

The Foreign Policy of Greece Towards its Northern Frontier Problems (1990-93)

Vassilis Angouras

**Ph.D.
The University of Edinburgh
1998**

I declare that this thesis has been composed by me and is the product of my own work.

Vassilis Angouras

Abstract

In the beginning of the 1990s Greece found itself facing a number of foreign policy problems in its northern frontiers. Although these problems had historic character, they had been staying dormant for years. The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of ethnic conflicts which followed caused the re-emergence of these problems: the Macedonian issue, the issue of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace (in Greece) and the issue of the Greek minority in Northern Epirus (Albania), began to trouble Greek foreign and domestic politics. Today these issues remain unresolved although they cause less tension. Greek foreign policy between 1990-93 was pre-occupied with these issues which caused many additional international and domestic problems for Greece. By the end of the summer of 1993 the Greek government fell under fierce domestic rows over the outcome of these issues. Greek foreign policy over these years was characterised by nationalism and incompetence to grasp the opportunities which appeared in the changing Balkans. The political changes in the Balkans initially were welcomed in Greece. The government and the nation believed that Greece could use the new situation to its own advantage by achieving a more influential role in the region and thus extending its prestige within the European Union. The Yugoslav conflict and the frontier issues that Greece began to face raised fears over security concerns. The initial hope which characterised Greek foreign policy in the beginning of the 1990s was substituted by insecurity over the future power position of the state and its own survival. However, Greek foreign policy was also characterised by arrogance which was evident in the government's way of dealing with the Macedonian issue. Security concerns and power games were two aspects of Greek foreign policy. These aspects are based on the dual character of the perception that Greeks have about the position of their country in the world: arrogance and fear. Historic reasons have led to the building of this perception: the twentieth century conflicts which led to the creation of the present day frontier. So, in order to understand contemporary Greek foreign policy one has to look to these twentieth century developments which built Greece and shaped the identity of its people (Part A of the thesis). Second, one has to look carefully to the specific details of contemporary Greek foreign policy in order to see and describe the number of different policy aspects. The combination of different aspects in Greek foreign policy appear to be: nationalism, fear, power competition, domestic political antagonisms, European and American interventions. The particularities of the frontier problems that emerged in the 1990s can give further insight in one's efforts to understand this policy (Part B). By looking to history and the contemporary situation a number of questions can be put forward. This is the first step towards explanation. It appears that psychological factors as well as objective ones play significant part in shaping Greek foreign policy. The author of this study believes that subjective criteria play a significant role during policy-making. The policy-makers interact between them, they bear a number of values, and understand and act through their subjective interpretation of the environment. A theoretical model which focuses on the policy-maker and could help the process of explanation is offered in Part C. The Realist school of thought with its focus on the individual gave to the author the opportunity to put together a theoretical background. This theory discusses the interaction of the following dimensions of foreign policy-making which influence the persons responsible for it: the operational environment provides the set of rules: the psychological environment, the national images and values which shape the national myth (ideology) shape the attitude of the policy-maker; the national interest as a powerful psychological and pragmatic concept shapes attitudes by focusing on the question of survival and power; the domestic environment provides different meanings of the national interest and competitions within it affect the foreign policy-making process; the dimension of the small and weak state in international relations also shape the psychology of the policy-maker; territorial identities and disputes can create attitudes which see frontiers at risk of being violated. The explanation which follows in Part D, the result of a combination of interviews, documents and literature concludes in proposing a model of Greek foreign policy explanation which can be extended to the rest of the Balkans: history, domestic politics, images and values, nationalism, fear, arrogance, survival and power, real and imaginary notions contribute in shaping the attitude of the policy-makers and their policies. The explanation that this thesis offers shows why the 1990-93 period was not an unfortunate time in history. This period of crisis simply showed in a conspicuous way the dimensions which are always present in the Greek foreign policy-making process.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank,

Professor Malcolm Anderson for the considerable intellectual aid he provided as my supervisor, for the moral support in the early stages of my work and for the patience he showed waiting for the thesis to be finished. I admire his authority and style ever since I was an M.Sc. student and tried to incorporate a number of his useful suggestions in the discussion. Although the writing of a Ph.D. is a lonely process some of the aspects in here are the product of constructive co-operation and I hope he can feel proud for it. My second supervisor, Dr. Michael Henry Palairot proved to be a constant source of arguments which helped me considerably in the early stages of my work. He helped me develop a perspective by relating my own experience and thoughts to his deep knowledge of the Balkan politics and mentalities. I got rid of a number of my own prejudices through our interaction and heated discussions.

The honourable Mr. Mihalis Papakonstantinou, former Minister of Foreign Affairs for his interview and the material he gave me. The late Ambassador Manolis Kalamidas for accepting me at his house and for giving me a memorable interview. Professor Hristos Rozakis, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Professor Yiannis Valinakis, and Professor Dimitris Konstas for the interviews they gave me. Also, Assistant Professor Panayiotis Ifestos and Senior Lecturer Athanassios Platias for the discussion they had with me. Professor Theodore Coulombis for the material he sent me. The former Prefect of Xanthi Mr. Konstantinos Thanopoulos for the interview he gave me. The minister officials, party members and army officers for a number of useful discussion and information. Assistant Professor Yiannis Yfantopoulos and Professor Nikos Antonopoulos for the friendly support they provided with references in a number of instances. The Vice-Mayor of Athens Mr. Yiannis Pieroutsakos and the late Dr. Maria Mentzou for supporting my application for scholarship. The Ministry of National Economy for accepting my application for scholarship under the NATO programme. I wouldn't be able to start this work without this financial support. The Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy provided great help by letting me use its archives. The Library of the Greek Parliament also let me use its archives. Unfortunately, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs refused to help me.

My good friends Amy McNeese, Peter Mechan and Sarah Vaughan for taking time out of their busy schedules in order to proof-read my thesis. The very good friend Manolis Melissaris for reading parts of the thesis and for the useful comments he made. All the people who provided computing knowledge and machines: Prodromos Sariyiannis, Sarandos Vloyiannitis, Yiannis Angouras, Manolis (again), Nassos, Panayiotis, Elias and Christiana Polyzoidis who also spent time writing the interviews on paper. Milena Angouras for interviewing equipment. Katerina Angouras for useful tips. My loving friends in Athens, Kostas Kavanozis, Yiorgos Mikroudis, Savas Vergis and Takis Eliopoulos, always followed my progress and provided me with information and ideas. My friends in Edinburgh provided fun and warmth in dull and cold times and made sure that these years will always be well remembered: Angie Voilas and Prodromos Sariyiannis are the first friends I made here and showed love and care in difficult times. Sofia Antoniadou and Takis Voilas were kind and caring enough to lose their sleep and deal with my loneliness when I used to take advantage of their hospitality until the early hours of the morning. Claire Grier's smiles taught me never to lose hope. Dora Alexopoulou and Demetra Papakonstantinou were the guardians of my consciousness. Yiannis Karayiorgos and Vassilis Stathakopoulos were the funniest guys in town. I also thank the rest for just being there: Alexandros, Evi, Emilios, Stavroula, Stamatis Spyrou, Yiorgos Kounavis, Antonis Kalokiris and, of course, Spyros Ghangas and the "Jameson" nights with Spyros Kokotas. Special thanks to the other three members of "Tinella", Nikos Labaras, Apostolis Georgiadis, and Manolis (again). The time we spent rehearsing, playing live and talking about music and more is one of the most treasured memories I will have in my life. It was a short experience but unforgettable. Special thanks also to some more intimate friends: Demetra Kolliakou for getting me into this and for supporting me in the beginning; Christiana Polyzoidis for trying hard to make me believe that I could do it; Vaso Synodinou for actually making me believe that I could finish this work.

Again my brother and sisters, Yiannis, Milena, Katerina and little Maria for just being young. My Parents Miranda and Nassos know that I wouldn't be able to do any of that without their financial and moral support and maybe their pressure. I love them and dedicate this work to them.

Table of Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| List of maps..... | viii |
| Introduction | 1 |
| Part A: The Drawing of the Northern Greek Frontier..... | 11 |
| Introduction..... | 12 |
| Chapter 1: The Balkan Disputes from the Beginning of the Twentieth Century until the End of the First World War..... | 14 |
| 1. The Balkan Disputes over Macedonia | 14 |
| The Macedonian Question..... | 17 |
| The Greeks..... | 20 |
| The Bulgarians | 21 |
| The Serbs..... | 22 |
| The Albanians..... | 23 |
| The IMRO..... | 24 |
| The Komitadjis..... | 25 |
| Diplomatic Movements and the Role of the Great Powers..... | 27 |
| 2. The Balkan Wars | 29 |
| The Alliance Pacts | 29 |
| The First Balkan War | 30 |
| The Second Balkan War | 31 |
| 3. The Greek-Albanian Dispute over “Northern Epirus”..... | 34 |
| The Drawing of the Greek-Albanian Frontier..... | 35 |
| The Greek Reactions | 36 |
| Developments during and after the First World War..... | 37 |
| 4. The Problem in Thrace..... | 39 |
| 5. The First World War and Its Aftermath in Macedonia and Thrace | 40 |
| | |
| Chapter 2: The Inter-Balkan Politics until the End of the Greek Civil War.. | 46 |
| 1. The Exchange of the Populations..... | 46 |
| 2. The Inter-War Relations Between the Balkan Countries | 50 |
| 3. The Communist Factor in the Inter-War Period..... | 54 |
| 4. The IMRO in the Inter-War Period..... | 57 |
| 5. The Second World War..... | 60 |
| The Bulgarian Occupation of Macedonia and Thrace..... | 62 |
| The End of the War..... | 64 |
| 6. The Greek Civil War..... | 65 |
| | |
| Conclusion | 71 |

Part B: The New Frontier Problems and the Greek Foreign Policy (1990-93).....72

Introduction.....73
The Outlook of the Greek Foreign Policy 1990-93.....73

Chapter 3: Western Thrace and the Muslim Minority.....74
1. The Ethnographic Divisions of Western Thrace.....74
2. Greek-Turkish Relations and the Muslim Minority.....77
3. Discrimination Against the Muslim Minority.....79
4. The Reaction of the Muslim Minority and its Nature.....86
5. The New Attitude of the Greek State88
6. Greek-Turkish Relations and the Muslim Minority (2)89

Chapter 4: Greek-Albanian Relations and the Question of the Greek Minority in Southern Albania92
1. The Greek Element in Southern Albania93
2. Discrimination Against the Greek Minority.....94
3. The Treatment of the Greek Minority after the Collapse of Communism and the Foundation of *Omonia*96
4. Greek-Albanian Relations and the Greek Minority98
5. The Continuing Problems of the Greek Minority in Southern Albania.....106

Chapter 5: The New ‘Macedonian Issue’109
1. The Re-Emergence of the Issue in Greek-Yugoslav Relations110
2. The Post-War Attitude of the Greek State Towards the Issue.....113
3. The Foundation of the Independent Macedonian Republic and the Issue of the Name.114
4. The Slav Element in Greek -Macedonia115
5. The Greek Fears Towards a Possible Slav-Macedonian Irredentism.....117
6. An Account of the Major Events of the “New Macedonian Issue” (1990-93).....121
7. The International Reaction and Greek Foreign Policy133

Conclusion140

Part C: Frontier Problems and the Foreign Policy of a Small State..... 141

Introduction.....142

Chapter 6: The Foreign Policy-Making Process.....144
1. The Environment.....148
Psychological and Operational Environment149
Image and National Values151
a. The National Image151
b. The National Values.....153
The Domestic Environment...155
2. The Information.....157
3. The Concept of the National Interest in International Relations159
“The National Interest”: A Modern Concept.....159
Definition of the National Interest161

| | |
|--|----------------|
| Hans Morgenthau on the National Interest | 166 |
| A Vague but Important Concept.. | 169 |
| 4. Policy-Making..... | 169 |
| The Pre-Decisional Stage..... | 171 |
| The Decision..... | 175 |
| The Post-Decisional Stage..... | 177 |
| Chapter 7: Small States in International Relations..... | 179 |
| 1. Definition and Characteristics of Small States | 181 |
| 2. Constraints and Opportunities..... | 185 |
| 3. Likely Patterns of Behaviour and Policy Options..... | 188 |
| Chapter 8: Boundaries and their Effect on the Foreign Policy-Making | 195 |
| The Definition of Boundaries and Frontier Regions..... | 195 |
| Boundary Disputes | 198 |
| Territorial Disputes..... | 201 |
| Entering a Dispute: Reasons and Natures of Disputes..... | 202 |
| Types and Nature of Arguments | 203 |
| Resolving Disputes..... | 207 |
| The Significance of Territory and the Phenomenon of Irredentism..... | 210 |
| Conclusion: Some Questions about Greece, a Small State in the Balkan Power Politics..... | 219 |
| The Environment..... | 219 |
| The Information | 221 |
| The National Interest, Image and Values..... | 221 |
| The Policy-Making Process..... | 223 |
| Weakness Versus Potential | 223 |
| The Significance of the Boundary | 224 |
| Part D: The Explanation of Greek Foreign Policy towards the Northern Frontier Problems | 226 |
| Introduction..... | 227 |
| Some Epistemological Considerations..... | 227 |
| The Structure of the Explanation..... | 231 |
| Chapter 9: The Northern Greek Frontier and the Power Relations in the Balkans..... | 233 |
| The Balkans..... | 234 |
| Yugoslavia..... | 239 |
| Macedonia..... | 240 |
| Albania..... | 249 |
| Turkey..... | 251 |
| Chapter 10: The Greek Foreign Policy as a Hostage of the Domestic Political Interests | 257 |
| Chapter 11: The Public Sense of National Identity and its Effect on the Greek Foreign Policy..... | 268 |

| | |
|--|-----|
| Conclusions: The Foreign Policy of Greece Towards its Northern Frontier | 277 |
| On the Approach | 277 |
| A Model of Explanation | 278 |
| Operational Environment..... | 279 |
| Psychological Environment: the Influence of the National Image and Values in Shaping the Greek National Interest and Foreign Policy..... | 280 |
| Domestic Environment and Policy-Making | 282 |
| Policy-Making Burdens in a Small State | 283 |
| Frontier Disputes and Territorial Identity | 285 |
| Some Final Comments .. | 287 |
| PostScript | 293 |
| | |
| Part E: Appendices | 295 |
| | |
| Appendix I: Documents..... | 296 |
| Appendix II: Interviews..... | 302 |
| Appendix III: Newspapers, Magazines, Periodicals, The Internet | 303 |
| Appendix IV: Bibliography and References..... | 304 |
| | |
| List of Maps | |
| | |
| Map 1: The Balkan Peninsula in 1900 | 15 |
| Map 2: The Balkan States in 1914 | 34 |
| Map 3: The Balkan States after World War I..... | 45 |

Introduction

The history of the Balkan peninsula is a history of wars, boundary redrawing and population movements. It is also a history in which the peoples of the Balkans were continuously searching for their national identity and were, consequently, demanding their right to self-determination. But the establishment of the national identity was not an easy task.

Firstly, the movement of a number of nomadic tribes of the Balkans caused the mixing, assimilation and exchange of the populations. The constant interrelations between the different linguistic and religious groups which existed under the rule of the Ottoman empire created confusion among a number of people as to where they should place their allegiance at the period of the national awakenings. It would not be wrong to say that in some aspects the proximity of the national groups and their existence under one rule for so many centuries have created a common Balkan culture. Similarities throughout the Balkan nations in folk music, dances, cuisine and the use of so many common words in their languages are a proof of that. However, the differences among them often led them to fight bitter wars; and they continue to do so even during the final few years before the end of the twentieth century. Religious affiliations proved to be an important factor for one's identification with a certain nation. Language would also be another important factor. Surprisingly however, some ethnic groups would claim that other groups with a different religion and different language were in fact their kith and kin on the basis of their shared traditions, historic presence in a certain area and "ethnic purity". Many backward and poor communities identified themselves with a certain nation only after a fierce cultural war between Churches and their schools took place or after they backed down due to the intimidation they suffered by armed bands. Every new ethnographic study would be quickly contradicted by another which would come out with different findings. The confusion remained and it seemed that wars with their tragic consequences would be the only, if forceful, solution to this problem.

Secondly, because the establishment of a national identity is closely related with the existence of a real or imaginary “motherland”. But how could the boundaries of each “motherland” be determined? The territorial claims that each national group had in the beginning of the century were overlapping each other. The wars and population movements that followed did not answer this question since they left a sense of resentment to a number of nations even if they had fought in the victorious side. Many thought that some of their “own” territory was finally granted to other nations. Along with the territory a number of their compatriots were left on the other side of the border and “suffered” under the authority of an alien nation. This sense of resentment triggered some official or unofficial action by states or groups which out of interest for the welfare of their “compatriots” published material, organised demonstrations and attended conferences in international fora. The stability that the Cold War had imposed made sure that they always fell short from making direct territorial claims.

The ethnic conflict that spread throughout Yugoslavia in the 1990s showed that the resentment that some nations had over the settlement of borders and territories, even within the boundaries of the same state, never ceased to exist. Quickly the world, and of course the Balkan states themselves, began to fear that this resentment could trigger further ethnic conflict in the region. Greece, a Balkan state which is also a member of NATO and the EU soon found itself involved in the new issues that were emerging after the end of the Cold War. As was the case with other Balkan states, Greece had gains and losses during its efforts to “liberate” all the regions considered to be “Greek” in the beginning of the century. Greek populations were left out of the modern Greek nation-state. Non-Greeks were also left inside its boundaries. The new situation in the Balkans prompted the Greek state to re-adjust its foreign policy. The neighbouring countries ceased to be Communist but the question that now emerged was whether they should be willing to negotiate new terms of co-operation or whether they should become bearers of revisionist claims.

The northern Greek frontier borders Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM), Bulgaria and Turkey. Most of these countries were Communist

and the Greek foreign policy towards them had to be to a large extent compatible with the policies of NATO. And it was. Greece was relying on NATO for the protection of the part of its territory which bordered Communist countries. Any territorial claims, or allegations about the mistreatment of minorities could be easily conceived as part of the Communist propaganda and threat that a Western country like Greece faced. NATO, however, was there to defend its security. Greece's main foreign policy concern was Turkey, a NATO ally which, however, was implicated in major controversies with Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean's continental shelf.

But the developments in the Balkans meant that Greece lost its strategic role in NATO. In addition, the rest of the Balkans could someday join in. And as it had happened in the controversies with Turkey, where NATO as well as the EU did not wish to get involved or take sides, the same could happen again. NATO and the EU quickly made clear that they wished to preserve the stability in the region but did not want to take sides. In the wake of the resurgence of ethnic conflict and minority movements Greece found itself facing a number of issues that had existed for a long time, but that Greek foreign policy was designed either to ignore or to tackle with half measures hoping that some time they will simply vanish.

The Greek minority in Albania (in Northern Epirus) formed its own political parties, established relations with groups in Greece whose aims are dubious, and asked the support of the Greek state. The Socialist Republic of Macedonia declared independence, and the use of a name and symbols which the Greeks believe belong to them were conceived as territorial claims against Greece. The issue of the Slav minority in Macedonia, which for the Greek state does not exist, could become a major problem in the relations of the two countries and could be used by the FYROM in any future territorial claims. Bulgaria, a state which in the twentieth century had a number of revisionist views over boundary settlements, recognised the FYROM state but did not recognise the Macedonian nation. Could that mean that Bulgaria would sometime in the future resume its earlier views about the identity of the Slav-Macedonians according to which they are ethnic Bulgarians? And if Bulgaria was turning once again to a revisionist state would it

just try to annex the FYROM or would it also adopt the Slav-Macedonian claims about a Slav minority in Greek Macedonia thus taking its territorial aspirations even further? In addition, the Muslim minority in Western Thrace, comprised of three ethnic groups, Turks, the Slav-speaking Pomaks and Gypsies, began to make strong demands for recognition of its human rights by the Greek state. Turkey was soon implicated by expressing its interest in the welfare of the Muslim minority, and accused Greece of mistreatment. Everything showed that although Greece was trying for years to leave the Muslim minority out of the Greek-Turkish controversies the issue *was* there and could easily become the focus of territorial conflict.

After a period of successive coalition governments which stayed in office for a few months, the party of New Democracy won the absolute, although slim, majority in the parliament in April 1990. It formed a government that had to deal with the emerging issues as soon as possible. The new developments in the Balkans presented Greece with an opportunity to increase its influence in the Balkans, expand the interests of Greek businesses in the region, and enhance the prestige of the country internationally. Greece had been for a period the “bad boy” of both NATO and the EU. Greece had dropped out from the military wing of the alliance after the invasion of Cyprus and had created numerous problems in the Community by vetoing all the decisions which tried to improve relations between Europe and Turkey and by constantly siding with Britain in trying to disrupt the process of European integration.

The new conservative government wanted to change all that. The Gulf War proved a remarkable opportunity for Greece to re-establish its position as a reliable ally and member of the Union and the government of Mr. Mitsotakis seized this opportunity. As a member of the West the Greek government wanted now to attract the attention of the Balkan countries that desperately wanted Western help to re-build their economies under liberal democratic institutions by becoming the spearhead of the European policy in the Balkans. This would give Greece a new role in the Balkans since its strategic importance in NATO had been diminished with the demise of the Eastern Bloc.

The new government wished to approach the issues that emerged in the Balkans with moderation and in a manner that would not damage its prestige abroad. This proved to be a very difficult task. Soon the whole country was talking about the new frontier problems. A wave of nationalism overwhelmed the population. The opposition was trying to capitalise on the government's shortfalls and a split within the top level of the government was reflected in contradicting actions. The European partners soon began to lose patience with Greece which seemed to be a real candidate for entering the Balkan conflict. They wanted Greece to act more responsibly. Although the government tried to do its best on other issues that concerned the Union, like the Maastricht treaty, its policies on the Balkans and especially on the new Macedonian issue was dictated by public feeling, pressures from within the party, and the opportunism of the opposition. Although Mr. Mitsotakis tried to reverse the public feeling and his government's policies the tide had swept away New Democracy's future in power. In the end, the slim majority of two proved to be fragile. The government fell in the end of the summer of 1993 after the ousted Foreign Affairs minister Mr. Samaras left the party in order to form with some nationalist MPs a new party which promised that it would not compromise Greece's national interests.

For a Greek student of politics who had been brought up and educated in school as a patriot but who did not want to compromise his own free ability of thinking, witnessing all these events raised a number of questions in his mind. Why did the Greek government behave like this? Why political differences and interests could play such a part in shaping Greek foreign policy? Why the Greek public, which although patriotic did not seem to be hysterical, was demonstrating in its millions and dictated in such a profound way the government's actions. Living abroad made the author look to the events with prudence but "nationalist" feelings were also present inside him. Explaining the foreign policy of Greece over this three year period would probably answer these questions and bring peace to his mind.

This thesis is the result of study and research and provides an explanation of Greek foreign policy between 1990-93 in relations to the problems mentioned above. Other

authors dealt with the same questions and published their views in papers and books. This study does not wish to refute the validity of other works. The aim of the author is to place his work alongside other works in a wider discussion that is already under way on Greek international affairs. Naturally, as a part of a wider discussion this thesis has similar arguments and findings with other publications. The difference of this work is the perspective under which the Greek foreign policy is approached, analysed and explained. This perspective offered by the author constitutes the contribution and the originality of the thesis:

First, the Macedonian, Northern Epirus and Western Thrace issues are studied together. Although these issues that troubled the Greek government had their own particular aspects, nevertheless they had similarities and a tremendous combined effect on Greek political life. There are publications which dealt with these issues but a comprehensive study of all three issues does not exist. The 1990s in Europe began with a re-emergence of nationalism which followed the early stages of re-assertion of people that had lived under oppressive communist regimes. The Balkans bitterly witnessed this and Greece could not get away from this effect. The Greek minority in Albania started to demonstrate its affiliation with Greece and created problems for Greek-Albanian relations. The Macedonian issue which had remained dormant for years became a major international problem for the Greek government. Activities of the Muslim minority in Thrace triggered more troubles in the already troublesome Greek-Turkish relations. On the other hand, the collapse of the communist regimes provided Greece with opportunities to advance its political and economic interests in the Balkans. Greece as a more developed neighbouring and European country hoped that it could penetrate these new markets, influence the new political leaderships and finally assert a prestigious role in the region as a European/Balkan state. However, the response of the Greek government and public to the issues that emerged did not help the country to achieve this; on the contrary, the prestige of the country diminished and the Greeks found themselves “fighting” at the same time in three fronts stretching from the Adriatic to the Evros river. The implications of these issues were tremendous: the defensive, nationalist and aggressive attitude of Greece

(government, public and media) as well as the political exploitation of national matters were aggravated by any development in any of these three areas. So, the study of the three issues together was imperative in order to understand and explain Greek foreign policy.

Second, the approach of the subject and the method of research are unique in a study of Greek international affairs and indeed rare in international relation studies. Greece is a small state in a particularly volatile and troubled region and it is affected by developments not only in the Balkans but also in the wider area of the Eastern Mediterranean. Foreign policy issues and territorial disputes have troubled the population of this land for thousands of years. Yet, there are still people who call themselves Greeks and they feel proud for their ethnic survival through the centuries and the continuation of a unique culture which combines Ancient Greek philosophy, Christian Orthodox mysticism, European and Oriental ways of life. These achievements of survival and culture despite the constant presence of “threats” constitute two significant aspects of the imagined community¹ of modern Greeks and are reflected in the psyche of the population and the attitude of the state in its international affairs since the subjects responsible for policy making bear the same sense of national identity.

This question about the influence of history and identity on the policy-makers fascinated the author and the approach he followed constitutes an analysis of Greek foreign policy from a subjective perspective. That approach helped the author to produce an analysis that is both comprehensive and objective: the concepts of the Greek national identity and interest, and the subjective interpretation of them are reflected in a number of dimensions of Greek foreign policy that are dealt with and analysed in this thesis. These include the environment, the effect of domestic politics, history, image and values, territorial identity, mode of policy-making, the questions of power and survival. In order to implement the task that this approach had generated the following method was chosen:

First a theoretical background which would provide the author with the necessary route in which his thoughts and questions should be directed was put together. Because

¹ The term is used in the sense that Benedict Anderson uses it in his celebrated work *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, New York, 1991.

the author had questions about survival, power, image and identity which are vague concepts (with even more vague content when a student analyses these concepts in a particular case study), the views of the Realist school of thought were chosen as a background. However, this background would not be complete without a look into the specific dimensions of foreign policy-making of small states and on the effect of boundaries on the relations between neighbouring states. Although the material which was consulted in reference to these two latter aspects does not entirely belong to the realist school of thought it was nevertheless incorporated in the theoretical background which provided the author with the momentum to form assumptions about Greek foreign policy.

Second, after the assumptions were made in accordance with the subjective approach the author turned to the policy-makers in order to find answers to his questions. The method of research combined interviews, gathering of speeches in parliament and elsewhere and published material by the policy-makers. It also included interviews with academics who have been close to the foreign policy-making machine either from their posts in institutes or as deputy ministers. Minor government officials, party members, public servants and army officers were also interviewed as they were people responsible for the implementation of policies (but they wished to keep their anonymity). In addition, a number of documents were gathered, through difficult circumstances, which in a number of occasions serve as a corroborating material of the author's views.

The final product of this study under the approach and method described above is the present thesis which is structured as follows: the thesis is divided into four parts, each one with its own introduction and conclusion and a number of chapters discussing the topic of each separate part. *Part A* provides a historical background on the developments that lead to the drawing of the present Greek northern frontier. Although it is based on secondary sources, and therefore lacks originality, it was considered an essential prerequisite so that the reader could form an understanding about the impact that the numerous conflicts in the Balkans had on contemporary attitudes of the Greek state *vis-à-vis* its northern neighbors. It can also help the reader to understand the notions of the Greek identity, the importance of history in contemporary Greek politics and international

affairs that are discussed in the following parts of the thesis. *Chapter 1* reviews the events from the beginning of the century, the Macedonian Struggle, the Balkan Wars and the First World War. *Chapter 2* reviews the inter-war period, the exchange of the populations, the Second World War and the Greek Civil War. *Part B* is concerned with the post-war developments in relation to the frontier problems that troubled Greece until the end of the Civil War and describe the problems, events, and developments of the years 1990-93 that triggered this study. *Chapter 3* describes the situation of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace and reviews the effect that the presence of the Muslim minority in Greece has on Greek-Turkish relations. *Chapter 4* describes the situation of the Greek minority in Albania and the Greek-Albanian relations. *Chapter 5* reviews in some detail the problems that the New Macedonian Issue caused. *Part C* provides the theoretical background for the development of explanation of the events that were described in Part B. *Chapter 6* describes the different dimensions of policy-making by reviewing some well known works, most of which belong to the Realist school of thought. These dimensions are important in shaping the questioning of the author about the various aspects of Greek foreign policy. *Chapter 7* and *Chapter 8* provide theoretical background on the foreign policy of small states and the effect of boundaries in international relations respectively. Part C concludes with a number of questions about Greek foreign policy in relation to the problems of frontiers that the author formed after consulting the international relations theory. The conclusions of Part C also make reference to the findings of other works about Greek foreign policy between 1990-93 and compares them with the questions of the author. *Part D* resumes the questioning about Greek foreign policy but also provides the explanation of it. It begins with an introduction which includes some epistemological remarks which the author thought to be necessary in order to connect the questions in the end of Part C with the explanation of Part D. *Chapter 9* is the most important chapter of the thesis because the majority of the answers about Greek foreign policy will be found there. The major questions about the aims, hopes, constraints, environmental aspects, regional antagonisms, and threats, that troubled the Greek policy-makers between 1990-93 are answered in this chapter. However, the explanation continues with *Chapter 10* and *Chapter 11* which

provide explanation about two important dimensions, namely the effect of domestic political interests and the effect of the notion of national identity on the Greek foreign policy. Part D and the thesis end with some concluding remarks of the author about the findings of his work.

The reader may recognise some of the remarks in the conclusions. However, a comprehensive study of Greek foreign policy in relation to northern frontier problems in the 1990s has never been made before. In addition, it is the first time that the theoretical background proposed in Part C is used in explaining Greek foreign policy. As the reader will discover this use of theory not only leads to an explanation of the situation between 1990-93 but can also be used in explaining all aspects of contemporary Greek foreign policy. Finally, the method of research which combined documents (some of which have never been cited before) and interviews of various people related to foreign policy issues is unique in a study of contemporary Greek affairs. With these considerations in mind the author presents this study as an original and comprehensive explanation of Greek foreign policy.

Part A:

The Drawing of the Northern Greek Frontier

Introduction

The study of the frontier problems of Greece would not be comprehensive without a consideration of the development of the present frontier. This section of the thesis does not add anything substantially new to the knowledge of the Greek and international history of the first half of the twentieth century. It is based on secondary sources, some of them very well known. But it is an essential introduction for the development of the discussion in the following parts of the thesis because it describes the developments which led to the creation of the northern Greek frontier and the significance that history, nationalism, territory and even folk images had in shaping the Greek national objectives and subsequently the state's foreign policy. It will also show that these notions affected the domestic politics of the country to such an extent that they were partly responsible for the civil war. The argument of the thesis is that the legacy of this period is still present and affects Greek foreign policy especially in times of crisis. For that reason the events of that period should be presented and their importance should be kept in mind during the discussion in the following parts.

The northern frontier of Greece was the product of wars that swept the Balkan peninsula in the second decade of the twentieth century. The outcome of the Balkan and the First World wars was the expansion of the Greek territory and the creation of the northern Greek frontier as it stands today. The Second World War and the Civil War played a major part in consolidating this frontier only few decades after its creation at a time when the twentieth century was approaching its half-way mark.

This means that its creation had left a number of "unresolved" issues for some major actors and the fear to some that its less than fifty years presence (after its post-war consolidation) could at some point spark new disputes. These frontier conflicts involved nation-states which still in the early twentieth century were building their national identity gave rise to a particularly strong sense of nationalism and irredentism which were fuelled by stories of blood, torture, heroism and survival; the constant transmission of such stories can lead the members of a nation to develop a strong sense of common identity and belonging to each other.

Today these wars are not only the subject of history books but a part of the living memory of the Balkan nations since many men and women still survive to tell their stories: in books, the TV, in commemorative events and so on. The national sentiment and the ideals that accompany it are still fed by these stories. And so are, the politicians and their parties, the policy-making machine which struggles to combine the national pride with the weakness of the Balkan states in the international environment and finally, the Greek policy-makers.

The struggle for the creation of the northern Greek frontier has actually marked the face of contemporary Greece. The size of Greece, the demography of the population in ethnic terms, even the development and the political system of Greece are results of this period. So, a look to these events is imperative in the process of understanding the contemporary way of thinking of the Greek policy-makers and their attitude towards frontier problems.

Chapter 1: The Balkan Disputes from the Beginning of the Twentieth Century until the End of the First World War

The disputes on Macedonia, Northern Epirus and Thrace were constant during the 1910s. All the participants had in one way or another legitimate claims. In view of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire they wanted to acquire the highest possible number of lands and become a controlling state in the Balkan peninsula. The regions under consideration were sensitive cases because they reflected both national dreams of liberation and unification but also ensured a strategic advantage for the state that acquired them.

Unfortunately, it took three wars, two Balkan ones and the First World War, before the disputed regions could be ceded to someone. By the end of the decade, each country was counting the gains and the losses of the bloody fought battles and of the diplomatic competitions. Greece, Serbia and Albania were clearly the winners. Bulgaria was left (if the Ottoman Empire is not counted) as the great loser of the decade.

1. The Balkan Disputes over Macedonia

The starting point of the Macedonian question and of the tensions between Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia in the twentieth century, may be the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. This treaty was the result of the Russian-Turkish war of 1877 which Greece tried to exploit in Thessaly and Macedonia by instigating a revolt in which irregular bands attacked the Ottoman army stationed in these regions. The revolt failed but these bands continued to operate in Macedonia¹. Russia won the war and imposed the treaty of San Stefano on Turkey. According to this treaty an independent Bulgarian state would include a large amount of Macedonian and Thracian territory. Russia's aim was to make Bulgaria a client state of the Russian empire and facilitate the latter's

¹ Richard Clogg, *A Short History of Modern Greece*, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 88-9.

effort to dominate the Balkans and the Aegean sea². The reaction of Britain and Austria-Hungary was immediate and a new settlement, of the same year,



Map 1. The Balkan peninsula in 1900 (Source: Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol.2, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p.14)

in the Congress of Berlin was agreed. The new settlement provided independence for Romania, Serbia and Montenegro, but only autonomy for Bulgaria which was divided between the autonomous regions of Northern Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. Greece as a consequence of the same agreements gained some territory in Thessaly in 1881. Serbia and Montenegro also made some territorial gains. But Bulgaria not only had

²Douglas Dakin, *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*, Institute for Balkan Studies,

not gained independence but also the territory of the autonomous Bulgarian region was much smaller in size from what the Treaty of San Stefano had designed as the future independent Bulgarian state. The future annexation of territories up to the San Stefano boundaries would constitute from now on the ideal of the Bulgarian national aspirations and would be the hallmark of the Bulgarian foreign policy until the end of the World War II³. The problem for Bulgaria was that Greece wanted to acquire Macedonia as well as Thrace and the whole of Epirus. Serbian nationalist aspirations also included a part of the Macedonian territory as a necessary component for the making of the future Greater Serbia.

The 1908 Young Turk Revolution and the gradual secularisation of the Ottoman Empire gave to the Balkan nations new hopes for liberation and unification of the historic nation lands. Although the aim of the Young Turk revolution was the strengthening of a crumbling and corrupt empire many nationalities felt that they could use the opportunity and re-ignite revolutionary movements and manipulate the new secular institutions of the state. Bulgaria declared its independence and as a state now started to consider how it would annex the Macedonian and Thracian provinces and enlarge itself to the San Stefano boundaries.

In Greece, the political leaders were particularly concerned with the Bulgarian independence and were afraid of a future expansion of the Bulgarian state with the annexation of lands which they considered as Greek. Moreover, apart from the Bulgarian claims the Greeks had to consider Albanian and Serbian claims and a growing Romanian concern for the Vlach population of lands which were still officially under Ottoman rule. Ever since the Greek independence in 1827, the Greek national sentiment had been kept high in a number of occasions which were related with national matters such as the liberation of Crete, Epirus and, of course, Macedonia. The Greeks were inspired by the Great Idea (*Megali Idea*) which constituted the major national objectives of the Greek foreign policy until the Asia Minor Disaster of 1922. The objective was to regain all the lands which were inhabited by Greeks or were associated with Greek history since the establishment of

Thessaloniki, 1993, p. 27.

³Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, Vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 39, 117, 216.

the Byzantine Empire. The two main exponents of the Great Idea were the Orthodox Patriarchate of Constantinople which has always been under Greek control, and the Greek state. Although there was some conflict in their objectives since the Patriarchate aimed at establishing a Greek theocracy that would include other Orthodox peoples (Slavs and Albanians), and the Greek state, guided by the emerging bourgeoisie, wanted to extend its frontiers to regions where the Greek economic, cultural and social influence had been historically strong, there was always a strong feeling that one must help the other⁴.

Unfortunately, for them, the 1897 military disaster which the Greek army suffered from the Ottoman forces in a short war, proved to be a long lasting setback for the Great Idea. The political leaders were reluctant to take any action to address the lasting national problems and that aroused a bitter sentiment within the army. In 1909, the Military League, which was composed by many low rank officers, brought Eleutherios Venizelos into power. Venizelos was a prominent Cretan politician and a devoted supporter of the national claims. A few years before the Balkan wars the Greeks had a new leader who was willing to build a new Greece, bigger in size of both territory and population.

The Macedonian Question

Macedonia covers an area of about 67,000 square kilometres and its geographical limits are the Sar mountains and the hills north of Skopje in the north, the Rila and Rhodope mountains in the east, the Aegean coast, the mountains Olympus and Pindus in the south, and the lakes Prespa and Ochrid in the west⁵. These limits would also be disputed since some Serb historians claimed that Skopje were part of “Old Serbia”⁶ and some Greeks would claim as they do today that Macedonia’s northern limits were quite south from Skopje since the city was not a part of the Ancient Kingdom of

⁴Douglas Dakin, op. cit., p. 138.

⁵Elisabeth Barker, *Macedonia - Its Place in Balkan Power Politics*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1950 p. 9.

⁶Ibid.

Macedon. Other Greeks, though, adhere to the view that Macedonia extends north of Skopje⁷. Its geographical position is very important from a strategic and economic point of view since it controls the main north-south route from Central Europe to the port of Thessaloniki through the Morava, Vardar, and Struma valleys⁸.

In the beginning of the century Macedonia was inhabited by almost two million people of various ethnic origins: Turks, Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, Albanians, Vlachs, Jews, and Gypsies. Slavs constituted the majority until 1923⁹. The presence of the Greek element was particularly strong in the cities¹⁰. The ethnic character of the region became much more mixed during the nineteenth century as a result of resettlement and colonisation¹¹. The mixture of the population could not provide a basis for a definition of the national character of the province according to ethnic and linguistic criteria. In the pseudo-scholarly propaganda of the period¹² any researcher who tried to provide information about the national character of Macedonia tended to exaggerate the numbers and was mainly influenced by his/her national aspirations on the matter¹³. Another problem was that the region did not have any specific political boundaries. What was clear to all the contestants was that Macedonia was a region of strategic importance. The state that could get hold of Macedonia would have strategic control in the south Balkans¹⁴: roads and railways pass from Central Europe to Asia Minor and the Middle East; the control of Macedonia assured also an exit to the Aegean sea and Eastern Mediterranean (Thessaloniki for example was a port of major strategic and commercial significance).

All the claimants had a basis for their arguments. First of all, the historic background: the Greeks associated the province with Ancient Greece (Aristotle and Alexander the Great) and Byzantium; the Serbs and Bulgarians also had historical claims dating back to the medieval times in which the Serbian and Bulgarian

⁷Evangelos Averof-Tositsas, *Fotia kai Tsekouri*, (Fire and Axe), Estia, Athens, 1976, p. 28.

⁸Elisabeth Barker, op. cit., p. 9.

⁹Barker, op. cit., p. 10.

¹⁰Dimitrije Djordjevic and Stephen Fischer-Galati, *The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition*, 1981, Columbia University Press, New York, p. 162.

¹¹Djordjevic and Fischer-Galati, op. cit., p.161.

¹²Ivo Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia, Origins, History, Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1984.

¹³Barbara Jelavich, op. cit., p. 89

Kingdoms had acquired parts of the territory. The second was the ethnic factor. But, as it was said above, the mixture of the population did not allow an ethnographic definition of the population. This mixture of the population created confusion or provided the basis for the production of deliberate miscalculations. As a result, the interested Balkan nations were claiming large sectors of the population to be their co-nationals.

According to the 1906 census in the Ottoman Empire the inhabitants of Macedonia were divided to 1,145,849 Muslims, 623,197 Greek Orthodox, and 626,715 Bulgarian Orthodox under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Exarchate which had broken away from the Greek-led Patriarchate of Constantinople in order to increase Bulgarian influence in Macedonia¹⁵. A different estimate divided the Christian population of Macedonia to 648,962 Greeks, 557,734 Bulgarians and 167,601 Serbs¹⁶. These numbers were, of course, misleading because the Muslim's numbers included many nationalities like Turks, Albanians, Greeks and Slavs while the numbers for the Greek and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches did not take account of the fact that Serbs joined either Church and not one of their own. They do, however, bear some relation to the Greek-Bulgarian agreement of 1912, when the number of Greek and Bulgarian delegates in the Turkish Parliament was fixed to ten and seven respectively¹⁷. Greek estimations of the period referred to 513,000 Greeks (42,6%), 475,000 Muslims, Turks, Albanian and Gypsies (39.3%), 119,000 Bulgarians (9.9%), and 98,000 Others, mostly Jews (8.2%)¹⁸. Post-war Greek estimations would remarkably give a larger number of Bulgarians, 132,482 and a smaller number of Greeks, 497,339¹⁹.

Another problem was the ethnic definition of the slavophone peoples of Macedonia. No written Slav-Macedonian language existed at that time and the inhabitants of different regions were speaking different dialects. Some of these dialects were close to Bulgarian (mainly grammatically) and others to Serbian (mainly

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Barbara Jelavich, op. cit., p. 91.

¹⁶Elisabeth Barker, op. cit., p. 11

¹⁷Douglas Dakin, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁸Diomidis N. Petsalis, *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1978, p. 345.

phonetically)²⁰ especially north of Skopje which were similar to the Serbian Prizren and Timok idioms²¹. For others the Slav dialects of Macedonia had developed a distinctive character. Should then one consider the speakers of those dialects as the members of a unique nationality? Some of them considered themselves to be Bulgarian, others Serbian -especially those who followed the Slava custom- and others Macedonian although this feeling was not very deeply-rooted²². However, as it was proved later, language, although it was widely believed in Europe at the time that denoted one's ethnic origin did not play an important role in the propaganda war as the ecclesiastical ties, social prestige, and sheer conservatism²³.

For the Bulgarians, Serbs, Greeks, and Albanians the population of Macedonia was not a separate nationality. They used the term Macedonian to indicate someone who was coming from the particular province as they did from the 19th century²⁴. The Great Powers, in the 1878 Congress of Berlin where they presented their opinions, thought that Macedonia was an extremely mixed area but believed that at least within the Christian population the majority was Bulgarian, the Greeks were fewer albeit in large numbers and the Serbs were in fact quite few²⁵.

The Greeks

The Greek arguments were mostly based on the historical association of the Hellenes with Macedonia since the classical times. Under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and before the foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate, the Greek Orthodox Church played a very important role in keeping this association alive through the cultural and religious control of the region. Thus, the Greek political leaders believed that the inhabitants of Macedonia were really Greeks. When some different views on the ethnographic composition of Macedonia started to become widely known the Greek

¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.* p. 11.

²¹Ivo Banac, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

²²Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

²³Douglas Dakin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

²⁴Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

leaders continued to believe that the slavophone inhabitants were in fact Greeks who had come under pressure to adopt a Slavic language but had retained a Greek national sentiment²⁶. However, they did not just believe that. They also tried to ensure that the population would feel Greek and continue to do so. They favoured, therefore, the development of a huge number of Greek schools built and run by the National Society. A cultural war started soon in Macedonia and Thrace in which Greece won the advantage by building and running the largest number of schools²⁷. It is estimated that in 1902 there existed over 1,000 Greek schools in Macedonia with 70,000 pupils²⁸. The Greek speaking population was mainly concentrated in towns and large villages, especially in the south, but in many occasions Greek pupils had as their classmates numerous children of the Slav-speakers of Macedonia²⁹ who in their effort to gain social prestige wanted their children to acquire Greek education.

The Bulgarians

The Bulgarians had as their main weapon the Bulgarian Exarchate and they tried to help the Bulgarian Church to expand its authority in Macedonia. After 1870 hundreds of priests accompanied by teachers, all of them with deep nationalist sentiments, were sent to Macedonia in order to promote the Bulgarian culture, language and the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Church which was thought that it would bring thousands of people under the Bulgarian national cause³⁰. The result was that, where an issue of ecclesiastical jurisdiction arose, the inhabitants of the region could vote in order to cast their preferences. If in a particular area the inhabitants could form a two-third majority in favour of joining the Exarchate then this area would be transferred under the jurisdiction of the Bulgarian Church as a whole. And since a number of the slavophone population was attracted by the service in Bulgarian, they voted in favour

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Antonios Bouras Lieut.-Gen., *H Ellas Mesogeiake kai Valkaniki Hora*, (Greece, a Mediterranean and Balkan Country), Ant. Livanis, Nea Synora, Athens, 1977, p. 80.

²⁷Richard Clogg, op. cit., p. 95.

²⁸Douglas Dakin, op. cit., p. 19.

²⁹Dakin, op. cit., p. 21.

of joining the Exarchate and thus, both the authority of the Bulgarian Church and of Bulgaria in general, grew considerably. Bulgarian schooling expanded as well and in 1902 the Bulgarians had 592 schools with 30,000 pupils³¹.

A few years before the Balkan wars the authority of the Exarchate had expanded so much that the limits of its jurisdiction were not so different from the boundaries of the Bulgarian state as these were drawn in the Treaty of San Stefano³². The Bulgarians then had gained a profound advantage over the control of the Macedonian inhabitants. But the expansion of the Exarchate's jurisdiction did not produce the results that the Bulgarians hoped for. Because even in the villages where the Exarchist movement expanded there remained either a majority or a strong minority of Patriarchists and still the majority of the villages remained under the Patriarchist control³³.

The Serbs

For the Serbs the facts were a bit different and not to their advantage. The occupation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary limited the possibility of Serbian expansion there. In 1881 Serbia and Austria-Hungary reached an agreement according to which Serbia could move towards Macedonia. Serbia started by opening consulates in Thessaloniki and Skopje in 1887 which quickly got involved in a major propaganda campaign. This campaign, organised by the society of Saint Sava, naturally targeted the slavophones. Its major objective was to convince them, especially the inhabitants of the Skopje region, that they were "South Serbs". The main disadvantage of the Serbs was that they lacked a Serbian ecclesiastical organisation, something that did not allow the expansion of Serbian cultural and political control³⁴. This disadvantage was evident in

³⁰Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 15. Greeks and Serbs followed similar tactics.

³¹Douglas Dakin, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

³²Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

³³Douglas Dakin, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-5.

³⁴Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

the small number of schools they opened in Macedonia³⁵. By 1901 the Serbs had only 233 schools³⁶.

The Albanians

Among the above mentioned claimants one should add the members of the Albanian National Movement which was growing in strength at that time. The Albanian National Movement was stressing the cultural and linguistic unity of the Albanians and tried to overcome the religious differences between Muslims and Christians³⁷. Its main objective was the creation of an independent Albanian state which consisted of the four Ottoman vilayets of Ioannina, Kosovo, Bitola, and Shkoder. Others wanted the creation of an autonomous Albania within the Ottoman Empire which would include the vilayet of Thessaloniki. In any case, they were looking forward in acquiring disputed Macedonian lands. Since the Albanian nation was not yet independent, the leaders of the National Movement were particularly concerned with the fate of those Albanians who were living in Macedonia. They were afraid that the Macedonian Albanians would be the victims of a partition plan between the “official” contestants. Their fears grew, also, from the fact that other independent Balkan states were claiming territories that they considered Albanian: Greece was claiming the whole of Epirus and Serbia was claiming parts of their northern land. The Albanian League of Prizren claimed in response that the regions of Jannina and Arta should belong to an independent Albania³⁸. The Albanian nationalist leagues spread considerably after the Young Turk revolution of 1908, in Ioannina, Thessaloniki and Monastir (Bitola)³⁹. In order to tackle the problem posed by the fast development of the nationalist leagues founded by the other competing nations and in an effort to overcome their own fears the leaders of the Albanian National Movement founded special armed units which were supposed to defend the Albanian inhabitants of

³⁵Richard Clogg, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

³⁶Douglas Dakin, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³⁷Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-85.

³⁸Djordjevic and Fischer-Galati, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

Macedonia, and if possible to establish control over territories that could be useful for future negotiations⁴⁰.

The IMRO

The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation was founded in 1893 in Thessaloniki by the nationalist teachers Damian Gruev and Gotse Delchev⁴¹. The rest of its founding members were small merchants, teachers and other professional men⁴². At the beginning it was urban orientated and preached liberation, egalitarianism and social order⁴³. The peasants began to join the organisation later as a response to Ottoman abuses and not entirely due to nationalistic tendencies⁴⁴. Even from the beginning there existed differences of opinion in its ranks⁴⁵: Some members favoured close collaboration with the Supreme Committee for the “liberation” of Macedonia which was founded in Sofia in 1895 and the Bulgarian War Office. The Supreme Committee under the leadership of Boris Sarafov was particularly in favour of unification with the IMRO. The followers of the Supreme Committee within the IMRO were in fact supporting the unification with Bulgaria and they used the terms of autonomy and independence only as a pretext. This trend developed amongst the extreme right-wing faction of the IMRO which apart from a brief period of collaboration with the Communist left and the Comintern in 1924, became anti-Communist and also took active part in the domestic Bulgarian politics as an opposition to the Union.

The other faction was composed of those who favoured the creation of an autonomous Macedonia within a Slavic federation, by preaching that the people of Macedonia were brothers, and they became known as the Federalists. An element of that faction supported a genuinely independent Macedonian state although they were

³⁹Djordjevic and Fischer Galati, op. cit., p. 200.

⁴⁰Barbara Jelavich, op. cit., p. 87.

⁴¹Elisabeth Barker, op. cit., p. 16.

⁴²Barbara Jelavich, op. cit., p. 93.

⁴³Djordjevic and Fischer-Galati, op. cit., p. 178, Douglas Dakin, op. cit., p. 47.

⁴⁴Djordjevic and Fischer-Galati, op. cit., p.178.

a small group. This was the left faction of the party and after the First World War it developed strong links with the Communists and it ceased to be recognised as the IMRO. This name was left to the pro-Bulgarian wing.

They were all agreed that an armed insurrection was inevitable and they started preparations for it. The IMRO organised revolutionary committees in the cities and the villages and some of them developed their own armed bands which firstly appeared in action in 1898⁴⁶. Their first organised action was the Ilinden uprising against the Turks in 1903, which spread mainly in the Slavic parts of northwestern Macedonia, in the Monastir (Bitola) and Skopje regions, but did not actually take the desired proportions and met with a crushing defeat. The IMRO leaders were not really prepared for the uprising and did not want it to take place but they went ahead under pressure from Bulgaria and Russia⁴⁷. The result of the catastrophe according to Bulgarian sources was that apart from the deaths, 9,830 households were destroyed and 60,953 people were made homeless⁴⁸. After the Ilinden fiasco, the IMRO formed its own armed bands which co-operated with the Komitadjis and had the Bulgarian territory as their base for operations. In fact, Bulgaria was assisting with any possible means the IMRO because it thought that the real objective of the organisation was the unification with the independent Bulgarian state. It was a policy consistent with the major objective of the Bulgarian foreign policy to acquire the lands to create the Greater Bulgaria of the San Stefano boundaries.

The Komitadjis

The Albanian units and the IMRO bands which were mentioned above, were not the only armed bands operating at that time in Macedonia. Bulgarian armed bands, known as the Komitadjis, began operations in Macedonia. These bands were named

⁴⁵Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

⁴⁶Djordjevic and Fischer-Galati, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

⁴⁷Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*

after the various Macedonian Liberation committees which were spreading at that time in Macedonia and Bulgaria, especially the Supreme Committee. The real objective of the Supreme Committee under the banner of the liberation of Macedonia was the annexation of the region to Bulgaria⁴⁹. The Komitadjis attacked both the Ottoman army and the villages of non-Bulgarian ethnic groups. The other national groups had also formed their own armed bands which were fighting for liberation. They also attacked the bands of opposing national groups. These battles continued until the regular armies of each nation would try to solve the Macedonian dispute. Sometimes they even betrayed each other to their common enemy the Turks⁵⁰. Gradually, the term Komitadjis was covering all this guerrilla units which operated in Macedonia. The Serbian bands were organised by Davidovic Ljubomir in 1904⁵¹ but they lacked the strength of the Bulgarian and Greek bands. The Greeks had their own bands as well, which were organised and funded by the Church and the Greek consular offices in Macedonia⁵². The founder of the Greek armed bands was the Defense Society of Thessaloniki headed by Ion Dragoumis, the Greek Consul in the city⁵³. A number of Greeks from the Greek state participated together with a number of Cretans (Crete had not yet been liberated), Vlachs and slavophones, and they were distinctively dressed in black. These were the Macedonian-Fighters and this period of general unrest in Macedonia between 1904-1908 became known as the period of the Macedonian Struggle⁵⁴: During this period chaos reigned in Macedonia, despite the official protests by the European powers (especially to the Greeks) to halt the activities of the irregulars. Terror, extortion and the commitment of barbaric atrocities was the order of the day⁵⁵. In the end the Greeks prevailed, especially after the death of the heroic figure of Pavlos Melas which increased the number of volunteers who entered the Greek bands and the sums of money that were allocated

⁴⁹Barker, op. cit., p. 15.

⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵¹Ivo Banac, op. cit., p. 177.

⁵²Richard Clogg, op. cit., p. 95.

⁵³Djordjevic-Fischer-Galati, op. cit., p. 180.

⁵⁴An objective story of the Macedonian Struggle is provided in great detail by Douglas Dakin in his book op. cit..

to them. The Greek prevalence was heightened with the Greek offensive of 1907 that swept away the remnants of the Bulgarian and IMRO Komitadjis and was due to the favourable agreements that the Greeks established with the Turkish army, and to their superior intelligence, strategy and tactics that they used and resulted in very few casualties over the period of the Macedonian Struggle⁵⁶.

Diplomatic Movements and the Role of the Great Powers

The Great powers were concerned with the increasing tensions in Macedonia and they were afraid that a collapse of the status quo was imminent. Russia and Austria-Hungary which were particularly in favour of the status quo pressed the other powers to intervene. The problem was that both of them as well as France, Britain, Germany and Italy wrongly believed that the tension in the region was caused by the bad socio-economic conditions under which the population of Macedonia was living⁵⁷. They pressed, therefore, the Ottoman Empire to undertake serious economic reforms.

As far as the main protagonists were concerned the Greeks and the Serbs came first to an understanding on the Macedonian issue during the 1890s but in the turn of the century they still had major differences over the partition plans for the province⁵⁸. So, they continued to give their support to those cultural and armed organisations which were operating in Macedonia.

The Ilinden uprising and the intensity of the armed clashes between the armed bands forced the Great Powers and especially Russia and Austria-Hungary to take a new diplomatic initiative. They started pressing the Ottoman Empire to accept foreign economic advisers and a foreign controlled gendarmerie and to proceed to economic and agrarian reform under the auspices of the Murzsteg programme. The intervention of the Great Powers was greeted with some enthusiasm by the nationalities of

⁵⁵Many details in numbers are given by Douglas Dakin on the atrocities committed by the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians refer to Greek atrocities in the *Documents and Materials on the History of Bulgarian People*, edited by the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of History, Sofia 1969.

⁵⁶Douglas Dakin, op. cit., pp. 310-11.

⁵⁷Barbara Jelavich, op. cit., p. 94.

⁵⁸Ibid.

Macedonia under Ottoman rule which began to expect that a redrawing of the frontiers under their auspices was imminent⁵⁹. The Ottoman Empire initially accepted the programme under pressure by the Great Powers but it soon became clear that it was not willing to make any concessions, most of all because it was afraid of the domestic reactions. At the same time the continuing, Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek sabotage created a chaotic situation⁶⁰. Thus, the Murzsteg programme was doomed to fail.

The growing dissatisfaction of many middle class Turks and of officers of the Ottoman army led to the revolution of the Young Turks in 1908. The situation now changed rapidly. Many representatives of the unredeemed nations under Ottoman rule supported the Revolution because they thought it would open the way for them to gain, if not independence, at least an autonomous status. It soon became evident that the new Turkish rulers were not willing to grant any special new rights to these people and that they had to pursue their liberation objectives with the same radical ways as in the past. Greece, which a year later experienced a similar revolution of army officers who brought the nationalist and ambitious Eleutherios Venizelos to power and Serbia, together with the newly independent Bulgaria thought that it was the right time to exploit the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire and try to make territorial advances. As far as Macedonia was concerned, the three Balkan states were not favouring any sort of autonomy for the region and they all wanted to gain as much Macedonian territory as they could, because all these decades of cultural and armed struggle had persuaded them that the region was rightfully theirs⁶¹. The time for the Balkan Wars had come.

⁵⁹Richard Clogg, *op. cit.*, p.96.

⁶⁰Djordjevic and Fischer-Galati, *op. cit.*, p.190.

⁶¹Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

2. The Balkan Wars

The Alliance Pacts

Russia, a predominantly Christian Orthodox state, was very concerned with the developments in the Balkans. Its own objectives were to build a front against Austria-Hungary and to destroy the Ottoman Empire⁶². The independent Balkan states which were also predominantly Christian Orthodox were providing a good base for Russia in order to promote its interests. Russia managed by diplomatic means to persuade the Balkan states to overcome their differences for a while and to reach agreements⁶³. These agreements took the form of war alliances and they were, of course, aimed against the Ottoman Empire.

First, Bulgaria and Serbia reached an agreement in March 1912. The two countries signed a mutual defence pact in case of war with the Ottoman Empire in which Serbia would deploy 150,000 troops and Bulgaria 200,000. They had, of course, differences on the partition plans over Macedonia. Bulgaria supported an autonomous Macedonia (with the prospect of joining the Bulgarian state later) while Serbia wanted an equal partition arrangement. In secret clauses of the pact the two countries agreed that Serbia could take the lands north of the Sar Mountains while Bulgaria could take the lands east of the Struma valley and Rhodope.⁶⁴ With this agreement a large part of the Macedonian territory was left unassigned. The representatives of Serbia and Bulgaria agreed that in case of difference the Russian Tsar would act as mediator.

Later, in May, Greece signed an alliance pact with Bulgaria but no land arrangements were made. It was clear to the representatives of the two countries that each state wanted to make as many gains as possible. They decided then after Venizelos' proposal to leave the arrangements for the period after the possible war and the victory⁶⁵. They believed that they could reach to agreements with the help of

⁶²Barabar Jelavich, op. cit., pp. 96-97.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Chris M. Woodhouse, *Modern Greece, A Short History*, Faber and Faber, London, 1977, p. 191.

the Great Powers. This belief was based on the assumption that since the Great Powers did not want to create a constant source of conflict in the Balkans the postwar arrangements would entail the idea of compensation, that is, each state would gain an equal part of territory as the other member state of the alliance. Thus, a post-Ottoman balance of power in the Balkans could be established.

The First Balkan War

In October 8, 1912, Montenegro attacked the Ottoman Empire, despite the Great Powers' urging for restraint. The other Balkan states quickly entered the war without hesitation. The Third Ottoman army in Macedonia was in a very weak position. It had only 320,000 men against the 700,000 of the Balkan alliance. Moreover, the Ottoman state was in despair because of the domestic political and financial problems and it was extremely difficult to undertake, at that time, the tasks that a war requires. The Ottomans tried to use diplomacy in an effort to prevent the worst and they held meetings with Italian delegates and Albanian nationalist leaders. But this attempt did not achieve anything.

In the theatre of operations the Macedonian Ottoman army found itself in an increasingly difficult position, and was cut off from the core of the Ottoman Empire after a while. The Bulgarian army undertook a major offensive in Thrace and the Greek fleet prevailed in the Aegean sea, in which it gained full control, thus preventing the Ottoman army of getting supplies and reinforcements from Asia Minor. On the western front, Serbs and Greeks advanced rapidly, occupying a number of the disputed Macedonian lands. The Bulgarians who had been left behind due to their fighting in Thrace, concentrated their efforts on Macedonia, and together with the Greek army they engaged in a race over who would take first Thessaloniki. The Greeks proved to be faster and they entered the city in November 8, only one month after the break of the war. They liberated the city, occupying the centre and the larger part of Thessaloniki, forcing the slightly slower Bulgarians to stay in the city's northeast outskirts. It should be noted, however, that Thessaloniki was not

included in the San Stefano boundaries; it could be argued then that the Bulgarians did not actually want to create the Great Bulgaria whose “legitimate” boundaries would be drawn according to the San Stefano treaty but wanted to create the “greatest possible Bulgaria”.

The Ottoman Empire quickly gave up fighting and wanted to end the war as soon as possible. For the Turks it was now imperative to concentrate their efforts in dealing with the domestic problems that the war had created. The interested parties met in London in May 1913 and signed a Treaty in which the Ottoman empire was delimited to the Enos-Media line and the surrounding areas. Bulgaria gained Adrianople, and Crete was officially ceded to Greece. The Macedonian issue remained unsolved and another problem also arose, that of the Albanian independence.

Greece and Serbia expected to make some territorial gains in Albania but the Great Powers favoured the creation of an independent Albanian state. Italy and Austria-Hungary in particular wanted to prevent Serbia from gaining Durres and acquiring an outlet to the Adriatic sea⁶⁶. As a consequence Greece and Serbia expected to make some gains in Macedonia as a compensation for the Bulgarian gains. But before the end of the conference a new Young Turk government resumed the hostilities and the Turks suffered a new defeat. The representatives of all the conflicting nations resumed their positions in the conference in July 1913. The major issues, however, apart from the creation of the new independent Albanian state, remained unresolved and everything indicated that a second round of hostilities would be required.

The Second Balkan War

Although Serbia now had a common frontier with Montenegro it was not satisfied with the outcome of the Treaty because it had wished for its own outlet in the Adriatic. Greece despite the acquisition of Jannina, Thessaloniki and Crete was

⁶⁶Chris Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

disappointed by the Treaty of London and made new secret agreements with Serbia in May 14, 1913 in Thessaloniki for mutual war aid not only against Bulgaria but also against any other power in case of attack. This agreement was one of many proofs that in the multilateral Balkan conflict there is a tendency between Greece and Serbia to ally themselves⁶⁷. They even reached common ground over partition arrangements and promised that the one would support the other during the negotiations. They also made contacts with Montenegro, which started to act as a close Serbian ally, Romania which had claims on the north of Bulgaria and even the Ottoman Empire which in the prospect of an allied conflict renewed its interest in improving its position in the European part of the Ottoman possessions and to dispel the recent military disaster.

Bulgaria was not satisfied either. The gain of Andrianople did not meet the Bulgarian objectives at all. The Bulgarian leaders were preparing for a new war by which they could gain what they wanted but they misjudged three crucial facts: first, the Great Powers' support was not well-disposed; second, Bulgaria lacked the military might to engage in a conflict against the rest of the Balkan states; and third, the Macedonian people were not entirely Bulgarian and that a large number of Slav-speakers in Macedonia would not view the Bulgarian army as a liberation army.

Nevertheless, Bulgaria broke the alliance with Serbia and Greece and attacked the two countries in June 29, 1913. The Bulgarians probably wanted to demonstrate their power rather than launch a full-scale war⁶⁸. But this act of aggression was what Greece and Serbia wanted. They were prepared for war and, moreover, had persuaded other enemies of Bulgaria to take part. Montenegro joined Serbia, Romania attacked from the north and the Ottomans from the east. Bulgaria found itself in a position worse than the Ottomans had found themselves the previous year. The Bulgarian army was suffering continuous attacks and defeats from every direction. The Greek and Serbian armies in particular did not have much difficulty in crushing their Bulgarian opponents. Bulgaria soon realised its disastrous mistake and in July 1913 an armistice was signed.

⁶⁷Chris Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

⁶⁸Robert Lee Wolf, *The Balkans In Our Time*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1956, p. 94.

In the new treaty which was signed in Bucharest in August of the same year, Greece and Serbia were the great victors and made substantial territorial gains. Serbia took a large part of the northern Macedonia (the Monastir region in Vardar Macedonia) and almost doubled its territory in size. Greece, too, doubled in size by gaining southern Macedonia (Aegean), including Kavalla, and parts of Epirus, including Ioannina, together with Crete and Samos. The Romanians took northern Dobrudja and later Turkey regained Adrianople and Thrace to the Maritsa river. Bulgaria was limited to the Struma valley, after the border line between Bulgaria and Greece was designed to be the Beles mountains and the Nestos river. But it took Alexandroupolis (Dedeagatch), thus securing an outlet in the Aegean sea which, nevertheless, was difficult to retain in the future from a military point of view. Still, Greece and Serbia were not entirely satisfied with the final agreements which they reached; because of pressure of the Great Powers, Albania became independent and the two countries lost their chance to acquire the lands that they claimed in its territory. Bulgaria's position after the Balkan Wars was tragic and they only hoped that a later conference sponsored by the Great Powers would only revise the Treaty of Bucharest to their favour. To their disappointment it was not only the Balkan countries that were against such idea but also France, Italy, Germany and even Russia⁶⁹.

With the end of the second Balkan war a chapter of the dispute over Macedonia closed. The First World War did not cause any spectacular change; in fact, it confirmed Bulgaria's weak position over Macedonia. At the same time, however, another dispute started to trouble two Balkan states. The dispute was concerned with the fate of Northern Epirus, and the countries engaged were Greece and the newly independent Albania.

⁶⁹Douglas Dakin, *op. cit.*, p. 466.



Map 2. The Balkan States 1914 (Source: Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, p. 107)

3. The Greek-Albanian Dispute Over “Northern Epirus”

As it was mentioned above, both Greeks and Albanians had claimed the whole of Epirus. They were arguing that the province had substantial Albanian or Greek ethnic population and the land was rightfully theirs. The basic argument of the Greeks was that the inhabitants of northern Epirus were Greeks because they were classified in the Ottoman census as *Rumi*, and because the Greek language was used in the churches and schools. But the Albanian’s counter-argument was that the term *Rumi* was used by the Turks for all Orthodox Christians without distinction and that the Greek language was used because the Ottomans forbade the use of the Albanian

vernacular⁷⁰. Turkish numbers of 1908 claimed that in Northern Epirus there were 107,380 Greeks and 103,013 Muslims the majority of whom were Albanians. The numbers given by the Greeks of Northern Epirus itself, through the provisional government that they established in 1913, claimed that the Greeks were 115,025 while the Muslims were 110,677⁷¹. In Southern Epirus the official Greek statistics of 1907 gave 166,000 (81.4%) Greeks and 38,000 (18.6%) Muslims⁷². The majority of them, around 30,000 were Albanians living in the coastal region of Chamouria and were called Chams⁷³. These people provided the basis for the Albanian claims in Southern Epirus. There were allegations that the Chams suffered heavy discrimination in the hands of the Greek authorities ever since the region was incorporated to Greece⁷⁴. But specific details are missing.

The Great Powers, Italy and Austria-Hungary in particular, were in favour of an independent Albania because they wanted to prevent Serbia from gaining an outlet in the Adriatic sea. Italy would engage itself in a long involvement in Albanian affairs that would end only after the Communist victory after the Second World War. As a first sign of their determination, Italy and Austria-Hungary strongly protested against the occupation of the cities of Himara and St. Saranta, which had a substantial Greek population, by the Greek army in December 1912 during the First Balkan War. The Italians sent an ultimatum warning the Greeks that any further advancement and occupation of Avlona (Valona) would be considered as a *casus belli*.

The Drawing of the Greek-Albanian Frontier

In January 1913, Greece announced its proposals that the line Himmarra- Lake Ochrid should be the Greek-Albanian frontier. The Great Powers rejected this proposal and in July 29, 1913, they recognised Albanian independence. In the Florence Protocol of December 17, which Greece was forced to accept, they declared

⁷⁰Robert Lee Wolff, op.cit., p. 149.

⁷¹Diomidis N. Petsalis, op. cit., p. 346.

⁷²Diomidis Petsalis, op. cit., p. 345.

⁷³Ibid.

that a Conference of Ambassadors would decide the drawing of the Greek-Albanian boundaries and a special International Committee would decide the fate of Gyrokastra (Argyrokastra). They decided that the coastal region up to Ftelia and the island of Sassona, together with all the region northern of the Greek line including the Ottoman eparchy of Korce (Korytsa) were to be Albanian.

The drawing of the boundary would be based on geographic and ethnographic considerations. It was left to the Conference and the Committee to decide which ethnographic and geographic criteria would be the essential ones for the final decision. The Committee decided that the main criterion would be the mother tongue of the population. In addition any plebiscites or other forms of political demonstration would not be legitimate. The Greek army should withdraw within a month after the final decision of the committee was taken. The Committee began work but they had to stop because of the winter weather of 1913-4 leaving thus the issue practically unresolved until the spring of 1914 when the First World War broke out.

The Greek Reactions

According to the Florence Protocol, Greece had to choose either the Aegean Islands or Northern Epirus. Greece decided to keep the Aegean Islands because it thought that the Greek sovereignty would not be challenged easily there. Greeks from Northern Epirus reacted against this and protested to the Greek prime minister Eleutherios Venizelos who advised them to remain calm and not to engage in any difficult and dangerous activities. (However, there is no evidence that the Greek state did anything to persuade the armed bands of the Greek Northern Epirots to disband).

The Northern Epirot representatives defied the instructions of the Greek government and they formed an autonomous government. They were, however, careful enough to announce that they wished to remain within the Albanian state but they wanted to be granted a special status in order to retain their religious, economic, and political liberties. The Greek-Northern Epirot government started pressing the

⁷⁴Robert Lee Wolff, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

International Committee which accepted their claims after a while. The autonomous government and the Committee signed a new Protocol in Corfu in June 12, 1914 and the Albanian government was forced to accept it. Thus, the Greek community was granted a special status and additional agreements for the free functioning of the Greek Orthodox Church and for the education in Greek language of the Northern Epirotes, were signed.

Developments during and after the First World War

With the break of the war a chaotic situation both on the military and diplomatic levels prevailed over Northern Epirus and in Albania in general. The war started with armed confrontations between Greeks and Albanians in which the armed bands of the Northern Epirot community also took part. By October 1914 the Greek army managed to occupy Gyrokastra and Premeti in the Korce region. In November the Entente agreed to support the Greek claims to retain Northern Epirus. Italy reacted by occupying Sassona and Avlona by December.

When Italy entered the Entente, it occupied the rest of the southern Albania and started pressing the Entente powers to accept its positions. In April 26 1915, Entente signed with Italy the secret Treaty of London in which Italy was granted the right to keep Sassona and Avlona. In August 1916 the Italians entered Himara and almost a year later in June 1917 they entered the official Greek territory and Ioannina. Obviously, they did that in order to press the Greek government to accept the Italian positions after the war; it was not an act of aggression as such since both countries were officially allies. The French were anxious about these Italian advances and signed with the Albanians a treaty in December 1916 recognising as autonomous what was left in Albania, namely the Korytsa (Korce) region. The Italians reacted again in 1917 recognising Albanian independence under Italian protection. As if this was not enough for Albania, Austria-Hungary in the same year declared Albania autonomous.

When the war was over France and Britain favoured the Greek positions because they did not really want Italy to become a major controlling power in the Balkans. The United States took a middle stance because the influence of the Wilson Doctrine in the American foreign policy at that time did not allow them to take decisions which would favour one nation against the right of self-determination of another. Italy was against any concession to Greece and continued to press the representatives of the Entente towards its cause. The Peace Conference of 1920, however, agreed to give Korytsa and Gyrokastre to Greece. Italy, in compensation, could keep Avlona. But Italy continued to oppose the Greek positions and finally in the Council of Ambassadors in November 11, 1921 succeeded in getting its way. The Council decided to recognise Albanian independence and the Florence borders as legitimate.

This was officially the end of the Greek-Albanian (and Italian) dispute over the fate of Northern Epirus, which ended with the Greek diplomatic defeat. But Greece delayed recognition of the Albanian independence until 1922. In various ways Greece tried to keep the tension alive when it continued to occupy part of the region and forced Albanians from the disputed regions travelling to Greece to give away their passports and accept Greek ones⁷⁵. There was some pro-Greek feeling among the southern Albanian Orthodox Christians because they feared discrimination by the King Zogu regime and this encouraged the Greek activities in southern Albania, although this pro-Greek feeling probably did not express a wish for union with Greece⁷⁶. Anyway, Greece was engaged in another major conflict at the same time in the Asia Minor campaign, because of which it continued to have diplomatic clashes with Italy. It was impossible for Greece to win the battle on two different diplomatic fronts at the same time. Nevertheless, the clashes between Italy and Greece resumed in August 1923 when the chairman of the Committee for the drawing of Albania's frontiers, the Italian General Tellini was murdered. The murder was attributed to Greece and Mussolini invaded and occupied Corfu for a while in retaliation. Greece

⁷⁵Robert Lee Wolff, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*

was obliged to pay heavy and humiliating fines for compensation. The Greek army, however, did not withdraw from the Korce region until October 1924.

The loss of Northern Epirus and the Asia Minor disaster put an end to the Great Idea and forced the Greeks to concentrate more to their own domestic problems of a weak economy and of a crumbling political system. As a result in 1926 the political leadership in Greece declared that “supra-patriotism is dangerous”⁷⁷ and dissolved all the societies agitating in favour of the annexation of Northern Epirus, signed a series of agreements with Albania and launched an era of peaceful co-existence between the two countries until 1940 when the Greek-Italian war in Albania would raise the old aspirations yet again. In 1922, however, Greece had accomplished a number of the Great Idea objectives (one could say enough to persuade it cease further territorial claims), during the First World War. First of all it secured its position in Macedonia and second, it gained Thrace.

4. The Problem in Thrace

The situation in the region was similar to Macedonia but it never took on the same significance. Thrace, however, was one of the main objectives of the Great Idea and Greek foreign policy aimed at acquiring the region.

In Thrace three countries were involved, Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria. The Bulgarians did not have many chances, however, because the Slav presence was not as significant as in Macedonia. In eastern Thrace it was actually non-existent. Turks and Greeks were comprising the majority of the population. The interesting thing was that the majority of the Greek population in the region inhabited the eastern part of Thrace, the part that today belongs to Turkey. The Turks inhabited the western part of the region, although Istanbul was heavily populated by them. According to Turkish figures of 1902 Western Thrace was populated by 313,794 (66,4%) Turks, 72,861 (15.5%) Greeks, 59,415 (12.7%) Bulgarians, and 27,279 (5.5%) others, probably

⁷⁷Ibid.

Gypsies. According to Greek figures of 1910 there were 268,448 (66.7%) Turks, 65,864 (16.4%) Greeks, 64,493 (16.0%) Bulgarians and 3,620 (0,9%) others⁷⁸.

Bulgaria acquired a part of Thrace after the annexation of Eastern Rumelia which was proclaimed an autonomous region within the Ottoman Empire after the Treaty of Berlin. But its own ambitions was to secure a second outlet in the Aegean sea. Bulgaria's main objective was to gain Alexandroupolis (Dedeagatch).

Greece had strong historical ties with the region and wanted to gain the territory back accomplishing, therefore, the Great Idea to liberate Constantinople and give to it the character of the capital of Orthodox Christianity once again. All the popular legends and the press had as their constant theme the liberation of Thrace and Constantinople and the Greeks were ready before the First World War to give up plans for Northern Epirus and other "unredeemed" regions if they could hold a mass service in the Church of Saint Sofia.

Fortunately, for Thrace, the Great Powers were more determined to secure a stable post-war outcome. The Straits that linked the Mediterranean with the Black Sea were of much greater strategic and economic significance than Macedonia. The Great Powers, therefore, divided Thrace, giving to Greece a large part and imposed a regime of Allied control for the rest after the war.

5. The First World War and its Aftermath in Macedonia and Thrace

The situation in the Balkans remained dangerous even after the end of the Balkan Wars. The national questions and the partition of Macedonia still were potential sources of conflict.

Bulgaria still wanted to acquire the lands as prescribed in the San Stefano treaty. The problem was that these lands were now under Greek and Serbian possession. The Central Powers which attacked Serbia with the break of the war offered to Bulgaria the Serbian Macedonian territory. This led to a major division of

⁷⁸Diomidis N.Petsalis, *op. cit.*, p.344.

opinion in Bulgaria⁷⁹. The memories of the defeat in the Balkan wars were still fresh and the prospect of joining an alliance which could possibly lose the war and worsen the Bulgarian position, gave cause for much skepticism. The Agrarian Union, the major centre-left party, and the socialists were against the alliance with the Central Powers. Whereas the Bulgarian king Ferdinand and the prime minister Vasil Radoslavov, were in favour of it. They decided to join the alliance of the Central Powers and in September 1915 an agreement promised that Bulgaria could gain Macedonia and possibly other lands in Thrace and elsewhere. A similar offer in 1915 by the Allied powers of Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria was not enough to change Bulgaria's alignment with the Central Powers⁸⁰.

A number of Slavs from Macedonia served in the Bulgarian army during the First World War, and members of the IMRO became officers (like Dimitar Vlahov who was later to serve in Marshall Tito's government⁸¹). As Serbia was crushed by the joined attack of the Central Powers and its government together with the remains of the Serbian army took refuge in the island of Corfu, the Bulgarian army occupied the Skopje and Bitola regions of Macedonia and some Greek territories in Macedonia and Thrace. A fast process of "Bulgarisation" of the occupied (or liberated from a Bulgarian point of view) lands started in which not only teachers were sent but also surname suffixes were changed to '-ov'⁸². The great mistake of the Bulgarians was that their army ceased quickly to act as a liberator and became a ruthless occupier. Even if a number of Slav-Macedonians initially saw Bulgaria as the only power that could protect them against Serbian and Albanian expansionism the deeds of the Bulgarian army quickly alienated the parts of the Slav-Macedonian population which had not been yet aligned to the Bulgarian ideal. It created resentment which was passed on to greater numbers of Slav-Macedonians and gradually diminished the influence of Bulgaria among the Slavs of Macedonia. The Bulgarians, though, would follow the same pattern in World War II.

⁷⁹Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 118

⁸⁰Ivo Banac, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁸¹Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 19

⁸²*Ibid.*

The Greek entry to the war, on the other hand, was not easy and it happened after a major domestic political crisis, three years after the war had started. The Greek king Constantine, was the brother-in-law of Kaiser William II and he had a pro-German attitude. But Kaiser told Constantine that Germany unfortunately could do nothing for Greece if it entered the war⁸³. So, Constantine and the pro-German group advised neutrality because the French and the British fleets which controlled the Mediterranean were much stronger than the Greek one and could easily defeat it. The Greek prime minister Venizelos thought that if Greece fought the war on the side of the Entente it could make new territorial gains and he was pressing for a quick entry of Greece in the war. Greece still had claims on Northern Epirus, certain Aegean islands including the Dodecanesse, on Cyprus and on the coastline of Asia Minor. Venizelos was quick to offer Greek support against Bulgaria and the Ottomans, but the initial response of the allies was negative because they wanted to limit the war as far as possible⁸⁴. Later the Entente allies wanted Greece to enter the war in order to balance the Ottoman entry on the side of the central Powers. They urged Venizelos to do whatever he could to ensure that Greece would enter the war in the Allied side. They tried to persuade Venizelos to make some concessions to Bulgaria in exchange for lands in the Asia Minor. Venizelos accepted the offer and was ready to give away Drama and Kavala in Macedonia⁸⁵ and gain Smyrni (Izmir). But he also demanded the landing of a British-French expeditionary force in Thessaloniki and Romanian intervention should Bulgaria attack Greece. As an indication of good will Venizelos offered the participation of Greek troops in the Gallipoli expedition in 1915. But the king and his supporters expressed their outright disagreement to this.

As a result Venizelos resigned and forced the country to early elections. He won by landslide and he returned to office. The Allies were now pressing for Greek help to Serbia, something that Greece was obliged to do after the mutual agreements of 1913. In order to help the Entente decided to deploy troops on the Greek soil and in October 1915 allied troops landed in Thessaloniki. The situation in Athens continued to be very tense and Venizelos resigned again and formed a quasi-

⁸³Chris Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

⁸⁴Chris Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

⁸⁵Woodhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 197 and Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

revolutionary government in Thessaloniki in October 1916. The allied fleet imposed a naval blockade in Piraeus and in June 1917 King Constantine abdicated in favour of his son Alexander. Greece was now ready to enter the war and it did so in the same month, officially as an Entente member, but without any definite promises for territorial gains. In September 1918 the Entente army was ready to launch its final assault in the Balkans. With twenty-eight divisions of which nine were Greek and six Serbian the Allied army accomplished an easy victory.

In the peace treaties that followed the war Greece had to negotiate hard in order to make territorial gains because it did not have any assurances for gains before entering the war. The Greek diplomats had to contest the Italians and the French who wanted to gain also a foothold on previously Ottoman lands. In the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 the British foreign secretary Sir Edward Gray offered to Greece land in Asia Minor and the north Aegean islands as compensation for Greece's cession of Drama, Kavalla and Serres to Bulgaria.⁸⁶ Venizelos initially accepted the idea as he was keen on getting the ancient Greek lands of Ionia (Asia Minor), but he was forced to change his mind under royal and military pressure⁸⁷. The outcome of the Conference was a setback for Venizelos who hoped for the annexation of Asia Minor, Thrace, and the Aegean islands not under Greek sovereignty, and that a solution in Greece's favour would be found for Northern Epirus. He sincerely believed that France and Britain preferred to accept Greece's demands⁸⁸. In fact, the Allies did not support the Greek claims despite Greece's significant strategic help in the Eastern theatre of World War I. Most surprising was the negative attitude of the United States especially on the issue of Northern Epirus where they did not accept any of the Greek arguments⁸⁹. Italy also firmly opposed all the Greek claims, preventing, thus, effectively the creation of a Greece that would gain a preponderant position in the region⁹⁰. Despite the setback Venizelos continued diplomatic activity, as he was cunning enough to exploit the differences between the Allies and he managed to gain the lands he wanted in Asia Minor in the Treaty of Sevres 1920.

⁸⁶Richard Clogg, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁸⁷*Ibid.*

⁸⁸Diomidis N. Petsalis, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

⁸⁹Petsalis, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

More important was the Treaty of Neuilly in November 1919, in which Greece gained from Bulgaria the western Thrace lands and confirmed its position in Macedonia as the legitimate holder of the province. (Greece would retain this part after the Asia Minor disaster and the Greek-Turkish border would be the Evros river.)

The war was another disaster for Bulgaria which would repeat the same mistake in World War II. It seems that the leaders of this country always did what they could to prevent Bulgaria from accomplishing the major objectives of its foreign policy. The numbers speak for themselves: Bulgaria gained only 6,798 square kilometres of Macedonia while Greece gained 34,600 sq. kil., and Yugoslavia 26,776 sq. kil.⁹¹.

For Greece the final settlements of the war together with the gains of the Balkan wars were a great success and a personal victory for Venizelos to whom Greece owes much as he was the celebrated leader that doubled the size of his country. The 1910s were the golden decade for Greece and Venizelos but the success did not continue. The disastrous defeat of 1922 by Kemal's forces would bring the country to a situation of permanent crisis and it would take a long time before Greece would put forward any new territorial claims. It was a good lesson, however, and made the Greeks not to take for granted any "Great Ideas" or the Greek popular saying that "appetite comes while eating".

The 1910s and the successive wars in the Balkans led to the dramatic redrawing of the boundaries. The following decades and the Second world war did not really change the post-World War I arrangements and these boundaries form the present frontier of Northern Greece. The disputes however, continued in the Inter-war era and also led to conflicts during the Second World War. The most significant new participants in the disputes were the Comintern and the respective Communist Parties in the Balkan countries. The same territories were still under dispute but the most important ones were concerned with Macedonia.

⁹⁰Petsalis, *op. cit.*, p. 339.

⁹¹Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 20.



Map 3. The Balkan States after World War I (Source: Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, p.123)

Chapter 2: The Inter Balkan Politics until the End of the Greek Civil War

1. The Exchange of the Populations

In the immediate postwar period until the mid-1920s the exchange of the populations was one of the most important developments. The Greek defeat by the forces of Mustafa Kemal led millions of Greeks to leave their birthplaces in the Aegean and Black Sea coastlines which they inhabited since the Ancient times. A number of them left while the defeated Greek army evacuated Asia Minor. Later they were joined by hundreds of thousands others who left their homes as a result of the Greek-Turkish agreements in the 1924 Treaty of Lausanne on the mandatory exchange of populations. At the same time hundreds of thousands of Turks and other Muslims left the territories of Greek Macedonia and went to Turkey. According to the treaty of Lausanne many of the lands it had gained in the treaty of Sevres such as Smyrna, Imbros, Tenedos, and the autonomous northern Epirus was restored to Turkey. The mandatory mass movement of populations was not a new phenomenon. In 1914 after a similar agreement between Greece and Turkey the Turkish government had expelled 150,000 Greeks from the Aegean coastline into Greece and had deported another 50,000 to the interior of Anatolia¹. The main Turkish aim was the disappearance from Turkey of the strong and disturbing Greek minority whose presence fueled the Greek irredentist propaganda². The Greek objective was much more practical since the influx of millions of refugees demanded the existence of cultivated land which could be provided only with the respective emigration of Turks from the Greek soil³. The main criterion for the expulsion of a person was his/her religion. This was a proof of the belief that religion played an important role in one's own national identity. As a result many Christian Turkish-speakers left Turkey for Greece and respectively many

¹Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers, 1939-45*, Oxford University Press NY, 1946, p. 13.

²Joseph B. Scechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

³*Ibid.*

Muslim Greek-speakers left Greece for Turkey. A number of 100,000 Greek Christians, though, remained in Istanbul in order to become the social base for the function of the Ecumenical Orthodox Patriarchate that remained there. As a balancing factor the Turks demanded the respective presence of a similar number of Muslims in Greece although there wasn't any reason as serious as the presence of an Ecumenical Patriarchate.

The immediate result of these population exchanges was that the ethnographic map of Macedonia changed rapidly and drastically transforming the region to an homogeneous area in which only few thousands of Slavs, Jews, Vlachs and Gypsies were left. In Thrace the change was not so drastic because as it was said, in the Treaty of Lausanne Greece and Turkey agreed to leave a number of about 100,000 Muslims there, who since then comprise the one third of the population in Greek Thrace. Overall, after the exchange of populations the percentage of the Greek element rose in Macedonia from 43% to 89% and in Thrace from 17% to 62%⁴.

The overall number of the slavophones was also diminished because of the Greek-Bulgarian convention for the voluntary exchange of the populations between the two countries⁵ which was signed at Neuilly on 27 November 1920. The idea for the Greek-Bulgarian exchange of populations was not new either. It seems that it had occurred to Venizelos as early as 1915, when he was ready to give away Kavala to Bulgaria, proceed to the necessary 'racial adjustments' with that country and try to build a homogenous country by securing the Hellenism of Asia Minor⁶. In the end he neither gave Kavala away nor did he secure Asia Minor. Nevertheless, the convention for the voluntary exchange of the populations between Greece and Bulgaria had already been signed. It is true that the slavophone population of Macedonia did not want to leave their homes since they had the right to choose to stay. But both countries followed the practice to "persuade" these people that they were unwanted. In the convention there wasn't any provision preventing the application of pressure on national minorities. So, since there was no compulsion for emigration very few had

⁴Richard Clogg, op. cit., p. 121.

⁵Elisabeth Barker, op. cit., p. 30.

⁶Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of the Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey*, MacMillan New York, 1932, p. 29.

registered to emigrate until 1923 when a combined application of direct or indirect pressure by both countries led the number of applications for emigration to rise considerably⁷. But in the end the racial adjustment between Greece and Bulgaria proved unilateral since the Greek minority disappeared almost entirely while the 60% of the Bulgarian minority remained in Greece mainly in western Greek Macedonia⁸.

Greece in particular, which had the problem of finding a place to accommodate the thousands of the refugees, followed the policy of sending them to settle in Macedonia and Thrace. The Greek government did so not only because it wanted to change deliberately the ethnographic composition of these areas, but also because it could not find any other vacant areas in Greece where these people could be placed without affecting negatively the economic development and the social peace in other areas which were homogeneously Greek. There was only a small friction between the Greek population of the settled areas and the new-comers because there was a great similarity of ideals between the Greeks living in the homeland and those living under foreign rule⁹. Many refugees were placed in Macedonia and some in Thrace where they received land from the division of large Turkish estates as well as lands previously held by Slavs. As a result the Slav population of Macedonia and Thrace could feel both the neglect by the Greek government and the hostility of the newcomers who despite their misfortunes remained deeply nationalist. Many of them then decided that their fortunes would be better in Bulgaria but a number of others left under forceful transportation organised by the Greek local authorities. It is estimated that 200,000 refugees entered Bulgaria from Greece and Serbia in the immediate post-war period. These exchanges considerably diminished the Slavic element in Greek Macedonia and Thrace which before the war was arguably composing one of the largest ethnic elements. The Slavs that remained in Greek Macedonia numbered according to various estimations between 60,000-100,000.¹⁰ Many of the Slav-speakers, especially in remote areas, were not nationalistic and

⁷Joseph B. Scechtman, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Charles B. Eddy, *Greece and the Greek Refugees*, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1931, p. 15.

¹⁰William Hardy McNeill, *The Greek Dilemma*, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1947, p. 215.

therefore accepted easily the influx of the Greek settlers, came under their influence¹¹ and were gradually assimilated. According to statistics carried out by the League of Nations 93% of the Macedonians in Greece had the Greek language as mother tongue and the Greeks believed, as they still do, that the remaining of the Slav-speakers in Greek Macedonia had Greek national consciousness for customary and religious reasons.¹² Thus, the Hellenisation of Macedonia and Thrace advanced considerably. As an observer put it, in the “now practically homogenous Macedonia where only a small Bulgarian minority, a Jewish element in Thessaloniki and a small representation of other races existed peace begun to reign where previously there had been continual strife between opposing nations”¹³. A similar process was followed in Yugoslav Macedonia where the 1921 census “serbianised” 585,000 inhabitants of the region which was considered South Serbia while in fact the true number of Serbs was well below that at 52,209¹⁴.

Bulgaria which was afraid that a continuation of these exchanges would weaken the Bulgarian position in international politics, since the successive Bulgarian governments continued to consider the San Stefano boundaries as the legitimate frontiers of the Bulgarian state, tried to secure, with partial success, the recognition of a Bulgarian minority by the Greek state. In 1924 both countries agreed that the Greek government would recognise the existence of a Bulgarian minority in Macedonia and Thrace¹⁵. But this agreement was strongly protested by Serbia which still was the most reliable Greek ally and Athens withdrew its recognition very quickly. It, therefore, resumed its previous policy towards the Slav population of Macedonia and in the 1928 census it stated that 28,000 slavophones (but not Bulgarians) existed in Greek Macedonia; this number, however, must be well below the real one. Other estimates put the number at roughly 100,000 but they also state that the Greek authorities treated the Slav-Macedonians of western Greek Macedonia

¹¹McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

¹²Averof-Tositsas, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

¹³Charles B. Eddy, *op. cit.*, p. 235.

¹⁴Ivo Banac, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

¹⁵Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

as Greek citizens without discrimination¹⁶. This improvement of the treatment of the Slav-Macedonians and the exchange of the population had as direct result the suspension of Bulgarian based IMRO activities to Greek soil since there was hardly any Slav-speakers left in eastern Greek Macedonia.

2. Inter-War Relations Between the Balkan Countries

In general, the wars had not settled the disputes over the bordering territories. Some minor incidents continued to cause friction between the countries, like the incident on the disputed Greek-Bulgarian frontier in October 1925, when the Greek army actually invaded Bulgaria but was forced to abandon the area after the League of Nations intervened in favour of Bulgaria. Similar incidents occurred between Greece and Albania but without any important effects in the relations between the two states. The most important friction was caused mainly by the attacks of the IMRO Komitadjis who used Bulgarian Macedonia as a base for attacks on the Yugoslav and to a lesser extent Greek Macedonian lands. The relations, in particular, between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were very strained between 1923 - 1934, as a result of the IMRO action.

After the wars the Balkan states were preoccupied mainly with domestic problems like the construction or the reconstruction of their economies and their political systems and believed that in the field of the international politics the different claims and the disputes were not in favour of the domestic development. Greece faced the problem of a continuous divide between the Republicans and the Monarchists which started before Greece entered the First World War as a member of the Entente, and also had to tackle the problem of a weak economy damaged by a decade of wars and by the influx of millions of refugees. Albania was a newly independent state which had to solve the problem of adopting a stable political system which would overcome the difficulties imposed by the antagonisms of the various Albanian clans. Yugoslavia was entering a long difficult process of constructing a multinational state of supposed independent states which had lived under the

¹⁶Robert Lee Wolff, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

authority of other multinational states and had never fully enjoyed national independence. Bulgaria was also gravely damaged by the wars and its domestic politics were characterised by the confrontation between organisations which would become powerful by using corruption and murder as their means of political practice, such as the IMRO, and on the other hand, the growth of social movements with humanitarian principles such as the Agrarian Union and in lesser extent the Socialist movement; finally, Turkey was in the process of transforming the remnants of the Ottoman empire to a more homogeneous nationally and culturally Republican and secular state.

In this context little room for pursuing national claims was left. It was generally believed that policies of stable relations and cooperation should be adopted and initiatives towards this direction formed the hallmark of the foreign policies of the Balkan states. In general the proposal for a Balkan Union which appeared at the time was a response to the international economic crisis of that period that had badly affected the developing Balkan nations.¹⁷ This process started with the Greek-Turkish rapprochement initiated by the prime ministers Venizelos and Inonu and concluded in the establishment of the Balkan Entente and the signing of the Balkan Pact in 1934.

Greece, in particular, played an active role towards the general rapprochement of the Balkan states and advocated political and economic cooperation and free admission and free economic activity¹⁸. These proposals led some to believe in a Balkan Federation. The first Balkan Conference was held in Athens in October 1930 but had a semi-official status in which prominent cultural, professional and political leaders stressed the common characteristics of the Balkan peoples and the need for cooperation and mutual aid. There were five meetings like that, each one gaining a more official status, which led to the establishment of the Balkan Entente between Greece, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Rumania. The only impediment in the progress of these meetings was Bulgaria which kept insisting on the minority issues with a persistence that caused fears to the Greeks that a rapprochement between Yugoslavia

¹⁷Prokopis Papastratis, 'From the "Great Idea" to Balkan Union', in Marion Sarafis and Martin Eve ed: *Background to Contemporary Greece*, The Merlin Press, 1990, London, p. 155.

¹⁸Prokopis Papastratis, op. cit., p. 159.

and Bulgaria would be established¹⁹ over the issue thus causing the cancellation of the process of Balkan Union.

Despite the obstacles put by Bulgaria the conclusion of these meetings was the signing of the Balkan Pact in 1934 from which Albania and Bulgaria opted to stay out. The purpose of the Pact was to safeguard the status-quo²⁰. In that sense the Pact was actually an alliance whose purpose was the preservation of the existing frontiers against Bulgarian aggression. In general, the whole negative attitude of Bulgaria towards the Balkan rapprochement and the belief that the San Stefano boundaries were the legitimate Bulgarian frontiers, isolated the country and made its neighbours to call Bulgaria a “revisionist state” which meant that it was the only Balkan state which actively supported a change in the existing frontiers. Albania was a different case, and did not sign the Pact because it had secured the active protection of Italy since the First World War.

The weakness of the Balkan Pact was that it was directed against Bulgaria and did not specify a common action against any foreign aggressor. In fact, no obligations for mutual aid were provided in case a Balkan state would fight a war against a Great Power. So, since no war was fought against Bulgaria at that time the Balkan Pact ceased to exist when the Second World War began. It was, nevertheless, one of the few genuine acts for the establishment of cooperation between the Balkan states.

In the second half of the 1930s the members of the Balkan Pact continued to pursue an understanding with Bulgaria despite its denial to join the Pact or to accept the existing territorial arrangements. Yugoslavia was the first country to succeed in that task. In 1937 both countries signed a treaty of friendship. Bulgaria at that time, though it had not abandoned its claims, realised that it was unable to act when it was confronted with the joined opposition of the rest of its neighbours. Further pressure from the Great Powers which feared a possible alignment of Bulgaria with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy persuaded the Bulgarian leaders to accept, at least for the short term, that the status quo in the Balkans was not in their favour. Initially, the other members of the Balkan Entente did not respond positively to the friendship

¹⁹Papastratis, op. cit., p. 156.

²⁰Papastratis, op. cit., p. 171.

treaty between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. Ioannis Metaxas, the dictator leader of Greece since 1936, was the first to be sceptic about the reliability of Greece's oldest ally in the Balkans, Serbia. The tensions between Greece and Yugoslavia over the Free Zone in the port of Thessaloniki and the friendship treaty almost persuaded him that the Balkan Pact was becoming a dead letter and so he strengthened the cooperation with Turkey's leaders Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Inonu.

Both countries agreed that Yugoslavia acted against its obligations towards the other members of the Balkan Entente, but their reaction was rational. They continued to pursue an understanding with Bulgaria but for the benefit of the Balkan Entente as a whole. They succeeded that in July 1938 when Metaxas, the acting president of the Entente signed with Bulgaria a treaty of friendship and non aggression. Bulgaria had gained the acceptance by the Balkan states to rearm but promised to bring any disputes to arbitration. So, while Bulgaria was still out of the Balkan Pact, it seemed that a few years before the Second World War the Balkan states had agreed not to repeat the same mistakes of the past by transforming the region to a conflagration zone.

It should be noted, however, that the disputes did not actually disappear. As it was noted above, they were able enough to cause friction between the Balkan states. Greece and Albania continued to have claims against each other over the respective parts of Epirus that each state held. Bulgaria continued to have claims on both Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia and on Greek and Turkish Thrace. In addition, some differences occurred between Greece and Yugoslavia over the exact size, the administration and the sovereignty of the Free Zone in the port of Thessaloniki.

These differences did not actually change the process towards Balkan cooperation but their existence reminded the Balkan governments that closer cooperation was not a panacea. In fact, the Second World War too provided a new chance for the Balkan countries to resume their nationalist claims especially in Macedonia, but until then the new factor in the Inter-Balkan politics was the Communist one.

3. The Communist Factor in the Inter-War Period

The Stalinist dominated Comintern, made Lenin's position on the right of national self-determination the principal one in the Communist policies over the national questions. This policy had a double negative effect, especially in the Balkans. First, it proved to be one of the main oppositions to the Balkan rapprochement since it was believed that the latter was a mere attempt of the bourgeoisie to crash the development of the revolutionary movement of the oppressed peoples. Second, it had a damaging effect on the respective Communist parties of the Balkan states which either faced the persecution of the authorities because of their supposed anti-national positions, as happened in the Greek Communist Party, or had to cooperate with nationalist organisations which had dubious political affinities like the IMRO.

In the practical point of view it was probably believed that the support for "national liberation" would provide the base for a mass following which at that time was missing from the Communist parties of the Balkans. In any way, the overlapping of the strategic and tactic goals led to a lot of confusion about the Communist positions, which other times spoke about autonomy or independence, some other times spoke about various types of a Balkan Soviet-style Federation, until their mutual postwar break of ties. In general, the Communist Parties became the bearers of the contradiction of being internationalist in ideology and character but nationalist in practice.

The Communists affected mainly the Macedonian question and to a lesser extent the Thracian one but they had very little influence on the question of Northern Epirus. In fact, they never accepted or supported the right of the Northern Epirots to self-determination as they did for the Macedonians and Thracians. That happened probably because Stalin and the Comintern did not consider this region to have the same important strategic and political significance as Macedonia and Thrace and did not actually want to find a "golden" solution for the fate of this region. For them it was much more useful to exploit the revolutionary potential of the nationalities problem in the strategic regions of the South Balkans undermining in this way the

influence of the Western Powers²¹. This would be achieved through a successful communist revolution in Bulgaria, which the Comintern believed was imminent in the 1920's, and in which the revolutionary potential of Macedonia would be of great help²².

In 1924, the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, believing that a call for an independent Macedonia would advance the Communist cause in the Balkans²³, decided that the "oppressed people" of Macedonia, Thrace, among those of Croatia, Slovenia, etc., had the right to self-determination and could organise through their national liberation struggle, separate states which could form in the future a Balkan Soviet Federation. For Macedonia in particular, the Comintern favoured a federation of the Aegean (Greek), Vardar (Yugoslav), and Pirin (Bulgarian) Macedonias.

The position of the Comintern in general tended to be pro-Bulgarian by widely accepting that the inhabitants of Macedonia and Thrace were Bulgarian²⁴. The Bulgarian Communist Party believed that too, and its leaders held the idea that the future socialist autonomous Macedonia and Thrace would eventually join the Bulgarian state. This position led in many occasions the Bulgarian Party into direct conflict with the Greek and Yugoslav ones. The Comintern actually imposed its decision to the Yugoslav and Greek parties despite their strenuous reaction and obliged them to co-operate with the Bulgarians in the implementation of this policy²⁵.

The Yugoslav Communist Party had initially accepted the idea of a federation since 1920 and especially since 1923 when it agreed that the component nations of Yugoslavia had the right to form separate states. And although the Macedonians were not placed in the same level as the Croats, and the Slovenes, they were also considered victims of the Serbian expansionism. They had, therefore, the right to self-determination as well as the other nations. This position had found a basis for support of the Communist Party in Yugoslav Macedonia ever since 1920 when the region elected 17 Communist representatives. The Yugoslav Party had, however, some

²¹Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p.49.

²²Robert Lee Wolff, *op. cit.*, p.146-7.

²³Averof-Tositsas, *op. cit.*, p.32.

²⁴Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 50, Jelavich *op. cit.* p. 259, .

²⁵Averof-Tositsas, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

difficulties in accepting the Comintern position, because the Yugoslav Communists favoured an autonomous Macedonia within the South Slav Federation, and not within a Balkan Federation. But the Yugoslav Party was forced to accept the Comintern decision and it did so in 1926.

The Communist Party of Greece was in the weakest position both because it could not influence the Comintern and because it was facing a constant persecution because of its anti-national positions. Ever since the times of the Ukrainian Expedition in which Greece participated and the Asia Minor Expedition which the Greek Communists condemned as imperialist, the Party had faced a series of government led persecutions and imprisonment of its cadres. The acceptance of the Comintern line had a further damaging effect because the Greek Party could not hope to appeal to the masses, since it was the only one from the other Balkan Communist Parties which was actually supporting a surrender of the national lands. In fact, the initial reaction of the Greek Communist Party was against the pro-Bulgarian position of the Comintern but it gave way to the official line. The cadres that continued to oppose the Comintern position were expelled from the party²⁶.

Even within the Communist movement the Greek Party could not put forward its position. In general, the Greek Communists tried to be very careful about their policies on the national questions, because they had found a basis for support among the poor Greek refugees from Asia Minor who had settled in the cities, and also on other minorities like the Jews of Thessaloniki and the slavophones of Macedonia. So, while it was not denying the right of the Macedonians and Thracians to self-determination it was stressing the fact that in Greek Macedonia and Thrace the ethnographic composition had rapidly changed since the settlement of the refugees from Asia Minor²⁷, and that the Comintern should keep that in mind and not deprive them from their right to self-determination for a second time. But the Comintern ignored this position, pronounced the settlement as an imperialist act whose sole purpose was to transform the ethnographic character of the regions on question and

²⁶Averof-Tositsas, op. cit., p. 31

²⁷Stephen Palmer Jr. and Robert King, *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question*, Archon Books, Connecticut, 1971, p. 49.

decided to keep its decisions unchanged²⁸. The result of this anti-Greek policy on the Greek Communist party was the diminished support it found in the Greek people, its consequent electoral isolation, and the persecution of its cadres like Zachariades, Maximos and Pouliopoulos who were convicted on charges of treason²⁹.

The main instrument for the implementation of the Comintern policies in Macedonia and Thrace was the Balkan Communist Federation. Its main programme was the creation of a Federation among the future Balkan Communist states, and all the Balkan Parties despite their strong differences had to work towards the accomplishment of this aim. In fact, the Federation was the battlefield between the Greek, Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communist Parties. The support of the Comintern, however, towards the Bulgarian Party ensured the relative success of the Federation which managed to establish links with the IMRO and influence its policies³⁰. This influence was so strong that led to the split between the different factions of IMRO. But the Balkan Communist Federation could not continue to operate with the growing bitterness between its own component members which tried to put forward their own positions. So, its function was gradually undermined in the beginning of the 1930s and its dissolution finally followed in 1935. After that, the Communist Parties of Greece and Yugoslavia quickly announced that they were against the independence of Macedonia and Thrace³¹. This position was not against the Comintern position anymore which in 1935 changed its policy as a result of the Popular Front strategy and favoured equal rights for all ethnic groups in Macedonia and Thrace³².

4. The IMRO in the Inter-War Period

The IMRO leaders were particularly disappointed with the outcome of the Balkan Wars and of the First World War, especially the pro-Bulgarian faction. It seemed to

²⁸Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

²⁹Averof-Tositsas, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

³⁰Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

³¹Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

³²Bouras *op. cit.*, p. 103.

them that the first possible action they could take was to continue the Komitadji attacks in the Macedonian lands which were ceded to Yugoslavia and Greece. They directed their actions mainly in the Yugoslav part of Macedonia because this one had the most homogeneous Slav population and it was easier for them to exercise their propaganda. They were, however, quite ruthless in their attacks because the Slav population of these parts during the wars had not expressed the pro-Bulgarian stance that they expected. In fact, the Bulgarian army's behaviour as occupier and the "Bulgarisation" process were resisted by the inhabitants of Macedonia. They continued to do so even after the war despite their resentment caused by the growing Serbian expansionism which started firstly with the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and later with Yugoslavia. The pro-Serbian sentiment among some of the Slavs of Macedonia continued even after the official renaming of Yugoslav Macedonia to Vardarska Banovina and the Serbian references to Slav-Macedonians as Serbs³³. So, they accepted arms provided by the Yugoslav authorities in order to defend themselves against the IMRO attacks³⁴.

Similar was the situation in Greece. The IMRO Komitadjis and propagandists had the following difficulty: the Slav population that remained in Greece after the exchange of the populations was mainly situated in the northwestern Greek Macedonia and they could not get there without encountering the resistance of the Greek army and the Greek villagers. Their chances, then, in accomplishing their aims in Greek Macedonia were very limited and, therefore, they concentrated their efforts to Yugoslav Macedonia.

The leaders of the IMRO at the early post-World War I time were Alexandrov and General Protogerov. They faced the strong opposition of their activities by the Union leader Stamboliski who favoured a reconciliation with Bulgaria's enemies in the War, and who actually arrested them and tried to disband the organisation. Stamboliski was a moderate politician and favoured a Union of the South Slavs³⁵. In this context he tried to control the activities of the IMRO and began with the arrest of

³³Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

³⁴Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

³⁵Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

its afore mentioned leaders. But they managed to escape and reorganised the IMRO resuming their attacks in Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia.

These attacks provoked the diplomatic reaction of the neighbouring countries which together with Romania protested in the League of Nations. Stamboliski responded to this protest with more reconciliatory mood and a major crisis was avoided. He continued the same policies towards the IMRO and arrested other leading figures in the organisation's strongholds Petrich and Kustendil³⁶. The IMRO, however, continued to operate in Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia and started to get more involved in the domestic Bulgarian politics. In fact, it participated in the June 1923 coup which was co-organised with the Officer's League of Colonel Valkov and the former socialist Professor Alexander Tsankov. They overthrew Stamboliski who was brutally murdered by IMRO members³⁷. After the coup the IMRO continued without any obstacles its activities which were the main cause of friction between Bulgaria and the other Balkan countries. It was after the 1934 coup by Zveno and the Military League which tired with the scale the IMRO was intervening in the domestic politics, the organisation faced the toughest persecution from the Bulgarian authorities³⁸. Many of its leaders were imprisoned and the IMRO suffered a near fatal blow from which it had not recovered in the beginning of the Second World War.

In practice, the IMRO was transformed from a revolutionary organisation to a terrorist one³⁹. The Slavs who had left the Macedonian and Thracian lands which were ceded to Greece, but were also very poor and had not been assimilated in Bulgaria, facing sometimes the hostility of the local population, provided the IMRO's recruitment base⁴⁰. The participation in IMRO's terrorist activities became for them a way of surpassing their difficulties in obtaining a proper job.

The leaders of IMRO in their turn became much more interested in Bulgarian politics rather than in the cause of the organisation⁴¹. They even accepted outside

³⁶Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

³⁷Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 21, Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

³⁸Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 21 and 29.

³⁹Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁴⁰Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

⁴¹Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

financial help, not only from Bulgarian sources, transforming themselves to instruments of others, like Fascist Italy⁴².

On one of these occasions the IMRO flirted with the Communists. This happened in 1924 when the Comintern had passed the resolution for an independent federal Macedonia which the leaders of the IMRO found suitable. At the same time, and under Communist guidance, they approached other rival Macedonian organisations. But this approach lasted only for a while because the IMRO leaders saw that the Communists were not the people they would like to do business with. This short period, however, had its impact on the IMRO and especially on the Federalist faction of the organisation. Some of them left the IMRO and became Communists and one of them, Vlahov, formed the pro-Communist United IMRO. The relations between the official IMRO, now under the leadership of Mihailov, and the Communists, in particular the Bulgarian Party, became very strained and resulted into accusations and even assassinations.⁴³ Anyway, the split in the IMRO further weakened its strength and cohesion and it was easy for the 1934 coup leaders to crash the organisation. For this reason the IMRO was not active during the Second World War.

5. The Second World War

The Second World war did not alter Greece's northern frontier. It was a period, though, in which the disputes over Macedonia, Thrace, and Northern Epirus, arose again with renewed intensity. The Greek Civil War which followed the retreat of the Germans imposed also a threat on Greece's frontiers which would not be removed before the final defeat of the Communists in 1949.

⁴²Barker, op. cit., p. 39.

⁴³Barker, op. cit., p. 43 and Robert Lee Wolff, op. cit., p. 147.

The important developments before the war were the occupation of Albania by Fascist Italy which turned the country to an Italian protectorate, and the signing by Bulgaria of the Tripartite Pact, which placed it in the side of the Axis.

The Greek-Italian war began on the 28th of October 1940, and proved to be one of the most successful Greek victories in the country's recent history. The Greek army occupied successively a number of south Albanian towns like Korce in November 22, Saranda, and Gyrokaster in December 6 and 8, which were all inside the disputed territory of Northern Epirus. The Greeks believed that the long claimed territory would soon become formally theirs. For this reason they did not accept the cooperation with King Zog of Albania when they were asked for help. The Greek army was ready to reach the towns of Himara and Valona but it was stopped by the severe winter and the hostilities were left at a standstill. The Greek leaders, however, eager as they were to advance further north in Albania, underestimated the German threat and they did not have enough troops to defend the Greek territory when the Nazis attacked in April 1941.

Bulgaria did not sign the Tripartite Pact without hesitation or without considering other offers first. The Soviet Union had offered to Bulgaria territories in Macedonia and Thrace which were in Turkish and Greek possession for not signing. Furthermore, the Bulgarians were afraid of a Turkish reaction. Turkey had warned Sofia, in the outbreak of the Greek-Italian war that it would not accept a Bulgarian attack against Greece. The Italian defeat persuaded the Bulgarians that they should not act incautiously. But on the other hand, the Bulgarians thought that the offer of German help would eventually lead to a redrawing of the boundaries in their favour. On February 1941, they signed a non-aggression pact with Turkey and they were, therefore, sure that they had no fears for a reaction from their neighbour in case they attacked Greece. On the 1st of March they signed the Tripartite Pact and they were promised that they would gain an outlet in the Aegean sea between the Struma and Maritsa rivers.

Yugoslavia followed Bulgaria and signed the Pact on the 25th of March, but it was agreed that Yugoslav troops would not participate in the field of war. Assurances were given that Yugoslavia would receive Thessaloniki in the future peace

settlements. But the military coup that followed the signing of the pact changed the minds of the Germans who decided that they should attack Yugoslavia as well as Greece.

The Bulgarian Occupation of Macedonia and Thrace

When the German attack against Yugoslavia and Greece was successfully completed the Bulgarian army, which had not participated in the hostilities, took over from the Germans Macedonia and Thrace. Thessaloniki remained under German occupation as well as a part of the Greek northwestern Macedonia, where the latter borders Albania, because the Axis powers wanted to prevent a possible clash between Bulgaria and Albania over Macedonia.

The occupation of Macedonia caused great enthusiasm in Bulgaria, where the Bulgarians thought, they had finally acquired the lands they believed were theirs. The Germans suggested that Bulgaria should not annex formally the lands they occupied before the end of the war, since their ethnic geographers had differentiated the Slavs of Macedonia from Bulgaria⁴⁴, but the Bulgarians did formally annex some of them in May 1941.

Initially many Macedonians, especially in the Yugoslav part, accepted the Bulgarian occupation because they were already dissatisfied with the Serbian expansionism. But the Bulgarian army started again to act as an occupying force rather than a liberating one and the new administration proved to be corrupt and incompetent⁴⁵. That caused a quick loss of sympathy among the population and many started to resist, passively in the beginning and actively later⁴⁶.

The Bulgarian government, resentful as it was with the passivity with which the Macedonian and Thracian population accepted the Bulgarian presence in their lands, inaugurated a massive propaganda in order to improve on the one hand, the presence of the Bulgarian element in these lands, and on the other, to tackle any

⁴⁴Palmer and King, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

⁴⁵Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 255 and Palmer and King, *op. cit.*, p. 64.

unfavourable reactions. This cultural propaganda, which may be termed “Bulgarisation” of Yugoslav Macedonia, emphasised the Bulgarian nationality of the Macedonians and Thracians⁴⁷. In Yugoslav Macedonia only, 800 schools were opened, and in Skopje, a university and a library. The Bulgarian Church took also control of the Orthodox parishes. The “Bulgarisation” of Vardar Macedonia continued with the purging of the land from the Serbian element. It is estimated that between 43,000 and 120,000 Serbs were forced out of Yugoslav Macedonia⁴⁸.

In Greek Macedonia and Thrace, the Bulgarians tried to impose the “Bulgarisation” of the population but they met stronger resistance. Macedonia had become ethnically Greek by 89% and Thrace by 62% as a result of the exchange of the populations. But despite the presence of only a small Slav minority the Bulgarians tried to enforce their policies by closing down the Greek schools, and by sending Bulgarian settlers to take the places of expelled Greeks. This use of force led to a revolt of the Greek population in Macedonia and Thrace in September 1941 in which 15,000 were killed and many more removed from their homes. It is estimated that more than half of the Greek inhabitants of Greek Macedonia were driven out of the region and replaced by settlers from Bulgaria⁴⁹. After the formation of the Communist-led, National Liberation Front in 1942, many Greeks would join it and fight during the Resistance against the Bulgarians. The Slav-Macedonians gained special legal rights, ration privileges, and provided the source for the creation of a slavic gendarmery which resolved to raids and atrocities against the Greek villages in retaliation for guerrilla activities⁵⁰. Many Slav-Macedonians were keen in supporting the “Bulgarisation” of Greek Macedonia as their peaceful assimilation was hindered by Metaxas government which before the war proclaimed the use of the slavic tongue illegal and gave rise to the old belief that the scarce, poor, and disputed land was theirs⁵¹.

⁴⁶Elisabeth Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁴⁷Barker, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁴⁸Palmer and King, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

⁵¹*Ibid.*

But the Bulgarians had an additional threat to worry about apart from the apathy and resistance they met in Yugoslav and Greek Macedonia and in Thrace. The Italians had taken a part of Greek Macedonia and since they were the official protectors of Albania, the Bulgarians feared that they would seek to create a larger Albania aiming parts of both Greek and Yugoslav Macedonia⁵². In order to overcome their fears they tried to take control of these lands and in August 1942, clashes between Italian-Albanian and Bulgarian troops broke out. The hostilities among the Axis allies were finally stopped after German mediation.

The End of the War

After the Bulgarian coup in 1944 and the entrance of the Red Army, and despite the official change of sides, Bulgaria still hoped that it could exercise power in Macedonia and Thrace. For this reason its army did not abandon the occupied territories immediately. The Fatherland Front government did not change the policies Bulgaria used to have over the issue and declared that Macedonians and Thracians should decide the fate of their lands and backed their independence with the hope that eventually these lands would become Bulgarian.

Yugoslavia, on the other hand, under the leadership of Marshal Tito, favoured the idea of federation and the union of the three Macedonias. Yugoslavia also proposed that Bulgaria should join the South Slav federation. That was initially rejected but the two countries reached to an agreement over Macedonia, in which it was agreed that the Pirin and Vardar Macedonias could form a sort of a cultural union. The fate of the two regions would be finally decided according to the outcome of the Greek Civil War. But the Stalin-Tito break gave an end to the talks of a Macedonian federation.

Greece, in its turn, and despite the domestic devastation that the Civil War brought with, and which was larger in scale than the devastation caused by the War itself, pursued a modification of the frontiers since its leaders considered themselves

⁵²Barbara Jelavich, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

as being among the victorious Allies. Maps of “Greater Greece” that appeared in the period showed the areas of Albania and Bulgaria that Greece wished to acquire together with a generous slice of Yugoslavia despite its status as an ally⁵³. But in particular, the official Greek state under Tsaldaris’ government wanted to acquire the Albanian territories which the Greek army had occupied during the Italian-Greek war in 1940 and demanded reparations from Bulgaria⁵⁴. But both demands were not granted. The British gave a mild support to the Greek claims, but most of all the US Senate passed a resolution in 1946 in favour of Greece. The cause of Greece in Albania gained some publicity due to the persecution of the Greek minority in Albania that led some to assume Albanian identities in order to escape the hazards and others to resume their nationalist activities⁵⁵. Greece presented the Paris Peace Conference (July 1946) with political, historical, military, and ethnological arguments which favoured its possession of south Albania⁵⁶. But the reaction by the Soviet Union was strongly against Greece and the rest of the Allies were unable to support Greece. The Soviets actually supported the Albanian claims over Southern Epirus and the Bulgarian ones over Thrace in the Paris Peace Conference⁵⁷, but, eventually, after this strong difference of opinion, there was no change in the northern Greek frontier after the Second World War.

6. The Greek Civil War

The threat to the Greek frontier that remained after the war was the Greek Communists’ position in favour of an independent federal Macedonia and the Yugoslav and Bulgarian desires over Macedonia and Thrace. The Albanians had also hope of acquiring the Chamouria region in Greek Epirus. The Yugoslavs had plans to annex Greek Macedonia and incorporate it into the South-Slav federation, and the

⁵³William McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 207.

⁵⁴Richard Clogg *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁵⁵McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

⁵⁶McNeill, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

⁵⁷Antonis Bouras, *op. cit.*, p. 36, McNeill p. 209.

Bulgarians had plans both on Greek Macedonia and Thrace something that became evident by the delayed withdrawal of the Bulgarian army from the Greek soil despite Bulgaria's change of sides during the war⁵⁸. The outcome of the Greek Civil war in favour of the National Government would put an end to that threat. Immediately after the war, and as a first response to that threat, loyalist forces launched a reign of terror against the slavophones⁵⁹ as a revenge for the Slav-Macedonian's help to the Bulgarian occupiers when many Greeks were slaughtered and others lost their homes and land to the slavophones. As a result of the royalist terror 7,000 people mainly Slav-Macedonians but also a number of Greek communist sympathisers took refuge in Yugoslavia⁶⁰. For the Greek National Guard all Slav-Macedonians were considered communists and therefore as the Civil War progressed the official recrimination against them intensified and they were beaten, robbed, and some killed on charges that sometimes were true⁶¹. Similar but more tragic was the fate of the Albanians of Chamouria who had actively co-operated with the Italians during occupation and committed many acts of atrocities against the Greek population. Immediately after liberation a pogrom was launched against them⁶²; many were slaughtered and the survivors took refuge in Albania from which they never returned.

The slavophone population of Greek Macedonia but also of Thrace, despite being a minority played an active part during the resistance in the side of the Greek Communist Party. In Macedonia, Yugoslav Communist help led to the formation of the Slav-Macedonian National Liberation Front (SNOF and later NOF) in Greece. In the liberated areas which were controlled and governed by the communist-led Greek National Liberation Front (EAM), the Slav-Macedonians enjoyed a number of civil liberties, and the Greek Communist Party during the resistance was willing to give them equal status within the Greek state⁶³. During the Civil war its members would compose a large sector of the Communist army in Macedonia reaching the 30% of the

⁵⁸Bouras, op. cit., pp. 110-12.

⁵⁹F.A. Voigt, *The Greek Sediton*, London, World Affairs Book Club, 1949, p. 45.

⁶⁰Christopher Chiclet, 'The Greek Civil War 1946-49', in Marion Sarafis ed., op. cit., p. 205.

⁶¹William McNeill, op. cit., p. 219.

⁶²Christopher Chiclet, op. cit., p. 203.

⁶³Svetozar Vukmanovic (Tempo), *How and Why the People's Liberation Struggle of Greece Met With Defeat*, Merlin Press Ltd., London 1985, p. 73.

total⁶⁴. The Greek Communist Party and the SNOF established close links with the Yugoslav Communists who would constitute the major source of help and political influence for the Greek Communists until the Stalin-Tito break in 1948. The Yugoslav Macedonian territory provided both training camps, the main route for supplies, and also camps that received refugees. Many slavophone children were sent to Yugoslav Macedonia by the Communists⁶⁵ in order to escape the war and receive Slav-Macedonian education and training. The withdrawal of Yugoslav help ensured the Communist defeat and the end of the dreams for a Federal Communist Macedonia.

The south part of Albania (Northern Epirus) also played a similar part as the Yugoslav Macedonia but to a lesser extent. Some reports were made, though, of cross-frontier fighting in which Albanian troops allegedly participated. The Greek government would have liked to use these reports as an excuse to invade Albania and regain the disputed territories, but the engagement in heavy fighting throughout Greece and the danger of provoking an international conflict prevented such an action.

The positions of the Greek Communists in general were contradictory. Sometimes they showed a strong patriotic sentiment and the actions of the Communist units actually proved that this was true. For example, when the first clashes broke in Athens between Communists and British forces in December 1944, the Communist units in northern Greece did not move from their positions and they did not occupy Thessaloniki and other cities, an action that would give their Party a strong strategic and negotiating position, but remained as guards of the northern frontier preventing any Yugoslav and Bulgarian intervention. Similarly, the guerrilla units of the Greek NLF (EAM), and later of the Communist Democratic Army (DSE) under the leadership of Markos Vafeiades were not only Communist but also Nationalist minded and had clashed with the units of SNOF many times during the Resistance and the Civil War⁶⁶. The best known clash was between ELAS forces (the military sector of EAM) and Capetan Gotsi's men. This clash occurred in October

⁶⁴Richard Clogg, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

⁶⁵F.A. Voigt, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

1944 before the start of the civil war. Gotsi was the leader of SNOF's armed sector who incorporated to his bands the Slav-Macedonian geandarmerie after liberation and who denied to surrender their weapons to ELAS. ELAS demanded the weapons on the basis that they previously belonged to the occupiers⁶⁷. Gotsi refused to surrender because he believed that the now combined Slav-Macedonian forces would fight for an independent Macedonia⁶⁸. His refusal forced the ELAS band of the region to start a hunt against his bands which were quickly forced out of Greece and into Yugoslav Macedonia. ELAS even informed the then Minister for War Papandreou to take the necessary diplomatic steps and persuade Tito to suspend Gotsi's activities⁶⁹. Yugoslav Communist reports of the time claim that the activities of the Greek Communists against Slav-Macedonians continued with forced mobilisation of Slav-Macedonians out of Greece, arrests of Slav-Macedonian Communists and their internment in southern Greece, proclamation of propaganda material as illegal, and expressed wishes from Greek Communist Party cadres that it would be better if the Slav-Macedonians collaborated with the Germans than entering the Greek Communist forces⁷⁰. Later when the Albanians and Yugoslavs proposed to send guerrilla forces in Epirus and Macedonia to help the communist cause the Greek Communist Party denied the offer as it didn't wish the presence of any foreign forces on Greek soil⁷¹. The nationalist positions were also evident in official party documents. The second plenum of the central committee of the Communist Party in 1946 passed a declaration against the self-determination of the Slav-Macedonians⁷². And the politburo in June 7, 1946, declared that if a majority in Northern Epirus wished union with Greece it would accept a Greek military intervention⁷³.

On the other hand the positions in favour of a federal Macedonia and later of the Stalin-inspired independent united Macedonia (5th plenum of the central committee in January 1949) were great mistakes that gradually led to the weakening

⁶⁶Elisabeth Barker, op. cit., pp.111-5 and Bouras, p.108.

⁶⁷William McNeill, op. cit., p. 218.

⁶⁸McNeill, op. cit., p. 218, Palmer and King, op. cit., p. 98.

⁶⁹Maj-Gen. Stefanos Sarafis, *ELAS, Greek Resistance Army*, Merlin Press, London, 1980, p. 411.

⁷⁰Palmer and King, op. cit., pp. 118-19.

⁷¹Antonios Bouras, op. cit., p. 108.

⁷²Svetosar Vukmanovic, op. cit., p. 72.

of the Communist army, since many of its fighters had previously participated in the resistance and had fought against the Bulgarian and German occupiers only in order to keep Macedonia and Thrace Greek. So, they felt a strong sense of resentment and they gradually either withdrew their support from the Communists or started fighting passively. In the end of the Civil War the members of the NOF constituted the majority of the Communist army's fighters as they were 14,000 out of a total of 25,000 troops. They were particularly active, especially in assassinating Greek nationalists⁷⁴. But after the Stalin-Tito break things gradually changed. NOF lost its seats in the Provisional Government, and many "Tito-ites" were purged when the Greek Communist Party attacked the NOF activists⁷⁵. Around 10,000 pro-Yugoslav NOF activists were dismissed from their positions within two months⁷⁶. Greek communists also suffered from the Stalin-Tito break and the purges had a direct negative effect to the struggle of the Communist Party. Zachariades the General Secretary of the Greek Communist Party also dismissed from head of the Democratic Army Vafeiades as a "Tito-ite"⁷⁷ an act that was later considered fateful. There was some reaction from the population to these purges but they were quickly suppressed by the Communist Party and pro-Bulgarians were put in charge of NOF⁷⁸. Then NOF in its second plenum in February 1949, passed an anti-Yugoslav declaration favouring a Macedonian state within a Balkan federation⁷⁹.

Towards the end of the war the slavophone population of Greek Macedonia witnessed a wave of repression and the majority of them (about 30,000) left their homes and took refuge in Yugoslav Macedonia, joining the 7,000 who had left in the beginning of the Civil War. So, the only result of the Civil War was that it transformed the ethnographic character of Greek Macedonia to even more homogeneously Greek. The outcome in Thrace was not the same, however, since the Turks and slavophone Pomaks did not participate in the war. The Muslim community,

⁷³Vukmanovic, op. cit., p. 74.

⁷⁴William McNeill, op. cit., p. 220.

⁷⁵Elisabeth Barker, op. cit., pp. 124-9, Vukmanovic, p. 120.

⁷⁶Christopher Chiclet, op. cit., p. 217.

⁷⁷Chiclet, op. cit., p. 216.

⁷⁸Elisabeth Barker, op. cit., p. 120.

⁷⁹Svetozar Vukmanovic, op. cit., p. 76.

therefore, continued to comprise the one third of the population as prescribed in the Treaty of Lausanne.

Conclusion

The previous chapters dealt with the creation of the present day northern Greek frontier. The disputes and wars that created and consolidated it played their part in creating the contemporary Greek identity as well as the identity of Greece's neighbours. Still, they left some issues "unresolved". Ethnic populations affiliated with a particular nation-state were left on the other side of the border: "lost territories" and "enslaved brothers" continued to exist. Yet, the ferocity of the struggle between the Balkan nations over the territories under consideration leaves no doubt that no one is willing to compromise their position and consolidation of sovereignty.

This is so clear if one considers the effect these issues had in the domestic politics of the nations involved. Greece, for example, witnessed constitutional changes, ruthless dictatorships and a bloody Civil War whose casualties outnumbered those of the Second World War. All these had to do, up to a point, with the developments in the arena of international politics. Greece was less than a century old, as a nation-state, when these events began to unfold and its size was still growing at the end of the Second World War (with the addition of the Dodecanese islands). The whole building of the Greek nation-state involved territorial acquisitions (or liberation for the Greeks). Yet the aftermath of these events did not satisfy the Greeks. It did not satisfy many of their neighbours either.

However, a new age was emerging. The division of the World, Europe and the Balkans to Communist and Westernised states suppressed in a way all the resentment or the aspirations that were left after the end of the war under the protective and forbidding umbrella of the Cold War equilibrium. It would take a lot of waiting before these issues could re-emerge, although in different forms, but the moment came with the collapse of Communism in Europe.

**Part B: The New Frontier Problems and the Greek
Foreign Policy (1990-3)**

Introduction

The previous chapters dealt with the developments that led to the creation of the present northern Greek frontier. This process which lasted for almost four decades highlighted the presence of a strong nationalist tendency in the development of Balkan politics and the strong and sometimes fatal link between foreign policy issues and the fate of the domestic political system. These characteristics re-emerged during the years in the government of the New Democracy party under the premiership of Mr. Konstantinos Mitsotakis. The handling of foreign policy issues caused many problems to his government and to some extent led to its downfall. The presence of certain characteristics in any given time highlights the way with which the Greek foreign policy is shaped and can lead to assumptions which may explain the tendencies of the Greek policy makers and the foreign policy they adopt. The creation of the assumptions demands the schematic presentation of the Greek foreign policy over the years under consideration. This will establish a first understanding of the Greek foreign policy. It will show the basic aspects of this policy, the important issues, and will provide the presentation of events upon which the combination of the theoretical aspects of Part C and the assumptions will be made.

The Outlook of the Greek Foreign Policy 1990-3

The problems for the Greek foreign policy-makers began with the first crumbling of the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The imminent collapse of these regimes and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact marked the dawning of a new era and a significant change in the European status quo. The re-emergence of ethnic conflict in the Eastern European countries that the collapse of Communism brought with it raised Greek fears considerably. When in the beginning of the 1990s the ethnic

conflict started to escalate in the Balkans (first in Kosovo with the clashes between Albanians and the Serbian forces and in Bulgaria with the deportation of thousands of Turks from south Bulgaria to Turkey) the Greeks, like many other Europeans, feared that the crisis would inevitably affect them and create an era of general instability in the region. The Greek government without any hesitation would follow a pro-status quo policy in the light of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It would become involved in the problems of the Balkans, especially those that mostly affected Greece, such as the problems of the Muslim minority in Greek Thrace (which Turkey also followed closely), the problems of the Greek-speaking minority in southern Albania, which took new dimensions after the end of Albania's era of isolation and, of course, the issue of the international recognition of the ex-Yugoslav Socialist Republic Of Macedonia. The problem over Macedonia would become the main issue of Greek foreign policy over the period and it is this issue that mostly reveals the Greek fears, aspirations, interests and values that developed this foreign policy. Greece would also become a fervent supporter of the European Union, of the Western European Union and of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe in its effort to overcome the threats that the re-emerging ethnic conflicts were making to its security. At the same time a wave of defensive nationalism would cover the country and this would be reflected in the foreign policy of the government. As a result the Greek foreign policy would be characterised by the paradox that despite Greece's pro-European stance, relations with the majority of the European Community partners would deteriorate. The Europeans believed that Greece's nationalism over Macedonia halted the EC's efforts to achieve stability in the Balkan region. The other paradox was that Greece despite the problems in its northern frontiers and the concentration of policy efforts to them, would not change its official defensive dogma that considers the main threat to Greece's security to lie in the east, i.e. Turkey.

The threat of Turkey would eventually characterise the whole of the foreign-policy making. To outside observers the antagonism between the two countries would seem to be the power struggle between two peripheral and relatively developed states over the opportunities which their less developed neighbours provided. But the fact is that Turkey appeared as the main threat to Greece's security now that the Warsaw

Pact was defunct. The role of Greece was gradually diminishing within the defence structures of NATO while Turkey's was expanding. Greece had to find new policies and arguments to highlight its position. One policy dimension was its membership in the EC and its institutions. The Greek government wanted to use the country's geographical position to become the spear head of the European policy in the troubled Balkan region and the Eastern Mediterranean. If this were accomplished it would certainly give points to Greece against Turkey. The other dimension was to successfully undermine the role of Turkey in general, and that could be accomplished by enhancing Greece's importance as the spearhead of the Christian West against the threat of the Islamic East. Turkey, it was thought, would fall in the Islamic block so Greece would fill the gap as the base for the West's policies towards the Islamic world. Turkey's support of Bosnia's independence, in combination with the presence of Muslim populations elsewhere in the immediate neighbourhood of Greece, was conceived as an effort to create an "Islamic Bow" that would cut Greece off from the rest of Europe and which would create a stable foothold of the Islamic East in Europe¹. The foreign affairs minister Mr. Antonis Samaras was much more than certain when he said that "*We [Greece] are the spear head of the non Islamic Europe. And our role in the West can not but be definitely determined by this fact*"². This fact could only exist in the minds of the Greek foreign policy makers because Turkey was driven by its leaders closer to Europe and the West through the whole of the period that is under study. Turkey's role during the Gulf War is a striking example. In Greece, though, as a whole, politicians, media and the public were persuaded that in these changing times the Christian West was under threat and that the role of Greece was important in tackling the number one enemy, Turkey.

¹ Franz-Lothar Altmann, "Ex-Yugoslavia's Neighbours: Who Wants What?", in *The World Today*, Vol. 48, no. 8-9, Aug./Sep. 1992, p. 165.

² Interview of the Foreign Affairs Minister Mr. Antonis Samaras in *Kathemerini*, September 2 1990.

Chapter 3: Western Thrace and the Muslim Minority

The first problems in Greece's northern frontier began with the 1989 parliamentary elections. The PASOK government introduced an electoral system of proportional representation in an effort to prevent the opposition conservative party of New Democracy to achieve absolute majority in the parliament. This system gave the opportunity to the Muslim minority of Thrace to nominate their own independent candidates. The majority of the Greeks knew that there existed a Muslim minority in Thrace but its existence had never created any serious problems and the mass media did not pay any particular attention to the problems of the Greek Orthodox and Muslim communities of Thrace. Some believe that the usually vigorous free press of Greece does not pay effective attention to cases involving the Muslim minority or other minority groups¹. But when the leaders of the minority chose to nominate their own candidates instead of the traditional way of representing the minority through the major political parties of New Democracy and PASOK the existence of the minority and the problems of Thrace became widely known to the Greek public.

1. The Ethnographic Divisions of Western Thrace

The Muslim minority is a product of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty between Greece and Turkey which arranged the exchange of populations. According to this treaty 100,000 Muslims would be exempted from the exchange and would stay in Thrace as a balancing factor for the 100,000 Greeks that would stay in Istanbul in order to provide the religious mass for the function of the Orthodox Patriarchate of

¹The United States State Department, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990*, Greece, Preface. It should be noted that the Greek government and media question the authority of these reports since they are not the product of research. It combines reports from various international human rights groups, the estimations of the American Embassy in the particular country, and the estimations of a special envoy of the State Department in the particular country who interviews the leaders of the minorities or other social movements and officials of the government. However, the statements quoted here are present in other reports quoted in the same section. Also, these reports play part in the formation of the US foreign policy and they should be considered as important material in the shaping of the arena of international politics.

Constantinople. Today less than 3,000 Greeks remain in Istanbul as a result of Turkish official or unofficial discrimination and repercussion. In Western Thrace, in the prefectures of Xanthi and Rhodope and to a much lesser extent in the prefecture of Evros on the Greek-Turkish frontier, the Muslim minority still exists and numbers around 100,000-120,000² people making it 1.2% of the population of Greece. The Muslim minority contains two major ethnic groups, Turks (60,000) and Pomaks (30,000) but it also contains a number of Rom Gypsies (20,000)³. The Pomaks are Muslims of Bulgarian origin and live mainly in the mountainous regions of Thrace. The majority of the Muslims are the Turks and live mainly in the plains and the cities. Smaller Turkish speaking communities exist in the Dodecanese islands, in Athens and other industrial areas but their status is not covered by any international treaty and they do not face any particular discrimination. Some would expect the number of the minority to be much higher considering the high rate of reproduction of the Turks in Turkey, an ethnic group that is largely represented in the Muslim minority of Western Thrace. But the Greek policy towards the minority is such that does not favour its members to remain in their birthplace. Official or unofficial Greek discrimination against the Muslim minority has resulted in a large rate of immigration towards Turkey or Western Europe, mainly Germany. In the period between 1939 and 1951 alone some 20,000 left for Turkey and the migration continues to the present day⁴.

2. Greek-Turkish Relations and the Muslim Minority

The policy towards the minority is officially a matter of domestic politics since the Muslims of Thrace are Greek citizens. But the Greek state confronts the minority as a foreign policy issue and the supervisors of the policies towards the Muslims of Thrace are officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The official agencies that are responsible for monitoring the minority and supervising the policies towards it is in

²Hugh Poulton and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, *Minorities in the Balkans*, Expedite Graphic Ltd., London, 1989, p. 32.

³Ibid.

⁴Hugh Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 33

Kavalla (Macedonia), and functions under the title of the “Offices of Cultural Affairs” of the prefectures of Xanthi and Rhodopi⁵. This is no surprise. The Greek state on many occasions has to face official Turkish complaints which refer to the mistreatment of the minority by the Greek authorities. Successive Greek governments fear that the presence of a Turkish speaking minority in Greece, especially in a border region can provide Turkey with an excuse similar to the one it used during the Cyprus invasion (namely the protection of the Turkish-Cypriots) and attack Greece⁶. The belief is that in combination with the threat of the excuse which Turkey may use the members of the minority can actively play a subversive role against the security of the Greek state. The Muslims of Thrace are conceived as potential enemies within the state. Consequently the Greek state takes the majority of their complaints as being orchestrated by Turkey⁷. When relations between Greece and Turkey are good the minority can feel free and can live without discrimination but in situations of crisis it is confronted by the Greek state as a fifth column⁸. There is, though, some evidence that Turkey tries to exploit the discontent of the Muslim minority and control its protest through the Turkish consulate in Kommotini⁹, which usually functions under the guidance of top Turkish diplomats. The constant contacts between minority activists and the officials of the consulate confirm the theory that the Greek state fears that the minority might become a Turkish advance guard within Greece. According to a well known theory there is a military plan to exterminate the Turks of Thrace in case of a confrontation between the two countries* .

⁵The Greek Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Minorities, “Round Discussion on the Ethnic Minorities Issues”, Athens 1990, Introduction.

⁶The Economist, “Race in Thrace”, 2 March 1991.

⁷Hugh Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁸The Greek Society..., “The Muslims of Thrace”, *op. cit.* p. 3.

⁹*Ibid.*

* There is not any evidence to confirm or deny this theory but people the author knows who have served their military service in Thrace have revealed that they were acquainted with such a plan during their time in the military. It is obvious that these people can not be named.

3. Discrimination Against the Muslim Minority

The policy of the Greek state towards the potentially alien Muslim minority is one of discreet discrimination instead of open persecution because of the threat posed by Turkey. The Muslims complain that the discriminatory tactics are used by the local administration and they are relevant to property ownership and transfers, and to education, religious affairs and freedom of movement of the Muslim citizens. The following paragraphs are a presentation of their complaints which usually result in a wave of protest from the Turkish government and media and therefore becomes a matter of foreign policy. In addition the fact that officials of the foreign affairs ministry handle the minority issues show that Greece views the minority as a foreign policy issue as well.

Since Western Thrace is a border region a large part of the area is a restricted zone for reasons of national security. The victims of this restriction of movement are the Muslim citizens whose freedom of movement is limited to 30 kms radius of their residence¹⁰. In these militarised areas, movements are strictly controlled and even foreign diplomats need special authorisation to enter the restriction zone which actually exists, its critics say as a mean of controlling the activities of the minority¹¹. If they leave Greece in order to travel abroad they are in danger of losing their Greek citizenship. Under Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Law “*any person who is of foreign origin leaving Greek territories without the intention of returning may be deprived of Greek citizenship*”¹². The citizenship can be deprived by a simple administrative act and there is no hearing, judicial review or effective appeal, and no statistics on loss of citizenship are provided¹³. Many of the Turkish-Muslims who travel to Turkey with the clear intention of coming back to Thrace fall victims of this article and its arbitrary interpretation given by the Greek authorities. Since the Turks of Thrace have religious and cultural affinities with Turkey they tend to travel to that country. Some young ones even go to study in Turkey because the Greek state does

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹State Department, op. cit., section 2d.

¹²Hugh Poulton, op. cit., p.33.

not provide university education in Turkish. These travels to Turkey are probably conceived by the Greek authorities as espionage against state security or training in other subversive activities. It is claimed that in 1988, at least 122 Muslims lost their citizenship and an additional 66 in June 1990 although minority leaders alleged that many had in fact the intention of returning to Greece¹⁴. In addition many Muslims find it difficult to obtain the normal five-year duration passports of the Greek republic¹⁵.

Over the years the Muslims complain that they can not buy real estate, apart from a few who co-operate with the authorities. They are not granted loans or credits from the banks. Issuing of permits for building construction and reconstruction, even of mosques, are unjustifiably delayed and as a result some members of the minority are forced to live in backward conditions¹⁶. Additionally, tractor licenses and permits for small businesses or the exercise of certain professions are either delayed or not given and private enterprises tend to give preference in employing Greeks¹⁷. Other complaints of discrimination refer to the expropriation of Muslim land for public works which never take place, like the construction of the new buildings of the University of Thrace and the poor compensation that was given for it¹⁸. Today the Muslims hold only 40% of the land they owned at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne¹⁹. The Greeks of the region are encouraged to buy the Muslim lands with very low interest “loans of national expediency” offered by the Greek Agricultural Bank. These tactics reflect the fear that the Greek authorities feel because of the Muslim element in the border region of Thrace. The fear is that due to their perceived high birthrate the Muslims would become a majority in Western Thrace and may settle in the prefecture of Evros²⁰, adjoining Turkey, thus making Turkish military interference easier and more possible. As a result the Muslims are

¹³State Department, op. cit., section 2d, “Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation”.

¹⁴State Department, op. cit., section 2d.

¹⁵Hugh Poulton op. cit., p.33.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷State Department, op. cit., section 5, Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status.

¹⁸Hugh Poulton, op. cit., p.33.

¹⁹The Greek Society..., op. cit. p.4.

²⁰State Department, op. cit., section 5.

forced to migrate away from Thrace and seek elsewhere for a better life. Those who migrate within Greece do not face any further official discrimination²¹, a situation showing that the Greek authorities are concerned to disperse the Muslim element from Thrace, weakening it and thus preventing the area from becoming one of the irredentist plans of Turkey.

Serious complaints are expressed in regard to the education of the minority. The employment of teachers from Turkey or the Arab world has been stopped and those who are interested in teaching must graduate from a special academy in Thessaloniki. The Muslims of Thrace complain that their children are forcefully hellenised because the Academy takes its intake from Greek secondary schools. It is based on an outdated religious curriculum, and the books that the children take from Turkey are often delayed or are outdated²². Chronic disputes between Greece and Turkey over teachers and books also result in leaving the minority schools with outdated texts, poor equipment and insufficiently trained teachers²³. In addition, the pupils who want to proceed to secondary education must take an entrance exam in Greek that no other child takes in the rest of Greece because entrance to secondary education is free for all primary graduates. The result of this tactic is that a dramatic decline in attendance of the secondary education has taken place and the numbers of students in the secondary schools of Xanthi and Komotini fell from 227 and 305 in 1983-4 to 85 and 42 respectively in 1986-7²⁴. The result of this education policy is that the majority of the Muslim children remain with only a poor reading and writing ability and many in fact are illiterate. The illiterate within the minority are close to 60% while in the rest of Greece they are only 12%²⁵. Those who manage to study in Turkey find that their degrees are not recognised by the state²⁶ after returning to Greece. The Muslims also complain that the Greek state confiscates most Turkish publications at the border and jams broadcasts from Turkish television in an effort to

²¹Ibid.

²²Hugh Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

²³State Department, *op. cit.*, section 5.

²⁴Hugh Poulton *op. cit.*, p. 33.

²⁵The Greek Society..., *op. cit.* p. 4.

²⁶Ibid.

reduce ethnic activism, an accusation that is strongly denied by the Greek government²⁷.

The complaints of the Muslims include also the way the Greek state handles their religious affairs. While in fact the Muslims are free to elect their religious leaders (Muftis) according to a 1920 decree, the local authorities usually do not accept the elected persons and appoint others who are ready to co-operate with them. These appointments cause a number of strong protests from the Muslim community and sometimes these appointed persons resign their positions and it takes months until one can be finally inaugurated as a Mufti²⁸. In December 1989 the Muslims of Komotini after denying the authority of the local appointed Mufti, appealed to the 1920 decree and proceeded in electing a new Mufti. The Greek government responded a day before the election with a Presidential decree which abrogated the 1920 decree, confirmed the appointment of the old Mufti, and entitled the Minister of Education and Religion and an advisory board of prominent Muslims to appoint the Mufti from a set of candidates that will present themselves. Muslims also complain that the local administration blocked permits for the maintenance and repair of some religious buildings by demanding proof of title which is not available²⁹.

With these tactics the Greek state forces the Muslim population to migrate either to Turkey or elsewhere in Europe. So, the number of the minority has been stagnated to around 100,000, as it was at the time of the Lausanne Treaty signing. Those who stay in Thrace suffer the tactics of assimilation of the Greek state. These tactics also include the settlement of repatriated Greeks in Thrace. Immediately after the Asia Minor disaster of 1922 the Greek state settled around 60,000 refugees in Thrace in contravention to the Lausanne Treaty and during the military junta many Sarakatsani* were given financial help in order to move and settle in Thrace in order to dilute the Muslim element³⁰. And in 1990 as Greece was struggling to settle 20,000 ethnic Greek refugees (Pontians) from the Soviet Union³¹ a programme to settle

²⁷State Department, op. cit., section 2a, "Freedom of Speech and Press".

²⁸Hugh Poulton op. cit., p. 33.

²⁹State Department, op. cit., section 2c, "Freedom of Religion".

* A Greek nomadic tribe similar with the Vlachs.

³⁰Hugh Poulton, op. cit., p.-4.

³¹State Department, op. cit., section 2d.

thousands of them gradually in Thrace was inspired by the government³². This programme aimed at changing the ethno-demographic map of the region. It was ambitious in that respect and would have certainly changed the ethnographic map because of the constant flow of Greeks from the former Soviet Union: during the 1980s 150,000 Pontians from Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, and Uzbekistan emigrated to Greece³³; in 1989 6,000 emigrated according to Soviet sources³⁴. Not all of them could be settled in Thrace, but if the first stage of the programme succeeded they could provide the necessary human resources for its continuation. But this programme was doomed to fail because the economy of Greece was in crisis, with high levels of unemployment, and because Western Thrace is the poorest region of the EC thus making the allocation of people into jobs difficult; even Greeks born in the area are unable to get a job. As a result the Pontians who come to Greece full of hopes, with a strong national sentiment and with government promises for a better life find themselves stuck in “welcome camps” which look like slums and live by selling the property that they brought from Russia. For that reason the programme was suspended.

Another act of discrimination is that the Turks of Thrace are not allowed to identify their ethnic origin. However, during the 1950s and after the common entrance of Greece and Turkey into NATO, and the bilateral agreement between the two countries, an era of friendship was launched which led to a drastic change of policy according to which the Turks were officially identified as such. The policy in favour of the characterisation “Turkish” was targeted against the Bulgarophone Pomaks which were suspect as an advance force of the then Warsaw Pact member Bulgaria³⁵. The general governor of Thrace at the time issued a decree according to which the term “Muslim” was forbidden³⁶. Anyone who flouted this policy could face legal action by the Greek courts and actually there were court decisions which officially endorsed the characterisation of the Muslims as Turks. Discrimination against the Turks was at its lowest level during that period. But after the anti-Greek events in Istanbul when many

³²The Economist, op. cit.

³³ J. Robert Shannan Peckham, ‘Albanians in Greek Clothing’, The World Today, p.59.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵The Greek Society..., op. cit. p.3.

³⁶Ibid.

Greeks were beaten and shops smashed, and the deterioration of the Cyprus issue, things gradually changed. And in 1967 after the Greek-Turkish crisis the junta returned to the pre-war tactics of not recognising the ethnicity of the Turks. The Turkish invasion in Cyprus triggered the deterioration of the situation of the minority. The adjective “Turkish” is now prohibited and when it is used causes fierce reaction by the Greek mass media and may result into court action. Actually the prohibition of the word “Turkish” was upheld by the Athens High Court in 1987. This case involved the prohibition of the Turkish associations in Thrace because they used the word “Turkish” in their bylaws and therefore, were incompatible with Greek law³⁷. This is an absurd situation because the Turks learn the Turkish language in their schools, they speak Turkish, they publish newspapers in that language and even their names are Turkish. The irony is that while the Turks can only be identified as Muslim Greeks, the Pomaks are identified as such by themselves and the Greek media. And the Gypsies are called by everyone Gypsies. Only the Turks of Thrace do not have the right to identify their ethnic origin.

This sort of discrimination is based on the Treaty of Lausanne which does not distinguish the Muslim minority between different ethnicities. As is known the exchange of the populations between Greece and Turkey had as its basic criterion the religion of the exchanged people. The first article of the Convention on the exchange of populations refers to Turkish citizens of Greek-Orthodox faith and Greek citizens of Muslim faith; accordingly article two exempts from the exchange the Greeks of Constantinople and the *Muslims* of Western Thrace³⁸. So, Christian Turks and Muslim Greeks were exchanged among the Greeks and Turks respectively. Obviously the Greek state does not wish to recognise officially an ethnic Turkish minority because it is afraid that in this way it may give ground to Turkish claims over Thrace and to an active Turkish military intervention. Threats over Thrace and the Aegean where the Turks occasionally doubt the Greek sovereignty on the islands and sea explain the Greek defensive dogma according to which the main danger on Greece’s security comes from the east.

³⁷State Department, op. cit., section 2b, “Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association”.

³⁸The Treaty of Lausanne, published by the Club of New Greeks, Papazisis, Athens, p. 65.

On the other hand the Pomaks have the right to identify their ethnic origin. This is no surprise. Successive Greek governments treated these Slav-speaking Muslims in the same manner as they treated the Turks because they had fallen in the falsehood of the Treaty of Lausanne. For the Greeks the Pomaks (an ethnic group akin to Bulgarians) were as dangerous as the Turks. The consequent mistreatment of the Pomaks led them to join forces with the Turks and today they consider the other major group of the Muslim minority as their ethnic brothers. Some identify themselves as Turks³⁹. The education they receive is also responsible for the “turanisation” of the Pomaks. In their schools they are taught in Greek and Turkish and their language exists only as a vernacular. They have close ties with the Turks of the cities especially the religious leaders. But since the Greek state views the Turks as more dangerous it now tries to distinguish Pomaks from the major group of the minority. The Greek media and the local authorities are trying to persuade them that they are distinct from the Turks. In fact they try to persuade them that they are Greeks who lost their language and faith during the dark age of the Ottoman occupation. Some pseudo-scholarly publications claim that they are one of the most pure Greek tribes because they are the descendants of the people that Alexander the Great used for his light infantry⁴⁰. But all these efforts are doomed to fail because the Pomaks feel one with the Turks and are offended by the media which propagate the claim that they are natives who have been forcefully turned to Islam⁴¹. It is obvious that the Greek authorities are trying to distinguish the Pomaks from the Turks in order to avoid a common wave of protest or any other subversive activities by both communities. The irony is that the Greek state with the policy of discrimination against the Muslims has resulted in the “turanisation” of the Pomaks, something that the Turks did not accomplish during the four centuries of Ottoman rule⁴².

More tragic is the fate of the Muslim Gypsies. They are around 45,000 out of a total of 140,000 Gypsies who live in Greece⁴³. These, although they have not connected their fate with the Turks and Pomaks, because of their nomadic way of life,

³⁹The Economist, op. cit.

⁴⁰The Greek Society..., op. cit., p. 4.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Hugh Poulton, op. cit., p. 34.

also face problems. Only 20,000 of them are permanently settled in Thrace but again many of them use the region simply as the base for their travels. Their main problem is that many lack Greek citizenship and therefore civil rights. Although under a 1979 law they were allowed to get identity cards many of them do not have them because they lack birth certificates⁴⁴ since many Gypsy women give birth in their camps. As a consequence many of them have education problems, although many of them speak Turkish, and occasionally, according to the will of the local authorities, they are faced with the 1976 law proclaiming camping illegal.

4. The Reaction of the Muslim Minority and its Nature

The protest of the Muslim community was not particularly strong until the mid 1980's and certainly were not massive. Only individuals made complaints from time to time about the deterioration of their lives. But after the first crumbling of the communist regimes which were combined with a re-emergence of the ethnic conflict the Muslims of Western Thrace and especially the Turks began to protest in a more organized manner. Almost entirely these protests were organised by the Turkish communities of Xanthi and Komotini and swept with them the more low-profile Pomaks. In response the Greek authorities began to take more drastic measures. In August 1986 the most noted Muslim activist, Dr. Ahmet Sadik, was arrested and later tried on charges of spreading false information, fomenting discord and causing unrest among the Greek population* for insisting on the Turkish identity of the Muslim minority and of falsifying six signatures on a petition addressed to the Council of Europe and the UN which protested the forced assimilation and emigration that the Muslim community suffered. Dr. Sadik received two years imprisonment but was released pending appeal; his new trial was postponed until 1989 due to pressure by human rights groups like Amnesty International. Greece was accused by Amnesty International that the charges were actually political, and that the Komotini court did not meet international judicial

⁴⁴Ibid.

norms⁴⁵. In 1988 protests got stronger. In the summer of that year large-scale demonstrations by the Turks in Komotini resulted in the first instances of violence between the two communities of Thrace. Until then Greeks and Turks co-existed peacefully and the Orthodox Christians did not follow the policy of discrimination of the authorities. But then two bombs exploded in respective religious sites in Komotini. It is not clear whether the bombs were placed by Greeks of Komotini or Greek terrorist fascists outside Thrace. Nevertheless, this event caused an enmity between the two communities and the result was the clashes between Christians and Muslims in January 1990 in Komotini where many Muslim shops were smashed and looted without interference from the watching police⁴⁶. During these incidents the first death was reported. This was a Greek who was brought injured after the clashes into Komotini hospital and apparently was thrown out of a window. Some Muslims who were treated in the same wing were accused but the circumstances of this death were so dubious that no one was later convicted.

The nomination of the independent candidates in 1989 made the problems of the Muslim minority widely and acutely known to the Greek public. The main political parties in a variety of ways tried to prevent the election of these independent candidates. Both PASOK and New Democracy nominated their own Muslim candidates who were considered loyal and the mass media engaged in a fierce political propaganda against the independent candidates. The Left Coalition, although more sympathetic of the minority's condition, had its own Muslim candidates an indication that the Left viewed the independent candidates as extremists. Other tactics included the movement of soldiers from Macedonia to Thrace in order to increase the Greek electorate of the region⁴⁷. The efforts against the election of these candidates failed even when one of them was tried on charges of fraud shortly before the elections of November 1989. The Muslim minority elected one independent MP, Dr. Sadik, from Rhodopi in June 1989, one in the parliamentary elections of November 1989, and

* It should be noted that these charges were used by the post-civil war governments, elected or not, to accuse Communists or other pro-democracy and human rights activists.

⁴⁵State Department, *op. cit.*, section 1e "Denial of Free Trial".

⁴⁶State Department, *op. cit.*, section 5. "Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status".

⁴⁷The Greek Society..., *op. cit.*, p. 4.

two, Ahmet Faikoglu from Xanthi, and Dr. Sadik from Rhodopi, in April 1990, the elections which brought New Democracy finally into power. It should be noted that after the June 1989 election of Dr. Sadik the Greek authorities resumed the trial against him and convicted him. The time he spent together with the hearing of his new appeal, which converted his sentence into a fine, was enough to prevent him from getting elected in November 1989. In addition, it should be noted, the percentage of the vote that these Turkish candidates received was above 30% of the region's total, combining the votes of both Turks and Pomaks, which indicates that the Pomaks have connected their fate with the future of the Turks of Thrace.

5. The New Attitude of the Greek State

The protests of the Muslim community and its independent presentation in the parliament changed the attitude of the political parties towards them. New Democracy and the Left Coalition pressed the all-party government that was formed after the November 1989 elections to form a policy that would improve the living conditions of the minority. New Democracy when it came into power wished to continue in the same track. Its intention to address certain complaints of the Muslim minority was recognised both internationally⁴⁸ and by the Muslim minority. This intention gave the government of New Democracy the support of the Muslim MP's in the vote of confidence that premier Konstantinos Mitsotakis needed in order to begin his administration. Dr. Sadik voted for the government while Mr. Faikoglu abstained, and Mr. Mitsotakis secured a slim majority of one, which later became two, with the support of the Muslim MP's.

Shortly after the new government got into power some forms of discrimination stopped. As reported and confirmed by the Muslims, hundreds of long-delayed driver's licenses and firearms permits were issued to their Muslim holders, land purchases were approved, and title deeds on family holdings were granted⁴⁹. Dr.

⁴⁸State Department, op. cit., "Preface".

⁴⁹State Department, op. cit., section 5.

Sadik admitted that between 1990-1992 the situation of the Muslim minority improved⁵⁰. However, the government passed a new electoral law, allegedly in order to avoid again the uneconomical and exhausting experience of holding elections within a year. According to this new law a party should gain 3 percent of the national vote before its candidates could become MPs irrespective of the percentage they could gain in their constituencies. This clause effectively excluded independent Muslim candidates from entering the parliament. Despite that, things gradually changed in favour of the minority and a cause for that was an effort between Greece and Turkey to overcome their differences and begin a more substantial dialogue over the issues that divide them.

6. Greek-Turkish Relations and the Muslim Minority (2)

The issue of the Muslim minority is destined to fall in the wider set of issues that divide the two countries. Relations between Greece and Turkey may not be excellent but they are not always tense. Some meetings are arranged from time to time, discussions are held and occasionally an agreement may be signed. But until a solution is found for the two main issues which divide the two countries, namely the question of Greece's sea frontiers and the Turkish continental shelf and the Cyprus problem, relations will remain less than friendly and the Muslim minority will be dragged in the diplomatic tug of war between the two. The presence of the Muslim minority in relation to the virtual extinction of the Greeks of Istanbul (whose present number is so low that the Greek government can not exploit it in its diplomatic plans) provide a useful diplomatic weapon with which Turkey exercises pressure on Greece whenever relations are tense or the Turkish leadership desires to achieve other ends. These ends include diversion of the Turkish public from the deep domestic problems, or diversion of the international community from Turkey's poor human rights record or its annual military attacks against the Kurds.

⁵⁰Noel Malcolm, *The New Bully of the Balkans*, The Spectator , 15 August 1992.

On the other hand Greece, whose security vis-a-vis Turkey is not guaranteed by the Western European Union and NATO, views the Turkish involvement in the minority issue as a reminder of the threat posed by this country. The policy of Greece towards the minority is partly based on the feeling that Turkey is a constant threat to the country's security. To the strong protests of the Turkish officials Greece reacts with strong replies referring to Turkey's bad record on human rights, the long occupation of the north part of Cyprus, the persecution of the Greeks of Istanbul, and the numerous breaches of the Treaty of Lausanne by Turkey. These official announcements by both sides stir up the national sentiments of Greeks and Turks and consequently the gap between the two countries appears to be unbridgable. In the troubled context of the Greek-Turkish relations with thousands of Cypriot refugees living away from their land for more than twenty years and the expressed Turkish threat that an imminent extension of Greece's sea frontiers to twelve miles will be conceived as *casus belli*, the Muslim minority becomes a victim. Thus, any progress that can be made rests upon the occasional Greek government which wishes to connect the status of the Muslim minority with its policy towards Turkey.

In particular, the use of the Muslim minority as a foreign policy issue between the two countries appears in the war of announcements of the two countries which refer to human rights and the Treaty of Lausanne. Greece and Turkey are guarantee powers for the implementation of the Lausanne treaty and are responsible for the well-being of the respective minorities whose rights are guaranteed under the clauses of the treaty. However, Turkey has breached the treaty on numerous occasions and has turned a blind eye on instances of anti-Greek activities like the events of 1955 when a pogrom against the Greeks of Istanbul was launched by an angry mob and the more recent damage of Greek graves and exhumation of bones in 1993⁵¹. The 1955 events were triggered by a bomb explosion in the Turkish consulate which as it was proved later was a provocative action done by a Turk from Komotini in agreement with the Turkish consul of Thessaloniki⁵². As a result of these persecutions the once

⁵¹More than 40 breaches of the treaty are presented in the edition of the Treaty of Lausanne by the Club of New Greeks op. cit., pp. 155-166. The 1955 events were particularly violent but their presentation is not a matter of this work.

⁵²The Club of New Greeks, op. cit., p.159.

thriving Greek community of Istanbul and Eastern Thrace whose presence in the region dates back to ancient times, today numbers less than 3,000. In addition, this 1955 action and the constant contacts between the Turkish minority leaders and the officials of the Komotini consulate as well as their usual trips to Turkey tend to confirm the Greek fears that Thrace is included in the irridentist aspirations of Turkey. Officials from Turkey do not hide their great interest in the minority and sometimes they make their views clear with long statements. One of these statements was the letter that the Turkish foreign minister Mr. Mesut Yilmaz sent to various international organisations on January 31 1990 after the last conviction of Dr. Sadik in January 25 1990⁵³. In his letter Mr. Yilmaz referred to the long violation of the minority's human rights by successive Greek governments, described in great detail the discriminatory climate that the defendants faced during their trial and referred to the events of Komotini that followed the trial, blaming the Greek authorities, police and media. He made suggestions on how the international community should press the Greek government to take measures in order to correct a situation which the Turkish minister despite his diplomatic language did not refrain from describing as "unacceptable". As a reply the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a letter to the same persons and institutions⁵⁴. At first Mr. Samaras accused Turkey of trying to divert the attention of the international community from its own poor human rights record. He then referred to the open trial of the minority defendants in a normal court unlike the procedure followed in Turkey. Mr. Samaras blamed the Turkish authorities and media for the events in Komotini, noting that the casualty of these events was a Greek death. He concluded by describing in detail a number of anti-Greek activities in Turkey in violation of the Treaty of Lausanne. This is how both countries fight a war of words over the problems of both communities in Western Thrace, the poorest region of the European Union, leaving the situation in a virtual stalemate.

⁵³Taken from the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, *Yearbook of Defense and Foreign Policy 1992*, pp. 261-267. This letter was sent to the General Secretary of the United Nations, the G.S. of NATO, the President of the Parliamentary Committee of the Council of Europe, the President of the European Parliament, the G.S. of the Islamic Conference, and the foreign minister of the CSCE countries. The Greek translation of the letter has been used for its presentation here.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

Chapter 4: Greek-Albanian Relations and the Question of the Greek Minority in Southern Albania

The significant dimension which affects the status of Greek-Albanian relations is the situation of the Greek minority in southern Albania (Northern Epirus). The disputed number of ethnic Greek inhabitants of the region has caused friction on a number of occasions between the two countries in the twentieth century. The Greek armies have occupied the region both during the First and Second World Wars and the dream of many Greeks at that time to incorporate Northern Epirus to the motherland seemed to become true. However, on both occasions the Peace Conferences that followed the Wars did not award the region to Greece and the “redemption” of the land was suspended. This caused much resentment among the Greeks, especially after the end of the Second World War, during which the war against Mussolini’s army in Albania was hailed as epic. The refusal to award the region to Greece was conceived as a betrayal of an allied country which had suffered a lot during the occupation and resistance years, and continued to suffer from Soviet inspired Communist insurrection and a civil war.

As a result Greece continued to be in a state of war with Albania, a situation which occurred in the beginning of the War since Albania, as an Italian protectorate and launching ground, was also responsible for the Fascist attack against Greece, and did not recognise the Greek-Albanian frontiers. This situation continued for many years, resulting in an almost non-existent state of relations between the two neighbours, a situation which was also cultivated by Albania’s long isolationism. Only in 1971 an exchange of lower ranking diplomatic officials took place in an effort of the military junta to approach other dictatorial regimes and third world countries.

In 1987 a significant change occurred in the relations between the two countries. The socialist government of Mr. Papandreou surprised everyone in Greece and abroad by announcing that Greece was suspending the state of war against Albania, and by sending his foreign minister Mr. Karolos Papoulias to pay the first visit by a western diplomat to Albania in the contemporary world. This action caused furious protests by members of the conservative, and traditionally nationalist,

opposition, and various groups for the “protection of the human rights” of the inhabitants of Northern Epirus. Since then, the relations of the two countries have entered into a new era: regular meetings are held, some agreements have been signed and some movement restrictions at the border have been lifted. However, a number of problems do rise, especially after the democratic shift of the Albanian regime. Among them stands the most important issue of the status of the Greek minority, and the recognition of the southern Albanian frontier. Greece, despite the suspension of the state of war, has yet to recognise officially the southern Albanian frontier, leaving the issue unresolved. Greece has, of course, signed the CSCE declaration which prohibits the redrawing of the present frontiers, but an official agreement of mutual recognition of the present frontiers between the two countries would put an end to a long-standing dispute over the region. The key factor to such a development seems to be the ethnic-Greek minority of Southern Albania.

1. The Greek Element in Southern Albania

The presence of the Greek element in the region that today comprises the southern part of Albania dates back to ancient times. Today it is difficult to estimate the exact number of Greeks in the region because as is common on such occasions people from different sides produce different numbers in their surveys. The Albanians in their 1961 census, according to which the Albanians constituted the 95% of the population, referred to only 40,000 Greeks living in Albania (2.4%). Unofficially, today they claim that because of the emigration of Albanian citizens after the recent opening of the frontier the number has fallen to just 28,000. The Greeks on the other hand refer to as many as 400,000 Greeks living in the region, citing pre-Balkan war catalogues of the Greek schools that operated in the region, and of the parishes under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople*. Other analysts outside Albania estimate that the number of Greeks in the region numbers between 200,000-250,000¹. However, other

* This number has appeared in various reports in the Greek media. No official source has confirmed this.

¹ Hugh Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

independent organisations, who actually cite Greek minority leaders, refer to 70,000-80,000 Greeks who comprise just 3-5% of the population and an equal number of Albanian Greeks who have emigrated or escaped to Greece². But the Greeks of Albania maintain the view that they number 300,000 people³.

2. Discrimination Against the Greek Minority

The Greek Orthodox community in Albania suffered a fierce attack against its own identity after the end of the World War II and the establishment of the communist regime. In the atheist regime of Albania Greeks were prohibited from practicing their religious affairs. They were practically discouraged from using their language in public, were forced to change their names into Albanian ones, and suffered the orchestrated influx of ethnic Albanians in the region and their own displacement to other regions of the country⁴.

The anti-religious campaign, whose victims were all Albanian citizens despite their ethnic origin, began in April 1967 as an equivalent of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. During this campaign 2,169 religious buildings were demolished or converted to grain depots, stables, theatres, or coffee shops. Religious practice was forbidden, and priests were denounced, shaven, defrocked, imprisoned and killed⁵. Defiant Greeks who managed to escape narrated hair-rising stories of secretive religious practice which if uncovered could result to death⁶.

In 1975, a name-changing campaign began for citizens who had inappropriate and offensive names and surnames from a political, ideological and moral standpoint⁷. The Greeks of southern Albania suffered the most from this campaign, although the campaign targeted all Albanians with offensive names. It is alleged that the campaign

² *The 1992 Human Rights Report for Albania*, Issued by the US Department of State, Washington DC January 19, 1993, p. 7-8.

³ *Memorandum to the CSCE/Conference on the Human Dimension*, Political, Social, and Cultural Organisation 'Omonia' of the Greek Minority of Albania, Moscow, September 10 - October 4 1991, p. 1.

⁴ Hugh Poulton, *op. cit.*, 36.

⁵ Hugh Poulton, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

⁶ *Ibid.*

against the Greeks started as far back as 1967⁸. It is also alleged that Muslims suffered less from this campaign and a proof for that is that First Secretary Hoxha, whose surname means Muslim priest, and other government members were not obliged to change their names⁹. The Greek governments of the period protested at this measure and the Albanians promised to stop this practice, but according to the leaders of the minority, local authorities continued to follow it¹⁰. The same principles were applied to name-changes of towns, especially in the areas of Greek concentration. So, Aghii Saranda, a town dedicated to forty martyrs of the Orthodox Church, became just Sarande.

Another discriminatory policy against the Greeks is the relocation of families or the internment of certain persons. There were several laws providing the authorities with the power to exercise this policy against people who represent a danger to the social system as the Decree no. 5912 of 1979 specified¹¹. Internees were sent either to concentration camps or remote villages where they had to report daily to the police. They were forced to work in agricultural and semi-industrial projects, and they risked the internment of their families if they escaped¹². The relocation of families involved both Greeks and Albanians, who were sent either north or south respectively, and had as a result the effective change of the Greek character of certain towns, which in order to be officially under the legal minority status had to be solely Greek; the presence of only two or three Albanian families resulted in the change of the minority status of the town¹³. So, in these Greek-Albanian villages the ethnic Greeks lost their right to learn their language¹⁴. In addition, representatives of the minority claimed that ethnic-Greeks who were educated or had acquired a certain expertise were forced to live in Tirana because they could not be employed in the area of their origin¹⁵. Gradually, the minority was restricted to a certain geographical area, the two south prefectures of Gyrokaster and Saranda with 100 Greek villages. No one was recognised as minority

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Political, Social and Cultural Organisation Omonia, op. cit., p. 4.

¹¹ Hugh Poulton, op. cit., p. 37.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Hugh Poulton, op. cit., p. 37.

¹⁴ Political, Social, and Cultural Organisation Omonia, op. cit., p.4.

member outside this area and as a result the entire population of Greek villages lost its rights to speak their language and participate in cultural events¹⁶. According to the minority leaders this tactic has produced an alteration of the statistics on the minority, because the authorities count as ethnic Greeks only those who inhabit this area, and that is why the Albanian authorities give such a small number of ethnic Greeks in contrast to the ‘real’ number the minority leaders claim that exists¹⁷.

Information about the education of the minority during the communist years is confusing. While the regime maintained the position that the minority children received the proper education, with teachers trained in a special Greek language academy and books in Greek, fugitives claimed that teaching in the Greek language stopped at the fourth grade of the primary school which was subsequently taught as a foreign language, and that the number of Greek schools was decreasing in the recent years¹⁸.

The fugitives also claimed that the use of the Greek language faced restrictions. Although there were no legal prohibitions against the use of Greek, fugitives of various ethnic origins claimed that authorities in some villages prohibited the use of minority languages in public, that Greek children were not allowed to talk to each other in their language while at school, and similar restriction were applied in the army and in prisons during visiting hours¹⁹.

3. The Treatment of the Greek Minority after the Collapse of Communism and the Foundation of *Omonia*

After the death of Enver Hoxha and in combination with Greece’s lifting of the state of war, things have gradually started to change. Some movement restrictions were lifted and a number of churches were restored. A significant change seemed to be under way as soon as Albania abandoned its isolationism and its communist regime.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ op. cit., p. 3.

¹⁷ op. cit., p.4.

¹⁸ Hugh Poulton op. cit., p.37.

The barbed wire on the frontier between Greece and Albania was lifted by the local population on the eve of 1991 in a similar manner with the demolition of the Berlin Wall. All travel restrictions were lifted for all Albanian citizens including the ethnic Greeks, all prohibitions against religious practice were lifted and the churches opened to the public, and all the ethnic Greek detainees were released²⁰.

In the 1991 first parliamentary elections, the ethnic Greek party of *Omonia* elected five deputies in the parliament. But its electoral campaign was not without problems, and the Albanian authorities showed their intentions of controlling the minority even if they had to resume discriminatory practices, although the expressed purpose of *Omonia* is to promote the good relationship between Greece and Albania²¹. *Omonia* was not allowed to list candidates in Gyrokaster, Saranda and Delvino although these regions are included in the minority area, and candidates were not allowed to appear in other areas which are inhabited by ethnic Greeks but which are outside the minority area²². The strength of the minority vote alarmed the Albanian authorities and in the July 1991 the People's Assembly passed a new election law which barred ethnically based parties, a decree which clearly targeted *Omonia*. The response of the political leaders of the minority was to create a new party, the Unity for Human Rights, which appeared as a national party and thus was granted governmental approval to participate in the elections. The damage, though, was done because after the first governmental crisis, which occurred very quickly after the decree was passed, Unity/*Omonia* did not have time to field lists of candidates in all the constituencies and its electoral support was diminished in the elections that followed the crisis. However, Unity/*Omonia* managed to elect some representatives in the first two Albanian elections. The persecution against *Omonia* prompted some Greeks in southern Albania to form groups which began to advocate autonomy or even secession and union with Greece²³.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Political, Social and Cultural Organisation *Omonia*, p. 5-6.

²¹ op. cit., p. 5.

²² op. cit., p. 6.

²³ James Pettifer, "Greece,; Into the Balkan Crisis", in *The World Today*, Vol. 48, no. 11, Nov. 1992, p. 195.

4. Greek-Albanian Relations and the Greek Minority

This discrimination against the Greek representatives in Albania caused the first strain in Greek-Albanian relations which had entered an era of rapprochement and understanding between 1987-1991. After the lifting of the barriers, visits by Greek governmental officials began to take place, discussions on possible agreements occurred, and wholehearted support of the new Albanian government was expressed. The interest of the Greek government in the Greek-Albanian minority was increased, moral and material support and aid was provided by official and unofficial sources and the minority was strengthened. Consequently, the prime-minister of Greece Mr. Konstantinos Mitsotakis in his first visit to Tirana expressed the Greek interest in the well-being of the minority and pressed the Albanian government to show the same interest: so, in the communique that followed the meeting of the two delegations both countries stressed that “*the respect of the human rights of the minorities according to the international law and agreements must constitute a factor of rapprochement, friendship and good relations*”²⁴. The expressed Greek interest in the status of the minority and the growing political power of the minority strengthened the Albanian fears about a separatist or irredentist movement and they proceeded to discrimination against the political representation of the minority.

The Albanian fears are not unjustified although they are somewhat exaggerated. Small groups in Greece, with religious, political, and social dimensions, organise events, publish various materials, act as pressure groups and in general try to influence the public in order to awaken a more active interest in the preservation and reinforcement of the human rights of the Greek minority in southern Albania. They belong to the far right wing of the political spectrum and they express nationalist and irredentist positions even if they try to conceal them behind their expressed interest in the human rights of the minority. They do not operate as parties but they try to influence the politics of Greece and they approach, successfully, members of the right wing party of New Democracy. So, Mr. A. Xarchas former vice-president of the

²⁴ Greek-Albanian Communique, Tirana, 13/1/1991.

Greek Parliament has participated in events of these groups. Another MP with New Democracy, Mr. A. Foussas, a former minister and a lawyer by profession is associated with these groups and has defended members of SFEVA in the Greek courts. SFEVA is a student nationalist group which is not recognised by the National Student Union of Greece (EFEE) because of its alleged extreme right wing connections. This group is not allowed to operate, openly at least, in the Greek universities due to EFEE's banning of extreme right wing groups but it has proceeded into activities which have provoked violent reactions from leftist groups and has resulted into court hearings. SFEVA is closely associated with the Panhellenic Association of Northern Epirot Struggle (PASIVA), a group that can not hide its irredentist aspirations although it tries to conceal them behind declarations of friendship between Greece and Albania. Their publications reveal their intentions: in their bi-monthly bulletin the *Vorioepirotikon Vima* (Northern-Epirot Pontium) one can read articles like "*Chimara is and will remain Greek; the Northern Epirots voted for union with Greece in the Albanian elections; the Albanians whether communists, nationalists or democrats are notorious in their anti-Greek hate and their aim is the extinction of the Greek minority; Macedonia, Northern Epirus, Cyprus and Constantinople are Greek*"²⁵. In another publication, the former President of PASIVA, the late Rev. Sevastianos, Metropolitan of Dhriinoupolis, has produced a map of 'Northern Epirus', which he claims numbers 400,000 Greeks and in which the region is not only larger in size than the province of Epirus in Greece but also covers half the size of Albania²⁶. It is true that PASIVA does not have a large influence on the Greek public and politics but in the era of the recent Balkan unrest and the resurgence of nationalism it may be gaining substantial ground of public support. These types of organisations and their links with some prominent Greek politicians has alarmed the Albanians whose reaction is the continuing discrimination against the political leaders of the minority. These actions of the Albanian authorities caused a fracture in the relations between the two countries which had entered a new era after the collapse of the Communist regime in Albania.

²⁵ *Vorioepirotikon Vima*, n. 23 March\April 1992 and n. 24 May\June 1992.

²⁶ Rev. Sevastianos, Metropolitan of Driinoupolis, *Behind Albania's Iron Curtain*, the Panhellenic Association of Northern Epirots, Athens 1990, p. 6-7.

The strain between Greece and Albania was deepened by another factor: the influx of hundreds of thousands of Albanian citizens. The lifting of the strict border control on the Albanian frontier caused a massive exodus of Greek-Albanians who waited patiently for the time that they could visit Greece and unite with their relatives, and an even greater exodus of Albanians who seek a better future in a more developed country. The Greek government, through its premier Mr. Konstantinos Mitsotakis, fearing that the influx of Greeks from Northern Epirus would weaken the Greek element of the region entreated the ethnic Greeks of Albania not to return to Greece²⁷ and promised that Greece would support and aid the development of the region. Mr. Mitsotakis pressed the Albanian government to welcome his appeal to the minority and he made sure that the Albanians would commit themselves in keeping the well being of the minority: in the common Greek-Albanian communique both countries agreed that the promotion of their common interest requires the presence of the minority in its mother-land; in addition, Albania announced that the ethnic Greeks who had left the country were welcomed to return and promised that they could continue their lives without any consequences as free Albanian citizens²⁸. The minority leaders, possibly, must have followed the wishes of the Greek government and persuaded the members of the minority not to abandon the region in large numbers. As a result the Greeks from Albania who have entered Greece is small compared to the influx of the Albanians²⁹. Unofficial numbers which are produced by the Greek media talk about 300,000-500,000 Albanians who enter illegally the Greek territory illegally but they must be strongly exaggerated. However, the Greek authorities have accepted that the Albanians in Greece are about 300,000 and they have forwarded this number to the EU³⁰. These Albanians, if they are lucky to be employed, send remittances to their families back home. Others stay and work for a short period, then they return to Albania and re-enter Greece when their funds are depleted.

²⁷ J. Robert Shannan Peckham, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

²⁸ Greek-Albanian Communique, Tirana, 13/1/1991.

²⁹ J. Robert Shannan Peckham, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

³⁰ The European Parliament, 'Resolution in Albania', 4 (b) B3-1054, 1087, 1093 and 1097/93, 15.07.1993. In this resolution the European Parliament demands action from the EC in order to tackle the social problem caused by the influx of the Albanians.

The influx of such a large number of illegal immigrants has caused a number of problems in Greek society. The struggling Greek economy, which has been in crisis since 1988, with very low rates of growth compared to the rest of the European Union and an unemployment rate of 10%, is not capable of accommodating immigrants and providing work for them. The number of immigrants in Greece has not yet been officially counted. Greece has been a country of emigration and has never asked for foreign workers. Subsequently, it lacks a comprehensive and consistent immigration policy. Immigration occurred after the mid 1980s and initially involved political refugees from Poland, Romania and other communist countries who were added to the refugees from Bulgaria, Turkey, Albania. The small refugee camps of Greece could not provide accommodation for the growing number of refugees and also provided the field for violent clashes between anti-Communist Bulgarians and leftist Turks and Kurds. So, eventually these refugees ended out in the open Greek society seeking for work and accommodation. The traditional political ties of Greece with the Arab world has proved to be a good ground for the influx of many Arabs for studies and work especially Palestinians. The first emigrants who were not refugees came from as far as Philippines. In the mid-1980s thousands of them entered Greece to work as butlers, maids and gardeners. Their employment became something of a status symbol and the demand for more Filipinos continued well into the 1990s. Africa provided another ground of emigration and shortly after the university students, work-seekers from many different countries of Africa began their trips to Greece. The collapse of the communist regimes triggered a new influx of emigrants from eastern Europe and Russia in the 1990s and culminated with the massive entrance of the Albanians. At the same period a new wave from Asia had grown and Chinese started to enter Greece together with Hindus and Pakistanis who abandoned their traditional Commonwealth routes. A growing number of Europeans from the EU also seeks employment in Greece but these can count only as internal migrants since they are European citizens. The hundreds of thousands of Greeks from the former Communist countries should also count in the problem of emigration, because although they are granted civil rights as the rest of the Greeks, their number is so high that the

programmes for their settlement and assimilation are not comprehensive and rarely succeed.

The large numbers of illegal immigrants puts a considerable strain and added social problems in the society of a country with a large deficit, the lowest economic performance in the EU, high unemployment rate, and virtually no funds to invest for a comprehensive social programme in order to tackle the problems of emigration³¹. Apart from the Europeans who work in foreign language schools, infrastructure projects funded by the EU, the tourist industry or as staff in various businesses, the rest of the mosaic of illegal immigrants are employed as a cheap work-force in building, night-shift employees, agricultural workers, maids, gardeners, dancers in night clubs, and many women as strippers and prostitutes. Although the majority of them come to Greece with the hope of making it later to the rest of Europe or North America only few of them manage to accomplish their dream. The majority of them stay in Greece and some of them return to their countries. They enter the Greek territory under the risk of being shot at the border. An international mafia which is paid between \$2,000-5,000 per head helps them to reach the border. If they escape the frontier guards, and many of them do because the people who bring them know the passages, they are left to their own and seek refuge in the big cities. Some of them on the frontier pay for their agony and despair with their lives, others are arrested by the police, tried and serve up to three years imprisonment until deportation. But their number is so high that neither the army nor the police are capable of preventing their entry. From time to time police round up some of them, especially the Albanians, and send them back. Actions like that have mainly political motives since they serve as a means of pressure against the Albanian government which relies on the income of these immigrants for the function of their market economy reforms. Their living and hygiene conditions are very poor, as they are stacked in fives, tens or even twenties in very small, dark, and cold apartments.

As employment for them is scarce in a country with a 10% unemployment rate some of them resort to crime in order to survive. The Greek authorities see the illegal immigrants as a headache that can not be cured with the usual measures of

³¹ J. Robert Shannan Peckham op. cit., p. 59.

deportation, or strict border controls. The Greek public, especially the lower urban classes, resent the inability of the state to tackle the issue and grow more and more xenophobic and some isolated incidents of racist violence have occurred. No funds for research are granted since these people are aliens for the Greek state and any information that can be provided comes from the mass media. But the media can not be reliable sources, especially the Greek ones which have a notorious capability to distort events. According to media calculations, the immigrants in Greece during the 1980s numbered between 40,000-120,000 but in any case these numbers must have tripled today³². For the time being these people remain left to their fate, stranded in an alien country as many of them have surrendered their passports to the mafia that brought them there, with no legal rights and a public that grows more and more hostile. It is only a matter of time until political exploitation against their presence will appear in Greek politics.

Crime, risks of diseases because of the poor hygiene of the immigrants, public resentment especially from the lower classes and the unemployed, corruption from state and police officials who are bribed in order to facilitate the movement of the illegal immigrants through the border are some of the problems that immigration has brought with it. The problem of illegal immigration is very difficult to tackle, especially after the massive influx of the Albanians. Strict border controls by police and army patrols are not always effective because of the high mountains, swamps, lakes and rivers that comprise the northern border. Many desperate Albanians in particular risk their lives by climbing up to the snow covered mountains in order to escape the border patrols. The Greek state, although it has sent more troops to the border, does not want to militarise the region entirely and weaken other areas since the Greek army is oriented in defending the country against Turkey. It appears that the Greek state does not have the necessary military and police resources to patrol the Greek-Albanian frontier intensely enough to prevent Albanian incursions³³.

So, the common tactic of the Greek state is to round up the Albanians from time to time and send them back. In this way the Greek state kills two birds with one

³² *Round Discussion on the Minorities in Greece*, the Greek Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Minorities op. cit., p.6.

³³ James Pettifer, 'Albania: A Challenge for Europe', *The World Today*, June 1992, p. 96.

shot. First, public resentment is calmed. The alarming rise of crime in the 1990s which the public is witnessing even in broad daylight, such as the stabbing of a man in an Athens bus, and the apparent organisation of Albanians into gangs and networks, the so-called 'Albanian Mafia'³⁴, has caused a widespread sense of fear and hostility towards the Albanians. Despite that many times they commit crimes against their fellow Albanians, they have become the usual suspects for the police and the media, and consequently the public. When a crime is committed, and no clear suspect is found, the police usually rounds up these immigrants, especially the Albanians. In one occasion, the police rounded up and forcefully repatriated more than 5,000 Albanians. This mission which was carried out by the infamous Greek riot police, which in other occasions is widely criticised by the media, was sympathetically reported on the television and the press³⁵. International observers though see these actions as quite serious human rights abuses which are committed by the Greek security forces on the border region³⁶. Some of these instances are horrific: Albanians captured in the border are humiliated in various ways, stripped in below zero temperatures, hanged from their feet and beaten*. Clearly, the purpose of these actions is to scare aspiring illegal entrants, at a time when many of them form armed bands and raid border villages³⁷, or seaside villages and tourist resorts of Corfu. But these actions and especially the deportation of so many people have more to do with the second objective of the Greek authorities in respect to this measure.

The second objective of the Greek government, it appears, is to exercise pressure to the Albanian government. Thousands of Albanian families depend on the income that their members who work in Greece send back home. This is a valuable source of foreign exchange for the Albanian government as well. But although this situation could provide the ground for understanding and closer ties between the two countries, the Albanian government, fearing that the Greek interest in the minority of

³⁴ J. Robert Shannan Peckham, *op. cit.*, p. 58-9.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question", in *International Affairs*, no. 68, 3 (July) 1992, pp. 475-485.

* An army officer of the Greek Special Forces which patrol the border revealed to the author the treatment that illegal Albanian immigrants face when captured. Sometimes in order to secure his troops aggressive behaviour he would beat them in front of the Albanians, so they would later try to overcome their shame by beating the captured with a vigorous dash. This source can not be named.

southern Albania entails separatist aspirations, proceeds with measures like the banning of *Omonia* which are likely to cause resentment in Greece. So, the Greek government as a response to that or as a means of exercising pressure, on other occasions sends back to Albania as many illegal immigrants as the police can gather on a short notice. These measures are likely to cause tension. So, on one occasion, Albanian fury because of the deportation of a number of Albanians in February 1992 who were allegedly physically abused by the Greek military personnel fueled fears of Greek irredentism and resulted in riots and looting of a number of Greek businesses and shops in Sarande³⁸.

The political change in Albania, and the vast economic aid that this country is desperately in need of, could provide the basis for close co-operation with Greece. During meetings between officials of the two countries, Greece, together with promises or plans, brings with it demands for an improvement of the conditions of the Greek minority in Albania. On the other hand, the Albanian government which also played the card of nationalism for domestic political reasons reacted to the demands of the ethnic Greek minority and the Greek government and also brought forward its own claims on the treatment of Albanian immigrants in Greece. This instigated a new issue concerning the “compensation” of the Albanians of Chamuria in Epirus who were forced out of Greece after the end of the war because they had co-operated with the fascist forces of occupation. The Greek government refused to talk about the Albanians of Chamouria since they are considered traitors, war criminals and have escaped justice and punishment³⁹. Some Albanian political groups which play strongly the card of nationalism have undertaken the cause of Chamuria, partly as a response to the more militant groups of the Greek minority⁴⁰ which advocate secession. Under these conditions the process of approach and co-operation is delayed and the problems of the minority remain acute and unsolved. In this context separatist aspirations possibly gain influence within the minority.

³⁷ James Pettifer, “The New Macedonian Question”, op. cit., p. 482.

³⁸ *The 1992 Human Rights Report for Albania*, op. cit., p. 2.

³⁹ A short but comprehensive review of the deeds of the Albanians of Chamouria is given by F.K. Voros, ‘Diplomatic Chamikos’ *Ekpedeutika*, vol. 27-28, Athens 1992, pp. 81-7.

⁴⁰ James Pettifer, “Greece: Into the Balkan Crisis”, op. cit. p. 195.

5. The Continuing Problems of the Greek Minority in Southern Albania

On the political level the parliamentary decision to prohibit ethnically based parties from participating in the elections has been conceived by the minority leaders as a clear indication of the intentions of the Albanian state towards the Greeks of Albania. The Omonia party reacted swiftly making sure that a new party would participate in the March 1992 elections and that it would gain the necessary support in order to elect representatives to the new parliament. According to international observers the effort of the minority leaders to ensure the electoral success of their candidates has produced a number of serious voting irregularities by the ethnic Greek election officials in favour of the Unity party in ethnic Greek areas⁴¹. In addition, Omonia bussed back to Albania thousands of ethnic Greeks who live in Greece in order to vote, a move which caused tensions between Albanians and Greeks in a number of southern cities⁴². As a result non-Greek candidates and ethnic Greek candidates were harassed in a number of instances in some areas⁴³. These irregular actions of the minority leaders are to an extent understandable because they had to respond to the problem they faced in a very short time. It could be argued though that the indifference to Albanian electoral rules that these *Omonia* members showed was a symptom of their growing dissatisfaction with their position within the Albanian state and a further confirmation of the fears of some Europeans that the “*Greek minority is showing signs of significant radicalisation which might lead its leaders to abandon their human rights politics in favour of unification with Greece*”⁴⁴. In fact inter-communal tension among locals has increased⁴⁵. Albanians are often the victims of

⁴¹ *The 1992 Human Rights Report*, op. cit., p. 7.

⁴² Op. cit., p. 8. Such a move was possibly arranged either with the help of Greek government officials or northern-epirot organisations in Greece.

⁴³ Op. cit., p. 7.

⁴⁴ James Pettifer, “Greece’s Post-Election Dilemmas”, *The World Today*, Dec. 1993, Vol. 49, No. 12.

⁴⁵ James Pettifer, “Albania, Greece and the Vorio-Epirus Question”, *The World Today*, Aug-Sep, 1994, Vol. 50, nos. 8-9.

violence by indiscriminate “vigilante” groups in Greece, and in two occasions (April and June 1994) Albanian soldiers were killed by the so-called Front for the Liberation of Voreio Epirus (MAVI)⁴⁶. Under these circumstances Greek-Albanian relations are damaged and the situation of the minority does not get any better.

As a result in other human rights aspects there are still problems. Although the fall of communism brought freedom of religion in Albania problems of ecclesiastical organisation have mingled with the politics concerning the minority and the relations of the two countries. So, when the Ecumenical Patriarch appointed three bishops of Greek origin to the Dioceses of Korce, Berat, and Gyrokaster, a storm of public protest persuaded the government not to accept their installation. The Albanian public demands that their religious leaders should be of Albanian origin although there are not such candidates available⁴⁷ because after so many years of religious repression there were no members of the Albanian clergy in the Orthodox high ranks. Similar were the reactions when the Patriarchate appointed another Greek, Rev. Anastasios Janullatos, as Archbishop of Albania. This time the government, facing the absence of any legitimate candidate of Albanian origin, accepted the appointment until a replacement could be found. The Patriarchate of Constantinople is itself in a difficult position since its ranks are mainly filled with Greeks. The majority of the Orthodox Churches are autonomous and although they accept the spiritual leadership of the Patriarch as a means of keeping a sense of unity between them, they have their own hierarchies and do not participate in the ranks of the Patriarchate. Nevertheless, its move to appoint Greek religious leaders was conceived as a favourable action towards the minority with possible separatist ambitions entailed in it, especially in the towns with a strong presence of the minority element.

Problems in the education of the minority children still exist. The children can receive schooling in Greek for the first five years of primary school. *Omonia* presses for the introduction of Greek classes through the 8th grade, building of new schools

⁴⁶ The existence of this group is contested. Some people, well known for their nationalist feelings and their participation in dubious Vorios-Epirus organisations, were arrested and charged in Greece in relation to these border incidents but they were acquitted and nothing in relation to the existence of this group was brought to light so the author can not take the responsibility to name them as responsible although there are people who believe that the weapons used in these incidents were found in their car.

and the refurbishing of the older ones and the creation of a chair of Greek Studies at the University of Gyrokaster. Until now the Albanian Ministry of Education opposes the majority of Omonia's proposals.

⁴⁷ The Human Rights Report, Op. cit., p.6.

Chapter 5: The New ‘Macedonian Issue’

The issue that pre-occupied Greek foreign policy and domestic politics was the dispute over the international recognition of the newly independent Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). This astonishing issue created an unpleasant strain between Greece and its partners in Europe and NATO and such domestic political unrest and antagonism that it led to the fall of the government. This issue, was far beyond the other foreign policy issues, the most significant in the sense that its development affected the policy makers’ approach on other international matters. It revealed the direct link between domestic political interests, exploitation of the public and foreign policy issues in Greece and caused the emergence of a characteristic public feeling of defensive nationalism that affected the domestic and international affairs of Greece.

As soon as the conflict in Yugoslavia posed the question of dismemberment of the federation and the recognition of new states the Greek government faced a problem which existed dormant for forty-five years but had never been faced by the Greek state properly and decisively.

The Socialist Republic of Macedonia was created after the take over of political power by Tito and the Communists. The creation of this republic exploited the demand for national self-determination of the Slav-Macedonians in order to achieve other political ends, namely the limitation of Serbian power within the federation and exploitation of the upheaval in Greece during the civil war by setting the grounds for claims on Greek Macedonia and the outlet of the Thessaloniki port. The Greek government protested to the international community and highlighted the threat to the country’s territorial sovereignty. But after the break between Tito and Stalin and the entry of Greece into NATO the reactions of the Greek governments stopped being as fierce as they used to be during the first years of the creation of the SRM. The order of the age of Cold War NATO was to exploit the differences between Yugoslavia and the USSR in order to create a bulwark against Soviet expansion in the rest of the Balkans. So, relations between the two neighbouring Balkan countries had to be good. The Macedonian issue would remain dormant as

long as the relations between the two countries were good and co-operative. In times of strain, however, or when the internal situation demanded the exploitation of a bilateral problem for domestic reason the issue would resurface.

1. The Re-Emergence of the Issue in Greek-Yugoslav Relations

Such was the situation in Yugoslavia in the summer of 1990 when Belgrade surprised the Greek government by abandoning the traditional friendly ties of the two countries and accused Greece of mistreatment of the alleged Slav-Macedonian minority in Aegean Macedonia. At this time the situation in Yugoslavia was critical and the separatist tendencies were gaining considerable ground. The central government in an effort to save the union tried to endorse the position of the SRM on the mistreatment of the 'Macedonians' in Greece and Bulgaria, a position that was rarely produced by the central Yugoslav government. By sanctioning the position of a constituting republic into a federal foreign policy directive the central government tried to withhold the centrifugal tendencies in the south of the federation by giving the impression to the leaders of the SRM that the federation was ready to transform into foreign policy their aspirations and agonies.

So, on June 22nd 1990, during the CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension the Yugoslav delegation produced a statement and a memorandum through Ambassador Vladislav Jovanovic which rebuked the governments of Greece and Bulgaria for mistreatment of the 'Macedonian national minority' in the two countries. The statement of the Ambassador referred to 230,000 Macedonians who live in Aegean Macedonia, who, like their compatriots in Bulgaria, are denied their very existence because they are not members of a "recognised" ethnic group. The statement suggested that this constituted violation of their human rights and demanded recognition of their national minority status in accordance with the

commitments assumed under the auspices of the various international organisations in which these two countries participate¹.

Greece was accused in particular of the following violations and mistreatments:

- ‘The Greek Parliament passed a number of laws by which the Macedonians have been declared “non grata citizens” (1950), encouraging their emigration to overseas countries. On the basis of special legislation (Law No. 2536 of 1953) the Aegean Macedonia has been populated by ethnic Greeks, i.e. “settlers with sound national consciousness”. This has not been redressed by subsequent legislation regulating the repatriation and return of Greek citizens and political refugees (Decision of the Minister of the Interior and Public Affairs, No. 106841 dated December 20, 1982), according to which only “Greeks by birth” are allowed to return to Greece. On the basis of the same discriminatory clause, their property rights in the Republic of Greece are also denied (Law No 1540 of 1985). In the educational field (under law No. 1268 of 1982) university diplomas in the language of instruction “not widely internationally recognised”, namely Macedonian, are not considered valid. By a special decision of the Minister of Education and Religious Affairs, the universities of Skopje and Bitola in the SR Macedonia, in Yugoslavia, have been described as such, thus denying the internationally recognised status of these universities and the equal status of the Macedonian language guaranteed by the Constitution of Yugoslavia, which is, as an authentic and equal European language, de facto recognised by all member States of the United Nations except Greece.’²

The statement continued with accusations against Greece and Bulgaria for ignoring certain clauses of the CSCE Final Act:

- ‘Communications are made difficult or obstructed for persons belonging to minorities, in their contacts with citizens of other states with whom they have a common national Macedonian origin or cultural heritage. In the field of information these states have not ensured that the Macedonians (par 45) can disseminate, have access to and exchange information in their mother tongue. They have not ensured that the members of the Macedonian minority can maintain and develop (par 59) their own Macedonian culture in all its aspects, including language, literature, etc., or receive instruction (par 68) on their own culture in their mother tongue etc.’³

The Yugoslav delegate proceeded in his statement in accusing Greece of not implementing other articles of several international conventions on human rights.

¹ Statement Delivered by Ambassador Vladislav Jovanovic, head of the Yugoslav Delegation, CSCE Conference, The Human Dimension Copenhagen, 22 June 1990, p. 2-3.

² Op. cit., p. 4-5.

³ Op. cit., p. 5.

The memorandum of the delegation of the SFR of Yugoslavia in the same conference went even further in expressing specific accusations against Greece. In a brief historical overview of the events in 'Aegean Macedonia' Greece is accused of forceful displacement of the population of the region after the Balkan Wars and the Greek Civil War, the subsequent prohibition of return into Greece of the refugees and immigrants and the prohibition of contacts between relatives and the realisation of their property rights⁴. In the following pages of the memorandum the Yugoslav delegation referred specifically to some measures the Greek state allegedly has taken against the minority which constitute breaches of a number of articles of international conventions on human rights⁵.

The memorandum also referred to the activities of a minority association in Greece, the "Committee for Macedonian Human Rights" and the rest of the minority members in towns such as Florina, Kastoria and Edhessa in pursuit of their recognition as an ethnic minority and the abolishment of the discriminatory measures and practices against them⁶. It also referred to the other forms of association of the minority in Europe and elsewhere which express these aspirations⁷.

The efforts of the Yugoslav government to point out these accusations for the consideration of the Greek authorities were also noted. The high point of these efforts was the *pro memoria* paper that the Yugoslav prime minister presented to the Greek premier in 1983, which as other similar protests, was rejected by the Greek side.

The truth is that the Yugoslav authorities were keen in bringing this issue in the contacts between the two countries. But they were never strong in pursuing their demands and in no case would they risk the status of the good relations between the two countries. Yugoslavia, a non aligned country, had much to gain from the co-operation with a neighbouring country which happened to be a member of NATO and the EC. Both countries faced the threat of the Warsaw Pact and co-operation was vital to their security. People and goods were passing to and from Greece into

⁴ Delegation of the SFR of Yugoslavia, Second Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 'Memorandum relating to the Macedonian national minority' Copenhagen, June 1990, p. 4 and 6.

⁵ *op. cit.*, p. 8-10.

⁶ Delegation of the SFR of Yugoslavia *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁷ *Ibid.*

Yugoslavia and the use of the Thessaloniki port by Yugoslavia was vital. The 'Macedonian issue' was a good pressure card for Yugoslavia when problems concerning the co-operation of the two countries were emerging, even regardless of the aspirations of some leading figures from the SR of Macedonia who lobbied the issue for other reasons at home and abroad.

2. The Post-War Attitude of the Greek State Towards the Issue

The continuous propaganda on the 'Macedonian minority' and the expressed aspirations of some Slav-Macedonian expatriates created a sense of fear in consecutive Greek post-war governments. This fear was constituted on the belief that there are people and political groups on the other side of the border which have revisionist aspirations towards the frontiers. The Greek governments dealt with the issue and their fears by choosing not to deal with them. Every time a formal complaint was made or propaganda material appeared somewhere in the world the Greek state representatives would dismiss any accusations with the argument that no Macedonian issue exists, that Macedonia is Greek from ancient times, and that the population of Macedonia is homogenous. They would also argue that the SRM does not have any historical rights to the use of the name Macedonia and that any claims of the mistreatment of their compatriots are absurd. Some material would be published from time to time by authors who tried to tackle the issue with semi-academic works and occasional oral clashes would take place in international academic conferences.

But the fact remained that the Greek state had chosen not to face the issue all these years because it had to comply with the NATO policies which demanded that a good state of affairs should be preserved between Greece and Yugoslavia. Greece, therefore, by being a member of NATO had to compromise its position on an important national issue. Its complaints to international fora were weak, its arguments absurd and the policies which were taken only tried to hide the issue from the public and the international environment instead of tackling it. So, the answer to the major argument of the other side which related to the presence of an ethnic Slav-

Macedonian minority was that this minority does not exist. Post-war Greek governments did not recognise the presence of the Slav element in the region, did not conduct any form of survey whatsoever and chose to leave the other side with plenty of arguments and complaints in the international environment. Similarly to its policies towards the Muslim minority and its predominantly Turkish character the Greek state denied the existence of another ethnic element in its border regions as if the acceptance of the presence of ethnic minorities would immediately involve a full frontal military attack against Greece from its neighbours.

3. The Foundation of the Independent Macedonian Republic and the Issue of the Name

However, an international issue exists from the moment one state decides to put it forward to international consideration. And there was not a more profound way for Greece to realise that it was about to enter a serious international debate than this attack from the Yugoslav delegation in the CSCE conference. Soon it would become evident that Yugoslavia would collapse and that a new state north of the Greek frontier would emerge, calling itself Macedonia. The nightmare that successive Greek governments tried to forget every morning with the phrase ‘The Macedonian issue does not exist’ was becoming a reality. More importantly, the new state made clear that it did not only claim the use of the word Macedonia for itself but gave itself the authority to take care of its co-nationals living abroad as immigrants or as minorities in neighbouring countries. In the Declaration for the Sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia it is stated that “*the Assembly of SRM can undertake measures for protection and promotion of the situation and rights of the parts of the Macedonian people living as national minorities in the neighbouring countries*”⁸.

The prospect of facing a state north of the border which would use a name with which the Greek nation was historically affiliated and moreover that it would

⁸ The Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, *Declaration for the Sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia*, 17/9/1991, Article 6

hassle the Greek state over the mistreatment of an alleged national minority resulted in an outright hostility which was founded on fears of reliving the past. The policy of the Greek government would aim in preventing the recognition of the FYROM with the name Macedonia. The Greek government believed that a success in this field would stop and deter firstly, any allegations for the mistreatment of the Slav-Macedonian minority; secondly, the possible territorial and irredentist claims that future FYROM governments would like to put forward; and thirdly, the nightmare of an anti-Greek revisionist alliance between Turkey and Greece's northern neighbours. At that time, of course, there was no hint whatsoever that any of the above was about to happen but the Greek government chose to act before any of these threats could become reality. The Greek response to the news of the independent Slav-Macedonian republic was rather guided by fear than by reason. The fear that overwhelmed the Greek authorities was the apparent difficulty they were going to have defending the very long northern border, which the army and police would have to defend by stretching, therefore weakening, their forces⁹.

Greece was now paying the penalty for its total lack of any kind of minority policy, or any prudent foreign policy that dealt with frontier problems one might add, resulting in the mere use of the name "Macedonia" to be conceived as a territorial claim against northern Greece¹⁰. The issue of the name would be vital in Greek foreign policy since a success on that would deprive the leaders of the new state from a ground for putting forward claims on more vital issues that could emerge like possible claims on the Greek-Macedonian territory and the minority population present there.

4. The Slav Element in Greek Macedonia

The question of the alleged Slav-Macedonian minority in Greece is vital in the understanding of the issue as it was developed between 1990-1993. Extensive

⁹ James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question", *op. cit.*, p. 478.

¹⁰ Franz-Lothar Altmann, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

presentation of the Slav-Macedonian part in the events leading to the formation of the northern Greek frontier and until the end of the Civil War was made in the first part of the thesis. The result of the Slav-Macedonian role in the Civil War was a hostile treatment of the minority by an extreme right-wing regime. The anti-communism with which the state institutions were fueled was targeted against the remnants of the Slav element in Greek-Macedonia especially after Greece's entry into NATO.

The turbulent decades that passed until the end of the Civil War diminished considerably the Slav element in Greek-Macedonia. In rough estimates, the two World Wars, the exchange of populations and the Civil War diminished the Slav-speaking population of Greece to about 30,000-60,000¹¹. Some Slav-Macedonian activists claim much larger numbers especially in Larissa (which incidentally is situated in Thessaly and not Macedonia) and Thessalonika¹². This small and harmless number of inhabitants was about to face further persecution by the right-wing regime of Greece. The 1953 Decree No. 2536 replaced Slav-Macedonians in the immediate border region with Yugoslavia with settlers of "sound national consciousness" and they were forbidden from using Slavonic forms of their names for official purposes; in 1954 the government began to remove whomever was considered to be Slav-Macedonian from official posts; villagers in places near Yugoslavia were forbidden to move away from their villages; and in 1959 inhabitants in and near Kastoria were asked to publicly confirm that they were not Slav-speakers. By the end of the decade and as a result of these persecutions many started to emigrate to Australia and Canada¹³. The Slav element in Greek Macedonia diminished further. During the military dictatorship some Slav-Macedonians were interned or imprisoned¹⁴ but this form of persecution might have been exercised because of their previous left-wing convictions.

The return to democracy and Greece's entry into the EC witnessed an abandonment of the official policies of persecution especially during the years of the

¹¹ The calculation is based on numbers presented in Chapter 1. The most recent estimate claims that there are 100,000-200,000 Slav-Macedonians in Greece but sufficient evidence to sustain this claim do not exist. This estimate appears in James Pettifer, Hugh Poulton, Minority Rights Group (Greece), *The Southern Balkans*, Report 94/4, 1994.

¹² James Pettifer, "Greece's Post-Election..." op. cit., p. 226.

¹³ Hugh Poulton, op. cit., p. 31

PASOK governments in the 1980's and 1990's¹⁵. The problem that the Slav element of the population faced was that its minority status would not be recognised. Henceforth no education in its language, staging of cultural activities or open declaration of ethnic identity on an official level were encouraged. In effect, the persecutions, the emigration of its more nationalistic element, the continuing education in Greek and the mixing with the Greek population of the region resulted in the complete assimilation of the bulk of the remaining Slav-speaking population. Slav-Macedonian nationalism appears much stronger in immigrant circles and in the FYROM than in Greek-Macedonia¹⁶. It could be argued that only a very slim minority within the Slav-speaking population adheres to preserving a distinct Slav-Macedonian/Macedonian identity and that can be deduced by the 7,263 votes that their political group, *Ouranio Toxo* (Rainbow) got in the June 1994 European elections (although fear might have prevented others from voting for Rainbow).

5. The Greek Fears Towards a Possible Slav-Macedonian Irredentism

In fact, it is the activities of these extreme nationalist circles that worried the Greek government and possibly played a major part in the formation of its policy towards the recognition of the FYROM. Various activities and publications by the emigres and official Yugoslav authorities revealed that Greece would eventually have to face an important issue that sooner or later the new state could choose to bring forward. This issue concerns the refugees of the Civil War. The socialist party PASOK had vowed that it would encourage the repatriation of the refugees of the Civil War who had fled to various eastern European countries. Early in the 1980s, soon after the takeover of power by the socialists, political refugees and their descendants began to return to Greece. Their repatriation continues to this day. Only the Slav-Macedonians were

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Pettifer, Poulton, MRG (Greece), op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁶ Ibid.

excluded from this process unless they agreed to abandon their Slav-Macedonian identity.

These refugees are also denied visa entries except in a few cases to attend funerals¹⁷. In July 1988 a group of refugees tried to enter Greece from the Yugoslav border and although some of them had passports from western countries and did not need to have visas in order to enter Greece, they were stopped at the border. The return of the refugees and the alleged mistreatment of the Slav-Macedonian minority are the main verbal weapons in the international immigrant propaganda of the Slav-Macedonians. Various organisations have sprung across the globe, mainly in the US, Australia and Canada. Their differences are obscure and can not be easily recognised but their action and the possible links they have with domestic FYROM political groups made the Greek government extremely anxious about the presence of a new “Macedonian” state north of its borders.

These groups are very active. They hold meetings, demonstrations, publish material, address international fora and always try to meet with government officials in the countries they operate. Their publications always contain numbers whose validity is questionable and use dramatic language in the typical way irredentists address their audience in order to trigger their sentimentality and sense of justice. Although they always refrain from openly expressing their wish for a “liberated” Aegean Macedonia their expressions and some lapses of language are capable enough of triggering Greek fears.

The Canadian “Association of Refugee Children From Aegean Macedonia” published a brochure immediately after a group of Slav-Macedonians were turned away on the Greek border. Titled “*The Exodus of the Children from the Aegean Part of Macedonia*”¹⁸ the brochure refers to the historic presence of “Macedonians” in Aegean Macedonia, numbers the death and persecution they suffered during the civil war, gives glory to the development of the “Macedonian” culture in the “free” parts of Aegean Macedonia under communist rule, moans about the forceful displacement of thousands of children to Eastern Europe and their subsequent return to the “free”

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The Association of Refugee Children from Aegean Macedonia, *The Exodus of the Children from the Aegean Part of Macedonia*,

part of Macedonia or their immigration to America and Australia. It also refers in detail to the experience the group of Slav-Macedonians had on the Greek border, and condemns the injustice they suffer unlike other Civil War refugees because of their ethnic identity. This sort of propaganda had an impact at least to the Canadian media and henceforth, public. The *Globe and Mail* on its August 22, 1988 edition, presented without questioning the arguments of the brochure and the “Association’s” spokesman Mr. Done Rakovsky more than a month after the incident happened¹⁹. This incident apparently provoked the mobilisation of the Greek-Macedonians in the US, Canada and Australia and subsequently domestic politicians were caught in the middle of the propaganda war. The brochure issued by the “Macedonian Orthodox Church” in Canada vindicates MP’s for their stance and ignorance and invites them to learn history as it is briefly presented in the most dramatic fashion of mixing fact with fiction, typical of any irredentist material²⁰.

Other organisations also publish material and try to put forward the issue in international fora. The “Macedonian-Canadian Human Rights Committee” has sent a letter to the Council of Europe in which it complains about the mistreatment of the Slav-Macedonians and the alleged suppression their associations suffer in Greece²¹. Lapses of language can be found on other publications of Slav-Macedonian propaganda. The “Macedonian Human Rights Movement” in one of its publications which was addressed to the CSCE and in which it recounts the usual allegations against Greece refers to Aegean Macedonia as the “51% of Macedonian ethnographic territory”²². The Skopje based “Forum for Human Rights of Macedonia” in its publication ‘The International Legal Treatment and the Situation of the Macedonian National Minority in Bulgaria, Greece and Albania’ undertakes the responsibility of defending the other minorities which exist in Greece apart from the “Macedonian” and even creates an Albanian one which “suffers” under Greek

¹⁹ The *Globe and Mail*, *Macedonian Canadians seek probe of Greek ban*, by Christine Harminc, August 22, 1988

²⁰ Macedonian Orthodox Church, Brochure addressed to Mr. Gerry Weiner and the House of Commons,

²¹ Macedonian-Canadian Human Rights, Letter to the Council of Europe, Committees for Culture, Youth and Education,

²² Macedonian Human Rights Movement (Europe, Canada, Australia, USA).

oppression²³. In another publication of the “Forum” which is supposedly circulated on behalf of a Thessaloniki based “Central Organisational Committee for Macedonian Human Rights” a map of Macedonia appears in which all the towns of western Greek Macedonia have Slavic names: Thessaloniki is Solun, Kilkis is Kukus, Edessa is Voden, Florina is Lerin and Kastoria is Kostur²⁴.

Strangely enough, the towns in the rest of Greek Macedonia which is still a part of the “51% of the Macedonian ethnographic territory” have retained their Greek names. The Slav-Macedonian propaganda has relinquished the struggle for human rights on the part of the Aegean Macedonia which borders Bulgaria by acknowledging that it is now ethnically homogenous. That is, one might suggest, a message towards Bulgaria. By implying that there is no “Macedonian” population in the regions which border Bulgaria, the Slav-Macedonians appropriate the Slav element of Greek Macedonia as their own and claim the responsibility of their defence.

Political personalities and organisation in the FYROM also use irredentist language even if their aim is to impress the Slav-Macedonian electorate by issuing extreme declarations just for publicity²⁵. These declarations involve announcements that ‘*VMRO-DPMNE (the successor of IMRO) will hold its party congress in Thessaloniki*’²⁶ or statements that ‘*VMRO is in favour of the spiritual, intellectual and territorial unification of Macedonia*’²⁷. In January 1992, VMRO tried also to pass a resolution from the Skopje parliament calling ‘*for the return of territories held by Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, which belong to the SRM by virtue of the fact that Macedonians live there*’²⁸.

The appearance of irredentist language, data and maps creates an automatic reflex defensive reaction from the Greek side which shapes the approach of successive Greek governments on the issue. This attitude was not more apparent than during the

²³ Human Rights Forum of Macedonia, *International Legal Treatment and the Situation of the Macedonian National Minority in Bulgaria, Greece and Albania*.

²⁴ Central Organizational Committee For Macedonian Human Rights, Australian Sub-Committee, On behalf of the Central Organizational Committee For Macedonian Human Rights, Thessaloniki, *Contemporary Greek Government Policy on the Macedonian Issue and Discriminatory Practices in Breach of International Law*, Melbourne 1989.

²⁵ *Ekonomaska Politika* (Belgrade) 21 Sep. 1992, p. 41.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ The Institute of International Political and Strategic Studies, *The Macedonian Affair*, Athens, p. 28, citing Ljupce Georgievski President of VMRO from the newspaper *Borba*, 31 Dec. 1990.

events which took place while the New Democracy party was in power. The development of the issue until the summer of 1993 played significant part and provided the best excuse for the fall of this government.

6. An Account of the Major Events of the “New Macedonian Issue” (1990-3)

In September 5, 1991, Bulgaria declared that it was willing to recognise the independence of the Macedonian Republic but its president made clear that a Macedonian nation does not exist for the Bulgarians. This development was perceived by the Greek government and media as dangerous because it revealed the revisionist plans of Bulgaria. Bulgaria has always had aspirations towards the region. The Communists during the war had accepted the plans for a Macedonian republic within a Balkan federation but never recognised the distinct identity of the Slav-Macedonians. The timing of this declaration made this perception even more acute because on the same day the Greek foreign minister and Slobodan Milosevic met in Belgrade to discuss common tactics in the wake of the Balkan upheaval.

This setback did not hinder the diplomatic process which led to the signing of a twenty-year pact of friendship, co-operation and security between Greece and Bulgaria a month later. It seems that Bulgaria’s decision not to recognise the existence of the Slav-Macedonian nation was taken in order to protect its own borders from any irredentist claims that the newly formed state could make.

At the same time Europe imposed sanctions against Serbia and its satellite republics within the rump Yugoslavia. A number of resolutions began to pass in a number of international organizations and fora against Serbia as well. Greece had to comply with these decisions in order to keep good relations with its fellow-members, on whom it relied for a favourable outcome in the diplomatic struggle which had just started and was no other than to persuade the international community not to recognise a state with the name Macedonia. In this context Greece had to turn against

²⁸ Ibid.

its old ally and friend Serbia. But on many other occasions it would grasp any opportunity to develop further the good mutual relations between the two countries. At a certain point Greece would be the only western state to communicate with Serbia which did good to the Greek government because its diplomats acted as the messengers of the West and hence the role of Greece in the region was enhanced.

Greece's only aim, however, remained the non-recognition of Slav-Macedonia. The government spokesman on November the 13th made clear that Greece was not willing to recognise an independent state which will bear the historic Greek name of Macedonia. A few days later the Greek foreign ministry announced that despite the claims made by the government in Skopje the new constitution of the former SRM approved in article 73 the possibility of frontier redrawing and in article 49 granted to the government the right to protect the Macedonian nation in the neighbouring countries.

As the Greek diplomatic initiative intensified so did the efforts of the Slav-Macedonian government. President Kiro Gligorov sent a letter to all the embassies in Belgrade asking for the recognition of his republic. A day later on the 4th of December the Greek government announced the three conditions which should be fulfilled before the FYROM could be granted international recognition. These conditions would become the bulwark of the Greek foreign policy over the period of three years. The Greek government decided to make these conditions the policy of the European Community as well and presented them to the following Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers which met in Brussels later in December 1991.

The conditions that Greece posed were the following:

- a) The newly formed republic should change the name Macedonia
- b) They should declare that they do not have territorial aspirations or claims against Greece
- c) They should declare that they accept that no Slav-Macedonian minority exists in Greece.

Greece indeed put forward these conditions in the December meeting of the EC foreign affairs ministers and got the result it wanted. The resolution of the Council demanded that if the FYROM wished to be recognised by the EC it should bind itself into adopting constitutional and political guarantees of not having any territorial

claims against a neighbouring member state of the Community, and it should refrain from any hostile propaganda against a neighbouring member state of the community including the use of a name which alludes territorial claims²⁹. The reaction of the FYROM was to state through its prime minister N. Klioushef that a change of name is out of the question. A little later on the 20th of December the FYROM sent a letter to the Dutch foreign affairs minister Van Der Brook asking for its recognition from the Community.

Three days into the new year and the President of the Republic Mr. K. Karamanlis sent a tearful letter to all the leaders of the EC countries arguing that Macedonia is historically affiliated with Greece, that he himself is Macedonian and that a usurpation of Greek names and symbols should not be accepted by the EC. In this context the meeting between Greek and FYROM officials on the 3rd of January 1992 was abandoned minutes after it had begun. Three days later the FYROM responded to the Greek pressures and the resolution of the Council of Ministers with constitutional amendments which were passed by the parliament of the republic.

Bulgaria sided with the FYROM and its foreign affairs minister asked for the republic's immediate recognition in the wake of a new meeting of the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers which was held on the 11th of January. The council, though, postponed for a later date its discussion on the Macedonian issue.

Then on the 14th of January Greece's foreign policy suffered a serious blow from within the Community. The Battinder Commission which was appointed by the EC to study and put forward proposals on the whole Yugoslav issue came away with a conclusion that FYROM met the conditions that the EC required, and therefore it should be recognised as an independent state. The report of the Battinder Commission created a number of reactions in Greece. For the Greek media Battinder was an evil anti-hellenist. For the Greek government it meant the beginning of the friction within its ranks that would lead to its eventual fall. Prime Minister Mitsotakis who did not

²⁹ Some people maintain the view that Germany in its effort to gather support for its bid to recognise Croatia was giving away promises and one of those was the promise that Europe will not recognise the FYROM with the name Macedonia. Greece supported Germany's plea and this Council resolution could be part of the deal. Claims for the existence of this deal are made in Y. Valinakis "Greece's Balkan Policy and the Macedonian Issue", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, (Ebenhausen, April 1992).

expect such an outcome reacted by traveling extensively within the EC trying to persuade the European leaders that the Battinder Commission not only was wrong but it had also put the existence of his government at risk. Mr. Mitsotakis was sure that the rest of the EC countries wanted him in power for he had undertaken a policy programme which would bring Greece closer to the process of European integration. In addition, he was not as nationalistic as the unpredictable leader of the opposition Mr. Papandreou. Therefore, he believed that the odds were somehow in his favour and that at least he could postpone any decisions that the EC would make. So, he favoured a more moderate approach based on dialogue and on the good personal relations he had with many European leaders. But his foreign affairs minister, Mr. Samaras who was championed by the nationalist right wing faction of the New Democracy party favoured a full frontal diplomatic attack both towards the EC and mainly the FYROM. His plans included the imposition of an embargo among others. The discussions on how Greece should react after the new developments revealed the rift between the two men. It was now clear that Greece was on the defensive and the evidence for that was the announcement by Bulgaria a day after the publication of the Battinder report, on the 15th of January, that it recognised the FYROM with the name Macedonia. Albania offered to recognise the FYROM in exchange for the latter's recognition of Kosovo. Twenty days later Turkey recognised FYROM with the same name.

All these developments stirred up Greek fears and anger towards the Europeans and the neighbouring countries. The Greek public feared a wider conspiracy against Greece and its northern territories manufactured by Albania, the FYROM, Bulgaria and Turkey and supported by some dark circles in Europe. Tension and defensive nationalism rose and on the 14th of February an angry crowd of 1,000,000 people gathered in Thessaloniki and demonstrated against the recognition of the FYROM with the name Macedonia, demanding respect of the history of the Greek nation by the international community.

The public feeling which was cultivated by the hysterical media coverage of the situation was so strong that none of the political parties found themselves able to formulate prudent policies which would ease the tension among the population. There

were differences among them but all agreed that the FYROM could not be recognised with the name Macedonia. In this context all the leaders of the parliamentary parties met with the President of the Greek Republic to discuss a common national strategy. In the meantime, tensions continued to rise when the FYROM accused Greece of imposing an embargo against the republic. That accusation was dismissed by Greece which argued that it only followed the EC sanctions against Yugoslavia. The Greek public though privately boycotted the Dutch and Italian goods which were available in the Greek market as a reaction to the support these two countries showed to the cause of the FYROM.

A couple of months later the political leaders met again with the President Karamanlis. According to the agenda their aim was to agree on some basic principles of a common national strategy. During the meeting though, the foreign affairs minister Samaras was sacked. He had developed a proposal which contained seven modes of action that all the political institutions of the country, President, Prime Minister, Government, Parliament, Parties, should follow in order to persuade the international community that Greece excludes any form of recognition for the FYROM. His proposal was not accepted because his views were considered to be dangerous and not prudent. He was asked by the President himself to be quiet and later he was sacked by Prime Minister Mitsotakis, who took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This development, although it revealed the rift within the government was welcomed by the Prime Minister because he thought that he could now act as he wished at the top level of foreign policy making.

The meeting of the political leaders with the President was not a success. Either out of principles (the Communist Party) or because of party political interests (the power struggle between New Democracy and PASOK) the leaders could not reach an agreement on a national strategy. Three parties, the New Democracy, PASOK and the Left Coalition agreed that Greece should recognise the new state only if it met the EC conditions of the 16th of December 1991. A necessary condition was that it should abandon the name Macedonia. They did not agree on any other issue and the question of how Greece should react and what measures it should take in case the FYROM was recognised as Macedonia remained without an answer.

Although Prime Minister Mitsotakis took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greek foreign policy did not seem to change. Greece continued to follow a policy of close links with Serbia and what was left of Yugoslavia. When Serbia and Montenegro announced the foundation of the “new” Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in June 1991 Mr. Mitsotakis, after visiting President Milosevic, announced that Greece accepts that the new Yugoslavia is a continuity of the Yugoslavia which was dissolved.

On the 2nd of May the foreign ministers of the EC met in Gimaraes in Portugal. Portugal, which had the EC presidency at that time presented the “Pineiro Package” after the name of its foreign affairs minister. The package was accepted by all the EC members including Greece. According to the package the name with which the FYROM would be recognised should be accepted by both Greece and the new state. If both parties could reach an agreement on the name then the EC would immediately recognise the new state as independent and sovereign within its present borders. A proposal by Germany to recognise the FYROM as the “Republic of Skopje” was rejected by France, Italy and the UK which stated that the EC can not baptise other states. A few days later, on the 10th of May, the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers set a deadline of four weeks within which the agreement should be reached and recognition should be declared. After a British proposal it was agreed that a mission of mediators should be sent to both Greece and the FYROM.

Greece responded to the EC calls with a mission of ambassador S. Karayiannis to president Gligorov. Mr. Gligorov was given a message by premier Mitsotakis in which it was promised that Greece was ready to offer economic and other aid to the FYROM if the latter accepted the three EC conditions. President Gligorov replied that although the message showed “good will”, his republic would not change its name.

Later that month the US intervened with a statement issued from the State Department. The US made clear that they would not recognise the FYROM if this would destabilise the political situation in Athens. This announcement was the result of heavy lobbying by the Greek-American community which kept the pressure by holding a mass demonstration outside the White House demanding a just solution to

the Macedonian and Cyprus issues. Other countries outside the EC made statements which were in conjunction with the Community's position. Austria declared that it would recognise the FYROM at the same time as the EC. The Canadian foreign affairs minister Mrs. Barbara McDougal after a meeting with Mr. Mitsotakis said that Canada would not recognise this part of ex-Yugoslavia because they were sensitive towards the position of Greece.

Early in June 1992 the prime minister of Portugal, Da Silva, announced that Greece rejected the name "Upper Macedonia" which was proposed by the Portuguese Presidency of the EC. The Lisbon summit was approaching and no agreement seemed to be reached. Faced with a possible negative reaction by the EC members for not reaching a compromise the Greek government sought and got backing from the Greek parliament which passed a motion asking for the support of the EC states and the rest of the international community. Greece once again asked through its parliament for the implementation of the Council of Foreign Ministers conditions and the dissuasion of the name Macedonia by the new state. All parliamentary parties voted for the motion except the Communist Party, but in this way the Greek government appeared to have the backing of the 95% of the Greek population making its position in the forthcoming summit appear as the expressed wish of a whole nation. A few days later the political leaders met once again with the president and agreed that in the wake of the escalation of conflict in Yugoslavia, Greece would not get involved in any military activity and would not permit the use of the NATO bases in Greece to any American or European forces. They did not agree, however, on how Greece should react to a negative outcome of the Lisbon summit. The questions of vetoing or closing the borders remained to be discussed. A few days before the summit the Greek government proposed the name "Vardar Republic" after the name of the river that runs through the republic.

The joint efforts of the Greek government and parliament succeeded. The Lisbon summit decided to endorse the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The actual decision of the summit on the 27th of June read:

"The European Council endorses the decision that the Community and its member states reached in Gimaraes, after the application of the Former Yugoslav

Republic Of Macedonia for recognition as an independent state. It [the Council] expresses its will to recognise this republic within its present limits, according to the Declaration of the 16th of December 1991, with a name that it will not include the term Macedonia. It considers that the borders of the Republic are inviolable and guaranteed according to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of Paris.³⁰

Another factor that led the European Council not to recognise the FYROM in Lisbon was the fear for Mr. Mitsotakis' government downfall. Mr. Mitsotakis followed an economic programme that was largely dictated by the Community's guidelines on European integration and Greece's European partners did not want a return to power of PASOK and Mr. Papandreou. Many in the Community believe that Greece is an over-privileged recipient of a disproportionately large amount of EC funds³¹. Despite that it angered its partners furthermore with the irresponsible foreign policy its government followed. But all this could be forgotten, or forgiven, in light of the prospect of PASOK returning to power³².

The FYROM reacted promptly and defiantly to the Lisbon decision. The parliament of the FYROM voted on July the 2nd to keep the name Macedonia. A new deadlock was arising, and the EC's patience begun to wither. In this context the British Foreign Office minister revealed that the 12 member states of the EC might soon review their decision not to recognise the FYROM if it did not drop the name Macedonia. Russia in its turn recognised the FYROM on the 6th of August with the name Macedonia ignoring the Greek reactions and the Lisbon summit decision. The tide had started turning against Greece.

The president of the FYROM sent a letter to the General Secretary of the UN presenting the problems of its country and blaming them to the continuing non recognition of its state by the international community. He asked the UN to put pressure on Greece to change its stance and abandon the diplomatic struggle that caused so many problems to a nation which tried to establish its rightful existence in the world. Greece had begun to look less like the country whose history and symbols were being usurped and more as the foe of a small and vulnerable nation.

³⁰ Yearbook of Defensive and Foreign Policy 1993, ELIAMEP, Athens, p. 315.

³¹ James Pettifer, "Greece: Into the Balkan Crisis", *op. cit.*, p. 194.

³² *Op. cit.*, p. 195.

In the last day of November Greece found that its position would be further weakened. The British Presidency and its responsible committee under Ambassador Robin O' Neal presented a report which included the term Macedonia in its proposals for the name of the new state under which it would be recognised by the EC. The Edinburgh summit which was scheduled for the 12th of December seemed to be crucial and the EC countries had now to consider a proposal which included the word Macedonia. As was the norm elsewhere in the world the Greek element in Scotland held a demonstration organised by the Edinburgh University Hellenic Society (EUHS) which was joined by members of the Orthodox Church in the UK and a hundred strong delegation of mayors from various Greek cities, especially from Macedonia. The demonstrators asked the Edinburgh summit not to take any decision that would compromise Greece's historic heritage and jeopardise its territorial integrity by recognising the republic which would give the opportunity to a number of prominent FYROM politicians (cited in their leaflets) to express their territorial claims as official representatives of the Macedonian nation. Just opposite the Greek demonstration and as the fate of their country would be discussed a FYROM delegation was allowed to hold another demonstration. Things quickly got out of control and as some hot-tempered participants of the two demonstrations began to clash a swift police intervention restored order in Edinburgh's most busy thoroughfare Princes street. It was obvious that the crucial Edinburgh summit could not reach an agreement or a decision when sentiments were so heated between the two nations, at a time when every possible move would be considered to avoid a general escalation of conflict in the Balkans. The Edinburgh summit did not recognise the FYROM but took other decisions to show its concern to the small republic: The Council of Foreign Ministers should continue to undertake the task of finding a solution to the issue of name, the EC would send economic and other aid to the FYROM and also endorsed the decision of the UN Security Council to deploy a monitoring force in the republic. In addition the European Council gave to its members the right to handle any other issue concerning the FYROM within the structure of the UN or the CSCE at their own free will. However, the CSCE, on the 14th of December did not accept the FYROM's application to become a full member.

Early in 1993 France came up with a proposal to solve the issue in an international tribunal. The FYROM rejected this proposal. Britain on the other hand, backed from Spain and France, came up with another proposal concerned with the application of the FYROM to enter the UN. According to this proposal the FYROM could enter the UN with any of the following names: 1) Macedonia-Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 2) Macedonia-Skopje, 3) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Britain and Spain joined this proposal with France's own for an international tribunal despite its previous rejection by the FYROM. After a meeting of Boutros Ghali with a delegation from these EC countries the proposal was endorsed as a plan for solving the issue.

Greece which started feeling more and more isolated reacted through its President. Mr. Karamanlis wrote yet another letter highlighting that Greece's position should be considered and understood, otherwise the Yugoslav conflict could move southwards. But things in Greece were not idyllic. The President did not want to hear any discussion of a compromise in the name issue. Prime minister Mitsotakis and his new foreign affairs minister Mr. Michalis Papakonstantinou, himself a Macedonian, favoured a compromise that would end the problem, give a boost to Greece's shattered prestige and let the government work its plan for enhanced cooperation between Greece and its neighbours. The ousted foreign affairs minister Mr. Samaras at the same time was gathering forces from the extreme right and was preparing a plan for overthrowing the government. PASOK leader and former premier Mr. Papandreou exploited the national resentment for the government's policies on the Macedonian issue and its tough austerity measures which had been taken in order to prepare the country's economy for European Monetary Union. For that reason he pulled out from the political leader's meeting and the much advertised national strategy planning was abandoned.

Things in Skopje were not favourable either. The international community was putting pressure on the Gligorov government as well. They wanted them to abandon the Vergina star from their flag and to soften their position on the name issue. It was the use of ancient Greek symbols, part of the Greek nation's national identity building, which infuriated the Greeks and hardened their position on the name issue. So, the

UN Security Council in an effort to escalate the pressure on both sides began to discuss the proposal of accepting the vulnerable state in its institutions but without recognising it as Macedonia until the name issue was finally resolved. The FYROM government initially rejected the proposal but in the end their stubbornness yielded under pressure. The new state was accepted in the UN under the name of Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM). Greece could not and did not object to this development. In a later development the Star of Vergina was dropped from its flag and was replaced by a golden sun whose rays point to all directions.

The reaction, of course, in Greece was not enthusiastic. The Mitsotakis-Papakonstantinou policy favoured a compromise and this was evident in their actions. Their next step was to accept the UN-EC partnership mediation committee under Vance and Owen. They started talks with Greek and FYROM officials and the result was the publishing of a mutual trust building plan which could be later transformed into a treaty between the two parties. Greece continued to have objections on the name issue but this was not the will of the two men who were responsible for the foreign policy making. PASOK accused the government of selling out and asked for a vote of confidence in the middle of the spring. The government survived this one but it was evident that it was counting its last days in power. Mr. Samaras announced the foundation of a new party in the middle of the summer whose main political slogans were about the Macedonian issue. The right wing rivals of the Mitsotakis-Papakonstantinou duo were sharpening their knives within the party but did not challenge the New Democracy leadership yet. They knew that Mr. Samaras party the Political Spring (POLAN), would recruit a few MP's from the current parliament which would eventually bring down the government. In the last days of summer two New Democracy MP's defected to POLAN and the government collapsed. On October the 10th after a fierce pre-election battle fought on the Macedonian affair and the government's austerity programme issue, PASOK secured a landslide.

The Macedonian issue and the nationalist frenzy that swept Greece over a three year period had taken its toll on the government. It was the first time since the fall of the dictators after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus that a government fell after an international problem. Although the Macedonian issue was not the only reason that

the New Democracy party lost almost ten percent of its electorate it was evident that once more international and foreign policy issues that stirred up nationalist ideology in Greece could become an important element in the shaping of domestic politics. This tendency has sometimes fatal consequences: Six ministers were tried and executed for treason after the 1922 military defeat by Turkey. The Communists lost the Civil War which they could have won because of the diminishing public support over their stance on the Macedonian issue in the late 1940s. The right lost the elections in 1963 after its alleged sell out policy on Cyprus, the junta fell after failing to hold back the Turkish invasion in Cyprus, and now in a largely westernised parliamentary system nationalism would be involved in the outcome of the elections.

Mr. Papandreou, after fighting fiercely against his old opponent Mr. Mitsotakis, followed the populist tactics that he loved. He discredited Mr. Mitsotakis during the pre-election campaign for selling out because the latter had stated at some point that Greeks should be more moderate on an issue that would be forgotten in ten years. His foreign policy would comprise much nationalist bravado thus securing the public backing at first, and then it would step back in a quiet way when the public would not be alarmed to realise it. So, as soon as he was back in power he pulled out from the UN sponsored talks, he closed the borders with FYROM, he defied EC wrath for this action and he even managed to win a battle in the European Court of Justice after the European Commission and its much hated, in Greece, member Mr. Van der Broeke had asked for the imposition of security measures against Greece. Then, when everything seemed to be at a dead end he accepted FYROM officials in Greece, signed an accord for co-operation on several matters and re-entered the UN sponsored talks. The result is that after four years of PASOK rule the FYROM is still recognised with this name, the talks continue and the new prime minister Mr. Simitis who succeeded the deceased Mr. Papandreou still points out that Greece will not accept the use of the word Macedonia in the name with which the FYROM will be subsequently recognised.

7. The International Reaction and Greek Foreign Policy

The policy that the Greek government followed through the years between 1990-3 was perceived as irrational and dangerous by many international observers. It was apparent that the whole country was swept by a psychosis leading to a delusion according to which many actors of the international community had devised a devious plan to destroy Greece: The European Union, Van Der Broeke and Elleman-Jensen, the Pope, Russia, Bulgaria, Islam, Turkey and the FYROM were all parts of the same anti-hellenic plot. All sorts of ridiculous theories were appearing in the written and electronic media which fed this psychosis. The most widely believed was the one that viewed the FYROM as a potential future trouble maker. Greece dismissed any idea that the FYROM as it was at the moment posed any threat towards Greece. But a future alliance with Turkey which would help its development and possibly arm the FYROM could be a threat. Apparently this theory had grounds in the minds of the Greek policy-makers and therefore shaped their attitude. The theory held that Turkey, which wishes to expand into the Aegean, would seek alliances which would create a number of fronts for Greece. Greece would find its political and military defences on a number of different fronts difficult to handle and therefore Turkey would have the advantage in a potential conflict. The FYROM could use the name Macedonia to put forward claims and raise problems to Greece which would eventually create destabilisation in the region and aid Turkey in its involvement. The FYROM could claim that Macedonia is a geographical region which should be unified and could put forward irredentist claims for its alleged compatriots who live under pressure in Greece. So, both the name and the unspoken question of the Slav-Macedonian minority were substantial in the making of the Greek foreign policy which aimed in securing the future of the Greek frontiers. The question that may arise is how big the problem of the Slav minority in Greece is and whether it could be used by the FYROM in order to put forward irredentist claims.

Post-war Greek officials continuously rejected any claim that a Slav-Macedonian minority exists in Greece. Mr. Mitsotakis, however, has admitted on many occasions publicly that Slav-speaking people exist in western Greek Macedonia

although he dismissed any idea that they constitute a distinctive ethnic minority. The “slavophones” as they are called by those who admit their existence in Greece are regarded as Slav-speakers of Greek origin pretty much as the Pomaks are Slav-speaker Muslims of ancient Greek origin (Alexander the Great’s archers!). Evidence of Slav-Macedonian identity groups in Greece can be provided by the cultural and political formation called the “Rainbow” (Ouranio Toxo) which has publicly stated its struggle for the human rights of the Slav-speaking minority. It has participated in three recent national and European elections but has managed to get just less than 4,000 votes in the whole of Greek Macedonia. Some people might be quick in arguing that the poor showing of this organisation is caused by the continuing Greek persecution, but as was stated above, independent observers find that the Slav-Macedonian cause is fought by circles outside Greece.

The instances of official persecution are fewer than a handful although they were enough to give Greece a bad press abroad. They happened amidst the height of the nationalist hysteria that had swept Greece, during which the Greek government refused to back down from its positions, making its partners in Europe grow more impatient.

The most publicised case was that of Mr. Hristos Sidiropoulos. Mr. Sidiropoulos appeared in a conference which was organised alongside the 1990 CSCE conference in Copenhagen. The Yugoslav delegation had arranged for this press conference to take place with the participation of “Macedonians” from Bulgaria and Greece. A detailed account of the conference is given in a confidential letter from Copenhagen by somebody called Emm. Moshonas and addressed to the External Division of the General Secretariat of Press and Information with the indication that it should be handed to the responsible minister³³. The author of the letter after a short reference to some of the participants and their announcements details the speech of the participant from Greek Macedonia “*whose name was not announced and who spoke in rather good Greek*”. The author of the letter characterised the speaker’s style as ‘melodramatic’ and continued that he

³³ A copy of this letter was handed to the author by persons whose identity will be withheld for their own protection.

“declared that he belongs to a category of people who are deprived from their rights, even from the right of [using] their own name. “*I am Macedonian*”, he continued, “*and live in the Greek Macedonia but I do not have the right to declare that, I can’t use my language, I can’t preserve the traditions of my forefathers and pass them to my descendants.....the national rights of the Macedonians are only recognised in the Yugoslav and Albanian parts [of Macedonia] while in Greece and Bulgaria our ‘Calvary’ continues. That is why 50% of the Macedonian population [i.e. those whose origin is in Bulgaria and Greece] live under the state of the political refugee or the immigrant. And he continued with an effusion of melodrama that “human rights are inalienable rights. What would you do if you were deprived from the right to see your brother, your child.”*”

The speaker then proceeded in repeating some of the accusations that the Yugoslav delegation made in the CSCE conference against Greece. The author of the letter then reports some questions that the speaker from Greek Macedonia answered. One of the most interesting questions was put forward by someone called Barba from Romania, “*a well known Securitate agent*” as the author described him. He remarked that a number of Slav-Macedonian immigrants come from the SRM itself and asked why the representative of the “Macedonians” of Greece did not use his language. In this question the speaker replied that the Greek state did not let him learn his language adequately. Later on though, he spoke in Slav-Macedonian during an argument with a Greek delegate in the CSCE about the real existence of the organisation for Macedonian Human Rights which published a manifesto in 1984 in Thessaloniki, this latter city name and its use being a fuse for heating up the argument. This document as described above bears the date of 15 June 1990. The next day the same man, Mr. Moshonas sent a handwritten note addressed to the same people and with the indication “confidential” saying³⁴:

“... in continuation of yesterday’s report we notify that the person who appeared as representative of the Greek Macedonians -and kept his anonymity in order to cause emotion- according to an exceptionally reliable source is Hristos Sidiropoulos from Amyntaio, and most probably is a forester.” [signed]

It is not known if Mr. Moshonas was acting on his own free will and zeal for protecting his country’s national security or it is his job to spy on his fellow citizens. These two notes though marked the beginning of Mr. Sidiropoulos’ persecution.

Some time after returning from Copenhagen Mr. Sidiropoulos was transferred from the Florina region where he worked to an island. Judging that his superiors decided to transfer him unfavourably because of his participation in the Copenhagen conference he refused to go claiming that he did not want to live away from his family. He was sacked. In April 1993 he was charged with spreading false information causing unrest and instigating conflict among Greeks. The same law, dating back to the days of the fascist regime of Ioannis Metaxas before World War II, was used against two different groups of Greek left-wingers who published materials supporting the recognition of the Slav-Macedonian republic and the granting of minority status to the Slav-speakers of Greek Macedonia. Persecution against other activists of the minority or Greek left-wing politicians who supported their plight was also recorded in the international press, although it had a semi-official character or was the “genuine” reaction of some members of the Greek public.

The small number of recorded instances of persecution against activists and their mainly judicial character coincided with the upsurge of the hysterical type of defensive nationalism that had swept the majority of the Greek public and affected the movements of the government. So, despite its numeric size and the relatively small harm it caused this persecution led a number of international observers to echo the fears of other European governments about the outcome the development of this issue might have in the rest of the Balkans and their prospect for peace. Among various accounts in the international press which tried to understand the situation a number of ironic and hostile articles appeared in the international press against Greece.

The Economist wrote that “*The prospect of Greece again being run by Andreas Papandreou, the awkward Socialist whose years of office in the 1980s were marked by constant bickering with Brussels, helped the other 11 leaders to change their minds [and not recognise Slav-Macedonia in the Lisbon summit]*”³⁴. The same journal wrote in August that “*Greek hysteria over Macedonia reflects politicians’ fears that whatever the western allies may say, borders in the Balkans can be redrawn.... A future revival of territorial claims by a state called Macedonia cannot*

³⁴ This additional note was also given to the author by the same people.

³⁵ The Economist, July 18th 1992, p. 44.

be ruled out, according to the Greeks.³⁶ Later in the same month another article wrote *“No sooner do you put one fire out than a nastier one flares up next door... One of them, Macedonia, may be the most explosive yet, because of its potential to draw in the neighbours... The problem is Greece’s veto over the name “Macedonia”. The Greeks feel passionately but wrongly that they have a historical patent on it, dating back to the days of Alexander the Great and beyond.³⁷”* And in a closer look at Greek reality the journal concluded that *“The Greek prime minister, Constantine Mitsotakis, is caught between ultra-nationalists on his right and a Socialist opposition that cares little about Macedonia but will use any stick to beat the government.³⁸*

Other articles were much more graphic and hostile. An article in World Today accused Greece of being unrelenting and provocative and claimed that international observers are concerned because President Milosevic had allegedly offered Mr. Mitsotakis the opportunity to carve-up Macedonia between Greece and Serbia³⁹. Marc Weller wrote that *“Athens has recently been arguing that the inhabitants of northern Greece are somehow more Macedonian than the people of the republic of Macedonia.... A foreigner visiting a cafe in Thessaloniki, the capital of northern Greece and of the Greek province of Macedonia, will find it difficult to sit in peace. Residents quickly seize the opportunity to explain that it was not only Alexander the Great who created Macedonia’s Hellenistic tradition, but there were also Aristotle and countless others.... In a sense, Greece is now asserting its claim to the brand name “Macedonia”. To confirm this claim, the airport of Thessaloniki has mysteriously converted itself into the airport of Macedonia. The Ministry for Northern Greece has suddenly become the Ministry of Macedonia and Thrace.⁴⁰”* Noel Malcolm’s article in the Spectator was the most acute in its criticism against Greece. He wrote:

“You begin to notice it the moment you arrive on Greek soil. If you land at Athens airport, you can find crude posters declaring “Macedonia is Greek” in the

³⁶ The Economist, August 1st 1992, p. 32.

³⁷ The Economist, August 29th 1992, p. 13.

³⁸ The Economist, November 14th 1992, p. 53.

³⁹ Paul Lendvai, “Flashpoint Balkans”, The World Today, Apr. 1995, Vol. 51, No. 4.

⁴⁰ Marc Weller, “Piggy in the Middle”, New Statesman and Society, 25 September 1992, p. 32.

customs hall. If you are crossing by land from the former Yugoslavia, you will find the passport control booth covered with stickers making the same point, some of them in English more hysterical than grammatical: "Macedonia is Greece Since Ever".

Inside the country, the barrage continues. Posters fill the windows of shops and offices: "Greeks awaken! Beware of the conspiracies of the great powers and the neighbouring states!", "An end to the provocations of Skopje!". In Florina, a town close to the former Yugoslav border, one building on the main square flies a large banner reading, "Macedonians shed their blood for Greece!"; the graffiti on a building up the road say "Freedom to the Greeks of Northern Macedonia and "Macedonia is One and Greek". Glancing at the print-out on a computerised bus-ticket, I found, in the space where you might expect "Have a nice trip", the statement, "Macedonia was and shall be Greek". Never outside the communist bloc have I had such a sense of an all-prevailing and unanimous campaign, in which all levels of public life are mobilised to whip up popular feeling. If one adds the world-wide campaign under the cover of the Greek Tourist Board, it must be the most expensive publicity campaign in Greek history.

It is also the silliest. Only fear for my personal safety has prevented me from amending some of these graffiti, changing them from "Macedonia is Greek" to "Greek Macedonia is Greek". Other bits of Macedonia self-evidently, are not.....

.... We are dealing here with the strangest and yet in some ways most typical of all Balkan states - a state with a profound neurosis about its own sense of identity. I refer, of course, to Greece. ... One of the ways in which Greek attitudes reveal themselves as typically Balkan is in this willful confusion of modern politics and ancient history.... the appeal to ancient history is vital to the Greeks precisely because it is their way of arguing that they are unlike the riffraff peoples of the Balkans. Their unbroken descent from Plato, Aristotle and Demosthenes sets them apart: theirs is a higher civilisation, a higher destiny. They have nothing to do with the messy history of the Balkans north of their ancient and immemorial border.

.... With its peculiar brand of paranoid nationalism, Greece's foreign policy is now the biggest single impediment to any sensible EEC policy in the Balkans; and if the Greek public mood intensifies any further, it may threaten not only the future of ex-Yugoslav Macedonia but the territorial integrity of Albania as well. Amid all the discussions about the procedure for new members to join the EEC, has anyone thought of a polite way of inviting one member to leave?⁴¹

Such critical accounts of the Greek psyche and the foreign policy it inspired reflected the growing hostile mood against Greece that was developing among EU members. This attitude was typical among European officials and statesmen who were criticised for being on the Macedonian issue "... *as in other problem areas of the Balkans recently.... deeply insensitive to the legitimate concerns of people about their cultural identity, to the detriment of the EC's political influence*⁴²". The "unanimous

⁴¹ Noel Malcolm, "The New Bully of the Balkans", *The Spectator*, op. cit., p. 8.

⁴² James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question", op. cit., p. 483.

campaign” that others could not understand was actually a “*spontaneous outburst of the whole country... if I were a Greek, bearing the grim past in mind and the present-day contagion of mischief and the dangers of possible future combinations, I would find these grasping birth-pangs* [the appropriation of the Vergina star in the state’s new flag and the alleged draft design of the banknote that showed the White Tower of Thessaloniki as Macedonian] *of the new state very sinister. I would contest their implications, and especially the misappropriation of the name “Macedonia” as a single entity, with vigour*⁴³”.

The ferocity with which the Greek media were covering the issue was matched by similar accounts in the international press. Yet the involvement of others and the international debate could not solve the issue. In fact, the attitude of the Western press did damage Greek prestige. It played its part in influencing the popular opinion of Europe which considered the Greek policy to be wrong. This attitude was reflected by many European officials and did not help the cause of the Greek government.

Domestic political interests, the Greek sense of national identity, the fear with which the Greek public was witnessing what was happening in its immediate neighbourhood played their part in forming a foreign policy that the rest of Europe and the world could not understand. Greece was left alone to fight an issue that the ghosts of the past had brought out in the light. The Greek government fought this lonely battle with policies which were bound to fail.

⁴³ Patrick Leigh Fermor, “A Clean Sheet For Paeonia”, *The Spectator*, 12 September 1992, p. 24. The existence of the draft banknote is highly disputed. Noel Malcolm said it was a lie (*The Spectator*, 19 September 1992, p. 25). Patrick Leigh Fermor and James Pettifer mention its existence in the above cited articles. Various reports in the international press also mentioned it.

Conclusion

The events that were presented in this part, especially the events surrounding the new Macedonian issue raise a number of questions about the planning and the conduct of Greek foreign policy. Which are the strategic aims of the Greek state policy? How are they valued and what sort of policy is chosen? What is happening during the decision-making process? How do the policy-makers react in a time of crisis? Which is the role of the political system and the public?

It seems that the foreign policy-making machine of Greece is suffering from a number of problems. The history and identity of the nation play such an important part that they cause an amount of inefficiency in the ability to adopt a prudent and rational attitude. Political interests irrelevant to the national objectives seem to intervene in the process of policy making. The public can easily become a component of the process. The existence of real or imaginary threats seem to be constantly in the minds of all, politicians, the media, the public. A simple outside statement or an action with little relevant value can cause a whole chain of reaction from various sources within Greece.

All that and numerous other sub-questions and aspects appear after the presentation of the events between 1990-93. In order to approach them and analyse them the help of international relations theory is needed. which can provide a background on various aspects of the foreign policy making of a small state like Greece facing frontier problems. That will help the explanation process because the theory will provide the basis for a thorough understanding of events from a number of different perspectives.

Part C:

**Frontier Problems and the Foreign Policy of a
Small State**

Introduction

In the previous parts the historical process of the making of the northern Greek frontier and the developments which led to the rise of the new frontier problems that the Greek government faced were presented. In both occasions Greek foreign policy had to respond to various factors present in the immediate international environment and the set of rules for the whole game of international politics. The Greek governments had to draw up plans, sustain principles, put forward objectives and try to retain power in a country whose electorate can become extremely volatile when irritated by matters of national importance. Developments between 1990-93 gave rise to frontier problems which are still unresolved today. The characteristic of the period under consideration in this study is that the whole foreign policy-making process was overwhelmed by a wave of nationalism that swept the country. Today, the policy-makers of the Greek government are much more relaxed but it is still possible that the sequence of events of the early 1990s can seriously affect their future in power. For the New Democracy party which was in power between 1990-93 the foreign policy issues were one major factor which led to their fall from power. In order to understand the Greek government's policy of that time and its impact on Greece and on itself, one has to look first to the dimensions of the foreign policy-making process, especially those that appear to be the more important in Greek politics.

This will help the actual purpose of this thesis: to provide an understanding of the Greek foreign policy towards the frontier problems which emerged immediately after the collapse of communism in the Balkans. The different aspects of frontier problems like the meaning of territorial identity, the emergence or the possibility of disputes, the grounds for cross-frontier co-operation and others, surely played their part in the way that the Greek policy-makers designed their foreign policy. The small size of the Greek state in conjunction with its relative power in the Balkans and its membership of powerful international organisations put forward constraints and opportunities that the policy-

makers had to take into account. And the different dimensions of the foreign policy-making process had to be considered since the purpose of the government was to protect the national interest in a rapidly changing international environment. Hence, the help of the international relations theory is necessary in order to provide the student with a basis for understanding and explaining the immediate response of the Greek state to the new developments in the Balkan neighbourhood. This theoretical background will be considered in this part of the thesis which is divided into three chapters: the first chapter (chapter 6) deals with the process of foreign policy-making, the second (chapter 7) with the role of the small power, like Greece, in international affairs and the third (chapter 8) with the question of frontiers and their significance in state relations.

Chapter 6: The Foreign Policy-Making Process

The dimensions of foreign policy making will be described in this chapter. An understanding of these dimensions under the guiding light of international relations theory will help the development of discussion. First, the position in which the Greek foreign policy making machine found itself at the beginning of the 1990s will be understood. The dimensions *inter alia* of the environment, the national image and values, the national interest that will be presented in this chapter are essential in understanding the situation by putting the Greek case into theoretical perspective. Second, certain questions about the aims of Greek foreign policy and its conduct can be asked which will direct the discussion into pointing out those aspects of policy making which were important during the years under study. Third, in combination with the theoretical background that the next two chapters will provide on other dimensions related to the Greek case, the discussion will be directed into making assumptions towards the analysis and explanation of Greek foreign policy.

The making of foreign policy is a complex, difficult and almost endless process. The result of this process, the actual policy, is the product of a number of different and often conflicting variables and actions as, for example, cautious deliberation over a period of time and fast response to a sudden change in a state's international environment.

In simple terms, the foreign policy is constituted by two fundamental elements: the objectives and the means required for their accomplishment¹. Definitions like the above are helpful because they highlight the essence of the foreign policy which aims at the benefit of the state which conducts it. But they are not complete because they do not refer to the many different national objectives that a state may set to itself and the variety of means which can be employed.

For example, a state may pursue an advance in its international power position by achieving greater influence over other states; it may want to secure greater foreign

¹Crabb Cecil V., Jr., *American Foreign Policy in The Nuclear Age*, New York, Harper and Row, Third Edition, 1972, p. 1.

financial aid necessary for its economic, technical and industrial development; and it may want to expand its size by acquiring new territories. In order to accomplish these objectives a state can use traditional diplomacy through bilateral meetings and agreements; it can put its case forward in international organisations and it can use the international market and banking system; in serious cases a state can also use coercion and take military action against another.

So, one reflection easily extracted from the above paragraph is that the study of foreign policy is not an easy task; on the contrary, there are no clear-cut dimensions, and no universal patterns of state behaviour, and, therefore, conclusions should be carefully drawn. A number of assumptions which are able to cover as many aspects as possible should be made, careful examination of data is required, and any explanations and predictions must be thoroughly tested.

The right direction for the beginning of the study of foreign policy will be provided through a number of preliminary questions which will highlight the different dimensions involved in the making of it: Thus, one could ask if the foreign policy should be studied as one specific, programmed, unified and rational process, or should be considered as a line of unconnected, individual, and often mutually contradictory political directives originated in the different levels and departments of state bureaucracy? Should the study of foreign policy be separated from the domestic politics or examined in conjunction with them? Where, in the end, should one locate the making of a state's foreign policy: on the individual political leaders, or on the various officials of political, economic and military ministries; on the national character, feelings and ideology or on the political and geographic position, and the developments in the external environment²?

In fact, these questions point to one thing: all these dimensions should be carefully examined and should be included in the study of foreign policy. Because, as it will be shown, the individual leaders play an important role in the formation of foreign policy as well as the officials in the various bureaucratic levels. Similarly, the geographic position is

²Couloumbis Theodore and Konstas Demetrios, *International Relations, An Overall Approach*, Athens, Papazeses, 1985, pp. 203-4.

connected with the development of the national character and the definition of the national interest in the foreign policy of a particular state.

But the above questions can only be employed as a useful tool for the definition of the different but related dimensions and variables of foreign policy. They do not, however, help to clarify the vagueness of the subject. Instead, they illustrate its complexity.

The most useful step in the direction of clarifying the subject and beginning a careful and detailed study is to define categories of variables and dimensions which influence the formation of foreign policy. Of course, these categories can not be important by themselves; it is the interrelation and interaction between them that is important for the making of foreign policy. The importance and character of the one is reflected onto the other and thus the understanding of foreign policy grows and becomes all-embracing. Thus, in a practical way the different sets of variables could be divided in the following interdependent categories:

First, the *environment* category; the external environment of a state like the neighbouring countries, the developments in the international system of states, the significance of supra-national organisations and the restrictions of international law, all set the rules of the game for each individual state and provide the stimuli for its responses. This can be called the *operational environment*. The domestic environment is also an important variable; the political system and the level of public debate on foreign policy issues, the organisation of the bureaucracy, the pressure that political parties and interest groups impose on the national government also play their part in the formation of the foreign policy. This category also includes the *image*, and the *national values*; the image, is the collective understanding of the state's position in the international system. It is also the perceived, and essentially subjective, understanding of the external environment and the opportunities it provides for action. The image, together with the national values about justice, good and bad, right and wrong, contribute to the development of what is called the *psychological environment*.

Second, is the category that links the international and domestic environments: the collection and processing of *information*; all the external developments provide information necessary for the understanding of new situations by decision-makers. The processing of information and the various different understandings among the decision-makers is essential for the evaluation of the situation and the action which should be taken.

The third category includes only one variable which, nonetheless, is one of the most important in the process of foreign policy making. This is the *national interest*. The national interest is a concept difficult to define and open to all sorts of different interpretations. It is always present though and serves both as a justification of a particular foreign policy and the ultimate goal of it. In broad terms, the national interest includes, the national myth or the idea a nation has for itself, the will and need for the physical, political and cultural, survival of a nation, and the aggregation of the different interests which exist in a given national society. It is necessary for the policy-makers always to take into account what the national interest dictates before and during that part of the foreign policy which constitutes the last category of variables.

That fourth category is concerned with the actual policy-making process. It involves the *definition of the situation* through the data; the setting of a number of *alternatives*; the *decision* and *choice* of a particular action which must be relevant to the particular opportunities provided by the environment, and the *implementation* of the policy and the *evaluation* of its results.

What is important to remember is that the distinction made between these categories is for the sake of convenience. As it was mentioned above these categories are interrelated. The variables within them influence the making of a state's foreign policy simultaneously. A sudden change in the international environment, for example, may change the image of the policy-makers and the national objectives and may lead to a new decision and implementation. Additionally, the domestic environment, the image, the national values and the external information are interrelated and any change in one may affect another.

1. The Environment

Political scientists give a widespread significance to the environment, both in domestic and international politics. Every governmental process is inextricably linked with the environment because it is the source for the government's inputs and the recipient of the policy outputs. In domestic politics the environment provides the government with such diverse inputs such as the demands by the social classes and the pressure groups; the level of the government's popularity; the realisation that a particular sector of the national economy needs redevelopment, etc. Every governmental action is an output in the environment which may satisfy the public demands and increase the government's popularity. Other actions may have opposite results.

In international politics, the environment is no other than the international system of states and the developments within it. However, governments do not always show the same amount of interest to developments in the international system. Greece, for example, will probably show no interest if Argentina and Chile were to sign a cooperation agreement. The Greek government, however, will show interest if Turkey and Bulgaria reach an agreement that affects Greek interests. On the other hand, the United States due to their position as a super-power show great interest in developments within the international system and become involved in many of them. So, what is clear from the beginning is that the significance of the environment is not the same for all states at the same time.

A state may be particularly interested in its close environment which includes its neighbouring countries and the states of the same regional sphere, like the Middle East, the Balkans, South-east Asia, Central America etc. The participation in supra-national organisations with a growing political and economic integration or in a military alliance is also important in the definition of a state's environment. International organisations like the United Nations and the Council of Europe under specific circumstances also become a part of a state's environment.

Psychological and Operational Environment

So, the environment becomes important when a state is affected by the developments within it and, therefore, some sort of action is required, or when it is perceived that the environment provides opportunities for action which will benefit the state. It is up to the decision-makers of the state to choose when the environment becomes favourable, and which particular environmental factors will be related to their foreign policy by taking them into account during the policy-forming process³. In other words, the definition of a state's own environment is to a great extent a subjective conception of an objectively existing international system.

At this point an important division of the environment can be made. The subjective conception of the environment constitutes the *psychological* environment of the policy makers and the factual situation of the international system and the developments within it constitute the *operational* environment.

The psychological environment includes the image about the actors of the international system and/or about the opponents of the state which the policy-makers have developed and share among themselves. It also includes their own estimate of the situation in which they are supposed to take decision and action, and their own understanding of the setting in which their actions will take place.

The operational environment on the other hand, provides the context in which the decisions will be executed and tested⁴. The operational environment is identical to the external environment which provides the cause for action through the developments within it. Its significance as operational environment, though, occurs when a particular state takes a decision and tries to implement it. The international law, the diplomatic and military strength of the opponent, the allies of the opponent, the will of the international

³ Sprout Harold and Margaret, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics", in Jacobson Karan Harold and Zimmerman William, *The Shaping of Foreign Policy*, Atherton Press, New York, 1969, p. 58.

⁴ Ibid.

community to take action, and a number of other variables impose limits on the possible effectiveness a decision and action of a state may have.

In addition, a part of the internal environment of a state is also a part of the operational environment. The actual resources that exist and can be employed and the level of internal agreement on a specific decision are also important for the success of a policy.

As it can be summarised, the relationship between the two environments is that "decisions take place in the decision-maker's mind [psychological environment] whereas actions take place in the [operational] environment"⁵.

This distinction, of course, does not imply that the two environments do not coincide, or that the policy-makers take decisions that are completely irrelevant to the international situation as it really is. The policy-makers generally have the ability to understand and decide in a rational and objective manner. However, their personal beliefs, the national objectives, their own feelings about their country's history, character and international position, impose limits to the rationality with which they can interpret the existing environment. So, during the actual policy-making it is their image about the environment that really matters⁶. While their state is a part of an already existing international environment and has some of its main lines of foreign policy imposed on it the decision-makers can find some margin for independent decision which will be determined by their interpretation of the environment and their conception of alternatives⁷.

In the end, their interpretation and decision may be quite relevant to the existing situation and a rational policy may be chosen; of course, they can also be completely mistaken. Both environments may or may not correspond to each other⁸.

⁵ Frankel Joseph, *The Making of Foreign Policy; An Analysis of Decision-Making*, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 1.

⁶ Sprout, op. cit.

⁷ Kissinger Henry A., "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy", in Jacobson and Zimmerman ed., op. cit., p. 140-1.

⁸ Sprout op. cit.

What is most important to remember is that both environments impose two limits in foreign policy. The psychological environment and its components (national objectives, sentiments, the policy-makers' own estimates, the pressures imposed by the domestic environment), "determine the limits of possible decisions"⁹ which can be taken at any given time and situation. The operational environment "determines the limits of possible effective actions"¹⁰ because the actual situation within the international system will be decisive if a policy is to succeed or not. Similarly decisive will be if a decision is going to be accepted as legitimate or dismissed as unacceptable.

Image and National Values

While the significance of the operational environment can be easily understood because it is always there, and includes a certain set of rules, the same can not be said for the psychological environment. The latter will be better understood if one looks to some of the variables responsible for the shaping of it and in particular to two of them: the image and the national values.

a. The National Image

The importance of the image and its impact on the formation of the psychological environment and, therefore, on the decision-making process can be understood through the analysis of the national image by Kenneth Boulding.

The connection between the psychological environment and the image is apparent because, for Boulding, the policy-makers do not respond to the facts of the objective developments in the international system but to their image of the situation. In addition,

⁹ Frankel, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

the decision they may take for action is driven from a field of choice which lies in the their image¹¹. So, in his words the image "must be thought of as the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit [state, government, policy-maker], or its internal view of itself and its universe"¹².

The national image can be described better as a "folk image" which is passed to all classes and groups of a national society through the family, the educational and other public institutions. It becomes a historical image that bounds together the members of a nation with their recorded past and common future. A very important aspect of this process is the establishment of a common national consciousness according to which all different groups of the nation have shared great events and experiences together¹³.

There are three basic dimensions of international relations which have an important effect in the shaping of the national image. Consequently, the same dimensions can also be used as terms for the description of international relations according to the image. These dimensions are the following¹⁴:

First, is the territorial/geographical dimension. The division of nations into different coloured shapes on the map, as Boulding puts it, has a profound effect in the formation of the national image. The most important aspect of it is the sense of territorial exclusiveness according to which each nation is entitled to occupy a certain amount of territory on which the neighbouring nations have no authority. The two immediate results of the territorial exclusiveness, are first the identification one will have with a particular shape on the map and the nation which is identified with that; and second, the way with which one will see the position of its nation and its relation with its neighbours, particularly when striking geographical irregularities appear on the map.

This way of seeing one's neighbours might be either with friendliness or hostility. This is the second dimension. The starting point of this dimension is that at any given time a nation will have a certain amount of friendliness or hostility towards other nations

¹¹ Boulding Kenneth E., "National Images and International Systems", in Jacobson and Zimmerman ed., *op. cit.*, p. 163.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 163-5.

(mainly its neighbours). The most typical aspect of it is the feeling that a nation is surrounded by enemies or potential enemies which are always more hostile to it than it is towards them. This image may have its impact on the way with which two different states conduct their international relations. So, according to Boulding, a strong nation may develop friendly relations with a weaker one in order to preserve a common interest against a third state. In a different situation two neighbouring nations, whose common relationships and wars, have played an important role in the formation of each other and the territory they occupy, may have a stable relationship of hostility.

The talk about hostility brings the discussion onto the third dimension which is about strength or weakness. This division between strength and weakness is attributed to many different elements: first, it has to do with differences in economic resources, development and productivity; second, with the strength and stability of the political system; third, with the willingness to pursue a certain policy which might even entail sacrifice; fourth, with military might which is important if a situation requires an engagement in conflict; finally, with the level of symbolic loyalties and affections for the nation, the territory and the government.

b. The National Values

The significance of the values is based on their long-established presence in a nation and their passing through tradition to the various sectors of society¹⁵. Their influence is mainly an emotional impact that they cause on the policy-makers which reduces their capacity to interpret in a rational way the external environment and the developments within it¹⁶.

Their effect in the policy-making process is the following¹⁷: First, they help the policy-makers to determine the relevance of the various elements of the operational

¹⁴ As presented in op. cit., pp. 166-9.

¹⁵ Frankel, op. cit., p. 111.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ As presented in op. cit., p. 112.

environment and form their psychological one. Second, they combine the elements of the psychological environment to form a vision of a state of affairs that the policy-makers (as well as the nation) find desirable. Third, they help the policy-makers to determine the desirable objectives of foreign policy and their principles of behaviour in the international environment. Fourth, they can also influence the policy-makers to choose some means for the accomplishment of these objectives which later will be incorporated into specific policies.

The significance of the national values is better understood when they are confronted with supra-national values. In the contemporary world the various nations-states have many common values about peace, freedom, democracy, humanity etc. Their participation in international organisations has elevated these common values to the supra-national and the ratification of many treaties concerned with these values has supposedly secured that the nation-states will abide by them. But the prevailing pattern, according to the author's interpretation, is that the nation-states take mainly into account the national rather than the supra-national values. The latter must be in conformity with the former and when a major clash occurs the national values will predominate¹⁸.

The clash between the two sets of values reveals the egocentric character of the foreign policy¹⁹. A foreign policy of a state can be called as such only when it pursues the national progression or at least defends its interests against an international system of sovereign states whose policies have the same character²⁰. It also reveals the contradictory ethics that exist within a state. While in the inside the state calls the individuals to act as a community and accept sacrifices for the sake of the common good, in external affairs the state acts as a selfish individual which has the right to pursue the national interest whatever the cost to the international community²¹.

These sort of egocentric ethics are inherent within the national values and the image and they affect the thinking of the foreign policy-makers. So, what the image and

¹⁸ Op. cit., pp. 119-20.

¹⁹ Vital David, *The Making of British Foreign Policy*, George Allen and Unwin, 1968, p. 18.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Calvert Peter, *The Foreign Policy of New States*, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., Brighton, 1986, p. 25.

the national values principally do to the psychological environment is that they form a values-ideas system about the nation, the state and its policy; that system is bound to affect the way with which the policy-makers will perceive each different situation and the policies they will adopt to tackle it.

In other words, they form a national ideology which, in respect to other ideologies about society, world or mankind, is more powerful. And that is because it can't be challenged, it is passed through tradition and history and it is widely accepted by all different sectors of a national society. It is more easily understood because it is not composed by a complicated system of values and ideas, but by some fundamental elements like the historical significance of the nation, its presence in the international community, etc. This national ideology, or national myth, can be manipulated by conflicting political interests which may cause friction instead of homogeneity (thus the characterisation myth does not only connote that this ideology is based on false or exaggerated material; it also connotes that the homogeneity which this national ideology hopes to establish can be broken proving that it is a myth anyway). Nevertheless, nationalist rhetoric or ideas and sentiments based on this myth are present in the policy makers' minds and play an important role in the formation of the national interest which is another important dimension of the foreign policy-making process.

The Domestic Environment

The discussion about the environmental dimension will not be completed without a reference to the influence of the domestic environment. The political system, party interests, internal objectives, public mood and opinion sometimes have an effect on the foreign policy-making process. At first sight the domestic environment does not have an immediate relation with the international affairs of a particular state. Occasionally, however, and especially in times of national crisis, the reaction of the opposition parties or of the public may have a profound effect on the state's foreign policy. The important

thing in such occasions is whether the political system is able to contain the different reactions and opinions without causing a damaging effect both in itself and in the state's foreign affairs.

Of course, not all the issues are discussed and not all details are publicly revealed. Much of modern diplomacy is still secret and the policy-makers keep some aspects hidden from the public. Problems of politics usually can't be widely comprehended by the public but the international affairs entail the handling of delicate matters which make them even more incomprehensible. So, any presentation of a foreign policy issue in the domestic political system is likely to lead to distortions and to a discussion in normative terms, appropriate only to public debate²².

In addition, foreign affairs are considered to be a matter of experts who have to deal with important issues like the national security. Therefore, they are entitled to keep matters such as these away from the public scrutiny in order to protect the nation²³.

But in the contemporary world the traditional distinction between the foreign and domestic politics is diminished. There is a popular demand for wider participation in policy debate. In addition, the widely accepted view is that the main objective of a state should be the domestic prosperity and welfare, not the pursuit of military might and domination of other states. For that reason, foreign policy should be integrated with the domestic policies of a government and justified by them in the same way²⁴.

So, on some occasions the foreign policy of a state is followed primarily to achieve domestic objectives. In such cases, it matters mainly the effect the policy will have on the citizens of the state rather than the consequences it will cause on the international relations of that state²⁵.

Whether the domestic environment will be of great influence in the foreign policy-making process will depend on the situation, the importance of the issue, and the state of affairs within the state. If the political system is democratic enough to allow a certain

²² Vital *op. cit.*, pp. 72-3.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 52-3.

²⁵ Calvert, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

degree of public debate then it can be expected that the opposition and the public will get involved. Additionally, if the system is polarised and characterised by great cleavages within the public, the government or the opposition may manipulate a foreign affairs issue for domestic reasons. And as it was mentioned above, in times of crisis all will get involved.

Interest groups, the different political officials of the state, and factions within the government party also form a very important part of the domestic environment. Their reactions and demands, although they are not always open to the public may have a profound effect to the top decision-makers.

2. The Information

Information gathering and processing serves as a link between the policy-makers and their environment. It is necessary for the understanding of the situation, the behaviour of the various actors, the possible changes that must be accounted for. It is substantial at all stages of the policy-making process. Every policy is built upon a certain appreciation of the circumstances, at any time of the policy-making process, and the constant flow of data is an important factor of that appreciation²⁶. Information can be obtained through the diplomatic and intelligence services but also through the mass media, academic works etc.

A significant role of information is that it links the operational and psychological environment²⁷. For example, if the information is carefully gathered and processed and if it is closely related to the real situation it can help the policy-makers to achieve an objective understanding of the operational environment and reach a decision which will be in conformity with it. On a different occasion, if the information is not properly understood, or if it is in disagreement (or agreement) with a very strong aspect of the national image it may cause a change (or not) to the psychological environment.

²⁶ Vital, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

²⁷ Frankel, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

Clearly, the effect that the information will have on the policy-makers depends on its quality, quantity, and classification. Poor quality or quantity leads to an insufficient understanding of the situation. Of course, complete comprehensive or reliable information about the external environment cannot be obtained, so some of the information might be wrong, misinterpreted or neglected by the officials, or be beyond assimilation by the policy-makers²⁸. So, the policy-makers who are confronted with a variety of phenomena with all sorts of different information must be selective²⁹ classifying the information in a manner which will help them to understand the situation.

Selectivity itself, may lead to new problems. Because the policy-makers in their attempt to clarify and classify over-abundant material may cause further distortions³⁰. Selectivity involves the compression of information, the omission of some details, simplification, and the further it proceeds to higher levels of the policy-making hierarchy the more it causes separation from the initial source of information and the operational environment causing further misunderstanding³¹.

This distortion of the information and the environment may lead to an interpretation which will create a psychological environment quite different from the operational one³², influenced mainly by the national image. So, cultural differences will either be disregarded or exaggerated, emotions will play a major part, different interests will be of great effect, and wishful instead of pragmatic thinking will prevail³³.

This discussion, of course, does not imply that information cannot be obtained and interpreted without being distorted. There are occasions where the data are perfectly clear and do not leave room for misinterpretation. The messages of the information can even have the power to cause changes in the image of the policy-makers or more seldom completely reorganise it³⁴. It shows, however, that while information is an important

²⁸ Vital, op. cit., pp. 14-5.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Frankel op. cit., p. 96.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Op. cit., p. 99.

³³ Op. cit., pp. 99-100.

³⁴ Op. cit., p. 108.

dimension of the foreign policy-making process it does not necessarily improve the objectivity of the policy-makers.

3. The Concept of the National Interest in International Relations

“The National Interest”: A Modern Concept

The concept of the national interest is the essence of a state's foreign policy and is the standard by which international relations are conducted. It is both the justification of a particular policy that a government may follow and the goal of this policy: a government will decide what is in the country's national interest, which policy should be followed and what should be the goals of this policy in order to achieve what is in the interest of the country. In other words, the national interest could be characterised as the beginning and the end of the foreign policy of any state in the world.

The national interest, as well as its sister concept, the public interest, is a relatively modern concept and its development is relevant to the evolution of democracy in the West³⁵. What was previously used as the essential element in diplomacy were such expressions as the "will of the prince", "dynastic interests", the "raison d' etat" and the "national honour"³⁶. The American and French revolutions and the gradual implication of the masses in politics led to the adoption of the terms national and public interest. These terms had the advantage to be all-embracing in the sense that they equated the interest of the aristocracy with the peasantry and of the bourgeoisie with the proletariat.

But the relationship between democracy and the concept of national and public interest is more or less symbolic. First, the public never decides at any given moment what is the national interest by way of a referendum or any other measurements of the

³⁵ Schubert Glendon, *The Public Interest; A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept*, The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1960, p. 16. The author presents the analysis of the concept as it was discussed by Charles Beard in his book, *The Idea of National Interest*, New York, Macmillan Co., 1934.

public opinion. It is the government which uses the concept as a principle to guide its foreign policy in general and specific terms, as something that always exists and dominates all. The public decides what is in its interest only at elections and only in very broad and vague terms. And in dictatorial regimes the people do not even have that chance.

Second, the concept is often used when the government wants to keep secrets from the public. In an ironic way this term serves as the stereotyped verbal formula with which the government tries to protect the public against itself³⁷: it would be better for the public if it did not know the details of a particular decision taken in the name of its interest: hence, the opposition should not try to scrutinise the government's policy and should not encourage the public debate on the subject.

Third, there is a serious semantic difference between the concepts of democracy and national interest. Democracy, entails free election and decision, a balance between the different wills and active participation of the public. The national interest is more relevant to Rousseau's general will which is something more than the will of the majority. As it was said above, the national interest is dominant, exists above all other interests, is all-embracing. Sometimes a challenge against it might be equivalent to treason.

In the end the public will never be sure whether the national interest is really the public's interest or not. In Lincoln's America the national interest was the preservation of the Union and a necessary prerequisite was the abolition of slavery, even if that meant the eruption of a bloody civil war. In Hitler's Germany the national interest was the acquisition of living space for the "Aryan race" even if that meant a full scale war all over Europe and the destruction of the continent (the natural home of that "race"). While in the second case the result was the destruction of Germany and national humiliation, in the US the civil war led to serious divisions in the American society which exist even today.

These are extreme examples, of course, in the sense that the national interest is supposed to guide the policy of a state every day and on trivial matters and not only in

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

serious occasions like the above. They highlight, however, the vagueness which is inherent in the concept and the room which is open for different interpretations by the leaders, the opposition, the public, and social scientists of the national interest. In the simple question what constitutes the national interest of our country one might get so many different answers as the population of that country. These answers might not all be contradictory to each other but they may have substantial qualitative differences. This means that at any given time some different definitions of the national interest may occur.

Definition of the National Interest

It is extremely difficult to define the national interest. At first glance, this term should relate to what is good for everybody and everything in a nation-state: the population, the different classes, the economy, the industry and so on. But as it was implied above, different people may believe that different things are good for the nation. Even more they believe that what is in their own interest is also in the interest of the nation. Hence, the famous assertion was made: what is in the interest of General Motors is in the interest of the United States. So, the definition of the national interest depends on the particular viewpoint one may have.

In the field of social sciences there are two main approaches to the definition of the national interest. The first, maintains the view that the national interest can be defined in an objective and scientific way. According to this view few people are supposed to be adequately trained to understand at any time what is in the public's interest and which decisions should be taken for the common good to be achieved. These decisions will be implemented by a specially trained administration whose efficiency will guarantee the achievement of the national good³⁸.

According to the second approach the national interest is the political outcome of a struggle between different subjective views and goals. For this view, the national

³⁸ Couloumbis Theodore and Konstas Demetrios, *op.cit.*, 1985, p. 180.

interest can not be defined in a scientific way, and there are no universal criteria which can be employed for the adoption of satisfactory decisions³⁹. This approach clearly has a more flexible conception of the national interest because it takes into account the many different views that exist in a certain society, and the dynamics that form and change these views.

In reality, however, the two approaches seem almost to coincide, especially in democratic states. Because on the one hand, the leaders of one state are elected on the grounds that they are supposed to know which the public interest is and are capable of preserving that interest and work for it. On the other hand, all democracies firstly take into account the will of the majority and secondly operate within a system of checks and balances according to which all different interests should be considered, aggregated and if possible satisfied.

So, at the time of decision the policy-makers will rely on their own understanding of the situation and their own conception of the national interest but will also take into account the public demands and the special proposals forwarded to them by several interest groups. The policy-makers will act differently in times of crisis when they will be forced to take fast decisions. In such cases, they will rely more on their own subjective judgement of what secures the national interest of their country and will let history to be the judge of their decision⁴⁰.

Returning to everyday reality it can be said that the national interest is defined in the following way: one has to point to the different actors whose interaction and communication are responsible for the formation of the national interest⁴¹:

“1. The Public. The role of the public is more or less symbolic since it does not participate in the actual decision-making but only through its representatives. Its role is significant only in cases of referendums on foreign policy issues, in elections whose outcome will draw the basic lines of the national interest. The public will also

³⁹ Op. cit., p. 181.

⁴⁰ Op. cit. p. 182.

⁴¹ The following is a presentation which combines Glendon Schubert's account of the actors in the decision-making process, op. cit. pp. 19-24 and Couloumbis and Konstas account of the criteria for the definition of the national interest in op. cit., p. 195-201.

be involved in times of crisis when the survival of common aspirations is at stake⁴². In such cases it will abandon the individual's usual indifference to foreign policy matters and will demonstrate in various ways its position on the issue.

2. Interest Groups. Interest groups always try to approach parties, political leaders, the legislature and the executive, in order to secure a better deal for their members. Professional and business groups in particular tend to be exceptionally strong in lobbying, and have the sense that their own interests are closely related to the national interest. But not all these groups have the same degree of interest in foreign policy and the definition of the national interest. So, they can be distinguished according to their degree of interest to⁴³:

2.1. Groups which have a permanent interest in foreign affairs because they affect their businesses, like foreign traders, shippers, and groups which advocate the interdependence of nations.

2.2. Groups which are interested in the realisation of their demands within the internal structure of the state but occasionally take interest on specific issues of the foreign affairs which affect their interests such as trade unions, farmer associations, etc.

2.3. Groups which are interested on the basic principles of foreign policy but can take interest on specific issues, like patriotic organisations and historic societies.

2.4. Groups which are mainly interested in internal questions but may take an interest in a very specific issue, like religious groups and scientific societies.

2.5. Groups which are never interested in foreign affairs but may be aroused in times of crisis. In this category the overwhelming majority of the nation is also included.

3. Political Parties. Parties are very much involved in the definition of the national interest especially if they hold the majority and the government. One of their basic interests is that the government succeeds in its handling of the domestic and foreign affairs so that the party will be able to win the next election. The opposition parties, on the other hand, will be extremely critical for the same reason. The amount of party involvement in the policy-making process is dependent on two variables: First, on the significance of the party's ideology and principles in the formulation of the party's policies. Second, on the degree of democracy within the party which delimits the opportunity of the rank-and-file, who from their position are able to grasp the public mood, to pass the message to the leaders.

4. The Legislators. The legislature will become involved when the government's policies are debated and scrutinised in the parliament. The position of the legislators is extremely difficult because on the one hand they have to comply to the party's policy and on the other they have to satisfy their constituency and the interest groups which will finance their next campaign. It becomes even more difficult when they have a certain amount of independence and believe that the national interest is different from the one that the party, or the people think.

5. The Government. Clearly the most important position is that of the government. As it was said above, the chief decision-makers are elected and appointed because

⁴² Haas Ernst B. and Whiting Allen S., *Dynamics of International Relations*, Mc Graw Hill, Book Company, Inc., New York, Toronto, London, 1956, p. 44.

⁴³ Op. cit., pp. 42-43.

they are supposed to know what is the national and public interest and what has to be done in order to achieve it. But they are also in a difficult position because they have always to justify their policies, to their colleagues, their party, and the people. They need to be successful in order to secure their job and get re-elected. Also their position becomes more difficult when they have a different opinion from their colleague in the cabinet or when the head of state has the power to veto their decision.

There are a number of criteria on which the chief decision-makers will form their own definition of the national interest⁴⁴:

5.1. *Criteria of Functional Philosophy.* According to their ideological positions and conception of their environment they will choose one of the following ways of action: They may choose the concise action in which they will be sure that they know which the national interest is and which are the right decisions to take, sure that all consequences can be predicted and controlled. Or, they may choose the way of augmentation according to which the problems are so complicated and difficult to solve. So, it is difficult to define precisely what the national interest is and, therefore, what is required is a number of gradual decisions which will be tested in the environment and then revised and corrected.

5.2. *Ideological Criteria.* Decision-makers may be very much influenced by their ideological position when they define the national interest. Otherwise, they may only justify their decisions according to ideological principles.

5.3. *Moral and Legal Criteria.* On occasions decision-makers will be confronted with dilemmas and they take their decisions according to their own moral principles or according to the rules of the international law.

5.4. *Technocratic and Pragmatic Criteria.* On other occasions they may take their decision in a prudent way by calculating, testing and avoiding any sentimental influence.

5.5. *Criteria of Professional Career.* Some decision makers will be ready to accept a compromise in order to secure their professional future.

5.6. *Criteria of Party Loyalty.* Similarly they may see as very important their position in their political party and may equate the party's interest with the country's interest.

5.7. *Criteria of Bureaucratic Interest.* According to the department they are heading, the decision-makers tend to equate the organisation's interest with the national interest. Since, every national budget can allow a limited spending a battle occurs between the heads of the various departments which try to secure a larger allocation of money for themselves. Usually, they produce programmes, which need funding and which they support in the name of the national interest.

5.8. *Ethnic Criteria.* When the decision-makers are also members of an ethnic minority they tend to support programmes that will benefit that minority. On a different occasion if a minority is closely related with an enemy country they may adopt programmes or assimilation or discrimination in order to tackle the threat that this minority poses to the national interest.

⁴⁴ Based on Coulombis op. cit., pp. 195-201.

5.9. *Criteria of Social Class Origin.* The social background of the policy-makers tends to influence the way they decide on programmes that will affect a particular social class.

5.10. *Criteria of Foreign Dependence.* These criteria apply more to small and vulnerable countries which rely their economic development and national security on foreign aid. The formation of the national interest of their country is usually affected by the dictum of the foreign protectors.

5.11. *Criteria of Interdependence.* In the contemporary world, many nation-states are part of supra-national organisations with strong integrative powers. The participation in such organisations forces the policy-makers to compromise part of the national interest in compliance with the interest of the fellow member-states.

6. *Bureaucracy and Administration.* Finally, the role of the administrative agencies is also important. Officially, these agencies are supposed to implement the decisions taken by the policy-makers. Only, the top ranks of the bureaucracy may participate in the decision-making process, mainly as advisers whose proposals are not binding. Both they and the lower ranks, however, are driven by the bureaucratic and professional criteria mentioned above and they equate the national interest with their own interest. If they fail to convince the policy-makers about the lawfulness of their proposals they may resolve to other tactics: for example, they may deliberately delay the implementation of the policy chosen forcing the chief decision-makers to re-examine it.”

All these actors intercommunicate, they put forward to each other their beliefs, and state their interests. This is a process of inputs, outputs and feedback before the formation of *the* national interest and the taking of decisions. It is not an easy process because different people and groups have different values and interests and, therefore, point to different elements of definition⁴⁵. So, they actually compete between them and try to secure that a significant part of their interests will be incorporated in the definition of the national interest. Thus, the political outcome of this process, the actual national interest can be described as the balanced aggregate of specific goals⁴⁶, a compromise of interests⁴⁷, which corresponds to the values of the whole national community in general and to the specific interests of different groups in particular⁴⁸.

There are elements of the national interest though, that remain permanently identified with the concept. These are the elements of the national myth and guarantee a

⁴⁵ Haas op. cit., pp. 44-45.

⁴⁶ Schubert op. cit., p. 18.

⁴⁷ Op. cit., p. 223.

⁴⁸ Haas op. cit., p. 45.

relative consistency in foreign policy from government to government⁴⁹. The national myth⁵⁰ is comprised by these values and beliefs existing in every nation, shared by all groups through education and propaganda. It is essentially the emotional idea that a nation has for itself and like the national interest is always present, all-embracing and can not be challenged. It is based on the individual's desire to be identified with others who share the same values. And these elements present both in the national myth and interest are based on a fundamental human instinct: survival.

Hans Morgenthau on the National Interest

The analysis of the national interest as primarily a question of survival is provided by Hans Morgenthau. Morgenthau is an advocate of what is known as the Realist school in international relations. He is forthright against any idealist perceptions like the supremacy of natural law in human affairs which he finds undemocratic. He believes that people have different interests and the essence of politics is to find a middle ground through a system of checks and balances⁵¹.

For Morgenthau the national interest is the essential motive of all diplomatic activity⁵². He recognises though, the vagueness of the term which contains a number of different multidimensional political interpretations and actions based either on tradition or occasion. As he puts it:

"The concept of the national interest is similar in two respects to the "great generalities" of the Constitution, such as the general welfare and due process. It contains a residual meaning which is inherent in the concept itself, but beyond these minimum requirements its content can run the whole gamut of meanings that are logically compatible with it. That content is determined by the political traditions and the total cultural context within which a nation formulates its foreign policy. The

⁴⁹ Op. cit., p. 46.

⁵⁰ Op. cit. pp. 32-34.

⁵¹ Morgenthau Hans, *Dilemmas of Politics*, The University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 55.

⁵² Coulombis op. cit., p. 188.

concept of the national interest, then, contains two elements, one that is logically required and in that sense necessary, and one that is variable and determined by circumstances. The former is, then, of necessity relatively permanent while the latter will vary with circumstances.⁵³

So, as it was discussed in the previous section, the national interest contains all the values and beliefs and desires that comprise the permanent national myth and the aggregate goals of the different individual and group interests on specific issues and times.

And in a world of competing nations which oppose each other for power, the minimum requirement of every foreign policy must be the reference to the essential notion of the national interest: survival. All nations design their foreign policy in such a way as to "*protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachments by other nations*"⁵⁴. The protection of physical identity means the maintenance of the territorial integrity of a nation-state, the protection of political identity means the preservation of the existing political and economic regime and the protection of cultural identity means the preservation of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and historical norms of the nation⁵⁵.

These are the general objectives of a nation's foreign policy and a number of policies of either cooperation or conflict may be adopted for their realisation. These policies may include competition of armaments, foreign aid, alliances, subversion, economic warfare etc.⁵⁶.

However, each policy must comply to the following guide-lines: first, the national interest and the nation's foreign policy must compromise the different interests between individuals, groups and bureaucratic organisations within the state; second, the national interest and the foreign policy must be relevant to the state's capabilities and resources; third, national diplomacy should be prudent, that is, to take account of the national interest of other nations and if possible to relate and compromise the different national interests; fourth, the national foreign policy must retain its relevance to the national

⁵³ Morgentau op. cit., pp. 65-66.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Coulombis Theodore A. and Wolfe James H., *Introduction to International Relations; Power and Justice*, Prentice Hall International Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, fifth edition, 1991, p. 103.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

interest and should avoid being sentimental and dependent on universal principles about equality, freedom etc.; fifth, participation in regional and military alliances should be welcomed but only as much as the national interest is adequately served and preserved by them⁵⁷. These are the essential guidelines of what is known as Realpolitik in international relations.

But Morgenthau does not stop there. He goes further and equates the national interest with the quest for power. As power is understood anything that establishes and maintains control by one state over another⁵⁸. This can be achieved either by coercive or cooperative means, and through the use of physical violence or the establishment of delicate psychological bonds⁵⁹.

A distinction between large and small states should be made here. Large states are supposed to have the necessary resources to achieve greater power: territorial size, population, developed economy, large army. Small states, on the other hand, are usually dependent and do not have the resources to pursue greater power. They can do that only when they are confronted with a relatively vulnerable state on the regional level⁶⁰.

Other limitations on the quest for power also exist. These are posed by the growing interdependence among nations and the existence of supra-national organisations with integrative powers. In such organisations the nation-states surrender an amount of their autonomy to take decisions, and they compromise their national interest with the national interest of the others. Similarly, the presence of supra-national governing bodies delimits the amount of power that a nation may exercise over another.

The perception of the national interest as a question of survival is extremely useful and describes the way in which the nation-state resolves to either cooperate or engage in conflict. But the equation of the national interest with the achievement of power can not be useful in explaining state behaviour. Only on specific occasions can the two concepts

⁵⁷ Coulombis and Konstas op. cit., pp. 188-191.

⁵⁸ Coulombis and Wolfe op. cit.

⁵⁹ Morgenthau Hans, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th Edition, New York, Knopf, 1973, p. 9.

⁶⁰ Vital David, *The Inequality of States. A Study of the Small Power in International Relations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, pp. 29-30 and pp. 124-125.

be related. That is, when the state has the abilities, the need, and the opportunity to do so. Survival is a fundamental need, power is not.

A Vague but Important Concept

As was pointed out elsewhere in the discussion the concept of the national interest is vague. Neither this discussion nor other literature which was consulted shed a definite light in the meaning of the concept. But that is no proof that the national interest does not exist and is not important.

As a compromise of interests, or a component of the national myth, or a question of survival, the national interest is important. And either it is responsible for the adoption of a particular foreign policy decision or simply justifies it. It is never challenged and is difficult to depart from, because if some do they could end up being charged as traitors.

4. Policy-Making

The previous discussion highlighted the general framework within which the policy-makers are supposed to act. The environment with both its actual and ideological dimensions limits the room of free decision and action; information is necessary for the understanding of the issue; the national interest is the guiding line which must be followed and protected. The time of decision is the most difficult, especially for those who will be responsible for it. The policy-makers must ensure that their decision will be in conformity with the operational environment if it is to succeed, whatever the influence of the national image and values. They must also ensure that any compromises for the sake of conformity with the international environment will not endanger the national interest.

The stage of the actual-decision should not be perceived as the "hour" or "moment" of decision. It takes, in fact, some time in which various departments of the

state machinery, ministerial officials, advisory bodies, parliamentary committees, meet, discuss, and deliberate before reaching a decision. The same process continues even after the decision when adjustments and compromises are required.

This is a critical phase for the policy-makers. Because firstly, they have to deal with time constraints, especially in periods of crisis. The decision-making process should use only as much time as the situation allows before the final decision. In times of crisis the decision-makers do not have the ability to utilise the whole machinery mentioned above, and do not have the time to fully judge the situation and deliberate on the course of action. Instead, the decision is taken by few people at the top of the policy-making body, it reflects the past experience rather than the reality of the situation, and is shaped by the need to act fast⁶¹. And only the post-decisional stage of the decision-making process is followed.

Secondly, because the decision-makers have to take into account the constraints that the environment imposes on the instruments of foreign policy that can be used. Not all countries have the material ability to use coercion and force (or the psychological ability to disregard the international community) in order to achieve their policy objectives. Whatever, the reasons that will lead to a decision, the latter must always be able to be implemented through the traditional way of diplomacy. Even if instruments of coercion are used, such as economic pressure or psychological warfare, their function will be one of deterrence, supplementary to mainstream diplomacy⁶². Decisions, should always allow the possibility of reaching agreement through negotiations; open and direct conflict must be the last resort.

If time permits, however, the foreign policy-making process will be divided into three stages. The pre-decisional stage where a number of different bodies will provide an assessment of the situation and will consider the various alternatives; the intermediate stage of decision where the higher body of policy-makers will take what they believe as the best decision; the post-decisional stage which implies the implementation of the

⁶¹ Jacobson Harold Akron and Zimmerman William, "Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Behavior", in Jacobson and Zimmerman ed., op. cit., p. 12.

chosen policy, its testing and the possible adjustments that might occur to it. The functions of the key policy-makers all through these stages will be to reconcile the different interests, to resolve the incompatibilities between alternatives and policies, to choose between different assessments and proposals, and to set the goals that the state administration will try to achieve⁶³.

The Pre-Decisional Stage

This stage is actually the most important of all in the foreign policy-making. It is the stage where the policy-makers will try to understand the situation through the available information. They will analyse their environment and how the issue stands in it, they will consider the alternatives for action and their compatibility with the environment and the national interest.

A pre-phase of the pre-decisional stage is the *planning*. It is in essence a theory of a course of action that should be followed by the state. It is based on the assumption that the future can be structured by understanding and manipulating the environment⁶⁴, and that the situation which will occur will be as envisaged by the planners⁶⁵. Planning is helpful because it predisposes the state machinery to await the occurrence of an issue and prepares it for a certain kind of action/reaction.

It is based, though, heavily on an imagined situation which might prove to be completely mistaken. Therefore, the planning will be irrelevant and to stick with it will have disastrous consequences⁶⁶. In addition, the preoccupation of the administration with a certain course of action might cause problems of adaptation to a different situation than that expected. One of these problems will be the refusal of the bureaucracy to change the standard procedures of operation, not only because bureaucratic mechanisms are usually

⁶² Vital, op. cit., p. 14.

⁶³ Op. cit., p. 20.

⁶⁴ Kissinger, op. cit., p. 144.

⁶⁵ Frankel, op. cit., pp. 180-3.

slow to adapt, but because they have the tendency to develop their own interests⁶⁷ which they like to preserve. Bureaucratic interests are a burden in policy-making in general, but long-term planning will give an excuse for the administration not to move away from them, and not to adapt to the situation, because it was "programmed" to act otherwise.

Planning, therefore, should take the form of schedules or scenarios, instead of a course of action. The policy-makers and the administration should have the opportunity to assess the situation and deliberate on the alternatives when the issue arises.

A first step is the *identification of the opponent (or opponents)*⁶⁸. An opponent, particularly a traditional one, is one important aspect in every foreign affairs issue. For the high-ranking policy-makers it is of great importance because they can relate the opponent and the issue with domestic objectives: their will to stay in power, to enhance their position, to secure an outcome which will benefit them⁶⁹. This, of course, implies that the issue might not be of great importance but it is presented as crucial mainly for domestic political reasons. The issue is crucial when the national interest is at stake and particularly when defined as survival. The identification of the opponent is then easy.

The more important step, therefore, is the *definition of the situation*. The crucial point in the definition is how the facts and the information will interact with the national image, values and interest of the policy-makers. This interaction should lead into a definition of the situation which would not entail major differences between the operational and psychological environment. Because, the next steps and the decision which will be taken are heavily dependent on it.

There are a number of aspects that are considered during this stage. The nature of the action taken by the opponent, the information that comes from the diplomatic representatives etc. The important results of the definition is first, the account of the impact of the foreign action and its consequence on the state of affairs of the two states;

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Kissinger, op. cit.

⁶⁸ Calvert, op. cit., p. 158.

⁶⁹ Op. cit., p. 160.

and, second, a first account on the nature of instruments that can be used as a response: diplomatic persuasion, appeal to international organisations, conflict etc.⁷⁰.

Another important aspect of that stage is that the high-rank policy-makers, those who will actually take the decision and the responsibility, do not evaluate the situation on their own. They usually have a general understanding of the situation and, therefore, they depend on a group of experts⁷¹ whose definition of the situation will be presented to them as reliable.

At this point a number of crucial problems arises: first, the group of experts or advisers may take a lot of time to conclude into their definition, especially if there is a lack of planning, and that may cause considerable delay⁷². Second, the advisers, which are often selected due to their political affiliations and not their expertise, may say to their superiors what they think to be politically correct or what the latter would like to hear. Third, they may present the situation in such a way which will define it as a crisis when it is simply a problem⁷³. Fourth, there may be a lack of effective communication between the group of experts and the top policy-makers: the constraints of time do not usually leave much room for detailed discussion and the experts must pass their conclusions through effective briefing; this might lead to misunderstandings since things that may sound correct will be wrong, or the reverse⁷⁴.

These are the perils that the advisory bodies may bring with them. They are necessary, however, because the top policy-makers usually do not spend much time in office, and their involvement with politics does not mean that they become experts of international affairs. That is probably the reason why their image of the situation and their understanding of the national interest heavily affects their decision.

⁷⁰ Op cit., p. 161.

⁷¹ Frankel, op. cit., p. 183.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Calvert, op. cit., pp. 162-3, gives a particular importance on the presentation of the situation. For him the basic stuff of diplomacy are *problems*, and crisis arise when problems are *defined* as such because they are exacerbated by embarrassing incidents for the state in question.

⁷⁴ Kissinger, op. cit., p.147.

When the definition of the situation is over, the policy-makers (high-rank officials, advisory bodies, ministerial representatives) will have formed an *image of the opponent* and will start consider *alternatives* for action.

First, their image will contain a number of attributes about the opponent state which in relation to the attributes of their own state will give an idea of how the two stand against each other. These attributes will cover the following aspects:

“1. Military Capability: the opponent might be superior, equal or inferior in military strength and might be capable or not of using it.

2. Domestic Policy: there may be governmental similarities, competitive (or not) political system, effective or ineffective policy administration.

3. Economic Structure: the opponent's economy might be stronger, equal or weaker, it might be accessible to foreign involvement or might have an overall capacity and stability with industrial potential, agricultural self-sufficiency etc.

4. Culture: cultural superiority, equality, or inferiority, degrees of literacy, religious differences, standard of living.

5. Supportiveness: how supportive other states will be to the one's or the other's policies.

6. Flexibility: how flexible or inflexible the opponent state will be and ready or not to compromise, change its tactics, etc.

7. Goals: how aggressive or passive will it be in its pursuit of goals and how much compatible or incompatible the latter will be.”⁷⁵

Second, the policy-makers will consider the alternatives which will be relevant to the situation, the attributes of the opponent state, the resources of their own state. The nature of these alternatives might be all-inclusive, that is, they include a number of options and proposals relevant to the situation and a number of them could be combined to form a structured policy; or it can be exclusive, where the utilisation of one alternative excludes the use of others. These alternatives, in broad terms, might be the following:

“1. Diplomatic Exchanges: *a)*. Diplomatic bilateral negotiations are possible and likely to succeed; *b)*. Non-governmental groups can participate and may be influential; *c)*. other states may be invited as mediators.

2. Military Force: coercion through the armed forces could be successful.

3. Economic Force: economic warfare may be an option and may succeed.

⁷⁵ As presented by Cottam Martha L., *Foreign Policy Decision Making; The Influence of Cognition*, Westview Press/Boulder and London 1986, pp. 51-4.

4. Do Nothing: a). could be the last resort in despair; b). could be used as a method to resolve disputes with some types of states.

5. Appeal to International Forums: Appropriate alternative when a different option entails dangers.”⁷⁶

Of these alternatives, the 1., 3., and 5., could be part of the structure of the same policy, so they can be called inclusive. Alternative 4.a., however, leaves all options free to the opponent and is, therefore, exclusive.

These alternatives describe a general course of action. A number of details and proposals will vary according to the situation and in the future adaptations may be required. So, one essential element that should be part of the alternatives is the *prediction*.

The pre-decisional stage is incomplete without an estimate of the possible changes in the situation and the consequences that the different alternatives may create to the environment⁷⁷. The policy-makers must take into account the likely outcomes of their decision in order to avoid embarrassment. By knowing the possible effect of the policy the decision-makers will be able to take the decision they believe is the best. In that respect, prediction not only is an estimate of the future but shapes it as well, since the decision-makers deliberately decide to follow the one instead of the other alternative by knowing the likely results beforehand⁷⁸.

The Decision

When the various alternatives have been taken into account and the likely outcomes have been considered the top policy-makers and their closest advisers are ready to take the decision.

At the top level of the decision-making mechanism the officials will be faced with a situation that requires a quick decision, a number of options, a number of restrictions and the limits imposed by the environment and the national interest.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Frankel, op. cit., p. 185.

At that stage they will realise that their freedom of choice and the opportunities of their state to play an international political game are based on three fundamental aspects: first, on the amount of material and human resources that the state can utilise in pursuit of its policies; second, on the authority that the government can exercise on the population and on the amount of public support for the governments policies; third, on the character and importance of the problems that face the state⁷⁹.

After taking into account these limits the decision-makers will proceed by, firstly, trying to reduce the incompatibilities of the various policy alternatives. The different ministries, (political, economic, military) might produce different estimates based on their own account and interests. At this point internal governmental divisions will arise and it is only because of the importance of the issue that the ministers will reach an agreement and decide to coordinate the actions of their departments in favour of the chosen policy⁸⁰. In any case it is impossible to compromise all the alternatives and values and the choice will favour some at the expense of others⁸¹.

Then, the policy-makers will have to deal with the conflicts between the operational environment and the national values and interest. The way with which they will finally deal with these conflicts will be reflected on the decision they will take. The alternative ways to follow and the respective outcomes are the following⁸²: First, they may ignore or accept the conflict but they may take no action towards compromise because it is either costly or the issue defies solution. Second, the environment might prevail, agreement between it and the values/interest is impossible, therefore, the only alternative is to compromise the national interest. Third, they may try to reduce the tension by altering the environment and compromising the values/interest in gradual and varying degrees. Fourth, the national values/interest might prevail, in which case, they will follow the path of open conflict with the environment in their pursuit to change it.

⁷⁸ Op. cit., p. 188.

⁷⁹ Vital, op. cit., pp. 28-9.

⁸⁰ Op. cit., pp. 45-6.

⁸¹ Frankel., op. cit., p. 200.

⁸² As presented by Frankel, op. cit., pp. 205-6.

In the end, the decision will reflect the history and tradition, the values and the need for survival⁸³. The foreign policy-makers usually base themselves on past-experience, on things that have been tested before, and lessons that have been learned from previous mistakes. It is easier for them to use the security of the past than the uncertainty of the future. This is another reason why there is continuity in the foreign policies of states, apart from the elements of the national myth which shape the national interest. Changes are few and small and tend to be policy adjustments in relation to the actions of the foreign government rather than shifts of strategy.

The Post-Decisional Stage

In the post-decisional stage the following steps are taken⁸⁴: first, the trial phase in which the policy-makers present their policy to various bodies in order to get further advice, to gather proposals for correction, and to register disagreements. Second, is the phase of implementation in which the policy is thrown into the operational environment where it will be tested; at the same time a number of administrative departments are utilised in order to implement the policy and secure its success. Third, is the evaluation of the success or failure of the policy, in which new discussions are held for registering reactions, gathering new alternatives and possibly reaching to a new decision which will put amendments on the previous one. Fourth, is the difficult task, especially when the policy is about a crucial issue, of explaining the policy to the parliament and the public and to present its rationale.

Of the post-decisional stage the most difficult phase is that of the implementation of the chosen policy. This difficulty does not have much to do with the environment since this functions independently from the state and may accept or not the whole or a part of

⁸³ Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

⁸⁴ As presented by Frankel, *op. cit.*, pp. 211-8.

the decision. The main difficulty lies with the ability of the policy-makers to direct the administration and the bureaucracy towards the goals of the policy.

The problems that the bureaucracy imposes on the policy-making process, domestic and foreign, were mentioned in the discussion about the pre-decisional stage. It continues to do so even after the policy has been decided. The main problem of the bureaucracy is the lack of efficiency in implementing the policy towards the defined goal. This may be caused by the differences between what the bureaucracy defines as operational routine or prescribed mode of action and the nature of the issue or the goal of the policy⁸⁵. So, a real success for the policy-makers will be to direct the state machinery to the goal of the decision, leaving it little room for analysing the merits of the policy⁸⁶.

Another important aspect of the post-decisional stage will be the outcome of the policy in the international environment. There are a number of possible outcomes which might be positive or negative for the state. What can be said with some certainty, however, is that the policy will result in some kind of change in the international environment, will provoke a (re)action from the foreign government and then the whole process will start from the beginning. This is the burden that people have to face in a world divided into nation-states.

⁸⁵ Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*

Chapter 7: Small States in International Relations

The previous chapter presented the different dimensions whose combination affects foreign policy-making. These dimensions played their part in the way Greek foreign policy was made during the years under study. There is, however, another dimension which is related to the size of Greece: the small state dimension. The size of Greece affects its foreign policy especially in relation to the country's immediate environment which is also comprised of other small or medium states whose relations with Greece have not always been friendly. In addition, small size in a world which until recently was divided into powerful opposing blocks surely meant that Greece was faced with a fundamental security problem. This problem forced Greece to enter international alliances and organisations which certainly imposed some policy guide lines to this small state. Although the collapse of the Eastern Bloc was followed by an increasingly momentous process of European integration, in which Greece participates, the developments in the Balkans caused some nervousness to the Greek side which was evident in its apparent friction with the Europeans and its subsequent pursuit of a different foreign policy. These considerations make evident the need to look into the specific details of the dimension of small size in international relations in order to understand the particularities of Greece and its environment as well as to form assumptions about the relation between size and the making of Greek foreign policy.

There is a limited amount of work about small states in the literature of international relations and foreign policy-making. Small states comprise the majority of the members of the international system, yet the studies of international relations tend to concentrate their attention on the great powers. The theories and studies of international relations in general, usually base their explanations and predictions on the study of the behaviour, the policy-making process and the overall significance in the international system, of the large/great powers. Moreover, the majority of studies about small states provide an analysis of the foreign policy and affairs of a particular state, and only few are

concerned with the small powers as a unique category which is worthy of an overall study.

There are reasons for this neglect of the small powers. One reason, is that the findings about the foreign affairs of the large powers often apply to the small states as well. The foreign policy-making process in democratic states, for example, follows more or less the same pattern everywhere. In addition, the instruments of foreign policy are the same for large and small alike: diplomatic representations, bilateral negotiations, participation in economic and military organisations, coercion and the use of force. Another reason is that the significance and influence of the large states in international relations is so great that they usually affect the developments in the international system in such a way that smaller ones can only adjust themselves to the new reality. A third is that the small states are usually dependent on the large ones and they can not easily pursue an independent foreign policy, especially if a number of the larger states are in disagreement with them. And while the large states have to comply with some of the norms of the international system and face a number of limits in the conduct of their foreign policy, the small ones have the additional hazard of satisfying the requirements of their larger allies. So, the literature used to concentrate its attention on the super and large powers and study international relations as a system which functioned according to operational rules imposed by them. A number of concepts were utilised to describe this system: the Balance of Power, East versus West, Centre-Periphery relations, First, Second, Third World countries, Nuclear Age, Satellite or Puppet states etc.

Yet the small states form an interesting case for study because there is no doubt, that despite the limitations they face, they try to protect their national interest and pursue a relatively independent policy. Their foreign affairs do not only include relations with the great powers but with other small states as well. It is with the latter that they have the opportunities to develop a more independent policy which might either protect their national interest or endanger it by putting them in a conflict situation.

Sometimes they might even face a threat imposed by a great power. In some cases they may be successful, in others they may surrender their independence. The different

but important cases of Vietnam, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Israel, prompted many observers to study the foreign policies of small states and the opportunities or limitations they faced when they were against a greater or a super power.

Moreover, throughout the Cold War a number of small states defied the way with which the international system was divided and tried, despite their smallness, to influence the developments within it in a positive way. Yugoslavia through the Non-Aligned movement and Sweden through positive neutrality, extended their foreign policies beyond the limited scope of the regional level. In addition, the various regional organisations that sprung after the Second World War gave the opportunity to small states to get involved and establish an equal say in matters that not only affected them but other nations as well. Organisations like the EEC with growing integrational powers established an equal status for small and large alike. The combined power of the small, on occasions, became a force the large states had to take into account.

Small states then are not only the majority of the members of the international system. They also provide an interesting field of study both individually and as a category. This section will examine them as a category. First, the characteristics common to the small states will be presented and the discussion of the definition of smallness will be evaluated. Second, the constraints and opportunities facing them. Third, the patterns of behaviour and the strategies they may follow in their foreign policy. The role of the environment, national ideology and the role of alliances will also be examined.

1. Definition and Characteristics of Small States

One of the major problems in the study of the small states is the definition of the small state. What sort of criteria should be applied for the distinction between large and small? Could all small states be part of the same category or there are important differences which distinguish one from another? Can there be a definition that will fully describe the

small states, their constraints and opportunities without overlooking the differences among them? As it has been remarked “... the term ‘Small States’ is a practical conventional term useful as such but evades definition”¹. A look in the available literature will provide some answers.

According to a conventional model the beginning to the definition of the small states is the definition of their common characteristics which are more or less the following: 1. small land area, 2. small population, 3. small GNP and 4. a low level of military capabilities². There are some problems with this model because it leads to confusion. For example in 1970 Israel with a population of 2.8 million had a much higher GNP than Burma with 25.2 million inhabitants³. Which one of the two was smaller?

The above model becomes less confusing with the addition of another approach: the relative influence of the foreign policies of the states under study⁴. The importance of this approach is that in combination with the objective or material elements of state capability (such as population, GNP, military might) it defines the small states in terms of weakness⁵. So, according to this approach a number of other common characteristics relevant to the behaviour of the small states can be identified. Some of them are the following⁶: Small states usually have a low level of international involvement and are usually interested in regional and economic issues; they are less able to withstand external pressure; their actions usually have limited consequences in the international system; when they are involved in a conflict situation they usually adopt a unilateral focus concerning their own national interest and survival unlike the larger powers which assess the consequences in the international system.

¹ Eek Hilding “The Conception of Small States”, in August Schou and Arne Olav Bruntland ed., *Small States in International Relations*, Nobel Symposium 17, Almqvist & Wiskell, Stockholm, 1971, p. 11.

² East Maurice A. “Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models”, *World Politics*, Vol. 25, pp. 557-76, 1973.

³ Barston Ronald P. “The External Relations of Small States”, in Schou and Bruntland ed., op. cit., pp. 39-56. Data from the Appendix 1.

⁴ Op. cit. p. 40. It should be noted that for purposes of discussion the author defines the small states as having a population between 10-15 million.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ As presented in op. cit., p. 41.

The definition of the small states in terms of weakness points to the essence of smallness: to what the small state is not capable or likely to do. Thus, on the one hand the small states are distinguished from the great and middle powers. On the other, the small state itself by acknowledging the limits of its power becomes conscious of its weakness. In other words, the small state is not defined as such only by the limits of its capabilities but also by recognising itself that it is weak.

So, a psychological factor apart from the material ones plays a role in the definition of smallness⁷. In its essence the recognition of weakness denotes a state's inability to protect itself. It points to a fundamental problem of security which is required for the survival of each state. Thus, a definition of the small state that can be given along the above lines is that:

“... a Small Power is a state which recognises that it can not obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the Small Power's belief in its inability to rely on its own means must also be recognised by the other states involved in international politics.”⁸

So, a definition of the small state is provided. A small state is that member of the international system with limited resources, limited defence capabilities, little influence, and the psychology of the weak. The problem with this definition is that it leads the study to what the small state cannot do. It presupposes that the small state due to its weakness has limited, if any, room to articulate an independent policy or influence things. Yet, there are instances where small states were able to pursue a policy according to their national interest even if they faced the opposition of a great power; and in other occasions they tried to get positively involved in wider issues.

One way to overcome this difficulty is not to take this definition as all-embracing and definitive. It would be better to take it as a conventional definition, able to be used but also capable of allowing the differences among small states to appear. In this sense it

⁷ Rothstein Robert L. *Alliances and Small Powers*, Columbia University Press, New York and London,, 1968 p. 29.

⁸ Ibid.

would be better to talk not about a definition and a subsequent model of behaviour but about a paradigm⁹. A paradigm does not define exactly how any member of that classification will act but points out the likely patterns of behaviour. It also helps the identification of limits and leaves free room for situations different from the pattern of the likely behaviour to occur.

A second step is to define categories of small states. Obviously some states may have more similarities if put together in economic, political and psychological terms. So, as the large states can be divided into super (or great) and middle powers according to criteria of influence, involvement, economic development and military capacity, the small states can also be divided along similar lines.

A first category can include all those states with a population of under one million. These are the very small or mini-states¹⁰. These states are the most vulnerable of all the small states. Their protection relies solely on other large states or international organisations like the United Nations. And as the majority of them are previous colonies their economic development needs a great support by the former colonial powers. For these countries independent statehood as such is a big problem so their involvement in international issues is extremely limited.

A more important categorisation of the small states is the distinction between the older European states and the developing small states of the third world¹¹. According to this categorisation the small European states are more economically developed, they have different security concerns, a higher degree of political stability, cultural homogeneity, historical associations with each other and the West, and more importantly a different perception of their role in the international system¹². It can be expected therefore that due

⁹ Vital David, "The Analysis of Small Power Politics", in Schou and Brundtland ed., op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁰ For an analysis of the mini-states and the problems they face see Rapoport Jacques et. al. *Small States and Territories*, New York, UNITAR, 1971.

¹¹ Papadakis Maria and Starr Harrey, "Opportunity, Willingness and Small States: The Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy", in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., James N. Rosenau ed., *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Boston, Allen & Unwin, 1987, p. 424.

¹² Ibid.

to their geographical position and immediate environment they have a number of different constraints and opportunities facing their foreign policies.

2. Constraints and Opportunities

Small states' policy makers are generally expected to encounter a number of constraints facing their foreign policies. Clearly, these constraints originate in the limited resources of the small state. And the importance of those constraints is exaggerated if the policy makers share to a high degree the psychology of the weak.

The significance of those constraints becomes obvious when one looks at the practical differences between large and small in foreign affairs:

- “1. Large states tend to be more active in foreign policy and often get involved in international issues.
2. Large states are more able to withstand conflict situations; indeed they often engage in conflicts.
3. Within alliance systems large states assume greater responsibility and a larger share of the burden.
4. Large states usually force small ones to accept mediation when engaged in dispute; mediation has been utilised mainly in the affairs of small countries.
5. Large states are more able to use coercion and force and to reward with economic and military aid while the small states are usually confined to diplomatic instruments of foreign policy.
6. Large states are keen on intervention since they are concerned with strategic power balances, economic, political, diplomatic and military interests; the small states, on the other hand, are concerned with regional disputes over territory or their security.
7. Small states usually decide to align themselves with a large power primarily in order to solve their security problems.”¹³

These are the main differences between large and small. They are the result of the small state's objective inability to articulate and pursue for a long time a particular policy due

¹³ Jensen Lloyd, *Explaining Foreign Policy*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1982, pp. 222-24.

to its lack of resources. The lack of resources, however, does not affect a particular policy only. It affects the general policy-making mechanism at any time.

The limited number of resources means that the small states can allocate a limited number of public servants in the foreign policy-making bureaucracy; consequently they face difficulty in obtaining and interpreting information from the external environment which limits their capacity of involvement in wider international issues¹⁴. They may also be slow in responding to foreign policy problems and that may lead the high-ranking policy-makers to assume full responsibility. This creates a personalised and even authoritarian decision-making style¹⁵.

In addition, their domestic economies are weak and underdeveloped which means that they highly depend upon foreign investment and trading partnership hence, upon foreign dependence. Sometimes they even have their economic guidelines imposed or suggested by international organisations such as the IMF or the OECD. This leads to a more vulnerable position and even domination by their trading partners¹⁶. This hinders the efforts for articulation of an independent foreign policy even further.

The economic vulnerability also means that the small states can withstand with great difficulty any outside pressure of economic nature. For that reason the most simple and usually effective weapon against a small country is the imposition of economic sanctions since its weak point is the economy and effective retaliation can be ruled out¹⁷.

Small states, as it was mentioned above, are not usually able to get involved in great international issues. Instead they are confined in their immediate international sub-environment of the regional issues. In fact, it is over regional issues that the small states feel that their interests are most directly affected. Therefore, they can get involved more positively especially if the presence of regional organisations allows such involvement; they also can pursue a policy which will be in agreement with the immediate national interests of the country. As far as resources are concerned, it is easier for small states to

¹⁴ Papadakis and Starr, *op. cit.*, p. 424.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 427.

¹⁶ Papadakis and Starr *op. cit.*, p. 425.

be interested in regional issues because the gathering and processing of information is easier and a carefully drawn policy may be conducted¹⁸.

So, the small state may be restricted mainly on the regional level but it has an opportunity to pursue positive and independent action. At this level, the small policy-making machinery may be an asset in the sense that it can concentrate its efforts on the important issue, therefore achieving a higher degree of co-ordination, responsiveness and efficiency¹⁹.

There is a number of other opportunities as well. At first, the small states, especially if they face an aggressive larger power, can either appeal to world opinion and the international organisation whose norms against coercion, imperialism and intervention limits the freedom of action of the stronger side, or point to a common interest which can benefit both sides²⁰.

The small European states usually have an additional asset which is a stable political system. This can boost confidence in the policy-making machine and highlight a number of domestic intellectual and cultural resources which may contribute to a prestigious international image²¹.

Another set of opportunities has to do with the ability of the small state to overcome up to a certain but significant extent its psychology of weakness or fear. This amounts to the development of a willingness to withstand pressure and protect the national interest. The development of this willingness which may help the small state to prevail over an issue even against a larger one is based on the following factors:

- “1. The ability of the small state to concentrate its efforts on a single issue.
2. Its willingness to take risks while pursuing a particular policy since it has little to lose; the larger state will not be able to go too far risking the collapse of the small in order to avoid involvement of third, probably aggressive parties.

¹⁷ Vital David, *The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972, p. 54.

¹⁸ Op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁹ Rapoport, op. cit., p. 148.

²⁰ Papadakis and Starr, op. cit., pp. 425-26.

²¹ Ibid.

3. The issue may of such importance for the small state and its population that may be willing to face sacrifices in order to achieve a positive outcome.
4. The small, and therefore, centralised bureaucracy of the small state may be able to locate possible allies in the larger and more pluralist bureaucracy of the large state and may try by lobbying them to influence them in favour of the small state.
5. The small state may possess some important natural resources or may have a strategic position which should not be jeopardised.
6. The small state may threaten alignment with a third side which may be a major adversary of the larger one.”²²

So, the small states have a number of opportunities in framing their foreign policies. These opportunities are not always the same for all and not all take advantage of them. It is usually the European small states that have the ability to utilise them due to their position and development. It should be said then that the geographic position and the international and regional environments provide the small states with different sets of constraints and opportunities²³. According to the environment and the situation the small state may be obliged to follow “superior” instructions, it may follow a policy similar in principles or conduct with the larger state, or it may follow a different one. A number of patterns of behaviour and policy options may be available according to the situation.

3. Likely Patterns of Behaviour and Policy Options

The literature on small states is particularly concerned with the aspects of behaviour and policy options. The problem of the literature is that it concentrates its interests mainly on the options of the small state when confronted by a large one as if the issues that arise among small are of inferior importance. However, the arguments that will be presented below can provide a basis for the understanding of the small state’s foreign policy if allowances are made for the particular aspects of each individual case-study to be considered during the process of explanation. Additionally, they should not be taken as

²² As presented by Lloyd Jensen, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-29.

definitive descriptions but rather as relative ones. They should be seen as suggestions whose combination could provide an almost realistic description of small state foreign policy.

Maurice East distinguishes two models of small state behaviour. The first is the *conventional* model whose patterns of behaviour are the following:

- a. Low levels of overall participation in world affairs.
- b. High levels of activity in intergovernmental organisations.
- c. High levels of support for international legal norms.
- d. Avoidance of the use of force as foreign policy instrument.
- e. Avoidance of behaviour and policies which may alienate powerful states in the international system.
- f. A narrow functional and geographic range of concern in their foreign policy.
- g. Frequent utilisation of moral and normative positions on international issues.”²⁴

The conventional model clearly takes the weak position of the small states as the basis of its assumptions. It also presupposes that the level of the psychology of the weak in the minds of the policy-makers of the small states is high. As a result the small states try to avoid risks by accepting the “rules of the game” and relying on the good will of the large states or the international organisation for the solution of their problems. So, according to this model there is not enough room for an independent foreign policy.

East, however, proposes the existence of a different and opposing model which he calls *alternative*. This alternative model stems from an economic perspective according to which the small states do not only have small economies, therefore limited resources that can allocate to foreign policy matters but also a small “surplus” which makes the amount of resources even smaller. The small amount of resources has four consequences:

- “1. The size of the bureaucracy in charge of foreign affairs is small, therefore, the monitoring of international developments will be limited, and adequate involvement with all the issues facing the small state will be rather unusual; instead certain functional and geographical areas should be emphasized.

²³ Papadakis and Starr op. cit., p. 420. See also Bjøl Erling’s “The Small State in International Politics”, pp. 29-37, in Schou and Brutland ed. op. cit.

²⁴ East op. cit., p. 557.

2. Small states are likely to be slow in perceiving international events or warning signals indicating new developments; when they finally perceive them the situation may have reached a stage that requires definite and high-risk behaviour with a higher than normal level of intensity and hostility.
3. The small state should avoid high costs and seek an economical method of statecraft through multilateral diplomacy, regional organisations, international conferences, etc.
4. Since internal demands and domestic reasons usually affect the foreign policy-making process the small state is likely to show little interest in wide international issues; instead, it will be more interested in issues concerned with its domestic development and security.”²⁵

The alternative model in many aspects shares similar assumptions with the conventional one (and East admits that). The major difference between the two is that the conventional model predicts avoidance of risk behaviour while the alternative does not.

There is a logical mistake though in the alternative model. It predicts that the small state will resume a high risk behaviour because it will be slow in perceiving the international events and the situation may reach such a level of development that it will be difficult to follow a peaceful approach. A confrontation with a great power is unlikely because great powers usually make their intentions very clear quite early allowing the small state to perceive the warnings and evaluate them.

So, situations like these may occur at the regional level where a neighbour may follow a hostile policy against another. But since the foreign policy-making machine concentrates its efforts on monitoring the regional environment and the issues which occur within it one should expect that the small state would be able to perceive the warnings in its immediate environment more easily. Therefore, the policy makers would be able to plan and follow a policy that would take the warnings into account, foresee the events, and avoid risks. So, unless the small state *wants* to follow a high risk behaviour it can be expected that only in situations of sudden political change in the immediate environment, the policy-maker may be slow to perceive warnings.

Close to the conventional model assumption of avoiding risks is the view that sees the small states opt for an alignment with a large state or for participation in an

²⁵ Ibid.

international military alliance. Robert Rothstein believes that the fundamental problem of the small state is their security. Based on that assumption he distinguishes a number of factors that lead to similar patterns of behaviour among the small states despite the differences that may exist between them. These factors are the following:

- “1. For small states the solution to their security problem will come from an outside source but will always have an ambiguous nature: it will be given in expectation of future benefits.
2. The small state is rarely able to increase its own power sufficiently to affect the outcome of an issue, therefore, at any time it only has peripheral control over its own fate, has few realistic policy options, a limited spectrum of choice, and can do little to encounter a threat.
3. With limited resources available the small state can not take risks and has little time to correct mistakes. But the small margin of error means that decisions can not be delayed, therefore, the small state must concentrate its efforts on short-term matters instead of long-term stability, hoping that it will confront and survive the most serious problems.
4. Sometimes foreign policy concentrates so much on short-term issues that the whole political process of the small state is consumed by it and makes any other discussion to appear irrelevant.”²⁶

These factors create the psychology of fear: the small state is preoccupied with its security and survival in a world where it can do little to defend itself. In order to solve this problem the small state joins alliances. In this way apart from securing its defence the small state enjoys other advantages:

- “1. In military terms the small state can hope that its participation in the alliance will deter a potential enemy from taking hostile action.
2. If deterrence fails, then the small state can hope that its allies will fulfill their obligations by defending it.
3. In political terms, the small state by participating in an alliance gains the right to be consulted as an equal, and hopes to influence the policies of the alliance especially in its favour.
4. The alliance can be used as a bargaining weapon against another power.
5. The alliance, especially with a prestigious power, gives to the small state a higher prestige and psychological advantages than the ones it should normally had on its own.”²⁷

²⁶ Rothstein op. cit., pp. 24-26.

²⁷ Op. cit., pp. 49-50.

But the small state as soon as it enters an alliance starts behaving in a dual fashion, a result of the psychology of fear. On the one hand, it tends to act irresponsibly by trying to withdraw itself from the issue and the imminent conflict, while on the other, it demands formal equality and the right to be consulted, according, of course, to its interests²⁸. As Rothstein points out:

“... Small Powers tend to rely on the hope that they can be protected by their own insignificance. If they can appear detached enough, and disinterested enough, and if they can convincingly indicate that they are powerless to affect the issue, they hope the storm will pass them by... This may explain, at least in part, the vaunted irresponsibility of the Small Powers. Their refusal to take sufficient account of international stability at the expense of immediate security considerations reflects the insoluble dilemmas confronting permanently weak ideas... [On the other hand] clamoring for formal recognition of equality serves to bolster hopes which have been endangered by substantive weakness. But it may have dangerous consequences, beyond the irritation it inspires. It may, for example, inhibit or prevent the Great Power from reaching a compromise solution...”²⁹

The small state tends to view the alliance as the bulwark of its national interest. The alliance is the protector of its independence and guarantees its security. So, the small state is not that much interested in the international role of the alliance and how it can contribute to that. And when the alliance thinks of a policy that the small state believes it jeopardises its interests it remembers its equal status and demands the right of consultation.

Similar behaviour for that matter may be followed in any other kind of organisation apart from alliances. Small states, in pursuit of their policies, tend to use international organisations to mobilise support by widening the arena of debate and criticism³⁰. Regional organisations, with increased levels of economic and political integration, may be used by the small state and drawn into its own disputes. If the allies or the partners are willing to respect the role of the organisation by finding a solution then the constraints of small state can be surpassed. Indeed, the larger members of each

²⁸ Rothstein op. cit., p. 28.

²⁹ Op. cit., pp. 26-28.

³⁰ Barston, op. cit., p. 46.

organisation which have a broader spectrum of interests and see things differently may apply pressure on the small state to compromise its position.

The small power has, however, some possibilities of overcoming its psychology of fear or weakness and pursue a more positive involvement on the regional level. In regions where there is a number of small states and the overall power is more or less equally distributed the small state can pursue a different kind of policy. Especially when a small state is confronted by a relatively weaker one it can manipulate the environment, use its own power, and achieve an equivalent of the great power ability of coercion to its own advantage³¹.

For David Vital the ability to get actively involved and the choice of what kind of policy will be followed is dependent on the following variables³²: First, on the external international environment and the restrictions or opportunities it possesses. Second, on the human and material resources the small state has available and can allocate in pursuing a certain policy. Third, and more importantly on the quality and ethos of the societies of both the state in question and the neighbour.

Indeed, the real strength of a small state is the ability to mobilise its population behind a certain policy and to have leaders that will feel obliged to follow a policy that is in agreement with the national values and interest. Public support and internal strength are the first line of defence of a small state if it has to tolerate sacrifices or force the opponent to withdraw its pressure³³.

For the accomplishment of internal strength the small nation must be united to fight an opponent whose actions are perceived aggressive or dangerous to the state's survival. This unity must be accomplished despite the domestic diversities of political, social or cultural nature. The way to maintain the national strength is by transmitting the national values and ideas with the help of history from the past, through the present and

³¹ Vital, *The Inequality...* op. cit., pp. 124-25.

³² Op. cit., p. 122.

³³ Op. cit., p. 144.

into the future³⁴. This strength which can be seen as equivalent to nationalism, and it grows in the course of history; it cannot be destroyed by occasional set-backs or defeats³⁵. With this internal strength the small state can face outside pressure, or pursue an uncompromising policy.

But in general, Vital distinguishes three different strategies that the small state can opt for. These strategies are the following:

“1. An essentially passive policy where the small state will see the struggle to maintain freedom as futile. It implies that the small state will be aware of the fact that it is not viable as an independent entity.

2. An active strategy designed to alter the external environment in favour of the small state. This could be accomplished by: a) reducing the discrepancy of strength between the state and the external forces of the immediate environment that matter; b) widening the limits of freedom of political manoeuvre; c) increasing the total resources of the states by external increment. This strategy may have as a target a less powerful neighbouring state, but in a sense can also be directed to the great powers in pursuit of their support.

3. A defensive strategy designed to preserve the status quo., relying on strength through internal increment. The defensive strategy which is considered to be safest is followed when the state lacks the ability to increase its total resources, or alter the external environment in its favour, so it is presumed that the avoidance of conflict is a better option.”³⁶

The best way to avoid conflict is by attracting the opponent to the advantages of developing a common interest. This interest can either concern mutual economic interests or co-operation on international problems with third countries in the same region³⁷.

³⁴ Sveics V.V. *Small Nation Survival: Political Defence in Unequal Conflicts*, Exposition Press, New York, 1969, p. 170.

³⁵ Op. cit., p. 265.

³⁶ Vital op. cit., pp. 121-22, p. 134, p. 143.

³⁷ Op. cit. p. 149.

Chapter 8: Boundaries and their Effect on The Foreign Policy-Making

This thesis is concerned with the foreign policy of Greece towards problems that emerged in the 1990s. After the discussion in chapters 6 and 7 provided a theoretical background on the specific dimensions of the foreign policy making of a small state, a consideration of the effect of boundaries on state relations should follow. Although the problems that emerged in Greece's northern frontier were not territorial disputes as such, the territorial aspect was important in relation to the history and the demographic/ethnic character of the region and some of the issues had the characteristics of territorial disputes. Moreover, boundaries and their adjacent territories, their history and subsequent psychological and political significance, play an important role on the way relations between neighbouring countries are conducted, especially in a region so volatile as the Balkans. Unsurprisingly they have an effect on the Greek foreign policy and a consideration of the theoretical background on them is necessary for the development of the discussion during the forthcoming stage of the explanation.

The Definition of Boundaries and Frontier Regions

Boundaries and their adjacent territories, the frontier regions, have often caused major problems in relations between states. The drawing of boundaries does not always satisfy the interested parties, especially when they have to accept an imposed situation as the result of a military defeat. In that case they wait, until the opportunity arises to claim back what was theirs or to acquire what they previously failed to take.

In other cases the boundary divides among states an otherwise unified ethnic and cultural area. This creates resentment to the inhabitants of that particular area and to their co-nationals on the other side of the border. The inhabitants of the area would like to see

themselves unified with their kith and kin across the border and the state would like to redeem its brothers and sisters and acquire a territory which "historically" belongs to it.

Other problems include the disputes which may arise over the use of a valuable resource in a frontier region; the general economic problems which may create or end a trans-frontier cooperation; the policing of the frontiers etc.

This section will examine mainly the disputes over territory, the significance of territory, the role of irredentism, the choices and arguments that can be used, etc. Its main objective is to see how these situations arise, what is usually done, and why no one can be sure that they will not arise again in the future once a solution has been found.

The terms boundary, frontier, and border are often used in invariable ways to indicate the same thing. There are differences though between the two terms. As Prescott¹ indicates boundary refers to a line, which is the way with which two states are divided in the contemporary world. Frontier refers to a zone, the way with which state authorities were divided prior to the development of the modern nation-state. The border or borderland indicates the strip of land within which the boundary lies.

A frontier region is an area adjacent to a boundary whose population is affected by the proximity to that boundary². This population can build a different identity, based on the difference between the region's peripheral location and its dependence on a state centre³. This identity has distinctive regional characteristics like the feeling of a distinctive history, economic and political position, and can get stronger if the state's boundaries do not coincide with the wishes of the population⁴. The development of the modern nation-state created and increased the difference between centre and periphery because the frontier regions were considered as possible battlefields and industrial development was considered unwise. In addition, the people in these areas were considered to be less loyal

¹ Prescott J.R.V. *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1987, p. 13.

² Anderson Malcolm, "The Political Problems of Frontier Regions", in Malcolm Anderson ed., *Frontier Regions in Western Europe*, West European Politics, Vol. 5, Num. 4, Oct. 1982, p. 1.

³ Tagil Sven, "The Question of Border Regions in Western Europe: An Historical Background" in M. Anderson ed. op. cit., p. 21.

⁴ Ibid.

especially when they had cultural affinities with the other side of the border⁵. Control and propaganda in these areas were, therefore, high and people were encouraged or forced to concentrate their attention to the activities in the national centre⁶.

Frontier and boundary, in political terms, indicate the limits of one's own sovereignty. That is, the boundary defines the outer extent of a state's political authority which can be exercised without any outside interference. In addition, the boundary creates a relatively permanent security agreement between the states and between the inhabitants of the frontier regions; thus, the state can exploit without challenge the human and material resources of its frontier region and utilise any advantages of strategic importance in the area⁷. Any challenge from the other side of the boundary will be met with a strong protest against interference in the state's sovereign rights.

For Prescott there are three situations when boundary negotiations may be launched between two states⁸:

First, two states of comparable strength may enter negotiations in order to solve the dispute, the administrative problems that arise from it and more importantly to avoid a serious conflict.

Second, a stronger state may pursue negotiation with a weaker one in order to acquire through diplomacy sovereignty on territory which is not held.

Third, a weaker state may propose negotiations to a stronger one in order to protect the territory it already has.

The drawing of a boundary between two states involves the following stages⁹: The first stage is the allocation of the boundary which involves the decision to draw a boundary and the initial political division of the territory between the two states. The second, is the delimitation which means the selection of a boundary site and its definition

⁵ Strassoldo Raimondo, "Frontier Regions: Future Collaboration or Conflict?" in M. Anderson op. cit., p. 123.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Prescott, op. cit., p. 24.

⁸ Op. cit., p. 60.

⁹ Op. cit., p. 13. The author refers to S.B. Jones' *Boundary Making, A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors, and Boundary Commissioners*, Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945.

on the treaty and the map. The final stage is the demarcation which is the actual construction of the boundary in the landscape. By the end of that stage the two states are effectively two separate political entities.

Distinctions can be also drawn between various types of boundaries which describe the relationship between the boundary and the landscape on which it was drawn¹⁰: first, there is the antecedent boundary which was drawn before the recent development of the cultural landscape; second, is the pioneer boundary which was drawn through an uninhabited area; third, the subsequent boundary which was drawn after the development of the cultural landscape; the fourth type, the consequent boundary corresponds to some physical or cultural divide; the fifth type which appears quite often is the superimposed or discordant and is drawn without correspondence to the physical or cultural divides; finally, a boundary which is not used any more but has left a landmark in the landscape is called a relict boundary. A similar classification which aims to help the study of boundaries by taking into account the development of the boundaries instead of some form of phenomenological structuring distinguishes only between the antecedent, subsequent, superimposed and relict boundaries¹¹.

Boundary Disputes

Boundary disputes between states may be long or short. They may involve the resurgence of an old feud, or a simple administrative problem. Some of them might become very serious political issues while others may be solved in a relatively easy way.

Any dispute (and the analysis that can be made of it) is developed through the following structure¹²: there is the initial cause of the dispute, the trigger action which

¹⁰ Op. cit. p. 14, the author refers to R. Harsthorne's, 'Suggestions on the Terminology of Political Boundaries', *Annals Association of American Geographers*, 26, pp. 56-7.

¹¹ Tagil, op. cit., p. 19, the author refers to Norman J. G. Pounds, *Political Geography*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963.

¹² J.R.V. Prescott, *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries*, Hutchinson University Library, London, 1965, p. 110.

creates a favourable situation for the claim to be made, the aims of the states involved in the dispute, the arguments that each side uses to support its claims, and the results of the dispute both on the area concerned and the international environment in general.

The nature and aims of the disputes can be used to categorise them into different types of boundary disputes. Prescott refers to four different types of land boundary disputes:

“1. The territorial dispute: It results from a special quality, human, material or strategic, that the frontier region has which makes it attractive to the state which puts forward the claim; its objective is to change the position of the boundary or a part of it.

2. The positional dispute: This type of dispute is concerned with the location of the boundary and results from different interpretations of the delimitation or description of it; it also aims to a change in the position of the boundary.

3. The functional dispute: It concerns differences between two states over the state functions applied on the boundary like the customs control; it can be solved with treaties regulating these function and does not aim to a boundary change.

4. Dispute over resource development: It is concerned with the regulation over the exploitation of a trans-boundary resource and can be solved with the creation of a common organisation which will take care of it.”¹³

A different typology of disputes distinguishes between four basic categories which some times may overlap one another:

“1. There are the disputes where a recognised boundary, delimited or demarcated, does not exist, and the conflict involves traditional or arbitrary claims from either side.

2. The disputes where a de facto frontier exists either delimited in a treaty or map or demarcated on the ground, but the entire legitimacy of the boundary is challenged by one state.

3. The disputes which involve two opposing delimitations deriving from different treaties, and the disputants are trying to find which is the legitimate line.

4. The disputes where a mutually agreed boundary exists but there is disagreement about the demarcation on the ground.”¹⁴

Boundary disputes do not always lead to conflict. In a number of occasions the dispute may be resolved through diplomacy. When the dispute arises the two states have

¹³ Op. cit., p. 109.

¹⁴ Evan Luard, 'Frontier Disputes in Modern International Relations' in Evan Luard ed., *The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1970, pp. 14-5.

the choice to follow either a bilateral or a unilateral course of action in order to solve it. If they decide to follow a bilateral course they face the following options:

“First, they may begin preliminary meetings between their delegations to estimate the difficulties that arise from the situation; then, the various responsible governmental departments will gather information and help the decision-makers to devise a number of options; and finally they will start formal negotiations which may lead to a successful outcome and the selection of a boundary which will be eventually demarcated.

But since most boundary disputes are not solved in such a smooth way, the interested parties might consider the next options.

The second option of the bilateral course of action is to draw a provisional line which will temporarily solve any administrative problems while at the same time the negotiations will continue.

Third, the two states might declare the disputed area a neutral zone and develop a system of common administration over it.

Fourth, the two parties may decide to solve the dispute through international arbitration by employing an individual or an international institution.”¹⁵

If on the other hand, the parties decide to pursue their interest through unilateral action then they have to consider two basic options:

“First, they may adopt a passive attitude to the dispute and refuse to protect their citizens in the disputed area or interfere with the activities of the citizens or the officials of the other state in the same area.

Second, they may decide to adopt a defensive attitude by defending their citizens, denying to any foreigners any rights on the area and pursue its claim on the disputed zone.”¹⁶

According to the attitude that the disputing states may adopt Prescott detects four possible outcomes:

“First, both states may adopt a passive attitude which effectively leaves the problem unresolved.

Second, one state may remain passive while the other defensive which means that a de facto boundary will develop in favour of the defensive one.

Third, both states may adopt a defensive attitude thus leading the dispute to a conflict; the result can be either that no one will be victorious and the problem will

¹⁵ Prescott, 1987, op. cit., p. 60-2.

¹⁶ Op. cit., p. 62.

remain unresolved, or, fourth, one state will be victorious and impose the new boundary to the other.”¹⁷

Territorial Disputes

This section is mainly concerned with the territorial disputes and a more detailed look on them will be given in the following paragraphs.

Territorial disputes can have a number of different characteristics and may affect the relations between two states in various ways. They do not necessarily lead the states on the brink of conflict. Two states may be engaged in a dispute for a very long time but without facing each other in battle. In fact, a much larger number of frontier disputes usually lead to a war of words rather than military conflict¹⁸. Disputes may last for a long time with the two sides repeating their claims loudly and at any possible time or they may be allowed to stay dormant and re-employed when it is necessary¹⁹. So, a dispute may cause a number of serious problems affecting the good relations of the two states but on the other hand it may not prevent them from cooperating in other aspects.

In other occasions, of course, disputes may cause serious problems between two states. The gravity of the situation depends mainly on the manner with which one state will put forward its claim when initiating the dispute or transferring it to a new phase and on the response from the other side. It also depends on how far the states are prepared to pursue their claim.

A key aspect in the gravity of the situation is the psychological significance of the territory in the minds of the nation and the government of the state that makes the claim. Territorial disputes can become very dangerous when the territory in question has a high psychological value which might not have any relation to its intrinsic values, whether

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Luard, *op. cit.*, p. 10

¹⁹ Ibid.

human, economic or strategic, but is able to arouse national sentiments rapidly and more intensely than any other issue²⁰.

Entering a Dispute: Reasons and Nature of Disputes

Generally a state must feel quite strong to put forward a claim. This is a common phenomenon in disputes since a state rarely chooses to negotiate from a weak position²¹. Some times it requires a significant political change either in the government of a state or in the regional political context, to persuade a state that it is sufficiently strong to pursue a claim and this may affect frontier regions that have not caused problems for a significant period of time²². The press, and nationalist parties or patriotic organisations can instigate public nationalist sentiment by indicating that the right moment to put forward a claim has come²³. A government may also use a dispute for other reasons: to divert the attention of the public from issues of the domestic political arena²⁴, or to exploit national sentiments in order to arouse the public opinion to its own favour²⁵.

The nature of the boundary and territorial disputes can be different from time to time. For example, until the end of the Second World War states engaged in conflict in order to acquire large parts of territory or even conquest another country. After the war, the nature of the disputes has changed. Now, states are mainly concerned with adjustments of the boundaries which represent a change of attitude: states want to consolidate their position rather than expand to new territories, and they want to define the map instead of changing it²⁶.

²⁰ Op. cit., p. 7.

²¹ Prescott, 1965, op. cit., pp. 113-5.

²² Ibid.

²³ Luard, op. cit., p. 13.

²⁴ Prescott, op. cit., pp. 115.

²⁵ Luard, op. cit., p. 13.

²⁶ Op. cit., pp. 9-10.

However, after the war the number of disputes has not been decreased. The changing nature of the disputes comes together with a number of new reasons which provide the ground for their development. Luard, refers to three main reasons for the post-war development of territorial disputes²⁷:

The first, is the end of the colonialist era. Colonialism has suppressed existing claims which emerge again when the colonialist power is removed and a new independent sovereignty replaces it. A similar pattern though, was experienced in Europe in the beginning of the century with the majority of the newly independent states facing boundary disputes²⁸. So, it can be deducted that changes in the territorial and political status quo resulting in the creation of new states would inevitably lead to some form of territorial disputes. And that because, as it was mentioned above, situations like these create new opportunities for asserting old or new claims since it is easier to act quickly when things are still fresh, the new political entity has not consolidated its presence in the international system, and a new status quo has not yet been established.

The second, is the growth of public administration, which now reaches the remotest places of a country and requires a better definition of the boundaries.

The third, is the growth in the number of opportunities for asserting territorial claims. The wide participation in international organisations provide ideal opportunities for putting forward claims, waging verbal wars, and using political arguments to gain sympathy for one's own cause.

Types and Nature of Arguments

In a dispute each state supports its claims with a number of arguments which frequently have a dubious validity and uncertain impact. There are different types of arguments like

²⁷ Op. cit., pp. 11-3.

²⁸ John Coakley, 'National Territories and Cultural Frontiers: Conflicts of Principle in the Formation of States in Europe', in M. Anderson ed., p. 34.

the legal, historic, geographic, strategic, economic and ethnic²⁹. In most cases, the different types are used in interchangeable ways but in connection and in support of one another.

The legal arguments are frequently employed, and each state engaged in a dispute wishes to support its case from a strong legal position. The employment of legal arguments seems to have a double aim: first, to win international support for the state's claims by using the principles of the international law to justify its position³⁰. The international community usually dislikes any other type of arguments, like the geographic or ethnic, which are viewed as expansionist and chauvinistic. But claims which are based on international legal principles have a different validity since the claimant state appears as trying to get what rightfully belongs to it by international standards.

The second aim is to build a case which might be successful if the dispute is to be resolved through arbitration or through the international judicial institutions. Legal arguments are usually based on the fact of the occupation or conquest of territory, and on the principles of contiguity, territorial propinquity, and prescription³¹. The faults of the legal arguments are that they may be based on a false interpretation of the international law, or that they usually produce nothing more than a pyrrhic victory since even if an international court decides in favour of the one state, the other can ignore the decision.

Historical arguments are usually based on the perception that the disputed territory is historically linked with one state and was wrongfully appropriated by another. Their employment aims in gaining international support for the state's claims, since other types of arguments can rarely work towards that direction, and in promoting internal cohesion and state loyalties³². But historical arguments usually refer to a remote period in history when a king or an emperor exercised authority on the disputed area, even for a brief time, and usually confuse rather than clarify the minds of people (even though

²⁹ Prescott, 1965, op. cit., pp. 118-21.

³⁰ Alexander B. Murphy, 'Territorial Ideology and International Conflict: The Legacy of Prior Political Formations', in Nurit Kliot and Stanley Waterman ed.: *The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace*, Belhaven Press, London, 1991, p. 132.

³¹ Prescott, 1987, op. cit., pp. 103-6, and Luard, op. cit., p. 18.

³² Murphy, op. cit., p. 138.

confusion may be a deliberate objective). In addition, they refer to a period when the vanished kingdom or empire was at its greatest splendour, therefore at its greatest territorial extent; this means that historical arguments between neighbouring states would inevitable overlap one another³³, or claim a significant part of another state's territory leaving much room for provocation.

Geographical arguments usually refer to a "natural boundary", which is normally either a river or a mountain range. The notion of the "natural boundary" can only be justified in security or strategic terms, because it refers to a zone which the state believes can provide a basis for effective defence against an external attack or for a successful attack on its neighbours. In fact, behind the notion of the "natural boundary" is hidden the desire of a state to expand up to a certain limit, since there is no state which wishes to withdraw to a "natural boundary"³⁴.

Ethnic arguments refer to the unity of the inhabitants of the disputed area with the people of the nation that makes the claim. They are based on a number of human qualities which prove that unity like language, race, religion, culture and history. They may be effective in attracting international sympathies, especially when the people on the other side, usually a territorial minority, are oppressed. They can be even more successful if an appeal is made to the principle of self-determination, which is an internationally accepted principle, by way of a referendum or other means.

There are a number of faults of the ethnic arguments and some of them are the following: first, there is an inherent problem in the belief that political and ethnic boundaries should coincide. On the one hand, it is based on the assumption that a person's political aspirations may be inferred from his ethnicity/nationality which usually corresponds to some linguistic or religious criteria; but language and religion may be used to distinguish communities for administrative purposes but can be controversial and invalid for territorial adjustments and boundary making³⁵. On the other, the drawing of boundaries according to separate cultural and political groups raises a number of

³³ Coakley, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

³⁴ Prescott, 1987, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

questions of method in general³⁶. And in almost any case boundary drawings of this kind usually leave the interested parties with resentment rather than satisfaction and they leave room for new disputes based on ethnic arguments in the future.

Second, the exact size of a minority often cannot be established, especially if it is not recorded in the official census of the other state; it can only be estimated which usually leaves much room for exaggeration. Third, the claim can be effective only when the minority is the majority in the disputed area and wishes to unite with the claimant state, and hence the principle of self-determination can be employed. In addition, the minority can be inter-mixed with the nationals of the other state, therefore, reducing its number and its desire to unite with the claimant state. Finally, since rarely a boundary is perfect, that is to divide two distinctively separate cultural communities, one can expect similar arguments from the other side which will further complicate the dispute.

Luard, referring to a problem of the principle of the self-determination³⁷, points out that after the First World War the principle was employed in order to create boundaries which would roughly correspond to existing cultural divisions, although this was not always successful. But after the Second World War the principle became a synonym for independence, and sovereignties were given within existing boundaries without regarding cultural divisions. Hence, grounds for future frontier disputes were created.

The main question that can be asked about the arguments is why a state is always keen to develop them and use them in a dispute. It can rarely expect that the other side will be convinced by hearing them, if it hears them at all. The only expectation that the claimant state may have is that it can convince others, which means that a third party is always expected to intervene in the dispute. If that party is an international arbitrator it can only pay attention to the most sound arguments which means that the majority of the arguments will be discarded.

³⁵ Coakley, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Luard, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

If the the third party is a state invited to use its influence and power politically or otherwise in favour of the claimant, then a paradox arises: States rarely give their support out of political conviction for the just cause of another. In most cases they expect some reward for their involvement, political, strategic, economic, etc. This means that if the claimant state is prepared to give this reward, a third power could intervene without being convinced by the arguments. In this case the will to intervene is not based on an evaluation of the arguments.

So which are the reasons for the development of the arguments? It is suggested here, that the reasons are two: the first, has to do with the claimant state which uses the arguments to justify its political and possibly military mobilisation to its population and to the international community. The second is that the third power uses the arguments of the claimant state to justify its involvement to its population and the international community. According to the number of allies and the common interests with other powers that both states have it can be expected that the arguments will reach, and possibly convince, wider audiences. Things may even become easier, when an international organisation can be persuaded, either by the arguments or more significantly by the third power, that one of the claimants is right and provide the legal and political justification for an outside intervention.

Intervention does not imply military involvement. As it was mentioned above disputes do not necessarily lead to conflict. Someone can intervene by mediating, arbitrating or moving behind the scenes in favour of one or another. It can also be employed during all the stages of a dispute, and in the different procedures which are available for its resolution.

Resolving Disputes

The latter play another significant part in every dispute. They can be employed separately or in connection, simultaneously or one following the other. Of course, their employment

can be effective or not, and can help to resolve the dispute or make it worse. The choice of one or the other depends on the gravity of the situation and the political will of the different parties. There are seven procedures which can be used in order to resolve territorial disputes. These are the following³⁸:

“1. War: The employment of this procedure usually aims to a quick and favourable outcome which normally is a fast and total victory. The choice of it will depend on a number of factors like the psychological, political, economic, strategic and other values of the territory, on considerations over military strength and capability, on considerations over the availability of a peaceful settlement, and on the age and history of the frontier and the degree of dispute over it.

2. Bilateral negotiations: At some point of almost every dispute settlement through bilateral negotiations is attempted. Sometimes they can be the first step before any other procedure is taken.

3. Good Offices: It refers to a third party which acts as a go-between in order to bring together in discussion the two contestants without trying to suggest a solution to the dispute.

4. Mediation: Both parties agree that a third should be asked to assist the resolution of the dispute but its fault is that it does not involve commitments from either sides that they will accept the results of the mediating procedure.

5. Arbitration: In this case the dispute is submitted to a body of arbitrators who will reach a decision according to the principles of the international law. However, the choice of the arbitrators can be controlled by the interested parties, and the decision can be rejected.

6. Judicial settlement: This involves an agreement by both parties to submit the case to an international judicial body. The result of this procedure can also be rejected by the interested parties.

7. International organisation: This procedure involves the intervention of an international or a regional organisation, like the UN or the EC to solve the dispute. The United Nations usually act either by setting up a mediating committee which tries to devise a plan to solve the dispute through negotiation and agreement; or by dispatching a mission to try to prevent any aggressive behaviour but without a mandate to solve the dispute³⁹. They have not been, however, very successful in solving disputes⁴⁰. On the other hand, regional organisations if and when they get involved in a frontier dispute they tend to operate only with regard to new or small states⁴¹. This means that regional organisations rarely want to change the status quo, or harm the interests of an old or large state.”

³⁸ Op. cit., pp. 22-8.

³⁹ Alan James, 'The United Nations and Frontier Disputes', in Evan Luard, ed., pp. 86-7

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Peter Lyon, 'Regional Organisations and Frontier Disputes', in Evan Luard, ed., p. 113.

Another, indirect, way to overcome a dispute is to leave it unresolved but establish a number of ties with the other side which will eventually let the dispute to rest without causing major problems. This can be done by establishing some kind of trans-frontier co-operation between the two states. There is, of course, the possibility that problems will re-emerge in the future, especially when disagreements appear over the exploitation of a resource near the border, or when one of the two states considers that the opportunity has come to reinstate its claims.

Co-operation is easier to be established if the two states participate in the same regional organisation. Regional organisations, on the one hand, are founded on the existing territorial status quo, therefore legitimating it, and on the other, they promote trans-boundary contact and co-operation, therefore reducing the frontiers' significance and political explosion⁴². In post-war Western Europe, for example, though the war did not solve the problems of frontiers, the development of trans-national regionalism, through NATO and the EEC, and the growing political and economic integration has reduced to a considerable extent the sources of potential territorial disputes⁴³. Regionalism, however, is not a panacea, and while there are a number of factors for the success of the movement of trans-frontier co-operation there are a number of others which might lead to its demise⁴⁴.

People do not surrender easily their national identity, nor the image of their country on the map, and how this used to be before the addition or the abstraction of certain territories. Frontier territories and their population play an important part in the shaping up of a nation's image and potentially in the state's policies.

⁴² Op. cit., p. 111.

⁴³ Tagil, op. cit., p. 29.

⁴⁴ For a presentation of these factors see Strassoldo, op. cit., pp. 124-34.

The Significance of Territory and the Phenomenon of Irredentism

It was mentioned above that in a dispute the gravity of the situation will depend on the psychological value of the territory in question. This value is analogous to the idea that the people of a country have about the territory and its inhabitants, which might have little relation to historical truth, or economic and strategic values. In that respect, frontiers, as markers of territory can become markers of identity as part of myths and beliefs about the unity of the people and the territory⁴⁵. The main point is that the territory forms an important component of the national identity, especially if it is "lost" to another state. Its psychological value is reflected in the national identity with a feeling of injustice for the loss of the territory, and a feeling of expectation for gaining it back.

The significance of territory in shaping up the national identity (as well as local identities) is considerable, even if there are no further areas to claim. This is succeeded through territorial socialisation, a process which emphasises the geographic aspect of political socialisation⁴⁶. Through a number of political and social institutions and their functions people become forever rationally and emotionally attached to a given territory distinctively separate from the rest of the world⁴⁷. In fact, territory is the base of a nation's existence and for that reason it is inextricably linked with modern nationalism.

Nationalism promotes the idea of the existence of a nation as a separate political entity, with its *own* laws, and the welfare of the people which requires the *exclusive* exploitation of material resources⁴⁸. The accomplishment of the two objectives requires the establishment of territorial sovereignty which implies the right to exclude others

⁴⁵ Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers, Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1996, p. 2.

⁴⁶ Ivo D. Duchacek, *The Territorial Dimensions of Politics, Within, Among, and Across Nations*, Westview Press/Boulder and London, 1986, pp. 16-7.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Jean Gottmann, *The Significance of Territory*, The University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1973, p. 95.

interfering with the nation's development⁴⁹. In the end, territory functions as a shelter for national security and a ground for broader opportunities⁵⁰.

Security reinforces the feeling of exclusiveness, according to which the nation can develop itself without alien control or interference. But in fact, security implies the existence of threats, mainly territorial ones. Without threats a nation would not have to feel secure, it would not even feel the need to exclude others. It would choose a different form of political existence not based on territorial sovereignty. Threats, however real or false, reinforce the national identity and increase the territorial awareness, to the point that the significance of any other internal concerns is reduced⁵¹. The nation is unified in expressing one basic interest which is its survival.

Political authorities are aware of that fact and promote the nation's territorial awareness by pointing to the existence of threats in order to justify their policies. The growth and budget of the military, for example could not be justified without the existence of potential or actual enemies⁵². In fact, often the maintenance of a state depends very much on the image of its enemies⁵³. This image is inherent in the broader national image that a nation has for itself, and is depicted through a perverted concept of history in terms of wars against "the enemy", designed to preserve the feeling of insecurity and to create uncomplaining conscripts willing to kill and die for the nation⁵⁴.

Territorial awareness is promoted also by another aspect of the national image which is the notion of the *critical boundary*⁵⁵. The critical boundary does not necessarily coincide with a state's international legal boundary; it may be the same as the legal boundary but it can also lie either inside it or outside it. The critical boundary emphasises the psychological and territorial limit of a nation-state's feeling of security. Its violation

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Op. cit., p. 14

⁵¹ Duchacek, op. cit., pp. 24-5.

⁵² Kenneth E. Boulding, 'The Nature and Causes of National and Military Self-Images in Relation to War and Peace', in Kliot and Waterman ed., op. cit., p. 145.

⁵³ Op. cit., p. 147.

⁵⁴ Op. cit., p. 145

will bring a feeling of insecurity and the re-emergence of external threats. So, its significance lies in the fact that if any events develop within it that the state does not appreciate, like the penetration of an alien organisation or an unfavourable political change, then it will react appropriately. This reaction may be aggressive for the outsiders but for the state it will only be defence of its critical boundary and its future territorial integrity. The concept of the critical boundary can be extended to include a series of boundaries with varying degrees of importance whose violation causes different reactions. The critical boundary, for example may be a vague sphere of influence whose violation will cause a small diplomatic protest but it can be the state's international boundary which can not be violated without war.

As a ground for opportunities territory can serve for putting forward claims (if co-operation is excluded). When these claims lead to the development of territorial disputes a nationalist ideology may be developed within the state that makes the claim, which serves as the justification and motivating power of the claim. This ideology is called irredentism.

There are different approaches and explanations of irredentism. One, in the sense described above, sees irredentism as a situation in which a certain ethnic group is the majority in the state making the claims and a minority in the other and wishes to incorporate its co-nationals and the territory they occupy in the parent state⁵⁶. Another approach sees irredentism as a situation in which an ethnic group is the a minority in two or more countries and seeks union with one of the countries or calls for independent statehood⁵⁷.

Different approaches also see irredentism as territorially oriented, a modern outcome of nationalism according to which cultural, political, and ethnic boundaries

⁵⁵ Kenneth E. Boulding, *Conflict and Defence: A General Theory*, Harper Torchbooks, The University Library, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1962-3, pp. 265-6. This paragraph presents the analysis of the critical boundary according to Boulding.

⁵⁶ Naomi Chazan, 'Approaches to the Study of Irredentism', introduction in Naomi Chazan ed., *Irredentism and International Politics*, Adamantine Press Ltd., London, 1991, p. 2.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

should coincide⁵⁸. Or as aiming towards the liberation of a regional population. In this paper both approaches, two different historic models, will be presented.

A territorial approach is one chosen by John Coakley⁵⁹. His approach of irredentism is based on the situation in Northern Ireland and, therefore, he names his model the "Ulster Syndrome". He believes that Ulster is a good example because although it has similarities with other international problems like the conflict in Cyprus, it has some distinctive characteristics. The basic one is that Ulster has been governed de jure and de facto by the United Kingdom while forming part of the constitutional national territory of the Republic of Ireland. The territoriality of the Irish irredentist claims lies in the fact that they claim a *territory* in the name of an ethnic group, even though this group is the minority in the particular area. The backbone of these claims are a number of historical arguments which try to show the historic unity of the two territories (the Republic and Ulster) prior to its ethnic-demographic change (in Ulster's case the influx of the Protestant immigrants from Britain in the seventeenth century). This situation in which historical criteria that ignore ethnic reality are applied in the articulation of a territorial demand, is called the "Ulster Syndrome".

The political significance of the "Ulster Syndrome" can be appreciated when one considers the experience of the newly independent states in Europe in the first decades of this century and the criteria that were employed by the nationalist leaderships in order to incorporate territory to their states:

“1. The ethnic criterion is dominant: This is the case of the nations with "less history", where community of language and culture rather than tradition, and former statehood were the motivating force of the nationalist movement.

2. The historic criterion is dominant: Old, historic, frontiers are appealed even if they enclose minorities ethnically distinct from the ethnic group that makes the claim.

3. Both criteria are applied: This happens when the emerging state acquires its territory at the expense of two or more neighbours.

4. Neither criterion is applied: To the extent that historic or ethnic claims are carried into effect they may disadvantage the emerging states; or they can be ignored.”⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Hedva-Ben Israel, 'Irredentism: Nationalism Reexamined', in Chazan, op. cit., p. 32

⁵⁹ Coakley, op. cit., pp. 43-7.

⁶⁰ Op. cit., p. 44.

As a result variants of the "Ulster Syndrome" may appear in all but the first of the above conditions. This will lead to disorder in which Coakley sees two possible solutions⁶¹: One is that the occasional "Ulster" will remain part of the new state, therefore, an internal settlement must be sought, based either on cultural autonomy and political accommodation or on expulsion; the other is to exclude "Ulster" from the new state in which case it becomes the subject of irredentist claims. New problems are generated again, though, since in either case the acceptance of a historic criterion in the case of one ethnic group might deny the ethnic rights of the other.

The other model is developed by Myron Weiner and views irredentism as an articulation of claims aiming at the "liberation" and the incorporation to the state that makes the claim of a minority population across the frontier. This model is called the "Macedonian Syndrome"⁶². Weiner believes that the Balkans form an appropriate case to build a model of international irredentist conflict for two reasons: first, because during the conflicts of the early twentieth century each Balkan state contained minorities within its boundaries and had "kinsmen" living across the frontier; and second, because every Balkan state was engaged in a dispute with its neighbours over their boundaries which divided some ethnic group⁶³.

This model is called a syndrome, because it suggests that both irredentist and anti-irredentist states have a common pattern of behaviour, a characteristic set of relations between the two and between them and other states; and because the various characteristics are generally found together, are causally interrelated and have a common origin⁶⁴. The aim of the model is to show, through the presentation of the common characteristics, that in a dispute the actions of the one actor affect the actions of the other; that external actions affect and are affected by internal political developments; and

⁶¹ Op. cit., p. 45.

⁶² Myron Weiner, 'The Macedonian Syndrome, An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development', in *World Politics*, Vol. 23, 1970-1, No. 4, pp. 665-83.

⁶³ Op. cit., p. 667.

⁶⁴ Op. cit., p. 670.

that the actors can follow an irrational and self-destructive behaviour⁶⁵. For Weiner there are sixteen such characteristics and these are the following:

“1. The irredentist state which presses for a revision of the boundary will attempt to form alliances against the anti-irredentist state, normally with neighbouring states of the "enemy" which also want revision of the boundary, or other anti-status quo powers, with respect to the regional balance of power.

2. The anti-irredentist state, that contains the ethnic minority, will respond by attempting to form defensive alliances, with neighbours of the irredentist state and other powers which wish to preserve the status quo.

3. Neighbouring states and other larger powers will eventually be drawn into the dispute, either as informal allies which simply endorse the claims of one or the other, or as formal allies, or as simple friends by establishing trade, and provide assistance.

4. As the irredentist state expresses its concern for the status of the minority, hopes for incorporation to the irredentist state, or achievement of independent statehood, increase within the minority; therefore, any efforts towards assimilation of the minority into the anti-irredentist state are met with hostile resistance.

5. There are three possible responses of the minority in the dispute: first, it may call for an improved status within the country in which it is a minority, viewing itself as a bridge for better relations between the two countries; second, it may call for union with the irredentist state; third, if it is a minority in both countries it may call for an independent statehood of its own.

6. Increasingly, the anti-irredentist state becomes suspicious of its ethnic minority and its loyalty towards the state. As a result it introduces stricter assimilating programmes and demands expressions of loyalty, and increases the police controls in the communities of the minority and military patrols along the frontier.

7. The irredentist state is easily aroused and reacts accordingly to any efforts of assimilation of the minority by the authorities of the other side.

8. In the process of time the irredentist state becomes so increasingly obsessed with the question of boundary revision that this issue overshadows any other internal developments in importance.

9. When the issue has overshadowed all other internal concerns, the domestic political structure develops in such a way as to favour those who advocate order and unity at home and militancy abroad.

10. The internal political culture changes as well. The people and the leaders express the desire to "redeem" the minority, national loyalties become paramount, there is a growing hostility to the countries that do not support the "just" demands of the nation, and finally discourse becomes fueled with emotion so that rational discussion of alternative courses of action becomes impossible.

11. As emotional rhetoric grows, there is a chance that the irredentist state will take chances in international affairs, without careful calculations as to the probability of success.

⁶⁵ Op. cit., p. 683.

12. If the irredentist state fails to meet the expectations of the minority there is a possibility that the latter will take an aggressive stance against its own prospective "redeemers".

13. The effects of the irredentist claims within the internal political structure of the anti-irredentist will depend on the magnitude of the threat from the revisionist state and on the degree of ethnic homogeneity in the anti-irredentist one.

14. Among all the actors in the dispute there will be a great concern, almost an obsession, with the past and the historical "truth" as each seeks to define its identity and justify its cause.

15. Among the actors every political leader who advocates a position contrary to the majority or the prevailing view will be considered disloyal.

16. There are several ways for terminating the dispute which involve, the use of violence or coercion, or the threat of their use. These are war, expulsion of the minority, or outside interference and settlement."⁶⁶

The symptoms described above although they are based on a study of the Balkan politics in the early twentieth century they can bring to mind many of the events that were presented in part two. This means that the validity of this model is timeless. If the author replaces the word "irredentism" with other appropriate words the characteristics (symptoms) of the new Macedonian issue (syndrome) will emerge:

1. The FYROM tried to draw to its side Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania, the Great Powers and the EEC.
2. Greece tried to draw to its side Serbia, the Great Powers and the EEC.
3. Balkan states and international organisations were eventually drawn into the dispute.
4. Resistance and protest by elements of the Slav-Macedonians in Greece appeared for the first time after the war.
5. These elements assumed various positions concerning their status.
6. Greek patrols along the border increased, persecutions were reported.
7. Accusations against Greece's mistreatment of the Slav-Macedonian element re-appeared.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

8. Greece became pre-occupied with some vague future boundary revision that the name Macedonia would imply and this impeded any development.
9. The domestic political system became pre-occupied with the issue and politicians who advocated militancy became popular.
10. Politicians from the FYROM used irredentist language, the Greek public became increasingly hostile to foreign personalities that did not support Greece, the President of the Greek Republic addressed the public in tears; emotions suppressed rational thought.
11. The FYROM adopted Greek symbols as its national emblems.
12. Some Slav-Macedonian sought alignment with Greek left-wingers.
13. The domestic political system at some point was homogenous in its support of the Greek government's policy.
14. The Greek government and the public became obsessed with the historical truth.
15. Greek left-wing politicians were booed by crowds and members of left-wing organisations were convicted for "spreading false information".
16. The disputing parties were forced to accept outside interference under the auspices of the United Nations in search for a settlement.

Some of these characteristics were present in the other issues that the Greek government faced. The relations between Greece and Albania or Turkey over the minorities in the respective territories have similarities with the characteristics of the above model. But the use of this model is limited. Frontier problems are not only disputes. The influx of thousands of illegal immigrants can be one, or the trafficking of drugs another. Cross-frontier co-operation may cause problems. The presence of minorities, or of lost territories does not necessarily mean that neighbouring states would not establish some kind of friendly ties.

The use of this model involves strictly the definition and prediction of likely patterns of behaviour when an issue similar to the Macedonian emerges. That pre-

supposes the involvement of states whose characteristics are similar to the Balkan states. But it does not explain why these states may follow this pattern of behaviour. In order to understand why a Balkan state, like Greece, followed this kind of international behaviour one should take under consideration its size, history, identity and political system. A consideration of the aspects presented in all chapters of part three should be taken.

Conclusion: Some Questions about Greece, a Small State in the Balkan Power Politics

The discussion in the chapters of part three has revealed a large number of parameters that can be significant in the process of understanding the Greek foreign policy towards the new frontier problems as they began to emerge after the collapse of Communism in the Balkans. The possibilities of international relations theory can only fascinate the student. However, for practical reasons a selection of approaches has to be made in order to achieve *an* understanding of Greek foreign policy.

This use of international relations' theory is here confined at considering a set of assumptions which can explain the foreign policy of Greece. To use a variety of the theoretical aspects in explaining every single event would certainly lead to self-evident assertions. Instead, the proper use of the theory is to help thinking about sets of assumptions that can determine the appropriate kind of explanation and then test the available data and literature on them. The dimensions of foreign policy understanding that the theory of international relations has provided in the chapters of Part C, and which can be proved to be helpful during the explanation process, as this was described above, have led the author to the following questions:

The Environment

How did developments in the Balkan environment affect the way Greek foreign policy was made? The collapse of Communism gave rise to opportunities for enhancing the Greek position in the power politics of the Balkans: the superior economic development, the stability of its political system, the membership in the EC/EU and NATO were conceived as a good card that Greece could play to its advantage. On the other hand, this changing environment raised fears which had been dormant for a long time. This would

certainly cause confusion to the way the Greek policy-makers viewed the environment: was it a land of opportunity or a powder-keg ready to explode? How far were they prepared to go in their (real or imagined) competition with Turkey for power in the Balkans? Were the EC partners friends or foes? It became clear that a part of their perceived image of the environment was false and subsequently a large part of their policy failed. The set of rules in the operational environment was quite different from their subjective interpretation of it. Was their perception blurred by the effect of the national image and values that they bore with them? Did they believe that Greece had a historic role to play in this changing times -a belief derived from Greece's geographical position, historic significance, and even "cultural superiority"? Did they think that Greece ought to be favoured by its European partners as a payment for their ancestors' contribution to Western civilisation, and Greek policy should be supported by them? Or is their belief that they were in a weak position struggling to gain some of the prestige and admiration possessed by their ancestors? Why were the Greek public and the country's political system, in the domestic environment, so preoccupied with matters of identity and foreign policy issues? Internal political strife, the rise of nationalism, the interaction between Greek domestic politics and foreign policy which is exploited by sensationalist media and a minority of super-patriots¹, not only hindered any rational thought about them, but in the end became a factor for the failure of Greek policy. Could it be suggested that the nationalist feelings of the Greek population were manipulated by the political leaderships in order to divert the attention of the public from a political and economic reality in crisis²? The failure of the Greek foreign policy and the damage to the country's prestige were too high a price to pay and any slightly sensible political leader would not follow such a policy especially in a time of international crisis in the region.

¹ Loukas Tsoukalis, "Is Greece a Backward Partner?" in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis ed. *Greece in a Changing Europe: Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 1996, p. 28.

² Anna Triantafyllidou, "Nationalism and the Threatening Other: The Case of Greece", in *The ASEN Bulletin*, no 13, Summer 1997, p. 19.

The Information

In a system so much preoccupied with the foreign policy issues the information about the international environment can be easily misinterpreted. First, the media very quickly can get hold of it either by their efficient network of reporters and informers, thus producing a public interpretation of it, instigating as a result responses that the policy-makers have to take into account to secure their continuation in office. Second, the political strife within the government can result in leaking distorted information which complicates the job of the policy-makers even more. Third, the preoccupation of the policy-makers with their identity, and with historical truth results in disregarding items of information that they should take under more serious consideration. This means further distortion and further poor choice of policy options.

The National Interest, Image and Values

The national myth that embraces the public and the policy-makers does not leave any room for questioning the contents of this part of the *general will* which is the national interest. Although it cannot be defined, in cases like the one studied the official interpretation of it cannot be questioned. All the actors involved in the definition of the international interest made clear their perception of it in various ways: political parties rallied behind the government's policy; interest group of different kinds became involved in the foreign policy issues with publications, events etc.; the public held demonstrations, the legislators discussed these subjects almost everyday; the government was trapped into pursuing it with out compromise and at any cost - in fact, the government paid the price with its downfall. The national myth of millions of people who today are called *Hellenes* is the history of survival through thousands of years: epic wars, building of empires, resistance to occupiers, splendour of civilisation are all elements of the history of the ethnic ancestors of modern Greeks. Some people argue that the Greek national identity is

the result of a misconceived malaise which has comprised two diametrically opposite traditions in a single national psyche: the ecumenism of the Ancient philosophy as this was adopted by the modern world and the ecumenical message of the Orthodox church against the nationalism that accompanied the Greek nation-building and which has fueled the national psyche with the belief that the Greeks are a constantly beleaguered nation³. The reality though is that, in these elements of national myth as the resistance, the epics, the splendour, the culture, Greeks recognise their superiority which has helped them survive. In the minds of the Greeks the nation has assumed social primacy even if that means supremacy over notions of individual rights⁴. Although the last time they were involved in a conflict they lost (Cyprus) and despite the fact that only a small proportion of them has actually read Aristotle, Plato and the rest of their cultural heroes, they believe that their historic, heroic and cultural significance must be preserved in modern times even if that means the adoption of a policy which would alienate allies and partners. Some Greeks explained this alienation as a confirmation of the Europeans' profound ignorance of the history and the realities of the region⁵.

An additional aspect of the Greek popular image is that the country is constantly under threat surrounded by potential and real enemies⁶. This fear has given rise to what some observers have called the syndrome of the underdog culture which contains the notion that Greece is despised by the West because of its glorious historical tradition and wishes to humiliate it by treating it as an inferior entity⁷.

³ Thanos Veremis, "A Greek View of Balkan Developments" in Featherstone and Ifantis, and by the same author, "Priorities for Athens - A Greek View" in *World Today*, Apr. 1994, Vol. 50, No. 4.

⁴ Kevin Featherstone, "Introduction" in Featherstone and Ifantis ed, op. cit. p. 14.

⁵ Tsoukalis op. cit., p. 28.

⁶ Tsoukalis op. cit., p. 26.

⁷ P.C. Ioakimidis, "Contradictions Between Policy and Performance" in Featherstone and Ifantis ed., and N. Diamantouros, "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91; an Interpretation" in Richard Clogg ed., *Greece 1981-89, The Populist Decade*, London, St. Martin's Press, 1993.

The Policy-Making Process

The implementation of a policy which did not have much support at the international level was a burden the Greek government failed to overcome. Although some of the assets of the country were correctly calculated their use did not produce the desirable outcome. As the policies started to rebound the policy-makers had to readjust their policy without backing down from their initial principles. But the conflict between the national interest and the environment ended in the policy-makers' downfall. Despite the inferior attributes of at least two of Greece's adversaries (Albania and the FYROM) and the consideration of many alternatives the foreign policy of Greece was deficient and could not overcome functional difficulties, either bureaucratic or political. Indeed, the rise of nationalism and the populist pressures that followed made very difficult to the Greek diplomatic service and the foreign ministry to resist them⁸. In addition the scarcity and inadequacy of well-trained civil servants, whose appointment is usually the result of political patronage, did not help the image and interests of Greece within the EU⁹ and played their part in the country's isolation within the European framework.

Weakness Versus Potential

The paradox of a state conscious of its weakness trying to behave as a powerful actor could be played in all seriousness and absurdity by a European-Balkan state. The country's participation in Western institutions, its regional economic and military superiority and its cultural significance were some of the qualities that Greece tried to exploit in order to promote its position in the Balkans and its prestige internationally. Weaker states were thought to be easy opponents, eager to accept the Greek government's demands in exchange for Greece's contribution to their survival and

⁸ James Pettifer, "Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy", in Featherstone and Ifantis ed., p. 21.

development. Fear of Turkey and of the EC's wrath only hindered Greece from taking more strong measures. The only hope was the sympathy of Greece's friends in Europe but in the end they lost patience with the Greek government's irresponsible stance as it often happens with small states which enter any sort of international alliance. Although the public was willing to take risks and make sacrifices, Greece's only chosen ally, Serbia, was too much preoccupied with its own conflicts to be of any help. In the end, either a number of opportunities in the regional level disappeared or progress was made in slow pace.

The Significance of the Boundary

Suddenly all the minority issues became every day talk in the Greek cafes and taxis. Reports on the mistreatment of Greeks in Albania. Muslims in Thrace who struggle to be identified as ethnic Turks. Is there a Slav-Macedonian minority in Greece? It was suddenly revealed that the homogeneity of the Greek population could be the result of policies which aimed at the integration of all aliens and that the state tried to discourage discussions on issues concerning ethnic, linguistic and religious differences in Greek society¹⁰. The geographical shape of Greece with numerous islands adjacent to Turkey and a very long border on the north which creates a sense of threat to the Greeks now gave rise to a particular brand of defensive nationalism. The changes in the Balkans violated the critical boundary of the Greek psyche and the Greek government's policy was affected. Patterns of behaviour that had appeared in times of war and nation building re-emerged, revealing that the fear of loss of territory is ever present in the Greek mind. To the EU the Greek positions on frontiers although it was rooted in cultural and ideological attitudes it nevertheless constituted a threat to EU cohesion, and did not take

⁹ Jonathan Eyal, "A Western View of Greece's Balkan Policy", in Featherstone and Ifantis op. cit., p. 142.

¹⁰ Christos Rozakis, "The International Protection of Minorities In Greece", in Featherstone and Ifantis, ed., p. 97.

into account the real concerns of Europe in relation to its external frontiers which had to do with impeding the flow of illegal immigrants, the strengthening of customs controls and the maintenance of stability in the region¹¹. In reality though, the Greek psyche without the exclusion of the policy makers is influenced by the history of the border territory and the blood that was spilled to acquire and secure it in the twentieth century. Moreover, the relation that this frontier bears to the Greek identity through its history has left a permanent feeling of insecurity among the Greeks. The Europeans could not understand this and the Greek government could not clarify that to anyone but the Greeks.

This is the immediate list of questions that emerges after the consultation of the theory. It can be used as a starting point for the analysis that follows in the next part. The use of the theory certainly helps the interpretation of events. However, there is more than one dimension to a single event. To interpret a social phenomenon from one point of view by choosing a certain aspect to study leaves room for misunderstanding. Combining the elements of the theory with the propositions that were expressed the author can begin the process of explanation.

¹¹ M. Anderson, *Frontiers*, op. cit., p. 183.

Part D:

The Explanation of Greek Foreign Policy towards the Northern Frontier Problems

Introduction

The discussion in the previous chapters provided the knowledge required for the understanding of the Greek foreign policy towards the northern Greek frontier. The discussion began from a historical perspective, essential for understanding the circumstances which led to the creation of the northern Greek frontier and their influence in the Greek domestic and international politics. Then the presentation of the events that accompanied the re-emergence of the frontier problems and the Greek government's response to them was presented. A number of questions can now be asked about the way the Greek government planned and conducted its foreign policy towards them. Before putting forward any assumptions or sought to explain this policy, the author should draw the background of the foreign policy-making process, and emphasise the importance of a small state in international relations and the significance of boundaries. That would provide the analysis with the necessary theoretical basis. This was the purpose of part three and it has provided the discussion with both a background and a line of thought that can help the formation of assumptions. A discussion of the available data and literature that can corroborate these assumptions will conclude the explanation process.

Some Epistemological Considerations

As it was pointed in the conclusion of Part C, fitting the different aspects of the theory into the events could lead to an interpretation but this would constitute a dubious approach. The conclusions would be more or less self-evident and could be contested by opposing theoretical points of view. The use of the theory in this thesis aims at helping the author to establish a line of thought that would lead towards an explanation: that is, the assumptions that follow in the next chapters (9, 10, and 11) would form a starting

point of explanation. Their validity, however, must be supported by evidence that would diminish the doubt of the reader towards the argument. For that reason the assumptions of the next chapters are accompanied by the necessary evidence and this combination completes the explanation process.

Two important questions arise here. The first was dealt with in the conclusion of part three and has to do with the variety of approaches available, and the range of detailed analysis potentially opened up by them. As happens very often in political studies the discussion impinges on other fields of the social sciences, sociological, anthropological, psychological and so on. The possibilities are numerous and that only proves that social reality is like a coin but with more than two faces. The purpose of this study is not to exhaust all possible paths of debate. Instead, this study is concerned with providing *a form of explanation*. Other researchers may come up with more detailed studies on other aspects, others will reach different conclusions. It is the belief of the author that no single explanation exists in social sciences. All studies must be a part of wider discussion and, therefore, all are welcomed. In this respect, the author of this study does not claim that a complete set of answers will be provided.

Rather, the motto that guides the development of discussion is that “*theories cannot be justified and their excellence cannot be shown without reference to other theories. There is no [prevailing] method in existence today*”¹. A certain combination of theories of international relations has been made in this study but that does not mean that they were chosen due to their unquestionable dominance over others. This combination was made because it has helped the student to develop a pattern of thought and a mode of discussion. The result is a theory on Greek foreign policy over a period of years. The word ‘theory’ is derived from the Greek verb *θεωρω* which means “looking from above”. In this sense the use of the word ‘theory’ denotes a way of looking and interpreting the events; a way of explaining the driving force behind the actions of the policy-makers and of the Greek public’s psyche. So, the student does not feel obliged to justify why a certain

¹ Paul Feyerabend, “How To Defend Society Against Science”, in Ian Hacking ed. *The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions*, Oxford University Press, 1981, pp 156-167.

combination of theories was made, a certain method of research was followed and a subsequent discussion was developed. The world which scientists explore is still largely unknown, and epistemological prescriptions, although they may look splendid compared to other epistemological prescriptions, they do not guarantee the best way to discover the secrets of nature, so all options must remain open². Understanding requires the mastering of all ideas and methods because uniformity impairs the critical power of science and the free development of the individual³. The choice of criteria according to which a choice of theory will be made is ultimately subjective⁴ but knowledge is enhanced through this subjective aspect of science: the interaction of different ideas, methods, theories, different subjective interpretations of reality leads to knowledge. So, this study develops a subjective interpretation of Greek politics in order to become a part of a wider discussion on them.

The second question is concerned with the available means of research and the gathering of data. The research for this thesis was conducted at a time when the events under study were actually happening. This means that the author could not have access to the archives of the foreign policy-making institutions. The way in which some revealing documents were eventually obtained is reminiscent of spy movies. The sources of these documents will remain secret for prudential reasons because it takes courage to leak documents in a time of high nationalistic feeling. Other sources were penetrated due to bad organisation and lack of security but they should not be revealed either. In any case, the documents are not enough to explain the course of events. They constitute a rather supplementary source of corroboration. So, the process of explanation requires a wider variety of information and this is provided through the combinations of interviews, the data that were eventually collected and the literature on the subject of the Greek foreign policy. This information constitutes the product of the research period.

² Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method*, NLB, London, 1975, p. 20.

³ Op. cit., pp. 306 and 35-46.

⁴ A.F. Chalmers *What Is This Thing Called Science?* The Open University Press, Milton Keynes, 1982, "Feyerabend's Anarchistic Theory Of Knowledge", p. 136

A way to overcome the frustration caused by the closed doors of a suspicious state machinery in a time of crisis was to approach some of the high-ranking policy makers who were willing to be interviewed. Some top level government officials who participated in the policy-making process fortunately agreed to do so. It is surprising that although they did not get rid of their political bias entirely they talked in a relaxed manner probably because they knew that their words would not appear in the newspapers the next day. The information they produced is revealing. A similar response was received from a number of Greek academics who agreed to talk about their understanding of the situation. Their interviews helped the student to clarify his arguments during the explanation process. Their authority on the subject proved to be essential in the analysis since they were themselves students of the governments' actions but also participated in advisory bodies close to the policy-making machine (although it should be noted that their capacity as advisors did not mean that they were actual planners of the Greek foreign policy). There was also a number of senior civil servants who were interviewed, most of whom did not want to be named, who had to implement government policy and who participated in the policy-making process through the reports that they addressed to the government.

The data eventually collected are some government documents concerned with the planning of the Greek foreign policy. A large scale research that was conducted by an independent enterprise also contains important information and it is used as well. The literature contains either articles written by politicians and government officials, published round table discussions with the participation of politicians and experts, parliamentary debates, and published material on the aspects of the Greek foreign policy by other researchers. The combined use of all this information transform the assumptions of the next chapters into an explanation of the Greek foreign policy towards the problems related to the country's northern frontier.

The Structure of the Explanation

In the next three chapters the assumptions that were developed during the discussion of the previous parts on the foreign policy of Greece towards the new frontier problems are presented. Reference is also made to the available evidence that corroborate them. The diplomatic undertaking of the Greek government to persuade the European Community (and the rest of the world) to refrain from recognising the FYROM with the name Macedonia is the starting point for these assumptions: the fact that the Greek government gave a different interpretation to the EC conditions for the recognition of the newly independent republic indicated a certain attitude towards not only the Greek-FYROM border but towards the Greek northern frontier as a whole. The next chapters seek to explain this attitude and describe the reasons which dictated the adoption of particular policies vis-a-vis the northern frontier.

The explanation covers three dimensions in the following respective chapters. The first chapter (Chapter 9) examines the dimension of the position of Greece in the power politics of eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. Accordingly, it questions whether the objective of the Greek foreign policy was the promotion of Greece as one of the major influential states and powers in the region. The second chapter (Chapter 10) examines the relation between foreign policy issues and the domestic political system and looks at the influence that domestic political interests had on the shaping of the Greek foreign policy. The third chapter (Chapter 11) examines the effect of the senses of national image, values and identity on the making of foreign policy and the social and psychological response to the issues that emerged.

It should be pointed, however, that this division of the explanation process was made for practical reasons. The three dimensions of the Greek foreign policy are strongly interrelated in the sense that a number of factors contributed in the shaping of the Greek foreign policy, factors which are present in all three of them and influenced the minds of the policy-makers in a simultaneous way. The contribution of different factors highlights the belief that there are more than one possible explanations of the way the Greek

government viewed the state's frontier problems and sought policies towards their solution. The hope of this discussion is to grasp as many factors as possible in its quest for explanation.

There is, of course, some difficulty in putting together an explanation that combine objective and subjective criteria (as the division of power between states and international organisations in the region and the sense of national identity). In addition, the validity of this combination may be challenged. But one of the main arguments in this thesis is that social phenomena, and government actions, are not merely the result of objective and rational reasoning but also the product of subjective interpretation of the social and political reality. This is how the factual and theoretical background, the epistemological and methodological considerations shaped the dynamics of a discussion and the explanation which follows.

Chapter 9: The Northern Greek Frontier and the Power Relationships in the Balkans

Greece is hardly the country which has the abilities and the power to undertake a leading role in the Mediterranean compared with other non-super power states of the region like Israel, Turkey or some of the Arab countries. The small size of Greece means that it can not enter a competition of power in the region by virtue of its own capabilities.

“Greece would like to play an important role in the Balkans but this is not easy because first of all Greece is not the country which has, so to speak, the powerful economy or the mighty political presence to achieve such a thing.”¹

A number of concerns over the country's development and security reasons related with the ever growing power of Turkey and the presence of Communist countries on the north forced Greece to enter alliances and international politico-economic organisations. Membership in organisations like NATO and the EC meant that Greece had to compromise a proportion of its ability to form an independent foreign policy. In fact, the era of the Cold War and the ever growing political integration of the EC, which included efforts to form a common foreign policy, meant that Greece had to accept a number of foreign policy guidelines which were imposed on it externally.

In an effort to achieve some sort of independent foreign policy as a small state Greece had to utilise carefully the opportunities provided within the framework of the external environment and the organisations in which it participated. The immediate environment presented threats but in an effort to overcome them Greece pursued the establishment of good ties of co-operation between itself and its neighbours. The room for manoeuvre that the external environment and the alliances left for Greece would be of essential importance in the state's efforts to achieve a higher status in the region. The regional level, within which almost everything that happens affects a state entity, is the

¹ Interview with Professor Dimitris Konstas of the Panteion University of Social Sciences in Athens, and head of the Institute of International Relations.

place in which a small state develops a major interest in acquiring and playing an important and influential role. In this respect, successive Greek governments tried to utilise the country's international ties in order to influence the politics of the region in a way that the poorer and smaller countries are not usually able to.

1. The Balkans

The Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean comprised this section of the external environment where Greece tried to pursue a form of independent policy. That direction in Greece's foreign policy was imposed by the country's deteriorating relations with Turkey over the Aegean and Cyprus. The NATO and EU response towards Greece's problems with Turkey did not satisfy the Greek side and made clear that in this respect Greece was more or less alone.

*“Can I say that NATO will come and help us? If they come it will be too late, after we will have already suffered much damage. If you explain that to foreigners they will answer **what are you talking about?** We don't have a strong argument to prove that we don't trust them. But we have every reason not to trust them.”²*

“Inside the political parties there are those who see the European Community as the solution to Greece's problems. There are those, the more nationalist, who say that the European Community is good but we need some other supplementary solutions on the regional level that will guarantee a greater sense of security. We have to think who on the regional level is going to help us against the Turks.”³

“Greece is a country with insecure frontiers. It tried to solve this problem by entering an alliance which in 1974 proved to be insufficient. The presence of the gigantic Turkey causes this insecurity that is shared by the majority of the public.”⁴

² From the interview with the late Ambassador Manolis Kalamidas, Head Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from April 1990 until April 1992. He was the principal aide of Mr. Antonis Samaras who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time. He followed Mr. Samaras' resignation from the New Democracy and co-founded with him the POLAN (Political Spring) party. He became the Head Spokesman of the party and remained as Mr. Samara's top advisor on foreign policy matters until his death in 1996.

³ Interview with Professor Yiannis Valinakis of the University of Athens and Assistant Director of the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).

⁴ D. Konstas (interview).

*“Greece is situated on roundabout of the world. We are Europe, more Europe with our participation in the EC, we are Balkans, we are Mediterranean, we are Middle East. A comprehensive Greek foreign policy should take account of all the factors which comprise our environment. That is why we changed the Greek defensive doctrine. The threat comes from the east. There is a threat in the Aegean and Thrace. It is real, it is long-term, and we can’t wait for Turkey or our allies in NATO to come to their senses.”*⁵

Therefore, Greece tried to establish good relations with a number of Balkan and Arab countries but its policies never really departed from the framework of the Western alliance. When things began to change in the immediate Balkan environment Greece thought that it ought to readjust its policies: a sudden major political change in the environment can either herald a new age of friendship and co-operation or bring deterioration in the relations between states. Greece should seize the opportunities that were emerging but should also be careful in calculating and tackling the dangers that accompanied this change.

*“Our aim in the Balkans was to strengthen our relations with Balkan countries, and to create a spirit of deterrence and co-operation, and to create a defence axis against the Turkish expansionism. Remember in March 1987, our Minister of Foreign Affairs went to Bulgaria on the brink of our conflict with Turkey. That deterred the Turks.”*⁶

*“The inter-Balkan co-operation was a policy initiated by the New Democracy and continued by PASOK on a higher scale. The inter-Balkan co-operation was successful. It is a policy in which we all agree and it is an asset for Greek foreign policy. This co-operation is based on principles that we now have to repeat to reassure ourselves. These principles are the inviolability of frontiers, the respect of international treaties, and the protection of human rights.”*⁷

After a period of successive coalition governments that were not able to go too far in terms of policy planning and making, the right-wing party of New Democracy came to power in April 1990. By then things in Eastern Europe had already acquired a

⁵ Andreas Papandreou, former Prime Minister of Greece speaking in *“The developments in the Balkans and the Greek foreign policy, the discussion of the political leaders”* (March 1990), Library of the Institute of International Relations, Panteion University, I. Sideris, Athens, 1991, p. 26.

⁶ A. Papandreou, in the *“Developments...”* op. cit., p. 27.

⁷ Konstantinos Mitsotakis, former Prime Minister of Greece in *“Developments...”* op. cit., p. 19.

momentum of change and had taken by surprise the Greek foreign policy-making machine. The Greek policy-makers had to form an estimate of the situation in a very short time. Under these circumstances this estimation and ensuing actions were based mainly on their psychological environment and to a lesser extent on a rational analytical procedure.

*“There is a problem with the education of the foreign policy-making machine. They tend to see things in a legalist tradition. They don’t analyse politically what is really happening. The ministry of foreign affairs is a bit disorganised. There is a fast turnover of staff not entirely based on rational considerations of efficiency. There is also a problem of political leadership. They receive the political messages in a distorted way.”*⁸

*“We have known long periods of improvisations in the making of foreign policy. This happens in conjunction with the sidelining and downgrading of the permanent professional diplomatic service from any political leadership.”*⁹

This rather ramshackle Greek government policy-making machine formed a view according to which the collapse of Communism and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc left plenty of room to the relatively more developed countries of the region to improve their position as influential powers. Greece as a European small state with greater economic development, general political stability, homogeneity, and military capability perceived, through its government, that it had an important role to play on the regional level, where it could support its policy with a better allocation of resources, larger efficiency and appeal. Greece’s involvement could be independent but its membership in international organisations could enhance its appeal. The geographical position of Greece and its proximity to politically sensitive areas, like Yugoslavia and the Middle East were perceived by the Greek leaders as opportunities with which they could both promote the power position and boost the international prestige of the country. In this respect, they presumed that their membership in NATO and the European Community could be used as a base on which they could sustain a policy which would lead the neighbouring

⁸ Y. Valinakis (interview).

countries to accept Greece's position as an influential regional power able to assist them in their quest for acceptance by the Western world.

*"This is the moment that proves that the policy of New Democracy to attach Greece to the European Community was correct. Greece's role in the Balkans is much more important now that we are a member of Europe. The other Balkan countries perceive Greece, the only Balkan country member of the EC, as a bridge which can help them accomplish their much wanted attachment to the EC."*¹⁰

*"We have to continue the great political tradition of positive relations and economic co-operation in the Balkans. It is a big challenge for us if we manage to play this role in the framework of the EC."*¹¹

The Greek government tried to combine some conventional and alternative behavioural options: first, it tried to utilise its membership and activity in intergovernmental organisations and follow an economical statecraft through multilateral diplomacy; second, it supported the establishment of new legal norms. Greece's active involvement was helped by its human and material resources through a strategy that combined an active aspect (increasing the total resources of the state through external increment i.e. the new market economies of the Balkans and the EC) and a defensive aspect (cultivating a common interest). A major actor in the formation and preservation of a country's national interest are the interests groups, and in this case business, the human and material mobilisation of which proved essential in Greece's effort to establish a higher status in the region.

"[Greece] simply tried to take advantage of the fact that it is a member of the EC and of NATO, that it has undoubtedly a much better economy than the other Balkan states, that it is militarily more powerful, and that it has stable democratic institutions. These are goals pursued now by the new democracies of the Balkans [which] have a strong feeling of national insecurity and, of course, economic problems and believe that the Community is paradise. Greece was in a position to help. In what sense? Private entrepreneurs have penetrated financially. There are hundreds of mixed companies and there are Greek enterprises which have made

⁹ Theodorakopoulos V., Lagakos E., Papoulias G, Giounis I., *"Thoughts and questions on our foreign policy"* Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy, I. Sideris, Athens, 1995, p. 92. The authors of this book are all former top diplomats close advisors of the Greek government of Mr. Mitsotakis.

¹⁰ K. Mitsotakis in the *"Developments..."* op. cit. p. 20.

¹¹ A. Papandreou in the *"Developments..."* op. cit. p., 30.

big investments on their own. The [Europeans] are not in yet because they don't have faith in the institutionalised regime over there; the Greek, a Balkan, is able to tackle and find a way to move around more freely [unlike other Europeans]. That is the form that the Greek penetration takes in the Balkans in relation to the fact that we are the most important country in the region. We helped them develop closer ties with the Community.”¹²

“Greece from the beginning saw the Balkans as the natural place for advancing its interest for the reasons that you described: prestige, the acquisition of new markets -especially for Northern Greece-, and naturally because it wanted a new stability to be established in the region -on the basis of the new developments that had taken place- which would create a sense for security for itself. For these reasons Greece really tried to acquire this role in the Balkans. We did not manage however to accomplish an exclusive economic presence, which we could, and to establish good relations with our neighbours. The private sector made some advances but the political context as it was developed prevented our businessmen feeling the security they needed in order to achieve their goals.”¹³

Greece tried to appear as the bearer of good news which would put forward the case of the weaker countries to the institutions of NATO and the EC, making sure that they would obtain the much desired attention and help they needed. In exchange these countries would accept the Greek government's position as a leading power in the region and would welcome its proposals for co-operation which would promote the Greek interests.

“Because of the competitive relationship that developed between the Albanian and the Greek political leaderships over the issues of the Greek minority and the pseudo-minority of Chamouria that the Albanians created as counter-argument Greece tried to halt the Community's aid. We wanted to acquire first some sort of political profit in exchange of the Community's help. Same was the case with Skopje.”¹⁴

At the same time the Greek government viewed an improvement of the country's position in the region as an opportunity to increase its prestige in NATO and the EC. If

¹² From the interview with Mr. Mihalis Papakonstantinou, former MP for Kozani western Macedonia and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Mr. Konstantinos Mitsotakis from August 1992 to October 1993. As a minister he tried to find a formula of compromise which could bridge the gap between Greece and the FYROM and Europe. In the summer of 1994 he was expelled from the party of New Democracy under the leadership of Mr. Miltiadis Evert for his views on the Macedonian issue and other foreign policy matters.

¹³ Y. Valinakis (interview).

the country assumed a leading role its partners in these organisations would probably welcome it and could help Greece to transform itself to a factor of stabilisation which would promote with efficiency the Western interests.

2. Yugoslavia

The first challenge against the Greek government's aims came with the escalation of conflict in Yugoslavia. Europe, until then mainly surprised by the changes in the East, was suddenly called to adopt new policies in relation to a conflict that seemed to escalate and cause trouble to vested interests in the region. It should be said that Europe, that is the EC as a whole, had no special interest in the Balkans. Only individual strong European states had taken serious consideration of the Balkans in the planning of their foreign policy. So, Europe's approach towards the Yugoslav crisis was guided by these states whose main concern was to help the region return to a stability which would ensure that their imminent investments would not be lost. If that meant a change in the status quo Europe would not necessarily oppose it as long as it did not violate the frontiers of the Community (and for that reason, Greece).

“The Balkans were never high on the list of priorities of the Community's planning. Central Europe and the Baltic states were. The Balkans became a part of the Community's priorities only after the collapse of communism. But even then they couldn't form a common policy. There were differences, German initiatives that dragged along the rest, then there were differences on how the Europeans should intervene.”¹⁵

But they did not take into serious consideration the volatile temper of the Balkan people and the conflict of interests between the Yugoslav nations. The recognition of states did not halt the escalation of conflicts and proved that Europe, and its leading states, were rushing to protect their interests in a manner that resembled the Holy

¹⁴ D. Konstas (interview).

¹⁵ D. Konstas (interview).

Alliance of the nineteenth century: instead of following the recommendations of their much publicised “Badinter” commission of legal experts they rushed to recognise Slovenia and Croatia for their own political reasons. They made the same mistakes with Bosnia. The conflict escalated and the policy of Europe was concentrated on efforts to avoid a further conflagration.

This development created confusion in the psychological environment of the Greek policy-makers. Their “critical boundary” was violated and their aspirations were replaced by a growing sense of uneasiness that had its origins in the psychology of the weak, always present in a small state. They believed that the dismemberment of Yugoslavia would herald the re-emergence of “historic” Balkan disputes which would pose a fundamental problem of security in the country, in addition to the threat of Turkey. Immediately they resolved to follow a defensive strategy in support of the preservation of the status quo. They tried to take an initiative which would lead to that direction and believed that this was their role as a Balkan and European state.

“Greece, from the beginning, played its part in the Yugoslav crisis. It tried until the end to halt the break up of Yugoslavia. That was the official Greek policy, and the policy of Europe, and the policy of the US, until the end, that is, until the 16th of December 1991. Until then everybody talked about a unified Yugoslavia.”¹⁶

“The conflict in Yugoslavia incited to Greece the fear that old national problems will re-emerge. That made Greece part of the discord but also a part of the medium that was called to solve the problem: Europe. This created a conflict of roles that became apparent on the issue of the name. The political conjunctions prevented Greece from playing a special role in the Balkans.”¹⁷

3. Macedonia

When this strategy failed the Greek government had to deal with the issues that were emerging in its very doorstep: Macedonia, Albania, Thrace. The “critical” boundary was

¹⁶ M. Kalamidas (interview).

¹⁷ D. Konstas (interview).

being violated even further in the minds of the Greek policy-makers. They began to view each action of Greece's neighbours with skepticism. The possibility that historic Balkan territorial conflicts would occur again was blocking the minds of the Greek policy-makers. Any irredentist language was used by specific groups or personalities (which was maybe utilised for domestic consumption) was conceived as proof of an official future plan against the Greek sovereignty.

“Our country wishes to establish good relations with Skopje but only after this country has abandoned its expansionist and irredentist aspirations. Our country has repeatedly stated that it does not have expansionist aspirations against Skopje but wishes the removal of the emblem of Vergina from the flag of this country and in addition the amendment of its constitution so that it will not include irredentist claims. Finally, Greece has made absolutely clear to every direction that it will never recognise Skopje while they use the name Macedonia or derivatives of it.”¹⁸

One of the fears of Greece had to do with the presence of a Slav minority in Western Greek Macedonia which FYROM could use in order to put forward territorial claims. Although the number of the Slavs in Greek Macedonia is small and harmless the Greek state has never accepted officially their existence and when Greek officials talk about them they invent a number of different characterisations about their identity and language.

*“It is a fact that this minority, as an ethnic minority does not exist, it is a ghost minority, as it has been said from the Greek side. There are Slavophones in Western Macedonia but they are Greeks, many times better than those who speak only Greek. And almost all are bilingual. This is a view that Greece accepts.”*¹⁹

“The other aspect of the problem is inside Greece and has to do with those who speak the “idiom”. Our mistake, a very old mistake, is that we believed or pretended that they don't exist. They exist and they fought alongside the Greek-speakers during the Macedonian Struggle. They exist and did not choose to leave during the exchange of populations following the First World War. They exist and did not follow the others after the end of the Civil War. How many are they? Have we ever counted them? And how many really want to separate a part of Greece and make it a part of Skopje or Bulgaria? Those who have openly appeared in international organisations calling themselves “enslaved” are very few. Why should let them be exploited by the Skopjan pseudo-irredentism? If we don't take care of the complaints about the

¹⁸ From a policy document called “The Balkan Policy of Greece”, circulated among the ministries. There is no date on the document but it was certainly circulated after the “embargo” that PASOK's government introduced shortly after re-gaining power in 1993 on a platform of tough stance towards Skopje.

¹⁹ Konstantinos Mitsotakis speaking in parliament (12/2/91). Parliamentary Proceedings, Session ΠΑΓ p. 5964 and 5981.

administration, education and welfare we will create a tank from which the outside propagandists will draft agents.”²⁰

Soon Greece entered the well-known dispute over the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Skopje for the Greeks). This dispute had many characteristics of a territorial dispute and in fact it was one, in the paradoxical sense that, although there were not any territorial claims, the psychological significance of the Macedonian territory shaped the foreign policy of Greece. As it happened, many characteristics of the dispute reminded the situation on which a whole model of behaviour is derived: ‘The Macedonian Syndrome’. The significant political change that resulted in the alteration of the status quo was the initial cause for this dispute as it cultivated uneasiness among the Greek policy-makers; the issue was exploited for domestic reasons* ; a war of words began and a number of legal, historical, ethnic and geographical arguments became part of the political language.

“This Republic has no right whatsoever, historical or ethnological, to use the name Macedonia. Historical, because the Slavs who comprise the majority of today’s population of this Republic appeared in the history of the region only on the 6th century AD, that is 1,000 years after the era that Alexander the Great made Macedonia an important part of the Ancient Greek world. Ethnological because the population of this Republic consists of Slavs, Albanians, Gypsies and other ethnicities that are certainly respected but do not have any relation to the Macedonians.”²¹

“This state is built upon an expansionist philosophy. This is the state that was destined to unite all the Macedonian lands under “alien” occupation into one unified Macedonian state. This doesn’t change by any means. They were born with that philosophy, they grew up with it. They see that their obligation as a state is to succeed in unifying Macedonia. Their expansionist aspirations are articulated in their constitution. This constitution apart from the forward, it has got a number of articles about the role that the Macedonian state plays in the region. These are explicit and denote an attitude. That is why the name is important. There is the whole issue. The frontiers in the region are not final. They are disputed by everyone but us. We say that the frontiers are final and can not be violated and we

²⁰ Theodorakopoulos and others op. cit., p. 45.

* This subject is discussed in the next chapter.

²¹ Kostantinos Karamanlis former President of the Hellenic Republic writing to the leaders of the European Community in an appeal to persuade them not to recognise the FYROM, 3/1/92, in “*The Yearbook of Defence and Foreign Policy*” ELIAMEP, Athens, 1993, p. 321.

mean it. The others don't see it the way we do. They say the same thing but they do not mean it. Because for years nationalism was suppressed in the communist countries. As soon as these regimes were brought down everything blew up in the air. And take into account that the low living and educational standards cultivate the awakening of the long-dormant nationalist tendencies.”²²

“The essential reason for our concern about the present and future policy of Skopje towards us is the obvious and latent expansionism of this new state which is covered under a dress of pseudo-irredentism. The obvious expressions of this expansionism are a) the symbols, b) the name, c) the constitution. The constitution of Skopje is the most serious cause for our concern because it is a legal document which officially states the rights and obligations of every Skopjan government. The preamble of the constitution refers to the principles of the 1944 constitution of the federation which calls for the unification of the Macedonian people which was divided between the Balkan imperialists in 1913 and 1918. In article no.3 there is reference that the frontiers are subject to change while the Skopjan territory is characterised undivided. In article no.49 the Skopjan state resumes the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other states in order to protect the rights of the alleged minorities. We should not forget that these are the external manifestations of this latent expansionism. We shouldn't stop to be aware even if they accept our demands. In the long term Skopje will be a problem whose roots should worry us more.”²³

Another aspect of a territorial dispute is the involvement of third parties. Greece tried to win Europe to its side in the same fashion that a small state tries to utilise its membership in an alliance for its own advantage. It was a matter of prestige for Greece to show that its voice counts within the Community and it is not the pariah of Europe. So, Greece claimed to be a fervent supporter of the principle of common solidarity and demanded that the European partners should abide by it. This and Greece's demand to be consulted as equal was conceived as irresponsible behaviour by the Europeans. They thought that Greece tried to hinder Europe from dealing with the real issue at a time when it was imperative for the Community to avoid further mistakes in the Balkans. Europe had already caused damage to its own credibility as a political institution at a time when serious efforts were taken to bring together the member states into a greater form of political integration. Greece supported this process and had no problem in ratifying the Maastricht treaty but soon discovered that the new Europe was not what it had expected.

²² M. Kalamidas (interview).

²³ Theodorakopoulos and others op. cit., p. 34-35 and p. 40-41.

“There was a conflict between the Greek national interest and the Common Foreign Policy. In 1992 the transformation of the European Community to a Union took place. Greece until then had been a great supporter of the programmes for the common foreign policy and security but it occurred that Greece was in fact a state with different views which did not agree with the average European views. Greece found itself out of this group of states which were working for greater political unification: it was clear that Greece’s interests forced its government to adopt a policy different from the common one.”²⁴

The Greek government’s pre-occupation with the name and its manipulation of the country’s membership in the Western organisations appeared to be unwelcomed and dangerous. The EC and NATO members feared that Greece tried to involve them in its own problems. As the situation in the Balkans was deteriorating they feared that they would be dragged into the conflict. The EC efforts to reach a compromise were bouncing on Greece’s insistence that it would not accept any form of the name Macedonia, and that Europe should safeguard the conditions that had been agreed on 16th December 1991 on the recognition of ex-Yugoslav states. The patience of the Europeans was slowly but steadily running out. Greece for a long time was exploiting its membership according to its own national interests on matters concerned with Turkey and now with Yugoslavia. They wanted an end to this.

*“There is no doubt that the country’s prestige was damaged. I made an effort to change this impression. But they are bored with us, fed up. Me too. I was disgusted with myself each time I had to talk to them about the Skopjan issue. The Europeans would ask: **Don’t you understand that you are in Europe? That the frontiers do not change? Are you so mis-informed? But we are.**”²⁵*

“Still, the Europeans could not make us understand this “highest of principles” that makes them harm the Greek interests and benefit the Skopjan ones. They haven’t convinced us. They tell us something general, that for the interests of the region Skopje should be recognised. But the European countries act according to their economic interests. And they saw the Balkans as an opportunity for economic penetration. The Europeans are convinced that the Skopjans tell the truth when they say that the expansionist aspirations are a thing of the past. The Europeans believe them because they haven’t lived in this region and they cannot understand our fears, as they don’t understand our fears towards Turkey. Our answer to that is

²⁴ D. Konstas (interview).

²⁵ M. Papakonstantinou (interview).

read Balkan history and you will understand. If you haven't understood, if you haven't lived and you try to see the issue from the perspective of the contemporary political reality believing that what applies in western and central Europe also applies to the Balkans then you are ignorant and you haven't studied history.”²⁶

“We had a problem communicating our policy. The way in which we tried to convince our partners was not the proper one. Instead of using strategic and political arguments we presented sentimental and historic ones which had a very limited effect abroad. On the other hand, we should not over-do it and believe that our frontiers are automatically Europe's frontiers and that those who will dare pass them will find European paratroopers and commandos defending them. We have to understand that since the end of the Cold War the Europeans do not have the reason to act as unified as they used to. They tend to concentrate on their individual interests, and in that respect they may not be interested in Greece's problems.”²⁷

The only ally left that Greece could turn to was the US. The US tried to be detached from the Balkan crisis and within NATO they had passed the authority to deal with the crisis to the Europeans, until it was proved that the Europeans were still incapable of dealing with foreign policy issues in common. Greece had had bad relations with the Americans for years because it had dropped out of NATO's military wing after Turkey's invasion in Cyprus and Mr. Papandreou's governments were causing trouble. Greece's swift response to America's call in the Kuwait crisis changed the climate. When the Americans decided to intervene Greece tried to establish a new “special” relationship which would transforme it to an agent that would bring the US balancing views within the conflicting interests. In many aspects Greece raised its previous objections to NATO's policies in the region and became more active in the military wing of the alliance²⁸. The Americans listened more sympathetically but did not depart from the view that a compromise should be found. They, however, managed to persuade Greece to attend the talks under Vans and Owen.

“Greece feels that the Americans have big interests at stake in the Balkans and that they are the only ones who can guarantee the stability of the region. No other

²⁶ M. Kalamidas (interview).

²⁷ Y. Valinakis (interview).

²⁸ Section III of the document “The Situation In the Balkans”.

country is considering military intervention and that means that they let those inside the crisis kill each other. We tried to secure through the US that the frontiers will remain in the same place. And there is the other dimension: we see the Americans as those who can sustain the balance between the conflicting views of the Europeans. They are for us the ones who can solve the communication problems that might increase in the future.”²⁹

“As long as there is no effective European foreign and defence policy Greece will try to keep the balance in relation to Turkey through the US. Until the process of unification is complete Greece’s special relation with the US will remain intact. In the wake of Europe’s indifference towards Greece’s position on the Skopje issue this attachment to the US was strengthened. As a result Greece’s foreign policy has acquired an “Atlantic” dimension which has no parallel at least since 1974 onwards.”³⁰

The Greek government, of course, did not think that this state would be a danger by itself but feared that it could participate in the future in an anti-Greek alliance along with Turkey, Bulgaria and other Balkan states. Especially Bulgaria’s recognition of the Macedonian state but not of the Macedonian nation created further consideration to the Greek policy-makers. A potential alien state like the FYROM would cut off Greece from its reliable ally, Serbia making things worse. For this reason the Greek government opposed the recognition of the FYROM with the name Macedonia and tried to refrain the international community from doing so. This was a defensive aspect of the Greek foreign policy.

“What we call a threat from Skopje is not an imminent threat. No one expects Gligorov’s troops to enter Thessaloniki. It is absurd to talk about such a thing. The same applies to Bulgaria and Albania, at least as things stand at this moment. We don’t know how things will be in ten years’ time. What sort of power conjunctions will exist then. There is where our problem with Skopje lies. What will happen if Skopje break up and become a part of Bulgaria in which case we will face a Greater Bulgaria. Imagine a federation between Skopjans and Bulgarians which will plan the liberation of their enslaved brothers who live under Greek rule. And they say such things in Bulgaria and Skopje. The Bulgarians with whom we are supposed to have friendly relations are doing their propaganda work and prepare themselves in order to claim some time in the future Thrace and Thessaloniki. For that reason they have developed a whole academic discipline, Thracology. If you go to Bulgaria and ask them which are their national aspirations they will tell you

²⁹ Y. Valinakis (interview).

³⁰ D. Konstas (interview).

Thessaloniki. What if Skopje in one way or another become a part of Albania in which case we have a Greater Albania. In this way the balance of power in the region changes. You have to take into account in your planning the middle-long-term possibility that may arise after some years."³¹

*"Greece never considered the other Balkan country's as individual threats. What concerns Greece is whether these countries would create a coalition with Turkey in which case serious security problems would arise since the frontier is so long."*³²

*"None of the countries (Albania-Skopje-Bulgaria) in itself is perceived to constitute a direct military threat to Greece for the time being. Nevertheless, Greece cannot exclude that a lesser or major threat, military or other, might arise from any of them acting alone or in alliance with others in the future."*³³

Greece also tried to solve the dispute by creating a common interest based on the FYROM's need to use the commercial routes that lead to Thessaloniki. It also tried to highlight the interest of the Greek entrepreneurs who wished to invest there in order to cajole its neighbour. So, it promised that if the republic change its name the Greek state would be willing to provide economic and political aid.

*"Greece couldn't do many things apart from building five super markets over there and buy some of their enterprises. Five hundred businesses in western Macedonia work for Skopje. Apart from the fact that each year 30,000 Skopjans are having their summer vacations in Pieria on Litohoro beach. Thessaloniki's cheap market on Egnatia was full of them who used to buy everything. There is no doubt that they need Thessaloniki. Otherwise they have to take oil from Bulgaria or Albania through bad ports and roads. They have calculated that if they take it from Thessaloniki it will cost them 1/3 or 1/4 less in transportation. They were asking to take a 'free zone' in the port of Thessaloniki as the heirs of Yugoslavia. We had 149 conventions with the Yugoslavs. They accepted only three in the "Measures" which are completely harmless to them: judicial help, and some agreements on hydro-economic matters. We told them let's prepare new conventions and then we discuss [our other problems]. Our own "big players" are ready to buy Mac-Petrol, the Skopjan petroleum company. The interested businessmen came to see me and asked me what they should do about it without being accused by the media for "treason". I told them: **keep talking, don't brake the negotiations. I am not telling you to buy the company now, but don't break the negotiations. Keep them happy, tell them that you are almost ready but you want to complete your calculations etc.**"³⁴*

³¹ M. Kalamidas (interview).

³² Y. Valinakis (interview).

³³ From a document presenting the Greek views in NATO called "The Situation In The Balkans".

³⁴ M. Papakonstantinou (interview).

The Greek government made a series of mistakes over this issue. It calculated wrongly the response of the European partners. Initially it thought that the opponent, in terms of military capability, economic structure, political environment and stability was weak and that the FYROM would soon accept Greece's demands and back down when faced by coercion tactics. The split which emerged within the government affected its decisions and its language was dual and confusing. It also made sure that in the post-decisional phase the Greek government would be unable to learn lessons and re-evaluate its policy. The big change in the government's policy came too late, after Greece suffered complete isolation by its partners in Europe which imposed on its government the acceptance of international mediation, the usual outcome of a dispute where small states are involved. Mediators Vance and Owen forced Greece to accept a dialogue under UN auspices which resulted into the first plan of agreement called "Measures for the Building of Mutual Trust" although the issue of the name was left out.

*"The cause of our problems was Mitsotakis' dual language. On 16th December 1991 we had an EC decision which was very specific: the EC would not accept any name that might imply territorial claims. Well, for internal reasons Mitsotakis followed a different policy. And instead of going all together with a united front of government and opposition we were split. Samaras would go to the Council of Ministers saying one thing and then Mitsotakis would meet with the prime-ministers saying directly the opposite. So, the others would say: **they are not serious; they can't find a solution between them so we can apply pressure towards the satisfaction of Skopje.** There is no doubt that Gligorov has internal problems. But we failed to exploit these problems and trample him on the ground (sic) and accomplish what we wanted. Gligorov faces an Albanian minority which has a quadruple birth rate than the Slavic population. He's got Serbs, Turks, Greeks in Monastiri (Bitola) Slavs who consider themselves Bulgarian and see Bulgaria as their motherland. He's walking on a tightrope but he counted on the Greek inadequacy: that Greece would make a mess of everything, as in fact happened because the front was broken. If you look at the economic statistics you will see that the largest investment in Skopje is made by Greeks. Gligorov succeeded in breaking the Greek front through the commercial relations he established with entrepreneurs of northern Greece. At that time Samaras had enforced the oil embargo. I have read with my own eyes a top-secret document where in a discussion Gligorov confirmed that if the embargo continued for few more weeks he would be forced to discuss according to the Greek terms. There were demonstrations in Skopje, and this is not widely known, where people cried **give them the name so we can eat bread.** This is not, of course, a way to do foreign*

policy but when your interests are at stake you have to resort to such measures. And Mitsotakis lifted the embargo because the Greek entrepreneurs complained that these measures were damaging their businesses. It is laughable.”³⁵

Another mistake that the Greek government did was that it did not concentrate on one issue. Although much of its efforts were concentrated on the Macedonian issue, other fronts remained open. It can be argued that this was inevitable since the change was affecting the whole region that borders Greece from the north but the mistake was that Greece thought that the issues could be dealt with simultaneously. The result was that the situation stagnated much to the disadvantage of Greece.

4. Albania

One important issue was Albania. Greece has not yet recognised the border with this country, although its signature in the CSCE treaties constitutes a ratification of the border. However, many problems had to be dealt with related with the presence of the Greek element in the south of Albania, the issue of the Albanian Chams that the Tirana government took out and dusted of the drawer, the influx of thousands of Albanian illegal immigrants into Greece. In the wake of Greece’s international isolation the Greek government tried to be careful in handling the issue of the Greek minority in Albania: without diminishing its interest it tried to play down any possible irredentist claims by some nationalist groups in order to avoid triggering similar actions from other countries against Greece.

“...we have made absolutely clear to the Albanian side that the safeguarding of the minority rights of all the Greeks in Albania wherever they are -not only in the arbitrary determined minority regions- is an indispensable condition of the forward development of the Greek-Albanian friendship and co-operation.”³⁶

³⁵ M. Kalamidas (interview).

³⁶ “The Balkan Policy of Greece” op. cit.

“The Albanians had the impression that we asked for more than the protection of the minority, which is wrong. But this impression was created because some of the messages coming from various sides within Greece were dubious. We didn't claim anything but we didn't make an effort towards the settlement of the frontier.”³⁷

“The things we say are a little bit far-fetched. Can you ever imagine a Turkish flag to be hoisted in Komotene or a near by village on the Turkish national day? We find it obvious and justified that they [the Greeks in Albania] can hoist the Greek flag on the national days of Greece. But these are Albanian nationals! There is also a radio station in Corfu which transmits propagandistic programmes which after my intervention reduced its tone a bit. And I tried to persuade Sevastianos (leader of the Panhellenic Union of Northern-Epirus Struggle) not to talk continuously about autonomy. Nor about secession. There is also a view expressed, which was stronger some years ago, to invade. Not only they [NATO and the EC] would drive us back but the Turks would take the chance to put a hand on Thrace. So, we made these mistakes, we still do.”³⁸

The opening of the frontiers with Albania caused a number of problems for Greece. The influx of thousands of Albanian illegal immigrants who accompanied the initially welcomed entry of ethnic-Greeks. They quickly formed a very cheap work force that was exploited in the agricultural sector and the construction industry. This initially created reaction by sectors of the population who were unemployed and in a country with a high rate of unemployment this could be easily exploited by populist political forces. The number of the Albanians was so high that not all of them could be employed and they quickly resorted to the violent crime which troubles the country today and has created a great sense of xenophobia and hatred among the Greek population. The policy of the open frontier was abandoned but the heavy policing is not adequate to stop the influx and the problems continue. In addition, the Albanian side protested on various occasions against the mistreatment of these refugees and created further problems in its relations with Greece which did not want to accept the refugees as permanent settlers, as recognised immigrants with rights.

³⁷ From the interview with Professor Hristos Rozakis of the University of Athens, former Deputy Minister Of Foreign Affairs in the government of Mr. Konstantinos Simitis.

³⁸ M. Papakonstantinou (interview).

“Another issue affecting relations between the two countries is the particularly large number of Albanian economic refugees who have fled to Greece and who are held largely accountable for the dramatic increase in crime and unemployment over the last three years.”³⁹

*“There is the great fiasco of the Albanian policy of the government. The frontiers have been abolished. There are not just the ethnic-Greeks who enter the country, and live under miserable conditions. It is probable that we will end up with an Albanian Muslim minority in our country.”*⁴⁰

5. Turkey

Another issue was also emerging and the arch-rival of Greece, Turkey, was implicated. The Muslim minority in Thrace became another aspect in the problematic relations of the two countries. Although the Muslim minority in Thrace is confined to an area which does not border on Turkey, the issue raised fears concerned with Greece’s security. The mistreatment of the minority came out in the open and Turkey tried to exploit the issue.

“Unfortunately, Turkey’s stance on the Cyprus question, and the absolutely clear attitude of this country towards the change of the status quo in the Aegean and Thrace, and its efforts to control the Muslim populations of the Balkans, do not offer guarantees for any Greek-Turkish approach.”⁴¹

*“The neighbouring country should realise that it can not intervene in the domestic affairs of Greece. It gives the impression that it has chauvinist aspirations of expansion in Thrace after the open intervention of the consulate of Komotini in Greece’s internal affairs. It creates a Turkish terrorism that cannot be accepted by any government.”*⁴²

“In Komotini we always make secret agreements, all the parties, in order to avoid the election of a Turkish mayor. They could elect one. And we lost the Pomaks with our stupidity. The Pomaks are not Turks. But the Turks embraced them and made them Turks. Their children now go to school and learn the Turkish language. Our government made some progress. We were not giving them driving, tractor, and

³⁹ “The Situation In The Balkans” op. cit.

⁴⁰ Andreas Papandreou speaking in parliament (12/2/91). Parliamentary proceedings, Session ΠΑΓ, p. 5968.

⁴¹ “The Balkan Policy of Greece” op. cit.

⁴² K. Mitsotakis (interview).

hunting licenses, absurd things. There was a pharmacist who had studied in the Greek university and he was not given a license to open a drugstore. You make them feel Turks in this way, surely. This is the sort of stupid policy that the Greek state follows.”⁴³

“There isn’t any increase on the numbers of the minority in Thrace. They are as many today as they were in 1923, which is a bit weird, of course, and that’s why the Turks are complaining. How can it be possible that they have increased only in a few thousands? Such policy was implemented precisely in order to keep the numbers low but you can’t write that in your thesis. Today they could number 800,000 and we would have a very big problem.”⁴⁴

The Greek government realised at some point that it cannot fight on too many fronts. The international press coverage of the situation of the Muslim minority was negative for Greece and did not help the other objectives that the government was pursuing. The Greek government protested and argued that it was actually Greece who had mostly respected the international norms and the Treaty of Lausanne and never harmed physically the minority, as did the Turks in numerous occasions. But the international community did not appreciate the policy of the Greek state because in its eyes it was taking its revenge on, otherwise, innocent people. The whole situation favoured Turkey, damaged the prestige of Greece abroad and measures were taken to change things in Thrace in order to defuse the tension and let the government concentrate on other issues.

“On the matters concerning the Muslim minority my government announced and implemented a brave change in the policy that Greece used to follow until now. All discriminatory administrative measures were abolished. We secured not only in words but in practice the equality of Christians and Muslims before the law. I’ve personally guaranteed the success of this policy. And I declare that any intention of minor administration officials to deviate from this policy will be decisively

⁴³ M. Papakonstantinou (interview).

⁴⁴ M. Kalamidas (interview). It should be said that this is the first time that a former major government personality admits that Greece was following policies of discrimination against the Turkish minority. In all fairness the author has to make clear that some of Mr. Kalamidas’ remarks were expressed in a confidential manner. It was Mr. Kalamidas’ sad and untimely death that prompted the author to reveal this piece of information, although the interviewee himself told him not to because these things should not be admitted by Greeks. However, this is an important information and the author publishes it here knowing that his source will not face any political cost.

punished. A special regulation was also passed that the Muftis can administer the Islamic law on several matters.”⁴⁵

“Only recently did we change our tactics. We built health centres and financed the restoration of mosques. I forced the Greek teachers to go to their classes, I offered TV’s to every coffee shop, we begun to draft Muslims in the police, in the public sector and we now have Muslim army officers.”⁴⁶

The threat that Turkey was posing to Greece’s security was cultivated by the invention of the threat of the “Islamic Bow” allegedly developing under Turkey’s leadership and whose aim was to surround and cut Greece off from the rest of Europe. This imaginary threat soon became part of the national myth and was presented as a proof of the animosity that was surrounding Greece. The phenomenological existence of this bow (Albania, Bosnia, The FYROM, Bulgaria, Thrace, Turkey) cultivated this fear in the minds of the public and the policy-makers. It even created confusion among those who believed that a balance of power existed between Greece and Turkey, those who still had faith in the international norms protected by intergovernmental organisations, and those who clearly saw that Turkey’s initial increase in its influence in the region did not bear the fruits that the Turkish governments expected. So, Greece instead of trying to make some moves forward in relation to Turkey continued to confront its adversary through the Community by putting impediments in Europe’s association with Turkey.

“Turkey made a big effort but did not succeed. It’s got 1,000,000 Turks in Bulgaria. There are many Muslims in Skopje. The Turks are about 120,000 and there are Muslim Albanians and so-called Muslim Macedonians. There is Bosnia. And, of course, half of the population of Albania is Muslim. This Muslim Bow does exist. Turkey made an effort to strengthen what we call Islamic Bow but did not succeed. It did not succeed in its efforts towards the new democracies of Central Asia.”⁴⁷

“You shouldn’t draw hasty conclusion; the “Islamic Bow” cannot exist because there are populations which share the same religion. That was Turkey’s ambition but Turkey had great expectations which could not be materialised. Because there are many differences and divisions among Muslim countries. Look at what is happening between other Muslim countries, all the killing and suffering. If you

⁴⁵ K. Mitsotakis speaking in parliament, Parliamentary Procedures, Session Θ, 18/10/91, p. 316.

⁴⁶ Interview with Mr. Konstantinos Thanopoulos former Prefect of Xanthi

⁴⁷ M. Papakonstantinou (interview).

draw such simple conclusions, that the Muslims will join forces against Christian Greece, then you can not draft foreign policy.”⁴⁸

The invention of the “Islamic Bow”, though, highlights the preoccupation that Greece has with Turkey. In a number of occasions Turkey has used force as a medium of accomplishing its objectives (Cyprus, Iraqi Kurdistan). Territorial claims appear in the Turkish media, and some politicians hold them. The population of Turkey is five times bigger than that of Greece and its military larger and active (against the Kurds). Europe and NATO have made clear that they want to stay out of the Greek-Turkish disputes and therefore, Greece’s much wanted aid from its allies cannot be secured. The sense of loneliness increases the fear and explains why the Greeks are so sensitive about everything that happens around them, especially if they feel that change may be in Turkey’s favour.

“The problem of Greece in the Balkans is not located on its northern frontiers but on the eastern ones. It is presented by Turkey. This threat exists since the end of the World War II even though it wasn’t very clear because these were different times and Turkey was not in a position to do anything. When Turkey became capable the threat was manifest, since 1972-3 onwards, and became more tangible. We have to put the main load of our efforts to tackle the threat from the east.”⁴⁹

“The Turkish threat exists. There is an imbalance of power and an active military presence of Turkey in the region; there is the occupation of Cyprus. There are differences of opinion in Greece on how this threat should be dealt. But all the Greek governments had some bad experiences with Turkey. Thus, the whole political spectrum has adopted to a great extent a common position towards Turkey.”⁵⁰

All in all the Greek government tried to combine moderation and toughness in its foreign policy. In its quest to promote its prestige in the Balkans and in the West it tried to look ready to discuss and compromise, since bravado was not welcomed by NATO and the EC. But the sense it developed about the new situation in the region was fueled by a certain amount of fear. In order to overcome that the Greek government chose to

⁴⁸ D. Konstas (interview).

⁴⁹ M. Kalamidas (interview).

⁵⁰ D. Konstas (interview).

follow a tough stance on the issues that mattered the most. It was very difficult for the government to back down from this stance since other institutions, especially the military, had already assessed the situation, made their views (which reflected a general mood that had developed) clear, and were preparing themselves for war. Although the military has been stripped of much of the powers that were a threat to the democracy, its role continues to be important. The Minister of Defence who participates in the Governmental Council of National Security, of the major institutions for policy planning, may be responsible of implementing the government's policies in the military but also brings back the views of the leadership of the armed forces which usually are very clear.

“...the destabilization of the Balkan security sub-system, a result of a wrong policy that allowed the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, in conjunction with the Balkan aspirations of Turkey affect the defence problem of our country and create many additional threats from the North. The provocations against our National Security in our Northern frontiers are caused by: a) The hypocritical insistence and the provocative attitude of Skopje, the falsification of the Greek history, the usurpation and stealing of the name of Macedonia and its spiritual and cultural heritage. It is certain that if these actions are legalised by the international community they will remain in history as political sacrilege which will sustain future causes of war in the Balkans. b) The aspiration of Tirana to create in the foreseeable future the Great Albania by incorporating Kossovo, Epirus, and the Albanian part of Skopje. To accomplish that the post-communist Albania establishes close political, economic, and military ties with Turkey and Albania's turn towards Islamism is characteristic. The practice of Tirana against the rights of the Greek minority in Northern Epirus and the effort to create an Albanian Cham minority in Epirus suggests and connotes that they have expansionist plans against us. c) The aspiration of Albania to violently incorporate Serbia's cultural and historical centre Kossovo, or any separatist insurrection there, will set alight the Balkans. Greece, in particular, will get involved in order to protect its frontiers, the Greek minorities in Northern Epirus and Monastiri, to prevent the influx of thousands of refugees, to prevent the creation of Greater Albania or Bulgaria. Turkey will also intervene due to its dogma of “protection of the Muslim populations in the Balkans” and in order to satisfy its expansionist aspirations in the Aegean and Thrace. d) Turkey tries to establish an anti-Greek axis between Ankara-Skopje-Tirana in order to outflank the Greek defence in the north. It also tries to create political, economic and military ties and interests through the “Islamic Dogma”.⁵¹

⁵¹ From a document called “Foreign and Defence Policy Views of the General Staff of National Defence.”

Two questions emerge here. To what extent was the official Greek foreign policy guided by the will to acquire more influence and standing in the region? And to what extent was this policy influenced by the fears towards the national security that were shared by the government and the military? The answer to these questions is that while the main objective was to gain more influence and acquire a higher power status, the Greek government found itself into a situation in which it felt that it had to deal first with the external threats, however real or unreal they were. The Greek government tried to tackle these two dimensions and while on the one hand it appeared defensive on the other its policy included the will to move towards the accomplishment of a higher status. The result was far from successful since in the end the Greek foreign policy-makers had to back down to external pressure in order to salvage their position and voice within the intergovernmental organisations they participate. Greece had failed to move independently and its foreign policy was once again guided, to a great extent, by the external environment.

“Greece became much too preoccupied with the Skopje issue. The result was that it missed the chance to form a comprehensive Balkan policy and in the end we found ourselves once again the followers of the line that others prescribe for us. We do not now have any objections to a possible allied military intervention in Bosnia, for example.”⁵²

The messages that the Greek government could not act freely in the international environment started to come very quickly. Yet, the policy did not change for a long time. The answer to this is that the stance of the Greek government was to a certain point imposed on the Greek government by the domestic political interests which quickly tried to exploit the foreign policy issues and the public mood towards them.

⁵² H. Rozakis (interview).

Chapter 10: The Greek Foreign Policy as a Hostage of the Domestic Political Interests

The domestic environment always plays a particular role in the shaping of the foreign policy of a state. This domestic dimension is examined in this chapter. The political system, party interests and internal objectives affect on the policy-making process. In times of crisis, like the one that the Greek government found itself, the reaction of the opposition, the public and other interests can have a profound effect. The Greeks are a nation highly interested in politics and the political system is shaped in such a way that a great amount of political debate takes place: in every coffee shop, in the vigorous media, the televised parliament sessions. The polarisation of the system between two major, and populist, parties ensures that the public interest in politics remains high. It also leaves room to the politicians to manipulate foreign affairs issues for domestic reasons.

“In Greece there is a tradition of manipulating foreign policy for internal consumption. One party accuses the other according to which is in power and which in opposition. Not all of them play this bad role when they are in opposition but the truth is that a lot of things are said; and those who say them do not really believe them.”¹

“When the foreign policy becomes the subject of party or personal manipulation it is unavoidable that it will be exercised according to party-political or personal criteria and will lean towards populism: that is the principle cause of the foreign policy’s distortion. The detachment of foreign policy from the party competition and the subsequent decrease of the political cost will be a great gain for our land.”²

The parties are also the “guardians” of the national interest. The vagueness of the concept allows them to attribute to it whatever content they like according to their own interests. These interests may be influenced by other interest groups mainly of an economic character which wish to pass their views on the party policies. Bureaucratic and trade union interests also play an important part in the shaping of the public interest. In

¹ Y. Valinakis (interview).

² Theodorakopolos and others op. cit., p. 91.

fact, many times these interests affect the international relation of Greece; especially towards Europe since the Greeks, champions of the demonstration and strike, strongly oppose EC/U policies which affect their vested interests.

“Mitsotakis, and that has been revealed, was forced to accept other interests and as a result we changed our policy.”³

“As far as the “national interest” was concerned I believe that the mentality of the weaker and more outdated social sectors was imposed on Greek foreign policy. Those sectors that cannot have an extrovert activity. Those who see the change as a danger to their vested interests and not as an opportunity to widen their interests and enhance their competence.”⁴

On the political level, parties in government usually try to persuade the public that they promote the national interest through their foreign policy in order to secure their vote in the next elections. The opposition is extremely critical and tries to persuade the public that the government has compromised the national interest. Ideological differences and conflict of interest within the same party can also affect the policy planning, always in the name of the national interest. The government can find itself in a difficult position in its effort to justify its foreign policy in party and the parliament. The great variety of the criteria taken under consideration in the shaping of the national interest in the policy-makers minds also ensures that a number of different interpretations of its content will appear which will in their turn result in different approaches on how it can be accomplished.

“There is some antagonism between bureaucracies; mainly between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is not immense. It is, though, within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially among the political leadership. There are three Ministers with different fields and three General Secretaries, and the Prime Minister’s Office which tries to dominate the policy-making process. This results in conflict and the policy is a compromise. These conflicts exist in other countries as well but because of our own organisational deficiency the problem is bigger and results in the impairment of the policy.”⁵

³ M. Kalamidas (interview).

⁴ H. Rozakis (interview).

⁵ Y. Valinakis (interview).

So, in times of crisis, when the state is dragged into a dispute, the press, nationalist politicians, patriotic organisations etc. intervene in the political debate. They are determined to try to impose the policies they believe should be followed so that the national interest can be accomplished. In situations like these, when national sentiments are heated, political interests exploit the disputes in order to divert the attention of the public from other issues or to manipulate it in order to achieve their own ends. Opposition leaders in particular, manipulate foreign policy issues, try to cause fear among the public, criticise every action of the government and use nationalistic language in order to persuade the public that it is them who can protect the national interest. The following quotation is an illuminating example of nationalist rhetoric:

“This is about the state expression and organisation of a frenetic, troublesome, and dangerous great-idealism. It is a dangerous great-idealism which is based on a cynical and absurd perversion of historical truth. And I hope that the government knows that anything that this great-idealism expresses, this great-idealism of the provocative maps and insults which creates powder barrels in Europe, cannot be confronted with verbal assurances of academic or ceremonial character. It cannot be confronted with statements that will be baptised assurances. It can only be confronted with objectively reassuring measures which will ensure that this great-idealism will collide on an insuperable dam and will collapse forever in the oblivion of history.”⁶

An examination of the Greek twentieth century history shows that domestic politics and “national matters” are interrelated. Of course, foreign policy issues always influence the domestic political system in every country. But in Greece the handling of foreign policy issues resulted on many occasions in grave political consequences. The discussion over the national issues led to political crisis like the “National Schism” during the First World War which resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy (at least for a period), led to the execution of senior government and military figures after the defeat by the Turks in 1922 in Asia Minor, and were part of political strife which led to the Civil War.

⁶ Anastasios Peponis former minister of PASOK speaking in parliament on behalf of A. Papandreou, Parliamentary Proceedings, Session Θ, 18/10/91, p. 324.

The outcome of the Civil War ensured the continuation of this pattern. The Greek left wingers were officially considered traitors as opposed to the patriotic right-wingers for a long time until the victory of the Socialist PASOK in 1981. The term “national-minded” (*ethnicofron*) became a synonym of the right wing bloc and denoted one’s support to the triptych “homeland, religion, family”. This slogan was used for the post-war creation of a centralised administration which would only employ servants who declared their allegiance to the national ideals. The police and the army followed that pattern and became very zealous, especially the police, in their protection of the state from the “*eam-o-bulgarian thief-gangs*” of the left⁷. Their allegiance to these values made the administration and the security forces swift in their support to any power group that ensured the protection of these principles whether this group was the monarchy, the military junta or elected right-wing politicians.

It can be argued that this triptych was used by the state in order to create an administration and security force which would have the ability and the necessary public support to withstand the threat the Warsaw Pact neighbours posed to Greece. It can also be argued that this was the way to ensure that the right-wing populist bloc would remain in power. Nevertheless, the “national-minded” ideology created a political culture among these elements of the Greek population that identified with it: the glory of the Ancient Greek civilisation, the grandeur of the Byzantine empire, the prevalence of the Christian-Orthodox faith. The defence of the “*Hellenic-Christian*” civilisation in political terms involved the struggle by all means against opposing ideologies, the preparation for war against the Communist countries and profound distaste of the infidels: Turks, the Vatican, the Jews⁸. The politicians who are defenders of this ideology are still members of the right-wing bloc and use it in order to gather votes. In times where national matters dominate the news they are ready to exploit this ideology and the public feeling for the sake of their political interest.

⁷ EAM was the National Liberation Front during the Occupation of Greece by Axis forces, “Bulgarian thief-gangs” were the fighters of the ELAS and DSE military wings of EAM.

*“The fear that many felt had to do with the past: with the danger that northern Greece faced during the Civil War. With the internal Communist coup or insurrection in conjunction with the help of the neighbours; a “Slav-communist” threat which does not exist today. This fear, that was a bit over the top, is explained only if one looks -only- on the historic past.”*⁹

On the other hand the centre-left bloc used the term “national-underbidder” to characterise their opponents. They thought that the maintenance of power hold of the right had been the result of a sell out of the national interests to Britain and the USA. They were the real patriots - they had inherited the glory of the national struggle against the Axis occupiers and the Western capitalist interests in the Balkans. The paradox in the non-Communist part of this bloc, the main opponent of the right, was that the basis of its national ideology was the same tradition as the right: the Ancient Greek civilisation and the Orthodox faith. The difference was that the elements of grandeur were stripped of their metaphysical character and became part of the people’s soul and history. The republican tradition was married successfully with these elements of nationalist ideology and helped this bloc to gain an ever-growing popular support in its struggle against the monarchy and the right.

*“Since the “Asia Minor Disaster”, if not earlier, Greece is a field of immense political confrontations based on severe ideological differences. These political rifts led to a Civil War. This political schism affects the context of the foreign policy-making. The Greek foreign policy is guided by choices of internal dispositions. Greece’s allegiance to the US was a foreign policy option which was based on internal choices, namely the right’s effort to defeat the left.”*¹⁰

The main heirs of the “patriotic” centre-left bloc were Mr. Papandreou’s PASOK socialists who came into power in 1981 on a nationalist anti-western platform under the slogan “Greece belongs to the Greeks”. The PASOK government purged the administration, the police and the army from the hard-line right-wing elements and tried

⁸ Priests all over the country teach their flock that the Pope wishes to eradicate the Orthodox faith. It was in the 1990s that Greece eventually established full diplomatic relations with Israel with the exchange of ambassadors.

⁹ Y. Valinakis (interview).

¹⁰ H. Rozakis (interview).

to replace them with servants from a more democratic tradition. The fashion though in which the replacements took place ensured that the new power bloc used the same populist tactics of the right. These purges enlarged the political gap and hatred between the two populist blocs and the result was that their ideologies, national and political, became a reference textbook for those who had in fact clientelist associations among them.

Nationalist rhetoric remained a characteristic of the domestic political language and was used in order to reassure the allegiance of the partisans or to gather votes from the more volatile components of the electorate. In 1987 at a time when PASOK's government was losing popularity due to an economic programme of austerity, Mr. Papandreou who had promised that his government would never negotiate an inch of Greek territory threatened to go to war because a Turkish ship tried to enter the Aegean in order to scan for oil. Greek and Turkish military forces maneuvered in the north-east Aegean but the tension was diffused in the last minute. The result was hailed as a diplomatic victory, raised the popularity of the government and reassured the people that "Greece belongs to the Greeks".

This language has become a component of the modern political culture and the attitude of the ordinary people is guided by it. That explains why so many Greeks felt that they had to support the diplomatic undertaking of the Greek government against the recognition of the FYROM with demonstrations and letters in the international press and the internet.

“ It wasn't the first time in our history that the political world divides the population on matters that should be dealt with calmness and with understanding. And it believed that political profits can be made by acting as the uncompromising patriot. It cannot resist the temptation of maximalism since it receives applause and votes with the slogan "all or nothing".”¹¹

It was not the last either. Recently, in 1996, the PASOK backed mayor of the Aegean island of Kalymnos, faithful to the old slogan raised the Greek flag on an

¹¹ Mihalis Papakonstantinou, *Memoirs Of A Politician - The Entanglement Of Skopje*, The Bookshop of Estia, Athens, 1994, p. 184.

uninhabited island whose size is similar to the Piccadilly Circus. The result of this action were three dead Greek Navy officers after Greek and Turkish forces were met once again in the Aegean. Calls for resignation of the moderate PASOK government of Mr. Simitis, an old rival of Mr. Papandreou in the party, were heard from some Papandreou faithful members of PASOK and calls for sending the responsible to “Goudi”¹² were heard from some right-wing MPs in the Parliament. Indeed, the New Democracy party under the leadership of Mr. Miltiadis Evert tried to capitalise in these events by trying to resume the role of the defender of the national interest. During the election campaign of the same year he used a populist language in which nationalism was a part of and claimed in the Greek television that there are no “lost homelands, there are only unredeemed homelands”. The important question though is that if the mayor of Kalymnos is able to dictate Greek foreign policy by bringing, with his actions, the country on the brink of war what would happen if the whole nation was fueled by a nationalist tendency over foreign policy issues and there were politicians ready to take advantage of this feeling. This was the case between 1990-3 and the New Democracy government of Mr. Mitsotakis.

“The handling of the foreign policy issues, especially the Macedonian issue, by some sectors of the political leadership was problematic. The leadership of the two major parties, and of the Left Coalition in which this phenomenon existed although it disappeared quicker, cultivated the fear of something that might become a threat in the future. They did so, either because they really believed it or because it suited their aims. They created something that became a boomerang and turned against the political leaderships which couldn’t in the end depart from the policy they had initiated.”¹³

The PASOK party which was in opposition at that time was calling for tough actions by the Greek government. On the Macedonian issue in particular they called for the closing of the border. On the other hand the moderate wing of the New Democracy whose origins was the republican centre and which began to infiltrate the right-wing bloc in the late seventies found it difficult to withstand the pressure of being the heirs in

¹² The place in Athens where six senior government and military officials charged with treason were executed after a swift and unjust trial following the defeat of 1922 in Asia Minor.

¹³ Y. Valinakis (interview).

government of the old *ethnicon* ideology. Mr. Mitsotakis, a moderate centre-right politician, and his colleagues found themselves trapped in the rhetoric of right-wing government officials like Mr. Evert, his future successor, and the Foreign Affairs minister Mr. Antonis Samaras. The government had a majority of only two in the parliament and that made things even more difficult. The power struggle within the party influenced the foreign policy of the government which could not back down from the position of not recognizing the FYROM with the name Macedonia. Mr. Mitsotakis and his colleagues struggled hard to keep the government together, and tried to plan a policy that would not back down from what their adversaries in and out of the party claimed to be the national interest; at the same time and as a result of continuing isolation from abroad they tried to appear open to discussion and compromise. In fact, they reached a point of compromise on several occasions but in the end they had to back off under internal pressure.

“[The preoccupation with the name and the symbols] was a matter of internal party strife and of competition between parties in domestic politics. The issue was left in the hands of people, forgive me for talking like that, who were ignorant of history, ignorant of the Balkans. On all sides and at the very highest levels. Even the President, Karamanlis, I am afraid that he lives with the ghosts of the Bulgarian occupation of his village. Our foreign policy is wrong and it is not the Ministry’s fault. They know better. It is the rest of the political leadership that it is wrong. Any political leadership. What could I do? I had to follow a line.”¹⁴

“The Prime Minister rejected my proposals. The developments in the Skopjan did not allow my resignation from the ministry. And we should think about the internal party situation, at a time when it looked like we were losing the slim majority that we had. We should clear first the situation inside our parliamentary wing.”¹⁵

“As a result of the slim majority, Mitsotakis lost control because he didn’t have the opportunity, or because didn’t feel strong enough, to distance himself from those who disagreed with his policy. He did so very late and he paid the price of his shortcomings. When the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs disagree the latter has to go. He can’t force the Prime Minister to accept his view and stay in office until the PM finds the strength to dismiss him. Mitsotakis himself had appeared on TV in November 1991 and talked about the “Macedonia of Skopje”. He had in his mind a combination of names. He was forced to play

¹⁴ M. Papakonstantinou (interview).

¹⁵ M. Papakonstantinou op. cit., p. 178.

Samaras' game and when Papakonstantinou came to the Ministry it was too late."¹⁶

*"The Greek government became a hostage of the tough stance it adopted. The antagonism between the "patriotic" positions that followed did not allow a compromise to be made when it was possible; when the Community had taken decisions, like in Lisbon, that could help this process. It would be easier then to discuss the issue of the name and agree to the use of a mixed name. It is more difficult now to achieve a change, when a situation is stabilised with the passing of time, when everybody calls Skopje, Macedonia."*¹⁷

The side of Mr. Evert tried to undermine the influence of Mr. Mitsotakis within the party and the base of New Democracy by making open criticisms on both the foreign and domestic policies of the government. The opposition was joining forces and tried to topple the government with a motion of censure. Mr. Mitsotakis, who used the best nationalist arguments against PASOK, only survived because the balance in the party struggle was still in his favour. The target of this motion, though, was the public, and in that respect it was successful.

*"The President of PASOK used the word "under-bidding". But this is how you governed when you were in power. In 1984, you gave the order that songs which refer to Macedonia, like "Our Macedonia" and "Macedonia Renowned" should be banned from the armed forces. Many officers who ordered their troops to sing these songs were punished. Any officer that dared speak about Macedonia and Northern Epirus and unredeemed Hellenism was conceived dangerous right-winger and fell into disfavour. Since 1990 officers can refer freely to Northern Epirus and Macedonia, to talk about the Greek just causes. And the two songs, after a General Army Staff order, are now sung again."*¹⁸

*"The truth is that our national policy is planned not in the framework of a national strategy but on the basis of internal party terms and confrontations. This is the degeneration of our land."*¹⁹

"Mr. Mitsotakis said that he never believed in the struggle we undertook on this national matter. The Prime Minister of the country said so in this very Chamber. If he didn't believe why didn't he try one and a half years ago to reach a compromise

¹⁶ Y. Valinakis (interview).

¹⁷ D. Konstas (interview).

¹⁸ K. Mitsotakis speaking against the motion against his government, Parliamentary Proceedings, Session PΔ, 29/3/93, p. 5368.

¹⁹ Stavros Benos, MP and former minister of PASOK speaking in parliament in favour of the motion against the government, Parliamentary Proceedings, Session PΔ, 29/3/93, p. 5324.

rather than stepping to this despicable compromise that we are now facing? Today we are not moving towards compromise. We are moving towards Waterloo. Mr. Mitsotakis not only abandoned the front, at a time when all the people and the young had been awakened, but he was mocking the fight of the Greeks.”²⁰

“This is not just a national defeat, one that would be the result of battles that the government fought but one could say that it lost. It is not a national humiliation either. Humiliation would involve the actions of third parties. This is an action of national suicide, an action of national degradation, a national self-vilification. I do have, however, the feeling that at last a new Greece is going to be born. A country that will believe in Europe but will not be dragged by Europe, a country that will believe in peace but will not be afraid of war, and most of all a country that will believe in itself. This is the Greece that we promise.”²¹

Mr. Samaras, an ambitious younger politician, quickly after his dismissal from office after the row within the government over Macedonia began to count his forces within the party. In the summer of 1993 he formed his own nationalist POLAN (Political Spring) party and quickly found the necessary amount of MPs who were willing to join and withdraw their support from the government. Amid the debate on other important political issues the Macedonian issue and the moderation of the government on other foreign policy matters had taken their toll on the government’s future in power. In the early elections of October 1993 PASOK returned to power with the promise that it would not compromise on the national matters. Meanwhile, the internal political struggle over the name had damaged Greek foreign policy.

“You should also keep in mind that at that time Papandreou was explicitly in favour of these views. He didn’t know that there was a difference of opinion between Samaras and Mitsotakis in order to exploit it as he did later. The rift in the government was inevitable. From one point onwards Samaras realised that Mitsotakis was pulling his legs. I lived all that story. Samaras would say one thing, Mitsotakis would answer “yes-yes” and then he would change it. In March 1992 an American initiative appeared, completely out of the blue, which called for recognition of those ex-Yugoslav states who hadn’t been yet recognised. Mitsotakis called a meeting with Samaras, Molyviatis, Giounis and other foreign policy officials of the government. Mitsotakis asked Samaras to prepare himself and see if he could accept a compromise at some point. Mitsotakis, though, had discussed this option with others [Americans, Europeans and his aides] and was ready to

²⁰ Mimis Androulakis former MP of the Coalition of the Left and Progress speaking in the aforementioned procedure, p. 5325.

²¹ Stylianos Papatthemelis former minister of PASOK speaking in the aforementioned procedure, p. 5339.

accept a compromise. Samaras said he would not accept a compromise. Mitsotakis said OK but he continued to work towards a compromise. Samaras realised that and he began to call for a meeting of the political leaders with the president where he would put forward his position. He threatened to resign if the meeting was not held. The meeting was held in April, Samaras repeated that he would not compromise and he was sacked.”²²

“The Macedonian issue was used as the focus of the internal struggle within the New Democracy. Samaras contested the leadership of Mitsotakis who had a very bad past since his defection from George Papandreou’s Centre Union party. Within the New Democracy he was viewed by many as an outsider, a non-conservative, a populist, and a nepotist. On the other hand, PASOK saw that the nationalist rhetoric of Samaras attracted the public and they adopted it. Out of petty-political interests the importance of the issue was exaggerated. Today, the people who exploited the issue try to reduce the public’s emotion.”²³

“Andreas is a cunning man. He is smart. He is able to manipulate the public any way he wants. He was shouting when he was in opposition. Now quietly, without any fuss he calls Skopje for discussions. If Mitsotakis was trying to do the same he would cause hue and cry.”²⁴

The devastating manner with which the domestic political interests are able to affect the way in which the foreign policy is conducted originates in the national ideology of the Greeks. Without it the politicians could not be able to play on public feeling in order to serve their interests. And the public would not be so critical of any government that did not protect the national interest unless the public itself was so preoccupied with issues that affected its own sense of national identity.

²² M. Kalamidas (interview).

²³ H. Rozakis (interview).

²⁴ M. Papakonstantinou (interview).

Chapter 11: The Public Sense of National Identity and its Effect on the Greek Foreign Policy

The identity of modern Greeks is a strange mixture of western and oriental elements. Their cuisine, popular music, sexual relationships, and market dealings are rooted in the oriental tradition. The Orthodox Church, which is an essential part of modern Hellenism, uses hymns whose harmonies and melodies combine Ancient Greek musical elements with Turkish and Arabic long-drawn *amane* music. The mystical effect of the Orthodox service is also enhanced by the burning of heavy incense. These oriental elements actually denote the existence of a strange mixture in the identity of the Church itself. The tradition of the Orthodox Church is firmly rooted in the Byzantine Empire and naturally it abhors anything that had to do with its demise, the Turks and Islam. On the other hand Byzantium's main cultural weapon against the Catholic West was the Church and in this respect Orthodoxy became a profound enemy of the Vatican. This hatred against Catholicism is expressed in the slogan "better the Turkish fez to the Franks' tiara"¹. Yet, the Church and the Greeks take much pride in believing that they are the defenders of the Christian faith of Europe against the Islamic East. And that the defence of Orthodoxy everywhere in the world is in the national interest of Greece.

*"We are the spearhead of the non-Islamic Europe. And our role in the West can only be determined by this fact. For as long as Islam acts as a unified political entity the non Islamic Greece will retain its strategic importance."*²

"For us it is very difficult to distinguish between Hellenism and Orthodoxy because for centuries the one concept has been brewed with the other. The Hellenic character that we have placed into Orthodoxy though, was not in favour of Hellenism."³

¹ This popular saying originates at the time of the Byzantium's siege by the Ottoman Turks. Actually one of the myths surrounding the fall of Constantinople describes that a group of priests who preferred the Ottomans to the Aristocracy's will to defend Byzantium by align it to the Catholic West opened the gate which enabled the Turks to infiltrate the city and attack its defenders from behind.

² Antonis Samaras, Interview in Kathemerini 2/10/90.

³ Theodorakopoulos and others, op. cit., p. 29.

*“We should have followed a policy which would be able to change the correlation in the Balkans. A policy which would have allowed us to keep our relations with Serbia on a high level. Which would have allowed us to strengthen the Orthodox front. We abandoned this front. We didn’t enhance our relations with Bulgaria and Russia, we didn’t look after the Orthodox populations and we let Turkey’s influence reach Serajevo. And what do we see now? We see the meeting of two bows. From the one side the German Bow and from the other the Islamic Bow meeting in Serajevo.”*⁴

Other elements of the Greek identity like their philosophical, scientific and political traditions are Western and actually originate in Ancient Greece which today is considered as the cradle of the Western civilisation in general. The preservation of these traditions fills with pride the Greeks who see themselves as part of Europe and the West. Although the contribution of Greece to philosophy, art, science and politics was made thousands of years ago, the modern Greeks try to take credit for it and actually believe that they should receive an appropriate amount of respect by the West.

*“More importantly, Greece constitutes the continuity of a Nation with a vast tradition and contribution to humanity, something that secures to it a unique and powerful national identity.”*⁵

Modern Greece is blessed by the presence of brilliant scientists and artists but this is rarely recognised by the West. This is partly a fault of the Greek authorities which place too much importance in promoting abroad the ancient grandeur of Greece and who believe that the sun, the sea and the relics are what it takes to attract tourism and admiration from abroad. As a result the West still views Greece as a fairly backward country, a characteristic that in previous times contributed to the attractiveness of Greece abroad, but it is now considered as a major problem in Greece’s attachment to the European integration project.

As a consequence, the Greeks view Europe and the West with much scepticism. They want to be a part of it but they resent the fact that their partners do not appreciate what they have been once and what they are now. Moreover, they are afraid that an

⁴ Ioannis Haralambopoulos, former minister of PASOK speaking in parliament in favour of the motion against the government, Parliamentary Proceedings, Session PΔ, 29/3/93, p. 5342.

⁵ K. Mitsotakis speaking in parliament, Parliamentary Proceedings, Session ΠΕ, 24/2/92, p. 4161.

outside appreciation would entail concessions to their lifestyle and elements of identity. And this is where a paradox appears in relation to the identity of the modern Greeks: it seems that they have not come to terms with their own identity. They do not want to be considered Orientals as they want to show and prove that they are capable of being a part of Europe in economic, political and lifestyle terms. But they do not want to compromise their traditional laid-back way of life into the coach of European efficiency and organisation. Although there is nothing wrong with an identity that combines oriental and western elements, the Greeks seem anxious to highlight or deny these characters according to the circumstances.

As a result the only stable reference from which they derive their identity is the glorious past of Ancient Greece and Byzantium. They believe that although such a long time has passed the light of this glory still lightens the world and proves the superiority of Hellenism as a national civilisation. This sense of superiority is increased by bringing into memory famous heroic battles and victories over enemies whose numbers and might were greater than those of the Greeks. But even in defeat, the myth continues, Hellenism survived and proved superior to the civilisation of the conquerors. Romans and Ottomans were influenced by Hellenism in many respects art, literature, politics economics etc. With these associations the notion of Hellenism as a civilisation is transformed into an idea.

“The Greeks are very sentimental people. It is a nation with a long history and is very proud for it. One reason that we can't understand today's reality is that once we were a great power and today we are not. We haven't come to terms with this although so much time has passed since then. And we can't accept that the stronger powers have more influence on things than the weaker ones. So, in the particular issues that emerged we were unable to understand correctly the developments and we showed a great deal of sensitivity which had to do with our history.”⁶

This idea constitutes the womb from which the modern Greek nationalism sprung. Hellenism must be fondled, nourished and protected in every place where Greek speaking communities exist: the Balkans, Europe, Russia, Turkey, Syria, Africa, Australia, North and South America.

“Protection of Ethnic Greeks living abroad: On the 15th August 1993, 1003 ethnic Greeks living in Georgia were evacuated. The removal from the area was necessary for the protection of their lives due to the critical situation there, since for more than a year now fighting between the Georgian Army and the Abkhajian separatists was raging. The operation’s code name was “Golden Fleece” and the European Press characterised the operation as the biggest one regarding evacuation of people from a war zone organised by a European Nation with National means only without any external assistance.”⁷

The Great Idea (*Megali Idea*) which expressed the Greek nationalism in the early twentieth century aspired to the redemption of the Greeks who still lived under Ottoman rule and to regain the “historic” boundaries of the Greek civilisation. The renaissance of Hellenism to its “natural” cultural boundaries meant that Greece could now be once again a part of the great Western civilisation. The rebirth of the Olympic idea in Athens in 1896 was a confirmation that Greece was taking its rightful place among the civilised nations of the world. Although the Great Idea led to disaster in 1922, the modern Greek state covers much of the “historic” territory of Hellenism. This territory is now viewed as the cultural centre for Greeks all over the world.

For some people the Great Idea is still alive. Religious, political and social groups still talk about the “unredeemed homelands”. But the main component of Greek nationalism remains the idea of Hellenism and its contemporary statehood. This statehood and tradition was thought to be threatened and violated when Greek nationalism resurfaced so strongly between 1990-3.

“The second threat -namely against our national identity and our cultural heritage- inspires a strong sentimental charge of all Greeks anywhere they may be living. This threat consists in the effort by Skopje to encroach and monopolise the history, the culture, the monuments, the symbols, the historic events and the personalities and everything referring to the presence and what the Greeks have created in Macedonia throughout the centuries. In other words it is a blatant violation of the rights of a people to its cultural identity and heritage..”⁸

⁶ Y. Valinakis (interview).

⁷ “The Situation In The Balkans” op. cit.

⁸ “The Situation In The Balkans” op. cit.

The folk image of the country surrounded by enemies which threaten the survival of Hellenism and its historic territory are the main themes of the present day Greek national myth. These themes comprised with the central idea of the Greek national ideology/myth make clear to any politician that the national interest in the eyes of the public is the preservation at any cost of this identity and its territory. The lower income groups (and members of the middle class of a humble origin), although they have very little knowledge of history and philosophy, are particularly prone to honour the symbols of this tradition since this is the only way they can feel proud. Older generations, and conservative families with their inclination to look to glorious past times extend the social spectrum of this nationalist ideology. Sentimentality on this issue ensures their readiness to accept any populist rhetoric which stimulates their nationalism especially when the territorial dimension is brought in with the identification of enemies. The shape of Greece, a long frontier in the north and numerous little islands facing Turkey, is a fundamental factor in the final making of the Greek national identity: it creates a sense of insecurity which results in a public mentality that quickly identifies “threats” from the outside. And these “threats” question the territorial exclusiveness of the Greek nation and the preservation of its ideology: Hellenism.

“I should have taken under consideration yet another factor: the myth-making attitude that has appeared in our land, the permanent and obsessive idea about the international conspiracy planned against us, the foreign “dactyl” or foreign factor, or the “dark forces” which always interfere with us. And that in the end, in every situation in which we face difficulty we are never the party in the wrong; is always “the others” who are to blame. The cause originates from us the politicians and is passed onto the people. It feeds our party expectations, it helps us to highlight our role as the protectors of the country upon whom our survival is based.”⁹

“The symbolisation of the foreign policy, the preservation of the historic past that it should achieve, was the characteristic that prevailed in the end. The weaker social strata in conjunction with some political powers created a politics of symbols. This is the politics of the old. Greece was like an old person stranded in the past of grandeur and had nothing new to look for.”¹⁰

⁹ M. Papakonstantinou op. cit., p. 31 and p. 102.

¹⁰ H. Rozakis (interview).

“The notion of the “brotherless nation” which is under threat by anybody is catastrophic. Likewise the notion that we are the cultural centre of the Earth, and that any desire we have can be satisfied.”¹¹

Such “threats” were identified after the 1990-93 developments in the Balkans. They violated the “critical boundary” of Hellenism and caused a sense of fear that could be vanquished only by the adoption of a valiant stance against enemies and fiends. The real or supposed usurpation of Greek symbols and names, with the apparent indifference of Europe, was conceived as a major crime against Hellenism. An international network of propaganda, in which Skopje had a part, was aspiring to destroy the image that Hellenism had created through thousands of years of survival. Soon conspiracy theories implicating neighbours and minorities would be the focus of the discussion among Greeks. The media were very active in trying to stir up the national sentiment. As a result millions would demonstrate that “Macedonia is Greek”, they would read pseudo-scholarly publications about the “greekness” of the Pomaks, they would begin to sympathise with the idea of an autonomous “Northern Epirus”, they would dread the emergence of the “Islamic Bow” surrounding Greece. Europe and NATO ceased to be partners and became either victims of the propaganda or foes of Hellenism. The Orthodox Serbs were the only friends since they had to fight against Islam, the Vatican and Europe. The Greeks awaited the time when the relation between powers would lead to a new full scale Balkan war which would bring together all the enemies of the past against Greece.

“The world we live in is sensitive. Greece does not know that. Greece ignores the Community, has a bad opinion for NATO; I am talking about the public now. Greece does not know what is the CSCE. Greece does not know about the complex of the new agreements, of the new world that has risen. And lives with the phantoms of the past. We want Macedonia because we remember Alexander the Great, Vassilios the ‘Bulgarian-slayer’ etc. These ghosts, these stories survive in our consciousness, even today.”¹²

¹¹ Leonidas Kyrkos, “Stepping towards Edinburgh” article of the former Secretary of the Coalition of the Left and Progress, in Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, 6/12/92, in “*The Yearbook Of Defence and Foreign Policy*”, The Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), p. 60.

¹² M. Papakonstantinou (interview).

*“After the “Asia Minor Disaster” 1,500,000 refugees, lost their homes and their father’s land and came to Greece. Today, the refugee’s descendants might number 2,500,000. This large sector of the population has been nurtured with the idea that Turkey is aggressive and can destroy us. The “Islamic Bow” is a postscript to this fear: that they will be driven once again away from their homes. Most of them live in northern Greece, mainly in Macedonia. All these people found a home to stay but the symbols of the past are alive in their minds and they fear that once again their homes are under threat. For these people issues like the name are of major importance.”*¹³

*“There is a natural feeling of threat felt by the Hellenic people, especially those living in Northern Greece, due to the fact that they have experienced three aggressions and two foreign occupations of their territory in the 20th century. In all three cases one neighbouring Balkan country, allied with one or more European countries, tried to give flesh to the territorial claims against Hellenic Macedonia and Thrace.”*¹⁴

At a time when the Greek public was tired with a corrupt political system, had to suffer the burden of an austerity in order to catch the train of European integration, and sensed that the country was losing its prestige abroad, the only thing that could make them feel proud was the continuation of their love affair with their past. There was no question of a compromise over the elements of their identity and their message was clear to the government and the whole of the political spectrum.

*“Greece cannot recognise Skopje with the name “Macedonia”. The huge demonstration in Thessaloniki proved that. This was something that we have never seen before. It surpassed all previous party rallies. That was the awakening of a nation. And similar events took place in Australia.”*¹⁵

“Since we incited a public of 1,000,000 to demonstrate in Thessaloniki and 1,000,000 in Athens, you can realise how difficult it was for us to accept a compromise afterwards. We were caught by a hyper-nationalistic fever and we were acting as we were afraid. It is absurd. The crowds are ignorant. We talk about a Macedonian minority in Greece. I live in my constituency. Indeed, there are some bilinguals, with Greek conscience, the majority of whom now speaks Greek instead of Slavic. They can express themselves in Greek and they feel Greeks. Agents will always exist, like Sidiropoulos. Why are we afraid about the Greek Macedonia? Because there are 30,000 bilinguals in the 2,000,000 of Greek Macedonians? Is the ignorance that possesses us. I live the region. I employ in my

¹³ H. Rozakis (interview).

¹⁴ “The Situation In The Balkans” op. cit.

¹⁵ A. Papandreou speaking in parliament, Parliamentary Proceedings, Session IIE, 24/2/92, p. 4164.

*political office in Kozani a bilingual. His grandfather was fighting alongside Pavlos Melas. And he has a letter framed in his living-room that Melas sent to his grandfather who could not read Greek. The hell with the minority, which minority? We are completely ridiculous.”*¹⁶

*“There is no Slav-Macedonian minority. There are Slavophones. And they have the most Hellenic conscience. The Slavophones of the Macedonian Struggle were too many. Some of the most brave captains were Slavophones like captain-Kotas who spoke the idiom that has passed to him from generation to generation but he had the most Greek of consciousness. We should be more careful though because in article 31 of the CSCE which we have signed we acknowledge that the affiliation with a minority is a matter of personal choice.”*¹⁷

*“In Florina, Kastoria, less in Kozani there are Greek compatriots who speak a vernacular idiom related to the Slavic. This is a reality and no one should close his eyes on reality. From this sector of the people many heroic figures appeared who gave their life for our homeland, when others were abandoning it.”*¹⁸

The government found itself trapped by this demand of the public and its actions were measured along the lines of the public reaction. When it tried to change course the public punished the government party by sending PASOK back to government with an absolute majority and by making the nationalist POLAN the third party in the Greek parliament.

*“The political leaders do not have the courage to present an unfavourable political message to the public. They are afraid of the price which in the end they pay double because of their bad handling of the situation. They are afraid to pay the small price of a truth and pay later when the public is disappointed and finds out that it has been misled, as it happened in the case of Skopje.”*¹⁹

Without any doubt the situation could not be handled in any case in a more reasonable manner. It is true that the masses can be manipulated and led but when they are led to situations where their sentiments take control of the mind it is extremely difficult to calm them down. A remarkable change of policy for that matter can not be put

¹⁶ M. Papakonstantinou (interview).

¹⁷ Leonidas Kyrkos, former Secretary of the Coalition of the Left and Progress, speaking in parliament (12/2/91). Parliamentary Proceedings, Session ΠΑΓ, p. 5981.

¹⁸ Demetrios Kostopoulos former Parliamentary Representative of the Communist Party of Greece, speaking in parliament, Parliamentary Proceedings, Session ΠΙΕ, 24/2/92, p. 4175.

¹⁹ Y. Valinakis (interview).

in the agenda of the policy-makers. The Greek public had made clear its beliefs with demonstrations. In a wide research that was carried out in the Spring of 1992 by a private research company the results of which were published in one of the most respectable Greek newspapers the Greek public gave the following answers²⁰: 1) The Macedonian and Northern Epirus issues were the most pressing national matters (80%) equal to the economy, education and Turkey. 2) The majority of the Greeks did not want Greece to accept any recognition of the FYROM with the name Macedonia (73%). 3) They thought that victory on that issue would enhance the international prestige of the country (51%). 4) They wanted the government to exercise veto to any unfavourable decision of the EC (80%). The high level of interest and sentimentality of the Greek public cultivated and exploited in that period affected the foreign policy of the state. It was another dimension, a factor, in the making of foreign policy. A dimension that mattered in the forming of an unsuccessful policy.

²⁰ Kathimerini 10/5/92, Research on a pan-Hellenic scale by ORCO, 2,013 persons questioned.

Conclusions: The Foreign Policy of Greece Towards its Northern Frontier

On the Approach

During the course of this study a considerable amount of literature and information on the subject of the Greek foreign policy was consulted. Books, journals, newspapers, magazines, conferences, the parliament and the television became the media from which academics, politicians, journalists, clergymen, even the simple people were expressing their views. Many of the arguments and discoveries of this work are similar to the findings of other works. It was not the intention of the author to refute the validity of other works. The ambition of the author was to produce a work which could become a part of a wider discussion and a participant in a discussion is bound to share a number of arguments with others. But there are special features on this thesis.

First, the method which the author chose to follow. The author did not try to purge himself from his background, previous knowledge and even his prejudices. Rather, previous knowledge was retained and cultivated in the same way that new knowledge was incorporated in the author's thinking. The study of the literature on international relations, frontier problems, and more specifically on Greek foreign policy provided this new knowledge plus an ability of understanding and a direction for analysis and questioning.

The basic question had to do with the approach to the subject that should be chosen. Systemic, functionalist, marxist and other approaches that are widely followed in the study of international relations were rejected. Firstly, because the majority of the works on Greece's international relations have followed similar approaches and therefore nothing new could be added in the discussion if yet another study along these lines was chosen. Secondly, because approaches which broadly fall in the category of scientific positivism do not suit the mind of this student. The questions that rose after the initial

studying of the literature pointed to a departure from the confines of positivism into the direction of subjectivism. These questions were: why there was a nation overwhelmed by a brand of defensive nationalist hysteria? Why did the leaders of the country follow such an irrational policy? What considerations did they have in mind? These questions could only be answered if the method of the study allowed an explanation extending beyond the facts and their objective characteristics. An open mind was kept for any influence and information coming from the environment. This position is similar to the position of the policy-makers themselves who have a certain background and certain prejudices which combine with the external influences and the information to come to certain conclusions. In that respect the author placed himself in the position of the policy-maker and became the subject of his questions.

Second, the author tried to place himself mentally alongside the subjects of his study, the policy-makers. This was not difficult as he shared the same history, values, fears, identity. On the way he discovered that the whole process of the policy-making involves a considerable amount of inter-subjective discourse in which many actors (persons-groups-notions) play a part: the individual policy-maker, the party, the parliament, the public, the history, the images, the national interest etc. In the realm of subjectivity where reality and imagination intermingle the author reached the understanding he wished and became able to follow an explanation. Powerful instruments in that process were theory and the testing of assumptions.

A Model of Explanation

The dimensions of foreign policy making in a small state with frontier problems were adequately presented in Part C. The discussion in these chapters helped the author to develop a number of assumptions which were presented in Part D accompanied with the necessary material that corroborated them. In conclusion the following model of

explanation combines the discussion in Parts C and D. Greek foreign policy appears to include the following aspects

Operational Environment

The operational environment of Greece does not provide the opportunities for advances that Greece would like to achieve. First, the strength of the country is not enough to make Greece a major influential power in the region. Greece although is relatively more powerful when compared with other countries in the same region it cannot compete with countries of higher regional power and influence like Italy, Turkey and Israel. Second, as a small country, with a number of security problems, Greece has become a member of international organisations. Within the framework of these organisations Greece has surrendered a portion of its sovereignty and has to accept foreign policy guidelines which more powerful partner countries impose to it. If Greece tries to implement policies which its partners do not approve it will find a strong block of opposition in the operational environment. Therefore, an important aspect of Greece's operational environment is its size (see below).

A third reason which hinders Greece's efforts is the volatile character of its immediate environment. First, a number of Greece's neighbours are (or were) engaged in conflicts: Bosnia, Kosovo, Turkish Kurdistan. Second, the history of the Balkans is generally a history of instability either within the domestic environments of the Balkan states or within the context relations among them. Third, the major political changes of the 1990s altered the external environment considerably. Greece which acted as a pro-status quo state found it difficult to adjust to the new circumstances.

However, the operational environment and the changes within it presented some opportunities which the Greek policy-makers initially calculated right. The changes in the Balkans were accompanied by the emergence of new leaderships, markets and institutions. The assistance which an EU neighbour could provide would be significant

and would raise this state's prestige. Greece tried to assume a role which aimed at extending its relative influence in the region. However, Greece's foreign policy failed. This failure was the result of a gradual discrepancy which occurred between the operational and psychological environments.

Psychological Environment: the Influence of the National Image and Values in Shaping the Greek National Interest and Foreign Policy

Greece was unable to follow the policies it had planned because a number of disputes emerged. The emergence of these disputes shattered the initial image of the policy-makers about the role of Greece and the opportunities in the environment. They had overestimated the material attributes of Greece and thought that the neighbouring new democracies would unquestionably accept a Greek leading role. They had even unilaterally adopted the arbitrary perception that Greece should become the spearhead of the European policy in the Balkans.

The initial hope disappeared as soon as the country entered a number of disputes which, although historical, had been staying dormant for many years. Initially, the Greek response was in agreement with the image that the Greek policy-makers had formed during the early stages of the political change in the region. They believed that European membership and material qualities could help Greece achieve the objectives they wanted. It became clear that they had underestimated the will of the international community which in its efforts to prevent the escalation of conflict did not view the Greek positions with sympathy. In this respect it was proved that the adoption of a pro-European attitude on Maastricht and other EU issues which Greece adopted in the early 1990s could not generate a pro-Greek attitude, especially on the Greek-Turkish dispute.

The gradual deterioration of the "power" image which the Greek policy-makers had formulated was substituted by the traditional image which shapes the psychological environment of the Greeks. This image is a peculiar combination of historical facts with

emotional beliefs. According to this image Greece is the birthplace of Western civilisation and its contribution should always be recognised. In this respect Greece's participation in supra-national organisations as an equal partner is perceived to be natural by virtue of the country's contribution. On the other hand, Greece is surrounded by enemies who envy its glory and its territory. The presence of potential or real threats is the other half of an image with a dual character: arrogance and fear.

This "folk image" or national myth is not only present in the policy-makers' minds. It is the national consciousness of a people which is brought up with these ideas in all stages of socialisation: family, education, public institutions, contribute to the building of this national myth. Its significance is obvious in all foreign policy dimensions. The territorial/geographical dimension views Greece as a country situated at the crossroads of three continents; as a consequence it has always been the target of many conquests. Its long northern frontier and its scattered sovereignty in the Aegean contribute to this feeling of insecurity. In the friendliness/hostility dimension Greece is perceived to be right when it views its neighbours with suspicion if not hostility. Friendships in the region have opportunistic character and cannot be taken for granted. This image is so powerful that makes the Greeks to view Americans and Europeans with suspicion as well. In the strength/weakness dimension Greece is viewed relatively stronger than other Balkan states but not strong enough to overcome its fear of Turkey (and its potential regional allies). This image, though, creates powerful symbolic loyalties to the nation whose unity and willingness to sacrifice in times of crisis is viewed as the real strength of the country.

This image limits the ability of the policy-makers to think rationally. This creates further discrepancy between psychological and operational environment because the policy-makers tend to think according to the national values they have been brought up with. These values, inherent in the national myth have a long emotional significance and shape the egocentric character of Greek foreign policy. Thus, other values that Greece is supposed to share with its partners are in conflict with the national ones.

More importantly, the impact of the national myth is paramount in the formation of the national interest. Its dual character (arrogance/fear) contributes to the formation of

a policy which has two contradictory aspects. First, Mr. Mitsotakis, a self-confessed proponent of Realpolitik, tried to follow a policy which aimed at establishing Greece as an influential power in the Balkans. Greece made several political and economic moves towards the new leaders of the Balkan countries in order to gain control over them.

Gradually though, Greek policy did not show the signs that a prudent Realpolitik is supposed to show. As Greece entered one dispute after another Greek foreign policy became totally uncompromising. It was guided by sentiment. It sought alliance with Serbia which was internationally isolated, hence Greece became isolated and its national interest could not be served. In the end, Greek foreign policy was not relevant to the country's capabilities because it had opened four different fronts (Albania, Macedonia, Turkey, EU). During these battles its diplomatic resources proved to be inadequate.

The reason for this failed attempt to Realpolitik was the second aspect in the national interest formation: fear and the need of survival. According to the national myth it is the survival of the nation, physical, political, cultural, that is always at stake. Between 1990-93 these supposed threats entered a new dimension: an imminent one. The fear increased and the policy-makers functioned more in accordance with their sentiments in their efforts to protect the survival of the nation.

Domestic Environment and Policy-Making

The Greek national interest is fundamentally a question of survival. However, not everybody in Greece talks about it in this frank way. As it happens elsewhere in the world the national interest has a vague content which is all-embracing but not specific. Its content can be determined by the cultural context which the national myth creates and the political tradition which gives to it varied meanings according to circumstances.

This political tradition in the Greek domestic environment is unique in its ability to mix foreign affairs issues with domestic politics. Polarisation is one aspect of the Greek political tradition and this leads to the exploitation of foreign affairs issues. The post-

1974 stability, democratisation and freedom of speech has led to higher levels of public awareness and apprehension by the politicians. National issues are included in the political competition. Foreign policies aim at causing impact to the public rather than the environment.

As a result all the actors which to the national interest its varied meaning compete in order to prove that their version is better. The public which is highly sentimental and can be easily manipulated shows its views with demonstrations and electoral behaviours. A number of interest groups, the Church included, try to influence foreign policy-making in every possible way. A constant struggle among parties, MPs, factions and ministers makes sure that foreign policy remains a hostage of domestic interests.

The combination of domestic objectives with sentimental criteria results in a decision making process which is not in conformity with the operational environment. Information can be easily distorted since the prevalence of national image and emotion disregards anything that is considered unacceptable or “anti-Hellenic”. In the pre-decisional stage, the employment of politically affiliated bodies does not only suggest that they have in mind the interests of the party. It also poses questions about their overall sufficiency. Different interests result in competing strategies for action. The decision stage reflects these differences with contradictory actions and statements. The government’s decisions reflect the national values and aim at compromising political differences and silencing the opposition. The post-decisional stage often finds an internationally embarrassed government in need to re-adjust its policies.

Policy-Making Burdens in a Small State

Greek foreign policy difficulties were highlighted by another aspect of Greece’s operational and psychological environment: size. Greece is a small state in a neighbourhood of other small states whose international behaviour identifies them as such: their actions have limited consequences in the international system; they are usually

interested in regional issues; they can often be the subjects of external pressure and their policies usually adopt a unilateral focus. They have also recognised the fact that their security can not be obtained by use of their own capabilities and therefore, they have accepted the fact that they are small and weak.

However, in a neighbourhood of states some are bound to be relatively more powerful than others. This can lead them to try to assume a greater regional role in an effort to advance their interests in the particular neighbourhood. Greece tried to do so. As a European small state Greece has a different perception of its role in the international system (although this perception is sentimental and rather anachronistic). The stability of the political system boosted the confidence of the policy-makers who believed that domestic, cultural and intellectual resources could contribute to a prestigious regional image of the country.

When a number of issues emerged a tough stance was thought appropriate because the disputes were of such importance that the population backed the government and showed signs of willingness to face sacrifices. Greece showed willingness to take risks by threatening or imposing sanctions against a weaker state despite the outrage of the international community. Until that stage Greece acted as if it was a powerful regional country. The power of the national myth led to popular mobilisation which contributed to this image of internal strength.

However, small states have to concentrate on a single issue. Their size means that there is only a small amount of officials that can be allocated and deal with these issues. Greece did not concentrate on a single issue and soon found that its diplomatic and foreign policy bodies were inadequate. Moreover, Greece realised once again that small state cannot engage in disputes on their own. The international community will soon impose mediation in case two states are unable to find a quick solution.

Greece showed all the likely patterns of behaviour of a small state. Its partners were in international organisations were expected to take its side. When they didn't Greece started to behave irresponsibly and jeopardised EU's policy in the Balkans. This behaviour revealed that it has a narrow geographic range of concern which tried to serve

by making frequent use of moral and normative positions. Finally, Greek policies were characterised by short-termism. Although Greek security concerns have a long history, Greek foreign policy-aims at achieving short-term objectives. These objectives may be of either domestic or international interest. In the latter case though, it does not lead to long-lasting settlement.

Greek foreign policy, though, was characterised by an initial level of public support which as it was mentioned above constitutes the real strength of a small state. This internal strength can be built by maintaining and using the powerful concept of the national myth in times of crisis. The mobilisation of the population and its leadership in supporting a policy of confrontation could not reach the levels it reached without the constant transmitting of the national values from past to present. This high level of significance of the national values and myth is accomplished through the direct reference to Greece's insecurity. Territorial awareness is a component of this insecurity and was reflected in the disputes which troubled Greece between 1990-93.

Frontier Disputes and Territorial Identity

The peculiarity of the 1990-93 era was that Greece entered disputes without actually facing any territorial claims. The nature, though, of the policy-makers' approach and of the types of arguments they used denotes that Greece had entered into territorial disputes. Turkey, FYROM and possibly Bulgaria are viewed as potential enemies. The issues of the Muslim minority, and of the Macedonian name were treated as territorial disputes. The Greek minority in Albania became a source of friction between the two states and although Greece constantly stated that it will not use military force against Albania it failed to propose a final settlement for the frontiers. Greek foreign policy over these issues was shaped by the high psychological value these territories have in the minds of the nation and its leaders. National sentiments were raised rapidly and intensely, especially over Macedonia and this is a characteristic of territorial disputes. The press,

nationalist politicians and interest groups took part in the debate and instigated nationalist sentiments. Exploitation of these sentiments for domestic reasons was made after any development in these issues.

The political change in the Balkans and the re-surgence of nationalism and sub-national irredentism caused fear to a pro-status quo country like Greece. The Greeks believed that this situation had created new opportunities for the assertion of old or new claims against their territory. Greek foreign policy tried to deter its potential enemies from expressing these claims.

The arguments that Greece used are typical of territorial disputes: legal, historical, geographical and ethnic arguments were used in order to persuade the international community for the rightfulness of the Greek position. Greece hoped that third parties, especially Europe, would intervene in its favour. When good offices and mediation were proposed by an international community which did not wish to take sides, Greece entered negotiations hesitantly. Today, though, the majority of the issues are unresolved. Progress is slow and past experience suggests that serious setbacks can happen.

The hesitation with which Greece entered negotiations and its inability to compromise and seek settlement reveals the high psychological value these territories have to the Greek national myth. Thrace, Macedonia and Epirus are territories which were liberated/acquired in the twentieth century. Before acquisition they were part of the nation's building process. After acquisition they became, together with Cyprus and the Aegean part of the nation's national consciousness/awareness. Northern Epirus as a "lost" territory after two occupations by the Allied, Greek army (World War I and II) is part of the national identity which sees that an injustice was made. Although the majority of the Greeks do not share the irredentist aspirations of a militant minority the feeling of injustice remains and contributes to the suspicion with which Greeks see their allies and partners. They believe that since they did not take care of Greece's interest in the past, they will do the same in the future. This suspicion generates more fear and contributes to the sense of insecurity which all Greeks share.

So, whereas there are no more territories to claim, the significance of territory in shaping up their national identity is considerable. The long frontier which separates these territories from the potentially alien nations raises the feeling of insecurity even higher. The political change and the issues that emerged violated the critical boundary of the Greek psyche, although claims were not made. The Greek reaction to the violation of a boundary which has psychological dimensions highlights the significance of territory and the insecurity of the population. Potentially, any action in the Balkan neighbourhood can constitute violation of the critical boundary and shapes up respective reactions by the Greek policy-makers and the public. Greece once again is perceived to be the target of supposed irredentism from the immediate environment. Greek reactions are so typical that can be described as syndromes, either territorial or psychological/historical. However, these types of syndromes are intrinsically Balkan and more specifically Greek.

The study of frontier problems and international behaviour though by “syndrome” models do not provide a thorough explanation. An analysis according to the model that this study used combines a number of dimensions together and can be more comprehensive. The results of this study allow the author to say that although the findings of the work are related to a particular period they nevertheless explain a number of other dimensions which shape contemporary Greek foreign policies. And if allowances are made for the particularities of the other Balkan states this model of explanation can be used for studying their foreign policies. Because the author believes that territory, domestic politics, history and images shape the foreign policies of other Balkan states.

Some Final Comments

This theory, as a way of looking into things, and the explanation of Greek foreign policy was based on the powerful concepts of the realist school of thought: prudence, survival, the will and the character of the subject. The search for a Macchiavelian Prince still continues in Greece today. The republic, the politician, the people can be the victims of

their volatile temperament which can create new miracles but also can lead to disasters. The survival of the state and its development are in many occasions dependent on outside pressure or help. The modern Greek state has not matured enough. The discussion in the three last chapters proves that this is the case in terms of the norm of thinking, debating and deciding.

And an important conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion in this part is that history still plays a significant role in Greece. It constitutes the base for the building of an identity which is rarely similar to any other in the world. Most nations are proud of themselves and have their myths upon which they built a supremacist ideology but few are like the Greeks. The building of the Greek national pride has, in some occasions, incorporated historic events that did not have an entirely Greek origin. They became in retrospect, however, part of the heritage of the proud Greek history. The Macedonians King Philip and Alexander the Great faced resistance by some Hellenes who did not want to become part of a unified Greek state for the first time (one of the reasons why he is celebrated today)¹. The founder of Constantinople and Byzantium, Constantine the Great was a Roman emperor and his successors were more Roman than Greek. That is why many of the fighters during the war of independence identified themselves as Romie whose cause was the liberation of Romiosini (The Greek/Roman Byzantines)². And what about the most celebrated heroes, the Albanian men and women of Souli who all died fighting the Turks? How many Greeks know the ethnic origin of the Souliotes? At least to some heroes their ethnic particularity is recognised, although in a peculiar way: they are Greeks who spoke Slavic or Vlach. It is because they sided with the Greek cause that allows them this recognition: despite their linguistic differences their consciousness was Greek. It is rather intriguing how the Greeks are able to look through the flesh and bones of an individual and discover the colour of his consciousness. The world is divided between *Phil-Ellenes* and *Anti-Ellenes* and this distinction as well as the ability to

¹ This remark does not try to dispute the ethnic-origin of Alexander the Great It tries to highlight the retrospective view of looking into history which contributes to the creation of the Greek national myth.

discover the colour of somebody's consciousness can be understood only when the metaphysical power of history is considered.

These are the key words. History has a metaphysical influence on the Greek identity. The struggle and wars that were presented in the first part of the thesis are not singular moments in time. They take place every day in the depths of the Greek psyche, alongside the other glorious events. The significance of the events that lead to the creation of the present frontier is even greater because they are part of the living memory. Every year on 28th October, the day of the commemoration of Greece's entry in the Second World War a parade takes place in Thessaloniki capital of Macedonia. The head of the parade is always comprised by some old figures, dressed in black shirts and kilts: the Macedonian-fighters or rather their descendants. The Greeks must remember and honour those who began the fight for the liberation/acquisition of Macedonia even though the people who parade did not have anything to do with the Macedonian Struggle.

That sort of memory and the myth which accompanies it are present in the minds of the Greeks and have shaped the building of the contemporary nation-state. It is very difficult for somebody especially on the top government levels to distance themselves from this view of history. All the present references to Greece's current position in the world, the threats that surround the country, the significance of Hellenism and its continuity are validated in the Greek mind through the metaphysical power of history. It is true that Greece's geographical position is unique and so is the history of the land and the people. The survival of a nation and its remarkable culture for so many thousand years despite the raids, wars and occupations is an outstanding achievement. It is also true that there is evidence for some of the threats especially from the east. Turkey always threatens war anytime Greece tries to follow a policy that will secure its sovereignty in the Aegean. The survival of the Greek nation is always at threat and this is the lesson of history.

² A very good study into the Greek national identity with particular reference to the duality of the Greek psyche between *Hellenism* and *Romiosiny* is given by Michael Herzfeld in *Anthropology Through the Looking Glass. Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

How can the policy-makers think rationally when the significance of history, territory and identity are treasured by the nation they represent? Prudent policy has put Greece into international organisations, alliances, and a process of political and economic integration that aspires to bring together the nations of Europe. With the security that Europe was supposed to provide Greece tried to use its higher development in the Balkan region, its stable political institutions, its relative strength in order to achieve prestige and power in the region and even surpass Turkey's own influence. But Europe, NATO and levels of development were not enough and the threats did not disappear. In fact they are joined by others, real or imaginary. The latter ones are the more important because imagination tends to block the ability for rational thinking.

The policy makers carry inside their minds fear and pride. Their political analytical discourse, their ability to gather and interpret the information from the environment which comes in all its clarity (by Americans, Europeans, and neighbours), their decisional prudence are diminished by the penetrating power of the nation's values and images. They are not allowed to close their eyes to these. They can not allow themselves to do it. The watchful and critical eye of the nation is particularly sensitive on these matters and can be excited by the vigorous media and the populist parties.

The political system has a long tradition of populism, deep ideological cleavages, national division and civil war. National issues always had their share in the domestic infighting. Populism always exploited the feelings and the sense of identity of the people.

The Greek policy-maker faces an unsympathetic and/or alien external reality, dilemmas from within his consciousness, the uncompromising position of his colleagues, the fierce criticism of the opposition, the cry of the public.

The situation between 1990-93 was the most conspicuous symptom of the unhealthy state of the Greek polity. It was that period that proved beyond doubt that Greek policy was inefficiently conducted. Moreover, the dismal conduct of the government suggests that probably there was a total lack of a comprehensive policy. The Greek foreign policy was the hostage of internal interests and populist rhetoric. The fact that the government had a vulnerable majority which could be exploited does neither

refute the significance that history and identity have in the policy-makers' minds nor the pattern of exploitation of the national issues for political purposes in the domestic environment. A party can secure a wide majority to govern but that will happen only if it has included in its promises a pledge to follow an independent foreign policy which will protect the national interest. Even with a comfortable majority any government will still face the ferocity of the opposition, or criticism from within the party. Every mistake will be exploited. And since a departure from the guidelines imposed by other more powerful states and organisations is impossible, each government knows that it cannot escape from this vicious circle. Brave initiatives fail many times since they are directed towards other small states whose own security concerns might force them to form alliances and channels of co-operation which nonetheless have an opportunistic character and collapse when another regional player offers more "prizes" and security. This the case especially when alliances are built with "orthodox" states which are supposed to be natural allies for Greece³. Other policies fail because outside pressure might force the government to back down. Fierce criticism follows in parliament. Many times a policy might only serve internal interests, namely the manipulation of the public; it will be withdrawn without much fuss when the public will not be able to realise that. The policy that is usually followed has short-term objectives and follows the pattern: decision-unfavourable reaction-hasty readjustment.

Many studies analyse international relations as a game of actors -the states- and the qualities of their material attributes -military, economy, level of development, organisational and bureaucratic efficiency. They consider domestic characteristics only

³ Sotiris Walden in *The Macedonian Issue and the Balkans*, Themelio, Athens, 1994, correctly points out that the building of an axis in the post-Cold War era does not secure peace and co-operation but automatically creates antagonisms and possibilities of conflict, even though it is supposed to deter the "enemies". Still, alliances in the Balkans have always had an opportunistic character and eventually collapse. The Greek-Bulgarian axis, which preceded the end of Cold-War, collapsed when Bulgaria realised that it is not wise to antagonise Turkey with a Turkish population of over one million inside its boundaries. The Greek-Serbian axis collapsed under much more absurd circumstances: the 1995 European Basketball Finals in Athens which Yugoslavia won ended the supposed "historic friendship" between Greeks and Serbs. Amid accusations for favourable refereeing, the Greek crowd booed the champions when their national anthem was played, and Serbs stormed the Greek Embassy in Belgrade

when they study moments of crisis and they look at them as if they are the ghosts of long bygone, an old-fashioned era. They may be anachronistic but they are there, they shape the foreign policy, at least the Greek one, and especially in times of crisis they are important.

The three dimensions discussed in the last part of the thesis intermingle in the minds of the policy makers. The power position can be analysed since the information is clear. There are weaker and stronger players, powerful friends who keep a watchful eye and will either help or punish; there are opportunities and constraints. The room for manoeuvre is limited and everything will depend on how well the policy makers can combine the messages from the external environment with the will to protect the national interest; on how they can make use of any objective and subjective advantages and bypass the constraints that they face; on how they can keep the public, the political system, and themselves satisfied by adopting a policy in accord with the national values but without putting in danger the prestige and the regional advantage of the country against its neighbours and allies. The anachronistic attributes of the political entity that is the modern Greek state and its foreign policy actually emphasise its immaturity: latent nationalism which can become hysteria, populism, polarisation, petty-political interests, power competitions, creation of dubious axis alliances (with orthodox states) should not be characteristics of a state that wants to be part of the European dream. Yet they are, and had a profound effect in the shaping of the Greek foreign policy, especially at a time of crisis. The result in 1993 was the end of the political career of some, and a damage in the prestige of the country. But in the wake of the Yugoslav bloodshed, and the insecurity that still hangs above the Balkans, the existence of such attributes in a European Union state is at best grotesque, at worst frightening.

smashing windows and destroying cars. Crowd tensions were so high that ministers had to travel back and forth in order to salvage the damaged alliance.

PostScript

After the fall of New Democracy in October 1993 Andreas Papandreou and PASOK came to power. In defiance of the EU, Greece dropped out of the UN sponsored talks about the Macedonian issue and closed the borders with the FYROM. Not long after the thirst of the public for tough action was satisfied the talks restarted and in fact a rapprochement began to emerge. The issue of the name, though remains unresolved and progress on the other issues that emerged in the north is slow. That was mainly due to the fact that Mr. Papandreou fell ill very quickly and could not act as a Prime Minister of the Greek government. Some things started to change, however, and had to do with the country's relations with the EU. After Mr. Papandreou's eventual resignation, early in 1996, a new government was formed by PASOK under the leadership of Mr. Konstantinos Simitis. The policies of the new government have improved further the Greek-European relations.

However, as soon as he was appointed, Mr. Simitis discovered how difficult his task was. Two days before winning the confidence vote in the parliament the Imia incident occurred. A situation which is normally dealt with the exchange of the usual diplomatic notes, led to the death of three young men as a result of the irresponsible actions of one Greek individual and his flag, three Turkish journalists and their flag and the hysterical Greek media which raised the public sentiment and forced the government to order naval and military deployments in the region. That mistake triggered a similar Turkish reaction with all the tragic consequences. Despite the tragedy and humiliation, and despite the exploitation and populism of the New Democracy, Mr. Simitis and PASOK were re-elected in September 1996. So, what has happened in Greece? Have the public and the state entered a more mature phase?

It seems that politicians and the public had given up the uncompromising position they had pursued over the years on the Macedonian and other national issues. They had already admitted defeat and the Imia incident was another serious blow in the national pride. The time was ripe for a change in political language and Mr. Simitis and his

colleagues in the government and PASOK were not afraid to take this risk. Indeed, it is the first time that a party is elected to govern not on the basis of its populist promises but on a platform of tough economic measures that will bring Greece closer to Europe. If there is an air of change in the political culture of Greece then it has started with brave steps towards maturity.

Part E: Appendices

APPENDIX I

DOCUMENTS

The following list includes a number of documents which were gathered during the research process. Reference to a number of them was made throughout the thesis, but an additional number of documents was also consulted and helped the author to advance his understanding of the subject. The source of these materials is named; the title and author of the publication is referred when a document has been published before; as it was mentioned in parts of the thesis some documents were collected without prior agreement with security officials therefore the source will not be named, or were secretly handed in by people who the author wishes to protect by concealing their identity.

“Manifest for the Macedonian Human Rights”, Movement for Human and National Rights for the Macedonians of Aegean Macedonia, Central Organisational Committee for Macedonian Human Rights (C.O.C. for M.H.R.) Salonika, (allegedly published in) Salonika, August 26, 1984, *source: ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation For Defence and Foreign Policy, Akadimias 17, Athens).*

The Association of Refugee Children from Aegean Macedonia, “The Exodus of the Children from the Aegean Part of Macedonia”, Scarborough, Ontario, 1988, *source: ELIAMEP.*

Letter of the President of the Macedonian Orthodox Church Tom Damcevski in Windsor, Ontario, to Gerry Weiner MP in the House of Commons Ottawa, *source: ELIAMEP.*

Irredentist maps showing a “unified” Macedonia in which place names in Greek Macedonia appear in Slav-Macedonian, in Dr. Chris Popov and Michael Radin, “Contemporary Greek Government Policy on the Macedonian Issue and Discriminatory Practices in Breach of International Law”, published by the Central Organisational Committee For Macedonian Human Rights, Australian Sub-Committee on behalf of the C.O.C. for M.H.R, Thessaloniki, Melbourne, 1989, *source: ELIAMEP.*

Forum for Human Rights of Macedonia, “International Legal Treatment and the Situation of the Macedonian National Minority in Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania, Skopje 1990, *source: ELIAMEP.*

Macedonian Human Rights Movement (Europe, Canada, Australia, USA), on the CSCE Conference in Copenhagen and the situation of the Slav-Macedonian minorities, 1990, *source: ELIAMEP.*

Macedonian-Canadian Human Rights Committee, "Violation of Human Rights of the Macedonian Minority in Greece", sent to the Council of Europe, Toronto, 1990, *source: ELIAMEP*.

Irredentist map showing Northern Epirus to extend as far as Scubi covering half the Albanian territory, in Metropolitan Dhriinoupolis Sevstianos' "Behind Albania's Iron Curtain", published by the Panhellenic Association of Northern Epirots, Athens January 1990, *source: the publishers*.

Department of State, "Country Report on Human Rights Practices (Greece)" Washington D.C., January 1990 (in Greek), *source: The Yearbook of Defence and Foreign Policy*, published by ELIAMEP, Athens, 1992 (in Greek).

Agreement of all parliamentary party leaders after a meeting with the Prime Minister of the all-party government Mr. Xenophon Zolotas on what should be done about the Muslim minority in Thrace (in Greek), January 31, 1990, *source: Greek Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Minorities*.

Letter of the Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister M. Yilmaz (January 31, 1990) and the reply of the Greek Foreign Affairs Minister A. Samaras to the following recipients: The UN Secretary-General, the NATO S-G, the President and S-G of the Assembly of the Council of Europe, the President of the European Parliament, the G-S of the Islamic Conference, the Foreign Affairs ministers of the CSCE members in relation to events in Western Thrace (in Greek), *source: The Yearbook op. cit.*

Platform of the Association for Protection of Human Rights of Macedonians Discriminated by Republic of Greece: "Dignity", "International Recognition of Macedonian Human Rights", Skopje 14 April 1990, *source: ELIAMEP*.

The Programme of the Government on National Defence (in Greek), April 24, 1990, *source: The Yearbook op. cit.*

Emm. Moshonas, "Confidential Report on the Press Conference of the Slav-Macedonians" to the Deputy Minister of Press and Information and the Director of Foreign Services in the General Secretariat of Press and Information, Copenhagen, June 15, 1990, (in Greek), *source: concealed*.

Emm. Moshonas, "Confidential (hand-written) note on the Press Conference of the Slav-Macedonians" to the Deputy Minister of Press and Information, Copenhagen, June 16, 1990, (in Greek), *source: concealed*.

Statement delivered by Ambassador Vladislav Jovanovic, Head of the Yugoslav Delegation and Memorandum Relating to the Macedonian National Identity, Second meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, Copenhagen, June 22, 1990, *source: ELIAMEP*.

The Greek Position in Relation to the “Macedonian Issue”, in the CSCE Conference, Copenhagen, June 29, 1990 (in Greek), *source*: The Yearbook op. cit.

Interview of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Antonis Samaras in Kathimerini, September 2, 1990, *source*: The Yearbook, op. cit.

Greek-Albanian Joint Statement (in Greek), Tirana, January 13, 1991, *source*: *ELIAMEP*.

Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1990”, Washington, January 1991, accompanied with a letter from the Greek Embassy to the Deputy Minister of Press and Information, in the General Secretariat of Press and Information (in Greek), February 1, 1991, *source*: *ELIAMEP*.

Parliamentary Proceedings Session RLG, February 12, 1991, *source*: *The Library of the Parliament of the Greeks, Syntagma Square, Athens*.

Declaration for the Sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Skopje 17/9/1991, *source*: *ELIAMEP*.

Memorandum of the Political, Social and Cultural Organisation Omonia of the Greek Minority in Albania, CSCE Conference on the Human Dimension, Moscow September 10 - October 4, 1991, *source*: *ELIAMEP*.

Ioannis Varvitsiotis, Minister of National Defence, “Thoughts upon the Defence Problem of the country after the Developments in the Balkans” (in Greek), Speech delivered in the War Museum, October 8, 1991, *source*: The Yearbook, op. cit.

Parliamentary Proceedings, Session Q, October 10, 1991, *source*: *The Library of the Parliament of the Greeks*.

Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting under the Presidency of the Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis, 5/12/1991 (in Greek), *source*: Mihalis Papakonstantinou, *Memoirs of a Politician, the entanglement of Skopje*, The Estia Bookshop, Athens, 1994 (in Greek).

Policy document titled “The Views of the General Headquarters of National Defence (Chief of Staff) on the Greek Foreign and Defence Policies”; no date is available but judging from the character of the content it should belong to the era when the Greek policy was uncompromising and hysterical that is early 1992, *source*: *concealed*.

“The Macedonian Affair”, propagandist material published by the Institute of International Political and Strategic Studies, Athens, Greece, 1992, *source*: *the publishers*.

Letter of the President of the Hellenic Republic Konstantinos Karamanlis to the leaders of the European Community, January 3 1992 (in Greek), *source*: The

Yearbook of Defence and Foreign Policy 1993, published by ELIAMEP, Athens 1993.

Commission D' Arbitrage En Yugoslavia, Avis No. 6, Sur la reconnaissance de la republique socialiste de Macedoine par la Communauté Européenne at ses états membres, (the so-called Badinter Commission), Paris, 11/1/1992, *source: ELIAMEP*.

Parliamentary Proceedings, Session PE, February 24, 1992, *source: the Library of the Parliament of the Greeks*.

Irredentist views expressed in *VoreioEpirotikon Vema*, Official Paper of the Panhellenic Union of Northern-Epirot Struggle (PASYVA), March, April, May, June, 1992, *source: the publishers*.

“The Greek Public Views on the National Matters”, research carried out by ORCO among 2,013 people in Greece on behalf of the Greek journal *Amyra kai Diplomatia* (Defence and Diplomacy), *source: published in the Kathimerini newspaper, Sunday May 10, 1992*.

Anti-war and Anti-nationalistic Campaign of Greece, “Greece: A New and Dangerous Nationalism in Development”, *source: the Internet, soc. culture Greece, June 25, 1992*.

Declaration of the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia (in response to the declaration of the Council of Europe in Lisbon on June 27, 1992), official translation, Skopje, July 3, 1992, *source: M. Papakonstantinou op. cit.*

Letter of the President of the Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov to the H. E. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary General of the United Nations, Skopje, July, 30, 1992, *source: M. Papakonstantinou op. cit.*

U.S. Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman (New York), Remarks by acting secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger and Greek Foreign Minister Mihalis Papakonstantinou prior to bilateral meeting, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, September 23, 1992, *source: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.*

Robin O' Neill, “Relations between the European Community and its Member States and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Report to the President of the Council of Ministers, The Right Honourable Douglas Hurd, MP, London, December 1, 1992, *source: M. Papakonstantinou op. cit.*

Report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, December 9, 1992, *source: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.*

Resolution 795 (1992) of the United Nations Security Council, (on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), December 11, 1992, *source: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.*

Edinburgh University Hellenic Society (EUHS), “The Macedonian Question at the Edinburgh Summit” distributed in Edinburgh’s Princes Street at a rally which was organised by EUHS and attracted 100 mayors from Greek cities, students from elsewhere in Britain, and of course, priests, Edinburgh, December 11, 1992, *source: EUHS*.

Letter of the Foreign Affairs Minister Mihalis Papakonstantinou to the Members of the United Nations Security Council, Athens, December 26, 1992, *source: M. Papakonstantinou op. cit.*

Message du Ministre d’Etat au Premier Ministre (Roland Dumas to Konstantinos Mitsotakis), “French Proposal”, 5/1/1993, *source: M. Papakonstantinou op. cit.*

Letter of the President of the Republic of Macedonia Kiro Gligorov to the Minister of State (Roland Dumas), Skopje 9/1/1993, *source: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.*

Department of State, “1992 Human Rights Report for Albania”, Washington D.C. January 19, 1993, *source: ELIAMEP*.

Facts on Macedonia from the CIA World Factbook, *source: the Internet, the Hellenic Discussion List, 20 January 1993*.

Letter of the Greek Foreign Affairs Minister Mihalis Papakonstantinou to the United Nations Secretary-General, (in Greek), January 25, 1993, in M. Papakonstantinou, *op. cit.*

Greek Memorandum on the Application of Acceptance in the United Nations of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (in Greek), New York, January 25, 1993, *source: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.*

Parliamentary Proceedings, Session RD, March 29, 1993, *source: the Library of the Parliament of the Greeks*.

Resolution 817 (1993), of the United Nations Security Council, Adopted by the Security Council at its 3196th meeting, on April 7, 1993 (accepting the Republic of Macedonia in the UN with the provisional name FYROM), *source: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.*

Presidential Statement upon adoption of Security Council Resolution 817 (1993), April 7, 1993, *source: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.*

“The Mutual Trust Building Measures Plan” by United Nations envoy Cyrus Vance and European Union envoy Lord Owen, 14/5/1993, published in *Oikonomikos Tahidromos*, F. 2(2071), Athens, January 13, 1994.

Reply of the Republic of Macedonia to the proposals of the Vance-Owen plan, signed by President Kiro Gligorov, (in Greek), 29/5/1993, *source*: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.

Reply of the Hellenic Republic to the proposals of the Vance-Owen plan, 29/5/1993, *source*: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.

Draft Resolution of the United Nations Security Council (on the progress of talks between Greece and FYROM under the auspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia), June 18, 1993, *source*: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.

The European Parliament Resolution in Albania, 4(b) B3 - 1054, 1087, 1093 and 1097/93, 15/7/1993, *source*: *ELIAMEP*.

Joint Statement (Cyrus Vance, Ambassador George D. Papoulias, Ambassador Ivan Tosevski on decision of commencing direct discussions), New York, August 23, 1993, *source*: M. Papakonstantinou, op. cit.

Draft document presenting the views of the Ministry of National Defence in NATO titled "The Situation in the Balkans", no date is available but it was certainly drafted after the PASOK victory in October 1993, when Greece pulled out from the UN sponsored talks with FYROM but before blocking the frontiers in February 1994, *source*: *concealed*.

Policy document circulated among ministers titled "The Balkan Policy of Greece", (in Greek); no date is available but it was circulated after the Greek blockade against FYROM in February 1994, *source*: *concealed*.

APPENDIX II

INTERVIEWS

In addition to the documents that were collected a number of interviews which the author conducted during the research period provided a thorough and enlightening understanding of the situation. The persons who kindly accepted to be interviewed were former policy-makers, academics with close ties with the policy-making machine and academics who simply were interviewed because their authority on the subject of international relations could help the author in his research. The interviewees in alphabetical order were:

Professor Dimitris Konstas, former Dean of the Panteion University in Athens, and head of the Institute of International Relations.

The late Ambassador Manolis Kalamidas, Head Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (April 1990-April 1992), co-founder of the Politiki Anixi party (POLAN - Political Spring).

The Right Honourable Mihalis Papakonstantinou, former MP, former Deputy Minister of National Defence, and former Minister of Industry, Agriculture, Justice, and Foreign Affairs (the latter between 1992-1993).

Professor Hristos Rozakis of the University of Athens, former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (1996-1997).

Mr. Konstantinos Thanopoulos, former Prefect of Xanthi.

Professor Yiannis Valinakis of the University of Athens, Assistant Director of the Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP).

A very constructive discussion was also held with:

Assistant Professor Panayiotis Ifestos of the Panteion University and Dr. Athanassios Platias Senior Lecturer in the same University.

A number of people whose occupation and experience were considered to be significant, were approached either in Athens or in travels in northern Greece. These people were not properly interviewed but they revealed, in friendly discussions, important information which was relevant to different aspects of the implementation of the Greek foreign policy. Since the information that these people provided was in many occasions confidential they will not be named. However, they included:

- Officials and members of political parties
- Local government officials and civil servants (especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- Army officers and soldiers

APPENDIX III

NEWSPAPERS, MAGAZINES, PERIODICALS, THE INTERNET

The following list includes daily and weekly newspapers as well as magazines and journals which were concerned with the subject of Greek foreign policy in their reports or analysis and were consulted by the author on a permanent basis. Other publications were also consulted whenever they carried relevant material but are not referred here. The Internet is already a medium of daily information on things that happen daily in Greece and do not get reported in the British press.

1. Newspapers

Eleftherotypia (Daily)
The European (Weekly)
The Guardian (Daily)
The Independent (Daily)
Kathimerini tis Kyriakis (Weekly)
Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia (Weekly)
To Vema (Weekly)

2. Magazines

Amyna kai Diplomatia (Monthly)
The Economist (Monthly)
The Spectator (Monthly)

3. Periodicals

The World Today
International Affairs

4. The Internet

Athens News: <http://athnews.dolnet.gr.8080>
Athens News Agency: <http://www.ana.gr/>
Eleftherotypia: <http://www.enet.gr/> (in Greek fonts)
Hellenic-Greek News: <http://www.greeknews.ariadne.t.gr/default.html>

APPENDIX IV

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES

The following list presents the number of published material which was consulted during the writing of this thesis. They include historical, theoretical, anthropological and political books and articles. Reference to a number of them has already been made throughout the thesis but the authors' reading process also included other published material which appear here.

Altmann Franz-Lothar (1992), "Ex-Yugoslavia's Neighbours: Who Wants What?" in *The World Today*, Vol. 48, nos. 8-9 Aug./Sep./ 1992.

American Red Cross (1919), "Reports of the American Red Cross Commissions upon their Activities in Macedonia, Thrace, Bulgaria, The Aegean Islands and Greece", American-Hellenic Society, New York.

Anderson Benedict (1991), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Verso, New York.

Anderson Malcolm ed. (1982), *Frontier Regions in Western Europe*, West European Politics, Vol. 5, No. 4, Oct. 1982.

_____ (1982) "The Political Problems of Frontier Regions" in Anderson ed. (1982) [see above].

_____ (1996), *Frontiers, Territory and State Formation in the Modern World*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

_____ and Bort Eberhard ed. (1996), *Boundaries and Identities: the Eastern Frontier of the European Union*, International Social Sciences Institute, University of Edinburgh Printing Services.

Averof-Tositsas Evangellos (1976), *Φωτιά και Τσεκούρι - Η Ελλάδα 1946-49*, The Estia Bookshop, Athens.

Banac Ivo (1984), *The National Question in Yugoslavia - Origins, History, Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London.

Barker Elisabeth (1950), *Macedonia - Its Place in Balkan Power Politics*, Royal Institute for International Affairs.

Barros James (1970), *The League of Nations and the Great Powers: the Greek-Bulgarian Incident*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

- Barston Ronald P. (1971), "The External Relations of Small States" in Schou and Bruntland ed. (1971) [see below].
- Beard Charles (1934), *The Idea of National Interest*, New York, Macmillan.
- Birch A.H. (1989), *Nationalism and National Integration*, London Unwin Hyman.
- Birnbaum Henrik and Vryonis Spyros Jr. (1971), *Aspects of the Balkans - Continuity and Change*, Mouton.
- Bjøl Erling (1971), "The Small State in International Politics", in Schou and Bruntland ed. (1971) [see below].
- Boll Michael (1984), *Cold War in the Balkans- American Foreign Policy and the Emergence of Communist Bulgaria*, Lexington University Press, Kentucky.
- Bonn MJ (1938), *The Crumbling of Empire - The Disintegration of World Economy*, London George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Boulding Kenneth E. (1962-3), *Conflict and Defence: a General Theory*, Harper Torchbooks, The University Library, Harper & Row publishers, New York.
- _____ (1969), "National Images and International Systems" in Jacobson and Zimmerman ed. (1969) [see below].
- _____ (1991), "The Nature and Cause of National and Military Self-Images in Relation to War and Peace" in Kliot and Waterman ed. (1991), [see below].
- Bouras Antonios Lieut. Gen. (1977), *Η Ελλάδα Μεσογειακή και Βαλκανική Χώρα*, Antonis Livanis, Nea Synora, Athens.
- Boyd Gavin ed. (1987), *Political Change and Foreign Policies*, New York, St. Martin's Press.
- Bozhinov V. and Panayotov L. (1978), *Macedonia: Documents and Material*, Sofia, Bulgarska Akademia na Naukite.
- Braun Aurel (1983), *Small-State Security in the Balkans*, London, Macmillan.
- Brown Peter and Shue Henry (1981), *Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits*, Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Littlefield.
- Bulgarian Academy of Sciences ed. (1969), *Documents and Materials on the History of Bulgarian People*, Institute of History, Sofia.
- Buxton Noel and Leese Leonard C (1919), *Balkan Problems and European Peace*, George Allen & Unwin.

Buzan Barry (1983), *People, States and Fear: the National Security Problem in International Relations*, Brighton, Wheatsheaf.

Calvert Peter (1986), *The Foreign Policy of New States*, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., Brighton.

Carter Francis (1977), *An Historical Geography of the Balkans*, London, Academic Press.

Chalmers A.F. (1982), *What Is This Thing Called Science?*, The Open University Press, Milton Keynes.

Chazan Naomi ed. (1991), *Irredentism and International Politics*, Adamantine Press Ltd., London.

_____ (1991), "Approaches to the Study of Irredentism", in Chazan ed. (1991) [see above].

Chiclet Christopher (1990), "The Greek Civil War", in Sarafis and Martin ed. (1990) [look below].

Clogg Richard (1973), *The Struggle for Greek Independence 1770-1821*, Macmillan.

_____ (1979) *A Short History of Modern Greece*, Cambridge University Press.

_____ (1983) *Greece in the 1980s*, Macmillan in association with the Centre for Contemporary Greek Studies, King's College, University of London.

_____ (1987) ed., *Parties and Elections in Greece - The Search for Legitimacy*, C. Hurst Company, London.

_____ (1993) ed., *Greece 1981-89 - The Populist Decade*, London, St. Martin's Press.

_____ (1993), "Greece and the Balkans in the 1990s" in H. Psomiades and S. Thomadakis ed., *Greece the New Europe and the Changing International Order*, New York, Pella.

Club of New Greeks (1990), "The Treaty of Lausanne", Papazisis.

Coakley John (1982), "National Territories and Cultural Frontiers: Conflicts of Principle in the Formation States in Europe" in Anderson ed. (1982) [see above].

Constas Demetrios (1990), *Για την Εξωτερική Πολιτική*, Papazesis, Athens.

_____ (1991), *The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the 1990s*, Macmillan, London.

Cottam Martha L. (1986), *Foreign Policy Decision Making: the Influence of Cognition*, Westview Press, Boulder and London.

Couloumbis Theodore A. and Constanas Demetrios (1985), *International Relations, an Overall Approach*, Athens, Papazesis.

_____ and Wolfe James H. (1990), *Introduction to International Relations - Power and Justice*, Prentice Hall International Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, fifth edition.

_____ and Yannas Prodromos (1996), "Greek Foreign Policy Priorities for the 1990s", in Kevin Featherstone and Kostas Ifantis ed. *Greece in a Changing Europe - Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York.

Crabb Cecil V. Jr. (1972), *American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age*, New York Harper and Row, Third Edition.

Curtright Lynn H. (1986), *Muddle, Indecision and Setback: British Policy and the Balkan States*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies.

Cviic Christopher (1991), *Remaking the Balkans*, London, Pinter Publishers.

Dakin Douglas (1966), *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki.

_____ (1973) *The Greek Struggle for Independence 1821-33*, University of California Press.

Day A.J. ed. (1987), *Border and Territorial Disputes*, Harlow, Longmann, 1987.

Diamantouros Nicos (1993), "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-91; an Interpretation" in Clogg ed. (1993).

Dieterich Karl Dr. (1918), *Hellenism in Asia Minor*, American-Hellenic Society.

Djilas Aleksa (1991), *The Contested Country Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution 1919-1953*, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press.

Djorjevic Dimitrije and Fischer-Galati Stephen (1981), *The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition*, Columbia University Press.

Dominian Leon (1917), *The Frontiers of Language and Nationality in Europe*, The American Geographical Society of New York, London: Constable and Company Limited.

- Dougherty James and Pfaltzgraff Robert (1990), *Contending Theories of International Relations: a Comprehensive Study*, New York, Harper & Row.
- Duchacek Ivo D. (1986), *The Territorial Dimensions of Politics, Within, Among, and Across Nations*, Westview Press, Boulder and London.
- East Maurice A. (1973), "Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: a Test of Two Models", *World Politics*, Vol. 25, 1973.
- Economides Spyros (1992), *The Balkan Agenda: Security and Regionalism in the New Europe*, London, Bracey's for the Centre for defence Studies.
- Eddy Charles B. (1931), *Greece and the Greek Refugees*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Eisenstadt S.N. & Rokkan S. (1973), *Building States and Nations*, Beverly Hills, University of California.
- ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for Defence and Foreign Policy) (1992), *The Yearbook for Defence and Foreign Policy 1992*, ELIAMEP, Athens (in Greek).
- _____ (1993) *The Yearbook for Defence and Foreign Policy 1993*, ELIAMEP, Athens.
- Eyal Jonathan (1989), *The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans - Moscow's Southern Flank*, Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- _____ (1996), "A Western View of Greece's Balkan Policy", in Featherstone and Ifantis ed. (1996).
- Featherstone Kevin and Ifantis Kostas (1996), *Greece in a Changing Europe - Between European Integration and Balkan Disintegration?*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York.
- Fermor Patrick Leigh (1992), "A Clean Sheet for Paeonia", *The Spectator*, September 12, 1992.
- Ferriman Z.D. (1918), *Greece and Tomorrow*, American-Hellenic Society.
- Feyerabend Paul (1975), *Against Method*, NLB, London.
- _____ (1981), "How to Defend Society Against Science" in Hacking ed. (1981) [see below].
- Forbes Nevill, Toynbee Arnold J., Mitrany D., Hogarth D.G. (1915), *The Balkans - A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Rumania and Turkey*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

- Forster Edward S. (1958), *A Short History of Modern Greece 1821-1956*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, Third Edition.
- Frankel Joseph (1963), *The Making of Foreign Policy; an Analysis of Decision-Making*, London, Oxford University Press.
- Gauvin August (1918), *The Greek Question*, American-Hellenic Society.
- Georgevitch T.R. (1918), *Macedonia*, London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
- Gewehr Wesley Marsh (1967), *The Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans 1800-1930*, Hamden (Conn), Archon Books.
- Gloagmen Philip and Josse Pierre (1985), *Greece and Yugoslavia*, New York, Collier, London, Collier - Macmillan.
- Gomme A.W. (1945), *Greece*, Oxford University Press.
- Gottmann Jean (1973), *The Significance of Territory*, The University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville.
- Greek Society for the Protection of the Rights of the Minorities (1990), "Round Discussion on the Ethnic Minorities Issues", Athens.
- Haas Ernst B. and Allen Whiting S. (1956), *Dynamics of International Relations*, Mc Graw Hill, Book Company Inc., New York, Toronto, London.
- Hacking Ian ed. (1981), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Oxford University Press,
- Harden Sheila (1985), *Small is Dangerous: Micr-states in a Macro-world*, London, Pinter.
- Harvie Christopher (1996), *Boundaries and Identities: the Walls in the Head*, International Social Sciences Institute, The University of Edinburgh.
- Heraclides A. (1991), *The self-determination of Minorities in International Politics*, London, Cass, 1991.
- Hermann Charles F., Kegley Charles W., Rosenau James N., (1987), *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, Boston, Allen & Unwin.
- Herzfeld Michael, (1982) *Ours Once More - Folklore Ideology and the Making of Modern Greece*, University of Texas Press, Austin.

_____ (1987), *Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass - Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, Cambridge University Press.

Hilding Eek (1971), "The Conception of Small States" in Schou and Bruntland ed. (1971) [see below].

Hinsley F.H. (1973), *Nationalism and the International System*, London, Hodder & Stoughton.

Hobsbawm E.J. (1991), *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*, Cambridge University Press.

Iatrides John O. (1980) ed., *Ambassador MacVeagh Reports - Greece 1933 - 47*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Ifantis Kostas (1996), "Greece and the USA After the Cold War", in Featherstone and Ifantis ed..

Ifestos Panayiotis (1993), "Διλλήματα και Προβλήματα της Εθνικής Στρατηγικής της Ελλάδος ως Ταυτόχρονα Ευρωπαϊκό και Βαλκανικό Κράτος" in Επιλογή, November 1993.

Ioakimidis P.C. (1996), "Contradictions Between Policy and Performance" in Featherstone and Ifantis ed. (1996) [see above].

Israel Hedva-Ben (1991), "Irredentism: Nationalism Re-examined" in Chazan ed. (1991) [see above].

Jacobson Karan Harold and Zimmerman William ed. (1969), *The Shaping of Foreign Policy*, Atherton Press, New York.

_____ (1969), "Approaches to the Study of Foreign Policy Behaviour" in Jacobson and Zimmerman ed (1969) [see above].

James Alan (1970), "The United Nations and Frontier Disputes" in Luard ed. (1970) [see below].

Jankovic Branimir (1988), *The Balkans in International Relations*, Basingstoke, Macmillan.

Jelavich Charles and Barbara (1963), *The Balkans in Transition*, University of California Press.

_____ (1965) *The Balkans*, Prentice Hall Inc.

Jelavich Barbara (1983), *History of the Balkans*, Vol. i-ii, Cambridge University Press.

Jensen Lloyd (1982), *Explaining Foreign Policy*, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Johnston R.J., Knight D., Kofman E. (1988), *Nationalism, Self-Determination and Political Geography*, London, Croom Helm.

Jones S.B. (1945), *Boundary Making - A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors and Boundary Commissioners*, Washington D.C., Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Kalligas Kostas (1992), “Ο Ελληνισμός Εμπρός στη Νέα Διεθνή Συγκυρία”, in ELIAMEP (1992).

Keating Michael (1988), *State and Regional Nationalism: Territorial Politics and the European System*, Brighton, Harvester, Wheatsheaf.

Keohane R.O. and Nye J.S. (1972), *Transnational Relations and European Identity*, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press.

Kissinger Henry (1969), “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy”, in Jacobson and Zimmerman ed. (1969) [see above].

Kitromolides Paschalis M. (1996), “‘Balkan Mentality’: History, Legend, Imagination”, in Nations and Nationalism, Volume 2 Part 2, July 1996.

Kliot Nurit and Waterman Stanley ed. (1991), *The Political Geography of Conflict and Peace*, Belhaven Press, London.

Kofos Evangelos (1986), “The Macedonia Question: the Politics of Mutation”, *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 27, No.1, 1986.

_____ (1992), “Η Ελλάδα και τα Βαλκάνια προς το 2000” in ELIAMEP (1992).

Kondis Basil (1976), *Greece and Albania 1908-14*, Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies.

Kordatos J. (1957), *History of Modern Greece*, Vol. 3-5, 20th Century, Athens.

Kourvetaris Yiorgos and Dobratz Betty A. (1987), *A Profile of Modern Greece in Search of Identity*, Claredon Press, Oxford.

Krejci Jaroslav (1981), *Ethnic and Political Nations in Europe*, London Croom Helm.

Kulischer Eugene M. (1943), *The Displacement of Population in Europe*, The International Labour Office, Montreal.

_____ (1948) *Europe on the Move - War and Population Changes, 1917-47*, New York, Columbia University Press.

Ladas Stephen P. (1932), *The Exchange of Minorities - Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*, New York, The Macmillan Company.

League of Nations (1926), "Greek Refugee Settlement", Geneva.

Lendvai Paul (1969), *Eagles in Cobwebs - Nationalism and Communism in the Balkan*, Doubleday, New York.

_____ (1995), "Flashpoint Balkans", in *The World Today*, Apr. 1995, Vol. 51, No. 4.

Library of the Institute of International Relations (1990), *Οι Εξελίξεις στα Βαλκάνια και η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική - Η Συζήτηση των Πολιτικών Αρχηγών*, Panteion University, I. Sideris, Athens.

Luard Evan (1970), *The International Regulation of Frontier Disputes*, London, Thames and Hudson.

_____ (1970), "Frontier Disputes in Modern International Relations" in Luard ed. (1970) [see above].

Lyon Peter (1970), "Regional Organisations and Frontier Disputes" in Luard ed. (1970) [see above].

Macridis Roy C. (1989), *Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions*, Engelwood Cliffs N.J., Prentice Hall, 7th edition.

Malcolm Noel (1992), "The New Bully of the Balkans", *The Spectator*, 15 August 1992.

Martis Nikolaos K. (1984), *The Falsification of Macedonian History*, Athens.

Marvus Michael R. (1985), *The Unwanted - European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford University Press.

Mayall James (1990), *Nationalism and International Society*, Cambridge University Press.

Mc Neill William Hardy (1947), *The Greek Dilemma - War and Aftermath*, London, Victor Gollancz.

Molte Nel and Peter (1960), *Balkan Roads to Istanbul*, London, Robert Hale Ltd.

Morgenthau Hans (1958), *Dilemmas of Politics*, The University of Chicago Press.

_____ (1973), *Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace*, 5th edition, New York, Knopf.

Mouzelis Nicos P. (1978), *Modern Greece - Facets of Underdevelopment*, London, Macmillan.

Murphy Alexander B. (1991), "Territorial Ideology and International Conflict: the Legacy of Prior Political Formations" in Kliot and Waterman ed. (1991) [see above].

Naval Intelligence Division (1916), "A Handbook of Macedonia and Surrounding Territories" on behalf of the Admiralty and the War Office.

_____ (1944), "Greece Vol. 1", Geographical Handbook Series.

Olson William (1991), *The Theory and Practice of International Relations*, Engelwood Cliffs, New Jersey.

O' Neill Robert ed. (1988), *Prospects of Security in the Mediterranean*, Basingstoke Macmillan and International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Palmer Stephen and King R. (1971), *Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question*, Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books.

Papadakis Maria and Starr Harrey (1987), "Opportunity, Willingness and Small States: the Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy" in Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau ed. (1987) [see above].

Papadopoulos Alexander Archimandrite (1919), *Persecution of the Greeks in Turkey Before the European War*, Central Committee of the Unredeemed Greeks in conjunction with the American-Hellenic Society, New York.

Papakonstantinou Mihalis (1994), *Το Ημερολόγιο ενός Πολιτικού. Η Εμπλοκή των Σκοπίων*, The Estia Bookshop, Athens.

Papastratis Prokopis (1990), "From the 'Great Idea' to Balkan Union", in Sarafis and Martin ed. (1990) [look below].

Patchen Martin (1988), *Resolving Disputes Between Nations: Coercion or Conciliation?*, Durham, Duke University Press.

Pearson Raymond (1983), *National Minorities in Eastern Europe 1848-1945*, The Macmillan Press, Ltd, London and Basingstoke.

Perry Duncan (1988), *The Politics of Terror: the Macedonian Liberation Movements*, Durham, Duke University Press.

Petsalis Diomidis N. (1978), *Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki.

Pettifer James (1992), "Albania: a Challenge for Europe", in *The World Today*, Vol. 48, No. 6, June 1992.

_____ (1992), "The New Macedonian Question", in *International Affairs*, no. 68, 3 (July) 1992.

_____ (1992), "Greece: Into the Balkan Crisis", in *The World Today*, Vol. 48, no. 11, Nov. 1992.

_____ (1994), *The Greeks - Land and People Since the War*, London, Viking/Penguin.

_____ with Hugh Poulton and Minority Rights Group Greece (1994), "The Southern Balkans - Reports" 94/4.

_____ (1994), "Albania, Greece and the Vorio-Epirus Question", in *The World Today*, Aug-Sep. 1994, Vol. 50, nos. 8-9.

_____ (1996) "Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy", in Featherstone and Ifantis ed. (1996).

Phocas-Cosmetatos S.P. (1928), *The Tragedy of Greece*, London, K. Poul.

Pollis A. (1992), "Greek National Identity - Religious Minorities, Rights and European Norms", *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 10;2.

Poulton Hugh and the Minnesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee (1989), *Minorities in the Balkans*, Expedite Graphic Ltd., London.

_____ (1991), *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*, Minority Rights Publications.

Pounds Norman J.G. (1963), *Political Geography*, New York, McGraw-Hill.

Prescott J.R.V. (1965), *The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries*, Hutchinson University Library, London.

_____ (1987), *Political Frontiers and Boundaries*, London, Allen and Unwin.

Prifti Peter (1978), *Socialist Albania since 1944 - Domestic and Foreign Developments*, MIT, Cambridge Mass./London.

Proudfoot Malcolm J. (1952), *European Refugees, 1939-52 - A Study in Forced Population Movement*, Faber and Faber Ltd., London.

- Psomiades H. and Thomadakis S. ed. (1993), *Greece the New Europe and the Changing International Order*, New York, Pella.
- Rapoport Jacques et. al. (1971), *Small States and Territories*, New York, UNITAR.
- Richter Heinz (1986), *British Intervention in Greece - From Varkiza to Civil War*, Merlin Press, London.
- Rokkan S. & Urwin D. eds. (1982), *The Politics of Territorial Identity: Studies in European Regionalism*, London, SAGE Publ.
- Romaeos Yiorgos (1992), “Η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική προς το 2000 - Η Αποχή της Αξιοματικής Αντιπολίτευσης”, in ELIAMEP (1992).
- Rothstein Robert L. (1968), *Alliances and Small Powers*, Columbia University Press, New York and London.
- Rozakis Christos L. (1996), “The International Protection of Minorities in Greece”, in Featherstone and Ifantis ed. (1996).
- Ruches Pyrrhus J. (1965), *Albania's Captives*, 1965, Argonaut Inc. Publishers, Chicago.
- Samaras Antonis (1992), “Η Ελληνική Εξωτερική Πολιτική προς το 2000 - Η Αποχή της Κυβέρνησης”, in ELIAMEP (1992).
- Sarafis Marion and Martin Eve ed. (1990), *Background to Contemporary Greece*, The Merlin Press, London.
- Sarafis Stefanos Maj. Gen. (1980), *ELAS, Greek Resistance Army*, Merlin Press, London.
- Schechtman Joseph B. (1946), *European Population Transfers 1939-45*, Oxford University Press.
- Schou August and Bruntland Arne Olav ed. (1971), *Small States in International Relations*, Nobel Symposium 17, Almqvist & Wiskell, Stockholm.
- Schubert Glendon (1960), *The Public Interest; a Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept*, The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois.
- Sergeant Lewis (1878), *New Greece*, Cassell, Peter & Galpin.
- Shannan Peckham Robert J. (1992), “Albanians in Greek Clothing”, in *The World Today*, Apr. 1992, Vol. 48. No. 4.

Shoup Paul (1968), *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question*, New York.

Smith Antony (1991), *National Identity*, London, Penguin.

Snyder Richard C., Bruck H.W., Burton Sapin eds. (1962), *Foreign Policy Decision-Making*, New York, Free Press.

Spencer Floyd A. (1952), *War and Post-War Greece: an Analysis Based on Greek Writings*, Washington, Library of Congress, European Affairs Division.

Sprout Harold and Margaret (1969), "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics" in Jacobson and Zimmerman ed. (1969) [see above].

Stavrianos L.S. (1961), *The Balkans Since 1453*, Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc.

Stavros Stephanos (1996), "Citizenship and the Protection of Minorities", in Featherstone and Ifantis ed.

Stokes Gale (1984), *Nationalism in the Balkans*, New York, Garland Pub.

Sveics V.V. (1969), *Small Nation Survival - Political Defence in Unequal Conflicts*, Exposition Press, New York.

Sweet Escott Bickham (1954), *Greece - A Political and Economic Survey 1939-53*, London & New York, Royal Institute for International Affairs.

Strassoldo Raimondo (1982), "Frontier Regions - Future Collaboration or Conflict?" in Anderson ed. (1982) [see above].

Tagil Sven (1977), *Studying Boundary Conflicts; a Theoretical Framework*, Stockholm, Essete Studium.

_____ (1982), "The Question of Border Regions in Western Europe: an Historical Background" in Anderson ed. (1982) [see above].

Theodorakopoulos V, Lagakos E., Papoulias G., Giounis I. (1995), *Σκέψεις και Προβληματισμοί για την Εξωτερική Πολιτική*, ELIAMEP, I. Sideris, Athens.

Triantafyllidou Anna (1997), "Nationalism and the Threatening Other: the Case of Greece" in the ASEN Bulletin, no. 13, Summer 1997.

Tsoukalis Loukas (1966), "Is Greece an Awkward Partner?", in Featherstone and Ifantis ed.

Tudjman Franjo (1981), *Nationalism in Contemporary Europe*, Boulder: East European Monographs, New York.

Valinakis Yiannis (1992), "Greece's Balkan Policy and the Macedonian Issue", Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, (Ebenhausen, April 1992).

_____ (1992, b.) "Η Ελλάδα Απέναντι στην Ευρωπαϊκή Κοσμογονία" in ELIAMEP (1992).

Vasdravellis John C. (1968), *The Greek Struggle for Independence - The Macedonians in the Revolution of 1821*, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki.

Venizelos Eleftherios (1919), *Greece Before the Peace Congress of 1919*, American-Hellenic Society.

Veremis Thanos (1994), "Priorities for Athens - A Greek View" in *The World Today*, Apr. 1994, Vol. 50, No.4.

_____ (1996) "A Greek View of Balkan Developments", in Featherstone and Ifantis ed. (1996) [see above].

Vermant Jacques (1953), *The Refugee in the Post-War World*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd.

Vital David (1968), *The Making of British Foreign Policy*, George Allen & Unwin.

_____ (1971), "The Analysis of Small Power Politics" in Schou and Bruntland ed. (1972) [see above].

_____ (1972), *The Inequality of States - A Study of the Small Power in International Relations*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Voigt F.A. (1949), *The Greek Sedition*, London, World Affairs Book Club.

Voros F.K. (1992), "Διπλωματικός Τσάμικος", in *Εκπαιδευτικά*, no. 27-28, Athens.

Vournas Tassos (1977-80), *Ιστορία της Σύγχρονης Ελλάδας*, Athens, Tolidis Brothers Publications.

Vukmanovic Svetozar (General Tempo) (1985), *How and Why the People's Liberation Struggle of Greece Met With Defeat*, Merlin Press.

Walden Sotiris (1994), *Το Μακεδονικό και τα Βαλκάνια, Η Αδιέξοδη Πορεία της Ελληνικής Πολιτικής*, Themelio, Athens.

Watson Micahel (1990), *Contemporary Minority Nationalism*, London, Routledge.

Weiner Myron (1970-1), "The Macedonian Syndrome, an Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development" in *World Politics*, Vol. 23, 1970-1, No. 4.

Weller Marc (1992), "Piggy in the Middle", *New Statesman and Society*, 25 September 1992.

Wilkinson H.R. (1951), *Maps and Politics - A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia*, Liverpool.

Williams Colin H., (1989), *Community Conflict, Partition and Nationalism*, London, Routledge.

Witner Lawrence S. (1982), *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-49*, Columbia University Press, New York.

Wolf Robert Lee (1956), *The Balkans in Our Time*, Harvard University Press.

Woodhouse C.M. (1968), *Modern Greece - A Short History*, Faber and Faber.

Zametica John (1992), "The Yugoslav Conflict", *Adelphi Paper* 270, Summer 1992.