

**THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATISATION ON STATE MEDIA SYSTEMS IN ZAMBIA:  
THE CASE OF THE TIMES NEWSPAPERS**

**By**

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## **DECLARATION**

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**I declare that THE IMPACT OF DEMOCRATISATION ON STATE MEDIA SYSTEMS IN ZAMBIA: THE CASE OF THE TIMES NEWSPAPERS is my own work, and that all sources that I have used or quoted have been indicated and acknowledged by means of complete references.**

.....  
**SIGNATURE**  
**(MR K CHIRAMBO)**

.....  
**DATE**

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

Without the motivation of my late father, Frederick Noble Chirambo, an accountant and auditor by profession, I could have lost the ambition to compete, to excel and to be a leader. His vision was for me to emulate him, to be an accountant given my pedigree in related academic fields in my early years as a scholar. However, my interests lay in various areas of the social sciences and I could not have been more rebellious than to venture first into journalism, then into the practical world of electoral politics.

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## **ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AMU	African Mine Workers Union
AMV	Africa Media Ventures
ANC	African National Congress
ANT	Actor-Network Theory
BEB	British Empire Broadcasting
BSA	British South Africa Company
CBU	Copperbelt University
CBU	Collective Bargaining Unit
CDD	Centre for Democracy and Development
CPE	Critical Political Economy
CPU	Commonwealth Press Union
ECZ	Electoral Commission of Zambia
EMU	European Mine Workers Union
ERT	Employee Rights Theory
FDD	Forum for Democracy and Development
FPTP	First Past The Post
FFTUZ	Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia
FODEP	Foundation for Democratic Processes
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
HDI	Human Development Index
HP	Heritage Party
IBA	Independent Broadcast Authority
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
ICTU	International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
IDASA	Institute for Democracy in South Africa
ILO	International Labour Organisation
INDECO	Industrial Development Corporation
IPE	International Political Economy

KANU	Kenya African National Union
LAZ	Law Association of Zambia
LONRHO	London Rhodesia Mining and Land Company
LPT	Labour Process Theory
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MECOZ	Media Ethics Council of Zambia
MIBS	Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services
MINDECO	Mining Development Corporation
MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
MLC	Media Liaison Committee
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MMP	Mixed Member Proportional
MNC	Multinational Corporation
MP	Member of Parliament
MRC	Media Reform Committee
MT	Metric Tonnes
MUZ	Mine Workers Union of Zambia
NAIS	National Agricultural Information Services
NAMECO	National Media Corporation
NCCBPGG	National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance
NDL	Newspaper Distributors Limited
NUCW	National Union of Communication Workers
NUT	National Union of Teachers
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
PAZA	Press Association of Zambia
PFCP	Press Freedom Committee of the Post Newspapers
PR	Proportional Representation
PSRP	Public Sector Reform Programme
RAMCOZ	Roan Antelope Mining Corporation
RSA	Radio South Africa
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme

SARDC	Southern African Research and Documentation Centre
SARS	Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
SOE	State Owned Enterprises
SOS	Share of Spending
SPD	Single Party Dominance
SSZJ	Society of Senior Zambia Journalists
TWU	Typographical Workers Unions
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UCT	University of Cape Town
UK	United Kingdom
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UPND	United Party for National Development
UPP	United Progressive Party
UTEC	United Technical Equipment Company
ZAMCOM	Zambia Institute of Mass Communications
ZAMWA	Zambia Media Women's Association
ZANA	Zambia News Agency
ZANACO	Zambia National Commercial Bank
ZANIS	Zambia National News and Information Service
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZESCO	Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation
ZDM	Zambia Daily Mail
ZHDR	Zambia Human Development Report
ZIMA	Zambia Independent Media Association
ZIMCO	Zambia Industrial Mining Corporation
ZMK	Zambian Kwacha
ZNBC	Zambia National Broadcasting Services
ZNHL	Zambia National Holdings
ZNPF	Zambia National Provident Fund
ZNWC	Zambia National Wholesale Company
ZPA	Zambia Privatisation Agency



ZRA	Zambia Revenue Authority
ZRP	Zambia Republican Party
ZSIC	Zambia State Insurance Corporation
ZUBID	Zambia Union of Broadcasters and Information Disseminators
ZUJ	Zambia Union of Journalists

## SUMMARY

This thesis explores the manner in which political-economic forces born of democratisation have shaped media developments in Zambia, affected the welfare of journalists and the viability of the state owned press epitomised by the *Times Newspapers*. The aim is to inform the privatisation policy discourse.

Using a political economy analysis, the thesis unveils the historical intimacy between nationalist administrations and multinational business elites and how these forces - often working in collusion - influenced patterns of media ownership, inhibited labour rights and controlled communicative activity – indicative of how the state and markets can constrain freedom of expression and association, despite democratisation.

The thesis contends that the uncertainty of neo-patrimonial conditions that characterised the post colonial era has not dissipated to a great extent and continues to undermine media and institutional reform in today's liberally inclined Zambia.

Pervasive clientelism has also compromised popular perceptions of state media systems, subverting competitiveness and the propagandist function of the *Times Newspapers* in the liberalised market, a point empirically illustrated through the analysis of market and public opinion data.

Inadvertently, the impact of labour market liberalisation, a hallmark of democratisation, has been to catalyse the unionisation of journalism, which has demonstrably improved the economic welfare of state media workers. Therefore, while transitional insecurities have moved ruling elites to limit freedom of expression within state media systems as a response to the perceived hostility of the private press, the strange paradox wrought by democratisation has been the unintended expansion of *group rights*, as journalists claim their constitutional entitlement to freedom of association. *Collective action*, hence, has conversely led to positive judicial and legislative outcomes.

The thesis cautions, however, that due to enduring patronage tendencies *unbridled privatisation* of state media systems in Zambia would likely consign institutions such as the *Times* to supporters of the state, promoting an *illusory* sense of independence and subjecting the entities to further – albeit – indirect political controls. Proposing a communal alternative, the thesis concludes that the complete reform of state media systems cannot possibly be divorced from the overall need for institutional transformation in Zambia. Methodologically, the thesis employs historical analysis and participant observation.

## **Key Terms**

Democratisation, public sphere, political economy, nationalisation, privatisation, liberalisation, commercialisation, digitisation, globalisation, dominant party system, single party system, Washington Consensus, neo-patrimonialism, clientelism, commodification, structuration, spatialisation, hegemony.

## **Exchange Rates**

Zambian Kwacha ZMK 4,760 = 1 United States Dollar, 17 January, 2011.

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**Figure 1: Map of Zambia**

## Zambia

### 1. Demographics:

Population: 13,460,305  
Population growth rate: 3.118% (2010 est.)  
Birth rate: 44.63 births/1,000 population (2010 est.)  
Death rate: 12.84 deaths/1,000 population (July 2010 est.)  
Urbanisation: 35% of total population (2008)

### 2. Political System:

Government type: republic  
Capital: Lusaka  
Administrative Divisions: 9 provinces; Central, Copperbelt, Eastern, Luapula, Lusaka, Northern, North-Western, Southern, Western  
Independence: 24 October 1964 (from the UK)  
Constitution: 24 August 1991; amended in 1996 to establish presidential term limits  
Legal system: based on English common law and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in an ad hoc constitutional council; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction  
Suffrage: 18 years of age; universal



### 2a. Executive Branch:

Head of government: President Rupiah BANDA (since 19 August 2008); Vice President George KUNDA (since 14 November 2008)

Cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the president from among the members of the National Assembly

Elections: president elected by popular vote for a five-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 30 October 2008 (next to be held in 2011)

Legislative Branch: Unicameral National Assembly (158 seats; 150 members are elected by popular vote, 8 members appointed by the president, to serve five-year terms)

### 3. Economic strength:

GDP: \$18.44 billion (2009 est.)  
GDP growth rate: 6.3% (2009 est.)  
GDP per capita (PPP): \$1,400 (2009 est.)  
GDP – composition by sector; agriculture: 19.7%, industry: 32.4%, services: 47.9% 2009 est.)  
Labour force: 5.416 million (2009 est.)  
Labour force by occupation: agriculture: 85%, industry: 6%, services: 9% (2004)  
Unemployment rate: 50% (2000 est.)  
Population below the poverty line: 68% (2007)<sup>1</sup>  
Gini index: 50.8 (2004)  
Budget: revenues: \$2.49 billion, expenditures: \$2.955 billion (2009 est.)  
Public debt: 25.9% of GDP (2009 est.)  
Consumer inflation rate: 13.4% (2009 est.)

**Source:** The World Factbook (2010).

<sup>1</sup> ZHDR, 2007

# CHAPTER ONE

## 1.1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis employs *participant observation* and *historical analysis* to explore the impact of political change on state media systems in Zambia as experienced by the *Times Newspapers*, one of the largest entities in print journalism in this southern African country.

The concept of political change is largely informed by modernisation theory, which is steeped in the much - criticised notion, suggesting that less developed societies only progress by adopting political, economic and social systems characteristic of highly industrialised western democracies (Smith, 1996:64).

Although modernisation is not the equivalent of democratisation, some studies have shown a positive correlation between the two. These conclusions have been based on statistical relationships drawn between income levels as key indicators of modernisation and democracy (Randall & Theobald, 1998:43). Similarly, media density and urbanisation have also been viewed as important variables that correlate with democratisation and economic growth (Berger, 2004: 46).

This thesis discusses political change in the context of democratisation - the process by which democracy may be achieved (Parry & Moran, 1994:1). It explores the ways in which macro level political economic forces born of democratisation may have shaped the structure, editorial policy, labour rights, public participation and the economic determination of the state media systems - epitomised by the *Times Newspapers*. The impact of democratisation will hence be *inferred* and *explained* from the response of the *Times* and of *labour* to policy reforms and interventions undertaken by state elites during the periods of transition.

Often, democratisation is intimately linked to political and economic liberalisation. Liberalisation refers to a loosening of restrictions and the expansion of *individual* and *group rights*, the consequence of which would manifest usually in both the political and economic arena. In most cases, the extension of political rights and freedoms; and reforms in the social and economic spheres has been based on the principles of liberal democracy (Keller, 1996: 204).

In the past 45 years, Zambia has at least once experienced what Huntington (1991: 15) would term, a 'reverse wave' to its democratisation process: Independent in 1964 from British rule, Zambia was led by Kenneth Kaunda under the United National Independence Party (UNIP) for 27 years during which the country regressed from liberal democracy (1964-1972) to a one party state (1973-1990).

Under pressure from pro-democracy activists, Kaunda repealed Article 4 of the constitution of Zambia to reintroduce plural politics in 1990. Against a background of futile nationalisation policies, he lost power to the market orientated-Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) led by Frederick Chiluba in the plural elections of October 31, 1991(Simutanyi, 2008: 4).

Chiluba's 10 years in office were characterised by political tensions with opposition and labour, as his liberal philosophy caused wide spread job losses (Global Policy Network, 2001) and acute poverty (Banda, 2004: 7-10).

His presidency ended with failed attempts to extend his rule in 2001. Levy Mwanawasa succeeded him as MMD and republican president after elections in 2001 but succumbed prematurely to mortality in 2008, following which his vice President Rupiah Banda ascended to the presidency. Through these transitions, state policies and actions have caused persistent concerns about the place of media under this emerging democracy.

Using a *political economy theoretical framework*, which considers historical, socio-economic and political imperatives, including matters of control, ownership and

labour relations (Boyd-Barret & Newbold, 1995: 186), the thesis therefore broadly investigates the manner in which reforms undertaken during three distinct period of change, have affected state media systems in Zambia in general and the *Times Newspapers* in particular.

Consistent with the ambitions of liberal democracy, *freedom of expression* and *freedom of association*<sup>2</sup> will be fore-grounded. Here, the thesis is interested in how political and economic forces produce, sustain and apportion privilege, including the distribution of rights within state media establishments. Montemayor (2008: 143) explains that just as citizens of a country possess specific moral rights, workers are also entitled to similar rights within their organisation by virtue of their participation in it. Edwards (1993: 35) elaborates on this, asserting that worker rights are not only drawn from constitutional rights but also from conditions of service and 'implied promises' granted by the employer. He calls these rights *enterprise rights*.

Without *struggle* however, Nord (1993: 341) cautions, constitutional rights cannot be translated into tangible rights. Nord is instructive in this regard when he differentiates between *stated rights* and *concrete rights*. Hence *trade unionism - in this case media unionism* - forms a central part of the thesis.

It is noteworthy that the political and economic reform imperatives of democratisation as they relate to Africa are clouded in much scholarly tension.

On the one hand, a new consensus among aid bureaucrats and policy makers emerging in the 1990s supported the argument that strengthening the democratic process, along with corporatist arrangements between political elites and interest groups would secure the economic reform process on the continent (Rakner,

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<sup>2</sup> Relating the notion of *freedom* to communicative rights is evidently inspired by communication theorist Jurgen Habermas (1989 & 1974) through his seminal works on the concept of the public sphere. The public sphere is discussed at length in Chapter Three, sections 3.1 and 3.2.8. In this regard, Beetham (1981: 192) notes that 'without freedom to express and communicate opinions, to assemble and associate, democracy would simply not exist'. Denis McQuail (1996: 70-71) also makes the point that in the realm of civil society, *freedom* has been defined in terms of communicative rights: of belief, speech, movement, assembly, association and access to information. This is generally how this thesis interprets this concept.

2001: 509-512). On the other hand, radical African positions denounced the dual reform process imposed on the continent as being more about western interests of control and exploitation than democracy. They continue to associate privatisation and liberalisation with the incapacitation of the state, a loss of sovereignty, disempowerment of workers through de-unionisation and retrenchments (Mkandawire, 1999: 337). Unfortunately these empirical realities of Africa have been ignored in the wider academic project (Rakner, 2001: 512).

The idea of a minimal state certainly projects a sense of powerlessness on the part of African governments, suggesting that all development, including media development, is to be externally dictated.

However, the remarkable characteristic of the works of scholars such as Mkandawire (1999, 2001) is that it defies the prescriptive advances of neo-liberal orthodoxy on institutional transformation in Africa. Implicitly, his arguments challenge us to re-think how we view and understand neo-liberal principles as they relate to the media. They further raise the concern that some of democracy's supposed sacred values, such as freedom of association and expression, might be largely subordinated to the financial interests of global capital despite democratisation.

These freedoms - which are closely inter-related - render it possible for people, journalists included, to express their own ideas, form associations, trade unions and other societies to defend and promote their own interests (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 1).

In Zambia, freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly and association are guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution's Article 20(1), Article 20(2) and Article 21(1), respectively. Legal experts hold that these freedoms, in any modern democracy, are not absolute and may be subject to legitimate limitations in their exercise. However, there are some concerns about the wide ranging nature of the derogations sections in the Zambian Constitution's

clause 20(3) and the abstract disposition of restrictions relating to public safety, public order and defence, in particular (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 1).<sup>3</sup>

Given these perspectives, the overall purpose of thesis is to contribute to the protracted policy discourse on merits and demerits of a fully liberalized and privatised media industry as opposed to state ownership in the Zambian political environment.

For the purposes of the thesis, democracy will imply liberal democracy - the official trajectory of the MMD government - which would encompass regular elections of leadership through a secret ballot, an orderly succession, openness of society, universal adult suffrage; independent judiciary, freedom of association, freedom of the press and freedom of ownership, institutional pluralism and fundamental human rights (Obasanjo, 1989: 34).<sup>4</sup> Because of demands on openness that underpin this model of democracy, the relevance of state owned media is a matter requiring evidence-based debates owing to the seeming lack of political commitment by successive Zambian administrations to reforms. The Objectives of the thesis hence are:

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<sup>3</sup> This thesis avoids an over elaboration on the legal and constitutional imperatives relating to freedom of expression and of the media firstly because this is not the focus of the study. Secondly, it is an area that has received extensive attention by scholars over the years (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999; Matibini, 2006; Chirwa, 1997, CPU, 1997) in a very general sense and has largely been associated with threats posed by legislation to the existence of the private press rather than on the law's micro level influences in the institutional realm of the state owned media. The thesis exercises caution in generalising the limitations of law to the state media mainly because it recognises that state sanctions against journalists in the SOEs can be masked by administrative actions. It is argued that such nuances are likely better investigated through the methods, among others, proposed by this thesis.

<sup>4</sup> Although democracy remains a highly contested idea, there is some level of consensus between scholars and politicians (as reflected in most modern constitutions) in regard to what its key elements are. Bello (2011: 52) for instance, identifies them as: equality, sovereignty of the people; respect for human life; the rule of law and liberty of the individual. Held (1993) extends the cluster to include: elected government, free and fair elections in which every citizen's vote has an equal weight, a suffrage which embraces all citizens irrespective of race, religion, class, sex, among other things: freedom of conscience, information and expression on all public matters; the right of all adults to oppose their government and contest political office; the right to form associations, including social movements, interest groups and political parties. Similar articulations of democracy are reflected in section 1.1.3 of this chapter through the works of Mafeje (1995), and in section 2.3.1 of Chapter Two where the thesis discusses measurement tools for democracy informed by Kekic (2007), Almond and Verba (1963), Landman (2005), Zakaria (2003), Mattes (2003) and Lolojih (2005).



- To explore the influence of democratisation on state media systems in Zambia.<sup>5</sup>
- To investigate how political change may have affected decision making structures on the *Times Newspapers* and what it portends for public participation and political conflict over communication resources in a pluralist society.
- To examine the ways in which democratisation has affected labour rights among media professionals in the state sector, and in particular, on the *Times Newspapers*.
- To contribute to evidence-based proposals on privatisation and their implications for job security for media professionals in Zambia
- To explore the impact of privatisation and liberalisation on the commercial aspects of the *Times Newspapers*<sup>6</sup>.

It is, perhaps relevant, at this juncture to categorically state that this is not a comparative study. It does not therefore seek to draw analogies between the Zambian model of state media, which, as will be explained in sections 3.2.8 of Chapter Three and 4.3.6 of Chapter Four, escapes easy categorisation within Siebert, Petersen and Schramm's (1956) *four theories of the press*<sup>7</sup> or the typology

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<sup>5</sup> The interest of this thesis is to explore and explain how democratisation, particularly, the four key characteristics of liberal democracy that constitute the independent variables – freedom of expression, freedom of association, liberalisation and privatisation – have influenced changes to oversight frameworks, structure, labour relations and rights, public participation; and the *Times Newspapers'* commercial disposition over time. The researcher recognises that there are other factors that could inhibit press freedom and commercial innovation, including managerial incompetence, a lack of personal integrity, cheque book journalism, poor training and preferences for non traditional media by publics, among others. While some of these could still be linked to the imperatives of a democratising society, the thesis draws the line specifically around institutional and labour related matters affecting the *Times* through the three distinct periods of political change. In the same vein, the thesis does not seek to analyse the content of state media as this is quite well exposed. Instead, through historical analysis and participant observation, it aims to unravel how power and wealth have interacted to influence communicative space within the organisational setting of the *Times Newspapers*. This is done in order to postulate the potential threat of states and markets to initiatives for privatisation.

<sup>6</sup> The research questions, which are closely linked to these objectives, are elaborated in section 1.3.1 of this chapter. Structurally, this thesis seeks to first map the relationship between theories anchored in the disciplines of political economy, political science and communication science in order to arrive at a conceptual coherency ahead of the explication of the problem statement, research questions and methods to be employed. In this sense, it deliberately departs from a standard format of the introductory chapter.

<sup>7</sup> The four theories of the press, first advanced by Siebert, Peterson and Scram, (1956) were initially the dominant paradigm in analysing global media systems and assessing press freedom across the world: The authoritarian theory suggests that media are designed to support and advance the policies of government, regardless of ownership; the libertarian theory held that man was rational and an end in

advanced by Article 19 (Article 19, 2006: 37). The thesis is, first and foremost, theoretical, and its main purpose is to test certain basic tenets of Critical Political Economy (CPE), including the positioning of labour in the media industry, framed against the dual influences of market and state on freedom of expression and association.

The methods for exploring these phenomena will be discussed in detail in section 1.4 of this Chapter. Detailed discussions on Zambia's history, its political trajectory and the emergence of organised media will follow in Chapter Two. A successive engagement on the concepts of democratisation, political economy and the public sphere is presented in Chapter Three. Chapter Four interrogates the influence of political and business elites on the *Times Newspapers'* capacity for free expression. It examines oversight frameworks and multiparty conflict over access to state media systems with a view to understanding what model of media would best support Zambia's democratic project. Chapter Five will analyse the manner in which democratisation - particularly labour market liberalisation - facilitated or impeded media unionism at various stages of Zambia's history. It will focus on the conditions that led to the rise of professional unions in the media sector; their response to the influence of the powerful; and their role - if any - in enabling better working environments for journalists in the state sector, and more specifically on the *Times*. The influence of liberalisation and privatisation on commercial strategies on the *Times Newspapers* will be discussed in Chapter Six. The thesis shall conclude with a summary and recommendations in Chapter Seven.

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himself and therefore laid emphasis on individual rights to communicate freely; the social responsibility theory was a creature of the libertarian model and underlined the social responsibility role of the media; lastly the Soviet communist theory, based on Marxist ideology, was anchored on the unity of the working class and fore grounded congruence of opinion, or only one truth (Yin, 2008: 6-7). The fast changing media context globally, has generally rendered the theories obsolete. For instance, critics argue that the theories were based on pro-capitalist bias and were products of the Cold War era; that they ignored the phenomenon of media concentration and its implications, characteristic of the libertarian media (Yin, 2008: 6-15). Others, like Ostini & Fung (2002: 42-46) decry the prescriptive nature of the theories – their failure to describe social phenomena by using an empirical basis for inquiry. The rapidly changing global context also annuls the theories' explanatory power, Ostini and Fung argue. Lastly, Obonyo, (2009: 1-10), in addition, posits that the theories do not adequately explain the structure and conduct of media in Africa. This thesis makes further reference to the theories in section 3.2.3 of Chapter Three.

### **1.1.1 Rationale**

Historically, the media in Zambia seem to have been caught in ideological tensions between powerful neo-Marxian interests that subscribe to a developmental/propagandist media model, where responsibilities toward national unity and development are emphasised over rights; and Libertarian persuasions, driven by free market ambitions.

In this regard, McQuail (1994: 127) is instructive in noting that societies in transition from colonialism lack the human and infrastructural resources to develop media systems outside of state support and will hence be structured toward propping up new democracies, accounting for the continuance of dominant media models.

For Bruce Baker (2000:11), the fundamental problem inhibiting reform in transitional states lies in *structural continuities* which are also related to the practice of recycling leadership at all levels of the state and the media. Recycled leaders tend to maintain the old social order, limiting the momentum for significant institutional transformation, he posits.

In similar vein, Charles Okigbo (1995: 189) observes that press freedom in Africa will not be attained simply by the replacement of one party regimes with popularly elected government. The unique contexts of various African countries suggest that long-standing political habits, public expectations and appreciation of new found freedoms; varied levels of journalistic training and the economic environment would ultimately determine the type of media that eventually develops.

Conceivably, it may be argued that democratic societies can evolve different profiles of the media and no distinct matrix of press development can be deemed necessary for a democratisation project (Price & Krug, 2002: 3). Price and Krug contend that various conceptions of democracy may demand different functions of the press. The notions of democracy that emphasise citizen participation would

underscore the need for that type of media; while more elitist societies would foreground the provision of adequate information for participants in the public sphere to make informed decisions and act as watchdogs. Other concepts of democracy prioritise the inculcation and dissemination of 'proper values' (Price & Krug, 2002: 3-4). .

As Price and Krug have noted further, history has few lessons regarding the media model that best advances democratisation. Three principal regulatory forms have been identified over time: the first is the *state monopoly ownership and media control* which permits alternative voices only with consent from the state authorities; the second is the *public or public service monopoly* which is associated more with broadcasting systems and exhibits sufficient autonomy from the state; the third is *private ownership*, which comes with varying levels of state regulation. Increasingly, the three systems have been known to combine or present themselves in diverse blends as states go through different transitions (Price & Krug, 2002: 3).

As alluded to earlier, Zambia experienced an 18 year post colonial period of pluralism(the First Republic: 1964-1972), followed by a phase of one party government (the Second Republic: 1973-1990) before the regime succumbed to a new post cold war wave of democratisation in 1991, leading up to the current period of political pluralism and economic liberalisation (the Third Republic).

The reversal from liberal democracy to one party state in 1973 is not unique to Zambia. Huntington (1991: 15) observes that history is not unidirectional: some of the countries that democratised have experienced a reversal to non - democratic rule. The factors causing this *cyclic* phenomenon are multifarious and therefore predicting at one point transitions occur is elusive, he posits. Throughout Zambia's three republics, the independence of the media has been at the centre of the country's democracy discourse (Makayi, 1997:17). Although efforts at controlling formerly foreign owned media such as the *Times Newspapers* eventually succeeded in 1982, the debate on privatisation intensified with the advent of the second wave of multiparty politics in 1991.

Generally, the First and Second Republics were characterised by the expansion of state interests in the media sector, which culminated in all electronic and print media - except the church owned *National Mirror* - being absorbed into a state corporate structure. While it has been relatively straightforward to establish a newspaper under the *Printed Publications Act* in the Third Republic, high costs of newsprint, declining per capita incomes of Zambians and therefore low newspaper sales, inhibit the growth and sustenance of print media (Zambia, 1996: 14)<sup>8</sup> Hence, the flurry of publications that characterised the enunciation of the multiparty era in 1990, collapsed within a ten year period, except for the *Post Newspapers* (Banda, 2003: 30).

The promise of change has been further undermined by the state's failure to privatise some or all of the media systems it controls; and to sufficiently reform the colonial legal architecture which is adjudged to pose impediments to free expression (XIX/Article 19, 2006:1).

Efforts at media reforms have been anchored by the understanding that a liberalised and privatised media sector would lubricate democratic citizenship and increase popular participation.

Several unsuccessful attempts have been made to engender a consensus on how the country's communication systems should be shaped, in this regard.

The Media Reform Committee (MRC) was one of the first of such initiatives and comprised media associations and senior journalists working with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS). However, state enthusiasm inexplicably petered out by 1994, leaving the initiative to civil society organisations and professional associations such as the Commonwealth Press Union (CPU), the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA); the Zambia Independent Media Association

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<sup>8</sup> According the Printed Publications Act Cap. 161, the following steps are necessary for establishing a newspaper: 1) provide full names, addresses of every individual involved in the entity; proprietor, printer or publisher 2) a description of the location of the newspaper, to the Director of the National Archives (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 12).

(ZIMA), which formed the informal Media Liaison Committee (MLC). During the same period, recommendations by the 1993 Mwanakatwe Constitution Review Commission for the enhancement of free speech were ignored by government (Makayi, 1997: 23).

In 2005, proposals by yet another Constitution Review Commission to enable freedom of information legislation and editorial leeway for all electronic and print media were again thrown out (XIX/Article 19, 2006:2).

And despite a much touted media liberalisation exercise, critics argue that the process has been selectively applied over the years (Kasoma, 2002:287). Banda (2006: 461) for instance notes that Zambia undertook 'cautious' deregulation of the media sector in 1993, with broadcast licenses being issued to Christian applicants, presumably because the government of Frederick Chiluba proclaimed the country a Christian nation, inclined in evangelical mode.

Foreign investors in the broadcasting industry were allowed in, largely on the state's terms and could therefore not be seen to be entirely free, Banda observes.

The Freedom of Expression Institute and Article 19 also note that despite the enactment of the Independent Broadcast Authority (IBA) and the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) Acts in 2003, apparently aimed at creating independent boards, the broadcast and print media facilities remain under the strict control and influence of the minister of information and broadcasting services. The existence of independent media in Zambia, the XIX/Article 19, laments, is as a result negated by 'government use of the powerful state owned media...' (XIX/Article 19, 2006: 3).

Although media and legal activists continue their efforts to hold the MMD government accountable to its promise of an independent media sector, the impetus for change appears to constantly need evidence - based advocacy to allow for an informed engagement with the state and non state actors on the

absolute necessity to respect the rights of workers in the media and of citizens to the greater access to information.

For supporters of the liberal paradigm of the media, it is of course tempting to conclude that a country as diversely ethnic as Zambia; with a 71 % adult literacy rate (UNICEF, 2008) encumbered by a complex mix of maladies ranging from 68 % poverty (ZHDR, 2007: 68-70) to under development, requires to utilize all necessary safety valves and promote a discursive, consensus based politics: That equal or equitable access to communication resources by political contestants may be central to these politics and to political stability in general given the highly competitive nature of Zambia's multiparty system exhibited in the last six years. Needless to say, access to the media and communication systems often constitutes a key element in determining a levelled playing field in democratic contests - a debate that has punctuated Zambian elections since 1991 (FODEP, 2001: 26).

It must however be noted that the tendency to argue for liberalised and privatised media systems has lately come under more scrutiny, with some scholars arguing that the complexion of the nation-state needs to be taken into account when structuring cultural institutions. Linz and Stepan (2001:105) for example hold that multicultural and multinational societies increase their chances of consolidating their democracies by allowing a variety of communal institutions - including media, multi-lingual schools, symbolic recognition of cultural diversity, and political tolerance for political parties representing different communities. In short, publicly funded media systems should not be seen to be inconsistent with democracy in a universal sense.

In this context, the thesis considers that despite pursuing policies and processes of privatisation and liberalisation, the Zambian government still owns the *Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)*, the *National Agricultural Information Service (NAIS)*, the *Zambia Information and News Services (ZANIS)*, the *Zambia Daily Mail*, the *Sunday Mail and Zambia Publishing Company*; the *Times of Zambia* and *Sunday Times of Zambia* (i.e. *TimesPrintpak (Zambia) Limited*).

The *Times Newspapers* are hence an integral part of state media systems in Zambia, ostensibly accountable to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS).

The state owned print media employs not less than 300 journalists who subscribe to professional bodies such as the PAZA and the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ). This conservative estimate does not include journalists employed by the ZNBC, ZIS or the NAIS. It does also not include cameramen, technicians, anchors and other media personnel who are not involved in field assignments (Phiri, 2008).

<sup>9</sup>The state is consequently, the largest employer of journalists in Zambia.

This form of state control, as O'Neil (1998:10) notes, creates a dependent relationship for journalists in terms of their livelihood, and for the public, in respect of their information needs.

The thesis also observes that by comparison, the emergent private media are relatively small, underdeveloped and unstable; that they are politically vulnerable to a wide array of existing legislation inherited from British colonialism; that they operate in an economic environment that is inhibiting with high costs of news print, limited printing capacities and commercial advertising opportunities (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: Banda, 2004: Makungu, 2004).

This point also raises the possibility of an unintended consequence of media reform processes: That the wholesale privatisation of state media systems could paradoxically portend ill for employment opportunities for journalists in Zambia, given the high death rates of the independent press in an environment characterised by declining revenues and acute poverty levels (Banda, 2004: 8).

There is another underlying factor to media privatisation that has yet to receive substantial attention from scholars; the prospect that powerful transnational

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<sup>9</sup> Unpublished, face-to-face interview: full text in appendix one of this thesis.



companies might colonise media space, should privatisation take root in this sector, given that citizens of countries such as Zambia may not have the economic means to operate viable businesses of their own in this very challenging industry. With the influence of transnational firms very much a source of concern in regard to the independence of the African state, the prospect of surrendering media space could well be a major reason for procrastination by political leaders.

Inevitably it has to be assumed that the monopolisation of the major media by either the state or market may result in the decline of the public sphere - which McQuail (1987: 83) describes as, 'an open space for rational political discourse between economy and state.' Similarly, other scholars such as McKenna (1995: 329); Curran (1996:82); and Mosco (2000: 135) understand Jurgen Habermas's concept of a public sphere as such, with close association to modern communication systems.

The approach suggested by this thesis promises some new insights into discussions around the dichotomous nature of media institutions in emerging African democracies and the western models they are often expected to emulate. Past studies have often paid more attention to historical analysis, legal and constitutional frameworks and their impact on the media or the commercial aspects of the private press.

Kasoma (1986) presented a historical discussion of media development in Zambia tinged with a narrative on press freedom. Chirwa (1996) was pre-occupied with matters of press freedom in the Third Republic; Matibini (2006) analysed the various legal developments regarding freedom of expression and of the press; while Banda (1996) addressed media's coverage of elections in Zambia. Makungu (2004) is a historical account of press freedom not dissimilar to Kasoma (1986) before him. Investigations on the commercialisation and sustainability of the media have tended to concentrate on the privately owned media based on the assumption - rather than on empirical evidence - that all state media are state funded and therefore not deserving of inquiry. Certainly Banda (2004:1) does allude to this. However, the more implicit reason seems to be that researchers

have not had easy access to state media systems of the type that would unravel new perspectives on either political or economic aspects.

### **1.1.2 Choice of the *Times Newspapers* as a case study**

The choice of the *Times Newspapers* for this study is strategic in historical terms. Before it became an integral part of a state owned system of communication, the *Times* made the transition from a privately owned entity under the British Conglomerate - the London Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (Lonrho) - to a fully state owned enterprise in 1982. The newspapers therefore epitomize the changing state-media relations through Zambia's three republics.

Secondly, because the company is still part of a centrally supervised communication system, it provides a microcosm of state media systems in Zambia.

Historically, the *Times Newspapers (Zambia) Limited* and its sister printing company, *Printpak (Zambia) limited*, had a dual management system falling under the oversight of Lonrho.

A general manager oversaw the financial aspects of the companies while the editor-in-chief, answerable to the presidency, was editorially superior. This was while the company was under an unusual state - Lonrho joint oversight framework (1968 - 1982). When the *Times/Printpak* were consigned to the *National Media Corporation (NAMECO)* a state owned print media conglomerate established by the presidency in 1989, the structure of the company was radically altered. The *Times Newspapers* and *Printpak* each had its own chief executive appointed. The circulation department was transformed into the *Newspaper Distributors Limited (NDL)*, headed by a general manager. All three chief executive officers reported to the managing director of NAMECO, who in turn was accountable to a director general located in the presidency - essentially - the special advisor to Zambia's founding president, Kenneth Kaunda (Firms in new hands, 1989:3).

Two years after the MMD won the 1991 multiparty elections, the state dissolved NAMECO (state dissolves Nameco, 1993:1). *Times/Printpak* was hence

consolidated with NDL reverting to a department within the structure. The position of managing director was created as the overall chief executive.

At the time of the study, the *Times/printmaker* employed 280 staff complemented by 76 casual workers. Its main activities continue to be located in the Zambian capital Lusaka, and Ndola, situated in the country's industrial hub (Times/Printpak Strategic Plan, 2009-2012: 5).

For the purposes of the study, the composite entity shall be referred to simply as the *Times Newspapers*. The *Times Newspapers* are the case study and the thesis will hence focus on the organisation's qualities constituting editorial policy, structure, lines of authority, commercial strategies, labour relations and mechanisms for public participation.

The key political and economic characteristics of liberal democracy, that is, freedom of expression, freedom of association, liberalisation and privatisation <sup>10</sup>will constitute the independent variables; while the state media (*Times Newspapers*),

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<sup>10</sup> According to Chiluba (1995: 126-130), the purpose of the liberal democratic model championed by the MMD was to restore civil and political liberties constrained under one party rule. The envisaged free flow of information under liberal democracy, he argues, was necessary for a successful market economy as citizens would have the avenues to challenge government policy and be guaranteed property rights. However, this libertarian notion has been challenged on the basis that unregulated markets, anchored by private property rights in the means of production, distribution and exchange, result in discrepancies in wealth and hierarchical relationships, aggravating inequalities of power and influence that in turn, constrain the range of democratic control (Bellamy, 1992: 260). In elucidating the MMD manifesto, Chiluba does in fact hint that denationalisation would lead to painful but necessary job losses but promises that the transfer of state assets into private or even foreign hands would have beneficial effects in the long term (Chiluba, 1995: 133). However, he underlines that not all SOEs would be surrendered by the state. Liberal democracy, he asserts, thrives best in a market oriented economy and that this may be a key element in the sustenance of democracy. Declaring that: 'The economic philosophy of the MMD government rests on the simple but incontrovertible belief that wealth must be created before it can be consumed', Chiluba summarises the hallmark of MMD's liberalisation and privatisation policies as follows: 1)Privatising State Owned Enterprises (SOEs); 2) reducing the enormous fiscal burden of the subsidy on maize 3) diversification away from mining 5) liberalisation of prices in the agricultural sector to catalyse the 600,000 traditional farmer's capacity (who were, at the time, providing 60% of the country's maize crop); (6)stabilisation of the exchange rate and sustained reduction in inflation to spur investment in manufacturing 7) enabling a shift in the incidence of tax away from production to consumption and improving tax collection (with the formation of the Zambia Revenue Authority); (8) increasing people participation in the wealth creation process of the formal sector with the promise of credit facilities and legal status for the 370,000 - 485,000 formal sector workers who might wish to establish businesses. He adds: 'Where people are not dependent on the state for their livelihood and where they have economic security or financial and economic resources that can be employed in defence of their liberty, then the power of the state is limited and checked' (Chiluba, 1995: 134).The effects of MMD's policies of liberalisation and privatisation on the workforce, including media workers, will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five; while their impact on the *Times Newspapers* is critically analysed in Chapter Six.

the dependent variable. The study provides for an intervening variable in trade unionism.<sup>11</sup>

### **1.1.3 Theoretical perspectives**

In analysing political change, the elements of which might have varied impacts on media development, this project elects to unpack the three inter-linked concepts that will inform the discussion:

- Democratisation.
- Political Economy.
- Public Sphere.

Scholars conceive of democratisation as a process that embraces democracy as a moral good but admit that the latter concept is understood differently across various cultures (Parry & Moran; 1994: Landman; 2005; Alvandi & Shalala, 2007: Pretorius; 2008). In addition, there is some measure of tension in regard to how democracy should be realized (Alvandi & Hakala, 2007: 5).

Parry and Moran (1994:1) argue that both the meanings of democracy and democratisation are problematic, and in some cases inter-linked. Neither is a condition that has been accomplished. As a result, both concepts pose difficulties for scholars and practitioners in terms of explanation, realisation and interpretation.

Mafeje (1995:5) reflects that three concepts of democracy have characterized European theoretical and political discourse: liberal, social and socialist democracy.

Each materialised as a critique of pre-existing forms of rule and wealth distribution. They co-existed beyond World War I and largely represented two competing

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<sup>11</sup> Specifically, media unionism.

systems of political and economic organisation. The social definitions emphasise socio-economic rights and full participation of citizens in collective decision-making. The socialist tradition also embraces popular power with majority rule prevailing. The liberal tradition on the other hand underlines open election of representatives accompanied by a range of democratic rights (Williams; 1993: 21). Liberal democracy is said to be the oldest and most widely promoted with its elements of freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of the press, rule of law and respect for individual rights (Mafeje, 1995: 7). Because of the size and complexity of modern democracies the notion of representation at all levels of political life is promoted by proponents of this system. Elected representatives in turn extend participation in decision making to varied constituencies (Green, 1993: 257). The reality remains however, that whether one discusses democracy or democratisation, the anticipated result seems to be utopian.

Huntington (1991; 35) attempts to apply some clarity to the concepts by reiterating that democratisation has three phases: 1) the end of an authoritarian regime; (2) installing a democratic regime; and (3) consolidating the new regime.

Each of these developments is caused by different factors, he cautions. Therefore analysing the independent variable, the possible causes of democratisation presents problems.

Based purely on the understanding of this plethora of literature, Zambia could be said to still be in a slow process of consolidation in its continuum toward this form of political change. The concept of consolidation has not only been related to a strengthening of political institutions beyond reversal; but also to the attainment of an economic threshold of Gross National Product (GNP) per capita of between \$6001 - \$7000, where the life expectancy of a democracy is on average at 125 years (Mattes, 2003: 79).

#### **1.1.4 Media's link to democracy**

But if understanding democratisation and democracy is an elusive under taking, the linkage between these two concepts and the media is itself vexing. The discourse around media and democracy is replete with conflicting views not only about media power but also their role in enabling change or responding to change. Earlier idealistic views informed by modernisation theory that extolled media as agents of change, have since yielded face to more radical positions which view the press as a means for capitalist oppression and control (Martin, 1998:63).

O'Neil (1998:1), Baker (2007: 7), Curran (2002: 4) and Graber (1984:1) all take note of some of these debates concerning the supposed connection between mass communications and democracy with varied analyses of how the two are inter-linked.

The most enduring line of argument appears to be in the liberal mode. That is, the assumption that democratisation may translate into a freer form of social interaction through, among other means, the mass media. James Curran (2002: 4) for example explains Britain's experience of the liberal narrative as one that advances the notion that the development of mass media immensely strengthened the democratisation process. As print and electronic media broke free of state controls, they also expanded public discourse and contributed to the growth of the political community.

In the same vein, Baker (2007:7) argues that for people to be self governing, they, among other things, require the means to form public opinion which in turn may influence legislation and policy.

Baker further suggests that media are critical for 'public will formation' as they mediate between public and government. He argues that a country 'is democratic

only to the extent that the media, as well as elections, are structurally egalitarian and politically salient' (Baker, 2007: 7).

However, as O'Neil (1998:1) and Raboy and Dagenais (1992: 9-10) concede, the relationship between media and democracy is not a straightforward one. For Raboy and Dagenais, the inter-linkage between the two is best understood by interrogating the notion of crisis.

They explore several views of crisis, which can range from radical change (disruption of social order) to the policy making process, where the integrity of a system is challenged by non state actors. They define democracy as a value, not a system - an on going struggle for equality, social justice and for popular participation in decision making processes.

Because crisis is a key characteristic of modern democracies, they posit, media will be the agents of social communication through which the crisis is made public and logically galvanize sentiments for change.

Crisis exposes state attempts at censorship or media's accession to self control, they explain. Raboy and Dagenais assert that the function of the media would therefore be to render choices on what constitutes a crisis and how this might be presented in the public sphere. But the scholars also concede that the labelling of a crisis is itself an exercise motivated by ideological and political proclivities.

The crisis framework pre-supposes that there must be a general loss of confidence in the established authorities; and that those in power are consequently resigned to coercive means of control. It also seems to suggest a rather romantic interpretation of media independence; particularly subscribing to the watchdog role which is increasingly in tension with the more contemporary assessments of how media are prone to the influence of political and economic power (Gibson, 2004:11).

In addition, crisis is itself not a straight forward concept. It does seem to imply a constellation of concepts; from a disruption, real or perceived, of social order to

uncertainty in politics, security or commerce of a nation (Raboy & Dagenais, 1992: 9).

From an African perspective, Raboy and Dagenais' arguments may perhaps be born out by other scholars who seem lately to increasingly realise that the challenge of democratisation and nation building on the continent is radically different from that of Europe.

Poku and Sandkjaer (2007:10), for example, assert that one of the key frailties of the African state is the manner in which the nations were fused, an assertion that seems to speak to the inherent persistence of crises. Whilst in some parts of Europe nation builders substituted the empires of old with a more deliberate mix of cultural, linguistic and patriotic harmony, the state in Africa was carved out of fractured, multi-ethnic societies by colonial powers.

Poverty and under-development in addition, seem to undermine efforts at building democratic institutions as these factors may either cause withdrawal of the poor from political activity or generate heightened disenchantment, threatening stability (Simon, 2002:1).

Against a background of poverty and under-development, the prioritisation of unity and national development by political leaders on the continent over rapid political liberalisation may perhaps be understood as a sensible means of sustaining highly fragile democracies.

Similarly, the assignment of nation-building roles to the mass media in Africa might partly be explained by these histories as Martin (1998: 68), seems to imply.

In fact, some criticisms of modernisation theory in this regard suggest that what might be interpreted as slow progress by African states toward change by western theorists, could very well be prudent, well meaning political calculations on the part of African elites wary of compromising stability (Smith, 1992: 80).

For Patrick H. O'Neil (1998: 6) the media's link to democracy and their role in society, particularly in transitional processes, is blurred by the lack of empirical



evidence and inadequate conceptual frameworks in both political and communication sciences to investigate the phenomena.

O'Neil observes that studies in this regard are framed in normative terms and will often not account for the media's role in moulding transitional processes and how this involvement might in future impede an easy transformation of communication systems to meet the expectations of democracy. O'Neil holds that transitions and societies in which they occur may appear to change but they carry over structures that might resist transformation, constraining forms of social action.

In addition, O'Neil (1998:1) notes that while the media are viewed as a crucial link between state and society, it should not always be assumed that democratic systems of government will necessarily facilitate the dispersal of power and public access to it. In his reflections on democratic theory, he notes that such systems 'can be easily corrupted thereby undermining participation and voice.'

Simply transplanting western models into foreign societies without due consideration of legacies of social order might not guarantee the sort of institutional transformation that is associated with modern democracies, alludes O'Neil. O'Neil is instructive in that he underlines the perils of enumerating the dividends of democracy by merely reflecting on liberalisation of the media sector for example. Media entities may be privately owned but the owners might be state - run or allied to the state leading to collusion with those in power in terms of the flavour of public communication or even the participation of alternative voices in the media. This scenario, it might be argued, presents an illusory sense of media freedom.

The line of discussion raises a third possibility: That states in transition may allow for the existence of a carefully managed private press while retaining a broader arsenal of state controlled media to extend a regime's endurance.

For Price and Krug (2002: 14) transitions are moments for reflection on how to design media that suit a particular conception and experience of democracy:

*“It is characteristic of most transitions that each step is a movement from one set of media structures to another. These windows of opportunity are moments to think through what kind of media the society needs” (Price & Krug, 2002: 14).*

In summary, democracy can be understood to have many variants which could yield media unique to a specific environment. As we assess liberal democracy and media developments, it should not be assumed that privatisation and liberation necessarily lead to emancipation from state controls or the influence of the market. From a labour point of view, privatisation and liberalisation of the media sector should be assessed in terms of how they affect worker welfare. In this case, reforms should be interrogated also in terms of the capacity of journalists to claim their right to freedom of association and therefore form unions. Perhaps, what may be gleaned from this preliminary discussion is that there are complex scenarios - often of a political, economic, social nature - brought about by changes in the social order that could influence the evolution of media systems. These are not usually comprehensively articulated, rendering a limited understanding of media development and behaviour in different cultural contexts.

### **1.1.5 Political economy**

As stated earlier, this thesis does not seek to investigate the role of media in fostering political change though the discussion will be tinged by some of these aspects from time to time.

The thesis rather attempts to understand how a changing political economic context may have affected the profile of a leading state media entity in editorial and commercial terms; as well as in respect of its contribution to the much envisioned improved public participation in the affairs of this emerging democracy.

Taking the fore-going into account therefore, the thesis embraces a political economy analysis of the media which will likely provide more holistic insights that encompass political, economic and social aspects of change and how they affect communication systems (Mosco, 1995: Boyd-Barret & Newbold, 1995, Golding & Murdock,1995).

In a plethora of literature, political economy is related to the mutual influence of political and economic forces on wider spheres of human activity. Mosco (1995: 142) asserts that the political economist poses the question: “How are power and wealth related? How do these influence our systems of mass media, information, and entertainment?”

From a communication perspective, political economy would consider matters of control, ownership and complex relationships between media, industry and political and social elites (Boyd-Barret & Newbold; 1995: 186). In this regard, Vincent Mosco (1995: 140); Golding & Murdock (1996:11) and Boyd Barrett (1995:186) are instructive in articulating the four critical characteristics of political economy which will be of relevance to this study:

- That political economy places a pre-eminence on social change and historical transformation.
- Political economy seeks to interrogate the totality of social relations which comprise economic, political, social and cultural fields.
- It is interested in moral philosophy; social values and moral principles.
- Political economy considers the balance between capitalist enterprise and public intervention.

Expanding on this understanding, Golding and Murdock (1996:16) identify four historical processes which are central to a critical political economy of culture: the growth of the media; the extension of corporate reach; commodification; and the changing role of state and government intervention. At a more practical level, Mosco (1995: 152) maps three entry processes to analysing the political economy of communication: *Commodification, spatialisation and structuration*:-

**Commodification** is the term used to denote the process of transforming goods which are valued for their use, into commodities valued for their worth on the market (Golding & Murdock, 1996:16). Mosco (1995, 152) argues that there is a connection between the type of media product, the structure of corporate control, and the nature of the labour process. This line of thought is particularly relevant to this thesis as it seeks to interrogate issues surrounding labour rights as they relate to workers' contribution to the public good, via their product (newspaper). The conduct of the ZUJ in the context of Zambia is hence extremely useful.

**Spatialisation:** is defined by Mosco (1995: 155) as the process of overcoming the constraints of time and space in social life. Technological advances facilitate the swift movement of goods, services and people across enormous distances. Related phenomena such as globalisation and industrial restructuring are viewed as impacting on state activity in four ways:

- **Commercialisation:** the state will be catalysed to transform institutions into revenue generating entities or along business principles
- **Privatisation:** state entities are sold to private interests
- **Liberalisation:** the state opens markets to competition
- **Internationalisation:** links are established between states with economic and political authority being transferred to supranational bodies.

**Structuration:** Mosco (1995: 158) explains structuration as having to do, in part, with connections between capital and labour; particularly, in terms of how labour organises and positions itself as an autonomous force within the relationship. Of great interest to this study is Mosco (1995: 160)'s analysis of the hegemonic process of individuation, which he defines as 'the process of social actors, capital and labour, particularly as individual subjects whose value is connected to individual rights, individual expression, the individual exercise of political responsibility of voting and the individual freedom of consumption.'

Elucidating the political economic tradition further, Mosco (1995: 140) discusses two definitions of the concept. The first he defines as 'the study of control and

survival in social life'. In this definition, control speaks to matters of internal organisation of social group members and the process of adapting to change.

He emphasises that control processes are broadly political which embrace social alignment of relationships within communities while survival processes are economic given their relationship to production and reproduction. Although the definition is all embracing of all human activity it lacks, what he terms, human political economy or human consciousness and awareness. Presumably, the definition is shorn of the recognition of the potency of human agency in fostering change and connotes subservience by communities to those who would seemingly control their destinies.

The second definition he examines is perhaps better suited to the undertaking of this thesis: '*...the study of the social relations, particularly the power relations that influence the production, distribution and consumption of resources, including communication resources*' (Mosco, 1995: 140).

While extolling the practical nature of this definition given that it focuses on how businesses function by establishing linkages between primary producers, wholesalers, retailers and consumers, Mosco warns of its ambiguity in failing to define these terms distinctly.

But political economy is evidently a broad discipline with a range of approaches, as the scholar notes. Mosco illuminates a variety of traditions in political economic studies; the *conservative approach* which seeks to supplant individualism with collective authority; the *utopian socialist approach* places community above market; the *neo-conservative tradition* aims at expanding individual freedoms; *neo-Marxian* scholars foreground the eminence of labour while *feminist political economy* tends toward interrogating patriarchy in labour markets.

*Environmental political economy* foregrounds the relationship between social behaviour and the broader organic environment. Finally, the institutionalists contend that institutional and technological limitations shape markets paving way

for corporations and governments to colonise them (*institutional political economy*). According to Mosco (1995: 147) communication studies draw largely from *institutional* and *Marxian traditions* of political economy. In his other work, Mosco (2000: 104) explains that the notion of political economy not only studies the role of power in production, distribution and exchange of mediated communication, but also includes the conflicts that arise as a result of who benefits from control over communication resources.

This thesis has concerns about conflict over communication resources in Zambia and more specifically about labour; the workers' rights to organise and to agitate for economic rewards and for communicative rights. Controls will be understood as both emanating from the state (political) and the market (economic).

Though it exudes shades of the neo-conservatism (individual freedoms of journalists to communicate and public to participate), to a very large extent, this study could be described as conforming to the *Institutional* and *Marxian traditions* of political economy.

In this sense, using a combination of Employee Rights Theory (ERT) and Labour Process Theory (LPT), the thesis will draw inspiration from the scholarly discourse on how conditions of work interface with the macro contexts in which organisations operate (Nord & Doherty, 1996: 206).

ERT is ranged at using *cooperation* with capital as the main tool for improving worker welfare and has claimed important victories in advancing *free speech*, *due process* and *freedom to organise* in the workplace in this regard. LPT on the other hand, is inherently hostile to capitalism and promotes *collective action*, *equal distribution of resources* and *conflict* to subdue workplace barriers.

While, ERT, a product of liberal democratic society (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 173-174), and a LPT, a creature of Marxian political economy (Ackroyd, 2009: 264) lack congruence, they may be integrated to potentially good effect (Nord & Doherty, 1996: 206), especially, one might add, in an age when democracy

appears to have prioritised the interests of capital over the concerns of labour (Global Policy Network, 2001).

### **1.1.6 Political economy and the public sphere notion**

Recent approaches to political economy have interrogated the condition of Jurgen Habermas' *public sphere* notion. This is supposedly an autonomous arena for public debate brought into being by modern capitalism, as noted by McKenna (1995: 329); Curran (1996:82); and Mosco (2000: 135). Habermas aggregated the dividends of capitalism as comprising economic independence enabled by private property, critical reflection exemplified by novels, letters, coffee shop and salon discussions and mainly the materialisation of a market driven press, all of which fostered critical political discussion and moulded a reason-based consensus that influenced the state.

The state is not the only entity that could limit this space: Advertisers dislike the public sphere because of the controversy generated by its small audiences which are not ideal for selling goods (Herman & Chomsky, 2002: xviii).

In their discussion of the Habermasan public sphere, Golding and Murdock (1997: xiv) underline the linkage between modern citizenship and a diverse and open communications system, which emerged with a democratizing Europe. While the system of democracy, they note, relied on popular legitimacy institutionalised in national and local assemblies, there was additional need to engender discursive representation arranged through public cultural institutions and subsequently the idea of media as institutions of the public sphere gained currency.

The concept of public sphere - which is the second theoretical consideration in this thesis - is hence closely related to both classical political economy and democracy in regard to the ambition to expand citizen opportunities for political discourse and free expression. Both theoretical concepts of political economy and public sphere will be discussed in great detail in Chapter Three of this thesis.

## 1.2. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT

It is argued from the fore-going that the political economy of the state media in Zambia will best be understood by extensively interrogating the practices of the colonial, post colonial and the multiparty establishments over a 45 year period of independence. In this regard, it can be noted that the state or settlers aligned to the colonial administration had played a central role in conditioning public communication in this former British Protectorate, well before it attained independence in 1964 as observed by Makayi (1997: 17), Kasoma (1986, 21-79) and Matibini (2006: 3).

As most newly independent African states, Zambia constructed presidential systems which centralised power, revolving around charismatic personal rule, authoritarianism and the denigration of parliament (Pettman, 1974: 35). Although the space for private ownership of the media existed, the state was generally hostile and unaccommodating as exemplified by its steps to take over the *Times Newspapers* which began with a negotiated political truce with Lonrho allowing the republican president to appoint the editor-in-chief. Lonrho continued to control the commercial aspect of the *Times* until a formal, complete acquisition was achieved by the state in 1982 (Makayi, 1997: 23).

An economic downturn in the late 1970s and early 1980s saw Zambia begin to experience repeated industrial action with attempted coups in 1988 and June 1990. These events coincided with the unlocking of civic power and the emergence of the MMD toward the close of 1990 (Phiri [sa]: 56).

The challenge to the one party constitution led to the rendering of Zambia as a pluralist state by Kaunda in 1990 through the repeal of Article 4 of the Constitution (Matibini, 2006:6). However, while initially the political environment and actions by the MMD catalysed the establishment of private media, tensions began to emerge between the new government, journalists and the opposition that led to the state



reneging on earlier indications of media reform. In addition, the liberalised economic environment did not attract the kind of investment that would generate competitive advertising to sustain the private press as envisaged (Phiri [sa]:57).

It is also notable that institutions of the First and Second Republics, such as the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS), continued to exist. Some scholars, such as Baker (2000: 2), O'Neil (1998: 10) and Pitts (2000: 284), attribute this failure to reform institutions to recycled leadership who continue with the old ways of doing things. To fully appreciate this discussion, the following section hence, contextualises the problem under six key themes:

- Structural continuities and recycled leadership.
- Undefined editorial relations between state and the *Times*.
- Shortcomings of the Information and Media Policy of 1996.
- State ownership and commercialisation.
- Labour rights and professional practices.
- Lack of public confidence, participation and access to state media.

### **1.2.1 Structural continuities and recycled leadership**

In general, the euphoria of change in Zambia seems to have been partly undermined by the lack of substantial reform in regard to the media sector and the legislation governing it. Zambia inherited a state of emergency which was maintained for 27 years (Matibini, 2006: 3). This facilitated detention without trial under the Preservation of Public Security Regulations Act 106 of the laws of Zambia (presently held in Chapter 112, section 3 (2a) (Makungu, 2004: 29).

Inherent in the legal framework to the present time, are pieces of legislation that relate to censorship; defamation; national security; sedition; public interest or official secrets; obscenity; racism, among others. The State Security Act, passed in 1969, replaced the Official Secrets Act of 1967 which was based on British statutes.

Section 3 of the Act covers publishing along with other offences and carries a minimum punishment of 25 years imprisonment (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 74). Although Zambia has provided for freedom of expression in the constitution, there are still many restrictions held in repressive laws from the colonial era which successive governments have not repealed despite democratisation (Matibini, 2006: 4).<sup>12</sup>

*“The dawn of political pluralism in 1991 has not led to the repeal of the repressive legislation. This has been made possible by the wide derogation clause contained in the Constitution and the lack of political commitment to individual rights on the part of government leaders,” (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 8).*

Purportedly because of the desire to maintain unity and foster nationalism, the successive administrations in Zambia have opted to control major media apparatus and seem to have employed varied forms of oversight frameworks along with the colonial legal architecture to ensure success.

The emergence of the MMD in 1990 clearly generated a need for new forms of popular expression. Incessant political pressure edged Kaunda to establish a Constitutional Review Commission on 24 September, 1991 headed by law professor, Patrick Mvunga.

Based on the commission’s final submissions, Article 20 (2) in the constitution of Zambia was amended to include the wording: *“subject to the provisions of this constitution no law shall make any provision that derogates from freedom of the press”* (Matibini, 2006: 6).

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<sup>12</sup> For example, Section 69 of the Penal Code aims to protect the reputation of the president and dignity of office. It however leaves the discretion of determining what constitutes an insulting matter to the police. Similarly no clarity exists in section 177 (1) of the Penal Code regarding what constitutes obscenity or ‘security’ under the National Security Act of 1969 as rightly noted by Chanda and Liswaniso (1999: 64 - 79).

Legal experts interpreted this as an important step toward the realisation of freedom of expression and of the media.

Price and Krug (2002: 5) warn however that media law reform must be viewed as assisting to constitute a media - sensitive society and evaluated in the manner they contribute to this process. In other words, informed citizen action is necessary to ensure that laws indeed lead to desired change. The presence of laws by themselves does not guarantee freedom.

Kaunda subsequently lost the presidential elections of October 1991 to Frederick Chiluba. The MMD won 125 seats of 150 elective seats in the National Assembly, signifying an overwhelming majority (SARDC, 1999:3).

As a result, Zambia entered the Third Republic with a *dominant party structure*, a factor that appears to have undermined the democratisation process in some ways. Matlosa and Karume (2004: 1) describe the dominant party system as one in which a single party assumes dominance over the political system and is firmly in control of state power for fairly long periods, despite the presence of a multiparty system. With a two thirds majority, dominant parties would render decisions without serious reference to the opposition. Brooks (2004:2) suggests that in Africa dominant party systems are often associated with concerns of the re-emergence of autocratic regimes and the one party state.

Hence it might not be entirely surprising that 19 years into multiparty democracy, Zambia is still caught in debates around democratic reforms in general and media transformation in particular, with perhaps, less than expected progress.

Baker (2000: 2), O'Neil (1998: 10) and Pitts (2000: 284) explain these legacies as a colonial inheritance that remains consistent with the behaviour of political elites toward media freedom in the present day: the structural continuities from the previous social order can be closely linked to the recycling of leaders from the First and Second Republics. Leaders from this era were accustomed, it might seem, to

media being a developmental tool and therefore closely linked to the aspirations of the state.

In a study he undertook in Zambia, Gregory Pitts (2000: 270) concludes that negative attitudes toward media freedom amongst Members of Parliament (MPs) were carried over from colonial traditions and Kaunda's *Philosophy of Humanism* which valued community over individual and defined the press as an instrument of national development. His survey of Zambia's multiparty parliament in 2000 asked MPs about their level of support for the media; their attitudes toward media regulation and their support for increased press freedom.

The results suggested that MPs, while supportive of press freedom were also wary of it: they favoured a media regulated by a press council. Pitts' arguments seem to hold some credence as it is observable today that ministers who served in the First and Second Republics still are still in power in the Third Republic.

This line of argument is strengthened by the observance of behaviours of political elites in regard to both liberalisation and privatisation processes: For instance, the establishment of private radio and television was not tabled before parliament in the first five years of the MMD reign. Instead, on 26 January, 1993 the then Vice President Levy Mwanawasa announced that the government would not privatise the *ZNBC*, *the Zambia Daily Mail* or *the Times Newspapers* (Makungu, 2004: 38). This meant that to a large extent, the major media apparatus would still be state controlled in the Third Republic.

The most prolific of the alternative newspapers formed during the transition to multiparty politics was the *Weekly Post*, owned by private business men from various political persuasions.

In total, at least 25 new newspapers and three magazines were registered with the National Archives of Zambia during the first five years of MMD government (Zambia, 1996:6).

On the strength of the numbers of new publications, the state could quite easily have argued that the process of democratisation had indeed offered Zambians options in regard to their engagement with the political public sphere, the economic impediments of prohibitive tax regimes and duty on newsprint notwithstanding. The reality seems to be that only the *Weekly Post*, *the Chronicle* and later *the Monitor*, were of any significance. The last two, as with many others, went into decline and oblivion within a 5 to 10 year period which coincides with an economic downturn during the same period. The Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ)'s Media Policy Document (1996) indicated that none of the three dailies circulated more than 20,000 copies by 1996. The *Times of Zambia* circulated 20, 000 copies daily; the *Zambia Daily Mail*, 12, 000; *the Post*, 20,000. An independent market survey on the other hand, estimates the circulation of the daily newspapers in 2008 stood at a total of 57,000. Of this total, the *Post* circulated 30,000, the *Times of Zambia*, 15,000 and the *Zambia Daily Mail*, 12,000 daily (Africa Media Ventures/OSISA, 2008: 45).

**Table 1: Media ownership in Zambia, 1996 (Zambia, 1996:6)**

MEDIA STATUS	MEDIA	OWNERSHIP
Dailies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Times of Zambia</li> <li>- Zambia Daily Mail</li> <li>- the post</li> </ul>	Government -/- Private
Weeklies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sunday times</li> <li>- Sunday mail</li> <li>- Business mail</li> <li>- National mirror</li> <li>- Weekly express</li> <li>- Zambia crime news</li> <li>- The Chronicle</li> <li>- The Sun</li> <li>- Sport on Monday</li> </ul>	Government -/- -/- Private -/- -/- -/- -/- -/- -/-
Monthlies (vernacular)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Ichengelo</li> <li>- Tsopano (eastern)</li> <li>- Imbila (northern, Luapula and Copperbelt)</li> <li>- Ngoma (southern)</li> <li>- Lseli (western)</li> <li>- Lukanga (central)</li> <li>- Intanda (north western)</li> </ul>	Church Government -/- -/- -/- -/- -/- -/- -/-
Electronic media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Zambia national broadcasting corporation (one TV and 3 radio channels)</li> <li>- Christian voice (radio station)</li> <li>- Multichoice TV</li> <li>- Radio phoenix</li> <li>- Ichengelo radio</li> </ul>	Government  Private -/- -/- -/-
News agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Zambia news agency</li> <li>- Palesa news agency</li> <li>- Africa media services</li> </ul>	Government  Private -/-
Information services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Zambia information services</li> </ul>	Government
Magazines	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Profit</li> <li>- search</li> <li>- 'Z' Magazine</li> </ul>	Private Government Government

By the state's own admission, all print media in Zambia are constrained by poor capitalisation; declining purchasing power of the readership; illiteracy; inflation, falling per capita income rendering products unaffordable; poor communication infrastructure which impedes wider distribution; high cost of newsprint and radio and television receivers (Zambia, 1996: 14).

Not surprisingly, all six privately owned weeklies had collapsed by the turn of the century; both independent news agencies had ceased; Of the state sector media; Search and 'Z' Magazine experienced financial problems and did not continue while local, language newspapers were inconsistently published.

The only growth area by 2001 was community radio. By the time the MMD entered its third term in office under president Levy Mwanawasa, there were three community radio stations and four church owned stations. *Mazabuka Community Radio station, Radio Lyambai and Radio Chikaya were designated community radio stations. Radio Yatsani, Radio Christian Voice, Radio Chikuni, Radio Maria, Radio Incengel,* were church owned. There a few more waiting to be registered in the same year (Kasoma, 2002: 18-22). Kasoma (2002:20) observes that most radio licences were being granted to Christian radio stations. A possible explanation for this would that Zambia, under Chiluba, had been declared a Christian nation which was evidently averse to other religions. There was hence no Islamic radio station for instance.

In short, on a national scale, the state owned media remain the principal conduit of information to Zambians; information that could be heavily flavoured with government bias. The matter of state - media relations and the nature and structure of editorial policy making, hence, remain at the core of the argument for a reformed state media system.

### 1.2.2 *Undefined editorial relations between the state and the Times Newspapers*

On the surface, the analyses of the post colonial state and the multiparty state of the Third Republic suggests that the forms of editorial policing may have changed for the worse due to the competing pressures of democratisation. That is, the emergence of a small but evidently critical privately owned media, may have cowed the state into not only retaining control of the *Times Newspapers* and other state media but also into devising more nuanced oversight frameworks to ensure complete compliance without overtly jeopardising their espoused democratic credentials.

In this regard, Okigbo (1995:203) posits that governments struggling with under development, poverty, disease, ignorance and poor service delivery may be wary of an independent media and would therefore seek to control the sector, despite apparent efforts at democratisation in other sphere of development. Over-bearing state controls have had a tendency to generate practices of self censorship, he posits.

However, the extent of these practices is poorly documented in the Zambian context.

The more noticeable phenomenon has been the post-colonial oversight framework practiced by the Kenneth Kaunda government based on an understanding with Lonrho, which conforms to what O'Neil (1998:9) describes as the *pre-censorship approach*.

*Pre-censorship*, he posits, is the extent to which the authoritarian system allows for the expression of alternative viewpoints and discourses. This framework denotes prior restraint.



A *post-censorship* framework is less direct on the other hand. In this approach, states tend to employ *socialisation, harassment, economic sanctions, revocation of licenses, torture and murder* against publications and their owners to achieve acquiescence. Keane (1992:23) highlights an even wider range of censorship tools used by states in transition and authoritarian regimes: *emergency powers, post publication censorship, armed secrecy or use of covert security agents* and the art of *political lying or defactualisation*.

Under state-Lonrho oversight, the *Times Newspapers'* general approach to reporting was to be critical of the ruling party, UNIP, but not to directly attack President Kaunda (Kasoma, 1986: 93), or for that matter the chairman of Lonrho, Roland 'Tiny' Rowland. Academic inquiry into the nature of the relationship between Kaunda and Rowland and its influence on political, economic and media development has been cursory or naught. And yet in the view of this researcher, the state-Lonrho oversight framework forms a basis for understanding how business and political elites can have similar influences on freedom of expression even in contemporary Zambia. Certainly today's Zambia conforms to the minimalist state paradigm inspired by neo-liberalism analogous to the post independence phase. In these conditions, multinationals have been known to have immense influence on the distribution of resources - and rights - in developing nations, working as allies of the state (LaPalombara & Blank, 1984: 16).

Preliminary inquiries with the *Times of Zambia*, suggested that the oversight frameworks of the Second Republic were substantially different from those of the Third. While in the First and Second Republics, the Kaunda government did make pronouncements which indicated 'what one could or could not do', the Third Republican government has no clear parameters. Further more instructions in the one party regime were issued by the Ministry of Information whereas today, interference emanates from ministers or deputy ministers in other line ministries as well (Phiri, 2008).

This anecdote, perhaps underlines a significant shift from previously documented practices amongst editors in the state sector of the media industry. There is seemingly a changing relationship between the *Times Newspapers* and the state in regard to reporting lines and editorial direction.

Paradoxically, the sum effect of these practices, it would seem on the outset, would be to potentially further limit the public sphere of communication, despite democratisation. Commercially, this might derail the systematic *production of news that can be valued for its worth on the market.*

### **1.2.3 Shortcomings of the media policy of 1996**

To its credit, the MMD government reformed the policy making process by establishing a more professional Policy Analysis and Coordination (PAC) division to improve the quality of proposals to cabinet, which was apparently meant to be a move away from centralised, bureaucratic, rule-driven government (Garnett, Koenen & Rielly, 1997: 2)

However, evidence reflecting significant public involvement in policy processes and proposals is lacking.

Certainly, the Media and Information Policy published in 1996 is contradictory at best: On the one hand, it advances the idea of a centrally supervised public communication superstructure, while on the other; it proposes the independence of state media. *The ZNBC, ZIS, ZANA<sup>13</sup>, the Zambia Daily Mail and Zambia Publishing Company and the Times of Zambia and Sunday Times of Zambia (Times Newspapers and Printpak limited), NAIS* would all continue to report to the MIBS under this policy.

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<sup>13</sup> The Zambia News Agency (ZANA) and the Zambia Information Services (ZIS) have since been merged to form the Zambia News and Information Services (ZANIS)

Despite this, the then Minister Amussa Mwanamwambwa stated that the document was consistent with the MMD manifesto and the vision of a democratic Zambia. Its aims were to 'ensure a free flow of information, vital for the development of the country' (Zambia: 1996: iv).

The policy addresses three key areas:

- Increasing media outreach and access to all, particularly the rural areas.
- Legal reforms to enhance rights to information, freedom of the press and freedom of expression, and;
- Encouraging private investment in the media and media support industries.

A set of programmatic interventions were set out to achieve these goals:

- A comprehensive, country-wide human and materials development programme.
- The setting up of community-based media, and;
- Amending or repealing laws that hinder the enjoyment of the fundamental freedoms of the media, and promotion of private investment in the media sector.

The MIBS blueprint is divided into an information policy and a media policy. Among its goals, the information policy aims to decentralise printing of vernacular newspapers; provision of community radio; and utilise an enhanced communication infrastructure for development purposes. The media policy further sought to, inter alia; establish provincial printing presses by the year 2000 as a first step toward setting up community-based media.

Perhaps significantly, the media policy claimed to: *"grant editorial independence to the Times of Zambia and the Zambia Daily Mail while maintaining government ownership of the two newspapers"* (Zambia, 1996:19).

While pronouncing an editorially free state owned newspaper industry, it is worth noting that the MIBS does not define what it means by 'editorial' independence. Secondly, the functions of these entities are prescribed. According to the Information and Media Policy the following were the roles of the various state media outlets:

- The *Times* and the *Daily Mail* should play educational, informational and entertainment roles.
- ZIS was to be a public relations wing of government;
- ZANA was to operate as a statutory body and gather and distribute local and foreign news around the country;
- The Zambia Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM) would train journalists as an independent trust;
- ZNBC would be an instrument for mass education and information.

The MIBS conceived its role as a coordinating mechanism of this information superstructure. In that arrangement, the media formations such as the ZUJ and the PAZA would reinforce the notion of an enhanced, state driven media system. A revised version of the policy released for discussion in 1999 included the primacy of community radio development and the transformation of the ZNBC into a public broadcaster. The *Times Newspapers* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* were to be rendered public institutions not accountable to the state (Banda, 2004: 28-29). None of these proposals have been implemented. Banda (2004: 31) rightly criticises the 'state-centric' nature of the two frameworks, which leave minimal space for citizen initiative. The oversight structure likely contributes to a lack of confidence in the state owned media

#### 1.2.4 ***Lack of public confidence, participation and access to the state media***

In fact, public opinion data suggests that trust in state media is comparatively low. There is less of it in the newspapers than in the ZNBC Television and Radio (Lolojih, 2005:29).

According to the *Afrobarometer's 2005 survey*, 38 % of Zambians have “no or “little trust” in the *Times of Zambia or the Zambia Daily Mail*. 21 % said they “somewhat” trusted them; 22% either “did not hear of them enough” or ‘simply did not know’ how to gauge them; while only 19 % indicated they had “a lot of trust” in the newspapers.

Ratings were higher for the *ZNBC* television and radio with 29 % of respondents expressing trust; and 24% having “some trust”. But the levels of distrust were equally high at 31% (‘just a little’) and 7% (‘not at all’).

On the other hand, 36 % of respondents indicated they had “a lot” of trust in the privately owned *Post Newspapers*. 18% had moderate levels of trust; a similar number had “just a little” trust and only 4 % had “no trust at all” (Lolojih; 2005: 29).

State control and the question of *participation* in state media or lack of it, could explain some of these negative public sentiments directed at the *Times* and the *Daily Mail*. The *ZNBC* did show higher confidence levels presumably because of its outreach and opportunities for telephonic contributions. In a narrow sense, participation can be defined as the proportion of the total population purchasing newspapers, owning radios and attending cinemas (Berger, 2004: 46).

In the case of this thesis participation will include opportunities for contributions to the content of the *Times Newspapers* and to interactive discussions on the internet, in addition to purchasing the *Times*.

It should be noted here that participation by the opposition in Zambia has been legally stipulated following pressure from activists ahead of the 1991 multiparty elections. Because of concerns that the ruling party might exclude competing voices, the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) drafts rules for direct access to state media systems by contesting political parties, thereby enhancing participation by alternative voices. However, the full application of these rules should be doubted given that evaluations by non state actors suggest that editors of the state media have been part and parcel of the ruling party campaign committees (FODEP, 2002: 25).

The state media's position during the transition to the Third Republic came under intense scrutiny just before the 1991 elections. Consequently opposition parties campaigned for equal access to the apparatus.

The ECZ working with state media agencies has had to draw up revised regulations to enable equal and equitable access to the state media by all actors through the elections beginning with the 1991 polls. Equal and equitable access to the state media is considered by electoral experts and donors as one of the means of levelling the playing field which implies that election rules and regulations apply fairly to all political parties and candidates (Zambia, 2000:13-19).

Possibly due to a fear of continued donor sanctions, the government did accede to the principles of equal access to the media prior to the 2001 elections. The National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in Zambia acknowledged the continued complaints by opposition about bias by the State media. The Government hence committed itself to:

- Ensuring that both the ZNBC and other public media (state owned media), as well as the Electoral Commission and other agencies of the Executive, enforce the provision of the Electoral (Conduct) Regulations of 1996;

- Reviewing the Electoral (Conduct) Regulations to provide for deterrent penalties for any breach of such regulations (Zambia, 2000:13-19).

The actions by government were roundly welcomed by donors, civil society and media associations. However, reports by election - based NGOs indicate that the state media, including the *Times of Zambia and Sunday Times*, were still used as a campaigning apparatus for the ruling MMD during the 2001 polls, as noted by the Foundation for Democratic Processes (FODEP, 2001: 27) and Henriot (2001:44).

Developments in the broader political arena in 2001 seem to have had some direct impact on the press freedom architecture in Zambia eventually.

Research commissioned by European donors (Chirambo, Nel & Erasmus, 2003: 1) indicates that Zambia for the first time in its history had a *working parliament* with a dominant opposition presence for the first few months after the 2001 presidential, parliamentary and local government elections. MMD won 81 seats (including eight nominees); the opposition: United Party for Democracy (UPND) - 47; UNIP - 13; Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) - 12; Heritage Party (HP) - 2; Zambia Republican Party (ZRP) - 1; Patriotic Front (PF) -1 and one independent. This development apparently facilitated stronger challenges on the constitution in terms of its democratic make-up.

Not surprisingly, Matibini (2006:44) also observes increased pressure from media associations, PAZA, ZUJ and the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA), for the introduction of a Freedom of Information Bill, an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and a Broadcasting Bill after this period.

The period after 2001 also saw the formation of the Media Ethics Council of Zambia (MECOZ), which aims to professionalize journalism. Finally, it is critical to mention that following the 2006 elections, the MMD began to grow in stature once again, as it won most of the by-elections arising from deaths, resignations, and dismissals of opposition MPs (Chirambo, 2008:35).

It might not be too far fetched to assume that the party's reluctance to fulfil promises on media reform in the recent past, may - again - be closely related to the lack of an imminent threat to its power base. For the state media, the proliferation of controls raises not just ethical questions but also concerns about the condition of labour.

### **1.2.5 *Liberalisation, labour rights and professional practices***

Without doubt, one of the most commendable outcomes of democratisation has been the materialisation of the ZUJ ranged at improving working conditions. This union has arisen as a direct result of market and labour liberalisation, even though the intension of both the one party establishment of Kaunda and the Chiluba administrations in amending the Industrial Relations Act (1990) and the Industrial Relations Act (1997) respectively was, apparently, to fracture a powerful Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) by *distributing rights* to various partisan interest groups within the mother body (Fashoyin, 2008: 5-11).

Essentially, the impact of market and labour liberalisation on the media sector can be gleaned from stated rights in constitutional and statutory provisions and from enterprise rights (conditions of service), earned from collective action and bargaining (Edwards, 1993: 33-37).

The down side of labour liberalisation is that it could in turn fracture the journalistic community with various interest groups subscribing to unions with narrow or sectarian values. The main interest of this thesis, of course, is the influence ZUJ wields within the organisational structures of the *Times Newspapers* and state media in general, relating to the welfare of media workers and their communicative freedoms.



Understanding the impact of ZUJ on the welfare of media professionals could possibly also explain the nature of the relationship between the state and the media professionals it employs, that is, whether it is one of willing participant or of coercion.

A definition of this relationship would indicate the potential for civil society to forge a consensus with journalists and work hand-in-hand with Journalists in fostering change in state media systems.

The formation of PAZA aimed at promoting professional practices is also of some significance. Certainly, the impact of PAZA, working with ZUJ, on state media systems is ill defined and poorly categorised by media historians.<sup>14</sup> A deeper understanding of how protection of journalists might possibly embolden bolder journalistic practices now or in future within the state media systems in general and in the *Times* in particular, will be essential to any recommendation that seeks to propose alternative beneficial arrangements for media professionals.

### **1.2.6 *Liberalisation, privatisation and commercialisation***

Finally, it has been noted that *Times Newspapers* have transitioned through three republics, each signifying distinct features. While the tendency in research on the media has been to focus on the political dimensions of democracy, more specifically on freedom of expression, this thesis underlines the importance of relating the actions of political elites to the consequences of their decisions on the economics of the press. The results of liberalisation and privatisation in the Third

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<sup>14</sup> It must be noted that the Societies Act, enacted in 1957, under which PAZA is registered, vests discretionary powers of de-registration and prohibition in the registrar and the Minister. Historically, this instrument has been used to harass opposition, including the banning of churches and the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) by the colonial administration. In the post independence era, UNIP used it to ban the opposition United Progressive Party (UPP), while the MMD government have deployed it to proscribe the Islamic Youth Party and the Zambia Alliance for Progress (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 20). PAZA, as other professional bodies, civil society organisations and political parties, are also prone to these instruments in the present day. Despite provisions on freedom of association contained in the constitution therefore, it can be argued that structures carried over from the colonial era have not been aligned to suit democratic standards and hence undermine democratisation.

Republic should hence inevitably form a central part of this inquiry in an attempt to fully understand the influences of a changing political context.

The question of whether the take over of the *Times* has rendered it unsustainable is not one that is supported by empirical evidence. In addition, it is crucial to understand the ways in which changes in economic policy have affected the state media and what propositions present themselves for potential viability.

While the literature review suggests that the pressures of globalisation would force the state to privatise or commercialise the enterprises it owns, there is little evidence of this in regard to the media industry in Zambia thus far.

Obviously, the most logical albeit unpopular option for the state would be to subsidise its media operations to protect them from private competition. Banda (2004: 1) speculates about this but provides no empirical evidence of the extent to which state media systems, particularly the newspapers, are financed by the state, if at all. He does however advance a reasoned argument indicating the indebtedness of the *Zambia Daily Mail* to its newsprint suppliers in 2002. According to Banda, the *Mail* owed South African suppliers Van De Ghinste Exports Limited US \$ 327,335.91 and local companies up to US \$29,000 in the 1990s. This was in addition to unpaid taxes to the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA).

*“In the absence of special state favours, such debts can easily cripple any newspaper into operational numbness” (Banda, 2004: 1).*

State financing is obvious for the electronic media, particularly, the *ZNBC*, *ZANIS* and *NAIS* because they are either integral parts of government departments, or are supported by legislation to under-score that support.

In fact, the history of the print media suggests extensive commercial experience and little evidence of direct state funding. Certainly the *Times Newspapers* do emanate from a background of private ownership. Hence, official advertising in

the printed media would probably be the most plausible means of support from the state, it would seem.

In general, commercialisation of state media entities is a prudent step if indeed the ultimate goal of democratisation as promoted by the MMD, is to engender a diversity anchored by fair rules. In this context, it is reasonable to assume that emergence of the private media should challenge the state media to devise competitive strategies in terms of advertising and distribution to survive.

If however, the suspicion remains that direct state financing is the sole or major contributor to the *Times Newspapers* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* it is likely that conflict might crystallise around the use of tax payers' resources to support a media system that essentially serves the interests of a ruling elite.

### **1.2.7 Conclusion to the exposition of the problem statement**

In summary, it can be noted that despite democratisation, the state of public communication in Zambia is inconsistent with democratic ideals set by the ruling MMD party.

Because the majority of Zambian journalists depend on the state for their livelihood, it is inevitable to interrogate the consequences this might continue to have on the ability of media activists and other non state actors to galvanize a consensus around a more viable alternative to state owned media systems.

While Zambia from time to time exhibits signs of progress on some fronts, such as the expansion of community and commercial radio stations; permissions seem to be granted selectively to applicants, with the bulk of licenses directed at applicants of Evangelical Christian persuasions, perhaps further limiting the participation of alternative religions and voices in the political public sphere.

This thesis notes that Zambia's elections are closely contested: That while there are opportunities for non state actors to hold sway at critical moments in the country's political trajectory, this energy has not yet translated into political commitment by the state to reforming the legal framework in any meaningful way; or to accede to proposals for a privatized state media sector as an essential conduit of public information and forum for discussion.

The *Times Newspapers* are in the unique position of having transitioned with the nation through three periods of one party and multiparty politics; and changed ownership in the process. However, the foot print left by state control on this entity, as with other state media enterprises, is one that has to be understood in political and economic terms to determine what form a transformed state media sector might assume, going forward.

The thesis concedes that the factors affecting the media as a result of political change extend far beyond the sector itself. The question of a dominant party structure and its impact on the continuity of old social orders is central to this discussion. The practice of recycling leadership through three republics lends itself to examination in relation to this topic, particularly, in regard to inherited political practices that seemingly continue to conceive of media as a developmental or propagandist tool. The question of whether public resources are used to support newspapers such as the *Times Newspapers* might continue to fuel tensions as Zambia's political contests become more competitive, particularly since opportunities for participation by alternative voices might be limited. These factors, along with key elements of under-development, could pose greater challenges to political stability.

The argument for reform, should however, not be restricted to political imperatives alone as the economic and labour perspectives may also provide an added impetus for launching stronger justifications for a complete or partial reform of state media systems in Zambia. In Chapters Five of this thesis, an in-depth discussion will be presented on these aspects of reform.

### 1.3. TYPE OF STUDY

Against this background, this thesis is constructed as an exploratory exercise. Mouton and Marais (1996: 121) and Babbie and Mouton; (2008: 79) explain that such studies are deployed when investigating areas that have previously not been investigated. Similarly, Wimmer and Dominick (2000: 255) note that exploratory research is not only used in investigating areas that have been marginally studied or un-researched; but is also ranged at searching for data indications rather than establishing causality. Babbie and Mouton (2008: 80) posit that exploration is also useful for studying persistent phenomena or in other instances to set ground for larger studies or simply to develop hypothesis. Similarly, Mouton and Marais (2008: 81), assert that the aims of exploratory undertakings may vary. The limitations of exploratory studies might include their inability to produce satisfactory answers. According to Mouton and Marais (1996:121) and Babbie and Mouton (2008:80), some of the key reasons for exploration are:

- To gain new insight into the phenomenon.
- To under-take a preliminary investigation ahead of a more structured study of the phenomenon.
- To explicate the central constructs and concepts.
- To determine priorities for future research.
- To develop a new hypothesis.
- To satisfy a researcher's curiosity and quest for better understanding of phenomena.

Mouton and Marais (1996: 42-44) are instructive in noting that not only does exploratory research survey people who have a *practical experience of the problem*, it also examines relevant literature and engages in the analysis of an in-depth nature. The important research design considerations that are recommended are flexible research strategies; and methods such as literature reviews, interviews, case studies, and informants who would provide the necessary insight and comprehension of the problem.

### 1.3.1 *Research questions contextualised*

In undertaking this exploratory exercise, one needs to reflect once again on the complex nature of the problem and its basic assumptions. The key assumptions that underpin this study suggest that privatisation does not guarantee press freedom as the private owners can harbour political ambitions not dissimilar to the state. Further, the thesis assumes that the political forces born of democratisation have up to this point, minimised the freedom to communicate by individual editors and journalists on the *Times*. The thesis underlines the notion that state elites have indirect ways of controlling media regardless of ownership. Correspondingly, it attributes the apparent commercial failures of the *Times Newspapers* largely to political controls which conceivably inhibit innovation in the liberalised era. Lastly, it assumes that while the benefits of political liberalisation might not be apparent, the enhancement of freedom of association has not only led to the formation of a media union but also to improvements in the economic welfare of journalists - despite state ownership of the *Times Newspapers*.

There are clearly two dimensions, one with political imperatives; the other influenced by changes in economic policy. The political dimensions relate to the influence of legal and constitutional changes and their contestation in the institutional setting of the *Times Newspapers*; and the influence of *wealth* and *power* through the application of varied oversight frameworks during periods of political change.

They also include the influence of multiparty party politics on regulations governing editorial access to state media systems; and the ownership of the *Times Newspapers*.

The economic dynamics discuss the potential impact of national policies of *liberalisation and privatisation* on the sustainability of the *Times Newspapers*. It is

conceivable that the *Times* as a state entity might have benefited from nationalisation due to advertising inevitably channelled through it by parastatals firms. On the other hand, liberalisation and privatisation of the economy under MMD gave no such guarantees. It can also be noted that a changing economic environment has not necessary provided an incentive for more advertising for the private press due to poor capitalisation of privatized companies. The same might be true of state media. The economic question also embraces the status of the labour force, particularly the professionals who produce the newspapers and how this changing political economic environment affects their welfare. Hence, the problem as explored in the preceding sections leads to the following research question(s):

**What is the impact of democratisation on the *Times Newspapers (Zambia) Limited?***

**1.3.2 Research questions**

- In what ways has democratisation influenced media development in Zambia?
- How has political change affected decision making structures and oversight frameworks on the *Times Newspapers*?
- What are the policies governing public participation in state media systems (and in particular, the *Times Newspapers*?)
- What is the influence of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) on the conditions of service and job security of journalists on the *Times Newspapers*?
- What is the impact of the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) and the Media Ethics Council of Zambia (MECOZ) on journalism practice on the *Times Newspapers*?
- In what ways have liberalisation and privatisation policies affected the *Times Newspapers*?

## 1.4. METHODOLOGY

This thesis elects to employ multiple methods based on the concept of *triangulation*, to explore the impact of democratisation on the *Times Newspapers*. Triangulation denotes the use of several methods, sometimes both qualitative and quantitative, in order to understand a research problem (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000: 49). It implies that accounts produced from one source can be compared and contrasted to those of another through the use of complementary research methods (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine & Newbold, 1998: 44).

*“Consistencies can be recognised and interpreted, discrepancies or differences can be pursued further, but all in pursuit of deeper, more valid, interpretations. Triangulation can be carried out in a variety of ways – across time, space, personnel, settings, organisations, methods, and researchers”* (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine & Newbold, 1998: 45).

Hansen et al (1998: 45) however caution researchers to carefully compare data sources from institutional sources with those accessed from documents, observation and other bodies of literature in order to arrive at a realistic understanding and interpretation of the situation.

Given the historical and institutionally focussed nature of this thesis, the methods chosen for investigating this phenomenon are *participant observation and historical analysis*. *Historical analysis* is associated with both qualitative and quantitative studies. In cases where it is employed in qualitative studies it assumes a narrative type of description where specific chronological relationship between events is hypothesised (Mouton & Marais, 1996: 44). As Mouton and Marais posit, historical analysis is closely associated with descriptive studies which focus on an in-depth description of a specific individual, situation, group, organisation, tribe, sub - culture, interaction, or social object. On the other hand, participant observation is linked more with description and explanation than with measurement and quantification (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000:111). Other scholars



however maintain that the technique does in fact include quantitative aspects (Hansen, Cottle, Negrine & Newbold, 1998:35).

Participant observation is seen by some scholars as being holistic as it involves *three or more distinct methods* of research, the key ones being: *document review, interviews, observation*, all of which are relevant to analysing policy documents, speeches, articles and notices and in obtaining data from hard-to-reach media and political elites and experts. Hansen et al (1998: 44) explain that while each method contained in participant observation may have its weaknesses, it can be improved upon through triangulation. The potential rewards of this method are acknowledged by Hansen, Cottle, Negrine and Newbold (1998: 35-44), Mouton and Marias (1996: 75) and Barbbie & Mouton (2008: 293).

As Hansen et al (1998:36) explain further, journalists are a professional group of people with connections to powerful institutions and political elites and the impact of these influences on their work will not be gleaned from a study of their products, rather by an insider's view of their operational challenges. In the case of this thesis, document review would include the analyses of existing statistics on trends in newspaper sales to signify public participation; and changes in advertising levels, to the extent that they are available.

This research topic is of a sensitive and complex nature, certainly not one that will readily be addressed through impersonal approaches. Experience suggests that political and media elites are usually reluctant to divulge official stand-points on matters of public nature where they lack consensus. However, they would be more inclined to discuss them in face-to-face interactions, where the researcher is formerly introduced and the mission is clearly defined. Hansen et al (1998:35) underline that participant observation is useful not only for the so-called under-dogs or poor of society but also for studying hard-to-examine elite groups which have ties to powerful institutions. Once access is negotiated, such interactions can yield rich body of knowledge.

For Babbie and Mouton (2008: 293) the dilemma of observation lies partly in determining whether overt or covert approaches would be the most useful or effective. The latter poses ethical questions of non disclosure of a researcher's identity, while the former might compromise them because they are essentially participants in the group being observed (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000: 111). Babbie and Mouton assert that the method requires self-discipline, proficiency and does not always imply complete participation in an activity.

The approach is criticised as a poor choice if the researcher is concerned with external validity and representativeness of the sample. Problems of reactivity - the influence of observation on the behaviour of the subject - may also occur. Counter arguments as those advanced by Janet Ward Schofield (1993:207) contend that even in qualitative research components of a study - including the units of analysis, concepts generated, population characteristics, and settings - can be used as a basis for comparison. One of the strongest justifications of participant observation is flexibility, which allows the researcher to pursue angles that might not have been covered in a questionnaire, for example (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000: 48-49). The question here will not be sample size but the status and influence the subjects exude which might define their role as a form of primary group in a complex network of communicative relationships with executive authority. Perhaps the greater motivation for *participant observation* lies in the opportunity it provides the researcher to investigate organisational, bureaucratic and professional nature of news production and to be fully schooled on the holistic aspects involved in news processing (Hansen et al, 1998: 35). There is a distinction drawn between a *participant-observer*, that is, being embedded within an organisation in an overt manner and often being part of the work process; and *observer-participant*, which implies remaining outside of the group to be studied and claiming a higher level of autonomy than the former. Hansen et al (1998: 51) concede that in practice, the lines between the two forms of observation become blurred as one is often drawn into a closer relationship with his objects of study in the latter form as well.

For instance, the challenge in investigating the *Times'* as an observer participant is that editorial meetings are carried out behind closed-doors. It could be argued that in this case, the participant-observer approach would be more useful as involvement in the editorial process might present some hitherto unknown perspectives to the professional nature of the news production.

However, the down side could be that editors might not present honest views in the presence of a researcher. In this case, flexibility within this methodology would mean adopting interviews with select officials within the establishment. In this regard, the observer-participant option could be deemed more appropriate.

There are obviously ethical considerations to be made. This researcher formally sought the permission of the managing director of the *Times Newspapers* to undertake this study and has done the same for all respondents. Therefore the general approach in this thesis can be closely associated with the observer-participant model given that it involved direct observation, face-to-face interviews, electronic interaction and telephonic conversations, in addition to document reviews.

#### **1.4.1 Stratified purposive sampling**

Stratified purposive sampling was applied to select the various categories of officials involved in the work of the *Times Newspapers* and other non state actors with vested interests in media development. These were drawn from *The Times Newspapers*, PAZA, the ZUJ and the Society of Senior Zambian Journalists (SSZJ). The depth of information to be gleaned is more important in this sense than the numbers of interviewees. “

### 1.4.2 *Collection of data*

*Document Review:* Submissions to the United Kingdom Competition Commission related to an inquiry on the operations of Lonrho were among the official documents examined and analysed in constructing historical, political and media developments in Zambia.

Other documents included government policy documents, annual reports, court rulings and judgments, financial statements and strategic plans from the *TimesPrintpak (Zambia) Limited*, newspaper reports, legal and media research on reforms and press freedom, independent advertising surveys and Afrobarometer studies on democracy and the media in Zambia.

*Observation:* Attendance to workshops by PAZA, ZUJ, MISA and other media bodies was considered. However, the information collected in the initial stages of this thesis did not warrant additional engagements of this nature, interviews with key informants proved much more useful. The fundamental reason for this was that the core of the problem was found to be located more in history and required face-to-face conversations with some key informants with limited direct observation. The approach was, hence, not inclined to understanding how news is processed, but rather to unravel the power relations that influence the nature of the end product.

*Interviews:* A standard open-ended questionnaire was applied to guide the process (appendices one, two and three). There were minor variations to the questions to respond to each context. Interviews were held in three distinct rounds each representing a set of groups: Former and current editors of the *Times Newspapers*; senior journalists from the public service; and presidents of the professional associations, namely, PAZA, ZUJ and the Society of Senior Zambian Journalists (SSZJ). The respondents presented both personal

experiences and official positions on matters of press freedom, worker welfare and political change. The management of the *TimesPrintpak (Zambia) Limited*, and its former editors were interviewed along the following themes:

- Their experience of state interventions in editorial matters in either; the First, Second, or Third Republics or of all three phases.
- Their opinion on the influence of dominant party structure on the nature of oversight on the *Times Newspapers*.
- Their impressions of the *Times Newspapers* as a competitor in a changing political economic environment (that is, nationalisation on the one hand; and liberalisation and privatisation on the other).
- Commercialisation of the state media in the face of private competition.
- The impact of unionisation on the *Times Newspapers* and the state media in general.

Executives of the ZUJ and PAZA were probed on the following main broad themes:

- Their overall impressions of democratisation and its dividends for journalists, in the state sector.
- The economic environment and its implications for job security for journalists in the state sector.
- The impact of collective agreements on worker welfare.
- The future and relevance of state media systems in Zambia.
- Potential reforms to the legal and constitutional framework.

Hard data on advertising was obtained both from the *Times* and independent advertising consultancies and has been synthesised and corroborated with information from interviews conducted by this researcher, to comprehend the nature of the commercial challenge that the newspapers face in a liberalised economy. Lastly, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services was engaged on:

- The 1996 Information and Media Policy and its implementation.
- The implementation of recommendations from constitutional and other reform commissions, regarding media freedom.
- Government financial support to the state media.

This information from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services was provided in the form of official documents and policies.

## 1.5 INDICATORS

A set of indicators were developed to determine the manner in which political and economic liberalisation, the key elements of liberal democracy, have affected the *Times Newspapers*. Specifically, the thesis considers *freedom of expression and freedom of association, and free market policies (liberalisation and privatisation)*, introduced by macro level political economic forces, and their influence in the organisational environment of the SOE. Babbie and Mouton (2008: 111) define indicators as specifications that show the absence or presence of a concept that is being studied.

The indicators for each variable are categorised into primary and secondary levels. The primary level of analysis gauges the presence of an approximation of the characteristic in question at macro level, while the secondary indicators confirm its influence (or absence) *qualitatively* at a micro level.

Freedom of expression and association for instance, will be gleaned in the work place context not only from the macro level presence of legal and constitutional provisions but in terms of the mechanism of appointment, editorial policies, oversight frameworks and worker representation on the *Times* in the First, Second and Third Republics.

In this regard, Edwards (1993: 33) is instructive in advancing the notion that *employee rights* are not only contained in statutory and constitutional protections but also in *collective agreements* and in the *conditions of service, policies and complaints procedures* granted by the employer (or *enterprise rights*). Here, as stated in section 1.1.6 of this chapter, the thesis is informed by Employee Rights Theory (ERT) a body of theory that has evolved with the aim of extending fundamental rights to the workplace from the broader liberal democratic society (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 176-174).

It is worth reiterating that ERT supporters have claimed victory in the introduction of rights to form unions, free speech and due process within the micro context of the work environment. The thesis will in addition be informed by Labour Process Theory (LPT) which draws its inspiration from Marxian political economy. The LPT, unlike the ERT which is anchored on negotiation with capital, emphasises *resistance to capitalist control*, promotes *collective action* and *equal distribution of resources* (Ackroyd, 2009: 264). While both theories aim for worker welfare, their modus operandi is different.

But they can be combined to good effect, assert Nord and Doherty (1996: 206). They argue that integrating the two approaches in fact strengthens the strategy for advancing worker welfare. They posit that there is a relationship between macro level political economic forces, how they produce, sustain and distribute power, privilege and rights and the micro level manifestations. Combining LPT and ERT, using their *Assertion for Empowerment Tool*, they claim, enables the workers to make optimal use of *cooperation* and *conflict* depending on the circumstances.

In addition, it enables them use 'rights talk' to catalyse action (Nord and Doherty, 1996: 206) (Chapter Five of this thesis will extensively discuss ERT and LPT in this regard).

Price and Krug (2002: 4) are also instructive in articulating the limitations of formal law: They argue that laws alone do not guarantee how media will function. There must be prior commitment by the community to values that underpin a free media.

They emphasise that it is important to understand the steps or processes that allow change to occur and what type of voices will be favoured in the process of transformation.

Embracing these approaches, one is challenged to extend this reasoning to the institutional dynamics within the *Times Newspapers*; to understand how administrative structures are fashioned to interact with workers and with the state within the ambit of the legal and constitutional framework stipulating fundamental freedoms. This is also because the state will likely deal with intransigence from editors administratively rather than through judicial means.

Understanding the types of oversight frameworks and how they work, will likely enrich this thesis in terms of its analysis of how changing political regimes may shape communicative space.

In addition, freedom of association and assembly will be reflected in the right of media professionals to organise. Formation of media unions as a result of legislative amendments born of democratic imperatives will illustrate the influence of the democratic process on state media systems.

Comparisons will be made between the First, Second and Third Republics in respect of the right of media professionals to belong to a union of choice. The outcomes of litigation, collective agreements and other forms of actions will provide a basis for assessing how products of political change may have contributed to the democratic project. The thesis will address the impact of the economic characteristics of liberal democracy - liberalisation and privatisation - by analysing the response of the *Times Newspapers* to competition from the private press in advertising and sales. This response will likely be reflected in strategic documents and in asset acquisition (new printing press for example), distribution strategies and generally, the whole commercialisation approach that the enterprise adopts. Finally government intervention might also connote financial insecurities among state media in the face of competition.



The figure below shows how the presence of each variable will be assessed:

**Table 2: Variables and indicators**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Primary indicators (macro)</b>	<b>Secondary indicators (micro)</b>
Freedom of expression	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Laws on media freedom and freedom of expression</li> <li>• Reporting structure (Mode of appointment of senior editors; editorial policy)</li> <li>• Representation of media associations/union on board of directors</li> <li>• Regulations on public access to state media</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Litigation on press freedom matters by journalists unions</li> <li>• Presence of grievance procedures in employment policy or collective agreements</li> <li>• Proposals by journalists adopted by state</li> <li>• Number of media initiated reform processes</li> <li>• Outcomes of judicial challenges regarding state media access and journalists' editorial freedom</li> </ul>
Freedom of association	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Laws on formation of societies, unions</li> <li>• Constitutional provisions on freedom of association, assembly</li> <li>• Registration of professional unions</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Official recognition of unions by <i>Times</i> management</li> <li>• Collective Agreements between media unions and management</li> <li>• Litigations by unions on behalf of workers</li> <li>• Codes of Ethics and Practice/enforcements thereof</li> <li>• Membership profiles of media unions</li> </ul>
Privatisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Official government policy on privatisation</li> <li>• unionisation rates in Journalists Unions as a result of privatisation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Outcomes of press union/associations' input into state media reform processes</li> <li>• Number of private media professionals in ZUJ</li> </ul>
Liberalisation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Number of privately owned daily newspapers competing with the <i>Times</i>, since liberalisation</li> <li>• Trends in circulation of the <i>Times</i> since liberal reforms</li> <li>• Advertising revenues of the <i>Times</i> since liberal reforms</li> <li>• Proportion of population purchasing <i>Times Newspapers</i> since liberal reforms</li> </ul> <p>State support to the <i>Times</i> since liberal reforms</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic plans by the <i>Times</i> responding to competition (commercialisation)</li> <li>• Changes in marketing strategies since liberalisation/structural changes</li> <li>• Asset acquisition since liberalisation</li> <li>• Reasons for economic intervention by the state (if any)</li> </ul>

The indicators will be reflected in standard semi-structured questionnaires to be administered to respondents.

### **1.5.1 Interpretation and presentation of data**

This study can largely be described as adopting an *idiographic* research strategy which Babbie and Mouton (2008:272) explain as one that is closely related to qualitative research and examines a single event or case and its structural coherence with a larger context.

On the contrary, *nomothetic* strategy draws largely on quantitative approaches, seeking to generalize results to larger populations and other settings.

This thesis will use multiple sources of data, consistent with thick descriptions, based on the notion of *convergence*.

In this regard, Babbie and Mouton (2008:272) suggest further that in *convergence*, multiple sources of evidence may be brought to bear on variables of interest. Due to the large volume of qualitative information anticipated, analytical strategies will embrace two modes of case study analysis:

- *Pattern matching*: patterns emerging in the data are related with patterns in the theory or in alternative predictions. Enhanced validity is assumed if the patterns concur.
- *Explanation building*; refers to the generation of explanations about the case, which is closely related to pattern matching. Generalizability of case studies is achieved by showing the linkages between the findings and previous studies (Babbie & Mouton:2008: 283).

The results will be thematically matched and organised into chapters responding to the five key areas:

- 1) *Historical perspectives; colonialism, democratisation and humanism*
- 2) *Theoretical discussion: democracy, political economy and the public sphere*
- 3) *Democratisation and oversight frameworks on the Times*
- 4) *Labour rights*
- 5) *Economic liberalisation and commercialisation.*

## 1.6 ORGANISATION OF CHAPTERS

In keeping with the ambitions of political economy, Chapter Two embarks on an extensive exploration of the political and socio-economic dimensions of Zambia's history and attempts to understand how various transitions have each contributed to the pre-eminence of dominant media models. To fully appreciate the state-media relations in post independence Zambia, the chapter undertakes to explain colonial practices of *ethnic stereotyping* which are often blamed for weak social cohesion and instability within African societies at independence. It further explores the uncertainties liberation politics may have wrought on Zambian political elites, particularly in terms of the extent of freedom of the media they would have allowed under the circumstances. To understand this logic, the chapter interrogates Kaunda's *Philosophy of Humanism* and how it interprets democracy and media freedom. In its final quest to establish the levels of public support for democracy through recent transitions, the chapter closes by discussing the various measurement tools employed by political scientists and their assessment of Zambia's progress thus far.

Chapter Three follows with an analytical discussion on the theoretical perspectives of political economy and the public sphere concepts and their relation to democratisation and the media. Building on the discussions broached in Chapter One, this chapter seeks mainly to unpack the concept of political economy and how it applies to communication studies with related phenomenon such as privatisation, liberalisation and commercialisation and digitisation forming part of the analysis. To understand the dichotomy between liberal political economists

and critical political economists, the chapter extensively interrogates historical perspectives and how they are articulated in contemporary times. Finally, within the context of privatisation and liberalisation, the chapter examines how *wealth* and *power* could influence *traditional media* and *alternative media* alike, despite democracy. The chapter underscores the Afro-centric perspectives which foreground the *leadership styles* of founding presidents and their alliances with transnational forces; and the centrality of all this in formulating discussions on *Third World political economy* as it relates to media independence.

To illustrate the relevance of leadership styles to this discussion, Chapter Four undertakes an elaborate investigation into the relationship between *wealth* and *power*, and in what ways their mutual influence manifests within the media development discourse in Zambia. The expedition traces pre-independence alliances between Zambia's founding president Kenneth Kaunda and the chair of the multinational Lonrho, Roland 'Tiny' Rowland and explains how the relationship between the two, conditioned the types of oversight frameworks that eventually governed the *Times* in the First and Second Republics. Despite the transition to pluralism in 1991, the chapter demonstrates that the tendencies for control of the media can also be attributed to the presence of dominant party systems in the First and Third Republics. Although, they are products of popular elections, dominant party structures share characteristics with single party systems to some extent. The lack of responsiveness to demands for genuine media reforms by Chiluba's government and his successors from the MMD may be partly explained by this.

Chapter Five critically examines the reasons and consequences of changes to the Industrial Relations Act by both one party and multiparty governments and how these reforms affected unionisation in general and the media profession in particular. The chapter follows with an analysis of the impact of ZUJ, working with PAZA, on worker welfare on the *Times Newspapers*, since its emergence in 1992.

Finally, Chapter Six emphasises that state control should not be viewed and examined in political terms alone. The nature of state control has likely had an impact on the quality of the product or essentially, perceptions of the product by

democratically inclined publics. The influence of nationalisation, liberalisation and privatisation on commercial approaches will be discussed here.

Part of the promise of liberalisation was that a free market would attract investments and media enterprises would presumably survive off advertising revenues, apart from competing for a limited readership. The chapter speaks to the privatisation question in greater detail, raising matters around commercialisation and sustainability of state media systems (*the Times* in particular). The thesis concludes in this Chapter Seven with a summary and recommendations.

## CHAPTER TWO

# COLONIALISM, DEMOCRATISATION AND HUMANISM: UNDERSTANDING MEDIA DEVELOPMENTS IN ZAMBIA

## 2.1 INTRODUCTION

Within the tenets of political economy, this chapter aims to discuss the influence of social change and historical transformation on media development in Zambia through the prism of colonialism. The chapter launches into a literature review analysing political developments from the first stages of colonisation to the present day. It argues that to understand the evolution of Zambia's media system one needs to interrogate a range of inter-related socio-political phenomena which might explain why political elites have sustained controlled communication systems despite transitions to liberal politics. The chapter therefore addresses the following:

- The history of colonialism in Zambia.
- The emergence of organised media and nationalism in the colonial era in Zambia.
- Kenneth Kaunda's *Philosophy of Humanism* and its vision for the media in Zambia.
- The advent of liberal democracy, its measurement and public perception by Zambians.

Before we reflect substantially on the problem statement expounded in Chapter One, it is perhaps imperative to remind ourselves that the broad context under which this discussion is located is *democratisation*, which has no distinct definition or closure as its supposed intended goal - *democracy*. Consensus suggests that both concepts aspire to popularly elected governments, freedom of expression, freedom of movement and assembly, freedom of association and

property and group rights. Media densification has also been closely related to democratisation as a key indicator of progress.

The preceding discussion however underlines that there is no agreement on the finer elements of how this system of democracy may render general public good in terms of citizens' socio-economic welfare and civil and political rights.

The elusive nature of the concepts notwithstanding, the discussion at least does place us in pole position to determine a starting point for Zambia's democratisation process.

It is noted by Huntington (1991: 2) in his seminal works that the process of democratisation begins with *parting with the authoritarian regime*. In this regard, it is interesting to note that both Kenneth Kaunda, the country's founding president who espoused *African Democratic Socialism* anchored by the *Philosophy of Humanism*, and his successor Frederick Chiluba, a convert of *liberal capitalism*, agree that democratisation began with liberation from colonialism on October 24, 1964.

In his *Humanism in Zambia (Part I)*, Kaunda (1968:3) lucidly relates the advent of democratisation to the 'defeat' of the colonial state. Similarly Frederick Chiluba, the man who would vanquish him in the pluralist elections of 1991, underscores the same point:

*"Democratisation symbolizes the original objective of Zambia's struggle for independence from colonial rule and the spirit of the people to create institutions and a political system that would allow them to elect government and participate in decision making on a free and equal basis,"* (Chiluba, 1995:1).

It can be posited therefore that Zambia's democratisation process commenced with the collapse of the colonial state and the emergence of a nationalist, majority - ruled government.

The problem statement in Chapter One suggests further that despite this much heralded advent of democratisation, political elites adopted colonial mindsets for

extended periods enabling the continuance of colonial structures and practices through the First and Second Republics. These 'colonial bad habits' may have had a fundamental influence on the country's political, legal and communication structures of today. This remains the core of the problem as several efforts at institutional reform driven by presidentially appointed Constitution Review Commissions have not yielded much change, particularly in regard to state ownership of the major media. The sub problems include the undefined editorial relations between the state-owned print media (the *Times Newspapers* in particular) and successive elected governments; and the unclear nature of the influence of journalists' unions and professional associations in opening up communicative space and engendering economic security for workers in the sector through periods of political transition.

The chapter also discussed the question of the impact of liberalisation on the commercial viability of the *Times*; the contentious nature of government support to state print media which could generate perceptions of misuse of public funds, leading to persistent conflict. All these factors necessitate careful evaluation of the meaning of democratisation as it relates to media and the place of a state sponsored media system in an era often associated with fair rules, interaction and broad participation in national affairs.

The problem statement suggests that these phenomena should not be viewed in isolation of each other or in narrow historical terms: that, there seems to be a relationship between the practices of the colonial, post colonial and the contemporary state in regard to how mass media are understood, controlled and managed in Zambia. This thesis therefore attaches much importance to the establishment of the colonial political economy in Zambia as the entire premise of controlled communication seems to also have links to the behaviour of colonial governors based on their agenda of modernisation, control, ethnic stereo-typing and divisiveness (Luchembe, 1992: 30).



In the same breath, it is also conceivable that the nationalist administrations sought to control media systems for diametrically opposite reasons: That is, to construct a nation out of fractured ethnic groups by using these very mass media systems ostensibly to consolidate national identity, unity and foster development.

In trying to locate the media in these complex historical developments, it is perhaps worth noting that the process of democratisation in Africa has not been informed by a single set of ideas over the last four decades, going by the several attempts made by countries such as Zambia to model societies that reflected local concerns as well as satisfy international expectations.

Zezeza (2009:20) underlines this point when he explains that the development project in Africa has been articulated through four paradigms - *modernisation, dependency, Marxist, and free market fundamentalist* theories.

The post-colonial period was largely swayed by modernisation theory where development was measured in terms of the extent to which countries adopted western ideologies, market institutions, capital, technology and models.

Apparent lack of human development amidst economic growth is noted to have spurred African governments to agitate for a new world economic order, with nationalists largely embracing Marxist ideologies which promoted collective ownership of the means of production. But as the Soviet communist bloc collapsed, the world witnessed the upsurge of the *Washington Consensus* or the regime of free market fundamentalism which eventually dominated the development discourse. The nationalist project paled before the burden of debt and proxy wars of the Cold War, leaving it open to colonisation by free market ideologies (Zezeza, 2009:20).

In the case of Zambia, the influence of the four paradigms may be inferred from the countries' transition from the First Republic, which began with a privatised economy and closed with a nationalised one; the Second Republic, which transferred the means of production to state ownership and was ideologically closer to the Soviet bloc while promoting *African democratic socialism*; and finally

the Third Republic, which rose on the collapse of communism in eastern Europe and cascaded into Africa on the back of neo-liberal ideas.

For Scholars, these changes raise both political and economic questions in regard to the interaction of the media with development. The first question is political and addresses the impact of media on democracy on the one hand and the influence of democratisation on the media on the other. The second is economic; and it speaks to the growth of the media as a service industry; ownership patterns, competitiveness and profitability. There is also a cultural and technological dimension: The former relates to how media can contribute to the development of social capital, while the latter discusses how they have embraced emerging technologies to their advantage (Zezeza, 2009: 21).

Some scholars have evidently over romanticized the extent to which democratisation has transformed the media landscape in Africa, in error, it might be argued. Karin Barber (2009: 14) for example explains in general terms how the 1990s wave of democratisation in Africa has led to the partial privatisation of state controlled media and pluralisation of the industry.

Barber claims that the nationalist agenda of mobilizing a national public through the media 'fell by the wayside and the media became a free-for-all-where interest groups of all sizes and persuasions could take to the airwaves' (Barber, 2009:15).

Barber's narrative, in some ways, contradicts assertions by scholars such as Banda (2006: 461) and Kasoma (2002:287) who observe that deregulation and registration of new electronic media outlets in Zambia for instance was a closely guarded affair with the large proportion of licenses often being awarded to pro-government applicants. Barber also ignores the economic constraints faced by new media which has given state owned enterprises a consistent edge over privately owned entities. While the growth of community radio might represent substantial media densification, they do serve small communities or restricted public spheres with no means of transporting ideas beyond the boundaries of their locale. Finally, in Zambia of course, there has been no relinquishing of state

control of the major electronic and print media, partial or otherwise, despite privatisation in the broader economy.

The *political economy approach* to investigating this problem, hence, allows for a holistic interpretation of developments in Zambia and the specific unique socio-political contexts which may or may not necessitate the existence of state-supported media systems.

Zambia has a complex history of state formation and colonisation which needs to be understood in order to make sense of the evolution of its social and cultural institutions.

In this regard, Kaplan (1979: 3) asserts that understanding Zambia's history and its institutions requires not just an analysis of individual polities or personalities but a much deeper exposition of the social and cultural phases of the territory's development.

Kaplan suggests that human society in Zambia has been punctuated by increasing social differentiation and specialisation of economic, social and political structures which require careful examination. He divides Zambia's history into three broad categories: *Pre-colonial, Colonial and the Period of Independence*.

Perhaps if the purpose of this thesis were solely to understand Zambia's history and transition to independence; this categorical analysis might be useful. However, applying the approach to a study of this nature would not be entirely helpful given that the both the periods of colonialism and independence had very distinct features which seemed to exhibit their own influences on the country's political trajectory. These varied phases are evidently also inextricably linked to media evolution and practices in Zambia.

In this regard, Phiri (2006:1) and Chipungu (1992:1) are more instructive in indicating that the colonial period had two discrete phases: 1890 to 1924, when

the country was under the British South Africa (BSA) Company; and 1924 to 1964 when it was placed under the control of the Colonial Office.

Phiri asserts that the two periods of colonialism have influenced the country's political developments in different ways to the present day; with the second segments of British rule leaving a firmer footprint.

Luchembe (1992:30) goes further to suggest that some of the fundamental problems associated with the colonial state are to be found in the first period of colonisation (1890 - 1924), when the BSA company initiated an enduring practice of ethnic-based, divisive politics. These divisive policies might have formed the underpinnings of a weakened, ethnically divided, independent Zambia, throwing the challenge for nation building at the feet of nationalists with limited resources to mobilize unity and development. The coercion of foreign owned media such as the *Times Newspapers* into a state - corporate structure, seems to have its roots in the insecurities accompanying nation building and developmental ambitions of nationalist governments hence.

This chapter therefore launches into an extended deliberation into the country's colonial past, its transition to independence and ultimately its path toward democratisation largely focussed on the four step categorisation of the country's history; the *Colonial, First Republic, Second Republic and Third Republic*.

This is, essentially, the period in which the development of modern organised media has been recorded.

What is perhaps striking in this analysis is that media were intrinsic to the maturation of colonial and nationalistic politics. For both white settler communities seeking greater autonomy from Britain; and Africans agitating for majority rule and independence, the importance attached to media ownership as a vehicle for political expression is evident, despite the seemingly restrictive environment of the time.

## 2.2 THE HISTORY OF COLONIALISM

Before the advent of British colonialism, the territory today known as Zambia was for several millennia inhabited by Stone Age hunter gatherers. The Stone Age phase was followed by an Iron Age closely associated with the coming of Bantu speaking ethnic groups from the north-western Kingdoms in the first millennium A.D. which are credited with further developments in language, culture and biology of present day Zambia (Kaplan, 1979: 4).

The appearance of Bantu speaking groups from present day Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) around 700 and 1200 A.D. signified the advent of more advanced cultures and agrarian based social structures, leading up to the formation of distinct societies and polities.

The development of state systems in the societies in the DRC is thought to have had an impact on the formation of Kingdoms in the Congo basin, central lakes districts and present - day Angola. As these Luba-Lunda dynasties expanded into Zambia, similar characteristics in regard to social organisation became palpable in this region as well. However, major cultural influences also included those of the Ngoni in the eastern part of the country who migrated from South Africa, fleeing the *Mfecane* conflicts waged by the great Zulu King Shaka (Phiri, 2006: 2).

Zambia also had its share of foreign raiders in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries: the Afro-Arabs from the east coast intent on commerce and the slave trade; and the Portuguese and European missionaries and conquerors after them. Eventually it was British diplomacy and war mongering that subdued the territory in the 1890s heralding a domination that would last until 1964, when independence was achieved (Kaplan, 1979:5).

The territory became a serious target of British imperialism during the scramble for Africa by European powers as the 20<sup>th</sup> century approached. Determined to pre-empt Portuguese, German and later Boer interventions, the British government authorised the BSA Company in 1889 to assume control of the (potentially) mineral rich lands beyond the Limpopo river which included present - day Zambia. By signing concessions with local Kings, the BSA Company was able to obtain exclusive mining rights in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and extend its administrative authority to Nyasaland (Malawi)(Hall, 1976: 2). These were periods characterised by conflict between the British and the Boers; and later with the Germans during the First World War in 1914 to 1918 (Roberts, 1995:1013).

The first incursion into Zambia by the BSA Company was through the western Kingdom of the Barotse where Cecil Rhodes, the principal representative of the BSA and the Queen of England, was able to sign concessions with local chiefs. The rest of the territory, later to be known as Northern Rhodesia was taken over by 1891 and subsequently divided into North-Eastern Rhodesia and North Western Rhodesia (Phiri, 2006:10)

This territory claimed for the British crown by the BSA Company was situated in Southern Africa occupying 752,614 Square kilometres; bordered by eight countries: Angola to the west, DRC to the northwest, Tanzania to the northeast, Malawi to the east, Mozambique to the southeast, Zimbabwe and Botswana southward, and Namibia to the Southwest (Roberts,1995: 1013).

British colonialism essentially fused no less than 73 ethnic groups into a single territory. The major groups were: the Bemba in the north, the Nyanja (Ngoni) in the east, Tonga in the South and Lozi in the West. Researchers have identified up to 80 languages spoken in what is today Zambia with seven of them designated as 'official' (Roberts, 1995: 1013). .

In the beginning, the British government had firmer control over the north - western part of the country through the appointment of an administrator and a

fully fledged office of support staff. The north - eastern segment of the territory was however supervised by the BSA Company representative. These two demarcations were fused in 1911 when 'official colonialism' of the protectorate of Northern Rhodesia began (Phiri, 2006: 10).

The territory was not considered a colony or an area of permanent settlement but as a labour reserve for developing white settled lands of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. Luchembe (1992: 30) describes the 24 year tenure of the BSA oversight of the territory as 'autocratic'. Luchembe contends that the answers to the basic enduring problems experienced by Zambia, may be found in this initial period of BSA rule when the foundations for a local political economy was established and racial and ethnic stereotypes entrenched.

White migration increased substantially with the discovery of copper in 1925 in Ndola and in surrounding areas on the border with the DRC. This discovery not only stimulated trade and commerce, but also catalysed rapid development of Northern Rhodesia, leading to swift urbanisation. The demands of this growth generally left the country unable to provide all the required skills from amongst the white population leading to expanded opportunities for African workers to take on administrative positions in the mines and civil service (Phiri, 2006:10).

Chipungu (1992:5) argues however that the allocation of these roles among Africans by the BSA and the Colonial Office was based on a policy of ethnic stereotyping; which categorised some ethnic groups as 'docile' and therefore suited to civil service jobs; while those from belligerent traditions were 'troublesome' and therefore consigned to under-ground mining work, for instance. Ethnic stereotyping, he concludes, may be closely related to the accentuation of tribalism through the country's political history.

Luchembe (1992: 31-40) expands on this argument by explaining that the Bemba, Ngoni and Lozi were considered 'stronger tribes' and were allocated policing, military, farming and mining roles. He notes that British administrators recorded in turns the superiority of the Lozi, Ngoni and Bemba over others in

Zambia. The Lunda, Luvale, Twa and Lamba were among the so-called 'weaker tribes' which required regular control and deserving of less demanding menial jobs.

Luchembe (1992, 35 - 40) also notes that some initial impressions of African ethnic groups changed over time. The Lozi originally lumped with the Bemba and Ngoni as belligerent tribes, were later thought to be 'friendly' and 'amenable to law and order'. As a result the Lozi Kingdom benefited from a series of treaties with the British the most significant being the 1909 agreement which rendered the Lozi Kingdom a protectorate of the British through the BSA Company<sup>15</sup>.

### **2.2.1 *Settler politics, nationalism and the media***

Further exposition of literature on Zambia suggests that neither the appeasement politics nor the stereo-typing and ethnic divisions prevented the advance of ideas or actions related to emancipation and democratisation. While on the one hand, the discovery of copper triggered white settler migration into Zambia, it also facilitated the emergence of a small, but literate African elite which increasingly began to form the vanguard of modern African nationalism, on the other. Similarly, as the European population increased, so did their participation in local politics.

As stated in the preamble of this chapter, the evolution of nationalism and settler politics in Zambia is tethered to the development of the organised media, which began essentially as a political tool for either oppression or resistance. The development of media occurred well before the copper-driven economic boom took root (Phiri, 2006:14).

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<sup>15</sup> The allocation of roles and resources by colonial authorities can be linked to Mosco (1995: 140)'s definition of political economy as the study of social relations, particularly power relations that influence the production and distribution of resources in society. This, inevitably, becomes a source of conflict between marginalised communities and the elite, as was the case in pre-colonial Zambia.



White settler elites sought a means for expression and social solidarity as ambitions for self rule began to manifest, and the newspaper was a natural vehicle. The first newspaper published in Zambia was the *Livingstone Pioneer* launched in 1906 by W. Tranter. It survived only a few months (Kasoma, 1986: 21).

It is Leopold Frank Moore, a chemist, who is however credited with the establishment of the more stable and significant newspaper in the *Livingstone Mail*, also launched in 1906 (Kasoma, 1986: 21). With this publication, the voice of white elites was amplified and the Colonial Office was forced to pay more attention to their concerns and aspirations, part of which included emerging resistance amongst Africans to British subjugation(Phiri, 2006:14).

Chipungu (1992: 62) traces the rise of political nationalism to the post-Second World War period. During this period, it is suggested by other scholars that the development of both print and electronic media became more pronounced (Chirwa, 1994: Banda, 1997: Makayi, 1997: Makungu, 2004). The electronic media were created as an extension of Britain's war and colonial propaganda apparatus, as it prosecuted the protracted conflict against Germany (Makayi, 1997:16).

Kasoma (2002: 3) explains that the first radio station in Zambia was established in 1941 at the back of a series of amateur attempts at wireless communication by settlers clubs. Radio was set up to service Africans in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland while white settlers were supposed to be catered for by the British Empire Broadcasting (BEB), and the Salisbury (Harare) based radio station, in addition to Radio South Africa (RSA). The local radio in Zambia stifled any dissemination of political party events by African nationalists and had no space for magazine or discussion programmes.

Robert Martin's (1998: 63) analysis of freedom of expression in Africa foregrounds, perhaps rightly so, the consequences of colonial intolerance for democratic impulse and the prohibition of free expression. No independent broadcasting was allowed; print media needed prior licensing approval to operate

and a range of legal instruments were applied to prevent the growth of any meaningful privately owned media, he notes.

It is also noteworthy that even though newspaper ownership was private, most of the owners often seemed to clearly lean toward settler or colonial sympathies. For example, the *Northern Advertiser*, established in 1935 by F. Mckenzie, was followed by *Mutende* in 1936; a propaganda instrument later renamed the *African Eagle*.

This might explain why pro-establishment newspapers seemed to have greater endurance. Hence, the pro-establishment *Eagle* survived until 1962 (Makungu, 2004: 8).

At the height of the Second World War in 1942, two miners E.C Wykerd and E.B. Hovelmeier launched the *Copperbelt Times*, a fortnightly catering for a small section of the settler community. This newspaper was purchased by Roy Welensky in 1944, who later became prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Makayi, 1997:16). Welensky renamed the paper the *Northern News*, essentially the fore-runner of the present-day *Times of Zambia*. Welensky in turn sold the *Northern News* to the *Rhodesia Printing Company*. This publishing company owned the *Herald* in Salisbury (Harare) and *The Chronicle* in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

*The Northern News* was transformed into a daily in 1953 at the dawn of the Federation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia with Nyasaland; and was circulating 20,000 copies by 1958 (Makayi, 1997: 17). In 1948, Dr Alexander Scott introduced the *Central African Post* which projected African nationalist views and therefore became a counter weight to the pro-colonial *Northern News*.

Both the *Northern News* and the *Central African Post* were appropriated by South Africa's *Argus Group* in 1951. For reasons not fully explained by media historians, the *Post* was closed in 1957. Still a robust opponent of the federation, Scott established another newspaper in 1958 - the *African Times* - which targeted

African and moderate white audiences as noted by Banda (1997:9) and Makayi (1997: 17).

When the venture failed, Scott came up with the *Central African Mail*, this time, in partnership with David Astor of the *London Observer*. *The Mail* was to make a mark by employing two African editors, Titus Mkupo and Kelvin Mlenga. Commercially, the *Mail* could not compete with the pro-settler *Northern News* which was becoming the pre-eminent newspaper as Northern Rhodesia edged toward independence in 1964. Sikota Wina became the first African in Northern Rhodesia to own and edit a newspaper, *African Life*, released in 1959. It could not however survive the economic rigors of the day and closed down in 1960 (Makungu, 2004: 12).

There are three main observations from these historical records of media development and politics in the colonial era. Firstly, it is certain the Colonial Office, in prosecuting a protracted and difficult war with Germany, required a means to mobilise and galvanise its subjects into a sense of unity; part of which was seen in its absolute control of the electronic media (radio, more specifically).

Secondly, there were divisions amongst the white community between those who wished to see Northern Rhodesia become an independent white controlled territory; and those who were typically aligned to continued British control from the Colonial office in London. Certainly, the types of media emerging during the war periods seem to indicate that there was a movement toward a settler agenda by the likes of Welensky and the media became the extension of that voice.

In this regard, it has been noted by Phiri (2006:14), Kaplan (1999:5) and Pettman (1974:11) that European politics were ranged at agitating for the Federation of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as a launch pad for greater independence from Britain. Kaplan (1979:5) observes that European settlers became increasingly insecure as African political consciousness matured

into nationalism. <sup>16</sup>On the other hand, African nationalists feared a merger of the two Rhodesias because of the presence of accentuated racism in the South (Pettman, 1974:12).

The third and last point relates to the space available to Africans to express themselves. With evidently low literacy rates, it was left to more educated pro-nationalist whites such as Dr Alexander Scott to establish newspapers in the beginning.

This changed as the Africans sharpened their skills in the 1950s and 1960s when the likes of Sikota Wina attempted to establish their own media; and at least two Africans were recorded to have assumed responsible positions on the pro-nationalist *Central African Mail*.

However, it needs to be asserted that despite a limited space for public communication extended to Africans, the nationalists were able to mobilise through Welfare Societies, given that trade unions were not permitted by the colonials (Hall, 1976: 71). These Societies had branches all over the country and converged around a mother body - the Federation of Welfare Societies - which transformed itself two years later in 1951, into the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (Roberts, 1995: 1013).

Despite this, Pettman (1974: 12) suggests that African resistance to white settler machinations was not strong enough to prevent the establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The settler efforts were aided by the victory of the Conservative Party in Britain in October 1951 which had little regard for the opinions of the Africans.

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<sup>16</sup> DiJohn (2010: 15) notes that popular African leaders worked hand in hand with workers, particularly mine workers, to challenge the colonial authority. The formation of the African Mine Workers Union (AMU) was a key indicator of both the advent of unionism and an organised struggle for independence. From the perspective of Marxian political economy, these actions conform to the tenets of Labour Process Theory (LPT), which foregrounds resistance, conflict and collective action as the key means of limiting the influence of capital (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 173). This matter is addressed in detail in Chapter Five, where labour rights form the essence of the discussion.

In 1953, the white settlers' lobbying proved successful as the two Rhodesias were placed under a common administration with Nyasaland. The Federation of these three territories undermined African trust in the British and galvanised indigenous efforts at self determination (Pettman, 1974: 13).

Prominent African nationalist movements such as the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress, though somewhat weakened over time, were key to leading resistance to white minority domination of the Federation. Internal conflict within the Northern Rhodesia ANC caused younger leaders such as Munukayambwa Sipalo, Simon Kapwepwe and Kaunda to challenge the much older leader Harry Nkumbula. This led to a breakaway movement led by Kaunda and Kapwepwe, called the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC). Further acts of civil disobedience and disturbances alarmed Welensky and his settler administration leading to the banning of the ZANC in March 1959. There were more splits within the ANC by August 1959 which resulted in further new formations, leading up to the creation of the United National Independence Party (UNIP). Kaunda was installed as leader of UNIP on his release from prison in January 1960 (Phiri, 2006: 116-121).

### ***2.2.2 First Republic: Independence, plural politics and the media***

A series of constitutional proposals from the Federal government eventually led to a transfer of power to Africans; facilitating a coalition government between UNIP and the ZANC. With the Federation virtually dead, Northern Rhodesia transitioned to independence: Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP won the pre-independence elections in January of 1964, taking 55 of the 65 available seats. Formal independence was granted on October 24, 1964. Kaunda was installed as Zambia's first President, with UNIP as its governing party (Pettman, 1974: 19).

What is notable in this extended historical account is that the ethnic consciousness promoted by the colonial state seemed to have been subordinated to the common

good of achieving African liberation by nationalists. This could be discerned by the alliances formed during the 1950s.

Harry Nkumbula from the Tonga ethnic group in the South; Sipalo was Lozi, Kaunda was born and bred in northern Zambia with roots from Nyasaland; Kapwepwe was a northerner.

Secondly, both in political and communicative terms, the rise of Roy Welensky after World War II, can be understood as signifying a high point in the trajectory of Northern Rhodesia. He not only led the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland but was also instrumental in establishing a key publication that spearheaded the growth of the printed media in Zambia. We remind ourselves here that his *Northern News* was to form part of a conglomerate that would become the *Times of Zambia* at independence. It was also under his administration, that the electronic media, particularly radio, were used as an effective state propaganda tool.

Soon after the transition to independence, the *Northern News* was purchased for 200,000 pounds Sterling by the London Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (Lonrho) owned by British tycoon Roland 'Tiny' Rowland. Lonrho's media interests had already been exemplified through its purchase of the *Heinrich Syndicate*, a brewing company which owned the *Zambia Times* and a weekly titled *Zambia News*. Rowland created the *Times of Zambia* by merging *the Northern News* and the *Zambia Times*. The *Zambia News* was renamed the *Sunday Times of Zambia*.

The *Central African Mail* was purchased by the new nationalist government led by Kenneth Kaunda's UNIP and renamed the *Zambia Daily Mail* (Makayi, 1997:18).

### **2.2.3 First Republic: Challenges of security, unity and media independence**

As we venture further into the independent Zambian state or the First Republic, there are critical observations to be made about country's transition to self rule:

The first is that although African nationalists did largely work toward one common goal amidst political differences, ethnic divisions began to manifest a few years into the First Republic. Simon Kapwepwe, now state vice president, split from UNIP to form the predominantly northern-based United Progressive Party (UPP) (Simutanyi, 2008: 10). The UPP was suppressed through intimidation and violence as the first stage of pluralist politics faltered. In December 1972, UNIP declared Zambia a one party state, presumably to maintain extended control of the country (Roberts, 1995: 1013).

The Zambian case is not unique in Africa. Nyong'o (1995: 29) notes that Africans were generally agreed that the most important step to be taken was independence and development. Stratified social classes represented through competing political parties under varied ideologies stood against the current of the time. Hence single-party systems became more of a natural framework for organising democratic government on the continent.

Secondly, Zambia had inherited immense mineral wealth, particularly held in the Copperbelt region of the country. Exploitation of this wealth by the colonial administration did not benefit national development a great deal as much of it was funnelled to support British interests in southern Africa and abroad. Kaunda's government hence was initially heavily dependent upon the white controlled industrial complex in southern Africa. The Kaunda administration's dependency on imports was inadvertently stemmed by Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) which forced independent Zambia to develop its own resources: coal deposits at Maamba were discovered and exploited; new hydro-electric projects were built; tele-communications and alternative arteries established particularly, the Tazara railway through Tanzania to the port of Dar-es-salaam. UDI Rhodesia also alarmed the new Zambian government into a heightened state of security (Roberts, 1995: 1013).

Presumably, this state of alert would justify a more controlled approach to the public's right to know and the state's impetus toward controlled communication to maintain internal unity and political stability.

Thirdly, in 1968, Kaunda's government instituted the *Mulungushi Reforms* which led to the nationalisation of 80 percent of the economy, covering manufacturing, transport and construction. These were brought under the umbrella of the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO), designed to catalyse industrial growth. Government acquired 51 per cent share holding in the mining industry through its parastatals, the Mining Development Corporation (MINDECO). The Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO) was created in March 1970 as the holding company for the new state owned parastatals giants (Kaunga:[sa]).

The economic reforms had ramifications for the development and sustenance of privately owned media as the major source of revenue - advertising - was now held by the state. Conceivably, the state could order its parastatals to withdraw advertising from media entities that were too critical of its performance.

Such action was deployed against the church owned *National Mirror* (Banda, 1997:13). The consequence of nationalisation for the media was that newspapers allied to the state could be assured of a flow of advertising from the parastatals sector.

The parastatals sector is recorded to have grown by 1972 constituting 53 percent of total manufacturing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) with a 42 percent share of employment. Parastatal's share of GDP and formal employment rose to 56 per cent and 54 percent respectively by 1980 (Kaunga: [sa]: 2).

These radical economic developments coincided with the state's ambitions to incorporate the media into this emergent state super-structure. Capitalising on this changing political-economic environment, Roland 'Tiny' Rowland, chair of Lonrho, was apparently willing to trade off the partial autonomy of his flagship newspapers the *Times of Zambia and the Sunday Times of Zambia* to protect his other industrial interests in Zambia. Based on a consultative arrangement with Lonrho, the government of Zambia was allowed to appoint the editor-in-chief of the *Times Newspapers*, albeit without formal ownership of the business concerns



by the state. Lonrho however retained control over commercial matters on the *Times* (Makayi, 2007:17).

This meant that the state was now in a position to appoint the heads of all the major media which included; the *Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS)* (the forerunner of the *Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation*); the *Zambia Information Services (ZIS)*, the *Zambia Daily Mail*, the *Zambia News Agency (ZANA)* and the *Times Newspapers*. Between 1964 and 1980, some of the key editors-in-chief to have their services terminated for criticism of government actions included, Richard Hall, one of the founding editors of the pro-nationalist *Central African Mail*; Naphy Nyalugwe and Dunstan Kamana, Kaunda's former press secretary, signifying highly conflictual state - media relations (Makungu, 2004: 15).

#### **2.2.4 Securitisation of the Zambian state and its implications for the media**

At this juncture, it is tempting to attribute the concentration of political and economic power by the Kaunda government to tendencies for authoritarianism without being cognisant of some key underlying arguments concerning Zambia's post colonial challenges of nation building and security.<sup>17</sup>

For Martin (1998; 69) the slow pace of change was not simply a case of African nationalists learning the colonial bad habits and extending their own form of 'colonial administration'. Martin rather suggests that the behaviour of post colonial governments to retain colonial legislation and limit media freedom may be explained by three reinforcing principles embraced by African nationalists:

- *Unity*: because they headed mass movements, African leaders tended to organise the masses against colonialism in demanding freedom. In the post

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<sup>17</sup> It should be emphasised that the meaning of democratisation to nationalists was not consistent with features often associated with western democracies. The Habermasian public sphere, which has been discussed in section 1.1.6 and will be elaborated on in Chapter Three, is remotely relevant here because the principal aim for the emergent Zambia was to foster a collective movement toward common goals with minimal friction between ethnic groups. Therefore, the aim was to control communicative space for uniform messaging, deemed an important ingredient in national building, it can be deduced. The ambitions of classical political economy and western liberal democracy in this regard, are marginalised against the goals of the historical project of social change.

independent era the same motto was used to engender social and economic progress.

- *Development*: though ill defined, development was the goal toward which a unified nation was to advance. Freedom of expression was, as a result, peripheral to the need to work as one. Implicitly, mass media were to be state-driven. The emergence of development journalism and development support communication, he argues, is related to these principles.
- *Nationalism*: finally nationalism provided the ideological foundation for unity and development; and presented liberal values of free expression and individualism as essentially western and therefore in tension with the core values of African society.

But it is Pettman (1974:35), who perhaps places this argument into a Zambia-specific context and outlays a much more complex problem associated with these phenomena. According to this scholar, the Zambia's priority at independence was national security. Zambia had not inherited a fully fledged political and governmental system to facilitate the administration of this vast country, he posits.

Pettman suggests that because of the fragile nature of independent Zambia, national unity and consolidation of state institutions and security took precedence over concerns of democratisation. Perhaps one might understand the behaviour of the state in the First Republic toward the privately owned media in this context. Pettman asserts further that the prioritisation of national security came with the following considerations:

- The nationalist government of Kaunda needed to secure and organise government to foster an ambitious development agenda.
- The nationalists needed to consolidate their legitimacy as a government and formerly control the entire country.
- All the units of the polity, the government, the state, and the nation were underdeveloped. The sense of nation was almost non-existent

- Unity and mobilisation attained at independence dissipated within a short period of time.

The explanations advanced by Pettman seem to provide some much needed insight into the manifestation of a one party state within the first 18 years of Kaunda's rule. He posits for example that the political structure inherited at independence became unbalanced upon the withdrawal of the colonial authorities and the political forces within the country did not find expression in an environment limited in its communicative freedoms.

He argues that an interrogation of Zambian politics of the time is inadequate without looking beyond the formal arrangements of government. He proposes that an examination include not just formal structures in isolation but the individuals who occupy those structures and the political and social context in which they operate.

In this regard, he highlights the role the presidency and its development under Kaunda as being central to conditioning governance in the First Republic. As with most other African states at independence, the Presidency was characterised by the charismatic appeal and personal power of the president.

*“African presidentialism reflects the post-independence institutionalisation of the leader and the party that led the country to independence” (Pettman, 1974: 35).*

He ventures to explain that a charismatic leader has been deemed necessary and inevitable in African politics, as a unifying force for nation-building. This personalisation of power, he posits, had some influence on the structure of government after independence: Firstly, it led to centralisation of power in the hands of a few men, based on a politicised civil service.

Secondly and more importantly, it elevated the position of president in constitutional, moral and political terms to a point where cabinet - appointed and

dismissed at will by the president - would act in compliance nearly at all times. In the Zambian case, the pre-eminence of the president through constitutional arrangements gave him power over the military as commander-in-chief, the appointment of the Chief Justice, members of the Public Service Commission, and Electoral Commission.

The only serious counter-weight was parliament which had shared powers over the budget, depending on whether dissenting voices in the national assembly were sufficient to block legislation. Apart from an unlikely loss in a presidential election, parliament is the institution that would remove a president for violating the constitution, for incapacity; or gross misconduct. But the procedures are long and complicated (Pettman, 1974:35).

### **2.2.5 Presidential pre-eminence and the influence of Humanism on state media systems**

This pre-eminence of the president described by Pettman would, in the view of this researcher, explain why and how Kaunda's *Philosophy of Humanism* became so pervasive in Zambian political communications and integral to the education system, particularly in the mid 1970s and the late 1980s.<sup>18</sup>

To fully understand this premise, the thesis hereafter ventures to interrogate in some detail the *Philosophy of Humanism*, the central thinking promoted by

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<sup>18</sup> Kaunda's actions could be described as hegemonic to a great extent. The concept of hegemony has often been associated with both coercive and benign intentions in achieving multiple goals on the basis of their national interest. Mahao (2006: 1) suggests that it takes the deployment of critical theory to unmask the class character of hegemonic theory, which, he argues, conceals domination and subordination. The word 'hegemon' emanates from the Greek word for 'political leader' applied largely in terms of hegemonic stability theory, a creature of International Political Economy (IPE) which evolved in the 1970s. The concept is also used in security and war studies and in wider applications related to leadership, primacy in an international system or in reference to a state which has the capacities to dominate others (Schoeman (2007: 2-3). Schoeman (2007: 1) asserts that hegemony has tended to gravitate toward coercion in most instances, leveraging an unquestioned social order. In the context of leadership, hegemony can be understood as coercing others to accept values they may not agree with. This analogy has punctuated references to African leadership over the years particularly, the tendency to impose personal ideologies as a national system of values. Kaunda's propagation of Humanism and his deliberate efforts to embed it as a national philosophy could therefore be interpreted as such.

Kaunda which was presumed to return Zambia to a pre-colonial, man-centred African society. In the discussion, the thesis seeks to engage with the concepts advanced by Kaunda and how these seem to interact with his pronouncements on the role of the media; and in particular, the place of the *Times* and the *Sunday Times of Zambia* in an elaborate national development scheme.

Perhaps there is something to be deduced from the preamble of Kaunda's *Philosophy of Humanism* in this regard. Kenneth Kaunda conceives of colonialism as intent not just on political and economic domination but cultural subjugation as well. The presence of foreign owned media may well have been understood as being an extension of alien cultural influences.

*"This being the case, the act of political independence forms but the first part of the process of decolonisation. This process is a very long one."* (Kaunda, 1968: 3).

While acknowledging the benefits of western civilisation which he cites as the advent of science and technology and modern health facilities, he attacks the unfair distribution of wealth and the general marginalisation and suppression of African populations that the colonial state stood for. Kaunda sees the pre-colonial African society as being inherently *just* but acknowledges the need to transform it from a non-money milieu to a money economy. Traditional community, he argues, discouraged *individualism* and instead promoted *common ownership* of land and common cooperative actions that benefited all.

Although authority over property such as land was vested in the chiefs and headmen; they did so, on behalf of the people. His vision of a man-centred society seeks to place man above ideology and institutions and extend this philosophy as a commonly held virtue in post independent Zambia.

In a 34 point exposition, Kaunda explains that the aim of independence was not simply to roll back an undemocratic regime but to ensure that Northern Rhodesia embraced the principles of democracy within an African context.

Kaunda's definition of democracy projects a hostility toward individualism, tribalism and provincialism and in the same breath espouses freedom of speech and of the press (Kaunda, 1968:10). This conceptualisation of democracy or 'African democratic socialism' emphasises social aspects with equitable access to; and ownership of; national resources, including communication resources. The engineering of African democratic socialism would be a huge undertaking in mass systemic education with the deployment of educationists, sociologists and psychologists to curriculum development for primary, secondary and tertiary institutions, he explains.

Humanism therefore was envisioned to be the under-pinning for a new nation going forward, as it attempted to un-do ethnic divisions wrought by the colonial state and reverse what might be seen as half a century of cultural imperialism. His reference to the media here, in regard to the objectives of the party, is of particular interest:

*"To run and establish newsletters, newspapers or magazines in order to advance the aims and objects of the party (we have comprehensive plans afoot)"* (Kaunda, 1968:11).

While he clearly promotes the idea of freedom of speech and of the press, it is discernible that he refers to the extension of a voice to the once *voiceless* African majority rather than to the promotion of unfettered individual enterprise amongst a culturally diverse society. It is implied by Kaunda's explanation that this freedom of expression by the masses was to be managed through participation in the one legal mass movement that was UNIP, the ruling party. His aversion for unfettered individualism is also self evident. For instance, he expresses a guarded appreciation of some form of private enterprise 'within the framework of accepted government policy...' (Kaunda, 1968: 23).

The thrust of Kaunda's argument suggests that the damage wrought by colonialism caused an erosion of African values and morals and that an alternate

strategy for redress was essential. The education system was one instrument, but clearly UNIP's ownership of media would be another.

Kaunda is emphatic on the need for "discipline" in the nation, to be ensured by village or section committees at all levels. It seems highly unlikely that a *watchdog model* of the media that constantly seeks to expose those in power to ridicule and probe would have been deemed to be "disciplined" in this regard.

It is of course arguable whether Kaunda's strategy to nationalise state media systems helped to consolidate nationhood over time. Kasoma (2002:16-17), does seem to think so. He explains that Zambia was hardly a nation at independence in 1964 and it was only through the effective use of national radio which broadcast Kaunda's speeches about unity and nationhood regularly with consistent symbolism that a sense of unity was forged amongst the 73 tribes.

Kasoma argues further that the use of the slogan "One Zambia, One Nation" prior to the commencement of each news bulletin remained ingrained in the nation's psyche and has provided the foundation for nation - building. Similarly, the projection of a tribally balanced cabinet and rendition of unity in the national anthem, an adaptation of the African National Congress (ANC)'s 'Nkosi Sikeleli Africa', on national radio and television would have served the same purpose. Although only seven of the 73 languages were granted national status on radio, the messages relayed the importance of national unity while the designation of English as the official language projected a sense of neutrality. Kasoma however admits that in the long term, state media systems were used to consolidate UNIP's hold on power, presenting it as the future of the nation, particularly during the Second Republic (Kasoma, 2002:16-17).

It was not quite as easy for UNIP to colonise the *Times Newspapers* in the same manner as radio and television given that the state had not formally purchased any shares in the Lonrho entity. Despite the appointment of the editor by the president, the professional staff of the *Times* remained largely tethered to ethics and standards of practice that reflected their training or orientation within their

institution, both of which were based on western values of media freedom, at least by all indications (Makungu, 2004: 27-30).

### **2.2.6 Watershed Speech: Editorial instructions to the Times and the Zambia Daily Mail**

The defining moment for the *Times of Zambia* and the *Sunday Times of Zambia* came in 1975, when the Kaunda announced that the party - UNIP - would appropriate 100 percent share holding in the daily and 50 percent in the weekly publications. In his *Watershed Speech*, Kaunda is quoted as saying reporting by all journalists in the state owned *Zambia Daily Mail*, *the Times of Zambia*, *the Sunday Times of Zambia*, *ZANA* and *ZBS* should reflect the official thinking of the Party and its Government (Makayi, 1997:19).

Media professionals were ordered to be fully committed to the *Philosophy of Humanism* in their respective and personal capacities and promote local cultural values.

The most significant and direct form of intervention prior to the *Watershed Speech* was the uproar which led to the sacking of several journalists on the *Times of Zambia* following the publication of an article on land - related corruption involving senior party officials. After his *Watershed Speech*, UNIP apparently responded to the demands of members of its Central Committee to 'fire all journalists, take it (*Times Newspapers*) over and re-employ only UNIP loyalists' (Makayi, 1997:19).

Although the journalists were reinstated later, the action could be viewed as a warning to the *Times* establishment regarding the supremacy of the party UNIP over all spheres of development. This was re-emphasised when the state made several efforts to regulate the media through a statutory council. Journalists resisted efforts to be organised into a union as an affiliate of the Zambia Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) and hence be controlled as part of a mass movement of workers aligned to UNIP.



Journalists reacted by creating their own Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) in 1983 which was non statutory (Makungu, 2004:28). The state responded with further actions aimed at creating a Media Council to license journalists and therefore determine who practised; and later by proposing the PAZA Act.

The Act, had it succeeded, would have enabled the PAZA to de-register journalists who contravened its regulations, effectively ending their careers (Makayi: 1997: 18).

The tensions between the state and the media in the latter part of the Second Republic suggest that the strategy of controlling the media through the appointment of a supposedly partisan editor-in-chief had only limited success, particularly in the case of the *Times Newspapers*. This might be because the state's strategy was too focussed on oversight, rather than reconditioning the thinking among journalists employed by the *Times Newspapers*.

Firstly, no consensus-based alternative standards of practice and ethics was ever agreed or discussed with journalists to engender majority support for the government actions. Secondly, Zambian newspapers had internal training programmes for their journalists based on British and American standards of practice. In addition, media institutions had increasingly begun to tap into the institutionalised systems offered by the Africa Literature Centre in Kitwe's Mindolo Ecumenical Centre and the Evelyn Hone of Applied Arts and Commerce. Later in the mid 1980s, The University of Zambia commenced a degree programme in Mass Communications (Makungu: 2004: 27).

Thirdly, following the *Watershed Speech* of 1975, UNIP did not assume absolute control of shares in the *Times Newspapers* until October, 1982, which meant a fair level of independence might still have been possible. The take over of the *Times Newspapers* in 1982, finally signifies the achievement of parity between the *Times* and the rest of the state owned media.

In 1988, the Government formed the *National Media Corporation (NAMECO)* which became the umbrella agency responsible for the overall management of the state owned dailies (Firms in new hands, 1998: 3).

This move can best be described as a form of state - driven *horizontal concentration*. NAMECO was directly answerable to the presidency while the ZNBC, ZANA and ZIS, came under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services.

Although no legal provision provided for direct control by the minister, the context in which the ministry related to the electronic media does give indicators of how the NAMECO might be treated: Section 27 of the *ZNBC Act* provides for the minister of information to officially censor any broadcasts that he/she deems defamatory, blasphemous, obscene or seditious (Chanda & Liswaniso, 1999: 25). Thus, for the first time, the prospect of uniformity of content in the consolidated state media systems became imminent.

Despite these controls, the state seemed dissatisfied with the levels of compliance by its editors: Makungu (2004: 30) observes that that editors of the *Times*, Komani Kachinga, and the *Zambia Daily Mail's* Cyrus Sikazwe, were dismissed in 1990 due to their coverage of the pro-democracy movements that were emerging in the country, preceded by a failed military coup in June 1990 and unrest over deteriorating economic conditions.

### ***2.2.7 Transition to the Third Republic: Pre-eminence of the Washington Consensus***

A new formation, named the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) comprising academics, trade unionists, students and former members of Kaunda's First and Second Republican governments, emerged as a major political force in 1990, in the wake of the attempted military coup.

The MMD sold itself on neo-liberal principles inspired by the *Washington Consensus* which signify a set of policy prescriptions that were deemed capable of transforming the *Third World* in terms of economic growth and affluence (Chiluba, 1995: Taylor, 1997: 2005: Fine, Lapavitsas & Pincus, 2003).

Fine et al (2003: 1) attribute the rise of the *Washington Consensus*, which is defined by the notion of a *minimal state and free markets*, to the apparent failure of the Soviet-inspired development ideology and practice of the 1950s and 1960s. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank promoted these principles in their engagement with developing countries.

Apart from embracing this neo-liberal framework therefore, the MMD categorically stated its promotion of a *libertarian model* of the media in its manifesto: "Freedom of expression and the right to information are basic human rights. As such journalists will have to play an important role in promoting democracy and development in an MMD-led Government" (Matibini: 2006: 6). The MMD Manifesto of 1991 outlined its vision in regard to the media as follows:

- All bona fide journalists, both local and foreign, would be accredited to perform their functions without interference.
- All Publications shall be registered by the National Archives of Zambia.
- In case of conflict within mass media, a press council composed of professional representatives would be established to receive and resolve such conflicts.
- Individuals and organisations shall have a right to own and operate their own press and electronic media facilities (Matibini: 2006: 6).

While the MMD did not categorically indicate that they would privatise the state owned media, they did seem to imply a changed media policy, albeit unwritten, in the Third Republic. As noted in section 1.2.1 of Chapter One, the first five years of MMD rule witnessed the birth of several new publications as registration rules were eased. However, the economic environment did not allow for rapid growth of the printed media. Generally, the early developments under Chiluba won many

accolades from political commentators initially as the judiciary demonstrated a measure of independence, and as sections of the press, particularly the *Weekly Post*-were increasingly critical of government. However the situation seemed to stagnate within five years.

Tordoff and Young (2005: 403) observe that the momentum for change receded as the pattern of dominant party politics took root. This phenomenon, leads to a party remaining in power for prolonged periods and influencing overwhelmingly, the affairs of state (Matlosa & Karume, 2004:1).

For Tardoff and Young (2005:418-419) this is not the only cause of lack of reform. They cite the presence of powerful presidential institutions and prevalence of weak and unstable opposition parties created for personal advancement, narrow regional or ethnic interests as an underlying contributor to the problem. Parliament was not strong enough to check the “unfettered” presidential government that materialised under Chiluba. Economically, the liberal policies suffered from falling copper prices which reduced government revenue. They argue that ultimately the state’s institutional framework was not strong enough to support the market economy approach. Despite this, Chiluba’s administration managed to privatise 80 percent of the economy by March 2000.

Tardoff and Young remain unimpressed with the country’s electoral democracy: the holding of regular elections serves the minimal function of marking democracy’s survival rather than an indication of consolidation, they contend.

Interestingly, as Baker (2000: 2), O’Neil (1998: 10) and Pitts (2000: 284) have noted, Tardoff and Young also point to ‘circulation of elites’ as a cause for a loss of momentum for democratisation. It can be noted by this researcher that indeed the composition of Chiluba’s cabinet suggested a continuation of politicians from the First, Second and Third Republics. Sikota Wina and his brother Arthur became ministers in Chiluba’s first cabinet. Vernon Mwaanga, a former former Zambia representative to the United Nations under Kaunda, and the likes of Michael Sata

a former Minister of Local Government, also became influential members of Chiluba's Cabinet.

Mwaanga, controversially appointed to the post of editor-in-chief in the 1970s by Kaunda straight from being a diplomat, also served as member of the UNIP Central Committee and rose to be minister of foreign affairs and minister of information under Chiluba and subsequent MMD administrations.

With a crop of influential first generation politicians possibly accustomed to practices of the past, it remains questionable whether this cyclic form of governance would allow for radical changes to a media system that might be seen as contributing to the hold of ruling elites on state power.

While *Humanism* was no longer the ideological guiding light for the government in regard to how state media operate editorially, the practices hardly changed under MMD, by all indications. MMD, as UNIP before it, continued to allow the powerful presidency to appoint or certainly influence the appointment of the editor-in-chief and managing director of the state newspapers, including the *Times*. The media policy of the MMD released in 1996 did not cast any doubt on the supervisory role the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services plays in the operations of the state media systems in Zambia (Zambia: 1996: 19).

Here, it is important perhaps to recall that this thesis has suggested that the motivation for control of media systems in the post independence era or First Republic could be deduced as being related to the need for unity, nation-building and forging a common national identity.

There was the added assumption that matters of security, given Zambia's geopolitical locus in southern Africa amidst raging liberation wars, might also have edged the state to stifle private or foreign media ownership. However, no strong security argument for continued control of the media appears viable in the 1990s. Nor is there a strong argument for ethnic integration and unity as a reason for the

failure to privatise. Certainly, no major indication of ethnic tensions has yet reared its head in Zambia in the last 20 years to warrant controlled media systems.

The only persistent explanation for retarded media reforms seems to be related strongly to the *recycled leadership and dominant party hypothesis* which suggests that while political administrations have changed four times in Zambia at presidential level, the substance of the leadership remains the same and the political system sustains a single influential party over extended periods.

The cyclic nature of presidential politics implies that *mindsets and beliefs* regarding media power may still be the guiding light of ruling elites in Zambia.

These practices and beliefs might not be dissimilar to the ideas advanced by Kaunda in *Humanism Part I*, despite Zambia embracing *Washington Consensus principles* at an economic level, under MMD.

In summary, the fore-going underscores the complex nature of change. The path to democracy is convoluted, and complicated by unforeseen internal and external dictates.

It is, perhaps, understandable why different cultures will render different interpretations of democracy, given the radically varied contexts in which change occurs. This poses challenges for scholars and citizens alike as to what constitutes progress or regression and how these phenomena may be measured to ensure a common understanding across cultures.

In the next section, this chapter discusses the key scientific methods that are commonly used to measure democracy, some of which foreground freedom of expression and of the press, freedom of association and assembly.

## 2.3 MAKING SENSE OF ZAMBIA'S DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS

The case of Zambia certainly shows how complex the notions of democratisation and democracy are. Casual interpretation of events over four decades could quite easily mislead one into concluding that the country has regressed or stagnated as a result of adopting radically different political models over the last 45 years. Eshetu Chole warns against this:

*“Social struggles are fought and won by stages, each stage being richly textured with advances and setbacks. Gains that appear minor when viewed in isolation may cumulatively add up to achievements not to be ignored. This is true of democratisation experiments in Africa”* (Chole, 1995:3).

Certainly there may be cumulative benefits from the three Zambian Republics which could have translated into positive developments over time. Perhaps one such instance is the organisation of journalists into unions such as the ZUJ and professional associations, such as PAZA following years of fighting state encroachment on their sector.

The other would be the numerous efforts of Zambians to establish privately owned media despite the economic limitations and the threat posed by a largely colonial constitutional - legal framework. These steps have been incremental, though not substantial.

The one-party state protagonists might also argue that they ensured political stability - a rarity in Africa. And because of their efforts to concentrate power and focus national efforts, Zambia enjoyed four decades of peace and stability. Their assertions could include their use of media messages tailored toward unity and nation building. Certainly, there is veracity in the argument that stability might have formed the underpinnings for change in political, economic and communicative terms in the present day.

### **2.3.1 Measuring democracy**

While understanding progress anywhere, least of all Zambia, seems an exercise in futility, scholars posit that there are credible and systematic measurements employed in political science to analyse democracy and democratisation which include *categorical, standards-based, survey-based or objective measures* (Mattes, 2003; Landman, 2005; Kekic, 2007). None of them are holistic or universally acceptable.

The various approaches to measurement are not without their short comings. Landman (2005:20-25) observes that the methods generally ignore historical processes of both socio-economic and political change at domestic and at global political levels. Categorical, standards-based, survey-based or objective measures all have merits and demerits, but the scholar argues for the inclusion of traditional forms of rule, nomadic populations and indigenous populations in developing core indicators that speak to alternative forms of organisation and representation. As Alvandi and Hakala, (2007: 5) and Parry and Moran (1994: 1) note in section 1.1.3 of this Chapter, Landman concedes that the term democracy remains ‘unfixed and is therefore flexible’ (Landman, 2005: 26).

At another level, the presence in the legal and constitutional framework of provisions that protect basic civil, political and socio economic rights provides a foundation for the inference of measurement of political democracy. Kekic (2007:1) is instructive in dividing the measurements into ‘thin’ concepts and ‘thick’ concepts. ‘Thin’ concepts are the legislative measurement and ‘thick’ are based on process.

Thin measurements are benchmarked against the International Human Rights Instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), among others. Measurements seek to infer the extent to which these provisions are reflected in the national legal and constitutional framework. In terms of the ‘thin’



measurement system, a state may be *de jure* democratic but be *de facto* one party dominant which suggests another form of governance.

The measurements applied by Freedom House, the US-based political think – tank, define democracy as a competitive multi-party political system whose outcomes are determined by regularly contested elections (Kekic, 2007:1). Freedom House’s index for measuring democracy is well known. It applies 10 indicators on a 1 to 7 scale to measure political freedom and 15 indicators to assess civil liberties. Kekic observes that Freedom House measures a narrower concept of ‘electoral democracy’ which he describes as a minimalist approach.

The approach assumes that fair and free practices are instituted which allow significant public access to campaigning parties; where the principle of secrecy of the ballot is upheld and where resources, presumably including communication resources; are accessible to all contestants. In evaluating these approaches, Almond and Verba (1963:3), and Kekic (2007:1-8) all agree that democracy transcends legalistic benchmarks and is rather also about values, attitudes, processes and civic culture. It is noted by a number of scholars that the Freedom House approach conceives of the emerging democracies in Africa as falling in categories such as: “illiberal”; “liberal” “free” “electoral” and “Pseudo or “virtual” democracies (Zakaria: 2003: Mattes; 2003; Landman: 2005). These criteria are defined as follows:

- **Illiberal democracies:** they have general characteristics of free and fair elections, relatively free press, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association. They are weak at protecting citizens from discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion, gender. They may be punctuated by torture, death in custody and ill treatment signifying a chasm between institutional dimensions of democracy and civil and minority rights on the other hand. Landman contends that countries with presidential systems, amongst these, have been the most unstable due to the extra-constitutional behaviour of presidents that makes the protection of rights precarious (Landman, 2005: 23).

- **Liberal or ‘free’ democracies:** Embrace the full range of political freedoms and civil rights with competitive politics. Mattes (2003: 78) places South Africa, Namibia and Botswana in this group. But all have dominant power structures that can inhibit effective competition, hence raising the possibility of them being semi-democratic.
  
- **Electoral Democracies:** Have political competition with an insufficient protection of rights. Freedom House rates Malawi, Tanzania, Mozambique and Lesotho as ‘partly free’.
  
- **Pseudo or virtual democracies:** Zambia has been rated amongst the countries that hold elections and allow opposition parties. But competition, pluralism and rights of *association, speech and media* are actively controlled by the state (Mattes, 2003: 78).

### **2.3.2 Zambia: A Pseudo-democracy?**

The categorisation of Zambia as a ‘virtual or Pseudo-democracy’ lends itself to further interrogation in regard to how it has protected its citizens’ communicative freedoms through the three republics and more generally how the political actors respond to the constitutional rules.

Once again it can be noted that the emerging picture is one of a Zambian state that had inherited some modicum of liberalised political space in the First Republic, reversed this model in 1972 (Second Republic), adopted a one party system of government in 1973 and succumbed to exogenous and endogenous factors in 1991, leading to plural politics once again. Since 1991, it has held competitive elections in 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2008 with disputes being channelled and settled legally through the judicial system.

Apart from recycled leadership, the constant in this transition has been the legal provisions largely inherited from the colonial administration of Roy Welensky, which remained to a great extent unchanged.

While the legal architecture allowed for the existence of private media it was debilitating in its penalties where transgression on the person of the president and encroachment on restricted public information, was concerned. Freedom House's categorical analysis will be seen to have some, if not much, merit in this regard considering that no clear definition of some legal impediments such an explanation of what constitutes *state security*, or *sedition*, is presented in the legal instruments that govern citizen rights to self expression and access to public information in Zambia (Chanda & Liswaniso, 2006: 73-102).

However this categorisation could be challenged on the grounds that despite the legal environment, civil society and media activists were able to organise themselves into trade unions and professional associations that won some key legal battles in a judiciary that has itself shown some modicum of independence. We could deepen this argument and relate to the capacity of the Zambian society to form political parties, establish private radio and newspaper outlets and influence to some degree the complexion of national parliament.

Zambia clearly exhibited the emergence of a middle class (intellectuals, unionists, students who formed MMD) that was able to position itself for political change by the 1990s. While Zambia's elections since 1991 have been disputed, potential conflict has been averted as aggrieved parties have tended to proceed through courts of law by launching election petitions at both presidential and parliamentary levels (FODEP, 2002: 59-61).

Within this atmosphere, Zambians were able to organise across religious and political divides and prevent their second president Frederick Chiluba from altering the constitution to extend his two terms in office in 2001 (Chirambo, Erasmus & Nel, 2003:3).

Civil society and media have also had some success in introducing an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act and are discussing a Freedom of Information Bill; though the application of the former legislation is still being contested in courts of law in regard to the composition and control of the IBA (Matibini, 2006: 80-89). These phenomena appear to point to a nation in a state of lethargic progression but progression none the less.

Using economic measurements to determine the durability of democracies however relegates much of what might have been achieved in Zambia to the back row of development. Mattes (2003:79) suggests there is a point where democracy is almost certainly irreversible; that there are economic conditions extending 'democratic endurance' and therefore its sustainability.

The fundamental thrust of this argument holds that wealthy democracies with a Gross National Product (GNP) per capita above \$ 6001 United States dollars are unlikely to collapse and will be considered at that point to have crossed the threshold of no return or on their way to consolidation (another contested concept). But the scholar does concede that there is an exception in the case of Argentina, which fell apart at the turn of century due to complex economic downturns.

Studies in this area, he adds, place the emerging democracies of Southern Africa, including Zambia, in a rather precarious position, with the longest survival rating of 36 years being held by the Botswana and South Africa both having recorded a GNP per capita of more than \$3000 in 1999. The underlying discourse relating to this study points to Zambia as potentially a country that may suffer democratic reversal.


### ***2.3.3 Survey-based methods: Public perception of a 'democratic' Zambia***

Lastly, the other key measurement tool for democracy is perception based. It is imperative, having dabbled into the political and economic measurement modalities to determine the democratic endurance, to seek the opinion of

Zambian citizens themselves on how they assess governmental performance in this regard.

The Afrobarometer, an instrument deployed jointly by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Michigan State University, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) in Ghana and the University of Cape Town (UCT) employs survey-based methods which gauge public confidence in their institutions, government performance and their understanding and expectations of democracy (Lolojih, 2005). The Afrobarometer, which has undertaken a systematic survey of ordinary Africans' views and attitudes towards democracy, markets and civil society, provides extensive insights into how citizens view their government's performance on the economy and on governance more generally. As part of a broader exercise undertaken in countries that had instituted economic reform, the Afrobarometer in the July-August 2005 surveyed all nine provinces of Zambia, using a multi-staged, stratified area cluster sampling approach. A total of 1200 Zambians 18 years and older were randomly selected in proportion to the relative size of each area in the population. The study took into account gender proportionality and respondents had a median age of 37 years. Thirty seven 37 % of the respondents were urban-based and 63 % rural (Lolojih, 2005:1).

**Figure 2: Support for Democracy: A comparative analysis**



Source: Lolojih (2005: 1).


Although Zambians in this survey projected a rather gloomy picture in terms of their appreciation of the government’s performance on the economy, Afrobarometer studies show they in general endorse the country’s trajectory toward democracy thus far. At least slightly over 60 % of Zambians still believed in the efficacy of their democracy. Zambia ranks 11th in this core, with countries such as Senegal, Ghana, Kenya, Botswana, South Africa and Nigeria, showing higher levels of public satisfaction with their democracies.

Zambians also ‘strongly disapprove’ of a reversion to authoritarian regimes or presidential dictatorships characteristic of the Second Republic. In short, there appeared to be hope for the future in Zambia at the time of the study despite the perceived deficit in service delivery by the government. Zambians will probably

feel there is more room to engender change, including media reforms, under the multiparty system than under the one party regime of the Second Republic.

Similar studies undertaken by Afrobarometer in 2009 ((Ismail, 2010/10/06), with modified questions show that 39% of Zambians feel their democracy still has many problems. Twenty five (25%) believe the problems are minor, while 22% trust that it is a full democracy. A mere 5% hold that it is not a democracy. The remaining 8% either did not understand or not know. Overall, when we combine those who believe Zambia either has minor or major problems, we find that while the majority of the country's citizens, at 64%, believe Zambia is a democracy, they believe it is grappling with many problems.

**Figure 3: Perceptions of democracy by Zambians**



**Source: Ismail (2010/10/06).**

Barometer studies can be useful in gauging the political temperature in a given country and possibly underlining the potential for endurance that a country might expect. However, they are but a snapshot in time and do lack depth; they are impersonal and will hence not necessarily expand on the nature of the disgruntlement amongst citizens but they do provide a basis for understanding public support for democracy on a regular basis.

## 2.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The fore-going suggests that the path to democratisation is a long, convoluted one. Scholars have been divided for decades on the definition of democratisation or democracy as neither concept lends itself to closure. Perhaps, the African context is even more challenging as the nationalist sense of progress was measured not in the plurality of their politics or the range of media that would have merged but in terms of the liberation of the black majority from colonial rule fore-mostly.

This was followed by the consolidation of national identity; the fostering of unity and development and the nationalisation of the means of production and strategic institutions such as media, as part of a broad nation-building agenda. Kenneth Kaunda's *Humanism Part I* is explicit, if not instructive, in this regard.

It is worth reiterating that Zambia emanated from a colonial background where ethnic consciousness was accentuated by the divisive policy of its British masters, which ostensibly pitted one tribe against the other. These divisions were to pose immense challenges for nationalising elites as the independence movement grew in the 1950s.

Within the white settler community, there were divisions amongst those that sought total independence from Britain with closer links to Rhodesia and South Africa; and those that campaigned for continued oversight from the motherland. These tensions naturally sought a vent for their political frustrations and ambitions. Although preceded by the *Livingstone Pioneer*, it was the formation of the *Livingstone Mail* in 1906 which signified organised settler communication as local politics matured. Subsequent efforts by pro-settler and pro-colonial office activists resulted in a number of publications materialising but the legal environment rendered it difficult for the registration of the print press; and impossible for the ownership of electronic media.



The electronic media remained the domain of the state and an extension of the British propaganda machinery during the Second World War. The rise of Roy Welensky to the position of prime minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had both political and communicative significance.

Prior to this ascendancy, he had shown that he was not only adept at using electronic media for political propaganda against the emergent nationalists, he also held the distinction of having established the *Northern News* - a fore-runner of the *Times Newspapers* - and used it effectively to promote his political ambitions.

Although we see little in terms of ownership of the media by African nationalists; it is clear that they benefited from the efforts of pro-nationalist publishers such as Dr Alexander Scott. Over time, Africans such as Sikota Wina were able to launch their own publications as independence approached in 1964, albeit with limited success. In the mainstream printed media, Africans rose to editorship on the *Central African Mail*, allowing for the subsequent rise in indigenous journalism. The agenda for democratisation set by nationalists is inextricable from media development as the need for the extension of a voice to the voiceless masses was recognised by its key protagonists.

The nationalisation of the major print media in independent Zambia, along with wholesale re-possession of the means of production by the nationalist government of Kenneth Kaunda, should not perhaps be seen in parochial terms as simply a brazen act of authoritarianism. It should rather be contextualised within the challenges faced by Zambia at various stages of its democratisation process.

The first of these challenges was *nation-building*. The divisions caused by colonialism were seen as threatening to a new government as it sought to organise all actors and institutions into one common agenda for development. The media were integral to these plans of unity and national identity construction; hence the move to control them.

The second was *national security*: Zambia entered its First Republic at odds with UDI Rhodesia and supporting the liberation of the southern Africa region despite it being dependent on the industrial complex controlled by the white settler regimes of the south. Media control could easily be seen as an essential step in ensuring that a country threatened by institutional weakness, ethnic divisiveness and potentially, an external invasion, did not accentuate internal fault-lines by allowing unfettered, if not conflictual, communication. The gradual take over of the *Times Newspapers*, previously owned by British Tycoon Tiny Rowland's Lonrho, signified part of a strategic plan best exemplified by the ambitions of Kaunda's *Philosophy of Humanism* which promoted a return to a disciplined, man-centred African society or *African democratic socialism*. This philosophy was clearly hostile toward western values of individualism and free expression.

While a case could be made for state control under the circumstances of the First and possibly parts of the Second Republics, there is little to support the same for the Third Republic which does not appear in immediate danger of ethnic conflict or external intervention. Despite this, the MMD government led by President Chiluba and subsequently by Levy Mwanawasa and now Rupiah Banda, has shown little interest in driving a new agenda for partial or total privatisation of the state owned media which remain a point of contention amongst political actors. Not only has the legal and constitutional framework largely remained the same through a 45 year period but the leadership of Zambia has been recycled essentially assigning many of the same people to ministerial roles in different administrations over four decades.

It has been suggested by scholars that this phenomenon is part of the problem of the lethargic progress in the democratisation process as the post-colonial mindsets amongst policy makers appears to prevail still, negating any significant shift in media reform.

Though cyclic, at times uncertain, Zambia's democratisation process appears to enjoy a fair level of support from the masses, perhaps signifying potential for further endurance, at least according to the Afro-barometer's public opinion surveys. Subsequent surveys concluded in 2009, suggest 64% of Zambians still believe their democracy has either major or minor problems.

Scaler and categorical measurements of democracy, controversial as they might be, however seem to suggest the country is a *virtual or pseudo-democracy* due to a variety of reasons, one of which is continued state control of the media. Yet liberal democracy remain the goal of Zambia's ruling party - at least in its manifesto (Chiluba, 1995: 126 -127).

In the larger scheme of things, the challenge of modelling a media system that is tolerant of individual enterprise but tethered still to state control of mainstream media raises serious questions about the condition and manner of what has been termed the *public sphere* by German scholar Jurgen Habermas. It should be noted that private media in Zambia have tended to have a short lifespan due to harsh economic conditions and, sometimes, due to the threat of legal sanctions from the state.

Under a democratising regime, community radio has grown allowing for the emergence of small spaces for interactions amongst various publics but the only media with significant nation - wide reach remains the state controlled television and radio anchored by two dailies, the *Times Newspapers* and the *Daily Mail*, a

set of weeklies, local language newspapers and a developmental communication network.

Despite the existence of the *Post Newspapers*, the only privately owned daily, and perhaps the only viable private print media entity at present, the influence of the state apparatus appears to be a source of concern for scholars and political actors alike. Obviously, this is because resources and infrastructure play a key role in determining the influence of media systems on democratisation as Tomaselli pointedly observes:

*“...the economic aspects of the media play an important role in assessing what contribution they can make to democratisation on the continent”*  
(Tomaselli, 2002:129).

The question of control and distribution of media resources hence becomes a more pronounced source of conflict in an environment where ideas are expected to be openly contested.

The next chapter pursues this discussion on democratisation from a theoretical perspective by critically analysing the extent to which this form of political change may realistically portend well, for free expression and free press.

It examines the origins and application of political economic theory to communication studies and positions the discussion in both historical and contemporary times, seeking to map the evolution and understanding of these concepts in an environment characterized by rapid technological advancement. It formulates arguments and counter arguments relating to how politics and technology interface; how media, including privately owned media, may not necessarily be immune to indirect forms of political control, despite privatisation for instance. It will discuss everything from traditional mass media to alternative

media and how they may or may not revolutionarise politics and freedom of expression. The chapter essentially lays the foundation for the empirical engagement in Chapter Four.

## CHAPTER THREE

# POLITICAL ECONOMY, THE PUBLIC SPHERE AND DEMOCRATISATION: A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

The primary interest of this chapter is to engender a deeper understanding of the origins and application of theories of political economy to communications studies in order to fully comprehend the influence of political change on the *Times Newspapers*. In so doing, the chapter seeks to lay a theoretical map of how *democratisation* will be linked to the notion of *public sphere* through a *political economic analysis*. The principal objectives of the chapter are the following:

- To unpack the origins and application of theories of political economy - the foundation of this thesis - to communications studies.
- To highlight the key linkages between theories of political economy, public sphere and democratisation.
- To discuss the notion of nationalisation, liberalisation and commercialisation as they relate to the media.
- To engage with the concept of the public sphere in a changing technological environment.

Ostensibly, the study of communications in the context of political economy seeks to understand the link between modern forms of communication and the historical and institutional organisation of production, power and ideology (Sussman 1999:85-86). Political economy captures the sense of ownership, control, media behaviour, labour rights and the power relations governing the distribution of communication resources and conflict over them (Mosco, 2000: 104).

The democratic imperatives manifest within this discourse as labour seeks to negotiate its existence, agitates for better working conditions and communicative space for media workers. The ownership question, it has been noted, also raises the possibility of either increased citizen participation in policy discourses or a decline in the discursive space which communication theorist Jurgen Habermas termed the *public sphere* (Habermas, 1989).

This is ever more evident in cases where states or markets impose conditions or negative influences upon the editorial functioning of newspapers, radio and television stations that they may own, despite purportedly embracing democracy which underscores liberty and justice.

It is important to mention on the onset, that this discussion is framed against the sustained optimism for improved communicative rights generated by the rapid advancements in Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in the recent past. Media convergence - the capacity to use one digital platform to deliver multiple media channels - is evidently creating a new media age (McPhillips & Merlo, 2008: 237-253).

Digitisation and technological convergence have rendered it easier for cross - media pollination and raised the need for multi-skilled practitioners therefore potentially changing the very nature of the professional practice of journalism (Erdal, 2007:51-56).

Despite the excitement over the emancipatory nature of these *alternative media*, however, it is palpable that the radical disposition of this transformation has lately caused some states to revise their policy frameworks governing the internet, digital broadcasting and other global commons. While on the one hand, there is an opportunity for progressive changes, actions by some states may not only enfeeble communication systems for supporting civil society but in effect, threaten their very existence (Hadl, 2009:3).

Undoubtedly, the internet - a key invention in this patchwork of technologies - has the incredible capacity to link with traditional media and provide individuals the potential to reach global audiences (Couldry & Curran, 2003:5). In addition, mobile media technologies can be harnessed to organise, plan and coordinate political actions, including insurrections, demonstrations and elections (Rheingold, [sa]:17)

In fact, it is felt that mobile phone technologies present the most feasible means for empowering Africans economically and politically. The continent has seen a phenomenal 200 % increase in mobile phone usage in the past five years which has enhanced the populace's interaction with markets and with social networks. However, low literacy levels, low income, unreliable electricity supplies, corruption and taxation and signal limitations inhibit even higher rates of growth on the continent. Ultimately, repressive governments may impede progress by imposing high tariff barriers on cell phone usage to prevent mass mobilisation by activists and opposition elements (Millicevic [sa]).

Therefore, the triumphalism attached to internet and mobile phone technologies as tools for political change has to be restrained through a more contextualised consideration of the glaring realities of emerging democracies, particularly the ability of states to suppress political expression and the lack of economic capacity amongst citizens to exploit these apparatus as alternatives to traditional media systems.

Given those limitations, this thesis is generally biased toward the examination of traditional mass media in its articulation of notions of political economy and the public sphere.

At the base of this discussion is the slippery nature of *democracy* as a concept. While liberal theorists extol rights and procedures as though they were unassailable, practitioners are often confronted with the harsh realities of democracy's character in practice.



Huntington (1991:168-169) for example notes that the third wave of democracy in the 1990s may have been exciting but it has often brought disenchantment as leaders betrayed the interest of their followers to achieve their intended goal.

Przeworski (1991:182) views this disconnectedness as essentially transforming what was meant to be a *negotiated democracy* into increasing *autocratic practice*. Like Giuseppe Di Palma (1990: 23-109) who doubts that democracy should be associated with social progress at all, Przeworski expunges the notion that democracy is intent on advancing general public good or that it is reflective of general public will. He argues that it is a contest decided by powerful competing forces: losing parties in elections simply choose to maintain stability by accepting the results and await their turn at the next polls.

Di Palma (1990: 28) augments this by suggesting that the whole notion of democracy becomes workable only when powerful groups find the idea of co-existence attractive enough to warrant an agreement on the rules of the political game. Without this understanding, the system will likely be undermined or destabilised. Democracy could therefore be seen as a playground for *the powerful* rather than a theatre where equal citizenship is nurtured.

This rather pessimistic view of democracy perhaps entices one to exercise caution in analysing political change in Africa. Firstly, not all promises are met by political elites. Secondly, an illusion of democracy is likely to endure where dominant parties extend their rule for long periods. Collusion over the outcomes and access to resources is highly likely as powerful groups seek to co-exist at the expense of the masses.

The possible consequence would be to undermine some fundamental rights including freedom of expression, association and assembly which might form a basis for legitimate citizen reaction.

The case of Zambia has been explained in Chapter Two with its colonial and post colonial practices in regard to democracy and the media. The tendency toward

centralisation of power and recycling leadership is noted as being problematic in regard to how freedom of the press has been exercised and how the policies of liberalisation and privatisation of the media industry have been implemented.

At one level, the divisive nature of colonialism seems to have provided a strong argument for the nationalists in terms of their decisions to bring all major media under state control, largely for the purpose of forging a common national identity and national unity amongst the 73 ethnic groups that formed the new Zambian nation.

At another level, the re-emergence of multiparty competition in the 1990s, while ushering in new media in the form of privately owned newspapers, community radio and television, seems to have frightened successive governments into breaking their electioneering promises. They have maintained their hold over state radio, television and daily newspapers presumably for purposes of sustaining a competitive edge over opposition parties.

Explaining these phenomena, Sussman (1999:85-87) posits that whether a regime is democratic or authoritarian, it is inherently unstable over time and will primarily be concerned with self preservation. As a consequence, it would seek to control the outlook, behaviour and welfare of others, and influence the mode of discourse by injecting language practices into concepts that legitimise its institutions and system of political economic organisation.

In this regard, it can be noted that in Zambia's *First and Second Republics*, there was a pre-eminence of the *Philosophy of Humanism* and *One Partyism* in the language discourse of the Kaunda administration. In Chiluba's multiparty *Third Republic*, the discourse accommodated diversity but the practices were cautious toward media liberalisation, deregulation and ultimately hostile toward media privatisation.

The idea therefore that media densification experienced in the past 19 years of multiparty democracy in Zambia is by itself an indicator of a widening freedom of

expression is contestable, given that the politicians in government still decide who benefits from communication resources. Rather than an expansion of the forums for public expression, it can be argued that media ownership benefits a privileged few middle to upper class citizens who have the means to own them and express their political views. It might also be a manifestation of a growing economic per-degree of an upper capitalist class bent on colonising the available media space for purely commercial intent, rather than contribute to an out-spring of political energy.

The ultimate losers are the poor and marginalised, whose only means of wider expression might be an accessible publicly funded national communications system, which could accommodate multilingual social interaction. Besley and Burgess (2002:1415-1416) typify these assertions by underlining the importance of information flows - essentially the role of mass media - in triggering government responsiveness to the needs of the poor.

They lament however, that vulnerable groups in society are usually poorly informed and less inclined to vote as their access to media systems and therefore current issues, may be limited.

The scholars emphasise the importance of media ownership patterns in enabling wider social interaction, policy discourse and accountability in this regard.

The merits of media in private ownership is supported by recent research which suggests that press freedom is linked to lower levels of corruption in cross-country data. Studies on media ownership patterns also indicate that state ownership of the media negatively correlates with good government. In addition, societies with more privately owned media and distinct provisions for press freedom experience shorter tenures of politicians (Besley & Burgess, 2002:1415-1416).

Within the discourse on democratisation, political economy is concerned with interrogating government's responsiveness to the needs of citizens. This is noted as especially relevant in low income countries where limited or absent market

opportunities constrain the ability of vulnerable populations to advance in life and cause them to rely heavily on the state to drive interventions for their survival. The critical issue for scholars therefore is to determine what institutions - economic, social and political - could be crafted to improve state effectiveness (Besley & Burgess, 2002:1415).

Against this background, a political economic analysis of Zambia's history provides a holistic understanding of the political, economic and social context under which decisions and actions on media control and regulation have originated and their influence on communicative activity in the long term.

Sussman (1997: 3-6) argues that a political economy analysis is distinct from media-centric approaches because it places emphasis on production or supply instead of consumption or demand as the determining moment. Understanding the political means of organising and allocating resources and energy he asserts, provides a basis for explaining society's communication needs and practices.

Because the thesis is couched under the broad context of political change - *democratisation* - to be more specific, the need to explain the influence of political elites, economic policies, state and political institutions, civil society and social divisions within Zambian society arises.

Adesoji (2006:43) reiterates that the approaches to explaining the patterns of democratisation across the globe are generally summarised in three theoretical approaches:

- *The modernisation approach*: it lays emphasis on the level of social and economic development and its centrality to the process of democratisation.
- *The transition approach*: it foregrounds political processes, elite initiatives and choices as accounting for progress from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy. The hallmark of this approach is to argue that strategies and interventions of political elites could benefit or undermine democracy. The

theoretical approach holds that ultimately democratisation is dependent mainly on what individuals and elites do; when and how they do it.

- *The structural approach* to democratisation is anchored around a fundamental premise that inter-relationships between particular structures of power - economic, social and political could - as they change over time - constrain or expand opportunities for elites and other actors to pursue democracy (Adesoji, 2006:43).

This thesis is concerned with transitions and their influence on media development. The question of political elites and their practices is central to the discussion on why the major media remain in the control and ownership of the state after forty five years of independence in Zambia. While the thesis interrogates political and economic structures, it does so by examining the policy decisions and actions made by political elites at various stages of Zambia's political development. The approach is hence, largely *transitional* in context, despite embracing key elements of what has been termed the *structural approach* to democratisation.

The key issues in a political economy analysis of these transitions in this perspective would be to emphasise the actions of politicians; their responsiveness to citizen demands; the need to evaluate existing institutions and build - if necessary - new models; and finally ensuring that state or public media provide reasonable space to meet the informational and communication needs of the populace.

The case of the *Times Newspapers* may therefore present a microcosm of how political actions have conspired to either undermine or energise the liberalisation and privatisation of the media sector. These actions will likely influence the ability of the wider public to *fully* exercise their informational and communicational rights in a country seemingly tethered to a democratic agenda; or provide insights into whether emerging democracies such as Zambia require more creative forms of

communal institutions that might address ethnic and political divides specific to the country's social-cultural environment.

### **3.2 THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMIC THEORIES**

Political economy, as Eileen R. Meehan (2007:1) notes, is the body of theory from which communication scholars glean knowledge and methods for understanding the rules and regulatory strictures that define the parameters for expression.

Ostensibly, this knowledge of how rules and relationships govern cultural production increases the level of appreciation of the nature of the news product.

This plethora of theories attempting to explain economic phenomena have largely sought to establish a relationship between economic theory and political ideas and actions in a bi-directional sense (Waterman, 2002:14).

Although there has been some tension as to whether political economy is an art or a science, the main thrust of academic discourse in the 19<sup>th</sup> century seemed to suggest that it was an art concerned with explaining production, distribution and exchange of wealth primarily (Sidgwick, 1883: 13).

Waterman (2002:13) traces the mutation of the body of theories that form the modern discourse of political economy to the year 1611, embodied in a treatise on government by L. de Mayerne-Turquet; and to Antonyne de Montchretien, Seur de Watteville in 1615-1621.

The intellectual ambitions of these scholars Waterman notes, was to generalise Aristotle's 'economics' to the level of state or commonwealth. It has been observed that Aristotle held economics as a form of household management and sought to extend this art of estate administration to the requirements and resources of the modern state.

The term *political economy* was apparently first employed by Sir James Steuart in his *Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy in 1767*. According to Steuart the term *economy* related to the art of providing for the needs of a family with prudence and frugality. In this context, the entire economy is directed by the head of the estate. He sets the laws of his economy and is therefore both lord and steward. Steuart distinguished domestic economy from political economy thus: political economy is vested in a state but is not entirely the preserve of the statesman. The statesman essentially is challenged to consider a diversity of operations, circumstances, habits and customs of people and introduce a range of institutions to manage social-political relations in the distribution of resources (Sidgwick 1883:15).

Adam Smith (1910:241-250) in his *Wealth of Nations* nine years after Steuart, presented a different role for the statesman whom he saw as providing an enabling environment for empowering the people to generate wealth. Smith suggests two clear objectives of political economy which he assumes would enrich both the people and the state:

- The first is to provide sufficient revenue or subsistence for the people or enable them provide such revenue for themselves.
- The second is to supply the state with the revenue sufficient for the public service.

His articulation of political economy represents what Waterman (2002: 14-15) calls a “decisive rejection” of the original ideas from scholars such as Steuart and Montechrentien. Smith agitated for wide spread *Laissez faire* founded on principles of *liberty* and *justice*. Adam Smith is hence credited with establishing the analytical distinction between the *normative* sense of political economy, which his predecessors understood as a system of policy design that would increase riches and power of a country; and a *positive*, more orthodox sense embracing an open-ended inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations.

Smith's doctrine is characterised by the following key elements which he and his supporters deem necessary for the advancement of modern society both politically and economically:

- Free competition in regard to distribution.
- Proportionate rewards to service.
- Self reliance.
- Intellectual freedom.
- Division of labour.
- Non interference (legislatively or administratively, by the state in the market).
- Limitation of government (Smith 1910: 4-441).

It can be deduced from this discussion that the foundations of modern liberalism are to be found in Smithian doctrines. Certainly, the notion of liberalisation and its application to the communications sector could also be understood in this sense.

Scholars such as David Ricardo were also steeped in Smithian thinking, but distinguished their ideas from Smith's by suggesting some forms of legislative controls to markets to safeguard the wellbeing of the poor (Sidgwick, 1883:22).

The 19<sup>th</sup> century hence, saw a coterie of philosophical revolutionaries led by Smith, John Stuart Mill, and Ricardo through their varying views and confluence of ideas begin to shape the body of theory representing classical political economy. The coherence in theory appears to have matured around the 1820s ranged on the rationality of non-intervention, pro-free-trade and anti-poor-law consensus (Waterman 2002:19).

But it is Karl Marx, the socialist scholar, who seems to have provided the most holistic analysis of political economy that has to this day inter-disciplinary remit. Marxian political economy is seen as being basically Smithian with modifications to key assumptions in order to predict spontaneous disorder and the fall of capitalism brought about by self-interested individual capitalists.



His pre-occupation with the class struggle and the place of the worker in the universe controlled by powerful capitalist forces lures scholars into interrogating the context of labour relations and rights in industry even as political and economic systems change (Waterman, 2002: 19).

Gerald Sussman (1999: 85-87) is instructive when he argues that the Marxian or neo-Marxian tradition of political economy provides for what he calls *“the intellectual self defense of working people and a call to resistance and action for the kind of social change that put people and common welfare ahead of personal and private accumulation and privilege”*.

In short, while Smithian and Ricardian doctrines are anchored by the notion of *free markets* and *comparative advantage*, Marxian political economy is seen as not only holistic but is also rooted in philosophy, social theory and economics; and, in addition addresses class conflict (Milward 2000:14). The distinctive and holistic nature of Marx’s political economy renders it relevant to all aspects of social theory, Milward asserts. The thrust of his argument, in aid of Marx, addresses the idea that understanding any system requires that one comprehends “the systemic whole”.

Indeed, Marx places the economic system as the primary foundation upon which all aspects of society are framed, including existing forms of social consciousness. Political and legal systems will vary depending on the economic structures. For him, in the capitalist system the notion of “freedom” and “representative democracy”, is all but an illusion conjured by the dominant class to serve their interests and perpetuate class relations formed out of relations of production. Similarly, the legal system serves the ruling class who would have the means to seek effective representation as opposed to disadvantaged citizens (Milward, 2000:21).

For Marx, not only is the legal structure in capitalism semi-autonomous, all superstructures are born of the economic structure which conditions power

relations within society. This would include media institutions. In Marxian philosophy, change in society can only be accorded through a change in the relations of production and thus through a change in the economic structure.

In explicating political economy from a communicative perspective, Sussman (1999:85-87) traces the critical sociology of communication to the Marxian age where there was a recognition that modern communications and transportation were integral to the corporate industrial complex.

McQuail (1994:84) underscores this point by observing that the media institution has come to be understood over time by scholars as being part and parcel of the economic system with close links to the political system.

### **3.2.1 Political economy of communications**

In this regard, in the context of communication, political economy concerns itself with the unveiling of the constitution of power and its hegemonic practices in terms of communicative control and ideological legitimacy.

On the contrary, the administrative approach to communication studies is pre-occupied with the skills and techniques of communicative exchange (Sussman 1997: ix).

Mosco (2000:104) expresses it more succinctly: political economy interrogates the role of power in the production, distribution and exchange of mediated communication.

*'Its primary research interests include strengthening the theoretical foundation of communication research by incorporating an understanding of how structures of power operate and contribute to the transformation of communication processes into commodified social relations'* Mosco (2000:104).

With the advent of computer-based communications which seem to promise a new form of liberation from conventional state and market controls, the question arises whether the new media could in fact supplant mediated public spaces or if they merely represent a quasi-private space akin to casual street conversations (Couldry, 2003:51).

Despite some acknowledgment of the catalytic effect of the internet on global activism (Curran, 2003:228), there is guarded optimism about its transformative effects on human communications and social and political relations (Bennett, 2003:26). Organised discourses would naturally benefit from a critical mass of contributors in any given situation.

But only 0.7 percent of the 12 million Zambians use the internet for instance (Africa internet usage and population statistics, 2010) which dampens the argument for it being a viable replacement for mediated communication at the present moment. Cell phones, despite their outreach potentials, have textual limitations for activism (Castells, Fernandez-Ardevol, Qiu & Sey, ([sa]:112]) and can also be used for distabilisation by the state or its opponents (Rheingold, [sa]:237).

The sense of 'freedom' extended by new technologies hence should be viewed with a realistic lens. It must also be appreciated that the state is still a regulatory authority and can interfere with computer - based communications as has been the case in China and Zimbabwe.

The underlying premise of political economy of communications therefore remains relevant: that politics and technology are fundamentally inseparable: the politicians make the rules concerning public and private investment, property ownership, tax obligations and rebates, rights and protections for workers and generally the financing of public goods and determine who benefits from them (Sussman 1997: ix).

The advance of globalisation characterised by *liberalisation, privatisation* and *deregulation*, Sussman posits, has rendered political economy even more relevant as an approach to the study of communications. In emphasising this point, McQuail (1994:84) attributes the growing relevance of political economic theory in communications studies to three key factors:

- The growth in media concentration worldwide' with increasing power and influence being vested in a few individuals. This is coupled with the conglomeration between software and hardware industries which end up impacting on the independence of media which may be part of merged industries.
- The growing global information economy which has seen convergence between telecommunications and broadcasting.
- A decline in the public sector of mass media and in direct control of telecommunications under the banner of deregulation, privatisation or liberalisation.

The widening understanding of the factors that influence media behaviour has, in McQuail's view, caused a decline in or a re-evaluation of dominant theoretical paradigms, framed around the *transmission model* of the media which ignored the imperatives of social contexts; that is, the power of local structures, traditional values; and economic constraints relative to what mass communications can realistically accomplish.

Historically, Robert A. Brady is credited with influencing the teaching of the political economy of communications in the United States in the 1930s and 40s after developing an analytical framework for emerging authoritarian and cultural practices. Dallas W. Smythe and Herbert I. Schiller are however more noted as pioneers of the political economy approach (Schiller, 1999: 89).

The application of Brady's framework to communications was apparently catalysed by the growth of electronic media and telecommunication systems particularly during World War II: political economists inevitably began to ask the

question of what forms of control and ownership characterised the sector; what social functions they played; what policies determined the distribution of communication resources (Schiller, 1999: 89).

Radical changes to the national complexion of the United States brought about by migrations and technological development in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries moved social theorists to evaluate the role newspapers, films and radio were playing in social integration and potentially in accentuating moral decay in society (Mcquail: 1994: 34).

Inevitably, the question was asked whether the systems of decision making in the media were linked with those that presided over other economic, political and cultural institutions. Brady in particular was pre-occupied with interrogating what he thought were fascist tendencies by business within the capitalist system. This led him to investigate how the political system, business and communication systems interfaced (Schiller, 1999: 90).

In more recent times, the understanding of political economy and its relation to communication has taken a more 'critical' approach, considering a range of factors in assessing media production and consumption. Peter Golding and Graham Murdock (1996:11-31) advance the notion of *critical political economy* which they argue, differs from mainstream economics because of the following:

- It is holistic.
- It is historical.
- It is concerned with a balance between capitalist enterprise and public intervention.
- It goes beyond technical considerations of efficiency and embraces the need for justice, equity and the public good.

While mainstream economics considers the 'economy' as a separate and specialised domain, critical political economy, they argue, encompasses the relationship between economic organisation and political, social and cultural life.

Of particular interest is the impact of economic dynamics on the range and diversity of public cultural expression, and its accessibility to various social groups. Golding and Murdock are instructive in elucidating that liberal political economists emphasise the open nature of markets and the freedom of consumer choice that comes with it. Motivated by the doctrines of Adam Smith, liberal political economists have also been the strong current behind privatisation of public services, they note.

Golding and Murdock distinguish critical political economists from their liberal counterparts based on the former's adherence to the principles of Karl Marx.

While not denying the merits of choice born of open markets, they contend that cultural producers and consumers make those choices within wider structures. Steeped in Marxian thinking, critical political economy also questions the unequal distribution of material and symbolic resources and how this re-configures communicative activity.

*“Where mainstream economics focuses on the sovereign individuals of capitalism, critical political economy starts with sets of social relations and the play of power. It is interested in seeing how the making and shaping of meaning is shaped at every level by the structured asymmetries in social relations”* (Golding & Murdock, 1996:14).

An interrogation of modern media systems, they hold, is not just an undertaking in understanding their integration into a capitalist economic system but primarily a project in analysing their centrality to the exercise of full citizenship.

What is striking about Golding and Murdock's argument is that they confront the predominant notion that capitalists deploy their economic power in a commercial market system to ensure the information flow is favourable to their interest almost without resistance. Essentially, this framework of analysis - which they define as *instrumentalist* - paints private media as instruments of class domination.

Instead Golding and Murdock posit that owners, advertisers and key political personnel cannot always have their way as there are structures which would limit their overall dominance. The scholars explain that understanding the nature and workings of those structures is the concern of critical political economists. Presumably the labour unions and professional bodies could constitute some of those formations that impede complete dominance of the wealthy over public welfare (an intervening variable).

In similar vein, they denounce the *structuralist* approach which conceives of structures as formal, immovable constructions. Instead, Golding and Murdock elect to view structures as organic, dynamic formations which can be regularly altered through practical interventions.

In short, to relate the outcomes of news directly to the economic structure of news organisations is questionable, according to the scholars. Rather, they advance the idea that:

*“...economic dynamics play a central role in defining the key features of the general environment within which communicative activity takes place, but not as a complete explanation of the nature of that activity”*  
(Golding & Murdock, 1996: 15).

### **3.2.2 Limitation of political economy analytical frameworks**

In the review of literature on political economy, one is drawn into the caveats that cast some doubt on the universal applicability to all social contexts of analytical frameworks developed in the west.

Mosco (1995:147) for instance cautions against making these assumptions. He argues that despite similarities in North American, European and Third World approaches, the political economy approach to communication is not sufficiently

developed theoretically to be explained in one analytical map. Each region bears peculiarities that warrant distinctions.

The North American tradition of political economy was pre-occupied with studying media concentration which bred mammoth conglomerates across various media; and convergence, where technological systems are integrated and companies concerned consumed by a whole.

The concern for scholars was how these larger conglomerates would influence the display of information, its distribution and production in a fast changing environment. Smythe and Stiller were instrumental in promoting this approach. Mosco describes their approach as being steeped in the 'institutional and Marxian' tradition.

Their focus on the growing power of transnational business renders their studies as markedly *institutional*; while their interest in social class, media imperialism and the exploitative and undemocratic nature of big business qualifies their works as essentially *Marxian* (Mosco, 1995:147).

Mosco details European political economic research in communications as being less associated with father figures but largely inclined toward defending public service media systems and promoting social movements.

Much of the work was categorised by resistance to liberalisation, commercialisation and privatisation of the communication industries, he notes.

Mosco posits that there is a domain of political economy which is fundamentally Third World in character. This has drawn extensively from dependency theory, western Marxism and the influence of worldwide liberation movements as scholars sought to understand communication as one among the principal sources of resistance to power.



Mosco notes that the so-called Third World research on the political economy of communication covers a wide area of interests, responding largely to the modernisation and development paradigm born in the west; and that Third World political economists have had a tendency to oppose the thesis that media growth is an indicator of development, in the same manner as urbanisation, education and other social forces.

This has formed the basis of criticism of the western approach which tended to ignore the power relations that underpinned the links between First and Third World nations and the multifarious class associations between and within them (Mosco, 1995:149).

### **3.2.3 *Third World political economy in an African context***

One could argue however that the so-called Third World political economy has in fact marginalised the fundamental differences within the developing contexts; for instance *leadership styles* and their influence on media behaviour and development. If political economy interrogates the role of power in the production, distribution and exchange of mediated communication, it stands to reason for one to vigorously locate this discussion within a context of leadership styles and the nature of competitive politics in Africa, where power is largely vested in the presidency. Widespread illiteracy and weak institutions within the African political milieu will likely also lubricate actions by political elites that are not entirely democratic in character.

Adopting a purely western analytical framework, hence, might not capture the subtleties that come with state ownership of the media in countries such as Zambia. The place of state subsidised media in the theoretical frameworks established in the west has, for instance, lately been questioned (Obonyo, 2009:1).

Calling for the development of theories of communications rooted in the African tradition, Obonyo argues that the four theories of the press, that is - *authoritarian, libertarian, developmental and democratic participant* - may not adequately explain

the structure and performance of media in an African setting which has its own unique power dynamics.

One could also appreciate the concerns raised by Hibou (2004:21) who posits that to understand the state one needs to understand the people in power, their machinations, their strategies and their historical practices.

It has also been noted in Chapter Two, section 2.2.3 that African nationalist governments often mirrored the behaviour of their colonial masters in regard to freedom of expression (Martin, 1998: 63) and that theoretical frameworks in political and communication sciences generally overlooked these influences on post independence media structures (O'Neil, 1998:6).

Yet history attests to how media in Africa has played a propagandist or developmental role rendering attempts at measuring progress within a western liberal paradigm somewhat redundant if not irrelevant to a degree (Berger, 2002:22). While Berger does not reject the explanatory relevance of the liberal pluralist paradigm in all instances, he posits that the liberal framework has its limitations as it disregards *monopolisation* and *elite congruence* in its articulation of media and democracy.

Correspondingly, Martin Sturmer (1998:1-15), in lamenting the dearth of a sociological framework to analyse African mass media systems, presents a typology for African mass communications which captures both historical and political perspectives tethered to the continent's history:

- **Autochthonous**; traditional societies in Africa had inherent checks and balances between the powers of the King and those of the elders and people. The traditional society limited the powers of the King through home-grown institutions and practices. Though no media in the western sense were present, drums, horn-hooting were some of the medium used to communicate and mobilise society.

- **Colonial:** The transition to colonialism brought an autocratic approach to public communication: the governor of the colonial establishments in Africa personified the law, despite the presence of a legislature or minister of colonial affairs. No fundamental freedoms of expression were extended to the natives, therefore undermining their historical communicative practices.
  
- **Sovereign:** though African governments came to power through democratic elections, the ensuing reconstruction of administrations and nations subordinated major spheres of public life - including journalism - to the broader goals of nation-building and unity (The pre-eminence of state media systems is inferred here).
  
- **Democratic societies;** lastly, the advent of multiparty democracy in the early 1990s spawned private newspapers, broadcast stations across Africa, media councils and journalists associations, minimising the influence of the state and expanding freedom of expression.

This typology does place Africa's contexts in some perspective and attempts, rather unsuccessfully, to distance itself from generalisations characteristic of liberal constructions that tend to frame media in Africa in the similar conditions to those of their western counterparts. Sturmer does not do justice to the typology as he assumes that democratic societies more or less translate into a freer media. In examining media in the sovereign and democratic context, it does however provide a basis to locate a discussion on leadership styles steeped in African tradition and their influence on media practice and development.

In Chapter Two, this thesis discussed the historical tendency in Zambia to recycle politicians conditioned by post colonial practices. These tendencies appear to explain the maintenance of legal statutes that have been inimical to free speech over four decades and the proclivity toward control of the major communications resources by the state through a constitutionally powerful presidency.

However, it would be myopic to explain the behaviour of media purely by peering through a leadership prism. Levels of illiteracy in Africa may limit citizen capacity to engage their leaders or interrogate them on the technical aspects of their decisions. Zambia, for example, only had 100 university graduates at independence (Kaunda, 2007: xviii). In addition, the integrity of institutions of participation and accountability also needs to be factored in order for these phenomena to be comprehensively appreciated. In this regard, a related discussion on the materialisation of person-based rule and the potential influence of dominant party systems and one party government on the leadership style and indirectly on the media will be presented in Chapter Four.

For the purposes of this section of the thesis, it is imperative that we continue to unpack the centrality of leadership, particularly the nationalising elites of Africa, in conditioning social and political communications.

Ali Mazrui (2007:3) presents a potent typology of leadership which Obonyo has deployed in interrogating the efficacy of a liberal model and *watchdog role* of the media in Africa. Mazrui posits that the history of leadership in Africa has stood on eight pillars:

- *Charismatic leader*: influenced by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, this style exudes great personal magnetism.
- *Mobilisation leader*: The use of charisma to mobilise masses on many causes. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania epitomised this form of leadership in the African context.
- *Reconciliatory leader*, tends to seek areas of compromise and consensus from amongst disparate views. Nigeria's Abdusalam Abubakar and General Yakubu Gowon are fitted into this category.
- *A Housekeeping style*: It is a minimalist approach to power; more governance and less genuine leadership; less vision, more verbosity. Characteristic of Kenya after Kenyatta.
- *Disciplinarian Leader*, Murtala Muhammed of Nigeria approximates this description.

- *A patriarchal system*: one in which a father figure emerges using the symbolism of the elder and the patriarch. Nelson Mandela is seen as both a patriarch and reconciliatory leader while Jomo Kenyatta more of the latter.
- *Technocratic leader*: Mazrui doubts that Africa has yet produced a technocratic president, even though Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana seem to find favour with him.
- *Personalistic political*: is indistinguishable from monarchical political style as both thrive on the personification of power' Malawi's Hastings Kamuzu Banda is described as one such leader who sought unquestionable allegiance.

Mazrui argues that there has also been a number of pre-colonial cultural traditions which have affected the nine leadership styles and types. The most obvious, he terms the *elder tradition* in the pre-colonial African culture, which influenced the *patriarchal style* after independence.

The older version of this was the monarchical tendency which had a veneer of royalty even though African society was itself monarchical.

As indicated in Chapter Two of this thesis, the leadership style of Zambia's first president Kenneth Kaunda, who promoted the *Philosophy of Humanism*, was characterised by personification of power and control of political, economic and communication systems through his *nationalisation* policies.

His style conforms to three of Mazrui's leadership types: *Charismatic*; because he used his personal charisma to project continuity and infallibility; *mobilisational*, because he used his charisma to mobilise his nation around his ideas and slogans; and *patriarchal*; because in his latter years, his image became one of a founding elder statesman, omnipresent in all media, having ruled Zambia for 27 years.

Obonyo's observations hence are extremely timely:

*“The patriarchal style produces a father figure who would have little problem treating the nation as an extension of his estate; after all he is the wise one. How would media operate under such leadership? The journalist would be considered as one of the young sons and who need to come to the old man for counsel”* (Obonyo, 2009: 10).

The question raised by this thesis in relation to power is that the Kaunda's leadership style while seemingly over taken by political change and a shift in economic policies has not dissipated to a great extent, it would seem.

The substance of the leadership in the *First, Second and Third Republics* remains largely the same. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) was formed, in part, by former members of Kaunda's cabinet and have retained some of his older traditions, such as the perpetuation of a media culture that serenades their personas.

The five elections held since 1991, have all but recycled leaders from the Second and First Republics and added little if any significant changes to the discourse on media privatisation.

An undertaking in political economic studies of communications cannot possibly overlook the imperatives of leadership styles in relation to how transformational reform is made in a country such as Zambia. The personalities in the government in this environment would likely have substantial influence on how the state intervenes in all sectors of the economy including the media sector.

### 3.2.4 Economic liberalism and the media

Because Zambia had elected to pursue free market principles in 1991 with the coming of the so-called 'third wave' of democratisation (Huntington, 1991), this thesis seeks to discuss the essential characteristics of this economic model and how they may affect the state owned media.

There is certainly no doubt that the global free market advanced by the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has left an indelible footprint on the policies of national government in the mainstream economic arena. Mosco (1995: 155) sketches the impact of these policies on states in four ways:

- **Liberalisation:** states are compelled to open up the markets to free competition.
- **Commercialisation:** states will embrace new strategies to enable parastatals to compete with private entities and generate profits.
- **Privatisation:** the state will sell its interests in parastatals to private interests.
- **Internationalisation:** new relationships are forged between states with the ultimate authority being ceded to supranational bodies.

The notion of a *global free market*, anchored by the doctrine of *laissez-faire* which is closely associated with the *Washington Consensus* (or the set of policies promoting free market principles), has often been touted as the panacea to the ills of the world, including the liberation of media from political control. The early 1990s witnessed strong currents of opinion contending that while democracy almost certainly generates popular support for the market, economic liberalisation by itself - as in the case of China - does not seem 'to be sufficient to trigger the demand for democracy'(Grosjean & Senik, 2007: 2).

However, some of the more recent thinking has robustly challenged the efficacy and altruism of liberal philosophy. African scholars have, for example, asserted that the continent's masses are now more far removed from popular control and

accountability, and that external controls from the west and the encroachment of global markets continue to undermine Africa's democratic constitutions and national sovereignty (Mkandawire, 1999: 337).

Mkandawire (2001: 306) strongly denounces the incapacitation of the state in Africa due to the stripping of assets through privatisation and the simultaneous retrenchment of the civil service. The 'downsizing' of the state has rendered the provision of social services and infrastructure highly vulnerable to foreign aid fluctuations, he argues. Mkandawire's offensive against the 'hijacking' of state functions by global capital emphasises that local capitalists are the losers in the liberalisation agenda.

Similarly, John Gray (1998:5-15) is vehement in his criticism of the consequences of the *Washington Consensus* policies. He sketches the failures of the liberal paradigm as being manifest in the emergence of new income inequalities, wealth, access to work and quality of life that rival those found in the mid-nineteenth century England.

He observes that although the *laissez faire* doctrine was widely applied in mid-nineteenth century England as essentially a social experiment in free market engineering, its consequences were to produce social dislocation and economic and political instability on a large scale as the majority of the people had not reaped from the economic boom accompanying it.

He contends that the free market was not an accident but a creation of state power; Japan, the United States, Russia and Germany all employed state intervention as a key factor in economic development. Gray therefore dismisses as a 'classical liberal illusion' the notion that the free market is a self regulating system that is fashioned to deliver general public good.

One of the fundamental features of the free market in regard to the media is the policy of *privatisation*, which, as explained by Mosco, implies surrender to private interests of state assets. What proponents of privatisation often ignore is the



manner and nature of the process and its potential to produce undemocratic outcomes.

Williamson (2004:11), the American economist who coined the term *Washington Consensus*, observes for instance that privatisation can be highly corrupt if not properly regulated. The transfer of state assets could benefit a few privileged elites for a small proportion of their true value despite evidence that it may bring benefits in terms of the quality of service, he notes.

In similar vein, Martin Gainsborough (2008:3) who examines privatisation in Vietnam asserts that the sell of state assets should not be seen as a retreat of the state.

Political power has the propensity to re-invent itself or is adept at subverting practices, such as *privatisation*, which might threaten its control. To safeguard their interests, political elites do craft new ways of establishing indirect government over private entities, he argues.

If this kind of thinking were extended to the media sector, it could quite easily imply that powerful elites might conspire to possess the most valued of media assets and use them to selfish intent, further marginalising the constituencies that direly desire voice in governance. Alternatively, they could sell state media assets only to people who are confirmed supporters of the party in power, providing an illusion of 'freedom' from the state.

Privatisation, as experienced in Britain during the Thatcher administration, also has tendencies of weakening the trade unions as intermediary institutions between workers and the market. The state's role in ensuring the labour market was self regulating allowed for a downward adjustment of wages and low costs for employers which whittled union influences in both the United States and Britain. The narrative on privatisation is replete with the loss of bargaining power by unions (Gray, 1999:29).

Both *liberalisation* and *privatisation* have been found to lead to higher unemployment in the absence of competition policies and oversight frameworks that stem the monopolisation of resources (Maxwell, 2005:1).

In other words, it may be over optimistic of one to expect media privatisation for instance to translate into an explosion of employment opportunities for journalists as new private interests assume control over SOEs.

In fact, the opposite might just be true: new owners will likely streamline operations to ensure profitability, leading to job destruction in an industry already offering limited opportunities for journalists in countries such as Zambia.

The loss of income is disempowering and could further inhibit the ability of workers in this industry to mobilise against state excesses. State ownership on the other hand might guarantee workers who are not necessarily productive, retirement opportunities given that the political elites in government may prioritise self preservation over commercialisation.

Because of these scenarios, the premise of *privatisation* as a means to media freedom has to be examined very cautiously indeed.

*Commercialisation* on the other hand, could be understood as a form of rational response by SOEs to survive a new era of competition from private interests. This might impact on the quality and value of the goods they produce and the manner in which the entities manage their labour relations, decision making and public engagement.

### **3.2.4 Summary**

In summary, this thesis adopts a *transitional approach* in discussing democratisation which foregrounds the actions of politicians and relates them to

the impact they would have on communication systems as economic, social and political institutions changed in Zambia over a 45 year period.

Political economy as an analytical framework provides the opportunity to interrogate historical processes and their impact on state media systems, and in this case, the changes in ownership and the consequences on communicational rights. It enables us to address the responsiveness of politicians to citizen actions and demands for press freedom; the role of unions as an intervening force; political conflict over communication resources as political systems transform; and ultimately the changing nature of state interventions in state owned media, particularly in the *Times Newspapers*, as Zambia experienced some radical political-economic shifts in the 1990s.

The economic perspective of this framework will be concerned with the policies adopted by successive Zambian governments in the 45 years characterised by systemic changes to political and economic institutions in the First, Second and Third Republics.

The concepts of nationalisation, liberalisation, and privatisation will, hence, provide the framework through which the response of the *Times Newspapers* to a changing political economic environment will be discussed.

### **3.2.6 Political economy, the public sphere and democracy**

While the preceding discussion has been pre-occupied with power and wealth and its wider implications for governance and for communication systems more generally, the following section foregrounds the manner in which power and wealth might undermine informational and communicative freedoms, potentially diminishing the public space that has been associated with the Habermasian notion of *public sphere* (Habermas, 1989).

The notion of *public sphere*, is one of the many western concepts that are currently under scrutiny by scholars in regard to how they relate to indigenous contexts.

Harbermas's central argument suggests that modern capitalism bred an autonomous forum of public debate, which he termed, the public sphere. The key factors leading to its materialisation relate to the emerging economic independence enabled by private property ownership; critical reflection fostered by literature (letters, novels), the blossoming of coffee shops and salons as arenas for political discourse and ultimately the emergence of a private, market-based press engaged in lively, critical political discussion. These phenomena were presented as having a fundamental influence on the direction of the state in the seventeenth and the first half of the nineteenth century (Curran, 1996: 82).

Scholars interpret the public sphere as a social space rather than a physical space or a forum where individual citizens may converse freely about day to day social political matters (Mckenna, 1995: Curran 1996; Golding & Murdock, 1996).

It is generally acknowledged that Harbermas's public sphere provides scholars a basis to interrogate the relationship between mass media and democracy, particularly in regard to the participation of culturally diverse groups in modern societies.

Mckenna (1995: 333) explains that historically, the public sphere has been associated with physical locations where citizens congregated to discuss public affairs. He argues that these must be regarded as concrete manifestations of the public sphere rather than the essence the public sphere by themselves.

Harbermas himself was distinctive in asserting that as long as citizens could freely assemble and discuss matters of a general interest, they would have utilised a public space for discussion which signified the public sphere (Harbermas 1974:49).

The public sphere, Harbermas would argue, evolved from a *bourgeois public sphere*, essentially a domain shared by private interests and the state, which allowed for public opinion to shape up and popular state supervision to emerge.

The public sphere was after the mid-nineteenth century colonised by organised economic interests and an expanded state.

The two forces bargained with each other to the exclusion of the wider public. The close relations between wealth and power corrupted the media into working less in the interest of the public and more as a tool of oppression and manipulation. The new corporatist pattern conditioned the public to play the passive role of consumers and not as key actors in the political debate.

### ***3.2.7 The public sphere and modern citizenship***

In their discussion of the Habermasian public sphere, Golding and Murdock (1997: xiv) underline the linkage between modern citizenship and a diverse and open communications system, which emerged with a democratizing Europe. While the system of democracy, they note, relied on popular legitimacy institutionalised in national and local assemblies, there was additional need to engender discursive representation arranged through public cultural institutions. Subsequently the idea of media as institutions of the public sphere gained currency. McKenna (1995: 334) distils the original conception of Habermas' public sphere, which was essentially dialogical, as follows:

- It is a space that guarantees access to all citizens.
- In principle, all citizens are equal once in the public sphere and will engage in democratic debate without consideration of hierarchies.
- The public sphere is without constraint to free expression.
- The public sphere is distinct from the 'private sphere' of citizens as its concern is for the public good rather than the pursuit of individual gain. It is autonomous from state and market, although it is not the same as civil society, the arena in which citizens exercise their independence from the state and market as a collective.

- The public sphere embraces criticism of state actions, debate and facilitates the exchange of information, therefore enabling the existence of informed citizenry

This conception assumes that the public is of a particular size and is cohesive and aware of matters within the precincts of their existence. It also assumes that citizens have unfettered rights of assembly and association. A country such as Zambia requires the state's permission for the congregation of individuals, and that would, by itself, be a limiting factor in terms of social interaction.

The second challenge to this notion is the size of publics in the present day. McKenna is emphatic in dissipating any notion that equates dialogical interaction to the modern challenges of democratic discourse. Beyond a certain size, he posits, public communication requires mass media to transmit messages. While the media are not the equivalent of the public sphere, they should be understood as entities that inhabit the public sphere essentially playing a facilitatory role in public communication, he explains.

It is of course well known that mass media do not display all of the messages that are relayed to it by the public. The communication is mediated and therefore will be tinged with bias. Secondly, it is argued by other scholars that government influences media behaviour and that media take their cue from official government sources, marginalising competing voices (Kuzyk & Mc Cluskey, 2006: 655).

Liberal scholars promote the idea of a market driven media which is located in the private domain and is therefore assumed to be free of state interference or censorship. This *no-regulation approach* is a weak argument in terms of media autonomy, as it disregards the influence of commercial interests in stifling information that might either undermine the market or injure the markets business associations with the state.

Promoters of public service media models view public ownership and the presence of regulation as a defence against commercial exploitation and market censorship. Regulation is considered a necessary instrument to ensure diversity in programming and coverage and inclusiveness as opposed to exclusion. Particularly related to electronic media, public service media can be bound by regulation to inform, entertain and educate. On the contrary, private media can be at liberty to commit entirely to entertainment if that makes commercial sense. But as McKenna rightly points out, there are many variations of public service media and no single definition of *public*. The media structures are also varied (McKenna, 1995: 334).

### **3.2.8 The public sphere and the print media**

On the whole, the print media's claim to being institutions of the public sphere is compromised by a set of factors which McKenna (1995: 334) details with clarity:

- Newspapers are inclined toward *entertainment* and are therefore depoliticised.
- Because of the different newspaper types aimed at distinct audiences, newspapers constitute *a fragmented forum*.
- Newspapers provide an edited public agenda; letters and opinions from the public can be filtered, edited or discarded. While access to information in the public sphere in this context may be universal, the opportunity to contribute to that information is not.
- *Political partisanship* is an added problem of the public sphere in the press. The industry in Europe is overwhelmingly rightwing, McKenna argues, therefore diminishing the prospect of a form of balance in the political discourses on display.
- *Unrepresentative ownership*: a few privileged people will own newspapers because the costs involved, extending influence to a disproportionate group of people.

- *Professional responsibility*; the degree of freedom for journalists working in the media varies and the concept of professionalism has no standard definition to merit serious considerations of the conduct of journalism as an intervening factor.

As stated earlier, in a modern sense, there should not be the expectation of direct participation in the public sphere despite democracy; the sheer size of modern publics entails that such participation be *representative* and debates be *mediated*.

The problem in the Zambian context arises partly from the understanding of what is public or state. The typology of forms of broadcast media presented by Article 19 (Article 19, 2006:37) can perhaps render some insights on how we understand state media systems in relation to public participation more generally. The definitions are as follows:

- *State Broadcasting* is controlled by the state and represents state interests. They may however be partly funded by the tax payer.
- *Government media* is controlled by the government of the day and represents the viewpoint of the executive. They too would be partly public funded.
- *Public Service broadcasting* is entrusted with the role of broadcasting material in the public interest. They may not necessarily be public owned but should be characterised with a commitment to public duty.
- *Public Broadcasting* on the other hand is owned by and is accountable to the public. The funding is largely public.

In the Zambian setting, the notion of state media (interchangeably also termed public media) is equated with nation building and national unity owing to the political circumstances of the country's transitions in the last 45 years.



The ZNBC are funded by the state and controlled by the government of the day but are integral to the state communication systems that incorporate the *Times Newspapers, the Zambia Daily Mail, The Sunday Mail, the Zambia Information and News Service (ZANIS) and the National Agricultural Information Service(NAIS)*..

The state media in Zambia hence, are not easily categorised within the frame work suggested by Article 19.

Within this complex set up, the *Times Newspapers* have a history of commercial independence, there is little evidence thus far to suggest the exact nature of state or public funding, for instance.

Yet, all of the electronic and print media under the *Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS)* are seemingly expected to project uniformity to a great extent on the tone and nature of their coverage.

Banda (2007:162) challenges the idea that a nation building role for the media has rendered general public good. Instead he asserts that the adherence to this approach has entrenched intolerance for diverse views amongst political elites who have tended to interpret any attempt at racial or ethnic self expression as detrimental to the national project of unity, reconciliation and reconstruction.

The transformation of the ZNBC from a state to a public broadcaster for instance, has stalled due to government machinations over the implementation of the ZNBC (Amendment) Act of 2002. The ZNBC, as the *Times Newspapers*, remain part of the network of state media systems that continue to dominate the country's media landscape.

Despite the presence of stimulating interventions from the private media, of which the *Post Newspapers* have been most enduring, it is hard to fathom media entities in Zambia as representing significant forums of national expression for the vast majority of people. The spaces available - both state and private - appear

to pander to distinct political constituencies and will not be obligated to always have a public service function.

The notion of media as institutions of the public sphere in these circumstances or their potential thereof, has to be carefully examined and not simply assumed to be; on the basis of theoretical assumptions. In fact the limited access of general publics to state media systems may be quite well known. The thrust of this thesis therefore would rather be to explore the ways in which state or public media may serve a communal role of social interaction amongst Zambia's diverse interest groups.

### **3.3 THE INTERNET, MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES AND THEIR POLITICAL- ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE**

Of course a strong argument against the existence of traditional mass media is anchored around the revolutionary nature of the internet and mobile phone technologies as social and political mass mobilisation tools. Opinion is divided regarding the potency of web-based communications as an alternative to mediated communications. Ding (2009:327-350) for example demonstrates how alternative media facilitated 'tactical risk communication' during the outbreak of the Severe Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, through rumour and gossip.

The rumours were disseminated through extra institutional communication before reaching demographically diverse recipients, navigating clear of official government censorship.

In addition, because of these "alternative media" the whole notion of publishing is changing. 'Open publishing' for instance is an innovative way of involving readers in the process of creating news and shaping editorials and ultimately redistributing or publishing the items on their own sites (Couldry, 2003:46).

Information and communication technologies, undeniably, have presented a 'powerful platform for political autonomy' and wireless communication especially, has demonstrated the ability to 'bypass the mass media as a source of information', creating a new public space (Castells, Fernandez-Ardevol, Qiu & Sey, ([sa]:112]).

Bennett (2003:26) and Curran (2003:227) are less enthusiastic about the internet in particular. Curran reminds us that new technology has not fundamentally altered the underlying economic factors that enable large media organisations to maintain their market dominance. *The OpenDemocracy*, an internet based magazine founded in Britain to facilitate networking among constitutional activists, initially struggled to attract attention until there was substantial intervention from the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, Irish-Atlantic Philanthropies and the Ford Foundation. It eventually succeeded in creating a discursive global forum for academics, journalists, activists, politicians, businesspeople and international civil servants around the world.

However, Curran also notes that search engines provide a sign posting system which influences where people go on cyberspace. Not being listed in the top ten or twenty of the search engine hierarchy leads to lack of attention as most people would not persist beyond that point. Curran highlights the lack of business acumen by the persons who set up alternative media, often leading to their demise. The internet as a significant political tool is not immune to the imperatives of economics, he further argues. Sopova (2000:1) simply dismisses the internet as an undemocratic tool, exclusive to the world's elite.

Bennett (2003:19) presents both the benefits of the internet and its shortfalls: the positive elements include expanding personal freedoms to choose and change identities while the negative effects encompass the production of stress, insecurity, complex management issues, and personal responsibility-taking for structural problems. He highlights increased global activism against world development agencies and corporations and the materialisation of ingenious accountability systems for corporate and governments, as evidence of the significance of the

internet. Coupled with other technologies such as cell phones and digital video, he asserts, people have conquered the limits of time, space, identity and ideology, which was previously simply illusory.

Bennett however cautions against embracing the internet as an instrument with transformative effects on human communication or social and political relations.

*“Rather, it is the interaction between the internet and its users - and their interactions, in turn in material social contexts - that constitute the matrix within which to locate the power of the new media to create new spaces for discourses and coordinated action” (Bennett, 2003:26).*

A country such as Zambia has seen user growth increase from 20,000 in the year 2000 to 816,700 (or 3,983.5%) in 2010. However, against a population of 12,056,923 that increase represents only 0.7% of the population (African Internet Usage and Population Statistics, 2010).

Computer literacy, economic means to pay for internet café costs, and distance to internet sites all play a part in determining whether the internet provides a substantial public sphere of communication, or for that matter, an alternative medium to the cluster of privately owned community, radio stations, television and private press and of course, the state sponsored mass media. Globally, upward of 80% of the population is literally excluded from the political, economic and social interactions provided by information networks (Millicevic [sa]).

On a positive note, global information networks do certainly help to lubricate communication amongst computer literate Zambians within the country and in the diaspora. They also facilitate the display of manifestos by political parties and of news by state and private media, beyond the limits of their borders.

However, the diaspora Zambians will not vote under current regulations and are therefore redundant, to a degree, as a transformative force in elective politics. Overall, unless connectivity can reach the levels of the developed world (94.4% is

the average outside of Africa according to internetstats.com), the elevation of *alternative media* to the equivalent of the traditional mediated communication is idealistic.

The most viable technological tool for Africa, as stated earlier, is the mobile phone. At least 280.7 million Africans accounting for 30.4% penetration were using cell phones by 2007(Millicevic [sa]).

Rheingold ([sa]:226), reminds us, that it was the use of mobile phones that coordinated political collective actions in the Philippines and Spain, leading to the downfall of governments. Cell phones have also been used to report voting fraud in elections in Ghana; following which local radio stations would transmit their allegations and police action would ensue. In Kenya, similarly, mobile phones enhanced transparency, campaign effectiveness and a reduction in fraud.

Mobile phones have also been leveraged to produce *social capital* or the nature and degree to which social interaction between communities and institutions mould economic performance (Sinha, 2005:4-14).

The technology, in addition, can deliver financial, agricultural and educational services beyond the limited reach of radio, television and newspapers (Aker & Mbiti, 2010:8-10).

Castells et al ([sa]) however caution that texting as a tool of political communication has serious handicaps: It facilitates short, unedited or unelaborated messages which are inadequate for civic deliberation.

The same tools, due to their unpredictable use, can be utilised to cause mayhem: disinformation and misinformation, leading to national instability. Conversely, the technologies could strengthen the hand of the state through automated surveillance, jamming or other countermeasures against oppositional messaging (Rheingold [sa]).

In many instances, it would seem, mobile phones can be seen to be *complementary* to mass media rather than an *alternative* to it. This is because they do enable individuals to link up with organised mass media alerting reporters to events that could then receive more professional coverage.

Despite their capacity to navigate official censorship on regular basis, they are not immune to counter-measures by the state or the pressure of the market.

### **3.4 CONCLUSION**

This chapter emphasises that media are an integral part of the political economic system and will likely be affected by changes to these institutions in many varied ways. The political economy approach to communication studies enables scholars to understand the linkages between media institutions, political elites and their economic blueprints and how these shape cultural production and expression. Through this body of theory, communication researchers have come to appreciate better the regulatory frameworks that define the limits of freedom of expression.

While there is arguably the potential to expand freedom of expression through computer-based communications, it must be remembered that the economic imperatives for the sustenance of alternative media are fundamentally similar to those required for maintaining traditional media. In economically stressed African countries such as Zambia where connectivity and usage are low, it is unrealistic to equate *alternative media* to the combined reach of state media systems or indeed the localised diffusion of privately owned electronic and print media. In many instances, they should rather be viewed as complementary to mass media, given that they allow for citizens to channel their experience of reality directly and in some cases break new events for the first time through existing systems.

Indeed cell phone technology - and less so the internet - has revolutionised civic actions allowing for greater transparency and accountability in procedural

democratic processes in Africa; facilitating the growth of social capital and presenting a somewhat more open public space. However, none of these technologies are immune to state or market pressures.

Counter-measures from the state or other political forces can undermine citizen interaction through disinformation and misinformation, jamming and automatic surveillance means, therefore dampening the whole notion of technology as extending an 'autonomous' political public sphere.

The basis of the thesis' central argument remains relevant: that politics and technology are intertwined; the terms for access and usage are determined by decisions made by politicians and to some extent the market. The operational realities suggest that the conditions of the economic environment do influence the survivability of alternative media, even when political conditions are favourable. The record of survival of alternative media has been dismal thus far. Framing these media in the context of a public sphere - despite the empirically grounded positive effects on global activism - should be an exercise in caution at best.

Political economic theory when applied to communications, allows us to interrogate a range of influences on communicative activity, encompassing history, political and social change. The hegemonic tendencies of wealth and power are central to the understanding of how social reality is framed and communicated in the final analysis.

Historically, the most influential political economists have been Adam Smith who promoted the idea of liberalism, competition, self reliance, intellectual freedom and proportionate reward for service; and Karl Marx who expanded on these ideas and challenged the control of the economic universe by capitalist forces. Marx's work is touted as being more holistic and inter-disciplinary and therefore widely applicable to a range of socio-economic sciences.

Indeed, the association of the media to the modern corporate industrial complex arises from the application of Marxian thought.

We are cautioned by Golding and Murdock (1996: 14) that the instrumentalist approach to political economy is bent on depicting media as instruments of class domination as though they were no intervening variables to minimise the influence of the rich and powerful on public communication.

The Marxian/Institutional approaches to political economy essentially allow for the assessment of the role of social movements in bringing about change and therefore limiting the impact of wealth and power on communication outputs.

Golding and Murdock advance the notion of *critical political economy*, which is influenced by Marxian thinking, as a means by which scholars should interrogate not just the impact of wealth and power on communications but also on the condition of labour and the nature and extent of freedom of expression through the communicative space which Habermas termed the *public sphere*.

While the political economy approach has gained currency amongst communication researchers, the analytical frameworks cannot be universally applied given the varied contexts of the so-called First and Third worlds.

It has been noted by this researcher that the African, and more specifically the Zambian context, is somewhat more challenging in the application of imported theoretical frameworks as it requires a further understanding of leadership types and practices for one to appreciate the relationship between power and communication.

It must be stated however that a discussion on leadership cannot happen in isolation. The institutional setting, that is, the primacy of democratic institutions in fostering accountability (of failing to do so) is fundamental in understanding why leaders may act against the interest of democracy and more specifically, media freedom, without recourse to their constituencies.



Historically, there has been a tendency for political leaders in Zambia to determine the role of media, essentially as a nation-building tool, and control the amount of space accorded to competing voices. Political transitions over the last 45 years have not extended the policies of privatisation to the state media, a factor which detracts from the strides made in liberalising political and economic space more generally.

At the base of this discussion is the place of the ordinary citizen in terms of their rights to participate in discourses affecting their general welfare through media that is ostensibly partly publicly funded or at least assumed to be. Again, the applicability of the notion of the Habermasian *public sphere* to an African context is to be questioned as the political environment appears quite different from that which the German theorist idealises in his works.

If the idea of public or state media institutions is meant to extend access to a communal system of communication by diverse interest and ethnic groups, the structure and power relations within these institutions need to be critically examined.

And if for stability's sake, as some would argue, emerging democracies should maintain state supported institutions of some kind owing to the limited resources available to citizens to possess their own media, the relevance of such institutions to a changing political economic environment needs to be carefully documented and analysed.

And if indeed, the measure of democracy includes freedom of association and expression and the role of trade unions, then the role of media unions ought to be understood, categorised and assessed to determine the nature of economic and political gains accruing to professionals as a result of the transition of Zambia from a one party state to a democracy.

This thesis will hence explore the influence of democratisation on state media systems in the following context:

- The political aspects will be seen largely in terms of *control and conflict* over access to communication resources by contending political actors, each with potentially its own ideas about the relevance of state media to a democracy. This will include an examination of political structures and changes thereof during periods of transition and relationship between political and business elites and their role in media development.
- The economic aspects will be largely analysed in terms of *privatisation* and the challenges posed by *liberalisation* and *commercialisation*. More competition could mean new strategies for state media or over reliance on public funding which might strengthen the argument for change in structure or ownership of state entities.
- *Public participation* of social groups in state media systems, will be seen in terms of the rules governing access to space on the *Times*, in addition to newspaper sales and space provided for public voice.
- The *intervention of labour* unions on working conditions and professional practice will be analysed within the context of freedom of association and expression, as constituted within the legal and constitutional framework of Zambia; and as localised through *labour rights*.

As the one institution that has survived three transitional phases in its metamorphosis from privately ownership to state control, the *Times Newspapers* hence provide the ideal case for understanding these phenomena.

To conclude, we do note from section 1.1.5 of Chapter One that political economy considers historical, social and political imperatives, including the power relations that condition the distribution of (communication) resources in a society; that it places a pre-eminence on social change and historical transformation and is concerned with social and moral values, and the balance between capitalist enterprise and public intervention. Further, it focuses on the complex relations between media, industry, political and social elites and how they influence communicative activity. Based on the understanding of these perspectives, the next chapter seeks to unmask the relationship between Zambia's nationalist

government and foreign capitalists and their dual influence on the media landscape. It undertakes an empirical exploration of the political, security and economic conditions that helped fashion these relationships and culminates in an analyses of the institutional settings in the Second and Third Republics and how these, and the actions of elites through transitional phases, impacted on the structure and editorial performance of the *Times Newspapers*.

## CHAPTER FOUR

# DEMOCRATISATION, THE LONDON RHODESIA MINING AND LAND COMPANY (LONRHO) AND THE *TIMES NEWSPAPERS*: EXPLORING THE ROLE OF *WEALTH* AND *POWER* IN MEDIA DEVELOPMENT IN ZAMBIA

## 4.1 INTRODUCTION

The principle aim of this chapter is to unmask the ways in which *wealth* and *power* have influenced media development in Zambia within the context of democratisation.

The chapter responds to the research questions advanced in section 1.3.2 of Chapter One stated as such:

- In what ways has democratisation influenced media development in Zambia?
- How has political change affected decision making structures and oversight frameworks on the *Times Newspapers*?
- What policies govern participation in the state media, particularly the *Times Newspapers*?

Democratisation has been understood as the popular process that manifested with the emergence of Zambia as an independent African state transitioning through three distinct phases of political and economic development; the First, Second and Third Republics. The democratisation process through the three republics has been affected by policies of nationalisation, privatisation and liberalisation, with varied implications for media ownership, freedom and development.

Because the thesis is informed mainly by the transitional approach to the analysis of democratisation, the actions of political elites are emphasised.

It is also established in Chapter Two, section 2.2.3, that the action by Zambian authorities to colonise media space was not unique in Africa. The retreat of colonialism saw nationalist governments across the continent adopt authoritarian approaches to privately owned media, often proscribing, purchasing or controlling newspapers and radio and television. By 1980, 90 % of the 90 daily newspapers in sub Saharan Africa were either owned by the state or the ruling party, albeit with varied degrees of freedom and repression (Sandbrook, 1996: 82).

What has however not been detailed at this juncture are the strategic relations between political and business elites that underpinned efforts by authorities to possess media enterprises owned by foreign interests.

In the case of the *Times Newspapers*, the take-over process was punctuated by an apparent personal relationship between Zambia's founding president, Kenneth Kaunda, and the chair of the multinational Lonrho, Roland "Tiny" Rowland with implications for media freedom more generally.

This chapter therefore seeks mainly to build on the theoretical discussion in Chapter Three, which explored, through a *political economic prism*, the means by which the state and market might limit the notion of media as institutions of the *public sphere* where contemporary politics may be discussed in a democracy. The specific aim of this chapter is four-fold:

- To illustrate how wealth and power, exemplified through the activities of the multinational corporation Lonrho and the first president of Zambia, influenced media development; and the configuration of the *Times Newspapers* in the First and Second Republics, in particular.

- Analyse how political decisions concerning the take-over of the *Times Newspapers* were aided by political systems characterised by person - based rule, dominant party and one-party systems.
- Discuss the influence of democratisation, particularly multiparty politics, on public participation in the state owned media systems.
- Draw conclusions on the imperatives of privatisation of the state media (the *Times* in particular) based on the historical precedents of foreign and private ownership.

The discussion is fore-grounded by an exposition of Lonrho and its dealings with African nationalist governments and white controlled territories of Rhodesia and South Africa, to provide insights into the conglomerate's modus operandi.

It further emphasises that the decision that allowed for a unique co-ownership arrangement of the *Times* between the state and this multinational corporate entity has its foundation in a larger political-economic scheme which saw Lonrho develop from a modest ranching and mining concern to a conglomerate of global renown with more than 90,000 employees and in excess of 500 subsidiaries.

## 4.2 METHODOLOGY

The principal method employed in this exercise is *historical analysis* based on *literature review*; and *interviews*, utilising open - ended *questionnaires*. Historical records of submissions to commissions of inquiry and biographic accounts of subjects under investigation, media articles and published works on Lonrho and the Kaunda establishment were also consulted in developing a pattern that could explain the response of the *Times* to political change at critical moments in Zambia's history.

*Semi-structured interviews* were conducted with former editors of the *Times of Zambia*, and *Sunday Times of Zambia*; representatives of the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) and the Society of Senior

Zambian Journalists (SSZJ) using three open-ended questionnaires. Follow-up interviews were also conducted to concretise and integrate the findings into the revelations gleaned from literature reviews. The editors were chosen based on their institutional memory, that is, each with substantial experience or knowledge of the workings of the *Times of Zambia and Printpak Limited* under Lonrho and state ownership, in the *First, Second and Third* Republics.

The key areas of engagement were:

- Their impressions of the impact of democratisation on media development generally.
- The benefits and/or deficits of state ownership of the *Times* versus private ownership.
- The nature of editorial relations between Lonrho and the *Times* on the one hand; and the state on the other.
- The preferred alternative to state or private ownership of media.

These insights are essential to understanding how the experience by the key informants of the behaviour of private and state ownerships has over time moulded their thinking about the future of the media in Zambia, a country that continues to espouse liberal democratic values.

#### **4.2.1 Defining wealth and power**

The discussion in Chapter Three, section 3.1.3, advances the notion that political economy in relation to communication interrogates the hegemonic tendencies of wealth and power in mutually constraining or influencing communicative activity.

Concepts of wealth and power are obviously not straight forward, and need to be categorised within set contexts to be relevant in a discussion of this nature.

Wealth is defined as ‘an abundance of valuable possessions or money’, a ‘state of being rich’; ‘an abundance or profusion of something desirable’ (South African Concise Oxford Dictionary, 2002: 1330).

In conventional terms, power has varied meanings. As a noun it is construed as the ‘right or authority given or delegated to a person or body’ or ‘the capacity to influence the behaviour of others’.

It can also be understood as ‘political authority or control’. As a verb, it is expressed as a force that may catalyse desired actions (South African Concise Oxford Dictionary, 2002: 916).

Owen (1975:3) conceives of power as a form of *freedom*, that is, the leeway to do or not to do something at some affordable price.

*“If there is no choice, there is no power and no freedom. A monopolist whose market is protected from entry by law has the power to set the price in a manner that achieves any objective he likes” (Owen, 1975:4)*

Logically, it can be inferred that power and wealth are related and that one can generate influence over the other. Hobbes (1660), for example, considers power as the inherent capacity to generate future ‘good’. Wealth, reputation, fame, specialized knowledge can be sources of power. In a militaristic sense, Hobbes conceives of power as a strength of arms which impedes aggression from other principalities or states.

More contemporary articulations of power, anchored by rational choice theory, forward the argument that the agent exercises power through his sensual and cognitive faculties. Rational choice holds that individual choices are enticed by calculations of benefit given the exclusion of all relevant factors beyond the agent’s control (Green, 2002: 4-5). This interpretation of agency and power has generated game theory in which outcomes of agent choice can be individuated and collectivized (Stern & Hedstrom, [sa]).



The Marxian entry point to the power discourse derives from social structures and the social means of production. Marxian theory not only conceives of power as a finite sum inherent in social structures but sees it also as a capacity to collectively act and capture economic and political apparatus, which essentially are the instruments of power (Slaughter, 1975:1). Vayrynen ([sa]), too, relates the origins of power to forms of governance, political or economic.

However political and economic institutions are not the only sources of power or its contestation. Media markets can for instance generate a form of *symbolic power*, against the influence of corporate entities and the state (Couldry, 2003:43-44). *Symbolic power*, in Couldry's articulation, relates to the possession, by media entities, of organisational and economic resources, which over time influence people's beliefs. States and markets however do contest this power which arises from the intention to access markets. In the case of the state, the market would be the *electorate*.

Couldry's construction of power, which intimately weaves political and economic controls with media's inherent - albeit limited influence - over communicative activity is fascinating and prepares ground for this discussion in terms of what actually transpires when the state and a major corporate entity contest the same media space for contending objectives; or sometimes similar political aims.

While the ambition to understand the mutual influence of wealth and power might benefit from an exploration of formal institutions and their intimacy with social processes, illustrating their patterns of influence will likely be underlined more succinctly through the actions of the individuals who occupy them.

After all, society is manipulated by social elites who command major hierarchies and organisations of society, from government, corporate to the military establishments (Mills, 1956: 1-5).

In a world where international institutions are weak and national institutions are conflict-ridden, power resides - not in formal structures - but in a cluster of wealthy individuals with immense global influence. This emergent '*superclass*' with 'cross-border potency', determines the trajectory of global politics and economics (Rothkopf, 2009; 14-85). Rothkopf (2009)'s empirically grounded argument holds that individuals could assume power from financial and professional success; and leadership of strategic institutions or by commanding quantifiable support from the masses.

Therefore, it can be understood, that individuals capitalise on professional, financial or leadership ascendancy to assume power. Conversely, it can also be inferred that persons who command quantifiable support from constituencies, through personal charisma for example, could exploit this power to assume wealth.

The exploration of relations between the multinational London Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (Lonrho) and the government of President Kaunda, and the mutual influence of this relationship on the *Times of Zambia*, is multifarious. It has institutional and personal dimensions; it encompasses cross border political weight by the multinational Lonrho and its chair Rowland; and the authority of the state through a powerful president, with a leading newspaper as the forum through which contending national priorities are reflected.

The implication here is that neither President Kaunda nor Lonrho would be seen to have *complete freedom* to exercise *choice*; that there would be political or economic limitations to the exercise of their power over one another. To some extent, there would also be limitations in their exercise of influence over the *Times of Zambia*, allowing it some space to express its *choice* over messaging - its *relative freedom* to interpret social reality.

This thesis therefore conceives of power not only as the individual's *relative freedom to influence others* but also - *fundamentally* - as a derivative of political governance structures and economic means of production.

#### **4.2.2 The relevance of Lonrho**

The Lonrho saga is intrinsic to the broader discussion on what Libby (1983: 379) terms 'transnational class alliances' that have tended to determine national policy and the allocation of key resources particularly in post independence Africa.

This is particularly relevant because Lonrho's interests were internationally as well as domestically multi-sectoral, ranging from ranching, mining, breweries to publishing.

This form of conglomeration has tendencies of undermining the independence of media entities within its group that either report negatively on its potential areas of investment or embarrass state elites with whom they would have strategic relationships.

*Lonrho's* ownership of the *Observer* in London for instance, resulted in its Chairman Roland 'Tiny' Rowland exerting undue pressure on the newspaper's editor to resign after exposing the Matabeleland atrocities in Zimbabwe in the 1980s. Zimbabwe not only hosted some of the multinational corporation's prized African assets, its president, Robert Mugabe, had close ties with the British Tycoon (Trelford, 2000: 1).

To start with, it is prudent to map the conditions that fertilise the entry of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) into developing nations and discuss briefly the challenges nationalising elites faced in building communal institutions in the face of administrative weaknesses. The discussion will then transition into the sphere of media ownership in an integrated manner.

#### **4.2.4 History of Multinational Corporations**

Scholars have traced the earliest forms of transnational trading from the age of the Phoenicians 2500 years BC and the Venetians from the 10<sup>th</sup> century who traded on an international scale. However, the emergence of modern MNCs, *business entities that control economic activity in more than a single nation state*, are recorded more recently in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in Europe.

These were best epitomised by firms such as Cockerel Steelworks in 1815 in Prussia, Bayer of Germany in 1863; Nestle of Switzerland and Lever Brothers of the United Kingdom (Ghertman & Allen, 1984: 7).

The period between 1895 and 1945 saw the growth of MNCs in major sectors in Japan, North America, Western Europe and Russia (Clairmonte & Cavanagh, 1984: 49).

The initial phase of growth of the modern multinational was impeded by the First and Second World Wars. The MNCs, hence, found firmer ground after World War II (Ghertman & Allen, 1984: 8).

The corporations extended their network of subsidiaries beyond borders and continents characterised by product differentiation; large scale organisational capacity; oligopoly power; research and development leading to technological monopolies, all underlined by extensive capital accumulation (Langdon, 1981: 4-5).

The influence of MNCs clearly varies in different development contexts and opinion is divided on what benefits are brought to bear on the host nation. While some scholars have a decidedly favourable view of the role of multinationals as engines of policy formulation in transitional democracies (Bernstein & Berger, 2000:7), others elect to cast in sharper focus their inclination to reduce the

government's control of the economy, particularly in developing countries (Hymer, 1979: 51).

However, the case of Africa, particularly post independence Africa, lends itself to further inquiry given the institutional weaknesses, poor infrastructure and fragile ethnic relations which appear to entice MNCs seeking exclusive favour with state elites.

In this regard, LaPalombara and Blank (1984:16) posit that there are a number of 'givens' that facilitate the entry and domination of developing nations by foreign interests:

- The endowment of natural resources.
- The political instability born of the colonial policies of divide and rule.
- The level of political and economic development at the time of independence: that is, whether a country had sufficient administrative and economic management capacity and infrastructure.
- The means by which a country gained independence: were it by force of arms or gradual non violent actions.

LaPalombara and Blank argue that these 'givens' have a fundamental influence on the types of choices a country makes and its capacity to negotiate favourably with foreign corporations. Without coherent national development policies and the requisite skills that go with implementing them, developing countries with resources will fail to harness the full potential for growth and will likely depend on foreign agents to provide the relevant skills.

These weaknesses and lack of cohesion within nation states sometimes facilitate the entry of MNCs acting in collusion with what they term 'strategic elites'.

The elites may be leaders of political parties, trade unions, influential industrialists and educators, opinion makers in the mass media and high level officials in the executive and legislative arms of government; and the civilian and military managers who hold sway in public bureaucracies.

For Beinstein and Berger (2000: 6-7), who rationalise the role of business in altruistic terms, a country in transition is mired between depending on the capacity of the old order - which lacks legitimacy - and taking calculated risks with new leaders - who lack both resource and organisational capacity to meet the aspirations of their people.

It is here that they conceive of business as playing a facilitatory and instrumental role, particularly pointing to the function corporate entities played in negotiating and implementing a National Peace Accord in South Africa.

Poynter (1985: 27-30), in his examination of foreign investment policies, identifies four types of host-nation interests groups that affect the intervention of MNCs:

- The ruling political party.
- Domestic capitalists or, in socialist countries their government peers.
- Influential leaders outside of the ruling party.
- Domestic managerial class.

While there are several approaches to the analyses of the behaviour of these influential groups, Poynter highlights the confluence of right-wing political groups, domestic capitalists and foreign investors whenever there is a leftist threat to the control of resources.

He argues that foreign investors tend to favour an economic and political system preferred by the two groups: - domestic capitalists and right wing political actors. Conversely, situations could also arise where the groups position themselves against a foreign investor.

Haley (2001:92) proposes however, that MNCs are not as pedantic: 'They behave as chameleons, changing in relation to their environment'.

The case of Lonrho and its investments in Zambia defies easy categorisation as it involves primarily, relations between two powerful men: a wealthy industrialist (Roland 'Tiny' Rowland) and a charismatic founding president (Kenneth Kaunda). That alliance was likely aided by inherent institutional weaknesses and lack of a credible opposition, a matter to be examined later in section 4.3.7 of this chapter.

Therefore, by placing the influence of organised groups in sharper relief, the conceptual approach discussed by Poynter falls short of unravelling the role of charismatic leaders and imbalances in the political system in fashioning out or facilitating national agenda that affect a country's intervention policy over the long term.

Understanding the various socio-political and economic contexts that condition the relationships between MNCs and state entities appears certainly to be a much more complex affair that seems in some ways limited in scope by the theoretical perspectives often applied to analyse situations affecting developing nations.

Ronald T. Libby (1983: 379-380) argues for example that *dependency* and *Marxist theory* are insufficient to explain the circumstances of what he terms 'peripheral capitalist societies'.

*Dependency* and *Marxist theory* tend to subordinate indigenous bourgeoisie to international capitalist interests inferred from the analysis of how capital flows, trading patterns, production and inflation affect domestic markets. This approach ignores the role of political elites and classes in promoting or impeding capitalist accumulation, Libby argues. Libby asserts instead that there is a convergence of interests between foreign capital and "dominant classes" in peripheral capitalist societies and these transnational class alliances determine the nature of capital accumulation within these environments.

His study of Zambia in the 1980s revealed that there was a major class division within the country's dominant class: He distinguishes the *political or state bourgeoisie* from a *subordinate, indigenous capitalist-owning class fraction*.

Although the interests of the two classes sometimes over-lap, he argues that it is the MNCs allied to the politically connected or state bourgeoisie that receive preferential treatment from the state. The context of this relationship between MNCs and the state bourgeoisie is conditioned by several factors including the importance of the foreign enterprise and particular threats and vulnerabilities to the dominant classes.

Libby subscribes to the notion that the ruling class in Zambia in the mid 1980s encapsulated elites in the ruling party, government agencies including army and police, parastatals and the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU).

However, the folly of embracing Libby's accounts fully as we peer into the First Republic resides in the time period in which the research was conducted.

For example, the Zambia of the First Republic could barely claim to have generated an indigenous capitalist-owning class of any significance (1964-72 periods).

There is evidently a lacuna to be exploited in extending the knowledge on the nature of political and economic influences that shaped events in Zambia in the three phases of transition, which would have had significant implications for the media then and now. Essentially, the history of the media in Zambia is intrinsic to the political economic history of the country itself.

As Ayub Rioba (1998:1) rightly asserts: *"Understanding media history in any society is - in itself - understanding a society's political, economic and social history"*.



#### **4.2.5 Lonrho's growth in Africa and Zambia: Understanding the influence of a Multinational**

In attempting to understand the influence of political and business elites on media development and behaviour in the First Republic therefore, this section of the thesis will begin by retracing the emergence of the conglomerate Lonrho and its chair, Roland 'Tiny' Rowland, in colonial and post independence southern Africa.

Secondly, this section of the thesis will analyse the strategic political alliances developed by Lonrho through its chair Rowland, which appear to have spurred its success while other British interests withdrew upon the advent of independence of its colonies.

Thirdly, this section of the thesis will link Lonrho's business concerns and the media it owned, to the conglomerate's wider political and commercial aspirations in the hope of unfurling the firm's modus operandi which will later provide a basis for understanding its behaviour in relation to the sell of the *Times Newspapers* to the state.

#### **4.2.6 Tiny Rowland**

Roland 'Tiny' Rowland's name is synonymous with the growth of Lonrho. He is recognised as the architect of the company's expansion whose business approaches were characterised by close liaisons with Africa's political elite (Bower, 1994: 270-276).

Roland 'Tiny' Rowland was born in India on 27 November, 1917. Rowland changed his name from Furhop, inherited from his pharmacist father, to Rowland upon his arrival in England in October 1939 (Cronje, Ling & Cronje, 1976: Bower; 1994).

After serving in the British Army's medical Corps as a non-combatant from 1939, he was discharged, and worked thereafter as a porter at Paddington station in London. Later in life, Rowland worked as an unofficial purchasing agent for a number of local authorities in Holland. In his ascendancy, he became proprietor of a refrigeration company in London (Cronje et al, 1976: 13).

Possibly using profits from these activities, he migrated to Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) where he purchased a farm at Gatooma and subsequently established Shepton Estates as a private holding company for other business ventures. One of the ventures included Norton Motors which had the franchise for Mercedes Benz. Expanding from car dealing, he acquired shares in gold and copper mining. He established himself within the copper mining industry as a middle man for a number of firms, with one of his most significant arrangements being the purchase by Rio Tinto Company Limited of the Sandawana Emerald mine in Rhodesia.

Rowland aided Rio Tinto's expansion in Rhodesia by involving them in negotiation with Lonrho over the acquisition of the Cam and Motor Gold mining Company (1919) Ltd. Rowland was appointed to the board of Cam and Motor thereafter. In 1961, he joined the board of Lonrho Ltd (Cronje et al, 1976: 14-17).

While Cronje et al (1976), Sardanis (2003) and media reports (Africa: Bye-Bye for Tiny Rowland: 1978) portray Rowland as a manipulative self-serving industrialist with little regard for the general welfare of the continent, Bower (1994), his unofficial biographer, presents a more sanitised image of a tycoon with 'genuine' concerns for Africa:

*"His affections for Africa were genuine as were his public utterances of devotion to the African cause. But that could not interfere with the real business of earning profits" (Bower, 1994: 124).*

#### **4.2.7 Lonrho**

The ascendancy in business of Tiny Rowland and Lonrho coincided with the decline of the Federation of Northern-Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; and the rise of nationalist sentiments against this colonial formation. As other British investors in Africa withdrew in the face of the uncertainty that accompanied African independence, Rowland saw opportunities amidst what others considered a crisis (Cronje et al, 1976:16).

In fact Bower (1994: 93) suggests that Rowland, as Lonrho head, began to speculatively acquire properties across Africa precisely because of instability in those territories.

Lonrho was formed in 1909 as the London and Rhodesia Mining and Land Company Ltd. Its principle aim was to acquire mining, agriculture and ranching in Southern Rhodesia (Kareithi, 1991:199).

In the first 50 years of its incorporation, Lonrho expanded its mining interests within Rhodesia and possessed property, ranching, agriculture and asbestos concerns. It acted as secretary and manager of several companies as well as dealing primarily in mining shares (United Kingdom 1981: sec.2.1).

But the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by Rhodesia on 11 November, 1965 jeopardised Lonrho's assets in the rebel territory due to the resultant economic sanctions. Under the Prohibited Trade and Dealings Order of December 1966, the United Kingdom instituted legal restraints on the operations of all subsidiaries resident in Rhodesia, including Lonrho (United Kingdom, 1981: sec. 3.1).

UDI especially threatened to harm Lonrho's oil interests in Rhodesia where the firm had built a pipeline to the Mozambican ports. Eager to be seen as an opponent of UDI, Lonrho voted for the closure of the pipeline and gained temporarily from 'bribes' of 54,000 pounds per month from the British government

(Bower, 1994: 94). However, it is apparent that the company did not completely withdraw from Rhodesia. Instead it strategically decided to leave behind a percentage of its assets (Hall, 1969: 91).

#### **4.2.8 Lonrho's strategic political alliances in Africa**

Rowland entered Zambia on the second day of UDI and registered as a Zambian resident (and did the same in Malawi). Despite this, Rowland located Lonrho headquarters in London, with Lusaka as its Africa operations base (Bower, 1994:124).

According to Bower, Rowland reasoned that Lonrho was too small by comparison to large MNCs such as Anglo American and Rio Tinto to meddle in partisan politics and was therefore intent on a very measured approach to the new leaders of the continent. He identified Kaunda as a natural ally.

*“Zambia had become the hub of Lonrho's expansion in Africa and Rowland's developing relations with Kaunda was pivotal” (Bower, 1994: 124).*

Kariethi (1991: 204), Bower (1994: 109), Cronje et al (1976; 26), Langdon, (1981: 141) and Sardanis (2003:142) all underscore Rowland's propensity for using inducements to gain access to power in the post independence era.

Kareithi (1991: 204), in particular, attributes the survival and growth of Rowland's 'revolutionary capitalism' ideology, to a four pronged strategy:

- Lonrho forged partnerships with government and financial agencies which assured access to local resources and strategic political support.
- The conglomerate appointed politically connected African elites to positions of influence in Lonrho to secure long term political assurance and to create a loyal indigenous bourgeoisie with access to credit facilities the entity could benefit from.

- A symbiosis was created between business interests and the Lonrho owned media which defended and glorified the ideology of capitalism in the public sphere.
- In Kenya, multinationals, epitomised by Lonrho, worked in collusion with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICTU) to suppress radical trade unionism and instead promote a wage - orientated apolitical movement through the Kenya Federation of Labour. Dissent was hence suppressed through institutions and the Lonrho media.

Kariethi's caricature of the Lonrho modus operandi suggests a complex inter-link between government, corporate entities, media and labour which would arguably condition a capitalist-friendly political environment. Rowland and Lonrho, Kariethi, posits, survived numerous political storms in Kenya by employing this cosy nexus of allies, with the *Standard*, the daily owned by Lonrho, playing a supportive role.

Rowland's political liaisons are well documented, the analyses of which begin to illustrate a pattern across much of Africa.

*"Securing personal introductions to those presidents was essential and, accordingly, Rowland sought Africans whose personal connections could pave his success" (Bower, 1994: 109).*

In Kenya, he appointed Udi Gecaga, President Kenyatta's son-in-law, as Managing Director of Lonrho's Kenyan holding company, a factor the company's critics suggested accounted for its success (Langdon, 1981: 141).

Upon the death of Kenyatta, Gecaga was dismissed and Mark Too, son of the then in-coming president Daniel Arap Moi was appointed as deputy chairman of Lonrho (Kariethi, 1991: 204).

In Malawi, Rowland impressed President Hastings Kamuzu Banda with the construction of a sugar refinery at Sucoma who asked him further to build a social centre for the Women's League of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) as a 'present'. 14,000 pounds Sterling of share holders' funds was used according to Bower. Lonrho went on to own Malawi's railways (Bower, 1994: 96).

In Togo, he sought the friendship of Gil Olympio, the son of the assassinated president and representative of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in West Africa, who introduced him to Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the Ivorian President at the time. Rowland sold an \$80 million sugar complex to the Ivorian president. He also ensured Lonrho was retained as its manager.

In Sudan, he used the foreign minister Mansour Khalid to promote Lonrho as a possible service provider for the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)'s oil requirements (Bower, 1994: 110-264). The transformation of Lonrho from a Rhodesian Mining and Land Company occurred hence five years after the collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as the firm opened offices in 14 newly independent countries in Africa by 1967. By 1968, Lonrho had moved into Ghana in West Africa (United Kingdom 1981: sec. 2.8).

Kenya and Zambia epitomised the growth of this new empire as diverse acquisitions included motor dealerships and rail transport, breweries, sisal, tea, cotton and sugar farming, warehousing and packaging; and newspapers and publishing (Cronje, 1976: 32).

Hence, from varied literature constructed at different periods of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, there is a confluence of thought regarding the general approach to business by Lonrho characterised by its chairman Rowland, who evidently used his *wealth* to achieve political aims.

#### **4.3 DEMOCRATISATION IN ZAMBIA AND THE ROWLAND - KAUNDA ALLIANCE**

The similarities in the countries in which Lonrho thrived are in many respects self evident: weak institutional capacities, political fragility and the endowment of rich natural resources.

Zambia was no exception to these conditions and institutional challenges. The country's administrative limitations at independence have already been alluded to

by Pettman (1974:35) in section 2.2.4 of Chapter Two of this thesis. However, it is Kaunda who perhaps succinctly summarises Zambia's incapacity to manage its vast natural resources at the dawn of the new nation, a factor that naturally raised foreign attention:

*“At independence in 1964, the country had produced only 100 university graduates after 70 years of British rule. Of these only three were medical doctors. We realised that we needed to develop our manpower in order for the country to attain the capacity to develop” (Kaunda, 2007: xviii).*

The limitations on skill notwithstanding, it is certain that the promise of democratisation in Africa was not simply the attainment of political freedoms. More fundamentally, the struggles were about economic liberation and therefore a transfer of assets to local ownership.

As a result, *Nationalisation* - the acquisition by the state of strategic industries - and *Africanisation* - the partial or complete transfer of foreign enterprises to local nationals - became a characteristic feature of countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Swaziland, Ghana and Nigeria among others. In all these newly independent states, Lonrho was compelled to negotiate with local interests for shared ownerships upon the advent of independence in the 1960s (United Kingdom 1981:sec. 2.17).

But while in countries such as Tanzania, Lonrho was compelled to sell all of its companies to the government-owned National Development Corporation, the case of Zambia was somewhat much more complex. For the Kaunda-Rowland relationship (and by implication, the state-Lonrho liaisons) transcended the boundaries of business and publishing, extending to the realms of security at the height of the liberation wars of southern Africa.

According to Andrew Sardanis (2003), a former Lonrho executive, pro-independence activist and Kaunda's financial advisor (Pettman, 1974:245), the relationship between Tiny Rowland and the Zambian President had its roots in the pre-independence era.

Born and schooled in Cyprus, Sardanis worked as a journalist in Northern Rhodesia in 1950; was involved with the independence movement led by Kenneth Kaunda; worked for Lonrho and later played an important role in the country's administration and its dealings with foreign interests.

Sardanis (2003:141) reveals that Rowland came to the aid of Kaunda's financially crippled UNIP in the colonial era. After a rebuff by the Anglo American Corporation, which apparently had been supporting the Federal government of Roy Welensky, Kaunda turned to Lonrho, then an emerging Rhodesian firm newly headed by Rowland. To secure his long term interests in Zambia, Rowland is reported to have paid a bank guaranteed cheque of 250,000 pounds (\$700,000) to Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) through his newly acquired *Heinrich Syndicate* (Sardanis, 2003:141-142).

*"It was a colossal sum of money in those days, particularly for UNIP, and it earned Tiny, KK's eternal gratitude and friendship. In the years that followed, Rowland drew heavily on that obligation and made a lot of money, repeatedly embarrassing Kaunda internationally and locally"* (Sardanis, 2003:142).

The *Heinrich Syndicate* was owned by Max Heinrich who had other investments in Johannesburg and Durban (Hall, 1968:91). In Zambia, Heinrich operated breweries and a duet of newspapers (Kasoma, 1986:86).

Recognising the challenges of travel in Africa, Rowland further extended as a courtesy, his newly acquired personal Beechcraft Queen Air 80 to the use of the Zambian President which ferried Kaunda to talks with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, a country where Lonrho had already acquired the Central Line Sisal Estates (Cronje, 1976:36).

In years to come, he was also to fly Ian Smith to Lusaka in his Lear-jet to clandestine meetings with Kaunda and Joshua Nkomo, the liberation leader of the Zimbabwe People's Union (ZAPU) (Africa: Bye-Bye for Tiny Rowland, 1978:19).



Lonrho's expansion in Zambia began with its acquisition of Consolidated Motors in 1961, a modest spares firm. This was followed in 1964 with the takeovers of Puzey and Diss and Milne's Motor supplies Ltd.

Sardanis (2003, 173-181) notes that the sanctions applied on Rhodesia provided the ideal opportunity for Rowland to grow his firm and edge closer to the Zambian establishment. Rowland apparently exploited British ambivalence on the construction of a Tanzania - Zambia oil pipeline and presented Lonrho as a service provider, using the company's reconstruction of a similar project between Rhodesia and Mozambique as a reference point.

Opposition from influential copper companies (Hall, 1969:212), particularly Anglo American (Libby, 1983:396) at the modest credentials of Lonrho, cost the conglomerate the oil deal. Libby (1983:396) contends however that over time Lonrho made strategic decisions that enabled it gain political favour with the state and catalyse its dramatic growth in Zambia in the 1970s:

- It committed itself to the achievement of the objectives of the Second National Development Plan (1972-1976) and;
- It offered financial support to Zambia's failing agricultural sector in 1970-71, thereby identifying itself with the ruling party's African democratic socialist ideology for the reconstruction of the country.
- It complied with United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia endeared it to the Zambian government politically.

But as we shall learn, Lornho was to renege on its position on sanctions against Rhodesia, inferentially with some collusion of silence from the *Times Newspapers* and the Kaunda government.

#### 4.3.1 ***Lonrho's newspaper acquisitions: The emergence of the Times of Zambia***

*“The main impact of the democratisation process at independence in 1964 was to make the media more inclusive. Prior to independence, the media was segmented and tended to serve the interests of the settler community more than that of the natives” (Simuchoba, 2009/12/2).*

In the years to follow, Lonrho acquired interests in amethyst mining, brewing and newspapers. As stated earlier, among them was the *Heinrich Syndicate Ltd* which included the Chibuku Breweries established in 1955 by Max Heinrich.

The Heinrich Syndicate included the *Zambia Times* and the *Zambia News*, two unprofitable newspapers. The *Northern News*, another medium circulating in northern Zambia, was also taken over by Rowland's growing concerns (Makayi, 1997:17).

In the re-organisation that followed, the weekly *Zambia Times* was closed; the *Zambia News* was transformed into a weekly while the *Northern News* became a daily named the *Times of Zambia*. The first edition of the *Times of Zambia* appeared on June 30, 1965 (Kasoma, 1986:87).

Again, Rowland's political connections materialised: He appointed Tom Mtine, Mayor of Ndola and employee of the Breweries, to the managing directorship and chairmanship of Lonrho-Zambia. Mtine had connections and access to powerful Zambian leaders, including President Kaunda. However, Rowland's influence on Kaunda and his venture into the publishing industry had begun to unsettle some within the Kaunda administration.

Intent on owning a voice of its own, the government hence moved to take over *The Central African Mail* owned by the Astor Group and renamed it the *Zambia Mail*, a bi-weekly. Rowland, after initially failing to possess the newspaper, bought the less significant *Financial Mail of Zambia* (Cronje et al, 1976:34-35).

As Simuchoba (2009/12/2)<sup>19</sup> a former managing editor of the *Times newspapers*, intimates in an interview, the entry of the government as a key player in the media industry had the effect of reducing the credibility of the state's first major publication - the *Zambia Daily Mail*.

*"The effect was reduced credibility for the Daily Mail which was derisively referred to as the Government Gazette" (Simuchoba 2009/12/2).*

During this period, business deals that accompanied the government's acquisition of private newspapers are however not sufficiently documented by Zambian media scholars.

It is Cronje et al (1976:34-36) who expose the behind-the-scenes trading that eventually consigned the *Times* to political ownership by the state: Initial plans should have involved a joint newspaper scheme between the state and Lonrho with the *Zambia Mail* and the *Zambia publishing company* and Lonrho's *Zambia Newspapers Limited* merging.

Equal shareholding of 50 percent was apparently discussed between the government and Lonrho, with one percent for voting purposes, inter-changeable between the state and Lonrho, depending on whether the matter concerned was of a financial or editorial nature.

Kaunda was to have the sole right to nominate senior editorial staff. Under the deal, the *Times of Zambia* would remain a daily while the *Zambia Mail* would become a Sunday newspaper. The *Zambia News* was to be discontinued.

According to Cronje et al (1976; 35), the arrangement collapsed due to a number of factors:

- Firstly due to the discovery that the Lonrho assets were worth only 100,000 pounds sterling while the assets of government's *Mail* totalled 1.25 million pounds sterling.

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<sup>19</sup> See Interview transcripts in Appendix One of this thesis

- Secondly, Lonrho's close links to Rhodesia caused some discomfort among some officials in the Zambian government, including vice president Simon Kapwepwe.
- Thirdly, the merger was going to reduce the number of dailies effectively to one, which might not have suited the new government's nation-building agenda.

In anticipation of the merger, Dunstan Kamana, Kaunda's press secretary was appointed as editor of the *Times of Zambia*, even though a formal announcement of the intended takeover was only made in June 1975 during Kaunda's watershed speech. The actual takeover did not come until October 1982 (Kasoma, 1986: 142).

#### **4.3.2 Examining the editorial independence of the Times Newspapers under Lonrho - state ownership**

Consequently, during the period 1968 to 1980, the *Times* survived complete state ownership and remained under an unusual joint 'ownership' arrangement between Lonrho and the state.

The *Times of Zambia*, largely because of its long history as the only foreign owned newspaper in Zambia, ostensibly continued to enjoy a favourable public image over the years.

Not surprisingly, the refrain in the Zambian academic fraternity has upheld the post independence media (and in particular the *Times*) as relatively free (Kasoma, 2000:25) and or categorically free (Makungu, 2004: 101), without often framing arguments within the broader political economic and social contexts of the day.

In this regard, Richard Hall, the first editor of the *Times of Zambia* vehemently denied any editorial interference from Lonrho (Kasoma, 1986: 93).

Interviews with former editors of the *Times of Zambia* conducted by this researcher understandably project the newspapers as having played a *watchdog role* in the *First Republic*. But there is a mixed impression of how far this freedom extended.

Arthur Simuchoba (2009/12/2) one of the first generation of formally trained Zambian journalists in the Lonrho era contends that the newspaper enjoyed 'complete editorial independence' (see interview questionnaires, appendix one). Denis Kapata (2011/02/21), a former news editor who worked under Lonrho ownership of the *Times*; and later experienced the take over of the newspapers by UNIP, concurs.

Ridgeway Liwena (2008),<sup>20</sup> the first black sports editor on the *Times of Zambia*, is more measured in suggesting that the newspaper recognised its limitations by, for instance, not directly criticising President Kaunda. Sandbrook (1996: 82) augments this assertion.

John Phiri (2009/11/20) the current managing director of the *Times/printmaker Limited*, however, rationalises that the *Times Newspapers* under Lonrho were inclined to protecting the interests of the Tiny Rowland primarily, despite the presence of a state appointed editor-in-chief.

#### **4.3.3 UK Competition Commission Inquiry into Lonrho's alleged editorial interference on the Times**

The relationships between the *Times* and its co-owners hence have lent themselves to much speculative analysis over the past 45 years. However, corporate censorship and collusion between the state and the market have not been emphasised at all in discourses on press freedom in Zambia.

And yet the revelations of the United Kingdom (UK) Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report (1981) on Lonrho severely discredit assertions of 'complete' independence ascribed to the *Times* in the *First Republic*.

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<sup>20</sup> Unpublished face-to-face interviews: See transcript in appendix one

The Commission's investigations into the dealings of Lonrho unravelled allegations of corporate interference in the editorial workings of the *Times of Zambia* in the 1966-68 periods, when the newspaper was edited by Richard Hall.

H.L. Leeds, who served as manager of the *Times of Zambia* between 1965 and 1968 submitted to the Commission that the paper's editors were continually harassed by Tiny Rowland for publishing news stories critical of the government or the ruling party (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.1). Some of the incidents cited are as follows:

- That Rowland instructed Hall to publish anti-Italian articles to counter negative publicity of Lonrho by the Italian press. This arose ostensibly because Italian companies were the major competitors to Lonrho for the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia oil pipeline. Both Rowland and Hall were placed on record as having denied these charges<sup>21</sup>.
- That the managing director of the Lonrho-owned Heinrich Brewery had instructed Leeds to suppress an article on labour disputes and the harassment of white management by its black workers. The Commission asserts that there is no doubt the story was suppressed and that as a result an assistant editor resigned. Richard Hall, apparently in London during the incident, wrote a memorandum to a local director "seriously condemning the incident" (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.3).
- That in 1967, Tom Mtine, the managing director of Lonrho Zambia Limited, upon losing mayoral elections, instructed Hall's successor at the *Times*, Philip Griffiths, never to publish a picture of the new mayor in the *Times Newspapers*. Following his appeal to Tiny Rowland, the editor was allegedly ordered to obey Mtine's instructions or resign. In defence of Mtine, Lonrho provided evidence of pictures of the managing director with the new mayor, at the installation ceremony.

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<sup>21</sup> According to the *Zambia Mail* of 27 August 1965, Leeds, while still serving as Lonrho Manager of the Lonrho newspapers, is reported to have publicly denied having personally ordered the removal of a story in the *Times of Zambia* involving the Lonrho owned Heinrich Syndicate (Kasoma, 1986: 94).

Further written evidence was submitted to the Commission by Derek Taylor, a former journalist (1963-65), political editor (1965-66) and deputy editor; and acting editor (1966-68). Taylor's affidavit focuses on occurrences in 1967 in Lusaka, the Zambian capital.

Taylor admits having been told by Leeds of Tiny Rowland's ire with Hall for an article critical of President Kaunda's remission of a prison sentence of a UNIP official. In Rowland's view, the story generated political hostility toward the newspaper. Rowland had allegedly suggested that both Taylor and the editor of the business magazine be dismissed (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.4).

Richard Hall's own submission appears to confirm the gravity of the situation, despite his earlier assertions of editorial independence.

The Commission reports that Hall volunteered to resign following the uproar over the UNIP article, a move 'reluctantly' accepted by Rowland. Rowland denies having forced Hall to resign or pressurising him over the incidence.

In the submissions, Hall claims Kaunda displayed no hostility toward him thereafter and had in fact offered him a senior position in the public service, which he declined (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.6).

For his part, Rowland defended Kaunda's press freedom credentials, citing the numerous occasions the *Times of Zambia* had attacked the president without repressive action.

During the hearings, Hall and his news editor, G. Gillies, submitted evidence denying any interference in the workings of the newspapers by either Rowland or Mtine. Gillies attested that the *Times of Zambia* had been severely critical of UDI in Rhodesia despite the vulnerability of Lonrho in Rhodesia (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.10).

In support of this stand-point, Hall similarly pointed to occasions when the *Times* had been critical of Lonrho despite it being the parent company.

The most compelling piece of evidence in defence of the independence of the *Times of Zambia* under Lonrho relates to the paper's vociferous criticism of Zairean president Mobutu Sese Seko's visit to Zambia, which resulted in the expropriation of the company's assets in that country.

The editors did not lose their jobs, Hall, Gillies and Rowland contend in their evidence. However, it is significant to note the Commission's final observations on this submission:

*"Mr Rowland also referred to this incident in his evidence and confirmed that it led to the confiscation of Lonrho's assets in Zaire. **But three years later, the company's property was returned**"* (United Kingdom 1981: sec 7.10).

In short, Rowland was inexplicably able to regain his investments in Zaire despite the rancour over the *Times* reports.

#### **4.3.4 'Unexposed' security liaisons between Rowland, Kaunda, Smith and Vorster**

It is prudent to continue to question the 'complete' independence of the *Times of Zambia* under Lonrho's ownership and the shared co-ownership arrangement with the state, given the gravity of the omissions in the recording of a significant aspect of the country's history, that is; the nature of its involvement in the liberation of southern Africa.<sup>22</sup>

Rowland and Hall's submissions to the United Kingdom Monopolies and Mergers Commission, in defence of the *Times of Zambia's* under Lonrho, certainly pale in the face of detailed published works of Cronje et al (1976; 37) and to some extent

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<sup>22</sup> It was not considered necessary, given the parameters of this thesis, to interview a large pool of journalists employed on the *Times* over the 45 year period, particularly on the specific cases of controversy relating to the coverage of political and business elites or policies/practices for hiring and firing reporters in the first, second and third republics. This was, obviously, not the central focus of the thesis and would therefore not have added value to the knowledge already gleaned from the methods adopted. This researcher recognises however the importance of this as a potential area for future research.



that of Rowland's biographer, Bower (1994:271) who expose how the newspapers allegedly covered up Rowland's secret dealings with Ian Smith and Vorster while working as an emissary of Kaunda's.

Cronje et al (1976: 37-38) posit that, at home, the *Times of Zambia* reflected Lonrho's interests in criticising the *nationalisation* policy announced by Kaunda in 1968.

This was because Lonrho's own *Smith and Youngson* was affected by the nationalisation programme and the company's displeasure was hence reflected through adverse newspaper articles.

Lonrho's influence is also attributed to the failure of the *Times Newspapers* to report the company's continued involvement in Rhodesia, a country which was effectively at war with liberation - inclined Zambia.

In this regard, Bower (1994: 269) suggests Kaunda was aware of Lonrho's sanction busting and was not able to expose Rowland's company because his own government was maintaining low key trade with Rhodesia.

*"Kaunda's and Rowland's ambitions in Africa were mutually dependent to a degree" (Bower, 1994:271).*

Indeed it is established that there was a level of covert trading going on between Zambia and Rhodesia during UDI (Hall, 1969:31). Although Zambia had reduced its imports from Rhodesia; the importation of goods from South Africa increased by a similar volume. Hall suggests that some of the Rhodesian goods were simply re-packaged and re-labelled in South Africa to avoid embarrassment.

The *Times of Zambia* made no exposé of these covert exchanges<sup>23</sup>. However, in 1971, Kaunda told the UNIP Parliamentary caucus that Zambia had imported

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<sup>23</sup> Kasoma (1986: 175) reveals that in 1977 the government owned *Zambia Daily Mail*, at the time, had received a late confirmation from the state of Ian Smith's visit to Zambia. The article was generated by the *Mail's* syndication department, under pressure from its foreign clients. The item was not essentially for the local market and had vital details missing. To emphasise the sensitivity of these matters, Kasoma

maize from Rhodesia to avert a national crisis. The *Times of Zambia* editorialised in favour of the state's decision endorsing the action as inevitable and a matter of national interest (Mtshali, 1973: 262).

Except for modest exposures of government sanction busting such as the use of the Rhodesian corridor for the export of copper, the *Times of Zambia* was generally in agreement with the Zambian government on matters relating to UDI Rhodesia (Kasoma, 1986:88).

According to Kasoma (1986:93), himself a former journalist, the Lonrho editorial policy allowed the newspaper to criticise UNIP as a party; but was wary of souring relations with the government or president Kaunda.

Perhaps the most profound of the revelations concerning the *Times* and the close relationship between the Zambian president and Rowland was the deployment of the latter as an intermediary in matters related to the country's security relations with apartheid South Africa and UDI Rhodesia.

Rowland was apparently used to set up meetings between Kaunda and South Africa's apartheid leader John Vorster. This was done against a background of incursions into Zambia by rebel Rhodesian troops and South African forces.

The meeting between the two allowed for a settlement for Rhodesia to be tabled. These events occurred to the ire of Zambia foreign minister and former editor of the *Times*, Vernon Mwaanga, who felt undermined by Kaunda and Rowland (Bower, 1994; 273).

Exploiting his secret mandate, Rowland apparently initiated the events that finally culminated in a summit on August 25 1975 at the Victoria Falls between Kaunda and Vorster. Vorster persuaded Smith to release Zimbabwean nationalist leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe from detention and declare a ceasefire. Because of his close ties to Kaunda, Rowland had to support the pro-western

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highlights the arrest in 1983 of *Daily Mail* Syndications editor Shadreck Soko, for carrying copies of Kaunda's speech on a holiday to Swaziland, a country located within the borders of the then, apartheid South Africa. Soko was interrogated for 13 days before release.

candidate, Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU over ZANU's Robert Mugabe (Bower, 1994: 276).

The public meeting between Kaunda and Vorster was reported widely. But not surprisingly, Rowland's role and the covert meetings between Smith and Kaunda are *not to be found* in the content of the *Times* at a time when the newspapers had their most enduring image as *a public watchdog!*

The logical explanation for this would be the complex entanglement of Lonrho and the state with Ian Smith's Rhodesia and possibly the national security considerations surrounding Rowland's activities necessitated a collusion of silence amongst state, Lonrho and its newspapers.

Herman and Chomsky (2002: 2)'s articulation of the *propaganda model* of the media, seems relevant here. While it is relatively easy to determine that the media serves the dominant class in environments where the state is in direct control, it is less evident where they are in private ownership. The influence of wealth and power will be masked by private media's periodic attacks and exposé of corporate and governmental shortcomings. Media in this instance will portray themselves as champions of free speech and the general community interest.

*"A propaganda model focuses on this inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel effects on mass media interests and choices. It traces the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalise dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public" (Herman & Chomsky, 2002: 2).*

#### **4.3.5 Comparing the behaviours of Lonrho media in Zambia and Kenya**

To augment these assertions, one is tempted to examine similar cases in other parts of the continent where Lonrho was active in business and publishing.

It is Kariethi (1991) who perhaps reinforces the notion of corporate interference from Lonrho by demonstrating similar behaviours in the Kenyan media milieu.

Although Kenya's media history is quite dissimilar to Zambia's, particularly in terms of the endurance of multinational ownership of the media to the present day, there are some parallels in respect of the Lonrho-owned newspapers which would prove useful to this discussion.

Kenya has an array of privately owned newspapers of which the three largest publishing groups are the *Nation Newspapers Limited*, owned by the Aga Khan, the *Standard* owned by Lonrho's Consolidated Holdings Limited; and the *Kenya Times*, owned by the founding political party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU)(Kariethi, 1991:200).

Kareithi (1991:208-209) posits that the *Standard* unwaveringly supported Tiny Rowland's notion of "revolutionary capitalism" and was scathing in its reaction to any public media criticism of foreign owned press or interests.

The key elements of his assertions can be summarised as such:

- Ostensibly because of Lonrho's close ties to political elites in Kenya, the *Standard* editorialised in support of detention without trial for opponents of President Moi.
- In 1982, when George Githi, the *Standard's* editor attempted to condemn detentions of dissidents, he was summarily dismissed by the Lonrho board of directors.
- The *Standard* was one of the leading supporters of constitutional amendments in May 1982 to render Kenya a de facto one party state.
- The *Standard* had not promoted indigenisation of the economy and land reforms, matters which were close to the masses of landless Kenyans(substantial portions).

The fore-going analysis establishes a pattern from various bodies of knowledge, that strengthens the argument that markets and states have similar influences on

media or more pointedly, that collusion between the two does occur and can undermine media freedom.

In fact, it can be argued quite authoritatively, based on corroborated accounts from the various sources thus far, that the *Times* was constrained by Lonrho in some respects although it was allowed enough leeway to sustain a sufficiently strong public image through generalised criticisms of government policies.

For instance, from Kasoma (1986), Sandbrook (1996) and Liwena (2008) we learn that the *Times Newspapers* were regularly critical of the party and its government but *did not directly attack President Kaunda* presumably because of his close ties to Rowland and the Zambian leader's unique position as the appointing authority of the chief executive of the foreign owned entity.

*“Political control started with Dunstan Kamana. **Although he never directly criticised the president, he was fearless.** He always protected his staff. I don't recall a reporter being called to answer to outsiders” (Liwena, 2008).*

The explanation for Kaunda's insulation from direct criticism is to be further deduced from the analysis presented by Cronje et al (1976: 37). These resonate with the allegations made by former senior employees of the *Times* to the United Kingdom (UK) Monopolies and Mergers Commission.

Therefore, while there is little doubt that the *Times* did interrogate party and government actions, it is certain that the two most prominent protagonists in the Zambia - Rhodesia saga, Kaunda and Rowland, were spared any traceable amount of critical scrutiny by the *Times*. The role of Lonrho in constraining the *Times* at critical moments in the politics of the country has virtually been left untouched in the wider academic project regarding the media in Zambia. Needless to say, the state and Lonrho each had somewhat varied interests in maintaining political controls on the *Times Newspapers*.

#### **4.3.6 The state-corporate control model**

Ultimately, it becomes increasingly evident that provided the *Times Newspapers* generated profits for Lonrho and avoided embarrassing the president and government to a certain degree, the conglomerate was disinterested in the day-to-day reporting of the newspaper (Kasoma, 1986:93). The evolving structure of the *Times* during the First republic, leading into the Second Republic begins to support this thesis.

*“Lonrho used board members largely drawn from the business community; whereas under the state ownership, party, government operatives have always outnumbered business community representatives” Phiri (2009/11/20).*

For Lonrho's profit motive to be fulfilled, the *Times* had to maintain a favourable public image. Rowland appears to have done so successfully without losing political favour from UNIP/state and from Kaunda in particular for most of the First Republic. Lonrho maintained its control of the commercial side of *Times and Printpak*, the publishing company and therefore continued appointing a General Manager and Chief Accountant:

*“Yes, they allowed Kaunda to appoint the editor-in-chief, but they continued to appoint the general manager and chief accountant because they were interested in the profits” (Liwena, 2008/05/08).*

Both Lonrho and the state, considered this enterprise as key to their own ambitions but from slightly different perspectives. The compromise position reached by the two eventually produced a structure that enabled what might be termed a *state-corporate control model* (Figure 5).

The model escapes the *four theories of the press* or the modified philosophy of a *social-centralist* media, to describe centrally controlled and guided newspapers (Merrill 1990:37). In essence, the applicability and adaptability of Siebert, Peterson and Schramm's *Four Theories of the Press* (1956) is increasingly challenged by rapid changes in global political and economic contexts characterised by the phenomena of liberalisation, privatisation, commercialisation, convergence and globalisation which necessitate a shift from the media as a cultural institution to a market driven one (Fourie, 2007: 3).

Changing political economic dynamics will also contest assertions by key authorities such as Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 40-41) who conceptualises news media as a semi-autonomous social sector, which despite experiencing external pressure, maintain internal homogeneity and are collectively capable of generating power to influence other sectors.

Bourdieu holds that the social world is structured around two opposing forms of power; *economic capital* - money or assets that can be transformed into money - and *cultural capital*, which includes educational credentials, technical expertise, general knowledge, verbal abilities and artistic sensibilities. Bourdieu views economic capital as being exhibited through circulation, advertising revenues or audience ratings whereas cultural capital of the field is demonstrated through the award of high profile honours to media professionals, such as the *Pulitzer Prize*.

Exposing the limitations of Bourdieu's *field theory*, Benson (2006: 189) rightly acknowledges the possibility of *external heterogeneity*, or; "*the multiple and potentially cross-cutting constraints on journalism arising from the political and economic fields*".

The "cross-cutting constraints" imposed on journalism by political and economic elites have been substantially illustrated in this chapter of the thesis, buttressing

Benson's position. The alliances formed by Kaunda and Rowland are expressed, hence, through the *state corporate control model*.

That alliance, and the entity it creates, lends itself to scrutiny from the Actor Network Theory (ANT) perspective. ANT's principal feature is that both humans and non humans constitute a network to be studied. It concerns itself with the motivations and actions of human actors that tailor their interests around the requirements of the non human actors. In the conventional understanding of this theory, the state, the public and media owners would be the human actors while the market would constitute the non human actor (Gao, 2005: 257).

ANT has been criticised for being '*politically neutral*', being too pre-occupied with questions of how networks are established in terms of relations, but not with whether these relations are characterised by *ethical* or *unethical* means (Alcadipani & Hassard([Sa])).

Based on this interpretation, the state-corporate structure (or network) formulated by Kaunda and Rowland, with the *Times* as the non human entity, is not based on *any discernible ethics*, but has invariably aligned the various interests of different humans and non human elements into a social artefact. The role of *the politically powerful* is fundamental here and can therefore not be avoided.

Shoemaker and Reese (1996:199) reinforce this notion that media content has multiple influences, with *the powerful*, being elemental in this regard.


Interestingly, Shoemaker and Reese, after evaluating a body of research on 58 countries in respect of state-media relations, conclude that all governments exert controls on mass media. Obviously the manner and extent of this influence varies from different developmental contexts.

In the case of China for example, Ernest Zhang and Kenneth Fleming (2005: 319-339) categorise media influences by *the powerful* in a *three-way party control model* which employs party and government at various levels to mould media content. This model might partly speak more distinctly to the *Times of Zambia*



after 1982 when Lonrho relinquished ownership to UNIP and its government, ironically, a similar party-government model reminiscent of the Communist bloc<sup>24</sup>.

**Figure 4: Three-way party-control model**



**Source: Zhang & Fleming (2005: 325).**

However, the Lonrho-state arrangement does not conform to these descriptions forwarded largely by western inspired scholarship.

Therefore, to fully appreciate how the interests of UNIP (which is conflated with the state in this context) and Lonrho co-existed symbiotically, one is challenged to re-construct the oversight framework of the *Times of Zambia* in the first 17 years of independence, a period when a fragile dominant party structure influenced the transformation of Zambia into a one party state by the end of 1972.


Figure 5 is constructed based on the insider accounts gained from interviews with current and former editors of the *Times of Zambia*, regarding the nature of the power relations between state, Lonrho and the *Times* establishment. This

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<sup>24</sup> This thesis does not pertinently address normative theory in the conduct of interviews and in the articulation of insider accounts because the main interest lies more in the field of political economy.

structure is demonstrative of actual lines of accountability rather than the conventional operational model presented by the *Times*.

**Figure 5: The two-way state-corporate control model**



**Source: constructed by author.**

There are three key aspects to this model: 1) It has been inferred from the foregoing analysis that the state influenced content on the *Times* to some degree through the direct appointment of the editor-in-chief by the president. 2) This was reinforced by an unwritten policy by the Lonrho-appointed board to allow the editor of the newspapers to criticise the party and less so the government and the president 3) Lonrho controlled the commercial aspects of the company, with direct access to the general manager of *Times/Printpak* and the chief accountant, therefore matters of sustainability and profitability remained under their superintendence. Conflict arose between the general manager and chief accountant on the one hand, with the editor-in-chief on the other, in respect of space and libel cases. It is here where the influences of the commercial and the editorial aspects of the *Times* can be said to be bi-directional. Simuchoba (2009/12/2) illuminates this pointedly:

*“Under Lonrho commercial interests were paramount and Lonrho always appointed the general manager of the Times whose responsibility was to see to the commercial interest. It is instructive that the editor-in-chief and the general manager were nearly always at odds as when the former would order withholding of adverts to create more room for news. The GM was never amused. Neither was he by a “big” libel file. The autonomy was tenuous in that sense-while the EIC could write pretty much what he thought fit, Lonrho had to make its money.”* (Simuchoba, 2009/12/2).

It has to be stated however that the transformation of the *Times* during the first republic and succeeding periods is not by any means, a social anomaly. Functionalist-structural approaches to mass communication studies have indicated that social systems respond structurally to environmental changes. The capacity to compensate the environmental influences serves as the assurance of the survival of a social system (Sturmer, 1998:6-7).

**To summarise:** This chapter has thus far mapped the extent of power relations that occasioned the distribution of communication resources in post independence Zambia, leading up to the present day.

The economic imperatives of this discussion point to a multinational entity that exploited personal friendship with charismatic leaders in Africa and Zambia more specifically; and that exploited the institutional weaknesses of independent states, to expand its empire. In all instances, the MNC Lonrho acquired media interests which played key roles in advancing its causes.

The arrangement between Lonrho and the state to co-own the *Times* underlines assertions that states and markets can have similar influences on media freedom, and in this rare instance, common purposes for limiting the political public sphere.

What is perhaps less certain at this point is how the institutional settings, the primacy of personal-based rule and conflation of party and state, may have facilitated these political actions and liaisons; inevitably impacting on the conduct of the *Times*.

#### **4.3.7 Dominant party structures and person-based rule: how the political system contributed to the demise of the Times**

This section of the chapter will therefore examine how the unassailability of Kaunda's relationship with Rowland was aided by three key factors:

- The dominant party structure that emerged at independence characterised by weak opposition and the subsequent single party state established in 1972.
- The constitutional powers of the presidency in Zambia which allowed him to appoint all cabinet ministers and speaker of national assembly
- The institutionalisation and personalisation of the presidency and the ruling party, a charismatic/patriarchal leadership style common to post independence Africa

The three factors will be discussed in an integrated fashion, to expose the extent to which political actions might have occurred without hindrance within and without the party political system.

In Chapter One section 1.2.1 reference was made to the over-riding influence of dominant party systems over many critical aspects of democracy in Africa.

It is important to reiterate on the outset that Zambia has had two periods of dominant party systems - the First Republic and the Third; and one of a de facto one party set up (the Second Republic).

Scholars note that despite some obvious similarities, there are clear distinctions between dominant party and one party system. A dominant party arises and endures as a result of the *will of the people through elections*. On the other hand, in the one party system, the ruling party and the state are the personification of the charismatic leader, a relationship that is forged around the ideology of the latter (Heywood, 2002:260).

Historically, one-party systems were not subject to competition and resulted from coercive legal proscription of opposition parties (Matshiqi, 2010: 2) or executive action (Simutanyi, 2008:11).

The two systems, in some instances, do share similar features, such as the pre-eminence of the presidency over other institutions and the propensity for centralised decision making, a fundamental feature which would encourage the kind of political liaisons that existed between Kaunda and Rowland over time.

The one party state might nonetheless present itself as the more repressive system given the preponderance of the so-called person-based rule, which immortalised founding presidents therefore rendering them invulnerable to wrong doing.

Spiess (2002:1) suggests that dominant parties are defined by numerical superiority over a prolonged period of time; dominance over bargaining when forming governments; and in determining the policy agenda.

Simutanyi (2008:11) identifies four key features of Single Party Dominance (SPDs):

- Control over the presidency.
- Proportionally higher share of parliamentary seats.
- Degree of exclusion of the opposition in policy formulation and decision-making.
- Presence of a maximum coalition de-legitimising opposition; and a weak and less institutionalised opposition.

Not only are dominant parties over bearing, they can also be resilient, surviving popular dissent due to their propensity to politicise public resources (Greene, 2010:2-4).

Against this background, it is hardly surprising that political scientists are beginning to increasingly question the relationship between one-party dominance

and democracy (Heywood, 2002: Simutanyi, 2008: Maudeni, Sebudubudu, Kebonang & Mokhawa, 2008, Matshiqi, 2010).

Disappointingly, none of the scholars lays any emphasis on media controls that arise as a result of single party dominance. For while the one party state is often associated with hostility to media independence, the dominant party phenomenon cannot be absolved of similar blame either.

In his analysis of SPDs in Zambia, Simutanyi (2008:3), as others before him, concentrates on the political effects arising from one-party dominance which include reducing political competition, excluding specific groups from political power and representation; blurring the lines between party and state, blocking political initiative, fuelling corruption, promoting self-centred/personal behaviour and preventing policy innovation.

However, by examining political events in Zambia in the First and Second Republics, an inference can be drawn that Kaunda's actions on the media were certainly bolstered by the emergence of UNIP as the dominant post independence party.

Pre-independence elections held on January 4, 1964, saw UNIP coast to victory with 55 seats against the African National Congress (ANC)'s 10, consigning the latter to a provincial party (Simutanyi, 2008: 9).

Simutanyi (2008: 9) traces Kaunda's personal rule to the 1967 UNIP Central Committee meeting which saw the nationalist leader replace competitive intraparty elections with a pre-selected list of preferred candidates who were to be endorsed at each party conference. The departure of Vice President Simon Kapwepwe in 1971 to form the United Progressive Party (UPP), referred to in Chapter Two, resulted directly from Kaunda's leadership style, he asserts.

Simutanyi observes that the post independence political parties were generally characterised by personalised leadership, lack of institutionalisation, factionalism and a high degree of fragmentation.

Because of UNIP's dominance and ethnic dissent over access to power compounded by weak opposition, Kaunda moved to consolidate his power base after the 1967 UNIP central committee meeting, combining the position of secretary-general and party president and dissolving several key positions within the party.

The pre-eminence of Zambia's first president and UNIP as the founding party hence allowed for the entrenchment of *Humanism* as a national philosophy.

With conditions set for the establishment of the one party state in 1972, Kaunda's person-based rule was institutionalised and expressed through national slogans.

The content of *Humanism Part 1* and the deification of Kaunda on the front pages of both the *Times* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*, and his headline treatment by both radio and television emphasise conformity driven by a deliberate state policy in this regard (Chisala, 1994:44).

Overall, it can be argued that the political climate propagated by dominant parties could allow for excessive actions, given that the public accountability role of opposition and media is often denuded.

It stands to reason to conclude that the liaisons such as those forged between Kaunda and Rowland would have gone unchecked because of the overriding influences of the person in power, the absence of opposition or organised civil society and above all, the nature of covert controls imposed on the leading daily of the day - the *Times of Zambia*.

#### **4.3.8 The one party state and the structure of the Times under the Zambia National Holdings (Second Republic)**

The advent of the one party state in 1972 saw a more aggressive agenda to colonise the *Times Newspapers* by the state, which was now distinctly conflated with the ruling party, UNIP.

It is critical to reiterate here that it was characteristic of many founding African leaders to prioritise national unity over individual freedoms (Sturmer, 1998:18) and therefore the media were increasingly seen as a tool for fostering social cohesion or national assimilation of ethnically diverse groups.

Consequently, upon the official takeover of the *Times* by UNIP in 1982, the reporting structure, at least in principle, changed. The *Times of Zambia and Sunday Times of Zambia*, along with *Printpak Zambia*, and *Newspaper Distributors* fell directly under the *Zambia National Holdings (ZNHL)*, the parent company of all of UNIP's assets. This essentially rendered the newspapers the property of the ruling party (Kasoma, 1986: 142).<sup>25</sup>

While the *Zambia Daily Mail* continued to be referred to as a 'government owned newspaper' the *Times Newspapers* were considered a party entity (Press now under one roof. 1988:1).

As a 'party paper' the *Times* was expected to be the extension of the voice of the party and its government' and the principle vehicle for the promotion of the ideals of Kaunda's *Humanism*, which has been discussed in section 2.2.5 of Chapter Two.

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<sup>25</sup> The take over of the *Times Newspapers* by UNIP in 1982 underlines the end of the Lonrho era. Further afield, it is inferred that Lonrho's influences in Zambia's political economic affairs also waned ahead of Tiny Rowland's passing. Bower (1994) has in fact suggested that the rise of the MMD and particularly the re-emergence of Vernon Mwaanga as foreign affairs minister under the Chiluba administration, accounts for the eventual marginalisation of Lonrho in Zambian politics. Rowland was deposed by the board of directors in 1994 for allegedly concealing financial information. The dismissal and eventual death of Rowland in 1998 finally, signified a change in the modus operandi of the multinational, that is, a noticeable departure from exploiting class national class alliances to achieve commercial aims. The Lonrho PLC report for 1998 commits to the demerger of Lonrho Africa from the Group. Chairman Sir John Craven, in January 1999, proposed a change in name of the company to Lonmin Plc (Craven, 1999: 1).



The management structure inherited from Lonrho remained largely the same, with a general manager who presided over the commercial functions of the *Times/Printpak Zambia Limited*, and an editor-in-chief whose main mandate was to lead the editorial aspects of the establishment.

There were modifications to the newspapers distribution department, which was constituted into a subsidiary company named *Newspaper Distributors*, headed by its own general manager.

The Second Republican structure of the *Times* ensured that *Times* staff, including the editor-in-chief and his reporters and editors, became card carrying members of the ruling party.

The implication of this was that employment could quite easily be denied on account of lack of party loyalty. This was alluded to in Kaunda's 1975 Watershed Speech and through the sackings of some senior editorial staff who appeared to deviate from prescribed party thinking (Makayi, 1997:19).

#### **4.3.9 *The structure of the Times under the National Media Corporation (NAMECO) and the MMD (Second and Third Republics)***

Kaunda remained committed to transforming the media sector along the lines of his philosophy of *Humanism* under which he sought to advance the party's aims and objectives through the ownership of newsletters, newspapers and magazines (Kaunda, 1968:11).

During the mid to late eighties when industrial unrest and food riots had begun to manifest the first major signs of popular disaffection with the one party regime (Roberts, 1995:1014-15), Kaunda began to publicly entertain a more integrated media conglomerate which would absorb loss making government media entities.

*“I know the Times of Zambia is standing on its own and does not get subsidy. But the Zambia Daily Mail cannot. It gets subsidy. There is need to bring them under one roof” (Spread Wings-KK, 1988:1).*

Darnoff (1997:202) notes that pressure on the state media has emanated from the ruling party (conflated with the state) in three key vectors:

- The economic dependence of the media on the state (which leads to the expectation of favourable and guaranteed coverage).
- The appointment of members of boards of directors (often chosen for their political orientation rather than their performance).
- The direct influence of ministers over news editors and programmers.

Kaunda’s proposed horizontal concentration of all state media certainly made this a reality.

In 1988 Kaunda brought the *Times Newspapers* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*, with their respective printing companies under the aegis of the *National Media Corporation* (NAMECO).

Kaunda instructed the board of NAMECO to ensure that the new media conglomerate became economically viable. Subsidies were assured for the first year of NAMECO’s operations; thereafter, the entity was to be self sustaining.

Kaunda assigned his special assistant for press and minister of national guidance, information and broadcasting, Milimo Punabantu to manage the re-organisation of the media entities. Punabantu, a former editor-in-chief of the *Times*, was to be assisted by Naphy Nyalugwe, himself a previous editor of the newspapers, who had fallen out of favour with the president for his critical editorials. The ZNHL formally ceased to be the holding company of the *Times Newspapers*, *Printpak* and *Newspaper Distributors* on 21 February, 1989 (Firms in new hands, 1989:3).

Under the new structure, the *Times Newspapers* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* were both headed by a managing editor that was the equivalent of the general managers of *Printpak, Zambia Printing Company and Newspaper Distributors*. The position of editor-in-chief was abolished to suit international trends.

The chief executives of these subsidiaries reported to the managing director of NAMECO, which had an elaborate governance structure. The managing director in turn, reported to the director general, who in this instance was Kaunda's personal advisor, Milimo Punabantu. The management structure of NAMECO included a director of press, director of finance, director of personnel and administration and a director of operations.

In effect, the structure confirms that the entire NAMECO establishment was controlled at the highest level from the presidency through Kaunda's top advisor Punabantu.

According to Punabantu, each of the subsidiaries of NAMECO were expected to operate profitably, by among other means, fully exploiting commercial printing, publishing and distribution to satisfy public demand while achieving the required return on investment. George Pelekamoyo, a former permanent secretary in the ministry of information and broadcasting, was named managing director of NAMECO on 5 March 1990. On Kaunda's instruction, 60 percent share capital of NAMECO was equally apportioned to leading parastatals - the Zambia State Insurance Corporation (ZSIC), the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZANACO) and the Zambia National Provident Fund (ZNPf). NAMECO was to eventually hold 40 percent of the total share capital (3 financial giants get 60p.c. NAMECO shares. 1990. 1).

The new conglomerate came with a promise of the acquisition of new printing equipment which would allow NAMECO to print the *Times of Zambia, Sunday Times of Zambia, and Zambia Daily Mail* simultaneously.

In effect, the horizontal concentration of state media entities was fashioned to commercialise all aspects of the newspapers with wider distribution of products

across a sparsely populated country (NAMECO to acquire new printing equipment, 1990:1).

Improved conditions of service were also promised to journalists and media workers in general (Media boss promises goodies, 1991:1).

Perhaps the striking factor concerning this transformation of the media lay in its timing. This researcher asserts that the creation of NAMECO was strategic and pre-emptive in nature, given the fast changing global political context which encouraged democracy, independent media and active citizenship.

NAMECO was conceived at a time when indicators of political change from the collapse of communism in Europe were self evident and when rumblings within the African continent for an end to one partyism were becoming more amplified.

The MMD harnessed this popular discontent of a nascent civil society to garner its own *power*. They used this power to begin to challenge the status quo, including greater public access to state media systems.

The advent of the third wave of democratisation hence stimulated UNIP to project one voice promoting its activities as opposed to disparate communications issuing from the *Zambia Daily Mail*, which was traditionally government inclined, and the *Times*, which occasionally retained a sharper critical edge from its Lonrho days.

The formal registration of the MMD in July 1990 and the emergence of the *Weekly Post*, generally regarded as an opposition mouthpiece by UNIP, prompted the NAMECO establishment to launch a multiplicity of publications through the newly appointed *Times* managing editor, Bweendo Mulengela (Nameco director salutes *Times*, 1991:5).

The *Evening Times*, the monthly *Search Magazine* and an expanded 32 page *Times of Zambia* were just some of the new changes on the establishment. The *Daily Mail* launched the *Financial Mail* and the *Sunday Mail* widening coverage of state activities during a period of intense political activity.

#### **4.3.10 The Third Republic and the influence of opposition politics on public participation in state media**

*“It (political pluralism) brought a shift in public expectations: from simply being dismissed as a government mouthpiece, the public started to demand that state media operate more as public media, by taking aboard the public’s interests in news content” (Phiri, 2009/11/20).*

The MMD strongly contested the idea that the NAMECO newspapers were state owned and therefore to be excessively abused by the ruling party.

Evidently due to the pressure applied by the new opposition movement, UNIP attempted to transfer the *Times Newspapers, Printpak Zambia and Newspaper Distributors* back to ZNHL, (leaving the *Daily Mail and Zambia Printing Companies* in government hands) ahead of October 31, 1991 multiparty elections. However, through a high court injunction by the MMD, this action was halted (Musaika 1991:1).

The interim injunction restrained NAMECO, Punabantu, Pelekamoyo, the *Times* and *Printpak, Newspaper Distributors* and the minister of finance and planning from proceeding with Kaunda’s instruction. The MMD argued that its members, as citizens of Zambia, were convinced that it was against public policy and an abuse of trust for UNIP to re-possess public assets reposed by the people to it during the one party era. The minister of finance and planning held the majority interest in NAMECO, incorporated on January 16, 1989. Essentially, it was argued that UNIP used tax payer’s funds to transfer the *Times* to ZNHL and subsequently to NAMECO. This effectively rendered the entities, public institutions.

UNIP’s argument was that there was no transfer of shares when the ZNHL subsidiaries were moved to NAMECO. The entities therefore were legally held by UNIP’s holding company. The court hearings dragged on beyond UNIP’s mandate in power. After the MMD won a landslide victory from the October 31,

1991 elections, Mwanawasa, now state vice president, instructed state lawyers assigned to the case by Kaunda's government, to withdraw their defence, effectively ending the legal contest (Times won't go back to UNIP, 1991:1).

The MMD dissolved NAMECO on 17 September, 1993, declaring all of its work redundant. All of NAMECO's interests and shares were to be transferred to the ministry of finance. All subsidiaries, which the new MMD administration admitted were loss making, were to be restructured and made commercially viable (state dissolves Nameco, 1993:1).

Certainly without the benefit of political change, particularly the repeal of article 4 of the constitution in 1990 by Kaunda upon pressure from MMD and an emerging active civil society, the media developments that prevented the consignment of the *Times* to a political party would likely not have taken place.

Not only did the presence of an opposition movement, and independent media in the *Weekly Post*, generate a new, energetic discourse on democratisation and the need for horizontal accountability, change appeared to have emboldened the judiciary to make decisions that challenged the primacy of government over all other institutions.

Vondoepp (2005:275-285), in his study of Malawi and Zambia's neo-patrimonial democracies,<sup>26</sup> augments this notion by noting that the uncertainty generated by electoral competition can encourage politicians to respect judicial independence. For example, President Frederick Chiluba's attempt at expelling members of his cabinet opposed to his third term in office was halted by the High Court in April 2001 for example. Media, particularly *The Post*, and to a lesser extent, the *Times of Zambia*, have also benefited from favourable judicial outcomes to ward off state inspired legal challenges in the past 20 years (Kasoma, 2003: 13).

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<sup>26</sup> Neo-patrimonialism refers to the arranged exchange of goods and services between patron and client, to solicit political support. Clientelism is the patrimonial side of neo-patrimonialism, where politics are defined by family and personal relationships (Erdmann, 2002: 1-8).

#### **4.4 POLITICAL PLURALISM AND THE STATE MEDIA: THE NEO-MULTIPARTY CONCEPTION OF THE PRESS**

Therefore, while it is indisputable that the state owned media, including the *Times*, have continued to be largely an extension of the state, it is critical to consider that democratisation has provided the space for opposition parties to demand and initiate actions based in law, that allow for public access to state media systems, albeit during election time.

Because of opposition pressures in the prelude to the 1991 multiparty elections, UNIP acceded to proposals for equitable access to the state media during elections for all registered political contestants. These regulations have changed over the last four presidential elections as electoral dialogue becomes the norm in Zambia.

Through the mid 1990s to the year 2001, donor, opposition and civil society pressures have led to public commitments by the MMD government to more equitable coverage of public policy events, particularly matters relating to the electoral process.

The government's National Capacity Building Programme for Good Governance in Zambia (NCBPGG)(Zambia: 2000:13) - a direct response to donor and civil society actions - emphasised the importance of a free and independent press and the value of wide access to information in an emerging democracy.

Kasoma (2000:61) also confirms that the state media in Zambia has responded to donor pressure on the government to allow opposition voices. The multi-stakeholder environment evidently introduces a vector of pressures onto the state media, under what has been termed a *neo-multiparty conception of the press*. The conception advances the notion that the philosophy, policy and performance of the press in African countries that democratised in the 1990s is donor-driven, with


other playmakers such as government, opposition parties, civil society and the church exerting their own influences. Donors would therefore be in a position to use their *wealth*, extended to the Zambia government in the form of conditional grants and loans, and their collective political *power* to achieve some modicum of compliance to democratic benchmarks.

Figure 6 relays a media model which is pummelled by multiple forces. Donor influence is all encompassing given that they finance or certainly have a measure of influence on virtually all the actors in the construct; civil society, government and political parties.

The neo-liberal philosophy is an agenda that embraces both political liberalisation and economic liberalisation as dual processes to be achieved in tandem. Media liberalisation and privatisation are both integral concepts of the liberal paradigm. The model therefore is predicated on the sensitisation and application of liberal values in the operations of media institutions. Although influence is bi-directional, the over-arching authority emanates from the donor community. Furthermore, since there has not been an effective multiparty forum in Zambia over the years, the model can be understood to facilitate political party influences on the media through indirect pressure on the donor community and direct challenges on the integrity of the state press through judicial means and public denunciations. Similarly 'others,' presumably, interest groups tethered to donors and varied political interests, will seek to either utilise the controversial nature of politics to question the role of the press or to refuse to purchase a particular medium and therefore use economic means to leverage change in coverage. Generally, economics and politics will have their own imprints on the media, particularly in the consideration of the quality of the product, public image which would affect sales and advertiser perceptions.



**Figure 6: The neo-multiparty model of press control**



**Source: Kasoma (2000: 60).**

However, it is certain from the behaviour of the MMD government since 1991 that political elites have learnt to manipulate donors when the need arises.

For example the MMD's commitments to the NCBPGG were prompted by the withdrawal of donor support in 1996 following a flawed elections process (Chirambo, Nel & Erasmus, 2003:48-49).

The promise of improved enforcement of the provision of the Electoral (Conduct) Regulations of 1996 (Zambia, 2000:19) can be seen hence as simply a means for re-gaining donor support by the MMD.

Civil society has also shown some clout by campaigning for an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA). However, the end result shows the state is very much in control of the process as its presence and influence does appear assured (XIX/Article 19, 2006: 3).

It can be argued based on the continued contestation of state media ownership in Zambia and regression on promises by the state, that while donor influence and actions of non state actors are certainly there, it is discernible only in relation to certain contexts (elections being one field). Overtime, donors can be manipulated with impunity by political elites.

It is also certain that the presence of opposition is paramount in the multiparty dispensation.

Unlike the one party state where explicit public orders were given to the state media without much external challenge, the advent of democratisation has allowed for opposition parties to use judicial leverage to seek communicative relief: the MMD sued the ZNBC in 1991 for refusing to air its political advertisements and was granted an order to access the station by the High Court. ZNBC for its part introduced a policy and practice to accommodate opposition parties in its election advertising and reportage (Kasoma, 2000:69).

Similarly, the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), through a High Court injunction, was able to temporarily dislodge media heads of *ZNBC*, *Zambia Daily Mail* and *Times of Zambia* for two weeks prior to the 1991 multiparty elections, owing to their alleged bias against opposition parties. This also fostered a more balanced reflection of the elections going forward, as Sakala, (2010/02/19) notes.

In editorial terms, the impact of democratisation on the *Times Newspapers* can be gleaned from a total collapse of public input and a predictably one-sided approach to opinion writing. While content analysis is not the pre-occupation of this thesis, it is important to note these changes. For instance, in 1969, Dunstan Kamana, the first black editor-in-chief published only three editorials in support of

government with 14 being critical (Kasoma, 1986: 96). With the advent of multiparty politics in 1990, editors on the *Times* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* were being fired for merely reporting the activities of the MMD (Makungu, 2004: 29). By 1997, the letters column had completely disappeared (Simuchoba, 2009/12/02).

Partly due to this, the tradition in Zambian politics since 1991 has been to use the electoral regulations, now held in the Electoral Code of Conduct, 2006, to cultivate public participation or more specifically, political communications by political parties.

For the 2006 presidential elections, the Electoral (Code of Conduct) Regulations, of 2006, issued under the Electoral Act no 12 (2006) instructed all public television and broadcasters to allocate public airtime equally to all political parties for their political broadcasts. The instructions state:

- A political party shall not buy more than thirty minutes air time in any given one language on public television and radio in any one week.
- Television shall not schedule any party's political broadcast or other political discussion or interview, opinion poll results or broadcast prediction of the result of polling day until the polls have closed.
- Broadcasters shall inform the public on the source of a public opinion poll and shall indicate its margin of error.

The Regulations have since been extended to all media, including newspapers of the provisions which demands of them to base their reporting on confirmed election results as announced and published by presiding officers (Zambia, 2006:sec 12–17).

In addition, the regulations allow all candidates to lodge complaints of unfair treatment or coverage in the course of elections campaigns in writing to the Electoral Commission and the newspaper so concerned to submit back copies of its publications.

*“Where a right of reply, a retraction or the correction of a matter of significance is necessary, it shall be made in a like manner and with equal and prominence as the original report or publication”(Zambia 2006: sec 14: 6).*

Interestingly also, the regulations attempt to protect reporters from their editors:

*“Heads and other senior management staff of public or private media organisations shall not intimidate media practitioners and shall allow them to exercise professional judgement without undue influence (Zambia, 2006: sec 12: 3).*

The gradual changes have been attributed to the emergence of a ‘working parliament’ from the 2001 elections when MMD’s parliamentary dominance was for once overturned by the opposition, albeit momentarily (Chirambo et al., 2003:33 ). None of these positives however, has any transformative effect on the state owned media in its regular reporting particularly because of the subtle nature of controls from state apparatus. An editor-in-chief is not obliged to justify the non-usage of a news story to his reporter for example, or its placement.

The Third Republic has also demonstrated that despite multipartism and the presence of a variety of interest groups and media, the state can still influence journalists in state, private and international media. In 2002, PAZA alleged that journalists were taking bribes from the state to ensure favourable coverage of the MMD in the elections. In late June of 2002, Reuters News Agency suspended a senior Johannesburg based correspondent following allegations that he had received payments from Zambian authorities to write positive articles about the Chiluba regime (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2002). Leading up to his failed attempt to seek an unconstitutional third term in office, Chiluba was also accused of using the presidential discretionary fund, which was not to be audited, for corrupting opposition parties and buying the support of interest groups (Chirambo et al, 2003: 1).

Chiluba's leadership style exhibited *charismatic* tendencies when he assumed power in 1991. He used his wide appeal to mobilise people behind the belt-tightening liberal initiatives fairly successfully. Over time however, as his popularity waned, it seemed to reflect more a *housekeeping style*, which Mazrui has described as '*a minimalist approach to power; more governance and less genuine leadership; less vision, more verbosity*' (Mazrui, 2007:3).

His attempt to seek a third term of office against the stipulations of the Zambian constitution invited opposition from within his own party and from a broad spectrum of civil society. Leaders in government, including his own vice president Christon Tembo, church and civil society stalwarts stood united in opposing his intentions (Chirambo, et al, 2003: 1). This potential reversal of democracy was thwarted by what Huntington would call: 'the methods of democracy' (Huntington, 1991: 164). It was demonstrations, campaigns and non - violent resolutions.

In the broader scheme of things, democratisation has also opened up potential opportunities for communication through the internet, expanding the avenues for activism to a global stage. The obvious reality of the internet is that it is an instrument that generally tends towards salacious gossip, scandal, mayhem and personal profiles (Couldry, 2003:19).

As a new communication option, however, it definitely remains open to future exploitation by a country such as Zambia, which currently has limited access to fulfil this potential.

#### **4.5. CONCLUSION**

This discussion opens up some critical matters relating to the notion of privatisation as an alternative path to nationalisation of media systems. The sense that privatisation will inevitably lead to greater freedom of expression must

be re-evaluated on the basis that private media owners can themselves form alliances with political elites in government and limit the scope of communication.

With trends in Zambia already exhibiting a lack of stability in privately owned print media, it is hardly far fetched to assume that some of the more viable print media entities that would survive the economic restraints in Zambia would likely be foreign funded or would have some level of donor support, and could therefore not be considered to be entirely independent. Certainly, the only surviving private daily, *The Post*, has received external financial grants (Phiri, 2009: 266).

In addition, (as noted in Chapter One, section 1.2.1) Zambia's deregulation of radio licensing can be illusory: foreign and private actors in this field were allowed in on the state's terms. This clearly restricts the media in reporting or entertaining opinions that might harm that relationship.

The case of the *Times Newspapers* under Lonrho illustrates just how complex matters of press freedom could be where political and economic interests affect both the investor and the party in power. So five key scenarios present themselves for further inquiry:

- The possibility that privatisation would attract a multinational entity with broader interests than publishing, therefore, more inclined toward guarding its relationship with the state to protect its more valued investments
- The possibility that a foreign investor will establish a leading daily.<sup>27</sup>
- The possibility that local entrepreneurs would seize the opportunity to purchase the *Times* (but would likely have to be vetted by the state as the seller; and therefore conform to some form of censorship).
- That a model encompassing a governance structure with key non-state actors as part of the boards of directors and minimal state presence might

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<sup>27</sup> However, given nationalistic and xenophobic fears of foreign ownership the world over, this is not envisaged. Even major democracies such as India have not allowed foreign newspaper ownership (Price & Krug, 2002: 11).

be accepted by the government as an alternative form of developing communal institutions within the context of Zambia's democracy.

- Lastly, the *highly unlikely* prospect that state media might become irrelevant anyway in the future given the advent of new social networks that might well funnel political information to an increasingly interconnected mass audience.<sup>28</sup>

These possibilities will be resurrected in Chapter Seven as we conclude this thesis and examine potential ways forward. Realistically, given the influential nature of the state in determining licensing of electronic media, duty on newsprint, advertising support, among other things, its presence or influence in all scenarios can be envisaged. The experience of implementing the IBA already points to how the state apparatus can frustrate a perfectly legal process, despite its public acquiescence to the idea.

On the whole, it can be noted, that the intimacy between *wealth* and *power* has shaped the trajectory of print media development in Zambia in ways which do not necessarily promote press freedom. The state has gradually achieved a horizontal concentration process of existing print media and not sufficiently provided an enabling economic environment for the development of viable private alternatives.

Historically, the relationship between President Kaunda, a powerful, charismatic leader by any description, and the wealthy industrialist Tiny Rowland catalysed a number of inter-related developments which ultimately influenced the structure and imposed an unwritten editorial policy of the *Times of Zambia*:

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<sup>28</sup> A highly unlikely scenario: a study by AMV/OSISA (2008: 41) shows that while the state media often trail the privately owned *Post Newspapers* in reader preferences, Zambians still prefer the *Dail Mail* for instance to either the *Post* or the *Times* in terms of their advertising information. Other studies such as Tailoka et al (2008) similarly suggest that the newspapers could improve on their sales with greater diversity and depth in content. The question of viability hence lends itself to greater creativity in the final product. Lastly, the lack of disposable income amongst the Zambian populace militates against accessibility to modern technology dampening hopes for the elevation of alternative media over traditional media in the near future.

- The awarding of a grant by Rowland's Lonrho to UNIP for its successful 1964 campaign for power: this assured Rowland of Kaunda's personal friendship; privileged access to the country's national resources to a great extent and Lonrho's continued presence in the *Times* up to 1982.
- The *unreported* clandestine meetings with leaders of apartheid South Africa and UDI Rhodesia that led to the release of Zimbabwean nationalist leaders and brought significant political changes to southern Africa.
- The insulation of President Kaunda, Rowland and government (particularly regarding its Rhodesia-South Africa liaisons) more generally from exposure to adverse publicity by the *Times of Zambia*.

While it is conceivable that security considerations overrode narrow journalistic ambitions in some respects, it appears certain the corporate interference was present under Lonrho in matters relating to the ruling party and the president of Zambia, going by the submissions of former non-Zambian, senior editors and managers of the *Times* to the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission.

The structure of the *Times* during the First Republic speaks, to some extent, to the divergent interests in the newspapers by state and Lonrho: the multinational retained the commercial aspects of the newspapers but surrendered political controls (appointment of the editor) to the state. Despite that the two entities' interests converged at some point, it is generally understood that efforts from both state and Lonrho undermined the editorial independence of the newspapers.

In this regard, Lonrho's modus operandi of establishing relations with political elites in each African country to further its economic interests is well documented by Cronje et al (1976), Bower (1994), Langdon(1981), Kariethi(1991), Sardanis (2003) and the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981) as such.

It is also underlined in this discussion that the actions by President Kaunda to engage Rowland in sensitive national matters might not have been possible under a more open and competitive multiparty dispensation. Certainly, the actions



would likely have been exposed by opposition parties, and independent media (that is, media outside of the state-corporate control model).

By examining the integrity of the political systems and the institutions therein, it can be inferred therefore that the actions by President Kaunda were aided by the pre-eminence of person-based rule under the one party state and the dominant party structure and ultimately the political culture of the day which lubricated the inclination for centralised decision making.

Furthermore, the influence of dominant parties in emerging democracies in southern Africa has been widely exposed by political scientists, addressing their control over public policy and their disregard for alternative views. Although similar in some ways to the one party state, it has been noted that a dominant party is a product of competitive, democratic elections.

However, its actions can be over-bearing, denuding media independence, undermining the principles of separation of powers and controlling the presidency, among other things.

Chiluba's administration, despite riding on the hopes of liberal democrats, is associated with subverting press freedom through bribery of local and foreign journalists and intimidation.

Zambia entered the Third Republic with a dominant party structure which has been blamed for inertia on media privatisation and constitutional reform, more generally over the past 19 years.

Regardless, it has been noted that Zambia had benefited from the opening up of political space with increased civil society activity and eventually the emergence of a more balanced parliament, all of which have aided the cause for gradual political and media reform. A clear demonstration of this is the tabling of important bills on freedom of information and independent broadcasting championed by media associations, unions, civil society and opposition parliamentarians.

For the first time, democratisation also ushered in a clause Article 20(2) specific to the protection of a free press<sup>29</sup>. The Third Republic, unlike the First and Second Republics, has been punctuated by opposition or media-led court injunctions against the state aimed at claiming communicative rights and defending journalists.

Political parties, at least in principle, can now hold state media to account during elections using the amended Electoral Code of Conduct regulations (2006). This does not however open up the state media to all actors, *at all times*, as might be expected in a democracy. Space is arguably made available when there is pressure from donors, opposition parties, civil societies, and churches or in extreme cases, when there is judicial intervention. The argument for privatisation hence may appear logical.

However, it is not unassailable. In an environment where citizens lack the economic capacity to own viable print media, it is plausible to assume that a sale of the *Times of Zambia* and *Zambia Daily Mail* might well consign them to political and business elites whose interests would not necessarily be promoting open public discussion on matters of national interest.

In short, this chapter re-affirms some of the basic assumptions of this thesis: 1) that privatisation does not guarantee press freedom as the private owners can harbour political ambitions not dissimilar to the state 2) that democratisation has up to this point, minimised the freedom to communicate by individual editors and journalists on the *Times* 3) that state elites have indirect ways of controlling media regardless of ownership.

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<sup>29</sup> As Chanda and Liswaniso (1999) before her, Mwanayanda (2011/02/25) a lawyer and former journalist, argues however that: "There is no enabling legislation on freedom of expression; it is a constitutional provision which has no real/practical enforcement mechanism in subordinate legislation. Legislation around sedition, official secrets etc (is) not democratic. Lack of a freedom of info law is a real impediment."

The findings of this chapter have been *validated by matching the patterns* in various bodies of research particularly Kariethi (1991: 204), Bower (1994: 109), Cronje et al (1976: 26), Langdon (1981: 141), Sardanis (2003:142), Kasoma (1986: 93), the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981) with the substance of key informant interviews conducted by this researcher. The synthesis of this literature establishes a pattern in the manner in which Rowland and Lonrho constructed a vast business empire which used high level political relations and media systems to promote *radical capitalism* as well as shore up the company's ties with the state. Parallels were drawn between the case of the *Times of Zambia* and that of the *Standard* in Kenya, where similar transnational class alliances impacted on media independence.

**To briefly recap**, this thesis has up to this point asserted that the political economy of the state media in Zambia is best understood by extensively examining the practices of colonial, post colonial and multiparty regimes.

Chapter one argues that despite democratisation, nationalist governments adopted the practices of their colonial masters in converting mass media to state use for purely political intent. While Zambia has undergone three distinct periods of political change, all palpably leading to experimentations with democracy, the trajectory for mass media has been set toward integration into a state corporate structure by successive administrations regardless of the political system in place.

This has compromised public confidence and possibly commercial viability of state media systems, including the *Times Newspapers*. It has also bred political conflict between contesting political parties during the multiparty era subsequently causing ruling establishments to subject editors to tighter oversight frameworks. The state media has, as a result, been deployed more as a counter-weight to emergent private media, despite the latter being relatively miniscule and largely unsustainable in the face of a harsh economic environment. These factors have had a tendency of virtually limiting the space available for public discourse in this realm, the controlled expansion of community voices via community radio notwithstanding.

Chapter Two contextualises this debate with historical perspectives which underline some key reasons explaining the nationalisation of communication resources by the UNIP government from independence in 1964. Ethnic stereotyping by colonial authorities perceptibly aggravated tribal fault lines, rightly or wrongly, justifying the acquisition and establishment of controlled media apparatus by the state evidently for the purpose of building national identity and unity.

However, structural continuities, leadership styles, the one party system and the *Philosophy of Humanism* exhibited intense hostility toward press criticism of the state illustrated through public pronouncements and overt actions to control and purchase the only significant foreign owned daily, *Times Newspapers* from Lonrho for example.

The advent of the second phase of multiparty democracy in 1991 brought the prospect of privatisation of the state owned media and the creation of an enabling environment for the establishment of the private press. These expectations have been dashed, to a great extent, as successive leaderships in Zambia appear wary of an uncontrolled media, a matter empirically underlined by Pitts (2000: 270).

Furthermore, optimism for the future of democracy by citizens (Lolojih, 2005:1) is often undermined by the actions of ruling elites who are supported by the leverage of *dominant party politics*.

Democracy supporters Chapter Three argues, over estimate the emancipatory value of privatisation, a key feature of the liberal doctrine pursued by Chiluba's MMD. Political economy as a concept helps us understand how the mass media are an integral part of the political and economic systems and are therefore subject to controls from both fields. Through what may be experienced as abstract political economic theory, Chapter Four finally, illustrates how wealth and

power undermine the democratic media project through collusion and indirect controls despite democratisation.

The fore-going re-affirms some basic tenets of *critical political economy* which frame the analysis of media in historical terms and foregrounds the role of government and business elites in constraining news production. The commandeering of media by large corporations with business interests beyond the sector is underlined as a major impediment to freedom of expression even in supposedly democratic settings.

Rejecting the classical political economic position that favours a minimal state and a dominant market, critical political economists hold that the distortions and inequalities of market systems should be remedied by state intervention (Golding & Murdock, 1996: 12-17). The case of Zambia somewhat eludes this analysis primarily because the state and the corporate body, Lonrho, at one stage worked as part of *a network*, sometimes, toward similar ambitions. The corrective agency of the state is lost in these contradictions. The state eventually assumed control of the media but has not surrendered enough editorial space since the country's 1991 democratic elections.

From the findings, one could rightly support the notion that some form of balance needs to be struck between public and private intervention given the excesses of both political and business elites. The place of the citizen as a shareholder in media enterprise might present a plausible starting point for balancing a system such as Zambia's.

Opinion is divided within media circles in this regard. For instance, Simuchoba (2009/12/02) suggests that the Zambian market is too small for 'an out and out commercial investor' to develop media industry in Zambia and sees limited government involvement in the media as inevitable. On the other hand, Sakala (2010/02/19), the president of PAZA at the time of research, is opposed to any form of state involvement in a restructured print media industry owing to the decline in free expression in the state media systems.

Finally, one other key assumption in critical political economy; that capital will be constrained by intervening forces such as labour, is less certain in the explorations in the First Republic in respect of the media. It becomes more evident towards the dawn of Third Republic. On the whole, it is evident that the state succeeded in thwarting any manoeuvre by journalists to act as a collective and form a representative body of their own in most of the First and Second Republics.

What the next chapter is challenged to examine as a result are the power relations between capital and labour as Zambia transitioned through three distinct cycles of political change. More specifically, Chapter Five examines the manner in which labour-based media formations and journalists' associations that mushroomed upon the advent of multiparty democracy in the Third Republic have responded to the challenge of *the powerful* despite their members' dependency on the state for their livelihood.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### THE IMPACT OF MARKET AND LABOUR LIBERALISATION ON TRADE UNIONISM AND EMPLOYEE WELFARE ON THE *TIMES NEWSPAPERS*

#### 5.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter's primary interest is to examine the welfare of media professionals within the context of *labour rights* as politics in Zambia evolved. The chapter revives the discussion broached in Chapter One, section 1.1.5 and Chapters Three and Four, which expand on the evolution of political economic theory and the imperatives and practicalities of liberal philosophy.

Chapter Three was absorbed in the discussion of the history of political economic theory, particularly the tension between liberal and critical political economists in their approaches to analysing the power relations governing the distribution of resources in societies.

Its ambition was to unpack the key elements of political economy which include historical, socio-economic and political imperatives and how they interface with the 'independence' of traditional and alternative media. It is noted that politics and technology are intertwined and media systems are not immune to the influence of political and economic systems, or the indirect control by *the powerful*. However, we also understand from the critical political economic perspective, that capitalists cannot always have their way: there is often *resistance* from *labour* which moderates the impact of employers on the welfare of workers.

Chapter Four illustrates how *wealth* and *power* have fundamentally influenced media development and performance, particularly the *Times Newspapers*, over a period of 45 years. Interventions by both state and business elites, in many

instances working together, undermined the credibility of this news media entity over time but the reasons have a much wider context than a naive fixation on censorship. For example, concerns about the exposure of covert security missions to South Africa and Rhodesia involving Lonrho chairman Tiny Rowland, working on behalf of the Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda, were just part of a complex matrix of international activities at the height of the liberation struggle for Southern Africa that were conceivably masked from the public eye.

The presence of *organised resistance* to capital and state interventions is not at all evident in the First and Second Republics when Journalists lacked cohesion as an occupation and were seemingly overwhelmed by the machinations of state power which left them de-unionised and without a coherent professional identity.

But as Zambia returned to liberal politics in 1991, organised groups, including media formations began to utilise judicial leverage to challenge the state.

This chapter begins to explore the ways in which democratisation has enabled or enfeebled, efforts by Journalists to exploit their freedoms of association and expression to organise unions and professional bodies and foster *collective action*. It narrows the discourse to the liberalisation of the labour market and its implications for the unionisation of journalism. It utilises a wide range of historical literature to illustrate how political change and specifically, market and labour liberalisation, have impacted on trade unionism and the ability of employees, including journalists, to organise themselves as an independent force. Fundamentally, the chapter uses primary and secondary data to understand how journalists' unions and associations, as *intervening variables*, have responded to the influence of *wealth* and *power* in the Third Republic.

Its main interest will be to establish how macro level rights held in the Zambian constitution have been applied at an institutional level to the benefit of media professionals. Labour Process Theory (LPT), a creature of Marxian political economy, and Employee Rights Theory (ERT), an offspring of liberal democratic



philosophy, will inform this section of the thesis. The key aims of Chapter Five as a result are:

- To discuss LPT and ERT in relation to the changing political economic context in Zambia.
- To unpack the history of trade unionism and the changing relations between labour and capital as the country underwent political economic reform.
- To explore the influence of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) on the working conditions of journalists in the state media (the *Times of Zambia* in particular).
- To analyse the role of ZUJ and the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) in addressing freedom of expression and association in the state media work environment and in national affairs more generally.

The *effectiveness* or potential thereof, of the ZUJ will be explained by gauging the *bargaining outcomes, industrial disputes and legal challenges*, part of the framework suggested by Buhlungu, Brookes and Wood (2008:439-440) for interrogating the impact of unionism on the workplace.

Evidently, there is a diversity of means by which unions may be measured as Bhulungu, Brookes and Wood (2008: 439) note: a comparison of legal contexts, a broad analysis of membership trends and understanding the orientation of workers, are some other ways of assessing trade unions depending on what the aim of the study might be. These approaches will largely be peripheral to this discussion as the main interest of the thesis lies in understanding bargaining outcomes and disputes.

## 5.2. BACKGROUND

'Pluralist paradox' (Webster, 1998: 39), to borrow a phrase, is perhaps an apt way of describing the democratisation process in Zambia in relation to labour movements and the imperatives of reform.

Collective wisdom over the years has suggested that the retreat of the one party state in 1991 opened new space for the emergence of civil society, opposition parties and strengthened labour formations, previously suppressed by a monolithic state structure.

However, the reality, which is increasingly empirically grounded, shows that the out-spring of non-governmental organisations and opposition parties in Zambia in 1991, coupled by the exigencies of dual reform processes (political and economic liberalisation) have led to a decline in the influence of labour in the emerging democracy for a variety of reasons (Rakner, 2001:509).

Significantly, while state-driven amendments to the *Industrial Relations Act (1990)*<sup>30</sup> inexorably led to the end of the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions' (ZCTU) reign as the sole, apex industrial body; it released journalists from the sector-specific union formations that were more inclined to the welfare of telecommunications and typographic workers than to media professionals.

As a result of the creation of ZUJ, political and business elites were, for the first time in Zambia's history, faced with the prospect of resistance from journalists as a collective, seeking both economic and communicative emancipation. Whereas the actions of *the wealthy and the powerful*, characterised by the *state-corporate control model* (explained in section 4.3.6 of the Chapter Four) went largely unchecked by media professionals as an organised group in the First and Second

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<sup>30</sup> The legal framework regulating the labour market in Zambia is provided for in the Employment Act CAP 268, the Industrial and Labour Relations Act CAP 269, the Employment Special provisions) Act CAP 270, the Workers Compensation Act CAP 271, the Employment of Young Persons and Children's ACT CAP 274, the Minimum Wages and Conditions of Employment ACT CAP 276, the Factories ACT CAP 441, National Pensions Scheme ACT No: 40 of 1996.

Republics, the presence of ZUJ and other associations in the Third Republic introduced *resistance* and *conflict* between *capital* and *labour*.

Historically, the enactment of the *Industrial Relations Act of 1971* by the Kaunda government which promoted the policy of '*one industry, one union*' consolidated unions under the aegis of the ZCTU, ostensibly, as a control measure.

Inadvertently, however, the action rendered ZCTU the most powerful 'opposition' to the UNIP government during the First and Second Republics by virtue of that consolidation.

As the multiparty movement materialised in 1990 amidst a severe economic crisis, the ZCTU strategically assumed the role of political ally to the market - orientated MMD and provided its first president in Frederick Chiluba. Paradoxically, it was Kaunda who first liberalised the labour sector with the *Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act of 1990*, an intervention interpreted as a calculated move to instigate divisions within ZCTU, the core of the pluralist movement. The MMD and ZCTU both resisted it but the Act endured into the Third Republic (Fashoyin, 2008:5).

Yet, within a short period of presiding over government, Chiluba too expressed his unease with the ZCTU's opposition to the MMD's *liberalisation* and *privatisation* policies and acted deliberately to perpetuate the *Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act of 1990* in its liberal form against his own electioneering promises (Fashoyin, 2008: 5).

The amended labour law presented an opportunity for dissenting elements within the mother union to consider forming an alternative body. Consequently, differences between private sector and public sector workers resulted in a major split in the ZCTU and the emergence of rival unions (Rakner, 2001:509).

Chiluba proceeded to align the *Industrial Relations Act* in 1997 with international norms and standards. Therefore, despite the appearance of the *Industrial*

*Relations (Amendment) Act of 1997* as another state-orchestrated move to further weaken the labour movement, it was ironically in conformity with the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise, which Chiluba subsequently ratified (Fashoyin, 2008: 7). With its traditional membership base eroded, the ZCTU ceased to be a major, *united* threat to the state's economic policies.

But while the demise of the '*one industry, one union*' policy may have sealed the fate of ZCTU to a great extent, the positive outcome of this development in the 1990s was that it allowed journalists to accelerate and justify their liberation from their coerced membership to the Typographical Workers Union (TWU) and the National Communications Workers Union (NUCW),<sup>31</sup> which had no coherent or strategic agenda for the improvement of the conditions of media professionals per se; but rather, generalised their work to the welfare of workers in their respective niche areas.

The history of the ZUJ, a body representing media professionals in the state sector, cannot hence be divorced from the broader industrial narrative of Zambia's labour relations nor the consequences of the country's political and economic transitions.

In this sense, the birth of ZUJ can be considered a milestone and a direct result of political liberalisation more specifically; and democratisation, more generally.

Similarly, the narrative on the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), formed in December 1983, is also compelling as it metamorphosised from National Press Clubs, discursive forums convened through the First, Second and Third Republics, which unfortunately had no organisational sense to mobilise journalists toward common press freedom causes across the country when journalism experienced incessant attacks from the state (Kasoma, 1986:175). PAZA assumed a much stronger role from 1990, spurred on by new leadership, the push for political

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<sup>31</sup> Not all journalists subscribed to these unions. The print media journalists were particularly distanced, serve for some of the more junior workers.

liberalisation and by the judiciary's bolder dispensation of justice toward the Third Republic, which this thesis noted earlier in section 4.3.1 of Chapter Four.

Against this background, this chapter will discuss the influence (or lack of) of ZUJ and to a lesser extent, PAZA, in an integrated fashion, as their work converges around matters of freedom of expression. Although the ZUJ is more inclined toward the working conditions of workers, it has similar ambitions to those of the PAZA, regarding communicative freedoms.

Much of the chapter shall, however, be dedicated to the role of ZUJ in negotiating for better wages and conditions for its members. This is essentially because the economic aspects of journalism - important as they seem - are often neglected, although they should ideally constitute a measure of progress or lack of it, arising from liberalisation of political and economic space in the 1990s. The chapter argues that the economic welfare of journalists will likely also influence the intensity with which they may oppose state practices and policies that are inimical to media advancement.

### **5.2.1 *Theoretical perspectives***

As referred to above, this section of the thesis shall be informed by Labour Process Theory (LPT) and Employee Rights Theory (ERT), which are bodies of theory developed within the realm of the social sciences and specifically, political economic studies. The theories have, however, enjoyed wide application across disciplinary lines (Ackroyd, 2009: 264).

The matter of *labour rights* was introduced in section 1.1.5 of Chapter One of this thesis in the initial presentation of political economy as the analytical framework through which media development was to be discussed.

The notion of *labour process* has its roots in Marxian political economy, emanating from Karl Marx's works in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century (Ackroyd, 2009: 264).

But not until it was radicalised by activists on the left in the 1970s in Britain and the United States, did it assume intellectual application and development to a great extent. Although the two bodies of theory - LPT and ERT- have their differences, they also have convergence points: - both share the concerns of improving human welfare and dignity in the workplace (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 173).

LPT is however anchored by different assumptions about the employer - employee relations and holds a more negative view of the capitalist political economic system. It will be concerned with conflict over the *distribution of the resources* in organisational settings, *resistance* and *control* matters in the workplace and the *struggles* of interest groups in societies, particularly those between *labour* and *capital* (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 173).

On the other hand, ERT, which has been developed largely in the United States as an extension of rights within a free democratic society, assumes that it is in the interest of capital to observe the rights of employees for capital's own longevity and survival. In that regard, it contrasts sharply with LPT which emphasises that worker welfare will seldom be attained without *struggle* with capital (Nord & Gaines, 1996: 173-174). A detailed analysis of LPT and ERT, their strengths and weaknesses, and their relevance to the analysis of labour rights will be presented in sections 5.2.3 and 5.3.4 of this chapter.

## **5.2.2 The Evolution of Labour Rights**

It is important to reiterate at this point that the area of labour and employment rights and related theory is often overlooked in media studies. This is a vital omission, in this researcher's view, as the relationship between capital and labour would likely have implications for how workers are able to express themselves individually and collectively. With the exception of, for example, the work of Mosco (1995: 158) and Golding and Murdock (1995: 11-31), there is, as far as this author could ascertain, little substantial literature in media studies that links the condition of the labour force in the mass media to their overall capacity to express themselves, organise and resist state power, certainly not from a theoretically

grounded labour rights perspective. This section of the thesis and section 5.2.3, therefore, undertakes to extensively discuss the evolution of labour rights and how ultimately emergent theory within political economic studies has been, and can be applied. Following this, the tenets of LPT and ERT will be used in the analysis of the workings of the ZUJ in section 5.3.8 of this chapter.

The underlying premise in the social sciences of what constitutes *rights* is that humans - *simply by virtue of being human* - have certain entitlements of a general nature which are aggregated under *moral* or *natural rights* (Gaines & Domagalski, 1996: 1).

The idea of *rights* predates modern society and is implicit in Hebrew, classical Greek city-states, and African society. Hebrew Societies upheld legitimate claims to physical security, basic necessities of life and participation in community governance. Greek societies, also, provided for rightful claims to private property, freedom of association and to equality before the law (Keeley, 1998: 27). Similarly, African society claims the centrality of man and his right to be a member of a community, to be protected by and respected by that community (Kaunda, 1968).

Although the middle-ages are considered to have developed rights more significantly, there are academic standpoints that doubt this as a truism.

Arguments against these assertions hold that individuals in the middle-ages had no rights other than those conferred from above by Kings. Day-to-day life was however able to continue without the benefit of instruction from the nobility (Keeley, 1998: 27-28).

*“Rights of self determination in some political and economic matters, then, were not unusual facts of medieval life, but integral aspects of various customary practices that were beyond the power of Kings to effectively abolish. From these practices, sprang a growing body of English common law, the infamous declaration of rights in the Enlightenment era and the modern idea of individual rights as claims to autonomy for one’s own sake”(Keeley, 1988: 27)*

Gaines and Domagalski (1996:177-178), echoing the opinions of leading philosophers and legal scholars, reiterate that, in the present day, the category of moral or natural rights include the rights to life, freedom and equal opportunity and that these rights contain common elements:

- They are universally applicable.
- They are accorded equally to all persons.
- And at times, there are justifiable exceptions to their claim.

For Montemayor (2008: 143), workers are entitled to specific moral rights merely by being part of the organisation that employs them, just as citizens of a country possess specific moral rights. Employee rights are defined by the understanding that an employer should not visit harm on his employees.

However, scholars also lament the paucity of literature and inconsistencies in the employee moral rights discourse.

Gaines and Domagalski (1996: 178) for example concede that an examination of employee rights literature unveils a lack of coherency in theoretical positioning



which compromises the understanding of the role of worker rights in the employment relationship.

Correspondingly, Montemayor (2008: 143) regrets the confinement of the rights discourse to 'workplace human rights' ignoring the rights derived by workers from their role in the employment relationship. He refers, here, specifically to matters of corporate governance which connote collaborative engagements between employer and employee and also recognises employees as key *investors* in the organisation they work for.

Edwards (1993: 31-41), in attempting to explain the fading influence of unions in the United States, posits that in addition to the law, labour rights also emanate from the institutional settings and can therefore be in tension with other rights.

He identifies three key sources from which employee rights emanate:

- **Statutory and constitutional protections.**
- **Collective agreements (or collective contract rights)**, which are based on signed understanding between employer and employees.
- **Enterprise rights**, which are independently granted by the organisation to its workers, arising from competitive pressures or designed to under-cut union organising efforts.

To strengthen workers rights, Edward proposes that *enterprise rights* be integrated into employee handbooks and the establishment of instruments for dispute resolution between employees and managers.

It is Nord (1993: 341) who finally cautions us against the loose usage of terms such as '*rights*' without clear rationale or definition or simply to advance political or religious agenda. He argues that users of the term often ignore historical contexts, '*...the pragmatics and evolution of rights*' and the absolutistic and universal connotation that the term relays. Nord differentiates between *de jure* and *de facto rights* - which absolutist standpoints neglect - and stresses the

centrality of *struggle*, which, he posits, is necessary for translating 'stated rights' into 'concrete rights'.

The place of labour, hence, as the *agent* that *leads the struggle* to constantly transform *stated rights* into *concrete rights* contextualises the understanding and appreciation of the *labour rights* discourse in this thesis. In addition, the thesis incorporates Edward's three dimension typology which includes *Constitutional rights*, *collective agreements* and *enterprise rights* in a broader understanding of what constitute *labour rights*.

### **5.2.3 A short history of Labour Process Theory (LPT) and Employee Rights Theory (ERT)**

The evolution and re-application of labour rights has a long history. Harry Braverman's book *Labour and Monopoly Capital* (1974) is generally adjudged by scholars to have restored the *labour process* as an artefact of critical inquiry, even though other critical literature had preceded it (Ackyroyd, 2009: Doherty, 2009: Zipp, 1996: Rowlinson & Hassard, 2001: Collinson & Collinson, 1996: Thompson & Smith, 2009).

For more than 30 years in the post-Braverman era, LPT has influenced approaches in industrial sociology, industrial relations, labour history and organisational analysis (Thompson & Smith, 2009: 253).

Braverman conceived of work as a labour process that contributed centrally to the mechanics of accumulation, therefore placing capitalism back into the spotlight. Calling for a revision of Weberian conceptions of industrial work, Braverman insisted that work as a labour process rendered it a means for the production of surplus value and capital accumulation (Ackyroyd, 2009: 265).

However, it was Karl Marx's *Capital: A Critical Analysis of Capitalist Production* (1867/1967) that first provided the definition of *labour process* as the channel through which the human workplace transformed raw materials (Gaines & Domagalski, 1996: 178).

Through the 20<sup>th</sup> century, LPT continued to integrate the intellectual links between Karl Marx and Max Weber, displaying hostility toward the negative effects of capitalism on human well being and casting in sharper focus the interface between macro-level political economic forces with the nature of work organisations (Nord & Doherty, 1996: 200).

The core-theory of LPT is, perhaps, best captured by Thompson (1990: 99-101) in his articulation of labour as a central determinant in the relations of production. Based on that, Zipp (1996: 253) summarises the nature of control relationship as such:

- What capitalists purchase is *labour power* - not *actual labour*: therefore capitalist production is based on the conversion of *potential labour* into *actual labour*. As a result of this, labour occupies a central status because it produces a surplus.
- The logic of capital accumulation needs capital to regularly *revolutionarise* the workplace.
- Transforming *labour power* into *labour* requires *control*: The existence of capitalism and market processes - alone - is inadequate to exercise that control.
- Finally, the relationship between capital and labour is antagonistic or is defined by '*structured antagonism*', (where coercive strategies to generate desired behaviour by management meet with varied forms of worker resistance).

Zipp argues that the control relationship between capital and labour is not as simplistic as often presented. He talks of the relationship having 'a dual nature' or

exhibiting a 'two-fold' visage. Workers and management both face contradictions, he asserts.

Because capital is confronted with the contradiction of simultaneously treating workers as both 'commodities' and 'non commodities', and the need to continually 'revolutionarise' the production process, it is inevitably inclined toward seeking the cooperation and creative powers of labour.

Employees, on the other hand, face the dilemma of opposing some elements of capitalist exploitation, *'while, at the same time, maintaining a strong interest in keeping their jobs, thus supporting the unit of capital that employs them'* (Zipp, 1996: 253).

Importantly, Zipp concludes that explaining control relationships from the perspective of the production alone is reductionist. Exogenous factors to the workplace, such as capital mobility, gender relations, race and cultural factors do also play key roles in moulding internal relations between capital and labour.

Unlike LPT, ERT has its origins in the United States where applied social scientists raised concerns about the conditions of labour in a capitalist economy characterised by tensions generated by competing interests of management and workers. Some scholars such as Dahl (1970), expressed worry about the impact on democracy by the capitalist workplace's hierarchical set up (Nord & Doherty, 1996: 194-195).

ERT departs from the universe where workers were dismissed at will by employers to one where the employer was expected or assumed to be responsible for the welfare of workers. Some key rights gained during the evolutionary period of ERT include the introduction of the following:

- Unemployment compensation.
- Occupational health and safety.
- Social security.

- Pensions and other benefits.
- Freedom from sexual and racial harassment.
- The right to form unions.
- Free speech.
- Due process.
- And privacy.

From Nord and Doherty (1996), we begin to understand that despite the differences between ERT and LPT, the two theoretical approaches can be combined to potentially good effect.

#### **5.2.4 LPT and ERT: Congruence, weaknesses and strengths**

It was stated earlier that ERT and LPT converge around some key issues. Nord and Doherty (1996: 194) reiterate that LPT assumes a macro view in attempting to comprehend sources of control and conflict that have to be eliminated to improve worker welfare and autonomy. ERT on the other hand advances a micro perspective, holding that collaboration between employers and employees in pursuing common interests is what ultimately secures worker rights.

Nord and Doherty identify the key areas of confluence between ERT and LPT as such:

- Emancipation of workers from oppressive practices, goals of asserting and gaining rights.
- There is agreement between scholars on both ends of the spectrum that achieving labour rights in a protracted process.
- Both perspectives have significant blind-spots which constrain their effectiveness.

Gaines and Domagalski (1996: 190) assert that LPT renders three major contributions to ERT:

- Uncovering the layers of capitalist ideology and revealing ways in which labour and capital can relate.
- It sows the seeds for worker emancipation by raising awareness of the exploitative nature of capitalism.
- Contributes to an informed understanding of employee rights by focusing on specific rights from a more critical paradigmatic perspective (also identifies control mechanisms in organisations that infringe or constrain employee rights).

Ironically, the strengths of one appear to compensate for the weaknesses of the other, providing a basis for cross-fertilisation of ideas to achieve essentially the same goal. For Zipp (1990: 255), ERT lacks the critical edge presented by LPT:

*“ER is less a theory and more a set of concerns and problems. Underlying the ER literature is the recognition that the half-century has witnessed a tremendous shift in the employer-employee relationship”, (Zipp, 1990:255).*

ERT’s normative positioning is criticised for its concern with rights that workers *ought* to have.

It is argued that ERT is also myopic in that it does not pay sufficient attention to the prospect that the demise of firms is determined by the policy choices of *the powerful*, who may elect to shift capital to achieve their own aims (Keeley, 1998: 30). That obviously closes the door to negotiation with workers.

Although appearing to rise above the shortcomings of ERT, LPT is itself not a faultless empowerment tool, contend Nord & Doherty (1996: 203). It is pivoted on collective action to overcome barriers but does not extend enough consideration to the means for generating that very intervention.

That, however, did not seem to concern Marx as he assumed capitalism would be doomed by the escalation in exploitation, slavery, degradation, misery and oppression.

*“Mobilisation was not problematic for Marx; it was more or less inevitable” (Nord & Doherty, 1996: 203).*

In their exposition of LPT, Nord & Doherty identify the following as key problems with the *collective action option*:

- Several classical incentive problems are ignored: for instance, there is no motivation for potential leaders of social change to sacrifice their well being for uncertain gains.
- There are no incentives for followers either (even though there is a recognition of Olson’s (1971) analysis of collective action, suggesting that many people opt to ‘free ride’, letting other people take the risks, while they benefit indirectly from the action).
- In response, Nord and Doherty assert that, if too many people ‘free ride’, the purpose of collective action is defeated.

Recognising the strengths and weaknesses of LPT and ERT, Nord and Doherty offer to integrate the two into one mutually supportive empowerment tool, which they term: *the Assertion for Empowerment Perspective*.

*“It maintains for example, that the degree of empowerment is a function of what people do and/or don’t do and see and/or don’t see in their local situations” (Nord & Doherty, 1996: 206).*

They synergise ERT and LPT, by isolating four key processes that ‘appear to affect empowerment’. These four processes are:

- 1) **Impact of macro forces on local level perceptions:** LPT is deployed as a corrective measure to ERT’s limited attention to macro-level political

economic forces that produce and sustain the distribution of power and privilege, including the distribution of rights. It is argued that ERT supporters ignore the fact that claims of rights preserve some privileges while disempowering others. Combining ERT with LPT would recognise the interface between conditions of work and the macro contexts in which organisations operate.

- 2) **Choice of optimal levels of cooperation and conflict depending on the situation:** LPT concentrates on the antagonism between labour and capital, while ERT assumes cooperative approaches. An approach embracing both would be more beneficial.
- 3) **Use of rights talk to mobilise action:** ERT and LPT complement each other through 'rights talk'. Rights talk is combined with collective action as rhetoric, pictures, phrases articulate an injustice, moving people into action, and;
- 4) **Use of rights talk or some alternative rhetoric to arouse emotions to provide the basis for an enriched theory of empowerment.**

To summarise, we understand the approaches to industrial relations as having assumed two opposing paradigms: the ERT, which favours compromise and is motivated by the liberal democratic norms, and the LPT, which draws on Marxian motivations for collective action and has inherent hostilities toward capitalism.

The two theoretical approaches have strengths and weaknesses which are unique to themselves. The ERT concentrates on micro level interventions but ignores the possibility that political, economic and social change could drastically alter labour relations, sometimes undermining the rights of workers and reducing the strengths of trade unions.

LPT offers the radical paradigm; seeking to mobilise the power of workers into a single force ranged at remedying the oppressive nature of capital. However, it overlooks the need to provide incentives for leaders and followers alike that might need to calculate risks and benefits in order to proceed with conflict.



The work of Nord and Doherty (1996) is instructive, in that it combines the ERT with the LPT, covering the weaknesses of one, with the strengths of the other. This produces an empowerment tool that interfaces *collaboration* with *collective action* ranged at the same goal - the welfare and dignity of workers.

Going forward, this thesis then begins to relate the evolution of labour unions in Zambia, from the colonial era to the present day, by framing the actions of labour within the context set by ERT and LPT.

### **5.2.5 *The history of trade unionism in Zambia***

This section of the thesis applies a historical prism to understand how state elites have used constitutional and legal instruments to either deny or apportion labour rights to competing interests and the effect of this on the expression of fundamental human rights. The influence of historical labour relations contexts has been virtually marginalised from media studies despite the potential for these perspectives to inform the analysis of power relations between political and business elites on the one hand and media workers on the other. As O'Neil (1998: 1) rightly notes, political transitions have had the tendency of carrying over colonial structures and practices which continue to impede freedom of expression, association and assembly to the present day in developing countries such as Zambia (discussed earlier in section 1.1.4 of Chapter One of this thesis).

From a media perspective therefore, history would help us fortify our understanding of the factors that would likely inhibit journalists from unionising their profession and defending their rights to organise and communicate in society. In essence, the political history of Zambia, as perhaps other countries, is closely inter-twined with the emergence of labour and the development of media and their role in transitional processes as discussed in Chapter Two. For this reason a broad politically based history of trade unionism and industrial relations is provided in order to arrive at a more informed analysis of media and democracy.

The formation of trade unions in Zambia is inextricably linked to the evolution of political parties in the colonial era.

The first vestiges of unionism in Zambia can be traced back to the mid 1930s when Africans rallied themselves to challenge the exclusionary nature of Legislative Councils set up by British Authorities in 1924, after the administration assumed full control of the territory from its proxy, the British South Africa Company (BSA) (Roberts, 1995:1013).

Historical literature on Zambia identifies the period after the Second World War as the most significant in terms of African nationalism (Roberts, 1975, Chipungu, 1992, Phiri, 2006, DiJohn, 2010).

Phiri (2006: 22-23), suggests that the outbreak of World War II, especially, had a transformative effect on labour relations in Northern and Southern Rhodesia in a number of ways:

- It coerced whites into joining the armed forces, thereby opening up job opportunities for Africans, particularly in Northern Rhodesia.
- The war effort enlisted Africans, who were shipped off to South East Asia, to fight for the British empire (presumably, precipitating ideas about self government).
- In seeking wide-spread sympathy for the war amongst Africans through propagandist communications, the colonial authority inadvertently ‘hastened’ African political awareness.

Hence, African nationalism developed initially as a political response to imperialism and its racial ideology underlined by the notion of white supremacy. Conceived as a reformist movement, the initial aim of African nationalism was to liberalise rather than overthrow, the thinking of which was embedded in the capitalist mode of production promoted by the colonial education system (Phiri, 2006:23).

The first moves toward political organisation were made by Africans from Nyasaland (Malawi), who dominated the African job market in Northern Rhodesia. Nyasas capitalised on their superior education from Livingstonia mission and began the earliest forms of political organisation in Northern Rhodesia and much of southern Africa. Opened by Scottish missionaries in 1894, Livingstonia Mission at Mwenzo generated a diverse pool of cadres of politically conscious Africans who in turn, catalysed the influences that led to the growth of African protests in Northern Rhodesia (DiJohn, 2010:14).

Among them was David Kaunda, father of Zambia's first President, Kenneth Kaunda, who set up a school in Chinsali, northern Zambia. Outspoken leaders such as Donald Siwale, a schools inspector at Mwenzo led the way into the formation of the first organised entity - the Mwenzo Welfare Association in 1912 - to engage with the colonial establishment more effectively (Roberts, 1976:196).

The Mwenzo initiative went into oblivion over time as World War I broke out but its impetus was assumed by other similar formations - spurred on by former Livingstonia mission students. Most of the welfare societies began to take on a more political zest in the 1929-31 periods (DiJohn, 2010:14).

Although not significant agents in shaping public opinion, the welfare societies culminated in novel - but failed - attempts at consolidation through the creation of the first territory wide body - the African Welfare Association of Northern Rhodesia in 1933. African Unions were still not allowed at this point, therefore, nationalists established welfare societies across Northern Rhodesia as large numbers of their compatriots were drafted into the copper mines as cheap labour (Roberts, 1975: 196-197).

Hall (1976: 71) describes the establishment of the Federation of Welfare Societies as *'the first step towards a national African political party...'*

Indeed, as indicated in section 2.2.1 of Chapter Two of this thesis, the body eventually constituted itself into a political party named the Northern Rhodesia

African Congress (renamed, the Northern Rhodesian African National Congress in 1951) (Roberts, 1995, 1013).

Supported by popular African leaders, workers in the long run became more organised and bold enough to challenge the colonial administration: the first strike by mine workers was recorded in 1935, which led to the killing of six workers by colonial police. The colonial office responded by extending more powers to tribal authorities, assumed to be the official vector of communication with colonial leaders. Meanwhile, fearful of the growing African workers' influence in industrial and political matters, European employees created the European Mine Workers' Union (EMU) (DiJohn, 2010: 15).

Formal efforts by the British at recognising the importance of African unions were made in 1947 by a labour government in Britain which accepted proposals for the formation of trade unions in all of the empire's colonies.

However, despite the secondment of a labour organiser to Northern Rhodesia, Africans were still not allowed to involve themselves in politics or finance any political activities. It was the appointment of William Comrie as labour officer for the Copperbelt that finally led to the implementation of the new government's policy on African trade unions, a precursor to formal political organisation.

Following that, the formation of the African Mine Workers Union (AMU) in 1947 not only symbolised a protracted struggle by African mineworkers to distinguish their aspirations from the European Mineworkers Union, but also signified the growth of the trade union movement in Zambia (Gilmore, 1988: 199-200).

Although the analyses of colonialism is often tinged with negativity, Chiluba (1995:23) argues that Britain, unlike other imperial regimes, prepared Africans for self government by involving them in elective Legislative Councils from 1959, and training them for administrative positions as non-partisan architects of the public service. Perhaps Zambia's foremost unionist in his day, Chiluba asserts that the principle of *collective bargaining*, introduced by the colonialist, was '*an important*

*legacy*' in the transition toward preparing the nationalists for '*a form of liberal democracy.*'

Between 1959 and 1964, the number of African trade unions increased from eight (8) to 50. The ZCTU was formed in 1966 and registered under section 8 of the Trade Union and Trade Disputes Ordinance of 1949 of Northern Rhodesia (Shikwe, 2003: 3). Independence in 1964 led to the consolidation of all unions into 18 entities by 1972, which formed the foundation of the ZCTU, then boasting a membership of 140,000 (Gilmore, 1988: 199-200).

### **5.2.6 Democratisation, economic reforms and the labour movement: Understanding industrial relations in Zambia**

The first tentative phase of liberal democracy in Zambia - the First Republic - saw a ruling party in UNIP, galvanise a nation around the nationalist sentiments of the independence struggle, while making overtures to labour as an ally (Fashoyin, 2008: 5).

Even as far back as the 1950's the autonomy of the labour movement had been a source of concern for the nationalists, as it declined to be directed in terms of economic and political liberation. Upon independence in 1964, the UNIP administration compromised the autonomy of the unions by reducing their capacity to strike through legislative changes. Presenting itself as the protector of labour from foreign capital, UNIP then began to lure the Mine Workers Union of Zambia (MUZ), the most powerful of the formations, into the umbrella of the ZCTU (Larmer, 2006: 296).

However, UNIP's policy of voluntary co-option of the labour movement into its development objectives failed as the country was continually rocked by industrial unrest.

The UNIP government elected finally to use legislative means to curb labour unions: In 1970, it passed the *Industrial Relations Act* (1971) which required

mandatory membership to one mother union (the basis of the '*one industry, one union*' policy). In principle, the Act strengthened UNIP's control over unions (Rakner, 2001: 513) but it also generated overtones of dissent from labour leaders (Fashoyin, 2008:5-6).

Inadvertently, however, the fusion of the unions consolidated the labour movement in financial terms and organisationally, breaking with the post independence tradition of intra-labour conflict (Simutanyi, 1996: 151-172).

It was, in effect, the nationalisation of the economy that brought UNIP into direct conflict with the interest groups representing labour, business and agriculture. Underpinned by the *Philosophy of Humanism*, the introduction of the one party state and nationalisation is seen by some as the expression of an explicit policy of co-optation into a state corporate structure that was centrally controlled.

Yet, the one-party state did not dampen labour's resistance to the state's development agenda - it seemed to embolden it (Rakner, 2001: 514).

Seemingly, UNIP sought to control the labour movement by extending membership drives to the various branches, capitalising on its status as the sole legal party. But this scheme was subverted by the rise of Frederick Chiluba as president of ZCTU and Newstead Zimba as its secretary-general in 1975, both strong opponents of the one party state.

Under their leadership, ZCTU's membership grew to 350,000 by 1991. The ZCTU hence became not only the most powerful non state actor in one party Zambia, but essentially the strongest political opponent to the government's development project (Rakner, 2001: 514).

In underlining his hard-line opposition to UNIP, Chiluba (1995:20-23), is emphatic in dismissing the notion that single partyism had pacific intentions at any given time. More than a century of socio-economic modernisation had rendered Zambia not only the most urbanised country in Africa but had also changed the

sense of ethnic consciousness that motivated the nationalists to develop a state corporate structure under visions of national unity, he asserts.

*“Today, many Zambians see themselves as individuals and not simply as members of some ethnic group. They are geographically mobile as between rural and urban areas, and at times the individual interests may be given precedence even over familial obligations. Zambia is a large country and government must be by representation of the people and not direct participation” (Chiluba, 1995: 21).*

Chiluba also strongly contests the idea that the one party state was brought about by popular acclaim, citing the opposition to it in the *Chona Commission of Inquiry* which preceded the 1972 legislation confirming the Second Republic. The one party regime exhibited vestiges of the colonial government which operated on the basis of surveillance of ‘trouble makers’, maintenance of the state of emergency and indefinite detention of opposition, he argues.

The failure of Kaunda’s socialist development strategy manifested in the poor management of the country’s nationalised industries including the copper mines. Copper prices and oils shocks worsened Zambia’s economic profile in the mid 1970s and into the 1980s. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from 6.7% to -2.4%; while overbearing state controls and bad management stifled employment creation in the productive sector (Fashoyin, 2008:1).

The economic downturn in the late 1970s leading into the 1980s saw the Zambian government face unrest as subsidies on the staple food maize were removed and the price of the commodity shot up by 120 %.

The price of fuel also went up by 70 %. In addition, student unrest typified the year 1986 when the state reintroduced boarding fees. This forced Kaunda to reverse his decisions and also break away from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) inspired economic austerity programme (Roberts, 1995: 1014).

The 84 industrial strikes that took place in the 1980s, and the detention of Chiluba and his colleagues during the same period epitomise the relationship between UNIP and ZCTU in the Second Republic (Rakner, 2001: 514).

Tayo Fashoyin (2008:vii), Director of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Sub Regional Office for Southern Africa, crucially notes, that employment relations in Zambia have been influenced by successive economic and political developments.

Going forward into the multiparty dispensation of the Third Republic, the expectation was certainly one of a more liberated labour environment, with rights of association being a *given*.

However, Rakner cautions that while political liberalisation generally leads to new freedoms of associations and free speech, the economic imperatives have proved challenging for African democracies. The same interest groups that rose from the liberalisation process have exercised their liberties to oppose the state's economic liberalisation policies and reforms, placing the continent's new democrats in a quagmire (Rakner, 2001: 514).

Fashoyin (2008:vii), also acknowledges that the tensions between economic liberalisation and market-oriented economic regimes and public policy, 'by design or default' undermined the role of trade unions and the employers' association' in Zambia.

### ***5.2.7 Trade unionism and liberal democracy***

Trade unionism and democracy, in short, do not sit comfortably with each other, even though it is held in some scholarly circles that a nation's development relies upon harmonious labour-management relations. Because of the assumed political and socio-economic fragility of developing nations, the existence of cordial relations between state and labour is considered even more paramount (Gilmore, 1998:196).



Democratic consolidation also, is presumed to be pivoted in part, upon robust union organisation that can enable workers to engage in negotiations and enforcement of agreements with the state and capital (Webster, 1998: 40).

However, opinion is divided as to whether labour's role should be predominantly political or economic. Supporters of the political paradigm have marshalled a plethora of evidence augmenting their position particularly for developing nations where alliances between nationalists and worker movements have led to liberation from colonial forces.

Those in support of the economic paradigm cite the cases of Tanzania and Ghana, where labour's resistance was spurred by the abuse at the hands of agricultural employers - not by political sentiment per se (Bates [Sa]: 366-369).

The political paradigm has however marshalled enough evidence to buttress its claims: There are significant highlights indicating that during periods of political change through the twentieth century, labour and politics have often tended to forge alliances to achieve common political and economic goals (Buhlungu, 2005: 701).

And yet in the recent past, the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies by African states has often undermined these coalitions. For liberalism imposes high costs on workers and minimises the power of the state to intervene in social, political and economic reconstruction (Webster, 1998:39-40).

Therefore, despite its promise of more equitable distribution of political power, democratisation's economic face increasingly relays social inequalities while its political character tends to compromise substantive political equality (Burnell, 2001:191). These development inevitably position labour to interrogate and challenge the efficacy of imported political models.

Contending priorities between state and unions in changing political-economic contexts inevitably undermines the union-party alliances: countries such as South Africa are increasingly attracting scholarly attention in regard to the African National Congress (ANC)'s and the Congress of South African Trade Unions' (COSATU) relationship as social inequalities remain a concern and expectations amongst workers meet with constant disappointments, for example (Buhlungu, Brookes & Wood, 2008: 439-468).

### ***5.2.8 The impact of Washington Consensus doctrines on Trade Unions***

The importance of this broad discussion to the overall aim of this thesis is two fold:

- To understand how economic policies and labour practices could either strengthen or weaken the ability of journalists to consolidate their efforts at unionisation.
- To provide an informed analysis of how political and business elites may undermine job security, freedom of association, and ultimately the growth of media unions in the foreseeable future.

The preceding discussion therefore illuminates how changing economic conditions may compromise political alliances between unions and ruling political parties, leading to a lack of confidence in the existing political model. The reaction of the ruling party, using state power, is of a fundamental interest here.

This would likely play a key role in determining the extent to which labour would claim a legitimate role in the political public sphere as an independent force. As an integral member of the ZCTU, a union of journalists cannot hence be deemed immune to the overall political conditions that influence labour relations in any given situation.

The Zambian case testifies to how the relations between UNIP and the ZCTU on the one hand; and MMD and the ZCTU, on the other, in both cases deteriorated as the economy collapsed at various points in history (Rakner, 1999: 507-527).

The fall of UNIP and its socialist development strategy of *nationalisation*, provided the launch pad for the enhancement of MMD as an alternative and rendered its economic blue-print, informed by the *Washington Consensus*, a viable proposition for the masses.

From the time Frederick Chiluba took over the reins of state power in 1991, Zambia experienced an intensification of the market - oriented economic reform (explained in section 1.1.2 of Chapter One ), which began modestly in Kaunda's last years in office. Chiluba solidly believed in the doctrine of the *Washington Consensus* and was quick to privatise 83% of the 280 state enterprises, which had been draining public finances. The sum effect of Chiluba's policies was to strengthen employers substantially while severely crippling the trade unions, which experienced huge membership declines through mass retrenchments.

In addition, the reforms generated social effects amongst workers, as the state used colonial liquidation laws to implement its plans, thereby inadequately compensating retrenchees. Chiluba's perpetuation of the *Industrial Relations Act* in its liberal form, while consistent with liberal philosophy, is blamed by labour officials for the factionalisation of the ZCTU because it encouraged groups with different viewpoints to government policy, to legally align along ideological lines. The ZCTU's influence, as a collective force, began to wane, hence. As a consequence, the two unions with the most financial capacity, the MUZ and the National Teachers Union (NUT) withdrew their affiliation to ZCTU in 1993-4 (Fashoyin, 2008:1-6).

They instead joined the newly created Federation of Free Trade Unions of Zambia (FFTUZ). The FFTUZ drew its membership from the public service, local government, mining and agriculture. The FFTUZ became a significant option to ZCTU and for the first time, the voice of labour was splintered exposing it to state

manipulation. The first two years of MMD rule, 1991 to 1993, showed some stability in major macro economic indicators but caused painful social effects. Zambia's real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) registered 6.8 % growth in 1993, 6.4% in 1996, 3.5% in 1997, 3.2% in 1999 and 3.5% in 2000. The manufacturing, transport, wholesale and retail sectors also recorded growth but without generating jobs in any significant sense. By 2000, 80% of Zambia's population was surviving on a dollar a day, conditions signifying acute poverty (Global Policy Network, 2001).

Unemployment and under - employment continued to deteriorate in the country as a consequence of adopting the IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Some major salient points on the socio-economic situation in Zambia in the first ten years of Chiluba's rule are summarised by the Global Policy Network (2001) as such:

- Because of retrenchments in both public and private sectors of the economy, the unemployment rate increased from 13% in 1986 to 22% in 1991.
- The 122,500 youths who entered the labour market every year, had no hope of securing jobs.
- A total of 61,000 formal sector jobs were lost between 1992 and 1995
- Formal wage employment continued to decline, compelling Zambians to resort to informal means of subsistence.
- The two policy measures which caused these phenomena are the Public Sector Reform Programme and the Privatisation Programme.

The other major factor undermining the economy and by extension unionisation, was the under performance of newly privatised firms. Some of the prolific acquisitions stand in sharper relief:

- Kapiri Glass Factory (eventually closed under private ownership).
- The Roan Antelope Mining Corporation (RAMCOZ), went into receivership during the same period jeopardising the futures of 4000 miners.

- Maamba Collieries had to be resold due poor performance under its original buyers.

Kabwe Pharmaceutical Limited was another of the several under achievers (Global Policy Network, 2001).

**Table 3: Formal sector employment trends, 1997- 2000 (Global Policy Network, 2001)**

<b>Sector</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000*</b>	<b>% Change</b>
<b>Formal Employment by Industry</b>	<b>475,161</b>	<b>467,193</b>	<b>477,508</b>	<b>476,347</b>	<b>-0.2</b>
Agriculture, Food, and Fishing	58,898	58,898	60,000	59,377	-1.0
Mining and Quarrying	44,498	39,160	38,521	35,042	-9.0
Manufacturing	47,118	46,685	46,000	47,782	3.9
Electricity, Gas and Water	5,009	5,237	5,300	5,049	-4.7
Construction	17,106	13,459	12,895	13,828	7.2
Trade and Distribution	48,893	48,964	51,097	52,336	2.4
Transport and Communication	45,963	45,840	45,000	46,719	3.8
Finance, Real Estate, and Business Services	37,862	35,276	34,682	31,483	-9.2
Community, Social, and Personal Services*	169,814	173,674	184,013	184,731	0.4
<b>Formal Employment by Sector</b>	<b>475,161</b>	<b>467,193</b>	<b>477,508</b>	<b>476,347</b>	<b>-0.2</b>
Central Government (civilian	129,200	117,250	112,345	101,300	-9.8
Local Authorities	15,161	13,048	12,900	12,500	-3.1
Parastatals Companies	73,900	68,046	65,300	65,700	0.6
Private Companies	256,900	268,849	286,963	296,847	3.4

\* Estimates as of June 30, 2000.

When the MMD began to pursue the Public Sector Reform Programme (PSRP) as part of its project to foster efficiency and cost effectiveness, the ripple effects on workers were profound. There were 180,000 public workers of whom, 75,000 were civil servants, 26,000 Local Authority workers, 45,000 non-joint council employees and 34,000 classified daily employees.

The PSRP aimed at pruning 17,200 civil servants and non civil servants between 1994 and 1996. But the mass retrenchments were somewhat delayed due to the enormous pay-outs involved. However, the gradual attrition had a telling effect on the profile of unions and on employer-employee relations (Global Policy Network, 2001).

### **5.3 FROM PRIVATISATION TO COMMERCIALISATION**

Labour movements accused the government of non-consultation and of being donor-driven in its development agenda. Thus, Chiluba's presidency, leading into Mwanawasa's in 2001, were characterised by conflict with unions over the following factors:

- Hyperinflation had eroded wages and incomes: despite a 3 digit inflation in the mid 1990s, nominal wages had only risen by 30 % per annum.
- The economy experienced a steady decline in employment, with formal employment - which represented 75% of the labour force - dropping to 10.3% in 1999.
- The mining, manufacturing and construction sectors witnessed declines of between 33% and 62%.
- Although trade, finance and services recorded 16% and 58 % growths during the same periods, the bulk of these jobs were in the casualisation category.
- Public service reform, aimed at efficiency, quality and cost-effective service delivery, led to the retrenchment of 3% of public workers, i.e. a reduction

from 139,000 to 101,000 between 1997 and 2000. These radical changes destabilised the labour movement in terms of membership, social effects on workers and created operational difficulties in employment relations.

- The Zambian economy became increasingly informalised with the 3.6 million people in the sector representing 79% of the labour force (Fashoyin, 2008:1-5).

To its credit, in 2005, the Mwanawasa government introduced the National Employment and Labour Market Policy which aimed to create quality and adequate jobs, improving incomes, protection of labour and human rights, whose results are yet to be seen (Fashoyin, 2008:1-5).

Because some state owned enterprises were not as attractive to investors, Levy Mwanawasa emphasised *commercialisation* - rather than *privatisation* - of existing state enterprises such as banks and the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation (ZESCO), which were central to the country's development (Fashoyin, 2008:1-5).

Under Mwanawasa, Zambia recorded a GDP growth rate of 10.1% in 2006 attributed to a robust performance of the mining sector (50% growth between 2001 and 2003) and the cancellation of the country's \$7.1billion external debt. However, the economic growth's impact on poverty and unemployment was intangible which led to labour and civil society rallying against the state's liberalisation policies once again.

### **5.3.1 Privatisation, liberalisation and unionisation**

Economic reforms had major impacts on nearly all 29 registered national unions in Zambia, particularly in terms of membership levels and unionisation rates (25 of the unions were members of the ZCTU, while four were affiliated to the FFTUZ)(Global Policy Network, 2001).

However economic reforms, while constituting a major factor, were not the only explanation for receding membership. The unions concede that, to a lesser extent, natural attrition, voluntary retirement and improvement in technology in the financial and banking sector replaced human labour with machines.

Unionisation rates dropped from 70% and 80% in the First and Second Republics respectively to about 50% in the Third. The Global Policy Network (2001) asserts that unions have failed to organise themselves under a new hostile environment introduced by the privatisation because the new capitalist owners were less inclined to promoting or observing worker rights.

*“The new private industry is more anti-union and some investors/employers are even refusing to recognise unions. Workers showing union sympathy are usually intimidated and threatened with dismissals. The new investors are encouraging part-time, temporary, and casual employment in an attempt to lower costs and avoid unions”, (Global Policy Network, 2001).*

The Global Network study supports its assertions by illustrating how the sectors with the largest proportion of privatised firms have had the lowest unionisation rates: Transport and communication (28.1%), agriculture (26.7%), manufacturing, trade, and distribution and hotels (27.8%), and finance (22.6%).

The mining sector is highlighted as the one sector which still enjoys high unionisation rates at 88.3%, attributed to the strengths and organisational capacity of the MUZ. In sectors dominated by parastatals firms, such as electricity and water (79.2%) and construction (88.3%), unionisation rates remain high. Finally, the public sector stands at 63.7% which is described as ‘moderate’ levels of unionisation.



**Table 4: Trade union membership, 1995 - 99 (Global Policy Network, 2001)**

Union	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Airways and Allied Workers	2,800	3,000	3,000	2,500	775
Bankers' Union of Zambia	1,000	1,000	1,600	500	500
Civil Servants Union of Zambia	29,000	29,000	34,500	30,000	39,267
Guards Union of Zambia	10,000	10,000	10,000	8,000	6,720
Mineworkers Union of Zambia	48,000	47,000	40,000	38,000	31,251
National Union of Commercial and Industrial Workers	18,000	15,000	15,000	12,000	18,000
National Union of Communications Workers	5,547	5,000	4,800	3,900	4,381
National Union of Public Service Workers	35,000	34,000	33,000	20,000	16,000
National Union of Technical Education Lecturers	-	800	800	800	800
National Union Transport and Allied Workers	5,000	5,000	5,200	3,000	1,099
Railway Workers Union of Zambia	7,000	6,000	5,000	4,000	4,000
Secondary Education Teachers Union**	2,600	3,000	5,000	4,500	4,500
University of Zambia and Allied Workers	4,275	4,000	4,000	2,500	2,500
University of Zambia Researchers and Lecturers Union	-	-	-	282	282

Workers Union of Tazara	-	-	-	2,000	2,383
Zambia National Union of Teachers	45,000	46,000	46,000	46,500	38,249
Zambia National Union of Health and Allied Workers	6,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000
Zambia Revenue Authority Workers Union	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	1,743
Zambia Typographical and Allied Workers Union	2,000	1,500	1,200	1,000	1,000
Zambia Union of Financial and Allied Workers**	7,000	6,000	6,000	5,800	5,800
Zambia Union of Journalist	300	300	300	300	300
Zambia United Local Authority Workers Union	22,000	18,000	18,000	17,000	10,000
<b>Total Trade Union Membership</b>	<b>289,322</b>	<b>280,400</b>	<b>282,700</b>	<b>245,742</b>	<b>234,522</b>
Total Formal employment	485,000	479,000	475,000	467,000	478,000

\* Formerly Zambia Electricity and Allied Workers Union.

\*\* Not affiliated to ZCTU.

What the study misses however, is the situation of the ZUJ in this equation. Table 4 above indicates that the journalists' union had 300 paid up members in 2001. This is still the case today, going by the information provided by both the management of the *Times Newspapers* (Phiri, 2009/11/20) and the ZUJ executive (Chonya: 2010/02/02). This is accounted for by the fact that ZUJ merely represents journalists working in the two state owned daily newspapers, not the entire fraternity of media professionals. The stability of the membership profile of ZUJ will also be explained in part by the state's treatment of its media as

a strategic political tool which may, occasionally perhaps, be supported and strengthened by subsidies, rather than weakened through all manner of attrition.

ZUJ's expansion, as will be explained in greater detail in section 5.3.5 appears inhibited by rival unions in the public sector or by the state itself, the latter being possibly uncomfortable with a union of journalists embracing public service media professionals. The other reason, of course, would likely be ZUJ's own lack of capacity to actually navigate inter-union and state manoeuvres to increase its membership base and unionisation rates.

The Global Network study provides no figures in terms of ZUJ's '*potential membership*' or '*number of workers in industry*' and will therefore not facilitate the calculation of '*estimated unionisation rates*' in the media entity. It stands to reason, at this stage, to assume that the absence of membership data may be caused by the lack of a clear definition of who, in essence, qualifies to be a journalist, a matter addressed in the same vein in section 5. 3.3 of this chapter.

**In summary**, it can be said that political and economic liberalisations do not necessarily work correspondingly with the growth of trade unions and other interest groups. The experience of Zambia, as other emerging nations, indicates that liberal democracy and its market orientated policies have a tendency to undermine worker rights and livelihoods, generating tensions between state and labour.

In all of Zambia's three republics, labour relations have been aggravated by deteriorating economies either caused by poor management, external forces such as oil shocks and poor copper prices; or austerity measures that are driven by the IMF and World Bank. Internally, labour has been compromised by state - orchestrated moves: under Kaunda's one party state, the introduction of the *Industrial Relations (1971) Act* promoted the policy of '*one industry, one union*' which limited the ability of sectoral unions to exercise choice in terms of which apex organisation they belonged to.

Inadvertently, the Act consolidated the ZCTU into a single, robust union which presented UNIP with its stiffest challenge during the First and Second Republics.

The UNIP administration employed the same tactic in reverse to attempt to split ZCTU ahead of the 1991 elections, a measure interpreted by scholars as a direct assault on the MMD, whose membership was largely bolstered by labour. The liberalisation of the labour sector through the *Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act (1990)*, met with opposition from the ZCTU and the MMD. Organisationally, the pro-democracy movement and labour were too cemented and ranged on change to fracture at that stage.

Upon ascendancy to power in 1991, however, the MMD's unanticipated reaction was to renege on its electioneering promise to reinstate the '*one industry, one union*' policy and instead liberalised freedoms of association further, aggravating the dismantling of the ZCTU as a monopoly umbrella union. Subsequently, rival unions emerged, compromising the ZCTU's position as a force in Zambian politics. While the changes to the *Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act of 1997* can easily pass as a calculated political manoeuvre to disable a consolidated labour movement through deliberate fragmentation, they can conversely be defended as being consistent with the liberal philosophy. Perhaps, more importantly for the MMD, the actions conformed to the ILO Convention 87 on freedom of association and the right to organise.

Soon after the MMD assumed office in 1991, relations with its pre-election ally, the ZCTU, began to deteriorate as radical privatisation and liberalisation policies threw thousands of workers - union members in many instances - out of formal employment. The economic reforms also reduced the size of the public service, weakening the unions further.

The measures served to strengthen the hand of the employer as the government opted to use liquidation Acts from the colonial era, which left retrenched workers poorly compensated for their loss. Unions declined in both membership levels

and unionisation rates. Apart from the IMF and World Bank inspired policies the other causes of attrition were early retirements and the replacement of human labour with technology, particularly in the financial and banking sectors.

Labour scholars (Global Policy Network, 2001) assert that the unions, more akin to a nationalised economy and its political dynamics, had not mustered the art of mobilisation under a novel hostile capitalist environment, where new investors avoided unions, electing to use casual labour instead of formal contract workers. Available data demonstrates that it is in the sectors with the highest number of privatised firms in which unionisation rates have declined the most. The exception has been the mining industry which has the most well financed and historically most organised of the unions. The public sector too has had modest declines compared to the private sector, owing to the PSRP launched by the MMD as part of its *Washington Consensus* inspiration. What is ignored in this discourse is that the ZUJ seems to have maintained its membership levels at 300 probably as a result of the state not deliberately retrenching workers in the newspapers.

Hence, while the history of liberal philosophies and their impact on unionism in Zambia strongly demonstrate sharp declines in the power of labour, amidst the crisis had arisen an opportunity for journalists to define and grow a union for themselves.

### **5.3.2 The formation of the Zambia Union of Journalists**

Organised literature on unionism in the media industry is virtually non-existent therefore much of this section will be constructed from official documents and unstructured interviewees with founding and former executives of ZUJ.

Formally constituted in 1990, ZUJ introduced a new dynamic in Zambian media culture with the first structured approach to improving the economic welfare of journalists, since independence.

The idea of a union was driven by mid level journalists on the *Times of Zambia* who were experienced in shop stewardship at the workplace either operating as members of the Typographical Workers Union (TWU) or loosely aligned to the NUCW (Phiri, 2009/11/20).

Unlike the PAZA which was initially headed by persons at the level of editor-in-chief (Kasoma, 1986: 175), therefore very much tethered to the state as their official appointing authority in their formal employment, ZUJ remained relatively unshackled from the restrictive construct of the state-corporate structure by virtue of being grass-roots driven.

Its first president, the late Edwin Musaika, a sub editor and subsequently chief reporter on the *Times*, hence, was able to launch broadsides at authorities insulated by the law, and without the uncertainty of job insecurity that might be associated with upper echelon editorial staff.

The constitution of ZUJ in Article 1(1) (ZUJ [sa]) defines the organisation as a professional entity as well as a trade union. ZUJ is registered in terms of the *Industrial Relations Act* and not under the *Societies Act*, as is PAZA. The professional Union's main objectives are articulated in Article (2) of its constitutive document thus:

- Professional advancement of journalism in Zambia.
- Safeguard the freedom of the press and freedom of journalists engaged in legitimate professional activity.
- Capacity building of members through training.
- The promotion, defence, protection of members' salary and conditions of service.
- To preserve the tenets of journalism as well as advance its ideals.
- To encourage the participation of workers in decision making processes

- To protect and advance the socio-economic and cultural interests of the community '*...and such other objects as are lawful and are not inconsistent with the spirit and practice of trade unionism*'.

### **5.3.3 ZUJ and the professional dilemmas of Journalism**

It is noteworthy that, in representing media professionals, ZUJ faces the dilemma of journalism everywhere: there is no clear definition of who should be called a journalist. Given the varied levels of education amongst media professionals, the unclear definition of 'journalist' may also partly explain why governments have been reluctant to extend uniform conditions to the industry for an extended period. The advent of *Face book*, *Twitter*, *You Tube* and other web/internet based communicative tools has, in addition, bred a new coterie of communicators who lay claim to being recognised as 'citizen journalists', further complicating the notion of 'professionalism' within this field.

We learn from Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 40-41) that any social formation consists of a hierarchy of multiple, relatively autonomous fields with codes of practice but with power contestation between agents and their positions within the field and with the sum of the parts being greater than the whole.

The extent of field autonomy is projected in the capacity of the occupation to defray intrusion from other fields. There are competing interests among the agents within the field, with each utilising their economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals to gain leverage (Lingard, Rawolle & Taylor, 2005: 760).

The limitations of Bourdieu's conceptualisation of the relative autonomy of the field of journalism have been raised in section 4.3.6 of Chapter Four of this thesis. Framed against new institutionalist theory, Bourdieu's field theory is seen to ignore the mutual role of political and economic fields in influencing journalism as an occupation (Benson, 2006: 189).

The empirical reality rather suggests that defining the constituent elements of journalism that could correspond with other occupations with professional recognition has been an elusive undertaking for sociologists the world over.

For example, while the *trait approach* to the study of professions has adjudged lawyers, accountants and medical professionals as belonging to occupations that play a societal system maintaining role, journalism has not measured up (Dickinson, 1996: 21). The *trait approach* distinguishes professions from other occupations by employing a three-pronged methodology to the undertaking of such assessments:

- 1) The possession of high level educational qualifications (presumably, university degrees).
- 2) Membership to a central body which lays down codes of conduct, and;
- 3) The enjoyment of a relatively privileged position in the hierarchy of occupations.

*Action-oriented approaches* embrace the notion of '*professional project*' which focuses more on *social closure* or *control* over entry to the occupation, often through systems of accreditation founded on the acquisition of esoteric knowledge (Dickinson, 1996: 21-22).

Dickinson (1996: 22) is emphatic in his reflections as he raises fundamental perspectives that inhibit the advancement of journalism as a profession. The key impediments he identifies are as follows:

- Journalists are a heterogeneous group.
- Not all media personnel exhibit the traits of traditional professions.
- The range of specialities in journalism is too wide to bracket into a single category.
- The workforce is relatively weak as a collective sharing common interests.



- Hierarchies within organisations which distinguish between levels of professionalism in most media have not caught the attention of sociologists of professions.

Overall, he concludes that media occupations do not meet the sociological criteria that would qualify them as professions. Dickinson however moderates this rather harsh assessment by drawing on the concept of *power* as an analytical tool within the *professional project approach*.

First advanced by Johnson (1972), the approach suggests that it is possible to differentiate between occupations by examining the extent to which their members exercise control over themselves and the level of control they are able to exercise over those who seek to control them. The approach raises the question of media autonomy from internal and external forces.

In this regard, the argument for self regulation<sup>32</sup> in Zambia, closely related to that of professionalism, is introduced. However, the case of Zambia shows that even within one occupation, there can be serious fissures over definitions and ethics. For an extended period, Zambian journalism has been riven by tensions between private and state sector professionals over these matters.

These differences did not escape the attention of the then *Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services, Ernest Mwansa*, in 1997 when journalists sought to refract state sanctions by proposing a composite non statutory regulatory body:

*“The government wonders whether a council not backed by law could seriously deliver the goods. How will enforcement be carried out, considering the stand-off between government owned media and those belonging to the independent press?” (Mwansa, 1997:3).*

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<sup>32</sup> It can be noted also, that there is a proposed introduction of a media tribunal in South Africa, arising from concerns by state elites about the supposedly unfettered nature of journalism.

The levels of education amongst journalists are also so diverse that to use academic attainments as a measure for defining who, in essence, is a journalist might prove futile. Okigbo (1996: 212) notes that Zambian journalists were not only poorly trained but were also underpaid in the 1990s. Reviewing literature on Zambian journalism and democracy, he observes that journalists had no motivation, exhibited a low self esteem, and a poor public image fostered under the one party regime and perpetuated by the Chiluba government in the mid 1990s. He notes that fewer than one out of ten held college degrees in 1995.

Their lowly public profile was reflected in their 'agonistic' writing which is intent on supporting one political camp or the other. However, other authors, particularly in the 1990s, have recognised the courageous efforts of journalists to expose wrong doing and efforts by the state to control them through legislated press councils as noted by (Makayi, 1997: 17) and (Kasoma, 1986:155-176).

In terms of intellectual capacity, Okigbo also underplays the existence of major training hubs for journalism that had extended their facilities to other Africans over the years:

- The Evelyn Hone College of Applied Arts and Commerce provides a three year Diploma programme in journalism (with mass communication).
- The Mindolo Ecumenical Centre, offers a one year certificate in Journalism.
- From 1985, the University of Zambia introduced a department of Mass Communications offering degree level training.
- The Zambia Institute of Mass Communications offers in-service training for working journalists.

Okigo is, nonetheless, implicitly correct in alluding to the heterogeneity of Zambian journalism: When the *Times of Zambia* was under the ownership of the London Rhodesia Mining and Land Company (Lonrho) for example, journalists were trained in-house by their British supervisors and therefore honed their skills outside of formal educational structures.

*“Under Lonrho, the policy was kind of elitist in that it sought to recruit the best the market could offer or mould its reporters to be among the best. Thus the Times of Zambia had a galaxy of talented reporters over the years. Government is not interested in that. It seeks and is comfortable with conformists and the mediocre” (Simuchoba, 2009/12/02).*

Ridgeway Liwena (2008) indicates that he began engaging with the *Times* as a letter writer before proceeding to apply for employment and seeking formal training at the Mindolo Ecumenical Centre to study Journalism. This situation gradually changed as Zambians generally began to reap the benefits of higher education during the First, Second and onward to the Third republic.

This researcher recalls from his experience as chair of the Commonwealth Press Union (CPU) Zambia section in 1996-1998, however, that even with the presence of formal training, it was common practice amongst some emerging, poorly financed private media to cost-save by employing school leavers or modestly trained personnel, therefore compromising efforts at achieving some form of ‘social closure’.

The state owned media and *The Post Newspapers*, on the other hand, began increasingly to absorb graduates of state tertiary institutions, logically because of their relatively more stable financial backgrounds.<sup>33</sup> The lack of social closure and

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1. <sup>33</sup> The profile of a Zambian journalist has evolved over time from one who was trained in-house, without formal academic qualifications, forming the core of institutions such as the *Times* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* in the First Republic; to one that is increasingly in possession of a basic formal certificate or diploma in journalism. This caricature became more apparent in the Second Republic when graduates from the Evelyn Hone College and Africa Literature Centre filtered into influential editorial positions. From 1986, onward, journalists with Bachelor of Arts degrees in Mass Communications from the University of Zambia added to this portfolio of formally trained practitioners. However, the advent of liberalisation introduced a plethora of poorly funded publications which have been referred to in Table 1, in section 1.2.1 of Chapter One. The tendency in this category of media was to employ school leavers due to their inability to meet the relatively higher salary demands of college and university graduates. Distinct descriptions of who in fact was a journalist have hence eluded media agencies seeking to promote the integrity of the

distinctness did pose problems for the founders of ZUJ when they initially attempted to register the union in 1992:

*“...but the people in the office wanted change, and so they allowed us to register; When registering, we could not even come up with 100 names required to set up the union. We then got employees from the ZNBC, ZIS etc, fast, to make up the numbers. The broadcasting workers still belonged to the National Union of Communication Workers” (Phiri, 2008).*

The positive aspects of heterogeneity, of course, lie in the numbers. Precisely because of the unsubstantial numbers of people who would qualify to be journalists if the benchmark were a college or university degree, it makes sense to expand the definition of journalist, if only for strategic purposes. The inclusion of general workers in the media industry and other support staff therefore, potentially contributes to the creation of a critical mass. The ZUJ’s membership has increased since its formation from 15 to 300 and remained as such (Chonya, 2010/02/02).

### **5.3.3 Membership and governance**

Against this backdrop, Article 3(1) of the ZUJ constitution makes an attempt to define who *is* a journalist and therefore who qualifies to be represented by the union:

*“Any person who is employed or has been employed as editorial staff (that is reporters, editors, sub editors, features editors. Sports writers,*

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profession in the eyes of the public. It is perhaps more realistic to draw parallels between journalists working for the privately owned *Post Newspapers* and state media journalists, principally because these institutions would have the means to consistently employ qualified professionals. On the whole, no single frame can capture the variety of people who qualify as journalists in Zambia, given the proliferation of community and commercial radio stations, television, weeklies and single issue publications which encompass a variety of media staff profiles.

*photographers, artists, information officers etc), directly employed and earn 60 percent of his income as editorial staff of newspapers, magazines, periodicals and other journals, book work, radio, television, news agencies and information officers engaged in corporations or companies as public relations officers, may become a member of the union”(ZUJ [sa]).*

Members who are employed for less than 12 months are regarded as ‘probationary members’ while ‘honorary membership’ may be granted to retired or physically disabled media professionals upon the decision of the General Conference. Non Zambian journalists, who are accorded associate membership, can participate in the deliberations of the general conference but will be excluded from voting.

The demands for membership seem to take into account the financial limitations that potential members would no doubt encounter: Article 5(1) stipulates monthly membership fees of K20 Kwacha, or \$4.00 US dollars paid through a check-off system (ZUJ [sa]).

A more recent document from the union suggests that ZUJ draws its resources from the 2% subscription by members from their monthly incomes (ZUJ, 2007). This is deducted by the employer in an understanding with the union, and channelled directly into the National Secretariat account of ZUJ.

Structurally, the supreme authority of the ZUJ is the General Conference which comprises provincial council chairmen and secretaries, district council delegates and elected chapels. The General Conference is held every four years to review accounts, reported, revising rules and charting the policy course (ZUJ, [sa]).

The National Executive Committee (NEC) of ZUJ is headed by a part-time national chairman (now called president) elected every four years with a national executive committee constituting a deputy national chairman, a full-time general secretary, and a national treasurer, nine (9) provincial chairmen, three national

trustees and six other elected members representing special interests that are not ordinarily catered for in defined categories of employment. Of the NEC, only the general secretary may be a non journalist, (given the requirement for administrative skills).

#### **5.3.4 Impact of market and labour liberalisation on the membership of ZUJ**

In section 5.3.1 of this chapter, we dwelt intensively on how trade unions registered sharp declines in membership as policies of liberalisation and privatisation took effect in the 1990s. ZUJ was one of the few unions that seemed to be unaffected, particularly in terms of membership loss. This is presumably because no major retrenchment exercise has taken place in the media sector apart from natural attritions of early retirement, which are apparently recoverable.

A closer examination of the situation however, seems to suggest that the liberalisation of the economy and the labour market, while largely a positive development for ZUJ and state sector journalists, has had its negative effects on the union as well.

Morgan Chonya (2010/02/02), the most recent past president of ZUJ confirms that ZUJ has, since its formation, failed to attract journalists from the private sector, for example. This scenario arises partly from protracted differences between journalists in the state sector and their private sector colleagues, largely over lack of congruence in ethics, practice and autonomy.

Secondly, it can also be surmised that the wage demands that accompany *collective bargaining* might bankrupt weakly financed private press entities.

A ZUJ Secretariat statement in July, 2007 reinforces this point by indicating that emerging privately owned media owners have been reluctant to allow their employees to join the union:

*“In the implementation of the liberalised economic and labour market policies, a number of challenging key issues have emerged, These include notable reluctance of new investors to tolerate and deal with trade unions leading to preponderance of casualisation of labour and the use of contract labour”(ZUJ, 2007).*

Again, this point has been raised by the ZCTU in regard to the reluctance of new investors to unionise their employees (Global Policy Network, 2001).

All things considered, other than for moral and strategic reasons, it hardly seems to matter that the private media sector is absent in ZUJ at present.

This is certainly because the death rates of privately owned newspapers, referred to in section 1.2.1 of Chapter One of this thesis, has been high, with *The Post* and the *Monitor*, being the only long term survivors thus far. Hence, the membership complement from the private press would be minimal to say the least.

On the whole, it would appear that the ZUJ’s membership drive has been compromised more by the intervention of the state and rival unions than the dithering of private sector compatriots. It is understood in conversing with media unionists that state and public service unions have resisted efforts to incorporate journalists working in the public service into the ZUJ since 1990. Journalists working for the *Zambia News and Information Services (ZANIS)* and *National Agricultural Information Services (NAIS)* and the *Zambia Information Services (ZIS)* subscribe to the *Civil Servants Union of Zambia (CSUZ)* while those in the *Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)* continue to subscribe to *NUCW*, which essentially embraces all manner of communications workers - rather than just journalists alone - into its fold.

However, recognising that the voice of journalists is subdued in *NUCW*, some media professionals in the *ZNBC* opted to form their own union termed: *the*

*Zambia Union of Broadcasters and Information Disseminators (ZUBID) (Chonya, 2010).* <sup>34</sup>The potential for fragmentation and divisiveness, reminiscent of the ZCTU and FFTU debacle, presents itself here. In this regard, Chonya indicates that ZUJ and ZUBID have been discussing a merger, which would consolidate journalists from print and broadcasting industries into a single body. It would still leave out public service journalists however.

In the present day, hence, ZUJ remains a union for journalists in the print media section of the state controlled communications sector. In addition, not all journalists employed by the state owned print media can be effective members of the union: As they rise in rank, they are absorbed into management scales. A distinct example is Chonya himself, who soon after his interview with this researcher, has since assumed an editorial position on the *Zambia Daily Mail*, bringing to an end his reign as president of ZUJ. That is in conformity with the Industrial and Labour Relations (Amendment) Act of 2008 (Zambia, 2008: sec 4.1.).

Therefore, because the members of ZUJ are largely drawn from the middle and lower rungs of the *Times Newspapers* and *Zambia Daily Mail*, it not only explains the membership levels of 300 or thereabouts, but also underlines the vulnerability of the union to state machinations (that is, the promise of promotion as an incentive, essentially silences a vocal leader).

### **5.3.5 ZUJ and worker welfare: Collective Agreements with the Times Newspapers**

The ambition of this section of the thesis is to unveil particularly what Edward (1993: 33) terms, *enterprise rights* and *collective contract rights* which might assist to formulate empirically grounded discussions and arguments regarding the *effectiveness* of the union, ZUJ.

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<sup>34</sup> Telephone conversation with author, notes in appendix.



To fully appreciate the ensuing discussion, one is tempted to briefly reflect on the perceptions of veterans of the profession on the rewards reminiscent of First and Second Republican journalism. The purpose is not to compare remuneration levels in any scientific sense, but to glean an understanding of the mechanisms that would have rendered improvements to worker welfare.

In the post colonial period which saw to the birth of the *Times of Zambia* as we know it today, there were, ostensibly, significant disparities between the conditions of service of African reporters and those of their British counterparts. Ridgeway Liwena (2008), who joined the *Times of Zambia* in 1966, recalls that Africans shared rented homes in high density townships.

*“One of the local conditions of service was that local workers should accommodate themselves. I was one of those who fought that: local workers lived in the townships-I lived with my uncle. Lonrho insisted they could only provide accommodation for people from outside the country. Though we were black, we all came from different districts, we couldn’t be expected to accommodate ourselves; we were also expatriates in our own right” (Liwena, 2008).*

It was Dunstan Kamana, the first black Zambian editor of the *Times of Zambia*, who uplifted the situation of Africans, eventually bringing parity to salaries and conditions of service, Liwena recalls.

*“We were satisfied, not so much with the salaries, but that now we were going to take over in a few years. With black management, all the archaic practices gave in to the more realistic Zambianisation policy. Kamana changed the complexion of the paper and blacks benefited” (Liwena, 2008).*

Onward into the 1970s, Lonrho extended incentives to its entire staff as the *Times* continued to publicly declare successive profits.

During the Second Republic, employees depended on the employer to acknowledge their input into the company's success:

*“Economic performance under Lonrho was excellent. There was always a 13th cheque for staff at the end of the financial year”*  
(Simuchoba, 2009/12/02).

After the takeover of the *Times of Zambia* by UNIP's *Zambia National Holdings (ZNHL)* in 1982 (which has been referred to in section 4.3.9 of Chapter Four of this thesis) the conditions of service remained largely stagnant with the bulk of junior reporters categorised in the same grades as general staff in the elaborate ZNHL structure. This is also the period that the *Times'* historical record of profit making turned into concurrent financial losses (Phiri, 2009/11/20).

In the absence of a journalists' union, there is no specific record that testifies to any organised approach to ZNHL by *Times* Journalists for improved conditions of service during this period.

When the *Times/Printpak* were brought under the aegis of the *National Media Corporation (NAMECO)* with the *Zambia Daily Mail/Zambia Printing Company* and *Newspaper Distributors limited*, in 1989, there was a marked change in the range of benefits(Simuchoba, 2009/12/02).

Kaunda had essentially fulfilled his pledge to improve the welfare of journalists with the formation of the new print media conglomerate, a matter referred to in section 4.3.9 of Chapter Five of this thesis. Apart from introducing a more competitive salary structure, some of the fringe benefits extended by NAMECO were:

- Entertainment allowances.
- Subsistence allowances.
- Housing allowances.
- Education allowances.
- Medical schemes.

These fringe benefits can be categorised as *enterprise rights*, which are conferred by an employer without the agency of the worker.

On the contrary, Journalists falling directly under the public service had the worst experiences in terms of remuneration. They were subjected to government conditions which did not systematically recognise nor reward them in accordance with their professional academic certificates.

For example, Mwaba Phiri, a former publications editor on the *Zambia Information Services (ZIS)*, worked with the state entity for 18 years until 1996, and was one of the first journalists to obtain a university degree in mass communications at the institution. Now an executive producer with the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), Phiri recalls in an interview with this researcher:

*“ZIS had no policy along the lines of professional qualifications. If there was one, it was not enforced. ZIS employed school leavers (Form two or Form five) who usually made their way up the ranks via long service. Long service in fact played a stronger role in one’s promotion than mere qualification. Some of our Directors rose in this manner having bettered their academic qualifications with an Evelyn Hone College Diploma while at work. So you usually expected some kind of promotion after your diploma but it was your service (and how savvy you were with the bosses) that counted” (Phiri/2010/09/21).*

One would deduce from this that the undefined process of recruitment of journalists inevitably impacted on the esteem that the occupation or its practitioners commanded within government circles and beyond. To the MMD government’s credit, the civil service has, in the recent past, undergone a process of professionalisation which has had positive outcomes for public service workers, including journalists. This can be regarded as a response to the competitive pressures of a liberalised market.

In 1996 a GRZ/UNDP report *Prospects of Sustainable Human Development in Zambia*, showed that a mid level civil servant was earning the equivalent of \$45 to \$70 per month compared to \$333 per month by civil servants of equivalent ranking in neighbouring Botswana. Within Zambia, there were wide disparities in wages at the time across sectors, industry and enterprises ranging between 50% and 70% (Global Policy Network, 2001).

*“What has happened is that it is no longer possible to pay journalists below government levels or deny them fringe benefits that apply to the public service. In recent years too, government has begun to pay professionals in its service very competitively and pays generally well. So the knock-on-effect on salaries in the media and conditions of service generally has been good” (Simuchoba, 2009/12/02).*

Indeed, the Zambian government, following two year cycles of negotiations with public service unions, continued to respond to new wage demands. One of the most significant steps taken was on 27 April 2010 when the state agreed to a 15% increment for all civil servants (Civil Servants win 15% salary increment, 2010:1).

The state followed this up with the establishment of a 15 person Public Service Salary Review Commission, sworn in on 29 July, 2010 (Public Service Salary Review Commission Sworn in, 2010: 1).

Before this, the real wages for the majority of workers had continued to decline with the erosion of the Zambian Kwacha’s buying power. Despite increases in nominal wages from the early 1990s, it is noted that real wage levels had in essence, declined between 1997 and the year 2000 (See table 5, below).

**Table 5: Trends in average earnings per month (Kwacha), 1997 - 2000\***  
(Global Policy Network, 2001)

	1997	1998	1999	2000	% Change 1999-2000 1999 as base year
<b>Average Nominal Earnings by sector **</b>	<b>150,230</b>	<b>184,281</b>	<b>233,687</b>	<b>245,265</b>	<b>5.0</b>
Central Government (civilian)	134,154	154,850	194,377	205,265	5.6
Local Authorities	152,328	124,536	189,792	197,681	4.2
Parastatals Companies	291,176	341,564	467,001	501,612	7.4
Private Sector Companies	103,264	141,780	187,661	206,771	10.2
<b>Real Average Earnings by Sector</b>	<b>625.4</b>	<b>616.5</b>	<b>616.6</b>	<b>513.4</b>	<b>-16.4</b>
Central Government (civilian)	566.5	524.0	515.9	429.7	-16.7
Local Authorities	643.3	421.4	503.7	413.8	-17.8
Parastatals Companies	1,229.6	1,155.9	1,239.4	1,050.1	-15.3
Private Sector Companies	436.1	479.8	498.0	432.8	-13.1

\* Estimates as at June 2000.

\*\* Totals do not add up as a result of weighted averaging.

The benefit of *collective action* in this regard cannot be under estimated nor denied. Civil servants appear to be benefiting from collective action from public service unions, who for years have argued for better conditions for workers.

The challenge for ZUJ was to struggle for improved conditions using ERT methods, something never before attempted in the media.

The union's strategic engagements are fostered through its Collective Bargaining Unit (CBU) which is composed of the president (formerly chairman), vice president, general secretary, treasurer and two chapel(branch) presidents from the company ZUJ is negotiating with (ZUJ, 2007).

The union's impact on the work environment, particularly on the *Times Newspapers* can be gauged qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative aspects of this assessment would speak to the content of the collective agreements (range and nature of conditions of service). The quantitative component would seek to project the incremental value of salary raises by comparing the 1994 (the period prior to the first collective agreement) with the 2010 portfolio.

John Phiri, the current Managing Director of the *Times/Printpak Zambia limited*, summarises the ZUJ's qualitative imprint as follows:

- ZUJ has continuously bargained for improved conditions of service for journalists.
- ZUJ has demonstrated the value of representation.
- ZUJ has improved job security 'here too, there is more protection as a result of the work of ZUJ'.
- Conflict resolution; dialogue between workers and management has improved.
- Expansion of communicative space has made it possible for journalists to be taken seriously as stakeholders.

In some cases, ZUJ has employed ERT approaches to negotiate for lesser punishment for erring journalists, notes Miti (2011/02/15) in addition to securing the conditions of professionals:

*“A good example could be when ZUJ fought for fixed overtime for sub-editors” (Miti/2011/02/15).*

Indeed, an examination of collective agreements signed between the *Zambia Daily Mail Limited* and ZUJ between 2004-2006 shows that the range of fringe benefits and conditions of service generally have qualitatively improved (ZDM/ZUJ, 2004-2006: 7). The following conditions, uniform to those negotiated for workers on the *Times*, are notable:

- Introduction of commuted car allowances.
- Housing allowances.
- Tool allowance (payable to any employee who has been permitted by management to use his or her own tools).
- One-off Allowances.
- Business Travel Abroad (at official government rates).
- Education Allowances.
- Leave allowances.
- Out of pocket allowance.
- Repatriation (upon retirement/redundancy) allowance.
- Subsistence allowances.
- Membership to one local professional body and one club for employees (professional scales) paid for by the company at rates agreed to with the ZUJ.

However, to fully comprehend the assertions made by former editors and unions leaders as to the ZUJ's influence in the workplace, it is critical at this stage to examine the quantitative data made available for the purposes of this research.

### 5.3.6 Calculating improvements to salaries and benefits

In the absence of collective agreements for the intervening years salary levels for 1994 prior to ZUJ entering into its first collective agreement with *Times* management, were compared with current salaries (2010) for grades 1-6 which represent unionised scales on the establishment. These grades exclude senior editors (news editor, Sunday editor, business editor, features editor, deputy editor-in-chief, managing director). As Giya advised (2010/09/23), adjustment for the cumulative inflation developments during the period was made to the calculations of salary and benefits to determine the levels of improvements.

The following calculations were made to account for inflation adjusted earnings: The inflation adjusted earning  $Y_1$  is a function of the past year earning  $Y_0$  and average inflation in the previous period  $Infl_0$ .

$$Y_1 = f(Y_0; Infl_0) \dots \text{Equation 1}$$

The adjustment process to get the inflation adjusted earning this year ( $Y_1$ ) involves adjusting previous year earnings ( $Y_0$ ) by the adjustment factor  $(1 + Infl_0)$  which depends on the level of inflation ( $Infl_0$ ) in the previous year. This process is represented by the equation below:

$$Y_1 = Y_0(1 + Infl_0) \dots \text{Equation 2}$$

Equation 2 was applied to inflation rate and earnings for 1994 to derive the inflation adjusted earnings for 1995.

The 1995 inflation adjusted earnings and the inflation rate for 1995 are then used to derive the inflation adjusted remunerations for 1996. The process is repeated for the subsequent years up to 2010. The 2010 inflation adjusted earnings is obtained using the 2009 average inflation rate and 2009 inflation adjusted earnings. The 2010 inflation adjusted earnings are then compared with the current earnings to find out if 1994 remunerations are better than the current




rewards. The earnings include basic salary and allowances (transport, housing, subsistence, lunch, holiday, education and tools).

The results of this exercise indicate that all the unionised employees on the *Times* (grade 1-6) have experienced improvements to their salaries and conditions of service compared to the earnings in 1994. The only exceptions are the subsistence and lunch allowances. Three key factors present themselves:

- The current purchasing power of the employees is firmer than that of 1994.
- The cumulative adjustments to the current earnings have outpaced the cumulative pace of the inflation dynamics between 1994 and 2010.
- Housing allowance is the only exception because it is pegged at 60% of the basic salary for grade 1-4 and 45% of the basic salary for grade 5-6, a significant proportion of the basic salary.

**Figure 7: Average earnings at 2010 levels versus 1994 levels in ZK 000**



Source: *Times of Zambia* (2010) & Giya (2010/09/23): Calculations by author.

The foregoing underlines succinctly the influence of collective agreements which are negotiated for between management and ZUJ every two years since 1994, on the conditions of service and salaries of media professionals.

The regularity with which this occurs also demonstrates the extent to which ZUJ can be considered an *active and effective* union. Previously these benefits would have been left to the prerogative of management.

### **5.3.7 Conflict with employers and grievance procedures**

It is noteworthy that ZUJ acknowledges that despite its successes in negotiating better conditions for its members, its relationship with management has not been without 'confrontation and intimidation' (ZUJ, 2007).

ZUJ laments that when its members on the *TimesPrintpak* resorted to strike action in 2007, for example, not only did management consider the wage demands as unrealistic, the state followed up with threats of dismissal.

*"There was a lot of intimidation of union leaders and threats of dismissals if they continued their industrial action as it was considered illegal", a statement from the ZUJ Secretariat in 2007 alleged (ZUJ, 2007).*

Apart from the reluctance of new investors to unionise their employees, ZUJ's argues that its effectiveness has been compromised by the following additional factors:

- Despite its freedom to operate, the union felt the state contributed to the friction between ZUJ and the management of the *Times of Zambia* in particular.
- Collective action by workers in the form of strikes was met with intimidation and threat of dismissal.

- Under the existing Zambia law, the union found it difficult to stage a legal strike.

Implicit, in this discussion, is the threat posed by management to individual employees who may be victimised indirectly for participating in strike actions as part of a collective. It is hence critical at this stage to take note that the *terms and conditions of service of the employees of the TimesPrintpak negotiated between management and the ZUJ for the 2008-2010 periods*, provide for specific *grievance procedures*. The procedure applies to individual employees and their adherence to 'self discipline'.

*"Discipline must be just and uniformly administered to ensure that all individuals are treated in a fair and consistent manner...this provision is not intended as a substitute for good management. It is an expression of the joint Disciplinary Policy of the Times Printpak Zambia Limited and the Zambia Union of Journalists, as employer and union respectively"*  
(TimesPrintpak/ZUJ, 2008: 11).

The procedure has three stages: the first, where an aggrieved employee may take up the matter with his/her immediate supervisor, with the option of consulting his shop steward. If dissatisfied with the resolution of the problem by the supervisor and human relations, the employee resorts to stage two: the chief executive; who must communicate with the employee within seven days of the employee's appeal. Stage three, is operationalised when a worker is still unhappy with the chief executive officer's decision upon which a Disciplinary Committee is constituted as a final option with the establishment. An employee retains the option of taking the matter to the Industrial Relations Court should the three stages not resolve the matter, from the worker's perspective (TimesPrintpak/ZUJ, 2008: 11).

Therefore, despite that macro level constitutional rights condition the formulation of *employee privileges* this is where the definition of *worker rights* is held to be distinctive from the general concept of *rights*. Edwards (1993: 28-29) elucidates

that worker rights are legitimated claims or privileges that an employee possesses '*as a result of being an employee and that the employee may exercise as protection from the established workplace governance*'.

The right to a minimum wage for example would have no meaning for the self employed, retirees or foreign tourists, he notes. Framed against constitutional rights, worker rights have one salient characteristic: dismissal from the workplace or expulsion from the group (union) may result in the loss of those rights. The threat to worker rights is hence more pronounced than *citizen rights* because democratic constitutions rarely allow for the withdrawal of formal citizenship.

Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that ZUJ has indeed introduced change to the print media from a *worker rights perspective* and in *economic terms* as a result of the democratisation process. The range of benefits that media professionals now in enjoy, and which were denied them under most of the one party era, are quite distinct in this regard.

It is also certain that the competitive pressures of the country's liberal market have forced the state to also offer competitive salaries and conditions of service to the public service, which by extension has also rewarded journalists working in government departments.

Lamentably, the union has failed to co-opt either wider membership from within the public sector or from the rather unstable private sector media.

Its membership drive is compromised by its strategic limitations, the autonomy of the labour market, the economic instability of the private print media and the insecurity of their owners; the prevailing suspicions between state sector and private sector journalists, and the lack of alignment between the ambitions of broadcasting and public sector peers, with the aspirations of ZUJ.

ZUJ has been, and continues to be, a union for print journalists on the *Times Newspapers and the Zambia Daily Mail*. While the union can be hailed as a direct

product of liberalisation and democracy, it appears not to have mustered the means to marshal support from a wider base of media professionals, given that it has been in existence for the past 18 years without much change to its membership diversity and profile.

In this sense, the name of the union, while projecting homogeneity amongst journalists, does not reflect its character in practice. It remains to be seen how ZUJ progresses beyond its current limitations.

Ominously, early indications from the experience of trade unionism under liberal democracy, may suggest that the privatisation of the state media might just contribute to ZUJ's decline or collapse, if trends in the private sector of opting for casual labour were to persist.

From a strategic standpoint, what can be gleaned from examining ZUJ's track record in negotiations with the two major government dailies is that it has used collaborative approaches defined in the ERT, and collective action which forms the central thrust of the LPT.

On the evidence of its actions and agreements, it can also be deduced that the ZUJ has effectively combined the two tools to good effect.

Given the consistency with which collective agreements are signed, on average, every two years, it can be said for example that ZUJ conforms largely to the tenets of the ERT: favouring *negotiation* and *dialogue* with the managements of the *Times* and *Daily Mail*, to leverage change in the livelihoods of its members. There are four principal areas in which ZUJ can claim success, that are apparent:

- The right to form unions (recognition by management).
- Due process (consensus based grievance procedures, recourse to Industrial Relations Court, as part of collective Agreements).

- Fringe benefits and privileges (enshrined in collective agreements, which include repatriation, funeral, education, car allowances, housing, Christmas bonuses, medical schemes).
- Gender Equality (which also includes specific reference to the *Times* as an equal opportunity employer, which will not discriminate on any other grounds: race, sex, marital status, religion, political opinion, tribal extraction or social status (TimesPrintpak/ZUJ, 2008: 1).

It does however tend to revert to LPT methods from time to time: the strike in 2007 brought it into direct conflict with the state and the *Times of Zambia* management. The mass demonstration against the Media Bill in 1997 also illustrates this perspective to ZUJ's strategies. Therefore, it can be noted that the notions of *resistance* and *conflict* characteristic of LPT are also evident in the union's approaches. From the LPT perspective, the areas that the union appears to actively pursue are related mainly to the promotion of *freedom of speech*. Administrative structures on the *Times* constrain free expression leading to the regular sacking of editors. However, judicial recourse has worked in at least one case involving acting managing editor Arthur Simuchoba which shall be explained in section 5.3.9 of this chapter. While mass action has prevented inimical legislation from reaching parliament in several instances, it has not led to state acquiescence to the privatisation of state media systems, yet.

In essence, one of ZUJ's main challenges is in its relations with the state: Its leaders are state employees, and while they appear to be better placed agitating for change while occupying lower scales in their respective organisations, their potency is certainly quite easily neutralised through promotions into management, which by law, excludes them from unionism.

As Kapata (2011/02/21) <sup>35</sup>notes:

*“...Recently a member of ZUJ who was also a senior member of staff with the Times of Zambia was retired at a very young age for being critical of government – ZUJ has failed to have him reinstated”.*

On the other end of the spectrum, the arm of the state becomes more pronounced when one casually examines the range of options that state sector journalists may enjoy as a result of being loyal to their employer such as appointment to the diplomatic service, senior government positions and to the presidency as press assistants. In the past 10 years at least 8 journalists from the state press and the ZNBC have landed appointments in diplomatic positions in Africa, Europe and the Americas.

This is good from the personal development point of view but perhaps not beneficial for the self esteem of journalism as an occupation that is purportedly designed to foster accountability, particularly since there is no publicly known criteria suggesting how the candidates for the foreign service are selected (other than the perception that they are party loyalists).

The union might also need to address the matter of intellectual capacity to effectively engage government as a collective, given that journalism is constantly accused of not resembling, to the barest minimum, the features of an established profession, that is, higher qualifications, high public esteem, codes of ethics and practice and self regulatory mechanisms that can lend it some modicum of public confidence.

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<sup>35</sup> Kapata refers to the retirement of Andrew Sakala, news editor at the time of his retirement and former president of PAZA. Sakala was, at the time, a member of the management of the *Times*, having been promoted in 2010. Technically, because of this promotion into management, he was no longer considered a union member.

### **5.3.8 ZUJ, PAZA and press freedom imperatives**

ZUJ, as other media formations, cannot however be accused of not attempting to formalise ethics and codes of practice. The history of such attempts is well documented (Makayi, 1997: 25) as are its opposition to state schemes to license and punish journalists through legislated media councils (CPU, 1997:1-3).

In fact, while ZUJ can be said to have a fairly formidable capacity to negotiate conditions of service for media workers, its press freedom credentials are not without merit either, albeit with some inconsistencies over the years<sup>36</sup>.

Much of the work the union has undertaken in this area, has been in collaboration with other, perhaps more activist orientated formations, such as the Commonwealth Press Union (CPU) Zambia Section, the Media institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Zambia Chapter, the PAZA and the Zambia Media Women's Association (ZAMWA).

The most underplayed intervention by ZUJ in terms of press freedom and unionism is perhaps the defence it launched in support of the dismissal of Arthur Simuchoba from the position of acting managing editor of the *Times Newspapers* by the state in 1995 for undefined company performance related charges. Simuchoba had cultivated a strong image as a fearless editorial writer, unflinching in his attacks on the presidency and cabinet, quite uncharacteristic of his immediate predecessors.

The state's first response was to restructure the *Times* and the *Daily Mail*, introducing the position of managing director, a higher designation to that of

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<sup>36</sup> It is worth underlining here that the benefits of being a ZUJ member, from the fore-going, include legal aid support; relatively higher job security; and improved group rights which enable the expansion of communicative space as a collective. Conceivably, this means there is less dependency on the employer to determine the plight of journalists in a consistent fashion, but rather, there is an opportunity for ZUJ members to expose exploitation through a relatively insulated forum and more widely through marshalling extra muscle from the ZCTU.



managing editor. While it was not clear how they two positions inter-faced, it was certain that an amount of friction might occur.

Emmanuel Nyirenda, a former diplomat, senior civil servant and former editor of the *Mail*, was appointed over and above Simuchoba after his dismissal. It was the ZUJ that sprang to Simuchoba's aid and successfully defended him in the High Court, leading to his reinstatement. Simuchoba's contract was eventually terminated.

*'I was supported by the ZUJ who paid the legal costs. No reason was given for the termination and under the contract they were not obliged to give any reasons' (Simuchoba, 2010/09/03).*

Comparatively speaking, there is a marked difference between how journalism as a profession responded to the dismissal of editors in the First and Second Republics, when there was no media union or association, and in the Third Republic when there was ZUJ and PAZA.

The republican president of Zambia appointed eight (8) editors-in-chief on the *Times of Zambia* between 1966 and 1985. All were either dismissed or forced out (Kasoma, 1986: 87-119) without the benefit of organised support from peers, or any known media formations. On the other hand, the first editor to have his contract terminated under multiparty democracy received the legal and moral support from a nascent trade union in ZUJ, born of liberal democratic policies<sup>37</sup>. There is a fundamental difference here in terms of how labour suddenly intervenes against the actions of *state power*.

Prior to ZUJ's formation in 1992, PAZA, with the benefit of new leadership, had just succeeded in temporarily removing heads of the state media through a court

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<sup>37</sup> Excluding Bweendo Mulengela, former managing editor of the *Times* appointed by President Kaunda, who PAZA wanted out in 1991 and whose services were eventually terminated by the MMD administration upon pressure from journalists. On the otherhand, Simuchoba rose through the ranks and assumed the position of managing editor in an acting capacity and was therefore seen to be a legitimate professional candidate.

injunction on account of their bias against the MMD prior to the 1991 elections (Sakala, 2010/02/19). The leadership of PAZA had changed from the likes of Komani Kachinga, then editor-in-chief of the *Times of Zambia* to Richard Sakala, a lecturer from the church run Africa Literature Centre Journalism School. For the first time, PAZA had a president and an executive committee, who were not all state employees. Perhaps that, and the more open multiparty system ushered in 1991, might also explain the organisations more aggressive posture on press freedom matters.

Related to this, what needs to be defined here is that the membership of ZUJ and PAZA overlap. Essentially, PAZA's membership is founded largely on workers from the *Times Newspapers* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*.

However, it has managed to extend its tentacles, without opposition, to the public service and the *ZNBC*, *ZANA*, *ZIS*, *the Mirror* and *NAIS* presumably because it is not a union and therefore is not in competition with any entity in that category.

In exploring the relationship between ZUJ and PAZA one is certain that the former has benefited from the experience and 'press freedom per-degree' of the latter and other media professional associations such as MISA - Zambia, and the CPU Zambia section at the time.

PAZA was formed in response to the state's intention to create a legislated association of journalists. Despite the formation of PAZA in 1982, the state still attempted to create a legislated media council in 1986. When this failed, the state moved to pass a PAZA Act which would have had punitive effects on media professionals. The intent was eventually overtaken by political change in 1991 (Makayi, 1997: 22).

Ironically, it was under the multiparty system that the media began its most extended battle to prevent state sanctions and controls through a legislated council. The attempt in 1995 by Chiluba's administration to introduce the Media Council of Zambia was opposed both through the judicial system, led by PAZA,

and through mass action, led by a coalition of associations which included CPU, PAZA, ZUJ, MISA and ZAMWA (CPU, 1997: 3).

A law suit by Professor Francis Kasoma, representing himself and other members of *the Press Association of Zambia V the Attorney general* sought to quash the decision by the state to enact a Media Council Bill (Matibini, 2006: 23).

Kasoma's High Court applications were based on the following grounds:

- The MCZ Act was not in furtherance of freedom of association, expression or of the press.
- The decision was made in bad faith because it aimed to control journalists rather than promote the good of the profession.
- The applicants were not consulted in rendering that decision.
- The establishment of the MCZ would harm journalists.

The announcement to parliament of the state's aim to regulate journalism by president Chiluba in 1997 provoked the first organised demonstration by journalists in Zambia (CPU, 1997:3). The CPU, PAZA, ZUJ, MISA and ZAMWA created the Media Liaison Committee (MLC) headed by former *Times of Zambia* assistant editor and first editor of the *Weekly Post*, Robinson Makayi. The state's threats were largely understood to be aimed at the private owned press, particularly, the *Weekly Post*, which was regularly exposing graft within state circles.

ZUJ and PAZA mobilised more than 100 journalists from the state media while MISA drummed up support from the private press. The joint demonstrations were widely publicised. On 22 August, 1997, then High Court Commissioner Anthony Nyangulu, having considered that the state's actions would negatively affect the freedom of journalists to assemble and associate and its inconsistency with the provisions of the constitution, halted the government's decision (Matibini, 2006: 23-26).

This was a major landmark in the history of journalism in Zambia, signalling for the first time, that democratisation, whatever its shortcomings, had opened avenues for the furtherance of employee rights and freedom of expression.

Consultative meetings and forums organised by the CPU brought the associations, lawyers and activists together with deputy minister of information and Broadcasting Services, Ernest Mwansa at the Zambia Institute of Mass Communications, 11-22 August, 1997 culminated in the proposed formation of a non statutory Media Council (CPU, 1997: 1-3).

Subsequent efforts by MISA Zambia working with PAZA have led to the continuation of these efforts leading to the formation of the Media Council of Zambia (MECOZ), launched formally on 11 July 2004, headed by retired Judge Kabazo Chanda. But MECOZ neither had the endorsement of media enterprises, the state, nor the financial means to be sustainable. Its legitimacy to sanction media heads or indeed claim to represent all media interests was sharply brought into question by government ministers (Matibini, 2006: 29-31).

Although these efforts at strengthening MECOZ continue to this day, the body faces many intricacies one of which would be to inculcate a culture of self regulation amongst journalists. Some of the key efforts by MISA, PAZA and ZUJ working together have succeeded in achieving the following:

- The development of a document on media law reform which formed the basis for launching counter motions for public broadcasting.
- Agitating for the creation of an *Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA)*.
- Campaigning for the repeal of the *Zambia Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) Act*.
- Agitating for the promulgation of a new *Broadcasting Act*, and;
- Campaigning for the enactment of a *Freedom of Information Act*.

Taking advantage of a strengthened opposition presence in parliament after 2001, the media associations used Members of Parliament (MPs) from the United

Party for National Development (UPND), the Heritage Party (HP), UNIP, the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), among others to present a private members motion for the enactment of a *Freedom of Information Act* and the creation of an *IBA* and repeal of the *ZNBC Act*. Upon notifying the Clerk of the National Assembly on 30<sup>th</sup> July 2002, the associations learnt that the state had initiated similar action (Matibini, 2006: 49).

Dithering on the bills by the Speaker of the National Assembly, on account of the financial costs to be born by the state, stalled the introduction the bills which had already been gazetted.

The state out manoeuvred MISA, PAZA and ZUJ by merely amending the ZNBC Act to remove broadcast licensing powers from the minister of Information and Broadcasting Services and ZNBC, and transferring them to the functions of the IBA.

The amendment also relinquished the powers of the minister to remove a director of ZNBC without cause or consultation. The board can however remove the director without the minister's consent (Matibini, 2006: 49).

Promising efforts at introducing a *Freedom of Information Bill*, which would, if enacted into law, allow citizens access to information held by the state, fell by the wayside in 2004, owing to state delays. State officials, in arguing against the bill, elevated concerns for national security over rights to information (Matibini, 2006: 122-123).

While campaigns by PAZA, MISA and ZUJ have born results which were previously inconceivable in the one party state, it is evident that the ruling party remains a powerful actor despite compromised numbers in parliament by the party in power at any one stage. This has been demonstrated in the way both the Speaker of the National Assembly has responded to private members motions and the indirect manner with which the state had undermined those initiatives, that is, by crafting similar legislation but with vital omissions.

## 5.4 OPPOSITION TO VAT ON NEWSPRINT

One of the most recent contributions of ZUJ to the wider media development project has been its joint opposition with PAZA, ZAMWA, and the Press Freedom Committee of the Post Newspapers (PFCP), MISA-Zambia and the Society for Senior Zambian Journalists (SSZJ), to the attempted increase by the Mwanawasa administration in taxation on newsprint.

Banda (2004: 44-46) has aptly documented the challenges of sustainability faced by the private sector media, much of which revolves around the high taxes on editorial inputs. At the time of Banda's study, Value Added Tax (VAT) on newsprint, printing ink, chemicals, films, plates and other requisites attracted a 17.5 % VAT rate. Newspaper advertising space was also targeted for VAT (excluding funeral related advertising).

Arguing that newspapers 'serve a democratic function in society', the media associations protested at the finance minister intended raise of VAT on newsprints and other inputs.

*"Instead of imposing taxes on the newspaper and magazine industry, the government must be proposing special incentives for the growth of this rather sleepy industry. For a population of 10 million, the current circulation levels are dangerously too low", (Media, 2006: 3).*

Again the associations presented their concerns in a joint statement dated 2 March 2006, to the Parliamentary Committee on Estimates. The key areas of argument were:

- That the cost of production would increase and affect the cover price of newspapers. The result would be a loss in 25% sales which would also harm government revenue from VAT.

- Job losses would result from reduced newspaper incomes affecting Pay-as-You-earn (PAYE), Corporate tax, excise duty on imported materials and Withholding Tax (WHT).
- Media institutions would further downsize distribution of products, which was already low.
- New taxes would inhibit any hope of growth in the troubled newspaper industry.

Contesting the Minister's assertion that the media industry was profitable, the associations underlined their point by referring to the viability (or lack of it) of the state media systems:

*"It is an open secret that both the Times of Zambia and the Zambia Daily Mail are just breaking even rather than making profit. Neither of them has declared a dividend to government, which is a majority shareholder, in many years. If the industry is profitable, why are they not declaring dividends?"(Media, 2006: 4).*

The increase never happened. The spectre of costly newsprint and other publishing inputs has haunted attempts at developing and sustaining privately owned media before. *Weekend World*, an entertainment inclined newspaper established by the ZNHL in 1978 barely survived a year, partly due to a lack of its own printing facilities.

The *Sunday Post* (1982-1983) blamed its demise on 'powerful forces' that had denied it newsprint. The *Sunday Drum*, started by Sikota Wina, previously the first African to own his own newspaper back in the colonial era, also failed for similar reasons (Kasoma, 1986: 177-183).

What is striking though is that since multiparty democracy in 1991, journalists have increasingly lobbied opposition parliamentarians and civil society as allies in their bid for increased communicative space.

On more than a single occasion, the judicial system and parliament have been used either to advance an agenda, as in the IBA and Information bills cases, or to oppose state actions that are seen to be inimical to press freedom.

As noted in Chapter Four, such actions were unheard of in the Second Republic, therefore underlining the notion that Zambia, while appearing to regress in some respects, demonstrates the impulse for democratisation as exemplified by the gradual proliferation and influence of media associations:- and a union in ZUJ.

## **5.5 CONCLUSION**

The fore-going underlines the momentum gained by the ZUJ from political and economic liberalisation, even as larger and older union formations struggled to maintain unity amidst diversity in a challenging new environment.

Generally, trade union-state alliances forged at critical periods of political transitions since Zambia's independence have been compromised over time by differences concerning economic policy.

While in the First and Second Republics relations between the ZCTU and the UNIP administration worsened with the poor performance of the economy, the period following the victory of the MMD in the 1991 multiparty elections exhibited much sharper impacts on working populations. The MMD's privatisation and liberalisation policies began to catalyse a decline in the influence of labour, which rendered the once formidable movement largely ineffectual in checking executive excesses.

Politically, the liberalisation of politics by President Kaunda in 1990 led to the emergence of new political parties and encouraged the formation of governance - based civil society organisations which claimed some of the space previously occupied by labour as the sole opposition to the state under the one party regime. Economically, the reforms implemented by the MMD caused mass retrenchments



and reluctance by new investors to unionise their workers, leading to a decline in union membership countrywide.

The liberalisation of the labour market also stimulated interest groups within the ZCTU to breakaway and form their own apex bodies. The FFTUZ was the result of divisions and a direct response to the liberalisation of the labour sector. The influence of labour unions as a united force under ZCTU noticeably declined thereafter.

Ironically, these developments enabled the ZUJ to emerge as a union for media professionals, after years of uncertainty among journalists occasioned by their uneasy, coerced, membership to the TWU and NUCW, both of which had no recognisable agenda that could be aligned to the ambitions of journalism.

It is clear however, that ZUJ is challenged by many factors, including the nebulous nature of the occupation of journalism, the disparities in education levels and backgrounds and low self esteem among media professionals, among others things. ZUJ nonetheless, has demonstrated the relevance of a union in the media sector through the several collective agreements signed with the managements of the *Times* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*, which have markedly improved conditions of service and salaries since 1994.

These actions speak more to the translation of *stated rights of freedom of association* into *concrete rights* within the realm of state media systems. The developments would, also, likely contribute to greater self esteem amongst media professionals serving in the state sector.

Previously under the now defunct NAMECO, the state owned umbrella body which controlled the operations of both the *Times* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*, media professionals relied on management to improve their conditions - which the conglomerate did to a degree. These *enterprise rights* did not however include the legal protection implicit in group memberships (Edwards, 1993: 29).

ZUJ has employed both the ERT and the LPT in approaching and pressuring management and the state in improving conditions of service as well as defending editors, reporters and championing media law reform along with other formations, such as PAZA, MISA-Zambia, the CPU-Zambia, ZAMWA, SSZJ and the PFC. The use of *collective action* is pronounced in the political aspects pursued by ZUJ, working with PAZA, MISA-Zambia, ZAMWA, CPU and others.

Apart from strike action characteristic of LPT, undertaken in 2007, which invited alleged intimidation from management and the state, ZUJ appears to have adopted an ERT approach to its bargaining strategies in most instances.

What is perhaps salient when one compares the Second Republic to the Third, is the use of avenues for redress that union formations and association adopted when aggrieved by state actions. The ZUJ successfully defended, in the High Court, the first managing editor to be sacked by the MMD administration in the post liberation era.

It can be noted therefore that while rights of freedom of expression and freedom of the press, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution's Article 20(1), Article 20(2) have not been positively experienced by state media journalists because of tighter pre-censorship frameworks under democratisation, freedom of assembly and association held in Article 21(1) have had substantial impacts in terms of their manifestation within the organisational setting of the *Times*. The exploitation of *groups rights* have taken root inspired by the liberalisation of the labour market. Collective action born of emergent unions has been used as a cover to address the loss of communicative space.

The legal defence staged for Arthur Simuchoba, the acting managing editor of the *Times* in the early 1990s; the public demonstration against the introduction of the media bill and cross sectoral actions demanding constitutional and institutional reform underline this point.

Edwards (1993: 28-29) is emphatic in distinguishing *worker rights* from *civic rights*. Despite that fundamental human rights of expression and association are gained from constitutional provisions, worker rights are enjoyed by virtue of being an employee and their protection result from processes of workplace governance.

He asserts that worker rights can also be lost upon termination of employment while a citizen's constitutional or statutory rights are rarely withdrawn.

*'Because of this limitation, how effectively a worker can exercise his rights will usually depend upon such diverse factors as the tightness of labour markets, the presence or absence of unions, employers' commitment to workers' rights, the degree of governmental resolve to protect workers' rights, and employers' option for organising production elsewhere'(Edwards, 1993: 29).*

Nord's (1993: 341) insistence on *struggle* to translate *constitutional rights* into *concrete rights* is also underscored here.

ZUJ, along with other sister media agencies, has forged alliances with opposition MPs, civil society and international organisations to pursue their common agenda on expanding communicative freedoms, with a measure of success. One of the most notable is the introduction of private members motions on bills relating to access to information and independent broadcasting.

Now Zambia has, though still to be implemented, an IBA and has seen changes to the ZNBC Act, reducing the powers of the minister to dictate all proceedings on the board of the national broadcaster. These actions might also inform future strategies on how the state owned print media's boards of directors might be fashioned.

What the preceding discussion and analysis of ZUJ has clearly illustrated, is that the impact of democratisation on state media systems can be understood from the labour perspective, in terms of the changing livelihoods of journalists and the

potential for labour to continuously claim the space to catalyse change in that regard. It can also be demonstrated by the milestones in pushing and achieving tangible legal reforms that would have long term impacts on media developments in Zambia.

The question remains however, whether ZUJ can indeed sustain itself as an effective union given that its members continue to depend on government for promotions to higher offices, which disqualifies them from unionisation, and of course are also eligible for the incentive of prestigious appointments to diplomatic or senior government positions. There is a genuine risk to the ZUJ leadership pre-occupying themselves with drawing the attention of authorities in government to be aware of their pedigree, for potential consideration of an appointment abroad for instance, than to purposefully pursue the risky proposition of engendering change. It is also noteworthy that ZUJ does not appear to have mustered how to garner membership from amongst public workers and private sector journalists.

Opposition from rival unions and subtle reluctance from the state; and resistance from private investors, are said to contribute to limiting the union's membership interventions. However, the limited capacity of ZUJ to organise beyond the realm of the two state dailies is confirmed by the lack of change in its membership status in 18 years of its existence. The union, going forward, needs to diversify its membership to remain competitive in a liberalised labour market. The emergence of a union for broadcast journalists may portend good or ill for the place of ZUJ in the union milieu, in this regard.

Finally, collective action by the media unions and professional associations had seemingly stalled state intentions to upwardly adjust VAT on newsprint. Taxation is certainly one of the most potent weapons the state can currently employ to undermine the growth of the print media. Already troubled by a range of inhibiting growth factors, all print media in Zambia are confronted by the harsh proposition of liberal philosophy: - to swim or sink.

Whereas in this chapter the emphasis was on the impact of market and labour liberalisation on trade unionism and employee welfare, and how this affected the *Times Newspapers* (and the media environment in general in Zambia), the next chapter, begins to interrogate the commercial implications of economic liberalisation and privatisation on the *Times Newspapers'* commercial profile.

## CHAPTER SIX

### THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION ON THE TIMES NEWSPAPERS' COMMERCIAL PROFILE

#### 6.1 INTRODUCTION

What is unravelling in this thesis thus far is the manner in which *state power* and to some degree, wealthy foreign interests, through out the First, Second and Third Republics have influenced the evolution of the print media in Zambia.

This process began with carefully nuanced efforts at nationalisation in the late 1960s. A nationalist government challenged by administrative frailties, ethnic tensions, security concerns and under development, crafted a trajectory that prioritised unity and development over political democracy.

The mass media were seen as central to this development project and were hence gradually absorbed into a state corporate structure. The case of the *Times Newspapers*, demonstrates that this was by no means easy to accomplish. In the absence of resources to purchase all the existing media entities, the government of President Kenneth Kaunda elected to enter into a co-ownership arrangement of the *Times*, with the multinational Lonrho, which survived until 1982.

The commercial significance of this oversight framework rests in the fact that it was managed well enough to mask the filters that determined what the public heard. The *Times* was able to criticise the party and government officials but not directly attack President Kaunda or Lonrho's Tiny Rowland, nor expose any substantial dealings they had with Rhodesia and South Africa for instance. Therefore, the framework not only enhanced the image of the newspapers in political terms, it also elevated it in commercial terms.

*“Media freedom also leads to positive benefits for the everyday needs of social organisation. For instance the credibility of any news and information supplied is largely dependent on confidence that it is not unduly or secretly influenced by partisan or vested interests, of government, advertiser, proprietor, source etc” (McQuail, 1996: 72).*

Over time however, as state influence became more obvious and as editors lost their jobs for crossing the line, the *Times* began to experience a down turn in fortunes, exacerbated by deteriorating economic conditions in the late seventies and eighties.

The advent of the second phase of liberal democracy in 1990 brought a new set of challenges as fresh entrants into the market, such as the *Weekly Post*, and a receding state corporate structure signified the coming of competition.

This section of the thesis reinforces the argument that despite democratisation, the state continues to play a significant role in shaping the media industry in Zambia by maintaining ownership of the major mass media, determining the cost of editorial inputs, regulating participants in electronic broadcasting and driving a media and information policy that marginalises popular participation.

As Price and Krug (2002: 14) have written, the media structure that materialises in any society *‘is usually not an accident’*. Even with democracy, the state can influence media growth by using its purchasing power to advertise only in those media that are supportive of its policies. State subsidised media could also undercut private competitors in a liberalised market, they argue. The aims of the chapter therefore are the following:

- To explore the impact of liberalisation and privatisation on the commercial aspects of the *Times Newspapers*.
- To unpack the key causes of readership decline on the *Times*.
- To identify the main sources of revenue for potential sustainability of the *Times*.

- To understand the nature and extent of state support to the *Times Newspapers*, if any.

## 6.2 METHODS

The discussion in this chapter is mainly the result of a literature study and analysis of key documents related to the topic of the research. The chapter is considered relevant to the study as it seeks to demonstrate, within the tenets of political economy, how economic forces, driven by changing political regimes, have shaped or influenced the commercial trajectory of the *Times Newspapers*. The discussion comprises this researcher's interpretation of recent, unpublished, market surveys commissioned by the *Times Newspapers*, and independent reports on advertising trends in Zambia. The second aspect of this chapter analyses the company's response to its market survey by interrogating the contents of its strategic plans, financial statements/audit reports, official communications and the substance of interviews with the management of the *Times Newspapers and former editors* conducted by this researcher. The import of document reviews and key informant interviews therefore is used to support the tenets of the political economy of the media, especially as applied to developing countries, in this case the *Times of Zambia*. This approach is consistent with *idiographic research* strategies and the use of multiple sources of data aimed at achieving *convergence*; that is, bringing varied forms of data to bear on variables of interest. As this researcher has already explained in section 1.5.1 of Chapter One, this method can allow for *generalizability* to be achieved through *pattern matching* and *explanation building*, by demonstrating the linkages between findings in this study with the results of other studies. In addition to the findings emanating from interviews by this author therefore, the original inferences and conclusions drawn from the synthesis of related data in this chapter are also based on, and derived from, the following principal documents:



- Tailoka, f., Mwiya, B., Phiri, J., Kabinga, M., & Musonda, M. E.2008. *Times of Zambia Readership Survey Report*. Lusaka: TimesPrintpak.
- Africa Media Ventures.2008.*Market feasibility of a business, economic and socially – orientated newspaper publication: The case of Zambia and Malawi*. [SI] Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa.
- Lolojih, P. (2005) *Summary results, round 3 Afrobarometer survey in Zambia*. Pretoria: Idasa.
- *Times Printpak (Zambia) limited, revised strategic plan 2003-2005*. Lusaka: TimesPrintpak.
- *Times Printmaker Zambia Limited Strategic Plan, 2009-2012*. Lusaka: Times Printpak.
- *Times Printmaker Zambia Limited Strategic Plan, 2009-2012*. Lusaka: Times Primped.
- Synovate.2009.*Category spends review, 2007-2009*. Lusaka: Synovate.

### **6.2.1 Structure of the Times Printpak in the post liberalisation era**


Ahead of the discussion on the commercial aspects of the *Times*, it is important to briefly reiterate that following misunderstandings between chief executive officers of the sister companies of the *Times Newspapers, Printpak (Zambia) Limited* and the *Newspaper Distributors Limited (NDL)* in 1993 over unpaid dues to each other (referred to in section 1.1.2 of Chapter One), the minister of information consolidated the companies under one management structure headed by a managing director. In 1997, the board of directors approved a new management structure with three key divisions. The Production Division was headed by a director of operations (reporting to the chief executive) and comprised, the Works Department, Advertising and Commercial Department and the Circulation Department. The Service Division was headed by the chief executive (managing director) and comprised the Accounts and Human Resources Departments. The third and last division, constituted the chief executive and the Editorial Department (features editor, business editor, sports editor, political and Sunday editor, reporters and sub-editor. The division of

interest to this chapter is the *Operations Department* which embraces the advertising, circulation and commercial functions of the entity. Since the merger, the core business of the *Times Printpak* has had five strands:

- Newspaper publishing and distribution.
- Advertising.
- Printing of commercial stationery, calendars, and industrial labels.
- Book publishing.
- Courier services.

At the time of the study, the *Times/printmaker* employed 280 staff complemented by 76 casual workers. Its main activities were located in the Zambian capital Lusaka, and Ndola, situated in the country's industrial hub.

**Figure 8: Times Printpak (Zambia) Limited Operations Department**



**Source: Times of Zambia (2010).**

### **6.2.2 Background: Socio-economic conditions**

It is Banda (2004:7) who makes the case for the sustainability of the media following the liberalisation of the economy in 1991 by the market oriented MMD government. Decrying poverty, the fact that 80 % of Zambians survived on less than a dollar a day by the turn of the century, Banda doubts that there are many Zambians who could afford to purchase a newspaper on a regular basis in the present day.

The *Times Printpak (Zambia) Limited's* Revised Strategic Plan of 2003 to 2005 also laments 'the significant drop' in sales volumes of the newspaper 'as a result of eroded buying power of the readership, a consequence of closed companies and retrenchment of those in formal employment' (Times/Printpak, 2003-5: 5).

Other official documents and independent studies in the last 18 years underline the impact of the IMF's Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) on human development in Zambia contextualising the incapacitation of the Zambian workforce (Global Policy Network, 2001: ZHDR, 2007).

The Africa Media Ventures (AMV) and Open Society Institute of Southern Africa (OSISA) study of 2008 also identifies low levels of disposable incomes, non availability of state-of-the-art technological infrastructure and poor reading cultures as some of the key problems afflicting the newspaper industry in Zambia (Africa Media Ventures/OSISA, 2008: 56).

In fact, the Zambian government's own media policy for 1996 concedes that the print media in the country are constrained by declining per capital income of the readership, poor capitalisation; illiteracy; inflation, poor communication infrastructure and high cost of newsprint (Zambia, 1996: 14).

Consequently, the newspaper industry has not registered any quantitative growth in the recent past (Tailoka, Mwiya, Phiri, Kabinga & Musonda, 2008: 21).

The significance of this point rests in examining the historical profile of the case being studied, the *Times Newspapers*, framed against prevailing socio-economic conditions. For instance, the *Times* boasted a circulation of more than 60,000 copies daily between 1974 and 1982. The *Sunday Times of Zambia* produced 71,093 in 1979 and 63, 941 in 1982 verified through the Audit Bureau of Circulations (ABC) (Kasoma, 1986: 113).

This can, perhaps, be explained by the presence of 70,000 economically empowered white expatriates in the post independence era, who constituted the readership of the *Northern News*<sup>38</sup>, the forerunner of the *Times*(Kasoma, 1986: 78).

Compared to the 20,000 daily circulation which today officially represents the daily outputs for the *Times and the Post* and the 12,000 copies for the *Zambia Daily Mail* (Zambia, 1996: 6), the numbers associated with the *Times of Zambia* and the *Sunday Times of Zambia* in the First and Second Republic, raise serious concerns about newspaper sustainability in the Third Republic.

As indicated in section 5.2.8 of Chapter Five, Chiluba's market driven policies generated mass retrenchments not only eroding trade union membership bases but also creating a new category of 'poor' in the thousands of retrenches, retirees and lowly paid public and private sector workers (Banda, 2004: 7). Banda suggests that after years of enjoying the benefits of the country's copper wealth, Zambia's middle-class experienced radical changes to their lifestyles, noticeable from increasing poverty by the turn of the century.

The Zambia National Human Development Report for Zambia (ZHDR, 2007: 69), published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), underscores this point by indicating that, compared to eight countries of similar human

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<sup>38</sup> The Central African Mail (Now Zambia Daily Mail) was a weekly serving 2.5 million Africans, who conceivably had a weaker buying potential. The Northern News circulated 21, 388 daily while the Central African Mail produced, 20,000 weekly in 1965 (Kasoma, 1986: 113).

development profiles, Zambia had performed the worst in almost 30 years between the period 1975 and 1985.

Zambia's *Human Development Index (HDI)* - the composite indicator that measures human progress by gauging education attainments, life expectancy and health, and material wellbeing - grew at a slower rate than the other eight countries up to 1985. The studies showed that the HDI value declined sharply to the extent that it exceeded the 1975 levels.

*"The global Human Development Reports have noted that no other country among 79 countries with data to allow the calculation of HDI, since 1975, has experienced that kind of reversal" (ZHDR, 2007: 69).*

Although it is acknowledged that the socio-economic environment began to deteriorate under the reign of UNIP, from 1973 to 1986, the country slid faster after the implementation of the market orientated policies by Chiluba's MMD in 1991 (Global Policy Network, 2001).

The ZHDR however reveals that the country has experienced a turn-around in HDI since 1994 with sharper increases from 0.451 to 0.462 being registered between 2000 and 2004. The steady increases in HDI which ranked Zambia only second to Morocco in the 1999-2004 periods have been attributed to sustained growth in the economy from 1999, achievements in health reforms, gains in education and strong responses to communicable diseases.

The ZHDR report asserts that the rise in Zambia's human development index is largely attributable to the consistent seven year growth in the economy between 1999 and 2005, which was accompanied by an 18.9 % increase in per capita income. Growths in construction, wholesale and retail trading and mining account for the improvements. Investments in mining resulted in 60 % increases in copper production from 256, 884 metric tonnes (MT) in 2000 to 410,971 MT in 2002. Cobalt also rose by 80% from 3, 538 in 2000 to 6,390 in 2004. Increases in

agricultural output and in non-traditional exports have also made important contributions to the turn - around (ZHDR, 2007: 75-80).

This was during the reign of the late President Levy Mwanawasa who exhibited a *technocratic leadership style* (Mazrui, 2007:3), marshalling immense donor confidence with his zero tolerance for corruption until his death in August, 2008 (Shacinda, 2008, 19 August:1).

By 2004, extreme poverty in rural areas declined from 71% in 1998 to 53%, while per capita GDP rose from K234, 933 to K276, 416 in the same period. Disappointingly the overall rise in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita at an average 2.7% is rendered insignificant when the country's population growth rate is factored in.

*“It is thus not surprising that poverty between 1998 and 2004 dropped slightly from 73% to 68% despite this growth. It has thus been suggested that for a significant impact on poverty, the Zambian economy needs to grow constantly at a rate higher than 7 %”*( ZHDR, 2007: 75).

By 2007, therefore, the Zambian economy was not buoyant enough to empower the citizenry to support a wide range of new and old publications on a daily basis. Taking all this into account, this section of the thesis explores the strategic response of the *Times of Zambia* to the dual reform process catalysed by the MMD. The readership characteristics, preferences and public perceptions of the *Times*, framed in commercial terms, constitute the main ingredients of the discussion.

### **6.2.3 Liberalisation and the Times of Zambia**

In general, the advent of democratisation has led to the encroachment of the state on principal media enterprises over a 45 year period. Despite what appears to be positive steps in liberalising the media sector, it is increasingly evident that the state's maintenance of high taxation on newsprint and other editorial inputs is

a primary factor in inhibiting quantitative print media growth. In some cases, overt political actions have led to the demise of promising private initiatives. For example, the reasons for the failure of Second Republican newspapers such as the *Sunday Post* and *Weekend World* were a combination of poor planning, bad economics and a modicum of political hostility (Kasoma, 1986: 195), in the case of the former.

Moreover, it has been inferred from the exposition in Chapter Four that the newspapers that were not allied to the state could simply not survive the First and Second Republics, except for the *National Mirror*, which had the benefit of assistance with newsprint donations from the German and Norwegian-based churches (Kasoma, 1986: 120-136).

In this regard, the covert use of *state power* to undermine the competitiveness of private media entities has been recognised as a problematic of democracies in the recent past (Price & Krug, 2002: 14).

The case of the *National Mirror* and *The Post* demonstrate this. Due to its incessant criticism of the UNIP leadership, the *Mirror* was subjected to politically instigated *economic censorship* through a denial of advertising from State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). The Chiluba administration deployed similar strategies against the *Post* through the first ten years of MMD rule. Richards and Murphy (1996: 21-22) define economic censorship as when advertisers use their economic influence to act as unofficial censors of the press.

The practice changed with the ascendancy to power of Levy Mwanawasa (Banda, 2004: 86) who extended state advertising to the *Post* and other privately owned media. This spell was short lived with the demise of Mwanawasa in 2008 and the rise of Rupiah Banda, whose disputed election brought him into direct conflict with the *Post*.

The *Times of Zambia* on the other hand, despite being critical of state policy in many instances in the First and parts of the Second Republics, did not



experience a withdrawal of SOE advertising support. The logic, already demonstrated in Chapter Four, is that the class alliance between Kaunda's administration and business elites in Lonrho insulated it from punitive actions of this nature. The state and Lonrho could after all, settle any disagreements with editors administratively.

The Kaunda - Rowland relationship expressed through what has been termed by this thesis as a *state-corporate control model* also enabled a cautious balance between the *Times Newspapers'* coverage of politics and its marketisation. This model, by all indications, had a notable measure of commercial success but was not sustainable over time as state controls resulted gradually in editorial timidity and subsequent loss of credibility.

In the last three years of the Second Republic (1989-1991), the state ensured that all print media came under the *National Media Corporation (NAMECO)*, while the electronic media answered directly to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS). The *Mirror* as a result remained the only *constant* through this period.

The MMD administrations have behaved much in the same manner as their UNIP predecessors in restraining state media since their ascension to power in 1991. Zambia's history is therefore replete with the use of *state power* to structure the media industry, despite democratisation.

The sum effect of this seems to be a harsh rendering of public assessments of state media in particular. Historically, one notable development was that the state take-over of the *Central African Mail (now Zambia Daily Mail)*, earned the newspaper the sobriquet '*government gazette*' (Simuchoba, 2009/10/02), making it susceptible to negative public perception and potentially undermining its competitiveness in a relatively small market.

In recent times, successive studies by the Afrobarometer in 2005 (Loloihi, 2005): and in 2009 (Ismail, 2010/10/06) have demonstrated continued discomfort by


Zambians with the notion of state control of the media, the nature of political reporting and state of the country's democracy in general. It stands to reason to assume that the decline of the *Times of Zambia* in circulation terms at least is not only to be linked to *socio-economic factors* but also to increased negative perceptions over time of its *lack of credibility* as a newspaper: The latter being a consequence of political interference (Kapata, 2011/02/02).

The Afrobarometer surveys of 2005 (referred to in section 1.2.4 of Chapter One) show that the state media in Zambia experience relatively less public confidence than their private competitors. The result of this would presumably be not only to weaken the newspaper's sales but also dampen the morale of advertisers.

The relatively weaker perception of the state owned media in the Afrobarometer survey can partly be explained by the state's deliberate positioning of the apparatus as a counter-weight to the privately owned press. There seems to have been no discernible ambition by the state to strategically modernise operations or enrich the quality of the product in this respect as a response to the challenge of the *surviving* private press.

The 2009 survey by Afrobarometer in Zambia (Ismail, 2010/10/06) correspondingly shows high public support for a *watchdog* media model. Figure 9, shows how 75% of respondents favour a media that investigates and reports on corruption and mistakes by government, against 16% who prefer a more cooperative press. Only 8% did not agree with either position or simply did not know what to say. The Afrobarometer study underlines the dissatisfaction by the public with media content at the moment.

**Figure 9: Afrobarometer on Zambians' preferred media model**



**Source: Ismail (2010/10/06).**

Similarly, a readership survey commissioned by the *Times Printpak Zambia Limited* in 2008 (Tailoka, Mwiya, Phiri, Kabinga & Musonda: 2008: 21) argues empirically that the state owned media have not diversified their political reportage in the post liberalisation era, surrendering space to the private media particularly the *Post* and the *Weekly Angel*, which have given a platform to alternative voices. A market survey sponsored by OSISA also found that 84.6 % of respondents preferred the *Post* over the *Times* or the *Daily Mail* (AMV/OSISA, 2008: 34) due to the former's relative depth. By all indications, the lack of ingenuity has characterised the state media's commercial response to a liberalised environment since 2001.

On the contrary, the *Post's* business strategy has enabled it establish an educational supplement targeting teachers and pupils, supported by the Business Development Services (BDS) project of the International Labour Organisation(ILO).

Funding injected into the *Post* facilitated the exploration of new markets amongst small to medium scale businesses. The privately owned daily also introduced colour printing <sup>39</sup>and purchased its own printing press, improving its advertising appeal and circulation. The competitive market has seen the *Post* overtake the *Times* as the most widely read newspaper in Zambia ((Tailoka et al: 2008: 21).

The *TimesPrintpak Readership Survey (2008)* which administered 2000 questionnaires to readers from Lusaka, Kitwe, Ndola, Mufulira, Luanshya, Kalululushi and Chingola found that approximately 50 percent of the readers *do not purchase* the *Times of Zambia or the Sunday Times*, while 18 % *no longer purchase* either of the two papers. Cumulatively, 68 % of the readership does not buy the state owned papers (Tailoka et al, 2008: 8).

In terms of *participation* - defined here as the proportion of the population purchasing the newspaper - therefore, it can be asserted upfront that the majority of the reading public does not participate in the *Times Newspapers*.

In hindsight, the immediate impact of democratisation on the *Times Newspapers* in commercial terms was first to propel it into a leading position as the most credible information vehicle: subsequently, it succumbed to a complex oversight framework fashioned by the presidency and Lonrho to manage its content amidst a period of political upheaval in Southern Africa but retained a fair amount of commercial and editorial freedom; ultimately, it was fully colonised by the state, which prioritised propaganda over profitability. The company has since been perceived by the public as an entity lacking credibility.

The twin policy characteristics of democratisation - political and economic liberalisation - found the *Times* unable to respond strategically to new competition particularly the *Post Newspapers*. Government restraints on content meant that

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<sup>39</sup> It has to be said, that the *Zambia Daily Mail* also purchased colour printing facilities during the same period underlining the sense that there was no common strategy for sustainability for the state print media initiated by government.

the creative capacity or indeed the incentive for creativity amongst the company's planners was likely undermined.

#### **6.2.4 The 2003-2005 Times/Printpak Strategic Plan: A post liberalisation response**

According to official company records, the decline in the circulation of the *Times* was openly noted by the *Times* management in 2003. The chairperson of the *Times* Board of Directors at the time, Miss Joyce Muwo, acknowledged that the company was being overtaken by technological advancements and new entrants to the market and needed to 'reinvent itself' (Muwo, 2003: 2).

*"We have to change to meet the expectations of our clients. What we did in the past and how we did it in the past is not what will make us what we ought to be in the future. We have to change our culture as an organisation, we have to change our behaviour, we have to change our image in order to survive the competition from both local and foreign news and publishing houses. Failure to embrace change and the way we do things may result in our organisation disappearing from the face of the earth like many organisations have done"* (Muwo, 2003: 2).

The *Times Printpak Strategic Plan* (2003-2005) shows that *Printpak* had begun to experience sustainability problems because of liberalisation and globalisation. Generally, the expansion of markets from South Africa gradually edged out poorly equipped Zambian competitors. At least 12 local Zambian printing firms lost business to South African competitors. Liberalisation and globalisation, hence, presented a local and foreign perspective to competition in the following manner:

- The clients that previously assigned their work to *Printpak*, were at liberty to import South African goods.
- *Printpak* clients began to subcontract their work to South African printers that had superior quality.

- The advent of computer technologies virtually ‘killed’ Printpak’s stationary printing contracts.

The immediate economic effects of liberalisation on the *Times Newspapers* appear to have been under-estimated, however. In 2003, the *Times* management surprisingly believed the paper still retained its ‘loyal readership’. Although it noted a significant decline in sales, the company felt then that it was ‘a market leader’ and that its fortunes would be reversed as the economy improved (TimesPrintpak, 2003: 5).

Some of the first signs of trouble for the *Times/Printpak/Newspaper Distributors formation* were the intra company conflicts of 1993. As noted in section 1.1.2 of Chapter One, the *Times Newspapers and Printpak* operated managerially as semi-independent companies, since the days of Lonrho. However, the structure was further complicated by the takeover of the media entities by NAMECO. The subsequent restructuring led to the appointment of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for each of the subsidiaries-the *Times Newspapers, Printpak Zambia and Newspaper Distributors Limited (NDL)*.

All three CEOs reported to the managing director of NAMECO. *Printpak* owned the printing machinery and building in Ndola and provided printing services to the *Times* at commercial rates. The returns accounted for 10% of its income. 85-90% of Printpak’s revenue came from printing food labels, calendars, boxes, stationary, cartons and books (TimesPrintpak, 2003: 4).

Following the NAMECO takeover of the state media, NDL were constituted as a subsidiary firm with its own general manager. The *Times* subcontracted the distribution and sales of its newspapers to NDL at 32% commission.

After the liquidation of NAMECO by the MMD, the subsidiary companies operated essentially with three centres of power, and without a central fulcrum. This was made more evident in 1993 when conflict flared up amongst them over delayed payments. The NDL ‘misapplied’ the funds from newspaper sales and failed to

transfer them to the *Times*. The *Times* in turn failed to pay *Printpak* which had to print the newspapers daily. Owed K250 million by the *Times*, *Printpak* threatened to halt the printing of the paper, prompting the minister of information and broadcasting services to convene an emergency meeting on 22 March, 1993. The minister presented a political solution to a business problem: he merged the companies under one directorship. The CEO of the *Times Newspapers*, hereafter became the managing director of *Times Printpak (Zambia) Limited* (*TimesPrintpak Revised Strategic Plan, 2003-5: 4*).

### **6.2.5 *Times* - State 'informal relationship' in the Third Republic**

The financial burden carried by the *Times* into the Third Republic, upon the dissolution of NAMECO in 1991, is revealed in the company's financial statements for the year ended 31 March 2003 audited by MT Ncube and Associates: In 1993, the government loaned the *Times* K3.7 billion<sup>40</sup> to pay the United Technical Equipment Company (UTEC) of South Africa for outstanding payments in newsprint. The *Times* repaid the amount half yearly over a three-year phase after a one year grace period. The last amount of K622, 274,182.10 was paid on 6<sup>th</sup> January 2000 (*Times Printpak Limited Financial Statements, 2003: 14*).

Essentially, Banda (2004)'s suspicions that the state media's endurance may be explained by undeclared government subsidies is somewhat validated – to an extent. For, it must also be noted that the amount extended to the *Times* by the state was designated as a *loan*, which was repaid eventually.

'*The belief is that these companies can generate their own funds*' the current Managing Director, John Phiri indicates in an interview with this researcher (Phiri, 2008).

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<sup>40</sup> Since the *Times* paid a total sum of K622, 274,182.10 twice (2) in each year for three (3) years, we can estimate that the total debt amounted to ZMK 3.7 billion or K 3, 733, 645, 092.6 (K622, 274. 182.10 x 2 x 3). Note: Calculations by author.

Phiri (2008) describes the economic relationship between the state and the *Times/printmaker* as 'informal'. The nature of support depends largely on who the permanent secretary in the ministry of information and broadcasting services is. During elections in particular, government support takes the form of the purchase of extra motor vehicles to improve national coverage.

However, there are other forms of support that begin to substantiate this notion of subsidies more succinctly: For example, during the privatisation exercise, the state instructed its parastatals, the *Zambia National Wholesale Company (ZNWC)*, through the *Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA)* to sell its building worth K200 million to the *Times of Zambia*. The state made a down payment of K70 million, while the *Times* met the difference (Phiri, 2008/05/09).

Were the *TimesPrintpak* a private entity, it might probably have failed to survive the first three years of liberalisation. The *Times* could not borrow from the banks because of lack of audited accounts during the period.

The structural and financial problems presented one of the company's most significant challenges. Relating to this, the strategic plan for 2003-2005 aggregates the weaknesses as follows:

- The company has not replaced old printing machinery.
- The workforce was bloated but could not be retrenched because of the financial commitments involved.
- The market for newspapers and other products had become more competitive.
- Unemployment due to poor economic performance had eroded readership levels.
- Political trends (presumably dictated influence on content).

To redress this state of affairs, the *Times* strategised to reduce its wage bill by trimming its workforce through early retirements, retrenchments and applying a freeze on employment. It opted to strengthen performance appraisals, training



and evaluations in order to maintain only the most qualified of staff. Its commercial strategies were as follows:

- To increase income from commercial printing from K326 million to K504 million by 2005.
- To achieve profit before tax of K500million by 2005 (expansion of commercial printing being a major consideration).
- To increase pagination of the two newspapers to 20 pages on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays by 2005 (with aggressive marketing by advertising personnel).
- To print 200,000 text books, 400,000 exercise books by 2005
- Increase circulation to 20,000 by 2005.
- Improve quality of newspapers and editorial content by 2005 (purchase state of the art equipment, vehicles, re-open offices in Kabwe and Livingstone, broaden rural coverage).
- To increase courier tonnage (expansion by aggressive marketing).

The strategic objectives set by the 2003-2005 plan were only partially met. One of the key highlights of the plan was the 73% annual turnover from the first year to the last. The plan failed to reduce pay roll costs which doubled during the period 2003-2006(TimesPrintpak, 2009: 13). In addition, Phiri (2008/05/09) concedes that:

- The company lost a lucrative account from a telecommunications firm due to its failure to print in colour.
- Institutional subscriptions continued to be compromised due to the demise of privatised companies.
- The company was not able to increase its newspaper distribution vans from 10 (or less) to cover the entire country.
- Circulation in 2008 had dropped from 20,000 to 10,000 daily because readership often shared one copy amongst “100 people” (a manifestation of hard economic times).

The fundamental goals set by the 2003 to 2005 plan were not hence substantially met. Following that, management commissioned an independent study to empirically unveil and articulate the company's position in the liberalised market.

#### **6.2.6 The 2008 Times Printpak Readership Survey: Understanding the impact of political and economic liberalisation on the commercial aspects of a state media enterprise**

*“Times newspapers has responded (to the effects of liberalisation) by commissioning a Readership Survey and, arising out of the reading of its recommendations, fashioning a three-year strategic plan aimed at attaining sustainability and later making a profit”(Phiri, 2009/11/20).*

The *Times Printpak Limited Readership Survey of March 2008* was the first independent study commissioned by the company to assess its commercial performance in the post liberalisation era. The findings of the study undertaken by the Copperbelt University (CBU) School of Business address the following key elements:


- Newspaper buying dynamics.
- Readership characteristics.
- Usage and rating of *Times* products.
- Satisfaction with paper content and size.
- Relation between education levels of readership and overall satisfaction.
- Overall rating of the *Times*' quality compared to competitors.

The study used questionnaires administered to 2000 respondents from Lusaka, Kitwe, Ndola, Mufulira, Luanshya, Kalulushi and Chingola. 1761 of the questionnaires were returned complete. Secondary data was collected from official documents from the *Times* and published works.

### 6.2.7 The newspaper and advertising sales paradox

The decline of the *Times Newspapers*, once a leading media entity in the country, manifests in the significant reduction in sales between 2000 and 2007. During this period the survey reveals that annual sales fell from 211,907 to 111,963 (figure: 10). The largest decline in sales (16.2%) occurred between the years 2000 and 2002, which coincides with the introduction of colour printing by the rival *Post Newspapers* (Tailoka et al, 2008: 26). What is perhaps surprising is that while the newspapers experienced a sharp drop in sales, their advertising and courier services registered unprecedented increases (Figure 11)

**Figure 10: Annual Newspaper sales from 2000 to 2007**



**Source: Tailoka et al (2008: 25).**

In nominal terms, advertising sales increased from ZMK 4,315 million to ZMK 18,029 million between 2000 and 2007. In percentage terms advertising increased by 33 % during this period.

Explaining this dichotomy, Tailoka et al (2008: 27) surmise that the news market and the advertising market are two distinct spheres.

On the one hand, consumer preferences caused the newspapers to lose ground to the *Post*. On the other end of the spectrum, subsequent improvements in the economy during the reign of President Levy Mwanawasa (2001-2008) catalysed advertising sales. The advertising volume in terms of square centimetres increased by a mere 15% during the period of the study (2000-2007), with the lowest level being 914000 square centimetres and the highest being 1202,000 square centimetres. The Average per year was 1266,000 centimetres. The company also experienced an increase in nominal courier sales between 2000 and 2007, which rose by an incredible 1000% in nominal terms. In real terms the courier sales rose by 300%. The inference by the survey is that courier sales have registered a marked increase over time. It is plausible also to interpret these findings from a different perspective. It has been established from Afrobarometer studies (2005) for instance that the state owned media have received lower approval ratings than the private press, largely because they are seen to be extensions of the state propaganda machinery.

The disapproval has also been inferred from Afrobarometer studies in 2009 (Ismail, 2010/10/06) where respondents favoured a *watchdog* model of the press. Therefore we may understand the influence of political liberalisation in terms of readership resistance to *unidirectional* messaging. The presence of private media alternatives facilitates choice and on the strength of perception alone, one concludes that Zambians would rather spend their hard earned money on a newspaper without *overt* state influence.

Tailoka et al (2008: 30) hypothesise that the *Times of Zambia* faces competition from other state owned media, radio, television and the *Zambia Daily Mail*, because they all project similar government sentiments.

Therefore a public that is economically challenged and has had prior exposure to state radio and television news will be highly unlikely to purchase a national newspaper that is predictably going to publish analogous official news.


The survey also concludes that institutional entities continue to purchase the *Times of Zambia* to glean official policy pronouncements from government and to seek business opportunities. This assertion is underscored by the OSISA market survey of 2008 which alludes to the notion that readers largely purchase the state media newspapers because of their interest in employment advertisements, cell phone packages from transnational corporations such as MTN, CELTEL and CELL Z (OSISA, 2008: 41-51). News content is evidently the least likely reason for attracting readers.

The OSISA study reveals that respondents surveyed preferred business to any other news. And of the three dailies, the *Post Newspapers* were adjudged to have had the better business offering.

Banda (2004: 32) on the other hand suggests that *globalisation* has also affected the Zambian newspaper market: South African newspapers such as the *Mail and Guardian* and Botswana's *Mmegi* have regionalised exposing the elite section of Zambian society to multicultural genres from across borders.

The advent of pay satellite television such as Multichoice Zambia adds to the demise of the local press as African news is transmitted regularly through a variety of international channels. It has been estimated that only 37.10% of the population read newspapers in Zambia while 50% listened to radio and 36% had access to television (Tailoka et al, 2008: 30). The advertising market is undeterred by these perceptions, it would seem from the *Times* readership survey.

**Figure 11: Advertising sales in 2000 constant kwacha '000**



**Source: Tailoka et al (2008: 27).**

A possible explanation would be that dedicated institutional advertisers that have close links to the state might be wary of being seen to advertise in (and therefore support) a private media entity, such as the *Post*, that is overly critical of the government, ahead of the safer option, as the *Times*. This assumption shall be tested in section 6.2.8 by analysing advertising trends in Zambia between 2007 and 2009.

### **6.2.8 Comparing advertising trends by Multinationals and SOEs in the Times, Daily Mail and the Post**

To respond empirically to the stated assumption, it is useful to examine trends in print advertising in Zambia between 2007 and 2009. The purpose of this is, firstly, to identify which companies are the top spenders in the print media advertising. Secondly, to establish whether the assumption that companies allied to the state would more likely advertise in the state owned media.

It would be interesting to note, for instance, where the SOEs in the top 10 category place their advertising: that is, whether they prefer the state owned media over the privately owned entities or vice versa. The logic will be extended to private companies and multinationals.

According to the Synovate review of advertising trends in Zambia during the 2007-2009, the top 10 spenders on print advertising included SOEs, Zambia Telecommunications Company (21% share of spending) and the Zambia National Commercial Bank (11%), and government departments such as the Road Transport and Safety Agency(5%). Multinational companies were the most competitive spenders: MTN Zambia (18%), Zain Zambia (14%), and Multichoice (12%). Financial institutions, Barclays Bank (6%), First National Bank (4%), were less significant (See table 6 below). The largest spender on print advertising during this period hence, was the SOE ZAMTEL followed closely by MTN (Synovate, 2009: 11).

**Table 6: Top 10 print spenders, December 2009 (Synovate, 2009: 11)**

<b>Company Name</b>	<b>Spend in ZMK</b>	<b>Share of spends</b>
Zambia Telecommunications	<b>177,688,371</b>	<b>21%</b>
MTN Zambia	<b>148,662,378</b>	<b>18%</b>
Zain Zambia	<b>121,949,408</b>	<b>14%</b>
Multichoice Zambia	<b>102,994,946</b>	<b>12%</b>
Zambia National Commercial Bank	<b>92,237,104</b>	<b>11%</b>
Barclays Bank	<b>51,635,122</b>	<b>6%</b>
Road Transport	<b>42,525,006</b>	<b>5%</b>
Golf view Hotel	<b>40,565,710</b>	<b>5%</b>
First National Bank	<b>37,372,580</b>	<b>4%</b>
Radian stores	<b>32,830,920</b>	<b>4%</b>
Total Spend in ZMK '000	<b>848,461,545</b>	<b>100%</b>

When the data is disaggregated, amongst the three daily newspapers: *The Post*, the *Times*, the *Daily Mail*, and the two weeklies, the *Monitor & Digest*, and the *National Mirror*, we begin to understand which medium is most preferred holistically.

Table 7 shows that the *Post Newspapers* are the market leader in advertising with an average of 54.3 % advertising over three years (57% in 2007; 50% in 2008; 56% in 2009). The *Zambia Daily Mail* averages at 27.3% over the same period (25% in 2007; 33% in 2008 and 24% in 2009), while the *Times* is third at 14.7% (13% in 2007, 13% in 2008, 18% in 2009). *Times Printpak* Managing Director John Phiri confirms that the company has lost ground to the *Post* and the *Daily Mail* mainly because of its failure to print in colour. The telecommunications companies in particular insist on colour printing. The *Times* has tended to outsource its colour printing which is costly and unsustainable over time (Phiri, 2010/08/24).

**Table 7: Print Advertising Spending Trends, 2007-2009 (Synovate, 2009: 6)**

Print Media	Jan-Dec, 2007	Jan-Dec, 2008	Jan-Dec, 2009
Post Newspapers	57%	50%	56%
Zambia Daily Mail	25 %	33%	24%
Times of Zambia	13%	13%	18%
National Mirror	0%	1%	1%
Monitor & Digest	4%	4%	1%

At this point it is important to reflect more substantially on the chapter's assumption that companies allied to the state will likely place the adverts in the state owned newspapers, and less so in privately owned entities.



A breakdown of ZAMTEL expenditure on television, radio and print advertising begins to relay a pattern that could be instructive here. Figure 12 below shows that the SOE ZAMTEL/CELL Z spends disproportionately on the state owned media. ZAMTEL spent 39% of advertising resources on the *Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)* in 2007, 64% in 2008 and 30% in 2009. The trend in expenditure has been consistently high. On average, ZAMTEL spent 44% on television advertising in the state owned broadcaster. Comparatively, it spent a mere 1.7% on the privately owned MUVI television. To be fair, ZNBC radio reaches 50% of the Zambian population and television 36% (Tailoka, et al, 2008) while MUVI TV is restricted to Lusaka, the capital and can only be accessed through subscriptions elsewhere. ZAMTEL could quite easily argue that these trends are logical from a business perspective.

However, when we examine the trends in the print media, we observe here too, that the *Zambia Daily Mail* and the *Times of Zambia* receive a disproportionate share of advertising from the ZAMTEL/CELL- Z, the largest advertiser in the print media. The *Zambia Daily Mail* carried an average 25% of ZAMTEL advertising in the print media between 2007-2009 (28% in 2007, 20% in 2008, 27% in 2009). The *Times of Zambia* got a 14.6% share over the same period (13% in 2007; 8% in 2008; 23% in 2009).<sup>41</sup>

*The Post Newspapers*, which have been confirmed as the most widely read newspapers in Zambia received a meagre 2.6% average in advertising from ZAMTEL/CELL Z. Significantly, no advert was placed in the *Post Newspapers* by ZAMTEL in the year 2008.

It seems unlikely that ZAMTEL<sup>42</sup> has considered the complexion of the readerships of the dailies and therefore assumes its target group is better served by the *Times*. This is because, from the *Times Printpak (Zambia) Limited* study of 2008, it can be inferred that the three dailies are essentially serving the same

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<sup>41</sup> Averages calculated by author.

<sup>42</sup> At the time of writing this thesis, ZAMTEL had been sold to Libyan investors. It is yet to be seen whether these patterns will change over time.

market. It is reasonable therefore to conclude that ZAMTEL/CELL-Z may have political reasons for not advertising through the *Post*.

**Table 8: Zamtel/Cell Z all media SOS January 2008, to December 2009 (Synovate, 2009: 32)**

Media share spend %	Jan-Dec, 2007	Jan-Dec 2008	Jan-Dec, 2009
ZNBC Radio 2	4%	4%	6%
ZNBC Radio 4	8%	3%	3%
Phoenix FM	0%	0%	3%
QFM	0%	0%	3%
Total Radio	13%	7%	13%
MUVI TV	2%	1%	2%
ZNBC	39%	64%	30%
Total TV	40%	65%	32%
Post Newspapers	3%	0%	5%
Zambia Daily Mail	28%	20%	27%
Times of Zambia	13%	8%	23%
Monitor & Digest	4%	28%	55%
Total Print	47%	28%	55%
Total Exp. ZMK,000	24, 595	9,541	38,469


Growth by month

-61%

303%

The dispersal of advertising by ZAMTEL/CELL Z in 2009 shows the disproportionate nature of allocation of resources to the three dailies. The *Times of Zambia* is the largest beneficiary at 53%, *Zambia Daily Mail* second at 25% and the *Post*, a distant third at 2%.

**Figure 12: ZAMTEL/CELL Z by Print SOS DEC 09**



**Total share of ZMK 177,688,000 increased by 99% from November 09**


**Source: Synovate (2009: 36).**

When one compares the preferences of ZAMTEL to those of its multinational competitors, particularly, MTN, the second highest spender on print advertising (18%), the picture is reversed. Figure 13 (below), demonstrates that MTN exposes its products through the *Post Newspapers*. In fact 89% of all of its print advertising goes to the *Post* while only 7% and 4% are targeted at the *Mail* and the *Times* respectively. It can also be noted from the same study that Zain, the third top spender in the print media advertising category (18%) prefers the *Post* (19%), to the *Zambia Daily Mail* (11%) or the *Times of Zambia* (3%). Infact Zain had completely migrated to the *Post* by the end of 2009 with 100% of its print advertising dedicated to the *Post Newspapers* (Synovate, 2009: 22-26). One could argue that MTN's preferences are likely market driven. This can be corroborated by the findings of the *TimesPrintpak Readership Survey*, which places the *Post* ahead of the *Times* and *Mail* in terms of readership preferences and circulation. The AMV/OSISA study confirms this categorically: the corporates

interviewed in this survey favoured the *Post* (40%) over the *Daily Mail* (33%) and the *Times* (27%) as their preferred publication for advertising (AMV/OSISA, 2008: 59).

Follow up interviews with the managing director of the *TimesPrintpak Zambia Limited* by this researcher confirm that the state and its parastatals enterprises continue to be the main advertisers in the *Times Newspapers*. Phiri (2011) indicates that ZAMTEL, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi Airways, ZESCO, ZRA, Road Development Agency, Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and ZANACO have been the biggest spenders on advertising in the *Times* between 2009 and 2011. Of these, it can be noted, only Airtel, MTN and Zambezi Airlines are privately owned companies. Seven of the top ten spenders are SOEs or government ministries.

**Figure 13: MTN by Print SOS Dec 2009**



**Source: Synovate (2009: 31).**

### **6.2.9 6.2.9 Readership characteristics and newspaper preferences**

In the endeavour to understand the changing fortunes of the company in the post liberalisation era, the *Times Printmaker Readership Survey (2008)*, as stated earlier, interviewed 1,761 respondents: 56 % from Lusaka province and 44% from the Copperbelt (Tailoka et al, 2008).

The sample constituted 65% males and 35% females, signifying a bias toward womenfolk. 7.6% of the respondents were aged below 20 years, 49 % between 20 and 29; 27 % between 30 and 39 and 12 % between 40 and 49 years. 5.6% were 50 years or older.

In terms of their education standards, 52% had a college qualification, 23% were grade 12 level 19% held a university degree, and 6% had not attained school certificate level. It is inferred in the survey that 94% of people in Lusaka and the Copperbelt are literate.

It was found that 50% of the respondents did not purchase the *Times or Sunday Times*. 18% had ceased to purchase the *Times Newspapers*, all together. Only 32% of readers purchased the newspaper. The reasons advanced were: inadequate information (46%), political bias (24%) and prohibitive pricing (19%).

Readers also relied on their employer to purchase the papers (8%), presumably shared across several employees. 2% had no access to the newspaper while 1% complained the product arrived late on the market.

The findings suggest the *Times* has not catered for the 20-49 year age group, 88% of whom complain that there is not enough information in the product. This is the same age group that has the highest number of respondents citing political bias as the cause for disfavoursing the *Times*. The survey deduces that this is probably because this age cohort is the most politically active and therefore concerned about content with heavy government flavour. 75% of the 20-39 year

olds do not buy the *Times* because of the cost - a pointer to their relatively modest levels of income.

**Table 9: Reasons for not or no longer buying Vs level of education (Tailoka et al, 2008: 40)**


		Age					Total	
		Under 20	20 - 29	30 - 39	40 - 49	above 50		
Reasons for Not Buying	Inadequate Information	Count	29	197	87	36	15	364
		% of Total	3.7%	24.9%	11.0%	4.6%	1.9%	46.0%
	Political Bias	Count	4	96	63	22	8	193
		% of Total	.5%	12.1%	8.0%	2.8%	1.0%	24.4%
	Employer Buys	Count	3	33	20	5	5	66
		% of Total	.4%	4.2%	2.5%	.6%	.6%	8.3%
	unaffordable	Count	13	92	23	13	12	153
		% of Total	1.6%	11.6%	2.9%	1.6%	1.5%	19.3%
	No access	Count	2	7	2	2	1	14
		% of Total	.3%	.9%	.3%	.3%	.1%	1.8%
	Late Delivery	Count	0	1	0	0	0	1
		% of Total	.0%	.1%	.0%	.0%	.0%	.1%
Total		Count	51	426	195	78	41	791
		% of Total	6.4%	53.9%	24.7%	9.9%	5.2%	100.0%

It was found further that 79% of the potential readers who cited political bias as a reason for not buying the newspapers, had a college degree while 77% of those concerned about price possessed grade 12 certificates or college degrees, presumably also reflecting a lack of income or inadequate buying power. The survey reveals that the more educated people demand better content.

Hence, the respondents with university degrees exhibited the least satisfaction with the content of the *Times* (30%).

Diploma holders stood at 36%, Grade 12 certificate holders 43% and under grade 12 respondents had the highest satisfaction rate with the content at 56%.

**Figure 14: Relationship between education levels and content satisfaction**



**Source: Tailoka et al (2009: 73).**

Some of the key improvements recommended by potential readers include:


- Independence from government control and balanced reporting.
- Coverage of development issues; health education, youth matters.
- Coverage of religious issues (worth recalling that Zambia was declared a Christian nation by Chiluba and has Catholic, protestant and evangelical influences across cultures).
- Science and Technology coverage.
- Lifestyles and profiles (rural coverage, business personalities, individual accounts of success etc).
- Gender reporting (which takes into account the disparate needs of men and women).
- Opinion columns (essentially suggests public participation in articulating the political, social and economic).

The readership calls for a change in the papers' size, design and emphasise the use of colour to render the product more attractive. It is also certain that the

majority of the readers (63.93%) do not think the product is worth what it costs at the moment, that is, ZMK3000.

What is even more fascinating about this survey is that the proportion of people who read the *Times* is higher (62%), than the proportion that buys the *Times* (31.70%). Implicitly this means the readership largely rely on shared copies bought by family members, employers, libraries, or simply use the internet.

**Figure 15: Proportion of Readers who read the Times**



**Source: Tailoka et al (2008: 49).**

The survey in essence shows that the *Times* is read largely in the office environment (42%), at home (28%), libraries (19%), news stands or street (8%) and Internet (3%). In short, the newspapers are losing revenue to free reading, owing to a combination of economic pressures on the consumer and a lack of content based incentives to spend on it.



Perhaps a pointer to the viability of a content - driven newspaper industry may be drawn from the conclusions of both the OSISA study and the *Times Readership Survey* which drew demands for diversity in news content.

A cross section of corporate institutions interviewed in the OSISA survey supported the idea of a business orientated newspaper with specialised analysis on mining, agriculture, transport and tourism, energy and the environment (AMV/OSISA, 2008: 59).

In other words, the state media could capitalise of this lacuna and claim a much larger segment of the market.

#### **6.4 SUMMARY**

To summarise, it is noted from five key studies (Afrobarometer, 2005 & 2009: Banda, 2004: Tailoka et al, 2008 and AMV/OSISA, 2008) that the main problems afflicting the *Times Newspapers* are the declining per capita income of the readership, the political bias of the newspapers; its limited range of content and the antiquated printing equipment and designs. The entry of more innovative publications (such as the *Post*) upon liberalisation in 1991 has relegated the once leading daily to second position or worse. Inferentially, the consequences of economic liberalisation have contributed to the reluctance of the readership to spend on a product that does not generally meet their needs.

This researcher's follow-up interviews complement the findings of the Synovate 2009 study by categorically establishing that the bulk of the *Times of Zambia's* advertising emanates from the state and its agencies. The biggest spenders in the last three years (2009-2011) have been: ZAMTEL, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi Airways, ZESCO, ZRA, Road Development Agency, the Ministries of Health and Education and ZANACO. Seven of these (excluding Airtel, MTN and Zambezi)

are state agencies or ministries. This cements the argument that the state is largely responsible for bolstering advertising profile of the *Times Newspapers*. The Synovate study of 2009 on advertising trends in Zambia also shows that the *Times* benefited largely from SOE advertising with the largest contributor being the state owned ZAMTEL/CELL Z parastatals in the 2007 to 2009 periods. This researcher's interpretation and analysis of this data suggests that ZAMTEL's advertising preferences of the *Times* and the *Mail* over the *Post* are likely determined by political allegiances. Conversely, the second largest spender in print advertising, MTN, allocates its advertising resources predominantly in the *Post*. The AMV/OSISA survey of 2008 leaves no doubt that corporate entities generally prefer the *Post* to the state owned dailies as outlets for their advertising because of better print quality and the elevated status in terms of market leadership of the privately owned entity. The disparities in the allocation of resources in both instances are huge. The challenges faced by the *TimesPrintpak (Zambia) Limited* can hence be aggregated around three thematic areas:

- The Political.
- The Operational.
- The Strategic.

#### **6.4.1 The Political**

*The political* dimension is the fundamental problem of the *Times Newspapers*. State control begins with the appointment of the CEO on the basis of political considerations rather than business - editorial credentials. This is the starting point of negative public perceptions and poor performance.

Secondly, the appointment process is shorn of transparency; there is a lack of representation of professional unions and associations; and other stakeholders on panels and boards of directors which clouds the candidate in doubt as to one's capacity and impartiality.

The high turn over of CEOs on the *Times* does not engender much public confidence in the institution, it can be surmised. The capacity and room for creativity seems largely subordinated to the overall political goal of promoting government pronouncements and policy.

We learn from both the *Afrobarometer* studies (Lolojih, 2005; Ismail, 2009) and the *Times Printpak Readership Survey* (Tailoka et al, 2008) that state control is detested by Zambians. It is the primary reason that those who would afford the newspapers do not spend on it. This intellectual middle class would constitute the basis of the country's opinion leaders in a closely contested political environment. The propaganda project that underpins state ownership in this sense self-destructs at best. The newspapers do hold some support from amongst the least educated people. But they are not economically empowered to *participate* in it through purchases. The *Times Newspapers* are essentially office-bound products where shared copies purchased by employers fulfil rudimentary informational needs that are not often news - content inclined.

The emphasis on political reporting constrains initiatives and exploration of other equally important spheres of human development, inadvertently under-cutting the commercial viability of the end product. The content and its relatively poor packaging account for a substantial amount of public resistance to the product, it can be noted.

#### **6.4.2 The Operational**

*The operational* aspects of the company will include its constantly changing structure and a lack of functional harmony with sister companies, the NDL and *Printpak*. Since the constitution of the *Times of Zambia* by Lonrho in 1965, there has been a tension with the structural arrangements, again influenced by *wealth* and *power*.

Because of the unusual partnership between Lonrho and the Kaunda government in the First and Second Republics, the *Times Printpak* had essentially *two centres of power*; reflecting the *oversight framework* that was imposed.

The general manager and chief accountant were answerable to Lonrho for the commercial performance of the company while the editor-in-chief assumed the role of political head, reporting to the president, and in subordinate measure, to the board.

And yet, the content and the quality of the product produced by *Printpak* are inter-related.

Controlling one without consideration of which one was a dependent variable, would likely have contributed to the eventual decline of the enterprise.

To be fair, this structure endured for longer than one would have expected, perhaps because there was somewhat a clearer editorial dictate from Lonrho in the First and parts of the Second Republic: *criticise the ruling party, not the president* (Kasoma, 1986: 93). This allowed for an intricate balance between producing a marketable product and being politically correct.

The takeover of the *Times* by the party UNIP in 1982 and later by the media corporation NAMECO, eventually changed the existing structure. NAMECO disaggregated *editorial production* from *printing* and *distribution*. Each component was headed by its own CEO.

The *Times* needed to pay *Printpak* to print the *Sunday Times* and the daily paper; in turn, NDL needed to be paid for its services.

The underlying tensions manifested in 1993 when misunderstandings over payment threatened to disrupt the publication of the newspapers.

The merger of the three NAMECO subsidiaries by the minister, in the aftermath of the liquidation of the parent company, might be considered prudent under the circumstances. However, there was a third problem: - failure to adjust to a changing socio-political - economic environment born of the MMD's dual reform agenda.

### **6.4.3 The Strategic**

The lack of a strategic sense and capacity is illustrated through the persistent poor quality of the product measured against its daily competitors. *The strategic* would include *the economics* of the newspaper in this regard.

Both the *Post* and the *Daily Mail* were able to acquire new colour printing facilities diverting some of the business monopolised by the *Times*.

It would make sense to assume that the tenuous nature of the position of CEO on the *Times* does not lend itself to fore-sightedness. There also appears no incentive or for that matter, communicative space for mid level editors and staff to engage with management on strategic issues, regarding commerce and viability.

From Chapter Five, it is noted that the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) has demonstrated its effectiveness going by the qualitative and quantitative increases in the remuneration of staff which are tethered to collective agreements. However, both ZUJ and the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) are not represented on the board of directors to effectively participate in the strategic direction of the company.

Strategic planning and financial accountability have been evidently poor, compromising both performance and credit worthiness. The end result has been that the *Times* has failed to exploit a market that is still potentially exploitable: the phenomenal growth of advertising and courier services are a pointer to the potential viability of the company. However, a poor strategic sense is, again,

noticeable. The 2003-2005 strategic plan for example continued to revel in the *Times* being a market leader (TimesPrintpak, 2003-2005: 5), without the benefit of empirical evidence, and at a time when the newspapers could barely circulate 20,000 copies daily.

A change of leadership in 2008 henceforth manifests a more evidence-based approach to assessing the company's weaknesses and strengths and in crafting solutions. The *TimesPrintpak 2009-2012 Strategic Plan* therefore, begins to show some urgency in resurrecting the company as a going concern.

Commercially, competition from other state media apparatus which carry similar pro-government news have etched into a market the company once dominated. Technologically, the *Times Newspapers* are out of their depth and have taken no distinct initiative to expand their electronic outputs in a technologically driven world.

Yet, with globalisation, satellite television, limited use of local private television and community radio outlets, the *Times'* reporting has been rendered irrelevant to some degree.

In the broader scheme of things, there is a convergence of opinion from the *Times* management (TimesPrintpak Strategic plan, 2003-5: 5) and independent researchers (Banda, 2004: 7), that the consequences of economic reforms generated a level of poverty that disabled the purchasing power of the citizen. With mass retrenchments came a new category of poor people who could hardly afford the leisure of a newspaper.

While it is certain that the economic collapse and public perception of the *Times Newspapers* has fundamentally contributed to their decline, there seems to be some hope for revitalisation given that the readership expect a wider variety of reportage to encapsulate development, science and technological advances and lifestyles.

What is perhaps most surprising is that the newspapers have seen an upsurge in the advertising sales and usage of courier services between 2000 and 2007.

This alone demonstrates that there is an institutional market that continues to consider them an important vehicle for business and possibly for gleaning government policy shifts and positions. Or more certainly, that dedicated SOEs, such as ZAMTEL/CELL Z, ZANACO, Road Development Agency, ZESCO, ZRA and government ministries have contributed significantly to the upsurge in the advertising revenues on the *Times Newspapers*, as part of state-driven sustainability initiative.

Similarly, there is a readership segment that uses the papers purely to seek knowledge on matters beyond the news; that is, job opportunities, family news, funeral notices, auctions and other such matters.

The impact of economic liberalisation is illustrated further by competition for *Printpak* from South African printers who are preferred by the market for their superior quality.

The lack of investment by the state in the media is self evident; the company has been unable to purchase a modern printing press due to financial problems and a low credit rating. State support appears to be extended only in the direst circumstances, or for electioneering purposes.

It has been proven from *audited financial statements* that the state absorbed the debt owed to South African printers by the *Times* but the records also show that the loan was *repaid* by the year 2000. Other forms of support, according to company management, come in the manner of extra vehicles bought for election purposes. The state has also assisted the *Times* to purchase offices in Freedom Way, in the capital Lusaka, relieving it of rental payments to landlords.

Given the fore-going, it is understandable that supporters of private media decry the unlevelled playing field that facilitates the continuance of state supported institutions while consigning emergent private newspapers to premature mortality.

Since the submission of the results of the Survey, the *Times* management has sought to begin the process of enhancing the company's commercial viability. In 2008, the company responded by producing the *Times Printpak Strategic Plan 2008-2012*. In the next section, we shall examine and analyse the content of the blueprint.

#### **6.4.3 How the *Times* responded to the Readership Survey**

The recommendations made by the CBU School of Business suggest an overhaul of both the newspaper's aesthetics and its focus and content. The main recommendations were:

- The introduction of colour to the newspapers.
- The *Times* must address perceptions of political bias.
- The *Times* needs to deliberately improve public awareness of its range of services which are under utilised.
- Quality, reliability and accessibility of the newspapers needs to improve
- Training of staff is needed to meet the challenges of the new market oriented environment.
- The company should commission studies to establish market share among players in newspaper advertising and courier industries to determine a baseline. Studies of this nature should be undertaken every two years.

The company's 2009-2012 Strategic Plan responds to the study with some clear cut intentions to improve its quality, reliability and accessibility. It also, for the first time, aims to exploit new opportunities outside of the country's borders and online publication and commerce. The strategy, in addition, emphasises more succinctly, the need to introduce more competitive salary structures including an



incentive scheme, upgrading of offices, improved intellectual and technical capacity of staff, acquisition of appropriate technologies and improved circulation of the newspaper. The overall corporate goal set in this strategy is to restore the *Times* to its position as a market leader. Some of principal areas that the plan addresses are:

- The acquisition of a modern colour printing press.
- Investing in electronic media (internet).
- Developing an electronic picture library.
- Distribution of foreign publications (through NDL).
- Expanding the company's printing business.
- Change perception effectively in the dissemination of government information, (engage specialist writers).
- Content diversification, including the introduction of new columns, puzzles, school quiz to cater for all categories of readership.
- Improve design by employing graphic and layout consultants (TimesPrintpak, 2009: 37).

In 2009, the time this researcher began to examine the commercial aspects of the company, it was learnt that the management had signed an agreement with Taiwanese firms in October of the same year to supply a new colour printing press costing \$2.3 million. The equipment was to be funded through a bank loan as opposed to government intervention (Phiri, 2009/11/20).

The company's managing director admits that the *Times* is increasingly losing ground to the *Zambia Daily Mail* and the *Post*, both of which had invested in colour printing equipment (Phiri, 2008). It is understood that with the new equipment will arise the need for better trained staff. Management acknowledges that not only are its printing methods and facilities outmoded, the printing and maintenance staff are poorly trained.

The 2009 strategic plan demands aggression from its circulations and marketing staff, the elements of which are to be provided through training.

*“One of the main reasons for the proposed training is the fact that the company needs (an) aggressive front to weather (the) competitive environment” (TimesPrintpak, 2009: 37).*

The costs of regeneration have not been quantified in the strategic plan and are therefore open to speculation. However, with elections approaching in 2011, it remains to be seen how far these new initiatives will proceed.

In closing, it is important to state that the ambitions of the *Times* in general need to recognise the dangers of tethering growth to increased readership and profit without an informed analysis of global trends which link commercialisation to a paucity of political content. As Mckenna (1995: 334) has noted, commercialisation often tends toward entertainment orientations rather than higher level technical analysis of political economic matters, thereby compromising the quality of the debates in society’s public sphere of communication.

## **6.5 CONCLUSION**

The fore-going signifies the recognition, that state controls have undermined the credibility of the *Times of Zambia*, a matter no longer subject to speculation given the empirical evidence of the *TimesPrintpak Readership Survey* (Tailoka et al, 2008) and the Afrobarometer studies (Lolojih, 2005: Ismail, 2009).

Since Zambia liberalised its economy in 1991, there has not been any evidence of a strategic plan that could re-position the *Times of Zambia* in a radically altered business environment. It took nearly 15 years for a notable proposition for transformation to be tabled by the company’s board of directors. The 2003-2005 Strategic Plan, however was crafted on the assumption that the *Times* was still the market leader, even as sales plummeted drastically.

The plan lacked any empirical basis for informed actions and appeared to regurgitate old-age formula for improving performance. For instance, there is no mention of tapping into new markets, or strategies around accessing alternative financial support to upgrade printing facilities. Nor is there any informed engagement with the use of technology in any substantial way.

The impact of liberalisation on the *Times Newspapers* is more pronounced when we consider what competition has wrought both in terms of contests for sales, advertising and printing. Advanced colour printing from South African competitors has rendered the offerings of the *TimesPrintpak* obsolete under the circumstances.

The company has, as a result, seen its traditional clientele migrate to South Africa or opt for local alternatives such as the *Post Newspapers* which have invested in relatively modern printing facilities.

Multinationals such as MTN have channelled 89% of their advertising to the *Post*, while the *Times* have consequently lost existing relationships with the rapidly expanding private cell phone industry.

The AMV/OSISA market survey of 2008 categorically confirms corporate preferences for the *Post Newspapers*, in this regard. More importantly, independent interviews by this researcher reveal that the state and its agencies have constituted seven of the ten top spenders in advertising on the *Times* in the past three years (2009-2011).

Therefore, were it not for the consistent support from the state and SOEs such as ZAMTEL/CELL Z in the post liberalisation era, it seems likely the *Times* would not only have lost all of its lucrative contracts from the competitive mobile technology industry, it would be in much dire circumstances.

On the whole, consistent support from ZAMTEL/CELL Z, ZESCO, ZRA, the Road Development Agency, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and

ZANACO confirms the assumption that the state (or its allies) can shape media growth through selective investment based on partisan considerations. The disproportionate nature of the investment by ZAMTEL/CELL Z into the print and electronic media indicates that it is inclined to supporting state owned enterprises as opposed to private entities, regardless of reputation or circulation. We learn from market reviews by Synovate that the *ZNBC*, the *Mail* and the *Times*, are the preferred outlets for ZAMTEL advertising. This is despite the fact that the *Times* has not been able to produce satisfactory colour products - by its own admission - for the last 19 years.

Conversely, in the whole of 2008, the ZAMTEL did not place a single advertisement in the *Post Newspapers*, despite the newspapers being the market leader by all indications. In the two years that it did advertise, it channelled less than 3 % of its resources to the *Post*. ZAMTEL, it was learnt during the course of this study, has since been sold to Libyan investors. Whether this pattern of advertising persists may depend on the political alliances and business considerations by the new owners.

In general the condition of the Zambian workforce; high levels of unemployment and poverty constrain the potential expansion and sustenance of print media systems in the country. The 2007 Zambia Human Development Report (ZHDR) produced by the UNDP underlines that the Zambian economy, while on the growth path, has not generated enough capacity to lift the 68% population out of acute poverty (ZHDR, 2007: 75).

In this regard, the financial limitations of the potential readership, ostensibly a consequence of economic reforms, has been echoed by scholars such as Banda (2004: 1-14), the Times/Printpak (Zambia) Limited Readership Survey (Tailoka, et al, 2008: 38) and has been alluded to by the state (Zambia: 1996: 14).

In short, since the economic conditions that occasion poor returns to the media industry are unlikely to dramatically change in the near future, it challenges

managers to craft new approaches to maintaining the segment of the readership that can still afford to purchase newspapers.

What is perhaps an incentive in this sense are the new investments in North-Western province of Zambia which is rapidly expanding as a copper mining zone.

The area has attracted investors in copper and cobalt mining, leading to measured growth in facilities and concentration of professionals in the province (Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, 2010:1). The AMV/OSISA (2008) study also re-affirms corporate-Zambia's desire for business and financial perspectives to media content.

Cultivating an expatriate market would invite new demands in terms of content and presentation. Foreign interests would likely seek in depth analysis of policy matters, long term focus of political trends and investment climate and day-to-day business analysis.

The *Times*, it would seem, should strive to hem in a market of upper echelon consumers who may be tethered to gleaning government positions and maintaining stronger links with state media because of their investment interests in the country.

The response of the *Times* management, in its 2008-2012 strategic document, does indicate a much more informed approach to redressing the company's failures to survive the pressures of the liberalised economy. Efforts at acquiring modern printing equipment from Taiwan through bank loans also suggests the management realises it needs to be self sustaining and *produce a product that can valued on the market for its worth*.

It is also noteworthy that while it may appear prudent for the *Times* management to acquire new colour printing presses, media entities around the world are beginning to experiment with the gravitation from newspapers as we know them to iPads, which deliver daily newspapers electronically at minimal cost. It is not at

all clear from the strategic plans or the interviews with the management how the establishment hopes to scale these technological horizons in the foreseeable future. The limitations and current access levels to the internet in Zambia, which this thesis addressed in section 3.3 of Chapter Three, standing at an abysmal 0.7% of the population (Internet Usage and Population Statistics, 2010), undermine suggestions for a migration to online platforms in any significant sense. Coupled with the lack of clear visions from both the state and the media elites (as evidenced by the strategic plans of the *Times* analysed by this thesis for example) in embracing innovative technologies, it remains uncertain whether state media in Zambia will substantially benefit from a younger generation of readers enamoured to the internet in the near future.

State intervention, it has been established, is present, but is inconsistent and opportunistic. The state has made critical subventions which have virtually saved the company from collapse at least on the one occasion in 1993, when the *Times* were burdened by newsprint debt to South African suppliers.

The absorption of debt owed to South African newsprint suppliers and the purchase of permanent buildings for the *Times Newspapers* in Lusaka can be seen as significant cost saving measures.

Overall, the state seems content with maintaining the newspapers with minimal improvements principally because they are deemed to play a critical electoral role. This, it might be argued, could be a misplaced understanding of how influential media can be in electoral contests. Given the dominance of negative perceptions of the *Times* exhibited in the studies examined in this thesis, it also seems strategically flawed to assume that such a resistant audience would base their choice of candidates or policy on the reportage of a medium they so distrust.

The evaluation of literature on the media and politics in Zambia leaves no doubt that political elites in the country are accustomed to using the state media as a conduit for their day-to-day political activities and pronouncements rather a source of business and political intelligence.

Since it is evident from the 2008 Readership Survey that how politics are reported by the *Times* has an influence on whether they entice the economic participation of potential readers, one cannot possibly ignore the political barriers facing a total transformation of the state media systems.

And yet, without the freedom to express one-self, it is inconceivable that chief executive officers of the *Times Newspapers* will have enough leverage to fully transform the company.

Freedom of expression would include one's ability to have reasonable say in the marketability of the newspaper's content and focus. The persistence by the state with its strategic support to the *Times* mainly during election times, however, is an indicator that changing the focus and content of the newspaper will not be the prerogative of business minded executives only. It remains the preserve of ruling elites, particularly at critical moments of the procedural democratic process.

In general, there are lessons to be learnt by states in Africa from the case of the *Times* in regard to press controls and their consequences for media viability and the value of a free media in/for society (South Africa is one of the countries that have lately moved to reign in the private media through a proposed Media Tribunal).

The first lesson for such states is that political controls can disconnect ruling elites from their markets (the electorate). The results of the *Times of Zambia's* own readership survey and Afrobarometer surveys all point to a dichotomy between the communications of the state and the reception and appreciation of those messages by citizens. The value of this communication is hence to be cast in grave doubt.

The second lesson concerns the power of the market, which could have similar effects on newspapers to that of authoritarian regimes. Left to their own means, market actors can leverage their influence on content to suit their ideological

positions. For instance, the inclination of ZAMTEL/CELL Z toward state media, this thesis surmises, is conditioned by its relations with the state. As the leading advertiser in print media in 2007-2009, the influence it would wield over content on under-resourced media entities could be immense. Similarly, MTN and Zain, two of the largest private investors in print advertising in the private media, have the potential to leverage favourable communications within the private media sector. Conversely, markets can also consider a watchdog model of the press as *a nuisance*, one that is likely to undermine business relations with the state.

We noted for example in Chapter Four, the collusion between the state and Lonrho in conditioning freedom of expression on the *Times of Zambia*. The state and Lonrho did find common ground in filtering the content of the *Times*, based on mutual interests, and without excessive exposure of their actions to the general public. The patronage conditions of the First Republic have not ceased, by all indications, given the immovable nature of political elites over media privatisation over the last 45 years and continued habit of imposing editorial leadership over state media systems. The need for a balance between state and private interests cannot therefore be over emphasised.

The starting point for ensuring a more business minded approach to news production in the *Times* and perhaps the construction of an entity with a more acceptable public image might be with the composition of the board of directors. The gradual maturation of politics in Zambia should allow for a multi-stakeholder structure that balances the interests of the state with those of non state actors and local business entities. This would be quite unlike the person-based Lonrho-state relationship which governed the *Times* in the First and Second Republics.

Commercial inclination will be improved, most likely, by eliciting the expertise of board members who possess substantial business pedigree. Basing appointments of board chairs and chief executive officers purely on political allegiances is unlikely to improve the commercial viability of state media systems in a competitive milieu. Under the current conditions, the pre-occupation of the



chief executive would be to survive the politics rather than re-engineer the economics.

Considering that the only changes to the state media systems thus far have occurred as a result of collective action from media professionals, civil society and opposition members of parliament, it is reasonable to assume that the overall *revolutionarisation* of state media systems in Zambia as the country democratises, will likely depend on the extent to which institutional transformation in the wider political environment is achieved.

A strengthened parliament has already demonstrated that it can partner with media activists and civil society organisations to pressurise successfully for the introduction of an Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) for example, despite the numerous hurdles yet to be scaled.

As the thesis concludes in Chapter Seven, some final thoughts and alternative approaches will be discussed at length.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### CONCLUSIONS, IMPEDIMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 7.1 SUMMARY

This thesis embarked on an exploration of the impact of democratisation on state media systems, particularly, the *Times Newspapers*, using a political economy framework, steeped in Marxian/institutional tradition. The impact of democratisation on state media was inferred from the response of the *Times* and of *labour* to the political - economic reforms since Zambia's independence in 1964.

In this regard, the thesis undertook to understand the influence, on the *Times Newspapers*, of nationalisation and the dual reform process of political and economic liberalisation which characterised the second phase of liberal democracy in 1991. The primary interest was to understand how macro level political economic forces born of democratisation shaped the structure, editorial policy, labour rights, participation and the economic determination of the state media systems - epitomised by the *Times Newspapers*. This knowledge is essential for informing efforts at democratising mass media in an emerging democracy, it has been argued. Evidence-based approaches help to reposition advocates of change in terms of the substance and moral value of their proposals, with relevant factors having been considered.

The holistic nature of political economy as a theoretical outline allowed for a historical interrogation of media developments and their links to the actions of business and political elites over three distinct periods of transitions from colonial rule. The main thrust of the thesis was that to appreciate the impact and implications of the dual reform process on the future of state media systems in

Zambia, one has to peer into the past, and interrogate complex relations between political, business and social elites and their links to the overall evolution and behaviour of media entities.

This understanding positions today's advocates of privatisation of the state media to empirically assess competing interests in Zambia's media sector by posing an array of research questions: What factors influence the allocation of communication resources in Zambia in the present day? What roles do the *wealthy* and the *powerful* play in conditioning communication in Zambia's democracy? What political interests do new investors favour and what are the wider implications for privatisation of the state media? What is the political economy of the private media?

These potential research questions would help activists, journalists and the public understand what vested interests control what they see, hear and read. The basic assumption that privatisation and liberalisation may not necessarily translate into emancipation from state or other controls does hold veracity, at least in the Zambian case, as we extensively explored connections between the political system, the economic system and media systems over time.

*Historical analysis*; and *participant observation*, a composite approach embracing three methods - *interviews*, *document reviews* and *observation* - was employed to illustrate the influence of wealth and power on *the Times Newspapers*, during political transitions which saw Zambia warp through three political cycles: two of tentative liberal democracy punctuated by dominant party systems, one of an extended one party state. The methodology was experienced to be appropriate, given the sensitive nature of the study and its relatively novel characteristics. It required careful negotiation of access with the *Times* management and other relevant sources to obtain the data, hitherto unexposed to the public.

Further, the historical, political and economic perspectives required literature reviews and synthesis to *pattern match*, and establish *generalizability*. Face-to-face interviews allowed for quantitative data to be supported with qualitative

substance. At one level, *validity* and *generalizability* were established through synthesising the works of Kariethi (1991: 204), Bower (1994: 109), Cronje et al (1976: 26), Langdon, (1981: 141), Sardanis (2003:142) and the United Kingdom's Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981), with the results of key informant interviews. Therefore the modus operandi of Lonrho, its links to powerful elites in Africa and the dual influence of these relationships on the media were mapped. The cases of the *Times of Zambia* and the *Kenya Standard* were compared in this regard. From the commercial perspective, patterns in the outcomes of the *Afrobarometer studies (2005 & 2009)* on public perceptions of the media in Zambia; the *TimesPrintpak Readership Survey, (Tailoka et al, 2008)*, the *Synovate Category Spends Review, 2009*; the *Times Printpak Strategic plans 2003-5 and 2009-2012*; and the *AMV/OSISA market survey of 2008*, provided a basis to conclude that state controls, lack of credibility and business acumen, local and foreign competition born of liberalisation inhibit the *Times of Zambia's* viability in varied ways.

The study was not pre-occupied with quantitative measurement of the impact of democratisation on state media systems; rather it sought to *qualitatively explain* how each variable affected the workings of the *Times* at an organisational plane. Key features of liberal democracy: that is, *freedom of association and expression*; and economic *liberalisation and privatisation*, constituted the independent variables; the *Times Newspapers*, the dependent variable, while media unionism (the practice of journalism) was the *intervening variable*.

Impact has been explained by bringing patterns in the literature to support the relevant variables. Hence the experience in the workplace of macro level constitutional changes to provisions on free speech, freedom of media and freedom of association were gleaned from policy documents, an analysis of oversight frameworks, modes of appointments; and from union formation and activity. Secondary indicators provided for a deeper analysis of the effectiveness of media unions by drawing on the nature and context of collective agreements, legal outcomes and contributions to further reform processes. It was noted that formal law only takes effect with struggle from interest groups. Hence, it is ultimately

through the actions of labour that the inconsistencies and contradictions between macro level frameworks and organisational moral rights are exposed.

In endeavouring to respond to the research problem, the thesis's objectives were 1) To explore how political change may have affected decision making structures on the *Times Newspapers* and what it portends for public participation and political conflict over communication resources in a pluralist society 2) To examine the ways in which democratisation has affected labour rights among media professionals in the state sector, and in particular, on the *Times Newspapers*, 3) To contribute to evidence-based proposals on privatisation and their implications for job security for media professionals in Zambia, 4) To explore the impact of privatisation and liberalisation on the commercial aspects of the *Times Newspapers*.

In general, the thesis responds to the principal research question: *What is the impact of democratisation on the Times Newspapers?*

In total, six related research questions were crafted to expand on the main problem statement: The six questions were structured into relevant chapters and were framed as follows:

1. In what ways has democratisation influenced media development in Zambia?
2. How has political change affected decision making structures and oversight frameworks on the *Times Newspapers*?
3. What are the policies governing public participation in state media systems (and in particular, the *Times Newspapers*?)
4. What is the influence of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) on the conditions of service and job security of journalists on the *Times Newspapers*?

5. What is the impact of the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), the Media Ethics Council of Zambia (MECOZ) on journalism practice on the *Times Newspapers*?
6. In what ways have liberalisation and privatisation policies affected the *Times Newspapers*?

The six chapters preceding this one were fashioned to integrate relevant questions into organised chapters. Chapter One introduced the thesis and its theoretical perspectives, including the methods adopted. Chapter Two responded to question one, utilising a wide range of historical literature and contemporary studies on Zambia's colonial, post colonial and history of democratisation and media evolution. The chapter explored the colonial political economy, addressed the matter of *ethnic stereo-typing* practised by the British and the insecurities these actions bred amongst nationalising elites as they inherited administratively weak, ethnically fractured states and elected hence to control print and electronic media as unifying apparatus. As in the colonial era, when media were used for propaganda purposes by the British, so it was with the nationalist: *structural continuities* from the colonial times in terms of the legal and constitutional framework, oversight frameworks and leadership practices underlined a legacy of 'colonial mindsets' persistent to a great degree across Zambia's three republics. The tensions of pluralist politics in the First Republic (1964-1972) and the liberation struggle in southern Africa, exacerbated these insecurities, while seemingly strengthening the justification for a one party state, achieved at the back of President Kenneth Kaunda's *philosophy of humanism*, which espoused man centeredness, unity and development reminiscent of old Africa. In this construct media were part of a collective vision for development: - a *watchdog model* of the media was incompatible with the aspirations of the one party state, hence the gradual integration of the *Times of Zambia*, a newspaper owned by the multinational Lonrho, into the state-corporate structure.

But if previous research on the media in Zambia has portrayed this transition in ownership of the *Times* in expansive terms, Chapter Three begins to explore the ways in which we can understand the relationship between *wealth* and *power* and

how their mutual influence can undermine the *public sphere* of communication in a democracy. Chapter Three therefore launches into a discussion on three related theoretical imperatives; *democratisation*, *political economy* and *public sphere*, drawing linkages and cementing the notion that regardless of democratisation, media, including *alternative media*, are susceptible to political economic cross winds. The chapter draws the distinction between *liberal political economy* which is *instrumentalist* and therefore foregrounds the dominance of capital over media; and *critical political economy* which considers matters of *labour* and *conflict* over *distribution* of communication resources.

The importance of media unionism as an outcome of democracy, which has been left isolated in the wider academic project on Zambian journalism, is illuminated here.

In Africa, the chapter argues, we should not only consider the influence of the state and the market in analysing democratisation and the media, but also the *leadership styles* of our presidents, which have many variants: *charismatic*, *mobilisational*, *house keeping*, *technocratic*, *personalistic-political*; and *patriarchal*, among others. All of them exhibit potential distinctions in how they condition governance, language discourses and controls in the media: some traces of these leadership types exhibit themselves in the present-day, presumably because of the tendency to recycle leaders from the post colonial era. Media reform cannot hence, ignore the mindsets of those in power and their hegemonic tendencies, in appreciating radically different communication systems.

It is in Chapter Four where the thesis illustrates how political and economic forces shaped the media in Zambia, particularly in the First and Second Republics. Addressing questions two and three here, *wealth* and *power* are largely exemplified by the personal influences of President Kaunda and Lonrho's now deceased chair Roland 'Tiny' Rowland. Rowland, upon assuming the reigns of Lonrho, grew this modest firm into a multinational with immense power within Africa. Promoting the idea of '*radical capitalism*' Rowland worked his way into relationships with powerful African leaders from central, eastern to western Africa,

knocking on the doors of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) itself. His business deals, using influential local proxies, propelled Lonrho into a competitive position, vying for a wide range of interests from farming, motor industries, mining, ranching to publishing and media ownership.

Lonrho's ownership of the media presented a problem for editors, often expected to carefully mask censorships with well managed public expressions of freedom. The tensions of Lonrho media in Zambia were similar to Kenya's experience. Both were carefully nuanced, accounting for why much of this has escaped social scientific inquiry. This thesis unravels the complex nature of the relationship between Kaunda and Rowland, and how it conditioned public communication through the *Times*, which inferentially left out crucial information on the country's liberation history and the latter's role in it. The relationship began with Rowland financing the United National Independence Party (UNIP) facilitating its successful acquisition of power in 1964. Subsequently, Rowland not only secretly arranged meetings between Kaunda, John Vorster, leader of apartheid South Africa, and Ian Smith of Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), which led to the release of Zimbabwean nationalists Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, he also used his private jets to facilitate these and other meetings. Lonrho and the Kaunda government meanwhile both continued to trade with Rhodesia, despite British-led sanctions over its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965.

The *Times of Zambia*, usually in support of the state's position over UDI, neither reported Lonrho's presence in Rhodesia or Zambia's trading, except in rare cases where there was open admission by the state through parliament.

The presence of Smith in Zambia in 1977 for instance, the thesis notes, was known to Zambian journalists but was not reported internally. Although the *Times* exhibited relatively high degrees of independence by any standard during this period, it has been established from key informants and existing literature, that editors could not directly attack President Kaunda, but could criticise the party at will. This *state-corporate control model* carefully balanced professionalism with marketisation; allowing the state to appoint the editor-in-chief, while Lonrho



controlled the general manager and chief accountant. The interests of political elites and the multinational were hence carefully balanced, while the public and media scholars were left to revel in the 'independence' of the *Times of Zambia* in the post colonial era. Detailed submissions to the United Kingdom Monopolies and Mergers Commission by former employees of *Lonrho-Times* in 1976-79 substantiate these assertions.

These actions, the chapter argues further, might not have been possible under a more open system of governance. The dominant party structure of the first republic, and the one party state, coupled by person-based rule accentuated the practices. However, one party dominance and its influences were again manifest under Frederick Chiluba's Movement for Multiparty democracy (MMD), which ascended to power in 1991, after Kaunda, under pressure from activists and labour, sanctioned plural politics through constitutional changes in 1990. Chiluba, exhibiting a *housekeeping/charismatic* leadership style, while commended for pushing for the institution of Article 20(2) on freedom of the media, was hostile toward state media privatisation once in office. Chiluba also used *state power* to intimidate the media and was accused of inducing favourable coverage from international correspondents through the use of presidential discretionary funds, underlining again the *wealth/power/media nexus*. His economic liberalisation policies have not only undermined private media growth through high taxation and economic censorship, they demonstrate that media development in Zambia has been deliberately shaped by *the powerful*, despite democracy.

But if democratisation's economic face has undermined private media growth and press freedom, what is its effect on *labour*? Chapter Five, responding to questions four and five, begins by first articulating the history of *labour rights* and the two principal theoretical approaches used to analyse labour relations: Employee Rights Theory (ERT), which is a liberal creature, and Labour Process Theory (LPT), inspired by Marxism. It is found that while democratisation brought unionism to Africans, it prompted nationalist governments to amend the Industrial Relations Act (1971) to consolidate labour movements into one controllable body, wary of the opposition to state power posed by workers.

The 'one industry, one union' principal meant that workers were coerced into sector-specific unions which might not have had any relevance to their ambitions.

Journalists found themselves tethered to telecommunications and typographical workers' unions neither of which showed any responsiveness to their needs.

The action by the Kaunda government to consolidate all unions under one apex body bolstered the labour movement financially and organisationally. The ZCTU as a result became the most potent opposition to the one party state, inadvertently. The liberalisation of the labour market by Kaunda in 1990 was seen by his opponents more as a measure to trigger factionalisation in the ZCTU at a time when it formed the base of the then opposition MMD, than an act of benevolence, to distribute rights among various labour interests.

From a liberal perspective, these actions were consistent with democratisation. It is hardly surprising therefore that Chiluba sustained a liberal labour market during his time, despite opposing Kaunda prior to the 1991 elections. Chiluba's actions were also seen as a means to weaken the ZCTU which was strongly opposed to his liberalisation philosophy. The interventions by both Kaunda and Chiluba to maintain a liberalised labour market paradoxically nourished the growth of the ZUJ. Labour market liberalisation meant that journalists were now able to break away from sector specific arrangements and create a professional union. ZUJ, demonstrably, has changed conditions of service and etched a modicum of communicative space within the realms of the *Times Newspapers* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*. Ironically, in the broader economy, liberalisation and privatisation have weakened trade unions through state facilitated retrenchments, and the avoidance of unionisation by new investors.

The chapter illustrates, first how ZUJ is a direct product of democratisation, then the manner in which the union, working with professional associations such as PAZA, has pursued, defended and championed the cause of worker rights and free speech. The MECOZ, it was found, had not materialised into any institution of

significance at the time of writing this thesis, therefore its contribution to the practice of journalism could not be assessed. In general, it is noted that the ZUJ and its professional associations have had their most success with media reform when the ruling party, the MMD, has been at its weakest in parliament. Working with opposition parties and civil society, important bills have been tabled for the first time in history which has led to modest changes to the corporate governance structures of the ZNBC through the establishment of an IBA. But it is emphasised that the union is prone to state influence as its leadership and members, ultimately depend on political elites for professional advancement within the organisational setting and beyond.

It also has a weak intellectual and organisational capacity, accounting for its lack of expansion beyond the two daily state print media entities.

The reluctance of private media investors to unionise workers, much the same as in the broader economy, portends ill for media unionism in the face of arbitrary privatisation, the thesis intimates. The chapter concludes by observing that while democratisation seems to have distributed macro level freedoms of association and expression, the media union has had gains and losses.

Freedom of expression by journalists as individuals is constrained by state-driven pre-censorship frameworks. However, as a collective under ZUJ and professional associations, journalists are able to foster change in their welfare and are adept at criticising, using judicial leverage to challenge the state and form cross-sectoral partnership to influence legislative processes. The impact of democratisation on state media systems therefore, should not be judged through an examination of content or editorial timidity per se but also by examining freedom from the perspective of expanded *group rights*.

Chapter Six addresses question six, essentially unmasking the complexities that liberalisation and privatisation have wrought on the *Times Newspapers*. The *Times Newspapers* have struggled to conform to a liberalised economy and have lost ground to the privately owned *Post Newspapers* and to other state media entities

in terms of advertising and readership. These trends are demonstrated empirically by analysing the findings of *unpublished* studies commissioned by the *Times* management and from the works of independent market researchers. From here, it is noted that while sales have plummeted drastically, advertising on the *Times* was on the upsurge between 2000 and 2007. However, through critically analysing the findings of independent market research, we find that the biggest investor in state media advertising is the state corporate sector, through among others, the ZAMTEL/CELL Z. By comparing ZAMTEL's advertising preferences to those of its leading private competitor MTN, we find that the latter has an inclination for following circulation and media outreach to determine its choices. ZAMTEL prefers state media regardless of market trends. Hence, it is noted with interest, that not a single advert was placed in the *Post* in 2008, and overall, advertising by the state entity in the private daily has not exceeded 3%. Similar actions from government departments and entities are also noted. Follow up interviews with the managing director of the *TimesPrintpak Limited* by this researcher confirm that seven out of ten top spenders in the *Times* between 2009 and 2011 were government ministries or SOEs. ZAMTEL, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi Airways, ZESCO, ZRA, the Road Development Agency, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education and ZANACO have been the biggest spenders on advertising in the *Times* during the period. Of these, only Airtel, MTN and Zambezi Airlines are privately owned.

Based on this, a conclusion is drawn that the *Times'* advertising record is bolstered by loyal SOE support. By *Times'* management own admission, the failure of the company to print in colour has caused it to lose business to local and foreign competitors. However, direct state assistance cannot always be counted on as it seems to come during elections or in extremely dire circumstances.

Unless the *Times'* 2009-2012 strategic plan which aims to technologically upgrade the newspapers among other things, succeeds, it seems the newspapers will be unsustainable.

Overall, it can be concluded that the state continues to deliberately shape media development in Zambia; sustaining high costs on newspaper inputs, determining

who obtains broadcast licences, influencing the pattern of advertising to suit supporters of its policy, while excluding its media critics from these resources.

Because the administrative structure has not been strong enough to support a liberalised economy and because privatised firms have performed poorly, media cannot rely on advertising alone for sustainability. The media in Zambia is therefore polarised not only in political terms but in economic terms as well.

The findings of this research and the following key impediments fore-grounded in section 7.2, under-score the importance of adopting holistic approaches to media studies. This is essentially because without the comprehensive understanding of how political and economic systems work, particularly in relation to media performance; and how they may facilitate or undermine change, it is highly unlikely that an informed analysis of media development might be achieved. Also, the importance of interrogating economic policy in relation to labour relations and institutional (media) performance, allows us to have an integrated understanding of what challenges lie in the way of the practice of journalism beyond the technical aspects of the profession. These impediments will provide a basis to determine the nature of media activism required to redress undemocratic situations. It will also assist with the alignment of the ambitions of journalists to those of other democratic actors seeking wider freedoms more generally. Historical perspectives augment the tenets of political economy in this regard by providing an empirical map of how political, business and social elites would have, over time, worked either in the interest of, or in this case, against the aspirations of freedom of expression and association.

## **7.2 KEY IMPEDIMENTS TO MEDIA REFORM**

Cognisant of all these factors, this thesis suggests that there may be alternative options of balancing private interests with public interventions going forward. However, there are some key fundamental problems identified in this study which should be flagged upfront:

1. **The Political System:** It seems unlikely that any radical changes in reforming the state media will occur without a substantial change in the complexion of parliament: stronger opposition leverage has already delivered the first tangible transformations in state broadcasting for instance (though still to be implemented). Therefore the issue of representation and diversity in the legislature is paramount and is definitely the starting point of any such reform. This might require some comprehensive changes to the electoral model as well to ensure greater diversity in representative institutions.
  
2. **The labour law:** The *casualisation of labour* is a problem in Zambia currently and will also affect the growth of the union of journalists. A movement toward stricter labour laws that compel employers to respect unionisation and avoid casualisation would bolster union formations as privatisation is entrenched. In South Africa for example, concerns about the informalisation of labour have led to the ruling party presenting legislative changes to the labour law. The Labour Relations Amendment Bill, 2010, aims to *'prohibit certain abusive practices'* and *'avoid the exploitation of workers'* (South Africa, 2010: sec 43: 26).
  
3. **Zambia's leadership is cyclic:** politicians have been recycled at all levels since independence. The current president of Zambia Rupiah Banda, among others in the administration, is a product of the first generation of nationalists from the Kaunda era. Thus far, he has not deviated from the path treaded by his predecessors. Unless there is a new generation of influential politicians at the helm; or unless pro-democracy activists succeed in changing mindsets of incumbents, it seems media privatisation or reform remains a protracted battle.
  
4. **Structuration:** the way forward for SOE's such as the *Times* appears partly to be a reformulation of modes of appointments to its governance structures. A more transparent and inclusive means of installation of a board of directors would help to restore some credibility. The position of labour in this structure

in relation to capital would be paramount. Diversity in the composition of the board and popular involvement in decision-making is lacking. The continued oversight of the Ministry of Information accentuates notions of control that undermine credibility of the newspapers and the people who work for them. It also ultimately impacts on readership levels, as evidenced by the *Times/printmaker Readership Survey 2008* and the *Afrobarometer studies (2005 & 2009)*.

5. **Freedom and commodification:** Aesthetically, the *Times* has not changed its appearance since its inception in 1965. Based on the dominant readership opinion, a business orientated transformation is needed. It seems certain from the findings of the *TimesPrintpak Readership Survey* (Tailoka et al, 2008) and the AMV/OSISA survey in the same year, that a broader range of topics and specialist writings would improve public participation. However, the freedom to radically alter the newspapers in content and appearance does not rest with the editor. The fact that instructions arise from all manner of ministers, means one cannot possibly engender a professional presentation of news based on its value or the public good.

The overall conclusion of this thesis is that there cannot be fundamental changes to the state media without significant changes to the political system and the political culture. There are three inter-linked steps which need to be explained further:

1. Diversity in representation in legislative structures.
2. A change in the culture of recycled leadership.
3. Exploration of a communal media system.

### ***7.2.1 Representation and diversity in legislative structures***

It can be noted from the fore-going that institutional transformation, does not occur in a vacuum. It took cross-sectoral efforts to achieve the tabling and enactment of bills relating to ZNBC and the IBA. These alliances, as indicated in section 5.3.9 of

Chapter Five, involved opposition members of parliament and a cross section of media associations and unions.

The passage of private members motions, it seems, depends also on the configurations of power within national parliament. An opposition without a two thirds majority will not have the leverage to execute change to these structures.

On occasions when change has been attained, the ruling party has been at its weakest. The achievement of parity and representation in state media systems, it can be argued hence, is predicated on the presence of a *working parliament*, with a firm balance between ruling elites and alternative voices.

The factors influencing these configurations are multifarious and may range from a more representative electoral system, integrity of the electoral process and of leadership, to the capacity of the electorate to make informed choices. Certainly, propositions for a Mixed Member Proportional System (MMP) which would combine Zambia's current First-Past-the Post system (a constituency based model) with the Proportional Representation (PR) system have been quite pronounced lately. Under PR systems, parties are allocated seats based on the proportion of votes gained in the entire country. In the FPTP system, electoral contests are located in constituencies with each contesting party presenting a candidate per voting district. The candidate with the most votes assumes the respective constituency seat in parliament. Parties with the largest number of constituency victories will hence have the most seats in the legislature. The idea behind these proposals is that combining the two systems enables the weaknesses of one system to be compensated for by the strengths of the other. Among other things, PR is credited for being inclusive of *minority voices* while FPTP is strong on *accountability*, because of the direct election of representatives (Chirambo, 2008: 6-12).<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> It should be noted here that the weaknesses and strengths of electoral models are many and often contested by political scientists. This reference, highlights but the principle disparities.



While none of these institutional arrangements provides guarantees of radical media transformation, they may conceivably improve the chances of representation, diversity, responsiveness and accountability at many levels. Certainly, more equitable governance systems would provide the platform for consensus-based solutions to the nature of media systems that would respond more favourably to the expectations of the public.

### **7.2.2 Recycled Leadership: Persistent post colonial mindsets about media power**

On the whole, the government's disregard for the recommendations of the Media Reform Committee (MRC), the Mwanakatwe Constitution Review Commission of 1995 and the Task Force on media reform of 1999, among others, are indicators that political elites, regardless of a change in administration, are convinced that maintaining control over media systems in a multiparty era ensures political leverage. This notion can be reinforced by observing the periods at which the *Times Newspapers* (and other state entities) receive state support. According to the findings of this thesis, state support is virtually guaranteed during elections. Since 1991, Zambia has held five competitive general and presidential elections to which state media coverage has been fully utilised.

Therefore, state media would have the capacity to reach every inch of Zambia's vastness either by using vehicles purchased by the state or accessing air and ground transportation from political leaders on campaign. A political metamorphosis of the *Times Newspapers* would likely entail a wholesale re-conditioning of a new generation of politicians about the benefits of a media system that has the leeway to determine its editorial course based on consumer demands or a general public good. Such an undertaking would require joint efforts by journalists, communication scientists, business experts, human rights activists, lawyers and willing allies within the state, to critically consider ways in which political elites could conceivably be dissuaded from a longstanding belief in the 'effects tradition' of media power.

An understanding of what factors influence voter choices, and which channels inform those choices, may be a starting point for arguing for a more professional and public inclined media. For there is no correlation between where the *Times of Zambia*, and other state media apparatus concentrate their messages, and where the MMD hold power.

Despite the *Times of Zambia* having its strongest presence on the Copperbelt for example, the province was largely won by the opposition Patriotic Front (PF) in the 2006 parliamentary elections (ECZ, 2006).

An examination of other urbanised areas and provinces within the reach of newspaper circulation and national broadcaster such as the Northern, Luapula and Southern Provinces, shows that none of these were swept by the ruling party. Instead the PF impressed in the North and in Luapula, while the South fell overwhelmingly to the United Party for National Development (UPND). Similar trends are notable from the 2001 election results (ECZ, 2001). While only further study can substantiate this particular statement, it does on the surface provide a basis for us to debunk the notion that state media are a major variable in electoral politics.

### **7.2.3 *The efficacy of a communal media model***

The third point to be noted is the crafting of a communal, as opposed to state owned model of the media that would attempt to balance public and state interests. It is McQuail (1996: 70)(and as formulated similarly in later editions of this seminal source) who underscores the point that any social order, regardless of whether it is anchored by freedom and equality, can only be maintained over time through processes of public communication.

He argues that for fundamental rights to be realised, there must be access to channels of communication and opportunities to receive a diversity of information.

McQuail experiments with a normative framework which would constitute *mass media in the public interest*. He crafts three models based on the three basic values for communication in society, *freedom, justice/equality; order/solidarity*.

*Freedom as a public communication value* is tethered to the *watchdog model* and emphasises openness to a wide range of demands and offering a variety of voices. Originality, the exercise of public vigilance with the propensity to offend the powerful when the need arises, is underscored here. This value overlaps with the concept of equality.

*Equality as a public communication value*; does not extend special favours to the powerful. Instead it opens itself up to all contestants, deviant voices and claims. It treats all legitimate advertisers in the same way, applying normal market principles. This principle calls for non discrimination, equal or equitable access, and diversity. Diversity would include accounting for language, ethnic and cultural identity. However, Mcquail himself admits that constraints of space are just some of the impediments, the equality principle would face.

Finally, the notion of *Order as a public communication value*, projects media as both potentially disruptive of normal order and sometimes, indispensable to its maintenance. The centrifugal and centripetal, differentiating and uniting effect of mass media hence is well known.

Mcquail however defines order in an elastic sense: implying symbolic cultural orders such as religion, art and customs among others.

This approach assumes a tendency to appreciate the mutually reinforcing nature of shared cultures and solidaristic experiences. A unitary perspective of consensual good order panders to group interests but is challenged by conflicting cultural and social factors. In the end, he admits that the coherence and symmetry of the three principles of media performance is *illusory*.

*“All claims about what is in the public interest have to be specific, based on evidence and argued out in some relevant public forum” (McQuail, 1996: 79).*

On the evidence of this thesis, this researcher notes that government, advertisers and proprietors have sophisticated means by which to control communications regardless of the model. The vectors of control are diverse and complex.

They would range from economic censorship of privately owned newspapers by investors allied to the state to the exclusion from privileged events such as press conferences by the state, which could undermine a newspaper's newsworthiness. It is noted for example that Lonrho and the presidency found a way to achieve both their interests while sustaining a fairly respectable image for the *Times* in the First and parts of the Second Republics. The discussions in Chapter Three also extensively present ways in which both alternative and traditional media may fall under indirect influences of the market and politics. The question of objectivity or impartiality of the media is therefore untenable under the many conceivable scenarios. To simply demand equal representation is not to resolve this problem either: the state can influence elections in media unions and professional bodies and ensure that the diverse group that materialises on the board of directors empathises with its ambitions. The proposition being presented is therefore of a discursive nature. It does not claim to be immune to political and economic forces but rather to minimise their dual influences.

### **7.3 PROPOSED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE FOR THE STATE PRINT MEDIA**

*Diversification and professionalisation of corporate governance structures:* It has been intimated in this thesis, that the *Times Newspapers* lack customer and market focus, editorial policy and strategy.


The company experiences low customer satisfaction and poor resources and information management capacities. The over-riding factors are unrestrained macro level influences from the country's political system which impact negatively on public perception of the newspapers. Therefore any business model, regardless of its excellence, will not prevail unless it addresses the political fundamentals that shape state media systems in Zambia.

This suggested re-engineering of the governance structure of the *Times*, hence, assumes that progress will only occur upon the re-configuration of power in the decision making structures of the state, such as parliament and the executive; and the subsequent fostering of a popular consensus on media change.

In terms of the governance structure of the *Times*, lessons may be drawn from the construction of the Zambia Institute of Mass Communications (ZAMCOM) which was transformed from a government entity into a public trust in 1991. Superintendence of the ZAMCOM is done by the Council, which consists of representatives of print and electronic media, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, journalism training institutes, publishing houses, PAZA and an appointee of the minister of information of broadcasting who must have private enterprise management experience. The relative strength of the structure is in its diversity, combining donor, activist and state interests, potentially minimising government control. The financial and other provisions of ZAMCOM may be allocated by parliament in addition to loans and donations from internal and external sources (Zambia, 1991: sec 17. 1).

The weakness of the ZAMCOM Council lies in its prescribed chairmanship and mode of appointment of members of the Council. Section 2 of the ZAMCOM Act of 1991 states that members of the council shall be *nominated* by their respective organisations or associations but *shall be appointed* by the minister (Zambia, 1991:sec 6.1). Without ministerial consent therefore, a nominee to the board from other interest groups could be rejected by the state at the minister’s discretion. Secondly, the Council is chaired by the permanent secretary of the ministry of information and is consequently very much shaped by ruling party interests.

**Figure 16: Proposed governance structure for state print media**



**Source: Constructed by author.**

To escape these subtle controls, it is perhaps important to draw further lessons from the constitution of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) which became law in December 2002 and was formalised as a body corporate.

The IBA, the result of sustained media and democracy activism, is not, in principle, subject to the direction of any individual or authority. Its board is made up of nine part time members appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of the Appointments Committee and subject to ratification by parliament (Matibini, 2006: 80-89).

The appointments committee consists of a representative from each of the following:

- The Law Association of Zambia.
- Non governmental organisations.
- One member from a media support group.
- One member nominated by religious organisations.
- One member from the Ministry of information and broadcasting.

The functions of the committee are to invite applications from suitably qualified individuals for appointment to the Board; to interview, select and recommend candidates to the Minister for appointment. Office bearers of political parties, members of parliament or local authority, non citizens and residents of Zambia or persons with vested interest in broadcast industry may not be eligible for appointment.

Government manipulation of this process has been well documented (Matibini, 2006: 89) and again speaks succinctly to the role assigned to the minister, who is in pole position to reject a candidate. While the composition of the Board is somewhat diverse, it could be broadened to strengthen the presence of media professionals and workers. Therefore to ensure that a proposed model for the print media minimises state interference, two key elements should underpin restructured state media systems:

- *Workers as investors:* Editors, Journalists and general workers on the *Times*, should be share holders or investors in the organisation. This would likely improve their capacity to exercise their fundamental rights and particularly, their communicative rights; to demand improvements in the product in order to obtain dividends in the ultimate.
  
- *Public participation and accountability:* low cost shares should be availed to the general public to increase the company's capitalisation. Poor capitalisation has been recognised by the government in its 1996 Media policy (Zambia, 1996: 14), as one of the fundamental problems facing all the print media. The institution would not only increase its working capital but also empathise with the wider public. Conversely, this would not only contribute to accountability of state media systems to the tax payer, it would transform the public from a *passive consumer of news* to an *active participant* in its production. Further, it is recommended that the governance structure of the *Times Newspapers* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* embrace representatives from diverse interests.

The corporate governance model being proposed is three-tier, constituting a *Council* composed of public interest actors, a *Non Executive Board* appointed by the Council, and *Senior Management* (Figure 6). The proposal seeks to improve on the ZAMCOM TRUST and the IBA models, by allowing media workers and the public to be direct share holders in the state media and therefore in a position to nominate members of the board, indirectly influencing the substance and conduct of management.

The Council, created through an Act of parliament, should be led by a Steering or Appointments Committee with representatives of labour (the Zambia Union of Journalists), the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Zambia Chapter, the Zambia Council of Churches, the Zambia Chamber of Commerce, the Economics Association of Zambia (EAZ) the Law Association of Zambia(LAZ), the umbrella body of non governmental



organisations in Zambia, and the permanent secretary of the ministry of information and broadcasting. The Steering/Appointments Committee would be convened by a Registrar appointed by Parliament to administer its operations. The Council should however elect its own chair of the Steering Committee and such a chair may not be in the employ of government or its agencies or a member of a political party. The professional chair of the committee should be elected from amongst the Committee Members, the latter having been appointed to the Steering Committee by the general Council meeting. The role of the Council's Steering/Appointments Committee would be the following:

- To consult with media workers and stakeholders annually on the strategic direction of state media systems.
- To develop criteria for candidates to the Board of Directors in consultation with shareholders, stakeholders.
- To invite applications from potential candidates to the Board of Directors.
- To interview applicants and nominees and submit recommendations to a bi-partisan select committee of the National Assembly.

The board may include the permanent secretary of the ministry of information as a member, not as chair. The chair of the Board of Directors should be nominated by the interests represented on the board based on business credentials and knowledge of the media and should emanate from the non state actors. The Minister may have no role in this process as he/she would fall under the category of active party member. The proposed governance structure of the *Times* can hence be unpacked as follows:

- 1) **The Council:** Constituted by an Act of parliament, it would constitute workers as share holders, media unions, associations, non governmental bodies, the clergy, the ministry of information, business, and the Law Association. It is led by a professional steering/appointments committee which facilitates the appointment of a professional board of directors.

- 2) **Board of Directors:** to be nominated by Council: interviewed, selected and recommended through open and transparent interview process. Nominees will need to meet set criteria that may include, experience in the management of a private enterprise, media, law etc. Office tenure should not exceed two, three - year terms.
  
- 3) **Senior Management:** the Managing Director, Deputy Managing Director, Managing Editor/Editor-in-Chief, Operations Manager, Chief Accountant and Company Secretary should be appointed by the board upon a public, transparent system of interviewing and assessment based on higher level academic credentials and experience of managing a private enterprise.

The model attempts to minimise the influence of any one interest group or actor and therefore operates off bi-directional vectors of power. In this model the council would include not just sectoral actors but also workers as investors or share holders in the company. The Council should convene twice yearly to participate in a broad review of the company operations and the performance of management editorially and commercially. The model emphasises sound and inclusive leadership as a means by which improved results may be obtained. The board of directors should include persons with proven business pedigree, legal know-how and at least a representative of labour unions.

The involvement of a bi-partisan parliamentary committee <sup>44</sup>is critical in terms of public exposure and discussion of financial commitments by the state and the regular evaluation of power relations and resource utilisation within the structures. The parliamentary committee should have a member each from each political party represented in parliament. The model would attempt to focus its leadership on the business interest and viability of the company rather than to appease any

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<sup>44</sup> It is through this bi-partisan committee that political parties will be seen to participate in this media model. Restricting the participation of political parties to only the agencies represented in parliament is logical given that registered organisations have numbered over 100 since the initiation of multiparty politics and yet less than six have survived beyond one electoral cycle. Secondly, limiting this participation to parliamentary political parties speaks to the notion of legitimacy, as the actors so represented will have had, at least in principle, a mandate from the electorate to act on their behalf.

single actor, let alone the state. More specifically, the following benefits might accrue to the state-sector media industry:

1. *Financial support* from the state to the state/public media should be determined and evaluated by a bi-partisan select committee of the national assembly. Since the notion of state ownership would have fallen away, any public financing that is appropriated by state media should be sanctioned by a legitimate bi-partisan body.
2. *Public access*; should not be the preserve of electoral contestants. A news agenda that represents the diverse interests of the groups participating in the *Times* would begin to serve much wider concerns than simply those of political elites. With Zambia's investment portfolio improving by the day, sectoral interests would attach much greater value to subscriptions and sponsored supplements. *The Post* and its sponsored small business supplement is a good example. Suggestions from the *Times Printpak Readership Survey* in this regard, substantiate this proposal. Interactive exchanges with audiences within Zambia and in the diaspora via the internet for example, would continually impress the need for improvement or indeed encourage a substantial increase in public discussion.
3. *Technically qualified leadership*: The process improves the possibilities of appointing highly qualified persons to top leadership positions in the media, with the potential to exploit technological and business opportunities; and with greater focus on the public good. Beginning with the Council and the Board, the presence of professional bodies outside of the media associations and the ministry of information and broadcasting, increases the probability of this happening.
4. *Localising newsprint production*: Newsprint, one of the key inputs affecting the print media viability is closely controlled by political interests. The cost of newsprint affects all media. Low tariffs on the input would assist the struggling industry to revive itself. The high cost of imported newsprint necessitates the exploration of new possibilities: that

is, localising its production. Such an intervention might need deliberate state/parliamentary intervention. However, dominant party politics still encourage a lack of commitment which might render the whole proposition untenable, unless oppositional influences prevail. Ideally, this should be a private initiative. Realistically, external state liaisons with the Chinese for example, might kick start the process.

In conclusion, from a theoretical perspective, it can be demonstrated that this model attempts to respond to McQuail's concerns about public consensus by drawing on the precedence set in Zambia since the early 1990s. ZAMCOM was born out of a discursive and consultative process, and more recently the IBA was advanced by a robust collective of actors which included opposition members of parliament, compelling the state to move ahead with a compromise agenda. The hope for change can therefore rest on improving on the results of the past: that Zambia has evolved, over time, a culture of peaceful resolution of conflict and of public discussion. Ultimately, what history teaches us is that none of these steps will occur without *struggle*. This researcher argues therefore, that until there is a greater opposition leverage - and changed mindsets in sections of the state - to drive a more aggressive and sustainable consensus on reforms; and unless there is constituted, electoral mechanisms and practices that allow for greater diversity in the National Assembly, the implementation of proposals such as these will be protracted if not frustrated for a long time to come.

Ends

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## **NEWSPAPER ARTICLES**

Discharge PAZA Injunction. 1991. Times of Zambia. 17 October: 1.

Financial giants get 60 p.c. nameco shares. 1990. Times of Zambia. 16 March: 1.

Firms in new hands. 1989. Times of Zambia. 22 February: 3.

Improve journalists working conditions, says Simuchimba. 1990. Times of Zambia. 3 February: 1.

Media boss promises goodies. 1991. Times of Zambia. 5 January: 1.

Nameco director salutes Times. 1991. 19 July: 1.

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Nameco to acquire new printing equipment.1990. Times of Zambia. 21 December: 3.

New firms get 'divorce'. 1989. Sunday Times of Zambia. 24 December: 1.

Press under now under one roof. 1988. Times of Zambia. 3 November: 1.

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## APPENDIX ONE

### QUESTIONNAIRES

The key aim of this area of inquiry was to glean an understanding of the experiences of democratisation by three generations of editors, representing the First, Second and Third Republics. The section is divided into two segments, one representing structured questionnaires administered by email and another related section constituting face-to-face interviews. The key areas addressed include comparative perspectives of media controls during periods of political change, the response of the *Times* to the challenges of liberalisation and the changing state and media relations over the past 45 years. The unstructured interviews, in addition, attempt to capture the insider experiences of state controls and of foreign ownership and the effect of this on worker welfare. In general, all questions sought to capture the key elements of the research questions:

- Democratisation and its influence on media development in Zambia
- Political change and oversight frameworks on the *Times Newspapers?*
- Public participation in state media systems (and in particular, the *Times Newspapers?*)
- The influence of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) on the conditions of service and job security of journalists on the *Times Newspapers?*
- The impact of the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) on the *Times Newspapers?*
- The impact of liberalisation and privatisation policies affected the *Times Newspapers?*

There were slight modifications to the questions to suit the experience and expertise of each respective respondent, that is: the foci of questions for interviewees who had experienced journalism under all three periods of change: the First, Second and Third Republics would be inclined toward extrapolating historical perspectives and comparisons with contemporary situations. The line of inquiry for legally inclined respondents concentrated more on the macro level constitutional frameworks and their influence on micro level organisational situations in the media.

## **RESPONSES TO THE EMAIL QUESTIONNAIRES:**

### **1. Simuchoba, A. 2009.[Former Acting Managing Editor, TimesPrintpak Zambia Limited, 1973- 1995].**

**Q. In what ways has the democratisation process in Zambia impacted on state media systems specifically; and on the media sector generally? (*Democratisation here is defined by political change during the period between 1964 when Zambia became independent to date*)**

A. The main impact of democratisation at independence in 1964 was to make the media more inclusive. Prior to independence the media was segmented and tended to serve the interests of the settler community more than that of the natives. Coverage was mainly of events that were of interest to the settler community and news about the majority community was largely ignored or covered only in passing partly because the white reporters who ran the media and especially the print media did not understand the significance of events within the black community. Radio was however slightly different. It more or less from the outset embraced the black community with broadcasts in the vernaculars. But again these were targeted at influencing the black community to see issues the way the settler population did.

The period after independence also saw the entry of Government for the first time as a player in the commercial media. Government took a stake in the Zambia Daily Mail. Previously government was involved with only its publications under the Department of Information later the Ministry. The effect was reduced credibility for the Daily Mail which was derisively referred to as the “Government Gazette.” In time, this involvement accelerated into the acquisition of the country’s only independent newspaper The Times of Zambia by the party. Again the consequence was reduced credibility for the newspaper. In the end, these acquisitions ended the era of the independent media in Zambia. Radio, television and the print media came to be under government control and all had to “toe the government line.” The result was reduced public credibility for the media all round. Some cynics for instance now referred to the Times of Zambia as Pravda.

The return of multi-party politics at the beginning of the 1990s saw the re-launch of “independent” journalism. It was a lot more vigorous and questioning of government actions and decisions to the extent that was not possible on the government-owned newspapers without consequences. This period eventually saw to the near wholesale migration of readership and advertising away from the government papers to the new independent media and reduced further the credibility of “public media” controlled by government. The independent media practiced and still does essentially tabloid journalism based on scandal and allegations and purveying of personal agendas. The up-shoot is that today Zambian journalism is hardly the most ethical or accurate and on both sides for that matter as the government media also strives to off-set the effect of the “independent” media and the latter will observe no ethic to get at individuals in government especially those that it has personal issues with. Now, the media is at the point where statutory regulation is under consideration and seems a real prospect largely because of the excesses of the independent media.

In summary- democratisation saw to an inclusive media in the first instance. Then, the tentative entry of government as a media player, the accentuation of that trend in later years and finally the re-emergence of the independent media without ethics and standards and now there is the prospect of statutory control.

**Q. What specific benefits has the democratisation process brought to the state owned media during the First, Second and Third Republics:**

**A.** In the first and second republic there are no known benefits. If anything they merely led to the reduced credibility of the media. However the formation of the National Media Corporation (NAMECO) in the 1980s led to the adoption of ZIMCO conditions of service by the group and salaries and some conditions of service improved subsequently to catch up with what ZIMCO was paying.

In the third republic, government paid off some debts and has at times, few and far between, invested money in plant and machinery for the newspapers. In 1992, the government for instance paid off the large newsprint debt that *The Times of Zambia* had contracted through the many newspapers it attempted to launch. Subsequently, in 2001 it released money for the purchase of vehicles although this facility was mismanaged through the purchase of poor second-hand cars from South Africa which were of little use to the newspapers as they did not last. But government at least attempted to help out the media whether that was the best help it could give is something else. Again some donations to the government in the form of vehicles from China have been passed on to the newspapers. The Times of Zambia also received a printing press from China though it doesn't seem fit for purpose. The point to note is that this generosity has been more pronounced near election time mainly. However, government has not been able to act freely in this respect given that its main financial partners the western governments, the IMF and World Bank are against subsidies and have long supported privatisation of the media in Zambia to avoid having to subsidize. So, government does so mindful or rather fearful of the possible reaction from them. There is also circumstantial evidence that in the payment of taxes, excise duty on imports etc, the Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) treats the state media kindly.

**Q. What negative aspects-if any- has democratisation wrought on the state media in Zambia (and on the *Times Newspapers* in particular)?**

Reduced credibility. *The Times* has lost prestige and seen largely as a government rag. It is no longer the leading newspaper and its content is dismissed as propaganda. Sales

have plummeted drastically. Until recently, it still sold reasonably well because of advertising especially job adverts but now even that has changed because most of the advertisers tend to be private companies and international NGOs that would rather advertise in the private media. It is limping badly and were it not for the government interest it would have been declared bankrupt by now. It is seen as a purveyor of government propaganda and the top reporters are those with good connections in government circles and the assent recently has been to counteract the Post and the only way to do that is to follow the Post and it is an extremely unethical newspaper that can't possibly be the standard. But in the kingdom of the blind, a one eyed man is king!

**Q. How would you compare the *Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited* under Lonrho (1964-1982) ownership on the one hand; and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) on the other, in terms of the following: Editorial policy, employment policy, structure of the board, economic determination and performance, and public participation:-**

A. Editorial Independence: Under LONRHO there was a great deal of editorial independence hence the running battles with the authorities. In fact the newspaper enjoyed complete editorial independence depending largely on the attitude of the editor and most editors of the era were brilliant and well educated and trained men, influential also able to hold their own. Under government ownership that was the first casualty because basically government acquired the newspaper so that it would be supported by it and therefore frowned and did not expect criticism or a serious expressions of independence.

Editorial policy: Under LONRHO the newspaper's editorial policy was based on objectivity, the truth as the newspaper saw it which is how even ordinary people saw things. Government ownership does not allow that especially where objectivity means strong and correct criticism or dissent from government positions.

Employment Policy: Under LONRHO, the policy was kind of elitist in that it sought to recruit the best on the market or mould its reporters to be among the best. Thus *The*

*Times of Zambia* had a galaxy of talented reporters over the years. Government is not so much interested in that. It seeks and is comfortable with conformists and the mediocre.

Structure of Board of Directors (representation by non-state actors): Under LONRHO the board of directors was far removed from the operation itself (newspaper); it was basically made up of largely anonymous LONRHO executives. Under government both UNIP and MMD the boards have been made up of political appointees and under the MMD increasingly of MMD loyalists being rewarded for their support. As an instrument of management, the board of directors today is quite useless made up of mainly people who know nothing about newspaper operations or operations of a business for that matter, only eager for the sitting allowances and an opportunity to supply stationery to the company and other such benefits.

Economic determination (autonomy over commercial decisions): Under LONRHO commercial interests were paramount and LONRHO always appointed the General Manager of the Times whose responsibility was to see to the commercial interest. It is instructive that the Editor-in Chief and the General Manager were nearly always at odds as when the former would order withholding of adverts to create more room for news. The GM was never amused. Neither was he by a “big” libel file. The autonomy was tenuous in that sense-while the EIC could write pretty much what he thought fit LONRHO had to make its money.

Economic performance; Economic performance under LONRHO was excellent. There was always the 13<sup>th</sup> cheque for staff at the end of the financial year, a sign that more than was anticipated was realized. It deteriorated under government control due to reduced credibility and the unwillingness of government to allow space for commercial profitability which is what “toeing the line” means at the end of the day. Most of the new economic players are private sector people ready to support only the private sector and anxious to see the government out of business.

Public Participation (provision for public input in editorial pages of the newspapers): It was better by far under LONRHO. Letters to the Editor were many and varied and there

was always some in any edition. One of the strengths of the Sunday Times for instance was the Sunday Forum. They have become very dangerous under government. Many times there are none and only those supporting government are published very rarely for that matter! This is the reality today. There are simply no letters to the editor and they have become a very occasional column not the regular one that it always was.

**Q. How would you compare the *Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited* under Lonrho (1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the following:**

A. Relations with the state: Under Lonrho relations with the state were poor and tense. But this was largely because of the fear in government circles that it would bring down the government. Under party and government control, this fear was removed but the newspaper still displeased the authorities. Today, relations are still complicated largely because of the belief that the newspaper is not doing enough to shield or counteract the criticism of the independent media. There is a clear; push to make them even more unprofessional the more government comes under attack.

Support from the state (subsidies, state advertising etc): These are periodic and tied to elections mainly otherwise government has little opportunity to subsidise the media because subsidies under the current financial regime are frowned upon and are mainly unacceptable and government is not ready to displease its financial partners. There appears to have been a tacit agreement in fact when government decided to hold on to the media that it would be on the basis of not subsidising it because that was the underlying argument in favour of privatizing. The real reason that the public media survives in the face of poor sales and advertising is simply that they are owned by the government otherwise bailiffs would have moved in to recover debts.

Public perception of the *Times Newspapers*: It is perceived as a purveyor of government propaganda and an unreliable source of information, therefore. It is far from the fearless and independent voice that it was known to be in previous years.



**Q. In your opinion, in what ways has the advent of democratisation affected the conditions of service for media workers and journalists in the state sector more specifically:**

A. It has been a mixed picture but where salaries and conditions of service are concerned it has been positive to a large extent. What has happened is that it is no longer possible to pay journalists below government levels or deny them fringe benefits that apply in the public service. In recent years too, government has begun to pay professionals in its service very competitively and pays generally well. So the knock-on effect on salaries in the media and conditions of service generally has been good. Many reporters are now able to at least drive through loans. But more important, they now have a union which can negotiate with management and reach agreement in terms of the ability to pay. The first is the result of the alignment to government and the second of democratisation. Previously journalists could not have a union because of the one industry one union rule.

**Q. In your opinion, how important has the introduction of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) been in regard to the following:**

A. Representation of workers: Reasonably good. The trouble is mob mentality which does not recognise real constraints on the ground like ability of the company to pay for instance. Many times superficial arguments are advanced to back pay rises followed by work stoppages which newspapers can ill-afford.

- Improving job security: Reasonably good at least there is a counter voice to management and management considers the attitude of the union before making major decisions.
- Conflict resolution between workers and employers; Not helpful at all. Unions use the mob to get their way and what they seek is not always possible or desirable.
- Expansion of communicative space for journalists: Quite good though the communications is not always of the informed type.
- professionalisation of journalism: ZUJ has plays a very limited role in this and is not supposed to by definition as it is reserved for the professional associations:

MISA and PAZA and has itself showed little interest and has in fact been negative in that it is ready to defend members who do not act professionally. The actions of ZUJ reflect the calibre of its leadership. At the outset ZUJ was reasonably well led but that is not longer the case. Today it more a stepping stone for higher things –to be noticed by government for a position as press attaché for instance.

*(Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or champion specific causes or worker situations)*

**Q. In what ways did the nationalisation of the economy in the *First Republic* affect the *Times Newspapers* in terms of the following:**

A. Advertising: The effect was positive because of the standing of the newspaper then. The new parastatals used it as the primary conduit for advertising and the newspaper was positioned to take advantage of that. Both the first and second republics were the golden era for advertising for the Times and it made a lot of money, a hell lot of money in fact as it had well developed advertising pages and policy.

- Commercialisation; Again positively generally because it was run as a fully-fledged commercial newspaper that survived on the basis of what it made.
- Circulation: Circulation figures were the highest then especially for the Sunday Times which was threatening 100,000 a Sunday. Today circulation cannot be more than 25,000 copies.

**Q. By all indications, the circulation of the *Times Newspapers* has been in decline since the *First Republic*? To what factors would you ascribe this decline in readership?**

There was no real decline in circulation during both the first and second republics. There was greater demand than was satisfied. But readership was at a level where the newspaper was profitable through advertising at those readership levels which were the

highest at the time. Policy tended to address the advertising and not circulation level since money did not come from circulation at all as a commercial newspaper, it is the commercial people who had the largest say in the direction of the paper (LONRHO). If the journalists had a stronger say circulation would have risen more than the levels it did. But at the level at which it was, the owners made more than they budgeted for annually hence the ex-gratia payments in March/April. It was never was LONRHO policy to run a large-circulation paper if they could make money without that and that is what happened. Pages were added to accommodate advertising but circulation was not increased. Complaints about the Times tended to be that it sometimes carried more advertising than news.

The decline in circulation occurred in 1990-1992 which was the period of the push for multi-party democracy. The Times backed the status-quo with the late Bwendo Mulengela as the Editor. The people were not interested in that message and sales declined drastically, very drastically to about 25,000 a day from around 70,000. After the elections in 1991 and departure of Mulengela sales improved rapidly and had built up to 55,000 and were rising rapidly until the beginning of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the IMF that led to wholesale job losses and circulation declined. Political interference which saw the newspaper as a government mouthpiece ate into its credibility and led to reduced sales. They have never improved. The decline first started with the pro-Kaunda editorial line in the 1990s, then SAP and now the reduced credibility due to political affiliation. The stagnation of circulation under LONRHO was not due to lack of demand but simply that good money could still be made from good advertisement flow without increasing circulation. It had a monopoly on advertising had there been a competitor perhaps that would have introduced a new dynamic.

**A. In what ways has the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 affected the state media in general and the *Times Newspapers* in particular (in editorial, political or economic terms):**

The main effect is reduced credibility and appeal in the face of competition from the independent media. The newspaper is seen as a purveyor of government propaganda even when this is not so. It is discredited and is no longer daring in its coverage lest it

displeases the authorities. Editors who displease the government are sacked and unlike in the past are forgotten-it is pretty frightening!

**Q. Briefly describe the impact of liberalisation on state media systems in general and the *Times Newspapers* in particular:**

A. Reduced earnings as a result of low credibility. Liberalisation has allowed the emergence of “independent” media with a populist agenda and this has ensured that government media has been pushed to the margins though the product of the independent media is not anything to write home about. But people are more prepared to believe what they publish even blatant lies!

**Q. How have the *Times Newspapers* responded to the competitive environment born of liberalisation?**

A. The newspaper itself is not in a position to respond without government say so. Its response has been largely to get closer to the government for whatever it is worth and that perhaps is the only response in the circumstances.

**Q. Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that new democracies may need to have *communal institutions* (such as state or public media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as detrimental to democracy or nation building. In your opinion, ideally, what should the role of government be in regard to the following:-**

A. A communal set up is clearly desirable i.e. in which government is involved. It is desirable because it can ensure longevity of the media houses. Many times independent media fizzles out for lack of financial wherewithal especially in Zambia but with government involvement that is unlikely to happen. However government has gone in as an investor without any other agenda. The trouble is government invests in order to obtain unquestioning support which kills the goose that lays the egg. It is not clear whether government is actually in a position to invest without this demand. But if it is

able to –invest and allow the media to operate without caveats that would be fine and would be the best. Broadly speaking it should be possible. Government’s real interest is served by an informed citizenry not one misled by propaganda.

- Media ownership: It can be a part owner or even majority shareholder but through perhaps an independent media investment company like NAMECO without a political agenda.
- Media policy: Let be determined by demands on the ground in order to ensure viability of the newspaper. If that is allowed government won’t have to subsidize. Again, after all governments have a duty to ensure that citizens are informed in an unbiased way that also is a responsibility of government even though it is rarely acknowledged.
- Privatisation: This is basically surrender to commercial interests. The danger here is that privatisation could lead to closure of media houses when commercial returns are not too attractive and in the newspaper industry they rarely are. Government should return a stake to guard against media disappearing because of ‘unattractive business climate.’ Some kind of joint ventures with government as minority shareholder should be considered.

**Q. How important is it for emerging democracies to retain communal media institutions? (Conversely, given the context of diversity and often fragility of state systems in Africa, would you recommend a continued state involvement in the media sector?)**

A. Definitely I would but with a hands off approach. Take the Times of Zambia for instance. It was 100% privately owned but the Editor was appointed by the President-it was an interesting model. When government begins to define editorial policy because of its stake that is when things go wrong because the playing field is no longer even. Government-owned press then find that they can’t tackle certain stories even though they are of the type that have the most public appeal. Thus they lose credibility but also revenue through reduced sales.

Q. Some scholars argue that complete *liberalisation* and *privatisation* of the media sector would disadvantage citizens. This is because most citizens would not have the

economic means to finance modern media systems on a national scale. This could open up the market to trans-national companies which are viewed in some ways as having negative effects on *freedom* and *justice* as do some state systems. *How do you react to this?*

A. I do not support complete liberalisation and privatisation because there are inherent dangers especially in Zambia for instance. The market is small and the revenue may not be worthwhile for an out and out commercial investor. Government involvement would be necessary to ensure survival of the media. But governments apparently do not go into the media business with “clean hands” so to speak. But they would be a stabilizing factor if they did and would at the level of the board ensure justice. The problem to me seems to be the attitude of governments towards the media if they could change accept media acting without government direction as a fact of modern life and invest with a hands off attitude, they could play a significant role. Take the BBC for instance. It is an interesting model though of course one notes certain friction at times as over the Iraq war but that is ok- differences can be there. It is better than the policy of he who pays the piper calls the tune.

**Q. To what degree-if at all- have the leadership styles of past and present republican presidents affected state media behaviour?(specific examples recommended)**

A. There's no general answer. All except perhaps Levy Mwanawasa believed to some extent at least in freedom of the press. Mwanawasa not so clearly because even as early as 1992 when there were recommendations by the media reform committee for partial privatisation Mwanawasa publicly opposed that saying the media should remain in government hands. Kaunda laid the foundation for the destruction of the public print media at least with his pseudo-socialist ideas yet he was the most tolerant of the press and even when he went overboard he had the knack to reverse himself in time. Chiluba started off well and bailed out the *Times* over its newsprint debt at his personal initiative. But he progressively became more suspicious of the media the longer he stayed in office. Rupiah Banda has had the worst treatment by the independent press but apart from seeking accurate reporting of what he has said has been the most tolerant since

coverage has included personal, very personal abuse of him and his wife. Their attitudes have differed from time to time depending on the pressures they have been under and they present a mixed picture.

**Q. If it will endure, what should public communication in Zambia look like in the next 20 years, given the challenges of liberalisation and privatisation in the last 45 years?**

A. It should definitely be a mix with government hands off investment in the media continuing to ensure stability.

**2. Phiri, J.2009. [Times/Printpak Zambia limited, 1987- to date]**

Q. In what ways has the democratisation process in Zambia impacted on state media systems specifically; and on the media sector generally? (*Democratisation here is defined by political change during the period between 1964 when Zambia became independent to date*)

A. Democratisation process has resulted in state media seeking ways to enhance their credibility and seek new ways of sustainability. For the media sector in general, democratisation has opened up the field to increasing numbers of players.

**Q. What specific benefits has the democratisation process brought to the state owned media during the following periods of political change:**

- the First Republic
- the Second Republic
- the Third Republic

A. During the Second Republic, democratisation removed the restrictive grip the State commanded over media content. During the Third Republic, there was a realisation that public media had to begin transforming themselves into sustainable entities, as significant levels of State support were no longer guaranteed.

**Q. What negative aspects-if any- has democratisation wrought on the state media in Zambia (and on the *Times Newspapers* in particular)?**

A. Greater competition can be negative if institution does not transform itself to face new reality.

**Q. How would you compare the *Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited* under Lohnro (1964-1982) ownership on the one hand; and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) on the other, in terms of editorial policy, employment policy, structure of the board, economic determination and performance, and public participation:-**

A. Editorial independence – Under Lonrho overriding interests were the promotion and protection of continental business interests of the owner Tiny Rowland. Under State control the interests of the State evolved from merely ensuring absence of content critical of the party and its government, to outright superintending of the editorial direction of the newspapers.

- Editorial policy: In both eras it remained unwritten and was enforced by force of personalities of the principal actors – the President of the Republic on one hand, and the editors he appointed, on the other.
- Employment policy – Employment policies under Lonrho appear to have favoured made light of academic qualifications and favoured the copy-boy-to-reporter system, partly as a way of restricting expenditure on staff which increased with the demand to compensate graduate staffers.
- Structure of Board of Directors (representation by non-state actors) – Lonrho used board members largely drawn from the business community, whereas under State ownership, party, government operatives have always outnumbered business community representatives.
- Economic determination (autonomy over commercial decisions) – Commercial considerations were paramount under Lonrho, whereas with State ownership came growing political considerations.



- Economic performance – The company made profit under Lonrho, and during the early years under Zambia National Holdings because structure was largely maintained. Since then it has continued making losses.
- public Participation (provision for public input in editorial pages of the newspapers)

**Q. How would you compare the *Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited* under Lohnro (1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the following?**

A. Relations with the state – Under Lonrho the relationship was managed between Rowland and the President of the Republic, while under State ownership there are many more players representing every imaginable state interest, the paramount one of course being the Presidency.

- Support from the state (subsidies, state advertising etc) – state support largely takes the form of grants given as and when the State sees fit and has funds to support particular media activities.
- Public perception of the *Times Newspapers* – Perception is predominantly of a government mouthpiece. This came out clearly in readership Survey conducted for Times by Copperbelt University.

**Q. In your opinion, in what ways has the advent of democratisation affected the conditions of service for media workers and journalists in the state sector more specifically?**

A. The process resulted in formation of Zambia Union of Journalists which has over the years continuously bargained for improvement in conditions of service for media workers.

**Q. In your opinion, how important has the introduction of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) been in regard to the following:**

- Representation of workers – In this area it has been very important.
- Improving job security – Here too there is more protection as a result of the work of ZUJ.
- Conflict resolution between workers and employers – There is now improved dialogue when conflicts arise.
- Expansion of communicative space for journalists – Has made it possible for journalist to be taken as serious stakeholder all round.
- Professionalisation of journalism – Not much impact as this is left largely to the Press Association of Zambia.

**Q. Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or champion specific causes or worker situations**

A. ZUJ has been quick to react to the increasing number of incidents of party cadres beating up journalists. One case is currently in court where hooligans are being prosecuted for beating up reporters recently.

**Q. In what ways did the nationalisation of the economy in the *First Republic* affect the *Times Newspapers* in terms of the following:**

A. Advertising - Not significantly

- Commercialisation – Weakened the company’s resolve to make profit since state support was assured.
- Circulation – Was the beginning of dwindling circulation because under-performing economy started affecting negatively the advertising volumes, and also reduced consumers’ buying power.

**Q. By all indications, the circulation of the *Times Newspapers* has been in decline since the *First Republic*? To what factors would you ascribe this decline in readership?**

A. The major factor is the general decline arising from failure of the government's economic policies.

**Q. In what ways has the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 affected the state media in general and the *Times Newspapers* in particular (in editorial, political or economic terms)**

A. It brought a shift in public expectations: from simply being dismissed as a government mouthpiece, the public started to demand that state media operate more as PUBLIC media, by taking aboard the public's interests in news content.

**Q. Briefly describe the impact of liberalisation on state media systems in general and the *Times Newspapers* in particular**

A. Major impact of liberalisation has been increased competition from new privately owned newspapers.

**Q. How have the *Times Newspapers* responded to the competitive environment born of liberalisation?**

A. Times newspapers has responded by commissioning a Readership Survey and, arising out of the reading of its recommendations, fashioning a three-year strategic plan aimed attaining sustainability and later making a profit.

Plan also supported by acquisition of new printing equipment from Taiwan. Contract for supply of the equipment was signed end of October. Value is \$2.3 million.

**Q. Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that new democracies may need to have *communal institutions* (such as state or public media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as detrimental to democracy or nation building. In your opinion, ideally, what should the role of government be in regard to the following:-**

A. Media ownership – Government still needs to be a player as the majority of the public lacks the sophistication to evaluate skewered content especially from the private media.

- media policy – providing a framework for deepening of the sector
- privatisation

**Q. How important is it for emerging democracies to retain communal media institutions? (Conversely, given the context of diversity and often fragility of state systems in Africa, would you recommend a continued state involvement in the media sector?)**

A. State involvement still desirable to foster national unity, where private media shows itself susceptible to strong commercial, ethnic or other dubious interests.

**Q. Some scholars argue that complete *liberalisation* and *privatisation* of the media sector would disadvantage citizens. This is because most citizens would not have the economic means to finance modern media systems on a national scale. This could open up the market to trans-national companies which are viewed in some ways as having negative effects on *freedom* and *justice* as do some state systems. How do you react to this?**

A. The threat of this is currently mitigated by the growth of community media that are feisty in defend local interests and the fact that it is now relatively cheaper to start a community radio or private newspaper.

**Q. To what degree-if at all- have the leadership styles of past and present republican presidents affected state media behaviour?(specific examples recommended)**

**A.** Kaunda maintained tight control on the media and on the political machinery. Chiluba was more open and was not averse to engage in media discussions even at personal level. He allowed greater freedom for media to operate. Levy Mwanawasa shifted from merely controlling state media to “aligning” himself with powerful private media to get ideas through.

**Q. If it will endure, what should public communication in Zambia look like in the next 20 years, given the challenges of liberalisation and privatisation in the last 45 years?**

**Note: follow up text message from Phiri[2011]**

**Q. John, hope u well. Just one thing: who is the Times of Zambia's top five or ten biggest advertisers (percentage wise)?**

A. Zamtel, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi Airways, ZESCO, ZRA, Road Development Agency, Health Ministry, Education Ministry.

**Q. Is zamtel your biggest spender? And is it possible to give percentages for 2008 to 2010 for at least the top five?**

A. Yes. In that order past 3 yrs.

**3. Kapata, D [Times Newspapers, Zambia Limited, 1973 - 1987]**

**Q. In what ways has democratisation in Zambia impacted on state media systems specifically; and on the media sector generally? (Democratisation here is defined by the period when Zambia became independent (1964) to date)**

A. Before Zambia's independence, media systems were skewed to serve settler interests in all respects and aspects. After independence, the trend changed with media systems becoming a little liberal and extended coverage to (African) Zambian interests but ostensibly still dominated by white interests. However, democratisation has opened up the media industry to private players and to some extent liberalised state media systems.

**Q. What specific benefits has the democratisation process brought to the state owned media during the following periods of political change:**

- **the First Republic**

- 

A. Under the First Republic, in essence it was only the government of the day which benefited from state-owned media systems in that they were used as propaganda tools to advance the one-party rule of founding President Kenneth Kaunda and his philosophy of Humanism. During this period as in the Second Republic, state-owned media got more advertising revenue as authority shunned the private media as a way of punishing them for their divergent opinions.

- **the Second Republic**

In the Second Republic after a democratically elected government of Frederick Chiluba was ushered, it brought in increased media freedoms and the country for the first time benefited from a diversity of media platform – both print and electronic. However private media systems faced intolerance from the government and did not operate freely while state-owned media operated under the influence of the government.

- **the Third Republic**

The Third Republic of President Levy Mwanawasa saw a proliferation of media systems and more media freedom. Under the Third Republic, state-owned media systems continued to toe the line of the government and enjoyed more advertisement from government and quasi-government institutions.

**Q.What negative aspects-if any- has democratisation wrought on the state media in Zambia (and on the *Times Newspapers* in particular)?**

A. Circulation of the paper has dwindled and its revenue base has hit low bottom levels. It is perceived as a government mouth piece and true to tag, the *Times Newspapers* has lost readership appeal.

**Q. How would you compare the *Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited* under Lonrho (1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the following:-**

## **A. Editorial Independence**

Under Lonrho (1964-1982), the *Times of Zambia/Printpak Limited* enjoyed Editorial Independence with its editors always in constant conflict with the authorities. During this period the publication enjoyed massive circulation and was the preferred choice for advertisers.

- **Editorial policy**

During the Lonrho days, Editorial Policy of the *Times of Zambia* was based on journalist principles and ethics.

- **Employment Policy**

**Under Lonrho, Employment Policy was based on merit and professionalism. Staff were awarded on their competence. As result of its employment policy, the paper attracted the cream of Zambian and expatriate journalists.**

- **Structure of Board of Directors (representation by non-state actors)**

The Structure of the Board of Directors was based professionalism and integrity of individuals.

- **Economic determination (autonomy over commercial decisions)**

Economic determination - only capable and competent people were appointed to run the paper. The paper was a thriving business enterprise.

## **Economic performance**

The paper operated commercially and was profitable. This was part of the reason why the ruling National Independence Party (UNIP) took it over.

- **Public Participation (provision for public input in editorial pages of the newspapers)**

There was no provision for public participation or public input in the editorial pages of the *Times of Zambia* under Lonrho. Editorial content was determined by the editorial staff.

**Q. How would you compare the *Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited* under Lonrho (1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media**

**Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the following:**

- **relations with the state**

A. Under Zambia National Holdings, National Media Corporation and the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services, the *Times of Zambia* lost its independence. Editors were appointed by the government. Although seasoned journalists, they had no commercial background and submitted to the whims of the appointing authority.

- **support from the state (subsidies, state advertising etc)**

The paper received government subsidies and state advertising support – but these were not enough to sustain the operations of the paper.

- **public perception of the *Times Newspapers***

Public perception of the *Times Newspapers* became very poor because not only did it carry half-baked articles but was seen and indeed was a propagandist for the state.

**Q. In your opinion, in what ways has the advent of democratisation affected the conditions of service for media workers and journalists in the state sector more specifically (NAMECO, compared to Zambia National Holdings)**

A. The conditions of services for workers and journalists in the state sector are no longer attractive. Firstly state media organisations are longer run commercially. The bloated staff levels have made it impossible for workers and journalists to be adequately remunerated. As a result of this state of affairs, lassitude has descended on workers and journalists in state-owned media institutions and are not only creative but downright unenthusiastic.

**Q. In your opinion, how important has the introduction of the Zambia Union of Journalists(ZUJ) been in regard to the following:**

- **representation of workers**

A. In terms of negotiating for improved conditions of service, it has a voice – but how do you extent something out of a financially struggling employer who is also heavily dependent on subsidies.

- **Improving job security**



It has no teeth. It has no influence at all. (A case in point - recently a member of ZUJ who was also a senior member of staff with *Times of Zambia* was retired at a very young age for being critical of the government – ZUJ failed to have him reinstated).

- **conflict resolution between workers and employers**

Even in this respect, ZUJ's allegiance is with the employers for fear of victimisation.

- **expansion of communicative space for journalists**

It has no capacity to agitate for more communicative space for journalists because of the moribund structure and for fear of risking ZUJ executive members' jobs.

- **professionalisation of journalism**

ZUJ cannot in its present form advance professionalism in journalism – some of its executive members are not journalists although they work for media organisations. ZUJ has failed to attract high calibre journalists because it is perceived as a mere talk shop. It could only do so if it had any influence or say in the training of journalists.

***Q. (Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or champion specific causes or worker situations)***

A. I can't recall of any instance where ZUJ acted to defend causes of its members. Right now in Zambia, there is a fierce debate going on regarding statutory and constitutional provisions for several aspects of media industry, ZUJ has not come out clearly on which side it is. ZUJ has not supported independent media which is calling for self regulation of the media other than statutory regulation as propagated by the authorities.

***Q. In what ways did the nationalisation of the economy in the *First Republic* affect the *Times Newspapers* in terms of the following:***

- **Advertising**

A. The paper's revenue from advertising went down even if government gave it more business than the private media.

- **Commercialisation**

The paper's attempts at commercialisation completely failed. The paper tried to introduce morning/evening papers - these lamentably failed. Introduction of a courier service only served to drain its meagre resources. Commercial printing at its Printpak plant also failed to succeed.

- **Circulation**

Circulation of the *Times of Zambia* has fallen to unimaginable levels. Whilst the daily print-run during its peak years with Lonrho run was almost hitting 100,000 - nowadays has it has drastically gone down to less than 20,000.

**Q.By all indications, the circulation of the *Times Newspapers* has been in decline since the *First Republic*? To what factors would you ascribe this decline in readership?**

A. Zambians have lost confidence in the paper. Its editorial content is low grade. It has lost appeal of the readers. The quality of the paper itself is of very standard with smudges all over. Its attempt to run colour adverts has completely failed.

**Q.In what ways has the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 affected the state media in general and the *Times Newspapers* in particular (in editorial, political or economic terms)**

A. Since the advent of multiparty democracy in 1991, state media and the *Times of Zambia* in particular have aligned themselves with the authorities. They have literally become praise singers of the government. Killing and non publication of articles critical of the authorities and only thriving on editorials and articles which are pleasing to the appointing authority— no matter how absurd they are to the people.

**Q. Briefly describe the impact of liberalisation on state media systems in general and the *Times Newspapers* in particular**

A. Liberalisation of state media systems in general and *Times Newspapers* in general have had no impact in the commercial running of the institutions. Rather than make run independently editorially and profitably – things have simply come in reverse and sorely independent on government coffers. Their deficits have become unbearable. They are heavily indebted to institutions such as Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA) and Pensions institutions. They don't remit their dues ZRA and statutory contributions of their workers Pensions Authorities.

**Q. How have the *Times Newspapers* responded to the competitive environment born of liberalisation?**

The Times Newspapers has failed to operate in a competitive liberalisation environment due to state interference in its editorial policy and because of being run by incompetent managers.

**A. Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that new democracies may need to have *communal institutions* (such as state or public media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as detrimental to democracy or nation building. In your opinion, ideally, what should the role of government be in regard to the following:-**

- **Media ownership**

Government in a way survives on state media. State media is critical to the credibility of the state although people are suspicious of the view. So it wouldn't be a bad idea for the state to take control media ownership but as long they let the institutions run independently and commercially viable.

- **Media policy**

It is important for government to put in place a media policy which does not infringe on press freedom and which allows freedom of expression.

- **Privatisation**

2. How important is it for emerging democracies to retain communal media institutions? (Conversely, given the context of diversity and often fragility of state systems in Africa, would you recommend a continued state involvement in the media sector?)

The continued state involvement in the media sector is crucial for its existence and survival on account that if there are no checks and balances such as a press council – government would be a mercy of the private media.

**Q. Some scholars argue that complete *liberalisation* and *privatisation* of the media sector would disadvantage citizens. This is because most citizens would not have the economic means to finance modern media systems on a national scale. This could open up the market to trans-national companies which are viewed in some ways as having negative effects on *freedom* and *justice* as some state systems. How do you react to this?**

A. Complete liberalisation and privatisation of the media although good in terms of running thriving and profitable enterprises can disadvantage the majority of people in the country in that access to them would be out of reach. This of course can bring in trans-national investors whose prime aim would be profit. So in a way, it is important for government to hold a fraction of media control.

**Q. What should public communication in Zambia look like in the next 20 years, given the challenges of liberalisation and privatisation in the last 45 years?**

A. Eventually government will lose grip of the media, especially when democracy takes strong and deep root and economic sense prevails. Loss making institutions at the expediency of government media control will not make economic sense in future.

#### 4. Miti.[Times Newspapers, Zambia Limited (1995-2008)]

**Q. How would you compare the *Times of Zambia/Print Pak Limited* under Lonrho (1964-1982) and under state ownership (Zambia National Holdings, National Media Corporation and Ministry of Information and Broadcasting) in terms of the following:**

- **relations with the state**
- **support from the state (subsidies, state advertising etc)**
- **public perception of the *Times Newspapers***

A. Under Lonrho (1964-1982) the paper's editorial independence was not as restricted or tightly controlled as it was under state ownership. In other words, the paper was more critical of government than it was under state ownership. The same applies to the paper's editorial policy, which was premised on free and fair reporting. This is unlike when the paper was under state ownership. Under state ownership, the paper's editorial policy entailed it to toe government line or back policies of the government of the day.

**Relations with the state:** Under Lonrho, the paper's could be said to be off and on in the sense that there were times when UNIP stalwarts demanded that the paper be banned because it was too critical of government or when it published stories or pictures which were deemed to be in bad taste. For example when the paper published pictures of a naked woman. Under state ownership, one would say the paper enjoyed good relations with the government as it had a say on what to and not to publish by appointing people aligned to the party and government to the position of editor-in-chief. This way news could be censored.

**Support from state:** Under Lonrho, there was little support or none at all in terms of funding, except in form of advertising. Being one of the major papers in the country at that time, with the Zambia Daily Mail, government didn't have much of a choice after all. They had to put their adverts in the same paper which they claimed was biting the finger that was feeding it. This is why threats surfaced that if the paper continued being critical of government, it would not receive any advertising from government. Under state ownership, however, the paper started receiving grants or

funding. As erratic as it might have been, but the paper got the support.

**Public Perception:** Because the paper took it upon itself to criticise the government, people viewed the paper in the positive light as it had gained their trust. In other words, the paper was playing its watchdog role on their behalf. However, under the state ownership, the paper was viewed negatively especially by those non UNIP members. To them, the paper was merely a government mouth piece, whose interest was to serve the interests of its master – the government.

**Q. In your opinion, in what ways has the advent of democratisation affected the conditions of service for media workers and journalists in the state sector more specifically (NAMECO, compared to Zambia National Holdings)**

A. In my opinion, nothing much has changed in as far as the conditions of service are concerned. Apart from introducing professional allowance, for graduates (for TOZ) the conditions of service are still much the same. With the merger of ZIS and Zana, into one body, there have been some changes in the salaries, but not much with the conditions of service.

**Q. In your opinion, how important has the introduction of the Zambia Union of Journalists(ZUJ) been in regard to the following:**

- **representation of workers**
- **Improving job security**
- **conflict resolution between workers and employers**
- **expansion of communicative space for journalists**
- **professionalisation of journalism**

***(Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or champion specific causes or worker situations)***

A. The introduction of ZUJ has helped to strengthen representation of Journalists. Yes it has also helped to improve job security.

The union has also in some instances ably mediated in disciplinary cases with management involving erring workers. Where such workers should have been fired the union has helped to negotiated for a lesser punishment. ZUJ has also enabled

journalists to network and fight for their common interest. As for professionalism, I feel ZUJ still has to do more on this, especially on training. A good example could be when ZUJ fought for fixed overtime for sub-editors.

**Q.By all indications, the circulation of the *Times Newspapers* has been in decline since the *First Republic*? To what factors would you ascribe this decline in readership?**

A. The decline in readership could be attributed to government interference in the newspaper's editorial decisions and censorship. For example, most of the stories carried in the paper are biased towards government – people say it's like a government gazette. As a result, people have a negative perception of the paper. Further, they have lost trust and interest in the paper because they tend to think, it serves government interest.

**Q.In what ways has the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 affected the state media in general and the *Times Newspapers* in particular (in editorial, political or economic terms)**

A. The introduction of multiparty politics saw the birth of the private media – the post. And other newspapers were born. This meant that the state-owned media no longer enjoyed the monopoly of news. This forced the TOZ and other state owned media to try and relax their tightly controlled editorial policies and to bring in some impartiality in covering opposition political parties. Parties which were previously were not covered were now at least given some coverage, knowing that even if they didn't cover them, the private media would. The paper had to do this or lose out on advertising to the private sector newspapers. The decline in readership resulted in the paper's loss of revenue as advertising also declined.

**Q.Briefly describe the impact of liberalisation on state media systems in general and the *Times Newspapers* in particular**

A. Liberalisation brought competition both for news as well as for revenue, which comes in through advertising. So with other newspapers on the scene, this TOZ losing out on revenue.

**Q. How have the *Times Newspapers* responded to the competitive environment born of liberalisation?**

A. The paper had to come up with other ways to rise its dwindling revenue, i.e. the paper merged with the printing company Printpak and hence TimesPrintpak. The company also had to consolidate its courier service to bring in more money

**Q. Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that new democracies may need to have *communal institutions* (such as state or public media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as detrimental to democracy or nation building. In your opinion, ideally, what should the role of government be in regard to the following:-**

- a. Media ownership
- b. Media policy
- c. Privatisation

A. Media ownership: There is no way the government will own a newspaper and have no say in what goes in that paper. As they say He who pays the piper calls the tune. So while there is nothing wrong with government owned media, it becomes dangerous in situation where only state media are in existence. For the sake of fair coverage and balance, I would rather we have both owned and stated-owned newspaper in a democracy as this will help people make decisions objectively having read both privately-owned papers and state-owned papers. I mean just having the privately-owned uncalled for criticism of the government even where it had done well in terms of service delivery.

Media policy: This is a thorn in the flesh of many governments because governments appear to hate criticism. However, where media have been privatized in a democracy, media policy should be left to the media itself to decide or regulate itself. Except for state-owned media, there is no way government will not have a say in this matter. They own the paper and pay the salaries, how can they not have a role to play directly or indirectly in the media policy? Otherwise generally media policy should be left to the media alone. Privatisation:



**Q. How important is it for emerging democracies to retain communal media institutions? (Conversely, given the context of diversity and often fragility of state systems in Africa, would you recommend a continued state involvement in the media sector?)**

A. The media is the watchdog and pillar of democracy. I believe that in a democracy it is healthy to have both state and privately-owned media. They both have an important role to play in as far as informing, educating and entertaining the citizens is concerned. As I said earlier, it help to bring about news balance. Hence I would only recommend state involvement in media, if and only if media freedom is guaranteed and the private media is allowed to thrive and operate without being muzzled.

**Q. Some scholars argue that complete *liberalisation* and *privatisation* of the media sector would disadvantage citizens. This is because most citizens would not have the economic means to finance modern media systems on a national scale. This could open up the market to trans-national companies which are viewed in some ways as having negative effects on *freedom* and *justice* as some state systems. *How do you react to this?***

A. Liberalisation and privatisation have brought about changes in communication in the media. With the availability of modern technology, the work of the media has been made relatively easier. It has become easier and quicker reporters to communicate and to get to their sources through cell phones and Internet. Given this background, one would say in the next 20 years communication would have been strengthened. People will not always have to rely on newspapers as they can go the any Internet Cafe to read the news online. This means that newspapers have to change with times to catch with the quick pace of communication to achieve their goal of informing the public. With wider communication options available, people will not want to wait for stale news.

**5. Mwanyanda.2011[Lawyer, former Journalist, Post Newspapers Zambia Limited]**

**Q. In what ways has democratisation in Zambia impacted on state media systems specifically; and on the media sector generally? (Democratisation here is defined by the parting with the colonial regime, that is, 1964 to date)**

A. There are constitutional provisions on freedom of expression enshrined in part three of the Constitution. However, there has been no enabling legislation to ensure this. In fact there are archaic pieces of legislation that continue to claw back on the media.

**Q. What specific benefits (in legal terms) has the democratisation process brought to the media (specifically state owned media) during the following periods of political change:**

A. I don't think anything has changed in legal terms. We still have repressive laws. Politically though, space has been opened for pluralistic media.

**Q. What are the key impediments, if any, in the present legal and constitutional framework in regard to freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of association and assembly (and how specifically, do they affect Journalists).**

A. There is no enabling legislation on freedom of expression; It is a constitutional provision which has no real/practical enforcement mechanism in subordinate legislation. Legislation around sedition, official secrets etc not democratic. Lack of a freedom of info law is a real impediment.

**Q. Briefly describe the significance of freedom of expression, freedom of the press and freedom of assembly and association as currently stipulated in the Constitution's Article 20(1), Article 20(2) and Article 21(1).**

A. Democracy is premised on this.

8. **What key instruments need to change in Zambia to facilitate more open debates, freedom of ownership, freedom of the press, freedom of association and assembly?**

Remove repressive laws and promulgate a FOI law.

## APPENDIX TWO

The interviews in this section were semi-structured. The aim of this exercise was to construct an insider historical perspective on the workings of the *Times* in both editorial and commercial terms. The key informants were Ridgeway Liwena, one of the first black journalists to be employed by the *Times of Zambia* in 1966. His explanations of the dichotomy between African and white counterparts working for the Lonrho owned *Times*; the editorial positioning of the first African editor-in-chief in relation the state and the multinational, provided additional substance to the understanding the challenges and experiences of the first generation of journalists in Zambia. As one of the few survivors of this generation, his reflective accounts shored up the construction of follow up, more structured questionnaires in appendix one. The second key informant is John Phiri, the current managing director of the *TimesPrintpak Zambia Limited*. His insights into the everyday experiences of working under one party and multiparty regimes; and the impact of liberal philosophy on commercialisation serve to inform this discourse.

### **6. Liwena R.2008.[Society of Senior Zambian Journalists/former Sunday Times Editor, 1966-1995]**

**Q. You were among the first Africans to Join the Times of Zambia, could you briefly describe to me the power relations between the board, the editor-in-chief and white and black employees?**

A. I joined the Times in 1966. At the time, the Board was Foreign based. We had just obtained independence and the political influence at the time was such that all foreign dominated companies should have had Zambians in their institutions. Fackson Nkandu was the first Zambian (black) News editor, John Mwansa was Managing editor appointed by Lonrho. There was a General Manager who was looking after the interest

of Lonrho. We were satisfied not so much with the salaries, but with the knowledge that now we are taking over.

**Q. What were conditions of service like at the time of joining the Times?**

One of the local conditions was that local workers (Zambians) should accommodate themselves. I was one of those who fought that. Local workers were in townships: I lived with my uncle. Lonrho said they could only provide accommodation for people from outside the country. Though we were black, we all could not be expected to accommodate ourselves.

**1. Were white employees paid differently from their black counterparts?**

Whites were paid expatriate salaries while blacks were on local conditions. We also considered ourselves expatriates since we came from different parts of the country. Eventually, the policy changed in the 1970s. With black management (under Dunstan Kamana), all the archaic policies gave into a more realistic Zambianisation policy. Dunstan Kamana changed the complexion of the paper and black people benefited.

**Q. How would you describe the editorial independence and political relations between the Times and the government at the time?**

A. Political controls started with Dunstan Kamana. His focus became more on indigenous issues. For me he was the best editor. He never directly criticised the president (Kenneth Kaunda). But, he would attack any other minister. He was fearless and he protected his staff. I do not recall a moment when a reporter was called to answer to outsiders. During his time, the *Times of Zambia* was burnt twice by UNIP cadres and Zimbabwean Freedom Fighters. There were so many demonstrations by UNIP youths (against the Times): these were vicious youths. We were called Times of liars". There were inter-party clashes between UNIP and ANC and with the coming of UPP. We saw the tribal parties come in.

**Q.At what point did you begin to discern state interference in editorial matters on the Times?**

A. Editorially, state intervention began to be felt around 1968. The General Manager did not attend editorial meetings. Lonrho maintained control of the general manager, chief accountant and advertising manager.

**Q. What were the criteria for employment of reporters and editors?**

Employment was always advertised and jobs were very competitive. I started as a letter writer to the Times. I completed my journalism certificate from Mindolo (The Africa literature Centre's journalism school) before I was engaged. One had to undergo an aptitude test to pass for employment. That is why we had better editorial staff. The *Daily Mail* was more localised than the *Times*. The British, Australian and New Zealanders who were our editors demanded very high standards.

**Q.At the time, what was the circulation of the Times Newspapers?**

A. Under Kamana, the *Times of Zambia* circulated between 60,000 and 65,000 copies daily. The Sunday Times circulated up to 70,000 copies. These figures were audited by the Audit Bureau of circulation. Things began to change in 1980 when the Zambia National Holdings (UNIP owned conglomerate) acquired major share holding in the Times.

**7.Phiri, J.2008.[TimesPrintpak Zambia limited]**

**Q. How would you describe the economic relations between the Times Newspapers and the state?**

A. "Informal". The belief is that these companies could generate their own funds. I could say there a link but it depends too much on who is the Permanent Secretary (at any given time). Right now we are getting the best support from government, especially during elections when they come up with motor vehicles: we received 8 vehicles prior to the 2006 elections. The government also instructed the Zambia National Wholesale Corporation through the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) to sell their building to the Times. The government made a down payment of k70, 000 Zambian Kwacha. The Times of Zambia paid the remaining K200 million. It is difficult to get finances from the ministry of finance if its not justified.

**Q. Could you contextualise the financial situation on the Times of Zambia?**

A. For then first time, we are serious about bringing a printing press worth K9billion. There was a subvention of K1billion in January, 2008. The Times of Zambia saved k2billion and we want to use it to make a down payment and borrow from the bank. The government does not give adequate funding, that as I said, depends on who is the Permanent Secretary. Currently, the Times of Zambia owes a lot in taxes to the Zambia Revenue Authority and the National Pensions Board.

**Q. How is the company's performance commercially?**

A. We get 80% of our revenue from advertising. Very little comes from circulation. Our circulation is 10,000 copies daily.

**Q. How can you explain the drastic drop in circulation?**

A. New, independent newspapers, affordability. Also, we lost the Cell Tel account because we cannot print in colour. In the past, institutional subscriptions accounted for most of our sales. Nowadays, many people read the paper from the office. One paper covers 100 people. The other aspect is the distribution line. Solwezi is just about the only rural area that gets the paper. Vans are less than 10. We need up to 20 to cover the country adequately. In the past we had even introduced a courier service.

**Q. Has the advent of technology helped?**

A. With computer technologies, things can be eased. ZANIS (Zambia National Information Services) are putting printing presses in every province. If that works out, we can exploit it. Only two printing presses are set up. We are particularly interested in Chipata (in the eastern province).

**Q. What measures need to be taken to improve the performance of the company?**

A. We should strengthen board oversight in terms of economic governance. We need a chair with a business pedigree than politics. The General Manager position was phased out and that of Managing Director created. But the editor-in-chief is weak in business terms and that is the difficulty. The board recognises that. But perhaps we need to create a position of Business Development Manager. The company still has a base: it controls 70% to 80% of the advertising market. But we have problems with auditing; the last audit was done three years ago. There has been a backlog and records are not up to date. The Post Newspapers are well run. The Times of Zambia could not borrow from the bank because of no audited records.

**Q. Are the unions and civil society represented on the board?**

A. There is no trade union or civil society representation. The people who have served are political operatives.

**Q. What is the political relationship between the Times and the state?**

A. Currently, the arrangements are disorganised. Previously all the state needed to do was appoint the editor-in-chief. The relationship was a bit more remote. But with the change of government, the relationship has become more obtrusive: anyone in the party or government can come in and give instructions. In the past it had to be the minister of information. Now there is a lot of indiscipline. And previously, there was no call from a deputy minister. There is a need for guidelines. In Tanzania for example, there is a



charter. You may not criticise individuals in government over policy matters but you can criticise the policy. Here, there is no guideline.

**Q. How would you compare state-times relations under the multiparty system and the one party state?**

Democratisation brings indiscipline. Under the one party state, it was easier to define what the state's political interest was. Nowadays, it is difficult to know what the president thinks. There are so many individual interests at play. In the one party state, when KK (President Kenneth Kaunda) made a statement, you knew what you could do and not do – now it is difficult.

**Q. Are the staff politicised?**

A. I found that there was no discipline. Reporters were in a habit of writing dossiers to State House (official residence of the republican president). Somebody wrote a dossier saying that I was funded by plunderers. A reporter submitted a list of who supports who. These things determine higher level promotions. It is now a pattern. The incentives are greater job security for people directly related to the state. There is an incentive to be posted to the diplomatic service/ and government positions.

**Q. What are the criteria for promotion on the Times of Zambia? Is there any political imperative to it?**

A. Job evaluation. But promotion has not always been based on serious evaluation. I have made suggestions that would allow heads of departments to scrutinise recommendations, critic them before notches are awarded.

**Q. How has the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) performed under the circumstances?**

A. PAZA is failing because of low intellectual capacity. People are voted in based on friendships; most senior people do not attend PAZA. The highest ranking officer is a news editor. Yet when PAZA was formed, it was headed by an editor-in-chief. These days' students are bussed in from private colleges for contenders to win votes.

**Q. How would you describe the effect of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) on media freedom and on the welfare of journalists?**

A. ZUJ has similar problems. One of the problems is simple lack of understanding of issues. We have what I would call 'uninformed militancy'. The first committee of ZUJ in 1991 had exposure and experience and was therefore better. At the time ZUJ was registered 'illegally' because we had the 'one industry one union policy'. Journalists were aligned to the Typographical Workers Union. But people in the registration office wanted change and allowed us to register. When registering, we could not come up with 100 names. We then got employees from ZNBC, ZIS etc, just to make the numbers. Broadcasting workers still belonged to the National Union of Communication Workers.

Generally, conditions of service have improved since ZUJ was formed.

## **APPENDIX THREE**

The overall aim of this line of inquiry was to establish the impact of market and labour liberalisation on unionisation and professionalisation of Journalism. The two key informants in this section are the President of the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) and the President of the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA). The broad areas of inquiry were:

- Conditions that led to the formation of the organisations
- The impact of democratisation on state media systems
- The role of organised labour in influencing worker welfare
- The impact of labour and market liberalisation on unionisation

The notable feature of this section is that the President of ZUJ responded to questions mainly by providing official documents, constitutions, statements, collective agreements and memos, which have informed the analysis in Chapter Five. The written responses were there brief and delivered against this background.

### **8. Sakala, A. 2010.[Press Association of Zambia]**

#### **Q. When and why was the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) formed?**

A. The Paza began as a small gathering of journalists in the 1960s and these were mostly based in Lusaka. Later in the 1970s, the gathering transformed itself into Lusaka press club with the main objective of promoting professionalism and protecting and advancing the cause of journalists. The other objective was to provide a forum where decision makers would interact with the public by way of holding Talk shows.

In the 1980s, members of the Lusaka press club decided to form a national

association for journalists and called the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) with the main objectives of promoting professional journalisms, advocate for media freedom, good governance and accountability in public office.

It is run by an elected board and has a secretariat head by an executive secretary.

**Q. What is the membership portfolio of the PAZA (please indicate trends; whether membership has grown since formation and the types of institutions which the union represents?)**

A. The membership of paza is from both private and public media institutions as well as public relations practitioners. This includes both individual and institutional membership. The composition includes state run news papers, national broadcaster, news agency, community radio stations and some free lance journalists.

**Q.What is the proportion of private media membership compared to state media membership in the PAZA?**

A. About 40 percent of the members are from the private media and this because this category of journalists is split with MISA (ZAMBIA).

**Q. How many PAZA members are there in the Times/Printpak?**

A. Times/Printpak has about 70 members.

**Q. By what means is the PAZA funded? (membership subscriptions, institutional support, etc)**

A. Paza receives funds from member's subscriptions from both individual and institutional members. It also receives support from donors and institutions that from time to time support paza programmes and projects.

**Q. In what ways has the democratisation process in Zambia influenced the formation of the PAZA, if at all? (*Democratisation here is defined by political***

***change during the period between 1964 when Zambia became independent to the present day)***

A. The democratisation has helped a lot of ways in that it has in a way encouraged journalists to demand for greater media freedom and recognition of the role that the media plays in development of a country.

This has been especially so after Zambia's return to Multi-party politics in 1990 as Paza has in partnership with other media associations been lobbying for reforming of media laws by way of either amending or repealing the current pieces of legislation that affect media operations. Paza has also been calling for amendment of the constitutional provisions on the media.

**Q. What were the major differences in relation to the working circumstances of journalists before PAZA was formed and after its formation, in terms of the following:**

- Representation by professional bodies
- Legal support from professional bodies
- Professional practice by journalists
- Relations with the state

A. Before Paza was formed and after it became active, the journalists now have professional representation and government and institutions now regularly consult Paza. For example government has invited Paza to sit on the constitution review bodies. The Anti-corruption commission also solicited Paza's view when a national anticorruption policy was being formulated. There has been legal support from the Legal resources foundation, which is a body which offers free legal services.

This was especially done when we carried out a campaign for media law reforms like at a time paza was calling for the amendment of ZNBC act, enactment of the Independent broadcasting authority (IBA) act. In terms of professional practice by journalists has raised awareness and promoted ethical and

professional journalism. For example in 2006, paza undertook a country wide awareness and sensitisation programme on the electoral code of conduct which contained sections of how the media are expected to conduct elections coverage.<sup>2</sup> As for the relations with the state, there has been a significant improvement as earlier stated although sometimes this depends on issues at hand and positions taken by Paza but generally I can safely say that paza is the first media body that the state consults on many matters.

**Q. What would you say is PAZA's biggest achievement in addressing matters of press freedom, media independence and professional practice in the state owned media? (Particularly, relating to the *Times Newspapers* and the *Zambia Daily Mail*)**

A. Honestly, this is a difficult one because situation change according to circumstances. For instance when we raised the need for balanced coverage during elections, there was some level adherence to the electoral code of conduct but with time and pressure from shareholders, this is slowly being ignored. However, the importance of balancing stories i.e. getting both or all sides of a story seems to catch on very well.

**Q. Describe in quantitative terms, how many legal interventions PAZA has deployed in defence of journalists in the state owned media and their outcomes?**

A. In 1991 Paza obtained an injunction to restrain media heads of the Times of Zambia, Zambia Daily Mail and Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) for alleged biased coverage. This allowed the three institutions to give balanced coverage in competing parties in 1991 elections although it was only for a short period.

In 1997, Paza went to court and successfully petitioned high court to rule that it would be a violation of media freedoms if the state imposed statutory regulation. This caused the state to with shelf plans to introduce a media council bill.

Paza together with other media bodies in 2005 challenged the state on whether the minister of information and broadcasting had power to veto nominees to sit on an adhoc selection committee meant to choose board members at IBA and ZNBC.

Initially the High court ruled in favour of Paza that the minister did not have such authority. However the decision was later overturned by the Supreme Court.

**Q. Does PAZA have a code of ethics, if so, describe its key elements?**

A. Yes it does and the key elements are impartiality, objectivity, accuracy, truthfulness, honesty, no free gifts from news sources, corruption free, balanced and unbiased reporting, transparency and equal treatment of news sources regardless of sex, race or status in society

**Q. Describe the impact of PAZA's code of ethics on journalistic practices in the state owned media?**

A. The impact had been limited and this largely due to influence from shareholders exerted on the heads of state run media.

**Q. What are the major impediments-if any-to the implementation of PAZA's code of ethics and practice in the state owned media?**

A. First is the insecurity faced by heads of these media institutions. The appointment of these functionaries are largely political and can be removed at any time. It appears that appointing authority expects that the institutions to toe the line of the party in power and therefore give them favourable coverage by promoting party interests. This in a way hinders the practice of ethical journalism and professionalism is sometime ignored to please the powers that be.

The other aspect is that some journalists are just ill-trained and in recent years, the employment system has not totally been on merit as some journalists are imposed on these media institutions by external forces.

**Q.Does PAZA participate in decision making structures of the state owned media or privately owned media (membership on the boards of directors, consultative forums in the development of institutional policies and procedures)**

A.Paza only participates at consultative level especially for community media although at one time, an executive secretary of Paza was a board member at one of the state dailies.

**Q.In what ways, if at all, has the PAZA influenced government media policies and what, in your view, was their impact on the state owned print media?**

A. Paza participated in the formulation of the media policy which has since expired. The association has also on several occasions made submissions to parliamentary select committees on media but quite honestly it is difficult to measure the impact on state owned media.

**Q.What is the PAZA's position on the privatisation of state media systems in Zambia? (Should they or should they not be privatised? If not, what alternative media models does the PAZA suggest in regard to a restructured media system in Zambia)**

A. The association supports the privatisation of the state media because it has proved difficult to have state media that will truly serve public interest. At the moment the state media always get trapped into serving partisan political interests. Privatisation with different owners will add diversity and plurality to the media landscape and since private owners have to compete, they will be forced to engage in more professional and competitive journalism and this may benefit the public

i.



**Q.In your view, how would PAZA and its membership be affected by the total privatisation of state media systems**

A.Paza's membership may not be affected adversely in terms of losing membership and hopefully the association's aspirations may be enhanced as the private sector seems to be more receptive to PAZA's objectives.

**Q.Emerging discourses on media privatisation and liberalisation suggest that new democracies may need to have *communal institutions* (such as state or public media systems) unique to their own contexts to foster political stability. Government ownership of the media should not therefore be seen as detrimental to democracy or nation building. How do you react to this?**

A. This idea seems good on paper but given the experience and practice in Zambia, this may just be a continuation of the status quo. The problem is there is generally a lack of integrity and presumption of good faith in management of public affairs. The temptation to advantage and gain undue benefit seems to have polluted the whole public service and is especially worse in the political arena, unfortunately, politicians in this context always have the last and final say.

In our situation this has stagnated rather than moved the democratic process.

Thank you

### **9. Chonya, M.2010.[Zambia Union of Journalists]**

**Q. When and why was the Zambia Union of Journalists (ZUJ) formed?**

A. It was formed in 1992 to represent the interests of journalists

**Q. What is the membership portfolio of the ZUJ (please indicate trends; whether membership has grown since formation and the types of institutions which the union represents?**

A. 15-100-300. The membership has grown since its inception

**Q. What is the proportion of private media membership compared to state media membership in the ZUJ?**

A. ZUJ does not have private media membership

**Q. By what means are the ZUJ funded? (membership subscriptions, institutional support, etc)**

A. Membership subscriptions

**Q. In what ways has the democratisation process in Zambia influenced the formation of the Zambia Union of Journalists, if at all? (*Democratisation here is defined by political change during the period between 1964 when Zambia became independent to date*)**

A. It had been influenced in that democracy was introduced in 1991

**Q. Before the formation of the ZUJ, some media workers belonged to the National Union of Communication Workers. How would you compare the representation of journalists before the formation of the ZUJ and in the present day (under the ambit of ZUJ)**

A. The representation before was poor and with the formation of ZUJ had tremendously improved

**Q. Describe the impact of collective agreements on the status of workers on state media systems in terms of the following:**

**a. conditions of service**

- b. job security
- c. Promotion of freedom of expression *(Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or champion specific causes of workers, including editors' in chief)*
- d. Labour rights *(Please cite any useful examples of where ZUJ has acted to protect, defend or champion specific causes of worker situations, including editors' in chief)*
- e. promotion of ethics and codes of practice

A. Job security is there. Promotion of freedom of expression is there though the state media is controlled by government. It is there and ZUJ has acted wherever workers had gone on strike to express their displeasure on certain issues and management had threatened to fire them

**Q. Does the ZUJ participate in decision making structures of the state owned media or privately owned media (membership on the boards of directors, consultative forums in the development of institutional policies and procedures)**

A. No ways

**Q. In your view, are the economic conditions in Zambia conducive to the growth of privately owned media?**

A. No.

**Q. In what ways, would the growth of privately owned media or lack of it, affect the ZUJ?**

A. It would be affected in that private media do not allow their workers to belong to a union. This would result in the loss of members for ZUJ.

Chonya M.2010.[Zambia Union of Journalists][Follow up interview by telephone]

**Q. In our earlier discussion you indicated that private media owner do not allow their workers to participate in the union. How do you explain the lack of membership in ZUJ by public service workers?**

A. The government and the public service unions undermine our efforts to recruit civil servants. This is because they see us as competitors. Lately we have been in talks with Broadcasting media workers. They have been discussing the formation of the Zambia Union of Broadcasters and Information Disseminators (ZUBID). ZUJ has been discussing with ZUBID about collaboration and a possible merger.

## APPENDIX FOUR

This section represents the follow on conversations with respondents, mainly to seek clarity on interviews already held (presented in appendix one). The key feature of this appendix is the communication from Mwaba Phiri, a former editor of the Z Magazine published by the then Zambia Information Services (ZIS). Currently Phiri is Executive Producer at the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). A follow up discussion with Arthur Simuchoba on the circumstances that led to his dismissal as managing editor of the *Times of Zambia* is also included.

### E-MAILS

I was supported by the ZUJ who paid the legal costs. No reason was given for the termination and under the contract they were not obliged to give any reasons

On 9/1/10, Kondwani Chirambo <[kchirambo@idasa.org.za](mailto:kchirambo@idasa.org.za)> wrote:

> Greetings Mr Simuchoba,  
>  
> I need to establish something about the case involving your suspension  
> from the Times back in 1994/5:  
> 1. Were you supported by PAZA/ZUJ or by one or the other (if so in what  
> ways)  
> 2. who financed the legal costs  
> 3. On what grounds was your contract terminate in the end (if it is not  
> too personal).  
>  
> Regards  
>  
> --  
> Kondwani Chirambo  
> Director  
> Governance and AIDS Programme  
> Institute for Democracy in South Africa  
> tel: 27-12-3920556  
> cell: 072171

Ok, the contract was terminated after the the court had reinstated me. In order words they used the discretionary clause in the contract to terminate it without reference to the court action. The court action could prevent them from doing so. I never worked with Nyirenda. He came after me. There was no managing Director in my time. Sorry for delay. My internet was down though I saw the query earlier  
Keep well  
Arthur Simuchoba

On Wed, Sep 22, 2010 at 3:21 AM, Kondwani Chirambo <[kchirambo@idasa.org.za](mailto:kchirambo@idasa.org.za)> wrote:

Hi,

Sorry another point of clarification; you won your case through the help of ZUJ, and were re-instated. Were you then retired or your contract was again terminated? Lastly, as managing editor, was the managing director (Nyirenda) your immediate supervisor or was his job simply to deal with commercial matters-at that point?

On 2010/09/03 10:19 AM, Arthur simuchoba wrote:

I was supported by the ZUJ who paid the legal costs. No reason was given for the termination and under the contract they were not obliged to give any reasons

On 9/1/10, Kondwani Chirambo<[kchirambo@idasa.org.za](mailto:kchirambo@idasa.org.za)> wrote:  
Greetings Mr Simuchoba,

I need to establish something about the case involving your suspension from the Times back in 1994/5:

1. Were you supported by PAZA/ZUJ or by one or the other (if so in what ways)
2. who financed the legal costs
3. On what grounds was your contract terminate in the end (if it is not too personal).

Regards

--

Kondwani Chirambo  
Director  
Governance and AIDS Programme  
Institute for Democracy in South Africa  
tel: 27-12-3920556  
cell: 072171

No bother KC. ZIS had no policy along the lines of professional qualifications. If there was one it was not enforced. ZIS employed school-leavers (Form two or Form Five) who usually made their way up the ranks via long service. Long service in fact played a stronger role in one's promotion than mere qualification. Some of our Directors rose in this manner having bettered their academic qualifications with an Evelyn Hone College diploma while at work.

So you usually expected some kind of promotion after your diploma but it was your service (and how savvy you were the the bosses) that counted.

Remember I was the first one to obtain a degree in the department. I wasn't given any promotion until three years later when I became Publications Editor/Manager. The dept just didn't know how to treat the

degree holders.

Since I worked next to the Ministry of agriculture in Ndola I noticed that there was a more defined policy regarding qualifications and ranks in that ministry as they had had a lot of staff with professional qualifications from Diplomas and degrees.

-----Original Message-----

From: Kondwani Chirambo [<mailto:kchirambo@idasa.org.za>]

Sent: 20 September 2010 10:09 PM

To: Mwaba Phiri

Subject: some help

Mwaba, hope you well. Could you give me some help:  
-I need to know how the government classified journalists in terms of scales in your time at ZIS:

- 1) those with degrees
- 2) those with diplomas and certificates
- 3) those without any formal qualifications

Sorry for the bother.

Personal communication to John Phiri, 2011.[Managing Director Times Printpak Zambia Limited] [SMS]:

Q. Is Zamtel your biggest spender? And is it possible to give percentages for 2008-2010 for at least the top five?

A. Zamtel, Airtel, MTN, Zambezi Airways, Zesco, ZRA, Road Development Agency, Healthy Ministry, Education Ministry, Zanaco. In that order past 3 yrs.

## KEY INFORMANTS

Name of respondent	Organisation (current or previous)	Position	Contact
John Phiri	<i>TimesPrintpak Zambia Limited</i>	Managing Director	Cell: 00260955882813 <a href="mailto:Phiriwaz@yahoo.com">Phiriwaz@yahoo.com</a> Office: 260-211-229076/226949/221695
Arthur Simuchoba	<i>Executive Issues, (Times Newspapers)</i>	Editor (and former managing editor, <i>TimesPrintpak</i> )	00260977820626 asimuchoba@gmail.com
Ridgeway Liwena	Society of Senior Zambian Journalists (Formerly, <i>Sunday Times of Zambia</i> )	President (and former editor, <i>Sunday Times of Zambia</i> )	E-mail: <a href="mailto:rliwena.lippuho@zamwa">rliwena.lippuho@zamwa</a> Tel: 00260966755698
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