

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HSUN-TZE

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DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own work and composition.

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

In the course of writing this thesis, I have been indebted to a great many persons for their help and encouragement.

Firstly, I must record my gratitude to my parents who have given me constant encouragement in their letters during the past three years.

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A B S T R A C T

This thesis offers an expository study and an examination of Hsun-tze's main thought, and an investigation of his position in Chinese history.

His theory that Man's Nature is Evil has been a focus of dispute; nevertheless, the unfavourable charges against him are often too brief to explain its theoretical difficulties. His theories of knowledge and of politics have recently attracted considerable attention. However, scholarly attentions have been selective: it is not possible to properly understand the main aspects of Hsun-tze's thought without attempting a comprehensive study of his essential system of thought. His theories of knowledge and of politics are only of secondary concern in his philosophical system. His theory of the Mind, however, is the very essence of his thought. This theory has been scarcely studied, and the interrelations of his main theories have also been neglected.

The First Part of this thesis attempts to investigate his theories of human nature, of knowledge, of Tao or the Ultimate Principle, and of politics and to show how they are linked. These studies make up a systematic account of his theory of the Mind. The Second Part examines the theoretical difficulties of his theories, points out their structural deficiencies and evaluates their philosophical contribution. The Epilogue aims at revealing the spirit of his thought, in order to investigate his significance in Chinese

philosophy and culture. Some arguments in favour of Hsun-tze against his critics are presented here, though such a defence is not the main purpose of this thesis. That purpose is, primarily and ultimately, an attempt to establish an appraisal of Hsun-tze's philosophical and historical position.

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INTRODUCTION

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STUDIES OF HSUN-TZE¹

In China, the studies of Hsun-tze have been significant in the following stages:

(1) From Hsun-tze's time to the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.), scholars mentioned or discussed Mencius (372-289 B.C.) and Hsun-tze as related Confucianists. The Han historian Ssu-ma Ch'ien, for example, wrote 'The Collective Biographies of Mencius and Hsun-tze' in his work THE RECORD OF HISTORY², which was written not much more than a hundred years after Hsun-tze's death. It is obvious that Ssu-ma Ch'ien considered Mencius and Hsun-tze to be the two most important Confucian thinkers after Confucius.

(2) Han Yü, an important literary writer in the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.) was the first to impugn the value of Hsun-tze's philosophy. He considered that Hsun-tze did not understand the meaning of Tao³. However, his criticism was too brief to be important as a study of Hsun-tze's thought, for he did not present any further argument for his opposition. Although another T'ang scholar, Yang Liang⁴,

1. In cases where no ambiguity is involved, I have omitted accents over vowels, e.g. Hsun-tze.

2. 司馬遷 Ssu-ma Ch'ien. 史記: 孟荀列傳 SHIH CHI: Meng-Hsun Lieh-Chuan.

3. 韓愈 Han Yü (768-824). In his essay 原道篇 Yuan-Tao P'ien, he wrote '堯 Yao passed it (i.e. Tao) to 舜 Shun; Shun to 禹 Yu; Yu to 湯 T'ang; T'ang to 文王 King Wen, 武王 King Wu and 周公 Duke Chou; King Wen, King Wu and Duke Chou to Confucius and Confucius to Mencius. After Mencius' death, no one succeeded to the tradition. Hsun (-tze) and 揚雄 Yang (Hsiung) chose what they liked (about Tao); and what they had chosen were not what was the essence (of Tao), and what they had said (about Tao) was incomplete and ambiguous.'

4. 楊儉 Yang Liang. His date was not known. However, he was the first Chinese scholar who annotated Hsun-tze's work.

annotated Hsun-tze's work, (preface dated 818 A.D.), and became the authority on which all later texts were based, Hsun-tze has not been in favour among scholars since then.

(3) During the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), the Yuan Dynasty (1277-1367) and Ming Dynasty (1386-1644), there were scarcely any scholars who specialized in the study of Hsun-tze, nor were there any scholars in favour of him. A scholar named Hsu Chi criticized Hsun-tze's theory of Man's Evil Nature⁵. Su Shih, an important literary writer of the Sung Dynasty, considered Hsun-tze's theory of Man's Evil Nature to be an evil and confusing theory⁶. The Ch'eng brothers, the important Sung philosophers, also considered Hsun-tze's theories 'most biased and impure (with regard to the tradition of Confucianism)'⁷. Chu Hsi, another important Sung philosopher, agreed with the Ch'eng brothers' criticism⁸. In fact, since then, the

5. 徐積 Hsu Chi (1028-1103). Hsu Chi considered that Hsun-tze suggested his theories 'without clear-minded thinking'. For details, please see 荀子辯 Hsun-tze Pien of 安定學案 An-Ting Hsueh-An of 宋元學案 SUNG-YUAN HSUEH-AN by 黃宗羲 Huang Tzung-Hsi (1610-1695).

6. 蘇軾 Su Shih (1036-1101). In his essay 荀卿論 Hsun-Ch'ing Lun, he wrote, 'Hsun Ch'ing liked to suggest heresies and he never gave way to others. He dared to make high-sounding assertions and he never showed concern about others. His theories were greeted with surprise by fools and delight by mean-spirited men (小人 Hsiao-Jen) . . . I think he must be extremely stubborn, haughty and over-confident . . . He (李斯 Li Shih) did not know that Hsun-tze hit upon his sudden ideas for his own pleasure . . . By means of Hsun-tze's theories, Li Shih created chaos in the world.' (蘇東坡集, 應詔集卷九 SU TUNG-P'O CHI, YING-CHAO CHI XVIII, Chüan IX)

7. 程顥 Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085) and 程頤 Ch'eng Yi (1033-1107). In 近思錄 CHIN-SSU LU, edited by 朱熹 Chu Hsi, Ch'eng Hao's views on Hsun-tze are quoted as follows:

'Hsun Ch'ing is an extremely brilliant man, yet his flaws (in his theories) are many . . . Hsun-tze is extremely biased and impure (with regard to the tradition of Confucianism). Only the one sentence that Man's Nature is Evil makes his theories lose the essence (of the Confucian ethics).'

(近思錄 CHIN-SSU LU, Chüan XIV)

8. 朱熹 Chu Hsi (1130-1200). He quoted Ch'eng Hao's criticism of Hsun-tze in his work CHIN-SSU LU.

reputation of Hsun-tze's theories sank into obscurity, and most scholars of this period considered them to be 'a branch of unorthodox theories'⁹ whereas Mencius' theories, on the contrary, enjoyed great attention.

(4) In the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), the studies of Hsun-tze's philosophy saw a flourishing revival. Yao Nai refuted Su Shih's charge against Hsun-tze's theories¹⁰. Ch'ien Ta-Hsin and Hao I-Hsing, two important scholars of the Ch'ing Dynasty, argued that Hsun-tze's philosophy did not deviate from the essence of Confucius' and Mencius' theories¹¹. Other Ch'ing scholars such as Lu Wen-Ch'ao, Hsieh Yung and Wang Nien-Sun offered new revised editions of HSUN-TZE¹², Wang Chung edited A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF HSUN-TZE¹³, Wang Hsien-Ch'ien compiled A COLLECTION OF EXPLANATIONS OF HSUN-TZE¹⁴ in 1891, and Chang T'ai-Yen discussed the theories of both Mencius and Hsun-tze from a Buddhist viewpoint¹⁵. These scholars all tried to re-evaluate Hsun-tze's theories from a sympathetic

9. 雜學 Tsa-Hsueh. 熊賜履 Hsiung Sze-Lü (1635-1709), for example, listed Hsun-tze's work as Tsa-Hsueh in his work 學統 HSUEH-T'UNG.

10. 姚鼐 Yao Nai (1731-1815). In his essay 李斯論 Li Shih Lun he wrote,

'Hsun Ch'ing expounds the theories of the early (sage) kings and highly praises the merits of the Confucianists. Although his theories occasionally have successes and failures, they as a whole outline the principles of ruling the country. Now Mr. Su considered that the disaster brought by Li Shih was the fault of Hsun-Ch'ing; is this not nonsense?' (惜抱軒全集文集 HSI-PAO HSUAN CH'ÜAN-CHI, Wen Chi, Chüan I)

11. 錢大昕 Ch'ien Ta-Hsin (1728-1804). 郝懿行 Hao I-Hsing (1757-1825). For details of their arguments, please see the Appendix of HSUN-TZE.

12. 盧文弨 Lu Wen-Ch'ao (1717-1795). 謝墉 Hsieh Yung (1719-1795). 王念孫 Wang Nien-Sun (1744-1832).

13. 汪中 Wang Chung (1744-1794) 荀子通論 HSUN-TZE T'UNG-LUN.

14. 王先謙 Wang Hsien-Ch'ien (1842-1917) 荀子集解 HSUN-TZE CHI-CHIEH.

15. 章太炎 Chang T'ai-Yen (1868-1935). For details, please see Chang's 國故論衡 KUO-KU LUN-HENG.

standpoint. However, T'an Szu-T'ung, another important Ch'ing scholar, charged Hsun-tze's theory of politics with encouraging the two thousand year old absolute or despotic monarchy in China¹⁶.

(5) From the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911 to the present day, Chinese scholars tended to pay much attention to Hsun-tze's theories of names (Ming)¹⁷, and theory of knowledge¹⁸. Some found psychology in his thought¹⁹. Besides annotated editions of HSUN-TZE, there were books of introduction, exposition and criticism of Hsun-tze's philosophy²⁰. Different aspects of his theories were also discussed. There was a mixture of praise and dispraise given by these scholars. Most of them, however, did not grasp the essence of his thought. They

16. 譚嗣同 T'an Szu-T'ung (1865-1898). In his work 仁學 JEN HSUEH, he wrote,

'Confucius' theories were made impure by Hsun-tze. . . . Hsun seized the chance, assumed the identity of a Confucianist and tarnished the theories of Confucius. . . . The politics of these two thousand years was a copy of the politics of the Ch'in Dynasty, and it was the politics of bandit leaders. The learning of these two thousand years was the learning of Hsun-tze, and it was the learning of the country hypocrites. It is only the bandit leaders who know how to take advantage of country hypocrites and it is only country hypocrites who labour to flatter the bandits.' (譚嗣同全集 仁學 T'AN SZU-T'UNG CH'ÜAN-CHI, JEN HSUEH, Chüan I)

17. 名 Ming. 梁啟超 Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao, for example, wrote 荀子正名篇 HSUN-TZE CHENG-MING P'IEN. For details, please see Liang's 飲冰室文集 YING-PING-SHI WEN-CHI.

18. 趙文秀 Chao Wen-Hsiu, for example, wrote a book on 荀子的知識方法論 HSUN-TZE TI CHIH-SHIH FANG-FA LUN published in 1974.

19. 胡適 Hu Shih, for example, mentioned Hsun-tze's psychology in his work 中國古代哲學史 CHUNG-KUO KU-TAI CHE-HSUEH SHIH, pp.40-46.

20. A list of important works on Hsun-tze is given in the bibliography of this thesis.

only offered a general outline of his theories. There were also a few important philosophical studies only²¹.

Hsun-tze is the last of the Pre-Ch'in Confucianists, and his teaching contains some of the most systematically structured thinking in his times. It is most readably presented in a fine literary form. His thinking is rich in philosophical value. His historical destiny has not enjoyed the same attention as was given to Confucius and Mencius, and whether the critics have given Hsun-tze a fair judgement is also doubtful. The purpose of this thesis is to re-evaluate his philosophy in a more careful manner.

THE CONTENT OF THIS THESIS

The first Part of this thesis offers an exposition of Hsun-tze's philosophy. Its main themes are set out in four chapters, namely: (1) theory of human nature, (2) theory of knowledge or of the Epistemological Mind²², (3) theory of Heaven²³ and that of Tao or the Ultimate Principle²⁴ or of the Ultimate Mind²⁵, and (4) theory

21. It may be suggested that two of the most important philosophical studies of Hsun-tze's thought are 勞思光 Lao Sse-Kwang's 中國哲學史 CHUNG-KUO CHE-HSUEH SHIH or A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY and 唐君毅 T'ang Chün-I's 中國哲學原論:原性篇、原道篇 CHUNG-KUO CHE-HSUEH YUAN-LUN: YUAN-HSING P'IEN AND YUAN-TAO P'IEN. The former charged Hsun-tze with leading Pre-Ch'in Confucianism astray and bringing the Pre-Ch'in cultural spirit to a state of 'disillusionment' (please see Lao's CHE-HSUEH SHIH, pp.276-299). The latter interpreted the important chapters of Hsun-tze and concluded that what Hsun-tze was concerned with was the principles of rites and righteousness as 'a way of administering all classes with culture'. (See Tan's YUAN-HSING P'IEN, pp.47-64 and YUAN-TAO P'IEN, pp.437-503).

22. Please see p.42, Note 55.

23. Please see p.2, Note 8.

24. Please see p.24, Note 37.

25. Please see p.42, Note 56.

of politics, which may be considered to be reorganisation or systematization of data for criticism of the next Part. Most scholars in the past who criticized Hsun-tze often failed to make an overall connection among his theories²⁶. They often argued against his theory of the Evil of Man's Nature²⁷, or discussed his theory of exaltation of rites and teachers, or attacked his theory of Wei or Artifice²⁸. His theory of the Mind, both the Epistemological and the Ultimate Mind, was also scarcely studied²⁹. In this Part an attempt is made to explain the following:

(1) His theory of Evil of Man's Nature serves as an introduction which leads to the core of his philosophy - the theory of the Mind.

(2) His theory of the Epistemological Mind serves to pave the way for further investigation of his theory of the Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind.

26. Scholars such as Han-Yü (768-824), who mentioned Hsun-tze with an opposing attitude in only a few sentences, did not offer a detailed study of Hsun-tze's theory or the reason of his opposition.

27. For this theory please see pp.3-16.

28. Please see p.10, Note 28.

29. Scholars in the past hardly ever gave discussions of Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind. A modern scholar, Lao Sse-Kwang, criticizes Hsun-tze's philosophy with a traditional unfavourable attitude. His study of Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind is concerned only with the Mind as an observer of knowledge or the Epistemological Mind interpreted in this thesis and fails to discuss Hsun-tze's theory of the moral functioning of the Mind or the Ultimate Mind interpreted in this thesis. T'ang Chün-I, another modern important philosopher, gives a brief discussion of Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind with a much fairer viewpoint. However he only mentions the nature of the Mind and he considers that in Hsun-tze's theory, the nature of the Mind is morally good or 善 Shan. He therefore concludes that Hsun-tze fails to give a transcendent reflection upon the nature of the Mind and to see the moral good or Shan in it. His study of Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind must be considered incomplete in the exposition of the theory. (A further discussion on this point in Part II, chapter VII of this thesis.) Hu Shih (1892-1962) offers a discussion of Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind with a genuinely psychological viewpoint. Other scholarly works on Hsun-tze's theories often neither give an exposition of his theory of the Mind nor give an examination of it.

(3) The central theme of his philosophy lies in the discussion of moral practice, or the Way of a Sage, which is also the Way of the Mind³⁰ to know and practise the Ultimate Principle of Man, or simply speaking, morality. The observation of rites and righteousness and the following of teachers may be considered to be some external guide of moral practices. However, what Hsun-tze is concerned with are the internal changes of the Mind from the state of Obsessions³¹ to that of a Sage³². External moral education or training may be considered to be of possible assistance to one's internal struggle for moral cultivation and perfection.

(4) His theory of politics is mainly the description of the external projection of the virtue of a Sage-King³³ to society. This is the minor theme of his philosophical system, compared to the theory of the Mind.

However, in this Part, what has been attempted is to systematize his theory without missing his meaning and essential ideas.

In the second Part an attempt has been made to give a close examination of his four main theories.

(1) Certain mistakes are made through his concentration on proving his belief that Man's Nature is Evil. Secondly his theory of Transformation of Man's Nature³⁴, which is based immediately upon

30. Please see Part I, Chapter III, Section 2, B.

31. Please see p.2, Note 10.

32. Please see p.2, Note 11.

33. Please see p.6, Note 22.

34. Please see p.1, Note 3.

his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, inevitably also has its theoretical difficulties. Thirdly, in his theory of Wei or Artifice, a single-minded development of only good Artifice is also a crucial point which leads to the incompleteness and inconciseness of his thought.

(2) As to his theory of knowledge, or more precisely speaking, that of names and virtue, it might be suggested that his theory of the Epistemological Mind is an incomplete theory of psychology, his theory of reasoning is one part of logic, and his theory of rectification of names is designed mainly for a moral rectification or rectifying names in terms of moral concepts. In short, his theories do touch on the theory of knowledge in general, yet his intention is not ambitious. They only serve as a preliminary chapter to his theory of the Ultimate Mind.

(3) As to his theory of Heaven, he tries to dispel man's superstitions of a supernatural heaven, and to introduce a proper concept of Heaven which is, to him, of a commonsense nature. It therefore cannot lead to cosmic metaphysics, religion and pure science. His theory of the Way of the Mind is the core of his thought. Its value lies in his concentration on ethical morality as well as social morality, which combines the knowledge and practice of morality, which reveals a vivid spirit of moral humanism and which also forms a theory of ethical metaphysics. His theory of Lü or Deliberation³⁵ is a single-minded development of merely rational Deliberation. This is again another crucial point which leads to the defect of his theory of the Mind. Although his theory of Tao or the Ultimate Principle and that of the Ultimate Mind, as a whole, is incompletely and loosely

35. Please see p.8, Note 25.

established, which certainly is another deficiency of his system of thought, this cannot detract from the value of his philosophy as a whole.

(4) With regard to his theory of politics, it might be suggested that a crucial failure lies in his concern merely with a king's way of ruling and his indifference to the establishment of a democratic system of politics which would guarantee the legal rights and interests of the masses. His theory of rule by a Sage-King certainly has its theoretical and practical problems. This defect originates, it might be suggested, from his lack of consciousness of different concepts of man's ethical duty and civic duty. His ideal society therefore is only an impractical ideal which encourages the masses to be contented only with 'fairness', if it may be so called, in employment and salary, and not to strive for their legal rights and interests. Besides some discussions of economic policies which may still be valuable for reference, the rest of the theories offer less contribution to the theory of politics but more value to the theory of moral practice.

In the epilogue an attempt has been made to clarify the historical unfavourable charges against Hsun-tze so as to evaluate the contribution of his theories to Confucianism, the spirit of philosophy and culture in the Pre-Ch'in Period, and to suggest the proper position of his philosophy in the history of Chinese thought.

This thesis offers an expository study and an examination of Hsun-tze's main thought, and an investigation of his position in

Chinese history. It also attempts to give a systematical study of his theory of the Mind. Although Hsun-tze repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the moral functioning of the Mind, he does not make a compact and schematic presentation of it. In this thesis an attempt has been made to re-organize his opinion of the moral functioning of the Mind in order to make his theory intelligible and explicit. Throughout the thesis, quotations from Hsun-tze have been translated by the present writer as part of the study. The translation is based mainly on the version of HSUN-TZE Ssu-Pu Pei-Yao (a photographic reprint published by Chung Hua Press, Taipei, 1965) and HSUN-TZE ERH-SHIH-CHUAN, Ssu-Pu Ts'ung K'an Ch'u-Pien Shu-Pen (a photographic reprint published by Commercial Press, Taipei, 1967). The former version was revised by Hsueh Yung in 1786, and the latter was annotated by Yang Liang in 818. Other useful sources are, HSUN-TZE CHIEN-SHIH by Liang Ch'i-Hsiung (Hong Kong, 1974, a revised edition of the work of the same name published in 1936), HSUN-TZE CHIEN-CHU by Chang Shih-T'ung (Shanghai, 1974) and HSUN-TZE TU-PEN by Wang Chung-Lin (Taipei, 1974). A selected bibliography is also listed for other references which have been consulted.

THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS

The 32 chapters in HSUN-TZE, including the last six chapters which are considered to have been put together by later scholars, have a wide-ranging content. The first 24 chapters, as a whole, mainly aim at one central theme: the goal of human life is to learn and practise to be a Sage. However, they touch on different subjects

concerning different aspects of life. If one studies the work chapter by chapter, one may find that besides the main theme of its content, there are miscellaneous pieces of interesting and profoundly meaningful thought. This thesis is not intended to be exhaustive in the whole range of Hsun-tze's thought and therefore, on one hand the main themes of his thoughts may be revealed through selected data, while on the other the reader will not be confused by irrelevant information and miss the essence of Hsun-tze's theories. Consequently only those theories which are relevant to the theory of human nature, the theory of the Mind and the theory of politics, have been selected; even so, the relevant theories are still too abundant to be quoted in full and only the important ones have been employed. Therefore although this thesis is entitled 'The Philosophy of Hsun-tze', it is, in fact, necessarily limited to the exposition and examination of his theories on the four main themes. This is a conscious limitation of this thesis.

Secondly, in this thesis, emphasis has been laid only upon the exposition and examination of the theories of Hsun-tze. With regard to the historical problems of the philosopher, such as the issues of his arguments against Mencius' theory that 'man's nature is innately good', his opposition to the theories of Mo-tze and contemporary philosophers, the charges levelled against him and the reasons for his unpopularity in the history of Chinese thought, it has not been possible to discuss them here due to limited time and the limits on the length of this thesis. This is also a conscious limitation of this thesis.

P A R T I:

AN ANALYSIS OF HSUN-TZE'S THEORIES

CHAPTER I:

HIS THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE

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In this chapter, Hsun-tze's theory that Man's Nature¹ is Evil² and his theory of the Transformation of Man's Nature³ are dealt with. These two beliefs are the foundation of his whole philosophy. From the awareness that Man's Nature is Evil and that the Transformation of Man's Nature is necessary Hsun-tze holds that man may start on a new Way of his Mind⁴ toward the ultimate goal of life: this leads to the central theme of Hsun-tze's philosophy - the philosophy of the Mind. Therefore in a study of Hsun-tze's thought, his theories of human nature are a necessary start.

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1. 性 Hsing, means 'nature'. It is a technical term in Hsun-tze's philosophy. To him, the Nature of Man is innately Evil, (please see Note 2) and an ordinary man is in general morally lower than the three grades of moral men in Hsun-tze's theory, i.e. 士 Shih, the Scholar, 君子 Chün-tze, the Conscientious Man, and 聖人 Sheng-jen, the Sage. Therefore 性 Hsing is translated as Man's Nature throughout this thesis.
 2. 惡 Wu, a technical term in his philosophy. It originally means: 'bad, evil, wicked, vice, to disgust, to sicken, to hate, to abhor, etc.'. Hsun-tze often uses it slightly differently to mean 'prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic' in the individual as well as a general atmosphere in society. However, it seems that there is no better word in English than 'evil' to denote Hsun-tze's idea, therefore a capitalized Evil is used throughout in order to show its meaning as well as its difference.
 3. 化性 Hua-Hsing, a difficult term in Hsun-tze's theories of human nature. The word 化 Hua, means 'to change, to influence'. Here it is translated as 'to transform, transformation'. In his theory, there is no explanation of what Man's Nature becomes after its transformation (please see Appendix 3). This theory must be considered a deficiency in his theories of human nature, which is fully discussed in pp.196-198.
 4. 心 Hsin, the most essential technical term in his philosophy. It means 'heart or mind'. To Hsun-tze, 心 Hsin is the faculty in charging of man's internal and external activities. It is autonomous, administrative and is the essence of man. The word 'Mind' is used throughout in translation.

SECTION 1: HIS THEORY THAT MAN'S NATURE IS EVIL

Hsun-tze firmly believes that Man's Nature is innately Evil. This belief might have stemmed from the chaotic state of the world in his time which would naturally lead him to come to such a conclusion, or it might have arisen because of his uncompromising opposition to Mencius⁵ who believes that human nature is innately good⁶. However, the academic value of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil lies in its spirit expressing, whether consciously or unconsciously, the following idea: that the value of man originates from his constant struggling against nature⁷, which Hsun-tze calls 'Heaven'⁸, and against evil emotions and desires which are part of Man's Nature⁹ and against the Obsession of the Mind¹⁰, in order to strive for the ideal moral state of a Sage¹¹.

5. 孟子 Mencius or Meng-tze, 372-289 B.C., an important Confucianist earlier than Hsun-tze. He is often considered to be one of the three greatest Confucianists in the Pre-Ch'in Period. The other two are: 孔子 Confucius, (551-479 B.C.), the founder of the Confucian school, and Hsun-tze.

6. For detail of his uncompromising attitude to Mencius, please see HSUN-TZE, Chapter VI; of his attack on Mencius theory, please see HSUN-TZE, Chapter XXIII.

7. Please see HSUN-TZE, Chapter XVII.

8. 天 T'ien, means 'the sky, the heaven, Nature, God, where God or the gods live, natural, day, climate, weather', etc. Hsun-tze uses it in the sense of impersonal nature, and he attacks the concept contained in the classics which was current in his time that Heaven is an anthropomorphic Deity. The word 'Heaven' is used throughout this thesis.

9. Please see HSUN-TZE, Chapter XXIII.

10. 蔽 Pi. It means 'to cover, hide, screen'. To Hsun-tze, it denotes a clouding or darkening of the understanding of the Mind. The word Obsessions seems to be the word closest to expressing his meaning and is used throughout this thesis. Hsun-tze also gives a discussion of the Obsessions of the Mind in Chapter XXI of his book.

11. 聖 Sheng, the key moral concept of his whole thought. A Sage is a combination of the ultimate wisdom and virtue, and he is in the highest state of a moral life.

Therefore even though this idea presents theoretical difficulties¹², yet his intention and efforts have a positive value.

A: HIS EXPLANATION OF 'MAN'S NATURE AND 'EVIL'

In his theories, Hsun-tze insists that Man's Nature is innately Evil. How, then, does he interpret Man's Nature (Hsing) and Evil (Wu)?

Hsun-tze's definition of the two terms is given in chapter XXIII, entitled 'Man's Nature is Evil'. One may find that in his theory of human nature, there are two important concepts involved, namely; the innateness of Man's Evil Nature and the universality of Man's Evil Nature. He explains Man's Nature in terms of life¹³, or more precisely, the biological needs and desires of life, which are not desirable in morality. Man's Evil Nature is, he also holds, universal in character, i.e. each man is born with the same Evil character. In other words, man, whether he is a Sage or a Mean-Spirited Man¹⁴, is born with Evil Nature. The detailed grounds on which he holds such beliefs will be discussed in the next part. The following is the original text of his definition of Man's Nature.

12. A detailed discussion is given in chapter V, Part II of this thesis.

13. 生 Sheng, it also means 'to live, to be born, to breed, uncooked, unfamiliar', etc.

14. 小人 Hsiao Jen, a technical term in his philosophy. It denotes an immoral man. Please also see C of this section.

- (i) 'That which is as it is from the time of birth is called Man's Nature'. (chapter XXII) (Vol. XVI, p.1)¹⁵
- (ii) 'Man's Nature is what he is naturally born with; it does not need to be learned, it does not need to be strenuously pursued . . . Not needing to be learned and striven after, that which is in man, is what is called Man's Nature'. (chapter XXIII) (XVII,2)
- (iii) 'That which is harmonious from birth, which is capable of perceiving through the senses and of responding to a stimuli spontaneously and without effort, is named Man's Nature'. (chapter XXII) (XVI, 1)
- (iv) 'There is a universal character in all men, . . . which is that which is innate from birth'. (chapter IV) (II, 10) 'Wherein they (the Sages) agree with all other men and do not differ from them, is their Nature'. (chapter XXIII) (XVII, 3)

The first explanation is given from a biological point of view, while the second and third are sociological ones. The fourth shows his belief in the universality of Man's Nature. The phrase that 'that which is harmonious from birth' indicates that what is natural from birth are the biological qualities of men. According to Hsun-tze, Man's Nature feels and responds naturally when perceiving and receiving outside stimuli, and these inductions¹⁶ have no connection with the effects of experiences from learning or practice. It accordingly is spontaneous, manifested naturally, and genuinely biological. Hsun-tze argues that there is no sign of any good quality in Man's Nature, nor is there any positive value at all in it. Therefore man must supersede his own biological Nature in order to advance to a social nature which is approved by a certain

15. All references are to 四部備要 Ssu-Pu Pei-Yao, a photographic reprint published by Chung-Hua Press, Taipei, 1965.

16. 感應 Kan-Ying, i.e. perception and response of Man's Nature.

standard of social ethics, and it is only through this process that the Evil of Man's Nature can be controlled, and man can ethically survive.

As for the explanation of Evil (Wu) given by Hsun-tze, it is discussed in detail in chapter XXIII. He argues,

'In ancient time and now, throughout the kingdom, what is meant by Good¹⁷ is upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly¹⁸, and by Evil is prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic¹⁹. This is the distinction between Good and Evil'.

(XVII, 4)

Hsun-tze thus establishes his criteria for defining these two terms: Good (Shan) and Evil (Wu). To him, Good is upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly in the individual as well as in society, whereas Evil is prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic in the two. But what then is upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly, and what is prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic? In chapter III, he gives the following definition:

17. 善 Shan, means 'good, virtuous, to be good at, to remedy, etc.'. Hsun-tze certainly gives a technical meaning to this term which denotes only the uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order in the individual as well as in society. He tends to establish a psychological and sociological analysis to the term without attaching it much to ethical judgement. A further discussion on this term is given on p.177.

18. 正 Cheng, 理 Li, 平 P'ing, 治 Chih.

19. 偏 P'ien, 險 Hsien, 悖 Pei, 亂 Luan.

'What is in accordance with rites²⁰ and righteousness²¹ is called orderly; and what is against them is called disorderly'. (II, 3)

Thus, to be in accordance with rites and righteousness is the means to orderliness. In chapter XXIII, he argues,

'Now is Man's Nature in fact intrinsically upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly? If so, what need would there be for Sage-Kings²² and rites and righteousness?' (XVII, 4)

What he means here is that since Man's nature has no uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order, the existences of Sage-Kings, rites and righteousness are always a necessity in order to control and influence men. Hsun-tze supposes that man is innately lacking the qualities of uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order, which are the causes of one's acting uprightly, rationally, peacefully and in order, therefore Man's Nature is, he concludes, Evil.

20. 禮 Li. It originally means 'to practise' and in common usage, it is interpreted as 'ceremonies, rituals, or rules of proper conduct in social institutions and human relations'. Hsun-tze uses this term in a Confucian moral concept, which in practice, denotes the actual rites according to 儀禮 YI LI, or BOOK OF ETIQUETTE AND CEREMONIAL, a record of procedures of ceremonies practised in Chou Dynasty (1111-256 B.C.), and in theory denotes the principle or meaning of rites according to the Confucian interpretations which later in Han Dynasty (202 B.C. - 220 A.D.) are edited as 禮記 LI CHI, or BOOK OF RITES. However, the English term 'rites' is employed throughout to denote his meaning both in theory and in practice.

21. 義 Yi. It originally means 'appropriateness'. Hsun-tze often uses it to denote the Confucian moral concept of righteousness within oneself as a motive of acting morally. Therefore the English term 'righteousness' is used throughout this thesis. Hsun-tze often attributes the establishment of rites and righteousness as a great merit of the ancient Sage-Kings.

22. 聖王 Sheng-Wang, a key concept of Hsun-tze's political theory. A Sage, to Hsun-tze, is a combination of ultimate or perfect wisdom and virtue, and if a king possesses such qualities, or if a Sage becomes a king, he is a Sage-King and he will, Hsun-tze believes, bring peace and happiness to the country as well as to his people.

On the other hand, Hsun-tze also considers that in the inner properties of Man's Nature, besides the qualities of prejudice, viciousness, rebelliousness and chaos there lie desires which also are the cause of Man's Evil. In chapter XXII he says,

'Man's Nature is that which one receives from Heaven, the emotions are the quality of Man's Nature and desires are the responses or induction of the emotion.' (XVI, 9)

Accordingly what is contained in Man's Nature also is emotion. There are seven types of emotions, which are simply referred to as 'the seven emotions'²³ in chapter XXII, namely: delight, anger, grief, joy, love, hate and desire²⁴. (XVI, 1) However, Hsun-tze lays particular emphasis on desire, which is only one of the seven emotions of Man's Nature. Here a point worth noticing is that Hsun-tze does not directly indicate, when he speaks of Man's Nature, that it is altogether evil; it is due to the fact that it possesses, besides prejudice, viciousness, rebelliousness and chaos, emotions, and these emotions elicit evil desires, consequently the Evil of Man's Nature is manifested. To be more precise, his theory that Man's Nature is Evil is a theory that desires which are innate in Man's Nature are evil, or man's desires are evil.

Hsun-tze uses what is natural by birth to explain Man's Nature, what is upright, reasonable, peacefull and orderly

23. 七情 Ch'i-Ch'ing.

24. 喜 Hsi, 怒 Nu, 哀 Ai, 樂 Le, 愛 Ai, 惡 Wu, 欲 Yü.

to explain Good, and what is prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic to explain Evil. Since Man's Nature is innately without the qualities of Good, his performance of Good, i.e. what is upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly, is a process of learning, Deliberation²⁵ and decision of the Mind, otherwise he may become Evil, i.e. prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic.

B: HIS ARGUMENT FOR THE THEORY THAT MAN'S NATURE IS EVIL

In chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze puts forward his argument in nine paragraphs to prove that Man's Nature is Evil. In the original script, it is said repeatedly, 'It is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil'. An analysis of this nine-paragraph argument is given here.

(i) Hsun-tze firstly points out that man is born with a 'fondness for profit, feelings of jealousy and hatred, the desires of the eyes and ears, and fondness for beautiful sights and sounds'. (XVII, 1) If a man follows his Nature and indulges his emotions, and becomes involved in wrangling and strife, violence and crime, license and wantonness will certainly occur, the virtues

25. 慮 Lü, an important technical term in his philosophy of Mind. It originally means 'to consider, to take into account'. Although Hsun-tze sometimes uses it in a meaning more close to '省 Sheng, or reflection', than to 'deliberation', the word '省 Sheng or reflection' carries a serious meaning of 'to examine, to introspect', which is related to a sense more of ethics than merely function; while in his theory, 慮 Lü is often referred to the function of the Mind. Therefore in translation, the word Deliberation is used to keep its literal originality and its difference from 'deliberation' in general usage.

of courtesy and humility, loyalty and trust, and the principle of rites and righteousness, and the form of decorum and order will fade away. Hsun-tze also says:

'If a man follows his Nature and gives free rein to his emotions, the result will certainly be fighting and wrangling, offending against the social order and confusing the ritual principles and finally he will become a tyrannical man. Therefore there must exist the influence of teacher and law, the instruction of ritual and righteous principles, when he will behave modestly and politely, his behaviour will be in accordance to what is suitable and right and the society will therefore be under control. From this, one may see that it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 1)

Since there are evil emotions in Man's Nature, Hsun-tze concludes that Man's Nature is Evil.

(ii) Next he takes the examples of 'a crooked piece of wood' and 'a piece of blunt metal' to illustrate the defect of Man's nature. (XVII, 1) Since Man's Nature is Evil, it must be transformed by the instructions of a teacher, restriction of laws and influence of rites and righteousness. Thus man may become upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly, just as the crooked piece of wood and the piece of blunt metal, by means of special treatment, may be straightened and sharpened. And he concludes his view on Man's Nature as follows:

'If now man is influenced by teacher and law, and he accumulates the learning of general education²⁶ and practices the principles of rites and righteousness, he

26. 文學 Wen-Hsueh, as a modern term, denotes 'literature or a literary work'. However, in the Chou Dynasty, it means 'the general education such as the teaching of classics'.

is a Conscientious Man²⁷. If he gives free rein to his Nature and emotions, feels at ease in his arrogance and indulgence, and turns away from rites and righteousness, he is a Mean-Spirited Man. From this one may see that it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 1)

(iii) Hsun-tze then argues against Mencius' theory that human nature is good. He thinks that Mencius does not understand the difference between Man's Nature and Artifice.²⁸ Hsun-tze thinks that 'what is contained in Man's Nature is given by Heaven, which cannot be learned, cannot be acquired by effort'. (XVII, 2)

He emphasizes that the various desires of the seven emotions are the most essential element in Man's Nature, while the activity which man can learn and follow in accordance with rites and righteousness is an Artifice. Thus Artifice is different from Man's Nature. He goes on to rebut the argument of Mencius that human nature becomes evil mainly because man loses his original good nature. He

27. 君子 Chün-tze, a technical term in Hsun-tze's moral concepts. He sets three moral grades of a man's life, i.e. 士 Shih, the Scholar who has started to know and understand morality as his final goal in moral life. 君子 Chün-tze, the Conscientious Man who is cautious in his knowledge and practice as a moral man, and 聖人 Sheng-Jen, the Sage who is ultimately wise and virtuous and who has reached an ultimate state in morality.

28. 偽 Wei, highly technical term in his philosophy. It normally means 'false, simulated, artificial, illegal', and in fact, it often carries a bad meaning in common usage. However, Hsun-tze uses it in an opposite way. By 偽 Wei, he means 'man-made, non-natural', and it is often used as a contrasting term to Man's Nature which is natural, or by birth. He also often tends to use it in a morally good sense, i.e. an activity which produces moral good. Hsun-tze is the only philosopher in antiquity, or perhaps in the history of Chinese thought, using this term with such a good meaning. It is also difficult to employ a suitable English word to denote his idea. The word 'Artifice' certainly is not an ideal one, yet it is close to its common meaning. Therefore the capitalized Artifice is used throughout.

considers that as soon as man is born, the Evil of his Nature is immediately expressed by showing his various desires, such as 'the desire for food when he is hungry, and the desire for warmth when he is cold'. (XVII, 2) If a man follows his desires, the Evil of his Nature is easily manifested. If a man is contrary to his Nature and follows rites and righteousness, he is practising Artifice which does not exist at all in his Nature. Therefore Man's Nature is, he concludes, obviously Evil.

(iv) Hsun-tze goes on to argue that the way of filial piety is that which is contrary to Man's Nature, yet it is in accordance with rites and righteousness. (XVII, 2) Therefore to be filial is to follow rites and righteousness and to act contrary to Man's Nature. He says:

'If man follows his emotions and his Nature, he will not behave modestly and politely. If he behaves modestly and politely, his behaviour deviates from his emotions and his Nature. From this, one may see that it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 2)

Hsun-tze then makes the contrast between man's desires of reluctance to behave morally and his courtesy and humility so as to prove that the former reveals that Man's Nature is Evil, while the latter stems from his Artifice.

(v) In this paragraph Hsun-tze first explains:

'Rites and righteousness originate from the Artifice of the Sage, and they do not innately originate from Man's Nature.' (XVII, 2)

Then he goes on to say that the Sage is primarily identical with all other men in his Evil Nature. However, the Sage knows to transform his Nature, encourage moral Artifice and eventually he reaches a

state of moral perfection, therefore he is ultimately not the same as all other men. Then, considering the case of a man who desires to perform morally, Hsun-tze adduces counter-evidence to the idea that Man's Nature is Evil. He argues that a man who is meagre in accomplishments, who is ugly, who is poor, who lives in cramped quarters and who is humble, longs for greatness, beauty, wealth, spaciousness and eminence. (XVII, 3) But a man who seeks to improve himself to a moral state does so precisely because he is Evil, i.e. he is lacking in Good, or because morality is not his Nature. Hsun-tze then concludes that 'whatever a man lacks in himself, he will seek outside'. (XVII, 3) Since Hsun-tze believes that Good is what is lacking in man, i.e. the quality of Goodness does not exist in Man's Nature, therefore man must search for Good from outside. Then he extends his theory in the same paragraph by saying,

'Now since Man's Nature is originally without rites and righteousness, he therefore forces himself to learn in order to possess them. Since his Nature does not know rites and righteousness, he contemplates order to know them. However, if he is uncultivated since birth, he will not possess rites and righteousness and will not know them. If he does not possess them, he will cause chaos; if he does not know them he will become rebellious. Therefore if he is uncultivated since birth, he will possess rebelliousness and chaos in himself. From this, one may see that it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 3-4)

(vi) In this paragraph, Hsun-tze refutes Mencius' theory again. Firstly, he gives his definition of Good and Evil:

'Good is upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly, while Evil is prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic.' (XVII, 4)

Hsun-tze thinks that if Man's Nature is originally Good as Mencius claims, there is no need for the existence of Sage-Kings to rule over and to control man, and there is also no need for rites and righteousness to influence him, for laws to restrict him or for strict punishments to restrain him. Hsun-tze continues,

'Now let us try to remove the rule of the King, education of rites and righteousness, control of law and prohibition of punishment, and let us watch on the sideline how the people of the world treat one another: one may see that the strong oppress and rob the weak, the many terrorize and extort from the few. The world will be in a state of complete chaos and its decay will instantly come. From this, one may see that it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 4)

(vii) In this paragraph, Hsun-tze indicates that in establishing one's argumentations the speaker should make his assertion according to fact and to what can be proved to be valid, and he should make it not just theoretical but also practical; by indicating this, he tries to prove that his own theory is up to this standard, and he derides the theory of Mencius as not in accordance with facts and not capable of being proved to be valid. He mocks at Mencius who 'sits on his mat propounding the theory and cannot stand up and put it into practise, nor can he extend it over a wide area with any success at all'. (XVII, 4) Hsun-tze thinks that if Mencius' theory that human nature is good is valid, then why do there exist the Sage-Kings, rites and righteousness? He also argues that because of the existence of warped wood, the production of a straightening board is needed, and because of the existence of the crookedness, the plumb line is needed, and because of the Evil of Man's Nature, the

government of the Sage-Kings and the elucidation of rites and righteousness are needed. (XVII, 4-5) Therefore he says:

'The purpose of the establishment of the rule of the King and the illumination of rites and righteousness is that Man's Nature is Evil. From this, one may see that it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.'

(XVII, 5)

(viii) In this paragraph, succeeding the one above, Hsun-tze continues his argument by making the supposition that by nature, the crooked wood is crooked, therefore it needs a straightening board, and by nature the straight wood is straight, it does not have to wait for the straightening board to become straight; thus he deduces that by nature, Man's Nature is Evil, so it needs the government of the Sage-Kings and the moral teaching and influence of rites and righteousness, and only then can man obtain order and conform to morality. (XVII, 5) Again he concludes the paragraph by saying that 'it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil'. In general this paragraph is just a repetition of the preceding argument.

(ix) In his last argument, Hsun-tze tries to answer the claim of a person who considers that rites, righteousness and the accumulation²⁹ of Artifice originate from Man's Nature, therefore the Sages are capable of bringing them forth. Hsun-tze explains by using as examples the potter and the carpenter as a simile of the Sage. The cases of moulding clay for pots and carving wood for utensils do not prove that moulding and carving are Man's Nature, for these are only man's skill. The same is true of the Sage: the

29. 積 Chi. Hsun-tze often speaks of the accumulation of Artifice as if it were measurable quantity. In fact, in Chinese language, most moral concepts are considered to be countable, such as the accumulation of virtue 積德 Chi Te, the accumulation of good 積善 Chi Shan.

ability to establish rites and righteousness and to accumulate good Artifice is not Man's Nature, it is an Artifice. Then Hsun-tze goes on to expound his doctrine of the universality of Man's Evil Nature. He argues that there is a sameness of Evil Nature present in the Sage and the ordinary man; in other words, the Evil of Man's Nature exists in every man, no matter who he is, a Sage or a Mean-Spirited Man. However, he distinguishes the Sage and the Mean-Spirited Man as follows:

'What is noble and respectable in Yao³⁰, Yu³¹ and the Conscientious Men is that they are capable of transforming their Nature and encouraging Artifice. When Artifice is encouraged, rites and righteousness are practised. Therefore rites and righteousness are the accumulation of the Artifice of the Sage just as the potter produces his pottery. From this, one may see that the accumulation of the Artifice of rites and righteousness is not Man's Nature. What is low and hateful in Chieh³² and Chih³³ and the Mean-Spirited Man is that they follow their Nature, give free rein to their emotions, feel at ease in arrogance and indulgence and their behaviour is the result of their fondness for profit, fighting and wrangling. Therefore it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 7)

His distinction between the Sage and the Mean-Spirited Man becomes the core of this chapter, or the key point of his moral philosophy. (1) It is, in his opinion, obviously not because of Man's Nature that man is honoured or despised, for all men are inevitably Evil in their Nature, and the man who is worthy of being honoured is the one who is capable of 'transforming his Evil Nature and of encouraging his Artifice (to act morally)' (XVII, 5); while the man who is

30. 堯 Yao, a legendary Sage-King in ancient China, whose reign is said to have extended from 2357 to 2253 B.C.

31. 禹 Yu, a legendary Sage-King and founder of the Hsia Dynasty.

32. 桀 Chieh, a tyrant and the last ruler of the Hsia Dynasty (2183-1752 B.C.).

33. 跖 Chih, a legendary notorious robber said to be active during the reign of 黃帝 Huang-ti (2700-2600 B.C.).

to be despised is the one who indulges his Nature, follows his emotions and refuses to transform his Nature. According to this the distinction between the honoured and the despised is clear.

(2) Rites and righteousness are in Hsun-tze's view the result of the conscious contemplation of the Sages and have been established by them, and it is only by learning and moral training that man can understand and practice rites and righteousness. Holding this, Hsun-tze teaches and repeatedly advises man to control and transform his Evil Nature.

By using this nine-paragraph argument, Hsun-tze demonstrates his theory that Man's Nature is Evil. There are logical mistakes in parts of his argument, and there are places which are over-obstinate or over-confident, which will be examined in the second Part of this thesis³⁴. However, there is one point worth mentioning: all Hsun-tze has been saying may be reduced into one idea, which is the importance of the Transformation of Man's Nature. In fact, what he is concerned with is the practical problem of man's moral life. He warns man that Man's Nature is innately Evil, and he also illustrates the image of a Mean-Spirited Man as a concrete example of this theory. Therefore a survey of his discussion of the Mean-Spirited Man is necessary.

C: HIS DISCUSSION OF A MEAN-SPIRITED MAN

In chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze tries to prove that Man's Nature is innately Evil. This is the general idea of the chapter.

34. An examination of his argument that Man's Nature is Evil on pp.185-191.

Furthermore, throughout his book he uses the notion of 'Mean-Spirited Man'³⁵ as an example of a man who continues through life to manifest the original Evil of his Nature. There follows a discussion of the meaning of the term 'Mean-Spirited Man', which Hsun-tze puts forward as a concrete example of Man's Evil Nature.

(i) The definition of a 'Mean-Spirited Man'

The Mean-Spirited Man whom Hsun-tze discusses is a person who fully displays the original appearance of his Evil Nature. In chapter IV, Hsun-tze says:

'Man is surely born as a Mean-Spirited Man. If there were no teacher and no law, man would only care for his own profit. Man is surely born as a Mean-Spirited Man, and in a disordered world, he acquires degenerate customs and practices; so from his Mean-Spiritedness, he becomes more Mean-Spirited and his Evil becomes more Evil.'
(II, 11)

From this, Hsun-tze clearly shows that Man's Nature is innately Evil, i.e. man is not born with the qualities of uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order. If a man is in a disordered world with bad customs and practices, with no teacher and laws for him to follow and obey, then he is not aware that the Transformation of his Nature is necessary, thus his Evil Nature will come out easily and he may become more prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and disorderly. As for the definition of a 'Mean-Spirited Man', this may be found in chapters VIII and XXIII. In the former chapter, Hsun-tze says:

'A man who gives rein to his desires and emotions, and is no example to others is a Mean-Spirited Man.'
(IV, 12)

35 小人 Hsiao-Jen.

Whereas in the latter, he says,

'He who gives rein to his desires and emotions, feels at ease in his arrogance and indulgence and turns away from rites and righteousness, is a Mean-spirited Man.' (XVII, 1)

When these two statements are compared, they are seen to be consistent. However, the latter description seems to be clearer than the former. Man's desires and emotions are Evil, and if he follows his Evil desires and emotions, he will become more Evil, and he will not be able to control himself any more. If he feels no shame in boasting of his accomplishments and his indulgence and he does not honour his teacher and respect law, then he does not follow rites and righteousness, and he is acting against the ethical rules laid down by the ancestral Sages. Therefore if a man does not make efforts to cultivate himself and behave rightly, and instead, as Hsun-tze says in chapter XX, 'takes pleasure in fulfilling his desires', (XIV, 3) then he is what Hsun-tze refers to as a Mean-Spirited Man.

In chapter III, Hsun-tze concludes,

'No reliance may ever be placed on his words, there is no loyalty in his action. He is only ready to chase after things which are profitable for him. Thus he is called a Mean-Spirited Man.' (II, 5-6)

Therefore according to Hsun-tze, if a man speaks and acts not in correspondence with the ways set by the ancient Sage-Kings, or with the ways of rites and righteousness, and merely thinks of his own desires and profits, then he is a Mean-Spirited Man.

(ii) A Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man

In his book Hsun-tze puts forward illustrations of the contrast between a Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man. What he wants to establish in his theories is a means of achieving an ideal personality, and the Conscientious Man is the first step towards such an ideal, and also the first step away from the conduct of the Mean-Spirited Man³⁶.

What characteristics does a Conscientious Man have in contrast with a Mean-Spirited Man? In chapter IV, Hsun-tze says,

'A Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man are identical in ability, innate Nature, knowledge and capacity. They both are good at loving honour, and hating disgrace, loving what is advantageous and hating what is harmful to them. It is in the way of life they follow and in which they seek these things that they are different.' (II, 10)

Hsun-tze then points out that originally, or innately, the Nature of a Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man are both Evil; yet it is due to their different approaches to two different goals or ways of life that they become men with different personalities. In the same chapter, there are further explanations of this point,

'Man has characteristics in common with others. When hungry, he desires to eat; when cold, he desires warmth; when exhausted he desires to rest; he loves what is advantageous and hates what is harmful: these are the qualities that men are born with and hold firm; these come naturally so that men do not have to wait till they learn them; these are also identical with those with which Yao and Chieh were born.' (II, 10)

36. Although Hsun-tze mentions 士 Shih or Scholar as the initial step of becoming a moral agent, he in fact does not give much detail about this term. He often makes contrasts between a Mean-Spirited Man and a Conscientious Man, and between a Conscientious Man and a Sage. Therefore it is taken here that the stage of a Conscientious Man is an intermediate one between a Sage and a Mean-Spirited Man.

Then how is it that a Mean-Spirited Man is a Mean-Spirited Man, and a Conscientious Man a Conscientious Man? Hsun-tze argues that there are two reasons for this: (1) the effort made by a Mean-Spirited Man is insufficient, and (2) a Mean-Spirited Man accumulates all the bad customs and practice, while the Conscientious Man accumulates good customs and practice. Thus in the same chapter, Hsun-tze says,

'A man can become a Yao or a Yu, he also can become a Chieh or a Chih, he can become a worker or a craftsman, he can become a farmer or a merchant; it all depends on his accumulation of customs and practice. These are also what man is born with and holds firm, these come naturally so that man does not have to wait till he learns them, these are identical with what Yao and Chieh were born with. If a man is a Yao or Yu, he always enjoys tranquillity and honour. If he is a Chieh or Chih, he will always suffer danger and disgrace. If he is a Yao or Yu, he always enjoys pleasure and ease. If he is a worker, craftsman, farmer or merchant, he will always suffer vexation and exhaustion. However, men prefer to toil like the latter and few become the former. Why is it? I say that it is because of the insufficiency of effort made by man.' (II, 11)

Here Hsun-tze puts forward the idea of the 'insufficiency of effort of man'. In the later part of the same paragraph, he also says,

'The insufficiency of effort of man is the common adversity of the world, it is also the biggest disaster and calamity of man.' (II, 12)

However, does Hsun-tze imply that the insufficiency of effort of man is an innate defect? Obviously not; according to him, the insufficient effort of man is the result of man's laziness. Thus Hsun-tze says in the same chapter,

'The virtue of Yao and Yü was not innate. It was produced from the Transformation of their Nature, and it was the accomplishment of their cultivation and Artifice. They had to wait till all their Evil Nature had ceased and then they were perfected with virtue.' (II, 11)

According to Hsun-tze, the Sage makes a great effort to do away with his Evil Nature, to transform it, then to cultivate himself and to accumulate good deeds and thereby accomplish virtue, and become different from a Mean-Spirited Man. So the Nature of a Mean-Spirited Man is the innate Evil Nature of Man and the Artifice of a Sage is the accomplishment of his postnatal effort towards virtue. The stage of a Conscientious Man is an intermediate one between a Sage and a Mean-Spirited Man; and the Way of a Conscientious Man is the first step in doing away with Evil and tending to Good. Thus Hsun-tze believes that man is ignorant and imperfect by birth, and if he is not controlled and guided by teacher and laws, he will become a Mean-Spirited Man; and that if he tries to transform his Evil Nature and to cultivate himself, then he will become a Conscientious Man. When all his Evil Nature vanishes and his virtue is then perfected, he is then called a Sage, just as Yao and Yü, the ancient Sages, were. This is a brief summary of Hsun-tze's moral philosophy. The details of Hsun-tze's description of the Way of a Conscientious Man and that of a Sage will be discussed in chapter III of this Part. However, from this summary, it is to be noted that what Hsun-tze values is the moral practice of man. In the same chapter, he says,

'To observe the knowledge and capacity of a Mean-Spirited Man, one has enough information to know that a Mean-Spirited Man has sufficient capacity to behave as a Conscientious Man.' (II, 10)

Then why is a Mean-Spirited Man a Mean-Spirited Man? Hsun-tze explains in chapter XXIII,

'A Mean-Spirited Man can become a Conscientious Man, but he does not want to.' (XVII, 6)

(iii) Descriptions of Mean-Spirited Man

There are quite a number of descriptions of a Mean-Spirited Man in his book. Here are some quotations which give pictures of Mean-Spirited Men.

1. Appearance and behaviour:

In chapter II, Hsun-tze gives this description:

'A Mean-Spirited Man . . . though he is extremely disorderly, hates those who criticise him; though he is extremely evil, he desires others to praise him as a virtuous man. His intention is as vicious as tigers and wolves; his behaviour as wild as beasts, and he also hates those who think he is a wicked man; he is intimate with those who flatter him, and he estranges those who admonish him. He laughs at those who are the most faithful and loyal to the country.' (I, 7)

2. Ability:

In chapter III, Hsun-tze says,

'The ability of a Mean-Spirited Man is monstrous, his inability is also monstrous. . . . When he has skill, he allows himself to be haughty and biased so as to be harsh and disrespectful to others. When he has no skill, then he shows jealousy and speaks ill of others so as to ruin them.' (II, 2)

3. Disposition:

In chapter III, Hsun-tze also says,

'When a Mean-Spirited Man . . . enlarges his ambition, then he is arrogant and tyrannical; if he

is narrow-minded, then he is licentious and rebellious; if he is learned, then he robs, steals and cheats; if he is stupid, then he is wicked, crafty and disorderly; if he is given an important assignment, then he is pleased with himself and arrogant; if he is not employed, then he curses and becomes crafty; when he is pleased, he is frivolous and smug; when he is worried, he is dejected and scared; when he is prominent, he is proud and narrow-minded; when he is in poverty, he is self-abandoned and in despair.' (II, 3)

From these quotations, it is apparent that a Mean-Spirited Man, according to Hsun-tze, is one who does not restrain his desires and emotions, causes troubles to others, and rejects rites and righteousness, and the Evil of his Nature is fully displayed. He is also a man with the most evil intentions, as Hsun-tze describes in chapter V,

'His appearance is good but his ambition is Evil, and this does not exclude him from being a Mean-Spirited Man.' (III, 1)

If asked why man becomes more and more Evil, Hsun-tze answers that it is because of the insufficient effort of man and also because of his accumulation of bad customs and practice which prevent him from bringing himself up to a moral standard, that he himself fails to toil fully to develop the function of his Mind to embark upon self-improvement. Furthermore a Mean-Spirited Man loves to attend to external objects. In chapter XVII, Hsun-tze says,

'The Mean-spirited Man misses what is within himself and envies what is in the world. This is why his (capacity of) Mind degenerates day by day.' (XI, 12)

The Mind degenerates daily, so Hsun-tze thinks, because a Mean-Spirited Man only calculates his profit, and does not use his

Mind to understand the Ultimate Principle of Man³⁷. Here Hsun-tze's theory of the Way of Mind towards the Ultimate Principle of Man is involved and it will be discussed in detail in the third chapter of this Part. However, the behaviour and appearance, the speech and arguments of a Mean-Spirited Man mentioned by Hsun-tze can be regarded as a concrete example of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil. Nevertheless, the main theme of Hsun-tze's philosophy does not lie here. The reason why he argues for man's Evil Nature and introduces the concept of the Mean-Spirited Man is because he tries to warn man to understand the importance of the Transformation of his Nature in order to reach the state of an ideal personality, i.e. the Sage. Therefore one who studies Hsun-tze's philosophy must observe carefully the purpose of his theories before one can grasp the essence of them. The structure

37. **道** Tao, an important technical term in his philosophy. **道** or Tao, originally means 'way, a road, a method, a principle, to speak, etc.'. **天道** T'ien-Tao, the Way of Heaven, **地道** Ti-Tao, the Way of Earth and **人道** Jen-Tao, the Way of Man. The first two form the principle of the universe. This principle is not so much as a metaphysical principle as to be attained by observation and experience. The latter becomes the core of his philosophical searches and he finally affirms that morality is the unique, universal and objective way of man, a way on which all men should walk in order to perfect themselves in life and in society. In this particular connection, i.e. Hsun-tze's emphasis on morality as the Way of Man, it is therefore translated as 'The Ultimate Principle' throughout this thesis. However, since there are three aspects of Tao in his theory, the term 'Ultimate Principle' may be appropriate to his discussion on the Way of Man, it may not always be appropriate to his two other aspects of Tao, i.e. the Way of Heaven and the Way of Earth. It is fully recognized that the translation is inadequate and may cause linguistic difficulty when discussing his theory of Oneness of the Mind in Tao and the theory that all things are a part of Tao. However, what Hsun-tze tries to emphasize throughout his book about Tao is the Way of Man and not the Way of the Universe, therefore it may still be convenient to use the translation 'The Ultimate Principle' in this thesis.

of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil is a disputable matter, yet the purpose of the theory is another matter; the former leads to certain theoretical difficulties which will be discussed in Chapter I of the second Part, while the latter, that is the purpose of the theories, leads to the chapter which immediately follows - the Transformation of Man's Nature - which is the key theory in the development of his philosophical system.

SECTION 2: HIS THEORY OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF MAN'S NATURE

In his discussion of the Evil of Man's Nature Hsun-tze emphasizes repeatedly that 'while Man's Nature is Evil is obvious, his Goodness is an Artifice'. (Chapter XXIII) The latter part of his statement forms the basis of discussion of this section. What Hsun-tze says about Goodness, according to the meaning of the passages in that chapter, is clearly about the Goodness of the individual; thus an interpretation of it could be as follows: the Goodness of the individual is acquired through moral Artifice. To expound this further, it might be suggested that the Goodness of a society as a whole results from collective work in which each member of society is morally educated in order to generate the good Artifice.

A: HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAN'S NATURE AND ARTIFICE

In Hsun-tze's theory, the words 'Man's Nature' and 'Artifice' are treated as a pair of opposites. In chapter XXIII he says,

'That which is within man, which cannot be learned and worked for, is Man's Nature; that which can be learned and worked for and be accomplished by man is called Artifice; these are the distinctions between the two.' (XVII, 2)

Thus, according to Hsun-tze, it is clear that Artifice is not innate in man nor is it in his Nature; it is only through learning and attention that a man may encourage its practice. On the other hand, Nature is innate in man, and it comprises, as mentioned in the previous section, the seven emotions. In the same chapter, Hsun-tze explains,

'Just as the eyes love colours, the ears love sounds, the mouth loves flavours, the mind loves profit, the body loves pleasure and leisure; these all originate from Man's Nature. When man receives a stimulus, he responds naturally accordingly and these are the things which man does not have to wait until he has learned them in order to produce them.' (XVII, 3)

While in another passage, Hsun-tze gives an explanation of Artifice,

'If when man perceives a stimulus, which he cannot respond to, and he has to wait until he has learned and followed what he has learned before he can respond accordingly, then it is considered that his response is from Artifice.' (XVII, 3)

Thus according to Hsun-tze, Man's Nature is manifested when he is stimulated by the external objects, and it comes forth directly and immediately. On the other hand, the result of Artifice is: when man is stimulated by external objects, the learned behaviour does not come forth directly and immediately, it must wait until man has made an effort to learn internally by his Deliberation, and externally by the influence of rites and righteousness, the

prohibitions of law and the admonitions of teachers; and only then does Artifice come into play and is man encouraged to do good.

B: HIS DEFINITION OF ARTIFICE

Besides the contrast between Man's Nature and Artifice just mentioned, Hsun-tze also defines Artifice in chapter XXII, where he says,

'The Mind deliberates , and action therefore moves; this is called Artifice. The accumulation of Deliberation, and the practice of action thus formed and completed is called Artifice.' (XVI, 1)

It seems that Hsun-tze has here given two slightly different definitions of Artifice, although what he tries to give is a consistent explanation of the process of origin and completion of Artifice. According to Hsun-tze, when man is stimulated by desires and excitement and he responds, his Mind instantly 'deliberates' the excitement and decides to accept or refuse it; thus arises the working of Deliberation. Deliberation or 'Lü' is, in modern terms, thinking. The mental selection and decision, Hsun-tze holds, will then be expressed in man's behaviour and action, and this is Artifice. Therefore Hsun-tze thinks that Artifice, i.e. the artificial behaviour, or learned behaviour of man, is a further manifestation of Deliberation. Furthermore, when man constantly displays judgements and behaviour, he then forms an accumulation of practices, which is also called Artifice. In short, the former part of Hsun-tze's definition of Artifice is an explanation of its origin while the latter is the exposition of its completed state.

C: HIS SUGGESTION OF THE CONCRETE MEANS TO ENCOURAGE
ARTIFICE

The origin of Artifice, accordingly, is twofold:

(1) internal Deliberation after an external stimulation, and
(2) the application of behaviour in accordance with the decision
of the Mind. These two steps are, Hsun-tze thinks, equally
important and interrelated; yet they are, more or less, easily
influenced by man's own learning or experience, and are easily
obsessed by his own insufficient knowledge of the external world.
In his book, there are therefore chapters especially devoted to
the discussion of learning and Obsessions, such as chapter I
, entitled 'Encouraging Learning' and chapter XXI 'Dispelling
Obsessions'. However, Hsun-tze lays more particular emphasis
on learning, which is the first possible stage of encouraging
Artifice.

(i) Learning of rites

In chapter I of his book, he says:

'Learn until you die. Therefore, though the
content of learning, such as subjects and skills, has
its ending point, the meaning of learning should not
be disregarded even for a second.' (I, 4)

The reason why a man is called a man is, Hsun-tze says, because
he holds firm the meaning of learning while a man becomes a beast
when he disregards it. Therefore to understand the meaning of
learning is important. As to the practical content of learning,
Hsun-tze explains in the same chapter:

'Where does learning start, and where does it
stop? I say, the subjects and skills of learning

start from man's reciting classic books, and it ends in reading RITES³⁸. (I, 4)

By classic books, Hsun-tze means THE BOOK OF ODES³⁹, and THE BOOK OF HISTORY⁴⁰, of which the former is, as he says, the rhythm and harmonizer of sound, and the latter, the discipline of political records. Rites, which are recorded in the RITES, is, as he explains in the same chapter,

'the basic principle of moral laws and the essential outline of social institutions.' (I, 4)

Therefore man who lives in society and is surrounded by human relations must learn it thoroughly. When a man thoroughly understands and devotedly practises rites according to RITES, he has, Hsun-tze comments, approached the 'perfection of morality'. (I, 4) In other words, such a man will, Hsun-tze believes, transcend worldliness and attain holiness. From this, it is apparent that the learning is, to Hsun-tze, not the learning related to subjects of the external world, but learning of morality, which is in direct contact with human relations and society. He makes this idea clearer in the same chapter,

'The principle of learning should be practised from the beginning of one's life as a Scholar, and be completed when one has become a Sage.' (I, 4)

38. 禮經 LI CHING, here Hsun-tze probably indicates the BOOK OF ETIQUETTE AND CEREMONIAL as well as some part of its interpretation by the Confucianists, which latter in Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.) was edited as BOOK OF RITES.

39. 詩經 SHIH CHING.

40. 書經 SHU CHING.

To Hsun-tze, a Sage is in a state of moral perfection, which fully satisfies his lust for learning, or morality, therefore a Sage needs no more learning but practice. At this point, Hsun-tze follows the orthodox path of the Confucian thought on learning which was first laid down by Confucius himself and then by Mencius, i.e. to learn for morality's sake, or, more precisely, to learn in order to develop the moral state of the individual. Thus a man should reject the notion of learning for learning's sake, for he should not, as the Confucianists hold, expend his life and energy merely on knowledge of the external world. This is one of the reasons why in Chinese philosophy, from the beginning, there is a tendency for scholars to attach much importance to morality and pay less attention to pure knowledge and science. Although parts of the theories of Hsun-tze are different from those of the Confucian thinking of Mencius, he is still considered to be a member of the Confucian family, and his stress on the importance of the principle of learning is one of the reasons which make him a Confucianist. To learn the principle and practice of rites is the main purpose of learning. It is one of the methods of transforming Man's Evil Nature, and also one of the ways to encourage Artifice.

In his book there are numerous passages on the concrete contents of theoretical and practical rites. In chapter XIX, he devotes this whole chapter to the discussion of rites. Rites, according to Hsun-tze, were established and introduced by the ancient Sage-Kings such as Yao and Yu, who saw the fighting and chaos caused by men trying to fulfill their own selfish desires.

The merit of rites to society and to the individual, viewed from outside, is mainly to classify the positions of men and to harmonize them in society, while viewed from internal viewpoint of the individual, is to nourish his Nature. The function of classification of the rites in ancient China, were to be a standard to show man's position in society. There were rites for an ordinary man, which he should practise and according to which he should be treated, so were those of an official, a minister, a feudal prince, a king, etc. In this chapter, Hsun-tze also gives concrete examples of rites. In the case of a funeral service, for instance, the coffin of an emperor, according to RITES, should have ten layers⁴¹; of a feudal prince, five layers; of an official, three layers; of a scholar, two layers; of a criminal, a three-inch layer only. (XIII, 6-7) Therefore according to Hsun-tze, the merit of rites is to distinguish the noble and the inferior in political class, the elder and younger of the family circle, and the rich and the poor of social class. In Hsun-tze's ideal, rites include all the classes of politics, family and society; that is to say, nothing which is not included in the human world. As to the practice of rites, Hsun-tze thinks that man should show neither exaggeration nor indifference of feelings; in other words, in practising rites, man should express his feelings in a proper way. As to the categories of rites, they can, Hsun-tze holds, be summarized as being within the processes of man's life. The real meaning of rites lies, to him, in respect for the living and

41. 重 Ch'ung.

exaltation of the dead. This is the principle and spirit of rites. Special regard for their practical content is not so important because the details of rites may be changed by social customs in different times. The multiplicity of rites is as Hsun-tze sees it, a minor aspect, for details of rites may be suitable for this time and this place but unsuitable for another time and place. What he wants to develop is the spirit of rites, namely: 'the principle of respecting those worthy of respect and being intimate with those worthy of intimacy'⁴². (XIII, 15)

This is the greatest merit of rites.

In his book Hsun-tze devotes chapter XX to a discussion of music⁴³, mentioning music with rites as a medium of encouraging good Artifice. In this chapter, he says,

'Music is the unchangeable harmony; rites are the unvariable principle. Music unites the similar, while rites distinguish the different. The unity of music and rites should be understood

42. 尊尊親親之義 Tsun-Tsun-Ch'in-Ch'in-Chih-Yi. This is also an important theme in the Confucian moral theory. In practice, it reminds man of an equally important Confucian theory that the king should behave like a king; the official, like an official; the father, like a father; the son, like a son. A son, for example, should, accordingly, respect and be intimate with his father, internally with love, and externally according to rites, to be obedient to his parents, to support them when he is independent, and to remain in mourning for three years after the death of his parent.

43. 樂 Yüeh. 樂經 YÜEH CHING or the BOOK OF MUSIC was lost, according to later scholars, during the Ch'in Dynasty (221-207 B.C.). However, it was affiliated in the BOOK OF RITES which was edited in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.). Later scholars suggested that the words of its songs might be selected from the BOOK OF ODES, its principle from the BOOK OF RITES and it is expressed by 伶官, the official theatrical performers.

thoroughly in man's Mind. To completely exhaust the origin (of man's feeling) and to make the changes (of man's life) thoroughly comprehensible is the nature of music; while to manifest sincerity (of man's will) and to shun hypocrisy is the true meaning of rites.' (XIV, 3)

What Hsun-tze means about music, it might be suggested, is that music itself thoroughly expresses the feelings of the author and those of the audience who appreciate it. Therefore Hsun-tze says that music 'unites the similar'. As to the nature of music, according to Hsun-tze, it is to present the feelings deep in the author's heart, and make them vividly manifested by means of its musical notes. In short, one may say that by music, the audience may trace out the feelings of its author as well as those of their own. If it is a piece of good music, the Confucianists hold, it may unite the moral men and influence the evil men; if it is licentious and lustful, it may assemble the evil men and have a bad influence on customs and spread an immoral atmosphere in society. From this, it is clear that Hsun-tze's view on the function of music is mainly of moral interest and that he does not depart from the Confucian thought on the moral role of music.

In short, Hsun-tze views rites and music as one of the practical means to encourage moral Artifice.

(ii) Respect for teachers

In chapter II of his book, Hsun-tze says,

'The purpose of rites is to rectify man's life.'
(I, 11)

If asked in what way man can learn rites, Hsun-tze answers in chapter I,

'There is no more convenient way of learning than that of being intimate with a teacher. RITES and MUSIC record only the main principles and they do not explain the details. The BOOK OF ODES and the BOOK OF HISTORY record only the ancient events which may not necessarily fit in with contemporary affairs, and the SPRING AND AUTUMN ANNALS⁴⁴ records things so briefly and indistinctly that the readers do not find it easy to understand immediately. If one follows a teacher, listening to his lectures and practising what he says, then one will be cultivated and will acquire a lofty personality and an all-embracing knowledge, and thus one will become a man of deliberation who can deal with any situation he encounters. Therefore I say: There is no more convenient way of learning than that of being intimate with a teacher. In the process of learning, there is no quicker way than that of esteeming a teacher, while the exaltation of rites is the second most important thing.'

(I, 5)

The details of rites are recorded in the BOOK OF ETIQUETTE AND CEREMONIAL which are almost too brief and indistinct to be understood by beginners, therefore Hsun-tze suggests that rather than groping in the dark, it is better for scholars to be intimate with a teacher. He indicates that to follow a teacher is the most effective way of encouraging Artifice. In putting forward this idea, he emphasizes the role of a teacher. In chapter II, on the one hand, he gives details of the relationship between learning rites and following a teacher, while on the other, he emphasizes the importance of a teacher. Thus he says,

44. 春秋 CH'UN-CH'IU. The annals of the state of 魯 Lu (722-484 B.C.) It is believed that Confucius, a native of Lu, edited it at one time.

'The purpose of rites is to rectify man's life; the purpose of a teacher is to rectify rites. Without rites, how can man rectify his life? Without a teacher, how can man know that the rites he practises are correct? Rites ought to be such, when man practises them as they are, that he is content with them. When what the teacher says, the man follows, then he understands that he should be obedient to his teacher. To be content with rites and to know that he should be obedient to his teacher is to be a Sage. Therefore those who are against rites are wild, irrational and lawless, those who are against teachers have their mind closed to the concept of the teacher. He, who does not accept teachers and laws and who loves to follow his own judgement, is just like a blind man who insists on distinguishing colours, or a deaf man who seeks to distinguish sounds. As a result, he will get nothing but disorder and confusion. Therefore what man ought to learn are rites and laws, and the function of a teacher is to act as an example of right appearance and deportment and to rectify these things in others. However, man should give more importance to rites and laws and be content with them.' (I, 11-12)

Here Hsun-tze makes it clear that the teacher is man's medium of learning. To be a Sage, the ideal personality of Hsun-tze, man should be content with rites and know how to be obedient to his teacher; in other words, a Sage should be one who feels comfortable and content with rites, and exalts and respects his teachers. Thus the teacher is elevated to a very high position. Since a teacher can rectify rites, as Hsun-tze says, the position of the teacher is higher than that of rites. From this, it is apparent that the practical means to encourage Artifice suggested by Hsun-tze are as follows: (1) to exalt and respect teachers, (2) to learn the rites, their practice and their meaning, and (3) to be content with rites and to understand how to obey teachers.

As the quality of a teacher has much influence on the pupil, and the function of a teacher is to rectify rites, the pupil

must, according to Hsun-tze, seek a good teacher. By good teacher, he means the one who is morally good and can be an example of moral personality to his pupil. In the last paragraph of chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze presents the theory of Gradually Accumulated Influence⁴⁵ to show his opinion on the necessity of a good teacher:

'Though a man may have fine qualities so that his Mind can distinguish and understand things, he still has to seek and serve a good teacher and to choose and be intimate with a good friend. If he has a good teacher to serve, then what he listens to will be the ways of Yao, Shun⁴⁶, Yu and T'ang⁴⁷; if he has a good friend to be intimate with, then what he sees will be the practice of loyalty, honesty, respect and humility. In this way, he will be on the way

45. 靡 Mi, a technical term of his philosophy. It originally means 'to disperse, to lean with pressure, to waste; small, wonderful, etc.' Hsun-tze uses it in a slightly different way to express his idea of gradual accumulation of either good or bad influence from teachers and friends. Therefore the phrase 'Gradually Accumulated Influence' is used here since it is difficult to render one English term similar and appropriate to Hsun-tze's idea.

46. 舜 Shun, a legendary Sage-King said to have ruled around 2000 B.C.

47. 湯 T'ang, an ancient Sage-King and the founder of the Shang Dynasty (1751-1111 B.C.)

to being Human-Minded⁴⁸ and to achieve righteousness day by day, and yet he will not be aware of it. It is the Gradually Accumulated Influence that makes him so! Now if a man stays with those who are not good, if what he hears is cheating, libel, swindling and hypocrisy, and what he sees is unrestrained conduct, debauchery and greediness, even if he is under sentence of death, he is still unawakened. It is the Gradually Accumulated Influence that makes him so!' (XVII, 9)

This shows the standpoint of Hsun-tze, for he claims that man should seek good teachers and friends so that a good Gradually Accumulated Influence will be achieved.

D: HIS THEORY CONCERNING CAPABILITY OF AND POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFORMATION OF MAN'S NATURE

According to Hsun-tze, the progress from the Evil of Man's Nature to the origin of good Artifice, or from being one of the masses to becoming a Sage, proves that Man's Nature is transformable. Hsun-tze repeatedly points out that the difference

48 仁 Jen, it may mean 'benevolence, humanity, mercy, kindness'. It became a technical term of Confucian ethics after Confucius took it as his moral ideal. In Confucian theory, Jen, means perfect virtue, or the ultimate state of man's moral life. In the chapters of the ANALECTS, although Confucius mentioned different aspects of practising Jen, he never defined it in its own terms. Therefore the philosophical inquiry of what Jen really is becomes difficult, if not impossible, to answer properly as it has been historically treated as an intuitive moral feeling, sometimes including reasoning, which is perhaps undefinable. However, the question of how Jen is practised is possible to construe. The Confucianists claim that moral practise is the key to reach the state of Jen, yet different concrete details of moral practice or moral effort are advertised by different thinkers. However, in translation, the modern moral term 'moral excellence' seems somewhat too vague for it, 'benevolence' is also not desirable, for Jen, often denotes a stronger moral sense which can only be completely manifested in the appearance and behaviour of the agent after moral cultivation. It seems that it is not possible to find an English term which bears a meaning similar to it, therefore the term 'Human-Minded' is tried for Mencius at one time interprets Jen as 'Human-Minded' (chapter VI, MENCIUS) meaning that Jen is the ultimate state of the human mind.

between a Sage and an ordinary man is that the former knows and is able to transform his Nature, while the latter fails to do so.

In chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze says,

'Therefore what makes a Sage identical with the masses, or the same as the masses, is his Nature. However, what makes him different and surpassing them is his Artifice.' (XVII, 3)

In chapter IV, he says,

'Yao and Yü were not born perfect. It was because of the Transformation of their Nature, and the accomplishment of well-cultivated Artifice that perfection is then attained after their Evil Nature has all been transformed.' (II, 11)

This shows, as Hsun-tze firmly believes, that all men are born with Evil Nature, that the accumulation of Artifice helps a man to transform his Evil Nature, and that by getting rid of his Evil Nature, he performs more good Artifice and gradually he surpasses others and attains holiness. Is then the Transformation of Man's Nature a universal possibility or are there men whose Nature cannot be transformed? Since, following the rule of Transformation of Man's Nature, all men could become as sage-like as Yao and Yü, is there a reason for the chaotic state of the world with its millions of Evil men? Hsun-tze answers these questions outstandingly well. In chapter XVIII, he argues,

'Yao and Shun were the most proficient people in the world at enlightening and civilizing the masses. When they sat facing south⁴⁹ and listened to the masses of the whole world⁵⁰, all men were stirred,

49. The seats of the ancient kings always faced south; later it became a tradition that all kings' seats faced south.

50. 天下 T'ien-Hsia, or all under Heaven. In ancient China the concept of territory was ambiguous, and most people considered that under Heaven lies the territory of China.

subdued and changed. Only Chu⁵¹ and Hsiang⁵² refused to change; this, however, was not the fault of Yao and Shun, but that of Chu and Hsiang. Yao and Shun were the most sagacious in the world, Chu and Hsiang, the most cunning and troublesome in their times . . . Yao and Shun, though the best at enlightening and civilizing the world, could not change the most cunning and troublesome men.' (XII, 9)

Sage-like though Yao and Shun were, they could not change their cunning and troublesome relatives, i.e. Chu and Hsiang. This was not the fault of the former, Hsun-tze believes, for Transformation of Man's Nature is a very personal affair. According to Hsun-tze, although there are rites and music, teacher and law, if a man does not learn assiduously and does not associate with a good teacher, then all these external means of help are useless. In chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze further explains,

'Someone asks, "As for reaching the stage of a Sage, man can accumulate (his Artifice) and attain it. However, there are the masses who cannot accumulate (Artifice). Why?" I answer: This is because man can do what he likes, but he cannot be forced. Therefore a Mean-Spirited Man could become a Conscientious Man, but he does not want to; a Conscientious Man could become a Mean-Spirited Man, but he does not want to. A Mean-Spirited Man and a Conscientious Man could exchange positions; however, they both reject the exchange: this is because man can do what he likes, but he cannot be forced. Therefore to say that anyone in the street can become a Yu is correct; to say that anyone in the street will eventually become a Yu is probably not true. Though man will not necessarily eventually become a Yu, it is not contradictory to say he can become a Yu. Feet generally can walk everywhere in the world, but in fact there are no feet which can really walk every inch of the world . . . Then the fact that man can do or become something does not

51. 朱 Chu, the son of Yao.

52. 象 Hsiang, the younger brother of Shun.

necessarily mean that he will eventually succeed; however, the fact that he does not succeed is no contradiction of the fact that he can do so. Thus the possibility of success and the capability of man are obviously different, and that the two cannot be exchanged in practice is clear.' (XVII, 6-7)

In this paragraph, Hsun-tze's argument is logical. The reasons given that Man's Transformation of his Nature is not a universal possibility are as follows: (1) external and objective power can help man to transform his Evil Nature but cannot force him to be transformed, and (2) internal and personal power of man can act according to his will but to be or not to be is his own decision and he is absolutely free to make his own decision. From these two factors, Hsun-tze singles out one very essential point: man's moral autonomy. The origins of Artifice are, according to Hsun-tze, on one hand, derived from the learning of the external world, including respect for the teacher and the law, and from the exaltation of rites and music; on the other hand, and more essentially, from man's rational Deliberation and decision, and outward behaviour. Accordingly, the Mind is the main origin of moral Artifice, and man possesses moral autonomy. Hsun-tze clearly indicates that the change or non-change of Man's Nature depends on the individual; however, a man who has the capability to become morally good and refuses to do so should shoulder the charge of being lazy, or of insufficiency in his moral effort. The influence of external factors, whether they are good or bad, cannot forcefully change anyone's decision unless he is willing. Man has the capacity to encourage good Artifice, but whether to follow the masses or the Sage is his choice.

Hsun-tze is the first in his time to suggest that Man's Nature is Evil, and must be transformed. He also suggests that man's final goal is to accumulate good Artifice in order to become a Sage. The ways to a Sage are, externally learning and exalting rites, being intimate with and serving a good teacher, and internally seeking for his rational Deliberation. This leads on to his theory of a Great Clear and Bright Mind⁵³. Here Hsun-tze develops his theory from the Transformation of Man's Nature to his investigations of the Mind, the essential part of his philosophy. However, his introduction of the term 'Artifice' certainly is an innovative one among classical writers. The theory of Artifice, on the one hand links up with his theories of Man's Evil Nature and its Transformation, while on the other, points to the theory of the Mind. It consistently runs through his entire system. Unfortunately later scholars, lacking the patience to read and digest his arguments and to understand the purpose of his theories of human nature, disliked the idea that Man's Nature is Evil, and rejected the concept of Artifice. Some even distorted the real meaning of these two technical terms, and therefore Hsun-tze has had few followers, which is a matter for regret in the history of Chinese philosophy⁵⁴.

53. 大清明心 Ta - Ch'ing-Ming-Hsin, a technical term of his theory of the Mind. He uses it to mean the state of the Mind when it is not obsessed.

54. A further discussion on p. 336.

His theory of Mind might be divided into two parts:

(1) the theory of the Epistemological Mind⁵⁵, and (2) the theory of the Ultimate Mind, or the Sage Mind⁵⁶. A survey of the first part will follow immediately.

55. In his theory, there is no such technical term. It is employed in this thesis as a special term to denote his idea of the capacity of the Mind to know and to examine all external objects including morality. It naturally involves itself in the realm of knowledge, and his theory of the Epistemological Mind is discussed in the chapter regarding his theory of knowledge.

56. **道心** Tao-Hsin. This term is used once in his book when he quotes from TAO TE CHING of Lao-tze, a philosopher earlier than him. He uses it to mean the Mind which has already completely united itself with the Ultimate Principle of Man, or Tao or morality. It simply means a Mind with perfect virtue. It is equivalent to the term '**聖心** Sheng-Hsin or a Sage Mind' which is also used in Chapter I of his book.

CHAPTER II:

HIS THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER II:

H I S T H E O R I E S O F K N O W L E D G E

It is obvious that Hsun-tze has no intention of establishing a system of theory of knowledge. For him, what is of most concern is morality, which he believes provides the only way to save the chaotic world of his time. One may consider that the purpose of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil is to introduce the theory of Artifice. After investigating the origin of Artifice he goes on to emphasize the functioning of the Mind. His philosophy then proceeds to the discussion of the relationship between the Mind and the Ultimate Principle of Man or Tao. The direction of his effort indeed is assigned to morality. Only because he had to resist contemporary sophistic theories did he develop his theory of knowledge, in which he puts forward four main themes, namely (1) the theory of names¹, (2) the theory of the Epistemological Mind, (3) the theory of reasoning, and (4) the theory of the rectification of names. Here an attempt is made to discuss these theories in order to give an outline of his opinion on knowledge.

SECTION 1: THE THEORY OF NAMES

Chapter XXII, entitled 'The Rectification of Names', is in fact his theory of names, which can be analysed into the following five parts.

1. 名 Ming, means 'name, designation, title, rank, position, honour, fame, reputation, famous, noble, great, etc.' Among the Pre-Ch'in scholars, Confucius is the first who insists on the correspondence between name and reality. He considers that names should serve as standards for social organization and personal conduct. Hsun-tze's theory of names offers a further development of that of Confucius.

A: HIS EXAMINATION OF THE ORIGIN OF NAMES

In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze first traces the history of names,

'When the later kings² formulated names, in the names of penalties, they followed the terms of Shang Dynasty³; in the titles of the nobility, they followed the terms of Chou Dynasty; in the names of ceremonies, they followed the terms of the book about rites⁴. As to the miscellaneous names given to all things, they followed those which were established by custom and were commonly approved in practice in the areas ruled by Hsia Dynasty⁵. People at a distance followed these standard uses of names and they made successful communication with one another.' (XVI, 1)

From this, it appears that Hsun-tze considers the origins of names to be derived from two sources, namely (1) the names of social institutions, and (2) those of miscellaneous common names. The former, including the names of laws, official ranks and rules of politeness, originates from the established institutional terms used by the ancient dynasties, while the latter originates from people with different customs and from different areas ruled by the Hsia Dynasty.

2. By the later kings or 後王 Hou-Wang, Hsun-tze refers them to the Sage-Kings of early Chou Dynasty (周 1111-256 B.C.). King Wen (文王) who paved the way for the founding of the dynasty, and King Wu (武王), the son of King Wen and the founder of the Chou Dynasty, are among those whom Hsun-tze praises as the models of his ideal political personalities, i.e. the Sage-Kings.

3. 商 Shang: approximately 1751-1111 B.C.

4. The book about rites which Hsun-tze mentions here is not LI CHI or THE BOOK OF RITES which was edited by the Han scholars, but 儀禮 YI LI or BOOK OF ETIQUETTE AND CEREMONIAL which records the rites established in early Chou Dynasty.

5. 夏 Hsia; approximately 2183-1752 B.C.

Hsun-tze then emphasizes the importance of the establishment of names for the purpose of communication, since two men using the same name but meaning different realities, cannot properly communicate with each other. Therefore a definition for each name concerned is necessary. When a name is established in common use, one also has to be careful if it is improperly or confusingly used by others. When a name is used loosely or abused, then one has to rectify and clarify the position. This is Hsun-tze's underlying idea in this chapter.

B: HIS DEFINITION OF NAME

In the same chapter, Hsun-tze defines the term 'name' as follows:

'Names have no intrinsic appropriateness. When men agree to use a certain name to apply to a certain thing and that thing is named, when the agreement is effective and becomes a matter of custom, the name may be said to be appropriate. If a name is used against convention, it is said to be inappropriate. Names have no intrinsic reality. When men agree to use a certain name to indicate a certain reality, and that reality is named, when the agreement is effective and becomes customary, the name may be said to be a real name.' (XVI, 4)

This argument so far as is known is first initiated by Hsun-tze among the thinkers of ancient China and is indeed not only pioneering but also of considerable profundity.

C: HIS DISCUSSION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF NAMES

His discussion of the functions of names which is found through the same chapter may be summarized in two points:

(i) Their political function

Hsun-tze discusses the intention of the Sage-Kings who regulated the proper uses of names as follows:

'If names are fixed so that realities can be distinguished; if the principles of regulating names are practised so that the wills of men may be communicated, then the kings can meticulously lead their people to comply and the world will thus be united. Therefore those who contest their definition of words and use unauthorized names to cause confusion in the use of correct names, and thus arouse doubt among the people and create much debate and litigation among them are called great scoundrels; their crimes are just like the crimes of those who make unauthorized allies⁶ and measures for officials. Therefore those of the king's people who dare not make strange terms so as to confuse the correct ones are honest people; since they are honest, they are easy to employ; since they are easy to employ, they have achievements. Since men among the king's people dare not make strange terms to create confusion in the use of the correct ones, they concentrate their efforts on observing the law and they are cautious to act according to the orders of the king, and thus the achievements of the king are increased. If the achievements of the king are increased, then success comes his way. This is the ultimate attainment of politics, and this is the merit of following faithfully the principle of regulating and abiding by names.' (XVI, 2)

In this paragraph, Hsun-tze discusses the merits of names with regard to politics, or rather the relationship between names and politics.

(ii) Their practical functions

According to Hsun-tze, the purpose of the proper regulation of names is to reach three goals, namely (1) from the

6. 符節 Fu-Chieh, carried for identification as a warrant in ancient China, usually carried by ambassadors when seeing high officials of another country.

aspect of name itself, to enable man to distinguish the nobles and the inferiors, the identical and the different; (2) from the aspect of man, to enable him to point out realities and to explain his will, and (3) from the aspect of events, to enable man to avoid the unhappiness of difficulties arising therefrom. Therefore Hsun-tze says,

'If different minds try to explain different forms of things; if name and reality are mixed without reference to actual things; if the noble and the inferior are not clarified; and if the identical and the different are not distinguished, then the will of men must endure the suffering of not being understood, and the event must suffer the calamity of being hindered or of failing. Therefore the wise man distinguishes different terms for the people, he regulates names to point out realities, and thus, on a high level, the result will be that the noble and the inferior are clarified, and on a lower level, that the identical and the different are distinguished. When the noble and the inferior are set apart, and the identical and the different are distinguished, then men's wills will not have to endure the suffering of not being understood, and the event will not then endure the calamity of being hindered or of failing; this is the reason for having names.' (XVI, 2-3)

Therefore Hsun-tze's reason for having names is also his justification of the practical function of names.

D: HIS SUGGESTION OF THE EXAMINATION OF NAMES

As to how to examine the correspondence of name and reality, Hsun-tze suggests two ways:

(i) By means of the natural senses of man

By using man's sensory organs, man can perceive and then know the similarities and differences of certain objects. In other words, man knows external object by experience.

(ii) By means of the Mind which can examine and understand

Hsun-tze suggests the Mind as the ultimate means of knowing, understanding and examining external realities. He says:

'The Mind has the ability to examine and know.'
(XVI, 3)

That is to say, the Mind, by gathering and examining the sense data which are received by the sensory organs, understands the existence of external objects and then reviews whether the names given are in correspondence with the factual truth. This suggestion involves Hsun-tze's theories on epistemology, which will be discussed in Section 2 of this chapter.

E: HIS PRINCIPLES OF FORMULATING NAMES

In his principles of formulating names, Hsun-tze suggests a threefold approach, namely (1) similarity and difference; (2) the general and the particular, and (3) the real number. To quote his own words:

'When things are alike, then they are named alike; when they are different, then they are named differently. When a single name is enough to explain a thing, then a single name is used; when a single name is insufficient to explain, then a compound name is used. When a single name and a compound name do not conflict with each other, then a general name may be used, and though a general name is used, it does no harm to the meanings either. Knowing that different realities have different names, he should not cause confusion among them. Likewise he should refer to the same realities with similar names. Therefore though all things are manifold, when times occur when men would like to speak of them all as a whole, he will name them as "things"⁷. "Thing" is a broad

7. 物 Wu, means things or physical objects.

general name⁸. Man deduces things according to their classes and generalises them, after generalisation there comes another broader general name till there are no more broader general names, and then the deduction ends. When times occur when man would like to speak of one thing in particular, he will name it as "bird" or "beast", (for example). "Bird" or "Beast" are broad particular names⁹. Man carries on the particularising and after particularisation, there comes another more particular name till there are no more particular names; then the particularisation ends.' (XVI, 4)

In the above paragraph, Hsun-tze indicates his first two principles of formulating names, i.e. the principles of naming the similarities and the differences, and the generalities and the particularities. As to the third principle, he says:

'There are things which have the same appearance but are in different places, there are also things which have different appearances but are in the same places; then they are distinguishable. Although things which have the same appearance but are in different places, can be called by the same name, they should be treated as two realities. When the appearance of a thing changes into a different one but its reality has no change, this is called change¹⁰. If a thing has changed yet its reality is still as it originally was, it should be treated as one reality.' (XVI, 4)

Hsun-tze's theories on the principles of formulating names are indeed, as far as known, the first suggested in ancient China.

SECTION 2: THE THEORIES OF EPISTEMOLOGY

Hsun-tze considers names to be a medium of knowing things. However, to examine whether a name corresponds with its reality,

8. 大共名 Ta-Kung-Ming.

9. 大別名 Ta-Pieh-Ming.

10. 化 Hua.

Hsun-tze suggests that man should use his senses and Mind. Before a name is fixed by common agreement and customary practice, the distinction of different realities is also made, according to Hsun-tze's theory, by man's sensory experiences. Therefore Hsun-tze's thinks that the necessary condition of knowing is man's own experience. In chapter XXII, he sets a question to himself:

'Then by what means does man distinguish the similarities and the differences?' (XVI, 3)

Here the argument proceeds to a further step in the investigation of the necessary condition of knowing.

A: HIS EXPLANATION OF KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSES

Hsun-tze's first answer is as follows:

'I say, by means of the natural sensory organs. When two men see things of the same kind and in the same situation, their sensory organs should have the same perceptions and make the same assumptions. Therefore they use gesticulation and comparison to describe the thing they see, and they then understand each other; this is also the time when they agree to fix a name on that thing, so that their knowledge of these things can be mutually transmitted to each other.'

(XVI, 3)

Thus Hsun-tze clearly indicates that the sensory organs of man are the first means of knowing things. Then he continues to distinguish the functions of man's five sensory organs: the eyes to distinguish form, body, colour and shape; the ears to distinguish the clear and turbid, broad and narrow and the strange of sounds; the tongue to distinguish the sweet, bitter, salty, fresh, peppery, sour and strange of tastes; the nose to distinguish the fragrant, stinking,

aromatic, rotten of smells, the different odours of pig, dog, horse and cow and the strange of smells; the body to distinguish the pain, itch, cold, hot, smooth, rough, light and heavy of feelings; the Mind to distinguish the pleasure and dislike, joy and anger, sadness and happiness, love and hatred and desire of emotions. Thus all these above are, for Hsun-tze, means of perceiving objects of knowledge.

B: HIS SUGGESTION OF MIND'S EXAMINING OF KNOWLEDGE

In the discussion of means of knowing, Hsun-tze is not satisfied with mere sensory organs, or more precisely, sensory experiences. He goes on to suggest the Mind as the faculty of examining and rationally understanding. He says:

'The Mind has the ability to examine and understand. Since it has the ability to examine and understand, thus by means of ears, it knows sounds; by means of eyes, it knows form and body.' (XVI, 3)

Therefore, according to Hsun-tze, the Mind, by means of sensory organs, perceives and recognizes things; and the Mind hence is the necessary condition of knowing. However, the realization of the ability of the Mind relies much on the appropriate contact of the related sensory organs. For instance, the condition that eyes can see is simply and initially that there is a visible object. Now supposing that the eyes can see and that there is an unknown object which the eyes can see as white in colour and square in shape, of which the eyes can see the approximate degree of whiteness and its volume, yet the eyes cannot distinguish whether it is warm or cool by sight. Therefore each sensory organ has its limitation in

providing the Mind with the data of the object contacted. In other words, the data of an object received by the Mind is limited, or conditioned by the senses. As to those things or existences which human senses cannot reach, such as what there is beyond the universe, or what is God, Hsun-tze suggests that man should admit that these things or existences are unknowable to him. Hsun-tze makes the above idea plain in these words:

'However, the Mind's ability to examine and understand must wait until the sensory organs can make an appropriate contact then can it be realized. If the five sensory organs contact an object and they cannot perceive sufficient data of it, then although the Mind examines and tries to give a meaning or understanding to the object, it cannot make a successful explanation or interpretation, and because of this man would say he does not know the object.' (XVI, 3)

This shows, according to Hsun-tze, that the ability of the Mind to examine and understand external objects has its limits. Hsun-tze admits, accordingly, that there are limits to knowledge from experience, but he also considers that there is no way of obtaining knowledge other than by experience.¹¹

In his discussions of the means of distinguishing the similar and the different, Hsun-tze puts forward natural organs and the Mind to structure his system of epistemology. If asked how the Mind examines and understands things, Hsun-tze gives a further step in search for the structure of the Epistemological Mind as discussed in chapter XXI:

11. Please note that to Hsun-tze, the Epistemological Mind in examining and understanding external objects undeniably has its limits, yet the Ultimate Mind in comprehending and practising morality may have no limits. For detailed discussion, please see pp.281-284.

'How does the Mind know? I say: because of its Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness¹² . . . There is nothing which the Mind does not store, yet there is what is called Receptiveness¹³ in it. There is no time in which the Mind does not know more than two things, yet there is what is called Attentiveness¹⁴ in it. There is no staticness in the Mind, yet there is what is called Undisturbedness¹⁵ in it. Man is born with the ability to know. After learning, he has memory. Memory is to store knowledge. However, what is called Receptiveness comes about when, in the Mind, the thing to be learned is not obstructed by the knowledge already stored; this is called the Receptiveness of the Mind. The Mind is born with the capacity of knowing; after knowing, the Mind distinguishes the differences, and the differences can be known simultaneously. However, what is called Attentiveness is that this one is not obstructed by that one; this is called the Attentiveness of the Mind. When the Mind sleeps, it dreams; when it relaxes, it wanders away; and when used, it works attentively; therefore there is no staticness in the Mind. However, what is called Undisturbedness means that fantasising and vexation will not disturb the knowledge which has been stored; this is called Undisturbedness . . . The Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness of the Mind is called Great Clearness and Brightness.' (XV, 4-5)

In the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness of the Mind, or when the Mind is a Great Clear and Bright one, according to Hsun-tze, knowledge of old and new all have their place in the Mind without obstructing one another, and there is always space, too, to store the world. Knowledge stored will not be mixed and

12. 虛壹而靜 Hsu-I-Erh-Ching.

13. 虛 Hsu, means 'empty, hollow, void, unoccupied, shapeless, unreal, false, deceptive, unfounded, groundless, weak, feeble, etc.' Hsun-tze uses this term in a technical way meaning the capacity of Receptiveness of the Mind.

14. 壹 I, an elaborate form of '一' (one) now used mostly in accounting. Hsun-tze uses it in a technical way meaning a state of the Mind which is devoted to, committed to, Tao. Attentiveness is suggested here.

15. 靜 Ching, means 'still, motionless, tranquility, silent, peaceful, serene, virtuous, chaste, etc.' Hsun-tze uses it in a technical way meaning the state of the Mind which is undisturbed by any internal and external situation.

become indistinct, and it also will not be disturbed by dreams or daydreams or vexation of the Mind. However, Hsun-tze says that those who can keep their Mind in such a state are the Sages. Thus it is clear that what he would like to achieve in this theory is to direct knowledge to morality. This will be discussed in the next chapter of this Part. However, his analysis of the condition of knowing of the Mind is also outstanding in his time. He tries to give a psychological explanation of how the mind has the ability of knowing, the origin of memory and the capacity of identification. Although his arguments are too succinct and his theory is not compact, his contribution to ancient Chinese philosophy in the field of psychology is significant.

C: HIS DISCUSSION ON ILLUSIONS

To keep the Mind in a state of Great Clearness and Brightness is not easy to achieve, and illusion slips in easily and thus the Mind will be obsessed. To dispel Obsessions of the Mind¹⁶, man should first understand the origins of illusions.

Thus in chapter XXI, Hsun-tze says:

'If a man sees a thing with a doubting eye, and his Mind is uncertain, then external things become indistinct, and the Deliberation of his Mind also becomes unintelligent; and thus, man cannot decide the right or wrong of his knowledge.' (XV, 8)

Hsun-tze at one point uses the metaphor of a pan of water as an illustration. There is clear and clean water in the upper part of

16. For reference, please see p.2, Note 10.

the pan and turbid and muddy water in the lower. When even a mild wind passes, the turbid and muddy water is moved down below while the clear and clean thus become disorderly. Likewise, whenever the Mind views when obsessed, Hsunt-tze claims, it doubts and becomes uncertain. In other words, man cannot then control his own Mind and it follows the ups and downs of the external world, and thus the Mind cannot clearly distinguish external things. The Mind thus fails to judge the validity of its cognition, not to mention its capacity of identification. Therefore, accordingly and consequently, illusions originate. In the same chapter, Hsun-tze points out several kinds of illusions to illustrate his argument that when the Mind is uncertain and follows the ups and downs of the external world, illusions follow. One of his examples of illusions may be quoted here:

'When walking in the dark, a man sees a piece of rock lying and thinks that it is a crawling tiger; he sees a row of trees and thinks that it is a crowd of men following him. This is because of darkness that obsesses his brightness.' (XV, 8)

Here Hsun-tze takes the example of a man walking in the dark; owing to the uncertainty of his Mind, he has unnecessary suspicions of seeing imaginary objects. It is not the brightness of sight that darkness has obsessed but the brightness of the Mind. The essential ideas of chapter XXI are to make plain the condition of knowing and the origin of Obsessions of the Mind, and to find the way of dispelling these Obsessions, or the way of keeping the state of Great Clearness and Brightness of the Mind.

Hsun-tze's theories of epistemology in this chapter start from the appeal for rectification of names, then proceed to the examination of why there are names and man's experience in examining whether the names correspond to reality, and then turn to the discussion of the origin of knowledge from sensory experiences and essentially from the Mind, and finally, the analysis of the capacity of the Great Clear and Bright Mind. He lays emphasis on knowledge from experience, yet he concludes his system with the Mind's capacity of knowing the Ultimate Principle, when it is in the state of Great Clearness and Brightness. Consequently, although his theories are quite systematically structured, Hsun-tze always puts forward his concept of morality as the final aim. In other words, he has no ambition of founding a theory of epistemology or knowledge, and therefore he does not develop his views on pure thinking or pure knowledge. His view on knowledge is knowledge for morality's sake, just like his view on learning, as mentioned in the last chapter. The effort of Hsun-tze, and also of many Chinese scholars of his time and of later times, is to pave the way for man to reach the state of moral perfection; in other words, all he and many others are concerned with is morality, or how to achieve moral perfection.

SECTION 3: THE THEORIES OF REASONING

Hsun-tze considers the Mind to be the subject or source of knowing. The Mind's capacity of knowing depends on the Mind and the object of knowing being in contact with each other.

Hsun-tze admits that man's experience is limited, and therefore the contact of the Mind with the external objects is also limited. Thus if asked the way in which the Mind may know more about the world, Hsun-tze puts forward his theory of reasoning. However, there is no complete system or discussion of theory of reasoning in his book; in other words, he does not consciously establish a whole theory of it. Only some fragments have survived in scattered places, related to the theory. These fragments which are quoted below may be divided into three kinds related to three types of reasoning.

A: HIS SUGGESTION OF ANALOGICAL REASONING

In chapter V, Hsun-tze says:

'Therefore he (the Sage) measures the man of the past by means of the man of the present, the situation of the past by means of the situation of the present, the classification of the past by means of the classification of the present, and the merits of the past by means of theories of the present. He attains observations of all of these by means of an Ultimate Principle: and he then finds that the present and the past are alike and the measurement used is always the same.' (III, 4-5)

The measurement the Sage uses is, according to Hsun-tze, the Ultimate Principle, or Tao. However, knowledge by means of analogical measuring or reasoning is, Hsun-tze considers, possible.

B: HIS SUGGESTION OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING

In chapter IX, Hsun-tze says:

'From classification, man observes the miscellaneousness of all things. From one, man observes all.' (V, 7)

In chapter VIII he says:

'From the shallow, man measures the deep,
from the past, he measures the present; from one,
he measures ten thousand.' (IV, 10)

Also in chapter V he says:

'If man wants to view one thousand years
later, then he should review today; if he wants
to know ten thousand or a hundred million, then
he should review one and two . . . From the
immediate, man knows the remote, from one, he
knows ten thousand; from the obscure, he knows
the obvious side.' (III, 4)

Here the words 'observe', 'measure', 'review', and 'know' used
by Hsun-tze all have the meaning of reasoning, and the way of
reasoning suggested which proceeds from one universal to a
thousand particulars is classified as deductive reasoning.

C: HIS SUGGESTION OF INDUCTIVE REASONING

In chapter III, Hsun-tze says:

'The emotion of a thousand or ten thousand
men are that of one man.' (II, 5)

Here Hsun-tze is using inductive reasoning to induce one universal
principle from thousands of particularities.

From the above, it is clear that although Hsun-tze shows
some interest in the use of names, and he tries to establish the
proper ones and to rectify the confused ones, yet he does not turn
his attention to pure knowledge and to founding a complete system

of theory of knowledge. The main reason for this is that he has no interest in non-ethical arguments. The above analyses merely serve to demonstrate that he has said something related to the theory of reasoning. If he had developed his thought in this area, he might have made a greater contribution to the theory of knowledge. However, although his words in this field do not go into detail, it would be unfair to say that he had not touched on the topic.

SECTION 4: THE THEORY OF THE RECTIFICATION OF NAMES (A)
— THE SOLUTIONS OF THE THREE CONFUSIONS —

In chapter XXII, entitled 'The Rectification of Names' Hsun-tze firstly explains the function of names and the principles of formulating names; then he tries to argue against the popular sophistries of his contemporaries. He debates rigorously and tries to point out their defects sharply. Thus he produces his notable discussion on the 'three confusions',¹⁷ which later scholars comment to be the most important arguments of Hsun-tze that involve the problems of logic¹⁸.

Hsun-tze analyses contemporary sophistries into three groups; and he charges them of (1) using words to confuse names, (2) using fact to confuse names, and (3) using words to confuse

17. 惑 Huo. To Hsun-tze, Huo is a fallacy in the application of name which gives rise to confusion.

18. However, the comment may not be valid, for Hsun-tze's discussion of the three confusions itself is not as successful as is attributed. For a further argument, please see pp.240-251.

fact¹⁹. In each discussion, he firstly gives examples quoted from contemporary popular sophistical statements which unfortunately can now almost all be seen in fragments only, then he follows by an investigation of the reason for their confusions or deficiencies, and finally suggests a solution to each of them.

A: HIS DISCUSSION OF USING WORDS TO CONFUSE NAMES

In his first analysis, Hsun-tze says:

'To be insulted is not disgraceful. The sage does not love himself. To kill a thief is not to kill a man. These confusions are caused by the speaker's using words to confuse names. If the reason for having names is examined, and the appropriateness of names used is investigated, then the confusion can be refuted.' (XVI, 5)

The first example of confusions is quoted from the theory of Sung-tze²⁰ that to be insulted is not disgraceful. In chapter XVIII, Hsun-tze argues against Sung-tze's theory in detail:

'Master Sung-tze once said, "If the theory that to be insulted is not disgraceful is clearly explained and understood, then men will not fight; it is because men think that to be insulted is disgraceful that they fight; if they know that to be insulted is not disgraceful, then they will not fight". I respond, "Then you consider that man feels that he does not hate to be insulted?" The answer is²¹, "He hates, yet he does not feel disgraced." I say, "If so, your wish must

19. 以名亂名,以名亂實,以實亂名. I-Ming-Luan-Ming, I-Ming-Luan-Shih, I-Shih-Luan-Ming.

20. 宋子 Sung-tze, 360-290 B.C., a scholar in the Warring States Period. He is said to have written eighteen essays yet none of them have survived. Hsun-tze must have read or heard of this statement of Sung-tze; however, one cannot now find it in any other philosophical work of this period.

21. It is suggested by later scholars that the answer probably came from the follower or disciple of Sung-tze.

never be realized. The fighting of men is certainly caused by their feeling of hatred rather than their feeling of disgrace. Now watch the clown, the dwarf and the comedian, they insult one another, yet they do not start fighting. Do they not understand the teaching that to be insulted is not disgraceful? In fact, the reason why they do not start fighting is that they do not hate (the game of teasing one another). Now, there is a man entering inside someone else's garden wall, and stealing someone else's pig, then the master of the house takes up his sword to drive him off. Now if the master of the house does not care about his life in fighting against the thief, is not that because he thinks that losing a pig is disgraceful? In fact, the reason why he dares to fight is because he hates (the behaviour of the thief). Although man may think that to be insulted is disgraceful, if he does not feel hatred, he will not start fighting; again, although he may know that to be insulted is not disgraceful, if he feels hatred, he will certainly start fighting. Then to fight or not to fight is not determined by the feeling of being insulted or not but by the feeling of hatred or not. Now Master Sung-tze cannot explain man's feeling of hating to be insulted and he merely insists that man should not feel he is insulted, is it not extremely erroneous!"

(XII, 11-13)

In this paragraph, Hsun-tze argues the mistake of Sung-tze that if man is insulted and does not feel disgraced, then he will have no motive to fight. In debate, Hsun-tze considers that the motive for fighting lies in the feeling of hatred of being insulted and not in the feeling of disgrace because of being insulted. Since Sung-tze misunderstands, Hsun-tze claims, the cause of man's fighting, his statement becomes a confusion. According to solution of this confusion, suggested by Hsun-tze, man should examine the different meanings of the words 'not disgraceful' and 'not feeling hatred', and understand that the cause of fighting does not lie in the feeling of disgrace. Thus the fallacy committed by Sung-tze may be resolved.

The second example given is 'the sage does not love himself' which might be a quotation from his contemporary Mo-ists, follower of Mo-tze²². Hsun-tze considers that the sage is the one who loves all men, and so if one says that the sage loves all men but himself, it is evident that the speaker does not understand that the terms 'men' and 'one's own self' are two names with one reality, or more clearly speaking, that the sage himself is a man as well. It is contradictory to say that the sage loves all men, including himself, but he does not love one man who is himself. Therefore, according to Hsun-tze, if the speaker considers that the words 'men' and 'the sage himself' bear a similar reality, this confusing statement will be resolved.

The third example given 'to kill a thief is not to kill a man', is a quotation which now can be found in MO-TZE²³. Hsun-tze considers that a thief is undoubtedly a man, thus the

22. 墨子 Mo-Ti or Mocius, was born between 500-490 B.C. and died between 425-416 B.C. He is one of the important thinkers in the Warring States Period and the founder of Mo Chia or the Mohism or the school of Mo. The book of MO-TZE is believed to be written by his disciples. The quotation Hsun-tze uses here is in the latter part of MO-TZE, which is often called MO-PIEN by later scholars. There are six chapters in MO-TZE, which are commonly considered not from the same author of the other chapters and possibly an appendix added by the Mo-ists after Mo-tze to record the development or achievements of a particular branch of Moism thought, which contains a rich content of discussions such as the theoretical structure of knowledge, the discussion of epistemological methodology, the definitions of certain names or terms, and discussions of logic in debate. The third and fourth chapters are interpretations of the first two chapters, and the later two chapters are of independent subject matter. These six chapters, namely 經上 Ch'ing-Shang, 經下 Ch'ing-Hsia, 經解上 Ch'ing-Chieh-Shang, 經解下 Ch'ing-Chieh-Hsia, 大取 Ta-Ch'ü and 小取 Hsiao-Ch'ü, are usually named MO-PIEN.

23. This quotation appears in the sixth chapter entitled 'Hsiao-Ch'ü' in MO-PIEN.

above statement, substituting the word 'thief' by the word 'man', reading 'to kill a man is not to kill a man' is eminently fallacious. Hsun-tze thinks that the mistake of the statement is that the names being used are unclarified and this causes confusion.

B: HIS DISCUSSION OF USING FACT TO CONFUSE NAMES

In the same chapter, Hsun-tze says:

'Mountains and chasms are on the same level. Man naturally has few desires. A feast of grass-fed and grain-fed animals has no tastiness. The music of the great bell gives no pleasure. These confusing statements are caused by the misuse of fact to confuse names. If the means of distinguishing the similarities and the differences is examined, and the appropriateness of names used is investigated, then such confusions can be stopped.'

..(XVI, 5)

The first quotation given in the paragraph is suggested by Hui-Shih²⁴. Hsun-tze considers that the source of knowledge is man's experience and the statement of Hui-Shih is surpassing what man can experience. If a man stands on a plain ground, as Hsun-tze would argue, what his eyes can see is obviously that the sky and the earth are on a different level, and that the mountains and chasms are also on a different level, the former being in the higher

24. 惠施 Hui-Shih, approximately 380-300 B.C., a friend of 莊子 Chuang-tze (approx. 369-286 B.C.) and a prime minister of the State of 魏 Wei. Only ten paradoxes and a few fragmentary statements of his work have survived and are quoted in the last chapter of CHUANG-TZE (chapter XXXIII), a work by Chuang-tze and possibly others. However, the background of why Hui-Shih says so is not known.

position while the latter are in the lower position. Therefore Hsun-tze considers the mistake made by Hui-Shih is that Hui-Shih does not examine the fact with his senses or experience.

The second example quoted is suggested by Sung-tze²⁵.

In chapter XVIII, Hsun-tze picks out the statement and makes a full argument:

'Master Sung-tze says, "Man naturally has few desires; if man thinks that he desires much, then he is wrong". Therefore Sung-tze leads his fellows to support his theory and to explain it clearly with metaphors, with the purpose of making man understand that man naturally is to desire little. In answer, I say, "If so, then Sung-tze also considers that man naturally does as follows: his eyes do not desire the extremely beautiful colours, the ears do not desire the extremely musical sounds, the tongue does not desire the extremely delicious tastes, the nose does not desire the extremely pleasant smells, and the body does not desire extremely comfortable leisure. Are these five extremes not wanted by man?" The answer is, "Man naturally wants these". I say, "If so, then your theory will certainly not be realized. If man thinks that man naturally wants these five extremes but does not desire much of them, this is just like thinking that man naturally desires richness and high position but he does not desire property or goods, he loves beauty but he hates Hsi-Shih²⁶. Men in the ancient time did not think like this; they thought that man naturally desires much and does not desire little. Therefore the ancient Sage-Kings rewarded his people with great wealth or punished them by the death penalty or some other severe punishment. This was the way which the hundred kings were similar in their policy . . . Now that Master Sung-tze considers that man naturally desires little and does not desire much, that means accordingly that the early

25. The background of this statement is not known as the work of Sung-tze or details of his philosophical system is lost.

26. 西施 Hsi-Shih, a very beautiful woman in the Epoch of Spring and Autumn (approximately from 722-484 B.C.) who was offered to King Wu (吳王 Wu-Wang) by King of Yueh (越王 Yueh-Wang).

Sage-Kings had rewarded their people with what the people did not desire and punished them with what they desired. There is no confusion greater than this!" (XII, 13-14)

From this it is evident that Hsun-tze considers that the mistake made by Sung-tze is that Sung-tze's argument is not in accordance with man's experience. Hsun-tze thinks that all men naturally love beautiful colours, musical sounds, delicious tastes, pleasant smells, and care-free relaxation, therefore the theory of Sung-tze is contradictory to fact and experience and thus it is a fallacy.

The third and fourth examples quoted are similar in their implication, and both may be from the contemporary saying of Mo-ists²⁷. According to the theory of Hsun-tze, a feast of grass-fed and grain-fed animals is delicious, a fact that every man may have experienced. Now if a man partakes of such a feast, he cannot deny that the feast has great tastiness. Similarly, a great bell produces fine music, which anyone may have experienced. Now if a man is entertained by such a musical bell, he cannot deny that the bell gives pleasure; because these are unquestionably facts. Therefore, Hsun-tze considers that the two statements are confusions, for they are not in accordance with facts and experiences.

C: HIS DISCUSSION OF USING WORDS TO CONFUSE FACT

In most of the Chinese classical texts, punctuation was seldom used. When the work was edited or rearranged for

27. Again why these statements are made remains unknown.

publication in the later centuries, punctuation might be added and the punctuation inserted often according to the interpretation of the editor in every century. The validity of the interpretation often became the subject of controversial textual researches. In the case of the first nine Chinese words in the following paragraph quoted by Hsun-tze, later scholars found it difficult to add appropriate punctuation so as to divide them into intelligible sentences. These first nine Chinese words, which Hsun-tze quotes in the third discussion may have, according to later scholars, two possible readings:

- (1) 'He who censures (his enemy) visits him. The pillar has an ox. A (white) horse is not a horse.'
- (2) 'He who censures (his enemy) visits him and is (politely waiting to be interviewed) beside the pillar. To have an ox and a horse is not to have a horse²⁸.' (XVI, 5)

In the first way of reading them, the first example quoted is, according to Hsun-tze, a confusion, for the words 'censure' and 'visit' seem contradictory to each other in their meanings. Man naturally does not visit his enemy whom he censures. The same interpretation can be used for the first example of the second way of reading them. As to the second example quoted of the first way of reading, there may be incorrect or missing words

28. The two ways of reading these nine Chinese words are:

- (1) 非而謁，楹有牛，馬非馬也。
'Fei-Erh-Yeh, Ying-You-Niu, Ma-Fei-Ma-Yeh'.
- (2) 非而謁楹，有牛馬非馬也。
'Fei-Erh-Yeh-Ying, You-Niu-Ma-Fei-Ma-Yeh'.

It is difficult to know whose statements Hsun-tze is quoting here, especially the first two of the first reading, although some later scholars speculated that the words were derived from MO-PIEN or some other Mo-ist. The only thing one can be sure is that these 'words' are popular in Hsun-tze's times and he feels that they are sophistries about which he must have something to say.

in the sentence, and it is still a riddle to later scholars. It may be interpreted as follows: there is a carving of an ox on the pillar, and if one simply says that the pillar has an ox, then the words he uses are leading to confusion of the facts. As to the third example of the first way of reading, the statement that a (white) horse is not a horse is, most commentators suggest, quoted from the sayings of Kung-sun Lung²⁹. Kung-sun Lung considers that when man speaks of a white horse, he speaks of a particular one, therefore (1) a white horse is not any horse but a particular one which is spoken of particularly; (2) a white horse or any particular horse cannot, therefore, represent all horses. However, according to Hsun-tze, the term 'horse' is a general name while the term 'white horse' is a particular name, and both can be compounded to indicate one reality, therefore Hsun-tze considers that a white horse is a horse or that a horse can always represent all horses. Thus he claims that the words used in the statement lead to confusion as to the fact. As to the other way of reading it, it is evidently fallacious, for, according to Hsun-tze, an ox and a horse are two realities; therefore to say that an ox and a horse is not a horse is factual. If a man tries to make this statement into a theory, it is apparent that he is trying to do something which is meaningless, and this results in confusion. Hsun-tze may thus charge it of being confusing. However, these two possible ways of reading the nine words are also confusing to later scholars; although the first way of reading them seems to

29. 公孫龍 Kung-sun Lung, born 325-315 and died 250 B.C., one of the famous sophists in the Warring States Period. In his work entitled KUNG-SUN-LUNG TZE, in six chapters, he shows great interest in the discussion of names.

be more suitable to the original discussion, it has still remained a subject for further investigation.

The solution suggested to these fallacies is, Hsun-tze continues in the passage, as follows:

'If the agreement of names is examined, and the appropriateness of realities which those names represent and of the usage of those names is investigated, then the confusion will be prevented.' (XVI, 5)

Therefore when the appropriateness of the names used and the realities which they are intended to indicate is sorted out, the mistake or the fallacy will not be repeated.

The above mentioned are the famed three kinds of confusions and their solutions and Hsun-tze makes use of the three ways of examining names, as he himself suggested, to argue against these three confusions or sophistries of his contemporaries. The three ways of examining names he uses are: (1) to examine the reason for having names; (2) to examine the means of distinction of similarities and difference, and (3) to examine what is agreed of the name. In other words if one examines the appropriateness of name and reality by means of one's experience, confused names and statements may be rectified.

This is his negative way of rectifying confused names.

SECTION 5: THE THEORY OF THE RECTIFICATION OF NAMES (B)
— THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARTS OF DEBATE —

In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze says:

'Now the Sage-Kings are dead, the world is in chaos and evil sayings arise.' (XVI, 6)

In a chaotic world Hsun-tze who wants to rectify names feels that it is insufficient to rely merely on theories, and that to have practical debate with those who make evil sayings and confuse correct names is necessary and essential. Thus he introduces the arts of debate³⁰ as the practical means of rectifying names.

A: THE MEANING OF DEBATE

In chapter V, Hsun-tze says:

'A Conscientious Man must debate. There is no one who does not like to speak what he considers good, and a Conscientious Man is the most earnest of them.' (III, 6)

It is evident that the reason why a Conscientious Man must debate is that he likes to speak what he considers good, and if he does not like to speak what he considers good, he is not a Conscientious Man.

In the same chapter, Hsun-tze also says:

'Man follows the earlier kings, obeys propriety and righteousness and relates himself to learning, yet if he does not like to speak, he does not take pleasure in debate, then he certainly is not a sincere Scholar. Therefore in order to speak (what he considers good), a Conscientious Man loves it (i.e. debate) sincerely, practises it easily and says it willingly. For this reason, a Conscientious Man must debate.' (III, 5)

30. 辯術 Pien-Shu.

In another paragraph, Hsun-tze repeatedly emphasizes that debate to a Conscientious Man is just as important as Human-Mindedness to him, thus he says:

'The practice of Human-Mindedness of a Conscientious Man is insatiable, . . . The speaking (of what he considers good) of a Conscientious Man is insatiable.'

(III, 5-6)

In fact, what a Conscientious Man considers good is, according to Hsun-tze, Human-Mindedness; therefore Hsun-tze concludes that 'what a Conscientious Man debates is Human-Mindedness'. (III, 6) From this, it is clear that the Conscientious Man introduced by Hsun-tze is the one who loves to speak of and debate on what he considers good, and to debate, therefore, is a conscious practice of a Conscientious Man. This is the positive meaning of the statement that 'a Conscientious Man must debate'.

On the other hand, the necessity of a Conscientious Man to debate arises partly because he is in a chaotic world. In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze says:

'Since the Conscientious Man is not officially influenced and powerful and he is not in the position to use official penalties to prohibit (evil sayings), therefore he has to debate.' (XVI, 6)

For this reason, Hsun-tze considers the purpose of debate of a Conscientious Man is to stop evil sayings, and thus to illuminate the right and wrong, to keep the country under control and to bring peace to the world. This is the negative meaning of the statement that 'a Conscientious Man must debate'.

In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze also suggests a definition of debate:

'To debate is to speak of the Mind's intimation of the Ultimate Principle. The Ultimate Principle is the common law and policy of administration. The Mind should be in accordance with the Ultimate Principle; the debate should accord with the Mind, and statements should accord with the debate.' (XVI, 6)

In other words, to debate is to speak of the accordance of the Mind with the Ultimate Principle, which manifests itself in, according to Hsun-tze, morality, or in his term 'the Ultimate Principle of Man'. This definition is also consistent with the above-mentioned positive and negative meaning of debate. According to Hsun-tze's suggestion, on one hand, and positively, to debate is to speak of what man considers to be in accordance with the Ultimate Principle of Man, and on the other hand, negatively to debate is to illuminate the right and wrong, to keep the country under control and to bring peace to the world.

In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze also says,

'To debate is to speak of what is no different in name and reality and to explain the way of the dynamic and the static³¹.' (XVI, 6)

Therefore accordingly, to debate is also a way of rectifying names. This statement also points out the essence of debate: in debate, any names used must be in accordance with its reality, otherwise the

31. 動靜之道 Tung-Ching-Chih-Tao, an equivalent of 陰陽之道 Yin-Yang-Chih-Tao, or the way of Yin and Yang in Hsun-tze's theory. It seems that Hsun-tze used the term in a non-metaphysical sense; to him, it simply means the phenomena of the world.

statement made becomes sophistry. As to the way of the dynamic and the static, these are in fact the way of the events and principles of the world, or the realities of the world. Therefore, accordingly, to debate is to use the proper word to explain the appropriate fact or reality of the world. Hsun-tze then continues in the same passage:

'To give a name and to assign a fixed meaning to the name is the function of debate.' (XVI, 6)

Therefore in the application of words in debate, man can employ several names to construct a statement, or invent appropriate new names. As to the necessary rules of debate, Hsun-tze suggests that 'the reasons must be fully given'. (XVI, 6) In other words, in debate, man must display all the supporting reasons; if one debates without giving any supporting reasons, it is just like not making a debate at all. A debater must firstly have his reasons for debate, then he should use names in their proper functions, assign fixed meanings to names used, or give new names, and display his opinion or suggestions so as to reach the purpose of his debate.

Therefore to use a name, to designate a fixed meaning to the name used, and to give a new name must all be in accordance with fact or reality; then to explain fully the supporting reasons so as to make clear principles or events is the essence of debate, or simply speaking, a good debate. And from another point of view, it is also a necessary condition of debate.

B: HIS SUGGESTION OF WHAT A CONSCIENTIOUS MAN DOES NOT DEBATE

Although Hsun-tze insists that a Conscientious Man must debate, there are circumstances which, he considers, a Conscientious Man should not speak of or in which it is unnecessary for a Conscientious Man to speak. These circumstances are as follows:

(i) In doubt

In chapter XXVII, Hsun-tze says:

'When in doubt, a Conscientious Man should not speak.'
(XIX, 12)

According to what he has said on the Obsessions of the Mind, if man is in doubt, then his Mind is not clear and bright, and he cannot correctly distinguish things. Therefore in such a circumstance, no man should speak or make debate, not to mention a Conscientious Man.

(ii) When not concerned with Human-Mindedness or 'Jen'

In chapter V, Hsun-tze says:

'When man's speech is not concerned with Human-Mindedness, then his speech can do no better than his silence, and his debate can do no better than his stammering.' (III,7)

According to Hsun-tze, if the content of the speech is not concerned with Human-Mindedness or 'Jen', or broadly speaking, with morality, it is better not to waste time in such a speech.

(iii) Valueless speech

In chapter XVII, Hsun-tze says:

'As to valueless speech and the investigation of non-urgent matters, man should abandon them and leave them aside.' (XI, 12-13)

Then what is valueless speech? Hsun-tze explains in chapter XXI.

'If it is not to distinguish the right and the wrong, not to deal with the crooked and the straight, not to identify order and disorder, and not to research on the Ultimate Principle of Man, then although man makes such a speech, it is of no benefit to others.' (XV, 10)

Therefore accordingly, the valueless speech is that which is not relevant to the ethical administration of man, or simply speaking, to morality.

(iv) Speech and silence

In chapter VI, Hsun-tze says:

'To speak appropriately is wise, to be silent in a suitable time is also wise. Therefore wise silence is as good as wise speech.' (III, 10)

Speech and silence are a pair of opposites and Hsun-tze gives a wise meaning to the use of them. He holds that to apply them in the appropriate times is wise, and sometimes when silence is applied properly, it is as good as speech. Therefore Hsun-tze says that a wise silence is equivalent to a wise speech. So in certain circumstances, as mentioned above, a Conscientious Man should not make debate. In effect, his silence speaks.

In conclusion, Hsun-tze considers that a Conscientious Man should not debate when he is in doubt, or when the discussion is not concerned with Human-Mindedness, or broadly speaking, with morality, or when it is a valueless speech. If to speak is not appropriate, then it is better to remain silent. These are also

ways of proper application of debate, or art of debate in a negative sense. Thus ends his theory on the rectification of names and the discussion of his theory of knowledge.

CHAPTER III:

HIS THEORIES OF HEAVEN AND
THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE

CHAPTER III:

H I S T H E O R I E S O F H E A V E N A N D T H E U L T I M A T E P R I N C I P L E

Hsun-tze's theory of the Ultimate Principle is the very core of his philosophy. However, in theory, before he can explain what the Ultimate Principle is, it is logical for him to clarify what it is not. For him, knowledge, the accumulation of various kinds of thought, when it becomes an absolute value of life, is an Obsession of man's thought; while Heaven, when it is considered to be the absolute authority of the universe and becomes an object of man's superstitions, is an Obsession to man's Mind; and these Obsessions become the main factors of man's failure to see the Ultimate Principle. Therefore the rectification of the name and concept of Heaven becomes a necessary preliminary step for Hsun-tze.

SECTION 1: THE THEORIES OF HEAVEN

A: THE PROBLEMS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEAVEN AND MAN

In the New Stone Age (approximately 6000 years ago), the Chinese people lived together in the valley of Yellow River¹ and started to form their agricultural society. Perhaps because of such constant calamities as the flooding of the Yellow River, people gradually came to fear nature, or the heaven and earth. Also, because farming inevitably depended on nature, they could not help feeling that they had to pray to nature for protection. Therefore, as recorded by the classic in the three dynasties of Hsia, Shang and

1. 黄河 Huang-Ho.

Chou, the belief in ghosts, gods, and the business of divining or foretelling were popular. Besides worshipping the Heaven God in order to ask for rain and blessings or to pray for protection against calamities, they offered sacrifices to the Earth God, the River God, the Mountain God, the gods of crops, the gods of the four corners², the Wind God, the Moon God, the gods of stars, etc., and they also offered sacrifices to their ancestors in order to ask for blessing and protection against calamities. This was different from the ceremonies held in later centuries of offering sacrifices to ancestors in remembrance of their life and teaching. This became an even more popular fashion in the Chou Dynasty. From the beginning, however, China favoured polytheism and not monotheism. To the ancient Chinese, although the Heaven God is the master of the universe, it seems that it has little contact with the ordinary masses. It is the king's duty directly to pray and offer sacrifices to the Heaven God for his people and his country. As to the masses, they pray and offer sacrifices particularly to the Earth God and gods of crops, who are of particular importance to them, and they also pray and offer sacrifices to other gods and ghosts. Their general attitude to their god(s) was a feeling of fear mixed with the hope to please. Their beliefs in general were childish, naive, and unsophisticated, or, simply speaking, were superstitious. Their god(s) to them was merely connected with physical livelihood and survival rather than the satisfaction of man's mental life. Men of that time seldom had profound beliefs in one god, who was believed to be the origin of the universe and of all lives, or from whose revelation they were enlightened to an ideal of life. In other words, their beliefs were only to fulfil their physical or practical needs.

2. Gods of east, south, west and north.

From the above it seems that the relations of Heaven and man in ancient China led to superstition in which there was no religious ideal or value. In short, the beliefs of the ancient Chinese are a development of polytheistic superstitions. This development extended to the times of Hsun-tze.

In the time of Hsun-tze, near the end of the Warring States period after the fall of the Chou Dynasty, when wars and calamities occurred year after year, the traditional superstitions towards gods and ghosts tended to become even more widespread. In Ch'i³, there was a group of scholars who devoted themselves to absurd and peculiar thoughts. Among them were the accultists who talked about gods and ghosts, monsters and demons, and the astrologers who talked about the interrelations of Heaven and man. This tendency led to a sharpened contrast between heaven and man, or between god and man, or more precisely, that between a master and his subordinate. In other words, the position of the supernatural god was getting higher and higher day by day, while that of man sunk lower and lower. Hsun-tze, who was strongly against these thoughts and tendencies, felt it necessary to speak in order to put right this confusing situation. The chapter entitled 'On Heaven' (chapter XVII) functions as an elimination of superstitions on Heaven and as rectification of the name 'Heaven'.

Hsun-tze's theories of Heaven can therefore be divided into four parts: namely, his theory of the different power and abilities of Heaven and man; his elimination of superstitions about

³齊 Ch'i, one of the seven strong countries in the Warring States Period.

Heaven; his concept of Heaven, and his suggestion on the possible relationship between Heaven and man.

B: HIS THEORY OF DIFFERENT POWERS OF HEAVEN AND MAN

To Hsun-tze, Heaven and man are two different realities and there is no moral causation between them. Therefore, the statements such as 'to be damned by Heaven and Earth', 'Heaven and Earth cannot accept', etc. are, to Hsun-tze, not apposite. And he also considers that the power of Heaven and the ability of man are completely different and not relevant at all to each other. In chapter XVII, he makes it clear that 'those who understand the difference between Heaven and man are called Sages'. (XI, 9)

In the same chapter he says:

'Success without making efforts and attainment without seeking help are the power of Heaven. Therefore although man's Deliberation is profound, it cannot affect Heaven; although his ability is great, it cannot affect Heaven; and although his observation is thorough and accurate, it cannot affect Heaven. This is what I would advise, not to compete for power with Heaven.' (XI, 9)

From this it is evident that Hsun-tze admits the limit of human power. No human ability can completely overcome the power of Heaven, or nature. He goes on to say:

'The man with great skill is he who knows not to strive (with Heaven), and the man with great wisdom is he who knows what not to deliberate.' (XI, 10)

In other words, a wise man who is also sharp, keen and skilful knows not to waste all his thoughts and ability on investigating Heaven.

However, Hsun-tze does not insist that besides morality, there is no knowledge at all; thus he explains:

'What can be recorded and understood about Heaven is its phenomena of which regular sequences can be forecast by man. What can be recorded and understood about Earth is its conditions in which all things can be bred, increased and multiplied. What can be recorded and understood about the four seasons is the calendar by which man can cultivate in spring, grow in summer, harvest in autumn and store in winter. What can be recorded and understood about the Yin and Yang⁴ of all things is their harmony, by which principle man may obtain peace and control to the world. The officials of the astronomical observatory should watch the (changes of) Heaven, yet they themselves should also follow the principle of man.' (XI, 10-11)

In this paragraph, Hsun-tze indicates clearly his standpoint on science; he considers that the knowledge of the phenomena of nature or the universe is merely for the purpose of employing or using nature to increase and multiply all things so as to allow man to enjoy a better life and to live harmoniously among all things. Therefore an astronomer should, according to Hsun-tze, not only keep to his duty as an astronomical observer, but also keep to the principle of man, i.e. morality; as to the ordinary man, similarly, he should keep to his life as man and his employment as his livelihood. Thus Hsun-tze says:

'Heaven keeps its own time, the Earth has its own riches and man has his own business.' (XI, 9)

In distinguishing Heaven and man as two different concepts, Hsun-tze shows also that the relationship between the two only exists on the level of the usefulness of Heaven in providing the need of man's life;

4. 陰陽 Yin-Yang, the phenomena of all things. Please see p.71, n.31.

and there is no mysterious relationship or master-and-servant relationship between them. The proper work of Heaven or nature is, according to Hsun-tze, to maintain all things in being while the proper work of man is mainly to maintain his life as a moral being.

C: HIS ELIMINATION OF SUPERSTITIONS ABOUT HEAVEN

In chapter XVII, Hsun-tze repeatedly points out the erroneous concepts of Heaven so as to establish a correct meaning of the name Heaven to accord with its reality. He gives illustrations of three kinds of such erroneous concepts.

(i) Natural phenomena

In this chapter Hsun-tze says:

'When the stars fall and the wood makes sounds,⁵ people in the country all feel scared; they all ask, "What are these?" In answer, I say, these are nothing peculiar; they are the changes of Heaven and Earth, the influence of Yin and Yang⁶, and the unusual phenomena of things. If man finds them strange, it is reasonable; if he is scared of them, it is wrong. The phenomena of the eclipses of the sun and the moon, untimely wind and rain, and the unexpected appearance of strange stars occur not infrequently in every generation.' (XI, 12)

Here Hsun-tze explains that the unusual phenomena of the universe are only the changes of nature and man can marvel at them since they are rarely seen; yet there is no reason for him to be scared of them. Some lines later he says:

5. 鳴木 Ming-Mu. Hsun-tze is probably referring in particular to a kind of sacred tree which can make certain sounds or crackings.

6. The dynamic and static movements of the universe.

'Suppose one prays for rain and it rains.
Why is this so? I say: this is nothing peculiar.
It is just like not praying for rain and it rains.'
(XI, 13)

Again Hsun-tze tries to make it clear that the natural phenomena are merely phenomena of nature and nothing more. Therefore the popular superstitious concepts of these phenomena are foolish and unnecessary and should be got rid of.

(ii) The relationship between natural phenomena and human affairs

In Hsun-tze's time, people tended to relate the strange phenomena of nature to human affairs. They thought that strange natural phenomena indicated coming change in human affairs such as a change of dynasty; the death of an important person; and they believed that unusual natural disasters were a punishment from Heaven or God, and that exceptionally auspicious phenomena such as a good harvest, timely weather, or even the lack of a natural disaster in the year meant that Heaven or God was pleased with men. To Hsun-tze, these are stupid superstitions and wrong concepts which must be rectified. In this chapter he says:

'If those in high position are reasonable and their policies are fair, then although these (disastrous phenomena) occur continuously through the century, they bring no harm (to the people). If those in high positions are stupid and ignorant and their policies are treacherous, then though these do not happen even once, there is no advantage.' (XI, 12)

These statements show that the strange natural phenomena are merely strange or unusual; they have nothing to do with human affairs.

In another passage, Hsun-tze takes this idea further:

'Is the order and disorder of a nation preordained by Heaven? I say: the sun, the moon, the stars and the phenomena of the calendar are identical in the ages of both Yu and Chieh, yet Yu makes the world in order and Chieh in chaos; this proves therefore that the order and disorder of a nation or an age is not ordained by Heaven. Is it, then, fated by the time and circumstances? I say: the time of the reproducing and flourishing of spring and summer, and the harvest and storing-up of autumn and winter, were identical in the time of both Yu and Chieh. However, Yu makes the world in order and Chieh, in chaos; this proves therefore that the order and disorder of a nation or an age is not preordained by time. Then is it preordained by Earth? I say: the principles that the earth being well-cultivated, all things are alive and survive, and the earth being uncultivated, all things perish and vanish are identical in the age of both Yu and Chieh. However, Yu puts the world in order and Chieh, in chaos; this proves therefore that the order and disorder of a nation and an age is not preordained by earth.' (XI, 11)

Yu is a famous Sage-King and Chieh is a famous tyrant, both are described by most of the Chinese classics. They ruled during the Hsia Dynasty at different times, yet the former ruled successfully while the latter, in failure. Hsun-tze tries to prove that it is not Heaven, Earth or time that preordains the country but the virtue of the ruler himself that determines the political destiny of his nation. In other words, Hsun-tze considers that nature and human affairs, especially with regard to the political situation, i.e. order or disorder, have no relation to each other.

In Hsun-tze's theory, natural phenomena not only have no connection with the order and disorder of the world, but also they have nothing to do with the love and hatred of man. In the same chapter, Hsun-tze says:

'Although man hates coldness, Heaven will not cease to have winter for that reason; although man hates distances, Earth will not therefore narrow its vastness.' (XI, 11)

As there is no necessary relationship between natural phenomena and human affairs, such superstitious concepts should, Hsun-tze insists, be rectified.

(iii) The fallacy of divination

Owing to the mistaken concept that there is a necessary connection between natural phenomena and human affairs, people in ancient China had all sorts of superstitions. They believed that there is a God in heaven, which they named Heaven, or 'T'ien', who has a supreme power over all men. They later invented divination, a way by which man may, they believed, communicate with Heaven in order to ask for luck or to plead for mercy. In this chapter, Hsun-tze also gives a definition of divination in an extraordinary way:

'When there is an eclipse of the sun and the moon, prayer is made to save the sun or the moon; when there is a drought, prayer is made for rain; when there is an important event to be decided in the country, a divination is made; it is understood of all these (prayers and divinations) that success is not guaranteed for what is prayed for; they are only to cover up the actual situation by impressive ceremonies. Therefore a Conscientious Man understands that these are only ceremonies, while the masses believe them to be (communication with) God. It is good to consider them only as ceremonies and it is bad for man to consider these to be (communication with) God.'

(XI, 13)

It is worth noticing that Hsun-tze does not indicate that prayer or divination itself is necessarily evil, nor are ceremonies deceitful; he accepts that all kinds of ceremonies, including official prayer or divination are one kind of propriety or Li. He considers that the purpose of official prayer or divination is, and should only be, to

add confidence to the masses as well as politically to direct their attention to ceremonial programmes so that they may temporarily forget about their misery. This is just like a political game. Only a Conscientious Man who is wise enough to understand this purpose does not blindly believe in the dramatical function of these prayers and divinations; yet the foolish masses who whole-heartedly believe them are swindled and thus excessive superstition may lead to man-made disasters, such as unnecessary sacrifices of human life.

The three superstitious concepts of Heaven mentioned above are significant in Hsun-tze's time. In his theory, they are put forward in order to lay the ground for the demonstration of his rectified name of Heaven. What, then, does he mean by the name 'Heaven'?

D: HIS CONCEPT OF HEAVEN

The Heaven Hsun-tze means is the nature of common-sense. His concepts of Heaven are twofold, as follows:

(i) Constant regularity of Heaven

Hsun-tze lays emphasis on the fact that there is no necessary connection, either morally or politically, between Heaven and man; in other words, Heaven and man are two different realities. According to Hsun-tze, Heaven or nature as a whole is constant, regular and unchangeable. In this chapter he says:

'Heaven has its constant regularity in its movement. It does not exist and become orderly because of Yao and it does not become disorderly and perish because of Chieh.' (XI, 9)

How, then, does this constant regular and unchangeable Heaven exist?

In answer he says:

'The stars revolve in succession, the sun and the moon shine alternately, the four seasons arrive in order, Yin and Yang complete their great changes, and wind and rain widely fertilizes all things. Thus all things respectively attain their harmony in order to grow and survive, and their nourishment in order to mature and complete their life. The workings of all these are not seen but the operations are obvious. The operations are wondrous⁷.' (XI, 9-10)

Here Hsun-tze uses the word 'wondrous' to describe his attitude to the work of Heaven. It is thus clear that what Hsun-tze means by Heaven is nature, whose work is seen while how it works is unknown. Therefore he says:

'Men all know its operations, but no one knows its invisible form; this is called Heaven.'
(XI, 10)

And what Hsun-tze is concerned with is that man should know the accomplishments of Heaven so as to make good use of them rather than wasting time on the researches on the metaphysical or epistemological source of this invisible and unknowable form, or even worse, worshipping it as a personified God. He claims that man should realise when he is aware of the constant regularity of Heaven, he is aware of the reality of Heaven.

7. 神 Shen. This term may also mean 'god'. However, Hsun-tze has strictly rejected the idea of a supreme immortal. The term here obviously should only be interpreted in its other meanings, such as 'marvelous, wondrous'.

(ii) Heaven has no faculties of distinction and will

After Hsun-tze disposes of the mysterious concept of Heaven, what is left of it is the phenomena which are visible and knowable. Although Heaven can be distinguished by man, Hsun-tze goes on to say, it does not itself have the power of awareness or discrimination. Therefore Hsun-tze says:

'Heaven brings life to all things, yet it cannot distinguish all things; Earth carries man, yet it cannot administer man.' (XIII, 10)

It is clear that Heaven has, Hsun-tze claims, no faculty for distinction and will. Hsun-tze thus removes its mysteries and tries to establish that what is visible and knowable is its actual reality. In such a way, he brings the positions of Heaven and man to the same level. Heaven not only cannot distinguish between men, not to mention ruling over men, but also Hsun-tze continues to discern, does not have its will to punish man or to bless him. This is a necessary further logical extension of his theory.

He also considers that the duties of Heaven are to harmonize and nourish all things and the attitude of man towards it is to understand its duties in order to participate with and assist in the completion of its duties. These are his main concepts about nature or Heaven. As to the invisible and unknowable parts of Heaven or nature, such as the question of the width and distance of the universe, the origin of the world, they are unapproachable by man, and they are the problems of nature itself, which man cannot

and need not strive to know. This is Hsun-tze's attitude to the knowledge of nature, and this is also the general idea indicated in the chapter entitled 'On Heaven'.

E: HIS SUGGESTION AS TO THE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEAVEN AND MAN

In his theories Hsun-tze tries firstly to make people understand that the power of Heaven and the ability of man are different; then he tries to eliminate their superstitious concepts about Heaven; and finally he goes on to reproduce its original face with common-sense knowledge. He thus makes a rectification of the name 'Heaven'.

In the relationship between Heaven and man, as Hsun-tze suggests, man should, firstly, passively and negatively be able to participate in its nourishing, and then he can actively and positively advance to make the best use of the visible and knowable nature to serve mankind, and to conquer the disadvantages or disasters of nature that harm mankind. In this chapter Hsun-tze sets forth his doctrine as follows:

'Rather than to honour Heaven and admire it, it is better to treat it as a material object to be tended, looked after and mastered; rather than to obey it and praise it, it is better to suppress its destiny and to make use of it; rather than to look up to the four seasons and wait for their gifts, it is better to adapt oneself to the present time and make use of it; rather than to let things increase by themselves it is better to give a full display of one's abilities to change them; rather than to be indulgent in and become a slave of it, it is better to be rational towards it and not to lose it; and rather

than to admire its productions it is better to be devoted to assist its completion. Therefore if man misses what is in himself and admires Heaven, then he will lose the understanding of the nature of all things.' (XI, 13)

It is apparent here that what Hsun-tze is concerned with is human affairs, or simply, man, and not Heaven or nature. In another passage, he says:

'If man strengthens his resources and cuts down expenses, then Heaven cannot make him poor; if he lives in good health, keeps precaution against disease and his action is proper and in good time, then Heaven cannot make him ill; if he is cultivated according to morality and he sticks to it, then Heaven cannot cause him trouble or disaster . . . If his sources are deficient and his expenditure is extravagant and excessive, then Heaven cannot make him rich; if his regimen is unbalanced and he rarely takes exercise, then Heaven cannot make him strong and healthy; if he is diametrically opposed to morality and acts recklessly and rashly, then Heaven cannot make him trouble-free or auspicious.' (XI, 9)

According to Hsun-tze, it may be said that man's living relies on nature, yet his life on himself. For man's living, Hsun-tze suggests that man should conquer nature and make good use of it, adapt himself to seasons or time and employ it, give full display of his abilities to change things and be rational about things; yet for his life, he should not miss what is in himself, i.e. his ability to approach to morality, or in Hsun-tze's own word 'Tao', the Ultimate Principle of Man.

The word 'Heaven' used by Hsun-tze therefore means nature. He employs a common-sense nature to oppose his contemporary popular mysterious deity. Thus he liberates man from a slavish attitude to

the deity. Furthermore, he tries to educate man to conquer and use nature; consequently, he makes man's position paramount in the universe. However, his doctrine does not then lead him to science, for his interest does not fall in that area, and he considers that science is just one side of human affairs. As to the ultimate achievement of human affairs, he attributes it to morality; and Tao or the Ultimate Principle is, according to him, the culmination of morality. What, then, is Tao or the Ultimate Principle, and how is it related to man?

SECTION 2: THE THEORIES OF THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE

The theories of the Ultimate Principle are the very essence of Hsun-tze's philosophy. In short, what he means by Tao or the Ultimate Principle can be reduced to one single theory: the Way of the Mind. However, although the theory of the Mind is the culminating point of his philosophy and the core of his philosophical system, it seems that he does not have it established in a well organized way. Since the system of this theory is scattered in a rather disorderly way in different places or paragraphs in his book, readers may find it difficult to get a thorough comprehension of this theory unless they are capable of careful analysis and synthesis of the relevant materials in his book. The following are an attempt to reorganize the sources in order to adumbrate this theory according to the text. First of all, he establishes the ground of his theory

of the Mind by the theory that the Ultimate Principle is the Ultimate Principle of Man or the Way of Man⁸, from which he further construes that the Way of Man is the Way of the Mind.

A: HIS DISCUSSION OF THE WAY OF MAN

In chapter XVII entitled 'On Heaven', Hsun-tze says:

'All things are one part of Tao.' (XI, 14)

The word 'Tao' here indicates, according to Hsun-tze, the Ultimate Principle of the Heaven and Earth, or the Ultimate Principle of the Universe⁹. However, when he speaks of Tao, he hardly applies the word in this way; he usually means the Ultimate Principle of Man. In chapter VIII, he says:

'Tao is neither the Way of Heaven, nor the Way of Earth, but the Way which a man should practise, or rather, which a Conscientious Man practises.' (IV, 3)

What, then, does a Conscientious Man practise? Hsun-tze goes on to explain:

'What is called capable and virtuous in a Conscientious Man is not that he is capable of doing all that man is able to; what is called wisdom in a Conscientious Man is not that he is capable of knowing all that man can know; what is called eloquence in a Conscientious Man is not that he is capable of debating eloquently all that man can debate, and what is called observant in a Conscientious Man is not that he is capable of observing all that man can observe; there are limits for him. As to measuring the high and the low, the sterile and the fertile of lands and ordering the sequence of the five cereals¹⁰ to suit the time for

8. 人道 Jen-Tao.

9. 天地之道 T'ien-Ti-Chih-Tao.

10. 五穀 Wu-Ku. The five major seeds of grains, i.e. millet, paddy bean, wheat and hemp.

sowing, a Conscientious Man may do no better than a farmer. In circulating currency, examining the good and bad of commodities, and judging the expensive and cheap of prices, a Conscientious Man may do no better than a merchant. In designing patterns and measurements, arranging the standard, so as to produce fine and delicate instruments for use, a Conscientious Man may do no better than a craftsman. In recommending each other and putting on airs, and humiliating and swindling each other, without regard to rights and wrongs, or to the facts of the case, a Conscientious Man may do no better than those such as Hui-Shih and Teng Hsi¹¹. To be able to judge another's virtue and then decide his rank, to measure his ability and then give him an official job, thus to let the capable and virtuous and the rotten all have their places, and the talented and the incompetent all have their jobs and all things obtain what is most suitable for them, when things change, a suitable response is forthcoming, Shen¹² and Mo¹³, are not able to advance their doctrines, and Hui-Shih and Teng Hsi dare not make any change or alteration in their observations, so that speech is absolutely appropriate to reason, and action to duty. These are the characteristics of a Conscientious Man.'

(IV, 3-4)

Hsun-tze considers that a Conscientious Man is not necessarily one with special technical talents like the farmer, merchant or craftsman; yet he must be one who, with the Ultimate Principle in his Mind, is able to administer all manner of human affairs. Therefore what Hsun-tze means by Tao or Way is nothing cosmological. He positively considers it to be the Way of Man, or the Ultimate Principle of Man. In other words, Tao, to him, is the Way of Man.

If asked the reason why the Ultimate Principle or Tao must be that of man, Hsun-tze gives his answer in chapter VIII and

11. 鄧析 Teng-Hsi, a famous sophist in Hsun-tze's time.

12. 慎到 Shen Tao, a Faist in Hsun-tze's time. His writings, collected in forty-two volumes, are now lost.

13. 墨子 Mo-tze.

XXI. In chapter VIII he defines 'Tao' as 'the Way which a man should practise, or rather, which a Conscientious Man practises.'

(IV, 3) In chapter XXI, he also says:

'Learning is to learn where to stop. Where should it stop? I say: it should stop at the ultimate adequateness. What is the ultimate adequateness? I say: to be a Sage. A Sage is the one who completely fulfils his duty in human relations. A King is the one who perfects the system of social institutions. If a man completely fulfils both of these two, he will obtain the ultimate achievement in the world.' (XV, 9-10)

Hsun-tze considers that the main duties of man in his life are twofold: (1) completely to fulfil his duty in human relations, and (2) completely to fulfil his duty in social institutions. In other words, a man should practise his duties of both ethical and social morality. When a man faces all other men, whether relatives, such as grandparents, parents, brothers, children; or his social relations, such as teacher, senior, friend, junior, neighbour, superior, inferior, or the relations of clan, nation, race; he asks himself, 'How should I treat them?' When man reflects that there must be an objective and universal principle according to which he then will completely fulfil his duty in these human relations, and when man comes to understand that morality, excluding social or legal commitments of any kind, is the answer, then he is practising ethical morality. However, if man tries to fulfil his duty in human relations according to social institutions or rites, customs and laws, then he is practising social morality. In Hsun-tze's ideal, if one practices ethical morality, one should include the practice of social morality, and if one practices social morality, one should eventually promote oneself to the practice of ethical morality. Therefore by

means of the Sage Mind, man completely fulfils his duty in human relations and he thus becomes a Sage; and by means of good Artifice or moral education, man completely fulfils his duty in social institutions, including rites, customs and laws, which are established by the Sage-Kings. When man fulfils both the duties of human relations and that of social institutions, he is then a Sage and his effort of learning may stop at this point, for what remains for him at this stage is merely the continuous practice of morality as practised by a Sage. Hsun-tze repeatedly points out that in the moment when man's Mind is clear and bright, he will see that morality is the Ultimate Principle of Man, and his effort of practising morality, both in an ethical sense and in a social sense, distinguishes him from other animals and displays his nobility as a man. The nobility of man lies, on one hand, in his proper use of his absolute freedom, his decision and choice in the perfection of morality, and on the other, his continuous efforts toward the perfection of morality. Therefore Hsun-tze considers that the perfection of morality is the ultimate achievement of man.

B: HIS DISCUSSION OF THE MIND AND THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE

Hsun-tze considers that the Ultimate Principle of Man is objective and universal. In his theory, he also expounds the question; how does man know it, or how is this objective and universal principle accepted by man's Mind which is subjective and particular or individual? Or simply speaking, what is the relationship between the Ultimate Principle and Mind? In answer, Hsun-tze indicates two processes whereby the Mind knows the Ultimate Principle: (1) the psychological condition of the Mind in knowing the Ultimate Principle,

and (2) the method of maintaining such a condition in order to receive it.

(i) The psychological condition

Hsun-tze thinks that when the Mind is in the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, or when it is a Great Clear and Bright Mind, it will see and know the Ultimate Principle. Therefore in chapter XXI he says:

'How does man know the Ultimate Principle?
I say: by means of the Mind. How does the Mind know? I say: when it is in the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness.'
(XV, 4)

When the Mind is in such a state it may receive, according to Hsun-tze, two aspects of knowledge, namely: the knowledge of knowledge, and the knowledge of morality. In his discussion on the Mind's obtaining knowledge of morality, he considers that when the Mind is in the state of Receptiveness, it is then able to accommodate the Ultimate Principle; when it is Attentive to the Ultimate Principle, it is then able to apprehend thoroughly this Principle, and when it is Undisturbed, it is then able to observe and experience this Principle. In other words, when the Mind has no chores or confused and disorderly thoughts, or when it is not obsessed, misguided and disturbed, it is then able to receive, understand and experience the Ultimate Principle. In the following passage, Hsun-tze explains this.

'For those who have not yet obtained the Ultimate Principle, tell them about Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness of the Mind. If they behave

accordingly, then, with Receptiveness, they, who are expecting the Ultimate Principle, are able to enter into it; with Attentiveness, they, who are attentive to it, are able to thoroughly practise it; and with Undisturbedness, they, who contemplate it, are able to understand it. Those who know it, understand it, and practise it are the ones who experience it.' (XV, 5)

Therefore, according to Hsun-tze, the Mind is the faculty of knowing the Ultimate Principle and the psychological condition of the Mind when knowing the Ultimate Principle is when it is in a state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, or when it has Great Clearness and Brightness.

(ii) The method of keeping such a condition

In chapter XXI, Hsun-tze says,

'To direct the Mind with reason, to maintain it with clarity and not to allow it to fall into worldly things.' (XV, 7)

By these methods, the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness of the Mind can, Hsun-tze believes, be maintained.

As to a more practical method of cultivating the Mind and governing the disposition, Hsun-tze says the following in chapter

II:

'If he has a hot or violent temper, then he should be softened by harmonization; if he is reserved and abstruse, he should be bent on becoming easy-going and straightforward; if he is brave and violent, he should be assisted with instruction, exhortation and warning; if he is too hurried, he should be held down with calmness and steadiness; if he is narrow-minded, he should be made open-minded; if he is base, slothful and avaricious, he should be corrected with incorruptibility and great

morality; if he is an ordinary person, incompetent and distracted, he should be taken from his bad habits by teacher and friends; if he is lax and crude, irreverent and frivolous, he should be warned about the consequent disasters; and if he is stupidly honest and serious, he should be nursed with proper rites and music¹⁴, and be enlightened by means of contemplation and introspection. In the methods of cultivating the Mind and governing the disposition¹⁵, there is nothing quicker than following rites, nothing more important than obtaining a good teacher and nothing more wondrously effective than concentrating attention on to what is morally good. These are what are called the methods of cultivating the Mind and governing the disposition.' (I, 8-9)

From this, it is clear that what Hsun-tze suggests here is that man should remove the Evil of his Nature, and the Obsessions of his Mind in order to maintain a Great Clear and Bright Mind, then he can fully identify himself with Tao or the Ultimate Principle of Man. In chapter III, Hsun-tze also says:

'As to the cultivation of the Mind of a Conscientious Man, there is no better way than Sincerity¹⁶; once he is devoted to Sincerity, there is nothing else which needs (to be attended to). To be sincere in the Mind, he must maintain only what is Human-Minded or Jen, and he must practise only what is right. If he keeps to Human-Mindedness with Sincerity, his

14. 禮樂 Li-Yüeh, the Confucian rites and music which carries the moral role of cultivating man's disposition.

15. 氣 Ch'i, means 'breath, the vital fluid, force, spirit'. To Hsun-tze, it refers to disposition. However, it is not clear whether Ch'i or disposition has, in his opinion, any connection or relation to Man's Nature or the Mind.

16. 誠 Ch'eng, means 'sincere, honest, cordial, true'. The concept has been historically adopted by most Chinese thinkers, especially the Confucianists, in a morally serious way meaning 'to be committed to'. The term 'Sincerity' is used here. However, one must bear in mind also wherever it is used, it implies a strong moral-seriousness of a sincere and respectful attitude of man toward his moral ideal. It is quite near to the religious sense of piety. In Hsun-tze's theory, Sincerity of the Mind is the commitment of the Mind, to Tao or the Ultimate Principle of Man.

moral goodness (Artifice) will certainly be formed outwardly; if his moral goodness is completed, he will be as wise and virtuous as the spirits¹⁷. If he practises righteousness with Sincerity, he will live in accordance with reason; if he lives in accordance with reason, he will be considerate and understanding; and if he is considerate and understanding, he will be able to cope with all changes.'

(II, 4)

With Sincerity, according to Hsun-tze, man will be devoted in keeping to Human-Mindedness and practising righteousness, and he will become wise and virtuous, considerate and understanding, and he will be able to assist the nourishing of all things and to cope with all changes. Sincerity, too, is a psychological attribute recommended by Hsun-tze to maintain a Great Clear and Bright Mind.

In conclusion, when speaking on the Mind's knowing the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, Hsun-tze illustrates the state of Great Clearness and Brightness of the Mind which enables man to know the Ultimate Principle and the actual process of knowing and experiencing it; and he explains the methods by which such a state may be maintained. This is his doctrine of 'cultivating the Mind and governing the disposition', which is in fact the first step of the Mind's practising the Ultimate Principle.

(iii) The relationship between the Ultimate Principle and the Mind

In this part the question dealt with is: Why should the Mind know the Ultimate Principle?

17. 神 Shen, Hsun-tze uses this word in a causal manner, or following the prevailing customs.

According to Hsun-tze, Tao or the Ultimate Principle, is not the ultimate Principle of the universe, or the Way of Heaven, but the Ultimate Principle of Man. In chapter XXI, he gives a definition of Tao:

'The Sage knows the defect of the Mind and he sees the calamity of its Obsessions, therefore he advocates that man should dwell neither on desires nor hatred, neither on beginning nor on end, neither on nearness nor on distance, neither on profundity nor on superficiality, neither on the ancient nor on the modern; and that man should be able to enumerate all things and keep a balance between them in the middle. In this way the numerous varieties, though they are different, cannot confuse one another and disorder their series. What is the balance? I say: it is Tao.' (XV, 4)

According to Hsun-tze, the ancient Sages, seeing the calamity originating from Obsessions of the Mind, laid down an objective and universal principle in order to guide man to the right path of life, and to arrange all things in their rightful place in human affairs. This principle works like a scale or balance to weigh the positions of all things and is named by Hsun-tze 'Tao'. The man who wants to attain it must, Hsun-tze claims, initially remove or clear the Obsessions of the Mind. As to the Obsessions, Hsun-tze suggests two classes, namely: the Obsessions of external objects, and those of man's view of the Ultimate Principle. In the same chapter he especially points out the latter.

'If one defines Tao by practical usage, the whole world may become utilitarian; if one defines it by following what man desires, it is merely trying to please all; if one defines it by laws or rules, it is easily limited to the trifling classes of regulations; if one defines it by influential position or power, it is merely suitable for the convenience (of the rulers); if one

defines it merely by empty words and statements, it is only good for dialectic sophistry; and if one defines it by Heaven, it is only good for trying to explain the origin of the world. However, all these several definitions are merely one aspect of Tao.' (XV, 3)

Hsun-tze considers that to weigh and measure all things with any of the above-mentioned aspects of Tao or the Ultimate Principle is likely to have partial success as well as partial failure, for all these aspects are only one part of Tao. Hsun-tze continues to describe Tao as 'a constant substance with extremely changeable forms'. (XV, 3) In other words, accordingly, the principle of weighing and measuring all things is constant, yet the ways of weighing and measuring are changeable and variable according to its different objects, thus its form seems different also. Therefore, if man sees one of its forms and claims that he sees what Tao is, his perception is partial and his claim is insufficient to be said valid. Hsun-tze goes on to say:

'One aspect is insufficient to express the whole. Those who have partial knowledge and observe only one aspect of Tao are not able to know it at all. Therefore what they consider sufficient and feel satisfaction with is what makes them confuse themselves internally, and externally to mislead others. Thus superiors cause Obsessions to inferiors, and vice versa. This is the calamity of Obsessions.' (XV, 3-4)

Hsun-tze considers, therefore, that man's view of the Ultimate Principle or Tao can also become a cause of Obsession of the Mind.

In the same chapter, Hsun-tze repeatedly lays emphasis on the necessity of the Mind's knowing the Ultimate Principle. He says:

'The Mind must not be ignorant of the Ultimate Principle. If the Mind does not know the Ultimate Principle, it will not like it and instead it will like the opposite of the Ultimate Principle¹⁸. If anyone puts no restraint on his desire, then would he keep to what he does not like and desist from what he likes? If one with a Mind which does not approve of the Ultimate Principle looks for a man, then one's criterion will match with those who do not practise the Ultimate Principle and will not suit those who practise it. If anyone with a Mind which does not approve of the Ultimate Principle and who does not practise it harasses with argument those who practise it, this is the ultimate source of chaos.' (XV, 4)

Accordingly, the ultimate source of chaos of the world starts from the Mind of the individual who does not know the Ultimate Principle of Man, or morality. Hsun-tze believes that since the Mind does not know the Ultimate Principle of Man which every man should follow, man therefore will not follow what is right and proper. Furthermore, he will not fulfil his duties in human relations and social institutions. If what he follows is immorality and he gives free rein to his Nature which is innately Evil, he will be licentious in his evil desires and become a Mean-Spirited Man. When a Mean-Spirited Man speaks of the Sage whose moral excellence always beats him back, he will make every effort to insult the Sage with false and crooked arguments and thus the chaos starts. Hsun-tze then goes on to describe the advantages of the Mind's knowing the Ultimate Principle of Man.

'If the Mind knows the Ultimate Principle, then the Mind will approve it; if it approves it, man therefore will keep to the Ultimate Principle and desist from the opposite principle. If man looks for others with such a Mind, then he will meet those who practise the Ultimate Principle although he may not be accepted by those who do not practise it. To debate with a Mind approving the Ultimate Principle and with those who practise it is an important policy in administration.'

(XV, 4)

18. 非道 Fei-Tao, immorality.

The term 'an important policy in administration' is in contrast to the earlier term 'the ultimate source of chaos'. What Hsun-tze tries to explain is that when the Mind in its state of Great Clearness and Brightness knows the Ultimate Principle of Man, it will then understand that this Principle is a principle which every man should follow. After recognition the Mind practises it. Understanding that the evil of the opposite principle, i.e. immorality, is the source of chaos, man therefore tries to prohibit it by arguing against it. In other words, the important policy in the administration of the world as well as in the individual is to attain an Ultimate Mind or to become a Sage, and the first step is to enable the Mind to know the Ultimate Principle of Man. Therefore the Ultimate Principle of Man is, according to Hsun-tze, to save the Mind from being confused and wicked. The theme of chapter XXI entitled 'Dispelling Obsessions' is to point out the necessity of the Mind's knowing the Ultimate Principle of Man, and to point out that a Mind which sees and understands it must keep to it and practise it. The method of dispelling the Obsessions of the Mind in order to maintain its state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, is also an essential and primary way of cultivating the Mind and governing the disposition.

From the above, it is clear that when Hsun-tze discusses the relationship between the Mind and the Ultimate Principle his key belief is that the Mind is capable of knowing it and the Mind must know it. When a man knows it, he can, according to Hsun-tze, know all things, know how to assist their nourishing and know how to fit

himself among them with great harmony and know how to weigh and measure all things and know how to arrange suitable places for them. In this way, the Epistemological Mind has completed its first step with regard to the knowledge of the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, and the next step is the question of how the Mind practises it, or how the Mind becomes an Ultimate Mind.

C: HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN DETAILS OF THE ULTIMATE MIND AND CONSCIENTIOUS MIND

Though in his philosophy, what Hsun-tze tries to establish is the way or method of practising the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, he understands that knowledge of it must come first. He therefore insists that it is necessary for the Mind to know the Ultimate Principle of Man. How, then, could one describe the process from the Mind's knowing the Ultimate Principle to its actually practising it? This is also a question which Hsun-tze tries to explain. In chapter XXI, he quotes the words of TAO CHING¹⁹,

'the serious-mindedness of the Conscientious Mind and the profundity of the Mind of Tao²⁰' (XV, 7),

in order to explain the following: how it is that one's Mind knows how to be serious-minded, and is cultivated to become an Ultimate Mind and how a man experiences the profundity of an Ultimate Mind.

19. 道經 By TAO CHING Hsun-tze probably means the contemporary version of 道經 TAO-TE-CHING. In CHIN WEN SHANG SHU 今尚書 (LÜ SHU 虞書), there are similar words with slight textual variations, yet the authority of this book is doubtful for it is believed to be a forgery of Han scholars. On the other hand, if Hsun-tze quotes these words from SHU CHING, he would use 'SHU says' (as in chapters II, IX, XVIII, etc.) instead of 'TAO CHING says.' It was not until the Han Dynasty that SHU became a 'CHING', a standard reading for all scholars. However, in the existing TAO TE CHING, one cannot find these words either. It is assumed that Hsun-tze quotes them from the version of TAO TE CHING of his times. TAO TE CHING, another title of LAO TZE, is considered to be written by 老子 Lao-tze (604-531 B.C.), the initiator of the school of Taoism.

20. 人心之危, 道心之微 Jen-Hsin-Chih-Wei, Tao-Hsin-Chih-Wei. The Conscientious Mind is, according to Hsun-tze, the Mind of the Conscientious Man, and the Mind of Tao is the Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind. As for the explanation of Wei or serious-mindedness and Wei or profundity, please see the discussion on pp. 110-115.

(i) The Mind should know where to stop

According to Hsun-tze, an Epistemological Mind fulfils its function by, externally, perception and response to the information gathered by the five sensory organs, and internally, its observations of external objects. However, the knowledge of external physical objects and the search for their principle is, to Hsun-tze, an endless and pointless game, for if one searches for them, one 'can never reach them all throughout one's life'. (XV, 9) Therefore Hsun-tze considers that man should not chase after external physical objects, or else his Mind will be obsessed by them and become ignorant of the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, which is, and should be, the ultimate goal of man's life. Therefore Hsun-tze indicates that there must be a limit at which man's Epistemological Mind has to stop. On the other hand, man can have knowledge of his own knowledge, yet he cannot have all knowledge of that of others. Hsun-tze points out that a farmer is good at his field, a merchant is good at his market and a craftsman is good at his craftwork, yet a farmer may not be good at the market like the merchant and at the craftwork like the craftsman, and he may not be good at social administration, science, etc. In other words, a man can never be good at all sorts of skills. If a man desires to know all things, he will finally find that it is not possible to fulfil his desires at all, his Mind will be split and will collapse, in such a state as Hsun-tze describes:

'When he is distracted by minor things, his appearance changes clearly and his Mind collapses within. Then his Mind is not clear and bright enough for him to judge and decide even on common principles.' (XV, 7)

Hsun-tze admits the limitation of the experience of the Mind and considers that the Mind cannot know all things, nor can it know all the skills of different men in order to administer them. Therefore Hsun-tze thinks that one's Mind on learning knowledge must stop at a certain point. Here a transcendent reflection of the Mind²¹ must function before it understands its limit. Another question which may come to one's mind is that if the function of the Mind is not wholly epistemological researches, what then is its main function?

(ii) The two stages by which a Conscientious Mind recognizes the Ultimate Principle

One's Mind must, Hsun-tze insists, desist from endless and pointless searches for material knowledge and physical objects and at the same time, it must not stop searching for the knowledge of the Ultimate Principle. This is clearly expressed in Hsun-tze's theoretical system. As to his discussion of the Mind's recognizing the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, one may divide the process into two stages.

(a) The initial stage

When a man knows that his searches for material knowledge and physical objects must stop at a certain point, he is reflecting transcendentally upon the limitation of the Epistemological Mind in things. According to Hsun-tze, this reflection of the Mind must operate in the state of its Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness. Therefore when the Mind is Great Clear and Bright, it reflects that its knowledge of knowledge is limited, and it should

21. A reflection which is self-transcending, in the sense of going beyond previous reflections.

stop chasing after such knowledge. However, according to Hsun-tze, man naturally has a desire for knowledge. When a man looks for the goal of his life, and of all men's life, he is in the initial stage of consciousness. Hsun-tze proposes the Ultimate Principle of Man or 'Tao' or morality in a broad sense, as the goal of all men and he suggests that one's Mind should dwell on it. Hsun-tze considers that if a man reflects thoroughly on the following situations, then he has started on the initial stages of recognition of the Ultimate Principle of Man: (1) there must be an ultimate principle which man should follow in his life, which satisfies his desire to search for the goal of his life and all human life, and which is necessary, objective and universal; (2) the Way of Man or the Ultimate Principle of Man's fulfilling his duty in human relations and social institutions is necessary, objective and universal, and enables man to achieve the highest success in his spiritual life, to cope with the principle of the changes of all things and to deal with the changes negatively by his constant efforts to fulfil his duties and positively by holding firm his belief in the Ultimate Principle²²; and (3) therefore the principle of man is the Ultimate Principle. In this chapter, Hsun-tze says:

'The man who is both keen and cautious as regards the Ultimate Principle is the one who is also both keen and cautious in administering all things. Therefore the one who is good at one thing²³ is good at that particular thing; and the one who is good at the Ultimate Principle is able to administer all things. For this reason, a Conscientious Man concentrates his attention on knowing and practising it so as to assist the working of all things.' (XV, 6)

22. This will be discussed on pp. 281-285.

23. 物 Wu, also means 'matter, the physical world, nature, etc.'

Here the one who knows the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality described by Hsun-tze, may not have the common knowledge of all things, or the profound knowledge of their principles or causes, but since he knows the Ultimate Principle of Man, he will then understand the way to respond to and deal with the changes of all things, and to assist and participate in their changes as part of nature's nourishing. However, most important of all, he will know how to arrange a suitable place for each thing in the human world; thus man in the world will not be confused by them or by his knowledge of them. In short, Hsun-tze considers that the knowledge or understanding of the Ultimate Principle of Man is the initial stage of the Mind of conscious recognition of the Ultimate Principle of Man.

(b) The practical stage

Once man has recognized the existence and the externality of the Ultimate Principle of Man, the next stage and also the necessary stage is to establish a way to internalize it into his Mind. Hsun-tze suggests practical experience as the means of achieving this. That is to say, man externally relies on the instruction and direction of the teacher and social institutions such as rites and laws, and internally cultivates the Sincerity of his Mind so as to produce the external Artifice. In this process, the essential factor is, Hsun-tze emphasizes, the Mind. Thus in this chapter, Hsun-tze explains:

'In this state of the Mind, its choices are unrestrained, yet its choices naturally reflect its state. What is stored within it is numerous and miscellaneous, yet the acme of its essence is never twofold.'

(XV, 6)

Then what is the acme of the essence of the Mind? Hsun-tze suggests Sincerity. He considers that if the Mind concentrates all its attention upon Sincerity, it will naturally maintain Human-Mindedness and righteousness within itself; in other words, a sincere Mind is that which is devoted firmly to the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality. In this way the full functioning of the Mind, i.e. its Deliberation, choice, decision and encouragement of Artifice will operate within the scope of morality, and as a result good Artifice arises. This is Hsun-tze's theory of the practical stage of the Mind's recognizing the Ultimate Principle of Man, a process which the function of the Mind operates from external to internal, and then from internal to external. In this stage, the practice of the Ultimate Principle of Man is involved. Thus Hsun-tze says:

'The man who knows the Ultimate Principle of Man observes, examines and understands it, and he who recognizes it practises, exercises and experiences it; then he is called the one who really is in the Ultimate Principle.' (XV, 5)

In short, man, after knowing the Ultimate Principle of Man, should, by virtue of continuous efforts of practice, actually experience it.

The process of the Mind's knowing that it should desist from endless and useless researches into material knowledge and physical things, and go deep into the knowledge of morality, is the important transition from the epistemology of knowledge to the moral epistemology of the Mind. However, it seems that Hsun-tze does not consciously establish a systematical discussion of the connection or relation between the Epistemological Mind and the Ultimate Mind. In

other words, Hsun-tze does not point out the transition from the former to the latter²⁴.

The Mind's approval of morality as the Way of Man or the Ultimate Principle of Man and its knowledge that it should practise the Ultimate Principle of Man, and finally its actual practice and experience of morality, constitutes the consistent functioning of the Mind. Hsun-tze therefore concludes that the main function of the Mind is to know and practice the Ultimate Principle of Man. When the Mind is in the initial stage of knowing the Ultimate Principle of Man and understanding the necessity of practising it, the Mind promotes itself from the stage of an ordinary Mind to that of a Conscientious Mind.

(iii) The Ultimate Mind

The process of the Mind's knowledge and practice of the Ultimate Principle of Man, that is its transcendent reflection on the transition from worldly knowledge to moral knowledge and its actual practice in morality, is the ultimate perfection of the function of the Mind. The Mind at this stage is not the Mind of an ordinary man any more, and with constant practice of the Ultimate Principle of Man it surpasses the state of a Conscientious Mind. It becomes the Mind of a Sage; therefore it is named here 'the Ultimate Mind', or, in Hsun-tze's own term, 'the Sage Mind' (Chapter I, I,3). The Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind is that which is united or in

24. A further discussion on p.269.

Oneness with the Ultimate Principle of Man or Tao, therefore Hsun-tze quotes 'The Mind of Tao' of TAO-TE-CHING as an illustration. The process of the Mind's recognising the Ultimate Principle of Man is named here 'the Way of the Mind', and according to Hsun-tze, the acme of the Way of the Mind, and also the final goal of moral life, is the perfection of an Ultimate Mind or of a Sage. What the Ultimate Mind accomplishes is, in Hsun-tze's theory, a Mind which knows all things, knows how to classify them, assists nature's nourishing of them, and maintains peacefulness and lives harmoniously among them.

(iv) His distinction of the two Minds

In this chapter (XXI), Hsun-tze quotes the phrases of TAO-TE-CHING, 'the Serious-Mindedness of the Conscientious Mind' and 'the Profundity of the Mind of Tao'. Later scholars have offered various interpretations of these two phrases and the reason why Hsun-tze quotes them, yet they have failed to agree on the subject. In the preface of THE GOLDEN MEANS²⁵, edited by Chu-tze²⁶, the editor makes the following exposition: since the Mind may have all sorts of desires, man feels uneasy and worries as if he were going to fall into a great crisis; and since the Mind of Tao is in the Ultimate Principle of Man, it is so indistinct that it can hardly be seen. However, this exposition may not, it may be suggested, be sufficient if one would like to understand thoroughly the purpose or meaning of Hsun-tze's quoting the phrase. The interpretation of

25. 中庸 Chung-Yung, one of the 四書 Ssu-Shu or the FOUR BOOKS in Chinese Classics.

26. 朱子 Chu-tze or 朱熹 Chu Hsi (1130-1200 A.D.) a scholar of Li or the Rational Principle of Sung Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) famous for his commentary on Confucian classics.

the fourth and the eighth words should, according to Hsun-tze's theory, be as follows: The fourth word ' or Wei' may mean: danger, to fear, high and just, etc., and it may be better fitted to Hsun-tze's meaning if it means 'as serious-minded as walking on thin ice', thus according to Hsun-tze, if man is serious-minded in the operation of the Way of his Mind towards the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, he is a Conscientious Man. In other words, he is not worried and he has no fear, yet he is serious-minded and attentive to his moral goal. The eighth word ' or Wei' may mean: small, low, weak, hidden, etc., and it may be better fitted to Hsun-tze's meaning if it is interpreted as 'profundity' rather than 'indistinct'. Thus according to Hsun-tze, if a man transcendently knows and actually practises the Ultimate Principle of Man, and his Mind and body concentrate devotedly upon being in accord with morality. His knowledge of morality is profundity and his appearance and behaviour is natural, and is different from the serious-mindedness of a Conscientious Man. However, the natural performance of a Sage, or the Way of a Sage is not easy to distinguish for the ordinary man as opposed the the wise man. In the same chapter, Hsun-tze expresses this idea:

'If a man is humble and concentrates with seriousness, then he is surrounded with honour; if he nourishes the Ultimate Principle of Man and concentrates upon its profundity, then honour is in him yet no one notices . . . As to the stage of either serious-mindedness or profundity, it is only the wise man that may have the knowledge.' (XV, 6-7)

However, according to Hsun-tze, to know and distinguish such a stage is to be a wise man, and to practise it is to be a Sage. In a later passage, Hsun-tze says:

'There is a man named Ji²⁷ living in a cave among the rocks. He is good at solving riddles and he likes thinking. He finds that when the desires of ears and eyes assail him, they ruin his train of thought, and when he hears the sound of gadflies, they disturb his concentration. Therefore he suppresses the desires of ears and eyes and keeps away from the sound of gadflies, and living in leisure, and thinking in quietness, his thought then flows free from obstruction. If he thinks of Human-Mindedness in such a way, can he be said to be profound? Mensius hates to be corrupted in his virtue, therefore he expels his wife, and he can be said to be able to drive himself hard. You-tze²⁸ hates to doze (while reading), therefore he burns his palms, and he can be said to be able to endure self-infliction. However, they both are not good enough. He who refutes the desires of ears and eyes can be said to be able to drive himself hard, yet it is not as good as to sink himself in deep thinking; if he notices that when he hears the sound of mosquitoes and gadflies his concentration is disturbed, then he can be said to be serious-minded, yet he cannot be said to be profound. The one who is profound is the perfect man²⁹. The perfect man has no need to drive himself hard, to endure self-inflicted suffering or to be serious-minded. Therefore there are men with an opaquely bright appearance and there are also men with a clear bright interior state³⁰. A Sage gives free rein to his desires and also his emotions, yet what he establishes or performs is reasonable and rational. Thus what is the need to drive himself hard, enduring self-inflicted suffering and being serious-minded? The way the man of Human-Mindedness practices the Ultimate Principle of Man is to do nothing; while the way the Sage practises the Ultimate Principle of Man is not to drive himself hard. The thought of a Human-Minded man is respectfully serious while the thought of a Sage is joyful.' (XV, 8)

27. 皃 Ji.

28. 有子 You-tze, a disciple of Confucius.

29. 至人 Chih-Jen, an equivalent to the term 'the Sage'.

30. 濁明外景, 清明內景。 Cho-Ming-Wai-Ching, Ch'ing-Ming-Nei-Ching, the former statement is a description of the state of Mind of a Conscientious Man, while the latter one is that of the state of Mind of a Sage.

In this passage, when Hsun-tze speaks of 'being serious-minded' and 'being profound', it is an echo of the earlier quotation of TAO-TE-CHING. What he tries to explain is that there are many people who, although they suffer much to overcome their desires, do not really achieve the essence of moral principle. Hsun-tze describes them as having an opaquely bright appearance, for although they know the Ultimate Principle of Man, their practice is not proficient and perfect. He also describes that a Sage, with his Ultimate Mind which is extremely profound in the knowledge and practice of morality, speaks and acts always in accordance with the Ultimate Principle of Man, and his Mind which is clear and bright, is always intimately united with the Ultimate Principle of Man. Therefore a Sage's thought, without being too serious-minded, is joyful. In this way, Hsun-tze also makes clear the distinction between the Way of a Sage and that of a Conscientious Man.

Therefore the Way of Mind, as Hsun-tze claims, is perfected only when it starts from the Way of the Conscientious Mind and ends with the Way of an Ultimate Mind. This includes the whole operation of the moral functioning of the Mind. One may say that the progression from the serious-mindedness of the Conscientious Mind to reflecting transcendently to knowing the Ultimate Principle of Man, and to the generation of the moral functioning of the Mind, is just like that of streams flowing down to the river which becomes wider, deeper and more remote; yet, it has not yet run into the sea. This is the Way of a Conscientious Man, in which he consciously recognises the Ultimate Principle of Man, and what he thinks, speaks and does is in a moral, serious manner. As to the Sage, his whole

Mind is united with the Ultimate Principle of Man and he completely forgets to know and practise it; he becomes part of the Ultimate Principle of Man, while it becomes part of him. This may be considered in the following example: the river rushes to the sea and ocean, and all of a sudden, it becomes part of the boundlessness and limitlessness of the sea. This is the Way of a Sage, and the turbulence and roaring in him are the Ultimate Principle of Man, or Tao. Hsun-tze considers that a Sage is conscious that he is in the Ultimate Principle of Man, and yet there is no need for him to be conscious to know it and to know to practice it, for what he knows and practises are already learnt on the path to the Ultimate Principle of Man. The Ultimate Mind and its state may hardly be known to the ordinary man; therefore Hsun-tze says that only a wise man can understand the two stages. A wise man knows the difference, but a Sage experiences the difference; for this reason, Hsun-tze repeatedly makes it clear in his book that a Conscientious Man and a Sage are not identical; and it is the stage of operating the function of the Mind that makes them different from each other. Therefore to Hsun-tze, the stages of practising the Ultimate Principle of Man are on two levels; namely, the Way of a Conscientious Man and that of a Sage. The philosophy of Hsun-tze in fact is to establish the way of practising the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality and so the two stages mentioned are indeed the basis of his ideal way of life. In his book, Hsun-tze quite often uses the way of a Mean-Spirited Man to contrast with the ways of a Conscientious Man and a Sage. However, this only serves to provide a background to make

prominent the dignity of the latter. There follows some quotations from his illustrations which give a picture of the ways of the two.

(a) Manner and appearance of a Conscientious Man and his Way

Chapter I:

'A Conscientious Man says: Learning cannot be stopped . . . A Conscientious Man is learned and he reflects upon himself three times a day; if so, then his knowledge is clear and bright and his behaviour makes no error . . . A Conscientious Man is neither rash and impatient, nor ambiguous in speech, nor blind and obstinate to the situation. He should be serious-minded and should order his thoughts when speaking . . . He should instruct his eyes not to desire to see what is not complete and perfect³¹, his ears not desire to hear what is not complete and perfect, his mouth not desire to speak and his Mind not desire to consider what is not complete and perfect.' (I, 1-7)

Chapter VIII:

'The speech of a Conscientious Man should have its boundary or judgement as to rites, and his behaviour should have its precaution and standard.' (IV, 13)

Chapter XX:

'The ears of a Conscientious Man should not listen to wanton sound, his eyes should not see carnal charm and his mouth should not speak abusive and evil language. These three "should nots" are what a Conscientious Man should be careful in.' (XIV, 3)

There are many more similar statements in HSUN-TZE.

In short, the manner and appearance of a Conscientious Man is, accordingly, serious-minded, careful or prudent, honest and attentive; and in the knowledge and practice of the Ultimate Principle of Man he yearns for it, adapts himself to it, yet he is also restrained, confined and imprisoned by it.

31. 不全不粹 Pu-Ch'üan-Pu-Ts'ui, i.e. what is not morally perfect, or not complete and perfect in morality.

(b)

The distinction between the Way of a Sage and that of a
Conscientious Man

Chapter II:

'He who loves laws and regulations and practises accordingly is a Scholar, or a man of learning; he who firmly determines to follow the Ultimate Principle of Man and examines and experiences it serious-mindedly is a Conscientious Man; and he whose Deliberation is soaked in the Ultimate Principle of Man and is wise and keen and never exhausted is a Sage.' (I, 11)

Chapter V:

'Debate needs no preparation beforehand, no strategy in advance, it is delivered properly and rationally, its literary elegance is perfect and it is in accordance with the reality, and however it is presented or rearranged, it adapts to all changes and its adaptations are never exhausted; this is the debate of a Sage. If the debate needs preparation beforehand, strategy in advance; though it is delivered in an unexpected instance, it is worthy enough to be listened to, it is reliable and honest, and it is learned, straightforward and orthodox; this is the debate of a Scholar and a Conscientious Man.'

(III, 7)

Chapter VI:

'A Conscientious Man . . . is at ease and in comfort, yet he is not negligent and idle; he is diligent, yet he is not slow and remiss. However, the one who is able to trace the source (of the Ultimate Principle of Man), to stick to it so as to deal with all changes, and to manage all things to their appropriateness, is then the Sage.'

(III, 13)

Chapter VIII:

'If one asks, "I wish from inferiority to become honorable, from foolishness to become wise, and from poverty to become rich. Is it possible?" I say: Yes, by means of learning. The one who actually learns is called a Scholar; the one who learns industriously and serious-mindedly is called a Conscientious Man; and the one who is profound and expert at learning is a Sage . . . The one who considers following customs is good, who considers commodities and currency to be the most precious treasure,

and who considers the formula of healthy living and personal interest to be the most essential way of life, displays the Nature of an ordinary man. The one whose practice is in accordance with laws, whose will is determined and whose learning is not disturbed by his own desires, can be said to be a resolute Scholar. The man whose practice is in accordance with laws, and whose will is determined, who loves to rectify what he hears and learns, and to affect his emotion and Nature, whose speech is mostly correct yet not clear enough, whose behaviour is mostly correct yet not restful, and whose knowledge and Deliberation is mostly correct yet not complete and perfect, and who at the very best, can glorify what he honours, and secondarily, can educate and enlighten those who are less learned, can then be said to be a very sincere Conscientious Man. The one who revises the laws established by the hundreds of kings as easily as distinguishing between black and white, who deals with the immediate changes as easily as counting the numbers one and two, who behaves and feels content with what is according to rites as naturally as man is born with four limbs, who achieves timely accomplishments and also does not lose his power and influence as effortlessly as the four seasons proclaim the growth and completion of all things; who is fair and just, amiable and most virtuous; who, among thousands of millions, is the most learned and devoted, can then be called the Sage.' (IV, 4-6)

More distinctions can be found throughout the chapters of HSUN-TZE. According to the author, a Conscientious Man holds firmly to his way of practising the Ultimate Principle of Man and is thus confined or imprisoned by it. In other words, since the Mind of a Conscientious Man or the Conscientious Mind has not yet united with the Ultimate Principle of Man, a Conscientious Man sees morality as high and above him. A Sage blends his Mind with it and thus unites the two. In other words, he is within it and it exists in him, and he does not then need to act, speak, learn and exercise particularly according to it, or to adapt himself to it, for all his speech and behaviour will necessarily be in accordance with it.

(c) The manner and appearance of a Sage and his Way

Chapter VIII:

'He is systematic and manages things in a principled way; he is meticulous and strict and his dignity and prestige earn him respect; he is determined and firm and sees things through to successful completion, he is peaceful and serene and his influence long-lasting; he is joyful and devotes himself to the Ultimate Principle of Man without fear; he is outstandingly wise and his use of wisdom is keen and profound; he is orderly and in his behaviour he takes into consideration every aspect of a matter; he is refined and his writing is elegant; he is cordial and he wishes others to have goodness and virtue; he is sympathetic and he worries about others' impropriety; if all these are so, then one can be said a Sage. His Way originates from "one"³². What is "one"? I say: to hold firmly to the "spirit"³³ and be impregnable. What is the "spirit"? I say: to be perfectly good and controlled is called the "spirit"; if all things are unable to corrupt him, this is called being impregnable. To hold the "spirit" and be impregnable is called being a Sage . . . A Sage is the one who originates Human-Mindedness and righteousness, who searches for the correct distinction between the right and wrong, makes uniform his speech and conduct and all is done perfectly without missing one point. His success has no other way but concentrating all his attentions upon practice.' (IV, 6-7)

Chapter IX:

'On one hand, he (the Sage) observes and knows Heaven, and on the other, he manages and uses the Earth. His Human-Mindedness fills up the universe, and his righteousness applies to all things. He makes plain what is hidden, he lengthens what is too short and he broadens what is too narrow. By following the most simple principle he becomes wise, extensive and profound. Therefore I say: By one Principle, all principles are illustrated and unified. The one who acts in this way is called a Sage.' (V, 8)

In conclusion, the Sage, according to Hsun-tze, is in possession of the Ultimate Principle of Man within himself, thus his

32. 一 I, to Hsun-tze it is the moral practice.

33. 神 Shen, to Hsun-tze it is the spirit or attitude of moral practice.

Mind knows thoroughly the principle of all things; he is loyal to the Ultimate Principle of Man, thus nothing can corrupt him; his Ultimate Mind is profound, yet clear and bright, and his inner state is Receptive, Attentive, and Undisturbed³⁴ so as to store the Ultimate Principle of Man, and thus he is capable of dealing with all things and all changes.

A BRIEF CONCLUSION OF THIS CHAPTER

In this chapter an attempt has been made to explain Hsun-tze's theory of Heaven and of Mind. In the former Hsun-tze reduces Heaven to its common-sense origin, and thus the obverse of his theory is to try to eliminate man's superstitions about Heaven while its positive purpose is to get man to keep away from supernatural illusions such as personified gods, and to return to the search for the consciousness of his own Mind; thus arises Hsunt-tze's theory of Mind. The theme of the latter is to establish the two stages of the Way of Mind. According to his theory the accomplishment of an Ultimate Mind from an ordinary Mind is a continuous struggle waged with great effect. He also suggests Tao or the Ultimate Principle of Man as his own moral ideal, the principle which every man must follow, and its concrete content is in the practice of completely fulfilling one's duty in human relations and social institutions. A Conscientious Man is, Hsun-tze describes, one who practises sincerely and honestly what he recognises and learns, and a Sage is the one whose knowledge and practice are completely united with the Ultimate Principle of Man. The characteristic

34. For reference of these terms, please see p.53.

of a Sage and what makes him different from a Conscientious Man is, according to Hsun-tze, that a Sage is not isolated from the public, he mixes with the masses, not losing his nobility; he is good at instructing and enlightening them in the search for the Ultimate Principle of Man; that he follows the customs yet he does not lose his clearness of the Mind and he cleanses their defects; that he is wise and clever in dealing with changes; in short, he is wise and Human-Minded. Thus describing the Sage, Hsun-tze completes the establishment of his moral philosophy. This is the positive side of his theory. On the other hand, Hsun-tze considers that if all men delight in morality, and dispel the Obsessions of their Minds, though their achievements may not be the same, or in other words some may become Scholars, or Conscientious Men, or Sages, then at least, Mean-Spirited Men will disappear from the world and control and peace will be obtained. This is the negative side of his theory. And thus his ideal moral society or his ideal world is introduced. The interpretation and analysis of his moral philosophy has thus come to an end. However, the completion of the whole scope of his theory must include his theory of politics, considered in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV:

HIS THEORIES OF POLITICS

CHAPTER IV:

H I S T H E O R I E S O F P O L I T I C S

In his theory of human nature, Hsun-tze first suggests that Man's Nature is Evil, and then by way of his theory of the Transformation of Man's Evil Nature, he arrives at his theory of the Mind. Thus his insistence that Man's Nature is Evil only serves as a means to illustrate an ideal state of the Mind which can be achieved only after the Transformation of Man's Evil Nature and the dispelling of the Mind's Obsessions. The different characteristics of a Mean-Spirited Man, a Scholar, a Conscientious Man and a Sage represent the different stages through which a man may pass. This is the essence of his thought. As to his political theory, his establishment of the image of the Sage-King is merely an extension of his moral philosophy.

SECTION 1: THE THEORIES OF THE WAY OF A KING

In his political theory most of Hsun-tze's discussion is about the personality and policies of the Sage-King, and the way of becoming a Sage-King. The following are the structure of his theory.

A: HIS DEFINITION OF A KING

In chapter VIII, Hsun-tze says,

'If he (the king) is capable, then the whole world follows him; if he is incapable, then the whole world abandons him.' (IV, 1)

Thus Hsun-tze defines the king as a capable man, and this is the key to the understanding of Hsun-tze's theory of politics. The capability

of the ideal king of Hsun-tze lies in moral cultivation. In other words, the Sage-King is one who is capable of moral-cultivation to the state of moral perfection and of educating to and influencing on the moral life of his people.

B: HIS OPINION ON THE CULTIVATION OF A KING

(1) The necessity of a King's moral cultivation

In chapter XIV, Hsun-tze says:

'If the Men's Master¹ is able to make understood his virtue, then the world will follow him as the cicada follows the bright fire.' (IX, 7)

From this, Hsun-tze makes significant his theory that a king must make himself a morally cultivated man. In his book, there is a statement from THE BOOK OF ODES repeatedly quoted by Hsun-tze:

'From the west and the east, from the south and the north, there is no one that does not follow willingly.'

To make the people follow willingly, a king must, Hsun-tze holds, be morally cultivated. In chapter XII, he says:

'If one asks, "May I ask the way to rule the country?" I say: I have heard about the way of cultivating oneself, yet I have never heard about that of ruling the country. The king is like a model, his people are like his shadow, when the model is upright, so is its shadow. The king is like a wooden tray, his people are like water, when the wooden tray is round, the water is round too. The king likes shooting, so do his officers. Once King Chuang of Ch'u² loved the

1. 人主 Jen-Chu, a similar term to the name 'king'. Hsun-tze also uses the terms '君人者', Chün-Jen-Che, or 'the one who rules', '人君' Jen-Chün, or 'man's ruler', '天子' T'ien-tze, or the son of Heaven to describe the king.

2. 莊王 Chuang-Wang, a king of 楚 Ch'u, (740-330 B.C.) a feudal state in Chou Dynasty.

slender-waisted women, and yet there were hungry girls in the country. Therefore I say, I have heard about the cultivation of a king, yet I have never heard about the way of ruling the country.' (VIII, 3)

From this it is clear that what Hsun-tze considers important about the king is not his policy but his virtue, for Hsun-tze believes that with moral perfection a king will certainly implement beneficial policies in his country and his people will have no sufferings.

(2) Moral-cultivation³ of a king

Hsun-tze suggests four essential practices of a King's moral-cultivation in chapter XVI:

'The king who wants to win must first gain the hearts of his people, and to gain their hearts he must learn their way. What is their way? I say: it is the practice of rites, righteousness, honesty and trustworthiness . . . Therefore he who is above his people should be assiduous in practising rites, righteousness, honesty and trustworthiness, and then his practice can be said to be appropriate. This is the great principle of a king.' (XI, 4,8)

This is also, Hsun-tze suggests, the method of moral cultivation of a king.

(i) Rites

According to Hsun-tze, if the king practises rites as a way of moral-cultivation, then the result is that capable and virtuous men will come to serve him and the officials will be appropriately appointed. In chapter XV, he says:

'Rites is the highest principle of government and administration, it is the source of a country's strength, it is the way to win prestige and get things done, and it is the essence of achievement and fame. If kings and dukes follow the principle of rites, they will win the

whole world, whereas if they do not follow it, they will lose their country and do them harm.' (X, 9)

In chapter VIII, he says:

'Rites is the principle which the king uses to measure his officials just as logically as one uses a rule to measure an inch, a foot, eight feet⁴, or ten feet⁵.' (IV, 13)

In chapter XIV he also says,

'If a king assiduously practises rites and righteousness, the the Conscientious Men will follow him.' (IX, 7)

In short, to Hsun-tze, rites are the first essential practice of a king both in his moral-cultivation and his political administration.

(ii) Righteousness

In chapter XVI, Hsun-tze says:

'Righteousness is what prohibits man from behaving with evil and wickedness . . . Righteousness is what is appropriate in man and appropriate in all things, and what on one hand gives peace to the king and on the other harmonizes the people. Righteousness has the quality of being applicable to people close and people afar, to both high and low . . . Righteousness is the main source of good government and trustworthiness is a secondary source.' (XI, 8)

Here Hsun-tze considers righteousness to be appropriate and proper in the individual as well as in man's treatment of all things. It is one of the essential factors in the moral-cultivation of a king, as well as his policy.

4. 尋 Hsun, a measure of length in ancient China (roughly equivalent to eight feet).

5. 丈 Chang, a unit in Chinese lineal measurement slightly longer than ten feet.

(iii) Honesty and trustworthiness

In chapter XII, Hsun-tze says:

'When people examine if the tassel matches the tally, or if the counterfoils of the contract or agreement are identical, this is done for the sake of trust.
(VIII, 1)

Tassel and tally, and the counterfoils of a contract or agreement, were symbolic and documentary bases for keeping promises in ancient times. In fact, at first they were merely used to provide matters of trust with a basis of proof, yet after some time the exchanges of tallies, etc. became ritualized. According to Hsun-tze, a king who has to deal with hundreds of thousands of officials and people, must keep his promises and perform in such a way as to show his subordinates that he is trustworthy; thus his officials and people will then trust him, follow him, and obey him. Hsun-tze also considers honesty as one of the essential factors in the moral-cultivation of a king as well as in his policy, for if a king is honest to his people he will concentrate on implementing beneficial policies and see to their completion; and in return, his people will be faithful and loyal to him. To Hsun-tze, honesty and trustworthiness always come together; if a king is trustworthy and honest to his people, his people will then trust and be faithful to him.

The chief results of moral-cultivation of a king are twofold; (1) capable and virtuous men will come to follow him, and (2) by giving them suitable official positions and with their help he may lead his country to become strong and wealthy. Thus it seems that Hsun-tze's advice that a king should morally cultivate himself

is a necessary practical policy; yet for Hsun-tze, the accomplishment of the government and administration of a Sage-King is only the projection or extension of his virtue to the external and the more remote, and just as for a Sage, so for a Sage-King, moral-cultivation is always his ultimate aim.

(3) Policy-framing⁶ of a king

Hsun-tze suggests four ways for a king to frame his policy and bring about orderly political administration, namely: (1) to love the people and to maintain a policy of fairness; (2) to enrich the country and to strengthen the army; (3) to root out evil and to eliminate the traitorous; and (4) to follow the policy of recent Sage-Kings.

(i) Loving the people and maintaining a policy of fairness

In chapter IX, Hsun-tze says:

'To choose the capable and virtuous, to employ the sincere and respectful, to promote the dutiful son and the brotherly man, to accommodate the orphans and the widowed and to supply the impoverished and the poor; this is the way to ensure that the masses will be content with such a policy . . . and that the Conscientious Men will be undisturbed and content in their official positions . . . Therefore if the king wishes to have a peaceful and stable policy, there is no way better than to love people and to maintain a policy of fairness.' (V, 2-3)

The positive function of this policy is to satisfy the needs of the people as well as to keep them under protection, so that the masses will be grateful to the king and follow and obey him; its negative

6. 脩政 Hsiu-Cheng

function is to calm and smooth the relationship between the king and his people as well as to stop the possible chaos and rebellion in the country. Therefore in chapter XII, Hsun-tze says:

'If the king loves his people he will obtain a peaceful and stable country; if he uses the capable and virtuous men he will obtain glory and honour; and if he does neither of the two, he and his country will be in danger of perishing.' (VIII, 3)

In chapter XI, he also says:

'The relationship of the superior to his subordinates is like the protection of the father to his infants.' (VII, 10)

In short, the fatherly love of the king to his people is, according to Hsun-tze, most important in a king's policy.

(ii) Enriching the country and strengthening the army

To Hsun-tze, the purpose of enriching the country is to enrich the people, and that of strengthening the army is to protect the people. The practical scheme of the former, Hsun-tze suggests, negatively is to cut down expenses, and positively is to open more sources of income. In chapter X, entitled 'Enriching the country', he discusses this in detail:

'The way of enriching the country is by cutting down expenses, letting people be rich, and by being wise in storing up surpluses. According to the regulations and

the system recorded in RITES⁷, expenses will thus be cut down; and by means of good administration, the people will thus be enriched. If the government enriches the people, it will have surplus (food and currency); if the people are enriched, they will become wealthy and self-sufficient; if they are wealthy and sufficient, they will make their field fertile and the crops well-cultivated, and the harvest will produce a hundredfold. If the government takes (what is produced by the people) according to a fixed price, and the people cut down their expenses according to the regulations of RITES, then the surpluses are as high as a mountain.' (VI, 2)

As to how to let people be rich or enrich the people, Hsun-tze suggests some practical methods of opening up more sources of incomes in chapter IX:

'When the grass and the trees are exuberant and flourishing, axes should then not be allowed in the mountains and forests; thus the grass and trees will not be used up early and their growth will not be terminated. As for spring cultivation, summer weeding, autumn harvest and winter storage, if these four events are not missed, the five major grains will thus not run out, and the masses will have surplus food. If the closed season is meticulously kept in ponds, lakes, gullies, marshes and rivers, then fishes and turtles will be abundant and the

7. 儀禮 YI LI. What Hsun-tze is saying here is that if expenses, no matter whether they are needed by the king or the people, are according to the regulations of YI LI and if excessive expenses on impractical or luxurious entertainments or the like are avoided, then the economic situation of the country as a whole will be improved. The word 'expenses' here means 'unnecessary expenses'. For example, the emperor may have, according to the rites of the Chou Dynasty recorded in YI LI, sixty-four dancers in the worshipping performance in the ancestral temple of the royal family; while the feudal prince may have thirty-six dancers; a minister sixteen dancers; and an official, four dancers. In the time of Hsun-tze, these details of rites were not respected and properly practised because the emperors of the Chou Dynasty were too weak to control the feudal princes, ministers and officials whose growing power and influence seriously threatened them. The rich and powerful political figures became independent of the emperor and made themselves kings. They adopted the details of the rites of the emperor such as having sixty-four dancers in worshipping performance for their ancestors. To Hsun-tze, such usurpations of title and practice of rites were, in many aspects, incorrect. Unnecessary expenses and extravagance which exhausted the economic sources of the country was one of the aspects which Hsun-tze feels he has to point out.

masses will have surplus provisions; if the times of felling and planting of trees are not missed, the mountains and forests will thus not be barren and the masses will have surplus timber. This is the way a Sage-King manages his economy.' (V, 8)

In another paragraph he also says:

'What is covered by Heaven and what is borne by the earth are all in peak condition and are available for practical use. On one hand, they become the ornaments of the capable and the virtuous; and on the other, they nourish the masses and make them easy and comfortable. This is called the great administration. (V, 6)

Here Hsun-tze suggests that a good policy includes positively opening the sources of income so that on one hand, the supply becomes sufficient because of increased production, and on the other the lives of the masses may become easier and enriched by promoting efficiency through the division of labour and encouraging the expansion of business and markets. This is Hsun-tze's positive suggestion for enriching the country. However, he also suggests some negative policies to meet the purpose. In the same chapter he says:

'The taxation of cultivated lands should be collected in tithes⁸; the customs stations and markets should be checked but should not be taxed; the mountains, forests, marshes and bridges should be closed and opened at the appropriate seasons but should not be taxed. To investigate the quality of lands and then to fix the taxation accordingly; to distinguish the distances of roads and then to ask for the tribute; as regards currency, commodities, grain and rice, not to allow them to become dead stock but to let them circulate and be exchanged; these policies should be carried to all four corners of the country, and applied as to one family.' (V, 5-6)

8. 什一 Shih-I, one tenth.

There are many more passages in his book concerning suggestions for enriching the country, which still have not lost their value in modern times. The point worth noticing is that Hsun-tze's suggestions on the subject show that he also considers the interests of the people, though he often tends to see politics from the standpoint of the king. On the other hand, Hsun-tze lays emphasis on the Human-Mindedness and wisdom with which the ruler may supplement nature's nourishment and utilize all things to improve the living standard of his people.

As to the policy of strengthening the army, Hsun-tze explains its purpose in chapter XV, entitled 'Discussion on the army'.

'The Human-Minded Man loves men, and since he loves men, he hates those who harm men. The righteous man follows reason and principle, and since he follows reason and principle, he hates those who bring disorder to men. His army is for the sake of prohibiting the tyrannical and eliminating the dangerous, and not for fighting for the leading role, nor for conquering cities and capturing territories. Therefore the army of a Human-Minded Man, wherever it stations, brings peace and administration; whatever territory it occupies, influences and civilizes its enemies, and it is just like the fall of timely rain with which there is no one who is not delighted.' (X, 8)

Here Hsun-tze clearly indicates that the purpose of an army is to put down the tyrannical and eliminate the dangerous so as to bring peace to the people, or in short, to protect the people against harm. What, then, is the policy of controlling the army? Hsun-tze answers in the same chapter:

'The essence of controlling the army and attacking in battle is to unite the people . . . Therefore those who are good at being close to their people are good at controlling the army. . . . To a great king, the

management of his army is a comparatively minor matter, . . . if he is virtuous, his country will be governed in peace; . . . if he honours rites and righteousness, his country will be governed in peace . . . To honour rites and bring their functions to full play, is the best strategem; to value official salary and rank, while honouring moral fortitude is the secondary policy; to esteem utility and belittle moral fortitude is a most foolish scheme . . . He who is fond of the capable and virtuous will strengthen his country, . . . he who loves his people will strengthen his country, . . . he whose official orders are trustworthy will strengthen his country, . . . he who unites his people will strengthen his country, . . . he who offers heavy rewards will strengthen his country, . . . he whose punishment is stern and severe will strengthen his country.' (X, 1-4)

This is Hsun-tze's policy of controlling the army and it is also a succinct description of his policy of the way of a king. In chapter XVII, he also says:

'If a king honours rites and respects the capable and virtuous, he is a Sage-King; if he esteems laws but loves his people, he is a mighty chief.' (XI, 13)

As to the result of the army of the Sage-King, Hsun-tze says in chapter XV:

'The people near him become delighted with his good policy and those at a distance admire his virtue; his army does not stain with blood, and the distant and the near will come to follow him; his virtue brings prosperity to those nearby yet his good policy is extended to the four corners of the world.' (X, 9)

In short, the ideal army is led by a Sage-King and the effect or influence of such an army is to bring culture and virtue to its enemy.

(iii) Rooting out the evil and eliminating the traitorous

The ideal policy of a king is, according to Hsun-tze, to influence his people with his virtue. As to those who do not accept

this, the only way to deal with them is, Hsun-tze holds, to root them out. In chapter V, he describes the chief of the evil and the traitorous:

'Listen to his speech and one will find that his words are deceptive, sophisticated, and without basis; if one uses him as an officer, one will find that he is tricky and deceitful, and he has no merit; on one hand, he is not good enough to serve a wise king, and on the other, he is not good enough to harmonize and unite the masses; yet his arguments are smooth, his promises are restricted; he considers himself good enough to join the class of the remarkable, and the great men and the saviours of the country. He is the chief of the evil and the traitorous.' (III, 7)

In short, such a man is an extreme example of a Mean-Spirited Man. Hsun-tze considers that such a man must be put to death for he will never bring good to others but be harmful to society and country. Therefore the first thing a Sage-King must do after he has succeeded to the throne is, says Hsun-tze, to eliminate such a kind of man.

The next person who should be rooted out is the tyrant. In chapter XVIII, Hsun-tze says:

'To eliminate a tyrant is just like killing an ordinary man.' (XII, 2)

The tyrant does not love his people but instead he harms and endangers them; he does not maintain a good policy but instead he employs a selfish and unjust one; he does not enrich the country but instead he wastes and exhausts the wealth of the country, and the reason for him to strengthen his army is only to fight for supreme power or to conquer more lands or for profit. Therefore, Hsun-tze holds that a Sage-King, protecting the people from suffering, must eliminate the tyrant.

(iv) Following the policy of the recent Sage-Kings

There had been arguments among the Pre-Ch'in scholars on the models for a king's policy - whether to follow the early Sage-Kings⁹ or the recent Sage-Kings¹⁰. The former Sage-Kings are, according to them, the five famed ancient kings¹¹, and the recent Sage-Kings are those who ruled in the early Chou Dynasty.

Hsun-tze does not oppose the ancient Sage-Kings; on the contrary, he sincerely praises the spirit of their policy. In chapter VIII, he says:

'The ways of the early kings were an exaltation of Human-Mindedness and in their actions they followed the middle way (i.e. the appropriate principle) . . . A true Confucianist should follow the pattern of the early kings and exalt the rites and righteousness.'

(IV, 3)

In chapter I, he also says:

'Those who have never heard of the instructions of the early kings will not know the profundity of knowledge.' (I, 1)

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9. 先王 Hsien-Wang, the ancient legendary Sage-Kings.
10. 後王 Huo-Wang, usually denotes King Wen, King Wu of early Chou.
11. 五帝 Wu-Ti, they are listed at least in three different ways:
- (1) 太昊 Tai Hao, 神農 Shen Nong, 黃帝 Huang Ti, 少昊 Shao Hao, and 顓頊 Chuan Hsu (according to LI YUEH LING 禮月令)
- (2) Huang Ti, Chuan Hsu, 帝嚳 Ti Ku, Tao and Shun (according to TA TAI LI CH'I 大戴禮記 and SHIH CHING 詩經); and
- (3) Shao Hao, Chuan Hsu, Ti Ku, Yao and Shun, (according to THE HEREDITARY RECORDS OF THE KINGS)

In chapter V, he says:

'All those speeches which are not in accordance with the (spirit of) the early kings, and do not obey rites and righteousness are wicked speeches.' (III, 5)

It is clear that Hsun-tze appreciates the establishment and the exaltation of rites and righteousness of the ancient legendary Sage-Kings and considers that their spirit should always be remembered. However, the detailed contents of their establishment and exaltation are not to be found after so many generations, and therefore Hsun-tze objects to following their policy which had ceased to exist. In chapter V he makes clear this idea:

'Before the five kings there were no legendary Sage-Kings. This was not because there were no capable and virtuous men before them but because so much time had elapsed. No policy of the five kings has been transmitted down to today. This is not because there was no good policy among them, but because of the long time which has elapsed. Although Yu and T'ang transmitted good policies, the details are not as observable as those of the Chou Dynasty. This is not because there were no good policies at their time, but because of the long time which has elapsed. The longer the time over which the theories were transmitted, the more sketchy their contents became.' (III, 5)

In other words, Hsun-tze considers that it is foolish to take, as models, the policies of the former Sage-Kings which have become incomplete and indistinct after generations.

As for the reason for following the recent Sage-Kings, Hsun-tze explains in the same chapter:

'If one wants to observe the merits of the policies of the Sage-Kings, they can only be found among the recent

kings who possess them in a complete and clear form. The recent kings are contemporary rulers. If men abandon the recent kings and talk about those of pre-historic time, they are just like those who abandon their own king and serve someone else's king.' (III, 4)

In chapter III, he also says:

'The ways of the hundred kings of ancient times¹² are no different from the ways of the recent kings. If a Conscientious Man examines the ways of the recent kings and infers the ways of the kings before the hundred kings, then he always feels easy and composed as a ruler who rules without actually governing does¹³.' (II, 5)

The recent kings collected the essence of the policies of the ancient kings and their policies represent the complete form of the latter, and therefore Hsun-tze insists that a king must follow the patterns of the recent kings. In chapter VIII, he also says:

'If man asks about morality, he should be told nothing more than the ways of the recent kings¹⁴. If the comments go beyond the three dynasties¹⁵, then this is entirely unreliable. To follow the pattern of different policies than those of the recent kings is improper . . . If the various theories of the hundred schools do not include that of the recent kings, then man need not listen to them.' (IV, 13)

This shows Hsun-tze's radical theory that a king or even an ordinary man should follow the ways of the recent kings.

12. 百王 Pai-Wang. The term 'the hundred kings' denotes the approximate numbers of kings from ancient legend.

13. What Hsun-tze means here is simply that the policies of the recent kings are identical with those of the ancient kings.

14. The term 'the ways of the recent kings' means the practice of rites and righteousness.

15. 三代 San-Tai, denotes 夏 Hsia (2183-1752 B.C.), 商 Shang (c.1751-1111 B.C.) and 周 Chou (1111-256 B.C.).

As to the detail of the ways of recent kings, it seems that Hsun-tze has included them in his theories of the ways of a Sage-King or his ideal policies. He agrees with the spirit of the policies of the ancient kings or pre-historic Sage-Kings, but he advocates that one should follow the details of the policies of the recent Sage-Kings simply because they are transmitted in their entirety. In this case, although his theory is opposite to that of Mencius who is in favour of following the early kings or ancient kings, the principle and the spirit of both indeed are not far away from each other as far as political ideals are concerned.

C: HIS DISCUSSION OF THE INHERITANCE OF KINGSHIP

The problem of the inheritance of kingship, or the succession of the ruler is one of the major problems of the philosophy of politics. In his discussion, Hsun-tze suggests two points: (1) the succeeding to the throne after the elimination of a tyrant, and (2) the succeeding of a Sage by another Sage.

(i) Elimination of a tyrant

When a king is tyrannical to his people and harmful to his country, a new Sage-King will, Hsun-tze believes, gain power and eliminate the tyrant for the people. In chapter XVIII, Hsun-tze says:

'If he (the tyrant) is without capability and acts improperly, then inside the country, his people hate him, and outside the country, the feudal princes rebel against him. In the near circle of his kingdom there is no unification within the border; and in the distances, the feudal princes disobey him. His orders

therefore are not executed in the country, and even worse, the feudal princes invade and conquer him, attack and subjugate him. If the situation is like this, then although he has not been conquered, I would say he does not own the world any more . . . Among the feudal princes, there is one who is capable, virtuous, wise and powerful, and among the people in the country, there is no one unwilling to have him as king and teacher; though the tyrant is haughty and evil, he will soon be eliminated by the Sage.' (XII, 2)

From this, it is obvious that Hsun-tze's judgement on the tyrant is that either he will be killed by another capable and virtuous king or the world will leave him and follow another good king, and eventually he will lose his people and his country.

(ii) A Sage succeeding another Sage

In chapter XVIII, Hsun-tze says:

'If a Sage-King is dead and there is no other Sage in the world, then there is no-one worthy to take over the world. However, if the world has Sages and their descendants are Sages, the world will not split up and rebel, and there will be no changes of officials in the court, no reformation of institutions in the country, and the world will be peaceful and be no different from the past; if a Yao succeeds to a Yao, then why should there be any changes? If the Sage is not the descendant of a Sage-King but is found among the ministers, then if the world follows him, is moved by and yields to him, it will be peaceful and will be no different from the past; if a Yao succeeds to a Yao, then why should there be any changes? Only if the court and the institution are changed, then comes the difference. However, when the Sage-King is alive, the world is unified, most peaceful and controlled; if he measures his follower's virtue and allocates them appropriate ranks, then after his death there must be someone who is certainly capable of being responsible for the world.' (XII, 6-7)

In the same chapter, Hsun-tze therefore argues the error of the use of the term 'abdication of the throne'¹⁶ by his contemporaries as

16. 禪讓 Ch'an-Jang. According to the legend, Yao selected Shun as his successor and passed his rein of office to Shun before he died. Shun selected Yu and made him king before he retired also. Both Yao and Shun did not leave their thrones to their own sons for they considered them not capable and virtuous enough to rule the world. Most of the Pre-Ch'in scholars, especially Confucius and Mencius, highly praised this legendary story.

well as by many traditional scholars of the legendary story of Yao and Shun. He considers the term to be used improperly as well as unnecessarily for the following reasons:

(1) According to Hsun-tze, if a man is a Sage, the world will follow him and make him a king. Therefore if the man to whom a Sage-King abdicates the throne is a Sage, the world will certainly accept him. It is not because the king has elected him as his successor but because he himself wins the hearts of the people. On the other hand, if a man is not the one whom a Sage-King chooses, yet he is a Sage, the world will follow him and make him their king. What makes a man king is, Hsun-tze claims, his virtue which makes the world follow him, and not the abdication of the throne by a former king. In the case of Shun and Yu, it was because of their virtue that people willingly followed them and, in Hsun-tze's opinion, their popularity was not because they were elected successors to the throne. Thus the term is, in Hsun-tze's view, not in accordance with the facts and it therefore is a misleading name or a confusion.

(2) Hsun-tze implies that the death of a Sage-King is like that of a common man. There should be no changes in policy, officials and institutions if another Sage-King succeeds to the throne and follows the good policy or the kingly policy of his former. Therefore he repeatedly emphasizes that if a Yao, a new Sage-King, succeeds to a Yao, the aged or dead Sage-King, there should be no changes in the country. Hsun-tze considers that the changes of kings are not important as long as the good policy is maintained. Therefore the term is unnecessary or of no importance to political theory.

3. To Hsun-tze, when a Sage-King is living, there must be many capable and virtuous men in the court; when he dies, there is certainly at least one Sage who is capable and virtuous enough to succeed to the throne. Therefore the formal procedure of abdication of the throne before he dies is not a necessary one. To Hsun-tze, the legendary story of 'abdication of the throne' denotes, if it is a historical fact, an unresistant current of the masses to follow whom they approve. Therefore the term itself carries no political significance and should not, Hsun-tze claims, be over-estimated as most of the scholars of his time do.

From the above, it is clear that what Hsun-tze is concerned with is the virtue of the king in his moral-cultivation and policy-framing. As to arguments about the term 'abdication of the throne', and the banishment or elimination of the tyrant, Hsun-tze sees these as only minor or insignificant details.

D: HIS ILLUSTRATION OF A SAGE-KING AND A KINGLY GOVERNMENT

Hsun-tze's ideal king is a Sage-King who possesses three extremes as mentioned in chapter XVIII:

'A king's task is the heaviest, he must be extremely strong to be competent for such a position; it is the most important, he must be extremely good at discrimination and evaluation properly to see his duty; and it is the most varied, he must be extremely brilliant to harmonize the masses. Unless he is a Sage, he can never perfect these three extremes.' (XII, 7)

It is apparent that Hsun-tze considers that only a Sage can be a Sage-King.

As to a more practical picture of Hsun-tze's ideal government or a kingly government, he suggests 'the perfected policy of a Confucianist', which is discussed in chapter XI:

'A Confucianist . . . must perfect his policy. His court must exert every effort to know the rites and righteousness and to discriminate between the noble and the humble, if it does so, then the soldiers will all value integrity and be prepared to die for their country; his hundreds of officials must be organized in a uniformed system, their ranks must be respected and their salaries increased; if so, then they will all fear the laws and obey orders; the customs and markets must be checked but without imposing taxation, the judges and the laws must put down evil doers and not follow them; if so, then all the merchants and businessmen will become honest and prudent and they will trade without fraud; all the workers must cut the wood in good time, the government must delay the deadline in order to allow them to make full use of their skills and techniques, if so, then they will all become honest and trustworthy, and their products will not be of low quality and not durable. In the villages and remote places, the taxes must be reduced, the levy on products such as knives and cloths must be reduced, corvée must be kept to the minimum, and must not interrupt the farming seasons, if so, then all farmers will work diligently and no one will hide his capability. If the soldiers respect integrity and are prepared to die for their country, then the army will be strengthened. If the hundreds of officials fear laws and obey orders, then the country will be stabilized and will not become chaotic. If the merchants and businessmen are honest and prudent and not fraudulent, then the trade will be stable and the currency will be circulated and the country will be self-sufficient. If the hundreds of workers are honest and trustworthy and their products are not of low quality and are durable, then utensils will be ingenious and useful and the currency will not become short. If the farmers work diligently and do not hide their capability, then above, the seasons of Heaven will not be missed, and below, the profits of the earth will not be lost, while in the middle, the harmony between men will be achieved and human activities will not be interrupted. This will mean that policy and orders are executed and customs are refined. If a king keeps to such a policy, he will achieve stability; if he uses it to quell rebels, he will strengthen his power; if he keeps to defence, he will gain fame and name; and whatever he does, will achieve merits. This is what a Confucianist calls "the perfected policy".' (VII, 14)

The appearance of a Sage-King is described in chapter XII:

'A king observes without seeing, apprehends without listening, knows without considering, achieves merit without moving; he alone sits there and the whole world as a body obeys him just as the four limbs follow the Mind. This is called the great appearance (of the king).' (VIII, 5)

When a king obtains such a 'great appearance', Hsun-tze considers that his policy and educational influence on his people will reach to the highest success; thus Hsun-tze says in chapter XV:

'The people follow him like running water. Wherever he stays, he brings peace and control; whatever he does, he influences and relieves his people. Those who are tyrannical, fierce and mighty are changed into the sincere and virtuous; those who are narrow-minded, evil, biased and selfish are changed into the fair and just; those who are quick-tempered and perverse are changed into the harmonious. This is called the great influence and the ultimate unification.' (X, 12)

In short, Hsun-tze's ideal policy is an effective moral education and moral influence from the Sage-King to the masses.

Hsun-tze also suggests that the key policy of a Sage-King is to act in accordance with rites and propriety. In chapter XII, he says:

''Please tell us about the way of a king''. I answer: he should discriminate and administer according to rites . . . The way of employing an official is to examine him by means of rites.' (VIII, 2)

From this, it is evident that Hsun-tze always considers rites to be the most essential word in the king's moral-cultivation and policy-framing. In chapter XIX, entitled 'Discussion of Rites', he says:

'Rites are the culmination of the Ultimate Principle of Man.' (XIII,5)

Rites assist the development of the Way of the Mind from an ordinary man to a Sage, and complete the policy of a Sage-King, therefore Hsun-tze always lays emphasis on the importance of rites in its function as regards the individual as well as in politics. The ideal policy of Hsun-tze is a ritual administration, and his political theory is an advocacy of the administration of a Sage-King or a kingly policy.

SECTION 2: THE THEORIES OF THE WAY OF OFFICIALS

Hsun-tze devotes quite a large space in his book to discussing the way of a king; yet he also extends to a certain length the discussion of the way of officials. He mentions the integrity of a prime minister, a general and officials and his descriptions are concrete and detailed. Hsun-tze's suggestions about the way of officials in general are twofold, namely: to serve the king with absolute loyalty and obedience, and to attend the people with love and protection, which latter point is not described in great detail while the former is mentioned repeatedly. The contents of his discussion can be divided into two parts: (1) the virtue of officials, and (2) the capability of officials.

A: HIS DISCUSSIONS OF THE VIRTUE OF OFFICIALS

There are many passages in his book devoted to this subject. Briefly, Hsun-tze's ideal official is a Sage-official whose virtue should be that of a Sage.

(i) Moral-cultivation

In chapter VI, Hsun-tze says:

'He (the official) is in a high position, honoured and respected, yet he does not therefore show haughtiness to others; he is sagacious, virtuous and intelligent, yet he does not therefore make others embarrassed; he is agile, nimble and energetic, yet he is not on that account anxious to be ahead of others; and he is tough, determined and brave, yet he does not nevertheless hurt others. When he does not know, he asks; when he is not able to do, he learns; even if he is able, he is always moderate; then he is said to have virtue. When he encounters the king, he performs the duty as the king's subject or official; when he encounters villagers, he performs the duty of seniority and juniority in age or generation; when he encounters elders, he performs the duty of the younger; when he encounters friends, he performs the duty of courtesy and modesty; and when he encounters the young inferiors, he performs the duty of correcting, advising, instructing and forgiving. There is no one he does not love and respect; he does not fight for anything with others; and his Mind is as magnanimous and extensive as Heaven and earth which monopolize all things. If he is so, then the capable and virtuous will honour him, and the ordinary people will love to be intimate with him.'

(III, 11)

This is Hsun-tze's ideal or standard of moral-cultivation of an official as an individual; and in fact, his description is quite similar to that of a Sage. In other passages in his book, he frankly reveals that his ideal official is a Sage-official. (IX, 1)

(ii) Loyalty

In chapter XIII, entitled 'The Way of Officials', there is a passage which Hsun-tze particularly devotes to the discussion of the loyalty of officials to the king. He considers loyalty to be one of the essential virtues of an official. In that chapter, he divides loyalty into three categories in contrast with rebelliousness as follows:

'To protect, benefit, and influence his king with his virtue, this is great loyalty; to adjust, regulate and assist the king with his virtue, this is secondary loyalty; to admonish the wrong-doing of the king with reason and to complain and be resentful if the admonition is not accepted; this is the lowest grade of loyalty; not to be concerned about the honour and disgrace of the king, not to be concerned about the good or bad of the country, to avail himself of leisure times, to flatter and be obsequious, to enjoy ease without regard to principle and to cheat, only to receive official pay in order to keep one's living, and to entertain guests and visitors, this is rebelliousness.' (IX, 4)

(iii) Other necessary virtue

In chapter VII, Hsun-tze discusses the necessary virtue of an official:

'If the king honours and respects him, he should be serious, reverent and deferential; if the king trusts and favours him, he should be serious-minded, prudent and modest; if the king especially appoints him (to take up an important task), he should hold fast to it carefully and devotedly and complete it successfully; if the king likes to be intimate with him, he should keep company with the king and yet he should not flatter him; if the king alienates him, he should keep his loyalty and should not renounce the king; and if the king criticizes him unfavourably and dismisses him, he should be fearful and worried but he should not resent it. Even though he is highly-placed and eminent, he is not wasteful and extravagant; even though he is trusted, he will not put himself in a compromising position; even though he shoulders an important role, he is not dictatorial; even though wealth and profit run his way, he always considers that he is not good enough to gain them and he must do his best to avoid their acceptance unless they are necessary. When luck comes, he is calm and rational; when disaster comes, he is clear-minded, composed and rational; if he is rich, he gives favours to others widely; if he is poor, he cuts his own expenses; he can live in a position noble or inferior, wealthy or poor, yet he is prepared to be killed but he cannot be forced to perform evil deeds. This is the way for an official to gain the favour of a king, to maintain his position and to keep to it through his whole life without tiring of it . . . If he seeks for a way

which assists him to be good at staying in a high position, managing important duties, being in the favour of the king of a country of ten thousand chariots¹⁷ and which assures him of having no disastrous aftermath, then there is no better way than to be willing to be associated with other men, helping and recommending the capable and virtuous, relieving the masses with liberal aid, removing the resentment of others and refraining from harming or interfering with others. If his ability is good enough to be employed, he should serious-mindedly and prudently practise this way; if his ability is not good enough to be employed, and he is worried that he will lose the favour of the king, then there is no better way than as soon as possible to share his power with others, exalting the capable and virtuous, abdicating to the able, and feeling at ease to follow after them. If he is like this, when he is favoured, then he will certainly achieve honour; when he loses favour, he will certainly not be accused of misdeeds. This is the golden law of serving the king and the way to ensure that there is no disastrous aftermath . . . To honour and respect is the first step, to be loyal and trustworthy is the highest virtue, to act with caution and serious-mindedness, to maintain these principles with dignity and honesty; and in the moment of hindrance and poverty, to struggle again and again with diligence, exertion and determination in order to appeal and make preparations for a comeback. Even though the king does not know him, he has no resentment and hatred; even though his achievement is quite great, his face betrays no pride; he eagerly seeks occasions for rendering distinguished service, and his love and respect is never weary; if he is like this, there is never anything that does not go smoothly for him. By means of this, if he serves the king, he will certainly have dignity and eminence; if he practises Human-Mindedness, he will certainly become a Sage; this is the art of living in the world.' (III, 15-17)

In short, the essential virtue of an official is no less than that of a Sage; or in other words, an official should be a Sage. And no matter whether he is a king or an official, he should Hsun-tze claims, take this opportunity to project his virtue as a Sage right down to the masses.

17. 萬乘之國 Wan-Ch'eng-Chih-Kuo. In the period of the Chou Dynasty, a king had ten thousand or more chariots at his command, a feudal prince a thousand; this was a way to classify their authorities, so a country of ten thousand chariots indicates an empire.

B: HIS OPINION ON THE CAPABILITY OF AN OFFICIAL

The capability of an official is measured and thus classified by Hsun-tze for the reference of the king. In chapter XIII, he classified officials into four categories, namely; the feigned official, the usurping official, the meritorious official, and the Sage-official¹⁸. He says:

'If inside the country, he is not good enough to unify the people, outside the country, he is not good enough to resist difficulties, if the people are not intimate with him, and the feudal princes do not trust him, and he is cunning, clever, obsequious and flattering, and he is good at gaining favour of his superiors, he is a feigned official. If on one hand, he is not loyal to the king, and on the other, he is good at fishing for a good reputation and publicity by flattering the people, if he is not concerned about general principles and constant rules, if he constitutes cliques or personal parties and joins with others to surround the king so as to gain personal profit, he is an usurping official. If inside the country, he is good enough to be employed to unify the people, outside the country, he is good enough to resist difficulties, if the people are intimate with him and the officials trust him, if on one hand he is loyal to the king, and on the other, he loves the people without feeling weary; he is a meritorious official. If on one hand, he is able to honour the king, and on the other, he is able to love the masses, if his policy is carried out and his instruction is influential, and he himself is an example or model whom the people follow like his shadow, if he deals with sudden changes as effectively and speedily as the echo follows the call, if he looks into the codification of laws and applies precedents to new situations and thus completes the revision and creation of institutions and laws, then he is a Sage-official. Thus the one who employs a Sage-official will become a king, the one who employs a meritorious official will become strong, the one who employs an usurping official will bring the country into danger and the one who employs a feigned official will cause decay.' (IX, 1)

18. 態臣 T'ai-Ch'en, 篡臣 Ts'uan-Ch'en,
功臣 Kung-Ch'en, 聖臣 Sheng-Ch'en.

In chapter III, Hsun-tze divides officials into four groups as follows:

'If on one hand, he is able to honour the king, on the other, he is able to love people, if things approach, he can respond and deal with them, if when events originate, he can manage and overcome them, thus he can be said to be a clear and logical official. If he does not alienate his inferiors in order to fool his superiors, and he does not join with his superiors to do harm to his inferiors, if in disputes he remains neutral and he does not harm others with a personal grudge, then he can be said to be a fair official. If his merits are not known to his superiors or the king, he will not resent it; if his shortcomings are not known to his superiors or the king, he will not secretly consider it fortunate, if he does not cover up or disguise his shortcomings or merits and reveals himself with the true facts and statements, then he can be said a candid official. If he insists on trustworthiness in his casual speaking, and insists on serious-mindedness in his casual behaviour, if he shuns following popular worldliness and he shuns considering what he alone sees is right, then he can be said to be a cautious official.' (II, 5)

These qualities of four groups of officials are what Hsun-tze considers to be the basic qualities of an ordinary official.

A great Confucianist is, to Hsun-tze, a Sage, and a Sage as an individual is high above all men and a Sage as an official leader, i.e. a king or a ruler, or an official of high-position to assist the king, is also high above all officials. In chapter VIII he says:

'If his will is refined and restrained, then he is able to be fair and just; if his behaviour is liberated from passion, then he is able to cultivate himself; if he is clever and inquisitive, then he is able to become versatile; if he is fair and just, self-cultivated and versatile in his abilities, then he can be said to be a

moderate Confucianist. If his will is content with what is fair and just, in his behaviour he is satisfied with self-cultivation, his knowledge is clear and logical and all-embracing, then he can be called a great Confucianist. A great Confucianist can be a king or one of the three prime ministers. A moderate Confucianist can be a feudal prince or an official or a Scholar.'

(IV, 13)

In chapter XIII, entitled 'The Way of Officials', Hsun-tze defines a series of terms related to the capability or qualities of an official; he says:

'To obey orders and that which is advantageous to the king is called obedience; to obey orders and that which is disadvantageous to the king is called flattery; to disobey orders and that which is advantageous to the king is called loyalty, to disobey orders and that which is disadvantageous to the king is called usurpation . . . When the king commits mistakes in plans and deeds, which might have the fearful possibility of endangering the country and being harmful to society, an official of high rank or one of the seniors in the king's family can offer advice to the king and if the king accepts it, he stays; if the king does not accept it, he leaves; this is called admonition. If the official is able to offer advice to the king and if the king accepts it, he stays; if the king does not accept it, he commits suicide; this is called struggle. If the official is able to unite the wise and the powerful and to lead all the other officials to force the king and to correct him, so that even though the king is uneasy, he has to listen and thus a great calamity to the country is averted and a great danger is dispelled and the honour of the king and peace of the country is finally achieved, this is called assistance. If an official is able to resist the orders of the king, to employ important officials of the king in an unauthorized way, to oppose the king's conduct and thus dispel the danger to the country and remove the disgrace of the king, and this is sufficient to bring great advantages to the country; this is called expedient aid. Thus the one who presents admonition, struggle, assistance and expedient aid is a servant of the society and a treasure of the king. He should be honoured and greatly favoured by a clever king, yet he may be considered to be a rebel by a foolish and confused king.'

(IX, 2-3)

In Hsun-tze's view, admonition, struggle, assistance and expedient aid are also the qualities of the Sage-official.

As to the way of giving service to the king, Hsun-tze's opinion on this subject is also outstanding. In chapter XIII, he says:

'To honour, respect and be moderate; to obey, follow and be flexible in carrying out orders, to shun arbitrary decision and choice, to shun taking or giving personal favours, and to obey the words of superiors as though they were one's own wishes; this is the principle of serving the Sage-King. To be loyal and trustworthy and not to flatter, to admonish and struggle and not toady, to be fortitudinous and determined, to be upright and not be swayed, to say what is right is right and what is wrong is wrong; this is the principle of servicing an ordinary king. To be harmonious yet not to follow worldliness, to be tender yet not to bend, to forgive yet not to cause disorder, to explain the Ultimate Principle of Man which harmonizes and adjusts all things, and to be able to influence and change the Nature of the king and always be able to advise and persuade him and help him to return to a proper path; this is the principle of serving a tyrant. It is just like governing an untrained horse, nursing an infant or feeding a hungry man. He (the official) seizes the moment when the tyrant is frightened, then corrects his mistakes; when the tyrant is worried, he then changes his Nature; when the tyrant is happy, he then directs him to the Ultimate Principle of Man; when he is angry, he then relieves his resentment; and he does his best to be successful in these things.' (IX, 3-4)

Therefore only a Sage-official is suitable for and capable of such a task.

In his theory of the Way of the official, Hsun-tze particularly lays emphasis on the virtue and capability of officials. He considers that the virtue of an official on one hand can influence and change the king, and on the other can teach and nourish the

masses, and that the capability of an official is to be able to respond to and deal with the changes of any situations and to be able to implement the policy and unify the nation. Thus on one hand he can honour and add glory and grace to the king, or assist him, and on the other he can protect the masses. If the country is in the hands of a Sage-King and Sage-officials, then the country will, Hsun-tze believes, be peaceful, strong, and wealthy.

SECTION 3: THE THEORIES OF THE WAY OF THE MASSES

In his book, Hsun-tze has left very little information about his opinions on the masses in politics. He mentions, however, the relationship between the king and his people, and also gives some descriptions of the masses.

A: HIS DISTINCTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE KING AND HIS PEOPLE

There are obvious differences in the political relationships between the king and his people in Hsun-tze's theory. He suggests two as follows.

(i) The Heavenly God and men or the parent and his children

Hsun-tze compares the relationship of the king to his people to that of Heavenly God to men and a parent to his children. It is necessary to explain that the term 'Heavenly God' which he uses does not mean that he, having just opposed superstitious belief of Heaven, has now returned to it; he uses this simile to follow the

prevailing custom so as to help to illustrate his ideas. This description is given in chapter X:

'To master ten thousand changes, to judge all things, to nourish all people and at the same time also to administer the whole world; there is no one better than a Human-Minded Man. For his knowledge and Deliberation is sufficient to administer the world, his Human-Mindedness and sincerity is sufficient to calm the world, and his virtue and saying are sufficient to influence and change the world. If the world has him, then it will be under control; if it loses him, it will become chaotic. The masses are certainly dependent on his wise Deliberation, therefore they themselves lead one another to work hard for him in order to ensure his leisure so that he can nurture and discipline his wisdom. They certainly praise his Human-Mindedness, therefore they render service at the cost of their lives, and sacrifice themselves determinedly for him in order to protect and save him so that he can nurture and cultivate his Human-Mindedness. They certainly love his virtue, therefore they cut and polish, engrave and carve, sew and embroider, compose and write for him in order to honour him and ornament his life so that he can nurture and cultivate his virtue. Therefore if a Human-Minded man is in the highest position, the masses will honour him as the Heavenly God, and be intimate with him as a parent, they render service at the cost of their lives and are willing to sacrifice themselves for him and they feel happy to do so. There is no other reason for this except what they consider right really is very fine, what they gain really is great and the benefits they obtain are many.' (VI, 4)

It is evident that Hsun-tze considers that the reason for the hard work, sacrifices, offers of tribute and contribution of the people for the king is simply because they love, admire and adore him for his virtue and wisdom. And thus the relationship between the masses and their king to Hsun-tze are like a flock of innocent sheep following their shepherd or an infant wanting its mother.

(ii) Virtue and labour

In chapter X, Hsun-tze says:

'A Conscientious Man rules with his virtue, and the masses serve with their labour. The labour is the service due to the virtuous. The labour of the masses depends on (the virtue and ability of the Sage-King) to achieve merits; the group life of the masses depends on it to obtain harmony; their wealth depends on it to be accumulated; their condition depends on it to obtain stability; and their life depends on it to enjoy longevity. Thus the fathers and sons must be intimate with one another; the seniors and juniors must yield to one another; and the men and women must be happy and harmonious with one another. And thus the youngsters can be brought up, and the aged can be supported and cared for. Therefore I say: The Heaven and earth give birth to the masses and the Sage perfects them.' (VI, 4-5)

It is evident here that Hsun-tze considers that the virtue of the Sage-King and the labour of the masses are complimentary to each other and at the same time constitute an ideal world, or rather, ideal politics. According to Hsun-tze's theory, on one hand the Sage-King contributes his virtue and capability to rule, to administer, to influence and to nourish his people and to have them perfected and on the other, the people should offer their labour to carry out the policy of the Sage-King in order to show their obedience, loyalty and trust as well as to work for their king's necessities of life in order to relieve him from extra labour and to express their love, admiration and adoration for him. This is a supplementary theory to his saying that the relationship between a king and his people is like that between Heavenly God and men and the parent and his children.

From the above, it is seen that the theme of Hsun-tze's political theory is personality-administration or more precisely, virtue-administration. Personality-administration is a government brought about by virtuous ruler(s) or in Hsun-tze's term the 'Sage-King'. To Hsun-tze, the ideal government is that which is ruled by a host of Sage-officials led by a Sage-King, which may be conveniently called 'the government of the Sages'; and to the ideal relationship between the king and the people, which can be conveniently termed 'the relationship between the Sages and non-Sages.'

B: HIS OPINION ON THE VIRTUE AND ABILITIES OF THE MASSES

Not much has been said by Hsun-tze on this subject except a few words in passages seen at scattered places. In chapter VIII, he mentions the ordinary man or the worldly man in contrast with the worldly Confucianist, the Conscientious Confucianist and the Great Confucianist. He says:

'He who does not know how to learn and to ask, does not have proper and righteous conduct and he who considers wealth and profit to be the ultimate in life is an ordinary man or a worldly man.' (IV, 9)

In the same chapter, he also mentions the masses as follows:

'His will is inevitably biased and selfish, yet he expects others to think that he is fair and just; his behaviour is inevitably reckless and uncontrolled, yet he expects others to think that he is cultivated and moral; his foolishness and innocence makes him deeply confused and feeble-minded, yet he expects others to think that he is wise and learned; he is a common man, one of the masses . . . The masses are to work as workers, farmers, merchants and businessmen.'

(IV, 12)

To Hsun-tze, the moral status of the masses is that of a Mean-Spirited Man, and their social status or political status are the components of the lower classes in the division of labour in their country.

In chapter VIII, Hsun-tze mentions the virtue of the masses as follows:

'To think that following the custom is good, commodities and currency are treasures, regimen and personal interest are the highest principles of life; this is the virtue of the masses.' (IV, 6)

It is reasonable to believe that the words 'the virtue of the masses' used by Hsun-tze means simply 'the common characteristic or qualities of the ordinary people', and it does not carry the meaning of 'virtue in a moral sense such as the virtue of performing what is morally good and avoiding what is morally evil'. In other words, the 'virtue' and abilities of the masses are, in Hsun-tze's view, always in the lowest of classes in morality as well as in politics, or broadly speaking, society.

In chapter XII, there is a passage in which Hsun-tze describes his ideal man in a family role:

'When asked about the way of being a father, I say: one should be lenient, kind and polite. When asked about the way of being a son, I say: one should respect, adore and be extremely obedient. When asked about the way of being an elder brother, I say: one should be benevolent, loving and friendly. When asked about being a younger brother, I say: one should respect,

be moderate and should not be arrogantly impolite. When asked about being a husband, I say: one should be extremely gentle, joyful and should not have become licentious, one should also be easily approachable and yet should know the different duties of husband and wife. When asked about being a wife, I say: if the husband is polite, one should be tender, keep company with and listen to and attend on him; if the husband is impolite, one should fear him and keep him at a respectable distance.' (VIII, 2)

Hsun-tze thus suggests a brief outline of individual moral duties or virtue, which can also be considered to be his suggestion of the ideal virtue of man, as a member of society. However, anyone who is able to perfect such virtue is already a Conscientious Man, or a Sage.

Hsun-tze's impression of the masses in general is that of the Mean-Spirited Man, while his ideal model of man in society is still a Sage.

SECTION 4: THE THEORY OF IDEAL SOCIETY

A: HIS OPINION ON DIVISION OF LABOUR

In chapter X, Hsun-tze considers that in the division of labour, the ruling class should serve with virtue and the masses should serve with work or labour. He says:

'The way of making the whole world to be economically sufficient is to discriminate the various duties. To measure the land and make clear the boundary, to cut the weed and to cultivate the crops, to apply sufficient fertilizers and to keep the land well-fertilized; this is the work of

the farmers, the masses and the ordinary man. To observe the time and seasons and to encourage the people, to promote business and to improve results, to harmonize and unify the masses and to prohibit people from becoming lazy; this is the business of officials. To keep the high lands free from drought, and the lower lands free from flood, to let the work of winters and summers be adjusted and be appropriate and the five crops ripen in time; this is the business of Heaven and earth. However, to serve, to protect and nourish the whole world, to serve and love the whole world, to serve, conquer and administer the whole world; when in the year of famine, misfortune, flood and drought, to enable the masses to survive the disasters of severe cold and hunger; this is the business of the Sage-King and the virtuous and capable prime ministers.' (VI, 5)

In other words, the masses should contribute their labour to raise productivity, the officials should keep business going and going well, and the Sage-King and his high-ranking officials should direct the business to a proper path, make over-all plans, take care of and benefit their people. This is the idea of a centralized government ruled by the Sages, which Hsun-tze considers would benefit society most , and his scheme of division of labour is the initial step to his ideal society.

B: HIS IDEAL SOCIETY - AN ULTIMATELY FAIR SOCIETY

In chapter IV, Hsun-tze says:

'The ancient kings established rites and righteousness to classify men, thus allowing men to have different ranks from the noble to the lowly, discrepancies between seniority and juniority, distinctions between the wise and the innocent, the capable and the incapable. All these were in order to enable people to obtain their respective occupations and to gain their appropriate rewards, and then to let the more or less, the increasing or decreasing of official salaries be regularized; this is the principle of harmony and unity in social life. Therefore if a Human-Minded man is in a high position, then the farmers will put the fields to

full use with their labour, the businessmen will put the currency into full use with their clever observation and investigation, all sorts of workers will put the implements and tools to full use with their techniques; from officials in general onwards, up to prime ministers and feudal princes all will put their official duties into full play with their kindness, sincerity, wisdom and capabilities; this is called Ultimate Fairness¹⁹. (II, 13)

The ideal society, or the society of Ultimate Fairness is, according to Hsun-tze, that in which all men are occupied in work which is most suitable to their capabilities, and in which all men receive the most appropriate ~~pay~~ ^{pay} to their contribution to society. The term 'Ultimate Fairness' used here should mean the fairness as to man's capability as well as to his salary, and furthermore, to his position in society. It is only the Sage-King, according to Hsun-tze, who can complete such a task; to measure the virtues and capabilities of man and to give him a suitable place in society, and it is only by means of rites that a Sage-King can fulfil such a task. That is to say: after the measurement, the Sage-King offers man an appropriate position and treats him with related rites and pays him with the salary fixed by the regulations of RITES or YI LI, and on the other hand, that man can enjoy what is offered to him according to the regulations of RITES such as the style of clothing, food²⁰ and pay, office and residence, and style and amount of chariots and horses, etc. For this reason, the foundation of the Ultimately Fair society is established on rites. In chapter VIII, Hsun-tze says:

19. 至平 Chih-P'ing.

20. In ancient China, officials were paid partly with rice and partly with currency.

'Rites are the principle of the king to measure the merit or defects of his officials and the classifications of men are all included and completed in them.'
(IV, 13)

Thus to understand whether an official has fulfilled his duties, a king can, Hsun-tze suggests, examine whether the behaviour and speech of that official have been according to the regulation of RITES and to the spirit of righteousness. If in the country, all men including the king, officials and the masses practise the principle of rites and righteousness, or more precisely, the Way of a Sage, then Hsun-tze's ideal society may be realized. Thus in chapter XII, Hsun-tze says:

'When asked about the way of a king, I say: classify and administer by means of rites, evenly, uniformly and not with bias. When asked about the way of being an official, I say: serve the king with rites, be loyal and obedient and not neglectful.'
(VIII, 2)

Hsun-tze proceeds to his suggestions on the way of being a father, a son, a husband and a wife, by means of various forms of rites, quoted earlier in this section. In chapter IX, entitled 'The Constitution of a Kingly Government', he says:

'If there is no Conscientious Man, then the world will not be administered, and there will be no uniformity in rites and righteousness. If on one hand, there are no rites and righteousness among the king and teachers, and on the other, there are no rites and righteousness among father and son, this is called the utmost chaos. Rites and righteousness of the king and officials, father and son, the elder and younger brothers, the husband and wife, are, from the beginning to the end, and from the end to the beginning, the same principle as that of Heaven and earth, and will endure for ten thousand generations; this

is the great foundation. Thus the same truth is in the practices of funeral services, the sacrifices offered to gods or the deceased, official intercourse among feudal princes and the armies in military affairs; thus is the same principle in the classification of the noble and the lowly, the use of capital punishment and reprieve, and the punishment of depriving man of his civil rights; thus is the principle by which king should be a king, officials should be officials, fathers should be fathers, sons should be sons, elder brothers should be elder brothers, and younger brothers should be younger brothers, and thus is the same principle by which farmers should be farmers, scholars should be scholars, workers should be workers and merchants should be merchants.' (V, 7)

To Hsun-tze, the truth and principle which has existed and will exist eternally is that of rites and righteousness. In chapter XXI, he concludes his theories of his thought in the following lines:

'To be a Sage is to perfect thoroughly the duties in human relationship and to be a king is to perfect thoroughly the duties of social institutions. If one has perfected these two, one will have sufficient to reach perfection in the world.' (XV, 9-10)

To be a Sage is the core of Hsun-tze's moral philosophy, and for a country to be administered by a Sage-King is the core of his political philosophy. He lays emphasis on a Sage-King administering his country by perfecting the duties of social institutions or by following the principle of rites and righteousness, so that the external behaviour of the individual in society will be regulated and restrained. However, according to Hsun-tze, rites are effective only in assisting man to promote the Mind to a higher level of moral practice. As to the essence of morality,

Hsun-tze always considers that the functioning of the Mind is the most important factor. The Sage is the one who individually perfects his virtue as a man and socially perfects the institution of rites and righteousness. The principle of becoming a Sage is applicable to all classes in society, therefore Hsun-tze uses the sociological terms: king, official, father, son, elder brother, younger brother, husband, wife, and also farmer, scholar, worker and merchant for the purpose of making explicit that all these names or terms must first be rectified; that is to say, a king should behave as a king, an official should do what an official should do and so on. As to the way of rectifying these names, Hsun-tze suggests rites and righteousness. The society of Ultimate Fairness, or a society of great propriety, is in fact the final aim of his philosophy.

From the theories of Man's Evil Nature, Transformation of Man's Nature, to the theories of the Way of the Mind which are connected by the theories of knowledge and of Heaven and the Ultimate Principle of Man, Hsun-tze surveys the moral duties of man. As to his political theories, they are only an extension of his theory of the Way of the Mind to the social duties of man. In short, what Hsun-tze is concerned with is the establishment of an ideal personality, or his ideal man, the Sage. However, his theory of the society of Ultimate Fairness, or his ideal society which is initially ruled by the Sage-King and in which finally all men are Sages, brings an end to his philosophy. The chapters of exposition and analysis of his theories may therefore be ended here.

P A R T I I :

A N E X A M I N A T I O N O F H I S T H E O R I E S

CHAPTER V:

CRITICISM OF HIS THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE

PART II

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF HIS THEORIES

CHAPTER V:

CRITICISM OF HIS THEORIES OF HUMAN
NATURE

SECTION 1: HIS THEORY THAT MAN'S NATURE IS EVIL

The original purpose of Hsun-tze's theory that Man's Nature is Evil is to establish the theory of Transformation of Man's Nature and that of Artifice, and then to develop the theory of the Way of the Mind in order to introduce the stage of Sagehood. The Evil of Man's Nature may not be the main emphasis of his philosophy. However, since the theory forms part of the basis of his philosophical system and since it has been a focus of dispute in the history of Chinese thought, it seems necessary to first examine it in the criticism of his theories of human nature.

A: HUMAN NATURE IS NOT A GOOD OR AN EVIL IN ITSELF

(i) The logical and linguistic traps in the theories of innate goodness or innate evil of human nature

In the Pre-Ch'in Period, earlier or later than Hsun-tze, or contemporary with him, there are five types of hypothesis on the theory of human nature, namely:

(1) The theory which says that human nature is neither good (Shan) nor not good¹ (Pu Shan). This theory is put forward by Kao-tze².

1. 性無善無不善 Hsing Wu Shan Wu Pu Shan, this statement is recorded and discussed in MENCIUS, Chapter VI.

2. 告子 Kao-tze, a contemporary of Mencius. His discussions with Mencius about human nature and the undisturbed Mind which are recorded in MENCIUS, Chapter VI, are the sources one may find about him and his thought.

- (2) The theory which claims that human nature has the potentiality of realizing goodness (Shan) or non-goodness (Pu Shan)³.
- (3) The theory that there is good (Shan) Human nature and there is evil (Wu) human nature⁴.
- (4) The theory that human nature is innately good (Shan), whose establishment is attributed to Mencius⁵.
- (5) The theory that Man's Nature is Evil (Wu), which is put forward by Hsun-tze.

What these theories have in common is that they all focus on the topic of whether human nature is good (Shan) or evil (Wu). Since then, the later thinkers in their discussion of the theory of human nature tend to limit the moral content of human nature to good (Shan) and evil (Wu).

Some Chinese philosophers have discussed the good and evil of human nature in terms of the following two sets of concepts: (a) the essence, or the potentiality, or the spiritual aspect of human nature. These are approaches to human nature that are primarily of non-empirical emphasis; and (b) the postnatal development, or the empirical reality, or the physical or biological state of human nature. What they have in common is that they, as Chinese,

3. 性可以為善，可以為不善，Hsing K'o I Wei Shan, K'o I Wei Pu Shan. This statement is also recorded in MENCIUS, Chapter VI. but it is not known who proposed this argument.

4. 有性善，有性惡，Yu Hsing Shan, Yu Hsing Wu. This statement is also recorded in MENCIUS, Chapter VI, however the one who suggested this theory is not stated.

5. 性善，Hsing Shan. Mencius gives his opinion on human nature in Chapter II and VI. However, he never uses the term 'Hsing Shan' or 'good human nature' although his theory implies this.

show a traditional attitude of 'searching for practical solutions' for the problems of the nature of human nature, i.e. no matter what the nature of human nature is, moral-cultivation as well as moral education or training is important. Although such a conclusion is reached practically in order to solve the problem, the premise is still a problematic one when one wants to determine whether the nature of human nature is good or evil; and so in the history of Chinese thought, arguments on this problem have been and are still unceasing.

A one-sided or temporary solution of such a problem may lie in the examination of the interpretation in which the term 'human nature' is used by the arguer, whether he speaks of human nature in the sense of physical or biological life or experience, or whether he speaks of it in the sense of its reason or rational reflection as its essence, or potentiality or spiritual aspect. After such an examination is made, the arguments may be dissolved if different methods of thinking are recognized and accepted and the focus of attention is redirected to the conclusions, not the premises, of the problem, i.e. how can human nature, no matter how one defines it, be trained or cultivated to realize or manifest itself in the state of moral perfection? However, if one searches more deeply into the source of the problem, one should not only look at the interpretation of the term 'human nature', but also consider whether it can have a moral content of either moral good (Shan) or evil (Wu). If man naturally desires food when hungry, warmth when cold, then the question is whether these natural desires, or physical or biological desires can be distinguished as

morally good or evil. One may see that these natural desires themselves are neutral, or not a good or evil in themselves except that when man gives free rein to them the intention and practice of giving free rein may lead to evil activities and results. There are, however, cases in which, even though man gives free rein to his natural desires, his action may not be judged as morally evil. Suppose that a man gives free rein to his desire for food and eats excessively, as a result he gets fatter and fatter or he gets an illness from being too fat, yet his desire and action and the result of the action cannot be judged as morally good or evil at all. Therefore, even if human nature is genuinely interpreted as the manifestation of physical and biological life, it still may not necessarily have such content as moral good or evil. If, taking another example, a man desires to become wealthy, and he exhausts all efforts, mentally and physically, to smuggle, to transport illegal goods, to play tricks to gamble or to set traps to swindle others, then can this worldly thinking or reflection be distinguished as moral good or evil? In other words, if human nature is interpreted as including the conscious reflection of the mind, then can human nature be judged in moral terms? The answer is positive. When conscious thinking is involved, personal choice and decision on a moral activity may follow and morally good or evil consequences from that activity may be distinguished.

In conclusion, there is nothing morally good or evil in human nature itself, nor in the mind itself, yet in the moment when conscious thinking or reflection is manifested, it immediately decides the good or evil of man's behaviour.

For the above reason, the statement that human nature is necessarily morally good or evil has no philosophical value, and any arguments about such a statement can only fall into self-made traps.

(ii) The meaning of good (Shan) and evil (Wu)

The problem which an attempt has just been made to solve, is that of whether human nature itself possesses a moral content of good or evil. In answer, it is suggested that human nature is obviously not good (Shan) or evil (Wu) in itself.

In fact, when one discusses morality, it is not enough for one to observe morality occurring within the agent; one should also notice and examine morality occurring in the activities, mentally or physically, occurring in the relationship between or among the agent and other people. In this stage, the conditions of a moral activity may occur in the situations as follows:

(1) The subjective condition of a moral activity: That is moral activity which is accomplished by man's internal moral consciousness to encourage the action of his external physical faculties. 'Moral Consciousness' here, means the internal awareness of the necessity of morality in the individual as well as in society, and an understanding of a subjective and objective need for moral practice. Therefore it is not an innate knowledge of morality, nor is it an organic or psychological faculty for the knowledge of morality. It is rather, it may be suggested, an internal awareness of the necessary existence of morality in the sense primarily of the concern of the agent with the welfare of others and his respect for all

lives. It may manifest itself vaguely in a not well morally-trained mind but distinctly in a rationally functioning mind which knows that it must choose to do what is morally right or appropriate. Therefore 'moral consciousness' is a process of rational moral thinking in the light of awareness of morality in the above-mentioned sense. It is a guide to moral conduct and the source of moral activity. For all men, whether or not they are morally trained, educated or cultivated, their possession of moral consciousness must be a distinctive character which differentiates them from other animals. Every moral activity must be the responsibility, to a large extent, of the moral consciousness of the individual, and the consequences of the moral activity which is completed by the physical faculties must also be dependant, to a certain extent, upon the physical faculties of man. In short, all moral activities must be the responsibility of the agent himself.

(2) The objective condition of a moral activity: The moment in which a moral activity is necessarily possible, or when the functioning of one's moral consciousness is needed may be conveniently called the moral situation and is the objective condition of a moral activity. For example, when a man is walking with his friend along the street, chatting about some events in daily life, he is not at all in need of exercising his moral consciousness. Yet at the moment which needs his decision on a moral issue, for instance, whether or not to rob a bank with his friend or to rescue his friend from indulgence in alcohol, he must exercise his moral consciousness in a morally distinctive way. One's moral consciousness

should manifest itself and be exercised by the agent at the necessary moment; however, there is not always a need for such an exercise of the agent. In other words, moral good may be attributed to the fact that while man's moral consciousness is exercised at a proper time in a proper way, yet it does not follow that when man's moral consciousness is exercised at an unsuitable time yet a proper way, something which a morally serious man often does, evil will occur.

It may be suggested that a moral judgement in this case may therefore be based on the above two conditions. In other words, the moral act which originates from man's moral consciousness encouraging the physical faculties in a moral situation and its consequence are the objects of the moral judgement. The following example may serve to explain the above suggestion. A man finds a brief-case of money on a quiet road. At that moment several considerations may flash through his mind as follows:

(1) He may think of the laws and customs that say 'to pick up what others have lost and keep it as one's own is against the law as well as customs', therefore he decides not to pick up the money. If his decision is made for the fear of law and punishment, then it has no merit of morality at all; if it is because he does not want to flout the law or he shows his respect of the law, then it may have the merit of social morality, which only identifies moral activity with concern with and respect for the social laws and customs. However, in both cases, it has no merit of morality

in a strict sense. By morality in a strict sense, or ethical morality, is meant the knowledge and practice of one's concern with and respect for all lives, a rational and moral sensation which springs genuinely from reflexive consideration of the welfare of all lives, and which is separate from restraints of social laws or national laws or customs.

(2) He may think: (a) if it were he himself who had lost the money in the brief-case, no matter whether he were a millionaire or a penniless man, he would naturally hope that the lost property would be returned to the owner; thus he reflects that the owner who has lost the money will have the same wish; (b) if the lost money is very important to the owner, then the possible situation that he may not find it again will become a great loss to him mentally and physically; (c) if he (the agent) picks up the money, with such a large amount of money he will possibly either survive hunger, or spend it as extra income or supplement his own, or buy something which has been longed for, but if he had not suddenly found this money, then he would have had to do something to avert this crisis; and if he considers himself no opportunist, then he should improve himself, strengthen himself and renew himself in order to seek for his own survival or his own needs and he should not be tempted by the present convenience.

With these trains of thought changed several times, at this very moment of the situation of whether he ought to or ought not to leave the money in the same place, and with considerations, setting aside the questions of social and national laws or

traditional customs and starting genuinely from his concern with and respect for the owner of lost money, he makes a decision, and this decision is that of his moral consciousness. Thus his action of picking up the money or not is a moral activity. In this case, if a judgement is to be put on him, it should be founded on judging both his thought and his action. The situation may be as follows: (a) if his consideration tends to ethical morality and his final decision is not to pick up the money, then his act can be justified morally good; if he picks up the money and makes every effort to return it to the owner, either through the police or the press, then this should be considered another act of good; (b) if his consideration tempts him to pick up the money and he actually decides on it and eventually does it, then his act can be said to be evil, morally and socially; and (c) if his consideration tempts him to pick up the money, but however he has no chance of doing so either because of certain inconvenience such as pedestrians approaching and passing or because the owner returns searching for his lost brief-case, then although he does not perform any external or visible evil deeds, his mind or thought has committed it; in other words, his internal moral activity has committed evil.

There may be a case like the following in the same example: the man who finds a brief-case of money on a quiet road has suffered hunger for a while and obviously he cannot offer himself food. A succession of thoughts flashes through his mind several times and at last he decides to pick up the money and buy some food. This can be explained by the fact that he is too hungry to consider


morality. Yet viewed from another aspect, it can be said that even if he does not get social benefits for some reason, he is too lazy to work for his living or find a way, legally and morally, to save him from starving. In a moral situation, if man's decision is made genuinely according to his physical nature, then it is because of his lack of cultivation and training of his 'moral sentiment'. Moral sentiment, it may be suggested, is a non-physical faculty, primarily a morally intuitive feeling, which leads to the exercising of rational moral thinking of the moral consciousness. Therefore his mind is, in Hsun-tze's term, 'obsessed', and his moral consciousness does not manifest itself. When a man's moral consciousness does not manifest itself, it becomes a failing of his consideration or thinking and consequently affects his action; in other words, his action is blind and in this case, his act, strictly speaking, has not much value in morality. However, such a case cannot possibly occur; that is to say, a man cannot have virtually no cultivation and training of his moral sentiment, and his moral consciousness thus cannot have no manifestation at all. The reason is that, viewed from an external aspect, man must live in a society, and a society must have its established laws and customs; one of the functions of a society is not to restrain its citizens with laws and customs but to direct and cultivate them with education, no matter what forms of education it delivers to them; academic education, or social or custom norms, for example. Therefore if there is a man who does not know laws and customs, it is the fault of society and its education. Viewed from an internal aspect, man should absorb experiences of his own

life and livelihood and knowledge of what he hears and sees and he should internalize these experiences and knowledge within himself in order to encourage the sentiments of either ethical morality or at least of social morality. In other words, it is necessary that every man must have some knowledge of morality as his life in society develops. If a man says that he has never heard of the restraint of law or customs or that he has never for a moment been concerned about the welfare of other people or not paid the least respect to other people, and tries to evade acting morally or exercising his moral responsibility, he is either consciously or unconsciously deceiving himself and deceiving others. In either case, it is mainly his fault.

Man gradually accumulates influences by cultivating and training his moral sentiment and developing a moral consciousness through good work. This is additional to the educational merit provided by society. Consequently, a man cannot have no cultivation and training of his moral sentiment and his moral consciousness cannot have no manifestation at all. Morality in a strict sense, or ethical morality originates from the consideration and decision of man's moral consciousness; and in such a case moral judgement must be based on his consideration and decision, and his action and its effect or consequence.

The following diagram may show this theory:

condition of
moral activity



Thus the meaning of moral good (Shan) and evil (Wu) can be defined as follows: In a moral situation, when the decision of man's moral consciousness encourages moral acts, good and evil can be distinguished. Moral good, or Shan, is always, for the agent, concern for the welfare of all life and the respect for all life including persons, and his efforts in action to meet his ideal. For the visible fact, a result of the agent's moral activity which shows the virtue of his concern and respect and brings direct or indirect advantages to the welfare of the recipient. Although the philosophical interpretations of the word 'good' have appeared to be a semantic multiplicity, and the suggestion of 'concern' and 'respect' as good here does not necessarily displace the other notable concepts of goodness, such as, for example, utilitarian goodness and Hedonistic good. One cannot deny that almost all kinds of interpretations of the word 'good' have intrinsic connections. 'Concern' and 'respect' may be considered to be good as an end or terminal and intrinsic good, which carry a utilitarian view of pursuing what is

beneficial and avoiding what is harmful to the greatest number, and may include also the Hedonistic view in the sense that concern and respect for others' pleasure also brings pleasure to the agent. Moral evil, or Wu, on the other hand, is always caused by the excessive demand when considering the advantages for oneself and harm to others and by the act that follows accordingly.

(iii) The idea of human nature as good or evil is mere belief

From the above argument it may be suggested that the origin of moral good and evil lies in the decision of man's moral consciousness and that moral judgement, if it is to be made, should be based mainly on that decision. If human nature includes conscious reflection, then it can be said that the conscious reflection of human nature is the source of moral good or evil. However, human nature itself cannot be seen as good or evil, nor can it be said a good or evil in itself. It is only in its functioning that one may see and say whether the resulting activity is morally good or evil. If human nature is interpreted as a physical element of life, then again it cannot be maintained that something inherent is justified as morality. In other words, there is no good or evil in human nature, and therefore to say that human nature is good or evil is not correct.

One certainly cannot deny that all men have certain inborn characteristics which some people such as Hsun-tze may directly call 'human nature'. These basic inborn characteristics, such as learning and exploratory behaviour, will be either more strongly

manifested after years of formation and become one of the distinctive characteristics of an individual, or differentiated in their development by great changes of postnatal social and cultural environment, learning and cultivation into several special characters which may preserve some of their originality or which may almost completely lose their traits. However, although these inborn characteristics may be classified as good or bad in their qualities, they are not a moral good or evil in themselves. Human nature is a term which may also denote man's attributes in general. Different philosophers of different centuries have given different interpretations to it. Some consider that human nature consists of psychological attributes such as delight, anger, grief, joy, love, hatred, and desires, including the physical desires for fame and profits, biological desires for sexual activity, or desire for morality, etc. As to the total content of these psychological attributes, it remains a recurrent philosophical argument which has not yet, nor may it ever, reach common agreement. Some philosophers also go on to analyse the good or bad qualities of these psychological attributes of human nature. However, their analysis should not become a moral judgement. Some people, for example, tend to classify human nature into two groups: inborn good qualities such as gentleness, quietness, and inborn bad qualities such as greediness and emulativeness. However, these classifications should only touch on the level of good or bad qualities, and not that of moral good or evil. The reason for this is that all men must understand what morality is before they may act morally and their behaviour then may be justified as morally good or evil. If seeing man's moral activities, one tries

to trace their source, and concludes that it is man's inborn characteristic or human nature leading to his morally good or evil act, this dogmatical conclusion may be charged with emotions either too optimistic or too pessimistic, and these statements emerge with little credit in moral philosophy.

In conclusion, it may be suggested that one should admit that all men have basic inborn characteristics which are themselves morally neutral, and the continuous development of these characteristics may become the postnatal psychological attributes which may be distinguished as good and bad characteristics. If one wants to trace the sources of man's acquired behaviour and tries to ascertain that man may have good or bad potentialities, this is not badly mistaken though it rather expresses a belief than a theory. However, when a moral judgement is to be made upon man's moral conduct one must only judge from the consideration, decision and action of each moral activity.

Chinese scholars through the centuries have tended to adopt theories that human nature is innately either good (Shan) or evil (Wu), and they commit themselves to an endless argument. Some of them further argue, adopting the theory suggested above, that the origin of moral good and evil, viewed from the internal aspect of the individual, is mainly in the moment of the decision of man's moral consciousness. That is to say, the moral consciousness within man is good and that it should follow that human nature is good⁶.

6. A typical example of this argument may be found in Prof. T'ang's A TREATISE OF THE ORIGIN OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY - THE ORIGIN OF HSING. Hong Kong, 1968, pp.53-58.

Such an argument leads itself back to the same old topic of the dispute on human nature. It is obvious that the arguer presupposes that moral consciousness is within the essence and potentiality of human nature and that moral consciousness is the ultimate source of morally good conduct, therefore it is logical to conclude that human nature is also morally good. Moral consciousness itself, however, is neither morally good or evil, it is only when in its functioning moral good or evil may emerge from it. If the difficulties of this problem, which will be listed below, are appreciated, then the dispute may possibly be brought to an end.

(1) Two pairs of key moral concepts here appeal to be brought forward for further clarification. They are Shan and Wu, Hao and Huai. In Chinese, Shan may be defined as 'moral good, intrinsic good, ultimate good, highest good or summum bonum', with Wu as its opposite. Hao, though it has often been used as a secondary or weak synonym to Shan, i.e. it carries a less serious concern for morality than Shan, seems, at least for the present purpose of investigation, to be distinguished as 'something good in quality which, if related to morality, is an instrumental good, or good-making characteristic', leading to the source or achievement of Shan; and Huai is its opposite. However, these two pairs of terms, particularly the term Shan, have been historically used with extreme looseness mainly because philosophers, presupposing its existence, made no further enquiry into its proper nature or content and tend to take its meaning for granted. It is undeniably true that some, if not most, Chinese moral concepts such as Jen and

Shan are often loosely applied as if they were not designed for conceptual investigation or analysis. They are rather sets of intuitive, creative concepts and although it may be difficult, if not impossible, to submit them to a universal test by common empirical experience, are real and true in the inexhaustive understanding of different Chinese philosophers who claim to have experienced them. The point is: since Shen and Hao are used without discrimination, difficulties arise when, particularly in moral discussion, there is a need to free them from their entanglements. It may therefore be suggested that Shan should be used in a strict moral sense, while Hao may be applied in a sense including, but wider than, morality. To avoid confusion one should say 'moral good or evil' and 'good or bad characteristics'. Thus if one says that moral consciousness is within man and such 'withinness' is good, one is actually applying the concept of Hao and not that of Shan. One would also agree that such 'withinness' lays the basis for the source or achievement of Shan and it is itself not an ultimate good but rather an instrumental good or a good-making characteristic. Similarly, to say that human nature is good or bad in quality, or Hao or Huai, for some provable reasons is acceptable; yet to say that it is morally good or evil, or Shan or Wu, leads to the same difficulties which have been repeatedly discussed above. Consequently, when one says that human nature is innately good or evil, or Shan or Wu, one may have used these terms inaccurately or incorrectly in a way which does not concisely express what one wishes to say, or what one means may be simply that human nature is in some way innately good or bad, or Hao or Huai, in quality. This reveals a misuse of language.

(2) The criterion of moral good and evil is often historically obscure or improperly applied. If the theories that the origin of moral good and evil is in the decision and action of moral consciousness and that moral judgement as to the case is founded on such a principle are accepted, then the judging of moral good and evil will certainly not be based on the essence or potentiality of human nature, for the reason that when its essence and potentiality have not yet revealed themselves and been realized, or the moral consciousness has not yet manifested itself and the moral activity has not formed and been performed, there is no way to see an act done and to judge whether the act is morally good or evil. Therefore if one considers that the moral consciousness within man is morally good, or Shan, then one commits faults not only in the application of language but also in logic. Similarly if one says that human nature is innately good or evil, Shan or Wu, one commits the same mistakes.

The above are the difficulties of the propositions that human nature is innately good or evil. It is clear that the descriptive statement that human nature is good or bad in quality, or Hao or Huai, does nevertheless not express any ultimate moral appraisal of human nature. Why then have Chinese scholars through the centuries tended to subscribe to such theories? The answer is, because of their beliefs. They may believe that nothing comes from nothing; therefore there must be a concrete and reasonable origin of everything, and they find it easier to say and believe that there is innate moral good or evil in the nature of all men in order to go on to explain the reasons why man's acts are morally good or evil. In other words,

since there is good or evil in human nature, therefore there is, they claim, good or evil realized in his act, or man's acting morally or immorally is, more or less, caused by his innate nature. It is no merit to disagree and argue against this for it is a question of belief or a mind-comforting opinion. And since such an opinion does not touch upon moral activity either internally or externally, it is considered only a belief rather than a philosophical statement and judgement.

(iv) The origin of moral value

It may be suggested that to say that human nature is innately good or evil is a statement of belief. However, even though the statement itself has committed mistakes in the use of language and logic, Chinese scholars throughout the centuries have never stopped expressing their recognition or approval of it. After all, viewed from the standpoint of morality in a strict sense, such a statement of belief cannot offer much as a contribution to moral philosophy; that is to say, if moral value of man's activity originates from his innate good or evil nature which may be realized by means of man's cultivation and training, then the real value of man's life is not distinct. That man is honourable and noble is not merely and not necessarily in the possession of certain good characteristics in his nature, or in the potentiality of certain possible good tendencies in his nature. It is his continuously making efforts in the processes of achieving moral good in himself as well as in his action that makes him honourable and noble. In other words, it is because man continuously practices the rational

thinking of his moral consciousness and directs himself toward morality that his moral value is revealed. Therefore the theory presupposing an a priori conviction that human nature is innately good, does not reflect the dignity and nobility of man; nor does it explain the real value of man's life. The origin of the moral value is in the effort of his moral consciousness in making a proper decision and action in a moral situation, and it is also in this theory itself that one may find its necessary philosophical value.

To summarize the above, it may be suggested that the statement that human nature is innately good or evil is a two-sided linguistic and logical trap that brings endless arguments; that it is a subjective belief of the individual; that the origin of good or evil is in the decision and action of man's moral consciousness in a moral situation; and that the moral value of man is in the continuous efforts of deciding and practising his moral consciousness: these are the foundations of the examination and critique of Hsun-tze's theories of human nature in the following pages. However, it is not possible here, nor is it intended in this thesis, to undertake an exhaustive investigation and clarification of moral concepts. In this thesis, it is also intended to set aside the problems of the detailed nature of human nature except to say that human nature is morally neutral in terms of moral activity. There may be many forms of 'perceptions' or viewpoints of the nature of human nature, and the knowledge which one perceiver or viewer claims may be as true as that of another, as each of them may have perceived or viewed an aspect, or some aspects, of human nature in a different

light. The point is that the study of the nature of human nature may serve as a reference to the study of moral philosophy. However, without the former study, a study of moral philosophy is no less possible and may be no less valid.

An attempt has been made to discuss the generation of moral good and evil from the functioning of moral consciousness, to distinguish the difference between the Chinese terms Shan and Hao, or the moral good and the good quality, in order to build up, or at least adumbrate an outlined structure of some important aspects of moral philosophy sufficient for the purpose of making an examination of Hsun-tze's theories of human nature.

Hsun-tze considers Man's Nature to be physical life⁷ and thus concludes that it is Evil. However, as he clearly says that Man's Nature is Evil, viewed from the system of his philosophy and not from the purpose of his speech, his statement falls into a self-made trap and he is speaking according to his belief regardless of the linguistic and logical difficulties the statement may give rise to. On the other hand, that he also clearly discerns the function of the Mind and the merit of morally good Artifice and recognizes that the necessary and continuous effort of performing morally in order to become a Sage make parts of his theories accord, to a certain extent, with the principles of moral philosophy mentioned above. The Mind mentioned by Hsun-tze can be interpreted as moral consciousness. Here, a few words to further explain the

7. For reference please see p.3.

nature of moral consciousness may be needed. Moral consciousness is, as suggested above, an awareness of morality which is, more or less, primarily or partially intuitive. Nevertheless, the process of exercising moral consciousness in a moral situation is often a practice of human reason while the approach to the assumed existing morality is rational thinking and behaving. However, it is perhaps sufficient for the present purpose to call a halt to further conceptual analysis. The point is, moral consciousness, or the Mind, in Hsun-tze's terminology, is morally neutral and the fact that Hsun-tze always assumes that the Mind itself must necessarily be a rational one or its functioning must lead to a moral good, makes the theory rather too biased and narrow.⁸ However, if he argues that Man's Nature, or the psychological attributes of man's inborn characteristics is of bad qualities, or Huai, because it lacks the good quality of uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order, then this argument is, though still disputable, not seriously wrong. However, his insistence that Man's Nature is Evil, or Wu, is a confusion. On the other hand, he considers that the postnatal or learned or cultural characteristics^{to} which he gives the general name 'Mind', always lead to a morally good result, whose functioning is the source of Deliberation and Artifice, and that postnatal moral evil is caused by the Obsessions of the Mind. This is a dogmatic radical analysis.

When Hsun-tze comes to explain the origin of human moral acts, however, he indicates that morality is the result of

8. A further argument on this in pp.269-271.

man's conscious thought (Deliberation) and behaviour (Artifice) in a moral situation: this is a correct viewpoint in moral philosophy.

However, (1) if Hsun-tze had not insisted that there must be a strict difference (a) between Man's Nature and Artifice, and (b) between Man's Nature and the Mind; (2) if he had not insisted that Man's Nature is Evil and Artifice is good; and (3) if he could have gone more deeply into the investigation of Artifice, then he would have offered a greater contribution in moral philosophy.

In short, his theory that Man's Nature is Evil is that of a subjective belief, which as a part of the structure of his philosophy presents natural and obvious difficulties. However, in his theories of human nature, the main emphasis is obviously given to the theory of Transformation of Man's Nature and not to that which maintains that Man's Nature is Evil, while in his philosophy the emphasis is also given to the theory of the Mind and not to that of human nature. In his philosophical structure, human nature, placed in the lower level, is gradually cancelled in the higher levels, and the process whereby the Mind exalts itself, level by level, to its highest stage, i.e. a Sage Mind or an Ultimate Mind, is what Hsun-tze attempts to establish (please see Appendix 3). His theory that Man's Nature is Evil is a defect of his theory of human nature; yet this should not greatly vitiate his contribution as a whole to moral philosophy.

B: THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE STRUCTURE OF HIS THEORY
THAT MAN'S NATURE IS EVIL

In accordance with the above discussion, it is suggested that Hsun-tze's theory that Man's Nature is Evil is his subjective belief, the use of which as a part of his philosophical structure has its theoretical difficulties. In a detailed study of his arguments of this theory, it is found that the words he uses are often too forced and far-fetched to have the effect of logical conviction.

In the first paragraph of his argument, he tries to prove Man's Evil Nature by observing that man's desires are always evil. However, he does not make it clear how he determines that these 'evil' desires, i.e. the fondness for profit, feelings of envy and hatred, the desires of the eyes and ears and fondness for beautiful sights and sounds, are definitely innate within Man's Nature and not the conscious decisions and choices of the individual. After all, these 'evil' desires mentioned may merely be bad (Huai) qualities or characteristics of human nature, and should not be counted morally evil, (Wu). If, however, there occurs a process of decision and choice of 'following' and 'indulgence' in these bad qualities of human nature in a moral situation, then the result of man's mental or physical activity can be discerned to be morally evil.

In the third paragraph, Hsun-tze distinguishes strictly the differences between Man's Nature and Artifice. This is a crucial turning-point in his theories for with the notion of Artifice

he may rescue himself from this extreme view on human nature. However, he adheres too much to the points that (1) they are necessarily different, and (2) that their difference lies only between what is learnable and attainable and what is non-learnable and non-attainable. Thus on one hand, he insists firmly on his theory that Man's Nature is inevitably Evil and this leaves no chance for the theory to recover and survive, and on the other hand, he externalizes Artifice to a certain extent by emphasizing excessively the importance of rites and teachers and fails to discuss the fact that the morally good Artifice originates directly in man's own moral consciousness, or in his term 'Deliberation' or, broadly speaking, the functioning of the Mind, and to let his thoughts **develop** from that. Therefore this paragraph must be considered an incomplete argument.

In the fifth paragraph, Hsun-tze offers counter-evidence that since man's desire to perform morally is because of the innate lack of what is morally good, or Shan, in his Nature, therefore Man's Nature is born Evil. The examples he gives to support his argument are forced ones. If man's aim in doing good is indeed to improve his own imperfections, then Hsun-tze's argument is valid, if not, then it is a bad argument. Unfortunately Hsun-tze does not reveal his arguments more deeply in this direction. Also in saying that Man's Nature is Evil, and that therefore he desires to do good it does not necessarily follow that man desires to do good, therefore his nature is evil, and Hsun-tze's argument here also is in danger of logical fallacy. Also he claims that good (Shan) is what is lacking in man, therefore man must search for good from outside, i.e.

from rites and teachers. Since he denies that good primarily exists within human nature, it is logical for him to claim that Man's Nature is Evil; however, he is perhaps too confident in supposing that there are no good qualities in human nature at all which may become the source of moral achievement. Some good qualities such as gentleness, quietness, are empirically experiential, and may be developed to encourage moral action. He also claims that not only is there no possession and no understanding of rites and righteousness in Man's Nature, but also that chaos exists in it from birth. His claim is rather confusing. It is clear that rites and righteousness are not human nature, they are only social and customary systems or institutions made by man; and it is also clear that since man does not understand rites and righteousness, he is easily cramped in the state of chaos because of the temptations of the external world. Therefore rites and righteousness are the creation of society and chaos is the consequence of man's behaviour. Hsun-tze's argument that chaos innately exists in Man's Nature is perhaps too briefly claimed. There are also two more points which Hsun-tze must be charged in this connection: (1) In his supposition that since there are no rites and righteousness in Man's Nature, there exists chaos instead, he may be accused of over-confidence in his belief. (2) He does not point out why man desires to do good and reveal the importance of the functioning of moral consciousness. It is man himself who decides and chooses to do good or evil, and his decision and choice is certainly and directly related to the cultivation and training of his moral sentiment. The chaos made by man is the

consequence of his behaviour and if his behaviour is a moral act, then it certainly originates from the functioning of his moral consciousness. Therefore the argument of this paragraph is the weakest one in his chapter.

In the sixth paragraph, Hsun-tze gives his own definition of Good and Evil: to be Good is to be upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly; to be Evil is to be prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic. However, Hsun-tze does not ~~amplify~~ his definitions, and this easily leads to their ambiguity. Furthermore, whatever opinions he holds, he falls back into his self-made trap of insisting upon his belief that Man's Nature is Evil. He may be accused of being obsessed by his own belief. Also he does not discuss the problem of how the good of society is to be transferred to that of Man's Nature. In other words, the relationship between the good of society, e.g. uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order, and that of Man's Nature is not carefully pondered upon by him and it certainly needs more interpretation and unfortunately he does not leave his reader with a detailed picture of his ideas in this aspect.

In the seventh paragraph, Hsun-tze considers that the reason for the Sage-King's establishment of the institutions of rites and righteousness is to be found in the intention to restrain Man's Evil Nature. However, Hsun-tze fails to indicate clearly that rites and righteousness established by the Sages are only a means to assist man to understand social morality and also one of

the forms of education, and that the function of such an institution is, on one hand, to guide man to cultivation and training of his moral sentiment in order to exalt his moral consciousness towards good and, on the other, to restrain man from offending against the peace of society by making him keep the principles of social morality in relations between himself and others, or in a narrow sense, in society and the country, in short, to decrease criminal acts. Such a failure of Hsun-tze is a possible cause for the charges made by the later scholars that Hsun-tze lays emphasis only on the forms of rites and righteousness and considers them to be the origin of human value⁹. As to his dispute with Mencius, since there are differences in content of the uses of the same terms, such as the different interpretations of the term 'human nature' by the two thinkers¹⁰, of which Hsun-tze himself seems to be not fully aware, his argument is therefore not a good one. Nevertheless, there is one point worth noticing here: Hsun-tze lays much emphasis on experience and practice. He explains that on making an assertion, arguments should accord with the facts and what can be proved to be valid. His suggestion is a constructive one. Also when he says that because of the existence of warped wood, the production of a straightening board is needed, and because of the Evil of Man's Nature, the government of Sage-Kings and elucidation of rites and righteousness are needed; the process of the above reasoning is logical. However, wherever his theory extends to his basic belief that Man's Nature is innately Evil, it seems that there is no way out from his self-drawn circle.

9. The charge was an incorrect one. For detailed discussion, please see p.266.

10. Hsun-tze interprets 'human nature' as 'life' whereas Mencius interprets it as 'potentiality'. For a detailed exposition of Mencius' theory on human nature, please see, for example, Lao's

In the last paragraph, Hsun-tze considers that whether a man is honourable or shameful is judged by whether he can have his Evil Nature transformed and whether he can thus act morally by good Artifice. Here Hsun-tze tries to break through his self-drawn circle, or more clearly speaking, his determinism on the theory that Man's Nature is Evil. This argument is naturally an important and successful break-through within his circle of ideas. In moral philosophy, however, it is not essential to establish whether human nature is good or evil, therefore his break-through brings little contribution.

In paragraphs two, four and eight, there is nothing particularly illuminating or profound. Briefly, in his arguments on the theory that Man's Nature is Evil, not only is there not much sharpness and discovery but there are also places where forced statements occur. In fact, since Hsun-tze has already expressed his subjective belief in the theory of human nature, it is not a necessary step for him to prove his belief. However, the sentences which he puts forward in order to support his belief are not strong enough to be persuasive and to make others have the same subjective feeling. This is a failure of his argument. In his argument in which he points out the distinction of Man's Nature and Artifice, the latter word gives a new life to his philosophical system. If he had gone deeper in considering the origin and meaning of his own theory of Deliberation and that of Artifice, then he would have achieved a more fruitful success in moral philosophy. Viewed from the structure of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, it is not strong enough to support a great system. However, it is obvious

that Hsun-tze does not found his philosophy on it, and that he only treats it as a stepping stone which, though it does not seem quite secure, it does not have much major destructive effect on the whole. By passing it, he stands firm in his theory of Transformation of Man's Nature and that of the Mind and marches on to the end which, in some way, makes his theories worthy of respect.

C: A SURVEY OF HIS THEORY OF THE MEAN-SPIRITED MAN

Hsun-tze's discussion of a Mean-Spirited Man is based on his theory that Man's Nature is Evil. He considers that a Mean-Spirited Man fully displays the original appearance of his Evil Nature. In his definition of a Mean-Spirited Man, he says that a Mean-Spirited Man is the one who gives free rein to desires and emotions, feels at ease in his arrogance and indulgence and turns away from rites and righteousness. From the verbs he uses, i.e. 'gives free rein to', 'feels at ease', and 'turns away', he can in fact easily go more deeply into the problem of man's moral consciousness, or the moral functioning of the Mind. However, he does not ponder very carefully over it. The reason for his carelessness may be that (1) all Deliberations, to him, are always good and wise ones. This is indeed a great defect of his theory of the Mind. (2) He may consider that the origin of 'giving free rein to', 'feeling at ease' and 'turning away' is in Man's Evil Nature and not in the free choice of man's moral consciousness. (3) On the other hand, he claims that a man is born a Mean-Spirited Man and such a claim seems rather absurd or at least unconvincing as a theory of moral philosophy, for if a Mean-Spirited Man who gives free rein to his desires and emotions is evil because he has an

innate evil nature, something which he compulsorily possesses from birth, then he should not be held responsible for any moral duty at all. In other words, it is natural for man, or every man, according to Hsun-tze, to do evil. (That is why Hsun-tze claims that it is 'unnatural' for man to do good and all man's good actions are from Artifice.) However, if man gives free rein to his desires and emotions and chooses to do evil, then it is he himself who should be completely responsible for his own acts; in other words, it is his moral consciousness which is responsible for a morally evil act and not his innate nature. Since Hsun-tze confines himself to his own theory that Man's Nature is Evil, when he speaks of the Mean-Spirited Man his viewpoint is biased and obsessed.

As to his distinction between a Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man, if his misleading theory that there is no difference between the two in the Evil of their Nature is excluded, it is still worth mentioning his emphasis on their two different ways of seeking the principles of life. He considers that a Conscientious Man who seeks the way of becoming a Sage tends to direct his way of life toward morality, while a Mean-Spirited Man who only seeks the way of an easy comfortable life, whose Mind is obsessed by worldliness, completely exposes his Evil Nature in his behaviour. The point worthy of notice here is that Hsun-tze suggests the theory of insufficiency of effort of a Mean-Spirited Man, a theory explaining that the immoral activities of a Mean-Spirited Man is simply caused by his laziness in making the effort to perform morally. However, it seems that here Hsun-tze is holding

two theories which can be mutually divergent or conflicting.

(1) If the laziness of moral effort of the Mean-Spirited Man is part of his Nature which is innately Evil, then this laziness is natural and should not be responsible for his immoral conduct.

(2) If this laziness is not part of his Nature and either (i) it is an evil Artifice which he has brought about and which should, as Hsun-tze implies, be held completely responsible for his immoral conduct, then it may logically be suggested that not every Artifice is, as Hsun-tze often unconsciously assumes, necessarily morally good, some Artifices can be evil; or (ii) it is neither part of Man's Nature, nor is it a piece of evil Artifice, but something that causes a man to become more Mean-Spirited, then it may also logically be suggested that the alleged Evil Nature of Man is not seriously 'Evil', for it is a secondary, not the first, cause of one's evil deeds.

An outline of Hsun-tze's idea may be illustrated as follows:

A is a born Mean-Spirited Man for he possesses an innate Evil Nature, however, with morally good Artifice, he may become a Conscientious Man and eventually a Sage.

B is a born Mean-Spirited Man for he possesses an innate Evil Nature, and with his laziness of moral effort he will become a more Mean-Spirited Man.

The difficulties here are (1) Hsun-tze's insistence on his belief that Man's Nature is innately Evil, a premise which is unconvincing as well as unnecessary; (2) he does not give his opinion as to whether there is a relationship or connection between the Evil Nature of Man and his laziness in moral effort. How can he

extricate himself from this confusing situation or how would he fill the gap between the two? In fact, he leaves these questions without answers. Because of this theoretical inconsistency, he may be charged with carelessness in his logical analysis.

He also mentions that a Conscientious Man makes efforts to seek for the way to become a Sage by transforming his Evil Nature, accomplishing self-cultivation and self-training, and that he has to wait till all his Evil Nature has ceased and then he is perfected with virtue. The way to become a Sage is internally to demand of oneself to make earnest efforts towards self-discipline, and externally consistently to follow good customs, and here it is evident that Hsun-tze also appreciates, though without saying so explicitly, that the moral value of man originates from his continuous efforts to promote his moral consciousness towards good. Also, when he mentions that the difference between a Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man is that the former is able to transform his Nature while the latter cannot and would not like to do so, it is obvious that Hsun-tze agrees that whether a man may come to have moral excellence depends entirely on the functioning of the Mind, his moral Deliberation, decision, Artifice or, in short, the moral efforts of the agent, and he thus implies that the value of Man lies in his Mind, or his moral consciousness.

To summarize the above, Hsun-tze's discussion of a Mean-Spirited Man and his belief that the essence of a Mean-Spirited Man is his Evil Nature is an extension of the error in his theory

that Man's Nature is Evil. As to his suggestion of the insufficiency of effort of a Mean-Spirited Man and his suggestion that man is certainly born a Mean-Spirited Man it is evident that they are theoretically inconsistent. Thus it is sufficient to see that his belief that Man's Nature is Evil serving as a structural theory is too weak to be of importance. As to his description of the appearance and behaviour, ability and disposition of a Mean-Spirited Man, he observes these from an empirical viewpoint and his observations are fairly to the point. However, because of the theoretical shakiness of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, his theory of a Mean-Spirited Man offers no philosophical contribution to his system of thought, and on the contrary, it often easily exposes the error of the former one. In other words, it proves that the theory which is based on the concept of Man's Evil Nature is difficult to make consistent and convincing.

SECTION 2: HIS THEORIES OF TRANSFORMATION OF MAN'S EVIL NATURE

The theory of Transformation of Man's Evil Nature is a key turning point in Hsun-tze's theories of human nature. At one end, it is connected with his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, and at the other, it leads to that of Mind. However, theoretically, it immediately touches on the difficulty of the validity of the term 'Transformation of Man's Evil Nature'.

A: THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE THEORY

As Hsun-tze insists that Man's Nature is innately Evil it is logical for him to claim that if one wants to perform morally and to be a Sage, one must first do away with one's Evil Nature for good, and thus he suggests the theory of Transformation of Man's Nature. However, as discussed in the last section there are practical difficulties in his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, therefore the following difficulties are bound to occur in his theory of Transformation of Man's Nature which is immediately founded on the former.

(i) As has been discussed, human nature is not a good in itself. The theory that human nature is good or evil is a subjective belief and to try to found a theoretical structure on a subjective belief is methodologically unsound. As human nature itself is not evil as suggested above, the theory that man's Evil Nature must be transformed, or that the Evil of Man's Nature must be cancelled, seems impossible to maintain.

(ii) Hsun-tze lays strong emphasis upon the necessity of Transformation of Man's Nature, yet he does not make it clear what it is that Man's Nature is then transformed into after its Transformation. In other words, if Man's Nature has already been transformed, then in what way it will reappear is a question waiting to be explained.

(iii) As the theory leads to that of the Mind, the relation between Man's Nature and the Mind is not explained by Hsun-tze

either. Viewed from the structure of his philosophy (please see Appendix 3), it is seen that beyond his theory of Transformation of Man's Nature, there is no further development in his theory of human nature, and he then concentrates his attention upon the structure of the theories of the Mind. It may be suggested that after its Transformation, Man's Nature becomes an unobsessed Mind, yet this suggestion may not be immediately fitted into Hsun-tze's original idea, for he often indicates that Man's Nature is Evil while the Mind is the possible source for moral perfection, thus it seems that he presupposes that the Mind and Man's Nature are two different elements. This is a logical and philosophical gap to which Hsun-tze certainly needs to give more interpretation. In fact, it seems that Hsun-tze himself is not fully aware of such a difficulty at all.

(iv) The origin of moral good and evil is, as suggested above, in the decision and action of man's moral consciousness which is responsible for its own moral activities. The capability of man's moral consciousness of promotion toward morality is greatly dependent on the cultivation and training of his moral sentiment, therefore it is clear that if man desires to shun his Evil Nature and perform what is morally good, he must start from the cultivation and training of his moral sentiment and thus the possible decision of his moral consciousness to do evil can be reformed. Therefore to say 'to transform Man's Nature' is misleading and it is a misuse of language and defective logic. If the words 'to make virtuous man's moral consciousness' are used instead, theoretically it seems more easily comprehensible.

Since Hsun-tze confines himself to his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, it is necessary for him to establish the theory of Transformation of Man's Nature. It is a weak point of his moral philosophy which begins with this theory and founds the rest of his theories of human nature on it. Furthermore, it seems that he fails to reflect thoroughly on the origin of moral good and evil. Therefore in the structure of his moral philosophy, although he suggests the moral functioning of the Mind which is similar, to a certain extent, to that of moral consciousness, and he also suggests the theory of removal of Obsession of the Mind which is similar, to a certain extent, to avoid the moral consciousness falling into the temptation of performing evil, he may still be accused of not positively pointing out the importance of cultivation and training of man's moral sentiment in order to make virtuous his moral consciousness. This is the defect of his theory of the Mind which will be discussed in more detail in chapter VII of this Part. However, the shallowness of his theory of human nature in which he starts by assuming that human nature is in a once-for-all mould of unchangeable evil, leads to the weakness of the theoretical structure of his moral philosophy.

B: THE DIFFICULTIES OF HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAN'S
NATURE AND ARTIFICE

The difficulties of Hsun-tze's theory of Transformation of Man's Nature lies in the linguistic and logical error of the connection to the theory that Man's Nature is Evil. However, the value of the theory should not thus be denied altogether. The first part of the supposition of the theory says that since Man's

Nature is Evil, therefore it is necessary for man to have his Nature transformed; and the latter part says that the way of Transformation is in the artificial moral education, or by means of moral Artifice. The notion of 'Artifice' is a discovery of thought in his time.

Artifice, or Wei, to Hsun-tze, means unnatural, not innate, or man-made, and it is encouraged by learning or education. Artifice may be interpreted as either the moral functioning of the Mind or the external practical performance, and it is difficult to know which interpretation Hsun-tze uses on different occasions. What is clear is that Artifice is not a part of Man's Nature nor is it a part of the Mind, for Man's Nature is always Evil, and Artifice is always, in his theory, morally good. It may be reasonable to think that Artifice arises from the functioning of the Mind, i.e. at the moment when the Mind deliberates on a moral issue then an Artifice also arises (therefore Hsun-tze always says that the performance of moral good is an Artifice). In short, Artifice is born by encouragement of the dynamic functioning of the Mind, as well as by external assistance, such as rites, righteousness, law and teachers. However, a conceptual puzzle may arise as follows. If moral Artifice is what is unnatural in man¹¹ as Hsun-tze claims, it may follow that the functioning of the Mind from which Artifice arises may also be unnatural in man; this may imply a presupposition that, originally and naturally, it is not in the nature of the Mind to perform morally. Such an analysis may end in a puzzling query as to what the nature of the Mind is. Hsun-tze perhaps does not

11. 其善者偽也 Ch'i Shan Che Wei Yeh.

intend to designate his concept of Artifice for objective analysis and he just, as often, subjectively and intuitively takes it for granted.

Hsun-tze considers that the difference between Man's Nature and his Artifice lies mainly in whether or not it can be learned and attained, and he suggests that it is impossible for Man's Nature to be learned and attained, while Artifice can be. However, since he insists that Man's Nature is Evil (although it would be possible to avoid all these errors if he did not insist on this), he naturally and logically only considers the possibility of morally good Artifice as a contrast to the Evil of Man's Nature and ignores the possibility of a morally evil one. Although he says that Man's good behaviour is artificial, it does not seem wise for him to suppose that all Artifices are morally good. It is, in fact, possible to have morally good or morally evil Artifice. As Artifice is the learned behaviour of man, including that which does not directly result from moral education, it is difficult to maintain that Artifice is certainly of one nature, as Hsun-tze holds, i.e. that it is certainly always morally good. According to what has just been suggested, it is possible to have a morally good Artifice as well as a morally evil one, and it all depends on, internally, the decision and choice of man's moral consciousness and, externally, learning and education. If learning and education tend to moral goodness, they may cause man to turn to morality; if they tend to moral evil, they may cause man to keep to evil. The difficulty here is: it seems that Hsun-tze tends to describe only the positive side of his theories of Man's

Evil Nature, Transformation of Man's Nature and morally good Artifice and their connections, excluding the other possible alternatives of these theories. He may be charged with over-stubbornness in his series of beliefs in human nature. Some indications of his stubbornness may be found in chapter XIX, where he says:

'Without Man's Nature, Artifice will have nothing to be added to; without Artifice, Man's Nature will be unable to beautify itself.' (XIII, 10)

Here it is evident that Hsun-tze tries to contrast the two situations in man, namely: the innate Evil of Man's Nature and the morally good Artifice from moral education. In his belief, Man's Evil Nature necessarily exists so that the morally good Artifice can stem from it, and the morally good Artifice is necessarily possible so that Man's Evil Nature can thus be transformed, and the morally good Artifice is then encouraged and eventually Man's Nature thus beautifies itself. However, the notion of the self-beautification of human nature is never clearly explained by Hsun-tze. It seems that he is not serious about the use of this new concept, or else he again runs into trouble for theoretical inconsistency or for introducing it without clear-minded consideration, for it seems inconceivable that Man's Nature, which is innately Evil, can be self-beautified by transforming itself into a nothing or cancelling itself completely. Since he considers that Artifice is always morally good, and he does not hold firm to the theory that the origin of moral good lies in man's moral consciousness itself, his defect here is indeed a serious theoretical after-effect caused by his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, and that of strict distinction between Man's Nature and Artifice.

C: A SURVEY OF HIS SUPPOSITION OF ARTIFICE AS A CAUSE
 OF MORAL GOODNESS

To Hsun-tze the Evil of Man's Nature is innate. However, does he consider that Artifice is voluntary and self-conscious? The answer is positive. According to his theory, Artifice originates after the process of Transformation of Man's Nature. Man's Nature hereafter vanishes completely and the newly originated Artifice is influenced, on one hand, by the learning from external situation, and on the other, certainly by man himself for example, by the way he receives the learning. In other words, man himself directly participates in the whole process; and Artifice thus originates in a voluntary and self-conscious state of man. It is clear that to Hsun-tze, the Transformation of Man's Nature is an internal struggle of man. This is the reason why Hsun-tze considers that the Sage, who well performed the Transformation of his Evil Nature and fully develops his morally excellent Artifice, is identical with all men in his Nature and is different from all men in his Artifice.

Does Hsun-tze then consider that Artifice is a necessary cause of moral goodness? His answer is also positive. According to his definition of Artifice: the Mind considers and action thus ensues, Deliberations accumulate and the full functioning of the Mind is exercised, and thus Artifice is formed and completed. In other words, Artifice is the result of Deliberation and decision of the Mind. However, Hsun-tze tends to speak merely of the positive side of Artifice, i.e. morally good Artifice and to neglect its negative side, i.e. morally evil Artifice. In chapter XVIII, he defines Deliberation as follows: when man is stimulated by external

objects and he responds to them and when his Mind selects a decision for him, the selection is called Deliberation. Here the definition itself does not imply the quality of Deliberation, i.e. whether or not it is rational and wise. But in chapter X, he says:

'His (the Sage-King's) knowledge and Deliberation is sufficient to manage the world.' (VI, 4)

In other chapters, the same notion appears. This indicates that Hsun-tze always thinks that Deliberations are rational and wise and encourage man to act in a morally good way. For Hsun-tze it is perhaps logically necessary to propose and affirm this, however, the argument here is that man's Deliberation is not always rational, wise and moral, and that man's action may possibly come to be morally evil. In other words, Artifice is not necessarily a cause of moral good. The result of man's moral activity, objectively speaking, is unlikely to be guaranteed to be certainly morally good, and in fact, in the process of moral activity, what can be guaranteed is the absolute freedom of decision and choice of man's moral consciousness. In other words, man is absolutely free to choose to perform good or evil, yet it is not possible for moral activity to have an objective guarantee of certain moral goodness and that no external moral education or training can possibly have a guarantee of reforming man's moral consciousness toward the moral good. Or, it is man's moral consciousness itself which decides its moral activity and it is man's moral consciousness itself which decides the behaviour of moral good or evil; not the external moral education or training or Artifice.

In conclusion it is suggested that the means of assuring the direction of man's moral consciousness towards good may be to cultivate and train his own moral sentiment towards good by continuous efforts of self-consciousness, self-strengthening, and self-improvement: this is an internal and basic practice, while the accumulation of practices of learning and moral education in moral activities is an external and additional one of slightly minor importance. It is not suggested here that learning and moral education are not important at all; on the contrary, it is admitted that they are undeniably of great importance as long as they are in the position of successfully assisting man to become morally conscious and eventually become a morally excellent man. Viewed from outside, they are the most important means of educating or cultivating man's personality, and they are only a useful external guide to his search for moral life; however, without them, he may also practise his moral effort by other means such as self-strengthening, and self-improvement. The point is, even if one is to benefit from these external aids, one still needs to fully exercise one's moral consciousness to make good use of them before one can actually achieve moral perfection. However, Hsun-tze does not clearly construe the relationship or connection between the Mind and Artifice which is philosophically vitally important. He indicates only that Artifice is the cause of moral goodness. His indication is either too brief to be comprehensive or too partial or biased or only viewed from a social standpoint to complete an all-round theory. And this was the main reason why later scholars misguidedly charged him with over-emphasis on external guidance.

D: A DISCUSSION OF HIS SUGGESTION OF RITES, MUSIC, TEACHER
 AND LAW AS THE SOURCES OF ARTIFICE

According to Hsun-tze the initial methods of man's moral efforts are twofold: (1) internally to seek for the removal of Obsessions of the Mind as well as for the Transformation of his Evil Nature, and (2) to seek for the external assistance of rites, music, teachers and laws by learning from them. The theory of removal of the Mind's Obsessions belongs to Hsun-tzes' theories of the Mind and will be discussed later. In this part, his suggestion of the external assistance of rites, music, teachers and laws is dealt with.

(i) Rites and music may be conveniently considered to be a group which represent a moderate way of moral education. To Hsun-tze, rites restrain and rectify man's internal and external activities, and music harmonizes man himself and his life in society. Teachers and law may be conveniently grouped together as a radical way of moral education or training and to Hsun-tze, a teacher guides man to a proper approach to morality while law controls and prohibits man from committing crimes or further crimes.

(ii) Viewed from another point of view, rites and law belong to the particular methods of restraint of social morality and law is established and applied when the influence or force of rites are not strong enough to deal with the evil of man. Music and teachers belong to the group of social educators. By music man is tamed and cultivated, and by teachers man's mischiefs are rectified.

From the above Hsun-tze suggests a complete system of education and restraint in order to make man perform morality.

It is also a complete outline of a social educational system. However, in what way do these four essential elements of assistance to man's Artifice become unanimously effective in their function of guidance and influence or moral education for man? This is not obvious from Hsun-tze's book. Also, in what way are the practical details of these four elements connected with the actual demands of moral education? This again is not discussed.

Generally speaking, the purpose of rites, music, teachers and laws exists to stimulate man's moral sentiment, to cultivate and train it, to allow it to have a complete and thorough understanding of the principle of morality and to make it possess a sense of moral responsibility. Thus in the process of moral activity, man's moral sentiment will be able to effectively direct its moral consciousness to make morally good decisions. Therefore the purpose of the exaltation of rites and music and the respect for teachers and law is to show an appreciation of their assistance or guidance to man's moral goal and moral practice. It should not be a blind adoration of them. Viewed from the standpoint of modern theories of education, the ways of moral education are manifold: one's own experiences, the mute teachers such as books and magazines, the immediate teachers including any individual, for example, members of the family, school teachers or any men contacted directly or indirectly with the learner, and other means of communication such as radio, television, films and records. Therefore the media of moral education are not necessarily restricted to the classic rites, or a serious and morally conscientious teacher, as suggested by Hsun-tze. Hsun-tze lived in a chaotic

period and his appeal for respect for teachers and rites seems necessary and natural in order to protect himself as a teacher and scholar and to survive those dangerous and disorderly times. On one hand he is limited by his times, and on the other it is a need of his times. However, the emphasis itself needs more theoretical explanation, for it is only by serving a good teacher that the advantages of his instruction can be gained, and by fully understanding the meaning of rites that his performance or practice of it can be said to be proper. If a bad teacher who is incapable of fulfilling his duty is followed, the pupil may learn nothing moral from him. The pupil will then become innocent of the principle of rites, music and law, or he may know merely the minor details of them; thus he not only receives no influence of their assistance or education, but also practises their empty forms without a sense of true respect and sincerity. Although Hsun-tze suggests the theory of Gradually Accumulated Influence in which he emphasizes the importance of a good teacher, this theory is not given in sufficient detail to establish this point. In later times, sophists borrowed his theory of exaltation of teachers and laws to become part of their own theories, and formed the school of Fa Chia¹². This situation was certainly not foreseen by Hsun-tze. Nevertheless, if he had made this point clear he would have avoided the unnecessary accusation by the later scholars of encouraging the rise of that school¹³.

12. 法家 Fa Chia, one of the schools of learning in Pre-Ch'in Period, stressing law and punishment as the means of control of the king.

13. For a further argument that Hsun-tze is different from the Fa-ists, please see pp.355.

In HSUN-TZE there is a chapter devoted to the discussion of rites, that is chapter XIX entitled 'On Rites', in which some details of rites are listed. Hsun-tze distinguishes different contents of rites practised and applied to different classes of man in society, i.e. the ordinary masses, officials, feudal princes and the king. His distinction and opinion on rites was considered to be a standard one by Han Confucianists and in the BOOK OF RITES which they edited, there were many quotations from this chapter and other chapters of HSUN-TZE. His interpretation of the Confucian concept of rites contributes a more detailed theoretical system than the aphoristic sayings of Confucius and the interpretations of other Confucianists in Hsun-tze's time. However, his viewpoints on rites are, from a modern standpoint, feudalistic and anachronistic. What Hsun-tze considers important is the principle of rites and not its minor details. Therefore the chapter is not completely valueless or invalid. There is also chapter XX, entitled 'On Music' in which he devotes his efforts to interpretation of the Confucian concept of music. The ancient music, i.e. the music of Yao and Shun, was lost, according to later textual researchers, in the Ch'in Dynasty (221-207 B.C.), when it ceased to be heard and studied; however, arguments for and against its existence and its excellence have been extended until the present day. Confucius once heard the Music of Shao¹⁴ and highly praised it¹⁵.

14. 韶 Shao, the music during the time of Shun (ruled around 2000 B.C.).

15. THE ANALECTS, chapter III and chapter VII.

However, Hsun-tze is the first Confucianist who provides a full discussion of the importance of a piece of good music in moral cultivation. One of his aims in this chapter is to argue against the Mo-ist's Anti-Music theory. Nevertheless, his concern with the importance of music from a moral viewpoint is constructive and valid even today. His main suggestion is that a piece of good music, i.e. the music like Shao or that of the Sage-Kings such as Yao and Shun, may promote the moral well-being of man and peacefulness of society; while a piece of evil music which spreads the sounds of licentiousness, wantonness, or unpleasant noises may disturb man's mental state of serenity or his effort in moral practice and consequently may violate the peacefulness of society. THE BOOK OF MUSIC edited by Han Confucianists also adopted and quoted many of Hsun-tze's words from this chapter. One may find that Hsun-tze's discussion on rites and music have had a great influence on later scholars and indeed this is also his important contribution to Confucian philosophy. And his opinions on these subjects, especially his interpretations of the moral role of rites and music are universally considered accurate and to the point. However, it is also difficult to give further comment on it without a complete understanding of the concrete content of ancient music. In chapter I, entitled 'Encouraging Learning', he points out the importance of the teacher, yet the importance of a good teacher is not much discussed for, to him, a teacher who is worthy to be followed is always a morally good one. As to law, there is no chapter devoted to this and in his work nothing much about law is given in detail. In chapter XII, he says:

'There is only the tyrant but no tyrannical country; there is only the ruling man but no ruling law . . . Law cannot exist independently and its regulations cannot be implemented by themselves . . . Law is the beginning of administration and a Conscientious Man is the source of Law.' (VIII, 1)

From this it is evident that Hsun-tze does not have the intention of especially emphasizing the law itself, for he considers that a virtuous law-maker is more important. The question of how a Conscientious Man is related to law or becomes the source of law is not clearly explained, and the exact meaning and the detail of this statement needs further discussion and explanation, and Hsun-tze fails to give this.

In his theory of Artifice, the exaltation of teacher and rites is the first and important step, while the implementation of law is a secondary policy. However, Hsun-tze on one hand fails to hold firm to the discussion of how rites, music, teacher and law become unanimously effective in moral education, and on the other fails to point out their position only as media of moral education. Therefore although his theoretical structure of this theory is formed it is incomplete in content as well as in theory itself.

The main theoretical difficulty of the theory of Transformation of Man's Nature lies in the following: (1) it is limited because of his belief that Man's Nature is Evil, and (2) he fails to hold firm to the theory of the origin of moral good

and evil in man's moral consciousness. This also affects his theory of Artifice which itself, though philosophically meaningful, is theoretically weak and incomplete.

Hsun-tze's whole set of theories of human nature is like a piece of jade with trivial flaws or defects which may not seriously damage its essence as jade, though it is no longer a piece of good jade.

CHAPTER VI:

CRITICISM OF HIS THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE

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The fact that Hsun-tze has no ambition to establish a whole system of theory of knowledge has been discussed in Part I, chapter II. What he tries to explain about knowledge is that all searches for common knowledge are endless and of no great value to man's life and it is only in morality that man will find his home. In his theories Hsun-tze starts from the theory of names (Ming) in which he discusses the origin of names, their definition and function, the principles of formulating names and the relationship between names and man's experience, and his intention is, in principle, to explain the importance of the relationship between names and man's moral reality. He then points out the three types of 'confusions' (Huo) of contemporary sophists and he gives solutions to these confusions by correcting their errors in the relationship of names to reality. Hsun-tze also tries to establish the principle or art of debate with the purpose of elucidating the ideal that man should not only speak properly but also speak nothing but morality, for there is nothing more important in man's life than morality. Of morality he claims that man should speak on the Ultimate Principle of Man or the Way of Man, and thus he paves the way for his theory of the Mind. As his efforts aim at morality and not knowledge itself, Hsun-tze does not, either intentionally or unconsciously, go deep in pure thinking in order to contemplate the central issues of knowledge such as its content, scope and limit, and value. What he would like to

establish is the Confucian ethics of notions like 'to respect those worthy of respect and to be intimate with those worthy of intimacy' and 'a king should be a king, officials should be officials, the father should be a father, the son should be a son, the senior should be a senior, the junior should be a junior, and the farmer should be a farmer, the scholar should be a scholar, the worker should be a worker and the merchant should be a merchant', (chapter IX). In other words, he would like to see that all men in society are in their appropriate positions and that they all fulfil and perfect their virtue as men and as members of society. This is also the purpose of his philosophy. Therefore it is better to consider this part of his thoughts as belonging to the theory of names and morality rather than the theory of knowledge.

However, in his theory of names and morality, there are theories actually related to or within the scope of theory of knowledge and they are discussed outstandingly well; therefore it is still convenient to call them here 'his theory of knowledge'.

SECTION 1: HIS THEORIES OF NAMES

In his judgement, there is nothing as necessary as appropriateness in the relation of a name (Ming) to reality (Shih). After men have agreed upon a certain name to indicate a certain reality and have used it in practice, then a firm relationship between name and reality is, Hsun-tze claims, established and its application can be said to be appropriate. However, he observes that in his days, the sophists spread their artful and peculiar argumentations or

even worse, they lie and make deceptive speech in order to confuse, fool and swindle man, and thus make name and reality lose their appropriateness. Hsun-tze therefore insists that a Conscientious Man must debate and his debate should start from the rectification of names, and he also considers that the definition and function of name, the examination of names¹ and the principle of formulating names² are three inseparable aspects of the knowledge of names. The following pages examine these three aspects.

A: THE THEORETICAL INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CLASSIFICATION
AND FUNCTIONS OF NAMES

A name should indicate a certain reality, or a name should be in accordance with a certain reality: this is the main principle of formulating names and also the main function of names in Hsun-tze's theory. In chapter XXII, entitled 'Rectification of Names', he says:

'When a name is heard, its reality is thus
clearly expressed: this is the function of names.'
(XVI, 6)

However, in common-sense, is name necessarily obliged to be in accordance with its fixed reality? In most cases the answer may be positive, yet there are exceptions. In the case of a horse, for example, it is necessary to call a horse which possesses all the characteristics of a horse, a horse, and it is necessary to name that which shows all the characteristics of a horse, a horse. Thus the name 'horse' and its reality 'which possesses all the characteristics of a horse' are in correspondence to each other, and when man uses

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1. 驗名 Yen-Ming. For reference, please see p.47.
 2. 制名 Chih-Ming. For reference, please see p.48.

the word in this way, he is making a proper application of the name and his application can, according to Hsun-tze, be said to be appropriate. Yet in the case of proper names, it can be quite different. For example, to name a new-born horse 'Prize Winner' is only to show the expectation of its owner or whoever names it. The name 'Prize Winner' itself does not have guaranteed reality, that is to say, the horse with such a name may not be guaranteed a future prize winner. In other words, proper names are often used simply to draw the hearer's attention to or remind him of the presence of the person or thing so named, and the proper name itself does not necessarily have a descriptive sense. The argument here is that the scope of classification of names suggested by Hsun-tze is incomplete; in other words, he is speaking merely of some kinds of names and not all names. For some kinds of names it is possible for semantics and reality to be in correspondence. However, for some other kinds of names, such as proper names, they generally only carry a vocative function of calling a hearer's attention to or reminding him of someone or something present or existent. In other words, Hsun-tze starts with the assumption that every name must have a referent or have the function of referring to something in the world so as to make the name itself an intelligible meaning. Yet his investigation on names is incomplete and his assumption is thus theoretically weakened. On the other hand, his theory of referential relation of name to reality itself is not self-sufficient, for there are the cases of names such as proper names, which may not have a referential reality. And the theoretical insufficiency of his theory of names is clear. In chapter XXII, he suggests two classes of names: (1) names of social institutions including names of

of penalties, titles of the nobility, and names of ceremonies; and (2) names in general, e.g. Nature, Deliberation, Artifice, etc. which he calls 'miscellaneous common names'. The classification itself is obviously an incomplete one. From the modern viewpoint the former class belongs to 'common names' and the latter to 'abstract names'. He does not mention those names which also lie in the category of names such as proper names and collective names. Furthermore, Hsun-tze only gives examples of the miscellaneous common names of man and he does not mention the miscellaneous common names of other things than man, such as places, things and animals. Thus his classification is limited to the class of attributes of man and that of social institutions. It can be seen that the classification itself is quite partial and narrow. However, to Hsun-tze, these two classes of names, for the sake of keeping the social institutions and restraining man's behavior, must have their fixed realities and a man who is involved in or is in possession of some names of these classes should behave in correspondence with the realities of the names. In other words, the officials should fulfil his duty as an official, the masses should fulfil their duties as members of the country, and a man should fulfil his duties as a man. Doubtlessly, this is a logical and necessary theory in Hsun-tze's moral philosophy. The point is that since his classification of names carries a special function concerned only with morality, the result is that in his distinction as to whether or not a man uses a name appropriately or possesses a name appropriate to reality, always involves moral judgement, whereas such cases are rare in the classification of names in syntax.

In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze considers that the functions of names are twofold; (1) politically, if names are fixed and realities can be distinguished, then the world will be united for there will be no dispute and confusion about them; and (2) practically, (a) names enable man to distinguish the noble and the inferior, the identical and the different, (b) man is thus able to point out the realities and to explain his will, and (c) man is thus able to avoid the unhappiness of having events becoming difficult and failing. His emphasis of the functions of names mentioned in fact is laid on their practical functions, for the former one is a result of the success of the latter. After a close examination of the latter, certain difficulties are found as follows:

(i) Hsun-tze says that a name enables man to distinguish the noble and the inferior, but the statement is ambiguous. The term 'the noble and the inferior', if it is spoken in a social sense, may imply those of either the political class or the economic class; if it is spoken in a moral sense, it may imply the Conscientious Man or the Sage and the Mean-Spirited Man. No matter what sense Hsun-tze implies here, the function of names always results in a moral judgment. For example, to call someone a high-positioned official, to use the name or title he bears implies, according to Hsun-tze, that he should fulfil his duties as a high-positioned official and he should show the virtue required by his position. In other words, the reality behind the name should be reflected in the actual behavior of the man who is thus named. The difficulty here is that man's name itself, whether a social title or a moral title, sometimes does

not reflect his actual behaviour or situation. For instance, the fact that a man is named a morally Conscientious Man does not further imply his social status; or the fact that a man is named a prime minister may imply that his ability is sufficient for him to be in such a position or that he, being in such a position, should fulfil his duties, but the name 'prime minister' itself does not give information as to his actual conduct or virtue. Therefore Hsun-tze's statement stands accused of the following: (a) the criterion of 'the noble and the inferior' is not clear, and (b) name itself is not a sufficient means for such a distinction. The same difficulty applies to the immediately following pairs of 'the identical and the different'.

(ii) The second and third points of the practical functions of name are also not clearly presented. It is obvious that Hsun-tze should give more examples to interpret his opinion but he fails to do so. There are names which enable man to point out the realities but they do not necessarily explain his will, or they have nothing to do with his will. The words 'the unhappiness of having events becoming difficult and failing', are not clear too. That the event becomes difficult and fails is not entirely due to names though it may be a part of the trouble. However, even when the correct name is applied, it is still possible for difficulty and failing of events to occur.

The reasons for the difficulties of his theory of classification and that of the function of names are:

(i) Hsun-tze does not indicate the particular scope of his theory of names, which compared with that of syntax is narrow and incomplete. Therefore what he says in his theory also becomes narrow and incomplete. This constitutes a limitation of his theory of classification of names and that of the function of names.

(ii) The main purpose of Hsun-tze's theories of names is evidently to elucidate the fact that man in his position should appropriately fulfil his duties. In other words, Hsun-tze is speaking of morality in a wide sense: that is, man should fulfil his duties in both social and ethical morality. Therefore his theory is a means to morality and not an end in itself. This forms another limitation of his theory. In short, Hsun-tze insists that every name (however, to him, it only means names of moral concern) must have a referential reality (to morality) so as to establish for itself an intelligible meaning (to morality). If he had gone more deeply to the assumption itself that every name must have a referential reality so as to establish its intelligible meaning, he might have possibly developed some interesting patterns of metaphysical argumentation ^{about} ~~of~~ the relation ^{between the} ~~of~~ meaning of a name ~~and~~ its referential reality. However, what he is concerned with is not to construct a philosophical enquiry into a theory of language, but to draw attention to the relationship between name (Ming) and morality, or simply an appeal for 'man in society as a genuine moral being'.

Since his theories of names have a moral purpose and only to a small extent relate to philosophical inquiries of pure

knowledge, although parts of them are outstanding and unique for his times, it may be considered that they are only a partial success in theory of knowledge. However, this may serve as evidence that Hsun-tze's intention lies in the discussion of the relations of names and morality and not in conceptual investigation of name or knowledge itself.

B: A SURVEY OF HIS EXAMINATION OF NAMES

Hsun-tze's theory of examination of names suggests, on one hand, the examination of the validity of the established names by means of man's experience of its referential reality, and on the other, the formulation of new names also by means of man's experience on the realities. In Hsun-tze's words, the method of examining is 'by means of man's natural sense' and of 'man's Mind which can examine and understand'. The theory is indeed rich in an epistemological sense. Hsun-tze tries to answer the following questions: How does man know external objects? Or how does knowledge originate?

To Hsun-tze, knowledge originates from man's physical senses or his sensory organs and his Mind or his Epistemological Mind, while names originates from the fact that men have the same feelings for the same things which they compare and mutually understand and then finally agree on a new name and put it into practice. The method he suggests to examine the validity of knowledge here is in the main an empiricist criterion which generally refers to sensory experience as a necessary condition of knowledge. He also investigates the function of name in communication in which by means of names, the identity, similarity and correspondence between the

speaker and hearer may be achieved. For him, names of moral vocabulary, for instance, father, expresses the morally correct role of a person so described. To extend this idea further, he claims that such an interrelationship between names and realities thus make human communication possible. This doctrine is a keen and profound observation by Hsun-tze. He also considers that the Mind unifies and controls all the physical senses, and that the physical senses such as eyes, nose, ears, mouth and the body can receive and distinguish external objects, but they cannot know and understand them. In other words, the Mind is the faculty of thinking and the key to examine and know external things. Thus in theory, Hsun-tze starts from the experience of man's physical senses and then he lays emphasis on the comprehension of the Mind. This makes him not only genuinely an empiricist but also a rationalist. However, though he is a combination of both, he is not at all inconsistent if his theory is understood as follows: in the sense of the origin of knowledge, or in the initial step of knowing, it is necessary for man to experience external objects by means of his physical senses in order to allow information for the purpose of examining and understanding to reach the Mind. Therefore in chapter XXII, he says that the ability of examining and understanding of the Mind must wait for suitable contacts with objects by related sensory organs, before it can be realized. In the explanation of the structure of knowledge, it is necessary for man to admit the important role of the Mind. The five sensory organs, i.e. eyes, ears, mouth, nose and body are capable of perceiving and distinguishing objects; yet if the perceived data do not go through the examination

and understanding of the Mind, then an appropriate judgement on the object cannot be given, therefore in the process of knowing, the Mind unifies and controls all the physical senses.

To the question of the origin of knowledge, Hsun-tze has suggested a dualistic viewpoint. However, his suggestion merely solves the problem of the process of man's subjective knowledge. As to the issues of the object of knowledge, such as its nature, the value and its content, Hsun-tze does not mention anything of these in his book. This is perhaps because he always relates names to morality, and perhaps because he concentrates his attentions on the Ultimate Mind and not on the Epistemological Mind, thus limiting his treatment to the philosophical issue of the theory of knowledge.

C: A SURVEY OF HIS PRINCIPLE OF FORMULATING NAMES

The initial step of formulating names, Hsun-tze suggests, is to examine whether the established name and its referential reality are in correspondence with each other by means of man's five senses and his Mind, and its practical step is to formulate a new name when necessary by the principle of similarity and difference, that of generality and particularity and that of numbers. His theory is, in content, rich in a syntactic sense.

In his system of names, Hsun-tze suggests two terms; the broad particular name and the broad general name³; and he takes 'bird or beast' as an example of the former term and 'things' as that of the latter. From this it can be seen that his theoretical

3. For reference, please see p.49.

system of this classification is not sufficiently compact.

According to the modern study of names, an object has at least three names: its common name, its particular name and its proper name. For example, apart from its taxonomy in biological study, the common name for a cat is of course a cat, its particular name is, for instance, a siamese cat, and its proper name is perhaps Sai-mi. If Hsun-tze's terms are used, a broad general name for a cat is a living thing or creature, and its broad particular name is a cat. However, he fails to at least mention the proper name. Perhaps he is aware of this defect; therefore in chapter XXII he suggests that man deduces things according to their classes and generalizes them until there is no more broader general name and then the deduction ends, and that man carries on the particularizing until there is no more particular name and then the particularization ends. It seems that the incompleteness of his theory is thus slightly modified. The following example may help to clarify this point. Supposing that 'man' is a general name, deduced to a broader sense, 'man' is a kind of animal, and an animal is a kind of living thing or object; therefore living thing or object is the broadest general name of 'man'. On the other hand, if carried on to particularization, the Chinese is one of the nations of men, Han is one of the clans of the Chinese, Cantonese is one of the natives in the clans, Wong is one of the families of Cantonese, and Wong Hsiao-erh is one of the members of the Wong families; therefore 'man' is a broad general name for Wong Hsiao-erh while the name 'Wong Hsiao-erh' is the most particular name in Hsun-tze's terminology or proper name in modern terminology. Thus although Hsun-tze does not mention the term 'proper name', what he says in fact implicitly

includes it. If his principle of formulating names is applied here a corresponding result of a similar type can be obtained. For example, Andrew and Douglas are men, and a common name for them is human beings. Andrew is three and Douglas is thirty. Since their ages are different, therefore the different names for them are: child for Andrew and adult for Douglas. Since they are male, therefore a single name for them is male; in detail, the compound name for Andrew is boy and for Douglas, man. A general name for them is m.a.n and their particular names are Andrew and Douglas. Thus the validity of Hsun-tze's theory is tested and in principle, it is acceptable. However, the names or terminology suggested are rather too simple to form a complete and well-founded theory, yet that his ambition does not lie here is understood.

As to his discussion of formulating numbers, he suggests that things which have different appearances but are in the same place are two realities with the same name and they should be numbered as two, that things which have the same appearance but are in different places are still two realities but they should be numbered as one, and that a thing which has changed but still retains its original reality should also be numbered as one; thus accordingly, all things can be properly numbered. Here it may be helpful to explain his theory more clearly by using the following example: In the case of water, although there are differences, at least in taste, between sea water and river water, they are without doubt water, and thus they are named similarly for they are one reality. As to the three conditions of water, from water to ice, or to steam, although its appearance changes, its reality

as water has not changed, therefore to number it man should, Hsun-tze holds, name it as one (reality). In the case of water and land, they are of different classes, and therefore they are given two names and numbered as two (realities). Thus accordingly the numbers of one, two, ... etc. are produced and distinguished. This is also an outstanding theory in his theory of knowledge of his time, and indeed it does possess more meaning in pure epistemology than in morality. As to the term 'good name'⁴ which he suggests, since it means the name which, according to man's mutual agreement and common practice to be appropriate, is in correspondence with its actual reality and which, when applied, is clear and straight-forward and not against its reality, thus it again involves moral judgement as discussed in A of this section.

His theory of formulating names, as a whole, was outstanding in his times, and is also valuable in the field, although some parts of it need to be further polished in the manner suggested and they need to be further supplemented to complete a compact system.

SECTION 2: HIS THEORIES OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL MIND

The theories of the Mind are the keynote of Hsun-tze's philosophy. They can be divided into two main parts: (1) epistemological theory of the Mind, or the theory of the Epistemological Mind, and (2) moral theory of the Mind, or the theory of the Ultimate Mind. The latter part will be discussed in the following chapter and in this section, the former one is to be examined.

4. 善名 Shan-Ming. Please see HSUN-TZE, chapter XXII (XVI, 4).

A: A SURVEY OF HIS EXPLANATION OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE
 EXAMINATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE MIND

In B of the last section, the theory that the Mind unifies and controls man's five senses and that it examines and understands external objects is discussed. Knowledge originates, to Hsun-tze, in the combined function of the Mind and the senses. However, he merely pursues the issue of how man knows or the subject of knowledge, and the issue of how things are or the object of knowledge is neglected; the latter failure becomes a deficiency of his theories of knowledge.

From his discussion on the subject of knowledge the following question inevitably arises: if in the process of knowing, the Mind is capable of unifying and controlling the senses and of examining and understanding the object, then why can it examine and understand it, or how is knowledge possible in the Mind? Hsun-tze in fact does not give an answer.

In chapter XXI, entitled 'Dispelling Obsessions', he suggests that the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness of the Mind is the way to know. By Receptiveness of the Mind he means that there are, besides the storing-up places, empty places in the Mind for further storing. Although the knowledge stored-up in the Mind is great, the Mind will not thus lack empty spaces for more knowledge; in other words, the capability of the Mind of receiving knowledge is unlimited. By Attentiveness, he means that the Mind is able to know two things simultaneously and it is able to distinguish that these two things are not one thing; in other words,

the Mind is able to attend to and recognise the different objects learned without confusion. By Undisturbedness he means that although there is a time when the Deliberation ceases to function temporarily, and daydreams start to arise, nevertheless when it is working the internal confusions or contradictions of the Mind will vanish and the acquired knowledge of the Mind is always still and not disturbed. In short, the Mind is able to receive knowledge unlimitedly, to know without confusion and to think undisturbedly. Therefore, in Hsun-tze's thinking, when the Mind is in the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, or when it is unobsessed, it is able to obtain knowledge of an external object. However, if one examines this closely, one may find that such a state of Mind, i.e. Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness may only serve as an explanation of the condition of the possibility of knowledge, yet it does not answer the question of why the Mind knows the object. What he has said is based upon a presupposition that the Mind is capable of knowing external objects. And his explanation of the condition of possibility of knowledge of the Mind is rather a psychological one and not a pure epistemological one.

It may be helpful to investigate briefly the difference in scope or concern between psychology and epistemology in order to establish a support for the arguments here. Although the study of epistemology has been historically intimately allied with that of psychology, it does not follow that they are one field. A fundamental difference lies in the fact that psychology is concerned solely with the investigation of states of the mind while epistemology investigates not only the cognitive state of the mind, but attempts to grasp

different types of object of cognition. Therefore epistemology embraces a wider scope of study of knowledge, namely the possibility of knowledge, its origin, its limits, its categories, and some philosophical issues such as the problem of the a priori, the structure of the knowledge-situation, and the problem of truth. Psychology, on the other hand, may involve itself with epistemology only when the cognitive activity of the Mind is under discussion, yet it is still distinctively different from the latter in its field of interest. Briefly, psychology is interested only in the description and explanation of certain states of the mind, including its conscious cognitive activities, whereas epistemology tries to deal with the various philosophical issues such as the relation of the subject of knowledge to the object of knowledge, or the structure of a knowledge-situation and the source of genuine knowledge in the mind. Although some analyses or interpretations of both studies may suggest interdependent data to each other, a clear cleavage in their directions of interest or in their methods of approach to their subject matter is always distinctive. Since Hsun-tze does not explain in detail whether it is because of a transcendental rational cause or an empirical cause that the Mind is able to know, to examine and to understand or recognise external objects, nor is he interested in the investigation of the structure of knowledge-situation, i.e. whether external objects exist independently of man, his theory is not strictly speaking an approved one in epistemology.

In the same chapter, Hsun-tze also mentions that when man's Mind is Receptive, Attentive and Undisturbed, when he looks he

sees; when he sees he distinguishes, and when he distinguishes he knows and understands; and that when man's Mind is obsessed, his cognitive reactions are completely opposite. This again is obviously a psychological description, for Hsun-tze does not explain the reason why, when a man is in a conscious state or, in his terms, when a man's Mind is Receptive, Attentive and Undisturbed, he is able to see, distinguish and know. The following example may help to explain the argument here: a man sees Mr. Cheung, for example, and he will not mistake him for Mr. Lee, or a man sees a deer and he will not mistake it for a horse. What makes him recognise without mistake? Furthermore, a man, after recognition, is always able to make judgements according to what he has recognised. For instance, when a man recognises Mr. Cheung and he hears someone call Mr. Cheung by the name of Mr. Lee, he is able to correct the mistake, or when he recognises a deer and hears someone call it a horse, he is able to correct the mistake. Why is he able to do so? Is reason or experience the source of his identification and judgement on the accuracy, objectivity, necessity and efficiency of his own knowledge? These questions lead to the field of epistemology or the theory of knowledge, and they lie outside the scope of psychology.

Hsun-tze's explanation, therefore, that the reason for the knowing of the Mind lies in its Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, or the fact that he tries to use a psychological explanation to solve the cognitive validity of the theory of knowledge, is a theoretical error.

B: A SURVEY OF HIS EPISTEMOLOGICAL MIND AS AN OBSERVER
 OF KNOWLEDGE

Hsun-tze in one place makes use of a metaphor to explain his view of the Mind. In his thinking it seems that there are originally two levels in man's Mind as with the water in the pan. The Obsessions of the Mind are similar to the deep turbidity of the water in the bottom, whereas the state of Great Clearness and Brightness of the Mind is similar to the clear brightness of the water on the top. If man's Mind is in its highest state which man's Evil Nature and other Obsessions sink to its bottom and are buried there and thus man's Deliberation may come into full play, then it may, Hsun-tze claims, observe and understand the Ultimate Principle of Man and thus it may observe and understand the principle of all things in the physical world. However, he also maintains, if man's Mind is obsessed by physical objects, and his Evil Nature is exposed unbridledly and ungovernably as with the blowing of a breeze on the pan so that the water inside is totally disturbed, then it is not able to distinguish the right and the wrong, the true and the false. It seems that the Mind in Hsun-tze's theory is that which is responsible for man's knowledge, in other words, it is in this connection an Epistemological Mind and its function is to observe and understand what it perceives. Some later Chinese scholars therefore argue that since the Mind in Hsun-tze's theory is just an observing Mind which is able only to observe and understand at its best, the principles of the physical world, and which itself does not originate morality; therefore it, the Mind, is not, they conclude, the source of moral value, or his theory of Mind as a whole has no value in moral studies.

These arguments and comments show a lack of thorough understanding of Hsun-tze's theory. According to Hsun-tze, the Epistemological Mind may observe all knowledge, including the knowledge of morality. Undoubtedly, Hsun-tze never lays much emphasis on general knowledge, or knowledge in general, except moral knowledge. For him, the knowledge of morality is higher in level than that of general knowledge. Therefore what the Mind may desire to observe in its state of Great Clearness and Brightness is obviously, according to his theory, not only general knowledge and its principles but also the knowledge and principles of morality. Here a puzzle about moral knowledge in Hsun-tze's theory of knowledge may arise: what does he mean by moral knowledge or knowing morality, the Ultimate Principle of Man? In fact, the question of what is Tao or the Way or the Ultimate Principle or Li or the Rational Principle, or whatever it is called, has historically hardly ever been objectively investigated by most of the Chinese thinkers. Moral knowledge is to Hsun-tze and many other Chinese thinkers, seen as a matter of conviction rather than an analytical understanding. From such a knowledge or conviction, thinkers such as Hsun-tze make every effort to keep to it by certain form(s) of moral practice(s). In other words, they try to affirm the reality of such knowledge by means of concrete moral experiences. By these experiences they are enlightened with a new knowledge of experience of 'morality and self'. From such a new knowledge, they devote themselves to continuous moral practices, elevate themselves level by level to an experience of 'Oneness with morality', or a state of moral perfection. However, the experience of 'Oneness with morality' or the state of moral

perfection may be mainly a psychological and subjective feeling. However, it does not follow here that their moral knowledge and moral experience which may not immediately form an objective principle are not true or valid. The above narration may give some indication of the traditional Chinese thinkers' attitude when they speak of morality. Since the Chinese thinkers believe that they may communicate and be allied with morality by means of their own moral cultivation, there has been almost no conscious establishment of objective and systematic analysis of moral knowledge in Chinese philosophy. However, this does not imply that Chinese thinkers consider that moral practice is possible without moral knowledge. For most of them, the knowledge of certain forms of moral practices such as rites and their moral meanings is itself moral knowledge, while the knowledge of morality is subjectively identical with each level of moral practice and cultivation. In short, they are concerned only with empirical moral knowledge as the way to morality. Perhaps because of this an establishment of objective and systematic investigation of moral knowledge has not been important and necessary to them. In Hsun-tze's theory of knowledge, moral knowledge is never properly defined. In fact, he often unwittingly identifies it with moral practice of rites in human relationships and social institutions. However, the ambiguity of certain concepts such as Tao, and knowledge of Tao, may also be one of his theoretical deficiencies in conceptual investigation. As to the question of whether the Mind is the source of moral value or whether his theory of Mind as a whole has value in morality, this will be discussed in the next chapter. However, since what Hsun-tze is concerned with is morality and not knowledge, he has thus limited the development of his theory of the Epistemological Mind.

C: A SURVEY OF HIS THEORIES OF THE OBSESSED MIND AND
 ILLUSIONS

 In chapter XXI, Hsun-tze lists the Obsessions of Mind
as follows:

 'Desire is Obsession, hatred is Obsession, the
beginning is Obsession, the end is Obsession, far is
Obsession, near is Obsession, broadness is Obsession,
narrowness is Obsession, the ancient is Obsession, and
the present is also Obsession. If things are differ-
ent, then they are considered to be obsessed by each
other. These are the general defects of the Mind.'

(XV, 1)

 To summarize his words, the Obsessions of Mind include
man's emotion or desires, event, space, knowledge, time and things
which roughly are in the general categories of known objects. It
is apparent that, to Hsun-tze, objects themselves are not the
Obsessions, it is the biased interpretation by the Mind of these
external objects which give rise to Obsessions. In other words,
the origin of the Obsessions of Mind lies in the Mind itself.
The Mind turns to external objects and it is then more and more
remote from morality, and wherever it turns to and whatever it
chases after, Obsessions are to be found. Therefore in the begin-
ning of this chapter, Hsun-tze says that if a man's knowledge is
biased and his Mind is obsessed, then he becomes innocent of the
'great principle', i.e. the Ultimate Principle, and this is 'an
affliction of man'.

 However, the explanation Hsun-tze has tried to give of
the different kinds of Obsessions of Mind again belongs to the realm
of psychology. Furthermore, to say that all known objects are
likely to cause Obsessions is highly disputable. Viewed from the

standpoint of morality, this statement of Hsun-tze is acceptable since he also explains that the Mind is the origin of its Obsessions. However, if the question is explored more deeply, the following difficulty is found. (1) As all external objects are merely possible causes of the Obsessions, and the Mind itself is the main cause of its Obsessions, then it is the Mind that chooses to follow external objects and it is the Mind that should be responsible for its culpable choice. In other words, external objects are not responsible for the Obsessions of the Mind. There is no reason therefore for man to devalue all external objects as objects of knowledge, which Hsun-tze in fact has been trying to do, in order to negatively make perfect the virtue of the Mind. Therefore the fact that Hsun-tze does not want to lay much emphasis on general knowledge is, in theory, inconsistent and it is difficult for him to reconcile these two positions. (2) On the other hand, the fact that he considers only morality and nothing else is also likely to cause Obsession of his own Mind and of his philosophical systems, although his great effort to establish his ideal in morality and to apply it to man is quite understandable and highly commendable.

As to the method of dispelling or removing the Obsessions of Mind, Hsun-tze suggests that one should make the Mind keep to its state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, in other words, to let the Mind know and understand the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality. This leads to his theory of the Ultimate Mind and the core of his philosophy, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

The origin of illusion according to Hsun-tze, lies in the fact that the Mind, observing things and having doubt, feels uncertain or confused. The causes of doubtfulness in the observation of things are, Hsun-tze suggests, darkness that blinds the eyes, improper application of the senses which confuses man's sensory organs⁵, distance and height that disorder man's sight, wine which disturbs man's clear-mindedness, and man's own foolishness and over-fearfulness. In other words, external physical causes, man's own physiological causes and his psychological causes are possible factors in the uncertainty of the Mind. To Hsun-tze, no matter which of the above causes occur, while the Mind is in doubt and is uncertain, illusions easily emerge; and at this time, what is in the Mind should not be used as the basis of Consideration and decision. However, Hsun-tze attributes the origin of illusions to psychological explanations which may not lie within the scope of epistemology or the theory of knowledge. In other words, his discussions of the Obsessed Mind and illusions or, roughly speaking, certain states of the Mind and the activities as a result, may primarily be of psychological and not epistemological concern.

It is apparent from the above that his theory of the Mind is not originally designed for epistemology, and that what is involved in his theory of the Epistemological Mind is indeed in the main his theory of psychology. However, Hsun-tze does not have the ambition of establishing a system of psychology and what he tries to explain is the different kinds of Obsessions of Mind, with the intention of paving the way for his further discussion of the theory of the Ultimate Mind. Therefore, although he may be considered the pioneer in the

5. One of the examples given by Hsun-tze is that man covers his ears with his hands and hears loud sounds which in fact outside his ears are soft and low.

field of psychology in ancient China, as some modern scholars comment⁶, he is not discussing psychology for its own sake, and furthermore, he does not establish a school of psychology. It is perhaps an Obsession arising from his over-stubbornness as regards morality.

SECTION 3: HIS THEORIES OF REASONING

In Hsun-tze's system of thought the theories of analogical reasoning, deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning may more or less theoretically supplement the insufficiency of his theory of the knowing and examining of the Mind. In other words, the limit of knowledge by means of the Epistemological Mind can be slightly amended by his theories of reasoning. However, two difficulties immediately follow, namely, the efficiency of the theory of reasoning as a means to knowledge and the relation of the theory of reasoning to that of knowledge.

A: THE EFFICIENCY OF THE THEORY OF REASONING IN EPISTEMOLOGY

(i) Examination of the theory of analogical reasoning

In chapter V Hsun-tze takes the Sage as an example to explain the theory that by analogical reasoning a Sage may know all human situations, relations, and so forth⁷. The Sage is the model of Hsun-tze's perfect personality, devoting himself to the

6. A typical discussion may be found, for example, in the introduction of Wang Chung-Lin's translation (into modern Chinese) of HSUN-TZE.

7. For reference, please see p.57.

Ultimate Principle and thus there is nothing, according to Hsun-tze, he does not see, hear and know. By practising his moral excellence the Sage may also measure and deal with all human affairs. However, the following difficulties immediately emerge:

(1) Men are not all Sages. In the case of an ordinary man, the knowledge which he attains by applying reason as far as he can to the best of his limited ability may turn out to be quite different from the knowledge of the Sage. In other words, the subjective analogical reasoning of an ordinary man may not guarantee a cognitive validity.

(2) The Sage, according to Hsun-tze, by means of his practice of the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, may also know the principle of all things. However, the principle of all things which Hsun-tze advertises as the Sage's knowledge in fact may not be the detailed physical principle of all things. This is a statement needing further interpretation to be intelligible⁸. As to an ordinary man, such knowledge is not easily obtained, therefore the level of objective efficiency of the knowledge resulting from the analogical reasoning of a Sage is difficult, if not impossible, for an ordinary man to achieve.

(ii) Examination of the theory of deductive reasoning

In chapters V, VIII and IX, the argument put forward by Hsun-tze is that it is possible to know ten thousand by one, by the Conscientious Man or the Sage⁹. In other words, by means of moral

8. For a further interpretation, please see p.283.

9. For reference, please see p.58.

practice the Conscientious Man or the Sage is able to assist and participate in the working of nature or Heaven and to classify all things. However, seeking for epistemological knowledge with such a theory of moral practice will eventually run into the two difficulties mentioned above.

(iii) Examination of the theory of inductive reasoning

In chapter III, Hsun-tze argues that the emotions of a thousand or ten thousand men are that of one man¹⁰. He is again taking the example of a Conscientious Man who, putting his moral knowledge into practice may apprehend the principle of all things. Similarly, such a theory inevitably meets with the above-mentioned difficulties.

To summarize the above, no matter whether in his theory of analogical reasoning, or that of deductive reasoning, or that of inductive reasoning, Hsun-tze is only taking the example of the Conscientious Man or the Sage who, by means of moral practice, comes to know how to deal with all things and all changes in a special way. In short, a way of obtaining knowledge is, he suggests, moral practice. Hsun-tze may thus be accused of the following: (1) Ambiguity in his argument. The knowledge claimed to be achieved by the moral agent is not the genuine epistemological cognition of external objects, but may be either the knowledge of certain forms of moral practice or a special way to deal with all things and all changes; however, it is difficult to know to which of these Hsun-tze is referring.

10. For reference, please see p. 58.

(2) It is also difficult to express these theories satisfactorily in an objective manner for only a Sage may achieve certain, if not all, epistemological knowledge by means of moral practice and an ordinary man may not. It seems that Hsun-tze fails to take into account the position of the ordinary man. (3) His main defect lies in his neglect of the different realms of morality and knowledge. He has been incorrectly including knowledge in morality and fails to see knowledge as an independent study. Besides, whether the theories of reasoning can sufficiently supply man with genuine knowledge, or at least valid cognition, is also doubtful.

B THE RELATIONS OF THE ESSENCES OF THE THEORY OF REASONING AND THAT OF THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The theories of analogical reasoning, deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning are, in principle, three methods of making use of the known knowledge to deduce the unknown. Although Hsun-tze's arguments always unconsciously tend to an unnecessary entanglement with morality, his commentators cannot deny the fact that his arguments also involve themselves unconsciously in the category of methodology of knowledge. However, these three theories of reasoning belong only to the category of methodology of knowledge itself. The basic difference between the two is that the former is primarily and principally the study of the form and principle of reasoning while the latter is principally the study of the knowledge, the possibility of knowledge, its limits, its origins, its categories, its structure and its validity. The analysis of different forms of reasoning and their validity in acquisition of knowledge may be considered to belong to epistemology. However, the theory of

reasoning itself may not be the concern of epistemological validity. In other words, these two studies are of different interests. Therefore Hsun-tze's arguments on the theories of reasoning have accidentally touched on logic or methodology of knowledge; they cannot then be considered to be in the field of the theory of knowledge for Hsun-tze does not go more deeply into a philosophical discussion or an epistemological inquiry into their cognitive validity. In conclusion, his theories of reasoning, though they are practically of some importance in his system and they suggest some sources in logic, are theoretically of little merit with regard to the theory of knowledge.

SECTION 4: HIS THEORIES OF RECTIFICATION OF NAMES

Hsun-tze's theories of rectification of names consist negatively, of an argument against three contemporary sophistic statements and of giving his own solutions to them, and positively, establishing the way of debate.

A: DISPUTABLE POINTS IN HIS SOLUTIONS OF THE THREE CONFUSIONS

The three confusions which Hsun-tze argues against are; (1) using words to confuse names; (2) using fact to confuse names; and (3) using words to confuse fact¹¹. They are so named because in all of them the names and realities fail to correspond and thus cause man's confusion. The following is a close examination of these three confusions.

11. For reference, please see pp.60-68.

(i) Using words to confuse names

To take an example, to say that someone is not happy does not, in theory, necessarily mean that he is sad, or to say that someone is not poor does not necessarily mean that he is rich. Therefore if one considers that 'not happy' means 'sad' or 'not poor' means 'rich' one may be guilty of imprecise meaning and the words one applies may lead to confusion of the factual truth. As put forward by Hsun-tze, the confusion itself is undisputable for such a confusion is possible. However, what is disputable are the first two statements quoted as examples. Whether they are 'confusions' as Hsun-tze charges is worthy of being examined as follows:

(a) In the example of Sung-tze's statement that to be insulted is not disgraceful, Hsun-tze considers that the reason for man's not fighting is that he does not hate to be insulted¹². However, this may not be in correspondence with Sung-tze's original idea. The structure of propositions of both thinkers may be outlined as follows:

Sung-tze: If one considers that to be insulted is not disgraceful then one will not start fighting.

Hsun-tze: If one considers that to be insulted is not hateful, then one will not start fighting.

Both of them come to the same moral conclusion; however, their premises are slightly different, yet not entirely contradictory to each other. The former considers that the fact of being insulted is not disgraceful, while the latter thinks that the Mind does not feel hateful about the fact of being insulted. It may be suggested, however, that both factors can be the reasons for man's not fighting.

12. For reference, please see p.60.

and it all depends on the high or low level of man's cultivation or moral education. In other words, Sung-tze's reason that man does not consider being insulted as insulting and thus does not fight is one of a negative attitude in morality, while Hsun-tze's reason that man does not hate to be insulted and thus does not fight is one of a positive attitude in morality. Therefore the statement of Sung-tze is not necessarily to be considered a confusing one, or deviating from fact or, in Hsun-tze's term, 'reality'.

(b) In the second example, the statement quoted from the contemporary popular saying that the Sage does not love himself, Hsun-tze argues that a Sage should love all men including himself as one of all men, for the names 'man' and 'oneself' is of one reality¹³. Viewed from another aspect, the statement may be interpreted as meaning that the Sage does not pay attention to love for himself but extends his love to all men. In the chapter of 'Ta - Ch'ü' of MO-PIEN¹⁴ it is written:

'To love all men is not excluding one's own self, for one's own self is in those whom one loves.'

Accordingly, the Sage needs not particularly love himself for he himself is included in his love for all men, and such an interpretation is the same as that of Hsun-tze. He may perhaps have heard of the saying of some contemporary Mo-ists, yet he may not have heard of the one quoted above which can be found in MO-PIEN. However, the point is that the statement itself is not necessarily the sophistic confusion which it is accused by Hsun-tze of being.

13. For reference, please see p.62.

14. 墨辯大取 Mo-Pien Ta - Ch'ü.

As to the third example, the statement seen in MO-PIEN that to kill a thief is not to kill a man, Hsun-tze argues that the thief is also a man, therefore to kill a thief is to kill a man¹⁵. However, in the same chapter, i.e. 'Hsiao Ch'ü',¹⁶ of MO-PIEN, a paragraph is written as follows:

'A thief is a man. However, to say that there are many thieves does not mean that there are many men; to say that there is no thief does not mean that there is no man . . . To say that one hates that gang of thieves does not mean that one hates a group of men, or to say that one wishes there is no thief does not mean that one wishes there is no man. If viewed from the identical point of them both, then it is valid to say that though one is a thief, one is a man. However, to love a thief is not equivalent to loving a man; similarly not to love a thief does not mean not to love a man. And thus to kill a thief is not to kill a man.'

Accordingly, viewed from the physical identities of man, all men are alike, and therefore a thief is qualified physically to be called a man. However, viewed from the individual identities of each man, all men are not the same, and more importantly, if viewed from the standpoint of morality, men are moral beings, and the thief who has broken a moral rule or ceased to follow a moral code is not a moral man. Thus in the original statement, it is said that a gang of thieves is not equivalent to a group of men. It is also apparent that the following two statements in the original carry the same idea. Love for a thief should have a special meaning, in other words, the love for a certain thief is not transferrable to another person. As to the last and most important statement: to kill a thief is not to kill a man, it may be interpreted in the

15. For reference, please see p.62.

16. 墨辯小取 Mo-Pien Hsiao-Ch'ü.

following ways: (1) viewed from the viewpoint of physical identities of men, a thief is also a man; thus to kill a thief is undoubtedly to kill a man; and (2) viewed from the moral identities of each man, a thief is not a moral man, or not a man in a moral sense, thus to kill a thief is not to kill a man in a moral sense. Therefore the interpretation of the author of Hsiao Ch'u and that of Hsun-tze are different viewpoints under different lights, and in theory, their interpretations can both be said to be correct. However, in practice, to kill someone, either a thief or not a thief, is non-moral activity, therefore the killer is also not a man in moral sense. Perhaps one more statement may be added; the one who kills a thief is also not a moral man. In law, however, a thief is a man in society; thus to kill a thief is certainly to kill a man. In this case, the accusation of Hsun-tze against the statement is reasonable.

(ii) Using fact to confuse names

In one of the poems of the T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.), it is written:

'On the sea rises the moon bright; though far
away we share this moment this night.'¹⁷

If taking the poetry as an example, one expounds further its meaning, one may also examine the validity of Hsun-tze's accusation here. Taking the latter part of the sentence, if the actual situation is, for example, that someone is in Hong Kong on a June

17. 'Gazing at the moon and thinking of someone far away' by 張九齡 Chang Chiu-ling (673-740 A.D.), one of the greatest poets in T'ang Dynasty.

night and the one he thinks of in South America on the same night, then the realities of the two places are doubtlessly different, i.e. a summer night in Hong Kong and a winter night in South America, while for geographical reasons they cannot possibly see the moon at the same time. However, if the geographical distance is drawn nearer, for example, someone is in Hong Kong Island and the one he thinks of is in Kowloon which is a few miles away from Hong Kong Island, it is possible for them to watch the moon at the same time and the same night. Therefore, viewed practically the words 'far away' should not mean a place really too far away to be in correspondence with the words 'this moment' and 'the moon'. However, dismissing the practical concepts of time and space, one may find that the following interpretation is possible: though someone and the one he thinks of live far apart, they may psychologically share the same moment. For example, someone is in London where the time is eight hours behind that of Hong Kong, and the distance between them is thousands of miles, and now when he is in London thinks of someone in Hong Kong, he can easily feel and know the possible situation of his friend's life as this is a part of recollection in his memory and sometimes he may even feel and know that the one he thinks of is also thinking of him too. Therefore, in psychology, a complete meeting of two minds can be possible. Thus the poetry seems to be psychologically reasonable and in fact a lyrical poetry is always considered good at psychological descriptions.

Returning to Hsun-tze's accusation of man's using fact to confuse names, it is apparent that the accusation is unsuccessful for there are psychological exceptions. The reality or fact for Hsun-tze always means only an experienced or common-sense one, and he always excludes psychological feelings and responses, which are also

realities. The experienced or common-sense reality perceived by man is the subjective knowledge of that reality, and his psychological feelings and responses are also a reality of man's feeling. In other words, cognitive validity depending on individual perception is subject to relativity. So arguments against different perceptions from one's own may be unnecessary. Briefly, the psychological fact does not necessarily confuse names and thus lead to a sophistic confusion. The examples quoted by Hsun-tze are thus again disputable ones.

(a) The first example quoted is Hui Shih's statement that mountains and chasms are on the same level¹⁸. The statement can now be found in the book CHUANG-TZE:

'The heaven and earth are similarly low and the mountains and chasms are on the same level.' (XXXIII)

In Hui Shih's thinking the universe is boundlessly large. What the man on earth sees as 'sky' or 'heaven' is in fact the atmosphere, and viewed from the standpoint of the universe the 'sky or 'heaven' and the earth on which man stands can be said to be as if on the same level. Similarly, if man stands on very high ground or, in modern days, if man sits in an aeroplane and looks down, he will see that the mountains and chasms are as if on the same level. If one takes another example as follows: viewed from a distance men are as small as ants, one may find that such a perception is as true as any other perception of men. The point here is: since cognitive validity depending on individual perception is subject to relativity, Hui-Shih's perception may be as true as Hsun-tze's, although its

18. For reference, please see p.63.

epistemological validity may lead to further controversial arguments. On the other hand, the ground on which Hui-Shih bases his statement is simply his own rich imagination and his own intelligent intuition. And in the modern scientific world, his wild imagination is not altogether impossible. Therefore the statement of Hui-Shih may not be a confusion as Hsun-tze accuses it of being.

(b) In the second example, Hsun-tze quotes Sung-tze's statement that man naturally desires little; Hsun-tze considers that man naturally desires much and not little and thus he concludes that the statement is a confusion. However, viewing it from another aspect, one may argue that when man's moral sentiment is cultivated and educated to a high level, the desires of the ears and the eyes for sound and colour will gradually be decreased, and perhaps sublimated or transformed, and instead there are sentiments of appreciation, which are certainly different from the desires of possession. Therefore the meaning of Sung-tze's statement that man 'naturally wants these (i.e. the enjoyments of the ears and eyes, etc.)'¹⁹ is that man may desire or want the existence of such enjoyments but he does not necessarily desire to occupy them all. Man loves beautiful colour and fine sound simply because they are beautiful and fine, and he loves them with a sense of aesthetic appreciation. For example, man loves to see beautiful roses in the garden, he enjoys their beauty, he watches them, he praises them and he appreciates them. However, he will certainly feel unhappy if he cuts them to decorate his vase or to place them on his desk and thus shorten their natural

19. For reference, please see p.64.

lives. Similarly, when man is morally cultivated and educated, one may say that at this stage he may naturally desire little of physical objects. In other words, the physical desire of a morally good man is relatively decreased. Thus it is because of the different content and meaning of the words 'desire' used by Sung-tze and Hsun-tze that Hsun-tze's accusation may not necessarily be valid.

(c) In the third example Hsun-tze quotes the statements which are speculated to be from the saying of Mo-ists that a feast of grass-fed and grain-fed animals has no tastiness and the music of the great bell gives no pleasure and Hsun-tze accuses them of not being in accordance with facts and experiences²⁰. The fact that delicious food and wonderful music give tastiness and pleasure to man is practical common sense; however, there are men who eat without tasting anything, who hear without hearing a sound, for they are psychologically very ill and what they are doing is often a mechanical repetition without feeling. In fact the changes of subjective emotion in man often affect his behaviour and his responses to common-sense. In such a case it should not be treated as a sophistic confusion.

Hsun-tze always considers that the fact of common-sense or empirical knowledge is the reality and any fact of non-common-sense or non-empirical knowledge which is not in correspondence with the empirical reality is therefore a confusion. One may say that his accusation against these sayings are not sufficiently careful and compact.

20. For reference, please see p.65.


(iii) Using words to confuse fact

The examples quoted in Hsun-tze's accusation are again subjects of dispute. In the original text there is no fixed reading of the examples²¹. According to the first reading, in the first quotation that 'he who censures his enemy visits him', the words 'censures' and 'visits' are not necessarily the causes of confusion. For example, an employee censures his manager for some reason and he has to visit him in order to ask for a favour. The case simply implies the necessity of the objective situation and it does not imply inconsistency in the man's feeling and behaviour. In the second quotation that 'the pillar has an ox', since the statement itself is too ambiguous to understand, any argument against it seems a waste of time. The third quotation that 'a white horse is not a horse' is a famous theory of Kung-Sun Lung. Hsun-tze considers that a white horse is a horse and it can always represent all horses and that thus the statement is confusing as to the fact²². However, this statement may be interpreted in a different way that: a white horse is not an ordinary horse. In the study of category, 'horse' is a general name while 'a white horse' is a particular name. A white horse possesses the special quality of whiteness which makes it different from other horses. Therefore viewed from the aspect of similarity, a white horse is a horse; however, viewed from the aspect of difference, a white horse is not a horse of ordinary quality but of special quality in colour. Viewed from the standpoint of Hsun-tze's principle of formulating names, i.e. name should correspond with its

21. For reference please see p.66.

22. For reference please see pp.67-68.

reality, no matter which kinds or colours of horses, they are horses and should be called horses, therefore one cannot say that a white horse is not a horse. However, viewed from the standpoint of Kung-Sun Lung, by using analysis of category, one may say that a white horse is not a horse of an ordinary kind. Hsun-tze concentrates his attention on the 'horse' in Kung-Sun Lung's statement and finds it absurd if one refuses to agree that a white horse or any horse is not a horse. Kung-Sun Lung emphasizes the word 'white' in his statement and finds it logically necessary to proclaim that a white horse is not a (an ordinary) horse. In short, a class of white horses is not equivalent to a class of horses in general. Nevertheless, if one goes deeply into the statement, one may also find that the statement itself has its theoretical fallacy which is different from the practical fallacy claimed to have been found by Hsun-tze. According to Kung-Sun Lung's proposition: If a part is not equal to its whole, then a white horse is not a horse. The following diagram may be useful to see his argumentation:



However, the fact that Kung-Sun Lung takes colour as the quality-in-common of horses is an error. In other words, when man distinguishes horses, he cannot take colour as the principal criterion or the only distinctive characteristic of a horse. When he thinks of a horse, he will think of an animal with thin legs, long face, small ears, having a mane, hair, a long spreading tail, the capability of running fast, etc. Although it is possible for a man to think simultaneously of a coloured horse, he may not confine his thinking to a horse of certain colour; he may think of a white, or black, or brown or mixed-colour horse. Similarly, he may also think of a big, or medium or small horse. The point is, when a man thinks of a horse, he is thinking of its qualities-in-common, such as its general shape and its general attributes, and he is not thinking of its qualities-in-particular, such as its colour and its size. Therefore the fact that to concentrate on the whiteness of a horse and to conclude that a white horse is not a horse is a mistaken focus or concentration of thought. Or one may say that the statement itself is logically valid in form but not intelligibly meaningful in content. It seems, therefore, that the two interpretations of the statement, i.e. (1) a white horse is not a horse of ordinary quality, and (2) a white horse cannot represent all horses, are without error in logical analysis but they are theoretically unsound as far as their cognitive or factual meaning is concerned. This theory of a white horse is, most commentators claimed, one of the important theories of the Ming Chia or the

school of names²³ in the Pre-Ch'in Period; however, the theory itself is indeed forced or sophistical and it does not offer an important contribution to the study of epistemology and logic.

As to the other reading of these statements, to the first part, i.e. 'he who censures his enemy visits him (and waits) besides the pillar', the argument suggested in the above is still applicable. As for the second part, i.e. 'to have an ox and a horse is not to have a horse', it is obviously a correct statement and it seems unnecessary for Hsun-tze to argue against it. Therefore it may be suggested that the second reading of the statement is possible not valid.

The method suggested by Hsun-tze in the solution to these three confusions is to use the principle of names and reality. Since he always uses experience or common-sense as the cognitive method to examine the efficiency of name and reality in a statement, thus what he can examine is only that which is in man's experience or which is common-sense knowledge. As to those statements such as

23. 名家 Ming Chia, one of the important schools of thought in Pre-Ch'in Period, represented by Hui-Shih, Kung-Sun Lung. Their main interests lie in epistemological inquiries about philosophical issues of logic and metaphysics. Their sayings are often considered to be sophistries by their contemporaries and some later commentators. However, although some of their statements seem to be rather sophistical, the rest are highly logical, philosophical and metaphysical. They are often looked down upon by orthodox Confucian commentators such as Hsun-tze simply because their sayings are often far from empirical or common-sense knowledge and are difficult to understand and accept. Only six chapters of Kung-Sun Lung's work have survived. The work of Hui-Shih and the other sophists have not been preserved and only fragments are recorded in the books CHUANG-TZE, MO-TZE and HSUN-TZE.

psychological descriptions, intuitive thinking, and genuine metaphysical discussions, where their truth-value may be independent of plain common-sense or general explanation they all seem sophistries to him, and become examples of confusion in his theory. However, since the name and reality in his theory is obsessed by experience and common sense, this becomes a deficiency of his theory of rectification of names.

Hsun-tze's reasons for accusing the three confusions of deficiency are theoretically correct. However, the quotations he uses as examples of confusions are almost all irrelevant. Perhaps it is because the statements themselves are too ambiguous to be understood properly, for at least they often have more than one interpretation. Therefore either Hsun-tze has used the wrong examples or he makes some wrong judgements on them.

From the solution of the three confusions, it is clear that the direction of Hsun-tze's effort tends to look for the factual meaning of a statement or empirical truth. This is because Hsun-tze emphasizes heavily the principle of name and reality and its relations to man's experience and this affects the way he deals with the problems of epistemology.

B: A SURVEY OF HIS THEORY OF THE ARTS OF DEBATE

The essence of debate (Pien) to Hsun-tze is, on one hand and positively, to speak of what man considers to be in accordance with the Ultimate Principle of Man and, on the other hand and

negatively, to enlighten people as to right and wrong, to keep the country under control and to bring peace to the world. In debate, name and reality must be completely in correspondence. The solutions of the three confusions given by Hsun-tze in fact are examples of a standard debate. However, his interpretation of the debate is always confined to the realm of his moral philosophy. Therefore he says that there are cases on which a Conscientious Man does not debate. The useless speech which he suggests, for example is in fact that which has no relation to morality²⁴. Therefore it is apparent that the debates of the Conscientious Man or the Sage, to Hsun-tze, are those of morality and not those of pure theoretical knowledge. They are also, precisely speaking, debates of names and virtue and not those of philosophical, conceptual, logical and epistemological concern. In other words, his theory of debate makes little contribution to that of pure thinking or pure knowledge.

As to his principles of the situations which a Conscientious Man does not debate, i.e. when in doubt, or if the topic is not concerned with Human-Mindedness, or if speech is useless, or when he should not speak and should keep silent, they all aim at the moral cultivation of the debator and naturally are valuable in the sense of morality.

The way or method of rectification of names suggested by Hsun-tze, no matter whether it is negatively to solve the three confusions, or positively to establish the arts or principle of debate, reveals the following two limits:

24. For reference, please see p.73.

(1) It examines names and reality merely by experience and common-sense, as a result of which sometimes the scope of examination becomes confined or too narrow.

(2) He suggests that man debates only what is morally relevant so that the semantical meaning of the term 'debate' becomes biased for it is only of moral interest and not of cognitive concern.

His theory of solutions of the three confusions has recently been very enthusiastically discussed by Chinese scholars and some of them consider it to be a great contribution to the study of logic. However, although it has some value in clarification of the idea of names, it makes little contribution to the theory of knowledge in general.

SECTION 5: CONCLUSION

A REASSESSMENT OF HIS THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

In his theory, since Hsun-tze speaks of knowledge originating from man's sensory organs, it is evident that he follows the theory of empiricism which suggests experience as the source of knowledge. However, when he speaks of the knowing and examining of the Mind, it is true that he is not far away from the theory of rationalism which proclaims reason or the rational functioning of the mind as the source of knowledge. Therefore his combination of

viewpoints of the origin of knowledge may be said to be close to that of 'criticism'. By criticism is meant that which reconciles empiricism and rationalism by proposing that both reason and experience play a role in the constitution of knowledge. Nevertheless, in his theory of the Epistemological Mind, he stresses cognition of morality and not that of knowledge, and his theory of the rectification of names is always related to experience and facts of common-sense, thus these two theories indeed lean to empiricism.

Hsun-tze scarcely touches on such matters as the structure of the knowledge-situation or its validity. The special branch of names which he indicates are the names of social institutions and those of man's attributes and they do not include all kinds of names and concepts. The reality is also confined to common-sense existence, and since he always considers that reality must be examined by man's experience, the reality thus indicated is common-sense existence within experience. He does not explain whether external objects can exist independently of man, the knowing subject, and whether it is identical with the data of knowledge. The point is that the problem of the structure of knowledge is not one with which he is concerned for it is not a problem of morality; therefore it is not surprising that he offers no discussion or argument on it.

In his discussion in general, Hsun-tze claims that the scope of possible knowledge of the external world or that of all objects in the universe is boundless and limitless, and that man's

knowledge is limited within his own experience or common-sense. He also holds that man should examine the names and realities of external objects by means of his five sensory organs and the Mind and that if man's sensory organs do not perceive sufficient information about external objects, his Mind will not be able to examine them. However, in his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Man, he believes that a man, when he is united with the Ultimate Principle or when his Mind is an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind, may become aware of a way to deal with the boundless and limitless world²⁵. It is obvious, however, that his theories are primarily and ultimately not pure epistemological inquiries. He does not deal with the questions of the possibility of knowledge, and limits of knowledge, in a professional way as an epistemologist does. In other words, he does not deliberately make an objective investigation or analysis of these issues. One may find it difficult to classify him with such a profession name as a sceptic.

The above is a general criticism on his theories of name and virtue, or theory of knowledge. His attitude to the theory of knowledge is non-radical. The reason for his non-radical position is perhaps that what he devotes himself to is not an objective study of knowledge itself but primarily and ultimately an appeal to morality. Therefore the theories which accidentally involve the theory of knowledge are not well-designed or well-organized, or are merely a skeleton without any flesh. This may explain why Hsun-tze has not argued himself into an extreme position as many others have.

25. A further discussion on p.283.

As to his theory of the Epistemological Mind, it is in the main a rough theory of psychology. His theory of reasoning may be attributed to the study of logic. His theory of method of debate may be considered to be a chapter of moral cultivation. However, Hsun-tze does not intend to cover a full discussion of the theory of knowledge, therefore it is not surprising that he does not pursue his inquiries into the nature, structure, validity and some other philosophical problems in the theory of knowledge.

The traditional development of Chinese philosophy, with the exception of such less significant scholars as the Ming-Chia or the school of names, tends to lay more emphasis on morality and less on pure knowledge; therefore there are quite well-formed studies of morality, while objective and systematical studies of pure knowledge are almost non-existent, not to mention the intentional studies and developments of other sciences in the dominating school such as Confucianism. Hsun-tze is a traditional Confucianist and a moralist; thus it is natural that he cares only for morality and slightly despises the studies of pure knowledge. It is perhaps too demanding to expect his theory of knowledge to construct a system of epistemological studies, and in fact his theories in this field are sufficiently outstanding for his time. In his discussion there are sections which could possibly have led him to a study of pure knowledge and pure thinking; however, he misses or perhaps gives up the chances altogether. It may be because the studies of pure knowledge and pure thinking were not the most urgent business for a philosopher at that time of extreme chaos. In a nutshell, in his theory, morality sometimes becomes an obsession to his thought on knowledge.

In this chapter an attempt to discuss the insufficiency of Hsun-tze's theory, if it can be so considered, of knowledge is made. Although it is evident that Hsun-tze has no ambition to establish a complete theory of knowledge, the fact that his discussions, more or less, have actually touched on some parts of the field of epistemology, psychology and logic, cannot be denied.

CHAPTER VII:

CRITICISM OF HIS THEORIES OF HEAVEN
AND OF THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE

CHAPTER VII:

C R I T I C I S M O F H I S T H E O R I E S O F H E A V E N
A N D O F T H E U L T I M A T E P R I N C I P L E

SECTION 1: HIS THEORIES OF HEAVEN

When man faces the world, the wonder of its geographic structure and the changes of human affairs, he may ask himself: 'What really is it that I see? Is all that I see really as I see it or does it have other faces behind it?'. When he continues to contemplate the essence of the world, its final cause or first principle, he is considering what is historically called the problem of metaphysics. He may ask himself such questions as, 'What is the meaning of life? What is the value of life?'. When he goes on to contemplate the problem of life and livelihood, he is now considering what is called the problem of moral philosophy. The theories of Heaven and of the Ultimate Principle are the opinions of Hsun-tze on the above-mentioned problems.

A: A SURVEY OF HIS CONCEPT OF 'HEAVEN'

Hsun-tze considers that the names 'Heaven' and 'man' are different names with different realities, therefore he elucidates his theory of the different abilities and duties of Heaven and man¹. He points out that if Heaven minds its own business, then 'all things will respectively attain their harmony in order to grow and survive, and their nourishment in order to mature and perfect themselves', and that if man administers his five senses by means of his Mind in order

1. For reference, please see p.79.

to obtain what is most suitable for his life, if he takes food in order to grow his body, if he follows nature and simultaneously overcomes and controls it in order to obtain what is most suitable for his livelihood, then he is considered to have paid proper attention to and well fulfilled his duties for his life and livelihood. Hsun-tze's main purpose in this chapter is to pave the way for his theory of Mind, thus he says, 'the Sage clears his Mind, properly uses his senses . . . thus he will know what he should do and what he should not', and to Hsun-tze, man's duty in principle is to know what he should do and what he should not. In other words, when man's Mind knows and practises the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, he is performing his duty as a man. Since the duties of Heaven and man are different, Hsun-tze suggests that man should pay full attention to his own business and not that of Heaven. After this clarification, Hsun-tze advances to the attempt at solving man's confusions about Heaven; that is to eliminate man's superstitions about natural phenomena, the relations of natural phenomena to human affairs, and divination². What he tries to clarify is that Heaven is not a personified god with faculties of distinction and will or intention, nor a masterly god with supreme powers, that Heaven is nature as it is commonly understood, and it should not be the object of man's superstitions. Hsun-tze thus transforms the relations of Heaven and man from that of master and subordinate to a relationship of equality or balance. In other words, he liberates man from slavery to divinity. Before Hsun-tze, the theories of elimination of superstitions had been established. Confucius says,

2. For reference, please see p.81.

'While one does not know life, how can one know about death?'³

It is obvious that Confucius has no ambition in the business of divinity. However, his presentation of this idea is negative and that of Hsun-tze is thorough, direct, positive and revolutionary. It may be suggested that the anti-theism of Hsun-tze far surpasses that of any of his antecedents. His theory of Heaven is a common-sense view of Heaven which gave a stunning blow to contemporary superstitions, and his clear-minded exposition of the position of Heaven is, though not of metaphysical interest, logically analytic and factually correct.

As to the conception of Heaven, Hsun-tze tries to establish a genuine natural and common-sense Heaven, or more precisely, nature whose constant regularity men can experience. Therefore his concept of Heaven is formed according to the principle of the theory of names. Hsun-tze considers that nature is a physical reality whose existence cannot be denied, but its value is only to supply conditions for life to all things including men and to nourish and preserve them, and it does not have thinking and will⁴. He thus purposely exalts man's position which had been inferior and subordinate to that of nature in his time. He also considers that man not only can externally distinguish things, but also can internally cultivate and nourish his own Nature and Mind so that when his Mind accords with the Ultimate Principle of Man he can, on one hand participate in and assist the changes of nature, and on the other make full use of it as well as control it⁵. Thus the position of man

3. THE ANALECTS, Chapter XI. sect. XII.

4. For reference, please see p. 87.

5. For reference, please see p. 88.

in the universe is gradually heightened, not only as high as that of nature, but in certain aspects, even higher than it. This is the essential meaning of his theory of Heaven.

B: A CONCLUSION THAT HIS THEORIES DO NOT LEAD TO COSMIC
 METAPHYSIC, RELIGION AND SCIENCE

In his theory of heaven, Hsun-tze discusses Heaven or nature from the aspect of man's common knowledge. He does not ask the question of the ultimate cause or the first principle of nature, of how the world is constructed or of how it should be structured, nor does he ask the metaphysical cognitive questions such as whether the essence of nature or the universe is singular or plural, and whether it is material or ideal or spiritual. In fact, Hsun-tze never considers Heaven as the ultimate principle of all things. Therefore his discussion of it is merely that of common knowledge and not that of metaphysics. In short, his theory of Heaven in no way leads to cosmic metaphysics.

On the other hand, Hsun-tze completely denies that behind Heaven there is an all-mighty reality or a supreme god. His theory of Heaven therefore falls within the viewpoint of atheism and his philosophy naturally cannot be developed into a religion in a general sense, i.e. a god-centred religion.

Furthermore, although Hsun-tze clarifies the conception of Heaven, and he advocates that man should observe its natural phenomena in order to make full use of them, what he is concerned

with is research for a practical and utilitarian purpose and not that of pure science. To him, though man exhausts his life in investigation of the vast universe, he certainly does so in vain; and after all, research into Heaven of the universe is just one subject of human knowledge, which there will be experts to study and which is not a compulsory course for all men. In other words, what all men should study is the knowledge of the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, and not that of special subjects such as science or astrology. In Hsun-tze's opinion, man should learn and practise on one hand, the principle of ethical morality, and on the other his social duties: this is the way of promoting man's virtue. Thus his philosophy opens no way to pure science.

The viewpoint of Hsun-tze on Heaven basically adopts that of the traditional Confucianists who do not consider Heaven as the ultimate cause of the universe, who do not believe that it is a supreme being or god, and who do not develop a purely scientific study of it. Traditionally, therefore, there are no theories of cosmic metaphysics, theology, religion and pure science in Confucian philosophy. The reason for this may be that the Confucianists tend to concentrate mainly on morality which, to them, is the ultimate ideal and final goal of man's life, and besides which there is nothing else more important and worthy of concern.

One may therefore say that Hsun-tze's theory of Heaven has no contribution to make to cosmic metaphysics, teleology, or

religion, or pure science. However, his clarifications on the confusions in his contemporary thinking on natural phenomena and their connection with human affairs⁶ are scientifically put forward and their achievements as regards general knowledge are positive.

SECTION 2: HIS THEORY OF THE ULTIMATE MIND

Although Hsun-tze's theory of Heaven does not lead to cosmic metaphysics and teleological religion, his theory of Mind is rich in the spirit of both. This theory may be divided into that of the Mind's knowing the Ultimate Principle and that of its practising the Ultimate Principle, which will be discussed in the following pages.

A: SURVEY OF HIS THEORY OF THE WAY OF MAN AS THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE

Hsun-tze considers that Tao or the Way or the Ultimate Principle is what man metaphorically should walk on, in other words, it is the Way of man⁷. He also considers that the Way of a Sage is the ultimate ideal goal of man. He thus tries to give the word Tao or the Ultimate Principle a sense of objectivity and universality.

It is clear that the Ultimate Principle in Hsun-tze's theory is the Ultimate Principle of Man, or more precisely, morality. He is, among all the scholars and thinkers in the Pre-Ch'in Period,

6. For reference, please see p.82.

7. For reference, please see p.24, note 37.

the most thoroughgoing advocate of 'Man-ism' and 'Moral-ism', since he always emphasizes man as the most important being in the universe and morality as the most important and final goal of man. His theory of the Ultimate Principle of Man or the Way of Man discusses the relations of men and suggests that man should complete his duties of ethical morality and social morality, by means of an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Ming; thus it combines theory with practice and reveals a strong-consciousness of moral humanism⁸. This is a success of his theory of Mind.

B: SURVEY OF THE PROBLEM OF 'MIND AND THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE' AND THAT OF 'THE MIND AND THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE'

Hsun-tze always emphasizes that the Mind should seek its Way or the Ultimate Principle. Is Hsun-tze then suggesting that the Mind and the Ultimate Principle or the Way are two separate existences? This question has in fact been the subject of dispute among Chinese scholars throughout the centuries. It is a common opinion of some Chinese scholars that the Mind and the Ultimate Principle in Hsun-tze's theory are two separate existences⁹. Some scholars also comment that the Mind in Hsun-tze's theory is the observer of the Ultimate Principle and thus the Ultimate Principle is distinct from the Mind and thus the origin of value is also distinct from the Mind¹⁰. To clarify the

8. A further discussion on p.287.

9. Please see the discussion of Prof. T'ang Chün-I's 'THE ORIGIN OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY - The Origin of Hsing, Hong Kong, 1968, pp.47-58.

10. Please see, for example, Lao's A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, pp.283-287.

problem, one should review the two stages of Mind in Hsun-tze's theory. According to Hsun-tze, Tao or the Ultimate Principle originally is not in man's Mind, and it is an objective and self-existent principle which man's Mind may or may not know and realize. That the Mind should know the Ultimate Principle and that man should practise it is the main emphasis of Hsun-tze's theories. However, it is obvious that at this stage, man's Mind is not the origin of this external Ultimate Principle, or the Mind is not the Ultimate Principle. When man's Mind knows it and practises it, the Mind at this stage then possesses the Ultimate Principle within itself; in other words, the Ultimate Principle is in the Mind. More clearly speaking, when man's Mind becomes an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind, it is united with Tao or becomes Oneness in Tao. And at this stage, the Ultimate Mind is the Ultimate Principle. Therefore man's Mind and the Ultimate Principle are two separate existences but the Ultimate Mind and the Ultimate Principle is one reality.

On the other hand, it is logically not necessary for Hsun-tze to establish the notion 'the Rational Principle' or Li which was suggested as the ultimate essence of the universe as well as of man by some later Confucianists¹¹, for it is included in his

11. **宋明理學家** Sung-Ming Li-Hsueh Chia. In the Sung Dynasty and Ming Dynasty, a group of Confucian thinkers who were named 'Li Hsueh Chia' or 'philosophers of the study of the Rational Principle' or simply Neo-Confucianists, showed great interest in the theory of 'The Rational Principle'. Among the chief exponents **程伊川** Ch'eng-I-Ch'uan (1033-1107), **程明道** Ch'eng Ming-Tao (1032-1086) and **朱熹** Chu Hsi (1130-1200), for example, considered that Li is the metaphysical principle of all things, and is also identical with their nature. **陸象山** Lu Hsiang-Shan (1139-1193) asserted that it is identical with man's mind, and **王陽明** Wang Yang-Ming (1473-1529) claimed that the mind is the embodiment of it. In short, these scholars considered that a metaphysical substance or, in their term 'Li' or the Rational Principle is identical with either the nature of man or the mind, and is the origin of the value of all existence. For a detailed discussion of this school, please see, for example, Prof. Mo Tsung-San's 'HSIN TI YÜ HSING TI', Taipei, Taiwan, 1968.

term Tao or the Ultimate Principle as interpreted here.

If asked whether the Mind is the origin of the value of man or whether besides the Mind there is an external existence which is the origin of the value of man, Hsun-tze would unhesitatingly take the former answer, that is: the Mind is the origin of the value of man. Two confusing points left to the later scholars are: (1) Hsun-tze often mentions the importance of rites, righteousness, law and teacher, which many later scholars consider to be his indication on the origin of human value; (2) Hsun-tze's metaphor of a pan of water which some scholars consider to be his opinion on the function of the Mind. As to the first confusion, it is clear that the confusion itself is groundless, if one studies carefully what Hsun-tze has been concerned with. The theory of the Mind is the central theme of his philosophy, and the proper functioning of the Mind is what is his main concern. The assistance of rites, righteousness, law and teacher is important for they are the external means of encouraging man's Artifice. However, it is only when the Mind is in the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, Hsun-tze repeatedly claims that it will receive the benefit of this external assistance. Therefore, it is obvious that in his thought, neither the existing rites, nor righteousness, nor law nor teacher is the direct origin of human value; they are functioning rather like a midwife helping to deliver the baby, i.e. the morally good Artifice, to be born. As to the second confusion, again it is rootlessly grounded. They believe that to Hsun-tze, the function of the Mind in its stage of Great Clearness and Brightness, is to observe all things and their principle. However, the observation of Mind may

include that of the principle of all things, including that of the principle of morality. As Hsun-tze considers that morality is more important than any other knowledge or things, therefore it is clear that in his theory the Mind seeks to observe not only knowledge of all things and their principle, but also and essentially, that of the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality. He considers that the value of man or man's nobility is in his continuous efforts at knowing and practising the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality. In short, what he tries to establish is not only a theory of the Mind's knowing morality but also and more importantly a theory of the Mind's practising morality. Thus the Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind suggested must be considered to be the origin of moral value, and the origin of the value of man. Therefore if commentators consider that in Hsun-tze's theory the Mind is not the Rational Principle or Li, they are interpreting it only as an Epistemological Mind; and it is obvious that either they misunderstand the meaning of Hsun-tze's theory of Mind or their understanding is partial and incomplete. If they consider that the Rational Principle or Li is the quality that makes man different from other animals in the universe and it is the result of the deliberation of man's moral consciousness, then Hsun-tze's theory of Deliberation or the functioning of the Mind may serve the same purpose. Hsun-tze emphasizes that if the Mind, level by level, elevates itself towards morality or moral excellence, then man in his moral world may gradually be able to deal with the changes of the external world and may also internally encourage Artifice to perfect himself. At such a stage, his Mind is the Ultimate Mind which is identical with

the Ultimate Principle or Tao, or in the later commentators' term the 'Rational Principle' or Li.

Therefore the above-mentioned commentary is caused by a misguided interpretation. However, the possible cause for this may lie in the lack of conciseness in Hsun-tze's description of the function of the Mind. In his discussion of the observation of the Epistemological Mind, Hsun-tze gives a clear description, but in his discussion on the Mind in accordance with the Ultimate Principle, there is no detailed definition of an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind, and also there is a lack of description of the interrelation of the Epistemological Mind and the Ultimate Mind. This lack of theoretical conciseness leads to confusion and dispute among the later scholars. However, studying more closely Hsun-tze's theory of Mind, one may say that although he does not strictly distinguish the two notions 'Mind' and the 'Rational Principle' or Li, the relation of the two is implied in his theory. From the point of view of knowledge and learning, Hsun-tze considers that the Mind may function as an observer; nevertheless, from the standpoint of the relations of the Mind and the Rational Principle or Li, he considers that the Mind may unite with the Ultimate Principle or Tao or the Rational Principle or Li, and finally becomes one ultimate reality: the Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind. Thus the Rational Principle or Li is not distinct from the Mind and indeed at this stage it is identical with the Mind. Therefore Hsun-tze does not especially establish the technical term the 'Rational Principle' or Li and offer a discussion of the relations of the Mind to it. It is also clear that in his theory of Mind, Hsun-tze is consistent in his thought. One crucial comment may be that: since Hsun-tze does not clearly explain the relation of the

Epistemological Mind to the Ultimate Mind, his theory of Mind becomes rather loose and ambiguous. He repeatedly emphasizes that only by constant moral practice may the Mind be gradually united with the Ultimate Principle; however he does not clearly give an account of the moral role of the Epistemological Mind, a concise definition of the term the 'Ultimate Mind' and a clear description of its functioning. Since his theory of Mind is not put forward in a well-organized way, (the exposition and discussion of this theory in this thesis has been reorganized in order to make it easier to apprehend) an unconscious theoretical gap such as the one commented on above may easily occur. It is obvious that Hsun-tze has no ambition to carry out a philosophical and conceptual analysis of the terms or concepts he has been using. His suggestions have arisen out of his moral practice or are awakened intuitively in his moral contemplation.

C: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL DELIBERATION

In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze claims that when Man's Nature is stimulated, Deliberation chooses and decides a suitable response and encourages external faculties to exercise Artifice. In other words, the Deliberation is the reflection leading to decision and it includes the whole process of the function of the Mind. In short, it is the highest level of moral functioning of man's Mind. According to Hsun-tze, Deliberation is caused by external stimulation. If this external stimulation gives rise to the processes of the examining and knowing by the Mind, then the Deliberation functions as an epistemological choice and decision. This may lead to his theory of epistemology or that of the Epistemological Mind. If external stimulation gives rise to a moral reflection, then the Deliberation functions

as a moral choice and decision. This may lead to his theory of the Way of the Mind. In other words, the Deliberation originally may be analysed into both by its epistemological deliberation and its moral deliberation; and in fact, the former leads to his theory of an observing Mind, and the latter leads to that of an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind. However, as far as the epistemological deliberation is concerned, whether the decision is appropriate is naturally affected by both the intellectual ability of the individual and his learning and experience. In other words, the epistemological deliberation may or may not be a wise one. On the other hand, where the moral deliberation is concerned, whether the decision is appropriate is mainly influenced by the cultivation and training of man's moral sentiment. In other words, the moral deliberation may or may not be a rational one.

When speaking of Deliberation, Hsun-tze always tends to think that it is a rational and wise reflection leading to the best moral decision. He fails to see that the foundation of moral deliberation is built upon the cultivation and training of man's moral sentiment. This is the insufficient or incomplete aspect of his theory of the Mind. On the other hand, Hsun-tze fails to explain the difference between epistemological deliberation and moral deliberation. In chapter XXI, when he discusses the removal of the Obsessions of the Mind, the Great Clearness and Brightness of Mind and the metaphor of a pan of water, his discussions, in theory, are not clear and concise enough to reveal what he intends to express. He fails to construe the interrelationship of these theories so as to make an intelligible argumentation of his opinion of the Mind. This

leads to misinterpretation by some later scholars and commentators who consider that in Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind, the Mind itself is only capable of epistemological observation or cognition and it does not have a moral capacity. Hsun-tze should certainly be partly responsible for such a misinterpretation as a result of his ambiguity in explaining his opinion.

Therefore the fact that Hsun-tze tends to use rational and wise Deliberation to display the capacity of the Mind is a mistake. The cause of such a mistake perhaps originates from Hsun-tze's successive beliefs on Man's Evil Nature, Transformation of Man's Nature, and good Artifice. He considers that since Artifice is always morally good and it originates from Deliberation, the latter must also be morally good. This is indeed a train of careless and erroneous reasoning or induction. On the other hand, he fails to ask how rational and wise Deliberation is possible before he freely uses the term and its implications. Thus the problem of Deliberation in his theory becomes a leaking hole waiting to be repaired in his system of moral philosophy.

D: A DISCUSSION OF HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MIND,
 MAN'S NATURE AND THE NATURE OF THE MIND

In the structure of his moral philosophy, Hsun-tze makes a distinctive separation of the Mind and Man's Nature; it is apparent that Man's Nature, as it is Evil, is placed at a lower level, whereas Man's Mind, when not obsessed, is placed at a higher level. His separation of the Mind and Man's Nature is unique among classical thinkers. However, it is also logically necessary for him to have

this separation. Hsun-tze clearly indicates that Man's Nature is innately Evil, and that a possible origin of moral goodness lies in the performance of good Artifice or moral education. Thus the internal origin of good Artifice and the internal reception of moral education naturally cannot rely on Man's Nature. As he claims that the reception of moral education and the exercise of Artifice cannot be forced, it is natural that he attributes them to an internal faculty of man which seems to him to be capable of controlling and administering the senses, therefore he identifies the Mind as the over-all internal authority of man. It is logical for him to assume that the Mind and Man's Nature are two distinct realities and not reducible to each other. However, if the fact that the Mind desires to follow the Ultimate Principle can be considered as meaning that the Nature of Mind, a term suggested by the later commentators¹², is good, then is Hsun-tze inconsistent in insisting that Man's Nature is Evil while the Nature of Mind is good?

In Hsun-tze's theory, the function of Mind is to deliberate, to choose, to decide and to encourage the exercise of Artifice. One should look on all these as a single activity which cannot be analysed into its parts. In other words, neither Deliberation nor choice nor decision nor action of Artifice is a complete moral function of the Mind; and only the combination of

12. 心性 or Hsin Hsing, a term popularly used in the late development of the Li-Hsueh or Neo-Confucian movement in which Wang Yang-Ming (1473-1529), one of the chief exponents, identified man's nature (Hsing) with the mind (Hsin), which is also the Rational Principle of the universe.

the four forms its completion. Therefore it is clear that the fact that the Deliberation desires good is merely the first step of its function and at this stage, it cannot yet be decided that the Mind must complete a morally good act only since the Deliberation desires good. If one considers that the Deliberation tends to be morally good and therefore concludes that it is necessary that the Nature of the Mind is also morally good, then one may be charged with over-confidence in one's conclusion. Firstly one may have confused oneself with the terms 'good and bad in quality' or Hao or Huai and 'good and evil in morality' or Shan and Wu. Although Deliberation tends to morality, one may not conclude that the complete functioning of the Mind will also eventually be moral without exception. Therefore the possession of 'possible tendency to morality' of the Mind is a good quality in its potentiality, but such a possession itself is not the good or Shan, and its further justification must wait until its full realization of its potentiality. Secondly, one may have misinterpreted the function of the Mind as though it were its Deliberation only. More clearly speaking, the desire of the Mind to do good is the will of an individual, which in itself does not necessarily reach the stage of practice; in other words, the desire cannot guarantee a successful realization. Therefore the later commentators' argument that in Hsun-tze's theory, the Nature of the Mind is good or Shan have committed either the misuse of language or the misinterpretation of the theory. Viewed from another aspect, a possible supposition of this situation is that of the ideal state of moral good or moral excellence; Hsun-tze may not want to lower his standard to and be content with the level of desire

of the Mind without further indication of its practical complete functioning. In the theory of the Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind it is obvious that the above supposition is not groundless for his suggestion of the Way of the Mind is indeed a procession of practice and effort toward morality, he is certainly not content to rest his philosophy at the shallow level of mere desire to perform morally; and when he mentions the Mind, he counts only its total functioning. In other words, he would like his followers to realize such a desire of the Mind through the level of moral practice or moral effort. This is throughout the essential theme of his moral philosophy. Therefore it is logical for him not to discuss the problem of the Nature of the Mind since, to him, it is not a real problem at all.

This problem in the hands of later Chinese commentators originates from two sides. On one hand, they themselves not only miss the point of Hsun-tze, but also confine themselves within their self-made trap; i.e. (1) they consider that good and evil are the moral content of the so-called 'Nature of Mind' whereas in fact, before the actual activities of the Mind are performed, there is no manifestation of moral good or evil; (2) they insist upon their subjective belief that Man's Nature or the Nature of Mind must be morally good; and (3) they misuse the term 'good and bad in quality' to mean 'good and evil in morality'. However, on the other hand, it is also a careless fault of Hsun-tze. When he describes the function of the Mind he tends to mention only its right sides, i.e. its rational Deliberation, choice, morally good decision and well-intentioned encouragement of the exercise of moral good. This leads to the confusion of the readers.

E: A DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSCENDENT REFLECTION OF THE
 ULTIMATE MIND AND THE FUNCTION OF THE MIND

The Way of Man's Mind should, according to Hsun-tze, externally lead to the Ultimate Principle. However, given that Deliberation knows to stop starting useless searches for knowledge of material objects and that it chooses and decides to seek for the knowledge of the Ultimate Principle, the Mind, in its state of Great Clearness and Brightness, must have a distinctive reflection upon the life of the individual. In other words, man reflects that what his life requires is an objective and universal principle which he may follow and practise through life. The Mind, after its Deliberation, choice, decision and the encouragement of the exercise of Artifice, should reflect consciously upon whether the Ultimate Principle it has been making efforts toward is in correspondence with its original need or intention. For example, if man reflects that his ideal goal of life is to become a Sage, then he starts, putting Hsun-tze's theory into practice, by learning rites, their functions, classifications and practical exercises. He then contemplates the meanings of rites and tries not to allow himself to become merely a formalist. Finally he practises the meaning of rites or their spirit or essence. However, at this stage he should review the result of his learning, contemplation and practice of rites, and also their relation to the perfection of a Sage. In other words, he should consciously reflect upon the content of becoming a Sage and the efficiency and sufficiency of rites in the practice of becoming a Sage. He thus makes a transcendent reflection upon all his practical activities. This is the full range of the function of the Mind.

The transcendent reflection of the Mind is a crucial point in the transition of Man's Mind to the Ultimate Mind. The course of origin of this transcendent reflection lies in a special exercise of man's moral consciousness, an exercise whose object is its past reflection. By this reflection man may be able to confirm or adjust his direction of effort toward his moral ideal. In other words this transcendent reflection leads to a new morally profound state of moral consciousness and besides its Deliberation, choice, decision and encouragement of action as suggested by Hsun-tze, the full functioning of the Mind must also include its transcendent reflection. However, Hsun-tze fails to grasp the principle that man's moral activity is dependent on his moral consciousness, or in other words has not gone sufficiently deeply into the discussion of the transcendent reflection of the Mind. Therefore his discussion of the moral function of the Mind is incomplete, inconcise or perhaps somewhat ambiguous, and this also leads to the incompleteness and laxity of his theory of the Mind.

F: DISCUSSION OF HIS SUGGESTION OF A PRACTICAL METHOD OF
 EXERCISING THE WAY OF MAN BY FULFILLING THE DUTIES
 OF HUMAN RELATIONS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

In chapter XXI entitled 'The Removal of Obsessions of Mind', Hsun-tze explains that man's Mind is always obsessed and he suggests that the way of removing the Obsessions is to let the Mind know, experience and practise the Ultimate Principle. In this chapter, he also discusses the origin of illusions and some different kinds of Obsessions in order to give exhortation to man that his Mind should not be obsessed by these things otherwise he may become a Mean-Spirited Man. However, what Hsun-tze tries to

establish is the theory of the Mind's practice of the Ultimate Principle and not only that of the Mind's knowledge of it. He also suggests the two processes of the Way of Mind: i.e. the state of the man's Mind of the Conscientious Man and that of the Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind of the Sage¹³. The main theme of Hsun-tze's philosophy is the Way of the Sage. Whether it be the Great Confucianist who has no official authority or position, or the Sage-Official who has influence, power and position in the court or government, or the Sage-King who is the ruler of the masses, Hsun-tze gives them the general name of 'Sage'. And, in fact, in the whole book there is no chapter in which he does not mention the appearance, manners, speech, behaviour, of the Sage. He believes that all the attributes of the Sage are demonstrations of the practice of the Ultimate Principle of his Ultimate Mind or Sage Mind. Therefore one may say that the book of HSUN-TZE is meant to establish the theory of the Mind's practice of the Ultimate Principle; in short, it is a theory of moral practice. In this stage man's Deliberation always dwells upon moral excellence, his Artifice is morally excellent, his Mind is an Ultimate Mind and the man is a Sage.

Some readers may complain that Hsun-tze only mentions some attributes of the Sage such as his appearance, manners, speech and behaviour, yet what is the concrete content of moral practice in Hsun-tze's ideal? In the last section of chapter XXI, Hsun-tze

13. For reference please see p.110.

puts forward the principle of man's complete fulfilment of the duties of human relations and social institutions as the concrete content of the practical exercise of a Sage. The duties of human relations are practised by a moral Mind or an ethical Mind or in Hsun-tze's term, 'an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind'; whereas the duties of social institutions, i.e. rites, customs, and laws, should be practised by a morally excellent man with moral cultivation and training or, in Hsun-tze's term 'Artifice'. In other words, the concrete content of moral practice in Hsun-tze's ideal is externally the morally excellent Artifice encouraged by rites, music, teacher and laws, and internally by morally excellent Deliberation together with the transcending reflection or the full function of the Mind; and the ideal moral state of Mind is the state of a Sage. The principle of complete fulfilment of the duties of human relations and social institutions is discussed directly or more often indirectly or implicitly throughout the book. Therefore it would be unfair to Hsun-tze to comment that he does not mention the concrete content of his ideal moral practice. It is to be regretted, however, that his theory of the Mind as a whole appears to be too much scattered in different chapters to form a coherent whole and, in fact, in its present form it may be considered to be not thoroughly well-established. The ancient thinkers in general did not pay much attention to the structural or systematical layout of their thoughts; it seems that they spoke as they thought without regard to systematization or further polishing of what they had said. Therefore in the classical writings it is always to be observed that there is much irrelevant and miscellaneous material in the chapters, and that there are places

where the theorizing lacks compactness and completion. It seems that their common deficiency is to explain a theory without applying a theory of explanation, and this sometimes is similar to the case of explaining logic without logic. Therefore if the reader interprets a passage of Hsun-tze without consulting the whole chapter or even the whole book, his interpretation or conclusion may easily lead to confusion, or his comprehension may not grasp the main theme of Hsun-tze's thought.

G: DISCUSSION OF HIS THEORY OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS MIND, THE
 ULTIMATE MIND AND MYSTICISM

The difference between the Conscientious Mind and the Ultimate Mind in Hsun-tze's theory is, in practice, the difference between the Way of a Conscientious Man and that of a Sage. The Conscientious Mind and the Ultimate Mind are the two levels of the Way of Mind whereas the Way of a Conscientious Man and that of a Sage are the completed processes of the practice of the Ultimate Principle. In his book, Hsun-tze always makes a contrast between the different aspects in order to explain their differences. In short, the Sage is the one who combines himself with the Ultimate Principle; in other words, the Sage himself is in the Ultimate Principle and the Ultimate Principle is in the Sage; therefore his Deliberation and Artifice are always morally excellent. The Conscientious Man is the one who is still in the stage of learning to become a Sage, therefore he is always serious-minded for fear that his Deliberation and Artifice may not meet the requirement of morality. The following example may be helpful in explaining the viewpoint of Hsun-tze. To a beginner in poetry what he cares about most in his composition

may be the form or style, the rules and the rhyme of poetry. He may cautiously do everything according to the rhyme book. Thus he may compose a piece of poetry for the sake of its form, rules and rhyme and forget to put his feelings into it, or he may be over-cautious in its form, rules and rhyme and fail to naturally express his feelings. To a gifted poet, smoothly and naturally, whatever he utters is good poetry which always corresponds excellently with the standard form, rules and rhyme. It is the degrees of practising the Ultimate Principle that differentiate the Sage and the Conscientious Man. The former's practice of the Ultimate Principle has reached the stage where it becomes a part of his natural behaviour whereas the latter has only just started out in that direction.

Some readers may say that the Way of a Conscientious Man is comprehensible; however, that of a Sage is difficult to understand, or rather like a myth. In chapter III of Part I in this thesis, where his theory of the Conscientious Mind and the Ultimate Mind are discussed, an explanation has also been proposed in order to clarify this problem¹⁴. According to Hsun-tze's description, the efforts of a Sage toward morality and his achievement in morality seem profound. However, Hsun-tze is also aware of this possible confusion, therefore he says that only a wise Conscientious Man may see or that only when a Conscientious Man becomes wise through the accumulation of practising the Ultimate Principle may he then see the profundity of the Way of a Sage. In other words, when a

14. For reference please see p.110.

Conscientious Man surpasses his Way and starts practising the Way of a Sage then in his transcending reflection he must be conscious of his efforts and he also clearly sees his goal. Therefore in theory and in practice, Hsun-tze's theory of the Ultimate Mind is possible, or the stage of a Sage is not an impossible dream but a practical reality which all men, with constant efforts, may eventually reach and achieve. Nevertheless, Hsun-tze has also put forward his principle of complete fulfilment of the duties of human relations and social institutions as the concrete content of his ideal moral practice; thus it is apparent that he always considers that moral practice is more important than mere theory. As to the achievement of moral practice, it is bound to the moral cultivation and training of the individual. However, as Hsun-tze has provided the practical method to become a Sage and the outline of the possible state of a Sage Mind, this differentiates his philosophy from mysticism.

H: SURVEY OF HIS DISCUSSION OF A SAGE

In Hsun-tze's theory the characteristics of a Sage may be summarized as follows:

- (i) Thorough comprehension and excellent management of all changes

This point which has been repeatedly mentioned by Hsun-tze is worth noticing. It is the nature of the world or the universe to be changeable, as are human affairs. Hsun-tze admits as regards these changes that man cannot take charge of them, nor can man fully explain them. Therefore the knowledge of all sciences,

to him, is an attempt to analyze or explain some of the changes, and the attainment of these branches of knowledge is the analysis or explanation of some phenomena of the world, including that of human affairs, or that of the universe; yet this knowledge does not provide an objective and universal principle or truth for man to follow and practice throughout his life, nor can it give a full explanation of the changes as a whole. The Sage, Hsun-tze's ideal moral image, is characterized by his thorough comprehension and excellent management through all changes. It is clear that the knowledge of a Sage certainly is not that of pure science nor is his comprehension of the changes that of the physical principles of the changes. All a Sage knows is an unchangeable principle, i.e. the Ultimate Principle or morality, and he deals with all changes with it. Therefore Hsun-tze's statement that the Sage knows and successfully deals with all things may become intelligible if it is interpreted as follows: If a Sage practises morality, then he always enjoys the great freedom of his Mind - and in fact the only freedom of man - and although he is among all the changes of human affairs, of the world or universe, he will understand that they can do no harm to him or his moral effort. In other words, when the Sage keeps his Mind in a state of Great Clearness and Brightness in order to be receptive and attentive to morality, he will not be changed or bothered by external changes. Therefore with his one unchangeable principle, i.e. morality, he may have thorough comprehension and excellent management of all changes in a special way. That is to say, a Sage devotes himself to morality and he may in practice neglect the external changeable world and its problems and this is, negatively speaking, the thorough comprehension and excellent management of all changes.

(ii) Ability of knowing the Ultimate Principle and also knowing the principle of all things

In Hsun-tze's theory when the Mind reflects that it should not chase after physical or material objects and be made materialistic by them, and it thus fully functions with devotion to the knowledge and practice of the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, nothing will become a cause of annoyance to it. On the contrary, it may calmly observe all things. In Hsun-tze's ideal the relationship between the Mind, the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality and the universe is that the Ultimate Mind which unifies the Mind with the Ultimate Principle, transcends the physical restraints of the universe and thus enjoys a great freedom in morality. However, the Sage certainly does not possess an overall comprehension or cognitive knowledge of the physical principles of all things. As discussed in (i) a Sage who holds firm to the unchangeable principle or devotion to morality realizes the one principle of all things, i.e. that all things are changeable, and with indifference to the changeable external world, he concentrates his attention on the knowledge and practice of morality.

(iii) His wisdom

According to Hsun-tze, when the Mind is in its Great Clearness and Brightness, it observes all things clear-headedly as an onlooker who watches what is going on with detachment. It also holds firm the unchangeable principle - the Ultimate Principle or morality, in order to understand and deal with all changes. Thus all changes of human affairs, of the world or the universe cannot hinder it and it enjoys a state of great freedom. In this stage it

may, on one hand, participate in and assist the nourishing of the universe and control and use the properties of the world; on the other hand, it may measure and judge natural phenomena which are connected with human affairs and fix them in the most suitable position with the purpose of putting them into full play. In other words, a Sage, on one hand, teaches man not to be confused by natural phenomena and encourages man to improve life by means of them, and on the other, establishes social institutions by means of the objective and universal principle or the Ultimate Principle. This is, in Hsun-tze's term, 'the establishment of a Sage-King'. A Sage certainly is not a god. He only holds firm to his moral ideal and practises it devotedly. Since his moral ideal leads to the complete fulfilment of the duties of human relations and social institutions and is an objective and universal principle which is appropriate to all men, a Sage, practising it thoroughly, may 'measure and judge the function and value of all things, and establish and formulate the great principle (of rites)', (chapter XXI). This is the ultimate and excellent wisdom of a Sage.

These are the characteristics of a Sage in Hsun-tze's theory. The following examples may be helpful in the comprehension of his opinion. The administrative officers of a university, for example, may not be specialists in the studies of literature, science, engineering, etc. However, they are responsible for the organization and the implementation of the business of the university. The same situation may be found in the management of a hospital, factory, business enterprise, etc. Again the president of a country, for

instance, may not be a skilled worker, or farmer, or soldier, nor be professional in any other occupation; however, with his ability as a president of a country, the experts of all occupations follow his ruling. A Sage-King may also not be an expert in any particular field; however, during his rule, he is able to offer official places to suitable persons, and settle the masses according to their abilities in the places which best suit them. However, a Sage and an administrative officer may not be completely similar to each other, for to Hsun-tze, a Sage must rule with his moral excellence rather than his wisdom and ability, whereas a modern administrator must show his ability in management rather than individual moral cultivation, yet they are more or less similar in their function.

From this it is clear that the discussion of a Sage in Hsun-tze's theory is not a theory of mysticism in the sense that it is not capable of verification. What he tries to demonstrate is that the complete functioning of the Mind of a Sage may assist and encourage the development and improvement of human relations and affairs. However, since Hsun-tze lays much emphasis on morality as the only property of a Sage, it is naturally difficult for his theories to develop in the field of pure knowledge and science. Thus when Hsun-tze mentions the characteristics of a Sage, viewed from the standpoint of common knowledge or that of an ordinary man with no experience in the state of a Sage, the theory may seem dogmatic and obscure.

The practical exercise of a Sage is in the complete fulfilment of the duties of human relations and social institutions. In other words, in his practice of morality a Sage is closely related to rites. Therefore Hsun-tze says that man's cultivation and training in morality start from learning rites. What, then, is the relation between a Sage and rites? In chapter I, Hsun-tze says: 'Learning is completed in the reading of RITES'. The later commentators consider that this statement reflects the fact that Hsun-tze does not have a thorough comprehension of Confucius' theory which emphasizes the meaning, not the form, of rites. However, their interpretation is misleading. According to Hsun-tze the proper way of learning morality is initially to learn rites. Rites are the social institutions and moral laws established by man with the purpose of maintaining order and interrelation in human society. Therefore all men may practise rites and completely fulfil their duties to society. However, man may not be content with blindly practising rites without a further inquiry into their meaning. When a man reflects that rites are an initial way of guiding or directing man to achieve the moral excellence of a Sage, he will then understand that to remain at and go no further than formal performance in the formality of rites is wrong; for if man practises rites merely for the sake of rites, the practice itself may become meaningless in morality. Therefore Hsun-tze says in the same chapter that the result of learning is eventually to enable man to become a Sage. If the reader studies his description of the appearance and manner of a Sage he may see that the Sage does not confine himself to the formality of rites. In Hsun-tze's theory, a Sage practises rites with his Sage Mind which is full of Jen or Human-Minded and Ch'ih or wisdom, while in Confucius' theory, a Human-Minded Man or Jen Jen,

his moral man, practises rites with Human-Mindedness. If the theories are compared carefully, it may be found that Hsun-tze's theory seems to be a further development of that of Confucius. Hsun-tze also repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the principle of rites. Therefore it is confusing to say that he does not have a thorough comprehension of Confucius' theory of rites.

I: THE VALUE OF HIS THEORY OF THE ULTIMATE MIND

The meaning and value of Hsun-tze's theory of the Ultimate Mind or the Way of Mind is profound and significant. A discussion follows here to reveal its value in moral philosophy, its meaning in correspondence with religion and its value in ethical metaphysics.

(i) Its value in moral philosophy

Hsun-tze's theory of an Ultimate Mind and his theory of an Epistemological Mind compose the theory of Mind. He indicates that the reason for the Mind's knowing and practising the Ultimate Principle depends on its Deliberation, he then develops his whole theory to its climax: the moral ideal - the state of a Sage mind; the ideal moral personality - the Sage; and the moral practice - in theory, the Way of the Mind, and in practice, the complete fulfilment of the duties of human relations and social institutions. All these developments are direct extensions of the function of the Mind. In other words, the value of his theory of Mind lies in his emphasis upon the importance of the function of the Mind. It is clear that, to him, the Mind is the origin of moral value or the value of life¹⁵.

15. For reference, please see p.267.

In the process of the Way of Mind, Hsun-tze always emphasizes the continuous efforts of moral cultivation and training of the individual. The Mind promotes itself level by level from its state of Obsessions to that of Great Clearness and Brightness and finally to that of a Sage by means of its continuous and conscious efforts towards moral excellence. This may be considered to be his theory of value. His concern with man and morality forms a significant and influential account of moral humanism in his time. It is also the value of his theory and its contribution to moral philosophy.

In conclusion, in his theory of the Mind, the full moral functioning of the Mind in order to encourage moral Artifice operates directly within the agent. Hsun-tze lays emphasis on the moral effort of man, and on one hand he points out that Man's Nature is Evil with the purpose of warning man to be conscious of his own innate defects, and on the other he also claims that man's Mind may easily be obsessed in the hope of instructing man to maintain a Great Clear and Bright Mind. All Hsun-tze's effort is to encourage man to be self-conscious, self-strengthened and self-improved in order to elevate himself to the state of moral perfection. Hsun-tze's theory thus reveals a strong sense of moral humanism which must be considered a success of his theory. As to how his theory of the Mind is significant in his time, this is a historical question which will be discussed in the Epilogue¹⁶.

(ii) Its meaning in correspondence with religion

Religion, in general, deals with the relationship between man and the supreme being or reality. In theory, if one considers

16. A further discussion of his contribution of moral humanism to the spirit of Chinese culture in p.381.

or believes that this supreme being or reality is a supernatural being or beings, with its or their supernatural ability or abilities, and that man can imitate it or them in order to be analogous to it or them and man can spiritually communicate with it or them; yet man can never become a supernatural being or take its place, then one is thinking in terms of the theory of 'supernaturality and man'. If one considers or believes that this supreme being or reality is a transcendent reality, which is surpassing all realities, and that man, through continuous efforts of practice toward it may eventually become this transcendent reality, then one is thinking in terms of the theory of 'transcendancy and man'. In order for these two theories to be called religion(s), they must fulfil the following points which might be suggested as the structure of religion.

(1) Belief in this supreme being or reality, which on one hand is objectively and necessarily the ultimate source of the universe, which surpasses the natural or physical world, and on the other hand, surpasses man's nature.

(2) Through continuous efforts of practice towards belief in this supreme being or reality, man may communicate with it, imitate it, or become united with it.

(3) The type of practice may be either through mental experience such as meditation or physical experience or both. However, the practice must be recognized or identified by an organization of a social group bound together by the above belief, which possesses its institutions, rites and basic doctrines or prohibitions.

Religion based on the theory of 'supernaturality and man' is found in the western traditional religions, or religions in general; such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam. The theory of 'transcendency and man' is found in the philosophy of Pre-Ch'in Confucianism and that of the Mahayana or 'Great Vehicle' schools in Buddhism. However, in Pre-Ch'in Confucianism, although Confucius and Mencius mention that man may be united with Jen or Human-Mindedness, which is believed to be the supreme reality or the transcendent reality, or in the case of Hsun-tze, that man may be united with the Ultimate Principle or Tao which is also believed to be the supreme or transcendent reality, none of them directly conclude (though they may have implied) in their theories that man at a certain stage is the supreme reality. Therefore their theories may be considered to be the theory of 'transcendency and man' in a negative sense. In the case of the 'Great Vehicle' schools in Buddhism, their emphasis is always laid upon one belief, the belief that man may become 'The Awakened One' or a Buddha, who is a supreme being; and all their theories flourish from this belief. Therefore their theories may be regarded as the theory of 'transcendency and man' in a positive sense. However, what makes the Pre-Ch'in Confucianism not a religion in a strict sense and what makes Buddhism a religion? The answer is that Buddhism is an organization of a social group bound together by its belief, which possesses its own institutions, rites and basic doctrines and prohibitions for a Buddhist monk or nun as well as for a Buddhist fellow believer, and that Pre-Ch'in Confucianism is a theory without organization. Therefore Buddhism is a religion whereas Pre-Ch'in Confucianism is not.

If the feelings or motions of self-interest such as utter dependence, awe, fear of punishment and damnation, gratitude for mercy and protection, or perhaps hope of salvation, etc. are excluded, the source of man's religion ideally stems from the following. Man has a feeling or desire or a need to have his life be in communication with a supreme being or reality purely because he believes that it is where truth and moral excellence originate, and he commits his feeling or desire or need to an objective and universal supreme being or reality through the practice of knowing, understanding and believing it. He then from this commitment, receives a revelation which he believes to be sanctioned by the supreme being or reality. Through continuous practice of certain forms, he believes that his life may directly communicate with the supreme being or reality and that in this communication, his initial feeling or desire or need may reach the state of absolute satisfaction. This process may be considered to be a religious one. However, when man actually participates in a certain religious group or society, or he himself creates one, it may be concluded from such an involvement that this man is a religious believer or he has a religion. In this stage, his initial feeling or desire or need is a religious feeling, his commitment becomes a religious belief and the revelation, a religious ideal, The supreme being or reality becomes a centre of his religion, and the various forms of practice as means of communicating with the supreme being or reality are religious practices. Thus the value of a religion, ideally speaking, is threefold:

- (1) Viewed from the standpoint of the individual, religion in general fulfils man's feeling or desire or need to communicate with a supreme being or reality.

(2) Viewed from the social viewpoint, religion usually serves as a metaphysical basis of social morality.

(3) In its emphasis upon practice, religion always is a great assistance to man's self-cultivation although the autonomy of morality lies in man himself and the motive of man's activity in ethical morality should exclude the influence of religion.

The discussion so far may have established some points in order to examine the value of Hsun-tze's theory of the Ultimate Mind in correspondence with the spirit of religion. His theory of the Ultimate Mind is that of 'transcendancy and man'. One may consider his theory in the following way: If a man has a feeling or desire or need to have his life in communication with a supreme being or reality, his feeling or desire or need, in Hsun-tze's terms, is a rational Deliberation. In his commitment to an objective and universal supreme being or reality which, in Hsun-tze's terms may be called the 'Ultimate Principle', man attains a revelation as his religious ideal, which in Hsun-tz's term may be called the 'state of a Sage'. Through continuous efforts of practice, which in Hsun-tze's term is the process of the 'Way of Mind', man eventually communicates with the supreme being and feels absolutely satisfied, which is in Hsun-tze's theory, described as follows:

'The Sage whose Ultimate Mind is tightly united with the Ultimate Principle, is pleasant and contented in his thought and does not need to force or restrain his behaviour.' (chapter XV, 8)

However, Hsun-tze's theory of the Ultimate Mind certainly need not necessarily follow the above interpretation. What it has

been attempted to explain is that his theory which is that of 'transcendency and man' is rich in a religious sense, and that although it does not eventually lead to the creation of a religion, it is in correspondence with some of the values of a religion and its achievement in morality, moreover, is more than that which a religion can achieve. The reason why his theory of Ultimate Mind does not lead to the creation of a religion is perhaps that, (1) Hsun-tze considers that the Ultimate Principle should be practised by all men and therefore the world of men may be considered to be a large social group or organization to practise it, thus the form of organization which is essential to the structure of religion is obscurely implied though not clearly applied; and (2) he considered that enlightening teaching is important to man when he is in the stage of knowing and understanding the Ultimate Principle while individual experience of the Ultimate Principle should be left to individual practice. In other words, the institutions, rites, doctrines or prohibitions of religion are not necessary. It is clear that the philosophy of Hsun-tze tends to exclude itself from religion, and in fact, most of the philosophies in the Pre-Ch'in Period have this tendency. Thus not only is there no teleology or theism among them, but also almost none of them created a religion.

(iii) Its value in ethical metaphysics

The purpose of metaphysics is generally regarded as being primarily the study of the ultimate cause or first substance of things in the universe. In his theory of the Ultimate Mind, Hsun-tze considers and believes that the Ultimate Principle or Tao is a

transcendent reality and the ultimate source and substance of the universe. What then is the value of his theory of the Mind in metaphysics? An examination may be carried out as follows:

(1) The Ultimate Principle in Hsun-tze's theory originally indicates three sources, namely: the Ultimate Principle of Heaven, the Ultimate Principle of Earth and the Ultimate Principle of Man. In other words, the Ultimate Principle is like a trinity, three in one. According to the name, the Ultimate Principle is a general name, whereas that of Heaven, that of Earth and that of Man are its classified names. Since morality is always the main theme of his philosophy, and it seems that he has little interest in a theory of metaphysics, he often reduces the usage of the term 'Ultimate Principle' to the meaning of the 'Ultimate Principle of Man'. However, it is clear that although Hsun-tze exalts the meaning of the Ultimate Principle of Man, he does not deny the existence of the Ultimate Principles of Heaven and Earth, or in short, the Ultimate Principle of Nature.

(2) Since Hsun-tze mentions that all things are a part of Tao, the term 'thing'¹⁷, or 'physical object' seems to be, in his theory, the constituent of the Ultimate Principle of Nature. Therefore some recent commentators suggest that Hsun-tze's viewpoint on cosmology is close to materialism in the sense that matter is the fundamental constituent of the universe. However, it is apparent that Hsun-tze never encourages the spirit of materialism in the sense that attaches supreme value to material goods or that human actions and cultural changes are determined solely or largely by material or

17. 物 Wu.

economic factors. On the contrary, owing to his special interest in moral issues, he shows an attitude of considering the knowledge of all physical objects to be relatively worthless. To him, the Mind may be completely united with Tao or become Oneness in Tao, and in that stage it is a metaphysical substance which identifies itself with Tao, the transcendent reality which pervades the entire universe. One may thus say that in this aspect Hsun-tze's viewpoint on the Mind is close to pure idealism or spiritualism in metaphysics. However, although in putting forward his theories he sometimes tends to adopt the viewpoints of both materialism and idealism, he does not then consider that the Mind and material matter are in opposition to each other. As to his theory of Mind and Man's Nature, he strictly distinguishes between them as two different realities and in this way he seems to imply their opposition to each other. However, he never proposed a detailed analysis of the interrelationship of these terms: the Mind and the external physical objects (things or Wu) and the Mind and Man's Nature. He simply discusses what is of greatest concern to him and puts aside conceptual argumentations or analyses. These may be generally considered important in philosophizing but, to him, they are a less urgent business with less practical value in his time.

(3) Hsun-tze considers that the Ultimate Principle of Nature has nothing to do with human affairs, and that it is treated in the realm of general knowledge, therefore he does not take further his study of its epistemological reality. Although he says that nature has its regularity, he also claims that man may control it and use it. To Hsun-tze, the knowledge of nature can be attained by common-sense

or experience, and it therefore has nothing supernatural about it and it is also not metaphysical. In this aspect his viewpoint about the universe is close to naturalism which holds that the universe requires no supernatural cause and government but is self-existent, self-explanatory, self-operating and self-directing. His view has to be contrasted with the theory of determinism that all events in the physical universe are determined and conditioned by certain laws or causes. In his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Man, he claims that the aim of man's practice of the Ultimate Principle is twofold: externally to completely fulfil his duties in human relations and in social institutions, and internally and ultimately to reach the stage of a Sage. In other words, all moral efforts aim at the good or the stage of a Sage. Hsun-tze's viewpoint in his theory of the Mind is also close to teleology.

(4) The Ultimate Principle of Nature, in Hsun-tze's theory, is not a supernatural being or a transcendent reality. Although it is not clearly defined by Hsun-tze, he seems to imply that it is a collection of natural phenomena with its own laws of movement or, in his words, its regularity of which man, with his common-sense, may have some knowledge. Its reality is not then further investigated by Hsun-tze. However, it is obvious that he certainly does not consider it to be a supreme being or reality. In other words, his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Nature is atheism. As to his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Man, Hsun-tze elevates the position of man who, when he reaches the stage of a Sage, is believed to be able to measure all things. In other words, this theory is also atheism.

(5) Since Hsun-tze considers that nature has no intention or will, his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Nature is neither necessitarianism nor determinism. As to his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Man, man has absolute freedom in his choice of practising morality; in other words, his moral activity is independent and free from the determination of causality. Therefore it is close to the viewpoint of libertarianism or indeterminism.

(6) In his theory, Hsun-tze does not elaborate an epistemological investigation of the Mind. His main interest lies in the discussion of the Way of the Mind which is closely related to the practical aspect of man's moral life. Therefore it is not surprising that one cannot find any further epistemological investigation of the Mind or inquiry into its nature or its 'faculties' or structure. He does not extend his theory to the inquiry of the philosophical issues of the Mind such as its very possibility of existence and its relation to the body.

To summarize the above, although the Ultimate Principle in Hsun-tze's theory is a kind of trinity, he is only interested in the Ultimate Principle of Man upon which his moral philosophy is founded. Therefore his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Nature is irrelevant to metaphysics, or in other words, it offers no contribution to metaphysics. However, in his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Man, Hsun-tze believes that to completely fulfil the Way of Mind is the complete fulfilment of the Ultimate Principle of Man, and that the Ultimate Principle of Man is the basic principle of all human affairs. In other words, morality is believed to be

the ultimate condition of the human world. It is in terms of ethics that he defines the traditional Confucian notions of the Ultimate Principle or Tao which is believed to pervade the universe; and he sees that metaphysical principles have an ultimately moral significance. Thus his theory of the Mind is in correspondence with the essence of metaphysics. And the theory of the Ultimate Mind may be regarded as the metaphysical foundation of his moral philosophy. His theory of the Ultimate Mind leads to that of ethical metaphysics, and it establishes the metaphysical basis for his moral philosophy. This is also the value of this theory.

J: CONCLUSION

The main achievement of Hsun-tze's theory of Mind is in his analysis of man's continuous efforts in moral practice. As to his description or outline of moral practice and moral effort it certainly has its value. There are a great many philosophers, in the past or present, who try to outline or describe their experience in morality in various ways. However, whether through these ways of practice, man may eventually achieve moral excellence is a crucial point. In Hsun-tze's theory, when the Mind proceeds to the complete fulfilment of duties of human relations and social institutions, it will then perfect itself with moral excellence. His theory may universally be applied to all men. In other words, his advocacy of moral practice and moral effort reveals the spirit of objectivist ethics which argue that ethical truths are not relative and certain actions are right and good for all individuals alike. His great concern with man and his moral life or his advocacy of 'man-ism' and 'moral-ism' also reveal in his theory of Mind a commendable spirit of moral humanism.

Secondly, although his theory of Mind does not become a religion, it is closely in correspondence with the meaning and value of religion.

Thirdly, since the theory of the Ultimate Mind is the metaphysical basis of his moral philosophy, it may be considered that it has value as ethical metaphysics.

However, what is regrettable is that there are weaknesses in his theory. Firstly, since his discussion on the subject is scattered and not systematical, and his language is often ambiguous and confusing, the reader may find it difficult to comprehend. Secondly and vitally, since he is merely concerned with moral practice, he leaves on one side ambiguous terms or philosophical issues without any discussion or investigation, which are essential to the understanding of his theory of moral philosophy. That is perhaps why there have been few followers of his philosophy and there have been so many objections against and misinterpretations of his theory of Mind. On the other hand, what he has been describing or establishing is a moral ideal recommended as the best way of life or a guidance of moral activities, and he fails to make an objective analysis or cognitive study of such issues as the primary or fundamental moral concept, the scope of moral action, moral judgements and the conditions for moral agency. In short, his moral philosophy which pertains only to the practical aspect of moral life or to the ideal of becoming a Sage is therefore theoretically incomplete. Most of the ancient Chinese philosophers tend to speak of morality as their own experiences

in moral activity, and it seems that they seldom treat morality as an objective subject for investigation or analysis. This is perhaps because traditionally they attach much importance to practice and subjective experience and they seldom commit themselves to thoughts of pure knowledge such as logic or epistemological inquiry and to objective analysis of certain philosophical issues such as the issues of human nature and the mind. Hsun-tze is a typical example of them in this respect.

CHAPTER VIII:

CRITICISM ON HIS THEORIES OF POLITICS

CHAPTER VIII:

C R I T I C I S M O N H I S T H E O R I E S O F
P O L I T I C S

Hsun-tze's theory of politics is basically an extension of his moral philosophy; it is a theory of the projection of the virtue of the Sage upon the external and the distant world. The purpose of his moral philosophy is to establish primarily and positively, an ideal personality, i.e. a Sage. However, he considers that a Sage who is morally and politically excellent, should become a king; and, in his belief, a Sage-King, establishing detailed standards of rites and righteousness in order to educate and cultivate his officials and people practically, will turn a society into an ideal state or in his term, 'A Society of Ultimate Fairness'. From this, one may find that the purpose of his theory of politics is to prescribe the way to realize his ideal state, i.e. the Sage-King is the only one who can lead the country towards A Society of Ultimate Fairness. Thus the description of a Sage-King becomes the main theme in Hsun-tze's political thought and also becomes the core of the following discussion. Certain problems arise from his discussion of a Sage-King.

SECTION 1: THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE FROM THE IDEAL OF
A SAGE-KING

To Hsun-tze, the ideal 'cabinet' or the ideal administration of a state must consist of a Sage-King with his Sage-Officials, implementing a continuous series of 'virtuous policies'. A Sage-King thus becomes eminently important in Hsun-tze's political theory. In

fact nearly one third of his book is devoted to the discussion of a Sage-King and among the chapters there are ten chapters (from VII to XVI) which are particularly rich in information about his political theories. This concentration on political theory is a result of the chaotic world of his times, Hsun-tze as well as many other contemporary philosophers, on one hand endeavours to save the world, and on the other hopes to impress the contemporary kings or feudal princes with his theory so that he may be employed by one of them. In theory, this line of thought may be considered to lead to the concrete realization in society of an Ultimate Mind of a Sage, or the projection of the Ultimate Mind to the external and the distant world. His theory of the administration of a Sage-King is inherited from the political theory of Confucius. However, this theory, as a whole must meet the following criticisms.

A: THE PROBLEM OF THE VIRTUE AND POLICY OF A RULER

The main problem of Hsuntze's theory of administration by a Sage (and in fact one may say the main problem of the traditional Confucian theory of politics) lies in his confusion of the different realms of morality and politics. In his ideal, a Sage-King with his moral and political excellence administers the world and the world will then attain 'the ultimate success in politics and education' (chapter XII). This success in politics and education should be, according to Hsun-tze, attributed to the efforts of the Sage-King. However, the following two problems immediately emerge:

(i) The moral and political excellence of the Sage-King

It is obvious that politics cannot be founded only upon the virtue of one man. Virtue, in a narrow sense, is man's possession of a profound knowledge of morality, a sense of responsibility in morality and a well-cultivated practice in morality. Politics is a science which basically aims at the organizing of social good, and historically serves as an analysis of the relationship between the authority or government or king and the people or the masses. Morality often involves the ethical and social relations of the agent to other people, and such relations can be peacefully and genuinely maintained through a common moral ideal and practice. Custom and social laws, for example, are a means of maintaining social morality, and the training and education of man's moral sentiment and moral consciousness are ways of achieving ethical morality. Politics often involves the struggle of the masses for legal rights such as public interest, and a guarantee of the rights and freedom of an individual's life and livelihood under those in political power and their search for improvement of the livelihood of the individual and better conditions in society. However, if a country is to maintain a state in which all men may enjoy these equal legal rights then firstly objective and concrete laws must be established, including laws delegating the right and power of the people to restrict or abolish those in political authority if ever they should abuse power. Secondly and more importantly, the men in its realm must be educated to be highly politically conscious; i.e. on one hand to know their rights and freedom in the country and to understand the proper use of them, and on the other to know their duties to their country.

In Hsun-tze's theory, the best policy is the extension of the king's excellent virtue. If a king, on one hand possesses his moral ideal and practises it honestly, and on the other endeavours to provide his subjects with social benefits and a sure guarantee of their lives and livelihood, he may then be said to be morally and politically excellent. However, this is often a case of good fortune for the kingdom which has come about by chance. In practice, it seems that more often, in Chinese history, the rulers and politicians neglected their morality in their policies, not to mention morality in their private lives. In those cases, how can the situation be rectified? It is practically wrong to insist that a morally excellent man must become a king, a ruler, or a politician, for he may not be prepared to exercise his moral excellence in politics or even if he is prepared to do so, his moral excellence may not be successfully transformed into a practical political excellence. Therefore one may conclude that Hsun-tze's political theory is based upon the optimistic viewpoint that a Sage-King will solve all the problems of the country. The main point here is that he always starts from the assumption that a Sage-King is the only saviour of all men. In other words, there is, to him, no other way to save the chaotic world or to put the world in progress towards an ideal society of ultimate peace and justice. However, such an assumption is (1) impractical, because in history the birth of a Sage-King is not guaranteed; and (2) not thoroughgoing, because the mass political consciousness and a juristical state are the primary concern of a theory of politics, while the law-implementating body or government or professional personality is a secondary concern.

Hsun-tze does not discuss such problems as the realization of mass political consciousness, and practical means to attain legal rights or rights of social benefit and a guarantee of the rights and freedom of people's lives and livelihood. Therefore his theory of the moral and political excellence of a Sage-King which is not coherently put forward is not a complete theory of politics.

(ii) Success in politics and education

According to Hsun-tze a Sage, through his continuous efforts in moral-cultivation, reaches a state of moral perfection, and with his virtue helps and educates other people to complete the process of becoming a Sage. The result of his success in moral education is that many people thus are encouraged and assisted by his moral teaching and finally may become Conscientious Men or Sages. When a Sage becomes a king, it is obvious that he has more chance to enlarge his circle of education and assistance and the number of his beneficiaries. In other words, the success in politics and education of a Sage-King results in his people becoming virtuous, yet they may not obtain a sure guarantee of rights and freedom in society. Therefore the success of a Sage-King and the benefit of his people are more concerned with morality than politics. It is clear that a Sage-King may be extremely successful in the policy of moral education, but it is doubtful if a successful policy in moral education can amount to a complete success in politics. In other words, though politics may, in some aspects, be involved in some moral issues such as justice, it does not simply end in morality. It certainly embraces a larger scope. Thus the sufficiency of the moral excellence of a Sage-King in his political administration again is put on crucial trial.

Hsun-tze admits that there are people whom the Sage-King fails to educate. In chapter XVIII, he mentions that the fact that Chu and Hsiang refused to change their Evil Nature is not the fault of Yao and Shun but the fault of Chu and Hsiang themselves¹. However, it is an undeniable fact that there are numerous specimens of Chu and Hsiang in the world. How does a Sage-King deal with these trouble-makers in order to guarantee the rights and interests of millions of honest citizens? Hsun-tze might say that millions of honest citizens will complain about the outlaws and accuse them, and the Sage-King will eliminate or punish them. This suggestion may be applicable in a small country with a small population, however in a large country with a large population even a Sage-King with his crowds of Sage-Officials may not thoroughly observe and understand all the events in the country if a well-organized government with concise laws is not established; and thus as regards those who are the enemies of the public, in what way may the citizens make their complaints about them or accuse them, or by what means can the Sage-King eliminate or punish them? It is clear then that the role of laws cannot be reduced to the moral personality of the Sage-King for the virtue of the Sage-King often cannot help much in politics. It is acceptable that the best way to transmit an important piece of information, no matter whether it be concerned with moral or non-moral issues, to the public is by means of educating the people, yet laws must be provided if the people refuse to follow the education. Laws may not necessarily be omnipotent, but at least it must be independent from any external power and possess indivisible sovereignty. Thus besides education in general, not merely restricted to morality, all kinds of laws, such

1. For reference, please see p.39.

as laws of the rights of citizens, laws to be obeyed by different classes of people, including the ruling class, laws of restriction of the power of authority and fiduciary trust of the masses in their government, must also be dealt with in the realm of politics. Although Hsun-tze does mention laws as one of the sources of Artifice he does not clearly analyse which laws are to be included in his thinking, nor does he give a detailed discussion, or even an outline, of the political function of laws rather than its moral role. This is another insufficiency of his theory of a Sage ruling by virtue and virtuous policy. In short, Hsun-tze insists that a king must educate his people up to the level of his own moral excellence. In other words, Hsun-tze advocates 'the policy of absolute or despotic morality'. However, in theory and in practice, this policy has its limits. In fact, in history, other than the legend of Yao and Shun in the pre-historical period, the success of this policy has never been heard of.

B: THE FUNCTION OF A RULER IN THE STATE AND AMONG THE MASSES

The subjects of politics are principally twofold: the state and the masses. The main components in the formation of a state are the masses; the masses therefore are the substance of the state. One of the functions of the ruler, whether he is a king of the old type or a president of modern times, is to lead the state or the society to a stage of ultimate harmonization. To the state he is a representative of the masses; to the masses he is a guarantor of the efficiency of laws which protect the rights and freedom of their lives and livelihood, and he also is an honest executor of appropriate

policy. However, all the rights and power he possesses as a ruler must come theoretically from the state and the masses, and practically from the laws of the state. To Hsun-tze a Sage-King is the substance of politics and the saviour of the masses; therefore the term 'politics' simply means, to Hsun-tze, the administration of a Sage-King. Hsun-tze fails to discuss the function of a ruler in the state and among the masses, nor does he go further in a discussion of the relationship between the state and the king. One may say that Hsun-tze is discussing politics in terms of morality and he is not tackling politics on its own terms. In short, his view of the function of a king with regard to the state as well as to the masses is not clearly presented. However, it is perhaps because of the special political situation in his time, when the king is the most powerful man in politics that Hsun-tze has to design his theories strategically so that he may recommend his moral philosophy to the king in a gentle and smooth way. Therefore he would rather not touch on such issues as the political role of a king, or when he has to confront such issues, he would put them in an oblique fashion or in an amiable way. This is perhaps an historical difficulty of most Chinese thinkers living under an absolute monarchy.

C: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RULER AND THE MASSES

Hsun-tze considers that the relation of the ruler to the masses is like that of the parent to his children, or the Heavenly God to his creation². Such an unbalanced position between the ruler

2. For reference, please see p.150.

and the masses has its historical origin. In the traditional Confucian theory of politics, the state is like a big family, the king is like the father, and the masses, the children. What is important in this family is the virtue of the father, and with his virtue and influence the whole family will naturally have no problems. The king is also described as a Heavenly God because his moral excellence reaches a state of perfection and his political achievements are great, and to the masses he is as perfect as the Heavenly God. Since the Confucianists consider that the Sage-King achieves the highest political success and he should be admired, respected and adored as the Heavenly God, they deliberately describe the Sage-King as a god-like figure when they put forward their moral and political theory to their contemporary kings. However, they fail to reflect that, as time changes, there are all kinds of complicated problems such as problems of economics, and sociology, likely to occur in the relationship between the state and the masses, the problems which the ancient Sage-King might never encounter and it is doubtful whether with his virtue only, the ruler may adequately deal with. In short, the Confucian discussion of the relationship between the king and the masses is historically an unbalanced one. According to Hsun-tze's theory, the masses are also described as a crowd of Mean-Spirited Men and the world is an assembly of these Mean-Spirited masses. Since the masses are stupid and unenlightened, they commit crimes of all kinds; and thus in Hsun-tze's thinking, a Sage-King must be born in order to save them, to educate them and to rule them. To Hsun-tze, the masses are mainly divided into two groups, namely: (1) the ignorant masses, and (2) the rioters; the former are those whose Evil Nature is displayed in a

slight degree while the latter are those who fully display their Evil Nature. The rebels must, in his theory, be eliminated or punished by the Sage-King, while the ignorant masses must admire the Sage-King and they must automatically be submissive to him. They, the ignorant masses, are like a clump of wild plants which sways in the wind. If there is a Sage-King in the country, they will survive just as the wild plants grow in the warm wind of spring; if there is a tyrant on the throne, they will suffer or die just like plants in an evil stormy wind. In other words, the masses are a crowd of poor creatures who are entirely dependent on the authority of the king. However, whether or not all the masses are merely either rebels or ignorant is the first disputable point of Hsun-tze's theory. He could be accused of being too dogmatic in his groundless belief. In short, the unbalanced relationship between the ruler and the masses described by Hsun-tze is, for a modern viewpoint, feudalistic and anachronistic.

D: THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF POLITICAL POWER

Supposing that a Sage becomes the king of a country and that he is capable of shouldering his heavy role then, according to Hsun-tze, the people of the whole country will follow him, he will employ Sage-Officials to assist him, and he will educate his people to become morally good. Thus the whole country will be full of Sages. When the Sage-King dies or is unable to carry on his work, a new Sage-King will succeed to his throne. However, in practice, the following problems must arise:

(1) How do the people of the country follow their Sage-King? There must be a political expression by the masses of approval of the king rather than just a personal loyalty to him. In what way may the word 'follow' be legally expressed and not be just mere words in their thought? This is a question Hsun-tze fails to answer.

(2) Supposing that the whole country is now full of sages, and according to Hsun-tze, the Sage should be the king, therefore all men in the country are qualified to be the king. In practice, if the Sage-Kings are many in the country, for the sake of efficiency of orders and decisions, there must be a Sage-King of all Sage-Kings. How, then, does this 'Sage-King of all Sage-Kings' come to the throne? By a public election or a personal approval of the citizens? Since Hsun-tze has failed to answer the former question it is not surprising that he fails to discuss the latter one.

(3) According to Hsun-tze, Sage-Officials are directly employed by the Sage-King. In other words, the employment of Sage-Officials is entirely dependent upon the wise observation, judgement and decision of the Sage-King, and the Sage-King is absolutely free in the choice of the officials he employs. Thus the ordinary people not only have no right to elect their king, but also have no right to elect their officials. They only have the duty of following authority, and they have no legal right and freedom to express their approval or disapproval of it or to elect, dethrone or dispose of it. This is another difficulty in Hsun-tze's political theories.

(4) In Hsun-tze's theory a Sage-King is expected to take up responsibility in the chaotic world in order to eliminate the

tyrannical and the wicked. However, (a) there is no guarantee that a Sage will take up such a task. If there is no Sage-King to save the world what can the masses hope for? According to Hsun-tze, the masses will be saved only when the Sage-King is ruling; however, in Chinese history, in a system of hereditary monarchy, such an occurrence is never guaranteed; what then can be the guarantee of their lives and livelihood besides the Sage-King? (b) If the purpose of the one who eliminates the tyrannical and the wicked is to seize power and kingship rather than to save the masses from sufferings so that the masses are, as it were, out of the frying pan and into the fire, then when will they be saved from this continuous political pressure? Here, if he goes more deeply into the above question, he may easily bring forward for further consideration the issues of well-founded legally contracted political institutions or governmental or social contract such as the liberal consent or covenant to form a state and to place fiduciary trust in the authority, or a juristic state of legal omnipotence, or another form of political theory, and the question of the political consciousness of the masses. However, Hsun-tze fails to discuss these questions.

To summarize, the failures of Hsun-tze's political theory of the administration of a Sage-King are as follows:

(1) Hsun-tze insists that virtue and politics are one inseparable reality, or that moral and political excellence are necessary characteristics of a ruler, yet such a strict distinction

offers little meaning for the practical problems of politics. Unfortunately he devotes almost the whole of his theory to such a discussion. Therefore this single-minded development of his political theory limits his thought, or becomes an obsession in his thought.

(2) In his theory, the function of a ruler in the state and among the masses is not clearly and correctly discussed. With regard to the relationship between the ruler and the masses, it is a relationship which is politically unbalanced and unguaranteed. This is a further failure in his political discussion.

(3) As to the question of the guarantee of the masses' lives and livelihood in the chaotic world, this is by extension a failure of his theory.

In ancient philosophy, thinkers tended to include politics in the discussion of ethics or morality, and to criticize their political theory with a modern eye is unfair to them. However, to measure a political theory purely from a theoretical viewpoint with objective criteria is what has been attempted, although the practical background which undeniably has greatly influenced the issue and development of the theory is equally appreciated. The fact that in the long political history of China there was no establishment of an objective political contract between the state, the ruler and the masses is a regrettable state of affairs for which most of the Confucianists throughout the centuries who greatly influenced the current of political thought should be responsible.

In conclusion, Hsun-tze's theory of the administration of a Sage-King is a theoretical ideal which, in practice, does not give any guarantee of success in politics and ignores the legal rights of the masses. His failure is connected with the political view of Confucian tradition and ideals, a further discussion of which will be given in the following chapter.

SECTION 2: A DISCUSSION OF THE CULTIVATION OF A KING

In Chinese history, starting from King Ch'i³ of Hsia to the times of Hsun-tze, it was an almost two-thousand-year tradition that the inheritance of kingship followed the ruler of family heredity, that is to say, when the king died or resigned normally his eldest son succeeded to the throne⁴. Hsun-tze well understands that there may be certain difficulties in implementing this theory of administration of a Sage-King under this traditional political institution, he therefore tries to persuade the kings to be morally well-educated. In his book, he repeatedly explains the following two points: (1) If the king keeps to a fair policy and loves his people, the whole country will follow him loyally and obediently, and (2) if the king is tyrannical to his people, the whole country will certainly abandon him. His theories of the moral and political cultivation of a king are the main theme of his viewpoint in politics. The following is an examination of them.

3. 啟 Ch'i, son of Yu. Ch'i succeeded after his father's death and became the second king of Hsia Dynasty (2183-1752 B.C.)

4. In the early Shang Dynasty, the inheritance of kingship followed a different principle, i.e. when the king died his younger brother succeeded to the throne; and if the king had no brother, his eldest son might become king. However, from the last four generations of the Shang Dynasty onward, it was only the eldest son who had the right to the throne.

There are numerous illustrations in Hsun-tze's book to encourage the ruler to be a Sage as well as to warn him not to be a tyrant. A brief summary is listed as follows:

(i) The 'three essential principles': (1) to keep to a fair policy and to love the people, (2) to exalt rites and to respect scholars, and (3) to give high rank to the virtuous and to employ the capable. When a king is morally educated, he will know how to practise these 'three principles'. These are discussed in chapter IX and they may be considered to be an outline of Hsun-tze's political theory. However, according to him, the purpose of these 'three principles' is 'to guarantee the king's security on his throne, honour among his people, and success and fame in the country'. Thus the result of the policy according to the 'three principles' has nothing to do with morality. In other words, the purpose of the king's self-cultivation and moral education is not the wellbeing of his people or his country, but his own interests of security, honour, success and fame as a king. This is an obvious inconsistency caused by either the ambiguity in his thought as to the king's duty to his people or a conscious or unconscious concession to contemporary kings in order to attract their interest to his theories.

(ii) The 'four rules of administration': (1) to be good at nourishing the people, (2) to be good at administering and controlling them, (3) to be good at exalting the capable and virtuous and arranging high official positions for them, and (4) to be good at classifying the people and enlightening them. These are discussed in chapter XII. However, they provide further details of the 'three principles', and they have the same purpose as discussed above,

therefore they fall into the same problem when one examines their purpose.

(iii) The 'five choices of practice' of the king: (1) the practice of the kingly way, (2) that of the way of the mighty and hegemonic leader, (3) that of the way of merely obtaining temporary peace and survival, (4) that of the way of endangering the kingdom, and (5) that of the way of extinction and decay. These are discussed in chapter IX. Hsun-tze insists that a king must choose and practise the first way, i.e. the kingly way. He believes that as a result of such a practice, 'the capable and virtuous man and the wise and sage man will naturally and willingly offer their services, hostile countries will naturally yield to the virtue of the Sage-King, and the country will naturally become wealthy'. However, the word 'naturally' is used in an ambiguous way. Furthermore, in his theory the practical details of the kingly way are not clearly discussed. This gives rise to difficulties when in practice.

(iv) The 'five means' of the king's administration through his officials: (1) rites and righteousness, (2) reliability and trust, (3) exaltation of the capable and virtuous, (4) appropriate bestowal of titles and emoluments to the nobility, and (5) celebration of success and reward of achievement. These are discussed in chapters X and XI. The theory is effective as long as the king is the supreme authority of the state. In other words, Hsun-tze is now speaking on behalf of a king or from the viewpoint of a king, and the purpose of this policy of administering the officials is, on one hand to gain the hearts of the king's inferiors, and on the other hand to

control them by making use of their desire for fame and profit. If a king applies this theory incorrectly, it may become his artificial means or skill in his administration, and even worse, he may become - and in Chinese history often is - a god-like authority who bestows kindness, favour or reward in a supreme way. However, if a king can really keep to the first three means suggested in administering his officials, he may succeed in influencing and overcoming them by his moral goodness as expected by Hsun-tze. And perhaps this is already a great advance in despotic monarchy under the traditional political situation of his times.

(v) The concrete contents of the king's 'fair policy and love for his people' are, Hsun-tze says in chapter IX:

'To choose the capable and virtuous, to employ the sincere and respectful, to promote the dutiful son and the brotherly man, to accommodate the orphans and the widowed, and to supply the impoverished and the poor.' (V, 2)

The first two statements again raise the problem of the way of 'choosing' and 'employment'. In Hsun-tze's theory, the fact that 'choosing' and 'employing' are in the hands of the king and there are no laws of public election is a crucial difficulty. As to the promotion of the dutiful son and the brotherly man to politics, a problem may immediately follow: the possibility of the transition from ethical morality to political ability. In other words, can a man, without training and experience in political administration, shoulder the heavy role of ruling the country and the people with only his personal moral cultivation? One may agree that it is

desirable for a ruler also to have moral cultivation, yet one may not find it makes any sense at all if one insists that a morally good man must also be good at politics. The last two statements fall into the category of social work and benefit, and they are certainly one of the necessary policies of a government. However, there must be more concrete but appropriate and necessary policies in a well-functioning government to protect and guarantee the rights of the life and livelihood of its countrymen as well as to deal with the problems, external and internal, of the country or the state. Therefore Hsun-tze's theory of 'fair policy' must be considered incomplete.

(vi) In the policy of enriching the country, Hsun-tze puts forward some practical and effective methods. The main points he suggests are (1) to cut down expenses and to open up more sources of income, (2) to enrich the people, (3) to make full use of natural and material sources, (4) to promote efficiency in the division of labour, and (5) to encourage business and the market. These are sensible enough, but if he had gone more deeply into the discussion of such issues as the policy of preventing the emergence of dominating financial powers which often determine the economic policy of the country and monopolise its economic structure, he would have made more of a contribution in this theory. However, perhaps one cannot expect Hsun-tze to produce a complete system of economics, since his interest obviously does not lie in this field and, in fact, one cannot deny that his theory of enriching the country is outstanding and is still valid today.

(vii) As to his theory of using the army, he believes that the army of a Sage-King will not stain itself with the blood of its enemy. The purpose of having an army is, according to Hsun-tze, for the sake of protecting the country and the people from the tyrannical and the wicked. However, without a strong army with necessary military equipment and supplies, how can it fulfil its duty? It is understood that Hsun-tze does not consider that military force is important, since the hostile country or enemy should surrender unconditionally under the influence of the Sage-King's virtue. However, no matter whether it is an army for the use of self-defence or an army for eliminating the tyrannical and the wicked, its organization, including military training and development of military equipment, is also of essential importance in politics. Hsun-tze does not give a detailed discussion of this aspect.

(viii) Hsun-tze's suggestion of following the pattern of the policy of the recent Sage-Kings offers, in political theory, no significant meaning. A ruler or a government, no matter what policies he or it follows, must be able to see the practical needs of the contemporary situation, including the needs of his or its countrymen. Thus the pattern of others' policies is of comparatively secondary consideration.

(ix) As to Hsun-tze's theory of the succession of a ruler, he suggests that ideally a Sage should succeed to a Sage. However, there are certain difficulties in this theory which have already been discussed in the last section.

In conclusion, his theory of the cultivation of a king, on one hand is theoretically incomplete because of its single-minded restriction to morality, and on the other hand is, in practice, often too idealized to be realizable. Another crucial failure is the fact that he always speaks for the king rather than for the people, which leads him to fail to touch upon the basic topic of political theory, i.e. the rights and duty of a man as a citizen of a country. The main cause of this failure lies in his deficiency in the distinction between man's ethical duty and his civic duty.

SECTION 3: HIS DEFECTIVENESS IN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF ETHICAL DUTY AND CIVIC DUTY

When man reflects that he himself can be the subject of his observation and reflection, he may also go on to investigate the meaning of his life, and the relationship between himself and an external object or objects. When he reflects upon the meaning of his own life, he may also come to the realization that human value lies in the need of his moral consciousness to perfect his moral capacity. There grows up in him a moral ideal and a sense of moral responsibility. He may conclude that the duty of man is to practise this moral ideal, and that the complete fulfilment of such a duty is the complete fulfilment of human life. One may call such a duty 'moral duty' which obviously emerges from his moral consciousness. However, man's moral ideal and moral practice cannot possibly be divorced from the relationship between himself

and other people. Therefore when he decides that he himself in human relations should also behave to the state of moral perfection one may say that his moral ideal of concern with and respect for all lives around him is also the ideal of ethical morality, his moral practice is also the practice of ethical morality and his moral duty is also the duty of ethical morality or, in short, ethical duty. Moral duty is a self-imposed demand to practise a moral ideal in order to reach moral perfection. Duty in such a sense does not necessarily have a correlation with rights or constraint or compulsion. It is rather a deliberate choice of the agent who considers that certain actions are morally required by him, or he feels that he must do such-and-such in order to become morally perfect. The term 'ethical duty' may serve as a synonym for moral duty denoting a sense of moral concern with and respect for all lives. Although the term 'ethical duty' indicates a higher level of moral ideal and it may also be considered to be an ideal moral duty, i.e. what ought to be practised in order to become a morally excellent man or a sage, in ordinary language, there is no great difference between the two terms. One may take the theory of Hsun-tze as an example in order to understand this. A man may demand of himself that he practises the Way of a Sage; this is his moral ideal, and he therefore urges himself to follow and practise the way of becoming a Sage and his practice becomes his self-committed moral duty. However, the processes of becoming a Sage include the practice of perfection of the duties of human relations and social institutions, this may also be a practice of ethical morality and thus may become his duty of ethical morality or his

ethical duty. Therefore one may conclude that man's moral duty is identical with his ethical duty. In short, the ethical duty of human life is to follow and practise the moral ideal of concern with and respect for all lives, by which on the one hand and externally, man may enjoy a harmonious life in society, and on the other and internally he may reach the state of moral perfection.

A man, while living in society which is constituted by certain institutions, should have certain rights and duties from and to his society. In other words, there must be a system of right and duty in order to make a society possible. Certain institutional or social practices such as the private collection of military equipment are illegal in some countries, or murder is forbidden in civilized society. These delimit one's social duty or civic duty. It is clear that a man in society may simultaneously practise his ethical duty and civic duty, and in fact, certain conventional moral duties have been recognized as institutional laws or social laws. Thus it seems that the content of one's moral duty and civic duty sometimes interpenetrate. However, society may not require each of its members to become a sage, therefore the social requirement of one's civic duties can be distinguished from the moral requirement of one's moral duties. In short, moral duty cannot be reduced to civic duty, yet the latter may be included in the former by an enlightened moral agent, who may see civic duty as part of his ethical duty or who practises the established rules or customs of social morality in the spirit of ethical morality. The objects of these two duties are also slightly different: the objects of the ethical duty embrace all men in society, while the

practice of civic duty is a direct response to social institutions or laws or to the state as a citizen in order to obtain certain rights and interest or security which it offers to its citizens. Therefore these two terms must not be confused and they are two names with two realities. The terms 'social duty' and 'civic duty' which may seem to be identical, may be further analyzed as follows: a man may be responsible for certain practices whatever society he is in, nevertheless he may not be obliged to follow what is taken as the civic duties of all countries or states, except his own. All men should not commit murder, for example, in any society, for this is a moral duty as well as a social duty, which should be strictly kept in all times and all societies. A tourist may have to pay V.A.T. when he is in the United Kingdom, yet he need not respond to the summons to military service since he is not a British citizen. In short, one's civic duty can be slightly different from one's social duty. However, for the present purpose, an understanding of the difference between one's ethical duty and one's civic duty in order to establish certain points in the criticism of Hsun-tze's political theory is more essential. Therefore one's ethical duty is conceived here as, in practice identical with one's moral duty while one's civic duty as, in theory no great difference from one's social duty.

One important point about these two concepts is that although a man practises his ethical duty, he may not obtain a guarantee of his civic rights. In theory a man in his highest moral state may practise his social duty and civic duty in a profound spirit of ethical morality. In practice, however, the result of fulfilment in ethical morality may not guarantee the acquisition of his civic right. The

former results in moral perfection in himself and establishes a moral reputation in society. He may project his internal moral excellence to other people and he may maintain a harmonious relationship between himself and other people. The latter secures him certain legal rights and guarantees under the protection of government which is a political institution designed for such a function. In short, when man practises these two duties, he may obtain two different results.

In ancient China a state was actually responsible for its citizens only under the following circumstances, either (1) because of the conscience of the ruler or the ruling class who was willing to consider (or be considerate of) the interests of his people; or (2) because of the continuous striving for certain rights by the masses. In China the political system of absolute or despotic monarchy enjoyed a long history and people often suffered much because the ruling king was neither considerate nor benevolent. During the Pre-Ch'in Period, China was in a state of disunity. The Chou kingdom was split up into many feudal states, each owning its territory and army, and wars among them for gaining leading authority or extending lands seemed never to end. Seeing the people suffering from wars and tyrannical kings, the Confucian thinkers realized that only a Sage-King who is considerate and benevolent to his people will not raise wars and make his people suffer. If all kings behave morally and all the masses follow the model of their kings, then the world will be, they believed, in a state of great peace. Therefore the Confucianists of that time and of later times in Chinese history, made every effort to educate the kings to be morally cultivated and

the masses to morally behave. Their efforts certainly are worthy of respect. In their theory, they often considered that if every man, no matter whether he is a king or an ordinary man, performs his moral duty, and if he performs his civic duty in a spirit of ethical duty, he is a sage. However, their conclusion did not give any indication of what sorts of legal rights a man ought to have if he performs his civic duty. It is clear that a man who practises his ethical duty may not be able to obtain a guarantee of his civic rights. Therefore the theory ardently suggested by Hsun-tze and most Confucian thinkers that with the virtuous administration of a Sage-King or by 'a policy of absolute or despotic morality' the state may secure peace and justice, may fail to be vindicated by historical events. An attempt of Hsun-tze, as well as many other Confucianists, to reduce the theory of politics to that of morality must be considered to be a theoretical deficiency.

An outline of the Confucian political theory initiated by Confucius and followed by most of the Confucianists may be helpful to explain the situation. A Confucianist believes that:

- (1) Ethical duty embraces civic duty.
- (2) The practice of ethical duty includes the practice of civic duty.
- (3) The result of these practices is to enable man to become a Sage.

These three summarized theories are themselves descriptive ones and one cannot and need not argue much to these beliefs. In practice, however, one may find that the following analyses are also

of great importance and from them one may see the weakness of the Confucian political theories:

(1) The purpose of moral practice is to enable the agent to reach a state of moral perfection, while the purpose of civic practice is to fulfil the requirement of being a citizen.

(2) The result of moral practice may enable a man to become a Sage, while the result of civic practice may enable a man to achieve what is legally right for him as a citizen by certain contracts mutually agreed by the government and the people. Therefore the results of both practices can be practically irrelevant to each other.

(3) The practice of ethical duty cannot guarantee the agent (i) to obtain legal rights in his country unless there are institutional laws established to ensure their efficiency, or he, with his colleagues, will have to strive for them, (ii) to have a society which is free from the tyrannical pressure of the ruling king.

It is clear that a state does not originate from the individual ambition for power nor does it originate from the virtue of a Sage. It is that a group of men, in return for the assurance of certain practical guarantees, consent to give certain fiduciary trust to a government in which they will be citizens. What then are these guarantees, or what may they claim as citizens? In short, and in essence, (1) man's right of life and livelihood must be guaranteed and be protected from irrational infringements of his

freedom; (2) man ought to have the right of expressing differing opinions about any governmental policies and presenting his arguments freely, and more importantly, he ought to have the right to participate in legislation and political administration, to elect and to be elected, and to abolish or reject governmental policies or the authority of the ruling class. In principle, people must be the source of a state, and any policies must be based upon the needs of the people and the function of a government is to protect and guarantee the rights and interests of its people: this is one of the practical themes of politics. As to the problems of international relationships, these should by no means be given less emphasis; however, one must see clearly the basic problem of a state before one can go further to investigate its extended field. In conclusion, it is clear that the result of man's practising his civic duty is different from that of practising his ethical duty.

To turn back to Hsun-tze's political theory, viewed from the standpoint which has just been discussed, one may see the following problems.

(i) Hsun-tze considers that if a king, with his officials, practises the Way of a Sage and educates his people to fulfil the duty of human relations and social institutions, then the whole state will practise a universal ethical duty and simultaneously fulfil a universal civic duty. This certainly is a highly ideal theory. However, this political ideal may be realized only when a Sage-King is on the throne or it is only when the conscience of the ruler is so morally awakened that the state is actually responsible for its

citizens. Since there are actual practical difficulties in the rule of a Sage-King as discussed in the previous section, such an ideal may also be difficult to realise.

(ii) If every man including the ruler and the officials in the country practises morality, the relationship among men, the state and the ruler should, in theory, be in a state of 'harmonious moral unity', and they should always come to a universal agreement upon all kinds of policies. In other words, there should be no argument or conflict among them. Thus, in this state, there is in fact no room for politics. The term 'Cheng Chih'⁵, or 'politics' in Chinese means 'a correct way of ruling', and when men, the state and the ruler are in a state of universal agreement, the need of 'ruling' is indeed unnecessary. Therefore the traditional Confucian ideal of politics always ends in a state of universal agreement, or more precisely, in a state of 'harmonious moral unity'. However, in practice, since the ideal of administration by a Sage-King is not easily realized, it follows that such an ideal state of universal agreement in policies is also not easy to achieve.

Hsun-tze's attempt to reduce man's civic duty to ethical duty leads to his failure in political theory. The reasons for this may be outlined as follows:

(i) He places excessive insistence upon the importance of morality in politics which in theory and in practice has its problems and difficulties, and he fails to see the difference between man's ethical duty and civic duty.

5. 政治 Cheng Chih.

(ii) Hsun-tze always considers that the end of politics lies in morality and thus politics become a means to morality or, more precisely, a means to reach the state of 'harmonious moral unity', or a moral world. He thus tries to 'moralize' or idealize politics and neglects its practical nature.

(iii) A fatal error also lies in the fact that Hsun-tze often speaks for the ruler or from the viewpoint of a ruler. He therefore considers that the ruler's practice of morality must be a crucial point in politics and it is not surprising that in his ideal state or in his term, 'the Ultimate Fair Society', he does not often mention the laws to protect and guarantee man's rights as a citizen, for he may think that they are not necessary. However, his neglect of the voice of the masses, especially their rights as citizens, is a crucial mistake in his theory.

In the understanding of the two concepts, namely, man's ethical duty and man's civic duty, Hsuntze may be accused of lacking accurate distinction and recognition. In nearly three thousand years from Confucius till modern times, Confucian scholars often care more about the way the king rules and less about the way politics should be practised, and this is, more or less, because of the ambiguity in their thoughts about these concepts. Hsun-tze in fact is not the only one whose theory can be blamed for this. Although the historical background might encourage the formation and development of this theoretical error, what is regrettable is that with their great sympathy for the suffering of man under political pressure or chaos and with their great wisdom and their profound thinking, they still failed to prevent political tragedy in history.

SECTION 4: AN EXAMINATION OF HIS IDEAL SOCIETY

In his book, Hsun-tze delineates three types of men according to whether or not they transform their Evil Nature, accumulate good Artifice and know and practise the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality. The descriptions and analyses of these three types of men, namely: the Mean-Spirited Man, the Conscientious Man and the Sage, occupy most of his book and, in fact, they are also the essential constituents and basis of his moral philosophy. However, his political philosophy also does not depart far from such a basis. He always insists that the perfection of man's ethical duty, including civic duty, is the ultimate and final goal of life. He also emphasizes that man may have different kinds of behaviour, moral or immoral, and that there therefore exist all kinds of people in society. If a man is a Mean-Spirited Man, and he is in an inferior position in society, he will become a wicked member of the masses, or a bogus or a usurping official of the government; and if he is in a high official position, he will become a traitor to the state or a tyrant. If a man is a Conscientious Man or a Sage, and he is in an inferior position, he will become a good citizen or a meritorious official; if he is in a high official position, he will become a Sage minister or a Sage-King. In Hsun-tze's theory, a Sage citizen should be invited by the King to serve in the government. If in the state, the king, his officials and his people are all Sages, then policies will always meet with universal agreement; this is the ideal society in Hsun-tze's thought. In other words, his ideal society is a society of Sages. However, he is aware that to reach such a political (if it may be so called) ideal is not easy, he

therefore advocates that by means of rites, society may at least reach a state of Ultimate Fairness, a theory which he puts forward in chapter IV.

The method of reaching a state of Ultimate Fairness in society, according to Hsun-tze, is by means of rites which are established by the kings of the early Chou Dynasty and are recorded in YI LI or THE BOOK OF ETIQUETTE AND CEREMONIAL. If the king uses rites to distinguish and classify the noble and the inferior, the senior and the junior, the wise and the foolish, and the capable and the incapable; then every man in society will obtain a position which is most suitable for him, he will devote himself to that position and be paid according to what he should be paid. It is only then that a society can be called Ultimately Fair. However, if such an ideal is to be realized, the following difficulties must first be overcome:

(i) According to Hsun-tze, rites are the means to achieve the goal of the social and political ideal of Ultimate Fairness. However, whether or not rites can be the criterion of distinction and classification of all societies or official employment and position must be open to question. In daily life, it is no doubt true that one should use appropriate rites to treat people appropriately. For example, one should attend to one's parents according to the rites as a son; one should show respect when being interviewed by the senior, or one should attend to one's teachers according to the rites as a pupil. By the suitable practice of appropriate rites a man thus shows his achievement or perfection in

moral education or cultivation. Therefore the practice of rites may be considered to be one of the means to moral cultivation. However, it is doubtful if by means of rites one can distinguish another's ability in political administration. Supposing that a government needs a new leader, the candidate must be chosen according to (1) his political ability including his knowledge of politics and perhaps some knowledge of history, sociology, economics, laws, philosophy and psychology and, more importantly, his theory of politics and policies, and (2) his past experience and behaviour in political activities. Then everyone in the country may freely make comments about the candidate(s); he is free to vote for the one he approves of and to say no to the one he does not support. When the candidate is elected to be the leader, then the people should distinguish him among them with special rites which are appropriate to him. Therefore the practice of rites should come after every man in society has been arranged in an appropriate position. In other words, the question of whether or not a society or a country can reach to a state of Ultimate Fairness is not answered by the fact that when all men are in their suitable positions they should then be treated with appropriate rites, but it has to go more deeply into the problem of how to arrange suitable positions for people. If every man has legal rights and freedom in society as well as in politics and he is protected by laws and governmental institutions, then the country may be said to be primarily in the state of fairness, which may further lead to the state of Ultimate Fairness only when education, including education of the individual's political consciousness, is universally and successfully practised. However, Hsun-tze's theory that rites can be the

criterion to distinguish and classify all social and official positions is doubtful, and it is also wrong to say that rites are a sufficient means to enable the country to reach the state of Ultimate Fairness.

(ii) Hsun-tze also considers that to practise politics by means of rites is the acme of politics. However, in maintaining social and political order, the power of rites to rule and control is doubtful. It may be suggested that after social and political order is well-established, the country may practise rites and righteousness as a higher means of ruling and control, and in this stage one may call it 'the acme of politics (if it may be so named)'. However, before social and political order is well-established, laws must play an important role in the ruling and control of the country. Therefore successful ruling and control by means of rites may be considered to be a way of ruling and control in a highly well-established and well-ordered country. However, there is more to politics than ruling.

(iii) The term 'Ultimate Fairness' means, according to Hsun-tze, fairness to man's capability as well as to his salary, and furthermore, to his position in society. However, only the Sage-King can be the judge with regard to fairness. It may be therefore neither political fairness nor social fairness but merely a fairness of judgement and appointment of a Sage-King. Here Hsun-tze is again speaking from the standpoint of the Sage-King. Although in his ideal, the country ruled by a Sage-King is an ideal state or society, this is an ideal which, in practice, is almost impossible to realise.

(iv) Supposing that it is a true fact that the whole country are Sages, it is undeniable that the problems of administration in the country will be greatly decreased. However, what still remains are certain problems of organization of the country and problems of international relations. However, if the whole world are Sages, what might happen is that, except for some necessary administrative organization, no more politics is needed. This reminds people of the picture of the 'Heavenly Kingdom' or 'God's Realm' in certain religions. However, the human world is still what it is, at least, it is certainly not the Heavenly Kingdom with only Sages as its citizens, and the above suppositions are, in fact, not practical in the human world.

In conclusion, the ideal society in Hsun-tze's theory is only an impractical ideal which makes no contribution to political philosophy.

The purpose of political philosophy is, in principle, to study the essence and value of the state, its practical problems such as its relation to the people, and the organization and realisation of the ideal state. This may include the clarification of concepts, an understanding, a criticism and an evaluation of certain forms of politics or policies. In Hsun-tze's political theory, there is only discussion of the king's ways of ruling and controlling his people. He does not establish a theory of politics or form of governmental contract which is connected with the legal rights and interests of the people, nor does he make an overall investigation into the essence of the state, its function and its value. Therefore

one may say that his political theory is an incomplete one which is of little importance in its field. It is mainly an extension of his moral philosophy for he is often speaking of politics in terms of morality. For a reader, it is another chapter of moral discussion rather than a chapter of political theory. Hsun-tze, as many other Confucianists, often does not mention politics in an open and direct manner, but instead, makes great efforts to explain that a state of harmonious relationship among all classes in society can be achieved by means of morality. Therefore it is indeed difficult to say that all his theories are completely relevant to the theory of politics. It is perhaps because he lived in an age of absolute monarchy that he had to strategically design his theories of politics in an oblique fashion. On the other hand, the political ideal of 'harmonious moral unity' may also reflect his suffering under the burden of traditional Confucian political thought. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

AN EPILOGUE

A N E P I L O G U E

In the history of Chinese philosophy, criticism of Hsun-tze's theory may be divided roughly into two schools.

(1) Most scholars when mentioning Hsun-tze automatically listed him as an orthodox Confucianist simply because he had labelled himself as a Confucianist. They also considered him as a significant Pre-Ch'in Confucianist, after Confucius and Mencius, simply because he had left his readers a substantial amount of writing which richly presented his theories and teachings. However, this school of criticism only shows a casual attitude in admitting the position of Hsun-tze in the line of Confucianists.

(2) Some considered Hsun-tze a defective Confucianist for the following reasons:

(a) Since Hsun-tze emphasized that Man's Nature is Evil and that teachers and laws are important, some accused him of encouraging the rise of the theory of Fa-ism¹.

(b) On the other hand, some considered that Hsun-tze did not understand the meaning of both Confucius' and Mencius' suggestion about human nature² and that in his theory, the origin of value of

1. Su-Shih (1036-1101), for example, holds this view. A recent recurrence of this view may be found in Lao Sse-Kwang's A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY. However, this viewpoint must be considered misleading, please see the discussion on p.357.

2. Han Yü (768-824) and Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085), for example, hold this view. However, Confucius in fact seldom talks about human nature and Mencius gives some indications that human nature is good with a different viewpoint from that of Hsun-tze.

morality lies externally in teachers and laws³, therefore Hsun-tze had led, they claimed, the Pre-Ch'in Confucianism astray. They claimed that the Han Confucianists misdirected their study of Pre-Ch'in Confucian theories to a study of the theory of the Yin Yang school, which was greatly away from the spirit of Pre-Ch'in Confucianism, and that afterward there came the invasion of Buddhism in the first century A.D. which gradually became a leading current in Chinese thought for nearly a thousand years, they therefore concluded that the spirit of Pre-Ch'in Confucianism after Hsun-tze almost came to an end. The renaissance of Confucianism occurred in the tenth and eleventh centuries led by the Ch'eng brothers⁴ and Chu Hsi. It was only because of their advocacy, they believed, of a study of Li, or the Rational Principle⁵ that the spirit of Confucianism survived. In short, they thought that Hsun-tze's theory was the main cause of the decay of Pre-Ch'in Confucianism⁶.

(c) Some more radical critics also claimed that while the Chinese cultural spirit of moral-ism originated from the hands of Confucius and Mencius, Hsun-tze distorted it by, they argued, his 'emphasis' of the importance of teachers and laws and his 'search' for the external origin of the value of morality. They thus

3. Again this is a misguided criticism which has been discussed on p.205.

4. Cheng Hao (1032-1085) and Cheng Yi (1033-1107) of the Sung Dynasty are famous scholars of the study of Li or the Rational Principle.

5. 理學 Li Hsueh, a study of mainly the Mind and human nature as the ultimate source of the Rational Principle.

6. Please see Lao's A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, p.292.

concluded that it was Hsun-tze who had weakened the cultural spirit of the Pre-Ch'in Period⁷.

In short, this school of critics laid blame on Hsun-tze, as an offender who caused the destruction of the Confucian theory and the cultural spirit. They denied that Hsun-tze's philosophy made a contribution of any value to the history of Chinese thought.

Is Hsun-tze a contributor to or an offender against Confucianism and Chinese culture? The following chapters are concerned with this question, where an attempt is made to re-estimate the proper value and position of Hsun-tze's philosophy in the history of Chinese thought. The first chapter, aiming at (1) the theoretical connection between Confucius and Hsun-tze, and (2) Hsun-tze's philosophical contribution to Confucius' moral theory, may give sufficient indication that Hsun-tze certainly offers supplementation to the perfection of Pre-Ch'in Confucianism. And Hsun-tze is not a defective Confucianist as far as moral philosophy is concerned. The second chapter is concerned with the differences between the viewpoints and interests of Hsun-tze and Han Fei Tze, the most important Fa-ist, who once was the pupil of Hsun-tze. This comparison shows the irrelevance and invalidity of the critics' attempt to connect the two thinkers. The last chapter, explaining the content of and the connection between the Pre-Ch'in philosophical spirit and

7. Please see Lao's A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, pp.324-325.

cultural spirit, will give a survey of Hsun-tze's positive contribution to the two, and attempts to dispel the misleading argument that Hsun-tze has weakened the Pre-Ch'in cultural spirit.

CHAPTER IX:

HSUN-TZE AS A CONFUCIANIST

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In his book, Hsun-tze praises and extols Confucius as a 'Ta Ju'⁸ (chapter VIII), a Sage (chapter VI) and as great as such Sages as King Wen, King Wu and Duke Chou (chapter XXI). He also praises, in chapter VIII for example, the great merits of Confucianists in politics. In other words, this implies that his thoughts flow from those of Confucius and in his view, Confucianism is the only way to save the chaotic world, disorderly countries and mankind's shortcomings. Almost all later Chinese scholars also listed him as a Confucianist⁹. However, how to prove, in theory, that Hsun-tze is an orthodox Confucianist is the theme of this chapter.

In this chapter, the spirit of the theories of both Confucius and Hsun-tze will be compared in order to examine their theoretical connection and Hsun-tze's further development of Confucius' theories will be discussed in order to evaluate his philosophical contribution to Confucianism.

A: THE SPIRIT OF CONFUCIUS' THOUGHT

It may be suggested that the spirit of Confucius' thought is briefly and essentially twofold:

8. 大儒 Ta-Ju, the greatest scholar. In Hsun-tze's theory, this term is no different from the term 'a Sage' which is used more popularly throughout his book.

9. However, some Ch'ing scholars such as Hsiung Tz'u-Lü (1637-1709) considered Hsun-tze's philosophy 'a branch of unorthodox theories' and some modern scholars such as Chang Shih-T'ung considered Hsun-tze to be an excellent exponent of Fa-ist. (For details, please see Chang's HSUN-TZE CHIEN CHU, preface.)

(1) Thought of moral humanism: The main theme of Confucius' philosophy is man and morality. He puts forward, (a) his theory of Jen or Human-Mindedness, Yi or righteousness and Li or rites in order to point out that man's moral behaviour lies in a sense of righteousness or an inner call from one's conscience; (b) his theory of the difference between Yi or righteousness and Ming or destiny in order to reveal that many aspects of human life are out of man's control, he nevertheless possesses his freedom as a moral being. Confucius considers Jen to be the ultimate moral ideal, while rites, filial piety, faithfulness, forgiveness, trustworthiness, rectification of names¹⁰ are details of moral practice. His ideal personality is a Jen Man¹¹ who, by constant moral practice, reaches the state of moral perfection. He thus establishes a system of moral humanism.

(2) The ideal of moral education: In his theories, no matter whether in the problems of politics, social relations or human relations, he always emphasizes that moral education and the influence of a Jen Man is the most effective means of instructing and correcting the moral deficiency of man.

These two points are interrelated; his concern for man, for morality and for moral education form a significant trinity which is deeply imprinted in the minds of his later followers, and which also became a strong current in Chinese thought and culture.

10. 禮 Li, 孝 Hsiao, 忠 Chung, 恕 Shu, 信 Hsin,
Cheng Ming.

11. 仁者 Jen-Che.

B: SIMILARITIES IN THE THEORIES OF BOTH THINKERS

In the philosophy of Hsun-tze, it is obvious that he always consciously follows the spirit of Confucius' thoughts. An analysis of their similarities is listed below:

(1) In Hsun-tze's theories, he does not show much interest in such problems as knowledge, nature or a supernatural god. As far as knowledge of the external world is concerned, he is merely interested in its practical value to man. In this respect, his attitude corresponds with that of Confucius, although he has given more detailed discussions to certain subjects of the external world such as Heaven, than one may find in THE ANALECTS.

(2) Confucius' ideal is to establish a universal moral pattern, and he thus turns to the problems of the individual and of human relations. Hsun-tze, cherishing the same ideal, also clearly advocates the Ultimate Principle of Man or the Way of Man (chapter VIII) as his moral ideal and as a universal moral pattern for man. At this point, their thoughts are no different.

(3) In the moral life of an individual, Confucius considers Jen or Human-Mindedness to be the most important practice, while in social institutions and human relations, he emphasizes the importance of observing rites. Hsun-tze advocates the state of a Sage as the ultimate goal of one's moral life, while in daily practice, he also exalts rites. For example, in chapter II he says:

'Without rites, man cannot live. Without rites, events may not be completed. Without rites, the country will not have peace.' (I, 8)

In chapter XIX, he says:

'Rites as a whole are the acme of the Way of Man.'
(XIII, 5)

There are many more similar statements expressing this idea in his book. One may say that the spirit of the two thinkers is the same. As to the connection between their moral ideals, the Jen or Human-Mindedness of Confucius and the Sheng or Sage of Hsun-tze, a full discussion will be given later.

(4) Confucius puts forward his theory of rectification of names by advocating that 'the king should be a king, the official should be an official, the father should be a father, and the son should be a son'¹². In chapter IX, Hsun-tze extends this idea by saying:

'The king should be a king, the official should be an official, the father should be a father, the son should be a son, the elder brother should be an elder brother, and the younger should be a younger brother: they all follow one principle. The farmer should be a farmer, the scholar should be a scholar, the worker should be a worker, and the merchant should be a merchant: they all follow one principle.'

(V, 7)

The one principle suggested by Hsun-tze is the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality which, in practice, is the practice of rites and righteousness. Therefore one may say that in the theory of rectification of names, they both indicate that man should fulfil the moral requirements of their positions in society and human relations. In other words, both their theories are concerned with names and morality.

12. Please see, THE ANALECTS, Chapter XII.

(5) Confucius repeatedly lays emphasis on moral education and he considers the acme of moral education to lie in the influence of the king's virtue upon his people. Hsun-tze reveals a similar approach. There are many paragraphs in HSUN-TZE describing the necessary moral cultivation of a king so that he may have a good influence on his people. In chapter XII entitled 'The Way of a King', Hsun-tze gives a concrete discussion of 'the acme of politics and moral education', which may serve as an example of his inheritance and development of Confucius' idea in this aspect.

C: HIS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT FROM THE THEORY OF CONFUCIUS

These similarities in both men's thinking may not, it may be argued, prove that Hsun-tze definitely intended to succeed to Confucius' thought. However, it is in fact not a difficult task to prove that he is an orthodox Confucianist. In his book, there are paragraphs in which he clearly expresses his standpoint as a Confucianist. In theory, it may be suggested that the following point is the most evident demonstration that he not only inherits Confucius' thought, but also tries to develop it to a perfect state. He considers that the state of a Sage is a further development and a higher level of the state of a Jen Man which is suggested by Confucius. In Confucius' theory, a Jen Man is different from a Chih Man¹³. He says:

'The Chih Man likes water, while the Jen Man likes the mountain; for the former is active, while the latter is calm. The Chih Man is joyful, and the Jen Man enjoys long life.' (THE ANALECTS, chapter VI)

13. 知者 Chih-Che, a wise man.

He also says:

'The Chih Man is not confused. The Jen Man does not worry.' (THE ANALECTS, Chapter IX)

However, Confucius implies, without spelling it out, that a Jen Man is also a Chih Man. Here is the description in THE ANALECTS:

'Once his disciple Tsai-O¹⁴ asked him, "If a Jen Man is told that a man has fallen in the well, will he get into the well to save the man?" Confucius replied, "Why should he do so? What a Chün-tze¹⁵ can do is to think up a way to save the man in the well, yet he himself should not be trapped in the well.'" (THE ANALECTS, Chapter VI).

In other words, a Jen Man should also be a Wise Man before he may be called a Chün-tze. Confucius also says:

'How can I dare to call myself a Sage and a Jen Man?' (THE ANALECTS, Chapter VII)

To him, a Sage and a Jen Man are not identical, yet in what way they are different Confucius does not give further explanation. In short, Jen or Human-Mindedness and Chih or wisdom are individually introduced by Confucius while the detailed characteristics of a Sage and the relationship between the Sage and Jen and Chih are not mentioned. To Hsun-tze, a Sage is a combination of Jen and Chih. His further development of Confucius' moral vocabularies of Jen, Chih and Sheng or the Sage, may be analysed as follows:

14. 宰我 Tsai-O.

15. 君子 Chün-tze, a morally good man. Hsun-tze also employs the same term to denote the 'Conscientious Man'. Confucius often does not give clear definitions of his technical moral terms such as the Jen Man, the Chih Man, the Chün-tze and the Sage, whereas Hsun-tze introduces his moral concepts in a well-organized way.

(1) In chapter I, Hsun-tze says:

'If one wants to seek the greatness of the early kings and to investigate the source of Jen and Yi, then rites are the important ways.' (I, 5)

In other words, Hsun-tze suggests that rites are the ways to practice Jen and Yi. Since in Confucius' theory Jen originates deep in one's mind, which is not easily seen externally, therefore Hsun-tze tries to put it into the practice of rites and thus Jen is externalized and revealed.

(2) In Hsun-tze's theory, to practise rites is to practise the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, and the one who practises the Ultimate Principle of Man is a Sage. A Sage therefore possesses Jen within himself. However, a Sage in his virtue, is more than a Jen Man.

(3) A Sage is, according to Hsun-tze, a combination of Jen and Chih, or Human-Mindedness and wisdom. In chapter XII, he says:

'Although he (the Sage) may be in poverty, he will certainly have reputation; if he achieves prominence in officialdom, he will certainly contribute meritorious deeds. His Human-Mindedness is so substantially wide that it could cover the universe and would never be exhausted, while his brightness (or wisdom) is so intelligent that it is attentive to every detail in his dealings with the universe and is capable of administering all changes without delay. His disposition is calm and peaceful, his ambition is great, and his practice fills the universe with Human-Mindedness and righteousness. This is the acme of the state of Jen and Chih. This is what is meant by a Sage.' (VIII, 2-3)

In the same chapter, Hsun-tze also says:

'One should not be wise (Chih) without Human-Mindedness (Jen) and one should not be Human-Minded without wisdom.'

It is thus clear that a Sage must possess not only Jen but also Chih. This may be suggested to be his contribution to Confucius' theory: he links up Confucius' moral vocabularies of Jen, Chih and Sheng so as to allow the Confucian ideal personality to reach a state of perfection in rational morality. If a moral man possesses merely Jen without Chih, he may do something foolishly wrong and in effect, his practice may produce an undesirable result. At one time, Confucius defines Jen as to love man¹⁶. In the case of a father, for example, if he lavishes his love upon his son then, Hsun-tze may argue, his son always gets what he asks for, becomes idle in every thing and in the long run he is, mentally and physically, no better than a disabled man. Or in the case of a man who by chance has to stay with a mentally disordered man; since he should love all men including this mad man whom he faces, he tries to fulfil every wish requested by the mad man even when a knife is requested, but eventually he may be deeply regretful, if the mad man kills himself with that knife or it may become a great tragedy if he is killed by the mad man. Therefore Hsun-tze wisely makes significant Chih or wisdom to make up the logical deficiency and also clarifies the Confucian concepts of Jen, Chih and Sheng and rearranges them in a well-ordered way. In other words, his theory of the state of a Sage

16. THE ANALECTS, Chapter XII.

is a thorough extension of Confucius' theory of the state of a Jen Man in order to allow the Confucian ideal moral state to become more concise, rational and logical. This is his contribution to Confucianism, which unfortunately most scholars in the past did not notice or appreciate.

The Sage, to Hsun-tze, is Human-Minded (Jen) and wise (Chih). In chapter XVI, Hsun-tze praises Confucius as a Sage who possesses these qualities, (XV, 4). This may suggest that, (1) Hsun-tze inherits the concept 'Jen' of Confucius and extends it in order to develop his own ideal personality of a combination of Jen and Chih in the state of a Sage; and (2) he holds Confucius in high esteem as the model of his ideal personality. In his book, besides the early kings such as Yao, Yu, Shun, the recent kings, such as King Wen and King Wu, and the historical figures such as Duke Chou, Confucius is the only one who is close to Hsun-tze's times to be crowned as a Sage.

It may thus be suggested that Hsun-tze's theory works as a further extension of and supplement to that of Confucius. Therefore Hsun-tze is not only an orthodox Confucianist but also a successful Confucianist in moral philosophy. The accusations that his Confucianism is defective and that he leads the orthodox Confucian moral theories in the wrong direction¹⁷ are thus misguided, being caused either by misinterpretation or overlooking the essence of Hsun-tze's theories.

17. op.cit., p.264, Lao's, pp.276-77, 292.

Chapter VIII of his book entitled 'The Merit of a Confucianist' is also an important demonstration of his inheritance and development of Confucian theory. The content of this chapter in general includes a great many miscellaneous subjects as with other chapters, yet in it, as in other chapters, the main theme lies in the discussion of the Way to becoming a Sage. He considers that the ultimate merits of a Confucianist are twofold:

(1) for the agent himself who by following the Confucian practice or the practice of rites and righteousness with Human-Mindedness and wisdom, will gradually reach the state of a Sage or that of moral perfection; and

(2) for the country, as by making use of the Confucian practice, the agent will successfully rule the country and should, if he is a king, become a Sage-King.

In other words, in Hsun-tze's ideal, a Confucianist should be internally a Sage and externally a king or a king-like figure with virtuous influence over others. This is the original ideal of Confucius, therefore the meaning of 'Confucianist' in Hsun-tze's theory also derives directly from Confucius' theory. In short, Hsun-tze makes a distinctive development of Confucianism. It is because the spirit of his thought as a whole lies within that of Confucius' philosophy, therefore in theory and in practice, he undoubtedly is an orthodox Confucianist.

D: HIS PRESCRIPTION FOR DEALING WITH THE THEORETICAL
PROBLEMS OF CONFUCIUS' THEORY

Although Hsun-tze is without doubt a Confucianist, it does not follow that he has successfully solved the theoretical problems of Confucius. In the Confucian theories, it may be suggested that the most essential theoretical problems needing to be amended, supplemented and developed are the following: (1) In his moral theories, how does Jen or Human-Mindedness originate, or how can it be demonstrated? (2) In his political theories, what is the principle of the transference of political power, or how can a Sage become a king or an official?

Hsun-tze approaches these problems as follows:

(1) In Hsun-tze' theory the first problem is not a real problem, for he puts Jen into practice, and by practising the Way of a Sage, the Jen which is within man is externalized and thus demonstrated. The quality of Jen is, Hsun-tze argues, not originally and innately in man's Nature, for Man's Nature is innately Evil. Therefore Jen must originate from the practice of Wei or Artifice; in other words, it originates from the moral functioning of the Mind when it is in the state of Great Clearness and Brightness. However, Hsun-tze does not clearly point out (a) the connection of Jen and Wei or Artifice, and (b) the relation of Jen to the Mind. He has clearly indicated that the Sage is a combination of Jen and Chih, in other words, the Sage is on a higher level than a Jen Man, yet he fails to tightly link up the progression from Artifice to the issue of Jen and to the perfection of a Sage, so as to establish a more concise system of his theory of the Mind.

(2) To the second problem Hsun-tze does not offer any solution at all. He puts forward his theory of 'rule by a Sage-King' and that of the Ultimately Fair Society which, in theory and in practice, do not alter the deficiency of Confucian political theory for the better. He does not carefully consider the essence and value of politics, and he thinks that the way of ruling is a sufficient way to solve the problems in the country. Therefore although he advocates moral administration, the moral cultivation of a king and a state of 'harmonious moral unity' in politics, these do not, in practice, establish an effective way to the harmonious and utilitarian state in a country. In short, he honestly follows the political pattern of Confucius and likewise, his political theories have the same problems as those of Confucius. The crucial defects of Confucian political theories as a whole are as follows:

(i) In the general tendency towards emphasis on morality the Confucianists often speak of politics in terms of morality. In short, they fail to see that the issues of politics are in many aspects different from those of morality.

(ii) They often fail to discern the different results of practice of ethical duty and that of practice of civic duty.

(iii) Although they also consider that people are the source of a country and the king should be considerate to his people, they do not thus found a system of democracy because they normally view the problem from the standpoint of a king or a ruler. Therefore in Chinese history, their great efforts to find ways to the solution of political problems were often, unfortunately, taken advantage of by

some emperors in order to fool their people. These emperors deliberately exalted Confucian thought, especially such theories as faithfulness, forgivingness, filial piety and obedience¹⁸, which were useful to their policies, so that their people would be brought up to be controlled without trouble. However, although the Confucianists in general are not successful in their political thought, they diligently give advice to the kings to behave morally and they also rigidly warn them that if they are tyrannical they will lose their people and their kingdom. Therefore the disorderly dynasties and the tyrannical policies in Chinese history were partly caused either by the real essence of Confucianism not being appreciated by the emperors, or by the contemporary so-called Confucian officials or bogus Confucianists not holding firm the spirit of Confucian policies and to give due advice and warning to their kings. However, another important problem of Chinese politics lies, it may be suggested, in the universal ignorance and neglect of democratic institutions which must be supported by a universal political consciousness of the masses. Therefore the rise and fall of dynasties in Chinese history must be the universal responsibility of all Chinese, and these should not be shouldered merely by Confucianists, although their political theory in itself certainly has its deficiencies.

Briefly, Hsun-tze succeeds in developing and supplementing Confucian moral theory and remedying some of its deficiencies.

18. 忠 Chung, 恕 Shu, 孝 Hsiao, and 順 Shun.

Nevertheless certain flaws, especially those in political theory, still make him unsuccessful in the attempt to improve Confucianism to a state of perfection, theoretically and practically.

In conclusion, the position of Hsun-tze's philosophy in Pre-Ch'in Confucianism may be outlined as follows:

(1) In his moral discussion he follows the path of moral humanism which was pioneered by Confucius. Nevertheless, his further development in this aspect makes him the most thorough advocate of moral humanism. His advocacy became a strong current of the cultural spirit of his time and encouraged the development of a healthy and sound cultural life in China. This was a success of his theories and also a contribution to Confucianism.

(2) His theory of combining Jen and Chih as an ideal state of moral perfection makes complete and rational the Confucian moral philosophy.

(3) His theory of the Mind is the most detailed one among all others in the Pre-Ch'in Period. It also paves the way for studies of the mind in later Confucianism.

(4) His theories of rites and music are far more thorough and detailed than those of Confucius. Most later Confucianists were greatly influenced by him. These theories have been adapted as basic teaching materials for a Confucianist.

In theoretical system, Hsun-tze's philosophy offers a better organization than those of Confucius and Mencius. One may say that Hsun-tze is a great contributor to the theory of the Mind

and that of moral humanism for Pre-Ch'in Confucianism. In this period Confucianism was developed and established by Hsun-tze. Since then its spirit went from rise to fall. There are various reasons for its decay. One might be because Hsun-tze's philosophy had no followers.

CHAPTER X:

HIS PHILOSOPHY AND FA-ISM

CHAPTER X:

H I S P H I L O S O P H Y A N D F A - I S M

A: A BRIEF SURVEY ON THE SIMILARITIES OF THE THEORIES
OF HSUN-TZE AND HAN FEI

Fa-ism¹ was one of the most important schools of thought in the late period of the Warring States. The leading figure of this period was Han Fei², who was at one time a pupil of Hsun-tze. Ch'in Shih Huang³ adopted the theories of Fa-ism and employed Li-Shih, another pupil of Hsun-tze, as prime minister, and in 221 B.C. he united China under the Ch'in Dynasty. However, the policies of Fa-ism obviously did not meet the needs of the masses and his dynasty ended in the third year after he died. Some later scholars, such as Su-Shih, made the accusation that the severe laws suggested by the Fa-ists led China to an extremely tyrannical state and they, directly and indirectly, lay the blame on Hsun-tze, the teacher of Han Fei who developed the system of Fa-ism, and the teacher of Li-Shih who implemented the policies of Fa-ism in the Ch'in Dynasty. Han Fei wrote some chapters on political issues and he was historically considered to be the most important Fa-ist in the Pre-Ch'in Period. There was no written work left by Li-Shih and thus in the history of Chinese thought he did not enjoy the same attention as that given to Han Fei. In this chapter, Han Fei's

1. op.cit., p.207, Note 12.

2. 韓非 Han Fei, (d.233 B.C.) the most important thinker of 法家 Fa-Chia or Fa-ism, or the school of laws. He advocated absolute government of the king by law and statecraft. There are fifty-five chapters in his book entitled HAN-FEI-TZE; however, most recent scholars suspect that there are only a few chapters which were written by him, the rest were added by other anonymous writers.

3. 秦始皇 Ch'in Shih Huang. The first emperor of Ch'in Dynasty (221-207 B.C.).

theories are to be taken as the typical exponents of Fa-ism in order to compare the differences between Hsun-tze's theory and that of Fa-ism.

The possible theoretical relations of the two thinkers may be summarized under the following three points:

(1) Han Fei advocates 'laws are the doctrines of the masses and the officials are their instructors'⁴. Some scholars therefore argued that his theory was a development of Hsun-tze's theory of exaltation of laws and teachers.

(2) Han Fei considers that men swindle and suspect one another and thus implies that man's nature is evil⁵. This was considered to be an inheritance of his teacher's famous theory that Man's Nature is Evil.

(3) Han Fei lays great emphasis on the power and authority of a ruler and suggests that a ruler must ride on his political influence or authority⁶, hold firmly to his political art or skillfulness⁷, and establish laws⁸. This was considered to be influenced by Hsun-tze's emphasis on respect to a king.

4. Please see HAN-FEI-TZE, chapter XLIX.

5. Please see HAN-FEI-TZE, chapter XLIX.

6. 勢 Shih. Please see HAN-FEI-TZE, chapters XXVIII, XL.

7. 術 Shu. Please see HAN-FEI-TZE, chapter XLIII.

8. 法 Fa. Please see HAN-FEI-TZE, chapters VIII, L.

B: THE DIFFERENT IDEALS OF THE TWO THINKERS

Hsun-tze could thus be charged with having a bad influence on Han Fei, his pupil, but this accusation will only lead to biased or dogmatic criticism. These charges are, in fact, disputable.

(1) Han Fei opposes the Confucian theory of the administration of the Sage-King, or in his terms 'rule by the virtuous'⁹. It may be suggested that he tries to rectify, consciously or unconsciously, this deficiency of Confucian political theory and therefore puts forward his theory of the law-administration of a king of ordinary talent. This is a wise breakaway from Confucian political theory, although his establishment of law-administration, which suggests that the ruler should have supreme authority and that only the king may have the freedom of law-making and overall control, leads to another defect in political theory, i.e. it is viewed merely from the standpoint of a ruler and neglects the welfare of the masses. However, his aim was to found a system of strict rule by the laws of a king which, he considers, is the only way to save the chaotic world. As to Hsun-tze's theory of exaltation of laws and teachers, his intention is to establish the restriction of laws and moral education of teachers as an external encouragement to good Artifice in order to assist man on his way to becoming a Sage. Therefore his theory is couched in terms of a moral discussion and it is initially not a theory of politics. He also clearly claims that morally good Artifice itself must originate from the moral functioning of one's Mind. Therefore his exaltation of laws and teachers is a secondary

9. 賢治 Hsien-Chih.

emphasis in his discussion of the origin of moral activity. In short, for Han Fei, teachers and laws are politically important, while for Hsun-tze, they are morally influential. The different viewpoints of the two thinkers are obvious. If one insists that Han Fei derives his theory from that of Hsun-tze, one must also bear in mind that they have different intentions.

(2) Han Fei indicates that given the fact that man loves profits and power, and easily becomes suspicious and jealous, man's nature therefore is evil. To Hsun-tze, the Evil of Man's Nature lies in man's lack of the qualities of uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order in him and his possession of all kinds of desires. However, Han Fei does not establish a theory of human nature, he merely tries to warn the ruler that his people have these 'evil' traits of character, and he must use severe laws and punishments in order to frighten them and make them obey his orders. Hsun-tze tries to advise that man must transform his Evil Nature before he can set off on the way to become a Sage. Therefore even if they both claim that man's nature is evil, the purpose of making such claims are different and the developments and directions of their theories are obviously not the same.

(3) Han Fei tries to establish a political system of the absolute unity of power and authority of the king. In other words, he advocates absolute or despotic monarchy. He also diametrically opposes the theory of 'rule by the virtuous' which, he considers, is not practical and not efficient in a disorderly age. In Hsun-tze's political theory, a king must be a Sage-King, and a Sage-King

must be respected by all his people for his perfect virtue or moral excellence, and a Sage-King is the moral teacher of all men in all times. In other words, Hsun-tze advocates a theory of what Han Fei calls 'rule by the virtuous', with which Han Fei fundamentally disagrees and so do the other Fa-ists. Therefore it is not convincing to insist that at this point Han Fei is influenced by Hsun-tze.

The critique that the two thinkers share the same ideals is therefore biased and misguided. To say that two thoughts are in correspondence with each other means that their essence or the direction of their ideal is generally the same. However, in the case of Hsun-tze and Han Fei, although in terminology they may have used similar names or terms, and in theory they may have accidental similarities in some minor points (but never the whole part), the spirits of these two thinkers are almost opposite to each other. This is why Hsun-tze is considered to be a Confucianist and not a Fa-ist, and Han Fei a Fa-ist and not a Confucianist. As to the argument that some parts of Han Fei's theory are encouraged or influenced by Hsun-tze's thought, it would be unfair to say that a teacher must be totally responsible for the bad results or defects of his pupil. In fact, in the conscious digestion of the teacher's instruction and the conscious establishment of one's own theory, one should be completely responsible for the consequence of one's own words and deeds, especially in the case of failure. In the case of Han Fei, his theory is, in fact, completely divorced from that of his teacher. According to the record of SHIH CHI or THE RECORDS OF HISTORY, Han Fei was quite young when he was a pupil of Hsun-tze, and

when he wrote his book entitled HAN FEI TZE, he had left his teacher and developed his theories independently. Therefore if one argues that since some parts of Hsun-tze's theory led to the biased theory of Fa-ism represented by Han Fei, so that the moral and cultural spirit of the Pre-Ch'in philosophy was since extinguished, this argument itself is manifestly rootless and erroneous¹⁰. The decay of the moral and cultural spirit of Pre-Ch'in philosophy was a fact caused by various factors, yet there is no evidence that Hsun-tze should be involved in this connection.

10. op.cit., p. 264. Lao's, pp.322-326.

CHAPTER XI:

THE VALUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HSUN-TZE
IN CHINESE CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER XI:

THE VALUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HSUN - TZE IN CHINESE CULTURE AND
PHILOSOPHY

A: THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

In modern times some western philosophers said that there was no philosophy in China¹. This is certainly an arguable statement. First of all one must examine the fact whether the term 'philosophy' bears the same meaning in the western and Chinese concepts, and secondly one must examine the different directions of both thoughts.

(i) The different meanings of the term 'philosophy' in Chinese and western thought

The term 'philosophy' in Chinese is constituted by the words Che and Hsueh. The use of these two words as a compound noun has not had a long history. In fact, they were a translation of a Japanese expression derived from the English term 'philosophy'. In a later period of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), they gradually came to be used by Chinese scholars. Although during these hundred years there were people who considered that the term translated was not appropriate, it gradually became popularly used and commonly accepted. However, the meaning of the term Che Hsueh, i.e. philosophy, is in correspondence with the spirit of Chinese traditional thought.

1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), for example, holds this opinion. For details, please see Hegel's LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (translated from the German by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson), Introduction, pp.3,99. Oriental Philosophy, pp.117-125.

According to ERH YA², Che is interpreted as 'wisdom', while Hsueh is interpreted, according to Tai Chuan of SHANG SHU by Fu Sheng³, as 'to imitate'; according to PAI HU TUNG by Pan Ku⁴, as 'to be awakened, to become aware of what one does not know'; and according to SHUO WEN⁵, as 'to realize'. Thus the term Che Hsueh means, accordingly, 'the awareness and imitation of wisdom'. In other words, Che Hsueh originates from internal awareness and external imitation of the individual to wisdom, and it is a process of combination of knowledge and practice. In the past, though the Chinese philosophers did not name the content of their thought Che Hsueh, they used some different terms instead. Chuang-tze (c.369-286 B.C.), for example, used the term Tao Shu⁶; the scholars of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) and Ming Dynasty (1386-1644 A.D.) used the term Li Hsueh⁷.

As to the term 'philosophy' in western thought, it was the combination of the two Greek words 'philos' and 'sophia' which means 'love of wisdom'. Because of their love of wisdom, the western philosophers search for where wisdom is, or where the truth is. What is different between the west and the Chinese is that, though the

2. 爾雅 ERH-YA, an ancient book containing commentaries on classics and names.

3. 伏生尚書大傳 Fu-Sheng: SHANG SHU Ta-Chuan, another name for BOOK OF HISTORY.

4. 班固白虎通 Pan Ku. PAI HU T'UNG. (or PO-HU T'UNG)

5. 許慎說文 SHUO WEN, title of an etymological dictionary composed by Hsu Shen of Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.).

6. 道術 Tao Shu.

7. 理學 Li Hsueh.

Chinese thinkers do not start from the fire of love for wisdom, they require themselves to have an internal awareness or realization of wisdom and they also require themselves to practise what they are aware of or what they are awakened by, while the western philosophers seem to care more for the knowledge of wisdom and less for the practice of what they know.

To conclude the above, one may say that the different explanations of the term 'philosophy' and Che Hsueh given by the west and the Chinese make the direction of the thoughts of the two slightly different.

(ii) The different directions of western and Chinese thoughts

In their search for wisdom the western philosophers often start off by investigating pure knowledge of the objective subjects in which they are interested, and many of them do not particularly require themselves to put their knowledge into practice. Thus the direction of their thought often tends to conceptual investigations. Some hold that philosophy is a study of linguistic usages. However, if one considers that the important subjects in western philosophy are theory of knowledge, metaphysics and ethics, then anyone who has really studied Chinese philosophy must agree that the Chinese philosophers also have, more or less, touched upon the same subjects, although whether or not they are intended to establish a theoretical system of the subject is another question.

In ancient China, philosophers such as the later followers of Mo-tze, Kung-Sun Lung, Hui Shih, Chuang-tze and Hsun-tze had

touched upon the thoughts of formal logic. However, they seldom intended to research into logic. Hsun-tze, for example, discussed the theory of names (Ming) and that of the rectification of names (Cheng Ming), and also mentioned the solution of the three confusions (Huo) which is considered to be rich in logic, yet his concern was with the relations of names to morality and not logic in its own terms. On the other hand, starting from the very beginning, the Chinese thinkers were skilful in the use of dialectic. The ANALECTS and MENCIUS, for example, are dialectical dialogues. In Hsun-tze's book, chapters XXI and XXII for example, are dialectically written. As to the problems of knowledge, such as its origin, its nature, its scope, some of the Chinese philosophers also offered a substantial discussion. Hsun-tze, for example, discussed, though incompletely, the origin of knowledge in his theory of Epistemological Mind. Therefore, although the Chinese thinkers do not establish a well-founded system of theory of knowledge, one cannot say that they have never said anything about it.

As to the theory of metaphysics, I CHING, or THE BOOK OF CHANGES, is a book which tries to give an explanation of the fundamental principle of the universe in terms of I or change which arises out of the interaction of the two cosmic forces of Yin and Yang or the passive and active principles⁸. Also in Mo-tze's theory, his doctrine of 'the will of heaven'⁹ and that of 'honour to god and ghosts'¹⁰ are rich in a metaphysical sense. As to the Confucianists,

8. For details, please see I CHING. 易經繫辭傳 Hsi-Ts'u Chuan.

9. 天志 T'ien-Chih. Please see MO-TZE, chapter XXVI.

10. 尚鬼 Shang-Kuei. Please see MO-TZE, chapter XXXI.

Confucius himself suggests Jen as the way of moral practice in order to enable man to know the order of nature or the goal of man's life¹¹; Mencius considers that human nature is good and he suggests that by the practice of 'perfection of the Mind and understanding of one's own nature'¹² one may know the order of the universe; and Hsun-tze suggests that by a Sage Mind man may know and practice the Ultimate Principle of Man which is the goal of man's life. They establish and complete a system of humanistic moral metaphysics. This tendency in Chinese thought is certainly different from cosmic metaphysics or theistical moral metaphysics in the western tradition. However, one must accept that all these inquiries into metaphysics, the western or the Chinese, are branches of metaphysical thought.

With regard to ethics, it seems that this has been of special concern in Chinese thought. Confucius considered Jen as the ultimate source of Li or propriety and Yi or righteousness, and he advocated the theory that to practice Jen is the free choice of man. Thus he opened the gate of moral freedom and the theory of moral humanism was then founded. After him, the theories of either Mo-ism or Tao-ism or Confucianism tend to be based on this foundation. For example, the 'Sage' in Mo-tze's theory¹³; the 'real man', 'ultimate man' and 'heavenly man'¹⁴ in Chuang-tze's theory; the 'Chün-tze' and 'great man'¹⁵ in Mencius; and the 'Sage' and 'Great

11. 知天 Chih T'ien.

12. 盡心知性 Chin-Hsin Chih-Hsing.

13. 聖人 Sheng-Jen.

14. 真人 Chen-Jen, 至人 Chi-Jen, 天人 T'ien-Jen.

15. 君子 Chün-tze, 大人 Ta-Jen.

Confucianist'¹⁶ in Hsun-tze, are all descriptions of those with ideal personality. In conclusion, the characteristics of ethical thought of the traditional Chinese thinkers are mainly twofold: (1) they emphasize man's absolute freedom in morality, and (2) they believe that if a man practises according to an objective and universal moral ideal, he will eventually achieve it within himself. In short, they reveal a strong sense of moral humanism.

Besides these three subjects, the ancient Chinese philosophers also gave their opinions on such subjects as politics, aesthetics, history, laws, economics, education, mathematics, physical or natural science, medical science and culture. Therefore one may say that they had produced almost all branches of philosophical thought. However, historically, the Chinese philosophers tend to concentrate on what concerns them most, i.e. morality. The general direction of their efforts has developed the spirit of Chinese philosophy. What then is the spirit of Chinese philosophy?

In the tradition, Confucian philosophers often tend to establish a philosophy of a moral ideal. Confucius is the first philosopher to exude a strong sense of moral humanism. The later traditional Confucianists also devotedly follow his emphasis on knowledge and practice of a moral ideal, and this becomes a traditional spirit of Confucian philosophy. They consider that man's life and livelihood is a reality, and the ultimate goal of man's life is morality. They also consider that the external world is also a reality,

16. 聖人 Sheng-Jen, 大儒 Ta - Ju.

and by means of senses and experience, man may achieve general knowledge of such a reality. They never question the existence of external reality, since they believe that it forms the physical or material world and man's epistemological world. However, they only care about the practical use of this common-sense reality, and its relation to man. As to the reality of man's life and livelihood, they find that only in the pursuit of a moral ideal may a man enjoy his absolute moral freedom, and he may achieve a sense of satisfaction through his fulfilment of a moral life. As regards the extension of morality to society and the country or state, this may be considered to be a minor detail of their concern. This is also a common tendency or essential spirit in the thoughts of Taoists and Moists in the Pre-Ch'in Period. This tendency extends to modern times. Therefore one may say that their concern for men and morality actually becomes the traditional spirit of Chinese philosophy. In short, the spirit of moral humanism is a consistent direction in Chinese philosophy.

Therefore anyone who says that there is no philosophy in China or that there is no western style of philosophy in the Chinese thought is one who does not have an overall understanding or comprehension of Chinese thought and who also does not thoroughly realize the spirit of the Chinese thinkers.

B: THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN CHINESE CULTURE

Throughout the past three thousand years in Chinese history although, in politics, there have been over ten changes of dynasties, its cultural life has never been suspended. Viewed from

the standpoint of internal or national affairs, although there are five main groups which make up the Chinese nation¹⁷, in politics the strongest group rules; and in culture the barbarian¹⁸ group is influenced and civilized. Viewed from the standpoint of international affairs, in politics those who offer tribute to the sovereign are treated with courtesy and respect, and those who invade the territory are resisted and fought; while in culture, no matter whether far or near, many countries are influenced, more or less, directly or indirectly, by the Chinese. The Chinese certainly should not, and in fact did not, feel excessively proud about their long history in culture, but they should reflect upon the reason for its continuity in order to carry on the heritage so as to pave the way for its future progress.

The history of Chinese politics, is indeed a succession of order and disorder, or the rise and fall of dynasties. It is true that only the emperors or the important officials can enjoy the freedom of political power and interest. As to the ordinary masses, they not only do not enjoy such a freedom, but also do not have a guarantee of their life and livelihood. However, has the Chinese culture thus ceased to flourish or been held back at a certain stage without further development as some scholars suggest¹⁹?

17. 漢 Han, Chinese. 滿 Man, Manchu. 蒙 Men, Mongol.
回 Hui, Mohammedan, and 藏 Tsang, Tibetan.

18. 夷狄 I-Ti.

19. G.W.F. Hegel, for example, holds this view. He considers that a subjective development in Chinese history has been absent since Han Dynasty. For details of his theory, please see Hegel's PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, First Part, chapters I and III.

The answer must certainly be negative. In fact, one has to separate the unnecessary entanglement between politics and culture before one can see clearly what culture is.

In Chinese political thought it is true that the theory of rule by morality which originates from the ideal of moral achievement is, indeed, only a way of ruling but not a system of politics. Most of the Chinese philosophers do not carefully and thoroughly ponder upon the actual problems of politics and are merely concerned with the way of ruling; no matter if they are confined either in their times or in their tradition, this must be considered to be a crucial obsession of their thought and serious defect of their theory. However, such a defect should not, and in fact did not, stop the continuity and development of Chinese culture and civilization. One cannot deny that this may have been, directly and indirectly, somewhat of a hindrance to the development of Chinese culture, yet it certainly cannot suspend its life. In the following pages an attempt will be made to clarify the concept of culture and to sort out the characteristics of Chinese culture. By then, the value of Chinese philosophy may be established, and a fair criticism of the value of Hsun-tze's thought in Chinese philosophy and culture may be reached.

(i) Culture and civilization

What, then, is culture?

Culture originates, roughly speaking, in the existence and livelihood of a nation. In other words, when a nation continues its existence and livelihood, its culture will certainly live on.

The levels of culture may be divided into three:

(1) Its lowest level originates from Man's basic needs in his existence and livelihood to invent material cultural instruments. One may call this level the 'cultural level of instrumental reality'.

(2) While man's basic needs in his existence and livelihood have gradually been solved he, the human being as a whole, also accumulates simultaneously his cultural heritage, including the technique of producing cultural instruments, language, gesture, writing system, arts, knowledge, mythology, religion, custom, and social practice including family and social systems, political institution and organization. His cultural accumulation gradually increases and extends: this gradually forms universal cultural patterns. One may call this level 'cultural level of accumulation'. In this level what is significant is that there is a gradual tendency to form, according to the universal ideal and belief of the 'cultural group', a current of cultural spirit which is separate from its 'level of instrumental reality'. 'Cultural group' means the constitution of at least the majority of the intellectuals and thinkers and the majority of the masses. Cultural spirit is the conscious selective accumulation of 'cultural mentality' or mental patterns.

(3) After their basic needs have been met human beings evolve their culture by the progress of either (a) improvement in their standard of living, or (b) response regulated by the traditional spirit of their culture to external or internal challenges or stimulations. The mode of their responses may be suggested as follows:

(a) by various forms of competition: A culture advances by responding to challenges by means either of dominating conquest of other cultures, or of competitive co-existence with other cultures, or of acculturation of other cultures. This may be called the positive response, or 'response of dominance'.

(b) by various forms of changes: A culture survives by means either of borrowing from other cultures in order to supplement its deficiencies, or of complete adaptation to or imitation of other cultures, or of transformation in order to avoid a cultural death. These different changes are in order in a degree in which a culture loses its determination. This may be called the negative response, or 'response of gradient'.

(c) by various forms of harmonization: A culture develops by means either of improvement brought out through cross-fertilization with the achievement of other cultures, or of improvement as a result of its own creative resources, or of integration or of convergence with other cultures in order to smooth the conflict without losing its self-determination. This may be called the integral response or 'response of concord'.

One may call this level the 'cultural level of process'.

In every level of process, culture itself is bound to attain a new level of accumulation, which may form a new accumulated cultural pattern. Each new accumulated cultural pattern may also become the base for the next cultural challenge or stimulation. Therefore one may conclude that culture as a whole is 'a functioning

dynamic system which originates from man's basic needs and evolves itself to an accumulated base by which its cultural spirit may lead to a natural improvement or an imperative response to its internal or external challenge or stimulation'.

Thus one may see that the existence of cultural products is static, while the spirit of culture, or its mental pattern, which is a continuous universal ideal and value distinctively featured itself in the constant accumulation of cultural experience in the nation, is dynamic. One also may see that to be able to deal with the internal or external challenge or stimulation depends upon the cultural spirit and not cultural products. The dynamic energy of culture lies internally in the energy current formed by cultural consciousness and cultural responsibility of the 'cultural group'. The term 'civilization' may have various interpretations. If one concentrates on its Chinese term Wen Ming²⁰ which may mean 'enlightening or awakening from culture', one may interpret 'civilization' or Wen Ming as 'the various aspects of consciousness in thoughts and livelihood of a nation, including principally the consciousness of morality, the consciousness of humanism, the consciousness of culture, the consciousness of society, the consciousness of nation and the consciousness of politics'. However, the term 'civilization' in modern days is used popularly to indicate material enjoyment and utility rather than mental awakening, a fact which is confusing²¹. It may be suggested that culture is a dynamic evolutionary process including the cultural products and cultural spirit, while civilization

20. 文明 Wen-Ming.

21. Oswald Spengler, for example, sees the period of civilization as the period of decline. Please see his work DECLINE OF THE WEST, Vol.1, pp.31,104.

denotes the various kinds of consciousness possessed by the 'cultural group' in the nation. Civilization originates after culture, and it is in direct proportion to its cultural spirit. If the cultural spirit of a nation is of high intelligence, the manifestation of its civilization is comparatively distinctive. In other words, if a nation continuously possesses a highly intelligent universal ideal and value, its people may also cherish various aspect of consciousness in thoughts and livelihood, and elevate their cultural spirit to a higher level.

The Chinese possess rich cultural products and a distinctive cultural spirit, however it has not yet reached the state of ultimate civilization, i.e. full possession of all kinds of consciousness of the cultural group. One of the reasons for this may be suggested to be that although the Chinese thinkers in the past consciously contemplated issues of morality, of humanism, of culture and of nature, they still were in need of development in the aspects of social and political consciousness. That is why, in China, there were unstable dynasties and unjust societies. Although there were merits in the theory of kingly politics and ethical social structure, or in the Confucianists' term 'harmonious moral unity in politics', the Chinese people were not led to a further progress toward the state of ultimate civilization. However, Chinese culture has never been suspended, a fact which is also undeniable.

(ii) The characteristics of Chinese culture

The key cause of the existence or decay of a culture may be suggested to be as follows:

(1) Due to the internal and external challenge or stimulation, culture itself produces an imperative response. The origin of such a response must lie, however, in the cultural consciousness of the 'cultural group'. In other words, the cultural consciousness is the necessary and efficient cause of the cultural dynamic process. Cultural consciousness means man's understanding and critique of his past cultural experience, his ability of cultural selection and his sense of cultural succession, evolution and diffusion. Therefore, if the cultural consciousness of a nation is significant its cultural life, in principle, will be suspended. This may also prove that although the consciousness of politics and the consciousness of society in a nation such as China have not yet been manifested or developed, it does not follow that its cultural life must then lag or lapse or fall into decay or suspense.

(2) As to the strength of its energy-current of response, it is determined by the cultural spirit of the 'cultural group'. The ideal traits of the cultural spirit may be suggested to be as follows:

(a) Homoeostasis: the ability to constantly stabilize the distinctive internal cultural traits, or to correct its unbalanced cultural life.

(b) Dynamic equilibrium: the functioning balance of the conflict between immanent base and external challenge or stimulation.

(c) Autonomy of culture-selection: the freedom to select the distinctive foreign culture as a fertilizer for self-improvement, reconstitution, revolution or convergence.

(d) Intellectual insight into the variable(s) of the changes and intellectual philosophy of cultural eugenics.

In conclusion, the cultural spirit is determined by the 'cultural group'; the more conscious members it gathers, the stronger cultural energy-current it aggregates. If the cultural spirit is sufficiently high, the durability of this culture will be incomparable, infinite, inexhaustible and invincible, and it certainly can dispel challenges and respond to stimulation.

(3) If a culture is able to constantly keep its durability, in its response to challenge and stimulation, it will also be qualified for historical continuity and evolutionary mobility which are the reasons for its continuous existence.

Therefore it is clear that the efficient cause of the continuous existence of a culture lies in the cultural spirit of the 'cultural group'. It is certainly not influenced by one man or a small group, nor does it follow an external, objective and necessary cultural law²². In other words, the zenith or fall of a culture is determined by the success or failure of the cultural energy-current of the 'cultural group'. From this one may see that the mechanistic theory of cultural life, which says that culture has its destiny similar to human life, i.e. growth, old-age, illness and

22. Oswald Spengler, for example, holds this view in his DECLINE OF THE WEST.

death, or that culture is similar to natural seasons, i.e. spring, summer, autumn and winter²³, is dogmatic. The unilinear conception of cultural evolution toward a 'golden age'²⁴ is not true either. If one bears in mind that cultural autonomy is in the hands of the 'cultural group' and that only if a nation possesses sufficient cultural consciousness and sense of cultural responsibility may it hold firm its culture-autonomy and durably continue its life, then one will not fall into those groundless pessimistic or optimistic beliefs. Although man himself is not the unique efficient cause of cultural process, and one should not neglect the fact that culture itself with its accumulation and heritage may also form one of the determinating causes of its evolution, one must see clearly that man himself or, more precisely, the 'cultural group' itself, is the main necessary cause of culture, or the main necessary origin of cultural energy-current, or the main necessary structure of cultural dynamics.

After the above conceptions have been established, one may turn back to the characteristics of Chinese culture or the Chinese cultural spirit, which made it significantly durably and

23. N. Danilevsky, for example, holds that the period of civilization of a nation is as short as that of the blooming of flowers. When this period passes, the culture will lapse. Danilevsky takes the example of the T'ang Dynasty in Chinese history to illustrate his theory. However his views on Chinese culture are shallow and dogmatic. For details of his theory, please see Danilevsky's *RUSSIA AND EUROPE* (translated by K. Notzell).

24. The progressively linear theories of the evolution of humanity advocated by the 17th century western philosophers such as Turgot (1727-1781), Condorcet (1743-1794) and the Encyclopedists.

continuously existent and still existing. In the past few thousand years in the many challenges which it faces, the modes of its responses are either the response of dominance, or the response of gradient, or the response of concord²⁵. However, what the Chinese 'cultural group' have expressed are, roughly speaking, two things: (1) intellectual intuition, and (2) ideal moral practice or sage practice. These two cultural characteristics were spread into four interconnected cultural types of thinking:

- (1) The emergence of the way of thinking expressed in the BOOK OF CHANGES²⁶.
- (2) The continuity of thought in the BOOK OF CHANGES²⁷.
- (3) The moral seriousness and self-strengthening, self-improvement and self-renewal of thought in Confucianism²⁸.
- (4) The harmony and integration of life aimed at by Confucianism²⁹.

25. For discussions of the Chinese cultural responses to challenges, please see for examples: LUN CHUNG-KUO WEN-HUA WEN-T'I by T'ang Chün-I and others, and Huang Wen-Shan's WEN-HUA HSUEH T'I-HSI, Vol.2.

26. For example, in I-CHING, the 卦 Kua or diagram of 既濟 Chi-Chi or 'already completed' is immediately followed by the last Kua of 未濟 Wei-Chi or 'not yet completed'. The idea of these Kua implies that the author tries not to limit the mind to a certain conclusion but urges one always to start a new direction of thinking.

27. For example, the author often emphasizes the notion of 生生 Sheng-Sheng or 'live and multiply without end' to denote the concept of 久 Chiu or the long-lasting nature of human life and cultural life.

28. For example, the Confucianists advocate the practice of 內聖外王 Nei-Sheng Wai-Wang or 'internal sage and external king'. A moral agent should, they claim, internally be as virtuous as a sage and externally be as noble in personality as a Sage-King.

29. For example, the notion of 天人合一 T'ien-Jen Ho-I or 'the unity of heaven and man' by means of moral practice. The Confucianists believe that by constant moral practice, man may achieve Oneness with the universe and he will then have no worry but only joy in his life.

These four classes of thought have accumulated a great deal of knowledge which cannot be discussed in detail here as it is not the subject of this thesis. However, these two cultural characteristics or four cultural classes of thought pave the road for Chinese culture to evolve with dignity, positively, harmoniously and in balance. They keep its state of homoeostasis, develop its dynamic equilibrium and supervise its autonomy of culture-selection, and they are the reasons for the durable, continuous and dynamical existence of Chinese culture throughout history.

It is hoped that the above analysis may give a sufficient understanding of Chinese culture and its spirit of mental patterns.

(iii) The role of philosophy in Chinese culture

The role of Chinese philosophy lies in the formation of the cultural spirit. The BOOK OF CHANGES provides the skeleton for Chinese cultural life while Confucianism provides its flesh. The former advocates a theory of biological evolution of cultural life while the latter supplements its development by a theory of moral humanism which significantly flows in the cultural energy-current of its cultural evolution.

The Confucianists emphasize social and ethical morality which thus forms a strong tradition of exaltation of rites and righteousness and respect for moral training or education. This certainly influences the livelihood of the general masses so that they live according to a certain moral standard or pattern. In fact, most of the local customs in a village are based on certain moral

codes which, providing that they do not run to extremes, are a strong moral influence in assisting the stabilization of the people and society. If the followers of Confucianism are able to reflect upon the meanings of these moral codes and to understand the teaching and efforts of earlier sages, they may then realize the meaning and value of man's life and livelihood. When they reach the state of a moral personality, the human world and the physical world become only a convenient means of their livelihood, and their mental life will enjoy a great independence. This is the process of knowledge and practice of morality described by the Confucianists as well as many other schools of Chinese thinkers. In short, they all seek the great independence of man's mind, or its absolute liberation. They also teach their followers to respect others, and to take others as an example of learning. This forms a general attitude of the Chinese thinkers when they face a cultural challenge or stimulation. Buddhist thought, for example, was introduced to China around the early years of the first century A.D. However, it was not until the T'ang Dynasty, over six hundred years later that it was gradually developed into three significant Chinese Buddhist sects: T'ien T'ai Hua Yuen (Avatamsaka) and Ch'an or Zen³⁰. One of the main reasons that these Buddhist sects were particularly adapted to Chinese society and flourished and developed there was that the spirit of the Mahayana or 'Great Vehicle' school was similar to the spirit of Chinese moral humanism. They therefore converged and integrated, and in later years paved the way for the Li Hsueh school³¹.

30. 天台宗 T'ien T'ai Tzung, 華嚴宗 Hua Yuen Tzung,
 禪宗 Ch'an Tzung.

31. 理學 Li Hsueh.

which flourished particularly in the Sung and Ming Dynasties, and which became a significant branch of thought in Chinese history. In other words, the Chinese philosophers in the past on one hand directed the traditional Chinese cultural spirit into cultural challenges or stimulations and, on the other, consciously selected aspects of foreign culture and eased the conflict between traditional cultural base and external challenge or stimulation. Thus with their intellectual insight and intellectual intuition they evolved Chinese culture into a more convergent and integral state. Their common cultural spirit of moral humanism and their cultural consciousness therefore worked as an engine and they moved and are still moving the life of Chinese culture to live on with great durability in history.

Therefore the role of philosophy in Chinese culture lies in its enlightening and instructing of the spirit of moral humanism in the nation and also in its intellectual insight and intellectual intuition in cultural challenge, stimulation or changes to which it puts into full play its function of homoeostasis, dynamic equilibrium and autonomy of culture-selection. Its value must be based on these.

In the above discussion an attempt has been made to analyze the role of Chinese philosophy in culture which is important when the value of Hsun-tze's philosophy in Chinese culture is estimated.

C: THE VALUE OF HSUN-TZE'S THOUGHT IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
 AND CULTURE

In Hsun-tze's philosophy there are certain theoretical defects which affect, directly and indirectly, his academic position in the history of Chinese thoughts. His theory has few followers, and he was often criticized as being a defective Confucianist, an accusation which was unjustifiably made against him. Certain of his theoretical defects are a theoretical problem, yet the value of his thought as a whole must not thus be degraded or diminished. The spirit of his philosophy is important to the development of Chinese thought. As discussed before, Hsun-tze is the most thoroughgoing advocator of 'Man-ism' and 'Moral-ism' in the Pre-Ch'in Period, and his theories are always in correspondence with the spirit of moral humanism. His theory of the Way of the Mind reveals his advocacy of the moral practice of 'internal sage and external king'. His theory of the Mind as a whole expresses the ideal of the unity of the Ultimate Principle or Tao and man. His theory always lays emphasis upon the knowledge and practice of morality, and his ideal state of moral perfection or the state of a Sage which richly reveals the spirit of ethical metaphysics encourages a cultural spirit of self-respect, self-discipline, self-improvement, self-strengthening and self-renewal. He thus participates in and assists the formation and development of the cultural energy-current of Chinese culture. These make his writings a philosophy of carrying on the heritage so as to pave the way for further generations.

The last paragraph of the last chapter (chapter XXXII) of HSUN-TZE, which is quoted below, may be found interesting:

'The commentators argued, "Hsun-tze is not so great as Confucius". This is not true. Hsun-tze was pressed by a chaotic world and was compelled by difficult circumstances. In his early years, there was no capable and virtuous king, and in his old age, he lived into the time of the tyrannical Ch'in king. Thus in his lifetime, the institutions of rites and righteousness were not observed, the ideals of moral education and influence were unfulfilled, the ones who practised Jen were few, the whole world was immersed in darkness, those whose moral cultivation were perfect were taunted, and the feudal nobles were in great confusion and caused chaos. At that time, the wise were not given a chance to make plans (for the country), the capable to administer and the virtuous to be employed. Therefore the kings were deceived and failed to see the truth, while the capable and the virtuous were rejected and exiled. Consequently, although Hsun-tze had a great sage mind, he had to disguise himself with feigned madness in order to let people believe him to be stupid. THE BOOK OF ODES says, "He who is wise and sage-like will protect his own life". The case of Hsun-tze may serve as an example of this saying. And this is why he was falsely accused, his followers were not many and his fame was not widespread. Nowadays scholars may learn the sayings and teachings which Hsun-tze left behind, which are sufficiently great to be a pattern and example to be followed by the world. Those who keep it will be enriched by it, and those who are under its influence will be impressed and pervaded by it. If one considers his moral excellence, one will understand that Confucius did not surpass him. However, people did not carefully investigate this and argued that Hsun-tze was not a Sage. What can one do about this? The world was not well-governed, and Hsun-tze did not meet a satisfactory opportunity. His virtue was as excellent as that of Yao and Yu, but few people knew it. He did not adopt the popular theories of his contemporaries and he was thus suspected and slandered. However, his wisdom was most bright, he followed the Ultimate Principle and his conduct was in righteousness: all these were sufficiently excellent to be the standard principle of life to others. Alas! How capable and virtuous he was! He should have been a king . . . Now the commentators also do not carefully investigate the truth but easily believe the ill fame attributed to him. His times were different, (in such a disorderly world), how could the reputation (of a sage) be known? He had no opportunity in politics, how could the success of politics be achieved? However, his devotedness in morality was perfect and his virtue was great; who can say that he was not capable and virtuous?'

(XX, 18)

The contents of the last six or seven chapters are an assortment of miscellaneous records without a central theme, which are often irrelevant to the thought of Hsun-tze. Most later scholars agreed that they were not written by the same author as the previous chapters, and were counterfeited by other later scholar(s). However, the paragraph quoted above is extremely interesting and in fact quite important. It seems that someone, after reading through the whole book, tried to give his evaluation of Hsun-tze and to come to his defence against those commentators who attempted to exalt Confucius and to defame Hsun-tze. This may also give some indication that in his lifetime, Hsun-tze was not popular and after his death, his thoughts were also not appreciated. Although in this paragraph, the writer did not give detailed information of the accusations of the commentators against Hsun-tze, nor did he himself give a critical examination of Hsun-tze's thought, it is obvious that the writer was greatly in favour of Hsun-tze and suggest that Hsun-tze, in his moral excellence, was as great as Confucius.

The moral excellence of Hsun-tze is, in practice, due to a lack of documentation, not easy to subject to textual research, and therefore one may find that the above comments do not help much in justifying the value of Hsun-tze's philosophy. However, if one considers that in his theories, his meritorious thoughts that (1) all men can become a sage which reveals a spirit of moral autonomy, (2) that knowledge and practice of morality must go hand in hand, which indicates the importance of moral practice, and (3) that thus he expresses his ideals and belief in moral humanism and his sense of

cultural responsibility, which encourages the flow of cultural energy-current to move forward in later history, one will find the necessary intrinsic value of his philosophy in Chinese culture.

Hsun-tze is the last great thinker who assists the movement and development of Confucianism in the Pre-Ch'in Period, and undoubtedly he is also one of the greatest Confucianists in Chinese history and philosophy and culture. Hsun-tze, like most Chinese philosophers, expresses his moral experience in, more or less, a subjective way. He does not treat moral philosophy as a subject-matter of conceptual investigation or theoretical analysis. He often speaks from the viewpoint of an individual judgement and he often makes statements based on personal experience. Therefore, he is not a moulder of moral concepts. There are inevitably some flaws in his theories. However, because of his great concern with man and his moral destiny, and his profound theory of the way to moral perfection, he is a great philosopher and he is worthy of respect.

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX 1:

A HISTORICAL RECORD OF HIS LIFE

An account of the life of Hsun-tze was written by Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-86 B.C.) about 100 B.C., not much more than a hundred years after Hsun-tze's death¹. It is as follows:

'Hsun² Ch'ing³ was a native of Chao⁴. It was not until he was fifty that he first came to widen his learning in Ch'i⁵. . . . Those people such as T'ien P'ien⁶ were all dead. In the time of King Hsiang of Ch'i⁷, Hsun Ch'ing became the most important scholar. At that time, Ch'i was still filling vacancies in the ranks of the Tai Fu or High Official⁸, and Hsun Ch'ing was thrice chosen as Chi Chiu⁹. Some people of Ch'i might possibly have slandered Hsun Ch'ing, in consequence

1. 司馬遷史記孟荀列傳 Ssu-ma Ch'ien's SHIH CHI; Meng-Hsun Lieh-Chuan.
2. 荀 Hsun, Surname.
3. 卿 Ch'ing. This is probably a form of title to honour Hsun-tze who was once the magistrate of Lan-Ling.
4. 趙 Chao, a feudal state, arose in the early period of the Warring States. Chao occupied the northern area of 晉 Chin by dividing the territory of Chin with 韓 Han and 魏 Wei, this including the central and northern parts of present 山西 Shansi and southwest of 河北 Hopeh. It existed during 376-229 B.C.
5. 齊 Ch'i, a feudal state conferred on the 魯 Lu family by 周公 Chou-Kung or the Duke of Chou, brother of 武王 Wu Wang or King Wu, the first ruler of the Chou Dynasty. During the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, Ch'i became the most powerful state, however, it was annexed by Ch'in in 221 B.C.
6. 田駢 T'ien P'ien, a native of Ch'i. Almost nothing is known about him. He lived in about 300-200 B.C. He was usually considered a Taoist.
7. 齊襄王 Ch'i Hsiang Wang, reigned 283-265 B.C.
8. 大夫 Tai Fu. In order to encourage scholars to gather in the capital, Ch'i offered the honorary title of Tai Fu or High Official. The title was given without any actual governmental power.
9. 祭酒 Chi Chiu. In ancient sacrificial ceremony, one officer who was officially named Chi Chiu and who normally was the most prominent among the High Officials, represented the court to offer wine to Heaven and Earth.

of which he went to Ch'u¹⁰, and was appointed the magistrate of Lan-Ling¹¹ by Lord Ch'un-Shen¹². When Lord Ch'un-Shen died, Hsun Ch'ing lost his position, and he made his home at Lan-Ling. Li Sze¹³, who afterwards became the prime minister of Ch'in¹⁴, was once his disciple. Hsun Ch'ing detested the politics of the disordered world of his time. Declining states were ruled by tyrannical princes who did not follow the great Way or the Ultimate Principle¹⁵, but turned to sorcery and incantations, and believed in omens and sought blessings from gods. Hsun-tze despised those shallow-minded and low scholars and those fellows of little learning, such as Chuang Chou¹⁶ and others. He also satirized the chaotic world. He therefore recommended the practice of the Confucian and Moist ethics¹⁷ in the hope that the chaotic situations could be rectified and the social order restored. He wrote several tens of thousands of words and died. He was buried in Lan-Ling.'

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10. 楚 Ch'u, a large feudal state in the south of Chou. It occupied 湖北 Hupeh, 湖南 Hunan and part of 河南 Honan and 江蘇 Kiangsu. After having been one of the leading states during Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, it was annexed by Ch'in in 223 B.C.
11. 蘭陵 Lan-Ling. A place in 山東 Shantung.
12. 春申君 Ch'un-Shen Chün, one of the 'Four Nobles' in the Warring States. He was the only one among the four having no princely blood. He was made prime minister and was ennobled as a prince by 楚考烈王 King K'ao-Lieh of Ch'u who reigned from 263-238 B.C.
13. 李斯 Li Sze.
14. 秦 Ch'in was established in 770 B.C. It occupied the western area of Chou. It gradually expanded during Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. In 249 B.C. Ch'in swallowed Chou. In 221 B.C. it extended its dominance over the whole empire and unified China.
15. 道 Tao, please see p.24, Note 37. For detailed discussion of Tao, please see Chapter III of this thesis.
16. 莊周 Chuang Chou, or Chuang-tze.
17. Hsun-tze implemented the Confucian ethics by his theories of the Ultimate Principle and his advocacy of the practice of the Way of a Sage. However, Hsun-tze did not agree with Mo-tze's theories and it is not known why Ssu-ma Ch'ien considered that Hsun-tze had recommended Moism.

About half a century later Liu Hsiang (77-6 B.C.) edited a new version of Hsun-tze's work, and he wrote a preface on the life of Hsun-tze, which is the only other early account one can find of this philosopher. Liu's account is as follows:

'Hsun Ch'ing was a native of Chao, his given name was K'uang¹⁸. In the time of King Hsuan¹⁹ and King Wei of Ch'i²⁰, those capable and virtuous of the empire were gathered at Chi Hsia²¹, and were honoured and favoured. People such as Tsou Yen²², T'ien P'ien, Ch'un Yu-K'un²³ and many others were titled as Tai Fu or High Officials, and all were praised by the world. They all wrote books to criticize what was happening at that time. During this time, Hsun Ch'ing possessed scholastic talent. When fifty, he first came to widen his knowledge in Ch'i. He thought that the types of doctrines of the contemporary philosophers were all contradictory to those of the ancient kings. Hsun Ch'ing was good at THE BOOK OF ODES, RITES, THE BOOK OF CHANGES and THE SPRING AND AUTUMN²⁴. At the time of King Hsiang of Ch'i, Hsun Ch'ing became the most important scholar; Ch'i was still filling the vacancies of the ranks of Tai Fu or High Officials, and Hsun Ch'ing was thrice chosen as Chi Chiu. Some people of Ch'i might possibly have defamed Hsun Ch'ing, and consequently he went to Ch'u. There he was made the magistrate of Lan-Ling by Lord Ch'un-Shen, the prime minister of Ch'u. Someone might have said to Lord Ch'un-Shen, "T'ang with a piece of land of seventy Li²⁵ became king; King Wu, with a hundred Li, also became king. Hsun Ch'ing is a virtuous man, now you offered him a piece of land of a hundred Li, is he not then dangerous to Ch'u?" Lord Ch'un-Shen dismissed Hsun Ch'ing, and therefore Hsun Ch'ing left Ch'u and journeyed to Chao. Later a guest said to Lord Ch'un-Shen, "When I Yin²⁶ left

18. 況 K'uang.

19. 齊宣王 Ch'i Hsuan Wang, 342-324 B.C.

20. 齊威王 Ch'i Wei Wang, 378-343 B.C.

21. 稷下 Chi Hsia, a place in Ch'i.

22. 鄒衍 Tsou Yen, a native of Ch'i.

23. 淳于髡 Ch'un Yü K'un, a native of Ch'i.

24. 詩經 SHIH CHING, 禮經 LI CHING, 易經 I CHING,
春秋 CH'UN CH'IU.

25. 里 Li, a unit of linear measure in ancient China, a Li is about one third of a mile.

26. 伊尹 I Yin, a prime minister of Yin Dynasty (c.1384-1111 B.C.).

Hsia and served Yin²⁷, Yin became the ruler of the world, and Hsia decayed. When Kuan Chung²⁸ left Lu²⁹ and served Ch'i, Lu became weak and Ch'i strong. Hence where there is a virtuous and capable man, the ruler is honoured and the state is at peace. Now Hsun Ch'ing is the most virtuous and capable man in the world, and does it not worry the state that he is left?" Thus Lord Ch'un-Shen sent his men to Hsun Ch'ing in the hope of re-employing him. Hsun Ch'ing refused with a letter criticising Ch'u to Lord Ch'un-Shen. Because of this letter, Lord Ch'un-Shen was displeased and decided not to employ him again. However, Hsun Ch'ing returned and became the magistrate of Lan-Ling again. When Lord Ch'un-Shen died, Hsun Ch'ing lost his post, since then he made his home at Lan-Ling.

Li Sze, who afterwards became the prime minister of Ch'in, was once Hsun Ch'ing's disciple. Han Fei, alias Han-tze, and Fou Ch'iu-Po³⁰ were also taught by Hsun Ch'ing, and all later became famous scholars.

While Hsun Ch'ing was invited to serve the nobles, he met King Chao of Ch'in³¹. King Chao at that time took delight in fighting and conquering, but Hsun Ch'ing tried to persuade him with the method of the Three Dynasties. He went also to Ying Hou³², the prime minister of Ch'in; yet no one was able or willing to employ him. He went to Chao, and discussed military affairs with Sun Pin³³ in front of King Hsiao Ch'eng of Chao³⁴. Sun Pin held that the army should be changeable and cunning, whereas Hsun Ch'ing insisted that "kingly soldiers" should not be so; both did not approach to an agreement. Consequently Hsun Ch'ing was not employed by Chao. . .

Hsun Ch'ing died about a hundred years later than Mencius . . . He had never been employed by the rulers of his time till his death, and spent his old age in Lan-Ling.'

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27. 殷 Yin, an alternative name for the latter half of the Shang Dynasty.
28. 管仲 Kuan Chung, a prime minister of Ch'i in the Spring and Autumn period.
29. 魯 Lu, a feudal state in the east of Chou. It occupied Shantung area, during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods. In 249 B.C. it was annexed by Ch'u.
30. 浮丘伯 Fu Ch'iu-Po, not much known about him. He is said to be a 仙人 Hsien-Jen or an immortal by some Han people. However, Liu might mention this name only according to heresay.
31. 秦昭王 Ch'in Chao Wang, 306-251 B.C.
32. 應侯 Ying Hou.
33. 孫臏 Sun Pin, a native of Ch'u. He is the descendant of Sun-tze, a strategist noted for his book, 孫子兵法 SUN-TZE PING-FA.
34. 趙孝成王 Chao Hsiao Ch'eng Wang, 265-245 B.C.

According to the statement that 'when fifty, he first came to widen his knowledge in Ch'i', it is believed by many scholars that this was about 286-85 B.C., when he was in Ch'i. Thus his date of birth might be suggested to be as early as 336-5 B.C. Also according to the statement that 'when Lord Ch'un-Shen died, he lost his post', Lord Ch'un-Shen was assassinated in 236 B.C., and thus Hsun-tze's death should not be before 236 B.C. However, since there is hardly any record with details of his date, one may only suggest that Hsun-tze was active between 286-5 B.C. and 236 B.C.

APPENDIX 2:

H S U N - T Z E ' S W O R K

The first edition of HSUN-TZE was compiled by Liu Hsiang (77-6 B.C.) who arranged the text in 32 chapters. Although it is doubtful that the last five or six chapters were written by Hsun-tze or the same author as that of the previous chapters, the text has been adopted since.

The earliest commentary known is by Yang Liang of the T'ang Dynasty, who edited the work and rearranged it into 20 volumes in 818 A.D., whose edition became an authority on which all later texts were based.

More work on Hsun-tze was done in the Ch'ing Dynasty. In 1891 Wang Hsien-Ch'ien (1842-1917) edited a collection of commentaries on all the previous textual studies of Hsun-tze and this edition also became another basic text for studies of Hsun-tze.

The following is the list of the established order of chapters:

VOL. 1:	Chapter I	Encouraging Learning
VOL. 2:	Chapter II	Self-cultivation
	Chapter III	On Seriousness
	Chapter IV	On Honour and Disgrace
VOL. 3:	Chapter V	Reprimand of Phrenology
	Chapter VI	Against the Twelve Scholars
	Chapter VII	Confucius
VOL. 4:	Chapter VIII	The Merit of Confucianists
VOL. 5:	Chapter IX	The Institutions of a Kingly Government
VOL. 6:	Chapter X	Enriching the Country

VOL. 7:	Chapter XI	The King and The Oppressor
VOL. 8:	Chapter XII	The Way of a King
VOL. 9:	Chapter XIII Chapter XIV	The Way of Officials Obtaining Officials
VOL. 10:	Chapter XV	Discussion of Military Matters
VOL. 11:	Chapter XVI Chapter XVII	The Strengthening of the Country On Heaven
VOL. 12:	Chapter XVIII	On the Rectification of Errors
VOL. 13:	Chapter XIX	On Rites
VOL. 14:	Chapter XX	On Music
VOL. 15:	Chapter XXI	Dispelling Obsessions (Removal of the Obsessions of the Mind)
VOL. 16:	Chapter XXII	The Rectification of Names
VOL. 17:	Chapter XXIII Chapter XXIV	Man's Nature is Evil A Conscientious Man (The Emperor)
VOL. 18:	Chapter XXV Chapter XXVI	The Perfection of a Prime Minister Poems
VOL. 19:	Chapter XXVII	Scattered Sayings
VOL. 20:	Chapter XXVIII Chapter XXIX Chapter XXX Chapter XXXI Chapter XXXII	The Mottoes The Way of a Son The Practice of Rules Duke Ai Yao Asked

APPENDIX 3:

THE STRUCTURE OF HSUN-TZE'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY

	THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE (TAO)	THE MIND	MAN'S NATURE	THE MAN
<p>HIGHER LEVEL</p> <p>(Progress along the the Way of the Mind from a man to a Sage)</p>	<p>The Mind's unification with the Ultimate Principle</p> <p>↑</p>	<p>A Sage Mind or An Ultimate Mind</p> <p>↑</p> <p>The successful dealing with all changes of the external world</p> <p>↑</p>	<p>The Transformation of Man's Nature</p>	<p>A Sage (Sheng Jen) (a man with ultimate Jen and Chih)</p> <p>↑</p> <p>A Wise Man (Chih Jen)</p> <p>↑</p>
	<p>The Mind's practicing the Ultimate Principle</p> <p>↑</p>	<p>The accumulation of morally good Artifice</p> <p>↑</p> <p>The rational Deliberation</p> <p>↑</p>		<p>A Human-Minded Man (Jen Jen)</p> <p>↑</p>
	<p>The Mind's knowing of the Ultimate Principle</p>	<p>The Great Clear and Bright Mind</p>		<p>A Conscientious Man (Chün-tze)</p> <p>↑</p> <p>A Scholar (Shih)</p>
<p>LOWER LEVEL</p> <p>(Basic structure of man)</p>	<p>Ignorance of the Ultimate Principle</p>	<p>The Obsessed Mind</p>	<p>Evilness of Man's Nature</p>	<p>A Mean-Spirited Man (Hsiao-Jen)</p>

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