empire in Europe, espionage and intelligence activities were confined to wartime or local service. The only considerable political force in Europe during the Dark Ages was the Catholic Church. The birth of large Nation-States, such as France and England, in the Middle Ages (that is, the ninth and tenth centuries), facilitated the need for intelligence in a diplomatic setting.

During the eleventh century, the Catholic Church rose to the fore in European politics. The Church had the largest bureaucratic network, the sources of Feudal Military forces, and the largest treasury in the world, and it developed a policy that governed the whole of Europe. In 1095 AD, Pope Urban II called for the first crusade, a military campaign to recapture Jerusalem and the Holy Land from Muslim and Byzantine rule. The church mobilized several large armies and employed spies to report on the defences surrounding Constantinople and Jerusalem. Special Intelligence agents infiltrated prisons to free the captured crusaders, or to sabotage the rival palaces, mosques, and military defences. The crusades continued for four centuries, draining the military and intelligence sources of most of the European monarchs (Lerner, 2010:4).

The thirteenth century Catholic Church Council was prompted by religious fervour and the desire for political consolidation to establish laws regarding the prosecution of heretics and anti-clerical political leaders. This movement became known as the Inquisition. Espionage became the essential component of the Inquisition. The church relied on mass networks of informants to find and denounce suspected heretics and political dissidents (Lerner, 2010:4-5). By the early fourteenth century, both the Roman and Spanish monarchs employed sizable secret police forces to carry-out mass trials and public executions, whilst in Southern France, heretical groups relied on information gathered from their own resistance networks to gauge the surrounding political climate, and assist in hiding refugees. In 1542 the process of Inquisition was

centralized within the church. Pope Paul III established the Council of the Holy Office, a permanent council composed of cardinals and other officials, whose mission was to maintain the political integrity of the church. The council maintained spies and informants, whose focus was to scrutinise the actions of Europe's monarchs and prominent aristocrats (Lerner, 2010:5-6).

3.6. RENAISSANCE

The renaissance marked the eclipse of the Church-dominated world. Europe changed to more localised, nationalistic models of government, with each nation or city-state employing its own intelligence force. As nations and city-states became wealthier and gained more power, espionage gained resurgence. Competition for dominance over trade and exploration of the New World changed the political climate of Europe, and forced regimes increasingly to adopt deft measures for protecting their political, military, and economic interests (Lerner, 2010:6-7). In his book entitled, ***The Prince, and The Art of War***, Nicolo Machiavelli (1515) advocated that rulers routinely employed espionage trade craft, engaging in deception and spying to ensure the protection of their power and interests (Lerner, 2010:7). According to Macková (2009:5) England was one of the states that relied on intelligence for survival, and their success story dates back to the 14th century. This story unfolds as follows; during the reign of Henry VII agents were employed permanently and deployed abroad to gather information. These agents were paid salaries from the special funds. Cardinal Wolsey and Henry VIII's chief minister perfected it by employing people who intercepted letters. The threat posed by Catholic conspiracy and Spanish invasion in the 1580s led to the establishment of Sir Francis Walsingham's secret service. The main function of the secret service was to gather information. Fresh and reliable information was the key to success.

The art of espionage and intelligence gathering was perfected during the reign of Queen Elizabeth I. Her secretary Sir Francis Walsingham controlled all aspects of intelligence gathering. During those times England had spies who spied inside the country and outside in countries such as Spain, France, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire. The effectiveness of her intelligence network helped her to be a step ahead

of everyone else and effectively maintained her position of power in a hostile environment (Brady, 2009:21). Lerner (2010:7-8) agree with Macková (2009:8) that “the Elizabethan espionage system was highly effective. Its success lay in its employment strategy. Instead of relying on haphazard, ill-trained volunteers, or military men, they employed linguists, scholars, authors, engineers, and scientists, relying on professional experts to seek (collect or gather) and analyse information to produce good intelligence products”. Lerner (2010:8) went further to state that technological development in the Renaissance changed and improved the practice of espionage. Chemists invented invisible ink, and the rebirth of complex mathematics revived the encryption and code methods long dormant since antiquity. Telescopes, magnifying glasses, the camera, and clocks facilitated remote surveillance and the effective use of “dead drops” to pass information between agents.

3.7 BIRTH OF MODERN INTELLIGENCE

From the 1700s to the 1900s there was significant improvement in the collection of information and use of espionage. Industrialisation, wars in Europe, economic and territorial expansion, and the diversification of political philosophies and regimes transformed the world’s intelligence communities. During the dictatorship of Robespierre, informant networks denounced traitors to the new Republic and tracked down refugee aristocrats and clergy for trial and execution. The wide application of the treason laws and charges marked one of the greatest abuses of intelligence in the modern era (Lerner, 2010:8). Many governments, especially those of England, France, and Prussia employed spies to infiltrate political and labour organisations and report any anti-government activities.

The collection of information changed forever in 1837, with the invention of daguerreotype, the first practical form of photography. The photograph gave agents of espionage an opportunity to portray targets, documents, and other interests as they actually were (Lerner, 2010:9). Until the advent of the electronic storage systems in the twentieth century, the photograph was the best method of copying and transmitting information, as the photographed items were taken in the original form. According to Lerner (2010:10), on 24 May 1844, Samuel Morse, sent the first

message via telegraph, and as soon as governments began to use telegraph to send vital communications, rival intelligence services learned to tap the line, gaining access to secret communication and conducting a detailed surveillance from a comfortable distance. The use of telegraph necessitated the development of complex codes and the creation of special cryptology departments.

Intelligence has evolved into being a highly specialised technical field. Far from the battle field and political intrigue of the ancient world, modern intelligence work involves more research and analysis than field operations. Specialised military intelligence agents are still used for strategic intelligence, but most nations have developed large, centralised civilian intelligence communities that conduct operations in war and peace time with increasing technological sophistication (Lerner, 2010:10).

3.8. EVOLUTION OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE IN AMERICA

The use of intelligence for law enforcement purposes dates back to political and social crises in the United States of America. In the early 1870s law enforcement intelligence was used to prevent and control crime and violence. In 1880 the Detective Bureau of New York City Police Department had intelligence capabilities (Smith, 2013:4). This implies that there was already a method of gathering, managing, and storing information about target of investigation.

According to Carter (2009:31), in the 1920's criminal intelligence records were stored or kept in a "dossier system" format. This implies that intelligence files were dossiers. The dossier contained raw information about people who were thought to be involved with criminals, or people who were thought to be a threat to the safety and order in the community. During the great depression of the 1930's there was no development in the criminal intelligence arena, because the economy and not criminality was regarded as a threat to the United States of America. During the latter part of the century, when the spread of communism was regarded as a threat, the police relied on the dossier system to collect and store information about the communists and those who were supporting the ideology of communism. The dossier on the communist threat became known as the "red files".

Although the communists and their sympathisers in the United States did not commit any criminal offence, the dossier was opened to collect information about their activities, because they were regarded as a threat to National Security. The dossier system was regarded as the best method of collecting and storing information about the activities of an individual (Carter, 2009:32). Intelligence dossiers appeared to be an important tool in the 1960s during the Civil Rights and Anti-Vietnam War movements. Activists of both social movements appeared to be on the fringe of mainstream society. They were vocal in their views, and both their exhortations and actions appeared to many as being “un-American”. During the late 1960’s and early 1970’s the lawsuits against the police by the community increased. Initially the focuses of the lawsuits were on various patterns of police misconduct, such as the excessive use of force and other violations of the law (Carter, 2009:33).

Ultimately such lawsuits moved towards police intelligence units. During such lawsuits, the court discovered that there was no evidence of criminality. The practice of keeping intelligence dossiers on a contingency basis was, therefore, found to be improper, serving no compelling state interest and depriving citizens of their constitutional rights in terms of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified as Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1983- Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights which states that “Every person who under colour of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress, except that any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia”. As a result, the courts ruled and ordered intelligence files to be purged from police records, and, in many cases, police agencies had to pay damage awards to plaintiffs. Citizens were also permitted to gain access to their own

records from the police intelligence dossier. Many activists publicised their intelligence files as a badge of honour, often to the embarrassment of the police. This led to the cutbacks or even the total cancellation of intelligence operations. The embarrassment and costs incurred by police intelligence units suggest caution in the development of intelligence records (Carter, 2009:33).

Information had, thus, to be collected, retained, reviewed, and disseminated in a manner that is consistent with legal and ethical standards. According to Carter (2009: 33-34), lessons learned from this gross violation of basic human rights led to the establishment of two committees. The first committee was the United States Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. The second Committee was the Church Committee, named after its chairman, Frank Church. This Committee held extensive hearings on domestic intelligence, especially regarding the programme of the Federal Bureau of Investigations' (FBI) which spanned the years 1959 to 1967. The findings of these committees showed that domestic intelligence activity has threatened and undermined the constitutional rights of Americans to free speech, association, and privacy (Carter, 2009:35). It has done so primarily because the Constitutional System for checking the abuse of power has not been applied. These findings and the concern of the broad public prompted the United States Department of Justice to develop guidelines for the management of Criminal Intelligence records that were maintained by state and local law enforcement agencies. These guidelines are contained in the Justice System Improvement Act of 1979. The Justice System Improvement Act of 1979 created a regulation codified as 28CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 23, and known as Criminal Intelligence Systems Operating Policies, which governs inter-jurisdictional and multijurisdictional systems that are operated by, or on behalf of, the state and local law enforcement agencies, which are funded by federal funds. Owing to the fact that the federal government cannot mandate policy to state and local governments, the only method by which such policy could be leveraged is to make policy implementation a condition for accessing federal funds. The regulation provides guidelines for the collection, retention, review, dissemination, and purging of criminal intelligence records. According to this regulation, before information that identifies an individual or an organisation may be retained in the criminal intelligence records system of a state or

local law enforcement agency, there must be sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable suspicion that the individual or organisation is involved in criminal activities.

3.8.1 Congressional inquiries into intelligence activities

The United States Congress conducted three inquiries on the functioning of the Intelligence community. The main focus of the inquiries was to assess the legality and propriety of the actual intelligence operations and, not the efficiency of such operations. The recommendations of these three congressional committees resulted in major changes in both the jurisdiction and roles of intelligence community members regarding law enforcement and national security intelligence. This led to the separation of Domestic and International intelligence.

According to Carter (2009:35), in 1975 the Rockefeller Commission, which focused on the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency within the United States, made two important recommendations. The first recommendation was the limitation of the Central Intelligence Agency's authority to conduct domestic intelligence operations. Secondly, it recommended that the director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the director of the FBI should set jurisdictional guidelines for their respective agencies. In 1976 the House Select Committee on Intelligence which was chaired by Otis Pike also recommended the further limitation of jurisdictional overlap between agencies responsible for national security intelligence and agencies which are primarily responsible for law enforcement intelligence (Carter, 2009:35). The United States Senate established the Church Committee to examine the conduct of the intelligence community in a broader manner than the Rockefeller Commission had. This inquiry produced one hundred and eighty three (183) recommendations, and most of them were directed at developing new operational boundaries for the CIA and FBI. The following recommendations illustrate how national security intelligence was separated from law enforcement intelligence. The committee recommended that agencies, such as the National Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the military branches, should not have the powers to conduct domestic intelligence operations, as this is regarded as a law enforcement intelligence function. Specific

attention was given to the role of the Central Intelligence Agency, noting that the CIA should be prohibited from conducting domestic security activities within the United States. The committee recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation should have the “sole responsibility” for conducting domestic intelligence investigations of Americans. The FBI should “look to the CIA as the overseas operational arm of the intelligence community”. All agencies were also advised to ensure that no improper intelligence activities are conducted. These recommendations have been widely recognised as a primary reason for the separation of law enforcement intelligence from National Security Intelligence. The committee, however, also recommended that the FBI and the CIA should continue sharing information and should make a better effort to coordinate their initiatives (Carter, 2009:35).

3.8.2 Crime commissions

Law enforcement intelligence is an outgrowth of military and national security intelligence. As indicated above, military intelligence dates back to ancient times. Security intelligence was adapted for use in law enforcement operations after the Second World War (Peterson, 2005:5). The crime commissions which are discussed below were a move by the government to introduce the use of intelligence in policing or law enforcement. From 1931 to 2004 the United States established fifteen (15) National Crime Commissions to examine and develop strategies to combat and prevent crime. The commissions examined crimes ranging from street crimes and drug trafficking to organised crime and terrorism. Most commissions made recommendations relating to law enforcement intelligence. These recommendations demonstrate the intention of establishing law enforcement intelligence operations that are objective, analytical, and respectful of privacy and civil rights. These serve as a foundation for modern law enforcement intelligence practices (Carter, 2009:36). The following commissions made findings and recommendations regarding law enforcement intelligence:

3.8.2.1 *Wickersham Commission (1931)*

Known as the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, this commission was established to examine all aspects of serious crime in the United States of America. The main aim of this Commission was to address the growth of organised crime, especially that which had arisen from prohibition, and increases in violent crime that appeared to be generated by industrialisation and urbanisation. The secondary objective of the Commission was to understand the failure of law enforcement, the courts, and corrections to manage America's crime problem effectively. The commission recommended that law enforcement agencies should establish an intelligence system to provide police and other public officials with reliable information that might help to prevent the outbreak of disorder and to institute effective control measures in the event of the eruption of a riot (Carter, 2009:39).

3.8.2.2 *Warren Commission (1964)*

In 1963, after the assassination of President J.F Kennedy, President L.B Johnson established the President Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, known as the Warren commission. The primary goal of the commission was to determine the circumstances which had led to the assassination of President Kennedy. The outcome of the enquiry also highlighted the relationship among federal, state, and local law enforcement, their communications, and generally their ability to work together for the common purpose of protecting the president of the country (Carter, 2009:39).

3.8.2.3 *President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967)*

Concern about the high level of crime which was generated by violence, drug use, and organised crime as well as the concerns about inequalities in the administration of justice, especially when dealing with minorities, resulted in the establishment of the President's Commission in 1965. This Commission was tasked with the investigation of all aspects of the criminal justice system and to conduct specific inquiries into

narcotics and organised crime (Carter, 2009:39). The commission made the following two recommendations. The first one was that every major city police department should have intelligence units that will focus on gathering and processing information on organised crime. Secondly, it was recommended that the United States Justice Department should encourage the development of efficient system for intelligence gathering and dissemination by offering financial assistance (Porter, 2008:7).

3.8.2.4 *Kerner Commission (1967)*

A series of violent demonstrations in cities throughout the United States orchestrated by the civil rights movement in 1967 led to the creation of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, chaired by Otto Kerner, the governor of Illinois. This Commission became known as the Kerner Commission. The goal of this commission was to unpack and understand the dynamics of civil disobedience and civil disorders as well as to evaluate the government's response. The Commission made the following observations with regard to civil disorders and riots in United States cities. "No particular control tactic was successful in every situation. The varied effectiveness of control techniques emphasizes the need for advance training, planning, adequate intelligence systems, and knowledge of the inner city" (Carter, 2009:39). Based on the above mentioned observation, the commission recommended that law enforcement agencies should establish an intelligence system to provide police and other public officials with reliable information that might help to prevent the outbreak of a disorder and to institute effective control measures in the event of the eruption of a riot (Carter, 2009:39).

3.8.2.5 *National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1968).*

The primary function of this commission was to identify causes of various crimes, to provide blue-ribbon advice on the best tactics, and develop strategies and programmes to deal with crime. The Commission made the following recommendations or found the following with regard to intelligence, "a major weakness" of many police departments is the absence of a reliable intelligence system. The absence has gravely handicapped police and public officials in

anticipating and preventing trouble, and in minimising and controlling a disorder that has broken out. In large part, this happens because of a failure to learn about and understand neighbourhood problems and grievances and to develop reliable information concerning community organisations and leaders. Related to this problem is the need for a reliable mechanism to monitor, to collect, and to evaluate rumours and also the need for an effective program to counter false and provocative rumours which can aggravate tension and incite violence (Carter, 2009:39-40).

3.8.2.6 *National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (1973)*

Carter (2009:40) agrees with Porter (2008:7-8) that in order to improve intelligence capacity to enable different law enforcement agencies to prevent and combat crime, the Commission recommended that every police agency and every state should immediately establish and maintain the capability to gather and evaluate information and to disseminate intelligence in a manner which protects every individual's right to privacy while it curtails organised crime and public disorder. Further recommendations were also made with regard to the structure and operations of the intelligence functions for state and law enforcement agencies. According to Porter (2008:7-8) and Carter (2009:40-41) the Commission made the following recommendations with regard to the structure of the intelligence units:

- Each State should develop a centralised law enforcement intelligence function with the participation of each police agency within the state;
- States should consider establishing regional intelligence networks across contiguous states to enhance criminal information-sharing process; and
- Every local law enforcement agency should establish its own intelligence function in accordance with its respective state's intelligence function.

With regard to intelligence operations the following recommendations were made:

- Each state and local intelligence function should provide support to federal agencies;
- Operational policies and procedures should be developed for each local, state, and regional intelligence function to ensure efficiency and effectiveness;

- Each agency should have a designated official who reports directly to the chief and oversees all intelligence operations; and
- Each agency should develop procedures to ensure the proper screening, securing, and disseminating of intelligence related information (Carter, 2009:40-41).

3.8.2.7 *President's Commission on Organised Crime (1983)*

This Commission was established to examine all aspects of organised crime, ranging from “traditional” organised crime, that is, the Mafia, La Cosa Nostra, to drug trafficking cartels, sophisticated money laundering operations, and entrepreneurial crime of all types and commodities. The main objective of the inquiry was to provide a detailed insight into organised crime, its structure, its effects, and how best to control it. The findings of the commission were that effective intelligence analysis was a critical tool to enable law enforcement to deal successfully with multi-jurisdictional complex criminality (Carter, 2009:41).

3.8.2.8 *Attorney General's Commission on Pornography (1986)*

Like other previous commissions, this commission also found that intelligence operations are vital for stopping and intercepting interstate traffic of obscene and pornographic materials (Carter, 2009:41).

3.8.2.9 *Gilmore Commission (1999)*

Following an increased number of terrorist attacks in the Middle East in the 1990s, especially the bombings of United States embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and in Nairobi, Kenya, the Congress mandated the creation of an Advisory Panel to assess domestic response capabilities for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction which became known as Gilmore Commission in 1999. The commission recommended that there should be more robust intelligence and information sharing by the law enforcement and intelligence community. They went further by saying, “Intelligence – its timely collection, thoughtful analysis, and appropriate dissemination is the key to effective prevention of terrorist attacks” (Carter, 2009:42).

3.8.3 Introduction of intelligence led policing in the United States of America

According to Gül (2009:29), in the United States of America intelligence led policing was triggered by the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001. This horrific incident led to the hosting of a Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit by the International Association of Chiefs of Police the following year. This summit emphasized the importance of intelligence sharing and intelligence led policing. Guidetti (2006:56) supports the view that the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 in the United States of America highlighted the need for the use of intelligence by State police organisations.

3.9 EVOLUTION OF POLICE INTELLIGENCE UNITS IN BRITAIN

The use of intelligence in policing has been a vital tool since the birth of modern policing. It was introduced by Sir Charles Rowan, a former commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, who had been an intelligence officer in Wellington's Peninsular Army. Although intelligence was introduced into policing almost a century ago it played an insignificant role, and was not regarded as central to policing. The police managers looked upon it as something that added to the investigative picture or supported the operational capability of the organisation rather than a tool that drove strategy (Kleiven, 2005:258).

As an indication that intelligence plays a pivotal role in policing, different British Constabularies have intelligence units to deal with different threats in different regions such as organised crime, drugs, and other complex crimes unique to their jurisdictions. Football intelligence units which deal with hooliganism at soccer matches are examples of intelligence units of different constabularies. During the 1980's the National Drug Intelligence unit was created at National level to deal with trans-national drug trafficking and associated crimes, such as money laundering. This unit was expanded in 1992 and renamed the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) tasked with dealing with all forms of organised crime. In 2006, the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the investigation unit known as National Crime Squad, and the drug enforcement functions of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs Service

were integrated to form or create a new agency known as the Serious Organised Crime Agency (Carter, 2009:84).

3.10 INFORMATION COLLECTION IN AUSTRALIA

Although Australia does not have an external threat of terrorism it has a counter-terrorism information collection organisation known as the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. This agency was created in 1949 and derives its authority from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) Act of 1979. The main function of this intelligence organisation is to collect and analyse information on threats to the country's internal security, such as terrorism and trans-national crimes. Intelligence products are disseminated to the government, police, and the Australian Intelligence Community at large for operationalisation. The main source of information for this agency is the community who provide information as informants or ordinary law abiding citizens. In addition, the agency actively collects information via computer access, intercepts of mail and telecommunications, and through covert listening and tracking devices. ASIO has a close working relationship with federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004:38).

3.11 INFORMATION COLLECTION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The South African Communist party was established in 1921. During the start of the Second World War, the communists in South Africa refused to be involved in any way in the war, either by supporting the allied forces or physically participating in the war as soldiers of the Union of South Africa. Immediately after the invasion of Russia by Hitler, the communists became loyal and fervent allies of the Allied powers, namely, Britain and the United States of America. This led to the Communist party of South Africa recruiting members to fight against Germany in the war. As a result, the communists managed to infiltrate the army, the civil service, and the labour unions of South Africa. This strong position of the Communist party of South Africa posed a serious threat to the internal security of the country as it was suspected of being behind the strike actions by miners in the Witwatersrand area and in other areas in the Transvaal province (de Witt Dippenaar, 1988:196). As the first line of defence,

the police had to improvise to deal with the threat of communism which was spreading like cancer in South Africa, creating insecurity by organising strikes across the country. This situation posed a serious threat to the white minority government of South Africa. The situation prompted the police management to establish a special unit which was tasked with preserving the internal security of the country. In response, the then Commissioner of the South African Police, Major General Palmer, instructed Major H. J du Toit to establish the Security branch of the South African Police which would deal mainly with the threat of communism and other political activities which threatened to undermine the white government in 1947. This new branch was on a par with the Detective and Uniform branches of the SAP. The establishment of this new branch was met with resistance from the old commissioned officers, who regarded the security branch as essentially foreign to the traditional nature and duties of the police force. In 1948 Major du Toit and a team of police officials went to Britain to be trained in methods of combating subversion and subversive organisations. After the training, they returned to South Africa with firm ideas regarding the further operation of the Security Branch and began to apply them in practice (de Witt Dippenaar, 1988:211). Africa and Kwadjo (2009:65) in addition state that this unit acted as an elite political police. Its primary function was to gather information about the political opponents of the apartheid regime. The main aim of this unit was to achieve short and medium term objectives such as detentions, prosecutions, and imprisonment.

3.11.1 Functions of the Security Branch

The functions and duties of the Security Branch was the maintenance of the internal security of the country and its inhabitants. Its responsibilities, within the framework of police activities in terms of the SAP Standing Order (General) 14, was, firstly, the identification of trends dangerous to the State and subversive trends present in individuals and organisations, conducting every investigation and research in this regard, and the combating of such trends by means of prosecution, restriction, detention or otherwise, in accordance with the common law and or existing security legislation. The second function was the establishment of an effective intelligence network through the recruitment, training, and operating of sources/agents, with the

object of discovering and researching the ideological and physical threat against the State in order that intended or planned internal or external threats, undermining activities and subversion which may endanger the good order, peace and quiet, may be identified timeously and dealt with in the manner as stated above. Africa and Kwadjo (2009:67) contend that one of the roles of the Security Branch during the struggle against apartheid was to monitor resistance through the co-ordination of an extensive network of informers in anti-apartheid groups, along with detention, harassment, and surveillance. Secret files were kept about the activities of these opponents. In order to understand the evolution of intelligence collection in South Africa it is vital to have a look at the different intelligence structures of the Apartheid regime which were created to neutralize the threat of communism and resistance from liberation movements. The next paragraph will highlight the establishment and roles of different intelligence structures which helped to keep the apartheid regime in power for four and a half decades.

3.11.2 South African intelligence community

In order to deal with the increasing threat of internal resistance, the apartheid government created an entangled-web of information collection. In 1948 the Afrikaner National Party won the elections to become the ruling party in South Africa. From then onwards, until South Africa declared itself a Republic in 1961, intelligence was a 'limited' function (O'Brien, 2003:3). It was a limited function in the sense that its whole authority and responsibility rested with one individual known as Brigadier "Lang" Hendrik van den Bergh. The Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was formed in 1961 as a unit under the South African Defence Force (SADF). During the British rule of South Africa, the intelligence function had been the responsibility of the SAP Special Branch, which later became known as the Security Branch. So the establishment of the Directorate of Military Intelligence within the SADF meant that the intelligence functions in South Africa were then transferred to the DMI. These changes led to increased rivalry and poorly-delineated mandates resulting in infighting, including incidents of spying against each other (O'Brien, 2003:3).

As a result, important and relevant information was withheld by one side from the other, agents of either side were exposed, and political back-stabbing within the

government arena grew. It was clear that the Republic's intelligence needs were not met because of the infighting. As compensation for the poor performance of the DMI, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd instructed van den Berg, who was the head of the Security Branch, to establish a separate intelligence agency outside of the Security Branch's day-to-day interests which would be responsible for a national intelligence function. This unit was established in 1963 and it became known as the Republican Intelligence (RI), and it was headed by Brigadier van den Bergh himself (O'Brien, 2003:4). Little was achieved by this unit as a result of the growth of the DMI and failing relations with Great Britain.

The other failure of the Republican Intelligence could be attributed to its existence in the shadow of the security branch. In order to address the growing intelligence needs of the Republic, the Cabinet agreed to the establishment of a centralised intelligence service. On 28 August 1968, van den Bergh was again instructed to set up such a new structure. According to O'Brien (2003:4-5), on 1 October 1968 van den Bergh was appointed as Prime Minister Vorster's security advisor. On 13 May 1969 an organisation known as the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) was officially formed, in terms of the Public Service Amendment Act, Number 86 of 1969. Although this Act led to the establishment of Bureau for State Security, it did not give a full brief for the agency. Later on, the State Security Council Act, 64 of 1972 outlined the functions of BOSS as follows, to identify any threat to the country, and to collect, evaluate, correlate, and interpret national security intelligence information. This arrangement led to further confusion and clashes within the intelligence community. In order to address this problem, Prime Minister Vorster established a commission of inquiry, headed by Judge Potgieter.

3.11.2.1 Potgieter Commission of Inquiry

According to (O'Brien, 2003:5), in 1970 Prime Minister Vorster established the Potgieter Commission to inquire into Certain Intelligence Aspects of State Security and to come up with recommendations. The findings and recommendations of the commission led to the enactment of Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act, 64 of 1972. This Act laid out the mandate of BOSS as indicated above and the

establishment of the State Security Council as the operational centre of the government security strategy. In terms of this Act, the function of the State Security Council was:

- To advise the Government on the formulation of national policy and strategy in relation to the security of the country and the manner in which this should be implemented;
- To advise on a policy to combat any particular threat to the security of the Republic of South Africa; and
- To determine intelligence priorities on the recommendation of BOSS.

BOSS was also responsible for the surveillance and infiltration of anti-apartheid organisations abroad, as well as individuals engaged in activities against South Africa. The covert operations of BOSS both internationally and domestically resulted in the assassinations of opponents of the apartheid regime. One of its units involved in these assassinations was the 'Z Squad' (O'Brien, 2003:5-6). The first assassination of the enemies of apartheid regime outside South Africa took place in February 1974. Within two weeks of each other, the founder-member of ANC's armed wing, Umkonto Wesizwe (MK), John Dube, and South African Student Organisation founder-member, Abram Tiro, were killed by letter-bombs in Zambia and Botswana respectively. One account indicates that, between 1977 and 1989, more than fifty (50) opponents of apartheid regime were assassinated by security forces (O'Brien, 2003:6-7).

One of the commission's recommendations regarding the police was that, except insofar as it might be necessary for the South African Police to collect information covertly for the purpose of investigating offences connected with the security of the State, it should be the exclusive function of the Bureau for State Security (BOSS) to collect information covertly (Horrell, Horner, Kane-Berman & Margo, 1972:69). Although the different structures of the intelligence community were able to infiltrate, and cause great harm to the liberation struggle, there were still a lack of trust and cooperation amongst them. Every agency wanted to have control and influence over political masters. This battle for supremacy became known as the "Battle for the intelligence brief" which will be discussed in the next paragraph.

3.11.2.2 *Battle for the Intelligence Brief*

The battle for supremacy by the country's intelligence agencies was followed by the so-called "Information Scandal" which rocked South African politics in 1978 and led to the fall of Vorster, and the rise of the then Defence Minister, P. W. Botha, in September 1978. To avoid using intelligence agencies for personal gain which contributed to its poor performance against the so called "Total Onslaught", Botha divided the responsibilities for intelligence brief between the agencies, that is DMI, BOSS, Security Branch, and Foreign Affairs, which contributed to the overall intelligence picture. The DMI became a lead agency in all respects, and other agencies were responsible for clearly defined mandates in combating the "Total Onslaught" (O'Brien, 2003:7)

To eliminate BOSS's potential interference with new intelligence community setup, Botha forced its head, Brigadier van den Bergh, to resign, and in August 1978 BOSS was disbanded (O'Brien, 2003:8). In October 1978 Botha appointed Kobie Coetsee as Deputy Minister of Defence and National Security, and, at the same time, Kobie Coetsee was appointed to lead a commission of inquiry to examine options to rationalise the intelligence functions and determine a future course for the strategic intelligence brief. To do away with BOSS entirely, a new agency based on "academic" principles of analysis was built, forcing the majority of BOSS senior managers to take early retirement. In August 1978 the new agency called "Department of National Security" (DONS), which later became the National Intelligence Service (NIS), was formed (O'Brien, 2003:8). The mandate of NIS was to conduct research into and the analysis of strategic issues. The DMI dominated the South African intelligence community, and it advised the Prime Minister, who later became President of the country, on all aspects of national policy and strategy, ran the Total National Strategy, and the National Security Management System, and even oversaw intelligence operations based outside South Africa, including Namibia (O'Brien, 2003:7-8). The DMI's dominance of South African intelligence community ended in the 1990's when President F.W de Klerk mandated the NIS to oversee the negotiation process with the African National Congress (ANC). The following "significant" changes then followed, the DMI's power and position were seriously reduced, while the Security Branch

underwent a massive transformation into the Crime Combating and Investigation Service, and later became known as the Crime Intelligence Division of the newly reformed SAPS. This marked the end of the apartheid security forces and their total dominance over South African politics and society (O'Brien, 2003:8-9).

3.11.3 Regime change and policing

When the winds of change blew once again in South Africa, they also swept through the functions and duties of the SAP. Before his famous U-turn in January 1990, by releasing of Nelson Mandela and unbanning the ANC and other political parties, President De Klerk held a meeting with five hundred high ranking officers of the SAP at the police college in Pretoria. In his speech he indicated that "Up to now the police have been required to perform two types of functions. The one is to handle typical crime situations, such as murder, rape, and theft, which is the task of a police force around the world. You will no longer be required to prevent people from gathering to canvass support for their views. This is the political arena and we want to take the police out of it. We do not want to use you any more as instruments to reach certain political goals. We as politicians must take full responsibility for politics. This is the direction we are taking, and I want you to make peace with this new line" (Cawthra, 1992:3).

The shift from policing politics to policing crime created some challenges especially to the police force which was used to enforcing apartheid laws that were suppressing the majority of the country's citizens who happened to be Black. This meant that the police would have to render a service to all citizens of South Africa, and not only to a specific section of the community which happened to be white and were enjoying protection from the police who were enforcing apartheid laws. To deal with the new challenges of crime, the police had to develop new strategies. This is echoed by Bayley in Shaw (2002:10), when he states that "an efficient police in one age is an irrelevant police in another". It is a fact that the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy was a watershed moment in the history of South Africa, and it is also important to comprehend that the roots of criminality were bred before the transition began, were magnified in the period immediately before dramatic shifts in political

power occurred, and then became highly visible in the post transition period. This changing crime situation requires that the SAPS invent or adopt effective policing strategies to deal with this threat that affects all South Africans, irrespective of age, gender, race, or social status (Shaw, 2002:04).

3.11.4 Crime intelligence division of the South African Police Service

The crime intelligence division of the SAPS forms part of the South African intelligence community. Just as other members of the South African Intelligence community it is established by law, and governed by the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994. In terms of Section 2(3) of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994, the functions of the SAPS Intelligence Division shall be:

- (a) To gather, correlate, evaluate, co-ordinate, and use crime intelligence in support of the objects of the South African Police Service as contemplated in Section 205(3) of the constitution;
- (b) To institute counter-intelligence measures within the South African Police Service;
and
- (c) To supply crime intelligence relating to National Strategic Intelligence to NICOC.

According to the White Paper on Safety and Security, one of the specific interventions to improve investigations was that crime analysts should be appointed to the SAPS to assist in improving the quality of intelligence used by detectives. It went further by proposing the establishment of an overt crime analysis and information capacity at local level, that is, at police station level. Contrary to what was proposed by the committee which drew up a White Paper on Safety and Security more than a decade ago, in practice some of the police stations in South Africa do not have crime analysts. This situation has negative repercussions on effective policing, specifically crime prevention, as there is no guiding tool or document on where, how, and when police in such stations should conduct their operations and crime prevention activities.

3.12 CONCLUSION

History has shown us that there is a thin line between victory and defeat, success and failure, and that significant line is intelligence. What is important, however, is that proper use of intelligence guarantees victory and success, but ignorance of intelligence brings defeat, failure, and death. The success of, Moses, Julius Caesar, Sun Tsu, the Great Khan, and other ancient warriors and politicians is proof that, from the mists of time, intelligence is crucial not just for survival, but for battlefield success and political power. This shows that, from the very beginning, intelligence has been the hidden hand of victory. Thus, if properly applied in policing, huge successes in crime prevention and combating can be achieved. The next chapter will focus on information collection. The exploration and the dissection of different collection methods will be discussed. As we have seen from the historical background, information gathering has been problematic. South Africa has also experienced such challenges. The next chapter will, therefore, also focus on the challenges South Africa is still experiencing.

CHAPTER 4: INFORMATION COLLECTION

4.1 INTRODUCTION

There are many reasons for the collection of information, some of these reasons are national security, law enforcement, protective operations, and business or economic competition. The collection of information is mainly conducted by government agencies, although, in some instances, such as business and economic private sectors, information collection activities are conducted. This study will focus on the collection of information for the purpose of law enforcement. Attention will be given to the following aspects which form the core of information collection, namely, definition of intelligence, sources of information, information communication strategies, basic processes of gathering information, controlled access to information, information collection and information collection techniques.

4.2 DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE

The Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners defines “information” as knowledge or facts about someone or something (Rundell & Fox, 2005:735). Pieces of information are building blocks of intelligence, meaning that there can be no intelligence without information. In simple terms it implies that only information can be gathered or collected but not intelligence, intelligence is a product. In order to understand fully the concept of information collection it is equally important to take a look at the definition of intelligence. Although there are many different definitions of the term “*intelligence*”, the following will suffice for the purpose of this study.

Metscher and Gilbride (2005:3) define intelligence as a product created through the process of collecting, collating, and analysing data, for dissemination as usable information that typically assesses events, locations or adversaries, to allow the appropriate deployment of resources to reach a desired outcome. Hannah, O’Brien & Rathmell (2005:iii) define intelligence as a special kind of knowledge, a specialised subset of information that has been put through a systematic analytical process in order to support a state’s decision and policy makers. The International Association of

Law Enforcement Intelligence analysts define intelligence as an *analytic process* of deriving meaning from fact, by collecting information collected in the course of an investigation, or from internal or external files, and arriving at something more than was evident before. This could be leads in a case, a more accurate view of the crime problem, a forecast of future crime levels, a hypothesis of who might have committed a crime, or a strategy to prevent crime (Bacarese, 2009:38).

Intelligence is the end product of an *analytic process* that evaluates information collected from diverse sources; it integrates the relevant information into a logical package, and produces a conclusion, estimation, or a forecast about a criminal phenomenon by using the scientific approach to problem solving (analysis). Intelligence, therefore, is a synergistic product intended to provide meaningful and trustworthy actionable knowledge to law enforcement decision makers about complex criminality, criminal enterprises, criminal extremists, and terrorists (Carter, 2009:9).

Although there are different definitions of intelligence from different books and agencies, they all have one common factor, and that is analysis. The different definitions all prove that intelligence is the end result of analysis. This implies that any raw information or data which has not been analysed cannot be labelled as intelligence until it undergoes the process of analysis. Intelligence is, therefore, not collected but produced or generated, whilst information/data can be collected. Researchers and intelligence operatives in the field are collecting information/data, and analysts produce or generate intelligence products. It is equally important also to highlight the definition of crime intelligence as this chapter focuses on information collection for the purpose for law enforcement.

4.2.1 Crime intelligence

Sheptycki, in Coyne and Bell (2011:23), states that intelligence has become increasingly vital in this age where the role of the police has changed from a simplistic response and enforcement activity to one of managing human security risk. He further argues that, in this evolving paradigm shift, intelligence can be used to reduce the impact of strategic surprise from evolving criminal threats and environmental change.

So, in order to be a step ahead of the criminals, the police need to generate crime intelligence. But, before the generation of crime intelligence, it is crucial for every police official to know what crime intelligence means. In order to simplify this matter the following definitions of the term “*crime intelligence*” from two sources have been used. In terms of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994 crime intelligence means intelligence used in the prevention of crime or to conduct criminal investigations and to prepare evidence for the purpose of law enforcement and the prosecution of offenders. Zinn (2010:120) defines crime intelligence as information about crime that has been systematically processed into a form that can be readily accessed and used to track down criminals and combat crime. It is clear from the above definitions that crime intelligence is intelligence about criminal activities. Crime intelligence, therefore, is generated to prevent, combat, or investigate criminal activities. Intelligence products which are used to prevent, combat, or investigate crime are the end results of pieces of information which are collected from various sources of information. The next paragraph will describe these different sources of information briefly.

4.3 SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Information is the fundamental building block of intelligence. This implies that the collection of information is a vital step in the generation of intelligence. Information is collected from different sources. These sources of information are classified into two groups, namely the open and closed sources of information. Open sources of information are those sources which are readily available to the public and easily accessible, such as the information from television, radio, and newspapers. On the other hand, closed sources of information are those sources of information which are not easily accessible or available to the public, such as what is gathered from informers and agents (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:5).

4.3.1 Open sources of information

Open source information is any information which is most readily available, and it includes all print and electronic media sources, publicly accessible databases,

commercially available databases, government reports, and all information available through the internet. Open sources of information are divided into two, namely, free access, and pay access information. Free access information sources are sources which are accessible without any subscription, such as the internet search engines like Google, Yahoo, Teoma, Dogpile, and many more. Newspapers, magazines, and groups of all flavours have provided web access to their materials. The researcher can access an enormous amount of information from these information data bases. On the other hand, pay access information sources, are sources of information which require payment from the consumer or researcher to access such information. These include high-end media service databases and consumer information databases (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:8).

4.3.2 Closed sources of information

Closed sources of information are those sources which are essentially “non-public”, meaning that they are not open for public access. This is information which is forbidden for public consumption and general distribution. This type of information is classified and kept in restricted government records, and can be obtained by the public only through deceit or misdirection, and the public will have access to it only when it is declassified. In the government sector, this category of information is information concerning on-going law enforcement investigations, military preparedness, and national security issues. In the corporate sector, this information includes marketing strategies, accounting and finance records, network access information, individual salary information, and any other records that a company would not want to be made available publicly. Closed source information is obtained from a person divulging it, or through a review of records. Closed sources in law-enforcement include, Crime Administration System (CAS), Criminal Record System (CRIM), Inkwazi system, and human sources of information (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:9).

4.3.3 Nature of information

For information/data to be valuable it must meet certain requirements. These requirements are information quality, timeliness of information, accuracy of information, and the validity and applicability of information.

4.3.3.1 Information Quality

There are many sources of information, and each has a different quality. Although all information is valuable, it does not have the same value. The value of information is affected by factors such as timeline, reliability, and applicability. For instance, if the information is old or out-dated (timeline), its value is reduced in the context of forecasting a specific future event. Secondly, information that cannot be trusted, or is unreliable, is less valuable because it needs extra effort to verify and make sure that it is accurate. Thirdly, the information which is not applicable to the organisational goals or needs is of little or no use. The accuracy of intelligence, therefore, depends on the value and quality of information used to generate such intelligence product. As highlighted earlier on, information/data is the fundamental building block of intelligence; it should also be borne in mind that information consists of smaller components of data. This implies that poor data lead to poor information, and the net result is poor, flawed intelligence. As a result of poor intelligence, the police would not succeed in preventing crime or arresting perpetrators. It may also lead to the killing of innocent people. Ultimately the credibility of the intelligence unit which generates such flawed intelligence products and the police agency as a whole is affected negatively (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:5).

According to Bacarese (2009:39-40), to establish the value of information received from different sources of information, the following six, standard questions must be answered. These questions are, Who?, What?, Where?, When?, How?, and Why? The following pointers provide some useful indicators on what is being sought under each heading:

Who?

- Full names and any other identifying personal particulars, such as date of birth, current addresses, aliases and nicknames;
- Criminal records, reference numbers, or other adverse records including previous intelligence traces;
- Nationality, ethnicity, migration status, language(s) and dialect(s); and
- Family members and the extent of their involvement.

What?

- Main criminal activities, other criminal activities;
- Scale and frequency of criminal activities;
- Nature of involvement, role played;
- Associates and contacts, including nature of relationships; and
- Legitimate business activities.

Where?

- Main location of criminal activities, plus reach, “turf” or spread;
- Use of vehicles and other means of transport, including driving licence details and vehicle registration numbers; and
- Travel details, including passport details and routes.

When?

- Actual dates and times; and
- Periods (from/to).

How?

- Criminal methods (how the business is organised and conducted);
- Means of communication, including telephone numbers, internet use, and use of coded language; and
- Assets employed, for instance, premises, vehicles and personnel.

Why?

- Rationale for particular actions and choices;
- Motivation;
- Attitudes towards risks and criminal opportunities; and
- Lifestyle, such as the use of criminal profits to fund property purchases, vehicles, “nest eggs”, family support, entertainment, and holidays.

4.3.3.2 *Timeline of Information*

Information should be collected in time, in order to inform and activate the relevant role players before an activity or planned action takes place. For instance in a planned escape from lawful custody, the information should be collected and disseminated to the relevant role players such as the station commander, the investigating officer, and others before an actual escape takes place, in order to afford the relevant authorities an opportunity to plan and prevent the escape. Such information has met one of the requirements of valuable information, and, as a result, it can be turned into an intelligence product, which serves as a warning. Any information that comes after an activity has taken place is no more intelligence but “history”. It should also be noted that collection efforts occur over a period of time. In some instances, the collection time line causes earlier information to expire. To preserve its usefulness, such information is divulged in an interim report. It is very important to note that “time value of information” causes the value of information to dissipate over time. It may be one hour, one day, one decade, but the value of that particular piece of information is generally reduced (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:6).

4.3.3.3 *Accuracy of Information*

Accuracy of information is very important, because inaccurate data will ultimately lead to inaccurate intelligence, which leads to catastrophe. Accurate intelligence ensures that an organisation’s actions are proportional. One of the methods which can be used to ensure the accuracy of information is to assess the reliability of the source of information. A source of information is known for its reliability if the data obtained from that particular source is consistently accurate. The other way of determining the reliability of any information is corroboration. Corroboration of information could be described as nothing else than obtaining the same information from another unrelated source (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:7). Rundel & Fox (2005:313), in the Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners, define “corroboration” as evidence or information that supports what someone has said.

To ensure that information corroboration is done from totally different sources, independent from one another, the originality test is conducted. The originality test is conducted by tracing information back from its earliest existence, that is, the origin of that particular information. This process allows the neutralisation of the spin which different sources may put to the same information. To evaluate further as to why a particular source “spins” in a specific way, the motivation for generating information should be considered. In instances where data may not be corroborated the reliability of the source becomes even more important. The following factors should be checked, for instance, what had motivated the source in the past, if he/she had previously provided information? What motivates him/her now? The reason for any changes may indicate a significant change in the reliability of the source (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:7).

4.3.3.4 *Validity and Applicability*

The ultimate goal of information collection is to generate a reliable intelligence product which will assist in formulating an effective and economical response to a particular issue or crime threat. Reviewing data from several perspectives affords an opportunity to increase certainty that information analysis will be based on a solid foundation. It is extremely important that data should be challenged to ensure its accuracy, timeliness, and validity because failure to do that may result in unnecessary injuries, expenditure, and embarrassment (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:7).

4.4 **INFORMATION COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES**

News media reports always highlight the fact that international terrorist groups use coded messages through public websites for communication. We often hear about computer programmes hiding data within image pixels and artists that have concealed text within their artwork. Computer experts issue regular warnings that files should be encrypted. During the Second World War, phrases like *“It is hot in Suez; the dice are on the table”* were used to inform French resistance and undercover agents that an assault was coming. These are some of the examples of hiding critical information in plain sight, where everybody has access but only those who have the

code and understanding of the meaning of each word used would be able to interpret the message. Hiding information in plain sight is done in many ways, but the commonly used methods are, encoding, encrypting, covert channels, and steganography. These methods require a code key to decode and understand the information being communicated (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:10). For information to retain its value and importance it should reach the intended recipient in its original form and be hidden from the adversaries by all means.

4.4.1 Encoding

The most common form of protected communication is the creation of codes for communicating information without sharing it. The simplest form is the statement “meet me at the usual place.” Security and law enforcement use radio ten-codes and duress phrases to communicate specific information. True duress words or phrases signal the need for immediate assistance without informing the adversaries that help is on the way, or is needed. For example the following vehicle registration numbers “**DBC 614 FS**” will be pronounced over the police two way radio as “**Delta, Bravo, Charlie 614 Foxtrot, Sierra**”. The more outlandish the code the less likely an eavesdropper will be able to understand the message. If the code is used often, the risk of it being broken is high (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:10).

4.4.2 Encrypting

Ciphers have been used by government communications for many years, up to the discovery and wide use of the internet. Scrambled and secure phones were once exclusively used by the governments. The internet brought about massive data traffic which is used by everyone, government, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and individuals. The encryption of a message by using a cipher alters the message in some predetermined manner so that someone unaware of the method used for changing the message cannot change it back to a readable format. Technically it means that a message is encrypted by way of a mathematical algorithm using a controlled factor, or key, so that the resulting message is unreadable until the message is decrypted with the cipher key. A person who is not in possession of the

key is unable, in theory, to decipher the message. Although there are variations of this process, including the private and public key methods, but the most common and important factor is that a cipher is composed of an algorithm and a key or set of keys. Algorithms are constructed to be mathematically strong, to prevent “brute force” attacks, or simply trying every key combination to break the cipher. Encryption requires resources to encrypt and decrypt messages in time; in most instances, therefore, only important messages are encrypted. Encryption is an important tool in protected communications, but, although it is so important, it is not an end in itself but it is one of means towards the end. When dealing with encrypted information it is important to store captured messages until they can be deciphered later on when the key is obtained, or when, resources permitting, a brute force attack is mounted on the captured message until the key is discovered (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:11).

4.4.3 Covert channels

A covert channel is a communication channel that may be exploited to transfer information in such a way as to violate the communication system’s security policy. The essence of all covert channels is the sending of an undetectable message within a data stream in any communications medium (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:11).

4.4.4 Steganography

Steganography is a concept of concealed writing. It is the art and science of hiding information by embedding messages within other, seemingly harmless, messages. In simple terms this is an art of passing a message, picture, or diagram with a message hidden in such a way that it will not be detected except by the person it is intended for. Such a method provides easy cover and a defence from accusations when engaged in information collection/espionage activities. Electronically this involves the replacement of specific bits of data with the desired information. Previously, that is before the computer age, messages were micro-dotted or micro-printed, where the printing is reduced to appear as a dot or line. Nowadays it can be embedded into nearly any sort of electronic file for a computer. This means that the messages are

literally in plain sight, but made to appear as a feature of the document or data file (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:11-12).

4.5 BASIC PROCESSES OF GATHERING INFORMATION

The South African White paper on Safety and Security states that “the gathering and collection of crime information must take place within the law”. This implies that the collection of information must be done according to the law of the country which governs specific police actions. Basic information gathering or collection consists of collecting facts (data) and observations from open sources or clandestine sources. Then it is patiently and rigorously analysed, evaluated, compared, and integrated with other information and existing intelligence to arrive at conclusions relevant to the needs of policymakers. Trends and anomalies from the collected information are processed carefully, and, if the incoming information seems to follow a pattern that pre-existing intelligence has indicated, this is often called “connecting the dots.” If there is an anomalous, sharp spike in the quantity or quality of incoming information, this is often called “increased chatter.” For information to be successful, the next process, after the deployment of collection elements, is “cross-cueing”. This process ensures that the collected information is rapidly compared in a pre-production process and that the intelligence products are disseminated in time for utilisation. The next process is called “fusion”, which takes place when basic information collection products are compared to the kind of collected information coming in from advanced methods, such as orbital or airborne sensors (O’Connor, 2005:3).

All gathered information is rated for its quality and reliability, and then it is exploited. It is customary to apply a simple alphabet (A-F) and numeric (1-6) system to raw data, where the alphabetical characters represent the reliability of the source of information, for instance A=completely reliable, F=Unknown reliability and the numerical characters represent the accuracy of the information, for instance 1=confirmed by other sources, 6=truth cannot be judged (O’Connor, 2005:3).

In the pre-production analysis phase, cross-cued information is evaluated by what is called “analysis of competing hypotheses.” Using this approach, an analyst or group of analysts tries to identify all plausible explanations or conclusions about an issue in

an effort to select the correct or most correct one. There is then a simultaneous comparison of how well the available information supports each potential hypothesis. The ultimate finished product is a NIE (National Intelligence Estimate) that lays out the probabilities or possibilities (O'Connor, 2005:4).

For example, in the case of dagga trafficking from Lesotho to RSA, the South African Police Service have the following hypotheses:(1) a lot of dagga crosses from Lesotho into RSA when it is dagga harvest time during May to July and (2) a lot of dagga is smuggled into RSA from Lesotho across Caledon river when the water level is low (May to July). So the most correct conclusion in this case will be a lot of dagga is smuggled into the RSA from Lesotho during the period May to July, which indicates that a threat of dagga smuggling exists during that period.

O'Connor (2005:4) contends that intelligence work has its own folklore which provides many cautions for those who produce intelligence products. He describes some of this folklore as follows:

- Whatever you think you know is incomplete;
- At least some of it is wrong;
- You cannot know which parts of what you think you know are wrong;
- You cannot know what you do not know; and
- You cannot know how much you do not know.

4.6 CONTROLLED ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Intelligence products of all forms should be controlled to ensure that they are disclosed only to the relevant individuals. Although some reports may not contain any information that may be detrimental if revealed unnecessarily, the report itself will provide insight into an organisation's abilities and capabilities. This implies that *all* collected data, processed information, and analysis reports should be carefully controlled. Every organisation should have documented procedures, specifying what should be disseminated, to whom it should be disseminated, in what format it may be disseminated, who has the authority to make the alterations to the dissemination lists and formats, and who is responsible for ensuring procedural compliance. The most

important and central issues in this aspect of dissemination are the concepts of need-to-know, right-to-know, and third party information sharing which are briefly discussed below (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:12). In the SAPS access control and storage of classified documents and information is regulated by the Minimum Information Security Standards (MISS). The MISS document stipulates the classification of information, storage of classified documents, as well as access control to classified information.

4.6.1 Need-to-know

Colombo & Nash (2007:4) state that a need to know is a state of facts that supports the legitimacy of access to specific intelligence by a person with the right to know. The need to know must be pertinent to and necessary to the performance of a specific law enforcement activity. Thus Need-to-know takes place between an intelligence operative or unit with another unit or person whose job or duties require access to intelligence products to be effective (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:12). For example, a Station Commander of station “A” is briefed about an intelligence led operation which will have an impact on his operational area, such as an increase of detainees in police cells.

4.6.2 Right-to-know

Right to know is the status of being a person or entity engaged in law enforcement activity that, because of his/her official capacity and/or statutory authority, may have access if there is a need to know (Colombo & Nash, 2007:4). There are instances where a person may benefit from the information but is not allowed to receive it because it may have negative results on the outcome of the investigation. In simple terms this implies that the person who might benefit from the information does not have a right-to-know. For instance, an analyst will very likely need information to conclude his analysis, but if the analyst knew how the information had been obtained it might corrupt his/her research, thereby wasting already limited resources. If this is an issue then it may be possible to develop a modified version of the product that either conceals how information was obtained or presented in an acceptable fashion.

In order, therefore, to disseminate the information so that work can be done, but at the same time protecting the collection and analysis process, the document which contains information is “sanitised”. “Sanitising” a document involves removing any information that is not to be disseminated. This diluted version of the report is sufficient for the receiving individuals to fulfil their duties while protecting the collection and analysis process. This may also involve substituting code words and phrases for specific pieces of information in such a way as to make the document more difficult to understand by a casual observer (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:12).

4.6.3 Third party information

Third party information sharing is a process of sharing information between two or more organisations. This is an effective method of augmenting the intelligence apparatus. There must be a high level of trust amongst organisations or individuals who share the information, because inappropriately shared information could jeopardise the lives of officers, agents, and informants. It is vitally important to recognise that even a product developed entirely from open sources should be controlled (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:12).

4.7 INFORMATION COLLECTION

In terms of section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 the objectives of the South African Police Service are to:

- Prevent, combat, and investigate crime;
- Maintain public order;
- Protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property; and
- Uphold and enforce the law.

The above statute establishes the legal mandate, roles, and functions of the South African Police Crime Intelligence Service. Thus information is collected to meet the above mentioned objectives of the South African Police Service in terms of the Constitution. Ball (2007:11) agrees with the above by stating that information is collected to develop a greater understanding of the motives, capabilities, and intentions of the issues and subjects that pose a threat to public safety.

According to Peterson (2005:6), information collection is the second step in the intelligence cycle. This is the most important step as there can be no intelligence without information collection. This is the most labour-intensive aspect of the intelligence cycle. Information should always be collected within the ambit of the law in order to avoid criminal and civil actions being instituted against the collector. The success and failure of intelligence depends on the information collection process. The most common forms of information/data collection in the crime environment are through:

- reported crime and disorder;
- confidential informants;
- undercover agents;
- physical and electronic surveillance;
- newspaper reports, internet sources (open sources of information); and
- Public records, e.g., property tax records.

The first step in the information collection process is to establish and understand the assets that the organisation is responsible to protect. An example would be, that in the law enforcement environment the police are responsible for protecting the citizens from criminal elements and any public disorder. It is, therefore, very important to know the capabilities of different individual criminals and criminal organisations, and to understand where they can direct their intelligence efforts. Prior to collecting any information, it is essential to define adversaries or targets (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:13).

Metscher and Gilbride (2005:13) define an adversary as any person or organisation which is involved in criminal activities. On the other hand, Colombo and Nash (2007:4-5) define a target as a group, organisation, or individual that is the intended subject of an authorised criminal intelligence assignment because there is a reasonable suspicion that the group or organisation is, or individual members of the group or organisation are, involved in a definable criminal activity or enterprise. The above definitions will help to direct collection efforts, namely who should be the target of collection, and what and where the efforts should be directed. Adversaries pose a

threat to the organisation. It is, thus, very important to understand the meaning of the word “threat”.

A threat can be defined by this simple equation, namely “Threat = Capability + Intent”. This implies that, without intent, an individual or an organisation is not a threat, but they could become one if their motives and drives change. Without the capability of carrying out a specific action an individual or organisation cannot, therefore, be considered to be a threat, but it becomes one immediately when it starts seeking such capability or plans to do so. In other words, even though they may not pose an imminent threat, they may still be adversaries worthy of attention. In identifying specific information that needs to be collected, the following questions should be answered:

- What do we currently know?
- What do we not know?
- What do we need to know? and
- What would we like to know?

Answers to these questions will create a hierarchy of information which will help in directing the collector as to what information needs to be collected (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:13-14). Information can be collected from two, basic sources of information, namely open sources and closed sources of information. The next paragraph will discuss these sources of information.

4.7.1 Open source collection

Collection of information from the open sources of information is relatively straight forward. Information is collected in two ways, namely active collection and passive collection.

4.7.1.1 Active Collection

Active collection includes entering search criteria into a search engine, reading through articles in print media, or making “open cover” telephone calls. With active search, the researcher must enter search criteria and review the results, or dial a phone number to determine if it is a voice or data line (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:15).

Even though open sources of information are such vital tools of information collection, in South Africa only a few crime analysts and intelligence operatives, especially at station level, have access to open sources of information such as print and electronic media. This creates a deficiency with regard to information collection and the generation of intelligence products.

4.7.1.2 Passive Collection

Passive collection is conducted using automated processes, with some offered free of charge. Using refined, relatively focused search criteria with an automated process provides useful results with minimal “noise”. The basic service is typically a “news alert” offered by a search engine with varying amounts of customisation, and, at the high end, are either pay access media databases offering intelligent agent features or a local software application that crawls the web, or any other designated network, in search of matching data. These applications will monitor specific websites or blogs and give notification when the content of the site changes (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:15).

4.7.1.2.1 Web searches

Web searches are conducted by entering criteria into a search engine and sifting through the results. Well-constructed search criteria will result in less “noise” being returned in the search. They may allow the researcher to discover data/information that an automated process would have overlooked. Web searches are, however, time consuming (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:15).

4.7.1.2.2 Online media search

These searches offer content which is not generally on the web. These pay access databases may use a web browser interface for convenience, but they usually offer extensive search, collection, and storage features, and they will catalogue media sources that are not found on the web. Services like *Factiva* or *Lexis-Nexis* can search through over three sound media publications (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:15).

4.7.1.2.3 Consumer information data bases

These databases are also pay access and provide a number of services ranging from Social Security Number verification, address histories, neighbourhood demographics, and criminal database searches. Examples in this category are Choice Point and IRB which have an ever-expanding amount of data (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:15).

4.7.1.2.4 Internal data searches

An organisation's data systems can provide significant information. Systems like CAS, CRIM, and INKWAZI, can provide valuable information about the victim or the perpetrator's address and previous records. An organisation's internal systems are to be consulted first when conducting research or collecting information (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:16).

4.7.1.2.5 Print media review

Print media review is a slow and painstaking process. This can be done on media that is not available in the electronic format, and which is not on the internet. News-papers provide vital information about the activities of individuals, syndicates, and gangs (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:16).

4.7.1.2.6 Telephone calls

These calls would be for information that is already publicly available. These include information that is already available at the town or city information centres, like the location of guest house, and tourist attraction points (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:16).

4.7.2 Closed sources collection

There are various sources of private, covert, or non-public information. Since closed source collection focuses on activities of an individual or an organisation which are both in the public domain and also those that are strictly private, a collector should act

within the ambit of the law. Owing to its nature, this type of activity is divided into two categories, namely Court Action and Non-Court Action. The difference between the two is that in the Court Action a legal decree is used to pre-empt Constitutional protections for accumulating the data. On the other hand, Non-Court Actions are conducted without any legal authority (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:18).

4.7.2.1 *Court Action Collection*

These collections are typically used for developing information in furthering an investigation. Search warrants, warrants for arrest, and warrants for detention, give the police powers or authority to deprive individuals and organisations of their constitutional rights. These constitutional rights are the right to privacy, the right to freedom, etc., which are forfeited immediately these warrants are executed. Since warrants normally require that “probable cause” be established before they are issued, the threshold for already developed information is relatively high for substantiating the need for a warrant. An issuing authority, such as a judge or magistrate, must believe that there is sufficient information to believe that executing the warrant and depriving the individual of his/her rights will result in gaining necessary evidence in an investigation.

Court Actions may include activities like intercepting telephone/cell phone conversations, and information on phone/cell numbers. These also include document seizures which have bank records, propaganda materials, and other items which have a bearing on crime. Court Action collections are significant in that they provide needed information for an on-going investigation, but, once the information is collected, it may be relevant to other investigations, or provide data used to develop intelligence that ultimately directs another investigation. These types of collections are legal, in that a duly constituted authority has given permission for impinging on an individual’s constitutional rights (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:18).

4.7.2.2 *Non-Court Action Collection*

These actions include many of the same methods found in Court Action collections, but the collection in this instance is done without the permission of or authority from the court. In other words Non-Court Collection activities infringe on the rights of an individual or organisation illegally and expose the collector to criminal and civil action (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:18).

4.8 INFORMATION COLLECTION TECHNIQUES

Duarte (2007:14) contends that information collection is the bedrock of intelligence, and that it is the most difficult aspect in the intelligence cycle. Collection is difficult because it should answer questions posed by the policy makers. The questions are often difficult and challenging because the answers are always protected by the enemy or criminal group. The collector, therefore, is faced with the challenge of obtaining information that is difficult to get or hidden from plain view. Instead of attempting to answer main intelligence questions outright, intelligence professionals seek to break down requirements into packets of information that can be analysed. These requests which are known as intelligence requirements outline specific bits of information to be collected. Together these bits of information help the analyst to form answers to the policy question being investigated.

As has been indicated previously information collection has to be done within the ambit of the law, and Section 2(3) of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994 gives the South African Police powers to collect information. It states that the function of the Crime Intelligence Division of the South African Police Service shall be to gather, correlate, evaluate, and use crime intelligence in support of the functions of the South African Police Service as contemplated in section 205 of the constitution. Emanating from the needs of a specific intelligence problem, collection is conducted utilising sources, methods, and techniques in the fields of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Technical Intelligence (TECHINT), and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). The products of all these different collection activities are forwarded to the intelligence analyst who will

convert these raw data to an intelligence product. During the conversion of information into intelligence the analyst is also responsible for the identification of information deficiencies or gaps. After identifying the information gaps the analyst will formulate them into intelligence collection requirements. These requirements are compiled or included in a collection sheet or plan and thereafter distributed to the correct information or intelligence collection technique agency, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Technical Intelligence (TECHINT), and Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) to satisfy the information or intelligence requirements (Stephens, Smith, van der Merwe, Maganedisa, Mthimunye, Makhombothi, Nel, Mawdsley, Neethling, Sizani, de Beer, Terblanche, & Duvenhage, 2004: 01).

In the next paragraph focus will be given to different methods of information collection which are used primarily in the policing environment. These methods are electronic collection, infiltration, and direct collection. The three methods can be used either during Court-Action Collection or Non-Court action Collection.

4.8.1 Electronic collection

Electronic collection is a way of collecting information from a target without any contact with the target, and it is one of the most reliable sources of raw information. This raw information is collected directly from the target as he/she interacts with his/her employees, agents, comrades, friends, and vendors. (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:19). Electronic information collection techniques include telephone eavesdropping, direct eavesdropping, and traffic capture.

4.8.1.1 Telephonic Eavesdropping

Before Alexander Bell invented the telephone, people talked to each other only in person. At that time the only way of hearing a conversation between two or more people was by standing close and listening to them. With the advent of long distance communications, people increasingly converse without seeing each other, which makes it difficult to listen to and hear their conversation. To catch up with the

developments in the field of technology, the police started to use the eavesdropping method which is safer and more secure than it was before (Koops, 1999:204). This technique of information collection is often referred to as “tapping the line”. It may provide considerable information concerning the plans, capabilities, and conspirators of the target. This involves intercepting the signal from one, or more telephone units or service points and either monitoring it as it happens (live) or recording it for later review and presentation (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:19).

Section 5 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act, 70 of 2002 guides the members of the South African Police Service engaged in collecting information to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. It states that (1) any person, other than a law enforcement officer, may intercept any communication if one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent in writing to such interception, unless such communication is intercepted by such person for the purposes of committing an offence; and (2) any law enforcement officer may intercept any communication if (a) one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent in writing to such interception.

In terms of Section 3 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act, 70 of 2002:

- (a) Any authorized person who executes an interception direction or assists with the execution thereof, may intercept any communication; and
- (b) Any postal service provider, to whom an interception direction is addressed, may intercept any indirect communication.

In order to keep abreast of the criminal activities the police can make use of wiretapping as one of the information gathering equipment. There are four main categories of wire taps which will be discussed in the next subparagraphs, namely, hardwired wiretaps, soft wiretaps, record wiretaps, and transmit wiretaps.

4.8.1.1.1 Hardwired wiretaps

Wiretapping is an information collection procedure used to obtain high quality information without being detected. This is done by tying into a wire or other

conductor which is being used to transmit some form of message. In most instances the wire is a telephone line. A private branch exchange cable, a local area network, closed circuit television video system, an alarm system, or any other communication medium can also be used. A hardwired wiretap is done by physically directly gaining access to a section of a wire that the signal travels on, such as telephone line. A second wire is then attached to the main wire, normally through the use of an “isolation or slave device”. The signal is then transmitted back to a secure location. This type of wiretap is easy to trace back to the listening post when discovered. An “isolation or slave device” is a device which is used to connect the telephone line being monitored to the wire being used to divert the communications signal back to the listening post where it is then monitored. This one is difficult to trace back because it allows eavesdropping on the target telephone line to be performed from any telephone in the world (Hewitt, 2008:7).

4.8.1.1.2 Soft wiretaps

This method is the most preferred for phone tapping. It consists of wiretapping implemented in the telephone company’s equipment, which works by analysing digital information as it passes through the telephone company’s switching computer. This modification can be done at a private branch exchange of a business or telephone company itself (Hewitt, 2008:8). Cellular phone conversations can be intercepted while transmitting between the nearest cell tower and the handset or as the signal is relayed between towers to the cell phone exchange. All data and conversations sent to and from a cell phone, including e-mails, videos, images, and text messages can be captured without any physical access to the cellular phone itself (Wallace, Melton & Schlesinger, 2008:406).

4.8.1.1.3 Record wiretaps

Record wiretaps are similar to hardwired wiretaps in the sense that they are wired directly into the line transmitting the signal. This type of wiretap is done simply by wiring a tape recorder into a telephone line. The tapes for record wiretaps must be

changed regularly, which increase the risk of exposing the person changing the tapes (Hewitt, 2008:8).

4.8.1.1.4 Transmit wiretaps

This is done by connecting a radio frequency transmitter to a signal wire. It is not advisable to use this type of wiretap against the more technologically advanced targets because it generates a large amount of energy, thus making it easy to detect by bug sweeper experts (Hewitt, 2008:9).

4.8.1.2 *Direct Eavesdropping*

Koops (1999:205) defines direct eavesdropping as the monitoring and recording of communications with technical means directly where the communication takes place. There are three types of direct eavesdropping, namely; listening in on and recording a conversation directly, listening in on and recording with a directional microphone, and placing bugs. The next subparagraphs will examine each method of eavesdropping.

4.8.1.2.1 Recording a conversation directly

This method of eavesdropping is quite feasible when it is done by one of the interlocutors. This is done by carrying a small tape recorder in one's pocket or any other visual or audio devices in one's clothing or body. Conversations can be recorded in public and in private. This is used mostly by informants and undercover agents (Koops, 1999:205).

Directional Microphones - These types of microphone are stealthy. They are potentially strong enough to overhear conversations at a distance of several hundreds of meters, even across walls. Depending on their size directional microphones can be used only in certain circumstances, when they can be placed stealthily somewhere next-door or in a car. This type of microphone is used predominantly by agents, and is installed in their cars to record conversations with criminals especially with regard to the purchase of illegal items such as drugs and diamonds (Koops, 1999:205-206).

Placing Bugs - This is a valuable way of gathering information. Bugs can transmit or record conversations quite clearly, for instance when placed in a telephone, a lamp, or a cockroach, and they can also transmit or record computer activity, such as keyboard strokes and mouse clicks. Placing bugs requires breaking into the suspect's premises to place them, and so, there is a risk of being discovered and alarming the suspect (Koops, 1999:206). A cellular phone can also be bugged by gaining access to the hand-set for the time required to swap batteries. Modified batteries containing a microphone, digital storage media, and a computer chip constitute a self-contained eavesdropping system. Once the audio is captured and stored in compressed format, the microcomputer chip in the system dials a programmed number and burst-transmits the stored information to a receiver. The bug automatically recharges itself when the user charges his/her cellular phone battery (Wallace, Melton & Schlesinger, 2008:406-407).

4.8.1.3 Telephone "Trap and Trace" and "Pen Registers"

These establish who is calling a specific number and which numbers are being called. Significant information may be developed by knowing who is calling whom. Times of calls and the length of each call can assist in placing individuals at specific locations, and potentially identify co-conspirators (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:19). Section 205(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 guide members of the SAPS engaged in collecting information to fulfil their duties and responsibilities within the ambit of the law. It states that a judge of the supreme court, a regional court magistrate, or a magistrate may, subject to the provisions of subsection (4) upon the request of an attorney-general or a public prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the attorney-general, require the attendance before him or any other judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate, for examination by the attorney general or the public prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the attorney-general of any person who is likely to give material or relevant information as to any alleged offence, whether or not it is known by whom the offence was committed.

4.8.1.4 *Traffic Capture*

Network traffic “sniffing” allows the sniffer to observe data packet traffic as it crosses a designated point in a network. Packets are then captured for review. The capture can be covert, in which copies of the packets are made and the original sent on to its destination, or it may interdict the traffic and simply take the packets (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:19).

4.8.2 **Surveillance**

In order to comprehend the concept of surveillance it is important firstly to take a look at the meaning of the word “surveillance”. The following three definitions will suffice for the purpose of this study. Dempsey, in Baker and Gunter (2005:3), defines surveillance as a covert observation of places and persons for the purpose of obtaining information. Stanley (2004:9) defines surveillance as any collection and processing of personal data, whether identifiable or not, for the purpose of influencing or managing those whose data have been garnered. The Macmillan English dictionary for advanced learners defines surveillance as the process of carefully watching a person or place that may be involved in a criminal activity (Rundell & Fox, 2005:1448).

Taking the above definition into consideration it is clear that surveillance is one of the methods of collecting information by watching the activities of a person or group of people, without being noticed. According to Barker and Gunter (2005:1), the objectives of surveillance vary from case to case. They further identify the following as the common objectives of surveillance:

- Obtain information for a search warrant;
- Locate a subject, contraband, or the site of illegal activities;
- Obtain information about a subject, criminal group or location;
- Prevent a crime from occurring through covert or overt surveillance;
- Gather information for a raid; and
- Provide protection for informants, undercover individuals or others.

Surveillance can further be divided into physical and electronic surveillance, which are briefly described and discussed below.

4.8.2.1 *Physical Surveillance*

Physical surveillance is conducted by individuals or surveillance teams. Stephens *et al* (2004:84) identifies the following different types of physical surveillance:

Static Surveillance - is performed from a fixed observation point and focuses mostly on fixed targets, houses, and flats.

Foot Surveillance - is carried out on foot and, therefore, focuses on targets moving on foot. It can be performed by individuals or team members; and

Vehicle Surveillance - is carried out by vehicles and focuses on targets travelling in vehicles. It can also be performed by individuals or on a team basis. Barker and Gunter (2005:4) contend that, for surveillance to be successful, it should be conducted in a concealed and hidden way, to allow the subject of surveillance to act and perform in a natural way. Remaining undetected during covert physical surveillance work often involves physical fatigue, mental stress, and very challenging situations. The golden rule of surveillance is that “being a good hunter involves being aware and in tune with one’s surroundings”. So the following hints and tips can help accomplish this goal:

- When watching a subject’s residence, pay attention to the birds and squirrels. When the birds fly and the squirrels run, expect that someone is exiting the house.
- It is easiest to decide when a man is retiring to his motel room for the night based on the thoroughness and the manner in which he checks, locks, and double-checks his car in the parking lot.
- Thieves will look around nervously shortly before they steal. If a subject changes his or her demeanour from normal to nervous or cautious, something important is likely to occur soon. Nervous activity is best defined by the investigator’s instinct.
- Marijuana is smoked differently from tobacco and there are very few substances that are safe to snort. Being able to point out the differences on videotape is the mark of an investigator aware of his/her environment.

4.8.2.2 *Electronic Surveillance*

The use of stationery technical surveillance can provide massive information to collectors. This type of surveillance must be limited to activities that would normally be visible from a public venue such as street or sidewalk. This method of surveillance involves three components, namely, a surveillance platform, a power source, and a camera/recording device. The most common and suitable surveillance platform is a vehicle. The suitable vehicle for this type of work, which will also assist in concealing the identity of the surveillance team, is a rental vehicle.

These vehicles may be changed to meet the specific needs of the environment or terrain of the target; for instance it is easier to identify a surveillance sedan vehicle on a farm than it would be a dirty van. Once the platform is established, the next step is to hide the power supply and camera/recorder components in the surveillance platform. The technical connections and preparations should be made covertly in a garage or other secluded location (Baker & Gunter, 2005:7). Creativity plays an important role in this type of surveillance. For instance if there is activity, the investigator is not going to be able to run up to the car and move the camera to change the field of view. Information about the subject and the purpose of the investigation must be used to determine the location of the camera. The front door is usually the best place to identify individuals who live and arrive. Knowledge of what is expected from this kind of surveillance will determine the placement of the surveillance platform and the positioning of the camera for the right field of view. The surveillance camera or lens can be hidden in a box, a pile of news-papers, or on anything within the vehicle (Baker & Gunter, 2005:7).

4.8.3 Infiltration collections

According to Metscher and Gilbride (2005:20), this method of information collection requires some sort of movement, that is the collector or informant must enter the territory of the targets in order to obtain information. In simple terms this implies moving “behind enemy lines” in an environment where the intelligence operative or informant has little or no control. This method poses a great risk and danger to the

collector. For instance informants can turn and lead the operative into a trap, their cover can be exposed during undercover operations, and a savvy person receiving a pretext call may “reverse engineer” it to gain information about the caller. The reliability of the information obtained here varies since the actual source is likely to be someone other than the specific target. The target of a pretext may present dated or biased information, and informants may be more interested in their reward than the accuracy of their product.

An important factor when developing an infiltration plan is to determine the time frame of the infiltration. That means the infiltration should have a start and end date. This is vital for determining how many times intrusions or contacts must be made. If the duration of the infiltration is indeterminate then any individual cover identities, online aliases, phone numbers, addresses, should be durable. Durability of a cover identity describes the level of scrutiny that the identity can withstand before it begins to break down (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:20). There are different types of cover identities that are used during the infiltration process. Some of these cover identities include the following:

4.8.3.1 Online Alias

The online alias cover allows information gathering without exposing the operatives or their organisations. Varying degrees of protection may go into such an alias including the use of open proxy servers, and separate broadband access (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:20).

4.8.3.2 Tactical

A tactical cover is used for an extremely short period of time. For instance, it is used by agents, informants, or operatives to get out of a tight situation when cornered. This cover sounds plausible but does not stand up to any scrutiny. Negotiators may use such ruse information as persons attempting to exit a facility which they are not authorised to be in quickly. Although they may seem to be “off the cuff” they should

be created ahead of time and tailored to specific situations with a maximum of unverifiable information (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:21).

4.8.3.3 *Short, Immediate, and Long term*

These covers will stand up to varying levels of scrutiny. The quality of cover is built for the duration of the operation and should also give details of exit plan. The cover may leave the city, state, or country, but the event should be relatively unverifiable. A short term cover may include disconnected phone numbers or cell phones and no true addresses, while a long term cover may include a true false identity with an occupied address, working phone, and verifiable contacts (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:21).

4.8.3.4 *Legends*

This is the extremely long term cover. A true legend will stand up to extensive scrutiny and may be based on a living person who is in a safe location. The term “legend” is often used as slang to describe any strong cover (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:21).

4.8.4 Social Engineering

Kee (2008:5) describes social engineering as the art of manipulating people into performing actions or divulging confidential information. This is also known as pretexts or ruses and it involves conversing with a person to accomplish a goal. This is commonly known as networking in business and political terms. Social engineering can be as simple as convincing someone on the other end of the phone to provide employee names and internal phone extensions, or as complex as working through several individuals to have them provide internal documents of a company or organisation (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:22). People who are engaged in social engineering use the following techniques.

4.8.4.1 *Phone calls*

It is the use of a phone to contact individuals of a company to persuade them to divulge in confidential information (Kee, 2008:6). Phone calls are the common form of social engineering, because the phone lowers the immediate risk to the engineer. The advantage of the phone call is that a social engineer can simply hang up the phone and walk away if he/she is discovered, or he/she can create a new ruse and try again. Telephone calls can be exceptionally dangerous to the target since they ultimately have limited means of discovering the identity of their attacker (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:22).

4.8.4.2 *Interviews*

Pretext interviews, or conversations, are pre-arranged meetings for whatever the pretext reason might be, and this is quite often somewhat different from the information that is sought. For instance, a job interview may be attended by a person seeking information concerning an organisation, or a vendor may act in the same way. Interviews pose a risk for the social engineer, because their identity is exposed (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:22).

4.8.4.3 *Chance Meetings*

These types of meeting are also known as “change meetings”. These are meetings which are planned around a known event in the “mark” or target’s life, commonly known as habits. For instance a social engineer may frequent police canteens, and ultimately buy drink for targeted people. Ultimately a conversation ensues between the social engineer and the target, rapport is built, and, at some point in the future, information is obtained (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:23).

4.8.4.4 *Network Interaction*

It is described as persuading or gathering information through the use of online chat sessions, emails, or any other method that the organisation uses to interact online

with the public (Kee, 2008:6). By using this method the social engineer may gain valuable insight into organisations or an individual's existence. People tend to believe what they are being "told" online, and even enjoy a little embellishment, but they still believe the underlying purpose of the interaction. As a result it is possible to gain the confidence of a person or organisation and begin obtaining information. This is anything but passive, the intent is to develop on-line rapport and trust to gain information or get into the "inner circle" (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:23).

4.8.4.5 Unauthorised Network Access

This is the art of gaining access to a target network without the permission of the owner. It can be done entirely technically, or with a little physical infiltration to assist in the process. An example of this would be for a person visiting the facility to attach a "rogue" wireless access device to the network (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:23).

4.8.4.6 Physical Break-ins

This is the actual breaking-in and entering a place, for example a room, or office, to search for and obtain data/information. The information here can be documentary materials, and computers. Break-ins can be done in the following ways, namely, picking a lock, tricking an alarm system, or just breaking a window to gain access (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:23).

4.8.4.7 Surreptitious Entry

This is the epitome of infiltration. It involves entering a facility during business hours and moving amongst the employees to obtain information. Many workplaces do not have strong access controls, and so, during normal business hours, it may be rather easy to do this (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:23).

4.8.4.8 *Shoulder Surfing*

It is described as an act of looking over someone's shoulder while they are using a computer or laptop, the purpose being to see and read information or access pass words. This can be done in close range as well as long range using a pair of binoculars or software (Kee, 2008:7).

4.8.5 **Human sources**

In order to reduce criminality and victimisation, the police agency should first understand the criminal environment. One of the ways of understanding the criminal environment is through information provided by the community and human sources that have access to the criminal world. That is why it is so important for human sources to be an integral part of police intelligence doctrine and practices (Crous, 2009:117). Successful policing and criminal investigation depends on proper and professional information gathering. When police lack witnesses and there is no evidence at the crime scene, the only tools that can be used to solve the case are human sources of information (O'Connor, 2011:1). Crous (2009:121) states that "in contrast to the traditional approach of human sources being used for crime investigation *per se*, contemporary policing reforms require the use of human sources to support proactive policing strategies which aim to understand criminality better and keep communities safe".

4.8.5.1 *Defining Human Sources in Contemporary Policing*

Greer, in Crous (2009:118), identifies two categories of community members who provide information to the police. The first category consists of *informants*, who are people providing information to the police about any matter; examples are community policing forum members, and ward councillors. The second category consists of *informers*. Informers are people who have particular motive to provide specific information to the police. These are people who normally associate with the criminals and expect police to maintain a level of secrecy about their relationship with the

police. Examples of this group are runners of a particular drug dealer, or associates of a stock thief.

Owing to developments in policing and modernisation the words “informer” or “informant” are no longer used, but, instead, people who provide information to the police are now called human sources of information. According to Crous (2009:118), a human source is a person with specific or general knowledge about criminality and the criminal market, who has a long-term relationship with the police, who can be deployed by the police, and who might seek to receive some form of reward.

4.8.5.2 *Different Types of Human Sources*

Weston and Lushbaugh, in O’Connor (2011:1), distinguish the type, usefulness, and quality of different types of human sources as follows:

- **Basic lead human source** - is usually a friend or acquaintance of a criminal with any number of possible motives who is most useful and accurate at revealing the whereabouts or geographical location of persons or property;
- **Participant human source** - is usually a go-between or arrestee turned informant who helps police instigate a drug sting or reverse transaction or lure a suspect into surveillance;
- **Covert human source** - is usually someone deep inside a criminal organisation with a falling out or difference of opinion who wants to provide spot intelligence over a period of time as long as his/her identity is protected and a pleasant future guaranteed for them; and
- **Accomplice/witness human source** – is usually a co-defendant in a criminal case who agrees to testify for the prosecution and/or do one last undercover operation by being wired for sound in return for a package deal of immunity and the witness protection plan.

4.8.5.3 *Recruitment of Human Sources*

The recruited human source is neither a victim, witness, nor suspect in an investigation involving him/her or against him/her, but someone with connections to

the criminal underworld who is able to tell things that are about to happen. These types of human sources are regarded as the best human sources because they give information voluntarily. They are active informers who provide information about future criminal events, unlike witness human sources who give information about crimes which have already been committed. These types of human sources include people who are doing business around an area where criminals conduct their business. Such people include tavern owners, car guards, petrol attendants, employees at restaurants, and prostitutes. The idea is that such people can get as close to the criminal suspects as possible. These types of human sources constitute a deviant street network of eyes and ears for the police which will provide pro-active information for crime prevention. This is the equivalent of espionage work by setting up a ring of spies, or agents in place (O'Connor, 2011:1).

A productive and effective human source must display the following three characteristics: firstly, he or she must have access to criminal information; secondly, he or she must have the motivation to bring crime-related information to the attention of the police; and finally, he or she must submit him or herself to the control of the police who will direct his or her activities. These are members of the community who should be utilised fruitfully for crime reduction and community safety. The need to engage with the community is thus now more important than ever. To build such characters as described above out of the ordinary law abiding citizens the police should harness the knowledge and skills of those people in the community with access to the criminal world by implementing a structured, well-resourced human sources management frame work (Crous, 2009:119).

4.8.5.3.1 Pre-recruitment phase

Kalugin (2004:183) states that spies do not spring up as a result of a wave of hand inside an adversary's backyard. They need to be carefully selected, meticulously vetted, trained, patiently nurtured, and prepared for risky assignments. Thus the recruitment of human sources is a long pain-staking process which is divided into five phases, namely, human source target analysis, talent spotting, investigation, selection, and recruitment.

Human source target analysis - Before the recruitment of a human source, an analysis must be conducted on the potential human source, the targets, and the target organisation. The main purpose of the analysis is to determine whether the required information can be obtained by means of infiltration or penetration. A thorough study of the operational objectives must be made before beginning to organise or conduct covert collection activities utilising human sources. This type of study will enable the information collector or operative firstly to determine the operational objectives and, secondly, to analyse the set operational objectives, which include a detailed examination of the specific target or selected targets (Stephens *et al*, 2004:2).

Determination of the operational objectives - Operational objectives, such as the arrest and prosecution of criminals, and restoration of public confidence in the police, are determined by the organisation. The nature of the activity to be engaged in is also determined by the organisation (sponsor), for instance, information collection, arrest of suspects, and confiscation of items (Stephens *et al*, 2004:2).

Analysis of the Operational objectives - During the analysis phase, the following factors, the 'what', 'why', 'where' (target location), and 'how' (target analysis) of the required activity are examined. The main aim of the analysis is to determine the best way of neutralising the targets. For example, if the analysis indicates that the use of a human source or an agent is the best way to carry out the assigned mission, then the next step is to consider what types of informers or agents are required. Once this determination is made the intelligence operative can start the process of acquiring the suitable human sources or agents (Stephens *et al*, 2004:2-3).

4.8.5.4 Talent Spotting Phase

Talent spotting is a process of locating, identifying, and gathering preliminary data on persons who appear to be of potential value to the current collection operations or those, which may conceivably take place at a future date. Thus, the purpose of talent spotting is to identify persons who have access to, or can gain access to, target organisations. This is a continuous process until the target group/ organisation/

persons are neutralised by means of arrest and prosecution or they no longer pose a threat. The following people can conduct talent spotting, the intelligence operatives, professional talent spotters, occasional talent spotters, existing human sources conducting it wittingly or unwittingly, former members of the intelligence community; and members of the public wittingly or unwittingly. The following people can be identified by talent spotters, depending on their ability and the need for specific organisation, human sources or occasional contacts, persons who can supply operational or logistical support such as accommodation, safe houses, telephones, mail boxes, and cars, firms and companies which could be used as front/cover organisations, people who can identify possible witnesses for prosecution purpose, persons such as traders, businessmen, and academics, who have access to target organisations (Stephens *et al*, 2004:3).

According to O'Connor (2005:6), handlers generally look for angry or desperate people in middle management positions when spotting. The best candidates to be recruited are those who are ambitious and have been passed over for promotion. Secondly, handlers look for clerks, secretaries, and "invisible" people in the organisation such as cleaners and gardeners. These categories of people have personal problems, anger and desperation, which is why they are considered to be soft targets for recruitment.

Vital information about the potential informer - According to Stephens *et al* (2004:4) the talent spotter should keep a file on the activities and abilities of the potential informer which is vital for the use of, and the task to be performed by, the potential human source. This information includes the following:

- *Potential operational use of the informer/agent (talent)* - this includes the manner of access to the target group/organisation/person which also include the knowledge of the commodity the target is trading in;
- *Description* - this is the description of the potential human source which entails names, age, date and place of birth, gender, height, nationality, colour of eyes and hair, health, citizenship, and photographs;
- *Background* - this includes education, experience, family history, character, personality, and intelligence;

- *Motivation* - this includes loyalties, possible motivations for co-operation, such as financial gain, revenge, political or religious beliefs, and sense of adventure; and
- *Security risk* - this includes factors such as attractiveness to active opposition, and weaknesses such as drinking, sex, drug addiction, and gambling, potential routes of access for eventual use by the recruiter, current patterns of everyday activities, such as employment, recreation, private and public family life.

Record selection - After conducting the talent spotting, the record of the potential human source must be checked against the police informer data base to ensure that they are not used by other units. The purpose of this phase is to prevent spending time on a person who has already been recruited or was previously unfavourable to the intelligence community (Stephens *et al*, 2004:4-5).

4.8.5.5 *Investigation Phase*

According to Stephens *et al* (2004:5-7), in this phase, all the positive and negative aspects of the potential human source are investigated. The talent spotting report, forms the basis of the investigation. The investigation report should entail the following factors:

- *Operational use* - this assesses the manner of access to the target group/organisation/person;
- *Description* - the description of the potential human source should include names (nicknames, aliases, variation in spelling), date and place of birth, apparent age, gender, height, weight, eyes (colour, eyeglasses), nationality, health (physical condition, known defects), scars, tattoos, dress, language, accent, speech patterns (type of clothing habitually worn, condition of dress, personal appearance, personal adornments), photographs (front and profile, bust and standing), handwriting specimens, and fingerprints;
- *Background* - this include education, experience, character, personality and intelligence, that is EQ and IQ;
- *Family history* – this should include parents (full names and aliases, maiden name of mother, step mother, foster mother, date and place of birth, education, employment, places, residencies, political and religious affiliation), relatives and

family friends (place of residence, importance in human sources/agent candidate life, current status of relationship with informer/agent candidate, political and religious affiliation), informer/agent candidates' relationship with his family and frequency of contact;

- *Marital status* - number of marriages (date, place, and circumstances of each), spouse's maiden name, aliases, date of birth and apparent age, mistresses' names and aliases, political affiliation of spouses, and their attitude;
- *Motivation* - includes loyalties, possible reasons for co-operation;
- *Security risk* - attractiveness to the active and passive opposition, weaknesses, and factors such as drinking, sex, drug addiction, and gambling;
- *Potential* routes of access for eventual use by the recruiter, current patterns of everyday activities that are employment, recreation, private, public, and family life;
- *History* and legend of the contact;
- *Dependants* - children (names, dates of birth and apparent ages), sex, residences, devotion to children and aspirations for each, support (medical, educational, economic), political attitudes, relatives supported (degree and type of support);
- *Character and personality* - persistent personal traits such as extroversion, introversion, indications of mental disorder, changes in character as a result of external forces such as adolescence, impact of strong personalities, political discipline, reading, and attitude towards money;
- *Education and experience* - intelligence fields of interest such as humanities, sciences, etc., intellectual opportunities realised or unrealised, views (political, social, economic), loyalties, education, principal courses of study, language proficiency (in reading, writing and speaking), political and ideological complexions of past and present associates having influence over an informer/agent candidates, reading habits, aptitudes, skills, talents, and past employment records;
- *Everyday activities* - employment (place, nature of duties, hours), places of relaxation and recreation (hangouts, solitary pleasure and social activities), private and family life (time devoted to family life, and places patronised), personal friends (status, friction, conflicts, and basis for friendship);
- *Religious affiliation* - religious history (family affiliation, early religious training, present religious practices, effect of political affiliation on religious views and vice versa);

- *Political affiliation* - political groups or parties, present political affiliation (friends, contacts and acquaintances), political career (early history, admission to party, party career, standing within party, personal contacts in the party, international connections, and detailed description of party activities);
- *Economic status* - real and personal property owned, financial status (source of income, indebtedness, and contribution);
- *Criminal/police record* - date and place of arrest and offence, identity of arresting agency, disposition of each arrest, sentences served, assistance in legal defence, personal friends and acquaintances contacted in jail and among police officials, attitude towards imprisonment;
- *Military record* - chronological account of military history;
- *Travel* - chronological account of travel movement;
- *Addresses* - past and present residencies (location, physical description, type of neighbourhood, offices, telephone number);
- *Comments* - specific security factors, additional information not previously recorded;
- *Network suitability*;
- *Training* received and training to be done; and
- The handler must procure and collate the maximum information available on the human source/agent candidate in order to determine his or her qualifications, motivation, *bona fides*, and possible reaction to recruitment.

4.8.5.6 Selection Phase

This phase is the process of selecting the most suitable person amongst several potential human sources. According to Stephens *et al* (2004:8) the following factors should be considered when selecting the most suitable person, namely;

- *Competence*- the suitable candidate should be competent to perform the task.
- *Determining the recruitment risk factors during profiling*- it is the assessment of risk involved for each potential human source or agent if the recruitment fails. The assessment should also include the risk involved during the handling of the human source or agent.

- *Availability*- whether the potential human source or agent is somebody who is always available at the target place after recruitment.
- *Expenses*- should money be the motivation of the potential human source, it must be determined, if the expenses justify the value of the information. What will the cost of recruitment be?
- *Time factor*- how long will it take before the recruitment of the human source. The time is very crucial as other human sources can take months or years to recruit, depending on the toughness of the recruitment.
- *Access*- it should also be determined whether the potential human source or agent has direct access to the target.
- *Attractiveness to the active opposition*- is to determine whether the potential human source or contact can be recruited successfully by other intelligence services.

4.8.5.7 *Risk Assessment*

Before a human source can be recruited or utilised, a risk assessment should be conducted. When conducting the risk assessment special attention should be paid to the following factors: does his/her deployment fall within the mandate, role and functions of the intelligence agency; what will the implication be if exposed; can his/her actions lead to the possible embarrassment of the agency; is it ethically/morally correct to deploy the human source in his/her given role; physical dangers to the human source; possibility of being a double agent; possible psychological problems that may develop; is the “legend” feasible?; is the approach strategy feasible?; contingency plans for ex-filtration of human source; and the possibility of devious motives (Els, 2000:51-52).

4.8.5.8 *Approach Strategies*

It is normally said that “first impression lasts”. That is why the initial contact between the recruiter and the potential human source is extremely important. The approach will determine the success or failure of the recruitment process. There are a number of approach strategies which are normally used in the intelligence environment when

recruiting a human source, depending on the profile of the potential human source, the prevailing circumstances and the situation (Els, 2000:51-52). These common approaches are, the development approach, the combined approach, the direct approach, and the indirect approach.

4.8.5.8.1 Development approach

In this approach a relationship is established between the recruiter and the potential human source some time before the actual recruitment takes place (Els, 2000:52).

4.8.5.8.2 Combined approach

Here the recruitment is effected by a third party whilst the identity of the initial recruiter remains concealed (Els, 2000:52).

4.8.5.8.3 Direct approach

This approach is also known as the cold approach. In this approach no prior contact exists between the recruiter and the potential human source (Els, 2000:52).

4.8.5.8.4 Indirect approach

This approach is also called a false flag approach. Here a 'legend' is used by the recruiter to make contact with the potential human source. The recruiter will reveal his true identity only when necessary (Els, 2000:52).

4.8.5.9 Planning of the Recruitment

This is the first phase of the recruitment process. Successful recruitment depends on proper planning. So, for the recruitment to be successful, the following should be taken into consideration: who will recruit the human source?; time of recruitment; place of recruitment; motives of the human source for co-operation; what can be offered to the potential human source?; and how is the potential human source to be approached? (Els, 2000:53).

4.8.5.10 *Actual Recruitment of Human Sources*

Kalugin (2004:184) states that the recruitment of agents within or the infiltration of agents into, the vital structures of institutions, groupings, and cells of potential adversaries must be at the centre of all intelligence efforts.

The actual recruitment is the sensitive stage of the recruitment process. At this stage the potential human source is met face to face and convinced to provide information voluntarily regarding the identified threat. The following factors are vital during the recruitment process: the recruiter may wish to reveal his or her own affiliations to the human source; give the assurance that their association will remain undisclosed; should the attempted recruitment fail, the recruiter must terminate the meeting without any unpleasantness; should the potential human source agree to the recruitment, as much information as possible should be obtained; if the human source agrees to the recruitment, terms of employment must be discussed; after agreement, the recruiter must impress upon him or her the need for secrecy and security measures; an initial assignment and test may be given; and the recruiter must, under no circumstances, make any promises of any nature (Els, 2000:53-54).

4.8.5.11 *Briefing of Human Sources*

The briefing of human sources should be done in an organised fashion and not in a haphazard way. The handler should always bear the following factors in mind during the briefing session: a human source must be briefed in accordance with the undertaking signed by him or her within the framework of specified crime threat; the briefing must be done in accordance with the legal framework and mandate of the intelligence agency. The following guidelines must be followed when briefing the human source: it must be done in relation to the human source's access and ability to address a specific threat; it must be explicit, relevant, concise, and understandable; the "need to know" principle must be enforced; the human source must be briefed so as to ensure that the specified threat and information requirements are understood and will be addressed efficiently; the briefing must be of such nature that it will ensure that the client's requirements are met; a thorough knowledge of the operational

circumstances of the human source is a prerequisite to ensure a meaningful briefing; and an human source should be briefed in such a manner that the presence of other human sources at work in the specific target-field are not revealed, as this may lead to the human source's hunting or searching for other human sources. This will endanger the operation and could lead to exposure of the human sources (Els, 2000:62-63).

According to Crous (2009:125), a human source should be given formal tasking and direction by the handler. This formal tasking entails providing human sources with a target on which to provide information. Thus, the human source is expected to gather information about the activities of a specific target. Targets can be individual offenders or criminal groups. The objective of tasking the human source is to discover, in a structured formal manner, more information and to build knowledge about the target's activities. After that the police will decide on how to disrupt the target's activities, which can be either by means of arrest or disruption, by means of patrol.

4.8.5.12 Debriefing

Debriefing is a process of receiving feedback by the intelligence operative from the human source on previous tasks. The feedback can be in the form of either a verbal or written report. The debriefing should, firstly, cover feedback on previous tasks, and then new issues can also be discussed. A clear distinction must be made between assumptions, comments, generalisations, and factual information (Els, 2000: 64).

4.8.5.13 Infiltration Process

Infiltration is the development of an on-going relationship between an undercover officer and a target or non-target group or organisation, by participating in and/or attending the activities of a target or non-target group or organisation, for the purpose of gathering criminal information on the target group or organisation (Colombo & Nash, 2007:3). The Dutch draft law on investigation powers defines infiltration as

participating in or assisting a group of persons planning or committing crimes, under the direction of the public prosecutor for the sake of investigation (Koops, 1999:215). The infiltration process may be either sudden and seemingly aggressive or slow and insidious. Neither is best suited to all situations, and so each infiltration should be carefully planned and orchestrated to ensure that the objective is met. In this case the objective is to gain access undetected, or in such a way that, once discovered, the discovery no longer matters (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:21).

Human sources are the basic collection platform for an intelligence system. Information gathering at the clandestine level is a lot like undercover police work. The main purpose of working undercover is to remove any impediments to acquiring information, and it allows a number of activities such as surveillance, eavesdropping, use of human sources, and espionage. It allows someone to circulate in areas where he/she would not ordinarily be welcome. The work of anyone working undercover is to make cases, by gathering or collecting enough information to enable a successful outcome. The goal of such work is to be a hunter not a gatherer. The first rule of clandestine information gathering is to go after big game and to make the largest impact possible (O'Connor, 2005:4).

Section 252A(1) of the criminal procedure Act, 51 of 1977 assists the members of the service engaged in collecting information to fulfil their duties and responsibilities. It states that any law enforcement officer, official of the state, or any other person authorised thereto for such purposes (hereinafter referred to in this section as an official or his/her human sources/agent) may make use of a trap or engage in an undercover operation in order to detect, investigate, or uncover the commission of an offence, or to prevent the commission of any offence, and the evidence so obtained shall be admissible if that conduct does go beyond providing an opportunity to commit an offence. Provided that where the conduct goes beyond providing an opportunity to commit an offence a court may admit evidence so obtained subject to subsection(3).

4.8.5.13.1 Early stages of infiltration

In the early stages of infiltration the typical pattern is to bring someone in as a lover of the infiltrator and after a while distance him or herself from that infiltrator. Once it is clear to all parties involved that the undercover agent is single again, another undercover agent is brought in as a girlfriend or boyfriend of the first undercover agent. This process increases the number of agents within a group, and allows the agents to work as a team, which improves their security. The initial targets of such infiltration are the leaders of the group, although in some instances the infiltration starts with foot soldiers of the target group, accumulating information and stealing documents used by the group (O'Connor, 2005:4).

4.8.5.13.2 Middle stages of infiltration

In the middle stages some agents are allowed to create their own cover stories or legends. This will depend upon the type of behaviour involved (for example drugs, contraband, gambling, "subversive" groups, and terrorism). In such cases, agents use false documents and computer records. The need may also arise for creating various kinds of setup situations in which the agent "proves" his/her criminality or loyalty by engaging in a staged showdown with the police. For example, an agent involved in robberies will be arrested, and his residence searched for drugs. This also helps in the supervision and the debriefing and briefing of the agent without the suspicion of the target group which is being infiltrated (O'Connor, 2005:4).

4.8.5.13.3 Late stages of infiltration

In the late stages some deep undercover agents lose perspective and go native. In such instances agencies have policies in place to avoid that. Danger, temptation, or paranoia play a part at this stage, and it is always possible for a person to become a rogue agent. Surveillance and close monitoring at all costs is vital at this stage (O'Connor, 2005:4-5).

4.8.6 Extraction of information from human beings

The Macmillan English dictionary for advanced learners define “extract” as “to get someone to tell or give you something when they do not want to, or to get the exact information you need from a lot of information that you have” (Rundel & Fox, 2005: 489). Human beings are vital sources of information. They can, thus, be able to provide information about the working mechanisms of other sources of information. For instance, they can be able to give information on how the GIS which is used by the police to identify crime hot spots is operating and how to access it. The following methods of extracting information from human beings will be discussed below briefly.

4.8.6.1 *Sexual Intercourse as a Weapon*

Sex is one of the methods that can be used to turn someone into a traitor, spy, or informer. All the motives for becoming such a person are expressed in the acronym **MICE** (Money, Ideology, Compromise, Ego). Sex falls under the Compromise category, which is divided into three sub categories, namely:

- Heterosexual Compromise;
- Homosexual Compromise; and
- Nonsexual Compromise.

The theory behind the use of sex in espionage is based on Freudian psychology. According to this theory, sex is the basic drive in humans and animals. In addition, the sex drive is compulsive or addictive. It cuts across various degrees of mental intellect. There are incidents in which powerful and intelligent people have jeopardised their careers by satisfying a sexual urge or craving. Beautiful women have been used as baits in situations known as planting a “honey trap”. In some instances good looking men (Romeos) are planted. The Arab countries are said to know everything about North Atlantic Treaty Organisation activities and plans by using Arab Romeos to infiltrate it. Historically homosexual agents have been successfully used in spying. Examples of this are the Cambridge spies ring or sexual deviants, as well as the KGB agent Geoffrey Prime. Instead of being called “honey traps” a homosexual compromise situation is called a “drone-trap” (O’Connor, 2005:8). That is why

prostitutes are regarded as important human sources of intelligence agencies. They can be used to collect information about their clients, or the relationship between a client and a prostitute can be used to blackmail the client. They can also be used to infiltrate very powerful people.

4.8.6.2 *Nonsexual Compromises*

Recruits are also often enticed into various deals which expose them to blackmail by intelligence agencies. The following techniques are used:

- Black-marketing - Targets are threatened with exposure for buying contraband goods and services on the black market;
- Currency violations - Targets are threatened with exposure for violating currency laws of the host nation;
- Security violations - Targets are threatened with exposure for violating “no trespassing” zones or being on government property of the host nation; and
- Criminal Law violations - Targets are threatened with prosecution for various criminal offences in which they have been set up.

Any refugee or war criminal makes excellent material for recruitment. The immigration quota system is often used to threaten people. An applicant is converted into a human source of information by promises of moving quickly on their visa application in return for spying in their newly-adopted countries. In some instances, tuition fees for students studying at a college or university are paid by the intelligence service (O'Connor, 2005:8-9).

4.8.7 **Direct collections**

Direct collection methods are conducted in a relatively controlled environment but use information resources that are not generally available to the public. These kinds of collections always take place in close contact with the target or sources of information. The identity of the collector is not hidden; physical contact with the target is unavoidable (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:24). In the next sub-paragraphs some of the direct information collection methods will be discussed briefly.

4.8.7.1 *Warrant of Searches and Seizures*

This is primarily used by law enforcement agencies to access, search, and confiscate certain items at a target place. In most cases, this kind of information collection is conducted to target or obtain the following items for information purposes, documents, drugs, weapons, stolen credit cards, counterfeiting equipment, and any other criminal tools. The warrants are obtained from the court of law in order to legalize the search and seizure (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:24).

The legislation which gives the police the powers to search and seize articles is Sections (19 to 36) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 which states that a search warrant issued under subsection (1) shall require a police official to seize the article in question and shall, to that end, authorize such a police official to search any person identified in the warrant and to search any person found on or at such premises.

4.8.7.2 *Searches without a Warrant*

This type of search is also known as a consent search because, in most instances, the target person is requested to give permission for the law enforcement agency or security personnel to conduct a search. This is a simple search conducted with the consent of the person being searched or the owner of the property being searched (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:24). Warrant-less searches are authorised by section 22(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977 by stating that a police official may, without a search warrant, search any person or container or premises for the purpose of seizing any article referred to in section 20 if he/she, on reasonable grounds, believes;

- (1) that a search warrant will be issued to him if he applies for such warrant; and
- (2) that the delay in obtaining such warrant would defeat the object of the search.

Section 13(8) (g) of the South African Police Service Act, 68 of 1995 states that any member of the police may without warrant search any person or vehicle stopped at a

roadblock, and seize any article referred to in section 20 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1977.

4.8.8 Prisoner/detainee interviews

Detainees are a good source of information irrespective of what crime they are detained for. They can be able to give information about the activities of other criminals outside as well as about their fellow detainees. They may provide information on the known and unknown *modus operandi*, the identification of other criminals, after-theft markets, and counter-detection methods employed (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:24). Crime Information Officials, Information gatherers, and investigators conduct interviews of detainees, and CIO's compile their profiles. Respondents in the crime intelligence environment confirmed that detainees are a valuable source of information. In describing the importance of detainees, respondent number six (6) stated that, "Prisons and police cells are the most important institutions which information collectors should use as a base for building ground coverage network of informers. The inmates (detainees) have a lot of information about criminal activities taking place inside and outside the prison walls".

4.8.9 Dumpster diving

This is a method of reviewing the target's garbage in order to obtain information about the target. The vital information about the target can be obtained from the discarded documents, CDs as well as other forms of removable storage. Of significant note here is that any local laws must be followed, especially those pertaining to trespassing, and theft. That means that the trash may be taken only if it is no longer on private property. The other way may be to contact the target's refuse vendor and offer to purchase the trash. So long as there is not a clause preventing this in the target's contract, the vendor can normally dispose of the refuse as he/she sees fit. Data that can be found in dumpsters include passwords, source code, system architecture maps, financial statements, internal phone books, general work papers, and internal procedure manuals (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:24).

4.8.10 Field Reports

These are reports which are generated by field officers during patrols, attendance of complaints, or guard duties. These include reports about suspicious persons or vehicles, complaints, and incident reports. These types of report provide vital information for the building of an intelligence picture about certain areas (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:25). During the interaction with Crime Information Officials, the officials indicated that few police officials and units provide patrol reports. This non-compliance continues despite the stipulations of the Draft Crime Information/Intelligence Flow, Management and Analysis in the South African Police Service which requires every member of the police to collect and submit information in the form of a patrol report. Respondent number seven (7) describe this situation as follows “Although the national guideline stipulates that all members of the SAPS should collect information, in practice only crime intelligence members and a few members from visible policing do collect information. The detectives are worse; they do not provide information, verbally or in the form of patrol reports, at all”.

4.8.11 Field officer/Agent interviews

On some occasions, informal interviews may be conducted by field personnel but these will not generate reports. This information may be of even greater value owing to its timeliness. These contacts should be documented (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:25).

4.8.12 Internal document review

Internal sources of information can provide vital information, so it is very important that the operative/collector should review these sources of information from time to time. Knowledge of various types of data which is maintained in the organisation or through regional sharing agreements is important for the collector (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:25).

4.8.13 Personal network

Networking at different places, with different people, is another way of getting information. It is necessary always to build a network with people on a personal level as it will help to keep a person abreast with what is happening (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:25).

4.8.14 “Covert channel” observation

Covert channels are communication paths that violate communication system security policy, and they may be used to provide information deliberately or unintentionally. For instance, a significant increase of electricity bills might be an indication that marijuana growers are incurring these increases as a result of the use of their indoor lighting systems. This transmits information about the activities which take place at a certain house unintentionally. Methods, such as steganography, are used to embed messages within other data streams. (Metscher & Gilbride, 2005:25)

4.9 CONCLUSION

Information collection is the gathering of data/information on a specific individual or group in order to understand his/her/its activities. This type of activity is used by government and the private sector to protect its interests and to acquire secrets about a rival organisation or individuals. The collected data/information should be analysed in order to be usable as an intelligence product. Intelligence products are used to predict future events and to give warnings to decision makers. Although information/data collection has been used by the South African police for decades, this concept is still not understood correctly or used properly to prevent and combat crime. The next chapter will focus on the analysis of raw information/data to generate intelligence products which are used to prevent or combat crime.

CHAPTER 5: CRIME ANALYSIS

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Only the human race is liable for the committing of crime. Thus, crime as a human factor can be controlled or managed. One of the ways of controlling or managing crime is to analyse it. In analysing crime the analyst will be able to predict future criminal activities, and be able to come up with prevention strategies. At the same time, through analysis, the perpetrator can be identified, thus helping detectives to apprehend him/her. This chapter will explore crime analysis by focusing on the concept of crime analysis, different types of crime analysis, as well as crime and information analysis.

5.2 HISTORY OF CRIME ANALYSIS

In their opening remarks, Gwinn, Bruce, Cooper and Hick (2008:7), states that “information is the most valuable commodity in the world. It is more valuable than money, for with it one can make money. It is more valuable than power, for with it one can achieve power. It is more valuable than goods, for with it one can build, acquire, and improve goods.” Crime analysis is one of the ways and means of finding information about crime and disorder. This information is then presented in a structured format for use by patrol officers, crime prevention officers, and detectives to prevent, combat, and apprehend the perpetrators of crime. In order to understand the concept of crime analysis, the reader will be taken through the history and origin of the concept, its evolution in the United Kingdom, United States of America, Australia, and the implementation of the concept in South Africa.

5.2.1 Britain

Crime analysis originated in the United Kingdom in the early 19th century. The concept of crime analysis was a response to organised crime which was becoming a global threat. The threat of organised crime demanded that police come up with new strategies that would make them more efficient and cost effective. In response to the

threat of organised crime and the public outcry for the police to do something, the London Metropolitan police created a Detective Bureau whose sole responsibility was to identify crime patterns by collecting and analysing police information. Crime statistics were available for the city of London as early as 1847, outlining the collection and analysis process developed by the newly-established Detective Bureau. The same detective bureau came up with the concept of *modus operandi* (Stenton, 2006:1).

Bruce, in Stenton (2006:1), defines *modus operandi* as how an offender commits a particular crime, including such variables as the tools used, means of entry, techniques or skills applied, and means of flight or exit from a crime scene. The concept of *modus operandi* was used to classify offenders and criminal offences successfully in the late 19th century. According to Stenton (2006:1), the concept of *modus operandi* was first developed by the London Metropolitan Police. Offenders and crimes were classified according to the *modus operandi*. Although the concept of *modus operandi* was primarily applied to cases of murder, it helped the police to identify patterns and series more accurately. This method was used in identifying the most famous murder series in history which occurred between 1888 and 1889 in London's East End. The introduction of this concept in America marked the beginning of the profession of crime analysis.

5.2.2 United States of America

Crime analysis was first used in the USA law enforcement agencies in the early 1900s by August Vollmer during the introduction of the English technique of systematic classification of known offender *modus operandi*. (Phelan & Fenske, 1995:2). The proponents of the concept of crime analysis in America were August Vollmer, Orlando W. Wilson, and Robert O. Heck. The contribution of each one of them will be discussed briefly in the next sub-paragraphs.

August Vollmer 1905-1932. He was a pioneer in the field of policing. Owing to his innovations in the field of policing, he is called "the father of American Policing". Vollmer's contribution to modern policing include, bicycle patrol, vehicle patrol, radio

communication, scientific investigation, a fingerprint system, demands for higher police education, and professionalism. Most importantly, for the purpose of this study, are his innovations in the field of crime analysis. In 1906 Vollmer directed the development of a basic records-management system that helped organise police reports in a manner conducive to analysis. He encouraged the regular review of police reports and mapped crime locations with coloured pins. Most significantly he used crime information to create patrol districts (Stenton, 2006:2-3).

Orlando W. Wilson 1925-1971. He was a protégé of August Volmer. Wilson held a number of posts during his long career in policing, such as Chief of Police in Fullerton, California (1925), Chief of Police in Wichita (1928-1939), and Superintendent of Police in Chicago (1960-1971). He also published a number of books about policing, such as *Police Records* in 1942, *Police Administration* in 1950, and *Police Planning* in 1957 (Stenton, 2006:3).

The term “crime analysis” was first used by Wilson in his book *Police Administration* (Phelan & Fenske, 1995:2). In 1963 he formally defined crime analysis as a process by which crime data and information are statistically examined in an effort to identify crime trends, patterns, and possible suspect description. He proposed that police agencies should create a special unit dedicated to the practice of crime analysis. According to him, the responsibilities of this unit would be to review and examine daily crime reports in an effort to identify trends and patterns, prepare charts and graphs depicting noteworthy findings, interpreting and disseminating crime statistics, and preparing written reports on crime trends and offender *modus operandi* to be distributed to the agency on a regular basis (Stenton, 2006:3). Wilson also expanded Vollmer’s technique of reviewing crime reports and calls for the service to identify crime patterns and trends, by including crime weighting factors that would help categorise crimes and give them a level of priority in order to better allocate resources. Large law enforcement agencies in the United States of America had implemented Wilson’s concept of crime analysis units by the late 1960’s (Stenton, 2006:4).

Robert O. Heck 1970. During the late 1970's Robert O. Heck further developed the foundation of crime analysis which had been laid by Vollmer and Wilson. Firstly, he developed the Patrol Emphasis Program designed to encourage law enforcement agencies to adopt the crime analysis process and use it in conjunction with other policing strategies in order to investigate and track crime in a more efficient and effective manner. Later on, he introduced a new programme, which became known as Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP). This programme focused on the structure and management of the police organisation and the integration of its service in order to increase general efficiency and effectiveness within the organisation. This programme was a success, resulting in an increase in quality arrests, case clearance, and successful prosecutions as law enforcement agencies found that they were able to devote more of their time and energy to proactive law enforcement strategies (Stenton, 2006:4).

5.2.3 Australia

Askew (1993:73-74) states that in the late 1960's Australia experienced an increase in organised crime which cut across the whole country, disregarding the state or territorial boundaries. This created a problem for state law enforcement agencies. In response to this threat of organised crime, a number of Royal Commissions were established to come up with strategies to combat this threat. In the late 1970's and early 1980's these commissions recommended the establishment of a national intelligence unit to combat the activities of organised criminal elements. These recommendations led to the establishment of the Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence (ABCI) in 1981 by the Australian Police Minister's Council. The role of the ABCI is to provide facilities for the collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination of criminal intelligence, with a view to providing such intelligence to Australian law enforcement agencies to enable them to combat organised crime in Australia. The main functions of the ABCI are:

- Research and distribution of criminal intelligence;
- Liaison;
- Identification of national projects for operational action; and
- Recommendation of proposals for legislative changes to combat organised crime.

5.2.3.1 *The Australian Criminal Intelligence Database*

In order to cope with and manage massive data that will enable the ABCI to perform its function effectively, it established the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database. ACID is the only national criminal intelligence database in Australia. This criminal data base is located on the ABCI's own mainframe computer and linked to all Australian police force computer systems by way of encrypted, high speed lines. This database holds considerable intelligence data in a manner that enables its users to perform both simple and complex searches across the stored data, establishing a comprehensive variety of linkages. It is a secure database which keeps pace with the international developments in criminal intelligence and provides a significant resource to Australia's criminal intelligence analysts for operational, tactical, and strategic planning, and policy development (Askew, 1993:77).

5.2.4 **South Africa**

In terms of section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, which is the supreme law of the country, the objects of the police service are to prevent crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.

Crime analysis is a new concept in the South African Police Service. In April 1991, the Crime Combating and Investigation Division of the South African Police was established by merging the Security Branch and the Crime Investigation Division. This division existed until June 1994. In July 1994 the SAPS National Crime Investigation Service (NCIS) was created. This new division is now known as Crime Intelligence Division and its sole responsibility is to concentrate on crime intelligence (O'Brien, 2003:30).

The functions of this division are clearly stipulated in the National Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994. As a developing country, South Africa adopted and integrated crime analysis units into mainstream policing during 1994. With high crime levels ravaging the country, police management relies increasingly on crime analysis

to guide the decision-making process (Krause, 2007:15).

This view is supported by the Mandate Committee in the White Paper on Safety and Security which has made two important recommendations regarding Crime Intelligence in the SAPS. Firstly the committee's recommendation regarding specific interventions to improve investigation is that Crime Intelligence Analysts should be appointed to the SAPS to assist in improving the quality of intelligence used by the Detectives. Secondly, the committee noted that accurate crime information regarding the locality and nature of crime in a particular area is central to effective visible policing, and it recommended the establishment of overt crime analysis at local level. According to Zinn (2010:5), the gathering and analysis of crime information is significant for the generation of crime intelligence. This will add value to the investigation and prevention of crime.

A number of pieces of legislation in South Africa encourage the use of crime intelligence in the fight against crime. The following pieces of legislation are some of those which emphasize the use of intelligence to fight crime, with specific reference to crime analysis:

1. In terms of section 17F(6) of the South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995, the Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation shall be supported by the Crime Intelligence Division of the Service to gather, correlate, evaluate, co-ordinate, and use crime intelligence in the performance of its functions. These functions include, among others, the prevention, combating, and investigation of national priority offences; and
2. In terms of section 3(a) of the National Strategic Intelligence Act, Act 39 of 1994, the function of the Crime Intelligence Division of the South African Police Service is to gather, correlate, evaluate, and use crime intelligence in support of the functions of the South African Police Service as contemplated in section 205 of the constitution. These functions are performed by the Crime Intelligence Division of the SAPS at station, cluster, provincial, and national level.

5.3 THE DISCIPLINE OF CRIME ANALYSIS

Crime analysis is the focused and systematic examination of crime and disorder problems. The analysis techniques used by the crime analysts employ both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis. Qualitative data and methods are used when examining the non-numeric data for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of relationships. The qualitative methods used in crime analysis include field research, such as observing characteristics of locations, and content analysis, such as examining police report narratives. Quantitative methods are used when conducting statistical analysis of numerical or categorical data. In most instances crime analysts use simple statistical methods, such as frequencies, percentages, means, and rates (Boba, 2009:4). Vellani and Nahoun (2001:1-2) describe crime analysis as the autopsy of the criminal incident, for the purpose of getting solutions to the security breach that enabled the commission of the offence in order to enhance crime prediction capabilities and to develop proactive approaches to security and prevention. According to Osborne and Wernicke (2009:1) crime analysis is an act of analysing crime by breaking up actions which took place in the violation of laws into different parts, and thus find out their nature in order to come up with findings.

The central focus of crime analysis is the study of crime, for example rape, robbery, murder, and disorder such as noise complaints, burglary alarms, and suspicious activities. Crime analysis also focuses on problems and information related to the nature of crime incidents, offenders, and victims, or targets of crime. Targets of crime are inanimate objects such as buildings or property. There are three most important kinds of information that are used by crime analysts, namely, socio-demographic, spatial, and temporal information.

Socio-demographic - This is information about the personal characteristics of individuals and groups, such as sex, race, income, age, and education. Socio-demographic information is used on two levels, namely, the individual and broader level. On an individual level, socio-demographic information is used to search and identify crime suspects. On a broader level, such information is used to determine the

characteristics of groups and how they relate to crime. For example, crime analysts may use socio-demographic information to answer the question, “Is there a white, male suspect, 30 to 35 years of age, with brown hair and brown eyes, to link to a particular robbery?” or “Can demographic characteristics explain why the people in one group are victimized more often than people in another group in a particular area?”

Spatial - This is information about the position of crime incidents in a specific area. The spatial nature of crime and other police-related issues is vital to understanding the nature of the crime and disorder problem. The improvement in computer technology in recent years has facilitated a larger role for spatial analysis in crime analysis. Visual displays of crime locations and their relationship to other events and geographical features are essential to understanding the nature of crime and disorder.

Temporal - This is information which is related to practical material affairs, that is time, day, and place, where crime is happening. Crime analysts conduct several levels of temporal analysis, including:

- Examination of long-term patterns in crime trends over several years; the seasonal nature of crime, and patterns by month;
- Examination of mid-length patterns, such as patterns by day of week, and time of day; and
- Examination of short-term patterns, such as patterns by day of week, time of day or time between incidents within a particular crime series (Boba, 2009:4-5).

5.3.1 Purpose of crime analysis

Ribaux, Girod, Walsh, Margot, Mizrahi and Clivaz (2003:54) state that crime analysis aims at revealing problems, analysing their potential causes, and trying to foresee their development in order to determine where best to target law enforcement resources. The above statement is supported by Boba (2009:5) when she states that the primary purpose of crime analysis is to support the police operations. This implies that the main aim of crime analysis is to enhance police operations. Zinn (2010:5)

supports these views by stating that the investigation of crimes and prosecution of offenders is not enough to combat South Africa's exceptionally high levels of crime; the gathering and analysis of crime information are of cardinal value in formulating crime intelligence.

In order to accomplish the task of supporting police operations, four goals of crime analysis must be achieved. The first goal is to *assist in criminal apprehension*. Criminal apprehension is one of the main goals of police work. This function is performed mainly by the detectives. For instance, a crime analyst may be able to assist the detectives in identifying a criminal who is robbing shoppers at a specific mall through socio-demographic information of previous offenders on the data base.

The second goal is to help to identify and analyse crime and disorder problems as well as to develop crime prevention responses for those problems. For example, members of a crime prevention unit want to conduct a crime prevention campaign regarding rapes. A crime analyst may assist by conducting an analysis of rape which examines how, when, and where the rapes took place, which age group is victimized, and who the perpetrators are. The crime analyst can then use this information to develop crime prevention suggestions such as recommending that school girls should always walk in groups, etc.

The third goal is to help the police to reduce crime. Crime analysts can assist the police with these efforts by researching and analysing problems such as suspicious activities, noise complaints, violations of municipal by-laws, and trespass warnings to provide officers with information they can use to address these issues before they become more serious criminal problems.

The fourth goal of crime analysis is to help evaluate police efforts by determining the level of success of programmes and initiatives implemented to control and prevent crime and disorder, and measuring how effectively police organisations are run. An example may be an evaluation of the effectiveness of a two month rape awareness programme. Crime analysts can also assist police stations in evaluating internal organisational procedures, such as resource allocation (that is how officers are assigned to patrol areas), realignment of sector boundaries, the forecasting of staffing needs, and the development of performance measures (Boba, 2009:5-6).

5.4 DEFINITION OF CRIME ANALYSIS

In order to understand what crime analysis is all about, it is vital to look at different definitions of the term. There are many definitions of crime analysis, but for the purpose of this study the following definitions will suffice.

Gottlieb, Arenberg and Singh, in Osborne & Wernicke (2009:12-13), define crime analysis as a set of systematic, analytical processes directed at providing timely and pertinent information relative to crime patterns and trend correlations to assist operational and administrative personnel in planning the deployment of resources for the prevention and suppression of criminal activities, aiding the investigative process, and increasing apprehensions and clearance of cases. Boba (2001:9) defines crime analysis as the qualitative and quantitative study of crime and law enforcement information in combination with socio-demographic and spatial factors to apprehend criminals, prevent crime, reduce disorder, and evaluate organisational procedures.

Bruce (2005:2) defines crime analysis as the study of criminal incidents, the identification of patterns, trends, and problems, and the dissemination of information that helps a police agency develop tactics and strategies to solve patterns, trends, and problems. Agarwal, Nagpal and Sehgal (2013:1) define crime analysis as an analytical process which provides relevant information, relative to crime pattern and trend correlations, to assist personnel in planning the deployment of resources for the prevention and suppression of criminal activities.

From the above definitions it is clear that there are three main aims or objectives of crime analysis. The first aim or objective is to prevent crime, the second is to suppress criminal activities and reduce disorder, and the third aim or objective is to apprehend criminals. This implies that when the crime analysis products are correctly employed by operational units such as crime prevention, patrol officers in the community service centre, detectives and other operational units, crime and disorder will decrease.

5.5 TYPES OF CRIME ANALYSIS

There are six types of crime analysis, namely, tactical crime analysis, strategic crime analysis, administrative crime analysis, investigative crime analysis, intelligence analysis, and operations analysis. Each type contains characteristics of crime analysis in general. Although these types of crime analysis have one common characteristic, which is crime analysis, they differ in relation to the type of data used, the analysis method and purpose. These types of crime analysis will be discussed under their different subheadings, in the next sub-paragraphs.

5.5.1 Tactical crime analysis

Tactical crime analysis involves analysing data to develop information on three questions, namely, the **where**, **when**, and **how** of crimes in order to assist crime prevention officers, patrol officers, and investigators in identifying and understanding specific and immediate crime problems. The primary goal of tactical crime analysis is to promote a rapid response to a crime problem happening **right now**. One of the roles of a crime analyst is to detect current **crime patterns** to predict future crime events. Crime patterns are generally defined in geographical terms, as a pattern of a particular crime clustered in a geographical area. A pattern of crime may, however, transcend a geographical area. A pattern implies similarities that are repeated, such as in design, which means that for crime pattern to exist in a crime type, it must have at least one variable that seems to be repeated, whether it is the location (**where**), time (**when**), target (**who**) or *modus operandi* (**how**) part of crime (Osborne & Wernicke, 2009:13).

A crime series is a crime pattern where there is reason to believe that the same person committed the crimes. Thus the primary mission of tactical crime analysis is to identify an existing crime series as early as possible. By examining the *modus operandi*, the analyst, can come to some conclusions regarding the dates, times, and locations of future criminal events committed in a series. It is, therefore, imperative for crime analysts to develop suspect and victim profiles based on data from various sources of information (Osborne & Wernicke, 2009:14).

Boba (2001:13) contends that, this type of analysis focuses on information from recent crimes reported to the police. This includes crimes which had been reported in the past few months, or a longer period for a specific on-going problem, such as theft of motor vehicles, e.g. old white sedans for the past six months. Tactical crime analysis also focuses on specific information about each crime, such as the method of entry in a burglary case, point of entry, like a door, window or broken wall, the suspect's actions, e.g. eating food after entering, type of victim, lady who attended a night vigil or man who was at the tavern, type of weapon used, like bolt cutter, and brick, date, time, location, and type of dwelling in the case of burglary at residential place, e.g. a shack, mud house or a modern brick house. Patrol report information such as suspicious vehicles or persons is also considered during this type of analysis. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis is used. For instance, qualitative analysis is used in critical thinking and content analysis to identify trends and patterns, whereas quantitative analysis is used once a pattern has been identified to give a statistical picture of the crime incidents.

According to Boba (2001:13), tactical crime analysis is used for three main purposes. Firstly it is used to link cases together and identify the notable characteristics of the patterns and trends; secondly, it is used to identify potential suspects of a crime or crime pattern; and, thirdly, it is used to clear cases. The main objective of tactical crime analysis is to examine data on a daily basis in order to identify patterns, trends, and investigative leads from recent criminal and potential criminal activity, and to exchange the information with the detectives for investigation and apprehension of the suspect or crime prevention unit for prevention purposes.

A good example of tactical crime analysis would be the identification of a crime series such as, business robberies in a specific geographical area where the description of a suspect and the *modus operandi* is similar. Similarities noted in these business robberies are: a group of African males; suspects in their early twenties; wearing balaclavas; all in possession of handguns and threatening their victims with them, yelling for everyone to get down on to the ground; and taking bank notes only. Several consecutive incidents with matching descriptions of suspects and *modus operandi* information would constitute a crime series. An analyst identifying or

discovering these crime series by analysing data would be conducting a **tactical analysis**. A tactical analysis report should also include a summary of the analysis conducted, suspect and victim profiles, the *modus operandi*, area or premise type, day and time preferred by the suspect, and other factors which may aid in identifying the suspects, such as clothes like sports clothes, when they enter a place under surveillance. The desired result of tactical analysis is the arrest of the suspect before the committing of a crime. Other factors which may be added to the crime analysis report are suggestions for tactical responses, such as increasing patrols at a certain area for a specific period of time.

According to Osborne & Wernicke (2009:14-15), tactical crime analysis suggestions may also include the altering of the environment to prevent crimes. The concept of crime prevention through environmental design, which is known as CPTED for short, stresses the environment to prevent crime after careful analysis of environmental factors like poor lighting and shrubs contributing to the crime problem. One of the main purposes of analysts visiting the crime scenes is to determine environmental factors which contribute to crime. Recommendations to alter target victim behaviour may also help in preventing crime. If tactical crime analysis produces information that elderly females are being targeted for purse snatching in grocery store parking lots, the information can be used to warn potential victims of this trend and possibly prevent future crimes.

5.5.2 Strategic crime analysis

Strategic Crime analysis deals with long-range problems and planning for long-term projects. Strategic analysts examine long-term increases or decreases in crime, known as "**crime trends**." A crime trend is the direction of movement of crime and reflects either no change or increase/decrease in crime frequencies within a specific jurisdiction or area (Osborne & Wernicke, 2009:15). Boba (2001:13) states that this is the study of crime and law enforcement information integrated with socio-demographic and spatial factors to determine a long term "pattern" of activity, to assist in problem solving, as well as to research and evaluate responses and procedures. Strategic crime analysis consists mainly of quantitative data. Monthly,

quarterly, and yearly crime statistics are some of the examples of strategic analysis. This also includes categories such as date, time, location, race, class, gender, and type of crime. The primary purpose of strategic analysis is to assist in the identification and analysis of long-term problems, such as stock theft, drug activities, etc. Secondly, it is to conduct studies to investigate or evaluate relevant responses and procedures. An example of strategic crime analysis would be strategizing a plan for decreasing stock theft, which increases during winter months when it is cold and the moon is full. Owing to extreme cold weather conditions, owners of stock stay in their houses, and go to sleep early, and there are few people on the streets or roads.

According to Osborne & Wernicke (2009:15), strategic crime analysts may provide information to crime prevention officers, community policing officers, planning and research, and community outreach programmes. These groups should then work together to develop an action plan to address crime in specific areas, like development areas, complexes, business districts, or the whole geographical area. The emphasis on becoming cost-effective and proactive in policing will require strategic analysis of crime and disorder problems as tools for successful policing.

5.5.3 Administrative crime analysis

Administrative crime analysis is the presentation of interesting findings of crime research and analysis based on legal, political, and practical concerns to inform audiences within law enforcement administration, city government/-council, and citizens. This type of analysis focuses on the presentation of the findings of the statistical analysis or research. The main aim is on what should be presented and how. The primary aim of administrative crime analysis is to convey a message to the audience, which is always determined by privacy and confidentiality of information such as a strike by unions or election assessments. An example of administrative crime analysis is the presentation of crime statistics by the police to parliament before they are released, for public consumption, or the release of crime figures by the Minister of Police for public consumption. The information published or presented should be simple, clear, and concise, and it should not divulge sensitive information (Boba, 2001:14). Osborne & Wernicke (2009:17) state that administrative analysis

utilises basic descriptive statistics to measure crime and calls for service in local law enforcement. An example would be the provision of comparisons of crime figures, showing this year versus last year, this month versus last month.

5.5.4 Investigative crime analysis

This is the study of serial criminals, victims, and/or crime scenes as well as physical, socio-demographic, psychological, and geographic characteristics to develop patterns that will assist in linking together and solving current serial criminal activity. Data analysed in this type are of a qualitative nature, and the main focus is serious serial crimes, such as rape and murder. The purpose of this analysis is to develop patterns of serial crimes at the station precinct, and beyond. Profiling of an unknown offender based on the nature of crime, facts of the case, and characteristics of the victim are part of this type of analysis (Boba, 2001:12).

Osborne & Wernicke (2009:17) contend that investigative crime analysis involves profiling suspects and victims for investigators based on the analysis of available information, for example, the profiling of serial criminals (repeat offenders) in order to determine what type of person is committing a particular crime series. This type of profiling information can help to give investigators leads in identifying offenders.

5.5.5 Intelligence analysis

Intelligence analysis focuses on organised crime, terrorism, and on supporting specific investigations with information analysis and presentation. Analysts serve as support for the intelligence and investigation teams by becoming the “processors of information”. Information is analysed, and presented in the form of time lines, and association link charts to give a clear picture of the criminal group and its activities. There is a difference between crime analysis and intelligence analysis in one key area. For instance, intelligence analysis usually starts with an identified problem statement or an identified problem subject, such as a criminal syndicate dealing in drugs. Information specific to the topic is then identified, gathered, analysed, and disseminated. Crime analysis, on the other hand, often involves the discovery of

crime problems and the identification of the nature of crime problems by filtering through large quantities of data (Osborne & Wernicke, 2009:18).

Boba (2001:11-12) states that intelligence analysis is the study of “organised” criminal activity, whether or not it is reported to law enforcement, to assist investigative personnel in linking people, events, and property. The main purpose of intelligence analysis is to identify criminal networks and individuals for arrest. Its goal is to link pieces of information together, to build an understandable picture about criminal syndicates, their method of operation, area of operation, targets, etc. Most of the information or data analysed in this type of crime analysis is not reported by citizens as crime which is captured in the police records or systems, i.e. police dockets or inquiries are not opened, but it is information which is collected by the police themselves. This information is mainly collected by informants, surveillance, or police observations and is found in victimless crimes like, prostitution, drug use, etc. In order to get a picture of a criminal syndicate or individual criminal many aspects are analysed; these include, criminal activities, telephone conversations, travel information, financial information, tax information, and family and business relationships.

5.5.6 Operations analysis

Operations analysis examines how a police agency is using its resources. It focuses on issues such as deployment, use of grant funds, redistricting assignments (re-demarcation of policing areas), and budgeting. For example in the re-demarcation of a specific area where additional land is added to a district or area, police departments need to determine the following needs:

- Current calls for service load, by whoever is currently servicing the area;
- Projected growth, type of growth (that is residential, commercial, entertainment, and so on), and projected population increase (day and night);
- Response time by current/ proposed staffing;
- Recommended additional hires needed to provide same level of coverage/response currently provided to citizens; and

- Any re-demarcation of current city property that may occur as a result of the annexation of new land (Osborne & Wernicke, 2009:18-19).

5.6 ROLE OF THEORY IN CRIME ANALYSIS

Most of the research in different fields makes use of theories. The use of criminological theories in the profession of crime analysis is a new practice. Until recently crime analysts have primarily been involved in collecting and cleaning data, counting crime statistics and identifying minor trends in order to provide quick fixes to crime and disorder problems. This implies that they are basically creating short-term solutions, to long-term problems.

Criminological theories are used in the analysis of crime to guide more in-depth and long-term analysis. This type of analysis helps to prevent and eliminate significant crime series and trends, taking into consideration that the main objective of crime analysis is to assist law enforcement officers in addressing the how, and why of everyday acts of crime and disorder that are occurring. Theories which explain the immediate situational causes of criminal acts are more relevant to the practice of crime analysis than theories which deal with the underlying factors relating to why certain individuals become criminals. A number of criminological theories are used to explain and find the root causes of crime during research. The most significant and relevant theories to the discipline of crime analysis are found in the branch of criminological theory known as environmental criminology (Stenton, 2006:25).

5.6.1 Environmental criminology

Environmental criminology is the field of criminology and criminal justice which examines patterns of motivation for offenders, opportunities that exist for crime, and the relationship between crime and specific aspects of the social, legal, economic, and physical environment. Environmental criminology takes a holistic approach to the study of crime by examining both intrinsic and extrinsic factors of criminal events in order to identify patterns of behaviour and environmental factors that create opportunities for crime. This means that the characteristics of an individual and the

situation are examined in this type of research allowing for interaction effects to be identified and analysed (Stenton, 2006:27).

An example that qualifies the notion can be found in this description of a possible occurrence; Mr Tsotetsi's house was broken into, electrical appliances stolen, while he was attending a night vigil. In this instance environmental criminology does not attempt to explain why that particular person's house was broken into on that particular day as an isolated incident, nor does it seek to examine the underlying factors related to the offender's background such as abusive childhood, poor education, unemployment, that caused them to commit that particular burglary.

Instead environmental criminology focuses on the notion that leaving a house unattended creates an opportunity for crime and the fact that a large number of people routinely leave their houses unattended facilitates the crime. A crime analyst, therefore, working from this theoretical framework would want to find answers to the following questions. "Have there been other houses which were broken into, in the same suburb which were left unattended?" "Is the problem related to this particular suburb, such as, does it lack adequate lighting, is it patrolled by the police during the night?" "Is the problem a result of victim behaviour, which is leaving the house unattended?" In this situation, the crime analyst analyses data for all burglaries in this particular location within a specified time period in order to answer the above mentioned questions. Subsequently, the crime analyst would make recommendations as to how the environment and victim behaviour should be modified in order to decrease the number of further opportunities for this type of crime, such as increase lighting, regular police patrols, etc. Environmental criminology consists of a number of criminological theories, such as the crime pattern theory, the rational activity theory, etc. Above all, the core of environmental criminology is the concept of the crime triangle. The crime triangle demonstrates the different elements that comprise a criminal act and how the relationship and interaction between these elements create opportunities for crime.




Figure 5.1 Crime Triangle (Stenton, 2006:28).

Figure 5.1 above depicts the crime triangle as illustrated by Stenton (2006:28). The triangle at the centre of the diagram symbolizes the notion that three elements must be present in order for a crime to occur, namely, an offender, a victim/target, and a specific place or geographical location. If one or more of these elements is not present, a crime will not occur. The outer triangle represents the different individuals or organisations that can exert a certain amount of control of the three elements, namely, offender, victim/target, and place.

Guardians: The role of the guardian is to protect the target of the offender, such as human beings, animals, and objects like property. The presence of a guardian minimizes or prevents the crime or act of disorder from taking place. Guardians include friends protecting friends, individuals protecting their belongings, as well as security guards and police officers (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008:235).

Managers represent those people who are responsible for the maintenance and guardianship of specific locations, such as apartment buildings and hotel managers, store clerks, and the owners of large shopping complexes (Stenton, 2006:29).

Handlers: According to Wortley and Mazerolle (2008:235) the handler in the crime triangle represents two categories of people, who have influence or control over the

potential offender. The first category is of people to whom the offender is emotionally attached and who therefore are in a position to dissuade or deter the offender. This category type exercise control over the offender through emotional attachment. This category consists of parents, neighbours, and sports coaches. The second category is people to whom the offender is legally attached. This type exercise control over the offender through legal attachment. The category consists of police officers, probation and parole officers as well as magistrates and judges.

5.7 THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY

According to the theory of environmental criminology crime analysis has four dimensions. These dimensions are the victim, the offender, the geo-temporal dimension, and the legal dimension. Environmental criminology emphasises the significance of the crime location in understanding the criminal event. The physical layout of a town or city and its roads and transport infrastructure have crime attractors such as restaurants, shopping malls, vehicle parking areas, etc. The location of a crime is also determined by the conscious or sub-conscious decision making process of the victim and offender which are shaped by their personal lifestyles.

According to Brantingham and Brantingham theoretical model, urban crime includes the following factors:

- Certain persons are motivated to commit crime;
- The commission of the crime is a result of a conscious decision-making process;
- The location itself indicates that it is ripe for criminal activity;
- The motivated person uses the location indicators to search for a suitable victim;
- The motivated person learns from the location indicators and forms a personal template for future use;
- The template influences future behaviour becoming self-reinforcing; and
- Owing to the combined effect of targets, victims and places, multiple crime selection templates are constructed. Humans are creatures of habit, thereby making the similarities in templates identifiable (Adderley, 2007:37).

5.8 ROLE OF PLACE IN THE COMMISSION OF CRIME

Places where crime takes place are vital in the research of crime and criminality. This implies that the environment plays an important role either in the commission or prevention of crime. These places could provide an answer to why certain crimes occur at certain places. Places can be street corners, parks, parking areas, shopping malls, etc. Three perspectives suggest the importance of places for understanding crime, namely the rational choice theory, the routine activity theory, and the crime pattern theory.

5.8.1 Rational choice theory

The proponents of this theory are Cornish and Clarke. The approach of this theory is borrowed from the economic approach with regard to behaviour which assumes that criminals make a rational decision to commit crime. This refers to opportunities, costs, and benefits from the criminal event. The commission of crime is, therefore, seen as a choice that is influenced by its costs and benefits. According to this theory, crime will be more likely to be deterred if its costs are raised, for example more effort required, more punishment applied, etc., especially if the costs are certain and immediate (Williams & McShane, 1994: 221-222). The approach of this theory has six key propositions which will be discussed in the next sub-paragraphs.

5.8.1.1 Crimes Are Deliberate and Purposive

The first assumption is that crimes are deliberate and purposive. This implies that those who commit crimes do so with the intention of deriving some type of benefit from such acts. Such benefits may be in the form of cash, material goods, prestige, fun, excitement, sexual gratification, and domination (Willison, 2002:45).

5.8.1.2 Bounded Rationality

The second proposition relates to the concept of bounded rationality. This means that criminal decision making is at times less than perfect as a consequence of the

conditions under which decisions are made. With the associated risks and uncertainty in offending, criminals may make decisions without the knowledge of all the potential costs and benefits. In certain situations peers may put pressure on a person to commit a criminal act, which is an indication that sometimes criminal acts are committed under limited rationality (Willison, 2002:45).

5.8.1.3 Crime Specificity

According to the crime specificity proposition, a criminal considers a number of factors before and during the commission of crime. These factors include the experience, capabilities and chances of successfully committing the crime. For instance in a cash-in-transit heist, the following skills are needed, driving skills to drive a get-away car, and a sharpshooter, who will use a firearm when confronted by the police or security guards, etc. Thus the offenders are divided into two groups, namely, general offenders and expert offenders (Willison, 2002:46).

5.8.1.4 Division of Criminal Choices

Criminal choices are divided into two categories, event and involvement decisions. Event decisions refer to those decisions made during the commission of a crime. For example, in a case of burglary the following decisions are taken, namely, the target, the point of entry, and the type of items to be stolen. Involvement decision is about the criminal career of a particular criminal, which is divided into three stages. In the first stage the offender must make decisions about embarking on criminal activities. The second stage is deciding to continue with criminal activities over a period of time. The last stage is of deciding when to stop offending. The above mentioned steps can be summarised as the initiation, habituation, and desistance of a criminal career (Willison, 2002:46).

5.8.1.5 Crime Specific Principles

The fifth proposition asserts that the crime-specific principle is applied to the three stages of a criminal career, namely, initiation, habituation, and desistance stage. This

is based on an understanding that the decisions made for each of these stages will be influenced by different sets of variables, which must accordingly be recognised for the purpose of prevention. These variables can be divided into three categories, namely, background factors, current life circumstances, and situational variables.

Background Factors: Background factors include the psychological factors, such as: temperament, gender, and intelligence; upbringing factors such as broken home, parental crime, poor education, and; and social factors, such as class, ethnicity, and social exclusion.

Current Life Circumstances: Current life circumstances include factors such as marital status, employment, housing, and leisure pursuits, e.g. drug taking and gambling.

Situational Variables: Situational variables include factors such as current needs and motives, for example, an urgent need for cash, opportunities, and inducements, be they of a legitimate nature like a job offer or an illegitimate nature like an invitation to commit a robbery. The above-mentioned groups and factors play a significant role in the involvement of an individual in criminal activities. For instance, background factors have the greatest impact on initiation decision. Current life circumstances, on the other hand, play a major role with regard to habituation choices. A decision on whether to end a criminal career will further be influenced by current life circumstances and enhanced knowledge of the potential costs of crime with background factors playing no role in the decision (Willison, 2002:47).

5.8.1.6 Sequence of Event Decision

This final proposition focuses on the sequence of event decisions, which an offender faces during the commission of a crime. These are decisions which are made before, during, and after the commission of a crime. The speed with which the criminal act presents the choices, give an offender little time to decide on them (Willison, 2002:48). According to Adderley (2007:41-42), the decision making process of a criminal consists of seven steps. These steps are outlined as follows:

Background Feature: This includes personal information about the criminal such as level of intelligence, family background, social and demographic factors;

Previous experience and learning: An offender's criminality and his/her own perception of relevant skills are examined. An example is the comparison of the current target with previous successes;

Amount of effort required: It is the assessment as to whether the rewards or costs of the crime outweigh other methods of satisfying the offender's needs;

Situational factors: This includes factors such as drug or alcohol dependency and peer pressure;

Need for money or status: This is the basic motive for the commission of crime. An example is show off or sexual gratification;

Blocked opportunities: It refers to the legitimate avenues available for satisfying the criminal's needs. For example, can the same amount of money be made available by working, gambling, and borrowing? and

Readiness to commit crime: This is understood as the offender's being in the right state of mind, often justifying that committing the crime is right for him/her believing that the victim does not deserve to have the items.

5.8.2 Routine activity theory

The proponents of this theory are Cohen and Felson. According to this theory the volume of criminal offences is related to the nature of the everyday pattern of social interaction. It states further that, for a criminal event to take place, three elements must converge at a particular time and place. The first element is a motivated offender with both criminal inclinations and the ability to carry out those inclinations. The second element is a suitable target. The third element is the absence of capable guardians who can protect the target against violation or criminal event. If one of these elements is missing, then a crime will not be likely to occur.

Routine patterns of behaviour affect the convergence of these three elements. Routine activities are defined as recurrent and prevalent activities, which fulfil an

individual's physical, emotional, or social needs, whether they be biological or cultural in origin. Routine activities occur in the home, at work, and at other places outside the home where individuals frequently attend. The frequency of their convergence is also dictated by certain ecological factors such as the timing with which events occur and the placement of an offender in relation to the placement of the victim (Pourheidari & Croisdale, 2010:8-9).

Adderley (2007:39) states that the target's risk of being attacked is influenced by the following four main features, the value of the target to the offender; the size and weight of the target; offenders must be aware that the target is available for stealing; and, lastly, suitable access to the target, meaning either a suitable road or transport infrastructure or simply target location by a door or window. According to Cullen and Agnew (2006:7), the best way to reduce crime is through the use of situational crime prevention in which the focus is not on changing offenders but on reducing the opportunity to commit a crime in a given place.

5.8.3 Crime pattern theory

The proponents of this theory are P.J Brantingham, and P.L Brantingham. According to the theory, crime is not random but, rather, highly patterned. These patterns indicate how people interact with their physical environment. This theory has three concepts, nodes, paths, and edges (Adderley, 2007:40).

5.8.3.1 Nodes

Node is a transportation terminology which refers to a place or point where people travel to and from. A node is regarded as a central point on which the life of an individual revolves such as school, bar, town centre, and church. Some nodes can be the generators of crime at that geographical point or nearby, such as a tavern which generates crime and disorder around it (Adderley, 2007:40).

5.8.3.2 *Paths*

These are the transit routes which connect nodes, either by transport or pedestrian travel. Individual's daily activities force them to travel on the same paths when visiting the same nodes. For instance, when a person goes to work and comes back home he or she is likely to use one path. The paths that fall in with an individual's routine activity are closely related to where they fall victim to crime (Adderley, 2007:40).

5.8.3.3 *Edges*

Edges refer to the boundaries of an area where people have anchorage points such as home, and work. Some crimes are more prominent at those edges as people who seldom know each other come together at these places and, because they are unknown, either offend or become a victim. Examples of edge crimes are robbery, racial attacks, and shoplifting. People who live outside of the boundaries commit crimes at the edge and then retreat into the safety of their own areas. Crimes committed by people who live inside the boundaries are often committed close to an anchorage point, their own neighbourhoods (Adderley, 2007:40).

5.9 **CRIME ANALYSIS PROCESS**

For centuries, military strategists have used analysis in order to know more about the enemy and about the conditions and causes of a situation, including the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy. Criminals are the enemies of the community, thus justifying any legal means of fighting and defeating them. The main objective of crime analysis is to find meaningful information in large amounts of data and to disseminate that to police officers in the field to apprehend criminals and suppress criminal activity (Osborne & Wernicke, 2009:13-14).

Boba (2001:9) points out that the crime analysis process uses both the qualitative and quantitative data and analytical techniques. Qualitative data and analytical techniques refer to non-numerical data as well as the examination and interpretation of observations for the purpose of discovering underlying meanings and patterns of

relationship. For instance, the crime report, or the victim account of the events in a form of a witness statement in the police docket are a form of qualitative data, whilst the analytical technique is the dissection of these statements, in order to establish patterns of relationship. This is typically field research, content analysis, and historical research. Quantitative data are data which are primarily in numerical or categorical format. Quantitative analysis consists of manipulations of observations for the purpose of describing and explaining the phenomena that those observations reflect, and it is primarily statistical. Quantitative data are information such as date, time, location of crime, and type of crime where statistics or numbers can be used to analyse those variables. There are many reasons as to why crime is analysed. According to Osborne & Wernicke (2009:15-17), some of the reasons why crime is analysed are as follows:

- To take advantage of the abundance of information existing in law enforcement agencies, criminal justice system, and the public domain;
- To maximize the use of limited law enforcement resources;
- To inform law enforcers about general and specific crime trends, patterns, and series in an on-going, timely manner;
- To have an objective means to access crime problems locally, regionally, nationally, and globally between law enforcement agencies;
- To be proactive in detecting and preventing crime; and
- To meet the law enforcement needs of a changing society.

According to Boba in (Stenton, 2006:16), the crime analysis process comprises of five stages. These stages are data collection, data collation, analysis, dissemination of results, and lastly the feedback from the information users. Each stage is significant in the crime analysis process because it ensures accuracy, validity, and reliability of analytical products and results. The next paragraphs will discuss the five stages of crime analysis process.

5.9.1 Data collection

The first step in the analysis process is data collection. This is the most important step, owing to the fact that without data there is no analysis. The crime analyst

receives data/information in many different formats. This data/information can be grouped into two general categories, namely, internal sources of information and external sources of information. Internal sources of information include, offence reports, arrests reports, victim and witness statements, Crime Administration System, Inkwazi, Circulation System, Criminal Record System, etc. External sources of information include information from other departments such as, Home affairs, the Traffic department, Military Intelligence, and Correctional Services. Data from internal sources of information is captured by other components within the police agency. So it is significant that those who enter data on the computerized system should ensure that it is detailed and correct (Stenton, 2006:16).

5.9.2 Data collation

Gottlieb, Arenberg and Singh, in Stenton (2006:19), define data collation as the sorting, extracting, and storage of raw data. The process of data collation is divided into three steps, namely, the sorting step, extracting step, and data storage step. These different steps are discussed in the next paragraph.

5.9.2.1 Data Sorting

At this step the analyst separates data and sorts it according to different categories. For example, crimes reported within a specific period are separated firstly into different crime categories, such as thefts, robberies, assaults, etc. By separating the reports and sorting them into piles according to crime type, the first step of data collation is completed (Stenton, 2006:19).

5.9.2.2 Data Extraction

At this step the analyst reads through each report, one crime type at a time, and pulls out information that is consistent throughout the reports and that would, therefore, be appropriate for further analysis. Each category of data that has been extracted by the analyst would then be placed in a separate file for that particular type of data and would subsequently be added to, as more reports are processed by the analyst, thus

concluding the second step of data collation process (Stenton, 2006:19-20).

5.9.2.3 *Data Storage*

At this step the analyst places each category of data which he/she has extracted in a separate file for that particular type of data. This will be a continuous process for all reports which are processed. The different types of data for which files are created are in the following categories, geographical factors, victim descriptors, physical evidence descriptors, specific *modus operandi* factors, suspect descriptors, and suspect vehicle descriptors. It is the responsibility of the analyst throughout the process of sorting, extracting, and storing to clean data by identifying and correcting errors. Equally, the analyst is also responsible for, searching for additional information when there is a shortage of details in the initial report, and ensuring that the format of the data is compatible with the analytical tools that will be used in the next stage of crime analysis process (Stenton, 2006:19-20).

5.9.3 **Analysis**

Analysis is the core of the analysis process. It is at this stage that data is turned into a format or product that is timely, useful, and accurate for dissemination to law enforcement officers. The primary objective of the analysis stage is to examine and process data and subsequently develop packages of information on crime series, patterns, and trends. One of the responsibilities of the crime analyst is to interpret and apply meaning to the large amount of data which has been collected previously to the management, patrol officers, and detectives, in order to achieve the organisational goal of reducing crime and disorder. The interpretation of crime series, patterns, and trends is done in two ways, namely, *modus operandi* detection and correlation analysis, as well as statistical analysis (Stenton, 2006:19-20).

5.9.3.1 *Modus Operandi Detection and Correlation Analysis*

Modus operandi detection and correlation analysis refers to searching through files and data bases in order to determine whether a series of events with matching *modus*

operandi descriptions are occurring, or to link criminal events together after an arrest has been made, and, as a result, revealing trends or sudden spikes of crime in a particular area(Stenton, 2006:20-21). For example, twenty burglary residential cases were reported in the Clubview suburb in Phuthaditjhaba policing precinct, in the period of a month. Fifteen of the twenty cases occurred on Friday nights between 20:00 and 23:30, when the victims were attending the night vigils. In all fifteen cases entry was gained by breaking the bedroom window. In all these cases electrical appliances such as a television set, music systems, DVD machines, were targeted.

Modus operandi pattern prediction will link these fifteen cases as a series based on the fact that all victims were attending night vigils during the commission of a crime, bedroom windows were broken to gain entry, and electrical appliances were targeted. Here an analyst may be able to link or correlate other events to these sources once an arrest has been made, and the *modus operandi* of the offence has been confirmed. By searching through history files for residential burglary the analyst is able to locate all similar incidents for which the apprehended offender is likely to be responsible (Stenton, 2006:20-21).

5.9.3.2 *Statistical Analysis*

Statistical analysis is also used to establish relationships between criminal events through the use of mathematical calculations and probability estimates. This is done by measuring the frequency of the events and the time periods in which they occurred in order to draw causal links and confirm that these events are in fact part of a series (Stenton, 2006:21).

5.9.4 **Dissemination**

Once the analysis stage is completed, the product must be communicated to different role players, such as patrol officers, investigators, police management, the general public, etc. It is, thus, very important for the analyst to consider the following factors when preparing results for dissemination. Firstly, the presentation of the data should be tailored to the knowledge level of the audience for which it is targeted. For

example, an audience such as the general public may require clarification and explanation of different crime categories, like property crimes, contact crimes, etc. On the other hand, patrol officers, investigators, and police management know the different crime categories, which mean that it is not necessary to explain crime categories to them.

Secondly, the results that are distributed or presented contain only the information that is essential to conveying the topic or issue at hand. For instance, the majority of the work conducted by analysts is done behind the scenes (e.g. data collection), and it is not necessary for the entire process to be included in the dissemination and presentation of analytical results (Stenton, 2006:23).

5.9.5 Feedback

Feedback is the final stage of the crime analysis process. This stage is crucial to the refinement and advancement of crime analysis. Feedback from individuals who have utilised analytical products can lead to further modification and improvement of the analytical process as a whole. Feedback may be provided regarding the quality of the analysis, the nature of data that was utilised, or the usefulness of the analytical products for decision making. Such feedback can assist the analysts to modify their procedures and refine their methods in order continually to improve upon their work (Stenton, 2006:24).

During the interviews, it transpired that in South Africa there is no feedback mechanism in place on intelligence products. This issue was raised by respondents from both visible policing (users of intelligence products) and crime intelligence (generators/producers of intelligence products) environments. A brief account of the respondents with regard to feedback on the intelligence products was as follows:

Respondent number 5: “There is no feedback mechanism in place. We just operate, get successes or prevent crime successfully but at the end crime intelligence is not part of the debriefing session at the end of the operation”.

Respondent number 6: “There is no feedback mechanism in place. The only thing the clients (visible policing) present is the successes that they achieved during the

operation; they do not give a report of what they observed in the form of patrol reports. The patrol reports will enrich the intelligence product used in the operation”.

5.10 CRIME LINKAGES

The following terms which form part of crime analysis are commonly used when conducting crime linkages, namely, trend, pattern, series, spree, hot spot, *criminogen*, and criminal organisation/conspiracy. These terms are briefly described as follows;

5.10.1 Trend

A crime trend is the direction of movement of crime and reflects either no change or increase/decrease in crime frequencies within a specific jurisdiction or area (Osborne & Wernicke, 2008:7). It is a crime phenomenon which occurs over a large geographical area over an extended period of time. A trend generally occurs when an area becomes more conducive or less conducive to a particular crime or group of crimes. In a trend, different perpetrators are responsible for different crimes, and there are different victims. For example, the opening of a new shopping mall in sector A, led to an increase in the theft of motor vehicles, robberies and thefts in that area (Waltham, 2011:2).

5.10.2 Pattern

A crime pattern is the number of offences that have some common characteristics, but not necessarily unique to a given person or criminal group. The main objective of crime pattern is to suppress the criminal activity (Phelan & Fenske, 1995:1).

5.10.3 Series

A series is a group of the same crimes committed over a short period of time, probably by the same offender. In other words, the offender is a common factor. For instance, a tall, slender, light in complexion African male in his early thirties is raping and robbing university students near the bushes between the University of Free State

Qwaqwa campus and Bluegumbosch residential area on their way from school. Victims are students who travel alone during the day from school (Waltham, 2011:2).

5.10.4 Spree

These are groups of the same crimes committed almost at the same time, by the same perpetrator. A spree is described as a number of crimes which happen on a single occasion. An example would be thefts, robberies and malicious damage to property committed by a group of angry municipal workers on strike, during a march to hand over a memorandum of their grievances to the mayor of the local municipality (Waltham, 2011:2).

5.10.5 Hot Spot

A hot spot is a location where a variety of crimes keep occurring over an extended period of time. An example is a shopping mall where robberies, thefts, and assault take place regularly (Waltham, 2011:3).

5.10.6 Criminogen

Criminogen is a known individual offender who is responsible for a large number of minor crimes, or an individual victim that reports a large number of crimes, for example a business person who reports burglaries at his business every month (Waltham, 2011:3).

5.10.7 Criminal organisation/ conspiracy

This is an organisation, gang, or other group of persons dedicated to perpetuating one or a number of different crimes, usually for financial profit, but often for other motivation, for example drug cartels, and terrorist cells (Waltham, 2011:3).

5.11 INFORMATION ANALYSIS

Information analysis has been used by police agencies around the world for more than four decades. It has become an important part of law enforcement to such an extent that every police operation is preceded by analysis. It is a process of deriving meaning from fact, by carefully examining information collected in the course of an investigation, from internal police systems like, CAS, INKWAZI, CRIM, Vehicle and firearm circulation systems, etc. and external systems like NATIS, Home affairs, etc. to arriving at something more than what seemed to be evident before. After conducting the analysis, the analyst will be able to present an accurate picture and climate measurement regarding crime, and most importantly, a hypothesis of who may have committed a crime (Peterson, Falhman, Ridgeway, Erwin & Kuzniar, 1996:1).

5.11.1 Information analysis techniques/methodologies

According to Demirci (2001:46) information analysis uses analytical models which give detailed information of a specific syndicate, criminal group, individual, or criminal activity for tactical and strategic assessment. These techniques dissect complex associations, activities, and relationships that exist in the criminal network, and make them simple and comprehensible. In addition to the above statement Peterson *et al* (1996:2) is of the view that information analysis can be applied to every type of police investigation, from murder, rape, robbery, to dealing in drugs and commercial crimes. It assists in identifying assets used in, or resulting from, a crime and aids in their eventual seizure and forfeiture.

The following analysis techniques and methodologies will be discussed in detail in the next paragraph: association analysis; telephone record analysis; event flow and activity flow analysis; commodity flow and visual investigative analysis; financial analysis; threat analysis and vulnerability analysis; and crime pattern analysis and time series analysis.

5.11.1.1 Association Analysis

Association analysis, which is also known as Network or Link analysis, is the analysis of relationships or connections among people and organisations involved in a criminal activity. This analysis technique gives a picture of a criminal organisation, the role of every individual within the organisation, and its hierarchy. It can also be used to show the connections among people, locations, organisations, and criminal activities. The hierarchy of an organisation can be used by intelligence operatives to identify the strong and weak points of an organisation and identify soft targets to be recruited or to be targets of infiltration (Peterson *et al*, 1996:3). Martens, in Dermici (2001:47), describe the significance of network analysis in the intelligence community by referring to it as the “bread and butter” of the intelligence unit. This technique is used when there is multiple data which reflect relationships. It can be constructed from the products of other analysis, such as telephone record analysis, which shows the connections between telephone numbers and financial analysis, which depicts connections between bank accounts and individuals or entities. Association analysis can also be used to uncover new conspirators, to show the geographical breadth of the criminal activity and also provide a basis for criminal organisation and asset forfeiture charges (Peterson *et al*, 1996:3). The association chart is illustrated in Figure 5.2 below. Four individuals are linked through the association chart. Names used in figure 5.2 below are fictitious.




Figure 5.2 Association Chart

5.11.1.2 Phone Record Analysis

Phone record analysis is the compilation of information from telephone and cellular phone bills. This information includes the following information with regard to telephone, code number, in-coming and outgoing call times, dates, and duration of calls. In the case of cellular phones it includes, the location that is tower information, in-coming and outgoing call times, dates, and duration of calls (Peterson *et al*, 1996:4).

For the investigation or intelligence unit to get this information from the service providers, like Telkom, MTN, VODACOM, etc. a section 205 application in terms of Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 should be authorized by the director of public prosecutions or a public prosecutor. Section 11 of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication Related Information Act, 70 of 2002 which amended Section 205(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 stipulates that "A judge of a High Court, a regional court magistrate or a magistrate may, subject to the provisions of Communication related Information Act, 2002, upon the request of a Director of Public Prosecutions or a public prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the director of public prosecution, require the attendance before him or her or any other judge, regional court magistrate or magistrate, for examination by the Director of Public Prosecutions or Prosecutor, of any person who is likely to give material or relevant information as to any alleged offence, whether or not it is known by whom the offence was committed ." To make analysis easy the information is provided on computer disk. In most instances the telephone record is a building block towards telephone tapping. The products of a telephone record analysis include a telephone record chart and the listing of primary numbers. Peterson *et al* (1996:4) suggests that, at the end of the analysis, there should be recommendations and conclusions. Among others the conclusion includes the identification of new conspirators and suggestions that their telephone or cellular phones be subpoenaed for comparison to records of other conspirators already collected. According to Peterson, in Demirci (2001:48), phone record analysis is conducted in the following ten steps;

1. Gather the records to be analysed.
2. Identify the scope of the calls.
3. Determine the frequency of calls by date and day of the week.
4. Detect the frequency of calls to specific numbers.
5. Determine the length of calls.
6. Identify a priority listing of frequent contacts in steps four and five.
7. Examine frequently called numbers for pattern.
8. Review all records for geographic distribution.
9. Prepare charts.
10. Integrate all information above in an intelligence analysis report.

A phone record chart is illustrated in figure 5.3 below.




Figure 5.3 Cellular Phone Record Chart

5.11.1.3 Event Flow and Activity Flow Analysis

This analysis focuses on a series of events that led to a criminal activity. It can show several paths of flow, depicting multiple actors or victims, and where their path converged. It can point to missing information or conflicts in previously provided statements or information. It can also show corroborating information regarding potential suspects. Events can be presented in two different formats on a chart. The

first one is an Event Flow Chart. This chart gives a summary of actions in boxes or other symbols in chronological order. It shows a link between the first and second until the last event. This is shown by lines connecting the events with arrows. The second format is a Time Line Chart. A time line summarises each activity along a dated line. The line is used to distinguish between known and suspected activities and to separate facts from misrepresentations. Time lines are used to guide the prosecutors through a complex series of events, making it easy for them to understand the sequence of activities.

Event flow analysis can be used in insurance fraud, murder, robbery, terrorism, and any other event-orientated investigation and prosecution. It can also be used to show the growth and development of a criminal organisation within a strategic analysis. On the other hand, the activity flow analysis views the actions in a more generic sense, with specific focus on the modus operandi of the criminals. This helps to establish the behavioural or criminal patterns of a criminal or syndicate and highlights places where those patterns might be interdicted by law enforcement agencies. In an activity flow chart, events are presented in the form of symbols, and they are connected by lines and arrows to show the flow of an activity (Peterson *et al*, 1996:7). The timeline chart is illustrated in Figure 5.4 below.




Figure 5.4 Timeline Chart

5.11.1.4 Commodity Flow and Visual Investigative Analysis

Commodity flow analysis is the analysis of the flow of goods, currency, or services relating to a criminal act, among people, organisations, or businesses. This type of analysis shows the movement of criminal profits, such as money laundering, or a trail of stolen goods, or a series of dealings in which contraband goods are exchanged. Arrows are used in the commodity flow charts to depict the direction of the flow. Goods, monies, or services changing hands are noted outside of the symbols, along the lines of the flows. A commodity flow chart takes the specific flows and arranges them along lines connecting the person or entity to which it is flowing. Other products, such as, a commodity flow matrix, which shows the flow of commodity amongst several sources, can be created from the commodity flow chart results.

Another product is the visual investigative analysis which looks at the steps taken in a criminal activity or criminal investigation. A visual investigative chart outlines the steps and places them along a line chronologically. Information about each step, including the end result, is reflected. This kind of analysis technique is more effective in major cases or task force management because it allows the manager to view the actions taken by the investigators, what equipment or other resources were used during the action, and the end result of the action (Peterson *et al*, 1996:8).

5.11.1.5 *Financial Analysis*

Financial analysis becomes an integral part of most investigations where profit is the motive for the commission of the crime. This is evident in crimes such as dealing in drugs, cash in transit heists, murder where the victim was insured by the perpetrator, etc. Financial analysis is conducted on a number of financial aspects, such as bank record analysis, corporate record analysis, Net Worth analysis, source analysis, and the application of funds analysis.

Bank record analysis is the analysis of the bank financial records of the targeted person or organisation. It involves taking copies of bank statements, cheques, deposit items, electronic transfers, and debit or credit memoranda and collating them to determine whether there were any illegal sources or destinations of funds as well as whether any criminal activity can be seen through the use of the funds. A key product of this analysis is the data uncovered that leads to other bank accounts or assets. Bank record analysis is crucial in determining who benefits from the proceeds of crime, and how much are they benefiting.

Corporate record analysis involves the analysis of business ledgers, sales receipts, tax reports filed, income statements, etc. to corroborate information in bank records, to compare those records for inconsistencies, and /or to compare them to an industry standard. It is used to determine whether there are illegal activities occurring within a business. Types of activities that can be detected in this analysis are money laundering, false loans, and tax evasions.

Net worth, source analysis, and the application of funds analysis, is the analysis of an individual's reported income versus what was spent over a year to determine whether there was significantly more spent than earned. A similar analysis of loan or credit card records may also uncover ties to criminal activity (Peterson *et al*, 1996:9). The same procedure of submitting an application in terms of Section 205 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 to get the bank statements of the suspected person from the bank is applicable.

5.11.1.6 *Threat Analysis and Vulnerability Analysis*

Threat analysis is done on criminal, terrorist, or politically-motivated groups or individuals who want to commit crimes or disrupt government activities such as elections or the inauguration of a new president of a country, or any major event, like the FIFA Soccer World Cup, taking place. This is the review of information about the tendency and behaviour of certain individuals or groups towards something, especially events, or the possible occurrence of a criminal activity in a certain time or place. Threat analysis is completed after including recent information gathered about the current activities of an individual or group, and from there it is updated continuously up until the event passes and even after the event. The threat analysis should indicate the possible degree of a threat, projected time frame, and possible targets of a threat. The assessment should be concluded by indicating the actions which will be the result of the threat and counter measures which should be taken in response to these actions (Peterson *et al*, 1996:12). For example, a strike by municipal workers who work at the electricity department may be analysed as follows: The possible strike by South African Municipal Workers Union affiliated workers who work at the electricity department in the Maluti-A-Phofung local municipality may result in continuous electricity cut offs at business and residential areas because they have control and access to electricity substations in the municipality, and this action can cause disruptive action in the community as electricity is the only source of energy in the municipality, which, in turn, may lead to blockades of roads and an increase in criminal activity. The planned strike is expected to last for two weeks until the municipality pays workers overtime. The targets for the strike are electricity substations which supply electricity to the business and residential areas. Ultimately

this action will cause disruptions which will force the municipality to comply with the demands of the workers. Police and the army should guard the electricity substations to prevent any acts of sabotage and the municipality should outsource electricians to attend to electricity problems during the strike.

Vulnerability analysis is the review of information on a potential victim and the identification of areas that may expose a person to victimisation. These areas might include penetrable defences, openness to attacks, the number and severity of threats made against the victim, location of the victim, etc. The report should end with a conclusion of weaknesses identified and recommendations to minimize them. This analysis is done to enhance and support the security of VIP's, like presidents, and major events like the Olympics. Both threat and vulnerability analysis are very important intelligence products for the policing of all major political and other events of great magnitude like FIFA Soccer World Cup (Peterson *et al*,1996:12).

5.11.1.7 *Crime Pattern Analysis and Time Series Analysis*

Gottschalk (2008:96) describe crime pattern analysis is the examination of the nature and distribution of crime within an area to identify the emerging and current trends and patterns, unlike crimes or incidents and hot spots. It includes crime trend identification, crime series identification, general profile analysis, hot spots analysis, examination of the nature and scale of crime within an area and time frame. (Peterson *et al*, 1996:13) describe it as the analysis of information regarding a series of crimes which have occurred. It is used to identify perpetrators of such crimes or the prevention of similar criminal actions. By looking at the *modus operandi* and signatures of the previous crimes, analysts may be able to detect whether the reported crimes form a series and, so, predict when and where the next in the series may occur. The type of pattern reviewed include, victimology, geographical location, time of day, day of the week, property taken, and the description of the perpetrator. This analysis is employed in the combating and prevention of street-level crimes, such as street robberies, burglaries, theft of motor vehicles, and theft from and out of motor vehicles.

Time series analysis, on the other hand, looks at the occurrence of crime over a period of time. This can show fluctuations in crime statistics or in the occurrence of specific activities within a series of criminal actions. For instance, a number of phone calls over a period of time may pinpoint the time of a criminal violation. A combination of time series and geographical analysis may provide a picture of when and where the crimes occurred (Peterson *et al*, 1996:13).

5.12 CRIME MAPPING

The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines “analysis” as the examination of something by dividing it into its separate parts (Davis, Forsyth, Lambert, Tricker & Walter, 1991:30). Crime mapping is another method of dividing crime by pinning every incident of crime, thus depicting the crime hot spots, in the first instance, and, secondly, showing the clustering of specific crimes at specific places. This can be referred to as one of the analytical methods. There are three types of crime mapping, namely, manual pin mapping, computer mapping, and geographic information system (GIS). The next paragraph will discuss the above-mentioned types of mapping.

5.12.1 Manual pin mapping

Manual pin mapping is done on a wall map of a specific station precinct, town, or area. Wall maps have been used for decades to depict crime incidents or crime hot spots. Crime incidents are represented by pins with different colours, for instance a red pin for rape, white pin for common assault, yellow pin for stock theft, etc. Although these maps are very useful, especially during the briefing of shifts, they have some challenges. These challenges are that, they offer limited utility because they are difficult to keep updated, keep accurate, make easy to read, and can only display a limited amount of data. For instance, coloured pins are used to represent different types of crime; information such as date, time of incidents, and nature of incidents cannot be displayed. The other challenge is that, in order to update a manual wall map, the pins must be removed every month, and vital information is lost. To preserve that particular information a photo should be taken every month end, which

makes month to month comparison difficult. Finally these maps become unreadable when they display large amounts of data because of the numerous pins and holes (Boba, 2001:18).

5.12.2 Computer mapping

The computer map is similar to a wall map; the difference is that it is in electronic format. Geographical features, such as locations, streets, and parks are static. In essence computer mapping has limitations similar to those of a wall map. For example, when clicking at a specific point, such as the address of crime incident, the user cannot access further crime particulars beyond that point (Boba, 2001:19). During the interview and interaction with CIO's it came to light that in South Africa some of the police stations are still not on the geographical information system, although we are living in an age which is best described as the computer age. The non-availability of GIS hampers crime analysis as it is done manually, taking a lot of time and manpower.

5.12.2.1 Geographic Information System

This is a set of computer-based tools that allow a person to modify, visualise, query, and analyse geographical and tabular data. It is a powerful software tool that allows the user to create anything from a simple point map to a three-dimensional visualisation of spatial or temporal data. On the geographic information system the analyst can view data behind the geographic features, combine various features, manipulate the data and maps, and perform statistical functions. The system can also be used to analyse crime (Boba, 2001:19).

5.12.2.1.1 Components of the geographic information system

The geographic information system consists of the following major components, data representation, data features, visualisation, scale, and querying. The next paragraphs will be a brief explanation of each component.

➤ Data Representation

Data in the geographic information system is represented by the following features, point, line, polygon, and image features (Boba, 2001:20).

Point feature: A point feature is a discrete location that is usually depicted by a symbol or label. A point feature in the geographic information system is similar to a pin placed on a paper wall map. Different symbols are used to depict different things, for instance, a star for the location of crimes, triangle for schools, bottle for liquor outlets, and a pole for cell phone towers (Boba, 2001:20).

Line feature: A line feature is a geographical feature that can be represented by a line or set of lines. Solid or broken lines may be used to depict railway lines, streets, rivers, or streams in a neighbourhood. Information about footpaths, power lines, bus routes can also be shown on the map (Boba, 2001:21).

Polygon feature: A polygon feature is a multisided figure represented by a closed set of lines. Coloured lines may be used to represent different boundaries in a polygon feature, such as blue line for police station precinct, yellow line for municipal wards and red lines for buildings. In the policing environment these lines can be used to demarcate different sectors in the policing precinct. Polygon features can represent areas as large as continents and as small as buildings (Boba, 2001:21).

Image feature: An image feature is a vertical photograph taken from a satellite or a plane that is digitized and placed within the geographic information system coordinate system so that there are $-x$ and $-y$ coordinates associated with it. Image features show the details of streets, buildings, and environmental features such as landscaping. The geographic information system is able to show two types of photographs, namely, the aerial photographs, and the digital *orthophotography*. Aerial photography is just the aerial image of a place, and *orthophotography* is the combination of the aerial image of a place's geometric qualities of the map. Owing to the fact that *orthophotographs* are located within the geographic information system, they can be viewed with other layers, such as street or parcel information (Boba, 2001:22).

➤ Data of Geographical Features

The geographic information system has a data table for three attributes of the four types of features. These three attributes are, point, line, and polygon. By using the geographic information system the analyst is able to query, relate, and manipulate data behind these features. A simple click on a point, line, or polygon can produce the data table associated with that particular feature (Boba, 2001:23).

Point Data: In every case that is reported and captured on the system, each line of data describes a different point on the map, and each variable describes something about that point. For instance, a red point may represent a rape which took place at 18:00 on 16 June 2011 (Boba, 2001:23).

Line Data: This feature is able to provide the analyst with a table which describes street segments, such as kilometres, the length of that street segment, and name of the street. Each colour on the street segment corresponds with the case which is highlighted with the same colour in the data table. For example, rape is highlighted with red colour in the data table, and will correspond with a red street segment on the map (Boba, 2001:24).

Polygon Data: This feature can provide the analyst with a zip code which can give the name of the place highlighted on the map, size in terms of square kilometres, population, and the year the census was conducted (Boba, 2001:24).

5.13 CONCLUSION

Crime analysis is the engine of policing, in the sense that, if correctly done, it can assist in identifying places where crime is taking place as well as people who are responsible for the commission of such crimes. In other words, the products of crime analysis can be used to prevent crime by predicting future criminal activities as well as by investigating crime, by identifying perpetrators. The next chapter will highlight the circulation of intelligence either hard core intelligence or analysis products. This process is known as the intelligence cycle.

CHAPTER 6: INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

6.1 INTRODUCTION

As is true of any other tool or instrument which is going to be used in a fight, war, or battle for supremacy, information needs to be sharpened and tested. In order to pass the test, that information must go through a number of stages or processes. The end product of such stages or processes is called intelligence, which will be suitable for consumption or use by operational units or policy makers. The producer of the intelligence product will have achieved his/her goal only if the product meets the needs of a client.

This chapter will explore the intelligence process which is commonly known as the “intelligence cycle”. Firstly, attention will be given to the term “cycle” before taking the reader through the journey of the intelligence cycle. Nine stages of the cycle will be discussed in detail. These stages are planning, collection, verification of information, processing/collation, analysis, assessment of analytical rigour and value, distribution/ dissemination, application of intelligence, and re-evaluation.

6.2 DEFINITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The intelligence cycle is the combination of two words, namely, “intelligence” and “cycle”. The word “intelligence” has been described and defined in chapter four. Before defining “intelligence cycle” it will be proper to take the reader through the definition of the word “cycle”. Two English dictionaries define the word “cycle” as follows. Firstly, the Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners defines a “cycle” as a series of events that happen again and again in the same order or at the same times (Rundell & Fox, 2005:345). Secondly, the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines a “cycle” as a number of related events happening in a regularly repeated order (Davis *et al*, 1991:256). Then “intelligence cycle” is defined as follows by different authors.

Fuentes (2006:6) defines intelligence cycle as the process by which intelligence gaps are identified, relevant data/information are collected, and then converted into finished intelligence for dissemination to consumers at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. According to Miller (1997:11), intelligence cycle is a process by which information is converted into intelligence and made available to users. It is clear from the above definitions that the intelligence cycle is a process of producing intelligence from gathered or collected information/data and then utilising the intelligence product. This process has a number of steps that repeat themselves, and it is a continuous process until the desired results are achieved.

6.3 INTELLIGENCE CYCLE PROCESS

Carter (2009:57) states that the main purpose of the intelligence cycle is to have a systematic, scientific, and logical methodology to process information comprehensively to ensure that the most accurate, actionable intelligence is produced and disseminated to the people who provide an operational response to prevent a criminal threat from reaching fruition. For example, the station commander of Police Station “A” is experiencing problems with regard to the increase of burglaries in his station precinct. He requests assistance from the Commander of Crime Intelligence Station regarding, his crime problem. The first step of the Commander of Crime Intelligence Station will be to have a meeting with his Crime Information Official, Commander Crime Information Management Office as well as Commander Overt Intelligence Collection, which is the planning phase. After all other steps in the intelligence cycle have been done, the last three steps will be to distribute the product of analysed information, that is the “intelligence product”, for implementation which is commonly known as the application of intelligence stage, and, lastly, to re-evaluate the impact of the intelligence product with the Station Commander of Police Station “A”, as well as the Crime Prevention Unit (Visible policing) and the detectives who were employing the intelligence. The intelligence cycle is illustrated in figure 6.1 below. The nine steps of the intelligence cycle are discussed in their chronological order below.



Figure 6.1 Intelligence Cycle (Carter, 2009:57).

6.3.1 Planning

According to Peterson (2005:6) and Champagne (2009:4), planning is the first phase of the intelligence cycle which takes place after a request by a client or after the identification of a threat by the intelligence agency itself. Planning how data will be collected is central to the intelligence process. Evaluating the existing data and ensuring that the collection of additional data will fill the gaps in the information already on the data base is the foundation of effective planning. Fuentes (2006:6) emphasizes that planning and direction is the phase where intelligence consumers at all levels formulate questions about the operational environment and define their priorities for data collection and intelligence analysis efforts. These priorities are then coordinated through a formal tasking process. This phase determines **what**, to collect. Peterson (2005:6) goes further by stating that, in order to produce a quality intelligence product, the collection of information must be planned and focused, its methods must be coordinated, and its guidelines must prohibit illegal methods such as torture to be employed to obtain information. Inaccurate collection efforts can result in a flawed outcome or product, regardless of the analytical skills employed.

Successful planning requires a close working relationship between analysts, who understand how to manage, compile, and analyse information, and the information collectors who know how best to collect and obtain information (Peterson, 2005:6).

According to Schneider (2009:404), there are four inter-related methodological components within the planning stage. These components are: conducting an environmental scan; choosing a topic for inquiry; defining the problem; and developing a collection plan. These components are discussed briefly below.

6.3.1.1 Environmental Scan

This is the first step in the planning activity, and it requires the development of a wide-ranging awareness of the environment surrounding the intelligence function. This means focusing on the identified problem from the outset. This includes identifying and examining factors such as demographic characteristics, which include: age, population size, racial and ethnic composition of the population; overall crime rate; general enforcement objectives and strategies; economic; socio-economic; and physical conditions. In all of these, trends should be identified and extrapolated into the future. The results of scanning must be used as a basis for intelligence and be further articulated to the management on a regular basis (Schneider, 2009:404).

6.3.1.2 Choosing a Topic

After laying out the general parameters through the environmental scan, the next step is to choose a topic that will be analysed. A topic for analysis should emanate from different sources, including the environmental scan, executive management policy, recent events, analytical queries, and standard operating procedure. It is always advisable to narrow the topic and limit it to specific type of crime or group, for instance motor vehicle hijackings, and truck hijackings (Schneider, 2009:404). Gill, in Demirci (2001:39), argues that the intelligence process cannot be successful without targeting and directing a goal or objective. This means that, in order to be focused, the topic of intelligence collection should be narrow, which will make the search more efficient and effective.

6.3.1.3 *Definition of a Problem*

Once a general topic has been chosen, a problem must then be defined to pave the way forward. This step involves the examination of the issues subsumed within the topic, considering it from several viewpoints and breaking it down into a set of questions or a hypothesis to be proved or refuted by the intelligence project. For example, a hypothesis for strategic assessment might be, “has organised stock theft infiltrated the legitimate business of selling stock in Phuthaditjhaba?” The definition of a problem hypothesis formation is critical because it will guide the collection and analysis of information (Schneider, 2009:405). McDowell (1997:15) points out that defining a problem does not only illuminate all possible aspects of the issues involved, but also, through clever re-definition and re-statement of the intelligence task, guides the further planning for later activities, especially the collection of information.

6.3.1.4 *Developing a Collection Plan*

In order to give proper direction to the intelligence process it is vital to have a plan which will give direction. The collection plan includes the analyst’s research methodology, and it focuses the collection of resources to ensure that they refute or prove the hypothesis. It establishes precise pieces of information necessary to accomplish the overall goal of the project and provides the intelligence officer with an understanding of how the data/information fits into the larger puzzle. It helps the intelligence operatives to be focused. The results of collection without a plan are non-direction, misdirection, and totally inefficient and ineffective utilisation of collection resources. The collection plan should include the following information, a description of information to be gathered, the sources of information, steps to be taken to obtain information, and the completion date for each stage of information collection (Schneider, 2009:405).

6.3.2 Collection

This is the second stage of the intelligence cycle. According to Hannah *et al* (2005:4), collection is the process of gathering raw data/information which forms the basis for refined intelligence. There are various methods of information collection which range from human intelligence, for example, agents, and informers; to the interception of electronic communications, known as SIGINT; and satellite images from imagery intelligence. In order to get a clear picture, it is always advisable to make use of the different methods of collecting information, which were discussed in detail in chapter four.

Schneider (2009:405) emphasizes that the success of the intelligence operation depends on focused information collection. Thus, the definition of a problem must guide the collection effort. It will direct the information collection process to be both goal-oriented and relevant to the criminal activity under investigation. Peterson (2005:6) describes data/information collection as the most labour-intensive aspect of the intelligence cycle. The success and failure of intelligence depends on the data/information collection process. The most common forms of data collection in the crime environment are through:

- reported crime and disorder;
- Confidential Informants;
- Undercover agents;
- Physical and Electronic Surveillance;
- Newspaper reports, Internet sources (open sources of information); and
- Public records, for example property tax records.

Fuentes (2006:7) points out that the collection phase refers to the research and operations activities that fulfil the formal tasking created during the planning and direction phase. This involves both the researching of existing intelligence and conducting operations to gather raw data from different potential sources of information. The collection phase addresses the, **who**, **where**, and **how** of the collection of information that fulfils the commander's needs. The collection process is divided into two main functions, namely, research and operations.

6.3.2.1 *Research*

This is the process of going through the existing data bases, such as the Crime Administration System, CRIM, or other information repositories, to search for information. Previously processed intelligence can be obtained on systems like Inkwazi or archives that are relevant to the current investigation (Fuentes, 2006:7).

6.3.2.2 *Operations*

These are traditional police activities aimed at getting more data about a particular criminal, criminal environment, or event. They include the use of human sources, physical and electronic surveillance, and the execution of search and arrest warrants (Fuentes, 2006:8).

6.3.3 **Verification of information**

Verification of information is the third stage of the intelligence cycle. This stage ensures that the collected information is useful for an investigation, strategic planning, and management decisions. The main objective of continuous evaluation of collected information is to verify the validity and accuracy of such raw information, as well as to check its effectiveness and relevance (Schneider, 2009:406). Wolf, in Schneider (2009:406), states that the verification of information must be based on its pertinence, reliability, and accuracy as follows:

Pertinence - New information should be examined immediately to determine the degree to which it is relevant, urgent, and valuable. The examination process is done by answering the following three questions, namely:

- Is this information relevant to the subject of a specific investigation(s), defined problem, or strategic planning?
- Is this information needed immediately, and if so, by whom?
- Is this information of possible present or future value, and, if so, to whom?

Reliability - Information found to be pertinent is next judged on the reliability of the source of information and on the reliability of the agency and or individual who had collected and reported it. The source of the information, its past reliability, and the motives of the source must be critically evaluated. The following are additional questions to determine the reliability of the source:

- Under the existing conditions at the time, was it possible for this information to have been obtained?
- Would the source have had access to the information reported?

Accuracy - Information is judged for accuracy or its truth and completeness. Accuracy is judged by answering the following questions:

- Is the reported fact or event at all possible?
- Is the report consistent within itself?
- Is the report confirmed or corroborated by information from different sources or agencies?
- In what respects does the report agree or disagree with other available information, particularly information known to be true?
- If the information does not agree with information from other sources or agencies, which is more likely to be true?

6.3.4 Processing/collation

Processing or collation is the fourth stage of the intelligence cycle. Hannah *et al* (2005:4) define processing as turning the potentially large quantities of information gathered by collection methods into a format suitable for closer inspection. For instance, the transcription of audio conversations obtained through the telephone tapping process. This stage can also be described as a process of sifting through available data to eliminate useless, irrelevant, or incorrect information and to put data into a logical order. This organisation of data makes it easier to identify relationships among entities and to uncover relevant information. It is at this stage that information or collected data are evaluated, firstly for validity, and secondly for the reliability of sources. Thus, it is crucial for the information to meet the standard of relevancy, which means that it must be relevant to the criminal activity being investigated (Peterson, 2005:6).

Hicks, in Demirci (2001:40), states that accurate and goal-orientated intelligence can be processed only with precise and relevant information. That is why it is so important that collection efforts be focused in order to minimize the collection of irrelevant information. This focus is directed by the planning stage. The organisation of information/data is of critical importance. Information can be organised around specific categories, such as crime groups or networks, for example West Africans drug syndicates; organised crime; criminal specialties like pension pay-outs robbers, and truck hijackers; *modus operandi* or geographical territory.

Through this categorisation of information, patterns and trends may become obvious. These trends and patterns should then be used to stimulate a more intensive information collection effort directed at an above-mentioned category that may raise a new set of questions that deserve further investigation (Schneider, 2009:406).

6.3.5 Analysis

Analysis is the fifth, and the most critical, stage of the intelligence cycle. It is at this stage that information or data is turned into intelligence. Fuentes (2006:9) defines intelligence analysis as the process of producing intelligence products, such as briefings, and reports, based on the evaluation of data and inputs from multiple sources about a specific area of interest. Chainey (2012:2), points out that analysis involves generating intelligence that helps to understand and explain the problem that is being studied, and the crucial part is to interpret what is causing the problem. In support of the above viewpoint, Kleiven (2005:15) states that analysis produces a meaningful “pictures” out of individual intelligence reports and facilitates the development of preventative strategies.

In the intelligence context, analysis takes on two additional overtones that distinguish it from other fields of analysis. Firstly, the environment within which intelligence activity takes place, rarely involves the collection and subsequent processing of information that is entirely quantifiable or controllable. Instead, the nature of intelligence work regardless of its focus is that much of the information involves judgments about the activity of people, with all the uncertainties involved in that. Secondly, the intelligence analysis must result in an outcome that is, at the very least,

both descriptive and explanatory of any given set of circumstances, and, at best, provides forecasts of future events (McDowell, 1997:17).

According to Peterson (2005:7), at this step, the process of analysing, converts information into intelligence. In simple terms, analysis is a process of deriving meaning from the collected data by identifying the information gaps such as “what information is present and what is missing from the facts”. In police intelligence operations, data is analysed to provide further leads in investigations, to present hypotheses about who committed a crime or how it was committed, to predict future crime patterns, and to assess threats facing a policing precinct. Thus, analysis includes synthesizing data, developing inferences or conclusions, and making recommendations for action based on the data and inferences. These inferences constitute the finished intelligence product. Commanders and policy makers should always bear in mind that an analyst, **only recommends** but does not **direct or decide** on policy matters to minimize crime problems. The following analytic techniques are available to support crime prevention and detection:

- Crime Analysis, which consists of crime pattern analysis, geographical analysis, time-series analysis, frequency distribution analysis, behavioural analysis, and statistical analysis;
- Investigative (Evidential) Analysis, consisting of network analysis, phone record analysis, event, commodity, and activity-flow analysis, visual investigative analysis, bank record analysis, net worth analysis, business record analysis, content analysis, post-seizure analysis, case analysis, and conversation analysis; and
- Strategic Analysis: Threat assessments, pre-monitories, vulnerability assessments, risk assessments, estimates, general assessments, warnings, problem profiles, and strategic targeting.

Schneider (2009:407) emphasizes that the analytical activity must focus on the working hypothesis which was formulated, in conjunction with the problem definition, during the planning stage. McDowell (1997:16) defines working hypotheses as likely answers, observations, or alternative judgments that might usefully describe the particular situation, explain the causes of trend changes or forecast future developments.

Intelligence which relates specifically to the substance of the hypothesis and the pre-defined problem must be produced. Using the social scientific model, analysis should attempt to refute the hypothesis. This orderly approach to refining hypothesis has as its result the survival of only the strongest, best founded, and most convincing conclusion. In testing hypotheses and drawing conclusions, the analyst, in turning information into intelligence, must use both inductive and deductive reasoning. Once a conclusion has been drawn, the strategic analyst must make predictions and suggest alternative investigative, enforcement, or policy strategies (Schneider, 2009:407).

According to Peterson, in Schneider (2009:407-408), there are three steps which make up the complete tactical analysis phase: arranging the pieces, that is collection and collation; examining each piece for clues about its role or placement in the puzzle, which is analysis; and assembling the puzzle, which is case analysis or synthesis. Peterson argues that to accomplish these three general steps, a “**Case Analysis Model**” should be used. This model has seventeen steps, namely:

- **Gather information/data:** This is the process of collecting relevant information from different sources of information;
- **Reference information/data:** This is the process of looking for relevant information on the collected data and labelling/numbering it;
- **Review information/data:** This is the process of examining the collected information again;
- **Research criminal context:** By posing questions such as, What particular crimes are alleged and what are their elements? Were the crimes committed in a criminal environment with other crimes? What were the other crimes? How was the crime committed? How does the subject or case compare to other known criminals engaged in this activity?
- **Separate data based on methods:** data should be separated according to the type of analysis to be performed upon it, for example telephone toll analysis, and financial analysis;
- **Perform basic analysis:** first complete basic analysis of records present. For example, toll analysis and/or financial analysis are distinct analytical forms, the results of which can be used in other analysis;
- **Extract the data:** this involves pulling the relevant data from original records;

- **Decide on other methods to be used:** identify other methods which can be used to analyse the extracted data. Analysts should do a rough version of all possible methods/products and eliminate those which seem unnecessary;
- **Perform the appropriate analysis:** this is the logical outcome of the screening process;
- **Review investigative methodologies:** compile a list of all investigative steps that were taken and what resulted from these steps to evaluate what outcomes were achieved;
- **Compare products:** for accuracy, consistency, and what is missing. Questions which arise in the mind of the analyst stemming from the analysis should be noted and form the basis of what else may be needed to complete the case or prepare it for court;
- **Synopsis analytical products:** based on all products, listings, charts, and graphs synopsise the findings achieved through the analysis process. These are the basis for the fact pattern and recommendations;
- **Prepare a fact pattern:** a fact pattern is a short summary of the facts of a case. This can be one or two paragraphs and should include the basics of all investigations;
- **Use logic to arrive at overall conclusions:** Give a brief but detailed conclusion of the findings;
- **Recommend further action:** Recommend which steps need to be taken to address the identified problem, for instance conduct vehicle patrols, stop and search, etc.;
- **Prepare final report:** This is the stage where the report is checked by the analyst and the supervisor before the report is published. This involves proper checking and re-checking.; and
- **Present final report:** This is the last stage where the final product is presented to the management or policy-makers.

6.3.5.1 Analytical Assessments

According to Schneider (2009:409), in order for intelligence to be used in a strategic or tactical manner, the analysed information must be presented in a functional

assessment package. Standard assessments include *premonitories*, threat assessments, aggressiveness analysis, market analysis, vulnerability analysis, estimates and general strategic assessments.

6.3.5.1.1 Premonitories

These are short range assessments which bridge the gap between investigative and strategic intelligence. They use a strategic approach but are completed to generate investigative targets. The difference between this and other types of strategic analysis is the time frame. *Premonitories* are generally done on potential subjects of investigation immediately prior to initiating an investigation, whereas other forms of strategic intelligence products are more long-range (Schneider, 2009:409).

6.3.5.1.2 Threat assessments

This is the analysis of “what” organised crime groups and operations are costing the community, directly and indirectly, and what groups and operations are most threatening to the peace and stability of the community. This type of analysis can also be pro-active when it attempts to predict the vulnerability of a community to organised crime (Schneider, 2009:409).

6.3.5.1.3 Aggressiveness analysis

This is the study of aggressiveness, adventurousness, and expansionist tendencies of organised crime groups and their operations. It includes the use of lethal violence by a group (Schneider, 2009:409).

6.3.5.1.4 Market analysis

This type of analysis examines a market for a particular product or service, both legal and illegal. The objective of this kind of analysis is to determine the interactions within the market, its size, value, consumers, the involvement of organised crime groups, etc. Central to analysing illegal markets is the use of economic theory and analytical

models which centre on the demand and supply of a product or service (Schneider, 2009:409). According to Gottschalk (2008:97) this type of analysis can be augmented by crime pattern and network analysis. This will enhance the picture of the target market and make it easy for the consumers of the product to understand the situation. He describes network analysis as the provision of a detailed picture of the roles played by individuals, the nature and significance of the u-link between people, and the strengths and weaknesses of the criminal network.

6.3.5.1.5 Vulnerability analysis

This type of analysis examines the internal characteristics of an organised crime group to identify the individual points of weakness and vulnerability to interdiction. The outcome of this analysis will later be used during the planning of the infiltration strategy (Schneider, 2009:409).

6.3.5.1.6 Estimates

These are a compilation of data which measure the historical occurrence of criminal activity and include trends and forecasts based on that historical data. An example of strategic intelligence estimates is “**drug trafficking between Lesotho and South Africa**”. This includes information on drug supply, routes, prices, source country production, availability, and future trends (Schneider, 2009:409).

6.3.5.1.7 General strategic assessments

This is an overview of all known information on a criminal group or criminal activity with conclusions about the group and recommendations concerning possible enforcement measures against the group, network, or criminal activity (Schneider, 2009:409).

6.3.5.2 *Types of Analysis*

According to Osborne (2006:96), law enforcement analysts are dependent on the vision of their agency, their access to information, skills and training received, the objectives set by their supervisors. Focused and well trained, skilful law enforcement analysts are able to do the following types of analysis.

6.3.5.2.1 Frequency analysis

This is the analysis of the quantity of disorderly behaviour and criminal variables. It is done by counting crime incidents, comparing the counts, and analysing crime trends. This is also called statistical analysis. This can also be done by counting the complaints reported in the community service centre and or 10111 centre of the specific policing precinct. Frequency of other variables such as types of vehicles, and colour of suspect's clothing, may be recorded in order to find patterns in data (Osborne, 2006:97).

6.3.5.2.2 Spatial analysis

This is the analysis about the “**where**” of crime or disorder. It is performed by mapping crime, either using pin maps or a sophisticated geographic information system. This type of crime analysis assists in identifying patterns of location. Spatial analysis can include refinement to specific locations in buildings, such as certain rooms, elevators, and parks, if information is collected at that level. Spatial analysis also includes examining the spatial relationships between variables, such as ATMs to robbery, and vandalism to schools (Osborne, 2006:97). Demirci (2001:30) went further to indicate that this type of analysis enables the viewer to see patterns and trends of criminal activities. Therefore it can be used to deploy personnel and other resources at specific places and times for police operations.

6.3.5.2.3 Temporal analysis

This type of analysis answers the “**when**” of crime and disorder. Some crimes occur in a distinct pattern of time. So temporal analysis identify patterns of crime or disorder by time of day; day of week; time of month; time of year; season; special events, such as holidays, sporting events, as well as the tempo of crime. The most difficult and challenging part of analysis is to identify patterns that occur over years, even in the same jurisdiction, because human beings tend to think in short-term time frames. For instance, a rapist who strikes every other year is less likely to be detected as a serial offender through the traditional temporal analysis, compared to one who strikes every month (Osborne, 2006:97).

6.3.5.2.4 Modus operandi analysis

Modus operandi analysis answers the “**how**” of crime and disorder. This analysis is helpful in highlighting whether crimes are related, that is in doing the linkages of crime. *Modus operandi* analysis consists of analysing the qualitative aspects of crime and disorder incidents by examining the method used in committing the offences. The analysis focuses on aspects such as approach methods; phrases spoken; entry methods; degree of force; specific type of items taken; weapons used; and types of graffiti, to uncover relationships and similarities between specific crime and disorder events (Osborne, 2006:97).

6.3.5.2.5 Suspect or victim analysis

Suspect or victim analysis answers the “**who**” of crime or disorder. The information about the description of the suspect is analysed as well as the crime series like crimes perpetrated by the same individual(s) or trends of emerging groups or gangs. Victim information is analysed to uncover series such as those targeting the elderly and trends such as an increase in juvenile victims (Osborne, 2006:97).

According to Gottlieb and Arenberg (1992:17) victim analysis is the examination of factors that cause a person, structure, vehicle, or an establishment to be vulnerable.

They went further to point out that this type of analysis identifies the type of person, structure, vehicle or establishment most likely to be attacked by a suspect or perpetrator. This type of analysis benefits both the police and the community in the following manner. Firstly the police use this type of intelligence product to plan and develop patrol plans. This type of plans guides the activities of operational units to combat or prevent criminal activities, such as business robberies. Secondly it can also be used to warn the community about the impending or existing criminal activity. Thirdly the community can take some precautions to prevent them from being victims of crime through, for example, target hardening, such as erection of burglar proofs or bullet proof windows in their tuck shops or arranging for drop-in safes.

6.3.5.2.6 Property analysis

This type of analysis focuses on the “**what**” of crime or disorder. Property taken during the commission of a crime can be analysed to uncover trends or to link related crimes. For example, with regard to the problem of the theft of motor vehicles, the type and colour can be analysed to find out which cars need theft prevention modifications (Osborne, 2006:98).

6.3.5.2.7 Problem analysis

This is the analysis of the depth of crime or disorder. It is a multi-faceted approach of analysing crime or disorder by visiting crime hotspots and interviewing members of the community and/or interviewing victims of crime and witnesses (Osborne, 2006:98).

6.3.5.2.8 Demographic analysis

This is the analysis of population and crime or disorder. This type of analysis focuses on demographic variables and their possible influence on crime and disorder in the community (Osborne, 2006:98).

6.3.5.2.9 Market analysis

This is the analysis of places and individuals who receive stolen items. The purpose of this type of analysis is to uncover markets and to develop a strategy to disrupt those markets (Osborne, 2006:98).

6.3.5.2.10 Network/ Association analysis

This is the analysis of the organisation of crime. This analysis discovers and displays the relationships in a criminal group and the activities of specific criminals (Osborne, 2006:98). Metscher & Gilbride (2005:28) claim that this type of analysis may provide insight into organisational structure, capability, and which investigative methods could be most effective.

6.3.5.2.11 Communication analysis

Osborne (2006:98) agree with Metscher & Gilbride (2005:28) that communication analysis explores the relationships of suspect individuals/organisations as exhibited through telephone, e-mail, pager, text messaging, etc. The main purpose of this type of analysis is to uncover the relationships among suspects.

6.3.5.2.12 Financial analysis

According to Metscher and Gilbride (2005:28), financial analysis is the review and analysis of financial data to ascertain the presence of criminal activity. This includes the analysis of transactions of suspect individuals or organisations such as financial profiles, source and application of funds, and bank secrecy records. According to Osborne (2006:98) financial analysis scrutinizes the records of suspected individuals, and businesses, to uncover relationships and possible illegal activity.

6.3.6 Assessment of analytical rigor and value

Schneider (2009:414) states that, after completing the analysis stage, the intelligence products must be scrutinised and verified for the rigour of their analytical value before being disseminated to management, crime prevention, or investigators. This is to make sure that only accurate and well-written reports are disseminated. The following criteria should be used in assessing the analytical rigour and value of tactical and strategic intelligence products:

- To what extent was the past understood? Are present trends discerned and their significance noted?
- To what extent is the present state understood? Are present trends discerned and their significance noted?
- To what extent are future trends, particularly those that can simply be extrapolated from the past and present, logically and consistently derived?
- To what extent has there been an attempt to look for new or unusual developments, which will bear significantly on future trends?
- Is the estimate interdisciplinary in the sense that a comprehensive approach to all kinds of evidence, political, economic, cultural, and social, is attempted?
- If future trends were accurately identified and their direction adequately perceived, were predictions made? And, however, imprecise, how accurate were those predictions?

6.3.7 Distribution/ Dissemination

According to Cleary (2006:11), dissemination is the process of distributing actionable intelligence to those who have the need and the right to use it. Continuous management is vital during this process in order to strike a balance between sharing and withholding valuable intelligence that might damage the investigation if released. Carter (2009:69) states that an intelligence product has virtually no value unless the system is able to get the right information to the right people in a time frame that provides value to the report's content. This implies that the effectiveness of the intelligence product is seen when it is disseminated to the right people who employ the intelligence properly.

6.3.8 Application of intelligence

This is the stage where intelligence products are applied, for crime prevention, investigation, operational, or management purposes. The intelligence unit must ensure that the intelligence products are thoroughly understood by the operational components and the management who utilise them. In cases of tactical intelligence, an analyst should work actively with the investigators or crime prevention unit to give advice and monitor the application of intelligence. There must be constant feedback among those who use the intelligence and the analyst and the intelligence unit manager (Schneider, 2009:416). During the interaction with CIO's, CIMO and crime prevention commanders, it came to light that in South Africa, there are few, if not no, instances where feedback is given to crime analysts about the utilisation of intelligence products. To add salt to the wound there is no credit given to crime analysts when successes are achieved from the intelligence products.

6.3.9 Re-evaluation

According to Simeone (2007:22), the re-evaluation stage involves assessing whether intelligence products generated are fulfilling the needs of the consumers, or clients; that is, are they having impact on crime? Feedback obtained from evaluating the intelligence should, therefore, be used as a basis for directing future intelligence operations. Consumer or client feedback is vital because it helps the agency to improve its products or services.

Cleary (2006:11) agrees with Peterson (2005:7) that re-evaluation is the process of examining the intelligence products to determine their effectiveness. The role players in this process include consumers of the intelligence products, like Station Commanders, Crime Prevention Officers, and Detectives, to whom the intelligence is directed. One of the re-evaluation ways is by attaching a feedback form on each intelligence product disseminated, with specific questions relating to the usefulness of the intelligence.

According to the account of the respondents in the SAPS, there is no feedback mechanism between the consumers and generators of intelligence products. This creates a gap between the users of intelligence products such as crime prevention officers and the generators of the products. This gap results in a lack of improvement in the intelligence products, the lack of utilisation of intelligence products, and finger pointing where there is an intelligence failure or unsuccessful crime prevention operations. Crime Intelligence is often blamed for providing poor intelligence.

6.4 CONCLUSION

The purpose of the intelligence cycle is to outline how the intelligence process works. From the above discussion it is clear that intelligence is generated through analysis; it is not collected. Only data or information is collected. The nine stages of the intelligence cycle are vital for the success of any intelligence operation or for the production of a valuable intelligence product. Thus, properly generated intelligence products and well executed intelligence led operations could lead to the decrease of, or prevent, any crime.

CHAPTER 7: INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Intelligence led or intelligence driven policing has existed in policing circles for more than two decades now. Although it has been around for such a long time, it is still not well understood or implemented in South Africa. Although intelligence has been used in policing for more than half a century in South Africa, intelligence led policing is still a new concept in policing. This chapter will explore the concept of intelligence led policing. Attention will be given to the origin of the concept, its inception in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Australia, and the Republic of South Africa. The application of the concept will also be discussed.

7.2 USE OF INTELLIGENCE IN POLICING

According to Schreier (2009:60), the police used intelligence to fight crime a long time ago. In the United States of America it was used to fight organised crime, in some European countries, such as the United Kingdom, it was used for “political policing” which was to suppress political opponents of the state, which was also the case in the Republic of South Africa. Intelligence emerged as a vital tool in all policing matters after the recognition of the inability of the traditional reactive model of policing to cope with the inexorable rise in crime in the United Kingdom.

Smith (1997:13), points out that information has always been available to the law enforcement agencies but it was never developed. It was recorded on the police records books but not exposed to analysis for utilisation by the entire police agency. Only a limited number of police officials knew about this information, which, if utilised properly, could benefit the entire police agency for preventing crime. Thus information was not used in a coordinated fashion.

7.3 DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING

Before talking about the concept of intelligence led policing it is vital to take the reader through the definition of the term, “*intelligence led policing*”. As a new concept in policing, academics and practitioners have not agreed on a single definition of the term, so there are different definitions. For the purpose of this study the following definitions from various academics and practitioners will suffice. According to Ratcliffe (2005:2), intelligence led policing is a business model and managerial philosophy where data **analysis** and crime intelligence are pivotal to an objective, decision-making framework that facilitates crime and problem reduction, disruption and prevention through both strategic management and effective enforcement strategies that target prolific and serious offenders. Fuentes (2006:3) defines intelligence led policing as a collaborative philosophy that starts with information, gathered at all levels of the organisation that is **analysed** to create useful intelligence and an improved understanding of the operational environment. Loyka, Faggiani, Karchmer, Bginski, Bibel, Carraway, Kirby, Martinez, Sellers and Sullivan (2005:19) define intelligence led policing as the collection and **analysis** of information to produce an intelligence end-product designed to inform police decision making at both the tactical and strategic level. According to Taylor, Boba and Egge (2011:49), intelligence led policing is a contemporary business model and management philosophy that puts the intelligence **[analytical]** function within the overall mission of the police organisation and seeks to reduce and prevent crime as well as disrupt offender activity, guided by the combination of crime analysis and criminal intelligence.

From the above definitions it is clear that **“analysis”** is central to intelligence led policing. This implies that intelligence led policing revolves around the collection of information and its analysis. The process of intelligence led policing is driven by crime intelligence analysis products. Thus operations and decisions are not conducted or taken randomly, but they are directed and influenced by available intelligence.

7.3.1 An operational definition of intelligence led policing

Carter (2008:2) distinguishes between the different definitions of intelligence led policing. According to him there is an academic and operational definition of the term. Different academic definitions were listed in the preceding paragraph. He states that the operational definition of intelligence led policing is, “The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats”. He goes further to identify six critical components which form the basis of the definition. These critical components are, collection, analysis, crime and conditions that contribute to crime, actionable intelligence, tactical responses to threats, and strategic planning related to emerging or changing threats. These critical components of an operational definition of intelligence led policing will be discussed briefly in the next sub-paragraphs.

7.3.1.1 Collection

Collection is the process of gathering raw information for the purpose of analysis. In order to generate quality intelligence products, collection should be focused on identified threats. This focus and direction is done by the analyst who defines the intelligence requirements based on information received from police officials and the community in the form of tips, leads, and suspicious activity reports. Most importantly is that “collection seeks raw information within defined parameters that is essential for effective analysis” (Carter, 2008:3).

7.3.1.2 Analysis

Analysis is a scientific approach to problem solving, which relies on deductive and inductive reasoning to define requirements and forecast threats. Strategic analysis is mostly quantitative, although in many instances qualitative is used for both strategic and tactical analysis. According to the office of the director of National Intelligence, analysis is “a process in the production of intelligence in which intelligence

information is subjected to systematic examination in order to identify significant facts and derive conclusions.” According to National Intelligence there is a difference between raw information and intelligence or analysed information. The difference between the two is that **raw information** is used to provide input and build awareness, whereas **intelligence** is used to provide understanding, reduce uncertainty, and enable better decisions. Analysis is a concerted effort which provides integrated meaning and derives meaning from diverse raw facts. In addition, analysis is used to define intelligence “gaps” and articulate “requirements” (Carter, 2008:3).

7.3.1.3 *Crime and Conditions that Contribute to Crime*

In order to deal effectively with threats that pose a risk to the community it is cardinal to identify factors within the community that contribute to or generate crime. Gathered information should provide factors and conditions which nourish or serve as fertile ground for crime to thrive. This information should also provide the names, addresses, and other particulars of individuals involved in the commission of such crimes or posing a threat to the community (Carter, 2008:3).

7.3.1.4 *Actionable Intelligence*

Proper and quality intelligence products should be used as radar for decision making, and the execution of operations. Thus, useful intelligence products provide direction for the development and execution of plans. This implies that the law enforcement agency must be able to make use of intelligence products to prevent crime and apprehend the perpetrators of criminal activities. The intelligence products should describe an imminent threat to a community or region, wanted persons who may pose as threats, or threat methodologies about which law enforcement officers should be aware (Carter, 2008:4).

7.3.1.5 *Tactical Responses to Threats*

Actionable intelligence is the extension of both strategic and tactical intelligence. Proper reaction to any tactical intelligence product is to develop prevention strategies,

either by the patrolling and saturation of crime hot spot area with police officials or waylaying and arresting perpetrators before the commission of a crime. Tactical intelligence is epitomized by the question, what type of operational response can be developed using this intelligence? (Carter, 2008:4).

7.3.1.6 Strategic Planning Related To Emerging / Changing Threats

Threats are not constant but, rather, they change as time goes on. Strategic analysis is used primarily for planning and allocating resources to components and units to enable them to deal effectively with changing threats of crime or terrorism. Decision makers are provided with information in the form of an intelligence product which paints a picture of the nature of the changing threat, and characteristics and methodologies of the threat. The purpose of this type of intelligence product is to help decision makers in developing a response strategy and reallocation of resources. When strategic analysis is used, plans may be developed either to prevent a threat from maturing or to mitigate the threat should it emerge. For example, if a community has never had a problem with right-to-life extremists and a new clinic opens providing abortion procedures, a strategic analysis may provide insight as to whether the clinic and its personnel will be subjected to any type of threat by extremist groups. It is epitomised by the question, what future plans and resources must be configured, and how must they be configured, to meet threats defined in the strategic analysis? (Carter, 2008:4).

7.4 EVOLUTION OF INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING

There are a number of factors which have led to the invention of this style of policing. The increase in property crime, such as theft of motor vehicles, burglary at residential premises, and budget cuts for policing in Britain are some of the factors which prompted this style of policing. The evolution of intelligence led policing in Britain will be discussed in the next sub-paragraphs. The focus will be on the following developments in chronological order, the invention of this style of policing in Kent, the British Audit Commission report of 1993, and the National Intelligence Model.

7.4.1 Kent Constabulary

According to Anderson in Gül (2009:28-29), there were several factors which prompted the development of intelligence led policing in Kent, United Kingdom in the early 1990's. These factors were the rising crime level in the preceding years, particularly property-related offences of burglary and automobile theft. Secondly, the economic recession had increased the pressure for restraint in public spending, and the police were expected to produce more with budgets that either remained constant or were reduced in real terms.

An increase in property crime prompted the Kent constabulary to begin prioritising calls for service and referring the less serious calls to other entities. This concept allowed the police to focus their resources on groups or individuals who were responsible for the majority of property crimes. This concept led to a dramatic decrease in crime and the better utilisation of police resources. The concept of intelligence led policing shifted the attention from crimes to criminals. The intelligence developed on targeted criminals resulted in the arrest of those responsible for the majority of crimes and produced a more efficient and effective law enforcement effort. This concept became known as the Kent Policing Model, and it led to the policing with intelligence report (Mallory, 2007:4).

7.4.2 Kent policing model

In 1993 David Philips and Brian Flood introduced the Kent Policing Model which employs a holistic system of intelligence led policing model as a deviation from the traditional reactive policing methods. According to Philips, the collection and analysis of information on criminals and their associates could inform target enforcement that would prevent criminal behaviour through disruption (Osborn, 2012:15). Tilley, in Osborn (2012:15), went further and described the Kent Policing Model as the most extensive and influential proactive intelligence led policing initiative demonstrated across the United Kingdom.

Initially the police intelligence systems were not configured to support intelligence sharing or problem solving activities. Before the KPM could be implemented there was a significant need for police structural change and reorganisation in order to produce an integrated system, thus making it difficult to implement the model. Although it was difficult, Phillips and Flood managed to convince the authorities to adopt and implement the model. Through their hard work and commitment ultimately, in 1993, KPM was piloted for a period of twelve months in Thanet, which is a city of 120 000 residents. During the implementation of this model the police recorded a decrease in the following crimes which had previously shown an increase, namely, auto crime, burglary, drugs, and robbery. Subsequently independent research was conducted to check the effectiveness of this model. This research could not produce conclusive results as to what the contributing factors to the decrease were, but the survey showed an increase in victim satisfaction and that the police welcomed the changes. Owing to the inconclusive results of the independent research, Flood also conducted his own research but on a broader population as the model expanded across the force. The results of the research were positive, showing a decrease in recorded crimes, but the critical success factors were difficult to identify because the BCU's employed their own interpretation of the model and varied tactics in response to crime reduction and prevention. Nevertheless, Phillips was convinced that the KPM effective blending of intelligence led and problem-oriented policing could be developed as a National Model. In support of Phillips, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies suggested that the model had significance which extended well beyond Kent to the police service nationally. Phillips never thought that what had started as a small idea would become an internationally-renowned policing model. Encouraged by the results from Kent, the endorsement by HMIC, and the subsequent adoption of the model by the Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO] in 1998, NCIS offered Flood a position in its Cooperate Development Unit. Flood worked with NCIS deputy director general, Roger Gaspar, to re-engineer and re-brand the KPM as a National Intelligence Model. Their work was published during 1999 in a "blue book", *"An Introduction and Effective Manual of Guidance to the NIM"*, which was circulated to all police forces in England and Wales (Osborn, 2012:16). Owing to its tremendous impact on crime, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies described the Kent

policing model as intelligence led proactive problem solving approach to policing with crime reduction as its primary objective (Osborn, 2012:14).

7.4.3 Audit Commission Report

In response to the above-mentioned challenges that were facing the police, the 1993 British Audit Commission report into the police effectiveness came up with famous twenty first century intelligence led policing strategy. The main purpose of the commission was to develop a strategy which would help the police to reduce crime levels. The theme of this commission was *“helping with enquiries-tackling crime effectively”* and focused on three main issues, namely, that existing roles and the level of accountability lacked integration and efficiency, secondly, that the police were failing to make the best use of resources, and, lastly, that the greater emphasis on tackling criminals would be more effective than focusing on crimes (Ratcliffe, 2003:2).

The findings of the Audit Commission in 1993 were that “a relatively small number of individuals account for a substantial proportion of detected crime. The deterrence or incapacitation of these individuals could therefore potentially make a substantial impact on the crime problem”. The findings of the commission served as a foundation for intelligence led policing. Before the report of the commission was published, the police were using the traditional method of policing. These were methods involving the police responding to a crime during or after it had happened, relying on witnesses and collecting evidence, arresting suspects, and then trying to elicit confessions from these suspects to support court convictions (Guidetti, 2006:40-41).

7.4.4 Origin of National Intelligence Model

In the late 1990s, the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing, with advice from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, developed the British National Intelligence Model [NIM], which was initially released in 2000 and formally adopted in 2002 as an accepted policy by the British Association of Chief Police Officers [ACPO], which is a national police policymaking body (Carter, 2009:84-85). Commissioned by ACPO (Association of Chief Police Officers), the National Intelligence Model was launched in

1999. This model was co-authored by Messrs Flood and Gaspar. The model was developed from the Kent Policing Model. NIM is the product of a move to professionalize policing in Kent by David Phillips. This policing model was first promoted to the Home Office by ACPO, and, ultimately, it became a central government “law and order agenda” (Osborn, 2012:8).

7.4.4.1 *National Intelligence Model*

The National Intelligence Model was endorsed by the British Home Office. This model was firstly piloted in England and Wales in 1999. The main aim of piloting the model was to produce an ideal intelligence model for the whole business of policing that would enable police commanders to understand and anticipate risks and threats across the public safety domain. As a result of this pilot project in November 2002, the NIM was included in the first policing plan 2003-2006 by the Home Secretary David Blunkett. The National Policing Plan stated that NIM had demonstrated an ability to improve the collection, analysis, and the management of police intelligence and police deployment, requiring all 43 police authorities in England and Wales to adopt and implement the model by April 2004. The main purpose of NIM was to facilitate compatibility between different organisations involved in criminal investigation. Secondly, it was to provide clarity of responsibility for chief officers and police authorities. Thirdly, it was to ensure observance of the principles and standards of implementation, resulting in a systematic programme of continuous development, practice, and capability. In 2005, ACPO published a document entitled “*Guidance on the National Intelligence Model*” which provides a rationale and lengthy description of the NIM. The compliance requirements of the NIM are described in the Code of Practice that provided minimum standards. In terms of section 2 of the Police reform Act, 2002, the code of practice and the guidance were given statutory recognition which enforced the adoption and implementation of the NIM (Osborn, 2012:16-17).

Osborn (2012:17) states that NIM incorporates elements of earlier police initiatives such as “problem oriented policing”, “community policing”, “crime reduction and neighbourhood policing”, and “aspects of COMPSTAT” such as quality of life policing.

According to the United Kingdom's National Intelligence Model (NIM) the end results of the intelligence function should be community safety, crime reduction, criminal and disorder control. In order to achieve these results the following objectives must be met: the establishment of a task and coordination process; the development of core intelligence products to drive the operation; the development of rules for best training practices at all levels of policing; the development of systems and protocols to facilitate intelligence; and the holding of regular meetings to keep participants focused on the stated goals and sustain the intelligence cycle (Peterson, 2005:10). Kleiven (2005:258) agrees with Innes and Sheptycki (2004:5) when they state that "intelligence is increasingly identified as pivotal to the conduct of effective and efficient policing".

NIM is designed to work at three levels of policing, namely; local, cross border (across police station boundaries), and national and international levels. At local level the neighbourhood policing teams handle their own crime and disorder problems. They collect information and use local resources to address local crime and disorder problems. At cross border level NIM deals with offenders who operate in more than one policing precinct. Lastly at National or International level it deals with serious and organised crime activity. Offenders operating at this level are identified and dealt with by dedicated units (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008:274-275).

7.5 INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING CONCEPT

Leman-Langlois and Shearing (2011:33) describe intelligence led policing as a new orthodoxy in policing which is regarded by many as a new mantra in police circles. They state further that it involves the combination of three elements, namely: a risk management approach to crime control, based on the targeting of specifically identified individuals, which requires heavy reliance on intelligence; secondly the collection of intelligence about repeat offenders; and, lastly, the criminological knowledge useful for mapping, tracing, and predicting criminal behaviour. The measuring tool of this model of policing is crime statistics.

Schreier (2009:61) states further that the fundamental principle of intelligence led policing is the collection and analysis of information to produce an intelligence product

which is designed to inform police decision-making at the tactical and strategic levels. This is a model of policing in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations rather than the other way round, based on the notion that a principal task of the police is to *prevent and detect crime* rather than simply to react to it. Loyka *et al* (2005:19) agree with Shreier (2009:61) by stating that intelligence led policing is a management orientation in which intelligence serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse. The aspirations of the proponents of this style of policing are to, target repeat or active offenders, identify and address crime hot spots, link crime and incidents, and apply measures to prevent crime and disorder (Mallory, 2007:4-5). The crime reduction process of intelligence led policing is discussed in the next sub-paragraph.

7.5.1 Intelligence led policing model

The intelligence led policing model has four features, which distinguish it from other policing strategies and make it the best policing model in the twenty first century. These features are: targeting offenders, especially the targeting of active criminals through overt and covert means; the management of crime and disorder hotspots; the investigation of linked series of crimes and incidents; and the application of preventative measures, including working with local partnerships to reduce crime and disorder. The United Kingdom National Intelligence Model works on the premise that crime does not occur randomly, but that it is concentrated on certain areas owing to social and geographical factors. The areas where crime is concentrated are known as crime hot spots. This model emphasizes that, in order to prevent crime, the police should identify hot spots and concentrate on them (Ratcliffe, 2003:2).

This view is echoed by Billante (2003:5) when he states that “one of the paramount aspects of successful crime prevention by police, built on deterrence and police presence, is the targeting of policing in areas with a high concentration of crime, referred to as hotspots”. Secondly the model encourages the police to form partnerships with other government agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and communities to prevent crime. Finally, it emphasize that there should be a spotlight on targeting the criminals and not a focus on the crime (Ratcliffe, 2003:2). Billante (2003:6) states further that research has shown that a large proportion of

crimes are committed by a small number of offenders. Aiming to get those criminals off the street may, therefore, positively affect the crime rate by taking repeat offenders out of circulation. Billante's view is supported by Guidetti (2006:41) when he states that, by pursuing the "usual suspects" implies the police should dispense more resources aimed at producing intelligence by targeting known recidivist offenders compared with simply responding to the reports of crimes and then commencing investigations.

7.5.1.1 Advantages of Intelligence led Policing

According to Zinn (2010:121), intelligence led policing has a number of advantages over the traditional approach. Firstly, it is both more realistic and more effective in its use of policing resources. Secondly, when investigating criminal behaviour, intelligence led policing seeks to establish links and patterns between individual crimes, thereby identifying "crime series". Thirdly, it takes a long-term view of the combating of crime by applying a range of preventative measures, such as recommending legislative and policy changes, implementing neighbourhood watch schemes, using closed circuit television systems, and using more directed patrols.

7.5.2 Intelligence led policing process

Sir Richard Mayne, the first Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, in Stevens (2001:1), stated that "It should be understood at the outset, that the principle object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime. To this great end, every effort of the police is to be directed".

Pawson and Tilley, in Ratcliffe (2003:3), are of the view that it is important to be clear on the mechanism for any crime reduction or prevention initiative, as this helps to understand why it works. So it is imperative to outline the concept of the process of intelligence led policing. The intelligence led process focuses on three aspects, namely the criminal environment, the intelligence product, and the decision maker (Ratcliffe, 2003:3). These features will be discussed in the next paragraph.

7.5.2.1 *Criminal Environment*

The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines “environment” as the physical and social conditions in which people live, especially as it influences their feelings and development (Davis *et al*, 1991:340). The criminal environment is the physical space and the social conditions in which criminal activities are taking place. This environment differs from one level of policing to the other. For instance a rural police station, that has a problem of stock theft will have a different criminal environment to compete with, as compared to an organised crime unit, which focuses on an organised crime syndicate dealing in hard drugs in the province or country. Although there are significant differences between the two, there are also some overlaps. This implies that each level of policing is faced with a challenging criminal situation that is dynamic, has a different membership, and different structures (Ratcliffe, 2003:3).

7.5.2.2 *Intelligence*

Ratcliffe (2003:3) defines intelligence as a value-added product, derived from the collection and processing of all relevant information relating to client needs, which is immediately or potentially significant to client decision making. Whitaker, in Innes and Sheptycki (2004:6), defines intelligence as the systematic and purposeful acquisition, sorting, retrieval, analysis, interpretation, and protection of information. Whilst, on the other hand, information consists of bits of data which, when combined and viewed together with relevant background knowledge, may be used to produce intelligence, which informs the actions and decisions of police organisations. Ratcliffe (2003:3) further states that a broader view of intelligence could incorporate the view that intelligence is a structure, a process, and a product. Intelligence is a structure in the sense that, within different police agencies, there are established intelligence units or sections with skilful people working in that particular unit. Intelligence is also a process, incorporating a continuous cycle of tasking, data collection, collation, analysis, dissemination and feedback, prior to the next, or a refined, task. This continuous process is responsible for the generation of an intelligence product, which is designed to shape the thinking of decision-makers.

7.5.2.3 *Decision-Makers*

Decision-makers are commanders and operational members whose actions can have an impact on the criminal environment. Ratcliffe (2003:4) is of the view that accurate targeting of police activities to the “hot spots” and “hot times” of crime has substantial support as a crime reduction technique, but it requires the necessary intelligence such as hot places and hot times to find its way to the decision-makers to properly understand and respond to the information.

According to Mallory (2007:7), the strategy for intelligence led policing involves a model which demonstrates how the concept is effective and efficient, resulting in a crime reduction process. This process has three stages, namely the interpreting stage, influencing stage, and the impact stage. The first stage is the interpreting stage of the criminal environment by the intelligence unit. The second stage is the influencing of the decision makers who have the ability to have an impact on the criminal environment. The end result of the process is an impact in the form of crime reduction by decision makers on the criminal environment. In order to complete the process of intelligence led policing the following three stages of the process should be followed, the interpretation, the influence, and the impact stage.

7.5.2.4 *Interpret*

The first stage of the intelligence led policing model is to interpret the criminal environment. The interpretation of the criminal environment is the work of an intelligence unit within the police agency. In order to perform this function, the intelligence section or unit needs to have information from both external and internal sources. The interpretation of a criminal environment is done by analysing crime data and information about the activities taking place at a specific place or area, including the role players in those criminal activities. The intelligence product generated from such information should be disseminated to operational units who will impact positively on the criminal environment (Ratcliffe, 2003:3).

7.5.2.5 *Influence*

The Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners defines “influence” as the effect that a person or thing has on someone’s decisions, opinions, or behaviour or on the way something happens (Rundell & Fox, 2005:735). The second stage requires the intelligence structure to be able to identify and influence the decision-makers. This requires both an ability to identify the decision-makers, as well as to influence their thinking regarding the types of reduction strategies that should be implemented (Ratcliffe, 2003:3).

7.5.2.6 *Impact*

The Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines “impact” as a strong or powerful influence or effect caused or produced by an idea, invention, event, etc. (Davis *et al*, 1991:523). This implies that the strategy that the decision maker is going to use to prevent or combat crime must have a strong or powerful influence or effect on the criminal environment. This last stage, therefore, requires decision-makers to have the enthusiasm and skills to explore ways of reducing crime and to have a positive impact on the criminal environment (Ratcliffe, 2003:3).

Positive impact on the criminal environment is measured by reduction in crime statistics, and the absence of fear of crime and disorder in the community. Most important is the safety of the community, good police-community relations, and the trust and confidence by the community in the police who serve them. Figure 7.1 below depicts the 3-i model of intelligence led policing as designed by Ratcliffe (2011:12).




Figure 7.1 3-i Model (Ratcliffe, 2011:12).

7.6 PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING

Clemente and Milligan (2004:2) describe the three main purposes of intelligence led policing as follows:

- Identification of crime trends and “hot spots”;
- Focus on small number of people responsible for the majority of crime, who are commonly known as recidivists or repeat offenders; and
- Facilitation of the deployment of resources on **hot spots and recidivists**.

Schreier (2009:60-61) adds the fourth purpose of intelligence led policing model as the investigation of linked series of crimes and incidents. The practical implementation of intelligence led policing is done through the National Intelligence Model. The National Intelligence Model serves as a guiding document on how intelligence led policing should be implemented. The next paragraph will discuss the process of the practical implementation of intelligence led policing.

7.6.1 National Intelligence Model Process

The National Intelligence Model stipulates certain procedures that need to be followed when implementing intelligence led policing. These procedures are incorporated into the Police Reform Act, 2002; others are circulated continuously as instructions and circulars. Section 2 of Police Reform Act 2002 stipulates that “chief officers must ensure that there are procedures in place throughout their force to monitor compliance with this code of practice and the National Intelligence Model Minimum

Standards document of April 2003 (and with any successor document as directed by the Association of Chief Police Officers). Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies will inspect and report on those procedures". According to Osborn (2012:19), compliance with the NIM implies that every police force should adhere to the minimum standards by ensuring that there is a systematic adoption of intelligence led investigation and policing.

Osborn (2012:19) agrees with Ratcliffe (2011:12-13) that National Intelligence Model has been adopted as a business model through which to implement the conceptual framework of intelligence led policing in the United Kingdom. It is designed to work on three levels, namely, the local level, cross border area level, and on national level. At the first level, which is local, the local police handle their own crime and disorder problems, gather information, and use local intelligence resources to address problems in the local area. At the second level, operations take place in a cross-border area, which is where offenders operate in more than one policing precinct. The third level is designed for serious and organised criminal activities that take place at National and International level. Perpetrators operating at this level may have to be identified by more proactive methods and the targeting and response is directed primarily through the work of dedicated units. The tasking and coordinating process plays the central part of the model. Knowledge, system, source, and people assets play a vital role in supporting the model. The main goal of the model is community safety, reduced crime, limiting criminality, and reducing disorder. The practical implementation of the intelligence led policing concept is done in a number of steps which will be discussed in the next sub-paragraphs. These are the tasking and coordinating process and the intelligence products which form the core of intelligence led policing. Figure 7.2 below is the illustration of National Intelligence Model process as depicted by Osborn (2012:19).




Figure 7.2 Illustration of National Intelligence Model Process (Osborn, 2012: 19).

7.6.1.1 Tasking and Coordinating Process

Tasking and co-ordination is regarded as the engine of the national intelligence model. This engine makes use of intelligence products to guide and inform its decision-making processes. These intelligence products are used during the strategic and tactical tasking and co-ordination group meetings. The NCIS document prioritizes intelligence work in decision making by stating that “the strategic tasking and co-ordination group works from a single key intelligence product, the strategic assessment, on the basis of which it sets the ‘control strategy’, an integral part of

which is the setting of operational intelligence priorities, or an ‘intelligence requirement’. This directs the work of intelligence staff in the provision of intelligence to operational teams as well as continuing to provide strategic intelligence” (Osborn, 2012:19).

Ratcliffe (2011:13) and Osborn (2012:20-21) describe the functions of strategic and tactical co-ordination groups as follows.

Strategic Tasking and Co-ordination Group: The (Strategic T&CG) sits twice yearly at each level. This co-ordination group sets the Control Strategy for its area of command, based on the Strategic Assessment document; it also approves an intelligence requirement that provides direction to all police staff regarding the collection of intelligence.

Tactical Tasking and Co-ordination Group: The (Tactical T&CG) sits at least fortnightly at Borough Command Unit (BCU) and force levels, and quarterly (3-monthly) at a regional level. Informed by the Tactical Assessment and the resources available, it prioritizes the proposed tactical activity for the BCU, force, or region for the next period and ensures that it is aligned to the priorities identified within the Control Strategy. The Tactical T&CG also commissions the remaining two Intelligence Products, viz, the Problem Profile and the Target Profile, as and when required, and it prioritizes the tactical activity to be taken against each.

Gaspar and Flood (2005:9) states that, in terms of the National Intelligence Model, the main role of the tactical tasking and co-ordination group is to commission and apply the tactical menu to the control strategy. Secondly, it is to respond to new needs and to check that agreed plans and enforcement work are still on course to meet objectives. The key intelligence product that drives the decision-making process of this group is the tactical assessment.

The four elements of the tactical menu are:

- Targeting offenders in line with the priorities of the control strategy;
- The management of crime and disorder hot spots:

- The investigation of crimes and incidents which can be shown to be linked into “series”: and
- The application of the range of “preventative measures” such as CCTV and lighting schemes or community action initiatives.

In essence the tactical tasking and co-ordination group should check progress and encourage work in the four elements of the tactical menu. The agenda of the tactical tasking and co-ordination meeting should, thus, encompass accountability from those charged with investigating targets, from those allocated responsibility for planning the management of hot spots, from those applying preventative initiatives, and from those overseeing series crime investigation.

Ratcliffe (2011:13) emphasize that the function of this group is to take the control strategy and use it as the guiding document that dictates the day-to-day priorities for resource allocation. The other role of the tactical group is to identify crime hotspots for attention, to try to identify linked crime series, and to identify and target prolific and serious offenders, all within the broad mandate of the strategic assessment. Figure 7.3 below depicts the tasking and co-coordinating group as illustrated by Osborn (2012:23).




Figure 7.3 Tasking and Co-ordination Group (Osborn, 2012:23).

7.6.1.2 Tasking and Co-ordination Meetings

In terms of the National Intelligence Model, the critical factor in securing a reduction in crime is the proactive role of management. The proactive role of management is

nothing other than engaging in planning meetings, hence the expression of “*failing to plan is planning to fail*”. In order, therefore, to drive the process of policing forward using the National Intelligence Model, managers and operational commanders must have tasking and co-ordination meetings (Gaspar & Flood, 2005:9). Gaspar and Flood (2005:9) in the National Intelligence Model describe the purpose, role players and format of the meetings as follows:

Purpose of the Meeting:

- To drive the control strategy setting the agenda for intelligence, prevention, and enforcement priorities;
- To tackle the strategic issues within the command unit area; and
- To tackle the tactical issues within the command unit area.

Role Players in the Meeting:

- At local level [level 1] the manager with senior operational responsibility chairs the meeting.
- At cross-border and National level [level 2 & 3], which is a multi-agency meeting, a mutually appointed senior member chairs the meeting.
- The role players are intelligence managers, analysts, middle managers with operational responsibility, and relevant specialists as required.

Ratcliffe (2011:13) substantiates the above facts by illustrating the role players of the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group as follows, senior management of the local police area and commanders of the following units, namely, operations, traffic policing, business and administration, training, technology, forensics, and crime intelligence. The following additional role players should also form part of the meeting, local police authorities, prosecution, as well as crime and disorder reduction team.

Format of the Meeting:

Gaspar and Flood (2005:9) describe the format of the meeting as follows:

- Strategic group sits on quarterly or half yearly basis; and
- Tactical group sits on weekly or fortnightly basis.

The decisions of the strategic and tactical tasking and coordinating groups are influenced by the following key intelligence products which are presented during the meeting (Gaspar & Flood, 2005:9).

7.6.2 Intelligence products

According to Broadbent (2011:12) and Ratcliffe (2011:13), the National Intelligence Model business activity is driven by four key intelligence products. These products are strategic intelligence assessment, tactical intelligence assessment, problem profile, and target profile. These products are explained in the next sub-paragraphs.

7.6.2.1 Strategic Intelligence Assessment

This intelligence product gives an overview of the problems facing an area or region. It is based on research and analysis of a wide range of information sources and is not restricted to police information on criminal activity or criminals. The following should also be included in the assessment: public perception; public satisfaction surveys; health, welfare and education data; and local arrangements to capture the effect of crime and disorder (Broadbent, 2011:12).

According to Ratcliffe (2011:13), the Strategic Assessment product is prepared every six months for presentation in the Strategic Tasking and coordinating meeting and used to indicate long-term priorities and intelligence gaps. (Gaspar & Flood, 2005:66) in the National Intelligence Model describe the product as follows:

Strategic Assessment			
Aim	[1] To identify the longer term issues in an area, as well as the scope of, and projections for, growth in criminality.		
Purpose	[1] To establish law-enforcement priorities, determine resource allocations, support business planning, and inform senior managers and policy makers. [2] To set a control strategy priorities for intelligence, prevention, and enforcement.		
Content	<table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> [1] Aim (Terms of references) [2] Scope (Functional/Geographic) [3] Current situation/survey) [4] Main objectives set/met Progress since last assessment [5] Major areas of criminality </td> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> [6] Demographic/Social problems [7] Pattern/trend (Medium/Long term) [8] Resource constraints [9] Overview/summary </td> </tr> </table>	[1] Aim (Terms of references) [2] Scope (Functional/Geographic) [3] Current situation/survey) [4] Main objectives set/met Progress since last assessment [5] Major areas of criminality	[6] Demographic/Social problems [7] Pattern/trend (Medium/Long term) [8] Resource constraints [9] Overview/summary
[1] Aim (Terms of references) [2] Scope (Functional/Geographic) [3] Current situation/survey) [4] Main objectives set/met Progress since last assessment [5] Major areas of criminality	[6] Demographic/Social problems [7] Pattern/trend (Medium/Long term) [8] Resource constraints [9] Overview/summary		

Table 7.1 Strategic Assessment (Gaspar & Flood, 2005:66).

7.6.2.2 Tactical Intelligence Assessment

Ratcliffe (2011:13) describes Tactical Assessment as an operational document which supports the business of the tasking and coordinating group. It is essentially an update document that charts progress towards the control strategy. Broadbent (2011:12) goes further to state that tactical intelligence assessment provides the overall crime picture and incidents in accordance with control strategy priorities. It also helps to provide a picture of crime trends, crime series, emerging hot spots, and the selection of targets. It also enables the tactical tasking and coordinating groups to make resource allocation decisions balanced against priorities by reviewing intelligence, prevention, and enforcement plans. (Gaspar & Flood, 2005:67) in the National Intelligence Model describe the product as follows;

Tactical Assessments		
Aim	[1] To identify the shorter term issues in an area which, with prompt action, can prevent a situation deteriorating or developing. [2] To monitor progress on current business in the “tactical menu”.	
Purpose	To assist in the management of current operations and plans, as well as reallocate resources and efforts according to changing needs and problems.	
Content	[1] Current situation - Progress on targeting crime and other series, hot spots, and preventative measures. [2] Option for further action. [3] Advantages/ Disadvantages.	[4] Best courses of action (Plans). [5] Time frame (Short/ Medium term). [6] Resource implications/changes.

Table 7.2 Tactical Assessment (Gaspar & Flood, 2005:67).

7.6.2.3 Problem Profile

This is a report produced after a detailed examination and thorough assessment of a problem. This kind of report should provide the following. Firstly, it should provide a clear intelligence profile of crime or incident series, hot spots, disorder problems, or a priority theme identified within the control strategy. Secondly, it should identify

intelligence gaps and make recommendations for intelligence collection, enforcement, and prevention plans (Broadbent, 2011:13). Gaspar and Flood (2005:71) in the National Intelligence Model describe the product as follows;

Problem Profile		
Aim	To identify established and merging crime incident series and crime hot spots.	
Purpose	To assist management in resourcing investigative needs, targeting, hot spot management, and directing crime-reducing initiatives and crime prevention measures.	
Content	[1] Problem identification [2] Background and causes [3] Scale of damage [4] Level of disorder/offending	[5] Perpetrators [6] Internal or external links [7] Social impact [8] Resource implications

Table 7.3 Problem Profile (Gaspar & Flood, 2005:71).

7.6.2.4 Target Profile

According to Broadbent (2011:13), target profile is a document which provides a clear picture of the intelligence assembled on a subject or subjects within an operation, or provides intelligence on a subject that needs further development. It should contain sufficient information to enable operational managers to make resourcing decisions and prioritize subjects. Hopkinson (1999:31) states that target profiles entail information about criminal capability and any threat posed by a group, syndicate or individual. This is information about associations, lifestyle, finances, *modus operandi*, strengths, and vulnerabilities, as well as techniques that have worked or failed in the past. Ratcliffe (2011:13) is of the view that this is a product that directs law enforcement to tackle the offenders responsible for causing the significant disruption that often causes a problem profile. (Gaspar & Flood, 2005:69) in the National Intelligence Model describe the product as follows;

Target Profile		
Aim	To provide a detailed picture of the (potential) offender and his/her associates for subsequent action.	
Purpose	To assist operational management in selecting targets, guiding investigations, shaping plans and maintaining supervision.	
Content	[1] Personal record [2] Criminal record [3] Financial profile [4] Network Association report	[5] Communication report [6] Transport report [7] Surveillance appraisal [8] Intelligence Gaps

Table 7.4 Target Profile (Gaspar & Flood, 2005:69).

7.7 COMPARATIVE INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING MODELS FROM DIFFERENT COUNTRIES.

This research project is a comparative study of the implementation of intelligence led policing model in different countries around the world. Focus will be on the Kent Police in the United Kingdom, the New Jersey Police Department in New Jersey in the United States of America, the South Australia Police in Australia, as well as in South Africa. The next paragraph will outline the implementation of the intelligence led policing concept in these countries.

7.7.1 Policing in Britain

The police service of England and Wales consists of forty three (43) separate police forces. Each force is under the command of a chief constable, who is answerable to his/her local police authority, and the home secretary. These police forces have distinctive organisational structures, which are influenced by the following factors, viz, historical, demographic, geographical layout, style, and philosophies of successive chief officers (James, 2011:28-29).

7.7.1.1 Events Leading Up To Intelligence Led Policing In Britain

Intelligence led policing, which is also known as intelligence driven policing originated in the United Kingdom in the early 1990's. The sharp increase in crime during the late 1980's and early 1990 sparked an outcry from the public, calling for the police to be more effective and more cost efficient. Both internal and external pressure led to the invention of this excellent policing strategy. Internal pressure was driven by factors such as the battle that the police were losing on the streets. The criminals were winning and controlling the streets, which resulted in a loss of public confidence. The rapid growth of private sector security resulted in the marginalisation of the police in some areas of public safety. External pressure came from the inability of the traditional, reactive model of policing to cope with the rapid changes in globalisation which have increased opportunities for transnational organised crime and removed the physical and technological barriers across the policing domain (Ratcliffe, 2003:1-2).

7.7.1.2 Policing in Kent

Kent police is one of the pioneering forces in the development of proactive policing strategy. The man behind this effective policing strategy is David Phillips, the chief constable of Kent police force. In 1993 Phillips introduced the Kent Policing Model, a predecessor of the Intelligence led policing model, which he claimed would revolutionise the delivery of operational policing in Britain. He went further by influencing investigative policy in England and Wales through his sponsorship of the National Intelligence Model. What prompted Phillips to engage on both projects was the need to come up with an alternative to the reactive policing style that had dominated policing since the failed experiment of Unit Beat Policing in the 1960's. Phillips' aim was to break the so-called "vicious cycle of reactive policing" in which crime threatened to overwhelm the police and the criminal justice system. The main purpose or aim of this model was to manage the police business more effectively. The model also emphasized that intelligence work should be focused on outcomes, so that crime would be reduced by reinforcing discrete areas of policing activity (James, 2011:131-132).

7.7.1.2.1 Kent's crime management model

In 1993, Phillips established the "Force Intelligence Review Team" in order to formulate intelligence led policing strategy for the Kent police force. The team subsequently produced the "Force Intelligence Review" which established the framework for the Kent Policing Model. This model was founded on two principles, acknowledging the findings of the 1993 Audit Commission, which stated that "*most offences were committed by a very few, known, offenders*" and identifying offending patterns which required a strategic direction that relied on the "*increasing specialisation of the work force*". One of the significant discoveries of the Force Intelligence Review Team was that police intelligence systems were not configured in a way that could readily support problem solving approaches. Instead, they tended to be "passive, recording inputs and acting as a reserve bank of information". Based on this, the team was faced with the challenge of creating a model that was based upon "cyclical and analytical approaches" that might manage the demand upon the force's services and would enable the force to switch "more effort into planned operations and away from response deployment" (James, 2011:133-134).

James (2011:137-138) states that one of the critical issues in KPM was the development of intelligence and analysis capacities. That development included plans to ensure that the force had sufficient specialists, officers, and staff highly qualified for their work. The foundation of the new structure would be the new intelligence unit. This new unit would be headed by an inspector who would be the intelligence co-ordinator. The goal of the unit was to provide commanders with short, medium, and long term intelligence forecasts. In order to achieve this goal the units were made up of the following people:

- *Source co-coordinators*: These were members who will handle informers;
- *Crime analysts*: They are members who will be responsible for the analysis of crime;
- *Technical officers*: They are members who will be responsible for carrying out covert observation and surveillance; and
- *Field intelligence officers*: The main function of these members would be to maintain the informant strategy, such as the recruitment of informers to fill the

identified intelligence gaps and to develop intelligence packages for tactical officers.

To show the significance of intelligence in the KPM, Philips in Osborn (2012:15) stated that “the collection and analysis of information on offenders and their associates could inform target enforcement that would prevent criminal behaviour through disruption”.

Community intelligence was highly regarded by the architects of KPM. This implies that there needed to be a mechanism in place for generating or acquiring information from the community, and ***there is only one way of generating information from the community and it is by building police community relations and the continuous improvement of them.*** Police, community relations provide the “aorta” which allows information to flow from the community to the police. FIRT also recognised that intelligence is not built from top down but instead it is built from the bottom up. In order to enhance police-community relations, the KPM stresses two approaches to policing. The first is that local officers should be in regular communication with “as many local institutions as possible”, in particular, town and parish councils. Secondly, uniformed officers should patrol particular localities such as problem housing estates or town centres which are commonly known as crime “hotspots” to provide presence, to sustain local contacts, and to support local volunteers such as special constables and neighbourhood or business watch schemes. In order to coordinate the functions of these different policing levels, the tasking and coordination group was established. The aim of this reorganisation was to produce the tactical capability that enabled the intelligence to be worked through effectively. Because of his passion for intelligence work, Phillips recruited into the intelligence world only officers “who were the brightest of the bunch”. The policy of recruiting and appointing the “best” in police intelligence units is consistent with the practice in the military and security services, and it is a policy that should be pursued much more rigorously in the mainstream of policing. KPM was piloted in Thanet, which experienced a decrease in the following crimes after the implementation of the model, robbery, auto crime, burglary, and drugs (James, 2011:137-140).

Functions of Role Players

According to Treverton, Wollman, Wilke and Lai (2011:34), Britain's National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) identifies the four tenets of its National Intelligence Model as the targeting of offenders, management of crime and disorder hot spots, investigation of linked series of crimes and incidents, and the application of preventive measures. The above will be realised by conducting the following operational activities as envisaged by Phillips; intelligence collection; collation, analysis and evaluation; presentation of evidence/ intelligence assessments; consultation; and monitoring identified problems. These activities will be discussed briefly in the next sub-paragraphs.

Intelligence Collection: Force intelligence bureaux and local intelligence units should supervise intelligence collection. Bureaux consist of intelligence officers and analysts who report directly to the force's director of intelligence. The size of the force intelligence bureaux depends on the police force. According to the KPM, the collator offices were replaced by local intelligence units. These units were developed in response to the 1997 HMIC criticism of intelligence work. Usually the local intelligence units were headed by a manager with the rank of Detective Inspector, and, staffed by intelligence officers, field intelligence officers, analysts, researchers, and briefing officers. The role of the intelligence manager is to develop the capabilities of the intelligence unit, and to deliver accurate and relevant intelligence assessment. These managers should mediate between the operational and intelligence worlds, between the action-oriented and more thoughtful reflective milieus, to 'add value' and operational credibility to what otherwise might be evidence-based but operationally-naïve analyses (James, 2011:151).

Collation, Analysis, and Evaluation: Information analysis is the fundamental component of the National Intelligence Model. The role of analysts is to collect, review, and interpret a range of qualitative and quantitative data to develop and support recommendations for tactical and/or strategic police activity. The most common analysis techniques are subject profiling, crime pattern analysis, and

network analysis (James, 2011:151-152). These different analysis techniques were discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

Presentation of Evidence/ Intelligence Assessment: Analysis and other information should form part of an intelligence analysis during the presentation. According to the National Intelligence Model, the starting point of the process is strategic assessment which is an overview of the policing challenges that commanders will face in the next twelve months. Strategic assessments are generated by Force Intelligence Bureaux and the Basic Command Unit. The FIB assessment is intended for the chief constable, whilst the BCU's assessment is for the BCU commander. Assessments compiled by the FIB should embody the BCU's assessments. This type of document is updated every three months and discussed during strategic meetings. Tactical assessments are completed periodically thereafter, that is on a weekly or fortnightly basis. Tactical assessments should only address priorities identified at a strategic meeting, thereby ensuring that commanders remain focused on challenges that have been identified for action. These documented intelligence assessments also serve as a yardstick for the community to measure the effectiveness of the police in their area. If the intelligence picture does not change, either the quality of the assessments or the execution of prevention operations is questionable (James, 2011:154).

Consultation: The main role players in the strategic meetings are force executives, if it is a force meeting, and the BCU command team when it is a BCU meeting, resource owners such as finance directors, commanders of supply chain management, middle managers, the intelligence manager, the senior analyst, and policing partners especially those who are involved in the Crime and Disorder Crime Reduction Partnership. The purpose of the meeting is to discuss strategic assessment with partners and decide on priorities, adding them to the Control Strategy (the 'what will be dealt with' list) or the Intelligence Requirement (the 'deferred but monitored' list). The purpose of the tactical meeting, on the other hand, is to ensure that plans made at the strategic meeting are implemented. The chairperson of the meeting should always be a senior manager. At force level the

meeting should be chaired by an ACPO member, and, at BCU level, the BCU commander (James, 2011:154).

Monitoring Identified Problems: Problems selected for the control strategy are assigned to middle managers on the rank of inspector or chief inspector, and they should take personal responsibility for them. Partners should nominate the manager who has the authority over resources to see the plans through. The intelligence unit is responsible for monitoring the identified problems. Before closing the strategic meeting, the commander should issue a set of instructions to the intelligence unit, regarding the collection of information in support of the control strategy priorities and those other problems included in the intelligence requirement. This action completes the National Intelligence Model cycle (James, 2011:155).

7.7.2 Policing in the United States of America

The United States of America has different local police departments and a single federal police department. Some police departments are small, and commonly known as single person departments. This single person is usually called a chief, marshal, or constable, and he/she performs all the police functions. On the other hand, local law enforcement agencies have thousands of personnel, different police departments, and specialised units (Grillo, 2011:93).

Carter (2008:8) states that the United States of America has roughly 16000 law enforcement agencies, most of which have ten or fewer sworn officers. This makes the USA the most diverse country in policing. Thus, the coordination of the task performed by so many police agencies is enormous. Ball (2007:35) points out that, over the last century and a half, American policing has been through four transformation periods, in order to be compatible with a democratic society. These periods of transformation became known as policing eras, which will be discussed in the next paragraph.

7.7.2.1 *Eras of Policing*

According to Kelling and More, in Grillo (2011:95), American policing is divided into three eras, namely, political, reform, and community problem solving. These eras are determined on the basis of a dominant policing strategy at the time which was highly influenced by the political climate. These authors use the concept of cooperative strategy to interpret these policing eras. Police organisations are described according to the following seven interrelated categories:

- The source from which the police construct the legitimacy and continuing power to act in society;
- The definition of the police function or role in society;
- The organisational design of police departments;
- The relationships the police create with the external environment;
- The nature of police efforts to market or manage the demand for their services;
- The principle activities, programmes and tactics on which police agencies rely to fulfil their mission or achieve operational success; and
- The concrete measures the police use to define operational success or failure.

USA policing went through a number of adaptations in order to meet the needs of the community. So it is imperative to take the reader through periods of American policing, in order to understand its evolution. The three different policing eras mentioned above, and the fourth one which is the homeland security era, will be discussed briefly in the next sub-paragraphs.

7.7.2.1.1 *Political Era*

The political era started in the 1830's and lasted until the 1920's. During this time, the local governments that were under the leadership of politicians, provided police authority and resources. Police departments were highly decentralised, despite their paramilitary structures. Cities were divided into a number of precincts that were managed by a precinct-level manager. The police were always in consultation with their local political representatives to discuss crime and policing priorities. The police were always in contact with the communities they served by staying in areas they

patrolled. The main function of the police was to control crime and maintain order within the community. The result of political era was social order, and political and citizen satisfaction (Grillo, 2011:95-96). Although the results of this era were positive, Hooper (2014:1) agrees with Perry (2010:17-18) on the following aspects which had negative implications on the image and professionalism of the police. The politicians decided who would be hired as police officers, and who would be rejected. People were hired and promoted because of their political connections. No educational requirements were attached to the posts. These close ties with politicians led to the inevitable patronage and corruption.

7.7.2.1.2 Reform Era

The reform era, which is also known as the professional era, started in the 1920's and continued up until the 1960's. This period is known by the rejection of local politics as the basis for policing legitimacy. Criminal law and professionalism became the cornerstone of policing. That is why crime control and the arrest of criminals became the primary functions of the police. During this period, reformers adopted the "classical" theory of organisational administration. In accordance with this adopted "classical" theory" police organisations became centralised, and the police work, such as patrols, became professional, routine, and standardised. The police also introduced the 911 system, where service calls were channelled. Tactics and technology included preventative patrols and a rapid response to calls for service. The outcome of the reform era was effective crime control (Grillo, 2011:96).

7.7.2.1.3 Community problem solving Era

The reform strategy dominated American policing until the problems of an increase in crime arose in the late 1960's. During the late 1960's the police were faced with a challenge of an increasing crime rate, which resulted in the fear of crime by the citizens, as well as unstable social conditions. The solution to these challenges was the implementation of the concept of community policing, which emphasized the community's authorisation for policing. This era also focused on law enforcement and professionalism. During this era, the main police functions were crime control, crime

prevention, and problem solving. In terms of the community policing strategy tactical and operational decision making were decentralised, allowing patrol officers to diagnose and respond to neighbourhood and community problems. Thus, the analysis of underlying problems within the community drove the demand for police services. In order to achieve this goal, the police revived old tactics of engaging the communities in policing matters in the form of, foot patrols, crime control programmes, educational programmes and problem solving, as well as the implementation of new technology. The result of this policing model was the improvement in the quality of life, the eradication of the fear of crime and community satisfaction (Grillo, 2011:96-97).

According to Ball (2007:35) the community policing model is based on the belief that police and the community should collaborate to identify and solve community problems. The last era of policing is known as homeland security era, which is discussed in detail in the next paragraph.

7.7.2.1.4 Homeland Security Era

Treverton *et al* (2011:16) describe this era as an intelligence-based policing era. They state further that the goal of this policing era is to maintain order and control crime. The era of homeland security was triggered by the events of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America which shocked the whole world. Police authorisation was driven by national and international threats of terrorism. Thus, the main police function in this era is crime control. According to Grillo (2011:97), this era swung the organisational design of the police back to centralization, which requires a centralised decision-making process.

Oliver, in Grillo (2011:97), contends that crime control, the enforcement of criminal law, and traffic law can expose many potential threats and enable the police to gather information. ***Thus this era regards the community as a vital source of information.*** This era of policing is dominated by tactics and technology, such as computers which play a major role in capturing data and its analysis. In order to control crime effectively the following functions are vital, the collection of information,

risk assessment, and the development of large-scale crisis response into daily operations. The desired result of this era of policing is crime control, community safety, and relief from fear of crime and terrorism.

Despite all these different policing eras, USA is a country governed by the rule of law. The police are also expected to abide by the law and comply with certain guidelines. One of those guidelines is the mission statement of law enforcement organisations which places two responsibilities on the law enforcement officers. The first one is to protect life, property, and constitutional guarantees. Secondly is to preserve order by preventing crime, pursuing and apprehending offenders, and to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution and convictions (Smith, 2013:2).

7.7.2.2 Intelligence as a Tool for Effective Policing

Osborne (2006:4) points out that law enforcement in the United States, unlike the military, has not been intelligence driven, until recently and even now most often it is not. She emphasize that, although crime analysis and intelligence analysis have existed in various state and local law enforcement agencies since the 1970s, intelligence processes are not institutionalised nor widely understood by law enforcement managers and officers.

The gathering of information and use of intelligence in policing is not something that emerged only after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the United States of America. The use of intelligence in policing dates back to 1971 when the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice published a guide for gathering information. This guide was supported by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in 1973 by instructing law enforcement agencies to gather and evaluate information related to policing practice (Treverton *et al*, 2011:34).

Ratcliffe, in Treverton *at et* (2011:36), describes intelligence led policing as a management philosophy or business model characterised by the following:

- **Goal:** To both achieve crime reduction and prevention and also to disrupt offender activity;
- **Organisation:** A top-down management approach that operates by standard guidance; and
- **Practices:** A combination of crime analysis and criminal intelligence into crime intelligence, use of crime intelligence to direct police resource decisions objectively, and to focus on enforcement activities on prolific and serious offenders.

7.7.2.2.1 Events leading up to intelligence led policing in USA

The main triggering event for intelligence led policing was the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City. This tragic terrorist event called for a better, proactive, and cooperative policing model. In response to this tragic event, the International Association of Chiefs of Police hosted a Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit in March 2002. The summit emphasized the sharing of intelligence and the implementation of intelligence led policing at different agencies (Gül, 2009:29-30). According to Carter (2009:79), participants from the International Association of Chiefs of Police, in the Criminal Intelligence Sharing Summit on March 2002 recommended the adoption of intelligence led policing by America's state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies. The summit envisioned intelligence led policing as a tool for sharing information that would aid law enforcement agencies in identifying threats and developing responses to prevent those threats from reaching fruition in America's communities.

Gül (2009:29) summarizes the reasons, and events, as well as the purpose behind the existence of intelligence led policing in the United Kingdom and the United States of America by stating that, in the United Kingdom financial issues provided the impetus for a policing model that would be more efficient and effective in agencies with limited resources. Whilst in the United States, the impetus was a tragic terrorist event that called for a better, proactive, and cooperative policing model. Although the events leading to the establishment of this excellent policing model differ from one country to the other, it is clear that intelligence is the vital tool that can be used to

solve the challenges that are facing communities and organisations. This implies that intelligence can be used to solve the problem of ineffective, inefficient policing, the threat of terrorism, and crime.

The New Jersey Police Department is one of the police agencies in the USA that accepted intelligence led policing. It is one of the classical examples of the implementation of intelligence led policing. In the next paragraph the reader will be taken through the acceptance and implementation of intelligence led policing by the New Jersey Police Department.

7.7.2.3 New Jersey Police Department

Fuentes (2006:3-4) points out that New Jersey State Police has used intelligence in policing for decades. During April 1967, Colonel David B. Kelly created the Intelligence Bureau with a group of dedicated detectives to investigate organised crime. In order to address the new challenges in the field of organised crime, the Intelligence Bureau established three regional intelligence units.

Casino Intelligence Unit - This unit was established in 1976 when the first casino opened in Atlantic City. The main focus of the unit was to collect information on organised crime in the casino industry.

Drug trafficking Intelligence Unit - This unit was established in the 1990's, to address the threat of drug trafficking.

Gang Intelligence Unit - This unit was also established in the 1990's, to deal with the threat of street gangs, which was threatening the safety and security of the residents of New Jersey. The intelligence generated by the Intelligence Bureau led to the successful prosecution of numerous high-profile organised crime cases throughout the 1980's. This is an indication that, for more than five decades, New Jersey State Police have greatly valued the concept of the use of intelligence in policing, devoting considerable resources to the cause.

7.7.2.3.1 Implementation of intelligence led policing

To implement the intelligence led policing concept the New Jersey State Police changed its operational process by making improvements in the structure of the organisation in order to meet its mid- and long-term goals. This was done by the simultaneous and on-going implementation of the following four primary facets. The first facet was the reorganisation of the New Jersey State Police to ensure an adaptable force constructed for flexible deployment; the second was the adoption of the intelligence cycle for processing and analysing data; the third was the development and integration of Regional Operations and Intelligence Centre (ROIC) functions; and the last was the use of strategic planning and intelligence driven analysis to set priorities and allocate resources (Fuentes, 2006:5).

Reorganisation of the New Jersey State Police: The New Jersey State Police Investigation Branch reviewed its intelligence infrastructure to prepare itself for the challenges of homeland security and crime control. Central to this challenge was the issue of limited resources with which the organisation was faced. After a feasibility study was conducted, several barriers were identified and a strategic plan was crafted to transform the Investigations Branch into an agile investigative entity capable of tackling all crimes, all hazards, and all threats. In order to ensure the success of this endeavour the following five strategies were developed:

- An architectural realignment of the organisation to remove barriers and promote intelligence and information exchange;
- A cultural shift to embrace intelligence led policing philosophies and practices;
- The re-tooling of the distribution and management of the State wide Intelligence Management System (SIMS);
- The creation of a fusion centre known as the Regional Operations and Intelligence Centre (ROIC); and
- The implementation of regional accountability plans for managing intelligence and enforcement operations related to organised criminal activities.

In addition to this, a decision was also made to adapt intelligence-related matters of the organisation to the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle is regarded as a good

method of managing and promoting a constructive and orderly interface among data collectors, intelligence analysts, field operators, and intelligence product consumers (Fuentes, 2006:5).

Role Players in The Intelligence led Policing Model: According to the New Jersey State Police the following role players play a vital role in the implementation of the intelligence led policing concept: Strategic leadership; Operators (troopers and detectives); Analysts; and the ROIC. The role played by the above mentioned role players will be discussed briefly in the following sub-paragraphs.

➤ **Strategic Leadership**

For the implementation of the intelligence led policing concept to be successful, senior leadership of the organisation must be actively involved. Strategic leadership plays two important roles in the implementation of the concept. The first role is to engage the analysts and the operators to collect and analyse information in order to draw and paint the picture of the environment with regard to the threats and the security of the state. Secondly, it is to distribute the resources according to the conclusions and priorities drawn from the understanding of the picture of the environment (Fuentes, 2006:5).

➤ **Operators (Troopers and Detectives)**

Operators who are troopers and detectives fulfil dual functions. These functions are, firstly, collecting information/data, and, secondly, consuming and utilising intelligence-related products. This implies that they should gather relevant pro-active information continuously and ensure that it is captured on the appropriate data base. Equally important is that they should also be able to put intelligence products generated by the analysts into practice (Fuentes, 2006:5).

➤ **Analysts**

The main function of the analysts is to create or generate tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence products that support immediate needs, promote situational awareness, and provide the foundation for longer-term planning. Among other things, the role of the analysts is to assist in the creation of the collection intent, and to ensure that the collection plan remains a dynamic, living product (Fuentes, 2006:5-6).

➤ **Regional Operations and Intelligence Centre.**

The Regional Operations and Intelligence Centre is responsible for three main functions. The first function is to watch floor operations, which are commonly known as *Watch Ops*. The second function is the analysis of real-time tactical intelligence. The third function is the tracking of assets, in the form assets management and coordination. During normal daily operations, these functions are performed to create a complete picture of the current operating environment throughout the state of New Jersey, including external factors that may pose threats to the safety and security of the residents, such as terrorism, severe weather events, gang or drug problems in the neighbouring states, as well as the availability of resources to address them. The same function remains paramount during crisis operations, but those are conducted with much greater immediacy of information flow and expanded outreach to, and integration with, external role players and federal partners. The ROIC is the centre of gravity for the successful execution of operations, during both normal and crisis situations (Fuentes, 2006:6).

➤ **Roles and Functions of Key Players in the Intelligence led Policing Model**

The above-mentioned role players in intelligence led policing have specific roles and functions which will be discussed briefly in the next sub-paragraphs.

❖ Leadership

Fuentes (2006:14) emphasizes the fact that all command levels of the New Jersey State Police must always strive to implement the intelligence led policing framework

by applying its precepts to their specific organisational role. In order to carry out this mandate, the following functions or tasks should be performed by the commanders at all levels:

- Setting appropriate guidance for prioritized intelligence collection and operational focus;
- Supporting full New Jersey State Police adoption of intelligence led policing and the intelligence cycle, including the allocation of necessary funding for equipment upgrades and training for analysts, operators, and other users;
- Implementing promotional and other job performance standards based on group performance with respect to these priorities;
- Unit level leadership should manage resources in accordance with stated New Jersey State Police priorities as well as ensuring that squads collect and process requested information properly, including the validation of SIMS entries;
- Unit leaders are also responsible for understanding the value that analysts can provide to their units regarding interpreting information collected from the field; and
- Unit leaders should also encourage the interface between operators including briefings, debriefings, and updates.

❖ Operators (Troopers and Detectives)

Fuentes (2006:14) describes the main functions of operators on the ground as follows:

- Collection of information/data specifically on identified priorities in order to fill in the critical gaps in the current understanding of the operational environment;
- Record the collected information/-data in the proper SIMS database in order to maximize utility through broader analysis and understanding of all relevant information;
- Conduct operations and additional research/-outreach to fellow operators to acquire relevant data for processing into intelligence products;
- Engage analysts on a regular basis and formally request appropriate analytical intelligence support for on-going operations, including briefings and debriefings with the analysts; and

- Provide intelligence analysts with evaluations of products and other relevant feedback to ensure optimal future analysis in support of their tactical, operational, and strategic needs.

❖ Intelligence Analysts

According to Fuentes (2006:14), the basic roles and functions of analysts within the intelligence led policing model are as follows:

- The primary role of intelligence analysts is to work with the operators, analysts, ROIC personnel, and external partners (public and private) to develop accurate situational awareness upon which the New Jersey State Police leadership can make appropriate resource allocation decisions;
- Reach out to analysts, both within and outside the New Jersey State Police to foster cooperation and compare notes, as well as ensuring that all relevant external open-source information and other available intelligence products are included in SIMS or other appropriate databases;
- Generate and provide appropriate, relevant reports and other finished products to troopers, detectives, fellow analysts, and strategic leadership;
- Develop timely and relevant intelligence products that address the information needs of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence customers;
- Develop and maintain in-depth awareness of, and familiarity with, evolutions in the criminal environment throughout New Jersey, and, as needed, throughout the world;
- Assist strategic and operational leaders with the formulation and production of section and Bureau collection intent, operating directives, and collection requirements;
- Conduct briefings and debriefings to intelligence consumers on various topics;
- Blend a wide range of open source information with covert reporting when developing intelligence products in order to describe the environment and context in which the criminal activity is occurring better;
- Conduct on-going critical evaluations of their own information sources, analytical assumptions, and intelligence judgments, as well as performing quality assurance or peer review of intelligence products to ensure that effects of bias, groupthink, or selective omission are eliminated; and

- Take the initiative in refining/-defining/-determining the information needs of intelligence consumers based on a balance of mission parameters, operating environment, and consumer guidance, including regular consultation with the section and bureau intelligence officers to adapt intelligence collection requirements to changing conditions.

7.7.3 Policing in Australia

Australia consists of six states, namely, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia, and two territories, which are, Northern Territory, and Australian Capital Territory. Each of these states and territories has its own police service. In addition to these police services, there is also a Federal Police Service (McLachlan, 2007:4). Chan, in Lambertus and Yakimchuk (2007:10), point out that Australia has focused most of its policing strategies around intelligence led and problem-orientated policing. These styles of policing place a managerial concentration on intelligence collection, focused patrols, hot spot analysis, and proactive crime prevention tactics.

Different police forces in Australia have adopted and implemented the intelligence led policing concept. Although this concept is originally from Britain, Australians adopted and perfected it to suit their own policing environment. Australia's law enforcement, policing and National Security agencies developed the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model to improve the flow of criminal intelligence across the domain. The next paragraph discusses the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model which is a vehicle for the implementation of intelligence led policing in Australia.

7.7.3.1 Australian Criminal Intelligence Model

As indicated above, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model was developed by Australia's law enforcement, policing, and national security agencies at the request of the Australian Crime Commission. This model was designed for two main purposes, which are, firstly, to provide clarity and consistency of standards, processes, and protocols for intelligence led policing and collaborative work to enhance the national

picture of organised crime, and, secondly, the model reflects on the intelligence needs of law enforcement, policing and national security agencies across the Commonwealth states and seeks to provide greater inter-operability with the national security domain.

This model supports the management of criminal intelligence more holistically through the collaborative use of best practices, standards, and competencies, technologies, committees and forums, policy and legislation in order to encourage information sharing and enhance criminal intelligence capabilities at all levels of law enforcement in Australia (Burns, Hine, Irvin, Medcraft, O'Callaghan, Pezzullo, Quaedvlieg, Scipione, Stewart, Wilkins, Lawler, D'Ascenzo, Negus, Lay, and McRoberts, 2012: 23-24).

7.7.3.1.1 Guiding principles of the model

According to Burns *et al* (2012:24), the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model has three moral rules, or set of ideas, which guide behaviour amongst agencies which subscribe to it. These principles or the set of moral rules underpins the vision of “*intelligence partnerships for a safer Australia*”. These guiding principles are as follows:

- Intelligence should be customer focused and requirements driven;
- Information and intelligence should be collected once and used often; and
- Information security requirements should be balanced accordingly to enable the right people to access the right information quickly, securely, and from the right sources.

7.7.3.1.2 Strategic objectives of the model

Burns *et al* (2012:24) state that the mission statement of the model is, “the free flow of criminal intelligence across the policing, law enforcement, law compliance and national security environments”. In order to realise the vision and mission of the model the following strategic objectives must be achieved:

- Ensuring quality intelligence supports tactical, operational, and strategic decision-making to ensure more effective responses;
- Inculcating a culture where security requirements are balanced and information generated and held by individual jurisdictions and the Commonwealth is valued as a national asset for all;
- Establishing common standards, processes, and protocols for managing intelligence assets, enabling more effective sharing across domains;
- Professionalising the intelligence discipline through the development of national standards for intelligence practitioners and analysts, leading to an improved quality of intelligence outputs;
- Embedding an agreed national threat, harm, and risk assessment methodology to ensure a consistent approach across jurisdictions;
- Pursuing common technical and security architectures for information and intelligence holdings to improve intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing; and
- Maximizing the value of fusion and technical analysis capabilities.

Figure 1 is the illustration of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Model as depicted by the Australian Crime Commission in Burns *et al* (2012:24).




Figure 7.4 Australian Criminal Intelligence Model in Burns *et al* (2012:24)

7.7.3.2 *South Australian Police Service.*

The Police Service of South Australia is a major state institution which provides policing services to the people of South Australia. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, in 2004/2005 South Australian Police Service rendered a policing service to approximately 1.5 million people. The most prevalent crimes in this state are property crimes. The South Australian Police Service is regarded as one of the best police services in Australia. Its commitment and hard work was confirmed by Premier Mike Rann during his speech in 2006 when he stated that “the reduction in crime is no accident; rather, it is the product of a hardworking, well-resourced police force” (McLachlan, 2007:9).

7.7.3.2.1 *Implementation of intelligence led policing by South Australia Police*

Intelligence is the compass of pro-active policing because it guides police problem-solving activities, either crime or social disorder problems. That is why the South Australian police adopted the intelligence led policing concept as a tool for effective problem solving. Intelligence led policing provides an opportunity for on-going crime analysis which helps to identify perpetrators and crime hot spots. In order for intelligence led policing to succeed it should be complemented by collaborative crime and disorder activities. These activities, which are operational and non-operational strategies, must be informed by quality intelligence products. Effective ILP activities and collaborative strategies include the following, four steps: firstly, problem analysis; secondly, strategy development; thirdly, strategy implementation; and, lastly, strategy review. This works in a cycle form, which means that it should be repeated over and over again until desired results are achieved (Doherty & Roche, 2003:59). Figure 7.5 below shows the effective ILP activities and strategies as illustrated by Doherty & Roche (2003:59).



Figure 7.5 Effective ILP Activities and Strategies (Doherty & Roche, 2003:59).

As a way of enhancing effective intelligence led policing activities and strategies, the West Australia police implemented the so called “TARGET” strategy which will be discussed in the next sub-paragraph.

➤ “TARGET” Strategy

According to Doherty & Roche (2003:59), this strategy plays a significant role in ensuring that a thorough approach is taken when addressing crime and disorder. “TARGET” is a process which is followed when dealing with a crime and disorder problem as a way or means of enhancing intelligence led policing. The process unfolds as follows:

❖ **Timely and accurate information:** this means accurate information used in a timely fashion. Identify and verify that it is an actual or potential problem. Consider the following matters:

Realistic: What can be achieved?

Impact: Who is affected?

Seriousness: How urgent is it?

Complexity: How difficult it is to deal with?

Public interest: Is this matter of public interest.

- ❖ **Analysis of a problem:** analysis should provide answers to the problem. It should be able to answer the following questions, namely; who, what, when-, where, why, and how? When dealing with the crime problems, apply the methodology to the victim, offender, and the location.
- ❖ **Resource allocation and tactical deployment:** consider both long and short term goals. It is a good idea to brainstorm ideas in a group to determine the best plan. The other important thing when dealing with resources is to consider the doctrine of 3E's, which are:
 - Engineering - what structural change needs to occur?
 - Enforcement - what policing tactics can be used to address the problem, for instance, hot spot management, disruptive tactics, or partner participation?
 - Education - what training, promotion aspects are required for staff, stakeholders, general public, and the target group?
- ❖ **Gather feedback:** after allocation of resources and tactical deployment feedback should be given in order to monitor performance.
- ❖ **Evaluate results:** during the evaluation process the following should be considered.
 - Appropriateness - to check whether the method used to solve a crime or disorder problem correct or suitable for such a situation.
 - Effectiveness - did you obtain the expected or desired results or goals from the intervention strategy that was implemented to address a problem?
 - Efficiency - was the dedicated resources used to the maximum potential?
- ❖ **Take further action:** at this stage it is important either to continue with the set strategy if it is successful or change the strategy if it does not yield the required results. The motto of the problem-solving approach is ***“Remember there are no failures in problem solving. There are only successes and attempts”***.
- ❖ The “TARGET” methodology is not only limited to solving crime and disorder problems; it can be used in any problem solving.

7.7.4 Policing in South Africa

During the apartheid regime, the police were regarded as enemies of the communities, especially African communities. But they were used by the government to serve the interests of the white minority. That is why most of the police stations

were built in town, and few in the townships. The animosity between the African communities and the police was aggravated by the covert activities of the Security Branch and the ruthlessness of the police riot units. Many political activists were killed or disappeared during the operations of these units. After the fall of the apartheid regime and the election of a democratic government, a new policing concept was introduced. This new concept of policing in South Africa was “community policing” which was already in practice in western countries. The main aim of the introduction of this concept was to bridge the gap between the communities and the police. At the same time it was used to build trust between police, and communities and to encourage partnership in the fight against crime. In the process of building the relationship, the criminals seized the opportunity and crime increased (Bruce, 2002:1).

As a developing country which has just emerged from a liberation war, South Africa adopted policing strategies or models from western countries. The main reason for the adoption of these models was to try to cope with the new challenges of a high crime rate and the dynamics of a democratic society. In order to understand the evolution of the SAPS, it is important to comprehend the epoch of policing in South Africa, from 1948. The significant periods of modern policing in South Africa are divided into two eras, Apartheid era policing, and Democratic era policing, which will be discussed in the next paragraphs.

7.7.4.1 Apartheid Era Policing

When the National party came into power in 1948, apartheid became the official policy of the government. The apartheid policy was formalised through the institutionalisation and entrenchment of a number of laws that imposed racial discrimination. The introduction of such laws was to achieve two goals. The first goal was to 'exclude blacks from the political, social and economic world of whites whilst retaining their labour'. The second, goal was to pass laws which were aimed at repressing black opposition to apartheid by making such opposition illegal. As law enforcers, the police were instrumental in protecting and sustaining the apartheid system. When the political struggle against apartheid intensified from 1983 to 1989,

police units, such as the security branch, became involved in forms of 'counter-insurgency warfare, analogous to the one developed by the US in the arenas of Korea and Vietnam'. This involved extensive use of covert methods including assassinations of political activists, like Matthew Goniwe and others. It is during this period that the South African liberation war coincided with the cold war between the United States of America and its allies, and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Thus, instead of fighting crime, the South African police were fighting the "threat of communism". The Security Branch became notorious for its use of torture as a means of extracting information from both armed and political opposition to the government. This practice infested the police interrogation method to such an extent that even the criminal suspects were tortured. This serves as an indication that the primary task of the police was to protect and maintain the apartheid system. Crime was not a priority to the police or the apartheid regime (Bruce, 2002:1-2).

The South African Police has a reputation of brutality, the heavy use of force, and a disregard for human rights. This reputation is illustrated by historical and current events where the police carried out bloodbaths in different parts of the country. These are: the Sharpeville massacre in 1960; Soweto students uprising in 1976; Uitenhage in 1985; and, most recently, the Marikana massacre in 2012. These acts of brutality by the police will always be remembered by South Africans, and there will always be a dark cloud hanging over the police in this country. The heart-breaking story about these incidents is that they were carried out against one sector of the community who happen to be black (Bruce, 2002:1).

The experience of policing by African communities was one of harassment and physical brutality. The police were, thus, seen as enemies and oppressors and not as protectors. This was the opposite when dealing with white communities who regarded the police as protectors and friends. This state of affairs also affected the type of service rendered to White and African communities. This implies that there were two approaches to policing in South Africa, namely, an approach to policing for Whites and an approach to policing for Africans. Inferior and poor services, which failed to meet the needs for safety and protection was rendered to the African communities (Bruce, 2002:1).

According to Bezuidenhout (2011:12), the South African Police Force (SAP) utilised a militaristic approach to policing which was based on limited community involvement in policing matters. Marais (1992:12) points out that apartheid policing were effective in two ways. Firstly, it was effective in the enforcement of legislation governing many aspects of people's lives, such as the pass laws, Group Areas Act, etc. Secondly it was effective political policing, which involved the monitoring of people who were seen as threats to the apartheid regime, such as political activists and members of the banned liberation organisations.

7.7.4.1.1 Transition to democracy

On 2 February 1990, the then South African State President, F.W de Klerk, announced the un-banning of the liberation organisations such as the ANC, PAC, AZAPO, and the SACP. He also announced the government's intention to release ANC leader Nelson Mandela, who had then spent more than 27 years in prison. After a number of negotiations from 1990 to 1994 between the government led by National Party and liberation organisations, the first democratic elections were held on 27 April 1994. The South African interim constitution also came into operation on 27 April 1994. During this election the ANC won an overwhelming victory, and on 10 May 1994 Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratically-elected president of the Republic of South Africa. At this time the SAPS was formed by amalgamating the South African Police and the police forces from four independent states (Transkei; Venda; Bophuthatswana; Ciskei) and six self-governing homelands (Kwazulu; Qwaqwa; Lebowa; Gazankulu; Kwandebele; Kangwane). These eleven police agencies were amalgamated to form the SAPS. George Fivas was appointed as the National commissioner of the newly-formed SAPS (Bruce, 2002:3).

7.7.4.2 Democratic Era Policing

After the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the government engaged in a process of transforming the police. The main goal of this transformation process was to align the South African Police with the democratic government. The history of police brutality had created a gap between the police and the community. In order to

close that gap which had existed for decades, the government introduced the community policing model. This model was planned as only one step towards deepening democracy (Lambertus & Yakimchuk, 2007:12). Policing models which have been implemented since the advent of democracy will be discussed in the next paragraph.

In an effort to deal with the crime problem and challenges which were facing the newly-established SAPS new policing models were implemented. From a number of policing strategies implemented there were three models which shaped the field of policing in South Africa. These are the Community Policing Model, the Sector Policing Model, and the Intelligence led Policing Model. In the South African policing context these three models complement one another. This implies that they are implemented simultaneously. For the purpose of this study it is vital also to look at the first two models before taking the reader to the third model, which is the theme of this study. These significant policing models will be discussed briefly in the next sub-paragraphs.

7.7.4.2.1 Community policing

Community policing in South Africa emanates from the dark days of political violence that ravaged Gauteng and Kwazulu-Natal provinces. This violence occurred after the unbanning of liberation organisations in 1990. This violence, which led to the killing of innocent people, was a result of political intolerance between supporters of Inkatha and the ANC. Following long and often bitter negotiations, the ANC, Inkatha, and the government signed a National Peace Accord on 14 September 1991 which laid the foundation for community policing in South Africa. One of the provisions contained in the accord reads, "The police shall endeavour to protect the people of South Africa from all criminal acts and shall do so in a rigorously non-partisan fashion, regardless of the political belief and affiliation, race, religion, gender or ethnic origin of the perpetrators or victims of such acts. The police shall be guided by the belief that they are accountable to society in rendering their policing service and shall therefore conduct themselves so as to secure and retain the respect and approval of the public. Through such accountability and friendly, effective and prompt service, the police

shall endeavour to obtain the co-operation of the public whose partnership in the task of crime control and prevention is essential" (Pelser, 1999:1-2).

According to Bezuidenhout (2011:12), after the advent of democracy in 1994, the government envisaged that community policing would be a proper model of a concerted effort between the police and the community in the fight against crime which was overwhelming the police. It was also aimed at mending the relationship which had been broken by the apartheid regime for decades. This view is also supported by Tilley, in Mackenzie and Henry (2009:14), by stating that "Community policing stresses policing with and for the community rather than policing of the community".

Community policing is described as a partnership between the police and the community to solve safety problems in a relevant policing district. The main purpose of introducing this model of policing was to ensure effective crime control, and enhance police service and legitimacy. Unfortunately community policing failed to yield expected results. Thus criminal activities remained rife in South Africa despite the fact that this new open, participative, and accountable approach is still being advocated and supported by many police advocates (Bezuidenhout, 2011:12-13).

According to Pelsler (1999:4), community policing in South Africa has five core elements, which are as follows:

- *Service orientation*: the provision of a professional policing service, responsive to community needs and accountable for addressing these needs;
- *Partnership*: the facilitation of a co-operative, consultative process of problem-solving;
- *Problem-solving*: the joint identification and analysis of the causes of crime and conflict and the development of innovative measures to address these;
- *Empowerment*: the creation of joint responsibility and capacity for addressing crime; and

- *Accountability*: the creation of a culture of accountability for addressing the needs and concerns of communities. This was outlined primarily in terms of the functions

of various structures like the national and provincial secretariats, the Independent Complaints Directorate, and members of the provincial legislatures responsible for safety and security (MECs).

Owing to the fact that community policing was not yielding the expected results, one of them being the disclosure of crime-related information by the community to the police, a second model was introduced. The main aim of introducing this model was to augment community policing. This additional model is sector policing, which will be discussed in the next paragraph.

7.7.4.2.2 Sector policing

Sector policing is a policing model which originates from Britain. It is a more decentralized approach to policing, because it was tailor-made to address crime problems of a specific geographical location within a policing precinct in partnership with the inhabitants of that specific location. This type of policing is also known as neighbourhood policing, geographic policing, zone policing, or team policing. The important aspect of this model is that a small team of police officers, including supervisors and managers, are assigned to a specific geographical location to render a comprehensive policing service (Mahuntse, 2007:17-18). According to Bezuidenhout (2011:15), the SAPS define sector policing as *“policing that focuses on small manageable sectors of a police station area. Sector Policing is a tool to implement Community Policing.”*

❖ Introduction of Sector Policing in South Africa:

In an effort to globalise policing in South Africa the SAPS adopted a sector policing model. Actually sector policing was the wish of the Minister of Safety and Security in 1994 when the African National Congress took over as the ruling party. This point is corroborated by the draft policy document of the Minister of Safety and Security in 1994 which talked about community police officers with an intimate knowledge of a particular area and its problems as the main operational units of a lean and efficient police organisation (Mahuntse, 2007:20).

According to Dixon and Rauch (2004:21), there are two versions of the origin of sector policing in South Africa. According to the first version, it was picked up by a senior South African Police officer who attended a conference of the United States of America police agencies in 1993 or 1994. The second version is that a senior SAP officer was attending a training course in Britain in 1994 where he had the opportunity to examine sector policing practices (and documents) in London.

Although sector policing was initially not introduced as the formal policy of government in 1994, it emerged as one of the models which should be implemented by the SAPS to reduce the high crime levels. This view is supported by section 2 of the White Paper on Safety and Security which describes sector policing as the division of areas into smaller managerial sectors and the assignment of police officers to these areas on a full time basis. The function of these police officers is to patrol their own sector, identify problems, and seek appropriate solutions. Key to this model of policing is constant contact with members of the local communities.

In terms of section 2 of the White Paper on Safety and Security, sector policing should meet the following criteria:

- Be proactively, vigorously, and fairly conducted;
- Based on clear instructions from police commanders to patrol officers;
- Planned on the basis of crime analysis;
- Focused on specific problems within any area;
- Implemented on the basis of specific time frames; and
- Developed in collaboration with municipal police services and other relevant role players.

❖ ***Policy Documents on Sector Policing:***

As part of the evolution of the sector policing model in South Africa a number of policy documents on the implementation of the concept were written. Like any other policy document they have been changed with time in order to improve the model. Currently the implementation of sector policing has five phases. These phases will be discussed briefly in their chronological order in the next sub-paragraphs.

▪ **Phase 1**

This is the first phase of the implementation of sector policing. In this phase the policing precinct of a police station is demarcated into geographic sectors. This process is done in consultation with the local SAPS management, Community Policing Forum chairperson, and the head of reservists. Manageability of the sectors for the envisaged sector managers should be used as a yardstick for deciding on the size of the sectors and boundaries (Dixon & Rauch, 2004:25).

According to Maroga in Mudau (2008:104), the following factors should be taken into consideration when developing sector boundaries:

Alignment with municipal wards: Boundaries of the sectors should be aligned with the municipal wards.

Infrastructure: such as main roads, railway lines, bus routes, taxi routes and terminals.

Demographic features: such as population size, cultural diversity, distribution and size of suburbs, industrial areas, residential areas, business areas, farms and small holdings, CAS geographical blocks.

Community Groups: Common needs of the various community interest groups.

Geographical size and topographical of the policing areas: such as mountain ranges and rivers.

▪ **Phase 2**

The second phase starts with the appointment of sector managers and a deputy for each sector. This is followed by the recruitment of reservists in each sector who will be utilised for policing activities for which the local police does not have capacity. Sector managers are envisaged as being members of the SAPS who have excellent community work skills. Deputy sector managers can be reservists or members of the local CPF (Dixon & Rauch, 2004:25).

▪ **Phase 3**

The third phase is the compilation of the sector profile. The complete sector profile should have the following: details of prominent people; places of interest; population; demographics; crime trends; and any information that can be used for planning crime

prevention activities in the sector. This information is vital because it will assist the manager and deputy, firstly to familiarize themselves with the location, and, secondly, with prioritization and planning (Dixon & Rauch, 2004:25).

▪ **Phase 4**

The fourth phase is the establishment of the sector crime forum. This forum can also serve as a link between the sector and community policing forum, which encompasses all the sectors in the policing precinct (Dixon & Rauch, 2004:25).

▪ **Phase 5**

This is the last phase of the implementation process, which is the management of the sector. This phase requires the sector manager to participate in the station crime combating forum on a daily basis. The manager is also expected to liaise on a regular basis with other components of the SAPS to share and exchange information. The other responsibility of the manager is to build a partnership with a wide variety of stakeholders and to initiate crime prevention or safety-promotion projects (Dixon & Rauch, 2004:26).

According to Bezuidenhout (2011:13), sector policing was introduced to enhance the relationship between the community and the police in the fight against crime. This implies that sector policing did not revoke community policing but was an additional policing philosophy intended to augment community policing. The main aim of sector policing is to preserve social order by encouraging police involvement in smaller, more manageable, geographical sectors within a particular police precinct. Maroga, in Bezuidenhout (2011:13), states that sector policing adopts a more decentralized approach to policing with the aim of addressing the root causes of crime in specific areas or communities.

Although sector policing was intended to build a good relationship between the police and the communities they serve, there is still resentment. The community does not trust the police, owing to corruption and the unprofessional behaviour of some police members. As a result of this mistrust, it is difficult for the police to get crime-related information from the community. The social conditions of South Africans, such as

poverty, substance abuse, dysfunctional families, unemployment, the abundant availability of illegal firearms, greed, and the so-called “culture of violence” makes innovative policing efforts, strategies, and philosophies, which are largely borrowed from other countries, ineffective (Bezuidenhout, 2011:13). Minnaar (2009:21) postulates that sector policing is the combination of the features of community policing, visible policing, special operations, crime analysis, and intelligence led policing.

7.7.4.2.3 Intelligence led policing

In his foreword on the White Paper on Safety and Security, the then Minister of Safety and Security, The Hon F. S. Mofamadi, stated that “the SAPS faces new challenges within the increasingly sophisticated, technological and international crime arena. To meet these demands the SAPS needs to upgrade the skills, competencies and capacity of its members and its ability to gather and use crime intelligence”.

By uttering these words the Minister set a tone for the adoption of intelligence led policing in South Africa. At the same time, he was also highlighting the importance of crime intelligence in all policing activities. This statement was reiterated by the current Minister of Police, The Hon Nathi Mthethwa, in his opening address to a conference on Policing in South Africa 2010 and beyond when he stated that, “In any policing set-up intelligence is a nerve centre and plays a crucial role, therefore, the need to revitalize the intelligence component of the SAPS has been prioritized to ensure the integration of intelligence into all aspects of policing” (Newham & Dissel, 2011:3).

❖ **Reorganisation of the South African Police Service**

In April 1991, the Crime Combating and Investigation Division of the South African Police was established by merging the South African Police Security Branch and the Crime Investigation Division (O’Brien, 2003:30). In July 1994, this unit was disbanded, and a new unit, known as SAPS National Crime Investigation Service (NCIS), was created. The main functions of this new unit were **crime intelligence** and no longer issues relating to national security. Its mandate was to “gather, evaluate and use crime intelligence in support of the functions of the SAPS and to institute counter-

intelligence measures within the SAPS. The first National Commissioner of the newly-formed SAPS, George Fivaz, stated that police intelligence work was the key to fighting crime, which poses the biggest threat to the country's security and democratic order (O'Brien, 2003:30).

Rauch (1991:2) further states that the purpose of the merger was twofold. Firstly, it was to improve the South African Police's ability to fight crime. Secondly, it was to de-politicise the Security Branch which had been focusing on the political opponents of the Apartheid government, re-directing their efforts and expertise to fighting crime in the country.

❖ ***Adoption of Intelligence led Policing***

Zinn (2010:121) alleges that in South Africa there is a crime intelligence office at most police stations, and also at provincial and national levels. In spite of this, the majority of police service members, especially at station level, do not see crime intelligence as a primary policing tool. As a result, the SAPS Crime Intelligence is far from functioning optimally. Schneider (2009:403) supports this view by stating that the discipline of criminal intelligence still remains largely misunderstood and under-utilised in most police agencies around the world. These views were supported by most of the respondents in the sense that crime intelligence is under-resourced, with regard to physical and human resources.

Zinn (2010:133) states further that the intelligence led policing model is already in place in South Africa, but it has yet to be fully and comprehensively adopted. He is also of the view that, if an intelligence led policing model was accepted by the SAPS as the core of all policing activities, it would introduce a more scientific approach towards combating crime, and ensure the most efficient and cost-effective use of policing resources. Zinn (2010:133) echoed Peterson's (2005:1) view point by stating that "for intelligence to be effective, it should support an agency's entire operation. Crime prevention and deterrence must be based on all-source information gathering and analysis".

❖ **Implementation of Intelligence led Policing**

According to Govender (2012:83), the SAPS implemented intelligence led policing in 1995. It was used as an instrument to probe organised crime syndicates. This was done as follows:

- Crime analysts are used to identify problem crimes, by using the crime pattern analysis matrix;
- After identifying the problem crime, they would collect data/information from the police systems about previous incidents of that particular crime, such as *modus operandi*, arrested persons, victims, and out-come of the adjudication process, using docket analysis strategy;
- Information was collected on the associates of the previously arrested perpetrators, their membership and structures;
- Covert and overt techniques of collecting information were used;
- Collected information was used by analysts to develop a linkage analysis or association network analysis chart; and
- The association network analysis chart linked all the associates of the identified perpetrator. It also linked the perpetrator to specific activities and institutions.

The association network analysis chart assists the investigator to conduct a money or paper trail in organised crime investigations. Some of the pieces of legislation which stipulate the use of intelligence led policing model in South Africa are discussed briefly in the next sub-paragraphs.

▪ **White Paper on Safety and Security**

The White Paper on Safety and Security is one of the documents which emphasize the use crime intelligence in preventing crime. According to this document, accurate crime information regarding the locality and nature of crime in a particular area is crucial to effective crime prevention. The significance of crime intelligence is mentioned in the following crime prevention strategies, with specific reference to crime analysis which is the focal point of intelligence led policing:

Preventive Patrol: This consists of a constant uniformed police presence in an area on the basis of analysis of crime patterns. Police officials on patrol can also respond

to incidents reported by members of the public, depending on the seriousness of the incident.

Directed Patrol: This type of patrol is conducted by deploying patrol officers in a specific location for a limited period of time, and for a specific purpose. This type of patrol relies on crime analysis to provide timely information on crime patterns in any area.

▪ ***Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994***

Section 1 of Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994, defines crime intelligence as intelligence used in the prevention of crime or to conduct criminal investigations and to prepare evidence for the purpose of law enforcement and the prosecution of offenders. Section 3 (a) of the Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994, stipulates that, “it shall be the function of the SAPS to gather, correlate, evaluate and use crime intelligence in support of the SAPS as contemplated in section 205 (3) of the constitution”, inter alia prevention of crime.

▪ ***National Crime Prevention Strategy***

In terms of paragraph 11 of the National Crime Prevention Strategy, adequate crime information is a key resource in developing proactive, problem-solving approaches to crime prevention. This paragraph is also an indication of how vital crime intelligence is in preventing or combating crime.

❖ ***Current Status of Intelligence led Policing in South Africa***

The South African Police have used intelligence for decades, either in crime prevention or investigation. A number of “laws” relating to policing matters make reference to the use of intelligence in policing. These led to intelligence led policing being a common expression in the SAPS. This common usage created an impression that every police official comprehends the term intelligence led policing and its implications, which is not the case.

The above statement is corroborated by Zinn (2011:19-20) in his inaugural address at the University of South Africa by pointing out that, “the value and use of crime intelligence is not yet fully apprehended by the general police officer in South Africa,

despite the effort put by Crime Intelligence Division to introduce intelligence led initiatives in all levels of policing”. He emphasizes that the problem of crime control in South Africa is exacerbated by the ineffective and mostly reactive policing style that is predominant in South Africa. This situation is caused by the failure of the SAPS to implement the intelligence led policing style that has proven to be very effective internationally.

7.8 CONCLUSION

The implementation of intelligence led policing in Britain changed the approach to policing from rendering a service as a government agency to being based on a business model. As a business model, intelligence led policing made the police more effective than they had been before. There are many reasons which prompted the invention and implementation of intelligence led policing, in Britain, the United States of America, Australia, and South Africa, dependent on the uniqueness of the challenges in each country. Intelligence led policing indicates that there has always been a missing link in the traditional way of policing, and that the central role should be played by crime intelligence in every effort at fighting crime. Although laws and circulars on policing in South Africa, stipulate that the police should use the intelligence led policing model in the fight against crime, there are no clear guidelines with regard to the implementation of this model. The next chapter will table the results of the research conducted in this study.

CHAPTER 8: DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

8.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this study has been to conduct a comparative study on the implementation of intelligence led policing concept the following, places, New Jersey in the USA, South Australia State in Australia, England in the United Kingdom, and South Africa. The ultimate goal of the research was to develop an intelligence led policing model for South Africa. The researcher decided that the best way of collecting data on this subject was, firstly, by conducting literature research on the subject with regard to the implementation of the concept, to conduct interviews with the generators and users of intelligence products in the police environment in South Africa, to scrutinize intelligence products used for planning and executing crime prevention operations and activities, and to conducting observations during the execution of the operations. A total of twenty five respondents from ten police stations in five provinces participated in the study. As this topic involves the acquiring of sensitive information in the police environment, especially with regard to classified documents such as intelligence products used for planning and executing crime prevention operations and activities, the researcher obtained permission to conduct research from the police. In this chapter, the data obtained qualitatively and quantitatively is analysed and interpreted.

8.2 ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

Sarantakos (1998:313) defines data analysis and interpretation as a process of data processing and of converting data into meaningful statements. Polit and Beck (2008:507) go further and describe the purpose of data analysis as “to organise, provide structure to, and elicit meaning from research data”. Data was collected by means of structured interviews using close-ended and open-ended questions as indicated in chapter two. The questionnaire used to interview the respondents who are police officials was divided into four sections, namely: Section A (demographic details); Section B (knowledge of the concept of intelligence led policing); Section C

(utilisation of intelligence products); and Section D (application of the concept of intelligence led policing).

According to Polit and Beck (2008:556), statistical procedures enable researchers to organise, interpret, and communicate numeric information. Descriptive statistics such as percentages are used to describe and synthesize data. To explain response according to numbers, descriptive statistics in the form of percentages are also used. In order to derive meaning from the collected data, the above mentioned sections were divided into themes as follows.

8.2.1 Characteristics of the study group

The sampling procedure of this study group was discussed in paragraph 2.2.2. Before embarking on the interview process an application to conduct research in the SAPS in terms of National Instruction 1 of 2006 was made and permission was granted. All the participants gave their consent to participate in the study, and prior permission to interview them was obtained from their commanders. According to Maree (2007:103-104), a useful first step in data processing, as well as in the reporting of findings, is to give a detailed description of your participants because the emerging patterns and findings aid your understanding of the perceptions and constructed reality of your participants as it pertains to the specific situation or group.

8.2.1.1 Demographic Details (Section A)

The demographic details of the respondents consist of, gender, race, rank, and position occupied. These details are briefly discussed in the next sub-paragraphs to give the reader background of the participants.

8.2.1.1.1 Gender

A total number of twenty five (25) respondents participated in the research. Seventy six per cent (76%) were males and twenty four per cent (24%) were female respondents. The disparity on the ratio of males and females may be attributed to the

fact that the field of policing is male dominated although females have recently made inroads. Figure 8.1 below illustrates the gender of the respondents.




Figure 8.1 Genders

8.2.1.1.2 Race

Regarding the race of the respondents, sixty eight per cent (68%) were Africans, followed by sixteen per cent (16%) whites. The category of Indians and Coloureds each comprised eight per cent (8%) of the respondents. The race of respondents is illustrated in figure 8.2 below.




Figure 8.2 Races

8.2.1.1.3 Rank

Rank plays an important role owing to the fact that the police force is a semi-military institution, which relies on the rank structure for command and control as well as for maintaining discipline. It is vital, therefore, to categorise the respondents according to their ranks, which are as follows, thirty two per cent (32%) of the respondents were colonels, followed by sixteen per cent (16%) of lieutenant colonels, and sixteen per cent (16%) brigadiers. Twelve per cent (12%) are constables and another twelve per cent (12%) captains. Eight per cent (8%) were major generals, and four per cent (4%) warrant officers of those who participated in the research. The categorisation of respondents according to their ranks is illustrated in figure 8.3 below.




Figure 8.3 Rank

8.2.1.1.4 Position Occupied by Respondents

As indicated in paragraph 2.2.2, respondents in the following positions in the operational environment participated in the research. Twenty four per cent (24%) of the respondents were commanders in the crime information office at the police stations, followed by twenty per cent (20%) of commanders in visible policing. Sixteen per cent (16%) of the respondents were station commanders, twelve per cent (12%) cluster commanders, and another twelve per cent were commanders of crime

intelligence stations. They were followed by eight per cent (8%) each of commander overt intelligence collection and crime information management office. The positions occupied by respondents in the work place are illustrated in figure 8.4 below.




Figure 8.4 Position Occupied by Respondents

8.2.2 Knowledge of the concept of intelligence led policing

To achieve an understanding and knowledge of the concept of intelligence led policing closed ended questions (in figure 8.5 below) were asked. Answers given by respondents with regard to their knowledge of the concept of intelligence led policing are illustrated in figure 8.5 below, in the form of a bar chart. From the answers given by the respondents it is clear that intelligence led policing is being practised by the SAPS. This is also an indication that members of the SAPS understand that crime intelligence is a vital tool for successful policing.

QUESTION 1: Crime prevention should plan operations by identifying places where they are going to operate and times and then invite crime intelligence unit (Information collectors/ CIO/CIMO) to provide information for that specific time frame for operationalisation.

QUESTION 2: Members attached to the Crime intelligence unit are the sole collectors of information in the South African Police.

QUESTION 3: Crime analysis and information collection are the backbone of the concept of intelligence led policing

QUESTION 4: Crime Intelligence should be used effectively to guide and support police operations

QUESTION 5: All police operations and activities should be based on crime intelligence

Answers below




Figure 8.5 Knowledge of the Concept of Intelligence led Policing

8.2.3 Utilisation of intelligence products (Section C)

Respondents were also interviewed about the utilisation of crime intelligence products in the planning and executing of crime prevention operations and activities. The response was divided into the following themes: planning of operations; information collection; and intelligence driven operations and activities.

8.2.3.1 *Planning of Operations*

This theme relates to question one of Section C of the questionnaire. Regarding this question, ninety six per cent (96%) of the respondents plan and execute operations based on crime intelligence, in contrast to four per cent (4%) who plan without crime intelligence or requesting crime intelligence that will be used during the execution of operations. The response is an indication that the norm is that crime prevention operations are planned and executed based on the crime intelligence products generated by CIMO/CIO or hard core information from the information collectors. Respondent number twenty four (24) supported this view by stating that, *“What happens in practice is that the CIO/CIMO identifies the problem areas and crime prevention plan operations based on that crime intelligence. Previously we used to plan roadblocks without any crime intelligence and that led to unsuccessful operations which were just a waste of money and resources”*.

Although the norm is to plan and execute operations based on crime intelligence, there are deviations here, and there were operations which were held as no more than a show of force without crime intelligence products informing such operations. Respondent number two (2) made the following remarks with regard to such deviations, *“In some instances, especially when holding roadblocks or celebrating women’s day, crime prevention plans operations and requests crime intelligence to provide information that can be operationalized during those specific times, days, and places”*.

8.2.3.2 *Information Collection*

Eighty-eight per cent (88%) of the respondents indicated that all members of the SAPS are responsible for the collection of information and reporting it according to the prescribed channels of the information flow process. This is in line with the stipulations of the draft crime information/intelligence flow, management and analysis in the SAPS which states that “all members of the SAPS have a crime information collection responsibility and function, irrespective of rank, station, and job description” (Hankel, 1999:1) The remaining twelve per cent (12%) are of the view that information

collection is the mandate of crime intelligence and that information collectors from crime intelligence have the skills and resources to do that.

Although the draft crime information/intelligence flow, management and analysis in the SAPS stipulates that all members of the SAPS are responsible for collecting information, all thirteen respondents, that is fifty two (52%) from the crime intelligence environment, which is the custodian of information in the SAPS, stated that they receive a only minimal amount of information from other units or components (visible policing, detectives, and specialist units in the visible policing and detective environment). Respondent number seven (7) describes non-adherence to this national guideline as follows, *“Although the national guideline stipulates that all members of the SAPS should collect information, in practice only crime intelligence members and a few members from visible policing do collect information. The detectives are worse; they do not provide information, verbally or in the form of patrol reports at all”*. This statement is corroborated by respondent number eighteen (18) who stated that, *“Even though all members of the SAPS are supposed to collect information we do not receive any information from the shifts, crime prevention, and detectives”*.

This implies that, although the guidelines on the collection of information requires all members of the police to collect information, in practice this function or activity is performed by crime intelligence; other units make a minimal contribution to information collection. This situation can be attributed to the perception that information collection is the responsibility and function of crime intelligence.

8.2.3.3 *Intelligence driven Operations and Activities*

This theme encompasses questions three, four, and five of Section C of the questionnaire. One hundred per cent (100%) of the respondents agree that information collection and crime analysis are the basis of the intelligence led policing concept and that, to be successful, all police crime prevention operations and activities should be based on crime intelligence. This shows that both crime intelligence and its clients, that is visible policing and management, acknowledge the

importance of crime intelligence products in crime prevention. Respondent number twenty five (25) highlighted the importance of crime intelligence in policing by stating that, “*all successful police operations and activities are based on crime intelligence*”.

8.2.4 Intelligence products

Crime intelligence products play a critical role in the success or failure of the concept. The response with regard to intelligence products is discussed in the next sub-paragraphs.

8.2.4.1 Production of Intelligence Products (1)

This theme relates to the production of intelligence products (question one) which sought to establish to whether intelligence products are generated or produced regularly, sometimes, or not at all for planning crime prevention operations. Ninety six per cent (96%) of the respondents indicated that intelligence products are produced or generated on a regular basis for use in planning and executing crime prevention operations, as opposed to four per cent (4%) who indicated that they are produced *sometimes*. The overwhelming response on the production and use of intelligence products is an indication that intelligence products are utilised in planning and preventing crime.

8.2.4.2 Utilisation of Intelligence Products (Questions 2&3)

This theme encompasses question two and three of the questionnaire. Eighty per cent (80%) of the respondents indicated that intelligence products are often used in planning crime prevention operations, in contrast to twenty per cent (20%) who indicated that they are seldom used. Eighty four per cent (84%) of the respondents indicated that all police operations and activities are based on intelligence, be they patrols, vehicle control points, road blocks or crime awareness campaigns, as opposed to six per cent (6%) which indicated that various police activities (road blocks, and vehicle control points) can be planned and executed without intelligence. Crime intelligence is regarded as the most important ingredient for successful crime

prevention. Respondent number six (6) remarked as follows, regarding the execution of operations without crime intelligence, *“Although every police activity should be guided by crime intelligence, some of the police managers do not regard intelligence as a vital tool in the fight against crime. Some of the operations like roadblocks are conducted without intelligence. That is why you find police officials looking for drivers’ licenses at the roadblock, because the roadblock was erected without any intelligence”*.

Respondent number five (5) explains the practical situation of conducting non-intelligence driven operations as follows, *“In practice we do get instructions from the provincial office to conduct roadblocks which are not informed by crime intelligence. I personally view this as a show of force which does not impact on crime”*.

Respondent number seven (7) put another dimension to the practice of conducting non-intelligence driven operations by stating that, *“For the police to be effective all their activities need intelligence. Operations or activities which are conducted without intelligence do not yield quality results, thus it is fruitless expenditure”*.

8.2.4.3 Quality of intelligence Products (4)

Although intelligence products are used as a guiding tool to prevent crime or launch crime awareness campaigns, respondents rated their quality as follows: poor = four per cent (4%); average = forty four per cent (44%); good = forty per cent (40%); and excellent = twelve per cent (12%). The majority of the respondents rated the quality of intelligence products as average, forty four per cent (44%), followed by good at forty per cent (40%). There were a number of reasons mentioned by the respondents as to why the crime intelligence products were rated as such. The most important two reasons were insufficient information, and inadequate training. Different respondents commented as follows on the above-mentioned short comings.

8.2.4.3.1 Insufficient information

According to Speziale and Carpenter (2007:269), direct quotations provide corroboration of and credibility to a researcher's interpretation. The following quotations are used to corroborate the interpretation of the data:

Respondent Number 4: *“Station Crime Intelligence Profile is not utilised effectively because of flaws in its compilation. It is compiled by using the previous months' crime data, not taking into consideration the changing seasons, for instance crimes which are committed in winter differ from those that are committed during spring months, because of the weather patterns.”*

Respondent Number 6: *“In most cases, if not all, these products are only compiled out of data of reported crime, without information generated by intelligence collection, or any information from the detectives who are investigating such cases. This implies that there is no integrated approach to the compilation of the document.”*

Respondent Number 7: *“In most instances these products are not properly compiled, firstly due to shortage of personnel at the Crime Information Office. Secondly they are compiled solely on crime data/information, without information from the intelligence collectors and detectives who are investigating cases and have a lot of information from the suspects and witnesses. The other contributing factor to the poor quality of intelligence products is the issue of data integrity. In most instances data that is captured in the Community Service Centre is not up to standard. For example, a victim who does not stay in Thabong, reports that he has been robbed near a school built with red bricks. Instead of the CSC members taking the victim to the scene to make sure that it is a correct place, they assume that it is at school “A” which makes the place of crime incorrect”.*

Respondent Number 11: *“These products are only compiled out of the data of reported cases, disorder reports; information from witnesses or information from the collectors is not included”.*

Respondent Number 23: *“Although the products specify places, days and time on which the crime is committed, they lack one thing, which is, who are the perpetrators”.*

8.2.4.3.2 Inadequate training and shortage of resources

Respondent Number 7: *“In most instances these products are not properly compiled, firstly due to shortage of personnel at the Crime Information Office. Secondly they are compiled solely on crime data information, without information from the intelligence collector or detectives who are investigating cases and have a lot of information from the suspects and witnesses. The other contributing factor to the poor quality of intelligence products is the issue of data integrity. In most instances data that is captured in the CSC is not up to standard. For example a victim who does not stay in Thabong, reports that he has been robbed near a school built with red bricks, instead of the CSC members taking the victim to the scene to make sure that it is a correct place, they assume that it at school A, which makes the place of crime incorrect”.*

Respondent Number 17: *“Some of the members are not trained on the issue of crime analysis”.*

Respondent Number 19: *“The products that we get from the Crime Information Office are of good quality although they still need training on some aspects of crime analysis. They are trying their level best to produce good quality products even though they do not have a commander. The captain who was commanding that office was transferred leaving behind two constables and an administration clerk.”*

Respondent Number 24: *“When conducting crime analysis the police only make use of the data in their systems; they do not venture into dark figures of crime which they can only obtain by means of community surveys. On its own this affects the quality of the intelligence products which are used to prevent crime”.*

8.2.4.4 Remarks

The following remarks are made with regard to the above mentioned comments by the respondents.

8.2.4.4.1 Insufficient information

Most of the respondents indicated that crime intelligence product documents are based only on data of reported cases. There is no information about disorder reports, information from informers of crime intelligence, information not corroborated by witnesses and victims of crime from the detective's side, and no observation reports from the patrollers. These shortcomings lead to a situation whereby only the times, days, places, targeted property are mentioned without the perpetrators or their identity, which makes it difficult for the patrollers to conduct targeted patrols.

8.2.4.4.2 Shortage of resources

Crime intelligence as a structure which navigates the police to success in preventing crime should be resourced. It should be resourced to do the work and give direction to other police units. According to my experience as a police official, and on the basis of my interaction with the respondents and crime intelligence members, some of the police stations do not have a Crime Information Office, or, if they have, only one member works in that office. In most instances, the crime information collectors and the crime information officials do not have vehicles, which are the basic tools of performing their function, to mention only one of the problems. Lack of human and physical resources in the crime intelligence environment, either in the analysis or information collection, has serious consequences for the fight against crime. The remark of respondent number six (6) on this issue was that, *"members of crime intelligence are like orphans in the SAPS. Nobody wants to take responsibility for their wellbeing and resources, because in one moment they resort under province, and next moment they are a national component. Station commanders used to complain about the quality of the intelligence products, when these members were resorting under crime intelligence, but when they resort under them (station commanders), they do not complain about the quality of the same product, because no one is performing the functions of the crime information officials when they are on vacation leave or sick leave"*.

Respondent number fifteen (15) used the following words with regard to the same issue, *“Crime intelligence is in shambles, the structure of the component is changing now and then. These changes make the issue of command and control difficult at the lower level, which affects the production of the members”*.

The above comments show that there is a gap between information collectors and crime analysts. At the same time they highlight the fact that there is no integrated approach to the production of intelligence products, that is, there is no link between crime analysis and information analysis. These shortcomings lead to skewed intelligence products which, in turn, lead to ineffective crime prevention operations and activities. In the same breath, police management at all levels should take responsibility and ensure that all South Africans feel safe. This can be done only by providing the necessary resources and support to crime intelligence, which will boost the quality of intelligence products.

8.2.4.4 Contribution of Crime Intelligence to Crime Prevention (5)

With regard to the contribution of Crime Intelligence towards the fight against crime, that is crime prevention, one hundred per cent (100%) of the respondents indicated that it is extensive. Thus Crime Intelligence (structure) is regarded as the leading component in the fight against crime which directs police operations. Respondent number fourteen (14) stresses the importance of crime intelligence when conducting operations by stating that, *“To launch an effective crime prevention operation or crime awareness campaign you need crime intelligence”*.

The respondents confirm what was stated by Hankel (1999:1) in the Draft Crime information/intelligence flow, management, and analysis in the SAPS when he said, *“No police agency can function without the benefit of crime intelligence”*.

8.2.5 Application of the concept of intelligence led policing

Respondents were also asked open-ended questions with regard to the application of the concept of intelligence led policing. Responses pertaining to the following subjects that are discussed below were received.

8.2.5.1 Intelligence Products and Planning Process

One hundred per cent (100%) of the respondents indicated that they use the following crime intelligence products for planning and executing crime prevention operations: Station Crime Intelligence Profile; Crime Threat Analysis; Crime Pattern Analysis; Crime Statistics; and Weekly Crime Matrix. With regard to the planning process, the following role players listed in table 8.1 below and their roles were indicated by a hundred per cent (100%) of the respondents.

Role player	Role
Station Commander (Station level) Cluster Commander (Cluster level)	Chairperson of the meeting
Commander: Commander Visible Policing	Compile the operational plan. Deploy resources and lead the operation
Detective Commander	Deployment of resources and provide expertise with regard to investigation as well as tracing of wanted suspects
Commander: CIO/CIMO	Present the crime pattern and statistics
Internal (uniform and detectives specializing units) and external (traffic, SANDF, etc) role players depending on the type and nature of operation	Deployment of resources and to provide expertise in their different field of operation

Table 8.1 Role players in the crime combating/prevention meeting

8.2.5.2 Impact of Intelligence products and feedback mechanism

One hundred per cent (100%) of the respondents indicated that the impact of the crime intelligence products is measured in three ways, namely, a decrease in crime, the arrest of offenders and the recovery of stolen items or illegal items used to commit crime, and community satisfaction.

8.2.5.2.1 Decrease in crime

The decrease in crime especially in areas where the police had launched an operation is measured by comparing current crime statistics from the same area with previous crime statistics from the same area, during the same period the previous year. If the crime statistics shows a decrease it means that the operation has been successful.

8.2.5.2.2 Arrest of offenders

The arrest of perpetrators before, and during, the commission of the crime is also a measuring tool for the successful operation, and so the indication of the quality of the intelligence product. This is also coupled with the recovery of stolen or robbed items as well as illegal items such as illegal firearms and drugs.

8.2.5.2.3 Community satisfaction

The third measuring tool is community satisfaction. This is one of the rarest measuring tools applied by the police, because it is time consuming. When commenting about this tool, respondent number three (3) stated that, *“The other measuring tool is the attitude of the community towards the police, checking whether are we able to build trust and reduce or eradicate the fear of crime from the community. The unfortunate situation is that the police do not measure the impact of their operations or service by conducting surveys, but they rely on the performance chart which does not reflect the feeling of the clients that we serve”*.

A decrease in the crime report rate is not the sole measuring tool because trust in the police can also contribute to high report rate of certain crimes, such as rape and domestic violence related crimes. This fact is confirmed by respondent number three (3) when he states that, *“Police success is measured by crime report rate, that is the decrease in crime as compared to the same period the previous year, but it should also be taken into consideration that other types of crime may increase due to awareness campaigns which result in trust in the police by victims who had lost faith in the police, and did not report crime.”* The attitude of the community is an important yardstick for measuring trust, the absence of fear of crime, and a feeling of security by the community. The only way of measuring this aspect is by conducting surveys which is not done in most instances.

8.2.5.2.4 Feedback mechanism

One hundred per cent (100%) of the respondents indicated that there is no feedback mechanism with regard to the quality and usage of the crime intelligence products. Thus, all of the respondents attribute lack of improvement in the quality of the intelligence products to the absence of feedback mechanism. Respondent number twelve (12) described the situation as follows, *“To be honest there is no feedback mechanism in place, it is a one way traffic”*. All the respondents indicated that feedback is given only with regard to the execution of the operations during crime combating forums at different levels, which is Station, Cluster, and Province.

8.2.5.3 *Definition of Crime Intelligence and Intelligence led Policing (Understanding)*

One hundred per cent (100%) of the respondents defined crime intelligence in different ways, but in all those definitions there are common factors, or words, such as: “confirmed information; analysed information; verified information”. Intelligence led policing was defined as policing based on intelligence.

8.2.6 Observations

Although observation is one of the oldest methods of data collection, today it is proclaimed to be one of the fundamental techniques of social research. It is a method of data collection that employs vision as its main means of data collection (Sarantakos, 1998:207).

The researcher conducted open observation, which Sarantakos (1998:209) describes as an observation where participants are well informed about the nature of the study and the identity of the researcher, at seven police stations as a way of collecting data on how the concept of intelligence led policing is being implemented practically using an observation schedule. They were conducted during the following sessions of crime

prevention operations or shifts in the community service centre: prior the commencement of duties (on-duty parades); during the operations (tour of duty); as well as during the reporting off duty period. The following issues were observed.

8.2.6.1 *On-duty Parade (Briefing Session)*

Members are briefed about the nature of the duty they are going to perform (crime to be prevented) and places which are regarded as hotspots which need to be patrolled. They are also given descriptions of stolen vehicles, if there are any, and their registration plates. Although hot places and times are given to the patrol officers there is no indication of the names and photos of the perpetrators at the mentioned places. This situation was best described by respondent number twenty three (23) when he stated that, *“Although the products specify places, days and time on which the crime is committed, they lack one thing, which is to indicate who the perpetrators are.”*

8.2.6.2 *During the Operation*

Most of the crime prevention duties, either by the crime prevention unit or shifts in the Community Service Centre, are conducted by means of vehicle patrols. Foot patrols are minimal, which limits the interaction between the police and the community, and, as a result, vital information which could have been obtained during that interaction with the community is lost. Most crime prevention operations are patrols and vehicle control points aimed at increasing visibility; other types of operations, such as way lays are minimal. Respondent number twenty four (24) described the situation as follows, *“The other factor which causes the police to fail is that they are putting more effort into police visibility which does not yield good results. Waylay operations and targeted arrests are no longer emphasized”.*

8.2.6.3 *Off-duty Parade (Debriefing Session)*

The off-duty parade is a debriefing session. The focus of this session is on the outcome of the operations, that is problems encountered, arrests made, and other

successes achieved. The quality of the intelligence product used in executing the operation is not discussed. No feedback on what was observed during the tour of duty is given; that is, patrol reports are not completed. This issue was also raised by respondent number six (6) when he stated that, *“There is no feedback mechanism in place. The only thing the clients present is the successes that they achieved during the operation; they do not give a report of what they observed in the form of patrol reports. The patrol reports will enrich the intelligence product used in the operation.”*

8.2.7 Perusal of intelligence products

The researcher also perused the different intelligence products which are used for planning and executing crime prevention operations. The main aim of perusing the products was, firstly, to establish whether there is a standard format of these intelligence products, secondly, to determine the quality of the products, and, lastly, to determine the procedure followed in the compilation of the products. The following products were perused.

8.2.7.1 Crime Pattern Analysis

Crime pattern analyses are compiled on weekly basis and used for planning and executing crime prevention operations. Weekly data are used to generate this product. During the perusal of this document it was found that limited data from which is difficult to make sense or draw conclusions is used. Secondly, only reported crime data are used to compile the document; there is no corroborative data from other sources. The limited data used to compile this document results in the document's not having adequate information.

8.2.7.2 Crime Threat Analysis

The crime threat analysis is compiled on a monthly basis at station level and sometimes quarterly at cluster level. This is a process of prioritizing crimes which pose a threat in a station area, by using a point system, and the crimes will be listed in chronological order, starting with the crime which had achieved the highest number

of points to that which had the lowest. This is done by using statistical analysis (comparative statistics, of the current year compared to previous year, of the same month) and points' allocation form. The main purpose of prioritizing these crimes is to give attention to crimes from top downwards. This document is compiled according to the prescribed guidelines.

8.2.7.3 Station Crime Intelligence Profile

Station crime intelligence profiles of different police stations were also perused. It was found that the documents are compiled on a monthly basis at station level, and monthly or quarterly at cluster level, and this disparity is caused by instructions from the cluster or province. This vital document in the fight against crime is sometimes used, and, as a result, it contains copy and paste information. What is also clear is that there is no standard form of compiling this document, and, as a result, different formats are used. These different formats result in this vital intelligence product, which is the basis of crime prevention at station level, not having adequate information.

8.2.7.4 Crime Statistics

Daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and yearly crime statistics are compiled and given to clients for consumption. The compilation of crime statistics is in line with the national guidelines, that is comparing the same period from the previous year and the current year.

8.2.7.5 Crime Matrix

A crime matrix is compiled to indicate the what, when, where, why, who, and how of crime. This document is presented during the meetings, without any comment from the analysts which leaves it open for different interpretations by the consumers of intelligence products.

8.3 CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the data analysis that was followed in this study in order to determine the way the intelligence led policing concept is implemented by the SAPS. Data were gathered by means of interviews with open- and closed-ended questions, and observations during the police operations. All the respondents were police officials in the operational environment. The obtained data from the respondents are also interpreted in order to obtain the meaning of certain terms and situations. In some instances, the respondents narrated their experience of the implementation of intelligence led policing concept in order to give the reader, a clear picture of the situation. From their response it is clear that the SAPS use intelligence led policing to prevent crime. The next chapter will present the findings of the research and recommendations regarding the findings.

CHAPTER 9: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

9.1 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to establish whether the research objectives which were set in chapter one have been met or not. In order to ensure that the objectives have been met the research findings will be presented in the next subparagraphs, and, in addition to that, the recommendations for further studies will be made.

9.2 RESEARCH OVERVIEW

Section 205(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 states the functions of the SAPS in chronological order as follows: (1) to prevent crime; (2) to combat crime; (3) to investigate crime; (3) to maintain public order; (4) to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property; and (5) to uphold and enforce the law. The main focus of this research project was on the first function, which is the core of the SAPS, by interacting with commanders and members whose primary responsibility is the prevention and combatting of crime. These are men and women in the crime prevention environment, generally referred to as the visible policing and Crime Intelligence environment which is the “radar” of the police organisation.

9.2.1 Overview of the South African Police Service

The SAPS is a big organisation, with a personnel strength of one hundred and ninety eight thousand two hundred and twenty four (198 224) members according to the figures of March 2013. These members perform different functions in different divisions of the organisation. South Africa consists of nine provinces, namely Limpopo, Mpumalanga, Gauteng, North West, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Kwazulu-Natal, and Free State. Each province has a police provincial commissioner at the level of lieutenant general who is responsible for policing in that particular province. All the provincial commissioners fall under the Police National Commissioner at the level of General (<http://www.saps.gov.za/dynamicModules>).

9.2.2 Crime situation in South Africa

The crime situation in South Africa has attracted media attention. Crime features on a daily basis in the print and electronic media. So it is vital to take the reader through the crime situation in order to have a clear picture of crime and the impact of policing in South Africa. The crime situation in the country is a concern for the police and community. The police measure their success by comparing crime statistics, crime figures of a period during the previous year compared to the same period of the current year. In contrast, the community measures the success of the police by the absence of crime and the absence of fear of crime. A decrease in crime in the police language is regarded as community safety, while the absence of crime and fear of crime by the community is its understanding of safety. The following crime statistics below taken from (<http://intranet.saps.gov.za/>) which is the official website of the SAPS will help the reader to comprehend the above argument.




Figure 9.1 National Crime Statistics for the Past Six Years

(<http://intranet.saps.gov.za/>)

CONTACT CRIMES FOR 2011/2012

- Murder
- Assault GBH
- Common Robbery
- Sexual Crimes
- Attempted Murder
- Common Assault
- Robbery with Aggravating circumstances




Figure 9.2 Contact Crimes for 2011/212 Financial Year

(<http://intranet.saps.gov.za/>)

PROPERTY RELATED CRIMES FOR 2011/2012

- Burglary at Business Premises
- Theft of Motor Vehicles
- Stock Theft
- Burglary at Residential Premises
- Theft Out/From Motor Vehicles




Figure 9.3 Property Crimes for 2011/212 Financial Year

(<http://intranet.saps.gov.za/>)

CRIMES HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON POLICE ACTION FOR DETECTION FOR 2011/2012

■ Unlawful Possession of Firearm/Ammunition ■ Drug Related Crimes
■ Driving Under the Influence of Liquor




Figure 9.4 Crimes Heavily Dependent on Police Action for Detection for 2011/212 Financial Year (<http://intranet.saps.gov.za/>).

9.3 FINDINGS

Research findings that follow in the next subparagraphs show the connection between the aims of the study and its outcomes. This implies that the findings will be based on the research aims and the hypotheses which were set in chapter one of this study. After discussing all the issues which were identified in this study, the researcher has come to the following findings.

9.3.1 Hypotheses

According to Collins *et al* (2000:65) hypotheses are informed guesses in the form of statements that indicate what is expected to be found in a research. They, therefore, play a crucial role in a research project because they direct or focus the researcher's attention to particular phenomena and the relationship among them. The researcher used the hypotheses framed in chapter one to guide or direct him during the research

process. At the end, of the process of analysis and interpretation of valid and reliable data that was collected, the researcher is either able to prove or disprove the hypotheses framed in chapter one, as follows.

Hypothesis no 1: There is no integrated approach on intelligence collection or gathering within the police in South Africa, as it is perceived to be the responsibility of Crime Intelligence. (Intelligence collection is not seen as everyone's job).

This hypothesis has been proved owing to the fact that the research has revealed that, other units in the police do not provide information to the analysts (Crime Information Office/Crime Information Management Office) apart from crime intelligence, despite the stipulations of the draft policy on crime information/intelligence flow, management, and analysis in the SAPS which states that "all members of the SAPS have a crime information responsibility and function, irrespective of rank, station, and job description". This is disobedience/non-compliance on the part of the members because they are aware of this draft policy on information management. The perception that only the crime intelligence unit (structure) within the SAPS is responsible for collecting crime information, and the notion "Intelligence collection is not seen as everyone's job" still exists. There is, thus, no integrated approach on intelligence collection or gathering within the SAPS.

Hypothesis no 2: The SAPS utilises crime intelligence products in planning and executing crime prevention and combatting operations.

The research finding with regard to this hypothesis is that members of the SAPS use intelligence products in planning and executing crime prevention and crime combating operations. Thus the hypothesis is proved.

Hypothesis no 3: Crime intelligence products which are used to plan and execute crime prevention operations do not provide adequate information, which has a negative impact on crime reduction.

With regard to this hypothesis the research revealed that the intelligence products used for planning and executing crime prevention and/or crime combatting operations

do not have adequate information, which does affect the outcome of the operations. The lack of adequate information on the intelligence products is attributed to non-integrated crime and information analysis, as well as noncompliance with the draft policy on crime information/intelligence flow, management, and analysis in the SAPS which states that “all members of the SAPS have a crime information responsibility and function, irrespective of rank, station, and job description”. Thus the hypothesis has been proved. Intelligence products which lack adequate crime information are in conflict with the stipulations of the blueprint of crime prevention in South Africa, the ***National Crime Prevention Strategy*** which states that “adequate crime information is a key resource in developing proactive, problem solving approaches to crime prevention”.

9.3.2 Aims and objectives of the study

AIM 1: To conduct a comparative study on the implementation of the Intelligence led policing concept by New Jersey in the United States of America, England in the United Kingdom, South Australia State in Australia and South Africa.

The researcher has achieved this aim or objective by conducting research into the literature on the implementation of the intelligence led policing concept in England in the United Kingdom, New Jersey in the United States of America, South Australia State in Australia, as well as in South Africa (See Chapter 7). In addition to this, the South African implementation of the concept was also studied by conducting interviews with those implementing the concept, and observations on the implementation process and documents of implementation such as intelligence products which were perused (See Chapter 7 and 8).

AIM 2: To develop a model for intelligence led policing in South Africa.

The researcher achieved this aim or objective by developing intelligence led policing model for South Africa (See Paragraph 9.5).

AIM 3: To make contribution to the study field of intelligence led Policing.

The researcher has achieved this aim or objective by conducting research into the literature on the different components or features of intelligence led policing (See Chapters, 3; 4; 5; 6; and 7), and developed the model for intelligence led policing in South Africa (See Paragraph 9.5).

9.4 RECOMMENDATIONS

After analysing the implementation of the concept of intelligence led policing in England in the United Kingdom, New Jersey in the United States of America, South Australia State in Australia, as well as in South Africa, the following recommendations are proposed by the researcher in order to improve and implement effective intelligence led policing in South Africa.

9.4.1 Integrated crime and information analysis

Crime analysis and information analysis are the vital processes of creating an intelligence product which is used either to prevent crime or to combat crime. Both of these processes provide backbone to the concept of intelligence led policing. Separation of these two processes, leads to the compilation of intelligence products which do not contain adequate information. In compiling the intelligence products, the Crime Information Office, or the Crime Information Management Office, should make use of crime data (reported cases), crime information (collected by information collectors and patrol officers), and disorder reports. This process will enhance the quality of the intelligence products.

9.4.2 Staffing of the Crime Intelligence Office

Although, according to the ***National Crime Prevention Strategy***, there should be crime analysts in every police station, in reality there are still police stations which do not have crime analysts. In most instances the Crime Information Offices are understaffed, coping with only one or two members who are not able to produce

quality intelligence products because they are overworked. Intelligence products are, thus, based only on crime data from reported cases. With regard to this situation the following proposal is made.

9.4.3 Inculcate the culture of information collection in the South African Police Service

Although the draft policy on crime information/intelligence flow, management, and analysis in the SAPS which states that “all members of the SAPS have a crime information responsibility and function, irrespective of rank, station, and job description” was disseminated more than a decade ago, there is still a need to inculcate the culture of information collection in the SAPS. Members of the SAPS live all over the country, and interact with different communities from different backgrounds and social status. Crime is committed in places where these people live, so, in one way or another, they witness crime or hear about it. When every member of the SAPS can provide information that he or she has come across either on or off-duty, the police will be able to reduce crime. Information collection by all members should be a mantra of the SAPS.

9.5 PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE LED POLICING MODEL FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Although the SAPS uses intelligence led policing to prevent and combat crime, there are no guidelines on the implementation of this concept. Unlike the community policing concept and sector policing concept which have national and provincial guidelines and directives, there is no policy on the implementation of the intelligence led policing concept in South Africa. The ultimate goal of this research project has been to propose Intelligence led Policing Model for South Africa. After carefully studying the intelligence led policing concept and the different models in different countries which were part of the study, the following model is proposed for South Africa.

9.5.1 Intelligence led policing model

When ushering the South African Police into democracy, three vital documents were compiled as blueprints for democratic policing in South Africa. These documents are the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the National Crime Prevention Strategy, and the White Paper on Safety and Security. The above mentioned documents will guide and shape the South African concept of intelligence led policing. Even though the SAPS have practised intelligence led policing for more than a decade, there are no guidelines or policies on the implementation of this concept. Since the advent of democracy, the SAPS have implemented two policing concepts, namely, community policing, and sector policing. These two policing concepts complement each other, and were discussed briefly in Chapter 7 to give the reader a background of post democratic policing in South Africa.

As a policing concept which is practised but has never been formalised in South Africa, intelligence led policing needs to complement its predecessors, community policing and sector policing. Owing to the crime situation and the type of society in the country, the South African model needs to intertwine all three of these models or concepts to make one concept, namely, community policing, sector policing, and the current version of intelligence led policing.

9.5.2 Guiding principles

Taking into consideration the developments in South Africa, it is imperative to align the principles of intelligence led policing with the stipulation of the South African National Development Plan, Vision 2030, which states that “People living in South Africa should feel safe and have no fear of crime. They are safe at home, school, at work and they enjoy an active community life free of fear. Women can walk freely in the streets and children can play safely outside. The police service is a well-resourced, professional institution staffed by highly skilled officers who value their work, serve the community, safeguard lives and property without discrimination, protect the peaceful against violence and respect the rights of all to equality and justice”.

This implies that intelligence should be used effectively to realise the above mentioned goals. The collection and analysis of any information to generate intelligence products should, therefore, be done with the aim of preventing, combatting, investigating criminal activities, and eradicating the fear of crime. In order to realise the above, the following should be the mantra of the SAPS:

- Active community participation in policing;
- Information collection is a concerted effort (information collection is the responsibility of every member of the SAPS, irrespective of rank, position, or component); and
- Quality crime intelligence products should guide and direct tactical, operational and strategic decision-making to ensure more effective responses.

9.5.3 Role players

The following role players are vital in the establishment, management, and sustaining of the intelligence led policing concept in South Africa, namely:

Leadership (Cluster Commander; Station Commander; Commander: Visible Policing; Commander: Detectives; Commander: Crime Information Office; Commanders Crime Information Management Office; Commander: Overt Intelligence Collection; and Commander: Crime Intelligence Station);

Operators (Sector Managers, Patrol Officers, Crime Analysts, Information Collectors); and

Community (All members of the community, from all social and political backgrounds, including foreign nationals who are in South Africa).

9.5.4 Roles and functions

The above mentioned role players will play and perform the following roles and functions.

Leadership: Fuentes (2006:5) describes the role of leadership by stating that “for the implementation of the intelligence led policing concept to be successful senior leadership of the organisation must be actively involved. Strategic leadership plays

two important roles in the implementation of the concept. The first role is to engage the analysts and the operators to collect and analyse information in order to draw and paint the picture of the environment with regard to the threats and the security of the state. Secondly is to distribute the resources according to the conclusions and priorities drawn from the understanding of the picture of the environment”.

The third critical role of leaders is to encourage co-operation amongst members of different units and always strive for unity and team work. At the same time they should ensure that the police work in harness with the community, other government departments, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Operatives: Different operatives will perform the following functions to ensure the successful implementation of the concept.

Sector Managers : According to Steinberg, in Mudau (2008:119), the sector manager performs the following functions:

- To introduce the concept of sector policing and establish it;
- To compile the sector profile according to the set guidelines; and
- To manage the sector to achieve the objectives of sector policing, *inter alia*, the establishment of a sector crime forum, the identification of the need for crime prevention projects, the mobilisation and organisation of the role players, and continuous networking with all role players to resolve crime issues collectively.

Patrol Officers: The White Paper on Safety and security outlines the primary function of patrol officers by stating that, “for visible policing to be effective, police officers on the beat need to assertively perform their police functions, by communicating with members of the public and engaging in street level law enforcement”.

According to Fuentes (2006:14), the patrol officers contribute to the success of the concept by performing the following functions:

- The collection of information/data in order to fill the critical gaps in the current understanding of the operational environment;

- The recording of the collected information/ data into the patrol report and submitting it to the crime information office in order to maximize utility through broader analysis and understanding of all relevant information;
- The ability to implement intelligence products generated by the analysts is equally important;
- The provision of intelligence analysts with evaluations of products and other relevant feedback to ensure optimal future analysis in support of their tactical, operational, and strategic needs; and
- The engaging of analysts on a regular basis and formally requesting appropriate analytical intelligence support for on-going operations, including briefings and debriefings with the analysts.

Detectives: As investigators of different crimes, detectives come into contact with victims, witnesses, perpetrators of crime, and the community at large. The nature of the detective work exposes them to considerable amounts of information; they are, thus, the vital generators of information. Fuentes (2006:14) states that detectives play dual functions in the intelligence led policing concept. These functions are, firstly, that of collecting information/data, and, secondly, that of consuming and utilising intelligence related products. This implies that they should gather relevant information continuously and ensure that it is captured on the patrol report and submitted to the Crime Information Office. Equally important is that they should also be able to employ intelligence products generated by the analysts. Their functions can be summarized as follows:

- The collection of information/data in order to fill the critical gaps in the current understanding of the operational environment;
- The recording of the collected information/data in the patrol report and the submission of it to the crime information office in order to maximize utility through broader analysis and understanding of all relevant information;
- The recruitment, management, and handling of informers;
- The provision to information analysts of the evaluation of products and other relevant feedback to ensure optimal future analysis in support of their tactical, operational, and strategic needs; and

- Engaging with analysts on a regular basis and formally requesting appropriate analytical intelligence support for on-going operations, including briefings and debriefings with the analysts.

Information Collectors: Fuentes (2006:14) and James (2011:151) describe the functions of the information collectors as follows:

- The collection of information/data from open and closed sources of information in order to fill the critical gaps in the current understanding of the operational environment;
- The recording of collected information/data in an information report and the submission of it to the crime information office in order to maximize utility through broader analysis and understanding of all relevant information;
- The recruitment, management, and handling of informers;
- The provision to information analysts of evaluations of products and other relevant feedback to ensure optimal future analysis in support of their tactical, operational, and strategic needs; and
- Engaging with analysts on a regular basis and formally requesting appropriate analytical intelligence support for on-going operations, including briefings and debriefings with the analysts.

Analysts: According Fuentes (2006:140), the main function of the analysts is to create or generate tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence products that support immediate needs, promote situational awareness, and provide the foundation for longer-term planning, by conducting the following:

- To generate and provide appropriate, relevant reports and other finished products to troopers, detectives, fellow analysts, and strategic leadership;
- To develop timely and relevant intelligence products that address the information needs of tactical, operational and strategic intelligence customers;
- To conduct briefings and debriefings to intelligence consumers on various topics;
- To blend a wide range of open source information with covert reporting when developing intelligence products in order to describe the environment and context in which the criminal activity is occurring better;

- To conduct on-going critical evaluations of their own information sources, analytical assumptions and intelligence judgments, as well as to perform quality assurance or peer review of intelligence products to ensure that effects of bias, groupthink or selective omission are eliminated; and
- To take the initiative in refining/-defining/-determining the information needs of intelligence consumers based on a balance of mission parameters, operating environment and consumer guidance, including regular consultation with the section and bureau intelligence officers to adapt intelligence collection requirements to changing conditions.

Surveillance Teams: These are members who will be responsible for carrying out covert observations and surveillance of targeted people (criminals).

Community: In terms of the National Crime Prevention Strategy, crime prevention, crime combating, and crime investigation should be based on the premise that crime cannot be prevented or reduced without the active involvement of citizens, community groups, and civil society organisations. It went further by stating that effective crime prevention requires that communities should be actively concerned and involved in all aspects of crime prevention. This view is also supported by James (2011:137) who states that the architects of the Kemp Policing Model regarded community intelligence as a vital tool in intelligence led policing.

As a leading department, the police should mobilize communities, and civil society organisations to participate in local police structures, such as the community policing forums, sector policing, and street committees, to fight crime. The information which will be generated from the community is vital for successful crime prevention.

9.5.5 Implementation process

The proposed implementation process will be as follows.

9.5.5.1 Structure of Crime Intelligence

In order for the intelligence led policing concept to function effectively and successfully it is imperative that the structure of crime intelligence at cluster and

station level be adjusted. The purpose of the adjustment is to adapt the concept to the South African situation. The adjustment will be made according to the different levels of policing, namely, station and cluster level, as follows.

Station Level

Current Status: The crime intelligence office at station level is known as the Crime Information Office (CIO). The main function of the office is to analyse crime at station level, and it consists only of crime analysts and administration clerks or data typists. With recent changes the CIO fall under the command and control of the station commander.

Proposed Changes: The office should fall under the command and control of the commander of crime intelligence station. It should be staffed by the following operators: analysts who will analyse crime and information; overt information collectors, who will collect information for that specific station precinct; and administration clerk/ data typists for capturing of information. All these members will be under the command and control of the Crime Information Office Commander, who falls directly under the command of the Commander: Crime Intelligence Station. Information should be analysed according to the sectors with the intention of creating a station crime picture. Equally important is that information collectors should build informer networks in all sectors. (Informer ground coverage according to sectors). The size of the office will depend on the size of the police station and the volume of work to be done.

Cluster Level

Current Status: Currently crime intelligence at cluster level is known as Crime Intelligence Station (CIS). The office falls under the command and control of the Provincial Head Crime Intelligence, through the section head of crime intelligence cluster co-ordination. At cluster level there are three sub-components: Crime Information Management Office (CIMO) which consists of analysts who perform information and crime analysis; and data typists. The second subcomponent is Overt Intelligence Collection, which consists of information collectors and data typists. The third sub-component is generic support, which consists of administration clerks who

perform different support functions, such as human resource management, and finance.

Proposed Changes: The structure should remain the same; the only change should be with regard to intelligence collection. Information collection should change from being overt to covert, and it should be another sub-component of surveillance. This implies that surveillance should be decentralised to cluster level. The purpose of this decentralisation is to bring service nearer to the clients. The proposed structure is illustrated in figure 9.5 below.




Figure 9.5 Proposed Structure of Crime Intelligence at Cluster Level

9.5.5.2 Police Station Precinct

For the successful implementation of intelligence led policing, the station should be divided into sectors, in accordance with the sector policing policy of the SAPS. Active community policing forums and sector policing are the fertile ground in which intelligence led policing will flourish.

Every sector in the policing precinct should have a sector manager, and his/her team should consist of patrol officers, detectives, and information collectors (for the purpose of building good relations and trust with the community, officers should be assigned for a specific sector). The sector intelligence concept is illustrated in figure 9.6 below.




Figure 9.6 Sector Intelligence Concept

9.5.5.3 Information Flow Process

The information flow process will be as follows. Information collectors (overt) and patrol officers will submit their information in the form of information reports and patrol reports respectively to the Crime Information Office at station level, where they will be analysed, enriched, and channelled to the Crime Information Management Office at cluster level. These information reports and patrol reports should be used to generate and enhance intelligence products such as station crime intelligence profile at station level. After receiving information reports from the Crime Information Office, the analysts at Crime Information Management Office should enrich them and forward them to the Operational Intelligence Analysis Centre at provincial level and task the

Crime Information Office for further collection. These reports should be used to create the cluster, provincial, and National picture in the form of tactical and strategic assessments. The proposed information flow process is depicted in figure 9.7 below.




Figure 9.7 Information Flow Process

9.5.5.4 Intelligence Products

Quality intelligence products should be the basis of any police operation/activity.

9.5.5.4.1 Production of intelligence products

In order to ensure that quality intelligence products are produced, the data from the following sources should be used as a basis: disorder reports (from the occurrence book, information book, sector crime forum minutes, station, cluster, provincial and national crime combating forums); crime data (crime administration system, business intelligence system, case dockets); and crime information (information reports from

information collectors, patrol reports from patrol officers, interrogation/interview reports from victims and perpetrators of crime by the detectives, information from the cell register). The following basic intelligence products should be generated out of the collected data/information at the different levels of policing:

Station level: Station Crime Intelligence Profile; Individual target profile; organisational target profile; information bulletins; and crime statistics;

Cluster level: Tactical Assessment; Individual target profile; organisational target profile; and crime statistics; and

Provincial and National level: Tactical Assessment; Individual target profile; organisational target profile; and crime statistics.

Figure 9.8 below illustrates the generation of basic intelligence products.




Figure 9.8 Generation/Production of basic intelligence products

9.5.5.5 Meetings

The following meetings at different levels of policing are vital for the success of this concept.

9.5.5.5.1 Station level

The station crime combating meeting should be held on a daily basis. This is a crime combating meeting which deals with crime only; it is not a management meeting. Managers should know that a battle is not won in the boardroom but on the battlefield, so is the crime. Supervisors should endeavour to ensure that professional service is rendered to the community. This implies that supervisors should have enough time to give guidance, lead, and supervise operations on the ground. The permanent role players in the meeting are:

Station Commander: He/she is responsible for chairing the meeting;

Commander-Detectives: Should brief the meeting about the following: progress on investigation, court appearance of previous serious cases; bail applications on serious cases; new cases received; arrests made for the past 24 hours; wanted suspects; case clearance;

Commander Visible policing: operations conducted, and successes achieved/impact; patrols conducted/complaints attended by CSC and successes achieved; planned crime prevention activities; feedback from sectors; custody management;

Commander Support Services: should brief the meeting about data integrity; status of resources (human, overtime and money spent on operations conducted, vehicles); status of dockets, transferred to/from other stations; and

Commander-Crime information office: Present crime picture of the station and sectors (statistics, shifting of crime, old and emerging crime hotspots, new modus operandi), upcoming events, and crime bulletins.

Guiding Document: The guiding document for the Station Crime Combating Forum should be the station crime intelligence profile which should be a living document which is updated on a daily basis. The proposed station crime intelligence profile is

attached as per **Annexure A**, and the individual/target profile is attached as per **Annexure B**.

9.5.5.5.2 Cluster level

The cluster crime combatting forum should be held on a weekly basis. The main focus of the meeting should be crime, and nothing else.

Cluster Commander: He/-She is responsible for chairing the meeting and taking final decision;

Station Commander : He/-She is responsible for chairing the meeting and taking final decision;

Detectives: brief the meeting about the following: progress on investigation, court appearance of previous serious cases; bail applications on serious cases; new cases received; arrests made for the past week; wanted suspects; case clearance;

(Visible policing): operations conducted, and successes achieved/impact; patrols conducted/complaints attended by CSC and successes achieved; planned crime prevention activities; feedback from sectors; custody management;

Commander- Crime Intelligence Station: Present crime picture of the station and sectors (statistics, shifting of crime, old and emerging crime hotspots, new modus operandi), upcoming events, and crime bulletins;

Commander Legal Service: To give legal advice on operational matters emanating from the meeting;

Commanders of Detective Specialising Units: (*Vehicle Investigation Section; Family Violence, child protection and sexual offences unit*) Brief the meeting about the following: progress on investigation, court appearance of previous serious cases; bail applications on serious cases; new cases received; arrests made for the past week; wanted suspects; case clearance; and

Commanders of Uniform Specialising Units: (Police emergency services, public order policing) operations conducted, and successes achieved/impact; planned crime prevention activities.

Guiding Document: The guiding document for the Cluster Crime Combating Forum should be the tactical assessment which is compiled on a quarterly basis. The

proposed tactical assessment document is attached as per **Annexure C**. The Provincial and National Crime combating forum should use the strategic assessment document that is compiled on a six months basis as their guiding document. The strategic assessment is attached as per **annexure D**.

9.6 CONCLUSION

Intelligence led policing is one of the best policing models to fight crime. From the advent of democracy in South Africa, the SAPS have been, and is still, using this concept to prevent crime. Although the concept has been used by the SAPS, for more than a decade, there is still no policy on intelligence led policing. The success of any concept which is imported from other countries depends on its adaptation to the host country, and this is equally true of intelligence led policing.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Adderley, R. W. 2007. *The use of data mining technique in crime trend analysis and offender profiling*. London: University of Wolverhampton.
- Africa, S & Kwadjo, J. (eds). 2009. *Changing Intelligence Dynamics in Africa*. Johannesburg: Global Facilitation Network For Security Sector Reform- African Security Sector Network(GFN-SSR).
- Agarwal, J. Nagpal, R. & Sehgal, R. 2013. Crime Analysis Using K-Means Clustering. *International Journal of Computer Applications*. vol. 83(4): 1-4, December.
- Askew, K. 1993. *Drugs-The Role of The Australian Bureau of Criminal Intelligence and The Australian Criminal Intelligence Database*.
http://www.aic.gov.au/media_library/publications/proceedings/18/askew.pdf
(8 July 2012).
- Babbie, E. R. 1998. *Survey Research Methods* (2nd edition). California: Wadsworth Belmont.
- Bacarese, A. 2009. *Tracing Stolen Assets. A Practitioner's Handbook*. The Role of Intelligence in the Investigation and the Tracing of Stolen Assets in Complex Economic Crime and Corruption Cases. Basel: Basel Institute of Governance, International Centre for Asset Recovery.
- Bailey, K. D. 1994. *Methods of Social Research* (4th edition). New York: MacMillan Incorporated.
- Ball, J. E. 2007. *Rethinking Intelligence to Integrate Counterterrorism into the Local Law Enforcement Mission*. California: Naval Post Graduate School.

- Barker, B. D. & Gunter, W. D. 2005. *Surveillance: Concepts and Practices for Fraud, Security and Crime Investigation*. New York: International Foundation for Protection Officers.
- Berger, F. J. 2006. Crime Combating in Perspective: A Strategic Approach to Policing and the Prevention of Crime. *Acta Criminologica vol 19(2)*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- Bezuidenhout, C. 2011. Sector Policing in South Africa: Case Closed.....or Not? *Pakistan Journal Of Criminology*. Volume 3, No. 2 & 3, April - July, 2011.
- Billante, N. 2003. *The Beat Goes On: Policing for Crime Prevention. Issue Analysis*. St Leonards, New South Wales: The Centre for Independent Studies.
- Boba, R. 2001. *Introductory Guide to Crime Analysis and Mapping*. New York : Community Oriented Policing Service US Department of Justice.
- Boba, R. L. 2009. *Crime Analysis with Crime Mapping. Second Revised Edition*. London: Paperback.
- Bowers, S. R. 1984. *The Political Evolution of Intelligence*. New York: Liberty University.
- Brady, B. 2009. *Royal Methods of Rule Used by Queens in Patriarchal Societies: How Elizabeth I of England and Catherine the Great of Russia Governed*. www.jmu.edu/mwa/docs/2010/2010Brady.pdf (8 July 2014).
- Broadbent, P. 2011. *Investigating Burglary: A guide to Investigative Options and Good Practice*. London: National Policing Improvement Agency.
- Bruce, C. W. 2005. *Fundamentals of Crime Analysis*. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Association of Crime Analysts.

- Bruce, D. 2002. *New Wine from An Old Cask? The South African Police Service and The Process Of Transformation*. Johannesburg: Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation.
- Burds, J. 2011. *The Second Oldest Profession: A World History of Espionage. Part One*. Boston, Massachusetts: Northeastern University.
- Burns, G. Hine, D. Irvin, D. Medcraft, G. O'Callaghan, K. Pezzullo, M. Quaedvlieg, R. Scipione, A. Stewart, I. Wilkins, R. Lawler, J. D'Ascenzo, M. Negus, T. Lay, K & McRoberts, J. 2012. *Australian Crime Commission Submission to: The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement Inquiry Into: The Gathering and Use of Criminal Intelligence By The Australian Crime Commission*. Canberra: Australian Crime Commission.
- Cardwell, J. M. 2004. A Bible Lesson on Spying.
<http://southerncrossreview.org/44/cia-bible.htm> (8 July 2014).
- Carter, D. L. 2008. *The Concept and Development of Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP)*. Michigan: Michigan State University.
- Carter, D. L. 2009. *Law Enforcement Intelligence: A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies (2nd edition)*. Michigan: Michigan State University.
- Castle, P. J. 1996. *Participants' Perceptions and Affirmative Action Programmes in South Africa*. Johannesburg: University of Witwatersrand.
- Cawthra, G. 1992. *South Africa's Police. From Police State to Democratic Policing?* London: Catholic Institute for International Relations.
- Chainey, S. 2012. Improving the Explanatory Content of Analysis Products Using Hypothesis Testing. *Policing. A Journal of Policy and Practice*. London: Oxford University Press.

Chalk, P. & Rosenau, W. 2004. *Confronting the “Enemy Within” Security Intelligence, the Police, and Counterterrorism in Four Democracies*. California: RAND Corporation.

Champagne, B. 2009. *The United Nations and Intelligence*. [online]. Available on the Internet at: <http://www.peaceopstraining.org/theses/champagne.pdf>. (15 November 2009).

Cleary, C. 2006. *Strategy for Local Law Enforcement Agencies to Improve Collection, Analysis, and Dissemination of Terrorist Information*. California: Naval Post Graduate School.

Clemente, B. & Milligan, D. 2004. *Intelligence-led policing system: Architecture and Capabilities for State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies*. Washington: Center for Criminal Justice Technology.

Collins, K. J. du Plooy, G. M. Grobbelaar, M. M. Puttergill, C. H. Terre Blanche, M. J. van Eeden, R. van Rensburg, G. H. & Wigston D.J 2000. *Research in Social Sciences. Only Study Guide for RSC201-H*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Colombo, H. J. & Nash, R. C. 2007. *California Attorney General’s Model Standards and Procedures for Maintaining Criminal Intelligence Files and Criminal Intelligence Operational Activities*. California: California Department of Justice.

Coyne, J. W. & Bell, P. 2011. Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement: A Review. *Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism*. vol. 6(1):23-39, April. London: Routledge.

Crous, C. 2009. Human Intelligence Sources: Challenges in Policy Development. *Security Challenges volume 5, number 3*. Kingston ACT: Kokoda Foundation.

Crowdy, T. 2006. *The Enemy Within: History of Spies, Spymasters And Espionage*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd.

- Cullen, F. T & Agnew, R. 2006. *Criminological Theory: Past To Present. Essential Readings. Third Edition.* California: Roxbury Publishing Company.
- Davis, K. Forsyth, A. Lambert, S. Tricker, D & Walter, E. (eds). 1991. *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. New Edition.* London: Longman Group UK Limited.
- de Witt Deppenaar, M. 1988. *South African Police Commemorative Album. The History of the South African Police 1913-1988.* Silverton: Promedia Publications (Pty) Ltd.
- Demirci, S. 2001. *New Organized Crime. Problems and Issues for Information Analysis.* Houston: University of North Texas.
- Dixon, B. & Rauch, J. 2004. *Sector Policing: Origins And Prospects.* Institute for Security Studies. Monograph No.97. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- Doherty, S. J. & Roche, A. M. 2003. *Alcohol and Licensed Premises: Best Practice in Policing. A monograph for Police and Policy Makers.* Payneham: Australasian Centre for Policing Research.
- Duarte, N. 2007. *Unleashing Our Untapped Domestic Collection is the Key to Prevention.* California: Naval Post Graduate School.
- Els, W. J. 2000. *Crime Intelligence Gathering: Policy Directives and Procedures.* Pretoria: South African Police Service.
- Fuentes, J. R. 2006. *Practical Guide to Intelligence-Led Policing.* New Jersey: New Jersey State Police.
- Gaspar, R & Flood, B. 2005. *National Intelligence Model.* London: National Centre of Policing Excellence.

- Gottschalk, P. 2008. *Knowledge Management in Policing: Enforcing Law on Criminal Business Enterprises*. New York: Hindawi Publishing Corporation.
- Govender, D. 2012. Information Management Strategies to Combat Crime and Prevent losses. *Acta Criminologica* 25(1). Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- Grillo, M. 2011. *Police Organisational Change in a Post-September 11 Environment: Rhetoric or Reality?* New Jersey: Rutgers, State University of New Jersey.
- Guidetti, R. A. 2006. *Policing the Homeland: Choosing the Intelligence Option*. California: Naval Postgraduate School.
- Gül, Z. 2009. *A Partial Test of The Intelligence-led Policing Model*. Kent: Kent State University.
- Gwinn, S. L, Bruce, C. Cooper, J. P & Hick, S. (eds). 2008. *Exploring Crime Analysis. Readings on Essential Skills. Second Edition*. Overland Park: International Association of Crime Analysts.
- Hankel, M. 1999. *Draft Crime Information/Intelligence Flow, Management and Analysis in the South African Police Service*. Pretoria: South African Police Service.
- Hannah, G. O'Brien, K. & Rathmell, A. 2005. *Intelligence and Security Legislation for Security Sector Reform*. London: Rand Europe.
- Hewitt, M. 2008. *Wiretapping: A Necessity for Effectively Combating Terrorism in the 21st Century*. Virginia: Liberty University.
- Hooper, M.K 2014. *Journal of Forensic Research and Crime Studies*. Acknowledging Existence of a Fourth Era of Policing: The Information Era. JScholar Publishers: California.

- Hopkinson, A. (ed) 1999. *Intelligence Models and Best Practices: Professionalizing Intelligence Worldwide*. Lawrenceville: International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts.
- Horrell, M. Horner, D. Kane-Berman, J. & Margo, R. 1972. *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*. Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations.
- Hughes-Wilson, J. 2005. *The Puppet Masters. Spies, Traitors and the real forces behind world events*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Innes, M & Sheptycki, J. W. E. 2004. From Detection to Disruption: Intelligence and the Changing Logic of Police Crime Control in the United Kingdom. *International Criminal Justice Review*. Volume 14. Georgia: Georgia State University.
- James, A. 2011. *The Influence of Intelligence-Led Policing Models on Investigative Policy and Practice in Mainstream Policing 1993-2007: Division, Resistance and Investigative Orthodoxy*. London. London School of Economics and Political Science.
- Kalugin, O. 2004. Terrorism and Human Intelligence: The Soviet Experience. *Brown Journal of World Affairs*. Volume xi Issue 1. Providence: Brown University.
- Kee, J. 2008. Social Engineering: Manipulating The Source.
www.sans.org/.../engineering/social-engineering-manipulation-source-32914
(8 August 2013).
- Kleiven, M. E. 2005. *Where's the intelligence in the UK's National Intelligence Model?* London: University of Portsmouth.
- Koops, B. 1999. *The Crypto Controversy: A Key Conflict in the Information Society*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.

- Krause, A. 2007. *Crime Threat Analysis Process. An Assessment*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.
- Lambertus, S. & Yakimchuk, R. 2007. *Future of Policing in Alberta: International Trends and Case Studies*. Alberta: Policing and Community Safety Branch Solicitor General and Public Security.
- Leman-Langlois, S. & Shearing, C. D. 2011. *Human Rights Implications of New Developments in Policing*. <http://www.crime-reg.com> (8 February 2013).
- Lerner, A. W. 2010. *Espionage and Intelligence, Early Historical Foundations*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Loyka, S.A. Faggiani, D.A. Karchmer, C. Baginski, M. Bibel, D. Carraway, M. Kirby, S. Martinez, R.A. Sellers, S. & Sullivan, J. 2005. *Protecting Your Community From Terrorism: The Strategies for Local Law Enforcement series*. Washington: Police Executive Research Forum.
- Mackenzie, S. & Henry, A. 2009. *Community Policing: A Review of the Evidence*. Edinburgh: Scottish Government Social Research.
- Macková, M. 2009. *The Elizabethan Secret Service*. Brno, Czeck Republic: Masaryk University.
- Mahuntse, N. N. 2007. *Sector Policing In The Johannesburg Central Police Station Area*. Pretoria : Tshwane University Of Technology.
- Mallory, S. L. 2007. *The Concept of Asymmetrical Policing. International Police Executive Symposium Working Paper No 12*. www.IPES.info(8 February 2010).
- Marais, E. 1992. *The Police-Community Relationship*. Pretoria: Centre For The Study Of Violence And Reconciliation.

Maree, K. 2007. *First Steps in Research*. Durban: Van Schaik.

McDowell, D. 1997. *Strategic Intelligence and Analysis: Guidelines on Methodology and Application*. Sydney: The Intelligence Study Centre.

McLachlan, K. J. 2007. *Grounds of Hope and Disappointment: Victims'/Survivors' Perception of South Australia Police Responses to Rape*. Adelaide: Flinders University.

Metscher, R. & Gilbride, B. 2005. *Intelligence as an Investigative Function*. New York: International Foundation for Protection Officers.

Miller, M. E. 1997. *The Integration of Operations and Intelligence: Getting Information to the Warfighter*. Washington DC: Air Command and Staff College.

Minnaar, A. 2009. The Changing Face Of 'Community Policing' In South Africa, Post - 1994. *Acta Criminologica*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Mudau, M. E. 2008. *The Implementation of Sector Policing in the Limpopo Province*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Newham, G. & Dissel, A. 2011. Conference Report. Policing in South Africa 2010 and beyond. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Nieswiadomy, R. M. 1993. *Foundations of Nursing Research. Second Edition*. Dallas, Texas: Texas Woman's University College of Nursing.

O'Brien, K. A. 2003. *Controlling the Hydra: An Historical Analysis of South African Intelligence Oversight. "Making Intelligence Accountable; Executive and Legislative Oversight of Intelligence Services"*. Geneva: Geneva Centre For The Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

O'Connor, T. 2005. *Intelligence Collection* [online]. Available on the Internet at: <http://faculty.ncwc.edu/toconnor/427/427lect02.htm> (29 December 2005).

O'Connor, T. 2011. *Informants, Surveillance, and Undercover Operations. MegaLinks in Criminal Justice*. <http://www.drtoconnor.com/3220/3220lect02c.hmt> (09 February 2012).

Osborn, N. 2012. *To What Degree Have The Non-police Public Services Adopted The National Intelligence Model? What Benefits Could The National Intelligence Model Deliver*. Portsmouth: University of Portsmouth.

Osborne, D. A & Wernicke, S. C. 2009. *Introduction to Crime Analysis. Basic Resources for Criminal Justice Practice*. New York: The Haworth Press.

Osborne, D. 2006. *Out of Bounds: Innovation and Change in Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis*. Washington DC: Joint Military Intelligence College.

Patton, M. Q. 1996. *Qualitative Evaluation Methods*. London: Sage Publications.

Pelser, E. 1999. *The Challenges Of Community Policing In South Africa*. Occasional Paper No 42. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

Perry, A.E. 2010. *The Evolution of Police Organizations and Leadership in the United States. Potential Political and Social Implications*. Northeastern University: Boston.

Peterson, M. 2005. *Intelligence Led-Policing: The New Intelligence Architecture. New Realities. Law Enforcement In the Post 9/11 Era*. Washington DC: Bureau of Justice Assistance.

Peterson, M. B, Fahlman, R.C, Ridgeway, R.G, Erwin, P and Kuzniar, M.T. 1996. *Successful Law Enforcement Using Analytic Methods*. Virginia USA : i2 INC.

- Peterson, M. B. 2007. *Improving the Law Enforcement Intelligence Community Relationship. Developments in Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysis*. National Defense Intelligence College: Washington.
- Phelan, L. & Fenske, J. 1995. *Texas Law Enforcement Management And Administrative Statistics Program*. Crime Analysis:Administrative Aspects. Houston: Enforcement Management Institute of Texas.
- Polit, D. F & Beck, C. T. 2008. *Nursing Research: Generating and Assessing Evidence for Nursing Practice. Eighth Edition*. Philadelphia, USA: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
- Porter, R. M. 2008. "Focus on Fusion Centers: A Progress Report" Before The Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration of the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs United States Senate. [www.hsgac.senate.gov>.....>Hearings](http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/.../Hearings) (8 June 2014).
- Pourheidari, A & Croisdale T. 2010. *Understanding Criminal Co-offending: A Histogramy of Research Literature*. Geneva: Geneva Centre For The Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
- Ratcliffe, J. H. 2003. *Intelligence-led Policing: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.
- Ratcliffe, J. H. 2005. *Integrated Intelligence and Crime Analysis: Enhanced Information Management for Law Enforcement Leaders*. New York: Community Oriented Policing Services.
- Ratcliffe, J, H. 2007. *Integrated Intelligence and Crime Analysis: Enhanced Information Management for Law Enforcement Leaders*. Washington DC: Police Foundation.

Ratcliffe, J. H. 2011. *Intelligence-led policing*.

<http://jratcliffe.net/paper/Ratcliffe%20intelligence-led%20policing%20draft.pdf>

(8 February 2011).

Rauch, J. 1991. *Deconstructing the South African Police Force*. Centre For The Study Of Violence And Reconciliation.

<http://www.csvr.org.za/wits/papers/papdsaps.htm> (8 February 2012).

Ribaux, O, Girod, A, Walsh, S, J, Margot, P, Mizrahi, S & Clivaz, V. 2003. *Forensic Intelligence and Crime Analysis*. London: Oxford University Press.

Rundell, M. & Fox, G. (eds) 2005. *Macmillan English Dictionary for advanced Learners*. London: A&C Black Publishers Ltd.

Sarantakos, S. 1998. *Social Research*. South Yarra: MacMillan.

Schneider, S. R. 2009. The Criminal Intelligence Function: Toward a Comprehensive and Normative Model. *International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts Journal*. vol 9(2):403-427. Richmond: International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts.

Schreier, F. 2009. *Fighting the Pre-eminent Threat with Intelligence-led Operations*. Occasional Paper No 16. Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.

Shaw, M. 2002. *Crime, Police, and Public in Transitional Societies*. Michigan : Michigan State University Press.

Sheldon, R. M. 2011. *The Intelligencer: Journal of US Intelligence Studies*. A Guide To Intelligence From Antiquity to Rome. Virginia, USA: Association of Former Intelligence Officers.

- Simeone, M. J. 2007. *The Integration of Virtual Public-Private Partnerships into Local Law Enforcement to Achieve Enhanced Intelligence-Led Policing*. California: Naval Post Graduate School.
- Smith, A. 1997. *Intelligence Led Policing International Perspectives on Policing in the 21st Century*. Lawrenceville, New Jersey: International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, Inc.
- Smith, R.A. 2013. *The intelligencer*. Law Enforcement Intelligence: Its Evolution and Scope Today. Association of Former Intelligence Officers: Virginia, USA.
- Speziale, H. J. S. & Carpenter, D. R. 2007. *Qualitative Research in Nursing. Advancing the Humanistic Imperative*. Philadelphia, USA: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.
- Stanley, T. W. 2004. *The Urban God and Surveillance Society*. Manchester : University of Manchester.
- Stenton, A. E. 2006. *Crime Analysis: An Examination Of Crime Prevention and Reduction Strategies*. Ottawa: Simon Frazer University.
- Stephens, K. Smith, J. van der Merwe, A. Maganedisa, A. Mthimunye, G. Makhombothi, N. Nel, M. Mawdsley, J. H. Neethling, C. Sizani, M. de Beer, W. Terblanche, J. & Duvenhage, D. 2004. *Human Intelligence Tradecraft Manual*. Pretoria: South African Police Service.
- Stevens, J. 2001. *Intelligence-Led Policing*. <http://www.servamus.co.za> (8 March 2010).
- Taylor, B. Boba, R. & Egge, J. 2011. *The Integration of Crime Analysis Into Patrol Work: A Guidebook*. Washington: Community Oriented Policing Service.

Treverton, G. F. Wollman, M. Wilke, E. Lai, D. 2011. *Moving Toward The Future of Policing*. Santa Monica : RAND Cooperation.

Vellani, K. H. & Nahoun, J.O. 2001. *Applied Crime Analysis*. Woburn: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Wallace, R. Melton, H. K. & Schlesinger, H. R. 2008. *Spy Craft. Inside the CIA's Top Secret Spy Lab*. London: Bantam Press.

Waltham, R.S. 2011. *Crime Analysis*.

http://www.calea.org/newweb/newsletter/N75/crime_analysis.htm. (20 February 2011).

Williams F. P & McShane, M. D. 1994. *Criminological Theory*. New Jersey : Prentice Hall.

Willison, R. A. 2002. *Opportunities for Computer Abuse: Assessing a Crime Specific Approach in the case of Barings Bank*. London: London School of Economics and Political Science.

Wortley, R. & Mazerolle, L (eds). 2008. *Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis*. Devon: Willan Publishing.

Zinn, R. 2010. *Home invasion: Robbers disclose what you should know*. Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Zinn, R. 2011. *Inaugural Address*. Pretoria: University of South Africa.

Internet Sites

<http://www.saps.gov.za/dynamicModules> (27 August 2013).

<http://intranet.saps.gov.za/> (27 August 2013).

Acts

South Africa (Republic). 1972. Security Intelligence and State Security Council Act, 64 of 1972. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa (Republic). 1977. Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. Pretoria. Government Printer.

United States of America. 1979. Justice System Improvement Act of 1979. Washington DC: Department of Justice.

South Africa (Republic). 1994. National Strategic Intelligence Act, 39 of 1994. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa (Republic). 1995. *South African Police Service Act, 68 of 1995.* Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa (Republic). 1996. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa (Republic). 2002. Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 70 of 2002. Pretoria: Government Printer.

South Africa (Republic). 1999. White Paper on Safety and Security. 1999-2004. Pretoria. Government Printer.

South Africa (Republic). 1995. Republic of South Africa: White Paper on Safety and Security. Pretoria: Government Printer

South Africa (Republic). South African Police Service Standing Order General 14.

Britain. 2002. Police Reform Act 2002.

STATION CRIME INTELLIGENCE PROFILE

SECTION A

1	NAME OF POLICE STATION

2	COMMAND STRUCTURE OF A POLICE STATION		
POST TITLE	RANK	INITIALS & SURNAME	CONTACT NUMBERS
STATION COMM			
DETECTIVE COMM			
VISIBLE POLICE COMM			
CRIM INTELL OFFICIAL			
COMM SUPORT SERV			

3	INTRODUCTION

4	GEOGRAPHICAL LAYOUT OF THE STATION/PROFILE
MAP OF THE POLICING PRECINCT	

5 DEMARCATION OF SECTORS			
SECTOR No	AREA	SECTOR MANAGER	CONTACT No

6 PRIORITY CRIMES OF THE STATION	
PRIORITY No	CRIME/OFFENCE
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

7 COMPARATIVE CRIME STATISTICS OF THE STATION																																												
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="4">CONTACT CRIMES</th> </tr> <tr> <th>CRIME</th> <th>2012</th> <th>2013</th> <th>DIF F</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>TOTAL SEXUAL CRIMES</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>MURDER</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>ATTEMPTED MURDER</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>ASSAULT GBH</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>ASSAULT COMMON</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>ROBBERY COMMON</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>ROBBERY AGGRAVAT</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>TOTAL</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </tbody> </table>					CONTACT CRIMES				CRIME	2012	2013	DIF F	TOTAL SEXUAL CRIMES				MURDER				ATTEMPTED MURDER				ASSAULT GBH				ASSAULT COMMON				ROBBERY COMMON				ROBBERY AGGRAVAT				TOTAL			
CONTACT CRIMES																																												
CRIME	2012	2013	DIF F																																									
TOTAL SEXUAL CRIMES																																												
MURDER																																												
ATTEMPTED MURDER																																												
ASSAULT GBH																																												
ASSAULT COMMON																																												
ROBBERY COMMON																																												
ROBBERY AGGRAVAT																																												
TOTAL																																												
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="4">CONTACT RELATED CRIMES</th> </tr> <tr> <th>CRIME</th> <th>2012</th> <th>2013</th> <th>DIF F</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>ARSON</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>MI TO PROP</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>TOTAL</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </tbody> </table>					CONTACT RELATED CRIMES				CRIME	2012	2013	DIF F	ARSON				MI TO PROP				TOTAL																							
CONTACT RELATED CRIMES																																												
CRIME	2012	2013	DIF F																																									
ARSON																																												
MI TO PROP																																												
TOTAL																																												
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="4">PROPERTY RELATED CRIMES</th> </tr> <tr> <th>CRIME</th> <th>2012</th> <th>2013</th> <th>DIFF</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>BURGLARY BUS & ATT</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>BURGLARY RES & ATT</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>THEFT OF M/V & ATT</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>THEFT O/F MOTOR/V</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>STOCK THEFT</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>TOTAL</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </tbody> </table>					PROPERTY RELATED CRIMES				CRIME	2012	2013	DIFF	BURGLARY BUS & ATT				BURGLARY RES & ATT				THEFT OF M/V & ATT				THEFT O/F MOTOR/V				STOCK THEFT				TOTAL											
PROPERTY RELATED CRIMES																																												
CRIME	2012	2013	DIFF																																									
BURGLARY BUS & ATT																																												
BURGLARY RES & ATT																																												
THEFT OF M/V & ATT																																												
THEFT O/F MOTOR/V																																												
STOCK THEFT																																												
TOTAL																																												
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="4">CRIMES HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON POLICE ACTION FOR DETECTION</th> </tr> <tr> <th>CRIME</th> <th>2012</th> <th>2013</th> <th>DIFF</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>DRUG RELATED</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>ILLEGAL POS F/A</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>DRIVING UNDER</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>TOTAL</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </tbody> </table>					CRIMES HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON POLICE ACTION FOR DETECTION				CRIME	2012	2013	DIFF	DRUG RELATED				ILLEGAL POS F/A				DRIVING UNDER				TOTAL																			
CRIMES HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON POLICE ACTION FOR DETECTION																																												
CRIME	2012	2013	DIFF																																									
DRUG RELATED																																												
ILLEGAL POS F/A																																												
DRIVING UNDER																																												
TOTAL																																												
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th colspan="4">OTHER SERIOUS CRIMES</th> </tr> <tr> <th>CRIME</th> <th>2012</th> <th>2013</th> <th>DIFF</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>THEFT GENERAL</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>SHOPLIFTING</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>COMM CRIMES</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> <tr><td>TOTAL</td><td> </td><td> </td><td> </td></tr> </tbody> </table>					OTHER SERIOUS CRIMES				CRIME	2012	2013	DIFF	THEFT GENERAL				SHOPLIFTING				COMM CRIMES				TOTAL																			
OTHER SERIOUS CRIMES																																												
CRIME	2012	2013	DIFF																																									
THEFT GENERAL																																												
SHOPLIFTING																																												
COMM CRIMES																																												
TOTAL																																												

8	CRIME PATTERN ANALYSIS (FOR EACH AND EVERY CRIME)
ASSAULT (ANSWER WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, & HOW)	
BURGLARY RESIDENTIAL (ANSWER WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, & HOW)	
STOCK THEFT (ANSWER WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, & HOW)	

SECTION B

1	SECTOR 1
INTRODUCTION (SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE THE DIVISION INTO SUBSECTORS IF NECESSARY)	
MAP OF THE SECTOR (SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE AREA)	
POPULATION (BRIEF INTRODUCTION, eg. Source of information)	
YOUTH	
ADULTS	
OLD AGE	
CHILDREN	
TOTAL	

PROMINENT PEOPLE IN THE SECTOR			
NAMES & SURNAME	POSITION HELD	CONTACT No	PHYSICAL ADDRESS

COMPARATIVE CRIME STATISTICS OF THE SECTOR

CONTACT CRIMES			
CRIME	2012	2013	DIF F
TOTAL SEXUAL CRIMES			
MURDER			
ATTEMPTED MURDER			
ASSAULT GBH			
ASSAULT COMMON			
ROBBERY COMMON			
ROBBERY AGGRAVAT			
TOTAL			

CONTACT RELATED CRIMES			
CRIME	2012	2013	DIF F
ARSON			
MI TO PROP			
TOTAL			

CRIMES HEAVILY DEPENDENT ON POLICE ACTION FOR DETECTION			
CRIME	2012	2013	DIFF
DRUG RELATED			
ILLEGAL POS F/A			
DRIVING UNDER			
TOTAL			

PROPERTY RELATED CRIMES			
CRIME	2012	2013	DIFF
BURGLARY BUS & ATT			
BURGLARY RES & ATT			
THEFT OF M/V & ATT			
THEFT O/F MOTOR/V			
STOCK THEFT			
TOTAL			

OTHER SERIOUS CRIMES			
CRIME	2012	2013	DIFF
THEFT GENERAL			
SHOPLIFTING			
COMM CRIMES			
TOTAL			

CRIME PATTERN ANALYSIS (FOR EACH AND EVERY CRIME)

ASSAULT (ANSWER WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, & HOW)

Blank area for crime pattern analysis of Assault.

BURGLARY RESIDENTIAL (ANSWER WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, & HOW)

Blank area for crime pattern analysis of Burglary Residential.

STOCK THEFT (ANSWER WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, WHY, & HOW)

--

SCALE OF DAMAGE

CRIME	TYPE OF PROPERTY	VALUE
TOTAL		

SOCIAL IMPACT (HOW DOES THE CRIME AFFECT THE COMMUNITY)

--

PLACES OF INTEREST

MAP OR PICTURE OF THE PLACES (eg. Police stations, hospitals, clinics, etc)

--

NAME OF PLACE	PHYSICAL ADDRESS	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	TYPE OF BUSINESS

BUSINESS PLACES			
NAME OF PLACE	PHYSICAL ADDRESS	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	TYPE OF BUSINESS
LIQUOR OUTLETS			
NAME OF PLACE	PHYSICAL ADDRESS	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	TYPE OF BUSINESS

TARGET DETERMINATION				
ROUTES USED TO SMUGGLE ILLEGAL/STOLEN GOODS				
ROUTE		TYPE OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITY		
LOCALITY OF INSTABILITY RELATED FLASHPOINT				
NAME OF LOCALITY	PHYSICAL ADDRESS		TYPE OF ACTIVITY	
SOFT TARGET				
NAME OF PLACE/TA	PHYSICAL ADDRESS	RESPONSIBLE PERSON & CONTACT NUMBERS	TYPE OF BUSINESS	REASON FOR VULNERABILITY

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES		
NON-ORGANISED CRIME		
NAMES	PHYSICAL ADDRESS	CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
ORGANISED CRIME		
NAMES	PHYSICAL ADDRESS	CRIMINAL ACTIVITY
PAROLLES		
NAMES	PHYSICAL ADDRESS	CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

WANTED CRIMINALS			
NAMES	PHYSICAL ADDRESS	CRIMINAL ACTIVITY	NAMES & CONTACT No of IO

CRIME HOT SPOTS
PICTURE OF THE HOT SPOT
BRIEF DECIPTION OF THE HOT SPOT

INHIBITING FACTORS

SECTION D
RECOMMENDATIONS

INDIVIDUAL/TARGET PROFILE

PHOTO		
PICTURE OF A PHOTO		
DESCRIPTION OF FACIAL FEATURES/MARKS		

PERSONAL PARTICULARS					
SURNAME					
NAMES					
ALIAS					
MAIDEN NAME					
DATE OF BIRTH					
IDENTITY NUMBER					
PASSPORT PARTICULARS	PP NUMBER		DATE ISSUED		EXPIRY DATE
RACE	AFRICAN	COLOURED	WHITE	INDIAN	OTHER(SPECIFY)
HOME LANGUAGE					
GENDER (mark with an x)	MALE		FEMALE		
MARITAL STATUS (mark with an x)	NEVER MARRIED		MARRIED		DEVORCED
CURRENT RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS					
RESIDENCE HISTORY	ADDRESS		PERIOD SPENT (FROM- TO)		
POSTAL ADDRESS					
FORMAL EDUCATION HISTORY (BASIC EDUCATION)	NAME OF SCHOOL		YEAR (FROM – TO)		STANDARD PASSED
FORMAL EDUCATION HISTORY (HIGHER EDUCATION)	NAME OF INSTITUTION		YEAR (FROM – TO)		QUALIFICATIONS

EMPLOYMENT HISTORY				
NAME OF COMPANY	TYPE OF BUSINESS	TYPE OF WORK	POSITION HELD	PERIOD

MOVEMENT CONTROL					
TRAVEL DOCUMENT No					
MOVEMENT INFO	DATE	TRAN No	PORT	DIRECT	TRAV DOC

VEHICLE PARTICULARS								
DRIVERS LICENSE								
DATE ISSUED								
CODE (mark with an x)	A	A1	B	C1	C	EB	EC1	EC
VEHICLE REGISTRAT No								
CHASSIS/ VIN NUMBER								
ENGINE NUMBER								
MAKE								
SERIES								
COLOUR								
OWNERSHIP DATE								
CURRENT OWNER								
REGISTERED ADDRESS								
REGISTERED ON NATIS? (mark with an x)	YES				NO			

FIREARM PARTICULARS	
MAKE	
SERIAL NUMBER	
CALIBER	
DATE ISSUED	

CONTACT PARTICULARS	
TEL HOME	
TEL WORK	
CELL NUMBER	

CRIMINAL RECORD					
POLICE STATION	CAS No	OFFENCE	DESCRIPTION	INVOLVEMENT	DATE OF INCIDENT

INCARCERATION HISTORY		
NAME OF PRISON	PERIOD OF INCARCERATION	INCACERATION (BEGIN – END DATE)

CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES			
STATION	CAS No	CRIME	NAMES OF ASSOCIATES

SPOUSE PARTICULARS												
SURNAME												
NAMES												
MAIDEN NAME												
DATE OF BIRTH												
IDENTITY NUMBER												
PASTPORT NUMBER												
RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS												
POSTAL ADDRESS												
CONTACT NUMBERS				TEL (W)			TEL (H)			CELL		

MISTRESS/GIRL FRIEND PARTICULARS												
SURNAME												
NAMES												
MAIDEN NAME												
DATE OF BIRTH												
IDENTITY NUMBER												
PASTPORT NUMBER												
RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS												
POSTAL ADDRESS												
CONTACT NUMBERS				TEL (W)			TEL (H)			CELL		

BUSINESS PARTICULARS	
NAME OF BUSINESS	
ADDRESS OF BUSINESS	
POSTAL ADDRESS	
BUSINESS NUMBER	
TAX NUMBER	
REGISTRATION DATE	
DIRECTORS	
SURNAME	
NAMES	
DATE	
RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS	
POSTAL ADDRESS	
IDENTITY NUMBER	

MEMORANDUM				
ACCOUNT INFORMATION	Supplier	Date Opened	Opening Balance	Current Balance
OCCUPANT INFORMATION				
EMPLOYER INFORMATION				
DEEDS INFORMATION				
TOWNSHIP/RD				
PROPERTY TYPE				
ERF/FARM/SCHEME No				
TITLE DEED				
MICROFILM REF				
REGISTRATION DATE				
PURCHASE DATE				
AMOUNT				

COMPILED BY

TACTICAL ASSESSMENT

SECTION: A		PAST & PRESENT			
CLUSTER STATISTICAL DATA OF STOCK THEFT					
FINANCIAL YEAR	2007/2008	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011	2011/2012
CRIME FIGURES					
TOTAL					
GRAPH					
CRIME REPORT RATE PER STATION					
FINANCIAL YEAR	2007/2008	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011	2011/2012
PHUTHADITJHABA					
HARRISMITH					
MAKWANE					
NAMAHADI					
TSEKI					
TSESENG					
KESTELL					
TOTAL					
GEOGRAPHICAL RANGE (INDICATE CRIME HOT SPOTS, PLACE WHERE CRIME IS MOSTLY TAKING PLACE)					

MODUS OPERANDI

KNOWN RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THIS CRIME AND ANY OTHER CRIME

INDIVIDUAL/GROUP INVOLVED IN THIS CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

NAME OF OFFENDER	RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS	MODUS OPERANDI	AREA OF OPERATION	OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

CONNECTIONS TO LEGITIMATE BUSINESS

INDIVIDUAL OFFENDER	TYPE OF BUSINESS	PRODUCTS PRODUCED/SOLD	PHYSICAL ADDRESS OF BUSINESS

FINANACIAL IMPLICATIONS OF CRIME (What is the monetary value of this crime per year)

WHAT HAPPENS TO THE PROFITS GENERATED BY THE CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

WHAT IS THE MARKET FOR THE CRIMINAL PRODUCT

ANY CONNECTION TO THE GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE (Are there government agencies or bodies that regulate the activity)

WHAT IS THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL & CRIMINAL CLIMATE IN THE AREA

(Comments about police presence in the area, in the form of investigation, or visibility)

HAS ANY AGENCY CONDUCTED INVESTIGATION, TACTICAL/STRATEGIC ANALYSIS ON THIS CRIMINAL ACTIVITY (If Yes What were the results/outcome of such actions)

SECTION: B	FUTURE (Based on data developed in Section A, predict the future of this activity)
PREVALENCE	
GEOGRAPHIC RANGE	
IMPACT OF EVOLVING TECHNIQUES	
GROUPS TAKING OVER (If any)	
POTENTIAL PROFIT STRUCTURE	
POTENTIAL GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION HAZARDS	

SECTION: C	ENFORCEMENT ALTERNATIVES (Based on data developed in Section A & B, recommend alternatives regarding investigation, prevention and enforcement including deployment)
UNIT/COMPONENT	PROPOSED ACTIVITY/RECOMMENDATION
CRIME INTELLIGENCE	
CRIME PREVENTION	
DETECTIVES	
COMMUNITY SERVICE CENTRE	
OTHER ROLE PLAYERS	

STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT

1	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
---	-------------------

--

2	INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND
OBJECTIVES OF ASSESSMENT	
PROBLEM DEFINITION/HYPOTHESIS	
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY/COLLECTION PLAN	
SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF NEW ASSESSMENTS	
REVIEW OF PREVIOUS ASSESSMENT/LITERATURE REVIEW	

INTRODUCTION: SCOPE OF ANALYSIS/ANALYTICAL METHODS USED

DESCRIPTION OF FINDINGS

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

4	CONCLUSIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSIONS	
POLICY/ENFORCEMENT ALTERNATIVES	
RECOMMENDED POLICY/ENFORCEMENT OPTIONS	
PREDICTION OF POLICY IMPLICATIONS(ON ENFORCEMENT TARGET & POLICE RESOURCES	

PRIMARY SOURCES(Informants, Data Bases, Investigators, etc)

SECONDARY SOURCES(News Papers, Magazines, Other Intelligence Assessments, etc)

Annexure E

CURRICULUM VITAE OF NTJA PATRICK MASHILOANE

PERSONAL DETAILS

SURNAME : Mashiloane
NAMES : Ntja Patrick
ID NUMBER : 6811125479083
RESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: 565K Clubview, Phuthaditjhaba
POSTAL ADDRESS : Box 5719, Phuthaditjhaba, 9866
TELEPHONE (HOME) : 082 418 2789
TELEPHONE (WORK) : 058 718 0944
E-MAIL : patricmashiloane@yahoo.com

LANGUAGES SPOKEN : Sesotho, Zulu, English, Afrikaans
HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED: Leifo-Iziko Secondary School, Petsana, Reitz.
(1984-1988)

HIGHEST STANDARD PASSED: Matric (Standard 10)

QUALIFICATIONS

- ❖ National Diploma Police Administration : Technikon SA [1994]
- ❖ Bachelor Of Arts (Police Science) : UNISA [1999]
- ❖ Honours Bachelor Of Arts : UNISA [2001]
- ❖ Magister Artium (Sociology) : University of Free State [2006]

WORK EXPERIENCE

South African Police Service (SAPS)

From 1989-06-05 till To Date

- ❖ Detective
- ❖ Detective Commander
- ❖ Area Head: Crime Intelligence
- ❖ Section Commander: Crime Intelligence Station

CURRENT EMPLOYER

South African Police Service (SAPS)

Position: Section Commander: Crime Intelligence Station

REFERENCES

Professor M. Montesh

Cell Number: 082 332 0607

Mr M. J Hadebe

Cell Number: 082 418 2784