

parten opgedeeld); zij bevatten afspraken over de datum van oplevering, de wijze van betaling, materiaalkosten en dergelijke, maar deden technische bijzonderheden af met 'naer de eisch van 't werck' of iets in die trant.

In het tweede pars van het boek onderzoekt Kolman de rol van de stad bij het onderhoud van stedelijke eigendommen en de aanbesteding van nieuwbouw. Hij leidt dit deel in met een overzicht van de functies van de bestuurderen en functionarissen die bij bouwzaken betrokken waren, raadsleden, muurmeesters, cameraars, rentmeesters, gecommiteerden en kerkmeesters. Het is het enige hoofdstuk waarin personen nauwelijks aan bod komen waardoor het niet erg levendig is, maar de gegevens zijn heel nuttig voor het goede begrip van hetgeen volgt: het optreden van de stad als bouwheer. Met particuliere ambachtsmeesters sloot het stadsbestuur contracten af om zich te verzekeren van hun beschikbaarheid voor stadswerk, dat in daghuur werd verricht. Wie dat waren en wat hun positie was is uit de aanstellingsovereenkomsten van de vijftiende eeuw af na te gaan. Lang niet allen waren Kamper poorters. Ook bij grote, afzonderlijk aanbestede bouwwerken werden door de stad de gilderegels niet in acht genomen en Kolman laat zien dat vanaf het eind van de zestiende eeuw de invloed van Hollandse architecten en technici sterk toenam. De eigen ambachtsmeesters voerden de werkzaamheden uit, maar volgden veelal ontwerpen en werktekeningen van anderen. De behoefte aan grote waterbouwkundige en vestingwerken speelde hierbij een rol van belang. Evenals in het eerste deel van de studie krijgt de lezer hier een boeiende kijk op het bouwbedrijf in verschillende fasen van de geschiedenis van de stad.

J. Kossmann-Putto

NIEUWE GESCHIEDENIS

K. Davids, L. Noordegraaf, ed., *The Dutch economy in the Golden Age. Nine studies* (Economic and social history in the Netherlands IV; Amsterdam: Nederlandsch economisch-historisch archief, 1993, 280 blz., f39,50, ISBN 90 71617 66 1).

This is a most welcome, valuable, and, on the whole, also very stimulating collection of nine studies on different aspects of the Dutch economy during the Golden Age. It not only summarizes in a useful manner the results of a great deal of recent research, and several recent debates but, in several of the essays, reassesses older views and evidence to yield new perspectives. Moreover, it is more comprehensive than such collections often tend to be, separate essays being devoted to every major aspect of the subject except (unaccountably) the key phenomenon of urbanization, a topic about which much has been written in recent years and which provides crucial evidence for weighing the validity of general arguments about the economy.

At the same time it strikes me that there are quite a number of revealing differences of perspective and internal discrepancies within this volume which serve to reinforce the impression that our overall view of the Dutch economy during the Golden Age is still at a somewhat transitional stage. An obvious example of such differences of view are the varying notions as to the commencement and end of the economic Golden Age. J. L. van Zanden attributes a certain significance and unity to the period 1500-1650. Leo Noordegraaf discerns the main period of industrial growth as coming between the 1580s and 1660s while Karel Davids' excellent article implies (with considerable justification) that in technology and industry there is no sense in

ending anywhere before the 1680s. Growth accelerated rather than decreased in many areas of the Dutch economy after 1650 and Davids provides a most eloquent proof of this with his remarks about the Zaanstreek which was arguably the first real industrial zone anywhere in Europe but where the number of industrial windmills, numbering around 160 in 1640 was only starting to proliferate by 1650. In 1731, the number was 584 but the peak would have been reached some years previously.

There may still be a lingering affection in some trendy quarters for the period 1500-1650 as the classic era of growth, ending with Braudel's *renversement de la tendance seculaire* around 1650. But readers may rest assured that in the Dutch context there is no sense in this whatsoever and one needs to look no further than this volume for conclusive proof of that. In most of the Holland towns the period from 1500 to the 1580s was one of stagnation or only very slight growth and, in that period, it was bulk carrying which was the essential basis of the economy. From around 1590 down to the early eighteenth century the picture is so totally different that there is no sensible reason for bracketing the era 1500-1590 with it as part of the Golden Age.

One of the most interesting and important essays in the collection is that about the overall development of Dutch overseas trade by J. Th. Lindblad. He makes many excellent points. But also, at a couple of crucial stages in his argument makes a glaring mistake or two which, when perceived, have the effect of completely changing the conclusion to be drawn from what is said about growth, dynamism and decline in the Dutch Golden Age economy. It is certainly an error to suppose as he does (without offering any good grounds) that there is no need to consider correctives for changes in the rates and tariffs (especially in 1621, 1648, 1651 and 1688) when using the series of *convooien en licenten* duties collected each year by the Dutch admiralty colleges on imports and exports. He argues that the changes only produced tiny differentials in the rates at which tariffs were collected. But here he is wrong and glaringly so. Moreover, it leads inevitably, given the figures, to the conclusion that the 1620s were one of the most successful, and the 1690s the most successful, decade of the entire century (see 241), which I am sure he himself does not for one moment believe since to suggest that would be patently absurd. It is quite clear, from all kinds of evidence that (as Jan de Vries says in this very volume) the 1620s marked 'a short but serious setback' (63). It is no less clear that the 1690s were a bad decade for Dutch trade. The high totals can only be explained by the fact that the admiralty colleges needed much more money than at other times (for war) and by accepting that (as I hope to prove in a forthcoming publication) the rates by which the *convooien and licenten* were increased were substantial. This is, after all, only common sense. What possible point would there be in the States General increasing the admiralties' income from *convooien en licenten* by a mere five or ten per cent? The difference in my opinion was more than 50% and it is, after all, hardly very plausible that it can have been much less.

Jonathan Israel

J. Steendijk-Kuypers, *Volksgesondheidszorg in de 16de en 17de eeuw te Hoorn. Een bijdrage tot de beeldvorming van sociaal-geneeskundige structuren in een stedelijke samenleving* (Dissertatie Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam 1994, Nieuwe Nederlandse bijdragen tot de geschiedenis der geneeskunde en der natuurwetenschappen XLVI; Rotterdam: Erasmus publishing, 1994, viii + 437 blz., ISBN 90 5235 061 2).

De lijvige, onder leiding van Van Deursen en Van Lieburg tot stand gekomen dissertatie over