

THE EXTRA-ORDINARY IN ORDINARY LANGUAGE

Social order in the talk of teachers

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Where the political state has achieved its full development, man leads a double life, a heavenly and an earthly life, not only in thought or consciousness, but in actuality. In the political community he regards himself as a communal being, but in civil society he is active as a private individual, treats other men as means, reduces himself to a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers. The political state is as spiritual in relation to civil society as heaven is in relation to earth. It stands in the same opposition to civil society, and goes beyond the limitation of the profane world, that is, by recognising, re-establishing, and necessarily allowing itself to be dominated by it. In his innermost actuality, in civil society, man is a profane being.

KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question

P r e f a c e

This study reports an empirical and theoretical investigation of everyday language. It discusses the speech of teachers and pupils in a school classroom, from a 'phenomenological' point of view.

In recent years, mutually contradictory phenomenological theories of language have been developed, based upon the works of Schutz and Sartre, whose essentialist readings of Husserl's explorations in consciousness have been translated into theories for the description of everyday speech. Garfinkel's 'ethnomethodology' follows Schutz in portraying everyday speakers as sustaining in their talk the appearance of a shared 'intersubjectivity' or social order, which he and they presume to be real. On this 'optimistic' view, a social world shared with others is inescapable. Laing's 'existential psychiatry' follows Sartre in portraying everyday speakers as sustaining in their talk the appearance of a unique 'subjectivity' or psychological self, which he and they presume to be real. On this 'pessimistic' view, a social world shared with others is unattainable. In contrast, my approach follows Husserl's attempt to suspend belief in any reality other than that which appears. I aspire thereby to be 'realistic'.

My approach throws into relief relations between words which are invisible when attention is focussed on the things to which words refer. I analyse spoken utterances into clauses or quasi-clausal units which I call 'pictures'. Within the speech of a single individual, and more generally, samenesses and differences can be established between pictures on the basis of grammatical structure (form), and vocabulary (content). In the present study, personal pronouns have been especially important for this purpose. On this basis 'realms' can be distinguished within everyday speech 'inhabited' by specific personal pronouns, and endowed with stable properties, which it is the task of linguistic phenomenology to investigate.

In these terms I analyse the talk of teachers and the response of pupils in the classroom setting, using material gathered during a six month period of participant observation. This speech sustains a structure of three realms: a social order, inhabited by the we, ordered by intelligible, 'rational' rules; a natural order, inhabited by impersonal figures such as somebody, governed by inexplicit inevitabilities; and finally a more problematic realm, inhabited by an I and a you, whose speech to one another entertains alternative realities in a dialectic. The structure is reminiscent of the theological realms of 'heaven', 'hell', and 'earth'. This last realm is for me the reality of ordinary speech, a reality neglected in previous phenomenologies of language, which have located reality in the extra-ordinary realms of social and natural order, 'heaven' and 'hell'.

The same location is made within ordinary speech itself. A problem crucial to the practice of teaching is the maintenance of discipline. The skilful teacher solves this problem by employing extra-ordinary speech to portray a stable social or natural order, or perhaps a mutually contradictory combination of the two. In ordinary speech he then portrays the I and the you present together here and now in the context of the external social or natural reality. In

theological terms the I is portrayed as the spokesman on 'earth' for the 'heavenly' social order, or as the instrument of the 'hellish' natural order, beyond.

These realms, and the transitions accomplished between them in language, correspond precisely to the realms and transitions in consciousness portrayed by Husserl. But Husserl's investigations are themselves produced in language. I hypothesise that they may also be found to exist in Husserl's writing itself. In this case the reference to 'consciousness' is redundant: Husserl's texts can be re-read as an exploration in and of language itself, that is, as exhibiting a linguistic phenomenology.

Analysis shows this to be the case. Husserl's texts exhibit briefly, the dialectic of ordinary language, from which the phenomenological reductions make extra-ordinary departures. His language, like that of the teachers, pursues the unproblematic certainties of social 'heaven' and natural 'hell', which once attained can be turned back upon the problematic 'earth' to order it. From my point of view, such language falsifies ordinary language, misrepresenting it to itself: extra-ordinary language covers over the dialectical flux of ordinary language. Husserl's phenomenology is uncritical of this extra-ordinary language in everyday life because it is itself a product of such language. Linguistic phenomenology must go beyond the limitations of Husserl's language, in order to be critical of everyday language itself.

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I n t r o d u c t i o n

INTERPRETING INTERSUBJECTIVITY

The notion of 'intersubjectivity' was first widely publicised by Alfred Schutz, though he derived it from the work of Edmund Husserl. 'Intersubjectivity' is held to define the philosophical grounding both for the social scientist's interpretation of the actions of others and for his attributed understanding of their interpretations of one another's actions. The double sense in which the social scientist employs this notion may be expressed by saying that for him it has theoreticity.¹ If he assumes that he and they assume intersubjectivity as the basis for all their social interaction, then a we is constituted for him. In this case, the term defines a closed circle of explanation: once we are immersed within it, we need never encounter any reason for emerging. The present text records my attempt to break out of this circle.

The practical social scientists who work within the circle of 'intersubjectivity' have been unmoved by recent philosophical criticisms of Schutz's derivation of the term.² Indeed, they have assumed it to be unnecessary to concern themselves with the philosophical antecedents of the notion.

It is my intention to challenge this assumption, which amounts to the premise that the philosophical and the practical are remote from one another. This premise is one which Schutz has himself investigated. In order to grasp Schutz's treatment of the problem, I shall consider the text in which he first systematically developed his ideas.

In the Phenomenology of the Social World Schutz set himself the task of providing a rigorous philosophical underpinning for the methodology of social science. Believing that thus far Max Weber had made most progress in this direction, Schutz sought to clarify what Weber called the 'key concepts of sociology'.

As is well known, Weber begins his series of interconnected definitions with the statement that Sociology is "a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action, in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects".³ Weber thus makes action, that is behaviour to which the acting individual "attaches a subjective meaning", the irreducible atomic unit of sociological enquiry. In particular, he tells us, the sociologist is concerned with social action, that is action which "by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals) ... takes account of the behaviours² of others and is thereby oriented in its course".⁴ This approach exhibits a tendency which becomes explicit in Talcott Parson's statement that the "action frame of reference" is analogous to the space/time frame of reference for physics, in its significance for sociological explanation.⁵

Schutz finds this starting-point to be insufficiently fundamental for his purpose. The concept of 'action', he says,

by no means defines a primitive ... It is, on the contrary, a mere label for a highly complex and ramified area that calls for much further study.⁶

For Schutz, 'the meaningful act of the individual' cannot be the basic unit of sociological study, because what is 'objectively' the 'same' act may have, and generally will have, different meanings for different individuals and indeed for the same individual, including the actor himself, on different occasions. It therefore becomes necessary to investigate a phenomenon more fundamental than 'action', namely meaning.

At this point, Schutz introduces a distinction unremarked by Weber, between commonsense and scientific methods of interpreting the actions of others. He states:

It must be stressed that careful description of the processes which enable one man to understand another's thoughts and actions is a prerequisite for the methodology of the empirical social sciences. The question how a scientific interpretation of human action is possible can only be resolved if an adequate answer is first given to the question of how man, in the natural attitude of daily life and common-sense, can understand another's action at all.⁷

Since Weber never made this distinction, his account of the interpretation of the actions of others has ambiguous status. It is at once a hypothesis as to how action is actually interpreted, in everyday life, and a methodological recommendation as to the interpretive procedures to be used by the social scientist.

For Schutz, the question then becomes: what method can be used to describe how one man interprets another in the natural attitude of daily life and common-sense? Schutz says that the procedure used can be "neither the method of

the empirical social sciences nor the method of common-
sense".⁸ He finds the source of such a method in the
'phenomenology' of Edmund Husserl.

Chapter One

HUSSERL'S TWO PHENOMENOLOGIES OF EVERYDAYNESS

The Idea of Phenomenology

The Idea of Phenomenology, a collection of lectures, originally delivered by Husserl in 1907, provides a simple introduction to his phenomenology. In this work, Husserl polemically identifies the whole of philosophy and science as previously practised, together with commonsense, as the 'natural attitude' in contrast to which he will define his own new science of philosophy. He states:

In the natural mode of reflection, we are turned to the objects as they are given to us each time ... even though they are given in different ways, and in different modes of being ... In perception, for instance, a thing stands before our eyes as a matter of course. It is there, among other things, living or lifeless, animate or inanimate. It is, in short, within a world of which part is perceived, ... and of which part is contextually supplied by [our] memory, from whence it spreads out into the indeterminate and the unknown ... Our judgements relate to this world .. We make judgements about things, their relations, their changes, about the

conditions which functionally determine their changes, and about the laws of their variations ... We generalise, and then apply again general knowledge to particular cases, or deduce analytically new generalisations from general knowledge. Isolated cognitions do not simply follow each other in the manner of mere succession. They enter logical relations with each other, they follow from one another, they support one another, thereby strengthening their logical power.¹

Thus far, it would seem, the 'natural attitude' consists of an elaborate self-fulfilling prophecy. But,

On the other hand, they also clash and contradict one another. They do not agree with one another ... and their claim to be cognitions is discredited ...²

What action do we now take? Do these contradictions cause us to question the 'natural' attitude?

Where do we look for help? We now weigh the reasons for different possible ways of deciding or providing an explanation. The weaker must give way to the stronger, and the stronger, in its turn, are of value [only] as long as they will stand up ...³

Paradoxically, then, an apparent weakness becomes a source of strength:

Thus, natural knowledge makes strides ... the various sciences of the natural sort come into being and flourish.⁴

The point which Husserl is making is that under the 'natural' attitude, in science or in commonsense, no distinction is acknowledged between the 'different ways' in which objects are given to us, and their correspondingly different modes of being. Such a distinction is to be made for example within what, in the 'natural' attitude we regard as 'perception', between that part which is 'perceived', and the part which is 'contextually supplied'. The relation between these parts is somewhat problematic: yet we never address it. We

confound the two levels together, never seeing any difficulty in their relationship.

What change in attitude precisely, does Husserl want to effect? He says,

Let us contrast the natural mode of reflection with the philosophical. With the awakening of reflection about the relation of cognition to its object, abysmal difficulties arise. Cognition, the thing most taken for granted in natural thinking, suddenly emerges as a mystery. But I must be more exact. What is taken for granted in natural thinking is the possibility of cognition. Constantly busy producing results, advancing from discovery to discovery in newer and newer branches of science, natural thinking finds no occasion to raise the question of the possibility of cognition as such ... ⁵

Now, what exactly is this 'question'? Husserl says, the correlation between cognition as a mental process, its referent and what objectively is, ... is the source of the deepest and most difficult problems. Collectively, the problem of cognition.⁶

So, for Husserl the 'natural' attitude assumes that 'cognitions' can correspond with what objectively is in the real world to which those cognitions refer. This is not to assume that there always is such correspondence: Husserl has acknowledged that within this attitude the distinction between true and false cognitions is made. By contrast, Husserl poses the 'philosophical' attitude, which makes no such presumption. Following Husserl, then, I propose to designate as the problem of philosophy the relation between the two 'modes of being', which for him is neglected by the 'natural attitude' of commonsense.

In his later writings, Husserl came to elaborate two distinct ways in which these modes could be investigated. These were the two famous 'phenomenological reductions', whereby the world was 'reduced' to the viewpoint of one mode of being or the other. For an overview of the broader context of the development of his writings, I can do no better than to quote Paul Ricoeur's statement:

After the Logical Investigations, Husserl's works follow two paths. On the one hand, descriptive themes never cease to be enriched and to overflow the initial logical framework; on the other hand, Husserl continues to refine the philosophy of his method, and thus to mix a phenomenological philosophy with a phenomenology actually practised ... The fact is, that the idealist interpretation of the method does not necessarily coincide with its actual practise, as many of his disciples have pointed out.

I propose to focus attention on two texts, respectively representative of the 'descriptive' and the 'philosophical' tendencies within Husserl's work, namely the Ideas, published in 1913, and the Cartesian Meditations, published in 1929. Apart from the fact that they are the best-known writings of Husserl's middle period,⁸ each of these presents a 'phenomenology of the social world'.

Immanentism

The Ideas in fact begins with an account of the social world, prior to the definition of the phenomenological reduction itself. In section 27, entitled "The World of the Natural Standpoint: I and my World about Me", Husserl states:

Our first outlook upon life is that of natural human beings, imagining, judging, feeling, willing, 'from the natural standpoint'. Let us make clear to ourselves what this means in the form of simple meditations which we can best carry on in the first person.

I am aware of a world, spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become, without end. I am aware of it, that means first of all, I discover it immediately, intuitively, I experience it. Through sight, touch, hearing, etc., in the different ways of sensory perception, corporeal things somehow spatially distributed are for me simply there, in verbal or figurative sense "present" whether or not I pay them special attention by busying myself with them, considering, thinking, feeling, willing. ... [I]t is not necessary that they and other objects likewise should be present precisely in my field of perception. For me real objects are there, definite, more or less familiar, agreeing with what is actually perceived without being themselves perceived or even intuitively present ... I find myself at all times, and without my ever being able to change this, set in relation to a world which, through constant changes, remains one and ever the same ... It is then to this world ... that the complex forms of my ... consciousness stand related ... Related to it likewise are the diverse acts and states of sentiment and disapproval, joy and sorrow ... decision and action. All these, together with the sheer acts of the Ego, in which I become acquainted with the world as immediately given to me, ... are included under the one Cartesian expression: Cogito.⁹

Thus I live in the Cogito, according to Husserl in this descriptive analysis. Should I step back and reflect upon 'my' experiences, then an Ego arises as an object for the Cogito: but that Cogito itself is not reflected upon, not an object for thought. I can by reflection, step aside from the natural attitude, into one of many other realms of thought, e.g. that of arithmetic:

The arithmetic world is there for me only when and so long as I occupy the arithmetic standpoint, But the natural world ... is constantly there for me, so long as I live naturally, and look in its direction.¹⁰

"The two worlds are present together, but disconnected", says Husserl.

Now it is within the 'natural' world, that I

comprehend other people. Within the 'natural attitude' "whatever holds good for me personally". Husserl states, "also holds good, as I know, for all other men whom I find present in my world-about-me".¹¹ Under this attitude, the world that is simply there for me is the same world that is simply there for all other men; and in this case a we arises.

we come to understandings with our neighbours, and set up in common an objective spatio-temporal fact-world as the world about us that is there for us all, and to which we ourselves nonetheless belong.¹²

The presumption of a world simply there, one and the same world for us all, Husserl now characterises as "the general thesis of the natural standpoint". This thesis is not a proposition, a judgement, or an assertion. Rather, it is prior to and assumed tacitly within every proposition, judgement, assertion, theory, formulated within the 'natural' attitude of commonsense.

Wishing to distance himself from the 'natural' standpoint which he has delineated, Husserl now defines his own standpoint with reference to the 'general thesis'. Such a new standpoint is only possible because he has expressed explicitly what could never be expressed within the natural attitude itself.

The new attitude may be anticipated in the light of Husserl's earlier argument. Under the 'natural' attitude, cognitions were judged to be 'true' or 'false', judgements which, in either case, took for granted the possibility of cognition. By contrast, in the 'philosophical' attitude, Husserl told us, no such correspondence could be presumed possible. Similarly in his new formulation of the matter in Ideas, Husserl wants to abstain from all judgements as to the truth or falsity of the 'general thesis of the natural standpoint'. He engages in an epoche, an 'abstinence' from or

'bracketing' of this attitude, which he calls the phenomenological epoche, and so reaches a new stance.

The new stance involves, so Husserl claims, a radical scepticism towards the claims made by the 'natural' sciences, a category which would of course include all non-phenomenological 'social' or 'human' sciences. He declares that

all sciences which relate to the natural world, though they stand never so firm to me, though they fill me with wondering admiration, though I am far from any thought of objecting to them in the least degree, I make no use of their standards.¹³

Why is this? Consider one such standard. 'Natural' sciences of all kinds have often laid claim to the title of 'positivism': the claim to rest their arguments on a firm 'position'.¹⁴ But Husserl says,

If, by 'positivism' we are to mean the absolutely unbiassed grounding of all science on what is 'positive', i.e. on what can be primordially apprehended, then it is we who are the true positivists.¹⁵

The core reason for this is, that the so-called positivists of the 'natural' sciences do not set out to explicate the constitutive assumptions of their own way of seeing the world: they are therefore far from being unbiassed and presuppositionless, as they claim to be.

On what basis does Husserl's claim to a firm 'position' rest, at this stage? He defines the philosophical status of this position in section 46 of the book, entitled "Indubitability of Immanent, Dubitability of Transcendent Perception", where he states

The thesis of my pure Ego and its personal life, which is 'necessary' and plainly indubitable, thus stands opposed to the thesis of the world, which is 'contingent'.¹⁶

The Ego here referred to is defined as "the stream of experience of the one who is thinking". It is ever-present. Therefore, echoing Descartes' expression, Husserl says, "I say forthwith and because I must, I am, this life is, I live, cogito".¹⁷

In the analysis of Ideas, then, the focus of Husserl's attention has become 'the stream of experience of the one who is thinking: this is immanent, and so indubitable. By contrast, what has been bracketed away, the transcendent and so dubitable, is the world common to all, presumed under the thesis of the 'natural' standpoint. All intersubjective, transcendental knowledge, therefore is to be bracketed, and the phenomenologist is to address his attention to what is unique and personal in his own subjective life.

Transcendentalism

Consider now, by contrast, the account of the social world given by Husserl in his theoretical phenomenological study, the Cartesian Meditations. For in section 8, Husserl tells us that the ego cogito, if Descartes' method is followed correctly, is not the immanent ego, the concrete person who 'has' my experiences, but is the transcendental ego, the 'apodictic' being which is 'antecedent to the being of the world'. How is this being revealed, discovered, from within my experience? By now carrying out another, second reduction, over and above the phenomenological reduction of Ideas, a transcendental reduction. In the first reduction, I abstained from judging whether I posited a world 'out there' corresponding to my experiences. I was left, then, merely contemplating my consciousness per se. Now I further abstain from judging whether I posit an I 'out there', the possessor of experiences which I regard as 'mine'.

It is necessary to guard against a possible misinter-

pretation of this procedure. The first epoche did not involve any disbelief in the external world, nor any forgetting of my experiences about that world. It rather involved taking up a new attitude which treated 'my experiences' as the object of enquiry in its own right. Similarly, the second epoche involves no disbelief in my experiences, nor any forgetting of the content of those experiences. It too involves a new attitude, which treats 'experience' as the object of enquiry in its own right. Husserl explains:

the philosophically reflective ego's abstention from position-takings, his depriving them of acceptance, does not signify their disappearance from his field of experience. The concrete subjective experiences, let us repeat, are indeed the things to which his attentive regard is directed, but the ... philosophising Ego practises abstention with regard to what he intuitively ... [E]verything meant in such accepting or positing ... is still retained completely, but ... [as] 'mere phenomenon'.¹⁸

The key to understanding this unfamiliar recommendation, I believe, lies in Husserl's choice of the word 'reflective'. Within the transcendental attitude, the philosophical attitude, I examine my 'subjective' experiences, certainly (what else can I ever do?) but not with a view to finding out about the uniqueness of my subjective consciousness as was my concern in the immanent attitudes, but rather with a view to finding out about consciousness per se, that is, about necessary features of all possible subjective experience.

It may therefore be misleading of Husserl to employ the term 'transcendental ego', as if this were a subject. For it is not an empirically existing subject in the sense that the cogito of Ideas was an empirically existing subject. The notion of a unique 'transcendental ego' is a contradiction, as if my transcendental ego were different to yours. For, if

this knowledge is knowledge held by any possible subjectivity, then plainly it is held by all subjectivities. It is this argument which Husserl undertakes in the most famous passage from his Cartesian Meditations, the concluding "Fifth Meditation".¹⁹

First, then, consider the argument with which Husserl opens this meditation. It is a defence against the charge, that transcendental phenomenology is in fact transcendental solipsism. Husserl sets out to answer this charge, by providing a transcendental phenomenological account of how it is possible to apprehend other people in the social world. He observes that, in the multiplicity of ways in which I apprehend others, two stand out. On the one hand, I experience them as objects 'in' the world. On the other hand, I experience them as subjects 'for' the world, as experiencing the same world that I experience, and in so doing experiencing me too, even as I experience the world and others in it. Now, he asks, how is it that the latter way of apprehending the other, as subjectivity, arises?

In a circuitous answer to this question, Husserl first re-considers how it is possible for me to apprehend what is my own. Within the transcendental sphere that is, wherein I am already considering features of any possible subjectivity, I am now to enquire, how can my subjectivity be apprehended? In other words, I am investigating features of any possible my-ness. I can conceive of this my-ness, he argues, by carrying out a third reduction. In effect, it is a repeat of the first, phenomenological reduction, observed from within the reflective standpoint attained by the second.

This third epoche is a bracketing-off of all that is alien to my I alone, i.e. all references to 'others', such as cultural objects, everything belonging to the surrounding world being capable of belonging to everyone, not simply to

I. This leaves behind, so Husserl argues, a 'unitary, founding stratum', a 'monad', comprising 'my' nature, animate organism, sensations, functioning organs, psychic life. This monad he calls the human ego. But this ego is not the entirety of the transcendental sphere. What is the other-ness which was, temporarily, bracketed off? How do I apprehend this sphere? Husserl now suggests, that I constitute a human ego not as I myself but as mirrored in my own human Ego, an 'alter ego' : a mirroring of my own self, an analogue, a pairing.

By means of this procedure, Husserl now argues that the problem of 'solipsism' has been overcome: the charge was unwarranted: transcendental phenomenology can account for our understanding of other people.

The 'pairing', 'mirror-image' notion explicates precisely the logical argument each of us must pursue to engage in social interaction with other people at all. In simple terms the procedure amounts to the assumption that others are 'like' ourselves. But, Husserl's two analyses permit greater precision than this. For a genuinely transcendental intersubjectivity, the 'likeness' that is involved is not some sort of vague resemblance between two empirically different psychological individuals. Such a claimed resemblance would in fact be false: for according to the presumptions of the immanent phenomenology which investigates these empirical psychologies, each may be unique. Rather, this 'likeness' is an exact identity, as between the necessary (and necessarily shared) features of any possible subjectivity. Such a claimed resemblance is true and indeed is for Husserl the only truth worthy of the name in its full sense. It follows, then, that insofar as transcendental phenomenology has not yet become part of the everyday consciousness of all society's members, then we live in a less than fully 'true' society: a society which remains false, fulfilling less than its true potential, to the extent that its members believe and daily act on the belief in their dealings with one another, that their

actuality corresponds with their potentiality.

Husserl explores the logic of this argument through his "Fifth Meditation", designating as "higher order intersubjectivities" those in which men become progressively more aware of one another's mutual orientedness. The beginning of this progression, which Husserl designates as the "First Objectivity" is simply the 'natural' world as it was described in Ideas, under the assumption of the 'general thesis of the natural standpoint'. It is characterised by the assumption, on each person's part, that the same nature, the same world, exists for all others as exists for me, with the allowance that for you it appears "as if I were standing over there".²⁰ This nature, this world, is constituted by each as 'the same' for all: "an identical intentional object of separate conscious processes".²¹

Progression to higher order intersubjectivities is possible, however insofar as the transcendental possibilities become immanent. That is, insofar as each monad becomes aware of others as aware of himself, as aware of possible as well as actual others, themselves aware of possible and actual others and so on. It might seem that the ramifying complexities could continue indefinitely, but for Husserl this is not the case. There is, rather, a utopian single community of monads, characterised by a specially developed form of reciprocated sociality, which marks the end-point, the telos of this process, conceived historically. Husserl describes it in this way:

Actually, therefore, there can exist only a single community of monads, the community of all co-existing monads. Hence, there can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature.²²

The pursuit of this one world is furthered by transcendental phenomenology which is nothing else than "an all-embracing

self-investigation"

In other words: the path leading to a knowledge absolutely grounded in the highest sense, or (this being the same thing) a philosophical knowledge, is necessarily the path of universal self-knowledge - first of all monadic, and then intermonadic. We can also say that a radical and universal continuation of Cartesian meditations, or (equivalently) a universal self-cognition, is philosophy itself and encompasses all self-accountable science. The Delphic motto "Know thyself" has gained a new signification
.....²³

Transcendental phenomenology can clarify the nature of this goal, and the steps which must be taken towards its attainment. The goal and the steps involve the deepening self-knowledge of man, a knowledge which takes a pre-assigned form, and so is amenable to a scientific analysis. Thus the conclusion of the Cartesian Meditations opens up a vista running from the immanentism of Ideas to the transcendentalism of his later position - a journey which it is man's historical destiny to complete.²⁴

Realism

Perhaps Husserl's utopia is too clinical for comfort. But if one is sceptical as to the culmination of his historical process, then the "Fifth Meditation" becomes suggestive as an exploration of modes of sociality in society short of the telos.²⁵ A range of such modes can be conceived in a world in which each member is engaged in ascribing a 'sameness', a 'pairing' to the others which differs from the ones others are ascribing to him. Three are explicitly explored by Husserl. First the mundane, or 'natural' attitude is subjected to critique in both of his studies, but is recognisably the same phenomenon in each. Secondly, the immanentist attitude is explored in some detail in Ideas, as an alternative to the 'natural' view. Thirdly the transcendentalist attitude, in its fully developed form, is

presented in the Meditations where it stands in contrast to both of its predecessors.

Husserl, of course, has devoted most attention to exploring the two extremes. In comparison he has neglected to articulate the standpoint of the mundane world itself. But his investigations throw light on this problem. Consider the standpoint of the mundane individual. Such an individual believes in the objectivity of the external world, and believes that consciousnesses can correspond to it, though not necessarily that they actually do. Thus he recognises that empirically a gap may exist, either between consciousness and reality, or between consciousness and consciousness, but he believes that this need not be the case. He thus postulates as his utopia a state of affairs in which full correspondence between consciousnesses and world exists. If this is his 'heaven', then his 'hell' is by contrast a world in which correspondence exists neither between consciousness and consciousness nor between consciousness and world.

But it is the immanentist consciousness which gives rise to the mundane vision of hell, with the necessary additional feature, to preserve it as hell, that its occupants know that they are there. More precisely, its members are sceptical as to the possibility of correspondence either between consciousness and consciousness or between world and consciousness, and therefore the remedies open to the mundane consciousness are denied them.

Likewise, it is the transcendentalist consciousness which gives rise to the mundane heaven, again with the necessary additional feature, to preserve it as heaven, that its occupants know that they are there. More precisely, they are certain of the correspondence between consciousness and consciousness, and so any possible consciousness, and so, the world.

From the mundane viewpoint, the immanentist vision is pessimistic, and the transcendentalist vision is optimistic. Neither could be the basis for a realistic investigation of everyday life. Each is an escape from the historical pursuit of rationality, the first by a denial of the possibility of such rationality, the second by a complacent assertion that it has been attained. Rather than escaping problematic everyday life for one or other of these unproblematic visions, the problem is to extricate consciousness from these visions and bring it back down to earth. It is with this aim in mind that I propose to pursue the investigations of the phenomenologists.

Chapter Two

THE OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM OF SCHUTZ AND SARTRE

Life versus thought in Schutz

Schutz's use of the method of phenomenology to advance upon Weber's account of action centres on a single distinction. "Weber", states Schutz, "makes no distinction between the action, considered as something in progress, and the completed act".¹ Schutz distinguishes these two as 'life' and 'thought', in the following terms:

Thought is focussed on the objects of the spatio-temporal world; life pertains to duration. The tension between the two is of the essence of the 'meaningfulness' of experience. It is misleading to say that experiences have meaning ... Rather, those experiences are meaningful which are grasped reflectively. The meaning is the way in which Ego regards its experience. The meaning lies in the attitude of the Ego towards that part of its stream of consciousness which has already flowed by.²

This distinction seems familiar. For Schutz as for Husserl, the ongoing immersion in life of the immanent, 'psychological ego' is contrasted with the reflective, timeless detachment of the 'transcendental ego'. But, Husserl himself was not consistent as to his own location within this distinction: in one work he takes up, methodologically, an immanentist position: in the other, he takes up methodologically a transcendentalist position. I have proposed, in opposition to each of these, a realist position.

It is of some importance to establish what position Schutz himself adopts. 'Lived experience', for Schutz, is rich and complex, but it can never apprehend itself. All apprehension of it takes place at the level of reflected thought. This applies to the man-in-the-street thinking about his experiences as much as it does to the phenomenologist theorising about experience in general. 'Thought' takes place at the level of reflection. Experience, regrettable though it may be, cannot be grasped and is always elusive: this is its very nature. But if these two are to be distinguished as transcendent reality versus immanent appearance, which is which? Here is a surprising reversal of the analysis of Husserl: it is experience which is real, whereas thought presents only the appearance of this reality. By contrast, in the developed viewpoint of Husserl's Meditations, experience grasped the mere immanent appearance of a reality knowable only in thought.

Intersubjectivity

In the light of this distinction, consider now Schutz's treatment of the problem of understanding other people. He distinguishes two cases. On the one hand, there is the case where I read about or hear about the actions of another person, without being there myself. In this case, obviously I have to deal in judgements about the other: my knowledge

is and remains a knowledge of types. But there is another case, namely that of face-to-face interaction, where I directly observe the ongoing actions of the other as they occur. Here, says Schutz, we meet in lived experience. A special and precise form of knowledge of the other person is here possible. Schutz portrays the situation in this way:

Since he is confronting me in person, the range of symptoms by which I apprehend his consciousness includes much more than what he is communicating to me purposefully. I observe his movements, gestures, and facial expressions. I hear the intonation and the rhythm of his utterances. Each phase of my consciousness is co-ordinated with a phase of my partner's. Since I perceive the continuous manifestations of my partner's conscious life, I am continuously attuned to it. One highly important consequence of this state of affairs is that my partner is given to me more vividly and in a sense more 'directly' than I apprehend myself. Since I 'know' my past, I 'know' myself in infinitely greater detail than anyone else. Yet this is knowledge in retrospect, in reflection: it is not direct and vivid experience. Hence, while I am straightforwardly engaged in the business of life, my own self is not present to me in an equally wide range of symptoms as is a fellow-man whom I confront in the Here and Now of a concrete We-relation.³

In this We-relation, Schutz states that a sharing of lived-experience occurs, that we 'grow older together'. This relationship then has a special importance, neglected by all those social theorists who conceive of social relationships purely on the reflective level, in terms of types. For Schutz, this apprehension of the other is not the outcome of reflection or judgment. It is 'pre-predicative', to use Husserl's term. In direct experience, I apprehend what the other says and does as he does so. I experience this ongoing action as 'his' stream of consciousness, his lived experience. I live through my own stream of experience but I do not experience it as 'mine', though I could do so by disengaging from the shared lived experience and engaging in a private reflection. In everyday experience we believe that we know when the other's attention wanders in this way. But when attention is reciprocated, we experience an interweaving of

subjectivities in a single stream: not my intersubjectivity, nor yours, but ours: this is intersubjectivity.

Plainly, this state of affairs can be located within the range of alternative visions of the social world portrayed by Husserl. It is the world in which men are "certain of the correspondence between consciousness and consciousness, and so any possible consciousness, and so, the world".⁴ It is, then, the world which Husserl portrayed in his Cartesian Meditations as the utopian telos of history, the end-of-the-world vision, of a society in which all men are transcendental phenomenologists, and apprehend one another as such. But now, what status does Schutz ascribe to this world? Is it, perhaps, an ideal vision of an interpersonal relationship which we occasionally glimpse, perhaps in a fleetingly intimate sharing of understanding with another person whom we know deeply, even love? Or is it, less optimistically, a vision of a relationship unattainable in the fallen state of our present society, a picture of social life in a yet-to-be-attained utopia, or with God in the Kingdom of Heaven? Not so, for Schutz. For Schutz, this we-relationship is not hard to attain. It is indeed impossible to avoid, insofar as we engage in any social encounter, however brief, with another person. The we-relationship, according to Schutz, characterises our everyday dealings with all other members of our society. For Schutz, it is the 'natural' attitude of everyday life.

In Schutz, Husserl's transcendentalist vision has been made immanent.⁵ One implication of this is particularly crucial for my argument. For Husserl the utopia was to be attained, historically, through the discipline of thought. For Schutz by contrast, this utopia is already available in the indiscipline of experience. Whereas Husserl's rationalist vision implies the necessity of changing society, Schutz's irrationalist vision implies the impossibility of doing so. For Schutz, we already live in the best of all possible worlds, in utopia, in heaven. Only the I thinks it does not.

Multiple Realities

Intersubjectivity is not the only reality which Schutz explores. Inspired by the account of 'multiple realities' given by William James,⁶ Schutz suggests that

there are several, probably an infinite number of various orders of realities, each with its own special and separate style of existence[:] the world of sense of physical things, the world of science, ... the worlds of sheer madness and vagary. The popular mind conceives of all these ... more or less disconnectedly, and when dealing with one of them forgets for the time being its relations to the rest. But every object we think of is ... referred to one of these subworlds.⁷

Schutz refers to these 'orders of realities' as finite provinces of meaning. Examples he suggests would be 'wide-awakeness', 'dreams', 'film', the world of a 'novel', the worlds of 'science', and so on. Each one of us encounters very many different provinces of meaning during the course of a day, and the shift from one to another is experienced, in Kierkegaard's term, as an existential 'shock', or 'leap'. (I am writing at my typewriter, for instance, absorbed in my work, when there is a knock on the door). These provinces may be distinguished by means of several parameters of which two are pre-eminent for the purposes of the present argument. These are 'accent of reality', and 'mode of sociality'.

The notion of a specific 'accent of reality' is one which James himself put forward, and it has an intuitive significance in for example the comparison between 'joking' and 'serious' talk. But Schutz is able to give it a more precise sense. He proposes adapting Husserl's methodological notion, that we may regard each accent of reality as sustained by a specific epoche of its own. This idea is highly suggestive because it promises to enable Husserl's immanent and transcendent realms, to be located in relation to everyday experience. What then of the reality which Husserl considered to be the core of everyday experience itself, the 'natural' attitude? Schutz

suggests that this attitude should be considered a finite province of meaning, one of special importance. He discusses its epoche as follows:

Phenomenology has taught us the concept of the phenomenological epoche, the suspension of our belief in the world as a device to overcome the natural attitude by radicalising the Cartesian method of philosophical doubt. The suggestion may be ventured that man within the natural attitude also uses a specific epoche, of course quite another one than the phenomenologist. He does not suspend belief in the outer world and its objects, but on the contrary, he suspends doubt in its existence. What he puts in brackets is the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him. We propose to call this epoche, the epoche of the natural attitude.⁸

Schutz, then defines the epoche of the natural attitude as the diametric opposite of the phenomenological epoche. But which phenomenological epoche is this? It is, of course, none other than the immanentist reduction of Husserl's Ideas, the suspension of the 'general thesis of the natural standpoint'. What, then, is the epoche of the natural attitude? Man within the 'natural attitude' for Schutz, suspends doubt that the world might be otherwise than it appears: not only to him as one individual, but to any individual, since this 'natural' attitude is intersubjective. But this does not refer to the mundane world as I have defined it⁹ - within that world, issues of 'truth' and 'falsity' are burning topics of conversation. It is, rather, the epoche of the transcendentalist stance, wherein correspondence between consciousness and consciousness, any consciousness, and so with world, is presumed. Thus it is confirmed that in Schutz's vision the 'natural' attitude is what is for Husserl the attitude of transcendentalism.

But now a broader conclusion follows. For, having defined his two polar opposite provinces of meaning, with reference to their accents of reality, Schutz now proceeds

to make this opposition the principle of organisation of all provinces of meaning: an organisation which I prefer to call a structure.¹⁰ He states that the specific epoche governing each and every other province of meaning can be considered as a further epoche applied to that of the natural attitude,

which suspend belief in more and more layers of the reality of daily life, putting them in brackets.¹¹

Clearly this process cannot continue indefinitely, but will terminate when the existence of the external world itself is put in brackets, namely, when it reaches the immanentist reduction explored by Husserl in Ideas. Thus, implicit within Schutz's analysis, is a theory as to the constitution of reality within the world of daily life, a theory which complements and extends Husserl's account to a greater extent than Schutz himself appeared to realise. It is that Husserl's 'immanentist' and 'transcendentalist' spheres define the extreme possibilities of a continuum of provinces of meaning ranging from the philosophical to the practical, all of which are available to the adventurous consciousness.

Consider now Schutz's notion of 'mode of sociality'. For Schutz, as has been shown, the 'natural' attitude, which in this respect corresponds to Husserl's transcendentalist vision, is characterised by intersubjectivity, the fullest form of communication possible with others. The opposite pole of the continuum, which in this respect corresponds to Husserl's immanentist reduced realm, is characterised by the least degree of communication possible with others. But to give a clear characterisation of this 'least degree of communication' presents difficulties. For if in the immanentist realm I experience only my unique subjectivity, then I can presumably communicate nothing of it to you: if I claim to do so, do I not thereby deny its claimed uniqueness? Is it in fact possible to communicate clearly the details of any 'province of meaning' one of whose character-

istics is that within it, less than completely clear communication is possible? Schutz himself shows ambiguity over this issue. His tendency is, in fact, to argue that communication is only possible at all within the intersubjective 'natural' attitude, but then to retreat from this position with somewhat ambiguous qualifications. Consider three of these arguments.

First, Schutz asserts repeatedly - it is perhaps his most famous slogan - that the world is 'from the outset' an intersubjective world. We are - all of us - born into the world of the 'natural' attitude, and that is where we remain, in all our interpersonal dealings, throughout our lives, unless we take specific steps to the contrary. The everyday intersubjective world is portrayed as a trouble-free zone: it is hard to understand why anyone would want to leave it. The practical man, getting on with the business of living would have no reason to do so. Only people engaging in psychological and philosophical speculations - people enquiring, perhaps into the 'phenomenology of the social world', or into other esoteric problems - would wish to do so. "The natural attitude", Schutz tells us,

does not know these problems. To it, the world is from the outset not the private world of the single individual, but an intersubjective world, common to all of us, in which we have not a theoretical, but an eminently practical interest.¹²

This is perhaps the weakest of the statements of the problem which is found in Schutz, in this sense: it does not rule out communication in other realms, but portrays such communication as a disturbance to the smooth-running world of everyday life.

Schutz's second formulation hinges on the question of language. He argues, that language per se pertains to the intersubjective world of the 'natural' attitude, and as such "obstinately resists serving as a vehicle for meanings which transcend its own presuppositions".¹³ This implies that thought is for Schutz something quite other than language. The former is private, the latter public.

This distinction will plainly pose problems for the practise of any proposed social science, or social philosophy, for it denies the possibility of any specialist language able to sustain a 'province of meaning' other than that of everyday life. This denial implies that for Schutz the status of his own writing, like that of any other writing, is that of the 'natural attitude' as he defines it. In the term I earlier employed, this attitude has theoreticity for him.¹⁴ I propose, by contrast, that from the mundane standpoint as I have defined it, Schutz articulates the view as seen from the unrealistic vision of heaven. As against this utopianism, it is already possible to venture an alternative suggestion. If as I have suggested, the everyday world should be correctly located at neither immanentist nor transcendentalist extreme, but at a point from which both can be entertained, then perhaps language should be acknowledged to belong in itself to neither extreme, but to be capable of conjuring up either possibility. Schutz's language would then stand as an example of language conjuring up one of these, namely, the utopia of transcendentalism.

Schutz's third formulation is his strongest. In the posthumously published writing entitled, The Problem of Relevance, he asserts, that "the level of reality constituted by our working acts gearing into the outer world", that is, the 'natural' attitude,

is the paramount reality because only within it are sociality and intrahuman communication at all possible.¹⁵

It is interesting that, in an editorial note at this point, R.M. Zaner states, "This sentence was marked for deletion".¹⁶ Schutz, it seems, was unhappy with this statement which seems to impose an implausible straitjacket on the possibilities of the social world. But, I propose, within the terms of the position which he had set out to explore, he had no alternative but to make it.

The Solitary Scientist

Schutz's importance is as a philosopher of social science. Where, then, is the social scientist located

within his scheme? This location has recently been subjected to critique by Barry Hindess,¹⁷ who is incensed by Schutz's argument that the social scientist is engaged in no more than the construction of yet another province of meaning, given Schutz's account of the relations between such provinces. This is, that

Consistency and compatibility of experience ... merely within the borders of the particular province of meaning to which those experiences belong. By no means will that which is compatible within the province of meaning P be also compatible within the province of meaning Q. On the contrary, seen from P, supposed to be real, Q and all the experiences belonging to it would appear as merely fictitious, inconsistent and incompatible, and vice versa.¹⁸

Hindess is disturbed by the implications of a position which, he says, portrays "a world in which there can be no science of history and no rational politics".¹⁹ Hindess diagnoses Schutz's failing as 'psychologism'. To make his interpretation, he takes note of this remark by Schutz:

The finite provinces of meaning are not separated states of the mental life in the sense that passing from one to another would require a transmigration of the soul and a complete extinction of memory and consciousness by death ... They are merely names for different tensions of one and the same consciousness ... experiences in various provinces can be remembered and reproduced. And that is why they can be communicated in ordinary language.²⁰

Hindess concludes, "Thus relationships between the provinces of history and of social science [or, social science and everyday life, B.T.] exist only in the consciousness of the knowing subject - or in books or papers that he may have written".²¹ But relationships in consciousness, and in books, and papers, for that matter, are precisely the topic of Schutz's, and of any phenomenological, enquiry. To dismiss the search for such relationships as 'psychologism' per se

is to portray a world in which there can be no science of consciousness, and no rational books or papers. I propose rather to pursue such a science, and such a rationality by criticising the account of these relationships which Schutz has produced.

What, then, is Schutz's account of the relationship between the 'natural' attitude of everyday life on the one hand, and the attitude of 'social science' on the other? Schutz discusses this problem at numerous points throughout his work. In the Phenomenology of the Social World, he put it this way:

All scientific knowledge of the social world is indirect: it is knowledge of the world of contemporaries and the world of predecessors, never of the world of immediate social reality. Accordingly, the social sciences can understand man in his everyday social life not as a living individual person with a unique consciousness but only as a personal ideal type without duration [of lived experience, B.T.] or spontaneity. They can understand him only as existing within an impersonal and anonymous objective time which no one ever has, or ever can, experience. ... Since the social sciences ... never actually encounter real people but deal only in personal ideal types, it is not the social scientist's function to understand the subjective meaning of another's action.²²

It is often assumed that as a 'phenomenological social philosopher', Schutz advocated a 'phenomenological social science'. Nothing could be further from the truth. In his view, expressed in this early work and unchanged throughout his life, the social scientist's task was the specification of the 'objective meaning contexts of subjective meaning contexts', and of all the social sciences economics most perfectly exemplified this ideal:

In our view, pure economics is a perfect example of an objective-meaning complex about subjective meaning-complexes, in other words, of an objective meaning-configuration stipulating the typical and invariant subjective experiences of anyone who acts within an economic framework.²³

Such a social science plainly aspires to transcendentalism - an account of the necessary conditions of any possible experience in the given social situation - but then it is only describing a state which everyday life has already achieved. Whereas Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is out in front, criticising the 'natural' attitude for its lack of self-knowledge, Schutz's social science is one step behind. Its task is to celebrate the self-knowledge exhibited by everyday life, exemplified by the predictability of subjective experience within the present economic order. Even this task it can only perform imperfectly.²⁴

There seems little doubt, then, as to the location of social science within the range of provinces of meaning as Schutz defines it: the solitary scientist has retreated from the transcendent reality of life to the immanent appearance of thought. This conclusion is reiterated in Schutz's later discussions of this problem. He develops one further implication which is crucial for the present argument. This arises from a consideration of the social scientist's account of human beings in the social world. Schutz tells us that

the theoretical thinker while remaining in the theoretical attitude cannot experience originally and grasp in immediacy the world of everyday life within which I and you, Peter and Paul, anyone and everyone have confused and ineffable perceptions, act, work, plan, worry, hope, are born, grow up, and will die, in a word live their life ... in their full humanity. This world eludes the immediate grasp of the theoretical social scientist.²⁵

He "has to build up an artificial device",²⁶ the method of the social sciences, which substitutes for the intersubjective life-world a model of this world:

This model, however, is not peopled with human beings in their full humanity, but with puppets, with types: they are constructed as though they could perform working actions and reactions ... Of course, these working actions and reactions are merely fictitious: ... they are only assigned

to these puppets by the grace of the scientist²⁷

I shall propose that this conception has a wider importance than it is granted by Schutz. For if it is the case, as I shall argue, that the range of provinces of meaning which Schutz has defined is, in fact, available to all of us within everyday language itself, then it may be suggested that the theoretical construction of models, peopled with puppets, is not the exclusive achievement of the solitary social scientist, but is rather practised by us all, insofar as within our speech we refer to other persons, or even to ourselves.

In this case, Schutz's account of the relations between provinces of meaning can indeed be criticised as 'psychologistic', but in a way which offers in its place a constructive alternative. Such an alternative would be an account of these relations as 'linguistic'. It would understand these relations not as a property of the mind of the individual thinker, but as the outcome of the social practise of speakers, an understanding which would indeed promise to be rational, and perhaps even scientific.

Life versus thought in Sartre

I now want to consider the social philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, which is widely regarded as radically incompatible with that of Schutz, not least by Schutz himself.²⁸ But I shall argue that it presents an account of the same structure of provinces of meaning, viewed from the opposite standpoint. The possibility of Sartre's standpoint is contained within that of Schutz, and vice-versa. This arises from the fact that both stem from a common origin, namely Husserl.

Despite the differences, a striking similarity appears in the discussions of consciousness by Schutz and by Sartre.

A passage from Sartre's early work, The Transcendence of the Ego states

[T]ranscendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. It determines our existence at each instant, without our being able to conceive anything before it. Thus each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihilo. Not a new arrangement, but a new existence. There is something distressing for each of us, to catch in the act this tireless creation of existence of which we are not the creators. At this level, man has the impression of ceaselessly escaping from himself, of overflowing himself, of being surprised by riches which are always unexpected.²⁹

Sartre explicitly identifies conscious experience as transcendental, an identification which had to be extracted from Schutz despite himself. Sartre vividly suggests the richness of this ongoing flow of time. However, this consciousness is never, in his view, empty. "Consciousness is always consciousness of something".³⁰ An example of such consciousness of a thing is Sartre's presentation, in his early novel Nausea, of his hero Roquentin's encounter with an object on the sea-shore:

Knotty, inert, nameless, it fascinated me, filled my eyes, brought me back unceasingly to its own existence ... I saw clearly that you could not pass from its function as a root, as a suction pump, to that, to that hard and thick skin of a sea-lion, to this oily, callous, stubborn look. The function explained nothing. The root with its colour, shape, its congealed movement, was beneath all explanation. Each of its qualities escaped it a little, flowed out of it, half solidified, almost became a thing: each one was superfluous in the root.³¹

It seems, then, that there is a parallel, for Sartre between the way in which man overflows himself, and the way in which things overflow our conceptions of them. In the latter case, the properties which we ascribe in our descriptions of a thing are what the thing 'overflows', transcends. These properties are what we ascribe in reflective thought. But Roquentin is able to experience much more than this. Thus for Sartre as

for Schutz, o n g o i n g lived experience is transcendent. Life is transcendent, by contrast with thought which presents merely the immanent appearance of that life. And lived experience holds out the promise of apprehending the very transcendence of 'things'.³²

By the same logic, Sartre argues that man's life transcends man's thought about man. Sartre argues that 'things', with their names, their reliable properties, their clear outlines, come into being as a result of our reflections on our experiences. In exactly the same way, he argues that the 'ego' comes into being only in reflection: in lived experience it does not exist. The 'ego' is man viewed as a 'thing'. Sartre states,

The ego never appears, in fact, except when one is not looking at it. ... Then, ... at the horizon, the ego appears. It is therefore never seen except 'out of the corner of my eye'.³³

The identification which is commonly made then, between the 'I' and consciousness - an identification enshrined philosophically in Descartes' remark, "I think, therefore I am" - is therefore, for Sartre, false. The 'I' is the immanent appearance in thought of the transcendent living reality, consciousness, for which it is an object. Sartre argues

Instead of expressing itself in effect as 'I alone exist as absolute', it must assert that 'absolute consciousness alone exists as absolute', which is obviously a truism. My I in effect is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate.³⁴

The 'me', Sartre states, is

an existent, strictly contemporaneous with the world whose existence has the same essential characteristics as the world.³⁵

But this point of view is already familiar. It is indeed precisely the argument Husserl employs in his Ideas, with

the merely terminological substitution by Sartre of the word 'consciousness' for Husserl's 'cogito'. In that work Husserl portrays 'the world as immediately given me', 'together with the sheer acts of the Ego'. Should I wish to stand back and engage in an act of reflection, I may do so: in this case, the Ego arises as an object for the cogito, but that cogito itself is not reflected upon, not an object for thought.

But, in his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl was engaged precisely in an enquiry into the conditions of any possible cogito (consciousness), by way of an exploration of Descartes' starting-point, the 'I think'. This enterprise reverses the assumptions of his early approach. Inspired as he is by that early approach, Sartre finds Husserl's transcendentalism a betrayal of all that, for him, phenomenology stood for. In his repudiation of this work of the later Husserl Sartre tells us:

[A]ll the accomplishments of phenomenology are in danger of crumbling if the I is not, in the same manner as the world, an object for consciousness.³⁶

Thus far the explanatory framework offered by Schutz and Sartre appears identical. The difference between them is merely one of mood. It is in the elaborating of his theory of social relations that Sartre marks an analytical break from Schutz.

Solitude Disturbed

It must be said at once that Sartre's presentation of his theory, in Being and Nothingness, is somewhat enigmatic. The crucial arguments are presented by way of examples which are intended more to remind the reader of experiences he or she has had, than to present analytical descriptions of unfamiliar situations.³⁷ The character of this language is clearly a central question for the present argument.

Consider, then, two scenarios in which Sartre exhibits his account of understanding other people. In the first, the individual concerned is portrayed as alone in a public park, when he gradually becomes aware of the presence of another person:

I am in a public park. Not far away there is a lawn, and along the edge of that lawn there are benches. A man passes by those benches. I see this man: I apprehend him as an object and at the same time as a man. What does this mean? What do I imply when I assert that this object is a man?³⁸

Sartre argues that if I saw him as a mere puppet, I should group him among other spatio-temporal 'things': 'beside' the benches, two yards and twenty inches from the lawn, and so on.

His relation with other objects would be of the purely additive type. ... In short, no new relations would appear through him between those things in my universe.³⁹

But this is not the case. To perceive him as a man is to perceive the things in the park as standing in a relation to him. This relation is not to be apprehended merely by my distances. "For instead of a grouping toward me of the objects, there is now an orientation which flees from me".⁴⁰ Sartre develops this theme:

The distance which unfolds between the lawn and the man ... is a negation of the distance which I establish ... between these two objects. The distance appears as a pure disintegration of the relations which I apprehend between the objects of my universe. ... Thus, the appearance among the objects of my universe of an element of disintegration of that universe is what I mean by the appearance of a man in my universe. ... The appearance of the Other in the world corresponds therefore to a congealed sliding of the whole universe, to a decentralisation of the world which undermines the centralisation which I am simultaneously effecting.⁴¹

In this first scenario, then, Sartre's theme is the individual in relation to physical things, and the way in which that relation is changed, challenged, by the presence of another man.

For Sartre the individual alone with objects can experience directly their transcendental reality. Insofar as the 'transcendent' is the 'real', then communion with this 'real' is always to be regarded as good, as authentic. But now the 'other' appears on the scene. With the appearance of the other, the correspondence between consciousness and world, and between consciousness and consciousness has been broken, not just possibly, but absolutely. I have been precipitated into what, from the mundane point of view as I earlier defined it, is the vision of 'hell'.⁴² This state arises in Sartre out of the denial of any possible correspondence between subjectivity and subjectivity, and therefore the attribution of absolute Other-ness to the empirically other person. It involves, in other words, an absolute denial of intersubjectivity. What is the source of such a denial? It is, I suggest, a familiar possibility: the one explored by the immanentist Husserl in Ideas: the definitive feature of that perspective was its suspension of belief in the 'general thesis of the natural standpoint', namely of one common external world. For Husserl this perspective was a methodological device: Sartre however has granted to this perspective ontological status.⁴³

Other-ness

In Being and Nothingness, Sartre discusses previous treatments of the problem of the "existence of others".⁴⁴ He declares that his earlier critique of Husserl in the Transcendence of the Ego, was not adequate as a treatment of the problem.

[A]lthough I am still persuaded that the hypothesis of a transcendental subject is useless and disastrous, abandoning it does not help one

bit to solve the question of the existence of Others. Even if outside the empirical Ego there is nothing other than the consciousness of that Ego - that is a transcendental field without a subject - the fact remains that my affirmation of the Other demands and requires the existence beyond the world of a similar transcendental field.⁴⁵

Recall that Sartre has explicitly stated, that consciousness is 'transcendental' and in particular his idea that experience 'overflows' our thoughts about that experience, an idea which, I argued, he shares with Schutz.⁴⁶ But now he diverges from Schutz. According to Sartre, 'beyond' one 'transcendental field', which despite his failure to do so, I can hardly fail to identify as 'mine', I 'demand and require the existence' of another 'similar transcendental field'.

How is it possible to conceive of more than one 'transcendent reality'? For the later Husserl, certainly such a conception would be self-contradictory. But Sartre has rejected the arguments of the later Husserl: his source is the Husserl of Ideas. In that work, Husserl's own attitude towards the 'transcendent' was somewhat paradoxical: he 'bracketed' it, and so was able to pronounce the 'Indubitability of Immanent, Dubitability of Transcendent Perception'.⁴⁷ As the expression of a methodological device, such reasoning may be acceptable. But if it is put forward as anything more, then the wording is rather strange. If the 'immanent'/'transcendent' distinction is another name for the 'appearance'/'reality' dichotomy, then it becomes awkward to refer to 'reality' as doubtful, whilst 'appearance' as opposed to reality is certain. A more logical terminology would rather adopt the reverse wording. This would refer to what had previously been taken as certain, the 'transcendent', but which from the new stance was doubtful, as the 'immanent', and would refer to what had previously been taken as doubtful, the 'mere' appearance, the 'immanent', which from our new stance is certain, as the 'transcendent'.

I propose that this is precisely what Sartre has done. He has taken as real, as 'ontological', what for Husserl is purely a 'methodological' position. In so doing, he has reversed Husserl's terminology and is in Husserl's terms taking up an immanentist position, which quite correctly from his viewpoint, he speaks of as transcendentalist.

It is from this position, I propose, that he is able to pose his problem in the terms he does. He continues again,

Consequently the only way to escape solipsism would be here again to prove that my transcendental consciousness is in its very being, affected by the extra-mundane existences of other consciousnesses of the same type.⁴⁸

Having first performed a radical detachment of consciousness from the social world within which all our dealings with other people are ordinarily performed, Sartre now demands that the social nature of the resulting privatised sphere be proven to him:

In a word, the sole point of departure is the interiority of the cogito. We must understand by this that each one must be able by starting out from his own interiority, to rediscover the Other's being as a transcendence which conditions the very being of that interiority.⁴⁹

And again, suggestively, "we must ask absolute immanence to throw us into absolute transcendence".⁵⁰

How is this to be done? As previously, Sartre presents a scenario:

Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity, or vice, I have just glued my ear to the door and looked through a keyhole ... [T]here is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way known; I am my acts and hence they carry in themselves their whole justification. I am a pure consciousness of things, and things, caught up in the circuit of my selfness, offer to me their potentialities.⁵¹

The setting is familiar. The individual is absorbed in a world of things, a pure 'immanentism' in Husserlian terms: for Sartre, consciousness simply being its own transcendence, lived experience not reflective thought.

But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall,
Someone is looking at me! What does this mean?⁵²

What it means, Sartre names as 'shame'. He says,

I now exist as myself for my unreflective
consciousness.⁵³

But previously for Sartre, my self could only become an object for consciousness when that was a reflective consciousness. This remains true:

Only the reflective consciousness has the self directly for an object. The unreflective consciousness does not apprehend the person directly or as its object; the person is presented to consciousness in so far as the person is an object for the Other.⁵⁴

What is the difference? The difference is, that, not having access to the other's subjectivity, I do not know the object I am for the other.

[A]ll of a sudden, I am conscious of myself as escaping myself ... in that I have a foundation outside myself.⁵⁵

Not 'knowing' (thought, reflective), but 'living' (experience, unreflective):

shame or pride makes me live, not know the situation of being looked at. ... [S]hame, is shame of self, it is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging ... Beyond any knowledge that I can have, I am this self which another knows. And this self which I am - this I am in a world which the Other has made alien to me, for the Other's look embraces my being, and correlatively the walls, the door, the keyhole. All these instrument-things in the midst of which I am, now turn toward the Other a face which on principle escapes me.⁵⁶

The other, as a 'transcendent' consciousness, escapes my consciousness, and my 'transcendent' consciousness escapes his. But 'I', as an object do not escape his consciousness, and neither does 'he' as an object escape mine. Rather, what 'I' am as an object for his consciousness escapes my consciousness, and what 'he' is as an object for my consciousness escapes his consciousness. Each one of us alienates the other, of necessity: the very condition of the transcendence of the other consciousness over anything that it or I can portray it as being is that I cannot know that other. Therefore I cannot know what I am for that other, and therefore that unknown 'what' alienates 'me', the unknown object that I am for the other, from my own transcendence, and vice-versa. Each is "transcendence-transcended".⁵⁷

Optimism and Pessimism

Sartre's theory is a radical denial of the possibility of a real intersubjectivity. This being so, the theorist to whose views Sartre's can be most directly opposed is Alfred Schutz. It is fortunate, therefore, that Schutz has taken the trouble to set out precisely his view of Sartre's arguments.⁵⁸ One may anticipate at once the conclusion of Schutz's statement. He tells us:

His attempt to overcome epistemological solipsism leads to an unrealistic construction which involves, so to speak, a practical solipsism. Either the Other looks at me, and alienates my liberty, or I assimilate and seize within Sartre's philosophy.⁵⁹

But this is only an assertion of Schutz's differences of opinion with Sartre. What arguments does Schutz offer? Schutz states:

Sartre has correctly criticised Hegel for not having taken one particular concrete consciousness as the starting point and system of reference. But Sartre himself becomes the victim of such 'optimism'. As a starting point of his analysis, he takes it tacitly for granted that my experiencing the Other's experiencing me are simply interchangeable.⁶⁰

Schutz's viewpoint is that

the demonstration of such an interchangeability might be the outcome of any analysis of intersubjective relation. Yet it cannot be taken for granted as its 'starting point' without, committing a petitio principii.⁶¹

But Schutz's own approach is not without its petitio principii. In the Phenomenology of the Social World he disclaims the rigour of Husserl's approach in these words:

The difficult question of the transcendental constitution of this [we] experience, and of the experience of the alter ego cannot be pursued here. By assuming the mundane existence of other Selves, we may turn to the description of the origin of experiences of fellow-men in the we-relation.⁶²

I have already shown that the assumption of the mundane existence of other Selves in the form in which Schutz makes it, amounts precisely to the assumption that transcendental intersubjectivity is already achieved, that is, to 'optimism' in my terms. I have proposed, that in a state of society short of the telos, such an assumption is false. For in such a society, the interchangeability of standpoints is invalid insofar as rational thought has not yet established the necessary conditions of any possible subjectivity. To that extent, my consciousness remains inexplicably different from yours. But this is precisely the point Sartre makes. However Sartre assumes that this uniqueness can never be overcome, that the transcendence of your consciousness over mine is absolute. In my terms, this amounts to 'pessimism'.

'Optimism' and 'pessimism' arise in Schutz and Sartre, insofar as, in both writers, experience is posed as the transcendent reality sui generis of which thought is the mere immanent appearance. On this view, 'thought' has no ability to criticise or to transform 'experience': rather, 'experience' defines the context within which 'thought' occurs, essentially. The difference between the two writers is, that in one respect they credit 'experience', with opposite properties. For

Schutz, this transcendent reality is 'from the outset' intersubjective, 'subjective' experience being a derivative phenomenon, whereas for Sartre this transcendent reality is, and always remains, subjective: it is 'intersubjective' phenomena which take on secondary status. 'Mutual interaction in freedom,' Schutz tells us, 'has no place within Sartre's philosophy'. This is true, but it may be replied that mutual interaction in unfreedom has no place within Schutz's.

The source of these two opposed 'ontological' positions can be found in Husserl's two opposed methodological investigations. But in order to defend his positions, each of the ontologists sets up his 'transcendent' realm as having a certain definitive property. It could never apprehend itself: it could be apprehended only in a derivative realm. For both Schutz and Sartre, Husserl's concluding watchword, 'know thyself', is a contradiction in terms: more precisely, it is ungrammatical. For 'knowing' pertains to one sphere of meaning, the sphere of 'reflective thought' which captures no more than the immanent appearance of things, whereas 'thyself', the reality of who, ontologically, I am pertains to a separate sphere of meaning, the sphere of transcendent 'lived experience'. These two are forever alienated from one another, as 'thought' and 'life'.

As opposed to this essential alienation posed in the phenomenologies of Schutz, and of Sartre, Husserl holds out the prospect of a historical transformation of life into thought, immanent into transcendent, of which the motive force would be the thought of phenomenology itself. Accordingly, it is in his terms that I now propose a 'phenomenological' investigation of the constitution of social 'reality' within a particular social setting. But first, it is necessary to devote some consideration to existing approaches competing for the claim to be 'phenomenological sociologies', in order to understand the relationships between their enterprises and the one which I now propose.

Chapter Three

THE ESSENTIALISMS OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM

Ethnomethodological Sociology

Any attempt to develop a phenomenological sociology must acknowledge the contribution made by Harold Garfinkel's 'ethnomethodology'. A clear statement of his programme is to be found in the "Preface" to his book, Studies in Ethnomethodology. There he announces,

In doing sociology, lay and professional, every reference to the 'real world', even where the reference is to physical or biological events, is a reference to the organised activities of everyday life. Thereby, in contrast to certain versions of Durkheim that teach that the objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle, the lesson is taken instead, and used as a study policy, that the objective reality of social facts as an ongoing accomplishment of the concerted activities of daily life, with the ordinary artful ways of that accomplishment being by members known, used, and taken for granted, is, for members doing sociology, a fundamental phenomenon. Because, and in the ways it is practical sociology's fundamental phenomenon, it is the prevailing topic for ethnomethodological study.¹

Garfinkel calls attention to the concern for 'reality' held not simply by 'professional' philosophers or other theorists, but also by 'lay' 'members' 'accomplishing' such reality in everyday life. To this extent, his concern and mine are identical. But Garfinkel puts a particular interpretation on this concern. For him, the 'members' and the 'professionals' are doing 'sociology'. What does this imply? Garfinkel states, referring to the 'fundamental phenomenon' earlier identified,

Ethnomethodological studies analyse everyday activities as members' methods for making those same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes, i.e. 'accountable', as organisations of commonplace everyday activities. The reflexivity of that phenomenon is a singular feature of practical actions, of practical circumstances, of commonsense knowledge of social structures, and of practical sociological reasoning. By permitting us to locate and examine their occurrence, the reflexivity of that phenomenon establishes their study.²

Members' methods, then, make their activities accountable 'for-all-practical-purposes'. Why 'practical'? Why not 'poetic', 'artistic', 'theological', 'scientific', or an indefinite number of other kinds of purposes? One suspects that Garfinkel is proposing in his 'ethnomethodology' to exhibit his vision of 'practical' man, which is only one of indefinitely many alternative visions which might be exhibited.

In Schutz's view, the main alternative to the 'practical', 'everyday' attitude was the 'theoretical' viewpoint of the philosopher or social scientist. What has Garfinkel to say about this distinction? The study of everyday activities, he states,

is directed to the tasks of learning how members' actual, ordinary, activities consist of methods to make practical actions, practical circumstances, commonsense knowledge of social structures, and practical sociological reasoning analysable; and of discovering the formal properties of commonplace, practical commonsense actions 'from within' actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of those settings. The formal properties obtain their guarantees from no other source, and in no other way. Because this is so, our study tasks

cannot be accomplished by free invention, constructive analytic theorising, mock-ups, or book reviews, and so no special interest is paid to them aside from an interest in their varieties as organisationally situated methods of practical reasoning. Similarly, there can be nothing to quarrel with or to correct about practical sociological reasoning, and so, because professional sociological enquiries are practical through and through, except that quarrels between those doing professional enquiries and ethnomethodology may be of interest as phenomena for ethnomethodological studies, these quarrels need not be taken seriously.³

Garfinkel himself, then, inhabits the same world which we all inhabit: a practical world through and through. There is 'no other source' than this practicality for the very standards of reasoned analysis by which everyday activities can be approached. Those who set themselves up as superior to those everyday standards are brought down to size abruptly: 'no special interest is paid to them' except as themselves examples of practicality. The ethnomethodologist's own work is nothing more nor less than practical reasoning ruminating on itself. The only problem seems to be, how it is that some of these 'practical' reasoners, the self-styled 'professional' ones could have got it into their heads to conceive of themselves as anything other than merely 'practical' men: how, that is, 'practicality' could have itself, somehow, given rise to something other than 'practicality'. But this problem does not present itself to the ethnomethodologist. For his analysis of everyday activities 'as members' methods for making those same activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical-purposes' involves precisely that these activities be seen in this way, and only in this way.

So, Garfinkel's vision is of a sociology which is thoroughly part of the society which it investigates, which is itself immersed in the standards of that society, whose task is to 'learn how' that society works, but never to criticise it, because it has no external standard by which

such criticism could be undertaken.

They [ethnomethodological studies] do not formulate a remedy for practical actions, as if it was being found out about practical actions that they were better or worse than they are usually cracked up to be.⁴

Its attitude to criticisms which it may encounter, e.g. criticisms of itself from 'professional' sociologists, is merely to learn from this criticism how criticism is done. In this vision, we already live in the best of all possible worlds: all we can do is to celebrate that fact. Previous sociology has failed to do so. Previous sociology has set itself up on a pedestal above society, and from those heights has reflected upon it. But the laugh is on that sociology. For, from those supposed 'heights' only an impoverished vision is available of the society below, and in fact the view obtained by those sociologists even of their own activity is an un-self-aware one. They have only apprehended an appearance of a reality which transcends their formulation of it.

Transcendentalism

But is this not a very familiar viewpoint? The vision of a society whose rich complexity transcends any possible formulation of it in reflective thought, a society which is beyond the scope of criticism, whose goodness we can only celebrate, is precisely Husserl's transcendentalist vision of 'heaven' as made immanent by Alfred Schutz. The picture of the impoverished work of conventional sociology is also Schutz's. But not having to be one himself, Schutz was quite reconciled to the idea of social scientists continuing their inadequate work indefinitely. The tone of Garfinkel's programme is rather different. Rather than staying up above with the social scientists, Garfinkel prefers to descend to immerse himself within the ongoing experience of life in the

'natural' attitude, there to carry out the Schutzian celebration of that attitude to greater effect. Thus, Garfinkel can be located precisely on the map which Schutz provided.

I propose that Garfinkel accepts the Schutzian vision of the world. Its main features are the transcendence of the 'natural' attitude of intersubjectivity, as compared with the mere immanence of any formulations of that attitude in thought. But he locates himself in a different position to that which Schutz recommends for the social scientist, namely within the 'natural' attitude itself. Once settled therein, he is able to castigate those social scientists who remain, as Schutz recommended they should, outside peering in. He is also able, believing himself in the best of all possible worlds, to refuse to conceive of the possibility of any alternative world, even in thought.

In short, Garfinkel's analysis, which explicates everyday language 'from within' does so precisely in the context of Schutz's statement that 'language - any language - pertains ... to the intersubjective world of working, and therefore obstinately resists serving as a vehicle for meanings which transcend its own presuppositions'. Ethnomethodology confines itself to elucidating those presuppositions, making no attempt to transcend them.

What has Garfinkel to say concerning the relation between his work and that of Schutz? A key paper, entitled "Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities", exhibits this relation. Garfinkel tells us,

In everyday discipline, humanistic or scientific, the familiar commonsense world of everyday life is a matter of abiding interest. In the social sciences, and in sociology particularly, it is a matter of essential preoccupation. It makes up sociology's problematic subject matter, enters the very constitution of the sociological attitude, and exercises an odd and obstinate sovereignty over sociologists' claims to adequate explanation.⁵

But, he continues,

Although sociologists take socially structured scenes of everyday life as a point of departure, they rarely see, as a task of sociological inquiry in its own right, the general question of how any such commonsense world is possible. Instead, the possibility of the everyday world is either settled by theoretical representation or merely assumed. As a topic and methodological ground for sociological enquiries, the definition of the commonsense world of everyday life, though it is appropriately a project of sociological inquiry, has been neglected.⁶

Garfinkel now cites one "magnificent exception"⁷ to his pessimistic statement, namely Alfred Schutz. He tells us,

Almost alone among sociological theorists, the late Alfred Schutz, in a series of classic studies of the constitutive phenomenology of the world of everyday life, described many of these seen but unnoticed background expectancies. He called them the 'attitude of daily life'. He referred to their scenic attributions as the 'world known in common and taken for granted'. Schutz's fundamental work makes it possible to pursue further the tasks of clarifying their nature and operations, of relating them to the processes of concerted actions, and assigning them their place in an empirically imaginable society.

In what way, then, does Garfinkel propose to 'further pursue' these tasks? For Garfinkel does not continue the method of individual philosophising of Schutz, Sartre, or Husserl. He conducts empirical investigations.

The Epoche of the 'Natural' Attitude

"Procedurally", Garfinkel states, "it is my preference to start with familiar scenes, and ask what can be done to make trouble".⁹ But, he says,

Despite their procedural emphasis, my studies are not, properly speaking, experimental. They are demonstrations, designed, in Herbert Spiegelberg's phrase, as 'aids to a sluggish imagination'. I have found that they produce reflections through which the strangeness of an obstinately familiar world can be detected.¹⁰

Is there a chink in Garfinkel's armour here? He refers in the earlier quotation above to 'assigning the background expectancies of daily life their places in an empirically imaginable society'. Now he refers to 'aids to a sluggish imagination'. He also refers to the 'special motive' needed to become estranged from everyday life, in order for these background expectancies to come into view. This 'special motive', he tells us,

consists in the programmatic task of treating a societal member's practical circumstances ... as matters of theoretic interest.¹¹

But if the ethnomethodologist's work is a matter of 'imagination' and 'theorising' as opposed to 'practicality', then two awkward questions emerge, namely first, how is the ethnomethodologist's stance different from that of other social scientists, in their departure from everyday life, and second, if these other than practical attitudes are possible for ethnomethodologists or other social scientists, then are they not also possible for members within everyday life?

While bearing these philosophical anxieties in mind, I propose they should not forestall a practical consideration of what Garfinkel is proposing. Consider one particular 'background expectancy' described by Schutz, and the bearing of Garfinkel's empirical investigations upon it. Garfinkel states:

One of the background expectancies Schutz described concerns the sanctioned use of doubt as a constituent feature of a world that is being understood in common. Schutz proposed, that for the conduct of his everyday affairs the person assumes, assumes the other person assumes as well, and assumes that as he assumes it of the other person, the other person assumes it of him, that a relation of undoubted correspondence is the sanctioned relationship between the actual appearances of an object and the intended object that appears in a particular way. For the person conducting his everyday affairs, objects, for him as he expects for others, are as they appear to be.¹²

This proposal of Schutz's is perfectly familiar. It is what he called the 'epoche of the natural attitude', which he described wherein man "puts in brackets the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears to him".¹³ An earlier source of this notion is Husserl's statement in the Idea of Phenomenology that "[w]hat is taken for granted in natural thinking is the possibility of cognition".¹⁴ Garfinkel gives his own name to this assumption: he calls it 'trust'.¹⁵ He now advocates an experimental procedure, whereby the experimenter will exhibit distrust in the experimental social setting:

The term 'trust' is used ... to refer to a person's compliance with the expectancies of the attitude of daily life as a morality. Acting in accordance with a rule of doubt directed to the correspondence between appearances and the objects that appearances are appearances of is only one way of specifying 'distrust'. Modifications of each of the other expectancies that make up the attitude of daily life, as well as their various sub-sets, furnish variations on the central theme of treating a world that one is required to know in common and take for granted as a problematic matter.¹⁶

Thus the analytically identical notion is proposed, as a constitutive feature of the 'natural attitude' of daily life, by Garfinkel, Schutz, and Husserl. But in Garfinkel it takes on a subtly new significance.

The 'epoche of the natural attitude', Garfinkel says, is a moral rule. It is a 'sanctioned' property of common discourse. Referring to such rules, he states:

They furnish a background of seen but unnoticed features of common discourse whereby actual utterances are recognised as events of common, reasonable, understandable, plain talk. Persons require these properties of discourse as conditions under which they are themselves entitled and entitle others to claim that they know what they are talking about, and that what they are saying is understandable and ought to be understood. In short, their seen but unnoticed presence is used to entitle persons to

conduct their common conversational affairs without interference. Departures from such usages call forth immediate attempts to restore a right state of affairs. 17

In essence, Garfinkel has transformed what was in Husserl and in Schutz a 'philosophical' rule into a 'sociological' one. But is this transformation unambiguously a gain? Husserl was clear that the assumption of the possibility of cognition was a barrier to the philosophical issues which he sought to pursue. It became the butt for his scornful criticism. Schutz was more ambiguous: very ready to tolerate the 'practical' justifications for the 'epoche of the natural attitude', he nonetheless and somewhat inexplicably found time to pursue philosophy, and granted that others might do the same. With Garfinkel, a new clarity is reached. From the commonsense standpoint within which he situates himself, philosophical questioning is inconceivable: departures from this epoche which alone would make philosophical discourse possible 'call forth immediate attempts to restore a right state of affairs'. The implications of this standpoint can be explored by examining one of Garfinkel's experiments.

Consider then an example of an experiment which was intended precisely to investigate 'trust' as 'a background feature of common discourse'. He reports the following:

Students were instructed to engage an acquaintance or a friend in ordinary conversation, and, without indicating that what the experimenter was asking was in any way unusual, to insist that the person clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks.¹⁸

Plainly, this is one way of breaking the rule of 'trust'. To ask someone to clarify the sense of remarks which would 'normally' be taken not to need such clarification is to call into question the 'correspondence between consciousness and consciousness' and so between consciousness and world which is definitive of the transcendentalist 'heaven' which

both Garfinkel and Schutz take to be the 'natural' attitude. It is to question whether appearances correspond with the object that appearances are appearances of, i.e. reality. There are, I propose, two ways in which such a question may be taken. Garfinkel's sociological way takes the question as departing from orderly conversation into disorder, or anomie, that is from meaningfulness to meaninglessness. By contrast, Husserl's philosophical way takes the question as departing from the practical attitude into a philosophically questioning attitude, i.e. as posing the problem of cognition, by shifting from transcendentalism into immanentism.

Consider, then the following conversation which Garfinkel reports:

- Subject: Hi, Ray. How is your girl friend feeling? (1)
- Experimenter: What do you mean, 'How is she feeling? Do you mean physical or mental?' (2)
- S: I mean how is she feeling? What's the matter with you? (He looked peeved) (3)
- E: Nothing. Just explain a little clearer what you mean. (4)
- S: Skip it. How are your Med School applications coming? (5)
- E: What do you mean, 'How are they?'
- S: You know what I mean. (7)
- E: I really don't. (8)
- S: What's the matter with you? Are you sick?¹⁹ (9)

According to Garfinkel, this conversation and others demonstrates the sanctioned character of the epoche of the natural attitude, i.e. trust. How can this sociological conclusion be displayed? I propose the following interpretation. The dialogue reveals two conversations. Within each conversation a 'social order' was briefly built up, but regrettably, in each case it broke down again into anomie. On this reading, the first of these conversations is 'about' Ray's girl friend, and lasts from utterance (1) to utterance (4), while the second is 'about' Ray's Med School applications, and

lasts from utterance (5) to utterance (9). On this interpretation of the conversation, tonical coherence consists in sustained reference to the same object, of which the conversation presents only the appearance, and that coherence is therefore by definition broken when the correspondence between the appearance (the conversation itself) and the reality (the object) is broken.

Anomie

Such a reading of the conversation depends upon the claim that at two points in the conversation, an anomic breakdown occurred, precipitated deliberately by the very non-'natural' act of the sociological Experimenter, which consisted in 'insisting that someone clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks'. This is an intriguing suggestion. It implies that it should now be possible to examine the conversation closely to see where this 'breaking-down' occurred, and to learn about a matter crucial to sociological theory: how to 'break-down' social order. However, on closer examination of the conversation, the matter appears less clear. Firstly, the point at which the Experimenter's deliberate act occurs is not the same as the point at which the breakdown occurs. In the conversation about the girl friend, the Experimenter's non-natural remark is utterance (2), "What do you mean, 'How is she feeling?' Do you mean physical or mental?". How does the Subject respond to this utterance? Not in a way which is obviously anomic. He meets the Experimenter's question with a question of his own, thereby continuing the conversation. In the conversation about the Med School applications, the Experimenter's non-natural remark is utterance (6), "What do you mean, 'How are They?'". Again the Subject's response continues the conversation: 'anomie' makes no appearance. Where, then, does it appear? Here is a paradox. Whereas it was easy to identify the Experimenter's remark which 'insisted that the Subject clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks', it is extremely difficult to pinpoint where it is that the 'anomie' appears.

Nonetheless, an attempt can be made. It would seem that the breakdown of the first conversation occurs at or around the end of utterance (4) and the beginning of utterance (5): "Just explain a little clearer what you mean". "Skip it". And it would seem, that the breakdown of the second conversation occurs at or around the end of utterance (9): "Are you sick?". It is hard not to be vague about exactly where, in either case. What is the reason for this vagueness? I suggest, it is because in themselves, utterances (4), (5), and (9) are not anomie at all. They are, rather, perfectly well-formed utterances occurring intelligibly within a conversation. Where, then, is the 'anomie' if not in the conversation at one or more of these points? The answer seems to be, that it must be posed as standing outside the conversation. We might say, that it is located 'between' utterances (4) and (5), and 'after' utterance (9). In this case, these utterances themselves do not exhibit anomie. They exhibit order.

But, if anomie is to be attributed to the situation at all, then it must presumably be viewed as standing in some relation to the conversation. These utterances, or some of them, must then be viewed as orienting to the anomie, perhaps, as coping with it. On this reading, such remarks as "What's the matter with you?", "Skip it", and "Are you sick?" are to be regarded as ways of coping with anomie, despite the fact that they make no mention of it. But then we are departing from the 'natural' attitude assumption that appearances correspond to reality, in order to make this attribution. As sociologists, then, we are saying that the problem we regard as 'anomie' is treated by everyday conversationalists in a very different way, i.e. that what we treat theoretically as 'anomie', everyday conversationalists treat practically in other terms. This point can be made more generally.

. If ordered social life is viewed as a conversation, then analytically anomie can never appear in the conversation itself: b e c a u s e a n y
c o n v e r s a t i o n is by that very token

ordered, not anomic. Therefore, to attribute anomie to a situation, is to attribute a phenomenon which it is impossible for the speakers in the conversation to address, in their speech. The attribution of anomie can only be an external judgement, made in external terms. Thus Garfinkel's sociological ethnomethodology is unable to live up to its aspirations. It is able to depict everyday life as wholly practical only by itself taking up a theoretical stance external to that of everyday life.

Conversational Analysis


Ethnomethodology has developed beyond Garfinkel's early experimental technique. In view of this I propose to reconsider his conversation in the light of the approach to everyday speech developed by Harvey Sacks and Emmanuel Schegloff under the title of 'conversational analysis'. This analysis will not simply replicate the conclusion just reached, but express it in a more precise form which points to a way of overcoming the limitations of the ethnomethodology itself.

One rule of 'orderly' conversation states, according to Sacks, that questions must be answered. He expresses the rule in this way:

If one party asks a question, when the question is complete, the other party properly speaks, and properly offers an answer to the question, and says no more than that.²⁰

It is important not to deprecate Sacks instantly for the simplicity of his rule, or that fact that as he says, "you know the rules anyway".²¹ The parsimony of the statement is a virtue, and it is not intended to be complete, but as he says "will need considerable explication".²² One particularly important 'explication' of this rule is its extension by the notion of 'insertion sequences', a topic researched by Emmanuel Schegloff. Schegloff states his rule, thus:

The kind of occurrences we are concerned with here may be called 'insertion sequences' or 'inserted sequences' because between an initial question and its answer there is inserted another question-answer sequence. ... If we represent question and answer pairs with the form QA, then we can represent such pairs with an inserted sequence as QQAA or



where the subscript 'b' stands for 'base' and the subscript 'i' stands for 'first insertion'. A general formulation of this format might be as follows: a QA sequence can take a QA inserted sequence. If we take this general formulation without qualification, then we may note that $Q_i A_i$ above, being a QA pair, can take an inserted sequence $Q_{ii} A_{ii}$, ... and $Q_{ii} A_{ii}$ can take an inserted sequence $Q_{iii} A_{iii}$, and so forth indefinitely. It is possible to invent a conversational fragment with many insertion sequences; for example one with three sequences ... However, such multiple insertions are rarely found in naturally occurring conversations. In many cases a Q_{ii} or second insertion sequence will be a meta- Q_{ii} question, requesting repetition of the Q_i (e.g. 'Huh?', or 'what?').²³

With these two rules, it is possible to analyse the conversation. But first a general comment will help clarify the argument. Sacks is concerned with features of 'proper' conversation. His 'question/answer' (QA for short) rule is put forward as such a feature. This means that if the rule is obeyed, then the conversation exhibits order, whereas if it is disobeyed, then the conversation exhibits anomie.

The conversation can be readily analysed along Sacks/Schegloff lines, as follows.

- S: (1) (a) Hi, Ray.
 (b) How is your girl friend feeling? Q_b
- E: (2) What do you mean, 'How is she feeling?' Do you mean physical or mental? Q_i
- S: (3) (a) I mean how is she feeling. A_i
 (b) What's the matter with you? $Q_{i'}$
- E: (4) (a) Nothing. $A_{i'}$
 (b) Just explain a little clearer, what you mean. $S_{i''}$
- S: (5) (a) Skip it. $A_{i''}$
 (b) How are your Med School applications coming? $Q_{b'}$
- E: (6) What do you mean, 'How are they?' $Q_{i''''}$
- S: (7) You know what I mean. $A_{i''''}$
- E: (8) I really don't. $S_{i''''}$
- S: (9) What's the matter with you? Are you sick? $Q_{i''''''}$

A number of comments need to be made about this analysis:

- (i) The analysis itself, i.e. the categorisation devices provided by Sacks and Schegloff, divide up the 'utterances', so that these are no longer the atomic units.
- (ii) "Hi, Ray" is a greeting which I have omitted from analysis.
- (iii) In identifying insertion sequences, I have followed Schegloff in designating the first insertion 'i'. However, the second insertion is not inserted within insertion 'i', for insertion 'i' is terminated before this second insertion begins. Accordingly, I have designated it 'i'', the next one 'i''', and so on. (Should there be, in a hypothetical case, insertions within such second insertions, these would have to be designated 'i'i', 'i'iii', and so on).

This implies that the number of the subscript (i, ii, etc. as opposed to its discriminant, 'i', etc.) determines what may be called the 'level' of the insertion. I take it that it is the number of these 'levels' to which Schegloff is referring when he says 'multiple insertions are rarely found in naturally occurring conversations', as intuitively there seems nothing unusual about the higher number of discriminants (five) found in the present case. In this case, the present conversation, which only reaches the level of one insertion, is not unusual by Schegloff's standard.

(iv) In utterance (2) there might appear to be two questions: I have only identified one. I propose that the second reformulates the first, so as to specify it. This could perhaps be regarded as a kind of mini-insertion sequence of its own within Q_i , but I prefer to regard the whole as a single question. The same situation arises in utterance (9).

(v) Utterance (4) section (b) is not a question. It does however demand a response. There seems no difficulty in assimilating it to the category of what Schegloff, following Sacks, calls 'summonses', which show a similar kind of organisation which can be called 'summons-answer sequences'.²⁴ Accordingly, this section is designated by S, instead of Q .

Utterance (8) presents a slightly different case. Utterance (7) is not a 'question'. Utterance (7) rather questions the need for the question: nonetheless, from the point of view of its sequential structure in the conversation, it appears to fulfil the role of an 'answer', i.e. in the absence of any following challenge to it (such as occurred in this case), the 'question' would be deemed 'answered'. (In everyday language, the expression 'answered back' fits this case happily). Accordingly, it is so treated here. But utterance (8) does then challenge its validity, so in the absence of any following challenge to it (such a challenge does not appear here), the original question is now once again deemed not answered. This somewhat complex case can be covered by designating utterance (8) as a 'summons'.

(vi) In Schegloff's diagram, the lines stemming from 'base' questions (Q_b and $Q_{b'}$) are not drawn, neither are 'question' and 'answer' lines joined in the case of insertion sequences. However, it plainly aids the present presentation to do so.

On the diagram which results from this analysis, the 'anomie' can be plainly seen. It consists precisely in the 'loose' ends: questions which have not been answered.

The value of such an analysis should not be lightly dismissed. Rather, I want to draw attention to a product of this analysis unremarked by ethnomethodology. In my interpretation, the Sacks/Schegloff mode of 'conversational

analysis' reveals two levels of meaning within the conversation. It is easy to identify what these levels are. The 'base' level is, of course, the transcendent intersubjectivity of the natural attitude itself, that realm whose participants 'are certain of the correspondence between consciousness and consciousness, and so any possible consciousness, and so, the world', the unproblematic 'heaven'. Level 'i' on the other hand is the realm to which the discourse shifts when there is trouble abroad. This is the immanentist subjectivity, a world of uncertain theorising and fantasy, that realm whose participants 'are sceptical as to the possibility of correspondence either between consciousness and consciousness or between world and consciousness', the vision of 'hell'.

This analysis in terms of form finds confirmation in terms of the content of the remarks. Q_b , refers to 'your Med School applications', a taken-for-granted feature of the external world. Q_i however takes as its topic not a feature of the external world but part of the conversation itself. The relation between this appearance and a pre-supposed underlying reality is called into question by the reference to 'what you mean'. This question is only intelligible when a real meaning is posited as separate to the appearance which exhibits its meaningfulness. Likewise Q_i , $S_{i!!!}$, $Q_{i!!!!}$ and $Q_{i!!!!!!}$ and the answers to them variously question and posit realities other than those which appear, and attempt to discuss them in a tone of uncertainty. In short, these remarks exhibit members speaking philosophically, whereas Q_b and $Q_{b!}$ exhibit members speaking practically.

I want to propose, that reading Sacks and Schegloff's analysis in this way raises more problems than their analysis can solve. Specifically, I shall argue, that their analysis solves neither their problem nor mine. Their problem, which I take to be the same as Garfinkel's, is how is the anomie produced? My problem is, how is the shift from

transcendent to immanent levels of meaning produced?
Consider each of these in turn.

'Anomie'

According to Garfinkel, it was the Experimenter who produced the anomie, by his question (2). But according to my Sacks/Schegloff analysis, the conversation was well ordered at every stage up to utterance (5). Although there were insertion sequences, these were never in excess of the permitted one level of insertions. According to the Sacks/Schegloff rules, the Experimenter was not limited in the number of sequential insertions he was permitted, and at any point he could have produced an utterance which could have read as A_b , an answer to Q_b , "How is your girl friend feeling?". Therefore to speak in exact terms, it was nothing that he did which produced the anomie. It was rather, retrospectively, the Subject who produced the anomie, by his remark (5) (a), "Skip it", followed by his question (5) (b), "How are your Med School applications coming?" But this was the remark which, previously, was judged to be a 'way of coping with anomie', if the notion was to be employed at all.

The same observation can be repeated in the case of the second occurrence of 'anomie'. Following the Subject's question Q_{b1} , the Experimenter is quite 'entitled', in terms of the Sacks/Schegloff rules, to begin the insertion sequence 'i"', and when that is completed, the sequence 'i"'. Retrospectively, it is the Subject who by his question $Q_{i"1}$, constitutes not one but two instances of Sacks rule having been broken.

The intriguing conclusion, emerges then, that, so long as the notion of anomie is to be upheld at all, then it is the remark which 'copes' with it which itself 'produces' it. This conclusion is an illustration of Foward Becker's

famous slogan, that "deviance is behaviour successfully so labelled".²⁵ Insofar as 'deviance' is a version of the idea of 'anomie', then this is not a new, but a very old, observation.

It is now possible to expand on the earlier finding, namely that anomie can never appear in the conversation itself. Rather, from within a state of order, anomie can be posed as having occurred, or as being about to occur. This is the case in the present instances. That is to say, utterances (5) and (9), spoken by the Subject, are themselves perfectly orderly, and promise to usher in a brave new era of ordered conversation, leaving the past behind. Anomie is a feature of accounts of reality, not of reality itself. That is, it may figure in the speech of members of society, or of sociologists. But it does not figure in society itself. For this reason, it should always be placed in quotation marks, thus: 'anomie'. It follows that all talk of 'producing' anomie should be treated in the same way. Similarly, all talk of 'deviance', or 'producing deviance' should be similarly treated. But 'deviance' and 'anomie' are simply 'rule-breaking'. It follows, that 'rules' and 'rule-breaking' should be treated in the same way. All of these are matters of accounts of reality, not of reality itself.

Now it is possible to see why Sacks and Schegloff's approach cannot solve the problem, how is anomie produced? For, if anomie is a feature of accounts of reality, then to ask, "How is anomie produced?" is itself to give an account of anomie, that is, to produce anomie. A question which does not involve this vicious circularity is, "How is 'anomie' produced?" But this is a question which acknowledges the separation between the levels of accounts (practise), and the 'reality' portrayed in those accounts (theory) which the ethnomethodologists, with their commitment to a practical vision of man, cannot acknowledge. The

separation, however, is made visible by ethnomethodology's own analysis. It is clear that within language this duality corresponds precisely to the dichotomy within consciousness between 'lived experience' and 'reflective thought'. This is suggestive. The phenomenological philosophers, Husserl, Schutz, and Sartre assume that as a feature of consciousness this distinction is an aspect of a reality external to accounts of that reality. Now however the reverse possibility comes into view: that this distinction is itself a feature of language, and as such of accounts of reality, rather than having a prior real existence.

Existential Psychology

By immersing himself within one of the two positions explored by phenomenological philosophers, namely Schutz's vision of the transcendent reality as 'intersubjectivity', Garfinkel has produced a 'phenomenological sociology' which views everyday speakers as everyday sociologists. This interpretation suggests an equal and opposite hypothetical possibility. By immersing oneself within the other position explored in phenomenological philosophy, namely Sartre's vision of the transcendent reality as 'subjectivity', it should be possible to produce a 'phenomenological psychology', which views everyday speakers as everyday psychologists. Indeed, Sartre anticipated this possibility himself in Being and Nothingness. He called it, 'existential psychoanalysis'. This 'psychoanalysis', for Sartre, was to begin with

the principle ... that man is a totality and not a collection. Consequently, he expresses himself as a whole in even his most insignificant and his most superficial behaviour. In other words, there is not a taste, a mannerism, or an human act which is not revealing.²⁶

Such a psychoanalysis could no doubt be inspired by Sartre's earlier remark, in the Transcendence of the Ego, that 'my I, in effect, is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate.' As he observed in that work, the theory that the I is a public object for

consciousness implies that it is available for investigation by other consciousnesses, and this can be the basis for a psychology:

I cannot conceive Peter's consciousness without making an object of it (since I do not conceive it as being my consciousness). I cannot conceive it because I would have to think of it as pure interiority and as transcendence at the same time, which is impossible. A consciousness cannot conceive of a consciousness other than itself. Thus we can distinguish, thanks to our conception of the me, a sphere accessible to psychology, in which the method of external observation and the introspective method have the same rights, and can mutually assist each other, and a pure transcendental sphere [in Husserl's terms a 'pure immanent sphere', B.T.] accessible to phenomenology alone.²⁷

I propose a linguistic interpretation of this suggestion. The 'psychology' which Sartre puts forward would be one whose concern would be for the language of the subject, investigating the I and the me spoken of by subject conceived as 'objects' for his 'consciousness'.

Such a psychology would never be able to gain access to that 'consciousness' which would be available only to a phenomenological investigation carried out by the subject upon himself. Thus, the 'psychological' approach would always be an incomplete investigation, an outsider's view:

'really to know oneself' is inevitably to take toward oneself the point of view of others, that is to say, a point of view which is necessarily false.²⁸

Precisely the same limitation is found to be in force, in Sartre's Being and Nothingness formulation of a programme for psychology:

[P]rojects revealed by existential psychoanalysis will be apprehended from the point of view of the Other.²⁹

Sartre, then, is quite explicit that there can be no transgressing the privileged appreciation which one consciousness

has of itself: all 'psychological' interpretation, is necessarily of the secondary kind, 'from the point of view of the Other'.

Thus, Sartre's psychologist has no privileged position as against the man-in-the-street: neither has he any disadvantage. By contrast, Schutz's sociologist is at a disadvantage compared to the man-in-the-street in that he can never make use of the direct experience of the other in the pure We-relationship. Sartre's psychologist sets up no puppets. Rather, he views everyday speakers themselves as setting up puppets, and it is these puppets which his psychology sets out to investigate. First and foremost among the puppets which any speaker sets up is, of course, his Ego. This suggests precisely the relationship between the methodological statements of Schutz and of Sartre. In Sartre's vision, every man is a 'scientist' of the kind portrayed by Schutz. Each of these sciences is imperfect: an attempt by reflective thought to grasp lived experience, which is doomed to failure. For Schutz, 'the working actions and reactions [of puppets] are merely fictitious'. For Sartre, 'to take the point of view of others is necessarily false'. Nonetheless each is convinced as to the truth of its vision. For Schutz, the object of this science is transcendental intersubjectivity, shared by all. For Sartre, the object of this science is transcendental subjectivity, to which the individual alone has access. Now, what situation arises if rival believers come face-to-face?

Ontological Insecurity

R.D. Laing has proposed, that these visions are alternative possibilities within everyday life. In his Divided Self, he vividly portrays the two possible states of mind, which he designates as 'ontological security' and 'ontological insecurity, respectively. He states:

A man may have a sense of his presence in the world as a real, active, alive whole, and in a temporal sense continuous person. As such, he can live out into the world and meet others: a world and others experienced as equally real, alive, whole, and continuous. Such a basically ontologically secure person will encounter all the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual, biological, from a centrally firm sense of his own and other people's reality and identity. It is often difficult for a person with such a sense of integral selfhood and personal identity, of the permanency of things, of the reliability of natural processes, ... of the substantiality of others, to transpose himself into the world of an individual whose experiences may be utterly lacking in any unquestionable self-validating certainties.³⁰

On the other hand,

The individual in the ordinary circumstances of living may feel more unreal than real; in a literal sense, more dead than alive; precariously differentiated from the world so that his identity and autonomy are always in question. He may not possess an over-riding sense of personal consistency or cohesiveness. He may feel more insubstantial than substantial, and unable to assume that the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, valuable. And he may feel that his self is partially divorced from his body.³¹

Laing illustrates what this 'ontological insecurity' means by quoting from an argument between two patients in an analytic group. One suddenly breaks off the argument to say, "I can't go on. You are arguing in order to have the pleasure of triumph over me. At best you win an argument. At worst you lose an argument. I am arguing in order to preserve my existence."³²

These two states of mind are quite familiar. The first is the outlook which is Schutz's concern and defines his own location: the complacency of consciousness in the 'natural' attitude, certain of the correspondence between consciousness and consciousness, and so any possible consciousness, and so world. The second is the outlook which defines Sartre's viewpoint: that of the restless consciousness, ceaselessly transcending itself, sceptical as to the possibility of correspondence between consciousness and

consciousness, or consciousness and world. Each thus conceives itself to inhabit a world populated by others like itself. That is, each assumes its own assumptions to have 'theoreticity'.

Now, I propose that it is impossible to apprehend Laing's point of view unless it is seen that for him the 'ontologically insecure' man is quite correct in his un-'natural' attitude. From Laing's viewpoint the correspondence between consciousness and consciousness, consciousness and world, is problematic. The assumption that it is not so is a false assumption. This false assumption finds potent expression in one particular situation: the psychiatric attribution of 'objective' meanings to the 'subjective' state of mind of the 'sick' person. Laing is well aware that this is identically a feature of 'lay' and 'professional' psychiatric attribution. The main characteristic of this situation, wherever it occurs, is that the account of his subjective experiences given by the 'sick' person is denied by others with whom he interacts, who attribute to him subjective experiences other than the ones which he ascribes. In Laing's words,

if we agree that you do not experience my experience, we agree that we rely on our communication to give us our clues as to how or what we are thinking, feeling, imagining, dreaming, and so forth. Things are going to be difficult if you tell me that I am experiencing something which I am not experiencing.³³

Yet such attribution does occur as a feature of everyday life, at least in the present state of our society. One kind of culprit - for Laing, such attribution is a crime, a constituent feature of the process of 'driving the other crazy' - can be the parent or other authority figure in relation to a subservient person. Laing gives a fictitious example:

A little boy runs out of school to meet his mother. ... [H]is mother opens her arms to hug him and he stands a little way off. She says, 'Don't you love your mummy?' He says, 'No'. She says, 'But mummy knows you do, darling,' and gives him a big hug.³⁴

Laing comments,

mother is impervious to what he says and feels, and counters by attributing feelings that overrule his own testimony. This form of attribution makes unreal feelings the 'victim' experiences as real. In this way, real disjunction is abolished and a false conjunction created.

Examples of attribution of this order are:

'You are just saying that. I know you don't mean it'.

'You may think you feel like that, but I know you don't really'.³⁵

Thus for Laing, men really 'feel' and 'experience', 'think, feel, imagine, dream', and these conscious experiences are privileged.

This argument is only intelligible from an immanentist position, in Husserl's terms, within which I suspend judgement on the truth of any reality 'outside' my own consciousness. From a transcendentalist viewpoint, his argument is unintelligible. For, from the transcendentalist viewpoint, through reflecting on my thoughts, feelings, imaginings, dreams, etc., I can seek to investigate the characteristics of any possible thoughts, feelings, imaginings, dreams, etc., and in this sense I can know characteristics of the thoughts, feelings, imaginings, and dreams of others. Such knowledge is, of course, the aspiration of scientific psychology, and it is such psychology which Laing finds to be the other kind of culprit par excellence. He asserts:

The psychiatrist may base his diagnosis of schizophrenia as much on what he considers the patient's relation to his actions to be, as on the actions themselves, viewed as 'behaviour' pure and simple. If the psychiatrist, or psychopathologist, under the illusion that he sees the other person in a purely 'objective' way, fails to subject his diagnosis by 'signs' and 'symptoms' to a critical examination, he is condemned by these 'clinical' categories to an impoverished and twisted view of the other. Such 'clinical' categories as schizoid, autistic, 'impoverished' affect, 'withdrawal', all presuppose that there are reliable, valid impersonal criteria for making attributions about the other person's relation to his actions. There are no such reliable or valid criteria.³⁶

The belief of those 'ontologically secure' persons understanding the world in terms of the transcendentalist 'natural' attitude, places 'ontologically insecure' immanentist persons in a false position. They find themselves in a divided world, split between their own 'inner' thoughts, feelings, imaginings, dreamings, etc. on the one hand, and the 'outer' accounts of those thoughts, feelings, imaginings, dreamings, accepted as true by others. This situation is vividly portrayed by Laing, as the title indicates, in his study The Divided Self. It is important to see that this 'divided self' arises as an analytic possibility as an emergent phenomenon: it is neither the experience of the immanentist nor the transcendentalist on his own, or immersed in a society consisting wholly of others of his kind, but is rather the experience of the immanentist in a world of transcendentalists. Now since Laing is at one with Garfinkel and Schutz in his assumption that the everyday social world is such a world of transcendentalists, his analysis is wholly compatible with theirs: if anyone were foolish enough to take up the immanentist stance, Garfinkel and the ethnomethodologists would be forced to agree, then his experiences would indeed be as Laing portrays them.

Immanentism

Laing claims, that his perspective enables him to speak for, and enables us to understand, those whom in the 'natural' attitude we have failed to comprehend, those whom we have placed in the position of a 'divided self'. He makes the following general statement as to his interpretive procedures, and what distinguished his interpretive procedures from those of the 'scientific' psychologists to whom, he is so opposed.

One basic function of genuinely analytical or existential therapy is the provision of a setting in [sic] which as little as possible impedes each person's capacity to discover his own self.³⁷

I propose the following interpretation of what this means. The 'divided self' arises, as an emergent phenomenon in the situation wherein an immanentist finds himself in a society of transcendentalists. Plainly, then, if the analyst takes up a transcendentalist position, if that is, he approaches the 'patient' with his own theory as to the conditions of all possible subjective states of mind, then within the encounter between patient and psychoanalyst, the divided self phenomenon will once again emerge. I have already considered Laing's account of how this is the case, in the encounter between the patient and the 'scientific' psychologist. But what perspective could the therapist take up which would differ from this? From Laing's point of view, the therapist must take up an immanentist position himself, in order not to 'impede' the immanentism of the patient. This is indeed the position which Laing himself takes up. Laing states,

our view of the other depends on our willingness to enlist all the powers of every aspect of ourselves in the act of comprehension. It seems also that we require to orient ourselves to the person in such a way as to leave open the possibility of understanding him. The art of understanding those aspects of an individual's being which we can observe as expressive of his mode of being-in-the-world, requires us to relate his actions to his way of experiencing the situation he is in with us. Similarly, it is in terms of his present that we have to understand his past, and not exclusively the other way round. This again is true even in the negative instances when it may be apparent through his behaviour that he is denying the existence of any situation he may be in with us, for instance when we feel ourselves treated as though we did not exist, or as existing only in terms of the patient's own wishes or anxieties. It is not a question here of affixing predetermined meanings to this behaviour in a rigid way. If we look at his actions as 'signs' of a 'disease', we are already imposing our categories of thought on to the patient. In a manner analogous to the way we may regard him as treating us; and we shall be doing the same if we imagine that we can 'explain' his present as a mechanical resultant of an immutable 'past'.³⁸

Laing portrays the gulf between 'his way of experiencing the situation', 'his mode of being-in-the-world', 'his present' and 'his past', and 'ours' as absolute. To conceive of such a gulf is, as Laing just as much as Schutz, and Garfinkel, is aware, is quite contrary to the 'natural' attitude of commonsense.

What is required of us? Understand him? The kernel of the schizophrenic's experience of himself must remain incomprehensible to us. As long as we are sane and he is insane, it will remain so. But comprehension as an effort to reach and grasp him, while remaining within our own world and judging him by our own categories by which he inevitably falls short, is not what the schizophrenic either wants or requires. We have to recognise all the time his distinctiveness and differentness, his separateness and loneliness and despair.³⁹

How can the therapist, Laing, grant the patient such 'recognition', this curious sympathy which takes the form of entering, with the patient, into a world in which all sympathy is eliminated, in which we are all alone, together? By taking up the very un-'natural' stance of 'immanentism', in early Husserlian terms, or 'existentialism', as Sartre puts it.⁴⁰ But the danger inherent in this position is clear. If Laing himself adopts an immanentist position in order to appreciate the immanentists done down by our transcendentalist society, then he runs the risk of being done down himself in the same manner. And who better to do him down than the spokesmen for transcendentalism, the ethnomethodologists? This is precisely what one ethnomethodologist, Jeff Coulter, has recently set out to do.

In his chapter entitled, "Phenomenological Conceptions of Schizophrenia", Coulter discusses Laing's work. He sets the scene by way of a discussion of Husserl's point of view:

In seeking to 'return' to the date of experience (Erlebnisse), phenomenologists seem to assume a disjunction between all events and our experience of them, as if there is always an intrinsic difference between my description of a thing or

event, and my description of my conscious experience of a thing or event. They do great service when they remind us that scientific knowledge (like all shared knowledge) has an intersubjective character ... but they confuse us when they appear to assert that there is a 'phenomenal world' ... somehow superimposed, or co-current with, the external world.⁴¹

The ethnomethodologist approves of the transcendentalist side of Husserl's work, but disapproves the immanentist side. More precisely, he situates himself within that 'heaven' in which correspondence between consciousness and consciousness, and so with the world, is assured, and from this position disbelieves in the 'hell' in which such correspondences cannot be assumed.

From Coulter's point of view the 'immanentist' vision of Sartre and of Laing, is simply wrong - unintelligible, even mad. It is instructive to consider one analysis by Laing, and Coulter's response to it, in order to see what this means. Consider then the following: Coulter's commentary on a case presented by Laing in The Politics of Experience:⁴²

Laing presents a transcription, with accompanying interpretive commentary, of a subject's recollections of a psychotic 'episode' (a voyage 'into inner space and time') recorded twenty-five years afterwards. A feature of this voyaging is 'ego-loss', wherein a danger is that 'One's own ego-less mind may be confused with one's ego.' A profusion of similarly metaphoric and apocalyptic imagery follows: the narrative is suffused with poetry and rhetoric.⁴³

The core of Coulter's complaint is that:

Laing treats his subjects' utterances both as resources for the explication of theoretical notions ('ontological insecurity' and 'self body split'), some of which he borrows from Sartre, some from Heidegger, and also as sketchy accounts in need of repair from time to time. We switch from a specialised sublanguage, probably quite foreign to the interlocutor, to paraphrasing and fillers-in with terms that do not significantly depart from the overall manner in which the subject is himself speaking. When Laing engages

in the use of his sublanguage, we are supposed to see in that an attempt at illumination or clarification; but it is here where we cannot be sure who is the better authority - analyst or analysand. Since his subject is cited as speaking coherent, albeit poetic, English sentences, it seems a little odd to see Laing as decoding them in a manner analogous to the translation of an alien tongue.⁴⁴

What seems, perhaps, odder is the implied claim Coulter is making for his own approach to the speech of 'schizophrenics' and other everyday members of society: is this to involve no 'specialised sublanguage', no 'decoding' of 'coherent English sentences'?

But first consider what for Coulter is a very different matter, but which one suspects is the same matter exactly, in another guise, namely Coulter's approach to the speech of his professional colleague. For I suggest that Laing's writing too involves 'coherent English sentences': but Coulter's 'decoding' of this writing is designed precisely to translate these into an alien tongue. Coulter finds Laing's statement 'One's own ego-less mind may be confused with one's ego' to be an example of 'metaphoric and apocalyptic imagery'. I propose, ironically, that Coulter's words are eminently self-certifying: his expression is itself 'metaphoric and apocalyptic'. More seriously, I propose that his statement confirms exactly my earlier analysis of the character of 'sociological' ethnomethodology. For here Coulter attributes anomie to Laing's speech, precisely as Garfinkel did to the speech of the Experimenter, and generally, as transcendentalism must do to immanentism.

I propose an alternative interpretation of Laing's remark. Consider the context in which it appears. The statement made by the inner voyager, Jesse Watkins, describes an experience he had, as follows:

'I was put in a bed and -- um well, I remember that night it was an appalling sort of experience because I had the - feeling that - um - that I was then - that I had died. And I felt that other people were in beds around me, and I thought they were all other people that had died - and they were there - just waiting to pass on to the next department!⁴⁵

Laing comments,

He had not died physically, but his 'ego' had died. Along with this ego-loss, this death, came feelings of the enhanced significance and relevance of everything. Loss of ego may be confused with one's death. ... One's own ego-less mind may be confused with one's ego.⁴⁶

It is certainly clear that Laing's comment is a translation, just as Coulter says it is. Laing renders Jesse's account in his own terms, terms which presumably are unavailable to Jesse. What terms are these? One can be perfectly explicit about this. Far from being 'metaphoric' or 'apocalyptic', they are precise analytical terms: the terms of immanentist Husserlian phenomenology, as adopted by Sartre in his Transcendence of the Ego. In these terms, the 'ego' that has 'died' is the 'I' of the patient, an 'object' or 'puppet' portrayed in the speech of Jesse. The 'I' that 'had the feeling' is not the same 'I'. It is Jesse's 'consciousness' or 'cogito', which is Laing's 'he' that had not died physically. Thus, the 'I' of reflected thought, the social 'I', had gone: all that was left was the immanent cogito.

Subjectivism

Laing's account is a theoretical account. The voice which he speaks, and its 'relation' to the voices about which he speaks, is open to investigation by investigating that theory, as indeed I am presently doing. There can be no grounds for criticism of him for this, per se. Rather, if one is interested in attributing praise or blame, then a necessary pre-requisite is that one should first locate the theory, with which he speaks. Having so located his theory, I do indeed now criticise the 'relation' which that

voice claims to the voices about which it speaks.

Laing understands an interpretation such as the one I have here considered in terms of his statement that '[t]he art of understanding those aspects of an individual's being which we can observe ... requires us to relate his actions to his way of experiencing the situation he is in with us.' But, in his view, such interpretation can only ever be incomplete; '[t]he kernel of the schizophrenic's experience of himself must remain incomprehensible to us'. In short, he understands his interpretation as a formulation of a phenomenon, 'consciousness', 'cogito', 'subjectivity', which transcends formulation. Thus Laing himself exhibits a 'divided self'. On the one hand, an interpretation such as that of Jesse Watkins' dream poses itself as absolute, that is, as Coulter points out, as a translation from a less articulate voice (Jesse's) to a more articulate voice (Laing's interpretation). But on the other hand, in his 'meta-statements' about interpretation he claims that any such interpretation must be dependent. What really seems to be involved in Laing's scheme is this: Jesse's 'subjectivity', transcends any formulation of it, including Jesse's own and Laing's. Laing's formulation of it, however, is a better one than Jesse's. Thus we have the spectacle of a competition between two speakers, Jesse and Laing, to best articulate an inarticulable transcendent, which goes by the name of 'Jesse'.

Do I, then, share Coulter's criticisms of Laing? I share them, and I claim, employ them more consistently than Coulter does. For me, these objections are just as forcefully employed against Coulter himself. In order to see this, consider now the other section of his essay which is of importance to us, namely Coulter's investigation into conversations with persons labelled 'schizophrenic'.

Intersubjectivism

Before discussing Coulter's own research, I should perhaps anticipate what one might expect an 'ethnomethodological' approach to find worthy of investigation in the field of 'insanity' given that the 'consciousness' of the 'insane' person is not a worthy topic of such an enquiry. By contrast to Laing and Sartre's focus upon 'subjectivity' as the transcendent reality, Garfinkel and Schutz focus upon 'intersubjectivity'. It may be anticipated, then, that an 'ethnomethodological' approach to this topic would concern itself with everyday ways of dealing with 'insanity'. But more can be said than this. As 'sociologists', the 'ethnomethodologists' work within the perspective of the problem of sociology, conceiving of everyday speakers as 'solving' the problem of 'order' versus 'disorder', 'anomie'. So it may be anticipated that the problem of 'dealing with 'insanity' will be conceived as the problem of 'dealing with disorder'. And one further prediction can be made. Following Schutz, the ethnomethodologists conceive of the everyday world of the 'natural' attitude as the 'best of all possible worlds', indeed, qua transcendent, as the only possible world. It can be anticipated then further that the 'everyday' procedures of dealing with insanity as disorder will be upheld as the best of all possible ways, indeed as beyond criticism, in striking contrast to Laing's indictment of these procedures.

Each of these characteristics is indeed to be found, in Coulter's presentation. He tells us,

We must, I believe, redefine the sociologist's legitimate interest in the phenomena of mental disorder, and provide a re formulation of his research task. Such a task ... should not be the provision of either mechanistic or conventional reason-adding accounts aimed at covering the whole field of mental disorders or any specific class or sample of the same. The sociologist must turn away from 'explanation' of the whys of insanity and toward a description of the hows of insanity ascription. 47

Consider one such analysis offered by Coulter, to see what it involves. One constituent feature of some insanity ascriptions, which Coulter discusses, is that of hallucination. He offers us the following record of an interview between a 'Mental Welfare Officer' and an interviewee, as an illustration of the way in which 'the hows of insanity ascription' may be investigated. The man being interviewed, Coulter states, was living in a flat, and was reported to the Mental Health Department by his flatmate "because of his moodiness, irritability, and refusal to get out of bed day after day - a condition which arose shortly after the man's brother's death".⁴⁸

Mental Welfare Officer: How long is't since yer brother died, Frank?

Frank: About a year. (Pause)

MWO: D'ya ... think ... about 'im much?

F: Yeah. (Pause) Quite a bit.

MWO: Errm ... d'ya ever hear him? In yer thoughts I mean. D'ya ever hear his voice?

F: No. (Pause) No, I think about 'im.

MWO: Are they yer own thoughts or yer brother's, Frank? (Pause)

F: Me own thoughts.

MWO: Does yer brother ... er ... yer brother ever speak t'ya from beyond? (Pause)

F: They're me own thoughts.⁴⁹

Coulter is concerned with the speech of the Mental Welfare Officer, not that of Frank. He argues,

Given limited time and resources, mental health personnel must do an ad hoc operation of probing where they think necessary in order to obtain grounds for inference [as] to psychological status; it is not always possible to allow mundane conversation to develop in the hope that it might generate such grounds by itself, and officers frequently force the issue in an attempt to detect any undisplayed mental problems.⁵⁰

Thus, in terms of the conversation, Coulter points out that the MWO's line of questioning "is not deterred by preliminary negative responses, which might, after all, be further evidence of the covertness of the 'real, underlying' trouble!"⁵¹

Here Coulter is involved, just as was Laing, in 'translating' what are 'coherent English sentences' into his own terms. Once again, there can be no grounds for criticism of him for this, per se. Rather, if one is interested in attributing praise or blame, then a necessary pre-requisite is that one should first locate the theory with which he speaks. Having so located his theory, I do indeed now criticise the 'relation' which that voice claims to the voices about which it speaks. Coulter understands an interpretation such as the one he is here dealing with in terms of his statement that "my discussion of insanity ascription [begins] to focus upon the conventional procedures and presuppositions involved in any set of recorded instances of talk about psychological status".⁵² But in his view such interpretation can only ever be incomplete: "We seek out and state the logically unavoidable procedures and presuppositions which members can make, irrespective of guessing any situated reading a member does make. Our interest lies not in definitive warrants for interpretations, but in specifying available interpretive procedures".⁵³ In short, he understands his interpretation as a formulation of a phenomenon, 'intersubjectivity', which transcends formulation. Thus Coulter himself speaks 'metaphorically and apocalyptically'. On the one hand, an interpretation such as that of the Mental Welfare Officer's questioning poses itself as absolute. That is, the MWO is posed as having no alternative but to speak in the way he does: 'given limited time and resources, mental health personnel must do an ad hoc operation of probing'. It is not always possible to allow mundane conversation to develop. But on the other hand, in his 'meta-statements' about interpretation, which I have just considered, he denies there

can be any such 'definitive warrants'. What really seems to be involved in Coulter's scheme is this: 'intersubjectivity', the definitive range of 'available interpretive procedures', transcends any formulation of them, including the MWO's own, and Coulter's. Coulter's formulation of them, however, is a better one than the MWO's. Thus we have the spectacle of a competition between two speakers, the MWO and Coulter, to best articulate an inarticulable transcendent, which goes by the name of 'intersubjectivity'.

Thus, Coulter's criticisms of Laing are turned back upon himself.

Linguistic Phenomenology

Both Laing and his 'existential psychiatrist' colleagues on the one hand, and Garfinkel, Coulter, and their 'ethnomethodological' colleagues on the other, sustain, following respectively Sartre and Schutz, a vision of their own speech as well as that of everyday speakers as dedicated to the task of glorifying a transcendent reality itself posed as outside speech. The opposition between these two visions is, I propose, not accidental but is itself an expression of the structure of meaningfulness which the phenomenologists have explored and within which their writing is itself located. It is only by coming to terms with this structure that a realistic phenomenology can be produced.

But what prospect is there of overcoming this dualism? I propose to explore a third possibility by refusing to lay claim to any transcendent reality, whether 'subjectivity' or 'intersubjectivity', standing outside speech. Such an approach will reverse the assumption of the essentialists, whether subjectivist or intersubjectivist, that speech is a false expression of the truth of these realities. It will rather propose that these 'realities' are the figments of accounts of reality in speech, whereas it is the speech

that is real. It will focus attention on speech itself, placing in brackets any reality to which speech is supposed to correspond. In this sense it will be neither a socio-logy nor a psycho-logy, but a linguistic phenomenology in the strict sense of the term.

Chapter Four

SOME WAYS OF NOT LISTENING TO WHAT PEOPLE SAY

A Pure Speaking

The aim of my investigation is to produce a linguistic phenomenology. I have investigated the existing claimants to this title stemming from Husserl via Schutz on the one hand and Sartre on the other and found them in each case to suffer from the fact that they pose transcendent realities standing outside the language which they investigate, and are thereby not genuinely phenomenological in Husserl's sense of the term. Otherwise stated, they are respectively 'sociological' or 'psychological' rather than 'philosophical'. That is to say, they respectively posit a 'society' (intersubjectivity) or a 'psyche' (subjectivity) as the reality to which the appearance of speech corresponds, rather than acknowledging that within speech itself the distinction between appearance and reality is already made, and that the relation between these two is a problem for speakers, and not simply for the sociologists or psychologists who speak about their speech. In contrast to these two reductionist approaches which stem respectively from Husserl's 'immanentist' and 'transcendentalist' investigations taken in isolation, I

have upheld the possibility of a 'realistic' phenomenology, which attempts to draw upon Husserl's two enquiries as a unity.

It is now time to pursue that possibility further. A first statement of the modus operandi of such a phenomenology may be derived from a statement made by Husserl in his early Idea of Phenomenology. There he proposes:

Every intellectual process, and indeed every mental process whatever, while being enacted, can be made the object of a pure 'seeing' and understanding, and is something absolutely given in this 'seeing'.¹

How can Husserl's proposal be put into effect as a method of investigating language? In the phenomenological stance which he here recommends, Husserl advocates a suspension of any belief in an external reality to which 'intellectual processes' correspond, and instead a focus on those 'processes' as a reality sui generis. I propose a borrowing of his idea : this would involve suspending any belief in an external reality to which 'linguistic' processes correspond, and instead a focus on those 'processes' as a reality sui generis.

Though Husserl's formulation is itself expressed in language, it proposes both an object of enquiry, namely 'intellectual processes', and a mode of enquiry, namely 'seeing' which are posed as realities external to language. If both are translated into linguistic terms, then the mode presumably becomes one of 'pure speaking'. The aspiration to a 'pure speaking' seems fraught with difficulties however, not the least of which is that such speech would somehow have to give a perfect account of its own character as speech. However the aspiration to such a speech undoubtedly acts as a polemic force against those 'impure' forms of speech which are demonstrably not presuppositionless in the way that, qua phenomenological speech, they claim to be. Thrust on by the logic of the argument itself, I propose to pursue this aim, of a 'pure speaking' though anticipating this aim to be

impossible of attainment, in order to discover what is achieved when that aim is pursued.

So, in aiming at the ideal which Husserl has provoked in me, namely that of 'pure speech', I adopt an attitude somewhat different to that of, inter alia, the positivist methodologists who currently hold sway in social science.² I expect that the ideal itself may be unattainable, and that, this being so, my way of living up to this ideal will be revealing of myself, as well as of the ideal. By contrast, the positivist believes that he attains the ideal, and as such that neither 'he' nor the ideal are revealed by his doing so.³ I can permit myself, then, a certain playfulness in my approach to this ideal, not with a view to being anarchic but with a view to revealing aspects of the ideal and of myself which might otherwise have remained hidden. I adopt, in short, an ironic attitude towards Husserl's methodological recommendation.⁴ With this aspiration in mind, then, I turn to the empirical content of enquiry, namely the 'everyday' speech of teachers and pupils in a school classroom.

Reporting Speech

The conversation materials which I am about to report were collected from a class of forty-one boys, and their teachers, in a large urban comprehensive school in a Scottish city. I shall call it Port Ness school.⁵ The class was a lower-middle stream boys class in the second year: I shall call it class D2. The boys were mainly fourteen years of age, and of skilled manual working-class family backgrounds. I engaged in participant observation with this class over a period of six months from January 1970. Unless I had a special reason for absence, I attended all of their lessons during this period, and usually spent breaks and lunch times in the company of the boys. I also visited all their homes once or twice during the period, and some of the youth clubs and other organisations which they frequented out of school. I maintained cordial but not familiar relations with the teaching staff, and interviewed each teacher towards the end of my stay. However, all of the conversations reported in this study were

collected in the classroom itself. I simply recorded conversations which interested me in longhand in a notebook. This admittedly rough and ready procedure offered one outstanding advantage over tape-recording, the more usual procedure today. This was, its flexibility. In the setting of the school classroom, in which most people were sitting at desks writing in books for most of the time, my own activity, namely sitting at a desk writing in a book, was inconspicuous. In the playground, I was often able to retire from a conversation to jot down an exchange which I had observed, without drawing attention to myself. In general, any remark which I overheard on any occasion could be recorded.

Nonetheless, it will be retorted, the method did constitute an intervention in the setting: my presence, my conversation with those already present, and my activity of writing all constituted a disturbance. Events took place which would not have taken place had I been absent, and events which would, or could, have taken place did not, or could not, because I was present. These points must be addressed. As to the first, the most clear-cut category of 'events which would not have taken place had I been absent' is those events specifically oriented toward me. Such events occurred, and insofar as they were linguistic were reportable by me. Indeed several such incidents provided intriguing samples of conversation for my analysis. There is no reason why they should be excluded. Insofar as events oriented to me were linguistic events, they were of as much interest for my enquiry as were linguistic events oriented to others. As to the second point, its importance must be considered in the specific context of the present enquiry. My concern is with the range of linguistic events, a range defined by my own categories. In terms of those categories, such a range was indeed found within the materials which I collected. Although this range may be narrower than it could otherwise have been, it is nonetheless a range upon which my analysis can set to work.

In order to introduce that analysis consider now the approach which I made to one teacher, in the very first lesson which I observed during my stay at Port Ness.⁷ The lesson was English, taught by a teacher I shall call Mr. Cramond. His classroom was open, and the boys entered before he arrived. When he appeared, I noted,

At first, almost complete silence. As lesson goes on, some talking, some gazing around, some whispering and hand tapping, coughing.⁸

The lesson dealt with etymology, e.g. 'tele-vision' means 'vision at a distance'. The teacher generally talked, then recapitulated, asking questions whose answers were the facts he had just given. I noted that there was "lively competition to answer" and a "good deal of shouting out", and that the "~~teacher~~ knows a lot of boys' Christian names".⁹ Toward the end of the lesson he gave them "seven minutes to talk quietly!"¹⁰, and came to talk to me. He told me that "this class ~~was~~ very good - ~~he~~ never needed to reprimand anyone".¹¹ I noted,

Mr. Cramond has ~~very~~ relaxed air, though kind of ... firmness in face ~~which is~~ taut, and voice ~~which is~~ hard, commands all the time.¹²

He told me that he made a point of learning boys' Christian names because the use of surnames "sets a barrier between you and them - I had that all through my school, surnames only!"¹³ Also, he told me, he always gave the boys five minutes to talk at the end of lessons.

On my first encounter with Mr. Cramond, then, I made various observations which help to convey the atmosphere of his lesson. But they did so only by formulating the situation in my words. To describe Mr. Cramond as 'relaxed', 'firm of face', with a 'hard, commanding voice' conjures up a picture of a teacher - but he is then no more than a puppet in my portrayal of the world. This approach denies access to his own ability to conjure up such visions. This 'reporting' speech, then, was not a 'pure' speech in the Husserlian sense.

Describing

In my second lesson with Mr. Cramond, I began to make observations of a different kind. This was the second period of a Monday afternoon, which as I later discovered Mr. Cramond regularly set aside for compositions. On this occasion, which was the first composition lesson after the Christmas-New Year holidays,¹⁴ he began by naming two alternative composition titles, 'Hogmanay',¹⁵ or 'The Best Day of the Holidays'. He discussed some points of writing style, e.g. that paragraph beginnings should be indented but that otherwise lines should start close to the margin. Then he announced,

'When we do compositions, we don't have any talking at all. I hope that is clear'.¹⁶

This utterance repays a little attention. For it gives access to the vision of the world conjured up by the speech of a person within the situation. What can be made of it?

I have elsewhere explored some of the less fruitful ways in which this utterance may be approached.¹⁷ Now, I approach it with a clearer mind. This linguistic process, while being enacted is to be made the object of a 'pure speaking'. I have found the following train of thought to be suggestive, in encouraging a new way of looking at a remark such as this one, a way which promises to exemplify the ideal proposed by Husserl. It is inspired by my own research experience, namely that of coming from a training as a social anthropologist in ways of approaching the strangest and most distant cultures from our own, to a situation at once familiar and close at hand, namely a school classroom. Was it not possible to recognise the strangeness that can be seen in the familiar and the close at hand?¹⁸ This is after all only the reverse of the practise of the social anthropologist, which is to recognise the familiarity of the strange and distant.

A direct way of making this transformation presents itself from this line of thought. Consider the we and the I in Mr. Cramond's remark. These are words which are so familiar to us that we scarcely count them as words. We think of them simply as pointers, equivalent perhaps to a brief gesture with the forefinger, pointing to persons really present,¹⁹ with us. Perhaps in a 'Schutzian' frame of mind we experience the vivid presence of these persons face-to-face with us as infinitely richer than these mere words. Or, perhaps in a more Sartrean mood, I conceive the mystery of the other's difference from myself to be such that mere words can never bridge the gap between us. We conceive of the we and the I as indications of a reality external to language, not as entities worthy of consideration in their own right. Certainly, we neither expect nor want to learn about the we and the I from words such as these. But suppose the utterance was

When Baba Yaga stamps three times, she turns twice the size. The frog promised this event would soon be seen.

Faced with this passage, we experience what Schutz calls an existential 'shock'. Our attitude changes dramatically, our feeling of familiarity changes to one of strangeness and uncertainty. We know a little about Baba Yaga - she figures in many Russian folk tales, and so do frogs that talk. But because we know that these characters figure nowhere but in tales, we pay those tales special attention. They are the only way in which we can learn about Baba Yaga and such frogs. What is more, faced with a magical tale of this kind, we are less certain of our usually taken-for-granted presumptions about any character, any person, at all. Rather than jumping to conclusions, we wait attentively for each new fact about these characters. And we tentatively put together their properties and try to make sense of them. Finally, uncertain about these characters, we are also uncertain about the milieu in which they live, and in particular its relation to the one which we believe ourselves to inhabit. We are attentive too, therefore, for

any signs of familiarity within the strange tale, which can help us to locate it in relation to ourselves.

Now, I propose to return to Mr. Cramond's utterance, and treat it with the attention which we would have been prepared to give to the folk tale.

Consider what is in the present case. Take the we and I referred to in the utterance. Obviously, it might be said, we know what these refer to: the boys and the teacher together, and the teacher alone, respectively. But, under my new attitude of mind, I propose to refrain from any such 'obvious' judgements, which begin and end with the assumption that there is nothing more to be said, that we already know what is obvious for Mr. Cramond. I prefer to assume that his remarks are his way of saying what is obvious for him.

In what relationship then are these two 'persons' posed as standing, first to one another, second to the impersonal features of Mr. Cramond's picture? Seemingly, the we is posed as subject to a rule, of the form 'if A then B', (in this case, when one does compositions [then] one does not have any talking at all). The I then appears as standing back from the we, reflecting on its position: 'I hope that [the position of the we] is clear'. It seems that here the I is posed as the interpreter of the rule. The we itself apparently has no room for manoeuvre within the rule. But doubt is possible in the province of the I, namely over the interpretation of the rule: the term 'hope' seems to express something less than certainty: it seems the I is available to the unspecified others present to make the interpretation clear if they wish.

The utterance, then, seems to convey the following definition of the situation:

1. There are rules governing our position here, rules which can be explicitly stated.
2. The rules affect all of us (the we) without distinction.
3. My special position (the I) is not that I stand above the rules, but that I can interpret the rules to you if you are in doubt about them.

Already then it has been possible to provide a description of the reality which Mr. Cramond sustains in his speech. This description has been produced in a manner analogous to the descriptive phenomenology elaborated in Husserl's Ideas, which takes as its object what is unique and personal in subjective life. By contrast I have taken as my object what is unique and personal in the speech of an individual. But on its own mere description pertains to the immanentism which has been explored in Sartre and in Laing: the vision of unique individual subjectivities, here translated into a portrayal of unique private languages. If my language describing the teacher's language is simply yet another unique private language, then it is no more 'pure' than any other. If my language claims more than this, it must make a claim to theorise, and so speak of language in general. It is to such theorising that I now turn.

Theorising

If my describing was inspired by Husserl's Ideas, my theorising is inspired by his Cartesian Meditations. It asks, what does Mr. Cramond's speech reveal as to the necessary conditions of any possible speech? Generalising from my analysis of this utterance, it would appear that every speaker can conjure up in his speech what might be called a 'world'. This world can be described as comprising a series of different realms, each with its specific properties, and each inhabited by specific persons. In confirmation of the idea which inspired this vision, note that such a 'world' is in principle very like the 'cosmology' conjured up in the folk tales of traditional society or the myths of a primitive tribe.

But, more significantly for the present argument, such a world of multiple realms appears to be the exact equivalent, in linguistic terms, of the 'multiple realities' described by Schutz as properties of conscious experience. Within such a world, then, the different characters, I, we, and others, are puppets conjured up by the speaker. The time in which they live, whether past, present, or future, is created for them by their speaker. The space which they inhabit, whether it has differentiated areas of great complexity, or an absence of such differentiation, is space granted to them by their speaker. And such consciousness as they may have, whether it be a brute mechanism of primitive urges, or a sophisticated appreciation of other persons, will be solely a consciousness attributed to them and sustained by that speaker.²⁰

But does this convergence with Schutz's ideas then involve a capitulation to his version of 'phenomenology' as against that of Sartre or others? Not at all. Intriguingly, this conception harmonises perfectly well with Sartre's account of conscious experience. The cornerstone of his first work, the Transcendence of the Ego, was the contention that 'the I is, in the same manner as the world, an object for consciousness'. It follows, of course, that so are the we, you, they, etc. In my terms, then, each of these entities is 'an object for language'. This is no trivial point. On the contrary, this 'translation' expresses the intelligibility of Sartre's insight more clearly than he does himself. Thus, a core implication of his theory is that 'my I in effect is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate'. So long as this thesis is expressed in terms of consciousness, it seems to be at best an analogy: the 'I' per se is not visible: it could only be inferred by a complex and problematic interpretation. But in my terms, the thesis is exact. My I, as a feature of my speech, is directly visible to other men. The promise of my method, then, is that it produces a syncretism of the two divergent phenomenologies of Schutz and Sartre.

But the very divergence of these approaches poses a further problem. Since Schutz and Sartre each advocate, prima facie, very different notions of 'reality', what is the notion of 'reality' implicit in this 'syncretism'? I have once again found the anthropological analogy suggestive in answering this question. The identification of the world of multiple realms conjured up by the individual speaker within an everyday setting with the world conjured up in fairy tales, or in myths, immediately invites the criticism which Hindess directed against Schutz's 'multiple realities' conception. As noted earlier, Hindess is particularly aggrieved by the implication of Schutz's position that science itself, and indeed all sense of 'reality' is no more than a 'fairy tale'. As has been seen, he expresses this criticism by referring to Schutz's position as 'psychologism', insofar as 'relationships between provinces of meaning exist only in the consciousness of the knowing subject'. In translation, Hindess' criticism of my present position can be expressed by the charge of 'linguisticism', the claim that 'relationships between realms exist only in the language of the speaker'. Indeed, Hindess includes within his description of 'psychologism' the view that these relationships exist 'in books or papers that the subject may have written'.

Hindess' charge stands so long as the object of linguistic phenomenological investigation is taken to be concretely the speech of the individual speaker, or the text of the individual writer.²¹ The speech in which I described the speech of Mr. Cramond was a concrete speech in this sense. My speaking posed his utterance as a self-sufficient ex nihilo creation. As such my speaking was 'impure' in speaking of a reality external to itself. A pure speaking would acknowledge its sameness with the speech of which it speaks. How can this be done?

Analysing

The object of linguistic phenomenology is not the

concrete speech of a single speaker nor the books and papers of a single writer. It is rather the language which makes possible both speech and writing.²² This language cannot be apprehended by treating either speech or writing at face value. Such a treatment trades on all manner of presuppositions which remain unexplicated, covered over by the belief in the mysterious uniqueness of the utterance or text.²³ The ideal of presuppositionlessness remains suggestive. I propose to treat as problematic the unity of the utterance, and to re-examine the utterance as Husserl puts it 'while being enacted' i.e. sequentially. Aspiring to bring with me no presuppositions, I shall seek to explicate, step-by-step, the way in which the utterance itself puts forward suppositions and connects them together.

Consider then the utterance, word by word. The first word encountered, following this procedure, is 'when'.

when This word does not 'make sense' on its own. But it points forward to other words which will complete its sense. Encountering this word, one knows in some detail what to expect. 'When' refers to a time. There are two aspects to such a time, first 'when' it is, and secondly what will happen 'at' that time. If the present utterance is coherent, one may expect that each of these aspects will be specified. One may also anticipate the grammatical form in which they will be specified. The normal form is 'when A then B', where A specifies the time, and B specifies what will happen 'at' that time.

we This word does not complete the sense begun by the first word, 'when'. It therefore itself points forward to other words, as yet unspecified, which will complete that sense if the utterance is well formed.

do This word contributes to the sense begun by the previous word 'we'. As it does not complete this sense, it points forward to other words which will complete it.

composi-
tions This word completes the sense begun by the previous two words, 'we' and 'do'. These three words together form a self-contained unit of sense, namely 'we do compositions', which points neither forward nor backward: it requires no other words to complete it. This unit is therefore an example of an atomic unit of sensibility within the utterance.

I propose to call such a unit a picture.

The sense of the picture has been completed but within the utterance a loose end remains to be completed. The word 'when', I previously noted, required the specification of two further aspects to complete its sense. It is now possible to see that the picture 'we do compositions' expressed the first of these aspects. It may be anticipated that another picture will complete the second. However, no such picture has yet presented itself, that is, the sense of the utterance still points forward.

we This word points forward to complete its sense, and still the when points forward to complete its own sense.

don't This word contributes to the sense begun by the previous word 'we'. As it does not complete this sense, it points forward to other words which will complete it.

have This word contributes to the sense begun by the previous words 'we don't'. As it does not complete this sense, it points forward to other words which will complete it.

any This word contributes to the sense begun by the previous words 'we don't have'. As it does not complete this sense, it points forward to other words which will complete it.

talking This word completes the sense begun by the previous words, 'we don't have any'. These five words together form a self-contained unit of sense, namely 'we don't have any talking' which points neither forward nor backward: it requires no other words to complete it. This unit, then, is a second instance of the atomic unit of sense which I have called a picture.

Not only the sense of the second picture has now been completed. The loose end remaining from the uncompleted sense of the 'when' has now been closed. There is now no outstanding sense awaiting completion. The whole string of words, 'when we do compositions we don't have any talking' thus comprises a self-contained unit of sense. But this is not an atomic unit. Rather, since it contains within itself as constituent parts two atomic units together with an

additional word, it is a molecular unit. I propose to call such a molecular unit, a stanza.

at It is not clear that this word refers to any word previously spoken, but it is clear that it points forward to other words which will complete its sense.

all This word contributes to the sense begun by the previous word, 'at'. It is possible to read these two words together as contributing to the sense of the previous picture, and completing that sense. But that sense was already complete. These two words therefore provide a specifically additional sense which retrospectively attaches itself to that picture. In completing that picture for the second time, they also complete the stanza for the second time.

I No previously spoken word contributes to completing the sense of this word, accordingly it does not point backwards. It does, however, point forwards to other words which will complete it.

hope This word contributes to the sense begun by the previous word, 'I'. It could indeed be regarded as completing that sense even though 'hope' requires an object to complete its sense. For it would be possible to regard the first stanza of the utterance as completing that sense by being what the I 'hoped'. However what follows provides an explicit object of the 'hope', so that I shall disregard this possibility here. The 'hope' can be regarded as requiring further words to complete its sense. I propose here to so regard it.

that This word does not complete the sense begun by the 'I hope'. Accordingly, this sense and the sense which it has begun point forward to other words which will complete it.

is This word contributes to completing the sense of the previous word, 'that', though not to the earlier two words, 'I hope'. As it does not complete either sense, both senses point forward to other words which will complete them.

clear This word completes the sense of the previous two words, 'that is'. These three words together form a self-contained unit of sense, namely 'that is clear', which is accordingly a third picture. This third picture, 'that is clear', itself completes the sense of the two words, 'I hope'. Thus 'I hope' plus 'that is clear' together make up a fourth picture. However this is, I propose, really two pictures of which one is contained within the other. These two together form a self-contained unit of meaning comprising two atomic units, that is, a second stanza.

Thus the utterance as a whole comprises two stanzas, each comprising two pictures. Each stanza is a self-contained sensible unit, comprised of two pictures which are self-contained sensible units. However, the sense of a stanza is not simply some kind of addition, of the senses of its constituent pictures, and neither is the sense of the whole utterance simply some kind of addition of the senses of its constituent stanzas. It seems, then, that my procedure has only performed half the task of a phenomenological approach to the utterance: namely, the analysis of the utterance into its constituent units. The further task remains, of showing how these constituent units are combined together in a synthesis.

Nonetheless, the findings of the analysis are worth reporting in their own right. I propose an algebraic and diagrammatic notation to simplify presentation of its findings. The algebraic notation employs roman numerals. I use upper case numerals to designate stanzas, thus: 'I', 'II'. I use lower case numerals to designate pictures within the stanzas of which they are part, thus: 'Ii', 'Iii', 'IIi', 'IIii'. In the event of a single picture being a stanza on its own, this can be designated with a zero, thus: 'IIIo'. The diagrammatic notation employs brackets. I use square brackets to designate stanzas, thus: '[]'. I use round brackets to designate pictures within the square brackets designating the stanza of which they are part, thus: '[() ()]', or in the case of a single picture stanza, '[()]'. In the event of one picture being contained within another picture, as in the utterance here treated as an example, I enclose sets of round brackets one inside the other, as appropriate. In addition, words which are constituent parts of stanzas without being parts of pictures are written in block capitals, thus: 'WHEN'. Finally, a 'false ending' to a picture such as occurs after 'talking' in the present utterance may be indicated by a dotted round bracket, thus:

') '.

It is also necessary to identify utterances as a whole. For a given speaker, I employ arabic numerals followed by an asterisk, thus: '1*'. Where necessary, the speaker may be identified by prefixing this number with his initial letter, thus 'C1*'. The asterisk appears so that, should it be necessary to refer to a specific stanza, this can be done by prefixing the utterance identification to the stanza or picture identification, thus: 'C1*Iii', 'C1*IIIi', etc.

Accordingly, the analysis of the utterance just completed may be summarised in the following display:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{I} \\
 \text{i} \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{ii} \\
 \text{[WHEN (we do compositions) (we don't have any talking at all)} \\
 \text{II} \\
 \text{i} \qquad \qquad \qquad \text{ii} \\
 \text{[(I hope (that is clear)]}
 \end{array}$$

Mr. Cramond's utterance C1*

I propose to express this analysis in terms of the notation which I have devised. I shall employ the ampersand, '&', to designate a hypothetical relation known concretely, but not yet expressed synthetically. Then the utterance comprises two stanzas, in a relation which has not yet been explicated. That is,

$$C1* = I \ \& \ II \ \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

Now, each of these stanzas has an internal structure of two pictures whose relationships have not yet been explicated. So:

$$C1*I = i \ \& \ ii \ \dots\dots\dots (2a)$$

$$C1*II = i \ \& \ ii \ \dots\dots\dots (2b)$$

The advantage of the diagrammatic and algebraic notation is, that it provides an absolutely explicit formulation of my analysis of the utterance.

Synthesising

My analysis has succeeded in questioning the unity of the utterance. It has in fact fragmented that utterance. Is the vision of language which I am proposing then one of free-floating 'atoms' and 'molecules' of sense, as opposed to the coherence of conversation as it concretely appears to its participants? It is not. The analysis thus far completed represents only the first stage of the linguistic phenomenological procedure. The analysis has concerned itself with the sense of the utterance. It has disregarded its reference.²⁴ But how could it acknowledge and investigate reference, if 'reference' was a feature of the external world to which the utterance referred? Undoubtedly, it could not. But I should like to propose an alternative conception of reference to this, a conception of reference to intra-linguistic entities. What could such entities be? They are, the transcendent 'realities' sustained by speech. And what is definitive of such transcendent 'realities'? I propose, that the repeated relation between one word and another, is what establishes these 'realities' as the object of a linguistic phenomenological enquiry.

The analysis of the utterance was concerned with the internal relations of 'pictures' and 'stanzas', 'atoms' and 'molecules'. Now I should like to address the synthesis of these units. Concretely, we were aware of a 'synthesis' - the utterance as a whole - before even conceiving of an analysis. But this concrete 'synthesis' is somewhat suspect. To be precise, it is a hypothesis. Nonetheless, it is the only possible beginning of an attempt to put the pieces back together again.

The task of synthesis, then, is to establish the nature of the ampersands in each of these three equations. Synthesis could, of course, show that the relation was nul, but this would be the outcome of a phenomenological investigation, not a prior commonsense judgement.

Consider then Ii and Iii. What relation between them can be discovered, if any? Another way of asking this question is, in what way is picture Iii different from any picture which could grammatically occupy this position? The most striking way in which picture Iii distinguishes itself from 'any' picture occurring at that position in the structure is, I propose, the recurrence of the word we, and, on a closer inspection, of do, in the two pictures, Ii and Iii. What is the significance of this phenomenon? A simple observation is, that the two pictures together determine "we do" as their common theme. Neither could determine such a theme on its own. By their overlap, the two pictures establish as central for each picture the 'we do', and by contrast as peripheral, in the one case, 'compositions', and in the other, 'not have any talking at all'. This way of putting the matter suggests immediately that other pictures, spoken on the same or on other occasions, could formulate the same common theme, varying in each case the peripheral matter. But in this case, the 'we', or more specifically the 'we do', defines a topic to which both pictures Ii and Iii, in short stanza I as a whole, refers, a topic nonetheless defined in purely linguistic terms. This topic is the we. It is at once possible to conceive that an indefinite number of other stanzas might take the we as their theme in the same way. In this case, these stanzas as a whole would form a legitimate object of linguistic phenomenological enquiry. I propose to refer to this object as the voice of the 'we.' It will be convenient to be able to identify the stanzas which exhibit this voice in the notation. This can be done by the use of a subscript to the numeral indicating the stanza, thus: 'I_{we}' or where necessary, 'I_{we} i', and so on.

But this observation has also clarified the manner in which stanza I is constructed, and this deserves recognition. I propose to identify this as a specific technique for the construction of stanzas by relating pictures together. I shall call it reverberation, indicating by this term the repetition of certain crucial words in the two pictures,

thereby constituting a named theme definitive of the stanza. This technique should also be acknowledged in the notation. I propose to mark it by a 'multiplication' sign thus: 'I.' Employing this sign, it is now possible to re-write equation (2a) so as to eliminate the ampersand:

$$C1 * I_{we} = i.ii \dots\dots\dots (3a)$$

Now consider stanza II. If this combination is a stanza, then it seems to be one constructed on somewhat different principles from those identified in the case of stanza 'I.' What is the relation between pictures IIIi and IIIii? If the I, in picture IIIi is a character in a cosmological realm, or a 'puppet' in a reality conjured up by Mr. Cramond's speech, then what is picture IIIii? The answer is plain: this picture portrays the I's consciousness, the consciousness which Mr. Cramond endows to his puppet. But then, the relation between a character and its consciousness, which we have here, is somewhat different from the relation between two formulations of the same named theme, which we found in stanza I. I propose to say, that whereas pictures Ii and Iii were on the same 'level', pictures IIIi and IIIii are on different 'levels'. This suggestion seems confirmed by the fact that gramatically, picture ii is, as it were, contained within picture i. What, then, is this difference between levels? In the present case, it is the difference between the I which simply 'hopes' and the 'hopings' themselves. What is this difference? I propose, that it is a very familiar difference: it is the difference between lived experience in the first case, and reflective thought, in the second. Admittedly, the distinction appears here in an unfamiliar guise: both Schutz and Sartre portrayed the distinction as aspects of a reality external to language. But here, the distinction arises entirely within language.

Plainly, now, the 'relation' between IIIi and IIIii is different in kind from that between Ii and Iii. Accordingly, I propose to designate the relation between IIIi and IIIii as

one of reflection. It would seem to follow that picture II must be conceived as the same voice as IIIi: but what voice is it? Plainly, it is the voice of the 'I,' even though no 'I' appears portrayed in IIIi. It is the voice of the 'I' in a reflective mode. So, we write, 'II_I', or where necessary 'II_Ii', 'C1*II_Iii' and so on.

The notation should also be able to indicate the relation of reflection where necessary. This can readily be done. I propose to borrow this notation from that employed on the diagram. Round brackets, '()', can indicate it. Equation (2b) can now be rewritten:

$$C1*II_I = i(ii) \dots\dots\dots (3b)$$

Finally, the relationship between the two stanzas, roughly expressed in equation (1), must now be investigated. Again this investigation must be based on the content of the stanzas themselves. I propose that the utterance must be interpreted in this way: 'that' in picture IIIi refers to stanza I as a whole. How does this reference work? One might be tempted to suppose, that picture IIIi simply sustained the same theme as that addressed in stanza I. In this case, 'that is clear' would serve as another picture within stanza I, and then by implication so would 'I hope'. The distinction between stanzas would have been dissolved. Why is this an inappropriate analysis? Because, I propose, it glosses over a very crucial distinction. This is, that the way in which the supposed 'same theme' is addressed in stanza I differs significantly from the way it is addressed in stanza II. But this is an inaccurate way of expressing it. More precisely, this way of expressing the matter postulates a 'same theme' which is itself external to the language which formulates it. This is precisely what I wish to avoid doing. Focussing on language itself shows that there is no 'same theme' addressed in stanza I and stanza II - or, which amounts to the same thing, to speak of such a 'same theme' is to speak in a

third voice different from that of either stanza I or stanza II, which then raises the problem of the 'relation' between that third voice and either of these others. In short, in the speech of stanza I, stanza I is not a 'that'. Stanza I is a 'that' only in the speech of stanza II.

How then does IIIi relate to I if not by sustaining a common theme? I propose, that the relationship is metaphorical. That is to say, that stanza II reformulates the theme of stanza I in its own words. But this can be expressed more simply: the voice of the I in stanza II speaks of the voice of the we in stanza I. Thus a plain distinction can be drawn between the relations of reverberation and reflection on the one hand, and that of metaphor on the other. The first two sustain sameness as between voices, whilst the third establishes difference.

The relation between stanzas must now be expressed in terms of the notation. The relation of metaphor is manifestly a more distant one than either of the other two. Yet it resembles the reflection relation in an important way. Just as by reflection picture IIIi refers to picture IIIi, and is in this sense dependent upon it, so by metaphor stanza II refers to stanza I, and is in this sense dependent on it, so by metaphor stanza II, or more precisely picture IIIi, refers to stanza I, and is in this sense dependent on it. For this reason I employ a similar notation in each case. Once again it is possible to borrow from the notation employed on the diagram. For I have argued that the relation of metaphor is constitutive of a difference between stanzas. Accordingly it is appropriately and unambiguously designated by square brackets, thus : ' [] '. In this case, equation (1) can be rewritten:

$$C1^* = II_I \quad [I_{we}] \dots\dots (4)$$

Once again the advantage of the notation is, that it provides an absolutely explicit formulation of my interpretation of the utterance.

'Reality'

I have now replaced the relatively vague and external description of the reality which Mr. Cramond conjured up in his speech with an exact 'linguistic' analysis of the techniques which constituted that reality.

In my concrete description of his talk Mr. Cramond was judged to be portraying transcendent rules, posed as existing for more than one subjectivity within the situation-at-hand, indeed for all these subjectivities, and posed as existing for more than one occasion on which he spoke, indeed for all occasions, so that they were 'social facts' in Durkheim's sense of the word.²⁵ Here I spoke of him as speaking of a reality external to language. My analysis has now shown that there was no need to do so. For now rather than descriptively judging stanza I to formulate a transcendent reality and stanza II to formulate the immanent appearance of that reality within the situation at hand, it can be observed that technically, stanza I is posed as transcending stanza II which reformulates it. The relation which I have expressed in algebraic terms as $Cl^* = II_I [I_{we}]$ itself exhibits transcendence: the voice of the we is posed as transcending the voice of the I which formulates its immanent appearance.²⁶

The analysis tells us, that the utterance portrayed one stanza, and then a second, which made reference to the first

and was in this sense dependent on the first for its intelligibility. Stanza I would have been complete on its own. But the addition of stanza II brings about a change. Now, neither I nor II is a blunt assertion. I want to say more than this. Now, from within the standpoint of stanza II as speech, stanza I is no longer speech. Rather, in purely linguistic terms, stanza I is transcendent: speech no longer concerns the truth of the reality of stanza I : it concerns only the truth of the appearance of stanza I, which is now tacitly posed as really true. In the shift from stanza I to stanza II, I am proposing, our speaker has 'changed gear', has changed the topic of speech, has changed what was speech previously into a reality which transcends speech.

I propose, that in the relationship of reference which is constituted by the techniques of reverberation, reflection, and metaphor, is to be found the very source of the notion of 'transcendence' i.e. reality as a phenomenon over and above mere appearance. This source is linguistic. The study of the linguistic techniques which gives rise to this transcendence defines a mode of enquiry directly comparable to that of 'ethnomethodology' the study of folk methods for constituting a transcendent social reality, i.e. everyday sociology. Less directly it is comparable with 'existential psychiatry' to the extent that that discipline studies methods whereby speakers constitute a transcendent psychological reality, i.e. everyday psychology.

But as against either of these disciplines, each of which formulates its own version of reality and then construes everyday speech as formulating the appearance of that reality, I propose my own version of reality as being speech itself, and my enquiry as being, how speakers speak of a 'reality' external to that speech, i.e. everyday philosophy. A speech which consistently speaks of 'reality' not of reality can be called 'pure' in Husserl's sense of the term.

This 'pure speaking' is Husserlian in the following sense. It de-structs (destroys)²⁷ and re-constructs speech, in a manner inspired by the ideal of presuppositionlessness. The de-struction is so inspired in that it presumes nothing as to the sense of the 'utterance', and instead seeks to establish analytically the sensible unities which relate together the spoken words.²⁸ The unities so discovered resemble familiar grammatical units, namely clauses, but are not identical to these. The con-struction is likewise inspired by presuppositionlessness in that it presumes nothing as to the reference of the 'utterance,' and instead seeks to establish synthetically relations of dependence and independence of reference between the sensible unities established by analysis.

Whereas the descriptive account treated the utterance concretely as a self-sufficient ex nihilo creation external to my description the theoretical account treats the teacher's speech as the product of a way of speaking of which my theorising must also be the product. This way of speaking comprises the techniques whereby speech speaks of 'reality'. My refusal to accept reality as the teacher defines it implies my criticism of his speech.

Theological Speech

For me, the way of speaking which above all reveals the quality of the teacher's utterance, is theological speaking.²⁹ The teacher's portrayal of a transcendent realm on the one hand, illuminating and informing the immanent realm on the other, is reminiscent of the Christian distinction between heaven and earth. In order to explore this further consider what it would involve to situate the teacher within the discourse of theology, by contrasting him with a theologian well-known in the sociological tradition, namely Calvin, as presented in Weber's classic study, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

The world conjured up by the teacher's utterance, comprises three realms, two inhabited by persons, the third

being an impersonal formulation of the situation-at-hand. Within this world, there are striking differences between the persons portrayed.

Firstly, within this world only the I shows concern: it 'hopes' the situation-at-hand is such and such. By implication, as I have already argued, this concern extends itself to the realm of the we. However, this is not precisely a concern for the we as such, but rather, a concern that the logicality of the order governing the transcendental we should be clearly visible in the situation-at-hand. By contrast to the I, the we itself exhibits no concerns. Second, the utterance portrays the I as standing on its own, and indeed as conjuring up other realms by its hoping, whereas the we does not: it is, rather, encompassed within a logical order into which it fits quite unproblematically, without revealing any autonomy. Third, the we is portrayed as actively engaged in its realm (as "doing"), whereas the I is posed as passively contemplating another realm, by way of "hoping". Fourth, the I is portrayed as present in close proximity to the situation-at-hand, whereas the transcendental we is remote from the immediate situation.

Compare the world conjured up by the speech of Calvinism. This world comprises two realms, heaven and earth, each inhabited by specific 'persons', God and man. There are two classes of man, the Elect, who are chosen by God to be saved, and the Damned, for whom God has predestined eternal punishment. Now Weber argues since no one could live with the knowledge that he was damned, the Calvinist believer lives with a fundamental anxiety: is he, or is he not, one of the Elect? This anxiety follows from the believer's decision to take Calvinism seriously. Compare this anxiety with the implications of a decision to take the teacher's utterance seriously as an exhibition of his world. First, within the Calvinist world, only God shows concern. "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation".³⁰ Man is to put no trust in his fellow man, but only in God.

However, God's concern is not precisely for man as such, but rather a concern that the logicity of the order governing the transcendental realm of the elect should be clearly visible on earth: "The elected Christian is in the world only to increase this glory of God by fulfilling His commandments to the best of his ability. But God requires social achievement of the Christian because He wills that social life shall be organised according to His commandments, in accordance with that purpose".³¹ Second, it plainly follows that God stands on his own, and indeed conjures up other realms, whereas man is encompassed within a logical order into which he fits quite unproblematically. "To apply earthly standards of justice to His sovereign decrees is meaningless, and an insult to His Majesty, since He and He alone is free, i.e. subject to no law".³² Third, man in this scheme of things is to devote himself to ever greater activity for the glorification of God upon earth - whereas God himself abstains from active involvement in the affairs of the world, having predetermined its entire course of development at the beginning of time. But fourth, in a different sense, God is close to the predicament of Man here on earth, whereas the transcendental realm of the Elect has always a problematic relation to the situation at hand: every man experiences anxiety as to his own membership of it.

Now plainly there are enormous differences of detail between these two formulations of the world. How could it be otherwise, when I am setting a sixteen word remark side by side with a full length study of a major intellectual movement? But one may take heart from the fact, that Weber's own description is an ideal type, concealing equally enormous differences between expressions of the tradition which he assembles together as his version of Calvinism. I propose that it is possible to explore what the samenesses, and what the differences, are between these ways of viewing the world. The samenesses come to view first. In each case, the speaker (the teacher in the one case, Calvin in the other) conjures up a 'rational',

explicitly rule-governed realm, which is posed as transcending the situation at hand (life on earth) in terms of space, in terms of time, and in terms of persons. In each case, a personal figure is also conjured up, who is concerned to reveal the nature of this rational order here on earth, where however it can never actually be made manifest. In each case, other personal figures are conjured up, who have no concerns themselves, but are unproblematically subsumed within the rational order in the transcendent realm. In each case, then, a fundamental anxiety communicating itself to those who are invited to believe in this world in that whilst it is impossible for them to actually live out the part of unconcerned personal figures within the transcendent realm, this is the only form of existence which is held out as a possibility to them.

Consider now the differences. Although each conjures up two realms, a situation-at-hand and a transcendent realm, the names which the teacher gives to the characters who inhabit these realms serve to disclaim any distinction between them: 'I' and 'we' are both situation-at-hand names which serve to deny transcendentalism in either case. Calvinism also conjures up different realms, but here the reverse tendency is to be seen: a denial of the situation-at-hand in favour of a transcendentalist view of the world: "God does not exist for men, but men for the sake of God". Both sets of names, then, exhibit a claimed reductionism, the one characteristic of the religious commonsense of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the other characteristic of the secular commonsense of the present time.

Linguistic phenomenology is critical of theological speech. Such criticism is impossible from a sociological point of view for the reason that, since Durkheim, sociological speech has itself been theological.³³ From my point of view, Mr. Cramond in his speech mis-represents the situation. His speech overtly portrays a situation in which the we and its realm is real, by contrast to which the I and its realm formulate only the mere appearance of that reality.

From my point of view, by contrast, the I is located at the level of reality, whereas the we is only a figment of the I's imagination.

This judgement is not simply a dogmatic assertion of the here and now over the enduring, as an expression of methodological individualism. Rather, what distinguishes the I and its realm from the we and its realm is this: the I is posed as acknowledging the distinction between reality and appearance. The precise purpose of the I's speech is to call into question whether the reality of the transcendent we appears immanently: 'I hope that is clear'.

Therefore in relation to those to whom he speaks, Mr. Cramond's I offers itself as part of a discourse. The I is posed as part of a realm within which presumably many men may speak with different voices. The I invites participation in this sense. By this means, the I's realm may be enriched in ways which Mr. Cramond cannot anticipate. By contrast, the we cannot be enriched, and in fact cannot be changed in any way. For the realm of the we is not open to participation by others present, i.e. the boys. The construction of the teacher's remark enables him to formulate this we in its unproblematic realm, and then to shift out of that realm into the realm of the I. Any discourse which may then occur occurs at this level: no invitation is extended to the boys to speak of the we.

It is clear why this must be the case. The spectacle of himself and the boys competing to articulate the voice of the we would destroy the basis of the order which Mr. Cramond seeks to sustain in the classroom by speaking of the we in the first place.

Appreciation and Criticism

The distinction between the two approaches can now be portrayed in more general terms. The descriptive analysis

found the teacher to be constituting social facts in his speech, social facts which the descriptive analysis itself likewise constituted. Thus the familiar spectacle arose : in my speech I competed with Mr. Cramond to articulate better than he his version of the transcendent reality. This is definitive of the descriptive approach: whether the reality concerned is 'sociological' or 'psychological', in the terms which I have distinguished, is immaterial. This descriptive approach incorporates assumptions which have already been discussed, notably the assumption of unique private languages which are in every case no more than a fairy tale. The modus operandi of this approach is well expressed in the famous statement of the social psychologist W.I. Thomas:

If men define situations as real,
they are real in their consequences.³⁴

Such an approach uncritically accepts, that is to say appreciates, whatever reality any speaker may care to summon up in his speech.³⁵

My theoretical approach is by contrast a critical approach, in this sense: where speakers are found speaking of a reality external to language, I criticise their speech and seek to show how such a sense could be summoned up by speech itself. My criticism of the speech of the teacher amounts to the fact that I write about what he is really doing in terms of my notion of 'reality' which differs from his. In so doing then I exhibit my version of 'reality'.

My writing about the speech of everyday speakers, then, is a translation of their speech into mine. But have I not precisely criticised others, notably Laing and Coulter, for such translation? Not so. My criticism was not directed at their translating the speech of others per se. On the contrary, I propose that all speech in response to the speech of others is a translation in this sense. Here once again my conception follows from Husserl's. In his terms,

Cognitive mental processes (and this belongs to their essence) have an intentio, they refer to something, they are related in this or that way to an object.³⁶

This 'intentionality' was the very object of Husserl's phenomenological enquiry. I would propose a translation of both 'consciousness' and 'object' into 'speech', and say accordingly that speech refers to speech, is related in this or that way to speech.³⁷ From this view, we are all engaged in translation, and this translation is the very object of linguistic phenomenological enquiry. But 'translation' was precisely what Coulter, and Laing, denied doing. Coulter claimed to 'seek out and state the logically unavoidable procedures and presuppositions which members can make, irrespective of guessing any situated reading a member does make'. Laing states that 'the art of understanding those aspects of an individual's being which we can observe requires us to relate his actions to his way of experiencing the situation he is in with us'. Coulter disclaims the problem of relating his own speech to the speech of the welfare officer by claiming direct access to a social reality standing behind his speech. Laing disclaims the problem of relating his own speech to the speech of the individual by claiming direct access to a psychological reality standing behind his speech. Accordingly both of these speakers are realistic. I by contrast am 'realistic'.³⁸

But is my conception not equally suspect? It must be said at once that there is a permanent danger of 'realism' degenerating into realism.³⁹ All that is required is that a single word understood in a 'realistic' sense comes to be taken realistically, i.e. as a slogan. Take for example the word 'realistic'. The slogan, "'realism' is real" is easy to devise. In this case, to guard against 'realism' being taken as reality it would be necessary to place it within quotation marks, thus "'realism'". Plainly this procedure could continue indefinitely. What way is there out of this regression?

The regression arises from the aspiration to literalism which is itself a commitment to realism (without quotation marks).⁴⁰ Such an aspiration expresses itself

as the search for a form of words which can be upheld as reality (without quotation marks). I have tried to show that no such form of words can be devised.

Dialectic

We live in a reality to which speech can never correspond. Yet all we can say of it must be said in speech! This paradox defines what may be called a dialectical ("through speaking") account of reality, though of course 'dialectic' is a word notoriously open to sloganising. It follows that only by enquiring into the character of speech can we enquire into the character of reality. But how can such an enquiry be conducted? There is no problem about this. 'We' are already engaged in such an enquiry. 'We' speak, and thereby exhibit the character of speaking. The only problem is, that we do not acknowledge we do so: for we think we exhibit the character of reality. That is we take our speech seriously. By contrast, I propose to take speech ironically, believing that any formulation in speech of reality is itself a formulation in a speech which is other than the reality which it can formulate, and that therefore its reality can be apprehended only when it is acknowledged as speaking of 'reality'.

Chapter Five

MR. CRAMOND'S VISION OF HEAVEN

Irony

Ironic speech about 'reality' must guard against a lapse into realism. Realism arises, when the relation of speech to speech is forgotten, with the consequence that speech is conceived to be about 'things' external to speech.¹ Accordingly, a way to guard against realism is to hold the relation of speech to speech in view always as the topic of speech itself. The ironic speech of the present enquiry does not arise ex nihilo as the first word on the subject, nor does it pretend to be the last word, a way of silencing further speech. It arises, rather, as a 'philosophical' critique of 'sociological' and 'psychological' speech. The critique is the relation between these speeches, and not my speech sui generis. Accordingly, I shall provide two accounts, descriptive and theoretical, the first speaking appreciatively of the reality conjured up in speech, the second speaking of the 'reality' summoned up in speech, and thereby critical of other speech including the first.

"Somebody talking"

I intend now to examine further the speech of Mr. Cramond. Consider, then, a second remark of his made a little later in the same lesson. He told the boys:

"'Somebody talking. You know what will happen. No five minute break. Something else, ...!'"

One can immediately make an impressionistic description of the reality here sustained. The 'persons' portrayed here are somebody and you. One can ask in what relationship do they stand to one another, and to the impersonal features portrayed? The somebody appears in a simply factual assertion. The you however, like the I earlier, is portrayed as reflecting on the situation, 'you know [no five minute break, something else] will happen!'. In each case, the inner picture claims an inescapable inevitability, external to human choice: 'when we do such-and-such we don't do something else!', 'no something, something else will happen!'. In each case, the outer picture portrays a human figure contemplating this inner picture. The I 'hopes' what the we does is clear. It seems that the I has a certain freedom of interpretation, a certain looseness in its involvement with the world. By contrast the you 'knows' what will happen. The you seems to have no freedom: it seems to be dominated by the world. This, then, seems to be a fourth principle:


4. You know the rules.

This second utterance, then, further elaborates the properties of the definition sustained by the first, in a way which also claims to go beyond the immediate occasion on which it was spoken, i.e. to be external to speech.

Thus, the description of the social reality sustained by the second utterance can be harmonised with that of the first. In fact what this involves is the construction of

a Weberian 'ideal-type' representation of the single reality sustained by Mr. Cramond over many occasions of talk.² The 'sociological' account thus 'ideal-ises' that talk.

My theoretical account of the utterance begins with an analysis which renders problematic its apparent unity:



Mr. Cramond's utterance C2*

The analytical equations, which express the above diagram algebraically, are:

- C2* = I & II & III & IV (1)
- C2*I = Io (2a)
- C2*II = i & ii (2b)
- C2*III = IIIo (2c)
- C2*IV = Vo (2d)

The breakdown of the utterance follows the procedure demonstrated in the last chapter. However, in the case of the previous utterance, every picture was a grammatical clause. Here, this is not the case, but there is no doubt that they are self-contained atomic units of sense, i.e. pictures.

Consider now the synthesis of these atomic and molecular units. The relation between pictures Iii and IIIi is

quite familiar. It is a case of the relation of reflection as identified in utterance C1*. This establishes not only the link between these pictures but also the fact that the resulting stanza exhibits the voice of the you, in the same way that stanza C1*II exhibited the voice of the I.

Accordingly it is possible to write:

$$C2*II_{\text{you}} = i(ii) \dots\dots\dots (3b)$$

The other three 'second set' of equations, namely 2a, 2c, and 2d, may be regarded as identical to the corresponding 'third set' of equations, 3a, 3c, and 3d respectively. This leaves temporarily unresolved the identification of the voices of these pictures. In every previous case the voice was established as a feature of the relation between pictures, not individual pictures themselves.

Now consider the relations between the constituent stanzas of the utterance as a whole. These relations will be relations of independence or dependence of reference between stanzas, following the synthetic procedure adopted in the case of utterance C1*. The first stanza, Io, of utterance C2*, is apparently autonomous. But the second is not. Even though this stanza might be intelligible on its own, in which case 'what' would be its reference, this is not the case in the present utterance. For stanza IIIo metaphorically reformulates the 'what', and so does stanza IVo. These two relationships permit a more precise account of the structure of the utterance as a whole than that presented in equation (1). It is possible to write:

$$C2* = I \ \& \ II \ [\ III \ \& \ IV]$$

But is this the fullest account of the structure that can be given? The equation itself suggests a search for a further relationship, between stanzas III and IV which share the identical relationship to stanza II.

These two stanzas are grammatically similar. Each exhibits two concepts linked together without a verb: 'No / five minute break', 'Something / else', as opposed to the pictures previously encountered which have been grammatically complete clauses. Once this identification is made, it is apparent that stanza I shares the same property: 'Somebody / talking'. Indeed it is possible to hypothesise a deeper similarity. Within each of these stanzas there is a structure of three concepts, namely, a quantifier plus two others: 'Some / body / talking', 'No / five-minute / break', 'Some / thing / else'. Then in one case at least an additional relation exists: the prefix some is repeated in the first and last stanzas, a relationship which, when it occurred between whole words, I named 'reverberation'. Intriguingly, the linguistic phenomenological approach here promises to penetrate beneath the traditional grammatical categories not only of sentences and clauses, but also of words.

I propose that between these three stanzas, a relationship exists, though one which is looser than those previously considered. Specifically, it is a relation more of form than of content. Accordingly this relationship does not permit the identification of a voice as the aggregate of speeches making reference to the same named theme. I propose to designate this relationship one of resonance, and to indicate it in the notation by means of a dash, thus: ' - '.

In this case a more satisfactory representation can be given of the utterance as a whole. It is:

$$C2^* = I \ \& \ II_{\text{you}} \ [\ III - IV \]$$

But this is not a complete account of the structure. Again the equation itself suggests the search for a further relationship. In fact, a relationship of metaphor exists between I and II. For 'somebody' within the realm portrayed by 'somebody talking', is precisely a metaphorical

reformulation of 'you' in 'you know what will happen'. This judgement implies an interpretation of the 'realities' portrayed by Mr. Cramond. I propose that within the realm of the 'you', there is no somebody, there is no-one who does not 'know what will happen'. Accordingly, whoever the somebody might be is included within the 'you'. Accordingly 'you' metaphorically reformulates 'somebody'. Now a further account of the utterance structure can be given. It is:

$$C2^* = II_{\text{you}} [I - III - IV]$$

As yet, it is impossible to identify the voice of the three stanzas I, III, and IV: and this may only be possible when further utterances are considered. However, a preliminary interpretation of the utterance is possible. I can now replace the vague, 'sociological' description of the reality, posed as external to language, which Mr. Cramond conjured up in his speech, with an exact linguistic analysis of the techniques which constituted that 'reality'. First note the direct parallel between the two utterances so far considered: $C2^* = II_{\text{you}} [I - III - IV]$, and $C^*1 = II_I [I_{\text{we}}]$. If, as I argued previously, the first exhibits the very definitive form of defended speech, then so in almost identical terms does the second.

What then is the significance of utterance 2*? Since the similarities are so clear, it may be more fruitful to focus discussion on the differences between the two utterances. In the first, the I is portrayed formulating the immanent appearance of the transcendent reality of the we, whereas in the second, the you is portrayed formulating the immanent appearance of a different transcendent reality.

What is the character of this second transcendent reality? An answer to this question must concern the way in which the language of the utterance summons up a sense of 'reality'. How does this language, the language of 'Somebody talking', 'No five minute break', and 'Something

else', compare with the language of 'When we do compositions we don't have any talking at all'. I propose that a familiar distinction within sociolinguistics captures the distinction precisely: in Basil Bernstein's terms, whereas the former is 'restricted', 'context-bound', the latter is 'elaborated', 'context-free'.³ Whereas C1*I_{we} aspires to explicitness, C2* [I - III - IV] aspires to inexplicitness. In short, whereas the speech of the we aspires to be complete rational speech, the speech of somebody aspires to silence.⁴

Consider the teacher's utterances, conceived as speech about speech. In his first remark he states, the position in terms of the we, and then steps back from this: the I is brought to bear to clarify the message of the we. The we's speech is thus posed as privileged: a message from the Gods which requires some care in its interpretation. But his second remark contains no explicit message. The you does not formulate 'what will happen': it rather asserts that this is already 'known'. Likewise, 'No five minute break' and 'Something else' do not formulate it: they rather create suspense, leaving the imagination free to wonder. In short, these stanzas are reluctant speech: they stand in for no speech, silence.

The very first of these brief stanzas suggests why this should be the case. 'Somebody talking' is not something that Mr. Cramond wishes to acknowledge within his own scheme of things, the scheme he articulated in the first utterance. It is imposed upon him from outside: and in his way of speaking, Mr. Cramond exhibits that this matter is exterior to his own version of reality. In short, 'restricted code' speech is speech purporting to be non-speech because it purports to present the exteriority of a system of meaning. By contrast, 'elaborated code' speech is speech aspiring to be complete speech because it purports to present the interiority of a system of meaning.⁵

In contrast to the sociological description, then, which unproblematically assimilated this utterance to the

reality which it portrayed Mr. Cramond as sustaining in his first remark, the philosophical account fragments the utterance not only from the previous utterance, but also within itself. It proposes a radical separation within the utterance between the speech of the you and the speech of somebody, etc. and again between this utterance and the previous one.

But in so doing, it throws new light on the sociological problem: the problem of anomie, or rather, the problem of 'anomie'. For, in Mr. Cramond's 'restricted code' pictures is to be found the concrete linguistic representation of 'anomie'. At this point it is helpful to make reference to three 'philosophical' treatments of the problem of social order which seem to bear on the linguistic style which Mr. Cramond exhibits in the construction of these remarks. The first of these and most familiar in view of the recent direction of my discussion, is to be found in theological speech.

Returning to the parallel between the speech of Mr. Cramond and that of Calvinism, can one not find in the somebody portrayed here the Damned of Calvinism, the anonymous but definitely present person or persons unknown who are not a part of the rational order of the transcendent realm? In these terms the you would be the community of Believers whose affirmation of their knowledge sustains the church. And the impersonally phrased 'what will happen' expresses the predestination to which all Believers subscribe. Thus in precise opposition within Mr. Cramond's scheme, one finds the two traditional worlds of the Christian doctrine, secularised, brought down to earth, in name only.

To be more precise about this: stanzas I, III, and IV exhibit the asocial realm of 'hell', whilst stanza II exhibits the you contemplating this asocial realm from within the safety of 'earth'. The difference is exhibited in the grammatical structure of each part of the utterance.

The second treatment is also familiar: it is Sartre's discussion of consciousness:

Transcendental consciousness is an impersonal spontaneity. It determines our existence at each instant, without our being able to conceive anything before it. Thus each instant of our conscious life reveals to us a creation ex nihilo. Not a new arrangement, but a new existence. There is something distressing for each of us, to catch in the act this tireless creation of existence of which we are not the creators.⁶

Is it not then the case, that just as Mr. Cramond portrayed the I as contemplating the 'heavenly' realm of the transcendental rationalist utopia, so he portrays the you as contemplating the 'hellish' realm of the immanentist existentialist vision?

Finally, consider Mr. Cramond's two schemes in the context of the classical discussions of social order in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Is it not the case that on the one hand the we in Mr. Cramond's speech embodies precisely the 'general will' of Rousseau's consensual utopia,⁷ whilst posed against it on the other hand in the realm of somebody etc., is an expression in language of the Hobbesian state of nature, in what are in fact precisely 'nasty, brutish, and short' utterances?⁸

Whilst acknowledging the suggestiveness of these historical parallels, I intend to focus the present discussion on Husserl. The philosophical interpretation suggests that the outcome of Mr. Cramond's theorising is the constitution of realms identical in range and character to those constituted by Husserl in his phenomenological philosophising, and adopted by his followers, direct and indirect. The familiarity of these realms suggests that this is not at all accidental, but that these alternative ways of speaking are deeply embedded in our language.⁹ This suggestion can be strengthened by further analysis of Mr. Cramond's speech in order to discover the extent to which he sustains the philosophical and theological realms

throughout his classroom utterances.

"Everybody sitting"

At the beginning of a lesson later in the term, Mr. Cramond told the boys:

"Right, everybody should be sitting in their own seats. As a general rule, we'll have no roaming around, because that's not a very good idea. And there'll be a lesson for those who forget ...!"

A sociological description suggests the following definition of the situation. Here again, the we is governed by 'a general rule'. The rule is apparently non-negotiable and emphatic. It is also expressed in terms of everybody. In addition, there is a statement of impersonal inevitability, "there'll be a lesson for those who forget", governing the case where the 'general rule' might be 'forgotten'. Interestingly, the I is absent from the whole utterance.

Analysis of this utterance presents little difficulty, and the following is the outcome:

Io

[RIGHT, (everybody should be sitting in their own seats)]

i' II ii

[AS (a general rule (we'll have) no roaming around)]

IIIo

[BECAUSE (that's not a very good idea)]

i IV ii

[AND (there'll be a lesson for (those) who forget)]

Mr. Cramond's utterance C3*

The analytical equations are:

$$C3^* = I \ \& \ II \ \& \ III \ \& \ IV \ \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

$$I = Io \ \dots\dots\dots (2a)$$

$$II = i \ \& \ ii \ \dots\dots\dots (2b)$$

$$III = IIIo \ \dots\dots\dots (2c)$$

$$IV = i \ \& \ ii \ \dots\dots\dots (2d)$$

It is necessary to comment on a new feature found in this utterance. In the case of stanzas II and IV above, there is an overlapping of pictures, ascertainable by the analytical method. In the case of stanza II, 'as a general rule we'll have' is a self-contained atomic unit of sense, in other words, 'we'll have a general eule'. The word 'as' preceding it has the logical function of leading the listener to expect two pictures, A and B, in the relation, 'as A,B', so that the complete stanza is made up with a second picture which is also based upon 'we'll have'. This second picture is 'we'll have no roaming around'. I propose that this overlapping is no more than a variant of what I earlier called 'reverberation', that is a grammatical device made possible by the repetition of a word or phrase in two adjacent pictures. It occurs in a similar way in stanza IV.

According to this interpretation the relations between pictures IIIi and IIIii on the one hand, and IVi and IVii on the other, consist of reverberation. But what voices are constituted by these reverberations? In stanza II, the reverberation is on the words 'we'll have'. This constitutes the voice of the we. The structure of this stanza is then:

$$C3*II_{we} = i.ii \dots\dots\dots (3b)$$

In stanza IV, the reverberation is on the word 'those'. This word then defines the voice of stanza IV, so the structure of this stanza is:

$$C3*IV_{those} = i.ii \dots\dots\dots (3d)$$

The other two 'second set' equations, namely 2a and 2c, may be regarded as identical to the corresponding 'third set' equations, leaving unresolved for the time being the question of the voices of stanzas I and III.

Now consider the overall structure of the 'utterance'. Stanza I is apparently independent of all others, in terms of reference. Likewise, stanza II. But having noted this, one notes that stanza II in fact, metaphorically reformulates stanza I. But there is a crucial difference between this metaphor and the previously encountered cases. The present metaphor merely places side by side two ways of putting the same thing with no hierarchical difference between them: they stand as genuinely alternative formulations. By contrast, in each case previously considered, the reference of one stanza was dependent upon that of another. This is indeed a metaphor, but can be expressed differently in the notation. Instead of writing $A = A [B]$, which shows the dependence of the reference of A upon that of B, I shall write simply, $[A] [B]$, placing the two side by side to indicate their interchangeability as a result of the metaphor.

Now consider the next stanza. Here is a 'mandatory' metaphorical relationship as opposed to the 'optional' one just considered. Stanza III requires reference back to stanza II, on which it is dependent: 'that', reformulates 'roaming around' in the previous stanza. Now consider stanza IV. The reference of this stanza is not autonomously determined. For, what is it that 'those' may forget? One is tempted to assume that it is the 'general rule'. In this case, stanza IV metaphorically reformulates stanza II. Then the overall structure of the utterance is:

$$C3^* = \begin{array}{c} \text{III} \\ \text{IV}_{\text{those}} \quad [II_{\text{we}}] \quad [I] \end{array}$$

In this equation 'III' appearing above 'IV' indicates that interchangeably each metaphorically reformulates stanza II. The significance of placing $[II]$ side by side with $[I]$ has already been indicated.

On this interpretation, the utterance exhibits a familiar form: that of the constitution of a transcendent reality though here in a double form, whereby two interchangeable formulations of the 'reality' are combined with two interchangeable formulations of the 'appearance' of that reality. But now, how do these 'realities' and these 'appearances' relate to those previously encountered in Mr. Cramond's utterances?

One of these realities is familiar already: that of the we. In utterance C1*, the we was portrayed in a stanza on its own, overlooked by another stanza, that of the I. In the present utterance, the we seems at first sight overlooked by two other stanzas, namely 'that's not a very good idea' and, 'there'll be a lesson for those who forget'. But is it really the case that both of these refer to the we? Certainly, 'that's not a very good idea' does so: this stanza could not refer to 'everybody should be sitting in their own seats' which of course is a good idea from Mr. Cramond's point of view. Apart from this argument with reference to content, there is another with reference to form: 'that's not a very good idea' reverberates with 'that is clear' in utterance C1*. This suggests that here the same voice overlooks the we as previously, namely, the voice of the I in a reflective mode.

But in this case, what of the other reality, unidentified as to voice on the basis of evidence internal to this utterance. Consider external evidence in this case too. The stanza, 'everybody should be sitting in their own seat' is reminiscent of Mr. Cramond's earlier reference, in utterance C2*, to 'somebody talking'. I suggest that this is a case of reverberation, constitutive of a voice which should then be identified as 'body'. In utterance C2*, the 'body' speech was overlooked by the voice of the you, saying, 'you know what will happen'. But in terms of content that stanza had a close resemblance to the present stanza IV, 'there'll be a lesson for those who forget'. Apart from

this parallel in terms of content, there is another with reference to form: 'will' is a word which reverberates in both stanzas. It is not an insignificant word. Accordingly to my account of the theology of Mr. Cramond's speech, it carries the whole weight of the impersonal inevitability of retributory punishment within the Calvinist hell. I conclude therefore that the same voice overlooks the body as previously, namely the voice of the you in a reflective mode.

So contrary to the first hypothesis proposed, what 'those' may forget is not the transcendental 'general rule' at all, but rather the immanent application of it, namely 'everybody should be sitting in their own seats'. This is of some importance in the interpretation of Mr. Cramond's scheme of things. I propose that it is inconceivable that the 'general rule' should be forgotten: qua transcendent, the existence of such a rule does not depend on its being remembered by 'those' present at hand. Rather, the sphere within which 'forgetting' is a possibility is another sphere altogether.

The utterance is then to be heard as if it were worded as follows:

Right, everybody should be sitting in their own seats. As a general rule we'll have no roaming around because [I think] that's not a very good idea. And [you know] there'll be a lesson for those who forget.

This is to say that the I and you are in the background, the reality behind the appearance of the speech. Thus the interpretation has taken a clear step away from mere description of the concrete utterance. Instead its object is theorised by the explicit procedures of the enquiry.

This theoretical object indeed makes possible a fuller kind of description. The present utterance gains a 'hardness' from the fact that the reassuring 'earthly' I and you

do not appear explicitly. By this means, its content is made more emphatic, and the utterance is given a power which it would otherwise not possess, the power of a sui generis transcendent 'reality'.

The algebraic presentation of the analysis must now be revised. The equation giving the structure of the utterance as a whole becomes:

$$C3^* = III_I [II_{we}] [I_{body}] IV_{you} \dots\dots\dots (4)$$

Here the notation [I] IV is reversed in order to place [II] and [I] adjacent to one another. This introduces no ambiguity in displaying the relation of I to IV. Now what is the significance of this theoretical account of the utterance? This account enables the utterance to be treated not as a unique creation ex nihilo, nor simply as confirmation of an ideal type of the reality portrayed by him, but as a consistent exhibition of his theorising, precisely aligned with other instances already considered. Indeed, the theoretical elaboration by which this utterance has been comprehended itself enables a fuller treatment of previous utterances to be made. For now it is possible to complete the equations denoting the structure of utterance C2*. The voice of stanzas I, III and IV of that utterance which previously could not be identified, is now seen to be the voice I have called 'body'. The structure of the utterance is then to be expressed as follows:

$$C2^* = II_{you} [I_{body} - III_{body} - IV_{body}] \dots\dots (4)$$

Thus each of the three utterances so far considered is seen to exhibit a consistent structure in two senses. First, each utterance is itself constructed in the same way, employing metaphorical reformulation to posit one voice as transcending another. Second, the voices and the relation established between them are the same in the case of each utterance spoken by Mr. Cramond.

I want to suggest that the structure exhibited by Mr. Cramond's speech as here recorded will turn out to be not unique to him, but in fact an expression of theorising within the Western tradition of philosophy per se, in which we, or rather 'you' and 'I', 'we' and 'body' are located, though they come together, no doubt, in an original way within Mr. Cramond's talk. In his vision, the I and the you are sharply distinguished even though they both inhabit the realistic 'earthly' realm from which they contemplate the unreal realms beyond. Contrary to Carfinkel's suggestion, they are not both everyday sociologists. Rather, the you is portrayed as the theorist, and the body as the inhabitant of the natural order, and the I as theorist and we as inhabitant of the social order.

The situation is a little more complex than Schutz allows for: whereas for him, the scientist conjures up a world of puppets, here within the speech of one individual are to be found at least two scientists, and correspondingly at least two sets of puppets. The difference between these worlds is striking and explicit: the world of the we is explicitly rule-governed by intelligible social conventions. As such its order is timeless, transcendent. The world of the body on the other hand is brutish, inexplicit, impersonal: an immanent here-and-now world. Yet in its very immanent facticity it is itself transcendent: it is posed as ek-isting the you which 'knows' it, just as the social world is posed as ek-sisting the I which 'thinks' it.¹⁰ In order to assess the generality of these findings, consider further empirical examples.

"Did you hear what I said?"

Almost as soon as the teacher had made the last pronouncement, Alec Rialto got up out of his seat to talk to Colin Forrest. Mr. Cramond spoke to him as follows: "Hey! Did you hear what I said? Get over there," indicating that the boy stand out in front of the class.

I noted, "Rialto stands, shrugs his shoulders, . . . grins, and looks sheepish". Having left him standing there for only a minute or two, Mr. Cramond said, "'Now, son, sit down and don't disobey orders in future, right? Use your ears!'" . Sammy Mason now spoke to Alec, saying "'He's a good lad, that's why he didn't give you the lash. Other teachers would have!'" .

Even from the descriptive, point of view, this is complex. In his remarks Mr. Cramond sustains a joke or fantasy, namely that Rialto had not heard his remark because he had not used his ears. In this way, he protects the integrity of the definition of the situation which he had earlier constructed from the threat passed to it by a boy's action which could have been construed as contradicting that definition. For, in the terms of the joke, an excuse is provided for Rialto's action.¹¹ This was portrayed, not as an infringement of the rule against 'roaming around', for which inescapable consequences had been portrayed, but against another rule (roughly, that one should use one's ears), for which no inevitable consequences had been postulated.

However, this interpretation was not the only one offered, by Mr. Cramond's remarks to Rialto. Another definition runs through these. The expression "don't disobey orders, right?" retrospectively suggests a redefinition of the previous remark as "orders". This expression, together with "Get over there" and "Now, son, sit down" are themselves "orders", in contrast to the previous remarks made by him. It seems characteristic of these orders that they are expressed with little of the elaboration found in those previous remarks. They appear here when Mr. Cramond was responding to a particular boy, rather than to the class as a whole.

Once again the appreciative approach finds the teacher's speech original, even unique, and so cannot help to establish rationally how it was possible for him to

say what he did. I propose to consider this conversation, section by section. The first remark to the boy can be readily analysed as follows:

I

[HEY! (Did you hear? (what) I said)]

II

[(Get over there)]

Mr. Cramond's utterance C4*

The analytical equations are:

$$C4^* = I \ \& \ II \ \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

$$I = i \ \& \ ii \ \dots\dots\dots (2a)$$

$$II = IIo \ \dots\dots\dots (2b)$$

The relation between the two pictures making up stanza I is a form of overlapping, a technique which I previously identified with reverberation, i.e. as establishing a sameness as between accents of reality of two adjacent pictures. But here I propose this is not the case. The overlapping word 'what' is a specifically problematic word within each of the two pictures. What is thereby established is not identity between voices, but a problematic relation, which relation is the issue of the speech. I propose to call this relation reciprocity, and to signify it in the notation by the use of an oblique, '/'. It is plainly a close relation to the technique of reflection. What voice does this relation constitute? I propose that it does not conjoin the two voices, but it does bring them face-to-face. This can be indicated by referring to it as the 'I/you' voice. In this case:

$$C4^*I_{I/you} = i/ii \ \dots\dots\dots (3a)$$

Equation 3b can be regarded as identical to equation 2b, though this leaves uninvestigated the question of the voice of stanza II.

Now consider relation between the stanzas. But there is no referential connection as between I and II. For the

first time, an 'utterance' has been encountered which comprises two disparate parts. The notation can record this fact by designating such an absence of relation with a double oblique thus: '//''. Then the 'utterance' as a whole is:

$$C4^* = I_{I/you} // IIo$$

But this is still incomplete: the voice of IIo is not yet determined. But this is readily done by searching for relations between this stanza and the earlier speech of the teacher. 'Get/over/there' resonates with the stanzas 'Some/body/talking', 'No/five-minute/break' and 'Some/thing/else' found in utterance C*2. Accordingly, it exhibits the same voice as them, the voice designated 'body'. The utterance as a whole is then

$$C4^* = I_{I/you} // IIo_{body} \cdot \dots\dots\dots (4)$$

What is the significance of this structure?

The reference to the previous utterance is intriguing, in that here Mr. Cramond speaks of a you and an I orienting to the speech of utterance C4*, after I had theoretically argued that they were present in the background of that utterance. My interpretation was, that in that utterance the voice of the we was contemplated by the voice of the I in a reflective mode, and the voice of the body was contemplated by the voice of the you in a reflective mode. Now, when trouble has arisen at that reflective level, Mr. Cramond changes gear and switches to the 'down to earth' mode of the you and the I. What is the significance of that realm? What realm is it that is inhabited by both the you and the I, from within which they reflectively glance in opposite directions?

From the point of view of sociological description, the separate existence of this realm presents a difficulty. For the voice of the body has been identified with the Hobbesian

state of nature, and the voice of the we with Rousseau's consensual solution to this problem. There is then within the sociological vision no place left to identify with the voice of the I and you.¹² In theological terms however the matter is more readily resolved. In these terms, the realm of the we is identified as 'heaven', and the realm of the body as 'hell'. Then there is no difficulty in identifying the realm between these two, from within which each can be viewed, as being manifestly 'earth'.

This argument is given greater precision when expressed in terms of Husserl's phenomenological investigation. The epoche characteristic of each of these provinces of meaning can be sharply distinguished. The realm of the we is the one wherein each consciousness is certain of the correspondence between itself and every other possible consciousness: the utopia of Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity, and of Schutz's pure we-relation. The impersonal realm of the body on the other hand is the one where each consciousness is utterly uncertain of the correspondence between itself and every other possible consciousness - though it is certain of its correspondence between itself and the natural world. With no I present this is the hell of Husserl's immanentist subjectivity, and of Sartre's encounter consciousness alone in a world of things. But in the speech of the everyday phenomenologist Mr. Cramond another realm is portrayed, a realm which seems to have escaped the attention of the professionals in this field. This is the realm of the I and the you, the realm of earth, of 'reality'. It is characterised by an epoche different from that of either of the other two realms to which, up to now, we have been confined. What is this epoche? It is one which acknowledges, that reality appears to you differently to the manner in which it appears to me, yet it is nonetheless the same reality, a reality which can be apprehended only in appearance. If the realm of the we expresses, exhibits, the epoche of the sociologist, whilst that of the body exhibits the epoche of the psychologist, this realm exhibits what I have consistently referred to as the epoche of the philosopher.

The professional phenomenologists, along with the professional sociologists and psychologists, have left uninvestigated, or to be more precise unexplored, that elusive level of 'reality', which makes its appearance consistently within the speech of the everyday philosopher whom I have called Mr. Cramond. They have spoken in extraordinary language, whereas in his speech ordinary language is revealed.¹³ In apprehending this fact, I have learned from Mr. Cramond of possibilities available to all speakers, within the structure of our language.

But I do not wish to foster illusions about this. Mr. Cramond does not persistently exemplify ordinary language, or what I have also called 'pure speech'. On the contrary, he himself continually departs from it. In so doing, he himself becomes an everyday sociologist or psychologist; alternatively stated, a transcendentalist or immanentist phenomenologist. In apprehending this fact, I learn from Mr. Cramond which of the structurally possible ways of speaking he employs himself.

There are thus two aspects to a linguistic phenomenological investigation. On the one hand speech exhibits the structure of language: this structure is the object of a theoretical investigation which will criticise that speech in seeking to show how that speech was possible in general. On the other hand, speech exhibits a specific location within the structure of language. This location is the object of a descriptive investigation which will appreciate that speech in seeking to show how it makes use of structural possibilities to fashion one way of speaking in particular.¹⁴

Understandably, in view of the prior need to learn the outlines of the structure of speech common to all, the task of describing Mr. Cramond's particular location within that structure has been somewhat neglected in the course of the argument thus far. But the utterance now under consideration provides ample opportunities with which to address this question. Consider the sequence running from utterance C3*, 'Everybody should be sitting in their own seats', to utterance

C4* which followed it: 'Did you hear what I said? Get over there!'. Synthesis has confirmed the intuitive feeling that there are two breaks ('existential leaps', in Schutz's term), within this sequence. The first occurs as between utterance C3* and utterance C4*. Utterance C3* was simultaneously located at both transcendentalist social order and immanentist natural order levels. The first stanza of C4* brought the utterance down to earth. That is, it involved a shift to the 'reflective' level within the discourse. What occasioned this shift was, the action of the boy in getting up out of his seat. This action caused the reality of the natural and social orders asserted in C3* to be called into question, i.e. to fail to correspond with appearance. In acknowledgment of this fact, the teacher shifts the accent of reality of his discourse to the one wherein the problematic relation between appearance and reality can be addressed. (Precisely the same shift was involved in the conversational practise of Garfinkel's Experimenter, as discussed in chapter three). Having momentarily revealed the possibility of discussing this problematic relation, Mr. Cramond shifts again, this time back to the immanentist natural order now formulated in its more familiar 'restricted code', the three-word stanza, 'get over there!'.

Mr. Cramond's speech operates on three levels: a natural order, a social order, and a problematic realm. It appears that, within his scheme, the social order stands as the pinnacle of legitimation of his regime, but that if the appearance of this reality is not upheld, he switches to the problematic realm, and thence to natural order. There is, then, no reason to be mesmerised by the seeming rationality of his 'we' realm: neither the rationality, nor the realm, are self-supporting. Certainly his speech exhibits a 'gloved fist' technique, that is 'coercion' underpinning 'consensus'. But from my point of view neither of these visions are to be treated at face value: they are both

utopian. What interests me is whether and how debate with the teacher can continue at what I have called the 'realistic', or 'philosophical' level. To explore this point further, consider the remainder of this conversation.

The teacher's next remark as analysed, is as follows:

Io

[NOW SON (sit down)]

i II ii

[AND (don't disobey orders ; in future,) right?)]

IIIo

[(Use your ears)]

Mr. Cramond's utterance C5*

The analytical equations are:

- C5* = I & II & III' (1)
- I = Io (2a)
- II = i & ii (2b)
- III = IIIo (2c)

Consider the relationship between pictures IIIi and IIIii. Had the picture IIIi concluded at 'orders', then this picture could have been identified as a 'restricted code' natural order stanza resonating with others of that type. The fact the picture is constructed so that it could conclude at this point itself establishes this possible interpretation as it were 'in the background', or 'in reserve'. But retrospectively, a transformation is brought about. 'In future' increases the length of the picture so that it no longer resonates. Picture IIIii, 'right?', calls into question the correspondence between IIIi and reality, modifying its epoche so that it can no longer be a mere assertion. Its accent of reality thereby becomes problematic: it is brought down to earth and offered as a 'philosophical' contribution to a discourse, equivalent to [you] don't disobey orders in future, right?'. Its voice is then that of the I/you. Its structure can be represented algebraically, thus:

$$C5^*II_{I/you} = (i)ii \dots\dots\dots (2b)$$

Equations (3a) and (3b) are identical to 2a and 2b, though this leaves indeterminate the voice of stanzas I and III. But there are no relations of reference as between these stanzas. In this case, the structure of the utterance is:

$$C5^* = I_o // II_{I/you} // III_o$$

But I propose that this interpretation inadequately grasps the unity of the utterance. That unity, I suggest, is based upon the 'hidden' structure of stanza II as revealed by theoretical reconstruction, rather than its concrete appearance. For if the inner phrase, 'don't disobey orders' is acknowledged as a possible picture in its own right to be designated IIIi', it then becomes clear that the utterance as a whole exhibits a unity. For it then comprises three 'restricted code' impersonal stanzas which resonate with one another. In this case, 'in future, right' brings not simply stanza II but all three stanzas 'down to earth'. 'In future, right?' can be regarded as attaching itself to each of the three pictures. For of course, the whole point of the exercise was that the boy should 'sit down in future' and affirm that this was 'right'. The question invites the boy, who is posed as situated at the 'earthly' level, to affirm the teacher's natural order, which is posed as situated at the 'immanentist' level.

The voice of the three immanentist stanzas must as usual be designated as that of 'body'. This allocation receives intuitive support in the case of stanza III which, characteristically for this province of meaning, formulates a personal matter in impersonal, i.e. bodily, terms, 'use your ears'. In this case the technique whereby the elaborated part of stanza II attaches itself to the restricted part is one which has not been previously encountered. I propose to refer to it as ellipsis, and to designate it by a plus sign, '+', written as a prefix to the additional part of the stanza concerned. Like metaphor, this technique establishes a difference as between voices, but unlike metaphor it does

so by dividing a stanza against itself. In this case the structure of the whole utterance can be represented as follows:

$$C5^* = [I_{\text{body}} - II_{\text{body}} - III_{\text{body}}] + II_{I/\text{you}} \dots (4)$$

This is a not insignificant observation. The philosophical method has found order, in a remark which sociologically speaking exhibits anomic features.

"He's a good lad"

I have proposed that throughout his utterances, namely in the stanzas which locate speech at the 'earthly' level, the teacher theoretically invites participation by the boys in discourse with him. It is important to ascertain whether, and in what terms, boys actually do so participate. A kind of participation is exhibited at the conclusion of the present conversation. I propose to treat Sammy Mason's remark exactly as I have treated those of the teacher. Its analysis is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{Io} \\ & [(\text{He's a good lad})] \\ & \text{II} \\ & [(\text{That's (why) he didn't give you the lash})] \\ & \text{IIIo} \\ & [(\text{Other teachers would have})] \end{aligned}$$

Sammy Mason's utterance M1*

The analytical equations are:

$$\begin{aligned} M1^* &= I \ \& \ II \ \& \ III \ \dots \dots \dots (1) \\ I &= \text{Io} \ \dots \dots \dots (2a) \\ II &= i \ \& \ ii \ \dots \dots \dots (2b) \\ III &= \text{IIIo} \ \dots \dots \dots (2c) \end{aligned}$$

Pictures IIIi and IIIii are linked by reciprocity involving the shared word, 'why'. This treats as problematic the reality underlying the appearance portrayed in IIIii, 'he didn't give you the lash'. Accordingly this is an 'earthly' stanza. Its voice cannot be identified immediately. So, all that can be said so far is:

$$M1*II = i/ii \dots\dots\dots (2b)$$

The other 'third set' equations are the same as the 'second set'.

Now consider the relations between the stanzas. 'That' in stanza II metaphorically reformulates stanza I, making II dependent upon I for its reference. Again, stanza III is dependent on stanza II for its reference. It seems that stanza III 'tacitly' repeats the wording of stanza II to complete itself. But such 'repetition' is not exact, for the result would be ungrammatical, i.e. 'other teachers would have give [sic] you the lash'. Therefore I propose this 'tacit repetition', is an instance of the technique of ungrammatical ellipsis, earlier discovered, which is equivalent to metaphor in establishing a difference between voices. The utterance as a whole is then:

$$M1* = [[I] II] +III$$

It is suggestive to see the utterance in this light, for in two senses this analysis is reminiscent of those produced of Mr. Cramond's own utterances. First, the utterance as here analysed exhibits precisely the structure of transcendent defended speech in the form it has been found since Mr. Cramond's first utterance. In the present case this structure appears in a double form. But secondly, the analysis breaks down the utterance into three parts which correspond directly, though loosely, with the three ways of speaking found so far in Mr. Cramond's speech, namely 'heaven', 'earth', and 'hell'. For the first of Mason's stanzas, 'he's a good lad' plainly formulates an idealised utopia which could readily be described as 'heavenly'. The third of Mason's stanzas given a resolution of its ellipsis, formulates an equally idealised but unpleasant state of affairs which could therefore be described as 'hellish'. By contrast to both of these, the second of Mason's stanzas formulates the situation at hand ('he didn't give you the lash'), and treats this formulation as an appearance to be related to reality. It can therefore be described as 'earthly'.

It must be said at once, that on the evidence of just one stanza, Mason's versions of 'heaven' and 'hell' (and presumably 'earth' as well) differ from those of Mr. Cramond. This difference can be given precise linguistic expression. At least within this utterance, the inhabitant of Mason's transcendental heaven is not a we but a he. It may be suspected that this 'he' lacks some of the sophistication of Mr. Cramond's 'we'. So far at least no rational rules or other devices have appeared to order the he's realm. Indeed it is not clear that 'he' has any realm to speak of. 'He' is simply, a 'good lad'. The inhabitant of Mason's immanentist hell is not, so far as we know, a 'body' but an evocative 'person' nonetheless, namely, 'others'. Both of these realms, then, are populated by 'third' persons. The same is true, at least in this utterance, of the 'earthly' realm which like the 'heaven' is inhabited by a 'he'. (There is no reason to presume it is the same one). Now it is possible to display the structure of Mason's utterance as a whole. It is:

$$M1^* = [[I_{he}] II_{he}] + III_{other} \dots\dots (4)$$

Plainly, a fuller investigation of Mason's response to Mr. Cramond even in this single utterance would require a linguistic phenomenology of Mason's speech as a whole. Regrettably this task cannot be pursued at the present time.

There are many senses in which Mason's remark fails to exhibit participation in the discourse spoken by Mr. Cramond. His remark is spoken so as to be inaudible to Mr. Cramond. Grammatically it in no way binds into the structure of the teacher's preceding speech. It formulates 'what happens' not in terms of the speech of the teacher nor in terms of Rialto's actions in relation to that speech, but in terms of an entirely different matter: the fact that 'he didn't give you the lash'. But I propose that all of these are superficial matters compared to one outstanding aspect of the situation. That is, that Mason's remark makes no reference to the phenomenological structure whereby the


teacher expresses himself in language, nor presumably does he expect the teacher to refer to his. If this is generally the case then no rational discourse between teacher and pupil in the classroom context is possible.¹⁵ But I should like to discuss a remark by a boy which apparently did contribute to such a discourse.

"Mr. Cramond gives out comics"

During the course of a conversation in which he discussed several teachers, Johnie Johnson made the following point:

Mr. Cramond sometimes gives out comics and chess and that. He does it for a purpose, 'cos he likes to see boys sharing. If they keep it up, you get a good community.

I propose the following analysis of this remark:



Johnie Johnson's utterance J1*

The analytical equations are:

- J1* = I & II & III (1)
- I = Io (2a)
- II = i & ii (2b)
- III = IIIo (2c)
- IV = IVo (2d)

The second stanza is bound together in a familiar manner: picture i reverberates with picture ii on the word 'he'.

This is accordingly the voice of the he. In this case:

$$J1*II_{he} = i.ii \dots\dots\dots (3b)$$

Apart from 3b, the 'third set' of equations are identical to the 'second set', with the result that the voices of stanzas I, III, and IV cannot yet be determined. I am proposing that although pictures IIIo and IVo are bound together by the logical 'if', they do not constitute a single voice stanza since there is no sensible connection internal to their wording.

Consider now the relations between stanzas. 'He' in stanza II refers to 'Mr. Cramond' in stanza I, accordingly stanza II is dependent upon stanza I. 'They' in stanza III is dependent on 'boys' in stanza II, accordingly stanza III is dependent upon stanza II. 'A good community' in stanza IV, I propose, metaphorically reformulates 'boys sharing' in stanza II. However no dependence is thereby constituted: this is an 'optional' metaphor, between equals. Now the overall structure of the utterance can be displayed, even though the voices of most stanzas are not yet identified:

$$J1* = [[I] \quad II_{he(boys)}] \begin{matrix} III \\ [IV] \end{matrix}$$

In this equation, 'III' is placed above '[IV]' to indicate that both interchangeably reformulate stanza II. As in the previous utterance, spoken by Mason, there is here a hierarchy of dependence. This hierarchy establishes 'Mr. Cramond' as the inhabitant of the transcendent realm, 'he' as inhabitant of the 'earthly' realm, and 'they' as inhabitant of the immanent realm. This identification on a purely formal basis receives confirmation at the level of content. Mr. Cramond giving out comics is indeed the utopian state of affairs which this utterance is praising. The 'he' realm does indeed exhibit many characteristics which are familiar properties of the 'earthly' realm, notably the attribution of consciousness to the person there portrayed, i.e. the ability to reflect and conjure up realms of its own. Finally, the 'they' realm does indeed

exhibit many characteristics which are familiar properties of the 'hellish' realm, notably its portrayal of persons in 'bodily' terms and in 'restricted code', as in this case, 'they keep it up'.

But I should like to say more than that the structure here exhibited is familiar in general. I should like to propose, that this structure portrayed in speech by John Johnson, is familiar as a representation of the speech of Mr. Cramond in particular. This proposal may be simply stated. I suggest, that the he portrayed in Johnson's utterance is not the so-called 'empirical' Mr. Cramond, but is the I portrayed in Mr. Cramond's speech. In so speaking, Johnson exhibits an orientation to Mr. Cramond's linguistic phenomenology. That is to say, he speaks of speech, he does not purport to speak of reality. By contrast I propose that in his utterance, Sammy Mason exhibited no orientation to Mr. Cramond's linguistic phenomenology, i.e. speech. He purported to speak of reality. From my point of view he spoke only of a 'reality' which was a product of his own linguistic phenomenology, namely 'a good lad'. (An enquiry into Mason's speech might trace the speech which was the origin of this 'reality': I suggest that it would not be the speech of Mr. Cramond).

Mr. Cramond says, 'when we do compositions, we don't have any talking at all. I hope that is clear'. I have argued that in such an utterance, he poses the voice of the I orienting towards the voice of the we, 'hoping' to see the transcendent rational community of the we made immanent upon earth. John Johnson says, 'he likes to see boys sharing'. I propose that in this stanza, Johnson recreates Mr. Cramond's I orienting toward the community of 'boys sharing', which he 'likes' to 'see', i.e. to be made apparent.

But to what end would Johnson so recreate, or mimick, Mr. Cramond's speech? In effect I have so far shown Johnson

appreciating, that is describing, Mr. Cramond's speech. This I have suggested is the work of his stanzas I, II, and III. But Johnson also criticises, that is to say theorises, Mr. Cramond's speech. This I propose is the work of stanza IV.

Stanza IV, I have argued, is an optional metaphor, on equal terms with stanza II as a whole. Here he puts in his own words what, for him, Mr. Cramond's rationality involves. In the absence of other speech by him one cannot be certain, but I propose it be identified as the voice of the you. Then the utterance structure as a whole can be displayed:

$$J1^* = \left[\left[\text{I}_{\text{Mr. Cramond}} \right] \text{II}_{\text{he(boys)}} \right] \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{III}_{\text{they}} \\ \text{IV}_{\text{you(community)}} \end{array} \right] \dots (4)$$

The utterance I take it sets up a parallel between the relation of the you to the community on the one hand, and that of the he and the boys on the other. But if, as I have argued, this he is none other than the I of Mr. Cramond, then Johnson is comparing speech with speech, and so 'reality', within speech itself.

For me, plainly, Johnson's speech is 'good speech', 'pure speech'. To stress only one aspect of this 'purity', Johnson locates both his own speech and that which he is criticising as 'earthly' speech. It is plain in his utterance that such 'realities' as Mr. Cramond observes are observed from within this 'earthly' level. In so relating speech to speech within his own speech, he contributes to man's historical pursuit of rationality.

But despite the subtlety of Johnson's response to Mr. Cramond's speech, I fear that the most significant aspect of his remark is that it was spoken outside the context of Mr. Cramond's classroom itself. Within that classroom, the boys were rarely given an opportunity to participate as speakers, despite the apparent 'rationalism' of the part which they were allocated within the world as portrayed in

Mr. Cramond's speech. I should like to conclude by considering three instances of speech between Mr. Cramond and individual boys, in order to explore the significance of this observation.

"You're a distracting member of the class"

The teacher was reading a poem on the Pied Piper of Hamelin. He had different boys read each verse. After one verse had been read by a boy, Mr. Cramond turned to Jones, saying,

"Shut up, Alan. You're a distracting member of the class. You know that, don't you?"

Jones replied: "Me?"

As before, we can immediately give a sociological description of this talk. There are two distinct yous portrayed here: one within an inner picture, the descriptive statement "You're a distracting member of the class", the other portrayed in an outer picture, reflecting on the statement, "knowing" it to be true. Jones is invited to affirm the whole, and with it Mr. Cramond's familiar definition. Mr. Cramond's location of his 'orders' within his definition of the situation is interesting. In the terminology of Max Weber¹⁶, the definition serves as a 'legitimate order' in terms of which the imperative is understood. The imperative is legitimated by assimilating the particular situation at hand to the familiar definition which is consistently and repeatedly reasserted on every possible occasion. Mr. Cramond treats an incident which could have posed a threat to his order as the occasion for reasserting and so strengthening that order.

Now consider a theoretical investigation of the talk. Analysis of the conversation produces the following display:

I
 i ii
 [(Shut up) Alan)]

IIo
 [(You're a distracting member of the class)]

III
 i ii
 [((You know that) don't you?)]

IVo
 [(me?)]

Mr. Cramond's utterance C5*

The analytical equations are:

- C5* = I & II & III & IV (1)
- I = i & ii (2a)
- II = IIo (2b)
- III = i & ii (2c)
- IV = IVo (2d)

Stanza I is bound together in the familiar technique of reflection. This establishes its 'earthly' character: the otherwise harsh accent of reality of the imperative is softened, i.e. made problematic, by the Christian name which follows it. This can be identified as the voice of the I/you, so that:

$$C5^*I_{I/you} = (i)ii \dots\dots\dots (3a)$$

Stanza III is likewise bound together by reflection. The otherwise emphatic accent of reality of picture i is called into question by picture ii. The two pictures also exhibit reverberation on the word 'you'. Consequently,

$$C5^*III_{you} = (i)ii \dots\dots\dots (3c)$$

The other 'third set' equations are identical to the corresponding 'second set' ones. The voices of stanzas II and IV remain unknown for the time being.

Consider now relations of reference within the conversation. Stanza II metaphorically reformulates stanza I, insofar as 'you' is a synonym for 'Alan'. However, I propose that this is not a mandatory metaphor establishing dependence but is rather optional, and so sustains equal independent relations between these stanzas. The criterion here is that what is an object, in this case a person, within one stanza is likewise an object within the other, so that the 'metaphor' is simply a change of name. By contrast dependency arises when what is speech in one stanza is an object in another. Stanza III metaphorically reformulates stanza II, in that 'that' refers to IIo as a whole: this establishes the dependence of III on II. Finally, IVo metaphorically reformulates 'you' in IIIi. This however like that between stanzas I and II is merely a matter of a change in name of what remains an object: accordingly it is an optional metaphor which establishes independent relations.

Now the utterance structure as a whole can be displayed:

$$C5^* = [I_{I/you-}] \quad [[II] III_{you-}] [IV]$$

This analysis suggests how the missing voices should be assigned. Stanza II is transcendent. It portrays the 'you' therefore I propose to designate it with this voice. However it must then be distinguished from the 'earthly' you voice. What kind of a you voice is it then? In terms of content, the 'you' is portrayed as a bad object. This would suggest that the vision of hell is being invoked. Additionally, in every previous remark considered, Mr. Cramond has portrayed the you as contemplating the natural rather than the social order. Accordingly, so it is here. By contrast stanza IV stands alone. It metaphorically reformulates the problematic 'earthly' you of stanza III. Accordingly, its voice is so

designated. Then the utterance structure as a whole is:

$$C5^* = [I_{I/\text{you}}] [[II_{\text{you}}] III_{\text{you}}] [IV_{\text{you}}] \dots (4)$$

Now, what is the significance of this result? I propose that the contrast between the portrayal of the situation by Mr. Cramond in his utterance, and that by Alan Jones in his, is worth remarking. Within his scheme, i.e. stanzas II and III, the teacher portrays the you, as 'knowing' that 'you're a distracting member of the class'. Ingeniously, then, Mr. Cramond at once labels the boy, and thereby calls into question his proper membership of the classroom situation, and portrays the boy as himself subscribing to this labelling. Thereby he affirms the boy's proper membership of the classroom situation insofar as he denies it, and denying it insofar as he affirms it.¹⁷ The boy's reply, 'Me?', could therefore be taken in many ways. It could refer to the transcendent you of stanza II, in which case it would be a transcendent 'me'. Or it could refer to the earthly you of picture IIIi, in which case it would be an earthly you. Again and most simply it could refer to Mr. Cramond's final 'you', the one in IIIii. Or, it could call into question the whole relevance of the utterance to himself at all, by referring to 'Alan', in stanza I. But there is yet another possibility. If Jones has grasped the predicament which Mr. Cramond's utterance places him in, then his 'Me?' could be at once a reference to the 'you' of II and the you of III, hellish and earthly.

In short, as a result of the way in which the teacher has constructed his utterance, it is impossible to distinguish whether the boy's response exhibits simply an attempt to question whether the remark is directed to him at all, and so to deflect it, or whether it exhibits a deep immersion in and comprehension of the predicament into which Mr. Cramond has placed him by speaking it. The teacher himself appears, in his speech, to be unconcerned as between these two. If so, then his elaborate speech does nothing to encourage the pursuit of rationality by those to whom he speaks.

I should now like to turn to consider the case of two boys who did themselves participate in one of Mr. Cramond's transcendental discourses, namely his voice of the we, and consider his response to their speech.

"Daft Alec Rialto"

Another incident involving Rialto occurred towards the end of my period of research. On this occasion, Mr. Cramond entered the room with a stack of books which he gave out. I noted, "the boys soon realise they're all different". He then told them,

Before the end of term we are each going to read a book. All these books are reasonably interesting - some of them are very interesting. We'll have a period of reading this morning, and we'll have one each week from time to time. Now, I hope you'll understand I don't like you reading aloud in your neighbour's ear - you know what I mean by that.

I do not propose to embark upon an analysis of this utterance at this stage. Suffice it to say, that it exhibits the familiar features of Mr. Cramond's cosmology, involving the we in a transcendent social fact 'heaven', counterposed to a transcendent natural facticity which I have called 'hell', with in between the realm of reciprocity as between the I and the you. As soon as the teacher had made this announcement, Rialto asked him, "Where do we start?". Many facets of this remark could be examined: for present purposes, however one will suffice. In his remark Rialto himself explicitly participates in the teacher's we province of meaning, the 'heavenly' collectivity. It is in that light that I believe the teacher's reply should be considered.

The teacher replied,

Now that's just like daft Alec Rialto. When I eat my dinner, I start with my pudding first. If you come down to McGrath House, you'll see that I eat my custard with my potatoes.

Uproarious laughter greeted this remark. It was 'obviously' a joke, and at Rialto's expense. A sociological analysis of this joke would I suggest, focus attention upon the relationship Mr. Cramond sustains between his speech and Rialto's. On this reading the joke works in the following way. In a world wherein one can intelligibly ask where to start reading a book, there can be no commonly agreed order of reading. In such a world there need be no commonly agreed order of doing anything, e.g. eating. In such a world Mr. Cramond eats custard with his potatoes. The laugh however is not on him but on Rialto who is revealed to have acted as if he inhabited such a 'daft' world. Such an analysis then would accept the serious substance of Mr. Cramond's joke, namely that the boy's question was unintelligible. Such an analysis, like any sociological analysis, would appreciate, not criticise, the speaker.

But I propose that from a philosophical point of view there is no need to capitulate to the teacher's definition of the situation in order to comprehend the joke. On the contrary the analysis is the occasion for criticism of his definition of the situation. Consider then how the philosophical treatment proceeds in the case of this utterance.

Analysis reveals the following:

 Io
[NOW (that's just like daft Alec Rialto)]

 II
 i ii
[WHEN (I eat my dinner) (I start with my pudding first)]

 III
 i ii
[IF (you come down to McGrath House) (you'll see that (I eat
 iii
 my custard with my potatoes))]

Mr. Cramond's utterance C7*

The analytical equations are:

- C7* = I & II & III (1)
 I = Io (2a)
 II = i & ii (2b)
 III = i & ii & iii (2c)

Stanza Io is on its own, however its voice is familiar. I suggest the 'that' establishes that here is to be found the voice of the I in the reflective mode. Equation 3a would be identical to equation 2a.

Stanza II has a familiar structure of reverberation. Therefore this stanza establishes itself as exhibiting the voice of the I. In this case:

$$C7*II_I = i.ii \dots\dots\dots (3b)$$

Stanza III is more complex but consists entirely of familiar relationships, of reverberation and reflection. Accordingly it exhibits the voice of the you reflecting upon the I, thus:

$$C7*III_{you} = i.ii(iii) \dots\dots\dots (3c)$$

Then the structure of the utterance as a whole can be considered. Stanza I is autonomous. But stanza II reverberates with picture IIIiii. Accordingly stanzas II and III are related together by reflection. The utterance as a whole is then:

$$C7* = I_I // (II_I) III_{you} \dots\dots\dots (4)$$

But now, consider that stanza I here portrayed is, according to my analysis, a portrayal of the I in the mode of reflection. If this is correct, the I is posed as reflecting on Alec Rialto. If th is is written into the equation representing the utterance structure, then it becomes:

$$I_I \text{ (Alec Rialto)} // (II_I) III_{you}$$

The conclusion is inescapable: the 'nul' relation at the centre of this utterance is not so neutral as it appears. It rather has the role of a mirror in being the axis around which a reversal is built into the utterance, of this form:

as I is to Alec Rialto so you is to I

Now what is the relation between I and Alec Rialto in this utterance? Simply that to the I, Alec appears 'daft'. What is the relation between you and the I? In his joke, the teacher portrays precisely the I as daft in its actions before the you.

I propose then that the structure of the teacher's utterance, which itself is only possible in terms of the structure which he persistently sustains, is crucial to a comprehension of the teacher's joke. More precisely, the joke consists of an inversion of his usual structure. Whereas that usual structure involves the we being upheld as an ideal before the I, here the I is upheld as a scape-goat before the you. But what brought on this reversal? Simply, Alec Rialto's formulation of his question in terms of the we. I propose then this conclusion: faced with a boy's participation in his we speech, the teacher constitutes his system as having been turned upside down. Retrospectively then, it is the boy who is constituted as having turned the system upside down. In such a way does Mr. Cramond defend his system of speaking.

In the same conversation another boy also made a we contribution. Immediately following the teacher's rebuttal of Rialto, Clason enquired, "Sir, do we put our names in the books?" To this the teacher answered,

There's no need to do that. I'll give you out slips of paper you can write your name on and use for bookmarks.

On this occasion it was apparently not possible for the teacher to exhibit the fantasy nature of the boy's question, for he had in fact pinpointed a genuine problem arising from the teacher's proposal that the boys each read different books over a period of weeks. Analysis reveals:

Io
 [(There's no need to do that)]
 i II ii
 [(I'll give you out (slips of paper) you can write your
 names on and use for bookmarks)]

Mr. Cramond's utterance C8*

No further examination is needed, I suggest, to establish that, faced with a contribution to his we discourse which the teacher could not invalidate, he abruptly switches out of that discourse, first into the natural order mode ('there's no need ...'), and then into the 'earthly' I/you mode.

"You know the order of events"

We can see, then, that the subtle complexity of Mr. Cramond's speech is no aid to the maintenance of a discourse with the boys, indeed quite the reverse: he employs his social skills most effectively to exclude the speech of the boys from participating in the structure of voices

which he sustains. It must be said that, in terms of sustaining social order in the classroom, that his methods were highly successful. Consider one last incident which illuminates the nature of this success. On one occasion, Mr. Cramond's room was in use for an examination which he had to supervise, so that the boys of J2 had to sit in a girls' classroom next door. Mr. Cramond told them:

Right, now. I think we know the order of events. You've got to get on by yourselves today, and I don't want to see anybody off their seats.

Sociologically speaking, we find that here the familiar

definition is reasserted. In the inner picture, the definite we is posed as knowing 'the order of events', watched over in the outer picture by the less certain I. On the other hand the you is portrayed as quite dominated by external necessity: 'you've got to ...'. The I appears again later in the utterance, again in an indefinite outer picture contemplating a definite factual state of affairs.

The boys asked whether they could read books but the teacher said, " get you something to do", and brought in games of draughts, and comics. Then he left. Ten minutes later he returned. He at once pointed to Mears, saying:

"'Right, next door. You were off your feet. You know the order of events. You were well warned!'"

Next door Mears was belted.

From a sociological viewpoint we find that as in utterance C5* above, the imperative is contained curtly in the first three words. The remainder of the remark legitimates the imperative by locating it within the familiar definition, which is thereby re-affirmed. Three pictures portray three yous, thereby achieving some rhetorical force. They are not all the same you however. The first and third portray the you descriptively: they refer to a factual state of affairs. The second picture by contrast portrays the reflective you, in its familiar stance of 'knowing' Mr. Cramond's definition of the situation. Had one adopted a 'dramaturgical standpoint',¹⁸ and attempted a description of Mr. Cramond's role performance, one might have had to view this interaction as a breakdown in the teacher's impression management. Even after being 'well warned', one might have noted, the boy still acted contrary to the command. But in view of our focus on the teacher's own portrayal of the situation, we come to a different conclusion, namely that the incident provided the teacher with yet another opportunity for re-asserting his definition.

The philosophical account proceeds as follows.
 Analysis reveals:

I

[RIGHT, NOW (I think (we know the order of events))]

II

[(You've got to (get on) by yourselves) TODAY]

III

[AND (I don't want to see (anybody off their seats))]

Mr. Cramond's utterance C9*

The analytical equations are:

$$C9^* = I \ \& \ II \ \& \ III \ \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

$$I = i \ \& \ ii \ \dots\dots\dots (2a)$$

$$II = i \ \& \ ii \ \dots\dots\dots (2b)$$

$$III = i \ \& \ ii \ \dots\dots\dots (2c)$$

Stanza I is structured by reflection in the familiar way:

$$C9^*I_I = i(ii) \ \dots\dots\dots (3a)$$

Stanza II is structured by the familiar device of reciprocity, whereby two pictures problematise the accent of reality of one another. Accordingly

$$C9^*II_{you} = i/ii \ \dots\dots\dots (3b)$$

Stanza III is also structured by reflection, though in an unfamiliar way. However, here we do find the voice of the I, so the equation is:

$$C9^*III_I = i(ii) \ \dots\dots\dots (3c)$$

Equation 3b is identical to equation 2b. Now consider the utterance structure as a whole. There appear to be no relations of reference within the utterance. In this case the structure is:

$$C9^* = I_I // III_{you} // III_I$$

But I suggest that this equation does not capture the complete structure of the utterance. For within stanza I, the 'earthly' I is posed as reflecting upon the 'heavenly' we. Symetrically opposite to this, in stanza III, the same 'earthly' I is posed glancing in a direction unusual for the I of Mr. Cramond, though as we shall see much the commonest direction for the I of another teacher to glance in: in the direction of the third person 'anybody' which is by reverberation identifiable as the voice of the 'body', the hardly mentionable realm of 'hell'. In this case, the utterance has a completeness which has not yet been expressed. A better representation would be:

$$C9^* = I_{I(we)} // II_{you} // III_{I(body)} \dots\dots (4)$$

If it is understood that the we here inhabits the heavenly realm, and the body the 'hellish' realm, then the utterance has a perfect symmetry: formulated upon 'earth', it articulates the viewpoint of the I, the you, the we, and the one, on the matter in question.

Now consider the teacher's response to the action of the unfortunate Mears. Analysis of his utterance reveals the following structure:

$$\begin{array}{c}
 I_0 \\
 \lceil \text{RIGHT, (next door) } \rceil \\
 II \\
 \lceil \begin{array}{cc} i & ii \\ \text{(You were (off your seat) } \end{array} \rceil \\
 III \\
 \lceil \begin{array}{cc} i & ii \\ \text{(You know (the order of events) } \end{array} \rceil \\
 IV \\
 \lceil \begin{array}{cc} i & ii \\ \text{(You were (well warned) } \end{array} \rceil
 \end{array}$$

Mr. Cramond's utterance C10*

The analytical equations are:

- C10* = I & II & III & IV (1)
 I = I_o (2a)
 II = i & ii (2b)
 III = i & ii (2c)
 IV = i & ii (2d)

Stanza I_o simply presents a 'restricted code' imperative. As such it pertains to the 'hellish' natural order.

It must be said at once that on a purely grammatical basis, no subdivisions would be made within stanzas II, III, IV. The division first appears as an optional possibility as a result of the analysis of stanza II. By analogy a parallel division is found within stanza III and again within stanza IV. In each case, the construction of the stanza is identical, consisting in the voice of the you engaging in reflection. The equations are:

$$II_{\text{you}} = i(ii) \dots\dots\dots (3b)$$

$$III_{\text{you}} = i(ii) \dots\dots\dots (3c)$$

$$IV_{\text{you}} = i(ii) \dots\dots\dots (3d)$$

Consider now the structure of the utterance as a whole. No reference as between stanzas is to be found in this utterance, but the last three stanzas reverberate with one another. The overall structure of the utterance might be represented thus:

$$C10* = I_{\text{body}} // II_{\text{you}} \cdot III_{\text{you}} \cdot IV_{\text{you}}$$

But this equation does not capture the complete structure of the utterance. For within stanzas II, III, and IV, the you is posed in relation to other realms. In stanza II, the you is portrayed, as it were, in bodily terms, 'off your seat'. In III, the you is portrayed reflecting on 'the order of events' which it 'knows'. In IV, the you is posed as 'warned'. I propose that these three express the you's relation to each of the three realms conjured up within Mr. Cramond's speech. II expressed the you's 'bodily' orientation, that is its

orientation towards 'hell'. III expresses the you's 'spiritual' orientation, that is, its orientation towards 'heaven'. IV expresses the you's orientation to other speech, that is to say, its 'earthly' orientation. I propose this can be expressed in the notation as follows:

$$C10^* = I_{\text{body}} // II_{\text{you(body)}} \cdot III_{\text{you(we)}} \cdot IV_{\text{you(you)}} \dots (4)$$

In his remark to Mears, the teacher's utterance reiterates the structure of his utterance to the assembled class a little earlier, with the difference that on this occasion the structure is defined specifically with respect to the you. Having specified Mears' situation in terms of every available mode of speech, the teacher felt able to enforce physical punishment.

Definition

The sociologist is struck by the fact that Mr. Cramond was able to treat the sequence of events in the daily life of the classroom as a continuous series of occasions for sustaining his definition of the situation¹⁹ in speech. This 'definition' could be regarded as an elaboration of Goffman's 'presentation of self'²⁰ idea, but going beyond it in two ways. Firstly, Mr. Cramond does not merely present his own 'self'. Certainly, the I is prominent in his remarks, and it has certain distinct characteristics: it 'hopes', 'thinks', and 'wants'; its presence is concerned, but detached. But the I is no more prominent than other 'persons' in his portrayal, notably the we and the you, who each have equally well-defined features. And the I is just as likely to be absent from a particular portrayal when they are present as the reverse. Secondly, Mr. Cramond does not portray 'persons' in a vacuum. He situates his I, we, and you in a context. This context, as we have seen, comprises 'rules', and inevitable laws ('what will happen'), which together Mr. Cramond calls 'the order of events'. He portrays this 'order' as having an existence external to the 'persons' in his world, as being a 'social fact'.

In contrast to this, my philosophical hypothesis is that these realms are in no sense the ex nihilo creation of Mr. Cramond's speech. They are rather the latest secularised versions of what Heidegger calls 'onto-theo-logical' categories which have shaped the Western tradition of philosophical speech for thousands of years.²¹ My test of this rather large hypothesis will be an investigation of the speech of other teachers and boys within the classroom setting. If I am correct, then in an important sense we shall learn nothing new from them. The same basic structure will be reaffirmed in each case though perhaps with differences in emphasis which it is hard to anticipate, having so far examined systematically the speech of only one individual.

From the linguistic point of view, the very words involved in this distinctions are of interest. Compare the etymologies of 'definition' and of 'tradition' as the motifs of the two approaches which I am contrasting. The Concise Oxford Dictionary states that definition meaning "stating the precise nature of a thing or meaning of a word"²² stems from the Latin finitio, to end or finish. By contrast tradition, having the first meaning "opinion or belief or custom handed down, handing down of these, from ancestors to posterity"²³ stems from the Latin dare, to give. Then the notion of speech as definition is appropriate if one's conception of speech is as mysterious ex nihilo creativity on the one hand or as rigid scientific termino-logy on the other.²⁴

By contrast, the notion of speech as tradition is appropriate if one conceives of speech as passed on, given, from one generation to the next. I have suggested that words, in their varied aspects, are the aspect of 'what is passed on' of specific concern to a linguistic phenomenology. Such an enquiry has a historical object, therefore, from the outset. In the present study this dimension has been sharply curtailed.

Tradition

From the descriptive point of view, Mr. Cramond's speech sustains one particular unique definition of the situation, and in so doing exhibits his skilfulness. Should he fail to do so, that definition would no longer exist: the result would be anomie. But from the philosophical point of view, Mr. Cramond's definition of the situation is not unique, and therefore there is no reason to conceive that it would fall should his social skill lapse on any occasion. Rather, insofar as the philosophical approach has delineated successfully the structure of any possible 'definition of the situation' within speech, then alternative speech by any other speaker would sustain the same structure. On this view, the metaphysical tradition which Mr. Cramond's speech exhibits is not so much fragile and in need of defence, as so all pervading that our difficulty lies in conceiving how to liberate ourselves from it.²⁵

Any programme for such liberation must demonstrate its own possibility from within this philosophical structure. I have proposed such a programme. It involves fastening attention on a neglected and elusive level within speech, namely the realm, located between the theological realms of heaven and hell, which I have identified as 'earth'. Though Mr. Cramond refers to it, his own preference is to escape from it. The outcome is his presentation of the world in terms of a dualism, 'heaven' versus 'hell', 'social order' versus 'natural order', a dualism matching those familiar within existing phenomenology, sociology, and psychology. By contrast, I have remained sceptical of realities which they have defined, and so I am sceptical of those which he defines, and defines in much the same terms. In contrast to the search for the certainty of extra-ordinariness which leads both Mr. Cramond and the philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists away from the problematic realm of ordinary speech, I propose a searching out of that ordinariness where it can be found.²⁶

C h a p t e r S i x

MR. LEE'S VISION OF HELL

Paradigm

Following a theoretical argument which established the need and the place for linguistic phenomenology as a critical investigation of the portrayal of 'reality' in speech, I have set out in some detail the manner in which a paradigm case of an empirical investigation of 'everyday' speech can be conducted. It is plain, that however detailed, the very detail revealed in speech by that study shows that that study is no more than preparatory. It would be fruitless at this stage to simply accumulate more and more facts about the speech of disparate individuals. Accordingly, I should like to address a more strategic question in the concluding chapters of the present enquiry. I should like to address certain modes of speech which might at first sight seem, for various reasons, so different from the paradigm case as to render the phenomenology which it exhibits to be implausible or impracticable.

My conception of what linguistic phenomenology can achieve has necessarily been inspired for me by the speech of one individual, Mr. Cramond. But in case that paradigm might be thought too narrow, such as to lead to the imposition of that one individual's way of speaking upon all, I now hope to indicate the approach the discipline would adopt to speakers markedly different from Mr. Cramond. The three cases I have in mind are, firstly, a teacher whose way of speaking exhibited the exact opposite to Mr. Cramond's mode, an immanentist mode of speech. By showing the fruitfulness of the approach in the case of such a speaker I hope to establish that it is in no sense biased towards the 'rationalism' which it purported to be criticising, but in fact can shed light on an 'existentialist' speaker equally well. Second I should like to consider a teacher who exhibited neither rationalist nor existentialist modes of speech, and indeed was not sufficiently skilful to sustain social order within the classroom setting. Accordingly, his lessons provided an opportunity to observe and analyse what is, sociologically speaking, 'anomic' speech. In this way I hope to offset another possible line of criticism, namely that despite its claim to criticise extraordinary speech my approach is in fact only an appreciation of social order in another guise. Finally, I should like tentatively to test the generality of the method by applying it to a speaker far removed from the classroom setting. I have in mind, as an intriguing context within which to explore the approach, the writings of Edmund Husserl which themselves inspired it. Such an exploration should permit the more precise formulation of a matter which I have so far addressed only loosely, namely in what sense my 'linguistic' approach is a translation of an approach developed by Husserl in an entirely different context, namely that of consciousness, or in what sense my approach may in fact be more faithful to his method than he was himself, insofar as in writing of 'consciousness' he conceived himself to be writing of a reality external to the language in which he was writing, whereas from my point of view he was rather writing of a 'reality' in writing.

These explorations will be neither as detailed nor as rigorous, as those of the previous chapter aspired to be. But they will not degenerate back into mere description. On the contrary they will be informed by the discipline of linguistic phenomenological method even where they do not fully practise it. In particular, they will be concerned to investigate a phenomenon thus far neglected by ethnomethodologists, existentialists, and others engaged in research into language, namely the distinction between reality and 'reality' as a feature of speech itself.

With this aspiration in mind, I return now to consider the classroom context.

"It's not very nice to come back to the classroom"

I now present a teacher whose mode of presentation of himself in the classroom 'felt' distinctively different from that of Mr. Cramond considered in the previous chapter. I hope to show that this 'feeling' can be accounted for by a linguistic analysis, which locates his speech within the same structure as that occupied by Mr. Cramond, albeit in a different position. In this way I intend to show how what is at first sight the rich complexity of available alternatives in fact reflects the impoverishment of real choices available to speakers within the structure of our existing language.¹ But first let us experience the 'existential leap' which the boys of J2 experienced seven times a day throughout their school lives of shifting abruptly to the discourse of another teacher.

I first met Mr. Lee at lunch ('school dinner') on my first day in the school. He told me that J2 was 'a very good class'. As an illustration of this point, he told me that he had offered three selected boys extra homework on Wednesdays, Thursdays and Tuesdays. The following week, several other boys had come to request extra work for themselves. I attended one of his lessons that first afternoon.

It followed the swimming period, so that the boys entered the classroom in one's, two's, and three's over a ten minute period. Mr. Lee greeted them with the following remark:

I know you've just had swimming, and its not very nice to come back to the classroom, but the sooner you get used to it the better. Come on, and we'll get some work done.

It can be said at once, in a descriptive observation, that the teacher poses the I as contemplating, and 'knowing' the situation of the you in a way which defines the you's situation for it. The you is told it had 'better' get used to this situation. Then, in a switch of voices, the we is invoked as being the mode in which the lesson will now go forward. This observation is interesting enough, but it remains sociological in the sense that it fails to explain why this particular definition of the situation, out of indefinitely many possible others, should be put forward at this point by this teacher. A theoretical investigation of this utterance can provide an outline of Mr. Lee's way of speaking which will serve as the context for a briefer treatment of his subsequent utterances.

The analysis of this utterance presents problems of ambiguity greater than any previously encountered. The simplest way to deal with this is to present one interpretation, and to discuss possible variations from it.

I propose the following analysis:

I
i ii
[I know (you've just had swimming)

I'
iii
AND (its not very nice to come back to the classroom)

I'
iv
BUT (the sooner you get used to it the better)]

II
[(Come on)]
III
[AND (we'll get some work done)]

Mr. Lee's utterance L1*

- L1* = I & II & III (1)
I = i & ii & iii & iv (2a)
II = IIo (2b)
III = IIIo (2c)

The first two pictures of stanza I present a familiar technique, but in an unfamiliar context. The link between them is one of reflection. This then implies that the you is a figment of the reflective consciousness of the I, and not 'on a par', i.e. on the same level, as the I as was the case in Mr. Cramond's speech. Recall that in Mr. Cramond's speech, the I's 'consciousness', or rather in my preferred term, 'speech', formulated the here and now situation at hand. This would seem to be the case here also: Mr. Lee's you is not a subject conscious of the world, but an object in the world. It may be hypothesised that within Mr. Lee's way of speaking, the you will not be attributed with a consciousness, with speech. Certainly there is as yet no evidence of a voice of the you. What is found here is the voice of the I.

This much is definite. Hereafter, ambiguity is inescapable. Picture Iiii is definitely within the scope of the reflection of the I in picture Ii. But it is unclear whether this scope extends any further, in particular, whether it extends to both what I have called Iiii and Iiv. If it does not extend to Iiii, then perhaps this picture should not be regarded as part of stanza I at all, but as beginning a new stanza on its own. But there are other grounds for linking Iiii with Iii. Although picture Iiii itself has no word in common with Ii or Iii, it reverberates with 'it' in Iiv, and Iiv reverberates with 'you' in Iii, accordingly this suggests that Iii, Iiii, and Iiv are 'on a level' with one another. But there is an alternative interpretation. This is that the 'it' in picture Iiv does not reverberate with the 'it' in picture Iiii, but metaphorically reformulates that picture. In this case, Iiii and Iiv are both

separate stanzas from stanza I, and Iiii formulates the transcendent natural order which the you in Iii and in Iiv articulates on earth.

To attempt to eliminate these ambiguities in a definitive interpretation would be to do violence to the utterance. Rather I propose that the ambiguity is a constituent feature of the utterance, with which the linguistic phenomenological method is well able to deal. What does it involve, then, in the present case?

The internal structure of the stanzas is, I propose, as follows:

$$L1*I_I = i(ii.iv.iii) \dots\dots\dots (3a)$$

The ambiguity, I suggest, subsists in the fact that what are here designated as Iiv, and especially Iiii, i.e. pictures within a stanza, may be equally well regarded as making a stanza in their own right. It is even possible to identify what the voice of this picture would be. Insofar as Iiv and Iiii reverberate together, it is on the word 'it', which accordingly defines the voice of what may be named as stanza I'. This stanza may be defined by the supplementary equation,

$$L1*I'_{it} = iii.iv. \dots\dots\dots (3a')$$

The equations 3b and 3c are identical to 2b and 2c respectively, leaving unidentified the voices of stanzas II and III.

Consider now relations between the stanzas here distinguished. If a relation exists between stanza I_I and stanza I'_{it} , then it exists via the relation of both to the you pictures. Stanza I reflects on the you, stanza I' reverberates with the you: the overall relation is then one of reflection. As between stanza I and stanza II there is no relation, but a relation exists between I' and II. It is one of metaphorical reformulation: 'come on' reformulates

'you get used to it'. This is an 'optional' metaphor, establishing no relations of dependence. As between II and III there is similarly an 'optional' metaphorical relation: 'come on' can equally reformulate 'we'll get some work done'. Thus stanza II, 'come on', is ambiguously situated between stanzas I' and III in a way not unlike the ambiguous location of picture Iiv between pictures Iii and Iiii. It is now possible to represent the overall structure of the utterance:

$$LI^* = [I_I (I'_{it})] [II] [III]$$

The voices of stanzas II and III have yet to be identified. But this synthesis is itself suggestive as to their identification. The voice of the I in stanza I is, as I have shown, intimately bound up with the impersonal it voice. It can at once be hypothesised that this is the voice of immanentist natural order. Facing it, as it were, is what is readily identified as the voice of the we, in stanza III, the voice of transcendentalist social order. And the realm which we have seen has ambiguous status between the two is plainly also familiar: it is the 'earthly' realm within which Mr. Lee's 'come on' imperative is pronounced. The overall structure is thus:

$$LI^* = [I_I (I'_{it})] [II_{earth}] [III_{we}] \dots\dots (4)$$

It is apparent that whilst this structure precisely reiterates the range of realms which was to be found in the speech of Mr. Cramond, there is a dramatic reversal in the part played by each within his scheme. In Mr. Cramond's way of speaking, the voice of the we is elaborated into the organising principle of his complex utterances, whereas the voice of the body is restricted in form and content, and has a residual part to play in grammatical structure. In Mr. Lee's utterance the opposite is the case. In and around the impersonal 'it' voice, he erects an elaborate structure, whereas the we voice is dismissed briefly in a restricted remark.

Of particular interest is the transformation in the relation of the I and the you which comes about in Mr. Lee's speech. Whereas these two play symmetric though unequal parts in Mr. Cramond's scheme, in Mr. Lee's speech all symmetry has disappeared. How has this come about? On the basis of Mr. Cramond's speech, one would have been prepared to assume that the location of the I and the you together in the 'earthly' realm was an essential structural feature, yet it is violated by Mr. Lee. But what has happened makes sense, I propose, if we learn from our earlier encounter with Sartre's transformation of Husserl's transcendentalist scheme into an immanentist viewpoint. The immanentist reduction, which Sartre took from the early Husserl, entailed a bracketing of the intersubjective social world, and a consequent retreat to my unique consciousness. In linguistic translation, this reduction entails a retreat to my unique voice, the voice of the I, and a bracketing of the voice of the we. As Sartre shows, the result is that the other's subjectivity can no longer be apprehended: the other is now simply an object for my consciousness, or here, for my language. So too is the natural world. But the status of this consciousness as 'mine' is somewhat problematic. For Sartre, consciousness is absolute consciousness: it is transcendent: it transcends 'me'. 'There is something distressing for each of us, to catch in the act this tireless creation of existence of which we are not the creators'. Thus in contrast to the complacent relationship existing for the rationalist between his consciousness and the we, the existentialist experiences an alienated relationship between consciousness and his I. I propose to explore this relation a little further in the speech of Mr. Lee. Consider then another remark, by which he opened the third of his French lessons which I observed.

The Ideology of the 'I'

Mr. Lee told the boys:

This utterance, as analysed, is revealing of the specificity which each of the three realms takes on within the speech of this particular teacher. First, the realm of the we is again markedly undeveloped. To be more precise, Mr. Lee's we is merely descriptive, by contrast with the theoretical we which was to be found in the speech of Mr. Cramond. Second, the earthly realm within Mr. Lee's speech is highly restricted. In Mr. Cramond's speech, a lively 'I/you' relationship was sustained within his speech, even if in practise the boys in the classroom rarely participated in it. But within Mr. Lee's realm, no discourse at the earthly level is possible at all. So far as we know at the moment, only imperatives make their appearance there. These imperatives then define what for me is the reality of Mr. Lee's speech: the voices of the we and the I formulate only the 'ideological' legitimation of those imperatives.

Nonetheless, Mr. Lee's ideology is of interest per se. In eight pictures in the present utterance, he reiterates his preferred vision of the world. A recurrent motif here is the I contemplating 'anyone'. I propose that there Mr. Lee gives direct expression to the Sartrean vision of the individual alone in a world of things. Striking is the way in which in pictures IIIi and IIIii personal matters are formulated impersonally. As in certain of Mr. Cramond's utterances bodily imagery, here 'feet', is prominent. This reaches a climax in picture IIIii, 'I don't want a squeak from anyone'. Now consider the final stanza. Here the anyone portrayed alone is an impersonal world, a world which treats the anyone in the same terms as does the I. It seems that the I and the impersonal facticity work hand in hand.

I propose that this is indeed the tendency present within Mr. Lee's style of speaking, a tendency which tends to contradict the separation of the 'earthly' I from the factual 'hell'. On this hypothesis I can make a further interpretation. For in the previous utterance, in Mr. Lee's scheme, the you is also 'up against' this facticity. It would seem then that for Mr. Lee, both I and you

inhabit a realm coterminous with the facticity, and both of them are likewise involved with it. But in what way are they so involved? Here there is a very obvious distinction to be made. For whilst, so far at least, the I has not come into conflict or even direct contact with the facticity, the you has had brushes with it, and the anyone is directly involved with its inescapable determining force. It would appear then, that in a sense which remains unclear, the I is on the same side as the facticity, that in some sense the one is the metaphorical reformulation, or the agent, of the other. In order to explore this relationship further, let us consider some further examples of Mr. Lee's speech.

At the beginning of a lesson in my seventh week in the school, Mr. Lee's first words to the boys were as reported below. I present the utterance already analysed for convenience.

i I ii
[((Close that door) please)

iii
(Stop that noise)]

II
[((I'm ⁱwarning you,) ⁱⁱJ2)]

IIIo
[(Eight members of A2 have been punished last period by me)]

IV
[(I hope (I'm ⁱnot going to have to ⁱⁱstart on you))]

Mr. Lee's utterance L3*

Consider the last stanza, which I propose, contains an interesting new element of Mr. Lee's scheme. Here the I is posed reflecting upon a world which contains both I and you. However this portrayal is no longer descriptive, as is IIIi. Rather, the I is here portrayed caught up in the impersonal demands of the facticity: ('I'm not going to have to ...'). Here is intriguing confirmation of the hypothetical interpretation which I advanced earlier; the tendency is for both

the I and the you to be portrayed as inhabiting a natural world which imposes its impersonal constraints on both of them alike. Or is it alike in both cases? To be sure, it seems that both the I and the you are portrayed as sharing a realm with the impersonal facticity. But the you had only 'better' get used to it. The facticity it would seem can only react to the you. By contrast, at least tentatively, the I is here portrayed as the active agent of the facticity, as 'having to' do its bidding. The intriguing conclusion can then be proposed - to be tested by recourse to further examples - that the I's freedom within Mr. Lee's world is in fact considerably less than that of the you: the I is the agent of the facticity in the world, whereas the you is free, except that it is pursued by the facticity.

Consider, in this connection, the following remark. At a point in a lesson when some boys continue to talk, Mr. Lee remarked,

Io

[(I've twice told (you to be quiet)]

II

[(I don'tⁱ want to make (an example of anyone)

ii

(it's a long time since (I had to)]

Mr. Lee's utterance L4*

The remark portrays the I as subsumed within the facticity: the I 'wants' not to be so subsumed: in this sense the I pleads with the free you not to allow the facticity to drag him away: only the you by voluntarily cooperating can permit the I its freedom.

Here a direct comparison with Mr. Cramond's scheme can be made. Mr. Cramond's I is in a sense the representative on earth of the transcendent social order: the I interprets and contemplates the we's rule governed procedures. Here in Mr. Lee's portrayal is an opposite situation. His I is the agent on earth of the immanentist natural facticity:

the I does the facticity's bidding. Thus whilst each speaker supports his I here on earth in the immanent realm by posing a transcendent reality² the mythologies whereby each sets up his transcendent reality have different implications in each case.

In an equal but opposite manner to that of Mr. Cramond, Mr. Lee was able to inhibit the participation of the boys in his preferred mode of speech. Strictly speaking, within his own terms, the realm of natural order, unlike the community of the we in Mr. Cramond's scheme, was not constituted in speech. Speech was only an imperfect representation of it. Thus Mr. Lee's talk is special talk. It is non-talk, one might almost say physical talk.

A simple example which confirms this key feature of Mr. Lee's definition of the situation is the following. Gerald Sinclair was asked a question in French. He was unable to reply correctly. The teacher told him,

Io

[(Yes)]

IIo

[(Its very hard remembering)]

IIIo

[WHEN (you've not been paying attention)]

Mr. Lee's utterance L5*

Here stanza IIo formulates the impersonal facticity of 'hell', whilst IIIo portrays the you as located within this facticity. As in previous utterances of Mr. Lee's, this you is ambiguous as between a formulation of the immanent situation at hand, and a formulation of the transcendental factual reality.

By means of this remark, the situation of the boy is identified as one which quite generally affects all you's within Mr. Lee's scheme. In that this general situation is thus spelled out, it must be presumed that within Mr. Lee's scheme the boy, even the you in general, does not

know this feature of its situation. Thus Mr. Lee poses himself as communicating his knowledge of their situation in general, one which he shares with them, to the you, the boys. Compare this with Mr. Cramond's portrayal. In every case of conversation with individual boys he individuates them by name. But more than this, he portrays the point of his speaking to them to be, to draw attention to their individual divergence from the presumed features of membership of the class which in other boys he takes for granted. For example, 'daft Alec Rialto' who doesn't know where to start, and Alan Jones who 'knows' he is 'a distracting member of the class'). In summary Mr. Cramond need only speak to individual deviants to remind them of what everyone already knows. But Mr. Lee needs to speak to the whole class to tell them matters which, but for his telling, none of them could be relied upon to know.

A plain example of this occurs in the course of the following episode. On one occasion, Mr. Lee discovered that he had not brought the right text books into the lesson with him. He told the boys, " Right, two boys to come with me, the rest of you remain in silence". Before leaving the room, he said,

i
ii I
iii

[(I think (most of you are aware ((one of the greatest crimes is being out of your seat) so far as I'm aware)))]

iv

Mr. Lee's utterance L6*

In this formulation, the definite facticity formulates is what is 'one of the greatest crimes so far as I'm aware': thus the I is the knower of the facticity. To be sure the you, or rather 'most of' the you is 'aware', but not of what is a great crime itself, rather, of what the I is aware is a great crime. And even here, this awareness of "most of" the you is itself only what the I thinks, and therefore tentative.

With this the teacher left the room, leaving the door wide open. Whilst he was away, Cannon arranged, "Everybody - start humming". Before the teacher returned, I noted, "Now all are humming quite loudly". On his return, I noted, "Humming still quite loud - teacher is giving out books and gives no sign of recognition at all". He told someone, "Take your anorak off".

Then Alistair Jackson told him he had nothing to write with. Here the teacher revealed another facet of his cosmological scheme. He told the boy,

I

[(Well you ⁱ should have) AND (you'd better ⁱⁱ borrow one)]

[(I can ⁱ punish (you ^{II} for) not having ⁱⁱ something to write with)

IF (I ⁱⁱ wish)]

Mr. Lee's utterance L7*

Here the freedom of the I by virtue of its relation to the facticity is stressed: the action of the you makes possible a choice for the I as to whether it will or will not activate the facticity. This freedom or whim gives to Mr. Lee's natural order an irrationality compared to the explicit rule-governed rationality claimed by Mr. Cramond. Though we have noted Mr. Cramond's exercise of discretion, e.g. in his treatment of Rialto, this discretion was legitimised by his coining of other distinctions bearing upon the enforcement of the rule, viz. whether the boy had heard the pronouncement of the rule or not. But here Mr. Lee specifically reveals the exercise of punishment as being at his own whim.

Only after this incident did Mr. Lee refer to the humming which had continued meanwhile. He announced,

Io

[(Stop this noise,) please)]

II

[(I'm ⁱ perfectly well aware (who the people are) that are ⁱⁱ causing this disturbance)]

IIIo

[BUT (I prefer to punish the whole class)]

IV

[(House meeting, or no house meeting, I'll keep you in)
AS LONG AS (I feel like it after half past three)]

(

V

[(The choice is yours)]

In a codicil, he added:

VI

[NOW (I'm warning you (I'm not in the habit of making
threats and not carrying them out))]

Mr. Lee's utterance L8*

Here the I is posed as being 'well aware' of who the individual offenders are but as preferring to deal with the whole class, the you. The you has the choice, whereas in the first instance the I does not. But if the you exercises that choice, then the I is given a certain kind of freedom: the freedom to continue the punishment 'as long as I feel like it'. Thus while they are not identical, it is plain that the I works hand in hand with its transcendental ally, absolute impersonal power. Though trapped into being the agent of this power, the I seemingly sustains pleasure at its opportunities to exercise this obedience. This I is then in every respect a devil in the theological vision of hell of traditional Western Christian thought. By contrast, Mr. Cramond's I had the role of Christ, or a priest at least, in relation to the theological vision of heaven in that same traditional vision.


Heaven and Hell

Neither Mr. Cramond nor Mr. Lee facilitated a rational discourse as between his way of speaking and that of the boys. The one constructed a defended, 'home base' for himself in the realm of the we, the other in the realm of

the it, from which the boys were excluded from participation. These realms therefore served as independent provinces of meaning in the terms described by Schutz, whereby from the standpoint of any one such province taken as real, all other provinces appeared contradictory.

From a sociological point of view, this is to say, our two teachers appeared quite different to one another. Sociologically, indeed, we can be more precise than this. These two teachers exemplified divergent answers to the well known 'problem of social order'. The answer given by Mr. Cramond was the familiar Rousseau-esque 'consensus' solution, whereby the we exemplifies the general will of all its members, whereas the answer given by Mr. Lee was the Hobbesian 'coercion' solution: the Leviathan representing the impersonal force subsuming all. This interpretation permits further discoveries. For both Hobbes and Rousseau posit as prior to the solution of the problem of social order, the 'state of nature'. For Hobbes this state is 'nasty, brutish, and short'. I have already observed that this characterisation precisely describes the restricted code utterances which appear most frequently as curt imperatives, 'Shut up!', 'come on!', and as characterisations of states of affairs such as 'Somebody talking!'. In the case of Mr. Cramond's speech I proposed that this 'restricted' speech formulated the 'natural order'. But a more intriguing possibility now emerges. It could be, that from within his 'social order' perspective the 'state of nature' and the 'natural order' shade into one another. They can however be sharply distinguished, and must be when the speech of a 'natural order' theorist such as Mr. Lee is considered: his speech is anything but 'restricted'. For it is now clear that the curt imperatives of restricted speech formulate, not 'heaven' nor 'hell', but the state between them which I call 'earth'. But they are not the only kind of speech to do so. Paradoxically, these blunt remarks, which in their inexpl'icit reluctance seem to aspire not to be speech at all, co-exist in this realm with a linguistic form which I have proposed is the epitome of what full speech can be, namely, the interweaving

'reciprocity' of words which enables speakers to entertain and address the problematic 'reality' conjured up by speech. If the former is to be characterised as the 'state of nature', the latter I propose exhibits the 'state of civil society', a state which is something quite distinct from the 'natural' and 'social' orders which lay claim to these titles within sociological speech.³ The relation between these possibilities is displayed on the following diagram:



For me the reality of speech is exhibited at the 'earthly' realm. Accordingly, where the earthly realm is occupied by curt imperatives, as it exclusively is in the speech of Mr. Lee, and is to a large extent within the speech of Mr. Cramond, then these imperatives express the reality of social life within that speech. In the context of such speech, then, life is indeed 'nasty, brutish, and short'. But in the speech of Mr. Cramond are seen glimpses, though within the speech of Mr. Lee even these disappear, of another kind of social life, one exhibiting reciprocity and a genuine pursuit of rationality, in a speech about 'reality'.

Thus the philosophical approach does more than simply appreciate the speech it encounters by locating them within a typology, in the manner of a sociological description. It criticises the speech by transcending the structure within which they are located. It does so by proposing, as a theoretical possibility, a mode of speech which is not

yet empirically available within society, though persistent glimpses of it can be noticed as a result of the philosophical analysis, glimpses which are seen but unnoticed from the sociological point of view.

Sociological Speech

It is in the context of the account here given of the world portrayed by Mr. Lee that boys' responses to him should be situated, not only within but also outside the classroom situation itself.

A 'sociological' response on the part of the boys consisted in offering rival definitions of the situation to the one put forward by Mr. Lee. Consider the following incident involving John Cannon:

Cannon and Davies came in late. Cannon says "dinner duty, sir" and walks down to his seat with the air of one who has accomplished a responsible task.

...

Cannon stands up, paces up the gangway, very self-righteously justified. He has glue all over his coat. Mr. Lee says: "It serves you right for poking noses [sic] into other people's business - that's not your seat". Cannon: "I was just coming through to share with someone". He goes to share with Mears, who refuses. Mr. Lee says: "Go to the washroom and get it off".

Legitimate arrival late in the class is a way in which a boy can offer a definition of the situation to challenge the all-pervasiveness of the teacher's definition. But the teacher finds a way of treating Cannon's misfortune as a way of reaffirming his usual definition of the situation.

The boy posed a problem for Mr. Lee, and delighted in doing so. By appealing to an alternative definition of the situation, in this case the school system of using junior boys to lay the tables for 'school dinner', he was able to exhibit the fantastic nature of Mr. Lee's 'reality'. Fantastic in that it purported to define a complete rational speech,⁴ whereas in fact every boy was aware

that the reality of this system was delimited by the spatial and temporal boundaries of Mr. Lee's lesson. The boy's action in exhibiting a reality which contradicts the teacher's claim is rational, that is intelligible in the light of the search for a realistic outlook on the world attributed to these speakers. Such pursuit of a rational grasp of Mr. Lee's speech had to be carried out in opposition to his own definition of the situation. For Mr. Lee's defended speech made it impossible within the classroom setting to come to terms with his speech. It must be said that the same obstacles stood in the way of the boys gaining a grasp of Mr. Cramond's speech. Despite its greater 'rationalism', his speech exhibited no greater rationality in my sense. Within his classroom, likewise, the boys were excluded from the talk which constituted the order within which the talk occurred.

Philosophical Speech

But without the classroom setting, a more 'philosophical' response was possible. 'Mr. Lee' was in fact an endless topic of the boys' conversation.

Typical of these remarks was Johnson's:

I
 [(The French master)]

i II ii

[(He tells you a lot of codswallop) (He just drums it into
 you, like a drill master)]

Johnie Johnson's utterance J2*

I propose that this statement is wholly understandable in terms of what we have seen of Mr. Lee. But what we have seen is not at all the actions of Mr. Lee, to which these words of the boy overtly refer, but Mr. Lee's own words. I propose that it is to these words that Johnson directs his remarks: specifically, that it is to Mr. Lee's I as an object which he puts before the class that Johnson is referring when he says 'he', not the empirically existing Mr. Lee 'himself'. My account of Mr. Lee's I was as the

instrument of the absolute and inevitable impersonal forces of 'hell'. It is this instrument which, I propose, Johnson formulates as 'just drumming it into you' and 'like a drill master'. For the drill master is, precisely, the mere agent of procedures lacking any higher rationality than the mechanical, which is precisely the basis of the order to which Mr. Lee appeals.

A more elaborated response is seen in this conversation between Sammy Mason and John Lawson:

Io

Mason: [(French itself is alright)]

II

[BUT (Mr. Lee!)]

IIIo

[(He's too strict!)]

IV

Lawson: [(He thinks (he's noⁱ strictⁱⁱ))]

Vo

Mason: [(You feel easier with Mr. Conway)]

VIo

[(Though he's strict)]

VII

[IF (you cannae do French) (Mr. Lee shouts at you)]

Sammy Mason's utterance M2*

Mason's remark constitutes 'Mr. Lee' as a transcendent object. The grammatical construction involving 'but' is interesting here. Stanza Io appears to set the scene, 'but' stanza II displays ex nihilo a feature retrospectively seen to have been specifically absent from the content of stanza Io. Stanza III is then made referentially dependent upon this stanza II. Lawson speaks of Mr. Lee in quite a different way: he attributes to his puppet, 'he', a

reflective consciousness, thereby bringing down to earth Mason's transcendent object, and raising the issue of the gap between appearance and reality which is not an issue for Mason. In the concluding section, 'Mr. Lee' is still an object, now in a realm governed by predictable laws. Here Mason portrays 'Mr. Lee' as trapped: if you do such and such, 'Mr. Lee' does such and such else. But this is precisely a feature of the logic of Mr. Lee's way of speaking according to my analysis. Accordingly, I propose that Mason is not merely making an external characterisation, but is displaying internal knowledge of the workings of Mr. Lee's system of meaning: he is speaking of his speech.

The forms of mimicry of 'Mr. Lee' were often stereotyped. But an attractive variation was the following:

Mentone to Mr. Howie, the maths teacher: "Sir, I'm fighting Lee this afternoon after school. Will you come and support me?"

Here in joke an attempt is made to enlist another teacher's support against the unfortunate stereotyped 'Mr. Lee'. How was it that this stereotype arose in his case, but not in the case of Mr. Cramond? How was it possible that the boy could confide in this stereotype in discourse with Mr. Howie when it was impossible to elaborate it within the discourse of Mr. Lee himself? The second question demands an investigation of the speech of Mr. Howie to which I shall now turn, but the first has already been answered. 'Mr. Lee' is constituted as a bad object by Mr. Lee himself. It is the name given by the boys to the I spoken by that speaker and placed before the boys, in the theological 'hellish' context which we have been investigating. The response of the boys is itself made possible by, and itself a skilful orientation to, the 'reality' which Mr. Lee himself displays in his speech. Such an orientation was made impossible for them within the context of Mr. Lee's speech itself: accordingly, they exhibited such an orientation without that context.

In precisely the same way, Mr. Cramond was constituted as a 'good object' in the talk of the boys, who in so speaking of him exhibited a skilful orientation to the reality which he displayed in his speech. Such an orientation was likewise made impossible for them within the terms of Mr. Cramond's own speech. Thus, although perhaps on rationalistic sociological grounds we might find Mr. Cramond's speech preferable to Mr. Lee's, from a philosophical point of view it is in no way superior: the difference is merely one of content, whereas my philosophical criticism is directed towards the form of their speech, which they share.

C h a p t e r S e v e n

THE DOWN TO EARTH SPEECH OF MR. MARTIN

Order-ary speech

I have proposed that the structure of our language implies the sustaining of three distinct realms of meaning within speech, corresponding to the theological distinction between 'heaven', 'hell', and 'earth', and that whereas philosophy, sociology, psychology, and much of everyday speech up to the present time have conceived reality to subsist at the first or the second of these, I by contrast conceive reality to subsist at the third, and conceive the 'realities' posed at the other two levels to be ideologies, or fantasies, covering over the reality of the third. In other terms, I conceive the first and second to exemplify extra-ordinary speech which ek-sists, stands outside, the ordinary speech which makes them possible and from within which they gain their sense of reality. Accordingly I propose a return to focus on ordinary speech itself. My enquiry then conceives its object, 'ordinary speech', as, more precisely, order-ary speech. This conception is in accord with the original sense of the word 'ordinary', which stems from the Latin ordinarius, "order".¹ A linguistic phenomenological enquiry should seek to establish how order is sustained in and

through ordinary language itself, without recourse to the extra-ordinary realms already explored. I am committed, then, to a view of ordinary language as itself more authentic than the extra-ordinary forms to which it has given birth.²

This being the case, I can only approve of a speaker who exhibits a consistent refusal to have recourse to extra-ordinary forms within his speaking. Such a speaker, as I shall now show, is Mr. Howie the maths master. But the kind of approval implied in finding his speech more authentic is only to say, that it exhibits clearly its sense of 'reality', and thereby offers that 'reality' as open to question in ordinary speech which responds to it, a questioning which is impossible in the case of the 'defended' extra-ordinary modes of speaking. I am thus very far from saying that ordinary speech is beyond criticism. On the contrary, it is in the character of ordinary speech to be critical of itself. Accordingly, in being ordinary speech addressing ordinary speech, my speech will be critical of the speech of Mr. Howie.

I have already suggested as a theoretical possibility the lines which this criticism must take. I have argued that within ordinary speech itself, two distinct modes have already made their appearance. They encompass the extreme possibilities of speaking, ranging from on the one hand the 'restricted' three, two and by extension one word pictures which I have viewed as 'reluctant' speech aspiring to silence, to on the other hand forms of speaking which may be called 'elaborated' wherein a sensitive orientation to different formulations of 'reality' becomes possible within speech. This range is precisely what should be expected, in terms of my argument, that it is in this realm that reality (the reality of 'reality') is to be found. It implies simply, that within this realm 'reality'

is an issue, whereas in the two other realms it is not. In the two other realms 'reality' is not an issue because it has been determined by fiat that speech speaks reality per se. But in this realm, wherein speech is permanently under challenge, no such determination is possible.

Within this realm then will be found speech ranging from the most sensitive to the most brutal. It is implied that here will be found forms of speech which offend the ear, and it is the fear of a proliferation of these forms which attracts many to the safety and security of the extraordinary forms. This safety is defended on the grounds that the alternative is 'anomie'. Now the significance of my earlier demonstration, that 'anomie' is no more than a 'reality', never a reality, becomes clear. 'Anomie' is the ideological label whereby extraordinary speech defends itself against ordinary speech. I propose, that whilst such speech can indeed guard against the appearance in speech of offensive, even dangerous words, the 'lower' forms of sociality which man has devised for himself, they are equally effective in guarding against the appearance in speech of the 'higher' forms: for they amount to a refusal to address modes of sociality as an issue in speech at all. For 'social order' theory, i.e. transcendentalism, these modes are not addressed because the existing society is held to constitute the best of all possible worlds. For 'natural order' theory, i.e. immanentism, these modes are not addressed because sociality, the orientation to other speakers, is not conceived to be a possibility at all.

The investigation of speech within Mr. Howie's classroom, then, promises to throw open to discussion the ways in which order is talked about as an issue within the conversation so ordered, ways which have been unavailable to talk in the classroom previously portrayed.

"Would you all stop talking, please?"

As in the case of Mr. Lee, I shall present a full theoretical interpretation of Mr. Howie's first conversations, in order to set the scene for a briefer treatment of subsequent exchanges.

The following occurred in my fourteenth week in the school.

"Teacher enters lesson, ten minutes late.

Alistair Munroe: 'Boo! Boo!'

(no one else joins in)

Teacher: 'Right, would you turn to page fourteen PLEASE!'

Cannon: (shouts) 'Where's Barrie?'

Teacher: 'Right, would you all stop talking, please?

Cannon, sit down!'

(no change in overall level of noise)

'Now, just before we went away '

Various boys: (interrupting) 'Are we going away?'

Teacher: (continues ignoring interruption) 'We were talking about sets'

Boys: 'Sex! Sex.'

Teacher: (interrupts uproar) 'Scott, why is your book not covered? And Davis, yours as well!'

Davis: 'I just got it!'

Teacher: 'You didn't just get it today.

The next thing I want to talk about is the intersection of sets!'

Cannon: 'What was that word you used?'

Some explanatory comments may help in setting the scene. Mr. Howie was habitually late for lessons, largely because like other teachers in their first year at the school he was allocated many lessons in the Annexe, a quarter mile from the main school buildings, yet was allotted no time to walk between the buildings. When he arrived late, boys usually hissed or booed. On this occasion, however, Alistair Munroe, an unpopular boy, was not supported in his booing. The point about covering books was a frequent bone of contention between the boys and teachers. A school rule stated that all boys were responsible for providing

paper covers for the books with which they were issued. The rule tended to be enforced only in the case of new books.

What does a descriptive approach reveal about Mr. Howie's way of speaking? As before, I shall look at the 'persons' his words portray, and at the 'context' within which he situated them. For the first, his remarks portray a you, a we, and an I, as well as several named individual boys. How are their characters described in his words? The you, the first to appear, is persistently indefinite: 'would you ... please?' appears twice. So also is the I in the expression 'I want to talk about' the I appears to have an uncertain relationship even to its own future activities. Mr. Howie's we is more definite, but only in a purely descriptive way. Overall, the persons portrayed are far simpler than those portrayed by Mr. Cramond. Consider for example the kind of consciousness which each teacher attributes to his 'persons': those in Mr. Cramond's presentation 'hope', 'think', and 'know', all rather thoughtful activities which permit some subtlety in his definition of the situation. Those in Mr. Howie's conversation, at least that so far reported, mainly simply 'do' things. The I alone is explicitly credited with a thought-process: it 'wants' a certain state of affairs. This term, also employed by Mr. Cramond is not one which accounts intelligibly for the situation to which it refers. The boys are invited to 'talk about the intersection of sets' simply as a 'want' of the I. These wants seem to be the sole basis of any legitimate order to which Mr. Howie appeals.

This interpretation is confirmed when consideration is given to the context within which Mr. Howie's persons are situated. He offers no definition which claims to go beyond the immediate situation and set up an enduring reality. His world involves no external social facts to which the boys could have independent recourse. The only recourse they can have is to the I, more precisely, to the I's wants from

time to time. Yet there is no reason offered why they should do so, and in Mr. Howie's portrayal ('would you ... please?'), it is quite uncertain whether they will. The world portrayed in Mr. Howie's speech, then, is a world in which persons simply behave from moment to moment as they please, a world in which only one person has a clear view of what he wants, namely the I, but that person can offer no reason to the others as to why they should want it.

Thus far, only the speech of the teacher has been considered. According to the analysis, his speech posed a dilemma for the boys in that it involved on the one hand imperatives and other expressions of what the I wanted of the boys, while on the other hand it offered no reason why the boys should conform with those expressions. One way in which the boys responded to this dilemma is exemplified in the sequence quoted. The boys treat his commands as the occasion for conjuring up fantasies as to what his definition might be - booing, 'going away', and 'sex' - all portray vague pictures. But however vague, they have one property in common, namely that they are beyond the pale of whatever definition of a maths lesson Mr. Howie's I might be portrayed as wanting. Their production allows the boys, momentarily, to indulge imaginatively in very different wants. Mr. Howie says nothing to suggest why they should do otherwise. Indeed his way of talking provides for the unlikelihood of their wanting what his I wants.

The 'sociological' viewpoint examines the conversation from the point of view of maintaining, or failing to maintain, social order in the immediate face-to-face setting. It finds the conversation reported above to be 'anomic', i.e. unskilful. Consider now a 'philosophical' approach to the same conversation.

The 'sociological' viewpoint purports to take as its object the concrete conversation as a whole. The 'philosophical' viewpoint, by contrast, explicitly constitutes its own object of enquiry, in this case the language which makes possible the speech of Mr. Howie. This implies that before making any attempt to see the conversation as a whole, Mr. Howie's contribution to it must be first analysed in its own right.

The following is an analysis of the conversation:

[BOO! BOO!]

I

[RIGHT, ((would you turn to page fourteen) please?)]

IIo

[(Where's Barrie?)]

III

[RIGHT, ((would you all stop talking,) please?)]

IVo

[CANNON, (sit down)]

V

[NOW (just before we went away) (Are we going away?)
(we were talking about sets)]

iii

[SEX!. SEX!]

VI

[SCOTT, (why is your book not covered?) AND DAVIES,
(yours as well)]

VII

[(I just got it) (You didn't just get it today)]

VIIIo

[(The next thing I want to talk about is the intersection
of sets).]

IX

[(What was (that word) you used?)]

Mr. Howie's conversation H1*

The analytical equations are:

- H1* = I & II & III & IV & V & VI & VIII & IX (1)
H1*I = i & ii (2a)
H1*II = IIo (2b)
H1*III = i & ii (2c)
H1*IV = IVo (2d)
H1*V = i & ii & iii (2e)
H1*VI = i & ii (2f)
H1*VII = i & ii (2g)
H1*VIII = VIIIo (2h)
H1*IX = i & ii (2i)

Consider now the relations between pictures making up the stanzas. In the case of stanza I, the relation is one of reflection. This does not identify the voice of this stanza however. For the present, note simply that:

$$H1*I = (i)ii$$

In stanza III the relation is again one of reflection, and the wording here is in identical terms to that of stanza I. The words 'right', 'would you', and 'please' are repeated. There is thus a relation between stanzas which resembles that of reverberation between pictures. I propose that this establishes the voice of the you as between these stanzas. Thus it is possible to write:

$$H1*I_{\text{you}} = (i)ii \dots\dots\dots (3a)$$

$$H1*III_{\text{you}} = (i)ii \dots\dots\dots (3c)$$

Stanza V exhibits the familiar technique of reverberation on the word 'we'. This accordingly constitutes a voice of the we:

$$H1*V_{\text{we}} = i.ii.iii \dots\dots\dots (3e)$$

Stanza VI likewise exhibits reverberation on 'your'. I propose that the interrogative mode constitutes a problematic accent of reality, as is found in the you stanzas I and III above, so that this stanza can be identified with the 'you' voice also:

$$H1*VI_{you} = i.ii \dots\dots\dots (3f)$$

Stanza VII exhibits reverberation on the words 'just got it'. The interchange here reported involves the I and the you in separate pictures of VIIi. From the point of view of Mr. Howie's speech, then, this stanza too exhibits the 'earthly' you voice. Then:

$$H1*VII_{you} = i.ii \dots\dots\dots (3g)$$

Finally, stanza IX exhibits overlapping on the words 'that word'. The two pictures may be judged to be of one voice. I propose it is the voice of the you already delineated, with its problematic accent of reality and consequent 'earthly' status. Then:

$$H1*IX_{you} = i.ii \dots\dots\dots (3i)$$

The remaining 'third set' of equations are identical to the corresponding 'second set' equations, with the voices of the respective stanzas still to be determined.

Now consider relations between the stanzas. I have already pointed to a link between stanzas I and III which resembled reverberation in its repetition of words. It is not reverberation however since it does not occur between adjacent pictures, and also it appears to involve repetition of significantly more than the one word usually found binding together the reverberation relation. Accordingly, I consider this to be a new relation, and accordingly name it repetition. As it achieves between stanzas what reverberation achieves between pictures, I employ a similar notation to designate it, namely the colon, thus: ':'.

The unity formed by the two stanzas is then to be written:

$$I_{you} : III_{you}$$

and it will be this unit which plays a part in the overall conversation structure.

Between all other stanzas, I propose, there is a null relation with the exception of stanzas VI and VII, where 'your' in stanza VI resembles 'you' in stanza VII. I propose that this is a second case of repetition. In this case the unity formed by these two stanzas is to be written:

VI_{you} :VII_{you}

and it will be this unit which plays a part in the overall conversation structure.

It is now possible to display this overall structure from the point of view of Mr. Howie's speech.

HI* = I_{you} :III_{you} // IV // V // IV_{you} :VII_{you} // VIII

However the voices of several stanzas remain to be determined. Consider these in turn. Stanza IV comprises the wording, 'Cannon, sit down'. To what voice should this imperative be allocated? Intuitively, the voice of the 'you' in stanzas I and III is very different from the imperative of stanza IV, so much so that an 'existential leap' is experienced at this point in the conversation. Is there any way in which this feeling can be accounted for theoretically?

I propose that the following line of thought provides such a way. In the case of Mr. Cramond's speech, an utterance was encountered which exhibited, I argued, the voices of the I and of the we even though these persons were not portrayed in the concrete appearance of the utterance. The result of this absence was the 'feeling' that the remark was 'hardened'. Theoretically speaking, I proposed that by omitting the I or you, the speaker posed the resulting words as a transcendent reality sui generis. My analysis was apparently confirmed when, in a remark immediately following, the speaker produced both the I and the you in order to address the problematic correspondence between the appearance portrayed by the utterance and the reality of life in the classroom at that point.

Now, is it not possible to propose a precisely parallel phenomenon here? Is it not the case that the 'hardness' of the imperative is explained by the absence from it of any formulation of the accent of reality of the imperative? In this case, the conclusion would have to be reached, that the imperative takes on a transcendent reality of its own. But in this case, such a transcendent reality would not be extra-ordinary in the manner in which either transcendentalist or immanentist realities are extra-ordinary, that is, by laying claim to a reality, be it 'intersubjectivity', 'subjectivity', or whatever which endures the ongoing flux of speech. Rather, it would be a reality specifically intra-ordinary, for its character would rest not on its enduring, but on its immediacy.³

In this case it would be true to say that the imperative exhibits a form of 'transcendancy' specific to the 'immanent' realm of ordinary speech itself. But this argument is not restricted to the imperative. It rather applies to what I have been calling 'restricted code' two and three word pictures per se. Each of these exhibits a specific departure from the structuring of elaborated speech. Elaborated speech, whether of the immanentist 'I', the transcendentalist 'we', or the earthly 'you', builds sense and reference out of the relations between speeches. Restricted speech cuts this short: it offers itself as a reality sui generis.

But this finding has already been anticipated: on the basis of an examination of the speech of Mr. Lee and Mr. Cramond it was possible to postulate two distinct modes of earthly speech: the elaborated speech of the you, and the 'nasty', brutish and short' speech of restricted code. I propose that this distinction can be formulated as the distinction between interiority and exteriority, not simply for an individual speaker, but for speech as a whole. (It is thereby possible to see how Mr. Cramond's use of restricted speech is but an aspect of this relation). I shall indeed propose that, in the absence of a transcendental 'reality' posed in extra-ordinary speech, this distinc-

tion between interiority and exteriority within the 'earthly' realm becomes a crucial organising feature of Mr. Howie's speech.

It follows then in the case of the present imperative it would be wrong to search for the 'voice' of this remark. Rather it should be acknowledged that this remark, along with other restricted contributions, is external to the structure of elaborated speech which is the object of the present examination of the conversation.

I propose to indicate this exteriority in the notation as follows. Single picture stanzas are in any case designated by 'o'. I propose to designate imperatives and other two and three word pictures by 'oo' to indicate they have no place within the grammatical structure itself. In the present case, then, IV = IVoo.

The voice of one other stanza has still to be determined. Stanza VIII is, 'The next think I want to talk about is the intersection of sets'. In the light of the speech of Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee previously considered, there is no difficulty in assimilating this stanza to the voice of the I. In this case, the structure of the elaborated part of Mr. Howie's contribution can now be determined. It is:

$$H1^* = I_{\text{you}} : III_{\text{you}} // V_{\text{we}} // VI_{\text{you}} : VII_{\text{you}} // VIII_{\text{I}} \dots \dots (4)$$

The outcome of the philosophical theoretical investigation is somewhat remarkable: an elegant structure has appeared where from a sociological/descriptive viewpoint only anomie was to be seen. The key features of Mr. Howie's way of speaking are to be seen in this display. They are, (1) that his 'home base' voice is the 'earthly' voice of the you, and that at this level he is able to build structure by his technique of repetition; (2) that from this 'ordinary' language home base, he makes 'extra-ordinary' departures into the familiar realms of the we and the I, but that these are short lived in that they do not build structure, and are rapidly brought down to earth again.

Further clarification arises if, inspired by the structure revealed in the diagram, one returns to the original utterance to search for resemblances between the two extraordinary modes of speech. It is at once observable that repetition is to be found between these, on the words or part-words 'talk about sets'. This suggests a third striking feature of Mr. Howie's talk, namely (3) the extra-ordinary realms of the I and the we, so sharply contrasted in the talk of the previous teachers discussed, here tend to merge into one realm within which the same named theme can be addressed.

But so far I have considered the conversation solely from Mr. Howie's speech. An examination of the boys' speech, conceived as responses to Mr. Howie's speech, provides confirmation of the findings so far. Consider, then, the stanzas and pictures produced by the boys. Cannon's question IIo is a two word picture bearing no relation to the teacher's preceding remark. As such it is exterior to the structure sustained by interior speech. (It is immediately clear that the teacher's 'exterior' imperative is a response to this remark in its own terms, and that thereby a 'restricted' conversation can carry on, as it were, side by side with the elaborated conversation, with little mutual interference.)

The next interruption by the boys is however of more significance. When the teacher mentions, 'before we went away', and a boy asks 'are we going away', he employs reverberation to locate his question within the extraordinary speech which the teacher has inaugurated by his remark. In posing a fantasy ('going away') within that realm, the boy exhibits as fantastic not simply Mr. Howie's remark, but extra-ordinary speech itself. The comparison with Mr. Cramond's treatment of Rialto is direct. When Rialto seriously entered the voice of the we in Mr. Cramond's speech, the teacher jokingly departed that voice and ridiculed Rialto for having entered it. When Mr. Howie seriously enters the voice of the we, a boy jokingly enters that voice and ridiculed Mr. Howie for having entered it.

This recurs in the next interchange when having raised the topic of 'sets', the teacher is faced with boys saying 'sex! sex!'. Once more it is the teacher's entry into the extraordinary voice of the we which is the occasion for the boys' ridicule. At this point he retires, hurt, back to the safety of his familiar you, the 'earthly' realm.

What is involved here? I propose that the teacher having established the 'earthly' mode of speech as his home base, the boys are most reluctant to allow him to depart from this base to impose extra-ordinary order upon them: they skilfully orient to his conversation in order to bring him back to earth.

In stanzas VI and VII a conversation occurs between the teacher and a boy at the earthly level of I/you.

In stanza VIII the teacher employs the voice of the I. I propose that this I is not the immanent I face to face with others but the transcendental I in a world of its own, as seems evidenced by the content of the remark, 'I want to talk about ...' making no mention of other persons. The fact that he here formulates in terms of the I a named theme which he earlier addressed in terms of the we, with a speech in terms of the you intervening, implies that he has been forced to retreat to this position, from the we to the you, then the you to the I, being unable to find a realm within which he could secure the trust in the boys that reality corresponded to appearances. Here too the teacher is at once questioned and called to clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks, that is to say, Cannon's immediate participation in this realm skilfully brings him back down to earth.

Thus contrary to the assumption of Garfinkel and Schutz that every speaker can attain the certitude of the intersubjective 'natural attitude' and contrary to the assumption of the existentialists that the I can attain subjective certainty alone, this teacher is able to attain neither privileged realm in his speech.

This episode is revealing, both as to the way in which the speech of teachers is conceived in particular, and as to the way in which speech itself is conceived within our society in general. For it is striking that when the teacher actually introduces the named topic of the lesson ('the intersection of sets') he does so by recourse to extra-ordinary speech. It is plausible to suggest that this notion has theoreticity for all speakers in the classroom, who conceive extra-ordinary speech to be the way in which teachers are supposed to teach, a necessary pre-requisite of teaching. Insofar as Mr. Howie is unable to achieve this speech, he is unable to teach.

Secondly, the conception is clearly crucial to the comprehension of personal relations in our society. In hoping for an extra-ordinary realm of safety, the teacher only aspires to a dream which is presumably widespread: the dream of a realm of meaning, or more precisely in my terms, of language, in which one will find certainty, and so peace. My argument implies that this dream wherever it recurs is a false one, damaging to the prospects of a genuine dialectic, that is, historical pursuit of rationality through speaking.

But if within Mr. Howie's speech extra-ordinary speech is unattained, what reference to 'reality' is possible in his speech at all? I want now to consider a conversation free of all extraordinariness in order to investigate this question. Contrary to sociological theory, which attributes anomie to situations which lack extra-ordinary order, I shall propose that indeed a 'reality' is discernible within this situation, and that speakers can be seen to be skilfully orienting to that 'reality' by the employment of specific and identifiable techniques. Accordingly, philosophical ethnomethodology can investigate the techniques whereby speakers orient to a sense of 'reality' in a context where the sociological ethnomethodologist can find no methods

whereby speakers summon up what he calls 'intersubjectivity'.

"Get stuffed"

In the middle of the maths lesson, Alan Jones loudly called out to me, to enquire what the time was. The teacher ordered him to leave the room. Jones replied, "Get stuffed". The teacher said, "Leave the room" louder than before. He then unlocked a cupboard, and took out his leather belt, telling Jones to come outside with him. Jones did so. After a short time, the teacher returned, leaving Jones outside. A little later, Jones burst into the room again, saying, "He's calling me names", indicating Gordon Russell. This was plausible, since he could have been watching through the glass window in the door. The teacher said, "Get out, Jones". After some pushing from the teacher, Jones did so, while someone shouted, "Alan, I'll stick up for you, pal". A few minutes later, Jones came in again, strode across the room, and hit Russell lightly. The teacher again said, "Get out, Jones". Jones replied, "Not if he's calling me names. Don't push me", very defiantly, and left the room again.

From a sociological viewpoint, in each of his utterances, the teacher presents an unadorned imperative. No enduring legitimate order is posed within which to make sense of his commands. Jones replies in kind. He responds to the teacher's first order with an expletive, and to subsequent orders with defiance. Since the teacher offered no definition of his position, he was unable to argue with a boy who offered no definition of his. The two confronted one another, with no common ground between their remarks.

From the sociological point of view, then, we find simply anomie in this situation, attributable to a lack of social skill on behalf of the speakers, in particular

the teacher. This conclusion is unacceptable philosophically: let me now show what the philosophical analysis will make of it.

Analysis presents the following result:

Io
 [(Get stuffed)]
 IIo
 [(Leave the room)]
 IIIo
 [(He's calling me names)]
 IVo
 [(Get out)]
 V
 [ALAN (I'll stick up for you) pal] i ii
 VI
 [((Get out) Jones)] i ii
 VIIo
 [NOT IF (he's calling me names)]
 VIIIo
 [(Don't push me)]

Mr. Howie's conversation H2*

I shall treat this conversation in the same way as the previous one, that is, by first providing an analysis specifically of Mr. Howie's part within the conversation, and then consider other contributions as they relate to that part.

The analytical equations are:

- H2* = I & II & III & IV & V & VI & VII & VIII ... (2b)
- I = Io (2a)
- I^I = IIo (2b)
- III = IIIo (2c)
- IV = IVo (2d)
- V = i & ii (2e)
- VI = i & ii (2f)

VII = VIo (2g)
 VIII = VIIIo (2h)

Consider the internal relations of the stanzas. Stanza I exhibits a relation of reflection between its two constituent pictures. My treatment of the name 'Alan' calls for comment. I propose that, intuitively, 'Alan' prefixed to the imperative has no softening effect, by contrast to 'pal' appended to it which does. My intuition finds empirical support in the different words used: 'Alan' is a neutral term of address, whereas 'pal' is an intimate term. The voice of this stanza is then the familiar 'earthly' you:

H2*V = (i)ii (3e)

The same relation precisely is found in stanza VI. Again I propose that the term of address following the imperative softens it by reflecting back upon its accent of reality to call it into question. In this particular case, intuition is supported by another empirical observation. In terms of its content 'get out' serves to deprive Jones of his membership of the classroom setting. By contrast, the appended names 'Jones' serves to reaffirm that membership, confirming that he is addressable in speech. Thus despite the sharp distinction between 'pal' and 'Jones', the softening is achieved in precisely the same fashion in each case.

But what is the voice of stanza VI? Let us refer to it as the 'get' voice, a specifically restricted code. Here I am obliged and able to introduce a subtler distinction in my treatment of restricted speech than was possible earlier because this conversation of Mr. Howie's is almost entirely made up of it. Then:

H2*VI_{get} = (i)ii (3f)

Consider now referential relations between stanzas. As previously, I consider only the teacher's remarks, to

begin with. As between stanza II, 'Leave the room', and stanza IV, 'get out', there is metaphorical reformulation. This however is 'optional' since either stands on its own. As between stanza IVo and stanza IVo, a relation of repetition is found. Accordingly, the conversation as a whole may be represented from Mr. Howie's point of view as follows:

$$H2^* = [II] [IV : VI]$$

Now, what are the voices of these stanzas? The voice of each is restricted by our previous standards. Nonetheless some discrimination is now necessary. I propose to designate that of II by 'leave': it is a three-word picture, and that of IV and VI by 'get', it is a two-word picture. To mark these wordings which seem important I append asterisks, thus: leave***, get**. In this case the structure from Mr. Howie's point of view is:

$$H2^* = [II_{\text{leave***}}] [IV_{\text{get**}} : VI_{\text{get**}}] \dots (4)$$

This equation establishes that within Mr. Howie's ordinary speech, two distinct voices are to be found, namely those of two and those of three word pictures.

Now consider the other contributions to the conversation in this light. It is a straightforward matter to place the first stanza spoken by Jones: this itself exhibits the 'get**' voice. But this stanza comes first in the conversation. The suggestion must now be made that Mr. Howie is inspired by Jones in his use of it. This suggestion emerges from synthesis: for the relation of repetition occurs as between stanza I, spoken by Jones, and stanza IV spoken by Mr. Howie. It appears then that Mr. Howie's technique of repetition is his way of orienting to the speech of others, in an attempt to incorporate their words into his own. But meanwhile consider other relations within the conversation.

Jones' IIIo has no relation to any previous stanza.

But Jones also exhibits the technique of repetition, and repeats this whole stanza at VIIo. But that stanza does not only relate to stanza IIo. It also relates to the teacher's stanza VI. In it is found a familiar relation, that of ungrammatical ellipsis: VIIo presumes the wording of VIIi to complete its reference, but 'Not get out if ...' is ungrammatical, accordingly this does not sustain the voice of stanza VI.

Finally, Jones' stanza VIIIo repeats the wording of his previous stanzas IIIo and VII, on the word 'me'. I propose then that the voice of III, VII, and VIII, is that of 'me'.

Accordingly the conversation structure as a whole can now be displayed:

$$H2^* = [I_{\text{get}^{**}} : IV_{\text{get}^{**}} VI_{\text{get}^{**}}] \begin{matrix} [II_{\text{leave}^{***}}] \\ [+VII_{\text{me}} : III_{\text{me}} : VIII_{\text{me}}] \end{matrix}$$

Remarkably, synthesis shows that from a philosophical point of view this conversation, which appears utterly anomic sociologically, is well formed and indeed in a certain sense exemplifies good speech. I propose that the significance of this speech can be expressed succinctly as follows: in this speech, Jones and Mr. Howie compete to articulate the sense of the transcendent exteriority, the voice of the 'get', in interior terms. For whereas both speakers sustain jointly the restricted two-word 'get' voice, they share nothing when the message of that two-word picture is expressed in more elaborated terms. Thus, a sameness is established between their speeches only in terms of exteriority. In terms of interiority they are quite separated.

It is in this context that the remark of the third contributor to the conversation must be understood. This speaker introduces a new voice not found in the speech of either of the other two participants, namely the 'earthly' I/you voice. Given the rival attempts by the two protagonists to deal with one another, this speaker offers the weight of his interior mode of speech to articulate the speech of Jones.

The orderliness of disorder.

It might be argued that the analysis and synthesis

of the conversation as here presented rests on narrow and formal grounds. Accordingly, I should now like to argue that this interpretation, itself no more than a skeleton, throws such light on questions of content in the conversation that it must be regarded as the indispensable context for any proposed 'content analysis'. It might also be argued that in denying the sociological attribution of anomie to this conversation, I have simply reversed the usual sociological assumptions, and am celebrating nothingness.⁴ In opposition to this suggestion I want to show how my account of what these speakers are saying flows from a critique of the sociological account. Specifically, in ironic critique of ethnomethodology I want to demonstrate the skill with which these speakers exhibit their orientation to 'reality' as I have found it in the conversation. Both of these tasks can be performed by way of reflections upon incidents in the conversation.

The boy responds to the teacher by saying 'Get stuffed'. Sociologically, this remark is viewed as an expletive, and as such as anomic. Note the distinction not drawn here from the sociological point of view, namely whether the remark's anomicity merely exhibits its absence of skill per se or whether on the other hand the remark is specifically generative of anomie, and as such perhaps skilful, even elegant. Sociologically, as in commonsense, I suggest, these two are confounded together: the type of person who would produce an expletive is regarded as the type of person who would speak anomically, i.e. would lack social skills, a 'dope', not a 'theorist'.⁵ Manifestly, such a judgement blinds itself to the skill which may be exhibited in the production of expletives, and in the 'theorising' which such production involves. I propose, indeed, that both are exhibited in the present situation, in the remark by Jones.

The sociological viewpoint treats the expletive as out-with the scope of ordinary discourse, as rudely, unskilfully, revealing the edges of the stable properties of the social world. I want to propose that in the present context the

visibility of those edges was apparent before the production of the expletive. I shall propose that this visibility is a precondition of the production of the expletive, and its correct production in the present context exhibits a skilful orientation to those preconditions on the part of Jones. But before seeking to demonstrate this point, let me point to a paradox in the notion of orderliness which the sociological viewpoint, as I have here portrayed it, exhibits. I propose that insofar as an expletive is recognisable as such by any ordinary (order-ary) speaker, then the production of the expletive must itself be orderly. That is, the production of disorder must itself be an orderly feature. It is for this reason that, philosophically, I am unable to treat 'anomie' at face value: for me, it exhibits that it is other than it says it is,

Consider, then, the present case. Linguistic analysis has clarified the situation. Jones's expletive is indeed an orderly way of showing disorder, i.e. of stepping outside of orderly discourse, and this orderly production of disorder can be seen prior to any judgement as to whether the remark is an expletive or not. Prior to an examination of the content of the remark, that is, its 'orderly disorder' can be seen by inspection of its form. This is given by the fact that this picture resonates with those two-concept pictures spoken by Mr. Cramond which, likewise, specifically stood outside his version of ordered discourse. Such pictures have been seen also in the speech of Mr. Lee, and also in the speech of other boys. These are in every case including Jones' remark here the remarks which, in purporting to deal with disorder, in fact constitute 'disorder' within their speech, that is, produce the reality to which they purport to be reacting.⁶

It is now becoming clear that, within the 'earthly' realm to which speech is confined by a speaker such as Mr. Howie, 'disorderly' speech has precisely the same organising role to play as 'extra-ordinary' speech plays within the talk of the previous teachers whom I have considered. The linguistic phenomenological approach treats each of these

productions of a reference to reality external to speech in precisely the same way. It treats them as a reference to 'reality' in speech brought about by identifiable techniques, and these techniques are the reality which is the object of the linguistic phenomenological enquiry.

I have suggested that the technique for distinguishing between 'orderly' and 'disorderly' speech is the one acknowledged by Bernstein as between 'restricted' and 'elaborated' linguistic codes. However, to make use of this distinction it is necessary to remove it from the context to which he restricted it, and place it in another. I propose that this distinction is a precise one between two grammatical forms which are available to all speakers.⁷

Bernstein distinguishes his concepts as 'context-free' speech (elaborated) versus 'context-bound' speech (restricted). However, for me this identification is misleading, and in fact exhibits a refusal to appreciate 'restricted' speech in its own terms, i.e. to understand the skilfulness which it exhibits, a rival version of skilfulness to that of 'elaborated' speech. Consider the present case. The boy's first word is 'get'. This is a term of remarkably general application in our language, capable of a multiplicity of uses in a multiplicity of contexts (and by a multiplicity of speakers). His second word, 'stuffed', is not in itself common, but the two words taken together form a well-known phrase, a cliché itself of very wide application. This is immediately suggestive. It might be said that this mode of speech is a mode which can be spoken by anyone. More accurately, it is a mode of speech which aspires to be speakable by anyone: this aspiration is its standard of artistry. By contrast, as has been seen in the case of the speech of Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee, it is plain that elaborated speech aspires to individual uniqueness of expression: this, then, is its very different artistic standard. But of these two then it is the 'restricted' code exemplified by Jones' remark which is context free.

In what sense is this speech, as I have argued, specifically outside ordinary (order-ary) discourse? I propose that to understand this requires a fuller understanding of what ordinary discourse is. Suppose that ordinary discourse is an interchange between speakers each of whom expresses himself in 'elaborated' speech, thereby revealing to the other the uniqueness of his own particular vision of the world. In this case, each speaker poses a philosophical problem for the other, insofar as the speech of the other exhibits a different appearance from that which the world presents to himself. Accordingly, such discourse is a remarkably demanding kind of speech, and at the same time a remarkably exposing kind of speech. In this sense it exhibits speech as speech. By contrast, the restricted speech we are now considering is remarkably undemanding and unexposing in this philosophical sense. That is, the speaker's whole skill is devoted to dissolving his individual uniqueness into a formula acceptable to all. In this sense it exhibits speech as non-speech, speech refusing to reveal itself as the speech of a speaker. It is speech which strives to disclaim a philosophical commitment, to refuse to expose itself to the extent of revealing its criteria of legitimacy. It aspires to be absolute speech.

But to dismiss it as anomic, is precisely to accept its claim to be absolute and so to exhibit absoluteness, and so philosophical silence.⁸ There would be no better way to appreciate Jones' speech than to be stunned to silence by his obscenity. Rather, to criticise its claim to silence is to hear it not as silence but as speech.

I propose now to examine the phrase 'Get stuffed' on this basis. It is an imperative, but first consider the infinitive form of the verb. Its richness immediately escapes beyond one's grasp in all directions. 'Stuffing' refers to sexual intercourse. A stuffs B is a way of referring to a male A having intercourse with a female B.

To begin with, the term 'stuff' has a prior meaning of 'to fill' as in 'to stuff a cushion' or 'to stuff an animal'. The conception of sex as 'stuffing' is derived from this. Secondly, the concept of 'stuffing' is a male chauvinist way of referring to sex, in that it literally implies an active agent who does the stuffing, and an inanimate entity (or corpse) which is stuffed. Thirdly, by extension, presumably, the notion A stuffs B could refer to a male B, if B were the recipient of homosexual intercourse from a male A. This account is clearly preliminary, referring only to the most obvious associations of the word. A fuller account would systematically examine other usages both in the present and in the history of the term and its etymological derivatives.

In a word, the boy's remark is magical. Its content, like its form, is external to the ongoing discourse - one might say, interpretively, it aspires to be as far removed as possible from that discourse. Intriguingly, whereas the teacher's imperative, whose wording is unfortunately not available, purported to remove the boy from sight, the boy's imperative purports to place the teacher on display. I propose that in this sense the boy's oath constitutes itself as equal and opposite to the teacher's imperative. But in this case, the significance of the boy's remark can be plainly seen. His expletive mimicks the teacher's imperative. It exhibits this sense: that the teacher's imperative is worth no more than the boy's expletive: that they are on a common footing.

I propose that this sense of Jones's expletive is not one which can simply be 'appreciated': it is one which must be affirmed. Within the standards of skilfulness appropriate to restricted code speech, this is a skilfully, that is, appropriately produced utterance. The teacher's imperative purports to remove the boy physically from the classroom. In terms of speech, the teacher speaking within the elaborated interior of his way of speaking purports to remove

Jones to the exterior, to make him disappear.

The teacher purports to speak to the boy so to remove him from speech. Such a speech is contradictory; it depends for its intelligibility on the implied membership of the boy within the community of speakers, yet overtly it excludes him from such membership. Within everyday speech the technique for handling this contradiction is the employment of speech which purports to be non-speech, namely restricted speech. Such speech is the speech which, in purporting to speak of anomie, itself exhibits the reality of anomie. That reality is not nothingness, but the reality of restricted speech which lies outside elaborated speech. Jones's expletive exhibits precisely that there is such a discourse lying outside the elaborated discourse of classroom speech, and that if Mr. Howie consigns him, Jones, to that discourse then he must face the implication. This is, that by revealing that other discourse, Mr. Howie renders himself liable to be redefined within its terms.

Thus Jones's remark portrays a claimed sameness between his speech and that of the teacher (both are magical), but exhibits a real difference (two different modes of speech). By contrast, as will now be seen, the teacher's reply portrays a claimed difference (two different modes of speech), but exhibits a real sameness (the same structure underlies both).⁹

Whereas the words of Jones's remarks are, separately and taken together, capable of conveying indefinitely many meanings, the words of the teacher's response are by contrast highly specific. 'Leave' specifies a familiar practical action, eminently possible within the present setting. 'The room' likewise specifies a familiar practical setting which is again quite unambiguous. 'Leaving the room' is an action which each person present routinely enacts at the end of every lesson throughout every school day. Thus 'leaving the room' is a notion which is acknowledged as having theoreticity in McHugh's sense: that is, it must analytically be intelligible and practicable to everyone present. The 'place' to which Jones is consigned by the

instruction is thus a place known and familiar to everyone and openly acknowledged to be so known and familiar. By contrast, the 'place' to which Jones consigned Mr. Howie is one which only some present would admit to knowing by referring to it in their speech. Thus a paradox appears: although really, I propose, restricted speech, e.g. the expletive, has theoreticity in that anyone could say it, apparently, in the sociological attitude, it is elaborated speech alone which has a theoretical part to play.

Sociological speech is thus blind to the philosophical character of restricted speech. It labels such speech 'anomic', and looks to elaborated speech for protection from it. Here, everyone knows that the 'place' Jones refers to is not a place in the teacher's world: in this sense the teacher's world protects them from it. They know that it is a terrible place, and that even the mention of its existence may cause the structure of 'elaborated' speech to shudder. The restraint of the teacher's reply comfortingly reaffirms the continued existence of the familiar world of the classroom: Jones' bluff is called. Just as his remark mimicked the teacher's and asserted its mere magicality, so now the teacher's remark implies the magicality of Jones': it exhibits that he has not 'got stuffed', and the world is unchanged by Jones' curse. What is more, as is appropriate in the way in which content echoes form, Mr. Howie's remark will have longer lasting effects - indeed, until further notice, Jones will have 'left the room' (further notice which Jones later gives) - whereas, a moment after it has been uttered, Jones' curse has dissolved into nothing. Thus in uttering the curse he is revealed to have enjoyed the merely ephemeral, momentary entertainment of a fantasy with no substance. As against this, the teacher has merely to reassert the serious, because substantial, basis of his own position.

The teacher's 'leave the room' remark shows that Jones' speech, which appeared to challenge the teacher's elaborated


social order, has done nothing of the kind. Rather, insofar as the teacher sought in his remark to exclude the boy physically from the room, and the boy's response itself asserted a position in speech metaphysically excluded from that of the classroom regime, Jones' remark can be seen retrospectively to have wholly supported the teacher's definition of the situation.

On his return to the classroom setting, Jones himself employs elaborated speech. He here portrays persons. These persons are engaged in intelligible activity: 'calling names' is an activity which one person can routinely do to another within our society. It may be said at once that 'leaving' the room is likewise an intelligible activity. However, drawing from Max Weber's well-known distinction,¹⁰ I propose that 'leaving' is a mere action involving per se no orientation to other persons. (Manifestly any concrete act of 'leaving', as the one which occurred here, will necessarily involve such an orientation - but so will any action concretely). By contrast, 'calling names' is a social action per se. It may be hypothesised that whereas mere actions can be portrayed in 'restricted' code speech, social action can only be formulated in 'elaborated' terms. In this case, we grasp a deeper significance of Jones' remark. Insofar as in his speech he portrays the unnamed boy as 'calling him names' he portrays that within the 'elaborated' classroom regime from which he was excluded, social action involving himself was already taking place. Jones, in his speech, portrays that he as an object for speech is already involved in, that is, interior to, the classroom regime, prior to his physical return to the interiority of the classroom from outside.

Thus once again Jones' remark, far from being 'anomic', exhibits its skilful orientation to the ongoing sensibility of the social situation, and in particular, to speech as it

is practised in this setting. So the conversation continues.

I propose that the 'philosophical' analysis has improved upon the sociological analysis in numerous ways. Most crucially, it has shown that the sociological attribution of 'anomie' as the absence of order, an attribution which I have shown is as much a part of 'sociological' ethnomethodology as it is of social order theory in sociology, is inadequate. More precisely the notion of anomie in this formulation is a vision of that state of nature which rears its head insofar as the state of civil society is not sustained in being. My analysis locates the existence of such a state of nature in the restricted modes of speech which purport to deal with, and so produce disorder. The relation between order and speech can thus be represented on the diagram earlier presented, in the following way:



The ongoing relation between 'restricted' and 'elaborated', 'exterior' and 'interior' speech then amounts to the ongoing resolution of the problem of social order within ordinary (order-ary) language.

Ironic speech

If restricted code expletives posed no challenge to the teacher's restricted code imperatives, was there any speech which did raise deeper issues for Mr. Howie's way of talking? I propose that indeed there was. Consider the following conversation which I present already analysed.

Io

Jones: [SIR (is this school going on strike? ?)]

IIo

Mr. Howie: [(They might)]

(Class break out into cheering and pandemonium)

IIIo

Jones: [(When are you going on strike?)]

IVo

Howie: [(I'm not ⁱgoing on strike) (I'm only ⁱⁱgoing to talk
about maths)]

Vo

Mears: [SIR (this is about maths))]

VIo

[(When are we going to get the maths exam?)]

Mr. Howie's conversation H3*

This conversation is structured in the form of a chain of reverberating/repeating pairs of pictures. Accordingly, I have broken it down into one possible set of stanzas, and will discuss further possibilities in the course of the analysis.

It is clear that all stanzas making up this utterance are single picture stanzas with the exception of stanza IV which is composed of two pictures bound together by reverberation and thereby constituting the voice of the I. Accordingly, the structure of this stanza is:

$$IV_I = i.ii \dots\dots\dots (2d)$$

The other equations are straightforward and need not be written out.

Now consider the relations between stanzas. Stanza II metaphorically reformulates stanza I and is so dependent upon it. Repetition joins stanzas Io and IIIo and picture IVi on the words 'going on strike'. Repetition joins picture IVii and stanza Vo, on the words 'about maths'. The relation between stanzas Vo and VIo is not one of repetition, however, despite the appearance of the word 'maths' in each.

It is a noun in the first and an adjective in the second. The relation here is one of metaphorical reformulation: 'this' in stanza Vo refers to stanza VIo as a whole and thereby renders stanza Vo dependent on stanza VIo.

Accordingly, the structure of the conversation as a whole is:

$$H3^* = II [I : III : IV_I : V [VI_{we}]]$$

In this equation, several stanzas do not have voices assigned. But the structure as synthesised is itself suggestive as to the identification of these voices. I propose that the chain of stanzas I, III, IV, V unambiguously belongs to the 'earthly' I/you voice. Stanza IIo is separate from the others, but its structure is familiar. It is a two-picture 'restricted' picture. Its voice is uncertain but may be tentatively designated 'they**'. In this case, the structure of the conversation can be explicated:

$$H3^* = II_{they^{**}} [I_{I/you} : III_{I/you} : IV_{I/you} : V_{I/you} [VI_{we}]] \dots (4)$$

Thus the conversation as a whole exhibits a clear structure. The voice of the we transcends the earthly 'elaborated' I/you voice which transcends the earthly 'restricted' two-picture voice. But now, consider what part within this structure is played by Mr. Howie, and what part is played by the boys.

In the structure as here synthesised, only stanzas II and IV are spoken by the teacher. Stanza I, which first inaugurates the I/you voice, and stanza VI, which shifts to the voice of the we, are both spoken by boys.

Jones opens the conversation, thereby constituting an 'earthly' discursive voice. But Mr. Howie is reluctant to enter this voice. His 'restricted' speech exhibits an initial refusal to do so, a preference for the exteriority

of 'silence'. This judgement in terms of the form of his speech receives confirmation in terms of the content. It exemplifies exteriority literally, for whereas Jones' remark is phrased in terms of the here and now ('this school'), the teacher's 'they' distances the topic from the persons and place present at hand. The teacher's word 'might' is also characteristic of 'restricted' vocabulary: it contributes no information in answer to the question, for 'might' implies equally well 'might not'.

Nonetheless this sends the class into raptures. I propose that in their cheering the boys skilfully orient to the state of the conversation at this point, viz. their cheering exhibits participation in a reality far removed from that of the classroom. It is Mr. Howie who has already constituted this reality as such by the form and content of his previous remark.¹¹

Jones' next question, directly challenges the teacher's exteriorising of the conversation: it impinges on the interior of his speech both in terms of form (elaborated) and content (you). Now the teacher takes up the theme: but it is Jones' remark which has made possible for him the reference to the 'I': this is only Mr. Howie's name for the 'you' which first made its appearance in Jones' speech. It may be suggested that at this point the teacher finds himself speaking with the voice of the I, which was provided for him by Jones, and endeavours to build on this to establish a safe immanentist home base for himself: his answer to Jones' question goes beyond that question and establishes a timeless enduring reality. But immediately Mears employs repetition twice in order to leave behind the immanentist I and shift first to the 'earthly' realm pure and simple ('this is about maths') and thence to the voice of the we where his question demands that the teacher follow him. The method by which he does so is of some interest.

In his speech, Mears employs a way of speaking not previously encountered. He enters into the precise wording employed by Mr. Howie, namely 'about maths'. This wording he formulates in a stanza on its own, a stanza specifically 'earthly' in its formulation of the here and now, by contrast to the immanentist tendency heard within Mr. Howie's stanza, 'I'm (not) going to'. He employs this formulation as a bridge to introduce his own wording, in terms of the we. Thus, unlike either Mr. Howie or Jones, Mears here speaks in words other than his own, and is not thereby taken over by them, but demonstrates a flexible ability to enter into and take over the discourse of another voice.

In his speech, I propose, Mears exhibits irony, that is, a preparedness to enter into the voice of another, in order to draw out its own tendencies and to learn from it. To do so he must make a distinction within his speech, between appearance and reality, in a way different from that employed by any of the three teachers whom I have considered. Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee do make such a distinction. But within their speech, the ability to entertain divergent appearances is entirely curtailed by their prior commitment to formulating the reality to which they relate those appearances always in the same words. Their speech, in short, is serious speech about reality. Mr. Howie does not make such a distinction. His speech, however, is serious speech about appearance. As a result he becomes trapped by the speech of others which impinges upon him. Thus Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee are transcendentalists whilst Mr. Howie is an immanentist in my terms, that is to say not in terms of consciousness but in terms of speech.

Mears' way of speaking exhibits an alternative to any of these. Mears exhibits the indexicality of speech, that is, the problematic relation between appearance and reality, in such a way as to exhibit the failure of the teacher's attempted recourse to the immanentist I. The teacher's

'I'm only going to talk about maths' was, I propose, an intended declaration of the beginning of the lesson: as I have earlier argued, teaching itself is conceived to be conducted within a context of extraordinary speech. The word 'only' here was, I suggest, an attempted exhibition of the certainty of this realm, as compared with the flux of ordinary speech. Mears' remark ironically shattered that illusion: his irony was directed against extra-ordinary speech itself. In employing the indexicality of the teacher's remark to turn it against itself, Mears exhibits that the attempted escape from ordinary speech is illusory: that speech is by its nature problematic and to be addressed as such. Ironic speech is the way in which extra-ordinary speech is addressed as down-to-earth speech. Mears speaks of the reality of 'about maths' not seriously but in order to exhibit its character as 'reality', that is, as speech.

Another instance of ironic speech employs a similar device. Consider this conversation, involving John Johnson.

I_o

Mr. Howie: [JOHNSON (ⁱ can you do this?))]

Johnson: [(I ⁱ ken that) ^{II} but (I ⁱⁱ dinnae ken (how to do it ⁱⁱⁱ (the way) you do it))]

Mr. Howie [((ⁱ How do you do it,) ^{III} then?) ⁱⁱ]

(Johnson does it, missing out a whole line of the teacher's argument).

IV

Mr. Howie: [ALRIGHT BUT (there's ⁱ still (a number of people) ⁱⁱ who can't do that)]

Mr. Howie's conversation H4*

It is possible to dispense with a complete interpretation of this conversation provided that certain practical judgements are made. I propose that the teacher's stanzas

I and III formulate the problematic 'earthly' voice of the you. Less certainly, stanza IV apparently perpetuates this 'earthly' mode. In stanza II, Johnson sustains an I voice reflecting on the problematic you voice, thus:

$$H4^*II_{I(\text{you})} = i.ii(iii/iv) \dots\dots\dots (3b)$$

There is repetition linking stanza Io, picture IIiv, and stanza III. Accordingly, the structure of the conversation as a whole is:

$$H4^* = II_I (I_{\text{you}} : II_{\text{you}} : III_{\text{you}} : IV_{\text{you}}) \dots (4)$$

Here, then, Johnson introduces the appearance/reality distinction neglected by Mr. Howie by employing the technique of reflection, a familiar form of speech for Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee, but seemingly one unavailable to Mr. Howie. It enables Johnson to ironically enter into the teacher's words, namely 'you do', which he repeats, and to shift to his own words ('I ken that') while retaining a relation to those with which he began.

The teacher's question was originally posed as being self-sufficient, complete in its own right. Johnson's reply questions the question: it distinguishes between the question, which refers to 'the way you do it' and Johnson's answer, which refers to the way he does it. Thus for Johnson, the relation between appearance and reality, between one person's speech and another's, is an issue in speech. It is not so for Mr. Howie. He does not take up the question of the gap between the two, between the intelligibility of his way, and that of Johnson's way. Instead, he simply takes Johnson's way, once it has been demonstrated, as another way of doing it.

Though I have criticised their ways of doing so, both Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee were able to sustain in one voice (reality) a single version of the order, social or natural,

which they shared with the boys, despite the fact that the boys spoke with many voices (appearances).¹³ Mr. Howie, by failing to acknowledge the appearance/reality distinction in his speech was unable to do so. The boys themselves, addressed this problem of order in their classroom speech with Mr. Howie and with one another, whereas they had no occasion to do so in their classroom speech with Mr. Cramond or Mr. Lee. I shall examine briefly how they did so.

"Shut up"

The examples I have in mind are in fact very simple ones. One fairly obvious method of 'assisting' the teacher to maintain order was to direct imperatives as unelaborated as his own, to other boys one disliked. For example Russell would shout "Munroe, shut up!". Mears nicely captured the hypocrisy of his position on one such occasion by commenting, "Russy shut up, and dinnae shout!" Here both Russell and Mears speak in what is 'objectively' 'restricted' talk. But this 'objective' judgement does not capture the point of Mears' comment. Mears, once again, speaks ironically in a voice not his own. He enters into the voice seriously spoken by Russell as reality, and instead exhibits it as 'reality'. He does so by showing that Russell's 'shut up' imperative is itself the occasion for a 'shut up' imperative, which is only to say that the ascription of anomie is itself anomic i.e. that the speech which purports to deal with disorder is itself disorderly.

Russell, in the remark quoted, spoke his imperative seriously, i.e. as reality. Consider by contrast another imperative directed at boystalking in the maths lesson. Mentone asserted himself over a group of such boys, saying, in a remark which I present already analysed,

I

[((Shut up) the lot of you)]

II

[OR (you'll get a kicking)]

I propose that just as the relation between Russell's speech and Mears' irony was one of reality to 'reality', so is the relation between Mentone's stanza II and his stanza III. That is, stanza III specifically exhibits that stanza II was not formulating a matter external to speech (external to the I which, I have argued, 'spoke' it) as it itself purported to do (the I was absent), but was itself speech, the speech of the I who appears explicitly in stanza III.

To put this in simpler and more familiar terms, having asserted the transcendentalist extra-ordinary I in stanza II, Mentone employed irony to bring his own extra-ordinary speech down to earth in stanza III. Here a direct contrast can be made with the defended speech which was exhibited in the very first utterance which I considered, and which has a formal similarity with the ironic technique. Defended speech, with its 'mandatory' metaphorical reference from extra-ordinary speech to ordinary speech, slavishly establishes the dependence of problematic earth upon the certainties established in heaven or hell. Ironic speech, with its 'optional' metaphorical relation between ordinary and extra-ordinary speech, joyfully exhibits the confidence of 'earthly' speech to speak as extra-ordinary speech does, and thereby liberates itself from servitude.¹⁵

There is no better way of re-establishing this contrast than by comparing Mentone's 'ironic' extra-ordinary support for Mr. Howie's ordinary speech with the 'serious' extra-ordinary support given to the maths master by Mr. Cramond, after a particularly rowdy maths lesson had reached his attention. He told the boys:

"It's been brought to my notice that some boys have been having a jolly good time in the maths class ... If there are any more complaints, you'll be brought down here for one or two little jobs like cleaning the lavatories. If you don't settle down and realise that you need two basic subjects, Maths and English,

for S.C.E., then you'll be brought right down here".

(The reference to "S.C.E." here is to a Scottish Certificate of Education examination somewhat equivalent to the English 'C.S.E.', Certificate of Secondary Education).

Like Menton's stanza II, this statement affirms the 'hellish' natural order within which the you is situated, and like that stanza this statement portrays no I or other speaker. Like Mentone's stanza III ('you think I'm kidding'), but unlike those of Mr. Howie, his speech makes intelligible the present appearance of things ('some boys have been having a jolly good time in the maths class'), but affirms that this is not the underlying reality. But in Mr. Cramond's remark, unlike that of Mentone, there is no possible ambiguity as to the relative significance of the formulation of the extraordinary reality, and that of the ordinary appearance. In Mr. Cramond's remark here, the 'good time' of some boys is false, whereas the 'need' of the you is true.

It remains true that in Mr. Howie's classroom, the boys were themselves able to address the issue of social order more persistently than was possible in other teachers' lessons. I should like to conclude by considering one conversation between Mr. Howie and the boys, on this question.

"Why don't you get a bit of order in the class?"

Presumably the obvious question to put to Mr. Howie was put to him by Russell:

Russell: [ⁱ (Why don't (you) get a bit of order in the class?)ⁱⁱ]

Mr. Howie: [ⁱ (How do you suggest (I do that?))ⁱⁱ]

IIIo

Russell: [(Kick them)]

IVo

[AND (Lash them)]

Vo

[AND (punch them in the face)]

VIo

Mentone: [(Get your lash out)]

Mr. Howie i
 (very fiercely): [RIGHT, IF (I see (you out of your seat ii
again)) (I'll belt you)) iii

Johnson: [(How do you have to do (what) i Russell tells you?) VIII ii]

Mentone: [(I told him too)]

The paradox involved in this conversation goes beyond a joke. How is it possible for one speaker to impose order on all others present in speech? I suggest that Mr. Howie's failure to do so stems from his reluctance to grant himself that special position taken up by Mr. Cramond or by Mr. Lee, which in either case involves the teacher distancing himself from the pupils by setting up an extra-ordinary discourse over and above the ordinary one within which they are situated. Mr. Howie, I propose, genuinely desires to speak with the boys: in this sense he is democratic, even egalitarian in spirit, though in a way which he has not articulated. Despite his failure, I believe that there is more prospect of a rational mode of speech arising in and out of his way of speaking to the boys, than there is in and out of the ways of speaking adopted by Mr. Cramond or Mr. Lee. How could such a mode of rationality arise, superior to either of these two modes, from within Mr. Howie's way of talking? This is the question asked of Mr. Howie by Russell.

What is striking in the discussion, here reported, is that, although this conversation itself exhibits a responsive interchange between speakers, conducted in 'elaborated' speech at the 'earthly' level, every speaker presumes that once a form of order is agreed upon, it will involve a departure from this mode. But the word 'presumes' is too weak here. This is not a matter of 'conscious' presumptions. It is rather a matter of linguistic practises. To reformulate the

matter, every speaker himself departs from elaborated speech at the earthly level in order to exhibit his version of order.

The first to do so is Russell. In answer to Mr. Howie's question "How do you suggest I do that?", Russell exhibits an answer to the question rather than speaking about an answer. 'Kick them', 'lash them', 'punch them' are specifically 'restricted' two-word single picture stanzas which mark a departure from the 'elaborated' discourse to 'disorderly' speech. Mentone's remark likewise, with its vocabulary of 'get' and 'out' which as has been seen are characteristically 'restricted' words, perpetuates this mode of speech. The teacher then adopts another tack. Unusually for him, he launches into an immanentist I(you) voice with the familiar property for this realm that the I itself becomes trapped by the impersonal logic summoned up in speech. (Compare Mr. Lee's utterance L3*, "I hope I'm not going to have to start on you"). Johnson at once employs ironic optional metaphor to bring the discourse back down to earth. In so doing he in fact calls into question the order within which Mr. Howie himself spoke his remark. Mentone sustains this theme, in doing so asserting his own preferred voice of the I. Order is no nearer being finally established so that speech can continue within its context: it remains an issue for speech.

Rationality

What is absent from all these conceptions is a notion of order as a rational synthesis of divergent speeches, a synthesis which could be persuasive of all because genuinely emergent out of the speech of all. Yet such a synthesis is in progress within the speech. I want to propose, that in their discussion of social order these speakers exhibit an orientation to order which transcends their explicit grasp of that orientation in words. The paradox which arises here arises identically for Hobbes. Hobbes proposed a once-for-all solution to this problem. I should prefer to propose that solving this problem is the ongoing work of speakers

within society. My turn of phrase here plainly echoes and is indebted to Garfinkel.¹⁶ But in contrast to Garfinkel's view, I propose that the problem which speakers are engaged in solving is not the problem of sustaining the appearance on earth of a transcendent heavenly reality called 'social order'. I propose it is rather one of achieving the transition from the state of nature to the state of civil society here on earth. The means to effect this transition are, I propose, already at our disposal, only we do not acknowledge them.

Hobbes's paradox is, that the discourse possible at the actual moment of adopting the social contract, itself momentarily exhibits a rationality superior to any discourse possible either before, in the reified state of nature, or after, in the reified state of civil society. I propose that those speakers who abjure the utopian solutions of 'heaven' and 'hell', 'social order' or 'natural order', find themselves perpetually engaged in making the transition from the state of nature to the state of civil society. For me this work is the reality of which 'natural order' and 'social order' respectively present the reified appearance. Parsons has pointed out that Hobbes' solution to the problem of social order involves the attribution of a 'higher' form of rationality than he considers justified:

This solution really involves stretching, at a critical point, the conception of rationality beyond its scope in the rest of the theory, to the point where the actors come to realise the situation as a whole instead of pursuing their own ends in terms of their immediate situation, and then take the action necessary to eliminate force and fraud, and, purchasing security at the sacrifice of the advantages to be gained by their future employment.¹⁷

The appearance of life in Mr. Howie's classroom might seem to support this pessimism. The speakers who strive for this rationality, notably Mr. Howie and the boys in his classroom, indefinitely defer agreement as to the contract.

They pose themselves perpetually at the point of transition from state of nature to state of civil society, perpetually on the brink between exteriority and interiority. In this they stand in direct contrast to speakers such as Mr. Lee who, unambiguously, situate themselves within the state of nature, or speakers such as Mr. Cramond who unambiguously situate themselves in the state of social order. But for me, they are more genuinely rational in their ongoing decision to do so. For, despite its greater 'rationality' in an instrumental sense, the regime imposed by either Mr. Cramond or Mr. Lee is a denial of the possibility of meaningful discourse involving more than one speaker. Without holding out any solution to this problem, Mr. Howie's discourse reveals constantly that this problem exists.

As against Parsons' sociological pessimism, I propose that a linguistic phenomenology inspired by Husserl's philosophy must be committed to the view, which he articulated, that men are indeed capable of exhibiting such a 'higher' rationality. It follows from the logic of my argument thus far that a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the attainment of such a rationality is that the constraints of 'transcendent' social and natural order be lifted from them. Husserl's critique of the everyday attitude has been my source in an attempt to overcome these constraints. Does he himself, then, exhibit this 'higher' rationality?

Chapter Eight

THE EVERYDAYNESS OF HUSSERL'S TWO PHENOMENOLOGIES

The Language of Phenomenology

The linguistic phenomenology which I have practised following the writings of Husserl has had some success in pinpointing the alienating gap between two antagonistic theological conceptions of 'reality' which besets contemporary **everyday** speech. But though I have not given their language such close consideration as everyday speech I have argued that this gap determines identically the writings of phenomenologists, ethnomethodologists, and existentialists themselves. It is now necessary to ground this argument more rigorously. This is made possible by the developed linguistic phenomenological method. I propose therefore that the writings of the phenomenologists previously taken as a resource, now be opened to investigation as a topic of linguistic phenomenological enquiry.¹

Husserl developed his phenomenology specifically against what he regarded as the hegemony of commonsense (the 'natural' attitude) in existing science and philosophy. He posed his

two phenomenological reductions as radical departures, previously unexplored, whereby a new and certain basis for knowledge could be achieved. Yet I have suggested that his two reductions correspond precisely to two modes of speech which are of daily occurrence in everyday life in an ordinary secondary school. How can this be accounted for? My proposal is, that far from having invested any radical new departure, Husserl's achievement was to explore rigorously and explicitly realms of meaning which were already available within the 'natural' attitude, or more precisely, within ordinary language.

I am proposing that Husserl's phenomenologies, so far from being remote from everyday life, are themselves everyday in character. But have I not argued that these reductions, and the modes of speech resembling them which I discovered in the classroom setting, were extra-ordinary? I have indeed. My proposal is that Husserl's reductions are extra-ordinary but everyday. It is necessary to clarify this distinction.

Up to now this distinction has scarcely been acknowledged: the assumption has been made that everyday language is ordinary language, and that languages of non-everyday settings, such as those of sociology, psychology, or phenomenology, were by the same token extra-ordinary. In contrast, I should like to propose that the distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary language is to be found in any setting, whether 'everyday' or otherwise, and that this being the case, the distinction between 'everyday' and other settings is a relatively unimportant one.

I should like to illustrate this proposal by turning now to investigate a case of language far removed from the everyday setting, yet crucial to the argument which I have been developing, namely Husserl's phenomenological writings, and in particular the three texts which I earlier discussed. If I can show that within these texts, the distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary language is made in

precisely the same way as in the classroom of 2D1, then I shall have established a plausible case for my argument. This will imply at the very least that Husserl's language and everyday language are not qualitatively different from one another. But there is another more powerful implication.

Husserl claims that his texts exhibit a presuppositionless account of conscious experience, both descriptive and theoretical. Whilst it is fashionable to be sceptical about such a claim, it is not a simple task to give an account of the presuppositions which he may exhibit.² I propose a way in which such presuppositions may be identified. If it is the case, as I have argued in the context of classroom conversations, that the structure of our language implies a limited range of metaphysical positions open to speakers (or writers) of that language, then it will follow that any speaker of this language will exhibit those metaphysical positions. But it might be expected that a writer who specifically laid claim to the ideal of presuppositionlessness would exhibit these positions more plainly than most, for the reason that he would have eliminated from his speech all the more concrete aims and aspirations.

This is indeed the hypothesis which I propose in the case of Husserl. If my conception is correct, then Husserl may be praised for the clarity with which he has exemplified existing metaphysical choices, even if his claim that they are the only possible ones be rejected.

The mode of investigation which I propose to employ to examine the character of Husserl's writing is that of the linguistic phenomenology which I have developed. But is this not a redundant enquiry, in view of the fact that I have already presented a reading of that writing as a prelude to the present argument? Clarification of this point will greatly clarify the proposal which I am making. The reading of Husserl which I presented in chapter one like those of Schutz, Sartre, Garfinkel, and Laing in chapters

two and three, was not a linguistic phenomenological analysis. What kind of analysis was it then? I propose it was necessarily descriptive rather than theoretical, appreciative rather than critical, sociological rather than philosophical, that in short, it read the texts concerned under the assumption of intersubjectivity. Each of these is but an aspect of another definitive property of that reading: it read the texts as if they wrote about a reality external to the language in which the texts were written. The name of that reality, in the case of Husserl, was consciousness.

It is clear how the new reading will differ from the old. Rather than being read as writing about a reality outside language, Husserl will be read as writing a 'reality' in language. Rather than reading the text as the speech of a single unproblematic subject, the text will be read as the product of diverse voices within the text which may conflict with one another. The second reading will be critical, philosophical, and theoretical.

But the question arises, which of the two will be the better reading? In answering this question, I am not appealing to some absolute standard. Rather, I should like to appeal to a highly specific one. Which reading will be truer to the spirit of Husserl's phenomenology itself? It will not be possible to answer this question until after the enquiry is complete, but nonetheless the nature of the question may be clarified. The question asks which comes first, consciousness or language? Up to now I have not attempted to answer this question. To be sure I have myself taken the view that language comes first, and that 'consciousness' is only a 'reality' for language. But I have assumed that this was my choice. In making it, I elected to borrow the concepts which Husserl developed for the description of consciousness, and apply them to language. But now a more rigorous argument suggests itself. What if it could be shown, that these concepts were linguistic

concepts from the outset, and that in that sense 'consciousness' was demonstrably no more than a linguistic construct? Such a demonstration would have to be made against those who purport to speak of and for consciousness, of whom Husserl is a key example.

Accordingly, I shall now explore the consequences of reading Husserl linguistically. This reading may be taken as a paradigm for the application of the linguistic phenomenological method beyond the sphere of speech in which I have so far explored it, into the sphere of writing.³

'Immanentism'

I propose to begin by reconsidering the passage which I have already considered descriptively, taken from section 27 of Husserl's Ideas, entitled "The World of the Natural Standpoint: I and my World about Me". These are reflections in which Husserl engages prior to taking up the phenomenological reduction:

- I_{we} [Our first outlook upon life is that of natural human beings, imagining, judging, feeling, willing, 'from the natural standpoint'. Let us make clear to ourselves what this means in the form of simple meditations which we can best carry on in the first person].
- II_I [I am aware of a world, spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and become, without end. I am aware of it, that means first of all, I discover it immediately, intuitively, I experience it]. [Through
- III_{imp} sight, touch, hearing, etc., in the different ways of sensory perception, corporeal things somehow spatially distributed are for me simply there, in verbal or
- [IV_I] figurative sense "present" [whether or not I pay them special attention by busying myself with them, considering, thinking, feeling, willing].]..[it is not necessary that they and other objects likewise should be present precisely in my field of perception. For me real objects are there, definite, more or less familiar, agreeing with what is actually perceived without being themselves perceived or even intuitively present] ...
- V_I [I find myself at all times, and without my ever being able to change this, set in relation to a world which, through constant changes, remains one and ever the same]. ... [It is then to this world ... that the complex forms of my ...consciousness stand related ... Related to it likewise

VI._{imp} are the diverse acts and states of sentiment and disapproval, joy and sorrow ... decision and action. All these, together with the sheer acts of the Ego, [in which I become acquainted with [VII_I]the world as immediately given to me] are included under the one Cartesian expression: Cogito].⁴

I propose that in this passage, three voices are to be found, respectively those of the we and the I, together with an impersonal voice. I have indicated the stanzas by means of square brackets in the usual way but have not distinguished pictures as to do so would involve unnecessary complexity for the purposes of the present argument. In the passage, Husserl himself explicitly identifies two voices, insofar as he begins in the first person plural and then states that the meditations can best be carried on 'in the first person' singular. The third, impersonal, voice arises as a means of summing up the 'first person' singular experiences.

Following stanza I which introduces the passage in the voice of the we, the I speaks in stanza II. The I's first 'finding' is of a 'world'. However, in stanza II the I is only 'aware' of this world 'immediately' and 'intuitively'. In stanza III, the impersonal voice metaphorically reformulates matters. This is an 'optional' metaphor, as this stanza is intelligible on its own. Stanza IV is an aside by the voice of the I. This is a 'mandatory' metaphor, that is, 'them' in stanza IV refers to 'corporeal things' in stanza III. In stanza V, the I again speaks of a 'world', but this time this 'world' has new properties. It is a world which 'through constant changes remains one and ever the same'. This statement presents a problem. How can the I which is only immediately and intuitively aware of the world reach the notion of a world which remains the same through constant changes? I suggest that left to itself the I could not. But this I is not left to itself. It is engaged in a dialogue with another voice, the impersonal voice. In the preceding stanza, that voice has concluded, 'for me real objects are there agreeing with what is actually perceived'. The impersonal voice is able to formulate a notion of reality ('real objects') transcending appearance ('what is

actually perceived'). This, I suggest, is the notion which the I learns from in order to speak its notion of a world remaining the same. But in this case, the voice of the I in stanza V is dependent upon the impersonal voice in stanza III. In stanza VI, the impersonal voice itself takes over the notion of 'world'. It formulates 'this world', 'together with the sheer acts of the Ego' as, together, 'Cogito'.

In a passage which follows shortly, this conclusion is extended also to the voice of the we:

I we [Whatever holds good for me personally also holds good, as I know, for all other men whom I find present in my world-about-me ... For each, the fields of perception and memory actually present are different ... Despite this we come to understandings with our neighbours and set up in common an objective spatio-temporal fact-world as the world about us that is there for us all, and to which we ourselves nonetheless belong]5.

This Husserl names as the 'general thesis of the natural standpoint'. Thus the notion of 'world' is one to which every voice can subscribe, a notion which each voice is able to articulate as a result of its encounter with other voices. What, then, is the significance of this word 'world'? For Husserl, as I previously read him, the word referred to a reality external to the language which formulated it. But now this no longer seems to be a necessary conclusion. What is it that every voice can come to comprehend as a result of its encounter with other voices? I propose, the fact that it is a voice at all is what becomes visible to the I, the impersonal, and the we, as a result of the encounter with other voices. I propose, then, that Husserl's word 'world' is to be translated into 'word', or in other words, 'voice'.

In this case, I am attaching a new significance to Husserl's 'general thesis of the natural standpoint'. It

is, simply, the setting up in common with our neighbours of 'an objective spatio-temporal fact-voice as the voice about us that is there for us all and to which we ourselves belong'. This phenomenon is familiar: it is the voice of the we, in other words, the 'heavenly' utopia known as 'intersubjectivity'.

But now, the phenomenological reduction itself is to be defined in terms of this attainment of the voice of the we, the 'general thesis':

I_{we} [We put out of action the general thesis which belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint, we place in brackets whatever it includes respecting the nature of Being: this entire natural world therefore which is continually 'there for us', 'present to our hand' and will ever remain there, is a 'fact world' of which we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it in brackets].⁶

What is involved here? I propose an interpretation of this passage, and hence of the phenomenological reduction itself. Having ascertained, through a dialectic undertaken entirely within the 'natural' attitude, that each voice could learn from each of the other voices that it was itself a voice, Husserl now proposes that the phenomenological attitude arises precisely by forgetting this fact. This could be put more strongly: by 'repressing' or 'suppressing' this fact. The significance of this from my point of view is plain. It amounts to a forgetting by speech that it is speech among speeches, in short, it amounts to a shift from 'realism' to realism, a shift from 'ordinary' (order-ary!) to extra-ordinary! speech.

The most famous result of this reduction, is already familiar to us. Husserl argues:

I_{imp} [The stream of experience which is mine, namely, of the one who is thinking, may be to ever so great an extent uncomprehended, unknown in its past and future reaches], [yet so soon as I glance towards the flowing life and into the real present it flows through, and in so doing grasp myself as the pure subject of this life ... I say forthwith and because I must: I am, this life is, I live, cogito].⁷

This passage splendidly enacts what it speaks about: the 'incomprehension' and 'unknowing' are as it were the 'experience' of the impersonal voice, themselves 'incomprehensible' and 'unknown' to the voice of the I, which confidently speaks forth. For Husserl this passage speaks of the gap between modes of experience. For me it speaks the gap between modes of speech. The gap arises as a result of the retreat of these two voices from one another, a retreat brought about by the phenomenological reduction.

But now a strange reversal occurs. The I has reached its strident conclusion by forgetting other voices, in particular the voice of the impersonal. But that voice has not forgotten it. For the impersonal voice is now able to metaphorically reformulate what the I has achieved:

I_{imp} [The thesis of my pure Ego and its personal life, which is 'necessary' and plainly indubitable, thus stands opposed to the thesis of the world which is 'contingent'].⁸

What is my reaction to this finding? I agree with it completely. But I do so in a very different way from Husserl's. My agreement with this thesis of Husserl's means that, for me, he has shown up the impoverishing consequences of allowing a voice to suppress, censor, all of its awareness of other voices, 'like' its own in ways from which it can learn, but from which it can learn only by acknowledging that they are 'different' from itself. My agreement with his thesis means that, for me, Husserl's exploration illuminates the possibilities of our language when that language departs from the sensitive mutuality which it can exhibit in ordinary speech, but that what it finds there is in no way superior to what is to be found in ordinary speech, but manifestly inferior in quality. He is exploring, as it were, the deadness of language left to itself. But how does he himself see it? For Husserl, this possibility which he has reached is exciting because of the certainty which it exhibits. 'The thesis of my pure Ego', he tells us, 'is "necessary"', whereas 'the thesis of the world' is "contingent"'. Notice that, paradoxically, this

'thesis', which itself arises out of the decision by the voice of the I to immerse itself entirely within itself, is expressed not in the voice of the I, but in the impersonal voice. It seems that whereas the voice of the I has suspended all awareness of other voices, the impersonal voice has not. What is happening here? The impersonal voice, claiming no special status for itself, asserts the absoluteness of the I voice.

But this is a very familiar relationship, though in an unusual context. The impersonal voice poses the voice of the I as transcending it's, the impersonal voice's, ability to formulate it. In short this is defended speech: in terms of the analysis which I have performed when this phenomenon has appeared in everyday language, the impersonal voice is here formulating the appearance of a reality which is posed as formulated by the voice of the I. In this case, following the analysis which I have proposed of Mr. Cramond's speech, and speech encountered since, it may be said that the very source of Husserl's notion of the 'transcendent' reality of the 'conscious' 'flowing life' and 'real present' of the I is precisely the separation he has made between the two voices which are a familiar feature of our language.

This analysis implies that for Husserl it is the impersonal voice which is the home base, and this his excursions into the voices of the I and the we are always with the purpose of establishing there certainties which can be employed to order the impersonal voice.⁸

I have summarised the implications of the 'immanentist' argument of Husserl's Ideas in a familiar way: this implication can be expressed in terms of the algebraic notation:

II._{impersonal}[I_I] = 'immanentism'

This equation is incomplete, as the voice I have called 'impersonal' has not been accurately identified yet. It is plain that from my point of view this viewpoint can no longer be called 'immanentism' at all. It is rather a version of transcendentalism as I have defined it, namely, the conjuring up of a reference to a reality transcending linguistic formulation of that reality by contemplating one voice as transcending another voice.

Having re-examined Husserl's 'immanentist' phenomenology, I should like to turn briefly to a comparison with his 'transcendental' approach.

'Transcendentalism'

I should like to begin by discussing the passage in which Husserl defines his second reduction. In section 8 of the Cartesian Meditations, entitled "The ego cogito as transcendental subjectivity", Husserl writes,

I_I [By my living, by my experiencing, thinking, valuing, and acting, I can enter no world other than the one that gets its sense and acceptance or status in and from me, myself. If I put myself above all this life and refrain from doing any believing that takes "the" world straightforwardly as existing - if I direct my regard exclusively to this life itself, as consciousness of "the" world - I thereby acquire myself as the pure ego, with the pure stream of my cogitationes].⁹

This passage exhibits dramatically the change from Husserl's immanentist to his transcendentalist phase. For here, within the voice of the I is formulated the phrase 'the pure ego', which in the Ideas was the phrase used by the impersonal voice to metaphorically reformulate the voice of the I. The promise of this transcendental investigation seems to be, that somehow the voice of the I will itself grasp the reflections of the impersonal voice about it. This would seem to express a welcome aspiration towards 'self-consciousness', or rather its linguistic equivalent. Such an aspiration would also seem to be expressed by the new attitude to

be taken to the world, or in my term, the voice. I have proposed that in the Ideas, the I was to forget that it was a voice. It was this that enabled it to reach its conclusion, 'I am, this life is, I live, cogito'. In short, the I was to forget that it was a voice formulating 'reality', and instead immerse itself within its voice, confidently speaking reality. But here it seems, the I is precisely to remember that it is a voice, and to strive to apprehend itself as such. It is to 'direct its regard to this life' itself as consciousness of "the" world'. In my terms, it is to direct its regard to its speech itself as speech of "the" voice, and so attempt to apprehend what it is to be a voice. Is this not precisely what I myself have advocated? Does Husserl here not advocate precisely a linguistic phenomenology?

He does not. For despite the reversal in one respect, in another the core characteristic of the earlier phenomenological reduction is preserved. The I is to continue to direct its attention exclusively to itself. Its learning what it is to be a voice will be entirely self-learning, never learning from others. By contrast, I have proposed that the object of linguistic phenomenological enquiry is the orientation of one voice to another, and the techniques whereby this is achieved. But here I am not merely advocating an alternative way of proceeding to that of Husserl. I am rather arguing that he proceeds in the way which I advocate, though he does not realise that he does so. I have argued in a translation from Husserl, that 'speeches refer to speech, they are related in this way or that way to speech'. I should now like to show specifically how Husserl's I speech is bound up with other speech in 'directing its regard'.

I should like to consider in particular Husserl's speech in the "Fifth Meditation", in which he most fully explicates the problem of the constitution of the social world. There are, as I indicated in my earlier consideration of this argument, two stages to be followed. The first is the

establishment within the 'transcendental' sphere of the notion of 'ownness' and so the 'human ego'. The second is the constitution of the 'alter ego' mirrored in my own ego. The first of these is straightforward: as I have argued, it is a repetition of the phenomenological reduction, only now conceived as a theoretical possibility, rather than a descriptive actuality. Husserl says:

I_I [As Ego in the transcendental attitude, I attempt first of all to delimit, within my horizon of transcendental experience, what is peculiarly my own. First I say that it is non-alien. I begin by freeing that horizon abstractively from everything that is at all alien].¹⁰

This procedure seems to be within the scope of the voice of the I. But as in the earlier descriptive version of this reduction, the I apparently requires the assistance of the impersonal voice for certain purposes:

II_{imp} [Furthermore, the characteristic of belonging to the surrounding world, not merely for others who are also given at the particular time in actual experience, but also for everyone, the characteristic of being there for and accessible to everyone ... should not be overlooked, but rather excluded abstractly].¹¹

The notion of phenomena 'belonging to the surrounding voice' e.g. 'for others' might seem to present some difficulty, but I propose that a clear linguistic interpretation may be placed upon it.

There is a problem for the voice of the I: Though this voice purports to formulate what is uniquely mine, the voice itself, qua voice, is not at all uniquely mine, but rather shared in common with others. Up to now, the 'transcendental' reduction has done no more than establish its position within the voice of the I generally. This third reduction purports to go further, to distinguish within that voice what is uniquely mine about my voice, from all else. It seems that the notion 'for everyone' cannot be formulated by the voice of the I alone, so that this reduction, which arrives at 'the human ego' is not the pure finding of the I.

However this is not the intervention of another voice which I consider to be most crucial. Consider now the second stage of the argument. Presuming that a 'human ego' has been constituted, how is it possible for the voice of the I to comprehend an ego other than its own? Husserl makes the following statement:

- I_I [I am here somatically, the centre of a primordial 'world' oriented around me]. [Consequently, my entire primordial ownness, proper to me as a monad, has the content of the Here not the content belonging to that definite There. Each of these contents
- II_{imp} excludes the other: they cannot both coexist in my sphere of ownness at the same time. But since the other body there enters into a pairing association with my body here and, being given perceptually, becomes the core of an appresentation, the core of my experience of a coexisting ego, that ego ... must be appresented as an ego now coexisting in the mode There,
- [III_I] ['such as I should be if I were there']. My own ego however, the ego given in constant self-perception, is actual now with the content belonging to his Here. Therefore an ego is appresented as other than mine].¹²

As the text shows, the voice of the I can formulate 'I am here', but no more. The introduction of a notion of 'there' by contrast to it is the work of the impersonal voice.

This is explicit in such a passage as the following:

- I_{imp} [Since other subjectivity, by appresentation within the exclusive own-essentialness of my subjectivity, arises with the sense and status of a subjectivity that is other in its own essence, it might at first seem to be a mystery how community - even the first community, in the form of a common world - becomes established. ... These two primordial spheres, mine which is for me as ego the original sphere, and his which is for me an appresented sphere - are they not separated by [an abyss] I cannot actually cross, since crossing it would mean, after all, that I acquired an original (rather than an appresenting) experience of someone else?]].¹³

Here the dilemma is posed unresolvably in the voice of the I which almost cries out for help at this point in the text. Where can help be found? It is to be found in the speech of the impersonal voice, which in so speaking reveals its identity plainly for the first time. The fundamental experience of someone else, Husserl tells us, is via the body:

[this natural body belonging to my sphere appresents the other Ego, by virtue of the pairing association with my bodily organism, and with my Ego governing in my organism, within my primordially constituted Nature. In so doing, it appresents first of all the other Ego's governing in this body, the body over there, and mediately his governing in the Nature that appears to him perceptually - identically the Nature in which the body over there belongs, identically the Nature that is my primordial Nature. It is the same Nature, but in the mode of appearance 'as if I were standing over there, where the Other's body is'].¹⁴

II.
imp

The impersonal voice, which as I have shown is Husserl's own voice in the Ideas can now be seen to be his own voice in the Meditations, and identified as the voice of 'body' or alternatively, of 'Nature'.

But this voice is quite familiar. It is precisely one of the ~~two~~ extra-ordinary voices which were found sustained in the speech of all three teachers within the 'everyday' school setting, though only for one of these was it his 'home base', his version of reality itself. It is intriguing to find Husserl granting this voice such a crucial part in his own scheme. Does this then mean that he himself can be located on the 'immanentist', or 'existentialist' side of the structure of everyday speech which I have proposed? It does not. For according to Husserl, formulation of the apprehension of the other which I have so far presented constitutes only the "first and lowest level of communalisation between me, the primordial monad for myself, and the monad constituted in me, yet as other."¹⁵

How, then, are what Husserl calls 'higher intersubjective communities' to be constituted?

Higher communities are deduced by generalising the results of the establishment of the first community.

Husserl expresses the character of this generalising in various ways. He states, for example, as in his own word a matter of 'fact', that

I_I [If, with my understanding of someone else, I penetrate more deeply into him, into his horizon of ownness, I shall soon run into the fact that, just as his animate bodily organism lies in my field of perception, so my animate organism lies in his field of perception, and that in general, he experiences me forthwith as an Other for him, just as I experience him as my Other].¹⁶

This gives rise to my conceiving of a plurality of others, possible as well as actual, which Husserl calls an 'open' community, inhabiting an 'open' Nature. It is in this connection that he makes what I regard as his more disciplined statement as to the generalisation process. He states,

I_{we} [To this community, there naturally corresponds in transcendental concreteness, a similarly open community of monads which we designate as transcendental intersubjectivity. We need hardly say that, as existing for me, it is constructed purely within me, the mediating ego, purely by virtue of sources belonging to my intentionality; nevertheless it is constituted thus as a community constituted also in every other monad ... as the same community - only with a different subjective mode of experience - and as necessarily bearing within it the same Objective world].¹⁷

Here, a new kind of logical principle is involved, and Husserl states it in a different way. He employs the voice of the we to designate this generalising which has the character 'given that I can constitute an Other ego so can every other ego', in short, so can we all.

But this result expressed in terms of the we is not Husserl's conclusion. He rather expresses that result in these terms:

II_{nature} [Actually therefore there can exist only a single community of monads, the community of all co-existing monads. Hence there can exist only one Objective world, only one Objective time, only one Objective space, only one Objective Nature].¹⁸

This result, expressed triumphantly in Husserl's preferred

impersonal (natural) voice is achieved by mandatory metaphorical reformulation of the voice of the we, which is thereby constituted as transcendent. The 'transcendent' argument of the Cartesian Meditations can thus be expressed in the familiar notation:

$$\text{II}_{\text{Nature}} [\text{I}_{\text{we}}] = \text{'transcendentalism'}$$

The argument of the Ideas can also be more fully expressed now that the voice of the impersonal has been identified:

$$\text{II}_{\text{Nature}} [\text{I}_{\text{I}}] = \text{'immanentism'}$$

It is apparent that Husserl's two reductions respectively constitute the two principle modes of extra-ordinary speech available in our language.

'Realism'

I hope to have exhibited an 'immanent' critique of Husserl's phenomenology in a double sense of the word. First, I propose that my critique of his writing is itself wholly inspired by the ideal of a new science of philosophy which he upheld in his writing.¹⁹ Secondly, I propose that insofar as that ideal itself represented a striving for an 'immanentist' position, and for the establishment of philosophical certainty upon that basis, the linguistic phenomenology which I have proposed now claims to occupy that position, and to have displaced Husserl from it. I shall elaborate on this second claim, and then return to reconsider the first.

Husserl claims to have articulated both an immanentist and a transcendentalist philosophical position, and so to have explored all the possibilities for philosophising available to consciousness. I hope to have shown, or at least established rigorously the principles on which such a showing should be made, that Husserl in fact explored the two transcendentalist positions available to language, leaving unexplored an immanentist position also available to

language, and in fact occupied by empirically available everyday speech. I have attempted to occupy this position, and have proposed a linguistic phenomenology located therein. But to refer to this position as 'immanentist' and to both of Husserl's positions as 'transcendentalist' is to bring about a change of terminology. Husserl's conception of the immanent is of a reality wholly available to consciousness, although only imperfectly available to language. My conception of the immanent is not of a reality wholly available to language. It is rather a conception which I have called 'reality', viz., that all that can be known of reality is knowable in language, but that language itself is other than reality. It conceives not of reality, but of speech about 'reality', as that which is immanent and so addressable in speech.

It would be pointless to state such a definition were it already widely accepted. I propose, however, that it is not. I propose that the prevailing conception of speech is as speech about reality. This conception is widespread, as I hope to have shown, not simply within everyday life (where however it is not the only mode of speech available) but also within phenomenological philosophy, sociology, and psychology (where it is the only mode of speech available). More specifically to the present argument, it is the conception of speech upheld by Husserl himself. This conception, is the one which I should like to refer to as 'natural' speech, insofar as it is exemplified by the voice of 'nature' spoken by Husserl himself.

My conception of a new science of philosophy is inspired by Husserl in this sense. Husserl set out to combat the 'natural' attitude which, endemic in philosophy, science, and commonsense, he saw as inhibiting the development of man's historical pursuit of rationality to its telos. I likewise see what is for me 'natural' speech as inhibiting such a pursuit. Specifically, the claim to certainty represented by the theological visions of extraordinary speech covers over the dialectic which is already

in progress within ordinary speech in our society.

C o n c l u s i o n

INTERRUPTING INTERSUBJECTIVITY

It is now possible to come to terms with the notion of intersubjectivity. I earlier proposed that this notion, predominant within contemporary sociological explanation, entails treating speech as the immanent appearance of a transcendent reality posited by the intersubjectivist. In like fashion the psychologist working with the notion of subjectivity treats speech as the immanent appearance of a transcendent reality which he posits. Each of these exhibits what Garfinkel calls the 'documentary method' of interpretation.¹ I have shown by contrast how it is possible for a linguistic phenomenologist to attend to the distinction between appearance and reality made by speakers themselves. I propose that as opposed to documentary method interpretation of speech the mode of investigation, which I have exhibited should be referred to as interruption of speech. This mode of investigation 'interrupts' the speech which it investigates in the sense that it places itself in the 'rupture' or gap between the voices which speak.² I have tried to exhibit what this interruption involves in my use of the writing of Husserl as the source for my version of linguistic phenomenology. This provides an occasion for contrasting the two

approaches, for I propose that in their use of Husserl as the source for their versions of linguistic phenomenology other writers have approached him under the assumption of intersubjectivity.

I propose that this distinction may be suggestively formulated in another way. Previous linguistic phenomenologies treated Husserl's texts as writing, that is to say they have been pro-grammed by Husserl's writing: mine has treated his texts as speech, that is to say I have been pro-voked by him. This contrast is illuminating as to the distinction between writing and speech. This distinction is important for my argument, for I propose that the relation between 'writing' and 'speech' as presently comprehended in our society, echoes precisely the relation between the 'extraordinary' and the 'ordinary' within speech itself.³

Chambers' Dictionary has the following entries for these words:

Programme, program ... a public notice: a paper, booklet, or the like, giving a scheme of proceedings arranged for an entertainment, conference, course of study &c., with relevant details: the items of such a scheme collectively: a plan of things to be done - v.t. to provide with, enter in &c., a programme ... [Greek programm, proclamation - pro, forth, gramma, a letter].⁴

Provoke ... v.t. to call forth: to summon: (obsolete) to call out, challenge: excite or call into action, stimulate: to incite, bring about: to excite with anger: to annoy, exasperate - v.i. (Dryden) to appeal ... [Latin provocare, - atum - pro-, forth, vocare, to call].⁵

The Concise Oxford Dictionary offers a little more etymological information: Greek pro has the sense of 'before', whereas Latin pro has the sense of 'in front of', 'on behalf of'; Greek grapho is 'to write'. It seems that one can safely say that 'programme' has the sense of 'writing before', whilst 'provoke' has the sense of 'speaking before'. But note the widely differing connotations of the two words. I suggest these may be summed up by saying, that 'programme' has the sense of determining what follows, whereas 'provoke' conveys no determinate relation to what follows, it rather, in its senses of 'annoy' and 'exasperate', would seem to convey a sense of changing what had been determined. Nonethe-

less these differences bear on a common theme: both words have a sense of one phenomenon leading to and being directly responsible for the production of, something else.

The crucial difference is, I suggest, that a 'programme' may be produced by the same agent who is then subjected to its implications, whereas a 'provocation' is always the work of an other. But if this is the heart of the distinction being made, why is the distinction between speech and writing involved? I propose the following interpretation. The distinction being made here rests on an aspect of the social situation of speaking and writing. Compare the relation between sender, recipient, and message in the spoken and written cases. In the case of a written message, the sender knows the complete message to its end before the recipient knows the beginning.

By contrast, in the case of the spoken message, neither sender nor recipient knows the end of the message, when it begins. There are of course cases of spoken language in which, to a greater or lesser extent, the whole message is known by both speaker and listener so soon as the beginning of the message is heard. This applies in particular to 'ritualised' forms of speech. But such forms of speech have been, precisely, the topic of the present enquiry. I suggest that it is precisely this character of 'defended' i.e. ritualised speech, which establishes its true character as 'writing', speech wherein the speaker guarantees the outcome of the speech before the listener hears its beginning. There are likewise cases of written language in which, to some extent, the sender does not know the end before the recipient knows the beginning. An important 'half-way' example would be a letter which was part of an ongoing personal correspondence, in which themes were introduced by one writer who could not anticipate how they would be developed by the other. By comparison with a published text such as a book or scientific paper, particularly one which has gone through a long process of redrafting and correction before it is made public, the letter is clearly more spontaneous, less predictable. I propose to say, that in this sense, it is

closer to speech. I suggest, then, that the distinction between 'speech' and 'writing' may be sustained in a rigorous fashion on the basis of this distinction.⁶

This distinction throws light on the distinction between 'provoking' and 'programming'. The 'programme' is a written message preceding something. As such, it is a message which is complete in itself: it therefore has an ordering function on whatever it is that follows it, and whatever it is must be bound by that order. In the terms earlier used, it stands as an extra-ordinary social fact which subsumes ordinary speech under its definition. The 'provocation' by contrast is a spoken message preceding something. As such, it demands a response. It therefore has a disordering effect on whatever was planned to be going on: and it cannot determine what the response to it should be. In the terms earlier used, it stands as ordinary speech within which it sustains a tradition.

Previous linguistic phenomenologies have written within the definition of Husserl's writings, or more usually, one or other of the two texts I have considered, which they have posed as extra-ordinary writing, programming their own ordinary writing. Thereby the alienating gap within his work has been uncritically perpetuated in the work of Schutz, Sartre, Garfinkel and Laing, none of whom address it as a topic in its own right. I have rather sought to write within the tradition of Husserl's writings, taking his two texts together, which I have posed as ordinary writing provoking my own ordinary writing. Specifically I have addressed as my topic the gap within Husserl's work, and sought to show how it may be overcome.

Thereby I hope to have interrupted the intersubjectivity surrounding Husserl. I hope to have done so not by a reduction of his work which accredited a unity to him as a subject on one occasion by covering over or repudiating his work on another, but by standing between the divergent voices which he speaks on all occasions.

But in addressing the gap between the voices in Husserl's speech, I have neglected the gap between the voices in my own. I hope to have interrupted the writing and speech which I have been examining. Since this is the conception of the encounter with the other which has theoreticity for me, I can only hope to be interrupted myself in turn.⁷ In this case why speak? I should like to conclude with some reflections on the prospects for speech in our society.

It need hardly be stressed that any critique provoked by Husserl's writings on the I and the we must begin by relocating these 'persons' within the ongoing flux of ordinary speech from which they have been severed. This severance is produced not by Husserl himself in an ex nihilo departure from everydayness as he supposes, but by extraordinary departures from ordinariness within everydayness itself, which Husserl merely exemplifies.⁸ It becomes clear, then, that to be provoked by Husserl into a critique of his presuppositions is to be provoked by the presuppositions of contemporary commonsense, presuppositions which he has admirably laid bare in his own writing. What would such a relocation involve?

I propose that a rational speech would indeed have a place for the we and the I within it. Rational speech, by one speaker to another, would continually relate the I to the we. The we would act as a discipline upon the I publically accountable to other I's, and would be open to innovation by the I in the light of its practise informed by the we. In short, in rational speech, the I is a convenient term with which to formulate the immanent appearance of the world to me. The we is a convenient term with which to formulate the necessary conditions of any possible appearance of the world i.e. its transcendent reality. But neither of these is a fixed and reified category: it can only become so when, as in defended speech, my we and my I are separated off from ongoing discourse, i.e. ongoing speech, and are thereby constituted as defended, written, categories 'transcending' everyday life, i.e. natural and social facts sui generis.

In the absence of such defences, each and every encounter with another is an opportunity for me to revise my speech. Insofar as I encounter you who portrays the world in different terms to mine, then your speech is an occasion for me to clarify both my notion of we, for you have extended my knowledge of the possibilities of appearances in general, and my notion of I, for now, knowing of you what I did not previously know, I know of my difference from you, and my difference from we, more deeply than I did previously: I know more of the way reality appears to me. This dialectical rationality comes into play only in the context of demanding speech, never in the context of defended speech.

Such rationality is not available in the school classroom. The teacher defends his speech so as not to be open to such demands by the pupils, nor to make such demands upon them. The teacher's I is unaccountable to his we, and every I is different. This being the case, the we is a fantasy construction just as is the I. In these circumstances, the boys are not being socialised into a rational discourse, but into the alienation of two opposed theological visions of the world, one the 'heaven' of social order of explicit rational rules, which is summoned up in fantasy but never actualised, the other the 'hell' of a natural order of impersonal inevitabilities in which each private consciousness is up against nature unprotected.

It might appear that this alienation of speech was solely a feature of specific, and reformable, institutional arrangements within the organisation of contemporary education. But the evidence is that this is not so: my analysis of everyday speech has shown the prevalence of these forms, and Husserl's writing confirms them from a seemingly 'independent' source. Accordingly, it seems they are deeply bound into the ideological forms of society's self-comprehension, which constitute the I and the we as being, in true Durkheimian fashion

external realities over and above the individuals to whom they refer. Only in certain instances of speech can one glimpse ways of overcoming these reifications. The urgent task for research is to discover how these ways may be strengthened and brought to fruition. The outcome could be, the changing of society.

N o t e s

INTRODUCTION

1. The term 'theoreticity' is defined by Peter McHugh in his "A Commonsense Conception of Deviance". McHugh's work as a whole has been a greater inspiration for this study than can be acknowledged in individual citations.
2. Barry Hindess, "The 'Phenomenological' Sociology of Alfred Schutz". This work is discussed in chapters two, "The Solitary Scientist" and four, "Theorising" below.
3. TSEO, p. 88.
4. ibid., p. 88.
5. SSA, p. 733.
6. PSW, pp. 17-8.
7. DSW, pp. 20-21.
8. ibid., p. 21.

CHAPTER ONE

1. IP, p 13, emphasis added.
2. ibid., p. 14.
3. ibid., p. 14.
4. ibid., p. 14.
5. ibid., pp 14-15.
6. ibid., p. 15.

7. Paul Ricoeur, Husserl, p. 7.
8. Other important works of this period are the Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, written from a 'descriptive' viewpoint, and Formal and Transcendental Logic, a 'philosophical' text. Both contain themes of importance to sociological theory. Whilst I exclude Husserl's earlier and later writings from discussion in the present essay, cf. Ricoeur, op. cit., it is true to say that the former exemplify the 'descriptive' and the latter the 'philosophical' tendencies within his work, so that consideration of my two chosen texts can illuminate Husserl's work as a whole.
9. ID, Section 27, pp. 91-3.
10. ibid., section 28, p. 94.
11. ibid., section 29, pp. 94-5.
12. ibid., section 25, p. 85.
13. ibid., section 32, p. 100.
14. Cf. McHugh, "The Failure of Positivism".
15. ID, section 20, p. 78.
16. ibid., section 46, p. 131.
17. ibid., p. 130.
18. CM, section 8, p. 20.
19. Cf. the discussion of this meditation by Quentin Lauer, "The Other Explained Intentionally".
20. CM, section 55, p. 123.
21. ibid., p. 127.
22. ibid., section 60, p. 140.
23. ibid., section 64, pp. 156-7.
24. Thus Husserl's two works taken together span the same philosophical journey as is traversed by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Mind.
25. Just as Hobbes' discussion of the problem of social order remains suggestive even if one is sceptical as to his solution to it. This point is taken up in chapter six below.

CHAPTER TWO

1. PSW, p. 8.
2. ibid., pp. 69-70.
3. DSW, p. 29.
4. Cf. Chapter One, "Realism", above.
5. Hindess op. cit., refers to this as "a 'sociologising' of [Husserl's] realm of transcendental intersubjectivity", (op. cit., p. 1).
6. William James, Principles of Psychology, chapter 21, Cf. also Husserl's Ideas, section 28, as discussed in chapter one, "Immanentism" above.
7. OMR, p. 207, emphasis added.
8. ibid., p. 229.
9. Cf. Chapter One, "Realism" above.
10. This study is not the place in which to discuss the relationship between 'phenomenology' and 'structuralism', but I believe that this would be the point at which any such discussion should start. Suffice it to say that the Schutzian account of the range of provinces of meaning and of their inter-relationship as I have interpreted it meets at least Levi-Strauss' criteria as to "what kind of model deserves the name 'structure'". Cf. his "Social Structure" pp. 279-280.
11. OMR, p. 233.
12. ibid., p. 208.
13. ibid., p. 233.
14. Cf. "Introduction" above.
15. Schutz Reflections on the Problem of Relevance, p. 125.
16. ibid., n.23, p. 125.
17. Hindess, op. cit.
18. OMR, p. 232.
19. Hindess, op. cit., p. 1.
20. OMR, pp. 257-8.
21. Hindess, op. cit., p. 20.
22. PSW, p. 241.
23. ibid., p. 245.
24. ibid., p. 242.

25. OMR, p. 255.
26. ibid., p. 255.
27. ibid., p. 255.
28. Schutz "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego". This is discussed in "Optimism and Pessimism" below.
29. TE, pp. 48-9.
30. BN, p. xxvii, TE, p. 44.
31. Quoted in R.D. Cummings, ed., The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre, p. 62.
32. A good discussion of this point appears in R. Aronson, "The Root [sic] of Sartre's Thought".
33. TE, p. 88.
34. ibid., p. 105.
35. ibid., p. 106.
36. ibid., p. 42.
37. Mary Warnock discusses this 'anecdotal mode of argument' in her "Introduction" to Hazel Barnes' translation of BN.
38. BN, p. 254.
39. ibid., p. 254.
40. ibid., p. 254.
41. ibid., p. 255.
42. Cf. chapter one, "Realism", above.
43. Sartre himself claims that Hegel's 'Master/Servant' dialectic in his Phenomenology of Mind represents an advance over Husserl's account of the encounter with the other in his Cartesian Meditations. But I have tried to show that Sartre's arguments are deducible from Husserl's Ideas irrespective of the relation they have to those of Hegel.
44. BN, part three, Chapter One, Section III.
45. ibid., p. 235.
46. "Life versus Thought in Sartre" above.
47. Chapter One, "Immanentism", above.
48. BN, p. 235.
49. ibid., p. 244.

50. ibid., p. 251.
51. ibid., p. 259.
52. ibid., p. 261.
53. ibid., p. 260.
54. ibid., p. 260.
55. ibid., p. 260.
56. ibid., p. 261.
57. ibid., p. 414.
58. Schutz, "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego".
59. ibid., p. 203.
60. ibid., p. 198.
61. ibid., p. 199.
62. DSW, p. 25. See also Schutz's "Appended Note" at pp. 43-4 of PSW.

CHAPTER THREE

1. SIE, p. vii.
2. ibid., p. vii.
3. ibid., p. viii, emphasis added.
4. ibid., p. vii.
5. RG, p. 36.
6. ibid., p. 36.
7. ibid., p. 36, n. 1.
8. ibid., p. 37.
9. ibid., p. 37.
10. ibid., p. 38.
11. ibid., p. 37.
12. ibid., p. 50.
13. Discussed above in Chapter Two, "Multiple Realities".
14. Discussed above in Chapter One, "The Idea of Phenomenology".
15. RG, p. 50 This notion is developed at greater length by Garfinkel in his paper, "A Conception of and Experiments with 'Trust' as a Condition of Stable Concerted Action".
16. ibid., p. 15, n. 5.
17. ibid., pp. 41-2.
18. ibid., p. 42.
19. ibid., pp. 42-3, utterance identification numbers added.
20. Harvey Sacks, "On the analysability of stories by children", p. 343.
21. ibid., p. 343.
22. ibid., p. 343.

23. Emmanuel A. Schegloff, "Notes on a conversational practise: formulating place", pp. 78-9.
24. ibid., pp. 76-7.
25. Howard S. Becker, Outsiders, Chapter One. Becker's incomplete development of the implications of this slogan is well argued by Melvyn Pollner "Constitutive and Mundane Versions of Labelling Theory". Further implications are drawn by McHugh in "A Commonsense Conception of Deviance". In relation to anomie in social interaction, McHugh's Definition of the Situation presents a re-analysis of another of Garfinkel's experiments, which has inspired my own. Within the terms of social order theory he formulates a hypothetical notion of anomie, then shows experimentally that such anomie does not appear, rather a shift is to be seen between two kinds of order. These correspond to the two which I distinguish in the present conversation.
26. BN, p. 568.
27. TE, p. 96.
28. ibid., p. 87.
29. BN, p. 571.
30. DS, p. 39.
31. ibid., p. 42.
32. ibid., p. 43.
33. SO, p. 27.
34. ibid., p. 153.
35. ibid., p. 154.
36. ibid., p. 128.
37. ibid., p. 123.
38. DS, pp. 32-3..
39. ibid., p. 38.
40. Laing himself acknowledges a debt to others beside Sartre, in particular to the existentialism of Martin Heidegger. But I should like to sharply distinguish the two existentialisms, and locate Laing squarely in the Sartrian mode. I believe that the focus on the plight of the individual alone, central to Sartre and Laing, is foreign to the historical and even sociological dimension central to all of Heidegger's accounts of the human predicament.
41. Jeff Coulter, Approaches to Insanity, p. 81.
42. PE, pp. 120-137.
43. Coulter, op. cit., p. 87.
44. ibid., p. 88.
45. PE, pp. 122-3.
46. ibid., p. 123.

47. Coulter, op. cit., pp. 112-3.
48. ibid., p. 120.
49. ibid., pp. 120-1.
50. ibid., p. 121.
51. ibid., p. 121.
52. ibid., p. 152.
53. ibid., p. 159.

CHAPTER FOUR

1. IP, p. 24.
2. Cf. McHugh, "The Failure of Positivism".
3. This is to say, that positivism conceives itself as mathematical, in the sense in which Martin Heidegger has explicated this term. Heidegger himself provides a re-reading of the history of modern science, which attempts to understand it in other than its own terms in his What is a Thing? The notion of the 'mathematical' as a critical term is employed by Alan Blum in his Theorising, and by Stanley Rosen in his Nihilism. My indebtedness to these three writers will be apparent to those who know their work.
4. The fruitfulness of irony in theorising is well presented by Barry Sandywell, "Marx, Alienation, Speech".
5. All names of people and places connected with the school setting are fictitious, with the exception of 'Scotland'.
6. One way of conceptualising my 'bias' is the following. Suppose that the range of speech available in the classroom can be discriminated, more or less roughly, as between 'public' and 'private' modes. Then as one participant speaker and listener in the setting, I have access to a certain selection from within this range. My access to the more 'public' modes of speech will equal that of any other participant. My access to more 'private' modes of speech may generally be less than that of any other participant. But in specific instances, it is likely that I shall have access to some 'intimate' speech unavailable to some others within the setting, just as each other person has access to some 'intimate' speech unavailable to me. My predicament is then qualitatively no different from that of any other speaker in the setting: I know of only part of what occurs. It is quantitatively different however, in that on the whole I know less of 'intimate' speech in general than 'anyone' else. In fact the present study focusses most of its attention on the 'public' talk of teachers.

7. I had previously carried out a pilot study at another city school which I shall call Peter's Hill. Here I had experimented with a variety of techniques of 'data collection' for the pursuit of a study which I regarded as an 'anthropological' approach to life in classrooms. These approaches involved the use of projective tests, sentence completion tests, tape-recorded interviews, an 'objective' coding scheme for examining non-verbal social 'interaction', and a computer-based analysis of classroom seating patterns. I employed the sentence-competition test, interviews, and analysis of seating patterns at Port Ness also, though they are not reported here. However, I made certain methodological decisions which did carry over. The first was that my participant observation, if it was to achieve its aim of an inconspicuous presence, could only be conducted within one class in one school at a time, and preferably would be sustained continuously throughout the day over a period of weeks or months, otherwise my presence or absence in a particular lesson on a particular day was itself a major issue for the teacher and pupils before and during that lesson. The second was that the collection of verbatim records of conversations was the richest and most rigorous 'data' which I could obtain, though to begin with I collected other kinds of information in addition. Only after some weeks in Port Ness, did I come to conceive this linguistic material to constitute a self-sufficient source of information for the purposes of my enquiry.
8. At Port Ness school, classrooms were allocated to teachers, so that pupils had to walk from one to another between lessons.
9. Hatching thus: '///// ' denotes my later expansion of abbreviations in the notes.
10. This particular teacher made a routine practise of giving the boys a 'break' of five minutes or so to talk at the end of every lesson. As will be seen he was able to use the threat of withdrawal of this privilege when trouble threatened.
11. I am discussing the situation at a commonsense level. I might add that though this opinion was perhaps a little over-stated, the general feeling among the staff was that J2 were a good-natured class who got on well together and with teachers.
12. In the subsequent analysis such descriptions as these of how speech was spoken are no longer considered relevant. The issue of how the 'physical' transmission of speech bears on the message of that speech is thus outside the scope of my enquiry. My view would be, that tone of voice, bodily gestures, and so forth, can in no way add meaning to the possibilities already contained within the words spoken themselves. That is to say, that language itself, more precisely the sensible/referential unities called voices which I shall display in the

sections on "Analysing" and "Synthesising" below, makes possible a range of 'meanings', and the transmission of speech can only enhance of discriminate between those 'meanings'. This being said, however, my investigation itself reveals great variation within language as between more and less explicit forms of speech, and it may be that phenomena presently regarded as 'non-verbal' accompaniments of language ought to be regarded as proto-linguistic themselves in a fuller analysis.

13. The systematic analysis of terms of address is unfortunately not attempted in the present study. Any such analysis would have to begin with a re-reading of Sacks' work on 'membership categorisation devices', cf. his "On the Analysability of Stories by Children". In the present case, it will be seen that Mr. Cramond's practise with regard to names, which he scrupulously observed, served to establish each boy as identically a member of the classroom community, and was thus completely consistent with his 'ideological' postulation of such a community in his talk to the boys.
14. I had hoped to begin my period of participant observation on the first day of the new term, but in fact began exactly one week after term had started.
15. The Scottish New Year, traditionally greater cause for celebration than Christmas.
16. Since this is the first out of many examples of utterances which I shall be presenting, a few words of comment may be necessary. It is I who has constituted this particular series of words, or to be pedantic, this stream of sounds, into an 'utterance' with a definite beginning, and end. In that sense this whole study simply exhibits my way of constituting speech. My study is not unique in this: so does every other written text 'about' speech, which includes inter alia the whole of empirical sociology. I shall go on to address in some detail what I make of these 'utterances' once collected. This includes treating as problematic whatever analytical unity they may possess. But I originally constituted them as a concrete unity, and there is no record of that procedure on my part. I can simply say that within a commonsense frame of mind I recorded 'utterances' where I heard one speaker as speaking but obtaining no response to his speech, and I recorded 'conversations' where I heard two or more speakers speaking in a mutually responsive way. It is certainly arguable that others would have 'heard' differently on occasions.
17. Each of "Teachers Talk and Classroom Discipline", and "Some Ways of not Listening to What People Say" explores some ways of interpreting spoken utterances suggested by recent sociological and philosophical writing. In "Teachers' Talk", the main butt for my criticism is Erving Goffman's 'dramaturgical perspective' presented in his Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. In "Some

Ways", my argument proceeds in terms of and against J.L. Austin's 'saying' and 'doing' distinction in his How to do Things with Words.

18. This possibility is of course axiomatic in 'phenomenological and 'existentialist' thought.
19. This conception of the personal pronouns was that articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce. A clear and critical presentation of his theory of signs is Arthur W. Burks, "Icon, Index, and Symbol". He quotes Peirce as arguing that:

I, thou, that, this ...indicate things in the directest possible way. ... A pronoun is an index. ... A pronoun ought to be defined as a word which may indicate anything to which the first and second person have suitable real connections, by calling the attention of the second person to it (quoted from the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, (2.287n), by Burks, op. cit., pp. 677-8).

This is precisely the view to which my own is most opposed.

20. This paragraph is written as a paraphrase of Schutz's remarks about the puppet world conjured up by the social scientist, in OMR, p. 255, as discussed in Chapter Two "Multiple Realities", above.
21. For the time being, I shall take 'speech' and 'writing' to be interchangeable. In the "Conclusion" below I suggest the basis for a principled distinction between them.
22. This statement is intendedly reminiscent of 'structuralism'. It is impossible here to embark upon a discussion of that movement: its diverse tendencies are as ramified as those within 'phenomenology'. A writer 'representative' of no one but himself, but who exhibits an identifiably 'structuralist' approach to language is Jacques Lacan. In his paper "The Insistence of the Letter in the Unconscious", he writes:

The speaking subject, if he seems thus to be the slave of language, is all the more so of a discourse in the universal moment of which he finds himself at birth, if only by dint of his proper name, (p.104).

Whilst I should conceive the task of a rational investigation of language to be precisely the liberation of speakers from such slavery, I find Lacan's account suggestive as an account of speech in a less than rational society.

23. The most powerful attack on this belief in general terms and in the specific contexts of literary and political writing has been mounted by the French 'Tel Quel' school of literary critics. I have discussed the relevance of their ideas for sociology in "Sociology as Writing". Their work is another source of inspiration for me which it is inadequate to acknowledge only in individual citations.
24. This distinction is due to Frege, cf. his "On Sense and Reference". I propose however that in the manner in which I have employed them both the notions of 'sense' and of 'reference' define the objects of a specifically Husserlian linguistic enquiry.
25. As defined by Emile Durkheim in his Rules of Sociological Method.
26. At this point I must acknowledge another source of inspiration for the proposal which I am putting forward. This is the point of view developed in the 1930s by the Russian writers on language, Mixail Baxtin and his colleague Valentin Volosinov. Baxtin expresses the importance of speech about speech in these terms:

The problem of the orientation of speech toward another utterance ... has a sociological significance of the highest order. The speech act by its nature is social. The word is not a tangible object, but an always shifting, always changing means of social communication. It never rests with one consciousness, one voice. Its dynamism consists in movement from speaker to speaker, from one context to another, from one social community to another, from one generation to another. Through it all the word does not forget its path of transfer and cannot completely free itself from the power of those concrete contexts into which it had entered. By no means does each member of the community apprehend the word as a neutral element of the language system. Instead, he receives the word from another voice, a word full of that other voice. The word enters his context from another context, and is permeated with the intentions of other speakers. His own orientation finds the word already occupied.

Thus the orientation of the word among words, the various perceptions of other speech acts, and the various means of reacting to them are perhaps the most crucial problems in the sociology of language usage, any kind of language usage, including the artistic, (Baxtin, "Discourse Typology in Prose", pp. 194-5).

This point of view leads Volosinov to place particular stress on the phenomenon of reported speech.

Reported speech is speech within speech, utterance within utterance within utterance and at the same time also speech about speech, utterance about utterance, (Volosinov, Marxism and The Philosophy of Language, p. 115).

This property, he argues, throws light on a crucial question for the sociology of language:

How, in fact, is another speaker's speech received? What is the mode of existence of another's utterance in the actual, inner-speech consciousness of the recipient? How is it manipulated there, and what process of orientation will the subsequent speech of the recipient himself have undergone in regard to it? (op.cit., p. 117).

The answers to all of these questions can be given, at least in part, by an examination of reported speech:

What we have in the forms of reported speech is precisely an objective documentation of this reception, (op.cit., p. 117).

But in view of my discussion of the 'documentary' interpretation of speech employed by Garfinkel, and by Laing, I cannot accept Volosinov's precise wording here. Of what, in his view, are the forms of reported speech the 'document'?

Once we have learned to decipher it, this document provides us with information, not about accidental and mercurial subjective psychological processes in the 'soul' of the recipient, but about steadfast social tendencies in an active reception of other speakers' speech, tendencies that have crystallised into language forms. The mechanism of this process is located, not in the individual soul, but in society. It is the function of society to select and to make grammatical (adapt to the grammatical structure of its language) just those factors in the active and evaluative reception of utterances that are socially vital and constant, and hence, that are surrounded in the economic existence of the particular community of speakers (op.cit., p. 117).

Despite the realistic context within which he locates his concerns, Volosinov's proposals for research into language are highly suggestive. The 'techniques' which I go on to investigate are in each case instances of the reception of one speech by another, and my search for such 'techniques' may be regarded as having its source in Volosinov's notion as much as in ethnomethodology.

27. The notion of 'destruction' is used in this sense by Heidegger, cf. especially Section 6 of Being and Time.
28. This analysis and synthesis as a whole is a way of investigating what Garfinkel calls the "retrospective/prospective sense" of speech, cf. RG, p. 41.

29. Recourse to 'theology' for the source of the explanation of transcendence as a phenomenon in everyday life is suggested by Marx in his well-known discussion of the 'fetishism' of commodities, where he states:

the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour ... it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy, we must have recourse to the mist-veiled regions of the religious world. In that world the productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering into a relation both with one another and the human race. (Capital, vol. I, p. 72).

The idea of viewing everyday life as 'theological' is also in accordance with Heidegger's account of the Western tradition of philosophy as 'onto-theological'. Cf. his Identity and Difference.

30. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 99.
31. ibid., p. 108
32. ibid., p. 105
33. Cf. Durkheim's discussion of the relationship between religion, society, and social science in the conclusion to his Elementary Forms of the Religious Life:

We have said that there is something eternal in religion: it is the cult and the faith. Men cannot celebrate ceremonies for which they see no reason, nor can they accept a faith which they in no way understand. To spread itself or merely maintain itself, it must be justified, that is to say, a theory must be made of it. A theory of this sort must undoubtedly be founded upon the different sciences, from the moment when these exist; first of all, upon the social sciences, for religious faith has its origin in society ... (pp. 430-431).

For Durkheim, sociology is the modern bearer of 'eternal' theological speech. It must be acknowledged that he is more explicit about this commitment and its implications than his more recent followers. Durkheim's work as a whole, and especially Elementary Forms, is a mine of observations of transcendence as a phenomenon in everyday life.

34. W.I. Thomas, The Child in America, p. 572, quoted in Schutz, CP I, p. 348.
35. David Matza, in Becoming Deviant, has proposed a version of phenomenological sociology under the title of an 'appreciationist' stance. From my point of view, however, the term is wider in application: it clearly applies to both Garfinkel and Laing, though the objects of their 'appreciation' differ.
36. IP, p. 43, Cf. Sartre's adoption of this argument discussed in chapter two, "Life versus Thought in Sartre", above.
37. Cf. no. 26 above.
38. I have discussed Coulter and Laing as paradigms for 'sociological' and 'psychological' explanation as a whole.
39. My conception of the 'permanent danger' stands in opposition to Rosen's, op. cit., for whom the danger is of 'nihilism'. This danger is exhibited by those who do not aspire to extra-ordinary speech. My view is, then, the inverse of his. In other words, his 'nihilism' is my 'anomie'.
40. Alan Blum has employed 'literalism' as a critical term in his "Reading Marx".

CHAPTER FIVE

1. McHugh et al formulate the problem here addressed in this way:

Ego, for us, is the speaker who, by speaking, necessarily forgets his reason for speech. Alter reminds ego why he speaks by formulating ego's auspices. We conceive ego then to make reference to his auspices in order that alter may formulate them. In this way, alter makes it rational for ego to speak.

(On the Beginning of Social Enquiry, p.4).

This statement appears in the preface to a text which was produced by collaboration between four persons acting as mutual egos and alters. Unfortunately they do not present the dialogue involved in that production. It should also be pointed out that they apparently conceive of 'ego' and 'alter' as persons, a concrete conception compared to my notion of 'voices' as the phenomena which respond to one another in speech.

2. TSEO, p. 89.
3. Basil Bernstein develops this distinction in his Class, Codes and Control.
4. The exclusive and exhaustive opposition between on the one hand speech which aspires to be completely rational, and on the other hand silence, is the theme of Stanley Rosen's essay, op. cit.
5. This proposal is in line with the critique of Bernstein's account of the relation between language and social class made by William Labov in 'The Logic of Non-Standard English'. Whereas Bernstein characterises working-class speech as 'restricted' as against middle-class speech as 'elaborated', Labov provides experimental evidence to show that black lower class children are able to articulate both modes of speech but that their use of each is context-specific.
6. Quoted and discussed in Chapter Two, "Life versus Thought in Sartre", above.
7. J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract.
8. T. Hobbes, Leviathan.
9. This proposal is in line with, and inspired by, Heidegger's account of what he calls the 'historicity' of our language, cf. Being and Time, section 6.
10. The notion of 'ek-sistence' is developed by J.J. Kockelmans in "Language, Meaning, and Ek-sistence", an interpretation of the later Heidegger's writings on language.
11. Cf. Austin's classic discussion of excuses, "A Plea for Excuses".
12. It is in this context that I would read Alan Dawe's argument in "The Two Sociologies", which poses

two sociologies, a sociology of social system and a sociology of social action, ... grounded in the diametrically opposed concerns with two central problems, those of order and control. ... The first asserts the paramount necessity ... of external constraint ... The key notion of the second is that of autonomous man, able to realise his full potential. (p. 214).

Dawe interestingly argues that:

The two problems do not only create sociological languages. Similar oppositions can be seen in many areas, in psychology, psychoanalysis, literature, and, obviously, political thought. (n. 32, p. 218).

His argument is thus compatible with and supportive of mine that the reality of this opposition is linguistic. In his paper however Dawe does not draw the conclusion that the task of a radical linguistic practice should be to overcome it.

13. I cannot address here the relationship between my version of linguistic phenomenology and what has become known as 'ordinary language philosophy'. Criticism has been directed against such philosophy, e.g. by Rosen op. cit., as advocating an uncritical acceptance of the existing state of everydayness. Such criticism would be inapplicable to my own approach. For in criticising extraordinary language I criticise it when it makes its appearance within everydayness, as it does continually within our society.
14. These two aspects are pursued separately in ethnomethodology and in existentialism respectively. I regard them as mutually indispensable. The question of change arises here. I should propose that insofar as the speech of an individual transcends the structure within which, up to that point, he speaks, he has changed that structure. Such innovation would exemplify what I understand by Heidegger's notion of aletheia, dis-discovery. Cf. his Introduction to Metaphysics.
15. Cf. Rosen's discussion of the conditions for rational discourse.
16. TSEO.
17. In DS, Laing refers to this contradiction as a 'double-bind', a concept which he derives from G. Bateson, "Toward a Theory of Schizophrenia". I discuss it more fully in Chapter Seven, 'The Orderliness of Disorder', below.
18. That is, the perspective developed by Goffman, op. cit. Cf. my fuller discussion of this in 'Teachers Talk'.
19. This notion stems from W.I. Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl.
20. Goffman, op. cit.

21. Heidegger elaborates this conception in his Identity and Difference. The impetus to treat etymologies seriously as a way of enquiring into our language stems from Heidegger's concern to investigate tradition.
22. Concise Oxford Dictionary, p. 319.
23. ibid., p. 1375.
24. The sameness between these seeming opposites is well drawn out by Rosen, op. cit.
25. Cf. Marx's remark
 The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like
 nightmare on the brain of the living.
 (Opening remarks to "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte").
26. Cf. n. 13 above, such an aspiration could be attributed to Wittgenstein and form the basis for a reading of him as a social critic. Cf. both his major works, Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations.

CHAPTER SIX

1. This poverty is a constant theme of the structuralist anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. Unfortunately he conceives it to be an essential feature of man's condition. I rather regard it as a historical feature of present society and hence as an indictment of that society. Cf. The Savage Mind, especially the concluding chapters, where Levi-Strauss articulates his radically anti-historical viewpoint.
2. It is intriguing to conceive of this reality as an 'ally' in terms discussed by Carlos Casteneda, The Teachings of Don Juan. Cf. David Silverman, Reading Casteneda.
3. Cf. Dawe, op. cit.
4. Cf. Rosen, op. cit.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary.
2. The notion of authenticity here is intended to be in accordance with Heidegger's usage throughout Being and Time.
3. Though it cannot be attempted here, an examination of the expletive in the light of Derrida's discussion of 'presence' would be intriguing. It would appear that in some way the twin notions of the enduring and the immediate represent the polar opposites of extra-ordinary and dis-orderly speech. Cf. his Speech and Phenomena.
4. This accusation has often been levelled against Heidegger. I prefer to level it against Durkheim, whose sociology celebrates the transcendent dis-order of anomie, which defines its own stance. Cf. Suicide.
5. Garfinkel has accused all previous sociology of portraying man as a 'judgemental dope', denying him the ability to interpret his situation. I have tried to show the limitations of his alternative vision, of man as sociologist, which makes of him a philosophical dope. The conception of man as theorist has been discussed as a feature of everyday life by McHugh in his "Commonsense conception of deviance", op. cit.
6. Cf. Melvin Pollner, who discusses this production in the case of 'deviance' in his paper, op. cit.
7. Cf. Chapter Five, "Somebody Talking", above.
8. This would be the starting point for a critique of Rosen's extra-ordinary attribution of nihilism to ordinary speech. Cf. Rosen, op. cit.
9. This dialectic is explored by McHugh et al in "Snubs".
10. TSEO, pp 88-9.
11. Compare the response made by another teacher when this issue was raised in his class at around the same time:

Russell: Sir, are you going on strike, 'cos Mr. Howie says the teachers are having a union meeting.

Sinclair: February 28th.

Mr. Harris: I don't belong to a union. I belong to a professional association.

Like Mr. Howie, this teacher treated the question addressed to 'you' as an occasion to switch to extraordinary speech. Unlike Mr. Howie's attempt at such speech, however, Mr. Harris' remark questioned the question addressed to him. (Cf. the Experimenter's questions in Garfinkel's conversation discussed in chapter two, "Anomie", above). Thus having established his extraordinary position, he placed the onus on the boys to reopen their questioning if they chose to do so.

12. Garfinkel, SIE, chapter one, and also H. Garfinkel & H. Sacks, "On Formal Structures of Practical Action".
13. This distinction between the one reality and the many appearances is the theme of Blum's Theorising.
14. Cf. Mentone's remark to Mr. Howie discussed in Chapter Six, "Philosophical Speech" above, and also his contribution to the conversation reported in "Why don't you get a bit of order in the class?" below.
15. The nature of this 'servitude' is explored by Hegel in his account of the Master/Slave relationship in the Phenomenology of Mind.
16. Garfinkel, SIE, p. 1.
17. SSA, p. 93.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. Don Zimmerman & Melvyn Pollner, "The Everyday World as a Phenomenon".
2. Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena is an effort to do so by way of an examination of Husserl's explicit account of language in his Logical Investigations, which I must acknowledge as the inspiration behind my own attempt to sketch a re-examination of the Ideas and the Cartesian Meditations.
3. Naturally this attempt must be somewhat rough and ready in view of the fact that it is working with an English translation from the German.
4. ID, Section 27, p. 91.

5. ibid., Section 29, pp 94-5.
6. ibid., Section 32, pp 99-100.
7. ibid., Section 46, p. 130.
8. ibid., p. 131.
9. CM, Section 8, p. 21.
10. ibid., Section 44, p. 95.
11. ibid., pp 95-6.
12. ibid., Section 54, p. 119.
13. ibid., Section 55, pp 120-121.
14. ibid., p. 123.
15. ibid., Section 56, p. 128.
16. ibid., pp 129-130.
17. ibid., p. 130.
18. ibid., p. 140.
19. This is not, of course, to claim that the present statement is the first to articulate such a critique. On the contrary, Heidegger's discussion of 'phenomenology' in section 7 of Being and Time, and Derrida's markedly Heideggerian critique of Husserl's account of language, are the inspiration for my own argument which should be seen as a response to and a restatement of their arguments. I hope, however, that it is a suggestive restatement, which may make the critique accessible in a researchable form.

CONCLUSION

1. SIE, chapter three.
2. This is intentionally evocative of Lacan, op. cit.

3. This concern is suggested by the Tel Quel writers, including Derrida, who place writing as superior to speech. I am here advocating the reverse. Cf. my "Sociology as Writing".
4. Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary.
5. ibid.
6. This distinction matches that in Schutz between the directness of the pure we-relationship on the one hand, and indirect typifying social relationships on the other hand. My distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary speech then corresponds precisely to that between lived experience and reflective thought in Sartre and Schutz. My commitment is then to the equivalent in this scheme of lived experience over reflective thought, that is, to speech over writing, in the belief that here the true impetus of the phenomenological movement can be recaptured.
7. This conception resonates with the dialectical account of the ego/alter relationship given by McHugh et al, discussed at n. 1, Chapter Five above, but also with the accounts of the interpersonal encounter given by Schutz and by Sartre, where in each case there is a sense in which the other apprehends me more truly than I apprehend myself.
8. This however suggests that there is no need to restrict the argument to phenomenology: it could be worked out through any one of the discourses available in our society at the present time. An imposing task would be to work through such a critique of the philosophy of language itself.

B i b l i o g r a p h y

The following abbreviations have been used:

- BN Sartre: Being and Nothingness
- CM Husserl: Cartesian Meditations
- CP Schutz: Collected Papers
- DS Laing: Divided Self
- DSW Schutz: Dimensions of the Social World
- ID Husserl: Ideas
- IP Husserl: Idea of Phenomenology
- OMR Schutz: On Multiple Realities
- PE Laing: Politics of Experience
- PSW Schutz: Phenomenology of the Social World
- RG Garfinkel: Studies in the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities
- SIE Garfinkel: Studies in Ethnomethodology
- SO Laing: Self and Others
- SSA Parsons: Structure of Social Action
- TE Sartre: Transcendence of the Ego
- TSEO Weber: Theory of Social and Economic Organisation

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