

COMMUNITY RADIO BROADCASTING  
IN ZAMBIA: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE

by

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## SUMMARY

This study is a policy investigation of community radio broadcasting in Zambia. The emergence of this tier of broadcasting can be traced to the 1990s, following the country's policy of politico-economic liberalisation. The state broadcasting system had hitherto reigned supreme. Based upon a *focused synthesis* of a range of historical, political, policy, regulatory and other factors, within the context of participatory development communication, this study proposes a normative policy model for community radio broadcasting in Zambia.

To begin with, the study focuses on the historical factors that have influenced the development of community radio broadcasting in the country, particularly in the period before and after 1991. This historical analysis establishes the fact that the *shape* that community radio broadcasting has assumed in Zambia is largely reflective of the state-centric policy-making regime. This policy-making regime is itself a legacy of British colonialism.

Next, the study offers a conceptual framework of community radio broadcasting. It analyses several theoretical antecedents upon which the conceptual edifice of community radio broadcasting would seem to be built. In particular, the study explores the contributions of *media effects* and *normative media* theories towards the conceptual underpinnings of community radio broadcasting. Furthermore, as an attempt at establishing some empirical referents for developing a community radio broadcasting policy for Zambia, the study delves into a comparative analysis of trends in broadcast policy and regulatory practices throughout the world, with a special focus on Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Australia. This comparative policy analysis reveals differentiated levels of sophistication of policy-cum-regulatory models relating to community radio broadcasting. This provides a wealth of chequered experiences for Zambia to learn from. To further substantiate the case for a policy model, the study examines selected community radio initiatives in Zambia.

Finally, based upon this focused synthesis, the study proposes a normative policy model for community radio broadcasting in Zambia. The policy proposal, informed by the assumptions of the *group* and *organised anarchy* models of policy-making, seeks to promote community radio broadcasting in terms of its vision, regulatory structures, funding, training, facilities, technology, production of local content and research.

Key terms:

Community; Community radio broadcasting; Community development; Policy formulation; Development communication; Focused synthesis; Participatory communication; Broadcast policy; Policy models; Policy analysis

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# CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

## 1.1 A geopolitical background to Zambia



Figure 1. **Map of Zambia** (Geography IQ 2003)

Zambia, a sub-Saharan African country, is completely landlocked. It covers an area of 753,000 kilometres, and shares borders with eight countries: Malawi and Mozambique to the east; Zimbabwe, Botswana and Namibia to the south; Angola to the west; and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) and Tanzania to the north. With a population of about 9.3 million people, of which 50.8 percent are female (Zambia. Central Statistical Office 2002), the country boasts seven major language groups, namely: Bemba, Njanja, Tonga, Kaonde, Lozi, Lunda and Luvale. There are over seventy-two (72) dialects spoken in Zambia.

For administrative purposes, Zambia is divided into nine provinces and seventy-two districts. The nine provinces are Central, Copperbelt, Eastern, Luapula, Lusaka, Northern, North-Western, Southern and Western provinces. The capital city of the country is Lusaka, which accounts for fourteen (14) percent of the population (Zambia. Central Statistical Office 2002:13). Southern province harbours Zambia's tourist capital, Livingstone, named after the British explorer-missionary, Dr. David Livingstone. It is here that the mighty Zambezi River gracefully meanders its way only to build up into a violent cascade that is the Victoria Falls – one of the Seven Wonders of the World. Other major cities include Ndola and Kitwe.

Zambia has a tropical climate with three distinct seasons: the cool and dry season which starts in April and ends in mid-August; the hot and dry season between mid-August and about early November; and the hot and wet season for the remainder of the year. The high rainfall areas are the Copperbelt, Luapula, Northern and North-Western provinces.

Agricultural production is mainly concentrated in Southern, Eastern, Central and Copperbelt provinces (Zambia. Central Statistical Office 2001:xiii,15).

The country is one of the highly urbanised in sub-Saharan Africa, with about thirty-nine (39) percent of the population living in urban areas (Zambia Review 2003:5).

Zambia's economy is dominated by copper exports, accounting for over seventy (70) percent of its export earnings (Zambia. Ministry of Finance and National Planning 2002). Alongside this are a series of measures aimed at implementing the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) entered into in collaboration with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

Among these measures are: the liberalisation of the economy; the privatisation of state firms; the deregulation of the exchange rate; and the public service restructuring (Zambia. Ministry of Finance and National Planning 2002:35).

Zambia's currency is the Kwacha (ZMK) which, at the time of this study, was trading at ZMK4850.00 to US\$1.00 (*The Post* 2003:8).

Historically, Zambia's development is directly linked to British colonial rule. With the opening up of trade routes from the east and west coasts of Africa by the Arabs and the Portuguese in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Zambia began to experience a wave of colonialist expansion. It was not until the second half of the century that the country had its first contact with British explorers, missionaries and prospectors. It was not long before this first contact gave way to the chartered British South Africa (B.S.A) Company of Cecil Rhodes, a company which subsequently won the first mineral rights in the country. Soon after this, Zambia came under the colonial rule of the British Empire in the name of a "Crown protectorate" (Kasoma 1986).

However, in 1948, nationalist sentiment became evident in what was then called Northern Rhodesia. The welfare societies set up for indigenous Northern Rhodesians (now Zambians) became a forum for political agitation. It was during this time that the first nationalist party – the African National Congress (ANC) – was formed. In 1958, another party – the United National Independence Party (UNIP) - was born under the leadership of Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda.

On 24 October 1964, after a successful settlement of Zambia's independence at the Lancaster House talks in the United Kingdom, a new republic was born. The nation, now renamed *Zambia*, was led by Kaunda as its first President.

## **1.2 Setting out the background to the study**

As noted above, Zambia gained its political independence from Britain on 24 October 1964. In 1973, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), a movement that led the country to its liberation, declared the new republic a *One-Party State*, effectively banning multi-party politics. This ushered in the so-called Second Republic.

Coupled with this was the enunciation of the philosophy of *humanism* by Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda, the first president of independent Zambia. The ideology of humanism

stressed the 'supremacy' of the state over and above the individual. Thus, all public institutions, including the media, became subservient to the state (Moore 1991).

This ideo-political structure was challenged in 1991 when the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) dislodged Dr. Kaunda's UNIP from power. This was the beginning of the Third Republic, a political dispensation that was followed by some legislative and policy changes relating to the mass media industry in the country. This is discussed in greater detail later in chapter two.

One particularly significant policy move by the MMD Government was the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS) 1996 *Information and Media Policy* framework paper, revised in 1999. Making submissions before the Parliamentary Committee on Information Broadcasting Services in 1999, the then MIBS Permanent Secretary, Ms. Suzanne Sikaneta, argued that the ministry's policy paper was a culmination of a consultative process involving key stakeholders in the media industry, such as the media themselves, media freedom activists and the government itself (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 1999).

However, civil society movements, especially media related ones, such as the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) (Sikazwe 2000) and the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA) (Chembo 2000), have repeatedly argued that they were not fully consulted in the development of this policy.

Interestingly, the policy framework makes very general statements about 'community radio' or 'community media'. This seems to reflect the fact that the development of community radio-friendly policy has not been moving at the same pace as the rapid developments in broadcasting and telecommunications worldwide. Several reasons can be given for this.

Firstly, although the phenomenon of community radio is not new on the African continent (Mtimde, Bonin, Maphiri & Nyamaku 1998), it was only after 1991 that it began to receive official recognition in Zambia. Following the liberalisation of the

politico-economic landscape, the media industry was opened up to private capital, with the result that several financiers began to apply for radio broadcasting licences.

Secondly, since community radio is *just* beginning to emerge as an important medium of local communication in Zambia, there is little comprehensive, systematic and coherent research data on the phenomenon. This may, in turn, explain why the formulation of policy has largely been neglected. Noteworthy is the fact that in the absence of such policy, the administering of the community radio field has not been effective and satisfactory to many community media initiators.

Thirdly, the Government *itself* has not actively pursued the formulation of a well-articulated policy framework for community radio broadcasting. Over the years, there have been verbal pronouncements which, unfortunately, have not been translated into concrete policy action. In part, this has resulted in some misconception about what constitutes 'community radio'. For instance, Radio Phoenix, a privately owned, commercial FM radio station, was given a licence in 1996 on the premise that it was a 'community radio' station. However, some years down the line, its proprietors have ceased to measure themselves against the standards used by such movements as the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC) to define community radio. These standards are discussed in detail in chapter three.

This misconception has clearly not been addressed by the *Information and Media Policy* paper of 1996 although it sees the setting up of "community-based media" as one of the prerequisites for "promoting and facilitating the growth of a sustainable media industry, capable of enhancing free flow of information and freedom of expression for national development over the 1996-2005 period" (Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1996). Nor has it been adequately addressed in the revised draft policy paper of 1999 (Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1999).

Despite this ambivalence in policy, between 1994 and 2000, several private radio stations have emerged. By 2000, a total of eleven (11) construction permits/licences had been issued.

This study, therefore, seeks to explore and analyse policy issues relating to community radio broadcasting in Zambia. Overall, the rationale underpinning this study is that there is need for a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of community radio. If indeed policy research is defined as the process of conducting research on, or analysis of, a fundamental social problem in order to provide policy makers with pragmatic, action-oriented recommendations for alleviating the problem (Majchrzak 1984:12), the need for a deeper insight into the structures and processes of community radio broadcasting cannot be over-emphasised. In this vein, the study is meant to assist the government and practitioners alike in their quest to develop a more coherent, consistent and comprehensive policy framework that will streamline the functions of community radio broadcasting within the development objectives formulated by the government or by non-governmental community radio initiators or motivators. Historically, most radio stations set up in Zambia have almost invariably invoked the concept of 'community radio' to justify their existence. In part, this study is motivated with this observation in mind.

### **1.3 Statement of the problem**

The government's 1996 policy paper (Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1996), revised in 1999, outlines three objectives for 'community media', namely:

1. Promoting civic education on people's rights, duties and responsibilities to enable them to participate fully in the democratic governance of the country;
2. Promoting HIV/AIDS awareness in communities and creating public awareness in times of epidemics and disasters; and
3. Disseminating community development information.



This policy framework assumes that, in contrast to the somewhat 'elitist' national broadcasting system and the emerging privately owned commercial broadcasting services, community radio emanates from a realisation that the information needs of the community, whether the 'community' is defined in terms of geographical location or shared interests, are critical to an effective community broadcasting system. In a word: the policy assumes that community radio should fundamentally be a grassroots media system.

Therefore, this current study has two basic assumptions. Firstly, community radio must exist to serve the community for which it is set up. As Wigston (1994) argues, 'community' implies a grassroots approach to the operation of the station within a specifically identifiable group of people, with an implied criticism of mainstream media, brought about by the marginalisation of that particular group. Secondly, it is possible to attain some, if not all, of such commonly known ideal-typical attributes of community radio as "ethos, representivity and governance, staffing and institutional organisation, programming production and community participation, and funding and sustainability" (Teer-Tomaselli 2000) through a coherent, consistent and comprehensive policy framework.

However, these assumptions underpinning both the government's policy paper and this study can be *problematized*. What is 'community radio'? Indeed, what is 'community'? Who defines what is 'community radio' and 'community'? Are there standards that government can impartially use in determining which applicants are given 'community radio' licences? Even when such licences are granted, is there a guarantee that successful applicants will live up to the community radio imperative of promoting 'grassroots' rather than 'elitist' voices? What policy model, then, can best ensure that 'community radio' lives up to most, if not all, of its attributes, as discussed in chapter three?

In short: the research problem under investigation can be set out, firstly, as an attempt to analyse the dynamics of community radio broadcasting in Zambia in

relation to the rest of the globe, and secondly, based on this comparative analysis, to propose a policy model for the community radio broadcasting sector in the country.

#### **1.4 Objectives of the study**

This study aims to:

- Analyse the historical context that has shaped the evolution of the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting in Zambia.
- Discuss the rationale for community radio broadcasting.
- Define community radio broadcasting in the Zambian context.
- Propose a policy model for community radio broadcasting in Zambia.

#### **1.5 Statement of research questions**

Related to the problem and objectives outlined above, this study sets out to answer the following research questions:

- What historical factors have shaped the development of community radio broadcasting in Zambia?
- What is community radio broadcasting?
- Is there a need for community radio broadcasting in Zambia?
- What are the problems associated with community radio broadcasting?
- What policy model for community radio broadcasting can be suggested for Zambia?

#### **1.6 Methodology**

The methodological approach used is the “focused synthesis”. This qualitative research technique is dependent on already existing information (Majchrzak 1984:59).

What might be referred to as the *data-inclusiveness* of this research technique is brought home when Majchrzak (1984:59) quotes a study undertaken by Burton for the Agency for International Development (AID) on the rural water supply problems in developing countries. The research effort was

based upon a survey of recent available and accessible literature; on my own field experience in the past five years in Africa and Latin America; and on discussions with individuals at the Ross Institute, International Reference Centre for Community Water Supply in the Hague, the World Health Organization, and the British Ministry for Overseas Development.

Whereas focused synthesis may be very much like traditional literature reviews by involving the selective review of written materials and existing research findings relevant to the particular research questions, it must not be confused with the latter.

The following distinctions may be advanced:

- A typical focused synthesis discusses information obtained from a variety of sources beyond published articles; it also engages in discussions with experts and stakeholders, anecdotal stories, personal past experience of the researcher, unpublished documents, staff memoranda, and published materials.
- Focused synthesis, unlike a literature review which seeks only to describe sets of research studies and identify gaps or areas needing more research, uses information sources to the extent that they directly contribute to the overall synthesis.
- While most traditional literature reviews are used as stepping-stones for subsequent research, focused synthesis tends to be used alone in a technical analysis in such a way that the results of the synthesis are themselves the results of the policy research effort (Majchrzak 1984:59-60).

In varying degrees, therefore, the following modes of data *generation* and analysis served to answer the research questions as posed above:

## 1. Interviewing of key stakeholders

This was done through a variety of data generation techniques, such as talking to community radio station officials and other stakeholders by telephone, talking to some of them in a face-to-face interview and, where possible, asking for information by e-mail.

## 2. Direct researcher experience

The rationale for this data generation technique is that in qualitative research the researcher is an integral part of the data. In most instances, this is referred to as *direct observation*. In fact, without the active participation of the researcher, no data exist (Wimmer & Dominick 1997:84). In this case, since the liberalisation of the media industry in 1994, this researcher has developed a keen interest in “mapping” the media terrain in Zambia, including the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting and how it has been developing over the years. As is typical of the focused synthesis technique, some of this researcher’s experience in this regard has been brought to bear upon this research project. This experience being referred to here is documented in some published works. To that end, attention can be drawn to some of the published works by this researcher.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, as Yin (1994:86-87) argues, such observational evidence is often useful in providing additional information about the topic being studied. Furthermore, the ‘direct researcher experience’ technique was implicitly drawn upon by Prof. F. P. Kasoma when he extensively adduced as evidence in support of his doctoral thesis at Finland’s University of Tampere some of his earlier published works on a range of subjects (Kasoma 2000).

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<sup>1</sup>For instance, see Banda, F. 1997. *Elections and the press in Zambia: the case of the 1996 polls*. Lusaka: Open Society/ZIMA; Banda, F. 1999. Zambia, in *Up in the air? The state of broadcasting in Southern Africa*, edited by I Opoku-Mensah. Harare: Panos Southern Africa/Weaver Press; Banda, F. 1999. *A study in issue-based journalism in Zambia*. Lusaka: Panos Southern Africa/British Council; and Banda, F. 2001. *Political change and the media in Africa - the Zambia report*, edited by J Mower. Arlington: Freedom Forum.

### 3. Literature review

This consisted of a collection and analysis of the body of literature accumulating on the local and global contexts within which the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting has been evolving over the years.

### 4. Review of documents

The analysis of documentary sources is a key data generation method used in social research. Essentially, this involves the gathering and analysis of documents produced in the course of every day events. In some instances, the documents are viewed literally as data itself. In other cases, they are read and integrated for evidence (Steyn & Nunes 2001:39). For the purpose of this study, the following key documents *inter alia* were collected, collated and integrated for evidence: 1) secondary *private* reports of two key studies undertaken on community attitudes and community media in Zambia, the first of these having being published by the Media Institute of Southern Africa (2000a) and the second by Panos Southern Africa (2002); and 2) primary and secondary *official* documents relating to the media and policy environment in Zambia.<sup>2</sup>

It must be pointed out that while some of these documents were purposefully sought others were simply 'pounced' upon serendipitously during the course of data generation. Where these were deemed useful, they constituted part of the overall evidence adduced for this thesis.

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<sup>2</sup>Mention must be made of the fact that Albert Weale (1992), in his article on 'The use of documentary evidence and official sources', makes a distinction between 'private' and 'official' or 'public' sources of documentary evidence. The former refers to those documents produced by governments for their own purposes, such as census reports, government gazettes, reports of the proceedings of parliament, statements of accounts and transcriptions of court cases; the latter refers to documents produced by private or non-governmental bodies or individuals, even if they comment on matters of an official or public nature, such as articles, biographies, books, newspapers, survey reports and theses. Weale also makes a distinction as to whether or not those documents can be treated as 'primary' or 'secondary' sources of information. For Weale's analysis, you may refer to Valdo, P (ed). 1992. *Introduction to social research*. Dar es salaam: Dar es salaam University Press:1-19.

At this point, attention is drawn to the fact that the term data *generation* is preferred to data *collection* because, as Steyn and Nunes (2001:39) argue, most qualitative perspectives would reject the notion that a researcher can be a completely neutral collector of information about the social world. Instead the researcher is treated as actively *constructing* knowledge about that world according to certain principles. This would also seem to reinforce the direct researcher experience technique of data gathering as spelt out above.

### **1.6.1 Problems in data generation**

The focused synthesis methodological approach seems to lend itself to just about any way of gathering data. That quality can be both its strength and weakness. It can be a strong point because it provides the researcher with a greater degree of independence to deploy a combination of data collection techniques, such as those described above.

Its weakness lies in the fact that such independence may not guarantee better quality control over the researcher's data gathering exercise. Although the 'synthesis' is definitely 'focused' on a particular dimension of the research problem, there is a very real possibility that the researcher can be tempted to factor in just about anything that comes the researcher's way and thus risk losing 'focus'. This temptation was very real in this researcher's case.

While there was a certain intellectual satisfaction in using a combination of techniques to gather data under the methodological label of 'focused synthesis', there came a point when just about any data went. This was expected, given the nature of this study. Most of the issues studied in this thesis were in the making, and therefore, the researcher needed to be on the look-out all the time to ensure that most of these were captured by the study. It was difficult to determine, as it were, a 'cut-off point' for data generation.

As a consequence of this, there was much difficulty in the author's attempt to organise the data into a meaningful and coherent whole within the context of the objectives of this study.

## **1.7 Structure of the study**

The chapters that follow are organised in relation to the objectives above. Therefore, chapter two discusses the historical context within which community radio broadcasting has evolved in Zambia. In particular, it begins by analysing the media landscape and the key political developments that impacted on it in the period prior to 1991. Secondly, it analyses the media situation in relation to the political dispensation ushered in after the first multiparty General Elections of 1991.

Chapter three sets out the case for community radio broadcasting. To start with, the chapter discusses the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting within an international or global context. Secondly, it delineates a theoretical framework within which to situate the concept of community radio broadcasting, and, within that theoretical framework, defines the concept for the purpose of sound policy formulation. Then, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the rationale or need for community radio broadcasting in Zambia.

Chapter four starts with a synthesised analysis of the findings of the MISA and Panos studies referred to above in relation to the research problem and research questions. Secondly, the chapter analyses four (4) community radio initiatives, namely *Mazabuka Community Radio Station*, *Radio Lyambai*, *Yatsani Radio* and *Chikuni Community Radio Station*. This analysis is based on a series of personal interviews conducted with key informants or stakeholders in these community media institutions as well as on correspondence supplied to this researcher by the concerned community radio initiatives. The case studies are also based on secondary data quoted from the MISA and Panos studies.

Chapter five discusses policy and regulatory issues relating to broadcasting. In so doing, it extends the analyses made in the preceding chapters. More specifically, the chapter first discusses policy formulation in general and then relates this analysis to the specific processes and structures of policy formulation in Zambia. Next, the chapter engages in a comparative analysis of community broadcasting policy trends in Australia, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa.

The rationale behind the choice of these countries may be set forth as follows: Firstly, the focus on Australia is to provide a Western broadcasting policy inflexion on the discussion of policy in Zambian community radio broadcasting. In addition, Australia is chosen because it would seem to provide some kind of 'disinterested' Western cultural background, in that it has never been associated with any colonialist/imperialist designs on Zambia. Being 'down under', it does not set itself forth as a robust exporter of such cultural products as soap operas to Zambia, in the same way as America and Britain do. In that sense, it could well be treated as something of a neutral Western civilisation and thus present the kind of broadcasting model to be used for purposes of comparison.

Secondly, Mozambique is chosen as a way of comparing trends in broadcasting policy in a Portuguese-speaking post-colonial state with those of an English-speaking African state. Also, Mozambique is fast becoming a strong and stable member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and can therefore legitimately provide the kinds of broadcasting policy developments that can resonate with Zambia.

Malawi and South Africa are chosen because Malawi provides an opportunity for analysing the kinds of broadcasting policy dynamics that can take place in a country where radio broadcasting has pretty much been a preserve of the state and where television broadcasting is in its early stages of development. It also presents a media scenario in which the development of policy has been dictated more by the state and



less by the industry itself. On the other hand, South Africa presents the picture of a newly established multi-racial African state in which media policy developments have been reportedly faster than in any part of the continent. It thus provides an opportunity to see the results of what has been tested within the African context.

Chapter six, drawing upon the preceding discussions, proposes a policy model for community radio broadcasting in Zambia.

Chapter seven is an overall conclusion of the study.

## CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL CONTEXTUALISATION

This chapter provides a brief overview of the media situation before and after 1991 in Zambia and highlights the key issues that have influenced the media's development.

However, it would be useful now to position Zambia's media scenario within a wider pan-African media landscape.

As Mbennah, Hooyberg and Mersham (1998:41-63) observe, the mass media in Africa have developed quite steadily since the late 1950s and particularly since the early period of decolonisation. In the 1970s, Africa was the continent least endowed with news communication resources, and compared to other continents, it had fewer newspapers, periodicals, broadcasting transmitters and receivers, and cinemas. Generally, mass communications, the authors argue, served a small, educated elite group, about ten (10) percent of the population, clustered in urban areas (Mbennah et al 1998:42). This picture, as will be demonstrated, mirrors a lot of what the media situation in Zambia is like today.

Table 1, together with Table 2 (**A** and **B**), below captures in statistical form some of the salient media trends in Africa.

Table 1. **Comparative media data and functional literacy** (Mbennah et al 1998:38-39)

<b>Country</b>	<b>TV per person</b>	<b>Radio per person</b>	<b>Newspapers' daily circulation per 1000 persons</b>	<b>Estimated functional literacy rate as a %</b>
Angola	1 to 14	1 to 7,7	54	57
Botswana	-	1 to 1,3	27	74
Egypt	1 to 11	1 to 4	62	48
Kenya	1 to 102	1 to 6,3	-	69
Lesotho	-	1 to 4,4	19	74
Madagascar	1 to 102	1 to 8,8	-	80
Namibia	1 to 40	1 to 5,6	-	72
Nigeria	1 to 21	1 to 9	16	42
Senegal	1 to 130	1 to 9,3	-	29
Uganda	1 to 154	1 to 5	-	48
Zambia	1 to 44	1 to 5	12	54

Table 1 above demonstrates the ubiquity of the radio medium as measured against such other media as television and newspapers. Clearly, given the fact that in most of the countries above functional literacy is not above eighty (80) percent, radio stands out as the most accessible medium of mass communication.

As for South Africa, which unfortunately is not included in the data presented by Mbennah et al above, its 2002-2003 mass media demographics may be set forth as follows:

Table 2. **South African media statistics**

**A. Radio and television outreach – 2002/03** (South Africa Yearbook 2003)

Radio outreach	Television outreach
Average daily adult audience of 20 834 million	Average daily adult audience of 17 million

**B. Daily and weekly newspaper outreach – 2002/03** (South Africa Yearbook 2003:142-143)<sup>3</sup>

Newspaper titles	Average audited circulation per newspaper title
38	93 116

It can be seen, even in the case of South Africa, that radio is by far the most pervasive medium of mass communication. It seems, therefore, that community *radio* stands in good stead for development communication.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that recent figures are generally hard to come by with regard to media and communication trends in Africa, not least because national statistical agencies take long to release such figures, if any at all, but also because not many researchers delve into the kind of pan-African media studies that can yield that kind of information in a systematic and sustained way.

There are, however, several studies that have attempted to present some kind of pan-African media statistical data that broadly paints a picture of the media and communication dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa (UNESCO 1999:281-282; Wigston 2001:24,25,56; MISA 2002; Global Civil Society 2002:276-285). Even what the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (2003) claims to be recent statistics only capture European countries, and not sub-Saharan African countries. Only Mozambique appears on their statistical tables, and even then the figures shown are as recent as 1998/99. In fact, as late as May 2003, this author's search for fresh and reliable pan-African media statistics proved futile.

Nevertheless, the argument must be made that, although these studies are not based on the most up-to-date data, they still point to something of the *trends* characterising the general development and underdevelopment of the media across the African continent.

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<sup>3</sup> The average audited circulation figure was calculated by this researcher based on the raw statistical

## 2.1 An overview of the media landscape before 1991

The media in Zambia, like in other African countries, are a legacy of the country's colonial past. The development of the media was directly or indirectly linked to the colonial objectives of the British Empire. As Mytton (1983:37) observes:

Africa's modern print and electronic media developed as the direct or indirect result of contact with Europe. Few African societies had a written language, and in those that did, printing was either unknown or underdeveloped. Arab traders brought literacy to West and East Africa, but the technology of printing came from Europe and the United States.

Furthermore, the history of the press in Zambia is closely bound up with that of South Africa. The country was linked to the South by economic ties, by transport and communications, and by the political pressures exerted by vocal white settler communities (Mytton 1983:37).

In Zambia (then called Northern Rhodesia), what Kasoma (1986) calls the 'white press' began to emerge in the 1940s, with Roy Welensky, white trade unionist, campaigner for settler interests and later Prime Minister, setting up the *Northern News* in 1944. Welensky was keen on advocating for the establishment of a white-ruled Rhodesia independent of Britain (Mytton 1983:49).

It was during this time that the white settler community was campaigning for the establishment of a federation of the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and Nyasaland (now Malawi). This, in the view of most nationalists, was meant to strengthen and entrench colonial rule (Mwanakatwe 1994). It was this political agenda that Welensky sought to push through the *Northern News*.

In 1948, another white settler, Dr. Alexander Scott, set up the *Central African Post*. Though a settler, Scott was against the idea of federation and thus used his paper to

highlight the views of the African nationalists who were diametrically opposed to the proposed federation, although in August of 1954 he went back on his earlier editorial policy and started supporting the idea of a federated Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Kasoma 1986:42-43).

In 1951, the South African Argus Group bought Welensky's *Northern News* and turned it into a daily in 1953. They later bought Scott's *Central African Post* only to close it down in 1957. Kasoma and Mytton, two scholars that have extensively researched the history of the press in Zambia, do not mention when the *Post* was sold, but a reading of the literature by both scholars would seem to suggest somewhere between 1954 and 1958 (Kasoma 1986:41-76; Mytton 1983:49). However, in 1958, Scott set up the *African Times*, which was even more strongly opposed to the federation and aimed at liberal-minded whites and Africans. However, this venture failed and Scott entered into a partnership with David Astor of the *London Observer* to start the *Central African Mail*. For the first time in the history of the press in Northern Rhodesia, two African editors - Titus Mukupo and later Kelvin Mlenga - served on this paper. However, up to the time of independence on 24 October 1964, the *Mail* could not compete favourably with the *Northern News* which was pro-federation (Mytton 1983:47).

In December 1964, shortly after independence, the *Northern News* was sold to the London-Rhodesia Corporation (LONRHO) (Kasoma 1986:83). LONRHO had also just bought out the brewing concern Heinrichs, which in 1964 had started another daily called the *Zambia Times* and a weekly called the *Zambia News*. LONRHO merged the *Northern News* and the *Zambia Times* into the *Times of Zambia*. It continued to publish the *Zambia News* which later became the *Sunday Times of Zambia*.

In May 1965, the new government formed by the United National Independence Party (UNIP) purchased Scott's and Astor's *Central African Mail*, whose success was in doubt (Kasoma 1986:75). It was renamed the *Zambia Daily Mail* and turned into a daily in 1969. While the privately owned *Times of Zambia* had more advertising, the

state-owned *Mail* did not, with the result that it had “fewer reporters, fewer offices and relied more heavily than did the *Times* on official press releases from the Government and its news agency”, the *Zambia News Agency* (ZANA) (Mytton 1983:47). ZANA was set up in 1969 to act as “an authoritative news gathering and clearing body for the entire country” which would serve to “reflect Zambia’s image to the world” (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 1999:11-13).

Meanwhile, the Government had also transformed the then Northern Rhodesia Information Services, set up in 1939 by the colonial government to justify Great Britain’s entry into the Second World War, into the *Zambia Information Services* (ZIS). The main task of ZIS was to “inform and educate the country’s populace in regard to Government policies and development programmes” (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 1999:13-15). That function – of being the Government’s ‘public relations’ department – has continued to the present day.

Later in 1975, the Government moved on to take over the *Times of Zambia* and its sister publication the *Sunday Times*. It was in 1983, however, that the Government acquired total ownership of the publications before they were placed under the management of the National Media Corporation (NAMECO), a parastatal company, five years later (Moore 1991:63-65).

Alongside these developments, the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC), a Catholic Church body, and the Christian Council of Zambia (CCZ), a platform for protestant churches, set up a private newspaper called the *National Mirror*, which was to provide a significant proportion of serious alternative news and views in the One-Party State given effect by the UNIP Government in 1973. More than a decade later, in 1990, this was to be joined by another privately owned newspaper, called the *Weekly Post*. Renamed the *Post*, this publication became a platform for those with dissenting views and news.

Other privately owned media organisations have since emerged, among which are *The Monitor*, *The People* and *Today*. As Table 3 shows, this has given rise to some competition for readers among these organisations. The circulation/readership figures given below must be viewed within the context of the national population of 10,285,631, as disclosed in the 1999/2000 Census of Housing and Population (Zambia. Central Statistical Office 2002).

Table 3. **Estimated circulation figures of key newspapers in Zambia -2002**<sup>4</sup>

<b>Newspaper</b>	<b>Circulation</b>
<i>The Post</i>	30000
<i>The Times of Zambia (Sunday Times)</i>	20000
<i>The Zambia Daily Mail (Sunday Mail)</i>	15000
<i>The Monitor</i>	15000
<i>The National Mirror</i>	5000
<i>The Mining Mirror</i>	6000
<i>Today</i>	2000
<b>TOTAL</b>	72000

Table 3 above shows that very few people, less than a million, access newspapers. Those who access newspapers mostly live along the line of rail. This points to a kind of informational starvation in rural areas because of limited distribution to such areas. It is for this reason, then, that the radio medium, given its wider reach, is set forth as a possible answer to this information problem.

To focus on the pioneering of the radio broadcasting service in Zambia, one can trace it to the period between the 1950s and the 1960s. Harry Franklin, Director of

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<sup>4</sup>The figures were compiled in March 2002 from information given to this researcher by the concerned media organisations' news editors and corroborated by sales and marketing personnel. It must be noted that these are averages. Furthermore, it must be noted that staff in such media institutions have been known to inflate such circulation/readership figures if only to attract advertisers. In confidence to this researcher, one of the interviewees noted that information about circulation is so sensitive that it is not easily given out for public use, unless it has been sufficiently 'doctored' for use by advertisers.



Information in the colonial administration, set up a radio station in Lusaka in 1941 and ran it in his own spare time. The station was useful in galvanising moral support for the war effort during the Second World War from the settler and indigenous communities. The few indigenous listeners availed themselves of community sets provided at chief's courts and administrative centres. In fact, it was during this period that an agreement was made with the administrations of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that Lusaka was to be the centre for broadcasting to Africans in the three territories under the proposed federation referred to above. Following the introduction of the so-called 'saucepan special' in 1949 (Mytton 1983:36,53), the first popular mass-produced radio set in Africa, and later the invention of the transistor, nearly half the African households along the line-of-rail had radio sets, and in the urban areas, eight out of ten Africans had become listeners (Radio listenership survey of Zambia 1965).

The most recent ZNBC audience survey carried out in 1998 indicates that 74.6 percent of the Zambian population of 10,285,631 listen to ZNBC's Radio channels 4, 2 and 1, while the remaining 25.4 percent is shared among *Radio Christian Voice*, *Radio Icengelo*, *Radio Phoenix* and other (mostly foreign) stations (Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation 1998). Quite clearly, the fact that the majority of the Zambian populace listen to ZNBC is attributable to its wide geographical spread and nationally placed transmitters that carry its audio signal over long distances.

To return to the discussion about the history of radio, the 'power' of radio was demonstrated by some listener at the time of the introduction of the 'saucepan special' in the following appreciative words:

The news which we listen through our wireless sets have taught us many things and some of these are:

(1) Agriculture, (2) Building villages at a suitable place, (3) Digging and building wells and dams, (4) Latrines in villages, (5) Care of children, (6) Education of Girls, (7) How to improve Livestock and (8) many other things.

The Broadcasting Officer should know that we bought wireless sets in order to use them and we are doing so (Mytton 1983:28).

In 1966, a Broadcasting Act was passed to allow for the dissolution of the *Zambia Broadcasting Corporation* (ZBC), as Franklin's creation was called, to pave way for the establishment in 1967 of the *Zambia Broadcasting Services* (ZBS) which was to be under direct governmental control (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 1999:15).

Television was introduced in 1961 by a private firm, the London Rhodesia Company (LONRHO) in Kitwe, a town on the Copperbelt province. Owned by 'Tiny' Rowland, this station was set up primarily to serve the large white mining and commercial community on the Copperbelt in the north (Information and Media Policy 1996:3-5). In 1967, television moved to Lusaka, the capital, and became part of the ZBS. In 1987, an Act was passed to turn ZBS into a body corporate to be called the *Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation* (ZNBC).

It was in 1972 during the first national mass media seminar attended by a large number of journalists in the country that the then President Kenneth David Kaunda of UNIP set out what seemed to be the Government's 'policy' orientation towards the media.

Kasoma (1986:104-105) summarises Kaunda's lengthy speech (6,140 words) to the journalists as follows:

...President Kaunda castigated them for failing to reflect Zambian society and for sometimes conducting themselves as if they were an alternative government...

The news media everywhere else in the world reflect the interests and values of the society they serve...Capitalist news media project the philosophy, value and interests of the capitalist society and the communist media do likewise for their societies...

President Kaunda said it was tragic to think that people criticised the party and Government, or the "scatterbrains", who had some "monstrous ideas",

were given more space in the Zambian news media than those who put forward constructive proposals.<sup>5</sup>

The arguments above reinforced Kaunda's earlier view put forth at the International Press Institute's annual assembly held in Kenya in 1968 that "the press is capable of making or destroying governments given appropriate conditions" and "it can cause war or create conditions for peace" as well as "promote development or create difficulties in the way of development" (Mytton 1983:58).

Kaunda's position was to receive an even clearer articulation when in 1975, during his so-called Watershed Speech to the National Council of UNIP, the party's highest

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<sup>5</sup>Kaunda's pre-occupation with the media raises a cardinal issue in media studies, namely press freedom. Media support groups, such as Reporters without Borders (2001) and MISA (2002), dedicate their time and money to documenting violations of press freedom throughout the sub-region - and beyond in the case of Reporters without Borders. The concept of 'press freedom' itself is usually viewed in terms of "freedom of expression." From a media-centric perspective, press freedom as "freedom of expression" would consider the media's modes of operation, their production of content and their distribution of information and meaning and whether or not these are in line with their developmental role (Fourie 2002:17). However, press freedom can be looked at in its own right as the freedom of the media, not necessarily in its *absolute* sense, to seek, process and distribute information. This is the kind of definition that is usually *legally* sought. That notion is implied in Negrine's conceptualisation of "press freedom" as *the structural and organisational independence* of the press from the state. This idea of a free press can also be extended to other influences in society, such as corporate and other interests (Negrine 1989:22-23). Press freedom activists almost always seek to lobby for some form of constitutional recognition of that freedom (MISA 2002:10-11). Generally, press freedom is seen as a tension created when democratising societies, such as those in Africa, work to suppress the newly-found freedom of the media to report critically on their activities. In some worst-case scenarios, this has resulted in such extra-judicial activities as killing of journalists, removing advertising from independent media, appointing senior staff for state media, et cetera. As Bourgault (1995:177) argues, it soon became evident that freedom of expression and freedom of the press were not particularly high on the agenda of the post-colonial regimes. Dr. Kaunda's disquiet with the media, therefore, could be looked at as an attempt to ensure that the media worked to reflect the specific and broad development goals of the newly-established nation of Zambia. For African countries with a First World media system, such as South Africa, the question of press freedom is not so clear-cut - in a country where the majority of black South Africans are poor and cannot access media products, the media's claim to be the *vox populi* of the South African people and therefore of the legitimacy of the media's claims to the right of freedom of expression, is countered by the government which asks of the media: who do you inform and whose public opinion do you distribute? (Fourie 2002:37). But then again, it could be argued that Kaunda, for instance, was moved to adopt a hardline stance towards the media for reasons of national stability in the wake of independence (Wilcox 1975:130-132), an argument that most ruling elites in the emerging democracies also invoke as an excuse for suppressing media independence and freedom (Bourgault 1995:220-221).

governing organ, he spelled out what amounted to specific terms of reference for the state-owned media in Zambia:

- *The Times of Zambia* would be required to reflect official Party and Government thinking.
- *The Sunday Times of Zambia* would be expected to carry analysis in depth on the Party and Government and the nation as a whole.
- *The Zambia News Agency (ZANA)* would collect news about the whole nation.
- *Zambia Television (ZTV)* would, apart from disseminating information, express in depth the various cultural aspects of this nation, apart from entertainment.
- Radio would be expected to continue disseminating information, providing entertainment and education in all its important aspects (Kaunda 1975).

The statements were made against Kaunda's belief that the nation needed to be harmonised around a common philosophical doctrine of humanism. Kaunda had already unveiled the philosophy of humanism two years and a half after independence to the UNIP National Council. The ideology was centred on the centrality of the human person, stressing the "equality of all men" and abhorring "the exploitation of man by man" (Mwanakatwe 1994:128). The philosophy elevated the "state" as the custodian of humanism.

Therefore, in keeping with this ideology, all institutions, including the media, were made to serve the state. It was in this light, coupled with the declaration of Zambia as a One-Party State, that the 'Party and Government' nationalised and took over all media in the country.

Kaunda's statements must also be evaluated in terms of what Kasoma (1986:134-173) calls "state-press struggles for freedom" in the period between 1975 and 1983. According to Kasoma, this period was characterised by an unprecedented struggle by the *Times of Zambia* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* for press freedom. The struggle

stemmed from the fact that the newspaper editors wanted to maintain a non-partisan editorial stance, even in the face of the UNIP take-over of the newspapers, while the UNIP politicians, fired by the One-Party doctrine, saw the newspapers as a vehicle for galvanising popular support for their party ideology and programmes.

Kasoma lists seventy-three (73) anti-UNIP/Government editorials by the *Times of Zambia* during this era, noting however that this critical stance by both newspapers waned off as years wore on. This was because the Kaunda regime was becoming increasingly authoritarian and was constantly demanding, as can be seen in Kaunda's statements above, that the media needed to be in line with the one-party philosophy encapsulated in the doctrine of humanism.

Four historically inter-related processes are discernible in this period. Firstly, the pre-independence press mirrored the 'free market' regime characteristic of the colonial power. It allowed for greater private involvement by enterprising white settlers in the development of the media sector as a business venture. At the same time, the 'white press' was openly interested in entrenching settler control over the British colonial territory. LONRHO's 'buy outs' of some of the settler media, while internationalising British private capital was, in a sense, extending British rule to the socio-cultural sphere of life in the colony. Hand in hand with this, though, was a neglect of private enterprise on the part of the colonised. In a sense, the pre-independence media were a reflection of the unequal social relationships between the imperial nation and the indigenous population. Notable also is the fact that colonial radio and television mirrored Great Britain's 'public broadcasting' ethos as seen through the setting up of broadcasting corporations along the lines of the *British Broadcasting Corporation* (BBC) (Mytton 1983:53,78).

Secondly, the period immediately after independence was characterised by the entrenchment of the new nationalist government through a series of heavy 'regulatory' activities. The declaration of the One-Party State, rationalised by the philosophy of humanism, set the scene for this regulation of the media industry.

Although most of the documents about this were the preserve of the 'Party and its Government', they still amounted to a regulatory framework within which the media were 'nationalised'. It is to this period that one can trace the genesis of media regulation in Zambia.

Thirdly, with the media thus integrated into the 'Party and Government' structure, this period marked the beginning of the repression and suppression of dissent in the media in an effort to bring them into line with the 'Party and Government' (Moore 1991:23). In part, this was reinforced by repressive laws inherited from the colonial past and left mostly intact by the nationalist government, such as the State Security Act (replacing the Official Secrets Act of 1911, 1920 and 1939 of the United Kingdom); the state of emergency then in force; and the Penal Code Act (Chanda & Liswaniso 1999), resulting in some kind of 'legal' dictatorship (Banda 1997).

Lastly, this period was characterised by a lack of a consistent, coherent and comprehensive policy on the media. As Moore (1991:69) notes: "issues regarding dissemination of information, service to rural areas, availability of equipment, education of the masses, development considerations, budget allocations to accomplish media goals, establishment of regular avenues of communication are vague and not contained in any unified statement of policy". The closest the Government came to enunciating a legal framework for the media was when it passed the ZNBC Act of 1987 to transform the ZBS into a *corporation* that would seek to generate its own revenue and depend less on state funding (Zambia 1987).

This was the status quo when in 1991, largely as a result of a combination of causal factors (eg the break-up of the Communist Soviet Union; the IMF/World Bank pressures on the Kaunda government to remove subsidies on essential goods and services amid the concomitant sky-rocketing prices; a continually deteriorating economy; an emerging private and questioning press; a vocal intelligentsia; a relentlessly aggressive opposition movement; and a fed-up civil society), the United

National Independence Party was removed from power to give way to the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD).

## **2.2 An overview of the media landscape after 1991**

Whereas the media in the so-called Second Republic (between 1973 and 1991) were a legacy of Zambia's colonial history, the media in the so-called Third Republic (between 1991 to-date) are a legacy of Kaunda's post-colonial state.

It is comparatively easy to start a newspaper in Zambia. Under the Printed Publications Act (Zambia 1994), all one is required to do is register one's newspaper with the Director of the National Archives. In so doing, one is also required to supply information relating to: 1) the full names and places of abode of every person who is or is to be proprietor, editor, printer, or publisher; and 2) the description of the premises where the newspaper will be published.

This relatively easy procedure would, in part, seem to explain why there was a sudden flurry of activity to start newspapers as soon as Kaunda announced the end of the One-Party State in 1990 to pave way for multiparty elections. The first newspaper to be set up was the *Weekly Post*, now a daily. There were other publications that followed suit, such as the *Sun*, the *Crime News* (later renamed the *Confidential*) and the *Chronicle* (Zambia. Task Force 2000). All these newspapers have since folded up.

While it is easy to set up a newspaper, problems ranging from the high cost of newsprint to low sales figures have continued to bedevil the sector (Lush 1999). This explains why most of the private newspapers set up in the aftermath of the Third Republic subsequently folded up. In fact, most of them, notably the *Chronicle*, depended so heavily on donor funding that when the donations dried up, they ceased their operations. Some, such as the *Monitor*, set up in 1996, have continued to receive donor funding. While the *Monitor* is trying to assume a more businesslike

approach, this is proving to be extremely difficult. Thus, the paper's future is uncertain. In all, apart from the *Monitor*, the following newspapers have continued to publish: the *Times of Zambia* and its sister *Sunday Times*; the *Zambia Daily Mail* and its sister *Sunday Mail* and *Financial Mail*; the *Post*; the *National Mirror* and the *Monitor*. The *Times of Zambia* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* have continued to receive government funding and have thus managed to keep their respective printing presses running. This has resulted in some competition skewed in favour of the government-owned media (Zambia. Task Force 2000:23). Apart from these, the *Zambia Information Services* (ZIS) and the *Zambia News Agency* (ZANA), already discussed above, have remained largely unchanged in their structure and function.

Table 4 lists the key newspapers that have continued to publish since the opening up of the media industry in 1991.

Table 4. **Key national newspapers in Zambia**

<b>Newspaper name</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Ownership</b>
<i>The Times of Zambia</i>	Daily	State/Government
<i>Sunday Times</i>	Daily	State/Government
<i>The Zambia Daily Mail</i>	Daily	State/Government
<i>Sunday Mail</i>	Weekly	State/Government
<i>Financial Mail</i>	Weekly	State/Government
<i>The National Mirror</i>	Weekly	Church
<i>The Post</i>	Daily	Private
<i>The Mining Mirror</i>	Monthly	Private
<i>The Monitor</i>	Fortnightly	Private
<i>The Today</i>	Twice a week	Private

In the broadcasting sector, the enactment of the ZNBC Act of 1987 provided the MMD Government with something upon which to construct its own broadcasting legal-cum-policy edifice (Zambia 1987). In its plan to liberalise the broadcasting



industry, the government relied on a clause in the ZNBC Act of 1987 which provides for the ZNBC to be a radio and television licensing authority. Thus it was that the MMD government enacted statutory instrument number 178 of 1993 referred to as the ZNBC (Licensing) Regulations Act of 1994. This legislation empowers the ZNBC to be part of the technical committee that screens those that would like to apply for a radio or television licence (Zambia 1994).

The 'dominance' of ZNBC, as seen in its being empowered to sit on the technical committee, points to the strategic importance that the government attaches to broadcasting, particularly local-language radio broadcasting. Indeed, apart from English, adopted as the official language at independence, there are seven main languages used for national broadcasting, namely Nyanja, Bemba, Lozi, Kaonde, Tonga, Luvale and Lunda.

Table 5 below shows what share of the audience ZNBC radio and television services command in relation to other radio and television channels.

Table 5. **ZNBC radio and TV audience share** (ZNBC 1998)

<b>Radio service</b>	<b>Share of listeners in %</b>	<b>Television service</b>	<b>Share of viewers in %</b>
ZNBC Radio 4	33	ZNBC TV	81.5
ZNBC Radio 2	28.4	Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN)	8.4
ZNBC Radio 1	13.2	South Africa owned DStv (digital)	6.7
Radio Christian Voice	11	Multichoice (analogue)	6.2
Radio Icengelo	6.7	Others	2.4
Radio Phoenix	6.5	CASAT	0.7
Other foreign stations	4.6		

It must be noted that there are no latest audience figures available generated by the ZNBC Research Unit or any other research institution that show such comparative

trends as are indicated above. Clearly, while ZNBC still has a greater share of the audience market, there is competition coming to the fore. Interestingly, ZNBC Radio 4, a largely entertainment-based channel of ZNBC, commands the greatest share of the market, possibly pointing to the fact that it appeals to young people who are in the majority.

Even so, radio and television ownership is severely low, posing a special challenge for broadcasting policy formulation to seriously consider the issue of access and accessibility (see footnote 10, page 81). Compared to ownership of television sets, telephones and other household goods, people seem to value radio sets more, as Table 6 below shows.

Table 6. **Percentage of households by type of assets owned** (Zambia. Central Statistical Office 1998:54)

<b>Type of asset</b>	<b>All Zambia</b>	<b>Rural</b>	<b>Urban</b>
<b>Radio</b>	54	38	71
<b>Television</b>	26	5	48
<b>Video player</b>	8	1	16
<b>Telephone (including cellular)</b>	4	0	7
Plough	11	18	5
Crop sprayer	6	9	3
Fishing boat	1	2	1
Canoe	4	8	1
Fishing net	7	11	2
Bicycle	30	36	23
Motor cycle	1	1	1
Motor vehicle	4	2	7
Tractor	1	1	1
Electric iron	21	3	40
Refrigerator/Deep freezer	13	1	25
Sewing machine/Knitting machine	12	7	17
Stove/Cooker	23	3	44
Non-residential building	4	3	4
Scotch cart	4	6	2
Donkeys	1	0	1
<b>Number of households</b>	<b>1,889,000</b>	<b>1,209,000</b>	<b>680,000</b>

It is clear that out of this study's four variables of interest grouped together in Table 6 – *radio, television, video player and telephone* – radio ranks as the most possessed asset by households in rural and urban areas. This propensity to own radio sets in greater numbers than television is also reflected in the patterns of radio listenership as opposed to those of television viewership. In the 2002 Zambia Demographic and Health Survey report entitled *Education data for decision-making*, it is reported that radio is the most widely used form of media. Fifty-five (55) percent of male and forty-five (45) percent of female parents/guardians listen to the radio at least once a week. Less common is watching television, with twenty-two (22) percent of male and twenty-eight (28) percent of female parents/guardians watching television (Zambia. Central Statistical Office & ORC Macro 2003:26-27).

Against this background of greater radio listenership, then, it was not surprising that the enactment of the ZNBC (Licensing) Regulations Act set the stage for the emergence of private, commercial and religious radio stations. Indeed, radio, maintaining its history as pacesetter in Zambian broadcasting, was the first to receive a bolt of life in the newly liberalised industry. *Radio Christian Voice*, owned by British evangelist-cum-businessman, Bob Edmonton, was the first privately owned radio station to be set up in 1994. Broadcasting twenty-four (24) hours, the station is financed by money raised from various businesses run by *Radio Christian Voice International*, including a farm in Zambia and elsewhere.

With the industry thus 'opened up', commercially orientated *Radio Phoenix* followed suit in 1996, broadcasting on FM firstly to Lusaka and later to the Copperbelt. Other applicants were given construction permits, which usually precede the award of a full broadcasting licence. Table 7 below shows the number of radio licences issued to date:

Table 7. **Radio broadcasting licences issued between 1994 and 2002** (Chipili 2002)

<b>Name</b>	<b>Ownership</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Status</b>
<i>Radio Christian Voice</i>	Private-Christian (Protestant)	Lusaka & Kitwe	Confirmed licence; broadcasting on Short-wave and FM
<i>Radio Phoenix</i>	Private-Commercial	Lusaka, Kabwe, Kapiri Mposhi, Ndola & Kitwe	Confirmed licence; broadcasting on FM
<i>Mazabuka Community Radio Station</i>	Community	Mazabuka	Confirmed licence; broadcasting on FM
<i>Radio Chikuni</i>	Private-Christian (Catholic)	Monze	Confirmed licence; broadcasting on FM
<i>Radio Icengelo</i>	Private-Christian (Catholic)	Kitwe	Confirmed licence; broadcasting on FM
<i>Q-FM</i>	Private-commercial	Lusaka	Confirmed licence; broadcasting on FM
<i>Radio Maria</i>	Private-Christian (Catholic)	Chipata	Confirmed licence; broadcasting on FM
<i>Yatsani Radio</i>	Private-Christian (Catholic)	Lusaka	Confirmed licence; broadcasting on FM
<i>SKY - FM</i>	Private-commercial	Monze	Confirmed licence; broadcasting on FM
<i>Chikaya Community Radio Station</i>	Community	Lundazi	Broadcasting on a construction permit (not yet given full licence)

<i>UNZA Radio</i>	Educational/teaching	Lusaka's Great East Road Campus and surrounding area	Broadcasting on a construction permit
<i>Radio Lyambai</i>	Community	Mongu	Broadcasting on a construction permit
<i>Radio Choice</i>	Private-commercial	Lusaka	Broadcasting on a construction permit

Private television has been growing slowly. To start with, ZNBC entered into a partnership with South Africa's *Electronic Media Network* (M-NET) to set up a joint venture called *Multichoice (Z) Ltd* in 1995. ZNBC holds thirty (30) percent shareholding, while M-NET holds the other seventy (70) percent. This satellite multi-channel subscription TV and radio network was envisaged to "give viewers and listeners a wider choice of programmes" (Banda 1995). Mostly, these programmes are American, ranging from Hollywood movies shown on the Movie Magic Channel, sports on ESPN, soaps on the Series Channel to science-fiction films on the Sci-Fi Channel. One outcome of this partnership was ZNBC's use of M-NET's 'open time' programmes for its broadcast schedule. ZNBC's 'open time' was a time slot used to broadcast programmes sourced from M-NET as a spin off of this strategic alliance.

As will be noted elsewhere, although ZNBC management may argue that this is a wise strategic business alliance, questions of media imperialism still come to the fore. For instance, given the incapacity of ZNBC to produce local television programmes, to what extent does this alliance compromise ZNBC's national duty to provide locally and culturally relevant productions?

To continue with the history, in 1998, *Multichoice (Z) Ltd* entered into a strategic alliance with the indigenous *Cable and Satellite (CASAT) Technologies Ltd*, another pay satellite television station. CASAT aimed to broaden analogue subscribers' choice of programmes. However, this partnership broke down in 1999, with CASAT going it alone to provide a cheaper subscription service based solely on analogue-decoder

technology. It is important to note that CASAT, in its submissions to the Parliamentary Committee on Information and Broadcasting Services of 1999 (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 1999), alleged that ZNBC was making it difficult for CASAT to increase its market share by denying it a licence to introduce "rural television". It accused ZNBC of using its privileged position as a licensing authority to block CASAT's progress towards expanding into rural areas.

1998 saw the establishment of an evangelical-Christian television station called the *Trinity Broadcasting Network* (TBN). This free-to-air broadcaster, an extension of America's TBN, was set up with the expressed purpose of using the technology of television to broadcast the message of God's salvation. The origins of the station in Zambia are traceable to the Rev. Dan Pule, a former Christian deputy minister in the MMD Government.

In order to improve its programming and financial standing, ZNBC has also entered into an alliance with the *African Broadcast Network* (ABN) in which the former will lease out some of its airtime to enable the latter to broadcast its entertainment programmes to television viewers in Zambia. The ABN, with offices in London and South Africa, is allied with Britain's media sales group Granada. It set up its Africa office in Nigeria in January 2001 as part of its long-term business strategy to "attract much needed international advertising investment to the continent"(Aginam 2000). According to ABN's General Manager, Yeside Oriyemi, ABN has obtained commitments from the *Ghana Broadcasting Corporation*, *African Independent Television Network*, *Kenya Broadcasting Corporation*, *Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation* and *Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation* in which ABN will be delivering "an identical daily programme stand (sic) to the largest broadcasters in sub-Saharan Africa" as well as supplying "programmes sourced from the world's foremost programme producers, upgrading the broadcaster's (sic) resources, increasing their station's (sic) revenues and flighting locally produced programmes" (Aginam 2000). In addition, ABN seeks to launch the African Media Foundation (AMF), whose focus would be on developing the skills, resources and programme production capacity of

the ABN broadcasters (Aginam 2000). According to Ben Kangwa (2003), ZNBC gets thirty (30) percent of the advertising revenue that ABN raises.

Telecare Ltd, a private television company, obtained a construction permit for Kabwe, a line-of-rail town in Zambia (see the **Map of Zambia** in chapter one), but it had not, at the time of this research, started out on any trial transmissions (Chipili 2002:9).

The newest television entrant on the market is the privately owned CASAT which received a licence to embark on a free-to-air television service to Lusaka viewers only. The station, which sources its programme content from *TV-Africa*, was, at the time of writing this thesis, involved in test transmissions (*ZIMA News* 2002).

### **2.2.1 Six distinguishable processes in the media landscape**

The foregoing analysis points to six inherent processes in Zambia's media landscape after 1991. These are discussed below.

#### *Cautious deregulation*

Firstly, while the government claims that it has embarked on a liberalisation programme of the Zambian economy, there appears to be a *cautious de-regulation* of the broadcasting regime. The enactment of the ZNBC (Licensing) Regulations, while meant to pave the way for the liberalisation of the broadcasting sector, still vests final authority for the awarding of radio and television licences in the Minister of Broadcasting and Information Services. Indeed, the minister is empowered to receive and scrutinise applications for radio and television licences. It is only he/she who can give or refuse to give a licence. In this regard, it must be noted that he/she is, first and foremost, a political appointee of the President. Therefore, as some have complained, the minister's judgment may be influenced by whether or not the applicant's political ideology and party membership agrees with his/her own.

Furthermore, the regulations as laid down by the Act are too cumbersome to follow, especially with regard to community broadcasting. The Act specifies the following eligible to apply for licences:

- an association, by whatever name called, established on a permanent basis;
- an individual; and
- a body corporate.

However, the set of broadcasting licence application forms, simply referred to as Forms MIBS/BLC1 and MIBS/BLC3 accompanying the standard application, that this researcher obtained in 1998 had a different, rather restrictive, provision, which stated:

Licences may be issued to natural and legal persons (corporate bodies) and associations of persons established on a permanent basis *other than political parties* (my italicising).<sup>6</sup>

Many, especially politically vocal human rights Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), complain that their applications for radio licences have not been considered positively for as long as two years. This complaint extends to political parties which, fed up with the limited access to state-owned media, want to apply for licences to set up their own radio stations. Quite clearly, the restriction for political parties is total. This has raised questions about the nature of community radio broadcasting in as far as political-party expression is concerned. Can 'political parties' be constructed sociologically as a 'community of political interest' and therefore qualify to set up its own community radio station?

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<sup>6</sup>This was certainly true when this researcher obtained, as part of this research assignment, the broadcasting licence application forms in 1998. There are indications that these Forms are no longer there at the ministry, or have been significantly altered. Certainly, this regulation may well have been discarded along the way. The concerned forms were designated as the MIBS/BLC1 and MIBS/BLC3 Forms. The new forms included in the information package for the application for a construction permit for radio and television broadcasting stations in Zambia - designated as MIBS/BLC 3 - now indicate three categories of applicants as follows: 1) natural person; 2) legal person (corporation); and 3) other. Presumably, the 'other' might subsume such categories as 'community trust', et cetera. It might also include 'political parties'. This shift is interesting in the sense that it does not seem to rule out political players in as plain a language as the old MIBS/BLC3 application forms did.



On the other hand, as Table 7 above demonstrates, Christian organisations have been among the ministry's most favoured licensees, although some highly critical Catholic radio stations, such as *Radio Icengelo*, have received a verbal bashing from ruling MMD and state functionaries.

### *Christian determinism*

The above point seems to hint at a second process, namely *Christian determinism* in broadcasting regulatory practice. The large number of Christian applicants given licences is suggestive of the notion that the ministry awards licences on the basis of one's Christian orientation. This argument is reinforced by the fact that the former MMD Republican President, Dr. F.T.J. Chiluba, declared Zambia a 'Christian' nation. Indeed, some have pointed to the fact that the first person - Bob Edmonton - to ever receive a private radio licence *is* a Christian. In addition, although the Act specifies that "only government media are allowed radio transmission on Short Wave (SW) for radio broadcasting" (Chanda & Liswaniso 1999:24), the ministry went ahead and granted Radio Christian Voice a SW frequency. In one sense, this could be interpreted as legal-cum-technical incompetence on the part of the ministry. In another sense, it could be explained as the ministry's endorsement of the applicant's religious inclination.

For some, this is sufficient evidence that there is need to develop a coherent, consistent and comprehensive policy that would ensure that such arbitrariness is avoided. It is in this light that many welcomed the Government's information and media policy framework of 1996. This policy framework, together with its revised version, is analysed in some detail later in this chapter.

### *Globalisation and its impact on Zambian broadcasting*

Thirdly, Zambia, like other African countries, seems to be under the onslaught of what Arthur (1998) calls "the globalization of communication". It is important to pay

extensive attention to this issue because current debates about media and communication policies in Zambia are characterised by the influences of globalisation – that “inter-related complex of processes, industrial, economic, technological, cultural and cognitive, which have resulted in regional boundaries (whether of family, class, religion or nation) being rendered permeable to distant influences” (Arthur 1998:3). These “distant influences” are clearly helping to reshape, not only the discussions about media and policy formulation in Zambia, but also the administrative activities of the Zambian government in terms of awarding broadcasting licences to such foreign media as M-NET and the British Broadcasting Service (BBC) World Service.

It is clear that the period between 1991 and 2003 has seen a remarkable and steady *internationalisation* or *transnationalisation* of major world broadcasting services into Zambia. The process of de-regulation embarked upon in 1994 by the Zambian government has given rise to the emergence of largely foreign-owned private satellite subscription and terrestrial free to air broadcasting services. M-NET has exposed Zambian subscribers to a variety of programmes sourced all over the globe. TBN has also exposed Zambian viewers to more international Christian-evangelical programming.

It is perhaps understandable that the hitherto monolithic state broadcaster ZNBC, struggling to turn itself into a *public* broadcaster, has begun to embrace transnational broadcasters in a bid to ward off competition from the new entrants.

This scenario - the onslaught of globalisation on public broadcasting spaces - is probably true of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) as well. Globalisation is viewed in terms of capitalistic marketing strategies, most of which are derived from the transnationalisation of capital (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1996). Underpinned by the theme of political economy, global media tend to provide a useful map of the process of conglomeratisation of giants such as Time-warner and Reuters, the rise of the new mogul empires such as Fininvest and the News International, Mitsushita, and

Sony and the corporate strategies of global cultural production (Sreberny-Mohammadi 1996:5).

At the centre of globalisation and broadcasting policy are the processes of commercialisation, liberalisation, privatisation and internationalisation (Rideout & Mosco 1997). Rideout and Mosco (1997:93-98) define these processes as follows:

- *Commercialisation*, usually connected to de-regulation, takes place when the state replaces forms of regulation based on public interest, public service, and related standards, such as universality, with market standards that establish market regulation.
- *Liberalisation* is a process of state intervention to expand the number of participants in the market, typically by creating, or easing the creation of competing providers of communication services. This might involve establishing a private competitor in a state or private monopoly marketplace. This might also be ensured via cross-ownership rules.
- *Privatisation* is a process of state intervention that sells off a state enterprise such as a public broadcaster or a state telephone company. This takes various forms, depending on the percentage of shares to be sold off, the extent to which any foreign ownership is permitted, the length, if any, of a phase-in period, and the specific form of continuing state involvement, typically constituted in a regulatory body, in the aftermath of privatisation.
- *Internationalisation*, embodied in regional and international trade and other alliances, shifts communication responses from national policy applications to ones in which bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral trade agreements require structural policy changes. These *internationalising* organs range from the European Commission (EC), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). Indeed, the elaboration of the NWICO was, in part, a response to this process of internationalisation. As Herman and McChesney (1997) would argue, the process of internationalisation is also

connected, both historically and functionally, to the spread of global capitalism, which laid the groundwork for the rise of global media – “the new missionaries of corporate capitalism”. This was itself tied to the emergence and ascension of the transnational corporation (TNC).

These issues have largely marked out the kind of communication policy terrain which public broadcasting systems world-wide have had to deal with in their attempt to adapt to the competition offered by the often robust privately-owned media companies, such as those cited above. As Negrine (1989) says of what he sees as the contrasting philosophies of “market liberalism” and “public regulation” in Britain, there is the twin issue of whether the fundamental aim of broadcasting policy is to enlarge the freedom of choice of the consumer and the opportunities to programme makers to offer alternative wares to the public, or to introduce some kind of regulations or policies “to prevent monopolistic concentration” and to impose “common carrier” obligations upon owners of transmission equipment.

In the case of Britain, the latter argument is essentially given in support of the BBC, which sees itself as basically providing “the worthy” as opposed to “the popular” programmes imported from America (Negrine 1989:35). It is this point that Fourie (2002) reiterates when he argues that, as far as content is concerned, technology and its resultant market approach has led to increased popularisation, repetition, less depth and less diversity despite the rise of the so-called niche channels.

Furthermore, as Steemers (1999) argues, with the advance of digitisation and communications convergence, whereupon broadcasting has become less of a universally available mass medium with more emphasis on transaction-based payment and thematic programming and alternative methods of delivery, the problem for public service broadcasters is deciding how far they should compartmentalise their outputs/products to appeal to different customers in contrast to their traditional generalist channels which have always offered universally those things that the commercial market could ostensibly never provide.

Even with the instinctive desire to protect itself, public service broadcasting, not only in Britain but also throughout the rest of Europe, came under attack in the 1980s (Garnham 1998). This was due to several reasons. First, technological developments - cable and satellite - were beginning to undermine the spectrum-scarcity argument, particularly given the fact that the imminent introduction of digital broadcasting and of video-on-demand via the switched telecommunications network reinforces this trend. Second, growing advertising budgets both fuelled a demand for more commercial channels and provided potential funding for them. Third, pressure on public finances made the licence fee increasingly unpopular with government, if not consumers (Garnham 1998:216; Negrine 1989:81-99).

It is not surprising, then, that Jacka (2000) contends "public service broadcasting (PSB) is under threat around the world". She adds that the classic model, exemplified in the BBC, and adapted to local conditions and histories in many different parts of the world, is fracturing. Indeed, according to Jacka (2000:2), opponents of PSB tend to describe it as elitist and thus inherently "anti-democratic". Indeed, it is this formulation of PSB that gives weight to the argument that community radio broadcasting needs to be grassroots-oriented as opposed to the former's elitist character in programme production, management, and other processes.

This construction of PSB is also reflected in Africa, particularly given the kind of situation where almost all the national broadcasting institutions on the continent are in fact *state* broadcasters (Raboy 1996) - from Zambia's *Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC)*, Zimbabwe's *Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC)* to Malawi's *Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC)*.

With all public service broadcasters seeking to favourably compete with the more robust commercial, and now community broadcasters, all sorts of survival strategies are being deployed.

As Fourie (2002:2) notes, among such strategies are the following:

- changing programming strategies (eg new and popular formats such as game shows and talk shows of which the quality is more than often dubious).
- a move towards thematic channels and narrowcasting.
- co-operating with independent producers/joint ventures.
- exploring supplementary sources of revenue (apart from advertising, sponsorships, subscriptions, etc.).
- rationalising working practices.
- providing additional value-added services (time-shift/extended coverage).
- provision of services which go beyond broadcasting, for example on-line services, et cetera.

However, even though public service broadcasting seems to be reeling under the impact of globalisation, it still seems to stand tall and proud against the “key features of the old system” of commercialism, among which are:

- aspirations for breadth of content and the representation of a wide range of opinions.
- positive discrimination in favour of national culture.
- the enforcing of public accountability.
- and the restrictions on cross-media ownership to enhance media diversity (Steemers 1999:4).

To return to the BBC, the point can be made that there is underway a process of redefining public service broadcasting. As Steemers (1999:5) argues, the BBC sees itself as taking up new digital services in order to meet its public service mandate in new and innovative ways, including providing universally accessible content for all platforms - satellite, terrestrial, cable, on analogue and digital, thereby fulfilling the objective of universal access for a diverse range of content. Indeed, although the

Corporation has always been involved in commercial activities on a small scale, it was the 1996 Royal Charter which endorsed commercial activities and digital services as core objectives of the BBC. Even so, the BBC cannot, according to Chalaby and Segell (1999), compete with commercial firms in technological mastery and leadership, thereby rendering it unlikely to keep the dominant role it used to play in the analogue era. The BBC cannot claim cutting edge expertise in any of the digital transmission systems currently being developed (Chalaby & Segell 1999:360).

Secondly, in terms of content, there has been a marked growth in thematic channels and value-added services offered both by private and public operators, a situation which, seen from a public service perspective, seems to be the targeting of genres and groups with packages of services in anticipation of the breakdown of mass audiences (Steemers 1999:9). Thirdly, with regard to funding for the BBC, enhancing commercial revenue has become a significant strand in the BBC's digital strategy in addition to its main public service remit, and commercial revenues are expected to provide 10-15 percent of income over the decade (Steemers 1999:12).

Lastly, there have also been aspirations for the BBC to establish a global brand and presence. Indeed, as Steemer (1999:12) reports, this was actually encouraged by the Conservative Government's 1994 White Paper on the BBC in which the BBC was envisaged to evolve "into an international multi-media enterprise, building on its present commercial services for audiences in this country and overseas". This has taken the establishing of an alliance with ICL/Fujitsu, the IT systems and services company, to create a commercial BBC Online Internet service. It has also taken a global partnership with Discovery Communications (48 percent owned by TCI, also Cox and Newhouse) to launch the joint venture international channels *Animal Planet* and *People and Arts*, and to co-produce programming (Steemers 1999:14).

In Zambia and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the BBC has set up FM radio stations for its World Service. These, in a large measure, have become competitors to most of the local FM radio stations for world news and current affairs. The

scenario described above in relation to the BBC may well capture the kinds of uncertainties that ZNBC has been experiencing in a fast globalising media environment.

Indeed, more television partnerships between the state-owned ZNBC and global media are emerging. For instance, *TV-Africa*, ABN and *Sandon TV* have appeared on the scene, with ZNBC providing airtime for their often foreign entertainment-based programming in exchange for a share of the advertising revenue accruing to such multinational media corporations.

While the 'strategic' partnership between Multichoice Zambia and ZNBC has provided a gateway for the Zambian television consumers to 'choose' from a menu of international broadcasters, such as *Bloomberg*, CNN, BBC World, CNBC, et cetera, it has also opened up the Zambian borders to a lot of South Africa's satellite television and free-to-air productions, such as Africa2Africa (A2A), SABC Africa, SABC 1, 2 and 3, E-TV, et cetera. Although the cost of subscribing to M-NET channels is high in a country where over seventy-seven (77) percent of the population live below the poverty datum line and are unable to meet their basic needs (Chigunta, Chisanga & Masiye 1998), there has been a steady increase in the number of urban-based elites subscribing to the service, as seen in the fact that the figure of 6000 in 1998 rose to 12000 in 2001. On average, the initial cost of installing the DStv dish and purchasing a digital decoder is about US\$400. After that, the subscriber has to pay a monthly subscription of roughly between US\$59 and US\$79 (Teletalk 2003; Lingela 2002). This is certainly beyond the reach of many urban-based people. Therefore, the effect of digital satellite subscription-based television has not been really felt by many people. It is legitimate to say, though, that many access this service via outdoor places like hotels, restaurants, bars and family networks. Although no empirical study has been conducted to establish this and the general impact of such a service on Zambians, anecdotal evidence would suggest that the service has been accepted by some sections of the Zambian society.



In a sense, then, it can be argued that South Africa, through this export of media cultural products, is itself turning into a 'big brother'. Programmes like *Egoli* and *Isidingo* have become part and parcel of the daily menu of ZNBC's programming, including influencing the Zambia National Arts Council (NAC) to invite Derek Nyati, one of the *Isidingo*'s stars to come as a special guest during their 2001 annual *Ngoma Awards* ceremony in Lusaka, Zambia. In fact, a Zambian local soap opera called *Kabanana*, shown on ZNBC, is patterned after South Africa's *Isidingo* and *Generations*, with the producers of *Isidingo*, for instance, sometimes inviting the *Kabanana* cast to take acting lessons from them in South Africa.

Quite clearly, the influence of South Africa's cultural products is beginning to be felt in Zambia, even as its economic muscle has already left a mark on the nation by virtue of such investments as Shoprite Checkers, Game Stores, and others. It might well be argued that South Africa's economic 'hegemony' in turn perpetuates a cultural hegemony that finds expression in the cultivating of a Zambian audience that is fired by aspirations of a better life in the 'city of gold' (Johannesburg).

While the above example may be said to be a positive cultural-artistic exchange in some respects, there have been other instances in which the Zambian public, especially the religious and political elites, has not taken too kindly to such media/cultural 'imperialism.'<sup>7</sup> As so often happens, in embracing foreign

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<sup>7</sup>The subject of 'media/cultural imperialism' necessarily gives rise to the discussion about the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). Although this is not the topic of this thesis, it is important to take note of it, as much as what has and is happening with the media in Southern Africa can be traced back to the concerns of the NWICO. As Fourie and Oosthuizen (2001:416) point out, the NWICO sought to address matters relating to the imbalanced international flow of news, information and media entertainment; inequities in the arena of international communication; and the crucial role of communication in economic and social development. Media imperialism, as the domination of mainly Western capitalist media in the arena of international communication (Fourie & Oosthuizen 2001:416) or as the process whereby the ownership, structure, distribution or content of the media in any one country are singly or together subject to substantial external pressures from the media interests of any other country or countries without proportionate reciprocation of influence by the country so affected (Boyd-Barret 1977:116), is seen as a series of targeted actions by the U.S military-communication conglomerates to ensure commercial, military and political hegemony throughout the world (Kunczik 1984). Within the context of African communication research, Ugboajah (1987) contends that the concept of a NWICO requires research which will examine some of the implications of NWICO, such as the existence of communication imperialism and media dependence, infringement of national sovereignty. Whatever the position one assumes on the matter, Brown-Syed (1999) argues that the NWICO was predicated on an imbalance that existed in the direction, volume, and types of information exchanged between developed countries and the Third World and the ethical notion that information should be viewed as a shared

programming to fill up ZNBC's 'open time', ZNBC is losing some of its more serious, political programming.

This scenario seems to be set against *globalisation* - referring to the growing interconnectedness of different parts of the world, a process which gives rise to complex forms of interaction and interdependency (Thomson 1995:149) - in which the state broadcaster is beginning to be drawn into the political economy of the world communication systems. Indeed, as Juneau (Raboy 1995:viii-xi), in his *Foreword* to the book *Public broadcasting for the 21<sup>st</sup> century*, has aptly observed, in a strictly commercial, competitive system, programming that lowers ratings is out. What sticks are entertainment formulas with a proven ability to draw large audiences. He goes on to suggest that a further trend is the extent to which even public television networks often feel obliged - or are, in fact, compelled by financial constraints - to compete with private sector television.

As Juneau further notes, the consequence of this chain of circumstances is that countries in the South or in the East, developing countries, or countries that are emerging from totalitarian regimes may not benefit from the media systems dedicated to imparting knowledge and to understanding themselves, their society, their problems, and their future.

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resource or as a social good rather than as a commodity. These ideas are echoed by the McBride Commission which asserted "a nation whose mass media are under foreign domination cannot claim to be a nation" (Berwanger 1987). To the end that the MacBride Commission sought to raise these issues, it deplored "disparities within countries", "regional disparities" and "disparities between developed and developing nations". It also frowned *inter alia* on the lack of "equal rights for women". It bemoaned "the vertical" flow of information, "cultural alienation", "the distortion of content", the detrimental effects of "concentration and monopolies" and "transnationalisation." The NWICO has been watered down, largely due to the overbearing influence of the USA. The USA, together with Britain, had withdrawn from UNESCO on account of the NWICO. Even as this is so, there is another dynamic emerging. With the dismantling of the Apartheid regime and the re-admission of South Africa among other nations, one can see NWICO's core concerns being re-activated when one views the way in which South Africa has transnationalised its media industry, as evidenced by Multichoice which is now providing much of the Digital Satellite Television (DStv) bouquet of channels to the rest of Southern Africa (Fourie & Oosthuizen 2001:436). However, the extent of the media penetration or 'media imperialism' of South Africa requires much more research than ever did the NWICO itself, apart from unbundling the concept of 'cultural imperialism' which has tended to be used more in connection with the depiction of a particular type of cultural development whereby it is persuasively communicated, in a massively uni-directional mode, to a receiving country. According to Braman (1996), there is a sense in which 'cultural imperialism' can, in fact, be eliminated in some kind of

However, Raboy, in his observations on what constitutes *public service broadcasting*, notes that, although traditionally public service broadcasting has been expected to represent the national as opposed to the foreign, it may be time to refocus these conceptual categories in terms of the local and the global. This, Raboy argues, is the reason why there is a “certain universal appeal to the products of Hollywood-based mass culture - that is, ultimately, the only possible explanation for their success” (Raboy 1995:viii-xi).

### *De-localised content*

To return to the six distinguishable processes in the Zambian media landscape and after having discussed (i) cautious deregulation, (ii) Christian determinism, and (iii) the impact of globalisation on Zambian broadcasting, a fourth distinguishable process, clearly associated with globalisation, is the de-localisation of broadcast content. While the mushrooming of private television could be said to have introduced a degree of choice into television viewership, much of what is televised has no local content - from hard news to soap operas. In a sense, even Zambia is beginning to experience something of the ‘Coca-colonisation’ of its television industry, with no locally produced programmes of its own to effectively compete against this trend. According to Sreberny (2000:103), any effort at countering the impact of the globalisation of media firms would amount to a process of *media localisation* in which at the same time as these dynamics of globalisation have been established, an opposite tendency is concurrently at work, as a consequence of, and often in reaction to, the former. This, she argues, is the dynamic of localised production and the indigenisation of such cultural products as television programmes. Nevertheless, as Sreberny herself is quick to point out, the evidence about this trend is patchy and contradictory. Indeed, as Figure 2 below indicates, statistics seem to suggest a slow but steady penetration of private foreign owned subscription and free-to-air television into the market.

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‘interpenetrated globalisation’ whereby the local can be the global and thus exist side by side with foreign forms of cultural expression.

<u>Television Channel</u>	<u>Share of Viewers in (%)</u>
ZNBC-TV	81.5
TBN	8.4
DStv (Digital)	8.7
Multichoice (Analogue)	6.2
Other	2.4
<u>CASAT</u>	<u>0.7</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>100</u>

Figure 2. **Television audience share** (ZNBC 1998)

Clearly, global media moguls are slowly but surely getting hold of the Zambian broadcasting market. As Thomson (1995:162-165) puts it:

A central feature of the globalisation of communication is the fact that media products circulate in an international arena. Material produced in one country is distributed not only in the domestic market but also - and increasingly - in a global market. It has long been recognised, however, that the international flow of media products is a structured process in which some regions of the world are heavily dependent on others for the supply of symbolic goods. Studies carried out in the early 1970s...showed a clear asymmetry in the international flow of television programmes: there was, to a large extent, a one-way traffic in news and entertainment programmes from the major exporting countries to the rest of the world...

This is likely to happen in a situation where “many television stations in less developed countries do not have the resources to produce extensive programming of their own” (Thomson 1995:162-163). The import of American serials, through such third-party agents as Multichoice and CASAT in Zambia, at prices negotiated on a country-by-country basis, is a relatively inexpensive (and financially very attractive) way to fill broadcasting schedules.

However, the "foreign" culture or value-system carried by such programmes has not gone without some opposition from largely conservative television viewers. Indeed, what amounted to a 'cultural' backlash against this seeming 'cultural imperialism' - a process that, according to Schiller, is been driven by the pursuit of the commercial interests of large US-based transnational corporations, often acting in collaboration with Western (predominantly American) political and military interests, with its resultant new form of dependency in which traditional cultures are destroyed through the intrusion of Western values (Thomson 1995:165) - was seen in 1998 when some viewers, including a good number of political and religious moralists, opposed the screening of M-NET's Channel O on ZNBC TV on grounds that it had sexually suggestive and amorous dance moves. Channel O is an M-NET channel which features a lot of Black-American musical icons and is, in that sense, reflective of a lot of the pop-cultural iconism of Hollywood, complete with amorous, sexually explicit dance routines that have offended many a conservative Zambian.

This one incident was indicative of some kind of *reactive* media policy-making that does not really take into account broader questions of press freedom and the people's right to access any media product. ZNBC management, more in response to the political elite who sided with the conservatives, set out to commission a 'study' into the popularity, or lack of it, of the channel (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 1999:16). The results of the survey indicated that fifty-four (54) percent of the respondents 'disliked' Channel O (ZNBC 1998). Based upon this finding, statistically insignificant as it might appear, ZNBC formulated a programme editorial policy against transmitting anything culturally 'distasteful'. It was in this light that the programme was removed from ZNBC 'Open Time'. However, this was an isolated organisational policy, and never extended to the privately owned subscription M-NET.

To some, an editorial decision such as this was understandable. ZNBC is so integrated into political power structures that it rarely makes independent programme transmission policies, a point that, historically, is related to what

Burgelman calls “the problematic position of the European public service broadcasting organisations”. He sets out the “problematic” in terms of the following variables:

1. There is constant pressure from big commercial groups, in line with the larger economic movement to ‘take away’ from the state what is profitable. This has resulted in the break-up of all public broadcasting monopolies in Europe and the explosion of commercial channels at the national level;
2. It can be suggested that many public broadcasters abused their monopoly by, among other things, linking themselves too much to the dominant political powers. As a result, many public service institutions lack the political (financial) and popular (audience) support they need today to compete with their commercial opponents; and
3. Everywhere in Europe, a new regulatory philosophy on culture in general is replacing the old post-World War II ones, which are judged to be too paternalistic (Burgelman 1998:125-128).

There are parallels between these problems and what ZNBC is facing. The de-regulation of the 1990s has seen the emergence of private-sector media competitors - terrestrial free-to-air, satellite pay-per-view or community -, who are gradually taking away a huge chunk of ZNBC’s audience share. ZNBC has no choice but to compete with these. However, having been heavily dependent on the state apparatus, ZNBC is finding it difficult to break out of the old cocoon of sycophancy and meet the challenge of new, more aggressive media. It has certainly not received such support from members of the public as it would need to break out of this ‘civil service’ mode. In fact, many still view it as a purely political party mouthpiece.

Furthermore, Zambian society has undergone a tremendous socio-political change, with the mushrooming of a vibrant civil society and numerous political party formations. A culture of socio-political diversity and plurality has become part of the

fabric of the Zambian society, as opposed to the one-party state culture of Kaunda's regime, a phenomenon to which ZNBC has not yet woken up to in its programming.

#### *Awareness of community radio*

Fifthly, there seems to be greater emphasis on, and awareness of, *community radio broadcasting*. The fact that several private local radio stations have sprung up at all points to growing awareness of, and interest in, community-based broadcasting.

#### *Lack of policy coherence*

Lastly, though, even with these developments, there appears to be a lack of a *coherent, consistent and comprehensive policy framework* that expressly recognises community radio broadcasting and accords it due importance. In short, where policy formulation on broadcasting is concerned, nothing much has been done since the Second Republic.

In fact, the last two processes, which are covered throughout this thesis, are listed here to show (i) that community radio is becoming an important issue and (ii) that overall media policy formulation must thus take the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting into account.

The six distinguishable processes examined above give rise to several implications for future media policy, in particular for community radio.

Firstly, the state needs to examine carefully the merits and demerits of a de-regulated media industry. While de-regulation and privatisation, in the name of the globalisation of communications, may be good for attracting private foreign and local actors to invest in the media industry, there is need to ensure that this is not at the expense of localised content production.

Secondly, then, it is important that future media policy takes into account the extent to which the entry of foreign media into the local media market can promote or stifle local media content. It could be argued that, by definition, community radio could serve as an important policy tool for ensuring that community-localised content counteracts against any undue foreign programme content.

Thirdly, in implementing any media policy, it is important that the state guards against such ideological issues as religion. As demonstrated above, the Zambian government has been known to give greater numbers of radio broadcasting licences to Christian media organisations, sometimes at the expense of other well-meaning applicants. The implicit ideological assumption is that Christian media organisations will churn out programmes that do not offend the political sensitivities of the government of the day. This is a subtle subversion of both freedom of expression and freedom of the press in the name of political expediency.

Fourthly and lastly, it is important, given the existing policy ambiguities, to spell out a coherent media policy that recognises the place of community radio broadcasting as a legitimate tier of broadcasting in Zambia.

The previous discussion in this chapter has explored the largely state-centric influences on the development of the media before and after 1991. It has also examined the impact of globalisation on the local media landscape. Based on this, it can be concluded that the media landscape in Zambia reflects its historical past of strong state intervention in media development. The purpose of the next section, then, is to focus on the present media policy mechanism in Zambia in order to show or prove that the post-colonial state, a legacy of British colonialism, has continued to play a pivotal role in media policy formulation and implementation, despite the often strong global influences being brought to bear on the local media landscape.



## 2.3 Existing media policy mechanisms in Zambia

Table 8 below describes the key broadcasting legislative or policy processes, some of them already referred to above, that have been underway as far back as 1966:

**Table 8:** Selective legal and policy developments in broadcasting -1966-2001

Law/policy	Year	Function	Observations
Broadcasting Act	1966	To regulate radio and television services in Zambia	The Government policy document of 1996 refers to the repealing of this, but nowhere is this evident
ZNBC Act	1987	To transform ZBS, hitherto under state control, into a body corporate that would be autonomous from the state	Interestingly, this has only happened in name. ZNBC is still locked into the state apparatus in terms of funding and appointment of key staff and ZNBC board of directors
ZNBC (Licensing) Regulations	1994	To empower ZNBC to be the custodian of broadcasting in Zambia, with statutory authority to be part of the screening process for awarding radio and television licences	This has had the effect of pitting ZNBC against potential competitors in broadcasting who have to answer to ZNBC
Telecommunications Act	1994	To establish a Communications Authority that would administer the radio frequency spectrum and ensure all technical requirements are	It must be noted, though, that ultimate authority for approving licences is vested in the Minister of Information and Broadcasting Services.

		adhered to	
Radiocommunications Act	1994	To provide scope for the Communication Authority's general supervision and control of radio communications services, including receiving and approving applications for radio licences	Still, it is significant to note that the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services plays a pivotal role in all this. There appears to be ambiguity about who the final arbiter is, though in practice the MIBS carries the day
Information and media policy	1996	To propose a policy framework for the media industry in Zambia	This policy has been in effect until 1999 when the Ministry of Information started out on reviewing it. However, there is no clear policy articulation on local content

There is need to focus on two key legal-cum-policy mechanisms above if only to lay the ground for a comparative analysis of the broadcasting policy model proposed by this thesis.

Firstly, a discussion of the ZNBC (Licensing) Regulations is in place. It has already been noted that this law vests final authority for awarding radio and television licences in the minister. Aside from this, there are other administrative procedures that would seem to make it difficult for an applicant to obtain a licence. Noteworthy is the fact that there are cumbersome requirements that an applicant must meet, most of which tend to be beyond those who apply for 'community radio' licences. It must be noted that these regulations do not yet recognise 'community radio' as a legitimate classification for radio stations. 'Community radio' licences are subsumed under 'private' and/or 'commercial' radio stations. This, in a sense, seems to be a hindrance to the growth of the community radio sector in the country.

Among the conditions for the award of a licence are the following:

- Applicants must have a registered office in Zambia and must: 1) have full legal capacity; 2) be fully suable in a court of law; and 3) provide proof of compliance with the Radio Communications Act of 1994.
- Applicants must demonstrate fully their financial ability to construct the station and operate for one year after construction is completed;
- Applicants must fully describe their proposed technical facilities;
- Applicants must indicate percentages of their programme content, taking care to include economic, social and cultural events in Zambia; and
- If several applicants are equally qualified except for programme considerations, the Minister based on which applicant's overall programme/proposal best advances a local or regional content will make a selection of the best applicant.

Secondly, following is an analysis of the MIBS Information and Media Policy framework. It is important to point out the fact that this policy has undergone some changes over the years; in fact, the Ministry of Information had, at the time of writing this thesis, released a somewhat revised document under the title 'National Media Policy' for input from 'stakeholders' (Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1999). Whereas the 1996 policy framework did not attempt to define 'community radio', the 1999 policy paper makes such an attempt and considers 'community radio' to be "a radio station owned and operated by a given community" (Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1999:2).

Both documents maintain the MIBS mission statement to *"promote and facilitate the growth of a sustainable media industry, capable of enhancing free flow of information and freedom of expression for national development"* (my italicising).

With that overall aim, both policy frameworks outline the following as the government's three main policy goals:

- The need to increase media outreach and access to all, particularly to the rural community;
- The need to pursue necessary and relevant legal reforms to enhance the people's right to information, freedom of the press and freedom of expression; and
- The need to encourage private investment in the media and the media support industries.

With the MIBS overall policy vision being to “create an enabling environment that will facilitate the growth of a sustainable media industry capable of ensuring free flow of information within the spirit of freedom of the press and expression to enhance democratic governance and national development”, the two policy frameworks set out the following policy objectives:

- To promote freedom of the press, including the safeguarding of people's rights to receiving and giving of information;
- To put in place a comprehensive and nationwide human and material resources development programme for media in order to strengthen capacity in both private and public media sectors for improved delivery of services particularly in rural areas;
- To promote civic education on people's rights, duties and responsibilities in order to enable them to participate fully in the democratic governance of the country;
- To pay attention to the information needs of the most vulnerable groups and persons;
- To create awareness and remedial action *inter alia* on the environment, population, health, gender and human rights issues in collaboration with relevant institutions and organisations;
- To record, store and publicise information on important national events;
- To create public awareness in times of epidemics and disasters; and
- To promote HIV/AIDS awareness in communities.

It is significant to note at this point that, whereas the 1996 policy framework recognised as a policy objective “the growth of community-based media”, the 1999 policy review document does not do so.

The policy review document then proposes “policy measures” under the following themes:

1. **Freedom of the press and good governance**, such as repealing Article 20 of the Constitution to provide for press freedom; enacting the Freedom of Information Act; turning ZNBC into a public broadcaster; turning the *Times-Printpak* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* into publicly-owned newspapers not answerable to the government of the day; and increasing access to information for all as a human right.
2. **Poor infrastructure**, such as establishing a country-wide communication infrastructure like transmitters, printing presses and computers to improve the quality of radio and television reception and speedy transmission of news from the country-side; providing new information technology; facilitating the provision of small-scale presses to cater for rural areas; and encouraging investment in the media, especially in rural areas.
3. **Inadequate funding**, such as implementing government policy on commercialisation of some government media services; providing adequate grants for ZNBC, the *Times of Zambia*, the *Zambia Daily Mail* and the Zambia Printing Company to enable them to acquire and maintain equipment and printing presses; reviewing the ZNBC Act of 1966 to enable the corporation to raise revenue from television and radio licensing; and allowing ZNBC to enter into joint ventures with players on the international broadcast market.
4. **Distribution, media outreach and access to information technologies**, such as establishing a newspaper distribution network through the use of various modes of transport to deliver newspapers to districts; establishing modern news processing and distribution equipment,

for example, computers and satellites; expanding the Internet service through ZAMTEL, ZAMNET and other providers so that more people could have access to local and foreign newspapers<sup>8</sup>; and *encouraging the establishment of community media, such as co-operatively-owned community broadcasting stations and newspapers* (my italicising).

5. **High cost of newsprint**, such as establishing new and cheaper sources of newsprint; monitoring levels of duty on newsprint to ensure that they remain at reasonable levels that encourage investment in the print media; and encouraging the establishment of factories manufacturing and re-cycling newsprint.
6. **Capacity building**, such as ensuring budgetary allocation for the training of journalists in government media; seeking donor funding for training of both public and private media journalists to enable them to undergo specialised training; and supporting and promoting research at media training schools and media houses.
7. **Gender sensitivity**, such as encouraging sensitivity and affirmative action in the recruitment, training and promotion of journalists both in the private and public media; and encouraging journalists and advertising agents to be gender sensitive in their coverage and treatment of women in news and advertisements.
8. **Professionalism and journalism ethics**, such as encouraging press associations to put in place strict guidelines on who should be allowed to practise as a journalist; facilitating the strengthening of and close liaison between various bodies set up for the sole purpose of enforcing media ethical standards (ie the Press Association of Zambia, the Zambia Independent Media Association and the Zambia Media Women's Association); and encouraging the press associations to set up one public complaints-hearing

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<sup>8</sup>ZAMTEL (Zambia Telecommunications Company Ltd) is a public utility that, like the private ZAMNET Communication Systems, provides Internet services in Zambia. ZAMNET is jointly owned by private financiers and the University of Zambia Computer Centre.

body with powers to publicly admonish or censure any erring media and/or recommend legal action against any such media or journalists.

9. **Promotion of culture**, such as encouraging the Film Censorship Board to classify films for parental guidance in the cinema industry; mobilising resources to support the making of films that reflect Zambia's culture, experiences, concerns and opportunities; and encouraging the acquisition of technologies by the country's broadcast media that enable parents to control what programmes are viewed by children.

However, despite these pronouncements on the promotion of culture, there is no clear policy guideline on local content promotion. The application forms for radio and television licences *do* have a section which requires the applicant to fill out the percentages or quotas that he/she plans to allocate to each of the programme categories indicated therein. According to Regulation 6(1) of the fourth schedule of the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Licensing) Regulations, the programme categories range from political, social, cultural, economic, to educational programming (Zambia 1993). It is not clear whether or not this requirement is designed to enhance local content production.

Finally, in setting forth the "institutional framework" for the implementation of the policy, the policy framework states that "implementation of information and media policy will be the responsibility of government, through the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services. The bottom line of this policy is the desire to put in place responsible, professional, efficient and self-motivated media, capable of meeting the information needs of the country, bearing in mind that information is an important tool for national development..."

Whereas the 1996 policy restricted the implementation strategy to state, quasi-public or statutory institutions, such as the *Zambia Information Services (ZIS)*, the *Zambia News Agency (ZANA)*, the Zambia Institute of Mass Communication

(ZAMCOM),<sup>9</sup> the *Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation* (ZNBC), the *Times of Zambia* and the *Zambia Daily Mail* where the government is the majority shareholder, the 1999 policy review framework attempts to be inclusive of such other stakeholders as “media associations and other journalists’ bodies”.

For instance, to demonstrate how exclusive the former policy framework was, the following diagram spells out what can be considered to be a “consultative mechanism” for the “continuous monitoring and evaluation of policy implementation,” suggested by the policy:

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<sup>9</sup>ZAMCOM was set up in 1980 as a result of a memorandum of understanding between the Zambian government and the German government. It was established as a media training institute that would offer in-service training to the departments that fell under MIBS, namely ZANA, ZIS, National Agricultural Information Services (NAIS) and Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS). In 1996, ZAMCOM was incorporated as a public institute and allowed to operate commercially without government financial support. It has now expanded its scope of operations beyond Zambia and offers training in conjunction with the World Bank, the UK Thomson Foundation and the Nordic Journalism Centre based in Mozambique (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 1999: 23-25).






Figure 3. **MIBS policy consultative mechanism** (Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1996:25)

**Key**

**WID:** Women in Development

**MIBS:** Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services

**ZUJ:** Zambia Union of Journalists (consists of state-owned media)

**PAZA:** Press Association of Zambia (The majority of its members are drawn from state-owned media)

↔ : Indicates the expectation that the MIBS will influence, and be influenced by, the relevant ministries, departments and organisations in the implementation of the policy. However, more importantly, it indicates that the MIBS has overall control over the implementation of the policy.

Several critical comments may be made about these MIBS policy frameworks. To start with, they are heavily state-centric. They seem to reduce everything to the agency of the state. A cursory look at the goals, objectives, and strategies, as well as the institutional framework, reflect the government's intention, conscious or not, to be the key player in the implementation of the policy. Indeed, the "departments and organisations" identified as part of the implementing partners are, in fact, structurally and/or operationally linked to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services. This is particularly so in the 1996 policy framework. Although the agency of the state apparatus has been somewhat toned down to include a semblance of civil society involvement in the 1999 revised document, there is still an impression that this is very much a state-centric policy formulation.

It can thus be concluded that the policy framework is meant to service the bureaucracy. As Figure 3 would seem to demonstrate, the policy, in its "Consultative Mechanism", serves to highlight the centrality of the "information units in the line ministries" to the implementation of the policy. Thus, all government ministries, especially those of tourism, education, health, science and technology, home affairs, labour and social services, agriculture, food and fisheries, and community development and social services, stand to have their information needs serviced by this policy framework.

Secondly, both policy frameworks, while referring to "community radio" and "community-based media", do not clearly define the parameters of what constitutes "community radio stations" or "community-based media". Implicitly, though, the policy papers seem to view the phenomenon in its "geographical" sense. Running through this policy is the government's desire to "address the existing imbalance between the rural and urban areas by increasing media outreach" (Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1996:13). Therefore, it would seem the

government's interest is to extend the reach of media to include rural communities more definitively.

Thirdly, and related to the observation above, is the fact that both policy attempts do not seem to clearly distinguish between public, community and private and/or commercial media. It refers to the "promotion of more private investment into the (media) sector" but does not engage in an analysis of the implications of private sector investment, especially issues relating to chain ownership of media and the implications of that for media pluralism and diversity. Both policy papers recognise private sector investment only to the extent that this engenders some kind of extension of broadcasting services to the rural areas. Indeed, this is so because it is realised that the state, through ZNBC, cannot work alone to improve media outreach to rural areas.

This would explain the Ministry of Information's acceptance of CASAT's - a private cable and satellite television company - proposal in 2001 to use the state's Constituency Development Fund to set up television broadcasting transmitters in some rural districts hitherto inaccessible by ZNBC and thus to enable such remote areas to access, via CASAT's own satellite technology, the ZNBC television signal (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 2002:4,17). This was in effect a lifting of the ban on CASAT's long-standing objective of setting up what it called "rural television". It is arguable that CASAT's long-term business strategy was to stimulate interest in television in such areas and cultivate a faithful following that might subsequently develop interest in CASAT's cable and satellite multi-choice bouquet of programmes.

While both policy documents speak of enacting legislation to turn ZNBC into a public broadcaster, there is no rigorous definition of the concept of "public service broadcasting" in relation to the emerging privately owned commercial and/or religious satellite or terrestrial broadcasting channels.

However, the Parliamentary Committee on Information and Broadcasting Services of 1999, chaired by Hon. Alexander Miti, attempts to define “public service broadcasting” in terms of the following elements:

- Independence from governmental control;
- Ownership by, and accountability to the public guaranteed through funding and appointments of directors of the board ratified by Parliament;
- Independence from commercial interests; and
- A clearly defined mandate which meets the needs not addressed by private pay TV and free-to-air commercial broadcasting services (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 1999).

The Parliamentary Committee on Information and Broadcasting Services (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 1999:20-23) takes the view that this “mandate” should revolve around: (i) the provision of timely, relevant and factual information, which would in turn provide a content for development and participation in decision-making; (ii) education and development in both formal and non-formal sectors and collaboration with educational or curricula-developing institutions; (iii) the provision of entertaining programming which would be enriching in both social and human spheres, capable of placing issues within a personal and global context; and (iv) the identification and promotion of core values that would assist in strengthening national unity whilst promoting diversity and the multiple faceted nature of society.

Fourthly, both policy documents do not adequately address the issue of local content in order to counteract the influence of media imperialism alluded to earlier on.

Lastly, not only do both policy frameworks fail to define “public service broadcasting”, but they also do not engage in an analysis of the emergence of private pay satellite and free-to-air broadcasting services. Perhaps, this is

understandable in the sense that, at the time of the formulation of the 1996 policy, such broadcasting services were still at the inchoate stage of development in Zambia. Even then, the 1999 review policy framework simply acknowledges the existence of such new media and does not address questions about protecting local content in the face of usually cheaper foreign productions, the cost of accessing such services, and new pro-active regulatory regimes for satellite broadcasting, et cetera.

To conclude, this chapter has set out a historical context within which the media have developed in Zambia, noting in particular how the pre - and post - 1990s politics of the country have helped to shape the contours of media activity. The chapter has also helped to illuminate the context within which discussion about community radio broadcasting can be established, noting in particular the fact that policy has largely been state-centred and influenced. In fact, it can be argued that there was little or no civil society participation in the development and enunciation of the two policy documents referred to, a fact that any future media and information policy development must take into account. In addition, perhaps because of this lack of wide-ranging consultation with different interest groups, the two policy documents belie a comprehensiveness and diversity of content in such areas as media performance, new information and communication technologies, press freedom, convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications, et cetera.

Furthermore, this chapter has, within the context of the research problem being investigated by this study, demonstrated that the evolution of community radio broadcasting in Zambia has been shaped by Zambia's colonial-state influences, post-colonial state hegemony, local pressure groups and the globalisation of communications, among other factors. The chapter, building on the cursory analysis of the gaps in Zambia's media policy frameworks of 1996 and 1999 as given in chapter one, has firmly positioned this thesis within a historical context that answers specific questions to do with how media policy development in

Zambia has neglected the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting. Chapter two has also demonstrated the impact of globalisation on Zambian broadcasting, noting the extent to which foreign cultural influences have rekindled notions of cultural identity among audiences, giving rise to a kind of 'localisation' project that is finding expression in the call for a better organised community radio broadcasting system in the country.

The analyses in chapters one and two have thus helped to set the scene for the next research question to do with the rationale for community radio broadcasting in Zambia. In presenting this rationale, chapter three below seeks, among other things, to discuss the international contextualisation of community radio broadcasting as a way of establishing what community radio broadcasting *is* both in Zambia and elsewhere. The analyses already undertaken in chapter one and two have begun to show a contrast between community radio broadcasting and other tiers of broadcasting, such as public service and commercial, a discussion that is extensively taken up in chapter three.

Five key lessons can be learnt from chapter two when developing a model for community radio broadcasting in Zambia. Firstly, the existing media policies in Zambia generally reflect the high-handedness of the colonial regime. While the historical conditions of colonialism may have necessitated such heavy-handedness, the new post-colonial state seems to want to perpetuate such state-centrism as a way of keeping the media away from political opponents. It is, therefore, imperative that such a media policy orientation be changed to facilitate a more inclusive process of policy-making.

The second lesson relates to the fact that policy-making must keep pace with the rapid globalisation of communications that has left Zambia not untouched. The advances in technology, and how these are reshaping the broadcasting landscape, need to spur the country to formulate corresponding policies. The globalisation of communication is also affecting the nature of community radio

broadcasting, particularly with regard to the use of new information and communication technologies (ICTs). For example, these technological developments have implications for the kind of training that community radio broadcasting personnel and/or volunteers should undergo in order for them to be well equipped.

Thirdly, there is need for any community radio broadcasting policy model to inculcate a clearer definition of what constitutes 'community radio'. As has been noted in this chapter, there has been a mushrooming of many privately owned radio stations, most of them commercial and religious. It is not very clear whether or not they live up to the notion of 'community-based' communication.

Fourthly, any policy model for Zambia must seek to creatively confront the process of 'media/cultural imperialism' that has been discussed in connection with the globalisation of communication. This can, as has been noted, be achieved through a process of media *localisation* that encourages the production of entertaining developmental local content.

Lastly, it is important for any policy model to emphasise the question of access and accessibility of community radio broadcasting as a way of ensuring the highest level of community participation.

## **CHAPTER THREE: THE CASE FOR COMMUNITY RADIO BROADCASTING IN ZAMBIA**

By way of introduction, this chapter makes the argument that the rationale behind community radio broadcasting in Zambia can be justified in terms of three imperatives, namely pragmatism, policy and politics. These three issues cannot be treated in isolation; they are part of a global discourse and movement about the role of communication in development. To that extent, it is important to discuss the *localised* rationale for community radio broadcasting in Zambia against the background of a geopolitical context for community communication and its role in shaping development agendas. This latter discussion is itself reflective of a range of theoretical discourses about community broadcasting and the kinds of claims it makes with regard to community empowerment, participation, development and cultural identity.

Therefore, in seeking to set out the case for community radio broadcasting in Zambia, the chapter commences with a discussion of the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting within an international or global context.

Secondly, it delineates a theoretical framework within which to situate the concept of community radio broadcasting and, within that theoretical framework, defines the concept of 'community radio broadcasting' as such. This is aimed at setting the scene for a discussion in chapter six of a policy model for a sound community radio broadcasting system in Zambia. The chapter then concludes with an analysis of the rationale or need for community radio broadcasting in Zambia.



### 3.1 Towards a global contextualisation of community radio broadcasting

The 1990s reverberated with the 1980s discourse about community radio and its role in development. Many saw community radio as representing “the democratisation of communication” and an assurance of community access<sup>10</sup> (Mtimde et al 1998:1). Others, especially such UN development agencies as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation

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<sup>10</sup>The concept of *access* has a clearer definitional articulation in the field of telecommunications, particularly telephony, and now increasingly information and communications technologies (ICTs). It is generally taken to refer to the concepts of *universal access* and *universal service* (Lush, Rushwayo & Banda 2000; Dunn 2000). Universal access, within the context of telecommunications, has been taken to mean that public telephones are placed within a reasonable distance of every home throughout the country, as is the case in Namibia and South Africa where there are policies that aim to ensure that everyone lives within “walking distance” of a telephone. On the other hand, universal service refers to the desire, whether reduced to policy or not, of governments and telephone companies to ensure that they attain universal access (Lush et al 2000:ix). The question of access, within the context of ICTs, is addressed under the umbrella of the so-called *open access* in the United States of America, which refers to the ability of any citizen to choose their Internet service provider, access any content or service, and transmit any information desired (Media Access Project 2002). Van Cuilenburg (1999) broadens the definition of *access* to *access to communications* which, according to him, means the “possibility for individuals, groups of individuals, organizations and institutions to share society’s communications resources, that is, to participate in the market of communications infrastructure and distribution (message delivery) services, and in the market of content and communication services”. Van Cuilenburg (1999:185) contrasts this with what he calls *accessibility of communications* which he argues refers to the degree to which it is possible to take a share in society’s communications resources. According to Cuilenburg, these two concepts are important with regard to communications policy because they fall within the matrix of issues that define such policy, namely 1) the definition of the domain in which the policy operates; 2) the availability of resources; 3) the organisation of access to resources; 4) the establishment and enforcement of norms and controls; and 5) the problems at the system boundaries (Cuilenburg 1999:184). Extending his observations, Van Cuilenburg contends that access and accessibility as communications concepts evidently relate to notions of social inclusion and exclusion. A high degree of accessibility of communications indicates a high degree of social inclusion of all groups and people in society, whereas limited access to society’s communications resources usually goes with communicative inequality and social exclusion of many groups and individuals (Cuilenburg 1999:185). Clearly, democratising communications is but one aspect of the discourse about ensuring universal access to media of communication, whether public, commercial or community. This is more so in the case of community radio broadcasting because of its idealistic claims of community participation and management, among others. Clearly, though, the issues of access to, and accessibility of, communications are basically influenced by many factors – commercial, political, technological, geographic, racial, et cetera. To elaborate on these points in no specific order: in South Africa, the black majority were marginalised from the mainstream media. People with little or no income are often excluded from the media, as they have no financial power to purchase radio and television sets and newspapers. Ruling elites in Africa tend to control the means of media production and deny opposition political parties access to state-run media. Some rural areas cannot be reached by radio or television broadcast signals, nor can they be reached by print publications. The use of antiquated technology for broadcast purposes sometimes accounts for this inability by some media organisations to reach the remotest parts of some countries.

(UNESCO), saw it as a realisation of the strategy of development communication. As will be seen later, UNESCO has been responsible for the creation of several community radio stations across Africa – from Malawi's *Dzimwe*, through Namibia's *Katutura*, to Zambia's *Mazabuka Community Radio Stations*.

Indeed, despite the fact that community radio is a growing phenomenon, both in actual terms and in popularity, it has developed differently across the African continent. In South Africa, for instance, the phenomenon has caught on and spread like bush fire, with the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA)<sup>11</sup> giving numerous licences to community radio initiators across cultural, religious, ethnic and political interests. The IBA set out to “encourage the ownership and control of broadcasting services by people from previously disadvantaged groups” (Golding-Duffy & Vilakazi 1998:87). Indeed, Golding-Duffy and Vilakazi (1998:94) further observe that ordinary members of the community have thus been given a chance to make important broadcasting, management and programming decisions.

South Africa presents a special case for communication policy in that legislation has clearly outlined three types of radio: public, commercial and *community* (my italicising) (Valentine 1995). This is against the backdrop of a country gripped in the throes of the apartheid regime where the broadcasting environment, dominated by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), was tightly controlled.

According to the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) - the new regulatory body - there are ninety-two (92) community services currently operational on FM frequencies, and eight (8) on AM frequencies.

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<sup>11</sup>The IBA has since been merged with the South African Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA) to form the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). Among other reasons, this is meant to take advantage of the ever-evolving convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications.

Community broadcasting services, as defined in the South African Broadcasting Act number 4 of 1999 (South Africa 1999):

- Are fully controlled by a non-profit entity and carried on for non-profitable purposes;
- Serve a particular community;
- Encourage members of the community served, or persons associated with or promoting the interests of such community, to participate in the selection and provision of programmes to be broadcast; and
- May be funded by donations, grants, sponsorships or advertising or membership fees, or by any combination of these.

The Act also states that programming provided by a community broadcasting service must reflect the needs of the people in the community which must include amongst others cultural, religious, language and demographic needs and must:

- Provide a distinct broadcasting service dealing specifically with community issues which are not normally dealt with by the broadcasting service covering the same area;
- Be informational, educational and entertaining;
- Focus on the provision of programmes that highlight grassroots community issues, including, but not limited to, developmental issues, health care, basic information and general education, environmental affairs, local and international, and the reflection of local culture; and
- Promote the development of a sense of common purpose with democracy and improve quality of life.

Furthermore, the following are content requirements for community radio services provided for by the law:

- Ensure that programming is community driven;
- Broadcast news and other information programmes, especially about events and issues at a local level;
- Provide diversity in format, adding to the diversity of provision in the local area;
- Reflect the language needs of their target communities; and
- Ensure the development of local music and talent and the development of the local music industry by ensuring that a minimum twenty (20) percent of music broadcast (for services dedicating more than fifteen (15) percent of their airtime to music) is of South African origin.

The Department of Communications, located within the Ministry of Post, Telecommunications and Broadcasting, is responsible for policy-making and policy review. This is achieved via a Broadcasting Policy Development Unit (South Africa 1999).

A more detailed analysis of the South African policy and regulatory environment, including an examination of the Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA), follows in chapter five. Indeed, it might be remarked at this point that, although community radio broadcasting seems to be thriving in South Africa, it is bedevilled by so many problems, some of which are discussed extensively in chapter five.

The Zambian policy-cum-legislative scenario, as will be demonstrated in some detail later, is far removed from the elaborate and precise community media system that the South African experience seems to present above. Largely as a consequence of this lack of legislative and *conceptual* clarity relating to community radio, many in Zambia were easily misled into assigning the label 'community radio' to any *new* radio station that appeared on the scene. It was not surprising, therefore, that people mistakenly referred to the privately owned, commercial *Radio Phoenix* as a 'community radio' station.

For its part, *Radio Phoenix* prided itself on being a 'community-based' radio station. Quite clearly, this flew into the face of the definition of community radio as adumbrated by the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC) and Panos as radio *owned and controlled by a community defined either geographically or as a community of interests* (Mtimde et al 1998:19).

Still, one might ask: Should one not define community radio less rigidly and focus more on the *processes of programming* than on the *structures of ownership and control*? Would it not be justifiable, for instance, to argue that a privately owned, commercial radio station which devotes *more* time to coverage of community issues and events satisfies the ideal of 'community radio'?

In fact, it was partly because of this ambiguity that some participants at the sixth conference of World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC) held in Dakar, Senegal, in 1995, resisted calls for a working definition of community radio as radio that is *owned, controlled and programmed by the community it serves* (Valentine 1995:8-9).

This conceptual impreciseness has implications for the manner in which policy on community radio broadcasting can be shaped. But this is dealt with elsewhere in greater detail. At this point, a look at other national contexts would be more illustrative of the towering character of the community radio phenomenon.

### **3.1.1 Trends in community broadcasting in Southern Africa**

The Southern African sub-region presents a chequered dynamic of community radio broadcasting, reflecting the multiplicity of historico-cultural experiences.

What follows below is just a cursory look at some countries in Southern Africa. A more detailed and comparatively nuanced discussion of some countries is given in chapter five.

To start with, Portuguese-speaking Mozambique is a Southern African country that has not remained untouched by the community radio fever. The Catholic Church, like in Zambia, has been in the forefront of setting up community radio stations in that country. Thus it was that *San Francisco Community Radio* in Pemba was set up. The National Institute for Social Communications, working in conjunction with *Radio Mozambique*, set up *ICS Community Radio* in Xai-Xai and *Mocuba Community Radio* (Siteo 1998:44-45). It is significant to note that *Radio Mozambique*, a state-owned media organisation, is involved with community radio. A more detailed analysis of the Mozambican media policy and regulatory structures is given in chapter five.

The same situation as described above with regard to *Radio Mozambique* is true of *Mazabuka Community Radio Station* in Zambia, which was set up with the help of both the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS) and the *Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation* (ZNBC) with financial support from UNESCO.

In Namibia, the poor township of Katutura saw the creation of *Katutura Community Radio* in 1995. Its original idea of promoting community development had for a while proved unworkable, with the young volunteers who flocked to it stamping their 'culture and values' on it, turning it into a predominantly music station, although it has now turned to news, current affairs and other talk shows. The station remains almost entirely donor-funded, with some of the major benefactors being the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, the Swedish International Development Authority, the Open Society Institute and UNESCO (Lush & Kaitira 1998:72-73).

Some countries like Botswana and Zimbabwe have known little or none of this community radio fever. For instance, the Botswana Telecommunications Authority (BTA) refused to give World Vision Botswana a licence for a radio station aimed at empowering the Basarwa or 'Bushmen'. The BTA argued that "to some extent the needs of non-commercial applicants for radio broadcasting (namely community based radio broadcasting) are currently being met by similar programmes provided by Radio Botswana" (Mosaka & Kanaimba 1998:25-26).

In Zimbabwe, a different model of community radio is visible. There are over fifty-two (52) radio listening clubs (RLCs) coordinated by the *Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation* (ZBC) and the Federation of African Media Women Zimbabwe (FAMWZ). Funded by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Panos Institute Southern Africa, this project involves club members, mostly women, listening to a half-hour radio programme on a portable radio cassette recorder. Thereafter, the members debate the broadcast, and the debate is recorded. Thus, the members set the agenda for developmental issues (Manyarara 1998:130).

Though this is not community radio *par excellence*, there is a process of community control over the content of the programmes. Furthermore, women do their own recordings. This has the effect of 'demystifying' the technology of radio for what are largely rural and illiterate communities.

Overall, via a state-controlled media institution, these clubs provide a bridge between rural community voices and urban-based policy-makers, setting in motion a process of 'development-through-radio' (DTR) (Moyo & Quarmye 1994) or 'dialogic communication' between rural women and urban policy-making elites. Moyo and Quarmye assign to this model three advantages, namely: extensive coverage, appropriate languages and a suitable mandate.

As an alternative to mainstream, usually state broadcasting, Radio Listening Clubs *are* indeed one of the many expressions of community communication.

A more extensive discussion about the broadcasting systems and policies of countries in Southern Africa and the rest of the Western world is given in chapter five, with special focus on Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Australia.

### **3.1.2. Trends in community broadcasting in other parts of Africa**

Like in Southern Africa, community radio broadcasting, or what is called “microcasting” (Myers 2000), has also caught on in West Africa. However, as Myers (2000:90) contends, in West Africa, particularly Mali, there are numerous examples of community-type stations existing on a commercial basis.

Myers (2000:90) further *problematizes* the concept of community radio as follows:

- To what extent can one justify as ‘community radio’ those stations with religious affiliation?
- To what extent can one justify as ‘community radio’ those stations owned and operated by the government for the community?
- To what degree can one justify ‘community ownership’ for those stations whose establishment and running costs are underpinned by an international NGO like OXFAM?

This definitional problematic notwithstanding, Myers (2000:90) proceeds to define community radio as “small-scale decentralized broadcasting initiatives which are easily accessed by local people, actively encourage their participation in programming, and which include some element of community ownership or membership”.



The rise of community radio, or what Myers (2000:91) calls “the independent radio explosion”, in Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Guinea, Mauritania and Senegal (with Mali and Burkina Faso accounting for almost three-quarters of the newly created radio stations in West Africa), could be attributed to several factors, among which are the following:

- The populations of all the Francophone states in West Africa are overwhelmingly rural, non - or semi-literate, and possess a strong oral tradition;
- There is virtually no competition from television and newspapers, particularly in the desperately poor and arid regions of northern Mali;
- The imposition of the structural adjustment programme on most countries in West Africa forced governments to liberalise their media industry and privatise previously state owned and operated mass media, with the net result being guidelines and enabling legislation to free the media;
- The growth in donor support to independent media as a powerful force for community development and the promotion of human rights; and
- International and local NGO pressure for government to enact appropriate legislation. A case in point was the West Africa-wide conference in 1993 which resulted in the adoption of the ‘Bamako Declaration on Radio Pluralism’.

The points raised above tally with Bourgault’s observation that in the 1990s, African radio was caught up in the wider political changes that swept the continent, so much so that there was a clamouring for a decentralisation of national radio services as a means towards entrenching political pluralism and public access to the means of communication (Bourgault 1995:99).

Bourgault (1995:101) adds another interesting dimension with regard to the question of what Fardon and Furniss (2000:1-20) call “African broadcast cultures”. She argues that radio pluralism for Africa, in some cases, meant more

access by foreign owners to African audiences. In Benin in 1991, she goes on, *FM 90*, a joint commercial partnership between *Radio France Internationale* and the *Office de Rediffusion et de Television du Benin* (OTB), went on the air in Cotonou.

As of 1991, Senegal was allowing *Radio France Internationale* to broadcast eighteen (18) hours a day on *Dakar FM*. In other countries, such as Cote d'Ivoire, foreign licence applicants are competing with locals for frequencies (Bourgault 1995:100). This trend has continued to this day, with the BBC World Service, for instance, having being given an FM licence in Zambia, Tanzania and other African countries.

Alongside this urban-centred and international access to radio broadcasting, there is another disturbing reality that was as true in the 1990s as it is true now. It is aptly captured by Bourgault (1995:102) in these words:

The current spate of enthusiasm over newly burgeoning radio services in Africa seems preoccupied with urban entertainment services and middle-class political concerns over media access. Meanwhile would-be private media owners are concerned very much with potential profits. *Unfortunately, little attention or energy has as yet been devoted to providing genuinely rural-based or "rural-friendly" broadcasting services to the media-starved regions of the hinterland.* (my italicising).

This concern about the lack of access to information by the rural poor raises questions about the nature of radio pluralism and the attendant legislation in West Africa. According to Djokotoe, Daka & Opoku-Mensah (1996:50-51), there are all kinds of hindrances to the enforcement of broadcasting legislation and laws. At the political level, either there is limited government commitment as in the case of Ghana, Guinea Bissau and Guinea, or licences and authorisations are issued on a preferential basis, by nepotism such as in Cote d'Ivoire. Furthermore, the shortcomings of the democratisation process and the desire of political powers to control the broadcasting sector are some of the negative impacts of

this process. At the technical level, the problem is aggravated by the prohibitive costs and shortages of equipment/spare parts. These issues serve to make the development of the community radio broadcasting sector a very difficult project indeed. As can be seen, these problems compare to those faced by the community radio broadcasting sector in Southern Africa. A more detailed analysis to that end is given in chapter five.

### **3.1.3 Trends in community broadcasting in the North**

Right from the outset, it must be reiterated that both in Africa and in the Western, industrialised countries, community radio, like other such media, developed as a distinct alternative to local commercial radio and local public radio.

For instance, situating his analysis within the United States, Italy and France, Sweden, Latin America and Britain, White (1990) argues that a great variety of approaches are included under the term 'community radio', but generally it revolves around the following characteristics:

- autonomous radio station serving no more than a single city with its immediate hinterland, all with a distinct local political-cultural identity;
- the governing organisation of the station is a non-profit, co-operative form with a board of management elected by the people of the community or by users of the medium who are members of the organisation by reason of a nominal membership fee or purchase of a share;
- community volunteers play an important role in the production of programming and distinctions between professional staff and ordinary users are played down;
- the station avoids as much as possible commercial criteria and seeks support primarily from the contributions of users, supplemented by grants from community organisations, foundations, et cetera;

- the major objectives are to encourage widespread community participation in broadcasting, provide an opportunity for horizontal communication between individuals and groups in the community, stimulate more free and open debate of the community issues and reflect the cultural and social diversity of the community; and
- a special effort is made to provide an active voice for less powerful minorities to make known their alternative views and lifestyles of life.

However, while some of the attributes cited above can indeed be applied to Africa, others have somewhat been 'refracted' through conflicting historical and cultural experiences, resulting in a somewhat different version of 'community radio' (White 1990).

Still in the Western world, McCain and Lowe (1990:94), defining 'community' as "any group whose members can be characterised as sharing an agenda of relatively widespread common interests and who recognise among themselves many more or less commonly held notions related to values, identification, practices, and needs", argue that local community radio is in the best position to satisfy needs for multiple access and control, apart from providing a "vital horizontal link to the communities they serve."

Even in the developed world, then, community radio *did* excite many a European Government. For example, the two authors above quote the British government's 1987 Green Paper on the matter:

We do not know the extent of the audience for such services. But the enthusiasm reflected in the applications...suggest that the demand is there...Community radio should be introduced through the UK, finding its place side by side with existing local commercial stations under a new form of light regulation.

In Australia, community radio, previously called Public Radio, has been a licensed tier of radio broadcasting since the mid 1970s (Price-Davies & Tacchi 2001). The Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) distinguishes community broadcasting services (which include radio and television) from other services in that they:

- are not operated for profit or as part of a profit-making enterprise
- are provided for community purposes
- represent a community of interest
- comply with the community broadcasting codes of practice
- encourage members of the community served to participate in the operations of the service and the selection and provision of programmes
- are prohibited from carrying advertising, but may broadcast up to five (5) minutes of sponsorship announcements per hour
- must continue to represent the community represented at the time the licence was allocated

The community broadcasting code of practice covers eight areas, which include:

- responsibilities of broadcasting to the community
- guidelines for general programming
- Australian music content
- sponsorship
- volunteers
- conflict resolution
- handling complaints
- review of codes

These will be explored in greater depth, in juxtaposition with other community broadcasting systems, in chapter five.

In Canada, community radio, whose importance has been acknowledged since the 1970s, is defined as:

owned and controlled by a not-for-profit organisation, the structure of which provides for membership, management, operation and programming primarily by members of the community at large. Programming should reflect the diversity of the market that the station is licensed to serve (Price-Davies & Tacchi 2001).

The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) sees its main objective for the community radio sector as ensuring that it provides local programming services that differ in style and substance from those provided by commercial stations and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). These services should add diversity to the broadcasting system by increasing programme choice in both music and spoken word by:

- offering programming that is different from and complements the programming of other stations in the market.
- being different from other elements of the broadcasting system, including commercial stations and stations operated by the CBC.
- broadcasting varied and diverse music and spoken word (Price-Davies & Tacchi 2001:20-21).

Furthermore, the CRTC sets out the role and mandate of community radio as providing access to the airwaves and offering diverse programming that reflects the needs and interests of the community served. The programming should include:

- music by new and local talent
- music not generally broadcast by commercial stations
- spoken word programming
- local information (Price-Davies & Tacchi 2001:20-21).

In France, community radio is just one of the five categories of 'private' radio recognised in legislation and the regulatory authorities. Community radio falls under 'category A' radio stations which include *local, community, cultural* or *student* radio services. They are obliged to carry at least four (4) hours of specific local programming every day to be broadcast between 6.00am and 10.00pm. The bulk of their output should be made up of either non-commercial network programming or programmes produced by other category A stations. These stations are limited to gaining no more than twenty (20) percent of their total income from either advertising or sponsorship. In return for this, they are eligible to get funding from the Fund for the Support of Expression by Radio.

In France, the community radio sector has developed since the late 1960s and the early 1970s as a consequence of the pirate ships based in the Channel and the Italian 'Free Radio' stations.

By 1974, a number of such stations were operating illegally. Among these were *Radio Halles, Radio Verte, Radio Libre Nantes, Radio Lazarc* and *Radio Active*. Many of these were explicitly political, and broadcast material unavailable on the national and regional stations controlled by the French government. These first stations faced jamming of their frequencies, seizure of equipment and arrest of station personnel. But much as in the UK, these pirate stations had also shown a clear demand amongst French listeners for a new kind of radio (Price-Davies & Tacchi 2001:27).

The Dutch experience treats community radio as 'local' radio, defining it in law as follows:

Its principal objective, as laid down in its constitution, is to provide a programme service for general broadcasting purposes which is aimed to such extent at satisfying the social, cultural, religious or ideological needs of the general public in a municipality or province or the area of the province served by the establishment that it may be deemed to be serving the public interest;

and it has a body which determines its programme service policy. This body shall be composed in such a way as to be representative of the main social, cultural, religious and ideological movements within the municipality or province (Price-Davies & Tacchi 2001:32).

Local broadcasting in Holland is thus considered to be part of the public broadcasting sector. It is not explicitly designated as non-profit distributing, though in practice none of these stations actually generate any profit, and most struggle to find sources of income.

There has been rapid growth of the sector since 1981 when local radio was only available on an 'experimental' basis. By 1999, there were 336 licensed local broadcasters in Holland, most of which are members of the Dutch Federation of Local Public Broadcasters.

The Dutch Media Authority requires that local radio be formally incorporated with the express objective of making and transmitting programmes for and on behalf of the local community. The programmes have to 'make a contribution to the community served', and this objective has to be incorporated into the organisational regulations of the radio station. The board of the station has to reflect the local community and be representative of the major cultural, social, religious and ideological organisations in the local community. The Court of Mayor and Aldermen in each municipality, upon the recommendation of the broadcaster, appoint the members of the board. Editorial independence is guaranteed by statute (Price-Davies & Tacchi 2001:32-34).

Quite clearly, these systems of broadcasting indicate a diversity of cultural experiences of community radio. In that sense, one can argue that community radio takes on the *idiosyncratic* character of a nation.

Other parts of the Third World, such as Bolivia, have generated a community radio system that uplifts people's cultural values in the face of oppression. As



O'Connor (1990) puts it, community radio in Bolivia is a *sine qua non* of cultural resistance, particularly in times of military control *vis-à-vis* union activity. In such times, he argues, community radio forms a "network of resistance against the approaching armed forces, broadcasts decisions made at public and organisational meetings and allows union leaders and members, women and students to offer advice, encouragement or criticism" (O'Connor 1990:104).

In all these socio-cultural contexts, what seems to be common to most discourses about community radio or, more generally, community media, are the notions of community 'access', 'management' and 'participation'. Articulated in part by UNESCO in the 1970s, many have come to consider them common-sense. Berrigan (1979:8-9), in the following extended quotation, notes:

Community media are adaptations of media for use by the community, for whatever purposes the community decides. They are media to which members of the community have access, for information, education, entertainment, when they want access. They are media in which the community participates, as planners, producers, and performers. They are the means of expression of the community, rather than for community. Community communications describe an exchange of views and news, not a transmission from one source to another...

There are some national and regional issues in which the community voice should be heard...Communications access and participation threaten vested interests. But it is partly for this reason that some widening of the means of control and decision-making within the media is considered desirable. There is concern that information sources are too tightly controlled, and by the wrong people. Programming and subjects for inclusion in programming are selected by the criteria of professional, for their dramatic quality, or their intrinsic value as media material, or simply to balance or neatly juxtapose the items previously selected.

### 3.2 Tendencies in community radio broadcasting research

In the main, studies of the community radio phenomenon have tended to focus more on the *operational* aspects than on either conceptual or methodological aspects. Thus, words like 'participation' have remained largely imprecise. In fact, it is within this conceptually murky context that Mckee (1996:218) has echoed this observation:

Community participation is a 'buzz word'. Its virtues are extolled in numerous conferences and seminars. A continuing stream of documents...plead, state, exhort or demand that community participation must be included in all water supply and sanitation projects. But community participation is a very vague and open concept and is used to mean very different things. It often subsumes other concepts and approaches (such as 'self-help', 'self-reliance', 'user-choice', 'community involvement' and 'participatory planning and development') which are themselves ill defined. In connection with community participation people will often talk of 'felt needs', 'local perceptions', 'bottom-up planning', 'motivation', 'latent development potential', 'catalytic development inputs,' 'integrated development at the village level,' etc. Yet all these concepts are highly complex and diffuse and their meaning in any particular context is often obscure.

This pessimism is not shared by Rahim (1996:127-133) who sees the "participatory" development communication process as 'dialogic' in nature and, to him, the "dialogic principle expands the meaning of the term *dialogue* beyond the level of simple conversation, emphasising relationships rather than a particular form of exchange, at different levels of communication". He goes on to argue that this dialogic process occurs on three planes, namely: *informational* (ie flow of needed development information); *ideological* (ie shared ideas, concepts, categories, and images of thought and systems of representation for making sense of development); and *entertainment* (ie serious-comical ways of diminishing the official rigidities, ideological dogmatism, and informational fetishism).

Proceeding from this argument, therefore, community radio can be situated within a dynamic network of socio-cultural relationships that promote a dialogic process of discourse or communication among people in a given community. It is largely within this general conceptual framework that studies on community radio have been carried on.

To illustrate this, Henning (1996) conducted a study which sought to determine the influences at play in the process of setting development agendas in Bushbuckridge, South Africa, prior to setting up a community radio station in that locality. Henning used the focus group and survey methods to test the hypothesis that development agenda-setting occurs as a result of mediation, advocacy and enabling communication. Henning defined *enabling communication* as occurring when individuals and groups are empowered through ownership or control of the means or medium of communication. He found that, while there was a strong need for *enabling communication* (another term for community media), people were already strongly aware of their development problems. This finding points to the fact that any community radio initiative becomes meaningful within the context of information needs and problems as defined and perceived by the community itself.

This is reinforced by Mersham and Hooyberg ([sa]) who conducted a case study of *Reach Out Radio* in Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa, to establish *inter alia* the role of the station in the areas of local governance, economic development, public relations and industrial relations. This case study was building upon a survey they had conducted earlier on the possibility of establishing a community radio station in Kwazulu-Natal that would serve as a basis for setting up *Reach Out Radio* later in August 1995.

In the tradition of the 'uses and gratifications' approach, the case study set out to sketch the community's communication needs *vis-à-vis* the station's potential to meet them. The researchers identified the following needs:

- social education in its widest sense;
- the articulation of community concerns;
- the dissemination of information felt to be relevant by the community to the community;
- the integration and dissemination of community goals in the form of a coherent voice; and
- the desire to create a sense of community.

While the above studies solicited responses from the communities under study, there appears to be no mention of the assumptions of the community radio initiators or motivators. While it is important for studies to give priority to the perceptions or definitions of 'needs' and 'problems' as articulated by the communities under study, it is just as important to attempt to understand the working assumptions of those who initiate community radio projects in order to establish whether or not there is any 'fit' between what they originally perceived to be the needs and problems of the communities and what the communities themselves perceive to be their needs and problems. In effect, this is the kind of participatory research process that can tease out possible processes of 'dialogic communication' likely to be embedded in the community structure.

This kind of approach seems to be evident in the study by Josiah (1994) which, though not specifically focusing on community radio, is illustrative of the kind of process of enquiry that seeks to find a 'fit' between the community and community development 'animator'.

Conducting research on *social mobilisation through animation for participatory development in Sierra Leone*, Josiah (1994) was, among other things, interested to find out how 'animators' created and stimulated awareness among communities about 'the reality in which they live.' To create this awareness, animators or 'skilled interveners', as Josiah calls them, conducted 'Listening Surveys'. These refer to a social survey conducted by a team of community members including the animator to identify community problems. After the survey, the animator held a series of meetings and at these meetings and during home visits, animators dialogued with community members and families to make them more aware of their life situations. This set in motion a process of investigation, reflection and analysis which stimulated the communities to explore what initiatives they could undertake to change the reality they were faced with.

According to Josiah, in the animated villages in Moyamba, communities have established committees to run and maintain the water wells. This is indicative of the process that is usually followed by community radio initiators or motivators in the quest to 'interest' the community in the idea of setting up a community radio station.

Indeed, it would appear that such emerging qualitative research methods as the Participatory Rural Communication Appraisal (PRCA), as espoused by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Centre of Communication for Development and the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO), are grounded in this view of socially participatory research. As Van der Stichele (1998) argues, PRCA is a "careful mix of elements from such social investigation traditions as participatory approaches, qualitative and quantitative research, as well as ethnography" with the ability to compare how 'interaction groups' in the community and development agencies perceive and define the problems, solutions and needs of the community.

The PRCA, taken together with Josiah's 'Listening Survey', as examples of ethnographic research methodology, seem to be an adjusted 'focus groups' methodology. It engages the 'moderator' and 'discussants' in a deeper and longer search for answers to the community's problems. Indeed, focus groups can equally be used to 'listen' in on the deeper and more systemic issues embedded in what we might refer to as 'Groupthink' and 'Groupspeak'.

Furthermore, this serves to underscore the notion that community radio research, by its very nature, is a social, participatory process that goes beyond conventional research methods restricted to questionnaire administration, sampling techniques, computer analysis and other quantitative activities. As Berrigan (1979:48) notes:

The importance of research in the area of community communications cannot be underestimated...This is a new area and, as such, it demands not only research into ways of making its efforts more effective, but new ways of carrying out research.

Berrigan exemplifies this by referring to the Audio Cassette Listening Forums Project (ACLF) conducted during 1977-8 in Tanzania which involved the use of audiocassette recorders to reach and involve rural women. The overall aim of the project was to "provide a development programme that enabled women to recognise the importance of their role and at the same time encourage implementation of self-determined action plans primarily related to health and nutrition" (Berrigan 1979:48).

The thrust of Berrigan's argument is reflected in Rahim's and Josiah's formulation above of development communication as a process of dialogue (Rahim 1996; Josiah 1994). As Berrigan argues, in practice, the ACLF evolved into Freire's model for 'dialogical communication', the goal of which was:

to stimulate critical, self-generated opinion messages from the populace so that messages would flow in two directions. The government, the

people 'in control' were to become responding as well as a directing body. The dichotomy between those who possess knowledge to 'extend' and those who 'do not know and must be taught' is thus eliminated. The emphasis of development was changed from one which concentrated on economic growth to one which centred on 'people participation' in all aspects of development (Berrigan 1979:29).

To reinforce this argument, in the tradition of what Thomas (1996) calls "Freire's espousal of another development based on participation, dialogue and local control", Servaes (1994) argues that the participatory research process must have three interrelated parts, namely:

- Collective definition and investigation of a problem by a group of people struggling to deal with it. This involves the social investigation which determines the concrete condition existing within the community under study, by those embedded in the social context;
- Group analysis of the underlying causes of their problems; and
- Group action to attempt to solve the problem.

What the above seems to underscore is the fact that, community radio, as a perceived instrument of development, must be grounded in a conceptual or theoretical framework that teases out the community's information and development needs and problems.

Community radio has emerged out of a desire to democratise the structures and processes of communication in society with a view to enabling largely marginalised and excluded communities to advance their own development agendas. Thus, community radio cannot be looked at in isolation from the process of development as a whole. Nor can it be looked at in isolation from the communities for whom it is arguably set up. To that end, one needs to understand the theoretical underpinnings of community radio broadcasting.

### **3.3 Towards a development communication theoretical framework for community radio broadcasting**

As noted in the fore-going analysis, community radio broadcasting is not a field in and of itself. It borrows most, if not all, of its concepts from earlier theories of the role of communication in society and in development.

To start with, then, this section seeks to highlight some of the theories that have influenced the conceptual basis of 'community radio broadcasting'. This is followed up by an extrapolation to modern discourse of what constitutes 'community radio'.

In delineating "early theory-building efforts in mass communication", Infante, Rancer and Womack (1997:360-394) state that during World War I, the new mass media were used to help activate or mobilise the population. Messages were so carefully planned as to mobilise support for the war effort. Mass communication thus became an important tool used by individuals engaged in large-scale persuasive efforts.

After World War I, American society became less and less homogeneous. Individuals were no longer so closely dependent on each other. To describe these 'atomised masses' (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach 1989), especially the relationship between the individual and the social order around them, sociologists coined the term 'mass society' (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach 1989:164). People were thought of as having lost their traditional values of stronger clan, tribe, family and friendship ties. It was within this context that scholars and researchers drawn from such disciplines as social psychology, sociology, political science and others began to analyse propaganda and research the process of persuasion. These were to leave behind a residue of results from the perspectives of, and based on the principles and theories in, their respective disciplines (Smith 1985).

What follows is a sketchy construction of some of the key and well-known communication theories that could well be treated as conceptual antecedents for the



community radio broadcasting discourse. These theories can be categorised as “media effects theories” and “normative theories” and they are being discussed here in order to emphasise the possible power and/or effect of the media in society. In this way, it is possible to argue that community radio can have an effect on society as illustrated by the numerous theories about the possible effects and power of the media.

### 3.3.1 Media effects theories

To start with, the *magic bullet* or *hypodermic needle* theory, reflecting the *psychologistic* thinking of the time, equates media influence with the effect of an intravenous injection with certain values, ideas and attitudes ‘injected’ into the media user, resulting in particular behaviour (Fourie 1988), with humans, by virtue of having inherited instincts over which they had no control, seen as susceptible to manipulation by a powerful communications stimulus that targeted these instincts (Smith 1985:559). Secondly, the *two-step flow theory*<sup>12</sup>, for its part, reflects the realisation in the fifties that there were many co-determinants or mediating factors that could account for human behaviour and attitudinal behaviour, such as selective exposure, selective perception, group influence, opinion leaders, diverse media system, et cetera (Fourie 1988:10-11). According to Infante, Rancer and Womack (1997:361-362), the two-step flow theory, developed by Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, posits that information from the media moves in two distinct stages. First, individuals who pay close attention (are frequent ‘attenders’) to the mass media and its messages receive the information. These individuals, called ‘opinion leaders’, are generally well-informed people who pass information along to others through informal, interpersonal communication. Opinion leaders also pass on their own interpretations in addition to the actual media content. The term ‘personal

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<sup>12</sup>It must be noted that this theory has evolved to focus on a *multi-step flow* theory. This is because the process of dissemination and audience behaviour can involve more than two steps of mediation. Indeed, the attempt proceeds from the assumption that in the communication process a variable number of relays and modification points can play a role, with some messages reaching the recipients directly while others do so indirectly. See Infante, Rancer & Womack (1997:362). See also Kunczik (1984).

influence' was coined to indicate the process intervening between the media's direct message and the audience's ultimate reaction to that message. The third theory is the *diffusion theory*. While the two-step flow model was primarily concerned with the exchange of information between the media and others, the diffusion theory, propounded by Everett M Rogers, centres around the conditions which increase or decrease the likelihood that a new idea, product, or practice will be adopted by members of a given culture (Kunczik 1984:139-142). Fourthly, the *agenda-setting theory*, as yet another "media effects" theory, postulates that the media tell their audience what is important and what is not in such a way that the mass media, through coverage of ideas and events, may have an influence on what the public regards as important (McCombs and Shaw 1972).

The fifth theory is the *functional theory* which sees communication as serving many functions in society, such as those presented by Charles R. Wright: surveillance (news), correlation (editorial), cultural transmission and entertainment (Smith 1985:561). The functional theory is somewhat related to the *uses and gratifications* theory, although the latter seeks to posit a cognitively active individual, asking what the individual uses communication for, rather than what are communication's effects on the individual (Smith 1985:560). One can also identify the *cultivation theory*. Developed by George Gerbner, this theory looks at the media, especially television, as the prime socialising agent and cultivator in modern society. It assumes that the values, opinions, knowledge and attitudes of all individuals are constructed, sustained, adapted and changed through the exchange of symbols (language, images, etc.) (Fourie 1988:12-13). This perspective suggests a causal relationship between television viewing or exposure to the mass media and perceptions of reality (Infante et al 1997:383). There is, finally, the *cultural system* theory which posits the mass media as a cultural phenomenon in their own right rather than a phenomenon within a context of culture, such that many different social actors, movements and communities, with concerns for multiple issues that may be local, national and global or all three, contribute to the shaping of mass media. This perspective supports the notion that when Western political and economic ideology

and culture are introduced through mass media, they are mediated through local cultures (Mersham 1998:23-24).

Because of the power of the media, it is possible to synthesise some normative theories about the role the media is supposed to play in society. According to Fourie (2001:269), normative theories are those ideal views from different perspectives and within different conditions about the role of the press in society. Normative theories, particularly those advanced by Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Petersen and Wilbur Schramm, are outlined by McQuail (1987) in the next section.

### **3.3.2 Normative media theories**

As outlined and highlighted by McQuail (1987:123), these theories range from the 'authoritarian media theory', the 'free press' or libertarian theory, the 'social responsibility theory', the 'Soviet media theory', the *'development media theory'*, to the *'democratic participant media theory'* (my italicising).

It is important to note that McQuail's interpretation of the 'development media' and 'democratic participant media' theories, taken together with the 'diffusion' theory, could serve as a starting point for providing a rationale behind the discourse of community radio broadcasting. For instance, using the 'democratic participant media' approach as a theoretical framework for his study in 'alternative media', Lewis (1993:13) points to McQuail's summary of the theory in the following statement of principles:

- Individual citizens and minority groups have rights of access to media and rights to be served by media according to their own determination of need.
- The organisation and content of media should not be subject to centralised political or state bureaucratic control.
- Media should exist primarily for their audiences and not for media organisations, professionals or the clients of media.

- Groups, organisations and local communities should have their own media.
- Small-scale, interactive and participative media forms are better than large-scale, one-way, professionalised media.
- Certain social needs relating to mass media are not adequately expressed through individual consumer demands, nor through the state and its major institutions.
- Communication is too important to be left to professionals.

Most of the principles highlighted above can be used to describe the 'typical' roles a phenomenon such as community radio broadcasting could play in society. In general, the point can be made, therefore, that the normative theories cited above have tended to form a basis for most of the general discourse about community media. Community radio broadcasting, for instance, has often been seen as playing a role in development and is thus closely associated with the fields of development communication, communication for development or development-support-communication.

Servaes (1996) notes that most notions of development communication revolve around the *diffusion* and the *participatory* approaches to development and communication. It is important to underscore the fact that McQuail extends the concept of 'participatory' approach *per se* and speaks instead of the *democratic participatory* theory. Nevertheless, whether 'participatory' or 'democratic participatory', both scholars would appear to be making reference to the 'centrifugal' tendencies of the media which focus on diversity, plurality, change, et cetera (McQuail 1987:94-96).

In the following section, the premises of development communication theory are briefly reviewed in order to show the possible roles that community radio broadcasting could play in development.

### 3.3.3 The diffusion/modernisation model

The diffusion model, fashioned after the *modernisation* approach to development, is represented in the main by such scholars as Walt W Rostow (1960), Everett M Rogers (1962) and Daniel Lerner (1958), who posit development communication as an engine of change from the 'traditional' to the 'modern' society (Lerner & Nelson 1977). According to Fjes (in Melkote 1991:38), "it was generally assumed that a nation became truly modern and developed when it arrived at the point where it closely resembled Western industrial nations in terms of political and economic behaviour and institutional attitudes towards technology and innovation, and social and psychic mobility."

The model is thus marked by a three-pronged strategy of communication for modernisation: psycho-sociological, institutional and technological. The *psycho-sociological* mechanism entails 'empathy', or the capacity to see oneself in the other fellow's situation, which is an indispensable skill for people moving out of traditional settings, a situation that can be enhanced by the media. According to Lerner (1958), there is a correlation between the expansion of economic activity being equated with *development* and a set of *modernising* variables, chief among which are urbanisation, literacy, mass media use, and democratic participation. Lerner (1958) argues that the spread of literacy in an urban milieu and the emergence of a *mobile personality* highly *empathetic* to modernising influences provide the means to create within the Third World societies a *climate of acceptance* of change. Recognisable within this view is the belief that the interaction between literacy and mass media can make people in Third World countries break out of the bonds of traditionalism and adopt modernising values and practices (Melkote 1991:24-29). Thus, the role of the mass media would be to create awareness of, and interest in, the innovations espoused by change agents. Quite clearly, this mechanism was influenced to a large extent by the two-step flow model of media influence, with the notion of 'opinion leaders'

playing a key role in bringing about modernising practices among their fellow citizens.

Secondly, the diffusion approach looks to the mass media as an *institutional* nexus of modernising practices and institutions in society, functioning as 'watchdogs', 'policymakers' and 'teachers for change and modernisation' (Shramm 1964). This approach further holds that traditional societies would have to go through a five-stage model of transition from a traditional economy to a modern industrial complex: the traditional society, preconditions for take-off, take-off, drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption (Rostow 1960). Cheng (1978), in his doctoral thesis, attempts to examine the contributions of Rostow's modernisation theory to media policy studies.

Lastly, technological advances would assist the shift towards the modern society also as another driving force for development. Technology was seen as pivotal to the growth of productive agricultural and industrial sectors and therefore the transfer of technical know-how from the developed North was seen as extremely crucial for development in the Third World nations (Melkote 1991:24-29).

Although this model was articulated as far back as the 1950s, it still lingers on. Researchers like Jo Ellen Fair (1989) have attempted to plot theoretical and methodological changes between 1958 and 1996. In her examination of 140 studies of communication and development published between 1958 and 1986 and also later in her study, jointly conducted with Hemant Shah (Fair & Shah 1997), of journal articles, book chapters and books published in English between 1987 and 1996, she concludes thus:

In the 1987-1996 period, Lerner's modernisation model completely disappears. Instead, the most frequently used theoretical framework is participatory development, an optimist post-modern orientation, which is almost the polar opposite of Lerner who viewed mass communication as playing a top-down role in social change. Also vanishing from research in this latter period is the two-step flow model, which was drawn upon by

modernisation scholars...Both periods do make use of theories or approaches such as the knowledge gap, indirect influence, and uses and gratifications. However, research appearing in the years from 1987 - 1996 can be characterised as much more theoretically diverse than that published between 1958 - 1986. In the 1958-1986 study, three directions for future research were suggested: to examine the relevance of message content, to conduct more comparative research, and to conduct more policy research, including institutional analysis of development agency coordination. This was followed by the need to research and develop indigenous models of communication and development through participatory research.

Towards the close of the 1990s, the diffusionist perspective found its re-articulation in the 1998/99 World Bank's *Knowledge for Development World Development Report* (World Bank 1999). To quote the report:

This *World Development Report* proposes that we look at the problems of development in a new way—from the perspective of knowledge. There are many types of knowledge. In this Report we focus on two sorts of knowledge and two types of problems.

The report then goes on to talk, firstly, about *knowledge about technology*, whose examples are 'nutrition, birth control, software engineering and accountancy'. The report argues that developing countries have less of these, terming this 'unequal distribution across and within countries' the *knowledge gaps*. Secondly, the report talks about *knowledge about attributes*, such as 'the quality of a product, the diligence of a worker, or the creditworthiness of a firm, all of which, the report argues, are 'crucial to effective markets'. The report terms the difficulties posed by incomplete knowledge attributes *information problems*.

Thus, although very little attention is given to an analysis of the mass media, the World Bank's approach implicitly sees the mass media's role as one of 'narrowing knowledge gaps', 'processing the economy's financial information', 'increasing our knowledge about the environment' and 'addressing information problems that hurt the poor' (World Bank 1999). This discourse – in which the World Bank touts itself as some kind of 'knowledge bank' – is extended to what is perceived as the

role of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) in engendering development in less developed countries.

According to Dzidonu (2000:16), ICTs usually refer to modern sophisticated software and hardware used in communicating. Dzidonu classifies ICTs as traditional, conventional and modern, explaining that the 'traditional' ICTs were rife in the pre-colonial period and the 'conventional' ICTs in the colonial period. However, according to Dzidonu, both these have been supplemented – but by no means superseded – by the 'modern' ICTs. Because of this connotation on the 'new', there is detectable in this a modernist belief in social progress as delivered by technology, something that is rarely if ever ideologically neutral (Lister, Dovey, Giddings, Grant & Kelly 2003:11). Indeed, the celebration and incessant promotion of new media and ICTs in both state and corporate sectors cannot be dissociated from the globalising neo-liberal forms of production and distribution which have been characteristic of the past twenty years (Lister et al 2003:11).

This concern is echoed by Fourie (2001:593) when he argues that, although the growth of ICTs promises economic and social development, it is just possible that they might result in a growing gap between developed (First World) and developing (Third World) countries and between the rich and the poor. It is this inherent dialectic that Mansell (1999:162) refers to as the dialectic of abundance and scarcity in the new media market, involving monopolisation strategies aimed at controlling access to networks and/or to electronic information products and services. According to Mansell, firms devise ways of limiting or controlling certain kinds of access to resources in order to secure their positions in the market.

To argue this problematic surrounding ICTs further, Nulens (1997) adopts Okot-Uma's classification, which identifies three key problems, namely:

- Operational (technical and economic);
- Contextual (socio-cultural characteristics of each region); and



- Strategic (local, national and international policy).

Operational problems may have something to do with the lack of technical efficiency of power-plants, the low quality of the African electricity network and the inaccessibility of transmission channels, such as satellites. The contextual problems may be occasioned by the fear that the transfer of Western technology only leads to economic and cultural dependency. In other words, technology is not neutral, and ICT policies must thus take into account the potential socio-cultural problems that may emerge in the appropriation of technology. Strategy problems occur largely as result of some telecommunications transnational companies whose business interests may go against the national-developmental aspirations of countries in Africa. It is the case that such companies tend to flex their muscles in shaping international policy-making institutions, such as the World Bank, on ICT matters (Nulens 1997:6).

Despite these problems, Africa has not been untouched by the frenzy and hype surrounding ICTs. Indeed, countries like South Africa have set out on the path to appropriating ICTs for socio-developmental goals, exemplified in South Africa's hosting in 1996 of the Information Society and Development Conference of the G-7 (Fourie 2001:605). The conference resulted in the adoption of a number of information infrastructure goals for South Africa.

The goals included the setting up of integrated information systems for, among others, epidemiological surveys and telemedicine; improved universal access; the development of appropriate applications and content; human resource development; support for business; support for good governance; and cultural heritage (Fourie 2001:605-606).

This ICT policy trend in South Africa resonates with what is happening elsewhere on the continent, with many policies concerning themselves with the development of a national ICT infrastructure, such as aspects of regulation,

universal service provision, the creation of mechanisms to fund universal service rollout, the structure of markets and competition, et cetera. Also, some policies are umbrella-type ICT policies, which cover a broad range of areas such as creating broader use and exploitation of ICTs and the inclusion of sectoral applications such as education, health, agriculture and tourism, the latter depending on national priorities (James 2001:159).

The issues explored above point to the firm belief that ICTs can be the engine of economic growth in Africa, affording hitherto technologically backward societies an opportunity to leapfrog some stages of development. It is not surprising, therefore, that this ICT discourse is being couched in terms of an 'information society' or 'knowledge society' (World Association for Christian Communication 2002), with the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) doing all it can to build global consensus on what should constitute an 'information society' as seen in its planning for a World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) to be held in Geneva in 2003 and in Tunis in 2005.

The World Bank has also sought to champion the use of ICTs for its development initiatives across the globe. This neo-liberal belief in the power of information and knowledge is brought home when the Bank's Managing Director, Mamphela Ramphele, points out that the Bank has made moves towards being a "true knowledge Bank" (*Today* 2001). Ramphele points out that the Bank needs to reposition itself in relation to information and communication technologies in order to enhance the Bank's development impact (*Today* 2001).

Clearly, this emphasis on the role of information and knowledge in the development process is reinforced with Ramphele's reiteration that the World Bank should steadily move to being a "Knowledge Bank that spurs the knowledge revolution in developing countries and acts as a global catalyst for creating, sharing, and applying the cutting-edge knowledge necessary for poverty reduction and economic development" (*Today* 2001).

It can be argued, therefore, that the World Bank believes that the 'transfer' of knowledge and information can play a catalytic role in the development process. Although notions of an all-round participatory approach are implied, it is evident that the Bank is harking back to the *diffusionist* paradigm. This is so because the Bank seems to believe that the new technological innovations of the Western world can be successfully transplanted into the Third World and thus be used to transfer some 'modernising' values, attitudes, skills or expertise, information and knowledge that can help the people of the Third World in their development initiatives.

Although the modernisation paradigm as such is not the subject of this thesis, there is need to note the criticism that has been levelled against it. According to Melkote (1991:139), the general note of optimism that characterised the fifties and sixties regarding the role and potential of the mass media in the development process in the Third World turned sour in the seventies. This was so because, in practice, the so-called 'modernising elites' – Western development communication experts, local communicators trained in Western capitals, et cetera – had become alienated from their communities because they seemed to be in conflict with the cultural values and practices of the communities in which they worked. As a reaction against what could be seen as the paternalistic outlook of the 'modernisers', the need for community radio broadcasting, arising out of and responding to the needs of the community, has thus become more entrenched in the development communication discourse. This is one reason why, therefore, there is need to examine the criticism against the modernisation tradition.

#### *Criticisms against the modernisation model*

To start with, it has been argued that Lerner's modernisation thesis reeked of ethnocentric bias. It hinted at a clear imposition of a Western liberal model on

Third World countries which sought to explain away the underdevelopment of the Third World in terms of the failure to attain Western forms of political arrangements (Melkote 1991:139).

Indeed, within the framework of the social theory of *dependency*, it is argued that modernisation schemes for the Third World required imported technologies, a scenario that promoted technological and financial dependence on the West. Tragically, the social structure in most Third World countries kept the demand for goods limited to a small group of upper-middle-class consumers (Bourgault 1995:235).

The *dependency* model, articulated by Paul A. Baran (1996:94), cynically sums up the insatiable hunger that capitalist accumulation might arouse in a Third World man or woman who has been exposed to the promises of a 'modernised' society:

Such export of capital and capitalism as has taken place had not only far-reaching implications of a social nature. It was accompanied by important physical and technical processes. Modern machines and products of advanced industries reached poverty-stricken backyards of the world. To be sure most, if not all, of these machines worked for their foreign owners – or at least were believed by the population to be working for no one else – and the new refined appurtenances of the good life belonged to foreign businessmen and their domestic counterparts. The bonanza that was capitalism, the fullness of things that was modern industrial civilization, were crowding the display windows – they were protected by barbed wire from the anxious grip of the starving and the desperate man in the street...

But they have drastically changed his outlook. Broadening and deepening his economic horizon, they aroused aspirations, envies, and hopes. Young intellectuals filled with zeal and patriotic devotion travelled from the underdeveloped lands to Berlin and London, to Paris and New York, and returned home with the "message of the possible".

In a sense, the above description refers to what Lerner might see as a "modernising elite". Yet the social dynamics – and a whole range of other intervening variables - in Africa might not work to the advantage of such a

“modernising elite”. It is not uncommon in some African countries for the rank and file of society to resent the so-called “modernising elite”, which usually ends up wielding political power as well. In such cases, the peasantry has been known to rise in social revolutions against this local elite to wrest political and economic power. Sometimes, this has been achieved through the use of non-mass communication channels (Servaes 1991), such as social mobilisation.

In fact, with specific reference to Lerner’s “modernising elite”, some studies have demonstrated that empathy is not greater among radio listeners than nonlisteners. Nor are the media easily isolated as prime movers in modernising attitudes (Katz & Wedell 1978:21).

Adding his critical voice to the debate, Andre Gunder Frank (1996:106) argues that underdevelopment is not original or traditional and that neither the past nor the present of the underdeveloped countries resembles in any important respect the past of the now developed countries. Indeed, the contemporary underdevelopment of a country can be understood as the product or reflection solely of its own economic, political, social, and cultural characteristics or structure. Frank goes on to suggest that historical research demonstrates that contemporary underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now developed metropolitan countries (Frank 1996:106).

In this vein, Frank (1996:110), based on empirical data on the relative isolation that Latin America experienced in the course of its history, advances the thesis that satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their most classically capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to their metropolis are weakest.

To digress, the dependency theory itself has been criticised on the basis of the following points:

- It sees the fundamental contradiction in the world between the centre and the periphery and, therefore, fails to take into account the internal class and the productive structures of the periphery that inhibits development of the productive forces
- It tends to focus on the centre and international capital as the cause of poverty and backwardness, instead of on local class formations
- It fails to differentiate capitalist from feudal (or other precapitalist) modes of controlling the direct producer and appropriating the surplus
- It ignores the productivity of labour as the central point in economic development and thus locates the driving force of capitalist development and underdevelopment in the transfer of the economic surplus from the periphery to the centre
- It encourages a Third World ideology that undermines the potential for international class solidarity by lumping together as “enemies” the elite and the masses in the centre nations
- It is static in that it is unable to explain and account for changes in the underdeveloped economies over time (Servaes 1991:58-60).

To return to the criticism of the modernisation paradigm, and especially in its application to communication for development, the following key charges may be brought against the model (Melkote 1991:139-40):

- The modernisation approach ignored the unequal power relationships in the Third World countries. Consequently, many dependent variables of modernity such as leadership, cosmopolitanism, and reference groups lacked face validity.
- The modernisation approach pushed the notion of the duality of the modern and traditional sectors to the exclusion of the observation that

rather than the traditional and modern sectors existing as two distinct systems, the modern and traditional systems exist within one system of economic, political and social relationships, with the modern sector dominating the traditional.

- The modernisation model neglected the fact that communication itself is so subordinate to the influence of the prevailing organisational arrangements of society that it can hardly be expected to act independently as a main contributor to profound and widespread social transformation.
- Following from this, the modernisation theory neglected the observation that communication, as it exists in the Third World, not only is by nature impotent to cause national development by itself, but it often works against development and favours the ruling minorities.
- The modernisation approach, particularly Lerner's *psychologistic* emphasis on the individual as a locus of change, neglected the influence of social-structural variables that affect communication as fundamental prerequisites for the attainment of genuinely human and democratic development.

The preceding sections have examined (i) the international context of community radio broadcasting, (ii) tendencies in community radio broadcasting research and (iii) aspects of the development communication theoretical framework. The next section of this chapter seeks to examine participatory communication as a theoretical model within which this thesis is grounded. The section also seeks to establish a rationale for community radio broadcasting in Zambia.

### **3.3.4 The participatory communication model**

In the following section, a more detailed analysis of the participatory theoretical model is called for. This particular study is situated within this model, not least because it contains most of the ideal-typical features of a community radio

broadcasting system, but because it represents an elastic or loose theoretical framework within which a variety of community media initiatives can easily and justifiably be slotted (Gumucio-Dagron 2001:8).

The model lies within the emerging paradigm of 'another development' (Melkote 1991:220). This model sets forth the importance of cultural identity of local communities and of democratisation and participation at all levels. It points to a development strategy which is not merely inclusive of, but largely emanating from, the traditional receivers. Central to this model are the concepts of participation, cultural identity and empowerment as well as the Freirian notions of dialogical communication (Servaes [sa]).

Viewed this way, communication becomes more "concerned with process and context, that is on the exchange of 'meanings', and on the importance of this process, namely, the social relational patterns and social institutions that are the result of and are determined by the process" (Servaes [sa]). 'Another' communication thus favours what McQuail has referred to as "multiplicity, smallness of scale, locality, de-institutionalisation, interchange of sender-receiver roles and horizontality of communication links at all levels of society" (McQuail 1987:97). In a sense, this is a shift from the positivist-instrumentalist approach of the modernisation paradigm towards a model that is less quantitative, and more qualitative and normative (Melkote 1991:234).

Viewed as an extension of Paul Freire's dialogical pedagogy, participatory communication becomes a process of *conscientisation* in which dialogue is both more receiver-centred and more conscious of social structure. Freire (1996), in his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, argues that in the traditional pedagogical systems, the receivers were supposed to be uncritical and passive, ingesting the world view of the elites and then perceiving their problems and needs in terms of the elite-dominated rationality. He called for a new dialogical pedagogy in which the receiver would be liberated from his/her mental inertia, penetrate the



ideological mist imposed by the elites and perceive the realities of his/her existence.<sup>13</sup> It is within the context of this conscientisation that *theory* can be appropriated as *praxis* for social and political transformation.<sup>14</sup>

Given this scenario, it is important that participatory communication policies are viewed as a function of how power is distributed in society and that therefore such policies must address the issue of structural change as a prerequisite for a meaningful sharing of political, economic, and other power. Communication policies are basically derivatives of the political, cultural and economic conditions and institutions under which they operate. They tend to legitimise the existing power relations in society, and therefore, they cannot be substantially changed unless there are fundamental structural changes in society that can alter these power relationships themselves. They must not assume a universal applicability that was inherent in the dominant paradigm, but must be based on the fact that priorities are more contextual to the needs and problems of individual countries or communities (Mowlana & Wilson 1987).

Gumucio-Dagron (2001:34-35) attempts to design a profile of participatory communication as follows:

- **An issue of power.** The democratisation of communication cuts through the issue of power. Participatory approaches contribute to put decision-making in the hands of the people. It also consolidates the capability of communities to confront their own ideas about development with development planners and technical staff. Within the

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<sup>13</sup>For this reading of Freirian political thought, refer to Diaz-Bordenave, J. 1976. Communication of agricultural innovations in Latin America, in *Communication and development: critical perspectives*, edited by EM Rogers. Beverly Hills: Sage:43-62. However, the original treatise can be located in Freire, P. 1985. *The politics of education: Culture, power and liberation*. New York: Bergin & Garvey as well as in Freire, P. 1996. Pedagogy of the oppressed, in *The political economy of development and underdevelopment* edited by KP Jameson & CK Wilber. 6<sup>th</sup> edition. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.

<sup>14</sup>See Habermas, J. 1974. *Theory and practice*. London: Heinemann. In this treatise, Habermas tries to demonstrate how theory or consciousness-building can specify the conditions under which reflection on the history of our history has become objectively possible; and at the same time it names those to whom this theory or consciousness-building is addressed, who then with its aid can gain enlightenment about their emancipatory role in the process of history.

community itself, it favours the strengthening of an internal democratic process.

- **An issue of identity.** Especially in communities that have been marginalised, repressed or simply neglected during decades, participatory communication contributes to install cultural pride and self-esteem. It reinforces the social tissue through the strengthening of local and indigenous forms of organisation. It protects tradition and cultural values, while facilitating the integration of new elements. Community development, therefore, must be possible within a communication process of horizontal and respectful cultural exchanges.

Gumucio-Dagron extends this typology of participatory communication in contradistinction with other models of communication in search of social change, such as those behaviour-change strategies that have been implemented around health and HIV/AIDS issues. Table 9 below contrasts the participatory communication approach with other models that can be labelled “conventional” approaches to communication.

Table 9. **Participatory communication vs. conventional communication** <sup>15</sup>

<b>Participatory communication</b>	<b>Conventional communication</b>	<b>Distinctive features</b>
Horizontal	Vertical	Treats people as dynamic actors, actively participating in the process of social change and in control of communication tools and contents; rather than people perceived as passive receivers of information and behavioural instructions, while others make decisions on their lives.
Process	Campaign	Enables people to take in hand their own future through a process of dialogue and democratic participation in planning communication activities; rather than extensive unsustainable top-down campaigns that help to mobilise but not to build a capacity to respond from the community level to the needs of change.
Long-term	Short-term	Communication and development in general is conceived as a long-term process which needs time to be appropriated by the people; rather than short-term planning, which is seldom sensitive to the cultural environment and mostly concerned with shaping "results" for evaluations external to the community.
Collective	Individual	Urban or rural communities acting collectively in the interest of the majority, preventing the risk of losing power to a few; rather than people targeted individually, detached from their community and from the communal forms of decision-making.
With	For	Researching, designing and disseminating messages with participation; rather than designing, pre-testing, launching and evaluating messages that were conceived for the community, and remain external to it

<sup>15</sup>The term 'conventional communication' is used here to denote the fields that in a sense have preceded participatory communication, such as social marketing, public and community relations, development communications and strategic communications. This contrast is made in: Gray-Felder, D & Deane, J. 1999. *Communication for social change: A position paper and conference report*. New York: Rockefeller Foundation.

Specific	Massive	The communication process is adapted to each community or social group in terms of content, language, culture and media; rather than the tendency to use the same techniques, the same media and the same messages in diverse cultural settings and for different social sectors of society.
People's needs	Donor's musts	Community-based dialogue and communication tools to help identify, define and discriminate between the felt needs and the real needs; rather than donor-driven communication initiatives based on donor needs (family planning, for example).
Ownership	Access	A communication process that is owned by the people to provide equal opportunities to the community; rather than access that is conditioned by social, political or religious factors.
Consciousness	Persuasion	A process of raising consciousness and deep understanding about social reality, problems and solutions; rather than persuasion for short-term behavioural changes that are only sustainable with continuous campaigns.

Noticeable in the above formulation of participatory communication, then, is the notion of 'empowerment'. Rensburg (1994) sees 'empowerment' as a move to inform and motivate the community to advance development in a way that may *not* turn out to be no more than 'paternalism', a 'de-empowering' phenomenon which entails 'acting out a fatherly role by limiting the freedom of the subject by well-meant rules, guidelines and regulations'. Participatory communication, then, entails a great deal of emphasis on what Rensburg calls 'grassroots participation'. In that sense, argues Rensburg, participatory communication tends to be pluralistic and does not suffer from the authoritarian overtones of the dominant paradigm. It enables the community to set its own priorities and standards which may be unique to its problem situations.

What has emerged from the foregoing exploration of the basic premises of the participatory communication model are what may be referred to as 'ideal-typical'

tenets of *community* communication. Indeed, it can be argued that some of these ideal-typical features have worked their way into the way community radio broadcasting is generally organised. For instance, it is argued that 'participation', within the context of community radio, can be realised through the use of community members as planners, producers and performers in such a way that their participation becomes the means of expression *of* the community rather than *for* the community (Wanyeki 2000:30).

The theme of community radio as 'participatory', 'empowering', or 'culturally specific' is taken up by Wigston (2001:30-31) who aptly sums it up by arguing that a community broadcasting service means a broadcasting service which:

- is fully controlled by a non-profit entity and carried on for non-profitable purposes;
- serves a particular community;
- encourages members of the community it serves or persons associated with or promoting the interests of such community to participate in the selection and provision of programmes to be broadcast in the course of such broadcasting service; and
- may be funded by donations, grants, sponsorships or advertising or membership fees, or by any combination of the aforementioned.

It can be noticed, therefore, that much of the thinking about the role of community radio in development and/or community radio as development, as well as the concepts to describe this role, are 'borrowed' from models of participatory communication. At the same time, the new realities and experiences that community radio initiatives are undergoing the world over are helping to reshape the debate about participatory communication itself.

For the purpose of this study, two conceptual labels can be used to delineate the dichotomy between 'participatory communication' and 'conventional communication'. On the one hand, participatory communication can be posited

as 'grassroots' communication. On the other, 'conventional communication' can be represented as 'elitist' communication. Therefore, in evaluating whether or not any community radio broadcasting policy represents a 'grassroots' or 'elitist' media system, the criteria established above may be brought to bear on any definitions of community radio. For instance, the 'cocktail' definition of community radio as "media produced, managed and owned by, for and about the community they serve, which can either be a geographic community or one of interest or both",<sup>16</sup> reflects much of what has been discussed about participatory communication.

### **3.4 A rationale for community radio broadcasting in Zambia**

Given the foregoing, it is easy to see why the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting is catching on in Zambia. Firstly, the process of development is increasingly being seen as requiring an informed citizenry and community radio offers that opportunity at a more localised level. Secondly, community radio is seen as a communicative tool that can be used to mobilise communities to support development initiatives, either those started by the government, the international aid agencies, or the local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). Thirdly, the evidence adduced above shows that community radio broadcasting is now a global phenomenon that all governments must seek to appropriate for their own development and policy goals. Fourthly, the very process of development, from the above analyses, is fast becoming a localised one, requiring the participation of local people.

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<sup>16</sup>This definition can best be described as a 'cocktail' from a whole range of perspectives, among which is the South African influenced model which views 'community radio' as being a geographically founded community or any group of persons or sector of the public having a specific, ascertainable common interest. For this, see Wigston, D. 2001. A South African media map, in *Media studies. Volume 1: institutions, theories and issues*, edited by P Fourie. Lansdowne: Juta:30-31. There is also the AMARC Africa model which postulates community broadcasting as a broadcasting service not for profit, owned and controlled by a particular community under an association, trust or foundation. In some instances it can be owned by non-governmental organisations working in communities (Mtimde et al 1998:19). Finally, there is the Western influenced notion which sees community radio as fundamentally an open or implied criticism of mainstream state-linked radio on the one hand and commercial radio on the other for their distortion, omission and marginalisation of the points of view of certain social groups. For an extensive discussion of this, see Lewis, PM. 1993. Neither the market nor the state: community radio - the third way, in *Media in transition: from totalitarianism to democracy*, edited by Y Prylivk & U Manaer. Kiev: Abris.

More specifically, however, the research question about the need for community radio broadcasting in Zambia can better be answered in terms of what might be referred to as *political*, *pragmatic* and *policy* imperatives.

### **3.4.1 The political imperative**

*Politically*, the liberalisation of the airwaves in 1994, in the wake of the political pluralism embarked upon in 1991, paved way for those who had plans to set up private radio stations, among which were to be commercial, religious and community radio projects. Other political factors were at play. A strong and vibrant civil society - NGOs, churches, professional bodies and other interest groups - had emerged. A more vigorous private press had also re-emerged. Political pluralism had culminated in the birth of many more than twenty (20) political parties. This was in turn a reflection of wide-ranging changes sweeping across the Southern Africa region, conditioned in part by the collapse of the Berlin Wall. Generally, the new regimes that were riding on this wave of democratic governance *needed* to be seen as *progressive*.

Zambia, in particular, with Dr. F.T.J Chiluba at the helm, embarked upon a policy of liberalisation and privatisation in all sectors of the economy, including the media industry. More than anything, the Chiluba administration did what it did in order to make a *political* statement that it was putting the country on a path to sustainable political, social and economic reforms.

### **3.4.2 The pragmatic imperative**

*Pragmatically*, Kasoma (2001:29-33) contends that the need for community radio can better be appreciated against a backdrop of the technical and other shortcomings of "national radio as provided by ZNBC, commercial radio, and Christian radio". Weighed against national radio, the need for community radio arises from the following reasons:

- The ZNBC radio signals do not reach all the people in the country;
- The content of ZNBC radio channels does not satisfy all the people in Zambia;
- A community radio station gives people a sense of mutual togetherness;
- ZNBC does not cater for all the language groups in the country; and
- Specific problems and issues faced by communities can only be addressed by community media.

Kasoma adds that the ZNBC broadcast signals do not reach every corner in Zambia even after its transmitting power was boosted in 2000/2001 by the installation of Chinese FM transmitters in almost every province. There are still pockets in the country that the signals do not reach, either because of geographical impediments or due to other atmospheric disturbances. In addition, in many parts of the country, the signal is too faint to provide a powerful and clearly audible reception, particularly on the cheaper, and hence weaker, sets that many people have in the country. Moreover, some of the channels of ZNBC radio, in particular Radio 4, do not reach most of the country. They are restricted only to a small area, along the line of the old railway from Livingstone to Chilimbambwe (Kasoma 2001:29-30).

When weighed against commercial radio, community radio represents a more responsive media system for the people, as its ethos is not primarily driven by profit and advertising. The programming of the commercial stations is therefore done with the aim of pleasing sponsors and advertisers. Programmes that sponsors and advertisers shun are, therefore, unlikely to be broadcast on a commercial radio station even though they may be beneficial to the community (Kasoma 2001:29-30).

When weighed against Christian or church-based radio, community radio would seem to be a lot less restrictive in the sense that the primary aim of a Christian radio is to evangelise. All the programmes broadcast are biased towards Christian teaching and are coloured with the Christian faith. Because Zambia has many Christian churches, the range of the content of a particular Christian radio station would depend on the type of church that owns it. Some churches are more fundamentalist than others and



their radio stations are, therefore, more likely to be fundamentalist (Kasoma 2001:30-33).

### 3.4.3 The policy imperative

With regard to the *policy* imperative, the movement of community radio broadcasters, represented in the main by the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC), had, by 1994, become *international* in scope and its advocacy for broadcast pluralism included the need to develop pro-community broadcasting policy frameworks in Africa, especially in the wake of the 'wind of change' that had blown in political pluralism. With a large number of African broadcasters joining its ranks, AMARC and other international lobbyists were beginning to present an influence on the local policy-making arenas in Africa. Many wishing to set up community radio stations were quick to seek membership of this world body (AMARC) and, in so doing, were enlisting in a world-wide campaign to push for the de-regulation of the broadcasting sector across Africa as a way of "democratising communications" (Mtimde et al 1998:1).<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>The concept of "democratising communication" has a resounding resonance in modern discourse about the role of communication in various aspects of development. Organisations such as the World Association for Christian Communication (WACC) (World Association for Christian Communication 1999) have, together with civil society organisations around the world, embarked upon the Campaign for Communication Rights in the Information Society (CRIS). This is linked to the United Nations World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) scheduled for 2005. The campaign, championed by such organisations as the Panos Institute, the People's Communication Charter, the World Association for Christian Communication, the European Communication Research Consortium (ECCR), the Association for Progressive Communication (APC), the InterPress Service (IPS), et cetera., is underpinned by a revulsion against the privatisation and commercialisation of media, the concentration of media ownership, the sanitisation and homogenisation of media and the consumerisation of information through advertising (World Association for Christian Communication 2002). In this breath, the concept of democratising communication relates to a situation whereby one ensures that information and knowledge become readily available for human development, and not locked up in private hands; that there is affordable access to, and effective use of, electronic networks in a development context; that the global commons, for both broadcast and telecommunication, are secured and extended to ensure this public resources is not sold for private ends; that democratic and transparent governance of the information society is instituted; and that community and people-centred media, traditional and new, are supported (World Association for Christian Communication 2002:2). This conceptualisation of "democratising communication" agrees with that suggested by Siochru (1999) who sees this social movement for democratising communication as representing a challenge to the global communication order in which media are becoming increasingly concentrated in private hands, especially through the neo-liberal policies and regulations of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other global governance organs. The social movement, according to Siochru (1999:4), is discerning international patterns of development shared across many sectors. These include telecommunications, mass media, intellectual property rights, copyright, and others - trends that in the end are leading to the concentration of power and control not just of channels of communication but of content, information and culture itself in the hands of a small number of international

This international campaign to liberalise the airwaves in support of the emerging community media sector was also championed by UNESCO as it sought to “provide a forum for the exchange of ideas and experiences about approaches to developing community media and to formulate strategies for promoting and enhancing the development of community media in African countries” (Boafo 2000:5). Along side this rhetoric was a practical commitment by UNESCO to fund the establishment of community radio stations, as exemplified by the UN agency’s financial support given to such radio stations as the *Mazabuka Community Radio Station* in Zambia, *Dzimwe Community Radio Station* in Malawi and *Katutura Community Radio Station* in Namibia. In the case of the *Mazabuka Community Radio Station*, UNESCO actually entered into partnership with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services to ensure the success of the community radio station. Arguably, UNESCO has used this partnership to push home the need for the necessary policy and legislative reforms.

In addition, at a more local level, there have been initiatives by media associations, such as the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA) and the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) to lobby for media reforms, such as the setting up of an independent broadcasting authority to regulate the broadcasting sector. These pressures, coupled with the dictates of a liberal-democratic philosophy currently being espoused by the ruling MMD, have coalesced into a crescendo to push government into a process of dialogue with civil society about media policy reforms.

The call for liberalising the airwaves, therefore, was at the same time a call for developing appropriate policy and regulatory frameworks wherever these were inadequate to deal with the new phenomenon of community radio on the African continent. In that sense, the government of the Republic of Zambia was forced to

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conglomerates. These concerns are further echoed by Oosthuizen (2001:173) when he argues that South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) 1992 policy guidelines for a democratic South Africa included a recommendation to democratise the media by ensuring that the different types of media should make provision for the diversity in communities; that steps should be taken to provide all communities with access to the technical means of receiving and disseminating information, such as electricity, telecommunication and other facilities; that communities should also have access to skills required to receive and disseminate information; that diversity of ownership of media production and distribution facilities should be guaranteed; and that affirmative action should be taken to make

rethink its overall information and media policy framework. It was in this vein that the 1996 policy framework was developed, later to be revised in 1999, to take into account both community radio and new information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1996; Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1999:12). Issues of definition of community radio, management, organisation, sustainability et cetera, for instance, require a clearer policy articulation. Therefore, it becomes imperative for policy-makers to preoccupy themselves with this additional tier of broadcasting.

To summarise, this chapter has sought to establish the rationale or need for community radio broadcasting in Zambia. In so doing, it has engaged in a broader discourse about the role of communication in development, taking care to analyse, albeit cursorily, key global trends in policy and regulatory issues relating to this tier of broadcasting. This examination of key trends in media policy and regulation is taken up, in greater detail, in chapter five, where the discussion focuses on Australia, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa.

The chapter has also focused on some of the key tendencies in research conducted into community radio broadcasting, examining the various facets that researchers in various cultural contexts have focused on.

Following from this, the chapter has examined what can be considered to be some of the most significant normative theoretical antecedents that go into conceptualising community radio broadcasting. Thus, the chapter has surveyed a whole range of theoretical approaches to media and communication.

Finally, the chapter has attempted to analyse the rationale behind community radio broadcasting in Zambia in terms of three imperatives, namely pragmatism, politics and policy.

It is clear from the analysis in this chapter that the concept of community radio broadcasting is intrinsically woven into the age-old discourse about the role of communication in the process of development. To that end, the theoretical underpinnings of the concept of community radio broadcasting, as mapped out in this chapter, are as eclectic as the disciplinary foundations of the theoretical antecedents reviewed in the chapter. It is also important to note that the adoption of the *participatory communication* model as this study's guiding theoretical perspective is a step towards developing a more participatory policy process.

In addition, it must be noted that the analysis in this chapter has set the stage for a more extensive analysis of trends in broadcast policy and regulation. While this chapter has attempted a cursory or snapshot analysis, chapter five takes up the discussion and links it to actual processes and structures of policy-making in Zambia and four other countries – Australia, Malawi, Mozambique and South Africa.

## CHAPTER FOUR: THE STATE OF THE ART OF COMMUNITY MEDIA IN ZAMBIA

This chapter seeks to integrate, for analysis, the key findings of the MISA and Panos studies (Media Institute of Southern Africa 2000a; Panos Southern Africa 2002) on community media in Zambia. In so doing, the chapter discusses, firstly, the methodological issues relating to the two studies. The findings of these studies will help reinforce the policy proposal attempted in chapter six of this study. Secondly, the chapter presents a synoptic analysis of the findings of the two studies. Thirdly, it proceeds to present an analysis of four (4) of the key community radio initiatives currently underway in Zambia. The community radio stations thus analysed were chosen simply because there was more data on them than on any other such initiative and because their proprietors were much more forthcoming for personal interviews and other searches for documentary evidence. This 'case-study' analysis was undertaken by this author.

It is important to stress the fact that this particular study is underpinned by the assumption that there is such a significant correlation between culture and policy-making that locally generated research data must be used in any attempt to propose a policy model for community radio broadcasting.

Indeed, local culture is an important element in policy-making, as is indirectly captured in the definition of "communication policies" adopted by the UNESCO meeting of Experts on Communication Policies and Planning in Paris in July 1972 as:

sets of principles and norms established to guide the behaviour of communication systems...*They are shaped in the context of society's general approach to communications* (my italicising). Emanating from political ideologies, the social and economic conditions of a country, and the values on which they are based, they strive to relate these to real needs and prospective opportunities of communication (Kasoma 2000:2).

To stress the point, in their book on *Reporting public policy: a handbook for journalists*, the African Women and Child Features Service (AWC) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) offices in Kenya, argue:

Culture takes various forms: political culture, administrative culture, academic culture, economic culture and so on...

Social and cultural norms or values are among many parameters that influence policy. They play a significant role in determining the nature of public policies, their acceptance and success. Changes in social norms and values can either influence the formulation of a new policy or enhance the existing one...To ensure success, then, any policy formulation must take into consideration social and cultural norms and ideals of the subject society. It should endeavour to portray itself as a sub-set of social and cultural values...(AWC & FES 1999:35-38).

Elsewhere, Traber (1989:93) argues, "communication is part of culture...it is culture in process."

#### **4.1 Towards a methodological justification**

Methodologically, the MISA and Panos studies used very similar methods for data collection. To start with the MISA study entitled *Community-level baseline research into community media attitudes and needs in Zambia and Namibia* (MISA 2000a), the methodology used included five (5) focus group discussions (FGD) and six (6) Key Informant Interviews (KII). The focus of the study was to examine the community priorities as well as the role of the media in reaching those priorities, the community's perceptions of community radio as well as their current information channels and the community organisational structures, decision-making as well as power-sharing.

The study by Panos (2002:i) also sought to provide a community-nuanced insight into the dynamics of emerging community media initiatives, in particular seeking to understand people's perceptions of community media. The study, carried out in Lusaka, the Copperbelt, and Southern provinces, used the focus group methodology for data collection, supplemented by interviews with key community media initiators or motivators.

In a nutshell, the study sought to understand something of the 'fit' between what ordinary people in the community say and what community media initiators say. As in the case of the MISA study above, the Panos study focused on such issues as (i) the community's information and communication needs and problems, (ii) the measures taken to meet those needs or resolve those problems, (iii) the community's perceptions of what constitutes 'community media', and (iv) the community's suggestions for any policy measures about community media in Zambia.

Noteworthy at this point is the fact that common to both studies is the use of the non-probabilistic 'focus group' method of data collection. Indeed, it is this author's contention that focus group discussions represent an effective, community-based and participatory tool for generating data on community radio broadcasting.

Therefore, to the extent that the data in the MISA and Panos studies was generated mostly via focus group discussions and to the extent that this data forms a larger part of the evidence for the policy analysis attempted in this present study, it is worth reflecting upon 'focus groups' as a qualitative research method.

Focus groups can be used to solicit and chart people's views about community radio in terms of commonly-shared interests and/or geographic locality. Generally, the focus group technique affords an opportunity to create a 'microcosm' of the community and engage its members in discussion about their deeper and more enduring views about community radio.

Indeed, although focus groups are not representative, they are an effective means of generating nuanced and detailed information about issues. They allow for the complicated and often contradictory views which people may hold in their everyday lives, and a rich and textured understanding of a particular topic or process. Thus, focus groups can be taken as indicative of more widely held views (South Africa. Independent Broadcasting Authority 1995).

Indeed, although focus groups lack *external validity*,<sup>18</sup> they still provide the sort of individualised insights that statistics collected on the basis of probabilistic methods, would not readily capture.

It is contended that the *sum* of the focus group discussions in both studies referred to above place this thesis in a position to make fairly “representative” conclusions about the people’s views of, and attitudes towards, community radio broadcasting in the country, the sort of conclusions that would provide a solid basis for a sound policy framework for community radio broadcasting in Zambia.

To argue the point further, in general support of the focus group methodology, Wimmer and Dominick (1997:461) argue as follows:

Some researchers claim that focus groups are not a good research methodology because of the potential influence of one or two respondents on the remaining members of the group. These critics say that a “dominant” respondent can negatively affect the outcome of the group, and that group “pressures” may influence the comments made by individuals...

It is the authors’ experience that those who criticize focus groups because of the potential influence of respondents do not have enough experience moderating focus groups to allow them to deal with the range of respondents who participate in the groups. A professional moderator never encounters problems with difficult respondents. A professional moderator can identify almost immediately a “problem” respondent and can solve the problem in a matter of minutes. If a moderator has problems with respondents, the moderator should consider another occupation.

A good focus group discussion, therefore, has the potential of ensuring that the “socio-psyche” of the community or, as some have put it, the “Groupthink” of the

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<sup>18</sup>According to Robert. K. Yin (1994), *external validity* deals with the problem of knowing whether a study’s findings are generalisable beyond the immediate study. Referring to the example of ‘case studies’, which in terms of sampling seem to suffer from similar inadequacies to those of ‘focus groups’, Yin suggests that critics of the non-probability sampling technique seem to be contrasting the situation to survey research, in which a ‘sample’ (if selected correctly) readily generalises to a larger universe. This analogy to samples and universes is incorrect when dealing with case studies. This is because survey research relies on *statistical* generalisation, whereas case studies rely on *analytical* generalisation. For an extensive discussion, refer to Yin, RK. 1994. *Case study research: design and methods*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. London: Sage.



community is captured, something that, according to Henning (1996), is a legitimate means of *intra-community* communication of abstract and practical ideas.

This is so even if the focus group members may well be selected on the basis of the non-probability sampling methods of “availability” and “purposive” sampling. While Bless and Achola (1988:75; Heguye 1992:169), for instance, claim that these sampling techniques have serious external validity problems as they rely heavily on subjective considerations, other researchers, notably Wimmer and Dominick (1997:62-64), assert that there are legitimate conditions under which such non-probability samples can be justifiably selected, among which are questions of the purpose of the study, its cost, time constraints and the amount of error that can be allowed.

#### **4.2 An integrated analysis of the key findings**

What follows is an attempt at presenting an integrated or synthesised analysis of the key findings of the two studies (MISA 2000a; Panos 2002). In attempting to analyse or interpret the data collected, the process of what Charles Puttergill (2000) calls *defocusing* came in handy. This refers to a situation whereby the researcher is open-ended and receptive and does not create an unintended barrier by narrowly pursuing predetermined issues. Openness thus allows the researcher to identify appropriate issues and address questions that emerge from the particular situation (Puttergill 2000:237).

To be faithful to the original renditions of the findings, this study has attempted to use *first-order interpretations* by way of participants' or respondents' own narratives or responses (Puttergill 2000:239). At the same time, though, this researcher has, in order to achieve the particular objectives of this study, undertaken a *second-order interpretation* of the findings of the two studies whereby an attempt has been made to critically synthesise the findings and ensure they make sense for the purpose of the entire study (Puttergill 2000:239).

### 4.2.1 Defining community radio

A range of definitions are suggested. Some respondents in the MISA study regard community radio as a “station that is built by the community and where community members are involved in the formation of programmes...If it is used by the same community and if the station serves the interest of the community then it is a community radio.” Other respondents regard it as a “station that airs what suits the community. It develops the community. It is owned and controlled by the community” (MISA 2000a:56-57).

The respondents in the Panos study would seem in the main to agree with these definitions. While some view it as a medium for use by the local people around activities of the local community, others see it as a communication channel that uses local languages of the locality (as opposed to just the seven official Zambian languages used on national radio and television) to ensure that messages or information are understood. Some others define it as a medium that pays attention to covering as broadly as possible community events and responds to information needs of the community promptly. Still others perceive it as a communicative device that truly reflects the lives of the people in the community. There is yet another category of respondents that see community radio as:

- run and managed by the local people with financial support from the local business people.
- existing for the local people.
- located in the community.
- non-profit making.

Interestingly, some other respondents in the MISA study contrast “community radio” with “national radio” in the sense that while in the former “programmes will be suggested by the community, a national radio station *imposes what it feels fit*” (my italicising). This reflects what Lewis (1993:201) says of community radio as “an open or implied criticism of mainstream radio in either of its two models” (namely

commercial and national public service models, or the *state* broadcasting model which would be a more accurate description for Zambia). It also corresponds with McCain and Lowe's observation that community local radio often arises as a response to a perception that commercial radio cannot serve the needs of small populations. It is valued for its ability to correct the distortions inherent in majority-controlled media (McCain & Lowe 1990).

The point must be made, though, that, as McCain and Lowe caution, "community" is a rather elastic concept. While in many cases it may be defined exclusively by geographic boundaries, it must be underscored that many community services can reach people who, although they live in dispersed locations, have shared interests (McCain & Lowe 1990). To that extent, then, community radio is not only a uniting medium *within* the locality in which it is physically situated but also among people *across* different geographic spaces who have shared interests, whether ethnic, religious, political or otherwise.

Given these definitional preliminaries, therefore, the other findings of the two studies may be summarised in terms of three analytical or interpretive frameworks or categories, namely 1) community radio as a *geographic* imperative; 2) community radio as a *socio-cultural* phenomenon; and 3) community radio as a *developmental* initiative.

#### **4.2.2 Community radio as a geographic necessity**

Community radio as a geographically defined project refers to the notion of being physically rooted or situated in a particular place. This is very clearly implied in the focus group discussions carried by the two studies. In fact, it is this geographic proximity that can guarantee the ease of access for community members to meaningfully and effectively participate in the purported management and programming of the community radio station as a mouthpiece for their issues and concerns. The MISA study quotes some focus groups as saying that "they even went to the station to discuss different issues on Chikuni Radio" (MISA 2000a:89).

In fact, most of the community radio initiatives set up by the Catholic Church in the country draw their “volunteers” from the local parishes that can easily access them without the need for incurring any huge transport costs. The Panos study reports, for instance, that local drama and other clubs, because of ease of physical access, help tremendously in the production of radio programmes on most stations in Lusaka, Southern and Copperbelt provinces (Panos 2002:16-17). The idea of physical nearness, therefore, constitutes an important element of ‘community’. Indeed, some of the ideal-typical attributes oft-cited in relation to community radio can be attained in a situation where people can easily reach the station.

As an example, to ensure effective participation by the community in the management and production functions of a community radio initiative, there is obviously need for community members to live within easy reach of the station. Though seemingly mundane, this is an important point to note in developing a policy framework for community radio broadcasting. It also has a bearing on any policy-related definition of the concept of community radio.

The notion of *geographicality* is further corroborated by Mphale and Lane (1998:12) who argue that the location of the studio is a matter on which technical advice is required. While the studio should be close to the transmitter, Mphale and Lane argue, it must also be close to the heart of the community. Members of the community must see it as part of the community in which all those interested can take part. From the community point of view the best location would be in a vibrant community centre where many members of the community come for shopping, concerts, education, social and cultural activities and where news of events is always coming in.

#### **4.2.3 Community radio as a socio-cultural phenomenon**

The idea of community radio as a socio-cultural phenomenon is clearly expressed in people’s perceptions of community radio. A community must have some shared interests around which community radio can resonate. Those interests vary from

ethnic affinities, religious affiliation, to ideological propensities. Significantly, the MISA study reports some of its respondents as saying that the dominant language should be Tonga for *Radio Chikuni* and probably English as the official language, “but English should be given less broadcasting time” (MISA 2000a:89). Quite clearly, because the station is situated in a place which Tonga people call their “home”, the people there look at it as an opportunity to forge their cultural identity by promoting the use of their language on the station. This can be contrasted with national radio which allots very few hours to Tonga, one of the seven main languages in which national broadcasting is conducted. At the same time, some respondents spoken to in the Panos study point out that the use of the Tonga language on most of the programmes on *Radio Chikuni* tends to exclude the non-Tonga-speaking residents in the area from the station. The study observes that most cities in Zambia are becoming linguistically cosmopolitan (MISA 2000a:14).

It is perhaps for this reason that the MISA study respondents suggest the use of English as an “official” language on *Radio Chikuni* in order to cater for those people who do not speak or understand Tonga. The MISA study reports respondents as saying that “it is important for the community to participate in management and decision-making as the community media is *part and parcel of the community* (MISA 2000a:85) (my italicising). This confirms the community’s belief in just how socio-culturally *integrated* they feel community radio should be in their lives.

#### **4.2.4 Community radio as a promoter of development**

Many notions of community radio make reference to the potential role that the medium can play in mobilising local support for community development initiatives or projects. As Kasoma (1994) argues, development is first and foremost a community or local project. The idea of community radio as instigator of development in the widest sense is captured in the following catalogue of community information needs in the Panos study:

- Information on HIV/AIDS awareness.
- Improved information on such other disease outbreaks as cholera, malaria and diarrhoea.
- Valuable information on crime.
- Information on reproductive health.
- Information specially tailored to focus on civic matters in the community, such as civic responsibility, child abuse, human rights and community development, including entrepreneurship.

The Panos study also reports that there is a general view that “lack of such information is both a cause and effect of under-development in the community. Small-scale business people are particularly concerned that the lack of information leads to poor business activity, especially where access to metropolitan markets is concerned. They feel a sense of isolation, disconnected from the epicentre of decision-making” (Panos Southern Africa 2002:5-6).

The MISA study corroborates this evidence. It reports respondents as agreeing that “radio” is a “very important” medium in promoting community development in such areas as agriculture, enterprise development, employment, education, health, culture, youth development, gender, et cetera (MISA 2000a:60-68). It is worthwhile to note, however, that the MISA study juxtaposes radio with other media, such as local drama, video, television, newspaper, newssheet, music, dancing, personal contact, et cetera, as possible promoters of development information. Local drama features second to radio in this regard.

To sum up this section, then, community radio is treated therefore as a *sine qua non* of development. It is a medium through which localised or community development agendas can be shaped, articulated and transmitted.

### **4.3 Conclusion of the findings**

To summarise the key findings of the Panos and MISA studies analysed above, it can be contended, firstly, that the two studies show a striking similarity in the way questions are framed and answered regarding community radio communication. Secondly, the definition of community radio is almost always reinforcing the notions of community participation, empowerment, and cultural identity – terms that many a development communication scholar has reflected upon in some fashion or other.

In a way, the findings lend a certain empirical credibility to the conceptualisation of community sound broadcasting posited in chapter three of this study. In fact, they show a general awareness among the general population in Zambia of the concept and practical outworking of community radio. In the final analysis, therefore, the findings point to the need for coming up with a more coherent and consistent policy framework for the community radio phenomenon.

### **4.4 Analysis of selected community radio initiatives in Zambia**

The descriptive-analytical data on the following community radio initiatives is simply to indicate, albeit sketchily, the existing status of some of those radio stations which, either by virtue of the type of license they have been issued with or by their own public statements, have been held up as 'community radio' in nature.

In the main, this 'case-study' analysis was undertaken by this author. The data analysed here was collected by way of correspondence supplied by respondents associated in some official capacity with these community radio initiatives or by way of personal interviews with such respondents. In addition, the researcher also relied on some secondary data that deals with any one of these initiatives. Where the MISA and Panos studies already cited above are used in connection with this 'case-study' analysis, they are fully acknowledged as such. While the MISA and Panos studies have, in the main, been reflective of the perceptions of the 'users' of community radio services, the analysis that follows is based on the 'initiators' of community radio

projects. This perspectival analysis can help illuminate any 'fit' or 'disjuncture' between the 'users' and the 'initiators'.

#### **4.4.1 Mazabuka Community Radio Station**

This station was set up in 2000 as a joint project of UNESCO and the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) in Mazabuka, Southern Province. The station relies mostly on 'volunteers' ('volunteers' because they do not have formal contracts of employment). UNESCO has since pulled out of the project, leaving it in the hands of the Government and the local community. While the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS) represents the Government, the local council/government and a board of directors represent the local community. The Board is not seen as largely representative of the community, because these are not elected directly by the community, but are appointed by the local council/government. Community control is not really in practice, as there has never been a formal general meeting of community members. In addition, the current board members are reportedly active in party politics. This has had the perceived effect of rendering politically biased programming (Lingela 2002).

Notwithstanding the above observation, community involvement can be seen, to some extent, in the affiliated women's radio clubs that produce programmes for the station. Also, the Red Ribbon Youth Club has a programme that has tended to resonate with the community, as evidenced through people calling in on air. The club links this programme up with the debates it has been running on HIV/AIDS in schools. Furthermore, the station relies for its content production on correspondents who have been trained in news reporting from district locations. However, their work is hampered by the fact that there is no outside recording equipment.

*Mazabuka FM*, as it is fondly called, broadcasts on 100.9FM. With regard to programme scheduling, it devotes sixteen (16) hours to transmission per day – between 6am and 10pm. The station conducts evaluations of its programmes via on-



air calls for feedback. Audience feedback also takes the form of postcards from members of the community.

Sixty (60) percent of the programming is in Tonga, the local language of the area. There is a fair amount of sponsored programming, such as that by the Zambia Sugar Company.

All in all, the following departments characterise the station:

- Tonga
- English
- News and Current Affairs
- Production
- Technical
- Commercial
- Administration

In terms of its technical capacity, the station, with a 1000watt transmitter, covers a 150km radius. The station appears to have insufficient equipment: while there is a basic transmission studio, there are no production and recording facilities. Thus, programmes are almost always *live*.

As for the station's editorial policy, it has the following "general regulations" effective 19/11/2000:

1. Follow the working roster.
2. When going on air, be at the station at least thirty (30) minutes before time.
3. Adhere to programme guide.
4. Make prior arrangements when absent.
5. Avoiding repeating programmes (unless after three months).
6. When having live programmes make arrangements with
  - (a) Head of Department

(b) Head of Production

7. Avoid unnecessary movements when on air.
8. Producers must brief guests against using language that may offend the public.

The “general regulations” go on to suggest that “punitive measures will be taken for failure to observe the general rules” (*Mazabuka Community Radio Station* 2000).

Clearly, these are very directive, almost dictatorial, regulations which might stifle the volunteers’ creativity and freedom of artistic expression. By its very nature, community radio broadcasting seeks to enhance community participation by volunteers and other non-professionals. To entangle them in such a web of rigid rules might run counter to the participatory ethos of community radio broadcasting, particularly as suggested throughout chapter three.

Among the programme types transmitted in English are those that cover health (eg *Health Line*), children’s entertainment (*Children’s Corner*), music, policing (*Police and You*), civic responsibility (*You and Your Community*), agriculture (*Farmers’ Voice*), the environment (*You and Your Environment*), education (*Education for All*), gender (*Women’s Half Hour*), religion (*Iqraa Islamic and Bible for Today*).

#### **4.4.2 Radio Lyambai**

*Radio Lyambai*, based in Mongu in Western Province, has been operating on a “construction permit” or “test broadcast licence” since 2000. Supported with digital broadcasting equipment (1000watt transmitter, microphones, analogue audio console which has features that can synchronise with digital technology, etc.) supplied by the Open Society Institute for Southern Africa (OSISA) based in South Africa and the Media Trust Fund based in Zambia, the station broadcasts a full range of news, current affairs, cultural, religious and developmental news (Lubinda 2002). This, however, contravenes the “music only” programming as demanded of the station under the terms of the construction permit.

Among the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services Inspection Team's reasons for having not granted the station a full broadcasting licence are the following:

- Lack of a well-equipped news room.
- Lack of a production room.
- Lack of a library.
- Lack of a waiting room for visitors.
- Lack of appropriate security arrangements.

Mr. Tab Lubinda, who is both station manager and founder board member, argues that they are addressing these issues, subject to financing from donors.

The station covers up to 150km in radius. A private financier, who also happens to be an opposition politician, in conjunction with other private hands, helped to set up the station. This majority shareholder or financier was the Chairperson of the board of the station until recently.

To remove the 'partisan' spectre now hanging over the station as a result of its Chairperson's political leanings, Mr. Lubinda says that they have asked the Chairperson to resign his position in order for him to concentrate on his political aspirations. Besides the board, there is also a station manager who attends to the day-to-day affairs of the station. There are no visible community participation or representation structures or mechanisms in place.

However, there are plans, according to Mr. Lubinda, for greater involvement of the community in the management of the station. One such plan is to expand their board to include four (4) members drawn from the community. From among these will be elected a treasurer to manage the station's finances.

The radio station has eight (8) volunteers, four (4) of whom are women. It employs six (6) people on a full-time basis, two (2) of whom are women. While those employed share among themselves a paltry K2 million<sup>19</sup>, the volunteers do not get paid at all. For their part, the volunteers help generate and prepare programmes for transmission.

With regard to programming, Table 10 below gives a breakdown of some of the more salient programme titles for the station:

Table 10. **Radio Lyambai - issue by programme title**

<b>Issues</b>	<b>Programme examples</b>
Healthcare	No specific programme
Development	<i>Zwelopili</i> (Development issues)
Gender	<i>Maikuto Abasali</i> (Women's Views)
Agriculture	<i>Njimo Mwabulozi</i> (Agriculture in Loziland)
Culture	<i>Puo</i> (Language); <i>Book Review in Silozi</i>

It must be noted, though, that no programme or editorial policy has yet been finalised. The above represent the general direction in which the station's programme policy is moving.

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<sup>19</sup>The Exchange Rate at the time the interview was conducted in 2002 was US\$1 to ZK4500.

Because the station is largely perceived as a private enterprise with *community aspirations*, the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA), of which it is a member, organised a workshop to sensitise the community to the need for their involvement in the management, production and other aspects of the community radio station.

#### **4.4.3 Yatsani Radio**

*Yatsani Radio station*, set up in December 1998 and transmitting on 99.1FM, defines itself as having a mission to “spread the love of God in unity and peace throughout the area covered by the Lusaka Archdiocese”. It receives its funding from the German diocese of Rottenburg, Survive-MIVA in the UK, and the United States Information Services (USIS) (*Yatsani Radio* 2001).

Its Coordinator, Sr. Janet Fearn (2000), argues that the Lusaka diocese faced many hurdles with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services before the licence was given to them. The technocrats working on the application took long to process it, subjecting the applicant to a long process of answering a series of queries of an administrative and/or technical sort.

The station is organised in such a way as to allow for its management by volunteers. These are drawn from the parish Radio Groups set up for this purpose. In the words of the Station Coordinator, this has certain advantages, such as:

- The expertise of the local community increases.
- The available pool of volunteers in the local community increases.
- There is maximum participation of the local community.
- The radio station becomes more truly community-directed.
- There is no central, over-concentration of resources and authority.
- There is maximum decentralisation.
- The role of the core team at the studios is one of coordination.

The local parishes, according to the Coordinator, undertake fifty (50) percent of the station's programming, and the volunteers drawn from these parishes play the role of helping, leading and guiding the community's involvement with the radio station.

*Yatsani Radio* sees the "total involvement of the community and 'ownership' by the community" as an important benchmark for determining the value of any community media initiative.

Furthermore, in the words of the Coordinator, "The radio is directly under the Archbishop of Lusaka. It has a core team with close ties to the local community. The aim is that there should be minimal central control and maximum involvement of the community. Most of the assistance given to the four-strong core team is on a purely voluntary, unpaid, basis. This means that the community in a real sense directs the radio. Their involvement means that they 'own' *Yatsani Radio* as 'their' radio station" (Fearn 2000).

Its coverage extends to such issues as: Christian evangelism (*Pause for prayer; Praise half-hour; Saint; Reading of the day; Youths - agents of evangelisation*, etc.); sports (*Sports Corner*); news; and children's entertainment (*Children's Corner*). Its programme schedule does not specify issues such as agriculture, the environment, political participation, business opportunities, et cetera.

The station has a clear editorial-cum-ethical policy. Among the principles spelt out in the policy are the following:

- All groups and individuals within the church have equal rights to justice and their good name.
- Any news item must fall within the questions: "Is this news item good/true/beautiful/helpful?" (Not everything which is true is helpful).
- Any news item about the church must promote the true nature and identity of the church.

- Any news item of major importance to the church is referred directly to church authority before it is broadcast.
- No news item is to be broadcast which is merely sensational, however newsworthy other media might consider it to be (*Yatsani Radio* 2001).

Furthermore, the policy states “advertisers and programme sponsors are not involved in the promotion of tobacco, alcohol or activities considered to be contrary to the support of all that is good, true and beautiful”(Yatsani Radio 2001).

Clearly, the idea of referring some controversial content to the church authority, as suggested above, indicates a certain strict ‘self-censorship’ based on the desire to protect the public image of the Roman Catholic Church. To that extent, it is arguable that, while also focusing on various social justice issues, *Yatsani Radio* is there to service the public communication needs of the church. The extent to which it *actually* services the needs of its ‘community of interest’ are doubtful, given the fact that it reflects so much of the *institution* of the Catholic church itself. It is possible to argue here that the rules applying to the institution of the church are brought to bear upon the radio station so much that it seems to stifle the creativity of the community that it purports to serve.

As regards technical limitations, the station uses a 500watt transmitter and a 90m mast. Its 2Kw signal covers an area of 120km radius around Lusaka, with a potential audience of two (2) million people. It broadcasts from 6am until 22pm daily.

The station identifies the following as the main community information problems/needs: poverty; voicelessness; unemployment; neglect by authorities, especially by the government; hunger; and poor infrastructure.

On empowerment and participation, the communities, through the parish Radio Groups, make their own programmes on the subjects of their choice and in the

language of their choice. Nevertheless, the station also originates its own programming on these issues.

The station is a strong member of the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA) and has sometimes received support in kind from the Media Association. Being a member of ZIMA entitles a radio station to such benefits as legal representation in an event of litigation, financial support, solidarity, training, and so on.

#### **4.4.4 Chikuni Community Radio Station**

An FM radio station broadcasting on 91.8FM, it was set up by the Catholic Diocese of Monze to “help people to develop and have access to information”. With five (5) paid staff and six (6) volunteers, four (4) of whom are male, the station targets people of all ages and tastes. Its signal goes up to Monze, about 100km from Chikuni, reaching between 20,000 and 30,000 people (*Chikuni Community Radio Station* 2000).

The station prides itself upon the Tonga saying “Kazyula Nkumba Muyoba...” (roughly translated into English this means “A rare opportunity...”) (*Chikuni Community Radio Station* 2000).

The station had no difficulty securing a licence. The station’s management perceive the role of community media as being to “help people to be fully alive” and promote “development in one’s spiritual, political, academic and other well-being.” They see this being realised through enabling people to grow in the use of their talents (Panos Southern Africa 2002:21-22).

For actual community participation, the station depends upon the seventy (70) listening clubs from whom it draws some of its programming. It has forty-two (42) volunteer news-gatherers based in twenty-one (21) outlying areas. These meet once per month to compare notes. There is no board yet, although plans are underway to establish one.



With a 500watt transmitter, the station boasts ownership of state-of-the-art equipment, among which are: a production and transmission studio; master reel-to-reel machine for producing cassettes; dubbing machines; cassette and compact-disc (CD) printing facilities; wrapping machines as well as computers. For financial support, the station depends upon sponsorship, advertisements and gifts from community members.

The station draws its staff from among the members of the community, such as teachers and other professionals. As there is no board yet, the involvement of the community in decision-making is only to the extent that they help choose programmes. With regard to the selection and provision of stories, the station provides an opportunity for the people to “produce, read and stage plays” for transmission (Lesniara 2000).

On what constitutes community information problems/needs, the station management sees this as essentially the people’s lack of access to newspapers, books or other means of information.

Table 11 below shows the issues covered and some examples of programme titles to illustrate how those issues are covered.

Table 11. **Radio Chikuni - issue by programme title**

<b>Issues</b>	<b>Programme examples</b>
Healthcare	No specific programme title
Citizens political participation	<i>Let's talk; Let the people talk</i>
Environmental protection	<i>No specific programme</i>
Crime prevention	<i>No specific programme</i>
Business opportunities	<i>No specific programme</i>
Christian or other evangelism	<i>Church Documents; Meditation/Gospel Music; Saint Portrait; Christian Perspective; Children/Catechetics, et</i>

	<i>cetera.</i>
Cultural transmission	<i>Top 10 ya Citonga (Top 10 musical hits in the Tonga language); Nkamu zya muCikombelo yesu (Our Church Groups); Community Special, et cetera.</i>
Governance	<i>Burning Issues; Let the people talk; Let's talk, et cetera.</i>
Gender	<i>Women</i>
Education	<i>Education</i>
Agriculture	<i>Agriculture</i>
Entertainment	<i>Entertainment</i>
Community issues	<i>Community News; Community Special; News &amp; Community Announcements, et cetera.</i>

The station is a member of the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA) and its volunteers have benefited from courses in broadcasting and media management organised by ZIMA.

It is worthwhile to point out, before drawing any conclusions from this section, that none of the community radio stations above has generated statistics on listenership demographics. Therefore, it is hard to tell whether or not they reach the whole of their potential audiences. It is perhaps safe to conclude that this cannot be so, given the fact that not all community dwellers possess radio sets. There is also the competition offered by the national broadcaster – ZNBC - to contend with.

To summarise this section on community media initiatives, the following observations may be made. To begin with, there seems to be emerging in Zambia a body of empirical knowledge on the community radio phenomenon. In one sense, if properly organised - as this study seeks to do - such data can help facilitate the development of a preliminary policy framework that is both informed by concrete realities and by a vision of the kind of community radio broadcasting

that can be truly underpinned by most of the attributes relating to community radio as a geographically, socio-culturally and developmentally desirable project.

Secondly, the above 'case-study' analysis suggests that one must approach such 'community' media initiatives with caution because their claims to most of the attributes of community broadcasting may not necessarily represent the reality of their operations. In other words, one must *problematise* the operational aspects of these community radio initiatives. This is particularly so with regard to the more *institutionally*-inclined Catholic model of community radio broadcasting.

Thirdly, though, the initiators of such community broadcasting projects are eager to show that they are in fact living up to the ideals of community radio. To some extent, members of the community *do* bear testimony to these assertions. However, the extent to which this is truly the case on the ground is doubtful. Indeed, the community radio initiatives studied here bear testimony to the many difficulties confronted by such initiatives – ranging from their perennial dependence on donor funding, right through to their poor management structures and practices. Other problematic instances include the lack of democratic structures that can effectively represent the communities of interest or place that these initiatives purport to serve.

These trends are typical of all other community radio initiatives in the country. They represent what one can characterise as *religious* models of community radio broadcasting (eg Catholic-initiated *Yatsani Radio* and *Chikuni Community Radio Station*); *private* models of community radio broadcasting (eg privately-initiated *Radio Lyambai*); and *donor-state-community* models of community radio broadcasting (eg *Mazabuka Community Radio Station* initially started by a donor, in conjunction with the Government of Zambia, and then turned over to community ownership and management).

These models, therefore, represent a pattern of how community radio initiatives in Zambia have generally started out. They have not been, first and foremost,

spontaneously or originally *community-initiated* projects. There has always been an initiator or motivator of sorts in any such community media project.

In concluding chapter four, the key issues raised can be synthesised as follows. Firstly, the Panos and MISA studies demonstrate the need for the use of community-participatory research methods in gathering data about community radio broadcasting. The very nature of community radio as a participatory process of communication demands that type of research design. Secondly, the findings of these studies raise significant normative issues relating to (i) community definitions or perceptions of community radio, (ii) geographic *localisation* of community radio, (iii) socio-cultural determinants of community radio, and (iv) the developmental basis of community radio.

The case study of community radio initiatives, for its part, points to important practical experiences of such initiatives as have been cited, including (i) the perceptions of community radio by community radio initiators, (ii) the specific problems faced by the community radio initiatives, (iii) the extent of community participation in the governance, programming and other aspects of such community radio initiatives, and (iv) the differing models of community radio. The relevance of this chapter, therefore, consists in the fact that these issues are accounted for in the suggested policy model in chapter six.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: POLICY FORMULATION AND BROADCAST REGULATION**

In the previous chapters, the emphasis was on (i) providing a historical contextualisation of the evolution of the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting in Zambia, including highlighting the existing media policy mechanisms; (ii) giving a rationale for community radio broadcasting in Zambia, including providing a global contextualisation of the phenomenon as experienced in Southern Africa, other parts of Africa and in the North, apart from pointing out tendencies in community radio broadcasting research; (iii) motivating the development communication theoretical framework for community radio broadcasting within which this study is situated; and (iv) presenting a synthesised analysis of the findings of the MISA and Panos studies as a way of providing an empirical motivation for the policy model that will be developed in chapter six.

In order to continue to substantiate the model that will be developed in chapter six, this chapter discusses the concept of policy-making in general. Secondly, it analyses the context for public policy-making in Zambia, focusing in particular on the structures and processes of policy formulation and implementation as they have evolved over time, linking the discussion as much as possible to the broadcasting terrain in the country. The chapter also engages in a comparative analysis of policy and regulatory trends in the broadcasting landscape in Southern Africa and the world at large. This should lay an even firmer foundation for a policy proposal for community radio broadcasting that follows in chapter six.

### **5.1 Theoretical approaches to policy-making**

Policy-making is a type of decision-making. Decision-making implies the purposive human behaviour of choosing among alternative strategies for solving a problem or achieving a goal (Lerner 1976; Quade 1989:xi). According to Parsons (1995),

the starting point for a discussion of public policy must be to consider what is meant by the notion of 'public', and to account for the development of the concept in theory and practice. In this vein, Parsons (1995:3) argues that the 'public' comprises that dimension of human activity which is regarded as requiring governmental or social regulation or intervention, or at least common action.

But what is 'policy'? According to Sapru (1994:2-3), the concept denotes, among other things, guidance for action. It may take the form of:

- A declaration of goals and objectives;
- A declaration of courses of action; and/or
- A declaration on societal values.

Sapru (1994:2-3) produces a synthesised definition of 'policy' as "a purposive course of action taken by those in power in pursuit of certain goals or objectives". Sapru's definition is a synthesis of the definitional perspectives of Y.Dror (general directives on the main lines of action to be followed); Peter Self (changing directives as to how tasks should be interpreted and performed); Sir Geoffrey Vickers (decisions giving direction, coherence and continuity to the courses of action for which the decision-making body is responsible); Carl Friedrich (a proposed course of action of a person, group, or government within a given environment providing obstacles and opportunities which the policy was proposed to utilise and overcome in an effort to reach a goal or realise an objective or a purpose); and James Anderson (a purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern).

'Public policy', then, becomes, according to Dye (1998), whatever governments choose to do or not to do. In a more expansive fashion, public policy is what governments do and fail to do - to and for their citizens (Sapru 1994:3).

Given the above definitional preliminaries, policy-making, according to Henry (1999), can be analysed in two streams. The first stream seeks to analyse the *process* of public policy-making and implementation; it endeavours to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. The second stream attempts to pinpoint the *outputs* and *effects* of public policy and is thus more prescriptive than descriptive.

Below follows a discussion of each of these streams.

### **5.1.1 Public policy-making and implementation as a process**

The following models can be deployed to represent public policy-making and implementation: the elite/mass, group, systems, institutionalist, neo-institutionalist, and organised anarchy models. What follows is a succinct description of each one of these models.

#### **5.1.1.1 The elite/mass model**

At the core of this model is how policy-makers or public administrators are viewed either as “servants of the people” or as “the establishment”. In a nutshell, this model postulates that a policy-making/policy-executing elite is able to act in an environment characterised by apathy and information distortion and thereby governs a largely passive mass. Policy flows downwards from the elite to the mass. Central to this is the notion of a society divided according to those who have power and those who do not. The elite are conceptualised as those who share common values and are characterised by higher incomes, more education, and more status than the mass. They are largely seen as conservative, preferring the status quo to any revolutionary societal change (Henry 1999:295).

Dye (1998:21-22) summarises the key features of the elite/mass model as follows:

- Society is divided into the few who have power and the many who do not.
  
- The few who govern are not typical of the masses who are governed. Elites are disproportionately from the upper socio-economic strata of society.
- The movement of nonelites to elite positions must be slow and continuous to maintain stability and avoid revolution. Only elites who have accepted the basic elite consensus can be admitted to the governing circles.
- Elites share consensus on behalf of the basic values of the social system and the preservation of the system.
- Public policy does not reflect the demands of masses but rather the prevailing values of the elite. Changes in public policy will be incremental rather than revolutionary.
- Active elites are subject to relatively little direct influence from apathetic masses.

#### **5.1.1.2 The group model**

The basic idea projected by this model is that in a pluralistic society pressure groups and lobbies also have relevance. The polity is conceived of as being a system of forces and pressures acting and reacting to one another in the formulation of public policy (Henry 1999:295). This entails that interest groups or non-governmental, non-profit organisations bring their respective ideologies or agendas to bear on the process of policy-making (Baur 1968:8). But, as is noted in Parsons (1995:252), in capitalist societies, the supposed pluralistic nature of public policy-making whereby a multiplicity of interest groups compete to influence public policy is constrained by the interests of business and the market.



By implication, decision-making is not a neutral affair, the demands of business interests predominate over the demands of other groups. As with the elite/mass model, issues of power arise even here. The more powerful an interest group, the more likely it is to influence policy-making. That power can be in terms of finances, information, capacity, et cetera.

### **5.1.1.3 The systems model**

The systems model relies on concepts of information theory (eg feedback, input, output) and conceives of the process as being essentially cyclical (Henry 1999:296). The model asks such questions as:

- What are the significant variables and patterns in the public policy-making process?
  - What constitutes the “black box” of the actual policy-making process?
  - What are the inputs, “withinputs”, outputs, and feedback of the process?
- (Henry 1999:296)

David Easton (1953), in his influential treatise entitled *The Political Systems*, provides a good political-scientific context for the systems model. Easton contends that the political system is that part of the society engaged in the authoritative allocation of values. This allocation of values can be presented in terms of *inputs*. To this end, Sapru (1994:34-35) argues that inputs are seen as the physical, social, economic and political products of the environment. These can influence the political system as both demands and supports. *Demands* occur when individuals and groups, in response to environmental conditions, act to effect public policy. On the other hand, the *supports* of the political system consist in the rules, laws and customs which provide a basis for the existence of a political community and authorities. It is rendered when individuals or groups accept the decisions or laws.

#### **5.1.1.4 The institutionalist model**

According to Henry (1999:296), this model focuses on the organisational chart of government. It describes the arrangements and official duties of bureaus and

departments, but customarily it has ignored the linkages between them. Constitutional provisions, administrative and common law, and similar legalities are the objects of the greatest interest; the behavioural connections between a department and the public policy emanating from it are of scant concern.

Furthermore, Sapru (1994:38) argues that this model treats the state as a web of government structures and institutions, adjudicating between conflict, social and economic interests. The activities of individuals and groups are generally directed toward governmental institutions such as the legislature, executive, judiciary, political parties, et cetera. Government institutions themselves give public policy three distinct features:

- They give legal authority to policies, complete with a set of sanctions for those who disobey such policies.
- They universalise the application of public policy, to the extent that it extends to *all* citizens.
- They give policies their coercive appeal. Only legitimate government institutions can legally impose sanctions on violators of public policies.

#### **5.1.1.5 The neo-institutionalist model**

This model is, in a sense, a revision of the institutionalist model. It represents public policies according to policy-making subsystems. It is predicated on two dimensions, namely the probability of coercion (remote or immediate) and the

target of coercion (individual or systemic). Henry (1999:297-299) makes reference to four "arenas of power", as adumbrated below.

In a *redistributive* arena of power, power is "redistributed" throughout the polity on a fundamental scale. Redistributive policies tend to be highly ideological and emotionally charged for particular groups, involving a fight between the "haves" and the "have-nots", but having low partisan visibility. Typical of this process is its secrecy within the bounds of government or state bureaucracy.

A *distributive policy* is one in which benefits are made directly to individuals, but there are really no particularly visible costs associated with the policy.

*Regulative policies* differ from distributive policies in that they are far more likely to be identified with costs to particular groups.

*Constituent policy* is one that affects the people as political actors directly. However, such policies do not target individuals for either punishments or rewards, and tend to reallocate political and economic values through the social structure itself.

#### **5.1.1.6 The organised anarchy model**

This model posits three "streams" of agenda-setting and policy-making. Firstly, there is the *problems stream*, which entails focusing the public's and policy-makers' attention on a particular social problem, defining the problem, and either applying a new public policy to the resolution of the problem or letting the problem fade from sight. Secondly, there is the *political stream*, which focuses on the *governmental agenda* - the list of issues or problems to be resolved. The primary participants in the formulation of the governmental agenda are various; they are the state, including high-level political appointees and the president's

staff; members of the legislature; the media; interest groups; political parties; electoral campaigns; and general public opinion. A consensus is achieved by bargaining among the participants, and at some point a “bandwagon” or “tilt” effect occurs that is a consequence of an intensifying desire by the participants to be “dealt in” on the policy resolution and not to be excluded. Thirdly, there is the

*policy stream*, which specifies the *decision agenda* or the “alternative specification”. This agenda or specification is the list of alternatives from which a public policy may be selected by policy-makers to resolve a problem. It is at this stage that a more intellectual process starts whereby career public administrators, academics, researchers and consultants, interest groups, et cetera, take the lead in offering such policy alternatives (Henry 1999:299-300).

In a sense, it is at this point that “trial balloons” are released and a variety of suggestions are made both publicly and privately about how to resolve a particular problem. These ideas survive according to the criteria of whether they are technically feasible, acceptable to broad social values or what future constraints - such as budgetary limitations and the prospects of political acceptance and public acquiescence - are anticipated (Henry 1999:299-300).

It is when these three streams collide that public policy can result. In many ways, this analysis provides what might be treated as the single most satisfactory explanation of policy-making as a *process*. Albeit limited, it is nonetheless comprehensive, systemic and empirical (Henry 1999:300).

### **5.1.2 Public policy-making and implementation as an output**

Considerations of public policy-making and implementation as an output tend to be more normative and prescriptive. In addition, they tend to be less “value-free”. They are more concerned with how to improve the content of public policies

themselves and how to improve the ways in which public policies are made, with the objective of forming better policies (Henry 1999:300).

### **5.1.2.1 The incrementalist model**

Incrementalism views public policy as a continuation of past government activities with only incremental modifications. Expounded by Charles E. Lindblom (1968) as a critique of the traditional rationalist model (see below), incrementalism recognises the impractical nature of “rational-comprehensive” policy-making, and describes a more conservative process of policy-making (Dye 1998:27-28).

The conservative nature of incrementalism is observable in the fact that it uses existing programmes, policies and expenditures as a base for new programmes and policies. The model is called *incremental* because it focuses on increases, decreases or modifications of current programmes (Dye 1998:28).

Parsons (1995:286-287) captures incrementalism in terms of what Lindblom (1968) had earlier called “muddling through” policy-making or, as Henry (1999:302) points out, “disjointed incrementalism”. This type of decision-making, according to Parsons (1995:286-287), is marked by the following characteristics:

- It proceeds through incremental change;
- It involves mutual adjustment and negotiation;
- It excludes by accident, rather than by systematic or deliberate exclusion;
- Policy is not made once and for all;
- It proceeds through a succession of incremental changes;
- It is not theoretically driven;

- It is superior to a 'futile attempt at superhuman comprehensiveness';
- The test of a good decision is agreement and process rather than goal-attainment or meeting objectives; and
- It involves trial and error (Parsons 1995:286-287).

Rather cynically, Henry (1999:302) sums up this model as positing a conservative tendency in administrative decision-making, with new public policies merely seen as being variations on the past. The public policy-maker is perceived as a person who does not have the brains, time, and money to fashion truly different policies.

### **5.1.2.2 The rationalist model**

A direct converse of incrementalism, rationalism in policy-making attempts to learn all the value preferences extant in society, assign each value a relative weight, discover all the policy alternatives available, know all the consequences of each alternative, calculate how the selection of any one policy will affect the remaining alternatives in terms of opportunity costs and benefits of social values. Whether or not these goals can be realised, the model works towards their achievement, and toward the reduction of incrementalism (Henry 1999:302; Dye 1998:24-25).

Sapru (1994:40-41) argues that rational policy-making requires making hard choices among competing policy alternatives and as such entails many stages:

- The rationality assumes that the policy-makers identify the underlying problem and formulate goal priorities.
- The rational policy-maker identifies the range of policy alternatives and options that might attain some of the goals set.
- The policy-maker must calculate predictions about the costs and benefits of policy alternatives.

- The rational policy-maker is then required to compare the alternatives with the highest benefits in order to ensure that an alternative with the “maximum social gain” is achieved (Dye 1998:24).
  
- If all the above steps are successfully followed through, the policy choice should be straightforward.

### **5.1.2.3 The “third approach”**

The limitations inherent in both the incrementalist and rationalist models have led Amitai Etzioni (1968:283) to champion a “third approach”. According to Etzioni, “what is needed... is a strategy that is less exacting than the rationalistic one, but not as constricting in its perspective as the incrementalist approach; not as utopian as rationalism, but not as conservative as incrementalism; not so unrealistic a model that it cannot be followed, but not one that legitimises myopic self-oriented, noninnovative decision making.”

Etzioni’s formulation, also known as “mixed scanning” (Parsons 1995:297-298) or “strategic planning” (Henry 1999:310), attempts to exhibit flexibility of decision-making in the light of change and uncertainty in the environment. The ability or capacity to scan has to be placed in the context of the incremental character of liberal democracy which requires consensus to be built, and thus inhibits long-run planning of the kind which has been deployed in totalitarian societies (Parsons 1995:297).

The strategic planning model incorporates an outward-looking, proactive focus that is sensitive to environmental changes, but does not assume that the organisation is necessarily a victim of changes in its task environment. It concentrates on decisions rather than on extensive documentation, analyses, and

forecasts. Because of its emphasis on decision-making, it blends economic and rational analyses, political values, and the psychology of the participants in the organisation. Given these dictates, strategic planning has to be highly participatory and tolerant of controversy. Strategic planning, therefore, is “a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that define what an organisation... is, what it does, and why it does it” (Henry 1999:312).

## **5.2 The relevance of the policy approaches for the thesis**

To summarise, the foregoing section, aside from defining the concept of ‘public policy’, has attempted to delineate some of the key theoretical approaches to policy-making and implementation. It is clear that policy-making is a complex process and can be assumed from a plurality of theoretical perspectives. To that end, it can be argued that the process of policy-making, while seeking to be as objective as possible, is almost always tinged with some element of subjectivism or other.

The importance of these policy approaches to this study lies in two fundamental points. Firstly, the analysis of the Zambian context for policy-making and implementation in the next section will throw into sharp relief some of the fundamental principles underlying these theoretical policy constructs. For instance, it will be argued that the media policy mechanisms in Zambia reflect much of what is assumed in the *elite/mass* and *institutionalist* models of policy-making and implementation. This, then, will provide a scenario against which the model policy process developed in chapter six can be contrasted.

Secondly, therefore, in contradistinction to the elite/mass and institutionalist models that seem to underpin the existing media policy initiatives in Zambia, the model in chapter six will be motivated, firstly, on the basis of the *group* model of policy-making and implementation, laying particular stress on the validity of the



contributions of the various media interest groups *as such* towards the development of media-oriented policies in Zambia. But beyond stressing the significance of one particular group, or most affected stakeholder, this thesis seeks to propose a policy model that is inclusive of several agendas in Zambian society. To that extent, it seems reasonable that the policy model developed in chapter six should also be informed by the assumptions of the *organised anarchy* model. This is so because this particular model revolves around several “streams” of agenda-setting. As has been adumbrated in this chapter, *agenda-setting* can be as much a media-centric activity as it can be an activity involving such other primary participants as high-level political appointees, members of the legislature, interest groups, political parties, et cetera. If such a policy process is properly managed, it should be so inclusive as to have inputs from a cross-section of society, including advocates of a much more democratised community broadcasting system, free from the interference of the political elite. It is for this very reason that the *group* model as such is seen as an important process of ensuring that the specific interests of the *community radio broadcasting sector* are put on the policy agenda.

The purpose of the next section, therefore, is to apply some of these theoretical approaches in understanding the Zambian politico-bureaucratic context for policy-making and implementation.

### **5.3 The Zambian context for policy-making**

With the advent of plural politics in 1991, policy-making has undergone some changes. As indicated elsewhere in this study, the period prior to 1991 was characterised by a hugely *Presidentialist* politico-legal system (Banda 1997:10). The executive branch of government was the prime mover of state and other policy formulation and articulation. This has been demonstrated in chapter two with regard to Dr. K.D. Kaunda driving the articulation of media related policy

statements. Quite clearly, the institutionalist model of policy-making described above, with its emphasis on structural-cum-bureaucratic legality, characterised much of the policy-making in the UNIP era, especially after the establishment of the One-Party State in 1973. It can be argued, therefore, that the President and his party functionaries were the principal forces in the policy formulation process.

What follows below is an attempt at delineating some of the most salient influences on the formulation or development of policy in Zambia in the period after 1991.

### **5.3.1 State agency in policy formulation**


The period after 1991 saw some fundamental steps taken by the MMD Government to strengthen policy-making institutions. In particular, as a way of vesting trust in the country's civil service to guide the political leadership in policy-making and implementation, efforts were made to strengthen the Cabinet Office in its responsibility to manage the policy formulation and implementation processes. Of particular importance was the establishment at the Cabinet Office of the Policy Analysis and Co-ordination (PAC) Division to provide technical input into policy-cum-legislative proposals submitted to the Cabinet Office by government ministries.

This was necessitated by the problems that typified the conceptualising, implementing and evaluating of public policy prior to 1991. According to Agere and Mandaza (1999:57-58), there were four such concerns. Firstly, even after the fall of copper prices in the 1970s, the government continued to spend more than it generated, resulting in rising budget deficits and growing overseas debt. Secondly, in addition to the lack of public accountability during Kaunda's term of office, there were poor formal systems of making and implementing policy. Rather than benefiting from

the perspective and analysis of technical experts, policy formulation and decision-making were centralised in the office of the President and the ruling party headquarters (UNIP) where decisions were based more on socialist dogma than on a careful analysis of problems or objectives and possible actions to address them. Thirdly, the civil servants in ministries had become increasingly marginalised from the policy processes. They began to avoid risk and conflict with politicians and consequently deferred even the most routine decisions upwards. As they were not involved in the decision-making processes, they developed little ownership, understanding and commitment to the implementation or follow-up of government policy decisions. Lastly, the morale of civil servants was very low as they could be fired and transferred at short notice and sometimes without alternatives to appeal against such arbitrary decisions.

#### **5.3.1.1 The policy-making and implementation process in Zambia**

With the establishment of the Policy Analysis and Coordination (PAC) Division at Cabinet Office to address some of the problems highlighted above, a new policy-making, implementation and evaluation process emerged, as the diagram below shows:



The Zambian Cabinet consists of the President, the Vice-President, Ministers, the Attorney-General, and the Secretary to the Cabinet and his Deputy. The President presides over Cabinet meetings. Deputy Ministers cannot sit in for their Ministers.

In effect, the Cabinet, with the addition of Deputy Ministers, constitutes the executive wing of the Zambian Government. In his *Foreword* to the Cabinet Handbook, former Secretary to the Cabinet, A.J. Adamson, puts it thus:

This Cabinet Handbook lays down the processes and procedures by which the Zambian Cabinet System operates. It is designed to assist members of the *executive wing* (my italicising) of the Government in the effective and efficient day-to-day handling and presentation of matters requiring consideration by Cabinet (Cabinet Handbook 1996).

The picture painted by the diagram above points to a particular perspective of the policy process. It seems to represent the *elite/mass* and *institutionalist* approaches to the formulation, implementation and evaluation of public policy. This is evident in the fact that the very conceptualisation of the policy problem to be addressed is vested, almost dogmatically, in government ministries. Even the process of monitoring and evaluation seems to rest within the institutional make-up of the state, particularly considering that it is the Policy Analysis and Coordination (PAC) Division that “requests a quarterly report on progress in the implementation of Cabinet decisions”, and the ministry's responsibility is to submit before Cabinet an implementation report and request Cabinet to adopt it (Cabinet Handbook 1996:10).

The state-centrism of policy-making is such that even the issue of *consultation* with relevant *stakeholders* is usually within the confines of government bureaucracy or

government institutional frameworks. For instance, the *Cabinet Handbook* lays out the following as the *basic requirements* for the consultation process:

- To facilitate decision-making, Ministers should ensure that, in the development of any policy, adequate consultation takes place with all major stakeholders within and outside their respective Ministries.
- Ministers should also ensure that intra - and inter-Ministerial consultation takes place at Ministerial and Official levels on proposals that may impinge on the portfolios of other Ministries (Cabinet Handbook 1996:10-12).

The Cabinet document does not, however, mention specific stakeholders other than those within the confines of the bureaucratic machinery of government ministries and departments. Given this governmental-cum-bureaucratic institutionalism, the formulation of policies about media and information issues would ordinarily be reposed in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS). With regard to policy formulation, the goal of the MIBS is “to provide a legal and policy framework for the development of a sustainable public and private media and to increase coverage for a well-informed society” (Chipili 2002:1). Quite clearly, the ministry sees itself as being in a Government-ascribed position to initiate policies relating to the development of the media industry in the country.

In fact, in keeping with their *policy-initiating* role, the MIBS had by 2001, without much evidence of consultation with relevant stakeholders in society, tabled five (5) media related memoranda for Cabinet consideration as follows:

- **Legislation:** Defamation (Amendment) Bill, 2001 CAB. (01) 02;
- **Legislation:** The Radio Communications (Amendment) Bill, 2001 CAB. (01) 03;

- **Legislation:** The Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Bill, 2001 CAB. (01) 10;
- **Public Policy:** Revised National Media Policy, CAB. (01) 04; and
- **Communication:** Establishment of Radio and Television Satellite Service in Zambia (Chipili 2002:4).

The MIBS also reports that Cabinet approved in principle the establishment of a government Radio and Television Satellite Service provided it is cheaper and that tender procedures are complied with (Chipili 2002:4).

Out of all these Cabinet Memoranda, only the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Bill saw itself being enacted in December 2002. Even then, this was after some concerted advocacy effort by civil society organisations, as is shown later in this section.

### **5.3.2 Parliamentary influence on policy formulation**

Beyond the confines of the executive policy-making bureaucracy are other checks and balances. With regard to media related policy formulation, the legislative wing of government essentially provides these checks and balances.

This is evident in the institution of the Parliamentary Committee on Information and Broadcasting Services. This “departmentally-related committee” is provided for by Article 149 (1) of the National Assembly Standing Orders of 1998, made under Article 86 (1) of the Constitution of Zambia. It is among several other such committees as “relate to the structure of Government consisting of ten members other than the Vice-President, Minister, Deputy Minister, or any other member holding or acting in any office prescribed by or under an Act of Parliament, appointed by the Speaker at the commencement of each session” (Zambia 1998: sec 86.1).

While Cabinet meetings, where policy-making *par excellence* may take place, is mostly a closed executive affair, the Standing Orders mandate such departmentally-related committees to:

1. Study, report and make appropriate recommendations to the Government through the House on the mandate, management and operations of the Government ministries, departments and/or agencies under their portfolio;
2. Carry out detailed scrutiny of certain activities being undertaken by the Government ministries, departments and/or agencies under their portfolio and make appropriate recommendations to the House for ultimate consideration by the Government;
3. Make, if necessary, recommendations to the Government on the need to review certain policies and/or certain existing legislation; and
4. Consider any Bills that may be referred to them by the House.

The Committee on Information and Broadcasting Services, chaired until 2001 by Hon. Alexander Miti, had released several reports to the House and the government on issues to do with media operations in the country and recommended certain policy-cum-legislative action. Mostly, their recommendations were not accepted. For instance, they recommended that the government should move quickly and establish an independent broadcasting authority as well as re-constitute the state-owned Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) into a genuine public service broadcaster.<sup>20</sup>

Arguably, such committees, even if their role is merely advisory, may have the effect of opening up the policy-making process to the wider society. Apart from arranging *in-*

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<sup>20</sup>For an understanding of this, attention may be drawn to the Committee's two reports for the third and fourth sessions of the eighth National Assembly (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia:1999; Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia:2000).



*camera* hearings from officials in government ministries/departments/agencies, they also listen to such interest groups as media and human rights activist organisations to get a sense of their views and perspectives on media issues.

As already noted, the policy process described above would seem to lend itself more to the *institutionalist* and *elite/mass* models of policy-making. Nevertheless, the fact that there is provision for the committee described above to summon any relevant stakeholder for an interview suggests that such a parliamentary process can open up the hugely *state-centric* policy-making process to the influences of particular *interest groups* in society, including media freedom activists. In the next sub-section, therefore, the role of interest groups in policy-making within the political context of Zambia is explored.

### **5.3.3 Societal interest groups as a factor in policy formulation**

As noted above, it would appear that the group model can be used to account for the immense pressures that are being brought to bear upon the hugely regimented governmental, bureaucratic and institutionalised processes of policy-making in Zambia. To exemplify, because the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services appeared to be reluctant to move faster with media reforms by pushing for legislation on freedom of information, introducing amendments to make the ZNBC Act of 1987 fall in line with aspirations for a true public broadcaster and pushing for the establishment of an independent broadcasting authority, the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA), the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA), the Zambia Media Women's Association (ZAMWA) and other stakeholders teamed up in 2002 in a partnership that was designed to galvanise mass or popular support for their media reforms project. More specifically, the three media activist organisations, working with mostly opposition political parties, hired a law firm to help them draft Bills to take care of the issues raised above.

The three Bills thus developed were:

- **The Freedom of Information Draft Bill:** Its goal was to open up public institutions to public scrutiny by guaranteeing access to them (Matibini 2002);
- **The Broadcasting Draft Bill:** It aimed at eliminating the overwhelming influence of the state over the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation and place it in the hands of an independent broadcasting regulator in order to promote public service broadcasting (Matibini 2002); and
- **The Independent Broadcasting Authority Draft Bill:** It sought to introduce an independent broadcasting authority to regulate the broadcasting industry, thereby effectively removing that responsibility from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (Matibini 2002).

Upon completing his assignment, the ZIMA legal consultant, Mr. Patrick Matibini, submitted the draft Bills to the Clerk of the National Assembly.

The ZIMA strategy, in this regard, was to get the mainly opposition Members of Parliament (MPs) in the House to propose what is called “a private members’ motion” on the Bills. However, after scrutinising these private Bills, the Speaker of the National Assembly, Hon. Amusaa Mwanamwambwa, held that the Bills could not be debated by the House because the executive wing of government, despite being so asked by the private members, had not granted them express consent to go ahead as was constitutionally required when such Bills had financial implications for the state treasury (Matibini 2002). If this process had gone ahead, it would have been the first time in the history of Zambia that policy-cum-legislation was initiated, discussed and pushed for adoption/enactment outside of the normal government bureaucracy and procedures. However, this was not to be. At the same time as ZIMA, PAZA and ZAMWA were pursuing these policy-cum-legislative media reforms through a private

member's motion, the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS) was working on its own versions of the three media Bills and urged the media organisations to drop theirs and instead work with the ministry in ensuring that it successfully moved the motions in the House.

The drama described above was unfolding against a backdrop of a National Assembly in which the ruling MMD was in a minority. The ZIMA strategy was to count on the combined opposition and some sympathetic MMD MPs to support the media reform Bills. As Table 12 indicates, the ruling MMD did not enjoy any majority in the House, although it has been known to 'persuade' some opposition MPs to support most of its legislative proposals.

Table 12. **A statistical profile of the National Assembly membership** (Zambia. National Assembly of Zambia 2003)

Movement for Multiparty Democracy	69
United National Independence Party	13
United Party for National Development	48
Heritage Party	2
Patriotic Front	1
Forum for Democracy and Development	12
Zambia Republican Party	1
Elected vacancies	3
Total number of elected MPs	147
Nominated MPs	8
Vacant nominees	0
Total number of MPs in the House	155
Total number of elected female MPs	17
Total number of ruling party MPs	77
<b>Total number of opposition MPs</b>	<b>78</b>

To be sure, the MIBS felt spited by the media reform campaign engineered and driven by civil society and did not take so kindly to having their mandate to initiate public policy 'usurped'.

At the time of this study, the MIBS had gone ahead and presented its Bills to Parliament, two of which - the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Bill (Zambia 2002c) and the Independent Broadcasting Authority Bill (Zambia 2002b) - had been passed and assented to by the President.

The Freedom of Information Bill (Zambia 2002a) was put on hold in order to assess its national security implications. There was a general feeling among the ruling MMD MPs and a small number of opposition MPs that, against the background of the 'Twin Tower' terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 in the United States of America (USA), there was need to have a tighter hold on national security information. They argued that such information must not be allowed to enter the public domain ever so easily as would be required by the Freedom of Information Bill, particularly given the fact that civil society had called for all the defence and security services to be subject to the law.

The scenario presented here gave rise to two parallel policy-cum-legislative processes on the same media issues or problems: one initiated by civil society and the other by government. It can be argued that there is an implied bureaucratic elitism whereby government officials view themselves as the rightful initiators of public policy and legislative action. This naturally lends itself to the *elite/mass* and *institutionalist* models of policy-making whereby ruling party MPs and government bureaucrats see themselves as better placed to think and plan for the governed 'masses'. At the same

time, one can legitimately argue that the *group* model of policy-making played itself out in that media interests coalesced into a public campaign for media reforms. It is worthwhile, however, to be cautious about the involvement of interest groups in the campaign described above. One can reasonably argue that the campaign by media interest groups was 'public' or 'grassroots-oriented' only to the extent that it galvanised support among an *elite* of media practitioners, lawyers, opposition political party MPs, academics and some enlightened members of the public. The public campaigns sponsored by such professional groups and transmitted on radio and television phone-in programmes were basically restricted to the urban elite who could afford to express their opinions on the programmes. The rural poor were simply not a factor in this campaign. It is a truism that many rural people do not understand the dynamics of media operations and would find it hard to connect with the arguments advanced by the urban-based media reformers. To that extent, then, one could easily argue that there is such a thing as a *professional elitism* whereby professional people seek to push for reforms as a way of living up to the values, rituals and routines of their professions. In this particular case, the media professionals and other allied professionals saw it fit to fight for the kind of reforms that would ensure that they held on to the values of press freedom, free speech, objectivity, factuality, and so on.

In concluding this section, then, it must be noted (i) that some of the theoretical approaches to policy-making - notably the elite/mass and institutional models - discussed above have characterised the way in which policies have been crafted in Zambia; and (ii) that the policy model suggested in chapter six is inspired by the group and organised anarchy approaches to policy-making.

The purpose of the next section is to take up the discussion started in chapter three about trends in policy and broadcast regulation across the globe, with a special focus

on Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Australia, in that order. The relevance of this discussion is to further motivate a comparative analysis for the purpose of the policy model developed in chapter six, particularly by isolating specific lessons for Zambia.

## **5.4 A comparative analysis of trends in community broadcasting policy and regulation**

This section seeks to discuss the broadcasting policy and regulatory regimes in four countries as a way of further prefacing a policy model for community radio broadcasting in Zambia. As noted earlier, the countries tackled, for reasons already advanced, are Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Australia. The order of presentation is largely determined by the level of sophistication of the legal regimes governing community radio broadcasting in each of these countries.

### **5.4.1 Malawi**

In seeking to explore broadcasting policy and regulatory trends in Malawi, one must first understand something of the political context in that country. Like Zambia, Malawi's media system is very much a legacy of British colonialism. As early as 1895, there existed in Malawi the *Central African Times*. This newspaper was to become the present-day *Daily Times* under Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the first President of Malawi. The Blantyre Printing & Publishing Company, incorporated in 1927, came under the control of Dr. Banda. In other words, as was the case in Zambia, the stage had been set for state ownership and control of the media industry. Thus, policy and regulation was to be dictated by the state (Media Council of Malawi 2001).

Indeed, this integration of the media into the structure of the then ruling Malawi Congress Party (MCP) degenerated into a media legacy that has come to be described as follows:

- Complete control of the media by the political elite (recruitment, editorial content, etc.).

- Stifled independent media.
- Monopolisation and control of the Blantyre Print & Publishing Company and the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation by the Government.
- Insufficient funding to stimulate establishment of more printing and publishing houses and electronic media (Media Council of Malawi 2001:18).

However, things were to change. With the loss of political power by the MCP, Malawi has witnessed a mushrooming of newspaper titles, most of them owned by journalists or printers (Chimombo & Chimombo 1996).

It is worthwhile to note, however, that, unlike the print media, the broadcasting sector has been developing at a slower pace, not least because the policy-cum-legislative landscape has itself been almost static. It was in 1998 that the greatest number of broadcasting licences were given out to privately-owned radio stations. The first such licence had been given to the Lilongwe-based *African Bible College Radio* in 1995. The new stations launched in 1998 were the community-based *Dzimwe Community Radio Station* for local women in the lakeshore district of Mangochi, *FM Power 101* and *Capital FM Radio*. Since then, there has been an upsurge in the establishment of privately owned FM radio stations. For instance, 1999 saw the setting up of *Trans World Radio* (Mhango 1998).

This opening up of the airwaves has posed a challenge to the state-owned *Malawi Broadcasting Corporation* (MBC). In part, this has 'compelled' MBC to introduce more community-based programming. This has given rise, for example, to the Development Broadcasting Unit within MBC, which serves as a community radio initiative in partnership with the UK Department for International Development (DFID), with technical-cum-management support from the UK-based Radio for Development (RFD) (Pankuku 2000). This involves producing programmes on a range of topics with the participation of rural communities across the country, an example of localised communication.

Also, influenced largely by the need to live up to its *public service* mandate, MBC entered into an alliance with Panos Southern Africa, in which Panos liaised with the Malawi Media Women's Association (MAMWA) to train women in Mangochi District in the basics of radio production, whereupon MBC would transmit the women's own programmes on different community developmental issues.

Along side the emergence of private radio stations was the setting up in 2000 of *Television Malawi* (TVM), which is the sole public service free-to-air television service. Prior to TVM, Malawians accessed subscription digital satellite television services offered by the multinational M-NET in such urban centres as Blantyre, Lilongwe, Mzuzu and Zomba.

With regard to broadcasting policy and regulatory issues, then, the starting point may well be the constitution of Malawi, which expressly guarantees freedom of the media as well as of expression. According to Kanyongolo (2001), article 36 of the constitution states that "the press shall have the right to report and publish freely, within Malawi and abroad, and to be accorded the fullest possible facilities for access to public information".

Kanyongolo (2001:14) is quick to observe that there are, nevertheless, many statutory instruments, notably the Official Secrets Act, that serve to muzzle the media in their work. In a sense, the state heavily 'regulates' the media. There seems to be an official recognition of Kanyongolo's assertion when Livuza, Director of Information in the Ministry of Information, affirms that the Malawian government's policy on the media is summed up in the following propositions: 1) scrapping repressive laws; 2) liberalising the airwaves; and 3) gradually improving the flow of information (Livuza 2001:5).

Aside from the constitution, there are other laws that make up the Malawian regulatory regime for the broadcasting industry. Table 13 below lists some of these legal instruments.



Table 13. **Malawian broadcasting regulatory regime**

<b>Policy/Law</b>	<b>Function</b>	<b>Observations</b>
The MBC Act	To provide for the existence of MBC and regulate radio services in Malawi, including licensing	This has not been repealed in many years, even with the enactment of the MACRA
The Communications Act	To provide for the existence of a regulatory authority Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) to regulate the frequency spectrum	This has not affected the legal standing of MBC; it thus does not extend to such qualitative issues as regulating the nature and scope of political broadcasting content on MBC. The MACRA has taken over from the Malawi Post and Telecommunication Corporation (Tenthani 2000:11)
The Censorship & Control of Entertainment Act of 1968	To regulate media content that is not in conformity with moral and cultural values.	This has had the effect of interfering and negating the fundamental rights of freedom of expression, to receive and impart information.

For the purpose of comparison, it is advisable to explore, in some detail, several issues relating to the Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA). This should help clarify a number of fundamental points that the policy model suggested for Zambia should clearly grapple with. Firstly, then, as has been noted above, the organ (MACRA) was established under the Malawi Communications Act, which was passed into law by Parliament in November 1998. The Act puts in place a legal framework for the regulation and provision of services in the communications sector. This sector essentially comprises telecommunications, broadcasting and postal services (Sasman 2002). Like the South African experience, it can thus be concluded that there is a certain technological convergence envisaged in the creation of the MACRA.

Secondly, the Act calls for the privatisation of the telecommunications sector and the reconstitution of the Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) as a public broadcaster (Sasman 2002:36). Underlying the privatisation of the telecommunications sector is obviously a neo-liberal approach to trade in telecommunications, with a firm belief in a reduced role for the state. However, the expressed desire to de-link the MBC from the state machinery, as through turning it into a public broadcaster, is almost immediately negated by the fact that the board of directors of the MACRA are appointed by the state President in keeping with the provisions of the Communications Act (Sasman 2002:36). It can be argued that Presidential appointees tend to act in line with the general philosophy of the appointing authority and thus their objectivity is usually compromised. It is doubtful, therefore, how such board members can steer the MBC out of the grip of state power and make it become more accountable to the public or to parliament.

Thirdly, there seems to be a strong cultural-nationalist propensity in the fact that the Communications Act obligates commercial broadcasting licensees to provide news and current affairs, with programming that “reflects the wide diversity of Malawi people” (Sasman 2002:36). In the same breath, the Act restricts foreign ownership or control of broadcast media, such that a foreign licensee should not exceed forty-nine (49) percent of the total equity of the licence.

Fourthly, the development of community radio broadcasting in Malawi has largely been as a consequence of the involvement of UNESCO, particularly with regard to *Dzimwe Community Radio Station* in Mangochi. In addition, the Roman Catholic Church and other Christian faiths have helped in the development of the community radio broadcasting sector through the creation, for example, of *Radio Maria*. It is perhaps this vibrancy outside of the state that may explain the existence of some community radio stations in Malawi. It is important to underscore this point because, as in the case of Mozambique below, the issue of donor funding for community radio broadcasting needs to become a matter for policy consideration. This factor is taken into account in the development of the policy model in chapter six.

Overall, what seems to be lacking in the Communications Act, and therefore in Malawi's broadcasting policy and regulatory regime, are clear principles to govern the administration of the community radio broadcasting sector, which is mostly bunched together with private, and even commercial, radio stations.

In summary, then, Malawi presents a country whose development of the community radio broadcasting sector has been as slow as the development of policy and legislation to govern the sector. It also represents a country in which actual media development has largely been state-determined, with little or no consultation with civil society broadly defined to include grassroots communities, social movements, the business community, et cetera.

#### **5.4.2 Mozambique**

Mozambique, in comparison with Malawi, has shown a tendency for greater policy-cum-legal progression, despite the fact that it endured many years of Portuguese colonialism and a long civil strife (Bonin 1999). The country's media related legal regime is derived from Article 74 of the constitution of Mozambique, which recognises that "all citizens shall have the right to freedom of expression and to freedom of the press, as well as the right to information" (Sadique 2001). Article 74 (3) further provides for the protection of professional independence and confidentiality (Free Press 2002:36).

It is also important to note that there has been a process of rapid liberalisation of the media industry in Mozambique. This process has extended to the broadcasting arena, whereby it provided an opportunity for private radio and television stations to be effectively removed from the control and interference of the Ministry of Information in as far as their editorial decision-making and operations were concerned (Free Press 2002:36). It was the High Council for Social Communication which was to assume the responsibility of acting as a watchdog and safeguard of freedom of the press. In fact, this is provided for in the Mozambican constitution in these words:

The right to information, the freedom of the press, and the independence of the media, as well as broadcasting rights and the right to reply, shall be guaranteed by the High Council for Social Communication (Sitoe 1998:39).

It must be noted that the implementation of Mozambique's broadcast legal regime is now reposed in the Office of the Prime Minister. This office is responsible for allocating of frequencies and the granting of licences. To stress this point, although the Ministry of Transport and Communications, in conjunction with the National Institute of Communication, can be involved in examining the legal and technical conditions of an application, it is still the Office of the Prime Minister that has the final say in awarding licences. Quite clearly, given the political nature of the Office of the Prime Minister, it is arguable that there is a strong political influence in the decision-making processes involving the awarding of radio and television licences (Free Press 2002:36).

Another significant trend worth noting is that there has been, according to Sadique (2001:9), the rise of the independent or non-governmental media sector. Taking up this point, Bonin (1999:35) argues that the independent media sector has registered remarkable and growing dynamism in terms of setting up and managing mass media, particularly radio stations, with the involvement of the communities. Sadique suggests that such independent media initiatives are a reaction to the ever increasing need for information among the citizenry who are not reached by the mostly Maputo-based media (Sadique 2001:11). Perhaps it is *here* that one can begin to talk about the necessity of *community radio broadcasting* in Mozambique.

Like in Malawi above, donor funding has largely been responsible for starting community radio projects in Mozambique. Indeed, the UNESCO-supported Mozambique Media Development Project, implemented in conjunction with the government, has influenced the development of community radio broadcasting in Mozambique. Within the context of that project, 'community radio' is defined as "radio of the community, *made by* the community and *for* the community". The concept of 'community' is defined as "a geographically based group and/or a social group or public sector which has common or specific interests" (Sadique 2001:12).

The community radio broadcasting scenario is somewhat reinforced by the Mozambican government's *Information and Strategy Document* which outlines the following priorities:

- Incentives for the development of community media, particularly in the rural areas.
- Incentives for the use of national languages, particularly, but not only, in the public service broadcasting sector.
- Strengthening the professional and technical capacities of journalists through formal and in-service training both within and outside the country (Sitoe 1998:40).

Clearly, there are a number of lessons that Zambia can learn from the Mozambican experience for its own policy model for community radio broadcasting. Firstly, the Mozambican case presents a legalistically rigid media regulatory regime, with most media governance institutions, such as the High Council for Social Communication, constitutionally provided for. In fact, despite the strong legal regime, and despite UNESCO touting it as a distinct sector, the community radio broadcasting terrain is not sufficiently and specifically dealt with in Mozambique's regulatory system. Like in Zambia and Malawi, but unlike in South Africa and Australia, as is demonstrated later, community radio is treated as simply a private, non-commercial broadcasting phenomenon that the state machinery must somehow or other contend with either through active support for it or simply through processing applications in the name of community radio broadcasting. It is useful for Zambia to appropriate such a strong regulatory regime, but in a way that reinforces the legal recognition of the uniqueness of the community radio broadcasting sector as a tool for localised development initiatives.

Secondly, the Mozambican case exhibits little evidence of government-initiated consultation with community radio broadcasting stakeholders on matters facing, or likely to face, the community radio broadcasting sector. While the regulatory system is expansive enough to allow for the registration of 'community radio stations', it does

not address the specific concerns and issues around which community radio broadcasting, as a sector distinct from public and commercial broadcasting, can develop. This is definitely a weakness that is similar to Zambia's hugely *elite/mass* and *institutionalistic* broadcasting policy-cum-regulatory environment. It is advisable, therefore, that the policy model to be developed in chapter six should take into account the need for a more inclusive regulatory-cum-policy regime *vis-à-vis* community radio broadcasting.

### **5.4.3 South Africa**

The South African model for policy formulation *vis-à-vis* broadcasting has been underpinned by what might be called a 'nationalist-reconstructionist' imperative and an 'expansionist-capitalist' agenda.

To start with, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) played a significant part in both constructing and supporting the governance structures of apartheid South Africa. It supported the then government's efforts to combat what were seen as the 'revolutionary forces' ostensibly marshalled by the African National Congress (ANC) in exile (Teer-Tomaselli & Tomaselli 2001:124).

Therefore, the crafting of South Africa's media policies has taken count of the forces that coalesced to transform the media landscape from such a commandist regime. Among such forces of transformation were the Film and Allied Workers Organisation (FAWO), the Campaign for Open Media (COM) and the Community Radio Working Group and its various affiliates, all of which served as the fulcrum around which a series of initiatives were taken (Teer-Tomaselli & Tomaselli 2001:125).

Among the most striking initiatives included the following: the march on the SABC building in August 1990; a media policy workshop at Rhodes University in 1990; the *Jabulani! Freedom of the Airwaves* Conference in Doorn, Holland in 1991; a second media policy workshop held at the University of Bophuthatswana in 1991; the release of the ANC's *Media Charter* in 1991; and the COM "Free, Fair and Open Media" Conference in 1992, which led to a set of proposals forwarded to the Conference for a

Democratic South Africa (CODESA) and the establishment of a Campaign for Independent Broadcasting (CIB). According to Teer-Tomaselli & Tomaselli (2001:125), it was these initiatives which led to the “democratic and transparent appointment in May 1993 of a new governing Board for the SABC” as well as the establishment of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) in 1994, later renamed the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) to reflect the technological convergence between broadcasting and telecommunications (Oosthuizen 2001:185).

Indeed, it was the Broadcasting Act of 1999 (South Africa 1999) that assigned the responsibility of *media regulation* to the IBA, with the government, through the Media Communication Policy Unit set up under the aegis of the Government Communication and Information System (GCIS), still mainly responsible for policy formulation (Mersham & Skinner 2001).

The restructuring of SABC and the formation of the IBA were, in a sense, a defining moment in South Africa’s new broadcast environment, something that one might indeed refer to as broadly aimed at reconstructing a nation that was not at peace with itself as a consequence of the apartheid regime. In fact, it was as a consequence of this policy-cum-legal development that SABC reconfigured its programming repertoire. Whereas it had previously served the interests of the middle classes, such as white, ‘coloured’ and Indian people, it now sought to redefine its public service mandate in terms of extending airtime for all official languages (other than English) on television, increasing local content programming; expanding the TV footprint to reach all potential viewers; and upgrading the African languages radio services (Teer-Tomaselli & Tomaselli 2001:126).

It is also important to note, particularly as a way of extracting a lesson for Zambia’s policy formulation, that South Africa espouses a three-tier broadcasting system which consists in public service broadcasting, commercial broadcasting and community radio broadcasting (Teer-Tomaselli 2001:234).

Since public service broadcasting has already been cursorily touched upon above, it might also be useful to reflect on commercial broadcasting, before finally concluding with a more detailed analysis of the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting.

It is clear that South African commercial broadcasting sought to internationalise with the collapse of the apartheid regime. As Berger (2001) observes, there was capital outflow in the form of investment abroad by local broadcasting media from 1994 to 2001. The period saw significant foreign investment by South African broadcast media groups, such as the Naspers-controlled Multichoice International (MIH), the owners of M-NET. *Union Alliance Media* bought pay-TV interests in a large number of African countries, and invested in radio in Botswana, Malawi and Namibia (Berger 2001:159). Berger (2001:158) further notes that these transnational developments may augur well for South Africa's economic growth. He argues that whereas previously black South Africans were presented as victims in international media and all South Africans as victims of a surfeit of USA-sourced programming back home, the situation has now become one in which South African media have become a player, albeit small, in the international mass media arena. Clearly, then, while the ANC's political project may have been to ensure that the black majority were sufficiently empowered to own media houses, the acceptance of South Africa among other nations of the world, hitherto a pariah state, led to the inevitable propensity for South African finance capital to internationalise and expand its market frontiers both on the African continent and beyond.

It can be argued that such capital outflows lend credence to the observation that African media might, with significant investment, countervail the influences of foreign programmes on local communicative spaces. For instance, the DStv channel *Africa-to-Africa* does attempt to broadcast programmes which are produced by Africa and are about Africa. Even so, because of the profit-motive that governs such foreign investment by South African media groups, the more ideological-cum-political agenda of, say, *African Renaissance* may not be effectively projected via such programming. This, though, is something that *SABC Africa*, the satellite channel of SABC, has been attempting to do, touting itself as the "Pulse of Africa's Creative Spirit".



To turn to the case of community radio, the IBA defines a community broadcasting service as one which:

- is fully controlled by a non-profit entity and carried on for non-profit purposes;
- serves a particular community;
- encourages members of the community served by it or persons associated with or promoting the interests of such community to participate in the selection and provision of programmes to be broadcast in the course of such broadcasting service; and
- may be funded by donations, grants, sponsorships, advertising or membership fees, or by any combination of the aforementioned (Teer-Tomaselli 2001:234).

According to Teer-Tomaselli (2001:234-236), the IBA Act attempts to delineate the concept of 'community' in terms of 'a geographic community' and 'a community of interest'. The Act identifies three types of community of interest radio stations, to wit: 1) 'institutional community' (servicing the needs of those persons directly associated with an institution of learning, labour or indeed, any other institutional formations); 2) 'religious community stations' (catering for the religious needs of a specific community); and 3) 'cultural radio stations' (which seek to meet the cultural needs of a defined 'cultural group').

Even as the debate about community radio rages in South Africa, there is another dynamic which is clear. In a very real sense, community radio broadcasting, apart from commercial broadcasting, has introduced competition for South Africa's public service broadcasting reposed in the SABC. According to Fourie (2002), after being the monopoly broadcaster for more than four decades, the SABC now has to compete with a great many radio and television channels, including community radio stations. There are, for example, fourteen private radio stations, one free-to-air private national terrestrial television channel, *e-tv*, and MultiChoice, provider of the subscription television channel M-NET and the DStv satellite bouquet of more than fifty (50) channels including BBC World, CNN, Sky News, National Geographic, Discovery

Channel, MTV, various sports channels, various niche channels, and various community channels including a highly successful channel for the Afrikaans speaking population *kykNet*.

Fourie adds that the present restrictive ownership and competition regulations are likely to be changed, such as prohibiting companies from owning more than two FM and AM licences and a twenty (20) percent limit on foreign ownership of local media assets. This change in regulation, according to Fourie, will introduce a second wave of transformation of the broadcasting regulatory environment. As has been noted earlier, the first (and present) one was introduced in the early nineties after the fall of apartheid to curtail those who already had broadcasting assets from acquiring more (mainly the Afrikaans and the English newspaper groups) and to encourage black empowerment through media ownership (Fourie 2002:5).

Indeed, the second wave of broadcasting regulation began, in part, with the enactment of the Media Development and Diversity Agency Act (South Africa 2002). This is particularly useful with regard to reinvigorating the debate about the need for the media to be as inclusive as possible of the hitherto marginalised and disadvantaged communities and persons. For the purpose of this comparative analysis, and particularly given that this model might be useful for issues relating to the funding of community radio broadcasting in the policy model for Zambia, it is important to recognise that the MDDA Act defines "diversity" as "access to the widest range of sources of information and opinion, as well as equitable representation within the media in general." It defines "media development" as "the development of the media environment and infrastructure so that historically disadvantaged communities and persons have access to the media as owners, managers, producers and consumers of media".

It is also important to take note of the specific tasks that the MDDA sets out to undertake, such as encouraging ownership and control of and access to media by historically disadvantaged communities as well as historically diminished indigenous language and cultural groups; encouraging the development of human resources and

training, and capacity building, within the media industry, especially amongst historically disadvantaged groups; and encouraging the channelling of resources to the community and commercial media sectors (South Africa. Media Development and Diversity Agency 2000:2-3).

It is significant to underline such tasks because they point to some of the ways of resolving the main *problems* associated with community radio broadcasting, such as inadequate funding and lack of skills. It is these problems which a policy model for Zambia must seek to navigate and find solutions to. In fact the MDDA has identified “the lack of resources to support the growth of community, non-profit and small commercial media” and “the legacy in media organisations of inadequate education, training and advancement of black South Africans” as being some of the major problems or challenges (South Africa. Media Development and Diversity Agency 2000:27-28). While the South African experience might lay stress on “black South Africans” in this regard, the Zambian situation, where racial segregation was not such an issue, might place emphasis on the generally poverty-stricken communities that are seeking solutions to their information and development problems.

To this end, therefore, the MDDA seeks to embark upon such strategies as providing funding, training and capacity building to promote diversity in ownership, control and staffing of media; stimulating debate and creating awareness about the importance of media diversity; striving to support the public broadcaster in carrying out its public service mandate; lobbying relevant self-regulatory bodies in the broadcasting, print and advertising industries to promote and develop their codes of conduct through open, public processes and to pay attention to advancing media diversity in the codes of conduct; and providing support to *community and other non-profit* media (my italicising) (South Africa. Media Development and Diversity Agency 2000:35-36).

Obviously, initiatives such as those cited above will require funding. This funding is expected to come from the agency itself, the media industry and the donors. Each would meet an equal portion of the average need of R60-million per year over a five-year period, representing a contribution of R20-million each a year (South Africa.

Media Development and Diversity Agency 2000:51; Direct Marketing Association of South Africa 2002).

As required by law, the MDDA is governed by a nine-person board of which six are appointed through an open process by Parliament and the President. Three seats are reserved for nominees from commercial print, commercial broadcast and one other (South Africa Yearbook 2003:145). At the time of writing this thesis, the MDDA Board had already been appointed by President Thabo Mbeki and was in the process of developing managerial and administrative structures for the operations of the agency (South Africa. GCIS 2002).

The problems that the MDDA sets out to resolve have long been recognised by scholars such as John Van Zyl. According to John Van Zyl (2001), the lack of professional radio acumen in the IBA (now ICASA) was apparent, among other things, in the granting of community radio licences where the ideological imperative of granting an unlimited number of licences ignored the sustainability of community radio stations. Additionally, community radio stations were compelled to broadcast news, educational programmes and community information as part of their licence conditions. This kind of programming, according to Van Zyl (2001:16), is expensive to produce, particularly when few community stations have production facilities. It also cuts into more popular, easier to produce, music request programmes. More specifically, Van Zyl (2001:18) identifies the following *problematic* situations with regard to community sound broadcasting in South Africa:

- Licences are normally granted to geographic communities that have proven evidence of community sector support.
- They can only operate as trusts or non-profit organisations.
- The transmitters are weak, usually 100watts, and the reach is seldom beyond a 50km radius.
- Equipment is often provided by donor organisations. This point is confirmed in chapter four by the 'case-study' analysis of some community radio initiatives in

Zambia and by the examples given in the analyses of Malawi and Mozambique above.

- As no provision has been made by the state for either training or financial assistance, the stations are staffed by volunteers that have been trained by NGOs operating with donor funds. Again, in the case of Zambia, this is corroborated in chapter four, where ZIMA has been instrumental in providing training to such volunteers.
- Community radio stations are obliged to broadcast community news and educational/developmental programmes under penalty of losing their licence. As few have production facilities, programmes are pre-produced by educational production NGOs and distributed to stations.

Given these problems, one can only wait and see the extent to which the MDDA will solve some of them. It is for this reason that the policy model for Zambia in chapter six must take note of the fact that the MDDA is still in its experimental stages. However, the very creation of such an agency is a useful lesson.

Against the background of such fast-evolving legislative changes, however, it is important to isolate another dynamic, namely the place of *popular support* for community radio broadcasting. It is useful to point to this dynamic because any such growing phenomenon as community radio broadcasting must resonate with the most affected players, namely community radio practitioners. In the case of South Africa, such popular support finds expression in the National Community Radio Forum (NCRF) established in 1995 following the 'Community Media 2000' conference convened in Cape Town. The conference took the position that 'freedom of expression' would not be realised by the majority of South Africans unless concrete steps were taken to redress the imbalances many communities had in relation to access to the media (Teer-Tomaselli 2001:234).

The NCRF, assuming a historico-political stance on the matter, considers community media to have represented the voice of the oppressed and played a significant role in

informing and mobilising grassroots communities against apartheid (Teer-Tomaselli 2001:233).

While the NCRF represents society at large and therefore a yearning for social mobilisation in support of the community radio broadcasting sector, the MDDA represents a state-led media partnership involving the government, the media and the donor community. Its success, however, lies in the extent to which it can resonate with such societal groups as the NCRF and the extent to which it can actually deliver on its promises to support community and small commercial media projects. It is in this regard, then, that South African media policy seems to be underpinned by a nationalist-reconstructionist agenda that seeks to integrate formerly marginalised communities into the mainstream media environment. While community radio broadcasting is seen as one possible, and perhaps most effective, strategy for this kind of societal integration, there is a recognition that other media types - notably public and commercial - need to be sufficiently developed to allow for the wide spectrum of opinion, knowledge, information and perspective that defines the 'Rainbow Nation'.

Furthermore, the wide-ranging discussions characteristic of the South African media policy landscape points to the premium placed on the role the media can play in realising the notion of 'simunye' (We are one). This could be understood against the chilling history of a media regulatory regime so dominated by the apartheid doctrine that it never allowed a positive portrayal of the black, coloured and Indian communities. The willingness by the MDDA to provide financial support to community and small commercial media is also testimony of the realisation that, left to itself, the private media sector can result in an unbridled concentration of media ownership by private capital to the further marginalisation of the voices of the historically disadvantaged communities or groups.

In summary, therefore, South Africa presents a fast-changing broadcasting policy scenario, responding to the changes in society and the world at large. On the one hand, there is the *nationalistic-ideological* desire to integrate the poor and

marginalised into the mainstream media and thus help them reap the socio-economic benefits of media business. On the other hand, there is the pragmatic pandering to the profit-making imperatives of corporate capital formerly, and largely still held, by the business section of the white minority. Somewhere in between is the ideology of a non-racial society that the political elite are seeking to project. This is the tight rope South African media policy and legislation must walk.

#### **5.4.4 Australia**

In Australia, the Government's stated ideological objective for the media is to support diversity among media outlets through a range of regulatory arrangements and expansion of access to media in regional Australia. However, people living in remote areas of the continent still have a more limited choice of news and entertainment (Australia Now 2002). This, one can argue, would reinforce the need for a more localised system of broadcasting that community radio can provide, even in a developed country like Australia.

It is worth noting that the broadcasting terrain in Australia is dominated by three national commercial television networks and two public broadcasters - the *Australian Broadcasting Corporation* (ABC) and the *Special Broadcasting Service* (SBS). The ABC has a national free-to-air television service carried on about 600 transmitters; six targeted radio networks across Australia on over 6000 transmitters; an international radio service (*Radio Australia*); a 24-hour news and parliamentary broadcast radio service; an international network of press offices; and an online service (Australia Now 2002). According to *Australia Now*, the SBS is a national multicultural and multilingual broadcaster (Australia Now 2002).

To focus on the regulatory regime in Australia, the notion of *self-regulation* seems to be at the core of the broadcasting system in that country. The regulatory authorities' scope for intervention is limited to a narrow range of specific areas. To that end, the Australian Broadcasting Authority (ABA) is the broadcasting regulator for radio and television in Australia, and is implementing a *co-regulatory* scheme for the content of

online services. Consumers who have complaints about programmes on television and radio or content on the Internet can apply to the ABA (Australia Now 2002).

It is important to observe that community radio broadcasting, within this system of co-regulation, is expressly provided for by the Broadcasting Services Act (Australia 1992:sec 218). The Act states that each community broadcaster will (i) remain a suitable licensee, (ii) continue to represent the same community as when the licence was issued and (iii) encourage members of the community served to participate in the operations of the licensee in providing the service and the selection and provision of programmes under the licence.

The Act (Australia 1992:sec 84) also empowers the minister to give directions to the ABA to give priority to a particular community of interest or interests, whether generally or in a particular licence area, in allocating community licences. More significantly, the Act further provides that in deciding whether or not to allocate a community broadcasting licence to an applicant or to one of a group of applicants, the ABA is to have regard to:

- the extent to which the proposed service would meet the existing and perceived future needs of the community;
- the nature and diversity of the interests of that community;
- the nature and diversity of other broadcasting services (including national broadcasting services) available within that licence area;
- the capacity of the applicant to provide the proposed service;
- the undesirability of one person being in a position to exercise control of more than one community broadcasting licence; and
- the undesirability of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory or political party being in a position to exercise control of a community broadcasting licence (Australia 1992:sec 84).

It must be noted, in addition, that the ABA is allowed only a *consultative* role in the regulation of the broadcasting sector. For example, as an aspect of its oversight of the



broadcasting industry, the ABA can exercise a consultative role with respect to the way programme content is regulated. It allows the various broadcasting industry sectors to set their own programming guidelines (ABA 2002). In fact, it was in this light that the ABA registered in November 2002 the revised codes of practice developed by the Community Broadcasting Association of Australia (CBAA) to replace those originally registered by the ABA in January 1995 (ABA 2002). ABA considers three mandatory criteria in assessing a code of practice for registration. These are (i) the code of practice must provide appropriate community safeguards for the matters covered by the code, (ii) the code must be endorsed by a majority of the providers of broadcasting services in that section of the industry, and (iii) the members of the public must have been given an adequate opportunity to comment on the code (ABA 2002).

The revised Code of Practice or policy for community radio broadcasting is divided into eight sections. These can be found on the ABA web site (ABA 2002). However, because they represent some important principles that Zambia's community radio broadcasting sector can learn from, they are summarised below.

To start with, there is an affirmation of the responsibilities associated with broadcasting to the community. The fundamental philosophy is that community radio stations must reflect the ethos of their community of interest. To that end, it is required that the community radio broadcasting station must be controlled and operated by an autonomous body which is representative of the licensee's community of interest. The second code provides specific guidelines for programming. The essential point is that community radio broadcasters must allow for active participation by the community in the station's management, development and operations. For instance, it is required that indigenous programming and coverage of indigenous issues should acknowledge the special place of the Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders of Australia as the first Australians. Thus, programming should take care to verify and observe the best way to respect indigenous cultures and customs. This, it would seem, is designed to respect the cultural identity of the indigenous people. Although this might not directly relate to the Zambian situation, it can be

extrapolated by arguing that a community radio broadcasting policy model for Zambia, in as far as programming guidelines are concerned, should seek to enhance the local cultures of the people served by community radio broadcasters, including their language, customs, rituals, et cetera.

The third code of practice emphasises the fact that it is crucial for a significant proportion of local and Australian music, including indigenous Australian music, to continue to be broadcast by community stations. To this end, community broadcasters are urged to ensure a proportion of the total number of musical items broadcast is not less than twenty-five (25) percent Australian musical items.

Fourthly, there is emphasis on the conditions under which sponsorship is permissible, such as the requirement that not more than five (5) minutes of the sponsorship announcements be broadcast in any one hour. Central to this provision is the need to ensure active participation by the community in the station's management, development and operations, without financial or other compromise.

The fifth code recognises the community broadcasting sector's reliance on volunteer workers for its continued operation. It thus enjoins on all individual community broadcasters to ensure that the rights and responsibilities regarding volunteering are addressed.

The sixth code of practice is related to conflict resolution for internal disputes. It aims to ensure that licensees have appropriate dispute resolution mechanisms in place to tackle internal disputes. Another aspect of this conflict resolution is the requirement for having in place the most appropriate way for stations to respond to complaints and other comments from *members of the public*. Lastly, there is a provision for a review of the codes of practice whenever there is need to reflect the more contemporary community broadcasting principles.

In summarising the Australian broadcasting regulatory system, it can be argued that it is not only based on the notion of self-control but also reinforced by a strong legal

framework that ensures adherence to the notion of self-regulation. The Code of Practice points to the fact of self-regulation by the community radio broadcasting sector, while the enactment of the Broadcasting Services Act in 1992, based as it was on the contributions of the media sector as a whole, reflects a societal concern to ensure that the notion of 'self-regulation' is not abused by the media, including the community radio broadcasting sector. This process - the balance between aspirations for professional self-regulation (professional agency) and state legislation (state agency) - is what is referred to as "a co-regulatory scheme" (ABA 2002). Given the *legalism* inherent in this 'self-regulatory' system, it is important to note that the *practice* of community broadcasting seems to be written down to the minutia, albeit with sufficient room to allow for understandable institutional particularities. This, one would argue, makes things easier for community broadcasting licensees.

Before drawing any lessons from the comparative analysis, it is worth tabulating the similarities and dissimilarities relating to the broadcasting systems and regulatory practices in each of the countries analysed:

**Table 14. Comparison of broadcasting systems and regulatory practices in Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Australia**

<b>Malawi</b>	<b>Mozambique</b>	<b>South Africa</b>	<b>Australia</b>
Nascent broadcast legal framework	Developed broadcast legal framework	Highly developed broadcast legal framework	Highly developed broadcast legal framework
Community radio indistinct from other types of broadcasting	Community radio receiving specialised attention, though not yet at regulatory level	Community radio distinct from public and commercial broadcasting	Community radio distinct from public and commercial broadcasting
Presence of a unitary broadcasting regulatory structure (Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority)	Presence of multiple broadcasting regulatory structures (High Council for Social Communication; Office of the Prime Minister; National Institute of Communications; and Ministry of Transport and Communication)	Presence of multiple broadcasting regulatory structures (Independent Communications Authority of South Africa and the Media Development and Diversity Agency)	Presence of unitary broadcasting regulatory structure (Australian Broadcasting Authority)
Absence of a community radio sector association	Absence of a community radio sector association	Presence of a community radio sector association (National Community Radio Forum)	Presence of a community radio sector association (Community Broadcasters Association of Australia)
Absence of specific funding for the development of the community radio sector	Absence of specific funding for the development of the community radio sector	With the MDDA in place, there is reason to believe that there will be statutory funding for community media initiatives owned and operated by previously disadvantaged groups	No statutory funding for the community radio sector

No code of conduct for community radio broadcasting	No code of conduct for community radio broadcasting	No code of conduct for community radio broadcasting, except for some definitional guidelines provided for by the IBA (now ICASA), although the NCRF has a Charter to which its member community radio broadcasters subscribe. This is, however, not backed by force of legislation.	Clear and elaborate code of conduct for community radio broadcasters, backed by force of law
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In conclusion, then, several lessons can be extracted from the above comparative analysis of broadcasting regulations and policies in Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Australia for the purpose of developing a normative policy model for Zambia in chapter six. Firstly, there is clearly need for the establishment of an independent regulatory structure, such as the MACRA in Malawi, the ICASA in South Africa and the ABA in Australia. While the specific functions of each of these regulatory authorities are unique to each country, the notion of an authority independent from government and other vested interests in society is useful for the regulation of the broadcasting sector. It is evident, however, that in Malawi, for example, such a body has not developed the kind of structural and operational independence that is evident in the Australian experience and, to a large extent, in the South African model.

Secondly, the regulatory trends analysed above would seem to suggest the need for Zambia to enact, not only a law that establishes an independent regulatory organ, but also provides for a multi-tier broadcasting system, with community radio broadcasting clearly elaborated and provided for. This is evident in South Africa and Australia, while it seems to be absent in the case of Malawi and Mozambique.

Thirdly, the enactment of the MDDA in South Africa provides, in one sense, a state-supported model for resource mobilisation for the development of the media, including community radio. This, then, is an example that a policy model for Zambia can emulate in terms of addressing problems relating to, among others, the funding, training and equipping of community radio in the country.

Fourthly and lastly, as in the cases of Australia and South Africa, there is need for a policy model for Zambia that will clearly establish a community radio broadcasters' association or forum to champion the cause of community radio broadcasting in the country. Although the establishment of the NCRF in South Africa is not grounded in a legal instrument, there is every reason to warrant such a body. Community radio broadcasting, as noted throughout this study, is about empowering communities and such a forum as NCRF can serve as a platform for community engagement. The Australian model of the CBAA is particularly appealing to this author's normative policy proposal, because it elevates the notion of a legally-founded self-regulatory system for community radio broadcasting.

The next chapter seeks to take up these lessons, and many other issues raised throughout this study, to motivate a normative policy model for community radio broadcasting in Zambia.

## CHAPTER SIX: A POLICY MODEL FOR COMMUNITY RADIO BROADCASTING IN ZAMBIA

In chapter five, a number of policy approaches were discussed. To recap, it was established that policy-making and implementation as a *process* lends itself to the elite/mass, the group, the systems, the institutionalist, the neo-institutionalist and the organised anarchy policy models. On the other hand, policy-making and implementation as an *output* can be explained in terms of the incrementalist, the rationalist and the strategic planning models.

For the purpose of this study, the *group* and *organised anarchy* models were set forth as possible frameworks for developing a policy for community radio broadcasting in Zambia. The motivation behind the selection of such policy approaches was that, firstly, the group model pays particular attention to the validity of the contributions of the various interest groups in the body politic. As such, the community radio broadcasting sector can be treated as an interest group that wishes to register its contributions to the growth of community radio broadcasting in the country. Secondly, beyond stressing the significance of one particular interest group, there was also a recognition of the fact that the organised anarchy model can go some way towards unravelling the policy process in terms of the contributions of a whole range of agenda-setters, including such primary participants as high-level political appointees, members of the legislature, interest groups (which could include community radio broadcasters and other interests), political parties, civil society organisations, et cetera.

These two policy approaches would seem to tie in with the overall theoretical framework within which this study is couched, namely the *participatory communication* model. As noted in chapter three, this theoretical framework, derived from the development communication discourse, emphasises the notion of empowerment, inclusion and participation. The policy process being proposed here, therefore, must be as empowering, inclusive and participatory as possible.

Furthermore, the point must be made that in chapter four it was concluded that the Panos and MISA studies lent a certain empirical credibility to the conceptualisation of community sound broadcasting within the participatory communication model posited in chapter three. It was further pointed out that the awareness among the general population in Zambia of the concept and practice of community radio confirmed an even greater need for coming up with a more coherent and consistent policy framework for the sector.

Apart from the theoretical policy approaches referred to above, chapter five also engaged in a comparative policy analysis of broadcasting in Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Australia. The lessons learnt from that policy analysis can be synthesised as follows:

1. State-led broadcasting policy processes, as is the case in Malawi and Mozambique, tend to be too institutionalistic or elitist to effectively include grassroots communities or the most affected stakeholders. It is perhaps because of this state-centrism that one sees no organised community radio broadcasting sector in these countries. It is useful, then, for one to take note of the policy process as such in developing any policy guidelines on community radio broadcasting.
2. On the other hand, where there has been evidence of community involvement in the crafting of community radio broadcasting policy guidelines, as in South Africa and Australia, there seems to be an entrenched community radio broadcasting system, complete with associations or forums of community radio broadcasters.
3. It is evident that, despite the enthusiasm with which most people greeted the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting in all the countries studied above, it is not without problems. These problems – lack of training, inadequate funding, poor production equipment and other technology, et cetera – pose challenges for more pro-active policies and regulations. The establishment of the MDDA in South Africa is, for instance, a positive move



towards addressing some of these problems, something that the policy model being proposed for Zambia may benefit from.

In this chapter, therefore, this author attempts to weave a policy proposal around some of the key issues that have emerged throughout this study. It must be stressed here that this is a *normative* policy proposal. To that extent, it must be seen as a starting point for the formulation of a community radio broadcasting policy in Zambia.

## **6.1 Introduction: restating the policy problem**

In chapter one, an attempt was made to introduce something of the policy problem confronting the media industry in Zambia. An attempt was also made to introduce the policy problem in terms of community media, especially community radio.

In this section, yet another attempt is made to restate or clarify the policy problem. To start with, it might be useful to re-emphasise that the community radio sector is nascent in Zambia. It started in earnest around 1994 soon after the airwaves were liberalised. As pointed out earlier on, there were several reasons for the emergence of community sound broadcasting in the country. These – ranging from political, pragmatic to policy imperatives - have been adduced in chapter three of this study.

As noted in chapter one, existing policy frameworks – notably the 1996 *Information and Media Policy* and the 1999 revised *National Media Policy* – do not adequately address the distinctiveness or uniqueness of the community broadcasting sector. They cursorily refer to it, but do not attempt to elaborate a coherent, cohesive and comprehensive policy framework for the management of this tier of broadcasting.

This policy laxity is also evident in Zambia's broadcast legislation. It has lagged behind the politico-technological advancements that have helped to reshape the broadcasting terrain the world over. A good example of the inability to legally categorise "community broadcasting" as such is evident in the following categorisation of "radio

station licences,” as expressed in the ZNBC (Licensing) Regulations (Zambia 1994: sec 7.1):

- (a) Commercial television stations;
- (b) Commercial AM/FM stations;
- (c) FM translators;
- (d) Television translators;
- (e) Low power television;
- (f) FM and television booster stations;
- (g) Auxiliary services;
- (h) International broadcasting stations; and
- (i) Cable television services.

Certainly at the time that this study was beginning in 1998, the situation was as unclear as described above. But, from 2001 to-date, there have been some media reforms. An example of this is documented in chapter five – the passing in Parliament of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act and the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (Amendment) Act, both assented to by the President on 31 December 2002. However, no statutory instruments have been developed to effect these Acts into commencement. In the IBA Act, for instance, community radio broadcasting is recognised as one of the other tiers of broadcasting – namely public, commercial and religious (Zambia 2002b). But even this seemingly progressive law does not give weight to community radio broadcasting as a special case that requires special attention. There is a recognition, however, that the IBA, once constituted, will progressively push for the necessary policies to enhance community radio broadcasting. But, given the snail’s pace at which media policies have been moving in Zambia, this recognition does not cheer many.

These policy-cum-legislative difficulties notwithstanding, some findings from the MISA (2000a) and Panos (2002) studies have shown that there is a whole community of people in different parts of Zambia who have a good understanding of both the concept and operations of community radio broadcasting. Their perceptions pretty

much reflect the conceptualisation of community radio broadcasting as advanced by such organisations as AMARC Africa and Panos (Mtimde et al 1998). There is also evidence that some community radio initiatives in Zambia try to approximate the ethos of community sound broadcasting in their management structures, programming, et cetera.

Nevertheless, although there are some celebratory aspects of how community radio is evolving in Zambia, there is so much that needs rethinking. Indeed, the claims made by community radio activists about the liberating power of community radio, and about the developmental potential that community radio holds out, are *now* being questioned, particularly given the multiplicity of problems bedevilling the sector – ranging from poor facilities, undemocratic management structures, to ill training of station volunteers. Also at issue is the question of the extent to which the lack of funding can influence the production capacities of community radio stations, particularly where *local* content production is concerned. This is a particularly acute problem when it is viewed in terms of the competition for audiences that seems to be raging between community radio broadcasters, on the one hand, and public service and commercial radio broadcasters, on the other hand. Indeed, this study has demonstrated that elsewhere, particularly in South Africa and Britain, public service broadcasting (PSB) is being forced to compete fiercely with community radio for audiences.

This, then, is the rather chaotic dynamic that foregrounds this normative policy proposal.

## **6.2 Policy problem analysis: operationalising the policy problem**

How, then, can the foregoing study be crystallised into clear policy objectives or principles?

## 6.2.1 Policy objectives

To start with, it is important to underscore three key objectives or principles which should underpin the policy model being proposed here. These are as follows:

- The airwaves are an exhaustible public property which should be allocated, controlled and used in the public good and public interest;
- The government, as the custodian of all public interest and public good, should put in place laws and other regulatory bodies, which will ensure that the allocation, control and use of the airwaves in broadcasting is done in a free, fair and transparent manner that gives equal opportunity to everyone, particularly the vulnerable and marginalised voices in society; and
- The executive wing of government, which, according to the analysis presented above, has tended to monopolise policy formulation and implementation, must not have undue influence and control over the acquisition, control and use of the airwaves in broadcasting.

Set against these objectives or principles, the policy problem being addressed here can be framed in terms of the following question: what policy guidelines can be developed to govern the following areas of community radio broadcasting:

- an articulation of the vision of community radio broadcasting in Zambia;
- the regulatory structure of community radio broadcasting;
- the funding of community radio broadcasters;
- the application of new information and communication technologies in community sound broadcasting, including overall infrastructure development;
- the provision of training and education to community radio practitioners;
- the production of content, especially local content; and
- research?

### **6.3 Proposed policy solutions: crafting policy strategies**

The following constitute some normative policy guidelines to address the issues identified above.

#### **6.3.1 Vision of community radio broadcasting**

For the purpose of this policy proposal, any vision of community sound broadcasting must be informed by a definition of community radio that elevates the power of communities to define and influence their own development through communication. The closest definition to this is one proffered by Myers (2000:90) and quoted in chapter three of this study, to wit: “small-scale decentralized broadcasting initiatives which are easily accessed by local people, actively encourage their participation in programming, and which include some element of community ownership or membership”.

This definition eliminates most of the ideal-typical scenarios that other, more dogmatic or rigid definitions seem to almost religiously or fanatically want to invoke. While recognising the central role of the community in ‘owning’ community media initiatives, this definition opens up possibilities for a single ‘initiator’ or ‘motivator’ to set up a community radio initiative and seek to introduce into it notions of ‘community ownership’, ‘community management’, ‘community programming’, et cetera. This is the kind of *elastic* or inclusive definition that recognises the place of enterprising individuals who are motivated, for some reason or other, to set up small-scale, community-located media initiatives. Such individuals may not be moved purely by commercial considerations. The definition also leaves the door open for those local-level media projects, or what Anthony Everitt (2003) calls “access radio projects”, that may be initiated by any form of community-based organisation.

The central idea of such a definition is further recognised in chapter three when this author poses the question as to whether or not one should not define community radio less rigidly and focus more on the *processes of programming* (or, more broadly,

*participation*) than on the *structures of ownership and control*. Another question asked is whether or not it would not be justifiable to argue that a privately owned, even commercial, radio station which devotes *more* time to coverage of community issues and events satisfies the ideal of 'community radio'. In this vein, it is argued that it was partly because of this definitional ambiguity that some participants at the sixth conference of the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC) held in 1995 frowned on calls to adopt a working definition of community radio as *radio that is owned, controlled and programmed by the community it serves* (Valentine 1995:8-9). Myer's definition, therefore, would seem to steer clear of such definitional sensitivities and refocus attention on the processes of community participation, and not necessarily on the rigid structures of ownership and control.

### **6.3.2 The regulatory structure for community radio broadcasting**

Following from this, the community radio broadcasting sector should have a two-pronged regulatory structure: state-mandated and community-driven, as expounded below. It is proposed that the structure should reflect the co-regulatory principle inherent in the Australian broadcasting system explored in chapter five.

Thus, following the example of Australia, the state should have overall legal oversight of the community sound broadcasting sector by enacting, or inserting within the existing legislation by way of an amendment, a law that ensures that community radio is expressly provided for in the scheme of broadcasting in Zambia and outlining the terms and conditions for applying for a community radio broadcasting licence. This should guide any proposed regulatory authority in discharging tasks relating to processing applications for licences.

The law should, therefore, also provide for the establishment of an independent broadcasting regulatory authority with specific directions on its composition, mandate, powers, et cetera. This will help reduce any discretionary powers that tend to result in the arbitrariness of decision-making *vis-à-vis* the awarding of broadcasting licences by the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS).

Indeed, as the United Kingdom-based Community Radio Association (CRA) suggests, there are advantages for there to be a single body for spectrum planning and frequency allocation, and for all of broadcast radio service planning. Terms of reference must include a clear policy to ensure equitable development of, and provision of spectrum for, each of the tiers of broadcasting in the country (CRA 1993).

Furthermore, as is the case in Australia, this law should provide for the establishment of a Zambian Community Radio Broadcasting Association (ZCRBA). The law should, in the spirit of promoting a legally-binding system of self-regulation for the sector, provide for the elaboration by the ZCRBA of a community radio broadcasting code of ethical conduct that addresses issues relating to the following:

- Responsibilities associated with broadcasting to the community;
- Guidelines for all programming;
- Local content quotas;
- Sponsorship and advertising limitations for community broadcasting;
- Recruitment and management of volunteer staff;
- Conflict resolution of internal disputes;
- Handling complaints from the public; and
- Mechanisms for the review of the code of ethical conduct.

Because of the emphasis on self-regulation, the law should provide for the active participation of the various communities which harbour community radio initiatives in the elaboration of the issues listed above in order to ensure greater consensus and agreement. Community radio broadcasting draws its life-blood, its soul, from the community and therefore it should resonate with the needs and aspirations of the community. The elaboration of the code of ethical conduct for community broadcasters, focusing on the issues listed above, should thus reflect maximum community participation. This should give the community radio broadcasters the community 'legitimacy' they so badly require in order to operate as such.

In fact, with specific reference to the developing of an appropriate code of conduct for community radio broadcasters, it is important to note, as is the case in Australia (ABA 2002), that three conditions should be met. These are:

- the code of practice must provide appropriate community safeguards for the matters covered by the code;
- the code must be endorsed by a majority of the providers of broadcasting services in that section of the industry; and
- the members of the public must have been given an adequate opportunity to comment on the code.

### **6.3.3 The funding of community radio broadcasters**

The study has made clear references to the fact that one of the perennial problems impinging upon the development and thriving of community radio broadcasting everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa has to do with funding. This is sufficiently documented in a number of places (Mtimde et al 1998:42; Teer-Tomaselli 2001:240-241; Van Zyl 2001:18).

Partly to address this problem, this policy model proposes the establishment of a Community Radio Support Fund (CRSF), along the lines of South Africa's Media Development and Diversity Agency (MDDA), although the latter embraces conventional forms of media as well. It is worthwhile to note that this proposal is also reinforced by the UK-based Community Radio Association (CRA) which called for setting up of "a production and development fund" for the community radio sector (CRA 1993:5). This was to be re-echoed in 2001 by the Community Media Association (CMA) – a successor to the CRA - when it argued that "a special fund set up" for community media "would reinforce the purpose and the viability of Community Media and it would assist by leveraging money from other sources" (CMA 2001:10).

Clearly, this raises the challenge about how this Fund would mobilise resources to support the community radio sector. The law proposed above could also address at



least five statutory mechanisms through which such a Fund would be financed within the overall institutional framework of the proposed ZCRBA:

- Government subventions, fully endorsed by Parliament so as to avoid any party-political strings attached, especially by the political party in power at any given time;
- A percentage of any sponsorship and/or advertising revenue accruing to the community radio broadcasting station. This percentage can be revised, from time to time, by the ZCRBA;
- A community radio broadcasting service levy to be charged on any private business firms operating in the community which is a beneficiary of that community broadcasting service. This can be treated as the 'social responsibility' obligation of the private business sector based in the community where that community broadcasting service is offered. There should be clarity about the fact that such financial or other support must not be given with any strings attached.
- Donations from a number of aid agencies such as UNESCO, the Soros Foundation, among others, is another possibility that could be sanctioned as a legitimate source of financing for community radio broadcasting.
- Any good-will contributions or donations by individual community members or organisations operating in the community serviced by a particular community radio broadcasting station might also serve as a source of funds.

Apart from the more general function of representing the overall interests of the community radio sector in Zambia, the ZCRBA must, therefore, also be mandated to undertake the following responsibilities:

- Mobilise resources for the community radio sector in Zambia.
- Support emerging community radio initiatives.
- Lobby and advocate for an enabling policy and legislative environment for the community radio sector.
- Develop appropriate codes of conduct for the community radio broadcasters.

#### **6.3.4 The application of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) and overall infrastructure development**

As Everitt (2003:32) has aptly noted, digitisation and the growth of computer processing power are contributing to a converging technological media environment. Quoting the Director of the UK-based Community Media Association, Steve Buckley, Everitt argues:

Convergence is taking place at the level of production between sound-based media and visual and moving image media and also at the level of distribution between broadcasting systems, radio and television, and telecommunications systems, which are developing from one-to-one systems to one-to-many.

Everitt (2003:33) then suggests that an overall cross-media approach would make better sense than treating media delivery systems separately, in order to reflect the ways in which communications media are developing in the electronic marketplace. This view is reinforced by Mtimde et al (1998:39-40) who, in reflecting on the interface between the new Internet and satellite technologies and community radio, argue that some community radio stations in Africa, and elsewhere in the world, now have access to the latest technology allowing them to receive news through a satellite link or through the Internet.

Nevertheless, Everitt (2003:33) contends that so far as consumers are concerned, the digital revolution is yet to take place and, until the penetration of digital radio sets approaches universality, it offers little to a tier of broadcasting aimed at disadvantaged and socially excluded communities whose members will be the last purchasers of new receiving equipment and a significant number of whom do not even rent telephone land lines. He also argues that, for all its advantages, the Internet will be of little use to community broadcasters until access to it has also become nearly universal. Although Everitt is referring to the minority communities resident in the UK, this picture is equally, if not more so, reflective of the sub-Saharan reality.

Therefore, given these limitations of new ICTs, but nevertheless recognising their due importance, this policy model proposes two things, namely:

- That community radio broadcasters should keep an open mind about the possibilities that new ICTs hold out for their programming capabilities and their audiences; and
- That community radio broadcasters should actively and innovatively apply such new ICTs where and when there is a likelihood that they will enhance their overall impact in the community.

The overriding policy consideration, though, should be the extent to which the community itself can fully identify with, and benefit from, any such technologies as the community radio station would like to use.

While ICTs, innovatively and creatively utilised, can be a useful device for community radio broadcasting, the importance of having in place an overall infrastructure development policy is even more useful. This study has noted the difficulties experienced by most community radio initiatives in Zambia and elsewhere to do with inadequate or poor production and/or recording facilities. In part, this can also account for the apparent incapacity of some community radio initiatives to produce good local programmes on any sustainable basis.

Given this realisation, this policy model proposes the following:

- The Community Radio Support Fund proposed above should be used to make available equipment grants or loans to, especially but not exclusively, emerging community radio initiatives.
- Following from the above recommendation, and to ensure a more focused and sustained infrastructure development plan, the Community Radio Support Fund could have a special sub-funding mechanism, such as a revolving 'Community Radio Broadcast Infrastructure Procurement' fund. Resource mobilisation for

this special funding mechanism can include a combination of methods, such as returns on loans given out, donor contributions, et cetera.

### **6.3.5 The provision of training and education to community radio practitioners**

The training and education of community radio staff, usually volunteers, is emphasised by many (Mtimde et al 1998:35; AMARC [sa]). In particular, AMARC notes that most of the training offered by media training institutions follows a traditional approach, concentrating on a fairly rigid approach to radio production, presentation and management – the kind of training that, according to AMARC, does not explore other creative and innovative means of improving the way in which community radio stations operate.

In addition, Mtimde et al (1998:36) stress the following point:

Training should always be conducted with a view of developing the community radio and not only some individuals. There have been cases where it is always the same individuals in a station that get access to training opportunities. This concentrates all the skills in a few hands, hence reducing the ability of a wider number of people to participate effectively on the station. Fewer skilled people weaken the radio's sustainability, should these individuals leave the station for greener pastures.

Training for the community radio sector can encompass such areas as the process of setting up a community radio, the management of the community radio, the production of programmes, and technical skills and equipment (Mtimde et al 1998:36; Kasoma 2001). Indeed, it is in this regard that the adoption and application of ICTs for community radio broadcasting can be appropriately incorporated into the overall training package for community radio staff and/or volunteers.

Given the central role of appropriate training for effective community sound broadcasting, the following policy guidelines are suggested:

- The proposed ZCRBA must incorporate in its structure a community broadcasting training unit whose task will be to conduct a periodic training needs assessment and design necessary interventions.
- The ZCRBA must lobby for the re-orientation of curricula in journalism and media training institutions in Zambia so as to bring them into line with the training requirements of the community radio broadcasting sector.
- The ZCRBA must articulate in its code of conduct for community radio broadcasters the requirement for community radio broadcasters to commit themselves to providing training opportunities for permanent and volunteer staff as a way of cultivating excellence in local content production.

### **6.3.6 The production of local content**

As noted in chapter three of this study, many community radio broadcasters have tended to 'ape' their more advanced commercial, hugely entertainment-based FM radio stations. Thus, it is not surprising that volunteers in most community radio stations in Zambia constantly fill up their programming with all manner of foreign popular music, especially from the United States of America (USA). They also have tended to replay programmes produced elsewhere in different cultural contexts, thus compromising their own capacity to produce local programmes. This has had the tendency to result in some kind of unintended cultural imperialism in the arena of content production. In this connection, the importance of local content production cannot be over-stressed.

Indeed, Everitt (2003:61-65), in his evaluation of the UK-based Bradford Community Broadcasting (BCB) initiative, selected two variables – *community language* and *local accent and expression* – to analyse the dynamics of participation in the production of local content. According to him, the BCB undertook to realise *community languages* through *inter alia* the following action steps:

- Use of the community radio to promote cultural expression in community languages, aiming to broadcast in the language that is most appropriate to their target audience; and
- Encouraging and supporting presenters in community languages to develop their presentation style, delivery and confidence.

As for *local accent and expression*, the community radio initiative undertook to engage *inter alia* in the following:

- Celebrate the different accents and ways that people express themselves within the Bradford District; and
- Actively encourage people, through their involvement with BCB, to develop confidence in their expression, reflecting and giving validity to the many ways that people communicate and express themselves within the city.

This present policy proposal, therefore, seeks to elevate the production of local content by community radio broadcasters in Zambia. It must be mentioned, however, that this proposal is mindful of the difficulties experienced by many community radio stations in terms of resources to mass-produce good local programmes on a sustainable basis. It is envisaged, however, that this problem will have been significantly reduced with the establishment of the Community Radio Support Fund (CRSF) and all the other ancillary funding mechanisms proposed in connection with the Community Radio Support Fund.

To this end, the following policy recommendations are advanced:

- The Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) Act, or an Amendment thereto, should expressly mandate the proposed broadcasting regulatory organ to fix a minimum percentage of local content for community radio broadcasters to follow. To this end, this policy proposes that community radio stations must adhere to a minimum of sixty (60) percent local content programming (eg local music, art, folklore, etc.); and

- This local content requirement, to be included in the elaboration of the proposed code of conduct, should then be monitored on a regular basis by the ZCRBA to ensure that it is adhered to. As part of this monitoring exercise, the proposed ZCRBA should also assist community radio stations in the event that they have genuine practical problems in attaining this requirement. In this way, the monitoring need not be seen as an intrusion into the operations of community radio broadcasters, but as an evaluative device to gauge the extent to which community radio broadcasters might need special assistance in meeting such an obligation.

Above all else, this policy model recognises the need for *developmental* local content. It has been noted throughout this study that most emerging community radio stations succumb to the temptation to fill their airtime with such cheap entertainment programmes as popular music. This point is made in chapter three, where Lush and Kaitira (1998:72-73) contend that most young volunteers in Namibia have tended to stamp their youth culture and values on community radio broadcasting through popular music, usually at the expense of programmes of a developmental character. Indeed, this observation does not preclude the fact that there is a place for *local* music promotion as part of a project to develop local cultural identities, but this should not be at the expense of serious developmental programmes.

This point is also recognised in chapter two by the Zambian government in its articulation of the *developmental* role of community media as bordering on (i) promoting civic education on people's rights, duties and responsibilities in order to enable them to participate fully in the democratic governance of the country, (ii) creating awareness and remedial action *inter alia* on the environment, population, health and gender, (iii) promoting HIV/AIDS awareness in communities and creating public awareness in times of epidemics and disasters, and (iv) disseminating community development information (Zambia. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services 1996).

The observation is further confirmed in chapter four by the Panos study which notes that there is a general view that “lack of such (developmental) information is both a cause and effect of under-development in the community. Small-scale business people are particularly concerned that the lack of information leads to poor business activity, especially where access to metropolitan markets is concerned. They feel a sense of isolation, disconnected from the epicentre of decision-making” (Panos Southern Africa 2002:5-6).

Given these important considerations, therefore, the following policy guidelines are suggested as a way of enhancing *developmental* local content:

- Of the minimum sixty (60) percent local content programming on all community radio stations, forty (40) percent should be dedicated to developmental issues, such as community development, education, health, agriculture, community business opportunities, the environment, et cetera.
- Given the central place of such developmental programming in the operations of community radio broadcasting, the policy guideline should provide for the full participation of the community in the identification, selection and treatment of issues for such developmental programming as is proposed above.

### **6.3.7 Research**

This author recognises the fact that policy should provide for continued research about community needs, uses and problems. Indeed, chapter three of this study underscores the importance of undertaking more community-participatory research into the dynamics of community radio broadcasting. To that end, chapter three also observes that it is possible that there might be a ‘divide’ in how urban-based and rural-based communities perceive the concept and practice of community radio. Research might serve to highlight that kind of knowledge ‘misfit’ and help policy-makers to address it.



In addition, chapter three notes that while most studies of community radio broadcasting tend to focus on the perceptions or definitions of 'needs' and 'problems' as articulated by the communities, there is need for research to also pay attention to the assumptions of the community radio initiators or motivators. This is the point that is partly addressed in chapter four, where several community radio initiatives in Zambia are analysed. It is this potential 'fit' or 'misfit' between the definitions of community needs by the community itself and the definitions of community needs by the community radio project motivator/initiator that research must seek to bring out. In effect, this is the kind of inclusive research process that can tease out possible processes of 'dialogic communication' likely to be embedded in the community structure.

To this end, the following policy guidelines may be advanced to provide for continued research:

- A Community Broadcasting Research Unit, under the management and oversight of the ZCRBA, should be established and placed within an existing media training institution, preferably the Zambia Institute of Mass Communication (ZAMCOM) and be mandated to undertake timely research projects into various aspects of community radio broadcasting.
- The results of any such research project should be used by community radio broadcasting stations, policy-makers and other stakeholders within the framework of the ZCRBA to improve the status of community radio broadcasting in Zambia.

#### **6.4 Policy implementation mechanism**

Given the above scenario, the following policy implementation mechanism can be envisaged:




Figure 5. **Proposed policy implementation mechanism**

This policy implementation mechanism represents an inclusive policy process. Organised civil society, as represented by the Zambia Independent Media Association (ZIMA), the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA) and other stakeholders, is envisaged to participate in all the processes - from the passing of the relevant legislation, the setting up of a broadcasting regulatory authority, the formation of a community radio association, the selection of representatives from the community radio sector and the general public to the review of all these processes outlined.

## 6.5 Conclusion: restating the policy process

In concluding this chapter, it is argued that this normative policy proposal is predicated upon a participatory process of policy-making in which the most affected targets of the policy proposal – the community radio broadcasters – assume the driving seat. The existing Government media related policy frameworks have not been as participatory as would ordinarily be required. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that these processes have generally assumed the *elite/mass* model of policy-making and implementation. In other instances, the policy-making and implementation approach has been *institutionalistic*, assuming that state bureaucracies or institutions can decide on behalf of the masses that constitute the emerging community radio sector in the country. It is thus important that this present policy proposal proceeds along the lines of the *group* and *organised anarchy* models of policy-making and implementation, as earlier expounded, because it must be informed by a multiplicity of agendas – interest groups, politicians, the media, et cetera. More importantly, though, the voice of the community radio sector needs to be heard above the voices of all other interest groups.

In summary, then, the policy proposes that existing legislation be amended to allow for the creation of a broadcasting regulatory structure, whose remit should expressly include providing *legal*, and not *operational*, oversight of the community radio broadcasting sector. Therefore, to ensure that the proposed regulatory body does not ‘lord it’ over the community radio sector, the law must clearly mandate the regulatory authority to facilitate the setting up of a Zambian Community Radio Broadcasting Association (ZCRBA), with guidelines for its composition, terms of reference, et cetera. The community radio broadcasters, as defined in the vision suggested above, together with members of the general public, should constitute this association and give it a more specific mandate whose scope must include some of the issues explained above relating to funding, training, local content production, use of ICTs, et cetera.

This co-regulatory structure for community radio broadcasting - entailing a kind of legally-binding self-regulation – should serve to be a good starting-point in what should be an on-going process of policy-cum-legislative reforms in Zambia.

## CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

The research problem this study set out to investigate could be described, firstly, as an attempt to analyse the dynamics of community radio broadcasting in Zambia in relation to other parts of the world, and secondly, based on this comparative analysis, to propose a policy model for community radio broadcasting in the country. Based on the *focused synthesis* methodology, which essentially is a more enhanced data generation tool than a literature review and serves as an end in itself for the policy analysis attempted in this study, it can be argued that this research problem has been sufficiently addressed.

To address this research problem, the study set itself four objectives, namely to (i) analyse the historical context that has shaped the evolution of the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting in Zambia, (ii) discuss the rationale for community radio broadcasting, (iii) define community radio broadcasting, and (iv) propose a policy model for community radio broadcasting in the country.

In trying to meet the above objectives, the study set forth five research questions, as follows:

1. What historical factors have shaped the development of community radio broadcasting in Zambia?
2. What is community radio broadcasting?
3. Is there need for community radio broadcasting in Zambia?
4. What are the problems associated with community radio broadcasting?
5. What policy model for community radio broadcasting can be suggested for Zambia?

The chapters were structured in such a way as to provide answers to these research questions. Chapter two, therefore, provides the answer to the first research question. Based upon historical and other records, it analyses the media landscape before and after 1991. The year 1991 was a milestone in the political life of Zambia in the sense

that it marked a shift from the One-Party State political arrangement that came into force in 1973. However, despite this political transformation, it is argued that the media policy orientations of post-colonial Zambia are *still* an aspect of the legacy of British colonialism. The present legal regime relating to broadcasting also testifies to that colonial legacy. It is also argued that there are other influences playing out upon the media landscape. Some of these point to the globalisation of communications and the political discourse of democratisation, good governance, human rights, et cetera. These forces, coupled with local pressures for reform, served to move the Government towards initiating some media policy-cum-legislative changes. This observation is made more specifically in chapter three. It is thus contended that the seed of community radio broadcasting has begun to take root within this muddy soil of colonial policy and legal precedence.

The next research question about conceptualising or defining community radio broadcasting is examined in chapter three, as a prelude to determining whether or not there is a need for it in Zambia. It is argued that the conceptualisation of community radio broadcasting is an extension of an age-old discourse about the media, society and development. It is contended, therefore, that the conceptual underpinnings of community radio can be traced to several theoretical antecedents. These theories, reflecting the 'effects' and 'normative' traditions in media studies, are explored, based upon such authorities as Fourie (1988), Infante et al (1997) and Kunczik (1984). Apart from these authorities, one may also refer to the work by Oliver Boyd-Barrett (1995:68-76).

Another research question that is posed and answered in chapter three is the extent to which community radio broadcasting can be rationalised in Zambia. In other words, the question seeks to establish the *need* for community radio broadcasting in the country. To this end, it is held that there are altogether political, pragmatic and policy imperatives that have occasioned the development of community radio broadcasting in the country. It is argued that the wave of political pluralism of the 1990s, coupled with the mushrooming of vibrant social movements, was partly responsible for the rise of the community radio broadcasting phenomenon, just as the donor involvement in

funding prototypical community radio initiatives at the height of these political reforms also contributed to the Government's pragmatic approach towards formulating policy to address media questions in general. For example, faced with the need to develop a policy framework for the media industry in 1996 and given the above considerations, it would seem that the Government had no choice but to acknowledge the need to include something of community radio broadcasting in its 1996 information and media policy framework, revised in 1999.

Having established the need for community radio broadcasting in Zambia, the study turns to the next research question about the problems associated with community radio broadcasting. Although the whole thesis touches on this question in varying degrees, especially chapter three where attempts are made to define and contextualise the concept of community radio, it is chapter four which answers this question from a more practical point of view. Chapter three, on the one hand, emphasises the problem of defining community radio in different cultural, political and economic contexts in ways that live up to the fundamentals of community empowerment, participation, management, cultural identity, et cetera.

Chapter four, on the other hand, examines the state of the art of community radio broadcasting in the country. The point of departure is the MISA (2000a) and Panos (2002) studies focusing on the state of community media in the country. It is contended that the two studies are bound up together in their usage of similar methodologies in their data gathering. In addition, the *synthesised* analysis of the findings of the two studies reveals remarkable similarities in the manner in which respondents answered the questions put to them. Although the *generalisability* of the findings based on such qualitative research techniques as focus groups, community meetings, et cetera, is often called into question, it can be argued that there is a compelling case in both studies for suggesting that the levels of knowledge about community radio broadcasting are sufficiently high to warrant an articulation of a coherent and consistent policy framework for the community radio sector. Indeed, it is this study's conclusion, therefore, that the respondents in either study are generally aware of the concept of community radio broadcasting and can contrast it with

commercial and public broadcasting in words that pretty much sum up some of the theoretical discussions that this study has engaged in. It is also this study's conclusion that all the community radio initiatives analysed in chapter four face similar problems to do with lack of funding, un-motivated volunteers, poor training of staff, lack of state-of-the-art equipment or even basic production equipment, et cetera.

The problems associated with community radio broadcasting are further discussed in chapter five. These problems are presented and discussed against the background of the policy and legislative processes analysed in relation to South Africa, Malawi and Mozambique.

The question about a possible model for community radio broadcasting is answered in chapters five and six. As part of the answer, chapter five deals with a range of theoretical approaches to policy-making and implementation, as listed below:

- The elite/mass model;
- The group model;
- The systems model;
- The institutionalist model;
- The neo-institutionalist model;
- The organised anarchy model;
- The incrementalist model;
- The rationalist model; and
- The 'third approach'.

This discussion of policy approaches leads to an analysis of the structures and processes of policy-making and implementation within the Zambian political context. To that end, the historical conditions that have influenced the practice of policy-making in Zambia are noted, particularly the politico-bureaucratic dynamics that characterised the Second and Third Republics. In this regard, the argument is advanced to the effect that the process of policy-making in Zambia reflects the *elite/mass* and *institutionalist* models of policy-making and implementation, focusing on party-political and bureaucratic elites as well as the governmental institutions of



Parliament and Cabinet. Chapter five also points out that organised civil society has presented itself as a key actor or stakeholder in policy-making. It is argued, therefore, that there is a sense in which interest groups are coalescing to influence policy-making – an idea that is encapsulated in the *group* model of policy-making and, to some extent, the *organised anarchy* model. It is pointed out that this scenario manifests itself in the way media reform activists have generally sought to influence the way the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services (MIBS) initiates its policy development processes. It is for this reason that the policy proposal developed in chapter six appropriates the basic assumptions of the group and organised anarchy models of policy-making and implementation.

Given the analysis in chapter five of the Zambian context for policy-making, this study, while acknowledging the positive contributions made to the community radio sector by Zambia's 1996 *Information and Media Policy*, also acknowledges the inadequacies of the policy framework. In particular, the study cites the insufficiency of such a policy framework to address issues of definitions relating to community radio, funding, training, new technology usage, local content, research, et cetera. While these policy limitations may be explained in terms of the fact that community radio broadcasting is a new phenomenon in Zambia, the study goes on to show that the very nature of *policy-making* may well be responsible for what seems to be a haphazard manner in which community radio broadcasting is carried on in the country.

Chapter six, therefore, based upon the study as a whole, proposes a normative policy model for community radio broadcasting in Zambia. Key to this policy proposal is the all-important need for a process of participation that goes beyond just *consulting* stakeholders on a policy framework already developed by bureaucratic elites. It is predicated upon a sacrosanct respect for the views, perspectives and knowledge of the key players in the community radio sector. To that end, the policy proposal outlined in this study recommends a more 'grassroots' or 'community' approach to policy-making and implementation. However, even as it emphasises such an approach, the policy proposal also recognises the importance of state *agency* in policy formulation. To that extent, in the tradition of the organised anarchy model, it

acknowledges the place of politico-bureaucratic elites, but only as representing institutions of government that can give *legislative* force to any policy proposed. The policy model, therefore, proposes a system of *co-regulation*, whereby the state's role is simply to enact a law that supports community broadcasting, leaving the finer details of operational management to the sector itself.

The policy proposal is underpinned by a belief, running throughout this study, that community radio broadcasting can only make sense if it is *seen* and *acted out* as a system of localised communication *of* the community, *by* the community and *for* the community.

What, then, is the future of this policy model? As stressed earlier, this is a normative model synthesised out of a discussion based on development communication theory, an integrated analysis of the findings of the MISA and Panos studies, a 'case-study' analysis of selected community radio initiatives and a comparative policy analysis of several countries. It is, therefore, a starting point for what may be a more elaborate policy for community radio in the country. It may not be taken as a panacea that will solve all the problems associated with community radio broadcasting, but it certainly charts some specific directions around which community radio broadcasting may be organised in the near future. To oversimplify, because it is normative, the model may well be treated as a wish list. However, it attempts to be as consistent as possible with the basic assumptions of the normative media theories that typify most of the development communication discourses presented in this study.

Following from this observation, therefore, there is need for more research into the phenomenon of community radio broadcasting. In particular, there is need to:

1. Undertake a comprehensive case study of all community radio initiatives in Zambia to establish the extent to which their claims of being 'community-based' correspond with the expectations and experiences of the communities they claim to serve. This should help to further tease out any false assumptions that

may be held by such community radio initiatives about their roles and functions.

2. Undertake a field survey to establish people's perceptions of the community radio phenomenon. While this particular study was dependent on the communities of interest, namely those which are directly served by some community radio initiatives, the survey being proposed should be nationally representative. There is need to understand the way society as a whole views this phenomenon, particularly given the fact that Zambian society can potentially be segmented into any number of communities of interest and of place.
3. With regard to the way media related policies have been developed in Zambia, there is need for a further policy research to be undertaken to determine the extent to which policy processes are inclusive or exclusive of the key stakeholders. This study's analysis of such policy processes in Zambia leads one to the conclusion that the policy processes tend to be hugely elitist or institutionalistic, with little or no input from those most affected by the policies flowing out of such processes. But, is this necessarily so? What are the political issues at play? Such questions might unravel more interesting dynamics in the processes of media policy-making in Zambia.

These suggested research directions can help illuminate the fast growing but least researched phenomenon of community radio broadcasting in Zambia. Indeed, the following words, uttered by Berrigan in 1979, are as applicable today as they were then:

The importance of research in the area of community communications cannot be underestimated...This is a new area and, as such, it demands not only research into ways of making its efforts more effective, but new ways of carrying out research (Berrigan 1979:48).

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## APPENDIX A.      **ACRONYMS**

ABA	Australian Broadcasting Authority
ABC	Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ACLF	Audio Cassette Listening Forums
AMF	African Media Foundation
AFRONET	Inter-African Network for Human Rights and Development
ANC	African National Congress (Zambia and South Africa)
AMARC	World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters
AWC	African Women and Child Features Services (Kenya)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BSA	Broadcasting Services Act (Australia)
BSA	British South Africa (Company)
BTA	Botswana Telecommunications Authority
CBAA	Community Broadcasters Association of Australia
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CCC	Committee for a Clean Campaign (Zambia)
CCZ	Christian Council of Zambia
CMA	Community Media Association (UK)
CNN	Cable News Network
CODESA	Conference for a Democratic South Africa
COM	Campaign for Open Media (South Africa)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CRA	Community Radio Association (UK)
CRTC	Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
CSO	Central Statistical Office (Zambia)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EC	European Commission

FAWO	Film and Allied Workers Organisation (South Africa)
FDD	Forum for Democracy and Development (Zambia)
FES	Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
GCIS	Government Communication and Information System (South Africa)
GRZ	Government of the Republic of Zambia
HP	Heritage Party (Zambia)
IBA	Independent Broadcasting Authority
ICASA	Independent Communication Authority of South Africa
ICTs	Information and Communications Technologies
IMCO	Inter-Ministerial Committee of Officials
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISP	Internet Service Provider
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
JCTR	Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection
LONRHO	London-Rhodesia Corporation
MACRA	Malawi Communication Regulatory Authority
MAMWA	Malawi Media Women's Association
MBC	Malawi Broadcasting Corporation
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MDDA	Media Development and Diversity Agency (South Africa)
MIBS	Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MISA	Media Institute of Southern Africa
MTF	Media Trust Fund (Zambia)
NAC	National Arts Council (Zambia)
NAMECO	National Media Corporation (Zambia)
NAPSA	National Pension Scheme Authority (Zambia)
NCRF	National Community Radio Forum (South Africa)
NWICO	New World Information and Communication Order

OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
PAC	Policy and Co-ordination Division (Zambian cabinet)
PAZA	Press Association of Zambia
PF	Patriotic Front (Zambia)
PRCA	Participatory Rural Communication Appraisal
PSB	Public Service Broadcasting
PSAf	Panos Southern Africa
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme (South Africa)
RFD	Radio For Development (UK)
SABC	South African Broadcasting Corporation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SBS	Special Broadcasting Services (Australia)
TNC	Transnational Corporation
TVM	Television Malawi
UNIP	United National Independence Party (Zambia)
UNZA	University of Zambia
UPND	United Party for National Development (Zambia)
WTO	World Trade Organisation
ZBC	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation
ZBS	Zambia Broadcasting Services
ZAMCOM	Zambia Institute of Mass Communication
ZAMTEL	Zambia Telecommunications Company
ZAMWA	Zambia Media Women's Association
ZANA	Zambia News Agency
ZEC	Zambia Episcopal Conference
ZNBC	Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation
ZIMA	Zambia Independent Media Association
ZIS	Zambia Information Services
ZRP	Zambia Republican Party

**APPENDIX B. A DIRECTORY OF KEY MEDIA, REGULATORY AND OTHER ORGANISATIONS IN ZAMBIA**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Contact address</b>	<b>Observation</b>
The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Services	P.O. BOX 51025, Independence Avenue, Lusaka Tel: 260-1-254218	Still responsible for award of radio and television licences, but this function is to be taken over by the Independent Broadcasting Authority soon to be established
The Mining Mirror	P.O. BOX 71505, Kalewa Road, Northrise, Ndola	Operational
The Monitor	P.O. BOX 31145, Lusaka afronet@zamnet.zm	Operational
The National Mirror	Plot 21A/377A, Bishops Road, Kabulonga, Lusaka nmirror@zamnet.zm	Operational
The Post	P/Bag E352, 36 Bwinjimfumu Road, Rhodes Park, Lusaka post@zamnet.zm	Operational
Radio Christian Voice	Christian Vision Farm, P/Bag E606, Lusaka West, Lusaka cvnews@zamnet.zm	Operational
Radio Icengelo	P.O. BOX 20694, Plot 5282, Mwandu Crescent, Riverside, Kitwe	Operational
Radio Phoenix	P/Bag E702, ZIMCO House, Cairo Road, Lusaka rphoenix@zamnet.zm	Operational
Times of Zambia	P.O. BOX 30394, Freedom Way, Lusaka times@zamnet.zm	Operational
Trinity Broadcasting Network (Zambia)	P.O. BOX 50768, Lusaka Tel: 260-1-250816	Operational, with some snippets of local political content. Mainly Christian evangelisation
Zambia Daily Mail	P.O. BOX 31421, Longolongo Road, Lusaka zadama@zamnet.zm	Operational
Zambia Union of	P.O. BOX 31421, Lusaka	Represents mainly

Journalists	Tel: 260-1-227798	journalists employed in the state-owned media – Times of Zambia, Zambia Daily Mail and ZNBC
Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation	P.O. BOX 50015, Alick Nkhata Road, Lusaka znbc@zamnet.zm	Operational
Zambia News Agency	P.O. BOX 3007, Alick Nkhata Road, Lusaka zana@zamnet.zm	Operational
Zambia Information Services	P.O. BOX 50020, Alick Nkhata Road, Lusaka informza@zamnet.zm	Operational
National Assembly	P.O. BOX 31299, Lusaka nazambia@zamnet.zm	Law-making organ
Radio Chikuni	P.O. BOX 660196, Kalomo Tel: +260 32 501211	Operational
Multichoice	P.O. BOX 320011, Lusaka Tel: +260-1-261616	Operational, but little local content, if any
Yatsani Radio	P.O. BOX 31965, Lusaka Tel: +260 1 263626	Operational
Zambia Institute of Mass Communication Educational Trust	P.O. BOX 50386, Lusaka zamcom@zamnet.zm	Operational
Press Association of Zambia	P.O. BOX R/W 50596, Lusaka paza@zamnet.zm	Operational
Zambia Independent Media Association	P.O. BOX 32295, Lusaka zima@zamnet.zm	Operational
Zambia Media Women's Association	P.O. BOX 50386, Lusaka zamcom@zamnet.zm	Operational, but not very actively
ZAMNET Communications Systems Ltd.	P.O. BOX 38299, Lusaka Tel: 260-1-224149/224159/225358/59 www.zamnet.zm	Private ISP
Zambia Telecommunications Corporation	P.O. BOX 34981, Lusaka Tel: 260-1-235588 zamtel@zamtel.zm	Semi-state telecommunications company. Also provides Internet service