

# ABSTRACT OF THESIS

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To speak is to be a man. To speak is to speak of. Therefore, to speak is to speak of man. All human actions are the search-for-identity. All subjects of which humans speak are concerned with this search-for-identity. Man is interested in the world around him neither for the world's nor for curiosity's sake, but for the sake of finding his own identity. Man finds his own identity and defines his own self by virtue of positing himself in a particular manner over against, and in relation to, the world which surrounds him.

Paul's and Seneca's writings are records of what they spoke, that is records of what they spoke of. In other words, Paul's and Seneca's writings provide us with sufficient material from which it is possible to infer what they thought of man.

In Paul's view, man is a creature who is not at-one-with-himself. This not being at-one-with-himself constitutes man's actual self which is a desire to be-in-itself, i.e. to be God. This is real man, but not true man. True man is creature who realizes that the source of his existence is outside of himself, that he can never achieve the status of being-in-itself. He cannot become being-in-itself because the presence of the Other is an incarnation of man's limits. At the same time the Other is an incarnation of his true being and his salvation. In the encounter with the Other man actualizes himself, i.e. he realizes that he is only potential being. Instead of being-in-itself he is a being-sustained-by-the-Other. Only in the presence of the Other can man find his own self. The absence of the Other is the destruction of his own self. The true nature and the salvation of man lies in man's willingness and capacity to "embrace", i.e. to enter into communion with the Other.

In Seneca's view, equally as in Paul's, man is a creature who is not at-one-with-himself. As opposed to Paul's view, Seneca's view is that man's desire to be-in-itself is potential, i.e. man's desire to be God can, and must, be actualized. The reason why man is not actually God is because of the presence of the Other. The Other is the incarnation of man's limits; he is a hindrance and an obstacle on man's way towards the actualization of himself. Hence the Other is man's hell, man's original sin. To achieve the true state of being, to become an actual being, i.e. God, man has to overcome his limitations. That means man has to wipe out, to destroy the Other. In whatever form the Other may present himself to man, man has to annihilate him. Man has to become the source of the Other's existence. Everything has to receive existence from man. When that is achieved, then man is ultimate. He is the source of his own existence. He is the source of the existence of the whole world. He has actualized his true state of being, i.e. he has become God.

Hence, Paul and Seneca dealt with the same problem, but held diametrically opposite views about the way the problem should be solved. Their respective solutions are analyzed in regard to the questions of man and God, man and world, man and freedom, and man and eschatology. The whole is then concluded by a general survey of their attitudes.

ANTHROPOLOGY OF PAUL AND SENECA

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I hereby certify that this Thesis represents  
my work, and was composed by me.



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To all the above people, named and un-named, I owe more than my sincere thanks could convey.

### ABBREVIATIONS

- Adam Barrett, C.K., From First Adam to Last. A Study in Pauline Anthropology, London, 1962.
- BN Sartre, J.P., Being and Nothingness. An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, London, 1972.
- Corinthians Barrett, C.K., A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, London, 1968.
- EF Bultmann, R., Existence and Faith, Collins, London & Glasgow, 1973.
- Freiheit Pohlenz, M., Griechische Freiheit, Wesen und Werden eines Lebensideals, Heidelberg, 1955.
- Gesetz Bornkamm, G., Das Ende des Gesetzes (Paulusstudien), Beiträge zur evangelischen Theologie, Band 16. München, 1952.
- Gewissen Böhlig, H., 'Das Gewissen bei Seneca und Paulus, Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung,' Theologische Studien und Kritiken, 1914, vol. 87.
- GV Bultmann, R., Glauben und Verstehen, Gesammelte Aufsätze, Bände i-iv, Tübingen, 1952.
- Hellenism Grant, F.C., Roman Hellenism and the New Testament, Edinburgh & London, 1962.
- Interpreters Schweitzer, A., Paul and his Interpreters, London, 1912.
- Maxim Betz, H.D., 'The Delphic Maxim γνῶθι σαυτόν in Hermetic Interpretation,' Harvard Theological Review, vol. 63, October, 1970, No. 4.
- Mysticism Schweitzer, A., The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, London, 1931.
- Outlines Zeller, E., Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, London, 1886.
- PJPS The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Ed. by Robert Denoon Cumming, London, 1968.
- PS Grant, F.C., 'St. Paul and Stoicism', Biblical World, Vol. 45, 1915.
- Romans Barrett, C.K., A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, London, 1957.



- Stoa Pohlenz, M., Die Stoa, Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung, Göttingen, 1948.
- Stoics Zeller, E., The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, London, 1892.
- Tarsos Böhlig, H., Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos im Augusteischen Zeitalter, Göttingen, 1913.
- Theology Prat, F., The Theology of St. Paul, Vols. I-II, London & Dublin, 1945.
- TNT Bultmann, R., Theology of the New Testament, vols. i-ii, London, 1952.
- Urchristentum Weiss, J., Das Urchristentum, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1917.

## A B S T R A C T

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find his own self. The absence of the Other is the destruction of his own self. The true nature and the salvation of man lies in man's willingness and capacity to "embrace", i.e. to enter into communion with the Other.

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Hence, Paul and Seneca dealt with the same problem, but held diametrically opposite views about the way the problem should be solved. Their respective solutions are analyzed in regard to the questions of man and God, man and world, man and freedom, and man and eschatology. The whole is then concluded by a general survey of their attitudes.

## INTRODUCTION

It has been categorically pointed out that the process of Hellenization within Christianity was not started by Paul,<sup>1</sup> and even Schoeps<sup>2</sup> admitted that "the acute Hellenization of the Christian gospel" began with the Pastoral letters, which he takes for Deutero-Pauline, and with the letter to Hebrews. However, Paul seems to have been responsible, in the eyes of many interpreters, for the introduction of Hellenistic thought in the Biblical sphere. The charge against Paul was more severe, and the problem appeared to be more acute, because of the generally accepted presupposition that the Biblical-Semitic world, on the one side, and the Hellenistic world, on the other side, were diametrically opposed, although it was argued that Paul's world is not to be viewed as if it was sharply split in two halves, but that a certain degree of unity is to be admitted.<sup>3</sup>

As to the problem concerning the relation between Paul and Seneca it is taken for granted (justly!) that it is Paul who is Hellenized and not Seneca who is Semiticized, although quite a number of scholars have argued that Stoicism had Eastern-Semitic roots (especially Pohlenz), and even that Seneca might have had

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1. See e.g.: J.N. Sevenster, Paul and Seneca, Leiden, 1961, p.240.; Albert Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, London, 1931, p. 334.
  2. Schoeps, J.H., Paul, The Theology of the Apostle in the Light of Jewish Religious History, London, 1961, p. 264.
  3. Adolf Deissmann, Paul, A Study in Social and Religious History, New York, 1957, p. 35.



Eastern blood.<sup>1</sup>

We shall not dispute any of these arguments here, for the first one appears to contain some truth in it. As to the second one it sounds highly improbable and unconvincing. Finally, whatever the fact about these two questions might be, they do not seem to be of high relevance for the problem that we are going to treat.

The correspondence between Paul and Seneca, which came into existence sometime in 3-4 century, has been proved to be faked,<sup>2</sup> so that it is not to be taken into serious consideration, as a possible aid for throwing some light on the problem of Paul and Seneca. Sound scholarship has also demolished a belief in the possible meetings between Paul and Seneca, so that we feel free to discard any discussion on the issue of friendship between the Apostle and the Philosopher.<sup>3</sup> Hence neither personal contacts between the two men, nor possible direct or indirect influences on each other should be taken either as a starting point or as a task of research. They shall rather be treated as two men, contemporaries in the strictest

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1. J.B. Lightfoot, St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, London and Cambridge, 1868, p. 275.; see also: J. Kroll, Gott und Hölle, Der Mythos vom Descensuskampfe, Berlin, 1932, p. 447.; Hugo Preller, 'Paulus oder Seneca?' Festschrift Walther Judeich, zum 70. Geburtstag, Weimar, 1929, p. 69.
  2. F.X. Kraus, 'Der Briefwechsel Pauli mit Seneca, Ein Beitrag zur Apokryphen-Literatur,' Theologische Quartalschrift, No.49. Tübingen, 1867, p. 606.; E. Westerborg, Der Ursprung der Sage dass Seneca Christ gewesen sei, Eine kritische Untersuchung, Berlin, 1881, p.6.; Sevenster, op.cit., p. 13.
  3. Chas. H. Stanley Davis, Greek and Roman Stoicism and Some of its Disciples, London, 1903, p. 160.; R.M. Gummere, Seneca the Philosopher and his Modern Message, London-Calcutta-Sidney, 1922, pp. 68-70.; F.W. Farrar, Seekers After God, Macmillan and Co., Publishers (1868?), p. 18.; Deissmann, op.cit., p. 74.; Westerborg, op.cit., pp. 7-8.; Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 10, 14.

sense of the word, whose teachings:

- a) reflect ideas and beliefs of the social, ethnic, philosophical and religious environment, and
- b) are likely to contain a certain message for contemporary readers and students who take them seriously.

The task of the present research is to examine and analyze the thought of St. Paul and the thought of Seneca, and to make an assessment of whether these two are, or are not, compatible and identical.

Now, what has appeared to be the subject of what we have listed under point "a)", the interpreters of Paul have regarded it as their task to establish what are the major influences and ideas standing behind Paul's letters. Thus it became a common feature of Pauline scholarship to argue that he was a "Jew of Jews",<sup>1</sup> or that he was altogether Hellenized,<sup>2</sup> although these two are not to

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1. Thus the most consistent adherent of this movement was Albert Schweitzer with his two volumes on Paul: Paul and his Interpreters, London, 1912, and The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, London, 1931; See further: Max Pohlenz, Paulus und die Stoa, Sonderausgabe, MCMLXIV Darmstadt, Zeitschrift für die Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der Älteren Kirche, 42, 1949, S.69-104, p. 19.; W.D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, London, 1956, pp. 124, 139.; D. de Zwaan, 'Paulinische Weltanschauung', Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie, Heft 3, 1931. The article is moderate but tends to see mainly Jewish influences in Paul's thought. R. Leichtenhan, 'Die Ueberwindung des Leides bei Paulus und in der zeitgenössischen Stoa', Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 1922, p. 390.
  2. This trend is mainly represented by Holzmann, Morgan, Bousset and Reitzenstein as criticised by W.D. Davies in his book on Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, London, 1962, pp. lff. Davies is particularly keen on seeing the Judaistic background behind every Pauline concept.



be sharply distinguished.<sup>1</sup> The most reasonable assessment would be to say that the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes. We do not want to argue in favour of what has been called "a distorted and erroneous view of the relation between thought and language",<sup>2</sup> but, however, we find it impossible to agree with the presupposition that St. Paul who has mastered the Greek language<sup>3</sup> was not at all Hellenized. Bultmann is surely justified in arguing that St. Paul's "letters show that he was a Hellenistic Jew, i.e. that in his training Jewish tradition and Greek culture are combined."<sup>4</sup>

Although we are of the opinion that the language is organically linked with the thought that it expresses we think it wise to "hesitate before assuming that the 'implicit metaphysics'"<sup>5</sup> are embedded in the whole structure of the language. In other words one should not exercise excessive speculation on Paul's usage of the language,<sup>6</sup> but, perhaps, it is not assuming too much

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1. J. Leipoldt, Christentum und Stoicismus, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, Band 27, Gotha, 1906, pp. 145-46.
  2. James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language, Oxford, 1961, p. 294.
  3. R. Bultmann, Existence and Faith, Collins, 1973, p. 131.
  4. EF, p. 131.
  5. Barr, op.cit., p. 295.
  6. For the variety of opinions on Paul's usage of the language see: W. von Loewenich, Paul, His Life and Work, Edinburgh and London, 1960, pp. 16-17; F.C. Grant, 'St. Paul and Stoicism', Biblical World, vol. 45, 1915, p. 279; C.K. Barrett, From First Adam to Last, A Study in Pauline Anthropology, London, 1962, p. 90; Interpreters, p. 238; Mysticism, p. 138; Stacey, op.cit., pp. 3, 31, 36, 38; Westerburg, op.cit., p. 22; Lightfoot, op.cit., p. 297.

to say that:

"the New Testament message cannot be separated from the way in which it is proclaimed, at various times and within various cultures. In order to reach the minds of Greeks, it not only had to be written in Greek, but its advocates had to employ categories of thought familiar to their audience.<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand we are presented with the difficulty precisely because of some of the categories and concepts which are to be found and which, it is known, are a corner-stone of the Greek philosophy contemporary with St. Paul.<sup>2</sup>

However, apart from the fact that Paul and Seneca used the same categories and concepts, which poses the problem for an interpreter, we are faced with another problem, and that problem is that our contemporary thought is preconditioned by Pauline and Senecan concepts. Thus we find ourselves frequently talking of the "inner man" (Paul) our "inner selves" (Seneca) etc. On the other hand, besides our using directly Paul's and Seneca's language, Christianity spread and grew in our part of the world under the strong influence of Roman Law and Stoicism. For that reason we must reckon with the fact that we are brought up within the culture

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1. J. Meyendorff, Christ in Eastern Christian Thought, Washington and Cleveland, 1969, p. viii; See also: D. Feine, 'Stoicismus und Christentum', Theologische Literaturblatt, Nos. 6-9; Febr. 1905, Leipzig, p. 77; W.L. Knox, St. Paul and the Church of Gentiles, Cambridge, 1939, pp. ix, 55; Stacey, op.cit., pp. 3, 38; Leichtenhan, op.cit., p. 390.
  2. E.g. concepts such as: nature, conscience, and self-sufficiency. For the variety of opinions on this issue see: Stacey, op.cit., p. 107; Loewenich, op.cit., p. 14; F.C. Grant, Roman Hellenism and the New Testament, Edinburgh and London, 1962, pp. 137-38; PS, pp. 274, 278-79; Davies, op.cit., p. 116; C.H. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks, London, 1954, pp. 36-37; H. Böhlig, Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos im Augusteischen Zeitalter, Göttingen, 1913, p. 82.



and civilization which are to some extent preconditioned and shaped by Paul's and Seneca's ideas.<sup>1</sup>

Consequently the difficulty which an interpreter faces is that he is partly identical with both Pauline and Senecan ways of thinking, and that prevents him from being altogether aloof from the ideas he is interpreting, so as to be unable to give an objective interpretation.

Throughout a century of the investigation of the problems relating to Paul and Seneca an external tool has been invoked as a help, namely the presupposition that both Paul<sup>2</sup> and Seneca<sup>3</sup> were unsystematic thinkers. In the case of Seneca it was ascribed to

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1. On the influence of Stoic thought and Roman Law on Western thought and society see: E.V. Arnold, Roman Stoicism, Cambridge 1911, p. 269; E. Brunner, Man in Revolt, London and Redhill, 1947, pp. 26, 32, 131; R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, London, 1941, vol. ii, p. 324; M. Pohlenz, Griechische Freiheit, Heidelberg, 1955, p. 21; Preller, op.cit., pp. 79-80; Grummere, op.cit., pp. 5, 54; M. Mühl, Die Antike Menschheitsidee in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Leipzig, 1928, p. 101; H. Baker, The Image of Man, New York and London, 1961, p. 78.
  2. J. Munck, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind, London, 1959, pp. 66-67; Schoeps, op.cit., pp. 13, 46; Deissmann, op.cit., p. 6; Loewenich, op.cit., pp. 9, 142; Freiheit, p. 184; R. Scroggs, The Last Adam, Oxford, 1966, p. 61; Hellenism, pp. 144, 146; Adam, p. 3; Sevenster, op.cit., p. 24.
  3. S. Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius, London and New York, 1904, p. 10; F. Holland, Seneca, London, 1920, p. 164; E. Holler, Seneca und die Seelenteilungslehre und Affektpsychologie der Mittelstoa, Kalmünz, 1934, p. 4; Dr. Holzherr, Der Philosoph Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Rastatt (Teil I u. Teil II) 1858-59; i, p. 26; H. Steiner, Theodizee bei Seneca, Erlangen, 1914, p. 2; W.L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, Edinburgh, 1907, p. 30; Farrar, op.cit., p. 34.

his syncretistic tendencies,<sup>1</sup> which he himself admitted.<sup>2</sup> However, we find it difficult to agree with such presuppositions. Apart from the fact that some authors have recognized the consistency and systematic thought<sup>3</sup> of the two men, it seems to be impossible to give a systematic survey or interpretation of their respective anthropologies, unless it is recognized that their thoughts are consistent and systematic, at least to the extent that an interpreter is able to put them under a coherent survey. Therefore, without entering into detailed discussion of Paul's and Seneca's (in-)consistency, we shall take their consistency for granted, hoping that the main body of the thesis will justify the procedure.

This introduction so far has dealt, in a general way, with some aspects of the problem raised by research into the relationship between St. Paul and Seneca. Their anthropologies have also been treated frequently within the general context of research. Some other aspects of their teachings were usually more profoundly treated.

Now, the most natural question to ask would be:

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1. F. Cumont, Afterlife in Roman Paganism, New Haven, 1922, p. 8; A. Bonhöffer, Epiktet und die Stoa, Stuttgart, 1890, p. 92; E. Zeller, The Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics, London, 1892, p. 53; R.D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean, London, 1910, pp. 14, 368; St. G. Stock, Stoicism, London, 1908, p. 108; C.F. Baur 'Seneca und Paulus', Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1858, vol. 58, p. 444; Davidson, op.cit., p. 127; Lightfoot, op.cit., p. 290; Gummere, op.cit., p. 60.
  2. "Sed ne te per circumitus traham, aliorum quidem opiniones praetribu -" De V. Beata, 3.2; "...et tamen excusatissimus essem, etiam si non praecepta illorum sequerer, sed exempla", De Otio, 2.1; "'Epicurus', inquis, 'dixit. Quid tibi cum alieno?' Quod verum est, meum est", Ep. 12.11.
  3. J. Weiss, Das Urchristentum, Göttingen, 1917, p. 321; G. Bornkamm, Paul, London, 1971, pp. xxi-xxii; O.P. Eatches, 'Paul's Use of the Term "Man"', The Review and Expositor, No.5, 1908, p. 522; Mysticism, pp. 34,98,139; Interpreters, pp. 15,41,60,247; Knox, op.cit., p.ix.



"Why anthropology at all?"

Why anthropology indeed, especially when we recall that it has been remarked that: "Paul's letters were not written...to give us an account of his anthropology" (Sevenster, op.cit., p. 63)?

One is entitled to question this statement, far more so after Bultmann's claim that the whole Pauline theology is expressed in terms of anthropology.<sup>1</sup> If Bultmann be mistaken, and Sevenster right, then according to Sevenster's own opinion we are on an unequal footing since "it is immediately clear from the titles of these (i.e. Seneca's writings)<sup>2</sup> works that man is their subject..." (op.cit., p. 67).

If we follow an argument of Paul himself, we shall have some ground for subscribing to Sevenster's opinion, for Paul's kerygma is Christo- and Theo-centric. So in his own words:

εἰ δὲ Χριστὸς οὐκ ἐγήγερται, κενὸν ἄρα τὸ  
κήρυγμα ἡμῶν, κενὴ καὶ ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν<sup>3</sup>

Hence Paul affirms that the content of his message, and the content of the faith of his converts is one and the same - the risen Christ, who for Paul is nobody else but:

ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ<sup>4</sup>

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1. R. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, London, 1955, vol. i, p. 191.
  2. Sevenster has in mind the works of Seneca such as: De Vita Beata, De Tranquillitate Animi, De Constantia Sapientis, De Otio, De Brevitate Vitae, De Ira.
  3. I Cor. 15.14.
  4. Rom. 1. 3,4,9; 5.10; 8.3,29; I Cor. 1.9; 15.28; II Cor. 1.19; Gal. 1.16; 2.20; 4.4; Eph. 4.13; I Thess. 1.13.

Consequently, the whole Pauline kerygma (be it theology or anthropology) revolves around the risen Christ, the Son of God. This is the centre on which all Pauline research should be focussed. Thus all attempts to reconstruct Paul's thought from the different backgrounds, Jewish and Hellenistic, which have shown different depths of insight into Pauline thought, could be summed up in the argument of one of the most learned, and fairly objective, investigators and critics of Paul, namely H.J. Schoeps.

Let us quote the passage in which Schoeps condenses skilfully all of these three points:

- a) the core of the Pauline problem,
- b) the origin of this problem, and
- c) its bearing upon an anthropological quest.

Hence insofar as we agree that the centre of Pauline thought is the faith in the resurrected Christ, Son of God, Schoeps writes:

"What is the origin of the Pauline faith in the Son of God, seeing that there is no basis for it in Judaism? The answer is: it clearly goes back to the self-testimony of Jesus, which for good reasons (cf. 161ff.) appeared intolerable to the Jews, because it blurs the line of demarcation between God and man,<sup>1</sup> and contradicts strict transcendent monotheism, that fundamental tenet of the Jewish creed (Deut. 6.4). Hence we see in the υἱός θεοῦ belief, to which Jesus himself testified according to the synoptic account - and only there - the sole decisive heathen premiss of Pauline thought".<sup>2</sup>

This statement Schoeps has put in an even more condensed way and in a more definite form by stating that:

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1. However, it was argued that: "...wahrt Paulus deutlicher einen Unterschied zwischen Gott und Christus. Das entspricht nicht nur seiner jüdischen, sondern der orientalischen Denkweise überhaupt." Tarsos, p. 19.
  2. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 158.



"The genesis of the whole structure is plain: the Messiah was Son of God - which is the sole un-Jewish point in Paul's thinking which explains all the other doctrines that have no parallel in Jewish writings; if we like, it is the Hellenistic premiss of his (Paul's) thought..."<sup>1</sup>

To make our three points clear, convinced that Schoeps's argument is clear enough as not to require an interpretation, let us just point out that Schoeps here backs up our argument that the central point of St. Paul's thought is the faith in the Messiah, the Son of God.

In regard to the other point, the origin of that faith - on which we do not feel compelled to agree with Schoeps - he explicitly says that it is non-Jewish, i.e. is Hellenistic; and finally the third point, its bearing upon an anthropological quest is expressed in Schoeps's words that that premiss of Paul "blurs the line of demarcation between God and man."

Consequently, it follows that the content of Pauline faith in Christ, the Son of God, is directly anthropologically relevant, for it has brought about the problem of transcendence and immanence, in such a way that it is most explicit precisely when man is at stake. Hence, it is our opinion that Bultmann's view of Pauline theology is correct, namely that Paul never considered God in Himself as Being, but only in so far as he has reacted upon the concrete situation of man. And the same is said of Pauline anthropology:

"Paul has contacts with Judaism in not considering man in an objective sense, with a view to what he is in himself. Man is seen a priori in the circumstances in which he exists, primarily in the relationship of the creature to the creator and to the created world."<sup>2</sup>

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1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 209.

2. Hans Conzelmann, An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament, London, 1969, p. 174.

The above points we hope to develop in detail later in the thesis.

There remains one more point to be clarified, namely the point of contact, or, if you prefer, there remains to be developed a framework within which Pauline and Senecan anthropology can be compared. So far we have seen two major points:

- a) an argument has been levelled that Paul's basic belief, upon which rest all his other doctrines and beliefs, is not of Jewish but of Hellenistic origin, and
- b) we have defended a theory of a moderate Hellenization of Paul, based mainly on two grounds: first that the Pauline world was, to a certain extent, a mixed one, i.e. Paul was in a position to encounter both, Jewish and Hellenistic, ideas, and second, in so far as the language determines thought that it expresses Paul was Hellenized, for he spoke the Greek language. (Here we want to stress again that we are not giving too great an importance to the argument concerning the relation between language and thought, but we believe, however, that the link between the two cannot be denied altogether.)<sup>1</sup>

An overemphasis of an importance of the link between the structure of the language and the thought has played quite an important role

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1. However G. Watson, in The Stoic Theory of Knowledge, Belfast, 1966, p. 7, writes: "Pohlenz suggests that the Stoics were particularly conscious of the problem of language and meaning because the leading men like Zeno and Chrysippus were bilingual (v. Die Stoa, I, 36). It was important that the words, the physical aspect or frame should be conformed as closely as possible to the meaning which penetrated them as maker's idea penetrates his material."



in biblical scholarship.<sup>1</sup> According to the adherents of this movement every language had its typical features and was separated by an emphatically distinct line from the other languages which were not of the same linguistic group, e.g. the Indo-European group of languages versus the Semitic group of languages. Thus Professor Barr writes:

"The habit of contrasting Greek and Hebrew modes of thought has become extremely commonplace in modern theology and has had very great influence upon it."<sup>2</sup>

This extreme school of biblical scholarship has mainly relied upon the presupposition that there are "implicit metaphysics" in the language as such. In fact the danger, to which Prof. Barr objects, is not the presupposition itself but its excessive usage.

As far as the particular problem of Paul and Seneca is concerned, we shall pose the problem as if it were a problem of Greek and Hebrew language - and respectively Greek and Hebrew thought. However, it is to be made clear here, that Paul would fall within the Hebrew thought and language structure, and Seneca within the Greek thought and language structure. We are doing this in order to confine ourselves to the views of those who tend to see Paul, and

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1. However see here *ibid.*, p. 44. "By language things are meant: meaningful language always implies a connection between word and reality. Language is the linking par excellence, the most effective realization of coherence. It seems to have been reflection on language which induced them (Stoics) to say that man, unlike the parrot for instance, has the *ἐννοια ἀκολουθίας* (SVF, ii, 223); for not only has he experience of it, but also understanding of the principle behind; and consequently, helped by 'material' language, he has much greater freedom in every case where *ἀκολουθία* is involved. Through language he can demonstrate the human reactions to reality which derive from *κοινὰ ἔννοιαι*. He shows how he shuffles and combines and contrasts his perceptions."

2. Barr, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

the thought of the New Testament as a whole, as if resting entirely upon the Judaistic background, and Seneca, being a Roman, is set within the sphere of Greek language, not because he wrote in Greek, for he did not, but because at the time of Seneca the philosophical movements and thoughts of Athens and Rome were identical, so that the language as such is of lesser importance.

Now, the main approach, to those who have linguistically founded their interpretations, is that they have seen Greek and Hebrew thought usually in terms of sharp contrasts. "The main contrasts", writes Prof. Barr:

"drawn between Greek and Hebrew thought are usually the following:

1. The contrast between static and dynamic. The Greeks were ultimately interested in contemplation, the Hebrews in action. Movement could not be ultimate reality for the Greeks, to whom being must be distinguished from becoming, and the ultimate must be changeless. For the Israelites the true reality was action and movement,<sup>1</sup> and the inactive and motionless was no reality at all."

The main modern interpreter of this sort at whom Barr's criticisms are pointed is Thorlief Boman,<sup>2</sup> who has made an effort to present the difference between Greek and Hebrew thought in as black and white terms as possible. Thus he writes:

"If Israelite thinking is to be characterised it is obvious first to call it dynamic, vigorous, passionate, and sometimes quite explosive in kind; correspondingly Greek thinking is static, peaceful, moderate, and harmonious in kind".<sup>3</sup>

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1. Barr, op.cit., pp. 10-11.

2. T. Boman, Hebrew Thought Compared with Greek, London, 1960.

3. *ibid.*, p. 27.



and also:

"The Greek most acutely experiences the world and existence while he stands and reflects, but the Israelite reaches his zenith in ceaseless movement. Rest, harmony, composure, and self-control - this is the Greek way; movement, life, deep emotion, and power - this is the Hebrew way".<sup>1</sup>

Now, this view of Boman is no novelty in biblical scholarship for already Albert Schweitzer had argued that the Hellenistic world-view was static, by saying that: "in the Stoic view the world is thought of as static and unaltering".<sup>2</sup> This view did not end with Barr's criticism of its basic presuppositions either, so that it is still advocated. So, for example, Niederwimmer has called the "griechischen Welt- und Menschenbild, das einen statisch-ruhenden und in sich geschlossenen Kosmos".<sup>3</sup>

Movement has been especially accepted (with justification!) as the means of depicting Pauline thought, since the Apostle's thought has been described as pre-eminently historical thought. Thus Schoeps writes:

"The fact is that Paul sees all earthly happenings as cohering with the continuity of a concrete divine plan of action. His historical understanding is never influenced by the Greek metaphysic of being, but derives always from the historical outlook characteristic of Israel". (op.cit., p. 231)

And indeed, insofar as history is understood as a characteristic human reality, whose hallmark is man's dealing with his environment, or, if you prefer, with his world, Paul's thought is foremostly historical thought. At least on this issue all interpreters are

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1. *ibid.*, p. 205.

2. *Mysticism*, p. 11.

3. K. Niederwimmer, *Der Begriff der Freiheit im Neuen Testament*, Berlin, 1966, p. 79.

at one.<sup>1</sup> Thus, for example, Paul has taken seriously Adam as a historical figure,<sup>2</sup> precisely because Adam's sin has borne historical consequences and is characteristic of the historical existence of every other man, and in that respect Conzelmann comments:

"As Ro. 5. shows, for Paul, even death of course is not essentially a natural process, but an indication that the relationship to God is broken, i.e. as a factor of historical existence. This historical intent can already be seen in I Cor. 15.22..."<sup>3</sup>

Precisely on this basis, understanding historical existence as an existence of movement,<sup>4</sup> interpreters have seen a static concept of existence and being in the Greek thought expressed through the concept of nature.<sup>5</sup> Having in mind this view of the basic differences between Greek and Semitic thought, the one being static and the other historical, i.e. dynamic, Emil Brunner wrote:

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1. On the interpretations of Paul's view of history see: de Zwaan, op.cit., pp. 569, 572; Baur, op.cit., p. 246; Mühl, op.cit., p. 101; Niebuhr, op.cit., i, pp. 135, 143; Mysticism, pp. 10-11; Stacey, op.cit., p. 35. Weiss, Urchristentum, p. 379; Liechtenhan, op.cit., p. 397; Knox, op.cit., p. 181; Brunner, op.cit., p. 435; M. Baumgarten, Lucius Annaeus Seneca und das Christentum in der tief gesunkenen Weltzeit, Rostock, 1895, pp. 123, 127; H. Greeven, Das Hauptproblem der Sozialethik in der Neueren Stoa und im Urchristentum, Gütersloh, 1934, p. 24; C.J. de Vogel, Greek Philosophy, iii, Leiden, 1959, p. 55; Scroggs, op.cit., p. 60.
  2. See C.K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, London, 1968, p. 351; Adam, p. 19; Scroggs, op.cit., p. 83; Schoeps, op.cit., p. 231.
  3. Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 188.
  4. "In der Weltanschauung des Paulus ist der ganze Kosmos ergriffen von der Dynamik..." de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 545.
  5. See H. Zahrnt, The Question of God, London, 1969, p. 73.



"Whether man is understood, ideally from the point of view of Idea or causally from that of Nature: in each case he is understood non-historically". (op.cit., p. 436)

In other words, if historical existence implies a dynamic existence, an existence on the plane of "nature" is a static existence. And this is indeed our crucial point, for we are reminded that: "to grasp the highest Stoic thought we need a definition of 'Nature'."<sup>1</sup> Undoubtedly, the concept of nature is a basic concept of the Stoic school, and of all schools of Greek philosophy.

The above listed views of the concept of nature, (Schweitzer, Brunner, Niederwimmer, Boman) will prove to be precisely the opposite of what the concept itself implies. The definition and the misapprehension of the word has been put this way:

"...we can see moving Purpose. It is Physis, the word which Romans unfortunately translated 'Natura', but which means 'Growing' or 'the way things grow' - almost what we call Evolution. But to the Stoic it is a living and conscious evolution..."<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, in so far as it is legitimate to rely on "implied metaphysics", we can point out that the word  $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$  is a derivation of the verb  $\phi\upsilon\omega$ , which means to plant, and thus the word itself implies movement. Thus an interpreter insists that: "Physis must be moving upward, or else it is not Physis."<sup>3</sup>

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1. G.H.C. Macgregor and A.C. Purdy, Jew and Greek: Tutors Unto Christ, London, 1936, p. 251.
  2. Gilbert Murray, Five Stages of Greek Religion, Oxford, 1925, p. 126.
  3. Gilbert Murray, The Stoic Philosophy, London, 1915, p. 49; See also p. 32; "We call it 'Evolution'. The Greeks called it Physis, a word which we translate by 'Nature', but which seems to mean exactly 'growth' or 'process of growth'."

Not only is the concept of nature not to be conceived as static, but the concept of nature is precisely the initiator of movement within the general sphere of being and existence.<sup>1</sup> Thus it is argued that:

"Gerade durch den Begriff der φύσις kommt in Gott oder der Logos die Bewegung als nothwendiges Moment hinein, ohne dass freilich von den Stoikern besonders Gewicht darauf gelegt worden wäre. Uebrigens braucht man nicht nur aus den beiden Begriffen zugelegten gleichen Definitionen auf die Identität zwischen Gott oder dem Logos zu Natur zu schliessen ..."<sup>2</sup>

Hence we have every reason to believe that the concept of nature was not a static but a kinetic one. As another interpreter puts it:

"Stoicism was, above all, as we saw, a philosophy which emphasized the dynamic nature of reality, and by its insistence on change, demanded the abandonment of any sort of a static knowledge of the universe and any sort of contentment at having arrived at a fixed, unchangeable truth."<sup>3</sup>

Finally it can be illustrated from Seneca himself for he says: "nihil ita ut immobile esset natura concepit",<sup>4</sup> and also: "cum dei natura adsidua et citatissima commutatione vel delectet se vel conservet".<sup>5</sup>

It has been pointed out also that not only the concept of nature is kinetic in Greek thought, but also the concept of truth:

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1. For a further illuminating interpretation of the concept of φύσις see: R.A. Nisbet, Social Change and History, London, Oxford, New York, 1969, pp. 16-24.
  2. M. Heinze, Die Lehre vom Logos in der griechischen Philosophie, Oldenburg, 1872, p. 104.
  3. Watson, G. op.cit., p. 87.
  4. N. Q. vi, 1.12.
  5. Ad Helv. 6.8; cf.: N.Q. ii, 45; De Ben. iv, 7.1; 8.3.



"For two things in particular Christian theology is Aristotle's debtor - his extraordinary skill in creating a philosophical terminology, and his assumption that truth is never static..."<sup>1</sup>

It is hoped that the above argument does not give an impression that we have come to believe that because of the structures of the Greek and Hebrew languages the respective thoughts have confined themselves to these structures. Our purpose has been only to point out:

- a) that from the language we can see what sort of thought is behind it, and
- b) that the differences between Greek and Hebrew thought, especially on the overdone examples of static-dynamic contrast, are far less than is often assumed.

The reason why we have entered into this argument, apart from the general points, namely that Paul's world is more of a unity than of polarisation and that Paul was Hellenized in certain aspects by the very fact that he has moved through the Greek culture and environment of Greek language, is that we envisage a terminology of "movement" as a possible vehicle for expressing both Paul's and Seneca's anthropologies. We are not trying to argue that either Paul or Seneca have seen movement as the essence of man or as the nature of man. Our intention is rather, if we have to provide an adequate terminology for comparing their anthropologies, to translate their respective anthropologies in terms of movement, for after all Luke may be doing Paul no injustice when he has him say:

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1. Macgregor and Purdy, op.cit., p. 246.

ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν,<sup>1</sup>

and Seneca wrote: "Natura enim humanus animus agilis est et pronus ad motus".<sup>2</sup> Thus we shall adopt the notion of movement as fundamental to the anthropologies of both, while distinguishing between them by suggesting that the movement typical of Pauline anthropology will be called a centrifugal movement, denoting that man by his nature is an ec-static being, outward orientated, whereas the movement typical of Senecan anthropology will be called a centripetal movement, denoting that man by his nature is an introspective being, inward orientated. These two movements, as the means for expressing Paul's and Seneca's anthropology, we have chosen, because they seem to coincide to a great extent with their respective views of the world and of existence.

Thus Paul, who has been charged with dualism,<sup>3</sup> and more frequently defended as not being a dualist,<sup>4</sup> we shall treat in such a way as will enable us to dispense with the word "dualist", and at the same time we shall be using the word "bipolar", understanding by it a view of the world and existence which implies two different realities, objectively distinct from each other, namely an objective "I" and an objective "Other". On the other hand, Seneca, who was also charged with dualism,<sup>5</sup> but ultimately was recognised as a

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1. Acts, 17.28.

2. De Tranq. An. 2.11.

3. See e.g., Urchristentum, pp. 471-72, 476; Schoeps, op.cit., p.200.

4. See Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 177; Stacey, op.cit., p. 176; Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 66,78; Scroggs, op.cit., pp. 60-61; de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 577; Th. Schreiner, Seneca im Gegensatz zu Paulus, Tübingen, 1936, pp. 69-70, 81.

5. W. Capelle, 'Seneca und die Humanität,' Monatshefte der Comenius Gesellschaft, N.F. 1909/10, pp. 38-39; M. Pohlenz, Die Stoa, Göttingen, 1948, i, p. 321; Heinze, op.cit., pp. 79, 167;



monist,<sup>1</sup> we shall treat as a monist, by which we (shall) understand that Seneca has viewed existence as an objective reality identical to itself in the sense that in his view of the world and existence the "I" cannot be objectively distinguished from the "Other". In Seneca's thought they are identical. But before we proceed with an analysis of the problem we think it important to state: what is to be understood under the concept of anthropology.

Considering the fact that man is a phenomenon distinct from any other phenomenon he is to be treated as such, i.e. as a distinct phenomenon, and not analogically on the basis of data provided through analogical and scientific observation and deduction.

The question arises: "What is it that makes a man a distinct phenomenon?" Put shortly an answer would be that: it is his capacity of making "himself the object of his own action".<sup>2</sup> Undoubtedly man is a creature different from the other creatures through the fact of his interference and dealing with his environment, i.e. he is a historical creature, but more than that he is

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Contd.) Holler, op.cit., p. 15; K. Deissner, Paulus und Seneca, Gütersloh, 1917, p. 36 (114); E. Benz, Das Todesproblem in der stoischen Philosophie, Stuttgart, 1929, pp. 30, 42; Arnold, op.cit., p. 241; Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 68, 75, 223.

1. Steiner, op.cit., pp. 1, 15, 34, 40, 78; Feine, op.cit., p. 75; Arnold, op.cit., pp. 172, 196, 238, 257; Sevenster, op.cit., p. 41; Heinze, op.cit., p. 172; Dill, op.cit., p. 307; Davis, op.cit., p. 74; De Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 52.

2. TNT, i, pp. 195-96.

the only historical creature. Man is a creature who gives a personal dimension to impersonal reality, through art,<sup>1</sup> he is a creature who identifies things and other creatures from his (human) point of view, (e.g. Adam naming the animals), through the reality of language, symbols and numbers.

Now, his process of dealing with his environment, which reveals itself through historical reality, is a process of identification, i.e. a process of giving an identity to an unidentified reality.<sup>2</sup> From this point is to be posed another question: "What is the relation of man's identifying the objective reality of his environment to his making 'himself the object of his own self'?" An answer is precisely that that relation is what anthropology is about - namely an enquiry into man's search-for-identity, in other words all man's actions of art, science, history etc., which we are classifying as the actions of identification, constitute the essence of man's humanity, his search-for-identity. In conclusion, man is the creature who wants to identify himself, and an anthropological primary (and sole!) task is to explicate the reasons for, the course and the boundaries of man's identifying himself.

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1. Thus M. Buber, Urdistanz und Beziehung, Heidelberg, 1951, p. 28, writes: "Kunst ist weder Impression naturhafter Objektivität, noch Expression seelenhafter Subjektivität, sie ist Werk und Zeugnis der Beziehung zwischen der substantia humana und der substantia rerum, das gestaltgewordene Zwischen".
  2. "Everything genuinely historical has both a particular and a concrete character. Carlyle, the most concrete and particular of the historians, says that John Lackland came upon this earth on such and such a day. This indeed is the very substance of history", writes N. Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, London, 1936, p. 13.



MAN AND GOD

Man being a creature who deals with an environment and external or objective reality, deals (or at least wants to deal!) with reality in its totality, and being "homo religiosus" that implies that man wants to, and does, deal with the realm of the divine, transcendent or supernatural.

Both Paul's and Seneca's writings provide us with sufficient material on this issue to enable us to reach some definite conclusions. It is hoped that these conclusions will show how much there is in common between Paul's and Seneca's views on man's relationship to God.

It is prophetically emphasized by Sartre that: "the knowledge of man must be a totality; empirical, partial pieces of knowledge on this level lack all significance."<sup>1</sup> Relating this definition, which we take as a correct one, to the problem of Paul's and Seneca's views on man's knowledge of God we have to clarify the position. The argument is that Seneca's and Paul's views of knowledge, - even if they are different, although we would object to such a presupposition, - are not of primary importance. Although the argument is going to remain strictly anthropological, we shall not altogether be able to avoid giving the impression of conducting an enquiry that is biographical or even psychological. This apparent *μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος* will be due to the fact that Paul and Seneca themselves are men who

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1. Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, London, 1972, p. 575.

desire to know. Hence the centre is man and the epicentre knowledge. A. Richardson,<sup>1</sup> defining the concept of knowledge in the Old Testament has said that biblical knowledge: "is knowledge in the sense of our knowledge of other persons rather than our knowledge of objects, 'existential' rather than 'scientific' knowledge."

With this definition we cannot agree, precisely because of an emphasis on the totality of human knowledge, the more so since we are primarily concerned with man, and not with knowledge. As to an existentialist kind of knowledge the loose usage of the terminology is no help, for Sartre, an arch-existentialist, does not seem to distinguish between the two for he says that: "the desire to know, no matter how disinterested it may appear, is a relation of the appropriation. To know is one of the forms which can be assumed by to have,"<sup>2</sup> and "that is why scientific research is nothing other than an effort to appropriate."<sup>3</sup> Sartre has identified totally an "existentialist" and "scientific" knowledge precisely emphasizing the fact that the knowledge of persons, in human relationships, is identical with scientific knowledge. Thus he argues that: "the lover's dream is to identify the beloved object with himself and still preserve for it its own individuality; let the Other become me without ceasing to be the Other. It is at this point that we encounter the similarity to scientific research..."<sup>4</sup>

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1. An Introduction to the Theology of the New Testament, London, 1958, p. 40.

2. BN, p. 580.

3. BN, p. 577.

4. BN, p. 579.



In conclusion, knowledge, in whatever sphere of human activity, is of the same nature. Regardless of what the immediate results of scientific research might appear to be, knowledge always has one task - ~~the-search-for-man's-authenticity~~. Hence, to talk of different kinds of knowledge might be perfectly in order, systematically and epistemologically speaking, but as far as anthropology is concerned we shall rule out that assumption as fallacious.

The other point, in the attempt to define the nature of knowledge, is to answer, why the problem of knowledge at all. The determinative point is the desire for knowledge, for: "Desire is a lack of being. As such it is directly supported by the being of which it is a lack."<sup>1</sup> Just as knowing is "a form of appropriation,"<sup>2</sup> equally "knowledge is assimilation."<sup>3</sup> What happens in the process of knowledge is that: "There is a movement of dissolution which passes from the object to the knowing subject. The known is transformed into me; it becomes my thought and thereby consents to receive its existence from me alone."<sup>4</sup> Consequently, man's desire to know is nothing else but his desire to be. Almost the same definition of knowledge is given by Heidegger,<sup>5</sup> who says that the translation of the Greek word ἀγχιβασις as "going toward" or "going near" is "an

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1. BN, p. 575.

2. BN, p. 577.

3. BN, p. 579.

4. BN, p. 579.

5. Discourse on Thinking, New York, 1969, pp. 88-89.

excellent name for designating the nature of knowledge."

By this is given a brief analysis of the nature of knowledge, insofar as it is relevant for an anthropological enquiry. There is no need for entering into a detailed analysis of the theory of knowledge, or developing any especial aspect of knowledge. We shall also avoid any especial argument for proving that Paul and Seneca had the same view of knowledge, for it could hardly be proved by an analytic method if one was to investigate their theory of knowledge. However, what concerns us here is to state that Paul's and Seneca's motives for knowing and knowledge are the same as those of Sartre and Heidegger. Insofar as it is human to want to know, there is no reason to presuppose that they had different reasons for wanting to know from the reasons of somebody else who wants to know.

Some of the arguments and presuppositions - such as that the desire to know is a desire to be, - will not be especially analysed here, but will be explicated in relation to anthropological argument later in the thesis. It is significant that it has been maintained that Paul did not have a speculative doctrine of God,<sup>1</sup> and this was immediately characterized as non-Hellenistic: "Ungriechisch denkt Paulus dabei nicht spekulativ an das Wesen Gottes überhaupt, sondern geschichtlich an seine 'Gerichte' und 'Wege'."<sup>2</sup> And indeed we cannot find any

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1. TNT, i, pp. 190-91; Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 34, 63;  
G. Bornkamm, Das Ende des Gesetzes, München, 1952, p.72.

2. Gesetz, p. 72.



trace of Paul's attempting to give an account of what God or the Divine Being is. Yet one cannot but accept the fact that his letters are full of passages which talk of God, but, strangely enough, all these passages are all at one on one thing, and that is that they talk of God as the one who acts in history and responds to the human ways of life and behaviour on earth. So for example Paul says: 'Αποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὀργὴ θεοῦ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων (Rom. 1. 18).

But this is where his discourse stops. No word of the nature of the "wrath" of God is spoken. However, this wrath, which is revealed by God, is precisely because of men who did not glorify God as they should have,<sup>1</sup> in other words the knowledge of God is again the crucial problem. The problem is how are men going to glorify God if they do not know him? The second question to be posed is implicit: Did Paul talk, or not, of knowledge of God? Briefly: yes, he did - and that is what is of interest to us here: what was Paul's view on man's capability of knowing God?

He said that God's wrath was revealed from heaven on the ungodliness of men, and then adds that they have no excuse, for having provoked God's anger on account of ignorance:

τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς. (Rom. 1. 19)

This whole pericope deals with the knowledge of God, and the language sounds Stoic, but Schoeps has proved that:

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1. Rom.1.21.

"What he (Paul) says in Rom. 1:18ff. and 2:14ff. about the natural knowledge of God which the heathen have, and which has been described as theologia naturalis, need not therefore be considered absolutely as a Judaicized stoicism. It can equally well be Derekh Eres teaching, ventilated in the Jewish missions of the time, a teaching such as showed humanity the way from Noah to<sup>1</sup> Moses - hence twenty-six generations before the Tora."<sup>1</sup>

There, where Paul is most straightforward on the question of knowledge of God he is thinking mostly in Old Testament terms, and it is precisely Old Testament writers who are claiming that man cannot possess the knowledge of God.<sup>2</sup> Thus Paul says: ἡ βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως θεοῦ. ὡς ἀνεξερεύνητα τὰ κρίματα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ (Rom.11.33). The most that can be said about man's knowledge of God here is that man is aware of God because he experiences acts of God, and that what man experiences is communicated to man only as experience. Precisely because of this, biblical language is notoriously anthropomorphic, for it is: "legitimate for the natural sciences to free themselves from the anthropomorphism which bestows human properties on inanimate objects. But it is perfectly absurd to introduce by analogy the same scorn for anthropomorphism in anthropology. In the investigation of man, what procedure can be more exact and rigorous than to recognise his human properties."<sup>3</sup> This is the paradox of the

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1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 224.

2. Richardson, op.cit., p. 39.

3. The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, Edited by R.D. Cumming, London, 1968, p. 418.



Bible which most interpreters have failed to note,<sup>1</sup> namely that the Bible is highly anthropomorphic **precisely** because it does not deal with God in Himself, but with God as revealed to man. And this particular Pauline pericope is entirely composed of Old Testament fragments.<sup>2</sup> In so far as man's affirmative knowledge of God is concerned Paul has admitted it only on one occasion (in principle!), but even then he has called it a "partial" knowledge:

ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι  
καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην. (1 Cor. 13. 12).

However, the emphasis here seems to be put not on knowledge as man's capacity, but rather on being known. The tendency of the argument is that I am known, and I shall know, when the time comes, as I am known. Thus the standard for knowledge is that of being known, about which Paul has a great deal to say. So for example he says in I Cor. 8.3:

εἰ δὲ τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν θεόν, οὗτος ἐγνωσται ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

and almost the same he says in Gal. 4.9:

νῦν δὲ γνόντες θεόν, μᾶλλον δὲ γνωσθέντες ὑπὸ θεοῦ

These two examples of Paul's views are conditioned very much by

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1. Thus for example some writers have argued that Seneca's idea of God has been chastened and approached the Christian idea of God by having become more spiritual and less anthropomorphic. But that is precisely where the problem lies, namely in the fact that the biblical view of God is very anthropomorphic. See: Dill, *op.cit.*, pp. 317, 331, 535; E. Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, London, 1886, pp. 253-54; Schreiner, *op.cit.*, pp. 16-17, 50; Farrar, *op.cit.*, pp. 44-45; Baumgarten, *op.cit.*, p. 116; Cf. Sen. Ep. 95. 49-50.
  2. "Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord, or being his counsellor hath taught him? With whom took he counsel, and who instructed him, and taught him in the path of judgment, and taught him knowledge, and shewed to him the way of understanding?" Is. 40. 13-14; "For who hath stood in the counsel of the Lord and hath perceived and heard his word? who hath marked his word, and heard it?" Jer. 23. 18; "Hast thou heard the secret of God? And dost thou restrain wisdom to thyself." Job, 15.8.

his Old Testament background, and Schweitzer comments on this:

"This being known by God, that is to say, the being acknowledged by God as belonging to Him, plays a great part in Paul's thought....This conception has nothing to do with the Hellenistic mystical theory of becoming one with God through knowledge, even though phrases connected with the latter<sup>1</sup> can be cited which have some affinity with those of Paul."<sup>1</sup>

Now, these examples show how Paul emphatically denies to man a knowledge of God and emphasizes man's being known by God. The root of this is exactly in his understanding of the nature of knowledge which appears to be entirely Old Testament.

Our argument at the beginning was that knowing is a form of appropriation and assimilation. So with justification Richardson writes:

"It is of the profoundest significance that the Hebrew word 'know' (yadha') is used of sexual intercourse (e.g. Gen. 4.1, 17, 25; Num. 31. 18, 35; Judg. 21. 12; cf. Matt. 1. 25; Lk. 1. 34), for the husband-wife relationship is the most intimate personal relation<sup>2</sup> in human life, the most active and satisfying knowing that exists."<sup>3</sup>

It surely is significant that the Old Testament should talk of sexual intercourse in terms of knowing. That this concept was not alien to Paul is revealed in the situation where he had to deal with the question of sex in I Cor. 7.4: ἡ γυνὴ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει ἀλλὰ ὁ ἀνὴρ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ ἀνὴρ τοῦ ἰδίου σώματος οὐκ ἐξουσιάζει ἀλλὰ ἡ γυνή. What actual knowledge means - an entire dissolution of any distance and barrier and difference between the subject which knows and the object which is known - is

1. Mysticism, p. 306.

2. Cf. BN, pp. 579ff.

3. Richardson, op.cit., p. 41.



implied in this verse. Paul regards man as being fully at the disposition of woman (wife) and vice versa, just because he is thinking of their relationship in terms of knowledge as he has inherited it from the Old Testament. Paul deliberately does not talk of man's knowing God precisely because "God is God and man is man,....., man consequently possesses no faculty or ability of himself to know God."<sup>1</sup> Precisely on this ground Paul has accused the Gentiles: ἤλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνοσ φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου (Rom.1.23).

The targets are here, first of all, philosophical speculations on the Divine Being in the Hellenistic world and in Greek philosophy. Paul is angry with the philosophers "precisely because the philosophers replace him (God) by the image of images, the idea,"<sup>2</sup> for having an idea of God means knowing Him, means being able to dispose of Him in the way it suits man. Having fully realized knowledge of God means having fully grasped God in the most concrete terms. On the other hand we can read in Dodd's Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel that no prophet of the Old Testament has claimed to know God. "It is noteworthy," writes Dodd, "that in this, and in nearly all Old Testament passages, man's knowledge of God is not present but future."<sup>3</sup> If Dodd's claim and inter-

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1. Zahrnt, op.cit., p. 55.

2. Buber, M., Eclipse of God, New York, 1957, p. 50.

3. Cambridge, 1954, p. 163. This point of man not knowing God, in the present but being directed toward the future, will, as it will appear later in the thesis, play an important role precisely in the anthropological perspectives of this problem. It will have to do with the problem of the actualization and with the problem of will to power.

pretation are correct, then it would be good evidence for Paul for a biblical background to the partial and total knowledge which is future orientated: τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι. After all, on the question of knowledge of God, Paul could not have been more explicit than when he said: οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ ( 1 Cor. 2. 11 ).

and then:

τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν κυρίου, (1 Cor. 2. 16).

These examples are clear indications that Paul did not have any intention of talking of man's knowledge of God in terms fashionable in the Hellenistic philosophy of his time - namely to speculate on the nature of God, or the Divine Being. Twice, when he spoke of the knowledge of God, it was clearly Christ-centred knowledge of God so that this ruled out again man's direct knowledge of God:

καὶ πᾶν ὕψωμα ἐπαιρόμενον κατὰ τῆς γνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ αἰχμαλωτίζοντες πᾶν νόημα εἰς τὴν ὑπακοὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ (2 Cor. 10. 5), and then: ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ὁ εἰπὼν. ἐκ σκοτῶν φῶς λάμπει, ὃς ἐλαμψεν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν πρὸς φωτισμὸν τῆς γνώσεως τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν προσώπῳ Χριστοῦ (2 Cor. 4. 6).

Hence, on these two occasions where Paul speaks of knowledge of God it is put in such a context, that it in fact denotes a concept of recognition. What basically remains firm on the biblical ground is that God has revealed himself to man through Jesus Christ, and through the obedience to Jesus man acquires the knowledge of God. Thus in fact, as to man's capacity for knowledge of God by his own powers, the status is unchanged. Man simply does not know God. It sounds strange that Paul should not have encouraged man to attempt



to come to the knowledge of God, but that is precisely the point of the Bible: the historical existence, known as "fallen" existence, started by man's attempt to know.<sup>1</sup> Precisely because being and knowing are identical man was tempted to know. His lack of knowledge was nothing else but the lack of being, and his wanting to know is nothing else but the willing to be. Thus one interpreter is able to say: "Out of Adam, the man, grows a being whose essential nature it is that he denies that he is a man, and affirms his deity."<sup>2</sup> And this is most paradoxical. In order to be man man has to refuse to be what he is - man. This is the meaning of not being what one is, but being what one is not (Sartre). Man wants to be-in-himself precisely because he is a lack of being.

If we turn to the problem of knowledge of God in Seneca's philosophy it will soon become clear that there is a striking difference between his and Paul's approach to this problem. First of all it must be remembered that Seneca was a pantheist,<sup>3</sup> and

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1. That the problem of knowledge is the problem of being can be clearly seen from Gen. 3.5: "for God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil."
  2. Adam, p. 12.
  3. "...sed eundem quem nos Iovem intellegunt, rectorem custodemque universi, animum ac spiritum mundi, operis huius dominum et artificem, cui nomen omne convenit. Vis illum fatum vocare, non errabis; hic est ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum. Vis illum providentiam dicere, recte dices; est enim cuius consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inoffensus exeat et actus suos explicet. Vis illum naturam vocare, non peccabis; hic est ex quo nata sunt omnia cuius spiritu vivimus. Vis illum vocare mundum, non falleris; ipse enim est hoc quod vides totum, partibus suis inditus et se sustinens et sua." N.Q.ii, 45.1-3.

has used several different names<sup>1</sup> for the description of the Divine Being. Because of his pantheism it is almost impossible to find a passage in which he is not dealing with God in His Being. If one reads carefully Seneca's writings one will not fail to notice that the emphasis is laid on knowledge of "things divine and things human." Knowledge is regarded as virtue and ignorance as vice.<sup>2</sup> Thus Seneca writes:

"Quid praecipuum in rebus humanis est?...sed animo omne vidisse et, qua maior nulla victoria est, vitia domuisse."<sup>3</sup>

It is not by chance that Seneca has laid an emphasis on knowledge, and the further we proceed with our enquiry the more obvious will become the role which positive knowledge played in Seneca's philosophy. Seneca, being foremostly concerned with philosophy, has argued that philosophy is not an occupation for one's spare time, but is to be pursued above all things.<sup>4</sup> If we look at

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1. "Dicet aliquis: 'Quid mihi prodest philosophia, si fatum est? Quid prodest, si deus rector est? Quid prodest, si casus imperat? Nam et mutari certa non possunt et nihil praeparari potest adversus incerta; sed aut consilium meum occupavit deus decrevitque quid facerem, aut consilio meo nihil fortuna permittit.' Quicquid est ex his, Lucili, vel si omnia haec sunt, philosophandum est: sive nos inexorabili lege fata constringunt, sive arbiter deus universi cuncta disposuit, sive casus res humanas sine ordine impellit et iactat, philosophia nos tueri debet. Haec adhortabitur, ut deo libenter pareamus, ut fortunae contumaciter; haec docebit, ut deum sequaris, feras casum. Sed non est nunc in hanc disputationem transeundum, quid sit iuris nostri, si providentia in imperio est." Ep. 16. 4-6; Cf. Ep. 65.12; Ad Helv. 8.3; De Ben. iv, 7. 1-2; 8. 1-3; N.Q. I. Praef. 13.
  2. "Quid ergo est bonum? Rerum scientia. Quid malum est? Rerum imperitia." Ep. 31.6.
  3. N.Q. iii, Praef., 10.
  4. See Epp. 17. 5.10; 29.12; 53.8-10; 59.10; 72.3-4; 75.16.



Seneca's definition of philosophy we will find that he again laid an emphasis on knowledge. So he writes:

"Sapientiam quidam ita finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum et humanorum scientiam. Quidam ita:<sup>1</sup> sapientia est nosse divina et humana et horum causas."

Because philosophy is the knowledge of things divine and things human, it is the only way of achieving virtue, and that is again a knowledge-based concept:

"Huc et illud accedat, ut perfecta virtus sit, aequalitas ac tenor vitae per omnia consonans sibi, quod non potest esse, nisi rerum scientia contingit et ars, per quam<sup>2</sup> humana ac divina noscantur. Hoc est summum bonum."

Consequently, there can be no doubt that Seneca was of a different opinion from Paul on the issue of whether man could or could not know God. As these passages show he was convinced of man's capacity to achieve knowledge of God and insisted on it, regarding philosophy as the means toward this goal.

Under this conviction, of man's capacity to comprehend the being of God, Seneca endeavoured to give a systematic exposition of the problem in his 58th letter.<sup>3</sup> What Seneca treats in this

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1. Ep. 89.5. Here Seneca [quotes] from Plutarch's De Pla. Phil. 874E: θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιστήμη; In Ep. 90.3. Seneca says: "Haec (philosophia) docuit colere divina, humana diligere, et penes deos imperium esse, inter homines consortium." Seneca almost identifies wisdom and philosophy. See Ep. 88.33. "Magna et spatiosa res est sapientia. Vacuo illi loco opus est. De divinis humanisque discendum est, de praeteritis de futuris, de caducis, de aeternis de tempore."
  2. Ep. 31.8.
  3. This letter being entirely dedicated to the problem of being demonstrates how Seneca's primary concern was ontology and not ethics.

letter is actually the Greek concept of *οὐσία* for which he uses a Latin translation "essentia" on the authority of Cicero and Fabianus.<sup>1</sup> His argument is as follows: "Quomodo dicetur *οὐσία* res necessaria, natura continens fundamentum omnium? Rogo itaque permittas mihi hoc verbo uti."<sup>2</sup> (par. 6.). Then he proceeds with his argument, (par. 7-8): "Magis damnabis angustias Romanas, si scieris unam syllabam esse, quam mutare non possum. Quae sit haec, quaeris? *τὸ θεῖον*. Duri tibi videor ingenii; in medio positum, posse sic transferri, ut dicam 'quod est'." Proceeding with Plato's analysis of the question of "species"<sup>3</sup> and the "things which exist"<sup>4</sup> Seneca says: "Quid ergo hoc est?"<sup>5</sup> and then answers: "Deus scilicet, maior ac potentior cunctis." (para. 17). The way in which he has deduced that *τὸ θεῖον* is God is developed in par. 10-11. Seneca's argument, there, is: "Hoc sic dividam, ut dicam corpora omnia aut animantia esse aut inanima. Etiamnunc est aliquid superius quam corpus. Dicimus enim quaedam corporalia esse, quaedam incorporalia. Quid ergo erit, ex quo haec deducantur? Illud, cui nomen modo parum proprium inposuimus, 'quod est.' Sic enim in species secabitur, ut dicamus: 'quod est' aut corporale est aut incorporale."

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1. Ep. 58.6.

2. From the first part of the paragraph it is obvious that the word Seneca is asking to be allowed to use is "essentia."

3. See *ibid.*, par. 9, 11-12.

4. See par. 16-17.

5. From the context it is clear that Seneca is dealing with the concept of "quod est" or *τὸ θεῖον*.



Now, if we summarise this argument, we see that he argues that there is an existing reality which man encounters around himself. Some of this reality is authentic in its existence, i.e. is in itself "quod est", and some of it is inauthentic, i.e. is lacking this "quod est," therefore is sustained by it. And what is this "quod est"? Seneca uses Plato again: "Secundum ex his, quae sunt, ponit Plato quod eminent et exsuperat omnia."<sup>1</sup> And then follows his own answer: "Quid ergo hoc est? Deus scilicet, maior ac potentior cunctis." Hence this "quod est," which has an authentic existence, and sustains an inauthentic existence is God. Finally, on the question whether there is the possibility of man's knowing this "quod est," Seneca answers:

"Primum illud 'quod est' nec visu nec tactu nec ullo sensu comprehenditur; cogitabile est." (par. 16).

Thus the faculty of reason and intellect, with which man is endowed gives him a positive capacity to know God. The same sort of argument is put forward in N.Q., vii, 30.3:

"Ipse qui ista tractat, qui condidit, qui totum hoc fundavit deditque circa se, maiorque est pars sui operis ac melior, effugit oculos; cogitatione visendus est."

And the argument culminates in N.Q. vi, 4.2:

"Quo nullum maius est, nosse naturam."

One has to have in mind that the concepts of Nature and God are identical in Seneca's thought,<sup>2</sup> hence to know nature is to know God. Accordingly, two major differences, so far, between Paul and Seneca

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1. Ep. 58.17.

2. See p. 33, n.1.

in respect of man's capacity of knowing God are that Paul argues against man's ability to know God and Seneca, on the other hand, defends it; and secondly while Paul has never attempted to develop any theological treatise on that issue, Seneca in fact did develop it.

We have now to ask what are the repercussions of these differences for the respective anthropologies of Paul and Seneca. First of all we have to clarify some, already discussed, pre-suppositions. Thus we have to bear in mind that the anthropological enquiry should be an enquiry into a problem which we have named a search-for-identity (see p. 21). Once we have established that Paul denied to man a capacity of recognizing and knowing God, and that Seneca - on the contrary - emphasized that capacity in man, the question which naturally arises is: "Why did they differ on that issue?" The reason for the difference and its background will be discussed in the following section.

In the introductory part of the thesis we pointed out that the most serious criticism, which has contained in itself all other reproaches against Paul, was that through his belief in the Son of God Paul blurred the line of demarcation between God and man, (see p. 9). According to this argument Paul simply over-emphasized the importance and value of man, and thus put in danger a strictly transcendent biblical view of God. Schoeps argues that Paul's "anthropocentric emphasis"<sup>1</sup> springs from the

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1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 30.



Septuagint, which was already influenced by Hellenistic philosophy. At the same time it was categorically maintained that "the restriction on the 'approach' to the divinity is one of the basic provisions of the Biblical religion."<sup>1</sup> On the other hand Paul is firmly defended. For "Paul however," writes Albert Schweitzer,

"is a Jew, and even as a believer in Christ he stands, in spite of his polemic against the law, wholly and solely on the basis of the absolute, transcendent Jewish conception of God."<sup>2</sup>

Schweitzer insists that Paul's "world-view is not one of an immanent but of a transcendent God."<sup>3</sup> Our main concern is to proceed from the anthropological point of view, i.e. the primary importance is to be laid on the issue of man, and not on the transcendence or immanence of God. We have already pointed out that Paul took Adam as a historical figure (see p. 15). Paul has understood the word Adam in its original meaning, which is man,<sup>4</sup> and thus it is maintained by a number of interpreters that when Paul talks of Adam he is talking of the whole of mankind.<sup>5</sup> Apart from that, the

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1. M. Buber, Moses, New York, 1958, p. 42.

2. Interpreters, p. 204.

3. Mysticism, p. 8.

4. Adam, p. 6.

5. J. Denney, 'Adam and Christ in St. Paul', The Expositor, ix, 1904, p. 152; F. Prat, The Theology of St. Paul, London & Dublin, 1945, ii, p. 171; J. Héring, The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians, London, 1962, p. 179; E.E. Ellis, Paul's Use of the Old Testament, Edinburgh-London, 1957, p. 60; Calvin's Commentaries, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, Edinburgh & London, 1960, p. 339; Scroggs, op.cit., p. 106; C.K. Barrett, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, London, 1957, p. 117. Corinthians, p. 351. Adam, p. 19; K. Barth, 'Christ and Adam', Scottish Journal of Theology, Occasional Papers, No. 5, 1956, p. 3; G. Wingren, Gospel and the Church, Edinburgh, 1964, p. 37; Brunner, op.cit., p. 301.

Hebrew word *adamah* means earth, a dark soil, so that man as such is identified with the creation:

"The account therefore tells the hearer what man is in himself, man is dust; he was not only once made out of it, but that is his abiding nature. Not only the first man, but every man is formed out of dust."<sup>1</sup>

This concept is typically biblical.<sup>2</sup> Equally often in the Old Testament man is referred to as being clay,<sup>3</sup> and God is a potter who has a power over him.<sup>4</sup>

Paul is entirely in accord with the whole of the Old Testament in considering man to be a part of creation, being a creature of God. The state of human existence and man's position before God Paul has described in strictly Old Testament terms:

ὦ ἄνθρωπε, μὴ νοῦν γε σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ ἀνταποκρινόμενος τῷ θεῷ; μὴ ἔρει τὸ πλάσμα τῷ πλάσαντι τί με ἐποίησας οὕτως; ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίαν ὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φερέματος ποιῆσαι ὃ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκευὸς, ὃ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν; (Rom. 9.20-21).

In the same manner Paul describes man as *σφραγιστός* as being opposed to God as *ἀσφραγιστός* (Rom. 1.23), and he talks of *πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ἐκ γῆς κοῖκός* (I Cor. 15.47). He calls Adam a creature which *ἐπλάσθη* (I Tim. 2.13)<sup>5</sup> in a passive form of the

1. Boman, op.cit., p. 91.

2. Gen. 2.7; 3.19; 18.27; I Kings, 16.2; Job, 10.9b; 14.19; 30.19; 34.15; Ps. 22.15; 22.29; 30.9; 103.14; 104.29; 119.25; Eccl. 3.20; 12.7.

3. Job, 10.9a; 33.6; Is. 29.16; 45.9; 64.8; Jer. 18.6; Ps. 40.2.

4. Ps. 2.9; Is. 29.16; 30.14; 64.8; Jer. 18.4ff.

5. Here Dr. Templeton has remarked: "I note you hold the P authorship of 1 Tim." Our intention is not to enter a dispute over Paul's authorship. But, as Prof. H. Anderson has remarked once, the fact that one talks of "Deutero-Pauline" letters entitles one to quote them in this context.



verb pointing to the fact that he is created by God. The  $\phi\theta\alpha\rho\tau\acute{o}\varsigma$   $\delta\upsilon\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$  of Rom. 1.23, is identical with the  $\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\varsigma$  of 1.25. That the concept of "creation" was not abolished in Pauline thought can be seen not only from the fact that he has used it so often and with profound understanding of the biblical trend of thought,<sup>1</sup> but, what is more he has given a new impetus to the relevance of this concept in his thought by having created a concept of  $\kappa\alpha\iota\nu\eta$   $\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ . And again this concept of the "new creation" is not an abstract concept but is attributed to man who is  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$   $\chi\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\omega}$ , i.e. who is engrafted into God's work of salvation.<sup>2</sup>

Now, Buber's "restriction on the approach" is to be understood in terms of Creator-creation. "The original Biblical word 'Creation'," writes Brunner,

"means first of all, that there is an impassable gulf between the Creator and the creature, that for ever they stand over against one another in a relation which can never be altered. There is no greater sense of distance than that which lies in the words Creator-Creation. Now this is the first and fundamental thing which can be said about man: He is a creature, and as such he is separated by an abyss from the Divine manner of being."<sup>3</sup>

Thus we come to the conclusion that in Paul's thought man is a creature who stands over against God as the Creator. And the relation between the Creator and creature, or relation between God and man is relation which can be called an "infinite qualitative

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1. What the term  $\kappa\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\iota\varsigma$  in Paul's thought encompasses can be seen best from passages such as: Rom. 1.20; 8.19-22; 8.33; Col. 1.23.
  2. See 2 Cor. 5.17; Gal. 6.15.
  3. Brunner, op.cit., p. 90.

distinction."<sup>1</sup>

Bultmann has rightly emphasized that Paul has made faith in creation "the critical principle of his discussion,"<sup>2</sup> i.e. Paul has emphasized the relevance of man's awareness of his being a creature and God being a Creator. Thus the basic fact about man in his humanity and about God in His Divinity is that God is "wholly other" than man. They cannot be identified or confused with one another. Hence, from the anthropological point of view, the charge that Paul has blurred the demarcation line between God and man looks less serious and it seems that he did not distort the basic biblical provision, the restriction on the approach. Thus Böhlig writes - although we are not quite sure of his intention - that: "wahrt Paulus deutlicher einen Unterschied zwischen Gott und Christus. Das entspricht nicht nur seiner jüdischen, sondern der orientalischen Denkweise überhaupt."<sup>3</sup>

Finally, our investigation, so far, on the relation of man to God in Paul's thought enables us to draw two basic conclusions:

- a) man by himself does not possess a capacity of knowing God in His Being, and
- b) man does not have that capacity because he is a creature and God is Creator, i.e. man and God are qualitatively different, not in degree, but in principle, so that what

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1. Zahrt, op.cit., p. 24.

2. EF, p. 204. The whole essay on 'Faith in God as Creator' (pp. 202-216) is instructive.

3. Tarsos, p. 19.



is characteristic of their relation to each other is their distinct "otherness".

Hence briefly: "God is God and man is man,..., man consequently possesses no faculty or ability of himself to know God."<sup>1</sup>

For the moment we shall leave this problem and turn to Seneca. Later on we shall point out some other implications in Paul's anthropology which stem from these basic presuppositions of Paul.

We previously stated that Seneca's conviction was that man has the capacity and ability to know God by himself. In one of his definitions of wisdom Seneca says:

"Alias quidem artes sub dominio habet. Nam cui vita, illi vitam ornantia quoque serviunt; ceterum ad beatum statum tendit, illo ducit, illo vias aperit. Quae sint mala, quae videantur ostendit, vanitatem exuit mentibus, dat magnitudinem solidam, inflatam vero et ex inani speciosam reprimit, nec ignorari sinit inter magna quid intersit et tumida, totius naturae notitiam ac suae tradit. Quid sint di qualesque declarat, quid inferi, quid lares et genii, quid in secundam numinum formam animae perpetuatae, ubi consistant, quid agant, quid possint, quid velint.

Haec eius initiamenta sunt, per quae non municipale sacrum, sed ingens deorum omnium templum, mundus ipse reseratur, cuius vera simulacra verasque facies cernendas mentibus protulit. Nam ad spectacula tam magna hebes visus est."<sup>2</sup>

From this passage we can see that the man who has achieved wisdom is endowed with a gift of the knowledge of nature, God and the human soul. If we ask which is the basic principle which entitles Seneca to claim this, an answer, in our opinion, will be that the basis for this is his concept of nature, φύσις. First of all

1. Zahrnt, op.cit., p. 55.

2. Ep. 90.27-28.

the universe is identified with Deity:

"Quid est deus? Mens universi. Quid est deus? Quod vides totum et quod non vides totum."<sup>1</sup>

"Nam mundus quoque cuncta complectens rectorque universi deus in exteriora quidem tendit sed tamen introrsum undique in se redit."<sup>2</sup>

"Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus;"<sup>3</sup>

We may also note that for Seneca God is identical with nature, φύσις:

"Vis illum naturam vocare, non peccabis; hic est ex quo nata sunt omnia, cuius spiritu vivimus."<sup>4</sup>

"'Natura', inquit, 'haec mihi praestat.' Non intellegis te, cum hoc dicis, mutare nomen deo? Quid enim aliud est natura quam deus et divina ratio toti mundo partibusque eius inserta?"<sup>5</sup>

"Ergo nihil agis, ingratiissime mortalium, qui te negas deo debere, sed naturae, quia nec natura sine deo est nec deus sine natura,..."<sup>6</sup>

At the same time God being both universe and nature, is reason:

"Ratio scilicet faciens, id est deus."<sup>7</sup>

"quisquis formator universi fuit, sive ille deus est potens omnium, sive incorporalis ratio,..."<sup>8</sup>

And finally this very reason which is God, who is nature and universe, is a real nature of man:

"Quid ergo interest inter naturam dei et nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum est. Totus est ratio,..."<sup>9</sup>

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1. N.Q., i, Praef. 13.
  2. De Vita Beata, 8.4.
  3. Ep. 92.30.
  4. N.Q., ii, 45.2.
  5. De Ben. iv, 7.1.
  6. De Ben. iv, 8.2.
  7. Ep. 65.12.
  8. Ad Helv. 8.3.
  9. N.Q., i, Praef. 14.



"divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa."<sup>1</sup>

"Quid in homine proprium? Ratio. Haec recta et consummata felicitatem hominis implevit...homini autem suum bonum ratio est; si hanc perfecit, laudabilis est et finem naturae suae tetigit."<sup>2</sup>

"Ratio vero dis hominibusque communis est; haec in illis consummata est, in nobis consummabilis."<sup>3</sup>

"Omnia animalia aut rationalia sunt, ut homines, ut di, aut inrationalia, ut ferae, ut pecora."<sup>4</sup>

Now, what we have discovered, through a brief survey of Seneca's strictly logical and consistent argument, is that God, Nature, Universe, Reason and man are identical. Hence, what is missing altogether is exactly what is in Paul called the "distance" or "otherness" or "restriction on the approach." So, it is not by chance that Schoeps has described the blurring of the line between God and man as heathen and Hellenistic. Thus, what we find in Seneca is not relationship which is characterized by "otherness" or "infinite qualitative distinction" between the two, but on the contrary "oneness" or "definite qualitative identification". In the words of Brunner it "is not conceived as an actual relationship, but as a substantial one, as similarity, affinity-in-being".<sup>5</sup> Put in Seneca's words:

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1. Ep. 66.12.
  2. Ep. 76.10; cf. Ep. 49.12.
  3. Ep. 92.27.
  4. Ep. 113.17.
  5. Brunner, op.cit., p. 554.

"Omnes, si ad originem primam revocantur, a dis sunt."<sup>1</sup>

When this is related to the problem of man's knowledge of God it becomes immediately clear why Seneca believed in, and advocated, man's capacity for the knowledge of God.

Since man and God are qualitatively identical, being in the realm of the human means being in the realm of the Divine. It is always one and the same sphere. Seneca's monistic thought does not allow the bipolarity of qualitative difference such as is presupposed in the antithesis of Creator-creation, precisely because: "belief in the Creation is the great stumbling-block to Idealistic Monism,"<sup>2</sup> and here we are faced with the ambiguity of the basic assumption of natural religion: "I. Man cannot naturally Perceive. but through his natural or bodily organs."<sup>3</sup> This presupposition does not contradict either Paul or Seneca, since for Paul God and man differ in their natures, hence man perceives only that which is within a category of creature like himself, i.e. he cannot have knowledge of God who being a Creator is of ultimate qualitative difference in comparison with man. On the other hand since God and man are, in Seneca's philosophy, identical they are of the same nature, and man has capacity to know God by natural perception through his natural faculties.

After having established that Seneca regarded knowledge of

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1. Ep. 44.1.

2. Brunner, op.cit., p. 90,n.1.

3. William Blake, THERE is NO Natural Religion, essay a., The Poetry and Prose of William Blake, New York, 1970., p.1.



God by man as possible, and after having stated the reasons for such a belief we can see where it reveals itself in his philosophy. A direct result of this belief of Seneca, directly anthropologically relevant, can be seen in his broad usage and interpretation of the Delphic maxim γνῶθι σαυτόν. First of all let us give a brief definition of that maxim as interpreted by Betz. He puts it this way:

"...The God Poimandres asks the initiate to interpret the following saying:

ὁ νοήσας ἑαυτὸν εἰς αὐτὸν χῶρει

'He who has recognised himself departs into him(self).' The exegetical problem which the initiate is supposed to solve concerns the relationship between 'ἑαυτὸν' and 'αὐτὸν' (scil., 'τὸν θεόν'). In his interpretation the initiate shows that the two must be identical. The Father-god consists of 'life and light' (par. 9), and so does his son, the Anthropos (par. 12) who is identical with the 'essential man' ('ὁ οὐσιώδης ἄνθρωπος' in par. 15) of those who are 'ἐννοῦς' (par. 18). To 'understand' this means to reverse the entire cosmogony and return to one's immortal self which is the divine."<sup>1</sup>

Later on Betz states:

"The strong influence of Posidonius can be seen also in later periods of Stoicism, especially in Seneca. In particular, several of Seneca's Moral Epistles contain interesting passages. In Ep. 41 Seneca develops the idea of the divine soul which has taken up residence in man, so that 'to know God' is nothing other than to know our divine selves."<sup>2</sup>

What Seneca says in that letter is:

"prope est a te deus, tecum est, intus est. Ita dico, Lucili: sacer intra nos spiritus sedet, malorum bonorumque nostrorum observator et custos."<sup>3</sup>

The actual meaning of this Seneca explains later in the 5th paragraph

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1. H.D. Betz, 'The Delphic Maxim γνῶθι σαυτόν in Hermetic interpretation', Harvard Theological Review, vol. 63, Oct. 1970, No.4, p. 468.
  2. Ibid., p. 475.
  3. Ep. 41. 1-2.

of the same letter:

"sic animus magnus ac sacer et in hoc demissus, ut propius divina nossemus, conversatur quidem nobiscum, sed haeret origini suae; illinc pendet, illuc spectat ac nititur, nostris tamquam melior interest."

The idea of God dwelling in man Seneca employed on other occasions:

"Animus, sed hic rectus, bonus, magnus. Quid aliud voces hunc quam deum in corpore humano hospitantem?"<sup>1</sup>

"'Quem,' inquis, 'deorum sponsorem accepisti?' Eum scilicet, qui neminem fallit, animum recti ac boni amatorem. In tuto pars tui melior est."<sup>2</sup>

"In insuperabili loco stat animus, qui externa deseruit, et arce se sua vindicat; infra illum omne telum cadit. Non habet, ut putamus, fortuna longas manus; neminem occupat nisi haerentem sibi. Itaque quantum possumus, ab illa resiliamus; quod sola praestabit sui naturaeque cognitio."<sup>3</sup>

Hence the point of argument is that God is dwelling within man and that the knowledge of God is identical with the knowledge of one's own self. This is possible precisely because these two are identical, so that addressing God as the "other" is in fact addressing my divine self. This concept Seneca has turned into his well-known doctrine of self-observation,<sup>4</sup> on which ground he has been regarded as a great teacher of the guidance of the soul.<sup>5</sup> The typical passages on self-observation are simply direct injunctions like: "Observa te,"<sup>6</sup> and a very characteristic one:

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1. Ep. 31.11.

2. Ep. 82.1.

3. Ep. 82.5-6.

4. Maxim, p. 475.

5. Dill, op.cit., pp. 334, 398.

6. Ep. 20.3.



"Observabo me protinus et, quod est utilissimum, diem meum recognoscam."<sup>1</sup> Especially anthropologically relevant is:

"Atqui cum voles veram hominis aestimationem inire et scire, qualis sit, nudum inspice; ponat patrimonium, ponat honores et alia fortunae mendacia, corpus ipsum exuat. Animum intueri, qualis quantusque sit, alieno an suo magnus."<sup>2</sup>

Hence what comes out is the surprising result that in Seneca the problem of man's knowledge of God is not a theological but an anthropological problem. If we now try to draw parallels to the conclusion that we have reached after an analysis of the same problem in Paul (see p. 41f.), we shall be able to summarize it as follows:

- a) In Seneca's philosophy man by his own capacities is in a position to achieve positive knowledge of God, and
- b) man is able to know God because their natures are identical. Between God and man there is no qualitative distinction, so that the divine manner of being is actually accessible to man's perceptive capacities.

If these two conclusions are to be compared to the conclusion drawn concerning Paul's outlook, then we may ask: "Is there in fact any point at which Seneca and Paul are at one? Is there anything in common between the two of them, on ground of which they could be compared?" In anthropological terms the question is: "Do Paul and Seneca talk of the same man, the same reality and the

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1. Ep. 83.2; Cf. Ep. 41.1-2; 73.16; 87.21.

2. Ep. 76.32; Cf. Ep. 92.30.

same problem?" The answer is "Yes!" They do talk of the same man with the same problem and in the same situation. However, where they differ is in their answers to this problem. To put it bluntly Paul and Seneca, while treating the same anthropological problem, have offered diametrically opposed answers. Approaching the problem from the strictly anthropological point of view the problem can be stated this way: The task of anthropology is an enquiry into man's search-for-identity (see p. 21), and this search-for-identity is precisely that which constitutes the reality of an actual man. This actual man is the subject of Paul's and Seneca's anthropological discourses.

Now, the reality of an actual man is nothing but "the desire to be."<sup>1</sup> In other words "the best way to conceive of the fundamental project of human reality is to say that man is the being whose project is to be God...Or if you prefer, man fundamentally is the desire to be God."<sup>2</sup> Accepting that both, Paul and Seneca, have conceived reality in these terms and considered it objectively it will become clear in what respect they have differed. It will also become apparent why we have chosen the terminology of movement for stating their respective anthropologies. Interpreters have maintained that:

"The Israelites like all other ancient peoples were 'outer-directed' and did not dissect their psychic life as modern man does. In that sense, even to the Hebrew, 'being' was something objective which existed independently of him and stood fast."<sup>3</sup>

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1. BN, p. 565.

2. BN, p. 566.

3. Boman, op.cit., p. 45.



This argument transferred into the sphere of Pauline anthropology, insofar as Paul is an Israelite, maintains that:

"Paul has contacts with Judaism in not considering man in an objective sense, with a view to what he is in himself. Man is seen a priori in the circumstances in which he exists, primarily in the relationship of the creature to the creator and to the created world."<sup>1</sup>

The first thing said about man in the story of creation,<sup>2</sup> is that he is made in the image of God,<sup>3</sup> so that "the imago dei idea is, consequently, no secondary and peripheral detail, but it is a zenith in Old Testament theology and anthropology."<sup>4</sup> At the same time it is claimed that "for the New Testament, however, we can claim that, like the doctrine of Creation, it is a natural pre-supposition."<sup>5</sup> In fact if one takes a close look at the anthropology of the "image", εἰκών, in the New Testament, one will notice that, significantly, it is only Paul, of all the New Testament writers, who has that type of anthropology. And, Paul said expressly that man is the image of God and not as Käsemann argues that:

"The apostle - unlike Judaism in general - never expressed the view that man remained in the image of God, even after the fall. Imago dei is for him Christ and Christ alone; it is he who, with the membership of his body, restores to believers, and to them only, the lost<sup>6</sup> divine image which was once the stamp of created being."

1. Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 45.
2. That every man is an image of God can be inferred from Gen. 5.3, where it is said that "Adam lived an hundred and thirty years, and begat a son in his own likeness, after his image."
3. Gen. 1. 26-27; 9.6; Cf. Brunner, op.cit., p. 102.
4. Boman, op.cit., p. 112.
5. Brunner, op.cit., p. 499.
6. E. Käsemann, Perspectives on Paul, London, 1971, p. 22.

To our understanding Paul was an entirely orthodox Jew in his usage of the concept of the image of God in man. Brunner here, as opposed to Käsemann, is justified in his presupposition, for Paul wrote:

ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ὀφείλει κατακαλύπτεσθαι τὴν κεφαλὴν,  
εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ ὑπάρχων (1 Cor. 11. 7).

Then Paul almost in a direct way states this doctrine when he says:

μὴ ψεύδεσθε εἰς ἀλλήλους, ἀπεκδυσάμενοι τὸν παλαιὸν  
ἄνθρωπον ὃν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι τὸν νέον  
τὸν ἀνακαινούμενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν<sup>1</sup>

This pericope is talking directly of the concept of image in the Old Testament, and, not to be overlooked, Paul does not use the word θεός but κτίστης, Creator. It is not by chance that he does that for the anthropology is inseparable from the theology of creation. Furthermore Paul has directly referred to Christ as the image of God. Thus he talks of: τὸν φωτισμὸν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τῆς δόξης τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ.<sup>2</sup>

and then on another occasion Paul talks of Christ as being:

εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου,<sup>3</sup>

So apart from the two directly anthropological statements, here we have two Christological statements. The relevance of these Christological statements for Paul's anthropology is obvious from

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1. Col. 3.9-10.

2. 2 Cor. 4.4.

3. Col. 1.15.





I Cor. 15.49 where Paul says:

καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ,<sup>1</sup>  
φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου.<sup>2</sup>

An argument, therefore, would be: we as men are in the image of Adam, and in the age of salvation shall be in the image of Christ. Now, since Christ is an image of God, man being an image of Christ is immediately an image of God. Here Käsemann is right.

We have therefore every reason to take for granted that Paul was fully acquainted with the anthropology of image, and that the concept of image in his anthropology is of the same meaning as, and deeply rooted in, the concept of the image in the Old Testament. But now we are faced with the problem of how to define this concept. The meaning of image is defined by Brunner in this way:

"'Created in His Image, in His Likeness' is a parable, hence its meaning does not lie on the surface. First of all, it says that the nature of man - in his origin or in general - is nothing in itself, and that it is not intelligible from itself, but that its ground of existence and of knowledge is in God. If we understand this phrase in the light of the specifically New Testament doctrine, we would do well to understand 'image' in the sense of reflexion, that is, as an existence which points back or refers back to something else."<sup>3</sup>

In the light of this definition we are to understand the arguments of Boman and Conzelmann (see pp. 49-50), and at this point we can define what is understood by our argument that the movement typical of Paul's anthropology is "centrifugal" and that man's nature is "ec-static."

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1. I.e. Adam=man.
  2. I.e. Christ=new man.
  3. Brunner, op.cit., p. 96.

The centrifugal movement expresses the fact, that, according to St. Paul, man is fully man, and is one with himself, when he sees himself in relation to the Other. In Heidegger's terms "man's nature is to be found by looking away from man."<sup>1</sup> Equally important, the argument that man's nature is ec-static states the fact that man does not have an authentic existence. Man's identity lies not within himself but outside of himself, i.e. the reality of man is not actual but potential, constituted by the reality of relationship; in other words "the being of human reality is originally not a substance but lived relation."<sup>2</sup> And the polarities which relate one to another, as to make a relationship objective, are the polarities of Creator-creature, i.e. man's creatureliness implies "that man does not appear isolated, as being in himself, but is involved in already existing relationships. To put it in an exaggerated way: I am my relationship to God,"<sup>3</sup> or even better: "man's relation to God is not something which is added to his human nature; it is the core and the ground of his humanitas."<sup>4</sup> That means that man's centre is outside of himself, i.e. man is man insofar as he is able to relate to the Other. This centrifugal movement which constitutes man's ec-static nature is implied by the very fact that man is creature. Man who is in Paul thought of as an unit,<sup>5</sup> is under-

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1. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 58.

2. BN, p. 575.

3. Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 193.

4. Brunner, op.cit., p. 94.

5. See: Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 66, 78; Scroggs, op.cit., pp. 60-61; Schreiner, op.cit., pp. 69-70, 81; de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 577; Arnold, op.cit., pp. 419-20.



stood under the concept of  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  ,<sup>1</sup> i.e. "man, his person as a whole can be denoted as soma."<sup>2</sup> If the man, denoted by  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  in Paul's thought, is essentially a relationship - being at the same time a creature - then he is a relationship to the Other, objectively distinct from himself, i.e. being a creature he is a relationship to the Creator. Bultmann has argued that man is  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  in the sense of being able to make "himself the object of his own action,"<sup>3</sup> i.e. he is in relation to himself. But this interpretation of Bultmann, which is based on Heidegger's philosophy, has been sharply criticised by Buber. "One can," says Buber, "stretch out one's hands to one's image or reflection in a mirror, but not to one's real self."<sup>4</sup> Man is not relationship to himself but to the Other, because, as Buber argues, the relationship to one's own self arises from Nietzsche's saying that "God is dead."<sup>5</sup> Hence what is implied in this concept of  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  (=creatureliness) is man in his capacity to relate to the Other,<sup>6</sup> so that " $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, as made for God."<sup>7</sup> On account of this understanding of man as  $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$  , who is related

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1. TNT, i, p. 194; Stacey, op.cit., p. 190; Sevenster, op.cit., p. 76; Cf. Rom. 6.12-19; I Cor. 6.15; 7.4; 9.27; 12.27; 13.3; 2 Cor. 4.10; Gal. 6.17.

2. TNT, i, pp. 195-96.

3. Ibid., p. 195.

4. M. buber, Between Man and Man, Collins, 1971, p. 204.

5. Ibid., p. 203; Cf. F. Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, Frag. 125, 343.

6. J.A.T. Robinson, The Body, London, 1963, p. 16.

7. Ibid., p. 31.

to the Other, Paul is to be regarded as essentially within the Hebrew tradition since "the implication of 'the body' for Hebrew, as opposed to Greek and later Western, thinking is one of solidarity, not of individuation."<sup>1</sup> Thus we can say that Paul has envisaged man as a relationship to the Other, objectively different from himself. This Other is God who is Creator, for only He stands as "wholly other" over against man who is the creature. In other words the actual reality of man is that which constitutes his relationship to the Other on the planes Creator-creature, God-man. This reality is an event which occurs within the sphere of infinite qualitative difference between the two.

Pauline man is man whose "I", whose ego, is not an actual but a potential one precisely because that "I" is the reflection of the objective reality of the Other. Man has his "I" insofar as he is willing and is able to recognise the "Thou" of the Other. In theological language this is to say that man is true man when he recognises and realizes his self through the recognition of the Other, God the Creator, as ultimately different from himself. Hence my "I" is not rooted in me myself, but is outside of myself, in the objective reality of the Other. "His (man's) continuity and identity also rest outside himself, in his participation in the heavenly world and in his communication with the Word of his creator."<sup>2</sup> This is exactly the meaning of man's being an image.

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1. Ibid., p. 78.

2. Käsemann, op.cit., p. 27.



As soon as the Other, as an objective reality, in whose image man is, is removed, man perishes, because he ceases to be an image of the Other, and becomes an image of nothingness.

On this basis we have to consider the Pauline term δικαιοσύνη as an anthropological term. Paul writes: μή ἔχων ἐμὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν ἐκ νόμου, ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην\* Righteousness stands here for the concept of man's identity, indicating that man has no authentic existence, in the sense that his centre is not within but outside of himself. He (man) neither is the source of his existence nor does he belong to himself, he belongs altogether to the Other, to God.<sup>1</sup> Thus Bultmann is correct in identifying righteousness, as being a Judaistic concept, with authentic existence:

"And he (Paul) fully agrees with Judaism in understanding this authenticity as 'righteousness'...As for Judaism, 'righteousness' for Paul is primarily a forensic and eschatological concept, i.e. it does not mean, first of all, man's moral uprightness, a human quality, but rather the position that he has in his relations with and before others, and pre-eminently before God in the judgment. His righteousness is his 'acceptance' which is granted to him by others and especially by God. Paul entirely agrees with Judaism that man can finally receive this acceptance only from God in the last judgment."<sup>2</sup>

It would not be an exaggeration to say that every verse where Paul

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1. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑαυτῷ ζῆ, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἑαυτῷ ἀποθνήσκει. ἐάν τε γὰρ ζῶμεν, τῷ κυρίῳ ζῶμεν, ἐάν τε ἀποθνήσκωμεν, τῷ κυρίῳ ἀποθνήσκομεν. ἐάν τε οὖν ζῶμεν ἐάν τε ἀποθνήσκομεν, τοῦ κυρίου ἐσμέν. (Rom. 14.7f).

2. EF, p. 161.

\* Phil. 3. 9.

talks of δικαιοσύνη is anthropological,<sup>1</sup> but especially obvious are those places where the concept of δικαιοσύνη is related to the concept of δόξα. Thus Paul, being fully Old Testamental about the concept of the image of God in man, relates this concept entirely to the concept of δόξα calling *μανεικὸν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ*.<sup>2</sup> i.e. man is not only an image in the sense that he is nothing in himself, but more than that, he has to remain a proper image in the sense that it has to reflect itself always in the Other, which Paul expresses through the verb *δοξάζω*. By this Paul simply means that man has to recognise his ultimate creatureliness over against God as creator who is of an infinite qualitative distinction. For that reason Paul insists on man's glorifying God.<sup>3</sup> Thus Paul emphasizes that: *ἡ διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος ἐστὶ ἐν δόξῃ* arguing that: *περισσεύει ἡ διακονία τῆς δικαιοσύνης δόξῃ*<sup>4</sup>

Translated in anthropological terms this means that insofar as

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1. Here Prof. Anderson has remarked "Every verse where Paul talks of δικαιοσύνη is anthropological? What of Romans 10:3? God's righteousness!" But this is precisely to justify the saying that an example of an exception proves the rule, therefore see: Rom. 1.17; 3.5, 21-22, 25-26; 4.3, 5-6, 9, 11-13, 22; 5.17, 21; 6.13, 16, 18-20; 8.10; 9. 30-31; 10. 3-10; 14. 17; I Cor. 1.30; 2 Cor. 3.9; 5.21; 6.7, 14; 9. 9-10; 11.15; Gal. 2.21; 3.6, 21; 5.5; Eph. 4.24; 5.9; 6.14; Phil. 1.11; 3.6,9; I Tim. 6.11; 2 Tim. 2.22; 3.16; 4.8; Tit. 3.5.
  2. I Cor. 11.7.
  3. Rom. 1.21; 15.6, 9; I Cor. 6.20; 2 Cor. 9.13; Gal. 1.24; 2 Thess. 3.1.
  4. 2 Cor. 3.9.



δικαιοσύνη is authentic existence - which is outside of man - the δόξα is the concept which describes the presence of that authentic existence in a particular way. That "particular" way is nothing else but an acceptance of the Other, realization and recognition of the difference between the two, i.e. to glorify God = to recognize the Other, means to be at one with oneself, means to realize that man's actuality is potential, and to be actualized or realized means to accept one's potentiality, i.e. to become an image in the true sense. For this reason Paul has heavily stressed the difference between man and God by saying:

γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθῆς, πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης,  
καθάπερ γέγραπται· ὅπως ἂν δικαιωθῆς ἐν τοῖς  
λόγοις σου καὶ νικήσεις ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαί σε.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the reality of true man is acceptance of the fact that he is not the source of his own existence, that he is not his own creator and that he is not an ultimate One, but is confronted by the Other, i.e. he is not alone but is in relationship, and as long as he is in that sphere of existence he is a true man. Man ceases to be a man when he ceases to recognize the Other, and wants to actualize his potential self by, and from, himself. For this reason Paul insists on the weakness of man, and what sounds so paradoxical, he insists that man is strongest when he is weak, for he is true man when realizing that he rests on a foundation, and that his source of existence is outside of himself:

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1. Rom. 3.4; Cf. Ps. 116.11.

ἡ γὰρ δύναμις ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ τελεῖται.<sup>1</sup>  
 ὅταν γὰρ ἀσθενῶ, τότε δυνατός εἰμι.<sup>2</sup>  
 χαίρομεν γὰρ ὅταν ἡμεῖς ἀσθενῶμεν,<sup>3</sup>  
 τὸ ἀσθενεῖς τοῦ θεοῦ ἰσχυρότερον τῶν ἀνθρώπων.<sup>4</sup>  
 τὰ ἀσθενῆ τοῦ κόσμου ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεὸς.<sup>5</sup>

Thus in Schoeps's own words:

"In his very weakness he (man) recognizes God's almighty power, in the realization of his creatureliness he receives the truth and dignity of his being, he is able to be the Creator's creature..."<sup>6</sup>

The argument could not be more plain. It is obvious that Paul's emphasis was on man's need to realize that he has no capacity to sustain his own existence, to know God in the sense of explaining his (man's) own existence. He is basically confined to the reality of potential, and not actualized existence, hence to be himself he must accept the Other, for it is exactly in the Other that his existence is based. Thus Schoeps has even less right to accuse Paul of having blurred the demarcation line between God and man, and thus automatically having become Hellenized.

If we look at Seneca's writings we shall soon realize that as regards man's relationship to God there is very little in common between him and Paul. There where Paul has seen man and

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1. 2 Cor. 12.9.
  2. Ibid., 12.10.
  3. Ibid., 13.9.
  4. I Cor. 1.25.
  5. Ibid., 1.27.
  6. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 292.



God related to each other on the plane Creator-creature, I-Other, Seneca, on the contrary, has seen it as an affinity in the manner of being. As we have shown earlier in the chapter, in Seneca's thought man and God are qualitatively identical. Sometimes this is expressed in popular mythological language, and sometimes in a philosophical form.

If we remember for the moment an analysis of Seneca's 58th letter which has dealt with the problem of being (see pp. 34ff.) we shall note that he had subsumed the "corporalia" under "quod est" i.e. God. If we now turn to the letter 106 we read in paragraphs 4-5:

"Bonum facit: prodest enim. Quod facit, corpus est. Bonum agitat animum et quodammodo format et continet, quae propria sunt corporis. Quae corporis bona sunt, corpora sunt; ergo et quae animi sunt. Nam et hoc corpus est. Bonum hominis necesse est corpus sit, cum ipse sit corporalis."

When we relate these two arguments to each other what comes out as a result is this: "animus humanus" is "corpus", "corpus" is "quod est", "quod est" is "deus" hence "animus humanus" is "deus". Therefore what is plain is that there is no dimension of qualitative difference which could be classified under the concept of a "restriction on the approach." There is no distance as a category of relationship between the two who are "wholly other" to each other. A demarcation line has not only been blurred but entirely wiped out. The whole perspective of human reality and human being has been shifted from the plane of "outside" to the plane of "inside". The "otherness" of human reality has been made an

"identity". True man, in his true humanity, is not envisaged as a potential being but precisely the opposite, a true man is a concrete actuality. This is the absolute and definite difference between the Pauline and the Senecan view of man. In the following pages we shall see how it is that we can describe Seneca's view of man as a centripetal movement and human nature as introspective.

After we have established that by purely philosophical and metaphysical speculation Seneca has identified the human spirit or soul<sup>1</sup> with God, we shall see that he sometimes expresses this concept in popular terms. Thus for example:

"sic animus magnus ac sacer et in hoc demissus, ut propius divina nossemus,"<sup>2</sup>

"Omnes, si ad originem primam revocantur, a dis sunt."<sup>3</sup>

"divinorum una natura est. Ratio autem nihil aliud est quam in corpus humanum pars divini spiritus mersa."<sup>4</sup>

"Deus ad homines venit, immo quod est propius, in homines venit; nulla sine deo mens bona est. Semina in corporibus humanis divina dispersa sunt."<sup>5</sup>

"Ideo vir magnus ac prudens animum diducit a corpore et multum cum meliore ac divina parte versatur,"<sup>6</sup>

"Tunc animus noster....Sursum illum vocant initia sua."<sup>7</sup>

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1. He uses different terms on different occasions like: anima, mens, animus, ratio, summum bonum, virtus and melior pars, meaning always one and the same thing, an essence of man.
  2. Ep. 41.5.
  3. Ep. 44.1.
  4. Ep. 66.12.
  5. Ep. 73.16.
  6. Ep. 78.10.
  7. Ep. 79.12.



"Animum quidem eius in caelum, ex quo erat, redisse persuadeo mihi,"<sup>1</sup>

"Nemo inprobe eo conatur ascendere, unde descenderat. Quid est autem cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere, qui dei pars est."<sup>2</sup>

"Habebat perfectum animum et ad summam sui adductum, supra quam nihil est nisi mens dei, ex quo pars et in hoc pectus mortale defluxit. Quod numquam magis divinum est, quam ubimortalitatem suam cogitat et scit in hoc natum hominem, ut vita defungeretur,"<sup>3</sup>

"I nunc et humanum animum ex isdem, quibus divina constant, seminibus compositum moleste ferre transitum ac migrationem puta, cum dei natura adsidua et citatissima commutatione vel delectet se vel conservet."<sup>4</sup>

"Quidquid optimum homini est, id extra humanam potentiam iacet, nec dari nec eripi potest. Mundus hic, quo nihil neque maius neque ornatus rerum natura genuit, et animus contemplator admiratorque mundi, pars eius magnificentissima, propria nobis et perpetua<sup>5</sup> et tam diu nobiscum mansura sunt, quam diu ipsi manebimus."<sup>5</sup>

"Animus quidem<sup>6</sup> ipse sacer et aeternus est et cui non possit inici manus."<sup>6</sup>

What we can see from the above passages is that essential human nature is identical with the divine nature, on the basis of which we cannot entertain any thought of the relationship in terms of qualitative differences. What was typical of Paul, a qualitative distinction and distance between God and man, has disappeared in Seneca's writings. Pauline metaphorical language, describing man as being an image of God, cannot be employed by Seneca for the

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1. Ep. 86.1.

2. Ep. 92.30 (see par. 31).

3. Ep. 120.14.

4. Ad Helv. 6.8.

5. Ibid., 8.4.

6. Ad Helv. 11.7; cf. N.Q., i, Praef., 12; De Ben., iii, 28.1-3.

simple reason that the relation of an image to its object has been replaced by the identification of the two. Man and God are identical. However, the movement of the reality of man in Seneca's anthropology has remained. In Paul the movement has been classified as a centrifugal one, because man is related to the Other who is different from, and is outside of, himself. Seneca's movement is a centripetal one, because man is identical to himself in his actual reality. He is being-in-himself. Seneca himself argues that man is a moving reality:

"Quemadmodum flamma surgit in rectum, iacere ac deprimi non potest, non magis quam quiescere; ita noster animus in motu est, eo mobilior et actuosior, quo vehementior fuerit."<sup>1</sup>

"Natura enim humanus animus agilis est et pronus ad motus."<sup>2</sup>

"Invenio qui dicant inesse naturalem quandam irritationem animis commutandi sedes et transferendi domicilia; mobilis enim et inquieta homini mens data est,"<sup>3</sup>

Anthropologically speaking to define the nature of this movement, which Seneca alleges to be proper to man, would be actually to define man himself. If we gather some of the basic data which were discussed so far then it will be possible to proceed.

First we saw that man and God are identical by their affinity in manner of being. Secondly, on account of this affinity<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ep. 39.3.

2. De Tranq. An. 2.11.

3. Ad Helv. 6.6.

4. "...inter bonos viros ac deos amicitia est conciliante virtute. Amicitiam dico? Immo etiam necessitudo et similitudo, quoniam quidem bonus tempore tantum a deo differt," De Provid. 1.5.



man is himself capable of knowing God. Thirdly, knowing something means possessing it, that is being its ultimate source of existence. This problem, which was discussed in Seneca's usage of γινῶθι σαυτὸν maxim, is now developed in the other, but similar, aspect of Seneca's anthropology. Earlier in the thesis we have ruled out that Seneca's view of the world and man should be regarded as a static view, but we shall agree with, and insist on, the argument that Seneca's view of man is the view of an "in sich geschlossenen Kosmos."<sup>1</sup> In Seneca's view man is not a static but kinetic reality, and yet, that reality is to be actualised and perfected in itself and by itself to the point of self-sufficiency, which is a corner-stone of Seneca's anthropology,<sup>2</sup> in the sense that "I apprehend myself as the original source of my possibility."<sup>3</sup> Seneca insisted upon man's being able by himself to be that which he wants to be, believing in human capacity. The primary task of man, in Seneca's view, is man's finding himself in himself, which is within his concrete existence and within his grasp:

"Quicquid facere te potest bonum, tecum est."<sup>4</sup>

By having said this Seneca has immediately made it clear that his view of man is of man as an actuality and not a potentiality, i.e.

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1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 79.

2. Epp. 9.1, 3-5, 8, 12-19; 59.8, 14; 71.26; 73.14; 74.30; 76.35; 85.37-41; 91.2, 4; 120.12-13, 18; De Const. Sap. 2.1; 5.4-7; 6.1-8; 8.3; 9.1; 15.3; De Tranq. An. 13.3; De Provid. 2.1-2.

3. BN, p. 41.

4. Ep. 80.3.

man is not likeness in the sense of a relationship to the object of which he is the likeness, but rather he is an object of his own likeness. He is the end and the source of his own existence. Man's foundation is within himself and the outside reality is not a part of himself. In his own words:

"Quid sapiens investigaverit, quid in lucem protraxerit, quaeris? Primum verum naturamque, quam non ut cetera animalia oculis secutus est tardis ad divina. Deinde vitae legem, quam ad universa derexit, nec nosse tantum sed sequi deos docuit et accidentia non aliter excipere quam imperata. Vetuit parere opinionibus falsis et quanti quidque esset, vera aestimatione perpendit. Damnavit mixtas paenitentia voluptates et bona semper placitura laudavit et palam fecit felicissimum esse cui felicitate, non opus est, potentissimum esse qui se habet in potestate."<sup>1</sup>

"Imperare sibi maximum imperium est."<sup>2</sup>

"Quem magis admiraberis, quam qui imperat sibi, quam qui se habet in potestate?"<sup>3</sup>

"Innumerabiles sunt qui populos,<sup>4</sup> qui urbes habuerunt in potestate; paucissimi qui se."<sup>4</sup>

And this was rightly interpreted:

"Das Erste, was nach Seneca nöthig ist, ist die Selbstemancipation des Einzelnen von jener allgemeinen geistigen Fremdherrschaft."<sup>5</sup>

It seems that self-knowledge and self-command are fully identical, since they both are talking of one and the same thing. The one talks of man's divine self and man's recognizing it, and the other talks of the nature and meaning of that divine self in man.

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1. Ep. 90.34.

2. Ep. 113.31.

3. De Ben. v, 7.5.

4. N.Q., iii, Praef., 10.

5. Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 73.



Man, according to this theory of Seneca, is the ultimate being who disposes of himself fully and the whole of existence is identical with himself. In terms of movement this is to say that man is a being who has the capacity of searching into an external reality, which is objectively different from himself, giving it thus an existence, and becoming a source of the whole of existence. For this reason Seneca emphasizes the importance of knowing and possessing one's own self, for it is the only objective reality that Seneca advocates. And this begs a question about the Other. Who or what is the Other, and what is man's position regarding the Other? As far as Seneca is concerned, the Other is the one who is not in, who is not within myself. If we apply this to the basic data of Seneca's anthropology, - namely that man is a source of his own self, that he is divine and consequently that he is a source of the whole of reality, - then as far as the Other is concerned we can say that:

"I can not consider the look which the Other directs on me as one of the possible manifestations of his objective being; the Other cannot look at me...since I am precisely the one by whom there is world; that is, the <sub>1</sub>one who on principle can not be an object for himself."

To put it in more concrete terms, this is to say:

"If there is an Other, whatever or whoever he may be, whatever may be his relations with me, and without his acting upon me in any way except by the pure upsurge of his being - then I have an outside, I have a <sub>2</sub>nature. My original fall is the existence of the Other."

This is exactly the meaning of Seneca's teaching on the self-

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1. BN, p. 257.

2. Ibid., p. 263.

sufficiency of man, the core of his anthropology. Man, in Seneca's view, is primarily the being who should be, or even is, an actual and not a potential being. Potentiality implies the recognition of the Other, an acceptance of objectively external reality, different from myself, by the being of which my identity is realized, i.e. human reality is the potentiality lived in a manner of relationship between the two, between the I and the Other. However, for Seneca "human reality is the desire of being-in-itself."<sup>1</sup> If we translate this in terms of movement that means that a centripetal movement of man is his effort and an attempt to transcend his potentiality, to actualize the desire of being-in-itself. But, as we have seen, that is impossible as long as there is an objective Other outside of myself. Hence my attempt to actualize myself comes from the presence of the Other, in other words "my project of recovering myself is fundamentally a project of absorbing the Other."<sup>2</sup> The Other is a threat to one's existence by his very presence, just because he testifies to the existence which does not spring out of the one. For that reason man has to eliminate the Other, since only by becoming an ultimate one can man be authentic. By being ultimate man's identity is identical to himself, i.e. man becomes an actual, authentic, self-sufficient being instead of what he in reality is: a potential, unauthentic, depending-on-the-Other, being. From this basic belief of Seneca spring both his humanism and his

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1. Ibid., pp. 565-66.

2. BN, p. 364.



anthropocentrism. The basic means for achieving this task of human reality Seneca has regarded to be man's capacity for knowledge and knowing things human and divine. The point which Paul has criticized Seneca has defended. Both, Seneca and Paul, knew the truthfulness of Nietzsche's saying that "Wo der Baum der Erkenntnis steht, ist immer das Paradies."<sup>1</sup> Knowing the reality of this they have interpreted it in entirely different ways. Paul insisted on the creatureliness and weakness of man. He is spitefully asking οὐχι ἐμώρανευ ὁ θεος τὴν σοφίαν τοῦ κόσμου;<sup>2</sup> giving it a shattering blow by saying that σοφία τοῦ κόσμου τούτου μωρία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐστίν.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand Seneca insists that "Capax est noster animus,"<sup>4</sup> seeing in philosophy an answer to the question of man's identity. "Hoc enim est, quod mihi philosophia promittit, ut parem deo faciat. Ad hoc invitatus sum, ad hoc veni; fidem praesta."<sup>5</sup> If we thus see the approaches to the problem of man in Paul and Seneca we notice that:

"What once seemed to be the highest privilege of man proves to be his peril and temptation; what appeared as his pride becomes his deepest humiliation. The Stoic precept that man has to obey and revere his inner principle the 'demon'<sup>6</sup> within himself, is now regarded as dangerous idolatry."

1. F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Fr. 152.

2. I Cor. 1.20.

3. I Cor. 3.19.

4. Ep. 92.30.

5. Ep. 48.11.

6. E. Cassirer, An Essay on Man, New York, London, Toronto, 1970, p.11.

And this problem of idolatry brings us ultimately back to the question of man. As it was said that, "man creates his idol in his own image,"<sup>1</sup> so it was rightly said that in the Stoic philosophy "the living God in human shape had taken the place of the god made of stone or gold or ivory."<sup>2</sup> This is exactly the situation of Seneca's philosophy. Man is God, because he knows God and "to be known directly is the characteristic mark of an idol. (Kierkegaard)."<sup>3</sup>

Considering this, it would be fair to describe Paul as an apophatic thinker in the sense that: "If in seeing God one can know what one sees, then one has not seen God Himself but something intelligible, something which is inferior to Him. It is by unknowing (ἀγνοῦσα) that one may know Him who is above every possible object of knowledge."<sup>4</sup> As opposed to Paul's theology stands Seneca's theology, which is "'cataphatic' or affirmative theology, the theology of 'divine names',"<sup>5</sup> which is based on the human reason and intellect, thus wiping out the qualitative difference between man and God.

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1. Brunner, op.cit., p. 187.

2. L. Edelstein, The Meaning of Stoicism, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, p.14.

3. Zahrnt, op.cit., p. 28.

4. V. Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, Cambridge & London, 1968, p. 25.

5. Ibid., p. 39.



MAN AND WORLD

Man is in the world, and to talk about the world means to talk about man. It is so for two reasons: firstly because man is in the world and cannot escape it, and secondly, the world is spoken of, - as anything else can be spoken of, - from, and solely from! man's point of view. Ultimately the question of the world is the question of man. But, more than that, we have to reckon with the fact that man is not only homo, but man is homo religiosus, therefore: to talk of the world means to talk of God.

Man's dealings with the world, in the last resort, are nothing else but attempts to answer an ultimate question: the problem of man's identity. In this respect anything that man does and undertakes can be regarded as the tool for the arriving at the point of answering the real question: man, hence:

"Anthropology must then eo ipso be cosmology just as certainly as, conversely, the cosmos is primarily viewed by Paul under an anthropological aspect, because the fate of the world is in fact decided in the human sphere."<sup>1</sup>

Man can deal with the world only through the means of his perceptive capacities, i.e. man cannot postulate anything about the world which is not given through the objective data which are subject to man's research. On the basis of analysis and the systematizing of these data it is possible for man to postulate the facts and realities which otherwise are not directly palpable and self-

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1. Käsemann, op.cit., p. 23.

evident to human experience. In short the knowledge of God and knowledge of the world are inseparably related to each other, and both ultimately bear anthropological relevance. In Rom. 1.18ff. Paul gives a short exposition of his view on the problem of knowledge of the world and God:

τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανερώσεν. τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθορᾶται (vv. 19-20).

This particular part of Paul's letter to the Romans has been often labelled Stoic in its structure of thought and argument. Schoeps,<sup>1</sup> however, has pointed out that this is not necessarily the case, finding the Judaistic background for this (see p.27). Along the same lines Pohlenz has argued:

"Die Worte τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ , die doch voraussetzen dass Gott in seinem innersten Wesen unfassbar bleibt, werden nicht aus der stoischen Philosophie sondern nur aus der jüdischen, platonisch beeinflussten Gedankenwelt verständlich."<sup>2</sup>

The emphasis should not, however, be put upon the source and background, but on the meaning and the implications of this argument of Paul. The importance of the concept, whatever its source may be, is not in its origin and background, but in its content and implications. Thus Bultmann interprets this passage:

"Man's being in relation to God is primarily a being claimed by God as the Creator. When Paul makes use of the Stoic theory of a natural knowledge of God (Rom. 1.20ff), it does not serve him in order to conclude to God's being in the world and to the divinity of the world

1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 224.

2. Pohlenz, Paulus und die Stoa, p. 7.



and the security of man by reason of divine providence, but rather in order to conclude to God's being beyond the world, to the world's creatureliness and to God's claim to be honoured by man.<sup>1</sup> Correspondingly, 'world' for Paul means 'creation'."<sup>2</sup>

Hence, what immediately becomes clear is that the world and man, each being a creation,<sup>2</sup> are qualitatively identical, and as such they stand over against God as Creator with a gap of an infinite qualitative difference between them. Just as the word κόσμος denotes the concept of creation in Paul's theology the same has been said about the word φύσις:

"Die alttestamentliche 'Weltanschauung' der grossen Führer Israels kennt keine 'Natur' als Offenbarung Gottes: was wir Natur nennen, ist für sie recht eigentlich die Stätte des Wunders, und das Wunder ist folglich die eigentlich offenbarende Betätigung Gottes. Wo Paulus somit am meisten als Grieche erscheinen konnte, nämlich, wo er im Begriffe zu sein scheint, Weltanschauung und Gottesanschauung ineinanderzuschieben, tut er dies geradezu nicht."<sup>3</sup>

As far as Paul's understanding of the world in epistemological terms is concerned it is of importance to reckon with the fact that Paul's language is highly mythological and anthropomorphic. And this has an anthropological relevance:

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1. EF, p. 151; cf. I Cor. 3.22.
  2. See how logically Paul argues in Rom. 1.23 saying that heathens ἠλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκονος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου and concludes in v. 25: καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα. Therefore, as God and man stand over against each other in qualitative distinction, so do the world and man stand together in solidarity of their creatureliness, which makes them qualitatively identical.
  3. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 543.

"...Paulus hat so gedacht, dass es ihm unschwer war, die Welt als nicht Gotthaft und doch als gottgewirkt zu sehen. Diese gottgewirkte Welt hat er als dreistufige gesehen, und das ist nicht ohne Belang für seine Anschauung vom Menschen..."<sup>1</sup>

This three-storied view of the world of Paul has been recognized by Böhlig<sup>2</sup> as well, but he argues that it is not Judaistic in origin.<sup>3</sup> And indeed Paul talks of the world in terms of οὐρανός,<sup>4</sup> γῆ,<sup>5</sup> κατὰ θόρον,<sup>6</sup> as if these were three different strata of the cosmic order in spatial terms. But when confronted with this sort of language one must not forget that:

"Die paulinische Weltanschauung kennt also nicht einen Weltprozess, sondern die Welt, auch was wir mit den Griechen Natur nennen, wird gesehen als Ort der geschichtlichen Betätigung eines göttlichen Willens."<sup>7</sup>

Hence, what we discover in Paul's language is the fact that he "changes space into time, the substantial into the historical."<sup>8</sup> Paul is not primarily interested in the world itself, but in the man who is in the world. Therefore we have always to consider his statements about the world as anthropological and theological statements. World in itself has no history and its historicity

1. Ibid., p. 556.

2. Tarsos, pp. 84ff; cf. Preller, op.cit., p. 69; Urchristentum, p. 466; Käsemann, op.cit., p. 23.

3. Tarsos, p. 86.

4. Rom. 1.18; 10.6; I Cor. 8.5; 15.47; 2 Cor. 5.1-2; 12.2; Gal. 1.8; Eph. 1.10; 3.1; 4.10; 6.9; Phil. 3.20; Col. 1.5, 20, 23; 4.1; I Thess. 1.10; 4.16; 2 Thess. 1.7.

5. Rom. 9.28; I Cor. 8.5; Eph. 1.10; 3.15; 4.9; 6.3; Col. 1.16, 20; 3.2,5.

6. Phil. 2.10; Eph. 4.9.

7. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 543.

8. Scroggs, op.cit., p. 60.



is given to it only through the reality of man's dealing with the world, hence man's being in the world and his dealing with the world is nothing else but that which constitutes man as a historical being. Ultimately, there is no history apart from human history. Therefore, insofar as Paul is interested in the world he is interested in it as the place of man's being historical, and not as a natural phenomenon. The historicity of man is inaugurated and determined by that which is called in theological language a "fall". Adam is not a historical figure in the sense that he can be singled out as a particular person and an individual, but he is historical in the sense that he constitutes, or rather symbolizes what makes every man to be a historical being.

We have already stressed that history is the reality of man's dealing with his environment, and with his world, in such a way that human affairs become a cosmic affair, and by being a cosmic affair it raises theological questions and presuppositions, and that is Paul's understanding of history:

"Es verdient aber auch Aufmerksamkeit, dass 'Geschichte' für ihn (Paulus) nicht eine rein menschliche Sache gewesen ist...der Sinn der Geschichte ist nämlich der Sinn der göttlichen Willensbetätigung; das Ziel der Geschichte, das diesem Sinne angemessen sein muss, ist die Absicht Gottes in seinen Taten. Was<sub>1</sub> der Mensch davon weiss, weiss er nur durch Offenbarungen."<sup>1</sup>

This definition of Paul's view of history is on its way towards the true Pauline concept of history, but it leaves the door open for polarization so that it enables one to suppose that Paul differentiated between secular and saving history. This view we

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1. de Zwaan, op.cit., pp. 570-71.

reject as false and non-Pauline. Although God has revealed himself to his people, Israel, and the salvation of mankind has come in Christ, i.e. through Israel, Paul does not indicate anywhere that God's dealings with the world were not on a cosmic scale, or that the events outside of Jewish history did not determine to any extent God's plans for salvation. On the contrary Paul writes: ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὀργὴ θεοῦ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων.<sup>1</sup>

Undoubtedly, here we cannot understand Israel, as the people of God, under the word ἄνθρωποι, but mankind in general. Hence history in Paul's thought is always considered in its cosmic dimensions, and Israel's history is part of cosmic history and conditions it. Another cosmic dimension of Paul's theology, with an especial anthropological emphasis is Rom. 8.22: οἴδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις συστενάζει καὶ συνωδίνει ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν.

This is a direct way of saying that man's history is universal, and that God is concerned with the whole of mankind, through man's history. If we try to correlate the two passages above what we see is that the whole world, the universe, or creation - since these three are identical in Paul - have become the context where the historicity of man is being revealed. This historical existence of man, i.e. man's dealing with the world, takes such a course, as provokes God's response in the form of wrath.

It remains now to be clarified in what sense and in what particular way the historicity of man is revealed and realized.

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1. Rom. 1.18.



As we have pointed out history is initiated by the fall of Adam (man) so that it can be said that:

"Wäre er (der Mensch) nicht gefallen, so<sup>1</sup> würde er so wenig wie der Kosmos eine Geschichte haben."<sup>1</sup>

and,

"Dieser Mensch geht in die menschliche<sup>2</sup> Geschichte ein, wie sie nach dem Fall geworden ist."<sup>2</sup>

If we try to put the myth of the fall into anthropological language which is fully historical, i.e. which is part of man's life and man's being in the world (= being historical), then we can see that the fall is the present reality of every man. The fall is every man's desire to 'covet divinity,'<sup>3</sup> to become God and to achieve an ultimate identity with him, to achieve an authentic existence by transcending human potentiality and making actual a trans-human potentiality. At this point we are confronted again with the basic argument of this thesis: a) that man's nature is a relationship, and b) that man's project, in his attempt to assert himself, is to destroy the Other. In other words man is a potential being, and his aim is - by the means of destruction of the Other - to become an actual one. The means for realization of this project is man's capacity for knowledge and comprehension. If we take a brief look at Gal. 4.3, we read: ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ἡμεθα δεδουλωμένοι and in verse 9. Paul reproachfully asks his converts: πῶς ἐπιστρέφετε πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀσθενῆ καὶ πτωχὰ στοιχεῖα;

1. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 577.

2. Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 362.

3. Scroggs, op.cit., p. 90.

In Colossians 2.8, he warns the Church:

βλέπετε μή τις ὑμᾶς ἔσται ὁ συλαγωγῶν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οὐ κατὰ Χριστόν'

because, Paul argues: ἀπεθάνετε σὺν Χριστῷ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων τοῦ κόσμου,<sup>1</sup> Niederwimmer insists that:

"Paulus hat den Dienst der Elemente, die religiöse Scheu und Verehrung der astralen Mächte als Gesetzesdienst verstanden und von daher beurteilt...Paulus hat sich nicht direkt mit stoischen Traditionen auseinandergesetzt. In der Auseinandersetzung mit den gnostisierenden Vorstellungen von den Weltelementen, - Vorstellungen, bei denen der stoische Einfluss unverkennbar ist, - ist aber implicit zugleich auch die Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen Tradition gegeben."<sup>2</sup>

It cannot be ruled out that Paul here had for his target some of the Stoic teachings about astral worship. The attitudes and beliefs with regard to the stars as exercising some sort of influence on man's life were features of the Hellenistic world, and it would be strange to imagine Paul as not being aware of it. However, whether the "worldly elements" are the astral worship in the form known in Paul's time or not is of secondary importance.

But emphasis should be laid on the fact that astrology in itself is a scientific approach to the relation between the stars and man. Astrology is clearly linked with astronomy, so that astrological belief about the stars determining man's life is rooted in, and based on certain astronomical data. Hence, astrology is not completely devoid of the scientific approach to life. The basis of astrology is γνῶσις.

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1. Col. 2.20.

2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 121.



In anthropological terms, what we are confronted with here is the problem of the Other. Man's fall was his attempt to break off from the Other, by introverting into himself. Man has denied the Other, because the Other was an incarnation of his potentiality and an obstacle to his actuality.

Since total actualization is authentic existence, realized in man himself, man has found external reality - the Other - a serious threat to himself. It actually has become the Other to him and his project now is to dissolve it. So, what man actually does through the mode of his historical being in the world, corresponds to the situation which we have described as the search-for-identity. Worship, idolatry, and scientific research are ultimately one and the same thing. They basically have one and the same task, to secure man's existence from within, and for, himself. For that reason any doctrine of God is inconceivable to Paul, if that doctrine is achieved by scientific means, and thus Niederwimmer rightly comments:

"Der fixierte Gott ist der Gott, den der Mensch (für sich) beansprucht. Im scheinbaren Rückbezug auf sein gnädiges, sich offenbarendes, verheissendes Wort, richtet der Mensch in Wahrheit seine <sup>eigene</sup> Gerechtigkeit (Röm. 10,3f.) auf. Der fixierte Gott ist der Grund der Selbstrechtfertigung, und das heisst des Versuches, sich aus sich selbst zu verwirklichen."<sup>1</sup>

Thus a historical man, i.e. a fallen man, is not only involved in the world but wants to become the source of existence of the world, since it, the world, in the form of the Other limits him. Through

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1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 145.

scientific research, which had taken a form of idolatry in Paul's time, - for it was the way of producing a God of which one can dispose - man is trying to assert himself over against the world, securing his existence from within, and for, himself. In that respect it is important that Paul insisted on the concept of dying with Christ to the worldly elements (Col. 2.20), which, in our language, means abandoning the deceitful thought that man is the source of his own existence, that he is an actual being.

A genuine human nature which is to be found in Christ and consequently in every Christian is an ec-static one, actualized by the act of acceptance of its limits and potentiality:

οἱ πνεύματι θεοῦ λατρεύοντες καὶ καυχώμενοι ἐν  
Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ καὶ οὐκ ἐν σαρκὶ πεποιθότες,<sup>1</sup>

Thus according to Paul living according to Christ and not according to the worldly elements is being a spiritual man, and "spirit when it is used of man is that in virtue of which he is open and transmits the life of God,"<sup>2</sup> whereas the man who is under the worldly elements, being in the flesh and not in Christ is "man in contrast with God."<sup>3</sup>

The man of the flesh, who trusts himself, is the one who is trying to actualize his existence from within himself, asserting himself over against the Other. The Other is God and the World insofar as they are a threat to his authentic existence. Hence the process is completely reversed, the Other who is the source of

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1. Phil. 3.3.

2. Robinson, op.cit., p. 19.

3. Ibid., p. 19; cf. Brunner, op.cit., pp. 9, 34, 229.



the existence of man has become a threat to man's existence and man has to destroy him:

τῆ γὰρ ματαιότητι ἡ κτίσις ὑπετάγη, οὐχ ἔκοῦσα, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξαντα, ἐφ' ἐλπίδι διότι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις ἐλευθερωθήσεται ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς δόξης τῶν τέκνων τοῦ θεοῦ.<sup>1</sup>

Man in his historical (= corruptible) existence relates to the world in such a way that he does not transmit the life of God to the world, by becoming an agent of the relationship between the Creator and the creature, between God and the world, but on the contrary, by his attempt to secure his existence for and from himself he has to subdue the world to himself, by means of scientific research he has to become the ultimate source of its existence. But as he (man) in reality is not the source of existence the world becomes subject to corruption.

Thus we see that Paul had a clear picture of the bilateral consequences coming out of man's historical existence (= sinful existence). One is that man in the attempt to find his source of existence in the creature - to which he is identical - loses himself altogether, with the total dissolution of his identity.<sup>2</sup> And the other is that man's attempt to find his source of existence in the world ultimately leads him to the point of seeing himself as the source of the existence of the world, thus subjecting the world to the state of corruption.<sup>3</sup> It has been argued that:

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1. Rom. 8.20-21.

2. Gal. 4.3, 9; Col. 2.8, 20.

3. Rom. 8.18-23.

"Nicht eine einzige Stelle findet sich im Neuen Testament, die den Blick erweiterte auf die Gesamtheit aller Menschen, ohne dass die Menschheit zugleich Gott gegenübergestellt wäre."<sup>1</sup>

There, where mankind stands united, opposing God, is in fact the issue of idolatry. Paul apparently understood idolatry in its deepest sense and opposed it severely. Thus, just as he reprimanded the Galatians for having returned to the "beggarly elements" so he praised the community in I Thessalonians: αὐτοὶ γὰρ περὶ ἡμῶν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὅποιαν εἰσοδὸν ἔσχομεν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, καὶ πῶς ἐπεστρέψατε πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων δουλεύειν θεῷ ζῶντι καὶ ἀληθινῷ<sup>2</sup>

It would not be an exaggeration to assume that Paul's understanding of sin and idolatry are inseparably linked together:

"The primal sin is not an inferior morality, but rather the understanding of oneself in terms of oneself and the attempt to secure one's existence by means of what one himself establishes, by means of one's own accomplishments. It is the boasting and self confidence of the natural man. Paul speaks of it as putting confidence in the flesh."<sup>3</sup>

That which we have called a centripetal movement is expressed by the Pauline concept of Sin,<sup>4</sup> which means that "through the Fall the unity of being and destiny, or of the 'I' and the 'Self,' has been lost. Hence sinful man is forced continually to seek his Self or

1. Greeven, op.cit., p. 20.

2. I Thess. 1.9.

3. EF, p. 94.

4. On the importance of the concept of sin in Paul's anthropology see: K. Stendahl, 'The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West', The Harvard Theological Review, vol. lvi, 1963, p. 208; Preller, op.cit., pp. 74-75; Schreiner, op.cit., p. 45; Scroggs, op.cit., p. 90; Brunner, op.cit., p. 471; Gesetz, pp. 187-90.



himself. Instead of circling round God the human life-movement now circles round the Self - lost and therefore sought."<sup>1</sup> The act of idolatry is the act of man's relating to his own self, because "man creates his idol in his own image."<sup>2</sup> If we for a moment remember that Paul's view of man is a view of a being whose essence is not something actual, but potential, i.e. man's nature is relationship, then we can see how important is the problem of idolatry. Idolatry is something which surpasses man's being in the world, it is a state of existence in which man is depicted as being of the world.<sup>3</sup> And why? Precisely because the world has no authentic existence and is qualitatively identical to man, is dust and in the last resort nothing. Its source of existence is outside of itself. It cannot either explain or sustain itself from its own point of view. Exactly from this background comes Paul's argument:

οἶδαμεν ὅτι οὐδὲν εἰδωλον ἐν κόσμῳ<sup>4</sup>

Hence worshipping an idol (= being of the world) is worshipping the world, and ultimately worshipping one's own self. Thus an idol's being nothing in the world is the same as man's nothingness.

Worshipping one's own self means rejection of the Other, and this attempt to assert himself and secure his existence from within himself is the problem of man's being or not being himself. By man's misconception of his true self he is putting himself in a

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1. Brunner, op.cit., p. 229; cf. p. 483.

2. Ibid., p. 187.

3. Jn. 15.19.

4. I Cor. 8.4.

situation which leads him further away from his authentic existence. Thus Paul writes: ὁ ἄνθρωπος πᾶς ὁ κρίνων. ἐν

ὃ γὰρ κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον, σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις.<sup>1</sup>

Man's existence in the world, be it of the world or not, is by its nature historical existence and that means that man's being in the world implies dealings with others, and with concrete reality. So, Paul emphasizes not the ethical but the ontological problem of man. Man has sentenced himself by having judged the other precisely because Paul has seen man as the being whose self is realized and actualized only through his relationship to an Other objectively different from himself. Here we see that the ontological structures of Paul's thought are neither ultimately transcendent nor immanent. They are inter-related, but clearly distinct from each other in terms of Creator-creature relationship. These two are ultimately different, and precisely because of their ultimate difference they cannot be confused; hence there is no need for separating them. Not only is man, being a creature, related to God, being a Creator, but at the same time man is related to the other man and to the world who are creatures like himself. Trying to destroy the Other is the only way by which a sinful man can assert himself, it is constituted by his fallenness by virtue of which "man, man himself...cannot affirm without denying."<sup>2</sup> This basic need to deny, to judge, and to reject the Other "recalls the fact that as a result of his sin Adam lost the

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1. Rom. 2.1.

2. PJPS, p. 386.



lordship over creation he was intended to have."<sup>1</sup>

What happens to the sinful man is that he has alienated himself from both the world and God; that is to say, he has alienated himself from himself, for his self was precisely constituted by his relationship to the Other. As the result of man's fallenness there arises an unnatural situation where the objective Others constitute the danger to each other. Instead of seeing themselves in each Other, man and world related to each other by being related to God on the plane of creaturehood, they all of a sudden seek to enslave each other.<sup>2</sup> Sinful man is not at home in the world, nor is the world at one with itself seeing that it is in the hold of sinful man. "While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me."<sup>3</sup>

When compared with Paul's view, it becomes quickly obvious that Seneca's picture of the world was a mythological one like Paul's. Just as Paul's view of the world is one of the three-storied universe so "the tripartition is found in Seneca, οὐρανός, γῆ, μετάρσιον, probably due to Posidonius."<sup>4</sup> Thus we find Seneca talking of the "celestia, sublimia, terrena,"<sup>5</sup> just as he speaks of the earth, sea, and the underworld,<sup>6</sup> or about the

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1. Adam, p. 16.

2. Rom. 8.20ff; Gal. 4.3,9; Phil. 2.8,20.

3. BN, p. 364.

4. De Vogel, op.cit.,iii, p.345.

5. N.Q. II, 1.1.

6. Hercules Furens, 597-610.

seas, lands and shades.<sup>1</sup> Simultaneously as we discover that Paul and Seneca share a threefold view of the world we can discover different origins of their thoughts.

Although Seneca talks of the underworld like Paul, as well as the heaven (sky) and earth, a notable difference is that his approach is scholarly and scientific in character, whereas Paul's approach is rather something that one might call existential. Thus for example Seneca's concept of cosmopolis "im ursprünglichen Sinne ist die Stadt der 'Götter und Menschen' mit gemeinsamen Nomos, dem Ausdruck immanenter Gerchtigkeit,"<sup>2</sup> and as to Paul it was said that man and God are always apart from each other (see p. 81). Hence, while we find in Paul the sense of otherness, on a cosmic plane, between God and the world,<sup>3</sup> in Seneca, as we shall see, this sense is totally absent.

Man's relationship to the world and man's being in the world, in Seneca's philosophy, is as much knowledge-centred as is the relationship of man to God. So he writes:

"Non praeterit me, Lucili virorum optime, quam magnarum rerum fundamenta ponam senex, qui mundum circuire constitui et causas<sub>4</sub> secretaque eius eruere atqui aliis noscenda prodere."<sup>4</sup>

There is nothing surprising about Seneca's feeling of being impelled to learn about the universe, for it is a natural consequence of his belief that there is an ultimate identity

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1. Hercules Oetaeus, 1477; cf. Kroll, op.cit., p. 423.

2. W. Ganns, Das Bild des Weisen bei Seneca, Schaan, 1952, p. 62.

3. ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὁργὴ θεοῦ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ (Rom. 1. 18).

4. N.Q. iii, Praef., 1.



between God, man and the world. To Seneca "the world is the embodiment and expression of the knowledge of God,"<sup>1</sup> and that means that the process of knowing the world is the process which identifies man with God. We have to look upon the problem from the anthropocentric and anthropological point of view. Knowing that "scientific research is nothing other than an effort to appropriate,"<sup>2</sup> it is easy to detect that behind Seneca's anxiety to know about the world stands the fear of the Other. To learn about the universe, to know it means both: to possess it and at the same time to find an authentic existence; i.e. by knowing the Other man gives an ultimate identity to himself in the sense of becoming an actual being. Thus it has been stated:

"Die Hellenen sind aber nicht nur die Augenmenschen, die scharf ein äusseres Bild aufnehmen; sie wollen auch das Wesen der Dinge schauen."<sup>3</sup>

Naturally, this applies to Seneca as well, and far more so since he has seen man to be the source and end of existence. To Seneca's understanding "the paradox is not that there are 'self-activated' existences but that there is no other kind. What is truly unthinkable is passive existence; that is, existence which perpetuates itself without having a force either to produce itself or to preserve itself."<sup>4</sup> An argument that "Seneca made a sharp distinction between God as the cause of the universe and the

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1. Watson, op.cit., p. 58.

2. BN, p. 577.

3. Stoa, i, p. 9.

4. BN, p. xxxii.

universe which is His work,"<sup>1</sup> is very unconvincing. "Unus omnium parens mundus est,"<sup>2</sup> says Seneca, and it takes little to realize that God is the father as well.<sup>3</sup> Hence God and the world, both being the father of man, are ultimately identical.<sup>4</sup> After all, Seneca himself says:

"Ipse qui ista tractat, qui condidit, qui totum hoc fundavit deditque circa se, maiorque est pars sui operis ac melior,..."<sup>5</sup>

Two things cannot be doubted on any pretext: a) that Seneca has conceived an existing reality as one, unique and actually related to itself in the sense of ultimate identity, and b) that man's task is to become the ultimate source and end of that reality; i.e. as long as the reality exists as an objective Other, who constitutes a threat to man's authentic existence and identity, man has to dissolve the Other, and that is achieved by the faculty of knowledge and comprehension. In that sense Pohlenz's interpretation is extremely apt.

Precisely because of this scientific attempt to answer the

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1. De Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 295.
  2. De Ben., iii, 28.2.
  3. On especially controversial opinions about the concept of the fatherhood of God in Paul and Seneca see: Stoics, p. 328; De Vogel, op.cit., iii, pp.81-86; Davidson, op.cit., p. 182; Dill, op.cit., pp. 306, 393; J. Kreyher, L. Annaeus Seneca und seine Beziehungen zum Urchristentum, Berlin, 1887, p. 64; Mysticism, p. 12; Kroll, op.cit., pp. 411-12; Leipoldt, op.-cit., pp. 136, 142-43, 165; Holzherr, op.cit., ii, p. 42; Deissner, op.cit., p. 37; Sevenster, op.cit., pp. 37-38.
  4. On Seneca's concept of God's fatherhood see esp. De Provid., passim.
  5. N.Q., vii, 30.3.



problem of his identity man has enslaved himself to deceit. For this very reason we are not to suppose Seneca too naive when he takes stars for divine bodies<sup>1</sup> with prophetic qualities.<sup>2</sup> Seneca says of stars:

"Quid, tu tot illa milia siderum iudicas otiosa lucere?  
 Quid est porro aliud quod errorem maximum incutiat peritis natalium quam quod paucis nos sideribus assignant, cum omnia quae supra nos sunt partem nostri sibi vindicent?... Ceterum et illa quae aut immota sunt aut propter velocitatem universo parem immotis similia non extra ius dominiumque nostri sunt."<sup>3</sup>

The problem here is not that Seneca has conceived the value of astrology on the plane of superficial and naive worship, but something more important. Seneca, namely, has taken the stars for something that one might call the basic data or the basic elements by the help of which man, through his perceptive and comprehensive power, is able to answer the problem of his own existence. This is exactly the concept which is covered by Paul's concept of τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου which he has opposed so severely. He has opposed exactly what Seneca has advocated, namely the belief that man by observation and scientific research would be able to identify himself with the Other and thus would be the ultimate one. Hence, here Paul and Seneca speak about one and the same thing, and we see that they entertain diametrically opposed opinions. What Seneca considers to be man's prior duty and task, Paul attacks as

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1. De Ben., iv, 23.4.

2. N.Q., vii, 28.1.

3. N.Q., ii, 32.7-8.

folly and deceit. What Paul regarded as sin Seneca has defined as virtue because: "die Einheit und Wesensgleichheit der Tugenden kommt bei Seneca besonders dadurch zum Ausdruck, dass er allen den Begriff des Wissens zu Grunde legt."<sup>1</sup> "Therefore to live perfectly one must know perfectly the whole interaction of cause and effect, all of nature, and become in a sense identical with it."<sup>2</sup> Of course this whole complex of thoughts and concepts, in Seneca's philosophy, is based on his emphasis on reason. Thus he defines man:

"Animus scilicet emendatus ac purus, aemulator dei, super humana se extollens, nihil extra se sui ponens. Rationale animal es. Quod ergo in te bonum est? Perfecta ratio."<sup>3</sup>

Seneca has taken reason to be "the supreme court of appeal,"<sup>4</sup> by saying that: "Omnia itaque ad rationem revocanda sunt."<sup>5</sup> In other words the reality of the external world, the Other, is being confirmed by, and has its source in, the human mind; i.e. by means of reason man asserts himself against the world - against the Other. Thus Seneca writes:

"sibi totus animus vacet et ad contemplationem sui saltem in ipso fine respiciat."<sup>6</sup>

Hence as we have argued, man's duty is to make research and to know

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1. S. Rubin, Die Ethik Senecas in ihrem Verhältnis zur älteren und mittleren Stoa, Nördlingen, 1901, p. 33.
  2. Watson, op.cit., p. 60.
  3. Ep. 124.23.
  4. Brunner, op.cit., p. 431.
  5. Ep. 99.18.
  6. N.Q., iii, Praef. 2; cf. Ep. 94.72: "Contra illos, qui gratiam ac potentiam attollunt, otium ipse suspiciat traditum litteris et animum ab externis ad sua reversum."



in order to subdue the world to his control and finally become the source of its existence. It has to be so for the simple reason that Seneca has seen existence as one and identical to itself. That implies one single source of existence, and it is natural that man, looking from his point of view, should regard himself as the source of the whole of existence.

This desire of man to know the Other, to become the Other's source of existence, is something which is inseparably linked with the search-for-identity, and Seneca speaks of it emphatically:

"magni animi res fuit rerum naturae latebras dimovere nec contentum exteriore eius aspectu introspicere et in deorum secreta descendere."<sup>1</sup>

Indeed the target of scientific research is not research for its own sake, but for the sake of an ulterior end, an attempt to actualize the human reality which is confined to the sphere of potentiality by the limits of man, i.e. "he (the knowing subject = man) is characterized by pneuma of a particular type which marks him off, and in time as we shall see, makes him superior to all around him, so that he can order and dispose the world for his own convenience."<sup>2</sup> Knowledge as a theoretical faculty in Seneca's thought cannot be separated from empirical knowledge, because he believes that there is nothing which is not accessible to man's comprehending capacity. Thus the sort of knowledge that he is interested in is knowledge as a totality which is the opposite of ignorance, so that knowledge is identical to virtue and ignorance

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1. N.Q., vi, 5.2.

2. Watson, op.cit., p. 21.

to vice.<sup>1</sup> In this context Seneca says: "Quo nullum maius est nosse naturam."<sup>2</sup> This statement is doubly important because behind it lies monistic thought, where man, world and God are identical, and knowledge expresses man's authentic existence. Thus we read in Seneca:

"Beatum enim illud uno loco positum est, in ipsa mente, grande, stabile, tranquillum, quod sine scientia divinorum humanorumque non potest effici."<sup>3</sup>

The great stable and tranquil mind here stands for an authentic existence. The argument is clear enough. Man's un-at-home feeling about himself, caused by the fact that he does not have an authentic existence - which is due to the presence of the Other - is quenched by man's destruction of the Other through knowledge. Man wants to know things divine and things human because these two are the elements of the commonwealth called cosmopolis which is assigned to man:

"Ergo cum animum sapientis intuemur potentem omnium et per universa dimissum, omnia illius esse dicimus, cum ad hoc ius cotidianum si ita res tulerit, capite censebitur."<sup>4</sup>

And the reason that all things belong to man (primarily to the Sage) is because he is "divini iuris atque humani peritus."<sup>5</sup> This knowledge of things human and divine and the knowledge of the

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1. Ep. 31.6. "Quid ergo est bonum? Rerum scientia. Quid malum est? Rerum imperitia."
  2. N.Q., vi, 4.2; cf. Ep. 82. 5-6: "In insuperabili loco stat animus, qui externa deseruit...Itaque quantum possumus, ab illa (sc. fortuna) resiliamus; quod sola praestabit sui naturaeque cognitio."
  3. Ep. 74.29.
  4. De Ben. vii, 8.1.
  5. Ibid., vii, 2.4.



universe has as its outcome man's being a citizen of the world:

"cum sapienti rem publicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum,"<sup>1</sup>

"Dic potius, quam naturale sit in immensum mentem suam extendere. Magna et generosa res humanus animus: nullos sibi poni nisi communes et cum deo terminos patitur."<sup>2</sup>

"Ego terras omnis tamquam meas videbo, meas tamquam omnium. Ego sic vivam quasi sciam aliis esse me natum et naturae rerum hoc nomine gratias agam;"<sup>3</sup>

These altruistically sounding cosmopolitan ideas of Seneca, which are the outcome of his vision of man's being in the world, have earned for him the reputation of being a humanist,<sup>4</sup> whose maxim was:

"Homo sacra res homini."<sup>5</sup>

This indeed sounds very altruistic, but, if we take a closer look at the whole complexity of Seneca's thought, we shall arrive at an entirely opposite conclusion. First of all, we shall take here Bultmann's definition of humanism as a correct interpretation, and on that assumption we shall argue that Seneca's altruism,

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1. Ep. 68.2.

2. Ep. 102.21.

3. De Vita Beata, 20.3; On the cosmopolitan ideas in Seneca's philosophy see further: Ep. 28.5; De Otio, 4.1-2; De Tranq. An. 4.4; Ad Helv. 8.5-6; 9.7.

4. On Seneca's humanism see: Preller, op.cit., p. 76; H.E. Wedeck, 'Seneca's Humanitarianism', Classical Journal, L, 1955, pp. 319-20; A.L. Motto, 'Seneca, Exponent of Humanitarianism', Classical Journal, L, 1955, pp. 315-18; Dill, op.cit., p. 117; Gummere, op.cit., p. 70; Kreyher, op.cit., p.1; U. Knoche, Der Philosoph Seneca, Frankfurt am Main, 1933, pp. 15, 20; Deissner, op.cit., pp. 32-33.

5. Ep. 95.33.

expressed in his discourses on friendship, and his cosmopolitanism are ego- and anthropocentric, just as it was already pointed out that: "Seneca contemplates friendship anthropocentrically and even - though with great refinement - egocentrically."<sup>1</sup> But now Bultmann's definition of humanism:

"Der humanistische Glaube an den Menschen ist gar nicht der Glaube an den Menschen in seiner empirischen Vorfindlichkeit, an seine Vernunft, an seine Recht und sein Vermögen, sich und der Welt die Gesetze zu geben. Er ist vielmehr der Glaube an die Idee des Menschen, die als Norm über seinem konkreten Leben steht und ihm seine Pflicht und eben damit seine Würde, seinen Adel gibt. Humanismus ist der Glaube an den Geist, an dem der Mensch teilhat, und Kraft dessen er die Welt des Wahren, des Guten, des Schönen erschafft in Wissenschaft, Recht und Kunst."<sup>2</sup>

Just as Bultmann has pointed out the high aspirations of humanists Seneca writes:

"O quam contempta res est homo, nisi supra humana surrexerit!"<sup>3</sup>

This sort of anthropocentricity of Seneca's humanism is entirely consistent with the whole of his philosophical system, for, as we have maintained so far, man is basically a being whose project is to assert himself over against the Other. His aspirations are always pointing beyond himself with the centripetal tendency of drawing in and dissolving the Other. Hence, although Seneca maintains that "homo sacra res homini est" we must not overlook

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1. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 176; cf. Brunner, op.cit., p.553; Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 73; Greeven, op.cit., p. 153.

2. GV, iii, p. 65; cit., H.D. Betz, Der Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition, Tübingen, 1972, p. 142.

3. N.Q., i, Praef, 5.



the reason for that, and the root of that saying is this:

"Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo, qua homo est."<sup>1</sup>

Proceeding from this point we shall see that the actual existence of the other man is a threat to man's existence, so that man's reverence for the Other becomes more and more doubtful. It is necessary to reckon with the other man as the mode of man's being-in-the-world in Seneca's philosophy, precisely because his philosophy is highly anthropocentric, or rather anthropological. So, just as the world constitutes a danger to man's existence, revealing itself as the Other, so does the other man constitute the most direct and concrete otherness which man can encounter in the world. It is not by chance that Seneca has dedicated such long discourses to the problem of friendship and to the problem of inter-human relationships in general. Man experiences the world through the other man, precisely because of their identity with and relation to the world and to each other through reason. In conclusion, it is fair to say that it is an impulse of self-preservation, and fear of the Other which makes Seneca say: "Ea enim parte sibi carus est homo qua homo est."

Seeing a man as the being whose "original fall is the existence of the Other,"<sup>2</sup> Seneca wrote to Lucilius:

"Sic est, non muto sententiam: fuge multitudinem, fuge paucitatem, fuge etiam unum. Non habeo, cum quo te communicatum velim. Et vide, quod iudicium meum habeas: audeo te tibi credere."<sup>3</sup>

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1. Ep. 121.14.

2. BN, p. 263.

3. Ep. 10.1.

A distrust towards the Other and the fear of the Other is Seneca's way of depicting the reality of man in the world, so that man faces the world not as the milieu for the actualization of his self, but on the contrary as his peril. For that reason man primarily has to look to himself and to assert himself over against the world. Thus even friendship is exclusively an egocentric concept:

"'Quaeris,' inquit, 'quid profecerim? Amicus esse mihi coepi.' Multum profecit; numquam erit solus. Scito hunc amicum omnibus esse."<sup>1</sup>

The chance for man to find his own self in the other man is entirely ruled out, and the reality of others is, primarily and exclusively, seen as a destructive power and force instead of as creative:

"Avarior redeo, ambitiosior, luxurior, immo vero crudelior et inhumanior, quia inter homines fui...Recede in te ipsum, quantum potes. Cum his versare, qui te meliorem facturi sunt. Illos admitte, quos tu potes facere meliores...Multi te laudant. Ecquid habes, cur placeas tibi, si is es, quem intellegant multi? Introrsus bona tua spectant."<sup>2</sup>

This self-centredness of man in the world is exactly what in Paul has been rebuked. Seneca has advocated the argument that "Introrsus bona tua spectant," because he was convinced that the question of man is to be answered primarily by looking at man: "Quicquid facere te potest bonum, tecum est."<sup>3</sup> And as the outcome of this, in addition to the fact that the Other is a threat to one's self, Seneca has stated: "unum bonum est, quod beatæ vitæ

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1. Ep. 6.7.

2. Ep. 7.3, 8, 12.

3. Ep. 80.3.



causa et firmamentum est, sibi fidere."<sup>1</sup> At this point Paul and Seneca are diametrically opposed to each other, for Paul says:

οἱ πνεύματι θεοῦ λατρεύοντες καὶ καυχώμενοι ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ  
καὶ οὐκ ἐν σαρκὶ πεποιθότες,<sup>2</sup>

Thus, insofar as Seneca is representative of Hellenistic thought, it has rightly been observed that:

"In der griechischen Auffassung gehört der Mensch wesentlich nicht zum Kosmos..."<sup>3</sup>

or as Benz puts it:

"Der Mensch ist nicht hier (in Seneca) in der Natur, sondern eine Trennung von Beschauer und Kosmos ist vorausgesetzt: der Mensch wird Zuschauer des grossen θέαμα, ohne sich selbst in den Kreislauf des Kosmos mit einbegriffen zu fühlen, was poseidonisch wäre, und ohne sich in das Schaffen der gleichen Kräfte hineinzustellen, die den Organismus der Welt durchfluten und sich in Formung der organischen Natur wie in der Seelischen, wie in der Gestaltung der Geschichte gleichmässig auswirken. Der Mensch ist nicht Zentrum der Schöpfung sondern - was einem Römer besonders imponieren musste - Beherrscher, ja Züchtiger der Natur."<sup>4</sup>

Hence, what characterizes Senecan man in the world is the fear of the Other, which finally results in two basic attitudes of man toward the world. First, man wants to flee from the world and to be himself, as if he was not part of the world, i.e. he wants to keep a distance between himself and the world which is the Other. Second, even if he, man, is at a distance from the Other, the Other is a threat to him because he actualizes the limit of man. The world, being the Other, comes in the way between actual man and

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1. Ep. 31.3.

2. Phil. 3.3.

3. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 576.

4. Benz, op.cit., pp. 35-36.

authentic existence. As a result man has to dissolve the Other by knowing him (it), for by having known it he will become an ultimate source of his own and the Other's existence.

God and the world are identical in the full sense of the word, so that existence is unique and one, a self-sustained and self-related reality admitting no qualitative difference but only qualitative oneness.<sup>1</sup> In the form of a diagram: "der Mensch ist zwischen Tier und Gott hineingestellt":<sup>2</sup> Animal—Man—God. Existence extends itself qualitatively all over its realm, so that any difference that we might find between the two beings is a difference of degree but not of quality. We can sum up and give the following classification of the cosmic aspect of Paul's and Seneca's anthropologies:

Paul has seen man as the being whose actual life and existence are in discord with the cosmic order. Man and world are qualitatively identical in the solidarity of their creaturehood. Both, man's and the world's existence are unauthentic in the sense that they both depend on God, i.e. their reality is potential and actualizes itself through their relationship to the Other on the plane of Creator-creature. Man and world being qualitatively identical, and with an infinite qualitative distinction from God, are not meant to regard each other as the source of their existence. Man being in the world is exposed to the

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1. N.Q., i, Praef, 10.

2. F. Husner, 'Leib und Seele in der Sprache Senecas', Philologus, Supplementband xvii, Heft iii, Leipzig, 1924, p. 96.



danger of falling a prey to the deceit by which he will regard himself as the source of his own existence. Such a man is characterized by Paul as σαρκικός, and his action as ἁμαρτία. Man who has a right sort of relationship to the world, through which he asserts the world as his real sphere of operations recognizes that its source of existence is God, is πνευματικός, and his action is one of πίστις or δικαιοσύνη (cf. Rom. 4.3,9). To put it bluntly: Paul's view of man in the world cannot be separated from his view of man before God. Man's being and existence are primarily conditioned by the fact that he is God's creature. Depending on the way man accepts his creaturehood is determined his being in the world and his relationship to the world. Both world and man depend on God because God has called them to being from nothingness: καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα (Rom. 4.17). That means that the world and man do not have an authentic existence. That which is actual about their existence is that they are potential beings, since they exist only insofar as they are related to God.

If we look at Seneca's concept of man's being-in-the-world, the first thing we notice is that the dimension of qualitative difference is dissolved altogether. In discussing man and God we have seen that they are qualitatively identical, and when we look at the question of the relationship of the world to God we see again that they are qualitatively identical. As a result of that comes the identity between the three: God, man and the world. On this ground Seneca was able to speak of the macro- and

microcosmos. However, the serious question which arises from this situation is an ontological one, namely the question of being and existence. If God is an ultimate being or an authentic existence, so also is man and so is the world; because they are qualitatively identical. Now, since being or existence is one and unique it follows that there can be only one objective source of existence. It follows of necessity that someone who claims to be a source of existence, in this case man, should see the Other as a threat to his existence, and the Other is the world, God and the other man, who makes the same claim. Hence the main project of the one who sees himself primarily as the source of being is to destroy the Other. Seneca's heroic man is faced with the problem of asserting himself over against the Other, the world and God, which he does through the faculty of knowledge, which is the means for the denial of the Other. Thus he exclaims:

"cum viro tibi negotium est; quaere, quem vincas."<sup>1</sup>

Seneca's man is mainly encountering the reality around himself as a threat to his existence, and he feels compelled to assert himself over against it and to establish his identity within the limits of his own being. Thus the world and God are a threat to his existence, because the recognition of them would imply the objective "otherness" of each of them, and where the Other is there cannot be an authentic existence for man, since an authentic existence is potential infinity, and where the Other is

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1. Ep. 98.14.



encountered the limit is actualized and the idea of infinity has to be dismissed altogether.

From this point, of potential infinity, we step into a third sphere of man's search-for-identity and authentic existence, namely man in the realm of freedom.

MAN AND FREEDOM

The problem that we are faced with here is most difficult since we do not have any objective definitions of what freedom is. While it is possible to deal with the problem of God or the world in itself, and then relate it to man within the anthropological context, this appears altogether impossible when the concept of freedom is to be dealt with. And why? Because freedom is not something which exists outside of the human context, outside of the historical existence of man. Freedom is something which exists, and is encountered, only where there is man. Thus, strictly speaking, freedom is neither theological nor cosmological but primarily and may be, the only genuine anthropological problem. And that means that the problem is the problem of authentic existence and identity.

Now, since we have ruled out the view that man is to be considered primarily by looking at him as an isolated existence, the enquiry into the problem of freedom will, of necessity, bring us back to the sphere of the theological and cosmological aspects of our anthropological enquiry. Hence, although we have stated that the problem of freedom, being a problem of identity, is the only genuine anthropological problem, it is related, however, to the problem of God and the world precisely because being a man means dealing with God and with the world.

Both Paul and Seneca have a great deal to say about the freedom of man, and our task is to show whether their sources are



common and whether the concepts, whatever their sources might be, are identical or not. To start with it has been recognized that:

"Dort, wo hellenistische und jüdisch-apokalyptische Traditionen aufeinanderstiessen, konnten die griechische Freiheit und die jüdische Endhoffnung eine Verbindung eingehen.<sup>1</sup> Freiheit konnte ein apokalyptischer Begriff werden."

In relation to Paul this is even more relevant if one gives full weight to Schweitzer's and Schoeps' arguments that Paul's theology was profoundly affected by the apocalyptic movements of his time and that a non-eschatological Paul is unintelligible.<sup>2</sup> As a logical consequence of these two arguments, namely that Paul was apocalyptic-eschatologically minded, and that that was a point of contact with the Hellenistic concept of freedom, it was said that:

"...aus dem Judentum Paulus' Freiheitsidee nicht stammen kann...Wir werden ruhig annehmen dürfen, dass Paulus von dem griechischen Freiheitsgedanken Anregungen empfangen hat..."<sup>3</sup>

It was equally said that "Der Satz: 'Alles ist euer', überhaupt Paulus' Lehre von der Freiheit ist stoisch."<sup>4</sup> Liechtenhan also wrote:

"Durch dieses Stirb und Werde wird jene innere Freiheit gewonnen, für deren Schilderung Paulus freilich Farbe und Stil der stoischen Diatribe verwendet."<sup>5</sup>

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1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 82.

2. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 273.

3. Freiheit, pp. 180-181.

4. Leipoldt, op.cit., p. 147.

5. Liechtenhan, op.cit., p. 397.

On the other hand it was uncompromisingly stated that:

"the Pauline idea of freedom differs in every respect from Seneca's, and it is therefore highly unlikely that the emphasis Paul lays upon freedom has its roots in Stoic thought."<sup>1</sup>

Along the same lines it was said:

"Nun hat das Alte Testament wohl keinen Freiheits-begriff, wenigstens nicht in dem Sinn, wie man von einem hellenischen, stoischen oder gnostischen Freiheitsbegriff sprechen kann...Dabei wird sich zeigen, dass es nicht zu viel ist, wenn man behauptet, dass das Alte Testament den Freiheitsbegriff des Neuen Testament prästrukturiert."<sup>2</sup>

And whatever is said of the concept of freedom in the New Testament is to be understood as if it were said of the concept of freedom in St. Paul's thought since:

"...der Begriff der Freiheit im Neuen Testament insbesondere vom Apostel Paulus geformt wurde und daher auch in erster Linie aus der paulinische Theologie zu erheben ist. In diesem Sinne ist Freiheit wesentlich ein 'paulinischer' Begriff."<sup>3</sup>

So, if an assessment is to be made we could say that Paul was familiar with the Hellenistic concepts of freedom, has employed its mode of speech, and yet has remained biblically preconditioned, since he dealt with the problems presented to him by the Old Testament writings. Having in mind the fact that he was preaching biblical concepts to the Greeks it is quite conceivable that he has made his message sound as intelligible to his audience as possible. However, to assume that this concept of freedom is altogether an Old Testament concept or altogether hellenized would

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1. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 122.

2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 76.

3. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 69.



be too bold an assessment. Hence we shall examine it within the framework of his anthropology and compare it with Seneca's concept of freedom.

Just as it has been said of Israelites that they "like all other ancient peoples were 'outer-directed',"<sup>1</sup> so it has been said that:

"Paul cannot simply define freedom in purely formal terms as the possibility of doing what one wants, on the basis of his concept of faith and his anthropology. Nor can he define it along idealistic lines as the freedom of the subject, because he has no idea of the free subject. Man is always seen in his relationships. As Paul does not consider freedom in itself, but only the freedom of faith (and lack of freedom, as fallenness into sin and the flesh), he does not find himself confronted with either the psychological problem of the freedom of the will or the cosmological problem of determinism or indeterminism as part of a world-view."<sup>2</sup>

As we proceed it will become obvious that Paul's concept of freedom was altogether preconditioned by his whole world-view. As Paul has conceived an existing reality as a relationship between the one and the Other, the Creator and the creature, equally so he has conceived freedom as potential reality which is not an actual essence, something by and in itself, but as a potential situation, i.e. freedom is a mode of relationship between the two. To talk about freedom without implying the relatedness of two objectively distinct entities is not proper for Paul. To be or not to be free means to be related to the Other in one or the other way. Relatedness between opposites is characteristic of

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1. Boman, op.cit., p. 27.

2. Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 275.

the biblical concept of freedom. Thus old Hebrew society, being a theocratic society, employs the term freedom in expressly relationship situations, such as the ones depicting social conditions in the society.<sup>1</sup> And throughout the whole of the Old Testament we do not find a single speculative attempt to define the concept of freedom in terms which would allow us to think that freedom was considered in itself. The concept of freedom in the Old Testament is ultimately preconditioned and determined by the view of reality as a whole, and reality was conceived of in terms of relationship.

If one observes closely passages in which Paul talks of freedom one can hardly fail to see that there is corresponding analogy between Paul's and the Old Testament concept of freedom. What becomes quickly apparent is that the term "freedom" in Paul, just as in the Old Testament, depicts the condition of man in the situation of relatedness to the external world, man, God, etc.

At the beginning of the chapter we stated that freedom within the framework of anthropology is an authentic existence. And as we have argued that man's authentic existence does not come out of himself, equally so man is not the source of his own freedom. Thus it has been commented:

"Die christliche Freiheit ist nichts aus dem Menschen organisch Herauswachsendes, sondern sie ist ein Geschenk Gottes, ein Wohnen Christi im Geist in unseren Herzen, eine Befreiung von einer in uns selbst liegenden Hemmung, indem von uns genommen wird, was der stoische Weise gar nicht kannte - die Sünde."<sup>2</sup>

1. See: Ex. 21.2,5,26-27; Deut. 15.12-13,18; I Sam. 17.25; Job. 3.19; 39.5; Ps. 88.5; Is. 58.6; Jer. 34.9-14.

2. Feine, op.cit., p. 80.



Or, put in even more accurate words:

"Wie der Mensch nicht mit sich selbst identisch ist, so ist es auch die Freiheit nicht. Wie der Mensch sich selbst fremd ist, so ist auch seine Freiheit entfremdet."<sup>1</sup>

In the first chapter it was discussed in what sense man is not identical to himself. Man is not identical to himself in the sense that he is not self-sustained, actual being, but sustained-from-the-Other being, an image, i.e. man is potential being in the sense that he has existence as long as he recognizes the Other. In other words his actuality is constituted by a paradoxical acceptance of his potentiality.

"Hierin wird die Paradoxie des neutestamentlichen Freiheitsbegriffes noch einmal deutlich. Denn Freiheit ist im Neuen Testament ein Gottesprädikat. Es kommt dem Menschen nur insofern zu als er Imago Dei ist."<sup>2</sup>

Man, being an Imago Dei, is potential being because he is a reflexion of the Other who is objectively different from man. Thus, to say that man is free insofar as he is an Imago Dei, is to say that freedom is a mode of the actualization of man's potentiality. Man is free as an Imago because by being, and accepting, an Imago he is at one with himself.

Having in mind a concept of freedom which is the freedom of an image of God Paul wrote:

ὁ δὲ κύριος τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν. οὗ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα κυρίου,  
ἐλευθερία. ἡμεῖς δὲ πάντες ἀνακεκαλυμμένοι προσώπῳ  
τῆν δόξαν κυρίου κατοπτριζόμενοι τῆν αὐτὴν εἰκόνα  
μεταμορφούμεθα ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν,

1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 88.

2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 143; cf. Rom. 8.20-30; Eph. 1.4ff.

3. 2 Cor. 3.17-18.

The Pauline concept of freedom is of necessity Christocentric, because his anthropology as a whole is Christocentric. The Pneumatological aspect of Paul's Christology makes an impact on his anthropology, precisely because Paul's argument is that believers move in the realm of the Spirit. Paul's Christology and Pneumatology are identical,<sup>1</sup> and on that ground it is to be argued that Christians move in the realm of the Spirit and are free. First of all, Paul himself says that Christ is Spirit (2 Cor. 3.17). Further Paul argues that everyone who is baptized into Christ has put on Christ;<sup>2</sup> i.e. is identical with Christ. He expresses it by saying that we who are baptized in Christ:

φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου,<sup>3</sup>

Therefore an argument would be: man baptized into Christ puts on Christ, or even more, becomes identical with Christ. Christ is the Spirit, hence the existence of man who is in Christ is an existence upheld by the Spirit.

Now, the attempt must be made to clarify the concept of freedom within its anthropological context since, on the basis of the above argument, Paul states that "the Lord is that Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." (2 Cor. 3.17). The argument is complex and a highly consistent one. Paul argues:

οὐ γὰρ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας, πάλιν εἰς φόβον,  
ἀλλὰ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἱοθεσίας.<sup>4</sup>

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1. A. Wikenhauser, Pauline Mysticism, Edinburgh-London, 1960, p.88.

2. Gal. 3.27; cf. Rom. 6.3; I Cor. 12.13.

3. I Cor. 15.49.

4. Rom. 8.15.



This "Spirit of sonship" is given to man because of Christ who is regarded as "Son of God."<sup>1</sup> And the title of "Son of God" is descriptive language for the concept of Imago Dei since Christ is regarded to be, as well, a true "image of God".<sup>2</sup>

If we now look at the argument that freedom "kommt dem Menschen nur insofern zu als er Imago Dei ist," (see p. 106), then we are bound to arrive at the conclusion that the quest for freedom is a quest for the authenticity of man. We said in the first chapter that the concept of image is the concept of relatedness. If that argument is accepted then we can join Heidegger and say that in Paul's view "freedom is essentially a relationship of open resolve and not one locked up within itself."<sup>3</sup>

Thus, the ultimate conclusion would be, according to Paul, that man is free when he realizes in himself the actuality of an image (=relatedness), and in the opposite case (the case would be an absence of the state of being an image) he is in a state of slavery (cf. Gal. 4.7). As man's whole being is constituted by his potentiality, i.e. his relationship to the Other, so is his freedom. Hence it follows that man is free by and in the act of the realization of his potential being. That simply means that man's freedom consists in his relatedness to the source of his existence. As the freedom of the image is the direct reflection from the object of which it is an image, so is man's freedom

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1. Rom. 1.3, 4, 9; 5.10; 8.29, 32; I Cor. 1.9; 15.28; 2 Cor. 1.19; Gal. 1.16; 2.20; 4.4, 6; Eph. 4.13; Col. 1.13.

2. I Cor. 11.7; 2 Cor. 4.4; Col. 1.15.

3. M. Heidegger, Existence and Being, London, 1949, p. 342.

expressed in terms of positive relationship, in terms of the acceptance of the Other, and not in the negative terms of the rejection of the Other, in terms of freedom of choice. This is one of the paradoxes of freedom:

"In der Freiheit schlummert die verführerische Möglichkeit, die dämonische Versuchung, sich von Gott abzuwenden und sich selbst zuzuwenden, sich selbst hybrid zur Gottheit zu erheben. Eben das aber ist die Urstunde - und wer sündigt, ist nicht mehr frei."<sup>1</sup>

And indeed Paul himself says:

ὅτι ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη, ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ.<sup>2</sup>

Paul conclusively talks of his converts as of ones who ἦτε δοῦλοι τῆς ἁμαρτίας,<sup>3</sup> and he is categorical on this issue by arguing that ὅτε γὰρ δοῦλοι ἦτε τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ἐλεύθεροι ἦτε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ. (Rom. 6. 20).

Thus Conzelmann rightly says:

"For Paul there is no question whether we are free or not. To this extent he understands freedom radically, and not in broken terms (as in modern subjectivism).<sup>4</sup> Therefore he does not reduce it to an inner freedom..."<sup>4</sup>

...which is a Hellenistic concept and a hallmark of the Stoic concept of freedom.<sup>5</sup> As opposed to the concept of "inner freedom" Paul's view of freedom is the view of an outward relatedness,

1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 107.

2. Rom. 6.6; this concept of Paul has influenced Johannine theology clearly in the narrative of Jn. 8.34f.: πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν δοῦλός ἐστιν τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

3. Rom. 6.17.

4. Conzelmann, op.cit., p. 183.

5. Freiheit, p. 180.



i.e. man is simultaneously free from and free for the Other. Man is freed from sin in order to be free for righteousness.<sup>1</sup> Hence freedom is always that which relates man to someone or something.

Man's enslavement to sin results in the enslavement of man to a number of other situations such as: φόβος,<sup>2</sup> φθόρα,<sup>3</sup> and τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου.<sup>4</sup> These are the objective situations, which stem from man's enslavement to sin, constitute his mode of historical existence, his being-in-the-world, and finally culminate in his being subject to death. Thus Paul states that *ὁ θάνατος τῆς ἁμαρτίας* δὲ θάνατος,<sup>5</sup> and Niederwimmer interprets it:

"Ist die Freiheit Voraussetzung der Sünde - als der Abwendung des Menschen von Gott und die Zuwendung zu sich selbst, als die ergriffene Selbst-ständigkeit - so folgt daraus, dass Freiheit zugleich auch die Voraussetzung des Todes ist. Ohne Freiheit gäbe es keinen Tod."<sup>6</sup>

In this knot all the threads come together. At this point it is obvious why freedom is authentic existence, and an anthropological problem par excellence. At this point it also becomes clear why Paul's concept of freedom is the concept which of necessity implies relationship. It is so because Paul knows that "either God or Man can be unconditionally free, but not both."<sup>7</sup> Only one of them

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1. Rom. 6.18: ἐλευθερωθέντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.
  2. Rom. 8.15.
  3. Rom. 8.21.
  4. Gal. 4.3; cf. Col. 2.8, 20.
  5. Rom. 5.12; cf. *ibid.*, 6.21-23; 8.2.
  6. Niederwimmer, *op.cit.*, p. 138.
  7. Brunner, *op.cit.*, p. 431.

can be unconditionally free because "Freiheit ist potentielle Unendlichkeit,"<sup>1</sup> and to be infinite means to be the source of one's own existence, means to have an authentic existence. It is ruled out that Paul could ever have indulged in speculating on that issue in such a way as to ascribe to man a mode of freedom which would make man God. However, it is clear that Paul has grasped the very roots of the problem and has understood the situation in the way we have outlined, namely that the quest of freedom is the quest of man, and to search for ultimate freedom is to search for authentic existence. In other words "das NT lehrt: der Mensch hat von sich aus keine Freiheit (Röm. 7 - um es schematisch zu sagen), die Freiheit wird ihm aber von Gott durch Christus in Hl. Geist geschenkt (Röm. 8)."<sup>2</sup>

Insofar as freedom is to be identified with an authentic existence, with an actual identity, man is not free, for he is a creature. Being a creature means to have a source of existence outside oneself, in the Creator. And yet it is argued that:

"Die Freiheit sprengt fast die Geschöpflichkeit und doch wird sie von der Geschöpflichkeit umgriffen und umgrenzt. Die menschliche Freiheit ist demnach endliche Freiheit."<sup>3</sup>

Paul himself writes: τῆ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸς ἠλευθέρωσεν.<sup>4</sup>

as if he has envisaged the concept of freedom in itself. However, we have argued that the concept of freedom in St. Paul's thought

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1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 105.

2. Ibid., p. 87.

3. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 105.

4. Gal. 5.1.



is a concept of relatedness, for man's freedom, just as man's being and existence, is not constituted by his "inness", but by his "outness", i.e. just as man is basically a relationship so is his freedom.

Now, this argument begs a question. What is it that Christ has freed us from and freed us for? According to Paul, what Christ has freed us from is θάνατος, and what he has freed us for is ζωή. Thus he writes:

εἰδότες ὅτι Χριστὸς ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει,  
θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει. ὁ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν,  
τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς. ὁ δὲ ζῆ, ζῆ τῷ θεῷ.<sup>1</sup>

We have become free from death only insofar as we have been liberated from the illusion that our roots and source of existence lie in ourselves - the sin of Adam - that we stem from ourselves and live to ourselves as an authentic and final goal. We are free relatively by having been re-related to our genuine source. Consequently, the ultimate freedom of man is his capacity to recognize the Other and to relate to him as to his source of existence. This is clear from Paul's words: ὁ δε ζῆ, ζῆ τῷ θεῷ.<sup>2</sup>

The idea of Christ liberating man from death is expressed

1. Rom. 6.9-10.

2. Insofar as self-sufficiency is a false view of freedom see Paul's argument in Rom. 14. 7-9: οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἑμῶν ἑαυτῷ ζῆ, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἑαυτῷ ἀποθνήσκει. ἐάν τε γὰρ ζῶμεν, τῷ κυρίῳ ζῶμεν, ἐάν τε ἀποθνήσκωμεν, τῷ κυρίῳ ἀποθνήσκομεν. ἐάν τε οὖν ζῶμεν ἐάν τε ἀποθνήσκωμεν, τοῦ κυρίου ἐσμέν.  
See further: Gal. 2.20; 1 Thess. 5.10; cf. Lk. 20.38-39.

in the most direct way in Rom. 8.2:

ὁ γὰρ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠλευθέρωσέν σε ἀπο τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου.

and the same idea is carried on in I Cor. 15.26, 55.

Hence the freedom of man is actually objective freedom. Man is free from death because he has become identical to his authentic being, i.e. he has realized his actuality. In other words he has accepted his potentiality, i.e. his creaturehood. Man was not free, man was a slave of death and sin, because he had misconceived his being and freedom. Just as he wanted to be a self-sustaining being so he conceived his freedom to be coming from within himself and relating him to his inner self. Lack of freedom is constituted by his inability to be a source of himself and to determine his own existence. This slavery is characterized by the centripetal outlook of man in which he regards himself as an introspective reality, self-centred and actualized within the limits of his empirical existence. Biblically speaking this is an existence known as sinful existence where the Imago Dei is eclipsed. In terms of freedom it is a state of slavery. As opposed to this is a new status and mode of existence which is granted to man through Christ. It is the status of sonship.<sup>1</sup> Christ is the Son and so is every man who is in Christ. And being an "image of God" (see p. 108) is the authentic being of man, i.e. is an actualization of his real being and his real freedom.

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1. Rom. 8.14, 19; 9.26; Gal. 3.26; 4.6.



By realizing that his roots and ground of being are outside of himself man has freed himself from the beguilement that he lives from and for himself. He realizes that he is from and for the Other.

Lastly, man's ultimate freedom is the freedom of a creature which accepts itself on the terms of its being related to its Creator. Thus Paul wrote to Galatians:

ὁμεῖς γὰρ ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ ἐκλήθητε, ἀδελφοί (5. 13).

Paul is referring here to those who are being saved in Christ, i.e. those who are called to salvation are identical with those who are called to freedom. And those who are called to salvation are saved by the restoration of the original state of man, the restoration of an image and likeness, i.e. the re-establishment of the true relationship on the plane of Creator-creature. Hence to be called to freedom is to be called to authentic existence.

Accepting the argument that the concept of δόξα in St. Paul is a concept for an authentic existence (see p. 57) one can easily see that the concept of freedom too is inseparably bound up with the concept of an authentic existence. In Rom. 8.21 Paul writes:

διότι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ κτίσις ἐλευθερωθήσεται ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας τῆς φθορᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς δόξης τῶν τέκνων τοῦ θεοῦ.

Here Paul has expressed the cosmic dimension of the historical existence of man and the impact of man's centripetal movement. An authentic existence is an authentic freedom, not only the authentic

freedom of man but of the whole of the universe, and this freedom is expressed in terms of relationship, sometimes in metaphorical language, where God the Creator, is addressed as father, and the world and man, the creature, are referred to as children. Their freedom consists in the glory which is realized by their glorifying God, i.e. by their understanding and accepting their status of an inauthentic existence. While in a historic state of existence (= corruption existence) they were subject to corruption by the act of deceiving themselves that they were independent. Man who has misunderstood himself, in the sense that he has regarded himself as being the source of his own existence, has imposed the state of corruption on the world, because he has understood himself as a centre of the world and the source of its existence. By the re-establishment of man's true, original state the whole of creation is freed from the deceit of self-sufficiency and thus from the subjection to corruption and is brought back into "the freedom and glory", i.e. has again assumed the status of an image.

In conclusion, it seems that Paul has viewed freedom as an objective reality. In his view freedom is not something coming from within, nor is it something which is added to the basic needs of human existence. Strictly speaking freedom belongs to the sphere of human reality and is to be spoken of only in terms of man. Further, the concept of freedom in St. Paul is, strictly speaking, a concept of relationship. There is not such a thing as man's freedom from and for himself. Man is free from something



objectively different from himself, and is free for something and someone, objectively different from himself. Insofar as absolute freedom (= an authentic existence) is concerned, in short: man does not have it:

ὁμοίως ὁ ἐλεύθερος κληθεὶς δοῦλος ἐστὶν Χριστοῦ (1 Cor. 7. 22).

Man's freedom is constituted by his being able to accept himself on the terms of what he really is (= a potential reality) which frees him from the deceit that he is an actual being equal to himself as an isolated unit. Man by nature is an ec-static being outwardly related, and so is freedom, because freedom is a peculiarly human phenomenon. There is no freedom apart from human reality, and if man is to be viewed as an ec-static being, and Paul views man that way, then there is no alternative to this understanding of freedom. To put it in an exaggerated way, man is equal to his freedom, i.e. freedom is a reality which could be classified as "between the two".<sup>1</sup> This "being between the two" means that man has no actual essence, but essentially is potential. In order to be man man has to open up towards the Other, to actualize this "between the two". Man's movement has to be centrifugal in order to cohere with his ec-static nature. To be free is to understand myself in terms of what I am, a relationship.

If we now turn to Seneca's concept of freedom the first thing to be said is that in Seneca as in Paul freedom and authentic existence are entirely identical concepts. The difference between

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1. This argument is valid insofar as one is ready to accept Conzelmann's definition of man: "I am my relationship to God" (op.cit., p. 193).

Paul and Seneca at this point lie in their diametrically opposed understanding of the actualization of this concept. While Paul, on the one hand, understands freedom and authentic existence as something that essentially comes to man from without and relates him to the Other as a reality objectively different from himself, Seneca, on the other hand, has understood freedom (= an authentic existence) as something which is within the power of man. Freedom is understood, by Seneca, to be within man's capacity in the sense that it is identical with man himself. Thus Pohlenz rightly states that "Die Freiheit ist mit der Menschennatur wesentlich verbunden",<sup>1</sup> or as it was said:

"Freiheit folgt aus dem Mensch-Sein, Unfreiheit ist Folge des Welt-Seins. Ist der Mensch Mensch in der Welt, dann ist er beides; er ist frei, sofern er Mensch ist, er ist unfrei, sofern er in der Welt ist, weil er damit ja dem Gesetz der Welt untersteht."<sup>2</sup>

This understanding of man and reality in the Greek world was possible because of its humanitarian tradition and anthropocentric understanding of reality, for which reason it was said:

"Grundzug des hellenischen Wesens ist der Drang nach Freiheit und Selbstständigkeit, und darin ist es begründet, dass die griechische Ethik die Sittlichkeit ausschliesslich aus der Physis des Menschen, aus seinem eigenen Können und Streben entwickelt und grundsätzlich von jeder höheren Macht absieht, die ihm sein Tun von aussen vorschreibt. Die Weltordnung, mit der die menschliche Natur gesetzt ist, ist selbst göttlich,..."<sup>3</sup>

In Seneca, freedom is authentic existence in the sense that man is

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1. Freiheit, p. 181.

2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 38.

3. Stoa, i, p. 135; cf. Freiheit, p. 18: "Grundzug ihres (hellenischen) Wesens aber ist der Freiheitsdrang."



fully independent, i.e. "my freedom is a choice of being God",<sup>1</sup>  
as Seneca writes:

"Itaque in tabulas vanum coicitur nomen libertatis, quam  
nec qui emerunt, habent nec qui vendiderunt. Tibi des  
oportet istud bonum, a te petas."<sup>2</sup>

By giving one's own freedom to oneself, man ultimately identifies himself with God, or even more emphatically, to underline the anthropocentric aspect of Seneca's philosophy one could say that man "makes himself man in order to be God."<sup>3</sup> If to be man means to be free (Pohlenz) then equally to be free is to be man, and to be ultimately free is to be God himself. In this light is to be seen Seneca's argument:

"In regno nati sumus; deo parere libertas est."<sup>4</sup>

Here there is to be borne in mind that "deus" is the *δαίμων*, which is within and is ultimately identical with man. If we list only a few examples of Seneca's attempts to define freedom, we shall immediately notice that what is most characteristic is man's fear of the Other.

Seneca writes:

"Quae sit libertas, quaeris? Nulli rei servire, nulli  
necessitati, nullis casibus, fortunam in aequum deducere."<sup>5</sup>

And in another letter he writes:

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1. BN, p. 599.
  2. Ep. 80.5.
  3. BN, p. 626.
  4. De Vita Beata, 15.7.
  5. Ep. 51.9.

"Liber est autem non in quem parum licet fortunae, sed in quem nihil. Ita est: nihil desideres, oportet, si vis Iovem provocare nihil desiderantem."<sup>1</sup>

The clearest definition of freedom that Seneca has given reads:

"Expectant nos, si ex hac aliquando faece in illud evadimus sublime et excelsum, tranquillitas animi et expulsis erroribus absoluta libertas. Quaeris quae sit ista? Non homines timere, non deos; nec turpia velle nec nimia; in se ipsum habere maximam potestatem. Inaestimabile bonum est suum fieri."<sup>2</sup>

There is no doubt that freedom here is identical with authentic existence. "Not fearing either men or gods," is simply another way of saying "possessing supreme power over oneself." Seneca has conceived freedom as man's capacity to exist on his own, to be centred in his own self in such a way that he can dispense with the Other and reject him. The presence of the Other constitutes lack of freedom for man, and thus an unauthentic existence. Thus man has to prove to be able to do without the Other:

"Je schwächer das Band der Abhängigkeit ist, das den Menschen mit Gott verknüpft, je selbstbewusster er im Bewusstsein seiner sittlichen Freiheit und Autonomie Gott gegenübersteht, je mehr man sich des Verhältniss des Menschen zu Gott nur nach den das äussere Wohl bedingenden göttlichen Eigenschaften zu denken gewohnt ist, um so mehr wird einer Lehre, wie die stoische ist, der tieferen, im Innern des Menschen in dem Bewusstsein der Sünde liegende Berührungspunkt mit dem Christentum fehlen."<sup>3</sup>

Thus a disregard for the Other is an external sign of freedom and an authentic existence:

"Non est autem libertas nihil pati, fallimur; libertas est animum superponere iniuriis et eum facere se, ex quo solo sibi gaudenda veniant, exteriora diducere a se, ne inquieta agenda sit vita omnium risus, omnium linguas timenti."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ep. 110.20.

2. Ep. 75.18.

3. Baur, op.cit., p. 190.

4. De Const. Sap. 19.2.



This concept relates to the thought of inner freedom:

"'Servus est.' Sed fortasse liber animo."<sup>1</sup>

so it is correct to say: "Der Stoiker erkennt, dass die Freiheit in der Einheit des Selbst mit Gott liegt."<sup>2</sup>

This ultimate freedom in which the divinity of man is actualized is expressed in Seneca through the concept of virtue. Thus Seneca writes: "Prima ars homini est ipsa virtus,"<sup>3</sup> and the interpreter adds:

"Darum ist die Tugend die rechte Vernunft (recta ratio), d.h. wer tugendhaft ist, hat diese göttliche ratio in sich und ist dadurch sich selbst θεός."<sup>4</sup>

Ultimately, the drive for freedom and for virtue, in Seneca's philosophy are identical. At the last resort they are both the drive for an ultimate freedom which is authentic existence. It is highly significant that Seneca regarded suicide as a means for attaining ultimate freedom,<sup>5</sup> for, paradoxically enough, "suicide, in fact, is a choice and affirmation - of being,"<sup>6</sup> and Niederwimmer is right when he writes:

"Der Selbst-mord des Stoikers ist gerade nicht Selbst-mord, sondern eigentlich Welt-mord. Im Suicid versucht er sein

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1. Ep. 47.17.

2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 51.

3. Ep. 92.10.

4. Schreiner, op.cit., p. 67; cf. Epp. 66.12; 76.17, 22.

5. Epp. 12.10; 26.10; 51.9; 70.12, 14-16; 77. 14-15; De Prov. 6.6-7; De Ira, iii, 15.3-4; Ad Marc. 1.2; 20.3; 22.7; cf. J.M. Rist, Stoic Philosophy, Cambridge, 1969, pp. 233, 247.

6. BN, p. 479.

Selbst endgültig von der ihm nicht verfügbaren Welt, dem Nicht-selbst zu erlösen..."<sup>1</sup>

And indeed, by its very presence and external reality, the world constitutes a danger and threat to man, for it is the objective limit to man's freedom. An impetus and a desire to actualize his authentic existence make man assert himself over against the Other. He does it by suicide for through the act of killing himself he has absorbed and dissolved the Other. Through suicide man has achieved an ultimate oneness, has become identical with himself in an actual sense, he is "König in seiner Innerlichkeit und so König der Welt."<sup>2</sup> Because of that the only one who is really free in Seneca's philosophy, is the wise man who is self-sufficient and virtuous, who is capable of scorning all external things,<sup>3</sup> and is fortified against external forces.<sup>4</sup> To scorn external things, i.e. to be ultimately free (= to have an authentic existence) means to regard oneself as the beginning and the end of the whole of existence, and that only a wise man can do, for:

"Freedom can be called its (virtue's) visible or outward aspect: for wisdom, which implies all virtues, liberates man from outward things. Epictetus therefore, calls the non-philosophical man *σοφλος* and says that Antisthenes 'liberated' him, viz. by teaching him not to desire outward things which are not in our power..."<sup>5</sup>

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1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., pp. 51-52.
  2. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 3.
  3. De Const. Sap. 19.2.
  4. Epp. 9.3-5, 8, 12-19; 59.8, 14; 71.26; 73.14; 74.30; 76.35; 85.37-41; 111. 2,4; 120. 12-13, 18; De Const. Sap. 2.1; 5.4-7; 6.1-8; 8.3; 9.1; 15.3; De Tranq. An. 13.3.
  5. De Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 139.



Insofar as virtue is authentic existence freedom is not only her visible aspect but is entirely identical with her. For that reason Seneca has considered very few, or no one, to be free:

"Tam prope libertas est; et servit aliquis?...Infelix, servis hominibus, servis rebus, servis vitae. Nam vita, si moriendi virtus abest, servitus est."<sup>1</sup>

Here also one can see that to be free, or to serve no one, is actually the way of expressing the concept of authentic, independent existence. Life itself constitutes the lack of freedom, because it is an existence conditioned and not authentic. From this conviction arises Seneca's scorn for life and an interpretation of suicide as being an ultimate freedom, as being an act of destruction of the Other.

In accordance with his humanistic beliefs (see p. 93 ) Seneca could not accept man on terms of human empirical existence. For that reason he argued:

"Liber est autem qui servitutem suam effugit;...Sibi se<sup>v</sup>ire gravissima est servitus."<sup>2</sup>

To serve oneself means to accept oneself on terms of conditioned existence, means to recognize the potentiality of man and his essential lack of being. Such belief is inadmissible, and would be contrary to the whole of Seneca's anthropology. That would mean abandoning the basic creed of human existence, to strive for the superhuman (see p.118f.). Freedom, according to Seneca, is

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1. Ep. 77.15.

2. N.Q., iii, Praef., pp. 16-17.

experienced in an empirical life by man's choice, and right, to reject the Other, and by his right to assert himself over against the Other, by transcending the limits of man's conditioned existence. For that reason it has been well said that:

"Das Leben ist Wagnis, ein unerbittlicher Kampf, dessen Preis der Mensch selbst ist, ein Kampf, in dem er über sich hinauswachsen muss."<sup>1</sup>

Man has to transcend himself in such a way that his introspective nature is actualized by a centripetal movement. That means that an ultimate freedom (= authentic existence) is realized from, by, and within man himself. That is why the human mind has been characterized as one "ex quo solo sibi gaudenda veniant," (see p. 119), and yet this mind has to be free. As to the freedom of mind Seneca says:

"Vacat enim animus molestia liber ad inspectum universi, nihilque illum avocatur a contemplatione naturae."<sup>2</sup>

These two, the universe and nature, are identical since Seneca regards both of these concepts as being divine. As such they stand over against man as objectively different, and by the very otherness of their being they constitute a danger to man's existence. Thus man has a need to absorb and to destroy them through the act of contemplation. By contemplating nature and the universe man comes to know them, becoming thus an ultimate source of their being and existence. By becoming, or by

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1. A. Paul, Untersuchungen zur Eigenart von Seneca's Phoenissen, Bonn, 1953, p. 83.

2. Ep. 92.6.



having become, the source of their existence man has removed the Other who was an objective threat to his existence. In other words by being free one is an ultimate one, a source and the end of the whole of existence and reality. Because of the knowledge, which enables man to dispose of things and of his own existence, Seneca has regarded the philosopher to be a true man. Thus he quotes Epicurus:

"Philosophiae servias oportet, ut tibi contingat vera libertas."<sup>1</sup>

And then he adds:

"Sapientia perfectum bonum est mentis humanae. Philosophia sapientiae amor est et adfectatio."<sup>2</sup>

Finally Seneca concludes:

"Sapientiam quidam ita finierunt, ut dicerent divinorum et humanorum scientiam."<sup>3</sup>

Hence, the argument would run: I am a slave to philosophy and by that very fact I am free since philosophy is the only way to achieve wisdom and wisdom is knowledge of "things human and things divine." Clearly, freedom is an ultimate knowledge of the Other, which makes man free by having become the source of the existence of the Other. Hence to be free is to be authentic. Lack of freedom, on the other hand, is nothing else but the lack of being, insofar as we are prepared to take an ultimate freedom as an authentic existence!, and so:

"...der eigentliche Zwiespalt, in dem der Mensch lebt und aus dem das Problem der Freiheit bzw. die Unfreiheit resultiert, ist nicht der Zwiespalt zwischen der

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1. Ep. 8.7; cf. Epp. 37.2-4; 88.2; 104.16.

2. Ep. 89.4.

3. Ep. 89.5; cf. Epp. 90.3; 88.33.

Innerlichkeit und allem 'Aeusseren', z.B. dem Leib, durch den der Mensch auch Welt ist; der eigentliche Zwiespalt liegt in Ich selber, er zerspaltet auch die Innerlichkeit des Menschen. Auch in der Innerlichkeit ist der Mensch nicht mit sich selbst eins - und also frei -; deshalb ist der blosser Rückzug auf die Innerlichkeit, auf den ἔσω ἄνθρωπος keine Rettung."<sup>1</sup>

This lack of being, revealed as lack of freedom, is realized through the presence of the Other who makes man to be dependent on him. For that reason "for Seneca freedom is closely linked with the spiritual independence of the autonomous human being,"<sup>2</sup> in the sense that man is his own source of existence. "Der Glaube an die Freiheit und die eigene Kraft des Menschen zur Erfüllung seiner sittlichen Aufgabe,"<sup>3</sup> is the basis of Seneca's anthropological optimism. The belief that man can determine his own life fully and authentically stems from his conviction that man disposes of himself in the sense that within the category of his existence man does not face anything qualitatively distinct which would limit him as the Other:

"Nemo inprobe eo conatur ascendere, unde descenderat. Quid est autem cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere, qui dei pars est? Totum hoc, quo continemur, et unum est et deus; et socii sumus eius et membra."<sup>4</sup>

The whole Greek world was under the impression that:

"Der Mensch vermag seinem Wesen getreu zu bleiben auch angesichts des Todes. Er kann sein bestes Teil, sein Ich, auch in physischen Untergänge<sub>5</sub> wahren. Das ist seine Freiheit und seine Grösse."<sup>5</sup>

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1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., pp. 52-53.

2. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 117.

3. Freiheit, p. 178.

4. Ep. 92.30.

5. Freiheit, p. 60.



And this greatness Seneca attributes to a Sage:

"Est aliquid, quo sapiens antecedit deum: ille naturae beneficio non timet, suo sapiens. Ecce res magna, habere inbecilitatem hominis, securitatem dei."<sup>1</sup>

Thus man's freedom consists of the actualization of what has been classified as an "endeavour to become God." Hence, freedom is not just a choice, but a choice to be. It is taken away from the sphere of ethics and is placed in the domain of ontology.

It deals with the problem of being rather than with well-being:

"Die Einheit von Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit constituiert den Begriff des höchsten Gutes. Dass Seneca diesem Begriff des höchsten in Gott erfasst hat, ergibt sich am deutlichsten daraus, dass er dem Menschen dieses höchste Gut als Ziel gesetzt hat."<sup>2</sup>

Precisely on account of his anthropocentric humanism Seneca was hailed as a consistent and an orthodox Stoic, for he believed that a wise man is "equal with God in moral purity and freedom."<sup>3</sup> This "equality" between man and God is man's real freedom. It is the state in which man is self-sufficient, and in a position to reject the Other. Freedom means the isolation of a solitary heroic individual who has made himself a God. On this pretext it was rightly said that:

"Geschichte des stoischen Freiheitsideal ist ein tragisches Kapitel der Menschheitsgeschichte. Das Leben rächte sich für diese Vergewaltigung unerbittlich. Der Weg zum Ideal des Weisen endete in der Resignation oder in der Verzweiflung oder....in der Vereinsamung."<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ep. 53.11-12.

2. Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 55; cf. Ep. 120.10.ff; De Ben. vi, 21.2.

3. Dill, op.cit., pp. 308-09; cf. Epp. 53.11; 59.16; 72.8.

4. Greeven, op.cit., p. 59.

This concept of freedom of Seneca is inseparably bound up with his teaching on self-observation and self-command, which stems from the philosophy of "know thyself" (see pp. 46ff.). Freedom, being authentic existence, is identical with self-possession, for one who possesses himself disposes of himself, not in a relative but in an absolute way, i.e. he can give an existence to himself and take it away. There is no greater freedom than that. The man who is free to that extent has actualized his existence, and transcended the limits of potential existence imposed on him by his ec-static nature and expressed in the mode of a centrifugal movement.

Hence, we can claim that Seneca's concept of freedom is unilateral and anthropocentric. It is identical with the authentic existence in which man fully disposes of himself:

"potentissimum esse qui se habet in potestate."<sup>1</sup>

"imperare sibi maximum imperium est."<sup>2</sup>

"quem magis admiraberis, quam qui imperat sibi, quam qui se habet in potestate."<sup>3</sup>

"quid praecipuum in rebus humanis est?...animo omne vidisse et, qua maior nulla victoria est, vitia domuisse. Innumerabiles sunt qui populos,<sup>4</sup> qui urbes habuerunt in potestate; paucissimi qui se."<sup>4</sup>

Passages like these are frequent in Seneca and are correctly related to the concept of freedom by Niederwimmer:

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1. Ep. 90.34.

2. Ep. 113.31.

3. De Ben., v, 7.5.

4. N.Q., iii, Praef., 10.



"Freisein heisst, sich selbst bestimmen können, über sich selbst verfügen können, sein eigener Herr sein; Freiheit ist die Macht über sich selbst, die Selbstmächtigkeit... Auch hinter der stoischen Freiheitsidee steht der Wille zur Macht."<sup>1</sup>

For this reason Seneca thinks it important that one should be entirely an authority over oneself, that one should impose a command on oneself, for by having done so man fully disposes of himself and in that state is God. The "Freiheitsdrang" being sustained by will to power has for its aim an authentic existence because "every will wants to actualize, and to have actuality as its element,"<sup>2</sup> and we have already clarified the position of actuality and potentiality in the context of Paul's and Seneca's anthropology. Thus, for example, emphasis has been put on the Pauline (and biblical) future-orientated knowledge of God (see p. 30, n. 3), whereas Seneca is totally orientated to the present:

"Sapientis quoque viri sententiam negatis posse mutari; quanto magis dei, cum sapiens quid sit optimum in praesentia sciat, illius divinitati omne praesens sit."<sup>3</sup>

"Hic (sapiens) praesentibus gaudet, ex futuro non pendet."<sup>4</sup>

Thus an interpreter has rightly remarked:

"The present can be grasped (v. D.L. vii, 141), it gives the best chance of being verified (cf. S.E. Adv. Math. viii, 247), and so it is the beginning of the systematization of structuring the knowledge. The Stoic, consequently, emphasizes the importance of the present tense of the verb, because it is this which conveys most truly the nature of reality. 'Only the present is real' ( ὑπάρχειν ), he says, ... (SVF, ii, 509)."<sup>5</sup>

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1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 3.
  2. Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, p. 80.
  3. N.Q., ii, 36.1.
  4. De Ben., vii, 2.4.
  5. Watson, op.cit., p. 40.

Indeed it can be said that while Paul's thought as a whole is potentiality-minded so is Seneca's actuality-minded with a profound emphasis.

It was argued that "the essence of man is his freedom",<sup>1</sup> and this essence or "human reality is the desire of being-in-itself",<sup>2</sup> so that the lack of freedom is the lack of being itself and an actualization of freedom is realization of being, is being-in-itself. Man, therefore, can be free only by achieving authentic existence, by becoming the source and aim of his own being. As long as he has not achieved this he is faced with the problem of the Other, which appears as the limit of his freedom. The ultimate, unlimited freedom is the same as ultimate, unlimited being. To be able to determine myself as free being means to dispose of myself unconditionally and to be the source of my own existence irrevocably.

Finally, it is clear that, just as in Paul, so in Seneca's thought, the concept of freedom and authentic existence are identical. Man is ultimately free when he ultimately disposes of himself. This is the point on which both Paul and Seneca have ultimately agreed.

Where they did not agree is that Paul, having seen man as a potential being, an ec-static unit, whose being is sustained-from-outside, or rather whose being is constituted by the reality of being-related-to-the-Other, has seen freedom as man's way of being.

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1. Niebuhr, op.cit., i, p. 18.

2. BN, pp. 565-66.



The only free man, for Paul, is the one who accepts himself as a potential reality, sustained by the centrifugal movement of his ec-static nature.

Seneca, on the other hand, has seen man as a self-contained reality actualized within the reality of his empirical being. As such man was identical with himself and his freedom was identical with himself. To be free means "to fear neither gods nor men", i.e. to dispose of oneself in such a way and degree as to be the unconditional source of one's existence. By the fact that man is faced by the Other he is being forced out of his actuality into a sphere of potentiality, and for that reason he finds an ultimate freedom in suicide. By suicide he is killing not himself but the Other who is his limit and thus his hell.

Hence, for Seneca, as opposed to Paul, the free man is not one who accepts himself on terms of his potentiality, but precisely the opposite, the free man is the one who actualizes himself. Being actual is being free, and being free is being ultimate. By having actualized himself man has come to the point where the whole of existence finds its source in, and springs from within, himself. Just as man's identity in Paul is identical with man's relatedness to the Other so is his freedom identical with it, and in Seneca, just as man is identical with his own self, being different from the Other, so is his freedom identical with his independence from the Other.

MAN AND ESCHATOLOGY

If the search-for-identity and the problem of authenticity constitute the core of an anthropological enquiry, then it is fair to insist that the eschatological aspect necessarily comes into it. Far more so since the question of identity and authenticity is a question of man's limitation, and man's limitation is death (Bultmann). To say the least an eschatological quest is an anthropological quest.

However, the eschatological perspective as presented in the New Testament and in Stoic philosophy goes beyond the sphere of the human in the sense that it is not only man who is eschatologically affected but the whole of creation or the universe.

Our task is to narrow down the eschatological enquiry and focus it on an anthropological level, but of course it can be done only within the framework of eschatology as a whole. Or, perhaps, it would not be an exaggeration to say that anything in Paul's and Seneca's writings about God, the world and man, and which can be included within the domain of eschatology, is speaking of, and is related to, man. At any rate it was said of Paul:

"Anthropology must then eo ipso be cosmology just as certainly as, conversely, the cosmos is primarily viewed by Paul under an anthropological aspect, because the fate of the world is in fact decided in the human sphere."<sup>1</sup>

Before we proceed with an exposition of the eschatological aspects of the anthropology of Paul and Seneca let us point out that it was argued that:

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1. Käsemann, op.cit., p. 23.



"Der stoische Glaube an die Unsterblichkeit, der allerdings sehr pantheistisch gefärbt ist, hat Paulus mindestens wankend gemacht, so dass er die jüdische Vorstellung der Auferstehung nicht mehr rein durchführt."<sup>1</sup>

This argument sums up in itself two points, a) an anthropocentric aspect of eschatology, and b) an affinity between Paul's and Stoic eschatology. With the second we disagree, but we shall not deal with it here. It was also said:

"On the philosophical side the Paulist view of immortality is closely akin to the Stoic, and<sup>2</sup> is exposed to the same charge of logical inconsistency."<sup>2</sup>

The most categorical argument for an affinity between Christian and Stoic eschatology, and thus possibly between Paul's and Seneca's eschatologies as well, came from Winckler who writes:

"Thatsächlich sind die vorzüglichsten Lehren der Stoiker ins Christenthum über - und aufgegangen, und bereits im N.T. nachzuweisen: Die Lehre vom Logos. Das ethische Ideal und die Paradoxa. Humanität und Kosmopolitanismus. Die Empfehlung der Askese. Die<sub>3</sub>Lehre von Unsterblichkeit der Seele. Die Eschatologie."<sup>3</sup>

Winckler further argues that:

"Die stoische Unsterblichkeitslehre ist im Christenthum nicht einmal mit alttestamentlichen Zusätzen versehen worden, aus dem einfachen Grunde, weil<sub>4</sub> das Judenthum Nichts dergleichen aufzuweisen hatte."<sup>4</sup>

And finally, insofar as eschatology on a cosmic plane is concerned,

Winckler writes:

"Stoicismus und Christenthum differieren in dieser Lehre von der Wiedergeburt der Welt insofern, als der Christ

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1. P. Barth, Die Stoa, Stuttgart, 1903, p. 181.

2. Arnold, op.cit., p. 421.

3. A. Winckler, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Stoicismus, Leipzig, 1878, p. 3.

4. Ibid., p. 52.

nur eine einzige Welt-Verbrennung und Neugeburt annimmt der Stoiker, hingegen eine ewige Wiederholung dieser Processes."<sup>1</sup>

Even though Winckler did not state what he actually understood under the concept of eschatology he argued for the similarity between the Christian and Stoic teachings about the last things. As for Paul's eschatology itself it was said that:

"Es ist nicht schwer zur stoischen Eschatologie die paulinischen Parallelen zu finden."<sup>2</sup>

The argument that it is not difficult to find the parallels between Pauline and Stoic eschatology is summed up by Smiley thus:

"Not all Stoics believed in the immortality of the soul, but there are at least a dozen passages in Seneca that indicate that he believed in a survival of the spirit... It is perhaps unnecessary to quote the many passages in the New Testament that refer to the immortality of the soul."<sup>3</sup>

This is the most common mistake to be found in the every day understanding of biblical eschatology, namely reading the New Testament from the Hellenistic standpoint. Later in the chapter we shall refer to Seneca's concept of immortality of the soul, but as far as Paul is concerned it is an utter misreading of his writings when one sees in them a Hellenistic concept of the immortal soul. It has categorically been argued that:

"Paul was too good a Jew and too poor a Hellenist to describe the soul as being delivered from the clothing of the body so that it might ascend to heaven naked. The Jews had an intense dislike of nakedness, which made it seem improper for a man even to pray in private until he had clothed

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1. Ibid., pp. 56-57.

2. Liechtenhan, op.cit., p. 387; cf. Hellenism, p. 21.

3. C.N. Smiley, 'Stoicism and its Influence on Roman Life and Thought', The Classical Journal, Chicago, 1933/34; vol. xxix; p. 653.



himself. Consequently he adopted the conception that the soul did not simply lay aside the body, but put on a new glorious body, the eternal habitation prepared for the soul in its true home in heaven."<sup>1</sup>

The immortal soul is the consequence of the teaching of an inner self of man, which is divine by origin, and as such cannot be found in Paul for:

"Die Lehre der naturhaft unsterblichen Seele ist nicht paulinisch. In seiner Weltanschauung hat sie keinen Platz. Sie ist griechisch und bedeutet, was z.B. Epiktet formulierte mit dem Spruch, dass es im Menschen ein  $\mu\acute{o}\rho\iota\omicron\nu$  τοῦ θεοῦ, ein Partikelchen der Gottheit, geben sollte."<sup>2</sup>

Such a view is non-Pauline because it leads precisely to what we have classified as a centripetal movement asserting man as an in-himself-centred-being, whereas we have argued throughout that Paul's view of man is such that it presents man as an ec-static being, outwardly orientated and centrifugally related to the rest of the world.

Thus along the same lines Schweitzer writes:<sup>3</sup>

"Eternal Blessedness is thought of by Paul not as purely spiritual existence, but as an existence in the condition incident on the bodily resurrection."

And this is the centre of the whole of St. Paul's message, as he himself states it.<sup>4</sup> The resurrection is the centre of Paul's kerygma and of his message. The concept of resurrection makes Pauline anthropology to be exclusively New Testamental and, to push it to its extreme, Pauline. On account of resurrection it

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1. Knox, op.cit., p. 137.

2. de Zwaan, op.cit., p. 576.

3. Mysticism, p. 68.

4. I Cor. 15.14; see pp. 6ff. of this thesis.

has been said that:

"The conception of a bodily resurrection," is the point on which, "Paul parts company with both Judaism and Hellenism."<sup>1</sup>

This is a counter-argument to P. Barth's claim (see p. 132), and we take it as a fairly correct description of the eschatological aspect of Pauline anthropology. Thus Paul, advocating fiercely the resurrection of the body, writes:

σπείρεται σῶμα ψυχικόν, ἐγείρεται σῶμα πνευματικόν.<sup>2</sup>

The reason that Paul insisted on the resurrection of the body is twofold. First it is a sign of an ultimate triumph of Christ over death,<sup>3</sup> and secondly man in his humanity is constituted by his corporeality (see pp. 53ff. of this thesis), so that an interpreter rightly writes:

"our corporeality is the relationship to the world and the creatureliness of our existence to which the appointed cosmocrator must lay claim, if he is to establish the basileia in the universe,"<sup>4</sup>

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1. Stacey, op.cit., p. 188. However Schweitzer in Mysticism, p. 274, argues curiously that: "The beginning of the Hellenization of Christianity consists in the adoption of a Hellenistic conception of resurrection in place of Late-Jewish. It was a conception which ran counter to Paul's saying that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God. Hellenistic thought could not so conceive of the resurrection required by the Christian hope as to suppose the soul, thought of as corporeal, to become naked in death and to assume at the resurrection a heavenly corporeity." This argument seems to oppose Stacey's claim.
  2. I Cor. 15.44.
  3. I Cor. 15.55.
  4. Käsemann, op.cit., p. 22.



On the ground of St. Paul's uncompromising insistence on the resurrection of the body, and with an understanding of corporeality<sup>such</sup>/as we have outlined, Käsemann further argues:

"Man cannot be defined from within his own limits, but he is eschatologically defined in the light of the name of Christ, just as Adam once received his name from God, thereby acquiring a definition as creature."<sup>1</sup>

And indeed, as it is argued by many (especially Schweitzer), this interpretation fits entirely within the argument that Paul was apocalyptic-eschatologically minded. So Schoeps writes:

"The non-eschatological Paul is simply<sup>2</sup> unintelligible; he could not possibly find a following."<sup>2</sup>

Simultaneously, as attempts were made to interpret Paul either entirely in Hellenistic or in Judaistic terms, it was said that we can "assume that Pauline eschatology was rooted in Judaism,"<sup>3</sup> apparently running counter to Stacey's argument (see p. 135). Schoeps also has admitted that "the theology of the apostle Paul arose from overwhelmingly Jewish religious ideas",<sup>4</sup> saying that Paul has "viewed the Messianic events within the framework of Jewish expectation;" hence an "attempt to derive his eschatology from Hellenism"<sup>5</sup> should be considered misguided. Schoeps finally concludes that:

"this type of eschatological thought which leads to a transcendent reinterpretation of the Messianic idea

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1. Käsemann, op.cit., p. 31.
  2. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 273.
  3. Davies, op.cit., p. 287.
  4. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 259.
  5. Ibid., p. 88.

εἰς αἰῶνα μελλόντα was deeply harmonious with the conceptual world of Paul."<sup>1</sup>

Pauline anthropology, complex as it is, is fully defined in terms of authentic existence which is expressed in terms of an everlasting life.<sup>2</sup> If death is a limitation of human existence (= an unauthentic existence) then opposed to it is an eternal life as authentic existence. If man's lack of authenticity is, as we have argued, lack of being, translated in Pauline terms = life, then existence within the sphere, and within the fullness, of being is eternal life as opposed to death. On this ground it should be possible to draw some logical and consistent lines of the eschatological aspect of Paul's anthropology.

Paul has considered man to be an authentic creature when, accepting his creaturehood, man recognizes, and relates to, the Other as the source of his existence. This capacity to relate to the Other, classified as a centrifugal movement, is expressed in Paul by the concept of σῶμα, or body. For this reason Paul's eschatology is body-centred and revolves around the resurrection of the body. By the resurrection of the body man is going (to be able) to recognize himself as a creature re-related to his Creator. And then Paul emphasizes that through the resurrection Christ has revealed the meaning of man's creaturehood:

ὥστε εἴ τις ἐν Χριστῷ, καινὴ κτίσις. (2 Cor. 5. 17).

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1. Ibid., p. 96.

2. Rom. 2.7; 5.10, 17, 21; 6.22; 8.6; Gal. 6.8.



Just as Paul argued that if Christ was not raised everything is in vain so he argues: οὔτε γὰρ περιτομή τί ἐστίν οὔτε ἀκροβυστία, ἀλλὰ καινὴ κτίσις (Gal. 6. 15).

Hence the threefold aspect of the authenticity of man is fully revealed. Man is creature and as such depends on his Creator. His (man's) creaturehood is actualized by his acceptance of himself in terms of his bodily existence. Sin is an attempt to deny his creaturehood and simultaneously is a destruction of authentic existence. The re-establishment of authenticity is a new creation which is fully actualized in the resurrection of the body. Thus we can agree with Sevenster:

"It will be obvious from what has gone before that his (Paul's) whole theology is steeped in eschatology, and that within this eschatological framework the past, present and future are most closely linked with one another."<sup>1</sup>

The continuity of man's being and existence, therefore, is twofold. Man is creature and is to remain a creature in the age to come. The authenticity of his being is to be actualized by his becoming a new creature. This existence of the fallen creaturehood is organically linked with the future existence of the new creaturehood. In that respect, according to Paul, the eschatological events are neither transcendent nor metaphysical, they are historical events, because in relation to man is decided the destiny of the world (see p. 131 ). The fulness of the authenticity of man's creaturehood will culminate in the re-establishment of full communion with the Creator, which Paul expresses by

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1. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 219.

the term "peace"<sup>1</sup> as opposed to the fallen state which is the state of hostility towards, denial and rejection of, the Other. Therefore to talk of an immortal soul in Paul's anthropology is to misread Paul. The resurrection, as a final coronation of the new creation, occurs not by natural laws and necessities, but by Christ's triumph over death and sin. A resurrected man is going to be fully Imago Dei, because he is resurrected precisely on account of his recognition of the Other and on account of accepting himself on terms of his creaturehood.

If we compare Paul's eschatology to Seneca's one striking thing quickly appears, namely that, while in Paul cosmology was totally anthropologically orientated, in Seneca it is vice versa: anthropology is cosmologically orientated. The reason for this is Seneca's understanding of the concept of soul,<sup>2</sup> which is identical to divine reason (see Chapter 1). The second striking difference between Paul and Seneca is that, while the eschatological aspect of Pauline anthropology was body-resurrection centred, the eschatological aspect of Senecan anthropology was soul-immortality centred.

In the first part of the chapter, while dealing with Paul, we have made it clear that the immortal soul has nothing to do with Pauline anthropology, in spite of arguments such as Winckler's (see pp. 132-33), but on the contrary Pauline anthropology, as

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1. Rom. 5.1; 8.6; 15.33; 16.20; I Cor. 7.15; 14.33; 2 Cor. 13.11; Phil. 4.9.

2. Seneca interchanges frequently the concepts of soul, spirit, mind and reason.



Bultmann puts it: "must be understood in terms of resurrection of the dead and not as the immortality of the soul."<sup>1</sup> As to Seneca we can quote De Vogel:

"With Seneca, immortality takes an important place. He speaks of it frequently and in terms which remind us of Plato (especially of Phaedo)."<sup>2</sup>

However, De Vogel herself long ago observed how controversial or ambivalent is the teaching of Seneca about the immortality of the soul. She has noticed that Seneca on that point is inconsistent,<sup>3</sup> speaking sometimes for, sometimes against the immortality of the soul.<sup>4</sup> It was argued that:

"Eine eigentliche persönliche Unsterblichkeit der Seele kennt das stoische System nicht."<sup>5</sup>

on account of the logical argument that:

"Die Lehre von Unsterblichkeit der Seele ist mit dem stoischen Dogma der periodischen Weltbrennung unvereinbar."<sup>6</sup>

Thus Sevenster has rightly argued that "for Seneca, however, immortality is - even when he states his certain belief in it - bounded by the cyclic return of all things."<sup>7</sup> Gummere has pointed out that "how far it (soul) was individually immortal was often debated and by none more than by Seneca,"<sup>8</sup> but it has also been

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1. EF, p.99.

2. De Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 99.

3. Ibid., iii, pp. 297-98.

4. See Ad Marc. 19.4-6; Ad Pol. 9.2; De Prov. 6.6; Epp. 65.24; 57.8; 71.16; 31.10-11.

5. Holzherr, op.cit., ii, p. 39.

6. Winckler, op.cit., p. 50.

7. Sevenster, op.cit., p. 227.

8. Gummere, op.cit., p. 57.

pointed out that "Seneca on this, as on many other questions of high moment, is not steady and consistent".<sup>1</sup> Zeller has seen Seneca as "describing the blessedness of the higher life after death in colours not unlike those of Plato and Christian theologians",<sup>2</sup> mainly because Seneca "gives attention to the kinship of the human spirit with God and the life after death".<sup>3</sup> An utterly ambiguous interpretation of the question of immortality in Stoic philosophy is given by Rist: "The Stoic belief seems to have been that as one dies, so one continues to exist until all identity is lost".<sup>4</sup> Some authors have made up their minds on the question of the immortality of the soul in Seneca's philosophy arguing that "he is not convinced of the truth of immortality. It is no more to him than a beautiful dream".<sup>5</sup> Almost in identical terms Pohlenz writes:

"In den Briefen betrachtet er (Seneca) die Unsterblichkeitsfrage zwar als ernsthaftes Problem, aber im Grunde ist ihm der Glaube an das Fortleben nur ein schöner Traum, aus dem er sich freilich nur ungern wecken lässt..."<sup>6</sup>

Prat has argued the same way by saying that to the Stoics:

"the soul is no more immortal than God is personal, it is dissolved within the body, returns to the elements and is lost in the great All of which it is only a tiny part."<sup>7</sup>

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1. Dill, op.cit., p. 502.
  2. Outlines, p. 244.
  3. Outlines, p. 288.
  4. Rist, op.cit., p. 258.
  5. Cumont, op.cit., p. 14.
  6. Stoa, i, p. 322.
  7. Theology, ii, p. 39.



This interpretation arises from misinterpretation of Paul himself, namely from taking for granted that St. Paul had a concept of the immortal soul. But, without raising once again the question of Paul's attitude towards the immortal soul, let us quote a final opinion on Seneca's attitude towards the immortality of the soul:

"Im 'chaos' zu verschwinden, dies ist der Unsterblichkeitsglaube Senecas; dafür entscheidet er sich, wenn er theoretisch denkt."<sup>1</sup>

All these arguments for and against Seneca's possibly having defended the immortality of the soul are founded on Seneca's statements, for at this point, it has to be admitted, Seneca spoke inconsistently of the soul as sometimes being mortal and sometimes immortal. Thus he defends the immortality of the soul:

"Itaque de illo quaerendum est, an possit immortalis esse. Hoc quidem certum habe: si superstes est corpori, praeteri\* illum nullo genere posse, propter quod non perit, quoniam nulla immortalitas cum exceptione est nec quicquam noxium aeterno est."<sup>2</sup>

Sometimes Seneca is explicitly and categorically defending the immortality of the soul. In the 102nd letter to Lucilius he writes:

"Iuvabat de<sub>3</sub>aeternitate animarum quaerere, immo mehercules credere."<sup>3</sup>

and later in the same letter he writes:

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1. Bickel, op.cit., p. 94.

2. Ep. 57.9.

3. Ep. 102.2.

\* praeteri Buecheler; preter p; propter VLPb; proteri Haupt.

"Dies iste, quem tamquam extremum reformidas, aeterni natalis est."<sup>1</sup>

If one is to take seriously these arguments of Seneca one is bound to speculate, in one way or another, on the immortality of the soul within the framework of the eschatological aspect of anthropology. On a number of other occasions Seneca spoke of the immortality of the soul in affirmative terms. Similarly he expressed the same opinion in Ad Marciam speaking of the immortal self:

"Imago dumtaxat fili tui perit et effigies non simillima; ipse quidem aeternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et sibi relictus."<sup>2</sup>

Likewise he consoles Polybius over the death of his brother, saying that his brother:

"Tandem liber, tandem tutus, tandem aeternus est."<sup>3</sup>

In Ad Helviam Seneca writes:

"Animus quidem ipse sacer et aeternus est..."<sup>4</sup>

and:

"Tum peragratis humilioribus ad summa perrumpit et pulcherrimo divinorum spectaculo fruitur, aeternitatis suae memor in omne quod fuit futurumque est vadit omnibus saeculis."<sup>5</sup>

In De Tranquillitate Animi Seneca writes:

"Omnes isti levi temporis impensa invenerunt, quomodo aeterni fierent, et ad immortalitatem moriendo venerunt."<sup>6</sup>

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1. Ep. 102.26.
  2. Ad Marc. 24.5.
  3. Ad Pol. 9.7.
  4. Ad Helv. 11.7.
  5. Ad Helv. 20.2.
  6. De Tranq. An. 16.4.



From the above quotations one is likely to deduce that Seneca did believe in the immortality of the soul, but at the same time one has no difficulties in illustrating from his writings that he did not believe in it, or at least, that he was doubtful of it:

"Mors nos aut consumit aut exuit. Emissis meliora restant onere detracto, consumptis nihil restat, bona pariter malaque submota sunt."<sup>1</sup>

And thus Seneca comes to the point of identifying death with non-existence:

"'Faciatur; ego illam (sc. mors) diu expertus sum.' 'Quando?' inquis. Antequam nascerer. Mors est non esse; id quale sit, iam scio. Hoc erit post me, quod ante me fuit...Nos quoque et extinguimur et accendimur;...In hoc enim, mi Lucili, nisi fallor, erramus, quod mortem iudicamus sequi, cum illa et praecesserit et secutura sit."<sup>2</sup>

If the immortality of the soul is to be regarded as the central hub of the eschatological aspect of Seneca's anthropology then we can agree with the statement that:

"Es ist freilich für den Seneca-Leser eine recht schwierige Aufgabe, ein klares und einheitliches Bild von Senecas Auffassungen des Jenseits und der Unsterblichkeit der Seele zu erhalten. Wie oft begegnen wir hier den grössten Widersprüchen! Scheint ihm eine Mal das Dogma von der Unsterblichkeit als etwas Selbstverständliches festzustehen, so äussert er sich an anderen Stellen sehr skeptisch und resigniert; und endlich schlägt seine Stimmung geradezu in eine bewusste Opposition gegen den Unsterblichkeitsglauben um."<sup>3</sup>

At the same time it has been argued that "where Seneca does

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1. Ep. 24.18; cf. Ep. 82.16; Ad Marc. 19.4.
  2. Ep. 54.4-5; cf. Ep. 77.11; "Haec paria sunt, non eris nec fuisti"; also Ep. 99.30: "...effugit enim maximum mortis incommodum, non esse."
  3. Deissner, op.cit., p. 10 (80).

deviate from the doctrine of the Porch is when he precisely states that the soul is everlasting and immortal."<sup>1</sup> Hence, if we are to take Seneca as a serious and consistent Stoic, we should put less weight on his arguments in favour of the immortality of the soul. To say the least the immortality belief in Seneca's anthropology does not make sense as long as we take seriously the cycles of conflagration as Winckler has rightly pointed out. In that context man's soul is immortal only insofar as it is a part of the whole of the divine universe and survives as a substance unchanged, having been always of divine nature, but its distinct otherness perishes altogether (see p. 141, n. 4.).

Now, insofar as Paul's eschatology is to be considered as an eschatology of "Jenseits" we have to make a basic distinction between Paul's and Seneca's anthropology. Consistent with Paul's view of man as a potential, ec-static being, the eschatological aspect of his anthropology is future orientated, and expressed in terms of resurrection. Seneca, on the other hand, having viewed man as an actualized, in-himself-centred reality, has brought the eschatological sphere within the life-span of man and put it within the limits of his empirical life.<sup>2</sup> Thus man, being a creature who creates himself, is realized in himself by becoming the source of his own existence and the end

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1. A.L. Motto, 'Seneca on Death and Immortality', Classical Journal, L, 1955, p. 189.

2. See Watson, op.cit., p. 40; cf. p.127f. of this thesis.



of his own being. What we have characterized as a centripetal movement, a reality characteristic of man's introspective nature, Niederwimmer describes thus:

"' ψυχή' ist 'Seele' oder 'Geist' im Sinne des eigentlichen und wahren Ich des Menschen. Es ist innerste und geistige Zentrum des Menschen, das, in dem der Mensch er selbst bei sich selbst ist. Nur so darf die rede von der 'Unsterblichkeit' der Seele verstanden werden, bzw. so muss und will sie 'entmythologisiert' werden."<sup>1</sup>

The dividing line between authentic and inauthentic existence in Paul's anthropology is death, whereas in Seneca it is the absence or presence of virtue which is determinative. Death as such is regarded as a natural process. It is a benefit bestowed upon us by nature,<sup>2</sup> a life's duty,<sup>3</sup> the law which admits no exceptions,<sup>4</sup> hence is not an evil,<sup>5</sup> but an indifferent thing.<sup>6</sup> By this view of death Seneca managed to focus the anthropological aspect of eschatology on man's empirical life so that it has been rightly said:

"Sokrates und Seneca stimmen darin überein, dass sie die Frage nach dem Sinn des Menschenlebens nicht durch Eschatologie und eine sich auf das Jenseits erstreckende Theodizee haben lösen wollen, sondern ihrer Frömmigkeit im Diesseits Ziel und Sinn gesetzt haben."<sup>7</sup>

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1. Niederwimmer, op.cit., p. 22.
  2. "Nega nunc magnum beneficium esse naturae, quod necesse est mori." Ep. 101.14.
  3. Ep. 77.19.
  4. "Mors naturae lex est." (N.Q., vi, 32.12); cf. Epp. 4.10; 24.25; 30.11; 37.2; 66.42-43; 71.15; 77.11-13; 78.6; 91.10-12,76; 93.12; 94.7; 98.10; 99.6-9; 101.14; 107.6; 114.26-27; 117.22; 120.14,17; 123.16; 124.14; De Prov. 5.7-8; De Ira, iii, 42.2-3; 43.1-5; Ad Marc. 10.5; 11.1-5; 12.5; 15.4; 17.1; 19.1-3; 20.2; 21.2; De Tranq. An. 1.13; 11.6; De Brev. Vitae, 8.5; Ad Pol. 1.2-4; 9.9; 10.4-6; 11.1-4; 17.2; N.Q. i, Praef. 4; ii, 59.4,6-9; vi, 1.8-9; 2.6-9; 32.6-8.
  5. Epp. 30.5-6; 82.15-17; 85.26-27; 99.29; 123.16; De Const. 8.3.
  6. Ep. 82.10-13; Ad Marc. 19.5.
  7. Bickel, op.cit., p. 92.

An anthropological emphasis is put on virtue as the aim of man's life precisely because of the cyclical conflagrations and thus virtue has a totally eschatological perspective, in the sense that realized virtue is realized authentic existence.

Interpreting the relation between death, virtue and immortality from the eschatological point of view Eucken wrote:

"Uebrigens bedeutet der grossen Merzahl der Stoiker der Tod kein völliges Erlöschen des individuellen Daseins. Die Einzelseelen werden so lange fortdauern, bis sie der periodisch wiederkehrende Weltbrand in die Gottheit, den Grund aller Dinge, zurückführt. Aber das Denken befasst sich hier kaum mit dem Jenseits, es bleibt dem Diesseits zugewandt und von seinen Problemen erfüllt."<sup>1</sup>

The only consistent eschatology on an anthropological level that can be worked out from Seneca's philosophy is the eschatology of "Diesseits" which is contained in Seneca's fully consistent teaching on virtue. Seneca argues that: "Virtus autem nihil aliud est quam animus quodammodo se habens, ergo animal est."<sup>2</sup>

And virtue Seneca describes as follows:

"Si volumus ista distinguere, ad primum bonum revertamur et consideremus id quale sit: animus intuens vera, peritus fugiendorum ac petendorum, non ex opinione, sed ex natura pretia rebus inponens, toti se inserens mundo et in omnes eius actus contemplationem suam mittens, cogitationibus actionibusque intentus, ex aequo magnus ac vehemens, asperis blandisque pariter invictus, neutri se fortunae summittens, supra omnia quae contingunt acciduntque eminens, pulcherrimus, ordinatissimus cum decore tum viribus, sanus ac siccus, inperturbatus, intrepidus, quem nulla vis frangat, quem nec adtollant<sub>3</sub> fortuita nec deprimant; talis animus virtus est."<sup>3</sup>

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1. R. Eucken, Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker, Leipzig, 1897, p. 107.

2. Ep. 113.2.

3. Ep. 66.6; cf. Epp. 115. 3-6; 120.10.



Virtue being in itself a life according to nature<sup>1</sup> should be man's primary art<sup>2</sup> since it makes man equal to God.<sup>3</sup> On this ground it is entirely legitimate to assume that the eschatological epicentre of Seneca's anthropology is "Diesseits"-centred, which has the divinization of man for its final goal. That divinization is expressed in terms of a vision of God which is the outcome of one's virtue.

Thus De Vogel writes: "For the Stoics, however, the clear vision of heavenly bodies was in the fullest sense the vision of God. Stoics, such as Seneca expect this vision as a right which will be given to them in consequence of their virtue."<sup>4</sup>

If we want to compare Paul's eschatological thought to Seneca's on the anthropological plane we can agree with Baur who wrote:

"Folgen wir dem Apostel Paulus in der Reihe der von ihm 1 Kor. 15, 20f. aufgeführten eschatologischen Momente, so ist das Letzte, in welchem die ganze Betrachtung ruht, der Weltlauf am Ende ist, der absolute Punkt, in welchem Alles sich abschliesst, dass Gott ist Alles in Allem. Was entspricht aber diesem Schlusspunkt der christliche Eschatologie auf der Seite des stoischen Systems? Es kann nur das gerade Entgegengesetzte sein, die im stoischen Tugendbegriff realisierte Forderung, dass der Mensch, d.h. das sich selbst genügende Ich des stoischen Weisen das Eine und Alles sei."<sup>5</sup>

And finally what characterizes the futuristic aspect of Pauline eschatology is that the day of resurrection and judgement<sup>6</sup> belongs

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1. Epp. 50.8; 74.30.

2. Ep. 92.10.

3. Ep. 92.29; cf. N.Q. i, Praef. 6.

4. De Vogel, op.cit., iii, p. 100; cf. Ep. 95.10.

5. Baur, op.cit., p. 234.

6. Rom. 2.5,16; I Cor. 1.8; 5.5; 2 Cor. 1.14; 6.2; Phil. 1.6; 1.10; 2.16; I Thess. 5.2,4; 2 Thess. 2.2; 2 Tim. 4.8.

to God. In Seneca it is man-orientated, where the conscience stands as man's last judge,<sup>1</sup> so that Baur rightly writes:

"Von einem am Ende bevorstehenden Tag des Gerichts spricht auch Seneca, nur setzt er diesen richtlichen Act nicht in einen über die Menschen ergehenden Urtheilsspruch Gottes, sondern in das Innere des Menschen selbst."<sup>2</sup>

While in Paul's thought man, being a creature whose existence is rooted outside of himself, is striving for the achievement of an authentic existence in terms of realizing the limits of his creaturehood, which will happen at the day of resurrection - for which reason man has to die with Christ - , in Seneca's thought man's authenticity will be achieved only when he is able to scorn death<sup>3</sup> and pass his own judgment unto himself, i.e. when he becomes virtuous to the point of being the source of his own existence.

So, over against Winckler's argument (see p. 132 ) that Christian and Stoic eschatologies should rest on the same ground we should rather agree with Holzherr's judgment:

"Gerade die Lehre von den letzten Dingen zeigt am deutlichsten die wesentliche Verschiedenheit der Weltanschauung Seneca's und der heidnischen überhaupt von der Christlichen."<sup>4</sup>

The theological aspect of Pauline anthropology is an outward going one. It is entirely permeated with the hope of resurrection. This hope of resurrection affects the course of man's life before

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1. De Ben. vii, 1.7; Epp. 43.5; 97.15-16; 105.7-8; De Clem. i, 13.3.

2. Baur, op.cit., pp. 231-32.

3. Epp. 3.4; 24.11-14; 30.5-10; 36.8,12; 78.5; 80.5; 82.16; 91.19-21; De Tranq. An. 11.5-6; N.Q. ii, 49.3; vi, 32.3,7-9,12; De Prov. 6.6; Ad Helv. 13.2.

4. Holzherr, op.cit., ii, p. 75.



death and man's life affects the development of the course of history. Thus due to the eschatological aspect of man's creaturehood he (man) is a decisive agent of the destiny of the world. He can be that only by the acceptance of his creaturehood and when he is in solidarity with the rest of creation. Solidarity with the creation is reflected in the anticipation of the resurrection of the body, by virtue of which the believers give their σώματα to Christ as σωσάν ζωσαν.<sup>1</sup> Only by virtue of the deep conviction that the "transcendent" state of existence is inseparably bound up with "earthly" existence could Paul say such a thing. For that reason it is legitimate to infer here that man is a creature, his creatureliness can be called body, and the resurrection body is that which Paul calls the new creation. The new creation, again, is the full actualization in man of the glory and the image of God. In becoming the fully perfect image and glory of God man is going to be a creature par excellence. Even resurrected man remains a creature, and that points back to our original argument for Paul's bipolar view of the world, man, reality and existence.

If the comparison with Seneca is to be assessed, an immediate appearance of a split between anthropological and cosmological eschatology is apparent. The continuity of existence is limited to the cataclysmic cycles, which embrace everything, abolishing the barriers of individual existence and amalgamating the multiplicity of appearances into the realm of

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1. Rom. 12.1.





and that is where he definitely differed from Paul. In a somewhat too strict judgment on Paul, let us conclude with Preller's words:

"Allein trotz aller Verwandtschaft mit der Anthropologie des Paulus huldigt Seneca trotz seiner durchaus positiven Wertung des Menschen durchaus nicht jener anthropocentrischen Weltanschauung, die Paulus bei ganz negativer Menschenwertung vertritt."<sup>1</sup>

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1. Preller, op.cit., p. 73.

## C O N C L U S I O N

What is now to be investigated are the hinterlands and trends behind Paul's and Seneca's anthropology. The last quotation on the previous page voices an opinion to which we have objected, but which, at any rate, has become a standard estimation of Paul's anthropology. Preller, in that quotation states that Seneca offers "durchaus positiven Wertung des Menschen," whereas Paul presents us with a "ganz negativen Menschenwertung." What is really meant is that while on the one hand we have a Hellenistic, totally positive estimation of man (Seneca), on the other hand we have a totally negative estimation of man in Paul. And this is thought to imply a different background, in that case Judaistic. Thus it is not by chance that A. Schweitzer, the scholar who has most vigorously argued for a Jewish background to Paul's thought, says: "The possibility that man, as man and universally, stands in close relation to God lies outside his (Paul's) horizon."<sup>1</sup>

What these arguments imply is that according to Hellenistic views the state of man, and man's place in the world and before God, has been seen as a happy one and therefore has a positive hallmark, while on the other hand Judaistic thought pictured it in more pessimistic terms. Here we have a Hellenistic anthropocentric humanism on one side and a Jewish Jahve-centred theism on the other.

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1. Mysticism, p. 9.



Thus Paul, in almost every interpretation, has had to submit to an interpretation which was very much one-sided. He was seen either as a Hellenist and thus associated with Seneca, and their thoughts were extensively matched and compared; or else he was seen as different and efforts were made to enumerate as many points of difference between the two as possible. Such one-sided interpretations were due mainly to the presupposition that the world of Paul was to be sharply distinguished from the Hellenistic one. But we have ruled this out from the very beginning (see p. 1). Thus it is always taken as a rule that if Paul's anthropology be characterised as optimistic it is Hellenistic, while if it is pessimistic it is Judaistic. However, Schoeps who has advocated Paul's strong Judaistic background goes on to say:

"The Christian religion does not express an attitude of man gained from the realization of the confrontation between the creatura and the creator - like the Jewish emuna - nor any state that can be attained by action in obedience to divine commands, but it is an opus operatum made possible by Christ's revelation in man. The Christian faith can neither be defined objectively as opus or virtus sub proprie merito, nor is it neutrally a mode of being to be aimed at by poenitentia and attritio; it is always an imputatio spiritus sancti made possible by Christ. The gift of faith to man is divinely bestowed. Man cannot attain the mode of being proper to faith, nor even prepare for it. Christianity is the testimony of a voluntas aliena in man, the testimonium internum spiritus sancti."<sup>1</sup>

For this pessimistic view of man in Christianity Schoeps holds Paul<sup>2</sup> responsible, and then further transfers it to the influence

1. Schoeps, op.cit., p. 291.

2. Ibid., p. 275.

which the LXX exercised upon Paul.<sup>1</sup> Hence here is something which strongly opposes traditional views in Pauline research. Running counter to all interpreters Schoeps argues here that it is a contradiction in terms to assume that pessimism is of Jewish origin. He argues for precisely the opposite, namely that the Judaistic view of man is an optimistic one. Of the same conviction is Knox when he writes:

"None the less there is one element in the Epistle which appears to be entirely alien to Judaism, and to the rest of the New Testament, in Rom. 7 with its insistence on the utter corruption of human nature and its incapacity to achieve its own salvation."<sup>2</sup>

Thus one is led to the conclusion that an anthropological pessimism on the whole is non-biblical. And indeed it is erroneous to conceive the biblical view of man as a pessimistic one. However, it is equally misleading to read pessimism into Paul and then trace it back to Hellenistic influences. K. Stendahl<sup>3</sup> has provided us with sufficient material, and with sufficient reasons for inducing us to reconsider the ways and methods by which we read and understand Paul. Many of the accusations that are levelled at Paul should really be levelled at his interpreters, such as Augustine, Luther<sup>4</sup> and Calvin,<sup>5</sup> who have twisted the Apostle's thought and

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1. Ibid., pp. 30, 191.

2. Knox, op.cit., p. 96.

3. Stendahl, op.cit., passim.

4. Thus Schoeps correctly traces but interprets wrongly the problem when he says: "Luther as is well known, was also strongly influenced by Augustine, who took even further the Pauline idea of sin, so that Luther estimated the power of sin far more pessimistically than did Paul, and that even in the Christian life." (op.cit., p. 275).

5. Note here the significance of the fact that the first work that Calvin published was, in his youth, the commentary on Seneca's De Clementia.



made him responsible for something for which he is not to blame. At the beginning of the thesis we stated that the "problem is that our contemporary thought is preconditioned by Pauline and Senecan concepts," (see p. 5). What is meant by that is that the West grew up in such an historical context in which simultaneously, Pauline thought and Pauline interpretations were exposed to the strong influence of surviving Stoic thought. Thus in the ages of the rapid growth of the early Church semi-Christian and semi-Stoic thoughts were read into Paul, mainly owing to superficial linguistic resemblances. Thus pessimistic thought is really something read into Paul. For one would hardly find any intelligible reason for Paul's frequent usage of the noun  $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha$ <sup>1</sup> and the verb  $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$ ,<sup>2</sup> if his view of man and the world surrounding him were so pessimistic. We do not intend here to come forward with a mass of arguments in defence of Paul's optimistic view of man, for it is hoped that such an argument can be deduced from the main body of the thesis throughout the previous four chapters. Arguments like Schweitzer's have been dealt with in the chapter on "Man and God". Hence there is no need to deal with them here.

On the issue of pessimism and optimism Seneca was equally subject to various interpretations and diametrically opposed views. Benz uses Seneca's discussion of suicide to demonstrate his

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1. Rom. 14.17; 15.13,32; 2 Cor. 1.15,24; 2.3; 7.4; 8.2; Gal. 5.22; Phil. 1.4,25; 2.2,29; 4.1; Col. 1.11; I Thess. 1.6; 2.19-20; 3.9.

2. Rom. 12.12,15; 16.19; I Cor. 7.30; 16.17; 2 Cor. 2.3; 6.10; 7.7,9,13,16; 13.9,11; Phil. 1.18; 2.17-18,28; 3.1; 4.4,10; Col. 1.24; 2.5; I Thess. 3.9; 5.16.

pessimistic view of the world. Thus on Seneca's Ep. 12.10:

"Patent undique ad libertatem viae multae breves, faciles.  
Agamus deo gratias, quod nemo in vita teneri potest.  
Calcarea ipsas necessitates licet."

Benz comments:

"Die Formulierung bei Seneca (sc. des Selbstmordes), in dessen pessimistischen Weltbild der Selbstmord ein vielbehandeltes Problem ist, deckt sich hier wörtlich mit einer epikureischen Lehre."<sup>1</sup>

Benz is right here for Seneca, whose syncretistic tendencies we have stressed, (see p. 7, n. 2 ) in his suggestion that this view comes from Epicurus.<sup>2</sup> But Seneca's syncretism does not interest us here; we are here concerned with the problem of pessimism in his anthropology, on which Benz once again comments:

"Der Ausdruck Pessimismus ist verwirrend, wenn man nicht betont, dass innerhalb der Stoa zwei Formen von Pessimismus unterschieden werden können: die eine, die, in einem Falle wie bei Seneca, auf einer vollkommen dualistischen Lehre vom prinzipiellen Gegensatz der beiden im Menschen vereinten Prinzipien Leib und Seele beruht, und der seine Aufhebung in einer erlösenden Trennung der beiden Teile findet, wie schon oben betont wurde: die andere Form neben diesem innermenschlichen Dualismus ist kaum Pessimismus zu nennen; auch in der jüngeren Stoa tauchen nämlich Klagen über die Schwere des Daseins auf, auch dort wird manchmal über die Unvollkommenheit des Irdischen gejammert: der Grund dabei ist aber nicht die innere Unmöglichkeit, den verschiedenartigen Tendenzen, die sich in der eigenen Person befenden, gleichmässig nachzugehen, und die daraus entstehende innere Verzweiflung an der Durchführung einer harmonischen Lebensgestaltung, sondern eine allgemeine Betrachtung der unerfreulichen und unvollkommenen Dinge, Ereignisse und Einrichtung des Lebens, die sich den Menschen entgegenstellen und seine Tatkraft hindern: während im ersten Fall der Dualismus ein innerer ist, ist er im anderen ein äusserer:

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1. Benz, op.cit., p. 56.

2. In para. 11, Seneca states that he is here borrowing from Epicurus; cf. p. 7, n. 2, of this thesis.



unter den letzten fällt der Pessimismus der Kyniker,  
unter den ersten z.B. der Platons und Senecas."<sup>1</sup>

In the chapter on eschatology we mentioned Seneca's anthropological optimism, and yet we find discussions on pessimism in his philosophy. In fact the question whether he is an optimist or a pessimist is not settled and for the moment we can pass on Deissner's judgement in which he argues that:

"...haben wir in der Auffassung von Menschen und von der Welt bei Seneca weder einen konsequenten Pessimismus noch einen Optimismus. Der Pessimismus wird bei ihm nicht so weit verfolgt, dass es zum völligen Verzweifeln an der eigene Kraft des Menschen kommt und dass dann die Bahn frei würde für eine andere Kraft, die dem Menschen in seiner innersten Not hilft und somit eine optimistische Betrachtungsweise eröffnen würde."<sup>2</sup>

The problem of the alternation of pessimistic and optimistic discourse in Seneca is on no account an inconsistency on his part. As far as he is concerned he is neither a pessimist nor an optimist. He appears to be either the one or the other to those who judge his writings from a certain point of view. In that case he can be classified as either, depending on the point of view from which he is looked at. Thus to describe his De Consolatione ad Polybium as "herzlosen Reflexionen des stoischen Pessimismus,"<sup>3</sup> implies of necessity the point of view of the interpreter. So, too, for example, Holzherr, who writes: "Eine eigentliche persönliche Unsterblichkeit der Seele kennt das stoische System nicht",<sup>4</sup> takes for granted that Seneca has

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1. Benz, op.cit., p. 60.

2. Deissner, op.cit., p. 26 (104).

3. Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 105.

4. Holzherr, op.cit., ii, p. 39.

to be a pessimist, for he is looking upon Stoicism from a quasi-christian eschatological point of view.<sup>1</sup> But just as Seneca has been characterised as a pessimist it has been argued that at the time of Seneca the Stoics have "die optimistische Weltansicht für physische Gebiet in einer Weise ausgesprochen und durchgeführt, wie dies vorher noch nicht geschehen war".<sup>2</sup> Heinze himself must have realized that Seneca was frequently seen as a pessimist in spite of his strongly accentuated humanism, for he attempted to give a compromising interpretation:

"Die Stoiker liebten die Gegensätze nebeneinander zu stellen: Gedanke und Materie, Optimismus und Pessimismus, Freiheit und Nothwendigkeit - der Widerstreit dieser Begriffe und der Versuch, seiner Lösung zieht sich durch ihre ganze Speculation."<sup>3</sup>

Now what is the truth? Is Seneca a pessimist or an optimist? If one had to give an answer one would do well by saying that he is both, for he indeed seems to be both, depending on the point of view. Because of the fact that he envisaged man as being in such a wretched situation under the threat of the presence of the Other, fettered by the unhappy reality of his historical existence, one is bound to describe him as a pessimist. On the other hand, because of the fact that he had the courage to assign to man the high aspiring task of becoming totally self-sufficient and describe

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1. We call this view "quasi-christian" for it takes for granted that the New Testament knows of the immortality of the soul in spite of the fact that we have dismissed it as false.
  2. Heinze, op.cit., p. 81.
  3. Ibid., p. 167.



him as the most happy when on his own, in need of no one and nothing, his philosophy has to be labelled optimism - whatever sort of optimism it may be.

In conclusion, the issue of optimism and pessimism in Paul and Seneca is far less clear cut than one would want it to be. We still maintain that Paul's view of man is an optimistic one, but a number of interpreters, including Schoeps, seem to regard Paul as a pessimist on account of his saying that man is in the grip of sin and thus picturing man as one who cannot save himself by his own power. However, this view of Paul is one-sided for it does not give any credit to Paul for his insistence on the hope of the coming age and the final salvation of all from death through the resurrection of the body. Paul's whole thought was future-orientated, he was an apocalyptic eschatologist, and only on that level can his anthropology be finally judged. Hence, someone who so consistently and stubbornly, against all reason, believed in the resurrection of the dead could hardly be called a pessimist by any standards.

Seneca, on the other hand, being an enthusiastic advocate of man's virtues and capacities, with all his shortcomings on the eschatological plane, could not be called a pessimist either. He invested more hope and belief in an idea of man than in actual man, and that is what makes his anthropology so hard to understand. However, he was consistent enough in his writings for it to be clear that his eschatology is not a transcendent but an immanent one, and yet - what sounds so odd - his belief is not in a real

man but in an idea of man. If we do not rebuke him for not having believed in a real man but credit him with a belief in an idea of man, then we have to admit that he had a childlike enthusiasm. But this enthusiasm is a run-away-from-the-reality precisely because he could not face up to the reality of the real world.

Now, <sup>for</sup> over a century of interpretation of the problem of Paul and Seneca, interpreters have understood it to be their task to prove that Paul and Seneca did have some points in common or that they did not. Thus, we have pointed out at the very beginning (see p. 2f) that the alleged correspondence between the Apostle and the Philosopher was a forgery. And yet it has been said:

"Doch lassen sich noch zwei uralte, von einander unabhängige Traditionen darüber (i.e. correspondence between Paul and Seneca) nachweisen, welche in den Linus-Akten verarbeitet sind. Zu ihnen kommt als dritte Quelle die von Hieronimus und Augustin bezeugte Existenz einer Correspondenz zwischen den beiden grossen Männern, welche echt gewesen sein kann. Denn die noch vorhandene apokryphe Briefsammlung, welche ihren Namen trägt, stammt erst aus dem Mittelalter und ist entschieden nicht damit identisch." <sup>1</sup>

Thus this interpreter, while recognizing the existence of a forged correspondence nevertheless still maintains that there once existed a genuine one also. Kreyher in this respect is a consistent advocate of a trend which saw Seneca as being close to Paul. And he writes:

"...Seneca sich von allen antiken Philosophen am meisten dem Christentum nähert, nur habe man darin nicht eine

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1. Kreyher, op.cit., p. 198.



von dem letzteren ausgehende Wirkung, sondern eine zu ihm führende Entwicklung zu sehen."<sup>1</sup>

Kreyher should be taken as an exuberant, rather than a typical, example of those who advocate the common roots and trends of Pauline and Senecan thought. Thus he did not shrink from producing, not less than 23 pages long, a list of parallels between biblical and Senecan texts,<sup>2</sup> concluding with the words:

"Wir schliessen diese Zusammenstellung paralleler Gedanken, indem wir noch einmal auf die grosse Zahl von Ausdrücken Seneca's hinweisen, welche zu der spezifisch biblischen resp. christlichen Terminologie gehören."<sup>3</sup>

This sort of interpretation and this view belong to an earlier period of interpretation which has not been discarded altogether. However, in the later period interpreters have been more cautious in drawing parallels between the two men when establishing their points of contact. These efforts to prove that there are common points between Paul and Seneca or between Christianity and Stoicism in general were sharply rebuked:

"Die Neigung, Seneca und Christenthum in nahe Verwandtschaft zu bringen, geht durch alle Jahrhunderte. Diese Neigung tritt aber sehr häufig in entgegengesetzter Weise der Wahrheit zu nahe; um es kurz auszudrücken, können wir sagen: entweder man säkularisiert das Christenthum, oder man apotheosiert den Seneca."<sup>4</sup>

Such a view runs counter to the view of Kreyher. The question remains: did Paul and Seneca have anything in common or did they not? One certainly cannot escape the impression that they have

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1. Ibid., p. 61.

2. Ibid., pp. 77-95.

3. Ibid., p. 96.

4. Baumgarten, op.cit., p. 5.

something in common, especially when we read comments like this:

"...it is quite possible for Paul and Stoics to have aimed toward a common centre, working in the same period, the same atmosphere,<sup>1</sup> though from different points of view and approach."

It is hard to know whether one should or should not disagree with this statement. If the author is saying that Paul and Stoics hold identical views about certain problems, but tackle them from different points of view then we strongly disagree. If, on the other hand, the author is trying to say that the problems facing Paul and contemporary Stoics were the same, but that they were offering different solutions to these, then we would agree. However, it sounds as if the former is the case, i.e. the author thinks that Paul and Seneca were saying the same thing and expressing it in two different ways. Therefore we shall object to such an interpretation for obvious reasons. Equally misleading is the claim that Seneca "war ein παιδαγωγός εις Χριστόν."<sup>2</sup> This is not the only misleading interpretation, for on another occasion it has been argued that "the thoughtful student may find many points of likeness in which the Christian theology and morals may have been indebted to the doctrine of the Stoics".<sup>3</sup> Of the same sort is an argument that "Seneca was Stoic, and Stoicism was the porch of Christianity",<sup>4</sup> and yet another author sets it as "one of the purposes...(of his article)...to illustrate

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1. PS, p. 281.

2. Burgmann, op.cit., p. 63.

3. Davis, op.cit., p. 114.

4. Gummere, op.cit., p. 54.



the truth"<sup>1</sup> of the above and suchlike sayings.

This sort of argument is based mainly on a) the similarity and external resemblance of the language of some Pauline and Senecan passages, and b) post-Senecan interpretations of Paul. A more careful judgement has been expressed as follows:

"Es ist nun wahr, dass kein anderer antiker Schriftsteller der Lehre des Christentums so nahe gekommen ist wie Seneca; aber die Grundanschauungen sind doch völlig verschieden..."<sup>2</sup>

This is the sort of explanation one would want to see gaining force, so that the fundamental elements of Paul's and Seneca's thought could be considered in themselves and thus judged instead of their being compared as presented and understood by later interpretations. So, in spite of the fact that "we must never overlook a fundamental difference between Stoicism and Christianity, both in motive and in their view of the mutual relation of man to man",<sup>3</sup> and in spite of the fact that "Stoicism is essentially self-centred and its aims self-sufficiency, while the driving force of Christianity is self-sacrifice,"<sup>4</sup> it has been said:

"The general trend of his (Seneca's) moral teaching, which commended the simple life and the gentler virtues, was sufficiently near to that of the early Christians to

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1. Smiley, op.cit., p. 645.

2. Westerburg, op.cit., p. 22.

3. Macgregor and Purdy, op.cit., p. 255.

4. Ibid., p. 255.

create a tradition (now wholly discarded) that Seneca had held converse with St. Paul."<sup>1</sup>

Although the author here sees clearly that there is little chance of St. Paul and Seneca having known each other, he seems to see more similarity between their teachings than would generally be accepted nowadays. This is once again the error of looking upon Paul's and Seneca's writings through the misleading diffraction of later interpretations which flourished especially in early Italian humanism.<sup>2</sup>

Thus one may eventually conclude by agreeing with Kroll who writes:

"Seneca bleibt in seinem Denken antik orientiert. Von orientalischem Denken hält er sich entfernt, von Christentum völlig trennt ihn eine ganze Welt."<sup>3</sup>

If this be the case one is bound to wonder on what plane to interpret the problem of Paul's and Seneca's thought. One is equally tempted to ask the question: "Why should one interpret them at all?" The answer to this question we have stated at the beginning of the thesis (see p. 3), for St. Paul is being daily preached throughout the world and the claim has been made that "certain aspects of the Senecan ideal have their value for men today".<sup>4</sup>

Now, if this be true - which one would scarcely dare doubt - then

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1. M. Cary and T.J. Haarhoff, Life and Thought in the Greek and Roman World, London, 1940, p. 266.
  2. K.A. Blüher, Seneca in Spanien, München, 1969, p. 21.
  3. Kroll, op.cit., p. 447.
  4. J.H.L. Wetmore, Seneca's Conception of the Stoic Sage as Shown in his Prose Works, Published by University of Alberta, 1936, p. 58.



this should be taken as a starting point for tackling the problem. The common denominator of all three, Paul, Seneca and modern man, is that they have and do live in the same or, at least, a similar world, hence are facing the same or, at least, similar problems. By facing the same or similar problems they are likely to ask the same or similar questions and possibly also suggest the same or similar answers.

In the main body of the thesis we have attempted to give a survey of what Seneca and Paul thought of man in a more or less analytic and direct way. We have tried also to enter into the core of their thoughts and see what lay behind them, i.e. what it was that made them think the way they thought. Bearing in mind what we have said in the main corpus of the thesis we shall attempt in this concluding part to give a possible "practical application" of what has been said.

Provided that our presupposition holds good that modern man is in the same, or at least <sup>a</sup> similar world <sup>to that</sup> in which Paul and Seneca lived, then the whole problem will be centred on the question of man's dealing with the world. Just as it was argued "that similar thoughts struck Paul the Apostle, and Seneca the philosopher",<sup>1</sup> and that one cannot help feeling that Seneca "nearly reached the truth, and owed to the influence of the religion of Jesus on the age in which he lived, much of the excellence of his philosophy",<sup>2</sup> so it can be argued that the

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1. J.H. Bryant, The Mutual Influence of Christianity and the Stoic School, London and Cambridge, 1866, p. 55.

2. Ibid., p. 64.

similar thoughts that struck Paul and Seneca strike modern man as well and modern man is in some measure indebted to them.

At the beginning of the thesis we stated that that which constitutes man's historicity is his being in the world. His dealings with the world are nothing else but the actions which characterize his historicity (see pp. 14ff.).

Thus Heidegger rightly interprets Paul's concept of κόσμος:

" Κόσμος οὗτος bedeutet bei Paulus (vgl. 1 Kor. u. Gall.) nicht nur und nicht primär den Zustand des 'Kosmischen', sondern den Zustand und die Lage des Menschen, die Art seiner Stellung zum Kosmos, seiner Schätzung der Güter. Κόσμος ist das Menschsein im Wie einer gottabgekehrten Gesinnung ( ἡ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου). Κόσμος οὗτος meint das menschliche Dasein in einer bestimmten 'geschichtlichen' Existenz, unterschieden gegen eine andere schon angebrochene ( αἰὼν ὁ μέλλων)."<sup>1</sup>

It is clear here that man's historicity is conditioned by the mode of his being in the world. Our task is precisely to depict what are the modes of being in the world that a modern man would regard as authentic and what relation these modes bear to the thought of Paul and Seneca. H.A. Overstreet, writes that "not all adults are adult. Many who look grown-up on the outside may be childish on the inside".<sup>2</sup> Overstreet made this remark in order to emphasize the importance of maturity and seriousness as opposed to playfulness and childlike behaviour, for "all childish minds are dangerous, but particularly when those minds are housed in

1. M. Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, Frankfurt a.M., 1955, p.24.

2. H.A. Overstreet, The Mature Mind, London, 1950, p. 19.



adult bodies; for then they have the power to put their immaturities fully and disastrously into effect".<sup>1</sup> This concept of maturity, so important to modern man, was praised by R.J. Leslie as follows: "Overstreet arrived at the same wisdom enunciated by Seneca almost 1900 years ago".<sup>2</sup> Leslie argues along the same lines as Overstreet, underwriting the importance of maturity and then goes on to quote Seneca saying:

"Tenes utique memoria, quantum senseris gaudium, cum praetexta posita sumpsisti virilem togam et in forum deductus es; maius expecta, cum puerilem animum deposueris et te in viros philosophia transcripserit. Adhuc enim non pueritia sed, quod est gravius, puerilitas remanet. Et hoc quidem peior res\* est, quod auctoritatem habemus senum, vitia puerorum, nec puerorum tantum sed infantum..."<sup>3</sup>

Seneca exposes here, in accord with Overstreet, the danger of childishness and immaturity. But this is not the only occasion on which Seneca spoke with displeasure of adults being like children. He also writes:

"Nihil me magis in ista voce delectat quam quod exprobatum senibus infantia."<sup>4</sup>

In a somewhat different context, however, he writes:

"...ad eum transeamus, qui consenuit. Quantulo vincit infantem!"<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ibid., p. 15.

2. R.J. Leslie, 'Seneca and the "New Insight"', Classical Journal, 1956, LII, p. 125.

3. Ep. 4.2.

4. Ep. 22.15.

5. Ep. 99.9-10.

\* The word "res" does not exist in the text published by Loeb Class. Libr., see apparatus.

Again, most explicitly, he states:

"...hunc sapiens adversus omnes, quibus etiam post iuventam canosque puerilitas est...quibus puerilis animi mala sunt auctique in maius errores, qui a pueris magnitudine tantum formaque corporum differunt..."<sup>1</sup>

and finally:

"Saepe grandis natu senex nullum aliud habet argumentum, quo se probet diu vixisse, praeter aetatem."<sup>2</sup>

These observations of Seneca are virtually identical with the ones from Overstreet. Seneca's conviction that it is disaster to remain a child in a grown-up body is based on his conviction that children are devoid of reason<sup>3</sup> and the good,<sup>4</sup> and of course, on the most important fact, that they are ignorant.<sup>5</sup> Of course it is understandable that Seneca should complain about man's being childish in view of the ignorance of children since ignorance constitutes a lack of being.<sup>6</sup>

The same thought is lurking in the back of Overstreet's mind when he writes:

"As this new insight penetrates our common consciousness, it helps us to understand the forces that have created our predicament and brought us close to destruction; and it affords the clue to our possible advance out of chaos.

This insight is what I choose to call the maturity concept. The understanding and living out of this most recent of our psychological and philosophic insights becomes our next obligation and hope."<sup>7</sup>

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1. De Const. Sap. 12.1.

2. De Tranq. An. 3.8.

3. See Epp. 121.14; 124.9; De Ben. iii, 31.2.

4. See Ep. 124. 1,8-11.

5. De Ira, ii, 26.6; 30.1; iii, 24.3.

6. On this topic see the Ist chapter of this thesis where the problem of knowledge of God and being was treated.

7. Overstreet, op.cit., pp. 9-10.



Apparently what Overstreet is concerned with is the problem of self-knowledge, and he argues that maturity is a step towards self-knowledge, which is our "obligation and hope". The relation between Seneca's and Overstreet's arguments is more than obvious. He sees an ultimate danger to human life in a lack of maturity and in man's childlike predisposition. This problem is expressed by Seneca thus:

"Illud potius cogitabis, non esse irascendum erroribus...  
Quid, si pueris, quod neglecto dispectu officiorum ad  
lusus et ineptos aequalium iocos spectant".<sup>1</sup>

Having regarded children's plays as "foolish" Seneca has advocated the sound training of children from the very beginning,<sup>2</sup> just as it has been advocated in our time, and on account of this it has been said that "here Seneca and modern pedagogy meet".<sup>3</sup> It can be argued that Seneca and modern pedagogy meet here accidentally, but it can on the other hand be argued that modern pedagogy draws its wisdom from Seneca or post-Senecan sources.

Thus it has been argued that - owing to Paul's having come from Tarsus, a centre of Stoic philosophy in his time - the Pauline theology and ethics have carried down the stream of time many almost purely Stoic thoughts and ideas which are yet so subtly blended with Paul's non-Stoic corpus of thoughts "that the effort to discriminate belongs to the very finest researches of the Higher Criticism".<sup>4</sup> Such an argument is really far-

1. De Ira, ii, 10.1.

2. De Ira, ii, 21.1-11.

3. Wetmore, op.cit., p. 61.

4. Ibid., p. 65.

fetched and makes an ambitious claim, since it tends to insinuate that where Seneca and modern pedagogy have met Paul too is in accord with them. In the following pages we shall elaborate on this point and try to refute the tendency of that argument. For the time being let us state that Seneca has emphasized maturity and seriousness as a thing to strive for and as a proper mode of being which he has exaggeratedly emphasized in his teaching on the formation of character,<sup>1</sup> which has not gone unnoticed<sup>2</sup> nor without praise. The reason which enables the modern interpreter to agree with Seneca on the question of character is precisely because he has taken Seneca as an authority and such an opinion of Seneca is exactly what we have classified under post-Senecan thought. Thus it has been emphasized that Seneca's "chief aim was the formation of character".<sup>3</sup>

Precisely on this point Paul and Seneca part company. While it was important to Seneca to develop the concept of character, as one of the most practical aspects of his anthropology, Paul never used the word.<sup>4</sup> While Seneca has conceived the historicity of man's being-in-the-world in the terms of the perfection of character, Paul on the contrary has seen it in the absence of such terms. The following assessment is relevant here:

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1. See Epp. 36.6; 40.6; 51.4-12; 52.12; 55.1; 47.21; 82.2; 89.18; 94.1-12, 21-25, 50; 95.2, 36; 121.1-3; 122.17; De Prov. 4.9; De Tranq. An. 1.16; 17.4; N.Q. iv, Praef. 3; vii, 31.2; De Ira, ii, 15.1-5.
  2. "The great problem of philosophy was to make character self-sufficient and independent", Dill, op.cit., p. 291.
  3. Holland, op.cit., p. 164.
  4. The word χαρακτήρ is to be found only once in the whole of the N.T., sc. Heb. 1.3.



"...character is always and necessarily ambiguous, strained, and 'posing' so long as the element of 'character' has not been overcome and replaced by the purely human, namely, that man instead of giving himself a Self, receives it from the hands of the Creator, and thus is a believer. We are 'characters' only so long as, and in so far as, we are not in faith ..."<sup>1</sup>

This thought of man's self coming from outside is by no means alien to Paul. The falsity of a concept of character is well revealed in his statement that the Christian's weakness is his strength (see p. 59 ). However, Paul states it even more explicitly in his rebuke to the Corinthians:  $\tau\acute{\iota}$  δὲ ἔχεις

$\delta$  οὐκ ἔλαβες; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἔλαβες,  $\tau\acute{\iota}$  καυχᾶσαι ὡς μὴ λαβών;<sup>2</sup>

Our intention here is not to enter an argument with Schoeps and Knox about how human nature is not able to redeem itself by its own capacities (see pp. 154-55), but to look at the problem from a different angle. We want to see the problem here in the light of Seneca's concepts of maturity, character and seriousness. In Seneca's thought the self-controlled man matures by means of strengthening his own character. This process itself is a serious process.

Now, Paul not only did not have the concept of character in Seneca's sense, but beyond that dismissed any attempt at encouraging man's efforts to make himself better than he is by improving his character. Such an action involves the psycho-analytic process of self-reflexion and examination. Such a process involves the utmost degree of seriousness. Self-reflexion

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1. Brunner, op.cit., p. 316.

2. I Cor. 4.7.

and seriousness are identical and they are the mode of being in which man sees himself as an object. Seriousness is a subject-object relationship, a world-man relationship.

One is almost tempted to claim, as it has in fact been claimed for centuries, that Paul is one of the most serious and introspective founders of Western thought, culture and civilization, but the process of correcting this erroneous reading of Paul is under way.<sup>1</sup> Paul is not a joker or a romantic, but, as it has been observed, he "is deeply aware of the precarious situation of man in this world".<sup>2</sup> It is significant, sadly enough, that the interpreters have not given enough attention to Paul's treatment of the problem of anxiety. It is by no means accidental that Paul uses the word μερίμνω<sup>3</sup> in the passage which contains the ὡς μὴ which has been described as Bultmann's "Lieblingswort".<sup>4</sup> Paul has a definite view of what the world is like and what the Christian's dealings with the world should be like. He tells the community in Corinth παράγει γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου (I Cor. 7.31) and therefore he demands: θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀμερίμνους εἶναι (v.32). Clearly Paul does not want anxiety for the world to cancel the lightness of the yoke (cf. Mt. 11.30). The world must not eclipse the good news and impose the seriousness of its state so as to become the serious

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1. We are referring to K. Stendahl's article quoted earlier.

2. Ibid., p. 213.

3. I Cor. 7.32-34.

4. G. Hasenhüttl, Der Glaubensvollzug, Eine Begegnung mit Rudolf Bultmann aus katholischem Glaubensverständnis, Essen, 1963, p. 226, n. 50.



and primary concern of man. The believer is to take the world with as much seriousness as if it were not there, ὡς μὴ.

The ὡς μὴ expression was called Bultmann's "Lieblingswort" because it is, most probably, the most frequently quoted passage in his writings.<sup>1</sup> Paul gives some particulars about his view of man and his being in the world thus: ὁ καιρὸς συνεσταλμένος ἐστὶν τὸ λοιπὸν ἵνα καὶ οἱ ἔχοντες γυναῖκας ὡς μὴ ἔχοντες ᾧσιν, καὶ οἱ κλαίοντες ὡς μὴ κλαίοντες, καὶ οἱ χαίροντες ὡς μὴ χαίροντες, καὶ οἱ ἀγοράζοντες ὡς μὴ κατέχοντες, καὶ οἱ χρώμενοι τὸν κόσμον ὡς μὴ καταχρώμενοι (1 Cor. 7. 29-31).

In the words of an interpreter this means that:

"Ich bleibe in der Welt, bin aber nicht mehr aus der Welt. Der Glaubende ist Herr über alle Dinge geworden, er ist radikal frei."<sup>2</sup>

It would be a misunderstanding of Paul's intentions and arguments to think that he is suggesting a flight from the world and reality on dualistic grounds.<sup>3</sup> It would be equally too sharp to say that he has failed to perceive the state which man and the world are in. Paul is not suggesting that the world for the believer does not matter, but he is saying that the world does not matter - or at least should not matter - more than it actually does matter. In Paul's view, insofar as man is concerned, the world revolves around man and not vice versa. Such a view could hardly be described as pessimistic. It is optimistic

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1. EF, pp. 21-22.

2. Hasenhüttl, op.cit., p. 226.

3. R. Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, Zweiter Band, Tübingen, 1952, p. 205.

in the sense that the playfulness of the Christian's place in the world is a very serious matter, or - if you prefer - Paul's faith in Jesus the resurrected Lord and trust in the Other (= God) is so serious that he can understand the world in terms of play. This  $\omega\varsigma\ \mu\eta$  relation to the world Bultmann calls "Entweltlichung"<sup>1</sup> and speaks of:

"...das radikale Verständnis der Entweltlichung und der Verzicht, die eschatologische Existenz im weltlich Gegebenen adäquat zum Ausdruck zu bringen..."<sup>2</sup>

This interpretation is true for Paul, especially when we remember that Schoeps argues that Paul is unintelligible outside of the eschatological framework of his theology.<sup>3</sup> In speaking of the situation of man in Christ Bultmann says again: "in allen weltlichen Verhaltungen ist deshalb die Haltung des 'Entweltlichten' durch jenes 'als ob nicht' charakterisiert."<sup>4</sup> The reason for Seneca's serious treatment of the problem of man in the world and Paul's understanding it in terms of play Bultmann correctly exegetes:

"Nach griechischer Auffassung ist der Mensch ein organisches Glied des Kosmos, seinem System eingegliedert und durch den Besitz seines Geistes, seiner Vernunft, dem göttlichen Geiste verwandt, der diesen Kosmos durchwaltet, gliedert und ordnet. Nach alttestamentlich-jüdischer und auch nach christlicher Anschauung steht der Mensch der Welt gegenüber."<sup>5</sup>

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1. Ibid., ii, p. 205.
  2. GV, ii, p. 77.
  3. See p. 136, n.2, of this thesis.
  4. GV, ii, p. 116.
  5. GV, ii, p. 243.



But this judgement of Bultmann is too harsh to do justice to judaeo-christian interpretation. The New Testament does not see man and the world on a hostile footing, where the world is trying to beguile man. It simply emphasizes that the source of man's existence is not in the world but in God.<sup>1</sup> Thus Bultmann insists that "in dieser Haltung des 'als ob nicht' besteht die christliche Freiheit der Welt gegenüber".<sup>2</sup> This 'light' attitude of Paul towards the world expressed through the ὡς μὴ Bultmann understands in terms of freedom within the eschatological scope of Paul's theology:

"Die Paradoxie des 'eschatologischen' Jetzt scheint der Verfasser (René Marlé) also nicht verstanden zu haben. Sie besteht doch darin, dass ich im Glauben 'entweltlicht' bin (als καὶνὴ κτίσις) und doch in der Welt und in der Geschichte bleibe als verantwortlich gegenüber Vergangenheit und Zukunft. Das Verhältnis des Glaubenden zur Welt und zur Geschichte ist das paradoxe des ὡς μὴ. Gerade diese Möglichkeit des ὡς μὴ wird durch die dem Glaubenden geschenkte 'Entweltlichung' gegeben."<sup>3</sup>

Thus conclusively:

"Diese Paradoxie ist ebenso in dem berühmten 'Als ob nicht' (1 Kor. 7, 29-31) ausgedrückt, das nicht die Weltflucht, sondern die innere Distanz zur Welt als das christliche Sein charakterisiert."<sup>4</sup>

Thus man has to live in a "paradox" or else he is going to live anachronistically:

"Warum die Indifferenz der Welt gegenüber geboten ist, sagt Paulus hier sehr deutlich. Der gleiche Grund, der das Neueingehen einer, Ehe unratsam macht, fordert gebieterisch die Einhaltung des ὡς μὴ für den Verheirateten:

1. Mt. 4.3-4; cf. Rom. 1.17.

2. GV, iii, p. 48.

3. GV, iii, p. 183.

4. GV, iii, p. 209.

die Gestalt dieser Welt vergeht. Dem Ende der Welt, der damit Verbundenen Parusie Jesu geht die Notzeit auf Erden voraus. In ihr leben die Christen bereits jetzt. So gilt: die Zeit ist begrenzt. Wie kann man sich da noch im Ernste auf ihre Inhalte einlassen? Man darf die Zeit nicht mehr als wie bisher weiterlaufend nehmen, sonst lebte man anachronistisch; also ὡς μὴ."<sup>1</sup>

Braun clearly recognises that this sort of thinking of Paul's has an apocalyptic background<sup>2</sup> and recognizes that:

"Paulus geht mit Epiktet konform, wenn er in I, Kor. 7.30 das Weinen und Lachen in die Indifferenz des ὡς μὴ verweist. Aber diese stoische Position wird von Paulus nicht durchgehalten. Anderen Ortes mahnt er vielmehr, sich zu freuen mit den sich Freuenden, zu weinen mit den Weinenden."<sup>3</sup>

Finally Braun concludes:

"Gott und Erlösung dagegen heissen bei Paulus: das Wandeln in dem πνεύμα, dessen Frucht an erster Stelle die Offenheit, das Dasein für den andern ist. Man kann darum schon fragen, ob Paulus gut daran tat, in I. Kor. 7, 29-31 diese stoa-nahe Position zu beziehen. Denn seine Intention ist nicht die Autarkie der stoischen Indifferenz, sondern das σύν der ἀγάπη."<sup>4</sup>

Even if Paul was here after indifference towards the world it does not necessarily mean that he is at one with Stoics and especially Seneca. Seneca has preached indifference in the sense that one must not be affected by external reality to the point of the loss of tranquility of mind.<sup>5</sup> Provided that tranquillity of mind remains unshaken, Seneca argues, man ought to engage in worldly

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1. Herbert Braun, Gesammelte Studien zum Neuen Testament und seiner Umwelt, Tübingen, 1962, p.161.

2. Braun, op.cit., p. 162.

3. Ibid., p. 166.

4. Ibid., p. 167.

5. De Ira, iii, 6.3-6; De Tranq. An. 13.1.



affairs to the highest degree of involvement.<sup>1</sup>

We have clearly pointed out that Paul did not want the world to take over and impose itself on his converts as the occasion or cause of an unsurpassable anxiety of a paramount importance. His view was that the world should not be given more attention than it deserves. On the other hand Seneca, mainly under the strain of his "Diesseits" eschatology, could not endorse the reality of the world as good. His maxim was an improvement of the world. Such an attitude towards the world is an ultimate seriousness. To understand to what a degree seriousness had taken over in Seneca's thought we have only to have a look at his philanthropic narratives concerning slaves,<sup>2</sup> again stemming from his cosmopolitan-humanitarian ideas.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand Paul was not scandalized at all in advising his converts to remain in the state in which they were found,<sup>4</sup> as far as their social position was concerned, precisely because of his apocalyptic view of the world in which he has envisaged the reality of the world and of life as only of penultimate importance. Thus it is not surprising that it has been said that "one of

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1. De Tranq. An. 3.1-2; De Otio, 3.2-3.

2. Epp. 17.3; 31.10-11; 47. passim; De Vita Beata, 17.2; De Tranq. An. 1.8; 8.6; 12.6; De Clem, i, 18.1-2; 24.1; 26.1; De Ira, iii, 24.2; 32.1; 35.2; 40.2; 29.1; De Brev. Vit., 12.15; De Ben. iii, 18.1-4; 19.1-4; 20.1-2; 21.1-2; 22.1-4; 23.1-5; 24; 25; 26.1-2; 27.1-4; 28.1-6; 29.1; vii, 4.4.

3. E.T. Salmon, A History of the Roman World from 30 B.C. to A.D. 138, London (Sixth Ed.) 1968, p. 70.

4. I. Cor. 7.22-24; cf. I Cor. 12.13; Gal. 3.28; Eph. 6.5-8; Col. 3.22; Philem. 16-17.

Seneca's most depressing traits is his lack of sense of humour... through all his writings Seneca has point without wit."<sup>1</sup> And another interpreter has found Seneca's works "exhaustingly boring."<sup>2</sup> Even if these overtones of Seneca's seriousness have managed to pass unnoticed by many of his interpreters they, however, were noticed by a poet. William Blake, a man who was able to write in a most childlike manner,<sup>3</sup> is known for his insights into the difference between the biblical and post-Hellenistic thought of the West. And it was he who detected this seriousness of Seneca's thought. Commenting in the margin of a book<sup>4</sup> where the text reads: "(Solomon's) admirable sermon on the vanity of every thing but piety and virtue", Blake writes: "Piety & Virtue/is Seneca Classical/O Fine Bishop".<sup>5</sup> And then when the author attempts to speak of "The moral precepts of the gospel..."<sup>6</sup> Blake rightly admonishes him: "The Gospel is Forgiveness of Sins & has No Moral Precepts these belong to Plato & Seneca & Nero".<sup>7</sup>

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1. D.R. Dudley, Neronians and Flavians, London and Boston, 1972, p. 12.
  2. J. Higginbotham, Greek and Latin Literature, London, 1969, p.18.
  3. See his Songs of Innocence.
  4. R. Watson, Bishop of Landaff, An Apology for the Bible, London, 1797, p. 48.
  5. The Poetry and Prose of William Blake, New York, 1970, p. 608.
  6. Watson, R., op.cit., p. 108.
  7. Blake, op.cit., p. 608.



Of course the gospel is more than just forgiveness of sins but Blake is impeccably right when he denounces the reading of it as a moral code. Blake here voices the same argument that K. Stendahl has advocated, namely that no idea is to be projected into the Bible and into Paul. Reading our ideas into the Pauline text is a violence to it for by doing that we are asking Paul to say what he did not say. Such an interpretation is analogical and "by way of analogy, one could of course say that in some sense every man has a 'legalistic Jew' in his heart. But this is an analogy, and should not be smuggled into the texts as their primary or explicit meaning in Paul. If this is done, something happens to the joy and humility of Gentile Christianity."<sup>1</sup>

In drawing these parallels we have attempted to outline the not so explicit, and not altogether indisputable, fact that Seneca's view of the world involved a far greater amount of seriousness than Paul's view. We are here aware of the fact that Paul has often been understood as a joy-killer<sup>2</sup> and praised as a hero of the introspective conscience. Our point, however, was to dismantle this argument by shifting the centre of gravity in interpretation towards a different aspect. Provided that our presuppositions can stand criticism, then we can point to the anthropological relevance of these aspects. Brunner writes:

"The fact that man as a whole cannot be understood from himself,

1. Stendahl, *op.cit.*, p. 215.

2. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Morgenröte, Fragm. 68; Antichrist, Fragments: 41, 42.

but that, in some way or another, in addition he must be regarded from a point of view which is 'above' man, is the pre-supposition common to all anthropologies".<sup>1</sup> In the light of this definition Sartre writes:

"The serious attitude involves starting from the world and attributing more reality to the world than to oneself; at the very least the serious man confers reality on himself to the degree to which he belongs to the world. It is not by chance that materialism is serious; it is not by chance that it is found at all times and places as the favourite doctrine of the revolutionary. This is because revolutionaries are serious. They come to know themselves first in terms of the world which oppresses them, and they wish to change this world...Thus all serious thought is thickened by the world; it coagulates; it is a dismissal of human reality in favour of the world. The serious man is 'of the world' and has no resource in himself...Man is serious when he takes himself for an object."<sup>2</sup>

This is an accurate picture of Seneca's man in the world, whose fear of the Other has escalated so much that it has imposed itself upon man in such a way that he can see himself in relation to the Other only as one who is being oppressed, limited and threatened by the presence of the Other. To encounter the Other is to encounter the peril of one's own Self. Therefore eagerness and boldness to be is eclipsed by the presence of the Other. Out of such a situation results a grave seriousness. On the other hand if man, instead of perceiving a threat, sees the source of his own being in the Other, if he "apprehends himself as free and wishes to use his freedom, a freedom, by the way, which could just as well be his anguish, then his activity

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1. Brunner, op.cit., pp. 63-64.

2. BN, p. 580.



is play. The first principle of play is man himself; through it he escapes his natural nature; he himself sets the value and rules for his acts and consents to play only according to the rules which he himself has established and defined. As a result, there is in a sense 'little reality' to the world".<sup>1</sup> Play is possible where confidence in the Other is fully established and where anxiety is diminished to its lowest possible point. That is why Paul did not want his converts to be overcome by anxiety because it would again bring them down to the "beggarly elements". Thus no wonder that it has been said:

"der Mensch spielt nur, wo er in voller Bedeutung des Wortes Mensch ist, und er ist nur da ganz Mensch, wo er spielt."<sup>2</sup>

If these arguments are seen against the background of what we have said of Paul and Seneca it seems that there was indeed a difference in their views of man. It is equally clear that terms like "optimistic", "pessimistic" and "dualistic" anthropology tell us very little of their anthropologies unless we are going - once again - to project ourselves into their writings and have them say what we want them to say.

It is clear, therefore, that Paul's and Seneca's views on man differed basically. Paul understands the whole of reality in terms of a dialectical dialogue between two things that are not opposite but different. Man himself is caught up in the

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1. BN, pp. 580-81.

2. Friedrich Schiller, Ueber die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen, München, 1967, Brief, 15, para. 5 (p.131); cf. Brief 25, and cf. Cassirer, op.cit., pp. 183ff.

midst of such a dialogue. His whole being and reality is constituted by that being "caught in the midst". His reality is not actual for it is not "self-explanatory", it has to have a "point of reference". His reality is potential, potential but not imaginary. It is real because he is there. And that is the greatest paradox of man's reality, namely that he is there for as long as he does not attempt to assert his being there. Only for as long as he recognizes that he is there because of the Other's being does he remain true to himself and true to the nature of his own being. By the attempt to secure his irrevocable being there he of necessity denies the Other's being there and by doing so he denies himself. Hence I am not the Other, each of us is different from the other, each of us being Other to the other. But I can exist as myself only insofar as the Other exists as Thou. Therefore man's reality is twofold or bipolar. The two Others are not distant from each other but they are different from each other. Paul does not know of the cyclical unity of being where the object and subject are identical. The twofoldness of the reality is never eclipsed:

"In der gelebten Wirklichkeit gibt es keine Einheit des Seins. Wirklichkeit besteht nur im Wirken, ihre Kraft und Tiefe in der seinen. Auch 'innere' Wirklichkeit ist nur, wenn Wechselwirkung ist. Die stärkste und tiefste Wirklichkeit ist, wo alles ins Wirken eingeht, der ganze Mensch ohne Rückhalt und der allumfassende Gott, das geeinte Ich und das schrankenlose Du."<sup>1</sup>

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1. M. Buber, 'Ich und Du', Dialogisches Leben, Gesammelte philosophische und pädagogische Schriften, Zürich, 1947, p.97.



Man exists only insofar as there exists the Other in the objective aspects of God and world. And it is not only that man exists only insofar as the Other exists, but this is the reality of human nature. The oddness of human reality is that man is not one with himself. Man is in "Widerspruch". That contradiction is constituted by man's being in the world, and that is where the vicious circle closes. Man is not one with himself because of his being in the world and yet he would not be a man unless he were in the world. Hence, man in himself is a contradiction. Man is a contradiction in the sense that he is running-away-from-the-Other without realizing that by doing so he is running-away-from-himself, since it is his relation to the Other which constitutes his self. This situation of man's uneasy feeling about himself Paul describes as sinful existence.

If we look at Seneca's views of man and reality we shall notice that some of what he says sounds like Paul. However, we shall regard it as legitimate to claim that Seneca's concepts of man and reality run counter to those of Paul. To be sure, there is something common to Paul and Seneca, but that is something different which we shall mention later. As we have emphasized throughout the thesis, to Seneca reality is a self-identical entity, a divine cosmos. To put it bluntly it simply means that the world exists, but not only that, it exists from and to itself. In such a perplexed situation it amounts to one basic, but daring, thought that the object is identical with the subject. This is mainly, or even exclusively,

because of the nature of knowledge and man's capacity to know. Man cannot see things from any other but from the human point of view. The world is identical to God who created it, and man is identical to God for two reasons: a) because he is his natural associate, and b) because he perceives him. Thus the world and God, being identical, present themselves as the object of man's knowledge. Man perceives them and thus becomes the source of their existence. They are abolished as an objective existence and exist only insofar as they consent to receive existence from man. Hence, reality is one and totally complete within itself. That reality is man because it is man who perceives and thus incarnates the reality of existence. It follows of necessity, according to this view, that man is fully and truly man when he is the beginning and the end of reality and of his own existence. He comes out of himself and returns into himself, for his self is the source of universal existence. For that reason his task is to contemplate: "Zieh dich zu dir selbst zurück und gib dich der Philosophie hin, der Betrachtung Gottes, des Kosmos, des Menschen, des Lebens und Todes".<sup>1</sup> This is what a modern interpreter recommends to a modern reader on the authority of Seneca himself. From what has been said in this thesis it should have become clear that these are the same objects of contemplation that Seneca is recommending. However, we have clearly stated why Seneca recommends the contemplation

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1. Hellfried Dahlmann, L. Annaeus Seneca, Ueber die Kürze des Lebens, München, 1949, p. 18.



of God, World, Man, Life and Death. These are objective aspects of the reality through which existence presents itself to man as the Other. Hence, the reason for contemplating these objects is that they have to be destroyed. They have to be expunged because they are the incarnation of man's limit and incapacity, and man's nature and task is to be the ultimate one. The Other is the peril to one's self and is to be destroyed. To be infinite and ultimate is the true state of man. Therefore, everything not only exists for the sake of man, but receives its existence from man. There are strivings of man which make him unhappy and unsatisfied with the state he is in - the state of having to face the Other. No doubt Seneca has deeply grasped the problems of human nature, on account of which it has been said:

"Die Werte, die Seneca kennt, verkündet den Menschen seiner Zeit, der die Harmonie und die ruhevollere Klarheit sicherer Verhältnisse fehlte, sind Werte, die Menschen aller Zeiten und Völker immer wieder als die ihren kannten, die von zeitloser Dauer uns heute in ihrem tiefsten Wesen so nahestehen wie den Menschen des neronischen Roms. Dass sie aber gerade als Gedanken Senecas ihren Weg durch die Geschichte des Abendlandes nehmen, liegt an der klassischen Form, in die allein er sie kleidete. Sein Wort, in erregender Unmittelbarkeit über Raum und Zeit von Mensch zu Mensch<sup>1</sup> gesprochen, öffnet sich jedem, der es nur hören will."

This is a typical example of what we have classified as post-Senecan thought and as analogical interpretation. The falsity of this argument we have no intention of proving here, but reserve the right to object to it on the ground that:

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1. Dahlmann, op.cit., pp. 26-27.

"Unhistorisch, wie die heutigen, dachten auch die antiken Kosmopoliten."<sup>1</sup> Suchlike thoughts of contemporary interpreters are not much help to modern man, since they are not really interpretations of Paul's and Seneca's thoughts, but the repetitions and the re-narrations of their thoughts. And that is what we have been trying to do in this thesis: not to re-write Paul and Seneca but to interpret them.

We have recognized at the very beginning that very many contemporary readers will take Paul and Seneca seriously. Therefore the interpreter's task is not, - as the fashion used to be, - to make an apology for the writings of these two men but to explain them. That is why they do not speak to men of all times and places - as Dahlmann wants it - unless re-interpreted against their historical background. We do not want to dispute that they both may be equally valid for modern man - provided they are properly interpreted - but we do want to dispute the argument that what Paul and Seneca were saying is one and the same thing. There seems to have existed a confusion of categories in the modern interpretation of this issue. Paul and Seneca did have something in common, and that is that they faced the same - or to a great extent similar - problems of man and thus have asked the same, or at least very similar questions. They both sensed the oddness of man's situation in the world. They both felt man's unease about himself. But on no account

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1. Mühl, op.cit., p. 101; cf. J-P. Sartre, What is Literature? London, 1967, pp. 49, 57.



did they offer the same answers to these problems. Hence, the questions they posed are not, by virtue of confusion, to be put in the place of answers they offered to these questions. The fact that they found themselves in the same situation does not mean that they saw the same way out of the situation. And here we meet the final point at which Paul and Seneca are valid for modern man, and that is that modern man is faced with the same, or at least very similar, questions as Paul and Seneca and is in search of an answer. Common to all three is their humanity. Should modern man attempt to answer his questions from Paul's and Seneca's works by "slotting in" Paul's or Seneca's wisdom he will uproot his own historicity and Paul and Seneca will be of no help to him in any respect. In this sense Paul and Seneca are not timeless. This is the only common thing between all three, Paul, Seneca and the modern man: their historicity, i.e. they are living men in the world, faced with similar problems and asking similar questions. The fact that they are asking the same questions tells us nothing more than that they are human. Both, Paul and Seneca, in answering these questions sensed and said things which are well founded, but it still does not mean that they have said the same thing.

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